The place and significance of Soren Kierkegaard’s attack, upon Christendom in the development of his authorship

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J. C. SAXBEE

The Place and Significance of Søren Kierkegaard's "Attack upon Christendom" in the development of his authorship

Ph. D. Thesis 1974

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
An examination of the debate surrounding Søren Kierkegaard's "Attack upon Christendom" reveals a tendency on the part of scholars to explain away these final polemics in terms of their author's physical and mental debilitation. In opposition to such views it is here argued that the "Attack" has a place in Kierkegaard's authorship as an integral and consistent part of his overall strategy in the cause of Christian inwardness. The principle of Subjectivity, adjudged to be decisive for Kierkegaard's understanding of Christianity, implies the relativisation of objective norms of Christian expression such as the Church. It is endeavoured to show that Kierkegaard's contemporaries, and especially the Danish Church Primate, Bishop Mynster, failed to recognise such implications of his authorship for their own status as members of an established Church. Being thus misunderstood, Kierkegaard was forced into a direct assault upon the objective norms of Christendom, leaving behind the kind of indirect communication characterising his earlier strategy. So the "Attack" is seen as consistent with the earlier authorship which is its presupposition.

Whilst sensing the inevitability of the "Attack", Kierkegaard delayed its inception in the interests of his plea for honesty on the part of his readers, and in order that his own authority should be clarified. These two concepts are described and their significance evaluated.

Because of their influence upon the timing and development of the "Attack", the personalities of J. P. Mynster and H. L. Martsensen are expounded biographically whilst Kierkegaard's perspective on the Church is analysed in the interest of further contextualisation.

Finally, the progress of the "Attack" is traced with especial reference to the contemporary debate surrounding and, to an extent, moulding the form and content of Kierkegaard's output in his last years.
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Whatever conclusions we may reach about the ultimate significance of Kierkegaard's "Attack upon Christendom", there can be no overestimating the extent and passion of the immediate reaction. A very large number of newspaper articles and letters appeared in Denmark during the months following Kierkegaard's first polemical outburst in Faedrelandet, many of which are listed in the bibliography. This "free for all" has its closest modern counterpart in the debate following the publication of Robinson's Honest to God - but, in character with general Danish practice of the time, even fewer concessions were made to politeness or objectivity! However, although study of these reactions in the Danish literary and ecclesiastical world can tell us a great deal about the effect Kierkegaard's attack had upon his contemporaries, in the last analysis we learn very little about what Kierkegaard really meant. Kierkegaard intended to evoke a response and these newspaper items help us to describe the response which actually arose, but little is gained to help the scholar in search of Kierkegaard's actual position.

There are two main reasons for this. First of all, the debate tended to revolve around questions of personalities. We shall argue that it was Kierkegaard's will that this should be so, but still it hampers any quest for clarity on basic issues. Secondly, by and large those who contributed to this debate had little familiarity with, and even less understanding of, Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole. H. L. Martensen, perhaps the most gifted and highly respected academic theologian of the time in Denmark, had made only scanty references to "this prolix literature", whilst N.F.S. Grundtvig greeted Kierkegaard's polemical articles with expressions of surprise that such an uproar should come from that unexpected quarter. As H. Toftdahl comments, "Grundtvig did not know much about the nerve of Kierkegaard's authorship". Several of the judgements made in the course of the debate illustrate the limitations of the contributor's acquaintance with Kierkegaard's major themes. Furthermore, Kierkegaard's contemporaries could have no
knowledge of his Journals and Papers. It is difficult for modern Kierkegaard scholars to imagine being without this very fundamental pool of interpretative resources, but early commentators were thus deprived and so some of their errors of judgement can be excused.

Now, our first inclination is to step in on Kierkegaard's behalf in order to provide the necessary context for the attack and so neutralise the initial erroneous interpretations. This process of contextualisation would seem to have two areas of interest, vis. the authorship and the historical situation. It can be argued that, as Kierkegaard's attack came at the end of his career as a writer, then the whole of the authorship must act as a prelude to it. We may conclude that *sjæblikket* is a basic deviation from, or a natural consequence of the preceding authorship, but either way there is no possibility of viewing these later articles in isolation. Those who were first on the scene tended to be guilty of this myopic approach and their error must be exposed and the imbalance redressed. Also the historical context is especially necessary for modern readers of Kierkegaard's attack. Those who wrote in immediate response to Kierkegaard's polemics were too much concerned, perhaps, with the historical connotations. They were principally involved with the implications of the "Attack" "in Protestantism and especially in Denmark", thus failing to notice the broader issues at stake. Even though it was also Kierkegaard's will that this should be so, later commentators have felt the need to clarify both the historical implications and limitations of Kierkegaard's outburst. In attacking Bishop Mynster, Kierkegaard is attacking what Mynster stands for and therefore he is attacking principles and presuppositions which exert an influence way beyond the limited context of 19th century Denmark. Yet the historical significance of the fact that it was Mynster and not another who came under fire needs to be clearly defined. This is the justification offered in support of an historical introduction to the "Attack".

All this seems natural enough. It is an accepted view that literary and historical research must contribute to our greater understanding of writers who lived in a different social and cultural milieu from ourselves.
An introduction to Kierkegaard's work, setting it in the context which produced it, would seem to be a welcome and necessary supplement to our reading of that work. But whether this is in fact true of other writers, in Kierkegaard's case the presupposition has certainly not gone unchallenged. Hermann Diem has maintained the impossibility of arriving at any understanding whatever of Kierkegaard's life work by means of comparative and genetic methods. 3 Diem emphasises that Kierkegaard had no system but only a dialectical method. Henriksen states Diem's case thus:

"Its (the dialectical method's) application requires two persons, teacher and pupil, in Socratic conversation with each other, the one who has knowledge asking the questions, the one who seeks knowledge giving the answers. When both have their attention directed towards the same subject during the conversation, it is the questioner's mission to release his counterpart from his immediate relation to the subject by resolving it into nothing by abstraction. If they succeed in bringing this course to a close, a new inner process, self-activity, will thereby be released in the questioned person. He must now, personally, without the assistance of teacher or knowledge, solve the problem of his existence. It was in order to arrive at this result that the person questioned, the reader, should be released from all external authorities and learn to think for himself, that Kierkegaard, adopting a pseudonym, attempted to disappear behind his works in Socratic concealment. The work done to demonstrate the personal element in his production is therefore in conflict with Kierkegaard's express wishes and an obstacle to the right understanding of his work. Comparative studies of his teaching and that of the Church, of his and Hegel's doctrines are likewise at best useless, because Kierkegaard has no doctrine, merely a method. We gain no understanding of or profit from Kierkegaard's books by talking of him but by entering into conversation with him.

More recently Paul Holmer has taken up a similar stance. 5 He stresses that, in order to understand Kierkegaard one must recognise that he was dealing with "possibles". Holmer then draws a distinction:

"Cognitive possibles get their reference in virtue of an act of the thinker, which act does not change the cognitive agent but affects only the transition from unintelligible to intelligible. Ethical possibles get their reference in virtue of an interest and passion of the person. As possibles they too are neutral and without reference. They acquire 'reference' only when they are chosen and willed as the model of one's future."

Now Holmer goes on to argue that a major error of philosophy is to treat such ethical and religious possibles as if they were true of objects; as if they were descriptive of actuality, hence, able to be synthesised into cognitive unities and presuppositions. Kierkegaard's books put these ethical
possibles into linguistic form without making them tools of cognition. So it is clear that for Holmer the best approach to an understanding of Kierkegaard is not by way of biographical research:

"for his own historical immediacy was his accidental point of departure for his encounter with the qualitative dialectic of ethico-religious possibilities, and he believed that every man's contemporaneity permitted, but did not require or predispose, the same immediacy".

One will not acquire an understanding of Kierkegaard by accumulating vast quantities of factual material about his historical context, his biography, his psychology or his biological idiosyncrasies. Rather "to grasp these possibles as requirements is Kierkegaard's wish for his readers. This does not ask for philosophical (or historical) talent as much as it does an ability to read and respond with fitting passion". So Holmer concludes that when writing about Kierkegaard one is obliged to do one of two things:

"a) write historical literature about his deeds, his books, the events occasioning either etc. or
b) write a critical literature in which one engages the argument, religious and philosophic. In the first instance there is no promise of a systematic consequence unless a metaphysic of learning obtains (and then Kierkegaard is wrong); in the second instance one writes not about the man and his books as much as one translates his language and thoughts into one's own".

It is this latter which alone, according to Holmer, has importance for Kierkegaard. Henriksen points out that Diem's methodology has not caught on to any significant extent in Scandinavia and certainly Scandinavian scholars have been very critical of his approach. Valter Lindström and Torsten Bohlin, whose views differ widely at most points, are united in attacking Diem. Lindström asserts that Kierkegaard's existential dialectic, which Diem is right to emphasise, cannot be detached from the dogma underlying it. The "what" and "how" of Christianity are inextricably linked. Bohlin makes a similar point when he argues against Diem that, although Kierkegaard strongly asserts the principle of individual Christian appropriation, this does not exclude him from enunciating a definite dogmatic "view". Furthermore, Per Lønning has argued that Diem's own books presuppose precisely the kind of unity in Kierkegaard's authorship which his own utterances are meant to
Paul Sponheim endorses Lønning's judgement. Now, although all these condemnations of Diem are justified and to the point, still these critics will all recognise the extent to which both he and Holmer have pointed to something very important characterising Kierkegaard's authorship. It is clear that Kierkegaard's theory of communication and the attempts he made to put this into practice must put the interpreter on his guard. If we are going to try and rectify the aberrations of those who responded to Kierkegaard's attack in the heat of the battle, then it is necessary for us to be more than usually attentive to the author's own methodological intentions. Diem and Holmer have a salutary word of warning to those who might try to reduce Kierkegaard's polemic to an isolated and, from the point of view of the modern reader, insignificant occurrence. Kierkegaard's authorship does not amount to a formal dogmatic system which can be conveniently set within a particular historical context and then be safely defused. He makes demands upon his readers which no amount of psychological, biographical or historical research must be allowed to 'tone down'. Mario Thulstrup writes as follows about modern reactions to Kierkegaard's attack on the Church: "... today (Kierkegaard) has become a virtual 'topic' about which one can retain a scholarly neutrality; if any personal factors appear in a modern critique they have the dubious advantage of being without 'contemporaneity' which played such a large role in Kierkegaard's thought. Because of this, many critics either put forward a clumsy condemnation or, what is worse, dismiss him with a modern psychiatric diagnosis, without bothering to find a coherence in his thought as a whole." Kierkegaard believed that Christianity had suffered radically at the hands of the interpreters. The same fate must not befall his own position. It is worth spending some time showing that the imbalance to which Diem and Holmer stand as correctives is no mere phantom. Lindström praises Diem for his role in rectifying the bias caused by those who attempt to isolate Kierkegaard's dogmatic and anthropological statements at the expense of his existential dialectic, and the history of Kierkegaardian scholarship reveals many attempts to subject the authorship to a psychological or historical reductionism. Per Lønning recognises the limitations and dangers
of this sort of approach to Kierkegaard:

"Without expressing any judgment of principle about this branch of Kierkegaard interpretation, we are justified in maintaining that it has often had the unfortunate consequence of reducing his thoughts to states of mind, conditioned by them and the factors pertaining to horizontality and situation, and so the interpreter thinks he has finished with them on such grounds". 16

In the early years of research two fine examples of the psychological approach are to be found in the work of H. S. Vodskov and Harald Høffding. 17 They both spend some time in the period 1847 - 1855 and both attempt to show the connection between Kierkegaard's religious development in the years immediately following the termination of the religious production and the passionate attack on the church launched just before his death. Vodskov is of the opinion that in the year 1849 Kierkegaard underwent a spiritual crisis centred on the problem of whether he should publish the three works he had completed in 1848, Training in Christianity, The Sickness unto Death and The Point of View. If he was to publish them then the further problem arose as to whether this should be under his own name. His innermost doubt was whether he was really called to be a witness to the truth or was merely a poet. "This is ... the nerve of the whole movement, that he has reached his limit that he has become doubtful as to his call, uncertain as to his duty, uncertain as to God's intention with him". Vodskov's final conclusion is that Kierkegaard was led astray by his striving for personal truth and that had he followed his calling, instead of launching into The Instant, he would have continued as a poet culminating after 1849 in an authorship glorifying in a positive way the Christian life.

On the other hand Høffding presents quite another view of the matter. According to his reading of the psychological evidence, the later move away from the Church is not to be traced to a crisis but, on the contrary, to a religious experience, a Christian awakening. In the Easter of 1848 Kierkegaard writes in his diary: "Now I have reached faith in the deepest sense ... to God everything is possible; this thought is now in the deepest sense my watchword". This change of heart gave Kierkegaard a keener eye
for the austerity of the Christian ideals and the weakness of the Christian Church. This change of heart, when supplemented by the external conditions of his persecution by The Corsair and the political upheaval of 1848, moves Kierkegaard, after some considerable deliberations on his status as a witness to the truth to an open assault on the Church and established Christianity.

Here we see two interpreters of Kierkegaard both seeking to explain psychologically the polemics of the last years by the manipulation of entries in the Journals, and yet both coming up with widely different results. This discrepancy must be partly due to the fact that both writers were influenced in reaching their conclusions by their own subjective judgment of what they expected to find. Thus Vodskov's known strong aversion to The Instant and Hoffding's acknowledged admiration for "the greatness of the theme marking these latter years and the passion with which it was carried on", must be adjudged to have influenced their handling of the evidence. However, some scepticism about the merit of biographical-psychological approaches to Kierkegaard's writings would seem to be justified by reference to these very different sets of conclusions.

Such scepticism is reinforced by our study of less subjectively motivated analyses written since the turn of the century. Most noteworthy amongst these is P. A. Heiberg's Søren Kierkegaard's religiøse Udvikling, Psykologisk Mikroskop. Heiberg saw Kierkegaard as one struggling to be healed from a sickness composed of elements of melancholy and self-accusation. This psychological disease, if disease it can be called, can be traced in his diaries and easily be diagnosed by careful attention to Kierkegaard's reflective writings. Then if we turn to the work of Hjalmar Helweg, and principally his book Søren Kierkegaard. En psykiatrisk-psykologisk studie we find the opinion advanced that Kierkegaard suffered from a manic depressive psychosis and evidence is found in Kierkegaard's severe attacks of melancholy, his self-accusation and sensations of fear. The diagnosis is strengthened by the fact that this mental disease was found in Kierkegaard's family and seems to have been inherited directly from parents to children. However, another writer using similar methods as Helweg (i.e. appeal to biographical
factors determining Kierkegaard's psychology and hence his authorship) in
fact counters Helweg's argument by associating Kierkegaard with the aesthetic-
schizothymic constitutional type. This is John Bjørkhem who further argues
that Kierkegaard experienced the world "more powerfully in thought and
imagination than in external contact through action. He had an inclination
to hide himself at any cost preferring intercourse with ideas rather than
with men". These are marked features of the schizothymic personality,
says Bjørkhem, and serve to validate his diagnosis. Yet another theory,
in respect of the biological factors compelling Kierkegaard's personality
is that put forward by Richard Magnusson. He argues that Kierkegaard was
a hunchback and tries to show the influence this physical deformity must
have had on Kierkegaard's psychic composition.

Now, it is my concern here not so much to assess the relative merits
of these various diagnoses as to emphasise their diversity. As Sponheim
observes:

"No diagnostic agreement regarding Kierkegaard's maladies appears
to have been reached by the practitioners of this art. While this
absence of agreement may not reflect adversely on the results of these
studies, one does wonder whether Kierkegaard was really that ill ... Our
quarrel pursues behind the results of such studies to their method
and presuppositions". The main presupposition in question here is that an awareness of Kierkegaard's
psychological constitution, social contacts and personal history can be a
gateway to an understanding of the essence of Kierkegaard. Against this
it must be contended that such influences are not causes but rather occasions
for the production of Kierkegaard's authorship. This point has been well
made by Louis Dupré:

"Kierkegaard's psychology did not create his religious philosophy, but was only the occasion, or, better, the necessary condition for its
discovery. Rather than serving as an explanation of his work, Kierkegaard's psychological constitution should be explained in the
light of his writings, for it is essentially subordinated to the reality
with which they are concerned". It is not enough to have given the occasion for Kierkegaard's writing and
to treat that as sufficient ground for judging his thought - especially when,
as Diem and Holmer emphasise, he proposes a dialectic of existence demanding
a method of communication and existential response such as cannot be reduced to any amount of historical or psychological data.

To recapitulate then, at this point. If we are to try and use our advantages in respect of sources and historical perspective in order to assess more accurately than his immediate contemporaries the significance of Kierkegaard's final assault upon Christendom, we must proceed with some caution. Whereas with the majority of authors the application of normal research tools to their work falls to their long term advantage, the special character of Kierkegaard's authorship imposes strict limitations upon the use of such tools in his case. Kierkegaard's intention was that his readers should become existentially engaged in his literary production; to indulge in Kierkegaardian research and yet stop short of this personal act of engagement is to fail to take one's subject seriously.

However, there have been a number of scholars who have desperately wanted to take Kierkegaard seriously and engage in his authorship and yet the "Attack" of the last years had proved to be an unavoidable stumbling block. Whereas for commentators of 120 years ago the attack came to them as something of a bolt from the blue (whether it should have been such a surprise is not important here), out of a feeling for Christian orthodoxy and integrity some modern interpreters have sought to deliberately isolate the attack from what went before. In order to be able to defend Kierkegaard's basic position they feel compelled to attack his final excesses. The "Attack" is something of an embarrassment, and it is this embarrassment which freethinkers like Brandes were happy to exploit by strongly emphasising the anti-establishment polemics. 24 A prominent example of this effort to defend Kierkegaard by attacking the "Attack" is found in N. H. Søe's lecture in the volume Kamp mod Kirken. 25

Whilst acknowledging the consistency of Kierkegaard's work, Søe queries whether it was necessary for him to go so far as he did in his attack on the Church. Certainly the Church has its failings and these need to be recognised openly and tackled without equivocation. But, nevertheless, this does not
demand such a destructive assault as Kierkegaard conducts against the clergy and ecclesiastical administrators, culminating in what Söe calls Kierkegaard's criminal act of calling men to abandon the worship conducted under the auspices of the State Church. Söe is left unimpressed by explanations of Kierkegaard's extreme position in terms of the need to exaggerate one's arguments in order to get them heard. Nothing so logical or contrived was going on in Kierkegaard's mind at this point - rather, he was the victim of unforeseen influences which were suddenly released when Mynster died and Kierkegaard's obligations to "his father's Priest" were abrogated. These influences can be traced back to the Regina debacle which rendered Kierkegaard bitter about sexual matters, his inherited wealth which caused him to worry a good deal about the Christian position with regard to material benefits and to his envy of Martensen with whom he had shared part of his youth and who now had risen to high ecclesiastical office. It is significant that Söe only mentions such influences upon Kierkegaard as his upbringing and his "thorn in the flesh" as if in passing.

The fact is that, in an attempt to defend Kierkegaard's outrages, Söe tries to make excuses for him - not in terms of influences dating back to his youth and so moulding his whole authorship, but, rather, in terms of historical and biographical influences which only came to the fore late in the production. These influences are presumed to have worked upon Kierkegaard to such an extent that he was prompted to launch an impulsive, unco-ordinated attack upon the Church which had fostered him and his family. So whereas Malantschuk is eager to give some semblance of order to the pamphlets (he divides them up into four distinct and consciously planned periods), Söe highlights their uncharacteristic impulsiveness - they are like the punches landed by the flailing fists of a mad man.

Söe, then, is concerned to defend Kierkegaard's major authorship by trying to lessen his culpability for the extravagances of the last years. He is presented as a man determined by largely external forces, no longer able to think clearly with regard to the overall message of the New Testament and unable to intuit the point at which to cry halt! Psychological and
historical influences playing upon Kierkegaard in his later years are deemed strong enough to make it possible for the interpreter to isolate the final polemics, so leaving him free to fish in less troubled waters.

Eduard Geismar also feels the need to qualify some of Kierkegaard's more extreme utterances with a causal explanation before he can bring himself to recommend Kierkegaard's teaching to the Church. This critic lays considerable stress upon Schopenhauer as a strong influence upon the late Kierkegaard. This influence shows itself principally in the greater negativity shown in respect of sexual matters and the possibility of life affirmation. Geismar believes that in dealing with these issues Kierkegaard departs radically from Luther who saw the rearing of children in marriage as a command of God, and in conformity with His Holy will. "His diaries from the last three years are full of comments on sexual matters which to my mind are revolting" says Geismar. He goes on: "There is indeed much that is impure in all these matters, both within and without marriage. Nevertheless, it is an arrangement of God ...". Then, having pointed out Kierkegaard's excesses and their origins in Schopenhauer, Geismar is able to declare that "in spite of this dissent, I am convinced that Kierkegaard has a message for the Church, and especially for Protestantism".

But whatever value Geismar may put upon Kierkegaard's message in these last years, he is nonetheless anxious to sever the "Attack" from the early authorship. In opposition to Bohlin's contention that Kierkegaard's final position can be traced back to the pseudonyms, Geismar protests that "the later Kierkegaard is not a consequence of them". Clearly Geismar wants to indulge in a certain amount of pruning before endorsing Kierkegaard's attack with the seal of his approval.

Valter Lindström, in spite of his plea for a "totality view" in respect of Kierkegaard's authorship, seems in the end to stop short of an unequivocal confrontation with the challenge of The Instant. In conscious opposition to Bohlin, Lindström asserts that: "In the case of a man of Kierkegaard's stature one must always work on the assumption that apparently opposed tendencies are somehow to be held together in a unified point of view ...
One must therefore assume a unified total view which provides the background to, and is reflected in, the edifying writings as well as the "aesthetic" production. However, Sponheim is justified in doubting whether Lindström's definition of the unifying principle is sufficiently precise to stamp a real unity on the shifts in Kierkegaard's thought which he finds in the course of the authorship. Yet when seen as a counter argument to Bohlin's divisive procedure, then Lindström's plea on behalf of coherence and consistency in Kierkegaard's thought is timely and valuable. However, Marie Thulstrup, who is a strong advocate of the coherent view of Kierkegaard's thought, goes so far as to accuse Lindström of jeopardising this unity. She writes: "Kierkegaard's pattern of thought is undeniably logical, although, in my opinion it does not reach its dialectical conclusion. But it contains no unconscious shifting of ideas, no distortion or perversion. If one does not want to accept Kierkegaard's results, one must necessarily alter the premises". She argues that the whole authorship is pervaded by Kierkegaard's dialectic of imitation and so stands against Lindström who sees the emphasis on imitation as characterising only the later writings and Journals. Lindström, it seems, occupies a middle point between the piecemeal approach associated with Bohlin and a genuine totality view. He assumes a unified total view, but also wants to identify a "gliding" from the outlook of the stages to the aesthetic teaching of The Instant. Bohlin is surely right in suggesting that Lindström has in fact identified a break in Kierkegaard's development which he tries to cover by the euphemistic use of the word "gliding". Lindström's error, as shown by Marie Thulstrup, is that he fails to pull himself sufficiently far away from Bohlin's position, thus leaving himself open to the charge that really, when the true sense of his arguments is ironed out, both men are in the same piecemeal camp. What is lacking in Lindström's work is the establishment of a genuine, thorough-going unity to Kierkegaard's authorship.

So, when Lindström comes to deal with The Instant at the extremity of Kierkegaard's thought, he reveals his doubts about the link between these
views and those expressed earlier in the authorship. For example, although he has been a strong supporter of the view that Kierkegaard's authorship generally manifests a positive attitude to Church and community life, Lindström finally concludes that this is not true of the last years. He opposes the invocation of "the corrective" as a front behind which there lies a thoroughly orthodox and positive _gemeinschaft_. Furthermore, he argues that the strong individualism and ascetic sundering from the community which Kierkegaard demands in _The Instant_ is not to be seen as a consequence of an individualistic tendency permeating his whole authorship. Neither is it indicative of a basic dualism between the spiritual and the material. Rather, this individualism and asceticism grows out of Kierkegaard's changed view of Christian discipleship. Lindström wants to defend Kierkegaard against Bohlin's assertion that the authorship from the beginning is obsessed with the individual and has no place for inter-personal relationship. But the solution Lindström proposes still does not take full account of _The Instant_ which must thence suffer detachment from the rest of the authorship. Although their approaches are very different, in the end it seems that Lindström can echo Geismar's comment regarding the relationship between the pseudonyms and the polemical attack: "the later Kierkegaard is not a consequence of them". But few writers have been more severe than Paul Rubow in their condemnation of Kierkegaard's attack, and he also looks upon it as the end point in a progressive deviation from an earlier position. Rubow believes that Kierkegaard was subjected to a clash of interests. He was torn between faith in authority (e.g. his veneration for Mynster) and his need to criticise it (e.g. Poul Martin Møller's comment that Kierkegaard was "through and through polemical"). Although this dichotomy was a fundamental personality characteristic according to Rubow, its consequences did not begin to be felt until after 1847. From this point onwards an increasingly more negative approach to humanity and to the Church becomes apparent until Training in Christianity which Rubow describes as a "non-Churchly" writing (_ukirkelige_). This was followed by the more severe agitation of _For self-
examination before Kierkegaard fell into a long period of silence. Rubow is unequivocal in his judgement: "What was left in his authorship were the dregs". 42 He goes on to describe the "Attack", finding no redeeming features either theological or literary. He writes: "Genuine thoughts are not found in the book" (i.e. The Instant) and goes on to describe it as a poison not only against the Church but also literarily. Rubow's book appeared at about the same time as P. G. Lindhardt's Kierkegaard's angreb pa Folkскirk'en, 43 and several reviewers have pointed to the extremely different viewpoints presented in these two works. Søren Holm observes that "Whilst Lindhardt considers Kierkegaard's attack on official Christianity as 'a clear and logical consequence of the whole of his authorship', Rubow thinks that his views underwent a change in the course of the years". 44

Now, as we pointed out earlier, these writers (Søe, Geismar, Lindström and possibly Rubow, although as P. Verner Hansen puts it, "Rubow cannot be said to be congenial with Kierkegaard") are concerned to defend Kierkegaard on the major points of his teaching. But to be able to do this they must first take account of those places where they are unable to follow him, and with each of the cases examined so far it is the attack upon Christendom which proves to be the offending hurdle. Yet simply to state disagreement with Kierkegaard at this point is not sufficient. It must be shown that these excesses are not a natural consequence of the main body of the authorship, otherwise the whole output may stand condemned. The simple way out is to argue that really Kierkegaard need not have gone so far in his assault; he has exaggerated the consequences of what is otherwise a timely and valid appraisal of Christianity and Christendom. However, this solution does not help very much. The question whether Kierkegaard should have forced the issues as far as he did is a very different question from that which asks whether his premises could take him that far. On the issue of the attack as a logical consequence of Kierkegaard's whole Christian output Søe asks: "If a man goes out to the Nørregade, is it so logical that he end up in the
Now, if the point at issue is whether a man should in fact go that far, then Søe's objection is valid; but he says nothing pertinent to the problem of whether the road actually does lead that far. Kierkegaard's attack upon Christendom can be both an unjustifiable exaggeration and a natural consequence of his authorship. So another way must be found of severing the "Attack" from its antecedents in order to neutralise its embarrassment to Kierkegaard's admirers.

This way is the familiar way of psychological, historical or biographical reductionism. Søe identifies a number of factors influencing Kierkegaard's attitudes and ultimately forcing him into an unwarranted and wholly unchristian attack. Søe takes the reference Kierkegaard himself makes to the sudden change which came over him in 1855, and asserts that one need not be psychologically expert to hear in this evidence of a sigh of release - now the forces within his mind could get on with their task. If only Kierkegaard had been aware of the origin of these forces! Søe himself argues that Kierkegaard underwent what is a fairly common psychological development. He became clear that to fulfil his destiny he had to release Regina. Consequently, he became bitter regarding sexual matters and late in life he took it out on the marriage state and the act of procreation. We shall not attempt to evaluate Søe's diagnosis. For our purposes at the moment it is merely necessary to note this echo from psychological studies of earlier years. According to Søe, the attack on the priests and their income is rooted in Kierkegaard's own financial embarrassment. In his case the extolling of material renunciation increases in direct proportion to the onset of his own financial discomfort. Furthermore, Søe suggests that Kierkegaard's aggression in the last years might also be attributed to his envy of Martensen.

As we have seen, Geismar looks to foreign influences, especially Schopenhauer as being instrumental in sending Kierkegaard over into the abyss of gross exaggeration and negativity.

Sponheim, in speaking of the ascendancy of the diastatic rhythm in
the final stage of Kierkegaard's authorship comments that "(Kierkegaard's) readers have understandably been in quest of biographical material which might at least have served as stimulus or occasion". He goes on: "The best candidate surely seems to be the Corsair incident of 1845-1846".

Lindström certainly attributes a good deal of influence to this incident in analysing the ways in which Kierkegaard's authorship changed towards the latter part of his life. Thus, he claims that the Corsair experience made it clear to Kierkegaard that the Christian must suffer - a good work is considered by common judgement to be an exaggeration or madness. Consequently those views about Christ's suffering which had been with Kierkegaard since his youth are reinforced. Elsewhere Lindström asserts that the Corsair affair brought home to Kierkegaard the fact that the Christian must take up his cross and collide with the world. The whole question of "hidden inwardness" is now thrown into the melting pot.

Then, in his discussion of *den Enkelte* as a central category for Kierkegaard, Lindström attributes to the Corsair incident a decisive influence in the direction of strengthening Kierkegaard in his antagonism towards the "masses", the "many" and the "public" which characterise "the present age". In other words, in relation to the important issues which Lindström identifies in Kierkegaard's authorship, the Corsair affair is considered to have been decisive in its influence. Now, although Lindström refrains from suggesting that this influence is sufficiently strong as to be determinative for the movements in Kierkegaard's authorship (in fact he insists that such views as the Corsair incident provoked were in fact with Kierkegaard long before this time), nonetheless Lindström keeps his options wide open in respect of a biographical causal explanation for the deviations of the last years.

Such appeals to biographical and psychological factors obviously recall the early work of Helweg and Heiberg and the dangers which we saw to be implicit in their procedure are also relevant to these more recent studies. The intention is perfectly honourable but it is arguable that the implications of such a use of sources external to the writings themselves, pose a threat
to the correct assimilation of Kierkegaard's message. Pierre Mesnard is strong in his support of the psychological approach to Kierkegaard's authorship and praises the work of earlier scholars along such lines. His view is that such an approach implies no "jugement pêchëratif sur la valeur d'une pensée qui n'a jamais vacillé". Theoretically, of course, Mesnard is correct. It does not follow that, because a cycle of thought can be shown to have its causal origins in the biography or psychology of the thinker concerned that therefore the value of such thought is annulled. However, in practice, when one is confronted with disagreeable propositions from the pen of one who is in all other respects to be admired, then the temptation to offer him the alibi of an external influence leading him astray becomes very strong. Again, this may not be entirely misguided. It could be true that a work is attributable entirely and exclusively to the interplay of forces beyond the control of the writer. However, simply because Kierkegaard's authorship is of a special kind, explanatory theories of the type described must be viewed with the greatest caution. The student of Kierkegaard's works must always have it in mind that the means of appropriating the contents of his message is at least as important as the message itself. Kenneth Hamilton writes: "I think Kierkegaard's words about the 'what' of Christianity being given in the 'how'. apply by analogy to his authorship also". So Kierkegaard's "Attack upon Christendom" is not simply a statement of strongly held opinions. It is also a factor in the process of communicating a fundamental Christian truth. Failure to take account of this communication process will inevitably result in failure to do justice to Kierkegaard's message. Ultimately Kierkegaard remains unharmed by learned criticism of his works and their contents. Unless the scholar enters fully into the passionate intensity of Kierkegaard's dialectic, then he will not really be dealing with Kierkegaard at all.

Now, to say that Kierkegaard lays so much stress on his method of communication is not tantamount to saying that his Christianity has no objective content. Diem, although providing a useful corrective to one
extreme position may have landed himself in the opposite one. Sponheim writes:

"We detect in Diem ... a strained effort both to stress Kierkegaard's use of the Socratic dialectic and to liberate God from the reproach of a delimiting description. The effort could only be successful if one could not only excise Kierkegaard's references to an objective content to the Christian possible, but also show that the employment of the Socratic method carried with it no substantive implications". 55

A famous passage from the Book about Adler bears out Sponheim's points:

"Christianity exists before any Christian exists, it must exist in order that one may become a Christian, it contains the determinant by which one may test whether one has become a Christian, it maintains its objective subsistence apart from all believers, while at the same time it is in the inwardness of the believer. In short, here there is no identity between the subjective and the objective". 56

Kierkegaard is not just "saying". He is saying "something", but this "something" cannot be tackled in the same way as any other collection of cognitive propositions, simply because how it is said is so inextricably a part of what is said. Diem and Holmer must be given the credit for reasserting this point.

In protesting against the method of those scholars who appeal to objective influences as determinative for Kierkegaard's thought, we are not thereby protesting against any use whatsoever of historical, biographical or literary tools of research. Rather, we object to the abuse of such tools. They are being used to justify the selection of material in support of a purely subjective value judgement. If the dialectical school of Kierkegaard interpretation is wrong in its over-emphasis on the exclusive value of subjective appropriation of Kierkegaard's teaching, then those interpreters are also at fault whose study of the works is dominated by a concern to reinforce their own predetermined attitudes. Neils Thulstrup declares: "As against this it must be insisted that the method of research and the attitude adopted - in so far as it is only a question of interpretation and not of assessment - should be adjusted to suit the given object of research and not vice versa". 57

Interpretation must precede assessment and must be subservient to it.

So the role of historical and systematic research is to make clear to the researcher himself and to modern readers in general, the nature of the
"possibles" presented by Kierkegaard's authorship. But there must be no stopping short at this point. In the same essay Thulstrup writes: "The works are central, and the problem or task is the same for the ordinary reader as for the specialist and research scholar, namely, to proceed from an understanding of each detail to an understanding of the whole, and again from each work to the author's whole achievement". 58 The need to grasp the wholeness of Kierkegaard's authorship is a vital one and if it is not met then unwarranted and subjective selectivity such as we have seen happening in respect of the "Attack upon Christendom", is bound to result.

To become engaged in Kierkegaard's message is only possible when the authorship conveying that message is appreciated as a unity of theme, and purpose. So, by understanding the "possibles" presented by Kierkegaard and by responding in the decisive and passionate manner appropriate to his means of communicating these "possibles" we can get to the heart of Kierkegaard's teaching, which is ultimately not a subjective projection of our own selves, but rather "the truth proclaimed in the New Testament witness to Jesus Christ". 59

Thus we can conclude this section by saying that efforts to contextualise Kierkegaard's "Attack" must take account not only of the historical and philosophical context, but also of the context provided by the whole authorship. In fact this latter context is the most important because it brings the "Attack" within the ambit of Kierkegaard's carefully controlled dialectical communication of Christian truth. The historical context serves only to clarify the poles of this dialectic. Our conclusions obviously imply a certain presupposition with respect to the unity of Kierkegaard's authorship, and it is to this vexed problem that we now turn.

Some years ago E. D. Klemke wrote that "Kierkegaard's writings lend themselves rather readily to misinterpretation". 60 The reasons he offered for this were largely based on literary considerations i.e. the use of pseudonyms, the special meanings attached to words which have other connotations, the abstract terminology in some passages, the mingling of jest and seriousness etc. Certainly these factors take their toll of clarity, but the threat to
misunderstanding presents itself at an even more fundamental level.

Arbaugh and Arbaugh ask: "Is it possible to enquire for the single meaning of a man who had such an astonishing number of highly coloured meanings?" It seems that difficulties reach right into the depths of Kierkegaard's philosophical expression. However, this has not prevented scholars proferring their theories as to what ultimately Kierkegaard's authorship is all about. So Arbaugh and Arbaugh themselves declare that "His one pervading meaning is found in his existence as a Christian. This concern is the magnetic centre around which all other aspects of his thought, life, bitter controversy, and work revolve; by which they are held in position, and from which they derive their final importance". Reidar Thomte suggests that "His whole literary productivity had as its total idea the problem of becoming a Christian in Christendom", whilst George Price believes that in his book "enough has been given for us to see how completely (the concept of man) dominated all his thought". Lindström contends that the foundation of Kierkegaard's thought is "the inescapability of the relation to God"; Per Lønning identifies the centrality of the concept of "contemporarity" and Villads Christensen points the kernel of Kierkegaard's thought in terms of sin and penance.

The obvious question to be asked here is: why does the attempt to define Kierkegaard's central meaning result in such a variety of conclusions? Surely the answer is that Kierkegaard's authorship is patient of all these interpretations, and many more besides. Each of the books we have mentioned succeeds in throwing light upon yet another Kierkegaardian theme which so penetrates the authorship that it assumes the proportions of THE Kierkegaardian theme. One response to such a diversity of themes might be to argue that the authorship is characterised by disunity and for the purposes of interpretation, must be divided up into self-contained unrelated units. Such is the piecemeal approach of Torsten Bohlin. He observes two trends of thought in Kierkegaard's authorship, which, he believes, should be sharply distinguished. Whilst one of these trends represents Kierkegaard's own experiences, the other is
only an artificial construction intended simply as a weapon to defeat his speculative opponents. This second trend is in fact unrelated to his real understanding of Christianity. Consequently two major Christian concepts - sin and faith - are each treated in two separate ways. Brief summaries of Bohlin's work are already available in English and there is no need to duplicate them. However, one quotation will suffice to show where Bohlin's procedure finally leads him:

"Thus the analysis of the fundamental determination of faith in Kierkegaard ends in the result that it is two altogether different conceptions of faith that clash, one of which is theoretically determined while the other is in a special sense christocentrically determined, the former of which belongs to the personally religious line of experience, while the other goes back to a marked view of the special nature of Christianity as opposed to other theological trends". Thus Bohlin sees fit to place certain works as representing one trend (The Concept of Dread and The Sickness unto Death) whilst Philosophical Fragments and Postscript represent the other. So the clear distinction is drawn between the "paradox line" and the "religious experience line".

Those who criticise Bohlin, do so mainly on the grounds that his analysis fails to take account of the cohesion which is seen to characterise Kierkegaard's authorship. Sponheim, for example, complains that Bohlin "does not seem alert to the highly complex interpenetration of the rhythms"; whilst we have already noted Lindström's assumption in favour of a general view underlying seemingly opposed tendencies in the authorship. J. Heywood Thomas has well summarised the argument against Bohlin's work when he writes: "It ignores the coherence and consistency of Kierkegaard's thought, denying its real, if complex unity".

Gregor Malantschuk acknowledges that Bohlin was the first to note that The Concept of Dread and Philosophical Fragments proceeded from different points of departure: "but since he did not discover the dialectical reasons for this, he thought that the incongruity of the two books was due to an error in Kierkegaard's thinking". So, when faced with the kaleidoscopic thematic diversity of Kierkegaard's authorship, we must either resort to a kind of neat compartmentalisation
process or else establish a bond of continuity sufficiently strong as to encompass the whole authorship and thus endow it with a genuine unity. But the quest for such a unifying principle will not be easy, and that for a number of reasons.

It is immediately obvious in even the most cursory reading of Kierkegaard that his authorship is totally unlike that of the more typical doematic theologian. The dialectical presentation of his thought militates from the start against attempts to directly assimilate his meaning. In The Point of View for my work as an Author Kierkegaard admits the deceptive character of his aesthetic works and has to underline the religious disposition of their author in order to avoid misunderstanding. Paul Sponheim has to devote over forty pages of his book to explaining "The sense of a systematic study" carefully pointing out that his interest in the systematic tendencies in Kierkegaard's thought "does not deny that these tendencies are often nearly completely hidden under details in an authorship marked by an almost excessive rhetorical brilliance and a strongly situationist sighting of the enemy under attack". Clearly, any unity to Kierkegaard's authorship will not be of a superficial nature.

The situation is not helped by what we know of Kierkegaard's own plans regarding the publication of his work. From the title, and from his Journal it is clear to us that he had it in his mind to conclude his authorship with the Concluding unscientific Postscript. Then he would take a country parish and settle down to the ordained ministry. But, of course, this was not to be, and although The Point of View offers explanations for his change of strategy the threat this poses to the unity and continuity of his work cannot be dispelled.

Amongst other factors militating against the recognition of an obvious unity in Kierkegaard's authorship, his use of pseudonyms and indirect communication must figure prominently. Kierkegaard's own explanations of his relationship to the pseudonyms only complicate matters for; whilst on the one hand he refers to them quite objectively as though they were real
persons, and warns the reader never to attribute any of their views to him; on the other hand he says that the pseudonymous works are a necessary part of the authorship, intimately related to the religious works, and that both should be read together. He also says that he himself was deeply involved in the pseudonymous works, that he came to terms with the aesthetic by means of them, and that he was only allowed to indulge in them by a special act of providence. Lars Bejerholm's study of Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms has revealed that such explanations should be interpreted more as afterthoughts than factual analyses. The real reasons for pseudonymity are seen to be far more dependent upon the prevailing practice of Kierkegaard's "post-Romantic milieu" than his appeals to "Providence" seems to suggest. Not surprisingly Bejerholm makes much of Kierkegaard's own confession that his explanation in The Point of View admits "a little too much in the direction of consciousness."

Arbaugh and Arbaugh also point out that while, as Kierkegaard says, the aesthetic literature indirectly served central religious purposes, it also served personal aims such as reconciliation with Regina and a legitimate aesthetic end. They conclude: "In view of this, it appears that even though Kierkegaard's explanation of his religious purpose is undoubtedly correct, in a measure it represents an over-simplification of his motives."

Now, a detailed assessment of Bejerholm's view lies beyond the scope of this present study. Suffice it to say, with Sponheim, that "Bejerholm is perhaps less persuasive in handling those points where The Point of View's explanation does seem to fit the facts - as, say, Kierkegaard's practice of publishing simultaneously pseudonymous works and edifying discourses in his own name." For our present purposes, the main lesson to be learnt from Bejerholm is that Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms, and his apologia for such usage, is by no means as simple as might at first appear. The extremely devious nature of these literary practices obviously presents an obstacle to the quest for coherence and unity in the authorship.

A similar judgement may be made in respect of Kierkegaard's use of indirect communication. Aage Henriksen shows how confusion is caused
by Kierkegaard's use of two forms of indirect communication, each
corresponding to a particular kind of religious tactics:

"In his production up to and including Unscientific Postscript
indirect communication is contrasted with Hegelian direct communication
and objective knowledge, the method being that the narrator, after
producing his testimony destroys himself and leaves the reader deserted
with a statement in which qualitative contrasts clash. The reader
can only save himself from the dilemma by a personal recognition and
solution of the problems. In The Point of View, the indirect
statement is contrasted with the direct preaching, which would lead
the hearer to the truth by persuasion. It is interpreted as a method
of inveigling him into the truth, by the teacher's pretending to be
in the pupil's situation (delusion) and thus achieving personal contact;
thereafter he slowly uncovers the truth, so that the learner, absorbed
in his interest, with the speed of abandonment, is made to run right
into the most decisive precepts of the religious." 87

Kierkegaard himself deals with this apparent contradiction in his Journal, 88
suggesting that both interpretations are equally true because
1) when he wrote Postscript he had not yet understood himself in the
definitive thought for the whole production,
2) that even his writings about his activity as an author are somewhat maieutic and
3) that he now understands the whole in such a way, that he himself by no
means has so surveyed the whole from the beginning. That is, the idea
of the authorship only became clear in retrospect. 89

As with the pseudonyms, so with the use of indirect communication,
it is clear that Kierkegaard's practice is far from being ambiguous. Yet
we have already intimated our concern to relate Kierkegaard's authorship
very closely to his method of communication, so any such ambiguity must
jeopardise a unified view of that authorship.

So if unity is to be ascribed to the Kierkegaardian literature then
it must be a unity able to overcome these difficulties. But such devices
as pseudonymity and indirect communication are so central to Kierkegaard's
peculiar genius as an author that a principle of unity would need to reflect
and explain the necessity for the use of such devices. In other words, were
we able to establish a particular theme as giving unity to Kierkegaard's
authorship, then the subject of that theme must be seen to inform and be
informed by, Kierkegaard's method of communication. If we propose a
unifying theme which does not positively DEMAND the use of unsystematic and
indirect communication then Kierkegaard's authorship would have to be condemned as ludicrously circuitous. Now, is there a basic theme which could not be communicated in a direct way and which therefore justifies Kierkegaard's maieutic? Postscript goes a long way towards providing us with an answer. Under the heading: "The subjective Existing Thinker has Regard to the Dialectics of the Process of Communication", Kierkegaard writes:

"While objective thought is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective thinker is as an existing individual essentially interested in his own thinking, existing as he does in his thought. His thinking has therefore a different type of reflection, namely the reflection of inwardness, of possession, by virtue of which it belongs to the thinking subject and to no one else. While objective thought translates everything into results, and helps all mankind to cheat, by copying these off and reciting them by rote, subjective thought puts everything in process and omits the result; partly because this belongs to him who has the way, and partly because as an existing individual he is constantly in process of coming to be, which holds true of every human being who has not permitted himself to be deceived into becoming objective ... The difference between subjective and objective thinking must express itself also in the form of the communication suitable to each".

Kierkegaard goes on to assert that the mode of communication appropriate to objective thinking is the direct approach. The reason for this is that "objective thinking is wholly indifferent to subjectivity and hence also to inwardness and appropriation". The clear inference is that subjective thinking alone necessitates the use of indirect communication:

"Wherever the subjective is of importance in knowledge, and where appropriation thus constitutes the crux of the matter, the process of communication is a work of art, and doubly reflected. Its very first form is precisely the subtle principle that the personalities must be held devoutly apart from one another, and not permitted to fuse or coagulate into objectivity. It is at this point that objectivity and subjectivity part from one another".

Thus it is clear that but one theme demands the form of communication which characterises Kierkegaard's authorship, and that is the theme of subjectivity. This is in accord with J. Heywood Thomas's assertion that "there is a unity in the whole production due to the fact that the whole of his work is the development of certain themes, the most fundamental of which we would say is the Principle of Subjectivity". The importance of this statement is that whilst it recognises that Kierkegaard's authorship
pursues several themes, still it is the theme of subjectivity which is "fundamental". It is the principle upon which Kierkegaard's whole work as an author is based and it is the theme from which all other themes take their reference. So Dr. Heywood Thomas lays great emphasis on the paradox theme in Kierkegaard, yet he quotes Lindström in support of the view that the truth objectively determined as a paradox is the counterpart thesis to the principle that "subjectivity is the truth". Furthermore, the dependence of major theological themes upon the basic principle of subjectivity is shown when Dr. Heywood Thomas writes: "Since the path of faith is that of subjectivity and inwardness, we would expect Kierkegaard to correlate the assertion of God's existence with subjectivity". Kierkegaard's complaint against the Docents is precisely that they failed to make such a correlation between their teaching and the demands of Christian inwardness. Their reflection is objective and so "the truth becomes an object, something objective, and ... thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity". There is no room for the Professor who carries his traditional absentmindedness to the point of forgetting himself. For Kierkegaard, only an appropriation process characterised by passionate inwardness can begin to grasp the truth of Christianity.

Gregor Malantschuk's penetrating study of the relationship between dialectic and existence in Kierkegaard's thought establishes the subjective actuality of the individual as the ultimate goal of the authorship. So he writes:

"In the application of the method of indirect argument to various philosophical systems, Kierkegaard concentrates exclusively on a sweeping criticism of Hegel and does not go into the other systems more deeply because his primary concern is a thorough penetration of the problem dealing with subjective actuality. Consequently all Kierkegaard's work in non-religious spheres, which is discussed at length in the opening section of Malantschuk's book, is related by Kierkegaard to subjective actuality. Thus:
"The objective truths and points of view do not become meaningful and significant for Kierkegaard until they illuminate actuality, his central concern: the actuality of the subject". 101

For Malantschuk's purposes the individual works must be seen always in the context of Kierkegaard's project towards subjective actuality. For example, Malantschuk maintains that, in reading The Concept of Irony "one gets the definite impression that Kierkegaard wants to show that he has completely mastered the working procedures of the objective disciplines before tackling the more difficult tasks confronting him in his increasing concentration upon subjective actuality". 102 Furthermore, "Kierkegaard places so much emphasis on the establishment of the stages because the standpoint of the stages lends itself to determining the periods in the development of subjective actuality". 103 Then, after discussing Virgilius Haufniensis' special interest in describing subjective anxiety in The Concept of Dread Malantschuk declares that this "is consistent with Kierkegaard's prevailing tendency to concentrate on subjective actuality". 104

These quotations should be enough to show the centrality of the subjectivity theme in Malantschuk's view of Kierkegaard's authorship. However, his final paragraph puts the issue beyond doubt. Having already deduced "that basic to (Kierkegaard's) view of the relation subjective-objective is a distinction between the quantative dialectic and the qualitative dialectic with which he operates in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 105 Malantschuk concludes: "In my account of the relation between dialectic and existence in Kierkegaard, the first portion is a consideration of the period prior to Kierkegaard's preparations for attacking the Church; in this earlier period the qualitative dialectic is central, and it is this dialectic that has been my concern; it is also the nerve in Kierkegaard's whole authorship". 106

So, underlying the whole of Kierkegaard's authorship is an endeavour in the direction of promoting Christian inwardness. But in the Journal notes to Postscript Kierkegaard makes it clear that having said so much, yet we must still say more. He writes: "If anyone were to give an account
of Hegel and say that he represents thinking, we would have the right to answer: well, that says nothing at all. I must have a better idea of which thoughts he represents. So also with inwardness. To say he represents it is to make a fool of oneself, and the one under review, for *loquere ut videam* applies here and I have to have an idea of how he represents it.  

So we must have some idea of how Kierkegaard represents inwardness and this brings us back inevitably to his method of communication. We appealed to Kierkegaard's method of communication in order to establish the decisive role of the subjectivity theme, and now we return to discuss how this theme controls Kierkegaard's method of communication. Kierkegaard himself is explicit as to the only form of communication appropriate to subjective Christian existence:

"Existential reality is incommunicable, and the subjective thinker finds his reality in his own ethical existence. When reality is apprehended by an outsider, it can be understood only as possibility. Everyone who makes a communication in so far as he becomes conscious of this fact, will therefore be careful to give his existential communication the form of a possibility, precisely in order that it may have a relationship to existence. A communication in the form of a possibility compels the recipient to face the problem of existing in it ...".

From this passage it is clear that for Kierkegaard there is a form of communication which alone is valid for the communication of inwardness. Furthermore, this form of communication is derived directly from the very nature of Christian truth as subjectivity. The subjective thinker can only find his reality in his own ethical existence, and since existential reality is incommunicable, only an indirect form of communication can be used to engage another in the truth of Christianity. Thus, the recipient is confronted by a choice between two possibilities, and by choosing one of them he becomes genuinely engaged.

Therefore, by way of summary, we can say that the central theme of Kierkegaard's authorship, i.e. that subjectivity is truth, automatically demands a method of indirect communication based on the presentation of possibilities to which the receiver's response must be the making of a decisive choice. In Paul Holmer's words: "...the principle kind of
understanding which Kierkegaard's writings demand - and this in virtue of their nature and what they concern - is every reader's encounter with these possibilities". 109

So when considering Kierkegaard's views on any aspect of Christian teaching, whether it be with regard to the existence of God 110 or the nature and function of the Church,111 we shall always need to have in mind their place within the overall context of his project towards Christian inwardness. Furthermore, as an inevitable consequence of the very nature of this project, we must always be on watch for the characteristic tendencies which must influence our subject matter as a result of the demands of indirect communication. Kierkegaard's view of the Church, for example, is to be seen as informing, and being informed by the principle of subjectivity, whilst the indirectness which must characterise the communication appropriate to this principle will leave its mark on the presentation of his ecclesiology.

Now, we have already quoted scholars to the effect that the unity of Kierkegaard's authorship is a complex unity.112 We suggest that this complexity is a direct consequence of his attempt to adhere to an authentic mode of communicating the unifying theme. The polemical nature of Kierkegaard's advocacy of inwardness is determined by the need to dispel the illusions which passed for truth in contemporary society. In The Point of View Kierkegaard devotes several pages to the proposition "That Christendom is a prodigious illusion" 113 and this is a theme to which he regularly returns - even so late as the final numbers of The Instant.114 Raymond E. Anderson has spelt out the nature of the illusion which a communicator must dispel if he is to succeed in the ethico-religious sphere:

"Although there are as many forms of ethical and religious illusions as there are modes of behaviour which superficially seem to be genuinely ethical or religious, a threefold classification of these illusions is possible - the poetic, the practical, and the speculative. In each of these types the individual confuses subjectivity with the more apparent correlates: in the poetic with moods and feelings; in the practical with respectability and practical accomplishment; and in the speculative with reading, thinking, and talking about ethical and religious matters". 115

Anderson goes on to assert that: "Such misconceptions, of course, are subtle
and stubborn - so formidable that the task of dispelling ethico-religious illusions requires an entirely new "military science". A quotation from The Point of View gives details of this strategy:

"The gist of it all can be expressed in one word: the method must be indirect. But the development of this method may require the labour of years, alert attention every hour of the day, daily practice of the scales, or patient finger-exercise in the dialectical, not to speak of a never slumbering fear and trembling ... All the old military science, all the apologetic and whatever goes with it, serves rather - candidly speaking - to betray the cause of Christianity. At every instant and at every point the tactics must be adapted to a fight which is waged against a conceit, an illusion." 116

So tactics and strategy are vital to the process of dispelling the illusions which conceal the subjective truth of Christianity - and such strategy must be varied to meet changing circumstances. Here may be found a clue to the divisions in Kierkegaard's authorship.

Løning believes that "the more one handles the material in chronological order, so that much greater become the chances of becoming aware of eventual developments and "glidings"." 117 whilst Johannes Sløk maintains that "(Kierkegaard's) concepts do not mean quite the same in all his works, not only because these works are written by different pseudonyms, but also because Kierkegaard quite simply bit by bit changed his views". 118

Now, the question at issue is whether Kierkegaard really did change his views at points where it really mattered, or was it his tactics which were adapted in the service of a fundamental viewpoint which remained unchanged.

Before considering this question further, we must look briefly at the major point of division in Kierkegaard's authorship.

Generally speaking, scholars who have attempted to analyse the structure of Kierkegaard's authorship, have tended to follow his own account in The Point of View. Here Kierkegaard sees the aesthetic works and Postscript as representing two ways in which a person may become a Christian (viz: away from the aesthetical and away from speculation). Then the "religious" writings stand alone, representing the overall point of view. 119

This division between the pseudonyms and the edifying writings before 1846 is basically the same as that between the pseudonyms and the "direct" communications
after that date. So Postscript is seen as the conclusion of one half of
the authorship, with the events of 1847-8 decisively determining the
significantly different character of the second half. The authorship is
seen to undergo a remarkable change, with the religious writings which
played an apparently secondary role in the early years now setting the
pattern for what was to follow.

The nature of this division has been variously described. Niels
Thulstrup puts the matter this way: "Whilst the main point in the first
half of the authorship was to explain how the individual man becomes a
Christian, the main point of the final period is to show how a man lives
as a Christian". 120 V. Lindström writes: "Kierkegaard's authorship revolves
around two major thought complexes - the question about the stages of human
life and the question about the imitation of Christ. In the first case
the task has been to show how one becomes a Christian, in the second case
how one is a Christian". 121 Per Wagndal argues that, whilst in the first
part of the authorship Kierkegaard was concerned with establishing the
Christian way of life over against the aesthetic way of life, in the second
part his concern is to set true Christianity over against aesthetic Christianity.

Behind each of these assessments lies the implicit judgement that a change
of strategy has exercised a profound influence on Kierkegaard's authorship.
The nature of his audience has somehow changed and so there must be a
consequent adjustment made to the means of communication. No basic change
is to be made in the content of the message, which is still oriented towards
the restitution of Christian subjectivity. Whilst initially Kierkegaard
was concerned with the aesthete and the ethicist, who made no pretention of
being Christian, at the end his chief aim becomes the introduction of
Christianity into Christendom. (We emphasise that this now becomes his
chief aim. We may assume that from his youth this "illusion" of Christendom
had never been lost on Kierkegaard but in the final years the destruction
of these illusions becomes the primary task). 122 Hitherto the inwardness
of Christianity had been communicated with reference to the respective
values of aesthetics and speculation. After the dialectical adventures of Either-Or the essential message comes through "only the truth which edifies is truth for you". Likewise the central theme of Postscript which is a thoroughgoing critique of Hegelian ideas is clear enough: Subjectivity is Truth. Here Christianity, with its emphasis on the quality of human existence as determined by passion and inwardness, is introduced into spheres of existence which, for all their intrinsic value, ultimately issue in despair. The illusions of non-Christianity which can be described in terms of aesthetics and ethics, are countered by the theology of the stages culminating in the summary definition of truth as: "An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation - process of the most passionate inwardness". This objective uncertainty finds theological expression in terms of the paradoxicality of the God-Man. But this theology also holds important consequences for Christendom, if it is understood and accepted. For then the objective norms of Christianity, such as the Bible, the Church and the Church's history will automatically assume their correct i.e. their relatively subordinate place in the perspective of the existing Christian individual. Kierkegaard insists that the truth as defined above is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual," and so it follows that acceptance of this definition implies the rejection of objective norms as absolute determinants of Christian truth. This would not involve their total abolition (no more than the exaltation of the religious sphere of existence denies the relative value of ethics and aesthetics). But certainly all those things which have become part of the establishment (det Bestaaende) can no longer be totally satisfying to him who exists as an individual in passion and inwardness. So the negativity which characterised the last years is implicit in all Kierkegaard had to say about the nature of Christian truth in the authorship up to and including Postscript. If his contemporaries had been able to understand and assimilate the essence of his teaching about Christianity as rooted in subjectivity and paradox, then there would be no further need for Kierkegaard
to take up his pen - or his sword. But this "if" is a very big one and it soon became clear to Kierkegaard in the tumultuous years at the end of the 1840s that his work had met with little or no real understanding. There was clearly need for a whole new strategy to be worked out and followed through. Instead of objective norms being relativised by his readers' own realisation of the absolute significance of Christianity as subjective truth, Kierkegaard now became increasingly aware of the need to face these norms and attack them directly. Introducing Christianity into Christendom was proving to be a far more difficult exercise than the conversion of heathendom, necessitating a far more precisely defined authority and making ever more strident demands for self sacrifice and possibly martyrdom. Only such an iconoclasm seemed able to inject Christendom with the realisation of what is involved in standing alone before God as a single responsible individual.

As the result of a number of factors, which we shall shortly be describing, Kierkegaard felt himself called after 1848 to destroy the illusions of Christendom and present Christianity in all its rigour and severity so that subjectivity might become accepted as the fundamental determinant of Truth.

So, to summarise our position so far. The pseudonymous authorship including the Fragments and Postscript establish the Christian sphere of existence as uniquely authentic relative to the sphere of aesthetics and ethics. The truth thus enunciated is defined in terms of inwardness and objective uncertainty. Meanwhile, in this period up to 1846, Kierkegaard published edifying discourses in his own name, basically directed at the representatives of Christendom rather than a non-Christian audience. However, when the message of the pseudonyms falls on barren soil, the consequent implications for the relative value of objective norms thus going unrecognised, Kierkegaard drops pseudonymity and embarks on a literary output which pushes through the principles of the edifying discourses to the furthest extremes of severity, culminating in the attack upon Christendom. This procedure is adopted in order to establish the claim of subjectivity by destroying the hold exerted by stable objective norms upon the prevailing Christian
establishment. Seen in the context of such a strategy, the "Attack" assumes its proper significance as a negatively orientated step along the path towards a positive goal.

An examination of Kierkegaard's attitude to the Church will help us to see better how this strategy actually evolved, and we must deal with those factors which prompted Kierkegaard to resort to the direct attack he had for so long resisted. But before proceeding further we shall examine the life and work of two principal figures in the evolution of the "Attack" - J. P. Mynster and H. L. Mørtensen.
NOTES


4. A. Henriksen: Methods and Results of Kierkegaard studies in Scandinavia. Kbh. 1951 pps. 11 - 12


6. op. cit. p. 46

7. ibid. p. 49

8. ibid. p. 52

9. ibid. p. 44


15. V. Lindstrøm: op. cit. p. 10

16. P. Lønning: op. cit. p. 9. However, Lønning correctly goes on to qualify this by saying that "naturally, this does not prevent a biographical or historical interest in Kierkegaard's life being combined with an understanding of his thought". (ibid. p. 11). See also: R. Magnus: Søren Kierkegaard, set udefra. Kbh. 1942. p. 12


18. Kbh. 1925: This large book was the culmination of several publications on the same theme beginning in 1895 with a psychological study of Kierkegaard's childhood and youth.

19. Kbh. 1933


22. P. Sponheim: op. cit. p. 15


26. Not that Søe is uncritical of Kierkegaard at other points. But it is the capacity of the authorship to be taken seriously which he wants to assert at the expense of the "Attack".


28. ibid. pps. 35–40


30. ibid. p. 92

31. E. Geismar: Omkring Kierkegaard. I. Torsten Bohlin. *Teologisk Tidskrift*. Kbh. 4. RK. Vol. 6 1925. p. 339. In his American lectures (p. 84) Geismar does state with reference to the final outburst: "These thoughts are not new to Kierkegaard". However, it is to be noted that this comment is made as a counter to the view that it was a sick man who penned The Instant. Of more significance is his categorical assertion in the biography that "... the pseudonymous writings do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the last year's violent attack on the Church". (S.K. Vol. IV p. 5)

32. V. Lindström: *Stadiernas Teologi*. Lund 1943 pps. 10–11

33. P. Sponheim: op. cit. p. 41

34. See J. Heywood Thomas: *Subjectivity and Paradox*. Blackwell 1957. pps. 45–47

35. M. Thulstrup: op. cit. p. 281. See also Hal Koch: *Et Kirkeskrift*. Kbh. 1960. p. 187 where the same point is made with regard to premises and conclusions. In fact, I am pleased to find support from Koch for my critique of Lindström's position. He notes Lindström's attempts to sever the final writings from the rest of the authorship in order to render the latter more acceptable. Koch comments: "This appears to me to be a not very successful endeavour". Cf. Lønning: op. cit. pps. 266–7

36. T. Bohlin: op. cit. pps. 66–68

37. V. Lindström: *Efterfølgelsens Teologi*. pps. 226–7. Cf. ibid. pps. 216–7 where Lindström argues that Kierkegaard's later emphasis on Christianity as misanthropic is a move away from the ideal of unity and variety of men before God as a necessary presupposition of true love of neighbour. "In the earlier phase Kierkegaard sees the significance of solitariness for a true love of neighbour and for a true Christian community; in the later phase he practically sees only the threat presented by the community to den enskildes spiritualit, t". Cf. V. Lindström: *La théologie de l'imitation de Jesus chez Soren Kierkegaard*. Revue d'histoire de phil. religieuse. Vol. 35. 1955. n 4 pps. 388–9

39. See above p. 13. This conclusion adds irony to Lindstrøm's own assertion that "If Kierkegaard's action in the course of the Church conflict becomes unexplained: this must call forth at least one misgiving concerning . . . the results obtained". Stadierønas Teologi p. 10

40. P. Rubow: Kierkegaard og Kirken Kbh. 1955

41. Pan. VII A 221; XI 1 A 275, 276

42. Ibid. p. 20

43. Kbh. 1955


45. Søe: op. cit. p. 64

46. Pan. XI 3 B 89. pps. 140 - 1

47. Søe: op. cit. pps. 63 - 66

48. Sponheim: op. cit. p. 93

49. V. Lindstrøm: Afkfoljerensens Teologi. pps. 22 - 3

50. Ibid. p. 97


54. It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard's criticisms of those who assume an objective standpoint towards Christianity are also appropriate to the kind of Kierkegaardian scholarship we have been discussing. See Concluding Unscientific Postscript pps. 23 - 4

55. Sponheim: p. 23. Also note that Sponheim's criticisms of Holmer run along similar lines. Ibid. pps. 25 - 4


58. Ibid. p. 288

59. Ibid. p. 296


62. ibid. p. 22


65. V. Lindström: Stadiernas Teologi. pps. 18 ff.

66. P. Lönning: op. cit.


68. Fabro describes the intention of "recent" Kierkegaard studies as "to delve deeply into the thematic complexity of his multiform works in order to rediscover his central dominant concept, and not to lose oneself in the literary maze of his writings". op. cit. p. 140


71. Per Lönning: op. cit. pps. 143 - 4 shows by reference to works by Rasmus Nielsen, Georg Brandes, Håffäng, Munch, Bruin and J. Gleditsch that the notion of Kierkegaard's authorship as a combination of two basically irreconcilable "lines" is by no means original to Bohlin - although the nature of these "lines" is seen to vary enormously.

72. Sponheim: op. cit. p. 42

73. See above: pps. 11 - 12

74. J. Heywood Thomas: op. cit. pps. 46 - 7


76. Sponheim: op. cit. pps. 3 - 4

77. See Postscript p. 166: "I conceived it as my task to create difficulties everywhere". Speaking of Stages Kierkegaard writes: "It is left to the reader himself to put two and two together, if he so desires; but nothing is done to minister to a reader's indolence". (Postscript pps. 264 = 5). Cf. Malantschuk: op. cit. p. 3

78. See Pap.VII A 4 (February 7th, 1846): "My idea is to give up being an author (which I can only be altogether or not at all) and prepare myself to be a pastor".
See The Point of View for my work as an Author

The general statements in 'A First and Last Declaration' (Postscript, pp. 551 - 4) throw little light on the actual motives for the use of pseudonymity and The Point of View's presentation is unhistorical.

The Point of View p. 73

Arbaugh and Arbaugh: op. cit. p. 713

Sponheim: op. cit. p. 32

Thus, prominent in Malantschuk's list of "difficulties we encounter in Kierkegaard's authorship" we find "Kierkegaard's scrupulously sustained use of pseudonyms (which) makes it difficult to find an unbroken line in the authorship". op. cit. pps. 3 - 4

Of course we must not overlook the fact that pseudonymity and indirect communication are related devices. See D. F. Swenson: Something about Kierkegaard. Minneap. 1945. p. 113 f.

Henriksen: op. cit. p. 9

Postscript pps. 67 - 74

ibid. pps. 67 - 8

ibid. p. 70

ibid. p. 73

J. Heywood Thomas: op. cit. p. 12


Postscript p. 171

James Brown: Subject and Object in Modern Theology. S.C.M. 1955. p. 43

Postscript p. 182

G. Malantschuk: op. cit. p. 114

ibid. p. 176. Cf. pps. 120, 122 - 143

ibid. p. 188

ibid. p. 150

ibid. p. 262. Also pps. 305 ff. where subjectivity is discussed with reference to Postscript.

ibid. p. 305

ibid. p. 371
"Kommunikationen syftar till att göra kommunikanden själv verksam; därför framställes olika "Huligheder" till 'Existents' ibland vilka kommunikanden har att välja en för egen del". Postscript pps. 216 – 7
110. See J. Heywood Thomas: op. cit. pps. 77 ff.
111. See below: "Kierkegaard's Perspective on the Church"
112. See above p. 19 ff.
113. Point of View pps. 22 – 27
114. Attack upon Christendom pps. 283 – 5
116. Point of View p. 38
117. P. Lønning: op. cit. p. 20
119. Point of View pps. 41 – 2
121. V. Lindström: Stadiernas Teologi. p. 9. See also Lindström's La théologie de l'initiation de Jesus-Christ chez Soren Kierkegaard. pps. 379 – 92
123. This is borne out by Kierkegaard's letter to Wilhelm Lund: "As you will know, I grew up in orthodoxy, so to speak, but as soon as I began to think for myself the enormous colossus gradually began to totter ... Now I could very well accept particular parts of it, but then these would prove to be comparable to the seedlings often found in rock fissures. On the other hand, I could probably also see the distortions in many separate points, but for a time I was obliged to let the main foundation stand in dubio". (Pap. I A 72)
124. See Pap.X 2 A 135; Point of View pps. 23, 43, 137 ff. and Training in Christianity p. 39
125. Either-Or II. p. 356
126. On the "illusions of objectivity" see Pap. VII 1 A
127. See Malantschuk op. cit. p. 140: "... according to Kierkegaard's view of the objective - subjective, there is an ascending scale from the predominantly objective disciplines to those in which the subjective prevails. In this way every discipline gets its proper place, and confusion arises if this stationing is not respected". Cf. Pap. X 1 A 146: "Objectivity is believed to be superior to subjectivity, but it is just the opposite; that is to say, an objectivity which is within a corresponding
subjectivity in the finale".

128. Postscript p. 182
PART II

The Personalities in the "Attack"
The close and long standing relationship which existed between Søren Kierkegaard and Bishop J. P. Lynster has inevitably proved a necessary object of study for Kierkegaard scholars. Psychologists have seen in Kierkegaard's self-confessed identification of his father's priest with the haunting figure of Old Michael himself an important factor in Kierkegaard's mental development; whilst biographers of Kierkegaard and analysts of his thought are bound to take account of their subject's relationship to this most influential figure. All too little, however, has been done, within the context of Kierkegaard studies, to bring the life and character of Lynster to the fore, and interest in him has generally been limited to those points at which he had a definite influence on the course of Kierkegaard's career. Yet it would seem obvious that a reliable and comprehensive understanding of this very important relationship is dependent upon a reasonably full knowledge of both, and not just one, of the parties. The necessity for such knowledge becomes even stronger when the object of study is that period of Kierkegaard's life dominated by the Attack upon Christendom. Herman Schwanenflügel was interested in studying Kirkestormen a little more closely and saw the necessity of a closer examination of Lynster's life and personality in order to evaluate the justice of the attack made upon him. The result of Schwanenflügel's investigations was rather dramatic for, instead of writing a book on the Church conflict, he finally published an extensive, two volume biography of Lynster - his admiration for the old Bishop having risen immensely, and at the expense of his previous devotion to Kierkegaard. As Jørgensen points out "It would be one-sided if we only heard Kierkegaard's opinion of Lynster",¹ and whether or not the reader responds in the same way as Schwanenflügel, nonetheless his experience shows how decisive a factor such knowledge of Lynster's life and personality can be in one's assessment of the "Attack".² It is my belief that Kierkegaard's existential dialectic makes as stringent demands upon the reader of The Fatherland and The Instant as upon him who would fully understand the rest of his authorship. An either-or is still being presented to the reader, and
the responsibility of choice lies entirely with the reader. On the one side lies synyster and the general awe and respect in which he was held by his contemporaries, on the other Kierkegaard's call to what Vernard Ellor describes as "radical discipleship". Certainly Kierkegaard is a corrective (although we must beware of using this term in order to minimise his demands); but a corrective to what? Surely synyster, and all that he stood for, must figure prominently in our answer to this problem. In the first paragraph of The Fatherland article of December 18th, 1854 (dated February, 1854), which contains Kierkegaard's opening shots in the "Attack", synyster is set firmly in the centre of the stage: "With the figure of the deceased bishop, his life and the manner of it, and the issue of it, before our eyes, we are exhorted to imitate the faith of the true guide, the genuine witness to the truth" (Hartensen's sermon, p. 5) to imitate his faith, for that, as was said expressly of Bishop synyster, was shown "not merely by word and profession, but in deed and in truth" (p. 9). It is to the deepening of our acquaintance with synyster's "life and the manner of it and the issue of it" this chapter is dedicated, in the belief that the choice Kierkegaard demands may be guided by a greater awareness of the alternatives he presents.

C.L.N. synyster, the Bishop's son, issues the warning that to write an accurate, comprehensive biography of synyster would certainly be a most difficult undertaking and H. L. Hartensen, after stressing synyster's great significance for Danish ecclesiastical and cultural history in the 19th Century, continues thus: "A complete presentation of his life and personality would therefore also demand a survey of contemporary ecclesiastical, literary and social relationships in Denmark - a description and evaluation of the prevailing spirit and direction of the times, the current circumstances and events in our fatherland". These remarks indicate how inadequate such a brief study as the following must be, and how great a role selection of material is going to play in determining the overall impression of synyster thus presented. However, it is to be hoped that with the assistance of facts and opinions as furnished by Church historians, literary critics, churchmen, friends and
relatives of Lynster and by Lynster himself we can present a picture of him which is both accurate in its detail and reliable in its judgements. We shall begin by describing the life and work of Lynster, and then proceed with a brief survey of his goals and achievements.

By and large, Lynster's childhood was not very happy. He was born on 6th November, 1775, but just two years later his father, who held a position of great responsibility at Frederiks Hospital in Copenhagen, died from consumption. His mother was not alone for long because she soon married Doctor F. L. Bang, Superintendent at the same hospital, and he took on the charge of Jacob Peter and his elder brother Ole.\(^7\) Only two more years were to pass before their mother died - also from consumption. From her letters we know her to have been a woman of great piety and perspicacity who quickly recognised her younger son's inclinations towards stubbornness and self-sufficiency.\(^8\) Bang remarried, but once again it was but two years before he was alone once more. He took a third wife, a girl of 16, who was to bear him nine children of whom only four survived infancy.\(^9\) Her domestic inefficiency resulted in Bang inviting her mother and two sisters to live in and run the house. Something of a matriarchy was thereby created so that the young family were brought up in a strange and unnatural atmosphere. In addition, Bang's extreme pietism cast a bleak shadow over the household, and Lynster was later to describe how each little misdemeanour was expanded into a grave sin.\(^10\) Lynster was to react strongly against such pietistic stringency when he had a household of his own to control. Bang saw it as his duty to decide categorically upon the professions his charges should pursue, and so Jakob Peter was destined for a living as a country parson. This did not displease him for such a role agreed well with his youthful dreams of a peaceful idyllic existence.\(^11\)

The children's education was largely entrusted to home tutors, but at the age of 15 Lynster was enrolled as a full time student, and he achieved very good results. However, he was still far from happy and in his autobiography he complains that "all the eulogies over the pleasures of youth are to a large extent illusory. It is individual hours and days which are
He did not make friends easily and only Henrik Steffens emerged as a really close acquaintance. However, his brother Ole was instrumental in organising regular evenings of fellowship and discussion at his lodging (known as "No. 5") where Lynster got involved in debates ranging over a multitude of subjects. He did not lack the wit and biting sarcasm which are so much the ingredients of these student exchanges, but he remained a far more introverted personality compared to his fellows.

As regards his dealings with the opposite sex, Lynster admits to deriving unspeakable pleasure from "the flashing of beautiful eyes". He was particularly attracted to one Sofie Gaarder and he waxes poetic about "how long he could survive on every small token of her favour she showed him, and enjoy it in love's most blessed rapture". There is no reason to believe that he ever expressed his love to the lady in question; rather he kept his feelings very much to himself.

In 1894 he passed his examinations "first class" and following Bang's initiative, he took up residence in the house of Grev Joachim Holtke at Bregentved to act as home-tutor to the 9 years old son of the house. His existence here was far from luxurious, but he came to respect the Holtkes as friends and mentors whilst the alertness of his pupil, the beauty of the surrounding countryside and the winters spent in Copenhagen did much to brighten his life. During this period he also had ample opportunity to study and broaden his education. He especially developed an interest in English, French, Italian, German and, especially, Classical literature. Furthermore, life amongst the Holtkes' equipped the young man with "a grateful nature, modesty and good manners".

In 1891 his pupil took and passed with credit the examinations for which Lynster had been preparing him so another chapter in his life had to close. Holtke had the patronage of the small country parish of Spjellerup and clearly Lynster was first in line for the appointment. But he expressed misgivings about entering upon a parish without a wife by his side. Furthermore, he was not absolutely convinced that ordination was the right course
for him to pursue. His religious upbringing in the Næng household did little to attract him towards the Church, whilst current trends in Biblical criticism were tending to jeopardise his faith in the integrity of scripture. He himself confesses that at times he felt himself "entombed in a consuming doubt and by materialist ideas. His deepest sentiments revolted against such thoughts, but his reason could not disperse them". He sought a firm standpoint for himself by wide reading in literature and philosophy and Kant exerted a great influence upon him. But try as he might, he could not be content with a faith founded on Kantian principles.

However, despite all his uncertainty, Lynster took his ordination examinations in July 1801 and was ordained on November 1st, the same year. He was still not happy about his unmarried status, and he felt acutely lonely at Spjellérup. His circumstances were comfortable, his income was good and he felt happy to be his own master at last. But spiritually he was deeply troubled. The assaults of rationalism upon the historicity of the Gospels gave him much cause for concern but he felt that his own faith was not built on a foundation sufficiently substantial to withstand these assaults. The early months of 1803 thus reveal to us a man undergoing a spiritual crisis of the severest kind. A real, dramatic spiritual breakthrough would be necessary to release him and this is precisely what occurred in the Summer of 1803. This religious experience is described at some length in Lynster's autobiography:

"Now it happened one day in the Summer of 1803 when I sat alone on my settee, towards evening, reading Jacobi's writing on Spinoza ... There tore through my soul something like a light from on high and I clearly said: 'If conscience is not a meaningless illusion - and in this respect I had no doubt at all - and if you follow it in some things, then you must follow it in all things, without exception, doing and saying what is in accordance with your duty as you recognise it and are able to fulfil it. You must remain quite unconcerned about the world's judgement, be it praise or criticism. And if there is a God - and neither was I in any doubt about this - and you do not refuse to bow before his will in some things, then you shall do likewise in all things, without reservation, and entirely commit yourself and all that is yours into his paternal hands. Be scrupulous with the talents he has allotted to you and endure without complaint the burden he imposes upon you'."

Lynster goes on to describe how the most significant words for him are
J: he is to give
of his whole self, and the recognition of this demand instills in him a peace
such as he had never experienced before - "the peace of God which passes all
understanding". Now, says Lijnster, the full significance of Christ's words
"No man can serve two masters" had been brought home to him.

This was what Lijnster called his "breakthrough" (Gennembrud) and it was
"as clear and definite as any which has occurred in any Lan's soul".21 The
stimulus to this breakthrough has been variously defined whilst there has been
a reluctance on the part of certain scholars to accept the details of Lijnster's
own account at face value. Martensen argues that Lijnster's reading of Jacobi
at the time of this dramatic experience is highly significant22 whilst
Schwanenflügel strongly denies any such connection.23 The truth probably
lies somewhere in between these two positions. So Plum writes:

"Even if there is a fruitful connection between Lijnster and Jacobi,
there is yet a divergence in their final positions. Lijnster found in
Jacobi one who articulated his yearnings towards a personal relationship
with God. From him he has learned to know the immediacy of the religious
relationship and the value of many religious concepts - but the way to
Christ he did not learn from him". 24

Hal Koch tends to emphasise the influence of Kant on Lijnster in the period
immediately preceding the breakthrough, and Waage is inclined to agree with
Koch at this point. 26 On the other hand, B. Ørsted believes the influence
of Spinoza via Steffens to have been stronger than that of Jacobi or Kant.27
Ørsted does not think that Lijnster came to a sudden Christian awareness, but
rather, the breakthrough simply initiated a progressive movement over a long
period. In other words, Ørsted thinks that Lijnster in his Heddelelsler has
considerably telescoped the progress of his Christian awakening and in this
he shared the view of Plum, who also wishes to define a progression in the
course of the breakthrough. 28

Although Ørsted and Plum do not wish to dispute the actuality of the
breakthrough, it is very clear that they wish to allow more scope for devel-
opment and re-appraisal with respect to Lijnster's religious thought than, for
example, does Schwanenflügel. However, the fact remains that Heddelelsler
reveal beyond all doubt the dramatic significance this breakthrough had in Lynster's own mind - even if we accept that, in reality, this experience was far less decisive and far more complicated in its development that Lynster recalled it in later life. However we support as having the greatest influence on Lynster at this time, his words in _Jeddelelser_ are relevant to them all. He says that philosophy "can never come to understand the Gospel in its entirety, however near to this it may be thought to have come". Plum puts the matter well enough. "... an examination of the purely human foundations does not demand that, in this calling of a young priest, we eliminate direct action from God". Clearly it would be a mistake to reduce Lynster's experience to an operation of the meditative mind. It was also a piercing of the soul and in his anxiety to stress the incisive novelty of the event, Lynster acknowledges no connection between his reading and what followed. We may believe that Paul on the Damascus Road was seriously contemplating the significance of his dealings with the Christians he was persecuting, and possibly having doubts about the rectitude of his actions; but it would be wrong to reduce his experience entirely to a logical cycle of thought. Likewise for Lynster, the content of his thought provided the stimulus to a dramatic confrontation with the objective reality of God.

Lynster kept this experience very much to himself, speaking of it only in his _Jeddelelser_. However, the climactic significance of this breakthrough cannot be denied: "it rose like a mountain and established itself as the boundary between that which had been, and that which was to come". To the end of his days, this occurrence represented to Lynster the most decisive event in his life. It was instrumental in convincing him of his calling to the priesthood and he settled down with a real enthusiasm for his work at Spjellerup where he was to stay for 10 years. He wrote to his brother "I now possess a truly historical Christ and walk more and more in a personal relationship to him ... I have a God and a Saviour". Lynster passed his time quietly at Spjellerup, and as in his early life, he was not anxious to seek company, although neighbouring priests provided him with some companionship.
He had a good deal of time for reading and he also made (relatively unsuccessful) attempts at writing poetry. But still he lacked, and missed, female company. Schmanenflügel quotes poems written by Lynster before and after the breakthrough which, he claims, demonstrate how the author's attitude to women changed as a result of his new experience. He is in the later poems more at peace and is content with what God will provide. However, such a transformation, if such there was, is probably more easily explained in terms of Lynster's new found friendship with one Kamna Rahbek who had been introduced to him by Steffens. Lynster virtually became a member of what came to be known as the Bakkhuskrøda (the Bakkhus circle). Lynster and Fru Rahbek were very much attracted to each other although there is some doubt as to exactly how deep was their relationship. They corresponded regularly (usually on topics of the day and often punctuated with artistic bursts of emotion), and exchanged visits. P.H. Boye describes her as one of the bright lights of the contemporary literary scene, although her behaviour in her relationship with men - especially those much younger than herself, seems to have been marked by a certain domineering possessiveness. She and her husband came to Spjellerup in 1804 and she continued to show her great admiration for this young, unmarried country priest. She had a very great influence on Lynster during a period when he was struggling for self-confidence and self-expression. We can safely say that to her flattering encouragement of his talents we owe his initial authorship. Reciprocally, it is true that he also, by his conversation, and most of all by his preaching exerted a considerable influence on the lady. The Rahbek's paper Minerva carried Lynster's first real literary work - an article replying to Bishop Boisen's Plan for the improving of public worship. But gradually life at Spjellerup became tiresome, and Kamna Rahbek's letters were amongst the few things to give him any satisfaction. This is not to imply that he failed markedly in his job. The Bishop noted after his visit in September 1809 that "Spjellerup and Smerup's young people are excellently versed in religious knowledge. Pastor M. is a worthy teacher, who has honestly endeavoured to fulfil his calling, and the congregation can
count itself fortunate in having such a zealous and bright man as its
Priest.\textsuperscript{1,2} Also, the Sunday after his own farewell sermon he sat as a
member of the congregation in the Parish Church at Spjellerup and heard the
preacher speak of the retired pastor as one "who not only endeavoured to
teach well but also to live well". But in spite of such words of praise,
Lynster felt that he had failed to get across to his people. The time was not
ripe for a religious revival - particularly amongst the farming community who
were well off and could be arrogantly indifferent to the preaching of
Christianity. The fault also lay with Lynster in so far as his rather gentle,
albeit earnest, demands upon his people did not match up to the hard-hitting
expression demanded by the times. He was not suited to a farming community
who were not taking to him as well as he would have liked and so he began to
set his heart on a move back to the Capital - Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{43} Many sought to
dissuade him from such a move, including Kamma Rahbek who accused him of
wishing to flaunt his eloquence amongst the country's social elite. There
may be a certain amount of truth in this charge. Although in 1803 Lynster,
in a treatise on the art of preaching, had stressed the need to make eloquence
subservient to the demands of a simple communication of the Gospel, he almost
certainly felt that his abilities as a public preacher and speaker deserved
the attention of a more refined public than that he found confronting him
in Spjellerup.\textsuperscript{44} Conveniently enough the position of Kapellan with Frue
Kirke in Copenhagen became vacant and, by using Woltke's good influence with
the King, Lynster was duly appointed (December 1811). Lynster observes
that this was the one and only post he ever sought after. All the others
came and sought him.\textsuperscript{45}

Lynster had to accept a drop in income on taking up his new post but
he found the new opportunities for preaching and the resplendent worship more
than sufficient compensation. He delivered his first sermon on the 7th
February, 1812, and although he was secretly dissatisfied with it, the press
received it well and on the next occasion he had a full church. Many
distinguished people flocked to hear him - including the Kierkegaard family.
Some of the semi-cultured claimed they could not understand, whilst the
Nationalists criticised his dogmatism. However, notwithstanding such
opinions lynster went from strength to strength as a popular preacher.

Outside his work, lynster lived a comparatively isolated life, numbering
only his brother and Carl Heger amongst his close acquaintances. His
apartment was made up of several small, light rooms on Cammeltory. His rooms
were not luxuriously furnished by modern standards, but Xanna Rahbek found
them "charming". Lynster tells of happy hours spent in work and contemplation in those rooms. But he also tells of hours in which (after an
expression of Fenelon) he only experienced "a bitter peace" (en bitter Fred).
This was not a sense of bitterness against the world, but a kind of indeter-
minable disturbance of the mind with no obvious source.

What was causing this "bitter peace"? Surely not public opinion, for
he was held in high regard, both as a preacher and preparer of Confirmees.
Schwanenflügel attributes these bouts of depression to lynster's relationship
with H. G. Clausen. He describes Clausen's preaching as most eloquent
and effective in its emphasis on obedience and discipleship with Christ as
the pattern, but devoid of attention to Christ as the revelation of God
in his capacity as Saviour and Redeemer. Lynster could agree with Clausen
to an extent, and he was always prepared to acknowledge a man of character.
But in their basic perspectives on life and religious understanding lynster
and Clausen were deeply divided. The stature of the scriptural record, the
mystery of the Incarnation and the real power of the Atoning work of Christ
were central to lynster's thought and yet he felt that Clausen was doing
violence to such beliefs. So, argues Schwanenflügel, we may assume that
between 1812 and 1828 when as Kapellan with Frue Kirke and as teacher in the
Pastoral seminary lynster had Clausen as his immediate superior, their
conflicting theological opinions must have caused some agitation in lynster's
mind. This is a possible explanation of lynster's trouble, although not
a scrap of evidence from his writings can be produced to support it. It
ultimately depends for its validity on whether lynster was the sort of man
to let theological differences between himself and a superior affect his mental stability. Again evidence to argue such a point is hard to come by, and one can only comment that if this was in fact the cause of Lynster's feelings of "bitter peace" then we might expect to find some references to such tensions in his generally frank and honest memoirs. 52 We may comment, in concluding our discussion of this aspect of Lynster's character, that if we can still be uncertain of what precisely constituted Kierkegaard's "thorn in the flesh" then it will not surprise us if our probes into the recesses of Lynster's mind - about which, in the absence of such voluminous journals as Kierkegaard produced, we can know so very little - should prove equally indefinite.

A source of great joy to Lynster, however, was his marriage in March 1855 to Fanny Hunter - the 19 year old daughter of the Bishop of Sjaelland. Although, when Lynster later became Bishop himself, people liked to joke at his expense about marrying into the job, we can safely accept Schwanenflügel's conclusion (p. 138) that no such ulterior motive determined Lynster's choice of a wife. A very real affection existed between them and they possessed well-matched temperaments. After 31 years of life together, Lynster was able to look back on a most happy marriage, praising his wife for her clear common sense, her tact and her tirelessness as a housewife. Two boys and two girls were born to the marriage. The sons both became theologians although one later turned to literature whilst the other died quite young.

With a wife came numerous financial obligations for Lynster, and his income from his post at Jnyre Kirke, notwithstanding Moltke's generosity, was not sufficient to meet such new obligations. However, two factors contributed to a relieving of the situation. First of all, by his marriage, he came into contact with the most influential group in Copenhagen, comprising wealthy business men like Constantin Brun who, with his wife, ran soirees for poets and promising personalities in the town. Lynster was well received in such circles and it is certain that these people would not have seen him go short of such things as were necessary for keeping up the standards expected of him. Secondly, Moltke used his influence to secure Lynster's appointment as a
member of the board for the supervision of the Grammar schools. Although there was some concern shown at the appointment of a Kapellan to such a high post,\(^\text{53}\) evidence suggests that Lynster carried out his duties firmly and effectively. He showed concern at the current trends towards humanism and made moves to ensure the retention of classical studies within the curriculum. The recent economic crisis (1813) had naturally occasioned a tightening of the belt in educational spending, but nonetheless Lynster spoke out strongly for teachers to receive fair pay and conditions. He was not so successful in his work with the university and he had occasion to write that "there is no group of people more difficult to govern that the Professors". We shall return to Lynster's work in the educational field when we come to discuss the fruits of his public career in a later section.\(^\text{54}\)

Lynster was now an object of praise from all sides. His sermons were widely read and held in very high regard and even the German historian F. C. Dahlmann was moved to comment about Freue Kirke's Kapellan: "we have no one to touch him in Germany".\(^\text{55}\) He was offered the post of tutor to the young Prince Frederik (later King Frederik VII), which he declined on the grounds of lack of ability. Also he was offered a post as Professor of Theology in the University of Christiania (Oslo) - an offer which he only declined after dissuasive approaches by Woltke.\(^\text{56}\) Ammundsen comments that "he would have greatly embellished our university, if he had taken that course".\(^\text{57}\) But he did accept the post of teacher in Psychology at the Pastoral Seminary in Copenhagen when it fell vacant. Bishop Hünther pressed Lynster to take the job in spite of the latter's protests that he lacked the necessary talents. In fact he became very successful, and he carried on spending two hours a week at the seminary even when he became Bishop - eventually he went so far as to write a text book on the subject. Bishop Hünther also laid on Lynster's shoulders the task of preparing a new edition of Luther's Catechism to replace the various different editions currently in circulation. Furthermore, Lynster became a member of a commission set up to produce a new translation of the New Testament. Despite Professor P.O. Brønsted's preference for a
much more free translation, Lynster was inclined to keep the tone of the old version (H.P. Reesen 1607) and not to deviate from the language of that version except where absolutely necessary. It was this latter, more conservative approach, which won the day.

Busy as he was, Lynster still found time for writing. He wrote a treatise on Lessing's Nathan the Wise; an article on "The Apostle Peter's first detention in Rome"; a doctoral dissertation on Paul and prepared a new collection of Spjellerup sermons. In addition, in 1867, two smaller works were published: Introduction to the Epistle to the Galatians and Five sermons on the occasion of the Reformation Festival 1867.

As if to warn Lynster against too much pride in his success, and too much confidence in the stability of his public and private life, there occurred five deaths amongst his closest friends and relations, all in 1848. First Sofie Ørsted, sister to Adam Oelenschlager, and then Count Joachim Holtke. The latter's death was most unexpected and Lynster wrote soon after: "Countless times since (his death) I have missed his advice and the much loved habit of visiting him in his rooms". Shortly after came the biggest blow of all to Lynster. His brother Ole died as the result of an apoplectic fit. In spite of the differences which had arisen between the brothers, this was a heart-rending blow to Lynster as well as giving him the task of attending to the future welfare of his brother's widow and children. But also death came to Lynster's own household. In the middle of September 1848 his wife Yanny had given birth to a son, but on the day scheduled for his Baptism the child was found dead in his cot. Again Lynster had been struck by a sudden blow from which one would expect him to take a long time to recover. The string of misfortunes ended in February 1849 with the death of the young Countess Holtke.

It is a tribute to the strength of Lynster's faith and diligence that these setbacks, following so quickly upon one another, did not retard his growth as a public official and theological writer. In the early 1820s he got involved in the current disputes between two schools of thought having
H. N. Clausen (the son of H. C. Clausen) and N. W. S. Grundtvig as their chief spokesmen. In 1825 Clausen published *Katolicismen og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning* and Grundtvig replied with *Kirkenes Gemæle* in which Clausen was accused of false teaching and of leading the people astray. Clausen's treatise was certainly rationalist in intent although he does try to find room for faith. Lynster can say (in *heddelelaer*) with some justification that the book serves between two different standpoints. It has abandoned pure reason yet cannot find rest in faith. L. Koch asserts that the contents of Clausen's book are of interest to Church historians only because of Grundtvig's subsequent attack. Certainly much of the argument which raged around this controversy was concerned with means rather than opinions.

Grundtvig was, to say the least, strongly outspoken in his article. Koch comments that it is easy to understand that "The Church's Reply must have made a discouraging impression upon the majority of cultured people; such a tone in a polemical writing had hardly been seen in the 19th Century".

P. G. Lindhardt says that it was written "in caustic phrases, and is full of insults". Lynster himself said that he did not wish to argue about the issues of the conflict, but rather about the mode of presentation. He delivered a sermon (Den Kristelige Visdom) which attacked the combatants, and especially Grundtvig. He was far from approving of Clausen's book, and in a letter to Englebroth he pointed out the extreme position of both points of view. Clausen's scientific arguments will not really stand up to scientific enquiry, whilst Lynster could not accept Grundtvig's elevation of the Catechism above Holy Scripture. However, what grieved Lynster was the bitterness which marred the tone of the dispute and his sermon dwelt at length on our duty to show compassion in our dealings with our fellow men.

The dispute raged on and eventually resulted in legal proceedings which saw Grundtvig placed under police censorship for his attack on Clausen, or at least, the manner of that attack. But from our point of view, the aspect of the affair which is most significant is Lynster's mediatorial bearing. He here clearly shows the qualities which were to make him an immediate choice
for high ecclesiastical office. Thus in 1626 when the rebuilding of the Castle Church at Christiansborg was complete, the King named Lynster as sost iræst (Court Chaplain). Also, the King's Confessor died and Lynster was appointed to take his place.

Lynster was pleased that this post was less subject to the whims of public taste and he also had more time for writing. It soon became apparent that many of the members of Kruise Kirke came to hear Lynster preach in the Castle Chapel (Slotskirken). He found this new post both easier and more attractive as well as being better paid. He spent four years of his time at Christiansborg working on a Christian Dogmatics. This exercise was basically for his own benefit and he showed it to no-one. He did write an article for the German periodical Theologische Studien und Kritik on the concept of Christian dogmatics, but the lack of response to his article in Germany only prompted him to observe that basically German and Danish theology are farther apart than was generally believed. But by far his most popular work was the two-volume Betrachtninger over de kristelige Troen Leerdomme (Reflections on the Christian faith). Lynster anticipated the popularity of this work, although he warned that it would give little satisfaction to those accustomed to more difficult (strenge) thinking. In fact, it came out in a second edition in 1837 and a third appeared in 1846. It was also translated into Swedish and German, and, according to Hal Koch 65 Reflections was by far the most widely read spiritual book of the century in Denmark.

In 1830 Bishop Jünter died and there was some unrest in the house, for it had generally been expected that Lynster would succeed his father-in-law and at that time he had no wish to leave the Slotskirke and relinquish his time for writing. Consequently there was some relief in the Lynster household when P. E. Huller was appointed as Sjaelland's new Bishop.

Lynster's elevation to the Bishopric came just four years later on the death of Huller who had been sick for some time. Now Lynster was not so reluctant to take up the vacancy. The work in connection with the Schools had not gone so well since the board's chairman, Lynster's friend Walling,
died in 1829. Bitter disagreements had arisen, particularly with regard to
the teaching of the classical languages, and so Iynster was not sorry when his
move to the Bishop's office forced his resignation from the directorate. Also,
Iynster was beginning to sense his age and felt that he could function more
effectively as a Bishop than as a Priest. But again financial problems
loomed on the horizon. His post as Hofpræst and Confessor had paid well,
and he had also been the recipient of a sizable payment as a member of the
directorate for the grammar schools, but the bishopric paid not nearly so
well. However, the matter was resolved by his being given permission to stay
on as the King's confessor and to keep his post at Slotskirken for the winter
along with the provision of an ex gratia payment as compensation for loss of
salary on leaving the directorate.

It was on the 9th September, 1834 that Iynster was named Bishop of
Sjaelland, by tradition the foremost ecclesiastical post in the country. It
is certain that Otto Laub was echoing the thoughts of many Danes, especially
in Copenhagen, when he wrote in his diary on hearing of Iynster's appointment:
"What an excellent development! Who could be Sjaelland's Bishop other than
he? Who could carry on in the Slotskirke, in preaching to the Capital,
the Students, the Priests and the whole country, what he has begun, other than
himself?".67 Schwanenflügel extols Iynster as a credit to his office - being
both a conscientious administrator and visitor, and he supports this praise
with something told to him by Iynster's daughter, viz. "Not one of Sjaelland's
Bishops has done as much visiting as he, not even my excellent friend Bishop
Martensen".68 However, Iynster was conscious that his new position was a
mixed blessing. On the good side he could see chances for theological study
and for exercising personal interests, and he also relished the opportunity
of travelling around his Diocese talking to and listening to the priests. But
on the debit side lay the fact that some priests, whilst appreciating having
a Bishop from their own midst, would only give full support to one who was
formerly a Professor. Also he was concerned at the rather imprecise nature
of his authority which gave him no power to rid himself of unworthy priests
and lecturers.
On the whole, Lynster's years as Bishop were not the happiest of his life. Denmark was at war with itself both theologically and constitutionally; and Lynster's conservative views in the face of Grundtvig's and Clausen's extreme demands brought him constantly into conflicts of the times. Whether the issues under debate concerned education, Church ritual, the prayer-book, the separatist "awakenings", the Baptists, the hymn-book, the constitutional position of the King, the power of the priest's conventicles or the correct interpretation of Luther's Cathechism, Lynster by virtue of his office could not avoid becoming heavily committed. We have already discussed Lynster's inclination towards mediation in Church conflicts and we have seen how, in the friction which arose between H. G. Clausen and Grundtvig, he was prepared to see the issues in as dispassionate a way as possible, and to condemn histrionics - even when the opinions thus presented have some validity in his eyes. But this is not to imply that Lynster was prepared to compromise his basic beliefs. Before becoming a Bishop, that is before he had to make ultimate decisions, he could afford to enjoy the role of a dispassionate observer. But now it was up to him to promote future Church policy, and it is certain that one of the factors which produced the experience of disillusionment climaxed by his closing of Lædelelser in 1847, must be traced to the failure to materialise of many of his plans for the State Church in Denmark. L. Koch suggests that Lynster, towards the end of his life, failed to keep up with the pace of events and the consequent shifts of opinion and perspective. In so far as this is in fact the case, it is a direct result of his refusal to compromise. In Schwanenflügel's words "No-one felt more strongly than him that 'we shall not serve the times, but the Lord!'" We shall only be able to point briefly to the conflicts which arose during Lynster's bishopric, and, as indicated earlier, a full handling of such issues would necessitate a description of 19th Century Church History such as we have no time to provide in this Chapter. However, it is hoped that some impression of the problems facing Lynster can be given, as well as a description of his proposed solutions.
By far, Lynster's worst clashes were with the Grundtvigians. Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783 - 1872) was an outstanding religious patriot and poet. He was the founder of the world famous Folk High-Schools. He was interested in Nordic mythology and wrote several books on the subject, the moral of which was that the Danes are of brave and sterling stock. His spiritual life was somewhat dramatic until, at the age of 40, he made his "incomparable discovery", namely, that the baptismal confession of faith, the Apostles' Creed, was the decisive statement of genuine Christianity. On this basis he proceeded to work out a theory according to which the Bible could give light, but not life; life being bestowed only through the sacraments and the Creed. Thus arose Grundtvigianism as an ecclesiastical party with peculiar views of its own, which right into the 20th Century have caused much conflict, now calmed down because the original Grundtvigian antithesis of Bible and Creed is no longer maintained in its extreme form. Perhaps Grundtvig's greatest personal contribution to Danish Church life was his hymn-writing. He penned nearly 1,500 hymns "which sing especially of the Pentecostal community, through which the Holy Spirit renews the life of the Lord as a present reality". The attacks which began the assault on Lynster, however, were printed in a paper Nordisk Kirketidende which was the work, not of Grundtvig himself, but of his disciple Jakob Lindberg. Lindberg was the son of a clergyman from Ribe. He had a most distinguished academic career and was particularly zealous in his study of Hebrew. He was also a master of the art of invective and Lindhardt described him as "probably the most violent ecclesiastical controversalist in Denmark". But he was a very capable propagandist who appreciated the value of the press in disseminating not only facts but also opinions. So it was that in Nordisk Kirketidende an attack was launched against Lynster's translation of Luther's Catechism (1819). Lindberg, acting quite in character, did not mince his words. Although he had once described Lynster's translation as the only one deserving any respect, he now declared it to be "the worst catechism we have ever had in Danish, and if Luther were alive he would have disassociated
h. i. m.

Although Lindberg's criticisms were largely directed only at small points of grammar and terminological usage, Lynster took the attacks very much to heart and replied with On de Danske Udgaver af Luthers lille Katehismus (Concerning the Danish editions of Luther's little Catechism), in which he went through all the various extant editions pointing out how changes occurred even in Luther's own time. Lindberg continued his attack with two further articles which Lynster thought unworthy of a reply - he simply published his paper in a second edition. Already in 1831, Lynster had written an article for Dansk Ugeskrift entitled Om injurier i trykte skrifter (Concerning injuries caused by the printed word), in which he delivered a disguised attack on Lindberg's vitriolic outbursts against H. N. Clausen. Clearly, Lynster was appalled by the theological mud-slinging which was beginning to characterise the conduct of Danish Church affairs, and he evidently felt no inclination to compete with Lindberg on such terms. The dispute over the Catechism was finally resolved in 1849 by the authorisation of G. F. Balslev's translation to be used in Danish schools.

Lynster ran into more criticism when he was asked to draw up a speech of thanks to the King from the Staender Forsamling (States General) in Roskilde (1835). Frederik VI had ordered the creation of such an assembly which could promote the people's wishes before the absolute monarchy. The general tone of Lynster's address was one of emphasis on the harmony between Prince and people, and the concurrence of the King's will with the wishes of the people. But when the speech was read out in the assembly, a great storm erupted. The assembly were not in favour of such a subservient approach - not thanks but demands were the order of the day. After a lively debate the address was passed with but one minor alteration. However, on its subsequent appearance in the press the speech provoked further outbursts and Lynster's membership of the assembly became very unpopular. These events also succeeded in marring Lynster's joy and pride in the Reformation festival (1836) which was variously condemned as extravagant and dull.
In 1834 Grundtvig had published Den Danske Statskirke upartisk betragtet (The Danish State Church impartially considered) in which he argued that the State Church is no longer an actual Church, but merely a human arrangement, a State Establishment. Further, he asserts that liberty of conscience "is the chief principle of all religion and every law abiding citizen's permanent right" and therefore demands the abolition of the parish bonds and the liberty of the priests so that he is free to speak and act according to his convictions in preaching and administration of the sacraments as well as in liturgical and dogmatic matters. Lynster could not find himself able to accept such demands and neither could he support the parallel demands for liturgical reform now being directed at the ecclesiastical authorities from all sides. Some groups and individuals - such as Faber in Odense, drew up alternative prayer books, and so in 1837 the Kancelliet met to decide upon what action, if any, should be taken. There was much disagreement in the Council as to who should sit on a commission to produce a new book of prayer and ritual, and finally Ørsted's suggestion that Lynster should alone carry out the project was accepted. Lynster quickly sounded out opinions about what the new forms should contain and submitted a draft for review by Academy Direktor Waage in Soro as well as by three other distinguished theologians. At last, early in 1839, the new proposals were ready for presentation to the King. Lynster wanted them to be made public but the King insisted that a commission made up of Bishops and academics should meet to consider Lynster's suggestions. The constitution of the commission was announced in July 1838 which temporarily took the ritual issue off the boil. But the Grundtvigians were not prepared to let the matter rest for long and soon they were as vociferous as ever in their demands for the immediate publication of the draft. But the commission proceeded slowly but surely with its work and only Professor Clausen proved consistently difficult. The matter finally reached the Council in 1841 and thence to the King. From the King the new prayer book must go to the Cabinet for approval, but despite Lynster's repeated reminders to the King the draft proposals went no further and so failed to become effective. The battle
of words which raised around the new prayer book proposals was especially violent, with attention being mainly centred on the new baptismal forms. One of the main objections was that there were two forms for baptism - one for adults and one for children. Grundtvig published _Prisprog_ and Bishop Lynster's _Forslag_ in which he firstly objected that the new Ritual was to be made obligatory, and, secondly, he complained that the questions at Baptism were changed so that according to the strict conception of the Apostles' Creed, which he now insisted on, a covenant was no longer instituted (by an acceptance of renunciation and faith). Against this attack, Lynster wrote _Oplysninger angaaende udkastet til en Alterbog_ where he deals not only with Grundtvig but also with _Kirketidende_ and other assaults on him. He complained of how the extreme viewpoints currently being promoted were conducive only to a rending of the Church into several distinct parties with none of which could he ally himself. He resisted all charges that his draft proposals comprised attempts to unite irreconcilable opinions and L. Koch asserts that Lynster would have nothing to do with Grundtvig's charges. If the object of Lynster's severe retort to Grundtvig's charges was to silence criticism from that quarter then he certainly had some success. However, as Lindhardt observes, Grundtvig's opposition succeeded as well and an authorised version of the Ritual has never since been possible. A ballot of the clergy in 1838 on the subject of the loosening of the parish bonds had shown a majority in favour of Lynster's advocacy of the _status quo_, and it could similarly be claimed that for various reasons (e.g. lack of an official organ such as _Nordisk Kirketidende_) the will of the majority had been thwarted by the aggressive tactics of the Grundtvigian party. So Lynster's prayer book, entirely Lutheran in spirit and certainly of great value as a foundation for further discussion and progress in liturgical reform became a dead letter.

"One might say that around the year 1840, Lynster's reputation reached its culminating point. It is true to say that for 25 years he had been an outstanding priest for the Danish Church as a whole. Then he expressed his opinion the great majority followed him and he had still never really been at variance with public opinion - not because he had adapted himself
to it, but because it had reverently bowed beneath his clarity of mind, his many talents and his overwhelming eloquence".

So writes L. Koch and it would be difficult to disagree with this judgment. Yet we shall shortly see how the events and moods of the 1840s were to control him and his reputation as never before in his career. So Koch continues: "But the ballot in the assembly over the loosening of the parish bonds was really the last victory in which he can be said to have commanded general support". On the death of Frederik VI political interests came more and more into the forefront of public affairs and this must have contributed to Lynster's failure to keep full control of events. But also Lynster himself must take some of the responsibility for the failures and disappointments of his later years. The new situations emerging out of the theological and political turmoils of mid-19th Century Denmark demanded an openness to radical change, an awareness of the limitations of old solutions in the face of new and revolutionary problems which it is doubtful whether Lynster possessed. A new form of government was emerging and with it a new kind of authority which put little value on the traditional structures of power in Church and State. But Lynster could not adapt himself readily to this change, and his very real grief expressed at the death of Frederik VI can be seen as a symbol of his heart-felt concern at the passing of the old order and the emergence of new conditions which he felt able neither to accept nor adequately control. So at this climactic point in Lynster's career one can say with justice: "The years which were passed had been entirely rich in honour and success; but the years to come comprised opposition and disturbance which often made him bitter and sometimes unjust".

One of the most bitter disputes during Lynster's episcopacy raged around the forced baptism of the children of Baptist parents. Again, he fell foul of the Copenhagen Conventicle which concluded that Lynster was too old to comprehend the spirit of the times and what it needed. The argument centred upon whether children whose parents, out of Baptist conviction, refuse to take them to be baptised should be baptised nevertheless, against the parents wishes and beliefs. Lynster believed that as Baptists refused to accept children as
members of their congregation before they are of an age to make personal profession of faith for themselves, such children must be treated as other neglected infants and be baptised into the congregation of the State Church. The dispute reached a head when P. G. Kierkegaard (Kierkegaard's brother) sought advice on what he should do with the children in his parish of Rodersborg whose parents refused to bring them to be baptised. Although Kierkegaard felt it against his conscience to enforce baptism against the parents' will, Lynster nevertheless asserted that this was what should be done. But the opposition proved too strong, with H. N. Clausen, Konrad, Hartensen, A. S. Ørsted and even his own son-in-law Paulli standing over against him on this issue. The King himself now began to waver and finally he transferred his favours from Lynster to the "pro-Baptist" camp. The case finally terminated around the year 1848 with the Baptists being recognised as a valid religious group in Denmark.

Now we come to the point early in 1847 when Lynster closed his memoirs for the first time. He does so in great despondency and expresses himself glad to be of an age when he dare hope that he might soon leave this life - despite the fact that at 71 he was still strong enough and ready for many more duties. His popularity was on the wane and he knew it - not only amongst the clergy but also in the political domain. He became identified with ultra-conservative positions and so was the whipping boy of the national-liberal opposition. In the final paragraph of Meddelelser Lynster expresses his disaffection with life - its instability and uncertainty. However, he dares to hope that he has not lived in vain either with regard to himself or others. He goes on "life has not been easy for me; however, I have enjoyed to the full the good things vouchsafed to me; but best of all was to be elevated above this world". He expresses the hope that he might still be able to drink the cup of tears when it is passed to him, and to bear whatever burdens are still to be laid upon him, although he adds in conclusion that the state of the Church and of his fatherland is not such as to make him wish for his life to be extended much longer. But an early death was not to be. In fact, just five
years later (September, 1852) Lynøe took to his memoirs again in order to correct the despondent conclusion with regard to the Church and the clergy and the State. "That which occasioned this despondency is now past" he writes, and he believes that a change has occurred in the attitudes of the more intelligent members of society including the clergy. They have discerned what is to be expected of the new order and they have moved from a position of militant alliance with the revolutionary forces, to one of orthodox Christian apologetics. In other words, they are allying themselves more and more with Lynøe and what he stands for; and Lynøe finds ample evidence for this shift in his clergy's affections in the demonstrations of good will and respect shown on the occasion of his Jubilee in the Priesthood (1851). Here we can quote the second conclusion to Heddelelær, and comparison with the words of 1847 will show how marked has been the change of mood during this period of five years:

"I recognise with thankfulness to both God and man that my position vis-à-vis the clergy of my Diocese is at the present time as happy as I could possibly wish. It is otherwise with respect to the future which is impending for the Danish Church. But I shall say little about this for everything in Denmark at the moment is so insecure that no reasonable assessment is possible. In any case, the time must be near when in one way or another my period of labour must come to an end. But whether my appointed time is to be a little longer, or shorter, the prayer of the old hymn writer is still appropriate to me:

"Vend synd og skam kun af,

at med et ærligt navn jeg lægges i min grav."

Lynøe's final feelings of contentment are not so much a result of his satisfaction at the turn of events in Denmark after 1847 (his comments about the instability of the Danish Church makes this very clear), but rather he takes pleasure in the fact that he has been proved right and that many of those who once opposed his conservatism have now seen the error of their ways and the wisdom of his. We have no space here to deal at length with the political events which fostered the 1848 revolution, but suffice it to say that an exaggerated national self-consciousness inspired by the Danes' successful defiance of Germany over the question of the future of Schleswig and Holstein was a major factor in the overthrow of royal absolutist rule. Danish opinion
was split on the question whether those two Duchies - German in ethos but still symbols of Denmark's successful self-assertion over against Germany in the past - should continue to be governed under the Danish constitution. Danish nationalists, who wished to maintain the Rüders as Denmark's southern border, finally persuaded the King to adopt their intransigent position and his assent to Nationalist feeling on this issue could not but strengthen the drive towards popular government. So came the Constitution of 1849 by which the monarchy finally abandoned its claims to autocracy in Denmark.

"With little or no struggle and sacrifice" writes J.F. Reddaway, "Denmark proper had become a limited hereditary monarchy, in which the King shared legislative power, with a Diet elected by the people ... Freedom of religion, of the Press, of public meeting and of industrial career were granted; and all privilege was abolished". 90

With regard to the Church, the Constitution of 1849 declared that "The Evangelical Lutheran Church is, as that Church to which the over-whelming majority of the people belong, to be considered as the Danish Folkekirke and enjoy as such the support of the State". Thus it did not call the Church of Denmark a state Church but the Church of the Nation. The document promised the Church a constitution and also a special act for dissenters. Although neither promise was kept, in actuality religious liberty followed with freedom for nonconformist congregations. It was apparent that, in Lindhardt's words, "on the one hand religious liberty was desired, and on the other it was commonly wished to avoid a break between Church and State". 91 Hence liberty was granted, but symbols of the Church-State alliance were maintained, e.g. it was made a condition that the King always should be a member of the Church. The Old State Church including all citizens was thus replaced by a privileged National People's Church without any change in cult or confession.

Much debate ensued about the new constitution and particularly about the paragraphs on the Folkekirke and on religious freedom. H. Schack maintained that the fact that only the Evangelical Lutheran Church was to be supported by the State was incompatible with religious freedom, whilst C. Palludan-Müller came to the same conclusion but from a different angle. He argued that the State should be to the Evangelical Lutheran Church as it is to all other sects
and so in such a way it could exert a general influence for good. Lynster considered the paragraph satisfactory because he found it impossible that in the foreseeably future any religion other than the Evangelical Lutheran would be dominant in Denmark.

With regard to the paragraph on religious freedom, inevitably the question of the loosening of the parish bonds which tied the people to particular priests had to arise. Lynster was suspicious of the motives behind such proposals - especially with regard to the offices of baptism and burial. He had no objection to communion and weddings being made an object of choice as to who should conduct them, but the other offices provided scope for those interested in gaining support outside their own parishes for certain changes in ritual and prayer book practice. Moves to release the parish bonds were, in fact, defeated at this stage; but those who supported such moves (and especially the Grundtvigians) were successful in 1855. On the question of the granting of specific rights as citizens to leaders and members of sects outside the Folkekirke, Lynster felt that a special law should be drawn up for each case and was against the granting of privilege under a general statute. On these questions, as well as on later issues such as the desirability of civil marriage (which he strongly opposed over against Rudelbach) Lynster can be seen trying to rescue as much as possible of the old order. All his amendments to the proposed constitution demonstrate his concern to keep the governing body of the Church and the Rigsdag as closely linked as possible.

But it was obvious that a new form of Church Government had come to stay, and one of its consequences was that Bishops such as Lynster were no longer listened to in reverent awe. The Rigsdag now saw itself able to pass laws and discuss issues without necessary reference to the Church - a circumstance which Lynster, with his strong inclination towards a close liaison between Church and State, could not but view with alarm and dismay. L. Koch summarises Lynster's reaction thus: "In the whole liberal movement he saw misfortune for the State, and in Grundtvig's efforts to loosen all ecclesiastical ties he saw a dissolution of the Folkekirke and a disintegration of the educational
influence it could exercise on the people". Koch concludes his history of the Danish Church 1817 - 54 with a comparison of the influence of Lynster and Grundtvig on the events of this period. His conclusion is that although Lynster may have experienced the opposition of his immediate contemporaries to his views, "The present generation (Koch is writing around 1870) has witnessed that all is not as it should be simply because we have loosened the parish bonds, given congregations the right to choose their minister and created the High Schools. And it is hardly too daring to think that the future will become more and more appreciative of Lynster's work, and, conversely, become clearer as to the lopsidedness of Grundtvigianism".

Lynster clearly felt that this movement back in his direction had begun before his death. On the occasion of his Jubilee year in the Priesthood he was honoured by the clergy of his diocese as well as being treated to a reunion of old relatives and acquaintances whilst on a visit to Valløby. "He saw in this evidence that the opposition of his colleagues had come to an end. The new constitution had not fulfilled their expectations, and they now admitted through their demonstrations of affection that their Bishop had not been quite so wrong in his opposition to their once violently expressed desires".

Several of Lynster's contemporaries have left us their impressions of the old Bishop in the period before his death. So Cl. Petersen speaks of "an unforgettable impression" which Lynster made upon him. Seldom has he seen in one man such nobility and deep wisdom so beautifully united with kindness and human love. Also, one of the few acquaintances of Lynster's own age to survive him, A. S. Ørsted, got the impression, on hearing his last sermons, of a man who felt the nearness of God and who was ready to leave this world. However, there is some confusion as to the exact state of Lynster's health in the months before his death. In his concluding note to Meddelelser which he published a few months after his father's death, F. Joachim Lynster says that there was little or no change in Lynster's condition after the completion of his memoirs. He showed the same lively concern for the Church and for study, and although he suffered some deterioration
in his eyesight he nonetheless undertook his itinerary of visitation in the Summer of 1853 and returned sound and well. But in a letter to Gude, Martensen expresses concern at Lynster's state of health and especially his inability to carry out the duties of leader of the assembly properly. So, in the middle of January, 1854, he caught a chill, and after only a very brief confinement to bed he died on the 30th of January, aged 76 years. His eldest son has this to say: "Only seldom, and then always in a very few words, did he talk to those nearest him about his death; but whoever has known him as a priest and as a man, have doubtlessly gained the impression that if anyone has been prepared to go hence, then certainly it was he".99

Lynster was buried eight days later, but what happened on the previous Sunday was to prove of more lasting significance. For it was on that day that Prof. theol. Martensen, in his capacity as Court Preacher, chose to deliver a eulogy on Bishop Lynster. His text was Hebrews 13, v. 7 f., and in the course of the address he said "From the man whose precious memory fills your hearts, your thought is led to the whole line of witnesses to the truth which like a holy chain stretches through the ages from the days of the Apostles". These words, which few people saw as particularly out of the ordinary, were seized upon by Kierkegaard and were to prove the spark which ignited a blazing inferno. Kierkegaard was convinced that something must be said, and he said it in no uncertain way. One can only speculate as to the probable nature of Lynster's historical reputation had Kierkegaard kept his thoughts to himself; but one can be sure that to many Danes of the present day: Lynster is the Bishop whom Kierkegaard attacked rather than the Bishop whom Martensen praised.100

Kierkegaard challenges us to evaluate Martensen's description of Lynster as a witness to the truth not only with his life before us, but also "the manner of it" (hans Liv og levnet). It is to the latter that we now turn.

Kierkegaard described Lynster as "pleasure-loving" or "self-indulgent" (Nydelssyg)101 and it is this assertion as much as any that incited the
indignation of those who came to the Bishop's defence. Now, according to the more common usage of the term, it is difficult to regard Lynster as especially self-indulgent; but it is also true that Kierkegaard would not wish to use the term so narrowly as is the custom. Kierkegaard would not have to concede defeat if it were to be shown that Lynster was not the overfed, underworked and generally excessively indulged playboy to whom we would tend to apply the term "self-indulgent", because his application of the term operates not in the range "average - excess" but rather in the range "Christian demand - average". Kierkegaard writes in one place that the paradox of the Incarnation would have been no less real if Christ had come as a King on a throne rather than as a baby in a manger - the heterogeneous nature of divine and human existence renders variations within the latter of small importance when in direct contact with the former. Similarly, the infinite qualitative difference between the Christian demand and the standards of the world means that any concession to worldly wisdom or earthly pleasures represents an abdication from one's obligations to God who is interested in but one thing - obedience. Therefore, we must warn the reader against bringing any image of Lynster's life and behaviour as evidence against Kierkegaard's charges, before the theory of Christian discipleship which fostered and prompted those charges has been understood and evaluated. In so far as this present chapter serves to underline the harshness of Kierkegaard's strictures against Lynster, then to the very same extent must it serve to elucidate in existential terms the severity of the Christian demand and the radical nature of the choice imposed on a man when confronted with the God-Man in Christ.

We have already spoken of Lynster's childhood days, and especially of his life under the repressive pietism of Frederik Bang, his step-father. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that Lynster felt no respect or affection for Bang, it would be equally extravagant to assert, as does Erslev's Vorfatterleksikon that Lynster found in him "a true father". Little joy was to be had in the atmosphere of the Bang household, although the vivacity of his third wife Louise, still only a teenager, could sometimes
enliven the scene - usually at the expense of her husband's dignity. The situation was not helped by the arrival of Louise's mother and elder sister who were called in by Bang to manage the affairs of the household when his young wife proved unequal to the task. Within the limits imposed by such a matriarchy, Lynster could not enjoy the full advantages of a normal family life, and the picture we have of him at this time indicates a small, weak-voiced, introverted youth who desperately needed a stimulus to self-assertion. His upbringing in the Bang family had a lasting effect on him, and the plastic severities which were so much a feature of his youth were conspicuously absent from his own household. His son tells us that he considered religious questions to be no subject for mealtime conversation or in company. He enjoyed listening to anyone talk on any subject without any prerequisite that the matter be especially significant. A similar reaction against the astringencies of his youth may be found in his attitude towards the observance of Sunday. Although the mornings should be spent in the observance of religious duties (Worship, Bible reading, etc.), he felt it as by no means necessary that the whole day should be spent thus.

So we must conclude that Lynster's early years were far from happy, being sadly deficient in the motherly love and domestic security which is expected of a stable home. The influence of these years on his later life seems to have been wholly negative. Neither was his experience as a student any happier. The circle at "No. 5" gave him the chance to meet many new friends and to indulge his taste for conversation on a wide variety of topics. There was also much emphasis laid on aesthetic subjects, especially literature and the theatre and we may assume that not only theatre-talk but also theatre-going was a feature of Lynster's student life. However, his involvement in a group whose members were generally much older than himself, and whose brilliance of wit and expression tended to exceed his own half-formed talents, contrived to create within him a conflict between an insecure inferiority complex and an unyielding ambition to become someone of importance. This was a real conflict for Lynster and one of the features of his post-breakthrough
years in his conscious rejection of "ambitious dreams" in the face of the Christian demand now made explicit to him. There is no evidence to suggest that Lynster lived in a particularly lavish fashion during his student days, and it took a period in the Holte's household to educate him in the finer points of cultured behaviour. For a man who was later to assume a position in the forefront of Danish upper class society this experience at Bregentved has to be seen as of very great value. We have also commented earlier in this chapter on the opportunities which his tutoring duties offered for him to widen his reading in modern and classical languages. Yet, despite these obvious benefits, Lynster could not be entirely happy in the uneventful, often rather stuffy surroundings of the Holte household. But, on the other hand, neither was he especially anxious to move into a Parish without a wife,\textsuperscript{107} or, what was of more importance, without a full conviction of the Christian Gospel. We may describe Lynster at this time as a man of wide learning and interests, diligent in performing tasks allotted to him and possessing a lively mind open to all ideas whatever the school of thought from which they came.\textsuperscript{103} Yet this mind was in a state of conflict and, unable to settle on a firm spiritual foundation, he lapsed into the state of deep depression which preceded his great breakthrough. His troubles were in no way related to material problems for he had a reasonable income and a home at Spjollerup which was to his liking - and, anyway, it seems his material demands were far from extravagant. Rather, his was a spiritual dilemma which demanded a spiritual solution. This is important, because it lends support to the view that the motivating force behind all Lynster's thinking and acting, throughout his life, was a religious force.\textsuperscript{109} Although he was prepared to accept the material benefits which sometimes went with ecclesiastical preferment, one would have to stretch the evidence more than a little if one is to argue that he was tempted by them and actively pursued them.

C.L.N. Lynster explicitly sets out to furnish his readers with "personal reminiscences" which, he hopes, will provide some help in understanding lievedelejer. This is a valuable document, because it sets out a comparatively
Objective view of Lynster although, with Jørgensen, we must accept that it is very much a product of filial affection. Also, it was occasioned by Georg Brandes' book on Kierkegaard (1877) and is written in conscious opposition to the attack on Lynster described in that book.

Early in the article, C.L.N. Lynster deals with his father's tendency towards too hasty judgement of other people. He describes how Lynster would often have to temper a too stringent judgement with jeg mener det ikke såa slemt (I do not mean it so badly), whilst several persons - especially politicians - who later became his friends, were initially repelled by his aggressive comment. Spiritual pride featured high in the list of Lynster's pet hates, and it is argued that it was this fault which principally turned Lynster against Grundtvig and led him to a fairly tolerant attitude towards the Rationalists who demonstrated greater humility in their conflicts with opposition forces. Lynster's wife is seen as especially instrumental in preventing her husband from pursuing his inclination towards too hasty decisions and unjustifiably harsh judgements. (p. 10).

C.L.N. Lynster spends a good deal of time describing his father's aesthetic interests and especially his tastes in reading, theatre, music and ballet. Although the description of Lynster's taste in poetry and prose reads rather like a library catalogue, the impression still comes through of a man who read widely, in all types of subjects, and who was prepared to enter wholeheartedly into current debates as to the merit of various works and writers. Particularly as a young man, and in his early years as Bishop, he endeavoured to set aside time for light reading, being convinced that one should mingle one's theological pursuits with something morsomt (amusing). He had a great regard for Shakespeare whilst works which were deficient in true entertainment value and freshness, or which were too intricate and over-ornate were the main object of his stern judgment. (p. 23).

As regards his taste in drama, Lynster had a great love of comedy and especially those plays which, whilst being amusing, also threw light on the serious side of life. He was an astute critic of actors and actresses but
warm in his praise of those who pleased him. However, music did not feature prominently amongst Lynster's diversions although it would be misleading to suggest that he was devoid of all musical appreciation (p. 25). But he had an especial dislike of musical evenings which obliged him to sit perfectly quiet listening to a seemingly endless musical recital when all he really wanted after a hard day's work was a chance to enjoy some lighthearted conversation.

When C.L.N. Lynster describes his father's daily routine we get very much the impression of a conscientious priest exercising his duties in a diligent and unremarkable way. His day began with Bible reading followed by breakfast and then "paper-work". His day-to-day business obviously varied according to circumstances, but he always tried to set aside times for quiet meditation, conversation with his family and recreation. He enjoyed playing cards, although chess was his favourite pastime - this being fostered as much as anything by his longstanding love of mathematics. He made it part of his duty to keep in touch with both national and international affairs by regular reading of the daily newspapers, and he endeavoured to incorporate information thus acquired into his prayers and meditations. He possessed two remarkable gifts which made it possible for him to produce a not inconsiderable authorship concurrently with his busy pastoral duties.

First of all he was able to study against the noisiest and most distracting of backgrounds, whilst, secondly, he possessed sufficient stamina, both physically and mentally, to continue his studies long after his family had gone to bed. C.L.N. Lynster recalls how, when he was engaged on the project to produce a new translation of the Old Testament, Lynster would bid goodnight to his family and then add *Nu skal jeg til at læse hebraisk* (Now I am off to read Hebrew). He did not greatly enjoy travelling although he welcomed the opportunities provided by his rounds of visitation for reading of all kinds. His library contained books covering every aspect of cultural life, but especially theology, philosophy and history. It appears from his son's account of his reading habits (p. 30 - 32) that Lynster had an especial penchant
for lesser known writers of his day, and was often highly dissatisfied with the works of Hegel and his followers, as well as with Schleiermacher's dogmatic productions - although he was attracted by the latter's personality and preaching.

As regards the quality of life in the Lynster household, As S. Ørsted writes that it must be described as "modest" although this does not mean that he did no entertaining. In fact, Vogtmann, in a letter to P. Hjort in 1830, suggests that the midday meals Lynster provided for himself and his guests were rather too luxurious, and Christian Kolbech in a letter to his son describes a meal he had with Lynster in December 1853 which "was of the first rank, really quite splendid with four if not five courses". C.L.N. Lynster, in reply to such suggestions, tells us that Lynster was anxious not to separate himself too much from the ruling class in such things (as social behaviour etc.), although he inwardly kept himself independent of them. Ørsted corroborates this view, and argues that Lynster indulged in social manners only in so far as this was in the interests of his pastoral work. He did not pursue such pastimes with an eye on the pleasures to be thus enjoyed. Although Lynster opposed asceticism and expressed his respect for the honourable pleasures of life, he was also aware of the struggle which must be endured if one is to aspire to the high Realm of "... he demanded nothing more of himself or of others than serious conscientious effort, and he opposed comfort and indolence in outward things (his son speaks of his father's aversion to comfortable armchairs on the grounds that they "pampered" people), but he also objected to "inner comfort". By this he meant failure to recognise the extent to which one's own will and sense of purpose controls one's actions and way of life. His son suggests that Lynster's avowed opposition to determinism was a product of his distaste for those who claimed that they could not become other than they were.

So we have given some hints as to the kind of life Lynster led as a youth and in early manhood, and, with the help of his son's reminiscences, it has been possible to describe the manner of his later life, especially his home life
and distribution of time. It is clear that he lived no more, but certainly not much less extravagantly than would normally have been expected of a man in his position. After all, he was not only Primate of Denmark but he also had the ear of the King and enjoyed the friendship of his most distinguished compatriots. Seen from such an angle, his ability to protect his privacy and enjoy a fairly normal, happy family life is quite remarkable. As we have said before, his relationship to such material benefits as he enjoyed was more one of passive acceptance than active pursuance, and it was on Kynster's alleged failure to resist the worldly comforts which traditionally went with ecclesiastical preferment that Kierkegaard based his charges.

2. See L. Koch: Døn Danske Kirkes Historie. Vol. X 1817 - 1855. pps. 287 - 5: "... and those who have reiterated and reinforced Kierkegaard's assertions have demonstrated that they have not been concerned to make themselves acquainted with the man they condemn. Although this is almost certainly too harsh a condemnation, nonetheless, Koch is right to stress the need for a closer acquaintance with Bishop Lynster.

3. So N. L. Plum: J. P. Lynster som Kristen og Teolog. Kbh. 1936. p. 16: 'Everyone must pass judgement here (i.e. on the issues raised by Kierkegaard's and Grundtvig's attacks on Lynster) on the basis of the material which lies before him and his own personal set of values'.

4. The phrase which Lowrie translates as "the issue of it" (i.e. Lynster's life) is Udgangen af hans Vandel which occurs in the text Hartensen chose for his eulogy on Lynster (Hebrews 13 v. 7,8: "... velledere ihu, som have forlyndt Euer det Cuds Ord; og naar I betragte Udgangen af deres Vandel, da efterfelder deres Tro. Jesus Christus er liger og idag den Samme, ja til evig Tid"). The Danish Udgangen translates the Greek Εξοδος which has the two possible meanings of "result" or "close" or "conclusion". (Cf. I Corinthians 10 v. 13 where Εξοδος is used as a synonym for Εξοδος). Udgang, however, can only strictly mean "end", "conclusion", "exit" and whether or not Hartensen was referring to the manner of Lynster's death, Kierkegaard certainly seized upon this interpretation in order to then demonstrate just how little the exit of Lynster from this world resembles that of a "... inness to the Truth" (Cf. Pap. XI 3 B 201 p. 338 and Attack p. 7 f. where clear reference is made to Lynster's life and death). As far as we are concerned, both possible interpretations of the Greek text are relevant to this chapter and we shall concern ourselves as much with the results of Lynster's life and career as with the manner in which he died. That this is in accordance with Kierkegaard's intentions is shown in the article "The point at issue with Bishop Hartensen" (Attack p. 21)


8. See Schwanenflügel: op. cit. pps. 4 - 8


11. ibid. p. 24

12. ibid. p. 38

13. See B. Ørsted: J. P. Lynster og Henrik Steffens. Kbh. 1965. This is a big book devoted to the documentation of Ørsted's belief that Steffens's influence on Lynster was dominant in determining the main lines of the latter's mental and spiritual development. On Lynster's loneliness at this time see ibid. pps. 30 ff.
However, in general the trend running through Jacobsgaard, Plum and Ørsted towards a more critical approach to the "Leddelelser" is in itself a healthy one. Plum and Ørsted detect a drastic foreshortening by Lynster of the time-scale relating to the breakthrough. This is to be expected when the intervening time between the events and Lynster's recording of them is as long as 50 years. But a sense of proportion must be kept when taking liberties with Lynster's account. For example, although Ørsted has done well to bring to the fore the obviously strong influence of Steffens on Lynster, his enthusiasm breaks reasonable bounds when Steffens is heralded as the dominant influence. At this point the "Leddelelser" account seems nearer to the truth.
30. But B. Ørsted and Plum believe that references to the breakthrough are to be found in many of Lynster's sermons, published works and letters. See B. Ørsted op. cit. pps. 512 ff.; Plum op. cit. pps. 48 - 54.

31. Schwanenflügel: op. cit. p. 68.

32. See Hal Koch and Bjorn Kornerup: Danmarks Kirkos Historie Vol. V. Kbh. 1954, p. 147: "This inner experience in his soul of the peace which exceeds all understanding, and the love which is beyond knowledge became the fixed point from which Lynster has since carried out his work both as priest and preacher in Spjellerup, and subsequently - in the face of heavy demands and violent storms - as the Church's leading man in the Capital".


34. Especially to be noted are M. E. Englebreth and C.A. Bjørn whose correspondence with Lynster long after he left Spjellerup reflects the strength of their friendship. See Leddelelser p. 147 and Køge Eilade af J.P. Lynsters Liv og Tid p. 440.

35. See Kornerup: J.P. Lynster og Spjellerup p. 102 where a neighbouring priest, L. Gude, is quoted as describing Lynster's life at Spjellerup as more that of a student than a priest.


40. See Breve Fra Lynster p. 79.


42. Hunters Visitatsbøger. Kbh. 1809.

43. See Breve Fra Lynster pps. 117 f.; leddelelser p. 181. On the farming community's reaction against the authority of the parish priest at that time see Hal Koch: op. cit. pps. 26 - 30; 36.

44. See B. Ørsted: op. cit. p. 312.

45. A. S. Ørsted: Af mit Livs og Tids Historie Pt. III. pps. 308 f. supports Lynster's contention in this respect, and Ørsted was a man of sufficient influence to have known if Lynster had deliberately courted preferment.

46. Leddelelser pps. 185 - 188, 190.

47. See Fr. Hammerich: Et Levnedsløb I p. 184.


49. H. G. Clausen was one of the most prominent spokesmen for the rationalist movement in Denmark. He was Dean of Copenhagen and also Principal of the Pastoral Seminary. See L. Koch: Danmarks Kirkos Historie IV - 17 pps. 115 - 124; 126 - 131 and Hal Koch: op. cit. Vol. VI pps. 69 - 71.
51. Clausen and Lynster came into conflict on the occasion of the Reformation Festival, 1817. Clausen, as Stiftsprøvet, preached the official sermons whilst Lynster, as Kapellan, published five sermons of his own. These were very different in tone from Clausen's, and made a point of emphasising Christ's atoning work and his resurrection as central to the Christian message.

52. See further H. N. Clausen: H.C. Clausen's Aftersmaal. Kbh. 1867. p. 42 where it is stated that H. C. Clausen accepted his new colleague "with real joy, and the amicable relationship, once established, was maintained in the ensuing years".

53. The remark was passed, "hitherto Professors could create Kapellans, now Kapellans could appoint Professors".

54. On Lynster's talents as an administrator, see Kornerup: op. cit. pps. 106 - 10

55. See Schwanenflügel: op. cit. p. 137

56. See Hedeboelser p. 192


58. L. Koch: op. cit. p. 51

59. But N.B. Hal Koch is strong in his praise of Clausen's book and believes that its exposition of Catholic thought and practice is still instructive. op. cit. pps. 199 ff.

60. L. Koch: op. cit. p. 55


62. See B. Ørsted: op. cit. pps. 5; 2 - 14 where the essential difference between Lynster and Grundtvig is seen in terms of their respective styles of preaching and public expression. See also H.L. Hartensen: Af mit Lewnet I pps. 46 - 9: "The opposition between Lynster and Grundtvig is not an opposition in terms of faith; they preach the same Gospel, have the same faith and the same hope. The opposition lies in the manner or, if you like the spirit in which the Gospel should be preached"; also Plum: op. cit. p. 122

63. See P. Hjorts Breve. Kbh. 1867 p. 141


65. Hal Koch: Danmarks Kirke gennem Tiderne p. 138


69. See Hal Koch: op. cit. p. 287: "... throughout all these years (i.e. of Lynster's episcopate) not one commission to do with ecclesiastical affairs could be established or chosen without Lynster being a member - and often its chairman".

It is worth noting that Grundtvig had for a long time admired Lynster and had been anxious to win his support - especially in the clash with Clausen. Lynster had been approached by Grundtvig to edit *Jaagiskrift* - the first of the Grundtvigian periodicals and Grundtvig was almost certainly upset when Lynster did not come unequivocally down on his side against Clausen. See H. L. Hartenson: *op. cit.* Vol. I pps. 50 f.


D. Patrick: *Pascal and Kierkegaard* Vol. II p. 30

See Hal Koch: *Den Danske Kirkes Historie* p. 274 and Postscript p. 45 where Kierkegaard has words of praise for Lindberg

Quoted by Schwanenflügel: *op. cit.* p. 19


See *Pap. I B 2* p. 163 where Kierkegaard also shows dissent from the views expressed in this address

See L. Koch: *op. cit.* pps. 149 - 51; Hal Koch: *op. cit.* pps. 301 - 2

See *Nogle Blade af Lynsters Tid og Liv* pps. 374 - 84

Hal Koch: *op. cit.* p. 296

*op. cit.* p. 161

ibid. p. 162. See also *Pap. I A 188* where Kierkegaard comments: "Now he is old, he has had his day ... and now his Church is not nearly so extraordinarily well attended".

See *Nogle Blade af Lynsters Tid og Liv* p. 278


F. G. Lindhardt: *op. cit.* pps. 118 - 9
92. See Hal Koch: op. cit. p. 205
93. L. Koch: op. cit. p. 287
94. ibid. p. 287
96. Cl. Petersen: Det Canile og det Ly ved Oehlenschlagers kjerneåraen p. 147
99. See Leddelelser p. 292
100. It is interesting to note that A. S. Ørsted (op. cit. p. 306) justifies spending so much time talking about Lynster by reference to Kierkegaard's attack. Cf. N. H. Plum: op. cit. p. 17
101. See Attack p. 9
103. Postscript pps. 527 f.
104. Pap. XI 1 A 5
105. C.L.N. Lynster: op. cit. p. 36
106. ibid. p. 44
108. See B. Ørsted: op. cit. pps. 44 - 86 and Leddelelser p. 102
109. See H. L. Hartensen: Til Erindringer om J. P. Lynster pps. 12 f. where a sense of religious vocation is seen as controlling Lynster's whole existence. See further Hartensen: Af mit Levnet II p. 76
110. See A. S. Ørsted: op. cit. Pt. III p. 311
111. ibid. p. 310
112. Breve til P. Hjert. First Collection p. 286
114. C.L.N. Lynster: op. cit. p. 14
115. See Breve Fra Lynster p. 66 where Lynster writes to Kamma Rahbek about the severity of the Christian fight
116. C.L.N. Lynster: op. cit. pps. 33 - 4
Whereas it is vital to have an insight into the life and personality of Lynster in order to fully understand the values at stake in the "Attack", there is rather less need to delve deeply into Hartensen's background. Lynster was called "a witness to the truth" and the justice and significance of such a designation can only be appreciated in the light of who Lynster was and what he represented. "Lynsterish Christianity" and "New Testament Christianity" stand as the poles between which the Christian must choose if he is to authenticate his faith existentially. So Hartensen, by his sermon, is but the occasion for the "Attack" whilst the person of Bishop Lynster lies at the heart of its meaning and purpose.  

However, Hartensen remains a central figure in the events of 1854 - 5 and we shall benefit from a closer awareness of his life and work. This will be of value not only so that we can say with Denzil Patrick 2 "and it was a man of that stamp who called Bishop Lynster one of the genuine witnesses to the truth of Christianity!" but also in order to elucidate the irony of the fact that the representative of the "cold and futile objectiveness of speculative divinity" should herald the chief personification of "the tepid objectiveness of conventional Churchmanship" as a witness to the truth. 3 Here we shall limit ourselves to a study of Hartensen's life and work only up until the time of Kierkegaard's "Attack", followed by a study of the relationship between the two men.  

Hans Lassen Hartensen was born on 19th August, 1808. His father, Hans Andersen Hartensen, was a sea faring man who rose to the status of ship's master. His career at sea ended with his being captured by the English in 1807 and imprisoned for 5 years. On his return to Flensborg he took up teaching and writing on nautical and commercial subjects. He had a great love of the Danish language and Danish culture which he passed on to his son.  

On the other hand, Hartensen's mother Anna Maria, whilst possessing a lively mind and an abundance of energy was not on the same cultural level as her husband. She was brought up in a home which looked to the South.
rather than the North for its inspiration and language, with the result that she spoke mostly German and in fact wrote her autobiography in German. It is Arildsen's view that from his mother Hans Jensen inherited an optimistic view of life and also his inclination towards the German language. ¹

Lartensen first went to school in Flensborg and he records not too favourable impressions of the predominantly rationalistic undertone of the curriculum. ² School lessons were conducted in German whilst at home his father spoke only Danish. This latter fact proved important when, in September 1817, Hans Andersen took the family from Flensborg to Copenhagen in the hope that his books written in Danish, would appeal to a wider public there. Now the son made his first acquaintance with Danish nationalist feelings and in his autobiography he was later to recall the decisive importance of this move for his concern to protect all things Danish as regards Schleswig. ³

The Lartensen family came to Copenhagen at the beginning of a period of considerable stress for Danish economic life. The collapse of the National bank in 1813 and the loss of Norway the following year was not only materially damaging but also emotionally demoralising to the people of Denmark. But these things only indirectly concerned a boy of eight, and Lartensen recalls that his most vivid impression from these years is of the Reformation Festival of 1817. Until 1823 Lartensen attended V. Westen's Institut where he found great difficulty with mathematics, little interest in Classical literature but was greatly attracted to Danish language and literature. He read widely in poetry, prose and drama and admits that he studied more what he wished rather than what he was obliged to study. He led a quiet, introverted home life over which his father's death by drowning in October 1822 was to cast a dark shadow. He describes his love for his mother and how he discussed everything with her, but nonetheless he has to conclude that his upbringing during this period was far from healthy. He had few contacts of his own age and so became left to himself for longer periods than was desirable. "My nature led me towards an introverted life" he writes "and as I lived in my
inner world and could abandon myself to it without being disturbed, so the 
external world became more unimportant to me than should have been the case. However, at the age of fifteen, Hartensen moved to the Metropolitan School and so, in Arildsen's words, began "a new, and as regards his education and development, very significant period of his life". His entry into this fine school was only made possible by his mother's willingness to sacrifice her own best interests for those of her son.

Now Hartensen found himself in a far more respectable and sophisticated environment than before. He comments very favourably upon the school buildings and he settled down to the work required of him - first out of a sense of obligation but this soon became a real love for academic study. Classical languages and literature dominated the curriculum and Hartensen acquired a strong affection for philological studies. But the school also provided plenty of opportunity for wider reading, and under the guidance of one of the school's most illustrious teachers, Paul Martin Møller, Hartensen became acquainted with "virtually the whole field of Danish poetry and a great deal of foreign poetry as well". He had made the close acquaintance of another pupil, Frederik Bornemann, and together they became especially attached to Oelenschlager's poetry. The headmaster was N. L. Nissen who commanded little respect from his pupils when he was teaching, but is praised by Hartensen for his maintenance of discipline and authority without forsaking human compassion. Perhaps Nissen's most decisive effect upon Hartensen was that by his naturalistic interpretations of the miracles, he first acquainted Hartensen with rationalistic ideas and thereby was the first to provoke his life-long antipathy towards this school of thought. At the school, Hartensen also came under the strong influence of J. C. Lindberg who, recognising the peculiar talents of this particular pupil, set out with vigour to win him to the Grundtvigian cause. Hartensen was suitably impressed by the personal attention he received at Lindberg's hands, and whilst he never adhered in any significant way to Grundtvig's basic teachings he was not prepared to be put off at this stage by Nissen's warnings against becoming too involved in
The pupils and staff of the school became very much involved in the current religious debate between H. N. Clausen and Grundtvig, and a great deal of debating ensued. We gather from Hartensen that the arguments soon came to revolve around the very basics of Christian belief and that there was stirred up a great deal of excitement in the souls of many of the pupils. As his teacher in religious subjects Hartensen had P. A. Plum who was a disciple of H. N. Clausen. So it is not difficult to understand that, under the dual influence of Plum and Lindberg Hartensen became deeply involved in the Kirketover currently dominating Danish Church politics.

Of great significance for Hartensen at this time was his reading of Henrik Steffens's small book Von der Falschen Theologie und dem wahren Glauben which was published in 1823 and appeared in Danish translation as Om den Falske Theologie og den sande Troe two years later. This work made a threefold impression on Hartensen which Arildsen calls 1) aesthetic (he was captivated by Steffens's thought on mythology and fantasy; 2) religious (he read with interest, but also with a degree of personal detachment, Steffens's descriptions of the inner life of the true Christian) and 3) speculative (the most abiding impression he got from the book was that of the totality of existence). At this time, having been exposed at the Metropolitan School to the main theological options currently in vogue, the young Hartensen was attracted to a doctrine such as Steffens's which emphasised the point

"that it must be possible to offer a view of the world and of life in which all that has significance for existence - nature and spirit, nature and history, poetry, art, philosophy - comes harmoniously together in a spiritual temple in which Christianity is the midpoint dominating and explaining all things". 12

These last words were written many years later, and when taken together with Hartensen's work as a whole they are sufficient tribute to the profound significance this book of Steffens had for him. Whether Lindberg or Steffens was the dominant influence on Hartensen during his last years at the Metropolitan School is a moot point, 13 but either way in 1827 he left to become a university student - having by virtue of his own diligence and the merits of his teachers, enjoyed a broad education, and fully justifying the glowing
So Hartensen began his studies in theology at the University. Whilst in his first year he heard lectures on philosophical and philological topics, it was clear from his last year at the Metropoliten School that the study of theology was to be his main objective. He began his studies at a time when "a fruitful awakening of new ideas went through the whole of protestant Christendom". Rationalism was on the defensive, whilst the Systems of Hegel and Schelling were commanding ever widening respect and Schleiermacher's theology was encouraging moves "in a deeper Christian direction in both religion and theology". If we add to these trends the spread of the "Awakenings", the growing power of Grundtvigianism and the consistent influence of Lynster we can acquire some impression of the exciting challenges facing a young, lively, thirsty mind like Hartensen's. As regards the theological faculty itself, Hal Koch sums the matter up thus: "Certainly none of the Professors were strong personalities such as to arouse enthusiasm, but they were nonetheless all competent in their subjects, solidly proficient and capable of winning the students' respect". C. V. Lornemann was "Summus Theologus" and he registered strong protests against "den moderne mystiske, phantastiske Naturphilosophie". Professors P. E. Kuller, and Jens Jøller were both alike in having passed through "a religious development from a vacillating position between Kant's Rationalism and German liberal theology to a fully evangelical standpoint". But the faculty's most significant and influential member was H. N. Clausen who was closely associated with the rationalist cause in Denmark although he was also under the influence of Schleiermacher.

Hartensen did not possess the sort of personality which rushed into alliance with one school of thought or another. "In my individuality", he writes, "there was an inclination not so much to become the disciple of one individual teacher, as to take up the various current trends, work upon them in my own way and thereby fashion for myself a conviction and a standpoint I could call my own". Arildsen describes Hartensen's psychological
composition as "religious - speculative" and asserts that he would only be at rest with a theological point of view which could combine both these positions. Thus he was attracted to Steffens and so it was that in his student years, he saw his basic problem to be the uniting of faith and knowledge, theology and philosophy. Hartensen's autobiography gives the impression of a fairly harmonious spiritual development during these years, but it seems certain that things were not as easy as the older man recalled them. He speaks, in a letter to L. Gude in 1853, in terms of his "first youthful years, his student years and first breakthrough" whilst J. K. Paulli, in a letter to G. P. Brammer, is more explicit and states that Hartensen had endured "the difficult fight against doubt". Just how difficult was this struggle we may not know, but, it is certain that he did not escape the inner turmoil which was a feature in the early lives of most of the great religious figures of the time. During his student years Hartensen sought "a harmonious unification of faith and knowledge". Whilst Grundtvig and H. N. Clausen influenced Hartensen in his search, the influence of Sibbern was most significant. In the Winter of 1831-2 Hartensen heard Sibbern lecture on Christian philosophy and he was deeply impressed. He records that here he learnt "That when Christianity is the truth then the Gospel must not only be accepted because it stands written, not only because it has been handed down by the Church, indeed not only because it addresses itself to our conscience and our hearts, but also because its truth is recognised as intellectual truth being in itself objectively real and valid". Hartensen records his thanks to Sibbern for having sown so many seeds in the young student's mind which were later to grow and blossom. Because Sibbern did not put forward his Christian philosophy in a printed form it is difficult to determine precisely the nature of these seeds, but certain it is that his influence is to be seen in many aspects of Hartensen's thought. Hartensen records that Sibbern's Christian philosophy "was basically a speculative theology. He adopted a standpoint from which he led us not only out beyond Rationalism, but also beyond orthodoxy and Grundtvigionism with their 'crass' concepts". However, despite the great influence Sibbern had on Hartensen
the latter never became "Sibbernian". But in Sibbern, Hartensen found the same seeking after a role for Christian speculation, a reinstatement of thought without thereby ignoring the valid impulses of feeling. The religious and the speculative must both be given their place. 28

Hartensen confesses that, at this time, whilst he looked upon Lynster with "deep respect" he was basically in agreement with the Grundtvigians in their depreciation of the future Bishop. He heard several of Lynster's sermons and read his publications, but he was not so impressed as to be able to say "that I now had a standpoint where I could rest or, what is the same thing, from which my further development could proceed. ... I had to seek the solution to my own problem. I sought the unity of faith and knowledge. My religious concern was commensurate with my speculative concern - they went, so to speak, as one. I could only rest where both were satisfied at once. Here indeed was much that I could not find in Lynster, and which Lynster could not give me ... I did not become a Grundtvigian, but neither did I become Lynsterian". 29

In pursuance of the solution to his problem Hartensen also felt drawn to immerse himself in the work of Schleiermacher and Hegel. 30 Although he was conscious of the great force of personality pervading the former's work he also identified certain deficiencies in Schleiermacher (i.e. lack of teaching about the last things, the Trinity and knowledge of God's nature). Anyway "Hartensen could not identify himself intimately with a God of the feelings, but needed also a God for thought". 31 Hegel, on the other hand, represented "a major contrast to Schleiermacher. He would have nothing to do with the view that religion should only be linked to the feelings. He desired that thought should be a basic motivating force in Religion". 32 In Hegel Hartensen found the demand for an objective world-view in which all the orthodox dogmas reproduced in "a new and fresh form" again come to be recognised for their objective validity. He goes on:

"by studying Hegel there arose in me the notion of a point of view which, with a Trinitarian background, understood Christ as the mid-point in existence, understood the Universe as a system of concentric circles all pointing towards the innermost circle in which is Christ, and only in him is there to be found clarification and understanding". 33

Now Hartensen's total world view with its centre point in Christ gains a new Trinitarian dimension as a result of Hegel's explorations into the nature of God. But still Hartensen has doubts as to the conclusiveness of Hegel's system and
he finds in those criticisms which accuse Hegel of threatening both the individual existence and the Christian revelation "much to think and meditate upon". 34

Besides his studies, Hartensen also undertook some preaching and tutoring during this period. He entered the Pastoral Seminary in November 1832 where the homiletical and catechetical examinations were supervised by H. C. Clausen, and it was before the latter that Hartensen preached. Hartensen tells us that his tutoring duties were undertaken with his eye on a future academic career although only a few students came under his supervision at this time. 35 Two of them became famous as opponents of Hartensen - the Grundtvigian, Vilhelm Birkedal 36 and Søren Kierkegaard. 37 Hartensen introduced Kierkegaard to Schleiermacher and soon became aware of the fact that this student was exceptionally gifted although he regrets his inclination towards sophistry.

So Hartensen's student years drew to a close. Our account of this period had tended to centre around his quest for a solution to that particular problem which was of so much concern to him, and in so doing we reflect the orientation of his own memoirs. Just exactly how true to the facts is this account we may not be able to tell, although we may safely concluded that Hartensen's recollection of events in later life could not but be to an extent coloured by subsequent events. 38 However, on the basis of such evidence as is available, Arildsen's summary of his subject's development during these years is sound:

"The result of Hartensen's student and first Candidatur years (1827 - 34), seen academically, is that he had still not found a firm standpoint from which he could develop his 'Totality view'; whilst personally he had not experienced the religious breakthrough which was precisely the sine qua non for his attaining the Christian stage at which his religious - speculative psyche could develop itself into this total Christian view of life and the world". 39

He has manifested in himself signs of a deeply religious disposition, but as yet he has not achieved that perspective necessary for the conversion of his view of Christianity as an object of scientific study into an awareness of Christianity as a powerful, personal force in his life. 40 It was thus that Hartensen set off with Bornemann on his grand foreign tour in 1834, and
however much he was conscious at this time of the tensions within him, he was to get no further than Berlin before the full trauma of a spiritual crisis made him aware of his need to come to terms with the reality of the Christian demand. It is to this most important period of Martensen's life that we now turn.

"That the great journey abroad which is traditionally reckoned to belong to the realms of the theologically cultured, has meant a great deal to many young Danes thus dragged away from the atmosphere of home to breathe the air of the great world cannot be disputed; but for no one has this journey signified more than it did for the young Martensen."

Although his travels lasted only two years, Martensen devotes approximately one fifth of his memoirs to a description of them, thus reflecting their significance in the memory of the older man. We shall obviously be unable to devote so much attention to this brief period, but we shall try to give some impression of the journey with especial reference being made to those aspects of it which were to prove instrumental in forming Martensen's subsequent character and theological disposition.

His first stop was Berlin where, in his own words, "Hegel was dead, but his philosophy continued in full flower". However, it was precisely whilst Martensen was in Berlin that the rift in the Hegelian school began to manifest itself. The differences of opinion largely revolved around questions concerning the doctrine of God, personal immortality and the person of Christ. Strauss named the two parties "right" and "left" Hegelians, and this designation adequately reflects the degree of disagreement between the representatives of the two groups - a rift which was destined to become very much worse. Generally speaking, Martensen was very disappointed with Berlin University and he was indeed unfortunate to have made his visit at a time when the pursuance of speculative studies at that university was in a state of flux. He naturally sampled all that Berlin had to offer by way of preaching and novel ecclesiastical practices, as well as enjoying the theatre, the music and the social atmosphere. However, despite finding much to interest him both "in life and academic study" he was nonetheless "quite lonely" and asserts that his "really good times were reserved for the study where he became
whether the rift in the Hegelian school had a corresponding effect upon Lartensen's inner thoughts, or whether he was simply the victim of physical pressures, certain it is that between January and April 1835 he underwent some kind of climactic religious experience.

He was first besieged by a physical illness, which fostered a state of hypochondria manifesting itself in scepticism and insecurity in respect of those things about which hitherto he had retained a position of confidence and stability. Now "all reality both in the world of things and of thought ... dissolved into naked shadows". Lartensen himself confesses to finding explanation of this experience difficult, but he is of the opinion that at one time or another the conflicting forces in our make-up must come into collision and resolve themselves into a dominance of one over the other - the creation of a situation providing for a decisive choice is inevitable. He asserts "what fought in me was the opposition between Theism and Pantheism".

All things spiritual were now up for questioning and the whole personal debate centred upon the possibility of reconciling Theism's concept of God as objectively revealed and the tenets of Pantheism. Pantheism indeed contained a degree of "incontrovertible truth" satisfying his need for a living God who truly is present and active in the world, a God whose fullness pervades earthly existence and is thus in decisive opposition to "the lifeless God of Deism". But Lartensen also demanded that "the divine decisions reveal themselves in existence", he demanded a unity of thought and existence and was thus attracted to Hegel's logic. So both Theism and Pantheism fostered elements necessary to the solution of his problem, but how were the two to be reconciled?

The very positing of the problem in this way made Lartensen aware of the one-sided bias of his previous religious position. He had been too much preoccupied with intellectual speculation with the result that his faith "had become repressed and inactive beneath his great intellectual endeavour". How it became clear to him that intellectual awareness is only one aspect of existence and that "it is faith which sustains all our knowledge of the personal
God and his revelation. It is from faith that knowledge in its deepest significance derives life`. He learnt that the riddle of human life was not, as Hegel thought, merely an epistemological riddle but a riddle of life which must be resolved in life, in existence such as Christianity teaches us.` If one is to become acquainted with the personal God then it is a basic requirement that one should become personally related to him; otherwise knowledge becomes merely `a shadow play of our own concepts and constructions`. Now Hartensen had made the appropriate and necessary course correction, now he was able `to bring faith and knowledge into the right relationship to each other in his own personal life`, no longer to indulge in futile speculation for its own sake. 46

It is clear from Hartensen’s memoirs that this was by no means a sudden conversion experience which dramatically turned his life upside down. He tells us that although he soon recovered full physical health, the attainment of the correct spiritual balance which the Berlin crisis instigated was to be a much longer process. Arildsen shows how aspects of Hartensen’s earlier written work and sermons display an attachment to the scriptures and traditional vehicles of religious authority every bit as strong as that which characterised his latter life. The conclusion to be thus drawn is that Hartensen’s breakthrough was not into a field of religious experience and awareness previously unknown to him, but rather it was the elevating of the religious in his nature to its rightful place - qualifying and uniforming his hitherto over-emphasised intellectual predilections. By his breakthrough Hartensen attained to a standpoint - `principally a metaphysical jumping-off point which could satisfy his thought and feelings as well as his personal needs. A foundation which could support the Christian totality view of life and the world, the unity of faith and thought, of thought and existence which represented for him the goal of his life.` 47 The choice between Pantheism and Theism is not for Hartensen an "Either-or" but a "Both-and" - the truth is to be found in some measure in both points of view, and by recourse to these truthful strands a position can be attained at which faith and knowledge are mutually related in a personal religious life. From here on Hartensen sets out to
define and describe the theory behind this coherence won at some cost but to his great personal satisfaction.  

In April 1835 the two travellers left Berlin and proceeded to Heidelberg where Martensen became especially interested in G. Daub. He found Daub's researches into speculative theology of great interest although he had to admit that he "did not find that in which he could rest". By experience Martensen had learnt that the conflict between Theism and Pantheism had to be resolved in terms of personal categories - it is a question of the fundamental relationship between the personal God and the human personality, between Creator and creature. From this perspective reason is not enough. Rather, conscience enters upon the scene to play its part in ensuring that the attitude of independent self-sufficiency so tempting to reason is qualified by an awareness that true fulfilment is only to be found in God and in absolute dependence upon him. Such personal concern Martensen found wanting in Daub and it was not until his next stop at Munich and his meeting with Fr. Baader that he met another spirit operating along similar lines to his own. Baader had an especial affection for the mystics and especially Jacob Böhme, and his often vitriolic attacks on the philosophical professors were largely concerned with emphasising their failure to give full weight to this aspect of Christian experience. Here, as indicated above, Martensen found a spirit in tune with his own, a spirit which vigorously opposed the debasement of philosophy from a Christian to a human science, a spirit anxious to reinstate personal experience of God as prior to all speculation as to His nature. However, as he says himself, Martensen did not become a "Baaderian". He could not accept the emphasis on nature which he found to be too strong in Baader, and neither could he fully ally himself with Baader's theosophical position - although Martensen does admit that in respect to mysticism several seeds were sown in his mind at this time by the Munich philosopher which were only to blossom forth some time later. Rather, Baader's influence lay mainly in the direction of lending support to an independent movement which was part of Martensen's own personal development. As Arildsen observes, Martensen's relationship with
Baader's thought proved fruitful his whole life through, and he continued to hold him in the greatest possible respect "without therefore becoming a blind admirer and dependent disciple of the Catholic philosopher in Munich".  

Hartensen was now firmly established in an epistemological position based upon the old motto Credo ut Intelligam. "Faith is primary"; he writes, "understanding is secondary and consecutive". Only he who has experienced the truth of Christianity in his own soul can begin to have any understanding of God - only in his light shall we see light! Now speculation can proceed from a true perspective no longer founded upon human reason but upon faith.

Now Hartensen felt at ease within himself after the upheavals experienced in Berlin - not because he has attained to a wholly new position, but because that perspective which had been with him in only a confused and unbalanced way when he left Copenhagen was now clarified and consolidated. He had been put to the test and had enjoyed the best possible results.

The travellers' last stopping-off place was Paris where Hartensen read further in the mystics although his time was largely spent in aesthetic pursuits. After a short stay, Hartensen and Bornemann, in the Autumn of 1836, left for home. "We both brought away with us a great deal which must now be worked upon further" wrote Hartensen, and he expressed his wish that he might be able to contribute towards the revision of Church dogmas and to the raising of Danish academic pursuits "to the heights of Danish Poetry".

So Hartensen's "grand tour" was at an end and it must be judged to have been an unqualified success. Not only had he met many of the leading personalities on the contemporary cultural scene - Steffens, Daub, Baader, Schelling, David Strauss, Lenau and many others - but also by a programme of study which embraced the Church fathers, Meister Eckhart, Dante, Hegel and the romantic poets he acquired a truly European cultural refinement. Few people back home in Denmark could match Hartensen's experience and it was clear that, aided by a big reputation in the world of German theology, he was destined for a brilliant career. Even though he had been exposed to such a galaxy of theological stars he had yet still avoided becoming a slavish adherent to the
vions of any one of them. He was ever on the look out for a solution to his particular problem and it was his intention to seek assistance from all available sources without obligation. Finally, it was Dr. Basler who supplied the stamp of coherence to Hartensen's thoughts following the Berlin crisis, and so from then on it was from a new and stabilised perspective that the young student pursued his itinerary. One of the most remarkable features of Hartensen's trip is the extensive diversity of his experiences. We must assume that his letters and memoirs do not tell us everything of importance that happened, but even on what evidence we have we can draw conclusions as to the openness of Hartensen's consciousness to the whole gamut of aesthetic, cultural and academic experience currently on offer in Europe. Everywhere he went he enjoyed a full and exciting social life whilst he still found time for extensive study and attendance at lectures. Added to this he developed ideas for published works on religious, theological/philosophical and aesthetic subjects.

In the period between his return to Denmark and his appointment in April 1838 to a post in the University, Hartensen prepared his dissertation for his Licentiate, and defended it brilliantly in mid-1837. It was entitled "De autonomia conscientiae humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostriti temporis introducta" and it signifies a break with Hegelian philosophy and its principle of autonomy. Religion does not glean its validity from speculation, rather speculative thought requires religion as its fundamental principle. Human self-knowledge, or conscience, demands first of all that one be known by God and therefore man cannot know the truth through his own unaided efforts. The truth can be known only from a theocentric standpoint and man is unable to reach this standpoint on account of his creaturliness and sinfulness. So, all understanding presupposes revelation and faith - and yet from this position it is possible to attain to a speculative understanding. Here, against Hegel, Hartensen asserts the impossibility of thinking without presuppositions. Man, says Hartensen, is a created being and that presupposes a creator. Man is ultimately therefore not autonomous, as Kant seemed to suggest. Both the
"moral theology" of Kant, and the "feeling theology" of Schleiermacher, place too much emphasis on man as the ground of truth. What is wanted is speculation based on faith in God; knowledge which accepts the fear of God as the beginning of wisdom. 57

"In the academic world the Licentiate dissertation became the object of kind acceptance and became, in fact, Hartensen's first literary triumph". So writes Arildsen (p. 138), and Hartensen himself acknowledges that "it found not a little recognition both here at home and also abroad". 58 Clearly Hartensen had come home from his travels to offer Danish theology something new. Over against Hynster he asserted the claims of speculation, over against Heiberg he prescribed going "beyond Hegel" whilst he confronted the theological faculty with a new thesis supporting the case for a greater emphasis on objective authorities. Hartensen had obviously projected a point of view which could not easily be ignored, and there is some good deal of truth in the assertion that this particular work can be seen "as introducing a new era in Danish theology". 59

It is worth dealing at some length with a controversy which arose indirectly out of Hartensen's dissertation. J. A. Bornemann wrote an article as a response to Hartensen's thesis in which he stressed the need for the present age to go beyond the traditional postulation of irreconcilable opposites. It was demanded by the present spiritual climate that unity and coherence should be brought to life's diversity. This demand is met by the Hegelian world-view which establishes the unity of objective and subjective, of nature and spirit. "In theology" writes Bornemann "both rationalism and supranaturalism are antiquated points of view which belong to an age which has since disappeared". 60 These words immediately aroused Hynster's antagonism. He saw here a typical example of the Hegelian tendency towards the blurring of concepts, and the abandonment of fundamental principles of logic. Hynster expressed his views in an article entitled "Rationalisme - Supranaturalisme". 61

Hynster argued that if rationalism abandons the necessity for revelation in God's communication with man, whilst supranaturalism bases itself precisely
upon just such a revelation then it is clear that religion must adopt one or other of these principles, and if one of them is in fact dead then the other must be living and dominant. Either one accepts this dichotomy or one abandons the principle exclusi medi inter duo contradictoria. Lynster insists that mediation between these two alternatives is impossible. There is an either-or, "one can mediate between contrasts (jodsætning), but not between contradictions (jodsægelser)". Rationalism and supranaturalism are mutually exclusive alternatives, and thereby is excluded all possibility of mediation.

Not surprisingly, Lynster's article aroused the Hegelian thinkers to make some response and so Heiberg duly published a paper entitled "Om Contra-
dictions - og Exclusions principet. En logisk Bemærkning". As the title suggests, this was concerned mainly with establishing the logical validity of Hegel's position in the face of Lynster's criticism. Of more significance was Hartensen's contribution to the debate entitled "Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme, og principium exclusi medi". Though not an Hegelian in Heiberg's sense, Hartensen felt that he had certain obligations to speak on defence of Hegel on account of his having been largely responsible for the current interest now being shown in his work in Denmark.

Hartensen begins his article with a tribute to Lynster "whom we have to thank for some of the best things in our spiritual existence", and he says that it is his intention to appeal to Lynster's own words and thoughts in order to try and come to some agreement on their apparently diverse opinions. Hartensen first objects to Lynster's contention that supranaturalism is one pole in an either-or which excludes all continuity and mediation with other standpoints. Christianity, as typified by the doctrine of the Incarnation, does not content itself with an either-or but goes on to establish a third, mediated position involving both-and. He says that from the standpoint of the Christian revelation "the concepts about the supranatural cannot become real without being mediated through the natural, and so must contain this as a factor within itself". This gives the warrant to speculative theology
whose presupposition is the identity of subjective and objective, of self-knowledge (selbsterkundigung) and revelation. It is not a pantheist but, on the contrary, a noble Christian thought, that God would not be spirit if, as object of the human understanding, he was not also himself "the true knowledge in us". Consequently speculative theology attains to understanding in the strength of the divine thinking itself. This is what is involved in the doctrine of the immanence of divine thoughts in human thinking. But does this not lead to mysticism, if one contends that the eye with which God looks upon man is the same as the eye with which man looks upon God? Yes it does, says Martensen, but only if this supranaturalist view is not held together with a degree of rationalism. This identity of vision must be mediated through the realm of objectivity and especially through history's highest objectivity - the positive, factual revelation.

At this point appeal is made to Hegel's dialectic which is based on the conviction that ultimately all objective, universal contradictions (Antithesen) in the intellectual sphere can be mediated. Amongst these Antithesen are to be included faith and knowledge, revelation and reason, pantheism and theism and last, but not least, rationalism and supranaturalism. Whilst supranaturalism will have to give up its dependence upon empiricism and positivism, and instead of continuing to rely on inner or outward experiences or upon God's inscrutable beneplacitum, it will now not be able to rest until it has made the truth of Christianity known as "grounded in God's thoughts and God's nature". So historical, psychological and anthropological standpoints will become taken up into the supranaturalist position, and rationalism and naturalism will be recognised as necessary factors on the way to achieving the standpoint of "the Idea". This must be seen as a typical progression in the history of dogma in which can be seen the continual mediation of opposed doctrines.

Martensen was prepared to leave the controversy there as regards its public prosecution although in private he did exchange views with Kynster resulting in the latter's conclusion that "Martensen was not nearly so firm
However, Lynster still wanted to take the debate further and so, in 1842 he published an article entitled "On de logiske principer". In this publication Lynster deals mainly with the Hegelian tendency to abuse the correct significance of terms like "principle of exclusion", "principle of contradiction" and "principle of identity". Even if in common usage mutually exclusive terms have tended to become blurred and indefinite, the world of thought still has a duty to define its concepts with clear-cut decisiveness. It is necessary to be clear that "A is A, A is not not-A and therefore A is either B or not-B". It is this clarity in defining thought's internal differentiations (i.e. between principles of contradiction and exclusion) that Lynster finds most lacking in Hegel, and in his disciple Heiberg. He also turns against Martensen's dialectic and affirms the necessity of positing a decisive either-or over against Martensen's synthesising both-and. By failing to define terms unequivocally one ends up by allowing "quite disparate conceptions to spill over into each other ... One acquires no knowledge when one mixes designations, which are introduced precisely in order to keep separate opposing concepts". Lynster emphasises that he does have sympathy with Christian speculation because by it one can establish the "unity and synthesis of the speculative and the historical elements ... the Idea and the Fact". However, he could not help entertaining certain misgivings about speculative theology and he concludes his article by disassociating himself from Martensen's theocentric standpoint which claims to be able "to see from above downwards" (at see ovenfra nedad). Lynster insists that "one can also see the Highest from below, and when one holds this constantly before one's eyes, then one ascends towards it".

This debate has been described at some length and in some detail because it is felt that here are exemplified important facets of Martensen's and Lynster's make-up which affected Kierkegaard's attitude towards them. We have already referred to the misunderstanding between Lynster and Martensen over what they meant by rationalism and supranaturalism; and we have also suggested that here is betrayed a significant philosophical naivety on
Lynster's part. V. Kuhr maintains that however debatable may be Lynster's vindication of the traditional scholastic expressions, he really represents in this argument the one "who protects deeper truths against being washed away by a momentary sed", whilst O. Haage argues that Lynster's analysis, definition and distinction eventually triumphed over Heiberg/Lartensen's synthesis, speculation and fluctuation. Lynster's religious concern lay less in the academic field than in the pastoral and ecclesiastical. He had experienced a breakthrough which resulted in a more decisive awareness of what is involved in calling oneself a Christian, and a clearer definition of the differentiation between Christian and secular values. God assumed a position of glorious transcendence in Lynster's mind, and any project in the direction of man's salvation must come from God's initiative alone. He has become personally aware, through his own experiences, of the need for divine revelation in the face of human finitude and helplessness. On such a theological foundation is built Lynster's belief in the opposition of supranaturalist and rationalist thinking - an opposition which one attempts to mediate only at much cost to one's awareness of the decisive and exclusive character of the Christian option. The world of thought exists, according to Lynster, precisely to prevent the blunting of the differences between God and man, time and eternity, revelation and reason; and in the firm belief that the Hegelians have abdicated their responsibilities in this respect, Lynster must make his protest.

Yet does not Martensen also accept that speculation must be first grounded in faith - Credo ut Intelligam? Did he not also undergo a break-through (albeit, perhaps, less personal and passionate than Lynster's) which, with Baader's help, made him aware of the one-sidedness of his previous over-intellectualised position? Has he not also, with Lynster, rejected Hegel's emphasis on human autonomy and re-throned God's transcendent supremacy? Indeed he has, and yet he is here prepared to defend the Hegelian dialectic in the face of Lynster's opposition. Why is this? Here, I feel, we have a glimpse of Martensen as "the Professor" Kierkegaard so bitterly attacked. Here he
can be caught, as it were, playing at theology: in his element as he manipulates concepts and evolves dialectical progressions. In his memoirs Martensen denies being an Hegelian and on the basis of the lectures delivered about the same time as this controversy, he is clearly correct. But this non-Hegelianism is far less easy to substantiate simply on the basis of this article on rationalism and supranaturalism. Here he appears almost as Hegel's defence council, arguing the latter's case even though his conviction of its true worth may not be absolutely whole-hearted. The difference between Lynster and Martensen at this point is that, even if he had been responsible for bringing Hegel's thought to Denmark, and even if his dissertation had provoked an indirect protest, Lynster would not have been prepared to make his deeply felt religious feelings subservient to the scoring of academic points. That Martensen was in fact guilty of such practices is underlined firstly by his rather self-conscious confession some ten years later that Lynster's stark positing of the either-or had subsequently been of some influence upon him, and secondly, by his admitted reluctance to indulge in a public feud with Lynster. In Martensen's behaviour at this point, Kierkegaard would clearly have found some stimulus for his criticism of the "Don" or Professor who in respect of the truth "understands not a single word of it all, he construes it all as a learned problem".

Now we can return to Martensen's work at the University. It was in fact his lectures on speculative Dogmatics which "in the course of a short time created his fame and established him as one of the leading personalities in the cultural life of Copenhagen". Martensen saw it as part of his task to introduce his listeners to the current philosophical trends - and this, of course, meant Hegel. Immediately a new and lively interest began to be shown in the study of philosophy and Hegel's views became the standard against which one assessed one's philosophical position. Martensen recalls that his listeners tended to divide into clearly defined groups. First, there were those who opposed Hegel unconditionally; secondly there were those who took Hegel seriously and tried to come to terms with him (although many of this
group could not understand how and why Martensen himself was not Hegelian—they could not see that despite his methodological dependence on Hegel, his presuppositions were fundamentally different; and thirdly those, particularly of the Hegelian left, who realised Martensen's deviance from their master and opposed him bitterly on pantheistic grounds.

That such confusion prevailed as a result of Martensen's lectures may be seen as an indictment upon the lecturing itself. However, this is probably too harsh a judgement. Martensen was highly praised on account of the quality of his presentation, and it must also be remembered that to many of his listeners Martensen's lectures opened up a whole new world of ideas. It would have indeed been remarkable if they had met with immediate and universal comprehension. However, it would appear that Martensen did not make sufficiently clear his teaching about "going beyond Hegel". He admits that he was unable to convey Schelling's and Baader's thoughts to his audience, whilst his use of Hegel's dialectical method in conjunction with his attack on Hegel's fundamental presuppositions, must have bewildered those not sufficiently versed in Hegelian categories as to be in a position to contemplate "going beyond" the great German master. Here too, we may see Martensen's academic "speculative" inclinations dominating over his "religious" perspective. Clearly he had supplied what the times demanded with his union of religion and thought, faith and reason, theology-philosophy and poetry. However, one is left wondering whether, in these early lectures, he was over-intent upon establishing Hegel's method, consequently failing to get across the Christian priority which he had learnt through his spiritual crisis in Berlin and his contact with Baader. Nevertheless, be that as it may, Martensen well deserved the recognition he received between 1840 and 1850. In fact he was appointed Professor extraordinarius in Theology as early as 1840, the King made him court preacher in 1845, and in 1850 he became Professor ordinarius.

Unfortunately, Martensen has not left us detailed records of the contents of his lectures on speculative Dogmatics and we can only make educated guesses at their contents. However, towards the end of the decade (1849) Martensen
had his magnum opus *Døn Christelige Dogmatik* ready for printing, and from this work we can gain some insight into the contents of his lectures. 79

This is not to suggest, however, that Hartensen's thought underwent no development during this period. Arildsen looks back upon Hartensen's progress in the '40s and concludes that these were years in which he gradually moved towards a position over against the Hegelians of the left, whilst at the same time he advanced in the direction of a more "kirkelig-bibelsk" position. 80

There is almost certainly significance in the fact that the book was published under the title "CHRISTIAN dogmatics" rather than speculative dogmatics which was the subject of the earlier lectures. Now Hartensen is intent upon giving full expression to the priority of the "religious" over the "speculative" in the field of systematic theology. He makes the point negatively thus:

"Dogmatics ... is not a mere historical exhibition of what has been, or now is, true for others, without being true for the author; nor is it a philosophical knowledge of Christian truth, obtained from a standpoint outside of faith and the Church".

He goes on to argue that dogmatics manifests an "intellectual love of Christian truth which ... is inseparable from a personal experience of Christian truth". 81

This approach to dogmatics is not different in kind from Hartensen's earlier position; but now he is consciously restoring balance to his thought now that the pioneering spirit in the dissemination of Hegelian ideas is no longer a priority.

As regards its form and style, Hartensen's book is superb in its class. He shows a marked ability to use words as felicitously as possible and he has no difficulty in giving suitable expression to the most involved thoughts. 82

Hal Koch remarks upon the solidity of the structure in which "the parts grow naturally out of the whole", 83 whilst Arildsen declares that: "It was in the truest sense of the word a theological system which Hartensen created, orientated as it was out from the metaphysic of the Trinity and developed in systematic clarity and architectonic elegance". 84 The starting point is God - his nature and attributes, and his hypostatic composition. Then the work evolves under three main headings: The Doctrine of the Father (the Creation, the Fall
and God's providence); The Doctrine of the Son (Christ's Person and Work) and the Doctrine of the Spirit (this deals mainly with the origins and evolution of the Church).

It is apparent that certain main characteristics present themselves in the Christian Dogmatics. Martensen is clearly fully convinced with regard to revelation's absolute truth and speculation's relative value as a vehicle for Christian knowledge, and his Dogmatics reflects overall his efforts to unite both. This quest after a unity of revelation and thought reflects, in its turn, Martensen's inclinations towards a "totality-view" of creation which we have identified as a prominent feature of his student days. Arildsen makes the point thus:

"Overall, unity is sought in multiplicity. Points of transition and lines of cohesion between the different developments are demonstrated in the major as well as the minor parts; points of contact are pursued with sustained zeal and general success".

A dialectical/mediatorial thought process is employed to demonstrate, on the one hand, the opposing factors which comprise existence and, on the other hand, the overall unity pervading existence.

Martensen thus employs an Hegelian dialectical method as the framework for his thought, but he rejects Hegel's presuppositions regarding human autonomy. Martensen comes through as one governed not by philosophical but by theological speculation. He is convinced of the truth of Christianity independently of all speculation, and he never forgot the absolute difference between Christianity and heathenism in his anthropological consideration. However, this is not to imply that he managed to apply the dialectic-mediation principle without difficulty. Hoffding is highly critical of Martensen on this very point. He argues that, notwithstanding his claims to pursue "higher unities" Martensen sets this principle aside when it proves awkward. Here might be cited the sections on Grace and Freedom (where God's almighty omniscience and human free will present Martensen with real difficulties when he pursues their mediation); and the sections on eschatology where Martensen is forced to admit that the two alternatives of universal restoration and everlasting condemnation represent an antinomy which must be left "as a crux of thought.
which never shall be, never must be solved by the Church militant, or from her point of view?

It appears that at these points cracks begin to manifest themselves in Martensen's great systematic edifice. The attempt to furnish speculative thought with a significant role in the evolution of divine revelation - the inspiring thought behind Martensen's early work, and especially the lectures in the early '40s - seems to be capitulating to Martensen's ethico-religious Christian perspective which we have seen as an ever present, yet mainly dormant feature hitherto.

However, these shifts in perspective must be seen largely as the exceptions which prove the rule. In whatever directions Martensen's work was to move in the future, around 1850 he is still operating as a predominantly speculative systematic theologian. His methodological presuppositions are Hegelian and Christian Dogmatics must be seen as in a direct line of descent from those thoughts inspired in the younger man by Steffens' lectures. Here is precisely Martensen's attempt "to offer a view of the world and of life in which all that has significance for existence - nature and spirit, nature and history, poetry, art, philosophy, - comes harmoniously together in a spiritual Temple in which Christianity is the midpoint dominating and explaining all things". Since those early days Martensen has experienced a religious crisis and breakthrough, and the marks of this more profound, personal Christian awareness can be discerned in Christian Dogmatics. But this stamp of personal religion is not so strong as to suppress, or even significantly temporise the mediating, systematising tendencies of the dispassionate "Don". Although having many of the disadvantages of generalisations, Hal Koch's summary statement still has some merit. He writes: "... the dialectical interplay between opposites which are constantly being joined in a higher necessity is, as is so often the case when it is subsequently subjected to critical examination, not much more than empty word play". He goes on to argue that this is one of the reasons why Martensen's work failed to have any significant influence upon the clergy's preaching. Chr. Garbo makes a similar point when he comes to analyse Martensen's theological status at the beginning of the 20th Century.
Clearly his influence has declined, says Carbo, and this must be attributed to the fact that his work was too much a product of the idealist speculative climate in which he operated. The intellectual concerns to unite thought and being is no longer a dominant one, with the result that Hartensen's theology, based as it is on just such a concern, begins to lose its appeal. The inference can surely be drawn that Hartensen's Idealist presuppositions were so strong as to blind later readers to what spiritual value his work may have contained.

Admittedly Hartensen stresses at the outset his intention to treat feeling, perception and volition as joint features of religious psychology - the one gaining no valid precedence over the others. They are all authentic psychological forms based on the sure foundation of faith. Thus far, Hartensen is rejecting the Hegelian rationalist position and is moving towards a more voluntaristic perspective. H. A. Durfee writes:

"Rationalistic emphasis which made the reason the central faculty, either metaphysically as far as the cosmos was concerned or individually as far as the metaphysical self was concerned, was continued in modern culture, reaching its climax in Hegelian rationalism". 92

Hartensen intends NOT to make reason the central faculty and yet a reading of his finished work is sufficient to convince us of his failure to abide by his intentions. The burden of his Dogmatics is the demonstration of the role of reason in uniting the antinomies which pervade existence until the multiplicity has been conscribed within the boundaries of a great Christocentric unity. Will and feeling take decidedly subordinate positions as the system evolves, and it is soon apparent that Hartensen is guilty of falling into the trap which he himself had marked, i.e. the overemphasizing of one of the three integral features of the religious psychological position. Here, as in the 1839 controversy with lynster, Hartensen has allowed his speculative predilections to get the better of his own best intentions. His dogmatic system fails to reflect his own, deep-felt religious passions and so he gives further ammunition to Kierkegaard in the latter's assault on the Professors who lecture objectively and dispassionately on subjects which convey eternal significance for the existing individual.
However, before we turn to deal specifically with Kierkegaard's reaction to Lartensen's publication, we shall look briefly at the general reaction. Without doubt Lartensen's magnum opus had been eagerly awaited and Flyve-Posten certainly reflected the feelings of the majority of cultured people in Denmark when it described Christian Dogmatics as "definitely the most significant work our theological literature has produced". It was widely read amongst a broad cross-section of the literate public, and testimony to its appeal is to be found in the necessity for a second edition to be printed within twelve months. Translations were published in French, German, English and Swedish and Lartensen recalls with relish the extent to which his work became the subject of lectures - even in Rome! But opposition soon manifested itself.

Lartensen had not mentioned Kierkegaard by name in his Dogmatics but there were several flimsily disguised references to the latter's "Jottings and aphorisms, whims and flashes" as well as to his anti-Hegelianism and religious individualism ("his arbitrary, atomistic religiosity"). Such comments could not but arouse Rasmus Nielsen who was at this point in his fluctuating career a firm disciple of Kierkegaard. So, in September 1849 appeared Nielsen's article entitled Nog. S. Kierkegaards "Johannes Climacus" og Dr. H. Lartensens "Christelig Dogmatik", En undersøgende Anmeldelse. Nielsen declares his concern to be the extent to which Christianity can be an object of objective knowledge or dogmatic speculation. He sees it as Johannes Climacus' service to have raised as primary the individual's relationship to Christianity rather than Christianity's truth in and for itself. In such a context, problems relating to God's nature and purpose are removed from the realms of objective speculation into the sphere of faith. He reiterates Kierkegaard's positing of paradox as characterising the highest truth with the consequent substitution of Credo, qua absurdum est for Credo ut intelligam. Nielsen seizes upon the aforementioned admission Lartensen made regarding the impossibility of uniting the eschatological antinomies of universal restoration and everlasting condemnation. Lartensen's
betrayal of true Christianity can be measured, says Nielsøn, in terms of his failure to see that this basic irreconcilability is characteristic of all Christian truth which is founded not on the principle of mediation but on an absolute paradox.

Nielsen was supported in his attack by P. H. Stilling who published "Om den indbøjde forsoning af Tro og Viden med særligt hensyn til Prof. Hartensens "Christelige Dogmatik", Kritisk - polemisk Afsendring." Stilling has no doubts about the fact that the attempt to unite such heterogeneous concepts as faith (hope) and knowledge (objective certainty) is based on an illusion. He dwells at length on the qualitative difference between the value one puts on reflection before and after one has come into a condition of faith. Hartensen is supposed to be writing out of faith and yet he is still trying to put a pre-faith value on scientific knowledge. Like Nielsen, Stilling calls up Hartensen's difficulties with regard to the problem of eschatology in order to highlight the latter's refusal, even when faced with such an example, to accept the inadequacy of knowledge from the point of view of faith. Not that the possibility of Christian dogmatics is destroyed by this admission of ikke-viden. Rather, says Stilling, the true role of dogmatics will thereby be established. The dogmatician will restrict himself to the ita and avoid proceeding to square: he will see his task as the plotting of reflection's course until it comes up against the absurd, the cross on which thought is crucified. Rather than this submission being a sign of weakness, Stilling declares it to be a sign of maturity on the part of "the man fashioned in reflection". By recognising and accepting the absurd character of God's decrees he thereby shows recognition of the great qualitative difference between God and man and the need for unconditional obedience. Stilling aims a subtle blow at Hartensen by commenting that it is by no means a compliment to the decrees of divine wisdom to say that a man, without particular difficulty, can think them after Him, assenting to and recognising their rationality. Stilling diagnoses Hartensen's fault as lying in his attempt to serve both speculation and the Church - an erroneous mixture
of heterogeneous masters. Consequently there is a failure to recognise
the limitations of human thought. Reflection is a two-edged sword, but
Hartensen neglects the contra in favour of the pro. So he claims to have
solved the antinomies in existence whilst, in fact, he demonstrates a lamentable
impartiality towards the evidence.

In addition to those contributions from writers much influenced by
Kierkegaard, articles also appeared by J. Paludan-Müller and members of
the Crundtvigian camp. However, Hartensen did not make an immediate
reply. It was June 1850 before he published **Dømmatiske Oplysninger. Et
Leilighedsskrift.** This article was intended as a corrective to certain
"misunderstandings" which had arisen concerning individual points in his
**Dogmatik** and he declared his aversion to a long drawn-out debate which would
prove "endless" and "fruitless". After expressing dismay at the almost
exclusive emphasis paid by his critics to the introductory, at the expense
of the developed parts of his work, Hartensen gives reasons for limiting
himself to Nielsen and Paludan-Müller.

Nielsen is indicted on the grounds of his failure to comprehend accurately
what **Christian Dogmatik** has to say about the relationship between faith and
reason. Also, he is accused of naive and unquestioning allegiance to
Kierkegaard's pseudonyms without thinking through such concepts as "the
Paradox" for himself. Kierkegaard himself is dismissed in passing. Unlike
Nielsen, Hartensen sees in the thoughts of Johannes Climacus no possible
scope for any form of dogmatic undertaking, rooted as they are in a thorough-
going individualism. However, he does admit that his acquaintance with
this "prolix literature" is only "poor and fragmentary". After this
brief diversion Hartensen returns to Nielsen and analyses those points he
thinks worthy of comment.

First, with respect to the doctrine of the Paradox, Hartensen accuses
his critic of a one-sided emphasis on the differences between God and man.
This bias is at the expense of a full treatment of the unifying power of
Christ's work. Then in a state of sin man's faculties were wholly inadequate
to the task of searching out the depths of God's nature. But now the Atonement has restored to man his pristine power - and not least his powers of dogmatic reasoning. Also, Nielsen lays too much stress on man's interest in his own personal salvation and this time the one-sidedness is at the expense of due emphasis upon God's revelation through the totality of his creation - and man's consequent sense of being related to this totality. So Hartensen claims to stand for a dogmatic undertaking which gives full value to both the salvific and revelatory factors in Christian experience. So he writes that it is not the task of the dogmatician "to preach the redemption, but ... to search out the revelatory content of redemption". Reason thus becomes an indispensable limiting factor which informs and tests our faith. Nielsen's rejection of reason causes him to embrace a woolly faith running too many cognitive risks. Reason is needed to give clarity and precision to the object of one's faith, although Hartensen is careful to acknowledge the danger of reducing God to an object of intellectual discovery, without any room being left for resort to faith. From this treatment of faith, Hartensen's response to Nielsen's charges made against his use of speculation is predictable. Nielsen demands an exclusive and unqualified choice - either God's nature is describable or it is not. Hartensen rejects this either-or and insists that reason is a fitting organ through which to make God relatively describable after admitting that faith is always richer than understanding. Reason is needed, in different ways and at different times to circumscribe the limits of understanding thus defining clearly the sphere of faith. At this point, Hartensen goes on to challenge Nielsen's charge that in Christian Dogmatics there is a failure to see that the impossibility of reconciling the eschatological antinomies of universal restoration and everlasting condemnation is a characteristic of all Christian truth. Hartensen makes the counter charge that Nielsen fails to recognise the boundaries, the limits of speculation in the sense in which Hartensen uses the term. Nielsen has overlooked the fact that whilst all other dogmatic antinomies have it in common to be expressions for indre normale modsætninger i den guddomelige
Teleologie, the aforementioned eschatological antinomy is an expression for the opposition (udbysædislæge) between the teleological and the anti-teleological. Because this latter antinomy is not patient of resolution by speculative means, the validity of speculation in the service of theological enquiry is not thereby completely annulled. Here we see the crux of the disagreement between Nielsen and Martensen. The one sees the characteristic of paradoxicality as informing the whole gamut of Christian knowledge each defined in terms of their viability, or otherwise, as objects of fruitful speculative enquiry. Martensen sees behind Nielsen's error a misunderstanding about the sense in which the word speculation is being used. Nielsen is charged with limiting theological speculation to "a variety or corruption" of philosophical speculation. He has no right, according to Martensen, to promote a monopoly of speculation by the philosophers. In fact, theological speculation has a significance all its own and independent of philosophical speculation.

Although Rasmus Nielsen issued a reply to Martensen, 102 and V. Rothe published a critique of Martensen's whole dogmatic position 103 we must be content to leave the debate with the Dogmatiske Oplysninger. Few will deny the validity of at least some of the criticism levelled against Martensen, although equally it is only fair to say that he suffered from not a little misunderstanding. We have neither the time nor the need to go at length into an evaluation of the views aired in this debate. However, a paragraph from Arildsen's concluding remarks about this part of Martensen's literary career is instructive from our point of view:

"It is Martensen's concern to attain a universal dogmatic Life and World view by means of a completely comprehensive synthesis. But it is true in both great and small matters that the synthesis is 'intuited' (anskum) but not 'comprehended' (begrebet) - the imagination's mirage has duped Martensen as to the consequences of his thought. He will synthesise creator and created; but in so far as he tries to synthesise diametrically opposed perspectives he is forced into a choice between either the renunciation of the synthesis if both points of view are to fully come into their own, or, the reduction of the price demanded by the consequences of his thought. Martensen chose the latter. Thus he comes to oscillate between reflexive and speculative thought. Now and then the development of speculative thought is broken by the religious perspective, e.g. in the doctrine of sin and regarding the
antinomy of eternal condemnation and restoration where the synthesis is seen to be unsatisfactory from both the religious and the speculative point of view. From all sides this is attacked as Harttensen's main error. Overall it is the speculative element which is dominant in comparison with the religious. He is more strongly interested in the content of faith than in the faith relationship, in the certainty of revelation rather than in the certainty of redemption. This also explains why ... taken as a whole, the relationship of immanence in Christianity is more withdrawn in the Harttensen system - or, as P. L. Stillig so pregnantly expresses the matter, Harttensen to a remarkable extent lacks qualitatively appropriate predicates for faith and hope in opposition to Kierkegaard's abundance thereof. 104.
NOTES


5. Hartensen: *op. cit.* Vol. I pps. 3 - 4


8. *op. cit.* p. 15


10. This affection for Oelesschläger stayed with Hartensen all his life and it was with great joy that he was later to make the poet's personal acquaintance. See *Af mit Levnet* Vol. II pps. 39 - 48 and Josephine Hartensen: H. L. Hartensen i sit Hjem og blandt sine Venner. Kbh. 1918. pps. 25, 99 f.


13. Hal Koch favours Lindberg (Den Dansk Kirkes Historie Vol. VI p. 318) whilst Arildsen (op. cit. p. 29) thinks Steffens' influence to have been the stronger. It is probably true that in the immediate context of the Clausen - Grundtvig turmoil (which, after all, is Koch's main concern as a Church historian) Lindberg held the greatest sway over the young Hartensen's mind, but certainly, in the light of the subsequent development of his thought, Hartensen's debt to Steffens for furnishing him at the outset with this decisive "Idea" (Anselm) cannot be exaggerated. For a critique of Arildsen's position see J. Oskar Andersen: "Biskop H. L. Hartensen's Ungdom" *Kirkehistorisk Samlinger* Series 6 Vol. I. 1933. pps. 146 - 153


15. Hal Koch: *op. cit.* p. 316. N. Thulstrup (Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift Vol. II p. 84) describes the prevailing perspective in the theological faculty as a "theology of mediation" (Næslingstedologi).


17. Arildsen: *op. cit.* p. 33


20. Josephs Hartensen: op. cit. p. 213

21. Theologisk Tidskrift Vol. 4. 1837. p. 470

22. Grundtvig, Lynster and Kierkegaard all experienced periods of doubt followed by some sort of breakthrough

23. Hartensen: op. cit. Vol. I p. 34. On Hartensen's attitude towards, and relationship with Grundtvig and his followers at this time, see op. cit. Vol. I pps. 26 - 43; Vol. II pps. 49, 53; Vol. III p. 66; V. Birkedal: "Roter til Biskop H. Hartensen's Tekst om Grundtvig," Kbh. 1883 pps. 8 f. This relationship is probably best summed up by Hartensen himself when he reports that, to him, Grundtvig was only "en meagtig Vejleder".


27. ibid. Vol. I p. 61


30. ibid. Vol. I p. 65


33. ibid. p. 67

34. Loc. Cit. See also Prisopgaven pps. 51 - 59 and Garbo: op. cit. p. 451


37. See Geismar: Søren Kierkegaard Pt. I p. 27 and Pap. IV B 1 p. 143

38. So J. Oscar Andersen: op. cit. pps. 130 - 237

39. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 74


48. Kierkegaard (p. 3 3 A 162) roundly accuses Hartensen of never having had to make a decision for Christianity. "... it was not that he chose to become a Christian - that was taken for granted - he chose between the faculties and chose theology. He became a theological student. Perhaps he had to think over whether he should take the practical or the theoretical path, become a Priest or a Professor. He became a Professor - that he is a Christian follows naturally of itself." We may not know exactly how much, if anything, Kierkegaard knew about Hartensen's "crisis". However, even if he was aware of the experience Hartensen describes in his autobiography, Kierkegaard could still accuse him of never having made a decision for Christianity - understanding the term in Kierkegaard's sense, i.e. total, passionate, personal commitment. For all their momentous consequences, neither Hynster's "breakthrough", Grundtvig's "matchless discovery" or Hartensen's "crisis" are experiences so sufficiently decisive as to meet Kierkegaard's assessment of what is involved in becoming a Christian.


50. See T. H. Croxall's introduction to his translation of Johannes Climacus or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. London 1958, pps. 69 ff. Croxall writes (p. 72) "... it is easy to see how deeply Hartensen was influenced by Beider. Hartensen's thesis on Autonomy, his theory of conscience, his desire to begin with God, and his hopes of integrating faith and knowledge, orthodoxy and speculative philosophy (and so 'come out beyond' Hegel) all show his deep influence ..."


52. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 99


54. Hartensen: op. cit. p. 234

55. ibid. p. 230

56. This work was translated into Danish by L.V. Petersen in 1841 with the title Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie. For a full discussion of its contents see Arildsen: op. cit. pps. 119 - 144. See also S. Kierkegaard: De Omnibus Dubitandum Est (Trans. by Croxall) pps. 47 - 50 and pps. 116 f. n 3

57. See P. Lødøn: op. cit. pps. 399 - 400 for a brief statement of the principles pervading the dissertation.

Both O. Waage: op. cit. p. 13 f., and V. Kuhr: op. cit. p. 9 point out that Lynster's aim in this article was not so much a detailed examination of the Hegelian treatment of the reason/revelation problem. Rather, he limited himself to a defence of traditional terminology implying the mutual exclusiveness of rationalism and supranaturalism. He then may, Lynster did assume a decisive position over against Hegelian speculation and its Danish adherents. (See N. Thulstrup: *Kierkegaards Forhold til Hegel* pp. 154 - 5, and N. Thulstrup: "Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel". Theologische Zeitschrift 1957, esp. pp. 213 - 215). Certainly he was prepared to go beyond the limited objectives of this article in attacking speculative philosophy.

For Kierkegaard's position in this debate see N. Thulstrup: *Kierkegaards Forhold til Hegel*. Gyldeval 1967. p. 154 - 5. "It is well known that both Lynster and Sibbern reacted against the Hegelian speculation and its adherents in Denmark, especially Heiberg and Hartensen; and Kierkegaard is at this point united in principle with Sibbern's and Lynster's philosophical objections". Cf. also N. Thulstrup: "Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel" pp. 213 - 14.
Lynster has more than once become a vanquished standpoint, though as such he seems to be doing very well, and it is rather to be feared that the tremendous exertion incident to the winning of the victory has been too much for the unvanquished victors”.


76. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 162

77. See H. Hoffding: Danske Filosofer pps. 14 f.

78. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 159. However, see Kierkegaard’s Pap. II C 12–24, 26, where can be found notes on the lectures Hartensen delivered under the title “Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics” (1837–8). Cf. N. Thulstrup: Kierkegaard’s Forhold til Hegel pps. 129–132 where there is to be found a brief exposition of the lectures on speculative dogmatics based on notes taken down by one of Kierkegaard’s colleagues (Cf. Pap. II C 26 ff.)


80. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 164
81. Christian Dogmatics pps. 1–2

82. See P. Madsen: op. cit. p. 404; Chr. Garbo: op. cit. p. 466

83. Hal Koch: op. cit. p. 324
84. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 223

85. Garbo: op. cit. p. 452

86. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 223
87. Madsen: op. cit. p. 402

88. H. Hoffding: op. cit. p. 147
89. Christian Dogmatics p. 483

90. Cf. Madsen: op. cit. p. 405 where the theosophical element in Martensen’s thought is seen as gaining an ever more dominant place from the Dogmatics onwards. Hoffding: op. cit. p. 145 where philosophy is described as playing a decreasing part in Martensen’s thought as time went on; Arildsen: op. cit. p. 242 f. deals with this point at some length in pointing to a measurable development in Martensen’s thought between 1839 and 1849, i.e. between the Licentiate dissertation and the Christian Dogmatics. This trend is described as in a Christian-churchly direction and is typified by Martensen’s modified attitude towards the supranaturalism / rationalism and philosophy/theology dichotomies. Thus, whilst in 1839 Martensen tended towards the mediation of these antinomies, some ten years later he is ready to relate rationalism and supranaturalism in terms of an either-or and to express what is essentially different about philosophy and theology as vehicles of knowledge.


94. Om Dr. Hartensen's Christelige Dogmatik. Kbh. 1850.


96. Den Christelige Dogmatik pps. II - III, 10, 77, 475.


100. R. Neilsen: Dr. H. Hartensen's Dogmatiske Oplysninger belyste. Kbh. 1850.


On the personal level there was little close contact between Kierkegaard and Martensen. In the Spring of 1834 Kierkegaard took Martensen as his tutor, and this is the closest they got to each other on a man to man basis. Kierkegaard attended Martensen's lectures on speculative догматics in the Winter 1837–8 whilst an interesting glimpse of Kierkegaard's compassionate nature is provided by accounts of his visits to Martensen's mother whilst her son was away on "the grand tour" of Europe. This concern demonstrates that, whilst there was no close personal attachment, neither did any personal animosity show itself between Kierkegaard and Martensen. On this level, the difference between Mynster and Martensen vis-à-vis Kierkegaard could not be more clearly marked. The factors which drew Kierkegaard to "his father's priest" did not apply in respect of Martensen, and even though Kierkegaard possessed collections of Martensen's sermons it is clear that Mynster's preaching took pride of place in Kierkegaard's mind. Also, in the dispute about logical principles Kierkegaard's sympathies clearly lay with Mynster over against Martensen and Heiberg.

However, once all this has been said, it remains a fact that Martensen's influence upon Kierkegaard's intellectual development was extensive and possibly decisive. N. Thulstrup, in his study of Kierkegaard's relationship to Hegel, comes to the conclusion that notes taken at Martensen's lectures on speculative догматics furnish us with the main sources of Kierkegaard's acquaintance with the Hegelian system as a whole. It need hardly be said that he who was responsible for acquainting Kierkegaard with Hegel automatically assumes a position of great significance in any study of Kierkegaard's early development.

But whatever may have been the size of Kierkegaard's debt to Martensen, it was not long before the latter came under attack a) as the personification of Hegelianism in Denmark (the principle target of Kierkegaard's polemic being Hegel and Goethe, but as Capel puts it "such polemic extends even to personal satires upon local personalities construed as spokesmen for these
opposed standpoints); and b) as the one who would "go beyond" Hegel.  
In respect of Kierkegaard's intellectual relationship to Hegel we shall restrict ourselves to four points of contact—


ii) Kierkegaard's student drama entitled "The conflict between the old and the new salt-cellar" found at Pap. II B 1 - 21.

iii) The Prefaces published in 1844 under the pseudonym Nicholas Notabene (Samlede Vaerker Vol. 5 pps. 7 - 77). Of especial interest here are the seventh and eighth Prefaces (pps. 43 - 75).

iv) The Concluding Unscientific Postscript

Martensen's significance for Kierkegaard in the period after 1847 and up to the outbreak of the "Attack" will be considered in a separate section.

i) In his contribution, Heiberg stressed the great significance of Hegelian philosophy. "Only the foundations of thought correspond with the foundations of the specifically human; for thought is at one and the same time the human factor which separates us from the subordinate forces of nature, and the God-like which unites us to the superior world beyond us". Here is echoed the fundamental principles of the Hegelian system and in his review Martensen is quick to put on record his agreement with Heiberg as to the value in the study of Hegel's philosophy. Martensen maintains that the System is of "infinite significance for our times". It represents the fullest and most comprehensive attempt to solve the problems of existence independently of tradition, and he who would acquaint himself with current intellectual trends cannot avoid studying the Hegelian philosophical system. Martensen goes
on to show how the principles of the new philosophy relate to the chief
principle of medieval thought which was the Anselmian \textit{credo ut Intelligam}.
Now philosophy has loosened itself from theology, by making not faith but
doubt the starting point for the quest after truth. Consequently "knowledge
now only recognises truth out from itself (ud af sig selv) and only that
which can establish itself as incontrovertible truth by means of thought's
internal, compelling necessity must be held as valid by men". \textsuperscript{10} In short,
the new philosophy represents the extreme consequence of the working out of
Cartesian principles. The result for Hegel is that God's self-consciousness
is identified with man's consciousness of God. \textsuperscript{11}

Martensen's admiration for the Hegelian system is obvious from this
first part of the review, and clearly anyone searching for a suitable
personification of Hegelianism in Denmark need look no further. But
Martensen is not content to leave his comments there, and so he proceeds
to argue that, whatever the value of the philosophical trend traceable from
Descartes to Hegel, nonetheless Rationalism is still "inadequate to comprehend
life's absolute fullness". \textsuperscript{12} Certain aspects of existence are not suitable
to full comprehension by means of reason, and yet they are not to be left
out of account. Thus one has to go beyond Hegel in order to supplement his
exclusive autonomous rationalising by pressing the claims of faith. "The
defect of this age" says Martensen "is its lack of a firm faith". Hegel's
philosophy is deficient in knowing "the eternal" (\textit{det Evige}) but not "the
holy" (\textit{det Hellige}). \textsuperscript{13} How this progression beyond Hegel is to be made
Martensen does not say, although he does promise to deal with it on "another
occasion". (Presumably his dissertation for the Licentiate is in his mind
here).

Various references (\textit{e.g.} to going beyond Hegel, to the primacy of
Descartes in modern thought, and to the tendency to despise the Middle Ages)
indicate that Kierk\c{e}gaard's Journal entry I A 328 was written with Martensen's
review of Heiberg in mind. Kierk\c{e}gaard writes: "One idea in particular
seems to have become the \textit{idée fixe} of the whole age and that is: to have
got 'beyond' the man ahead". He goes on to express his fears for those "who have to live on others. They have to grasp at the terminology as it rushes past them at a furious speed, which makes their expressions so various and motely". The aims of such people, says Kierkegaard, "is, presumably, to make the system popular". Surely Thulstrup is right in his judgement that "Kierkegaard has both Heiberg and Martensen in mind here". Thulstrup is convinced that it would be erroneous to suggest that Kierkegaard is concerned to attack Hegel directly at this point. Rather, he is concerned to take accurate aim at the more immediate manifestations of Hegelian thought in Denmark and the consequent errors arising therefrom. In other words, Kierkegaard is attacking Martensen's (and Heiberg's) exposition and application of Hegel rather than Hegel himself. Indeed, it seems that Kierkegaard concentrated his fire on the Danish Hegelians, not simply because they are near at hand but also because their attempts to popularise and "go beyond" Hegel (the latter charge being specifically laid at Martensen's door) are more in need of criticism than Hegel himself, "who was, because of his rigid form, of all modern philosophers the one most likely to compel silence."

This point is made more explicitly in Pap. II A 7. Here Kierkegaard observes that "Martensen's article in the Monthly Journal is a most curious production. After having played leap-frog over all his predecessors he advances forth into an illimitable eternity; for since his own position is not given us (this he merely announces) his criticism of Hegel is only made from outside, while his own existence is left up in the air". Elsewhere, Kierkegaard develops his criticism of those who maintain that they have gone beyond Hegel. So in September 1838 he wrote: "When certain people maintain that they have gone beyond Hegel, it must be regarded at best as a bold metaphor, by which they are trying to express and illustrate the thoroughness with which they have studied him, to describe the terrific running start they have made to get into his thought - and with their momentum they have not been able to stop but have gone beyond him".
This entry comes comparatively soon after the publication of Martensen's review. But this is not to suggest that the influence of this article on Kierkegaard was only short lived. So in 1833 the Preface to Fear and Trembling is clearly aimed at Martensen's claim to go beyond Hegel and on p. 43 of Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard puts his thought on the subject into a nutshell. "To go beyond Hegel", he writes, "is a miracle, but to get beyond Abraham is the easiest thing of all".

Thus, as early as 1836 we can see Kierkegaard's opinion of Martensen taking a clearly defined shape. He represents for Kierkegaard all that is insidious about the Hegelian attempt to mediate between philosophy and Christianity. In this respect he personifies, for Kierkegaard's purposes, the errors of the System. But more than that, he is the one who claims to go beyond Hegel - a claim which mystifies Kierkegaard and stokes the fires of his disillusionment with those - be they Professors or Bishops - who have "to live on others". These sentiments, established early, recur again and again throughout the rest of Kierkegaard's writings.

ii) Certainly the student-drama entitled "The conflict between the old and the new salt-cellar" (Pap. II B 1 - 24) and dating from 1839 - 40 is one of the more problematic features of Kierkegaard's writing. The disagreement over the purpose, date and background of this dramatic offering has been extensive, with Fr. Brandt, E. Hirsch, K. Jensenius and Carl Roos making some of the most significant contributions to the debate. However, N. Thulstrup has recently provided a compact summary of the problem and the value of the evidence brought in support of the divergent solutions which have been proposed. From our point of view the major sphere of interest is the problem as to the identity in real life of the characters in the play. Especially we are concerned with Hr. v. Springgaasen ("a philosopher"), Hr. Phrase ("an Avanturier, member of many learned societies and contributor to many journals") and, the main character, Willibald ("a young man").
After carefully weighing the evidence to hand, Thulstrup is in little doubt that Willibald is a caricature of Kierkegaard himself, v. Springgaasen represents J. C. Heiborg whilst Mr. Phrase represents Martensen. Examination of the dialogue respecting these three characters lends full support to his pattern of identification.

Of most significance, from our point of view, is the Second Act. The First Act opens with a view of Willibald as a disillusioned romantic who flees from aesthetic society to be alone. In his pursuit of solitude, he rejects companionship, but nonetheless, he runs into three men who are to be identified with P. C. Kierkegaard, A. G. Rudelbach and J. C. Lindberg, i.e. three prominent Grundtvigians. They try to exhort him to some kind of Christian awakening, but he flees from these influences as well. He flees, in fact, to the scene of Act Two which is called the Prytaneum. Thulstrup accepts Brandt's interpretation (as opposed to that of Hirsch) of this place as identical with Den Akademiske Læseforening (The academic literary circle) or Akademikum for short. Here he comes under the influence of v. Springgaasen and Phrase. But before his entry in Scene Three, a conversation ensues mainly between the latter two characters as to the possibility of popularising the results of the new philosophical thinking (i.e. Hegelian speculation). Phrase expresses his opinion that "our times' development ought to gain in extension what it loses in intensity" (p. 295). v. Springgaasen protests that the truly infinitely radical nature of the Cartesian doubt which characterises the newer philosophy could not be communicated on a popular level. v. Springgaasen sticks to this view, in spite of Phrase's explanation that he only had in mind the more refined members of society, and the protests of another character to the effect that philosophy should concern itself with practical questions to do with daily living. (p. 296).

Now Willibald enters. He falls to the floor and kisses the ground in gratitude for his escape from his past life. He is certain that he has come to a place where wisdom is to be found, and where he will find release from "the abominable relativity under which I have lain up until now".
Vo Springgaasen is quick to offer his opinion as to Willibald's disease - he is severely lacking in that Faustian doubt which is a feature of the newer philosophy. He embarks straightaway on the cure - an exposition of the principles behind this philosophy. He invites the other members of the circle to listen as well, and Phrase expresses his enthusiasm to hear Vo Springgaasen's exposition - even if he has heard it all before.

Vo Springgaasen expresses great joy in his disciple and entertains great hopes for Phrase as an ambassador for the new ways of thought. He now embarks with gusto upon his long-winded lecture.

After castigating the wayward tendencies of the times, Vo Springgaasen returns to Descartes "who uttered the remarkable, eternally unforgettable words: *cogito ergo sum* and *de omnibus disputandum est*" - words with which every confirmation candidate or, at least, every theology student should become familiar. The president of the circle intervenes to try and curtail Vo Springgaasen's discourse but he insists on continuing - for the sake of the Catachumen (i.e. Willibald). So Spinoza, Kant and Fichte come under review before physical force is called upon to get him to be silent. The result is that Vo Springgaasen has to omit what he wanted to say about Schliermacher, but he does succeed in making what, for him, is the most important point about Hegel. "It was Hegel", he says, "who speculatively concentrated the previous systems, and with him, therefore, knowledge (*Erkjendelse*) has reached its proper dogmatic high point" (p. 300). At this point Phrase jumps in and protests that Vo Springgaasen has given voice to a completely one-sided point of view and adds that he, at least, has come out beyond Hegel. Vo Springgaasen accuses Phrase of being a Judas who has betrayed "the eternal Idea". Phrase, undaunted, repeats his claim to have come out beyond Hegel and then proceeds to embark upon an exposition, starting with Descartes and apparently in the same vein as Vo Springgaasen's own discourse. The President finds this to be just too much and again intervenes to cut Phrase short.

Willibald is left absolutely unedified by all this talk and asks the
President why the sun has remained still during the speeches and the light in the Prytanum has stayed constant. This comment was made out of bitterness towards v. Springgaasen's intolerably lengthy discourse. This question now becomes the subject of a heated debate during which v. Springgaasen again expounds and extols the principles of the Hegelian speculative system.

Likewise, Phrase does not neglect to repeat his pet saying (or "phrase")²¹ i.e. "I am come out beyond Hegel" (p. 303).

The play ends with Willibald joining the Hegelians amid much rejoicing and awed judgements as to the momentous significance of the occasion. Inevitably the question must arise as to whether this alliance with the Hegelians on Willibald's part conforms directly with Kierkegaard's own experience. Certainly if this drama provided our only evidence on this matter then the apparently obvious conclusions would seem to be inevitable. However, the entries we have been considering above (Pep. I A 328 - 30 and II A 7 etc,) indicate clearly Kierkegaard's disenchantment with the Hegelian position. Also, Thulstrup's point that only one who stood outside Hegelianism could have written such an ironic drama as this, lends further support to the view that Kierkegaard himself did not join the Idealist camp.²²

For our purposes at this point, Hr. Phrase is of greatest interest. He is the image of Martensen and is typified by his repeated claims to have surpassed Hegel. It is significant that, although Phrase falls out with v. Springgaasen (Heiberg), he is quick to show his support for the latter's admiration of the Hegelian system. In Kierkegaard's eyes Martensen clearly personifies the speculative Idealist philosopher. This concurs well with the early Journal entries where Martensen also assumes the role of personified Hegelianism.²³ Also, Phrase is made to look somewhat ridiculous by his insistent repetition of "I am come out beyond Hegel", without ever giving us any idea of exactly to what point he has come. The close connection between Kierkegaard's satire at this point and the sentiments expressed in Pep. II A 7 is not difficult to discern.²⁴
iii) We move on now to the Prefaces published in June 1844 by the pseudonym Nicholas Notabene and subtitled "Light reading for the different classes at their time and leisure". This book of eight prefaces appeared on the same day as The Concept of Dread and, as the sub-title suggests, was intended as some sort of light-hearted relief from the more serious psychological nature of this book. "Each of these eight 'Prefaces' which he has occasioned, eight imaginary authors to write eight imaginary books", says Hohlenberg "is a little ironic or satirical sally against something which strikes him as comical or ridiculous at the time". Generally, Professor Heiberg is the one under attack because of his misinterpretation of Repetition apparent in one of his reviews. The first four "Prefaces" in fact are thinly disguised attacks upon reviewers in general and Heiberg in particular, and upon the whole purpose and orientation of Urania. But it is in Preface No. 7 that Kierkegaard really applies himself in earnest to the subject of writing a System.

He begins by expressing his general criticism of those who, in their lack of originality, can only manage to produce an eleventh book derived entirely from material found in ten previous books by other authors. He goes on to deliver an invective against all practitioners of the art of "Mediation" who purport to embrace everything and yet have failed to see the point of it all (p. 52). Nicholas makes an earnest plea that he should be spared the indignity of being drawn into the System's "bazaar" (Kramkiste). "I have a dread of Mediation; I can have nothing to do with it" (p. 53). Not that he is unfamiliar with the tenets of the newer philosophy and its starting point with Descartes. He knows all about the philosophical adventure built up around the evolution of the world out from the clashes between being and nothingness. However, he laments that what is described by the System is a purely logical movement (p. 53-4). Significantly, Nicholas does not fail to note his admiration and respect for "the Master" - Hegel himself. The inference is that his main complaint is against his adherents - especially Heiberg and Martensen. More specific references to the latter appear
in the eighth and final "Preface".

This "Preface" recounts Nicholas Notabene's thoughts regarding the possibility of his starting a new Tidskrift. He finds himself unable to begin by doubting everything (a prerequisite of speculative thought). Also, he is extremely doubtful as to whether men (non-philosophical men) are able to comprehend the philosophy (Hegelianism) which is offered as that which conquers all doubt. Martensen is almost certainly right in suggesting that the identification of theology with philosophy is what the times demand, but Nicholas has serious doubts about whether such teaching is in accordance with the NEEDS of the times (p. 58). Such thoughts would be expounded in his new periodical in the hope that the Hegelians would be moved to explain themselves to him so that he might be able to understand them. "There is one thing I know with absolute certainty, it is that I do not understand. There is one thing I beg of my contemporaries; and that is, an explanation". (p. 65) He is confident that those confirmed disciples of Hegel in Denmark will be able to make things clear to him - Heiberg presumably to be listed in this category. In any case, says Nicholas, "should any difficulties remain, I am confident that here at home there are also philosophers who have come out beyond Hegel. As soon as these philosophers (presumably Martensen and the like) ... explain how they have made this advance, so will I have unshakeable confidence in them".

Nicholas goes on to define more closely his sense of mystification in respect of this claim to have "come out beyond Hegel". He tells us (p. 66) he has read philosophical articles which in form and content have every appearance of having been written by Hegel himself. However, it transpires that they are the work of one who claims to have got beyond Hegel. Nicholas comments: "If the article could talk, it would probably say - What twaddle!" (p. 66). He goes on to describe how Hegel's philosophy claims to be completely comprehensive. Then another writer offers an identical presentation as Hegel's own, pervaded through and through by precisely the same thoughts - but, tagged on the end, is a paragraph which states the claim to have come out
beyond the master himself. Nicholas admits to being completely devoid of understanding at this point. What he needs, he says, is something quite insignificant. Two words will be enough, just a small, categorical statement concerning the relationship of such writers (e.g. Martensen) to Hegel himself.

The "Preface" concludes with Nicholas reiterating his hope that someone will furnish him with the philosophical understanding he obviously lacks and so earnestly desires. An understanding of speculative theology is necessary if a man is to conquer doubt - which in itself is a prerequisite of the quest for truth. Whether a man is ignorant or just plain stubborn, he must not be deprived of the required explanation.

In these Prefaces we see evidence of Kierkegaard's most scathing satire and irony. The mock humility and the Oh! so earnest quest after Hegelian enlightenment is calculated to throw into relief the dilettante antics of Hegel's Danish disciples, Heiberg and Martensen. Points made in the student drama concerning Martensen come clearly to the fore once again - some five years later. There is reference made to the slavish repetition of Hegelian concepts in Hegelian terms whilst the emphasis on Cartesian doubt, so much a feature of the play, now recurs in the Prefaces. Furthermore, Nicholas' debate with himself as to his capacity to acquire the appropriate philosophical understanding reflects the debate between His Phrase and v. Springgaasen on the possibility and merits of popularising the System. In that debate Phrase took a rather more optimistic line than his colleague, although, under pressure, he had to admit that only the cultured classes could aspire to edification. Clearly in the "Preface" No. 8 Kierkegaard is intent upon exposing the Danish Hegelians to the full consequences of their position. The knowledge vital to conquering doubt cannot be restricted to a cultural elite. But most significant of all is the recurrence of the "going beyond Hegel" theme. Kierkegaard's cynicism about this claim has not been at all blunted and, as Thulstrup observes, in the Prefaces we find expressions of "exactly the same attitude to Martensen as Kierkegaard adopted many years earlier" (Pap. II A 7 from 1838).
iv) Finally, we turn to Postscript and the light it throws upon Kierkegaard's estimate of Martensen in 1846. Martensen's significance in respect of Postscript is revealed in these two paragraphs of Thulstrup:

"Kierkegaard's objective in Postscript ... is to answer the question as to how every single individual can enter into a right relationship to Christianity - which is understood not as a doctrine in a philosophical sense but as a quite definite kerygma, an existential communication as he calls it.

In order to attain this objective he answers first of all the so-called objective problem about the truth of Christianity, and comes to the conclusion that by objective methods a man in existence can by no means discern the subjective problem of the individual's relationship to Christianity. After this, in the main part of the work, he deals precisely with the subjective problem in so far as he elaborates upon both his authorship and his theology, doing this in continuous conflict with Hegel and the right-wing Hegelians, especially Martensen, whose name, however, is not mentioned except in drafts of the work". 32

In other words, the central purpose of Postscript, i.e. the elucidation of the principle of Subjectivity, is worked out with constant reference to the principals in the contemporary Hegelian debate. Dr. J. Heywood Thomas justifies his devoting of a chapter of his book to a discussion of the historical situation surrounding Kierkegaard's work by declaring that "we cannot have a proper estimate of Kierkegaard's contribution unless we know exactly what he was combatting". 33 This judgement must be applied with especial force to Postscript which marks the culmination point of Kierkegaard's battle with Hegelianism and his exhortation "away from speculation!". More precisely, the battle was fought, at its most intimate level, with Heiberg and Martensen, the latter again having to face the charge of "going beyond" (or, at least, claiming to go beyond) Hegel himself. 34 This is not to imply that Postscript is unintelligible without some detailed knowledge of Hegel and the right-wing Hegelians. Thulstrup has shown to our satisfaction that Kierkegaard is not
dependent upon Hegelianism in the sense of being intelligible only within a context strongly characterised by speculative tendencies. However, although essentially an independent thinker, Kierkegaard was not inclined to express himself in a vacuum, with the result that personalities near at hand (i.e. Heiberg and Martensen) are used to personify the points of view under attack — they are set up as visible, tangible targets, ready to be struck down. To be sure, a "proper estimate" of Kierkegaard's authorship could not fail to take these contemporaries into account, neither can their significance in the outworking of Kierkegaard's thought be underestimated.

To summarise, then, we can say that Kierkegaard's relationship to Martensen combines elements of dependence and strongly satirical opposition. Kierkegaard first made his acquaintance with many of the most important trends and personalities in philosophical theology by way of Martensen's tutorship and lectures. He evidently appreciated most highly the talents of Martensen as a teacher — an appreciation which he was happy to commit to writing in his Journal (Papo VII B 88 pp. 291 - 2). He is answering one of the reviewers of Postscript who is excessively strong in his criticism of Martensen. Kierkegaard considers the question of who else could be appointed to Martensen's post as Professor and expresses the view that "... it is absolutely certain that Professor Martensen at the time he was installed was absolutely the best qualified, and not only this, for there was no-one else at all who could be taken into consideration, but he was absolutely qualified and in the possession of talents and learning ... he is a distinguished Docent and he has no rival now any more than he could be said to have one in his time ... Professor Martensen is an eminent Docent, so eminent that absolutely any instant he would be able to get an appointment in the most celebrated university in Germany". In the light of such expressions of appreciation it is not surprising that Kierkegaard was prepared to rely on Martensen as a guide through the maze of contemporary ideas. But unlike many another teacher-pupil relationship, his dependence upon Martensen went no further than his reliance upon him for factual information.
whilst recognising and exploiting Martensen's talents as a teacher, was too independent of mind, too much a Selvtaenker (Pap. VII B 88 p. 292) to become the Professor's disciple. 38 Quite the contrary! Rather, he gleefully accepted the ammunition Martensen offered him, moulded it into his own particular brand of shot, and fired it straight back at him.

Kierkegaard's opposition to Martensen was principally on two fronts i) as Hegel's representative in Denmark who tried to apply the principles of the System to the fundamentals of orthodox Christian teaching and practice and ii) as the Hegelian who yet pretended to advance beyond Hegel. Even though Martensen was not mentioned by name, few of Kierkegaard's readers could be in doubt as to who was under attack in The Concept of Irony, Prefaces, Fear and Trembling and Postscript. We have seen how Martensen's reputation grew in Denmark and elsewhere during the 'thirties and 'forties and his views would have been sufficiently well-known to make it unnecessary for Kierkegaard to make continuous reference to him by name. Furthermore, Kierkegaard would wish to avoid giving the impression that he was merely a critic lampooning contemporary academic stars. He had a definite, distinct point of view to communicate and such communication would be best served by minimising overt personal criticism. We are here dealing with a period of "indirect communication" when textual obscurity makes the task of interpretation most severe. However, detailed study of the pseudonymous works has shown that personal (albeit anonymous) satire plays a decisive part in these devious communications, with Professor Martensen serving as the object of frequent veiled allusions. Whether the identification and unravelling of such allusions is a sine qua non for understanding the pseudonymous literature is doubtful, but at least the obscurity of the text is thereby relieved and the significance Martensen had for Kierkegaard in the communication of his thought will not be overlooked.

We come now to Martensen's 'Christian Dogmatics' with Kierkegaard's response to its publication and the ensuing debate:
"In the whole of Martensen's Dogmatics (in any case, in the part I have read) there is not a single assertion which is an honest 'yes' or 'no'. It is the old sophistry of being able to lecture but not converse. For conversation points straightaway: You and I, and such questions as demand 'Yes' or 'No'. But the lecturer develops on the one hand - on the other hand and meanwhile so distracts the listener and the reader that the fact that he conveys no information at all goes unnoticed." 39

This judgement conveys the essence of Kierkegaard's attitude towards Christian Dogmatics and by extension to Martensen's whole enterprise in the field of speculative theology.

Christian Dogmatics appeared in late July 1849 and Kierkegaard quickly acquired a copy. Almost immediately he began to read it and to express his opinion in the Journal. The relevant entries begin at pp. X 1 A 553 and of the next 70 entries (probably from the last week in July and the first two or three weeks in August) some 24 refer more or less directly to his reading of this long-awaited work. The remaining entries give no hint of his being concerned with reading anything else (apart from his routine sermon reading) during this period, although references to the business of publishing his works, in this case Sickness unto Death (July 30th), and to issues of immediate personal interest, for example the death of Regina's father, continue to recur. Generally the entries regarding Martensen's Dogmatics reflect the progress of his reading - they have the nature of notes, jotted down as he went along. We begin with general comments concerning the assumption behind the writing of a dogmatic system. 40

Kierkegaard complains that the most dangerous assumption behind this enterprise is that all are Christians - such issues as to the place the doctrine of Angels should take in a dogmatic system could not be held to be important unless such an assumption is made. 41 "A dogmatic System is, Christianly speaking, a luxury article" says Kierkegaard. 42 Only when it is assumed that all men are Christians can there possibly be any time for systematising Christianity. 43
Two further things are involved in the writing of a systematic theology, according to Kierkegaard. The first relates to the main object of the task in hand. It is NOT to be based on an attempt to describe faith, but rather, on the attempt to describe how it is impossible to describe faith. Kierkegaard asserts that "Speculation can describe everything - except how I am come into the faith or how faith is come into the world". Because faith cannot be conscribed within the bounds of knowledge, the Professor who embarks upon a theological system inevitably becomes non-dialectical. This leads into the second point which is that a system, by its very nature, must be equivocal. Kierkegaard declares that his most popular writings reveal more clear-cut definitions than the whole of Martensen's system - Johannes Climacus is more scientific, and yet he it was who wrote the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Again, here, the essential incompatibility of faith and knowledge makes it impossible for the Christian systematiser to express a categorical "Yes" or "No".

Further entries deal with specific points at which these fundamental failings show themselves most clearly. Pap. X 1 A 620 tackles Martensen's paragraphs on Baptism which, he concludes, ultimately say nothing at all because Martensen fails to take a decisive stand on the issue. The section on Ordination reflects the same indecision. First Martensen asserts that "we cannot suppose that extraordinary gifts are connected therewith" (i.e. Ordination) and then adds,

"And, withal, as little can we suppose that Ordination is a mere ceremony in which nothing is conferred".

"Well, so what is Ordination then?" asks Kierkegaard. He goes on to declare that this equivocation characterises the whole book: "There appears to be something there - but really nothing becomes said at all". But the most dangerous blurring of the edges occurs with regard to the opposition between faith and knowledge. As indicated above, the Paradox which is the clue to the unravelling of the faith/knowledge dichotomy is cast aside by Martensen. The difference between "the essential thinker" and the Professor devolves
entirely upon the fact that the latter "takes away the Paradox". The Professor will consequently become popular - but only at the expense of Christian truth. At this point, and in his general criticism of Martensen's Dogmatics, Kierkegaard is basically in agreement with Neilsen and Stilling. However, his main concern is not to restrict himself to points of doctrine - for this would involve making concessions to Martensen's methodological presuppositions. Rather, he wants to show to what extent Martensen's creation of a system is symptomatic of the disease of Christendom.

Repeatedly whilst reading Christian Dogmatics he is prompted to make appeal to Martensen's whole existence as crying out against his so-called Christian teaching. Early in the Dogmatics, Kierkegaard finds Martensen insisting that Christianity must become a reality for us, not simply an object of our imagination. But does Martensen's life match up to this demand for Christian fulfilment? Not at all, says Kierkegaard, for it expresses only that he will enjoy the honour and good fortune which the World has to offer. Similarly, towards the close of Christian Dogmatics, Kierkegaard reads about the inevitability of suffering for the Christian in the world, and yet Martensen's life reflects only accommodation with worldly wisdom and manners.

In short, Martensen has adopted that Kynsterish "peace" which allows one to seek the most exalted places in society and the most pleasant things in life - this mode of existence being made up to be Christianity. Martensen corresponds not at all to that dialectic of inwardness taught by Climacus - in fact, "Martensen is entirely without dialectic".

Martensen then, is guilty of something far more reprehensible than mere doctrinal error. He is guilty of subverting the true existential demands of Christianity, beneath a morass of speculative dogma. Mediation has obscured also the necessity for a leap of faith on the part of the existing individual. The smug self-satisfaction of the "Professor" which allows him to sit back and play speculative games with Christianity is nauseating in the view of a man whose whole authorship was designed to make people aware of the demands of Christian inwardness. From this time forward
the professor crops up ever more frequently in the journals as well as the published works; he is yet another symbol of the decadence of Christendom so devastatingly attacked in Kierkegaard's last years.

But Kierkegaard was also critical of Martensen because he failed to make any significant reference to the pseudonymous literature. Kierkegaard finds this silence the more disconcerting because many of the debatable subjects in the Dogmatics were precisely those attended to by Climacus and the rest. The extent to which this was a deliberately antagonising silence on Martensen's part is difficult to decide. Clearly the Kierkegaardian literature was a phenomenon with which he was only a little bit familiar and which he admired even less. The pseudonyms cut so drastically at the very roots of Martensen's thought that either they must be answered in a fully comprehensive way or summarily dismissed at the very start. Martensen adopted the latter alternative there-after making only veiled references to Kierkegaard's ideas. That such "a contemporary effort in Danish literature" should be so summarily disposed of by Martensen could only result in Kierkegaard's becoming even more vehement in his protest. Also, it must serve to underline his resolve to become more direct in his communication.

Kierkegaard's anger was further sharpened by the almost fanatical acclaim accorded to Martensen on the publication of the Dogmatics - and especially when such acclaim was at his own expense. "I admit", he wrote in 1850 "that there was anger and indignation in my soul ... when Martensen, for example, was proclaimed as a profound genius, an earnest Christian who regenerated both learning (videnskab) and Christianity in the North - whilst I was a flighty bird, a scatterbrain etc." This complaint no doubt has behind it the opinion of Frederike Bremer, a Swedish authoress who visited Copenhagen in search of material for a book about Denmark. Evidently she was most enthusiastic about Christian Dogmatics and she it was who hailed Martensen as a speculative genius who "regenerated learning in the North". She wished to meet Kierkegaard, but he refused. Consequently she took pleasure in describing him as a "woman's-author"
Kierkegaard does not hesitate to lay at Martensen's door the guilt for this insult. 63

A further instance of Martensen gaining credit at Kierkegaard's expense involved the latter's brother Peter. On 30th October 1849 Peter delivered a speech to the Roskilde Convention during the course of which he spoke about "the rich literature which Søren has given to the reading public of Denmark". He spoke on the text II Corinthians 5:13 - "For whether we be beside ourselves, it is to God: or whether we be sober, it is for your cause". For the words here translated "be beside oneself", Peter used Extasen.

"I tried first to interpret the words in their context, and then to use them so as to show the difference between Søren's position and that of Martensen's Dogmatism. I said that ecstasy was by and large the characteristic of Søren, calm of Martensen. But I dealt chiefly with Søren, and only used Martensen to offset what I said; as any reader of my speech may see. Nevertheless, when the article was printed, and so I suppose came to Søren's knowledge, he was displeased". This last remark is a considerable understatement! Søren was of the opinion that the word Extasen "signifies for people in general the same as Mad". Whatever Peter in fact meant to imply by this use of words (and almost certainly, as Croxall observes, he meant that Søren "did not keep calm") there is probably some substance in Søren's fear that the average reader of Kirketidende would see here a reference to his being mentally unstable. But Søren was as much affronted by Martensen being described as "calm" in comparison with himself. He writes, "It is surely something like confusion-mongering to take that text of St. Paul and point to Martensen and me as representing respectively the two types of life spoken of in the text. For if you compare Martensen with Paul, then Paul is entirely (even his \( \sigma \omega \phi \rho \omega \sigma \nu \nu \gamma (sobriety) \)) ecstasy". This comparison between Martensen and Paul is a valuable one from Kierkegaard's point of view, because thereby is highlighted the existential commitment which surrounds the writing of the Epistles and yet which is so evidently lacking in the construction of a systematic Christian Dogmatics such as Martensen's. Yet more fuel had been added to the fires of Kierkegaard's antagonism towards Martensen and the brand of Christianity he represented. 69
The question remains as to why Kierkegaard, feeling as strongly as he did about *Christian Dogmatics* and Martensen’s treatment of his work, did not register a public protest. The answer to this question can be found in the journal entries relating to the debate following the publication of the *Dogmatics*. Of especial value are the entries collected together under the general heading "Professor Martensen and the theological conflict occasioned by his *Dogmatics*". Obviously Kierkegaard had a personal interest in Rasmus Nielsen’s contribution to the debate and a large amount of Journal space is devoted to this. He is not happy with the way Nielsen has used Johannes Climacus, particularly because he has tended to compromise too much with Martensen’s conception of Christianity as a question of individual doctrines. The basic critical issue of what it means to become a Christian — the central issue in Postscript — has been set aside by Nielsen as he attempts to play Martensen at his own game. Furthermore, Kierkegaard detects an element of personal enmity behind Nielsen’s attack on Martensen — a motive not conducive to clarity and honesty of thought. Also, and this is a frequently recurring charge from Kierkegaard’s side, the extent of Nielsen’s dependence upon the pseudonyms for the fashioning of his own perspective is not always acknowledged. There is a degree of plagiarism here which causes Kierkegaard some anxiety. But Kierkegaard’s greatest regret is that Nielsen has jumped the gun. No doubt his intentions were basically honourable and he is to be praised for the courage he has shown in taking a stand. However, his help is rather like that of an officer who sends his troops into battle a couple of hours too early or a couple of miles too far away — the strike is now something very different. As yet Kierkegaard is not in a position to speak directly (although he is in no doubt what his reply to Martensen would be were he able to come out in the open, i.e. very much the accusations which feature in the ultimate "Attack"). The same reasons which keep him from publishing *Training in Christianity* make it necessary for him to confine criticism of Martensen’s *Dogmatics* to the pages of his Journal. He must not get embroiled in issues of secondary importance — such as the form and content
of a dogmatic system. Rather, his crusade is against the religious smugness which makes the creation of a System possible, and he must wait awhile before firing the most direct shots in his campaign. 76

Prior to Martensen's sermon in which he called Mynster "a witness to the truth", references to him in the Journals appear less and less. The great majority of those references which do occur are generally related to well-tried issues i.e. the dispute about Christian Dogmatics and Nielsen's part in that dispute, 77 the suggestion that Martensen is responsible for the rebirth of Videnskab and Christianity in the North, and Peter's comparison of Martensen and Kierkegaard. 79 In addition to these overt comments about Martensen, there are de-personalised references to him as "The Professor". In the Journals of 1852 only two entries contain Martensen's name - and then only in passing. 80 On the other hand six entries feature "The Professor". 81 Such de-personalised references to Martensen reflects the thinly veiled comments in Training in Christianity which did not escape Mynster. 82 And as Mynster saw Training in Christianity as an attack with the double target of Martensen and himself, so the remaining Journal entries tend to show how these two religious dignitaries, in spite of all their differences, for Kierkegaard's purposes were jointly identified as twin pillars of established Christianity. Thus we find the hyphenated form "Mynster-Martensen" standing for det Bestaaende, 83 whilst elsewhere Martensen and Mynster are jointly accused of pursuing worldly advantage and good fortune instead of combatting "the numerical" in accordance with their calling. 84 Similarly, Kierkegaard accuses Martensen of the same errors which feature in his attack on Mynsterish Christianity. So Martensen is accused of presenting Christianity as a means to temporal gain rather than as profitless self sacrifice. 85 In this entry it is the pursuit of worldly prestige and embellishments which contrives to water down the demands of Christian ideality. As far as "The Professor" is concerned, then Kierkegaard sees the retreat from true Christianity in terms of its reduction to the categories of scholarship and dogma. In such wise "the Professors entirely conceal what Christianity is". 86 So Martensen
is accused, with Lønster, of soft-peddling the Christian requirement. Also, failure to match one's life to one's preaching incurs Kierkegaard's wrath against Martensen as well as Lønster. Finally, one of the most often recurring comments about Martensen in these Journals recalls an earlier theme. Kierkegaard notes that people take notice of Martensen because preaching Christianity is his living - with Kierkegaard the whole thing is gratis and so is not taken seriously. To work gratis is considered laughable.

Here the wide acclaim offered by the age to Martensen is seen to characterise the same general decadent spirit which encourages The Corsair in its sourcilous attack on Kierkegaard a few years earlier.

From these late Journal entries it is clear that Lønster was wrong in his estimate that Training in Christianity was half an attack on Martensen and half an attack on himself. In fact the whole of this book is an attack on both Martensen and Lønster, the joint representatives of established Christianity or Christendom. The proposed sub-title to "The collected works of completion" (or "consummation"), which included Training in Christianity was "An endeavour to introduce Christianity into Christendom". According to Kierkegaard, the Lønster-Martensen combination represented a fundamentally distorted perspective upon Christianity. Here was establishment, rather than becoming; the pursuit of comfort and position, rather than the leap of faith; here there was eloquence, rather than existence; here was a diluted, doctrinal Christianity rather than the existential Christianity of the New Testament.

As well as the positive aim of introducing Christianity into Christendom, Training in Christianity also involves the laying of charges against those elements responsible for introducing Christendom into Christianity. Martensen and Lønster stand side by side in the same dock, indicted for the same offence.

However, Lønster's estimate is right insofar as Martensen "The Professor" rather than Martensen the established church dignitary, has a special place in Training. Early in the book, the theme of Christ as an object of faith rather than knowledge is stated and holds its place as central to the whole argument. So we read: "... there is absolutely nothing that can be 'known'..."
about him" (p. 26); "Jesus Christ is the object of faith; one must either believe on him or be offended. For to "know" signifies exactly that the reference is not to Him. It is true enough that history furnishes knowledge in abundance, but knowledge demolishes Jesus Christ". (p. 36) Here it is speculation which is implicitly under attack. Elsewhere the references are much more direct, viz.: "Speculation naturally had the notion that it 'comprehended' God-Man - this one can easily comprehend, for speculation in speculating about the God-Man leaves out temporal existence, contemporaneousness and reality". (p. 83). Or: "... in Christendom we have all become Christians without taking notice of that which incidentally is the Christian weapon of defence against "speculative comprehension" and a death dealing blow against it, viz. the possibility of the offence - yea, it would seem, without even noticing that it is Jesus Christ himself that calls attention to the presence of the possibility of the offence; and surely it may be supposed that in this respect He is as well informed as the whole aggregation of speculative theological professors, without whose help and countenance, indeed, as everybody knows, Christianity came into the world, whereas it is quite possible, supposing there was nothing else to hinder, that by their help and countenance it might be smuggled out of the world" (p. 104). That Martensen is the principal "Speculative theological professor" Kierkegaard has in mind may not be questioned. Further side-swipes at Martensen and those he typifies recur persistently throughout the book. There are passages attacking "professional lecturing (Doceren) on Christianity" (p. 68), indeed, it is asserted that "Our age ... knows no other way of communication but the mediocre way of lecturing" (p. 133). The contemporary trend towards "proofs" and "doctrines" so characteristic of "the newest philosophy" (p. 204), is criticised at many points. In "The Moral" (p. 71) Anti-Climacus points to the abolition or abatement of the fact of sin as at least in part caused by learning "which has invented the doctrine of ... sin in general", whilst a little further on it is roundly declared that: "Christianity is not a doctrine" (p. 108). Theological "proofs" meet with a similar condemnation for: "in the situation
of contemporaneousness the direct proof is impossible" (p. 99). Kierkegaard's contempt for the Professors and Docents is summed up by reference to those who are "pampered by learning" (p. 177).

So, whilst it is true that Kierkegaard did not enter openly into a direct confrontation with Martensen at this stage, still his views did not escape publication. However, this critique is still thinly disguised. Kierkegaard insists that his intention lay in the direction of making the reader aware of himself as in the wrong before God. *Training* is not to be read as though it were designed to highlight the faults of Martensen and Mynster. In the papers relating to *Training* Kierkegaard is unequivocal in his condemnation of Martensen as one who has lost sight of Christianity in his pursuit of a worldly career. But, as Lowrie observed, "this book had not the petty aim of attacking individuals". Such directness must wait upon the admission — or rather, upon the absence of the admission. Meanwhile, Kierkegaard must rest content with this challenge to Christendom, at the same time building an arsenal of verbal weapons in his Journal ready for the final, inevitable assault. As Kierkegaard's main concern comes to be dominated more and more by the issues of established Christianity, it is naturally Mynster who commands attention at Martensen's expense. However, by scrutinising the Works and Journals we have discerned how Kierkegaard's opinion of Martensen developed and was expressed. We have seen enough to understand how poignantly Kierkegaard must have felt the significance of this man, of all men, calling Mynster "a Witness to the truth".
NOTES


3. Lee W. Capel: (The Concept of Irony. Collins 1966. p. 16) sees the very first entry in the Journals (Pap. I A 1) as written under the grateful impetus of conversations with Martensen, his private tutor. Capel translates thus: "To see one light clearly always requires another. For if we imagine ourselves in total darkness and presented with a single point of light, we would be unable to determine what we were looking at because it is impossible to determine spatial relations in the dark. Only by being provided with a second light would we be able to determine the position of the one in relation to the other".

4. Ibid. P. 15.

5. On Kierkegaard's increasing disenchantment with "the distinguished authorities", amongst whom Martensen must take a prominent place, see Postscript p. 15. See also Pap. II A 260 and G. Malantschuk: Kierkegaard's Thought. Trans. Hong. Princeton 1971. p. 64.

6. We omit, for example, detailed reference to De Omnibus Dubitandum Est although, as Malantschuk observes, by choosing this phrase as part of his title "Kierkegaard seems ... to be taking polemical aim specifically at Martensen who, during this period (i.e. the early 1840s) and out of his Hegelian presuppositions excelled in the interpretation of Descarte's De Omnibus Dubitandum Est". Kierkegaard's Thought. p. 208. See also: Pap. II C 18 and X 3 A 544.


11. Ibid. p. 523.

12. Ibid. p. 524.

13. Ibid. p. 526.


16. Viz. his promise to use "another occasion" to explain how it is he would go beyond Hegel.

17. Pap. II A 260.
Among other points of agreement between the dialogue of this play and Pap. I A 328 we may note the recurrence of the theme concerning the popularising of the System; and also the emphasis upon Descartes and his pioneering role as the one who laid down the rationalist principles which Hegelianism has come to perfect.

The fact that Phrase seems to embark upon a simple repetition of v. Springgaasen’s discourse (p. 300) after making his claim to have gone beyond Hegel suggests that, in Kierkegaard’s eyes, Martensen’s claims are entirely groundless, with the inference that he has nothing more to offer over and above Heiberg’s statement of the Hegelian case.

An echo of his earlier strictures against those "who have to live on others". Pap. I A 328


See N. Thulstrup: Philosophical Fragments (Commentator’s introduction). Princeton 1962. p. LX: "Kierkegaard always had respect for Hegel himself, in spite of disagreement, and disrespect for his chattering disciples". For a direct statement of Kierkegaard’s admiration for, and indebtedness to Hegel, see Pap. VI B 54.12. This is the more significant in so far as it relates to Postscript which contained Kierkegaard’s most consistent and closely argued critique of Hegelianism.

This matter of popularising the System was of especial importance to the right-wing Hegelians such as Martensen. They wished to emphasise the cohesion between Hegel’s teaching and traditional Church orthodoxy and so, inevitably, the debate encroached upon a very extensive area of concern.

N. Thulstrup: Kierkegaard’s Forhold til Hegel. p. 315

In his notes to Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Kbh. 1962. Vol. II p. 173) Thulstrup comments that a Journal entry aimed directly at Martensen’s Dogmatik (Pap. X 1 A 554) reiterates precisely the main theme of Postscript. Lars Bejerholm tends to lay greater stress upon Heiberg’s influence although not to the exclusion of Martensen’s. (Meddelelsers Dialektik. Lund 1962. pps. 74; 96 ff.)

34. See *Postscript* p. 331: "Just as in lesser things there have been people who have not much troubled themselves to understand Hegel, but have been all the more eager for the profit of going still further than Hegel, so it is tempting enough in connection with something so great and significant as Christianity to have gone further". Edward Geismar also points to Kierkegaard's criticism in *Postscript* (p. 258 f.) of those who make humour the highest stage of faith as a direct attack on Martensen. E. Geismar: *Søren Kierkegaard*. Kbh. 1927 - 8. Vol. I p. 100. See H. L. Martensen: *Grundrids til Moralphilosophiens System*. Kbh. 1841, p. 60

35. N. Thulstrup: *Kierkegaard's Forhold til Hegel*. pps. 328 - 333

36. Fr. Brandt (Den Unge Søren Kierkegaard. Kbh. 1929) has indicated Kierkegaard's use of his contemporaries as models for characters in his pseudonymous works e.g. P. L. Møller (p. 71 f.) and P. V. Jacobsen (p. 160 f.) N. K. Flum (Jakob Peter Lynster. Kbh. 1938, pps. 9 - 10) takes this a stage further and suggests that in like manner Kierkegaard has constructed two Lynsters to suit his own ends. Clearly the student drama shows Kierkegaard personifying Heiberg and Martensen in like manner and, we suggest, this tendency towards the personification of Hegelian perspectives is a feature of the more straightforward literary production as well. So Lee Capel writes: "As he required literary types to embody and give presence to philosophic standpoints or stages of intellectual and psychological development, so his discussion of concepts and cognitive issues was not without concrete reference to living personalities in his immediate milieu". *Concept of Irony*. Collins 1966, p. 14

37. Magnus Eirikson: "Dr. H. Martensen's trykte moralske Paragrafer, eller det saakaldte Grundrids til Moralphilosophiens System af Dr. Hans Martensen". *Adresseavisen*, 1846. Nrs. 274 and 275

38. See Lee Capel: *op. cit.* p. 428

39. *Pan.* X 1 A 566. Cf. 622

40. *Pan.* X 1 A 553, 554, 558, 561, 566, 573

41. *Pan.* X 1 A 553

42. *Pan.* X 1 A 561. Cf. *X 6 B* 108

43. See *Postscript* p. 49 where Kierkegaard attacks the speculative viewpoint because, although claiming that it proceeds from nothing, in fact Christianity is assumed as given.

44. *Pan.* X 1 A 561, 604, 679. Cf. *X 6 B* 111 p. 138 where Nielsen is chided for not making this point strongly enough against Martensen. See also *X 6 B* 114 p. 146

45. *Pan.* X 1 A 554

46. See above note 32

47. *Pan.* X 1 A 558, 604

48. See *Pan.* X 6 B 114
49. Pap. X 1 A 556
51. Pap. X 1 A 622. Cf. Pap. X 1 A 578
52. Cf. Pap. X 2 A 596 where Kierkegaard counters the traditional view that Martensen has emphasised the place of thought in relation to faith whereas Kierkegaard does not. In fact, says Kierkegaard, the opposite is the case. He invokes reason most fully so as to show its limitations.
53. Pap. X 1 A 558
54. Pap. X 1 A 616
55. Cf. Pap. X 5 B 54 where Kierkegaard says that one cannot do two things at once. Whilst Martensen is pursuing a worldly career it is not surprising to find that he has no idea of what Christianity is.
56. Pap. X 1 A 563
57. Pap. X 1 A 604
58. See especially Pap. X 6 B 109. Also X 6 B 114 p. 147; 116 p. 151; 121 p. 159 - 160
59. Pap. X 2 A 118
61. Pap. X 3 A 289
64. Quotations are from T. H. Croxall’s translation of passages from P. G. Kierkegaard’s Collected Works Vol. IV p. 121. (Glimpses and Impressions Nisbet 1959. p. 118 f). The speech was reported in Dansk Kirketidende 16th December, 1849, where Kierkegaard read it. As a result of his investigations into P. G. Kierkegaard’s papers, Otto Holmgaard has been able to reconstruct both this 1849 speech and the second one delivered July 1855. He has published them under the title Exstaticus (Kbh. 1967) furnished with an instructive introduction. (See also: Otto Holmgaard: “Søren Kierkegaards storm mod Kirken” (Søro Amstidende 7.11.1955); Carle Jørgensen: Søren Kierkegaards Skuffelser (Kbh. 1967. pps. 55 - 60) See Breve og Akstykker (Ed. N. Thulstrup: Kbh. 1953) No. 240 and Commentary p. 106. This letter written by Søren to his brother soon after the appearance of the latter’s article in the newspaper is somewhat milder in expression than the Journal entries on the subject. Clearly Søren felt that the time was still not right for him to speak his mind without reserve – even when questions of personal offence were involved. Also, the mildness of the letter suggests that Kierkegaard is more antagonistic towards the spirit of an age which could make such a comparison between himself and Martensen possible than towards any one individual.
65. Pap. XI 1 A 47. Cf. XI 2 A 307 p. 334
66. op. cit. p. 118 note 2
67. See O. Holmgaard: Exstaticus p. 10
68. Pap. X 2 A 273. Cf. 286, 275, 280

69. Cf. Pap. X 6 B 129 – 132 where Kierkegaard's main complaint against Peter is based on the fact that a lecture, prepared at very short notice to fill up a gap in the proceedings, should be committed to print. That the comparison between himself and Martensen should be made is not so important as the question whether it should be printed and thus be exposed to the possibility of public misunderstanding. Cf. X 2 A 256; XI 1 A 47

70. Pap. X 6 B pps. 127 – 193

71. Pap. X 6 B pps. 154 – 7. Cf. Postscript p. 270: "If the champions of an either-or invade the sphere of pure thought and there seek to defend their cause, they are quite without justification". See also Pap. X 4 A 164

72. Pap. X 2 A 580; X 3 A 2 p. 5

73. See Postscript p. 5; Pap. IV A 144 ("I loath all plagiarists"); X 3 A 198, 292

74. Pap. X 4 A 363 p. 214. N. Thulstrup describes Nielsen's attack upon Martensen's Dogmatics as "undoubtedly well-meant, but naive and clumsy" (Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. Vol. II p. 130). This states the situation precisely. Kierkegaard is unequivocal on the matter: "the whole Nielsenesque diversion against Martensen is disagreeable to me" (Pap. X 2 A 188). Nielsen himself in 1855 explains that Kierkegaard's criticism of him for acting polemically against his colleagues was based, not on a supposed misunderstanding of the Faith/Knowledge issue, but on a reluctance to compromise hisyner and Martensen. Here Nielsen shows himself to be sensitive to the personal issues controlling Kierkegaard's behaviour in the years immediately prior to the "Attack". (Faedrelandet. 10. 1. 1855: "En god Gjerning")

75. See Pap. X 3 A 105

76. See Pap. X 3 A 313 where Kierkegaard explains that, though tempted to join Nielsen and Stilling in an open attack on Martensen, the time was not right. The masses may have got the impression that he was only after worldly advantage.

77. See Pap. X 2 A 495, 580, 589, 596; X 3 A 2, 12, 70, 74, 95, 105, 164, 188, 198, 226, 292, 567, 678, 681, 701; X 4 A 164, 363; X 5 A 125

78. See Pap. X 3 A 274

79. See Pap. XI 1 A 47, 48

80. Pap. X 4 A 551 p. 369; X 4 A 604

81. Pap. X 4 A 450, 503, 532, 614, 628, 629. Cf. also X 3 A 316, 398

82. See Pap. X 3 A 563. "... one half of the book is an attack on Martensen, the other half on me"

83. Pap. X 5 A 125

84. Pap. X 4 A 551

85. Pap. X 3 A 797
The Professor is asked by our Lord if he has sought first the Kingdom of God. His reply is that, although he can't say yes to that question at least he knows what "to seek first the Kingdom of God" is in not just seven but nine languages! The Professor's characteristic tendency to merely talk about Christianity rather than enter existentially into it is taken up at Pap. X 4 A 503 where the mere profession of another man's sacrifice is seen to replace the element of self-sacrifice necessary to total Christian commitment. The Professor simply conceptualises.

(X 4 A 614).

89. However, whilst it is significant that Kierkegaard allies Martensen with Mynster as joint representatives of a particular "church-view", it is still Mynster who dominates the Journals of the last years. Kierkegaard demanded an admission from the head of the State Church on behalf of the State Church - and this meant Mynster rather than Martensen. (See Pap. XI 3 B 1, 15 p. 41 ff. Also J. K. Bukdal: "Indrømmelsen Dens plads i Søren Kierkegaards kristendomsforståelse og vækkelsaktion". Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift XXVI: 2 (Kbh. 1963) pps. 115 - 6; H. Diem: Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence pps. 116 - 8)

90. See also Training pps. 40, 82, 97 - 8, 200 - 202 etc.

91. See Training p. 90. Lowrie's footnote

92. See also Training pps. 122 - 3; 125 - 7; 140 - 43

93. See Pap. X 5 B 111 pps. 303 - 4

94. Pap. X 5 B 54

95. See Training p. 90. Lowrie's footnote

PART III

The "Attack": its Background, Evolution and Progress
KIERKEGAARD MISUNDERSTOOD

The Journals belonging to the period immediately following the publication of Concluding Unscientific Postscript contain a large number of entries concerned with Kierkegaard's position in "a market town" and his consciousness of being misunderstood. The Corsair incident ensured that he became acutely aware of being misunderstood as a personality, but linked to this is his awareness of being misunderstood as an author. The point is best illustrated with a few examples:

"... my life at the present time is exhausting; I am convinced that not a single person understands me".

"It is by being so thoroughly consistent that I myself have really brought about the collision. Had I only been half as consistent, I should, even by now, have been well understood".  

This entry speaks to the inability of his age to grasp the central theme of his complex production. A little later in the same "Report", the point is made more explicit:

"My contemporaries can form no idea of my work as a whole. Either-Or divided into four or six parts and published separately, so that it occupied six years; that would have been suitable. But that each part of Either-Or should only be part of the whole, and then again, Either-Or only part of a whole, that is enough to make one take leave of one's senses, says the bourgeois age we live in".  

The "Report" concludes, in fact, with a passionate expression of regret at having to deal with a "rabble" made up of men "who are unable to think two thoughts together, and can only understand that which is base and wretched". These sentiments are taken up and developed many times during the ensuing months. For example, the following entry which shows the effect that the Corsair attack has had upon his estimation of The Present Age. Looking to the future, Kierkegaard writes:

"The situation will change; I shall no longer have to bear the inquisitiveness of contemporaries who have at the most a few minutes to spend glancing through the books, or hardly even that, though plenty of time to be contemptuous."

"Contemporaries are as a rule impressed, they cannot forget that the other man looks like them and like others. But my contemporaries are particularly strong in their appreciation of my trousers - and in that they are right, it is just about all that they can understand of me".
In the last analysis it is the Kierkegaardian dialectic the age cannot comprehend. Towards the end of 1847, and about the time when he was preparing a course of lectures on "The Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication", Kierkegaard wrote in his Journal as follows:

"When in regard to communicating something it is self-evident what to communicate means, then it is simply a matter of course and not a moment needs to be wasted discussing the question, when it is the kind of assumption which does not even need to be mentioned; then, if one has something to communicate, it is as easy as shelling peas. But when an author has an individual conception of what communication is, when perhaps the distinctive characteristic, the reality of its historical importance is concentrated in precisely that; well, then it will be a long affair — 0 school of patience. Before there can be any mention of understanding anything which he has communicated one must first of all understand him from the point of view of his particular dialectic of communication, and understand everything from that point of view. For that particular dialectic of communication cannot be communicated in the traditional dialectical form. The age will of course require this of him. Oh, how long will it take to be understood, 0 school of patience. And the more a man understands himself through what he understands, the more easily he will discover that he is not understood — only those who themselves understand nothing can succeed with the illusion of believing that everyone understands them. Oh, the sadness, of having understood something true — and then of only seeing oneself misunderstood".

Although recognising the inevitability of being misunderstood, Kierkegaard is still passionately aware of the frustration which such misunderstanding invokes in the ethico-religious communicator.

Yet the lack of comprehension which characterised general public reaction to Kierkegaard's authorship did not only function on the intellectual level. It was not simply a case of his books being read and the point missed. In addition, Kierkegaard's position as a free lance writer militated against his being taken at all seriously by his contemporaries. He has the impression that, as things stand in Copenhagen, a man who philosophises is deemed to be wasting his time unless, like Sibbern, he earns his living as a professor of philosophy. He writes: "If one is a private person and consequently philosophises for philosophy's sake (which Sibbern certainly does, but which people do not in effect realise) they look upon it as just as mad as though a person of independent means were to sweep chimneys". Nowadays only the man who teaches or preaches for a living is taken seriously — "I am reckless because I work as well as anybody, without having a living".

The extent of Kierkegaard's frustrations in the face of such an attitude is not difficult to imagine. His authorship had been dedicated to the cause of religious subjectivity. He had sought to reinstate the significance of Christianity as truth to be appropriated by single individuals immersed in the passions of existence. He was the one who had insisted that "only the truth which edifies is truth for thee!". Yet here he was confronted with the view that truth comes only from the lips of those who expound it for a living. This is in line with the prevailing obsession with conformity. The "official meaning" must be generally adhered to, thus preventing people - even people of considerable ability - from coming to terms with the truth which Kierkegaard has confronted them, and which they must sooner or later confront in eternity. Whilst the mass of people ignore him because he has no official status, the gifted people who read him and do in fact understand what he says either shy away from his teaching or deliberately misrepresent it. Even though he can take comfort from the fact that he will not deceive himself into thinking that he can be understood before his death, and even though he can understand why he cannot be understood before then, and that all this is part of his duty, yet still he complains that "truly it is a huge task".

Now, Kierkegaard's feeling of being misunderstood was nothing new. In 1834 he reflects in the Journal upon the tragic in terms of being misunderstood and goes so far as to carefully arrange a hierarchy of tragic situations which owe their tragic content to the incidence of misunderstanding. He declares that "Doubtless the most sublime tragedy consists in being misunderstood" and then develops this in terms of Christ and then on down the scale via Job, Goethe and Holberg. He ends with "the busybody" from one of Holberg's comedies who "sees himself encumbered with an enormous mass of concerns; everyone else smiles at him and sees nothing". Kierkegaard then adds: "The tragedy in the hypochondriac's life also stems from this - and also the tragedy in the character who is seized with a longing for something higher and who then encounters people who do not understand him".
As Malantschuk observes: "most of these examples have a certain connection with Kierkegaard's own situations. This is most apparent in the last two examples". Therefore, in February, 1836, he writes: "People understand me so little that they do not even understand when I complain of being misunderstood". Whilst in November, 1837, he declares:

"It is really all nonsense about writing for one's own time, that is not how things happen. It all begins with one or more people going mad, according to the importance of the idea ... then a great mind comes along and understands the idea; but is not understood by his contemporaries". 

So, even before his authorship began, Kierkegaard reveals an awareness that misunderstanding is a real threat facing the exceptional man. Also he clearly sees it as part of his own fate as a genius in the bourgeois confines of 19th Century Copenhagen. Whatever the merits of Kierkegaard's behaviour with respect to The Corsair, his Journals leave us in no doubt as to how deeply he felt the public ridicule and disdain which issued from this affair. Eight years later he wrote in his Journal of "The wild goose" and there is obvious reference made here to the period when he suffered at the hands of public opinion and the popular press. Also, it is an account of the collapse in the understanding established between wild and domestic geese. Generally speaking, when the wild goose is heard overhead, the domestic goose on the ground become a little agitated but there is no real ambition amongst them to try and join him. However:

"Once upon a time there was a wild goose. In Autumn, about the migrating time, it noticed some domestic geese. It fell in love with them, it seemed a sin to fly away from them, it hoped to win them for its life, so that they would resolve to accompany it when the migration began.

"To this end, it took up with them in every possible way, it tried to attract them to rise a little higher, always a little higher in their flight, that they might if at all possible take part in the migration, released from the miserable and mediocre life of waddling around on the earth as respectable domestic geese.

"At first the domestic geese thought it was quite amusing, and they developed an affection for the wild goose. But soon they got tired of it, they rebuffed it with rough words, chiding it for a fantastic fool without experience or wisdom. But alas, the wild goose had become so familiar with the domestic geese that they had gradually acquired power over it, their words impressed it - and the end of the story is that the wild goose became a domestic goose."
So far it is clear that the wild goose erred in trying to overstep the natural and necessary understanding between wild and domestic geese. But then Kierkegaard goes on to argue that, where Christianity is the determining factor, it is possible for the domestic goose to become wild. The natural understanding can be over-ruled, with a subsequent collision of interests. Indeed it is the Christian's responsibility to encourage domestic geese to become wild. Meanwhile, the Christian is warned against the danger of the domestic goose getting power over him and compelling him to join them. So, with the wild goose trying to convert the domestic goose, and the domestic goose at the same time trying to win him to their way of life, there must inevitably be misunderstanding.

This parable makes it clear that, for Kierkegaard, part of the Christian's calling is to a life of suffering and disdain, an existence which always carries the threat of being misunderstood. In accordance with his thought way back in 1834, Kierkegaard now spells out this tragic aspect of the Christian's situation in life. 24

By taking these examples from Kierkegaard's Journals, ranging over a period of 21 years, we have shown that he consistently associated misunderstanding with the life of the ethico-religious individual. However, it is significant that this factor came to the fore especially in the years immediately after the publication of Postscript. Furthermore, we must note that it is not only the question of the Christian inevitably being misunderstood, or the genius being misunderstood, which concerns him here — as we have seen, these things he took for granted all along; but also he begins to show a real concern about his own authorship being misunderstood. Hitherto he had noted the existential tragedy involved when particular individuals are subjected to grave misunderstanding, but now he senses that his authorship has suffered the same fate. The Corsair incident and its aftermath plainly revealed that the generality of folk had failed to comprehend his message. But also, and maybe this hurt him most of all, certain events revealed that particular individuals, of whom he expected something better, showed
Just as little understanding,²⁵ Here we take especial note of Lynster, Wartensen, P.C. Kierkegaard and Rudelbach.

Of these four men, certainly Lynster is to be considered the most significant for the purposes of this discussion. Kierkegaard had a special long-standing relationship to the Bishop traceable back to his early childhood. Here we must spend some time on Kierkegaard's often expressed anxiety to be understood by Lynster and to have his books approved by "my father's priest". This anxiety is especially apparent in the years after Postscript was published, and most of the subsequent books are accompanied by Journal entries pertaining to Lynster's opinion of them. However, we begin with the "Report" dated March 9th, 1846, i.e. less than two weeks after Postscript appeared and three weeks prior to the publication of A Literary Review. At one point early in the "Report",²⁶ Kierkegaard reveals an acute sensitivity to what Lynster might think. He is talking about his Preface to Postscript, where he expresses satisfaction at the absence of a sensational response to Philosophical Fragments. He rejoices that

"No learned outcry was raised to mislead the expectant multitude, no shouts of warning from our literary sentinels served to put the reading public on its guard; everything happened with due decency and decorum ... The Author is thus qua author in the happy situation of owing nothing to anybody - I refer to critics, reviewers, middlemen, appraisers and the like, these tailors of the literary world, who make the man and help the author cut a figure". ²⁷

He goes on to rehearse the advantages of being the subject of disapproval, rather than acclaim. To have one's work negatively received is likely to result in far less encroachment upon one's private life and personal liberties.²⁸

So, in the "Report" he writes:

"Now, there was something in the Preface (to Postscript) which might certainly have been a reference to The Corsair affair ... Now, had I bothered myself about The Corsair, I should have altered it slightly, precisely in order to avoid giving that impression. I know how I fought with myself, as to whether I should do so or not because it pained me to think what Bishop Lynster, for example, might think: fancy Kierkegaard taking account of such a thing in a book".
We may compare this with an entry written twenty months later (November, 1847) and after the publication of *Works of Love*:

"Today I called on Bishop Mynster. He said he was very busy so I left immediately. But he was also very cold to me. He is probably shocked by the last book. That is how I understood it. Perhaps I am mistaken. But where I am not mistaken is in something else, that this has given me a sense of calm which I have not experienced before. I have always shrunken from writing what I knew must shock him, almost embitter him. Now I presume it has happened. It has happened many times before, but he would not let himself be shocked. But it is what hurts for a moment that gives me life and pleasure. I have never done the least thing to win his approval or his assent, but it would have pleased me indescribably to have had him agreeing with me — for his sake, too; for I know better than anyone that I am right — from his sermons".

Here we see the same sensitivity to Mynster’s feelings although we may also detect a certain amount of resignation to the inevitability of shocking the old man. As the final sentence indicates, Kierkegaard was in the process of developing an ever more critical stance with regard to Mynster’s sermons, whilst Mynster’s part in the drama of Kierkegaard’s vacillating approach to the possibility of seeking ordination did nothing to foster Kierkegaard’s confidence in him.

Late in 1846, Kierkegaard notes that, whilst Mynster’s support for his move to a country parsonage certainly corresponds with his desires, still their respective premises are at variance. Mynster is under the impression that such a move will further Kierkegaard along the road "to becoming something", whilst the latter, his authorship now completed, wants only "to be as little as possible". Thus he concludes that, "When Bishop Mynster advises me to be a country parson, he evidently does not understand me". Just two months later, Kierkegaard expresses the view that Mynster’s motives are not entirely honourable. "It is evident", says Kierkegaard, "that he looks upon me as a suspicious and dangerous person. He therefore wants to have me out in the country". Again the conclusion is the same:

"... Mynster does not understand me; when he was 36 years old, he would not have understood me; he would have hardened in order not to understand me, so as not to ruin his career, and now he cannot understand me".

Such entries provide the background to the meeting between the two men on the publication of *Works of Love*. 
Just over two weeks after this meeting we find a number of entries in which Kierkegaard is seen wrestling with the problem of his immediate relationship to the world around him. He states categorically that "As long as I live I cannot be recognised, for only a few can understand me". However, this does not prevent him from especially lamenting Mynster's lack of understanding:

"The only man in my time to whom I have paid attention is Mynster. But Mynster only bothers about bossing others, in the belief that this is the truth; he does not bother much about the truth, even if it suffers straight in front of him. He can only understand that the truth must and should rule, but that its very mark in suffering is something beyond his understanding".

Then, in the very next entry, Kierkegaard makes it clear that the troops are now drawn up to do battle between himself and Mynster. It is up to the latter not to make "a false move". From now until Mynster's death in 1854, the drama of the relationship between these two men is played out against the backcloth of this ultimatum.

The next skirmish arose in connection with the dedication and publication of Christian Discourses. There are clear indications that Kierkegaard seriously contemplated dedicating Part IV ("Discourses at the Communion on Fridays") to Bishop Mynster. However, it soon became apparent to him that such a dedication would be impossible, even though he would willingly do it in memory of his father. Kierkegaard indicates that two factors stood in the way. First of all, his path in life is too uncertain with regard to whether he should enjoy honour and respect or be reviled and persecuted for him to consider dedicating his work to a living person. Secondly, "the differences between us are too considerable". A little later in the same Journal, Kierkegaard admits that he has been touched by the fact that Mynster has retained his friendship in spite of Works of Love, and Kierkegaard feels inclined to do something to please him. He is aware that Mynster would think well of Christian Discourses if Part III was deleted but (as with the Preface to Postscript and with Works of Love) there can be no question of changing things to satisfy the old Bishop. Also, Kierkegaard reiterates that he "would willingly have
dedicated Part IV to him, but it cannot be. 39

The reasons why such a dedication must be impossible are clearly spelt out in Journal entries written about the same time as those just cited. Kierkegaard is becoming very much sharper in his criticism of Mynster's brand of Christianity which seems to be built around the accumulation of comforts and worldly benefits along with the pursuit of honour and esteem. Basically, his way of life is heathendom. Whereas Christianity is essentially impractical with respect to worldly affairs, Mynster is concerned with temporal practicalities. 40 Thus, whilst Kierkegaard still shows himself sensitive to Mynster's feelings and desirous of his approval, nonetheless the Bishop's private comments and public behaviour showed to Kierkegaard's satisfaction that his works had not been understood. Now the relationship between the two men became that little bit more tense, and the need for Kierkegaard to reappraise his tactics became even more urgent.

However, this was not to be the end of the "dedication" affair. In the Papers from 1850, we again find Kierkegaard deliberating about whether to dedicate a projected work to Mynster. It appears that the work in question was Three ethico-religious treatises, written in 1848 41 and still awaiting publication. 42 A number of drafts were made for the proposed dedication 43 but once again rejection of the plan was inevitable. Kierkegaard says he wants to use the dedication because it is what he (Kierkegaard) has always wanted to do and because the time seemed right (with Martensen under attack from another quarter on account of his Christian Dogmatics and Mynster sorely in need of some support). 44 However, good arguments can be found against the plan and it is significant that prominent here are the very same objections Kierkegaard raised against the earlier planned dedication, i.e. the authorship would be damaged by a dedication to a living person with whom he is in so great disagreement. 45 Even if the dedication had been used it would have contained a definite statement as to the radical difference between the two men as Christian thinkers. 46
In fact, a comparative study of these drafts clearly reveals the struggle Kierkegaard had in trying to combine deference to Mynster with honesty about their relationship. He wants to give Mynster the full credit due to him as a Christian preacher and leader, yet there must be left no room for supposing that he supports the establishment which Mynster represents.

But why should Kierkegaard again contemplate dedicating a work to Mynster when he had already rejected the idea two years earlier? No particular reason is offered in the Journals, but Lowrie is probably right in saying that Kierkegaard was anxious to convey his gratitude to Mynster on account of the latter's making so little fuss about *Sickness unto Death*. In other words, this whole business arose as a consequence of Kierkegaard's sensitivity in respect of Mynster's attitude to his books as they appeared. Kierkegaard desperately wants Mynster's support, and would dearly love to be in agreement with him. But yet there can be no fleeing from reality, neither can he sidestep the task to which he feels himself called. Despite his exalted position and his undisputed intelligence, Mynster simply does not understand Kierkegaard and no amount of wrestling with syntax or juggling with words will result in a declaration adequately conveying the real state of the parties. Perhaps this inner struggle over the problem of whether to dedicate to Mynster or not can be used as a cameo representation of Kierkegaard's general uncertainty about how to proceed with his authorship without openly attacking the Church Primate. Because the essence of his writings had not been understood, Kierkegaard knew that some form of direct communication must be used. But such directness must necessarily involve Bishop Mynster who Kierkegaard both venerates as a pastor and preacher and despises as one who has misunderstood his work - with the least excuse for doing so. A way must be found of stating his case against Christendom as strongly as possible without provoking an all out public clash of personalities. Eulogising Mynster in a dedication was one possibility - but this may have the undesired effect of seeming to cover over the important differences between him and Kierkegaard. At last Kierkegaard resolves
to publish *Training in Christianity* under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus. This he did on September 27th, 1850. Representing an ideality which is high enough to judge even Kierkegaard himself, Anti-Climacus is able to make statements roundly condemning Mynster yet without naming names. So long as Mynster doesn't make "a false move" (i.e. categorically condemn the book as destructive of the Church) then the way will be clear for Kierkegaard to continue his "defence" of established Christianity by pressing for the admission. As the Apostle of subjectivity, Kierkegaard would far rather see the Church, through its leader, honestly admit its faults and relative significance than have it capitulate to an all out assault on its institutions and values. Once again Mynster's reaction to his work becomes a decisive issue for Kierkegaard.

The crisis came when Kierkegaard had a conversation with Mynster at the Bishop's house just over a month after the publication of *Training in Christianity*. Kierkegaard's report of the conversation clearly reflects his anxiety about whether Mynster means to condemn it unconditionally. First of all, he recounts a meeting with Mynster's son-in-law Pastor Pauli. According to Pauli, Mynster was very angry about the book: "(it) has greatly embittered me", Mynster is reported as saying, "it is a profane game played with holy things". We may assume that this report both surprised and upset Kierkegaard. As he points out, in the three weeks prior to meeting Pauli, no official action had been taken in response to *Training*, neither had the papers indicated government disapproval. Also, Mynster's preaching contained nothing polemical about the book. So Kierkegaard began his conversation with Mynster by repeating Pauli's report that the Bishop intended to reprimand him on account of *Training in Christianity*. A good deal hinged on Mynster's response. In fact it was unexpectedly mild: "I have no right to reprimand" said Mynster, "I have told you before that I have no objection to each bird singing its own song". He then added; "People can perfectly well say what they like about me". This put Kierkegaard on his guard and so he pressed Mynster to tell him whether the book had in fact distressed him. To
Kierkegaard's great relief, Mynster's reply was not decisively damning: "Yes", he said "I really believe that it will not do any good". Kierkegaard reports that he was content with this reply: "It was kindly and personal". Apparently the rest of the conversation was not extraordinary except for Mynster's famous analysis of Training: "one half of the book is an attack on Martensen, the other half on me". Kierkegaard concludes the entry as follows:

"God be praised. O, how I have really suffered. I considered it my duty to conduct the case so that I made the establishment aware that, insofar as they opposed me they would force me to go further.

"Nothing has happened so far, everyone has kept silent - and Mynster talked thus.

"Perhaps what Pauli said was true - but that was the very first day. Possibly Mynster, having given up wanting to do anything officially, had really thought about doing something privately; but later gave up the idea.

"However, a little dig could well be made in a sermon". 55

Clearly Kierkegaard feels he has manoeuvred into the desired position. 56

The significance of this conversation is shown by the fact that he immediately made an entry in the Journal under the heading: "Mynster's importance for my whole work as an author". 57 He makes it clear that, had his veneration for Mynster not been already to hand as a given fact, then he might have pursued a course leading to the reform or subversion of the Church. But Mynster stood as the representative of the establishment who yet had to be buttressed up out of veneration. Kierkegaard believes that this has had a most salutary effect upon his tactical development. Had Mynster not existed, then Kierkegaard would have had to invent him. Mynster is thus seen as the barometer by means of which Kierkegaard has been able to measure the climate of feeling and opinion on the publication of each of his works. As was his practice, Kierkegaard has here imposed a retrospective view upon Mynster's role in his authorship. Whilst he was always conscious of the ambiguity of the relationship between himself and Mynster, it was only now, in 1850, that he was able to secure a definite place for him in the overall scheme of things. Kierkegaard had agonised over the question of whether to
publish *Training in Christianity*. Mynster's well-tempered reaction assured him that he was justified in delivering this severe challenge to Christendom in the way he did.

Although Kierkegaard persists in his criticism of Mynsterish Christianity in the weeks following the conversation about *Training in Christianity*, we may yet detect a mood for concession in the Journals. Thus he declares that Mynster knows Kierkegaard has right on his side, and that "to a certain extent Mynster understands me". This represents one of the very few occasions upon which Kierkegaard was prepared to concede that Mynster actually understood his position. However, in a sense this concession merely heaps more coals of fire on Mynster's head. The more understanding there is on Mynster's part, then all the more urgent becomes the need for an admission to be made in the light of Anti-Climacus' ideal presentation of Christianity.

Then something occurred which severely shook Kierkegaard's sense of contentment at the evolution of his plans.

In January, 1851, Doctor A. G. Rudelbach published *Concerning Civil Marriage* (*Om det borgerlige ægteskab*). Towards the end of this little book he wrote: "What is rightly called routine - and state Christianity must go. We must fight for the emancipation of the Church from the State by means of free institutions, one of which is civil marriage". Here is the burden of Rudelbach's argument. Then he adds: "This is exactly what Søren Kierkegaard seeks to impress upon, to imprint upon, and, as Luther says, to drive home to all those who will listen". On January 31st, Kierkegaard published a reply to Rudelbach in *The Fatherland*, strongly denying any point of agreement between himself and Rudelbach on the subject of external reforms. He makes it clear that he is not at all concerned with the advocacy of civil marriage or any other tampering with institutional forms. He maintains that he has:

"only provided, poetically, what may be called an existential-corrective to the established order, oriented toward inward deepening in 'the single individual' - that is, I am positive I have never
directed one word against the teaching and the organisation of the established order, but I have worked to make this teaching more and more the truth in 'the single individual". 64

In February, Rudelbach issued a reply to Kierkegaard's open letter which merely served to underline the disagreement between the two. 65

However, of more significance from our point of view is a contribution to the debate published by Mynster, March 13th, 1851. 66 Here Mynster made the following observation:

"Among the happy 'phenomena' - we take up this word following one of our most talented authors - which have appeared during these discussions, is the response which one voice has made; a voice which recently (see Fatherland No. 26) has been raised against the belief that the fault lies in the outward, 'that a change in outward things is required, or that a change in outward things can help us". 67

The word "phenomena" (Fremtoninge:r) was associated with Goldschmidt and it is to him that the description "most talented" refers. Then, just after these words, Mynster has occasion to describe Kierkegaard as a "gifted author". This was sufficient to arouse Kierkegaard's indignation. Whilst he had been on the watch for "a dig" from the pulpit, Mynster had attacked him from a very different quarter. Very quickly the Journal entries began to reflect his anger at having his name associated with that of Goldschmidt. Typically, he was quick to notice the irony in verses from the Psalms which he had read the day after he received Mynster's article. 68 He was especially struck by the appropriateness of Psalm 26, v. 4, and Psalm 27, v. 10: "I have not sat with vain persons, neither will I go in with dissemblers", and "when my father and my mother forsake me, then the Lord will take me up". The first quotation clearly expresses Kierkegaard's revulsion against being spoken of in the same breath as the man behind The Corsair whilst the second one reflects the store he laid by the fact that Mynster should thus speak of him.

We may never know whether Mynster really harboured the malicious intent ascribed to him by Kierkegaard. However, a good deal of evidence can be brought against him. First of all, when we look at the text itself, we can't help thinking that the reference to Goldschmidt is somewhat forced.
It certainly seems strange that lynster should go out of his way to use an adjectival phrase instead of mentioning Goldschmidt by name. Then we may note that, in conversations with Kierkegaard, lynster implicitly admits that a comparison is latent in his choice of epithets. Kierkegaard recalls that "he ( lynster) made an attempt to point out that he had used 'talented' for Goldschmidt and 'gifted' for me and that the latter meant much more". Furthermore, in the course of the same conversation it seems that lynster tried to leave the impression that he was not conversant with The Corsair or with Goldschmidt's editorship of the paper. That this should have been so is at best unlikely. We recall that in the "Report" written in 1846, Kierkegaard showed concern about how lynster would look upon possible references to The Corsair affair. There it is automatically assumed that lynster would know the facts of the case and would be acquainted with The Corsair's behaviour. Unfortunately, the only evidence we have is from Kierkegaard himself because lynster made no attempt to offer a public explanation of his intentions in so describing Kierkegaard and Goldschmidt. However, this silence may itself be significant and add further to the incriminating evidence. On the other hand, it is possible that lynster intended his remarks to be a straightforward compliment to Kierkegaard. After all, Kierkegaard had done the Bishop something of a service in opposing Rudelbach and a nod of gratitude would be in order. Kierkegaard himself admitted that this passage could be interpreted in many different ways - including the interpretation of it as a genuine expression of approval. However, Emmanuel Hirsch's judgement is probably correct: "That lynster took Kierkegaard's criticism of Rudelbach as a defence of the establishment was dishonest, but the comparison of Kierkegaard and Goldschmidt was so low as to be inexcusable".

But whatever lynster's intentions may really have been, Kierkegaard interpreted his words as a dangerous provocation and a challenge to his own tactical plans. A number of possible courses of action had to be considered. Maybe lynster's action had made it impossible to avoid a direct collision
between Kierkegaard and the establishment. Kierkegaard seriously contemplates the possibility of his being the victim of an intrigue perpetrated by the State Church and Lynster's action has made it inevitable that the public should cast Kierkegaard in the role of the State Church's opponent. Kierkegaard summarises his position under the heading: "The establishment and me":

"If I come into conflict with the establishment it will be entirely Lynster's fault. My whole endeavour is a defence of the established order, the only one that can honestly be made. Everything has been done to make things as gentle as possible for Lynster. But if he ends by obstinately maintaining that all his questionable preaching of Christianity, which has made Christianity into a theatrical amusement, is wisdom and Christianity, then it is he who made my attitude into something different".

On the basis of this entry we may conclude that Kierkegaard was bound to enter fairly soon into a polemical assault on the perversities of established Christianity as personified in Denmark's Primate. But, for Kierkegaard, Lynster is more than a representative. As noted earlier, Lynster has exercised a special influence upon the authorship on account of the veneration Kierkegaard felt for him. Now, once again, notwithstanding what he deemed to be a reckless provocation, Kierkegaard was constrained by this special relationship to Lynster from casting aside his reserve. He resolved to further postpone his public protest and have the matter out privately with Lynster. Hence the conversation at Lynster's house on May 2nd, 1851.

The principal aim of the conversation on Kierkegaard's side was to reassure Lynster that it is still his prestige Kierkegaard is seeking to defend. The need to make this point clear had arisen out of Kierkegaard's suspicion that Lynster's comparison of himself and Goldschmidt was part of an intrigue calculated to provoke an untimely outburst from Kierkegaard, damaging only to the latter's position. Ironically, Kierkegaard warns Lynster that maybe his description of Goldschmidt might be deemed an understatement in some quarters and thus damage the Bishop's reputation. Even when Lynster suggested that Goldschmidt should be exploited as "a useful man", 
Kierkegaard warned that this short term advantage was bought at too high a price. Furthermore, Kierkegaard advises Mynster that "If there is anything you disapprove of in me, I wish you would give me a thrashing, do it, do it, I can bear it, and I shall take pains to see that you do not suffer for it; but above all take care not to act in such a way as to injure your reputation". He then adds categorically: "It is your reputation I am interested in". Then, having made this point clear, Kierkegaard proceeds to hammer home to Mynster the full extent of his disapproval in respect of Mynster's attitude to Goldschmidt. "It must be noted that I have said I cannot approve of it" he declared, at the same time making as if to write the words on the table with his finger. This whole scene has all the drama appropriate to the significance Kierkegaard attached to it. It was a decisive battle in the war which raged within him between the inevitability of entering into conflict with the establishment and his personal respect for the representative of that establishment. If Mynster was to continue to be defended by Kierkegaard then it was vital that he understand the latter's position. Only on such a basis could Kierkegaard continue to hope for an admission from Mynster as to the deviance of the State Church from the New Testament ideal. For Kierkegaard this meeting represented a last ditch effort to acquaint Mynster with the strength of his feeling and the severity of his threat.

However, the whole thing was something of a charade. Although Kierkegaard was happy at having spoken to Mynster, he clearly did not feel the same sense of contentment and relief which characterised his feelings after their last meeting. Then he had come away satisfied that Mynster was not intent upon making "a false move" following the publication of Training in Christianity. This time, although they parted "in as friendly a way as possible", Kierkegaard must have known that Mynster was not prepared to demand a revocation from Goldschmidt for his part in The Corsair or to censure him. Furthermore, it must have been obvious that Mynster's immediate plans found no place for the sort of admission described in
Very soon after this meeting Kierkegaard wrote in the Journal of Mynster's errors:

1) "He has given the impression that there is some sense in saying 'that all we thousands and millions are Christians'" and

2) "he has hardened himself against me". 

Both these points can be attributed to the Goldschmidt inference, so clearly Kierkegaard had found no reassurance in his recent conversation with the Bishop. Quite the contrary, for the attacks on Mynster in the Journals now become ever more severe, with especial emphasis being laid on his alleged collusion with the new government. Also, Kierkegaard set about preparing a statement for publication which would relate directly to Mynster's utterances about himself and Goldschmidt, and deal generally with the prevailing relationship between himself and the Danish Primate.

In the drafts to the proposed publication we find much which is now familiar to us as a result of the open attack three years later. That Kierkegaard came so close to publishing these thoughts give some indication of the hopelessness he experienced in the face of Mynster's continued intransigence. But that he stopped short of publication is likewise indicative of his continued, compelling veneration for his father's priest.

Kierkegaard met Mynster again at the Bishop's house on 9th August, which, significantly, was the anniversary of the death of Kierkegaard's father. The close link between Mynster and old Michael in Kierkegaard's mind is nowhere more clearly expressed than by this symbolic visit. Kierkegaard himself admitted: "I liked to have everything as it should be on that day". But this sentimental motive was not alone in prompting Kierkegaard to pay Mynster another visit. Coupled with it was the customary desire to hear Mynster's views on two books which he had published at the beginning of August and copies of which he had sent to Mynster, whilst the latter was away on his annual parochial visitation. They were: About My Work as an Author and Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays. After exchanging views about the place of the Literary
In Kierkegaard's authorship, the conversation turned to what Kierkegaard had written about government in About My Work as an Author. In the passage under discussion, Kierkegaard had reaffirmed his desire to defend the establishment, especially since the revolutionary developments of 1848. He declares that: "Never has the race and the individual within it discovered so deeply that the race itself and every individual within it needs and craves to have something which unconditionally stands fast". In the light of such declarations as these, we are not surprised to learn that Mynster "was pleased and delighted and in agreement with me".

Yet, there is a strange atmosphere about this conversation, as it is recounted by Kierkegaard. Surely there is something ironic about Mynster's enthusiasm in respect of About My Work as an Author. The passage pertaining to government is found in the supplement to that work under the heading "My position as a religious writer in 'Christendom' and my tactics". Here Kierkegaard states unequivocally that:

"I have desired to be instrumental in bringing, if possible, by means of admissions, a little more truth into the imperfect existences which we lead ... which after all is something, and is at any rate the first condition for learning to live more effectively ... everything is made as lenient as possible, seeing that there is talk only of admissions and concessions, and indeed only of such concessions and admissions as everyone is left free to make for himself before God".

This clearly echoes the Preface to Training in Christianity as well as being a public affirmation of thoughts often repeated in the Journals. Kierkegaard's demand that the individual in Christendom should begin his journey back to Christianity by first admitting his limitations in the face of the stringent New Testament requirements is a frequently recurring refrain after 1846. But of more significance is the fact that this notion of the admission is closely associated with Mynster's status as head of the Danish Church and so chief representative of established Christianity in Denmark. Thus, only a few days before his August 9th meeting with Mynster, Kierkegaard wrote as follows under the heading "The Establishment and I":

"Nothing could be further from the truth than to say that I attack the establishment - in fact, I defend it against the activist party, against the times evil urge to reform."
"But I think that, for example, Bishop Mynster, who indeed also defends the establishment, does not defend it in the right way. Admissions must be made in respect of Christianity, we must confess that we really only approximate to being Christian ...". 95

Then again:

"On the whole Mynster must agree with me that this whole establishment is not Christian in the stronger sense. Perhaps as far as concerns himself, he has made God this admission but has considered that such things should be suppressed in order to encourage men to become Christians. This is shrewd and extremely dubious, especially when it is continued from generation to generation, so becoming completely subversive." 96

In these entries it is understood that Mynster should be the one to make the required admission not just on his own behalf but also as a public, representative gesture.

In the light of these sentiments expressed so soon before their meeting, it might reasonably be wondered why Kierkegaard did not raise the subject of an admission with Mynster face to face. Also, in the light of the fact that Kierkegaard saw Mynster's references to Goldschmidt as indicative of the Bishop's unholy alliance with the prevailing mass movements in journalism and politics, it is strange how little "the Master of irony" makes out of Mynster's agreement with the supplement to About My Work as an Author. Certainly Kierkegaard did take the opportunity to "let fall" a few words about his "not countenancing what (Mynster) said about Goldschmidt in his last book", but their jovial parting suggests that Kierkegaard was fairly restrained in his criticism. Clearly the relationship between Kierkegaard and Mynster was still in a state of suspended animation and another publication would have to be ventured even though the authorship was supposed to have closed with the two discourses at the Friday Communion. 97

Sure enough, one month later, on September 10th, Kierkegaard published "For Self-Examination, Commended to this Age". 98 No pseudonym was employed on this occasion and, as Lowrie observes, this book "marks a new stage of progress in the effort to break through this morbid reserve and to practise direct communication". 99 When we compare this book with the two communion discourses it is clear that we are moving into a very different atmosphere -
the atmosphere of the final polemical pamphlets. Hohlenberg puts the matter thus:

"When one comes from the Discourses to these two books (For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves) one feels as if, from a free voyage on the open sea, Kierkegaard is come into a severe monsoon which with increasing speed forces him inexorably on towards the climax. He himself felt that the time was now come to speak directly and to seek to 'rin men'. The format is the same with these two works also consisting of discourses, but the content is more concentrated and the tone has become sharper. All that which later comes to the fore in the Attack upon the Church lies here in embryo, and is said in more reserved but no less definite words". 100

Malentschuk makes very much the same point:

"They are like a fore-warning of the criticism of the Church and Christendom in general which is quietly being prepared ... These two books also herald a period in which the qualitative dialectic is no longer in the foreground, but rather the quantitative dialectic". 101

Thus Kierkegaard moved further along the path of greater severity. Yet he is still prepared to show restraint. Indeed, as Hohlenberg has said, the sentiments behind For Self-Examination are definitely those of the "Attack", but still we must note the significance of the fact that the expression is "more reserved". Also, it is equally significant that Kierkegaard refrained from publishing Judge for Yourselves, even though it was ready at this time. Notwithstanding his complaint that Wynster "has himself made it impossible" for him to go as far as he would like in support of the Bishop, 102 Kierkegaard is still prepared to temper his criticism by modifying the severity of his published works and postponing the publication of more extreme discourses. Kierkegaard still maintains that he is "an unauthoritative poet who moves people by means of the ideals", 103 and so Wynster is presented with another opportunity to make a definite response to Kierkegaard's challenge. 104 In the conversation after the publication of Training in Christianity Kierkegaard expressed the wish that one of them might have been dead before it was published and he comments "if one really wants to attack a man, one hardly would wish him to be dead beforehand". 105 These feelings are still the controlling ones at the end of 1851 when Kierkegaard published For Self-Examination. Close attention to Wynster's sermons, and to his general
existential demeanour convinces Kierkegaard that an open attack must be
only a question of time. For Self-Examination represents a partially
muted warning of the impending assault. Yet, at the same time, his
devotion to Mynster fosters the hope that even at this late stage something
might be able to avert the collision.

While Mynster lives the possibilities are three-fold:

1) He will be guided by Kierkegaard's progressive tightening of the
screw into an unequivocal condemnation of Kierkegaard's authorship. Or,
the positive equivalent of such a move, he will maintain "that the
preaching of Christianity as he represents it is genuine Christianity
according to the New Testament". In either event Kierkegaard would
begin the "Attack".

2) Mynster will make the required admission as head of the Danish Church.
In that event Kierkegaard will leave his authorship to stand as a defence
of the establishment and, presumably, go in search of a living. Certainly
there would be no question of continuing the polemical trend set by
For Self-Examination. There will be no direct attack.

3) Neither of these things will happen. Mynster will not make the
"false move" by attacking Kierkegaard or crediting his own preaching with
the mark of absolute truth. Neither will he make the admission.
In this event, Kierkegaard must either give up all hope of getting the
admission and so launch into combat, or else wait for Mynster's death.
The former alternative is barred for two reasons:

a) It would represent an endeavour of the sort usually associated with
the pursuit of external reforms. This would be contrary to Kierkegaard's
general tactics which were directed towards presenting Christianity in all
its lofty ideality, and thus requiring a confession if men are to enter
into it. Consequently:

"With regard to the 'established order', seeing that my special
concern was 'the individual', which was the point of my polemic against
the numerical, the crowd etc., I have always done the very opposite of
attacking it; I have never been in or with the 'opposition' which
wants to get rid of the 'government', nor have I been allied with it, but I have furnished what may be called a 'corrective', the intent of which was: For God's sake let us continue to be ruled by those who are called to this task, and that they should stand fast in the fear of God, willing only one thing, the Good". 107

So there can be no question of initiating a programme of external reform. Only such actions by the establishment as were described in 1) above could justify Kierkegaard in mounting a direct attack.

b) His devotion to Mynster as "his father's Priest" is still too compelling. No effort must be spared in order to avert the need for him to openly condemn this man who has exerted such a formative influence on Kierkegaard's spiritual development.

It was in fact the third possibility which was actually realised. Mynster did not make the admission but neither did he explicitly attack Kierkegaard or make absolute claims for the truth of his own preaching. At least, Kierkegaard was happy to conclude that Mynster had not made an attack such as to justify him in abandoning his armed neutrality.

Certainly the best candidate for the description of an attacking gesture by Mynster must be the latter's comments linking Kierkegaard and Goldschmidt. We have already made reference to Kierkegaard's plan for the publication of an article rebutting Mynster's comments, and in a moment we shall turn to consider in some detail his wrestling with various plans for this work. For now it is sufficient to notice how Kierkegaard rationalised his silence in the face of what he clearly considered to be a premeditated insult. One of the loose papers from the Journal of 1851, dated early in April, is headed "That nothing could be done on the occasion of Mynster's last book" and draws together points made many times elsewhere in the papers. Four reasons are offered why Kierkegaard must keep silent:

1) "The words cited by him are used absolutely correctly so there is nothing to protest about.

2) "A word of appreciation from Bishop Mynster I would wholeheartedly respect. But the way he has introduced Goldschmidt makes it wholly into an insult ... But I am not in the habit of taking notice of an insult; to defend oneself against an insult is not to fight in a godly way. In godly fashion one defends oneself only against notoriety and the like, especially when it is based on misunderstanding."
3) "My existential category is: 'without authority'. But here authority would essentially have to be used, and to attack Mynster would be in the direction of using authority. But I keep myself constantly only within the sphere of the poetical.

4) "It is self-evident that Mynster was the one for whom, against all others, I would have dared almost everything. But now he has weakened himself. Thus he has also brought me into a state of almost comical embarrassment because of my deep respect for him, for this is really not a category appropriate to a man who acts in such a way. In a way it could again satisfy me that I was the one to give him a blow. But, for the reasons already given, I cannot bring myself to do this. Moreover, many people will certainly understand Training in Christianity also as aimed in Mynster's direction, notwithstanding the fact that I have maintained the whole thing poetically and wished to continue unchanged with my 'in deep reverence'."

This entry was written only one month after Mynster's fateful intervention in the debate on civil marriage. However, the sentiments represented here became normative for Kierkegaard up until just before the Bishop's death. In accordance with his dialectical bent, Kierkegaard succeeds in hedging all his bets. Try as he may, he cannot but conclude that Mynster meant to insult him by comparing him with Goldschmidt. This seems like the kind of provocation which must incite Kierkegaard to launch his open attack on the establishment. But he concludes that this may not necessarily be the case. As they stand, Mynster's words can be seen as quite legitimate both in form and content. Kierkegaard may be able to detect the insult, but the expression is not sufficiently forthright as to form the basis for a direct retaliation. So, even if it is an insult, Kierkegaard feels that he can justifiably keep quiet. Furthermore, if it is an insult then it would not be right for Kierkegaard to react because the Christian should only seek to defend himself when he is praised, and that praise is founded on a misunderstanding. Thus a straightforward insult will not be the occasion for Kierkegaard to begin his attack. Rather, such a provocation is more likely to stem from a misguided compliment. But the introduction of Goldschmidt's name has assured Kierkegaard that Mynster did not mean to compliment Kierkegaard so the latter can legitimately refrain from an overt assault without feeling that he is thereby failing in his duty. Whilst, after the publication of Training in Christianity, Kierkegaard had
been looking for an unfavourable or even hostile response from Mynster
as the inevitable incitement to attack, now he is on his guard against a
word of praise founded on misunderstanding. Once Kierkegaard had seen
misunderstanding in terms of Mynster's attack on a writer whose basic aim
was to be a defence of the establishment; now it is defined in terms of
Mynster's praising a writer whose Christian perspective is fundamentally
at variance with his own. Here is clearly exemplified the tension which
marked Kierkegaard's relationship to Mynster, and which could only be resolved
by the latter's death. Kierkegaard asserts that in Mynster he sees his
"most dangerous and most zealous opponent", yet "he could never be
attacked". In the first Journal entry after Mynster's death, Kierkegaard
explained why:

"It would have been most desirable if he could have been persuaded
to end his life by confessing to Christianity that what he represented
was not really Christianity, but a milder form of it; for he supported
a whole generation.

"The possibility of this confession had therefore to be held open
to the end, to the very last moment. Perhaps he might have wished to
make it on his death-bed. That is why he could never be attacked and
I had to stand everything, even when he did such monstrous things as in
the Goldschmidt affair. For no one could be sure that it would not
react upon him and move him to make the confession.

"Now that he is dead without having made it, everything is changed;
all that is left is that by his preaching he has hardened Christianity
into a deception.

"And everything is changed in my melancholy devotion to my dead
father's pastor. For it would be too much if even after his death
I could not speak more freely of him, even though I know well that my
old devotion and my aesthetic admiration will always have a certain
fascination for me.

"At first I wanted to transform my whole work into a triumph for
Mynster. Later, when I saw things more clearly, my wish was unchanged,
but I had to ask for this little confession. I did not want it for
my own sake, and so - this was my thought - it could be made in such a
way that it was a triumph for Bishop Mynster.

"From the time that a hidden misunderstanding came between us,
it was my wish that I should at least succeed in avoiding any attack
on him during his life-time. And I thought that I myself might die
first.

"And yet it almost came to the point where I believed I had to
attack him. There was only a single sermon of his that I did not
hear, and that was the last. I was not hindered by sickness, on the
contrary, I went to hear Kolthorfi. For me, the meaning of this was
that now it must happen, you must break with your father's tradition. It was the last time Mynster preached. Praise God, is that not like a sign of Providence?

"If Bishop Mynster could have yielded (and it could have been concealed from everyone, and become for them his triumph), then my own outward circumstances would have been less troubled that they were. For though he certainly made concessions enough to me in his inmost heart, in matters of the spirit, he reckoned with worldly prudence that in the end I would yield to him in one way or the other, because I could not hold out against him financially. A phrase he often used in his conversations with me, without pointing it directly at me, was highly characteristic: it is not a question of who has the most strength, but who can hold out longest". 113

This entry has been quoted in full because it offers Kierkegaard's considered retrospective view of how things went between him and Mynster during the years immediately before the latter's death. It is not a hasty note for it was written over a month after the event. It clearly reflects the conflict in Kierkegaard's mind during the preceding months. He is adamant that no attack was possible while the confession might still be made and yet he admits that he finally came to a point where to attack seemed inevitable. This was symbolised in his absenting himself from Mynster's sermons, thus breaking with the tradition started during his father's lifetime and continued out of filial devotion. Countless Journal entries contained attacks on Mynster's preaching and his failure to reduplicate this in his existence, 114 and now, on Boxing Day 1853, Kierkegaard resolved to go elsewhere. This action he saw as the prelude to his opening an attack on Mynster. 115 Providentially, Mynster's death resolved the impending crisis. So, whilst wishing to avoid any attack on Mynster during his life-time, Kierkegaard had taken a decisive step in the direction of doing just that. Significantly, such a clash with Mynster is seen in terms of a deviation from his father's heritage. Devotion to Mynster as "his father's priest" is always at the heart of Kierkegaard's tactical deliberations and it is this same devotion which prompted Kierkegaard to thank providence for intervening to prevent the occurrence of events he most dearly wished to avoid. But now Mynster is dead and "everything is changed". Now the shackles are off and Kierkegaard is no longer restrained
by personal devotion or by the need to give opportunity for the admission to be made. When the time is right, Kierkegaard is free to begin the assault.

I cannot leave this entry without commenting on Kierkegaard's references to his financial position. He maintains that Mynster expected him to give in as a result of his pecuniary embarrassment. Presumably by "to give in" in this context Kierkegaard means the suspension of his "armed neutrality" and the retreat into full time employment as a pastor or teacher. Certainly, Mynster had a direct influence on Kierkegaard's vacillating plans with regard to ordination, and a pastoral placement. Whether or not the urge to penitence was always the decisive motivating influence behind Kierkegaard's pursuit and final rejection of a Church living, after the publication of Postscript economic factors also played an important role. Thus in 1848, in an entry concerned with the publication of Sickness unto Death and A Cycle of ethico-religious Treatises, Kierkegaard writes:

"The next step in publication will be very decisive for my outward existence. I have constantly entertained the remote possibility of being able to seek a parochial appointment when things came to the worst with respect to my livelihood. It is quite possible that when I now publish the last books they will deny me it even if I ask. So the difficulty, unlike previously, is not whether I dare accept it but whether they will in fact give it to me". 117

Kierkegaard even contemplated getting the parish first and then publishing. But he quickly rejected this notion, ironically condemning it as "a superb interpretation of 'to seek first the Kingdom of God'". 118 However, that the thought should have crossed Kierkegaard's mind at all is indicative of his concern to solve his economic difficulties.

At last, in June 1849, Kierkegaard decided to make approaches to J. N. Madvig (the government official responsible for ecclesiastical affairs) and Bishop Mynster with a view to obtaining a pastoral appointment. Subsequent expressions of relief at failing to make contact with either man clearly indicate that he had no real wish to have his request granted. He himself puts it this way: "I dare say in my own defence that this time, as
usual, I intended to take this step, but always with the possibility of gaining impetus to act in the very opposite direction". His only regret about not having been offered an appointment rests on his fear that he may be being soft on himself. Had he actually been offered a post and then declined it, he could proceed with much more self confidence. Following another abortive attempt to raise the matter with Mynster, we can say, with Malantschuk, that "Kierkegaard's interest for a pastoral appointment culminated and from now on, receded more and more into the background".

Yet, even while he was deliberating over the pursuit of a country living, Kierkegaard reports that he had dropped a hint to Mynster about the possibility of obtaining a post in the Pastoral Seminary, and this ambition proved to be far more persistent. After all, the country parish was probably not entirely what he had made it out to be, and also, by gaining a post in the seminary, he could remain in the capital. Kierkegaard felt that it was precisely this latter aspect of the case which motivated Mynster's opposition to such an appointment. "He will have me become a country parson ... and so have me out of the way". Maybe it was Mynster's lack of sympathy with this plan which led Kierkegaard to persist with it, and the question was raised again during a later conversation when Mynster cynically (although not without justice) suggested that Kierkegaard begin a Seminary of his own.

By 1852, Kierkegaard had asserted a link between Mynster's refusal to offer him a post in the Seminary and the wish to put financial pressure on him:

"I have already spoken to him over a period of many years about being appointed to a post in the Pastoral Seminary. I do not mean to say that I would therefore have accepted it, but I would that the possibility had been brought so close to me that I could more freely discern whether it was or was not the way I should go. Indeed Mynster could know nothing about this but he has not been willing to do even the smallest thing — he only puts off the time. Thus he reckons that, for economic reasons (and I have already told him many years since that I had worries in this respect, already in 46 I had told him this) I would be unable to hold out.

"So what shall I do now? If I desist then I must work extensively —
and to that end was an appointment at the Seminary. But Mynster does not want that. So I must become intensive and emphasise that it is the fault of Mynster himself. 128

Thus Kierkegaard charges Mynster with exercising extreme guile in his behaviour towards him. Though the Bishop could not have been wholly familiar with Kierkegaard's thoughts and plans, he must be guilty of exploiting Kierkegaard's financial insecurity. This charge seems to be extremely harsh and is supported by little or no concrete evidence. However, for our purposes the justice, or otherwise, of Kierkegaard's case is not of prime importance. It is enough to have thus shown the suspicion which Kierkegaard felt towards the Bishop, even if he did still retain the desire to promote Mynster's honour and prestige.

Again, we may detect a significant change in Kierkegaard's opinion of Mynster. It will be recalled that in 1846, Kierkegaard had argued that Mynster wholly misunderstood his motives in seeking a country parsonage. He wrote then that Mynster sees such a move in terms of Kierkegaard "becoming something" (with the accompanying benefits of social and financial security) whilst for Kierkegaard himself it signifies a step in the direction of becoming "as little as possible". Now, in 1852, Mynster is being accused of denying to Kierkegaard the possibility of accepting an appointment which would solve his financial problems. Without doubt the Goldschmidt affair contributed to this change in perspective. Thus Kierkegaard appended a note to the entry just quoted (X4 A 604) which argues that at the time when he hurled himself against Rudelbach, he "was even prepared to signalise Mynster once again, in parting". 129 However, "the very person who made it impossible (by introducing Goldschmidt the way he did) ... was Mynster himself". It seems that Kierkegaard was at one time prepared to make a gesture towards Mynster in spite of the latter's misunderstanding in respect of his plans for a country living. (The projected "dedication" is also evidence of Kierkegaard's mood for willingness to conciliate in his relationship to Mynster). But the Goldschmidt reference put paid to any such plans and now, far from trying to think the best of Mynster, Kierkegaard proceeds to
charge the Bishop with extreme deviousness. Although such sentiments are indicative of Kierkegaard's increasing intolerance of the establishment and its representatives, and although the similarities between entries from 1852 and 1854 suggest that Kierkegaard unswervingly held to these feelings over a considerable period of time, it is perhaps to his credit that he only very occasionally gave expression to them in his diary. Neither of the drafts for projected polemical publications against Mynster-resort to charges of the sort described above. This may be pointed out in support of Kierkegaard's claim to have done all in his power to remain a potential defence for Mynster if the admission were made. But by the Christmas of 1853 the deterioration of Kierkegaard's "outward circumstances" had been amongst factors bringing him to the point of opening a direct attack. Then came Mynster's timely death. Kierkegaard's acute anxiety about the need to hold out as long as possible is displayed in this entry from 1852:

**About Myself**

"The fact that I do not make my life easier and do not try to secure myself from the point of view of income might be said to be pride and arrogance.

"But is it? Now who, in fact, knows himself as well as that; but if it were pride, or if pride had a part in it, this is how I look at it: by simply holding out in this way it will be made plain, and I shall suffer my punishment.

"As for the rest, my thoughts are as follows. It seems to me that I owe it to what I have understood, that a higher power can require me to hold out as long as there is the slightest possibility. As soon as I ultimately deceive myself (while it was still possible to hold out a little longer) I am finished, and the world will immediately understand that all danger is over. I constantly feel that there is something higher acting within me, I mean that I cannot justify any other course than holding out as long as possible, in its service. If I have been mistaken, then in God's name my sin can be forgiven and the punishment will come in this life, but if I break off voluntarily before I truthfully have to do something for my livelihood, if I break off like that - and if there were something higher acting that would otherwise have come to light in me and through me: Oh, that I will only discover in eternity when it is too late". 130

In the very next entry, Kierkegaard expresses confidence in his ability to hold out, notwithstanding his financial worries. However, he significantly observes that his "courage and happiness" is not so strong as in 1848 when "anxiety for my livelihood was more remote" and he believes that, having
suffered so much in the past year "doubtless I am a good deal changed". In other words, Kierkegaard's financial circumstances are exerting more and more pressure upon him. In fact, the following year he reports that he has for a year and a half altered his way of life in the direction of asceticism "entirely in order to see what I can bear". Yet he has not entirely conquered his doubts about taking a living and the debate continues:

"... the mass of productivity that lies within me is enormous. But what occupies me is something else; dare I give all my efforts a worldly end and win worldly advantages by preaching — Christianity, which is the renunciation of the World?"

In October 1854, just two months before the first article of the "Attack" appeared in The Fatherland, Kierkegaard looked back over the previous five years and drew the following conclusions:

"It is true what I have had to tell myself so often: if for four or five years since, I had owned nothing, then humanly speaking I would have been helped. For then I still possessed sufficiently temporal and worldly joie de vivre to do something about my economic position and the case would not have been difficult. But so it goes on year after year. So long as I possess one farthing I cannot decide to do anything about the economic position for I believed that to be to break with God and the Idea: if Christianity is to hate oneself, to "die from", then it is wrong to do anything before the extremity has been reached. Meanwhile the joie de vivre declines year by year — Governance is a great reckoner (Regne-Mester)".

So it is clear that Kierkegaard saw the outbreak of the attack as controlled not only by the occurrence of the admission, but also by his financial position. If the time drags on too long, then his bankruptcy will force him into pursuing a country parish or a post in the Pastoral Seminary. Alternatively, he must look forward to a period of suffering or even martyrdom. Gradually this last alternative becomes more attractive to him and the possibility of "stepping out in character" to say "quite definitely" what he must say before his death moves closer to reality.

As usual, Kierkegaard retrospectively thanks Providence for his being guided away from the priesthood and so on towards the performance of his exceptional task. Mynster's death is seen as an act of Providence intervening at a time when Kierkegaard might have acted erroneously or precipitously. In such a context it might seem that Mynster was doing Kierkegaard a favour by responding negatively to his "hints" about a pastoral appointment. Isn't
Kynster thus a tool in the hands of Providence, pushing Kierkegaard along the desired path? In a sense this is true and Kierkegaard did greet Kynster's negativity with considerable relief - he never did feel convinced that ordination was part of God's plan for him. But even if Kynster was thus an instrument of Providence, Kierkegaard could still feel resentful about his failure to meet his request positively. First of all, Kierkegaard needed the self-assurance which would result from his actively rejecting a definite offer of a pastoral appointment. He could then be certain that he was not being soft on himself. This feeling was especially strong at the time when the *joie de vivre* mentioned in 1854 was still strong enough to make the ordained ministry appear a soft option for Kierkegaard. Then, secondly, Kierkegaard could feel that Kynster, far from seeking to do what he considered best for Kierkegaard, was in fact pursuing his own best interests. If Kierkegaard was deprived of the means of earning his livelihood, then he "would yield to (Kynster) in one way or another". This Kierkegaard saw as "worldly prudence" on Kynster's part. Kierkegaard would no longer hold out for the admission, but would be forced to go on bended knee to the Bishop, presumably to obtain a living. For his part, Kierkegaard could only accept an appointment once the admission had been made by Kynster. If this had been made, then his "outward circumstances would have been less troubled than they were".

Thus, by the time Kynster died in January, 1854, relations between the two men were at their lowest ebb. Kynster went about his episcopal business, probably giving not one thought to Kierkegaard or his demand for an admission. If Martensen is to be believed then the effect of *Training in Christianity* was "that the Bishop has now completely abandoned Kierkegaard's work; the impudent expressions about the Church's sermons have naturally made him indignant". But, as Villads Christensen has put it, "that a complete break between the two did not occur is owing to the fact that Kynster was too wise to completely thrust aside a man of Kierkegaard's calibre". That is, of course, if Kynster ever conceived of wanting
to actively "thrust" Kierkegaard aside. Most likely he never considered such action. He was quite content to let Kierkegaard persist in his self-imposed silence, and insofar as Kierkegaard wished to say anything publicly, well, he had already expressed his willingness to let every bird sing his own song. Such indifference must severely hurt Kierkegaard whose main concern was to shake people out of their Christian illusions. Kierkegaard had already maintained that for the establishment to attack him would represent a misunderstanding because his ultimate objective was to be a defence of the establishment. But if the establishment ignores him, if Bishop Mynster only responds to his books with studied indifference, then the misunderstanding is complete. 138 Kierkegaard had maintained that "Christianity is the utmost seriousness: in this life your eternity is decided". 139 whilst "Mynster sat there, with his immense wisdom, governing and carefully watching - and it must have been quite a strain - that for God's sake this matter of Christianity should not become serious". 140 Faced with this impasse it seems that Kierkegaard was prepared to speak out directly early in 1854, but this would have been most distasteful to him because, as he had once told Grundtvig, "Bishop Mynster must first live out his days and be buried with full music". 141 Fortunately, Mynster's death came just in time. Now it was just a matter of waiting for the burial, the music - and the memorial address.

Both emotionally and tactically Kierkegaard needed to be understood by Bishop Mynster. It was important that Mynster should not lose sight of the veneration felt for him by the younger man whilst the success of the "admission" strategy depended upon Mynster understanding that it was backed by the will to defend the establishment and its chief representative. We have seen how, over a period of eight years, Kierkegaard wrestled with the significance of events as they arose, looking for signs of understanding or auguries of ultimate conflict. In the end he had to resign himself to the inevitability of a direct confrontation as each of his books failed to elicit the desired response - or any response at all. It is not at all easy
to apportion responsibility for these developments. Naturally, Kierkegaard laid the burden of guilt at Mynster's door. Despite the occasional gleam of hope, he felt that Mynster had not really grasped the essential message of the authorship. Certainly they had found themselves in agreement over issues such as the debate on logical principles in 1839, and Kierkegaard was always ready to acknowledge Mynster's talents as a preacher, pastor, and ecclesiastical administrator. But it was with regard to the place and function of the establishment within Christianity that they failed to obtain mutual understanding. This is symbolised in the Goldschmidt affair. In his open letter to Rudelbach Kierkegaard had roundly denied any desire to reform the existing external order of things. Rather, his concern was with subjectivity and its place in Christian existence. However, in his article, Mynster proceeded to make the same error as Rudelbach, albeit in the opposite direction. As Kierkegaard said, if Mynster was issuing a compliment then it was one based on a misunderstanding. But, as we have seen, he was happy to treat it as an insult by Mynster and so excuse himself from issuing a reply. Yet, in the long series of drafts for an article which Kierkegaard prepared between 1851 and 1853, all manner of faults are attributed to Mynster on account of this fateful comparison. Most significantly Kierkegaard saw in Mynster's action an "example of the lack of relationship between Sunday's solemnity and Monday's reality".¹⁴² The charge that Mynster's week-day life failed to live up to his Sunday preaching became one of the most important and oft repeated charges levelled by Kierkegaard, and its origin in the Goldschmidt affair gives even more significance to that incident. Also, Mynster's failure to understand Kierkegaard's position vis a vis the establishment inevitably made it impossible for him to appreciate the significance of the admission in Kierkegaard's strategy. That Mynster did misunderstand Kierkegaard is a fact. The article on civil marriage testifies to this fact. But whether he is to be blamed for such misunderstanding is an open question. Mynster was a busy man confronted with a demanding role as Primate of the Danish Church. He
attempted to steer that Church through a period of change and upheaval with the result that he was always under threat from one quarter or another. Whether it was the Rationalist clergy, the representatives of the "awakenings", the Grundtvigians or the anti-establishment liberals he always seemed to be riding the storms of conflict. In such a context he may be forgiven for not taking too seriously the threat from an extremely "gifted" but nonetheless eccentric layman. Kierkegaard was quick to realise that his position outside the Church hierarchy militated against his being seriously understood, and he was typically cynical about this state of affairs. He was right to be cynical. But Mynster was in the hot seat and, for better or for worse, he had to face reality. In so far as he reneged on his principles in the interests of a compromise, to that same extent he typified failings Kierkegaard saw to be inherent in the principle of establishment. An admission to these failings would have satisfied Kierkegaard, but even with the benefit of hindsight it is difficult to see how Mynster could be completely aware of what was expected of him. When Kierkegaard was finally forced into the open with his attack, he presented a perceptive and penetrating challenge to Mynsterish Christianity and Christendom in general. But during Mynster's lifetime Kierkegaard's attempt to straddle the fence between a direct confrontation and the urge to venerate and defend the Bishop resulted in the latter's failure to properly understand what was going on and the steady build up of Kierkegaard's resentment.

So Mynster can be defended, and Kierkegaard might be convicted of a certain naivety. But whatever the respective merits of the case, Mynster's lack of understanding was a decisive factor in prompting Kierkegaard towards the launching of a direct attack upon the objective values and norms of established Christianity.

The name of A. G. Rudelbach has already figured prominently in our discussion and we turn now to consider the part he played in convincing Kierkegaard of the degree of misunderstanding surrounding his authorship.
A brief outline of Rudelbach's career has been published in English in Howard V. and Edna H. Hong's introduction to *Armed Neutrality* and *An Open Letter*, and need not be repeated here. Most significant for our purposes is the determination of that which Rudelbach represented and which prompted Kierkegaard to begin his first Journal entry about Rudelbach's article *On Civil Marriage* with the words: "We shall never understand one another". In fact, Kierkegaard laid considerable stress on Rudelbach's failure to understand. Thus he writes: "There is something curious about the whole thing; I am almost tempted to believe that Dr. (Rudelbach) has not read any of my writings at all but that it only seems so to him ..." Then a little later on we read:

"Doctor Rudelbach had used a very appreciative statement about me, and then it is always unpleasant to have to make an objection; with such a point of departure it is very easy to impinge on a man. But, after all, I have not had great returns as an author, and therefore I have wanted at least the satisfaction that what I have intended should stand as clearly as possible. And in this respect that little note was extremely misleading". The "little note" in question is the one which identified Kierkegaard with the cause emancipating the Church "from what is rightly called habitual and legally established Christianity". Kierkegaard took this to mean that he was thought "to attack established Christianity" and he was extremely indignant about this grave misunderstanding. He strongly maintains that his works could not possibly be deemed patient of such an interpretation:

"There is nothing about which I have greater misgivings than all that even slightly tastes of this disastrous confusion of politics and Christianity, a confusion which can very easily bring about a new kind and mode of Church reformation, a reverse reformation which in the name of reformation puts something new and worse in place of something old and better, although it is still supposed to be an honest-to-goodness reformation, which is then celebrated by floodlighting the entire city. Christianity is inwardness, inward deepening. If at a given time the forms under which one has to live are not the most perfect, if they can be improved, in God's name do so. But essentially Christianity is inwardness. Just as man's advantage over animals is to be able to live, according to its vigour, under the most imperfect conditions and forms, if such be the case. Politics is the external system, this Tantalus-like activity aimed at external change". He concludes that:
The difference between Dr. Rudelbach and me is quite obvious; this difference I must assert most definitely ... I cannot remain silent about an appreciatory - and such an extravagantly appreciatory - asseveration of the significance of my activity as an author. I am really afraid that, brief though it is, it might manage as Luther says 'to drive home' this misunderstanding 'to all those who will listen'. And I have considered it my present duty to oppose - something which otherwise would hardly have occurred to me - and oppose somewhat more specifically than would otherwise have occurred to me - this misunderstanding, and also to keep any particular party, perhaps misled by Dr. Rudelbach's words, from 'the habit' of automatically enrolling me in 'the party'. 150

At this point, midway through the article, Kierkegaard put his signature "indicating that the affair with Dr. Rudelbach had really terminated". 151

The rest of the article is devoted to making clear, "lest what I say be misunderstood", that he is not advocating total passiveness on the part of the Christian via a via external forms:

"I have only provided, poetically, what may be called an existential-corrective to the established order oriented toward inward deepening in 'the single individual' - that is, I am positive I have never directed one word against the teaching and the organisation of the established order, but I have worked to make this teaching more and more the truth in 'the single individual'. And in order to prevent any misunderstanding I have aimed polemically throughout this whole undertaking at 'the crowd', the numerical, also at the besetting sin of our time, self-appointed reformation and the falsifications along this line". 152

Nevertheless, in spite of these measures to prevent misunderstanding, Rudelbach's article clearly shows that he has been misunderstood and that by one who "possesses amazing learning". 153 The question now remained as to where he was going to go now. The open letter sufficed to put the record straight with regard to his works then published, but didn't Rudelbach's misunderstanding really point out the failure of these works to achieve their desired end? Could he now continue with his method of indirect communication, or should he not speak out more directly in the face of such widespread illusions as now permeated Christendom? The most dangerous illusion is that all are Christians with the result that all disquietude and passion has gone out of Christian existence. Rudelbach's pursuit of external reforms typified this complacency about one's status as a true Christian. 154 Could Kierkegaard continue to defend the Mynsterish establishment as a strategic device in his pursuit of introducing Christianity into Christendom? Perhaps the mediocrity of the age was becoming too obvious for the defensive procedure
to be of further use. As the Hong's have said:

"Although An Open Letter was in one sense a defence of Kynster against sectarian, politicising reformers, it was, together with Training in Christianity and For Self-Examination the beginning of a direct critique of the establishment because of its 'modifications' and devitalisation of Christianity". 155

The situation was as follows. Rudelbach's article showed that a misunderstanding was abroad to the effect that Kierkegaard supported the principle of disestablishment. Kierkegaard replied by arguing that his concern was Christian inwardness and that he was basically indifferent to the reform of externals (thus leaving himself open to the further misunderstanding articulated by Kynster, that he in fact supported the establishment). But the very fact that such an explanation was necessary indicated the ultimate bankruptcy of his previous strategy. The prevailing preoccupation with externals was so strong that no writer could be properly understood who professed indifference to such matters. He must inevitably find himself classified as a reformer or as an establishment figure. In an age devoid of inwardness only such objective categories acquired any meaning. Insofar as Kierkegaard's clash with Rudelbach brought home to him the total perversity of his environment, to that same extent it forced him towards a direct attack on the establishment.

It may be argued that in his final critical pamphlets Kierkegaard in fact adopted a position very much akin to that of Rudelbach. However, as Malantschuk has indicated:

"For Kierkegaard the critique of the state proceeded from different motives and rested upon a completely different basis than was the case with Rudelbach ... In relation to the state, Kierkegaard never wanted to assert the right to form free ecclesiastical institutions. The basis of his indictment of the state was that by its general encompassing of the lives of Christians in organised forms, and by its support of these forms, it contributed to making Christianity entirely external and superficial. Thus the individual is more easily enabled to slip out of the inner decisions and battles which characterise Christianity". 156

Then Malantschuk concludes by emphasising the point which Rudelbach failed to grasp, the point which underlay Kierkegaard's whole strategy, even so far as the merciless "Attack" itself:

"Kierkegaard" says Malantschuk, "did in fact remain true to the end to his conviction that 'Christianity is inwardness, inward deepening'".
In 1848, Kierkegaard wrote the following entry in his journal:

"Peter knows that my finances are in a precarious condition, he knows that my health is very shaky, he knows or at least has some notion of what a strain it is to be as active as I am, surrounded — by fools and daily obloquy: since then I have not heard a word from him. Now, apparently, he has become really afraid and cowardly as he always was, sits back and feels self-important at the thought that it is the punishment of God upon me. Oh, he is a molly-codly and vain besides, he accepts all the marks of respect from the Grundtvigians; 'how lovable' it is, how lovable.

"I cannot comprehend how anyone can behave like that. If one really thinks that a man is up against it, then it seems to me that all other considerations must disappear. No sooner was he in difficulties with Bishop Mynster than I took the trouble to write to him again and again. But the orthodoxy which does not have a frank, childlike relation to God but looks upon him as a tyrant to be flattered rather than to be lovingly adored, they always get a certain pleasure from thinking that God is punishing someone".

Here all Kierkegaard's grievances against his brother are rehearsed.

Kierkegaard feels that, like Mynster, Peter has responded badly to his financial difficulties and ill health. Also, like Mynster, he has chosen to remain silent whilst The Corsair stirred up so much dirty water.

Inevitably Søren must be deeply concerned about these personal slights. But he detected important differences between his brother and himself on questions of theological perspective as well. Kierkegaard is prepared to accept Peter's summary of these religious differences:

"There was some truth in what Peter once said, that the (religious) difference between him and me was that he looked upon his relation to God as being loved and I as loving.

To Peter's view of God as some sort of tyrant, Kierkegaard attributes the correlative sense of satisfaction in witnessing God's punishment upon Søren. Thus the two men are seen to be at odds over questions of basic perspective.

"But enough of that", Kierkegaard goes on. "I have the same feelings towards my brother as always; the man to whom God grants something extraordinary is inevitably misunderstood, particularly by his family and his friends."
Thus Peter's misunderstanding is singled out as typical of the fate which the man of extraordinary talent must suffer at the hands of his closest companions. In his indignation at Peter's speech to the Roskilde Convention at the end of October 1849, Kierkegaard was quick to point out the fallacy of the view that, because of the fraternal relationship, Peter's assessment of Kierkegaard's authorship must be taken very seriously. There is no reason why Peter should be any more reliable an authority than anyone else — indeed, as Kierkegaard points out often enough in his Journals, there is little doubt that Peter gravely misunderstands him. So he wrote, some months before that fateful speech to the Convention:

"In consideration of the fact that Peter is my brother, and of the religious assumptions necessary in order to be able to judge, which he clearly has, and also because I feel it is my duty to put him in such a position that when I am dead and the dialectical knot of my self-denial is solved, and its suffering explains it, he will then be humbled at having really judged me wrongly: I have, though with the greatest care, suggested that he should keep his eyes open.

"But he is, so he says, sure enough of his judgement. In that case it is his affair, it is not for my own sake that I have done this. I understand him, and his only being able to explain my life to himself as a foolish striving after greatness, perfectly well.

"That is easily understood, it is so comfortable; for we know quite well that such things do happen; it is so comfortable, instead of daring to follow, even for a short way, the exhausting thoughts which are contained in my works, exhausting simply because they show the narrow margin between true self-denial and egoism. My reality as an author lies, to a great extent, in having almost discovered the passion of sympathy.

"But all that costs effort; it is much easier to explain my life the other way, and so discover with a deal of self-satisfaction, that one's own quiet life is higher from a religious point of view.

"He is a living example of the fact that a man cannot understand more than his life expresses. Hence his point of view, according to which the opposition I have had to put up with lately is nemesis or the punishment of God".  

Peter is identified as "a living example of the fact that a man cannot understand more than his life expresses" and his life only expresses a "Jewish" brand of Christianity which is merely concerned with worldly pleasures, possessions and honours. Clearly, even before he uttered the first words of his speech, Kierkegaard must seriously question Peter's understanding of the authorship he purports to review. This suspicion
could only be strengthened by the revelation, in a subsequent conversation which occurred between the delivery of the speech and its publication in the press. 167 That Peter had no idea that H.H. was one of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. 168 Kierkegaard was amazed by his brother's being able to publish such a hastily prepared and flimsily substantiated lecture in the public press. 169 This could only serve to disseminate erroneous views which might otherwise have been excused as thoughts thrown out for discussion during a half-hour lull in the proceedings.

The most dangerous misunderstanding in Peter's speech, according to Kierkegaard, was contained in the reference to him in terms of "ecstacy" - especially when, by way of comparison, Martensen was described as "calm". Kierkegaard describes this as "confusion-mongering" and goes on to explain:

"... Martensen's and Peter's conception of sobriety is, to some extent, irreligious conception. It represents what is commonplace and easy-going. It should have been pointed out by Peter that in our days it is very difficult to set forth what ecstasy is. For mediocrity, worldly prudence, or whatever you like to call it - this is what counts nowadays. Furthermore, Peter might have pointed out that what characterises my ecstasy is that it carries just as much sobriety in it as ecstasy. Compare how I use pseudonyms, fanciful people (and it is therefore not I that is speaking) to represent ecstasy; while in my devotional discourses I myself speak, quietly and gently. Peter could have pointed to the category The Individual as used by the pseudonyms, and as used by me. And so on". 170

Kierkegaard is unequivocal in his judgement that "This is a misunderstanding so great that if it gains the ascendancy I am weakened fifty percent". 172 He goes on to argue that, in the world at large, Peter's words would be taken to mean that Kierkegaard is to be considered mad. He returned to make the same point some five years later. 173 In an entry which summarises Kierkegaard's reactions to Peter's article he contends that this behaviour is criminal, even though it has succeeded in making his brother respected in the eyes of "the Many". 174 When dealing with Rudelbach's article Kierkegaard showed concern about the spirit of an age which could foster such misunderstanding. Now, here also, Kierkegaard shows his concern for the effect of Peter's views upon the general public. Peter has misunderstood him, and, by making public his views on Kierkegaard, this misunderstanding is liable to gain respectability and achieve general
In the Journals from 1848 until Kierkegaard's death in 1855, the occasional references to Peter are largely of a critical nature although he is prepared to admit (as he admitted of Rudelbach) that his brother has "a good head". But whatever may be Peter's talents, he is now seen as the representative of a genial mediocrity which is only concerned with matters of trifling significance. Kierkegaard finds support for his judgement by reference to Peter's behaviour in the Landsting - never an institution likely to enjoy Kierkegaard's approval. Peter is representative of an age which needs "ecstasy" and yet which misunderstands the word to mean "madness". It is an age which only wants to know the safe middle way, never venturing into regions which require passion or tolerating the views of those who advocate ideal positions. Peter may have offered Kierkegaard a compliment but it is "a foolish compliment", the sort of "favourable discussion of me, which once again I shall have to put up with". For such a discussion is characterised by misunderstanding and is likely to mislead a public impressed by a man of some distinction who is also the brother of the author in question.

Although Kierkegaard prepared the draft of an article protesting against Peter's speech, in face he never expressed his resentment in public. However, his Journals record his strength of feeling at being so misused and his return to the theme in 1854 shows that, like so many apparently small occurrences, this event left a lasting impression on him. It seems beyond question that Peter's public statement added further to Kierkegaard's sense of having been misunderstood and thus encouraged him along the road of greater severity towards the inevitable confrontation with the establishment.

Finally, we turn to H. L. Martensen, who was very much at the centre of Kierkegaard's indignation toward his contemporaries' reception of his authorship. Elsewhere we deal at length with Martensen and his relationship
to Kierkegaard, and so it will only be necessary at this point to sketch the part he played in convincing Kierkegaard of the misunderstanding marring the effective appropriation of his work.

As a lecturer and author, Martensen commanded a great deal of respect and popularity. He was a man of considerable influence and the keen anticipation which preceded his Christian Dogmatics was matched by the enthusiastic response to its publication. Kierkegaard also recognised Martensen's talents, and was prepared to lay more than usual significance upon utterances from that quarter. If Mynster was the accredited representative of the established Church, then Martensen was the one who most completely reflected the academic atmosphere of the age. There could be no underestimating the significance of Martensen's judgements. Thus, the references to Kierkegaard in the Dogmatics of 1849 proved to be extremely offensive to him, not only on account of their content, but also for their almost contemptuous brevity. The subsequent Dogmatic Illuminations of 1850 did nothing to appease Kierkegaard's indignation. His authorship carried important existential implications for Christendom - for "the Professor" not less than "the Bishop" - yet here was Martensen indulging in the luxury of a dogmatic system as if all Kierkegaard's injunctions on behalf of Christian passion and inwardness had gone unheard. To this extent the writing of Christian Dogmatics represented for Kierkegaard an appropriate indication of the extent to which the full implications of his authorship had not been understood.

Furthermore, Martensen showed signs of having misunderstood Kierkegaard at more particular points, including the significance Kierkegaard laid on the atonement and the meaning of den enkelte for Kierkegaard. On reading through Christian Dogmatics, Kierkegaard found cause to make a number of comments in his Journals. These decisively attack both the general spirit behind the work and individual errors. Significantly Kierkegaard draws the general conclusion that the difference between "the essential thinker" and the Professor lies in the fact that the latter
The implication of this remark is that Martensen has set aside precisely that category which is central to Kierkegaard’s message. Kierkegaard could not have expressed his opposition to Martensen any more strongly than he does in this one sentence. The two writers are fundamentally at odds with each other.

Such a disparity in their respective positions would not have worried Kierkegaard too much, were it not for the fact that Martensen was so influential a figure. In putting forward a view of Christianity which both contradicts and misunderstands Kierkegaard’s point of view, Martensen has no doubt been influenced by the spirit of the age. But because of his respected position, Martensen’s publications can only be effective in furthering such misunderstanding:

"For one who, like Professor Martensen, respects the signs of the times, Professor Martensen is a peculiar sign of the times, a sign that it is a time of confusion". 183

For Kierkegaard, Martensen, like Wynster, is a representative. A representative of the fact that his authorship has been contemptuously maltreated and misunderstood by his contemporaries. There was no question of Kierkegaard wanting to attack the very nature of dogmatic theology. 184 However, he did maintain that the dogmatic enterprise was a "luxury article" undertaken on the presupposition that all men are Christians. 185 Such a presupposition is anathema to Kierkegaard and so he is in disagreement with Martensen on basic principles. Whilst Kierkegaard is concerned with the question of becoming a Christian, Martensen embarks on an objective enterprise based on the assumption that one "has arrived". Thus Martensen’s Christian Dogmatics goes right against the central thesis of Postscript, and even if he had not explicitly admitted that his acquaintance with this "prolix literature" was only "poor and fragmentary" 186 his book made the point well enough.

Kierkegaard had every reason to be sensitive about the prevailing tendency to criticise his authorship on the basis of an incomplete reading of it. Martensen was not the only culprit. In the Urania yearbook for
1844, J. L. Heiberg had reviewed _Repetition_. Kierkegaard suggests that his reviewer had not even read the book right through to the end. 187 He took great exception to this kind of treatment and the _Prefaces_ contain several jibes at Heiberg. 188 In 1851, a small book appeared entitled _Concerning Magister S. Kierkegaard's work as an author._ Observations by a country parson. The country parson was Pastor L. Gude, but this book appeared anonymously. 189 Gude was at this time Parish Priest at Hunesby after having previously served as a teacher and lecturer. In his student years he had been very much impressed by Martensen. Of Gude's doctoral thesis Bjørn Kornerup says that it "shows him as a typical disciple of Martensen. It is written in a clear and elegant style. Moreover, both in terminology and ideas it is strongly influenced by speculative theology". 190 On the publication of Kierkegaard's own book _About my work as an Author_ in 1851, Gude felt that the time was right for this book to be used in the making of certain observations about Kierkegaard's authorship. 191 This he intends to do notwithstanding the fact that he "has not been able to cope with the reading of all the esteemed author's books". 192

Kierkegaard drafted a reply to Gude which never in fact achieved publication. 193 The proposed article begins with biting sarcasm directed at a country parson who presumes to make "observations" about Kierkegaard's authorship, at the same time admitting that he is not totally familiar with it. Kierkegaard notes that his works have had the benefit of precious few reviews, and now that one has been published its author has simply "used" Kierkegaard's own book concerning his authorship. Fortunately, Kierkegaard has learnt to entertain no high expectations regarding other people's estimates of his work, but in this instance, such expectations would certainly have brought disappointment. 194 He proposes, with the aid of a few examples, to show that this author offers little to illuminate his work as an author. It seems that the country parson's main concern is with the question of whether "Magister Kierkegaard's writing can become popular". 195 But now for the examples.

First of all, Kierkegaard looks at the country parson's argument about the validity of maieutic in relation to Christianity. The author strongly argues that such a method of communication has no place in the Christian context. After all, Christ and the Apostles did not employ maieutic. Kierkegaard counters by declaring that:

"every reader of my writings must know — and if the country parson was a reader he would also know — that both the pseudonyms and myself have emphatically and repeatedly asserted that there is a decisive difference between preaching Christianity for heathens (non-Christians) and Christian preaching in 'Christendom'. Here the operation is aimed at an illusion; the illusion ... that one is a Christian. But where illusions exist, their maieutic is in its proper place — which I, even in the little tiny book about my work as an author, have found a place to have said in a note; but the country parson has not even been able to cope with reading that".

Kierkegaard's second complaint is that the country parson has failed to distinguish between the pseudonymous authorship and the edifying literature when attributing words to Kierkegaard. Certainly it is possible to take quotations from "The Seducer", from Johannes Climacus and from Kierkegaard himself and, by pointing to the contradictions, thus establish that the latter is "a sort of mad man". However, this would show a basic misunderstanding as to the structure of the authorship.

Thirdly, Kierkegaard deals with his reviewer's assumption that, because the authorship ends with direct communication, then this is to be evaluated as "higher" than indirect communication. In fact, nothing is higher than the indirect communication of Christ "in character". Such communication inevitably meets with hostility from those to whom it is directed, but still it is the only possible vehicle of communication for Him who is Himself the Truth. This misunderstanding with respect to the relative value of direct and indirect communication is particularly significant in the light of Gude's admiration for Martensen. As a sort of postscript to an article concerning the debate about Martensen's Christian Dogmatics, Kierkegaard drafted a statement entitled "On the occasion of an expression in Professor Martensen's Dogmatic Illuminations". The expression under review is to be found on page 13 of Martensen's book, and it contains
the declaration that Christianity is direct communication. Kierkegaard
states his opposition to this view in the strongest possible terms. Christ
certainly claimed directly that He was God. However, he lived a life of
poverty and endured persistent suffering and hostility. In the light of
such circumstances, how could one possibly speak of Christianity as direct
communication? Pastor Gude, the faithful disciple, has subsequently
rearticulated Martsen's opposition to a central principle of Kierkegaard's
Christian perspective. Furthermore, he has argued his point by appeal to
Kierkegaard's work as an author and his published "accounting" of that work.
Here Kierkegaard detects a distortion which does nothing to cast light on
the authorship. Rather, it represents an inexcusable misunderstanding of
Kierkegaard's position.

It is also apparent that the country parson has failed to grasp the
sense of Kierkegaard's view that Christianly, one should begin with the
interesting, the witty, the profound, and from these become simpler and
simpler until simplicity has been attained. Kierkegaard has to explain
that, although he shares his reviewer's concern for simplicity and is prepared
to advocate this as a starting point for Christian preaching in Heathendom,
in Christendom people are under the illusion that they are Christians and
so they have to begin by reflecting themselves out of their illusions in
order to become more and more simply, Christians. Kierkegaard then goes
on to develop, at some length, his estimate of Christendom and the form of
communication appropriate to that situation. He insists that his role has
been "to call attention to Christianity" as a poet, without authority. He
had already made this point in the book about his authorship, but
once again the country parson has got things wrong. He thinks there
is something dubious about Kierkegaard's claim to be merely a poet. It
can be used as a limiting factor, and these very words can be used to support
the relegation of Kierkegaard to a position below the priests. In comparison
to them, he is merely a poet. However, Kierkegaard insists that he has
never said that he is only a poet when measured against "the Priest".
Rather, he is a poet when the measure is ideality. The situation is the same as with his edifying discourses. He declines to call them sermons, not because they are qualitatively subordinate to the preaching of the clergy, but because they do not measure up to the criteria of ideality.

"On the whole", says Kierkegaard, "there is something for which I retain a use, which I am sometimes tempted to assume is not held to be useful by other men; Ideals. So it is no wonder that I become misunderstood". 208 Here Kierkegaard summarises his response to Gude's article. It represents the typical reaction of an age which lacks ideality and so misunderstands the work of a writer who measures himself against ideal standards.

So far, we have dealt with representatives of two major theological perspectives in Nineteenth Century Denmark, and Kierkegaard's consciousness of being misunderstood by them. Wynster and Martensen represented the established, State Church point of view, whilst P. C. Kierkegaard and Rudelbach defended Grundtvigian interests. Now, in order to emphasize the universality of the misunderstanding surrounding Kierkegaard's authorship, we should also make a brief reference to an expression of opinion from the Rationalist school.

In 1850, a book appeared under the pseudonym Theophilus Nicolaus with the lengthy title *Is Faith a Paradox and by virtue of the Absurd?* - a question occasioned by "Fear and Trembling" by Johannes de Silentio, answered with the help of a Knight of Faith's confidential communications, to the mutual edification of Jews, Christians and Mohammedans, by the aforesaid Knight of Faith's brother, Theophilus Nicolaus". 209 The author was in fact Magnus Eiriksson, a writer and teacher who had been strongly attached to the rationalism of H. N. Clausen. Although he is best known for his attacks on Martensen's theology and on the existing structure of monarchical absolutism, 210 on this occasion he applied himself to a study of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, especially Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus. Principally, he was concerned with the categories of absurdity and Paradox. However, although Kierkegaard here recognised a defence for
his teaching on the Paradox and an ally in the fight against speculative dogmatics, there were yet good reasons why he could not acknowledge Eiriksson as one with whom he was in agreement. Then, after dealing one by one with these reasons, Kierkegaard has to conclude that basically Eiriksson's case lacks clarity. He tells him "You have misunderstood Fear and Trembling to such an extent that I shall hardly be able to recognise it again". Theophilus Nicolaus has also fallen into the error of identifying Kierkegaard with his pseudonyms. At root, this writer is seen as representing the pettiness and mediocrity of the times and Kierkegaard is moved to make the following general observations:

"... how sad it is to live in such a limited environment that there is as good as nobody who really has eyes for a deeply sustained work of art.

"That which has cost me days of industry, immense effort, almost sleepless dialectical perseverance: to hold the threads correctly in this delicate work - such things do not exist for others. I am identified without further ado with my pseudonyms, and thus some nonsense is put out which - naturally - many more people understand; indeed, naturally!" 213

So, once again, this time from the rationalist quarter, Kierkegaard feels that he is the object of misunderstanding. By means of distortion his authorship has been made to support a position to which it is essentially opposed. It seems that even in his lifetime, Kierkegaard suffered from the same kinds of interpretative distortions as those perpetrated by liberal free-thinkers after his death. Whilst Eiriksson's background and basic perspective is very different from that of Mynster, Martensen and Nielsen, Gude or the Grundtvigians, still in Kierkegaard's eyes he shared with them the same fault, which was: to misunderstand the point and purpose of his authorship. The whole complex of pseudonyms and other literary devices evolved in accordance with a strategy of communication centred on the need to reassert the cause of subjectivity in Christendom. Through utterances emanating from several different quarters, Kierkegaard came to realise that his strategic use of indirect communication had failed to meet with understanding in the shallow, complacent mediocrity of Danish Christendom.
Carl Weltzer accepts Geismar's contention that when Kierkegaard took upon himself the role of "the extraordinary" who must be sacrificed, he subsequently adopted a far more severe view of other people's Christianity. He laid the same demands upon every single Christian as he made upon the extraordinary one. Then Weltzer argues that "this estimate of Kierkegaard is so much to the point that it is valid not only in respect of Kierkegaard's authorship, but can also be used as a caption for Kierkegaard's attitude to his closest acquaintances - especially his brother". In other words, Kierkegaard's increasing emphasis upon the negative and world-denying aspects of Christian discipleship resulted in his becoming ever more antagonistic towards those around him. However, the preceding discussion has shown that the blame for any increased strain in personal relationships may not be laid wholly on Kierkegaard's shoulders. In fact, it is our view that the incidence of abuse, misunderstanding and ignorance which characterised many of the reactions to Kierkegaard's authorship was in a large part responsible for his moving inexorably towards a direct offensive. This is not to imply that his motives for the attack were only founded on an urge for revenge. The pains he took to try and avoid the clash make such an interpretation impossible. Neither do we wish to argue that no new ideas or emphases are to be found in the writings after Postscript. However, we do want to suggest that these later expressions owe more to the cause of elucidation in the face of misunderstanding than they do to any novel development in Kierkegaard's perspective. Thus his increased attention to the question of imitation during the last years must be seen not in terms of a new and autonomous strand of thought, but rather, as the drawing out of notions already implicit in the aesthetic literature. Similarly, the attack on the objective established norms is not a new movement in Kierkegaard's thought, basically unrelated to his earlier works. Rather, it represents the more explicit enunciation of such consequences for Christendom as Christendom itself should have drawn from his authorship.
Now the question arises as to why Kierkegaard did not publish the various polemical articles which he wrote in response to Hartensen, Gude, Eiriksson etc. These draft responses take up almost the whole of one volume of his Journals, and the repeated corrections and revisions typify the care he lavished upon the works intended for publication. Yet they were not published. Why? By writing *Point of View* he had provided "A Report to History" which would forestall any misunderstanding on the part of later generations, particularly regarding the issue of whether this was a literary aesthete who only turned to religion in later life. So why didn't he publish these articles thus refuting misrepresentations and abuses which flowered in his own day? The answer to this question will have to pay attention to two very important aspects of Kierkegaard's Christian understanding. Firstly, there is his wish not to do or say anything which might usurp the right and duty of each individual to make a free choice with respect to issues involving his own eternal blessedness. In his published utterances, Kierkegaard never intended to abandon the dialectic of honesty which was founded upon his notion of the self and its eternal responsibility before God, and which dictated his method of communication at all points. We shall see how this dialectic of honesty played its part in determining the content and manner of his public statements even in the heat of the final battle. Then, secondly, we must take account of Kierkegaard's attitude to the whole question of authority. Who was he to stick his neck out and cast judgement upon the Christianity of his contemporaries? Certainly, in his Journals, he had not flinched from passing the severest of judgements upon the establishment's brand of Christianity, but the publication of such sentiments would involve moving towards the status of the extraordinary one, the martyr. But he was only a poet, without the authority to undertake such a venture. The attack upon Christendom can only be seen within the context of this agonised internal struggle as to the nature of authority in general and his own authority in particular. Kierkegaard's concern for this problem is shown
by his extensive wrestling with the issues involved in the Adler case. Also the Cycle of Ethico-Religious Treatises were largely concerned with the fundamental questions raised by the authority of revelation, apostleship and martyrdom.
1. See Peter Rohde: *En Geni i en København*. Kbh. 1962. Cf. also *The Point of View* p. 100 f. and *Pap.* X 5 A 159 p. 187 (1849)

2. *Pap.* VII 1 A 98 p. 42; 106

3. *Pap.* VII 1 A 118. Here we see Kierkegaard making a specific application (i.e. to himself) of thoughts presented in a more generalised form some ten years earlier: "(The bourgeois) have never caught a glimpse of the idea which lies underneath when we are pushed through the hidden, mysterious door, open in all its terror only to presentiment, into this dark realm of sights". (*Pap.* II A 127)

4. *Pap.* VII 1 A 128

5. *Pap.* VIII 1 A 120

6. *Pap.* VIII 1 A 84


8. *Pap.* VIII 1 A 466

9. Kierkegaard does not shrink from adding "misunderstanding" to a list of torments along with "failure, suffering, illness ... straitened circumstances, scant prospects". (Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life. Translated by D. F. Swenson, Augsburg Publishing House 1944. pps. 79, 113). Later, when speaking of "the 'itness to the Truth" in *For Self-Examination*, Kierkegaard says that "he must labouriously, day after day, work his way through all the misunderstandings of his contemporaries and through all the tortures of misunderstanding". (p. 48)


12. *Pap.* VIII 1 A 512

13. *Pap.* VIII 1 A 540

14. *Pap.* VIII 1 A 542

15. *Pap.* VIII 1 A 549


17. G. Malantschuk: Kierkegaard's Thought p. 42

18. *Pap.* I A 123


20. According to Kierkegaard, a certain secret suffering characterises the lives of "the most eminent world-historical figures" (*Pap.* VIII 1 A 161) and, for himself, he maintains "that my genius has really been my suffering" (*Pap.* X 1 A 670). In *Fear and Trembling* he argues that genius involves alienation from one's contemporaries insofar as "from the start the genius is disorientated in relation to the universal and is brought
into relation with the paradox" (p. 116). Thus: "When my poet ... comes (he) will assign me a place among those who have suffered for the sake of an idea, and he will say: "the martyrdom this author suffered may be briefly described thus: he suffered from being a genius in a market town"". (Point of View p. 100). Kierkegaard shows that to be misunderstood is part of his "secret suffering". It is his fate to be "trampled to death by geese" (Pap. VIII 1 A 99). But yet, even worse, it is also his fate to be misunderstood by his loved ones. Thus he wrote in 1843: "It was not my well-shaped nose she loved (i.e. Regina), nor my beautiful eyes, nor my small feet, nor my fine head - she only loved me, and yet she did not understand me". (Pap. III A 151). Then later we read: "even more burdensome than to misunderstand the truth is to become misunderstood by the beloved". (Pap. VIII 1 A 86).

21. For differing points of view see E. Bredsdorff: Corsaren. Kbh. 1958, and W. Louze: Kierkegaard pps. 347 - 63. Whilst the former is critical of Kierkegaard's role in provoking and pursuing this case, the latter is filled only with praise and admiration for Kierkegaard's patience and public-spiritedness. Now, whilst we feel that Kierkegaard cannot be wholly justified especially regarding his treatment of P. L. Hiöller - he probably suffered more public revilement than he deserved. Given that he was peculiarly sensitive to public opinion, his show of fortitude can be admired.


23. Pap. XI 1 A 195

24. See Pap. IX A 49. where the incompatibility of both being a Christian and being understood is clearly stated: "I understand very well how I ought to conduct myself in order to be understood - honoured and esteemed - how I could gain these benefits even by preaching Christianity. But this is simply unchristian - that the one who preaches Christianity is not himself what he says is Christianity".

25. Although Kierkegaard always entertained a strong affection for the common people (see J. Bukdahl: Kierkegaard og den menige mand. Kbh. 1967, and V. Christensen: Peripatetken Søren Kierkegaard) and strongly advocated the view that, in matters of faith, intellectual ability had no bearing; still he looked for leadership from those in exalted offices. This is shown most clearly in his setting so much store by an "admission" from Bishop Mynster.

26. Pap. VII 1 A 98. p. 44

27. Postscript pps. 3 - 4

28. Ibid. pps. 4 - 6

29. Pap. VIII 1 A 390
30. See, for example, Pap. VII 1 A 194, 234, 366, 388. We cannot underestimate the importance Kierkegaard laid upon Mynster's sermons. We may suppose that he looked to Mynster's sermons for indications of his having understood and accepted Kierkegaard's teaching. (Note how he later looked for a hint from Mynster from the pulpit - Pap. X 3 A 563 p. 370). That he gained the opposite impression must be adjudged significant.

31. Pap. VII 1 A 169

32. Pap. VII 1 A 221. See also Pap. VIII 1 A 332 where Kierkegaard recounts a meeting between himself and Mynster at which the latter suggested that they complemented each other. Kierkegaard rejects this view and tells Mynster that he is conscious of those things which must have shocked him, but things could not be otherwise.

33. Pap. VIII 1 A 414. p. 180

34. Loc. Cit.

35. Pap. VIII 1 A 415

36. Here we may recall Lowrie's point: "At the moment when his polemic against the Church was openly launched many were surprised at it, but now we have his Journals and can see how long it was brewing we have reason to wonder that it was so long repressed". (Lowrie: Kierkegaard p. 378)

37. See Pap. VIII 2 B 116 and 118

38. Pap. VIII 1 A 438

39. Pap. VIII 1 A 560 p. 261

40. Pap. VIII 1 A 502, 508, 510

41. Or, more precisely, adapted from The Book about Adler which had occupied Kierkegaard intermitently during the preceding two years.

42. See Pap. IX B 1, 2 and 4; X 1 A 422, 499, 535, 544; X 6 B 36 - 63. These were three of the six treatises featured in "A cycle of Ethico-Religious Treatises". Two of them ("Has a Man the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth" and "Concerning the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle") were published in May 1849 under the pseudonym H.H. Of the four remaining, "The Catastrophe in Magister Adler's Life" (See IX B 5) was set aside leaving "Something about what one Could Call Premise Authors"; "The Dialectical Relationship: the General, the Single Individual, the Special Individual" and "A Revelation in the Present Situation". These last three are the ones in question.

43. Pap. X 6 B 162 - 170

44. See pp. 65ff where Mynster's reputation is seen as at a low ebb at this time.

45. Pap. X 6 B 162

46. Pap. X 6 B 163 and 165. However, we note that the third draft (Pap. X 6 B 169) does not contain this statement.
47. Cf. Pap. VII 2 B 235 pps. 43 - 45 (On Authority and Revelation, Harper Torch Book 1966, pps. 36 - 37) from where was taken much of the panegyric found in the proposed dedication.

48. See Pap. X 1 A 535. Beside the marginal note "F.F.'s panegyric over Bishop Mynster", Kierkegaard writes: "This panegyric is delivered with the presupposition that 'State Church', 'established Christianity' are valid concepts. That one, from a Christian standpoint, denies this is something else again. But assuming these concepts to have reality (and one ought to assume this in an appreciation of Bishop Mynster when it is only fair to understand a man according to his own thoughts and ideas) then he is great and to be admired. On the other hand, Bishop Mynster can only be attacked when one attacks these two concepts". When Kierkegaard returned to these ethico-religious treatises after Mynster's death in 1854, he concluded that the passage about Mynster had to be omitted. Pap. XI 3 B 4.

49. W. Lowrie: Kierkegaard. pps. 513 - 4

50. See Pap. X 3 A 313 where Kierkegaard passionately described his struggle to resist the temptation of joining with Nielsen and Stilling in a direct attack upon Mynster and Martensen.

51. Also Kierkegaard tells us he was afraid that, by eulogising Mynster he would provoke Nielsen, "who hates Mynster", into adopting an extreme position. Furthermore, Kierkegaard was still unsure as to Mynster's likely reaction to such a eulogy. (Pap. X 4 A 377)

52. See Pap. X 3 A 535. See also N. Thulstrup: "Bidrag til Christendommens Indførelse i Christenheden af Søren Kierkegaard", Kristiigt Dagbladet. Kbh. 27. 9. 1950 who accepts the closest possible similarity between Training and the "Attack" as personal attacks on Mynster and Martensen.

53. Pap. X 3 A 563
54. Pap. X 3 A 564
55. Pap. X 3 A 563, p. 370
56. The following year Kierkegaard recalled that "after the conversation I was well pleased", and he even considered issuing the oft postponed eulogy. (Pap. X 4 A 377)

57. Pap. X 3 A 565
58. See Pap. X 3 A 588, 726, 780 etc.
59. See Pap. X 3 A 578
60. Pap. X 3 A 799, p. 505. Cf. X 4 A 55
61. See Pap. X 3 A 704 and X 4 A 152: "The Mynsterish Preaching. It is obvious that this is so far from to bring Christianity into the world that it represents a plain operation in the direction of smuggling Christianity out of the world - that is if any Christianity exists. Everything is put in aesthetic categories: Art - quiet hours, and the preacher existentially leads the most worldly and self-indulgent life. Still, this could be allowed - if he thus made the admission and confessed his inability to get himself to take Christianity higher".

62. A. G. Rudelbach: Om det borgelige Akteskab, (Kbh. 1851. p. 70)

Samlede Værker XIII pps. 472 - 80

64. An Open Letter p. 52

See Faedrelandet, 1851 No. 37 (Feb. 13) and No. 38 (Feb. 14). Also Pap. X 5 B 128 (Armed Neutrality and an Open Letter pp. 109 - 15)

66. J. F. Mynster: Yderligere Bidrag til Forhandlingerne om de Kirkelige Forhold i Danmark. (Kbh. 1851)

67. ibid. p. 44

68. Pap. X 4 A 195

69. Pap. X 4 A 270 p. 147

70. Pap. X 4 A 272

71. Pap. VII 1 A 98 p. 44

72. For an interesting comment on the absence of references to Kierkegaard in Mynster's Meddelelser af mit Levnet see P. Chr. Zahle: "Hvad der ikke meddeltes af Mynsters Meddelelser om sit Levnet". Faedrelandet No. 250, 28th October, 1857. Zahle suggests that references to Kierkegaard were excised before the Meddelelser were published by Mynster's son. If this view is accepted (and it would seem that the absence of such references does demand some kind of an explanation) then we may justifiably speculate as to whether what Mynster did write about the Goldschmidt affair and other things pertaining to Kierkegaard was in some way self-inorinating.

73. Pap. X 6 B 171 p. 259


75. Pap. X 4 A 204, X 6 B 171. pps. 259 - 60

76. See Pap. X 4 A 218

77. Pap. X 4 A 228

78. See Pap. X 3 A 565. Cf. X 4 A 218 where Kierkegaard reasserts his respect for Mynster on account of the latter's "great qualities" as well as out of love for "a dead man".

79. Pap. X 4 A 271

80. Loc. Cit.

81. Pap. X 4 A 270. Cf. X 6 B 171 p. 256 where Kierkegaard argues that Mynster's reputation will always be the loser when he makes reference to Goldschmidt or Goldschmidt makes reference to him.
82. See Pap. X 4 A 353, 382, 551 f., 606, where Kierkegaard looks upon
Hynister's mention of Goldschmidt as having far wider consequences
than is usual for a few passing comments. Basically Kierkegaard
sees Hynister's behaviour in this respect as an indication of his attempts
to identify with the new democratic mass movements after 1848.

83. Training, p. 71

84. Pap. X 4 A 296

85. Pap. X 6 B 171 - 236

86. Pap. X 4 A 373

87. Loc. cit. See also Pap. X 4 A 351

88. See Point of View (trans. Lowrie) Oxford 1939

89. See For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves (trans. Lowrie)
Oxford 1944

90. A Literary Review March 30th, 1846. The second part has been
published in English as: The Present Age (trans. Dru) Oxford 1940,
Fontana 1962

91. See Point of View (Harper Torch Books 1962) pps. 157 - 8

92. Loc. cit.

93. Pap. X 4 A 373

94. Point of View pps. 154 - 5

95. Pap. X 4 A 358

96. Pap. X 4 A 367

97. See the Preface to "Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays",
For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves. Oxford 1944, p. 5

98. For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves (trans. Lowrie)
Oxford 1944

99. W. Lowrie: Kierkegaard p. 470


101. Malantschuk: Kierkegaard's Thought. p. 357

102. Pap. X 4 A 377 p. 225


104. See Pap. X 6 B 217 pps. 343 - 5 where Kierkegaard defends himself against
the charge of weakness in speaking so mildly of his relationship to
Hynster in For Self-Examination after the insult contained in the
latter's article on "Civil Marriage". Kierkegaard writes: "Even if
the insult was the greatest possible I would consider myself weak if
I said anything about my relationship to Bishop Hynster other than
what is the truth - and in truth, I have said nothing other than that".

As we shall see, Kierkegaard's immediate rebuttal of Rudelbach's article was based on the need to actively oppose a misguided compliment. Kierkegaard was also conscious of the fact that his brother Peter had offered "a favourable discussion of me, which once again I shall have to put up with" in that lecture which so offended him (Pap. X 2 A 275. Cf. also Pap. X 2 A 589 p. 421). See Postscript p. 546: "Above all, may heaven preserve the book and me from every appreciative violence which might be done it", Cf. "Of the difference between a genius and an apostle". Present Age p. 104. "... to say something good of an apostle when it is inapposite does him no service, for as a result he is acclaimed for what in this case is a matter of indifference and admitted as something which essentially he is not, and then what he is is quite forgotten", Cf. Pap. XI 1 A 125

We shall deal elsewhere with the difficulty arising from the fact that Kierkegaard attacked the content of Mynster's sermons and yet at the same time condemned him for not living in accordance with what he taught.

Carl Jørgensen describes Kierkegaard's silence in the months immediately preceding Mynster's death and says that "there is a stillness about him like the stillness of a dead man and this stillness would perhaps have continued if Mynster had not died in January, 1854". (Jørgensen: Søren Kierkegaard Vol. IV p. 30). We suggest that Kierkegaard's absenting himself from Mynster's sermon was in itself a decisive act which effectively broke the "stillness" and heralded a flurry of activity. Cf. Pap. XI 3 B 15 p. 37 where Kierkegaard says that he alone knows just how near he came to attacking Mynster before his death.

See Villads Christensen: Søren Kierkegaard Kbh. 1963. pps. 70 - 76, 124 - 6

123. Pap. X 1 A 167
124. Pap. X 4 A 218
125. See Walantschuk op. cit. p. 19
126. See Lounie: Kierkegaard p. 455
127. Pap. X 4 A 373
130. Pap. X 4 A 559
131. Pap. X 4 A 560
132. Pap. X 5 A 146
134. Pap. X 6 B 232
135. Pap. XI 1 A 1
138. In one of the Fatherland articles of 1855, Kierkegaard has this to say about the publication of the first edition of Training in Christianity: "If there was power in him (Mynster), he must do one of two things: either declare himself decisively for the book, venture to go with it, let it count as the defence which would ward off the accusation against the whole official Christianity which the book implies poetically, affirming that it is an optical illusion, 'not worth a sour herring', or attack it as decisively as possible, brand it as a blasphemous and profane attempt, and declare that the official Christianity is the true Christianity. He did neither of the two, he did nothing, and it became clear to me that he was impotent". (Attack pps. 54 - 5).
This was how Kierkegaard came to see things some years after the event, although as we have seen, at the time he was more relieved at Mynster’s not responding negatively to the book than he was angry at the Bishop’s indecision. On Mynster’s indifferent response to Kierkegaard’s authorship, see Pap. X 1 A 357 and X 2 A 589
139. Pap. XI 1 A 91
140. Pap. XI 1 A 90
141. Attack upon Christendom p. 9
143. Indiana 1968. pps. 30 - 31
The significance of Rudelbach's error must have been reinforced in Kierkegaard's mind by the fact that only two years previously one of his books had been dedicated "to the very reverend Hr. Superintendent Dr. Rudelbach, R. of D., in friendship, from the author." The book in question was Ypperstnaæsten - Tolderen - Synderinden published in 1849. The page bearing the dedication became separated from the original copy of the book, but has recently come to light and has been accounted for by Fleming Chr. Nielsen in his article entitled: "Den Forsvundne Kierkegaard - dedikation" (Kunstak III:4, 1968, pp. 50 - 51). We have seen that Kierkegaard did not make his dedications in any light-hearted way, and we may assume that the inclusion of Rudelbach in a select group featuring Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard and Bishop Lynder is evidence of a very great respect on Kierkegaard's part. Thus the subsequent disappointment was even more poignant.

A. G. Rudelbach: Om det borgerlige ægteskab. Kbh. 1851. p. 70

An Open Letter p. 49

ibid. pp. 49 - 50

ibid. pp. 51 - 2

Papo X 5 B 128 p. 327. (Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter. p. 112)

Papo X 5 B 128 p. 327. (Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter. p. 111 - 2)

An Open Letter p. 49

Papo X 4 A 20

Introduction to Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter. pp. 31 - 2

G. Malantschuk: Commentary to An Open Letter. ibid. p. 141 - 2

A reference to the Corsair affair

A reference to the conflict arising from Mynster's insistence that the children of Baptists should be forcibly baptised into the State Church

See Papo X 2 A 275

Papo X 2 A 134

Papo X 2 A 256; Papo X 2 A 275; Papo X 2 A 286; Papo X 6 B 131

Papo X 1 A 61

See Papo IX A 245 f., 483

In the light of Journal entries from the same period, the following extract from a letter written by Kierkegaard in 1848 or 1849 becomes deeply ironical: "There are certain things which, naturally, I could not bring myself to say to certain people, because even with the best
will in the world they fail to understand. But with respect, to one so dialectically developed as yourself and, in addition, one of so much character, and moreover, when he is my brother; so would it be both uncertain and unsympathetic to give up the hope of being understood. (Breve og Akstykker, ed. N. Thulstrup. Kbh. 1953. pps. 218-9). However, Kierkegaard may not have intended irony here. Carl Weltzer argues that he genuinely expected to be better understood by Peter who was his own flesh and blood (Peter og Søren Kierkegaard, Kbh. 1936, pps. 219 ff.). If this was so, and there is yet room for doubt; then it would have the effect of augmenting Kierkegaard's disappointment when his brother showed lack of understanding.

167. In fact it must have taken place early in December. Kierkegaard tells us that the month was December and, as the article in fact appeared on December 16th Peter must be allowed some time for writing it up. He indicated in the course of the conversation that he had still to write the lecture.

168. H.H. was given as the author of Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises published 19th May, 1849. When Peter's speech actually appeared in print he suggested that H.H. bore a striking resemblance to Kierkegaard. (Dansk Kirketidende 1849. Nr. 219, column 19). As Kierkegaard himself observes "God knows what he actually said at the Convention". (Ped. X 2 A 280. Cf. 285)

169. Ped. X 6 B 132 p. 177; Ped. X 2 A 256

170. We may note that, like Rudelbach, so Peter is accused of identifying Magister Ko with the pseudonyms. (Ped. X 6 B 130 pps. 173 - 4 and Ped. X 6 B 131)


172. Ped. X 2 A 286

173. Ped. XI 1 A 47

174. Ped. X 3 A 38

175. G. Weltzer: Peter of Søren Kierkegaard. Kbh. 1936. p. 219: "The Journals from 1848 and after contain uncommonly sharp, nearly hateful expressions about the brother Peter".

176. Ped. X 2 A 306, 415

177. Ped. X 2 A 415, Ped. X 3 A 38, 569 (in connection with Peter's view that Training in Christianity went too far) 650. Here it is worth quoting the following extract from Hans Brøchner Recollections:

"Dr. Peter Kierkegaard once gave a course of lectures at the University. I cannot accurately remember when, but it must have been in the '50s, (see Carl Weltzer, Peter og Søren Kierkegaard, p. 24). The Lectures were in December, 1850) when he happened to be staying in Copenhagen. They were given in the Great Hall before a large and very mixed audience. Søren Kierkegaard was quite ironical about these lectures, and with a certain element of malice he told me a fragment of conversation he heard one evening, outside the University, just as the lecture was going to start. Many men, and still more women, came pouring up the steps of the University. The driver of one carriage waiting outside was accosted by a fellow passing by with the question 'What are all these people going to do inside there?' 'Oh, they are going to a dance' answered the driver, to the great delight of Søren Kierkegaard". (trans. by Croxall: Glimpses and Impressions of Kierkegaard. Nisbett 1959. p.25-6)
179. Pap. X 2 A 589 p. 421
180. Pap. X 2 A 275. See above, note 111
182. Pap. X 1 A 573
183. Pap. X 6 B 144
184. See H. Diem: "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence" p. 103
185. Pap. X 1 A 561
186. H. L. Bartensen: "Dogmatiske Oplysninger" pps. 12 - 13
187. Pap. IV B 115
188. Samlede Værker V. pps. 21 ff.
189. Om Magister S. Kierkegaards Forfattervirksomhed. Lagttagelser af en Landsbypræst. Kbh. 1851 (Reitzel)
191. Om Magister S. Kierkegaard .... p.4
193. See Pap. X 6 B 144 - 161
194. Pap. X 6 B 145 pps. 197 - 200
195. ibid. pps. 200 - 201
196. Om Magister S. Kierkegaard .... pps. 9 ff.
197. ibid. pps. 16 f.
198. See "My Activity as an Author" in The Point of View for my work as an Author. Harper Torch Book 1962. pps. 145 - 6 note
199. Pap. X 6 B 145 pps. 201 - 2
200. ibid. pps. 202 - 3
202. Pap. X 6 B 135
203. See Per Lønn: op. cit. pps. 93 - 4
205. Pap. X 6 B 145 p. 216
206. "My Activity as an Author" p. 151

207. Om magister S. Kierkegaard ... p. 19

208. Pap. X 6 B 145 p. 218


211. Pap. X 6 B 68 p. 72

212. ibid. p. 76

213. Pap. X 2 A 69


216. Pap. X 6 B pps. 69 - 396

217. See Pap. 1 A 239: "If my Journals were to be published after my death, it could be done under the heading: The Book of the Judge".

DIALECTIC OF HONESTY

"Christianity cannot undergo change, nor is it so situated that where everything and everybody changes it also is changed; nor is it put to embarrassment like human authority by the fact that all men change - but that it should be forced upon anybody is not Christianity's will and never has been. On the other hand, it has been its will from the very beginning, and it is still its will that it be presented unchanged, in all its absoluteness, so that every man can weigh in his own mind whether he will have anything to do with it or not". 1

This quotation makes it clear that, for Kierkegaard, the requirement that an individual make a perfectly free choice in the face of the Christian message is derived from Christianity itself. Furthermore, there is no question of external changes having any effect on the essentials of the Christian faith. The consequences of this are twofold. On the one hand, an erroneous Christian faith is not going to be corrected by the effecting of external reforms; whilst on the other hand, changes in externals can not harm true Christianity. In other words, the structures and institutions of the Christian religion are irrelevant to the very essentials of the Christian faith itself. The two basic norms for testing true Christianity are a) the demands of the Bible, and the New Testament in particular, and b) internal logical consistency. 2 If one's faith is consistent with these norms then one is free to form structures as and how one wills. However, Kierkegaard found himself confronted with a situation where the external structures of the Christian institutions were in fact devoid of true Christian content. They were like the walls of a building which remain intact after a fire has completely gutted the inside. In theory, such walls have no justification for their existence. Such justification could only be found in their service to the living rooms which they enclosed, but which have now been destroyed. But in Christendom, even though true Christianity had long disappeared, the walls of Christendom persevered by justifying their own existence to themselves and asserting their own self-preservation as an end itself. Indeed, an act in pursuance of such self-preservation could quite justifiably be called a Christian act. But that which should be of only secondary importance has now become primary
and the original determinants of true Christianity have been replaced by the values of objective norms. 3

In so far as Christendom represents such a distortion of the proper relationship between Christianity and its institutions, it is in unison with the evils of "the present age":

"A passionate tumultuous age will overthrow everything, pull everything down; but a revolutionary age, that is at the same time reflective and passionless, transforms that expression of strength into a feat of dialectics; it leaves everything standing but cunningly empties it of significance. Instead of culminating in a rebellion it reduces the inward reality of all relationships to a reflective tension which leaves everything standing but makes the whole of life ambiguous: so that everything continues to exist factually whilst by a dialectical deceit, privatissime, it supplies a secret interpretation - that it does not exist". 4

Kierkegaard expands this argument by referring to the master-pupil relationship and the father-son relationship. Thus he writes:

"A disobedient youth is no longer in fear of his schoolmaster - the relation is rather one of indifference in which schoolmaster and pupil discuss how a good school should be run. To go to school no longer means to be in fear of the master, or merely to learn, but rather implies being interested in the problem of education". 5

Similarly:

"A father no longer curses his son in anger, using all his parental authority, nor does a son defy his father, a conflict which might end in the inwardness of forgiveness; on the contrary, their relationship is irreproachable, for it is really in process of ceasing to exist, since they are no longer related to one another within the relationship; in fact it has become a problem in which the two partners observe each other as in a game instead of having any relationship to each other, and they note down each other's remarks instead of showing a firm devotion". 6

Of such situations, Kierkegaard writes:

"the relationship continues; something is expressed with an abstract continuity which prevents any real break, but although it must nevertheless be described as an expression of the relationship, the relationship is not only ambiguously expressed, it is almost meaningless". 7

Such is also true of the relationship between Christendom and the Christianity of the New Testament. The prevailing structures are still nominally Christian and to that extent the relationship between them and true Christianity still abides. However, the whole thing is basically an illusion which only gives rise to ambiguity. Because true Christianity
43. See C. B. Møllering, *Philosophien i Tydskland efter Hegel*, Kbh. 1872, pps. 11 - 29

44. Hartensen: op. cit. Vol. I pps. 91 - 95

45. ibid., Vol. I p. 104

46. ibid., p. 105

47. Arildsen: op. cit. pps. 63 ff.

48. Kierkegaard (p. 72, A 162) roundly accuses Hartensen of never having had to make a decision for Christianity. "... it was not that he chose to become a Christian - that was taken for granted - in his choice between the faculties and chose theology. He became a theological student. Perhaps he had to think over whether he should take the practical or the theoretical path, become a Priest or a Professor. He became a Professor - that he is a Christian follows naturally of itself." He may not know exactly how much, if anything, Kierkegaard knew about Hartensen's "crisis". However, even if he was aware of the experience Hartensen describes in his autobiography, Kierkegaard could still accuse him of never having made a decision for Christianity - understanding the term in Kierkegaard's sense, i.e. total, passionate, personal commitment. For all their momentous consequences, neither Lyotier's "breakthrough", Grundtvig's "matchless discovery" or Hartensen's "crisis" are experiences so sufficiently decisive as to meet Kierkegaard's assessment of what is involved in becoming a Christian.


50. See T. H. Croxall's introduction to his translation of Johannes Climacus or, *De Omnibus Dubitantum Est*. London 1958, pps. 69 ff. Croxall writes (p. 72) "... it is easy to see how deeply Hartensen was influenced by Baader. Hartensen's thesis on Autonomy, his theory of conscience, his desire to begin with God, and his hopes of integrating faith and knowledge, orthodoxy and speculative philosophy (and so 'come out beyond' Hegel) all show his deep influence ..." 


52. Arildsen: op. cit. p. 99


54. Hartensen: op. cit. p. 231

55. ibid., p. 230

56. This work was translated into Danish by L.V. Petersen in 1844 with the title *Den menneskelige Selvbevidsteheds Autonomie*. For a full discussion of its contents see Arildsen: op. cit. pps. 119 - 144. See also S. Kierkegaard: *De Omnibus Dubitantum Est* (Trans. by Croxall) pps. 47 - 50 and pps. 116 f. n 3

57. See P. Madsen: op. cit. pps. 399 - 400 for a brief statement of the principles pervading the dissertation.

has been set aside, Christendom is without justification and is, in the last analysis, meaningless.

Now, Kierkegaard realised that this situation could not possibly be ameliorated by attention to the institutional "containing walls" of Christendom. What was needed was the reassertion of what Christianity truly involves - Christianity has to be introduced into Christendom. As Kierkegaard intimated in the extract quoted at the beginning of this section, the Christianity thus introduced into Christendom will not be essentially different from the message of the missionary to heathendom - "Christendom cannot undergo change" but the need will arise for new emphases and correctives to misbegotten ideas. It had been the task of the pseudonyms "to introduce Christianity", but

"when it is the concept 'Christendom' which must be reformed, what has to be done is the dialectical opposite of to introduce Christianity, and yet in another sense rather similar: to introduce Christianity into Christendom". 8

It is the dialectically opposite procedure because, when Christianity is to be introduced into heathendom then Christianity itself comes as the climax of a progression from the primary values of the non-Christian man, i.e. aesthetics, ethics and religiousness A. But the attempt to introduce Christianity into Christendom must "begin with the claims of those who say they are Christians". Kierkegaard argues that:

"the illusion that all are Christian has reached its peak - therefore examination in Christianity is required; through a presentation of Christianity a test must be made of what is really meant by saying that all are Christians".

In both procedures the presentation of Christianity is the primary purpose and goal. To this extent they are "rather similar". But the need to come to terms with the illusion of Christendom is that which makes them very different, indeed dialectically opposite. 9

The power of this illusion is such that no progress can be made towards the goal of introducing Christianity into Christendom, until this threat has been met. But a direct attack upon Christendom would involve Kierkegaard in going further than he really wished. He had nothing against the
institutions and practices of the State Church. Indeed, in comparison with tendencies then in vogue, the State Church was to be highly prized and preserved at all costs. 10 Herein lies Kierkegaard's basic conservatism which may strike the reader of The Instant as a little strange but which is entirely consistent with his scale of values and priorities. 11 The alternative to such a direct attack Kierkegaard found in the call for an admission. Before there can be any question of moving on to a statement as to the nature of true Christianity, Christendom must look at itself with honesty and come clean with regard to its deviance from the New Testament ideal. If Christendom had responded honestly to Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship by examining itself and its existence, then the illusion that "all are Christians" could not prevail. But it was now clear to Kierkegaard that a more direct inducement to honesty must be offered. He feels strongly that a martyr is what the age needs, and we shall be discussing his deliberations on the issue of whether he himself should be that martyr. But first of all attention had to be drawn to the ideals of Christian existence and the need for the nominal Christians of Christendom to make an honest admission as to their failings and weakness in the face of such ideals. This theme re-echoes time and again through the works and Journals after 1846. So, in Works of Love (1847), Kierkegaard asserts that "offence guards the approach to Christianity". Then he goes on:

"So it is also with this command to love one's neighbour. Only acknowledge it; or if it is disturbing to you to have it put this way, I will admit that many times it has thrust me back and that I am yet very far from the illusion that I fulfil this command which to flesh and blood is offence, and to wisdom foolishness". 12

In the Christian Discourses of 1848, Kierkegaard makes a passionate plea on behalf of "sincerity". He writes:

"But there is one sin which makes grace impossible, that is, insincerity; and there is one thing which God must unconditionally require, that is, sincerity. If on the contrary a man holds God at arm's length by insincerity, such a man can neither learn to understand whether God would require him in the strictest sense to forsake all things, nor learn to understand himself in the humble admission that he had not indeed forsaken all things, but nevertheless confides in God's grace". 13
Then, in 1850, Kierkegaard discusses his position and tactics as a religious writer in Christendom, largely in terms of his concern "that the requirements of the ideal may at least be heard", rather than as an exercise in condemning others. He relates his tactics to those previously employed:

"The tactics in use for a long time past have been to employ every means to get as many as possible, and if possible all, to enter into Christianity - but without being at all scrupulous to ascertain whether what one got them to go into was really Christianity. By tactics were, by God's aid, to employ every means to make it clear what the requirement of Christianity truly is - even though not one single person should be induced, to enter into it, and though I myself might have to give up being a Christian (in which case I should have felt obliged to make open admission of the fact). On the other hand, my tactics were these: instead of giving the impression, in however small a degree, that there are such difficulties about Christianity that an apology for it is needed if men are to be persuaded to enter into it, rather to represent it as a thing so infinitely lofty, as in truth it is, that the apology belongs in another place, is required, that is to say, of us for the fact that we venture to call ourselves Christians, or it transforms itself into a contrite confession that we have God to thank if we merely assume to regard ourselves as Christians ... I have desired to be instrumental in bringing, if possible, by means of admissions, a little more truth into the imperfect existences we lead ... which is the first condition for learning to live more effectively ... Thus in the first place I have striven in godly fear to be honest. And then, though a sting of the truth is contained in the propositions, everything nevertheless is made as lenient as possible, seeing that there is talk only of admissions and concessions, and indeed only of such concessions and admissions as everyone is left free to make for himself before God."

Although written in 1850, this account was not in fact published until 1851 and just before Training in Christianity appeared. The Preface to this latter work clearly reflects the same tactical perspective:

"... the requirement (for being a Christian) ought to be uttered, plainly set forth, and heard. There must be no abatement of the requirement, not to speak of the suppression of it - instead of making admission and acknowledgement on one's own behalf."

Kierkegaard returns to this theme in the course of the book. Thus:

"I have never affirmed that every Christian is a martyr, or that no one was a true Christian who did not become a martyr, though it is my opinion that every such person (and as such I account myself) should, just for the sake of being a true Christian, make the humble admission that he had got off easier than they who were true Christians in the strictest sense, and that he should make this admission in order that, if I may so speak, the Christian order of precedence may not be confused, and place No. 1 drop out entirely, so that place No. 2 becomes the first place."

The following year Kierkegaard published his last work before the polemical articles of 1854. This was For Self-Examination - the very title thus
relating the book to our theme of self knowledge and honesty. Amongst the "preliminary remarks", we read the following:

"I acknowledge - and thou too, wilt thou not? - my imperfection; and so thou wilt acknowledge thine - not to me, no that is not required, but to thyself and to God. Alas, we who call ourselves Christians are, Christianly understood, so coddled, so far from being what Christianity requires of them that call themselves Christians, men who have died to the world; we have hardly even a notion of that sort of seriousness, we cannot yet dispense with or renounce the artistic presentation and its soothing effect, cannot endure the true impression of reality - well then, let us at least be honest and admit it". 17

When we move on to the "Attack" itself, then we find this theme adapted as the basis for a separate article in Fatherland entitled "What do I want?"

So the answer comes back:

"Quite simply: I want honesty. I am not, as well-intentioned people represent 18 ... a Christian severity as opposed to a Christian leniency."

"By no means. I am neither leniency nor severity. I am ... a human honesty". 19

These sample quotations demonstrate Kierkegaard's concern that the virtue of honesty might be reinstated in Christendom. There is no doubt that sincerity was seen by Kierkegaard as an end in itself. Thus his call for an honest admission need have no further objective than sincerity itself. The very act of admission is a move in the direction of inwardness and is therefore, by the same token, a move in the direction of Christianity.

However, this would be a move of an indecisive sort, and the situation in Christendom demanded a precise enunciation of what is involved in calling oneself a Christian. Thus Kierkegaard's demand for honesty is intimately bound up with his plea that the ideals of Christianity should be heard. For too long the notion of imitatio Christi has been suppressed. Whereas the reformation came as a timely corrective to the medieval over-emphasis on salvation as a reward for good works, now the corrective itself stands in need of correction. For in Protestantism, the atonement of Christ has been exploited as a reprieve from any necessity for strenuous discipleship on the part of Christians, and when such rigour is taken away then grace becomes simply an indulgence. 20 "For every higher degree of grace", writes
Kierkegaard, "law must also be made more rigorous in inwardness - otherwise the whole secular mentality rushes forward and takes 'grace' in vain. And this is precisely what happened in the Reformation". 21

The results of such an abuse are nothing short of disastrous:

"Just like those countries in which a rich and prolific nature produces everything and men do not need to work, so Christendom, by means of 'grace' which has been 'taken in vain', is more demoralised than even paganism was". 22

In response to this state of affairs, Kierkegaard tries to assert the need for Christendom to face up to the demands of Christ the model and not to take grace in vain: 23

"If thou canst not endure contemporaneousness, canst not endure the sight in reality, if thou art unable to go out in the street and perceive that it is God in this horrible procession, and that this is thy case wert thou to fall down and worship him - then thou art not essentially a Christian. What thou hast to do then is unconditionally to admit this to thyself, so that above all thou mayest preserve humility and fear and trembling with relation to what it means in truth to be a Christian. For that is the way thou must take to learn and to get training in fleeing to grace in such a wise that thou dost not take it in vain. Do not, for God's sake, repair to anyone to be 'set at ease'. 24

So the admission indicates an awareness that strenuous requirements are laid down for the Christian to follow. The ideal is made known (originally in the life of Christ and subsequently in the demand to imitate that model)25 and, once having confronted himself honestly with this model, then the admission must be made by the Christian individual. In this case the ideal comes first and the admission is consequent upon it. 26 Then, having made the admission, one can rely upon "Grace in the first place". That is, "man recognises how terrible a thing it is to approach God (which however is God's requirement) but confesses his weakness in consequence of which he does not dare to do so, at any rate not yet - and so he puts 'grace' first, and grace permits him to spare himself the maximum of spiritual effort". 27 But in certain cases the admission becomes only the prelude to ever more intense spiritual effort which in its turn makes clear man's persistent need of grace. This is what Kierkegaard calls "grace in the second place" and is the mark of "those noble ones" who are witnesses and martyrs. The problem in Christendom is that appeal is made to this "grace in the second place", not on the basis of personal
endeavour but, rather, on the basis of Jesus' atoning work. Before there can be any question of one's appealing to such a dispensation of grace, one must have approached the requirements of ideality in common with the martyrs and witnesses to the Truth. But Christendom has made no such approach. Indeed, "the accepted way of preaching in Christendom leaves out something very essential to the preaching of Christianity, imitation, dying from the world, conversion etc." The result is that "we who are in Christendom are not Christians". An attempt has been made to take the easy way out, and by an unjustified appeal to secondary grace (which can only be justified by being based on a martyr's existence) Christianity has actually been abolished. For such an abuse of God's gift of grace, Christendom deserves to be itself destroyed if it is unable to commit itself to rigorous discipleship. But Kierkegaard argues that the structures of Christendom can be yet tolerated because God's infinite love is prepared to accept men on the basis of an appeal to primary grace. Such tolerance is offered on the precondition that the appeal is made in all honesty, truth and sincerity: "Man must quite humbly recognise that the fault is in him, that he is afraid to be spiritual in the strictest sense and thus is evading something".

In other words, the current situation is that Christendom has set aside the Christian ideal as modelled by Christ himself and appeals to secondary grace as a dispensation from pursuing any such ideal. However, such a dispensation of secondary grace is dependent upon a prior adventuring into the realms of ideal existence. So Christendom is not under grace and so cannot be called Christian. Christianity has been abolished by Christendom. What are the possible solutions to this problem? A direct attack upon Christendom might be made in the light of Christian ideals, with a view to eliminating the error which Christendom represents. This is the most drastic solution because it must result in a situation in which only martyrs can justifiably be called Christians. Kierkegaard proposes another solution which will restore Christendom within the embrace of God's grace whilst at the same time admitting the name of "Christian" to those people whose weakness
leaves them short of the category "witness to the truth". The demand is made for an admission by Christendom that it is unable to meet the requirements disclosed in Christ the Pattern. If this admission reflects a genuine honesty and humility, then God will accept it and be free in his dispensation of grace. This way,

"the Establishment can be defended", i.e.

"by pronouncing a judgement upon it poetically, ... thus drawing upon 'grace' raised to the second power, in the sense that Christianity would not be forgiven merely for what is past, but by grace would be a sort of dispensation from following Christ in the proper sense and from the effort properly connected with being a Christian. In that way, truth would enter into the Establishment after all: it defends itself by condemning itself; it acknowledges the Christian requirement, makes for its own part an admission of its distance from the requirement and that it is not even an effort in the direction of coming closer to it, but has recourse to grace 'also with respect to the use one makes of grace'". 34

P. G. Lindhardt has repeatedly affirmed the double function of the admission. Thus it is an act required of all who come face to face with the Christian ideal. But it is also a concession made by Christianity to all those who honestly confess their relationship to these ideal demands. Then the admission stands as something "which shall not only be tolerated, but be respected because it is one with the gospel of grace and forgiveness of sins". 35

In the light of this discussion, Bradley Dewey's summary of Kierkegaard's tactics can be misleading. He writes: "Having demolished in principle the edifice of Christendom, he presents the plans on which true Christianity is to be constructed". 36 We have seen that Kierkegaard was far from wanting to demolish the edifice of Christendom. Indeed, he rejected this possibility and favoured a plan which would recognise Christendom to be merely an accommodation to human weakness but yet would tolerate it as such because the representatives and members of Christendom have admitted their distance from the ideal requirement. The possibility of launching a direct attack was never set aside. Kierkegaard simply observed an "armed neutrality" until it became clear that Christendom was not going to make use of the
defence Kierkegaard had drawn up. We must avoid getting things upside down. Dewey goes on: "(Kierkegaard's) two-pronged approach first dishonours Christendom. Next he represents the true demands of the life of imitation". In fact the reverse was the case. Kierkegaard first presented the Christian ideal as imitation of Christ and then called upon Christendom to face it and condemn or dishonour itself. Only when Christendom refused to accept the challenge did Kierkegaard set about exposing it in order to destroy the edifice and leave New Testament Christianity high and dry as the absolute demand. 37 But before reaching this point Kierkegaard tries everything to make Christendom itself admit its error and thus make a move in the direction of inwardness.

This last sentence is very important if we are to understand Kierkegaard's position in the years leading up to the final "Attack". His main aim was not to be destructive, but rather to underline the message of the earlier authorship. This message revolved around the theme of subjectivity and was more concerned with the appropriation of the Christian faith as given rather than with the development of a particular dogmatic position. 38 The theme of imitation receives an emphasis not simply because it has been neglected by the Church but because it can be made to serve the purpose Kierkegaard was pursuing, i.e. unrest in the direction of inwardness. This point is made in a concentrated sentence from Armed Neutrality - a product of the years 1848 - 50:

"By the ideal picture of a Christian, I understand in part a kind of human interpreting of Christ as the prototype, a human interpreting which, although he remains and is the object of faith, contains all the middle terms in relation to derivatives and casts everything into becoming - and in part the modifications related to the past confusions of a particular time". 39

Malantschuk says that the phrase "casts everything into becoming ..." shows that Kierkegaard does not want to give a new objective presentation of a decisive side of Christianity but wants to characterise the way of "inward deepening" in which the subjective element again comes to play an essential role. In Armed Neutrality Kierkegaard did not need to go into this more
deeply, since he considered an extensive account to have been given in his works. 40

Whilst the vacuous character of Christendom forced Kierkegaard to become more direct in his statement of the Christian requirement, and more emphatic as to the rigours involved in following Christ, he never deviated from his crucial role as an apostle of subjectivity. It was in pursuance of this role that he confronted men with Christ as the prototype in order that "the most central truth of Christianity, Christ as the object of faith (might) come to have its full and proper place". 41

So, the use of the phrase "casts everything into becoming" clearly establishes the link between the early and late authorship. It is true to say that whilst "the main point in the first half of the authorship was to explain how the individual man becomes a Christian, the main point of the final period is to show how a man lives as a Christian". 42 But even if the scene has shifted from heathendom to Christendom, the "becoming" element still has its place. When Kierkegaard deals with the question of "living as a Christian" or "being a Christian" his treatment consistently reflects the correlation between being and becoming, the existential actualisation of possibilities. In contrast to Christendom's claim that "all are Christians", Kierkegaard asserts that to be a Christian is to be every moment in a state of becoming, whereas Christendom rests content with quantitative objective validations of faith. 43 Kierkegaard asserted that faith is qualitatively determined in terms of passion and inwardness. In the last analysis "Establishment" can only be an accommodation and this is at the root of Kierkegaard's antagonism towards any identification of the Church with the State. "The 'Church'," says Kierkegaard "ought really to represent 'becoming', the 'State' on the other hand 'establishment'." 44

Now, for Kierkegaard, there is an unavoidable correlation between "becoming" and "freedom". J. Preston Cole summarises Kierkegaard's position this way:
"Becoming has to do not with essence but existence. It has to do with the transition from possibility to actuality, and this transpires in freedom – Otherwise, it is not a becoming at all". 45

The "Interlude" to Philosophical Fragments greatly elucidates Kierkegaard's thinking on the question of "becoming" and "freedom". He argues that a second "coming into existence" is possible within the first natural "coming into existence". This is what Kierkegaard calls "historical coming into existence" and it occurs "by the operation of a relatively freely effecting cause, which in turn points ultimately to an absolutely freely effecting cause". 46 It is only in freedom, in the existential moment of decision, that the self becomes a self. 47 "The avoidance of choice is characteristic of the listless, drifting immature self ... The vague unawareness of choice and weak-willed avoidance of choice must be eliminated if one is to 'adventure a decisive action". 48

The theology of the stages defines the gradient of realities which the self may choose as its ultimate referent, and the degrees of being or selfhood which result from such a choice. The choice of material reality as one's frame of reference produces aesthetic existence. The choice of social reality results in ethical existence. The choice of Spirit itself as the ultimate reality results in the authentic mode of self-hood which Kierkegaard calls religious existence. 49 But when the most radical choice, the leap of faith, has been made, the Christian has not therefore "arrived". He is not now "triumphant" but is still called upon to be militant in his existence as a finite being under the auspices of infinite reality. In Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard shows that the offensive thing about Christianity is that Christ - the God-Man - is evidence of the ultimate reality a self can possess in God's eyes:

"A self is qualitatively what its measure is. That Christ is the measure is on God's part attested as the expression for the immense reality a self possesses; for it is true for the first time in Christ that God is Man's goal and measure". 50

Christ, then, is the paradigm of selfhood for in him the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal meet. In Christ the target has been
set for man and the object of his potential "becoming" has been established. "The more conception of Christ, the more self". Therefore, the more a man becomes like Christ, the more of a self he becomes. The more imitation, the more selfhood. Let Kierkegaard's own words make the position clear:

"The phrase 'to draw truly to oneself', cannot mean merely to draw it away from being its own self, to draw it in such a way that it loses its own existence by being drawn into that which draws it unto itself. No, in the case of that which is truly a self, to be drawn in such a way, is again to be deceived... No, when that which is to be drawn is in itself a self, the real meaning of truly drawing oneself is, first to help it to become truly its own self, so as then to draw it to oneself, or it means to help it to become its own self with and by the drawing of it to oneself". Kierkegaard says that for Luther "Christ is the gift - to which faith corresponds. Then he is the prototype - to which imitation corresponds". He says that Luther is right to order things this way, but, significantly, he adds a third function for imitation and sets this before Luther's. So we have the following order:

1) imitation in the direction of decisive action whereby the situation for becoming a Christian comes into existence;
2) Christ as gift - faith;
3) imitation as the fruit of faith."

Christ the God-Man shows man the full potential of human selfhood and thus sets the standard for authentic Christian selfhood. Christ the prototype sets the pattern for the way of existence, the sphere and extent of the decisive action which will create the situation for a man to become a Christian. God's gift of grace means that the full extent and rigour of the model's demands do not need to be met before a man can justifiably call himself a Christian. But there can be no avoiding the passion of decision which finite human beings must endure in confronting the exalted standards set for them by God in Christ: there can be no exemption from "the tension of life" because "in order to become spirit (note that it is a factor in 'becoming') one must go through crises which make us, from a human point of view, as unhappy as possible". The choice must be made between the predilections of human finitude and the demands of the paradigmatic
life of Christ. An honest confession of weakness at this point will avail
a man of God's grace and a reprieve won by Christ the Redeemer. But the
choice must not be evaded for then "becoming" is lost in a shallow self-
satisfaction and outside of a continuous state of "becoming a Christian"
no Christianity can exist at all. The Christian ideal is set so high that
no man can honestly say "I am a Christian". The most a man can claim for
himself is that he is "becoming a Christian". He is always in a state of
appropriating Christianity and can only advance towards Christianity by
first confessing his weakness, vis a vis Christ the pattern, and avail himself
of God's grace. An emphasis on the subjective appropriation of Christianity
has been Kierkegaard's peculiar contribution to a balanced understanding of
the Christian faith. In the last years prior to the direct attack,
"Kierkegaard considers it his special task to introduce appropriation into
established Christendom".

So Kierkegaard's call for an admission is in line with his consistent
respect for individual freedom of decision in ethico-religious matters.
But by way of contrast with earlier emphases on "hidden inwardness" and
"inner journeyings", the poles of the later dialectic of honesty centre
around external manifestations of Christian existence. Jørgen Bukdahl is
at pains to show that, although the form of communication employed in the
last years is not of the "deluding people into the truth" variety, still
indirect communication is the order of the day. It is still left to the
individual himself to struggle with the interpretative dilemmas thrown up
by Christianity, and to this extent the whole authorship - including that
of the last years - can be called indirect communication.

The subjective quality of Christian truth makes it impossible for
definitive solutions to be thrust upon people after the fashion of scientific
"results". The admission also functions in the service of Christian truth
as subjectivity. Whilst it does throw a good deal of light on Kierkegaard's
understanding of Christianity, it is basically aimed at awakening people in
Christendom to their personal responsibilities before God. However, there is now no question of "creeping up on people from behind". Christendom has persistently ignored the implications of that approach as it evolved in the pseudonymous literature and edifying discourses. There must now be a transition from a qualitative to a quantitative dialectic. If Christendom is truth, and the kind of preaching prevalent in Christendom is the way it should be, then unrecognisability must be one's aim along with the achievement of greater inwardness. But Christendom still grips people in the illusion that the preservation of its own structures and the furthering of its temporal interests is a sufficient object of Christian striving. When the full ideality of New Testament Christianity is set alongside what passes for Christianity in Christendom, they are juxtaposed in a relationship of dialectical opposition. It is to this dialectical opposition that Christendom must respond in honesty and humility. If it does so respond, then this will represent a great "awakening" brought about "without the alarm which it is perhaps now difficult to avoid". These last words were written in 1854 when the chance of getting the required admission was slipping away. But in the immediately preceding years, Kierkegaard hoped for a response from Mynster which would show that the establishment recognised its limitations and was prepared to throw itself upon the mercy of God.

Mynster is probably the most significant personage in the evolution of this dialectic of honesty. As a representative of Christendom he fulfils a dual role. On the one hand he is a representative personification of Christendom's deviance from the New Testament picture of a true Christian existence. On the other hand, he is the most appropriate person from whom to demand a representative admission of the establishment failings. But the specific demand that Mynster should be the one to make the admission is not simply based on his position as Primate of the Danish Church. Kierkegaard was not one easily impressed by an office irrespective of the office-holder's character. The significance of the fact that it was Mynster
who held this office rather than anyone else, cannot be underestimated.
P. G. Lindhardt has written that Kierkegaard's relationship to Mynster warrants "a whole chapter to itself", whilst Carl Jørgensen's biography of Kierkegaard provides just that. For Mynster was not just Primate but he was also the one "who carried a whole generation". He was Kierkegaard's spiritual mentor from an early age, and upon the death of Michael Pederson Kierkegaard he was the one to whom Kierkegaard transferred his intense filial respect. For many years Søren had listened to Mynster preaching and had read his sermons as part of his regular devotions. As we have already seen, he hesitated to publish any of his books until he had reckoned with the Bishop's likely reaction. Kierkegaard found himself admiring so many of Mynster's qualities that he did not tire of saying that if Christendom and the established Church could be defended, Mynster was worthy of the greatest possible respect and allegiance. So an admission from Mynster would be of value not only because it came from the lips of the Danish Primate, but also because that Primate was such a person as Mynster.

We devote a good deal of space to a study of Mynster's life and career, in addition to surveying his specific relationship to Kierkegaard. In the years after 1847, Kierkegaard was especially concerned to make his contemporaries aware of the radical opposition between New Testament Christianity and the type of so-called Christian existence prevalent in Christendom. Mynster personified this latter brand of Christianity and so it can be said that Kierkegaard was confronting his age with a choice between Mynster's way of life and the Christian life as modelled by Christ in the New Testament. We have described this as a radical opposition because Kierkegaard was not concerned with matters of only superficial significance. He set out as a corrective to the unbalanced view of Christianity now typical "especially in Protestantism and more especially in Denmark". This was not an endeavour in the direction of effecting external reforms such as the loosing of parish bonds or the preparation of a new hymn book. Rather, his
aim was to create unrest in the direction of inwardness. He was cutting at the fundamental distortion of New Testament Christianity typified by a situation in which all are Christians and Church and State have become co-terminous. Precisely because Mynster displayed so many admirable qualities as the leader of established Christianity, he became the ideal negative pole of a dialectic concerned with the basic question of what is involved in becoming a Christian after the fashion of the New Testament.

On those issues, where it became usual for liberal reformers to criticise Mynster's conservative intransigence, Kierkegaard was to be found firmly supporting the Bishop. On occasion, this gave rise to certain apparent anomalies in Kierkegaard's reactions to events. For example, those familiar with his caustic remarks about the baptising of infants are likely to be mystified by his support for Mynster in the Bishop's decision to enforce the baptism of the children of Baptist parents in the face of Peter Christian Kierkegaard's opposition. However, despite the apparent inconsistency of Kierkegaard's attitude at these points, the fundamental motive behind them remains rigidly consistent. The Grundtvigian advocacy of a liberal attitude to the Baptists Kierkegaard saw as just another move in the pursuit of external reforms in line with the general democratic movements then in vogue. For this reason he felt justified in supporting Mynster so that Christendom might not be diverted along false trails when the most urgent requirement was a radical reassessment of what being a Christian really means. Similarly, his trenchant opposition to infant baptism was ultimately based on his concern to reassert the factor of individual passionate decision in the Christian existence - a factor which Christendom had suppressed in its concern with "extension" and its neglect of Christianity as an intensive movement.

If, after learning something about Mynster's character and career, we are prompted to ask what Kierkegaard could possibly find offensive about him, then we shall be in a position to understand the extremely radical objective he was pursuing. Along with so many of Kierkegaard's contemporaries, we might feel inclined to write off his attack on Mynster as a malicious act or
the consequence of a deterioration of his health. On the other hand, the respect we feel for Kierkegaard on account of his earlier authorship might move us to a patient examination of his motives in the last years. Even then we may feel that he went too far and was guilty of tactical errors, but we shall be better placed to see that he was consistent to his initial calling as an apostle of inwardness and honesty.

So Mynster was the ideal one to make the representative admission. As Bukdahl has rightly pointed out, Kierkegaard did not look upon this representative admission as a substitute for the individual admission. Rather, because Mynster was the worthy object of so much respect, his admission would effectively stimulate individuals to look into their own lives with greater honesty and to take the New Testament requirement more seriously. Bukdahl writes:

"Mynster dazzles the ordinary Christian with his authority. Therefore he must be used so that, from being the greatest hindrance he becomes the greatest driving force towards the awakening".

This is a correct assessment of the situation although it should be noted that not only Mynster's naked authority as Primate, but also his personal reputation made him the ideal instrument for the outworking of Kierkegaard's plans. Thus, up until the time of Mynster's death Kierkegaard looked upon the representative admission as the substitute for an outright attack. Such an admission would be tantamount to the established Church condemning itself and Kierkegaard would far rather have had things that way round than have to make the act of condemnation himself. But when it became clear that the admission was not going to be made and Mynster's death put this beyond any doubt, then Kierkegaard was forced into a direct challenge to the Church at large. Yet, notwithstanding the change in scenario consequent upon Mynster's death, the latter's character was always the decisive counter in Kierkegaard's strategy. If the Bishop had issued the admission before his death then he would have been saying to his people: I am your Primate and the one to whom you have seen fit to offer your admiration and loyalty, yet I hereby admit that I fall far short of what is
required of a Christian by the New Testament and flee to God's grace for acceptance in spite of my weakness. Here it is Mynster's character which is being pitted against the New Testament ideal, and the requirement is for all men in Christendom to judge the disparity for themselves and relate their findings to their own existence. The same requirement applied after Mynster's death except that now it will not be a representative admission that will force people to face the issues but Kierkegaard's own direct statement of how things stood. In his sermon Martensen played right into Kierkegaard's hands. By his identifying Mynster with the witness to the truth, that is, with those whose lives accord well with the rigorous demands of the New Testament, Martensen linked together the poles of Kierkegaard's dialectic of honesty. Hitherto, Kierkegaard had wanted Mynster to look with honesty at the question of whether with Christ as the model, he could still call himself a Christian. Now he challenges Martensen: can you honestly in the same breath speak of Mynster's existence and the existence of the true Christian witnesses? He challenges the priests and lay people: can you honestly hear Martensen speak this way and yet not make a protest? You knew Mynster, and you know what sort of Christian existence has been modelled by Christ, now, "judge for yourselves". 72

Lest it be felt that Mynster's significance in the last years is in danger of being exaggerated, we shall here attempt to show the extent to which he figured in Kierkegaard's writings in the later works and Journals. Already we have traced the history of Kierkegaard's personal contacts with Mynster after Postscript and the evolution of his plans to publish a polemical response to the Bishop's remarks about Goldschmidt. Here we shall be principally concerned with the implicit references to Mynster in the works intended for publication (including Judge for Yourselves), and the explicit references to him in the Journals (excluding the drafts dealt with above).
We shall begin with the Journal references simply because these are more explicit than those contained in the published works. When Lynster should make the admission, Kierkegaard felt strongly that it must be seen as the outcome of his, the Bishop's, personal struggle towards a decision about the Christian requirement as laid down in the New Testament. If Lynster's name was explicitly used in the works then it would be possible for people to argue that Lynster had been forced into the admission by the pressure of Kierkegaard's writings. This would take the emphasis away from the New Testament itself and raise important questions about Kierkegaard's authority to thus challenge the Danish Primate. Kierkegaard was profoundly conscious of being "without authority" and the pseudonym Anti-Climacus was introduced to satisfy Kierkegaard's scruples about the authority required of one who preaches ideal Christianity. But even Anti-Climacus did no more than imply that Lynster was the object of Kierkegaard's pressure.\textsuperscript{73} So long as Lynster recognised himself to be the target towards which Kierkegaard's arrows were directed then it mattered not at all whether others identified correctly. Kierkegaard makes this clear in a retrospective entry from 1854, where he writes that if Lynster had yielded "it could have been concealed from everyone, and become for them his triumph".\textsuperscript{74} But in the privacy of his diary, Kierkegaard often expressed his feelings regarding Lynster and the nature of the failings he wanted the Bishop to recognise and confess. We shall see that these failings were basically the same as those attributed to the more impersonal "Christendom" thus lending weight to those places where Kierkegaard speaks explicitly of Lynster as Christendom's representative. The main objections levelled against Lynster concern the kind of preaching prevalent in contemporary Protestantism, the absence of any emphasis on the need to observe and imitate Christ the Pattern and the failure to realise in existence what is preached from the pulpit and taught from the professorial chair. It will be shown that these are also amongst the fundamental tenets of Kierkegaard's critique of Christendom. But in the Journals we also see evidence of that filial piety which prevented Kierkegaard from taking any
sort of dispassionate attitude towards Lynster, coupled with Kierkegaard's repeated protests that he wants ultimately to be a defence for Lynster rather than his assailant. We shall deal with this aspect first of all.

Several times in his Journal Kierkegaard expresses his admiration for Lynster and his anxiety to uphold the Bishop's reputation. He even goes so far as to say that he loves Lynster and that the enhancing of the latter's prestige is his "single wish". Yet such sentiments are always expressed in conjunction with protestations of piety towards his dead father. Thus he writes: "I adhere firmly to this man (i.e. Lynster). Piety towards my Father is the decisive factor". Or again, "out of filial piety towards a deceased man I feel myself obliged to do everything to his (i.e. Lynster's) satisfaction". Lynster's symbolic value is shown in Kierkegaard's expression of joy at being able to visit him on the anniversary of Michael Kierkegaard's death. Such an attitude made it impossible for Kierkegaard to become emotionally detached in his evaluation of Lynster, and we mention it before all else because it underlies Kierkegaard's references to Lynster at every point.

Thus when Kierkegaard indicates his anxiety to be a defence for Lynster, we must sense the influence of this underlying and almost superstitious piety. Kierkegaard himself acknowledges that this piety has prevented him from becoming guilty of exaggeration, and has enabled him to adopt a correct position vis a vis the establishment. Even in his most bitter assaults upon Christendom Kierkegaard says that he would never wish to launch an open attack "because I have so much piety for Lynster". But of course it was not only personal concerns which prompted Kierkegaard to be a defence for Lynster. He was also well aware of Lynster's talents, both as a preacher and administrator. He had been "brought up on Lynster's preaching", and we may assume that the art of declamation featured amongst those "strong points" which Kierkegaard confessed to admiring. We shall see later how so many of the Journal entries relate to Lynster's preaching and there is a great deal of full, if ironic praise for his style and delivery. But there
is nothing ironic about Kierkegaard's statement that Lynster is the only figure in high places he is prepared to acknowledge. Indeed, Lynster "is great in wisdom and prudence, as he is also greatly gifted in many other things". Kierkegaard is prepared to defend Lynster because the Bishop is worth defending, not merely because he holds a special personal significance. Kierkegaard was never reluctant to withhold praise where praise was due, and neither would he shrink from cashing his esteem in terms of active support. Thus he sided with Lynster against the reformers, publicly acknowledged the contributions made to the debate about his authorship by Lynster's pseudonym "Kts" and of course diligently attended to Lynster's preaching. In fact, Lynster did not exactly grasp Kierkegaard's position and was far from understanding him as a defender of the established order, but Kierkegaard was here being entirely consistent with his views on the relation between the subjective appropriation of the Christian faith and its external trappings. Thus he writes in connection with Lynster and the current reforming unrest: "I represented agitation, but mark well that it was the agitation of inwardness so that there became no upheaval with the establishment". Then in a later entry he develops the point still further and underlines the fact that his defence of the establishment centres on the admission. He concludes that he is almost never understood because people cannot conceive of a layman wanting to defend the establishment - if an official does so then his action can be explained in terms of his concern for a career and livelihood, but for a private individual it is inexplicable. Neither did Wynster understand, but nonetheless Kierkegaard's urge to defend the Bishop and the establishment he represented was very real and entirely in character. As he himself declares: "... everyone can see that it is not personal enmity against Wynster which determines my actions". It is against this background of piety and respect that we turn to those entries in which Kierkegaard is rather more polemical in his attitude to Wynster. Of these entries, an extremely large proportion are specifically concerned with Wynster as preacher and we deal with these first of all.
These entries may be divided into two categories:

a) those pertaining to the content and delivery of Mynster's sermons, and

b) those attacking Mynster for his failure to reduplicate his preaching in existence.

a) Kierkegaard possessed a copy of Mynster's Meditations upon the Doctrines of the Christian Faith and from this work he would have grasped the essentials of Mynster's theology. But by far the greatest exposure to Mynster's thought would have come via the pulpit. Mynster's reputation was very largely built upon his ability as a preacher. The plethora of rationalist priests who dominated Danish Church life at the turn of the century had a dire effect upon preaching standards. Initially at Spjellerup, and subsequently in the Capital, Mynster earned widespread acclaim both for the content and the manner of delivering his sermons. A demand was created for volumes of his printed sermons, and he never failed to attract large crowds to hear him. Along with so many other notables, the young Kierkegaard attended regularly with the rest of his family; and this practice continued long after the death of his father. Thus it comes as no surprise to find comments pertaining to Mynster's sermons occurring frequently in the Journal. In addition it must be noted that Kierkegaard saw the preacher as holding an office of great responsibility. During the "Attack" he seldom loses a chance to emphasise that Martensen's eulogy was spoken "from the pulpit" and was thus even more to be deplored. In the early works and Journals Kierkegaard regularly demonstrates a reverence for the sermon and he never wavers on this point. Consequently he exercised more than a passing interest in the sermons he heard and this is reflected in the quantity and seriousness of his comments on this theme.

Now, Kierkegaard's basic objections to the content of Mynster's sermons is that they "tone down" the ideal Christian requirement. Thus in 1848 Mynster is accused in the Journal of minimising what it means to suffer as a Christian, and the following year he passionately pleads for an explanation as to how Mynster gained permission "to change Christianity to
such a feminine mildness". Whilst Kierkegaard himself feels that it is essential to preach Christianity in all its stringency, Mynster "will have it absolutely suppressed". Often Kierkegaard picks on particular phrases and arguments from sermons of Mynster he has heard or read. Then he proceeds to show how the Bishop deliberately interprets his text in order to satisfy the bourgeois hedonism of his hearers. As he comments in a general entry headed "the Mynsterish Preaching" from 1851: "Everything is couched in aesthetic categories: Art - quiet hours". For Kierkegaard, suffering is part of Christianity's absolute demand and is also an essential part of "training for eternity". There can be no question of one generation profiting in terms of enjoyment from the sufferings of an earlier generation. But "Mynster ... essentially destroys Eternity and sets Christianity safe and sound in an historical context as being commensurate with the historical. Coupled with these more general accusations goes the particular charge that Mynster has not only toned down, but has actually abolished the category of "imitation" from Christianity. When we recognise the centrality of this category in Kierkegaard's authorship - particularly in the later years, then the severity of this charge is clear. Mynster is not so much guilty of failing to observe that the imitating or following of Christ is a vital New Testament concept. Rather his error is the far more severe one of deliberately leaving this concept out of his preaching in the interests of his own comfort and that of his hearers. Thus Kierkegaard describes the situation in an entry entitled:

The Mynsterish

"Mynster would certainly not be reluctant to say that: 'before God I readily admit that the Christian preaching which I represent is by no means in accordance with what the New Testament demands, but in this corrupt world one is unable to attain anything more. Anyway it is at least something and one must to a certain extent when in Rome, do as the Romans do'.

"Very well - but for what reason has Christianity come into the world? Is it not come precisely to improve the world? But when that which shall improve the world is treated in the same way as everything else in the world, what then? Here is nonsense indeed. Treated in such a way, then Christianity is not Christianity ...
Neither has a tradesman permission to say: I am entitled to a little dishonesty because otherwise it is impossible to be a tradesman in this world - but at least the tradesman does not think that he represents that which shall make the world better. But it is absolute nonsense when that which shall improve the world is treated in the same shabby way as everything else.

However, perhaps Mynster says: 'Yes, but were I to behave otherwise, so will I come to suffer'. Absolutely right - to be a Christian is indeed also to suffer in this world. Woe, woe betide the man who first said: Christ has died for me - therefore I shall enjoy life.

In addition to criticising the content of Mynster's sermons, Kierkegaard also attacks his manner of delivery. Not that he is lacking in eloquence or rhetorical style. To the contrary, Mynster is "great as a declamator" but the trouble is that he is "only great as a declamator" (my emphasis). His oratorical talents are second to none, but really this is all an illusion. Underneath the impressive surface there is nothing said. His emotional performances in the pulpit are certainly very moving, but this is of no use when the need is for one to gesticulate as did Chrysostum "with his whole existence". As Kierkegaard put it in 1849: "His sermons are quite good - but in eternity he will not have to preach - but be judged."

b) However, Kierkegaard's most regular complaint is that Mynster fails to reduplicate his preaching in his existence - he does not practice what he preaches. On Sunday Mynster brilliantly declaims upon the subject of Christianity whilst on Monday his life by no means reflects the ideality of the Christian demand. Now here we note an obvious ambiguity in Kierkegaard's thinking. The point has been well made by Jørgen Bukdahl, writing with especial reference to the pamphlets of the last years:

"Kierkegaard indicts Mynster's (and therewith the age's) preaching on two counts. i) 'the teaching' itself for omitting something of the most decisively Christian, that which will prevent us from enjoying life and ii) the fact of not being in character with the doctrine - not on any occasion the toned-down doctrine - one delivers. Here lies the root of something unclear in the Church battle. On the one hand it is emphasised that the teaching is wholly right in order that the misrelation-ship between life and teaching appears with extra emphasis. On the other hand it is pointed out that the teaching is lacking in something of the most decisively Christian, in order that the corruption at this point can be attacked with full strength."

We have already seen how Kierkegaard attacked Mynster for his soft-centred teaching. From this we may deduce that the content of his sermons is
erroneous. However, as Dukdahl found in the "Attack", so also in the Journal, Kierkegaard suggests that Mynster's preaching is fine as regards message 106 but is damaging because it lacks an accompanying existential commitment on the part of the preacher. He draws an analogy with the theatre. People are prepared to accept that those who act the parts of Romeo and Juliet as ideal lovers may not realise such ideality in their everyday lives. Similarly, the preacher proclaims the rigours of ideality from the pulpit yet no-one expects this to be carried over into his private life. But as Kierkegaard says so often, the act of preaching is not a theatrical presentation - for "Christianity is indeed precisely these (ideal) demands carried out in practical life". 107 There are many entries which elaborate upon the ways in which Mynster's life fails to live up to the ideals of his preaching and we must content ourselves here with a small selection.

"In his address he says that there exist only a few Christians: his life suggests that we are all Christians, and therefore the life of the cleric can be as secure and peaceful an existence as his is". 108

"Reduplication is essential to Christianity, it is not only in doctrine that it is different from other doctrines, but essentially different in that it is the doctrine which reduplicates - thus the doctrine is important. Christianly the question constantly arises not only as to whether what one says is Christianly true, but also, what sort of person is he who speaks thus.

"So when a man in silk with honours and decorations says that the truth must endure the rigours of discipleship etc. then these proportions and this composition only generates an aesthetic relationship. His presentation is very moving - whilst his demeanor comforts with the thought that the situation is not like that now - that was in the old days. Thus this silken man says well (for he is orthodox, that nobody shall dare deny): 'remember you know not when the moment shall come for you to suffer for the truth' 109 and so he cries (for in imagination he is a martyr). But the hearers think as follows: praise be that the man's demeanor and the whole of his life offers the contrary comforting thought that it is no longer the case that the truth involves discipleship". 110

"Mynster - Myself"

"I read in the New Testament that preaching Christianity is the way to become ridiculed, put to death. My life expresses, at least, that to preach Christianity is the way to become a nothing. Mynster expresses that it is the way to the most glittering career, the way to lead the most richly indulgent way of life. Truly I would be a strange man if I could not understand why everyone avoids me and follows Mynster."
"I read in the New Testament that to preach Christianity forces a man into a position in which, if there is no eternal life, he is the most wretched of all men. My life is such that everyone can understand that if there is no eternal life then certainly I was fooled - I for whom the world has opened itself up in a rare way but I have refused it. Lynster expresses that, whether there is an eternal life or not, he is no fool because he has enjoyed the advantages of this life". 111

With these few entries many more could be quoted in which Kierkegaard assumes the validity of Lynster's Christian preaching and is yet highly critical of his comfortable and prestigious way of life.112 Lynster's sermons are like letters whose contents are admirable but which are wrongly addressed - Lynster's sermons should be addressed to himself.113

Now how shall we account for the ambiguity noted by Bukdahl? He himself says that "this lack of clarity - which is only a difference in emphasis, in Lynster's case an emphasising of both parts at the same time - is a simple consequence of the fact that Christianity is determined as an existential communication". 114 In other words, it is the price which has to be paid for trying to preserve the tension between Christianity as doctrine and Christianity as existential commitment. This is certainly true, but perhaps Bukdahl could make more of the fact that it is Lynster who is seen to be guilty on both counts at one and the same time. It is illogical to accuse Lynster of failing to realise in his life the high Christian ideals set forth in his preaching when it is at the same time argued that he has abolished New Testament Christianity from his preaching and has consciously toned down the severity of the Christian demand. Here two separate corruptions prevalent in Christendom are laid on the shoulders of one man. I feel that this can be explained in terms of Lynster's role as a representative of Christendom, and the fact that this leads Kierkegaard into such ambiguities lends weight to the view that this strategic device was very important to him. As the representative of Christendom Lynster personifies all the ills of Christendom - even to the extent of being accredited with mutually exclusive kinds of deviation. This serves to set him even more starkly over against New Testament Christianity as a pole in the dialectic of honesty challenging Christendom. Also, he becomes even more strongly qualified to be the
This leads us on to a consideration of those Journal entries which specifically deal with the dichotomies "severe Christianity/lynsterish Christianity" and "easy-going Christianity/New Testament Christianity". Together with those which deal with lynster as a representative of Christendom, these entries make up by far the majority of those concerning lynster found in the Journal 1848 - 53.

Basically, Kierkegaard's charge that lynster's Christianity is of a watered down, non-New Testament variety naturally parallels his attack on the Bishop's preaching. As the representative of Christendom lynster is to be identified with all that is wrong about Christendom, and this is made clear in the following entry:

"Upon what fearful Christian untruth is the so-called Christian state founded. It is really only a very small fraction of contemporaries who constitute the state. Beneath them is a chaos - and nobody dares to venture so far out that they seek to make these thousands aware.

"Take Denmark! Bishop lynster is at the head of the clergy. His life is directed towards a worldly wisdom. Preaching is an official job of work for him, coming round once a week or now every 6th day. For the rest, everyone thinks it is valid that he should keep his personal life as remote, as remote as possible, quite set apart. God in Heaven, that is a Christian clergy! He knew very well the errors of these thousands and thousands - but that he should involve himself with them: good gracious! that was much too stupid. God in Heaven, and that is a Christian clergy!"

"And he is the model! Everyone styles themselves on him. God in Heaven, and that is Christendom!"

"The Christian state is God forsaken and desperate to such an extent that one does not even have a little sympathetic respect for him who dares to do what one would not dare to do oneself."

"No, with the most unchristian objectivity, one considers such a person to be mad! God in Heaven, and thus are we all Christians!"

"Therefore the martyr in our time has one suffering more ... to be completely deprived of all consideration, in the midst of suffering to be accompanied by the taunt that he is surely mad to leave himself exposed to such things". 115

Here it is said explicitly that lynster is the model upon which Christendom is styled. A little later on we find an entry headed: "That the 'Christian - state' is based upon an untruth, not to say a lie, illustrated by Bishop lynster's existence".116 Then the following year we come across
an entry in which Kierkegaard twice uses the name of Mynster and then corrects it to "Fraesten". This would seem to underline Mynster's representative significance. Mynster's great error, says Kierkegaard, is that he has "made himself into a paradigm". The importance of this fact for Kierkegaard's purposes is made clear in that important entry following the decisive conversation with Mynster about Training in Christianity in October 1850. Kierkegaard there expresses his satisfaction with the fact that "Mynster now stood as the representative of the establishment". Furthermore, "Bishop Mynster is the mark of true Christian refinement" he is nothing other than an example of self-indulgent life dressed in his velvet, gilt-edged finery. Thus Mynster is explicitly designated as the representative of Christendom. He personifies established Christianity as opposed to the Christianity modelled by Jesus himself in the New Testament. As its personification, Mynster is in a position to speak for Christendom. Similarly people must come to terms with the qualitative difference between Mynsterish Christianity and the Christianity of the New Testament when by their choice they will show their true colours.

The identification of Mynster with the ills of Christendom is also indicated by Kierkegaard in a more indirect way. Thus all the evils associated with Christendom are in their turn imputed to Mynster as well. Just as the established Church is an accommodation to human weakness so Mynster's brand of Christian teaching and living makes innumerable concessions to wilful human frailty in the light of Christianity's severity. Read the following entry from 1849 and then reflect upon Kierkegaard's principal criticisms of Mynster:

"Christianity does not really exist. At least I have not seen a single Christian existence in the more rigorous sense and this applies to me. Is it, after all, anything but a frightful mockery that a whole nation is Christian and one thousand men live off the whole nation's being Christian.

"Christianity does not really exist. The relationship to original Christianity is like that between a delicate sentimental engagement and a marriage. They maintain a relationship of possibility to Christianity—perhaps with death in mind, but otherwise they do not put it on existentially. No one boldly ventures, so to speak, to leap existentially into the ethical."
"The essentially Christian does not exist. Everything is merely about Christianity, which is not". 126

In the light of what Kierkegaard has written about Lynster's failure to realise Christianity in his existence, then we need look no further for a representative of Christendom and its attendant ills. Just as the basic confusion of Christendom is that, "instead of entering as an individual, one comes along with the others - the others are Christians - ergo, I am, too, and am a Christian in the same sense as the others are",125 so Lynster's misfortune is essentially his having begun

"one stage too far on: he did not begin in his youth by asking himself: will you be a Christian; he began with the presupposition that he was naturally a Christian; and so he asked himself: will you be a Priest, or a Professor, or perhaps a Lawyer, etc." 126

Just as Christendom is an historical, worldly concept so Kierkegaard persistently accuses Lynster of worldly wisdom, worldly ambition and worldly enjoyment - he is fundamentally "a man of the world".127 The text "the Christian is as a stranger and pilgrim in the world" could well be used as a satire on Bishop Lynster.128 Just as Christendom stops short of the ultimate demands of Christian discipleship and imitation, preferring the Judaistic refinements of temporal comfort and stability,129 so Lynster is the model of earthly joys and human pleasures.130

Although Kierkegaard was more prolific in his Journal writing in the years after 1848 than at any other time, the number of entries pertaining to Bishop Lynster still comprise a significant proportion.131 Furthermore, these references show how important was Lynster's part in Kierkegaard's plan towards the introduction of Christianity into Christendom. Both by direct statements and indirect inferences, Lynster stands as the representative of established Christianity - not only on account of his exalted position in the Danish hierarchy but also because his preaching and way of life made him into the ideal personification of Christendom and its pervisity.

Now, whereas the Journals show us the ways in which Kierkegaard identified Lynster with Christendom, the published works had a very different orientation. Quite simply, their objective was to make Lynster identify himself with Christendom by means of the admission. This strategy involved the presentation
of New Testament Christianity in all its ideality whilst at the same time
setting it in the context of Lynsterish Christianity - but without mentioning
Lynster by name. Had the plan succeeded then Lynster would have recognised
himself and his failings *vis a vis* the New Testament demand. He would have
consequently admitted his weakness, resorted to Grace in the proper way and
so become worthy of the highest honour and respect. Furthermore, because
the weaknesses he admitted for himself were also the weaknesses of Christendom
in general, and because he was the titular head of the Church, this admission
would become a representative admission made on behalf of the established
Church and all its members.

*Training in Christianity* represents the most important step in this plan
of campaign. Here we see Kierkegaard trying to say just enough about Lynster
but not so much that it becomes an outright attack. As we observed when
discussing the personal contacts between the two men on the publication of
*Training*, Kierkegaard required some sort of response from Lynster - preferably
the admission rather than "a false move". But this must not be seen as
Lynster's response to direct charges. Just as Kierkegaard attempted "to
bring defence and attack together in such a unity that no one can say directly
whether one is attacking or defending ... and with this to be nobody, an
absentee, an objective something, not a personal man*", 132 so the object of
the defence/attack is hidden behind a mark of anonymity. Kierkegaard's
endeavour is to present Christendom and Established Christianity in all their
corruptness at the same time saying just enough to make Lynster see that he
represents the watered-down, institutionalised Christianity and that the
"moral" contains a particular message for him. When we recall what Kierkegaard
wrote about Lynster in his Journal between 1849 - 54, then the following
quotation from *Training* establishes him as their obvious referrent:

"Come hither, hither, all ye that labour and are heavy laden; oh, come hither; behold how He bids you come, how He openeth His
arms! Oh, when these words are uttered by a fashionable man in a
silk gown, with a pleasant and sonorous voice which resounds agreeably
from the lovely, vaulted ceiling, a silken man who bestows honour and
repute upon all who hear him ... then indeed thou wilt agree that there
is some sense in what he says. But make what sense out of it thou
wilt, one thing is sure, it is not Christianity, it is exactly the
opposite, as contrary to Christianity as could be — for remember who the Inviter is". 133

Then Kierkegaard writes of "Pastor Green" who is a chap "who doesn’t only know how to preach. One should not hear him on Sundays in Church, but on Mondays at the club — I only wish I had half his knowledge of the world". 134

"To make oneself literally one with the most miserable (and this, this alone is divine compassion) is for men the 'too much', over which one weeps in the quiet hour on Sundays, and at which one bursts with laughter when one sees it in reality". 135

"(God) will have nothing to do with man's port enquiry about why and why did Christianity come into the world: it is and shall be the absolute. Therefore everything men have hit upon relatively to explain the why and the wherefore is falsehood. Perhaps they have hit upon an explanation out of a humane compassion of a sort, which thinks that one might chaffer about the price — for God presumably does not understand men, his requirements are exorbitant, and so the parsons must be on hand to chaffer. Perhaps they hit upon an explanation in order to stand well with men and get some advantage out of preaching Christianity; for when it is toned down to the merely human, to what has 'entered into the heart of man' then naturally people will think well of it, and quite naturally also of the amiable orator who can make Christianity so gentle a thing ..." 136

"... to be a Christian in truth should mean in the world, in the eyes of men, to be abased, that it should mean all possible hardships, every possible sort of derision and insult, and mean at last to be punished as a criminal! Here again is the possibility of offence. Ah, and it holds good of this offence also that it may be avoided if thou, either out of hypocrisy or out of whimpering human sympathy for thyself or for others, will be a Christian only up to a certain point, only on the pagan principle of ne quid nimis; for then thou shalt be honoured and esteemed, shalt be able to avoid the possibility of offence, to accomplish a great deal in the world, and to win great multitudes who desire also to be Christians only up to a certain point. But if this is not thy desire, then thou must pass through the possibility of offence; for to be a Christian is certainly not to be Christ (what mockery of God!), but it is to be His follower — yet not the sort of fashionably rouged follower who profits by the firm's name and is content to regard Christ's sufferings as an affair of many, many centuries ago. No, to be a follower means that thy life has as great likeness to His as it is possible for a man's life to have". 137

"Thou wilt bear in mind that if there is to be any seriousness in stationing oneself or standing beside the cross, it must be in the situation of contemporaneousness, where it will mean actually to incur suffering with Him, not to propose subjects for reflection at the foot of the cross, but perhaps to be nailed oneself to a cross alongside of Him — there to propose subjects for reflection. Therefore ... do not think upon Him reflectively, but think first of all upon thyself with the aim of becoming in thy thought contemporary with Him. Cannot now this sight move thee? — I do not say to tears, which here are out of place and superfluous, if it is not over thine own self thou weepest — but in all seriousness, with a view to action, with a view perhaps to suffering somehow in His likeness". 138
"... if so-called established Christendom maybe does not expressly call itself the Church triumphant, perhaps disdaining this name as an externality, it nevertheless produces the same confusion by means of hidden inwardness; for again, established Christendom, where all are Christians, but only in hidden inwardness, resembles the militant Church just as little as the stillness of death resembles vociferous passion". 139

"If I am a parson, I do not require in the least that my true Christian character be recognised by the fact that I have the most hearers and am the most acclaimed preacher. No, if as a parson I am to have the most patronage, it depends artistically upon what gifts of eloquence I possess, it depends upon whether I have a voice, how the preaching gown becomes me, how well I have studied the newest philosophy so that I can satisfy 'the requirements of the age'; the true Christian I am is a thing for itself, a thing for myself, something I am in hidden inwardness - quite like all the others; but that I am a true Christian is sure enough, it is just as sure as that all the others are". 140

The accusations thus written in 1848 and published just two years later are substantially the same as those made against Kynster by name in subsequent Journal entries. Certainly Martensen is also to be identified as an object of indirect criticism in Training whilst Christendom and Established Christianity are attacked directly. However, it was against "the Kynsterish" that Kierkegaard's main thrusts were directed and it was Kynster himself, as representative of the established Church, who must draw his conclusions from "The Moral" and make the admission "in view of the requirements of ideality". Whilst Training does involve criticism of the prevailing corruptions of Christianity, its basic concern was with the practice of Christianity, i.e. the imitation of Christ the Prototype. As Malantschuk writes: "It is clear that Anti Climacus isolates Christ's quantitative degradation in order to accentuate imitation". 141 It is Christ the poor, scorned man who draws all men to himself, through the same degradations which he experienced upon earth. This is the Christ who is set over against 19th Century Danish Christianity and condemns it - unless, by making the representative admission Kynster leads Christendom to condemn itself and throw itself on the mercy of God. We have already described Kierkegaard's anxiety about Kynster's possible response to Training and now we can understand his concern even better. For his strategy was based on Kynster identifying himself and recognising his responsibility, thus making the appropriate response. In
the first instance, the general reaction to the book was not important to Kierkegaard. But Mynster's reaction was desperately important because it alone could determine the direction of Kierkegaard's subsequent authorship. Training in Christianity posited the mutually exclusive alternatives of Christendom and New Testament Christianity. It was up to Mynster to decide the response which he himself, and so Christendom, should make in the face of these alternatives. As we have seen, Mynster made no definite response to the challenge and so Kierkegaard resorted to the greater, although still considerably restrained severities of For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves. In these works, Kierkegaard's references to Mynster were far more explicit than those in Training and he came dangerously close to showing his hand. However, Judge for Yourselves remained unpublished and Training remained in circulation complete with Preface and Koral. Kierkegaard is still keeping the door open for Mynster to make the admission. Although "The Professor" in particular and the establishment in general continue to come under severe attack in these later works, it is still not Martensen's reaction which is important to Kierkegaard or the reaction of anyone else in Christendom - however dignified. Mynster must make the admission or face the ammunition which Kierkegaard was continually preparing in the Journal.

So, from the very beginning Kierkegaard's aim was to awaken disquietude with the intention of effecting inward change. To effect this purpose in heathendom is a fairly straightforward task, although a formal indirectness will still be necessary. However, Christendom, with all its errors and illusions presents a very different picture. In Christendom the kind of Christianity which prevails when "all are Christians" must be abandoned in order that individuals may be open to a true Christianity founded on the principles of paradox, inwardness, obedience and imitation. The pseudonymous literature contains the essentials of Kierkegaard's teaching on these principles, but, in the absence of the establishment's attention and understanding, the problem still remains as to how Christianity is to be introduced
into Christendom. It is in the service of this task that Kierkegaard's dialectic of honesty is employed. There could be no question of forcing people to accept Christianity in place of Christendom's illusions. This would be to deny that Christianity is an "appropriation process". Similarly, open assaults on Christendom's objective norms are to be avoided if at all possible. Rather, the situation must be created whereby an honest appraisal can be made regarding one's personal position vis-à-vis the Christianity of Christendom and the Christianity of the New Testament. Furthermore, being ever faithful to his existential dialectic of communication, the personification of New Testament Christianity which is Christ, is opposed by a personification of Christendom in the shape of Bishop Kynster. Thus are established the poles of the dialectic. It is up to Bishop Kynster to come to terms honestly with himself and admit how things truly stand between his existence and the life of Christ. Because of his position and reputation, Kynster's admission will have the effect of arousing the whole of Danish Christendom to a re-evaluation of itself, its teaching and its practice. Kierkegaard wants the objective canons of Christendom to be put into their proper perspective. Only by such a demonstration of honesty and humility can Christendom come to recognise the merely relative significance of these objectives and the need for the individual to throw himself unconditionally on the mercy of God. Through the miracle of grace, the admission enables a man to become a true self before God, not by the negative instruments of force and destruction, but through the free exercise of his will.
1. **Judge for Yourselves** p. 167

2. See N. Thulstrup: "The Complex of problems called 'Kierkegaard'". *Kierkegaard Critique* p. 295

3. Cf. *Training* pps. 246 - 7 and p. 221: "Christianity is quite literally dethroned in Christendom".


5. *ibid.* p. 48. N.B. Kierkegaard's comments about Hartensen's *Dogmatics* at *Pap.* X 1 A 566

6. *ibid.* pps. 47 - 8

7. *ibid.* p. 50

8. *Pap.* X 2 A 135

9. See *Point of View* pps. 22 ff., 43, 137 f. and *Training in Christianity* p. 39

10. See *Judge for Yourselves* p. 219, where Kierkegaard insists that the Established Church should be "established and upheld" rather than capitulate to "bungling efforts at reform (which) are more pernicious than the most pernicious establishment".

11. Kierkegaard states his position must succinctly in *An Open Letter*: "Christianity is inwardness, inward deepening. If at a given time the forms under which one has to live are not the most perfect, if they can be improved in God's name do so. But essentially Christianity is inwardness". (Armed Neutrality pps. 49 - 50). See Jørgen Bukdahl: "Indrømmelsen. Dens plads i Søren Kierkegaard's kristendoms forståelse og vækklessaktion". *Dansk Teologisk Tidskrift* 1963. p. 113.


15. *Training* p. 7

16. *ibid.* p. 221

17. *For Self-Examination* p. 37. Cf. pps. 56, 90


19. *Attack upon Christendom* p. 37


Luther's Reformation can be justified because it was what the times required and reflected an appropriate degree of religiosity. This cannot be said of modern attempts at reform. (Pap. X 3 A 799, 800)

See also X 5 A 27.


Training p. 69

The two factors are linked by Kierkegaard's teaching about the situation of contemporaneity. Pap. IX A 153, X 1 A 322, X 3 A 653. See Lønning: Santidighedens Situation. Oslo 1954, p. 18.

It should be pointed out that our concern here with the concept of "imitation" by no means exhausts the significance of this topic in Kierkegaard's authorship and Journals. We attend to it simply in terms of its function as the stimulus to the making of an admission of weakness in the face of the ideal requirement. It has been repeatedly shown that a preoccupation with the imitation of Christ characterises Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole. Thus Bradley Dewey concludes his study entitled The New Obedience, (Corpus Books, Washington 1968, p. 166) by asserting that "the major themes of Kierkegaard's literature have been shown to be intrinsically related to each other through their common linkage to the theme of Following. They all cohere around Kierkegaard's concern for the Following of Christ, which seems to have been a constant and central reference point for his entire authorship". Also, Marie Thulstrup contends that her enquiry into Kierkegaard's dialectic of imitation "will point out a definite coherence in Kierkegaard's thought as a whole ..." (Kierkegaard Critique p. 266). V. Lindström does not go this far, preferring to see "imitation" as a theme only really gaining prominence after the Corsair incident and the publication of Postscript. However, as a major theme of the last years, its significance is considerable. (See Stadernes Teologi, p. 339; Efterfølgelsens Teologi and "La Théologie de l'Imitation de Jesus-Christ chez Kierkegaard" Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses Vol. 35 (1955) pp. 379 - 392). So, whilst the theme of "imitation" is strongly related to Kierkegaard's demand for an admission, it basically has an autonomy within the authorship all of its own. Indeed, Kierkegaard's call for the admission arises out of his theology of imitation, rather than vice versa. The primacy of the imitation theme in this respect is especially discernible from a study of the Journals where Kierkegaard's expression is dictated rather less by the demands of his status as a god to Danish Christendom. (See Marie Thulstrup: op. cit. p. 278).

Pap. X 4 A 446

See Marie Thulstrup: "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Imitation". Kierkegaard Critique p. 271; "It would be presumptuous for someone to act as if he had an immediate relationship to God unless in fact he had one".


Pap. X 4 A 558
31. See Pap. X 5 A 89; 96 and 101. Kierkegaard writes: "The mistake Lynster and the whole official clan make is that they know neither how to apply the prototype (Forbillede) to 'imitation' nor how to use this advantageously with regard to relying upon grace. This last is what I wanted and now want: I want to apply the Christian requirement, imitation, in all its infinitude, in order to place the emphasis in the direction of grace". (X 5 A 88)

32. Pap. X 4 A 446

33. Training in Christianity makes clear Kierkegaard's aversion to such a conclusion

34. Attack upon Christendom p. 54. Cf. Preface to Training, and Pap. V p. 156 note. Another way for the Established Church to condemn itself would be by affirming "that in a strict sense it is true to Christianity in accordance with the New Testament" (Judge for Yourselves p. 219). However, far from becoming a defence for itself, such a self-condemning affirmation could only result in an all out attack by Kierkegaard on the Church. In the event, the absence of an admission was sufficient to push Kierkegaard beyond the bounds of restraint although Martensen's sermon amounted to a self-incriminating affirmation of the Church's righteousness


36. Dewey: op. cit. p. 44

37. See Pap. XI 1 A 505: "The situation at the beginning was: no Christians existed. So everyone became Christian - and for that reason again no Christians exist. This situation marked the end; now we stand once again at the beginning". Cf. G. Malantschuk: Kierkegaard's Thought p. 37: "... with his last writings Kierkegaard wants to be instrumental in destroying 'the phenomenon' Christendom in order to make room for the dawn of the new".

38. See An Open Letter p. 52: "I am positive I have never directed one word against the teaching and the organisation of the established order, but I have worked to make this teaching more and more the truth in 'the single individual'."


40. Ibid. p. 132

41. Malantschuk: Ibid. pps. 132 - 3

42. N. Thulstrup: Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift Vol. II p. 145

43. See Postscript pps. 25 - 47 and Dewey: op. cit. pps. 31 ff.

44. Pap. X 1 A 552. N.B. that the Danish word "Bestaende" and the English "Establishment" both have the Greek verb στάσις as their root. Cf. Training pps. 88 ff; 205 ff. and Diem: op. cit. pps. 124 ff.


46. Philosophical Fragments, Princeton 1962. p. 94
It is important to realise that when Jesus says "come unto me all you that labour and are heavy laden and I will give you rest" this is not an invitation to a life of comfort and security but rather is a call to follow in the footsteps of him who carried a cross. (Bradley Dewey: "Kierkegaard and the Blue Testament", Harvard Theological Review Vol. 60, 1967, pp. 403 - 4 note)

52. Training in Christianity p. 159. It is important to realise that when Jesus says "come unto me all you that labour and are heavy laden and I will give you rest" this is not an invitation to a life of comfort and security but rather is a call to follow in the footsteps of him who carried a cross. (Bradley Dewey: "Kierkegaard and the Blue Testament", Harvard Theological Review Vol. 60, 1967, pp. 403 - 4 note)

53. Pap. X 4 A 459

54. See Pap. XI 1 A 572

55. Pap. X 3 A 526

56. See Pap. XI 1 A 492: "The prototype' slays all, as it were, for no one achieves it. 'The Redeemer' wants to save all. Yet Christ is both, and that swindle which takes redemption and grace in vain is not Christianity".

57. Jørgen Bukdahl: op. cit. p. 112

58. On the shift in Kierkegaard's attitude to "hidden inwardness" see Lindstrøm: Efterfølgelsens Teologi pp. 95 - 130 and "La Théologie de l'imitation de Jésus-Christ chez Kierkegaard" Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses pp. 384 f. and Dewey: op. cit. pp. 219 - 20

59. Pap. VIII 2 C 3, 36

60. Bukdahl: op. cit. pps. 97 - 112

61. Halantschuk: Kierkegaard's Thought p. 368

62. Pap. X 4 A 558

63. Pap. XI 3 B 15 p. 43

64. "... now Mynster is there representing the Establishment" (X 3 A 565)


66. Carl Jørgensen: Kierkegaard Vol. 5

67. See above: Chapter on Bishop Mynster

68. Pap. X 6 B 60

69. Pap. X 4 A 493 p. 314; X 3 A 219 Cf. X 3 A 535 where Kierkegaard says that, if he was writing in his own name, then he would give Mynster credit for his preaching (i.e. he would not have said that he had never heard any Christian sermons). But Anti-Climacus speaks on behalf of ideality, so even Mynster stands condemned - but without naming names. X 6 B 60: "The eulogy over Bishop Mynster which is found in No. 2
(of the three ethico-religious treatises from 1854 - 3) is based on the presupposition that 'state Church' and 'the establishment' are valid concepts. What from a Christian standpoint one denies this is quite another matter. Now if one assumes the validity of these concepts then (Bishop Lynster) is great and to be admired. But on the other hand, when one attacks these two concepts, then must Bishop Lynster also come under attack'. Cf. IX A 136, 414.

70. See Lønning: op. cit. pps. 257 - 259

71. Bukdahl: op. cit. p. 115

72. See Pap. X 3 A 726 where the reader is specifically invited to consider a New Testament description of the Christian (i.e. as a foreigner and stranger in the world - Heb. 11 v. 13, I Peter 2, v. 11) and then think of Lynster. The entry is entitled: "Satire upon Bishop Lynster"

73. In fact, Kierkegaard argues that it is only the ideal position, adapted by Anti-Climacus which prevents him from making Lynster into an exceptional case to whom the basic charges do not apply. Thus Kierkegaard himself would not say, as does Anti-Climacus, that he has never heard a Christian sermon, because Lynster can be excepted from such a judgement. (Pap. X 3 A 535)

74. Pap. XI 1 A 1

75. Pap. IX A 85. Cf. XI 3 B 15

76. Pap. X 1 A 454 p. 290

77. Pap. X 3 A 742. Cf. X 4 A 218, 592

78. Pap. X 4 A 373

79. Pap. X 3 A 128

80. Pap. X 3 A 565 (This entry follows upon his conversation with Lynster after the publication of Training)

81. Pap. X 4 A 365

82. Pap. X 3 A 128; X 4 A 322; X 1 A 137

83. Pap. X 4 A 218, 493

84. Pap. X 2 A 589 p. 421

85. Pap. X 3 A 742, Cf. X 1 A 58

86. See Pap. X 1 A 92, 114

87. Pap. X 3 A 95, Cf. X 4 A 228

88. Pap. X 4 A 358 - 9, 363, 377

89. Pap. X 4 A 493, p. 314

90. Cf. for example Pap. X 4 A 136, 566; IX A 324

91. See Pap. IX A 188. Kierkegaard describes how Lynster attracted many hearers although his attraction declined in later years
106. So IX A 81 where Kierkegaard states categorically that "Lynster has preached true Christianity". Also, X 1 A 542 where Lynster's preaching, and especially his emphasis on the individual (individet), is contrasted favourably with Grundtvig's "historical escapades", Cf. For Self-Examination p. 45.
This accusation is probably harsher in its implications than Kierkegaard actually intended. By virtue of his office, his reputation and the qualities which Kierkegaard never denied he existed as a paradigm in Christendom. But there is no evidence to suggest that he actively invited such a designation.

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Cf. Pap. X 4 A 282 where Kierkegaard posits "Ideality" over against an age of philosophers, poets etc. "At least" he writes "one will have respect for what it is to be a Christian so that everyone can make the attempt or choose whether he will be that or not." Wynster wants to relativise everything to do with being a Christian.

In actual fact, Wynster agonised over his status as a Christian to a far greater extent than these cynical comments of Kierkegaard would seem to allow. However, it is fair to say that he never seriously doubted that he was at heart a Christian. Certainly such doubts as he had did not prevent him from getting ordained BEFORE his "breakthrough."

See, for example, Pap. X 1 A 114, 314, 375, 559, 611; X 2 A 257; X 3 A 135, 215, 235, 311, 321, 334, 449; X 4 A 361. Cf. Lønning, op. cit. p. 232 where "Christendom" is defined in terms of it becoming coincidental with "the world."

According to Kalle Sorainsen's calculations, Kierkegaard's reference to Wynster in the Journal outnumber references to any other single literary figure or personal acquaintance. Even Socrates 236 compares unfavourably with Wynster's 273. (K. Sorainsen: Navneregister til Søren Kierkegaards Papirer)

Training p. 133
Training p. 44
ibid. p. 54
ibid. p. 63
ibid. p. 66
ibid. p. 108
138. ibid. p. 171
139. ibid. p. 203 = 9
140. ibid. p. 211
141. Kierkegaard's Thought p. 351
142. See Index li 3 B 18, 12
143. For Self-Examination p. 45
In the Journal for 1850, under the heading "About Myself" we find the following entry:

"To produce a history of Christ’s sufferings was a task to which I had applied myself; I have already done a good deal to that end. I do not doubt that with respect to feeling, imagination and eloquence this harrowing and compelling portrayal would have become a masterpiece, indeed, would have been as fascinating as those painted works of art which depict Christ.

"But in this respect I would certainly have been different from those artists in that I would have had enough Christianity to simply thank God that I am permitted as an indulgence to sit enjoying this life and work on such a task.

"Ah, but I would nevertheless have become a Sophist if even the temptation remained that I even ever so humbly understood that I was such a one.

"Truly, if God does not compel a man, if God does not watch over him, so even the most honest man becomes a Sophist.

"Meanwhile an honest Sophist is not to be despised. What I say never goes further than that one shall at least admit that to be excused from real imitation is indulgence. I have never demanded more of anyone; and this I have not demanded except without authority, to draw attention to the fact that this ought to be so.

"And therefore, if God does not compel me, neither do I go further".

This acts as a useful link between our consideration of Kierkegaard’s dialectic of honesty and the present enquiry into his dialectic of authority. Whilst Kierkegaard invoked the need for the honest admission as a reason for deferring an open assault on the Church, so he also demanded honesty of himself regarding his personal authority to undertake such an assault. Bukdahl identifies five kinds of "admissions" in Kierkegaard’s works; besides the individual, representative and legitimising admissions, we have also the joint (solidariske) and spying (spionerende) admissions. These last two are essentially related to Kierkegaard’s personal position vis a vis his Christian teaching. The "Joint Admission" finds its best expression in the Preface to Training in Christianity:

"The requirement must be heard; and I understand what is said as addressed solely to me - that I might learn not only to take refuge in 'grace', but to take refuge in such a way as to make use of 'grace'".
Thus it is made clear that Kierkegaard himself realised the extent to which he enjoyed the benefit of God's merciful indulgence towards him, and the need for honesty. As Bukdahl also points out, Kierkegaard had good tactical reasons for publicly enunciating such an admission - he could come up from behind his hearers. But it was also ethically determined by the requirement of not giving himself out to be more advanced than was in fact the case. Linked to this is the need to avoid unauthorised judgements or condemnations. However, the "spying" admission is exclusively tactical. Here Kierkegaard simply claims to be a poet who presents the ideal requirement only poetically, not having actually realised it in his own existence. This way he does not pretend to be an examiner and judge of any man's inner life, but by his own admission, challenges the Christians of Christendom to examine themselves and to judge for themselves.

At the back of this tactical and ethical concern for the making of an admission on his own behalf, lies Kierkegaard's genuine wrestling with the problem of authority and his repeated claim to act and speak "without authority". If the admission demand was at least as much a strategic tactical device as it was a genuine expression of Kierkegaard's concern to be honest with himself before God, the problem of authority was almost exclusively a deep emotional and intellectual problem which also had the incidental effect of reinforcing his resolve to delay the direct attack.

In 1843 Kierkegaard has Judge William write to his aesthetic young friend as follows:

"Regard what I have written as of no importance, regard it as notes appended to Balle's 'Lesson-Book' - that is of no consequence; what I have said nevertheless has an authority which I hope you will respect. Or might it seem to you perhaps that I have wrongfully wished to usurp authority, that I have improperly confounded my official situation with this litigation, behaving as a judge, not as a party to it? I cheerfully relinquish every pretention, I am not even a party in this dispute with you; for while I willingly admit that aesthetics might well give you power of attorney to appear in its behalf, I am far from ascribing to myself enough importance to appear with power of attorney for ethics. I am nothing more than a witness, and it was only in this sense I expressed the opinion that this letter has a certain authority, for he who speaks of what he has experienced always speaks with authority. I am only a witness, and here you have my declaration in optima forma."
Now, whilst not wishing to confuse Kierkegaard's thoughts with those of his pseudonyms, we may still see in these words of Judge William an interesting foretaste of Kierkegaard's own subsequent wrestling with the question of authority. We see the same evidence of concern lest a false impression be given as to the status of his communication. We see the same penchant for self-deprecation as characterises Kierkegaard's own claim to be "without authority". We see the same close links established between authority and experience. Likewise at other places in the pseudonymous works we see how the issues raised by the question of authority found early expression in Kierkegaard's authorship. Thus in The Concept of Dread the need for books on psychology to display a "proper psychological-poetic authority" is adduced in opposition to the writing of "learned works" and the looking up of literary proof texts. In the same negative vein Kierkegaard makes the charge that "in our age speculative philosophy has arrogated to itself such authority that it has almost tempted God to feel uncertain about Himself". In Stages on Life's Way a discussion on the use of the comic makes a significant link between "deepest sufferings" and the acquisition of "true authority". Yet Frater Taciturnus also speaks of "vicarious authority such as an Apostle's, the dialectical definition of which I cannot understand though in reverence for what has been handed down to me as sacred, I refrain from drawing any conclusion from my lack of knowledge". Furthermore, the same writer admits to being unable to comprehend the dialectical position of "such authoritative individuals as the apostles".

As Lowrie points out, these latter admissions indicate that Kierkegaard "was already awake to the problem upon which his attention was riveted two years later by 'the case of Adler' ... There is also much in this entry which presages the Unscientific Postscript". Thus, when we do in fact look in Postscript for enlightenment regarding the subject of "authority" we notice that it is closely involved with the Apostle and with "the interrelated problem of the authority of an ordained minister". Early in the work we find a reference to "the miraculous authority of an Apostle", whilst it is
later affirmed that the notion of being an "outstanding personality" is merely an aesthetic notion "since from the religious point of view there is nothing validly outstanding except an Apostle's paradoxical-dialectical authority". Concerning the clergyman, Kierkegaard makes it clear that "the divine authority of the religious" is available to him for the transformation of conversation about even the simplest things into edifying discourse.  

But what is the nature of the "divine authority of the religious", this "paradoxical-dialectical authority"? Well, above all else, it establishes its bearer as a special individual and in a footnote Kierkegaard elaborates further upon this speciality in terms of the Apostle's existence as paradoxically dialectical:

"The Apostle's direct relationship to God is paradoxically dialectical, because a direct one is lower (the intermediate determinant is the religiousness of immanence, religiousness A) than the indirect relationship of the general congregation, since the indirect relationship is one between spirit and spirit, the direct relationship is aesthetic — and yet in this instance the direct relationship is higher. So the Apostle's relationship is not plainly higher than that of the general congregation, as a chatty person makes a gaping congregation believe — wherewith the whole thing returns to the aesthetic. Also the Apostle's direct relationship to other men is paradoxically dialectical for the fact that the Apostle's life is turned outward, employed in spreading Christianity throughout kingdoms and lands, for this relationship is lower than the indirect relationship of the private person to others which is grounded in the fact that he has to do essentially with himself. The direct relation is an aesthetic relation (oriented outward) and to that extent lower — and yet as an exception it is higher for the Apostle. This is the paradoxically dialectical aspect. It is not plainly higher, for with that we get the world-historical bustle of this man and everybody. The paradox consists precisely in the fact that what counts as higher for an Apostle does not so count for others".

The references here to the Apostle's status as dialectically opposed to that of "the general congregation" have definite implications for Kierkegaard's own position as he debated the merits of becoming a pastor or remaining with the laity. But of even greater personal significance is his judgement that "even the introduction of Christianity into a country may involve merely an aesthetic relationship, unless it is by an Apostle whose existence is paradoxically dialectical". Kierkegaard saw his task increasingly in terms of the introduction of Christianity into Christendom and in the light of these comments in Postscript we may not doubt the
importance he attached to the question of Apostolic authority and whether he could justifiably act with such authority.

But before we turn to consider in more detail Kierkegaard's internal struggle with the problem of his authority to act in a decisive way, we must look still further at his more theoretical deliberations upon the nature of divine authority. These are principally contained in the Book about Adler and especially the published Minor ethico-religious Treatises which arose out of that book. Now, whilst Book about Adler has been translated into English and German without including Adler's name in the title, Lowrie is right in his view that "Adler is the warp upon which this whole fabric is woven". But still we shall say no more about the man than is necessary for elucidating the main points at issue.

The most important fact about Adler is his claim to have experienced a revelatory "vision of light" which caused him to react against his pristine adherence to Hegel and to publish a book of "Several Sermons" which were supposed to have been dictated by Jesus Christ himself. This publication appeared in 1843 and within the space of two years he had been examined by Bishop Mynster and subsequently relieved of his pastoral duties. But he continued to write profusely and published five more books by mid 1846 - four of them appearing on the same day. In June of that year Kierkegaard acquired all six of Adler's books and studied them with such diligence as kept him from his Journal for six months.

It is not difficult to understand why Adler's claims should have been of so great interest to Kierkegaard, although Frederick Sontag's highly suppositional introduction errs in the direction of exaggerating their general significance. Certainly Adler's case enabled Kierkegaard to achieve a clearer perspective upon the consequences of his own philosophy for the concepts of election, authority and revelation. Kierkegaard himself acknowledged his debt to Adler in this respect - "rarely has a man by going astray come so opportunely to hand as has Magister Adler to me". Yet as with so many of his contemporaries, Kierkegaard found Adler to be no more
than the occasion for him to develop his thinking beyond the conclusion of
the pseudonymous authorship. Basically Adler led Kierkegaard to correlate
his philosophy of inwardness and paradox with the wider, more immediate
dimensions of Apostolic and clerical authority. Thus far Sontag is right
when he says of Postscript that:

"... taken literally it provides no standard with which to test
Adler's demented doctrines. To believe against the understanding is
described in Postscript as martyrdom, so that according to this Adler
would be a martyr. Reading Kierkegaard's early radical subjectivity
it is easy to see why Adler should have thought that he would find a
defender in Kierkegaard and came to him to plead for support. 22
It is equally easy to see why Kierkegaard should have found being faced
with Adler so unsettling. Inwardness cannot be directly communicated
and Kierkegaard has just said that indirect communication is the only
true way (p. 246), and yet there stands Adler who must be directly dealt
with and objectively ruled out of bounds. Christianity is said not
to be a doctrine (p. 339), but Adler is crazy and subjective and not
within the bounds of doctrine. A sane man who actually stays within
traditional bounds (as Kierkegaard did) can be allowed to espouse
radical doctrines, but a crazy man cannot be allowed to be radical and
so Adler forces a change upon Kierkegaard. In Postscript Kierkegaard
denies external authority; in Authority and Revelation it becomes a
needed concept. 23

But although it is true that Adler presented a challenge to Kierkegaard,
it is going too far to say that he thus forced a "change" on him and it
certainly is not the case that Kierkegaard invoked an external authority
hitherto denied. Here Sontag makes the same kind of error as that made by
scholars who would see Kierkegaard's views on authority as leading him
towards Catholicism. This has been maintained by E. Przywara 24 whilst
H. Roos subscribes to Geismar's view that Kierkegaard's theory of apostolic
authority "would lead inevitably into Catholicism if it was effected". 25
This viewpoint has been well countered by Louis Dupré, who points to
Kierkegaard's emphasis upon the importance of the authoritative individual's
existence as keeping him firmly within the Protestant camp. 26 But surely
it is not necessary to produce even such elementary counter arguments in
order to refute Sontag and the catholicising Kierkegardians. Lønning does
enough when he asserts that such theorising "has reflected more upon where
(Kierkegaard's theory of authority) will lead than upon from where it stems
and to what motives it would give expression". 27 Lønning expands his
point as follows:
"The fact that the preaching of Christianity happens with 'Authority' does not therefore signify that the preaching possesses in the Church's authority an objective factor by which it is supported, but, on the contrary, it signifies that the message in itself possesses an authority which does not allow itself to be usurped by anything else and the preacher's relationship to that he preaches must let this come clearly to expression. Then taken to extremes it can be said that 'a priest is essentially what he is by Ordination, and Ordination is a teacher's paradoxical change in time whereby in time he becomes something other than he would be through the immanent development of genius, talents, gifts etc.' (Postscript p. 244) - the meaning is clear enough: Ordination is an expression for the instant's paradoxical character as the breaking-in point of eternity, and its function and task is to be a dam against every tendency towards the aesthetising of the Christian revelation. **Ordination has objective and decisive significance insofar as it protects the paradox qua paradox,** from which eo ipso it follows that it can hardly have significance as an objective and independent guarantee for the truth of Christianity. Thus there will be found in Kierkegaard no analysis or development of the office's significance in and for itself. His view can be just as little taken for a sign (intext) of Catholicism as of modern protestant subjectivising with its principle of nullifying the office's significance. But one cannot understand Kierkegaard's talk about the authority of the ecclesiastical office before one is clear that the thought at most plays a derived and secondary role: it is a peripheral thought, in itself a necessary consequence of the paradox but in no way to be thought of as a starting point for the drawing of new conclusions."

Here Lønning concerns himself explicitly with the authority of the clergyman as treated by Kierkegaard, but the points he makes here are valid for the principle of authority in general. Adler did not cause Kierkegaard to "change" his earlier position on Christianity as founded on subjectivity and paradox. Kierkegaard did not feel any need to temper such a view of Christianity by giving emphasis to the principles of external authority. On the contrary, it was the notions of authority and revelation which required clarification in terms of his established Christian understanding. Adler was of service to Kierkegaard insofar as the latter came to a greater understanding of how he might justifiably proceed along a rather more explicit and negative path towards the introduction of Christianity into Christendom, and under what authority.

For Kierkegaard's purposes the Adler case prompted a deepened awareness on two counts. Just as the Corsair incident had recently acquainted Kierkegaard with the radical dissoluteness of his social milieu, so Adler as a phenomenon represented "the Religious Confusion of the Present Time". But on the more personal level Kierkegaard was enabled to delve more deeply
into the difference between don Enkeletz and den extraordinaire and whether he came into the latter category. Thus taking the question a stage further he examines the difference between the genius and the Apostle with especial attention being paid to their respective authority. Here again Kierkegaard addressed himself to the problem of where he stands in relation to these qualifications.

With regard to Kierkegaard's deepened awareness of the confusion apparent in the present age a paragraph under the heading "Iago, Adler as an epigram upon present day Christianity" illustrates this well enough:

"Magister A. was in fact born and confirmed in geographical Christendom and belonged to it ... so he was a Christian (as we all of us are Christians), he was a candidate in theology ... so he was a Christian (as we all of us are Christians); he became a Christian priest and then for the first time he had a curious experience: owing to a deep impression upon his life he came more seriously into contact with the decision ... to become a Christian. Just then when he had come nearer to being a Christian than ever before during all the time he was a Christian, just then he was deposed. And his deposition was quite proper, for then for the first time the State Church had an opportunity to become aware how it stood with his Christianity. But the epigram remains nevertheless that as a pagan he became a Christian priest, and that when he had undeniably come somewhat nearer to being a Christian he was deposed". 30

Both Hohlenberg and Lowrie quote this passage as a pointer to major themes in the final polemic, 31 and phrases like "geographical Christendom" and "we are all Christians" evoke an immediate response in the minds of those familiar with The Instant. As we see, Kierkegaard does not blame the State Church for acting as it did against Adler; indeed, it acted quite correctly in his view and Mynster comes in for a good deal of praise during the course of this book. This is in accordance with Kierkegaard's desire to be a defence for the State Church and its Primate in so far as this was possible. But Kierkegaard's pointing to a certain irony in the Church's behaviour in this case indicated that his defence will always be of a conditional nature, qualified by the degree of honesty to which the Establishment can aspire. 32 He will at the same time be restrained from openly attacking the Church by his scruples over whether he has the necessary authority to act so decisively. This is the most important aspect of Kierkegaard's involvement with the Adler
case and it is to this that we now turn.

The problem of how the individual man is related to man in society was occupying Kierkegaard from the earliest days of his work as an author. In Judge William's essay entitled "Equilibrium" it is made clear that, although the individual's objective is to be himself "this aim is nevertheless another, for the self which is the aim is not an abstract self which fits everywhere, and hence nowhere, but a concrete self which stands in reciprocal relations with these surroundings, these conditions of life, this natural order. This self which is the aim is not merely a personal self but a social, a civic self". There has been some argument, especially between Lindström and Bohlin, on the place allotted to "the exceptional man" in Kierkegaard's thinking at this point. Bohlin contends that Kierkegaard develops a wholly negative attitude towards community life on the basis of Judge William's allowance of exceptions to this idea of man in concreto. With Lindström we would argue that Bohlin is, to say the least, guilty of exaggerated interpretation at this point. But yet it is true that in Either-Or Kierkegaard "contemplated the possibility that the faulty exception to the universal human might eventually become exceptional in a good sense". In opposition to Bohlin, it must be maintained that Kierkegaard's struggling with the exceptional man/common man dichotomy bore fruit, not in the debate about the viability of a Christian community, but in the debate about the authority and status of the extraordinary man as a purveyor of Christian truth. It was Adler who provided this debate with a concentrated point of reference.

The nature of Adler's importance is made clear by Kierkegaard at the very start of his book:

"It was in the year 1843 that Magister Adler published his Sermons, in the preface to which he announced with the utmost solemnity that he had experienced a revelation, that by this a new doctrine was communicated to him, and in the sermons themselves he distinguished (and thereby made everything definitely clear) between the discourses which were by him and those which were by the direct assistance of the Spirit ... At that time, strange as it may seem now, afterwards, he was a teacher in the State-Church, he had, if one will so say, happily and well become a priest, only then occurred the event which must put him in the position of the special individual extraordinem by having a new point of departure from God".
So the revelation set Adler apart as a special, extraordinary individual. However, Adler desired still to remain as a priest in the State-Church. This prompted Kierkegaard to delve more deeply into the existential consequences of being the bearer of direct revelations from Christ. He concludes that "To wish to be in the service of the Establishment, and then to wish to perform a service, which aims precisely at the life of the Establishment, is just as unreasonable as if one were to wish to be in the service of a man, and yet to admit openly that his labour and zeal were to serve this man's enemy". 37

The conclusion to be drawn is that the receipt of divine revelation automatically presages exclusion from the generality of mankind and detachment from the established institutions. With such a revelation something new is brought into the world. Any new development automatically strikes at the very principles of the Establishment and so there can be no question of the extraordinary man identifying himself with the Establishment or the Establishment identifying itself with him. Such a situation spells conflict, 38 and an essential characteristic of the extraordinary man will be his willingness to endure suffering and self-sacrifice.

Now, Kierkegaard does not have to look far for an example of the "ordinary individual" - Bishop Mynster is seen to represent this class admirably. 39 Kierkegaard writes a most eloquent panegyric about Mynster which is unsparing in its praise of his "lofty calm ... sober discretion of seriousness ... noble turn of expression ... (standing) unshaken as a foundation pillar". The old and well known teachings found him "a spring so fresh and so refreshing, an expression so noble, so beautiful and so rich that during a long life he profoundly moved many and after his death he will continue to move many". He is one of these who finds pleasure in "expressing the universal and ... marching together in the ranks and teaching the rest of us to mark time". Yet "Bishop Mynster is indeed no great man ... he has invented nothing". It is this latter fact which distinguishes Mynster from the extraordinary man. The special individual, by the novelty of his revelation, threatens
the very pillars supporting the Establishment and so must stand outside of the Establishment.

But could Kierkegaard himself claim to be such an extraordinary man? In fact he makes no such claim for himself, but it is possible, as Geismar has shown, that the qualification ascribed to the extraordinary man is appropriate to Kierkegaard's own position. It is maintained in The Book on Adler that:

"The truly extraordinary man must have the presupposition of his age constantly at his service, in a highly eminent degree he must have at his disposition that which is the conspicuous mark of our age: reflection and intelligence ... though a revelation is a paradoxical immediacy, yet if it should happen to anyone in our age, it must also be recognisable in him by the serviceable reflection with which he accepts it. His reflection must not overwhelm the extraordinary man, but he must have reflection to introduce it into the age". 40

Geismar points out that Kierkegaard's aesthetic output gave clear evidence of his faithfulness to the reflection of his age. 41 Indeed, he published Crisis in the Life of an Actress to re-establish what he feared might be his waning aesthetic reputation. 42 The extraordinary man has also to secure himself against becoming identified with the prevailing revolutionary movements, for:

"... the 'man of movement' has nothing eternal, and therefore nothing firm, so as a consequence thereof he has not the courage to become the recognisable individual who wills something and will take risks for it". But the extraordinary man, far from seeking congratulation as the head of the Movement, stands alone

"forsaken, pointed out in the pillory of the special individual ... recognisable by the fact that he was executed - certainly it is a matter of course that after this he cannot very well go about with congratulations - but neither can he be mistaken for another". 43

These words must have been written when the events of the Corsair incident were vivid in Kierkegaard's mind, and surely Geismar is right to view them as testimony to the writer's own act of disassociation from the revolutionary vogue.

Furthermore, it is the duty of the extraordinary man to make sacrifices and to make himself repulsive, "so that no-one would wish to be like him or to be as he is". This he would do out of love for the Establishment and
the ordinary man, this would be his "sacrifice offered to the universal". Adler could have made himself repulsive by resigning his office on the pretext that the whole thing of being a priest was only a fleeting fancy, all the while ensuring that this interpretation of his action was taken as the true one:

"Thereupon he might perhaps have furnished a poetical account wherein he would have described a demon who knew the lack of religiousness and of Christianity in our age, who was sent by the devil to show what Christianity was and to scorn it, he who in his heart was not merely a pagan but a hystiphopteles. He became a priest and attained the triumph of scorn over men. Thereupon he resigned his office. All the better sort in the established order would be disgusted with such a repulsive thing, and it is precisely the better sort who should be protected against harm." 44

Such a devious way of inspiring revulsion against oneself is starkly reminiscent of Kierkegaard's own behaviour towards Regina and the act of self-sacrifice he made in giving her up. In the same way as he suggested Adler should resign his office i.e. as if giving up something which he considered to be of only passing interest, so Kierkegaard had "flippantly" cast Regina aside in true blackguardly fashion. Then subsequently the reviled blackguard steps forward to heap scorn upon the contemporary religious situation and to praise the institution of marriage. The parallel between Adler as the potential extraordinary man and Kierkegaard himself seems again to justify Geismar's contention that the first chapter of the Book on Adler is a disguised affirmation of his own claim to be a special individual. 45

Thus we may conclude that Kierkegaard's enquiry into "the case of Adler" effectively assured him of his own status as den Extraordinaire. Of course he never ceased to debate the issues involved, and the extraordinary or exceptional man is the subject of many, many entries in the Journals right up until the end.

Yet even before Adler came on the scene Kierkegaard had analysed the concept of "the exception" to the point of making some significant differentiations. Thus in Repetition Constantine Constantius offers a description of the poetic exception as one who thinks the universal with serious passion. But yet such a poet represents only a transition "to the more properly
aristocratic exceptions, namely, the religious exceptions". This can be supplemented by the rather more picturesque comparison in Postscript:

"...When Juliet sinks in impotence because she has lost Romeo, when her immediacy has breathed its last, and she has lost Romeo so that even Romeo could no longer comfort her, because the possession itself would only be a sad daily reminder; and when the last friend, all unhappy lovers' last friend, the poet, is silent -- then the religious orator will dare to break this silence. But perhaps for the purpose of presenting a little assortment of excellent consolations? Then indeed would the insulted Juliet turn to the poet, and the latter would, by assigning with victorious aesthetic authority his reverence a place in the low comic parts of the tragedy, defend that which in all eternity rightly belongs to the poet: the lovable, the despairing Juliet. No, the religious orator will dare to proclaim new suffering, still more fearful, and this will cause Juliet to rise again". 47

Here the respective authority of the poetic and religious spheres is defined, and these kinds of authority correspond to the poetic and religious exceptions as described by Constantine. It is left to Johannes de Silentio to provide a more precise analysis of the religious exception. So, as Balantschuk puts it:

"Replication culminates in a poetic exception who wants to serve the universal; in Fear and Trembling, the exception is in a religious category. As one who serves, the poetic exception is in continuous touch with the universal; the religious exception on the other hand is set outside the universal, and through his absolute isolation the individual breaks away from primary dependence on the race and becomes the single individual (den Enkelte)". 48

Having thus already defined the categories of poetic and religious exceptions, Kierkegaard was well equipped to penetrate further into the problem of whether he was the exception as genius (poet) or the exception as Apostle (the religious exception) in the light of Adler's claims. The result of his enquiries was a masterly treatise entitled "On the difference between a genius and an Apostle" which, although part of the unpublished Book on Adler, was in fact published separately as one of the Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises of 1849. 49 With every justification Hohlenberg can say of this book that "there is nothing like it in the world's literature". 50

Within the context of the Book on Adler this exposition serves to make the point that, because of the qualitative difference between the two positions, Adler cannot claim to be the recipient of a revelation, in apostolic fashion, from Christ, and then subsequently to content himself with the role of a genius.
Either he has always been merely a genius, in which case the initial claims to have been called by a revelation is false; or else he did receive such a revelation, in which case his ensuing behaviour gives evidence only of a remarkably confused state of mind. Yet outside of this immediate context, Kierkegaard's analysis of the difference between a genius and an apostle has a much broader area of application including, not least, Kierkegaard himself. Whilst his careful investigations have succeeded in showing the spurious nature of Adler's claims, both the requirement felt by the present age for the advent of an extraordinary man and the possibility of Kierkegaard himself being called to such a role have become much more clearly defined.

But Kierkegaard must avoid Adler's confusion and become clear as to precisely where his own extraordinariness lies and how this might be made manifest. Is he a genius or an Apostle? First of all the terms must be defined.

Kierkegaard relates the problem to the contemporary situation as follows:

"What, exactly, have the errors of exegesis and philosophy done in order to confuse Christianity, and how have they confused Christianity? Quite briefly and categorically, they have simply forced back the sphere of paradox-religion into the sphere of aesthetics, and, in consequence, have succeeded in bringing Christian terminology to such a pass that terms which, as long as they remain within their sphere, are qualitative categories, can be put to almost any use as clever expressions. If the sphere of paradox-religion is abolished, or explained away in aesthetics, an Apostle becomes neither more nor less than a genius, and then - good night Christianity! Esprit and the Spirit, revelation and originality, a call from God and genius, all end by meaning more or less the same thing". 51

However, as Kierkegaard then goes on to explain, "A genius and an Apostle are qualitatively different, they are definitions which each belong in their own spheres; the sphere of immanence, and the sphere of transcendence. 52 Apostles are called whilst poets can be born, the essential difference between them being centred around the concept of divine authority. Unlike the genius

"An Apostle can never come to himself in such a way that he becomes conscious of his apostolic calling as a factor in the development of his life. Apostolic calling is a paradoxical factor, which from first to last in his life stands paradoxically outside his personal identity with himself as the definite person he is". 53

Then again:
"Genius is appreciated purely aesthetically, according to the measure of its content, and its specific weight; an Apostle is what he is through having divine authority. Divine authority is qualitatively, the decisive factor." 54

This sentence contains the essence of Kierkegaard's argument in the treatise, and it is to the expansion of this point that he now turns at some length. There can be no question of the man called by a revelation, and to whom a doctrine is entrusted, appealing to his own cleverness in order to establish the authenticity of his authority. For St. Paul, if he entered into a purely aesthetic or philosophical discussion of the doctrine entrusted to him, would be nothing more than a fool. All he can say is that he makes his hearers and readers:

"... eternally responsible for your relation to this doctrine, by having proclaimed it as revealed to me, and consequently proclaimed it with divine authority."

"Authority is the decisive quality." 55

Such authority as God gives a man through the entrusting of him to a divine revelation cannot be proved or characterised by physical certainty. To ask for such physical proof is tantamount to making a fool of God. Authority cannot be acquired - even through the process of coming to understand the doctrine perfectly. For

"Authority is a specific quality which, coming from elsewhere, becomes qualitatively apparent when the content of the message or of the action is posited as indifferent". 56

In this way Kierkegaard establishes the qualitative distinction between the word-with-authority and the word-without-authority. 57 In the former case it is the authority rather than the word which is decisive. Even though Christ might speak the very same words as Plato, his teaching is to be unconditionally accepted simply on account of his authority as the Absolute Paradox. Plato's teaching, on the other hand, is subject to the usual aesthetic evaluations before it may come to be accepted. It is to this paradoxicality that all authority is ultimately traced:

"Between God and man ..., there is and remains an eternal, essential, qualitative difference. The paradox-religious relationship (which, quite rightly, cannot be thought but only believed) appears when God appoints a particular man to divine authority, in relation, be it carefully noted, to that which God has entrusted to him. The man thus
called is no longer related as man to man qua man; his relationship to other men is not that of a qualitative difference (such as genius, exceptional gifts, position, etc.), he is related paradoxically by having a specific quality which no immanence can resolve in the equality of eternity". 58

This statement leads Kierkegaard conveniently on to his third and final sub-heading: "Genius has only an immanent teleology; the Apostle is absolutely, paradoxically, teleologically placed". 59 The substance of this brief section is contained in its final sentence:

"No genius has an in order that; the Apostle has absolutely and paradoxically, an in order that".

Having thus analysed the respective roles of the genius and the Apostle, Kierkegaard was in a better position to understand where he was placed. He concludes that, whilst he is entitled to call himself extraordinary, he manifests this as a genius or poet rather than as an Apostle. This conclusion entails two important consequences for his future life and work.

1) Because, as we saw earlier, Kierkegaard's thinking on the concept of apostolic authority is closely linked to his views on ordination and priesthood, his rejection of any personal claims to Apostleship meant that his ambitions in the direction of a pastoral vocation must ultimately be thwarted. Gregor Malantschuk's compact study of the conflict in Kierkegaard's development between the urge towards poetic expression and a post as a village pastor has been published as part of the introduction to Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter.60 Here Malantschuk tends to emphasise Kierkegaard's "widening vision of the poet and his task" as a factor militating against his becoming ordained, rather than any development in his views on the priest's authority. However, Hohlenberg is left in no doubt that

"Through this recognition (of himself as den extraordinaire) Kierkegaard has finally an answer to the question about the possibility of his accepting a call to the priesthood. Even if economic reasons still persisted to arise, the matter was nevertheless now decided. If he is den extraordinaire, then every official post is eo ipso impossible". 61

In fact, Malantschuk's emphasis needs to be supplemented by Hohlenberg's view of the question. Certainly the idea of taking a country parish had
been with Kierkegaard since the publication of *Either-Or* whilst the concept of poetic authority is familiar on account of several references in the pseudonyms. Kierkegaard's unilateral development of this latter concept was obviously a strong influence drawing him away from the pastoral ministry. Yet so too was the greater clarification he achieved by relating the issues of the Adler case to the whole problem of ordination and the authority thus endowed. As he progressed in his enquiries as to the nature of religious authority, the attainment of such authority receded farther and farther from his grasp. The Apostle's authority was of the same paradoxical-dialectical type as that exercised by Christ himself. It was derived from a direct revelation which spanned the 1,800 years and drew upon Christ as the Absolute Paradox for its validity. Kierkegaard could lay claim to no such revelation of new doctrine, thus he was "without authority" - a poet. By a further process of derivation, the Priest by ordination also preaches with the paradoxical authority of the Apostles of Christ and so of God Himself - such an authoritative position Kierkegaard also had to decline.

Now the question is raised whether Kierkegaard really recognised such an authority as characteristic of the ordained preacher. An answer to this question has already been provided with the help of a quotation from Per Lønning. Basically Lowrie is right when he says that Kierkegaard did not expressly deal with the question, "where is the seat of authority in religion?" but he wrestled long and earnestly with a still more personal question, "What religious authority as a teacher do I, Søren Kierkegaard, possess?" Lowrie goes on to suggest that "It is significant that he did not seek to settle this question by having himself ordained". Just how this is significant is a difficult problem to resolve. Does it signify Kierkegaard's awareness of his own lack of worthiness? Or is it related to his increasing awareness of how corrupt the clergy had become in general? Probably both these motives played their part. But of most importance was his renewed commitment to the role of genius with poetic authority following the elimination of authority by revelation or ordination as a quality to which he might lay
claim. He felt called to be the extraordinary man the age demanded, thus in one sense going beyond the priest as an officer of the State Church (Kohlenberg). But at the same time he was more than ever aware of the possibilities inherent in the role of poetic genius and so was content to remain short of claiming divine authority as conferred on the Apostle and priest (Walantschuk).

2) So Kierkegaard became convinced of his role as a poet "without authority". Whilst the task of introducing Christianity into heathendom devolved upon the Apostle, because the task involved the dissemination of new doctrine amongst a community hitherto unacquainted with such doctrine; it was for the extraordinary man to introduce Christianity into Christendom. This latter task does not involve the dissemination of new teaching nor such Apostolic ploys as the recruitment of disciples.\(^65\) In Christendom the doctrine is already well enough known. In this situation the basic need is for a movement in the direction of inwardness, with a parallel movement away from Christianity as objectively determined. A protest must be made against the way in which the authorities have emptied Christianity of its passion and subjectivity. But could this situation be corrected by appeal to a counter authority? So long as hope still remains that Christendom is, at least potentially, a vehicle of Christian truth, then the answer to this question must be in the negative. By making the admission, the leaders of the established Church might yet revert to an even keel, and the evocation of this admission will come about, not by a direct assault, but poetically through the activity of one who is "without authority".

Although he was not confident of his call to be a direct assailant or "witness to the truth", Kierkegaard did feel able to cast himself in this role of the exception as poet. But be it noted that this was not merely a continuation of his poetical career prior to 1846. Then the poet as aesthete was dominant, now his duty lies in the religious sphere. The pseudonymous authorship had been "put under arrest by the religious" and Kierkegaard had looked upon his submission to ordination as a means of showing
"that (he) had been a religious man and that the pseudonyms were something foreign to (him)". 66 Now his plan was to continue as a writer, but essentially a religious writer or, more precisely, a religious poet.

Kierkegaard was emphatic that he was "an unauthorised poet who moves people by means of the ideals". 67 He was "unauthorised" because he was not an Apostle, neither was he a priest, nor was he the recipient of a direct revelation. He "moved people" insofar as he laboured for "disquietude in the direction of inward change", 68 thus fulfilling the requirements for introducing Christianity into Christendom. But it was the agency of "the ideals" he derived from remaining simply a poet. In Postscript Kierkegaard writes that

"Reality is for the poet merely an occasion, a point of departure, from which he goes in search of the ideality of the possible. The pathos of the poet is therefore essentially imaginative pathos. An attempt ethically to establish a poetic relationship to reality is therefore a misunderstanding, a backward step". 69

It is on this basis that Kierkegaard pursues his later authorship as a spokesman for Christian ideality. As a poet, he has not necessarily to exist in the categories about which he writes, yet he still carries a lesson, albeit "without authority" which Christendom would do well to heed. There can be no question of a man initiating Church reform before he has tackled the question of whether his existence accords with the demands of the New Testament. However, such a yearning for reform was only too prevalent in Kierkegaard's day and it was under the slogan "I am only a poet" that he set out to present Christianity in all its ideality. 70

The indulgence which is granted the poet when he expounds ideal standards, to which his own existence does not correspond, prompts Kierkegaard to emphasise the need for him to admit such deviance. Having described the sacrifice which is expected of "the single man" who is obedient to God's commands, Kierkegaard states categorically: "I admit that I am not such a man, I am only a poet". 71 Similarly the task of the poet is to promote honesty by confronting Christians, or so-called Christians, with the ideals of their faith. This is brought out especially strongly in Judge for Yourselves:
"I am only an unauthoritative poet, who at the most contends for the admission of our weakness ... 72.

"Yet if now the situation is thus with a Christian world, Christian states etc., is it not then true that we have the very greatest need to become sober? And is it not then the mildest possible thing (yet what wonder it is so mild since it is I that propose it, I who am the weak unauthoritative poet) -- is it not the mildest possible thing when there is no question of anything but the admission of anything?"

Superficially Kierkegaard is open to the charge that he is a hypocrite in company with, and for the same reasons as the priests he condemns. At the centre of Kierkegaard's polemic against the clergy is the charge that their lives do not correspond with their preaching. But does not Kierkegaard admit that he too is guilty in this way when he describes himself as a poet who presents ideals with which his existence does not accord? Indeed this is the case, but the emphasis must be on the word "admit". In The Instant Kierkegaard establishes the relationship between the poet and the priest:

"Christianity is renunciation of this world. This is the theme of the professor's lecture, and then he makes lecturing his career, without so much as admitting that this after all is not Christianity. If it is Christianity, where then is the renunciation of this world? No, this is not Christianity, it is a poet's relation to Christianity -- The priest preaches, he 'witnesses' (No, I thank you kindly!), that Christianity is renunciation, and then makes preaching his remunerative profession; he does not so much as admit to himself that this is not Christianity. But where is the renunciation? Is not this then also a poet-relationship?

"But the poet plays the hypocrite with men -- and the priest is a poet, as we have seen. So then the official worship is to play hypocrite -- and to attain this great blessing the state naturally does not hesitate to spend money.

"If hypocrisy is to be checked, the mildest form in which this can come about is for the 'priest' to make the admission that this after all is not Christianity -- otherwise we have hypocrisy.

So both the poet and the priest "play the hypocrite", but the important difference between them is that the poet can pursue his non-existentially reduplicated presentation of Christian ideality so long as he denies any claim to divine authority. But the priest contradicts himself and his office if he claims to be "without authority". Whilst not being an Apostle, the priest is of a kind with the Apostle in his paradoxical relationship to the generality of men. Through ordination he has an authority which can only be disowned through a word or act of hypocrisy. If the priest says he is
without authority then he is a hypocrite. But he is no less of a hypocrite when his authoritative preaching finds no parallel in his existence. Unlike the poet, the priest cannot deny his authority; he can only act as if what he preaches does not apply to him. This is the greatest hypocrisy to which the only antidote is the admission.

Now we note that Kierkegaard describes the admission as "the mildest form" in which hypocrisy can be checked, and this corresponds to the passage in J u d g e f o r Y o u r s e l v e s where the call for an admission is described as "the mildest possible thing". This concern for mildness is also connected with his denial of personal authority. As a poet he was only authorised to present the ideals in an imaginative way. Whilst he might lament the absence of a "Thou shalt" in contemporary Christianity, still he was not the one to enunciate such an authoritative injunction. His task was to present the ideals as possibility, without passing direct judgement and without issuing any commands other than the significant "judge for yourselves". The introduction of the pseudonym Anti-Climacus was designed precisely to underline his distance from any judgemental role. In theory he could have published Training i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and S i c k n e s s u n t o D e a t h in his own name, resting content with a specific and clear disavowal of divine authority - as he had done with the edifying discourses of earlier years. But because Anti-Climacus screwed up the Christian demand so much higher than Kierkegaard had reached himself, the added precaution of a pseudonym became necessary. Nobody must get the idea that Kierkegaard was asking for more than the admission. As we saw earlier, central to Kierkegaard’s strategy was the maintenance of an option for him to be a defence for the established Church once the admission was made. Presumably such support would have been given in his own name and so if such a strategy was to retain its credibility he could not put his name to a direct attack on the establishment. By the continued use of a pseudonym and by repeated claims to be "without authority" the authorship thus proceeded from the pen of a poet who emphasised the existential consequences of calling oneself a Christian, but with no objective
Beyond the evocation of an admission such as he offered on his own behalf.

In 1855 Kierkegaard described his poetic role as follows:

I began by giving myself out to be a poet aiming slyly at what I thought might well be the real situation of official Christianity, that the difference between a freethinker and official Christianity is that the freethinker is an honest man who bluntly teaches that Christianity is poetry, Dichtung, whereas official Christianity is a forger who solemnly protests that Christianity is something quite different, and by this means conceals the fact that for its part it does actually turn Christianity into poetry, doing away with the following of Christ, so that only through the power of imagination is one related to the Pattern whilst living for one's own part in entirely different categories, which means to be related poetically to Christianity or to transform it into poetry which is no more morally binding than poetry essentially is; and at last one casts the Pattern away entirely and lets what it is to be a man, mediocrity, count pretty nearly as the ideal.

"Under the name of a poet I then drew out a number of ideals, brought forth that to which - yes, to which 1,000 royal functionaries are bound by an oath. And these good men noticed nothing whatever, they felt perfectly secure, to such a degree was everything spiritlessness (i.e. stupidity) and worldliness; these good men had no presentiment that anything was hidden behind the poet - that the line of action was that of a detective's shrewdness in order to make the person concerned feel secure, a method the police use precisely for the sake of having a chance to get a profounder insight.

"Then some time elapsed. I even stood in very good terms with these perjured men - and quite quietly I managed to introduce the ideals, and at the same time got acquainted with the men with whom I had to deal". 77

As it stands this is a good summary of Kierkegaard's plan of campaign up to the point when he began to speak out most decisively against the established Church and its "1,000 royal functionaries". He goes on to describe how, following the outcry which met his article against Bishop Martensen about Wynster, "this poet suddenly transforms himself" and produced the New Testament as evidence against the priests. In other words, he now spoke out without reserve - the "poet" was changed into the militant protagonist on behalf of New Testament Christianity over against the prevailing "Wynsterish" deceit. This analysis of Kierkegaard's strategy is important for the point of view of this chapter because it links the unauthoritative poet with the policy of restraint. We have seen how Kierkegaard's claim to be "without authority" is linked to the call for an admission, and now we see that, in common with this call the role of unauthoritative poet determined Kierkegaard to defer the attack as long as possible. His authorship had met with little
attention or understanding so a direct attack was inevitable, but in the meantime Kierkegaard carried out his task as the poet, "without authority".

However, the summary account in The Instant says nothing about two important aspects of Kierkegaard's enquiry into the nature of authority in general and his own authority in particular. On the one hand there was his increased interest in the true character and credentials of the witness to the truth, and on the other there was his wrestling with the question of whether he could claim such status for himself. Before concluding this chapter, something must be said with respect to both these issues.

As Carl Jørgensen has pointed out, there is an ambiguity in the assignation "witness to the truth" which came to a head especially when Martensen used the term to describe Kynster. Whilst Martensen defended his usage on the grounds that Kynster had been a consistent defender of orthodox teaching, Kierkegaard had not used the term otherwise than to describe one who existentially reduplicated his teaching. Because the teaching in question is Christianity, then such existential reduplication must mean suffering or even martyrdom. As Jørgensen says: "in Christian Discourses from '48, in Two minor ethico-religious treatises, in Training in Christianity, in Two discourses at the Communion on Fridays and in For Self-Examination where he has written about the 'witness to the truth', Kierkegaard's use of the term remains constant". 79

Basically the martyr, or witness to the truth, has the function of making people aware. In 1847 Kierkegaard wrote:

"I wish to make men aware of their own ruin. And if they will not listen to good, then I will compel them through evil. Understand me, or at least do not misunderstand me. I do not mean that I am going to strike them (alas, one cannot strike the masses); I mean to make them strike me. And in that way I all the same compel them through evil. For if they once strike me they will be made aware; and if they put me to death - then they will certainly become aware of their position and I shall have won an absolute victory". 80

A little later these thoughts were crystallised into the famous statement that:

"What the age needs is not a genius - it has had geniuses enough, but a martyr, who in order to teach men to obey would himself be obedient unto death. A man whom men put to death and lose by having done so; for by having put him to death, by being victorious in that way, they would grow afraid of themselves. What the age needs is awakening." 81
What Christendom is to be made especially aware of is the heterogeneity which exists between Christianity and the world. Diem puts the matter this way:

"Witnessing to the truth is the appropriate form of the communication of Christianity because only so can the opposition of Christianity to the world be made clear, only so can the transformation of life wrought by the Gospel be thrown into relief and vital impulsion towards it be given". 82

This analysis can be supported by a quotation from Judge for Yourselves:

"People say that Christianity is a "doctrine" and they go on to recount that 'this doctrine has transformed the face of the earth'. Oh, what fools we are ... or how cunning! No, never has any doctrine ... transformed the face of the world, that is just as impossible as to make a kite rise by means of that which pulls it down, the weight attached to it; never has any doctrine, thus served, ever been able to stir up a little persecution, which surely is absolutely necessary if there is to be any question of transforming the world. But that is a thing the person concerned takes good care to avoid. No, but Christianity was served by witnesses for the truth, who, instead of having profit from the doctrine, and every sort of profit (and here is the decisive point which made this doctrine something else than a doctrine), made sacrifices for the doctrine and sacrificed everything; it was served by witnesses for the truth, who did not live on the doctrine, along with a family, but lived and died for the doctrine. Thereby Christianity became a power, the power which mastered and transformed the world". 83

Here we see plainly enough that it is his preparedness to make sacrifices for the sake of the doctrine which sets the witness for the truth apart in Christendom.

It must not be felt that the act of sacrifice, even if it is to the point of martyrdom, is in itself a validation of the doctrine taught by the witness. The doctrine is important in its own right and ultimately only derives its truth from its origin in God Himself. However, the "personal enforcement" of the proclamation still determines what is truly to be called Christian:

"My thesis is not that what is thus proclaimed in official Christianity ought not to be regarded as Christian. No, my thesis is that proclamation in itself is not Christianity. What I am concerned about is the "how", the personal enforcement of the proclamation: without that Christianity is not Christianity". 84

Elsewhere the link is firmly established between this "proclaiming" and the character of the witness:
"What is a witness? A witness is a man who immediately supplies proof of the truth of the doctrine he is proclaiming - immediately, well, partly by there being truth in him and blessedness, partly by at once offering himself and saying: see now whether you can compel me to deny this doctrine. As a result of that fight, where the witness perhaps succumbs physically - dies - the doctrine triumphs". 85

Whilst Christendom may indeed teach and preach true doctrine, the necessity of transforming one's whole existence in accordance with such teaching has been ignored. In the earliest Christian centuries the witnesses to the truth accumulated what Kierkegaard calls "an immense capital investment" through their self-sacrifices. Then:

"Worldly shrewdness hit upon the idea of turning the life of these witnesses, their sufferings, their blood, of turning it into money, or into honour and prestige". 86

The witnesses had established the heterogeneity between Christianity and the world by being prepared to sacrifice themselves for the doctrine. But notwithstanding the power thus gained, the Church "sold out" to the State and the infinite qualitative difference was replaced by an accommodating alliance which allowed the officials of Christendom to feed off the blood of the martyrs. Over the course of the centuries things have only deteriorated and Christendom has become stronger and even better established. The church needs more than ever to be emancipated from the State and "the emancipation must come about through martyrdom". 87

Kierkegaard wrestled long and hard with the problem raised by the martyr or blood-witness. Once again the Adler case stimulated him to further investigations. He was prompted to ask: "Has a man the right to let himself be put to death for the truth?" 88 He concluded that when the relationship was between heathen and heathen the answer must be "no" because in their case we cannot assume that any one of them may raise the claim to be in possession of absolute truth, and thus the distinction between them is only relative. Kierkegaard does not shrink from condemning Socrates for not preventing his enemies from becoming guilty of killing him. 89 However, when the relation is between Christian and heathen the answer is "yes" because the Christian, through communion with Christ, is rooted absolutely
in the truth. But the important relation from Kierkegaard's point of view is that between Christian and Christian. In such a situation there might well be a case for the Christian allowing himself to be mocked or jeered at: "this much relatively to them he may come to the truth: so far he may be above them in his knowledge of the truth. This may also serve to arouse their awareness". But before the Christian can allow himself to be put to death, it must be established that the so-called Christians are in fact so unspiritual as to be actually heathen. In such a case, the relation is the same as between Christian and heathen and so the martyrdom is justified. However, it is not permissible to allow oneself to be put to death for the truth when it cannot be altogether denied that the professing Christians are in fact Christians.

Now, who can possibly pass such a judgement upon the professing Christian? "If anyone dared do so, would he not have to know the human heart as only omniscience knows it?" In other words, only a man who is qualified in an extraordinary way can treat Christendom as heathendom, and to be such an extraordinary man can only be the consequence of a divine call. "Who then, has really been called?" asks Thust, and he furnishes his own answer:

"Only he who has attained true insight about an absolutely important matter, when all others are immersed in error. How does someone recognise that he has this true insight? Undoubtedly, by the fact that he alone discovers and knows how to eliminate a profound misconception which has come to dominate his whole environment".

The important point here is that this man "knows how to eliminate" the prevailing misconception of Christianity. There will be those who recognise that such a misconception exists but he knows how to tackle the problem. Furthermore, he is competent to put this knowledge into effect and is willing to sacrifice even his own life to this end. Thus Kierkegaard comes to terms with the special vocations of the Apostle, the witness and the martyr. These men are endowed with that paradoxical-dialectical authority which allows them to look into the souls of their contemporaries and to pass judgement upon their claim to be Christians. When they perceive that
Christian inferiority has been sacrificed upon the pagan altar of objective proofs and worldly values then their special calling also gives them the right to let themselves be put to death for the truth. In such a way the opposition of Christianity to the world is made clear, and the transforming power of Christianity in men's lives is decisively reasserted. This is the function of "those blessed ones", the Witnesses to the Truth.

This brings us on to the question of Kierkegaard's own position vis à vis the martyr. He is in no doubt as to his acquaintance with true Christianity and the errors of Christendom:

"I do maintain that I know with uncommon clarity and definiteness what Christianity is, what can be required of the Christian, what it means to be Christian. To an unusual degree I have, I believe, the qualifications to portray this. I also believe it is my duty to do it, simply because it seems to have been forgotten in Christendom, and obviously there is no probability that the present generation is capable of educating in Christianity". 92

This quotation comes from Armed Neutrality which is subtitled "by position as a Christian Author in Christendom" and effectively relates the issues raised by the Adler case to himself and his own mission. He begins the article by disclaiming any intention to present himself as a Christian to an extraordinary degree. He simply wants "to get clarified what is involved in being a Christian, to present a picture of a Christian in all its ideality". In so far as this picture casts a judgement upon anyone, such judgement will fall first and foremost upon himself. 93 As he says later: "It is not up to me, a man, to judge others, particularly not in the role of one who knows mens hearts, which here would have to be the case". 94

With this qualification in mind, Kierkegaard proceeds to describe the confusions prevalent in Christendom. Christianity has not been abolished, but it has been reduced to a doctrine and the vital element of existing as a Christian has been lost. Christendom is something established, when it can only really be a battling piety allowing for no relaxation, Christianity is essentially dialectical and yet "with the help of the scientific-scholarly abrogation of the dialectical element, this has been completely forgotten". Christianity belongs to the medium of existence and ethics, but it has been
shifted to the sphere of intellect, metaphysics and imagination. In short, "being a Christian has been abolished". 95

Having thus presented the case against Christendom, Kierkegaard reiterates his claim to be in no way identical with the ideal Christian, or a judge of his contemporaries. He is a poet, and only as a poet presenting the ideal picture is he out in front of the others. 96 This leads him on to a further denial of being a Christian in an extraordinary way; he says that he would not dare to expose himself to becoming a martyr - and he adds the significant rider: "particularly not in Christendom". In other words, he does not meet the condition necessary for allowing himself to be put to death for the truth when the relation is one between Christian and Christian. He does not have that essential "god like" insight into men's hearts in order to be able to judge their Christianity. He can only present what he knows to be true, ideal Christianity and humble himself beneath this ideal. Consequently he adopts a plan of campaign known as "armed neutrality":

"If I were involved with pagans, I could not be neutral, then in opposition to them I should have to say that I am a Christian. But I am living in Christendom among Christians or among men who all claim to be Christians. It is not up to me, a man, to judge others, particularly not in the role of one who knows men's hearts, which here would have to be the case. Now if I were to insist that I am Christian, what would this mean in the situation? It would mean that I am Christian in contrast to Christians - that is, that I am a Christian raised to the second power, the outstanding Christian. This is why I maintain neutrality in regard to my being Christian. On the other hand, this cannot possibly mean a denial of Christianity, for I am living in Christendom and am Christian just as are all the others. Moreover I declare forthrightly that I am Christian in the sense that others are but not in contrast to them. This way I keep neutral, but in contrast to being a Christian raised to the second power. And so I work at portraying the Christian ideal. In order to do it I must have this neutrality. How should I dare be so shameless as to occasion in the remotest manner the odious notion that I am talking about myself, or how should I in all modesty be capable of saying anything at all if I did not in every way avoid the obscene, the odious notion that I am talking about myself". 97

In the terms of such a plan, Kierkegaard inevitably falls short of martyrdom although the "wages" he will receive for portraying the ideal picture of Christianity "will be analogous to the honorarium the true Christian gets in the world, but only in a somewhat mitigated form, not in the form of suffering because I am Christian but only (in the mitigated form of suffering)
in my capacity as poet, philosopher etc." There can be no question of his calling himself a witness to the truth. He has not been the recipient of divine revelation or a call to martyrdom. He is simply a genius. The lack of such a qualification is hindrance enough, but Kierkegaard also adds:

"... even if there was no other hindrance, I have possessed wealth. Alas, that is enough to prevent me from calling myself a witness to the truth; it is a favour which relegates me to a lower class". In addition there was Kierkegaard's struggle with "the thorn in the flesh" which Geismar calls "the most profound reason why he could not be the coming martyr-prophet". The nature of the conflict which ensued in Kierkegaard's mind as a result of this malaise is best summed up by Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death:

"... like the poet's description of love, so this poet's description of the religious possesses an enchantment, a lyrical flight, such as no married man's description has, nor that of his Reverence. What he says is not untrue, by no means, his representation reflects his happier, his better ego. With respect to the religious he is an unhappy lover, that is, he is not in a strict sense a believer, he has only the first prerequisite of faith, and with that an ardent longing for the religious. His collision is essentially this: is he the elect, is the thorn in the flesh the expression for the fact that he is to be employed as the extraordinary, is it before God quite as it should be with respect to the extraordinary figure he has become? or is the thorn in the flesh the experience he must humble himself under in order to attain the universal human?"

To quote Lowrie, it need not be remarked "how intensely personal this whole paragraph is" even though it is attributed to a pseudonym. Having developed a precise image of the witness to the truth, in terms of suffering and public abuse, Kierkegaard could not help but look at the exigencies of his own life as potentially indicative of a divine call to martyrdom. But on the other hand that hidden sin which had prompted the "thorn in the flesh" also set a question mark against his worthiness to be a witness to the truth. Now, we notice that Kierkegaard's opinion with regard to the significance of "the thorn" for his future mission is marked by greater uncertainty than was typical of the claims in Armed Neutrality. There he disclaimed all pretensions to the title of witness for the truth and categorically affirmed his status as a poet "without authority". But the above
quotation from The Sickness unto Death lends rather more in the direction of uncertainty as to his right to remain only a poet relative to the martyr and witness. And this indecision is a rather more accurate reflection of Kierkegaard's actual search for clarity about his role as a Christian missionary in Christendom. Geismar describes the conflict in Kierkegaard's mind between the poet and the martyr as follows:

"... as Kierkegaard wrote of the figure, the coming martyr-prophet, he became himself convinced that this was beyond him: a man did not have permission to go so far. However, this figure held an irresistible attraction for him, as strong as the flames attraction for moths. He wanted the hero's suffering but not his honour. On the other hand, through his self-portrait in The Sickness unto Death he discovered his lower limit: he is not permitted to be a poet; for every poet-existence involved the sin of describing (at distance) instead of being. But what shall he do who has burned his fingers on the image of the coming martyr-prophet such as he is depicted in the beginning and the conclusion of the minor treatise? That is the difficulty which Kierkegaard, in the interests of his own education, must resolve in the times ahead. He is thrown from the one boundary to the other because he is permitted to be neither the martyr-prophet nor the poet".106

Whilst not wishing to accept all the conclusions which Geismar draws from this situation,107 basically he accurately represents the case. The long drawn-out debates in the Journals about the propriety of publishing the direct explanatory works relating to his authorship, and the strained silence in the years after For Self-Examination, before the outbreak of the "Attack", are both traceable to Kierkegaard's inner conflict as to how far he ought to, and yet dare not go in passing direct judgement upon the Establishment.108 So, whilst never deviating from his role in the years before the "Attack" as a Poet who "without authority" exists as a "corrective to the prevailing state of affairs",109 the martyr image did continue to attract him and he could not help looking at his own sufferings in the light of this image. But still two things stood in the way of his taking martyrdom upon himself. He was without a direct revelation, and he lived in Christendom where only such a divinely called witness could presume to die for the truth.

However, Kierkegaard was always alert to ways of meeting these conditions. Thus Dupré notices Kierkegaard's alternative sort of witness who, though different from the direct witness, is yet a witness on account of having
"been through the process of becoming one". In other words, as Dupré puts it:

"the Socratic teacher who becomes a witness has not had his mission from the beginning, but rather has searched so profoundly within himself for the truth that, at a certain moment, 'God overpowers him', and as a necessary consequence of his striving for the truth he is compelled to bear witness openly." 111

This is authority by evolution rather than revelation, and it accorded well with Kierkegaard's notion of the authorship as the vehicle of his own education in Christianity. 112 Because he had no wish to join Christendom in softening the demands of Christian ideality and the achievements of "the blessed martyrs" Kierkegaard refrained from appealing to this qualified concept of witness in order to justify a direct judgement of his contemporaries. Nevertheless the idea was there and testifies to the persistent tension between his poet-existence and his aspirations in the direction of Martyrdom.

Then Dupré deals with Kierkegaard's reservations about attacking his fellow Christians directly. He reminds us that these reservations were founded on the presupposition that Christendom was really made up of Christians. "Now" says Dupré, "it dawned on him that this was not so, and that the truth he had defended was not a relative, but an absolute one: the truth of Christianity against non-Christians". 113 This view is based on that entry, so dear to Lindström's heart, in which Kierkegaard confesses to a new realisation that "the accepted way of preaching in Christendom leaves out something very essential, the imitation, mortification, conversion... etc." with the result that "we who are in Christendom are not Christians, in which case one must stress being known". 114 Whilst he himself continued to lay emphasis on those features of Christian preaching he felt to be lacking in Christendom, this realisation still did not incite him to an immediate direct attack in the style of an assault upon heathendom. However, his thinking along these lines lends further support to the view that Kierkegaard rested far from content with his role as poet.

Whilst some scholars have been prepared to describe Kierkegaard as a martyr, such an attribution cannot be made strictly in accordance with
Kierkegaard's own terms. At the most he can be described as a "martyr at length", his untimely death as a result of the pressures ensuing from the "attack" can be called a sort of martyrdom. However, it seems that Kierkegaard never really succeeded in resolving the question of his own right to martyrdom. Lynster's death, together with Hartensen's subsequent careless use of the designation "witness to the truth" provided Kierkegaard with the occasion to present his case more forcibly. But still he was only able to condemn Christendom in so far as Christendom condemned itself. He could never claim the authority peculiar to a divine revelation and so he had to wait upon "a false move" from Christendom's side. However, he did become less restrained in his defence of the establishment's right to be called Christian. Not until the very end did Kierkegaard give up all hope of extracting an admission from the priests, and so setting himself up as the Church's defender. To the end he clung on to his hope for the interiorisation of Christendom, and he continued to claim only the status of a poet who presents the Christian ideal as possibility for the edification of Christians in Christendom.

So Kierkegaard's scrupulous attention to the question of his own authority was one of the factors preventing him from seeking directly to redress the misunderstanding which characterised the general reaction to his authorship. Certainly the age required awakening and this could only come about by a renewed awareness of Christianity as subjectivity. He knew that he was an extraordinary man and that he was called to play his part in this augmenting of "awareness in the direction of inwardness". He also knew that the martyr could exercise great power in such a cause - a preparedness for suffering and self-sacrifice was the only thing which could help to validate the credentials of one labouring in this cause. Yet his own struggle with the issues of the Adler case resulted in the moulding of a martyr image to which he knew himself incapable of conforming. He was simply a poet without authority, who must continue to respect the Christian claims of his contemporaries in Christendom despite the mounting arsenal of
weapons he was stockpiling against them. Despite the suffering inflicted upon him as "laughing's martyr" he must continue to tread with circumspection in the absence of a divine commission to venture out any further. The martyr had the authority to offer judgment and condemnation. As an unauthoritative poet, Kierkegaard could not usurp the right of Christendom to condemn itself. For such a self condemnation Kierkegaard waited, and when it came he acted without restraint.
NOTES

1. Pap. X 3 A 389


3. Training in Christianity p. 7


5. Either-Or Vol. II p. 328

6. Concept of Dread p. 49

7. ibid. p. 134 note

8. Stages p. 231

9. ibid. p. 314

10. ibid. p. 317

11. ibid. p. 314 note 116


13. Concluding Unscientific Postscript p. 69

14. ibid. p. 348

15. ibid. p. 430

16. ibid. p. 555 note

17. ibid. p. 388


22. See Hans Brochner's account of a visit by Adler to Kierkegaard soon after the appearance of Several Sermons in Glimpses and Impressions of Kierkegaard. T. H. Croxall p. 19


We must beware of the temptation to directly trace the polemics of the last years back to the Adler case. Michael Neiendam implies such an explicit link when he contends that the State Church's response to Adler reflected sufficiently badly upon the establishment as to have been a direct provocation of the final polemics. (See A. P. Adler in Dansk Biografisk Leksikon Vol. I 1933, p. 122). The irony of the situation was not lost on Kierkegaard, but basically he had more important things to learn from the Adler phenomenon.

32. Litter-Or II, p. 267
33. See below: Kierkegaard's Perspective on the Church
34. Lowrie: Søren Kierkegaard, p. 382
35. On Authority and Revelation, p. 19
36. Ibid., p. 21. Earlier Kierkegaard substitutes the phrase "self-contradictory" for "unreasonable"
37. See Repetition, (Harper Torch Books) p. 133: "On the one side stands the exception, on the other the universal, and the strife itself is a strange conflict between the wrath and impatience of the universal at the hubbub the exception causes, and its amatory predilection for the exception."
38. On Authority and Revelation, p. 36 ff.
39. On Authority and Revelation, p. 46 - 7
40. Geismar: Søren Kierkegaard IV, p. 19, 20
41. See Point of View, p. 14
42. On Authority and Revelation, p. 44
43. On Authority and Revelation, p. 51 - 55
46. Postscript, p. 394 - 5. Cf. The Concept of Dread, p. 49 with its reference to "psychological-poetic authority"
47. G. Malantschuk: Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 264
The Present Age: Translated by Dru. Fontana 1962, p. 103 (Lowrie p. 103 f.) (Quotations from *On the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle* will all come from this edition by Dru whilst the brackets will contain page references to Lowrie's translation in *On Authority and Revelation*).

Dru: p. 105 (Lowrie p. 105). (Kierkegaard's emphasis)
Dru: p. 107 (Lowrie p. 107)
Dru: p. 108 (Lowrie p. 108). (Kierkegaard's emphasis)
Dru: pp. 109 - 10 (Lowrie p. 108)
Dru: pp. 112 - 3 (Lowrie p. 110)
Dupré: *op. cit.* p. 186
Dru: pp. 115 - 6 (Lowrie p. 112)
Dru: p. 124 (Lowrie p. 118)

Trans. by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong. Indiana 1968


See Pap. VIII 1 A 419, 422

Lowrie: *Søren Kierkegaard* p. 275

N.B. his worry over past guilt. See for example Geismar: *Søren Kierkegaard* Vol. IV, p. 29

Pap. X 5 A 121

*Point of View* p. 86 f.

*For Self-Examination* p. 46

*loc. cit.*

*Postscript* p. 347. Cf. pp. 349, 353. See Pap. X 4 A 32 where the poet is described as one "who holds possibility open"

Pap. X 4 A 33

Pap. X 4 A 104

*Judge for Yourselves* p. 147

ibid. p. 155

*Attack* pp. 201 - 2

See Pap. X 1 A 182: "On each of the later works there is, on the title page:

*Poetic*, in order to show that I do not proclaim myself to be an exceptional Christian, or to be what I describe.
without Authority, in order to denote that I do not lay others under any obligation, or judge them.

A spiritual revival, in order to show that I have nothing to do with outward changes, or that kind of reformation."

76. Pap. X 1 A 517, 530, 557; X 2 A 184
77. Attack pps. 117 - 8
80. Pap. VIII 1 A 23
81. Pap. VIII 1 A 418. By emphasis. Cf. Point of View pps. 34 ff.; 90 Pap. IX B 63: "(The martyr has) the power to compel ... others through his suffering ... translating the masses into individuals". See also Pap. X 1 A 16
82. H. Diem: Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence. Oliver and Boyd 1959, p. 144
83. Judge for Yourselves p. 144
84. Pap. X 2 A 452. See Diem: op. cit. p. 145. See also X 5 A 28
85. Pap. X 3 A 5. See also X 5 A 35
86. Judge for Yourselves p. 144
87. Pap. X 4 A 22
88. Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises originally published under the pseudonym H.H. in May 1843. See The Present Age and Two Ethico-Religious Treatises. Trans. by Dru and Lowrie. London 1940
89. The Present Age (1940 ed.) p. 118
90. op. cit. p. 119
92. Armed Neutrality p. 42
93. ibid. p. 33. Cf. Pap. X 1 A 56, 74
94. ibid. p. 43
95. ibid., pps. 34 - 5
96. ibid. p. 37
97. ibid. p. 43
98. ibid. p. 44
99. Pap. X 1 A 328 p. 218
100. Pap. IX B 64 p. 379. Cf. Point of View p. 131

101. Geismar: Søren Kierkegaard Vol. IV p. 52

102. The Sickness unto Death p. 209. See Geismar: op. cit. IV pps. 52 - 62

103. Sickness. Translator's Notes p. 275

104. See Pap. X 5 A 89 pps. 104 - 5

105. See Pap. X 1 A 74, 97 where Armed Neutrality is described as enunciating Kierkegaard's denials of Apostleship and authority "as precisely as possible".

106. Geismar: op. cit. IV p. 63. See Pap. X 1 A 94 where Kierkegaard describes the possibilities open to him in terms of treading forth in character as the Extraordinary, pursuing a poet - existence and seeking a pastoral appointment.

107. For example, Geismar suggests that Kierkegaard came to forget the origins of his witness image in the Adler case - i.e. in the context of debate about the Apostle and the exception, and thus projected this image as the criterion in accordance with which even the commonest men are to be judged (ibid. IV p. 65 and 65 ff.). Against this view it may be pointed out that when Kierkegaard did finally come out and speak directly against the state Church in his own name, he did so with the New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ in his hand. It was not against the witness as described in his earlier works that the priests were to be judged (Kierkegaard was only too well aware that this depiction was of ideality) but it was as oath-takers upon the New Testament that they stood condemned - and no man, however lowly or exalted, escapes the penetrating judgement of the Gospel (See Attack p. 118). However, there is the offer of Grace consequent upon the appropriate admission (See Pap. X 5 A 96).

108. See Pap. X 5 A 104 p. 119 where Kierkegaard expresses concern whether in eternity he will regret having done too little. See also X 1 A 56, 74

109. Pap. X 1 A 640. As late as 1954 he insists on disclaiming "authority" (Pap. XI 2 A 250)

110. Pap. IX A 221. Dupré: op. cit. p. 207


112. See Pap. X 5 A 89 p. 105: "Without having an immediate relationship to God I have felt obliged to take upon myself sufferings which correspond to having an immediate relationship to God"

113. Dupré: op. cit. p. 211

114. Pap. X 4 A 558

115. Dupré: op. cit. p. 212

There are three principal reasons for including a chapter on Kierkegaard's perspective on the Church. First of all, and most obviously, the Church as an established institution comes under close critical scrutiny in the "Attack" of the last years. It is therefore most useful to examine the progress of Kierkegaard's ecclesiology in the preceding authorship. Secondly, the discussion of authority in the last chapter begs certain questions regarding Kierkegaard's views on the Church in which he was to consider accepting the post of pastor. Thirdly, the tracing of such a theme through the authorship should help us to test the argument of our first chapter where the primacy of subjectivity in Kierkegaard's message and the significance of his mode of communication was postulated and described. To what extent is Kierkegaard's treatment of the concept Church related to, and qualified by his emphasis on the subjective nature of Christian truth and the appropriation process deemed necessary to this emphasis? If it is the case that the message "Subjectivity is Truth" received full and complete treatment via a via ethics and aesthetics in the authorship up to and including Postscript how does this reflect upon Kierkegaard's treatment of such an obvious objective institution like the Church, and how does this correspond with the severely critical assault of 1854 - 5?

So, in relation to these problems and as background to the negative thrusts of the final years we shall in this chapter attempt to trace the role of the Church in Kierkegaard's authorship and Journals up to Postscript. That is, the period when Kierkegaard was most concerned to deal with the mechanics of becoming a Christian. Thus we shall be better equipped to appreciate the ecclesiology of that last period when his principle concern was the introduction of Christianity into Christendom. It seems appropriate that we should begin with an insight into Kierkegaard's own estimate of how the Church has figured in his work. So it was that, in 1851, Kierkegaard reacted strongly against an article by A. G. Rudelbach and it was in the
course of this controversy that Kierkegaard looked back over his authorship and disowned Rudelbach's assumptions regarding his ecclesiological position, and thereby sought to make his own position clear.

It was in January 1851 that Dr. Rudelbach published Om det borderlige aegteskab in which it was suggested that Kierkegaard is to be identified with the view that "... the deepest and highest interest of the Church in our day is ... to become emancipated particularly from what is rightly called habitual and legally established Christianity". 2 Kierkegaard quickly issued a reply containing the following disavowal:

"I am supposed to have taken a position against 'legally established Christianity' or 'state Christianity'. Yes, then Søren Kierkegaard's whole intention is supposed to be to attack established Christianity - more specifically, to fight for the emancipation of the Church from state, or at least, 'to inculcate, to impress, to drive this home'.

"In Ursin's Arithmetic, which was used in my school days, a reward was offered to anyone who could find a miscalculation in the book. I also promise a reward to anyone who can point out in these numerous books a single proposal for external change, or the slightest suggestion of such a proposal, or even anything which in the remotest way even for the most nearsighted person at the greatest distance could resemble an intimation of such a proposal or of a belief that the problem is lodged in externalities, that external change is what is needed, that external change is what will hold us". 3

Kierkegaard goes on to maintain that, so diligently has he worked for the inward deepening of Christianity in himself and in others, he has been indeed over-scrupulous in seeing that "not a passage, not a sentence, not a line, not a word, not a letter has slipped in about a proposal for external change or suggesting a belief that the problem is lodged in externalities ..." Even by Kierkegaard's standards, this denial is strongly worded - and clearly he felt very strongly about this issue. Rudelbach's article appeared just three months after the publication of Training in Christianity and it was most likely this work that was in the forefront of his mind in making such reference to Kierkegaard as he does. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard assumes that he has the whole of the authorship in mind (indeed he even chides Rudelbach for "packing together under one heading: Søren Kierkegaard" both the pseudonymous and edifying works). 4 So Kierkegaard is claiming that in no part of his authorship is there to be found trace of any interest in changing externals. Does this mean that Kierkegaard's
drive towards "the inward deepening of Christianity" has no consequences whatsoever for the structures of the Church? Apparently this is the case as Kierkegaard sees it, for in a footnote he urges that Rudelbach should not stress the word "Church" in respect of his activity "lest it be forgotten that I have been concerned only with 'the single individual'". In other words, Kierkegaard is maintaining that his published works have been devoid of implication for the Church - both in terms of its nature and its structures. Is this in fact borne out by the facts? What sort of reference is made to the concepts Church and congregation (mennighed) in the pseudonymous and edifying literature? On examination of this literature one is led to the conclusion that, on the whole, the point Kierkegaard makes is a valid one. Generally speaking when reference is made to the Church or the congregation it is never with the object of prescribing an external reform of some kind. On the contrary, the existence of the Church with its structural forms, services and sacraments is taken for granted. Furthermore, one must also sympathise with Kierkegaard's charge to Rudelbach that the concept "Church" should not be stressed when making generalised statements about his authorship. Truly den Enkelte is the obvious prime concern of this literature and references to ChristianGemenskap are not sufficient enough to detract from the centrality of this concern. However, criticisms of the Church and the clergy do creep into the text at various points, and these act as faint warnings of the impending storm. Also, the way in which the concepts "Church" and "congregation" are handled in these early works adumbrate the main area of Kierkegaard's concern with regard to the Church and its function. For example, the numerous references to the relationship of the preacher to his congregation give early notice of the passionate interest in the authority, character and behaviour of the preacher which was to be at least partly responsible for the later polemics against Lynster and those whom he typified. Likewise, in Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard asserts that "... the idea of the Church is not qualitatively different from that of the state in so far as the individual comes into
it by a simple mediation". Here is an obvious foretaste of how Kierkegaard's attitude to Church and State would develop in later years.

We shall now attempt to classify the references to Church and congregation in the authorship up to and including Postscript. In order to keep the discussion within reasonable proportions we are forced to leap from den Enkelte to Kirken or Jenicheden without stopping to trace the landmarks en route. These landmarks are those manifestations of non-individualism such as friendship and marriage. Valter Lindström and Per Wændal have dealt at some length with these forms of inter-personal relationship as part of Kierkegaard's total view of gemenskap, of which his idea of the Church is another part. Both of these scholars make it clear that the occurrence and development of Kierkegaard's views on organised religious gemenskap, in the form of Church and congregation, are homogeneous with his views on friendship and marriage. We, too, shall proceed on the assumption that, in so far as Kierkegaard's concern to press the claims of den Enkelte still allows him to recognise and comment upon the validity of communal forms of existence, then the more particular and intimate of these forms (friendship, marriage) have their place alongside his thoughts on the Church and its congregation.

Now we shall deal with the negative intimations of discontent with the basic role of the Church in Christendom, and the assumptions which surround them. It will be helpful to classify these negative points under two sections. The first is to include treatment of those references in the early authorship which point to the ever present danger of the Church coming between the individual and his relationship to God - this relationship being ultimately unique and decisive. The second section deals with those negative expressions concerning the Church which are related to Grundtvig's ideas and Kierkegaard's opinion of them. However, we shall begin with the positive comments on Church and congregation, and here also classification under two headings will be appropriate. First of all there are those points made with respect to the Church and marriage, whilst under the second heading we shall deal with Kierkegaard's views on the Church as a proper medium for authoritative preaching.
The Church and marriage

In the essay "The aesthetic validity of marriage" Judge William outlines the aesthete's problem with regard to the Church wedding service. The aesthetic bridegroom is seen to be resentful about the fact that his love is to be submitted to a third party. Various questions arise. "What sort of a power is this which dares to intrude between me and my bride, the bride who I myself have chosen and who has chosen me? And this power would command her to be faithful to me. Does she need to be commanded? And would she be true to me only because a third party, which then she would love more than me, commanded it? And it bids me be faithful to her. Do I need any such bidding?" (p. 53). Furthermore, the bridegroom is appalled that the Church should presume to call his bride a sinner. The Judge sees that it is the prospect of losing the full aesthetic interest of first love, which is causing concern here. He assures the young man that, by submitting his love to a third power in coming to Church, none of the sensuous quality of this love is lost. Rather, it gains a new dimension - spirituality. This not wishing to have his wedding solemnised in Church is a result of the young man's objection to witnesses of his love. "... when you think that you would like to swear by the clouds and the stars, but it puts you out that you have to swear by God, it is evident that you are caught in reflection. For the fact is your love must have no witnesses ... your love puts on such airs that not even God in heaven may know anything about it ... This need, then, of letting your love become transfigured in a higher sphere you do not feel ... (p. 57)."

From these remarks it is clear that Judge William sees the aesthete's shunning of the Church service as an attempt to turn away from God. So, conversely, the Church is seen as a direct instrument of God's activity and presence. Implicit in the words put into Judge William's mouth by Kierkegaard is a high doctrine of the Church, i.e. actions performed and vows taken within the rites of the Church are deemed to be actions performed and vows taken in the sight of God himself. Yet it would be wrong to attribute such a view to Judge William, or, through him, to Kierkegaard simply on the basis of these
remarks alone. The most that can be said is that the author clearly takes
the Church's role in marriage absolutely for granted. But when this same
author is to be found some years later directing strong words of criticism
at the Church then his acceptance of the prevailing situation at this early
stage is significant. 13

Further on in Either-Or (Vol. II pps. 100 - 105) Judge William defends
the role of the congregation at a wedding service in reply to the young man's
misgivings on this score. Whilst the latter is in favour of a quiet wedding,
on the grounds that the presence of a large gathering tends a) to lay too
much emphasis on the Church service alone as validating the marriage (i.e.
rather than the love of one partner for the other) and b) to provide further
material for idle gossip. Judge William defends the sentiment behind the
prayer book phrase "before God and this congregation" as well as asserting
the social and religious value of a congregational presence. He says: "The
great thing, as I regard it, is to live in the congregation, to bring something
finer out of it, if one is able; at all events to subordinate oneself to it
and put up with it if one is unable to better it". (p. 103). Not that he is
wanting to condone religious gossip for: "When I adhere to the congregation.
I do not identify it with a 'highly esteemed public' which, to use an
expression of Goethe's 'is shameless enough to believe that everything one
undertakes to do is done only to supply matter for conversation". However,
it is clear that the value of a congregational context for the outworking
of matters of great personal concern is rated very high. In the essay
"Equilibrium" it is made clear that an individual's sense of isolation
from the congregation in his God relationship may not be entirely without
value - indeed, so long as it is only a momentary withdrawal, it may have
the effect of increasing the inwardness of the earthly relationship. "But
what may be wholesome as a transient factor becomes a very serious sickness
when it is one-sidedly developed". 14 Here again, in this attack on the
isolation characteristic of mysticism, the ultimate value attaching to
membership of a congregation is strongly maintained. 15
So, we may discern in these passages in *Either-Or* dealing chiefly with
the Church's status and value in the solemnisation of matrimony two points
relevant to this chapter. i) The objective authority of the Church as an
instrument of God's will in such matters as marriage, is taken for granted.ii) The existence of a visible, worshipping community as a valid and desirable
ecclesiological feature is explicitly affirmed.

2. **The Church in its preaching and worship**

Kierkegaard was a life-long Church-goer - at least until the final weeks
of his life. Certain significant events of his life took place whilst at
Church (e.g. the celebrated "nod" from Regine) whilst attention to Wystter's
sermons was part of his staple devotional diet. Furthermore, he himself preached
the occasional sermon in Church and wrote many more which, although not actually
delivered were conceived with a Church context in mind. Although he strongly
recommends the private reading of sermons aloud to oneself - a discipline to
which he conscientiously submitted - yet listening to sermons never ceased
to be an important feature of Church life for Kierkegaard. With this
biographical data in mind we might expect Kierkegaard's authorship - an
avowedly thoroughly religious authorship - to draw considerably upon the
experiences of a life steeped in Church teaching and practice. In the early
years, however, frequent references to Church going or goings-on in Church do
not appear - thus underlining the point, that the authorship has an integrity
of its own and must be evaluated with this always in mind. It is significant
that references to Church services which are more than merely passing
references in the early aesthetic authorship are centred upon the marriage
ceremony. It is in this ceremony that the values of the aesthetically erotic,
ethical and religious spheres of existence impinge directly upon one another.
However, brief references to other aspects of Church practice do appear from
time to time and to these we now turn.

The nature and presuppositions of the sermon were of great interest to
Kierkegaard, and the most frequent sort of references to the Church and
congregation in his writings prior to *Postscript* are those to do with the
preacher and his hearers. Sometimes these references are fairly incidental, arising from discussion about very different subjects, whilst elsewhere the whole question of the preacher's relationship to his congregation and his subject matter is made into a priority concern. One of the earliest examples of the latter kind of reference is to be found in 

*Fear and Trembling* (1843). Here Johannes de Silentio castigates the preacher for failing to realise the full existential consequences of what he preaches. It is necessary that what is preached on Sunday should characterise the Monday lives of preacher and hearer alike. But the corollary is also true, and is implied in this passage, i.e. that one's existence on Monday should reflect the lesson of the Sunday sermon. The young man who reduplicated in existence what was preached to him at the Sunday service is the sympathetic figure in this narrative. In this sense attending Church and listening to the sermon are seen to be determinative of how one lives out life as a Christian. The main point being made in this passage is that the sermon must bear fruit in existence. But the correlative point is also implied - that existence should be a reduplication of authoritative Christian preaching. The reason this point is only implicitly made is clear. That the sermon preached week by week in the Churches is a normative instrument of training in Christianity is taken for granted by the author, it is a presupposition which he has no need to explain. Similar observations may be made in respect of a passage in 

*Stages on Life's Way* (1845). Here Frater Taciturnus provides a corrective to the prevailing notion that the sermon is an instrument employed by the preacher to bring salvation to his people whilst he himself is left out of account. On reading this passage one is left in no doubt as to the high value placed upon the religious oration by the author. Here again, although the main point being made is that the orator must always ensure that, even if nobody else gives any heed to him, he will himself seek for strength and edification in the words of his address, it is also clear that the value of the sermon to both preacher and hearer alike is beyond question.

In 1844 Vigilius Haufniensis also made it clear that the sermon is a
precious art and must be rescued from the contempt felt for it by the "scientific self-importance" of our age. Preaching is the most difficult of all arts", he writes, "and essentially it is the art which Socrates extols: the art of being able to converse. From this of course it does not follow that there must be someone in the congregation to make answer, or that it might be a help to have someone regularly introduced to speak ... Appropriation is precisely the secret of conversation". As in Stages, so also here, a corrective is being proposed - but the fundamental value of the sermon is taken for granted.

"Sin does not properly belong in any science. It is the theme with which the sermon deals, where the individual talks as an individual to the individual" (p. 14). When we recall the central position given to the concept of sin in Kierkegaard's theology, then the high value being placed upon the sermon in the above quotation is beyond question.

A passing reference in Stages to the sermon confirms us in our impression of the value placed by the pseudonyms upon the preacher and his task. In the context of a discussion about the beauty of mother love an incident is narrated which took place during a Church service. It concerns a young mother who took her child with her to Church. "Yesterday I related to my wife a little happening which attracted my attention to such a high degree that it made me an inattentive and distracted hearer of the sermon, which usually I am not". The narrator goes on to describe the wonderful ability of the mother to attend to her child whilst at the same time taking full account of the preacher and his message. No attempt is made here to extol the merits of the preacher. Rather, it is simply a beautifully descriptive anecdote which accepts the value and importance of the Church sermon as given. Certainly in this very passage it is made clear that some people evidently treat Church going as a mere formality, but behind such criticism the spiritual value of ecclesiastical worship is never in doubt.

Neither is the congregational context of the sermon challenged in these early works. Although Kierkegaard made a habit of reading Lynster's sermons, this did not obviate the need for him to attend Church regularly and listen
as one of the congregation. So, in the pseudonyms the current practices of congregational worship and piety are accepted and drawn upon where appropriate. Where the preacher is accused of flamboyancy or the congregation of lethargy no condemnation of the exercise itself is involved. Rather, the criticism is prompted by the author's adherence to the ideality of Church worship. Going to Church is seen by Kierkegaard to be accepted by youth un tarnished by the scepticism and precaution of maturity. In the edifying discourse "Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth" Kierkegaard writes: "(The youth) understands immediately that a God exists, for to the young, God's house lies next door to his father's yard, and it seems quite natural to him to be there. But when one becomes older, then the way to Church is often very long; when the wind is severe in winter, then it is so cold in the Church; when the birds sing in the woods in the summer time, the Church does not lie in the direction he is going". In a Journal entry dated some five years after this discourse, Kierkegaard is concerned to make the point that "your own home should become a house of God". Now, although this entry insists that "Surely this place is God's house" there is a marked shift of emphasis from the discourse in 1844 when to underline the special sanctity of the Church building as God's house was Kierkegaard's main concern.

It is clear then that for Kierkegaard, as he expressed himself in the writings up to Postscript, the institution of the Church as a centre for worship and religious oration was something to be not only taken for granted but positively endorsed. He is never sparing in his criticism of those who pervert the ideals of God's Church, but the basic giveness of this Church and its practice is never in doubt. Furthermore, especially in the edifying discourses, the concept of a congregation or community of believers as expounded by Peter and Paul is accepted without question.

When we turn to the rather more negative references to the Church in these early years, one very important Kierkegaardian theme immediately claims our attention. In 1847 Kierkegaard wrote:
"I marked the beginning of the literary production over my own name by the category of 'the individual' and that remained as a stereotyped formula, showing that this thing of the individual is not a later invention of mine but my first thought. With the category of 'the individual' is bound up any ethical importance I may have. If that category was right, if that category was in place, if I saw rightly at this point and understood rightly that it was my task (certainly not a pleasant nor a thankful one) to call attention to it, if that was the task given me to do ... in that case I stood fast and my works with me". 32

Thus is stated the decisive importance of 'the individual' as a category in Kierkegaard's thought. 33 The corollary of this emphasis is Kierkegaard's persistent attack on numerical categories such as the masses, the public, the majority. 34 Now, a body of literature which decisively emphasises the individual at the expense of "the many" would be expected to reflect a consequent negativity towards the communalism of the Church. The question to be tackled is whether, in fact, Kierkegaard's assault on "the crowd" and his elevation of den indløste necessarily constitutes a denial of the Church as a visible company of believers.

There has been no shortage of people prepared to defend this position. The two most significant of these being Hartensen in 1854 and Torsten Bohlin some eighty years later.

In an article in Berlingske Tidende dated 28th December, 1854, 35 Hartensen asserts that Kierkegaard's Christianity "is without Church and without history ... (he) only looks for Christ in the 'desert',... (his) Christianity is in no way whatsoever the community's (samfunds) faith, but purely and simply a private religion: a Christianity in which the Christian Church and the Holy Spirit's work in the Church is excluded, along with much else which is 'of the most decisively Christian'". This display of indignation by Hartensen reflects his view of the Church as defined in Christian Dogmatics and Christian Ethics. On account of the latter work especially, Croxall is right in his stress on the polarity of Hartensen's and Kierkegaard's thinking at this point. "Hartensen puts the Church before the individual", says Croxall, "Kierkegaard does the opposite". 36 Yet this last statement needs some qualification as will become clear from the subsequent discussion. Linåström writes: "Thus did Hartensen give expression to an understanding which was
by no means unique to himself and which posterity has allowed to become the generally accepted meaning - though certainly not completely without protest. 37  
Among the earliest of such protests is that of Rasmus Nielsen in The Fatherland just two weeks after Hartensen's article appeared: "It has been said of Kierkegaard that he was without any notion of the Church (ukirkeliir) and that his endeavour has the nature of a one-sided private affair. Also against this understanding can I as a Lutheran Protestant not but protest. The Kierkegaardian endeavour, as I understand it, is to a great extent a kirkeliir endeavour". 38  
So the scene was set before Kierkegaard himself died, for a debate which has continued unabated for 100 years. The issues come most sharply to a head with Lindström and Bohlin. Whilst Hartensen and Nielsen wrote in the strained atmosphere created by Kierkegaard's attack, and without the benefit of his letters and papers, Lindström and Bohlin have been able to make a long and intensive study of his thought with a much more extensive corpus of material at their disposal. However, in respect of our immediate concern, which is to establish the consequences of Kierkegaard's emphasis on den Enkelte for his ecclesiology, Hartensen's and Bohlin's conclusions are effectively the same.  
As early as 1918 Bohlin asserted that the Christian ethical ideal preached by Kierkegaard points to "a religious personal independence, which in relation to other men really signifies the absolute isolation of the individual". 39 Later Bohlin writes: "In Kierkegaard the personal element in religion is constantly confused with the individualistic and it is this fateful confusion which in the ethical sphere leads inexorably to abstraction from everything in the nature of community life, society and Church". 40 However, Bohlin's most significant contribution on this theme came in 1944 with the publication of Kierkegaards Tro och andra Kierkegaardstudier. 41 In his preface (p. 5) Bohlin expresses his anxiety to set his views over against other interpretations of Kierkegaard which differ from his own. Here he has Lindström especially in mind, and the essays entitled Breaches in
Kierkegaard's Religious thought and Kierkegaard and community life (gemenskapslivet) have a direct relevance to Lindström's book Staernas teologi and the article Kierkegaard's Individualism.

The burden of Bohlin's case is that Kierkegaard's emphasis on the individual to the exclusion of the Church is a direct consequence of a slow but radical transformation in his ethical views. The first full expression of Kierkegaard's ethical views, according to Bohlin, is to be found in Either-Or Pt. II. In these treatises "the mystery of the ethical life is to be at one and the same time an individual life and also what Kierkegaard calls the 'general' (allmanna) man, i.e. a man who stands in a positive relationship to the given reality, a social and civic (borgarlig) self". The true self is the concrete self equipped with certain individual qualities and placed in a particular environment, a particular community. "The aim of his striving the individual has in himself, but this self he does not understand in the abstraction of isolation but only in full concreteness; to that concreteness belong the factors through which the individual stands in a relation of interaction to the world and the people around him. The self which is the aim of his striving is thus a social and civic self, just as much as it is a purely personal self". This is Kierkegaard's most positive position with regard to community life; from this point on the only movement is in the direction of a more intense emphasis on den Enkelte. This emphasis is founded upon a loophole left by Judge William. He is aware that there are those exceptional people who will be unable to fully realise the generality of social and civic life. Thus Bohlin remarks:

"Either-Or's exceptional man ... represents in reality a tendency which in the course of the subsequent development becomes all the more decisively presented as a special ethical theme beside the ethical life style of the stages, and which shall gradually force this aside and itself become dominant".

Bohlin traces this development through Fear and Trembling, Repetition and Stages on Life's Way. But the complete and final breach with the ethical stage as presented in Either-Or only comes with Philosophical Fragments and The Concept of Dread. In these works, albeit in different ways, sin comes
to have the effect of emphasising man's powerlessness to fulfil the ethical stage. In relation to the absolute paradox of faith all men are "exceptions" and any talk of relationship to the common lot is now merely theoretical. In practice, no man can relate himself absolutely to the absolute and only relatively to the relative as Postscript demands. Consequently den Anhalte never gets beyond his sense of duty to his own self. He never succeeds in achieving the object of his ethical endeavours and is left only in suffering and isolation. The ultimate movement in Kierkegaard's thought now is inevitable. Henriksen draws together Bohlin's view thus:

"The ethical views Kierkegaard holds in Unscientific Postscript are not essentially altered in the production that follows from A Literary Review up to and including The Moment. On the one hand the polemics against the common human lot, the civic life, are intensified and concluded in The Moment with a condemnation of marriage, the Church, and altogether everything bearing a positive relation to the temporal world. But actually this only means that Kierkegaard had drawn the ultimate conclusions from that conception of Christianity which was developed in Unscientific Postscript. The transition from Assessor Wilhelm's humane ethics in Either-Or to the rigidly ascetic and misanthropic ethics asserted in The Moment is thus due to Kierkegaard's faith, more precisely to his abstract metaphysical concept of God and can be observed in his changing determination of the category of the exception".

On the basis of these presuppositions about the general movement in Kierkegaard's writings, Bohlin's analysis of his ecclesiology is predictable enough. Whereas, for example, Pap. VIII 1 A 4 might be taken at face value and so taken to imply a positive attitude to sociality on Kierkegaard's part, Bohlin lays emphasis on the assertion that Works of Love is merely a presentation of "the other side", i.e. it is a corrective. Bohlin's main concern therefore is to highlight the Journal entries of 1847 whose animosity towards the clergy and the Church is, says Bohlin, surpassed only in "the Attack" itself. Similarly, Kierkegaard's consideration of ordination is seen by Bohlin to reflect upon a general weakness in his character - an inability to carry out in his life the logical implications of his teaching with regard to the Church. In no way are these intentions to be made to support a positive view of the Church on Kierkegaard's part. This highly critical attitude to Kierkegaard's thoughts about ordination are in sharp contrast to the account given, for example, by Gregor Lalantschuk. His view is that Kierkegaard's
pastoral ambitions were ultimately tied up with his whole thinking about Christianity and the manner of Christian communication. Also at more definite points Bohlin's particular bias shows through. So, with regard to *Pan.* X 4 § 246 Bohlin sees Kierkegaard attacking the Augsburg confession with its definition of "the holy community" as found where the Word is preached and the Sacraments performed. On the other hand, Lindström interprets this entry to mean that, in fact, Kierkegaard endorses the view of the Church as found in the Augsburg Confession and Kierkegaard is really only attacking a defective version of that definition. In fact, strong evidence can be adduced from the Journals to support both Bohlin and Lindström at this point, and a categorical decision either way is virtually impossible. However, important pointers to the general position adopted in respect of Kierkegaard's teaching by these two scholars can be gleaned from their respective responses to this single entry.

How are we to regard the views of Bohlin and Martensen? Clearly their conclusions are the same, i.e. that Kierkegaard's writings ultimately lack a viable notion of Church and community. But their respective starting points differ radically. Whilst Martensen bases his conclusion on the pamphlets of the last years, Bohlin builds on a clue given first in *Either-or.* However, both critics are guilty of looking at Kierkegaard's output from altogether too limited a perspective. For his part, Martensen is content to enunciate judgements upon "this prolix literature" based almost entirely upon the final polemics. On the other hand, whilst he does draw upon the whole of Kierkegaard's production, Bohlin wishes to attribute a drastic disunity to it. Given that the ethical strand in Kierkegaard's thought represents an independent, self-contained theme, then Bohlin's procedure may yet be justified. However, such a severing of Kierkegaard's ethical views from his dogmatic opinions can only result in distorted analysis. This objection to Bohlin is at the centre of Lindström's work, and on this point, at least, Lindström's views are endorsed by J. Heywood Thomas, and Paul Sponheim. Nevertheless, Bohlin does have the virtue, against Martensen, of allowing room for a certain positive
attitude on Kierkegaard's part to the communal life if only in the second part of 'Johannes'. Thus far Bohlin's views accord with the conclusion we reached regarding Judge William's acceptance of the Church in various contexts as at least to be taken for granted. It remains to be seen whether this positive attitude gradually disappears in accordance with Bohlin's thesis or whether a higher unity within the authorship enables this attitude to be sustained even in the face of Kierkegaard's most direct polemical outbursts.58

Constance L. Smith, in reliance upon Martin Buber has issued one of the strongest attacks upon Kierkegaard's notion of dem Jinkelte.59 The "main points" of Kierkegaard's doctrine she lists as follows: "solitariness, renunciation of the world and of human beings in order to stand, unbound by any other essential relation, a free man before God; existential realisation of the truth as opposed to a possession of the truth; responsibility and, it is important to add, obedience to God and love for God". (p. 346). The thing is, to stand before God "unbound by any other essential relation". This leads Buber to say that, on Kierkegaard's terms, "Everyone should be chary about having to do with 'the others' and should speak only with God". (Buber p.50, Smith, p. 346). Now, still following Buber, Constance Smith protests that man only achieves this relationship to God which established him as man, "if he stands in an essential relation with other men and other things ... Kierkegaard has fatefuly misunderstood the human love that is between I and Thou as we stand together in the presence of God". (Smith, pps. 317 f.).

Furthermore, Kierkegaard is to be attacked for his treatment of "the Single One" and "the Crowd" as mutually exclusive. This criticism is based on such declarations as "The Crowd in untruth" and "No-one is excluded from becoming a Single One except him who excludes himself by wishing to be Crowd". Whilst acknowledging the need for warning against the crowd, Buber is convinced that in "the body politic" with all its faults, is to be found genuine efforts on man's part to realise a "turning to one another in the context of creation ... Supposing that the crowd is untruth, it is only a state of affairs in the body politic; how truth is here related to untruth
must be part and parcel of the true question to the Single One, and that
warning against the crowd can be only its preface". (Buber, p. 60). Constance
Smith writes: "This turning away from the world, not knowing, not wishing to
know, its essence, conceiving it as malformed and degenerate, gravely inval-
idates Kierkegaard's contention in the Works of Love that we must assume that
love and the lovable already exist in every man and that we are bound by the
duty of loving everybody just as we see them". (Smith, p. 319)

Finally, Constance Smith quotes Buber by way of a summary of her views
on Kierkegaard. She writes: "I submit that 'the Single One is not the man
who has to do with God essentially and only unessentially with others ...
The Single One is the man for whom the reality of relation with God as an
exclusive relation includes and encompasses the possibility of relation with
all otherness, and for whom the whole body politic, the reservoir of otherness,
offers just enough otherness for him to pass his life with it". (Smith, p. 320,
Buber, p. 65)

Here Kierkegaard's elevation of den Enkelte over against the crowd is
seen as total and unequivocal. By the very use of the phrase "the Single
One" as a translation of den Enkelte (der Einzelne) Constance Smith (following
R. Gregor Smith) assumes a sense for the term which denotes unmitigated and
unrelieved isolation. But is this what den Enkelte really signifies? If it
does then every sort of rapprochement with others is excluded. With Bohlin,
it must be concluded that fulfilment of his own self is the individual's sole
concern. The Church, as a community of believers, is of necessity denounced
as a falsehood. Now, certainly, expressions like "The Crowd is Untruth" must
be noted and taken seriously. But are Buber and Constance Smith right to
define den Enkelte so categorically in terms of such negative declarations?
Is den Enkelte merely the opposite of Maenaden, or has it a special quality
derived from its absorption into a fundamental theme pervading and unifying
the whole of Kierkegaard's work? It is with these questions in mind that
we turn from those who find only a negative attitude in Kierkegaard towards
the Church, to those whose interpretation of den Enkelte still leaves room for a positive view of a communal Christian existence.

Bishop Lindström falls most obviously into this category. His position can be simply described. Fundamental to his view is the presupposition that Kierkegaard's authorship represents a coherent unity. Whilst Bohlin wrote two separate books treating Kierkegaard's dogmatic and ethical views, Lindström assumes the constant influence of Kierkegaard's dogmatic view of faith upon the whole of the authorship. Consequently his division of Kierkegaard's work is made on chronological rather than thematic lines. The assumption lying behind the "Theology of the Stages" and "The Theology of Imitation" is that the theology remains the same even though a "sliding" or a shift in emphasis may occur. Henriksen comments: "If Lindström's book (Stadiernas Teologi) ... is compared with ... Bohlin's it will be plainly seen how different Søren Kierkegaard seems from the two opposed standpoints". This judgement is nowhere more apposite than in the issues raised by Kierkegaard's individualism and ecclesiology.

Lindström summarises his views thus:

"The significance of the category den Enkelte for Kierkegaard's view, cannot be rated too highly. He considers that his eventual ethical significance is linked to this category. Den Enkelte is the category through which, religiously regarded, time, history and the generation must pass, he says ... The basic significance of the concept den Enkelte is this, that the individual man stands in an unavoidable relation to God. Den Enkelte always denotes man before God's face; the relationship to God is inextricably linked in thought with the concept itself. It further expresses the fact that every man has absolute significance, that he therefore as God's creature has an eternal and particular destiny ... This is the dignity which from eternity is ascribed to every man and which he can only lose by his own fault, when he buries himself amongst 'the others', in the crowd or the masses. Yet if he seeks to cast aside his dignity (adelskap), the demand always persists, that he SHALL be den Enkelte. And just as little as consciencelessness (samvetsloshet) implies that man can escape God's unavoidable presence, so little can man avoid standing before God as den Enkelte, whether he wants to or not".

Lindström goes on to argue that this emphasis upon den Enkelte was especially vital for the age to which Kierkegaard addressed himself. Hegelianism had resulted in the generation and "the common interest" (det allmanna) being pushed forward at the expense of the individual. So, for
example, questions of immortality and Christology revolved more around man in general rather than the eternal responsibility of each single man before God or the unity of God and a single man. "In each of these cases the distance between God the Creator and creaturely, sinful man is obliterated". Clearly for Kierkegaard den Enkelte is superior to the generation. Man's ultimate ethical responsibility does not lie in his relationship to other men but in his relationship to God. "In this sense den Enkelte can be said to be the absolute. He does not encounter God's will in any generalised norms, but in God's particular purpose for him as his creation". Here Lindström seems to endorse Bohlin's view of den Enkelte in Kierkegaard as denoting man's exclusive concern for his own salvation. The following sentence confirms this impression: "He who lives ethically can therefore be said to have himself as his task and man is solely concerned with the eternal validity of his own, distinctly characteristic individuality as bestowed upon him in creation". However, Lindström specifically rejects the suggestion that Kierkegaard is "a spokesman for an extreme individualism", for this description bypasses an essential facet of den Enkelte as viewed by Kierkegaard. Lindström declares:

"When (Kierkegaard) talks about den Enkelte or man's self as the absolute, he points out that it belongs together with the self's concretion, that it stands in a reciprocal relationship to a definite environment, to life's distinct relationships and a distinctive ordering of things ... Man's self is not only a personal but also a social and civic self. And when Kierkegaard sets the individual against the generation, against the many and the masses, there is no question of his preaching the right of the individual to unilaterally divorce himself from other men".

There is, therefore, the possibility of a viable community life open to the Christian so long as the community does not become a substitute for the individual's awareness of himself as a sinner and his responsibility as one standing alone before God.

Bohlin is quick to notice that the documentation Lindström offers in support of his views comes from precisely the passage in Equilibrium which had figured prominently in Bohlin's own argument. The relevant paragraph runs as follows:
He who has ethically chosen and found himself possesses himself as he is determined in his whole concretion. He has himself, then, as an individual who has these talents, these passions, these inclinations, these habits, who is under these influences, who in this direction is affected thus, in another thus. Here, then, he has himself as a task, in such a sort that the task is principally to order, cultivate, temper, enkindle, repress, in short to bring about a proportionality in the soul, a harmony, which is the fruit of the personal virtues. Here the aim of his activity is himself, but not as arbitrarily determined, for he has himself as a task which is set for him, even though it has become his by the fact that he has chosen it. But even though he himself is in his aim, this aim is nevertheless another, for the self which is the aim is not an abstract self which fits everywhere, and hence nowhere, but a concrete self which stands in reciprocal relations with these surroundings, these conditions of life, this natural order. This self which is the aim is not merely a personal self but a social, a civic self. He has, then, himself as a task for an activity whereby as this definite personality he takes a hand in the affairs of life. Here his task is not to cultivate himself but to exert an influence, and yet at the same time he cultivates himself for, as I remarked earlier, the ethical individual so lives that he is constantly passing from one stage to the other. If the individual has not originally understood himself as a concrete personality in continuity, neither will he acquire this subsequent continuity. If he thinks that the trick is to begin like a Robinson Crusoe, he remains a fanciful adventurer to the end of his days. On the other hand, when he perceives that if he does not begin concretely he will never get to the point of beginning, and that if he does not begin he will not end, then he will be at once in continuity with the past and with the future. From the personal life he translates himself into the civic, and from this into the personal. The personal life as such was an isolation and hence imperfect; in the fact that through the civic life he comes back into his personality, the personal life manifests itself in a higher form. Personality manifests itself as the absolute which has its teleology in itself.

Now, it is Lindström's view that the notion of the individual contained in this passage undergoes no fundamental change and neither does Kierkegaard's idea of the relationship between the individual and community. The most that can be said is that in the later period of Kierkegaard's authorship there is a sharpening of critical judgements against those current trends which militate against the true Christian view of the individual. However, Bohlin, true to form, contends that the individual as depicted in this passage is only representative of, and appropriate to the ethical stage. The respective interpretations by these two writers of the individual as depicted in Fear and Trembling illustrates their relative attitudes. Lindström believes that Johannes de Silentio in effect reiterates Judge William's sentiments as expressed in Equilibrium.
"Even if in *Equilibrium* (Kierkegaard) has not talked about the ethical as paradox, it can nevertheless be observed, that there he has established principally the same point in such a way that any talk about the paradoxicality of ethics would have been just as much in place in this essay as in *Fear and Trembling*. If in *Fear and Trembling* the paradox of faith can be expressed by the formula that *den enkelde* is above the common lot, so in *Equilibrium* it is equally definite that *den enkelde* is the absolute, and that the personal self (personligheten) is the archimedean point from which one can lift the whole world. The formation of all the anthropological categories in *Equilibrium* reinforces precisely this thesis". 70

The common bond between these two works is sealed by the unavoidability of the individual's relationship to God. For Lindström, this unavoidable relationship gives substance to a theme uniting the whole of Kierkegaard's authorship. Thus, for example, he argues that: "Between the presentation of faith in *Fear and Trembling* and the understanding of the ethical as paradox in *Postscript* ... a clear agreement holds sway". 71 Notwithstanding the gradual "gliding" which Lindström identifies, the fundamental agreement on basic points between any two of Kierkegaard's works is assured.

Bohlin reads *Fear and Trembling*, and comes to a very different conclusion.

"In *Fear and Trembling* the 'religious exception' theme and the category *den enkelde* are joined. Ethically seen, Abraham, who sacrifices Isaac, is the faithful exception: an emigre from the common world, radically different from the ethical stage. But although the exception breaks with the common-ethical consciousness, here he represents - not a break - but, on the contrary, an example, a paradigm which is valid for everyone, a life-style which is the normal expression for the religious life, in its essential meaning. With 'the knight of faith' in *Fear and Trembling* a strongly individualistic religiosity has come to the fore. Thus Kierkegaard's ethical view has taken a wholly different path from that which is referred to in the ethical stage with its ideal of 'the common man'." 72

To Bohlin, *Fear and Trembling* represents but the first step along the way of increasing negativity regarding the possibility of a community life for the existing Christian individual.

We have already expressed disagreement with Bohlin's methodological presupposition. But what of his conclusions? Has Lindström effectively countered Bohlin's thesis that community, and with it the Church, has no place in Kierkegaard's teaching? Is it true that in the first part of the authorship Kierkegaard described a relationship between *den Enkelte
and "the others" which renders viable an orthodox view of the Church and congregation?

Lindström's work is self-consciously polemical and so it is no surprise to find him, to put it bluntly, trying too hard. This is most apparent in his selection of material and the distribution of emphasis. Sponheim warns against juxtaposing the rhythms of Kierkegaard's authorship chronologically in his career, and suggests that Lindström is guilty of this error. "He does not seem" says Sponheim "to stress sufficiently the link between the world-denying mood of the final period and the diastatic current in the earlier authorship". Clearly, even in the very early years, Kierkegaard had no great confidence in a positive view of the Church. His internal struggle on this subject is reflected in an entry from October 1837:

"How dreadful it is when everything historical vanishes before a diseased probing of one's own miserable history! Who is to show the middle course between being devoured by one's own reflections, as though one were the only man who ever had existed, or ever would exist and seeking a worthless consolation in the commune naufragium of mankind? This is really what the doctrine of an ecclesia should do". Here Kierkegaard poses the dilemma of ecclesiology, and it is not correct to argue that his emphasis on the unavoidability of the individual's relationship to God automatically allowed Kierkegaard to adopt a positive attitude to the individual's relationship with others. Whilst it may in fact be true that the communal life does find a place in Kierkegaard's Christian teaching, this endorsement is not given without a complete awareness of the difficulties involved. Furthermore, Lindström lays too much emphasis upon certain passages in Equilibrium. In the most relevant passage (quoted above, p.317) Kierkegaard constantly used det Individ rather than den Enkelte. Gregor Walantschuk says that, for Kierkegaard, as det Individ one stands in a relationship of thoroughgoing dependence upon the race and environment. Virgilius Haufniensis characterises this relationship of dependence thus: "The individual is himself and the race" (Concept of Dread p. 26). The individual must work his way out of his dependence in order to win self-dependence and Haufniensis extensively describes the freeing process which consists in the
individual's assuming the guilt of the race as his own. 77 Det Individ, then, stands somewhere between Exemplar (i.e. specimen, copy) and den Enkolté which is qualitatively the highest category. Now, to achieve real clarity in respect of Kierkegaard's terminology at this point is not at all easy. But, nonetheless, there can be no doubt that Kierkegaard wants his terminological variants to be significant. Confusion will be inevitable if Kierkegaard's designations are viewed without proper respect for their particular nuances. Whatever may be the precise difference between den Enkolté and det Individ, to read the implications of the former designation into passages concerned only with the latter concept must be considered a hazardous procedure.

Despite this over-enthusiasm, Lindström's belief in the possibility of extricating a positive view of the Church from Kierkegaard's authorship, both early and late, is to be supported. Kierkegaard's attack on "the many" and "the public" in the pseudonymous authorship must certainly be adjudged to have a direct bearing upon his later, more direct polemics. It therefore follows that such negativity towards communal institutions as characterises the later authorship has its roots way back in the early papers and works. But it is wrong to assume that these assaults on communalism necessarily imply the abrogation of the Church in Kierkegaard's thought. Kierkegaard's concern is to emphasise the individual in his immediate relationship to God, but it does not follow that his account of this relationship precludes the individual from relationship with "others". Sponheim's inference is justified: "If Kierkegaard affirms that God the creator brings into existence selves in relationship, one may doubt that he will argue that the work of God the redeemer wins its effects apart from some kind of Christian community". 78

In 1839 Kierkegaard wrote: "You can be a member of a brotherhood only because you are an independent being, and you can be a worthy and contributing member only in so far as you in yourself and with yourself are assured of your reconciliation with God". 79 On the other side of the God relationship, therefore, there is the possibility of inter-personal relationships which are qualitatively conditioned by the God-relationship. Kierkegaard's attack on
"the many" is essentially an attack, not on such inter-personal relationships in themselves, but rather, on the prevailing trend towards over-emphasis on such relationships to the detriment, or even the exclusion of a proper relationship to God. There is the danger that the numerical determinants can become an obstacle in the way of a man entering into relationship with God. Nowhere is this danger more strongly expressed than in the Marrying Discourses in Various Spirits, Part I (1847): 81

"Each man himself, as an individual, should render his account to God. No third person dares venture to intrude upon this accounting between God and den Enkelte. Yet the talk, by putting its question, dares and ought to dare to remind man, in a way never to be forgotten, that the most ruinous evasion of all is to be hidden in the crowd in an attempt to escape God's supervision of him as an individual, in an attempt to get away from hearing God's voice as an individual (Enkelte). Long ago, Adam attempted this same thing when his evil conscience led him to imagine that he could hide himself among the trees. It may even be easier and more convenient, and more cowardly to hide oneself among the crowd in the hope that God should not be able to recognise one from the other. But in eternity each shall render account as an individual. That is, eternity will demand of him that he shall have lived as an individual."

There can be little doubt that this threat presented by "the crowd" to den Enkelte also has implications for Kierkegaard's view of the Church even in his early years. Besides his antagonism to Grundtvig, Kierkegaard also expressed his feelings about this abuse of the Church in other contexts. During the Gilleleie journey of 1835 Kierkegaard is moved to ask whether the ideal place to worship God is out amongst the beauties and spontaneity of nature rather than in a Church. But more important from our point of view is an entry from 1837. Kierkegaard writes: "... there are those in Christian Europe who have not achieved more than irony and for that reason have also not been able to accomplish the absolutely isolated, independently personal humour. Therefore they either seek rest in the Church, where in united humour over the world the solidarity of individuals develops a Christian irony ... or, if the religious is not in motion, form a club". The impossibility of retreating into the numerical is a central theme of The Present Age. So Kierkegaard says: "It is only after the individual has acquired an ethical outlook, in the face of the whole world, that there can be any suggestion of really joining together ... It is quite impossible for the community or the
idea of association (lenigned) to save our age. Here lenigned, which Kierkegaard consistently (though not exclusively) uses to denote the Church congregation, appears jointly condemned with other numerical concepts, e.g. society, association, whilst at an early point in the same book lenigned is linked with nation, generation and society. With these other concepts, lenigned shares the characteristic of formlessness. In The Present Age this is defined as "the result of doing away with the vital distinction between form and content. Formlessness may, therefore, unlike madness or stupidity, have a content that is true, but the truth it contains can never be essentially true. It will be capable of being extended so as to include everything or touch upon everything, whereas a real content is clearly, and, if one likes, miserably, limited because of its intensity and self-absorption". It is this "intensity" which alone can validate a true Christian community. In En Litterair Anmeldelse (1846) Kierkegaard states the option far more decisively:

"When the religious idea inspires a congregation of brothers, expressing the same likeness as between brother and sister, then this is not formlessness because the sameness is the essential form; and neither is it empty abstraction so long as inwardness abides in it". Briefly, then, the Christian community stands condemned in so far as it shares the debilitating marks of the public, the many, generation etc. But when it is characterised by inwardness and so guards the individual's relationship to God then it is to be affirmed and valued. At the heart of Kierkegaard's Christianity is the individual's God relationship, but is is his belief as we have seen it expressed in the early authorship, that the Church may justifiably bask in the reflected glory of this relationship. The Church is not to be condemned simply because it involves the social grouping together of individuals. To judge the Church on such criteria would destroy Kierkegaard's claims to evaluate qualitatively and not just quantitatively. Kierkegaard is negatively disposed towards the Church when it appears as an obstacle between den Enkelte and his Creator. However, this is not a total and unqualified negativity. So long as the integrity of den Enkelte is honoured and preserved then the
joining together of such individuals in the enjoyment of a community life is not to be invalidated. Clearly, in the early days Kierkegaard HAD TO retain a place for the Church. However, it remains to be seen whether, as Bohlin suggests, the individual's concern for his own salvation comes to dominate the later authorship at the expense of the Church. In this later discussion the notion of 'congregated' as an "accommodation" will be important. Kierkegaard and Grundtvig

The preceding discussion leads appropriately into a discussion of Kierkegaard's and Grundtvig's respective view of the Church; for Kierkegaard's criticism of Grundtvig is very much determined by the emphasis he lays upon the individual and the dictum that subjectivity is truth. Hoirup writes: "Kierkegaard's attitude toward the concept of the Church is determined by the strictness with which he carries through his basic view: one becomes a Christian by becoming an individual, and the way goes through 'the religious' which is earnestness. Throughout his entire authorship he warns against the dangers which the Church presents for 'the development of individuality'". Now, we have seen that although this negative attitude to the Church does feature in the whole of Kierkegaard's work, at least in the early authorship, this co-exists with a more positive view. Hoirup himself admits that up to 1850 "there is yet a certain real understanding of Church life". However, it is true that Kierkegaard always saw Grundtvig's views as a threat to his own attempts at individualising Christianity as a corrective to current mass movements which in Christendom had even overrun the Church itself. In fact Knudsen maintains that Grundtvig's teaching had the effect of influencing Kierkegaard's very choice of terms. He has indicated how this influence complicates the work of the translator: "When Grundtvig and Kierkegaard ... use the word 'Kirke', they mean the universal and historic Church. When they use the word 'congregated' ('Congregation'; German: Gemeinde') they might use it synonymously with Kirke and mean the universal, historic Church. They might, however, also mean 'congregation' in the narrow or local sense". The problem is to try and decide whether Kierkegaard's criticisms of 'congregated
also involve an attack on any form of ecclesiology whatsoever, or whether they are simply directed at the "congregation" as a numerical concept which is used by Grundtvig to provide an objective norm replacing other objectivities, such as the Bible. It is hoped to show that whilst Grundtvig's intrusion has certainly helped to complicate Kierkegaard's expression of his "Church view", it has also had the effect of crystalising the issues involved.

Postscript contains the most thoroughgoing of Kierkegaard's published attacks on Grundtvig's view of the Church. However, as early as 1835 Kierkegaard committed to his Journal "Some remarks about Grundtvig's theory of the Church" whilst the reference in Fear and Trembling to "those people in our day and age who gad about with loose talk concerning the congregational idea" clearly has Grundtvig and his followers as its target. First of all, then, we must acquaint ourselves with the "matchless discovery" Grundtvig made in respect of the Church's place in the search for Christian truth. Then we shall describe and evaluate the significance of Kierkegaard's reaction to this view.

We can begin our account with the year 1822 when Grundtvig was appointed pastor (Kapellan) of Vor Frue Kirke in Copenhagen. This marked the fulfilment of Grundtvig's ambitions, but yet "the first years in Copenhagen was a bleak period in which hopelessness threatened to gain the upper hand". Although he attracted large congregations to hear him preach, yet he was certain they only comprised "lie-a-beds and somnambulists, skeletons and ghosts". Furthermore, he had not come to terms with the prevailing rationalist movement in theology and biblical studies. He was convinced that the orthodox Lutheran doctrine of inspiration did not satisfy him, but he was equally convinced that the rationally explained Bible did not represent true Christianity either. A new and alternative explanation was required. Grundtvig was helped in the resolution of his difficulties by his realisation that two basically different questions needed to be asked. It is necessary to ask: What is true Christianity? i.e. what has Christ taught? Then a second question arises: Is Christianity true? Is Christ worthy of belief?
The first question is "entirely historical and must be answered regardless of all other considerations, by the apostles and early Christians. The other ... is a question of conscience which everybody must be allowed to answer on his own responsibility." 99

Now, if one has rejected the orthodox notion that the Bible offers truth in its literal meaning (and Grundtvig felt compelled to reject such a position), how can a firm footing be established in one's search for true Christianity? Grundtvig proceeded to dissect the scriptural record in order to try and isolate the kernel of Christian truth. So, for example, John 3 v. 16 was seen by Grundtvig to summarise the whole Gospel message. However, even such a solution as this did not bring him complete satisfaction. Hal Koch says: "Countless fragments amongst his posthumous papers show just how diligently he worked in these months in order to find the proper defence for Christianity and the proper way to communicate with his contemporaries, but it would not come clear to him". 100 But towards the end of 1823 a new creative urge sprang up inside him. He had become gripped by the text from Romans: "The night is far spent and the day is at hand". This inspired his preaching to new heights whilst the poem "New Year's Morn" written in the Summer of 1824 has been described as "one of the greatest works in the world's literature". Together with "The Land of the Living", written about the same time, "New Year's Morn" represents a new optimism which led Grundtvig to look for the early revitalisation of Danish Church life. 102 He yearned for the chance to establish a small worshipping group of his associates, with whom he could preach his new found faith and sing the hymn inspired in him by this faith. It was not until 1839 that this dream was realised, when he took up a living at Vartov.

Meanwhile, the clash with rationalism came to a head.

Grundtvig had always been strong in his condemnation of the historical Catholic papacy, but now he turned his attention primarily to exposing the new "exegetical papacy" which held Lutheranism in its grip. Because it was now held that true Christianity could only be reached via critical interpretation of the scriptures, simple-minded people were forced into a state of dependence upon the clergy who alone had the ability to carry out such interpretation."103
Grundtvig became convinced that "there must be given an unerring witness to true Christianity, so constituted that no scientific quibbling could shake it, and so that even the most simple-minded could understand it". The search for such an understanding of Christianity as this characterised Theological Monthly (Teologisk Haandskrift) which Grundtvig began publishing in 1825 with the help of two extremely able scholars, J.C. Lindberg and A.G. Rudelbach. In addition to this theoretical assault on rationalist principles there arose also a rather more immediate and practical dispute. It revolved around the rationalist priests' opposition to a group of peasants on the island of Funen who held a number of independent religious meetings. The authorities moved in to stop the meetings and impose fines upon those taking part. Although Grundtvig was far from being himself one of the "awakened", nevertheless he was firm in his opposition to the intolerance of the rationalist authorities. It appalled him that simple-minded men of faith, who fundamentally held to old Lutheran teachings, should be so hounded by "faithless Priests". Grundtvig's disillusionment with the priests and theologians was now complete. It was in the heat of this conflict that his highly original view of the Church took shape.

Having called into question the value of a literal acceptance of the scriptures, Grundtvig wrote: "The Lord has a stronger and more valiant Regent in the world than the dead scriptural literalism and scriptural scholars. He has the Holy Spirit, which by way of the word in the congregation, the word in the Lord's name whereby we perform Baptism and Eucharist, renders Christianity recognisable to friend and enemy alike". So it becomes clear that "since the Church is not sanctified by scripture, but scripture by the Church, or because the word of faith we confessed and preached is the Church's living, and the scripture on the contrary its dead concept, so it is clearly not scripture which can or shall defend the Church but the Church which shall defend scripture". Hoirup comments that on these relatively few pages Grundtvig "promulgated his evangelical concept of the Church in such a way as, in all essentials, retained its validity for him". Hoirup adds further
that it was about this time that Grundtvig first began to use the terms Kirke and laenighed more or less synonymously as opposed to the current usage which used Kirke to denote the clergy and laenighed the laity. For Grundtvig the "ecclesiical papacy" has now been overthrown and the priesthood of all believers has attained to its proper status.

When H. N. Clausen, a leading spokesman for Nationalism, published his Catholicism and Protestantism's Ecclesiology, Teaching and Ritual in 1825, Grundtvig seized the opportunity to give expression to his new awareness of "that which is the Christian Churches' unshakeable and unchangeable foundation". In opposition to Clausen's rather spiritual concept of the Church Grundtvig concentrated on "the historical Church which calls itself Christian and admits to Baptism and the communion those who reject the Devil and confess faith in God and Father, Son and Holy Spirit, in accordance with the three articles of faith which scholars call the apostolic symbols". Elsewhere he maintains that "there has been, and is, a Christianity on earth, to be distinguished from every other faith by its unequalled creed, by which in all its tongues, under all its changing forms, it has proclaimed, and proclaims, faith in Jesus Christ ... as the certain and only way for sinners, as a way which through baptism and communion leads to the Kingdom of God and the Land of the Living". Thus, in answer to the question: what is true Christianity? Grundtvig points to the confession of faith "which forms the narrow door to the Church". We must look to "the true and secure tradition - the public, oral, trustworthy witness of the whole of our Lord Jesus Christ's congregation".

By this appeal to the liturgical confession of faith Grundtvig avoids the objections which he believed must be made against the view which emphasised the priority of scripture. It is not necessary to be a professional, i.e. a priest or theologian in order to become acquainted with Christian truth. Thus the exalted position of the Clergy vis a vis the laity is brushed aside, and the laity's subservience in matters of doctrine can no longer be maintained. "Kirken er laenigheden. In these three words are expressed the fundamentals of Grundtvig's 'discovery'". If anyone wants to know what
Christianity is, then he should not ask the scholars and linguists but rather he should ask the congregation where Christ himself is to be found in the living word. The fact is that this living word of Christ, i.e. the congregation's confession of its faith in Baptism and Communion existed in the Church prior to the written word. The confession of faith is the word of Christ which binds together heaven and earth, God and man. This union the individual man can experience in the congregation. Through the word of faith Christ dwells in the congregation and this word itself is described as "a word from the Lord's own mouth". The recitation of the creed at Baptism ensures that a covenant is established between God and the individual, whilst its repetition at the Communion ensures that God sustains the individual in the Christian life. The confession of faith is indicative of Christ's presence in the Church of the past, the present and the Church that lies in the future.

Hoirup declares:

"Grundtvig's concept of the Church is at once historical, actual and eschatological, but never only historical or only eschatological ... The Church is God's congregation in past, present and future, but never something which only has been or only shall become ... Without a congregation, no salvation. For where there is no body, there can be no limbs ... Church and Congregation represent for Grundtvig salvation's and the Saviour's body. The congregation is always a soteriological concept; in no other sense can there be talk about the Church".

Hoirup might have added that salvation is always a congregational experience for Grundtvig; in no other context can there be talk about redemption.

We come now to consider Kierkegaard's reaction to Grundtvig's view of the Church, and we shall consider first those references which mention Grundtvig explicitly by name.

It is significant that the Journal entries of 1835 dealing with Grundtvig's view of the Church are immediately preceded by entries strongly criticising biblical interpreters who "damage the understanding of the New Testament more than they benefit an understanding of it". To this extent, Kierkegaard is in agreement with Grundtvig's rejection of the "exegetical papacy". Similarly, much of Kierkegaard's section in *Postscript on The Holy Scriptures* which likewise precedes his critique of "The Church", would win Grundtvig's support. However, Kierkegaard's complaint is that Grundtvig's way out of the
Kierkegaard's remarks on "The Holy Scriptures" form part of his treatment of "the objective problem" i.e. objective investigation into Christianity must inevitably be thwarted by the necessary link between Christianity and its subjective appropriation. Objective enquiry, whether of the historical or philosophical sort, demands disinterestedness on the part of the enquirer. Therefore, when confronted with Christianity, the objective enquirer must find himself in one or the other of two situations:

"Either he is in faith convinced of the truth of Christianity, and in faith assured of his own relationship to it; in which case he cannot be infinitely interested in all the rest, since faith itself is the infinite interest in Christianity, and since every other interest may readily come to constitute a temptation. Or the enquirer is, on the other hand, not in an attitude of faith, but objectively in an attitude of contemplation, and hence not infinitely interested in the determination of the question". 119

Here Kierkegaard pulls the ground away from under Grundtvig's basic presupposition which is that the questions: what is true Christianity? and is Christianity true? are two separate questions. This separation is the presupposition of all objective enquiry, and whatever theory Grundtvig devised in order to establish what is true Christianity, his very starting point must antagonise "the apostle of subjectivity". Whatever may be the merit of Grundtvig's theory as opposed to the orthodox bias towards the scriptures (and Kierkegaard does see the merit of Grundtvig's appeal to the testimony of the living Church rather than the dead scriptures) 120 his starting point lies within the territory of the historical point of view where it becomes necessary "to secure an entirely trustworthy account of what the Christian doctrine really is". 121 Thus the vital question of the subjective relation of the enquirer to the truth of Christianity is set aside. Now, as the reinstatement of this relation dominates the exposition in Postscript it is clear that Kierkegaard's criticism of Grundtvig is founded on the basic first principles of their respective positions. 122 This point is important because it shows that a negative view of the Church does not follow from Kierkegaard's critique of
Grundtvig. In fact, what Kierkegaard attacks here is not the very notion of Church itself, but rather the use of the Church as a means of establishing what is true Christian doctrine. It is possible for Kierkegaard to value the Church as a vehicle of true Christian fellowship whilst at the same time attacking Grundtvig for resorting to the Church 'as the certain recourse for determining Christian doctrine'. Perhaps Kierkegaard's best summary of his position is tucked away in a footnote:

"The infinite reflection in which alone the concern of the subject for his eternal happiness can realise itself, has in general one distinguishing mark: the omnipresence of the dialectical. Let it be a word, a proposition, a book, a man, a fellowship, or whatever you please: as soon as it is proposed to make it serve as limit, in such a way that the limit is not itself again dialectical, we have superstition and narrowness of spirit ... As soon as I take the dialectical away, I become superstitious, and attempt to cheat God of each moment's strenuous reacquisition of that which has once been acquired. ... But it is far more comfortable to be objective, and superstitious, and boastful about it ..." 125

In addition to this general criticism of Grundtvig, Kierkegaard also attacks him on more particular aspects of his theory. From Kierkegaard's point of view, Grundtvig's stress on the Creed shares one particular failing with the prevailing biblicism. Both the Bible and the Creed are verbal forms thus being open to the charge of equivocation which always threatens 'words'. In the Journal Kierkegaard writes: "There must, after all, be something which is so holy that it cannot be expressed in words". 126 This general thought prompts the following comment about Grundtvig: "But when we look now at the expression of the Christian faith on which he thinks the Church is based, so must we acknowledge that, considered in and for itself, it is an impossibility that an idea can find completely adequate expression in words". 127 Kierkegaard goes on to introduce the problem of translation and interpretation which necessarily renders questionable any dependence upon a verbal norm in getting to the truth of Christianity. Kierkegaard argues further, that the creed may be said to be even more in danger of misinterpretation than the New Testament, on the grounds of its brevity. 128 By way of summary Kierkegaard writes: "The same objections can be made against the Symbol (Symbol, i.e. the Creed) as they (i.e. Grundtvigians) make against the
Furthermore, Kierkegaard argues on the basis of the New Testament that Grundtvig's emphasis on Baptism rather than Communion is totally misplaced. Kierkegaard believes that the Eucharist was more central to the living life of the early Church than Baptism, whilst Grundtvig's and Lindberg's contentions that the Creed does not occur in the New Testament or the early Fathers because 1) it was too well known to need citing and 2) it was considered to be a secret, are carefully refuted. Such objections to these may seem trivial, but they serve to underline the point Kierkegaard was to make in Postscript eleven years later:

"By suddenly shifting the plan of campaign (i.e. from the Bible to the Confession of Faith), when one is at the same time fortunate enough to have no one attack the new line of defence, a genius like Grundtvig may readily find himself blissfully convinced that all is now well, with the help of his matchless discovery. But let the Church theory endure attack as the Bible theory has had to endure it; let the whole swarm of possible objections arise to seek its life: what then? Then we shall here again consistently find that an introductory discipline becomes necessary; for every other procedure would nullify the Church theory itself, and transfer the problem to the realm of the subjective where it properly belongs, though the objective Grundtvig does not think so".

This quotation serves to underline that Kierkegaard's treatment of Grundtvig in Postscript is essentially part of his main theme - to establish the thesis that subjectivity is truth. What ever may be Grundtvig's (or Lindberg's) merits, ultimately his Church view poses a threat to the appropriation process which is so vital to Kierkegaard's Christian understanding. By proposing the Church's confession of faith as an objective norm for true Christianity Grundtvig is providing yet another "comfortable" way of becoming a Christian. Or rather, of course, a way ofbeguiling the individual into believing that he is a Christian. Grundtvig thus becomes another symbol of decayed Christianity "where all are Christians". To this extent his name can be uttered in the same condemnatory breath as the bourgeois clergy and the speculative philosophers.

Is Kierkegaard's attack on Grundtvig justified? It might be objected that, whilst Grundtvig wishes to emphasise the continuity of the faithful community since the time of Christ, Kierkegaard has onesidedly latched on to
the confession of faith as central to Grundtvig's theory. There are two reasons why this objection cannot be sustained. Firstly, in a sermon called "Christ is the Rock" Grundtvig says:

"... it struck me that the Creed at Baptism undeniably expressed that faith all the sincere members of the community must have in common, but from that moment it was as clear as day to me that this Creed, with its presupposed corresponding belief, was the rock which till now had supported the Church, and that neither could a single reasonable objection be made to the obvious truth that the Christian Church, as a Christian community which is established by Baptism, stands and falls by its baptismal covenant, to which the Creed inseparably belongs".

Here the Creed is that which binds the community together and thus, for Kierkegaard, it becomes a limiting factor in determining membership of the group. Herein lies the danger that acceptance of the Creed as a condition of Church membership may become an end in itself. An objective substitute for the full passion required of that individual who would become a Christian. Secondly, Kierkegaard was concerned to use Grundtvig's arguments against Grundtvig himself. Grundtvig maintained that the Bible was a dead word whilst he advocated the living word of the Church. Kierkegaard hammers home the point that, as a historical form giving only approximations, the confession of faith is struck down by the same ammunition as that used by Grundtvig himself to destroy the "exegetical Papacy" associated with the Bible.

However, there may be some substance to the charge that Kierkegaard ignored something very important in Grundtvig's teaching. In the above quotation there is mention of the Creed "with its presupposed corresponding belief". This belief does not simply amount to the acceptance of a given formula. This formula defines what Christianity is, but "the truth of Christianity is dependent on the individual, personal experience of sin and grace".

By attributing such thoughts to Grundtvig, Lindhardt is able to say that "in reality Grundtvig's and Kierkegaard's concerns and intentions are the same. That which Grundtvig proclaims in his sermons and especially in his hymns is really the existential present day message which Kierkegaard also wishes to give through his edifying and religious writings and for which he philosophically clears the way in the famous Concluding Unscientific Postscript".

Now,
Lindhardt is right in calling attention to the likeness between Grundtvig's and Kierkegaard's points of departure. Furthermore, it is probably true that Kierkegaard's concern to set Grundtvig up as a typical example of the contemporary trend towards objectivising Christianity resulted in his doing less than justice to Grundtvig's interest in the individual's personal appropriation of faith. But, as Hoirup has concluded, despite their similarities the two writers differ decisively in terms of both form and result. "It seems as if they were destined to go in different directions, just as the two largest rivers of Jutland have their source in the same small copse on the highlands but on different sides of the watershed, so that one travels east and the other west". As we pointed out above, the very recognition by Grundtvig of true Christianity and the truth of Christianity as two separate issues inevitably necessitated a breach between his views and those of Kierkegaard. Although their point of departure is the same, it soon becomes clear that their methodological presuppositions differ radically. Whilst Kierkegaard begins attacking the prevailing objectivity in religion by pressing the claims of inwardness, only later launching a direct assault when the former method foundered, Grundtvig moved straight into an overt campaign of ecclesiastical reform and renewal. As with Mynter, Martensen and Hegel, Kierkegaard is ready to give praise to Grundtvig where praise is due; but when the task to hand is the introduction of Christianity into Christendom then there can be no quarter given to those whose intentions and ideals may be honourable enough, but yet whose methods are liable to upset the whole campaign. Given the radical dimensions of Kierkegaard's reappraisal of Christianity, then his critique of Grundtvig may be justified. However, judged by the normal canons of critical assessment, Grundtvig's followers can justifiably claim that Kierkegaard's treatment of the teaching of their master "suffers from Kierkegaard's meagre ability to view others objectively".  

What does Kierkegaard's critique of Grundtvig contribute to our understanding of the former's view of the Church? It needs to be emphasised, I think, that in attacking Grundtvig at this point, Kierkegaard is not attacking
the Church itself, but a deviant abuse of it. Hoirup's assertion that Kierkegaard's criticism of prevailing Christian institutions "resulted in the rejection of any and all forms of the Church" may or may not be true, but anyway, such an attitude could not be causally attributed to his clash with Grundtvig. Through his study of Kierkegaard's relationship to Hegel, N. Thulstrup comes to the conclusion that the former's anti-Hegelianism is basic to his whole originality as a thinker and is not dependent, even in a negative sense, on Hegel himself. Similarly, Kierkegaard is consistently anti-Grundtvig when it comes to ecclesiology and this opposition is conditioned by Kierkegaard's extremely original and intensely personal theological position rather than by the terms of the discussion as laid down by Grundtvig. In other words, what Kierkegaard attacks is the Church as expounded by Grundtvig. After this attack it still remains an open question whether Kierkegaard still has a place for the Church in the life of the Christian.

Nonetheless, Kierkegaard's conflict with Grundtvig did help him to clarify a number of issues. Hoirup declares:

"For Kierkegaard, "sensu bono, has not its home in time, but in Eternity". Certainly Kierkegaard objects strongly to any attempts at abolishing the distinction between the visible and invisible Church, and clearly Grundtvig's theories helped him to reach clarity on this point. In Postscript Kierkegaard ironically dismisses attempts to abolish this distinction in historical retrospect. Then he comments, "The invisible Church is no historical phenomenon; it cannot be observed objectively at all, since it exists only in the subjectivity of the individual". This whole passage is probably written with Grundtvig at least partly in mind, and it serves to underline the fact that for Kierkegaard the question whether the Church is to be fully realised in time or in eternity is not of primary importance. Rather, he contends that the true Church, wherever or whenever it comes to fruition, will not be a historically determined reality but a subjective reality determined by the quality of personal inwardness on the part of single individuals. Whilst Grundtvig is founding his Church on the principle of
historical extension, Kierkegaard is pressing the case for passionate intensity.\textsuperscript{142} Or, to quote Toftdahl: "Grundtvig's menighed becomes taken up into Christ by a mutual compromise between priest and menighed. Kierkegaard seeks out Christ in connection with the imitation of his inwardness. It is a difference of inner exertion and activity".\textsuperscript{143}

Elsewhere in Postscript Kierkegaard describes how the prevalence of nominal Christianity has so expanded the visible Church "that all the original relationships have been reversed".\textsuperscript{144} Although he insists that he recognises "the difference that must always remain between the visible and the invisible Church", Kierkegaard makes it clear that in the move towards subjectivity he finds these labels unhelpful. He writes: "At the present time the difficulty of becoming a Christian involves actively transforming an initial being - a Christian into a possibility, in order to become a Christian in reality". In other words, members of the visible Church must, by a process of increasing inwardness, become real Christians. But does this "real Christianity" allow scope for community? If it does, then it will not be of the kind Grundtvig champions. It will not base its credentials on the approximation of historical research but on the quality as Christians of those who comprise it. This community will not be the necessary vehicle of salvation, as Grundtvig suggests. Rather, it will be the fruit of its members individual, saving relationship to God through Christ. Even though God must still be left "to judge the secrets of the heart",\textsuperscript{145} at least membership of this community might offer some proof that an individual is a Christian. God's sovereignty demands that the distinction between the visible and the invisible Church be retained. But his study of Grundtvig has taught him that the "community of believers"\textsuperscript{146} must not become an easy escape from the full rigours of Christian discipleship. The Church must never become a substitute for the individual's relationship to God.\textsuperscript{147}

Now, to what extent did Grundtvig's terminology influence Kierkegaard? This question brings us to our second sub-section:
b) Kierkegaard's implicit references to Grundtvig.

Vernard Miller writes: "Kierkegaard was hampered in developing his concept of Menighed (Gemeinde) simply because N.F.S. Grundtvig has appropriated the term and ruined it". It is doubtful if the issues here are quite so clear cut as this statement suggests. We have described how Grundtvig rejected the generally accepted usage of the terms Kirke and Menighed, in order to treat them synonymously. The clergy/laity dichotomy had to be abolished. Because the confession of faith receives its authority from its place in the congregation, no longer can the clergy alone claim a privileged position as protectors and interpreters of the faith. This understanding blossomed forth in Grundtvig's writings in the early and mid-twenties, and he never deviated from it to any significant extent. Now, if we are to attribute to Grundtvig's usage a really decisive influence upon Kierkegaard then we might expect this to be manifest in the early authorship which only began when Grundtvig's "matchless discovery" was nearly fifteen years old. However, in most respects Kierkegaard is seen to adopt precisely the usage rejected by Grundtvig.

Already we have given an account of Kierkegaard's treatment of the congregation (Menighed) as spectators at weddings and as listeners to sermons. In such cases, Menighed obviously refers to the laity and on occasion the English translators, quite correctly, use "laity" as the best equivalent of Menighed. On the other hand, Kirken is very often used in the pseudonymous literature to refer to the status and function of the hierarchy. In Either-Or Vol. I Kirken is used in connection with the consecration of a marriage whilst in Vol. II it is Kirken which the aesthete resents coming between him and his bride. This evidence alone would be of little value if not for the fact that Kirken seldom, if ever, is used to denote the congregation. In other words, for Kierkegaard Kirke and Menighed are certainly not synonymous terms in the way Grundtvig suggests they should be. Rather, at this stage, he is content to use such terms in their generally excepted sense, without being significantly influenced by Grundtvig's views on the matter. In this respect Kierkegaard reflects his general policy of not
interfering with externals. Whereas Grundtvig wants to free the laity from their bondage to the clergy (by campaigning for the abolition of parish bonds), Kierkegaard wishes to go much deeper into the root causes of the current demoralised situation in Christendom. Kierkegaard has so little in common with Grundtvig that his use of words hardly reflects the latter's influence. Whilst he shares with Grundtvig certain anti-clerical tendencies, his main concern is not to abolish or retain the traditional pattern of clergy and laity. That which incurs his wrath is the Grundtvigian tendency to play with the "idea of community" when the more urgent task is the instilling of passion and inwardness into the life of the individual. So, as with the more explicit references, where Kierkegaard makes an implicit reference to Grundtvig's view of the Church the motive is not a basic antagonism towards the notion of Christian community but rather a will to combat distorted emphases on Church and community which sidetrack from the most important challenge. Even if in later years Kierkegaard treats Kirke and menighed as interchangeable terms denoting the same basic evil in Christendom, the authorship up to and including Postscript reveals no tendencies to directly attack or redefine the accepted terminology.

By way of summary we may say that Kierkegaard's confrontation with Grundtvig helped him to clarify in his own mind exactly what aspects of Church theory he needed to oppose. Grundtvig's view of Kirke and menighed as synonymous terms is indicative of the general wish to raise the stature of the congregation to that of an objective norm for Christian truth. This Kierkegaard must oppose because it will tend to make membership of the congregation a satisfying end in itself. If this happens then the vital qualitative determination of the Christian faith has been sacrificed for a quantitative criterion. The witness of an historical Church cannot be called to vindicate an essentially paradoxical faith. Such witness has objective forms, only subjectivity is appropriate to the assimilation of true Christianity. Using his characteristic terminology Sponheim summarises the matter this way: "It may be noted that the diastatic tendency in Kierkegaard's thought finds active expression in his bitter criticism of Grundtvig".
respect to the Church the diastatic tendency produced an apparently negative attitude in Kierkegaard, and certainly his anti-Grundtvig polemic leaves the impression of a generally unfavourable judgement upon community relationships. However, we share Sponheim's concern not to base conclusions on "a diastatic reading of diastatic texts in Kierkegaard". The criticism of Grundtvig's Church view in Postscript is not an end in itself and does not carry any implications regarding a thorough-going assault on the principle of community. The critique is offered in pursuance of a far more basic point which impinges on the very nature of Christian faith. When Kierkegaard has finally resolved "what it means for me to become a Christian" then a place for the Church can be sought within this meaning.

What conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing study of the Church in Kierkegaard's early writings?

In all important respects Kierkegaard's claims made in his response to Rudelbach are borne out by the facts. The Church does not figure at all prominently in these years and when it does feature in the published works or the Journals it is often only as a given fact taken for granted. We have seen how the pseudonyms used the Church and congregation in a fashion neither apologetic nor polemical. Whatever conclusions we may draw from remarks made about the Church or the congregation in the ethicist's essays on marriage, which is the primary subject of interest, the Church arises only incidently. When Kierkegaard is dealing with the preacher and his hearers, then clearly the ecclesiastical and congregational context is very relevant. But still the basic impression given is that of the institutional and historic Church as an unchallenged presupposition. In actual fact Kierkegaard sometimes attacks the clergy for failing their flock thus implicitly accepting the principle of Christian community life as an objective worth fostering. If conclusions are to be based on this evidence alone then Kierkegaard's attitude to the Church might be described as one of indifferent acquiescence to the statu quo.
However, Kierkegaard’s essential originality as a Christian thinker prevented him from resting content with the situation as given. The subjective problem facing Kierkegaard — the problem of finding a truth which could become truth for him necessarily set him at odds with all attempts at objective solutions. The truth he seeks must be truth FOR HIM and he must not be lured on to a wild goose chase in pursuit of objective criteria of Christian truth which, in fact, only provide approximations. Thus he was bound to run up against the Church as an institution which sought to accredit itself with the criteria of truth, either vesting it in a Pope, a gaggle of Biblical interpreters or the historical witness of the congregation. From his experience, Kierkegaard knew that that for which a man can live and die is found only by winning through to a direct relationship between the individual and his creator. This battle is fought over 70,000 fathoms and not within the comfortable, clearly defined limits of truth as set by the clergy and Professors. The timidity of Christendom is like that of people who skate on the thick ice near the edge of the pond. Man has the freedom to venture farther into the middle — he needs only the will and passion to do it. The prize is Christianity. It is for the individual man, in the full passion of inwardness, to face the Paradox full square, not fleeing away in search of a less awesome resting place. The Church can be, and in Christendom has become just a resting place. What is required is the re-instatement of subjectivity — the reintroduction of Christianity into Christendom.

But yet, given this basic perspective, Kierkegaard did not want to promulgate external reforms. Once subjectivity has won back its rightful place then the objective usurpers will need to be seriously re-examined. Kierkegaard’s critique of the current Church view in Postscript means that he wants to abolish the Church no more than his critique of the Bible means that he has its destruction in mind. No. What Kierkegaard wants to do in the authorship up to and including Postscript is to show that the paradox of Christianity demands that subjective criteria of truth must take priority over objective norms. The Bible and the Church have a relative value in so...
far as they take the disciple some way along the road to becoming a Christian, but the decisive factor in the appropriation process must be subjectivity — the subjectivity of the subject becomes the final stage and objectivity a vanishing factor. 156 This requirement that the objective must vanish in the face of the individual's existential choice before God is missed by Grundtvig and by those who qualify Christianity numerically. However, as we pointed out in our discussion of Grundtvig and Kierkegaard, the fact that the latter attacks the former's falling short of this ultimate requirement does not mean that the Church for which he stands thereby is condemned. Kierkegaard wants to expose abuses of the Church in the thought of Christendom in order to reinstate it as a glorious reality lying on the other side of the individual's personal leap of faith.

In brief, then, the Church in the early authorship is accepted as a given fact. It exists as a guide on the road leading to the decision of faith. But yet its very existence is a threat to the possibility of the individual ever getting to the point of decision. So Kierkegaard criticises views and practices which seem likely to augment this threat. In putting the case for subjectivity, Kierkegaard is prepared to temper his criticism of the Church, contenting himself with an assault on the parallel threat posed by speculation. But when the case had been put, and still there was no understanding, Kierkegaard comes to tolerate the status quo less and less whilst at the same time attacking the objective complacency of the Church ever more bitterly.
1. See above pps. 25 ff.

2. A. G. Rudelbach: Om det borgerske selskab. Kbh. 1851. p. 70


4. Ibid. p. 472 (Hong p. 47)

5. Ibid. p. 473 (Hong pps. 47 - 8)

6. Although it is always essential to bear in mind the dichotomy of pseudonymous and edifying literature, we shall treat the body of the authorship as one unit in this instance for, however different these works may be, Kierkegaard nevertheless insists that none of them contains a proposal for external changes in the sphere of the Church and with regard to not one of them is "Church" a concept to be stressed. Ibid. p. 49 and Gregor Walantschuk's commentary in the same volume p. 139

7. Howard A. Johnson endorsed this point in his introductory article to the 1968 edition of Attack upon Christendom pps. xci - xxiii


10. Either-Or Vol. II pps. 5 - 157


12. Either-Or Vol. II p. 95: "... all the talk about the disparagement of love by the Church is utterly unfounded and exists only for him who has taken offence at religion".

13. In the light of these passages in Either-Or Rudelbach's appeal to Kierkegaard in support of civil marriage certainly seems ironical. However, we must resist any temptation to draw any deeper inferences from Kierkegaard's refusal to be allied with Rudelbach other than that he wished to be disassociated from moves towards changes in externals. But I do believe that in Vol. II of Either-Or he is wishing to say something positive about the Church, its value and authority as an instrument of God's will.

14. Either-Or Vol. II p. 251. See Pap. I 160: "(The Lystics) think that they stand in an immediate relationship to God and will thus not recognise that all men only stand in a mediated relationship (The Church - in the political sphere, the State)"; Pap. II A 53: "Faust expresses the individual after the abrogation of the Church, severed from its guidance and abandoned to himself; this is an indication of his relationship to the Reformation and is a parody of the Reformation in so far as it one-sidedly emphasises the negative aspect"; Pap. II A 223: "There are on
the whole very few men who are able to bear the Protestant view of life. If the Protestant view is really to become strengthening for the common man, it must either structure itself in a smaller community (separatism, small congregations etc.) or approach Catholicism, in order in both cases to develop the mutual bearing of life's burdens in a communal life, which only the most gifted individuals are able to discharge with. Christ indeed has died for all men, also for me, but this "for me" must nevertheless be interpreted in such a way that he has died for me only in so far as I belong to the many". (Kerner Stark maintains that this entry "affords the master-key to the interpretation of the whole institutional development of Christianity". "Kierkegaard on Capitalism". Sociological Review Vol. 42, 1950. p. 88). Cf. Pap. I A 307; II A 172, 187; III A 216

15. See Pap. I A 177: "It is dangerous to isolate oneself too much, to evade the bonds of Society", and Pap. II A 172. Here it is well to note that in dealing with references in Either-Or I have avoided the attribution of sentiments expressed there directly to Kierkegaard himself. However, that he himself valued the "finiteness" bestowed by participation in congregational activity may be inferred from the account of Judge William's visits "to one of the Churches here in the city" (Either-Or Vol. II pps. 318 - 9). These reminiscences have the ring of autobiography about them and probably reflect Kierkegaard's own experiences and values.

16. See Stages p. 16: "He returns home from his holy pilgrimage, he belongs to her, he is ready - ready to meet her at the altar where the Church is to declare him a proper husband". However, note also Either-Or Vol. II p. 36 and Pap. II A 537 where Kierkegaard warns against a superstitious view of the Church's power.

17. Pap. IV A 97. Cf. Pap. X 5 A 149. See also Stages pps. 278 - 9 where the substance of this meeting is recounted: "This ought not to have been in a Church ... (where) I am so readily tempted to regard the matter eternally". See "Kierkegaard's Kirkegang". Carl Tietzner in Aarhus Amstidende 17th November 1951.


19. In addition to the passages already noted see Either-Or I pps. 431 - 2

20. pps. 39 - 41
21. pps. 419 - 20
22. See Pap. II A 234
23. Concept of Dread pps. 14 - 15
24. Stages pps. 137 - 40
25. See Pap. II A 12 p. 12
26. See Fear and Trembling pps. 39 - 40; Pap. II A 463
27. See Pap. II A 537; Fear and Trembling pps. 39 - 40
29. Cf. Pap. VII A 176 p. 113
30. See Pap. X 1 A 212. Cf. Postscript p. 416
31. See "Love covers a multitude of sins". Three Killing Discourses (Four Vols.) Vol. I p. 81: "The Apostle (Peter) loves his community too much to keep weakly silent about the terrible news that the end of all things is approaching." See also "Strengthened in the Inner Man". Ibid, p. 96. These passages speak of the apostles' concern for their congregation, and this is the theme of one of the most decisive of the early Journal entries on the Church - Pap. IX A 522: The Church must watch over its children lest they betray their Lord and Master. As a guide to the way in which Kierkegaard's later polemical stance affected his attitude to this particular point, see Pap. IX 2 A 10 where the Apostles are accused of reducing the Christian demand by forming a society (Forening).

32. "The Individual". Two Notes concerning my work as an Author. Published 1859. Note 2 written 1847. Printed in Point of View pps. 129 - 30


34. Of the large number of references which might be quoted to document this point, we note especially Pap. IX A 4 (1848): "Balloting (which is essentially the life principle in government by the people; the numerical) is the destruction of everything great and noble and holy and lovable and, above all, of Christianity, since it is a deifying of worldliness and an infatuation with this world. Christianity is the exact opposite. (1) Purely formally. For Christianity is eternal truth, Christianity is entirely indifferent as to whether something has the majority behind it or not. But in the abracadabra of balloting, the majority is proof of the truth; whatever lacks it is not truth, and whatever has it is truth. Frightful spiritlessness! (2) Realiter Christianity is directly opposed. For Christianity as militant truth assumes that here in this wretched world truth is always in the minority. Consequently, from the Christian point of view, truth is in the minority; according to balloting, the majority is truth. Indeed!" From the writings intended for publication we take note of The Present Age in its entirety as well as the summary statement: "A Crowd is Untruth". This is found in the first of the "Two 'notes' concerning my work as an Author" (Point of View p. 116). Although the political events of 1848 brought Kierkegaard's attack on Haenenden to a head (see Howard A. Johnson: "Kierkegaard and Politics". A Kierkegaard Critique pps. 74 - 84), suspicion of the numerical and its threat to den Enkelte is an ingredient of Kierkegaard's whole Christian understanding.


40. T. Bohlin: Tro och Uppenbarelse 1926. p. 149
42. Bohlin is aware of the challenge that this is in fact Judge William who is speaking. However, he appeals to recent events involving Kierkegaard's renunciation of Regina in support of his claim that in fact Kierkegaard and the Judge are "kindred spirits" (Kierkegaard's Tro pps. 115 - 6)

43. Bohlin: op. cit. p. 114

44. Bohlin: Soren Kierkegaard's etiska åskådning p. 159

45. But even here Bohlin believed that Kierkegaard's concessions to concreteness are motivated less by a will to urge the significance of community life than by a desire to enrich the concept of individuality. (Bohlin: Kierkegaards Tro p. 115)

46. Bohlin: op. cit. p. 116

47. Bohlin: Soren Kierkegaards etiska åskådning p. 215

48. See Bohlin: Kierkegaard's Tro p. 130: "... Man realises his Christian duty to sacrifice everything in order to save his soul, so he cannot do other than adopt a posture of irreconcilable opposition to community life and to his surroundings". Cf. Pap. § 2 A 508


50. Bohlin: op. cit. pps. 127 f. See Pap. VIII 1 A 382, 388, 277, 242, 403 etc.

51. Bohlin: op. cit. pps. 135 - 45


53. Bohlin: op. cit. p. 214

54. Lindström: Efter J. Ljölsens Teologi p. 204

55. See G. Brandes: Soren Kierkegaard Kbh. 1877, reflecting both Hartkelsen's point of departure and his results (esp. p. 270)

56. Subjectivity and Paradox. Blackwell 1957. pps. 45 - 47

57. Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence. pps. 41 - 2

58. Whilst admitting to certain misgivings about some of his conclusions, Bohlin praises J. Hohlenberg for identifying Kierkegaard's "extreme individualism" and so posing questions in the right direction. (Bohlin: Kierkegaard's Tro p. 160). The title of one of Hohlenberg's books Den En Omommene Vei (Kbh. 1948) indicates the importance he attaches to "the individual" as a central motif in Kierkegaard's writings. Like Bohlin, he distinguishes two senses of den Enkelte in Kierkegaard one pointing to a quantitative and the other to a qualitative definition. In the pseudonyms the individual standing over against the masses is to the fore whilst in the "edifying" literature the qualitative individuality which it is the duty of all men to pursue is dominant. In this latter determination of individuality there is no question of the individual severing himself from his surroundings. Rather, there is "a common lot", a new "fellowship" to be obtained on the other side of "the narrow pass"
by means of which a man's relationship to God is established. However, the error of the Church lies in its having offered its members an easy way to God — a way which bypasses this "narrow way" — herein lies the great illusion of Christendom. In theory a Christian community life is possible, but in practice such communality has become an obstacle to each man's becoming a Fellow. In this respect Hohnenberg's position lies very close to Bohlin's. (See J. Hohnenberg: Soren Kierkegaard Ebn. 1940. pps. 349 - 354 and pps. 362 ff.)


60. Thus E. L. Allen: "Grundtvig and Kierkegaard". Congregational Quarterly Vol. 24, 1946. p. 209: "Kierkegaard's lonely individualism achieves sublimity at times by reason of its religious character: it is of the individual 'before God' that he speaks. But even so it is unsatisfying, for the individual is still an isolated unit, and if he has relations to God he seems to have none to his fellows. The Church as a religious fellowship hardly exists for Kierkegaard, but only the Church as an institution, and a highly questionable one at that". Also James Collins: The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago 1953) p. 238: "Kierkegaard's recounting of Christ's life is austere and highly selective. He passes over in silence those portions of the Johannine Gospel which record Christ's solicitude and effective prayer for unity and community among believers lest they weaken his insistence that the spiritual combat is an individual, solitary struggle".

61. V. Lindström: Stadiernas Teologi pps. 10 - 11

62. Henriksen: op. cit. p. 149

63. Lindström: Kierkegaard's Individualism pps. 21 - 22

64. ibid. pps. 22 - 23. Cf. Efterfoljesens Teologi pps. 173 - 4

65. ibid. p. 23


67. Either-Or Vol. II pps. 266 - 7

68. See Lindström: Efterfoljesens Teologi p. 167. However, it must be noted that in his discussion of The Instant Lindström expresses strong doubts with regard to the possibility of finding a positive view of the Church behind the final attack (ibid. p. 226). But he still insists that any such sundering of den Enkelte from the community is not the consequence of an individualistic tendency permeating the whole authorship. (ibid. p. 227). Rather, it is the upshot of Kierkegaard's changed view of Christian discipleship. Here, it seems to me, Lindström is at his weakest. In effect he recommends the severing of "the Attack" from the rest of the authorship for the purposes of attaining a body of literature able to sustain the kind of interpretation Lindström wishes to employ. It is wrong to begin with The Instant when interpreting Kierkegaard, but it is equally wrong to stop short of it. If the interpretation one offers cannot bear the starkness of "the attack", then it is the interpretation which must be reviewed. Per Wagdal, who follows Lindström in many ways, tries to get over this difficulty by
emphasising the need to read the Church battle with the positive view of Gemeinskap as found in Works of Love, for example, firmly in mind. (Vagndal: pps. 126 - 7). This is certainly an improvement on Lindström's position because it takes account of Kierkegaard's authorship - including the Instant - as a totality. Almost certainly Kierkegaard wanted the polemics of the last years to be qualified by his earlier authorship, and a great deal of the misunderstanding evident in the debate following the "attack" would have been avoided if Kierkegaard's detractors had taken greater cognizance of his earlier work. However, there is a danger that the attack might be explained away by reference to positive views expressed in the early authorship. It is my feeling that Vagndal does not wholly avoid this trap. The challenge of the Instant is characterised by an incisiveness which no amount of comparative study can allay.

Similar reservations in respect of Vagndal's work are felt by Sponheim (op. cit. pps. 209 n. 37) and Niels Thulstrup (Review of Vagndal's book in Ledendeiser af Soren Kierkegaard Selskabet Vol. 5. Kbh. 1955 no. 2. pps. 11 - 12)


70. Lindström: Studierne Teologi p. 228

71. ibid. p. 233

72. Bohlin: op. cit. p. 116

73. Sponheim: op. cit. p. 40 and note 128

74. Pap. II A 172. Predictably enough Vernard Eller quotes this entry in support of his claim that, as early as 1837, Kierkegaard was taking the first steps along the road towards a sectarian, Gemeinschaft (Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship). Princeton 1968. pps. 343 - 4). Eller is right in detecting here "a dissatisfaction with the usual crowd institutions" but he is wrong in his inference that Kierkegaard aspired to replace these institutions with a sectarian idea of community.

75. Henning Hoirup finds this inner struggle revealed in Either-Or Vol. II pps. 100 - 101. Here Judge William discusses with the aesthete the Church's marriage ceremony. He puts the following words into the aesthete's mouth: "The congregation ... the dear congregation which in spite of its multiplicity is nevertheless a moral person! Would that, along with the tiresome traits which all moral persons have, it possessed the good trait, that it had one head upon a single neck ... like Caligula, I know what I would do".

76. See Bohlin: Kierkegaard's Tro p. 210


78. Sponheim: op. cit. p. 209. Cf. ibid. pps. 105 - 9: "In looking at (the) material which constitutes the synthesis rhythm, we also find the most persuasive reasons for rejecting the suggestion that Kierkegaard's thought logically leads to the twin perils of theoretical solipsism and practical egoism". See James Collins: The Mind of Kierkegaard p. 156

79. Pap. II A 579. See also Pap. I A 177 f; II A 53, 187, 223, 522; III A 38, 216; VII I A 20: "Den Enkelte relates himself first to God and then to Kenigheden; this first relationship is the highest, but the latter is not to be despised".
80. Bradley R. Dewey has provided a useful summary of what længeten signifies for Kierkegaard. (The New Obedience, Corpus Books, Washington 1968, pp. 172 - 3). The emphasis is clearly laid on længeten as conveying a qualitative meaning with the quantitative overtones being purely accidental: "The stray sheep is just as sheep-like as the one in the midst of the herd. One person alone can have the characteristic of the masses". Dewey defends Kierkegaard against charges of isolationism and asserts that the notion of "a gathered Church" is entirely consistent with his ideal. (ibid., pps. 179 - 80)

81. *Purity of heart* pps. 162 - 3

82. *Pap. I A 66*

83. *Pap. II A 136*

84. *The Present Age* pps. 90 f.

85. *ibid.* p. 70

86. *ibid.* pps. 82 - 3

87. Samlede Vaerker Second Edition. Vol. VIII pps. 71 - 2. See Vagndal: op. cit., p. 69: "When community, with men, takes the place of community with God, then the very idea of community becomes something which must be combated. If, on the contrary, community becomes an organic linking of men based on faith in God which unites and binds everyone together, then it is something good and defensible". Vagndal offers the following summary (ibid., p. 85): "When Kierkegaard talks about the individual (den Enkelte) and the congregation (lenighetens) he wishes to give expression to both Christianity's intensive and its extensive work. Here, as usual in his thought, one must hold together the dialectic as a whole".

88. Let it be clear what we are saying here. We are not agreeing with Eller when he writes: "Kierkegaard's most basic premise was not 'den Enkelte before God' but actually 'Enkelte in Gemeinschaft before God'". Rather, the individual's relationship to God is always central for Kierkegaard - Gemeinschaft (lenighetet) never bisects this relationship. (V. Eller: op. cit., p. 352)

89. John Wild has argued that "(Kierkegaard's) attack upon mass standardisation and his passionate concern for the individual person often led him towards an existential solipsism which seemed to deny the possibility of intersubjective communication". (Kierkegaard and Contemporary Existentialist Philosophy". A Kierkegaard Critique p. 33). But I am in agreement with H. P. Sjursen when he writes: "Wild has correctly indicated a problem in the Kierkegaardian authorship, but to conclude that this is the main thrust of his position, as some others have done, represents a fundamental misunderstanding of Kierkegaard". (Kierkegaardiana Vol. VIII 1971 p. 200: "Method and Perspective when reading Kierkegaard").

Looking back over his authorship in 1849, Kierkegaard wrote: "Religiously speaking there is no such thing as a public, but only individuals ... (and in so far as there is, in a religious sense, such a thing as a 'congregation', this is a concept which lies on the other side of den Enkelte and which is by no means to be mixed up with such things as have political importance: the public, the masses, the numerical etc)". Samlede Vaerker Vol. XIII p. 533. Whether it is significant that the bracketed part of this quotation is relegated to a footnote is doubtful. Hoirup, wishing to establish the negativity of Kierkegaard's
view of the Church, thinks this is significant. Whilst "the individual" is emphasised in the text, the concept reigned appears only in "a hypothetical note". (H. Hoirup: Grundtvig s Syn paa Tro og Arkansas, Kbh. 1969, p. 324). In a Journal entry Kierkegaard avoids this ambiguity by stating categorically that, once one has grasped the absoluteness in every individual then "organic development will acquire its more profound and full worth, just as assuredly as an army would not be the worse because every soldier is a general in spirit".

Kierkegaard's significance for the development of Grundtvig's Church view of this move into an actual pastoral situation is discussed by Holger Begtrup: N.F.S. Grundtvig s Kirkebøger, 1825. En historisk Indledning, Kbh. 1901, p. 6 - 29. Ritherto he had been an orthodox biblical Christian, but now he begins to value more and more the living witness of the congregation. See also Grethe Bulow-Olsen: Grundtvigs Kirkebygning, Kr. Kirkeskrifter (edited by Hal Koch), Kbh. 1960, p. 88: "... when he again became a pastor, in 1821 ... his Christianity became churchly. He recognised that first and foremost the Church is the congregation as a living community gathered around the sacraments".

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90. Hal Koch: op. cit. p. 110
91. ibid. p. 110
92. ibid. p. 111
93. Paa I A 60 ff. Cf. ibid. p. 112
94. Fear and Trembling p. 121
95. Kierkegaard is fond of referring to Grundtvig's "matchless discovery" (See Either-Or Vol. I p. 407; Stampa p. 64) and it is probably from him rather than Grundtvig himself that the phrase originates (So Hal Koch: N.F.S. Grundtvig, Kbh. 1959, p. 149; H. Hoirup: Kristligt Dagblad 2nd March 1953). However, Thulstrup does point to a place in p. 334 where Grundtvig speaks of "a matchless discovery" with reference to the Creed. (Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift II p. 186)
96. The significance for the development of Grundtvig's Church view of this move into an actual pastoral situation is discussed by Holger Begtrup: N.F.S. Grundtvig's Kirkebøger, 1825. En historisk Indledning, Kbh. 1901, p. 6 - 29. Ritherto he had been an orthodox biblical Christian, but now he begins to value more and more the living witness of the congregation. See also Grethe Bulow-Olsen: Grundtvigs Kirkebygning, Kr. Kirkeskrifter (edited by Hal Koch), Kbh. 1960, p. 88: "... when he again became a pastor, in 1821 ... his Christianity became churchly. He recognised that first and foremost the Church is the congregation as a living community gathered around the sacraments".

97. Hal Koch: op. cit. p. 110
100. Hal Koch: op. cit. p. 111
103. Hoirup refers to Grundtvig's charge that Lutheranism had become a schoolroom, not a Church. See Grundtvig, paa Tro og Arkansas p. 318 and Udvalede Skrifter IV, p. 552 - 3. For a full discussion of Grundtvig's conflict with the "scripture principle" see Hoirup: ibid. p. 275 - 289
104. Hal Koch: op. cit. p. 119
105. See G. Bulow-Olsen: op. cit. p. 99. "Grundtvig's defence of the awakened became in every respect decisively significant for his own later form of
attack. It became the struggle for the rights of the congregation which forced him from a Bible-based position over to a position vindicating the old symbols to which every priest — including the rationalists — were bound by oath.


109. Hoirup: *op. cit.* p. 320

110. Hoirup (*Loc. Cit.*) quotes the couplet:

Kirken er Guds - menigheden,

Hverken mindre eller mer.

*(Selmer og Sædelige Sange af Nik Fred Sev Grundtvig* Vol. IV no. 80)

111. N.F.S. Grundtvig: "Kirkenes Gjennemfremgang* mod Professor Theologiae Dr. H.N. Clausen". *Udvælget Skrifter* IV pps. 395 ff. See Begtrup: *op. cit.* pps. 130 - 161

112. Hoirup: *op. cit.* p. 320

113. Hal Koch: *op. cit.* pps. 125 - 6. Note that Grundtvig did not take this claim so far as did some of his followers — especially Kierkegaard's brother Peter who believed and taught that the Creed was actually spoken verbatim by Christ in the period between the Resurrection and the Ascension. See Hal Koch: *Den danske Kirkes Historie* Vol. VI 1954. pps. 235 - 55

114. Hoirup: *op. cit.* pps. 322 - 3. See also Hoirup: "Grundtvig and Kierkegaard": Their views of the Church" p. 333

115. Principally we shall be concerned here with *Pap.* I A 56 - 62, *Postscript* pps. 35 - 45 and the papers relating to *Postscript* especially *Pap.* VI B 29 - 34. It may be noticed that eleven years separate the early Journal entries from *Postscript.* This prompts Halantschuk to write: "Kierkegaard seems to have deliberated upon the issues implicit in the theory of the Church with such thoroughness that eleven years later he could use almost without change his critical observations in his treatment of this theory in *Postscript.*". (*Kierkegaard's Thought* p. 113)

116. *Pap.* I A 54, 55

117. *Cf.* *Pap.* VI A 153

118. *Postscript* pps. 25 - 35


120. See *Postscript* p. 38: "The difficulty with the New Testament as a document belonging to the past appears now to be obviated in the case of the Church, which of course exists in the present. On this point Grundtvig's theory has merit". But despite this acknowledgement Kierkegaard strongly attacks this solution. For example, see *Pap.* I A 56 - 58: *Postscript* pps. 38 - 40 and *Cf.* H. Toftdahl: *Kierkegaard* *Først og Grundtvig* 44. Kob. 1969. p. 84

121. *Postscript* p. 25

122. *Note* the Journal entry on Grundtvig which begins: "The subjectivity which I think must be central for the Church ..." (*Pap.* I A 56)
124. Postscript p. 35
125. Postscript p. 35. Cf. Pap. V A 94: "The stupid thing about Grundtvig is that he wants to have certainty in the realm of the spirit"
127. Pap. I A 60 pps. 26 - 7
129. Pap. I A 61. Cf. I A 97 where the latest trend towards elevating the Creed to a position of supreme importance is linked with exaltation of the Papacy and the Bible as attitudes necessarily contributing to the corruption of Christianity. The common factor is the setting up of objective boundaries.
130. Pap. I A 60 pps. 27 - 29
131. Postscript pps. 39 - 40
132. See Halantschuk: Kierkegaard's Thought p. 285
133. Postscript p. 325
135. Lindhardt: op. cit. p. 41
136. Ibid. p. 48
138. Hoirup: op. cit. p. 328
139. Hoirup: Grundtvigs Syn paa Tro og Erkendelse p. 322. See also H. Toftdahl: op. cit. pps. 88 f.
140. Postscript pps. 52 - 3
141. Speculative philosophy is the principle object of attack in this section of Postscript, but we may recall the rhetorical question found in Kierkegaard's notes to this work. (Pap. VI B 29 p. 109): "is the discovery (i.e. Grundtvig's) a pendant to the Hegelian - that the external is the internal and the internal is the external?"
142. See Fear and Trembling p. 121: "In the Sermon on the Mount it said, 'when thou fastest, anoint thine head and wash thy face, that thou be not seen of men to fast'". This passage bears witness directly to the truth that subjectivity is incommensurable with reality; yea, that it has leave to deceive. If only the people who in our age go gabbling about with vague talk about the congregational idea were to read the New Testament, they would perhaps get other ideas into their heads". Cf. Pap. IV A 86.
143. op. cit. p. 89
144. Postscript p. 326
145. Loc. Cit.
146. Postscript pps. 28, 416
148. V. Adler: op. cit. p. 342
149. In addition to the places already cited see Postscript pps. 222, 53½, 378, 500 where Lenin denotes those who listen to sermons. This usage parallels Kierkegaard's references, especially in the edifying discourses, to Leninisten as the recipients of Paul's letters. So, for example, Edifying Discourses. Edited D.¥. and L. H. Swenson Vol. II p. 45 and Pps. IV A 153.
150. See Postscript p. 33. In Philosophical Fragments Swenson even offers the completely non-ecclesiastical translation: "the general public" (p. 118)
151. Either-Or Vol. I p. 202; II pps. 52 - 4; 56 - 7; 90 - 95; Stages p. 370 and Pps. IV A 522 where a dichotomy in the Church's structure is implicitly accepted.
152. See Fear and Trembling p. 121; Present Age pps. 90 ff; Pps. IV A 86.
153. See Lindström: Stadiernas Teologi p. 156: "Grundtvig's Church theory corresponds to the catholic doctrine of papal infallibility and is likewise an attempt to exclude dialectic from the individual's relationship to God. However, this cannot achieve fulfilment other than through the 'leap of faith'.
154. op. cit. p. 77
155. ibid. pps. 212 - 3
156. Postscript p. 176
THE ATTACK

We now come to the final period of Kierkegaard's activity as an author. The Church committed that decisive act of self-condemnation through the lips of Professor Martensen early in February, 1854.¹ From the Pulpit (this phrase occurs so often in the opening pages of the "Attack" that we are justified in giving it some emphasis) — from the pulpit Martensen described the late Bishop Mynster as a "witness to the truth". In Lowrie's words, "Martensen had provided him with a good opening, too good to be ignored".² In fact, there was no chance that Kierkegaard might ignore it. We have already seen how he wrestled with the problem of how he might encounter the failure of his contemporaries to understand the essentials of his Christian teaching. Any action he took might only be justified in so far as it conformed to the twin conditions he himself had laid down. Having no specific divine call, he could only perform the poet's task of making people aware — he must stop short of passing direct judgements. Furthermore, because faith can only be the end point of an individual's act of free will, every opportunity must be left open for his contemporaries to honestly face up to the demands of Christian discipleship, and to the extent of their own deviance from those standards. In short, if there is to be any act of condemnation, then the Church must condemn itself, not as the result of a process of honest self-appraisal but rather, on the basis of a dishonest assessment of its true relationship to the Christianity of the New Testament. Martensen's eulogy met these conditions precisely.

The debate which followed Kierkegaard's "Fatherland" articles of December 1854 has often been called "the witness to the truth" debate and this is basically correct. Kierkegaard has used the term in his most recent works and now Martensen had used it. Thus the debate revolved very much around the question as to what each man meant by this term, and whether one or the other was correct in his usage. But we must not lose sight of the fact that it was Bishop Mynster who was thus described. If Martensen
had simply issued a learned article attacking Kierkegaard's use of the
term "witness to the truth" then the subsequent debate would never have
reached the proportions it did. It was the introduction of a personality,
the eminent and sometimes controversial personality of Mynster, which
fired the emotions and released the spring of impassioned reaction. Thus
we must consider Mynster's life, career and personality if we are to under-
stand the issues behind the initial furore. Here was a man who had
distinguished himself as a Bishop, a man who had made his mistakes and yet
had managed to meet the upheavals of his episcopal reign with great
practical wisdom and perspicacity. Surely such a man could fairly be
described as a "witness to the truth". Not, says Kierkegaard, according
to the canons of Christian truth as expressed in the pseudonymous, edifying
and religious authorship. Because of the paradoxical dialectical nature of
the Christian truth, the qualities which go to warrant the title of "witness
to the truth" differ considerably from those which made Mynster into a worldly
success. Kierkegaard had no desire to deny Mynster such claims to temporal
admiration - he was the chief of his admirers. However, there must be an
honest admission that such qualities fall short of the ideal Christian demand
before they can be correctly evaluated. If such an admission had been made
by Mynster himself, then Kierkegaard would have stood forward as his most
fervent defender. But no such admission was forthcoming, whilst Martensen
made claims for Mynster which could only be justified on the basis of such
an admission. Thus the Church condemned itself through Martensen's words
from the pulpit, and Kierkegaard felt able to launch a direct protest.

Mynster's death was an event of considerable significance. The subsequent
funeral and memorial services attracted large congregations which included
the major figures in Danish political, cultural and Church life. Their
presence gave credence to Tryde's declaration that Mynster "was truly a
Prince in the spiritual kingdom of his age. Even if not everyone was
devoted to him with the same affection, everyone held him in sincere respect".
Tryde was one of three men to deliver eulogies at the funeral service, the others were Ængelstoft and Rudebach. However, Welter reports that "many were of the opinion that the memorial address for the dead Bishop delivered two days previously by Professor Martensen from his pulpit in Slotskirken was far better than the memorials now proclaimed under the roof of Frue Kirke". The significance of Martensen's contribution is borne out by its early publication in Berlingske Tidende and subsequent appearance as a monograph. Whatever we may think about Kierkegaard's jibe to the effect that, by his words in remembrance of Mynster, Martensen brought to remembrance his claims to the vacant episcopal see, it is a fact that this eulogy deeply affected those who heard and read it, thus lending weight to Martensen's cause.

The eulogy was basically concerned with Mynster's talents as a preacher: extolling both the quality of his delivery and the strength of the faith thus preached. The text was Hebrews 13, verses 7 and 8 which exorts its hearers to "remember your leaders, those who spoke to you the word of God". Martensen begins by emphasising the extent of Mynster's influence: "We remember what he for more than half a century has been not only for a single congregation, but for the whole Church in our land, for country and people ... indeed, also outside the borders of our homeland he is remembered in gratitude, in blessings". But then he narrows the area of concern down to the special blessings received through Mynster's words by the congregation at Slotskirken "where it was his constant joy to preach God's word". Thus Martensen defines his main concern at this time in terms of Mynster's role as occasional preacher to this particular congregation. Here Mynster enunciated the faith for which he lived and died, the faith in Jesus Christ as the same yesterday, today and forever. As the text goes on to teach, this is the faith which must be imitated - the faith of genuine witnesses to the truth. It is at this point Martensen makes his celebrated incorporation of Mynster "into the holy chain of witnesses to the truth which stretches through the ages from the Apostle's days up to our own". With them Mynster shares the
distinction of having had unbroken faith in Christ as always the same despite all worldly mutations and, most significantly for Martensen's purposes, this was the faith he communicated from the pulpit to his generation. This he did despite the shallowness of the Christianity in vogue when no answer was found to the most important question of all: "What must I do to be saved?". Then Mynster stopped forward to preach his Gospel of conversion and grace through Christ the Saviour - "the Saviour whom he had himself sought and found through his life's internal struggles ... without which nobody really finds the peace of Christ".

But now, Mynster's preaching will be heard no longer, and there will be those who feel that they can never again receive genuine edification regarding God's word. However, Martensen assures his hearers of Christ's promise to be with his people even unto the World's end. He illustrates the point by making a further implicit comparison between Mynster and the Apostles. "The Apostles died when they had fulfilled their duty, but the Lord remained with the Word, the Spirit and the Holy Sacraments; the Lord remained and equipped himself with new disciples, thus his mission continued from generation to generation, and shall continue until the end of days".

The sermon concludes with a lengthy prayer of thanksgiving to God for all that Mynster has been to his people - for his long life and good health, for the enlightenment which came through his words and witness, for his leadership, for his noble bearing which gave the impression of his body as a true Temple for the Holy Spirit.

"And above all, thank you Father because he did not only witness with word and profession but in deed and truth; also because his life for us was an unforgettable edifying lesson, confirmation of the inner man which now continues for us as a sustaining memory to which we will often turn back during our life's pilgrimage".

This last sentence represents one of only two occasions during the sermon when Martensen speaks about Mynster's life and work. Although his text enjoined readers to "consider the outcome of (their leader's) life", the sermon is mainly concerned with Mynster's preaching and the faith which
he offers for imitation. Yet Kierkegaard still picks on one of these passing references as a point of attack against Martensen. Perhaps Kierkegaard could have made a far more forceful judgement on the basis of Martensen's relative lack of concern for Mynster's existential deportment.

It can be said in Martensen's defence that this particular sermon was primarily directed at a congregation which had more direct personal contact with the late Bishop through his preaching than any other of his activities. Nonetheless, it is true that Martensen accords Mynster a place amongst the Apostles and witnesses to the truth almost entirely on the basis of his preaching, with scant attention paid to the reduplication of this preaching in his existence. The fact that Kierkegaard picked upon an unrepresentative reference to Mynster's faith as expressed "not merely by word and profession, but in deed and truth" 12 is indicative of his primary concern not so much to attack Martensen's limited perspective as to emphasise the deceased Bishop's existential deviance from what is required of a genuine witness to the truth. When we read Martensen's sermon and then Kierkegaard's opening article in Faedrelandet we are left in little doubt that the former only provided an occasion for the latter. Kierkegaard makes no real attempt to answer Martensen's eulogy - the ten month delay before publication would have rendered his protest irrelevant if it had been too closely bound up with the offending sermon. Rather, Martensen here gave Kierkegaard the chance to say what he had to say about Mynster, what he had been bottling up for so long. To convey this message Kierkegaard could afford to wait until the time was absolutely right without feeling under any constraint to make an immediate protest against Martensen's memorial address. As we shall see, Kierkegaard only made a direct attack upon Martensen once the latter had joined in the actual debate - and then Kierkegaard's remarks were confined to a footnote. 13

But now we must revert to the original time of the sermon and Kierkegaard's composition of the opening article. The article is unusual by virtue of the fact that it was written during one of Kierkegaard's prolonged rests
from writing entries in his Journal. One such period of silence occurred at the beginning of 1838 and before his authorship began. Now there is a pause between November 1853 and the following March - in all a period of four and a half months. Mynster's death occurred on January 30th whilst Kierkegaard's article is dated February 1854. With Geismar, it seems best to exclude explanations for this silence which suppose the loss of entries from this period, or uncertainties arising from Mynster's illness. After all, the Bishop's death came fairly soon after his falling ill. There is no evidence that Kierkegaard was himself sick, indeed, he himself denies this. However, it was obviously a period of great indecision and tactical uncertainty. During December he resolved to break with the tradition of hearing Mynster preach - a tradition sanctified by its association with his father's memory. On Boxing Day he took the decisive step of going to hear Kolthorf. This act was decisive because it signalled the end of Kierkegaard's hopes with regard to Mynster's admission. Kierkegaard had always seen the value of retaining an outward identification with the State Church, because if the admission had been made then his authorship could readily become its defence - the Preface and Moral to Training in Christianity still remained with their assurance of Grace after honesty. On that Boxing Day in 1853, Kierkegaard relinquished all hopes in this direction. But yet whilst Mynster still lived, there seemed to be no obvious path to a direct attack, beyond this symbolic gesture. When Kierkegaard did finally resume his Journal he begins with that penetrating monosyllabic declaration: "Now he is dead". We may assume that this was the fact which dominated Kierkegaard's silence. It is interesting to speculate upon what Kierkegaard would have done had Mynster not taken ill and died when he did. Because of his Boxing Day decision, we may feel that he would have entered into a direct attack upon the State Church and its Primate without waiting any longer. But to have done so would have been to go against his own oft expressed principles and desires with regard to the proper treatment of his father's priest, who
must first be buried "with full music". With this in mind, we may feel that he would rest content with his gesture of protest and continue to delay launching an open assault until Mynster was dead. Does this silence indicate that Kierkegaard was deeply at odds with himself over the course of action he should adopt? For so long, Kierkegaard had dwelt upon the dual possibility of Mynster either making the admission or dying in stubborn silence. Now the heightened improbability of the former event occurring, coupled with the delay of the latter event created a tension in Kierkegaard's mind which was further complicated by fear of his own premature death. He had nothing new to write in his Journal about those things which concerned him most at this time and the penultimate entry prior to the break contains a full account of his career. He begins that entry by denying any desire "to note down the religious impressions, thoughts, expressions as I use them myself, they are, as it were, too important for that ... And only when a word like that is, so to say, used up can it occur to me to note it down or let it become part of my productivity". The ensuing silence indicates that Kierkegaard still has some "impressions, thoughts, expressions" which need "using up" before committing himself to writing again. As he wrestles with the uncertainties of his present situation, he cannot but be silent.

Now, surprisingly enough, Kierkegaard wrote an article for publication whilst he was still silent in his Journal. This was entitled: "Was Bishop Mynster a 'witness to the truth', one of the 'genuine witnesses to the truth' - is this the truth?" It was dated February 1854 and we may assume that it was written towards the middle of that month. It gives the impression of having been written in immediate response to Martensen's sermon after it was published in Berlingske Tidende, whilst the absence of the customary several drafts and notes reinforces the view that only a short period separated the sermon from Kierkegaard's aggressive response. Such promptness indicates the strength of Kierkegaard's feelings of contempt and outrage. With this in mind, the fact that he managed to resist publishing this sole
product of those silent months until the following December appears all
the more remarkable.

Kierkegaard himself offers definite reasons for delaying the publi-
cation of the article. These reasons fall into two categories. On the
one hand there were issues of short term expediency. Thus Kierkegaard
explains:

"So long as there was question of appointment to the episcopal
see of Seeland, I thought that I ought to say nothing publicly concerning
Professor Martensen; for whether he were to become bishop or not, in any
case he was a candidate for this office, and presumably desired that so
long as this situation lasted as little as possible should happen
concerning him.

"With Professor Martensen's nomination as bishop this consideration
lapsed. But then again the article could not be published and therefore
was not. My thought was that there was no reason for haste. Moreover,
the nomination of Bishop Martensen called forth an attack upon him from
another side and an entirely different sort; it would have been more than
superfluous for me to coincide with this attack; so I waited". 17

So Kierkegaard was waiting for the in-fighting to be resolved by the
appointment of Løynster's successor. In addition, he was anxious not to
offer any impediment to the collection of donations towards a monument for
the late Bishop. He expresses satisfaction that "for the monument to him
there has surely by this time been received pretty much all that will be
received". 18 On the other hand, Kierkegaard hints at reasons for the
delay which go much deeper than these immediate considerations:

"My thought was, as I have said, that there was no reason for
haste, and that nothing is lost by waiting. Someone may even find
that something is gained, may find a deeper significance in the fact
that the protest comes so tardily". 19

Because the issues with which Kierkegaard was concerned were of far
more importance than the isolated incidence of an abuse of terminology by
Martensen, Kierkegaard was sure that there was "no reason for haste".

As regards the appointment of a new Bishop, if precedent was anything
to go on then the delay would only be a matter of weeks. However, on
this occasion there was no obvious undisputed successor to Løynster. It was
only to be expected that the prevailing trend towards factionalism in the
Danish Church should make it difficult for any one individual to rise head
and shoulders above the rest and win general approval. So, as Weltzer puts it,
"there was a number of honest and good men of the Church who mutually nominated each other for the bishopric". 20 But of this number, H.N. Clausen and Martensen emerged as the chief contenders. Their campaigns were vigorous and every effort was made to enlist the support of influential people. Clausen seemed to have the most important supporter of all in the shape of King Frederick himself. However, the highly respected views of A. S. Ørsted finally prevailed and Martensen was appointed. He was nominated as bishop on 15th April, 1854 and his consecration took place on Whit Monday, 15th June. 21 Kierkegaard did not want to become identified with any of the contending parties, especially as many of the issues brought under consideration would have seemed irrelevant to his present state of mind. Was Martensen's position on the Slesvig-Holstein question really of any importance when the basic validity of the State Church's right to call itself Christian was in doubt? 22 Thus Kierkegaard remained silent. In his own mind, he was in little doubt about the dubiety of the tactics adopted by the respective contestants. We especially note his sarcastic comment that Martensen's address might well be called a speech of remembrance "for the reason that it brought to Professor Martensen's remembrance the vacant episcopal see". 23 But Kierkegaard "would not prevent Martensen from advancing his career; he was not pursuing any worldly aim; he did not wish to do Martensen any personal harm". 24

The same might be said of Kierkegaard's attitude to the collection of money towards Mynster's monument. Whilst he didomit the panegyric upon Mynster's human greatness, and substitute for it the postscript reciting the extent of Mynster's worldly wisdom when the article finally appeared in December, still Kierkegaard did not want to interfere in the current plans for a memorial. 25 In short, he did not want his "Attack" to be misunderstood as a short-term critique with only a limited objective. When issues of such gravity are at stake, the question of Mynster's monument assumes very small proportions. Kierkegaard is prepared for Mynster to be given a suitable memorial, just as he was anxious for him to be buried "with full music". 
But to hear him described as a witness to the truth — that could not pass without a protest. When Kierkegaard speaks of something being gained, some deeper significance resulting from the protest being delayed, he must be referring to the chance thus given for things of only passing interest to be set aside. If his protest had been made straight away, then people would inevitably have interpreted it as an assault on Hartensen's suitability for the primacy or on the propriety of erecting a monument to Lynster. How easy it would then have been for Kierkegaard's protest to be written off in terms of personal malice and envy. Perhaps the delay would do something to draw his readers away from matters of such little importance and on towards the real issues which were of such deeper significance.

So the article sat in Kierkegaard's study waiting for the time when it should see the light of day. What did Kierkegaard do during these long months of waiting? How did his thinking develop and his tactics evolve?

In so far as his thinking and tactics underwent any kind of development, then it was in a negative direction. This point has been strongly argued by Geismar and there would appear to be a good deal of evidence in support of his position. Of most significance is the fact that Kierkegaard replaced a panegyric upon Lynster's worldly stature with a postscript describing his worldly wisdom and personal self-indulgence. However, we must beware of drawing the wrong conclusions from this revision. From Kierkegaard's point of view, there is no qualitative distinction to be made between calling a man of great worldly stature a witness to the truth or describing a worldly-wise and self-indulgent man as a witness to the truth. Because of the heterogeneity involved in being a witness, the excellency or otherwise of one's temporal standing is, at best, irrelevant. Of itself, Kierkegaard's replacement of the panegyric by the postscript does not point to any shift in the substance of his point of view. But it is indicative of how his tactics developed. So long as Lynster was alive, the possibility of the admission made it necessary for Kierkegaard to keep his option to be the primate's defender open. Kierkegaard did not want to call into question
Mynster's undoubted talents as a pastor and administrator. Rather, his main concern was with evoking a keener awareness of what Christianity existentially entails and what is really involved in being a witness to the truth. At that time he was more concerned with answering the question: what does it mean to be a Christian? than he was with attacking Mynster's right to be described as such. He is concerned to draw out the existential implications of his main thesis that truth is subjectivity. Circumstances had forced him to become more direct in his style of writing and in his mode of publication - thus tending to invite people to draw direct comparisons between his picture of the Christian life and the lives of contemporary Christians. But so far, he had not openly sought to juxtapose the life-style of one man over against his own severe definition of what it means to live in this world as a Christian. But now, during these months of silence, he became convinced that his cause could be best served by nothing less than the raising of a storm amongst the complacencies of contemporary Danish Christendom. There was now no need for Mynster's worldly stature to be upheld. Only the possibility of the admission made such respect an integral part of Kierkegaard's strategy. Now Mynster had to be set in diametrical opposition to the Christianity of the New Testament - then his readers must judge for themselves in terms of this dialectic. Inevitably, now that he had set himself to provoke a response, then the severity of his Christian definition became sharpened in direct proportion to the severity of his judgement upon Mynster. The tightening of Kierkegaard's view of Christianity is apparent at many points in the Journals from those months of quiet waiting.

On reading the Journals from these months, what immediately strikes one is the unrestrained severity of Kierkegaard's references to the clergy. His fundamental objection is that they are hypocrites in so far as they "turn the dead man's life and work and witness into profit for themselves and their families". At most they "read what has cost others mortal struggles and then use it as purple passages in their sermons". This is summed up in the frightful accusation that:
"The 'priests' (the Protestant priest, the pastor) and the professor are cannibals...

"And they are more abominable and gruesome than the cannibals.

"It is easy to see that they are cannibals: for they live on the fact that others have been killed, persecuted, maltreated for the sake of the truth.

"And this is more gruesome than the cannibals. For evil is always more horrible the longer it lasts. Cannibals kill a man and eat him - and that is that. It lasts only a short time, and when it is over, there is as it were a hope - till the next time - that the cannibal become a different man, might become better. But the priest and the professor make their preparations (with cold calculations) once for all to live on the sufferings of the saints. They get married on the strength of them, they beget children, they organise an idyllic and thoroughly enjoyable life. They live on the torments of the saints. Then they calculate how to augment their income - so with revolting coolness they arrange to live as cannibals; but no cannibal was ever so disgusting. In vain those saints cry to us, 'Follow me, follow me!' The priest and the professor stifle those voices, so that we do not hear them. And so they live, having taken possession of their prey - the saints on whose suffering they live."

The following year, Kierkegaard expanded these expressions and published them in the ninth number of The Instant. But at this earlier stage they stand as evidence of a new sharpening of Kierkegaard's invective against the priests. For this ascription of cannibalistic epithets is only part of a general increase in crude insults directed against the clergy. They are variously described as "assinine", disgustingly hypocritical, cunning and subtle liars after the fashion of women, false teachers, actors, and also as "a gang of politicians in silk and velvet". However critical Kierkegaard may have been in earlier Journals, here we see him at his most vitriolic, having cast off virtually all semblance of self-restraint. The clergy have set on one side all the rigours of true Christianity and by their very existence they now make Christianity "impossible". Kierkegaard is doubtful whether the priests would give up their comfortable livings even if it were to be proved completely that Christ never existed and that the whole thing was a fiction.

Furthermore, as the following quotation shows, the very institution of priesthood has served to make God distant - and there could be no harsher judgement than that:
"The law for God's farness (and this is the history of Christianity) is that everything that strengthens the appearance makes God distant ... When there were no priests, but the Christians were all brothers, then God was nearer to reality than when there were priests, many priests, a powerful priesthood. For priests are an increase in the direction of appearance, and God is related inversely to the phenomenon". 39

So in the months between Kynster's death and the opening of the attack, Kierkegaard's Journals show a marked turn in the direction of a greater severity in respect of the clergy.

Similarly, in this period, Kierkegaard also gave utterance to a radical misogyny. His relationship to Regina had naturally made him suspicious of any simple solution to the problem of love and marriage. But for most of his life he was prepared to interpret this experience as part of his own special calling - his "thorn in the flesh". However, in 1854, he declares: "Now after a long time I see that what was special to me is what Christianity calls the general, the normal: I see that Christianity holds by man's single state and rather makes marriage the special case". 40

Here Kierkegaard freely admits that he has changed his position with regard to what Christianity teaches about the relative merits of celibacy and marriage. This is brought out most clearly in his attitude to Luther's marriage. Kierkegaard is sure that, as a symbolic gesture against medieval catholic abuse, Luther's marriage was justified. But "he should have made it quite clear that his marriage was an exception, a corrective". 41 Instead "Luther became the head of all that throng of philoprogenitive men, who trust him and believe that it is a part of true Christianity to get married". 42

Without doubt, Schopenhauer's writing had a real part to play in the manner and timing of Kierkegaard's polemics against women, sex and marriage. 43 But even if he had not made Schopenhauer's acquaintance, still Kierkegaard would have been inclined to take up this negative stance. Not only is it in line with his attack on Luther, but it is also an element in his critique of Grundtvigianism and Judaism. 44 Clearly this is just one more indication of how Kierkegaard tightened his definition of Christianity during these few months of waiting. Now he declares that marriage and procreation of children have no part in the Christian scheme of things. 45 By marriage,
man sells himself to a purely human perspective upon life. From the Christian standpoint, the only good citizen "is he who does not propagate this sinful species". Just as the priest gets in the way of an individual's relationship to God, so the woman leads man (who was made for eternity) into a digression. This last point I believe to be of considerable significance. Whilst Kierkegaard's own psychology and biography must have contributed something towards the emergence of such a polemical outburst against women, sex and marriage; still the outburst must be seen as an element in Kierkegaard's endeavour in the direction of reasserting Christian subjectivity at the expense of current abuses. Basically, there is little point in trying to vindicate even part of Kierkegaard's assault by pointing out that belief in the lostness of most men makes it impossible to look on the process of procreation with joy, or the New Testament's view that it is easier for a single man to relate himself to God than is the case with a married man. These contributions serve only to damn Kierkegaard with faint praise. Rather, we must face the full extent of Kierkegaard's polemic and see it as part of a calculated step towards the isolation of the final dialectical poles between which the readers of The Instant would have to choose, i.e. Mynsterish Christianity or the Christianity of the New Testament. Thus Kierkegaard's misogyny is part of his general tightening of the Christian demand, and it is to this greater severity that we now turn.

This section may be conveniently introduced by some words of Gregor Malantschuk:

"Previously Kierkegaard had always directed men to return to life's concrete tasks. He does not, however, continue this during the attack on the Church; there is only one mitigation, the discourse "The Unchangeableness of God", which points back to his first upbuilding discourses. The way in which the idea of imitation is carried through during the attack upon the Church strongly indicates that at the end Kierkegaard wants to show that the old order has to go and that men are again standing 'at the beginning'". In accordance with such an objective, the months of waiting find Kierkegaard simultaneously embittering his attacks upon contemporary Christianity or Christendom, and emphasising the negative and life-denying aspects of the Christian requirement.
Now Kierkegaard is unequivocal in his assertion that the Christian can no longer "remain among men". Rather, "You must see that you suffer persecution - in order to preserve your heterogeneity, which in turn assures the standard of the individual and the ideal. But in direct continuity with the herd Christianity is impossible". 50

So Kierkegaard repeatedly attacks the current urge to be doing things - including being a Christian - in "association". 51 But by thus uniting men "are fully secured against Christianity. And this is Christendom". 52 From the Christian point of view, numbers serve only to detract from the Ideal and to distract individuals from the true path to be followed. 53 And this path is now almost exclusively defined in terms of suffering, persecution, isolation and even martyrdom. Indeed "the way is narrow", 54 persecution is inevitable, 55 in short, "according to the New Testament, to be a Christian is to be sacrificed". 56 Humanly speaking, to become a Christian is "to become unhappy in this life and to wish it". 57 Furthermore, there can be no question of a man appealing to some kind of hidden suffering: "If the New Testament is to decide what is meant by a true Christian, then to be a Christian in all secrecy, comfortably and enjoyably, is as impossible as firing a cannon in all secrecy". 58 Rather, "in the New Testament things are very different: what God wills is that you should love him. And this means that from the human standpoint you will come to suffer terribly - just because you have come to do with God. For what is the New Testament? It is a handbook for him who is to be sacrificed". 59

In fact, of the entries dating from this period, just under one hundred deal with Christian suffering 60 whilst the themes of martyrdom, 61 Imitation, 62 dying from the world 63(alde) and self-sacrifice 64 also feature regularly. It is clear that for Kierkegaard, these are the subjects which are now of paramount importance along with unrestrained criticisms of Christendom and its adherents. Similarly, grace is only dealt with in terms of Christendom's misuse of its benefits. As Malantschuk says: "Kierkegaard is progressively more attentive to the relation between faith and striving ... In later
Journal entries (he) used sharper expressions to characterise the misuse of grace which occurs with the omission of striving. Thus Kierkegaard's Christian judgement and definition was sharpened as he prepared to enter the sphere of popular journalism. In that sphere, only minimal concessions are made to human weakness and sensibility.

So to the "Attack" itself. Aage Kabell has written:

"Training in Christianity forced everyone to take sides. With the Kirkestorm of 1854 - 1855 one took sides to such an extent as has seldom been seen in this country." 66

Whilst Carl Weltzer states that

"in the course of quite a short time (after the publication of Kierkegaard's first polemical article in The Fatherland of December 18, 1854) the whole country was for or against Kierkegaard's view of the deceased Bishop". 67

These two summary judgements bear witness to the success of Kierkegaard's objective in launching into an open attack. The opening articles can only really be usefully discussed against the background of the debate initiated by the attack on Mynster. So we will undertake to trace chronologically the course of the battle, picking out the major contributions and relating them to Kierkegaard's plan of publication.

On January 31st, 1855, an article appeared in Lolland-Falsters Stiftstidende and was left unsigned. It is a contribution to the provincial paper from its Copenhagen correspondent, and it makes three main points. First of all, he reports that "Kierkegaard's attack upon Bishop Mynster's memory" is one of the major topics of interest in the capital. Secondly, he argues that people would have done Mynster the greatest service by simply ignoring Kierkegaard's attack. By entering into debate with him they are playing right into the hands of this brilliant dialectician. Mynster's memory was quite capable of looking after itself. Thirdly, the point is made that, whilst it is Mynster who is principally under attack in Kierkegaard's articles, Martensen must be seen as a "subsidiary" target. 68

On the first point, a glance at Himmelstrup's bibliography and Kabell's
chronicle of Kierkegaardian literature quickly confirms the impression that the "Attack" was a major talking point in both the religious and secular press - especially in Copenhagen. P. G. Lindhardt believes that Kierkegaard's outburst aroused "surprisingly little debate" and he attributes this to the weakness of the priests' position. During a period of liberalisation they had clung to the Establishment, the prevailing sectarian agitation put them under pressure, and also - one of Lindhardt's special theories - the priests' retreat from the cholera outbreak of 1853 severely damaged their credibility with the general public. In discussing the extent of the reaction to Kierkegaard's attack, of course we are dealing in relative terms, so if we have in view the size of the potential reaction to such a personal assault on the memory of a public figure then Lindhardt may be right. However, it is worth noting that it was not only the priests who took an interest in the case. The debate is distinguished by the number of lay people who made contributions. Furthermore, many priests may have shared the opinion of the Lolland-Falsters Stiftstidende Copenhagen correspondent that the best response to Kierkegaard's attack was a dignified silence whilst Mynster's reputation stood up for itself. Their silence need not necessarily be taken to infer that they were conscious of being in a weak position. As it happens, many priests did make their views known and for each one who took the trouble to write newspaper and periodical articles there must have been many more who restricted themselves to oral debate.

The third point made by the Lolland-Falsters Stiftstidende correspondent is interesting and shows a surprising insight on the part of one writing so early on in the debate. It is certainly right that Martensen's position as a target for Kierkegaard's polemics should be brought to the fore. It is clearly significant for the development of Kierkegaard's attack that Martensen should have been the one to utter the offending phrases in praise of Mynster. An earlier chapter has traced the history of Kierkegaard's relationship to Martensen and it is manifest that no other high-ranking Churchman could have provoked Kierkegaard as violently.
Furthermore, Kierkegaard obviously set great store by how Martensen would react to his attack and was ready to draw definite conclusions from his subsequent silence. But Martensen's role really only becomes highly significant when the issues involved in the Attack are dealt with as merely theoretical problems. If the dividing issues are really only based on a disagreement about the use of the term "witness to the truth" then Martensen, as an employer of the term, is to be seen as the chief target for attack. Doubtless it was Martensen's desire that the issues should be reduced to such a level as is evidenced by his reply to the opening article by Kierkegaard. Generally speaking, people would not like to argue with the view that Mynster preached true Christian doctrine: so if Martensen could persuade them that this is what he meant by referring to the dead Bishop as a witness to the truth then Kierkegaard's cause must be seriously undermined. However, as we have seen, Martensen appeared to Kierkegaard as the paradigmatic "professor", the one who above all should have known and understood his writings and his use of terms like "witness to the truth". Furthermore, as the new Bishop, Martensen replaced Mynster as the representative of the State Church and the Establishment. Thus Kierkegaard's jibes against the Establishment must be taken to include the new head of the Church along with his predecessor. But still it is important to emphasise that Martensen was only a subsidiary target. At the heart of Kierkegaard's polemic is the desire to set Mynster's example over against the Christianity of the New Testament. In protesting against Mynster being called a witness to the truth, Kierkegaard must automatically pass judgement upon him who made such an ascription. But essentially it is Mynster who is under attack.

Kierkegaard begins his first article with a brief resume of the offending points in Martensen's sermon with especial emphasis on the use of "witness to the truth" as descriptive of Bishop Mynster. He says that against such a description he must protest and now he can because Mynster is dead. Anticipating criticism on this point, Kierkegaard records the fact that the demands of brevity prevent him from discussing his prior relationship
to the deceased Bishop. 77 Next, Kierkegaard shows an awareness of two senses in which the word "preaching" might be used and shows how Mynster is in error on both counts. For not only does his preaching contain a watered-down Christianity but also his life is out of character with what he preached - easy going though that is. Thus in no way could Mynster's proclamation of Christianity bear comparison with the New Testament. Not that Mynster himself would have been unprepared to admit as much "before God and to himself" (though not publicly) - and to this extent he was "truthful". But there is absolutely no truth in depicting Mynster as a witness to the truth especially when such a depiction is made "from the pulpit". By so doing, Kierkegaard argues that Martensen has erected a monument to himself rather than to Mynster. 78 Kierkegaard then goes on to describe the life and death of a genuine witness to the truth. It is a life of suffering "unacquainted with everything which is called enjoyment". His sufferings are of the inward spiritual variety as well as of the outward and physical. His death is by crucifixion or beheading or burning. Then Kierkegaard reiterates his horror that Martensen should thus describe Mynster. 79 By so doing, Martensen is guilty of something worse than all heresies and schisms put together - he is guilty of "playing at Christianity". 80

To this article Kierkegaard appended two postscripts. The first is dated Autumn 1854 explaining the delay in publishing his attack. It is possible that Kierkegaard thought about publishing the article at this time. Although the collection for Mynster's memorial was still open, Kierkegaard could reasonably feel that he had left a suitable gap before launching into the attack. The fact that he delayed publication for another three months has to be explained basically in terms of Kierkegaard's own internal heart-searching. In a series of drafts dated "older than the conclusion of 1854" (and so possibly from the period immediately before the appearance of the first article) Kierkegaard wrestles with the problem of whether he can call himself a Christian. 81 This is consistent with an entry from the Journal of mid-December, 1854 82 and it is certain that Kierkegaard
anticipated in his own mind the criticism that he speaks for Christianity whilst confessing to be no Christian. Furthermore, he was still not happy about attacking Lønseth. The final postscript to the article of December 18th contains yet another rehearsal of Kierkegaard's relationship to the Bishop, whilst a string of Journal entries from the same time show that Kierkegaard was still trying to justify his publicly upbraiding Lønseth. So we can say that, right up to the last minute, Kierkegaard was still uncertain about the rights and wrongs of proceeding with his plans. The problem of authority and filial piety continued to control his thinking.

By mid-December 1854, Kierkegaard decided that the collection for Lønseth would have been completed. He gave this as the reason for his being unable "to keep silent any longer". Presumably he had also satisfied himself that he could justifiably embark upon this new direct stage in his authorship.

"The protest must come" he writes, "all the more serious for its tardiness, the protest against representing from the pulpit, that is, before God, Bishop Lønseth as a witness to the truth; for that is false, and proclaimed in this way is a falsehood which cries to heaven".

The immediate reaction to Kierkegaard's article in the press was entirely hostile. Dagbladet was first into the field with a short article signed "A". This paper, under the editorship of C. St. A. Bille, has been described as "one of the times' best journalistic enterprises". Like Faedrelandet, it adopted a generally liberal stance. However, "A" is quick to attack Kierkegaard on the grounds that he now says things about Lønseth which contradict the praises heaped upon the Bishop whilst he was alive. The next day another writer (or even the same man) elaborates upon this point with quotations from For Self-Examination and Prefaces and he challenges Kierkegaard to show how these relate to his most recent outburst against Lønseth. Notwithstanding the rather more conciliatory tone of a third article which appeared just after Christmas, the response of such a liberal journal as Dagbladet must be adjudged remarkably severe.
Besides the article by "D" in Dagbladet, two more contributions appeared in the Copenhagen press on December 22nd. Corsaren was inevitably antagonistic, whilst an article appeared in Berlingske Tidende above the pseudonym "D". The substance of this article lies in a critique of Kierkegaard's use of "witness to the truth". By reserving it only for martyrs Kierkegaard is accused of using it in a far too limited sense. Korshønsposten, which had carried critical reviews of Kierkegaard's work by Orla Lehmann and P.L. Wælker, came out with a protest in verse, followed the next day by "aesclusa" who casts doubts on Kierkegaard's sanity. On the 27th, an article signed "I.L." (possibly Israel Levin, Kierkegaard's secretary) argued that Kierkegaard was not really serious about what he had written.

Kierkegaard composed an article for Faerdrelandet offering a response to many of the criticisms levelled against him. This appeared on Thursday December 30th although it had been delivered to the printers on the 28th. This was just too late to take substantive notice of the most significant contribution to the debate so far. This came from Martensen who wrote an article in Berlingske Tidende of the 28th December. However, Kierkegaard did append a footnote to "There the matter rests!" dealing specifically with Martensen's rejoinder. Kierkegaard begins the article by reiterating the essence of his protest. He says that "to call a man who by preaching Christianity has attained and enjoyed in the greatest measure all possibly worldly goods and enjoyments, to represent him as a witness to the truth is as ridiculous as to talk about a maiden who is surrounded by her numerous troop of children". He goes on to argue that people are basically ill-informed about Christian concepts. "Hence it is that people do not understand - and therefore censor it, when a protest is raised against a witness to the truth who from a Christian point of view is just as ridiculous as that maiden". First of all he rebuts the suggestion that a man can be both a witness for the truth and something else at the same time. The witness, like Christianity, is essentially heterogeneous to this world, and so has his existence marked by renunciation and suffering. There can be no question of enjoying the
world's advantages and goods and then at the same time be a witness to the truth. Martensen, by calling Mynster a witness, has made it inevitable that Kierkegaard should draw attention to the late Bishop's worldly shrewdness and self-indulgence. In his memorial address Martensen articulated a point of view common to "the Protestant clergy". They all want to attain this world's goods and at the same time desire to be witnesses to the truth. Because this idea is so prevalent Kierkegaard is convinced that a protest should be made as emphatically as possible, "people's blood must be stirred, passions set in motion ...". Thus Kierkegaard justifies the making of a protest.

Next he faces the objections which especially preoccupied contributions to Dagbladet. How can he reconcile his criticisms of Mynster with the veneration which marked his attitude to the Bishop while he was alive? Kierkegaard makes it clear that his attitude to Mynster has not undergone any real change. There can be no question of his being allied with the Bishop's enemies. Rather, he might yet come forward as before to fight against his enemies on behalf of "the pastor of my deceased father". Contrary to public opinion, Kierkegaard says that he has never condemned Bishop Mynster - he was only the occasion for Mynster to condemn himself. Kierkegaard knew and warned Mynster about the disparity between his Sunday preaching and his life on Monday. If he had been an enemy of Mynster then he would have uttered his condemnation whilst the Bishop was alive. However, as an admirer, Kierkegaard held out for the admission and "honoured the false draft (the semblance of being a man of character which Bishop Mynster presented) instead of protesting it". So, far from accusing Kierkegaard of a volte face, people - especially Mynster's friends, should show gratitude for "the many years I have borne with the deceased".

From the early reaction to his attitude in the daily press, Kierkegaard was quickly made aware of the misunderstandings it had engendered. On his account he feels there is no need for him to answer the case brought against him by "aesculapius" in Københavnsposten or the writer to Flyveposten.
Furthermore, the charge that he has attacked a dead man who cannot answer is also based on a misunderstanding. Given the disparity between "the Wynsterish preaching and ecclesiastical rule" and the Christianity of the New Testament, his readers might well praise Kierkegaard for his restraint, while the Bishop yet lived. Kierkegaard argues that he did everything he could to protect Wynster's public reputation. Through Training in Christianity and For Self-Examination he "pressed upon the old man as closely as I could (but in an indirect way ...) the question whether he would give battle". He says that his treatment of Wynster was always so delicate as to leave open the possibility of his becoming the Bishop's defence on hearing the public admission.

I feel that Kierkegaard does meet the charges levelled against him at these points; but one must also appreciate the position of his critics. It was inevitable that when Kierkegaard tried to keep up a semblance of veneration for Wynster while he was alive this should rebound on him if the Bishop died without making the admission. There is no doubt that Kierkegaard was sincere in not wishing to launch a direct attack on the state Church. Thus his energies were directed rather less towards the least desired contingency. This is not to say that Kierkegaard was not properly prepared to attack - the voluminous Journal entries and draft articles testify otherwise. But it is true that Kierkegaard was keener to argue the case for defending Wynster than he was to attack him. This bias communicated itself to his reading public and, naturally, they were mystified by his subsequent apparent inconsistency. But it was Martensen who made the most significant attempt to meet the real issues at stake - this might be said in spite of Kierkegaard's assertion that it "does not require an explicit reply, since it does not alter the case in the least". However, we must turn to consider Martensen's reply and evaluate his arguments for ourselves.

Martensen begins by briefly summarising Kierkegaard's complaints against him, especially the objections to his calling Wynster a witness to the truth.
He quotes at some length from Kierkegaard's definition of a witness - "a man who in poverty witnesses to the truth, in poverty, in lowliness, in abasement ... a man who is at last crucified, or beheaded, or burnt, or roasted on a gridiron ..." Thus, says Martensen, according to Kierkegaard, a witness is "one of the men who is historically called a martyr". He goes on to make the guarded admission that, if Kierkegaard is right in thus equating the witness with the martyr then certainly he (i.e. Martensen) is at least guilty of a misuse of language. But what right, he asks, has Kierkegaard to use the term in a way contrary to traditional ecclesiastical usage. As "U" pointed out, according to Kierkegaard's definition, even the Apostle John would be excluded from the ranks of witnesses to the truth on the grounds that he did not suffer a violent death. Furthermore, Kierkegaard is unjustified in interpreting Martensen as saying that today's witnesses are to be directly equated with those of the apostolic era. In fact Martensen says he has made it clear that there are differences of gifts and tools whilst the Lord and Spirit are the same. It must not be forgotten that, through all the various stages of development, there remains one holy, catholic Church and that from generation to generation "both amongst the congregations and the teachers there are those who bear Christian witness ..." Otherwise, the unity of the Church through the ages would be broken. But it is useless offering such consideration to Kierkegaard "whose Christianity is without Church and without history". In fact, the Church never ceases to be militant and its witness continues even when it is not undergoing times of extraordinary stress. Also, if Kierkegaard is right in saying that suffering is the only mark of the witness then many enthusiasts and fanatics could be called witnesses. Next, Martensen accuses Kierkegaard of proposing a far too restrictive definition of suffering. He has ignored the realm of spiritual suffering and has failed to notice that aggressive words can be as damaging as real stones when hurled at the Christian.

Martensen goes on: "The next question, therefore, is whether, presupposing that the true Church is to be found amongst us, Bishop Mynster has a place
amongst the Christian witnesses for the truth in our country". Martensen is unrepentant and so reiterates his belief that Lynster in fact spoke up for Christianity when everyone else kept quiet. It is to his undying praise that he stood up for the Gospel and for the Lutheran form of worship when these were under threat at the beginning of the century. Likewise, he has never ceased to preach Jesus Christ and him crucified and has taught about dying to the world, albeit not in Kierkegaard's way. However, says Martensen, his sermon did not canonise Lynster as Kierkegaard insinuates that it did. Also, while it is right to warn against the suppression of those things which one is called to say, it is also necessary to guard oneself against saying more than the spirit has commissioned one to say. Wynster observed this "golden rule" and a good deal of false and exaggerated talk about the Christian life - e.g. about dying from the world, would be avoided, and "many edifying discourses and books would remain unwritten" if this principle was generally followed. Without doubt the character of one's witness must be conditioned partly by the demands of the time and partly by the witnesses own individuality. It would take far more than his article in Faedrelandet or the whole "prolix" literature for Kierkegaard to establish his view that, whilst Wynster is in other respects to be admired, his Christianity is false and ignoble. For Kierkegaard's own Christianity is adjudged by Martensen to be "by no means a corporate faith, but purely and simply a Christianity in which the Christian Church and the Holy Spirit's work in the Church is omitted together with much else that is most decisively Christian".

Finally Martensen turns to Kierkegaard's attack upon Wynster's life and character. In tones of angry cynicism he reiterated the complaint that Kierkegaard went through life wearing a "mask" of respect and veneration for Wynster - until the latter's death. Martensen challenges Kierkegaard to justify himself on this point although he is in no doubt "that he will know how to justify his action to satisfy his own conscience by appeal to one or other higher moral genius, perhaps even one or other higher religious demand which bids all other considerations to yield and provides him with a yardstick
for his action far above the common standard". Høibell concludes with the assurance that, with this most recent attack on a dead man, Kierkegaard will never be in danger of being forgotten.

Kabell says of Høibell's article that it is "at one and the same time a complete parry and a crushing attack, profound and to the point. There one finds briefly and clearly formulated that view of Kierkegaard and his work which must be found amongst the clergy - it is Høibell's argumentation which is later shared by the countless like-minded authors". However, Kierkegaard is of the opinion that the article "does not require an explicit reply, since it does not alter the case in the least". He goes on to defend himself skilfully against Høibell's charge that he equates the concepts "witness" and "martyr". Certainly in the footnote to the article, Kierkegaard refers only to "a suffering witness to the truth" and in no way implies that this must be a suffering unto death. Significantly, Høibell bases his case on the more detailed account of the witness to the truth as found in the article itself and ignores the footnote. Kierkegaard is justified in pointing out that violent death is restricted to the sphere of final promotion. By suffering death in this fashion a man does not therefore become a witness. Rather, he has already achieved such a position - by his death he is finally admitted "into the first class as defined by the Christian protocol". Thus John the Apostle can be called a witness to the truth on account of his suffering. But he would not be admitted to the "first class". Høibell and others may still find it objectionable that such a venerated founder of the Church should be thus offered only second-class status, but their objections cannot be directly related to Kierkegaard's use of terms. As to the objection that Kierkegaard now attacks Wynster after honouring him during his lifetime, we have seen how he dealt with this in the main article before Høibell's reply came to his notice.

However, Kierkegaard does not tackle Høibell's comment that Kierkegaard's authorship is without any notion of Church or communal faith. Yet Kabell asserts that "the episcopal emphasis upon the holy Catholic Church at the expense
of 'private religion' is the most decisive point of Martensen's article.\textsuperscript{107} Surely Kabell is exaggerating here. Martensen's references to Kierkegaard's lack of proper ecclesiology are at best incidental to the main thrust of the debate. Martensen cannot seriously maintain that Kierkegaard's attack on the nature and standard of the prevailing witness of the Church necessarily implies a denial of the validity of the Church's very existence. Rather, Martensen's remarks at this point are derived from his understanding of Kierkegaard's teaching as set forth in writings long before the appearance of the Faedreland article late in 1854. Kierkegaard is himself aware that, relative to the real issues at stake, Martensen's comments about his view of the Church are off the point. Indeed, after dealing with "a challenge" by Pastor Paludan-Müller, Kierkegaard next published an article entitled "The point at issue with Bishop Martensen" which makes it clear that the representation from the pulpit of Bishop Mynster as a witness to the truth is the central issue along with the consequences this carries for the established Church.\textsuperscript{108} It is the established Church which must be attacked by exposure to the demands of the New Testament. At this moment in time, the main point at issue is the justification for the establishment rather than the Church itself. We show elsewhere that Kierkegaard never abandoned the Church and Christian communality as viable and valid concepts. But he did want to destroy the abuses of Christendom when all else had failed. He was not going to allow Martensen to deviate him from pursuing this central and most decisive issue.

Berlingske Tidende published two more articles that week, but neither had anything new to say and certainly there was nothing to prompt a further response from Kierkegaard.\textsuperscript{109} However, a contribution to that paper by one W. Hjort did cause Kierkegaard to make a comment on his note book and a passing reference in his next published article.\textsuperscript{110} In the notebook Kierkegaard takes Hjort's article as the occasion for a comment upon the fact that, because Mynster did carry a whole generation and because Kierkegaard's own corrective to the prevailing misconceptions about the Christian faith was seldom read, then according to the only commonly recognised standard (i.e. Mynsterish Christianity)
people like Hjort were bound to look upon Kierkegaard as always in the wrong. But on a more specific level, Kierkegaard is especially scathing about Hjort's view that "Bishop Lynster is not a preacher of repentance but a messenger of peace". This presents Kierkegaard with a first-class opening for a renewed attack on Lynster's self-indulgent love of peace. This is a typical example of the way in which Kierkegaard takes the words of his opponents and turns them to their own condemnation. Of more significance from Kierkegaard's point of view was an article by Pastor J. Paludan-Müller which was published as a monograph early in January 1855 and reviewed in Berlingske Tidende on the 9th of that month. The reviewer describes Paludan-Müller's article as "excellent" and thus attracts Kierkegaard's ridicule.

Jens Paludan-Müller was a long-established ally of the leading Danish Churchmen. Already he had published a sympathetic study Concerning Dr. Næstved's Christian Dogmatics and an article entitled Concerning the apologetic content in Bishop Lynster's preaching which also betrayed his particular bias. As Kabell says "with such a past it can surprise nobody that he was prepared 'to look upon Bishop Lynster not only as one who has been a genuine witness to Christian Truth during a long life, but who has also witnessed in the Truth and by the Truth'.

First of all, Paludan-Müller sees Kierkegaard's attack as part of a general tendency to criticise the lives of good men "for the cause of truth". He says that the aim of this writing is to show just how far the high standard by which Kierkegaard measures Lynster is wrong and how far Kierkegaard's judgement of Lynster is wrong. Paludan-Müller goes on to defend Lynster against the charge of hypocrisy. He asserts that Lynster did practice what he preached, although he admits that he does not know whether Kierkegaard was so close to Lynster as to be aware of any such hypocrisy. Paludan-Müller sees Kierkegaard's basic error in terms of the wrong distinction he makes between subjective and objective truth. Unlike many of Kierkegaard's opponents, here Paludan-Müller reflects a deep knowledge of Kierkegaard's authorship and realises that the root of his attack upon Lynster lies in his basic understanding
of truth as subjectivity. However, the place of inwardness in Kierkegaard's thought is not as simple as Paludan-Müller seems to think, and no account is taken of Kierkegaard's alternative assertion that subjectivity is untruth.¹¹⁶

Next Paludan-Müller turns to Kierkegaard's interpretation of the New Testament and issues a challenge to Kierkegaard to prove by reference to the New Testament that Mynster's preaching "soft-pedals, slurs over, suppresses, omits something decisively Christian". It was this challenge which prompted Kierkegaard's third article which is dated January 11th, 1855 and appeared in Faedrelandet the following day. Paludan-Müller agrees that if dying from the world, hating oneself and suffering do constitute the essentials of the Christian faith, then certainly Mynster "left out that which is most decisively Christian". But he objects on two counts. Firstly, the New Testament is not limited to the themes Kierkegaard proposes and, secondly, Mynster's sermons (with which Paludan-Müller is very familiar) do contain references to these themes.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Paludan-Müller shows that Mynster had all the attributes which the common man customarily associates with a person of character and principle, but which Kierkegaard describes as self-indulgence and hypocritical.¹¹⁸ In addition, Paludan-Müller rehearses some of the points already made against Kierkegaard by other contributors to the debate. He declares that Kierkegaard is over obsessed with outward suffering whilst inward suffering is equally effective as a mark of the witness to the truth. He raises again the question of St. John and his status as one who did not undergo physical suffering and martyrdom. He charges Kierkegaard with underestimating the role of divine Grace in the spreading of Christianity. Only Jesus Christ himself could be called a witness by Kierkegaard's standards, but Paludan-Müller argues that they can be called witnesses who pursue the ideal without necessarily having achieved it.¹¹⁹

Kierkegaard dismisses Paludan-Müller's challenge on the grounds that, were he to enter into "a prolix, learned, theological investigation, with citations and citations, etc. about Bishop Mynster's preaching" then "the whole question and the statement of it would in a short time become quite different from what it is".¹²⁰ He repeats that "the question is about an
energetic protest from my side against representing from the pulpit Bishop Mynster as a witness to the truth ...” Contrary to Paludan-Müller's view that Mynster's qualities were readily recognised by the plain man whilst Kierkegaard saw them only as symptomatic of Mynster's error, Kierkegaard asserts that everyone can see "especially the plain man" that the Bishop's preaching "soft peddals, slurs over, supresses, omits something of the most decisively Christian". Paludan-Müller says that Mynster had the quality of being in the world, as a leaven, without being of the world. Kierkegaard retorts that, because the Christianity of the New Testament involves "the very deepest and most incurable breach with this world" one can only call Mynster a witness if "we are satisfied with the explanation: One is tout a fait a man of the world, a man entirely of this world, and 'at the same time' one has broken with this world". In other words, Kierkegaard refuses to recognise Paludan-Müller's distinction between being "in the world" but not "of the world". He can see no virtue in "attaining and enjoying all worldly goods and advantages by the preaching of Christianity". Least of all could he be called a witness to the truth. This is as much as Kierkegaard feels he need say in response to Paludan-Müller's "challenge". As far as he is concerned, the facts of the case, i.e. the New Testament over against Mynster's way of life and preaching, are plain enough to even the simplest person and in need of no further elaboration.

In the draft to this article, Kierkegaard appended a very significant postscript. He refers to a comment made by the Berlingske Tidende reviewer and which shows that this paper "prophesies against its will". For there it was written that, by his two articles in Faedrelandet Kierkegaard had ruined himself as an edifying author. Kierkegaard is quick to point out that, in the sense intended by the writer this judgement amounts to so much nonsense. However, the statement is still valid: "for precisely thus have I understood those two articles - I have ruined myself as an edifying author; for by the living God, I am determined not to build up but to demolish". Kierkegaard goes on to reiterate his gratitude to governance for allowing him to hold back from
this destructive phase whilst the Bishop was still alive and until he had been buried with full music. Thus we have Kierkegaard's own testimony to support the view that the articles comprising the "Attack" represent his first departure from a constructive approach to Christianity and its institutions.

Over two weeks passed before Kierkegaard wrote another article in Faedrelandet. This was published under the heading "The point at issue with Bishop Hartensen, as conclusive Christianly, for the hitherto dubious state of the Established Church, Christianly considered". Here he states categorically that: "The point at issue is this: about representing from the pulpit Bishop Mynster as a witness to the truth, one of the genuine witnesses to the truth, one in the holy chain of witnesses". He insists that this fact must be held fast "in spite of the mass of confusion which in the past days has been poured out through the press".

In fact, many of the leading Danish newspapers and journals, both in the capital and the provinces published articles during the period between Kierkegaard's reply to Paludan-Müller and this new contribution. These generally tended to be hostile to Kierkegaard. Thus Kjøbenhavnsposten continued the trend set in its columns by "1127" and "aesculap" by publishing the hostile views of one signing himself "N". Likewise, Flyvposten, described as one of Kierkegaard's severe opponents, entered the debate on no less than five occasions between the 9th and 19th of January. The first article was entitled "From a letter to a friend in Slesvig" and bears only the mark of a signature. He starts with the assumption that his friend knows enough about Mynster to know that Kierkegaard has no justification for his accusations against him. In fact, to deny Mynster the title of witness to the truth is nothing less than absurd and testifies to Kierkegaard's basically dialectical nature which thrives on saying outrageous things. The writer goes on to repeat the criticism already made by Hartensen - and answered by Kierkegaard - that he only gives the name of witness to the truth to those who have suffered a violent death. He also repeats the charge that Kierkegaard gives no value to inner suffering. But perhaps the most significant point to be made
about this article is that its writer is as clearly convinced about the self-evidence of Nynster's right to be called a witness to the truth as Kierkegaard is convinced to the contrary. Here is a deadlocked situation which, as we see from his reply to Paludan-Müller, Kierkegaard has no intention of resolving by the accumulation of corroborative evidence. He simply reiterates "The point at issue".

Next, Flyveposten published attacks upon Kierkegaard rather pompously signed "A Friend of the Truth". Again there is little new here, except for the provision of two conditions for calling a man a witness:

1) his teaching must be in accordance with accepted Evangelical-Lutheran teaching and
2) he must be firmly convinced of what he teaches. This writer is certain that no-one could possibly argue that Nynster lacked a firm faith and conviction about his teaching: "If anyone can be called a witness to the truth of his own doctrine then it was Nynster". He asserts that Nynster's teaching and character will shine through Kierkegaard's fanatical attack. As far as this "friend of the truth" is concerned, Hjort and Paludan-Müller have effectively countered Kierkegaard's assault on Nynster's character. We may say the same about the anonymous writer of the 5th article. He recognises that the debate is not only about words. Kierkegaard has attacked Nynster's basic way of life, and someone must come to the late Bishop's defence.

Further articles hostile to Kierkegaard also appeared in provincial newspapers at this time, especially the Lolland-Valsters Stiftstidende. But there were also those who came down on the side of Kierkegaard. Most noteworthy is Rasmus Nielsen who wrote twice for Faedrelandet. The first of his articles appeared on January 10th and it concurs entirely with Kierkegaard's later assertion that "the point at issue" revolves around Martensen's application of the term witness to the truth. He traces the history of Kierkegaard's relationship to Nynster through the successive publications after 1848 and the history of his demand for the admission. Nielsen is convinced in his own mind that Kierkegaard's recent protest amounts to "a good work" and he concludes
by challenging Martensen to make the admission "not for Kierkegaard's sake, nor mine, but for the sake of the Church". Then, just six days later he reiterated his challenge in a much shorter and more incisive article - also in Naadrelændet. Of all the contributions so far made to the debate, certainly Nielsen shows a greater readiness to take the "Attack" in the context of Kierkegaard's whole authorship, and demonstrates an unusually good understanding of Kierkegaard's intentions over the years.

The independent periodical Folkebladet provided Kierkegaard with another supporter at this time. This was one of the first of many contributions which were inspired rather more from political than religious motives. The writer dwells at length upon Mynster as a conservative ruler of the state Church and this really reflects his chief concern. Whilst Kierkegaard pursued Christian truth, this anonymous journalist took more delight in discomfiting the clergy whom he so obviously dislikes. Far different are two contributions to Dagbladet. It will be recalled how the pseudonyms "A" and "B" attacked Kierkegaard very early on in the debate whilst "C" made a move in his direction. Now a writer using the pseudonym "__g" attempts to clarify the issues in the broadening debate by insisting that one be not "for or against Kierkegaard" but "for or against Martensen". The question is, should Martensen from the pulpit judge Mynster? To do so is only to show how great a sinner Mynster was, because the standard from the pulpit is the Ideal. The writer also agrees with Kierkegaard that Mynster has lessened the New Testament demands; but he does take exception to Kierkegaard's insinuation that, in his address, Martensen reminded himself of the vacant bishopric. In such objection to Kierkegaard's presentation of the case at certain points, "__g" is joined by another anonymous contributor to Dagbladet the following day.

Obviously with the views of his opponents in mind, Kierkegaard seeks to rectify the "confusion" caused by the enumeration of Mynster's distinctive characteristics. Those things which made Mynster into a distinguished and extraordinary leader do not make him also a witness to the truth. On such criteria "even the blindest can see, every priest in the land is a witness to the truth". Kierkegaard goes on to argue with passion and at some length
that the important criterion is not whether one "offends against civil justice". Rather, the standard is set by the New Testament and Jesus Christ - "the poor, humiliated man, mocked and spat upon". Against such a standard "it is seen only too easily that the official preaching of Christianity, can only be defended (if it can be) in the way I once time indicated by the pseudonym Anti-Climacus". Kierkegaard goes on: "With respect to this, however, it is to be noted, that the Established Church has hitherto let nothing be heard from it" (my emphasis). Emphasis is laid on the word "hitherto" because here Kierkegaard seems to be supporting the challenge recently issued to Hartensen by Nielsen. Kierkegaard is still hopeful that the admission might be made, although his subsequent attack on the priests in this article shows him to be not very optimistic. Whatever may have been the case up until now "the Established Church can no longer be regarded as an extreme instance of leniency which nevertheless is related to the Christianity of the New Testament, but it is openly an apostasy from the Christianity of the New Testament". Thus Kierkegaard shows that, whilst in theory he remains faithful to the "admission" strategy, he is so pessimistic as to be no longer restrained from a direct attack upon the Established Church and its priests. In the second half of the article Kierkegaard lays renewed stress upon the fact that the representation of Wynster as a witness to the truth came "from the pulpit", and was therefore made "before God". Thus he takes up and expands the point especially emphasised by "" in Dagbladet. Hartensen is guilty of something far worse than a simple misuse of words. Because he spoke this from the pulpit and in God's presence (a presence invoked by the prayer before the sermon) Hartensen is guilty of "making a fool of God".

When compared with the previous three articles, this one clearly marks a new stage in Kierkegaard's campaign. This is more violent in its spirit and expression than anything hitherto. As the title suggests, the point at issue with Hartensen is now deemed to be "conclusive" in its judgement upon the Established Church which hitherto, according to Christian considerations, could only be described as "dubious". Kierkegaard implicitly rebuked Nielsen for describing the scandal aroused by the case as "unfortunate". What
Kierkegaard has to say is indeed "outrageous", and this must be so because of the scandal done to Christianity by Martensen. Now "the blood must be stirred, passions set in motion".

The break with previous strategy is demonstrated further in the article entitled "Two new witnesses to the Truth" and also published on January 29th. Whereas Mynster was inclined to "yield shrewdly" and displayed tendencies which could give Kierkegaard some optimism about the chances of getting the admission, Martensen is inclined "to brave it out". In the light of this "diversity of gifts", Kierkegaard suggests that it is the thought of divine governance "that the Establishment should survive as long as the old man lived, who was gifted to that effect, and that after his death the Establishment shall fall, and to that effect we have Bishop Martensen in the episcopal chair, a man who is gifted precisely in that direction". In other words, whatever grounds there may have been for justifying the Established Church, these have gone with the passing of Mynster and the succession of Martensen. Indeed, Kierkegaard appears to look upon the demise of the Established Church as inevitable under Martensen's leadership, although he is prepared to play a part - albeit a subordinate one - to bring this about. So Kierkegaard arrives at an entirely negative position with regard to the place of Christendom in Christianity. From now on, it is not simply a question of the relationship between Mynster and the witness to the truth. Now Kierkegaard asks "is there the least resemblance between these priests, deans, bishops and what Christ calls 'witnesses'?". Instead of demanding the admission, Kierkegaard is more anxious that "the sign should be taken down".

Now there followed a gap of nearly two months before Kierkegaard again wrote for Faerdrelandet. During this time articles continued to appear in the Copenhagen and provincial press but rather less frequently than hitherto, and containing few original ideas. Thus Kierkegaard was under no severe provocation to reply. But this alone does not explain this comparatively long period of silence. Villads Christensen suggests that Kierkegaard was waiting for Martensen to pronounce the admission which Mynster has failed to provide.
In the light of Nielsen's challenge, and the hints given by Kierkegaard in *The Point at Issue*, this explanation seems plausible. However, we have already referred to Kierkegaard's pessimism about the likelihood of ever receiving such an admission from Martensen — certainly his expectancy was not sufficient to restrain him from publishing for a period as long as two months. Perhaps we need to look for an explanation in the opposite direction. The evidence of the Journals point to the fact that, early in 1855, Kierkegaard was thinking seriously about "causing a catastrophe". So he writes:

"It is certain that what has occupied me in recent times is whether God wishes me to stake everything on bringing about a catastrophe — on getting arrested, condemned, and if possible executed.

"If I am to bring about a catastrophe, I had thought of giving the 'alarm', quite unexpectedly after the most complete silence, that public services are a mockery of God, that to take part in them is a crime.

"But before I was entirely clear about this, I did something else: I published the article on kynster against Martensen. This in itself was a weakening of the impetus to catastrophe."

The weakening lies in the fact that this article made the catastrophe predictable. But in the realm of the spirit a catastrophe can only be brought about when "the connecting links" are omitted and a consequence is drawn without showing first that of which it is the consequence. This is what happens when genius comes in conflict with the world. When a man consciously chooses to bring about such a catastrophe, i.e., volunteers to sacrifice himself, then in this consciousness lies a truly Christian element. At this thought, Kierkegaard is reminded of the problem as to whether a man is justified in doing this: "is it not harshness to the others?" However, he is of the opinion that the "lack of character, of sophistry, the chatter of reflection" can only be annulled by a catastrophe. Yet to do what is necessary to produce a catastrophe, i.e., to begin with the conclusion, omitting the premises, and also to give an explanation that this is what one is doing is ultimately to prevent catastrophe. The article against Martensen had precisely this effect. So Kierkegaard concludes that: "To bring about a catastrophe I must do things quite differently from how I have understood them hitherto". Basically the establishment must be forced into the position of having "to use the means in
its possession to defend itself. This will be achieved by the charge being made against the establishment that the whole thing is a lie, that the worship of God is a mockery of God, and that to join in it is a crime.

So, rather than anticipate the admission, Kierkegaard strives for the opposite reaction. The Church must be startled out of its silence into acts of self-defence. Thus the catastrophe will be caused. In the light of such a strategy, the two months silence would appear to serve a two-fold function.

1) It gives Martensen some time in which to break his silence and clash with Kierkegaard. Or, and this is where Kierkegaard has it both ways, if Martensen keeps silent for such a long time this would be a tacit admission that the Establishment has no case against Kierkegaard and would thus be self-incriminating. Because Kierkegaard has given up on the admission, whether he speaks or whether he remains silent, Martensen stands condemned.

2) Earlier Kierkegaard has seen the value of sounding the alarm "quite unexpectedly after the most complete silence". Although the initial articles had stifled any chance of creating a total surprise, after the hectic activity of late December and January, a period of silence might yet prove of value.

So on March 20th Kierkegaard published an article in Faedrelandet entitled "With regard to Bishop Mynster's death". This was in fact written just over one year earlier and Kierkegaard makes a point of drawing our attention to this fact. It seems that Kierkegaard wants to re-create the situation prior to December 1854 when the chance existed for a real catastrophe to be caused by a direct assault on the late Bishop. In fact, March 1854 saw Kierkegaard make drafts for a number of articles on Mynster and the contemporary Church situation. It seems likely that he was then seriously contemplating opening the assault. On the following day he issued the charge which he had already declared necessary for forcing the Church to defend itself. The substance is contained in the title: "Is this Christian worship, or is it treating God as a fool?". This is the question which must be asked when one makes out that nothing is the matter "whereas as a matter of fact everything is changed". The teacher (priest) takes an oath upon the New
Testament and yet is only "the trivial contrary" to a disciple of Jesus Christ. The doctrine which is preached as God's word "is different from God's word for the fact that it is not the same, nor the opposite, but neither one thing nor the other, which is precisely what is most contrary to Christianity and to God's Word". Furthermore, "the situation in which we speak ... no more resembles that in the New Testament than the bourgeois parlour or the child's playroom resembles the most frightful conflict we are confronted with in the most appalling reality, or resembles it even less, in so far as people spiritlessly pretend that the two situations resemble one another". Kierkegaard supplements these charges with short explanations of what he means by saying that the priest is the trivial contrary of a true disciple and how he sees the present situation in the light of the New Testament. Here are enunciated themes destined to be repeated many times in the subsequent issues of Faedrelandet and Øjeblikket. Emphasis is laid upon the civil rank and status of the priest and upon his making of a living for himself and his family by preaching Christ crucified and the need for Christ to be imitated. Kierkegaard notes how the priests go about in long robes in spite of Christ's warning to beware of such people. With regard to the "situation", Kierkegaard ridicules the fact that, where all are Christians, Christianity became the means of attaining "worldly goods, comforts, profit, etc. etc." But, according to the New Testament, faith is not possible "without coming into a relationship with the surrounding world which perhaps involves mortal danger."

This article is datelined Ascension Day 1854. Having this diagnosed the sickness, Kierkegaard next issued an article dated Monday in Whitsun week 1854 and headed: "What must be done - whether by me or by another". Here Kierkegaard declares that the time has come to do away with "optical illusions":

"Out with the truth! Out with the declaration that we no longer are capable of being Christians in the New Testament sense! ... an end must be put to the official - well-meaning - falsehood". 153

Although at the time these words were written Kierkegaard may have been genuinely doubtful about whether he was the one to bring about the desired
end, by the time it was published on March 22nd 1855 he had few doubts about his role.

"With its passing reference to "the impudent fudge about Christianity being perfectible" Kierkegaard clearly had Hartensen in mind when writing this latter piece. Just four days later he published an expanded critique of "The Religious situation" and addressed it explicitly to Bishop Hartensen — at least, in the draft version. It is clear that when Kierkegaard drafted this article (in January 1855) he was still thinking in terms of Hartensen choosing to "honestly and honourably make an admission as to how we are related to the Christianity of the New Testament; or to perform artful tricks to conceal the true situation, tricks to conjure up the vain semblance that Christianity is the prevailing religion in the land". Indeed, in a proposed postscript Kierkegaard demands that Hartensen should declare his agreement or disagreement with his analysis of the country's religious situation within eight days through the columns of Berlingske Tidende. Now, at the time of publication just two months later, Kierkegaard chooses to make no mention of Bishop Hartensen by name. Rather, this article is issued as part of his more generalised attack on the official Christianity, it is part of his advance toward a catastrophe.

This strategy reaches a climax on March 28th with Kierkegaard's declaration that there is but one thesis: "The Christianity of the New Testament simply does not exist". In this article Kierkegaard describes himself as "an accomplished detective talent" and infers his intention to practice his art of "throwing light upon (the) Christian criminal offence" so long as it is made clear that "nothing is the matter, as if everything is all right, and what we call 'Christianity' is the Christianity of the New Testament, or we perform artful tricks to conceal the difference, tricks to support the appearance that this is the Christianity of the New Testament". In other words, Kierkegaard intends to keep tightening the thumbscrews so long as there is no break in the official silence.

So just two days later Kierkegaard published perhaps his most aggressive
Apart from another reference to the doctrine of perfectibility - which may imply an attack on Hartensen - this is a generalised assault on Protestantism and the priests of Christendom. As if to underline the increased severity of this article, Kierkegaard prefaces it with the comment: "Before a man can be made use of as I am here, governance must coerce him dreadfully - this too is the case with me". In other words, by his action Kierkegaard is sacrificing himself to the control of "governance" - he is "salt, willing to be sacrificed". In a foot note Kierkegaard reiterates the principle "the fewer the better" and is prepared to see counteraction to the evils of number and extension in terms of just "a single person" representing Christian intention. The pending catastrophe may force Kierkegaard into just such a role.

Few of the themes in this article are new. It begins with the charge that Protestantism has erred in regarding itself as a principle rather than as a corrective remedy. Not that Catholicism provides the answer, for it, too, suffers from the errors associated with "Church" and "Christendom". Kierkegaard shows a preference for issuing his attack in terms of "Christendom" rather than "Church" because his main concern is with the prevailing obsessions with large numbers and numerical agglomerations such as nations and Kingdoms. One Christian can make a Church. Christendom is essentially to be defined in terms of numbers - large numbers - and therein lies the seed of an erroneous watering down of subjective and intensive Christian truth. Kierkegaard points to Denmark as the most perfect and complete example of such a move away from the New Testament:

"When one sees what it is to be a Christian in Denmark, how could it occur to anyone that this is what Jesus Christ talks about: cross and agony and suffering, crucifying the flesh, suffering for the doctrine, being salt, being sacrificed, etc? No, in Protestantism, especially in Denmark, Christianity marches to a different melody, to the tune of 'Merrily we roll along, roll along, roll along' - Christianity is enjoyment of life, tranquilised, as neither the Jew nor pagan was, by the assurance that the thing about eternity is settled, settled precisely in order that we might find pleasure in enjoying this life, as well as any pagan or Jew".

The real novelty of this article lies in the bitterness of the irony and
witi. He concludes a paragraph on the "silk and velvet priests" with the comment that:

"Even the most abandoned scum of humanity have, after all, this advantage, that their crimes are not extolled and honoured, almost worshipped and adored, as Christian virtues". 161

Then towards the end he expresses surprise that Judas, a Jew,

"had so little understanding of money that for 30 pieces of silver he was ready to dispose of such a prodigious money value as Jesus Christ represented, the greatest source of revenue ever encountered in the world, on which a million quadrillions have been realised, to dispose of it for thirty pieces of silver! But we are going forward, the world is perfectible; Judas after all expresses something less than perfect: first because he took only thirty pieces of silver, next because he did not have himself honoured and praised, almost worshipped and adored, as a true adherent of Christ".

Such expressions leave us in no doubt that Kierkegaard was intent upon causing a scandal and thus forcing the establishment to make some kind of response. In the following article Kierkegaard's tone is a little more restrained but the enunciation of his purpose is correspondingly more explicit. In answer to the rhetorical question: "What do I want" he declares that he simply wants honesty. 162 It is not his intention, as Nilesen had claimed, to present the severity of Christianity as opposed to a lenient perspective. The severity is there in the New Testament for all to see. Likewise the lenient view, as embodied in Christendom, is there for all to see. Now the chief requirement is for honesty. The softening down of Christianity is only possible by appeal to Grace, but such an appeal is impossible when one refuses to admit just how large is one's debt to Grace. The fact that the establishment has refused to display such honesty, or to be influenced in that direction by Kierkegaard, does not mean that he has resorted to a simple display of severity: "No, I am and remain quite simply a human honesty". He is prepared to accept rebellion against God so long as this arises out of an honest confrontation with Christianity. But he will have nothing to do with official Christianity "which by suppression and by artifice gives the impression of being the Christianity of the New Testament". So Kierkegaard thanks God that he did not go so far as to be ordained into the established Church. Furthermore, "if official Christianity in this country takes occasion from what is said here
to employ power against me, I am ready; for I want honesty". Again we see Kierkegaard looking for some kind of response from the establishment, and he is prepared for this to take an aggressive form.

Between January and March the flow of articles in newspapers and periodicals had slowed to a trickle. Indeed, a contributor to Flyvesposten expressed his feeling that the "fitness for the truth" argument was now dead in Denmark. However, this proved to be not the case and an article in Faerdelandet early in April provoked Kierkegaard into making an immediate response. Indeed, he wrote two articles with direct reference to this contribution and published them both in the course of the next week. The article was signed "N - n" and Kierkegaard makes a point of emphasising its anonymity. Almost certainly "N - n" was a pseudonym for H. N. Clausen and this would explain Kierkegaard's especial interest in it. After all, Clausen was a most influential figure in Church and State and his entry into the debate did represent some kind of response from high places. Two things especially caught Kierkegaard's attention in this article. First of all the writer urges Kierkegaard to produce a handbook of New Testament teaching such as that written by Mynster. Kierkegaard rejects such a proposal on the grounds that it would distract him from his main task. Kierkegaard's contemporaries are in no need of further elucidation of his position than that provided by Postscript, Sickness unto Death and especially Training in Christianity. Thus Kierkegaard underlines the point that the two poles of New Testament and established Christianity have already been made clear enough. The "introductory knowledge" desirable for "the instant" has been provided, now the demand of "the instant" must be met - the demand for honesty. No more time need be wasted presenting the case - now there must be a response.

"N - n" had further proposed that Kierkegaard should "stop ringing the fire alarm", and this moved him to make an interesting policy statement. Clausen's view is that the time has come for the alarm to stop sounding and to get on with doing something about the fire. Kierkegaard should now "do something more". Kierkegaard replies that there can be no question of leaving
off ringing the alarm while the fire continues to burn. However, he says that, strictly speaking, he is not the one ringing the bell. Rather, he is the one starting the fire and it is Christendom he is setting ablaze. This he does by posing the burning issue: that official Christianity is not the Christianity of the New Testament. Thus Kierkegaard makes it clear that his is a destructive attack. It is the illusions which have to go—the illusions fostered by 1,000 priests who may be capable, respectable and even estimable men, but whose "Christianity" is their means of livelihood. Kierkegaard implies that, without the priests fostering such illusions "everybody must be able to see that official Christianity is not the Christianity of the New Testament". There can be no doubt that this represents an attempt to undermine the position of the priests and to destroy them. They stand in the way of an honest appraisal of Christendom vis-à-vis the Christianity of the New Testament. In the light of these comments, the severity of The Instant can come as no surprise, and it is significant that in these two articles Kierkegaard makes his first references to the concept of "the instant" since he launched the "Attack".

Also on April 11th, Kierkegaard published a short, and relatively insignificant article on the absurdity of appealing to a royal commission in support of one's Christianity. Then, after a pause of just over two weeks, Kierkegaard issued a highly satirical reply to an article by Dean J. Victor Bloch. In this, and subsequent articles, Bloch's main preoccupation is with the indestructibility of the Church and it is at this point he takes issue with Kierkegaard. Bloch does not share Clausen's view that New Testament study will correct Kierkegaard's distortions. Rather, the Church must take a stand and this should take the form of excluding Kierkegaard from the Church if he does not modify his position. Kierkegaard greets this suggestion with a brilliant display of cynical wit. Of some significance is Kierkegaard's reminder to his readers that it has for some time been his custom not to attend Church, thus rendering the proposed punishment ineffective—"the infliction of this punishment will not cause even the very least change in my customary
mode of life upon which I set such great store". 174 Kierkegaard feels that he could well conclude his response with such thoughts but yet adds a postscript. His reason for adding these rather more serious thoughts is linked to the fact that Bloch was not only a Church dignitary, but had also "cut such a great figure (perhaps with the feeling that he too is representative of the whole order)". 172 In other words, Kierkegaard continues to be consistent in choosing to respond with some seriousness to those who write with some kind of representative authority. Kierkegaard speaks of the Christian preachers who are royally authorised in terms of self-contradiction:

"By ordination the priest is properly related to a kingdom which is not of this world, but having also royal authorisation - ah, this 'also' is it not an exceedingly questionable word, or do also and either/or perhaps come to the same thing?"

By putting the matter thus, Kierkegaard locates the issues of the final attack in the precise area of philosophical debate so characteristic of his earlier work. As with his discussion of incarnational theology, so here also it is the principle of contradiction which is at stake.

With regard to Bloch's emphasis on the indestructability of the Church (made explicit by the title of his collection of articles "God's Church is built for eternity") Kierkegaard quotes the text: "When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" According to Kierkegaard's reading of this text, Christ implies that apostasy from Christianity will be due to "craftiness and knavery". He does not ask whether any Christians will be found, but whether faith will be found. The world may be made up of Christians to a man, but New Testament Christianity has no place and no adherents. Rather, the general endorsement of established Christianity is seen as a way of securing oneself against New Testament Christianity. So once again we see Kierkegaard positing the priests of the established Church as dangerous impediments to the cause of Christian truth with the implication that they, or at least their indulgence, must be removed. Kierkegaard concludes by warning his readers that they must ultimately be held responsible if they believe the priest "too light-mindedly". 173 Thus a wedge is firmly
driven between the priest and those to whom he ministers or to whom he preaches.

In the light of the many articles to which we have referred, most of them written by priests, Kierkegaard's next publication may seem somewhat surprising. He says that, having maintained "a lively fire against the official Christianity, and thereby against the clergy in the land", he has no reply from the priests other than their preservation of "a significant silence". We have already dealt with the moot points pertaining to the extent of the debate Kierkegaard provoked, and it is clear that many priests did express their opinion in response to his challenge. In view of this is must be that Kierkegaard's real point is the significance of their very small response relative to their supposed station as witnesses to the truth. His was a challenge which could not possibly be ignored:

"Assuming that what I say is true - if the clergy had been witnesses to the truth, they would not have kept silent but declared themselves for the truth. Assuming that what I say is false - if the clergy had been witnesses to the truth, they would not have kept silent but declared themselves against this falsehood." 175

We have already suggested that Kierkegaard had given up hoping for the admission; and the appearance of the second edition of Training in Christianity minus the pseudonymity, the thrice repeated Preface and the Moral served to underline this fact. 176 So, of the possible responses the priests could make, he only expected them to declare against his falsehoods. Furthermore, as witnesses to the truth, such a declaration would have to be made as decisively and as vociferously as possible. From this point of view, even the fifty contributions already made in the Copenhagen press are insignificant. However, whilst Kierkegaard's inference that the clergy have tended to ignore his challenge because they were fearful of losing material comforts may be justified, his charges against their silences are certainly overstated.

In a postscript Kierkegaard explains his use of a widely circulated political journal for his attack. 177 The very provision of such an explanation shows that Kierkegaard was conscious of being open to the charge of gutter-press journalism. But it also shows that he recognised some justification
for the jibes against the proximity of his literature. Indeed, the draft notes to this postscript make explicit reference to "large books read by nobody".178

Significantly he omits reference to the length of his books in the published article, but still he clearly felt the need to express himself with increased succinctness and brevity. But the most important thing is that no-one should be allowed to excuse their unresponsiveness to Kierkegaard's challenge on the grounds that they had not read what he had to say. The very effectiveness of the attack depended upon everyone understanding and facing the issues for themselves. The need to put the later polemical articles into the context of the whole authorship was made more urgent by the comments of Dr. F.L.B. Zeuthen.179 To be precise, Kierkegaard was not moved to reply so much by Zeuthen himself (he describes him as "insignificant") as by the fact that an anonymous writer in Kjøbenhavnsposten pointed to his contribution as a rebuttal of Kierkegaard's charges of clerical silence.180 Kierkegaard feels that Zeuthen's defence of the Established Church is totally irrelevant because it is the one already offered in Postscript and other works. Once again Kierkegaard made it clear that his "Attack" must be seen as the final stage of a series of stages represented in the works already published. Kierkegaard reiterates this point in response to the suggestion made by the writer in Kjøbenhavnsposten that he should have issued replies to Zeuthen's criticisms:

"I am not a completely unknown person who writes a newspaper article and then ought to submit to the necessity of discussing things on perfectly equal terms with every chap who writes. No, the question here is about a matter which in one sense was finished in a whole literature of important works, to which works of mine I refer those who really are interested. It was for religious reasons I decided to use a widely circulated political journal - to make people take notice". 181

The careful subtleties of the pseudonymous and edifying authorship had failed to elicit the desired response and so Fædrelænderet is pressed into service as the means of access to a wider public and using the language acceptable to that audience. Thus the stage is set for The Instant.

But the first break with Fædrelænderet is represented by the publication of an article, the main part of which dated from December 1854. To the initial challenge Kierkegaard added a few supplementary paragraphs and published it on
Lay 16th, along with an accompanying sheet entitled "The midnight cry", and dating from mid-April. The pamphlet was entitled This has to be said, so be it now said. It contains the advice to the Church-going public of Denmark which Kierkegaard must have believed most likely to "raise a cry" against him - the advice to cease taking part in the public worship of God so that they might have "one guilt the less". Certainly Kierkegaard's remarks about Lynster had provoked a considerable amount of indignation, but nothing so great as that aroused by this injunction against Church-going. Even those who have wanted to take Kierkegaard's side have found this article difficult to defend. This is mainly because support for Kierkegaard's attack has been based on a desire to be associated with his role as a corrective. So long as he appeared to be presenting a challenge to the excesses of Christendom so that the established house might put itself in order then he could be applauded. But here in this pamphlet he offers prescriptive advice. In spite of his emphatic assurances that he "obliges no one to act accordingly" and that it is for the individual reader to act upon his own responsibility before God in response to that which "has to be said", still he gives every semblance of recommending abstinence from public worship. We may take it that his delay in publishing this article is related to its dramatic content. This adventure into a new realm of negative aggression could only be justified when all other attempts to elicit a definite response - either for him or against him - had been unsuccessful. As far as Kierkegaard was concerned, the Church had done nothing but maintain a dangerous silence: "but at midnight there is a cry".

Already in his Journal Kierkegaard had located "the Cry" in his scheme to work catastrophically. The article This has to be said was originally intended as the opening volley in the attack following the long silence after Lynster's death. But he remained undecided about this and eventually published Was Bishop Lynster a "witness to the truth"? instead. Even in Kierkegaard's own eyes this represented a weakening of the catastrophic effect. For him, the injunction against participation in public worship was far more provocative than a personal assault on Lynster and Hartensen. Now the time
had come to take this decisive step. Kierkegaard must put himself in the way of arrest and trial. Up until now he may have offended against good taste but he had done nothing illegal. To incite the faithful away from worship, however, that was different. Now he had acted decisively, and in spite of certain misgivings about "whether I am up to going to prison, to being executed" he had put his fate into the hands of God. But still he consciously weakened the catastrophe by publishing the accompanying sheet. The weakening as indicated earlier, lay in the fact that Kierkegaard thus predicted the catastrophe. In this sheet Kierkegaard stresses that, for the first time his purpose will be declared:

"The question about what Christianity is, and therewith in turn the question about the State Church ... shall be brought to the most definite decision ... shall be pressed to the last conclusion".

The rest leaves no doubt that this "last conclusion" will take the form of direct action against Kierkegaard by the civil and/or ecclesiastical authorities. He takes note of the fact that the Prime Minister had said that if Kierkegaard were arrested he would at once release such an illustrious man, and remarks that it "would after all be a very gracious punishment to be let off with the obligation to support the actual garrison of priests we now have". Kierkegaard reckons with only two possible reactions to his latest outburst - either he will be arrested and tried by the State, or he will be physically attacked by the 1,000 priests and their families. Even allowing for Kierkegaard's characteristic leanings towards sarcasm and exaggeration, it is clear that for him the conflict marking "the instant" is impending. So the time is ripe for The Instant to be launched.

However, Næderlandet was to carry one more article before Kierkegaard began publishing his independent journal. This one appeared on Saturday, May 26th and bore the prolix title: "That Bishop Wartensen's silence is, Christianly, (1) unjustifiable, (2) comical, (3) dumb-clever, (4) in more than one respect contemptible". This article makes it emphatically clear that, for Kierkegaard, the objective of eliciting some kind of definite reaction from the leader of the State Church was primary during the last few months. In the
face of Kierkegaard's challenge to the very principle of established Christianity, Hartensen's silence was unjustifiable. As far as Kierkegaard was concerned, Hartensen's article in Berlingske Tidende dealt only with the question of whether he had been impertinent to a deceased person. When Kierkegaard's attack was expanded to include the priests in general, and had less to do with Lynster in particular, then Hartensen kept silent. This silence had been maintained even in the face of Nielsen's challenge to Hartensen that he should admit the validity of Kierkegaard's view of Christianity as a breach with the world. Such silence serves only to make the point that Hartensen feels himself to be "in a fix". Kierkegaard goes on to recall Hartensen's history of maintaining silence in spite of attacks on his position by the pseudonyms. Such silence was broken only when he thought that Kierkegaard "had put his foot in it" by attacking Lynster. Kierkegaard infers that Hartensen was only prepared to climb on to the band wagon of hostile public opinion. In a way, this inference summarises Kierkegaard's opinion of Hartensen as a non-original thinker who has derived his philosophy from Hegel, his ecclesiastical status from Lynster and his attitudes from prevailing public opinion. In short, Hartensen is deemed nothing less than contemptible.

In a "Postscript", Kierkegaard expresses deep resentment against the "higher clergy" because they have tried by their silence to give "the plain man" the idea that what he has to say is unworthy of a reply. Indeed, Kierkegaard believes that an article in Dagbladet was written precisely to put the idea into the plain man's head that Kierkegaard spoke twaddle. Kierkegaard's anxiety to catch the mood of "the plain man" has been well documented elsewhere, and his aggressive reaction to such supposed attempts at deception by silence comes as no surprise. Kierkegaard concludes with the assurance that he now has no desire to provoke Hartensen to enter into a discussion. Rather, he says he is "essentially through with Bishop Hartensen". He served his purpose by being the occasion for Kierkegaard to "get his blow in at this thing about 'witnesses to the truth'". Furthermore, the objective of getting Hartensen to speak just the once and then to keep silent had been
obtained -- "...when one knows what his speech signifies, one knows also what his silence signifies".

Thus, appropriately enough, Kierkegaard concluded his Faedrelandet articles as he began them -- with Kiertsen. Now he was venturing into a new field of literary activity which has less and less to do with personalities. Any articles which were written after this time directed at specific individuals remained unpublished. For example, he refrained from publishing attacks on Bloch, Zeuthen, his brother Peter, and Birkedal and an anonymous contributor to Kynsavis. Just as Kierkegaard was "through with Bishop Kynster", so he was no longer interested in engaging in a dialogue with the other defenders of the Establishment. As Geismar says, the spirit of "The Cry" is maintained throughout the ten numbers of Øjeblikket which are general attacks on the Church. Hitherto, Kierkegaard had always been anxious to keep himself involved with people and to interact with them. Faedrelandet had served his purposes well to this end. It had retained a neutral position and had published things against as well as for Kierkegaard. But now the time had come to sever the link with this popular political journal. The Instant has arrived. The significance of this fact Kierkegaard brought out in a few paragraphs finally planned for publication in Øjeblikket No. 10 but dated May 29th, i.e. soon after the appearance of the first number:

"The Instant is when the man is there, the right man, the man of the instant."

"This is a secret which eternally will remain hidden from all worldly shrewdness, from everything which is only to a certain degree."

"Worldly shrewdness stares and stares at events, at circumstances, it reckons and reckons, thinking that it might be able to distill the Instant out of the circumstances, and so become itself a power by the aid of the Instant, this breaking through of the eternal, hoping that itself might be rejuvenated, as it so greatly needs to be, by means of the new."

"But in vain. Shrewdness does not succeed and never will to all eternity succeed by means of this surrogate - any more than all the arts of cosmetics succeed in producing natural beauty."

"No, only when the man is there, and when he ventures as one must venture (which is precisely what worldly shrewdness and mediocrity want to avoid), then is the Instant -- and the circumstances then obey the man of the Instant. In case nothing is brought into play but worldly shrewdness and mediocrity, the Instant never comes. Things may go on for hundreds of thousands and millions of years constantly the same --"
it looks perhaps as if it might now soon come; but so long as there is only worldly shrewdness and mediocrity etc., the Instant comes not, no more than does an unfruitful man beget children.

"But when the right man comes, yea, then the Instant is there. For the Instant is precisely that which does not lie in the circumstances, it is the new thing, the woof of eternity - but that same second it masters the circumstances to such a degree that (adroitly calculated to fool worldly shrewdness and mediocrity) it looks as if the Instant proceeded from the circumstances.

"There is nothing worldly shrewdness so broods over and so hankers after as the Instant. What would it not give to be able to calculate rightly! Yet no one is more surely excluded from ever grasping the Instant than worldly shrewdness. For the Instant is heaven's gift to - a pagan would say, to the fortunate and the enterprising, but a Christian says, to the believer. Yea, this thing which by worldly shrewdness is so deeply despised, or at the most dressed up with borrowed phrases of Sunday solemnity, this thing of believing, that and that only is related as possibility to the Instant. Worldly shrewdness is eternally excluded, despised and abhorred, as things are in heaven, more than all vices and crimes, because in its nature it of all things most belongs to this wretched world, and most of all is remote from having anything to do with heaven and the eternal."

These paragraphs serve to underline the point that The Instant was something new. Now the man is venturing forth in a way not dictated by circumstances, but vice versa. If Faedrelandet had involved a subtle combination of religion and political aims (i.e. a religious pandering to shrewdness and mediocrity) then Kjæblikket was to "introduce the Absolute". Now there could be no question of presenting Christianity "to a certain degree" or with a sense of detachment (and Kierkegaard makes it clear that he enjoys detached writing). Now the case must be presented in all its stark reality. Only "from time to time" will Kierkegaard make reference to the utterances of "mediocrity" - i.e. the comments and attacks of his contemporaries. On the whole Kierkegaard was now committed to an unqualified attack on the establishment and an undiluted statement of the demands of Christian discipleship. We have seen in detail Kierkegaard's concern to attack the illusions of Christendom; now he restates his view that this can only be done by emphasising the Christian "Either/Or":

"All this thing of 'to a certain degree' is theatrical, it grasps an illusion; only either/or is the embrace which grasps the unconditional."

Significantly, Kierkegaard chooses to define this "to a certain degree/either - or" dichotomy in terms of the relationship between Church and State:
"Everything which is only to a certain degree has not served Christianity, but perhaps itself, and can never honestly demand any other mark of distinction than at the most (as on a letter to Frank it) 'In the King's Service'; for what is in God's service is either/or". 204

As successive numbers of Øjeblikket were published, the exposure and condemnation of the false relationship between New Testament Christianity and the established state Church religion of Christendom became far and away Kierkegaard's principal concern. 205

Most of the items from Øjeblikket were written during the period April - July 1855. Those familiar with the Journals of 1852 - 5 could be in no doubt about the fundamental consistency of mood and ideas pervading the private and published writings. However, in themselves the Øjeblikket articles are original with very little material being taken from entries in the diary. 206

The use of popular idioms and uncomplicated language makes the meaning perfectly clear. Furthermore, Kierkegaard's refusal to enter into any significant public debate with contemporary antagonists obviates the need for such historical contextualisation as was necessary in our dealings with Faedrelandet articles. Consequently we shall confine our study to two main areas of interest:

1) content and style 2) chronology

1) The content and style of Øjeblikket.

In terms of the development of Kierkegaard's published opinions, there is clearly no break between Faedrelandet and Øjeblikket. In the pamphlet What Christ's judgement is about official Christianity 207 Kierkegaard traces the progress of his attack upon Christendom. From being a poet presenting ideals, Kierkegaard finally aroused the priests to a response with his article against Martensen and Lynster. Then the poet "suddenly transformed himself" and brought out a book which is called The New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ in order to confront the establishment with even loftier ideals. Then came the most damning and incisive accusation so far: "It is a crime, a great crime, to take part in the public worship of God as it now is". But still the charges were being made only in Kierkegaard's own name, and he is still "without authority". Thus Øjeblikket becomes the
inevitable culminating point of the attack, being backed by the judgement of Christ himself. I feel that the introduction of Christ's judgement at this point has a significance difficult to overemphasize. Once Kierkegaard had invoked the support of Christ's own words, the possibility of compromise was gone. The admission ceases to be a live option. Now there is only room for an all-out attack with no quarter given. The illusions, the objective norms of Christendom, are condemned without mercy. The content of \textit{	extdeg{}eblikket} is to be seen almost entirely in terms of this uncompromisingly negative perspective.

The third number is devoted entirely to the incompatibility of Church and State, and the severity of its tone is well indicated by the list of contents:

1. State/Christianity
2. Is the State justified, Christianly, in seducing a part of the youth engaged in study?
3. Is the State justified in receiving an oath which not only is not kept but in the taking of which is a self-contradiction?
4. Is the State justified, Christianly, in misleading the people, or in misleading their judgement as to what Christianity is?
5. Let the State test the reckoning and it will be found that the reckoning is radically wrong.
6. If the State truly would serve Christianity, let it take away the 1,000 livings.

The following paragraph from the opening page of this same number also provides a reliable guide to the spirit of \textit{	extdeg{}eblikket}:

"So then the concept 'Christianity' is inversely proportionate to number/'State' is directly proportionate; and for all that they have made Christianity and State divisible into one another - to the advantage of twaddle and the priests. For to set State and Christianity together by the ears in this fashion makes just as good sense as to talk of a yard of butter, or if possible there is less sense in it, since butter and a yard are merely things which have nothing to do with one another, whereas State and Christianity are inversely related to or rather from one another". 209

Kierkegaard weighs in repeatedly with the charge that in Christendom "all are Christians" which in effect means that Christianity does not exist. 210 Indeed "all are priests" if the current manifestations of priesthood are true. 211
But, of course, it is precisely Kierkegaard's point that the priests are hypocrites to a man, and that "there is not a single one who is not peculiarly interested in maintaining the illusion". 212 This is a most radical generalisation and Geismar thinks it equally doubtful whether he really did believe this accusation, or whether he half knew it went beyond the limit. 213 Certainly this would represent one of those utterances which Pastor Boesen said do not "correspond with reality but are more severe". 214

Kierkegaard himself puts his finger on the reason for this appearance of extreme exaggeration. He has introduced the New Testament as his most important line of defence, but the New Testament itself has "a difficulty about it". 215 The problem is that the New Testament not only presents an ideal picture of what is right, but also retains an ideal perspective upon what is wrong. Thus the New Testament does not issue direct blows against the prevailing evils of "twaddle, twattle, patter, smallness, mediocrity, playing at Christianity". Therefore, in a way, Kierkegaard is using the New Testament's arsenal of weapons against a situation which they are not designed to combat. This is merely another facet of the problem of introducing Christianity into Christendom, i.e. into a situation where it is supposed to exist already.
The admission was demanded so that men might either accept or reject the absolute demands of Christianity and thus move away from their mediocre middle of the road position. Now the admission strategy has been virtually abandoned, Kierkegaard is waging a war with weapons whose blows don't touch the enemy in question. The result is that those will only feel under attack who choose to feel so, whilst others can choose to ignore him. So much depends upon how one has responded to his authorship as a whole. Here lies the root of the misunderstanding which has bedevilled the "Attack" from the beginning.

Just as vigilant Christians all down the centuries have attacked "heresy, error and aberration" in order to be rid of these things and to purify the faith, so Kierkegaard devotes himself through Liebløkket to the assault and overthrow of the "twaddle ... mediocrity ... playing at Christianity", etc. apparent in Christendom. Kierkegaard's objective is the same as the
anti-heretic - to clear Christianity of all erroneous representation. However, the method and style of attack must differ. Heretical doctrine is best countered by the reasoned presentation of orthodoxy. The sheer ludicrousness of Christendom must be exposed on its own terms and so Jæbelikket proceeds copy by copy to do just that. There is a galaxy of images ranging from the subtle to the positively crude. There is a directness of style such as characterises little else in Kierkegaard's production. The length of the articles varies from "Short and Sharp" pieces to those pieces of which the title is almost an article in itself. But at all points, Kierkegaard reflects that penchant for effective journalése which had always found him both critical and jealous of the journalists' art. Kierkegaard is now addressing neither the man in the pulpit nor the man in the pew. His reader is the man in the market place where New Testament Christianity belongs but yet where Christendom appears most ludicrous.

2) The Chronology of Jæbelikket

There is very little to be gained from trying to analyse the timing of specific numbers of Jæbelikket. Kierkegaard had amassed an enormous amount of material in his Journals and many relatively complete drafts of polemical articles were available from which he could make his selection - although, as we pointed out earlier, each item in Jæbelikket was a spontaneous composition.

Malantschuk has sought to divide Kierkegaard's attack into four separate sections; and whilst we should beware of jeopardising the immediacy of these publications in favour of a pre-determined plan of campaign, such a scheme as Malantschuk provides is of value. First of all, there were articles in Faedrelandet, and to these Malantschuk adds the initial two numbers of Jæbelikket as comprising the first and second sections. The article: "What Christ's Judgement is about Official Christianity" thus becomes the watershed and merits being described as the third stage. Thus the first two numbers of Jæbelikket are separated from the next by this article. The third stage is completed by the ensuing numbers of Jæbelikket as their severity capitalises on Kierkegaard's claim to have the authority of Christ on his side. So during the Summer of
1855 the next five editions of _Jeblikket_ appeared at irregular intervals varying from one to four weeks. Between numbers five and six almost a month elapses, but only one week separates the publication of numbers six and seven. Clearly the matter is reaching some kind of climax in Kierkegaard's mind at the end of August, and this impression is confirmed by the summary article which is placed at the end of No. 7 "About the interest which is shown in my cause".

Here Kierkegaard laments that, whereas the interest shown in his articles increases with each edition that appears, there is a distinct lack of passion such as should characterise the religious sphere. People simply say:

"What Kierkegaard writes is substantially true, and it is exceedingly interesting to read how he shows that the whole official worship is making a fool of God, is blasphemy - but after all we are accustomed to do this, we are unable to emancipate ourselves from it, we lack the power to do so. But certain it is that what he writes we shall read with enjoyment; one can't help being impatient to get a new number and to learn something more about this prodigiously interesting criminal case, as it undeniably is".

Kierkegaard goes on to compare such a reaction with that of a husband who, having been told of his wife's unfaithfulness, declines to do anything about it because he would thus jeopardise his domestic ease and security. He concludes with a dramatic and decisive condemnation:

"Therefore, whoever thou art, if such be the case with thee - shame upon thee, shame upon thee, shame upon thee!"

I feel that this short item marks another watershed in Kierkegaard's publications during this final year. A case may be made out for the view that Kierkegaard must have felt a sense of profound despair in having to admit that his writings were received with mere interest devoid of religious passion. But this is not really likely. The years of patient waiting in vain for the admission had taught him to expect nothing different once the attack was fully unleashed. Such a response would have occasioned neither surprise nor an increased sense of despair. But clearly Kierkegaard was aware of one thing which was of some significance for his immediate strategy. For better or for worse, he was arousing interest and he was reaching a large audience who were looking forward with keen anticipation to each new publication. Whilst not
being prepared to pull back his heavy artillery from the front line of attack, Kierkegaard saw that he was now well placed to retire and re-emphasize the positive Christian message which lay at the heart of all his negative criticisms. So Kierkegaard published the discourse *The Unchangeableness of God* and Malantschuk is right in giving this the status of a separate fourth stage in the evolution of the "Attack".

Of all the articles comprising the final polemical authorship, this discourse is of most significance with regard to timing. In the numbers of *Ojeblikket* which had appeared most recently, every single idol of Christendom had come under attack. Baptism, Confirmation, Marriage and religious education became principal targets along with sex and the rearing of children. Whilst it is true that these latter issues are dealt with even more severely in the Journals, still the sharpness of his published remarks is extreme. Needless to say, the priests and officials of the State Church have continued to suffer from Kierkegaard's bitterest aggression. Now, in the midst of the ruins caused by his own verbal blitz, Kierkegaard seizes the chance to raise up for all to see the principle of God's unchanging rule and love.

One is inclined to look closely at the subsequent editions of *Ojeblikket* for signs of moderation in Kierkegaard's "Attack". But ultimately the search is in vain. In fact, one of the most vicious articles of all is reserved for issue number nine — i.e. Kierkegaard's likening of the priests to cannibals. So the discourse is in no way to be seen as a recantation by Kierkegaard of his aggressive assault. Rather, it stands as a reminder of the Christian truth which remained immutable behind every single stage of the authorship. His earlier Christian proclamation had fallen largely on deaf ears. Now he had a large and eager audience who needed to be told that he was attacking the Church as one who had stood forth boldly as a Christian. The text of the discourse was precisely the same as he used for his very first discourse and often thereafter. As regards the essence of his message — as God himself was unchanged so that was to remain unchanged.
With especial reference to The Instant M. Cornu has written:

"Il fait bien à certains moments défendre l'intériorité par les armes. L'arme de Kierkegaard est le pamphlet ... Le pamphlet, pour le penseur danois, n'a pas pour seul but de détruire. Il veut, en dénonçant la caricature du christianisme, rendre attentif le lecteur aux exigences du 'devenir chrétien'." 223

Here Kierkegaard's intentions in the last writings are clearly recognised. He was seeking to use an aggressive weapon as an integral part of a project towards upbuilding in Christianity. The task was difficult almost to the point of impossibility. A delicate balance had to be struck and maintained in the heat of a frantic public debate when tempers, and judgements, are not easily restrained. Matters were further complicated by the general display of ignorance as to the actual content of Kierkegaard's earlier writings. Add to this the ingredient of a thoroughgoing personality clash - in this case a clash regarding the personality of Bishop Løynster - and the possibility of constructive dialogue almost totally recedes from view. Mariie Nøy argues that "... Kierkegaard's final attack upon the Church is not only characterised by a fundamental division between two interpretations of Christianity, but also by a decisive judgement upon Løynster as a person". 224 This is correct so long as it is recognised that the judgement upon Løynster is part of the debate about the interpretation of Christianity which, in its turn, is part of an authorship specifically contrived "défendre l'intériorité". The aftermath of the "Attack" is marked by a general failure to hold these strands together. By and large, Kierkegaard's criticism of Løynster and the Church are seen in absolute terms and judged accordingly, whilst their intended relativisation in the context of a specific strategic enterprise is ignored. Indeed P.A. Stucki is right when he says that:

"il convient ... de souligner que ces critiques ne portent pas tant contre l'Eglise elle-même que contre la conception qu'on peut s'en faire ou la valeur qu'on peut lui accorder". 225

It is the value of the Church as an instrument of God's will relative to the demands of subjectivity and paradox that Kierkegaard wishes to establish and defend. But the subtlety of this point could not easily be grasped when friendship is at stake, revered personalities are under attack and a
enphiloeteering conflict is in full cry. Hal Koch argues for the unity of the "Attack" with the authorship as a whole and yet still maintains the impossibility of reading any positive view of the Church out of Kierkegaard's writings. 226 Whilst Koch is a most illustrious Church historian, still A. D. Pedersen can justifiably link him with those "who have gone astray and who cannot be forgiven". 227 Pedersen feels that Koch can be criticised all the more because "he knew what he was doing". This is to distinguish him from those who drew a similar conclusion but yet whose limited vantage point gave them adequate excuse. The point is that Kierkegaard's presentation of these final articles, and the context of their publication, was far from conducive to a ready and positive understanding of their true significance. No-one but Kierkegaard himself can ultimately be held responsible for this failure. Apart from such men as Lartensen and Bloch, the majority of Kierkegaard's readers could be forgiven for missing the subtleties behind the "Attack". They were ill-acquainted with the Authorship and Kierkegaard knew this only too well. However, some points can be made in his defence.

First of all, because of the thinking behind the "admission" strategy Kierkegaard looked precisely to the likes of Lartensen in formulating his "Attack". Essentially the sign board proclaiming the established Church to be truly Christian had to be taken down rather than pulled down by the howling mob. Only the authorities could put this into effect. Certainly, by his direct assault through the newspaper articles and pamphlets Kierkegaard would facilitate his communication with "the man in the market place", but this would only be a by-product of his primary intention to be more direct in his challenge to the representatives of Christendom.

Secondly, we should not lose sight of the fact that for Kierkegaard the way to Christian existence is marked by necessary points of decision and choice. Choices imply conflicts of interest and this element of conflict is essential to authentic existence. There must be correctives, and correctives to correctives, 228 in the cause of searching for ultimate truth
and reality. Kierkegaard was not so naive as to believe that by speaking as he does of lystner he could avoid arousing passionate feelings in the breasts of respectable Danish Churchmen. But neither did he wish to avoid arousing such passions for only thus, it seemed, could he breach the sturdy defences of complacency and self-assurance which enable Christendom to keep Christianity at bay. In the end Christ succeeded in arousing the authorities to respond passionately to his ministry and message - they persecuted, insulted, tortured and crucified Him. Kierkegaard was ready to succeed in the same kind of way.

Thirdly, Kierkegaard was being consistent in launching this assault on the established Church. The objective norms of Christendom did need to be subjected to radical reassessment, in the light of his project in the direction of inwardness. If he had stopped short of an attack when all else had failed to induce this reassessment on the part of the hierarchy then he would have been less than true to his own message and ideals. When a man has spent as much effort presenting his case as Kierkegaard spent in compiling his authorship, is he to be condemned for finally forcing to the front of people's minds the honest implications of his thought in spite of their likely inability to fully understand?

Fourthly, Kierkegaard knew only too well how people could neutralise his ideas in order to accommodate them to their own. This way the preaching of Christianity can be drained of all its passion and challenge. That is unless steps are taken to discourage such manipulation. Few would wish to ally themselves with a crude polemical assault so that the dangers of attracting adherents anxious to make the "Attack" more palatable are kept to a minimum. Kierkegaard did not entirely avoid the acquisition of such adherents but generally speaking the starkness of the issues were not qualified in this way. Of course there were those who felt able to agree with Kierkegaard's "Ideals" and then go back to "reality" without giving him another thought. But in so far as Kierkegaard wished to confront his contemporaries with real issues, then the aggression of Gjeblükket achieved the desired effect.
So Kierkegaard died a contented man. Content to have pursued the cause of honesty, content to have paid the price of being honest. During his lifetime he had sacrificed so much that he held dear. He had set Regine aside, he had attacked the only priest for whom he had any real affection and at the end he had refused to see his own brother Peter. He had conditioned his way of life to the demands of his authorship, he had borne the rebuffs of a satirical journal, he had known the pain of having his thoughts misunderstood. Now, in the last phase, he had been prepared to expose himself to all manner of insult and criticism. This preparedness to suffer so much must give us pause when we are tempted to make a facile condemnation of the "Attack". Indeed Kierkegaard was "a thoroughly polemical man" but he was also thoroughly consistent and true to the implications of his own philosophy. We may not admire his style or endorse his conclusions but we must beware of dividing his authorship according to our own tastes and opinions. If we are prepared to give full value to the unity of his authorship then much that we find superficially distasteful or even erroneous will acquire a substance and challenge worthy of further re-assessment. A critique of the Church from a position of total acceptance, an attack on a senior cleric from a sense of profound reverence and love - these apparently negative pursuits are not characterised by the customary marks of unqualified condemnation. Behind Kierkegaard's "Attack" there lies an essentially positive goal to which his polemics are necessarily subservient. Unlike so many attacks upon institutional norms, Kierkegaard's "Attack upon Christendom" is in no sense an end in itself. To look upon it as such is to automatically condemn all that Kierkegaard's authorship seeks to proclaim. On the other hand, to see what is positive in his thinking is to see deeper into the realities of our own poor selves as potential disciples of Christ and to know the power of God's grace which yet can make us whole. Within Kierkegaard's defence of Christianity there lies his "Attack upon Christendom"; within the "Attack upon Christendom" there lies his defence of Christianity. His contemporaries failed to grasp the former deduction - shall we succeed in grasping the latter?
NOTES

1. To be precise, on February 5th. Lynster died on January 30th and was buried on February 7th.

2. W. Bowrie: Sören Kierkegaard p. 566


5. On February 13th, 1854

6. Published by Heizel, Kbh. 1854

7. See Attack p. 5


9. Ibid. p. 7

10. Ibid. p. 13

11. Ibid. p. 15

12. Attack p. 5

13. Attack p. 10


15. Pap. XI A 1

16. Pap. X 5 A 146. Dated October 13th, 1853

17. Attack p. 8

18. Ibid. p. 9

19. Ibid. p. 8

20. Weltzer: op. cit.

21. See Pap. XI 1 A 72


23. Attack p. 5


25. See Pap. X 1 3 B 201 - 2 especially pps. 339 - 342


27. Pap. XI 2 A 32

28. Pap. XI 1 A 86
where Luther is chided for "reducing the price" for becoming a Christian.

43. See, for example, Pap. XI 1 A 141; 165; 193; XI 2 A 202. Cf. Geismar: op. cit. Vol. VI p. 42 f. where Schopenhauer is given a far more significant role in this respect than I am prepared to accept. Schopenhauer did not so much inspire Kierkegaard with new ideas, as encourage him to give expression to thoughts already developed independently. With regard to sex and marriage, Kierkegaard finds in Schopenhauer a kindred spirit as he also did with regard to the evaluation of Journalists. (Pap. XI 2 A 58). Kierkegaard sums up his relationship to Schopenhauer thus: "In a sense it is almost disagreeable to me to have to come to read Schopenhauer. I am indescribably scrupulous and fearful about issuing expressions and so on of others, without making it known. But his terms are at times so akin to mine that perhaps I end, with exaggerated fearfulness, by ascribing to him what is really my own". (Pap. XI 2 A 59).

44. Pap. XI 1 A 149; 184

45. See for example: Pap. XI 1 A 141; 157; 204; 226; 289; 293; 295; 313

46. Pap. XI 1 A 204

47. Pap. XI 1 A 426. Cf. XI 1 A 28 f.

48. As does Geismar: op. cit. Vol. VI p. 45. Sponheim makes a similar point against Geismar: "In seeking to defend such passages, E. Geismar rather reflects the diastatic rhythm than justifies it". (Sponheim: op. cit. p. 167 n.). Despite our differences, Sponheim and I are still united in wanting to assert and maintain the unity of kierkegaard's authorship. Thus it is that we share a suspicion of Geismar's attempts to justify aspects of his final outburst.


On the numerical see Pap. XI 1 A 16.


51. Pap. XI 1 A 130

52. Pap. XI 1 A 518


54. Pap. XI 1 A 23

55. Pap. XI 1 A 16

56. Pap. XI 1 A 7

57. Pap. XI 1 A 27. Cf. 66, 76, 82

58. Pap. XI 1 A 106

59. Pap. XI 2 A 86


63. Pap. XI 1 A 85, 166, 218, 558; XI 2 A 34, 66, 86, 109 f., 113, 132, 172, 212

64. Pap. XI 1 A 4, 7, 82, 126, 128, 141, 144, 159, 232, 271 f., 295, 325, 358, 439 f.; XI 2 A 10, 19, 36, 46, 263


68. Lolland-Falsters Stiftstidende 31. 1. 1855
69. P. G. Lindhardt: "Indrømmelsen". Jyllandsposten 18.12.1854. See also P. G. Lindhardt: Søren Kierkegaards Angrb pa volskirk'en. Aarhus 1955. p. 5. Certainly Lindhardt is right when he speaks of the attack coming as a surprise to many people, unacquainted as they were with the Journals and Judge for Yourselves. However, any numbing effect this caused would not have stifled reaction for long. Very quickly Kierkegaard's articles came to be seen as a self-contained body of literature meriting a response in their own right. (See Den Nordiske Folkeskole, Kbh. 1855 Nrs. 17 - 23. Less than five months after the launching of Kierkegaard's first article the editors of this publication felt that the debate justified extensive coverage.)

70. Some articles were signed "A Leyman". See Flyveposten 16.1.1855; Lolland-Falsters Stiftstidende 25.1.1855; Berlingske Tidende 9.7.1856; Dagbladet 21.7.1856. Cf. also Flyveposten 3.2.1855 signed "Y" but entitled "En Røst Fra Lenigheden" and Dagbladet 20.2.1855 signed "D" but entitled "Et ord Fra en Lægmand angaaende Sandhedsvindstriden".

71. Note the attitude of the Roskilde Convention in 1855. See Weltzer: op. cit. p. 255.

72. Vilh. Andersen contends that Kierkegaard's "final works of journalistic destruction occurred without any significant voice being raised for or against him". (Ill. Dansk Litteraturhistorie Vol. III. Kbh. 1924. p.692). Kabell points out that whether or not a voice is significant is a matter of taste. It is his view, right in my opinion, that Andersen's characterisation of the Church battle cannot be justified (Kabell: op. cit. p. 73). Hartensen tells us that Kierkegaard's article "has attracted great attention to itself" (Berlingske Tidende 26th December 1854)

73. See Attack pps 10 ff; 18 ff; 67 ff.


75. Very soon after the article was published Kierkegaard referred to it as "about kynster against Hartensen" (Fap. XI 2 A 265). But he also refers to "the attack upon Hartensen or upon Kynster per Hartensen" (Fap. XI 2 A 258)

76. A contributor to The Fatherland of January 4th, 1855 laments the fact that everyone feels it necessary to come down unequivocally for kynster or for Kierkegaard. There is no middle way according to their thinking. Leaving aside for the present the question of whether this writer is correct in lamenting such a state of affairs (I feel that Kierkegaard set out to evoke precisely such definite choices as here described) it is significant that he records the fact that "one talks less about Hartensen". Faedrelandet. Pseud. S.T. January 4th, 1855: "Andnu en par Ord".

77. One of the very first published responses to this article attacks Kierkegaard for speaking differently about kynster before and after his death (See article signed "A" in Dagbladet 21.12.1854. Cf. ibid. 22.12.1854 by pseudonym "B" and the counter argument of pseudonym "C", ibid. 28.12.1854. A writer in Flyveposten of 12.1.1855 signing himself "En Sandhedsven" accuses Kierkegaard of cowardice in waiting until kynster died before issuing the attack).

78. See Berlingske Tidende 1854. Nr. 37 (13th February): "Dr. H. Hartensen has published the sermon he delivered in Christiansborg Slotskirke ... and in which he ... from the pulpit has erected a beautiful and worthy monument to the deceased Bishop".
79. In a footnote Kierkegaard suggests that Lynster's own preaching did much to obscure the true meaning of "witness to the truth". By preaching such a watered down version of Christianity, Lynster implicitly condemned the Christianity of the "suffering witness" - instead of admitting that his own Christianity was a dispensation and indulgence to the frailty of ordinary men.

80. Cf. Pap. XI 1 A 70, XI 2 A 289

81. Pap. XI 3 B 43 - 48

82. Pap. XI 2 A 244


84. Attack p. 9

85. Pap. XI 2 A 251

86. Attack p. 9

87. Køb: op. cit. p. 67


89. "Endnu et par Ord om Dr. S. Kierkegaard's Angreb paa Lynster". Pseud. "B". Dagbladet 22nd December, 1854


91. "En Karikatur - Tegning." Pseud. L. Berlingske Tidende. 22nd December, 1854

92. Københavnsposten 31st March, 1836 (Lehmann) and 27th/28th March 1846

93. Københavnsposten 23rd December 1854. The anonymous poet particularly attacks Kierkegaard for attacking a dead man who cannot answer back

94. Københavnsposten 24th December 1854 (Signed "aesculap")

95. The editors of the third edition of Samlede Værker say that Levin was "certainly" the Author. Samlede Værker (3rd Edition) Vol. 19 p. 332. See Flyveposten 27th December Nr. 301

96. "I Anledning af Dr. S. Kierkegaards Artikel i Fædrelandet Nr. 295." H. L. Hartensen. Berlingske Tidende 28th December, 1854

97. Attack p. 11

98. Loc. Cit.

99. Attack p. 12

100. op. cit. pps. 12 - 13

101. Attack p. 14

102. Berlingske Tidende 22nd December, 1854

103. Køb: op. cit. p. 77
104. **Attack** p. 10

105. **Attack** pps. 6 - 7

106. **Attack** pps. 7 and 10 note


108. **Attack** pps. 18 ff.


110. Berlingske Tidende 6.1.1855, signed W. Hjort. See Vol. XI 3 B 51 and **Attack** p. 17

111. J. Paludan-Müller: *Dr. S. Kierkegaards Angreb paa Biskop Lynsters Eftermæle*. Kbh. 1855

112. **Attack** pps. 15 - 16

113. J. Paludan-Müller: *Om Dr. Kierensens christelige Dogmatik*. Kbh. 1850 and


115. Kabell: *op. cit.* p. 54 f. See J. Paludan-Müller: *Dr. S. Kierkegaards Angreb paa Biskop Lynsters Eftermæle* p. 22. Also, Paludan-Müller had already demonstrated his lack of sympathy with Kierkegaard. In a letter to Sibbern dated 27th February, 1844, he refers to *Euther-Or* and *Fear and Trembling* and doubts whether their author can justifiably be called "spiritual". (See Carl Weltzer: *Peter og Søren Kierkegaard*. Kbh. 1936. p. 186)

116. *op. cit.* pps. 5 - 6. See V. Lindstjerna: "The Problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in Kierkegaard". *Kierkegaard Critique* p. 238: "Kierkegaard states that his age is to be saved through subjectivity. But before this happens, the untruth of subjectivity must be eliminated ..."

117. *op. cit.* pps. 6 - 11

118. *op. cit.* pps. 11 - 14

119. *op. cit.* pps. 18 - 21

120. **Attack** p. 16

121. **Attack** p. 17

122. J. Paludan-Müller: *op. cit.* p. 13

123. Vol. XI 3 B 216, 8. See Berlingske Tidende 9th January, 1855

124. **Attack** pps. 18 ff. Dated January 26th and published January 29th

125. *Københavnsposten* 19th January, 1855

126. Kabell: *op. cit.*

127. *Flyveposten* 9th January, 1855. Cf. also 11th January
We should note that this article was written before the appearance of "There the matter rests" and is dated Christmas 1854.

"Dr. S. Kierkegaard en kristelige og filosofisk Sandhedsven".
Flyveposten 12th January, 1855

"Dr. Øren Kierkegaards Angreb paa Biskop Lynsters Eftermaale".
Flyveposten 19th January, 1855

See especially the article by "A Layman" dated 25th January

"En god Gjerning". Pædrelandet 10th January, 1855

"Til højvelbaerne højaerværdige Biskop Hartensen Et Spørgsmål". Pædrelandet. 16th January, 1855

"Biskop Lynster som Sandhedsvidne" (Unsigned). Volkebladet 10th January, 1855

"Et Indlæg i Sagen S. Kierkegaard kontra Hartensen" (Signed "___"). Dagbladet 12th January, 1855

"Striden mellem S. Kierkegaard og Hartensen" (Unsigned). Dagbladet. 13th January, 1855

Attack p. 18

ibid. p. 21

Attack p. 22. See Nielsen: "En god Gjerning".

See pseudonym ___ in Flyveposten 9th January 1855

Attack p. 22

Kierkegaard was especially angered by Hartensen's consecration address. He was consecrated on St. Stephen's Day (December 26th) and took as his text Acts 1:8 - "But ye shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost which shall come upon you, and ye: shall be my witnesses". During the course of the address he used the word "witnesses" several times and Kierkegaard saw this, with some justification, as stubborn bravado.

142. From Copenhagen see: Flyveposten: "En Røst Fra Kenigheden" 3rd February, 1855. (Basically a layman's panegyric upon Lynster); Flyveposten: "Dr. S. Kierkegaards Angreb paa Biskop Lynsters Eftermaale" 15th March, 1855 (reiterates Paludan-Müller's demand for Lynster's deviations from the New Testament to be spelt out in full. Criticises Kierkegaard for not making his charges whilst Lynster was alive. Also condemns Kierkegaard for answering his critics simply by saying that they do not understand him); Dagbladet: "Om Sandhedsvidner" by Otto Thomsen. 9th February, 1855 (Satirical account of how the writer's local priest responded to Kierkegaard's recent writings); Dagbladet: "Et ord fra en Lægemand angaende Sandhedsvidnestriden", Signed "F". 20th February, 1855 (basically supports Kierkegaard's argument although critical of his forms of expression. Chides Hartensen for not making a satisfactory reply to Kierkegaard). From the provinces see: Lolland-Falsters Stiftstidende: 31st January, 1855 signed "K"; Aarhus Stiftstidende: Ogsaa en Opgjørelse. 10th February, 1855 signed "b" (sees Kierkegaard's protest simply in terms of semantics and criticises him along these lines); Lolland-Falsters Stiftstidende: Signed "F" 14th February, 1855 (Reply to "K"). Should not
ignore Kierkegaard. His specific attack on Iynster is an implicit attack upon all who call themselves Christians. Is doubtful whether Iynster's personality should be thus used as a means to an end.


146. So Pap. XI 2 A 263 and 265

147. Not that he ceases to be convinced of its value. See Attack pps. 29 and 32

148. Attack p. 24

149. See Pap. XI 3 B 15 - 42

150. Attack p. 26

151. In the draft Kierkegaard also offers an expansion of his attack on the doctrine current in Christendom. Predictably he lays especial emphasis on the false teaching regarding the Church, grace, imitation of Christ and judgement. (Pap. XI 3 B 222, 10)

152. Attack p. 28

153. Attack p. 29

154. Attack p. 28

155. Pap. XI 3 B 224, 1, 3 and 11

156. Attack p. 32

157. Pap. XI 3 B 225

158. Attack p. 32

159. See Attack p. 33 ff.: article entitled "Salt"

160. Attack pps. 34 - 5

161. Attack p. 35

162. Attack pps. 37 ff.


164. Fædrelandet 3rd April, 1855. Signed "N - i"

165. The reference here is to Iynster's Betragtninger over de christelige Troslaerdomme

166. "With reference to an anonymous proposal made to me in No. 47 of this newspaper". Fædrelandet April 7th, 1855. Attack p. 40 f.

167. "Would it be best now to 'stop ringing the fire alarm'?" Fædrelandet April 11th, 1855. Attack p. 41 f.

168. Cf. Pap. XI 3 B 229, 2

169. Attack p. 43 f.
170. *Faedrelandet* 24th April, 1855. Later re-issued in the monograph *Guds kirke er bygget for Evigheden*. Odense 1855. pps. 5 - 9

171. Attack pps. 45 - 6

172. Attack p. 46

173. Attack p. 47


175. Attack p. 48

176. See Attack pps. 54 - 5. Here Kierkegaard makes it clear that Training in the second edition is an attack upon the establishment.

177. Attack p. 49 f.

178. Pap. XI 3 B 233, 2

179. See Ugeskrift for den evangeliske Kirke i Danmark 1855, Vol. V pps 90, 177 - 183, 351 f. Later that year, Zeuthen published a series of three articles entitled *Polemiske Blad* inud Dr. S. Kierkegaard. The first of these (published June 1855) prompted Kierkegaard to draft a new sally against its author (See Pap. XI 3 B 142)


181. Attack p. 53

182. Attack pps. 57 - 65

183. Matthew 25 v. 6: The motto to "This has to be said"

184. Pap. XI 2 A 263, 265

185. See Attack p. 8: "... as the beast of prey unites shrewdness and strength: first it remains perfectly quiet, quiet as no tame beast can be, and then collects itself wholly in one spring or blow ... so is the decisive effect produced. First quietness so quiet as it never is on a still day, quiet as it is only before the thunder - and then the storm breaks loose". Cf. Pap. XI 3 B 64

186. Attack p. 64. N.B. that the accompanying sheet was originally addressed to the Minister of Culture. Pap. XI 3 B 240, 1

187. Attack pps. 67 - 72

188. R. Nielsen: *Faedrelandet* January 10th, 1855. Cf. also January 16th

189. See the anonymous article in Dagbladet 25th April 1855 Mr. 95 entitled "Den Kierkegaardse Strid": "while the priests see in him almost a personal enemy, plain, sensible folk call his talk twaddle". Whilst it is almost certainly true that the hierarchy's silence was calculated to breed contempt for Kierkegaard's ideas amongst the laity, his appeal to this article for support is rather unfortunate. It is by no means certain that a pastor wrote the original letter - indeed, the writer says he was not a theologian and only claimed a right to be heard because he was a daily reader of the Bible. Thus the writer may have been just such "a plain man" as Kierkegaard thought best able to understand his protest.
Certainly there was no shortage of attacks on Kierkegaard, either in the newspapers or through individual publications. The bibliography furnishes a full list.

Geismar: op. cit. Vol. VI p. 74

See especially Gjeblikket No. 3 (Attack pps. 125 ff.), but also pps. 83 ff., 99 ff., 102 ff., 182, 184 etc.


Dated June 1855. Attack pps. 115 ff.

Geismar: op. cit. Vol. VI pps. 74 - 5

In a very brief preface to this discourse, dated May 5th, 1854, Kierkegaard wrote: "This address was delivered in the Church of the Citadel, on the 18th May 1851. The text is the first I have used. Later I have often brought it forward; now I again return to it". For Self-Examination p. 226

K. Hay: Søren Kierkegaard, En Folkelig Sildring Kbh. 1950 p. 247

Pierre-André Stucki: Le Christianisme et l'Histoire d'Aprés Kierkegaard Basel 1963 p. 95


A. B. Pedersen: "Gjeblikket". Tidhverv Kbh. 1969 Nr. 10 p. 103

See Pap. X 1 A 640

Pedersen: op. cit, p. 102
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