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THE CONCEPT OF VALUE: A THEORETICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY

by

Colin Paul Green

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Durham

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University of Durham
1990
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I declare that the work described in this thesis is entirely my own and has not been submitted for any other degree.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
Thanks are due to my supervisor Jim Good for his valuable and thought-provoking advice, and for encouraging me through the final stages. I am also indebted to Neil Bolton for stimulating my interest in the field of value, and for being my supervisor in the first year of research. The late Doug Graham also helped me along my way. I must also mention the contribution of the general intellectual environment at Durham. Without such an enlightened and wide-ranging climate, my project would not have survived. I thank all who have added to this atmosphere, especially my colleagues at the Psychology Department.

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Very special thanks go to Mandy, for her selfless support, advice, and encouragement, and to David and Eve for being themselves, and for giving me the 'everyday' knowledge of childhood to complement my more formal studies.
This thesis explores the idea of adopting the 'value point of view', from which value is seen as playing a central role in human affairs, and the study of value is regarded as a distinct subject area. The field of value is reviewed and analysed, an empirical approach is developed, and exploratory studies of children's values are conducted.

The involvement of values in psychology is examined, and the scope of the field of value is illustrated through a wide-ranging review of the philosophical and social psychological work that falls within it. An outline sketch of the field is made in which four branches are identified, and the main issues are discussed. The empirical branch is explored in more detail through the development of an empirical approach to the study of value. The relationship of this approach to the main issues in the field is examined.

The focus is then narrowed on to the development of values. The potential benefits of seeing child development from the value point of view are discussed, and previous studies of children's values are reviewed. Some aspects of the empirical approach are put into practice through a series of exploratory studies.

These illustrate the usefulness of the approach in guiding and supporting studies of children's values. It is suggested that the approach, allied to the appropriate techniques, is capable of identifying 'values attached', 'criteria applied', and 'ultimate values', thus providing insights into children's value networks and into the process of evaluation. The approach points the way to an area of research of considerable size and diversity. Some of the ways in which this area can be explored are suggested, along with the methodological problems that might be encountered.

The main implications of the exploratory studies are outlined. These include the observation that while values are greatly influenced by shared factors, the particular ways in which people's values are organised and conceptualised represent important differences. This is one reason why both idiographic and nomothetic studies of value are required for a full understanding of values.

Criticisms of the approach and of the techniques used are considered. The theoretical assumptions underlying the criticisms are examined, and compared with those of the approach. It is suggested that the issues involved should not hold back the development of the approach.
1.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about value. It adopts a perspective in which the concept of value, broadly construed, plays a central role in human affairs. The view from this position sees psychology as taking place in social, historical and personal contexts. To be consistent with this view, it is necessary to provide the background to the work presented in the thesis, and this is the main purpose of chapter one. It covers the important ideas that were responsible for impelling me to work in the field of value.

I arrived at the position that the concept of value is of central importance to psychology via two main routes. Firstly by way of the philosophy of the subject and the proposal that psychology could not be modelled on the natural sciences. The interpretive and purposive nature both of the people studied and of the psychological enterprise itself, requires special consideration, as does the complex interaction between psychology and its subject matter. This interaction occurs on at least two levels. The 'experimenter' and the 'subject' interact in terms of the nexus of purposes, meanings, and values found in an observational or experimental context. Furthermore, psychological knowledge has a cultural and historical setting, including its interaction with 'commonsense' psychology.

The second route was through the study of human experimental and cognitive psychology. I saw a prominent historical trend in the findings from these areas consisting of the gradual recognition of the importance of value. This required more than a modification of the then existing approaches. The broad approach from the 'value point of view' is being fostered as an alternative throughout this thesis.
Having found the concept of value to be of such importance, a preliminary scan of the area revealed a fragmented field. The ground had been cultivated intermittently and a variety of methods had been employed. There was a need for integration and for the clarification of concepts. Both of these needs presented further reasons for working in the field of value.

These strands of thought came together in the conviction that a psychological approach to value was needed which would be firmly located in relation to a broad vision of the field as a whole. As will be seen below, this has entailed a wide-ranging analysis of the field followed by the outlining of an empirical approach and the carrying out of exploratory studies within this approach. This work was thought to be necessary because the existing psychological approaches to value suffered from limitations of scope and from the lack of a theoretical context of sufficient breadth.

The study of value propounded in this thesis freely admits the use of 'mentalistic' concepts and acknowledges the interpretive nature of psychology and its subject matter. This makes psychology more complicated but more realistic as compared with the natural science model. Psychology is conceived of here, following Dilthey, as one of the sciences that can be lived through. This gives it many of its distinctive and challenging facets, but it does not mean that it is thereby disqualified from using methods more typically associated with the natural sciences. Measurement, statistical analysis, and experimentation can still be used to advantage as long as their limitations are taken into consideration when assessing the information that they provide.

The adoption of a broad view of the field of value provides a framework that has the potential to be involved in the main distinguishing features of psychology. The interactions between experimenter and subject, and between psychology and commonsense, can be analysed in terms of values. It can take account of the reflexive aspects of psychology, and it implies a purposive, dynamic, and holistic view of the person.
At the end of this chapter (section 1.5) the reader will find a summary description of the whole thesis. This is intended to act as a guide and to provide an overall context for the reader.

1.2 VALUE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

One of the main sources of my conviction that a study of the concept of value was needed in psychology was the debate over the possibility of regarding psychology as a natural science. Those who claimed that psychology is a natural science tended to be heavily influenced by logical positivism, asserting that anything that was neither empirically testable nor necessarily true by definition was 'metaphysical' and unworthy of serious attention. The behaviourists were closely linked with this approach, and their insistence on the public observability of data led many of them to condemn all 'mentalistic' concepts as unnecessary to the explanation of behaviour. As Stevenson (1974) and Klein (1970) pointed out, they were inclined to go beyond the methodological point, asserting that consciousness is an 'epiphenomenon', essentially separated from the causal mechanisms of the material world. The idea that there is freedom of action is illusory. These views are particularly associated with Skinner (Rottschaefer, 1982).

While this general position has the advantages of creating order in, and encouraging a systematic approach to, the study of behaviour, it has, in my opinion, serious drawbacks and inconsistencies. These will be revealed in the course of the following discussion, which aims to show that human purposes and values are deeply embedded in scientific psychology, and that the study of value, both empirical and theoretical, is of great importance to psychology.
1.2.1 Value and meaning in science

A psychology modelled on the natural sciences shares some features that are common to all sciences. It should rely on experimentation and observation for its primary data. Variables must be precisely defined and controlled, accuracy of observation, measurement, and calculation is stressed. The experimenter ought to be committed to avoiding any personal bias or prejudice in his assessment of his results.

These prescriptions for successful science illustrate some of the values that operate during the planning and conduct of empirical work. Likewise there are theoretical desiderata. Theories should be as concise as possible, be consistent, clearly stated, logically structured, and so on. The point to note here is that science is not free of values. It involves the imposition of a standard set of values on its practitioners which, it is believed, will give the optimum conditions for gaining access to the truth.

It is also pertinent to the present argument to note that the pursuit of scientific values does not take place in a cultural vacuum. Despite efforts to the contrary, there are hierarchies both between and within sciences. Some disciplines, topics, and schools of thought are regarded as more respectable, important, and essential than others. Hudson (1972) drew attention to this in both psychology and medicine, and he described how these biases are perpetuated through teaching, examination, and research policies. In addition, Kuhn's work (1962) on scientific revolutions describes how normal science occurs within the context of belief in a particular paradigm. This belief may become similar to religious faith. Anomalous facts do not threaten belief until they become overwhelming and provoke a crisis. Alternative paradigms may then be seen to assimilate all the known facts more effectively.

Despite these aspects of science, the objective attitude has undoubtedly borne fruits which a scientific psychology would aim to share in. It would also share the dangers of the objective attitude, however. Carried to its
limits, the pursuit of objectivity as a route to human knowledge is self-defeating. This is because it attempts to know what its subject matter is like in the absence of a knower. Applied to the material world, the objective attitude aims to describe a universe empty of purpose or meaning. Yet in order to gain this knowledge, scientists must act with purpose and relate their observations to meanings defined in terms of their theories. A meaningless void is given significance in terms of a framework of human concepts and values.

A similar relationship exists between the knowledge thus gained by scientists and the community of non-scientists. There is a danger that the pursuit of objectivity will make science as impenetrable to the layman as the pre-interpreted universe is to the scientist. The use of specialised concepts and language, and the need for extensive training encourage the creation of elitist cliques, dedicated to the acquisition of an esoteric body of knowledge. The main point I am making here is that knowledge is relative to a particular system of meanings. Viewed from the point of view of society at large, science, including scientific psychology, only has meaning insofar as it can be translated into a form that can be understood by the layman.

While attempts are indeed made to frame science in popular terms, there are also strong obscurantist tendencies, from which psychology has not been immune. As will be shown below, however, there are complicating factors in psychology because it is about people, and the layman has a direct insight.

1.2.2 Psychology is about people

It is this characteristic that must be seriously considered by any attempt to model psychology on the natural sciences. I have pointed out that scientific psychology shares with science in general the involvement of purpose and value both in its practice and theory, and because of its cultural setting. Moreover, the interpretation of scientific findings are
made in relation to a system of meaning, which is likely to contain an evaluative component. Even if these proposals are admitted it could still be maintained that psychology is no different from other natural sciences, and that it is possible to obtain an adequate amount of objectivity within the practical procedures of experimental work. Psychology faces additional factors, however, in the attempt to mould itself into a natural science, stemming from the similarity between the seeker after knowledge and the object of his study.

A. Reactivity

People react to being observed. Psychologists intent on carrying out experiments have therefore tended to either deceive their subjects or to limit the range of their responses. The subject's environment is carefully controlled. These procedures can be seen as attempts to make subjects as close as possible to the non-purposive entities studied in some natural sciences. This does not mean that subjects are non-purposive, however. Indeed, experiments depend upon the co-operation of the subjects, and the channeling of their intentions in accordance with any instructions given by the experimenter. There is evidence to suggest that subjects accept their role and are highly compliant (e.g. Orne, 1962). Orne and Holland (1968), however, proposed that subjects might also try to 'see through' the experiment, particularly if they perceive any incongruity in the behaviour of the experimenter. In this case they would still be playing the subject's role, which they would now see as solving the problem of what the experiment was really about. The experimenter may also unintentionally influence the subject to give the required responses (Rosenthal, 1966). The fact that psychologists have subsequently made strenuous efforts to avoid these effects testifies to the importance of reactivity.

Thus there is evidence to support the view that the psychological experiment is a social event, where factors due to both the subject and the
experimenter affect the results (Harre and Secord, 1972). This view contrasts sharply with the image of, for example, a physicist conducting an experiment. The psychological experiment involves a complex interaction between the purposes and values of both experimenter and subject. Social factors may be more or less influential according to the type of experiment being conducted, but even a simple reaction time experiment involves purpose and value. For such an experiment to succeed, subjects must co-operate, try to perform well, and give the required relative values to speed and accuracy.

B. Reflexivity

The similarity between the scientist and his subject matter in psychology also has various consequences for the activity of psychology. Knowledge of the psychological processes involved in the attempt to gain knowledge, and of the possible involvement of values of various kinds, can provide feedback which may make the psychologist decide to change his methods in order to improve his chances of arriving at the 'truth'. Alternatively, this knowledge may lead him to doubt the validity of his findings.

Indeed, to recognise reflexivity is an implicit admission of self-doubt. If studying psychology is partly aimed at studying oneself, then one is admitting some lack of self-knowledge by engaging in psychology. These relationships are not found in non-reflexive sciences. A gap in a geologist's knowledge of chalk, for example, would not normally affect his confidence in his ability to study chalk, and it is unlikely that his findings will tell him anything about himself.

Because the study of psychology is partly an exercise in self-scrutiny, the personal values of the psychologist are more likely to affect all stages of his work. His choice of topics and favoured theories, his observations, interpretations, and generalisations, are all likely to be influenced. Moreover, his knowledge that these processes are taking place could further
increase his doubt about his ability to be objective.

These reflexive factors vary in their impact according to the area of psychology being studied. An investigation of eye movements, for example, would be unlikely to be affected. Also, many psychologists are able to temporarily ignore their knowledge of their own fallibilities while working. Nevertheless, the reflexive aspect of psychology remains a structural reality of the discipline which, in my view, requires greater attention, and a complete psychology would need to devote some of its resources to the study of the activity of psychologists.

1.2.3 Reasons versus causes.

In the above discussion, I have proposed that purpose, value, and meaning, are necessarily involved in any attempt at a scientific psychology. This proposal is an attack on the foundations of a strict positivistic psychology, which assumes that 'mentalistic' concepts are not significant in the study of psychology. I will now maintain this attack by considering the debate between 'reasons' and 'causes' which was an important influence on the theoretical stance that I have adopted. As Macklin (1972) noted, the debate was between those she called the 'philosophical psychologists' (e.g. R.S.Peters, S.Hampshire, C.Taylor) who held that "...causal patterns of explanation are in general inappropriate for human action." (p.78), and the opposing view incorporated in the natural science model of psychology.

A. Objections to causes

The debate between 'reasons' and 'causes' was one aspect of a more general schism in psychology between humanism and physicalism. It developed as psychology in the English-speaking world began to release itself from the grip of behaviourism and its offshoots, and from its logical positivist basis. The reactions against this approach were varied, and some of these are mentioned in the rest of this chapter. My own views were also a
reaction against the 'causes' approach. Although some of these have been presaged above, it will be useful to summarise my main objections before proceeding further.

These may be arranged into three groups. Firstly, the 'causes' approach was inclined to overestimate the extent to which it could achieve 'objectivity'. While condemning its opponents to an inferior status through the use of supposed pejoratives such as 'mentalistic' or 'metaphysical', its own philosophical roots in logical positivism and pragmatism were taken to be absolutely secure. As regards methodology, the stress on operationalism and public observability gave the impression that such observations are immediately and objectively apparent to any intelligent observer. Yet it should be noted that this interpretation conveniently omitted some of the most important features of operationalism as formulated by Bridgman (1927). This emphasised that training is required in order to be able to observe in a manner that could be replicated, and that even after this training, scientific observations were still essentially private events. Reflecting on this point, Pratt (1945) observed that:

"Mentalism is the starting point of all sciences, and is inescapably polluted by privacy", and that "The initial data of behaviourism are no more public than the data of introspectionism." (p.263).

The stress on observability led to confusions in the 'causes' approach between methodology and assertions about the nature of its subject matter, and this brings me on to my second group of objections. These centre on the issue of the excessive reductionism entailed in the approach. There was a tendency to assume that the subject had no valid existence beyond that which can be observed and reported in the prescribed manner. However, as Klein (1970) indicated, the question of whether the entity being studied is physical or non-physical is separate from the issue of verifiability. The positivist tradition had given priority to the desire to be able to check and communicate findings rather than the production of an adequate model of
man. This had the effect that much that is particularly human and of special interest to people when understanding each other was excluded. Beliefs, opinions, attitudes, values, and the person's experiences, had no place in a position which reduced humanity to its overt expressions modelled on animal behaviour.

The poverty of its model of man was a factor in my third objection, which concerned the relationship between the psychologist and the object of his study. This presented a central paradox to the 'causes' approach. If this object is non-purposive or, at most, has purposes which have no effects, then either the psychologist is a different, and superior, sort of entity from his object of study, or psychology is non-purposive or, at best, ineffectual. Psychologists are either gods or nonentities.

In contrast to this polarisation between psychology and its subject matter, I took the view that psychology has a vast potential advantage that is lost by forcing it into a natural scientific mould. Because of their similarities, the psychologist can merge with and intermingle with his subject matter. This gives him a more immediate 'everyday' knowledge of his material which the natural scientist does not have. The chemist, for example, cannot become a hydrogen atom.

B. Commonsense psychology and interpretations

The recognition of the significance of this 'everyday' or 'commonsense' knowledge was an important aspect of the argument against the 'causes' approach. Dilthey (Brown, 1976; Smith, 1975) had earlier distinguished between the 'Naturwissenschaften' (natural sciences) and the 'Geisteswissenschaften' (this refers to the human studies, which can be lived through. Hence an investigator has access to a direct form of understanding based on his own experiences.). I found this distinction to be useful in providing a perspective and sharpening the issues in the reasons versus causes debate. Psychology covers such a broad spectrum of
concerns that it falls partly within both of Dilthey's categories. It could therefore be argued that positivism is appropriate for some psychology, and that criticisms made against the natural science approach are limited to attempts to apply it to those parts of psychology that can be 'lived through'. The reasons approach could be seen from this perspective as an attempt to establish an area of independence from the opposing, previously dominant, position that had attempted an untenable unification of the whole subject.

Dilthey's stress on 'living through' was consistent with the emerging importance of commonsense psychology. Joynson (1974) proposed that the layman's self-insight is more reliable than psychological findings because it is gained in wider and more varied conditions. According to Joynson if psychologists ignore 'commonsense' their findings tend to be obvious, trivial, or incorrect.

Harre and Secord (1972) also stressed the importance of 'everyday' understanding. Central to their thesis is the 'anthropomorphic' model of man whose self-awareness and language mean that he is of a different order of complexity from other animals. Psychology should advance from the basis of our 'everyday' understanding of ourselves and others. This would involve the collection of 'accounts', actors' own statements of the purpose and meanings behind their acts.

This highlights another strand in the reasons approach, concerning the interpretive nature of human activity. Harre and Secord's view of man includes the idea that experience involves the active interpretation of sensations in terms of a system of meaning or set of rules. 'Actions' also involve meanings. They are distinguished from mere 'movements' in that they are actively initiated in pursuance of some purpose.
Hudson (1972) also emphasised the importance of meaning. He saw the central concern of psychology to be interpretations:
"...interpretations, the interpretations of interpretations (both our own and other people's), and - especially in teaching - their transmission and control." (p.163). Shotter (1974) pointed to the importance of beliefs, intentionality, choice, and meaning, and also stressed the extent to which the human world and abstract concepts are the result of negotiation.

The importance of 'commonsense psychology' could be regarded as another aspect of the similarity between the psychologist and his subject matter. The content of 'commonsense psychology' is a valid topic of study for psychology, but so too should be its interaction with professional psychology. Theories formed by psychologists can become incorporated into 'everyday' knowledge, and the 'everyday' experiences of psychologists provide vital information for psychology. Both an 'everyday' experience as a human being, and a more detached perspective using systematic procedures are necessary to psychology. I agreed with Joynson that there were important reasons for psychology to avoid elitism (see 1.2.1. above), but I considered it a mistake to give a pre-eminent position to the layman's understanding. By polarising the layman and the psychologist, Joynson missed a major point about commonsense psychology. Not only is the layman a psychologist, but also the psychologist is a layman. It is through his 'everyday' experience that a psychologist knows about freewill, purpose, intention, and value.

The strict natural science approach rejected these concepts as 'unobservable' (correctly within its own tenets). The desire for a detached view of humanity is, I have tried to show above, flawed when pursued to excess. An adequate psychology should acknowledge the influence of the 'everyday' experience of the psychologist.
C. Some limitations of reasons

My views were fashioned within this general climate of opinion. I agreed that a fundamental feature of humanity is the interpretation of experience in terms of systems of meaning. Purpose, choice, and freewill are significant elements in human action. Various leanings were apparent within anti-positivism, however. These inclinations could, in my view, unnecessarily limit the scope of alternative approaches:

(1) Not enough attention was given to the way that ideas formed by psychologists might themselves affect the 'commonsense' view. Great emphasis was placed on systems of interpretation and the potential benefits to psychology of the 'layman's understanding', but the activity of psychologists can generate new interpretations which might be incorporated into 'commonsense'.

(2) The anti-positivist lobby inclined toward a social view of man, and toward the study of action rather than thought. These tendencies were apparent in Shotter and in Harre and Secord, but were most pronounced in MacMurray (1961). He blamed the excessively withdrawn 'theoretical standpoint' for many of the troublesome dichotomies in psychology and advocated instead the 'practical standpoint'. This involved adopting a social unit, the 'You and I' as primary. Koch (1971) warned that the backlash against behaviourism could result in the self becoming lost in the social and, in my opinion, psychology should be wary of this possibility. Harre and Secord's advocacy of ethogenics illustrated the tendency toward activity rather than thought and experience. An emphasis on the social does not necessitate stressing its overt manifestations, however, and this may reflect a desire to maintain the primacy of the directly observable even in a post-positivist world.
I found the 'reasons' approach to be inclined toward rationality. The 'reasons' for action were seen as reasonable in relation to some system of meaning or set of rules, even if these were not available to an onlooker. The tendency was to give rationality the benefit of the doubt, the assumption being that any apparently pointless action must make sense in terms of some as yet unknown system of meaning. This formulation fails to recognise that some actions may be genuinely irrational or paradoxical, and that they may only be fitted into some interpretive scheme after they have taken place. Furthermore, intuition and feeling may be involved in choices, and also some account must be taken of conflicts between alternative actions. Clashes of interests or purposes can occur both within the person and external to him, such that the rival courses of action are equally rational. Are these clashes resolved by rational means?

These unnecessary limitations could be corrected in my view if a more comprehensive perspective on the study of psychology were to be taken, a perspective such as that opened up by the study of value.

1.3 VALUE IN COGNITIVE AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

The importance of the study of value to psychology was also indicated by what I saw as a prevailing trend in cognitive and human experimental psychology. Although 'softer' than the strict positivist approach criticised above, this part of psychology was still organised around experimentation, and was inclined toward explanations in terms of mechanistic models. It also favoured a model of man that stressed rationality. Many developments in this area could, however, be read as a gradual integration of, broadly, affective and non-rational elements. A view of the person as a dispassionate and intelligent processor of information was being modified by findings that pointed to the importance of
context, expectation, affective and social factors. These findings were generally assimilated within the basic approach rather than taken to be challenges to the working paradigm.

From the standpoint adopted in this thesis, however, the value point of view, these findings represent glimpses of the central importance of the field of value. An opportunity for forging closer links between the information processing and social psychological traditions was being ignored. Social cognition has been developed since this time but, as will be argued in later chapters, this approach has its drawbacks as compared with the perspective afforded by the general study of value. I will now briefly outline some of the findings that represented the prevailing trend.

The importance of social and affective factors in perception were pointed out by Bruner (Bruner and Goodman, 1947; Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies, 1948) and by Sherif (Hood and Sherif, 1962). Bruner's work formed the basis of his 'new look' in perception, in which 'categorisation' played a large part. Cognitive categories were necessary to identify, sort, and give meaning to sensation. Furthermore, categories varied over time in their 'accessibility' according to the expectations, needs, and interests of the person (Bruner, 1957, 1958).

Examples of the need to add value-related concepts in order to obtain an adequate account of human processing were apparent in the field of information processing. In her work on attention, Treisman modified Broadbent's earlier model (Broadbent, 1958) to include the concept of 'attenuation'. She held that processing is not limited to the channel to which the person is attending. Some information, especially familiar and meaningful items, can pass through an 'unattended' channel. Words that are predictable from the context, or words of special importance, such as one's name, have a higher than average chance of being perceived (Massaro, 1975).

The meaning and familiarity of the incoming message were also stressed by Lindsay and Norman (1972). They contended that the physical characteristics
of the stimulus are insufficient to explain the human recognition system. Norman (1968) had earlier introduced the concept of 'pertinence' into his model of attention and memory. In Lindsay and Norman this was developed into an 'active synthesizing process' in which the construction and revision of expectations is a prominent feature.

These themes were also found in the work of Neisser. He advocated an active, constructivist view of attention, and incorporated these points into his more general theory, which stressed the need to provide an ecologically valid account of perception (Neisser, 1976).

Similar trends were evident in the study of language. Interest was shifting away from the purely linguistic aspects as the importance of context, expectations, and social factors were given greater emphasis. The work of some linguistic philosophers was gaining attention. Lakoff (1973), for example, stressed the importance of the social relationship between the parties to a conversation, and how this can often clash with the aim of sending clear messages to each other. Grice (1967) pointed to the co-operative nature of conversation and showed how the adherence or non-adherence to various maxims (e.g. 'be relevant', 'be as informative as required') can relay subtle messages to the listener via the 'implicatures' that might be made from the information given. Grice was intent on bringing natural language closer to formal logic, but in my opinion his work demonstrates the existence of a quasi-logical 'natural' form of human cognition that cannot be adequately modelled by formal logic.

Other examples of this come from research into semantic memory and the psychology of thinking. Lakoff (1972) suggested that natural concepts are not logically tight compartments. They have 'fuzzy' boundaries, and the status of an item within the concept can be described by the use of 'hedges' (e.g. 'sort of', 'strictly speaking'). Rosch (1975) provided experimental evidence that people can specify the degree to which an item belongs to a category, some items having more 'typicality' than others.
My own investigations (Green, 1977) supported these views and suggested that natural concepts are remembered in a stereotypic form.

In their studies of thinking, Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) found that 'natural' thinking is not in accord with propositional logic. They found that their subjects were inclined to allow the specific content of a problem to be more influential than its logical form. Subjects were also liberal in their use of presuppositions, and tended to think causally. For example, presented with the conditional statement 'if p then q', subjects tended to assume that p was the unique cause of q.

To summarise, the above examples provide evidence that the person is actively involved in extracting meaning from the world around him. Context and the person's expectations are important, as are social factors. Furthermore, there appears to be a 'natural' way of thinking and remembering which has its own regularities, but which is not logical in a formal sense. Although these findings were generally assimilated within the working paradigm of experimental psychology, they seemed to me to be instances where the essentially purposive and evaluative nature of the subjects had been revealed.

1.4 THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION AND INTEGRATION

I have argued that value is an essential and central concept in psychology. It is necessary to both the theory and practice of psychology, as well as being important in a reflexive sense, helping the understanding of the processes of, and distortions present in, the pursuit of knowledge and its application. It is evident that in order to fulfil these diverse functions, 'value' must be an extremely broad and loosely-defined concept. Indeed, its usefulness has often been criticised on the grounds that it is so broadly drawn as to be meaningless.

This broad outlook is deliberate in the present work. This does not entail the evaporation of the concept, however. Value can be thought of as
comprising a field of study, within which there are more detailed conceptual distinctions and areas of concern. An initial reading of wide-ranging works indicated that much remained to be done in clarifying these conceptual distinctions and in relating together and integrating the existing work. General surveys provided by Frankena (1967), Williams (1968), and Becker (1964) presented a series of overlapping views of the field. Much common ground was apparent, but there was no commonly accepted structure to the field. Other works adopted extensive outlooks, but propounded particular theoretical approaches (e.g. Rescher, 1969, Rokeach, 1968a, Najder, 1975).

Terminology has been another major problem. Lepley (1949) brought together a number of distinguished scholars in an attempt to produce a common glossary of value terms. This attempt failed because each theorist tended to use his own terms in accordance with his own particular approach. Nevertheless, there were some general similarities of approach, as well as many agreements on specific issues. The Lepley attempt at synthesis showed up the futility of focusing on terminology when many writers have been analysing the field for many years in their own way. A basic problem of the field of value is the use of the same word to refer to different concepts and different words to refer to the same concept. In addition, the use of concepts is often relative to a theoretical framework.

In my view there was a primary need to work out an organisational scheme for the field at the broadest level. An eclectic approach was required. It might then be possible to map the field in terms of the concepts involved rather than the words used to describe them, and to produce a framework for empirical work. Only then would it be useful to attempt to establish shorthand labels to refer to concepts.

Another shortcoming that was apparent from a broad survey of the field was the small amount of interaction between philosophical and empirical approaches to value. The present approach is strongly in favour of closer links between what will be referred to in chapter three as the 'empirical'
and 'theoretical' branches. As will be shown, the cross-fertilisation between these can produce a fruitful outcome.

Within psychology, the wide range of the field of value has meant that value-relevant work has emerged in many areas, even if value has not always been the prime target. Such work has, however, suffered because of its lack of a broader perspective and a full appreciation of the philosophical basis of its general approach from the value point of view.

An example is behaviourism, which can be regarded as containing a general theory of value, because it attempts to explain and predict values in terms of general principles. The environment becomes associated with positive and negative reinforcement and is accordingly attractive or repellant. The generality of the implied theory of value is of interest to the present broad approach, but, as has been indicated, it incorporates an unacceptably deterministic model of man, thus limiting its scope to involuntary aspects of value and to the value behaviour of animals. Behaviourist approaches to value are considered in more detail in chapter two.

Even when value, and its closely allied concept, 'attitude', have been specifically targeted, a broad outlook on the field reveals limitations. Commonly used definitions of value, such as those of C. Kluckhohn (1951) and Rokeach (1973), are seen to define only some of the ground. Value has often been found to be an important concept mediating between individual and society, or between the inner states of a person and his overt behaviour. Its potential has been diminished, however, by the lack of a wider philosophical perspective on the concept. This has led to an over-emphasis on the relatively provincial concept of 'attitude', but even then there have been arid debates over its utility, due to the lack of an adequate value vocabulary. Studies of value and attitude are considered in more detail in chapter two.
The limitations of developmental psychology from the broad value perspective are discussed in chapter five, but they will be briefly referred to here as examples of the need for integration in the field of value. Theories of socialisation necessarily imply an account of how values are acquired. Across a broad spectrum of different approaches, however (e.g. Bandura and Walters, 1964, Erikson, 1963, Aronfreed, 1968), there is a tendency to concentrate on the broad processes of socialisation rather than identifying the specific values that are being acquired. Aronfreed, for example, distinguishes between 'sensitization' and 'induction' as methods of socialisation, but does not go into details of the behaviours encouraged or discouraged.

The work on moral development in the Piaget and Kohlberg tradition (e.g. Piaget, 1932, Kohlberg, 1969) also demonstrates a limitation of scope. This is despite the fact that the label 'moral' is misleading because the work deals with areas such as the development of conformity as well. Many other types of value that a person might have are neglected, however. Examples include self-preservation, enjoyment, and personal progress.

There were in my view great potential benefits to be had by bringing together all value-related work in psychology under the general study of value, thereby integrating material that had previously been dealt with under separate paradigms, and linking this empirical work to a wider philosophical perspective. The remainder of this thesis represents the first few exploratory steps in this direction.
1.5 AN OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

The following outline is provided in order to help the reader to gain an overall impression of the thesis. It consists mainly of a chapter by chapter guide in which the driving forces behind the thesis are highlighted, and the rationale for the directions which the work took is outlined. General comments on the nature and organisation of the thesis are also presented.

Chapter one contains an account of the background to the thesis, describing the ideas that stimulated my interest in the field. This places the thesis in the context of the factors that impelled me to this work, simultaneously drawing attention to the importance of the concept of value in psychology and the significance of the general study of value. My commitment to the idea that the field of value could be regarded as a subject area in its own right, cross-cutting traditional academic disciplines has been a pervasive influence in relation to which the work as a whole should be seen.

The concerns of chapter one have already been summarised in 1.1 and therefore will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the chapter discusses the issues that led to the two main reasons why I undertake a broad analysis of the field in this thesis. Firstly I see it as a prerequisite to psychological studies of value, and secondly within value theory generally, there is a need for concepts to be examined, and for existing traditions to be related together in terms of a broad framework.

The carrying out of a broad survey of the field is one aspect of the way in which the thesis is radically different from a work that revolves around a series of experiments. Both the theory and the research are exploratory in nature. The potential of adopting the 'value point of view' is explored together with the utility of a specific empirical approach (described in chapter four). The features of children's values are explored using techniques which are themselves being assessed and developed.
The thesis is not, therefore, of the type where an established area of research has generated a problem or set of problems that can be translated into empirical form through the testing of hypotheses. This has had consequences for the organisation of the thesis which should be pointed out before continuing with the outline of the thesis.

Throughout the thesis there is a gradual narrowing down of focus through a series of stages. Broad, contextualising material is presented followed by the concentration on a particular area within that context, and so on. Thus the idea of the general study of value is narrowed down to a more specific focus on philosophy and psychology in chapter two. The outline sketch of the field (chapter three) provides the context for a more specific empirical approach (chapter four) which itself guides a series of studies which concentrate on some aspects of the approach.

As compared with a thesis that is organised around the central 'hub' of a series of experiments, the scope of the literature reviewed may seem excessively broad, and the set of studies (chapters six and seven) appear narrow in comparison with the issues covered when describing and discussing the general approach. The reader is asked to keep the general strategy of the thesis in mind when considering such matters.

In this connection a note on the location of the review of previous work on children's values is also required. This is located in chapter five because it did not contribute significantly to the construction of the general approach. It becomes relevant only when the focus of attention shifts toward the empirical studies.

The literature that did affect the general approach is described in chapter two. This work may be regarded as falling within a broad view of the field of value. As noted in the introduction to chapter two, inevitable processes of selection and compromise have taken place in deciding on its content. The main criteria for inclusion are discussed in section 2.1. The major leanings are reflected in the two main sections of the chapter, which
cover the philosophy and the social psychology of value. It is hoped that the gathering of material that is not often related together will provide an insight into the breadth and potential of the general study of value.

Chapters two and three together provide a broad survey of the field. Whereas chapter two describes the major writers and main traditions, chapter three concentrates on the main questions and issues, and the major positions on these. An outline sketch of the field is provided, in which four branches of the study of value are identified and discussed. Chapter three serves as a contextual framework for the topic of chapter four, which is the description and discussion of the particular empirical approach to the study of value that has been adopted in the thesis.

Chapter four includes outlining the important concepts employed, and considering the relation of the approach to the main theoretical and empirical issues identified in chapter three. The approach was oriented toward psychological studies of value, and was used to guide the investigations reported in later chapters. It was intended to overcome the limitations of previous psychological approaches. Hence the care taken in specifying its contents and relating it to the broader field.

Having formed a new psychological approach, the next stage was to examine and refine it in relation to a series of exploratory studies. The focus of the thesis now begins to move toward the empirical work. Children’s values were investigated, and hence chapter five is concerned with this topic.

There are two main parts to chapter five reflecting the transition between the theoretical and empirical parts of the thesis. Firstly the general issue of the place of the concept of value in the study of child development is considered. The potential benefits of adopting a ‘value point of view’ are pointed out. A co-ordinated and value-based approach to child development could provide new avenues of research as well as collecting together and organising those relevant studies that had already been made. The second main part of the chapter contains a review of the
previous empirical work on children's values that may be compared with the present investigations.

Chapters six and seven are concerned with illustrating the approach through a series of exploratory empirical studies. Chapter six focuses on idiographic and qualitative studies, while chapter seven deals with the potential of the approach for generating nomothetic research using quantitative techniques. In implementing the approach, its usefulness as a means to understanding children's values is illustrated, as well as its ability to provide information of theoretical relevance.

In chapter six, the rationale and details of a series of three interviews are described. These have enabled the value network model to be illustrated and assessed (section 6.3) and the model of the process of evaluation to be explored (section 6.4). The implementation of the approach in these idiographic studies enabled a detailed and wide-ranging understanding of the values of individual children to be obtained.

Chapter seven concentrates on nomothetic studies of children's values. Two main techniques were being developed in the course of the exploratory research, and these were used in a series of empirical studies. The initial approach in these studies was to take a non-directive position in an attempt to identify the broad outlines of the content and structure of values in the subject sample. The results of the studies are drawn upon in order to illustrate the techniques used and to describe the studies that might be conducted using the techniques.

The reasons behind my decision to focus on these particular techniques are discussed in section 7.2, where I consider the various techniques that were available. In section 7.3, the two techniques are described, together with their theoretical links to the approach and the ways in which they were used in the research. Section 7.4 gives a broad indication of the types of nomothetic research that can be carried out using the approach and techniques.
In the final chapter I take a broad overview of the work. The main theoretical implications of the exploratory research are abstracted, and discussed in section 8.2. The methodological implications are dealt with in section 8.3 as part of a more general concern with the future studies that might be guided by the approach. The need for extensive methodological research is suggested, together with the research strategies that might be adopted, and the more specific studies and areas of research that could provide a focus for research in the short term.

Section 8.4 is devoted to discussing some criticisms that can be levied against the approach and against the techniques used in the research. This leads to an examination of the theoretical basis of these criticisms and a restatement of the relevant positions of the present empirical approach to the study of value, before going on to widen the focus to the field of value generally in section 8.5.
THE FIELD OF VALUE: A REVIEW OF SOME OF THE MAIN TRADITIONS AND WRITERS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains a selective review of the literature on value divided into two main sections concerned with the philosophy and the social psychology of value. The extent of the review reflects not only the vastness of the field, but is also necessary as a prelude to the broad outline sketch and analysis provided in chapter three together with the description and discussion of my approach to the study of value presented in chapter four. The need for the outline sketch, and issues concerning the selection of material are discussed below. Firstly, however, some previous writers who have encouraged the study of value will be acknowledged.

In chapter one I outlined my reasons for asserting the importance of the study of value. The imperative need for expansion in this area has been stressed by many other writers. Hartmann (1939) called for a science of society that would apply to the understanding of science as well as to society. Value was proposed as the essential concept in this enterprise, functioning both as an object of study and as an explanatory tool.

Concern about the lack of direction in society led Josey (1949) and Snygg (1949) to contend that psychologists should be involved in attempting to establish a set of desirable human values toward which social organisation could be directed. Bain (1949) argued that this should be the task of all social sciences, while Hauser (1949) contended that social scientists should not get involved in making value judgements about social policy. He recognised the need for society to have explicit value orientations, but he suggested that the specification of these should be the province of 'social engineers'.
C. Kluckhohn (1958) had similar concerns, and thought that the behavioural sciences could provide knowledge about values to fill the vacuum left by the decline of religion. A science of values would be based on the universals of human nature, the human condition, the physical world and the interaction between man and nature.

Borsodi (1965) also called for a science of values, but one that was based on a form of rule utilitarianism. If the probable consequences of acting in accord with a value enhanced 'living' for human beings, then that value was deemed to be valid.

Vickers (1968) proposed an integration of science (the 'reality system') and value (the 'value system') within his concept of 'appreciation'. Understanding in the psycho-social sciences, and of the activity of science as a whole, would be incomplete without the involvement of both components.

Koch (1969) saw the study of value as a counter to the grip that behaviourism had on psychology. He sketched a view of value in which the main features were the 'value properties' of the value object and a neural reaction in the valuer. He hoped that this route would lead to a more precise knowledge of values than that provided by behaviourism.

Sperry (1977) similarly held that values could be incorporated into science through new concepts concerning the interaction between the consciousness of the mind and the neural activity of the brain. Values would ultimately be directed toward the good of life as a whole, and science would be able to direct what ought to be done in society.

Pugh (1978) was also concerned about the lack of a science of values and the omission of concern about values in social policy. He thought that sociobiology and evolutionary ethics provided the most promising basis for a scientific approach to value, which could then inform social policy.

More recently, a wide-ranging survey of the values of various populations around the world has been conducted (e.g. Abrams, Gerard and Timms, 1985). The scale of this operation demonstrates the importance attached to the
collection and analysis of 'people's values'. The questions asked, although interesting and intriguing, were not guided by a cohesive approach to value, however. Similar comments apply to the analysis and interpretation of the data. The disparate interests of the various contributors are clearly shown. The editors justify the inclusive approach to the survey by noting that research is at an exploratory stage.

Even among this small sample of writers, theoretical differences are apparent. They agree that the systematic study of value is important, but tend to disagree as to the best means toward this aim, the most promising routes, and the useful concepts. As will be seen below, such differences are amplified in the more substantial works in the field. Theoretical controversy is a normal state in any area of thought, but the lack of integration in the field, and the need for conceptual clarification are, in my view, major sources of difficulty. Too many writers have concentrated on their own theoretical position and area of interest to the detriment of the task of outlining and analysing the field as a whole.

Given these views, I have found it necessary to formulate a two-pronged strategy for the study of value. Not only have I delved in my areas of special interest, but I have also produced a broad outline sketch of the field as a whole. This has involved suggesting the main sub-divisions and areas of concern of the field, and identifying its important theoretical issues and the main conceptual distinctions to be drawn. This strategy represents a clear statement of, and commitment to, the idea that the study of value may be regarded as a subject area in its own right. At the very least, the strategy provides an organised account of my view of the field and of how I see my more detailed work fitting into this broader picture. This approach is consistent with the recognition that the 'reflexive' aspects of the study of value are of importance.
The intention to produce a broad outline sketch and analysis of the field required a wide-ranging review of the relevant literature. An immediate problem was encountered, however, because of the enormous scope of the concept of value. It would be pertinent to incorporate all of the major movements in the social sciences and humanities, either by considering their value-relevant content, or by reinterpreting them from the value point of view. Both tasks are valid pursuits in the field of value, but their dimensions preclude a full treatment in the context of a doctoral thesis.

Nevertheless, for the reasons already given, some faltering steps needed to be taken along this path, and this entailed compromise and selection. Initially this took the form of deciding what to read and in what detail. A complex interaction took place between my existing interests, such as those described in chapter one, and the stimulation of reading new material. This led to a leaning toward psychological approaches, and toward ethics, at the expense of aesthetics, economic value theory, and sociological approaches. Within these leanings, further selections were made. Notable omissions were the research on work values, values in psychotherapy, the role of values in delinquency, and the approach to value in humanistic psychology. The study of attitude, however, was considered to be so closely related to value that it was found necessary to include it within the field.

Decisions concerning the content of the present chapter represent a second stage of selection. A large body of literature needed to be condensed into a form that gives a representative account of the main influences on my view of the field, and this effort was hampered by the diversity, and perhaps the ineffability of these influences. In addition, other criteria of an adequate literature review vied for attention.
These considerations led me to form three objectives to guide the content of the literature review and the extent of coverage of each contributor:

(1) To describe the literature that is drawn upon in the outline sketch and analysis of the field presented in chapter three.

(2) To give due weight to the chief influences on the formation of the specific approach taken in this thesis described in chapter four.

(3) To provide an account of the historical development of the field.

The application of these objectives have meant that some major figures and movements in social psychology have been omitted. This is not because their work is of no relevance to value theory, but because they are not seen as being in the mainstream from the value point of view. Notable examples are G.H.Mead, 'symbolic interactionism, and Wundt's folk psychology.

Some inevitable narrowing down of the extent of the field covered in this thesis has therefore occurred, both in the initial exploration of the literature, and in the formal description of the material and its analysis. It is hoped, however, that the outline sketch and analysis is broad enough to assimilate, at a later stage, the related work that has not been fully considered.

It is intended that this literature review, together with the analyses of chapters three and four, will provide the broad approach to the study of value that has been lacking in psychological approaches. To identify and describe the main traditions and writers, and to organise them in a particular way, will hopefully stimulate interest and comment in the field.
2.2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE

2.2.1 A four-fold categorisation

The review begins with the specification of four categories, representing general approaches to the field of value. This provides a useful device which serves two main functions.

(1) It provides a framework for the presentation of the main ethical theories formed before the twentieth century. The exception to this is axiology, which is deemed to require a more extensive treatment.

(2) A pre-analysis of this kind was considered useful to provide and illustrate concepts that would be used in the rest of the review and in later chapters.

It should be noted at the outset that neither the four categories nor their sub-categories are intended to be mutually exclusive. Writers have been placed within them as the 'best fit' of those parts of their work covered by this review.

A. Ontological theories

The basis for this grouping is the relation of value to ideas about the 'being' or 'essence' of things. They typically adhere to a conception of a higher reality and an ontological system in terms of which true value is ascribed. Accordingly, the differences between the everyday world and some richer and superior reality are emphasised. There is often a dichotomy drawn up between the ordinary desires of the unenlightened, and the true values associated with the higher reality.

The major religions are examples of this approach. That which is good or right is that which is in accord with religious teaching or which leads to a closer understanding of the Godhead, however it is conceived. Even values
such as self-preservation and respect for the life of others can be over-ruled by reference to these higher considerations, as is evidenced by instances of martyrdom and the killing of heretics.

Also included here are Platonic positions. Plato held that sense impressions could only give an approximate knowledge of more fundamental and immutable levels of reality known as 'Ideas'. The 'Good' was held to be the highest Idea and therefore the ultimate end of knowledge. Insight into this truth was to be gained through a contemplative, ascetic way of life. The pleasures of the body, and knowledge gained through sense-experience were frowned upon. This approach was given a more religious emphasis in Neoplatonism.

Similar ideas were propounded by the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were likened to Plato by their tendency toward the view that moral principles are in some sense present in nature awaiting discovery by man. Although referred to as Platonists, they might also be regarded as forerunners of the intuitionists.

The tradition of Idealist Ethics can also be included here. According to Fichte, the phenomenal world is created by the projections of an Absolute Will. In addition, each person is a temporary embodiment of the Will, which is also expressed through social institutions, laws, and moral codes. Through acceptance of these, as opposed to following the values of self-interest, a higher freedom can be achieved through the 'realisation' of the Absolute Will.

Hegel conceived of a similar entity, an 'objective mind' which is in the process of self-realisation through the medium of human history. Part of this process is the creation of a rational system of social and political institutions which embody the rights and duties of individuals. Realisation and individual freedom are promoted insofar as individuals accept customs and laws, which are unquestionably correct because of their role in realisation. Good and right are thus defined in terms of conformity and in
relation to the furtherance of realisation. Hence, for example, slavery could be justified because it was necessary to produce the modern state, which is a necessary step toward realisation of the objective mind.

In the English-speaking world, Green, Bosanquet, and Bradley, and the Americans Emerson and Royce absorbed these ideas. Although each had his own approach, they shared the central features. Naturalism was rejected, true value being identified with the promotion of realisation rather than with the unreflective pursuit of pleasure and self-interest.

B. Intuitionist theories

The ideas that are collected together under this heading have in common the position that value exists independently of human wishes and aspirations. They are distinguished from ontological theories on the grounds that they are not enmeshed in a wider system of beliefs about a higher reality. They are subdivided according to the means by which value is thought to be encountered. This is either through a kind of inner conviction, called a moral sense, or through a type of 'perception', value being regarded as a property of objects.

Moral sense theories developed from the observation that people did not always act in their own best interests. This was thought to indicate the existence of a moral sense, which finds satisfaction in altruism, self-sacrifice, and the welfare of others. The idea was current in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, through the work of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and especially Hume. Hume limited the application of moral sense to ultimate values. He thought that ultimate values arise through feelings, which are highly subjective, yet he noted a considerable degree of agreement between people as regards the correct ends to be pursued. To account for this he posited a universal tendency in human nature toward pleasure in the welfare of others. Rousseau also embraced this idea, and suggested that aggression and selfishness are caused by social institutions which
arbitrarily impose customs and laws upon an otherwise genial human nature.

Later writers who incorporated similar ideas were Sidgwick, and Prichard. Sidgwick argued that ethics should be based on social utilitarianism. He was content to ground this conviction on an intuition, a direct and self-evident awareness of the correctness of the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. Prichard asserted that duty became apparent through the process of clear and careful consideration of any potential action. An inner experience of obligation would indicate the correct course of action.

It should be noted that moral sense theories, although holding that altruistic values are known through the medium of the moral sense, nevertheless tend to take up the position that these values do not depend upon their being recognised. For example, altruism would be valuable even if nobody knew of its value. These writers thus imply that the values in question exist independently of human wishes.

Common sense intuitionism was an eighteenth century development of moral sense theory, associated with the work of Reid and of Price. Moral qualities were thought to be present in things in much the same way as are physical qualities, and were thought to be perceived in a similar manner. This position still propounded the idea of a moral sense, which assisted in the perception of moral qualities.

G.E. Moore considered goodness to be a property of things, but he made it a special kind of property. It was a simple property, incapable of being broken down into smaller parts. It was thus indefinable, and it was non-natural, existing outside of the empirical realm of other properties. Moore’s ‘goodness’ was ineffable but could be apprehended through a special attitude of feeling and will.

Ross extended this view somewhat, holding that both ‘rightness’ and ‘goodness’ were directly intuited properties. In addition, he brought these notions back into the ordinary universe by allowing that they could be
dependent upon other properties, such as the capacity to produce pleasure. Ross also recognised the possibility of conflicts between directly intuited 'rightnesses', and incorporated the idea of grading them in order of their degree of obligation.

C. Naturalism

This category centres on the idea that value derives from man's physical nature. Value is independent of any higher reality, and is known through an acquaintance with the facts of human nature. Value thus becomes a subset of fact, and there is an emphasis on the discovery of effective means of promoting human benefit rather than on raising questions about the worth of final ends.

1. Hedonism

Hedonistic theories are those that take the production of human pleasure or happiness to be the only or main criterion of value. This does not usually entail proposing the unfettered pursuit of pleasant bodily sensations, but often stresses the importance of 'higher' pleasures and satisfactions, and the promotion of welfare.

This position was prominent in ancient philosophy. Aristotle identified many types of goodness, but the supreme good for individuals was held to be personal happiness, and for groups, the general welfare. Happiness was defined as the balanced and rational exercise of human faculties. This was held to be the correct function of a human being. The good person would follow the virtues, and use his judgement so as to act and feel in ways that were appropriate in the circumstances.

Earlier, Aristippus of Cyrene had regarded pleasure as being intrinsically good, and Epicurus had held that pleasure was the single standard of good. Neither of these thinkers advocated the unreflective pursuit of pleasure, however. Epicurus, like Aristotle, recommended the
middle way, asserting that true pleasure was to be found in a state of satisfied tranquility. Aristippus presaged Bentham in suggesting that pleasure had to be weighed against the pain that is required to produce it, or against its painful consequences.

Similar ideas were resurrected by Locke, for whom pleasure was the final standard of value. Consistent with his theory of knowledge, he regarded such concepts as 'goodness' and 'justice' to be formed through experience, as was the awareness of which things led to pleasure. However, Locke also suggested structural and non-empirical aspects of ethics, modelled on mathematics. A class of self-evident general propositions necessarily entailed particular rules of conduct. Thus Locke did not conclude that each person should unrestrainedly pursue his own pleasure, but suggested that obedience to customs and laws was necessary in order to promote the self-evident benefits of the general welfare and the natural rights of man.

Locke influenced Utilitarians such as Bentham, who prescribed that social policy and individual actions should be arranged so as to maximise the amount of pleasure in existence and minimise the amount of pain. He attempted to create a quantitative ethical theory proposing the 'hedonic calculus' which would measure pleasure in 'utils', and would take into account such factors as the intensity and duration of pleasure and the number of people affected. This enterprise met various difficulties stemming from the non-unitary nature of the concept of pleasure, and the difficulty of establishing and predicting means-ends relationships.

J.S. Mill realised that an undifferentiated pleasure scale could lead to a simple identity between utility and bodily pleasure, and hence to the advocacy of an uncultivated and egotistical way of life. He therefore added the notion of the quality of pleasure. Some pleasures were to be given superiority over others. For example, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral pleasures were to be better than bodily sensations. This position involves some weakening of the hedonistic stance, because non-hedonistic criteria are
implicit in the ranking of pleasures. Mill also tried to make the relationship between individual benefit and group welfare more explicit by positing a long-run coincidence of interests. Thus altruistic behaviour and social duty could be explained in utilitarian terms.

2. Self-preservation and self-interest

Another set of ideas that can be classed under naturalism are those that assert that self-preservation or self-interest are the final justifications for individual action.

Hobbes conceived human nature to be fundamentally self-centred. Social organisation is necessary in order to restrain the natural human tendencies toward aggression, envy, and mistrust. Hobbes therefore proposed that the individual should make a social contract with a 'Leviathan' state, which would guarantee his security in exchange for adherence to customs and laws, and the yielding of some individual rights and powers. Moral rules were thought to be the product of human reason, aimed at obtaining survival for all through universal adherence. If the state failed to uphold the peace, then Hobbes considered that the individual had a basic right to use whatever natural powers he has in order to preserve his existence.

Spinoza had similar views to Hobbes in some respects. Ethics was to be founded on human nature, which was thought to be centrally concerned with self-interest. Society was to be organised so as to fulfil human needs, including self-interest. He concluded, however, that a rational humane and cultivated way of life should follow from the exercise of self-interest. Spinoza made ethics a product of human thought, even though he held that there were some parallels with physical laws, which meant that they could not be disobeyed. Those who understood the nature of ethical rules, however, were thought to be free, happy, and virtuous. Ethical principles only seemed objective and independent of human nature to the uninformed.
3. Evolutionary ethics

Darwin's theory of evolution provided the inspiration for the idea that it might be possible to find a justification for ethical principles in the natural processes of evolution. Darwin himself suggested that there was a long-term trend in human evolution. Sympathy for others, courage, and faithfulness were among the attributes that were flourishing across the generations, whereas violence and intemperance were declining. There were small variations in the intellectual and moral faculties of each generation, and natural selection operated so as to produce a steady advance in these qualities. These processes resulted in the promotion of welfare and happiness for both the individual and for mankind in general.

Spencer concentrated on cultural evolution, drawing parallels between the evolution of social and organic structures. He too discerned an evolutionary trend whereby the pressures of survival had moulded cultural changes and the psychological features of the population. The emergence of agriculture and settled communities, and the occurrence of the feelings appropriate for social life, were examples of this trend. Spencer held a stronger view than Darwin as regards the inevitability of this process. He held that there is a definite progress in cultural and individual evolution toward perfection, which cannot be deflected from its path. Generally, altruism will replace egoism, social and individual interests will coincide, and evil will disappear. Spencer adopted a utilitarian standard of ultimate goodness, the general happiness. He argued that his approach, because it contained an explanatory framework, was an advance on the 'expediency philosophy' of utilitarianism, which was limited to descriptive observations of the factors leading to happiness.

Julian Huxley also recognised an evolutionary tendency toward perfection and suggested that the pain and combat of survival resulted in progress. For Huxley, an ethics based on evolution served the necessary function of providing an intellectual prop, giving comfort and direction in life. It
could be founded on a few main principles such as the realisation of new
possibilities in evolution and the respect for, and full development of,
individuality. His position allowed for more human control than did Darwin
and Spencer, as was illustrated by his view that it would be desirable to
intervene in social evolution in order to improve the conditions for the
progress toward perfection.

Evolutionary ethics thus equated goodness and rightness with those
individual qualities or social conditions that were identified as being on
the mainline journey toward progress and ultimate perfection. Anything
perceived as a retarding force was bad or wrong.

4. The naturalistic fallacy

Evolutionary ethics and naturalism generally are vulnerable to a
fundamental objection. The leap from 'is' to 'ought' cannot be justified on
factual grounds alone. Even if trends in human biological or cultural
evolution were established beyond all doubt, would it be valid to call them
progressive or steps toward perfection? This imbues them with an extreme
positive value and suggests that they ought to be welcomed and encouraged.
The processes of natural selection are blind. Is it valid to reason that
because they occur they must be desirable and ought to occur? Likewise, the
observations that people like pleasure and want to be happy do not provide
grounds for the conclusion that people ought to desire pleasure and
happiness.

Hume is generally credited with the observation that a deductively valid
ethical conclusion must have at least one evaluative premise. It was
G.E. Moore (1903), however, who was most responsible for the impact of the
naturalistic fallacy on recent ethical thought. His treatment of the
concept of 'goodness' contained an elaboration of the Humean position.
According to Moore, 'goodness' was outside of the realm of nature, it was a
simple concept that could not be analysed in terms of more basic elements,
and it was non-empirical, incapable of being known by normal perception.

If these arguments are accepted, naturalism is limited to the description of what is regarded as valuable or right by given individuals and groups. It cannot prescribe what is truly of worth without going beyond its own boundaries, thus making it non-naturalistic.

D. Rationalism

This category overlaps with both intuitionism and naturalism. It is useful to separate it out, however, because of its relation to the important question of whether or not values may be justified. The central proposal is the idea that the ultimate criterion of value is the exercise of man's rationality. It is thus broadly similar to naturalism, in that value is a product of human nature (in this case man's essentially rational character), but there are also connections with intuitionism. There is a suggestion of a fixed structure to the human mind and the ethical rules contained therein, which can be 'discovered' in some way. In addition there is a specific rejection of hedonism. Criteria based on pleasure or pain are spurned in favour of a reflective attitude through which genuine value may be established.

Aristotle emphasised the importance of reason as an end in itself as well as being a route to happiness, but Stoicism may be regarded as as the chief example of a rationalist approach in ancient philosophy. Man's ability to reason was thought to be his distinctive feature, and it was believed that the correct mode of life was to act according to rational principles of conduct. One should be indifferent to pleasure and pain, because value does not reside in bodily sensations, but in the degree to which behaviour is rational. Moral laws took on the status of laws of human nature, and it became a duty to conform to these. Withdrawals from social life were recommended in order to avoid the comforts and influences of conventional society and to reflect upon one's 'true' values.
Rationality was again stressed in the eighteenth century by Kant. He suggested that there were 'a priori' structures to both knowledge and ethics that were founded in the form of the human mind, and discoverable through reflection. Moral principles were held to be special in that they impelled a subjective feeling of obligation and produced a conviction that they ought to be followed by everyone. These were 'categorical imperatives' which should be obeyed regardless of the consequences for human happiness, pleasure or pain. Human activity should be aimed at being rational rather than attempting happiness. This would produce genuine freedom in contrast to enslavement by natural inclinations.

This last point is related to Kant's views of the 'autonomy of the will'. The rational will was conceived to be outside of the sphere of causal determinism, and was therefore able to follow self-made moral laws and to be independent of natural laws. Thus there could be no scientific proof of the autonomy of the will and no scientific study of ethics. It was therefore considered impossible to derive ethical principles from psychology or biology.

2.2.2 Axiology

The development of a general theory of value was a vital step in the history of thought about value. Axiology was closely linked with the emergence of psychology during the nineteenth century. Lotze and Brentano had their place within this development as well as being important figures in value theory. This new emphasis on psychology led to an approach which saw value as a mental process. The similarities between acts of valuing, regardless of their content, were studied and thus the field of value was regarded as a whole, rather than divided into areas such as ethics, aesthetics, and economics. This was the uniting feature of axiology, that was stressed in both its psychological and philosophical aspects.
The influences of Kant, German Idealism, and Intuitionism were fused in various ways in the ideas of the writers involved, who will now be considered in greater detail. Lotze may be regarded as a precursor of the two main schools of axiology, the Austrian school and the Baden school.

A. Lotze

Lotze's broad interests in physiology and psychology as well as in philosophy, led him to think about the relationship between science and value. He considered that the mind could not be fully explained in terms of physical and chemical processes. Meaning and value needed to be tackled by methods beyond those of the exact sciences. Indeed, the practice of science itself expressed the desire for knowledge and ultimately served the ends of feeling and emotion. Being contained within value, science could not be used to explain it.

For Lotze, 'value' was a distinct realm of knowledge, separated from 'fact' and 'universal law', both of which related to the physical world. Value was expressed through the physical world but was only understood through 'feeling'. This was held to be superior to thought because it could encounter reality directly, through experience. Thought was purely symbolic and could only provide ideas about reality. Lotze thus set up a distinction between fact and value, broadly conceived, and suggested that they were known through different means.

B. Austrian school

Although they worked independently, the philosophers Brentano, Meinong, and von Ehrenfels are commonly grouped together in discussions of value theory. Their first concern was psychological, to study the experience of value in a scientific manner. For Brentano and Meinong this led to assertions about the objective nature of value.
Brentano held that 'inner-perceptions' were a form of empirical evidence that were more immediate and therefore more trustworthy than perceptions of the outer world. He developed 'act psychology' in which an active component of experience, 'intentionality', apprehends a passive, and mentally defined 'content'. There were three types of mental act. Of these, 'love - hate', the feeling or desire toward an object, and 'judgement', in which the truth or falsity of an object was assessed, shared the similarities of being subjective assertions that were thought by the experiencer to be universally true. Also, both were referred to higher criteria for their validation. Brentano was not a subjectivist, however. The inner-perceptions of fair minded, sincere, and informed observers were thought to give an insight into the objective truths of love - hate. The self-evident values of knowledge, joy, correctness of love, and correctness of inner-perceptions could be known by this means.

Meinong agreed with Brentano that inner-perception could give insight into fact and value. In common with Brentano and with Rickert, he saw value as having both psychological and 'objective reality' aspects. His thought went through two stages. Initially he asserted that a feeling of value was produced by the involvement of an 'existence-judgement' about the value object. This judgement entailed reference to the realm of 'objectives' which contained the absolute truths and falsities about objects and their properties. He later inclined to a position closer to Lotze and Rickert, claiming that values were in an independent realm, known through either feeling or desire.

Von Ehrenfels was markedly more naturalistic. The other axiologists held that there was some sense in which values were objective, with knowledge of these values leading to a desire for them. In contrast, Von Ehrenfels contended that desire was primary, leading to value being ascribed to things. Desire was emotional in character, and thus his position regarded value as highly subjective and unstable in its overt manifestations. Some
stability was introduced, however, through the concept of 'feeling-disposition', which allowed for continuity of value in the same person across time. Also, similarities between the values of different people was explained by the idea of an evolutionary influence on desire.

C. Baden school

The Baden school was characterised by its Kantian approach but, as with the Austrian school, the influence of Lotze was apparent. Windelband married Kant's ideas of an a priori transcendent order to the German idealist tradition of an absolute mind within which ethical laws are located. Absolute values were organised into a rational order within the absolute mind of God, and this contrasted with the values of individuals, which were specific and dependent upon their wills and feelings.

Windelband's successor at Baden, Rickert, did not agree that it was necessary to locate transcendent values within an absolute mind. He regarded it as sufficient to conceive of a separate realm beyond, and prior to, the empirical world. Rickert emphasised the psychology of values, seeing values as psychological acts involving the valuation of objects by people. Thus there were subjective and objective aspects to value. A realm of validities which ought to be confirmed, contrasted with the actual, error-prone evaluations of people.

D. The absorption of axiology into American psychology

The interaction between axiology and pragmatism produced the philosophical background for much of the later empirical work in the field of value. The process was largely one of German philosophy and methods being moulded and supplemented by the predominant American concerns for usefulness and observability.

Both Rescher (1969) and Frankena (1967) credit Munsterberg with introducing axiology into the U.S.A. His active model of man, together with
an emphasis on psychological processes rather than Wundtian structuralism, found favour with the functionalists. Munsterberg, however, came from a very different tradition. Brentano's act psychology would have denied the naturalism implicit in James' approach. Munsterberg's distinction between scientific psychology (the physiological aspects of experience) and humanistic psychology (which inevitably involves value judgements) was played down.

This selectivity illustrates the nature of the absorption of axiology into American philosophy and psychology. The idea of a general theory of value, focusing on the psychological processes involved, was attractive to the functionalists. The ultimate, idealistic aspects of axiology were largely ignored. Despite the efforts of Urban, the naturalistic emphasis of von Ehrenfels held greatest sway. This was part of the broader trend in which functionalism eclipsed idealism and structuralism with profound results for the future of psychology and research into value.

There were forces opposing this trend, however. In particular, Urban (1926) maintained that debate about value had moved from psychology to philosophy as it became realised that a full account of value needed to go beyond studying the values that people held. Later he still maintained that "Value realism, in the sense of the independent subsistence of values, is a view widely held ..." (Urban, 1939,p.613).

In the same article, however, he pointed out the continuing problems of axiology: the excessive subjectivity of 'intuition', the precise mode of existence of value, and the relationship of value 'essences' to the rest of reality.

It was such problems that had been avoided by the functionalists and the related pragmatist philosophy. Pragmatism was of importance both directly and indirectly to the study of value.
2.2.3 Pragmatism

Thayer (1967) contended that pragmatism was a group of associated ideas rather than a unified movement, and the present account supports this view. The basic ideas were introduced by Peirce during the 1870s. He advocated that the meaning of abstract concepts, and the solution of complex arguments should be linked to concrete events.

A. James

William James brought pragmatism to a wider audience. His version differed from that of Peirce, however. James related pragmatism to behaviour and belief rather than to an abstract theory of meaning, and he introduced an evolutionary dimension. The central idea that knowledge should be related to its practical effects remained unaffected, however:

"The pragmatic method ... is to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right" (James, 1907, p.46/7).

James' pragmatism was not only a theory of knowledge. It was also possible to resolve religious and moral disputes using pragmatic methods. He saw pragmatism as mediating between empiricism ("facts without religion") and rationalism ("religion without facts"). Adherence to functionalism led James to concentrate on the function of belief and to stress the similarities between scientific and spiritual beliefs. Both served to produce satisfaction and reduce anxiety in the believer, and both were more readily accepted the more they cohered with existing beliefs. He arrived at the position that truth was a type of goodness in the sense that theories about empirical matters were 'true' insofar as they were 'good' (workable,
useful, and empirically testable). Likewise, religious and moral beliefs were 'true' and 'good' if they led to benefits for the believer (e.g. the reduction of anxiety). Beliefs were not entirely free to vary between situations, however. Single beliefs had to fit into a wider system, and avoid conflict with other, more beneficial beliefs. Also, James thought that beliefs had been subjected to the processes of evolution, which had ensured that many beliefs were in fact beneficial.

B. Dewey

Dewey was a leading figure in the development of functionalism and also made important contributions to pragmatism and the study of value. Building on the work of Peirce and James, he attempted to bridge 'fact' and 'value' by emphasising the similarities in the processes, functions, and purposes, of both scientific and moral inquiry.

When considering the process of scientific enquiry, Dewey noted the importance of value judgements. Hypotheses were 'good' in terms of criteria such as predictiveness, usefulness, fruitfulness and clarity. Enquiry was terminated with the settlement of the doubts that initiated it. Thus Dewey recognised that even the most 'objective' of evidence was set within a context of value. The acceptance of facts and hypotheses relied upon a feeling of 'satisfaction' and, more broadly, the whole purpose of inquiry was aimed at promoting welfare, solving problems, and so on.

Much of Dewey's thinking about value may be illustrated by considering the answers he gave to his influential 'questions about value' (Dewey, 1924, 1944, 1949). He affirmed that values should be defined in behavioural terms, but held that a cognitive component was necessary to a full account of value. The behavioural concepts of 'caring-for' in animals and 'valuing' in humans reflected the importance he gave to observability and evolutionary continuity. 'Evaluation', the cognitive appraisal of values, was also required, however, in order to avoid limiting values to momentary desires.
and unreflective habitual action. The distinction between 'valuing' and 'evaluation' was blurred in practice, however. Previous 'evaluations' could become automatic and resemble 'valuing'. Also, evaluation need not be a ponderous intellectual self-discussion. It could occur rapidly and spontaneously during 'valuing'.

As regards the relationship between value and fact, Dewey held that:

"(Both involved) ... scrupulous and systematic care in selection of genuine evidential material, with equal care in rejection of all subject matter whose presence can be traced to bias, prior commitment to a particular theory, professional repute, and so on" (Dewey, 1949, p.77).

His position was that value propositions did not have a different logical or scientific status from other propositions. They were distinguished by their subject matter alone.

This was interlinked with the question concerning the applicability of the scientific method to the field of value. He advocated that evaluations should be well-founded using a scientific approach. Thus science could be used not only to study what people valued, but also to assess their values. Disputes over value could be settled by rational procedures. Such assessment was contextual, however. Dewey held that values arise within particular states of motivation, locations, and times. There was no value essence that was a permanent feature of any object. Objects could have instrumental value, as means to another value, but nothing could be worthwhile 'in itself'. Thus there were no ultimate and absolute values in Dewey's scheme, but his advocacy of rationality had a central paradox, as Dewey himself realised. It relied on the unquestioned acceptance of the values that are associated with the scientific enterprise.
Perry was greatly influenced by James at Harvard, adopted a naturalist stance, was critical of emotivism and intuitionism, and produced a detailed and systematic offering of the functionalist approach to value.

In particular, he provided operational definitions of value phenomena. Thus he avoided a common failing of naturalist theories that relate value to human nature without specifying how values are to be identified in practice. His approach was 'axiological' in the sense of being a general theory of value. All instances of value, whether they were ethical, political, aesthetic, etc. were united through his central concept of 'interest'. The world was essentially neutral until some interest was taken in it.

"The silence of the desert is without value until some wanderer finds it lonely and terrifying" (Perry, 1926, p.125).

Interest was defined as dealing with the 'motor-affective life'. It was a comprehensive concept intended to include

"... instinct, desire, feeling, will and all their family of states, acts, and attitudes" (Perry, 1926, p.27).

This appears to be a behaviourist definition of interest and hence of value, but in Perry's set of definitions, through which he attempted to specify the meaning of normative concepts, a broader intent was displayed. For example, 'X is intrinsically good' equals 'X is the object of favourable interest for its own sake' implied that some value is due to factors beyond 'interest'. Also, 'X is morally good' equals 'X is the object of interests harmoniously organised by reflective agreement' suggested the involvement of cognition and the importance of consistency of organisation.

In fact, the concepts of cognition and harmony have important roles in Perry's value theory. 'Cognition' served to provide a factual view of objects which were then given values by 'interest'. The concept of harmony became important when Perry addressed the problem of the relative merit of values. Firstly, in an individual's value system, incompatible,
antagonistic, independent, and irrelevant elements were undesirable. Secondly, in the social and moral arena, Perry held that the interests of individuals should be harmonised for the benefit of all.

Later pragmatist writers included Lewis (1946, 1955) and Pepper (1947, 1958). The main impact of pragmatism in the field of value had already been made, however. This influence was very important on the social psychology of value, and was both direct, through the predominant view of the nature of value that was adopted, and indirect, through the promotion of certain background values that denoted what was good research and theory.

2.2.4 Emotivism

The emotivist approach to value developed out of the application of logical positivism to moral philosophy. The role of moral philosophers was seen as the analysis of the meaning of ethical terms. During the 1920s and 30s Russell was developing the view that moral statements are expressions of desire (see Edwards, 1967), but Ayer (1936) gave greater prominence to this position. To qualify for the class of meaningful statements a proposition had to be either necessarily true or empirically verifiable. Ayer held that moral propositions were neither. After further analysis, he concluded that their essential function was to express the feelings of the speaker. This denied the possibility of deciding moral issues through rational means. There were simply differences in feelings and any apparently reasoned arguments in ethics disguised this fact.

Ayer's views were stated concisely and it was left to Stevenson (1944) to provide an elaborated exposition of emotivism. Ayer had indicated that moral statements might also function to influence the feelings of others. Stevenson made this more central. He distinguished between belief and attitude, and between the associated descriptive and emotive meanings of words. In his 'second pattern of analysis' (p.206), Stevenson pointed out
that both meanings could be contained in the same statement. 'This is good', might describe the qualities of an object as well as expressing the speaker's approval of it.

Emotive meaning was associated with the 'dynamic use' of words. Statements containing emotive meaning were aimed at influencing the hearer's attitude and behaviour. This was the case for value statements even if they seemed to be descriptive on the surface. Value statements were fundamentally both expressions of feelings and attempts at influencing others.

2.2.5 Prescriptivism

This position, adopted by Hare (1952), was related to emotivism in that it derived from the analysis of how words are used, and made a broad separation between value and fact. It differed from both emotivism and existentialism, however, in holding that there could be rational grounds for choosing between value judgements.

Hare distinguished between prescriptive discourse and informative discourse, which was concerned with questions of fact. Value judgements were a type of prescriptive discourse and were likened to the imperative mode of speech. A similar position had been taken by Carnap, but Hare differed from this by denying that value judgements could be reduced to imperatives. They implied an imperative, but were different from simpler imperatives because of the strong feelings associated with them, the conviction of their universality, and their greater stability. For example, 'no smoking' could be a simple imperative referring to a particular time and place. In contrast, 'smoking is bad' could imply 'do not smoke' and reflect the speaker's more general adherence to a wider set of convictions. Values were organised in a logical manner within the person, giving them stability, and providing the rational grounds for choosing between competing moral judgements. Hare also differed from emotivism on the issue of the function
of value statements, which he saw as providing guidance to others rather than influencing them or expressing feelings.

2.2.6 Descriptivism

Descriptivism also employed the analysis of the logic and language of value as its basic method. Different conclusions were reached from those of prescriptivism however, and it was by its opposition to prescriptivism that it was largely defined. Foot was the major proponent of this position, which had as its main emphasis the inseparability of value and fact (e.g. Foot, 1967). Beauchamp (1982) identified two central theses of the position. The 'descriptivist thesis' contended that value judgements are not prescriptions. To say 'X is courageous' does not necessarily mean the speaker recommends that everyone should be courageous. It does, however, convey both a positive attitude toward X and a description of X. The evaluation and the description are logically inseparable.

The second thesis was the 'closed-criteria thesis'. This took the view that the criteria for goodness are given by the context. A good knife, for example, has certain features. Its size, strength, and sharpness must be appropriate to its intended use. The description and evaluation of its features are inseparable. This argument could be extended to the human world. Injury is bad, and well-being is good, in relation to the normal functioning of the human body. Also, if the features of a 'good' person can be established, then characteristics of individuals may be regarded as both factual and evaluative.

Beauchamp outlined arguments against descriptivism as had Hare (1963). These centred on the assertion that the inseparability of description and evaluation noted by Foot were due to prominent conventional values and were not logical necessities. For example, the statement 'X continually clasps and unclasps his hands' is a description of an action which has no conventional links with the production of any benefit. The evaluation of
this action is independent of its description. Although improbable, it is nevertheless possible that a person or culture may come to regard this action as being good in itself. This would establish a link between description and evaluation that was based on convention, and other linkages may have similar, but less apparent, origins.

2.2.7 Existentialism

In line with its broader assumptions, existentialism presented an account of value in which the emphasis was on the freedom of the individual to construct his own values. Man provided the meaning in an ultimately meaningless universe, but there were no objective criteria available for choosing values. Indeed, the insistence of the existentialists on the basic individuality and freedom of man meant that ethical rules were regarded as denials of freedom. Reliance on rules reflected an inauthentic desire to avoid responsibility.

Thus there were similarities with emotivism in the view that there were no grounds for justifying values. The early Sartre, for example, held that goodness could not be established either through intuition or through empirical investigation. As regards the emotivist claim that values function to influence others, however, the existentialists were firmly committed to the position that each person chooses his own values. The existentialist approach thus seemed to locate the origin of values in the nature of man and their exact manifestation depended upon individual psychology. Hence it may be regarded as a variety of naturalism. It is important to note, however, that the existentialist position itself implies the sovereign value of the freedom of the individual, and that an aim of philosophy ought to be to promote a greater awareness of this fundamental truth.
2.2.8 'Good reasons' approaches

A number of recent writers have continued with the method of extensive and careful enquiry into the logic of value judgements and the analysis of value language. These writers hold diverse views, but a prominent theme has been the attempt to discern what are 'good reasons' for holding particular values. This approach has a common ancestry with emotivism through the impact of logical positivism, but the conviction of the rationality of values sets the approach apart from emotivism. Once a 'good reason' has been established, and a closed context thus produced, a value judgement becomes similar to a factual judgement. In this respect the approach has links with descriptivism. The format also enables an apparent avoidance of the naturalistic fallacy. Ethical arguments follow the rules of ethical inference. Although they are not deductively valid, they are still logical in a more general sense.

Toulmin (1958) made a broad distinction between 'what ought to be' and 'what is or could be'. He was concerned to explore the nature of 'what ought to be' and its functions in everyday life. He identified two kinds of moral reasoning. Firstly, specific acts were referred to established rules and practices for their justification. Secondly, these rules and practices could themselves be questioned. In Toulmin's view, those rules and practices that minimised the total amount of suffering should be adopted. He recognised, however, that there were limits to the use of reasoning in ethics, beyond which was the concern of religion. This external reference seems to be necessary in Toulmin's system in order to justify, for example, the use of the minimisation of suffering as an ultimate criterion.

Baier (1958, 1973) can also be placed within this tradition. In his system, the final criterion of value was the effect on the 'quality of life', a concept derived from that of welfare in economic value theory. Ends such as survival, health, and security were indisputably and universally desirable because of their close connection with the quality of
life. Other ends, such as achievement and conformity could be judged in terms of their effects on the quality of life. Baier distinguished between 'imputations', the values held by a person or group, and 'assessments' concerning questions of the value of particular actions, events, objects, etc. Imputations were the province of psychology and sociology, but questions as to their soundness were the concern of value theory, and were to be judged in relation to their impact on specified ends, and finally on the quality of life.

Taylor (1961), in his analysis of 'normative discourse' took a more explicitly psychological stance, in that he focused on the processes and concepts that were necessary for a rational account of the evaluations of an individual. He was careful to point out, however, that this was not necessarily how they occurred in practice. This logical analysis was extremely complex, but it included the idea that evaluations were made in terms of standards or rules which could themselves be evaluated in terms of second order standards (e.g. comfort evaluated in terms of health). This was similar to Toulmin's position, but Taylor's discussion of intrinsic value indicated that the immediate experience of satisfaction was his final standard of value. At another level, however, Taylor suggested that different rules and standards were relevant to different 'realms of value' (morality, aesthetics, etc.).

This diversity was given greater emphasis by von Wright (1963a,b). He took the view that there was no unified category of 'goodness'. There were loosely related 'varieties' of goodness each with its own characteristics. Amongst these were welfare, hedonic and utilitarian goodness, and von Wright undertook a detailed analysis of each area. Despite his fragmentation of the field, von Wright can still be regarded as taking a broad axiological approach, treating ethics as a class of 'utilitarian' goodness. In contrast to many other writers, however, he declined to specify a single source of ultimate value. Each variety of goodness had its own 'good reasons'.
Rescher (1969) adopted a position close to Baier's, but with a greater stress on the possibility of the objective assessment of evaluations. The effect on 'human welfare' was decisive, and values such as health, well-being, and comfort were thus important. Rescher modelled value on economics, suggesting that a person's values could be seen in terms of a 'value economy' in which values had costs and benefits in relation to that person's conception of 'the good life'.

Najder (1975), like Taylor, carried out a conceptual analysis of the field of value. In this work, however, the divisions between social science and philosophy became less distinct. Indeed, he saw the encouragement of the cross-disciplinary study of value as one of his aims. He held that evaluations and pure descriptions could be justified in a closely similar manner, but that evaluation differed because it relied upon the acceptance of at least one final underlying value principle or 'axiological value'. These axiological values are the criteria that confer value on objects, events, qualities, etc. They combine with the factual and logical elements to determine evaluations. This rational structure to evaluation was held to apply not only to the overtly reasoned value judgement (discursive evaluation), but also to the motivational, unreflective, 'apperception' of things in everyday life (evaluative experience).

2.2.9 Rules, rights, and contracts

As will become apparent, a wide variety of positions are included under this heading. They are interlinked, however, by a stress on the tendency for human beings to impose structure and regularity on their lives, thus gaining some guidance for their value judgements. This view of man as a rule-follower emphasises rationality, and suggests that value judgements can be correct or incorrect in relation to an appropriate set of rules. There are thus strong affinities with the good-reasons approaches, in particular with Toulmin. His two-tier system presages the structure of many of the
theories described below, and the limits of rationality, stressed by Toulmin, are also recognised in the major positions reviewed.

The importance of the rules embedded in human institutions was pointed out by Searle (1969) in his attempt to challenge the naturalistic fallacy. For example, the rules of promising are such that a person who makes a promise thereby acquires an obligation. Thus an 'ought' statement expressing the obligation can be derived from the purely factual premisses associated with the making of the promise. Critics have pointed out that this formula is only available within the community of those who accept the rules, and that a detached person would be able to see that 'ought' has not been derived from 'is' alone. The value statement 'one ought to keep one's promises' was conveniently omitted from Searle's argument. Nevertheless, Searle drew attention to the social context of evaluation, and highlighted the way that philosophers, perhaps unrealistically, try to develop positions that would be valid only for isolated intellects, existing independently of the influences of everyday life.

Rule Utilitarianism was devised to avoid some of the perceived inadequacies of classical utilitarianism. Specific acts are assessed according to their conformity with general rules rather than being directly measured in terms of their expected utility. It is the rules themselves that are judged against utilitarian standards. Rawls (1971) propounded the 'practice conception' of rules, likening moral rules to the rules of a game. These should be adhered to by the players during play, but be subject to discussion and amendment at other times. On this view, specific acts are morally right because they are required by a rule of practice. Alternative sets of rules could themselves be judged by the amount of utility they produce.

Another rule utilitarian, Brandt (1971), proposed that rules should be assessed at a much higher level of generality. He looked at the entire moral code that was 'current' (widely accepted) in a society and suggested
that it could be judged by the average amount of good that it produced per person. By this criterion each society has an 'ideal moral code' and specific acts can be assessed in terms of this ideal. The moral codes currently applied in a society need not be the ideal, and hence particular moral judgments and the amount of good produced may be sub-optimal.

Two distinct kinds of value judgment are thus found in rule utilitarianism. Specifics are good or bad according to their conformity with general rules. The rules themselves are assessed in terms of the amount of utility produced. Both levels, at least in theory, are rational processes. The limits of rationality are, however, inherently recognised through the adoption of a hedonistic ultimate criterion.

Rawls (1972) developed his earlier position into one that contained a basic contrast with utilitarianism. Whereas utilitarianism defines what is right by what is good, in the sense of producing utility, Rawls adhered to the idea of fundamental and inviolable rights that could be used as a basis for deciding what is good. His theory is in the Kantian tradition through both the stress on rightness and the pervasive reliance on rationality. Also he used a contractarian method in his avowed aim of building on the social contract theories of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.

In his analysis of justice, the rational application of rules was seen at two levels. Firstly, moral judgments were to be made by reference to the two basic principles of justice that Rawls propounded. Secondly, these principles were conceived to be those that would inevitably be chosen through the application of the rules governing the 'original position'. In this hypothetical situation, equal, free, and rational persons intent on furthering their individual interests choose the principles that will govern their association. Each person was seen as acting behind a 'veil of ignorance', knowing nothing about himself or others that would confer any advantage.
Taken together, these two levels illustrate how, in the area of justice, specific moral judgements can be rationally traced back to the more basic values of equality and freedom. Rawls' ideas on value were broader than the area of justice that he specially developed, however. He suggested that other 'virtues' such as freedom and efficiency could be analysed using similar methods, envisaging this programme as falling within the theory of rational choice.

Rawls' ideas contained two approaches to value. In the 'full theory' of the good, the principles chosen in the original position are the final criteria of value. The limits of rationality became apparent in the 'thin theory' of the good, which was necessary to account for the choice of these principles.

Rawls acknowledged that his full theory does not address the issue of the final ends that might be pursued by a rational person. In the thin theory, however, he suggested that:

"In order to draw conclusions about these ends it is necessary to take note of certain general facts" (Rawls, 1972, p.424).

The 'facts' are his conception of the universals of human life, including human desires and needs and the necessities of social interdependence (e.g. social mores). These, in conjunction with the basic axiom of 'goodness as rationality', led to a set of 'primary goods'. These included liberty, wealth, and self-respect, conceived to be the values that the individuals in the original position seek for themselves. Thus Rawls pointed out that human beings employ reason as a means to more fundamental ends.

Gauthier (1986) followed Rawls' method of imagining an idealised 'initial position' from which individuals contract to establish the grounds for their cooperation. Responding to the long-established challenge of accounting for altruism in non-moral terms, Gauthier relied heavily on game theory, suggesting that the participants in the initial position would agree to 'mutual constraint'. This agreement to constrain self-interest is rational
because it produces mutual benefits such that each person's utility is maximised. Altruism reduces to an indirect form of self-interest in Gauthier's scheme, and genuine selflessness remains irrational. His approach is a form of rule utilitarianism. Adherence to the rules devised in the 'initial situation' will lead to the maximisation of utility and the two-tier system of rationally-assessed means and non-rational ends is clearly seen.

Nozick (1974) also stressed the rational following of rules in his analysis of justice. He saw his approach as falling within 'pure procedural justice', in which correct decisions involve following a set of specified and self-contained procedures. Like Rawls, Nozick based his theory on human rights. His choice of the fundamental right was different, however. He argued for the priority of freedom over equality, proposing that it is wrong for governments to redistribute wealth because this hampers the free choices of individuals.

2.2.10 Monism versus pluralism

The contrast between Rawls and Nozick illustrates how the different theoretical conclusions drawn by rival philosophers might be traced to differences in the values that they consider to be basic. Such differences may be seen as reflecting irresolvable disagreements about the nature and relative priorities of fundamental values. This view accepts that there is an irreducible pluralism in the field of value, and that individual choices of fundamentals echo this real diversity. Alternatively, it may be held that the diversity is only apparent, and that it is possible to discern a single underlying principle. On this view, choices of fundamental values are either correct or incorrect. This opposition may be seen among the good-reasons approaches. Von Wright's pluralism contrasts with the monism of Baier and of Rescher. The issue was brought into sharper focus, however, through the work of MacIntyre (1981).
MacIntyre claimed that the rise of ethical subjectivism is rooted in the misguided attempts of philosophers at the time of the Enlightenment to base morality on human nature. This project was bound to fail because it did not incorporate a concept of 'human nature as it could be'. There was no teleological view, no vision of man having an essence that defines his true end. Hence morality became fragmented, and there is now a proliferation of alternative and incommensurable ethical systems.

MacIntyre advocated the resurrection of Aristotle's view of the essential purpose of a human life as consisting in the achievement of happiness through the exercise of virtue. Morality would then serve to guide humanity toward its proper end. In addition, this formulation would allow the naturalistic fallacy to be answered. A 'good' person would be one who fulfills the criteria of what a good person ought to be. Actions would be right if they were in accord with what a good person would do in similar circumstances.

Larmore (1987), contended that MacIntyre's approach entails adopting an unreasonably restrictive standard for the objectivity of morals. Larmore held that objectivity can be achieved, but only within pre-defined contexts. In contrast, MacIntyre insists on an objective basis for morality as a whole. Such a standard is not applied to science as a whole, where contextualism is normally accepted. Larmore argues for moral pluralism. Where MacIntyre sees a problem, Larmore welcomes the diversity of ultimate commitments. These ideas were strongly influenced by Nagel (1979,1980).

Nagel adopted a definition of objectivity which essentially involves the ability to view the world with oneself included. This he contrasted with physical objectivity, which ideally aims to define reality in physicalist terms. When applied to the field of value, Nagel's objectivity leads to a complicated contextualism with many embedded levels at which values may be said to be objective. Many perspectives may be adopted. These include the reassessment by an individual of his past or present values, and the
'agent-neutral' judgement of what anybody should do given the same circumstances.

Despite this variety of objective perspectives, there are regularities that apply at all levels. Nagel's position relies on value realism, which "... leads us to seek a detached point of view from which it will be possible to correct inclination and to discern what we really should do or want." (Nagel, 1980, p.99)

Even for an individual's specific choices, Nagel proposed that there is a correct decision to be made that would be in the best interests of a person of that type in those circumstances. Nagel did not apply absolute standards, but instead recognised that any 'objective' perspective is itself value-laden, being influenced by normative and motivational factors. This in turn may be assessed from a further viewpoint.

For the broader picture Nagel adhered to value pluralism. There is no single source of value, and the field is necessarily fragmented. This is mainly because the complexity of human beings enables the variety of perspectives. In the ultimate, however, there are no objective grounds for choosing between perspectives. Thus there are limits to the objectivity of value, which is only available within defined contexts. Moreover, there are some values, for example those involved in close personal relationships, that will always remain outside of objectivity because the adoption of a cold, detached standpoint would destroy them.

In addition, Nagel attempted to fill the moral vacuum beyond objectivity by recourse to Aristotle's concept of 'judgement'. This refers to the ability to make decisions that are appropriate to the circumstances. It relies on both thought and feeling, and is largely gained and improved through experience. 'Judgement' is applied intuitively in particular instances and the process cannot be formally defined by a rigid set of rules. By using this concept, Nagel attempts to maintain his value realism beyond the bounds of rationality. The choice between alternative value
perspectives becomes a matter of 'judgement', that can be correct or incorrect in relation to an implied standard of what is truly appropriate to the circumstances.

Another solution to the problem of the choice between competing ultimate values was provided by Norman (1983). The value conflicts of an individual may be resolved through practical discovery. One makes a practical choice and then discovers through experience if it is correct. Value pluralism remains at the collective level, however, because different people will prefer different values in similar circumstances.

Norman's naturalist ethics provided limits to an unbridled subjectivism. Centred on a humanistic world-view in which human harm or good are the fundamental considerations, there are two main categories providing good reasons for evaluation and action: human needs and social relations. Within the class of needs, Norman includes both basic physical requirements and some higher order general needs that he thinks must be fulfilled in order for life to be worthwhile. Among these are the need for meaningful work and activity, and the need for satisfactory relations with others. Social relations include short and long-term interpersonal relations together with large-scale attachments (to culture and class, for example).

Norman was explicitly pluralist in his insistence that human needs and social relations have an irreducible variety. They cannot be made qualitatively similar as is supposed by utilitarian positions. Thus Norman was a pluralist who imposed natural constraints on subjectivism. He specified a set of human universals, providing valid final ends for all persons. Where, for a person, these final ends conflict, thus providing classic moral dilemmas, his position implies that individual preference is the final arbiter.

Norman's work included the specification of a set of human universals, an ambitious task indeed, which he tackled through an eclectic survey of the ideas of other moral philosophers. Any list of this kind is bound to be
contentious, but there is a sense in which the exact content is less important than the idea that everyone's values are subject to the same constraints. An evolutionary perspective on this idea is given in the approaches that are considered next.

2.2.11 Evolutionary approaches

Biologically based positions were given impetus by the development of ethology and sociobiology, which drew attention to the interaction between innate processes and social behaviour. In the field of value these developments entailed a revision of the role of evolution, value being seen mainly as the product of the processes of evolution. They include Spencer's idea that cultures evolve in a manner that can be modelled on biological evolution (see 2.2.1 C3). Culturally evolved values can clash with innate values, causing psychological tension and social problems.

Cattell (1972) called for science to provide a new moral order (Beyondism), based on evolutionary principles. The later approaches that are described below shared Cattell's concern to provide ethical guidance and were thus broadly normative as opposed to the metaethical stance of much of twentieth century value philosophy.

Pugh (1978) adopted an approach that revolved around two main themes, the similarity between decision-making processes in humans and computers, and the idea that innate values play a vital part in human decisions. He noted that complex problems in computing need a form of judgement to be made. This requires the use of a value-driven decision system with two classes of values. Primary values are fixed by the designer as the final decision criteria. Secondary values are more flexible and developed by the system itself. They too are decision criteria, but are only important as intermediate steps toward the primary values.

Pugh used this simple basic structure as an analogy for human values. Value is a functional component of decision-making, divided into two broad
classes. Primary values are innate and resistant to change. They are the result of biological evolution and can only be altered through surgery, genetic engineering, or the use of drugs. Secondary values are learned, and can be formed or changed by social pressure and rational persuasion, because they are the products of the human mind. Their purpose is to promote the realisation of primary values by simplifying the environment and providing intermediate goals. Thus money and ethical principles are valuable only as means to the more fundamental, biologically determined values, such as well-being and social acceptance.

Despite the computing analogy, and the closeness of Pugh's primary/secondary dichotomy to similar ideas in behaviourism, man was seen as a purposive, intelligent, conscious being who is able to exercise rational choice in his behaviour. Yet the emphasis on primary values as final decision criteria, and the depiction of these as irrational feelings derived from man's evolutionary past, reveal Pugh's leaning toward a form of evolutionary ethics. Rational choice is limited to serving innate feelings. When Pugh discussed social and environmental issues, for example, he proposed that large urban developments and work specialisation are wrong because they fail to fulfil innate human values. He accepted that innate feelings are the prime sources of value simply because they are innate, and that they should not be overridden by culturally acquired values.

Campbell (1979) criticised Pugh's position as an example of 'normative biologism', the view that what is biologically natural is normatively good. He reasoned that innate tendencies have evolved in response to past environments, and that some of these are now non-adaptive, and can be recognised as such. Furthermore, Campbell contended that the naturalistic fallacy should be avoided. Ultimate goals cannot be logically justified, but there can still be good reasons for adopting particular values. Campbell advocated a form of ethics in which the ultimate goals are taken as given, and attention is directed toward the search for intermediate ethical
rules that will provide the optimal means to the stated ends.

The ability to criticise innate values and to suggest alternatives implies the operation of a higher order value system that, in contrast to Pugh's position, can override innate values. This is provided by the notion of social evolution. Societies evolve in a manner analogous to biological organisms. The same basic processes of variation, selection, and reproduction can be seen as taking place in societies.

Thus values are subject to selective pressures both through the greater survival and reproduction rates of those individuals having the most adaptive values, and likewise through the selection of the most successful social values. In Campbell's system, values have a temporary status, the product of a complex interaction between environment, inheritance, and society. In many instances social and innate values coincide. It is where they conflict that difficulties occur and ethical rules emerge.

Ultimate goals are not absolutes for Campbell, but he suggested that there may be some human universals deriving from regularities in the conditions of human existence and the development of societies. Survival, enjoyment, comfort, and group welfare might be universally approved, for example. Thus there were some anchoring points in Campbell's world of value flux. In addition, his criticism of 'normative sociologism' on similar grounds to 'normative biologism' (e.g. 'nationalistic military patriotism' he held to be maladaptive in a nuclear age) implies the operation of a set of values that are independent of both biological and social evolution and which stand outside his system to function as absolute criteria.

Buckley (1979) proposed a useful framework which may be used to relate the approaches noted here. He suggested that adaptation operates through three main channels: a) Darwinian natural selection, b) individual learning, and c) sociocultural evolution. All three are subject to the basic mechanisms of evolution as well as having their own special features. In these terms, Pugh focuses on a) and b), and Campbell on a) and c).
Hayek (1978) was prompted by Pugh's book to point out the role of cultural evolution in forming values. He viewed this as an almost accidental process, independent of deliberate intervention, whereby the most successful norms and values survived. Effectiveness, rather than moral desirability, has shaped cultural rules. In the conflict between innate and cultural values, Hayek chose to side with the latter. He held that traditional culture is better adapted to present conditions and should not be tampered with. Hayek was thus guilty of 'normative sociologism' in Campbell's terms. Implicit in Hayek's position is the view that the values that have evolved with culture must therefore be valuable in some absolute sense and be given priority over any alternative standards.

2.2.12 Phenomenological approaches

The post-axiological positions considered so far have, despite their many differences, tended to locate value in some aspect of humanity. The idea of value existing in some form independently of human experience has persisted, however. These approaches were influenced by the idealist aspects of axiology. Urban's attempts to promote axiology have already been mentioned. Husserl's phenomenology provided a major impetus to these views.

Scheler (1913) retained the axiological concept of a realm of value in which universal, necessary and objective values are located. Scheler added the idea of a hierarchy of these values. In broad terms, religious values preceded cultural values which were in turn superior to material values. Direct access to the realm of values was achieved by a Husserlian intuition of 'essences', through the feelings of love and sympathy.

According to Nielsen (1967a), Hartmann gave the most extensive phenomenological discussion of value. Values were 'essences', they had an ideal self-existence and were hierarchically structured. Careful attention to feelings could result in an intuited knowledge of values and their relative ordering. Hartmann accounted for contextual variations in what is
good or right in concrete situations, while maintaining a universal and absolute state of value, by introducing the concepts of 'Ought to Be' and 'Ought to Do'. These were the ideal states of value that remained stable while their counterparts in reality varied across situations.

Kohler (1939), arguing against the tide of positivism, used Hartmann's and Husserl's terminology in identifying value with the 'ought to be' and the 'requiredness' of things. He argued for a phenomenological approach in which 'requiredness' was given in experience with equal status to facts. He saw a need to link the world of requiredness with the world of actions, however, and thus advocated Perry's interest theory of value in which goodness derived from a broadly defined 'interest' rather than vice versa.

Findlay (1961) also rejected the prevailing logical analysis of value and concentrated on the nature of 'end-values'. He contended that there was a small set of especially compelling values. These he identified using 'transcendental deduction'. Operating with Husserlian concepts and methods, he identified seven general headings of value that had a certain 'requiredness' about them. He used the concept of 'impersonality' to refer to their inevitable presence despite changes in the circumstances of evaluation. Findlay's work was particularly interesting because of his willingness to go beyond the pointing out of a general class of 'end-values', to their identification and analysis.

Kupperman (1982) also advocated a phenomenological approach, but did not expand on the method to be used except that it should be based on

"... a careful study of the ways in which values occur in different lives." (p.518)

A major consideration for Kupperman was the human experience of a sense of value, an awareness of a difference between what is valued and what is truly valuable. There is an aspect of value that is beyond the desires of individuals. Kupperman argues against utilitarian and rights-based approaches (e.g. Rawls) for ignoring these deeper issues. Like Findlay, he
attempted to identify universal values. This he found to be easier for negative values, such as physical pain. His set of positive universals include transcendental values such as the desires for the loss of selfness and for peace of mind.
2.3 THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUE

Following the review of the philosophy of value, attention now turns to the social psychology of value. An important point to note at the outset is the way in which the concept of attitude rather than value has evolved as the main focus of academic interest within social psychology. While much important work has been done under the heading of value, it has not achieved the same degree of recognition as an integrated field of research as has the concept of attitude.

From the present standpoint, however, studies of attitude fall within the field of value. The following review, in conjunction with the analysis of the field in chapters three and four, attempts to show how work that has been conceived as being concerned with either attitude or value, or both concepts, may be interrelated in a broader perspective.

In seeking to build an alternative viewpoint it is necessary to proceed from existing concepts. The status of attitude is such that it is necessary to focus on it in two sections below. Firstly, in section 2.3.1, I deal with the introduction of the concept into social psychology, while in section 2.3.11, the main concerns in the study of attitude are identified before concentrating on the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive approaches.

2.3.1 Early attitude theory

At about the same time that 'value' was being incorporated into pragmatism, the concept of 'attitude' was being adopted by American social psychology. This concept also had German origins and initially had a more direct influence on social psychology than 'value'. Allport (1935) traced the early history of 'attitude'. He noted how separate concepts that had exclusively either mental or motor reference became fused into the single notion of 'attitude', and how the Wurzburg introspectionists had recognised the influences of the 'preparedness' of their subjects, forming several
attitude-like concepts to describe these influences. 'Attitudes' became accepted in psychology and, Allport suggested, served a vital function in early social psychology. A psychological concept was needed to set the individual apart from being merely a function of biology and society, and 'attitude' filled this role.

Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) are generally regarded as the first authors who used 'attitude' as the central concept in social psychology. Allport notes, however, that the new concept was not unanimously welcomed.

McDougall (1932), for example, criticised the concept as being far too broad. This was weighty opposition, for McDougall's instinct theory had an early impact on social psychology. His approach, influenced by Darwinism, gave paramount importance to 'instinct' in social behaviour. Innate predispositions toward perception gave rise to emotional, and conative responses. Instincts could be fused in various combinations to produce 'sentiments'. Although not normally recognised as such, McDougall's position could be regarded as a type of value theory, where instinct is the major determining factor.

Thomas and Znaniecki made use of both 'attitude' and 'social value' as concepts. Their interrelationship is complex, but it seems that they were regarded as complementary aspects of the interaction between individuals and society. Social values and attitudes were seen as being connected by, and coming into existence through, the medium of 'activity'. An attitude was considered to be a process of the individual, referring to inner states such as liking/disliking which were influenced by motivational and personality factors. Through attitude, the individual was given some separate identity, but was still intimately bound to society through activity. A social value related to the social meaning of a concept. Social values were shared by all members of a social group, and gave meaning to an otherwise valueless world. Two meanings were fused in Thomas and Znaniecki's idea of value. At times, social value stressed the non-evaluative aspects of the concept. It
appeared to relate to the definition of socially shared categories such as 'money' or 'foreigners'. The evaluative aspect seemed to arise through the interaction with attitudes. At other times, however they seemed to want social value to function as a kind of social attitude (in their terms) where it represents 'society's view' of the evaluation of an item. This fusion of meanings can be interpreted as signifying that they saw social value on a par with Durkheim's 'collective representations'. It should be noted, however, that the social component had a similar status to the individual component, having some separateness but still intimately bound to individuals through 'activity'.

Despite these reservations, it must be acknowledged that Thomas and Znaniecki's work has been interpreted as stressing the impact of group membership on individual attitudes (e.g. Barron, 1951). In this view, attitudes derive from the rules that societies and groups confer on their members. They serve to differentiate between groups more than between members of the same group. (Jaspars and Fraser, 1984).

Murphy and Kovach (1972) report that McDougall's influence began to wane during the 1920s as evidence of cultural relativism in values began to be collected by social anthropologists and more use was made of the experimental method by social psychologists. Studies of attitude and value abounded, and this trend was accelerated by the development of psychometric techniques and measures of value and attitude.

At the forefront of this movement was Thurstone, who proposed that the methods that had been successful in psychophysics could also be used in social psychology. He argued that it was not necessary to identify a physical dimension corresponding to the psychological one being measured. Psychophysical methods could therefore be used with highly emotive subject matter, such as the study of preferences, attitudes, and values, without needing to assume the objective existence of an absolute scale of values.
The pivotal concept in this enterprise was the 'law of comparative judgement' (Thurstone, 1927a, 1927b). He assumed that if a person were to make repeated judgements of the same item on a scale of 'goodness', a normal distribution would result, having a mean of the 'true' point on the scale for that item. From this assumption he was able to produce an equation representing the law of comparative judgement. This contained an observable term which could be obtained using the method of paired comparisons. Each item was paired in turn with each other item and subjects were asked to indicate which member of the pair they preferred. Scale values for each item could then be obtained by using simultaneous equations. A large measure of success was achieved with these methods, and meaningful results were obtained with, for example, judgements of the seriousness of crimes, and nationality preferences. The law of comparative judgement was also the basis for Thurstone's attitude scales based on the Q-sort procedure (Thurstone, 1928).

Thurstone laid the foundations for the measurement of attitude and value, but his measurement procedures were simplified by Likert (1932), who abandoned the requirement for scale values to be obtained for each item, and in addition required respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement. Likert's method was found to be more reliable than Thurstone's, but both assumed that attitudes could be described on a single dimension. Guttman (1944) devised a method for checking this assumption.

These developments diverged from the Thomas and Znaniecki approach, however, becoming more concerned with the attitudes and values of individuals. Jaspars and Fraser (1984) attribute this change of direction, undesirable in their view, mainly to the influence of Allport, and partly to his adoption of a definition of attitude that combined too many disparate elements.
2.3.2 Allport

Allport's work focused on the study of personality. Both attitude and value were seen as a class of trait, distinguished by their special feature of involving acceptance or rejection of their objects. Allport (1935) considered numerous previous definitions of attitude, and saw the concept as involving essentially a preparation or readiness for response. For Allport, therefore, attitude was a dispositional concept that exerted a directive or dynamic influence upon the person's behaviour.

Value was a broader concept than attitude, referring to the general philosophies of life found in the mature person. This focus reflects the influence of Dilthey's 'verstehende' psychology on Allport. This held that the uniqueness of each person should be emphasised, and hence Allport adopted an idiographic approach to the study of personality. The person was studied in depth as a unique, complex and dynamic entity.

Allport was not completely opposed to experimental psychology, however. Much of his practical work was carried out within mainstream social psychology and he explicitly noted that both the idiographic and the nomothetic approaches were needed in the study of personality. This dual approach was illustrated by the use of the work of Spranger (1922) in the development of the 'Study of Values' which Allport published in collaboration with Vernon and later with Lindzey. (Allport, Vernon and Lindzey, 1951).

Spranger had described six 'ideal types' of person, defined in terms of their main outlook on life. These were described in Vernon and Allport (1931) who named them: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious. They were given operational definitions in terms of people's responses to the items that made up the 'Study of Values' (The 'types' had now become known as 'values'). This was a forced-choice instrument that gave an indication of the relative standing of each value rather than an absolute measure. A high score on one value necessarily reduced the total
of the remaining five.

It is surprising that Allport's major impact on the field of value was through this instrument, given his avowed support for 'verstehen'. Spranger's 'types' were divorced from their idealist, Hegelian context and 'operationalised' to produce a nomothetic instrument which was used for the kind of psychometric studies opposed by Dilthey. Furthermore, some unease must be felt that these six 'values' were chosen on a priori grounds to form the basis of an empirical test and to delimit the field. Allport himself noted that the 'types' may have been drawn too broadly and that values such as "hedonistic, sensual, and vital values..." (Allport, 1938, p.230) were excluded. Also, Spranger's types were only one set among others posited by thinkers of a similar persuasion. Allport gave no reason for favouring Spranger other than: "The most remarkable and convincing a priori analysis of values experienced by man, seems, to the authors, to be that of Eduard Spranger" (Vernon and Allport, 1931, p.232).

These problems and weaknesses led Allport to assert that the use of the 'types' should only be a starting point for the empirical study of values (Allport, 1938, p.230). Nevertheless, its simplicity of administration and the lack of influential competitors led to the extensive use of the 'Study of Values' with little apparent concern for the limiting factors. Many investigators seemed to want an easy measure of value without examining the issues of wider import to the field of value. In particular, the 'Study' limited the field, equating value with generalised interests in six specific areas of life.

This was especially problematic given the wide influence of the instrument. The problem was highlighted in a review paper by Dukes (1955), who concluded that the study of individual differences in values was excessively dominated by the Allport-Vernon 'Study of Values' to the exclusion of other potentially useful techniques.
2.3.3 Lewin

Gestalt psychology was having an influence on psychology during the 1920s and 1930s, especially in the field of perception. Its emphases on holism and dynamism also had an impact on social psychology and the major influential figure was Lewin. Murphy and Kovach (1972) explain how Lewin’s field theory had such a range of application that it attracted many enthusiastic pupils to him, who then spread his influence to many areas of social psychology (including cognitive consistency theories of attitude, see 2.3.11 B). His field theory of personality and motivation can also be viewed as a theory of value, in which holism and the dynamics of a situation are emphasised as opposed to any stable elements of personality.

The central concept was that of 'need'. The person moved through the psychological environment driven by need. These 'locomotions' were psychological and not necessarily physical as well. This illustrates the subjectivity of Lewin’s theory. The psychological environment was defined as the person’s internal representation of the physical world.

The use of the concept of 'valence' was important from the viewpoint of the study of value. The arousal of a need specified the 'valence' of each region, which could be positive or negative to varying degrees. A region with a positive valence could decrease tension and vice versa.

Lewin’s work represented a highly dynamic and need-related account of value. It is clear that the understanding of the momentary situation is important, but his ideas leave many questions unanswered. ‘Need’ defines the elements of the momentary situation, but there is no description of how this happens. Much is left unspecified about the way that people structure their ‘psychological environments’ in response to their physiological conditions, desires, and intentions. He allows the person considerable influence over the structure of the situation, although this influence is not made explicit within the field theory and is presumably itself subject to relatively enduring facets of personality. It was this aspect of Lewin’s
work that led Forgas (1981a) to view him as a precursor of social cognition, in that he gave primacy to the individual’s subjective perceptions of a situation.

More specifically for value theory, there is no account of the way that a valence arises from a need. This appears to limit Lewin to the description of values. Prediction and explanation do not seem possible without enquiring into the link between valence and need. This link seems to rest upon knowledge about the past experiences and enduring characteristics of the person. Nevertheless, Lewin’s work contains much of relevance to value theory, in particular the idea of valences combining (via 'force') to produce an overall effect on behaviour and psychological movement. One might question, however, the adequacy of a diagrammatic representation for more complex psychological events.

2.3.4 Behaviouristics

The behaviouristic standpoint provided the basis for some important contributions to the study of value. These became possible as 'intervening variables' began to be posited and investigated within this tradition.

Hovland conducted a research programme into mass communication, taking a behaviouristic stance. The main components in communication were stimulus, response, and mediating processes. Attitude change was found to be dependent upon such factors as the learning ability and intelligence of the subject, the prior information available, and the interpretation placed on the message.

This theoretical position was similar to that earlier adopted by Doob. An attitude was an 'intervening variable' between stimulus and response. It was an implicit response to a stimulus, which itself acted as a stimulus to an overt response. This viewpoint was placed within a framework of behaviourist concepts. Attitudes could be reinforced or extinguished and were relatively prominent in proportion to their drive strength.
The contribution of Morris to the study of value was both theoretical, through his promotion of a scientific approach, and empirical via his 'Ways to Live' document. His theoretical position was heavily influenced by Dewey, and was also affected by his involvement in the 'unified science' movement which hoped to integrate the social sciences into the exact sciences. In addition, he worked toward a general theory of behaviour, which attracted him to behaviouristics.

It is against this background that his statements on value theory must be seen (Morris, 1949; 1961). He advocated a science of preferential behaviour that he called axiology. This choice of word was unfortunate, because Morris' post-pragmatist position was far removed from the concerns of the nineteenth century axiologists such as Lotze and Brentano. Axiology was to describe and formulate laws concerning which organisms prefer what things under what conditions.

Morris regarded Dewey as having built the foundations of axiology through his promotion of a scientific approach. Morris' reliance on Dewey was illustrated through his absorption both of the valuing/evaluation dichotomy (see 2.2.3 B) and the idea that there is no fixed set of ultimate values. In his discussion of 'appraisive signs', however, Morris indicated his departure from Dewey's view that values ultimately serve to promote survival. He held that preferences need not satisfy basic drives, and might even put survival at risk.

Morris' empirical work revolved around his 'Ways to Live' document reported in Morris, 1956. The basis for this was an earlier work (Morris, 1942) in which he identified three basic components in human personality (dionysian, promethean, buddhistic). Morris thought that these personality components were present in varying degrees in each person, and that various combinations could define typical approaches to life or 'Ways to Live'. With the intentions of being as wide-ranging as possible, and encompassing the major ethical and religious systems of mankind, Morris formulated 13
'Ways to Live', that were described in Morris, 1956.

Morris suggested that whereas the Allport-Vernon Study of Values measured 'operative values' (social roles), the Ways to Live were 'conceived values' (ideals). Although he produced an alternative instrument to the Study of Values, Morris was unable to dent its popularity. Both were attempts to analyse values in terms of larger theoretical constructs, but despite Morris' abstraction of the 'Ways' to a 3 x 2 model (Morris and Jones, 1955), the Allport approach appeared to be more prosaic, easier to administer and interpret, and hence more acceptable to social psychologists.

2.3.5 Osgood

Another approach to emerge from the behaviouristic tradition was that of Osgood. Osgood's work centred on investigations designed to acquire information about the 'black box' of intervening variables. He used a model of 'meaning' similar to that used by Doob for 'attitude'. Osgood and his colleagues aimed to elaborate meaning using the Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). Subjects were asked to judge numerous 'signs' (printed words) according to the extent to which they were described by the adjectives on a large number of bipolar scales. Because of the manner in which the subjects were asked to respond (to give their immediate feelings) the researchers believed that they were measuring affective meaning only. The responses from a number of similar studies were analysed using factor analysis. This indicated the presence of three major dimensions: evaluation, potency, and activity.

Evaluation regularly appeared as the first factor and was approximately twice as large as both potency and activity. This was clearly an important finding to the study of value, as it suggested that there was a large evaluative component in the affective meaning of words. Osgood et al also found some evidence for sub-divisions of the evaluative dimension. (Osgood et al, 1957, p.70-71), but these did not seem to be stable across studies,
and the interpretations of these sub-divisions given by the authors (e.g. taking 'clean' and 'tasty' to indicate a 'moral' dimension) was questionable.

Of further importance to the study of value was the possibility of deriving a generalised attitude scale from Osgood's work. He considered that the 'evaluation' dimension could serve as a measure of attitude defined as follows: "We then define attitude toward a concept as the projection of this point onto the evaluative dimension of that space" (Osgood et al, 1957, p.190). 'This point' referred to the position of the meaning of a concept within a multidimensional semantic space. Such a measure would have both direction and strength. Osgood noted that generalised attitude scales with a more limited scope had been developed in the 1930s by Remmers, and considered some objections against an enterprise of this kind. These mainly related to the loss of detail and possible distortions involved in using such a scale, and Osgood contended that these objections could be met by making supplementary studies in cases where problems might arise. He supported his case by obtaining correlations of the order of 0.8 between attitudes measured by his generalised scale, Thurstone scales, and Guttman scales.

Osgood later extended his work to cross-cultural studies of meaning, and found that the three major dimensions of meaning emerged even when the subjects were drawn from 27 world-wide communities of diverse language and culture (Osgood, 1974).

This approach is evidently of importance in the study of value, but some consideration should be given to the underlying assumptions and the problems involved with it. It is important to note that there is no necessary connection between Osgood et al's findings and the behaviouristic concepts that the authors used to define 'meaning'. The findings illuminate factors involved in the assessment of words but, beyond the assumption that these can be described by a spatial model, there is little that is theory-bound.
Also, as the authors themselves point out, the typical structure of semantic space is just that, a 'typical' view, that may not apply at a more molecular level. This space may be structured differently for various combinations of people, concepts, and contexts. This problem is related to that of concept-scale interaction. The loadings of scales on the dimensions may alter according to the concept being considered. For example, if the concept is 'athlete', the scale 'strong-weak' may have a higher than normal loading on the 'evaluation' dimension. Finally, the Semantic Differential has been criticised for asking people to assess words in relation to inappropriate dimensions. For example, Brown (1958) asked 'is a boulder sweet or sour?' He suggested that the use of such questions meant that the Semantic Differential measured a word's connotations rather than its strict linguistic meaning. This seems to be in accord with the measurement of affective meaning, however. No doubt, subjects may find some of the assessments absurd and this may lead some of them not to take the task seriously, but the Semantic Differential has the advantage of not making a priori judgements about the relationships of words to scales, and the results, on the whole, are sensible.
2.3.6 Behaviourism and value

The admission of 'intervening variables' in behaviouristics made the study of value more accessible within the broad behavioural tradition. Strict behaviourism, however, can also be regarded as containing a general theory of value. It incorporates concepts of need and need reduction, together with the study of the conditions under which stimuli can change or modify behaviour. Organisms are seen as behaving in their environment in ways that necessitate concepts of reward, punishment, goodness, and badness. This primitive evaluative context was given a wider perspective by Hull (1944,1945) and Skinner (1971). Both writers developed value positions that are closely linked to their behaviourist theories, and both believe that a science of value is possible using behaviourist methods.

A. Hull

Hull sets out a systematic and empirically verifiable scheme for the science of value. He advocates a disciplined approach, from the clear definition of basic concepts, through the equations representing primary principles, to a set of testable theorems. Hull suggests that empirical testing combined with a systematic approach will lead to the progressive refinement of knowledge about value.

The specification of these methods illustrates Hull's own aversions to introspection and attractions to system and experimentation. The substance of his value theory is very closely related to his behaviourism. His key concept is 'primary need', a general concept describing conditions which, if continued, would endanger the survival of an organism. By the processes of conditioning, 'habits' and 'reaction potentials' can form, and result in 'strivings', which provide the observable evidence of evaluation. Secondary needs can arise as intermediate steps to the reduction of primary needs. These can become detached from primary needs and in human beings much behaviour is motivated by secondary needs.
Thus in Hull's theory the reduction of need is a prime good, and whatever helps (or hinders) need reduction has instrumental goodness (or badness). As regards the priority of needs, much depends on the situation, the amount and type of reinforcement present, in interaction with the existing habit strengths and current state of the organism. Long and short-term factors thus combine in deciding what is of value from moment to moment, and value is dependent on the interaction between organism and environment. From a wider viewpoint the distinction between primary and secondary needs indicates that the former are more important, and that the diversity of observable strivings may be reducible to a relatively few biological needs.

When discussing the application of his ideas to human situations, Hull gives the impression that his value theory is based on self-interest. A person will tend to do whatever will reduce his needs, and such behaviour, if successful, is reinforced. Hull's behaviourism results in a naturalistic and egotistical theory of value but it is important to note that he conceived of a further layer of ethical value. Whereas the study of the most effective ways of obtaining values, of moral behaviour and moral judgement could be scientific because it is observable and predictable, the assessment of ultimate ethical values is outside of the scope of science.

B. Skinner

Skinner aimed to show that the science of behaviour can provide impersonal standards for the solution of value conflicts and ethical issues, and empirical methods for assessing the truth or falsity of evaluations. He makes a simple identity between good/bad and positive/negative reinforcers. Thus, for example, whatever increases the probability of a behaviour as a result of its occurrence following the behaviour, is good by definition. By this means Skinner simultaneously provides an empirical definition of good and bad, and absorbs them into the conceptual framework of behaviourism.
Value is thus a relative term, dependent on the interaction of organism and environment. Skinner’s account of value is not confined to the identification of situationally specific reinforcers, however. The complexity of human value behaviour is dealt with by conceiving of three types of good. Beside the good of the self, there is the good of others and the good of the culture. As Graham (1977) pointed out, the good of the culture is problematic in that a culture is not an organism, and therefore cannot be reinforced. Here Skinner brings in concepts of cultural evolution and survival. A good culture is one that provides reinforcement to those who engage in its practices. It is constantly under selective pressure to continue rewarding its participants, who reciprocate by sustaining it. This illustrates Skinner’s view that the conditioned reinforcers controlling behaviour toward culture and others are ultimately based on personal reinforcers. Thus altruism and social behaviour reduce to self-interest.

Biological evolution also plays a vital role in Skinner’s theory of value. Personal reinforcers originated in the reinforcement regime that applied during human evolution. This provides grounds for the specification of general reinforcers that apply to all people. Thus Skinner reduces social behaviour to personal aims and thence to biological evolution. His impersonal standards for value are based on evolutionary ethics, and the comments regarding this position apply (see 2.2.1 C4 and 2.2.11).

It is important to note Skinner’s views on feeling, thinking, and value. This point is particularly emphasised by Rottschaefer (1982). Although appropriate feelings have become attached to reinforcers through the processes of evolution, these have no causal effect on behaviour. Likewise any planning concerned with values is ineffectual. Behaviour is conceived to be under the control of reinforcers, and value can be explained without recourse to concepts such as desire and want. Skinner thus differs from utilitarianism in holding that value is not determined by feelings (pleasure/pain) but by things (reinforcers).
2.3.7 Cultural approaches

Both Parsons (Parsons and Shils, 1951) and the Kluckhohns (Kluckhohn C, 1951; Kluckhohn F.R. and Strodtbeck, 1961) developed the idea that 'value orientations' were adopted by each culture. These were expressed as a number of dichotomies, and the culture was viewed as adopting one side or the other. Parsons suggested five dichotomies and hence 32 possible patterns of 'value orientation'. It seemed to be possible for these to apply at any level of specificity. They could apply to the typical 'value orientation' of a whole culture (e.g. American culture: 'individualistic', 'achievement') or to the 'value orientation' of a person, and could also vary according to the object of action. The person was seen as a microcosm of a culture, with his own particularised pattern of 'value orientation' deviating from that of his culture according to the specific features of his history and genetic development.

Parsons was concerned with formulating a general theory of action. Within this, values functioned as standards and were subdivided according to which 'type of problem' was faced in action. Cognitive standards solved problems of mean-ends relationships; appreciative standards helped the actor decide what he liked and disliked; moral standards dictated the rightness of an action. These were all sub-systems of the system of evaluative symbols, with moral values playing an overall integrative role.

The value orientations of cultures were also among the interests of C. and F.R. Kluckhohn. C. Kluckhohn provided one of the most often quoted definitions of value. "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" (C. Kluckhohn, 1951, p.395). Value orientations were associated with the answers adopted by a culture to a number of universal human problems. These were concerned with such matters as the character of human nature, and the relation of man to nature (F.R. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961). Another
anthropologist (Albert, 1956) saw 'value orientations' and a culture's world-view as the highest level in a hierarchical organisation of values that descended through 'focal values' (e.g. health, education), directives (prescribed/prohibited behaviour) and evaluation of character, down to the evaluation of specific entities.

The sociologist Williams has made an impact on the study of value, particularly influencing Rokeach. A revision and elaboration of his ideas was presented in Williams, 1979. The influence of Parsons on his work is apparent. Value is an important element of the 'normative orientations' developed in all human groupings, and values are conceived of as being internalised as a basic component of personality. Values are seen as learned criteria or standards of preference that are organised into systems and used as guides for, and justifications of, action. It is the role of value as a criterion that is its essential character for Williams. As well as making factual judgements about the world, people are seen as continually making explicit or implicit value judgements, applying criteria of value. "Values merge affect and concept" (Williams, 1979, p.16). A continual interaction between knowledge and value occurs. Changes in factual beliefs can alter values and vice versa.

Williams draws a distinction between information, which includes values, and energy, which includes drives originating in the biological organism. Energy is controlled by information, and hence values help to define and interpret motivational states. This is an important aspect of his view of value. Not only does it imply a purposive view of man, but it also suggests that biological drives do not constitute values unless they are controlled by some aspect of 'information'.

While the main emphasis of the above writers is on the cultural origins of values, other workers have focused on personal values, and the self-serving functions of attitudes. In between these groups stand approaches that concentrate on the interaction between the self and society.
Newcomb, for example, in his classic study of college students stressed the pervasive influence of reference groups on attitudes and values, but also pointed to the individual need for personal recognition that was served by adapting to a social group. In addition, pre-existing values played a part in the choice of reference group.

Woodruff (1952) viewed an individual’s values in relation to society, but his was an individualistic emphasis, in which people were seen as using society for their own ends. An individual’s social reactions were conceived as superficial and contrived in order to serve the ‘true’ self. Woodruff developed a ‘Study of Choices’ for measuring values, and examined the relationships between value, attitude and concept using this instrument (Woodruff and DiVesta, 1948), concluding that concept changes were the most frequent causes of attitude change.

Catton (1959) outlined a value theory that aimed at a synthesis of sociological and psychological approaches. The preferences of individuals were patterned through the operation of culturally acquired values. His was a subjectivist theory in that it concentrated on the person’s cognition of the value object and conception of the valuable. He developed a dynamic model of value in action using the metaphor of a magnetic force field, the details of which may be found in Catton (1959).

2.3.8 Functional approaches

For M.B. Smith, attitude played a vital part in the functioning of the self (Smith, Bruner and White, 1956). Five personality functions served by attitudes were specified. They could help the person conform to a social group, provide meaning to the world, provide an indirect gratification of basic needs, promote the consistency of the person, and express the person’s values. The intensity of an attitude was proportional to the degree of its involvement with a value and the centrality of the value.
His value-related thought went further than this however (Smith, 1980). In advocating an evolutionary and historical approach to social psychology, Smith identified the self and the interpersonal world as crucial components of the characteristically human process of symbolisation and creation of meaning. The concepts of attitude and value stood in relation to this view of the self. Attitudes were seen as complex dispositional factors located between the self and the outside world. The concept of value was less developed in Smith's approach. Attitude objects were appraised partly by reference to a person's values. It appears that Smith was thinking in terms of highly generalised standards of the desirable, as can be gathered from his stated agreements with Rokeach and with C.Kluckhohn (Smith, 1980). He also agreed with Rokeach in holding that both attitudes and values have a cognitive core, but noted that they involve much more than cold informational content. He differed from Rokeach, however, in rejecting the notion that values were shared standards.

An approach to the study of attitude and value that was similar to Smith's in stressing the function of attitude was that of Katz (1960). He proposed four functions that bore some resemblance to those outlined in Smith, Bruner and White (1956), but his stance was primarily motivational, emphasising the psychological needs met by attitudes rather than viewing them in the context of the interaction between self and society.

An attitude was made up of an affective core together with a cognitive component, made up of beliefs about the object and its relationships. It could have a behavioural component (an 'action tendency'; Katz and Stotland, 1959), but the affective component was its distinguishing feature. Although attitude was a dispositional concept, this was a disposition toward evaluation and not necessarily toward behaviour. This focus resembles Dewey's concept of 'evaluation' and its distinction from 'valuing'.

Attitudes could be organised into value systems, hierarchical structures organised around a central theme such as religion or economic
conservativism. The stability of an attitude varied with the number and strength of its connections with value systems. Its centrality depended upon the closeness of its value system(s) to the self-concept.

A final concept to be noted is that of proximal attitude (Katz and Stotland, 1959). This relates to an attitude toward an object that has a direct effect on the satisfaction of a need, as contrasted with an instrumental attitude, the object of which was a means to a further goal.

2.3.9 Organisation in values and attitudes

The theories of value described so far have tended to point to some favoured general organisational principles that are held to be the most important factors underlying the surface variety of values. These principles have referred to static or dynamic features of personality, to the influence of extra-personal factors such as culture, or to some complex mixture of these. In this connection it is instructive to briefly examine the influential area of research that has its roots in the work of Adorno et al (1950). Although it does not comprise a general approach to value, this area is an important part of the field, and contains some vital lessons for the study of value as a whole.

The investigation of authoritarianism grew out of a concerted effort to understand the social and individual bases of the fascism and extreme anti-semitism of the 1930s and 40s. A large part of this effort was concerned with the identification and description of the 'authoritarian type of man'. This implies that authoritarianism is a personality trait, but it must be remembered that the study was cross-disciplinary, and that the contributors differed as to the relative priorities of psychological and sociological factors.

The background to the study is also of interest in that it may itself have been influenced by ideological factors. It came from a Marxist tradition that had been ousted from Germany, and started from the premise...
that, whatever they were, the bases of fascism and anti-semitism were 'bad'. The study therefore assumes that authoritarianism is undesirable.

This prejudice is illustrated by the failure to identify authoritarianism on the left of the political spectrum. The later work of Rokeach (1954) on dogmatism remedied this omission. The dogmatic person was similar to the authoritarian, but was independent of political affiliation. Rokeach portrayed dogmatism as being a general personality trait, typified by exceptional resistance to change, that would be reflected in other areas of activity as well as in politics. Related research was carried out by Wilson and Patterson (1968, 1975) and Wilson (1970). They devised a measure of conservativism, conceived as a general factor underlying social attitudes, essentially similar to authoritarianism and dogmatism. A simpler, more direct measurement procedure was adopted, with context and wording kept to a minimum. Four components of conservativism were identified. These were correlated with, but separable from, the general factor.

The development of the Rokeach Value Survey (see 2.3.10) has stimulated more research in this area. The considerable amount of empirical work produced by Feather includes a study of the relationship between values and conservativism (Feather, 1979a). Half of the RVS values were found to have significant correlations with conservativism for both samples of subjects. The results were theoretically meaningful in relation to previous research. Values concerned with ego-defence, for example, were found to be ranked higher by those high on conservativism. This personality factor appears to be important as an organiser of values as measured by the RVS.

Similar studies connect Rokeach values with dogmatism and authoritarianism (Rim, 1970) and with Eysenck's personality variables (Rim, 1971). This work was criticised by Furnham (1984) for combining an atheoretical approach with a superficial analysis. Furnham carried out his own study of the relationship between personality and values hoping to avoid some of the problems of Rim's work. He found some links between
extraversion, neuroticism, and values, and held that these could be interpreted in terms of the needs of each personality type. The effects are small, however, and are in need of replication. It is interesting to note that in Rim's rejoinder (Rim, 1985) he asserts that there is a considerable and surprising similarity between his results and Furnham's. Closer inspection reveals, however, that there is only one completely overlapping finding, that 'unstable introverts' rank self-respect higher than do other personality types.

Another attempt to relate Rokeach values to wider organisational factors has been made by Triandis and his colleagues (Triandis et al, 1985). They focus on the distinction between allocentric and idiocentric tendencies, which they see as the psychological counterpart of the distinction between collectivism and individualism at the cultural level. Correlations were obtained with an amended RVS, using both ranking and rating methods. Small but significant relationships were found which made theoretical sense. Allocentrism was associated with co-operation, honesty, and self-sacrifice, and idiocentrism was associated with competition and self-reliance. The correlations did not exceed 0.34, however.

Further evidence for organisational factors in values has been found by Phillips and Harding (1985). Their analysis is based on the British sample of the wide-ranging European Value Systems Study (Abrams et al, 1985), but it is mainly concerned with a small sub-set of the data, the replies to 22 'morally debatable' issues. A factor analysis found that 48% of the variance could be accounted for by three factors labelled 'personal/sexual morality', 'self-interest morality', and 'legal morality'. Comparisons between respondents' factor scores and their replies to other questions disclosed some interesting groupings. Moral relativists could be distinguished from moral absolutists, who were more likely to be guided by religion. A set of self-seeking individualists also seemed to be present, as did a group of left-wing radicals who tended to value social equality.
over individual freedom. Age was also found to be an important factor, 'permissive' values tending to significantly decrease with increasing age.

Despite the small portion of the value field covered by this analysis, similarities with earlier findings may be detected. The absolutist/relativist distinction and the age effect can be linked to the authoritarianism/dogmatism/conservativism research tradition. The groupings of individualists and radicals bear comparison with Triandis et al's idiocentric/allocentric tendencies and Rokeach's two-value model of political attitudes.

It is evident that individual differences are not the only source of value organisation, however. There are ideological influences that can affect all the members of a community. As Plamenatz (1970) observed, these can range from the broad effects of Kantian 'a priori' structures and the Marxist concept of 'consciousness', to the particular concerns of an identifiable social group, where ideology functions to hold the group together. Large-scale cultural factors such as the 'protestant ethic' proposed by Weber (1930) can be regarded as falling in between these, and the use of a common language, being imbued with implicit assumptions and evaluations, may serve to support a common ideology (Thompson, 1984). In addition, the work of Kuhn (1962) suggests that ideology pervades the pursuit of science.

This area of research supports the idea that there are measurable individual differences (however they may originate) underlying values and attitudes, and that ideological factors can also organise values. Moreover, social scientists are themselves not immune to these influences. These aspects would need to be incorporated into any general account of value.
2.3.10 Rokeach

The approaches considered so far have attempted to attribute organisation in values and attitudes to some factor outside of the field of value itself. It also possible, however, to identify significant value organisation within value-related concepts. Rokeach is an important figure here. In his analysis of political attitudes, he held that the main political positions were organised by reference to the more basic values of freedom and equality (Rokeach, 1971). His theory of value is much wider than this, however (Rokeach, 1968a, 1973). He incorporates the idea of a functional approach to attitude and value, (emphasised by Smith, and by Katz) together with a conception of value as a socially derived standard or criterion (as propounded by Williams). His interest in value was part of a wider concern with the organisation of belief systems and their interaction with personality.

Rokeach’s central concept was that of belief. Attitudes and values were regarded as types of belief, differing from simpler beliefs in terms of their functions in the total belief system. There were four categories of belief (Rokeach, 1968b, 1980).

1. Descriptive (true/false: correct/incorrect).
2. Evaluative (good/bad).
3. Prescriptive (beliefs about (un)desirability of action and end-states).
4. Causal (beliefs about causes of behaviour, states of affairs, etc.)

An attitude was conceived as a set of beliefs of all four categories organised around an object or situation. It thus contained not only ‘pro-con’ elements but was also inextricably entwined with ‘factual’ beliefs. This suggested the importance of attribution theory to the study of attitude (Rokeach, 1980).
The belief system was an organised and dynamic system found in each person, the components of which were in constant interaction with each other and with the outside world. Despite this complexity it had a simple hierarchical structure. Countless beliefs were organised into thousands of attitudes. These were influenced by 'several dozens' of instrumental values which in turn served 'several handfuls' of terminal values (Rokeach, 1973). The final end of the belief system was to serve the functions of the self.

A 'value' was a prescriptive belief. This is important to note, because evaluative beliefs are specifically excluded from the class of 'value'. This limitation reflects the special 'oughtness' about values. The definition of a prescriptive belief also reflected the view that values were seen as divided into two categories - instrumental and terminal. The latter were fewer in number and more central to the self. Instrumental values were 'ideal modes of behaviour' which served to promote terminal values, defined as 'ideal end-states of existence'. Terminal values were held to serve the needs of the self. He suggested that these needs could be divided into two exhaustive superordinate categories: the maintenance and enhancement of self-conceptions of (a) morality and (b) competence. These aims of the self were thought to be largely derived from social demands (Rokeach, 1980).

The influence of society on the individual was a prominent theme in Rokeach's system. Although values were influenced by the needs of the individual (themselves socially influenced), it was the ranking of values and not their identity that was influenced. Values were shared standards of the preferable, and Rokeach held that there were fixed sets of instrumental and terminal values found in all persons and cultures. Individual, social, and cultural differences were identified with differences in the ranking of these values.

Values functioned as general standards, and played an important part in resolving conflicts of choice. If values were arranged, as he supposed, in an order of preference, and if the values promoted, or detracted from, for
each alternative could be perfectly identified, then a 'correct' choice could be made. This function flowed out from the centre. The needs of the 'self' had an effect on terminal values, which could serve as standards for instrumental values which in turn helped decide attitudes. The latter structured simpler beliefs. These relationships had important implications for the study of attitude and value change. Rokeach thought that value change would be more permanent and difficult to achieve than attitude change. Any changes to values would also tend to affect less 'central' beliefs, bringing them into line with the revised superordinate beliefs.

Rokeach's ideas about value, particularly those of a universal set of values and the importance of a rank ordering of these, were major influences on the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS). This has been widely used in value research and consists of separate lists of eighteen instrumental and eighteen terminal values which subjects are asked to arrange in their order of preference. The lists of the values and the various methods by which they were compiled may be consulted in Rokeach, 1973. Rokeach admitted that his methods of selection were 'intuitive' and noted that other researchers may have compiled a different list. This he seemed to readily accept, being willing to let the RVS be judged in relation to the usefulness, consistency, and meaningfulness of the results it produced. The RVS has been used in numerous studies of many kinds. It would be inappropriate to describe these in any detail here. Those which are more directly relevant to the present research are considered in chapter five.

Rokeach's theoretical and empirical work has been influential in the study of value. In particular, his allocation of a special position to the concept of value and his description of a relationship between the self, value, attitude and belief, are important contributions. Rokeach has had a profound influence on the subsequent direction of empirical research on values. The RVS has replaced the Allport, Vernon and Lindzey instrument as the convenient, easily-administered, ready-made tool that researchers first
reach for when they wish to measure values.

There have been many criticisms of the RVS, however. The main areas of concern are as follows:

(a) Doubts that the values included in the RVS are representative of the entire scope of the value field. (Jones et al, 1978; Keats and Keats, 1974; Lynn, 1974; Kitwood and Smithers, 1975).

(b) The issue concerning whether or not the Rokeach values can be reduced to a more basic structure. Feather and Peay (1975) agreed with Rokeach (1973) that the RVS could not be convincingly reduced to smaller subsets. Other studies suggest the existence of simpler structures, however. (Kilmann, 1975; Jones et al, 1978; Heath and Fogel, 1978; Munson and Posner, 1980; Hogan and Mookherjee, 1981; Thompson et al, 1982).

(c) The use of rank order judgements. (Cooper and Clare, 1981; Thompson et al, 1982; Kitwood and Smithers, 1975; Chapman et al, 1983; Miethe, 1985).

(d) Possible variations between subjects in the meanings given to the value descriptions. (Gorsuch, 1970; Homant, 1970; Kitwood and Smithers, 1975).

Other objections could be raised concerning the unnecessary rigidity imposed by the specification of a set of definitive values and their classification as either instrumental or terminal. Individuals and cultures may differ in the nature of their values and their conception of them. Furthermore, belief systems may not be as well-organised and logically structured as Rokeach supposes.

The most comprehensive attempt to deal with these issues, and to produce a modified instrument for measuring values, has been made by Braithwaite and Law (1985). They set out to establish the goals in life and ways of
behaving that served as guiding principles for their respondents. They also conducted interviews, aimed at assessing the adequacy of the RVS. Following a factor analysis of their results, they concluded that the RVS is wide-ranging, but omits values concerned with physical development and well-being, and basic human rights. Subjects reported that they found rating items more meaningful than ranking them, and this also eliminated the statistical problems associated with ipsative data.

'Goals in life' (parallel to Rokeach's terminal values) were split into two categories, social goals and personal goals. This was because respondents were uncertain as to which orientation they should take when presented with an uncategorised list of goals. Similar considerations led to modifications to the 'mode values inventory' (akin to instrumental values).

In conclusion, Braithwaite and Law propose a new value instrument containing 21 items or 'value constructs'. They contend that this adequately reflects the range of the value domain. Emphasis is put on using multi-item indexes, and this has been achieved for 14 values.

2.3.11 The study of attitude

As noted at the start of 2.3, the broad view of the field of value includes the vast amount of theory and research that has been conventionally classed under the heading of 'attitude'. Because of its development as a distinct focus of interest, it is necessary to review the study of attitude as such, by devoting a section to it. The present section begins by identifying the main concerns in the area, before going on to concentrate on cognitive and non-cognitive approaches and associated issues, in order to cover the ground that is particularly relevant to the present work.
A. Main concerns in the area

Some of these have already been identified above. The search for organisation in attitudes, for example, and the study of the functions of attitudes. Another prevalent feature is the periodic doubting of the usefulness of the concept of attitude. This issue goes back at least as far as McDougall's (1932) objection and usually relates to the imprecision and/or lack of observability of the concept. Campbell's (1963) review identified 76 attitude-like concepts, but nevertheless contended that attitude could serve a useful purpose in psychology, perhaps because of its imprecision. Abelson (1972) inquired 'are attitudes necessary?' Failures to observe a sufficiently clear attitude/behaviour correspondence have also cast doubt on the concept (LaPierre, 1934; Wicker, 1969).

This debate is likely to continue, but recent reviews (Cialdini et al, 1981; Cooper and Croyle, 1984; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987) do not give it prominence. These reviews suggest that there are several persistent and central topics in the area. These may be listed as:

(1) The continuing dichotomy between cognitive and non-cognitive approaches.

(2) The question of the correspondence between attitude and behaviour.

(3) Approaches focusing on the consistency of attitudes.

(4) Studies of attitude change.

McGuire (1986) suggests that attitude is in the process of regaining a central place in social psychology in an era in which 'structural' studies will predominate. Although he employs different terms, the above four topics are all earmarked for further refinement in his analysis.
The dichotomy between cognitive and non-cognitive approaches is the most relevant of these topics for present purposes, but it is important to recognise that there is a degree of overlap with both the attitude-behaviour relationship and consistency theories. Nevertheless it will be useful to organise the following material in terms of the first-mentioned topic. Cognitive approaches are those that stress the importance of cognitive processes in the formation, stability, and change of attitudes. Non-cognitive approaches view cognition as being incidental or of secondary importance to affective, innate, physiological, or behavioural factors.

B. Cognitive approaches

Consistency theories are a major part of the cognitive approach. They illustrate the influence of Gestalt psychology, via Lewin, and have been one of the main directing traditions in the study of attitudes during the post-war period. Heider’s ideas prompted much research in this area. The sentiment attached to people, objects, and events was regarded as but one factor in attitude along with cognitive aspects such as attributions of causality and the ‘belongingness’ of items. The ‘oughtness’ of actions was also regarded as important. Heider’s well-known triadic diagrams illustrated his balance principle which relied on the assumption of a tendency toward consistency in related attitudes.

Apart from Heider, the other major influence in this area has been Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), while another consistency theory, which illustrated the potential use of the semantic differential in this area, was Osgood and Tannenbaum’s (1955) congruity theory.

Consistency theories were influential in the development and content of ‘expectancy-value’ attitude theories. These will be covered in some detail because of their relationship to the model of the process of evaluation presented in chapter four. The various expectancy-value theories are
similar in that they separate out the cognitive and affective parts of an attitude. The cognitive component contains ideas about the features of attitude objects and their perceived usefulness, whereas the affective component is located in the desirability, undesirability, goodness, badness, etc. of an object's features or consequences. Expectancy-value theories may be contrasted with approaches in the Rokeach tradition in their tendency to treat value as a component of attitude rather than as an organiser of attitudes.

The analysis of cognitive balancing (Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960) was closely related to Heider's balance theory. Balance or imbalance was seen in terms of cognitive units or 'bands', consisting of a 'cognitive relation' between two 'cognitive elements'. The authors assumed that there was a tendency to redress imbalance when it was noticed by the person. This could be done by changing any combination of signs, redefining the concepts, or ceasing to think about the imbalance. The theory extended beyond interpersonal cognitions, and was not limited to like/dislike relations, but to all possible relations between elements (e.g. helps/hinders; is vital to/is inimical to). In addition, the authors' studies suggested that balance was not the only consideration at work. A 'second force', the drive to maximise gain and minimise loss, was also operating, and could prove stronger than the tendency toward balance. If an individual could profit through discrepant attitudes, then an imbalance might remain unresolved.

Jones and Gerard (1967) presented an account of the relationship between value, attitude and belief in a syllogistic model. An attitude resulted from the combination of a belief statement and a value statement to produce a conclusion containing an attitude. For example:

Belief statement: 'Fluoride is a poison'
Value statement: 'Poison is bad'
Resulting attitude: 'Therefore, fluoride is bad'.
The syllogistic model was further elaborated into a conception of the person's attitude-value-belief system with vertical and horizontal dimensions. Vertically, both belief and value statements could be derived from antecedent syllogisms in which they feature as conclusions. Horizontally, any number of syllogisms might result in the same attitudinal conclusion. The authors compared their model to Fishbein's approach, noting that his model of attitude dealt with the 'horizontal' aspects, but ignored the 'vertical'.

The Jones and Gerard model is one in which the concept of 'attitude' and 'value' are to some extent interchangeable and differentiated only in terms of their functioning within a syllogism. For example, 'killing is bad' can be a 'value' when it is used to conclude that 'war is bad', but it would be an 'attitude' if it were the conclusion of another syllogism. Thus in everyday operation there would appear to be no difference between the concepts. They are both 'values' in the sense that they define the attractive and repellant features of the environment. They only become distinguished upon analysis. This is a major point about Jones and Gerard's use of the term 'value'. They apply it to both the 'affective charge' attached to cognitive categories, and to its function as a standard within their syllogistic model, where it is an antecedent that helps determine the 'affective charges' of consequent cognitive categories.

Fishbein's approach to attitude was outlined in Fishbein (1965) and Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). The distinction between belief and attitude was fundamental to this approach. 'Attitude' was the 'affective' component. It was regarded as a learned dispositional factor that mediated evaluative behaviour. Fishbein relied heavily on Osgood's conception of attitude, and used a concept's score on the evaluative dimension of the semantic differential as an operational definition of attitude. Belief could also be measured using bipolar scales.
All belief statements could be expressed in terms of a relationship or assertion connecting two objects or concepts, symbolised:

$$\text{(X)} \quad \text{relationship} \quad \text{(Y)}$$

object or concept
or relationship or assertion or concept

All objects or concepts had an 'evaluative aspect' which could be broadly categorised as either positive, negative or neutral. Relationships or assertions could be associative or dissociative. Thus the belief statement 'Peter likes cricket' might be classified \(-+\). In this case, the person dislikes both Peter and cricket, and liking is an associative relationship (+).

Fishbein proposed that the attitude toward an object could be measured by considering all the belief statements about that object and treating the 'evaluative aspect' of the object as an unknown. The attitude would be given by the sum of the outcomes of the other two components. Thus for 'Peter', in a simple case:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(X)</th>
<th>(Ri)</th>
<th>(Yi)</th>
<th>Outcome(Ri x Yi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Peter' likes cricket</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is male</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevents harm to me</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall attitude toward 'Peter' would be positive \((2+1-)\)
Attitude was thus seen as a function of beliefs and the 'evaluative aspects' of the objects or concepts related to the attitude object by those beliefs. The (X) - (Y) structure enabled both 'factual' and 'value' statements to be regarded as belief statements. Thus 'John is tall' was regarded as being qualitatively similar to 'John is good'. 'Value' was located in the concepts joined by a belief statement and was not held to be only typical of some statements.

Jaspars (1978) reports that there is some criticism over the way in which an attitude is treated as the sum of 'outcomes' as illustrated above. This criticism would appear to be justified in that attitude as thus measured is unduly influenced by the number of belief statements used. In addition, careful attention would need to be given to the range of belief statements used. Furthermore, it should be noted that Fishbein's method of measuring attitude assumes a state of balance in the person's cognitive-evaluative system. If imbalance were present at the time of assessment this would distort the measurement.

Expectancy-value theories generally may be criticised on the grounds that the distinction between the cognitive and affective components is drawn too sharply. McClure and Tyler (1967) argued that a person's preferences are closely connected with the conceptual distinctions that he makes. They called for studies of value to be sensitive to individual differences in discrimination. Expectancy-value approaches are in principle able to do this by treating the scope of concepts and their interrelationships as particular to individuals. They do not, however, adequately reflect the possibility of the interconnectedness of their components. Culture, social group, or personality might provide a common nexus for belief, categorisation, attitude, and value. Expectancy-value theories would then be regarded as making a false separation between the beliefs and values of their subjects.
The continuing emphasis on cognitive approaches to the study of attitude was noted in a recent review by Chaiken and Stangor (1987). The issue of the relationship between complexity of thought and extremity of attitude is an example of this emphasis. Tetlock (1984) analysed interviews with British politicians that had been collected by Putnam (1971). Tetlock found that moderate socialists displayed a greater complexity of thought than other political groups, and that moderate conservatives were more complex than extreme conservatives. These results could be explained in terms of Tetlock's value pluralism model, which is based partly on Rokeach's two-value model of political attitudes. The moderate politicians were thought to have two basic values underlying their positions and to acknowledge more readily the possibility of conflict between these values.

Tetlock's findings were consistent with the research of Linville (Linville and Jones, 1980; Linville, 1982) who had built up a coherent picture using various techniques and classes of object, indicating that complexity of cognitive representation of an object was associated with moderated attitudes toward it. This contrasted with the work of Tesser, however (Tesser, 1978; Tesser and Cowan, 1975; Tesser and Leone, 1977), who had found that a 'well developed schema' about an attitude object, produced through time spent thinking about the object, tended to result in a more extreme attitude.

Judd and Lusk (1984) suggested a reconciliation in terms of the degree of correlation between the dimensions underlying an evaluative judgement. In the Tesser case the dimensions are correlated and so increasing their number leads to a more extreme judgement. If the dimensions are orthogonal, however, as in Linville's studies, then more dimensions will tend to produce less extreme judgements.

In his more recent work (Tetlock, 1986), Tetlock has broadened the scope of the value pluralism model, demonstrating that complexity of thought is high when highly ranked values of equal status come into conflict. In the
light of the Judd and Lusk analysis, however, it can be seen that this is only one type of complexity. If the basic values of Tetlock's 'pluralists' are consistent with each other on an issue, then a complex, yet extreme, evaluation would result. Similarly 'monistic' positions could produce either extreme or neutral judgements according to the intensity of the underlying value.

Viewed as a whole, this body of work suggests that extremity is influenced by the relationships between the criteria underlying an attitude rather than the number of criteria involved. Tetlock suggests that these relationships vary a great deal across evaluative contexts and that complexity is more usefully seen as being situationally dependent rather than being associated with any ideology or personality type.

C. Non-cognitive approaches

Although the cognitive aspects have received the main share of attention in the study of attitude, there has been more interest in non-cognitive approaches following Zajonc (1980). Before this both Bem (1967) and McGuire (1969) made important contributions.

Bem attempted to explain the findings associated with cognitive dissonance theory in terms that did not require any references to internal processes. Following in the behaviourist tradition, he saw self-perception as a special case of interpersonal perception. The community teaches the child both to recognise the 'public events' from which the inner states of others may be inferred, and to employ the same 'public events' to express its own inner states. Eventually the child begins to infer his own inner states more from his overt expressions of them than by direct reference. Likewise, when a person makes a statement about his attitudes, he is making an inference from his overt behaviour and not reporting on an inner state. All the information available to the person about his attitudes is publicly observable, and thus any discrepancy between his 'true' attitude
as reported by him and that inferred by others must be due to such factors as differences in attribution skills or opportunity to observe the person behaving. While being parsimonious, Bem's account seems counter-intuitive and if followed would have missed the potentially more fruitful avenues of the cognitive approach. It speaks more of the scientist's desire for precise and concise knowledge than of an attempt at a credible and accurate depiction of people's attitudes.

McGuire (1969) reviewed the evidence for innate and physiological factors. He found that illness and drugs could alter a person's general attitude and outlook on life, and either increase or decrease his susceptibility to persuasion. Ageing was associated with particular changes in attitude (e.g. in political attitude), but findings in this area are confounded with factors such as social role, and degree of experience. McGuire noted that the study of innate influences on attitude were unpopular in the current 'environmentalist' climate and might therefore have been neglected. This could explain why he was only able to provide evidence for 'a general lack of aggressiveness' as an innate influence on attitude. The subsequent emergence of sociobiology has created renewed interest in this area, however (see 2.2.11).

Zajonc (1980) gave a considerable impetus to the study of non-cognitive approaches by challenging the cognitivist assumption that affective reactions are invariably post-cognitive. He assembled a wide-ranging body of evidence to support his contention that affect and cognition are separate systems that can interact and influence each other, but which are independent factors in information processing. An affective reaction always precedes cognitive analysis, and it can be strong and salient enough to dominate cognition.

This position suggested that attitudes could be formed and accessed through effortless, unconscious and entirely affective processes. Zajonc (1968) had already provided evidence that goodness ratings increased with
the amount of exposure to an object, suggesting the operation of affective and involuntary factors in attitudes.

A similar emphasis was made in a series of experiments conducted by Fazio and his colleagues (e.g. Fazio et al, 1983, 1986). These studies provide evidence that attitudes can be automatically activated upon observation of attitude objects, without any conscious effort by the person. The degree of this activation is equivalent to the strength of the association between an object and its evaluation. The strength of an attitude is an important concept for Fazio, and is independent of its degree of goodness or badness and the origins of the attitude. The automatic activation is an entirely affective phenomenon, although it may have cognitive origins. It may be increased by such uncomplicated means as the repeated expression of an attitude.

Wilson and his colleagues have followed another line of research indicating the importance of immediacy in attitudes (e.g. Wilson et al, 1984; Wilson and Dunn, 1986). They found that asking people to analyse the reasons why they held an attitude tended to lower the relationship between attitude and behaviour. They interpreted this as showing that close analysis can mislead the person and distort his attitudes. This contrasts with observation of own attitudes which has generally been found in self-awareness theory to lead to greater accuracy. Wilson's findings appear to be consistent with the earlier work of Snyder (e.g. Snyder, 1979), which demonstrated a higher attitude-behaviour correspondence for 'low self-monitoring' persons.
D. The integration of cognition and affect

The dichotomy between cognitive and non-cognitive approaches is partly a result of the deliberately controversial stance adopted by Zajonc (1980) to draw attention to the neglect of affect. He recognised this in Zajonc (1984), when he took the position that cognition and affect are normally in constant interaction, and instances of the separateness of affect are only occasional and atypical. Similar reservations may be found in discussions of their findings by the Fazio and Wilson research groups. The emphasis of their work gives a surface impression that attitude is limited to affective responses that are overtly expressed in some item of behaviour. This reflects their dominant concerns with the attitude-behaviour relationship and the intention to avoid the attribution of false attitudes that may occur in pencil-and-paper measurements. Part of this emphasis is illustrated in the interpretation that Wilson et al (1984) place on their results. When close analysis changes an attitude such that it is less connected with behaviour, it is the behaviour that is considered to be 'real' and the new attitude 'misleading'. Yet behaviour may be subject to factors that prevent one's 'true' attitude from being expressed. Wilson et al recognise that their findings may not be general, noting that self-analysis in their experiments differs in amount and depth from self-analysis in everyday life.

In the contrast that has so far been made between affect and cognition, the latter is regarded as a rational, effortful, and high-level process. The exchange between Lazarus (1984) and Zajonc (1984) makes it clear that a conception of cognition as a pre-conscious, effortless, and low-level process is also relevant to attempted distinctions between cognitive and non-cognitive approaches. Lazarus defined 'emotion' so as to always include prior low-level cognitive appraisal. If this were not involved then, for Lazarus, the response was 'not-emotion', on a par with the reflexes. Zajonc (1984) objected to this view of cognition, staking out a place for the primacy of affect by requiring that cognition, although not necessarily
conscious, must involve some minimum 'mental work'. On the Lazarus view, shared by the dominant information processing tradition that Zajonc (1980) opposed, a non-cognitive attitude is impossible because the attitude must have at least involved the recognition of an attitude object.

Wicklund and Frey (1981) expressed fears that the prevailing trend toward cognition could produce unrealistically 'cold' models of man and argued that motivational components should be incorporated. It should be noted that the information processing approach is indeed 'cold' as a means of description and explanation, but this does not necessitate the 'coldness' of the processes that it refers to. For example, expectancy-value theories of attitude have been been classed above as cognitive approaches because they involve the assumption that attitude results from complex cognitive operations involving both factual knowledge and feelings. This is normally a pre-conscious, effortless variety of cognition, however, and expectancy-value processes refer to phenomena that are, in their overt expressions, 'hot' and affectively charged. These comments may be applied generally to cognitive consistency theories of attitude and value.

Although many approaches view cognition and affect as being merged, it may still, as Chaiken and Stangor (1987) point out, be useful to separate out cognitive, affective, and behavioural aspects of attitudes. Among recent tripartite positions, Breckler (1984) views attitude as a hypothetical response with three classes, Ajzen (1984) and Davis and Ostrom (1984) regard attitude as having three domains through which it may be expressed and observed, while Zanna and Rempel (1986) take the position that attitude is an evaluative appraisal that uses three channels of information. The Zanna and Rempel position contains the merging of the three components through the idea that they are combined in an evaluation which then becomes independent of all three. Thus, effortful and reasoned cognitive processing, simpler behavioural tendencies, as exemplified by Bem's approach, and the automatic reactions described in the 'primacy of affect'
positions, all feature as components in an overall evaluation.

It must also be recognised that factors outside of the individual's control can influence the expression of attitudes. This has been acknowledged by Ajzen in his theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen and Madden, 1986) which modifies the theory of reasoned action by allowing for the person's perception that situational or internal obstacles may prevent him effecting his behavioural intentions. Abelson (1982) pointed out that a person's behaviour may be subject to 'deindividuating conditions', determined by the symbolic attitudes defining his in-group, or be dominated by 'scripted contexts', driven by an expected sequence of events. In contrast, 'individuating conditions' require a great deal of personal deliberation, and behaviour is then more likely to reflect personal attitude.

The perspective provided by Abelson widens the debate over the control of expressed attitudes from cognition versus affect to consider the influence of social factors. In many situations attitudes may be non-individual as well as non-cognitive in the 'high-level' sense of cognition. Furthermore, social influences may be all-pervasive, infiltrating cognitive beliefs and categories as well as feelings. This perspective is considered in social cognition.

2.3.12 Social cognition and social representations

These words have been put to many uses, as was pointed out by McGuire (1986). It is therefore important to note that I am here concerned with the movement that has grown out of a dissatisfaction with the limitations of the information processing approach to cognition. The main themes that are emphasised are that cognition is intimately bound up with social influences, and that it is coloured by values, motivations, and norms. Despite the social emphasis, there remains the concern to examine conceptual organisation and cognitive processes from the perspective of the individual,
even though these are thought to be largely socially derived. (Forgas, 1981b).

In terms of McGuire’s six ways in which cognition might be ‘social’, I see social cognition as assuming that representations are shared, are social in origin, and encourage the maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, social representations are not confined to McGuire’s ‘reductional aspects’ of cognition, but also enable the immediate situation to be cognitively elaborated.

This version of social cognition is important to the study of value because it regards evaluative concepts as essential ingredients of a holistic view of human cognition. Values and attitudes cannot be adequately understood without reference to social factors. The ideas surrounding the approach are more complex than this, however. Human mental processes are viewed as a seamless whole involving the merging of the social, the cognitive, and the evaluative. Some examples of this interdependency will illustrate the place of value within this scheme.

Jaspars and Fraser (1984) contrast the position of the concept of attitude taken in the French tradition and the Anglo-American tradition. They see in social cognition a movement toward the French view involving a recognition of the importance of ‘social representations’. This involves moving from a focus on individuals to a position in which attitudes have social origins and are widely shared, being part of social reality. They particularly criticise Fishbein’s view which involves an individualist view of not only the degree and direction of an attitude, but also of the cognitive beliefs surrounding the attitude object. On the Jaspars and Fraser view both aspects are heavily influenced by social representations. They do make some allowance for individual variation, however, when they describe attitude as:

"... individual response dispositions based on collective representations." (Jaspars and Fraser, 1984, p.123). The social influence on attitudes is,
however, paramount. This need not be culture-wide as Moscovici (1981) indicates. For example, views on unemployment (cognitive and evaluative) can derive from different social segments, for example from conservative or socialist ideologies.

Moscovici’s account of social representations goes far beyond merely pointing out the social nature of attitudes, however. (Moscovici, 1981, 1984). It also contains important ideas about cognition and its interrelationship with evaluative factors. He describes the processes involved in the translation of abstract scientific knowledge into a commonsense form (the ‘consensual universe’). ‘Anchoring’, ‘objectification’, the transformation of the unfamiliar into the familiar, and the tendency to seek confirmation of existing views, are all involved in social representations. They indicate ways in which human understanding is not purely logical. It is woven into a social/evaluative/cognitive whole. This can be interpreted as indicating that the very nature of human cognition is shaped by evaluative factors. For example, the desires "...to feel at home, sheltered from areas of disagreement and from incompatibility." (Moscovici, 1981, p.188/9) are put forward as reasons for the leaning of social representation toward the familiar and the status quo. Moscovici makes it clear, however, that cognition within the consensual universe is to be distinguished from cognition in the ‘reified universe’, scientific knowledge taking a different form to commonsense knowledge.

The social cognition approach also implies a strong link between cognitive categorisation and evaluation. Both Moscovici and Tajfel and Forgas (1981) point out that categorisation involves not only the cognitive locating of an item, but also the assignment of value and a place in a hierarchy. Tajfel and Forgas describe the tendencies to play down differences between items placed in the same category and to emphasise differences between items placed in different categories. Also, the characteristics underlying category membership are accentuated. These
tendencies are involved in the maintenance of the person's social identity, defined as the social groups that a person belongs to. There is a bias toward maintaining inter-group distinctiveness and the existing evaluations and categorisations of social groups. Tajfel and Forgas suggest that the tendency to think in terms of positively valued in-groups and negatively valued out-groups is extremely compelling, can be observed in everyday life, and has been known to occur spontaneously in artificial experimental situations (Tajfel et al, 1971). They also report that there is a tendency to be over-cautious in categorising people as belonging to a highly valued social group and to be over-liberal in assigning others to a negative category (Pettigrew et al, 1958; Tajfel, 1969).

Eiser (1981) also stresses that social groups are the main influence on attitudes. He advocates a more detailed analysis of the factors underlying attitudes, on the identification of the criteria by which attitude objects are evaluated, for example. When the evaluation has some direct behavioural reference involving a choice between a number of options, the social psychologist should examine the consequences of each option as perceived by his informants, their probability and desirability. Important differences might thus be identified between, for example, pro- and anti-nuclear groups.

This focus contains similarities with expectancy-value theories in the way that it treats attitude as the outcome of a combination of evaluative and cognitive components. It differs, however, in contending that social factors are the dominant influence on both components.

2.3.13 Some recent trends in the social psychology of value

This section describes a number of relatively recent approaches that illustrate what I see as the most promising trends in this area of the study of value. The first of these is the attempt to incorporate a number of aspects of the field rather than to take one side or the other on an established issue. The work of Zavalloni, Feather, Kessler, and Kinston,
all display some aspect of this trend toward synthesis that is discussed in more detail in chapter three (3.2.3 C6). A second promising development consists of the production of models of the cognitive organisation of values and attitudes. Kessler, Gold, and Zavalloni are examples of this approach. Thirdly, and independently of the trend toward synthesis, is the undertaking of a conceptual analysis of the field. This is particularly seen in Zavalloni and in Kinston. Finally, idiographic approaches are more in evidence. Kitwood is the most prominent example here, while Zavalloni's procedures and Kessler's models are explicitly for use in either nomothetic or idiographic studies.

Kessler (1978) has developed an approach to value that is derived from exchange theory as espoused by Homans (1958). A 'cognitive-evaluative map' is assumed to be involved in the decision-making of individuals. This is made up of a set of values, a set of alternatives, and a set of expectations as to the outcomes of the alternatives in relation to the values. A 'decision rule' converts the expectations into preferences for action, at the same time converting the many value dimensions of the map into a single dimension of preference.

These processes have been approximated by Kessler using multivariate statistics. Subjects are asked to judge the similarity between various alternatives. Multidimensional scaling is then used to arrange the alternatives in terms of a number of dimensions. These dimensions model the values of the 'cognitive-evaluative map', and the 'value relevance' of each alternative to each value is given by its position in relation to each dimension.

A simplified example is given in figure 2.1. Here, two values, 'size' and 'cost' have been established as defining the value space. Alternative A is high on cost (e.g. it is cheap) and neutral as regards size. Alternative B is high on size (e.g. it is large) and low on cost (e.g. it is expensive).
The alternatives are thus far arranged in an n-dimensional value space. Two models for defining the relative preferences for the alternatives are suggested by Kessler. The first consists of calculating a vector that is positioned so as to give due weight to the relative importance of each value dimension. The projections of the alternatives on to this vector defines their relative preferences. The second model envisages an ideal point in the space, and the relative preferences are given by the distances of the alternatives from the ideal. In both cases the preferences obtained using Kessler's procedures may be compared with independent measures.

These methods have the advantage of being applicable to idiographic and nomothetic data. They can also be used to assess the degree and nature of the similarity between individuals for any set of value objects. This might be done by reference to the four types of model that Kessler arranged in their order of generality (Kessler, 1978, p. 17). These range from a model
where all value dimensions are particular to individuals, to one where the identity of the value dimensions and their relative importance in the determination of preferences, are common to all respondents.

An approach that illustrates some similarities between Rokeach and expectancy-value theories is the semantic memory model of value (Gold and Russ, 1977, Gold and Robbins, 1979). This reduces evaluation to a simple two-level hierarchical relationship between value and attitude, based on a simplified version of the network model of semantic memory (Collins and Quillian, 1969). It is assumed that evaluations are stored with values and not with attitudes. For example 'racial integration' might be subsumed under the value 'equality'. The model assumes that labels such as good, wise and rational would be stored with 'equality' and not with 'racial integration'. Thus, in order to evaluate an attitude object, the person makes reference to a superordinate value. Choice reaction time experiments generally support the model. On average, values were responded to faster than attitude objects, and 'priming' tended to reduce response times for attitude objects, but not for values.

This approach promises to forge links between diverse areas, but it is too simple at present. The connection between Rokeach and expectancy-value theories is only achieved by reducing them to their lowest common denominator. In both theories the evaluation of lower-order entities is made by reference to a higher-order class of values. Much elaboration is required to take account of all the complexities of a value hierarchy before it can be regarded as a credible theory of value. In this respect it is interesting to note that their results also indicate some differentiation within their class of values, the more central and important values being responded to faster.

Kinston (1986) has produced a conceptual analysis of purpose derived from studies of organisations. Although purpose is his central concept, value is an important part of his scheme, and his work can be seen as falling within
the field of value from a broader viewpoint. A five-level hierarchy is proposed, the function of which is the translation of values into action. The hierarchy is arranged along an implicit continuum from the general and abstract to the specific and concrete. At the abstract end are 'banner goals'. These are values that are shared with the wider community. 'Missions' are stable values that are the special concern of an organisation, and 'political aims' are concerned with ranking values in terms of their priority. 'Strategic objectives' give political aims a practical direction, and 'tactical objectives' are specific goals with definite time objectives.

Although Kinston's analysis is primarily aimed at the understanding of the behaviour of organisations, it contains general principles that may be applied to individuals and which inform value theory generally. Kinston tries to keep the concepts of purpose and value distinct, but his hierarchy demonstrates the fluidity between them. At the abstract end are general criteria or ideals that are 'value-like', and at the concrete end the concepts are 'purpose-like'. This arrangement suggests that a single affective/motivational concept underlies both purpose and value as used by Kinston. This single concept takes on different forms as it comes into contact with the contingencies of the concrete world and is expressed and modified in plans, decisions, and actions. Kinston's scheme also contains both shared and individual values, and the idea that values need to be given relative importance.

An attempt to integrate nomothetic and idiographic approaches to the study of value has been made by Zavalloni (1980) through her 'Multistages Social Identity Inquirer' (MSII). This technique places value within a context of cognitive organisation generally, and may be seen as being related to the social cognition movement. It is concerned with values as they occur in the social identity of a person as seen by that person. The MSII consists of a complex series of procedures in various structured stages.
aimed at probing the phenomenal world of individuals.

The approach treats value as part of an integrated whole. The MSII does not only aim to identify important values, but also is concerned with the 'representational units' used to think about self and others. The applicability to the self of these units, their different meanings when applied to different persons or groups, and their 'field of actualization' (private, interpersonal, social, or political) are among the topics of inquiry.

Cross-cultural nomothetic comparisons are possible using these methods. For example the meaning of 'being a man' in different cultures may be compared. Idiographically, an idea of the 'Intrapsychic Operant Synthesis' may be obtained for each person. This concept refers to a holistic understanding of the person's cognition of his social identity. It is conceived of as a dynamic and organised structure in which perceptions of the world and values are related.

Kitwood (1976,1978,1980) holds that psychometric approaches such as those of Rokeach and Allport make too many a priori assumptions (for example that all people possess the same values to different degrees). Kitwood aimed at devising an approach that was closer to the psychodynamic tradition in which there would be concern for the real life of the person, but with an emphasis on theoretical and methodological rigour as well.

His main method of studying values is an interviewing procedure in which people are presented with a list of fifteen 'situations' (chosen by Kitwood) and asked to choose ten of them to talk about. The 'situations' are concerned with interpersonal interactions, for example 'when there was a misunderstanding between yourself and someone else'. Analysis consists of a content analysis of the interviews, counting the relative frequency of choice of each 'situation', collecting material on particular themes, and "...the imaginative and creative proposal of hypotheses consistent with the character of the categorized and quantified data." (Kitwood,1978, p.191).
The aim is to produce an understanding that is deeper than that produced by content analysis, but which remains on firm empirical ground. The whole process of interview and analysis is conceived to be an idiographic approach to personality.

By his own account (Kitwood, 1980), Kitwood's work has moved away from the intention to produce a more valid and powerful measure of values than was previously available, toward a 'verstehende' orientation. His analysis and interpretation of his data on adolescent values are interesting, but are open to the criticism that he has selected from his available results, albeit unconsciously, only those findings that suit his purposes. Another problem with Kitwood's approach is that although he holds that his methods produce idiographic understanding, he has no hesitation in drawing nomothetic conclusions. For example, he concludes that adolescents generally have no coherent value systems (Kitwood, 1976), and that they typically embrace 'perspective morality' (Kitwood, 1978).

The Australian researcher Feather has made extensive use of the RVS, but he shows signs of moving away from Rokeach in his theoretical stance (Feather, 1979b). He is more specifically interested in the relationship between values and behaviour, and he sees his work as an attempt to develop an 'ecology of values', examining the values of individuals and groups in relation to their value environment. In the second of the models that Feather adopts to investigate the relationship between values and action, value is regarded as falling within the class of motives. This gives the concept a closer link with overt behaviour than did Rokeach, for whom value was a particularly abstract type of belief. Feather wishes to maintain the generality of the concept, however, stressing that values transcend situations, and act as standards or criteria to guide both thought and action.

Feather labels his second model the 'expectancy-valence model'. Although he does not seem to be aware of it, this model has striking similarities to
'expectancy value' theories of attitude. Behavioural tendencies are viewed as a combination of 'expectancies' of the outcomes of alternative actions, and 'valences', the affective signs attached to these predicted outcomes. This position is radically different from that of Rokeach. Value (as valence) is identified with what Rokeach called 'evaluative beliefs'. In Feather's model, valence functions as the evaluative component of a behavioural tendency. For Rokeach, value is identified with 'prescriptive beliefs', abstract and relatively stable entities that function as standards or criteria for more concrete items. 'Evaluative beliefs' are specifically excluded.

Feather's position on value is widened, however, in his description of what actual behaviour depends upon (as opposed to behavioural tendency). It can be seen that Feather's approach to the value/behaviour linkage contains a hybrid view of value. Not only behavioural tendency, but also persisting tendencies from the past and the relative strengths of the competing tendencies in the present situation, play a part in influencing behaviour. The influence of the past would seem to require stable and enduring entities linked to personality such as those provided in Rokeach's system. This inference is supported by the reflection that Feather wishes to maintain the function of value as a 'free-floating' standard or criterion while also classing it as a motive.

The idea of competing tendencies may be traced to the Lewinian position on value, and Feather acknowledges Lewin as an important influence on his position. Feather's view of value, as expressed in his 'second model', thus contains three distinct strands in the theory of value, associated with values as standards (Rokeach), values as qualities (expectancy-value theories), and value dynamics (Lewin).
CHAPTER THREE

THE FIELD OF VALUE: AN OUTLINE SKETCH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains the analysis of the field that I consider to be necessary if my empirical work on value is to avoid the limitations of previous approaches. In chapter two the main traditions and writers in the field were described. This material will now be used in order to draw a broad outline sketch of the field and to identify and discuss its main issues and concepts more explicitly. Clearly all the issues and their nuances cannot be covered, but it is intended to highlight the most prominent features of the field, its main issues, and the major positions that have been adopted. The emphasis is on the classification and analysis of the material already described. To avoid an excessive amount of repetition, this is often referred to in a brief form. The reader is advised to refer back to chapter two where necessary.

As well as setting out a view of the field the chapter also serves a useful purpose as a supplement to the review of the literature. Whereas chapter two indicates the main writers and traditions, chapter three presents a cross-cutting categorisation in terms of the main issues in the field, thus providing bridges or clarifying distinctions between traditions.

The chapter begins by presenting an outline sketch of the field which functions both to provide the context for the approach to the study of value being taken in this thesis, and to organise the rest of the chapter. The outline sketch is then developed in more detail through a discussion of each of the four main branches of the study of value.
3.2 OUTLINE SKETCH OF THE FIELD OF VALUE

In order to gain a context for what follows it is useful to provide a sketch of the field at the broadest level. Four main branches of the study of value are proposed. Their identity owes much to a similar classification by von Wright (1963a). He considered that ethics could be divided into normative and non-normative branches. The former was concerned with such functions of the moralist as the prescription of correct action and of the truly valuable. Non-normative ethics was split into a natural history of moral ideas (the province of psychology and sociology) and metaethics (the logical, conceptual, and linguistic analysis of ethics.)

A comparable scheme may be applied to the field of value as a whole. This gives three branches, to which I have added a fourth (reflexive). The four branches are:

(1) Theoretical
The dispassionate, detached, highly intellectual study of value, equivalent to metaethics.

(2) Normative
Specific applications of value knowledge, involving advice as to what is good, best, most obligatory, and so on, in given contexts.

(3) Empirical
Investigations into the values held by individuals, groups, societies, and cultures.

(4) Reflexive
The study of the involvement of values in the process of enquiry, including value enquiry. The explicit and implicit values in both theoretical and empirical approaches are investigated.
The specification of these branches is useful in providing landmarks in the field of value, but it should be carefully noted that they are not intended to be entirely separate. They intertwine in many ways, and a large amount of interaction between each branch is likely to be fruitful. Each branch will now be considered in more detail.

3.2.1 Theoretical

This branch is concerned with the production of theories of, and approaches to, value. It is conceived as an intellectual and creative function, relatively detached from the rest of the field, in which positions may be fashioned and their consequences explored. Concepts and methods that influence ways of thinking within the other branches may also be produced. The larger issues in the field are addressed by this branch as distinct from the small-scale theories and hypotheses that may be necessary for specific problems of the empirical branch.

Three important and interrelated questions will be addressed:

A. What is the relation of value to fact?

B. How is value known?

C. Can values be justified?

By considering these questions it is hoped that the main issues of the theoretical branch will be revealed, and that the essential similarities and differences between the major approaches will be indicated.

A. What is the relation of value to fact?

In considering this question it will be helpful to distinguish two broad categories of approach, naturalism and non-naturalism.

A common feature of naturalism is the explicit or implicit premise that value depends upon the existence of purposive beings. The relation between value and fact is seen in terms of the relation between intentions, desires,
and so on, and an otherwise inert world.

Non-naturalism asserts that value exists in some form apart from the natural world, independent of the activities of purposive beings. The position tends to be linked with the view that insights into value may be gained through special forms of awareness. The relation between value and fact is seen in terms of a contrast between the natural world and a separate existence in which value is located.

A third category, rationalism, although it is an approach with its own characteristics (see 2.2.1 D) can be viewed in this context as falling between the other two classes of approach, sharing some of the features of each of them.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the main concerns of naturalism and non-naturalism on the relation between value and fact.

Figure 3.1: Illustration of the main interests of naturalism and non-naturalism concerning the relation between value and fact

(a) Naturalism. Emphasises the boundary between purposive beings and the natural world.

(b) Non-naturalism. Emphasises the boundary between the natural world and an 'outer' existence.

At this molar level the concepts of value and fact have been kept deliberately nebulous. Closer inspection of both naturalism and non-naturalism reveals much diversity in the treatment of both value and fact.
1. Naturalism

A prominent theme of naturalism has been the propounding of specified valuable ends for which people will strive, be interested in, desire, and so on. Different ends have been specified by different traditions and writers. In various forms, pleasure, welfare, and self-interest have been notable candidates for this role. Hedonistic theories, including utilitarianism, are of this type, as are approaches that emphasise self-interest. Under these conditions questions of value may be regarded as questions of fact. Values can be assessed in terms of whether or not they promote the specified legitimate ends. It becomes possible, as Bentham proposed, to regard ethics as a science. Value is seen as deriving from the natural conditions of human existence, the striving toward pleasure or happiness which may often be indirect, for example through the promotion of the general welfare.

The equivalence of value and fact is also found in theories that stress the role of evolution in forming values. In these, value is a fact of human biological or cultural evolution. In early theories there was a belief in perfectionism, both innate and cultural values tending toward harmony with each other and the conditions of human existence. Later approaches recognise conflict between these two sources of value (e.g. Campbell), and side with either nature (e.g. Pugh) or culture (e.g. Hayek).

Perry's interest theory of value provides another example of an identity between value and fact. In this case, however, the link is pitched at an individual level. The fact of an interest taken in an object is sufficient to create a value. In contrast with other naturalist approaches, Perry did not specify desirable ends which then dictated the desirability of means. Following von Ehrenfels, he put interest or desire before value.

Approaches that are broadly naturalist, but which divorce value and fact are uncommon. Existentialism is a major example. Value arises through the choice of individuals or the imposition of rules, but this is contrasted with the meaningless void of the natural world.
In the context of the analysis of value language, both emotivism and prescriptivism made distinctions between value and fact. The 'meaningless' status of value statements was fundamental to emotivism, and Stevenson distinguished descriptive from emotive meaning. Hare similarly separated informative from prescriptive discourse, but both Stevenson and Hare recognised that in practice the two modes may intermingle. Nevertheless, they were logically distinct categories. These approaches would not deny that value is a fact in Perry's sense, indeed emotivism consigns value to the world of emotions and both emotivism and prescriptivism analyse the functions of value statements in human interactions. The main feature of these approaches, however, is the making of an important assertion about the metaphysical status of value, a broad contrast being drawn between the human world and the universes of logic and physical reality.

This contrasts with the descriptivist view, which insists on a fusion between description and evaluation. As Beauchamp pointed out, this position relies on a closed context for its contention that value and fact are equivalent. Objects are evaluated in relation to their normal purposes, intended uses, and so on. MacIntyre's revival of the Aristotelian notion of the essential purpose of human life may be regarded as an extreme form of descriptivism. In contrast to emotivism, social reality is given equal status to physical reality, and hence the fusion between value and fact is only true within a cultural context. This is clear in objections to Foot and in Searle's attempt to solve the naturalistic fallacy.

The importance of context in the relation between value and fact was also recognised in the work of Nagel, von Wright, Taylor, Campbell and Norman. 'Good reasons' and rights-based approaches generally depend upon such a context to enable the rational assessment of values. They tend to consist of two levels, however. There is a set of rules or an intermediate context in terms of which specifics may be evaluated. The rules or contexts derive from more fundamental values, however. These are various, and include the
general welfare (rule utilitarianism) and human universals (Norman, Rawls). The equivalence between value and fact also has two aspects corresponding to the two levels, being either of the descriptivist, contextual kind, or treating value as a natural fact deriving from the conditions of human existence.

Another stance on the value-fact relationship may be found in the work of James and Dewey. This is broadly naturalist, but concentrates on the processes and functions of knowing either value or fact. These are regarded as forms of knowledge subject to similar influences and limitations, and are distinguished only by their subject matter. In this pragmatist position, value is equivalent to fact in terms of the psychological facts involved in human knowledge. This emphasis shows the influence of axiology. Brentano, for example, stressed the similarities between the 'inner perceptions' of both factual and evaluative contents. Also, both James and Dewey, like Lotze, recognised that science takes place within a value framework. They did not deem it necessary, however, to conceive of a separate realm of value. Indeed, Dewey was intent on modelling value on the scientific method. There was little concern with questions of the ultimate status of value.

Kohler may be seen as an intermediate figure between axiology and pragmatism. He stressed the identity between value and fact at the level of experience, but also advocated Perry's interest theory, equating value with fact in the sense of an individual's interaction with his environment. He was not a behaviourist, however, and seemed to want to draw interest more broadly to be on a par with 'intentionality'. Although he used such phenomenological concepts, he did not go so far as to place all value outside of the natural world. Through his attachment to Perry he maintained a link with the world of actions.
2. Non-naturalism

These approaches focus on the disparity between the natural world and a separate reality in which genuine values are located. Diverse examples of this pattern may be found. A prominent feature of axiology and the phenomenological approaches is the contention that values exist in some form independently of the world of facts. Lotze placed value as a whole outside of scientific scrutiny. The dichotomy was taken up by Brentano, Meinong, Rickert, and Windelband, who linked the idea with the German Idealist tradition. Similar conceptions were adopted by Scheler and by Hartmann, while Findlay stressed the 'requiredness' of certain end-values and Kupperman saw an aspect of value beyond the desires of individuals.

It is important to note that this distinction between value and fact is drawn in terms of a contrast with positivistic science. If fact is conceived in relation to the ways of knowing expounded by phenomenologists then the distinction is not present. The status of both fact and value as transcendent objective truths was proposed by Brentano, who also stressed the similarity in the psychological processes of knowing either value or fact. This aspect of the relation between value and fact was found in the Austrian school of axiology, and it was taken up by the pragmatists. Among the axiologists generally, however, values as they were perceived and acted upon in the everyday world were regarded as an error-prone and variable aspect of value to be contrasted with the ideal states of value in its objective realm.

A similar distinction is a primary feature of Platonism which may be grouped with religious views and German Idealism as regards their position on the relationship between value and fact. They are all 'ontological' theories, conceiving of higher realities of various kinds in terms of which true values are to be defined. Thus there is a broad disjunction between value and the facts of the physical world, yet in the context of the superior reality value and fact are conjoined in pursuance of spiritual
goals.

Another group of approaches that assert the transcendence of value may be
grouped together as intuitionist theories (see 2.2.1 B). These propose that
value is independent of the natural facts of human existence or the desires
of individuals. Values are nevertheless facts in the sense of being present
in the universe in a form that may be apprehended by human beings. Moral
sense theories located value in a special human faculty but they also
implied that there was something ‘external’ that was valuable in itself.
G.E. Moore’s contention that ‘goodness’ was a special non-natural and
elemental quality of things can also be mentioned in this category, as may
the common sense intuitionists.

3. Rationalism

Rationalism straddles the border between naturalism and non-naturalism on
this issue. Value is seen as deriving from human nature, but this is not
the human nature of the naturalists. There is a transcendental orientation
which is close to some non-naturalist positions.

Kant distinguished between man’s ethical nature and his organic nature.
The former stands outside the influence of natural laws. The autonomous
will makes its own laws, and the values encountered are universal and have a
special obligatory force. They have an equivalence with fact in this sense
and are to be contrasted with the values that merely derive from the facts
of man’s organic nature. Likewise, the Stoics located true value in
rationality rather than in the pursuit of bodily or conventional pleasures.

This orientation is distinct from the recent resurgence of interest in
rationality found in ‘good reasons’ or rules-based approaches. These
generally employ rational reflection within a defined context, as a means to
various naturalistic ends. The rationalist position as it is portrayed
here, however, pursues rationality for its own sake, viewing it as being
united with universal values.
B. How is value known?

On this issue it is necessary to delimit the scope of the discussion at the outset. Value can be known at various levels. Among these are the direct valuings of the individual in the course of his life, his reflections upon these, and a knowledge of the values of self and others that may be acquired using psychological techniques. Within the 'theoretical branch' of value, this issue is pitched at the level of the philosophical analysis of value.

In the case of pragmatism, because of the focus on the values of individuals, the philosophical and the individual levels coincide. For Perry and James, value is known through its direct experience. Self-serving criteria such as satisfaction, coherence, and harmony underly this experience. This was also true for Dewey's 'valuing'. Through his concept of 'evaluation', however, he recognised that value could also be known through a process of cognitive appraisal.

Naturalism generally adheres to the position that values are known in the same manner as other facts about the world are known, through a complex mixture of observation and experience. Whatever leads to a specified valuable end is of value. For example, knowledge of actions, events, and causal relationships concerning the antecedents of 'welfare' can constitute a knowledge of value. Rules-based approaches such as rule utilitarianism introduce an additional form of the knowledge of value, in relation to its conformity with a set of rules, while the value of the rules themselves is known by other means.

Those theories which assign a meaningless or arbitrary status to value hold that value cannot be known in any absolute sense in isolation from specific human contexts. Nevertheless, both Hare and Sartre acknowledged that this does not prevent people from thinking that their deep moral commitments are absolute and universally applicable. There is a similarity here to Kant's categorical imperatives. For Kant, however, such experiences
are not necessarily the mistaken delusions of a fallible humanity, but can be direct intuitions into true value.

This idea of a special form of knowledge giving insight into a more remote reality than the natural world is a general feature of non-naturalist approaches. Religious methods of special insight, such as prayer and meditation are commonly proposed as ways of encountering true value, and this may extend to the necessity for a particular way of life. Likewise, encounters with Platonic 'ideas' or the 'realisation' required in German idealism seem to require special modes of awareness.

On a less elevated plane, the moral sense theorists broadly adhered to the position that value could be known through a special inner sense. The axiologists also tended to suppose that the realm of value was accessed directly through 'feeling'. In Brentano's inner-perceptions and intentionality, however, is the additional claim that both value and fact are known through the same process. This idea was further encouraged by Husserl, and was prominent in the writings of Hartmann, Scheler, Kohler and Findlay.

C. Can values be justified?

1. Non-cognitivism

The 'non-cognitivists' take the view that values cannot be justified. The existentialists hold that values are specific to individuals who create them as part of the imposition of meaning on an otherwise meaningless void. The emotivists place value outside of scientific scrutiny, holding that general ethical positions cannot be justified. A value statement is essentially a personal statement incapable of proof or disproof because there are no valid super-personal criteria that can be applied. Values can be relatively effective in terms of the personal functions that they serve, however.
2. Justification and Contextualism

The approaches which hold that values can be justified are notable for their great variety. The precise nature of justification varies considerably according to the framework of ideas comprising an approach to value which, as has been shown above, can be broadly naturalist, non-naturalist, or rationalist. Taking advantage of the perspective provided by the current broad survey of the field, it is possible to highlight the common features of justificationist positions, gaining a useful insight into a prime characteristic of value which is so basic that it could easily be overlooked.

The present broad survey of the field enables value to be seen as a contextual phenomenon. Any value theory may be viewed as being but one of several theoretical options, each embedded within a larger set of ideas about the nature of reality. The justification of any particular value occurs in relation to a closed context defined within a value theory. This broad perspective on the field makes plain the contextualism of value, despite the assertions of some specific approaches that they give access to absolute values.

Contextualism has been particularly prevalent in recent approaches to value. The implicit cultural context of the descriptivist programme has already been discussed. The good reasons approach developed from a reaction to emotivism, aiming to demonstrate that a rational justification of value is possible. It rests upon the specification of what constitutes 'good reasons' for evaluation, however, and a consequent closed context.

Similar considerations apply to approaches based on rules, rights, or contracts, although these are typically more elaborate, having at least two contextual levels. In rule utilitarianism, for example, specific acts are justified in relation to their conformity with a set of rules, which are in turn justified by utilitarian criteria. Many levels of contextual justification are also found in Rawls' theory of goodness.
Dewey also recognised the contextualism present in the justification of value. He did not specify ends, but nevertheless emphasised that value had a means-ends structure. The precise identity of means and ends varied between situations, however, and a means in one context could become an end in another, and vice versa. Nothing was of absolute value 'in itself'.

Nagel saw that the contextualism of value was ensured because of the multiple perspectives that are available to the rational human mind and the human organism acting in his environment. Norman's contextualism gives human universals a vital role in structuring values, as does Campbell's evolutionary approach.

There is a strong flow toward contextualism in value theory, and the present approach joins in with this current. Those earlier positions that were absolutist as regards the ultimate source of value may be seen as contextualist when viewed from the broad survey of the field. Many justificationist positions share a common pattern. A position on value is adopted as part of a wider framework of ideas, together with the specification of some ultimate criterion of value. Examples range from bodily pleasure through the exercise of reason, to the fulfillment of absolute mind. A closed context for value is chosen from a great variety of theoretical options.

3. Ultimate values

Value can be justified when a closed context is accepted, but it could be argued that this constitutes an evasion of some of the essential characteristics of value. Value is reduced to a fact-like relationship between specifics and the criteria that are to be applied in their evaluation. At best this could only provide a general account of means or instrumental value. Final ends are regarded as being already established.

Nothing is said about the especially compelling nature of ultimate values. Is it possible to justify this type of value? This question has
often been addressed by considering the problem of choosing between fundamental values. If some principle can be discerned to justify the choice of one fundamental value over another, then there may be some sense in which an ultimate value has been justified.

The issue is central to the monism versus pluralism debate discussed in chapter two (2.2.10). Positions holding that there could be no justification for choosing between fundamental values are opposed by the monist position that a single underlying principle could regulate this choice. There have been many other attempts from various traditions to deal with this problem. Ross held that directly intuited 'rightnesses' could be graded in terms of their degree of obligation. Both Scheler and Hartmann proposed the idea that the values in an ideal realm were arranged into a hierarchy. J.S. Mill's introduction into utilitarianism of the idea of the quality of pleasure represented an effort to discriminate between pleasures. Among evolutionary approaches, Pugh, Hayek, and Campbell all recognised that different evolutionary processes could produce opposing values. They disagreed, however, as to which class of evolution-based values should be paramount. Finally, the pragmatist tradition also addressed this issue.

For James, a person's fundamental beliefs could be assessed in terms of the amount of personal benefit provided and by how well they cohered with his whole belief system, while Perry regarded harmony as an important criterion for ordering values both within an individual's value system and as regards value conflict between individuals.

Note that I have been using the term 'fundamental value' rather than 'ultimate value' or 'final end'. This is because I contend that the issue of the choice between competing fundamental values, although it has often been treated otherwise, does not address the question of the justification of ultimate values. Attempts to arrange fundamental values in terms of their relative importance either employ a yet more fundamental principle or imply the use of such a device. The source of ultimate value simply becomes
relocated and the main question is not dealt with. This can be illustrated by MacIntyre's monism. If his position is accepted, values that may previously have been regarded as ultimates become instrumental to a new ultimate value, containing a view of the true purpose of human life, which remains unjustified.

The issue of the choice between fundamental values does not provide a route to the justification of ultimate values. Can a way be found by considering naturalism and non-naturalism in turn?

a. Naturalism

I have included many different approaches to value under the general heading of naturalism. They share the assumption that value derives solely from some aspect of human nature. This may be pitched at an individual level, as in pragmatism, or by reference to universal human tendencies and/or the common influences of the human condition, as in hedonistic and evolutionary approaches. More complex positions that are naturalistic at their core are also included. Descriptivism is founded on human intentions and social norms, while good reasons and rules-based approaches are based on various naturalistic ultimate values.

Naturalistic positions tend to be ends oriented. Either a single type of final end (e.g. 'happiness'), or a set of human universals deemed to derive from the constants of human nature or the conditions of human life, are established as the ultimate values that people strive for, and as the source of justification for particular values.

In the case of evolutionary approaches, people are regarded as striving for a set of values that are adapted to the achievement of the yet further end of the survival of the human species. Theoretical positions differ as to whether the values formed by biological or by cultural evolution are more effective in achieving this end.
This orientation toward ends is clearly central to many theories. Other approaches do not highlight this structure yet find a need to resort to such ideas when their positions are pushed to their limits. Both von Ehrenfels and James saw that evolutionary influences served to limit the variability of the desires and beliefs of individuals. Human universals were important determinants of final values for both Norman and Campbell (although both writers made it clear that these were not to be regarded as absolutes). Rawls also held that ideas of goodness and rightness were ultimately founded on the universals of human life.

Naturalistic theories are thus typically oriented toward final ends. The essential question for current purposes is, whatever specific form they take, can these ultimate values be justified? If the universe of discourse is limited to a human context, then the answer is yes. People cannot avoid valuing in accordance with their nature or in relation to the universal conditions of human existence. A person who values his own happiness, for example, is justified in so doing if this is conceived to be a natural human state.

A problem with this type of justification immediately presents itself, however. If any particular ultimate value were so naturally human, then its status would be accepted by all. Yet there is a great deal of disagreement between naturalistic positions as to the identity of ultimate values. If there are universal human values, then they cannot be any of the final ends that have been debated over.

Furthermore, there is a fundamental problem with the general form of naturalistic justification. Even if a specific ultimate value, for example 'the survival of the human species', were agreed by everyone to be valuable, it could still be regarded as a contextual evaluation. Human inquiry is able to extend beyond the confines of a naturalistic viewpoint. There always remains the ability to ask such questions as 'is it justified to value the survival of the human species?'
If there are no further terms by which a value can be justified, then it is genuinely 'ultimate', and cannot be justified. If further criteria are discovered, then the value ceases to be an ultimate value, and the chain of reasoning continues until a non-justifiable ultimate value is reached. This is another aspect of the truism known as the naturalistic fallacy. It means that, as writers such as Dewey, Nagel, Campbell, and Norman recognised, naturalistic positions are inevitably contextual. All such positions must contain at least one 'human universal', the value of which cannot be justified, serving as a premise of a closed-criteria context for evaluation.

The perspective provided by this argument also shows that attempts to answer the naturalistic fallacy from within naturalism are futile. The efforts of Toulmin, Searle, and MacIntyre contain implicit relocations of, and new specifications for, the inevitable value premise.

b. Non-naturalism

Several thinkers have recognised that ultimate values require a separate treatment and have proposed exceptional ways of dealing with them. Among these, Hume suggested that ultimate values alone were apprehended by the 'moral sense'. Sidgwick's social utilitarianism was based on a direct self-evident awareness of its correctness as a final standard. Toulmin recognised that there were limits to his good reasons approach, and acknowledged that religious principles may apply in the ultimate. Nagel's use of the Aristotelian concept of 'judgement' can also be regarded as being a step toward recognising the special nature of final ends.

The above are approaches that are predominantly naturalistic in outlook, but which pay some heed to the limits of naturalism. The non-naturalistic tradition goes further and locates all genuine value outside of human nature. The wide range of this tradition is clear, but I believe that it is possible to extract its common features to illustrate the general argument that follows.
Within non-naturalism generally, ultimate values are independent entities of a different, and sometimes higher, order than the facts of the physical world. They are known by 'intuition', which I am using here as a general term to cover the various exceptional forms of knowing proposed in non-naturalism. How can the ultimate values encountered by these means be justified? This is certain to be difficult because 'intuition', in all its varieties, is a private and quasi-mystical process. An 'intuited' value is one in which a direct awareness of its self-evident goodness has been encountered. The holding of such a value could only be justified by reference back to the 'intuition' itself and to the conviction that reality has been encountered:

"X is good because I know it to be good."

This may be likened to asking a similar question about empirical qualities. "Can you justify your assertion that X is red?" could only be replied to by stating "X is red because I know it to be red." One could call on supporting evidence such as the consistency of the percept across time, the agreement of others, and the coherence with a wider body of knowledge. Similar support is also available to the non-naturalist. His value may cohere with the wider framework of ideas associated with his non-naturalistic position, it may be shared by others and be stable across time. Any disagreement with sceptical others can be assigned to the unfamiliarity and difficulty of 'intuition', and indeed might be used to bolster the idea that exceptional and problematic methods are required to gain an insight into 'true reality'.

Each non-naturalistic approach has its own system of reality, and its values must be seen in relation to this framework of ideas. They share the problem of naturalism that they cannot be finally justified outside of their own terms. Yet perhaps the emphasis on the direct 'intuition' of values, as compared with the ends-oriented approach of naturalism, has the effect that non-naturalism deals more effectively with ultimate values. They are
treated as a type of 'truth' or 'fact' capable of being 'intuited' rather than standing outside of the rest of the system as a final source of value.

It will be useful to summarise the argument contained in this section (3.2.1 C) at this point. Values can only be justified if they are contained within a closed-criteria context where they are treated as being instrumental to some more fundamental value. The conceptual frameworks comprising particular theoretical positions on value may be regarded as examples of closed-criteria contexts.

Ultimate values cannot be justified, however. In the ends-oriented approaches often found in naturalism they constitute the final value premise required for the justification of other values, and cannot, by definition, be justified. Likewise, in positions where value is regarded as a type of truth to be 'intuited', ultimate values cannot be justified outside of their particular theoretical context.

3.2.2 Normative

The outline sketch of the field of value being presented here sees normative approaches as being centrally concerned with the application of value knowledge. Normative ethics was identified as a branch of ethics by von Wright (1963), and the position taken here proposes that a normative branch may be usefully set apart in the study of value as a whole. A departure is made from traditional normative approaches, however. Following the analysis of the question 'can values be justified?', it is proposed that normative recommendations be limited to contexts where, at least in principle, it is possible to justify values. This 'contextual normativism' enables the normative branch to be extended in scope to apply to the making of practical recommendations at all levels of evaluation within closed-criteria contexts.
In traditional normative approaches the adherents are committed to the acceptance of certain basic principles or specified desirable ends. There is generally a practical orientation among such approaches. They are aimed at prescribing, for example, what is good, right or moral in real situations, and they attempt to persuade others to their underlying convictions. The normative outlook is founded on the ideas that there is a true moral code, and that philosophers can provide its details and a valid knowledge of good and evil.

Examples of normative approaches may be naturalist or non-naturalist, empiricist or intuitionist. Advocates of hedonism, self-interest, utility or evolutionary fitness may be included alongside those who require adherence to religious dogma or who seek to promote 'realisation'.

In contrast to the normative outlook stands the metaethical approach. Here the main concern is to analyse the concepts of morality, goodness, or value, and the ways that they are used, without making any recommendations as to what ought to be valued. The 'good-reasons' approaches, for example, focus on the language and logic of value. Emotivism and prescriptivism concentrate on delineating the functions of value statements.

The boundary between normative and non-normative is imprecisely drawn, however. Von Wright recognised this and argued that metaethics was not neutral, because the concepts that it created influenced moral thinking, and it was implicitly aimed at directing people’s lives.

The theoretical and normative are conjoined in many writers’ work. For example, when a 'good-reasons' approach such as Rescher’s specifies 'human welfare' as a valid justification of evaluations it is difficult to separate analysis from advocacy. Another example is the existentialist approach which does not specify ends to be pursued but which is covertly normative in promoting the freedom of the individual.

Emotivism also contains tacit value judgements. It paradoxically asserts that value is irrational while upholding the value of rationality. It
suggests that human affairs should be based on 'provable' knowledge, a class from which value statements are excluded, yet this position is itself founded on a value. Both Dewey and Nagel, although contextualists, also rely on the unstated assertion that rationality is desirable and ought to be pursued. Rawls explicitly acknowledges this foundation in his principle of 'goodness as rationality'. Although his work is analytical and dispassionate on the surface it is fundamentally normative.

Finally, among the evolutionary approaches that have been considered, Campbell seems to be the most non-normative. Yet his criticism of normativism in both biological and cultural positions, together with his readiness to comment on the desirability of particular values, implies the operation of a set of unstated value criteria that he thinks ought to be employed to arbitrate between competing evolution-based values.

A central characteristic of traditional normative approaches is the conceptual distinction between the 'valued' and the 'valuable' with its attendant recognition of the possibility of error in evaluation. The values advocated are typically conceived to be truly worthwhile (valuable) as contrasted with the values that are held by the unenlightened or misinformed, which are regarded as being valued but not valuable.

The distinction appears to emanate from an absolutist stance as regards the final source of value. From the viewpoint of the current broad survey of the field, however, it has been seen that it is not possible to justify ultimate values, and that absolutist positions represent theoretical alternatives that are essentially contextualist. Normative approaches would appear to collapse with the abandonment of absolutism, yet I propose that a normative branch of the field of value is still feasible.

This position is tenable if it is realised that the distinction between the valued and the valuable rests upon the definition of a closed-criteria context rather than upon assertions concerning the absolute status of values. It is the structural features of the conventional normative
approach, rather than conceptions as to the inevitability of any specific final criterion, that enables it to provide practical guidance.

From the broader normative approach being proposed here, specific normative statements are seen to be relative to particular theoretical positions. It should be possible to assess specific items regarded, within a theoretical position, as being valuable or valued as to whether or not they are indeed valuable or valued in relation to its ultimate values. The perceptions of absolutism or otherwise by the adherents of any position become irrelevant from this enlarged normative perspective, which may also be applied to those metaethical positions that contain covert normative assumptions. In these cases any implicit ultimate values would need to be identified as far as possible and the assertions about value made within a 'metaethical' position would be seen as relative to these implicit criteria. Thus metaethical approaches would no longer be seen as being different in kind from traditional normative approaches.

As well as making normative assessments within the contexts of specific theoretical approaches, however, it is possible to apply the enlarged normative approach to any situation where a closed-criteria context is in operation. In principle, it is possible to make practical recommendations as to what is desirable and undesirable in situations ranging from the specific short-term aims of individuals through to a culture-wide social philosophy. This formulation has an important advantage over traditional normative approaches because circumstances where the criteria of value are not imposed by the theorist but chosen by those seeking guidance can be incorporated. The ends that are imposed in traditional normative approaches are not necessarily those that are regarded as desirable or incontrovertible by those at whom the advice is aimed. In contrast, in the broader normative approach, a relativistic aspect is introduced, the normative practitioner advising individuals or groups as to the optimal means for achieving their stated goals.
Again, the perceived absoluteness or otherwise of these goals is not relevant to a normative assessment. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the reliance of closed-criteria systems upon at least one ultimate value that cannot be justified in terms of the system that it supports. The contextual normativism being proposed in this section thus depends upon a structural concept that has an 'absolute' status. This concept is to be contrasted, however, with the very specific claims made in traditional normative approaches. It is a highly generalised concept that can vary greatly in its exact manifestations, and it is independent of any personal, group, or cultural perceptions of particular absolute values.

It is vital to recognise, however, that despite differences in degree of specificity, both the ultimate values of traditional normative approaches, and the free-floating 'absolute' element necessary to contextual normativism, fulfil the same function within the structure of a closed-criteria system. Any evaluation entails at least one ultimate value.

The adoption of contextual normativism still leaves considerable practical problems found in all normative approaches, however. Among these are questions concerning the connections between means and ends and what is to be regarded as evidence for these connections, for example the assertion that a particular action is highly likely to result in a valued outcome. Procedures for recognising and deciding when valued ends have been reached would also need to be specified. An additional problem is the possibility that there may be numerous competing ends which need to be assigned relative priorities.

The solutions to these problems will vary according to the positions taken on the various theoretical questions already discussed. This dependency on theoretical position again indicates that the normative approach is only possible within particular boundaries. This is a crucial conclusion, and it is suggested that the clarification of these boundaries would be helpful in understanding and assessing each position. Furthermore,
it is contended that the empirical branch of the study of value may usefully inform any normative approach within its specified bounds. The normative branch is thus seen as combining theoretical approaches and empirical knowledge in an applied context.

3.2.3 Empirical

The empirical branch is centrally concerned with values as they occur in, or are expressed by, individuals, groups, societies, and cultures. The emphasis is on observation and experiment, and it is to be hoped that by these means a large body of information and knowledge would be obtained. As is already plain from even the selective review in chapter two, there are numerous viewpoints and theoretical approaches, and findings have likewise been interpreted in many ways. It was thus advisable to outline the approaches taken and to identify the main issues within the empirical branch rather than to describe the details of the findings obtained.

The empirical branch contains theoretical issues, but although these are wide-ranging they are still to be distinguished from the larger issues in the field that are the province of the theoretical branch. Empirical theories are tied to empirical issues while the theoretical branch is conceived to be detached.

The expansiveness of the outline sketch being drawn in this chapter provides a broad viewpoint from which to view the diversity of empirical approaches. From this perspective it will first be argued that many approaches that have expressly concerned themselves with value have tended to be rather limited in scope. This is followed by the proposal that a broader view of the empirical branch should be taken, a view that would include studies of 'attitude'. The major issues and divisions within this extended conception will then be outlined, drawing on the literature described in chapter two.
A. Limited views

The limited view taken by many approaches to the study of value may firstly be illustrated by considering the work of Allport and of Morris. Both writers saw values in terms of organisational factors in personality. A number of stereotypic patterns were predefined, and individuals were analysed in accordance with their similarity to each pattern. These approaches seem to have more affinity with the study of personality than of value. In the case of Morris this was emphasised by the reduction of the 'Ways to Live' to a 3 x 2 model (Morris and Jones, 1956) that had no direct reference to evaluation. A further similarity between Allport and Morris was the divergence between their theoretical outlooks and their empirical studies of value. Morris was influenced by Dewey and Allport by 'verstehen', but in neither case was this adequately reflected in their main instruments for measuring value.

The approaches outlined in section 2.3.7 tended to see value as a phenomenon of culture. The idea of each culture having a set of 'value orientations' was prevalent among these writers. This was generally operationalised in terms of concepts devised by anthropologists, the most influential scheme being that of F.R.Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). The approaches varied in detail, but were characterised by their agreement that 'orientations' were a profound influence on the values of individuals.

Another important feature of these approaches was their particular use of the concept of value. It was given the status of a standard, a view that Parsons particularly promoted and which was furthered by Williams. It was also evident in C.Kluckhohn's definition of value as a conception of the desirable.

Parson's identification of various kinds of standard gave his approach a broader scope and indicated an awareness of some of the theoretical issues in the study of value. This was also evident in the work of Catton and Woodruff. Both saw value in terms of the interaction between individual and
society, and both incorporated value concepts derived from Dewey. Woodruff's hierarchical organisation of values and Catton's adaption of Morris' theoretical distinctions can be traced to the influence of Dewey.

The idea of a hierarchical system was also prominent in the thinking of both Katz and Rokeach, but the concept of value was given a more limited role. Both authors saw values as high-order organisational factors, essentially clusters of attitudes which functioned to serve the needs of the self. Value was thus seen in terms of its place in a functioning personality, although cultural aspects were recognised, particularly in Rokeach's adoption of the idea of shared standards.

This depiction of value may be broadly contrasted with the expectancy-value theories (see 2.3.11 B). In these, value is generally regarded as the affective aspect of a belief statement which contributes toward a higher-order attitude. Value is thus a component of attitude rather than an organiser of attitudes. As noted when discussing Jones and Gerard, however, the distinction between attitude and value is in terms of the logical model proposed by expectancy-value theories. Both concepts refer to an 'affective charge' attached to objects that can function either as a value or as an attitude. This position owes much to the work of Osgood as was acknowledged in Fishbein's version of the approach.

B. Toward a broader conception

Even the small selection of approaches outlined above illustrate the diversity of uses to which the term 'value' has been put by empirical studies and the various concepts to which it has been applied. From the broad viewpoint being adopted here, however, this variety can be interpreted as reflecting differences in the precise part of the field of value concentrated upon. They have chosen to highlight certain aspects and to attach the label 'value' to them.
Many of the approaches indicate a strong affinity between the concepts of 'value' and 'attitude' as variously conceived. It is contended that this connection illustrates that attitude may be usefully regarded as being included in the empirical study of value. The coverage given to attitude theories in chapter two reflects this view.

My position as regards the dangers of drawing value too broadly was set out in chapter one (1.4). This position holds that it is useful to regard value as a field of study within which there is a need for a more precise definition of the important conceptual distinctions. In line with these views the analysis of the empirical branch has been inclined to try to look beyond the use of labels, such as value and attitude, to the nature and scope of the concepts they refer to. In the course of this analysis the concepts of many traditions and writers have been examined. Despite the variety of approaches it is suggested that there is sufficient resemblance between them to permit their inclusion within a common field of study.

C. Main divisions and issues in the empirical branch

1. Social and individual approaches

A prominent theme in the study of value and attitude has been the opposition between approaches that see value in social and cultural terms and those who propose that the individual has a degree of freedom from such influences. Examples of social approaches include Newcomb's studies of reference groups, the 'value orientation' emphasis of the Kluckhohns and Parsons, and the work of Williams. Social Cognition stresses the pervasive influence of 'collective representations', and contends that much of twentieth-century work on values and attitudes is excessively concerned with individuals, this bias being traceable to the influence of Allport.

The emphasis on the individual is exemplified by the value theories of Allport and of Morris, and by the work on attitude and value that may be included in the line of development emanating from Gestalt theory,
incorporating Lewin, Festinger, Heider, Asch, Sherif, and expectancy-value theories. The functional theories of Katz, M.B. Smith, and Rokeach also concentrate on the individual.

The influence of Williams can be detected in Rokeach's work, however, through his adoption of the idea of values as a fixed set of shared standards. Among other writers who clearly attempt to incorporate both social and individual elements are Woodruff, Catton, and Ajzen and Fishbein, who proposed both individual and social factors in the theory of reasoned action. Braithwaite and Law found it necessary to include, and distinguish between, social and personal goals in their reformulation of the Rokeach Value Survey.

The evidence for organisational factors underlying values and attitudes also divides between the cultural or social on the one hand, and personality factors on the other. Ideological influences have been referred to in section 2.3.9, where the impact of personality was also noted through the associated line of research running from Adorno et al. through Rokeach's study of dogmatism, and Wilson's conservativism. The work of Rim and of Furnham are further examples of the search for personality factors in values, and the research of Phillips and Harding, although sociological in origin, seems to support some of the findings concerning personality and values.

Triandis et al. straddle both the individual and the social orientations through their distinction between allocentric and idiocentric tendencies. This is conceived as a psychological distinction even though there are close connections with the collectivist - individualist dimension used to describe cultures. The distinction has intriguing 'reflexive' possibilities in that it may be possible to view theorists' relative emphases of either social-cultural or individual factors in terms of a personality dimension.
2. Cognitive and non-cognitive approaches

Many investigators see attitude and value in relation to cognitive processes. Consistency theories of attitude and expectancy-value theories have this emphasis, and Rokeach's value theory is an example of a functional approach in which the elements are related together in a rationally-organised hierarchy aimed at serving the self. Among non-cognitive approaches, Zajonc stressed the 'primacy of affect', while Fazio built on the earlier work of Zajonc, indicating that attitudes could be activated and strengthened without conscious deliberation.

The differences between these positions are not so marked upon closer examination, however. Cognitive approaches typically rely on the combination of affective concepts and factual knowledge, while the limitations and reservations of a purely affective approach to attitude were noted in section 2.3.11 D.

Much of this debate seems to hinge on the definition of cognition, and two distinct concepts have emerged, which I shall refer to as 'high-level' and 'low-level' cognition. High-level cognition is a conscious, considered, and effortful process, whereas low-level cognition is effortless, unconscious, and automatic. The issues surrounding these concepts were discussed in section 2.3.11 D.

A similar distinction had already been made in the theory of value through Dewey's concepts of 'evaluation' and 'valuing', and his idea that 'evaluation' can become automatic and resemble 'valuing'. Similar ideas underly Najder's distinction between 'discursive evaluation' and 'evaluative experience', while in Perry's interest theory, the involvement of low-level cognition is necessary to the existence of a value.

Cognitive approaches are capable of incorporating low-level processes but, on the other hand, behaviourism and positions which stress the importance of innate factors emphasise that biology or environment may control values and attitudes. McGuire (1969) had lamented the lack of
investigations of innate influences on attitudes. The development of
ethology and sociobiology has subsequently increased interest in this area.
Evolutionary approaches may be classed as non-cognitive because they propose
that there is a class of exceptionally compelling values that originate in
biological or cultural evolution, and which may be universal to the species.
By their nature these are the 'givens' in evaluation. They are not to be
regarded as the outcome of low-level cognitive processes, and they cannot be
altered by conscious deliberation.

The idea of primary motivating goals with origins in human evolution was
used by behaviourist approaches. In addition, they give a strong emphasis
to the overlay due to individual experience. Although they make use of the
affective concepts of pleasure and pain, and imply the operation of
low-level cognition (values are determined by a logical connection with
whatever is in an organism's long-term self-interest), their theoretical
requirement to avoid recourse to 'mentalistic' concepts means that
behaviourist positions may be classed as non-cognitive.

3. The location of value

Behaviourism was an important influence on an issue that has been
especially prominent in the study of attitude. This concerns whether
attitude is an enduring feature of the person or only a part of his
responses, a dichotomy that seems to be connected with the dual origins of
the concept in both mental and motor aspects as noted by Allport (1935).

Clearly the cognitive approaches to value and attitude assume that there
is some sense in which they are 'inside' the person. Positions that stress
the importance of affective factors also maintain that attitude is an
'inner' state that can be activated, strengthened, and changed. In
contrast, approaches that are inspired by behaviourism propose that
attitudes and values should be defined solely by reference to observables.
Bem's self-perception theory of attitude is an example of this orientation.
Behaviouristic stances such as those of Doob, and of Osgood are intermediate, maintaining a close link with overt responses while positing the existence of intervening variables.

The issue was considered by DeFleur and Westie (1963), in their distinction between 'probability' and 'latent process' conceptions of attitude, while Campbell (1963) suggested that the learning theory and social perception approaches could be unified by the concept of attitude. This role of attitude as a mediating concept was possible because of its varied meanings and connotations.

4. Standards and qualities

This issue is concerned with the distinction between values regarded as standards and value as a quality of value objects. Parsons was particularly important in promoting the 'standards' approach. Earlier, Thomas and Znaniecki's concept of 'social value' had alternated between being either an evaluative or a purely cognitive idea. Parsons made it clear, however, that in functioning as a standard, value contained a cognitive component as well as appreciative and moral elements. This combination persisted in the work of Williams, and was adopted by Rokeach. Both writers had their own system of concepts, but they shared the common threads of the 'standards' approach, that values are socially shared standards containing both cognitive and affective components.

Expectancy-value theories took the position that value may be regarded as a quality, conceived as an 'affective charge' attached to a concept by an individual. They tended to make a clear theoretical separation between affective and cognitive elements. The term value is used in a limited way to refer to the affective component only.

The work of Gold and his colleagues highlighted the basic similarities between the two approaches. In both, the evaluation of lower-order entities is made by reference to a higher-order class of values. When its everyday
operation is considered, the ‘quality’ approach can be seen to incorporate the idea of value as a standard as well. This is apparent in those expectancy-value theories that address themselves to the prediction of attitudes, as was noted when considering Jones and Gerard’s version in chapter two (2.3.11 B).

The importance of standards in evaluation can be seen in various recent positions. Kessler used values, weighted according to their relative importance, to estimate the order of preference of a set of alternatives. Research investigating the relationship between complexity of thought and extremity of attitude (e.g. Tetlock, 1984 - see 2.3.11 B), relies upon the notion of a number of criteria combining to produce an evaluation. This idea is also found in Zanna and Rempel’s suggestion that affective, behavioural, and cognitive components combine in an overall evaluation, while in the area of Social Cognition, Eiser proposed that the identification of the criteria by which evaluations are made should be among the factors considered in an adequate analysis of attitudes.

5. Nomothetic and idiographic approaches

The nomothetic approach has been influential through the use of popular measures of values. Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey’s Study of Values and the Rokeach Value Survey both embody theoretical constructs that are assumed to apply to all individuals, and which are used as a means of comparison between them. In consequence, a large portion of empirical research into the content of values has been framed in terms of the response options and modes of analysing and interpreting values contained within these measures, and is ultimately based upon their underlying theoretical assumptions. The full individuality of the subjects is filtered out and seen only in terms of variations on a set of constructs defined by the measure.

The impact of Allport and Rokeach in promoting the nomothetic study of value is surprising because both gave more importance to individual
variation in their wider theoretical stance. Allport encouraged and practised the understanding of personality in terms of individual uniqueness, while Rokeach's functional theory allowed for much individual variation in the clustering of simple beliefs into attitudes and values, and in the manner in which the latter served the self.

This points to a prominent feature of empirical studies of value. Many psychological approaches have been mainly concerned with outlining the processes, principles, or functions of value and attitude. Among these may be included Lewin's topology, consistency theories of attitude, functional theories of value, behaviourist positions, and studies of attitude that stress the importance of affect. In principle, each of these is capable of supporting idiographic studies of the content of the values of individuals. In practice, however, empirical studies have been dominated by the use of nomothetically-oriented value measures.

A concern to remedy this nomothetic bias is apparent in some recent approaches. Kitwood devised an idiographic method for assessing adolescents' values, while both Kessler and Zavalloni developed measures of value that are capable of producing either nomothetic or idiographic understanding.

6. Unified approaches

This fusion of approaches by Zavalloni and by Kessler is an indication of a marked recent trend toward synthesis. Attempts have been made to search for the common ground between the opposite sides of the issues noted above, and approaches have been developed that attempt to reconcile or unify them. This tendency may be observed in the softening of the attack of the 'primacy of affect' attitude theorists against cognitive approaches. This has been documented in section 2.3.11 D. The perceived scope of purely affectively-determined attitudes has been reduced, and the issue of the relative importance of cognitive and non-cognitive factors has been seen to
be vitally dependent on the construction of concepts.

Feather's theoretical position contains the potential for the unification of previously exclusive approaches. He incorporates elements from Lewin's dynamic model of value, from Rokeach's position of value as a standard, and from expectancy-value theories, while also encouraging a view of value that is closely linked with behaviour.

Kinston's approach also sees connections between opposites. His hierarchy contains a transition between 'inner' general values that function as standards, and 'outer' values associated with activity and attached to particular objects. Value is seen either as a static, relatively enduring, inner construct, or in dynamic interaction with the external world, relative priorities needing to be assigned to competing values. The notion of a continuum between general, shared, cultural values, and values specific to groups and individuals is also found in his theory.

The work of Braithwaite and Law recognises that the values included in a measure of values should cover the full range, including both individual and social orientations, generalised 'inner' values and those more particular values that are closer to behaviour. Both Allport and Rokeach admitted their weaknesses in this regard, and time will tell if this latest, more inclusive, measure will be as popular with researchers as its predecessors were.

The most far-reaching attempt at unification, however, is found in social cognition, in which the social, the cognitive, and the evaluative are seen as an essential unity in human apprehension and understanding. The present approach takes the position that this movement takes unification too far, however, and risks the loss of the self in the social (Koch, 1971). This issue is discussed in chapter four (4.3.2 F).
3.2.4 Reflexive

The field of value as outlined so far evidently implies a model of man in which value plays a vital and central part. This model extends to the activities involved in attempting to acquire knowledge about value. It is considered important to conceive of the process of enquiry itself as falling within the scope of the field and not as being somehow detached from it, capable of obtaining value-free 'objective truths' about its subject matter.

The study of value thus has a special opportunity of applying its own methods of investigation to itself, and this possibility could be developed within the 'reflexive branch'. As will become apparent, this branch could be concerned not only with value enquiry but also with the value implications of enquiry in general. It is clear that this branch is itself of vast scope, I do not therefore intend to delve into it in detail, but merely wish to outline some of the areas that I see as falling within it.

It has often been recognised that science takes place within a value framework. Within value theory itself the axiologists, following Lotze, generally held this position. The pragmatists, especially Dewey, often gave the impression that their interest in value derived from a desire to understand the value conditions applying to their enquiries in other fields. Some of the work of James and Dewey may be regarded as falling within the reflexive branch. There is room, however, for a much enlarged and more detailed study of the values implicit in all types of enquiry.

This enterprise could operate at many levels, examining for example any distinctive values of particular traditions and approaches, or looking into the value background of key individuals. Attention could be directed to other disciplines as well as to the study of value itself. These functions are carried out informally at present, and almost incidentally by biographers and commentators, but a more systematic approach may prove fruitful.
Values are undoubtedly involved in such areas as the choice of subject matter, the identification and categorisation of problems, procedural conventions, and the criteria of excellence applied to any undertaking. It would be the task of the reflexive branch to look at all value aspects of the process of attempting to gain knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, and to identify the explicit and implicit criteria applied.

A value-oriented approach to disciplines which study human subjects directly may be especially rewarding. This would be pertinent to the empirical branch of the study of value, and would also be relevant to social psychology as a whole. In an experimental setting, the special problems of the similarity between the human subject matter and the human experimenter, the reactivity of the subject to non-experimental factors, and the values brought by both experimenter and subject to the situation, could all be topics of study. The reactivity of subjects in observational studies could also be looked at from a value perspective.

Furthermore, there may be value-oriented enquiries into the ways in which an investigator's extraneous 'commonsense' knowledge, expectations and values might interact with the intention to make an 'objective' interpretation based solely upon his findings and theoretical approach.

In conclusion, it may be emphasised that the reflexive branch has great potential for the systematic reordering of existing work and for expansion into specifically directed studies.
4.1 INTRODUCTION

The field of value as outlined in chapter three is evidently of vast size, and its complexity is reflected in the variety of the theoretical positions and empirical approaches taken. Any empirical study focusing on such a central and important concept as 'value' risks being overwhelmed into inaction, random delving in specific areas, or the dissipation of effort across the entire field.

Before undertaking any empirical research it was necessary to adopt a general stance linked to the wider field in order that the investigations might have some guidance. As mentioned in earlier chapters, I see the failure to do this as a major weakness of previous empirical work in the field of value. A closer, and more explicitly stated, connection between empirical and theoretical branches may well prove fruitful.

It was therefore considered necessary to clearly specify the approach taken, important concepts employed, and the relationship of the approach to the rest of the field. These are the main aims of chapter four. The provision of these details gives a useful insight into the ideas that have been involved in directing and interpreting the exploratory research outlined in chapters six and seven.

There are two main sections to this chapter. In 4.2 a description of the approach is provided, while in 4.3 its relationship to the rest of the field is discussed. This latter section not only indicates the orientation of the approach within a wider body of knowledge, but it also gives a more precise insight into how it can avoid the limitations of previous psychological approaches. In addition, it enables the nature of the approach to be
conveyed in more detail through consideration of the issues it raises, its scope of application, strengths, and weaknesses.

In connection with this chapter, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between the communication of the approach in a formal manner, such as that presented here, and the way in which it evolved and operated in practice to guide the research. The limitations imposed by the formal presentation of the material have exaggerated the separateness of the theoretical and empirical work. In order to convey the work in a structured way, it has been necessary to divide it into separate compartments. This gives the false impression that the work proceeded in the same order in which it is reported, that all the detailed reading and thought underlying the general approach was first completed, and then the exploratory research was planned and carried out.

The actual sequence of events comprised a closer interaction between theory and empirical research, in which streams of thought and influences intermingled in complex ways.

4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE APPROACH TAKEN

4.2.1 Introduction

A primary distinction is drawn between the content, structure, and process of value. These concepts will become clearer as they are used, but a brief description will be given here. Content refers to the actual values given to things by individuals and groups, and the criteria by which they are justified. Structure is concerned with such items as the type of relationships that exist between valued things, the connections between values and organisational cognitive structures such as semantic memory, and the degree of complexity of the value system. Process relates to the psychological processes that might occur when evaluations are made.

Two interconnected sets of ideas concerning a) structure and b) process have influenced the direction and interpretation of the research reported in
It is therefore informative to describe these in more detail, and in so doing some of the important concepts used in the research will be introduced.

4.2.2 Structure

I assume that people's values are organised into value systems in which concepts are interlinked according to their function in justifying the value of, or their being justified by, related concepts. A simple example is shown in figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Simple example of part of a value system

Types of relationship

- Positive link
- Negative link
- Self-justification
- Indicates a possible relationship with concepts outside of the part of the value system illustrated. All concepts shown could have these relationships.
Part of figure 4.1 may be interpreted:

The value of 'doctor' is justified in terms of the promotion of 'health' which in turn both promotes 'happiness' and helps to avoid 'death'. Both 'happiness' and 'death' are self-justified. 'Laziness' can promote ill-health, and 'health' may also enable a 'job' to be done leading to 'money' and so on.

The value system is thus conceived as a network in which 'nodes' (concepts) are connected by relationships. Values are 'attached' to each node, and the type of relationships between them are reflected in the direction of their value. In figure 4.1, for example, there is:

- a negative link between health (+) and death (-)
- a positive link between money (+) and food (+)
- a positive link between hunger (-) and starvation (-).

In real life, a person's value system is likely to be vastly more complicated and dynamic than the example given. A network model presented in a two-dimensional format might be inadequate except for the simplest situations. Nevertheless, it could be useful to pursue the basic idea, particularly as it may be possible to produce multi-dimensional representations and analyses using computerised techniques. Furthermore, two dimensions may be sufficient for studies of limited areas of the value system (concentrating on the value relationships of a single concept, for example).

Both content and structure are represented in a value network. Structural factors are indicated by the types of relationships between nodes and by the complexity of the network (for example the average number of relationships between nodes). The degree of stability across time is also conceived to be a structural factor. These factors are assumed to vary between individuals, and are thought to be tendencies in the subject that exert general influences on evaluation operating independently of the specific details of the object and context of a particular evaluation.
Structure is defined so as to be intimately related to cognitive complexity and organisation. Hence it is expected that the evaluation of specific objects, and their position in value networks, will be closely connected with the conceptual organisation of the person as reflected in cognitive structures such as semantic memory.

The value network is the basis for the analysis of the interviews carried out as part of this research. Techniques of probing, recording and symbolising value networks are outlined in more detail in chapter seven and in the appendix.

Before going on to describe the process of value, it will be beneficial to introduce three important value concepts that are of use in relation to both structure and process.

Value attached refers to an 'affective charge' that is connected to each concept. The position adopted here is that taken in Osgood's Semantic Differential (Osgood et al., 1957). Part of a concept's meaning is its 'value'. This value is 'affective', and has both magnitude and direction. Thus in figure 4.1, the 'value' attached to each of the 'nodes' not only has direction, e.g. health (+), death (-), but also has magnitude, e.g. health (+1.5), death (-3.0).

Criteria applied refers to the nodes that are used to justify the values of other nodes. For example, in figure 4.1, 'health' is justified in relation to 'job', 'death' and 'happiness'. A node may both be a criterion and have its own criteria applied (e.g. as well as having its own criteria applied, 'health' is also a criterion applied to 'doctor' and 'laziness'). Such relationships may exist with any number of other nodes. It is also possible for nodes to be entirely justified by self-reference (e.g. 'happiness' and 'death' in figure 4.1).

These self-justified nodes are ultimate values. They are those items in a value system that are not susceptible to justification in terms other than self-reference. When presented as value objects they are either found to
have no criteria applicable, or are viewed as inviolable by the subject and deemed not to require justification. They serve a vital function as value criteria, however. Their distinctive character means that they act as first principles in a value system, and it is possible that all value criteria could be reduced to a small set of ultimate values.

4.2.3 Process

I will now go into some detail in describing a model of the process of evaluation. This detail is necessary because it has had an important guiding influence on the research as well as being a convenient theoretical tool for conveying my general approach to the empirical study of value, and for comparing it with other approaches. It is also useful as a framework for interpreting and analysing the results of the research.

It is important to note that this model is at an early stage of development and is not being directly tested in the exploratory research except as regards its usefulness as a conceptual framework. No claims are being made at this stage about the validity of the relationships between the various sub-processes described and the sequence of processing. Likewise, the numerical examples are only illustrative, and I do not wish to assert, for example, that ratio-type comparative judgements are actually made by subjects. Such precision and elaboration requires more detailed study than the exploratory research reported here. Nevertheless, I propose that the model is correct in its general approach and that something of this sort occurs during the process of evaluation. My intention is to make a broad sketch of the concepts and sub-processes that are necessary to account for evaluation.

I assume that there are three elements involved in the process of evaluation, the subject, object, and context. These are set apart from each other as useful analytical concepts in the study of the process of evaluation, but it is recognised that in practice they will always occur in
complex interaction with each other. An example of this interaction is mentioned below, when discussing 'non-cognitive' evaluation. As will be seen, their interaction results in 'criteria applied'. Each element will now be discussed in turn.

A. Subject

The subject refers to the purposive being that is making the evaluation. 

The subject may be viewed as containing three classes of items of relevance to evaluation.

(1) A criteria profile. This consists of a list of all the possible value criteria that a subject might apply when making an evaluation, together with the relative likelihood of their occurrence. Thus a criteria profile both identifies, and indicates the prominence of, all value criteria available to a subject. A simple example, in which each subject has only three criteria available is given in table 4.1. For both table 4.1 and table 4.2 the numbers are proportions, indicating the probability that a criterion will be applied by a subject.

In table 4.1, subject A has a strong disposition toward making evaluations in terms of 'safety'. He is three times more likely to apply this criterion than the criterion 'enjoyment', and six times more likely to apply 'safety' than 'achievement'. 'Altruism' is not available to subject A as a value criterion. It can be seen that Subject B has similar relationships among the items in his criteria profile, the order of precedence being 'enjoyment', 'altruism', 'safety', with 'achievement' not being available.

Table 4.1 Example of simple criteria profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value criteria</th>
<th>SUBJECT A (probability associated with each criterion)</th>
<th>SUBJECT B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoyment</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Whereas the criteria profile is conceived as being primarily a function of the cognitive categories that the subject tends to employ when making evaluations, values attached comprise the affective, emotional or feeling components of the subject. Each value criterion is thought to have an 'affective charge' attached to it. Continuing with the simple example of table 4.1, subject A might have values attached of:

safety +1.5, enjoyment -0.5, achievement +1.5.

Hence for 'safety' subject A has a high positive feeling, (Safety is a very good thing), as well as being inclined to evaluate objects in terms of their safety aspects. 'Enjoyment' is rather less likely to be employed as a criterion, and also is regarded as being moderately bad, indicating a puritanical outlook. Finally 'achievement' has a high positive value attached for this subject, but it is a lot less likely than 'safety' to be a 'criterion applied'.

'Values attached' are regarded as being the outcome of evaluation processes similar to those being described here. They may be available to the subject in an 'instant' form, the evaluation having been made in the past and stored in a value memory for future reference, or they may be re-assessed or re-evaluated at the time of making an evaluation.

(3) The third class of items present in the subject are ultimate values. These refer to instances where the subject's value criteria have values attached to them which are not evaluated by the process being described here. The value of ultimate values is regarded as being self-evident by the subject. The value attached to such an item would be of the highest magnitude, either positive or negative.

Ultimate values normally serve as value criteria, and are likely to be prominent in the subject's criteria profile. If they are presented as value objects, however, the subject cannot, and does not regard it as necessary to, find value criteria in terms of which he can evaluate his ultimate values.
B. Object

The 'value object' is the thing that is evaluated, which can be a physical object, an abstract notion, an event, a person, a society, and so on. In fact any concept that the subject may form is a potential 'value object'. Strictly, it is not the object itself that is of relevance, but the subject's representation of the object. This is likely to be influenced by social and cultural factors as well as by the physical features and manifestations of the value object.

The subject is regarded as having a set of beliefs about all value objects. These beliefs are of various kinds and may include its physical features, symbolic significance, associations, uses, causes and effects. The subject's representation of the object thus consists of a collection of beliefs about it which are assumed to be part of broader beliefs about reality and the interrelationships of objects. The classing of the object as a separate entity is itself a function of this broader picture.

In the process of evaluation, therefore, it is the value object as viewed by the subject that is of significance. The subject does not have complete freedom to define the value object, however. It is clear from everyday observation that the value object is a considerable influence on evaluation. The value criteria applied to 'tree', for example, are likely to differ from those applied to 'work'. It seems necessary to assume underlying physical and/or culturally defined factors which have a major impact on the subject's representation of value objects. Factors unique to the subject are influential, but these are regarded as being relatively small as compared with physical and cultural influences.

These considerations lead to the concept of a 'criteria profile' for objects as well as for subjects. Just as subjects were regarded as differing in the probability of applying value criteria, so value objects are conceived to be associated with value criteria to varying degrees. A simple example, parallel to that used in table 4.1 is shown in table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Example of simple criteria profiles for value objects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Criteria</th>
<th>Tree (probability associated with each criterion)</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoyment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides wood</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example, 'tree' is most often evaluated in terms of beauty, which is three times more likely to be applied than 'provides wood' and six times more likely to be applied than 'danger'. Similar relationships are present in the evaluation of 'work' between the criteria 'wealth', 'achievement' and 'enjoyment'.

To summarise, it is being asserted that there is a strong 'objective' influence on evaluation exerted by the underlying nature of the value object. In each instance of evaluation the value object will figure as the subject's representation of it, but this representation is normally heavily influenced by 'objective' factors. The concept of a criteria profile for each value object, although never directly observable, is a vital theoretical tool in the account of evaluation being outlined here. In principle, the criteria profile for a given object may be estimated by averaging the criteria applied to it by numerous subjects. As a subject sample increases in size, so factors unique to each subject would tend to become insignificant, while the factors particular to the object would retain their prominence.

C. Context

This is the third main element involved in the process of evaluation, and often refers to the purposes for which the evaluation is made. For example, the criteria applied to 'house' may be different when the subject is assessing the attractiveness of a town, as compared with when he is viewing
potential homes. The concept also covers the social context of the evaluation and any other situational factors that might materially affect an evaluation.

Similar issues arise as for the value object. Each subject has beliefs about what criteria are applicable in a given context, and will evaluate on that basis. Nevertheless, it is assumed that each context has its own typical criteria profile. This may be closely defined by a set of rules (e.g. judging a competition) or may be more variable among subjects (e.g. choosing a home to buy). Context may also be defined by the motivational state of the subject. The role of context is elaborated in connection with the comparison between this approach and the wider field (sections 4.3.2 B and 4.3.3).

D. Outline description of the process of evaluation

A schematic diagram is provided in figure 4.2. The subject must firstly identify both the object and the context. This will involve attention, perception, memory, in fact all the psychological processes necessary to identification. These are unexceptional as regards evaluation except in the case of a carefully considered evaluation where the subject is clearly aware that he is evaluating. Special attention may then be paid to the relevant aspects of context and object during the identification.

In the special case of the value object being an ultimate value, the subject is able to immediately attach a value and make a 'subjective evaluation'. This entails the idea that ultimate values must be represented in the subject in a manner that enables him to recognise them if they occur as value objects.

If the object is not an ultimate value, the criteria to be applied must be determined. These emerge as a result of the combination of the influences of the criteria profiles of subject, object, and context. The subject has predispositions but is constrained by 'objective' factors.
Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram of the process of evaluation

Key to Figure 4.2

- Element (i.e. Subject, Object, Context)
- Sub-process
- Termination point
- Flow of processing
- Influence

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associated with the object and context. When engaged in paid employment, for example, a subject may give a greater weighting to his conception of the value criteria of the organisation for which he works than to his own criteria profile.

The relative importance of context, object, and subject is conceived to vary according to the nature of the evaluation. Examples are given when comparing the model with other approaches in section 4.3 below. Regardless of the precise mix of elements, the processes leading to criteria applied are defined as being those in which the cognitive aspects of evaluation are most involved. These entail the conceptual structuring of the situation by the subject, including his interpretation of object, context, and value criteria. Also included is his knowledge of their interconnections, the possible actions that may be taken in relation to them, and the consequences of these actions. As will be seen below, affective and motivational factors may influence the emergence of criteria applied, but it is considered theoretically useful to make a broad conceptual distinction between these mainly cognitive aspects and the affective components represented by the concepts of 'ultimate value' and 'value attached'.

The outcome of the mixture of the criteria profiles of subject, object, and context is a criteria profile listing the criteria to be applied and their relative importance.

The subject is next assumed to examine the relevant features of the value object. This is a more detailed scrutiny than the mere identification of the object. For example, if the criterion 'physical strength' is applied to the value object 'my father', then the subject would pay specific attention to those features of the object that indicate 'strength'. The subject's aim is to assess the relationship between the object and the criteria applied. Such issues as whether the object possesses or lacks the criterion, leads toward or away from it, encourages or discourages it, will be considered. In addition, the degree of this relationship will be judged.
The combination of the criteria applied with the results of the examination of the value object enables what I shall refer to as a 'contextual evaluation' to be made. This is the closest that can be approached to 'objectivity' in evaluation. It is influenced by the criteria profiles of value object and context as well as the properties of the value object, but these are all as they are apprehended by the subject. Nevertheless, a 'contextual evaluation' is held to be considerably less influenced by personal factors as compared with a 'subjective evaluation'.

This latter type of evaluation arises when the 'values attached' to each criterion are included in the process. These are explicitly of an affective nature, and are thus heavily influenced by the characteristics of the subject. The values attached have both direction and magnitude and are combined with the outcomes of other aspects of the process of evaluation to result in a 'subjective evaluation'.

Finally, a distinction is necessary between an evaluation made by the subject (either contextual or subjective) and the 'reported evaluation'. This concept refers to the various ways in which an evaluation is signalled to the outside world. These include preferential behaviour, verbal expressions of likes and dislikes, and replies given to the questionnaires of psychologists. The view taken here is that the process of evaluation is largely internal and many evaluations remain so and are not 'reported'. The study of evaluation is reliant upon 'reported evaluations' or the observable aspects of other parts of the process. The possibility of differences between 'real' evaluations and reported evaluations is explicitly recognised in this account of the process of evaluation. The difference is assumed to occur through an evaluation of the proposed 'reported evaluation' itself. For example, a subject might attach a negative value to the proposed statement 'I like cream cakes' (a potential reported evaluation), and either report an altered version 'I dislike cream cakes' or censor it entirely.
4.2.4 Numerical analysis of evaluation

The model of the process of evaluation may also be used as a basis for the numerical analysis of contextual evaluation and subjective evaluation. This is of the general form:

\[
\text{Contextual evaluation} = \text{Criteria applied} \times \text{Features of object}
\]

\[
\text{Subjective evaluation} = \text{Contextual values attached} \times \text{to criteria}
\]

A simple illustration would be two subjects evaluating two objects in the same context, for example when hungry. The criteria profiles of context, subject, and object (in this case the class of edible objects) are assumed to have combined to produce criteria applied profiles.

The result of this combination might be:

Criteria applied

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Hunger reduction} & 0.7 & 0.8 \\
\text{Nutrition} & - & 0.2 \\
\text{Tastiness} & 0.3 & - \\
\end{array}
\]

The subjects will examine the appropriate features of the two objects, and their feature scores might be:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
\text{SUBJECT 1} & \text{SUBJECT 2} & \\
\text{OBJECT A} & \text{OBJECT B} & \text{OBJECT A} & \text{OBJECT B} \\
\text{Hunger reduction} & 5 & 2 & 5 & 3 \\
\text{Nutrition} & - & - & 6 & 1 \\
\text{Tastiness} & 4 & 5 & - & - \\
\end{array}
\]

Contextual evaluations may be calculated:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{SUBJECT 1} & \text{OBJECT A} & \text{OBJECT B} \\
\text{Hunger reduction} & 0.7 \times 5 = 3.5 & 0.7 \times 2 = 1.4 \\
\text{Nutrition} & - & - \\
\text{Tastiness} & 0.3 \times 4 = 1.2 & 0.3 \times 5 = 1.5 \\
\text{CONTEXTUAL EVALUATION} & 4.7 & 2.9 \\
\end{array}
\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUBJECT 2</th>
<th>OBJECT A</th>
<th>OBJECT B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunger reduction</td>
<td>0.8 x 5 = 4.0</td>
<td>0.8 x 3 = 2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>0.2 x 6 = 1.2</td>
<td>0.2 x 1 = 0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tastiness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTEXTUAL EVALUATION</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both subjects, object A is superior to object B in this context. This superiority is more marked for subject 2.

Subjective evaluations may be calculated by introducing the 'values attached' in a similar manner. If these are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUBJECT 1</th>
<th>SUBJECT 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunger reduction</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tastiness</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in each cell are altered accordingly.

For example, subject 1; object A; hunger reduction:

\[= 0.7 \times 5 \times 2.5 = 8.75.\]

The subjective evaluation of object A by subject 1 would be made up:

- Hunger reduction: (as above) \[= 8.75\]
- Nutrition: \[0 \times 3.0 = 0\]
- Tastiness: \[0.3 \times 4 \times 1.0 = 1.2\]

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION: 9.95

Using such calculations, subjective evaluations will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUBJECT 1</th>
<th>SUBJECT 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJECT A</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECT B</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both subjects still prefer object A, but subject 1 has a stronger attraction than subject 2 to both objects, mainly because of his higher value attached to 'hunger reduction'.

The numerical analysis thus expresses evaluation as the product of a maximum of three variables. Criteria applied must always be positive in sign. Thus, if 'food' has 'hunger' as a criterion, as above, then the negative relationship must be expressed in a positive form by restating the criterion as its opposite ('hunger reduction'). Negative numbers may be applied to 'feature scores', (e.g.'food' (+), 'watching others eat' (-)).
and to 'values attached' ('hunger' (-), 'hunger reduction' (+)).

It must be stressed that the analysis has the status of a research tool, and no assertions are made about its reality. Among the technical problems that may be anticipated in its practical application are:

(1) the appropriate procedures for measuring the variables,
(2) the relative weightings for 'values attached' and 'feature scores',
(3) the level of data analysis appropriate to each variable.

(Ratio scales have been used in the illustrations, but interval, ordinal or nominal measures may be more relevant).

4.2.5 Various issues concerning the approach taken

A. It is important to state the connection between the ideas of 'value network' and the model of the process of evaluation. The 'value network' may be seen as a simplification of the process model and as a device for the representation of the connections between several evaluations. The relationship JOB → MONEY portrayed in a value network shows merely that the value of 'job' is justified in terms of 'money'. The process model may elaborate this by locating 'values attached' in both concepts and by analysing the relationship between them into the product of 'criterion applied' (likelihood of 'money' being applied to 'job') and 'feature score' ('job' judged objectively as a means to 'money'). The relationship between concepts in the value network is thus a component of a 'contextual evaluation'.

B. The process model also goes beyond a simple expression of the relationship between concepts by suggesting that 'criteria applied' may be the result of a mixture of the influences of hypothetical 'criteria profiles' of subject, object and context. This mixture is likely to be extremely complex and is not addressed at all in the numerical analysis, which starts from 'criteria applied'. In terms of a 'value network',
the subject's 'criteria profile' will be reflected by the number of times concepts are used as justifications for other concepts. The more the incoming connections of a concept, the more prominent it will be in the subject's 'criteria profile'. This is taken to be a cognitive phenomenon, an expression of the way in which the subject categorises the things around him. This is contrasted with the affective 'values attached', which are located in the nodes of a value network, and which are the outcome of 'subjective evaluations'. These concepts have been separated for theoretical reasons, but it must be borne in mind that in real value systems the largest values attached (positive or negative) may tend to be more prominent as criteria applied.

C. The inclusion of values attached (themselves the product of a process of evaluation) as components of subjective evaluations implies an infinite regress in the process of evaluation. In order for a subjective evaluation to be made, evaluations of criteria applied must be made. These in turn require further evaluations and so on. There are two reasons why this infinite regress may not occur. Firstly, the embedding will cease when 'ultimate values' are applied as criteria. These are self-justified. Secondly, it seems likely that the process of evaluation is not carried out in its full form for each evaluation. It is probable that there is a value memory, perhaps the value network itself, which contains the values attached to concepts. The full process might only operate when concepts are unfamiliar or being revised. It should also be noted that other components of the process of evaluation, particularly the emergence of criteria applied, and the examination of the features of objects, may themselves entail evaluative processes. This issue is not addressed in the current work, but its existence is acknowledged.

D. The approach taken to evaluation enables structure and process to be studied in terms of their various component parts. Thus, changes in a
subject’s evaluations, differences between the evaluations of groups of subjects, and developmental trends may, in principle, be located in specific items. These could range from changes in the perception of the value object to long-term changes in the value attached to one of its value criteria. In addition, the process model, allied to its numerical analysis, has the potential for assessing and analysing various psychological phenomena. For example, the degree of conflict and uncertainty experienced in evaluation may be indicated by the variance of the contributions made to the total evaluation by each criterion.

4.3 THE PLACE OF THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE STUDY OF VALUE

4.3.1 Relationship to the wider issues in the field

A. Introduction

The approach is regarded as falling within the empirical branch of the study of value. Its interactions with other branches, particularly the theoretical, are considered to be of great importance, however. Theoretical work can provide useful concepts and methods that may guide empirical studies and the findings from these studies may in turn provide information of relevance to the broad theoretical issues in the field. The present empirical approach has been strongly influenced by the outline sketch of the field and the analyses of the theoretical and normative branches made in chapter three.

The literature reviewed in chapter two indicated a general lack of interaction between the philosophy of value and social psychological approaches. The latter have tended to be directed by important issues within social psychology. Any philosophical influences have tended to be indirect. Functional theories of attitude, for example, have been influenced by some aspects of pragmatism. In contrast, the present approach is concerned to explore this potentially fruitful relationship.
B. Common features shared with other empirical approaches

Despite this difference in orientation, the approach taken in this thesis shares many common features with other empirical approaches as regards their place in the broader field of value, and these may be usefully outlined here.

Empirical approaches have inclined to be naturalist approaches. Through all their various differences of emphasis and disagreements, there has been the basic assumption that value depends in some manner on the existence of purposive beings and their interactions with each other and their surroundings. The approach taken here shares this assumption.

The approach also accords with many other empirical approaches by being non-normative. There is no intention of prescribing what people ought to value or how they ought to behave. The observations, experiments and relatively small-scale theories within the empirical branch are mainly attempts to gather information, and this may be distinguished from the uses to which that information is put.

Empirical approaches have also tended to employ closed-criteria systems when typifying the nature of value. These were mentioned in chapter three as necessary components of normative approaches, and are also widespread in theoretical approaches. They are so common in the field of value as to almost amount to an unacknowledged background feature. Only those approaches that hold that value cannot be justified seem to avoid using them. In the empirical branch they are found in many varieties, sharing the common premise that values are organised in relation to some more inclusive concept or concepts. This may be the interest of the self, or the promotion of consistency, for instance. There are many other examples, but these diverse approaches are linked by the idea of a relationship between values and their ordering principles.

The present approach explicitly recognises the importance of closed-criteria systems to the study of value. The idea of values being
linked to criteria is a major principle in both value networks and the model of the process of evaluation. The possibility of value systems being organised by ultimate values is also recognised. The application of a closed-criteria system also suggests that values may be justified and that they are governed by rules. Here justification refers to the possibility that values may be justified in relation to the concepts employed in the system, and not to justification in an absolute sense. The present approach shares this orientation because it proposes that the relationships of justification between values is the major cohesive principle in value systems. There is no attempt, however, to specify the precise empirical form that this justification takes (for example the interest of the self). This is left as a matter for empirical research and may indeed vary between subjects.

The description of values as being governed by rules does not depend on the assertion that evaluation is a carefully considered, conscious, and controlled process. As will be seen in section 4.3.2 B below, the model may be applied to 'non-cognitive' evaluations, and regardless of whether or not the person is in full conscious control of his evaluation. Even if the person acts impulsively to maximise his pleasure, his behaviour may still be conceived as being rule-governed, and not random and irrational. The model of the process of evaluation is described in terms that imply that it is applicable only to a fully aware, highly considered variety of evaluation. This is not the case, however. It may be used to describe 'low-level' cognition as well (see 3.2.3 C2).

A final similarity between the present approach and many other empirical approaches is the use of a broad separation between value and fact. This refers to the various value-like and fact-like concepts that have been used in studies of values and attitudes. There are many examples. In Lewin's Field Theory the concept of 'valence' is separated from the idea of a person dividing his psychological space into 'regions'. Heider distinguished
between the sentiment attached to people, objects, and events, and the
person's knowledge of the relationships between them. This broad
distinction remained prevalent in other consistency theories and expectancy
value theories. Among those treating values as standards, Parsons
emphasised the merging of affective and conceptual components, but he
nevertheless set cognitive standards apart from appreciative and moral
standards. Similar broad separations were present in Rokeach's four
categories of belief.

In the present approach, the processes of identifying and examining the
value object and the factors influencing the criteria to be applied to it
are considered to be primarily cognitive, whereas the concept of 'value
attached' is affective in nature.

It is important to note, however, that this is not the only level at
which the relation between value and fact may be viewed, and the present
work differs from many other empirical approaches on some aspects of this
relation.

C. Differences from other empirical approaches

Naturalism involves the acceptance that value is in some sense a fact of
human nature. There are many differences, however, as to what aspect of
human nature is most influential in determining values. In the present
approach, the adoption of a wide perspective entails the recognition that
value can originate in many ways. Narrow, short-term goals can define
values, as emphasised in Lewin's work and in Perry's interest theory of
value. Broad, long-term aims are also of importance, however, as stressed
by hedonistic and utilitarian positions, for example, and in Rokeach's use
of 'terminal values'. Value can spring from the particular desires of
individuals, or from a set of rules accepted by many people, as advocated in
rule utilitarianism. It can arise from millions of years of biological
evolution or be part of a shorter cultural tradition. It is hoped that the
empirical study of value will provide information as to which values are related to which sources under which conditions.

In accord with the background to the approach described in chapter one, the present work is more sympathetic to the pragmatist view of the relation between value and fact than the position of the 'non-cognitivist' philosophers as exemplified by emotivism. The intermingling between value and fact when both are seen as psychological processes is stressed in preference to setting up a dichotomy between value and the facts of the non-experienced world. This stance involves the rejection of approaches such as behaviourism that share a common ancestry with emotivism. The pragmatist view is better able to cope with those issues discussed in chapter one deriving from the fact that the psychologist and his subject matter are similar entities. In addition, the use of this foundation to the present approach has led to some further assertions concerning the relation between value and fact which are considered in section 4.3.3.

Another issue on which the present approach is distinct from other empirical approaches is concerned with the question of 'how is value known?'. In common with other empirical approaches, the focus is on gaining knowledge of values as they occur in individuals and groups rather than on investigating the processes by which a class of 'truly valuable' absolute values might be known. This does not exclude the study of such processes as they might occur in individuals, however.

Indeed, the present approach differs from many other empirical approaches because it aims to know value from the point of view of the subject. Empirical approaches have been primarily interested in outlining the main factors involved in, and the principles that organise, stability and change in values and attitudes. Value has tended to be understood in terms of theoretical constructs rather than in relation to a subject's conceptual system. For example, a person may see his values as being statements of religious faith, but a social psychologist might view this as an instance of
conformity to group norms.

In contrast, the model of the process of evaluation gives free expression to subjects' beliefs about their values. Although it is an empirical approach, it is able to describe and analyse subjects whose outlook is non-naturalist and/or who arrive at their values by intuitive means. The object and context are conceived within the model to be empirically known. It is possible, however, that a person who believes that values are 'intuited' in some way will apply value criteria that will overwhelm the influence of the object and context as empirical entities. Their main criterion applied would be their favoured method of intuition, and objects would be 'examined' in relation to this method. In addition the inclusion of the concept of 'ultimate value' within the model permits an element of non-justification within the value system.

Although this section has emphasised the potential of the present approach for providing an idiographic understanding of value, it is important to recognise that both nomothetic and idiographic forms of understanding are encompassed (see 4.3.2 E).

D. Ultimate value

A further significant topic concerning the relationship of the present approach to the wider field is that of ultimate value. This requires an extended treatment because of its profound importance as a concept in the study of value. In chapter three it was argued that ultimate values are inevitable in naturalism. As part of a naturalist approach itself, the importance of ultimate value is recognised in the model of the process of evaluation.

Ultimate values are a requisite part of closed-criteria systems. The logic of these systems requires that there is a criterion or set of criteria which act as first principles or basic axioms. These provide the rationale for the other values in the system, yet in naturalist positions they stand
outside of it because they cannot themselves be justified in terms of the system. It is this concept that will be referred to by the term 'ultimate value'. The prevalence of closed-criteria systems in the study of value indicates the importance of ultimate values. In general, however, the inclusion of ultimate values in empirical approaches has been concerned with the advocacy of basic organising principles for values and attitudes and has not been greatly influenced by an appreciation of the importance of the concept in the wider field.

The structure of closed-criteria systems involves dividing values into two broad classes according to their function. These may be referred to as 'means' and 'ends' or, in the terminology preferred here, 'instrumental values' and 'ultimate values'. As noted in connection with the issue of the justification of value, if ultimate values are taken as fixed, then questions of value become questions of the factual relationships between instrumental and ultimate values, or in the case of empirical approaches, these factual relationships as perceived by the subject.

Important objections may be made, however, to this transformation in that it may exclude the distinctive features of the field of value. Limitation of the field to instrumental values could be inadequate because this might omit the affective tone of value, feelings of compulsion and obligation, and conviction of the universal applicability of one's values. Indeed, there is a case for the field to concentrate mainly on ultimate values. Findlay took this position (see 2.2.12), and the broad opposition between intuitionist, non-naturalist approaches and empiricist, naturalist approaches is enmeshed with this issue. Many empirical approaches seem to unwittingly avoid coming fully to terms with the distinctive features of value by attributing them to a basic organising principle. This remains unanalysed as the 'source' of value, and instrumental values only possess value-like features in a derivative sense.
In contrast, the present approach, in addition to studying instrumental values in detail, aims to give an important place to ultimate values. In the interviews conducted during the exploratory research, the subjects were given the opportunity to express ultimate values. It is nevertheless appreciated that ultimate values stand beyond justification and it is recognised that an empirical study such as this cannot fully comprehend ultimate values without ceasing to be empirical.

It can, however, study the incidence of ultimate values and identify them for particular subjects. It is also possible to investigate ultimate values by focusing on the object. If a number of subjects are studied then criteria profiles for objects may be estimated. The degree of self-reference within an object's criteria profile will indicate the likelihood of it being an ultimate value. For example, the object 'pleasure' might contain itself within its own criteria profile, whereas the object 'tree' might not. Simplified criteria profiles are presented in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Illustrative criteria profile for objects 'pleasure' and 'tree'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Pleasure</th>
<th>Tree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides wood</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contentment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objects may thus differ in the extent to which their physical and culturally defined features make them possible ultimate values.
4.3.2 Relationship to main empirical issues

A. Social and individual factors

No firm stance is taken on the relative importance in evaluation of social factors and factors specific to individuals. This is regarded as a matter for considerable research in the field. It is anticipated that both individual and sociocultural factors may influence all elements of the process of evaluation and value networks, and that it will not be possible to fully explain values in terms of either side of the dichotomy.

Their relative influence may differ at various points, however. Cultural and social factors might mainly operate through the definition of concepts and their interrelationships, hence influencing the criteria profiles of object and context. There may also be a large social influence on the difference between 'subjective evaluation' and 'reported evaluation'. Individual factors are more likely to predominate in the criteria profile of the subject, in values attached, and in ultimate values.

This highlights an important feature of the present approach. The sub-division of the field makes it possible to investigate the relative importance of social or individual factors more precisely than has previously been possible. It may be more appropriate to adopt a social position for some aspects and an individual approach in other areas, rather than taking a particular emphasis for the empirical study of value as a whole.

B. Cognitive and non-cognitive approaches

This issue is of considerable importance in the empirical study of value and was also identified in a 'theoretical' form by Dewey in his 'questions about value'. Dewey's thoughts on the matter encapsulate some important points of relevance to the empirical branch as well. In particular, his concepts of 'valuing' and 'evaluation' may be profitably employed even though his labels may be confusing.
The model of the process of evaluation is expressed in language that suggests that evaluation is a carefully considered, highly intellectual, process of which the subject is fully aware. This would be an approximation to Dewey's concept of evaluation, and refers to 'high-level' cognition. The model is intended to apply to this process, but it is also conceived to have a wider scope. The impression it gives of being an intellectual model is more a function of the mode in which it attempts to understand value rather than of the supposed experience of the subject. The mode of understanding that it seeks is 'cold', but the phenomena that it attempts to describe and explain can be either 'hot' or 'cold'.

In this respect, the present approach is similar to expectancy-value theories. It regards evaluations as the outcome of a combination of affective and cognitive elements. It is more complex and has a broader range than these theories, however, being applicable to some evaluations that have previously been classed as 'non-cognitive'.

The possibility of a direct access to value memory has already been touched upon in 4.2.5 C above. This may occur where the object and context are familiar to the subject and no exceptional factors are perceived. The process of evaluation may cease, in its full form, after the identification of object and context. Such an evaluation may still be regarded as being explainable within the terms of the model, however. The 'value attached' to the object is thought to be connected by relationships of justification to other values within a network, and the subject is normally expected to be able to state these relationships if asked. Such evaluations are thought to have been through the full process in the past and are now available in an 'instant' form. This phenomenon was recognised by Dewey when he suggested that 'evaluation' could become automatic and resemble 'valuing'.

Another form of non-cognitive evaluation may be depicted as analogous to Dewey's 'valuing'. Here evaluations are unreflective, perhaps greatly influenced by a particular drive or motive, and are manifested in overt
behaviour. From the present perspective, although he is affected by a given state, the subject is still conceived to be in overall control of his behaviour which is, furthermore, rule-governed. In terms of the process model, this situation can be regarded as one in which the context (the criteria profile of the context, as influenced by a motive) exerts a relatively large influence on the value criteria selected. For example, if a person is very thirsty, criteria such as 'wetness', 'tastiness' and 'safe to drink' become prominent. Together with the values attached to criteria and an inspection of the features of objects, a subjective evaluation can be made. This may differ in many ways from the 'reported evaluation', which in this case consists of the behaviour itself. It might be noted that this account of Dewey's 'valuing' extends the bounds of the concept beyond its union with observed behaviour to cover instances where behaviour occurs in private or is censored or altered in some way.

The final category of non-cognitive evaluation that will be considered covers instances where the subject may be said to be out of control of the process. Under this heading could be placed both innate factors and values that may have resulted from conditioning (e.g. phobias). Although these stand apart from many other items in the value system by reason of their origins and greater inflexibility, they may nevertheless be incorporated within it. Firstly they may be viewed not in terms of their origins but by reference to the way that the subject justifies them. This may or may not reflect their 'genuine' origins. These are instances where particular criteria have gained a special importance for the subject in relation to a given object. This in turn has an exceptional impact on the criteria selected and consequently influences the reported evaluation.

It is important to remember that the present approach recognises the limitations of a cognitive account of evaluation through the concept of 'ultimate value'. Ultimate values cannot be justified in terms of the model, and hence an irreducible non-cognitive component is acknowledged.
C. Location of value

On this issue, the present approach has been influenced by Campbell's analysis of the concept of attitude. Both attitude and value have frequently been employed as useful mediating concepts. They have formed links between the person and his behavioural response, belief and action, need or motive and behaviour. This ability is due to the many concepts that are contained within the broadly-defined field of value.

One of the tasks of the present approach is to identify some of these concepts. As regards the 'location' of value, different assumptions are made according to which concept is being considered. In its overall stance the current approach is cognitive, locating value 'inside' individuals. In relation to some concepts within the field, however, it is theoretically useful to externalise value. For example, the concept of value network suggests that value is an enduring feature that is 'inside' the person. Value networks may also be applied to groups however, in which case value is located 'inside' the group but 'outside' its component individuals.

The model of the process of evaluation envisages a relationship between subject, object, and context. Some elements of evaluation are due to the subject, but the features of object and context are also influential. The concept of 'criteria profile' for both object and context is thought to be necessary to give an adequate account of evaluation. This enables factors that are common to many subjects to be included, for example, the physical properties of the object and context or social and cultural definitions of, and beliefs about, objects and contexts. The use of these criteria profiles locates some aspects of value outside of individuals. It is not intended to suggest, however, that value exists independently in either objects or in an objective realm of value. At the broadest level, the approach is naturalist in the sense that value is seen as requiring the existence of purposive beings.
The concept of 'reported evaluation' is also located outside of the person, in the world of observable behaviour. Of the concepts identified, this one is closest to behaviourist conceptions of value. As well as the process of evaluating a proposed reported evaluation outlined in 4.2.3 D above, extraneous factors out of the individual’s control may intervene between 'subjective evaluation' and 'reported evaluation' (c.f. Ajzen's theory of planned behaviour).

D. Standards and qualities

On this issue, an affinity may be noted between the present approach and expectancy value theories. The notion of affectively charged concepts being linked in logical relationships is found in Rosenberg and Abelson’s bands, Jones and Gerard’s syllogisms and Fishbein’s belief statements. In the present approach, this is embedded within value networks and the associated model of the process of evaluation, in which the concept of 'value attached' is crucial.

Value is not to be regarded as being limited to the concept of 'value attached', however. The involvement of standards in evaluation is acknowledged. This derives from the theoretical background to the present approach with its stress on the importance of closed-criteria systems. Intrinsic to the approach, therefore, is the assertion that not only concepts which are associated with value objects in some manner, but also free-floating, standard-like concepts, are required for an adequate account of evaluation. It should be noted, however, that concepts that are not from these two classes are also needed.

The present approach incorporates and extends expectancy-value theories, making it clear that they involve the operation of value criteria. Jones and Gerard’s horizontal dimension is incorporated in the idea that an evaluation may be the result of the application of any number of criteria. Their vertical dimension is also covered by the functional interchangeability of a concept, which can act as a criterion or as a value
Expectancy value theories are enhanced by the model of evaluation through various supplementary ideas. Criteria applied are conceived to vary in their relative impact on an evaluation. The overall evaluation is not simply the sum of its component parts, and hence this idea may go some way to avoiding the weaknesses in Fishbein's theory highlighted by Jaspars (1978). In addition, the present approach suggests more detail, both as regards the origins of criteria applied and concerning the different types of evaluation that might be made (contextual, subjective, reported).

The greater detail of the present approach re-emphasises that value is not limited to the Osgood-inspired concept of 'value attached', seen as a 'quality' of the value object. There are many other concepts necessary to give full justice to the study of value. These include the concepts of 'criteria applied', 'criteria profile', and 'ultimate value', all of which are more in the nature of standards than qualities.

E. Nomothetic and idiographic approaches

The present approach takes the position that both modes of understanding can provide insights into the nature of value systems and the process of evaluation. The methods of investigation and analysis aim to accommodate both idiographic and nomothetic knowledge. In the model of the process of evaluation, it is clear that the sub-processes are defined so that some are conceived to be free of individual variation (for example the criteria profile of an object), while others are expected to display a greater variation between individuals. It may be appropriate to apply a different mode of understanding to each of the sub-processes.

It is also possible, however, to adopt either type of approach to the whole process. The investigator may attempt to accommodate his understanding to coincide with that of his subject as far as possible. In this case, the constructs employed by the subject to define the object and context, and to
frame the criteria applied will be used to understand his evaluations. This does not violate the definitions of those sub-processes that are conceived to be free of individual variation because the proposed commonality is not absolute. The criteria profile of an object, for example, is conceived to be greatly influenced by social, cultural, and physical factors. Nevertheless, it is the subject’s apprehension of object and context that is of importance in evaluation. The possibility of individual variation is allowed for.

On the other hand, the entire process can be understood in a nomothetic way. The investigator may assimilate his observations of subjects into his own system of constructs. Criteria profiles and ultimate values, for example, would be understood in terms of categories formed by the investigator. Knowledge of a subject’s evaluations would be relative to a set of explicit or implied norms for the categories employed.

It is also appropriate here to stress that within the terms of the approach taken, ‘subject’ may apply not only to individuals but also to groups of individuals. Thus it may be possible to refer to the value networks and processes of evaluation of, for example, ‘policemen’, ‘nine year-old girls’, ‘Labour voters’, or ‘the French’. Such groups may be treated as if they were individuals, and it is anticipated that important insights into group values may be gained using this rubric. An idiographic type of understanding could be obtained of the group, whereas the values of the individuals making up the group might be understood in a nomothetic manner, by framing their values in terms of the value categories and norms found in the group.
F. Unified approaches

The view is taken here that it is theoretically useful to explore the common ground between the oppositions noted above, examining the conditions under which they merge into each other or remain separate. The present approach suggests ways in which this might be done in relation to the model of the process of evaluation. It is regarded as a mistake, however, to abandon the theoretically useful terms contained in the oppositions in the pursuit of unity.

It is recognised that in everyday activity and thought there is an essential merging of affective, cognitive, evaluative, social, behavioural, etc. factors. The identification of these factors is, perhaps, more a function of the social reality of psychology than discernible and separable in ‘real life’. Nevertheless, psychology as a human social activity must employ such categories as reference points if it is to achieve a systematic understanding (as contrasted with an everyday understanding). Those aspects of social cognition described in chapter two have served a valuable function by emphasising the links between some of these categories, and by redrawing the boundaries between them. From the perspective of the present approach, however, it overemphasises social factors. The relative influence of social and individual factors on the sub-processes involved in evaluation are regarded as a matter of empirical investigation, but it is anticipated that criteria such as individual well-being and survival, and personal pleasure, will play at least some part in evaluation.

Another point of disagreement between the present approach and social cognition involves its tendency to take holism too far. This tendency seems born of a desire to model everyday experience as closely as possible. Experience must be distinguished from psychological analysis, however. Psychologists share the opportunity to experience everyday life at first hand, and this fact helps them in their more systematic professional mode of understanding. The two forms should not be confused, however. Moscovici's
distinction between the 'consensual' and 'reified' universes is relevant here. The holistic tendency seems to want to use a form of understanding that is appropriate to the 'consensual' universe while acting in the 'reified' universe. The issue is also related to that of 'hot' and 'cold' processes in the understanding of attitudes (see 2.3.11 D). The success of cognitive approaches illustrates that both 'hot' and 'cold' processes can be understood by 'cold' means. The mode of understanding does not need to mirror the underlying processes.

4.3.3 Value and fact

Supplied with the above description of the approach taken and a discussion of its relation to the main issues in the field, another venture into the important relationship between value and fact may now be profitably embarked upon. It is appropriate to deal with this issue here because it reveals an important aspect of the approach taken, and because it provides the opportunity for more detail to be provided concerning the model of the process of evaluation.

It is useful to disentangle three strands in the connection between value and fact.

Firstly, value-like and fact-like concepts may be employed in describing and explaining evaluation, attitude formation and change, etc. In section 4.3.1 B it was noted that many writers had found it useful to distinguish value and fact at this level. The present approach also makes distinctions of this kind.

Secondly, there is the theoretical question discussed in chapter three (3.2.1 A), where the broad differences between naturalist and non-naturalist positions were outlined. As indicated throughout, the present approach aligns with the naturalists on this issue, taking Perry's position that value is a 'subjective addendum' to reality.
The third aspect of the relationship concerns how both value and fact are known. This aspect has not yet been expanded upon, and so will receive a longer exposition in this section. The adoption of an empiricist, as opposed to an intuitionist position entails holding that value is known in the same manner as fact. It can be noted here that this identity entails taking a particular view of what constitutes fact. Harrison (1967a) pointed out that if fact is restricted to a narrow sense, meaning isolated empirical observations about the existence of things, then value cannot be likened to fact.

The most prominent exposition of the similarity between value and fact at this level comes from the pragmatist tradition, particularly Dewey in answer to his third question (see 2.2.3 B). Descriptivism also stresses this unity, and among empiricist approaches, Rokeach (attitudes are a type of belief) and Fishbein (both value statements and factual statements are belief statements) can be seen as examples which emphasise the similarity.

In the present approach, the process model of evaluation contains an important statement on this third aspect of the relationship between value and fact. The essence of this is that some factual judgements may be regarded as a species of evaluation. This will be illustrated by considering in more detail the case of a contextual evaluation.

It was noted above that a contextual evaluation is the result of a combination of criteria applied and a detailed examination of the value object. The criteria applied are a complex mixture of the influences of subject, object, and context. If the context becomes closely defined, however, then it will have a greater influence on the criteria applied. Subjects' evaluations will tend to become more uniform, and evaluation may be seen to shade into factual judgement. This may happen if, for example, a set of rules becomes applicable.

Consider the judging of sports competitions. The judges of a gymnast's performance may have been specially trained, and may agree on the important
criteria applied. There is still the scope for a degree of subjective influence in these judgements, however.

The shading of evaluation into factual judgement is illustrated by moving on to consider judgements of the performance of a long jumper. In this case the criteria applied are strictly delimited, and the judgement is more clearly regarded as being 'factual' as compared with the gymnastics case. 'Distance jumped' is the main criterion, but this is only applied if the jump has received a positive 'contextual evaluation' by reference to the criteria that are applied concerning the legality of the elements making up the entire activity (such as 'length of run up' and 'location of take-off'). Each of these judgements is commonly considered to be a factual judgement, but here they are treated as a species of evaluation in which contextual factors predominate. The context defines the criteria applied and ignores other potential criteria such as 'technique' or 'nationality of jumper'.

The judging of competitions is an example where the rules governing the context are comparatively formal. In other types of factual judgement there may be no formal rules, but the criteria to be applied may be generally well known in an informal manner. One class of examples is evaluating the fitness of an object for a specified purpose. If 'desks' are evaluated as 'surfaces for working on', criteria such as 'flatness', 'stability' and 'height' tend to be more prominent than 'elegance'.

This model can also be applied to assessments of category membership. Given the criteria for membership and the features of the value object, questions in the form of 'is X a Y?' can be answered in terms of contextual evaluation. There are important limits to the model's scope of application, however. Judgements of quantity, for example, cannot be dealt with. Nevertheless, there are significant advantages in this proposed relationship between evaluation and some factual judgements. Questions concerning whether or not a particular judgement is a question of fact or value become irrelevant. Other questions, framed in terms of the relative influence of
various parts of the process of evaluation, become more pertinent. Thus questions about personal characteristics, for example 'is John generous?' need not be puzzled over as to whether they are questions about fact or value.

Furthermore, evaluations which are intended to be 'objective' may be usefully compared and contrasted with other evaluations. If objectivity is aimed at, the subject would be attempting to minimise the effects of his criteria profile on the criteria applied, and would also wish to avoid involving his 'values attached'. In addition, there are unlikely to be any material difference between the actual evaluation and reported evaluation.

In real life situations, however, the intention may not be fully met. Errors may occur, and personal bias may become involved in various parts of the evaluation process. The subject's criteria profile may have an unintended influence on the criteria selected and the involvement of values attached might convert a contextual into a subjective evaluation. Thus the occurrence of errors and bias in factual judgements may receive a potentially fruitful interpretation through this comparison with evaluation, and these unintended distortions may be analysed in terms of the various sub-processes thought to be involved in evaluation.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE STUDY OF CHILDREN'S VALUES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter marks a transition between the theoretical and empirical parts of the thesis. It is concerned with previous empirical work on children's values, looking at the place of the concept of value in the study of child development generally, and describing those investigations that are of relevance to the current series of studies.

As emphasised in chapter one, the material described in this chapter did not play a significant part in the formation of the general approach outlined in earlier chapters. Hence its 'delayed' entrance as compared with a thesis that is mainly concerned with empirical research. The importance of a theoretical framework such as that developed in earlier chapters was demonstrated during the process of choosing the content of this review. There is a vast potential literature to draw upon, and the selection of material needed to be guided in some way. This guidance was provided by the outline of the field described in chapter three, the general empirical approach presented in chapter four, and the specific series of exploratory studies carried out. Not only the selection of material, but also its organisation, and its assessment have been affected. Without such guidance, the task of reviewing the child development literature of relevance to the study of value would have been overwhelming.

The review begins with an overall look at the area of child development from the viewpoint of the general study of value. It is noted that value development has not emerged as a separate topic, and the potential benefits of adopting the 'value point of view' are suggested. Following the discussion of a possible threat to the unified view of the field, the
coverage of the material becomes more specifically involved with previous empirical studies. In order to gain an overall perspective, some prominent areas of research are identified. This is followed by the description of findings from approaches that are limited, according to the present approach, either in terms of the value objects sampled or the methods used.

Broader approaches, that are closer to the current viewpoint are then described and assessed, followed by a brief outline of the few findings concerned with the structural aspects of value. The chapter ends by adopting a wider focus once more, through a consideration of the degree of similarity that has been observed between the values of different groups of subjects.

5.2 VALUES AND THE STUDY OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT

General books on child development do not contain extensive sections on the development of values or attitudes (e.g. Mussen and Hetherington, 1983; Damon, 1983; Gardner, 1982). Their organisation and content reveal the major systems of categorisation that are used by developmentalists, and the areas that have been concentrated upon. The use of these categories does not deny the importance of values, but nevertheless contains an implicit message that values are not of primary importance. It is assumed that they are organised by, or can be explained in terms of, other phenomena and processes.

The idea of discrete age categories is an example. 'Infancy' and 'adolescence' are commonly used as anchoring points between which various categories of 'childhood' are to be found. Each age category is conceived to have its own specific nature and concerns, and a vastly complex, holistic view of each category is constructed. There is a tacit assumption that a person's attitudes and values are largely influenced by his stage of life.

Age categories provide useful benchmarks for those wishing to understand human development, but no developmentalist would maintain that all children
pass through these 'typical' phases in the same manner. One source of variance lies in another important system of categorisation that has been employed by those interested in social development. This is the idea of analysing the person in terms of the important types of relationship that he has with others or the roles that he plays. Whereas the age category approach aims at a holistic view of the person at a point in time, the role concept is fragmentary, dividing the person into categories such as his gender or sex role, his family life, and relationships with peers, parents, and school. Implied in this schema of thought is the idea that values derive from, and can be explained in terms of, a number of relatively autonomous areas of the person's life.

It is highly likely that both age category and role are important influences on children's lives. The present work intends to begin constructing an alternative perspective, however, deriving from the standpoint of the study of value. This would proceed from the value issues and concepts developed and described in earlier chapters, and be informed by empirical investigations. Although this approach requires considerable development, some of its benefits may be anticipated. Assuming that age and role are indeed important categories for the persons being studied, the relative importance that a person allots to each of his roles might be analysed in terms of the nature of the values that underly them. Where conflicts arise in practice between, for example, peer and parental demands, the intensity of the conflict and its resolution or continuance might be understood in relation to the values involved.

In addition, the age category approach might benefit from a more precise description of the identity and intensity of the values 'typically' held by children of various ages. It might be possible to understand the changes and tensions that accompany the transition between age categories (if, indeed, the person experiences such change as a discrete step) in terms of the value concepts described in chapter four.
Another prominent approach revolves around the concept of 'socialization'. Being concerned with the transmission and acquisition of values, this area would be of great importance in the empirical branch of a general approach to value. There is a tendency for the psychology of socialization to be analysed in terms of a number of approaches that are wedded to broader theories. Among these are psychoanalytic approaches (Freud, 1933; Erikson, 1963, 1968), behaviouristic and learning theory approaches (Eysenck, 1964; Aronfreed, 1968; Bandura and Walters, 1964), and cognitive approaches (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969). Many interesting and useful insights and findings have emerged from these approaches, but they tend to be driven by concerns to discover the processes at work in social development, and to develop ideas that are consistent with their broader psychological theories. There is a relative neglect of content, with the identification and description of the values that are being transmitted. An approach to children's values founded upon a broadly-based theory of value would partly concern itself with content, and hope eventually to provide an account of socialization in terms of the principles of stability and change in value systems and of the interaction between the value systems of individuals and groups.

In addition to being organised around broad theories, the area of socialization is often divided into those topics considered to be of special relevance in the development of a social being. Among these topics are infant attachment, the development of conscience, of empathy and altruism, and of guilt and anxiety. These are all important areas, but from the point of view of the general study of value they fail to take sufficient account of the involvement of values, preferring to employ other descriptive and explanatory concepts. The potential usefulness of value as a unifying concept which could forge links between these separate topics has not been fully explored.
This is also the case for the broader study of child development. The specific fields of study that are identified in general books on child development tend to reflect those areas that have both been the focus of a great deal of research and which are generally recognised as having produced fruitful results. The study of value does not figure among these. Areas such as play, friendship, the development of the self, aggression, achievement, language development, and cognitive development, no doubt involve values, but value has not been concentrated upon as a distinct field of study.

The nature of the values involved in each of these areas of development could be studied, as could the ways in which values might be moulded by them. Moreover, a focus on value could provide an overall perspective that might be able to provide accounts of the relative importance of each of these areas from the child's viewpoint at various stages of development. There is also the potential for describing similarities and conflicts between different areas (e.g. between achievement and play) in terms of the values involved.

Stage theories have also figured prominently in descriptions of social development. As with age categories, development is divided into a number of discrete steps, and the 'typical' features of each level are outlined. There is no necessary link between stage and age, however, except that the stages are conceived to be passed through in a temporal sequence.

Stage descriptions have been developed for various specific topics of interest. For example, Selman (1976,1980) for role-taking and for friendship, and Damon (1977,1980) on authority and obedience, and on fairness in sharing (positive justice). These are important aspects of children's lives, and could be prominent as criteria of value, but from the current perspective, similar comments to those applied to other areas of child development can be made. The lack of a general value approach means that the relative importance of, and relations between, each area to
children at various stages remain unknown.

Within the confines of specific stage descriptions, however, some work has been done on outlining the dominant values involved at each stage. Damon (1980) on positive justice, for example, suggests that children tend to develop from self-interest, through equality, to a concern to share goods according to merit, to a stage where the greater awareness of the existence of different and conflicting principles produces judgements based on compromise. This and similar descriptions would benefit from a broader value perspective, however. From this perspective they appear to be limited in scope.

The most influential stage approach has been the cognitive theory of moral development based on the work of Piaget (1932) and developed by Kohlberg (1969). The theory centres on moral development, but also covers a wider area of the field of value. Kohlberg suggests that a child’s primary orientation will, at various stages, be egocentric, conformist, authoritarian, contractarian, and relativist. Given the broad approach to moral development adopted by this tradition, and its foundations in general cognitive development, one might expect other areas in the field of value to follow similar developmental paths. This remains to be seen, however. The breadth of the approach has perhaps hindered the emergence of an even broader approach to value development such as that being currently proposed. Attention has been distracted from areas such as enjoyment, safety, and well-being, and it would be interesting to observe the extent to which developmental theories focusing on these areas might be based on similar principles to those proposed by Piaget and by Kohlberg for moral development. In addition, it would be informative to assess the relative prominence of evaluations by children in terms of moral considerations as compared with other value criteria, and to examine the variations in the use of moral criteria with changes in subject, object, and context.
5.3 A CHALLENGE TO THE UNIFIED VIEW OF THE FIELD

The Kohlberg/Piaget position on moral development has recently been questioned by a substantial body of research that has been stimulated by the work of Turiel (1978). This is also a challenge to the unified 'axiological' approach to the field of value being adopted in this thesis, because it contends that the moral and the social conventional are to be treated as distinct areas, whereas the 'axiological' view emphasises the similarities in the field that occur regardless of the specific content of an evaluation. This research will be considered in some detail because of the threats that it poses and because, as will be seen, its assessment allows the nature and strengths of the value point of view to be illustrated.

Turiel draws a basic distinction between social conventional acts and moral acts. The former are relative to the social context and are in themselves arbitrary. In contrast, moral acts have implications for the rights and well-being of others which stem directly from the nature of an act (e.g. hitting). Moral rules are typically perceived as being universally applicable. This research has been summarised by Nucci (1982). A variety of methods have been employed, and subjects ranging from two and a half to twenty years have been studied. The general conclusion is that people at all of these ages can clearly distinguish between the moral and the social conventional. It is suggested that the two areas follow distinct developmental paths, that for convention being described by Turiel (see Nucci, 1982, p.105).

This idea of separate development is opposed to the Kohlberg position that morality displaces convention as a basis for moral judgements at the third level of development. A closer look at the research, however, shows that the assertion that young children are able to make moral judgements is not as well founded as workers in the Turiel tradition have suggested. Interviews with preschool children (3 to 5 years, Nucci and Turiel, 1978)
concerning events observed by the children, found that more than 80% of their categorisations of events as either moral or conventional were in accord with those of adults. It is important to note that a child’s interpretation of an event was coded as moral if the child answered ‘no’ to the question:

"What if there weren’t a rule in the school about (the observed event), would it be right to do it then?" (Nucci and Turiel, 1978, p. 403).

This operational definition does not exclude the possibility that the children are still responding to conventional rules, those that have a wider range of application than those of a school. The dichotomy seen by the experimenters between ‘moral’ and ‘conventional’ could be the result of the ability of children to recognise that some conventional rules are specific (e.g. school rules) and others are general.

This interpretation may also be applied to the results of other studies using this method (Nucci and Nucci, 1982), to studies using a similar method with imaginary stories and pictures, (Smetana, 1981, Nucci, 1981), and to studies which examine children’s ideas on the legitimacy of an authority’s supposed attempts to contradict broader proscriptions (e.g. a school sanctioning the use of physical violence by pupils. Weston and Turiel, 1980).

A weakness of these studies is the definition on theoretical grounds of experimental stimuli and responses as either conventional or moral. The placing of children’s responses into these categories does not mean that they themselves think in these terms. The study by Nucci and Nucci (1982) on children’s overt responses to moral or conventional transgressions also suffers from this weakness because both the transgressions and the responses were classified into the two categories.

Nucci (1981) did, however, ask children about the reasons for their judgements of the ‘wrongness’ of various events. Limiting our attention to the youngest age group (7 years), it was found that those events that were
judged 'most wrong' (which tended to be those defined as moral by the experimenter) were inclined to be judged in terms of the injustice of an act or its absolute prohibition. In contrast, those events that were judged 'less wrong' (which tended to be those defined as social conventional by the experimenter) were inclined to be judged as wrong because they are prohibited by a law, rule, or authority, or because they create disorder. These findings were interpreted as supporting the moral/conventional dichotomy, but it is also possible to view some of the 'moral' responses as indicating adherence to a set of rules.

These results become even more informative if they are analysed with the aim of identifying age trends. If the reasons listed in table 2 (Nucci, 1981, p.118) are grouped into:

A. Those that are rule-related (act should never be committed, act prohibited, rule rejected, creates disorder)
B. Those that show some concern for the effects of acts on others (unjust act, act affects others, impoliteness)

then it may be seen that for the 'most wrong' events, rule-related reasons decline with age through grades two, five, eight, eleven, and college, the respective percentages being 43, 33, 17, 11, and 8. In contrast, group B reasons increase with age (48, 60, 74, 74, 77). For the 'less wrong' events, rule-related reasons again decrease (78, 76, 59, 44, 41) while group B reasons increase (12, 16, 20, 37, 39). These data are in accord with the Piaget and Kohlberg tradition, concern for others increasing with age while rule-related judgements decline in frequency. The age trends seem to reflect the increasing proportion of children at 'higher' stages of moral reasoning.

Other examples of findings indicating age-related declines in rule-following may be found in Nucci (1982, Table 1) and Weston and Turiel (1980, Table 3). The latter study is informative in that it illustrates the
effect of rules on children's evaluations. A comparison of their tables 1 and 2 shows that the values attached to four actions (including 'hitting', categorised as moral) are substantially increased if they are permitted by the school.

The above reassessment of the research in the Turiel tradition has illustrated some advantages of adopting a viewpoint based on a general theory of value. From this perspective it became clear that in the majority of findings the researchers were obtaining various measures of the 'values attached' by subjects to the two classes of stimuli while assuming, perhaps incorrectly, that the 'criteria applied' by subjects were the same as those of the researchers. Evidence of a broad dichotomy in children's judgements was taken to be evidence that they were distinguishing between the conventional and the moral. In the absence of studies of the subjects' 'criteria applied', however, the findings are open to alternative interpretations.

The reanalysed findings do, however, provide some support for the Turiel hypothesis in that there is an effect of 'type of item' in addition to the age effects. The 'most wrong' items (mainly moral) did show a tendency to be supported by reasons concerned with effect on others, while the 'less wrong' items (mainly conventional) were most often judged in terms of rule-related reasons. In relation to the model of evaluation outlined in chapter four, this finding illustrates the importance of the features of the value object as well as those of the subject.

The findings of this research tradition do not, as they threatened at first sight, seriously challenge the idea of a unified theory of value. Indeed they strengthen this idea because they can be reinterpreted in terms of a general value approach, their weaknesses being identified and their hidden findings brought to light.
5.4 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF CHILDREN’S VALUES

In section 5.2 it was noted that value development has not emerged as a distinct area of study, and that where values are studied the approach appears limited in scope from the value perspective being currently advocated. There is, however, a large body of empirical research on children’s values which has not been generally regarded as being interlinked. In the following sections it is intended to illustrate some aspects of the broad approach to the study of value development by organising and commenting upon some of this research, concentrating on the description of those findings that are comparable with the exploratory research.

5.4.1 Some prominent areas

Many empirical studies of children’s values are organised around particular practical or theoretical interests. While children’s values might be an important topic of interest in these studies, the predominant concern lies elsewhere. Although this is the case, it will be informative to identify some of the main areas of research that have concerned themselves with children’s values. This will convey an impression of the scope and nature of empirical work on children’s values, and illustrate some of the potential of a general approach to value. Its directions of expansion might be into those areas which are already concerned with value development, and its broad outlook could serve to inform, develop, and relate together these diverse areas of research. Four areas will be mentioned in this regard: Adolescent values, values and school, values education, and occupational values. It should be noted that the references cited in this section are illustrative. There is no intention to review each area comprehensively.

The study of adolescent values is a vast area which seems to have been stimulated by the idea that adolescence is a particularly problematic period
of life. Much of the work on adolescent values is concerned with delinquency (Peretti, 1981; Zieman and Benson, 1983). Kitwood suggests that adolescents are oriented toward 'perspective morality', being mainly concerned with the feelings of self and others. Goodman (1969) analysed adolescent values in terms of the various roles played by young people. Kalberer (1975) charted the changes and stabilities in adolescent concerns over the period 1935 to 1970. Some authors, however, question the assumption that adolescence is an exceptional period of development (Friesen, 1972; Coleman, 1980).

Many studies of value focus on school life. Hargreaves (1967) and Lacey (1970) described the polarisation of British schoolchildren into two distinct groups with separate values, particularly as regards the value attached to 'school', and the effects of this process on academic success or failure. Ermalinski and Ruscelli (1971), in an American study, found that black lower class children were at a disadvantage even at preschool level because their values are more different from teachers' values than are white middle class children's values.

Quine (1974) failed to observe the polarisation noted by Hargreaves, but did find a dichotomy between school values and the values of working class pupils. Harmsden (1979) carried out a similar analysis for sex differences, finding that girls are closer to teachers' values than are boys. Schneider and Coutts (1982) looked at differences in the values of coeducational and single sex schools. Feather (1970, 1973) and Martin and Field (1976) have used the Rokeach Value Survey to investigate differences between students' own values and those that they perceive in their teachers and schools. Athey (1982) concentrated on the effect of values on a particular academic skill, investigating the possible importance of affective factors in reading ability.

A related area is that of values education. This consists of attempts to deliberately influence values and is normally carried out in a school.
setting. The two main approaches are values clarification, in which the emphasis is on helping the child to explore his existing values rather than on indoctrination (Raths, Harmin, and Simon, 1966; Simon and Clark, 1975) and moral development, based on Kohlberg's stage theory, in which attempts are made to move pupils to higher developmental stages (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971). Lockwood (1978) produced an analysis of research in both of these areas and compared their effectiveness. Other value education schemes have included the Character Education Project (Arnaud, 1973) and the Character Research Project (Barber, 1971).

Research on occupation and values is an established area. Studies of children understandably concentrate on the older age groups. A study of the role of school curriculum in changing work values between ages 15 and 18 was made by Kapes and Strickler (1975). Tittle (1982) suggested that the interactions between occupational, parenthood and marriage values were important in the career choices of 17 year old girls. Cochran (1986) found that harmony between important values was a factor in the occupational decisions of 16 and 17 year olds, while Feather (1979c) as part of a wider study relating job satisfaction to the degree of similarity between personal and work values, looked at the relationship between values and the 'job satisfaction' attained in school by 15 to 17 year olds.

5.4.2 Studies limited by range of value object

Some studies of children's values are limited by the nature of the class of value object considered. Ahammer (1971) investigated the values attached to four personality dimensions. For present purposes attention is limited to the two youngest groups studied (11 to 12 years and 15 to 18 years) and the 'personal desirability' condition. A clear age trend was found for 'nurturance', with the younger group attaching a higher value than the older group. For 'autonomy', however, there was a different age trend for either sex. For the boys, the older group showed a greater desire for 'autonomy',
whereas the reverse was the case for the girls. The age differences for 'affiliation' and 'achievement' were small. Girls were found to desire 'affiliation' and 'nurturance' more than boys, while boys rated 'autonomy' higher, but only at the 15 to 18 years level.

Comeau (1980) asked 15 to 18 year olds to rank a set of ten personality trait words. The most notable outcome of this procedure was the high level of agreement. No age differences were noted, and the largest sex difference was for 'intelligent', which boys tended to rank higher than girls. Small differences were found for 'attractive' (boys > girls) and 'independent' (girls > boys).

Another group of workers (Knight and Dubro, 1984; Knight et al, 1985) investigated children's 'social values'. These are statistically defined in terms of the types of response made by children to a card-sorting task which the subject believes will determine the rewards to be received by himself and another child. Six 'social values' were defined. For example, 'superiority' in these terms means responding so as to maximise own gains while also minimising other's gains. 'Individualism' involves responding solely with regard to one's own gains. In both experiments it was found that more than half of the subjects in the 6 to 10 years range could be placed in the 'superiority' category. In addition, the 6 to 7 year olds responded more often in this way than did the 8 to 10 year olds, who made more 'equality' responses than the younger children.

These effects remained significant following an adjustment for differences in information processing abilities. When 3 to 5 year old children were included (Knight et al, 1985) it was found that 52% of their responses could be classed as 'individualism'. The authors suggest that the transition from 'individualism' to 'superiority' as the most frequent response type could be due to cognitive factors (the 'individualism' response is less complex).
The response types being assessed in these experiments are highly specific to the technique being used, and it is therefore unwise to assert that 'social values' are being measured. Nevertheless, the distributions across the six response styles for each age level can be taken as a rough estimate of the relative values attached to six possible outcomes concerning the sharing of resources.

Other studies which include measures of 'values attached', but which cover a limited range of value objects include Hess and Torney (1967), Musgrave and Reid (1971), Jahoda and Cramond (1972), and Vaughan et al (1981).

Hess and Torney (1967) studied the development of political attitudes. As part of their explorations of children’s feelings and ideas about Government and the Law they found that the value attached to authority figures such as 'policeman' and 'president' declined steadily across the 8 to 14 year age range. This decline coincided with an increasing acknowledgement of the fallibility of authority and a decline in the belief that all laws are fair. The age trend was not observed for the authority figure 'father', however.

Musgrave and Reid (1971) studied 11 and 12 year old’s values through their usage of the mass media. This included findings concerning children’s attitudes to violence. Boys liked watching 'fighting and killing' on television considerably more than girls (90% v 61%), and this difference was also present but to a lesser degree in a measure of attitude toward 'fighting and killing' (see their table 13). This attitude was also associated with IQ, the higher the IQ level, the more 'fighting and killing' was judged to be wrong.

In a Government study concerning children and alcohol, Jahoda and Cramond (1972) found that the value attached to the value objects 'beer', 'whisky' and 'pub' declined over the 6 to 10 year age range. Approval of drinking also decreased across these ages.
Vaughan et al (1981) devised an experiment whereby different parts of the body were evaluated by 9 and 12 year olds. Both white and black children were used as subjects, but for comparison purposes only the results for white children are reported here. The combined results for all parts of the body evaluated in the experiment showed clear age and sex effects with no interaction. A higher value was attached to 'parts of the body' by 11 year olds than by 8 year olds, and boys valued them higher than girls.

Studies involving 'criteria applied' also have limitations as regards the range of value objects covered. An example of this is Schavaneveldt et al (1970). The criteria applied by 3 to 5 year olds when evaluating parents were investigated. Boys applied 'domestic' and 'nurturant' criteria to mother more often than girls. For father, however, girls applied 'nurturant' criteria more often than boys, while boys evaluated father more often in terms of 'recreation'.

This illustrates the interaction between object and subject that occurs in evaluation, and particular object/subject combinations are of course legitimate as a focus of interest. If the concern is with the estimation of broader parameters, however, then a wider range of data must be collected. For example, if sex differences in the criteria profiles of children of a certain age are being investigated, then a broad spectrum of value objects will need to be covered. It might then be possible to identify overall differences between the sexes, independent of particular value objects, in their tendency to apply criteria such as 'nurturance'.

A series of studies using the 'ideal person' method goes some way to making a broader scan of criteria applied. Various techniques have been used, a common one being the request that subjects complete the sentence "The person I would most like to be like....". As Hawkes (1973) notes this method has a long history (Darrah, 1898; Barnes, 1902), and early studies were primarily interested in examining the sources of ideals (parents, famous people, etc.). This emphasis has remained, but for present purposes the
analysis of the dominant values indicated by choices of ideal person are more relevant. The content analysis system developed by Havighurst and Taba (1949) and followed by Eppel and Eppel (1966) has proved influential in this regard. The six categories follow a broad egocentrism – altruism dimension ('material', 'physical appearance and popular personality', 'friendly', 'honest and responsible', 'co-operative and helpful', 'self-sacrifice').

Musgrave (1984) found it necessary to add three categories in order to describe his data adequately, 'competency' (winning, fame, being good at things), 'hedonistic' (enjoying oneself), and 'personal integrity' (being oneself, self-development). Using Australian subjects between 12 and 18 years old, Musgrave found that girls' choices more frequently expressed the dominant values 'friendly', 'co-operative and helpful', and 'personal integrity'. Boys were more frequent on 'competency'. Age differences were also obtained, with 'physical appearance and popular personality' declining across the age range while 'personal integrity' increased.

As regards the overall relative frequency of dominant values expressed, Musgrave did not replicate the finding of the Eppels that the 'physical appearance and popular personality' category was by far the most prominent, containing about half of the values. Simmons and Wade (1983, 1985) did replicate the Eppels' findings, however, using the original categories. The perhaps unhelpful breadth of the 'physical appearance and popularity' category as originally conceived is...highlighted by the changes made by Musgrave. For example, it seems to include a desire for success and achievement which Musgrave separated out as 'competency'.

Despite these differences in the categories, there is some overlap between the findings of Simmons and Wade and those of Musgrave. Using a sample of British 15 year olds Simmons and Wade (1983) found that girls expressed 'friendly' values more often than boys, while boys had a higher frequency of 'materialistic' values. These differences were also present in Eppel and Eppel (1966). Simmons and Wade (1985) replicated these sex
differences in a study of Western European 14 to 17 year olds, and also found that girls displayed more 'co-operative and helpful' values than did boys. It should be noted that the category 'friendly' includes both the desire to be a social success and a concern to be polite and even-tempered.

Although the findings from the ideal person method encourage the identification of a wide range of criteria applied, they are still limited because the effective value objects are restricted to the class of 'ideal people'. Would the same criteria be applied with the same relative frequencies, and would the observed age and sex differences still be present if a wider range of value objects were sampled?

Simmons and Wade (1982) extended their scope by asking 15 year olds to complete the sentence "What matters to me more than anything else...". By this means they hoped to survey values in a more direct way than their ideal person method. Comparing the dominant values expressed in the two methods they found that the more direct sentence decreased the frequency of materialistic values and increased the amount of reference to family and friends. In addition, the respondents became more concerned with reality and less with fantasy.

It should be noted that in the content analysis of the more direct sentence Simmons and Wade tried to broadly adhere to the Eppels' categories. They made considerable changes to the precise nature of the categories, however. For example, approximately half of the values were classified as 'health' (personal happiness, employment), a curiously extensive category with no equivalent in the Eppels' scheme. Despite these changes, it is possible to see that the previously observed sex differences are broadly repeated in the more direct method. Boys expressed more 'materialistic' values than girls, while girls expressed more 'friendship' values than boys. This was limited to instances where friendship was valued for 'deeper' reasons, however. When friendship was expressed for utilitarian reasons, no sex difference was present.
This broadening of scope by Simmons and Wade has illustrated that a different profile of values is likely to emerge for different methods and ranges of value object. They have tried to cope with these changes by persisting with an Eppels-like six category system broadly ranging between egocentricity and altruism, their aim presumably being to enable valid comparisons to be made across their two sentences. This has not entirely succeeded as is evidenced by the changes that have been necessary to the nature of the categories. Musgrave (1984) also needed to revise and extend the categories in the light of the results from his subject sample.

What appears to be needed is a set of content analysis categories for values that is inclusive enough to be able to deal with variations in method, value objects, and subjects. Comparisons between studies might then be made with more confidence and with less shifting ground. The Simmons and Wade work also demonstrates, however, that some effects may be persistent enough to remain despite alterations in method, range of value objects sampled, and the nature of the content analysis system used to analyse the findings. A final proviso concerning the work of Simmons and Wade needs to be made, however. The more direct sentence was always presented as the sixth in a series of ten unfinished sentences, and it was always preceded by people-centred items, including the 'ideal person' test. The findings should be viewed with this procedural weakness in mind.

5.4.3 Standardised measures of values

The problem of the classification of values met by work using the 'Ideal Person' method is effectively treated as being solved when standardised tests are used. In using the term 'standardised' I refer to methods which both restrict the subjects' choice of response, and interpret these responses in terms of pre-established categories. Since the decline of interest in the 'Study of Values' (Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey, 1951),
Gordon's Survey of Interpersonal Values (SIV) and the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) have been widely used as standardised measures of children's values.

The SIV was developed through the use of factor analysis, which identified the six values that are measured by the instrument, and which are assumed to be the most important values involved in interpersonal relationships. The six values are described by Bachtold (1968).

The findings for sex differences using the SIV show much consistency across studies. Gordon (1960, 1963) published norms for 17 to 18 year olds showing that girls tended to attach a higher value than boys to 'support', 'conformity', and 'benevolence', and boys tended to rate 'independence' and 'leadership' higher. There was no sex difference for 'recognition'. With the exception of 'conformity', the sex differences have been repeated, with minor discrepancies, in several studies covering the age range 12 to 18 years (Bachtold, 1968; Stein, 1972; Kammes, 1972; Blumer, 1975). A sex difference for 'conformity' was observed in only one of these studies (Blumer, 1975, boys > girls at age 15). As regards 'recognition' Kammes (1972) found that boys in the 15 to 18 years range scored higher than girls, and Stein (1972) found this difference at age 16, but at age 15 it was reversed.

Age effects were most marked for 'conformity', 'independence' and 'benevolence'. A general decrease in the value attached to 'conformity' between ages 12 and 18 is present in the findings of Stein (1972), Kammes (1972) and Blumer (1975), although this decline seems to reach a plateau at ages 16 and 17 before continuing. For 'independence', higher value is attached at the oldest end of the age range as compared with the youngest, but the intervening trend is unclear (Bachtold, 1969; Gordon, 1960, 1963; Stein, 1972; Kammes, 1972). 'Benevolence' shows the opposite pattern to 'independence', the youngest subjects rating it higher than the oldest. An exception to this tendency is the finding of Blumer (1975) that 15 year olds score higher on 'benevolence' than 13 year olds. Age differences have not
been observed among this group of studies for 'leadership', while Blumer provides the only positive finding for 'support' and 'recognition', observing that 15 year olds attach a higher value than 13 year olds to both items.

The Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) has been a popular choice of instrument among investigators of children's values. A major developmental study covering the 11 to 17 years range was described by Rokeach (1973) (ex Beech and Schoeppe, 1970), and substantially the same data were reported and discussed in Beech and Schoeppe (1974). These data are complex. For each of the thirty-six values, four age levels and both sexes were studied. Interest could focus on the precise form of the age x sex pattern for each value. For present purposes, however, the level of description will be that adopted by Beech and Schoeppe (1974). As regards age effects, broad changes across the age range will be pointed out within the framework of Beech and Schoeppe's interpretation of these changes.

Beech and Schoeppe regard their findings as demonstrating, for both sexes, a growing self-confidence through achievement and competence (increases in importance of 'a sense of accomplishment', 'self respect', 'wisdom', 'ambitious', and 'responsible'), an increasing realism (decrease in 'a world of beauty'), a transition from group concerns to a greater awareness of the worth of the self (decrease in 'true friendship'), and a discarding of childhood roles in favour of greater independence (decreases in 'cheerful', 'helpful', and 'obedient').

In addition to these tendencies, the results for the girls are taken to illustrate conflicts regarding a girl's cultural sex role and her struggle to establish an adult role and independence within the family (increases in 'equality', 'inner harmony', 'social recognition', 'independent', and 'logical'; decreases in 'a comfortable life', 'an exciting life', 'family security', 'pleasure', and 'salvation').
Martin and Field (1976) compared a group of middle school (12 to 14 years) and high school students (15 to 18 years) and repeated some of these broad age trends. Like Beech and Schoeppe they found increases in the importance, for both sexes, of 'a sense of accomplishment' and 'responsible' and decreases in 'a world of beauty' and 'cheerful'. They also found, however, that 'inner harmony' increased and 'clean' decreased for both sexes, whereas Beech and Schoeppe had observed these for one sex only (girls and boys respectively), and that 'loving' and 'national security' decreased in importance (no effect found by Beech and Schoeppe). Most of Beech and Schoeppe's age trends did not recur.

Williams (1972), using an amended form of the RVS, looked at differences between 10 and 12 year olds, and some of the age trends found for the older age range were found to extend back to these ages. 'Self respect' and 'ambitious' increased in importance with age, while 'a world of beauty', 'true friendship', 'cheerful', 'clean', and 'loving' decreased. Additional age effects were noted for 'polite' (decrease), 'an exciting life', and 'dependable (increases).

The comparison of the Beech and Schoeppe findings with other studies can be extended to include investigations that are not primarily interested in age trends, but which sample populations at the ends of the age range covered (McCartin et al, 1984; Feather, 1972). These are not exactly comparable (for example McCartin et al used a version of the RVS modified for younger children) but the relative positions of the values may nevertheless be weighed against those observed by Beech and Schoeppe, and a judgement made as to whether or not they are in accord with the proposed age trends.

A combined consideration of these various studies indicates that 'a sense of accomplishment', 'ambitious', and 'responsible' have most empirical support as items that increase in value over the 12 to 18 years range, while 'a world of beauty', 'cheerful', 'helpful', 'family security', and
'pleasure' decrease in value.

Sex differences on the RVS using subjects in the 10 to 18 years range display a remarkable pattern. A collation of results from several investigations (Beech and Schoeppe, 1974; Feather, 1972; Williams, 1972; Martin and Field, 1976; Simmons, 1977; McCartin et al, 1984) shows that while sex differences are not invariably found for a particular value, when they do occur there is rarely a contradiction across studies. Out of thirty-four positive findings, only two (for 'logical') clashed. Sex differences found in three or more of the studies were for 'a comfortable life', 'an exciting life', 'pleasure', 'capable', 'intellectual', and 'self control', which tended to be ranked higher by boys, while girls ranked 'forgiving' and 'loving' higher. No sex differences were found in any of the studies for 'freedom', 'obedient', and 'responsible'.

Although the RVS covers a broad span of values, there are doubts that it adequately covers the entire value field. This is one of several problems with the RVS that were mentioned in chapter two (2.3.10). Of particular relevance to the use of the RVS with children is the problem of the meanings given by the subjects to the descriptions of the values. Several studies (Cole, 1972; Williams, 1972; McCartin et al, 1984) found it necessary to use a simplified form of the RVS with children in the 10 to 12 years range. In addition, the content of the RVS was chosen by Rokeach with the measurement of adult values in mind. The range and identity of values might be different if studies of children's values were to be used to determine the content of a standardised test aimed at children.

The SIV has the advantages of being derived from factor analysis and of using a rating rather than a ranking method, but it also was designed for use with adults, and it is narrow in range, being limited to interpersonal values.
5.4.4 Broad approaches

Some of the issues highlighted by the use of the RVS and SIV with children had already been considered by Cameron and Robertson (1970). They found that their standardised test, in which nine value dimensions were measured using Likert scales, did not detect age, sex, or cultural differences in values for a sample of 10 to 18 year olds from Scotland and the U.S.A. This was in contrast to the results from using an open-ended questionnaire followed by content analysis, which revealed significant cultural differences.

The similarity between children’s values found by the standardised test is itself an important observation, but Cameron and Robertson noted that a difficulty in the use of such tests "...lies in the difference between the categorization of theorists and that employed by the child on the street." (p.138). The value categories devised by psychologists or derived from adult subjects may not be those that are important for the children being studied, and therefore may fail to detect important value phenomena. Also, Cameron and Robertson pointed out the influence that the description of the items in a standardised test can have, suggesting that it would be possible to alter the relative preferences for items by making small changes in wording.

Their open-ended questionnaire did not suffer from these drawbacks. They asked for written replies to the question "What are the two most important things in life?". The generality of the question seems to encourage the expression of a broad range of values. It is similar to the 'more direct method' of Simmons and Wade (1982), but does not suffer from their procedural weaknesses and the straitjacket of the Eppels’ content analysis system. To analyse their data Cameron and Robertson devised 150 categories that were later reduced to 32 broader categories.

In presenting their findings the authors are primarily concerned with cultural differences, and therefore they do not provide a breakdown by age.
and sex. Nevertheless, the results are useful for present purposes in that they give an indication of the relative prominence of the values of children in the 10 to 18 years range. Taking both cultural groups together, 'education' was the most prominent category. This was followed by 'happiness', 'fun', 'health', and 'career', each of which contained more than 10% of all responses for at least one group. 'Family', 'friendship', 'religion', and 'biological needs' each accounted for between 5 and 8% of all responses.

Britton et al (1969) also used open-ended measures of children's values. Their main concern was to identify cultural differences between American and Finnish children in the 9 to 11 years range, but their methods and data are of interest for present purposes. They asked children to write down the best and worst things that could happen to them, and good/bad things that a child could do that would be praised/blamed. Each set of replies were categorised so as to aid cross-cultural comparisons, but if the findings are averaged over all subjects, they give an indication of the prominent value categories of children in this age range.

'Personal achievement' and 'personal pleasure' were the two main categories of 'best things that could happen'. 'Receive clothes or property' was also a prominent category. In the analysis of 'worst things that could happen', 'accident or illness of self' was the major category, followed by 'personal inadequacy or failure' and 'misfortune, discomfort'.

In the second set of questions, orientations toward conformity and social relations appear to be encouraged. When 'good things to do' were analysed, 'service to others' was found to be the prime category, followed by 'family relations' and 'achievement and self-improvement'. The most prominent category of the 'bad things to do' was 'aggressive behaviour, fighting, killing' with 'lack of care of property or self' in second place.

Another approach that comprises a broad scan of the value field is that of Dennis (1974). The Uses Test was constructed as part of a cross-cultural
research programme into values. It relies upon the assumptions that thinking in terms of purposes is universal, and that in answering questions about the purposes of objects, a person's prevalent values are revealed. The Uses Test is not a direct measure of values, but does seem to sample cognitive beliefs about objects, and thus could indicate the prominent criteria applied to value objects. The test was devised with the intention that it could be used with children, and the scoring categories were derived empirically, being those which the researchers found accounted for about 90% of all replies.

The categories are 'sustentative' (basic requirements of ordinary living), 'benevolent' (helping and friendship), 'malevolent' (unpleasant, harmful, fearful, dangerous, etc.), 'hedonistic' (pleasure, liking), 'esthetic' (pretty, attractive, beautiful), 'religious' (reference to deities, religious beliefs and practices), 'hierarchical' (status, ambition, achievement), and 'not scorable' (answers which cannot be otherwise categorised plus illegible and incoherent responses).

The Uses Test has mainly been employed for examining cross-cultural differences in values, so there is no information on age and sex differences on the instrument. Some studies, however, enable the relative prominence of these categories among children to be assessed. Dennis (1974) reports studies on 11 to 13 year olds (Al-Issa and Dennis, 1967) and 10 to 15 year olds (Al-Issa, 1968). Botha (1968, 1970) collected data from 14 and 15 year olds in South Africa. The stability of the relative prominence of the categories across several cultural groups is remarkable. 'Sustentative' is the most prominent category, accounting for between 28 and 37% of answers. 'Hedonistic' and 'benevolent' tend to vie for second place, with 12 to 21% and 10 to 20% of all replies respectively. This pattern was also observed by Pandey (1977) using an Indian sample of 10 to 12 year olds.

This degree of similarity arouses the suspicion, however, that the categories of the test are too broad and not precise enough to detect
important differences in values. This possibility is supported by the observation made by Dennis himself that Manaster and Havighurst (1972) found it necessary to sub-divide the 'sustentative' category by abstracting from it an 'intellectual' category.

Another open-ended method designed to be used with children is the Social Values Inventory (SVI) (Ryan, 1971). As reported by Silvino (1975) this is a twelve-item open-ended questionnaire designed to elicit a variety of values or value-related statements. These are then analysed into twenty value categories. Silvino (1975) used the SVI to examine age and sex differences in a sample of 10 to 12 year olds. He found that the 10 year olds' replies fell into the 'achievement' and 'health' categories more often than the other two age groups. The 11 year olds replied more often than the other ages in terms of 'religion', while a similar finding occurred for the 12 year olds and 'independence'.

Boys' replies were more often than girls' categorised as 'pleasure', 'materialism', and 'achievement', and girls were found to reply more frequently than boys in terms of 'environment'.

In the studies considered so far, even when open-ended methods have been used, the categories for the analysis of children's values have been determined by adults. This has been either as respondents in factor analysis studies, or as researchers deciding upon content analysis systems or the items of a standardised measure. Hallworth and Waite (1963, 1966) conducted factor analysis studies of the evaluations of 14 and 15 year olds, which gave an indication of the value criteria applied by this age group. A number of familiar concepts were rated on evaluative scales of the Semantic Differential. In their first study, using girls only, five independent factors were identified. These were labelled as 'virtues and associated personalities', 'the feminine image', the image of school and authority', 'abstract concepts', and 'the masculine image'.

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Both sexes were included in the second study, and the factor analysis was more complex. The Promax, first order factors are most relevant for current purposes. There were five of these non-independent factors for either sex. For the boys, these were labelled as 'success, ambition, and reward', 'teachers, school and authority', 'virtue, home and pleasure', 'money and the future', and 'parents and self'. The girls' factors were labelled 'the feminine image', 'security', 'the image of school and men', 'honesty and kindness', and 'reward, youth, and money'.

Factor analysis of children's evaluations has also been used in the development of the Values Inventory for Children (VIC) (Guilford and Gupta, 1971; Guilford, Gupta, and Goldberg, 1971). This has been designed as a nonverbal measure of values for use with children from age 6 upwards, in which children are asked either to evaluate pictures by circling one of four drawn faces ranging from a frown to a broad smile (form X), or to express a preference for one of a pair of pictures by means of a drawn mark (form Y).

Factor analysis of both versions of the VIC have resulted in the same seven dimensions. These are 'me first' (dominance, selfishness), 'masculinity' (liking for danger and aggression), 'asocial' (liking for the socially disapproved or harmful), 'academic' (school, learning), 'adult closeness' (physical closeness to parents), 'sociability' (liking many friends), and 'social conformity' (conforming to adults' rules, being helpful). The VIC provides scores on each of these dimensions, and age differences in these for both versions of the VIC were reported by Guilford (1974). The age range is from 7 to 10 years.

The most marked age effects are for 'me first', and 'asocial', which decline with age over the 7 to 9 years range, and 'sociability', which increases between ages 8 and 9. 'Academic' tends to be valued higher by the younger children, particularly the 8 year olds. No age differences were observed for 'social conformity', while the few differences found for 'masculinity' and 'adult closeness' were inconsistent across VIC versions.
The findings described and issues discussed concerning the study of children's values have so far been confined to what I have called the content of value. This thesis also investigates the structure of value. The position is taken that there is an intimate relationship between cognitive development and the development of value systems, that these related changes can properly be regarded as an integral part of the study of value development, and that it is theoretically useful to make a conceptual distinction between content and structure. Some structural factors, for example the complexity of a value system, are conceived to be general tendencies in the subject that influence evaluations regardless of the context or specific object being evaluated.

In the exploratory research it was found that 'response style' reflects the complexity of a value system. There is little in the value development literature that is concerned with this topic, however, beyond a few incidental observations. Weir (1960) noted that Werner's differentiation theory suggests "An increasing ability to draw fine distinctions in evaluation" (p.66). Weir did not study children's evaluations, however, and his interest in response style in adults was only peripheral. Osgood et al (1957) commented that children operate better with a five-step rather than a seven-step SD scale, while Knight et al (1985) found in pilot tests that 3 to 5 year olds could not understand the category 'neither like nor dislike'.

Butzin and Anderson (1973) used a seven-point response scale consisting of a series of smiling or frowning faces with children aged 5 to 13 years. They did not report any age-related response style effects and concluded that interval scales could be used effectively with children as young as 5 years. In the 'X form' of the Values Inventory for Children (Guilford, 1974), however, only four faces were used as response categories with children aged 7 to 10 years.
Increases in the stability of values with age have been noted by Lehalle (1973) and by DiVesta and Dick (1964). Lehalle (1973) studied the reliability of the rankings of value objects by children aged 5 to 12 years, interpreted in Piagetian terms to indicate invariance. An increase in invariance up to 9 years was observed, followed by a slight decrease. DiVesta and Dick (1964), in their 'delayed retest' condition, found an increase in the reliability of children's SD evaluations between 8 and 11 years.

5.5 SIMILARITIES IN VALUES

In section 5.4 the main emphasis when describing empirical findings was on identifying age and sex effects found in previous studies. It is important to note, however, that a high degree of value similarity has often been observed. A review of value development at the broadest level should take sufficient note of this phenomenon.

Beech and Schoeppe (1974) in their RVS study of 11 to 17 year olds remarked that "The most striking result was the relative stability of the rankings over all grades, perhaps indicative of a core cultural pattern." (p.644). McCartin et al (1984) used an amended form of the RVS with 12 year olds and noted that there was high agreement in rankings of values within generational groups. The high degree of consistency across several cultures in the relative prominence of the categories of the Uses Test has already been noted, as has the observations by Cameron and Robertson (1970) concerning their standardised test. In this, very high correlations were found between the inferred rankings of nine values by six groups of children defined by an age x culture matrix.

Potter (1969) noted a remarkable degree of consistency between different groups of high school seniors in their rankings of the eight values in the Poe Inventory of Values. Earlier, the results presented by Hawkes (1952) displayed a high level of consensus between the sexes and between 10 and 12
year olds in the rank orders of the ten values measured by his 'Making Choices' inventory. Likewise, Comeau (1980) found a very high level of concordance across age (15 to 18 years) and sex in the rank ordering of ten adjectives describing 'self-values'. Ahammer (1971) also observed high correlations between age groups ranging from 11-12 years to 64-74 years in their desirability judgements of four personality dimensions. Two earlier studies of desirability judgements referred to by Ahammer also reported high correlations between subjects of different ages: Klieger and Walsh (1967) with groups of children from 4 to 11 years and students, and Cowen (1966), who compared children of 6 to 7 years with students.

Some of these findings may be attributable to the use of techniques which do not make sufficiently fine categorisations of children's values. This again highlights the need for the development of better measures of children's values, in this case for an instrument that includes a measure of the degree of similarity between subjects as well as the relative influence of factors of interest to the user (age, sex, class, culture, etc.).

Improved techniques for measuring values would hopefully emerge from the approach to the study of value being explored in this thesis.
CHAPTER SIX

IDIOPHORIC STUDIES OF VALUE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Following the theoretical analysis of the field and the description of an empirical approach to the study of value, the next part of the thesis concentrates on illustrating the approach by means of a number of exploratory studies. The present chapter is focused upon the use of the approach in obtaining a qualitative and idiographic understanding of children’s values, whereas chapter seven is concerned with the quantitative and nomothetic aspects of understanding values.

This implementation of the approach illustrates its usefulness in understanding children’s values. The approach may be seen as an organising and facilitating heuristic device, providing concepts which help us to understand the values of children. There is, however, a continual dynamic interaction between the approach and the information that it helps to provide. Thus, in what follows, not only is the approach illustrated, but also there are indications of how it might be modified as a result of the observations.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In 6.2 the details of the three interviews carried out are briefly described. The two remaining sections correspond to the two main aspects of the approach introduced in chapter four. In 6.3 the value network model (see 4.2.2) is considered. This section is aimed at illustrating and assessing the usefulness of the concept of value network and its associated ideas. While this model is conceived to be part of the structure of value, it should be pointed out that it is of help in describing the content of value, as is illustrated in section 6.3.1. Section 6.4 is concerned with the model of the process of
evaluation (see 4.2.3), and again this is found to be useful vehicle for conveying the content of children's values.

6.2 DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEWS

The content of the present chapter is based upon the interpretation and analysis of a set of three interviews which I carried out with each of twelve children. The children were pupils of St Hild's primary school in Durham aged ten and eleven years, and were randomly chosen from a class of 28. There were eight girls and four boys in the sample. Children of this age were studied in order to avoid problems associated with either end of the age range being investigated in the exploratory research. Some of the younger children might be unaware of their values or be unable to articulate their values in an interview. Some older children may have complex value systems which would require more time than was available in order to fully explore them. The first two interviews were conducted in a one-to-one situation, out of the hearing of any other person. The third interview was observed by the child's teacher.

The scope and structure of the interviews were guided by the approach. The procedure described below, in which the probing of criteria applied was interspersed with general conversation, was aimed at constructing value networks. Criteria applied were elicited, together with the direction of the values attached to these criteria. The relationships between the child's values were indicated, and the procedure also enabled ultimate values to be identified.

While the general form of the interviews was decided in advance, the precise content was influenced by the child. It was important to allow the children free rein to express and discuss the values of their choice, in order that a representative view of their individual value systems might be obtained.
Ultimate values were studied in depth in the interviews because of their importance to the approach. These were identified by analysing the comments made by the children in their first interviews, and were then investigated further in the second interviews.

In addition to being a wide-ranging exploration of value networks, however, the set of interviews were also intended to study specific aspects of the process of evaluation. Among these was the influence of context, the importance of which was emphasised in chapter four. The effects of variation in context were examined in two ways. Firstly, at the start of the second interview, the children were asked to make two contextual evaluations. Secondly, the social context of the third interview included the presence of the child's schoolteacher. In order to study the effects of these changes in context, it was necessary to focus on the evaluation of specific objects. 'School' and 'toy' were chosen as items of relevance to ten and eleven year olds. In order to establish a 'baseline' condition, school and toy were always the first words to be evaluated in the first interview. In addition, information about the children's beliefs about school and toy was obtained at the start of the first interview.

The differences between subjective and reported evaluations were investigated in the second interview by asking the child to tell me about any occasions when they might have said that they liked or disliked a person or a thing, when really they thought that the opposite was true. This question was included in the second session in the hope that a relationship between myself and the child might have been established by this time, sufficient to encourage the child to reveal this sort of information.

In the first interview the children were asked to pretend that I was a visitor to their country who knew nothing about their life. They were first asked to tell me about school, and then asked to tell me about toys. This procedure allowed me to establish a rapport with the child, and also served as a warm-up session prior to talking about their values. It also enabled
some insight into their beliefs about 'school' and 'toy', which was of use in studying the effects of changes in context.

The remainder of the first interview consisted of six separate units each of which followed the same pattern. The children were asked to evaluate a written word by placing it into one of five categories: 'very good', 'good', 'not good or bad', 'bad', and 'very bad'. Each category name was written on a separate sheet of paper, and the child was asked to place the word (written on a piece of paper) on to one of the sheets.

The criteria applied in the evaluation were explored by asking a question such as: "I see you've placed 'cheat' on the sheet marked 'bad', can you tell me why that is please?". The replies given by the children often revealed other values and the basis for these were questioned in turn. This procedure continued until a value was reached which the child could not provide a reason for, or until the child referred to a value which had already been investigated.

The procedure was interspersed with more general, unstructured talk about the topics being covered. It was found that this method encouraged a wide-ranging discourse to occur which diverged from the word which had been evaluated. The precise ground covered was largely decided by the children themselves through the values that they reported in reply to my questions. 'School' and 'toy' were always the first two words to be evaluated. The remaining four words were chosen at random from a pool of a hundred words that had been used in the second factor analysis study (see 7.3.1 and appendix A8).

The second interview began by asking the children to make two contextual evaluations. Firstly they were asked to imagine that they were fifteen years old, asked to evaluate 'school' and to tell me the basis for their evaluation. Secondly they were asked to imagine that they were their own age but were a member of the opposite sex. They were then asked to evaluate 'toy' and to give the basis for their evaluation.
The remainder of the second interview was similar to the first in that it included asking the children to make evaluations which were followed by questioning about the basis for those evaluations, interspersed with general conversation. This time, however, the objects to be evaluated consisted of words or phrases chosen to express the ultimate values or important values that were indicated in the first interview. For subject LC2, for example, these included 'feeling guilty' and 'men and women being equal'. In addition all subjects were asked, at an opportune moment when appropriate to the discourse, to tell me about any occasions when they might have said that they liked or disliked a person or a thing, when really they thought that the opposite was true.

The third interview consisted of a short session which was intended to examine the effects of a change in context on the evaluation and criteria applied to 'school'. The variation of context consisted of the presence of the children's form teacher. As a warm-up task the children were first asked to evaluate 'toy' and to explain their evaluation. They were then asked to do the same for 'school'.

6.3 THE VALUE NETWORK MODEL

6.3.1 Two children's values analysed in depth

The value network model will now be demonstrated by analysing the comments made by two children (GA and AH) during their interviews. Value networks were constructed for all twelve children, and any of them could have been analysed in this section for the purposes of illustrating the model. Two children whose value networks were distinctly different as regards content were selected. The wider range of values thereby covered enables the model to be illustrated in more detail. In addition, the contrast suggests that the values of children of a similar age and from the same culture can revolve around very different concerns.
In the course of analysing these value networks, I will be using a set of symbols for displaying them. These may be consulted in the appendix (A2).

All children were asked about their beliefs and values concerning school. It is instructive to compare the two children currently being considered in terms of the values attached and criteria applied to school.

The appropriate portions of their value networks are shown in figure 6.1. Whereas AH evaluated school as 'good', GA was only prepared to say it was 'not good or bad'. When asked in more detail about these evaluations the children indicated that they applied similar criteria, but that there was an important difference as well. GA applied two criteria. The degree of interest and enjoyment or, conversely, disinterest and boredom that school might provide was the first of these. The other concerned the opportunities for either playing with friends or losing them. The good things about school, the interest, enjoyment, and friendship aspects were balanced by its bad features, the disliked, boring work and the possibility of quarreling with friends.

AH also applied both of these criteria, but added a third, the role of school in providing useful knowledge. For AH school was partly a means to the goal of getting a good office job. This orientation toward the future was also indicated when AH volunteered: "I don't really like school, I don't like the work". This suggests that at present school is bad for AH, the requirement to do disliked work outweighing the playing with friends aspect. When future benefits are added, however, the balance is tilted toward regarding school as a good thing overall.

A wider view of the values of these two children will now be taken. A useful strategy is to build up the network starting from the fragment already considered, adding related information gathered at various points in the interviews. I will analyse GA's values first. A diagram of this value network is provided (figure 6.2).
Figure 6.1: Subjects GA and AH.
Value networks associated with school

A. Subject GA

B. Subject AH

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Figure 6.2: Value network of subject GA

- being bored
- having someone to talk to
- having hurt feelings
- being alone
- being good, loving, understanding
- helping with problems
- sharing problems
- helping someone
- mutual help
- feeling worried about someone
- demonstrating friendship
- making new friends
- giving presents
- being cheered up
- giving
- girl
- independence
- playing with friends
- activities with friends
- being happy
- enjoying yourself
- being kind
- doing good things
- being gods
- loneliness
- school
- interesting activities
- being alone
- boredom
- loneliness
- school
- loneliness
- boredom
- loneliness
- school
The most prominent feature of this value network is the central importance of friendship and related concepts in influencing what is of value or disvalue. Several lines of probing converged on this web of concepts. Thus 'give' was interpreted as 'giving presents' and was given a positive evaluation. This is a demonstration of existing friendships "It means that you like someone...you give presents to friends, you know what they like". This knowledge of the likes and dislikes of friends was stressed as an indicator of friendship. Friends give each other appropriate gifts. Presents might also be given to strengthen, to mend broken, or to make new friendships.

The pull of friendship as a value criterion was demonstrated in the course of further questioning about the value of having close friends. According to GA, this enables the sharing of problems and having someone to talk to, which in turn avoids a situation in which "you would be bored.... staying at home". Here was an opportunity for the chain of justification to break away from friendship. This 'bored' scenario might be bad because you might become ill, or annoy parents, for example, but GA replied: "nobody would like you, you'd be unpopular, people would shun you. I like to have friends to talk to, to be happy with".

Value criteria again converged on friendship from the topic of God. God is good in terms of the 'personal characteristics' that he is said to possess. "If there is a God, and he's like people say he is, being good, loving, and understanding, then he would be good". When asked why these qualities were good, GA's attention shifted to the human world. Having these qualities attracts people to you and you can help them with their problems. This in turn helps you to be friends with people.

Another example of this convergence was found when the value attached to 'girl' was investigated (GA is an eleven-year-old boy). Overall, GA is neutral toward girls. "If I like her, and she's nice, we might make friends. They're just the same as boys really, I would treat her like my
other friends". On the other hand: "She could be someone horrible...who
expects to be bought things. She might invite you round for tea and you
really don’t want to go. They might not like to play the things that you
do". This shows that girls are good to the extent that they become
boy-like, just another friend, but they can thwart the desire to play with
friends and threaten one’s independence.

The above information was gathered in the first interview with GA.
Following analysis of this interview, and the evident importance of
friendship, I asked him more directly about its value in the second session.
He evaluated ‘having friends’ as being good, and when asked why this was so,
he elaborated his idea of friendship. There appear to be two main strands
to this idea, the activities that can be pursued with friends ("...going out
with them, playing with them, going to the pictures, going for walks,
instead of being by yourself not doing anything") and the mutual help given
by friends ("You can help each other with problems ...they can help you with
your work or you can get cheered up if you have problems"). For both of
these strands, when asked why they were good, GA indicated that they
produced happiness. This suggests an intimate connection between friendship
and happiness for this person, friendship being a major and direct route to
happiness. This connection was further illustrated when he was asked about
both ‘being happy’ and ‘enjoying yourself’. The status of the former as an
ultimate value was indicated when in reply to "why is it a good thing to be
happy?" he said "I don’t know. I just like being happy", but it’s close
connection with friendship was also suggested when he added "I’m happy when
I’m doing things. It’s miserable when you stay in and you’re not friends
with anyone". Similarly ‘enjoying yourself’ was good because "It means
you’re happy. Again you’re not sitting around being miserable. You’re
going out where you want with your friends. It gives you a nice feeling
really".
Yet further evidence for the central importance of friendship as a value criterion was obtained when GA spoke about 'having hurt feelings' and 'feeling worried about someone'. The place of these two concepts in the network is indicated in figure 6.2.

Returning now to the portion of the value network concerning school (Figure 6.1) it can be seen that one of the criteria applied goes directly to the heart of GA's values. Exploration of the other criterion also revealed some interesting features. The concept of 'work' was found to be closely identified with the aspects of school that were evaluated in terms of the interest and enjoyment, or otherwise, of the various activities engaged in. Work was good if enjoyable, not boring, and interesting, or bad "if it's doing work that you don't like. It's pretty boring, not interesting". Concepts such as school and work can thus be identified as being close in evaluative meaning and placed in close proximity in the value network.

Further probing of what constituted interesting work for GA suggested that the criteria of activity and independence were important. Being outside, studying wildlife or doing sports was preferred to being in class. Doing creative work such as writing stories and drawing was preferred to directed activities such as doing sums. Having a choice of which sport to do was singled out as being a special treat.

The value of independence was also found at other points in the interviews. As already mentioned, girls are bad if they threaten independence. Interesting interactions between the values of friendship and independence were noted. When talking about playing with friends he indicated that he was often willing to play games that he did not want to play in order to please his friends: "...so as to be friends. I don't like to boss my friends about". In addition, when speaking of being alone, he volunteered that this had its compensations: "...but you can do what you like when you're on your own. You can watch the telly, see a video". In
both cases it should be noted that the comments suggest that a higher value is attached to friendship than to independence.

Turning now to AH, I will again follow the strategy of building up the value network from the fragment associated with school. The value network of this subject clusters around the 'future benefits' criterion. Strictly speaking I should refer to the 'potential life disasters' that school can help to avoid, because the values of AH are organised around negatively valued concepts often concerned with miserable states of existence. The value network of AH is shown in figure 6.3.

This negativity was illustrated when AH was asked to evaluate 'life'. This was judged to be good, but her explanations were negative: "You wouldn't live if you didn't have life... no one would live, you wouldn't be able to do the things that you do now". These things were categorised as work and play. As regards work, this was good because: "You learn things. If you didn't, you'd have no job, no money, life wouldn't be worth living". This state of affairs was bad because "you'd have nothing to look forward to or anything". When pressed to say why this in turn was undesirable, she replied: "You would just be sitting there, or wandering around with nothing to do". Her replies were essentially elaborations on, or reiterations of, the central concept of living a worthless life, which is how I have termed this concept on the value network. This is to be regarded as a shorthand label for its full complexity, which includes notions of pointlessness and hopelessness.

The other main aspect of life, play, was good because: "it stops you from being bored" which means "you have nothing to do, you moan on, get shouted at". In this bad state "you wouldn't feel happy... you'd feel sick, you wouldn't really like it".

Another route to miserable states of existence was found when evaluating 'doctor'. Again the goodness of doctors was expressed in terms of the avoidance of negative states. "You might die if there were no doctors, or
Figure 6.3: Value network of subject AH

greed = being demanding

being impolite = hurting someone's feelings

not giving in return = being selfish

being selfish = cheating

making teacher angry = having undeserved success

not learning = not getting an office job

not learning = not having a job

having no money = play

having no money = being bored

having nothing to do; complaining = being told off by parents

being sad and unhappy = suffering

suffering = others suffering

others suffering = doctor

doctor = dying

living a worthless life = being with friends

being with friends = doing liked work

doing liked work = school

school = being friends

being friends = doing liked work

being friends = school

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if doctors didn’t come" and also "You would usually suffer". Suffering was bad because "You wouldn’t be very happy, you’d be sad all the time" and "life wouldn’t be worth living if you were suffering and you were unhappy all the time".

In the second session further information about AH’s ‘miserable states’ was obtained by asking her about ‘feeling unhappy’, ‘suffering’, and ‘a miserable life’. Her comments on feeling unhappy pertained to her ‘being bored’ scenario, reiterating the disvalues previously expressed. Some further detail was found when she spoke of suffering, however. She focused on a situation where a person was suffering and likely to die. "...it’s better to let them die rather than to see them suffer... if they’re in a coma and are going to die anyway". This shows that for AH suffering of this kind is worse than death, and again stresses her central concern that miserable states of life should be avoided.

When asked to evaluate ‘living a miserable life’ she translated this into her terms as ‘living a sad life’ and judged it to be bad. When asked why this was so, her replies indicated that this was an ultimate value. She merely restated the value "It’s living a sad life, nothing to look forward to", and when pressed further she did not know why this was bad. She was, however, able to give an example of such a life: "People on the streets, runaways, living in tunnels. They don’t have a proper home, they go shoplifting and that". This is a vivid example of AH’s value system, illustrating how part of it centres on the avoidance of such states, and how the value attached to objects, ‘school’ for example, can be influenced by this concern. AH’s positive evaluation of school appears to be due to her desire to avoid becoming a jobless and homeless young adult.

While building up the value network from the fragment associated with school has proved a useful strategy, it does not necessarily identify all the important features identified in the interviews. In the case of AH there is a distinct and separate part of the network centred on the concept
of 'things that are not right'.

Talking about 'greed', for example led to comments about how it was bad to be demanding: "wanting this, wanting that", this was "not polite" which: "doesn't seem right, I don't know why". Also, to accept sweets from friends and not give in return was unfair, which again was bad because: "I don't know, it doesn't seem right". The criteria applied to 'cheat' also revolved around unfairness (there is a link from the concept of cheating to the other part of the value network. Cheating in school can lead to the no job/no money scenario through teachers being angry). Likewise 'being selfish' was viewed as being unfair and 'not being polite' meant hurting somebody's feelings which "...wouldn't be right. I wouldn't like it, you wouldn't feel happy inside".

6.3.2 The usefulness and limitations of the value network model

The use of value networks has greatly helped the identification of the most prominent features of these children's value systems. The expression of a complex reality in terms of an abstract, schematic representation has enabled some prominent values to be detected and shown the relationships between many of their values. For example, the differences between the two children in the value attached to 'school' were found to reflect more fundamental differences in their value systems. AH lays more stress on the long-term benefits of school, reflecting one of her central concerns, the avoidance of a worthless life. She knows that school can also provide friends, but this is a relatively minor factor. In contrast, this aspect reflects the central importance of friendship in the value system of GA.

The value network model was found to be of use in the analysis and description of the values expressed by the children during the interviews. The complexity of the children's replies to my questions was simplified into a schematic representation of their values as given in a value network. This is one level at which values can be understood, but value networks also
serve as an organising framework which can be used to understand the complexities and detail of a value system. The above descriptions, in which the subjects' own remarks are interspersed with my interpretations is an example of how the use of value networks in this way can lead to a more complex understanding, an understanding which conveys something of the unique 'flavour' of a person's values, while being informed and organised by the earlier structural analysis.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that a value network is a heuristic device, a model of reality, and that it is bound to be an imperfect replica. As well as using the value network model as an aid to understanding the values of children as expressed during the interviews, I have also noted those instances when the comments made by the children could require the model to be modified. These observations are also worth recording for their own sake as interesting facets of value systems.

The possible modifications were indicated when the children qualified their evaluations of objects in some way. Broadly speaking, this reflects the fact that objects can have both good and bad aspects, and that subjects may be more or less aware of this fact when making evaluations. Some examples of this awareness can be comfortably handled by the value network model. For example, KG was speaking of how cultural advances had led to people living longer: "...to some extent it's a good thing, but you could see your friends and children dying if you lived for ever". Comments of this kind are in accord with the model because it includes the idea that a value attached to an object can be the result of both 'good' and 'bad' criteria applied. The subject in the example is referring to each of these in turn.

More difficult for the model are examples such as SV's views on equality, where everyone should be equal "...instead of some people being in higher places ...apart from the Queen and the Prime Minister, people who have power". Also problematic are examples of the recognition that you can have
too much of a good thing. For EW, being able to stay up and watch television is a good thing, but: "If you watch telly all night you would be tired in the mornings". These cases seem to require that a more complex representation of the subject's concepts is incorporated into value networks. The model must recognise that a concept can be made up of more than one value object. EW's concept of 'watching television', for example, contains the value objects 'watching too much television' and 'watching the right amount of television'.

This sub-division of concepts can lead to the subject being unwilling to make an overall evaluation of a concept. When asked to evaluate 'teacher', CS replied "It depends on what sort of teacher it is. I prefer a man. It depends on what subject he's doing as well". Here we have an example where there are values attached to the various sub-divisions of 'teacher' but not to the overall concept. The subject cannot make an evaluation until he has more information as to which of his sub-concepts is being referred to. Although these observations cause difficulties for the model they should not lead to any substantial alterations being needed. It merely seems that the 'nodes' of the network need to be specified in more detail than was previously thought.

Other changes required as a result of the interviews may be more fundamental, however. The model may need to incorporate subjects' awareness of a temporal component in evaluation. Examples of this are the 'live now, pay later' outlook and also the recognition that future benefits may accrue if one does something that is difficult or unpleasant. An instance of this time aspect was noted when AH was talking about watching 'video nasties'. While the immediate experience of watching a horror film can vary wildly between pleasant and unpleasant feelings, the overall experience is enjoyed. In the longer term, however, AH knows through personal experience that the watching of such films can cause nightmares and extremely unpleasant feelings.
The 'video nasty' example highlights a final point at which the model may need to be supplemented. A dynamic element is required in order to describe ambivalence or mixed feelings. In such cases the good and bad aspects of the object are both highly charged and seem to alternate in their control of the value attached. Winning an award, for example, can be good because people would talk about it and you would feel good, but you could also feel extremely embarrassed in this situation (EW).

6.3.3 Justification and non-justification in value networks

The value network model incorporates the idea of justification, supposing that values are organised in relation to the justificatory links between them. The children interviewed generally found no difficulty in answering questions of the form "Why is X a good (or bad) thing?". On the whole they easily and happily coped with such questions, tending to answer in terms of the consequences that might flow from a value object, or a situation involving it. These consequences were themselves charged with a 'value attached'. For example, when asked why 'stranger' was bad LC1 replied "He might ask you if you want to see some kittens.... but might want to take you somewhere and kill you or something". Many examples were noted. Another comes from CG for whom 'having hurt feelings' is bad because: "They might start doing stupid things, blaming other people and hurting other people".

In a minority of cases, however, justification was not in terms of the effects of the value but in relation to its causes, what must have happened for a value to have come into existence. Thus 'having a heart attack' is bad because "It would show that you've been lazy" (EW).

Justification of values was commonplace, but not universal. Instances where a value was not justified are consistent with the network model, however. One class of these reflects the subject's desire to define more precisely the value being considered. One or more particular circumstances or sub-divisions of the concept might be defined. This was merely a prelude
to justifying the value as more exactly specified, however. 'Take', for example, was judged to be bad by MH. When asked why this was so he said what he meant by 'take' before justifying the disvalue: "It's being used to taking things and not giving them back".

A second class of non-justification occurred when the subject was clearly unwilling or unable to fully explore her values and was therefore inclined to give no answer or reply "I don't know". Thus when asked why it would be bad not to be able to co-operate with friends and family or to do things to help them, PL gave no reply. In terms of the model this event could indicate an ultimate value, but interpretations should be made in relation to the overall pattern of the subject's replies and the general manner of the subject. PL seemed reticent and unwilling to display her values. If the above exchange occurred with subject GA, however, who showed plenty of evidence of the importance to him of friendship, and who was clearly happy to talk, then the lack of a reply would have been interpreted as a difficulty in justifying an ultimate value.

This brings me on to the third, and most important, class of non-justification, those replies which were taken to indicate ultimate values. This inability to justify is built into the definition of an ultimate value. Replies to a request to say why such a value is held result in the subject being unable to justify it (don't know or no reply), replying by merely restating the value or saying that it 'just is' good or bad, or replying with a form of words which is essentially a reassertion of the same value. When asked why it was bad to be continually sad, for example, LC2 replied "It's just not nice being sad all the time". Also, talking with SV about boredom: it is bad because "They'd be nobody to play with on a Saturday, I'd be totally bored", and when asked why this was bad: "It would just be a bad thing".
The ultimate value concept plays an important role in both the value network model and the model of the process of evaluation. It can also be of use in describing the values of individuals as was found above when GA and AH were considered. It may be possible to obtain important insights into a person’s value system through knowing the main focal points which influence the values attached to less central value objects. An important observation that was made during the interviews, however, was that a person’s ultimate values may not be of equal importance. That is, they are not all at the extreme ends of a good—bad scale, but may be arranged by the subject in an order of rank. A good example of this was given by LC2, for whom both 'death' and 'living in pain' were ultimate values. Talking of accident victims she said: "It would be better for them to die rather than being in pain all the time...". Another example, mentioned by three children, was the conflict between 'being fair' and 'being healthy' in relation to eating meat (SV, CG, LC2). For all of these children 'fairness' was a central value, but it was outranked by survival needs when the two values clashed. The killing of animals was unfair to the animals, but justified when it was done to provide food.

The importance of ultimate values in understanding value systems suggests that it could be useful to classify them in some way. The interviews carried out in this part of the research only provide a small sample, but they do contain some interesting pointers. The most compelling observation about ultimate values is that a large number of them may be classified broadly as 'hedonistic', referring to good or bad feelings experienced by individuals. Values involving liking, disliking, happiness, enjoyment, feeling sad and feeling bored are examples, as are the various states of misery that AH among others described: living in constant pain, being forever worried about being safe, living in permanent poverty, and so on.
Other ultimate values may be classed as 'Justice' (fairness, unfairness, equality) 'Survival' (Having food, danger, dying, being killed) 'Altruism' (being kind, helping people, helping animals, giving) and 'Friendship' (playing with friends, sharing problems).

6.3.5 Coping with the rich diversity of value networks

This analysis might be seen as laying the groundwork for a description of individuals in terms of which category their ultimate values fall into, a primitive 'typology' akin to the Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey Study of Values. This would be mistaken, however, in that it allows the theoretical constructs which are intended as an aid to understanding to dominate and obscure the rich diversity of people's values.

One of the main impressions that I have gained from this series of interviews is that while individuals can have very similar values at the heart of their value systems, the nuances and scope of their concepts can comprise important differences. These details need to be grasped in order to understand the person's values.

To illustrate this important point I will compare GA and MH. Both boys had 'friendship' as a central feature of their value systems. Both recognised that having friends provided enjoyment and help, and prevented being bored and lonely. Being 'good' in various ways can lead to having friends while being 'bad' can discourage friendships. If these subjects were to be 'typified', they would be likely to be banded together because the values that they attach to objects flow from a concern for friendship and the values that it provides and prevents.

Behind the surface similarities, however, there are essential differences. For GA, being 'good' has an indirect relationship with friendship. Being kind, loving, and understanding enables a person to help others with their problems. This can lead to friendships. MH, however, sees being unselfish as a direct means for making friends, while being
greedy and demanding will lose friends.

MH laid greater stress than GA on the personal benefits to be gained. While GA referred to the sharing of problems and the mutual helping associated with friendship, MH's concerns were oriented toward self-interest: "They can help you if you are in trouble or injured". "People might stick up for you...you won't be in so much bother with other people". In contrast to this orientation, GA tended to emphasise the intrinsic features of friendship: "...going out with them, playing with them, going to the pictures, going for walks, instead of being by yourself not doing anything".

A final important difference was the prominent place of parents in the value system of MH as opposed to their lack of any mention by GA. In terms of value, the concepts of parents and friends are closely allied for MH. Good or bad behaviour can strengthen or weaken the relationship with parents as well as make or break friendships. Also, a main reason for pleasing parents and friends is for the help and support that they can provide. This suggests that MH is less mature than GA. Friendships are seen as an extension of nurturant parental relationships, while GA appears to be integrated into a peer culture.

6.4 THE MODEL OF THE PROCESS OF EVALUATION

In this section I will be dealing with some aspects of the model of the process of evaluation described in chapter four (4.2). The first step is to illustrate the dynamic interaction that I suggest takes place between subject, object, and context in determining the criteria to be applied in a particular evaluation. It is important to remember that the term 'subject' is defined in terms of the model either as the purposive, intentional, sentient being who is evaluating, or as a group of such beings. This term is not to be confused with the same term as used in many psychology experiments.
6.4.1 The influence of the object

The influence of the value object is obvious. The same subject in the same context is likely to apply different criteria to different objects. An evaluation of a meal, for example, is likely to give rise to different criteria than those that apply to an evaluation of a person who might be sharing the meal. In the current set of studies it was noted that the criteria that were applied tended to be drawn from a set of criteria that were broadly relevant to the object. For example, for 'school', criteria concerned with the interesting or boring activities engaged in, or with the opportunity for making friends, were in the set of relevant criteria. There may be some benefit to be obtained in focusing attention on specific objects, and this possibility is examined in section 7.4.2.

6.4.2 The influence of the subject

The influence of the subject is less obvious, however. The effects of a common culture or of a common biological nature may mean that there is little difference between individuals when they evaluate the same object in the same context. In what follows, I examine the similarities and differences between the criteria applied by different subjects while the object and context are held constant. The objects used were 'school' and 'toy'. The context consisted of the subject being asked by me to evaluate the object in a one-to-one situation in the subject's school, knowing that further questions would follow. No other person was present.

The criteria that were applied under these circumstances tended to be drawn from a set of criteria that were broadly relevant to the object, and this presumably reflects the influence of the object. Subjects selected different combinations of these criteria, however, for their particular evaluation, and I take this to be a reflection of their unique value systems.
LC1, for example, showed similar central concerns to AH, being anxious to avoid living in misery. These concerns were supplemented by a high prominence being given to family life and social respectability. Her central values were reflected in the evaluation of school which she saw only in terms of obtaining an education and acquiring a job. In contrast to many other subjects she did not apply criteria expressing the interest and pleasure that might be intrinsic to some schoolwork.

Subjects who had the avoidance of miserable lives as an important part of their value systems were more likely than others to evaluate 'toy' for negative reasons. For LC2, whose ultimate values included both misery and unfairness, toys were good because: "If you don't have anything to do you can play with a toy. It stops you from being bored".

In contrast, those who evaluated toys for positive reasons tended to have ultimate values that were concerned with friendship or with happiness in general. GA, for example, said: "I enjoy playing with toys, with remote control cars, helicopters...", while KG, whose prominent ultimate value was (un)happiness, also evaluated toys partly in terms of her personal liking for them.

Hedonistic criteria were also applied by KG in the evaluation of school. It was good primarily because of the good fun and play which it provided, and bad: "When you have to get up of a morning, and you just want to lay in bed". Neither the intrinsic worth of schoolwork or the value of school as a means to a job was mentioned.

KG also applied criteria concerned with friends, however, and this was also found for subjects for whom friendship was a prominent value. The case of GA has already been mentioned. For EW, as well, this connection was found. Her idea of friendship was comprised of going out with friends, enjoying herself, and giving mutual support, while in her evaluation of school she said: "You have friends at school, you make friends, go to their houses on a weekend, they can come to yours, you go places with them....".
Those for whom friends were important also tended to stress the intrinsic value (or otherwise) of schoolwork. Thus for EW: "You do interesting things, go on trips", while for MH some schoolwork was "Incredibly boring" in contrast to "...some Maths, English, Art, and Sports".

6.4.3 Are differences between subjects due to differences in beliefs about objects?

It could be the case that these differences between subjects in the criteria applied are partly due to differences in their beliefs about the object. Two sets of observations suggest that this is at most only a minor factor, however. Firstly, children were asked to describe both 'school' and 'toy' before making any evaluations. For 'school', all subjects referred to basic schoolwork such as learning to read and write, and doing maths as part of their description. For 'toy', all but one subject mentioned that a toy was for playing with.

Secondly, there were no inconsistencies between subjects in beliefs about the directions of the links between an object and a criterion. For example, a toy was thought to be something that could prevent boredom, rather than create boredom by all subjects who mentioned this criterion. Similarly, for those who referred to the educational value of toys, a positive link between toy and learning was always present. For school, all subjects who applied the criterion concerned with interesting activities agreed that school could provide these, and likewise for friends. School was always seen as being a potential source of friends by those who applied this criterion. Those contradictions that did occur were associated with the recognition of ambivalence by an individual. CS, for example, stated that school could involve doing subjects that he disliked and regarded as being boring, but also recognised that school enables him to do the subjects that he likes.

The main point that I am making here is that differences between subjects in the criteria that they apply are far more prevalent than differences in
their beliefs about objects. They are largely in agreement about the nature of an object and what it might lead to, provide, hinder, or help avoid, but they differ as to the relative importance of the various criteria that might be applied when evaluating the object in a given context. I take these differences to reflect real differences in the value systems of the subjects.

6.4.4 The influence of the context

Changes in beliefs occurred more frequently, however, as a result of changes in context. This was one of three main categories that were noted when the same subject evaluated the same object but with the context changed. The three categories were:

- Changes in criteria applied.
- Same criteria applied, sometimes accompanied by changes in beliefs about the details of a criterion.
- Changes in belief about the direction of the link between an object and a criterion.

A. Changes in criteria applied.

This was the most frequent of the categories, indicating that the context can be of considerable importance in evaluation. In the case of the object 'school', when ten and eleven year olds evaluated school while imagining they were fifteen years old, there tended to be more emphasis on criteria concerned with obtaining employment. The benefits that could be obtained directly through attending school became less frequent as criteria applied. Thus, for KG, school would no longer be good because of the fun and play that it provided, but because it could give the key to a good job through exam success.

Similar changes occurred when the children's teacher was present. In this context only one child mentioned that school might be good because of
the opportunity provided for meeting and playing with friends, while none referred to the enjoyment and fun that could be found in school. Criteria concerned with learning as a means to getting a job became more prevalent. For example, LC2 had previously said: "When I'm at home all day I'm bored. At school I get amused more. I like it, I've got a lot of friends". With her teacher present, however, school was good only because: "You get to learn...because when you're older if you don't learn anything you won't get a job".

As regards the negative criteria applied to school, many children seemed to take the opportunity of the teacher's presence to inform him, indirectly, of those aspects of school which they found to be dull and boring. EW, for example, said that she found school assembly boring, together with some of the stories which were read by the teacher in class. These aspects of school were not mentioned by EW when I spoke to her alone. She had then stressed the positive things about school.

Other changes in criteria applied occurred when the children evaluated 'toy' while imagining that they were a member of the opposite sex. Girls tended to overestimate the value of playing for boys, while boys tended to underestimate the value of playing for girls. LC2, for example, when making her own evaluation, saw toys as a low priority, only being of use as a means to avoid being bored when there was nothing else to do. She saw boys as being more interested in toys, however, which provide enjoyment for them, and: "Boys like to play. They don't want to do their homework, but girls do".

B. Same criteria applied, sometimes accompanied by changes in beliefs about the details of a criterion.

Many instances were noted, however, where subjects did not change their criteria applied when the context changed. This illustrates the complexity of the interaction between subject, object, and context, in that the
strength of the subject’s values or the influence of the object, or both, can negate the effects of changes in context.

For LC1, school was a means to a job, both now and at fifteen years, while MH continued to evaluate school in terms of liked and disliked activities. Both subjects continued to apply the same criteria when their teacher was present. Changes can occur, however, in the specific details of what a criterion contains. Such changes were found for MH and school, for example. He envisaged that liked activities would include sports when he was fifteen, whereas: "Maths will be getting harder", and hence would migrate from the class of liked to that of disliked activities.

Likewise when PL evaluated 'toy'. For both her own evaluation and her evaluation as a boy, toys were good because they provided enjoyment. She had very definite ideas as to the differences between boy’s and girl’s toys however. Boys enjoy playing with 'He-man' models while for herself: "You can play with figures, play families and all that". Similarly, GA saw enjoyment as a prime criterion for both himself and for girls, but girls enjoyed playing with dolls or hairdo sets, while he would play with remote-controlled cars, helicopters, and boats.

C. Changes in belief about the direction of the link between an object and a criterion.

These were observed relatively rarely, but are theoretically important because they illustrate that context can affect not only the criteria applied, but also some aspects of the subject’s beliefs.

LC2, for example, thought that she would evaluate school as bad when she was fifteen: "There’s too much work to do. You’d be wanting to go out to town with friends, going to discos". This contrasted with her present evaluation of school as good, one of the criteria being the opportunity to meet friends. Another example was provided by EW, who saw school as being good partly because of the interest and enjoyment that it provides. At age
fifteen, however, she envisages that school will be uninteresting and she
would want to leave as soon as she could.

A final example comes from KG and her beliefs about the linkages between
toys and learning. In her own value network there is a positive link
between toys and learning. She gives a high priority to the educational
value of toys. For boys, however, she thinks that toys hinder learning:
"They don't try so hard at school, they're playing with toys instead. They
might think they should be playing all the time".

It should be noted that changes in belief, both in direction of link, and
about the details of a criterion, only occurred for those contexts where the
subject was asked to evaluate and to give reasons for their evaluation from
an imaginary perspective. Under these circumstances subjects sometimes
anticipated that they would change their beliefs about what constituted a
criterion or concerning the link between an object and a criterion. When
the changed context involved the social situation (teacher present),
however, the subject was still evaluating 'as himself' and no changes in
beliefs were observed.

6.4.5 Subjective and Reported Evaluations

During the interviews all children were asked to tell me about any
occasions when they might have said that they liked or disliked a person or
a thing, when really they thought that the opposite was true. In terms of
the model, this request was intended as an investigation of the difference
between a subjective evaluation, the subject's genuine value attached to a
given object, and a reported evaluation, the value attached that is
expressed for public consumption. The limitations of this procedure should
be made explicit at the outset. The instances revealed by the subject can
only be drawn from those where the subject was aware that he was altering
his subjective evaluation. Moreover, further changes, either deliberate or
unconscious, may occur when the subject talks about these matters with a
stranger. Most of the children, however, appeared to be remarkably open and honest about having concealed or changed their values on occasions. They were aware of having done this and could articulate their experiences and their reasons for masking their values. Much further research is clearly required, but the observations already made provide some interesting pointers to the factors operating in this area, as well as giving another illustration of the use of the model.

Looking at the children's comments overall, it is clear that they see the deliberate concealment of their values as being undesirable. It is only done in order to prevent a greater disvalue, to create a value of sufficient magnitude to justify the deception, or as a result of social pressure. Most of the instances mentioned by the children are social in nature. LCI, for example: "I've said that I like G, but I don't. She was being nice to me, so I was being nice to her, but she always takes my friends, so I don't like her". Also GA described a situation where two of his friends disliked each other, and how in order to keep both of the friends he would pretend to dislike one when playing with the other. Another example of social pressure came from LC2: "...I said to the Headmistress that I liked her new hairdo when really I hated it. Everyone else was saying they liked it".

Pretending to like someone can be done for egotistical or altruistic reasons. "I have an auntie who I don't like...I pretend to like her when I see her...I pretend to like her because I'd probably get wrong off my mam or my nanna" (SV). "There was a girl who was being left out. I said I liked her to stop her being left out. I felt sorry for her" (CG). This concern for others was also observed when children spoke about unwanted gifts. AH: "I say I like it because if you say you don't like it, it will hurt the person's feelings". This implication that hurting the feelings of others is worse than reporting a false evaluation in this context was also found for GA and KG.
A temporal component was also noted. MH: "When my mum and dad get cross with me I think 'I hate you', I'm going to run away...". On these occasions he would keep the negative subjective evaluation of his parents to himself and not express it verbally as a reported evaluation. He knows that "deep down inside" he likes them. This suggests that the difference between the two evaluations may be a reflection of the subject's recognition at some level that the subjective evaluation is the result of temporary and atypical factors and therefore ought not to be reported. This was also indicated by GA's comments when speaking of being called names by his friends. "I feel like hitting people but I don't because they are my friends".
CHAPTER SEVEN

NOMOTHETIC STUDIES OF VALUE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter my intention is to indicate the potential of the approach for guiding and supporting nomothetic and quantitative studies of values. I have been developing two main techniques for these types of study, and have conducted exploratory empirical research aimed both at refining these techniques and at obtaining information about the structure, content, and process of children's values.

A considerable amount of data were collected in the course of these investigations, and the analysis and interpretation of this information comprises a substantial body of research in the empirical branch of the study of value. The emphasis of this chapter is, however, on outlining the development and application of techniques and some of the associated methodological problems, rather than on describing and analysing the findings of the exploratory research. Details of the findings and the necessary background information will only be drawn upon in order to illustrate the techniques used (7.3) and the studies that might be conducted using these techniques (7.4).

Some steps have been taken toward assessing the reliability and validity of the techniques used, and in demonstrating that the body of findings produced has internal coherence and also accords in some respects with everyday understanding and with the findings of other workers. It is clear, however, that further work is required in replicating findings and in carrying out studies aimed at establishing the strengths and weaknesses of the techniques. This is part of the further development of the approach which is also outlined in chapter eight (8.3.3).
In order to understand the development of the techniques used in the exploratory research it is first necessary to outline the reasons behind the decision to focus on these particular methods rather than any of the others available for studying children's values. This is done in section 7.2. I then go on, in section 7.3, to describe the two techniques in turn, how they were used in the research, and their theoretical linkages with the present approach. Section 7.4 is concerned with indicating, in broad terms, the types of nomothetic and quantitative research that can be undertaken using the approach and techniques.

The present approach points the way to an area of research of considerable size and diversity, the exploration of which should reap rich benefits. An immediate danger when exploring such new areas is the "...incoherent massing of data..." (Smedslund, 1979, p.140). I agree that this is a problem for the study of value. Indeed, in earlier chapters I have stressed that previous empirical work in the field has suffered because it lacks an adequate grounding in the philosophy of value. Much of this thesis is concerned with a broad analysis of the field and the development of an empirical approach which has its position in the field made explicit.

The vastness of the empirical area opened up should be seen against this background. Its exploration should be framed and guided by the empirical approach described in chapter four, and this will help to avoid the random and uncontrolled collection of data.

I am in disagreement with Smedslund, however, over the relationship between empirical research and its theoretical background. There is a vital and fruitful interaction between theory and research, and this is reflected in my suggestions for the research strategy that should be adopted for the study of value (8.3.2). This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter eight (8.4.1).
7.2 THE CHOICE OF TECHNIQUES FOR STUDYING CHILDREN’S VALUES

The characteristics required of a measure of values for present purposes were anticipated when discussing related studies of children’s values in chapter five. It was thought that the net should be cast widely in order to capture the full range of values. Hence the methods required the use of a variety of value objects and needed to facilitate the expression and identification of subject’s values. The procedures should encourage asocial, individual values as well as those centred on interpersonal relations. Pre-established categorisation systems were to be avoided. The position was taken that the classification of values should be derived as far as possible from the subjects themselves.

The measures used also needed to cohere with the present approach. Consistency with the model of the process of evaluation and the idea of value networks was sought, as well as the availability of operational definitions for the main value concepts described in chapter four.

A wide age range of 6 to 15 years was covered in the current research. The tasks immediately facing the subjects needed to be understood and manageable by all of them, but this was particularly so for the youngest children. It was thought desirable to present the same material to all subjects, and therefore the tasks chosen needed to be simple enough for 6 year olds, yet should not appear facile and childish to the 15 year olds. It was intended that ambiguous items, and those that could be phrased so as to influence evaluations should be avoided.

In addition, it was thought that indirect methods of sampling values would be more fruitful than asking questions such as "what are the most important things in life to you?" As well as the possibility of a lack of self-awareness in the children, it was thought that 'reactivity' (see section 1.2.2 A) could distort the outcomes of such surveys. It was considered that more fundamental values would be likely to be revealed through the indirect method of asking subjects to evaluate particular
The established standardised measures of values failed to meet the requirements of the current research on a number of counts. Some of the drawbacks of the RVS and SIV have already been mentioned, and it should also be noted that these both have age limitations. Modifications to the RVS have been found necessary for use with 10 to 12 year olds (Cole, 1972; Williams, 1972; McCartin et al, 1984), while the lower age limit of the SIV appears to be around 12 years. Simplifications and revisions of the 'Study of Values' (Allport, Vernon and Lindzey, 1951) aimed at its use with children also seem to be restricted to this lower age limit (Levy, 1958; Simmons, 1977). It was thought doubtful that any of these techniques could be effectively used with 6 year olds. Murphy (1970) reported the early stages of the development of an instrument that could be used with younger children, but this does not appear to have been pursued further.

The Values Inventory for Children (VIC) (Guilford and Gupta, 1971) was specifically designed for use with children from the age of 6 years. In this case, however, there is an upper age limit. The inventory would appear childish to older subjects. Measures of values aimed at younger children have often used simple tasks and concrete items designed to appeal to this age group which made them inappropriate for use in the current research (e.g. Haaf, 1971; Jahoda and Cramond, 1972; Butzin and Anderson, 1973; Pickford, 1982).

Among broad approaches to the study of children's values (see 5.4.4), some require writing skills and an ability for self-expression which would make them difficult to use with 6 year olds (Britton et al, 1969; Cameron and Robertson, 1970; Ryan, 1971). The Uses Test (Dennis, 1974) offered more promise for use with the entire 6 to 15 years range, as did the 'three wishes' method of Milgram and Riedel (1969). In both cases, however, their link with the study of values was considered to be uncertain.
Hallworth and Waite (1963, 1966) provided a method that could be beneficially applied to the nomothetic study of value. Obtaining Semantic Differential (SD) evaluations from subjects and then using factor analysis was thought to meet most of the requirements described above. The SD could be simplified for use with younger children without making it inappropriate for use with older subjects. Problems associated with the number of response categories and their labelling could be avoided by presenting scales as continuous lines, while the written descriptions of the scales and the items to be rated could be adapted to the abilities of the youngest children. The use of the SD also had theoretical attractions because of the link between Osgood's 'evaluation' dimension of affective meaning and the concept of 'value attached' (see 4.2.2).

The factor analysis of evaluations was thought to be a method of identifying the 'criteria applied' by the subject sample. This procedure has the advantage of deriving criteria from the children themselves, although there are difficulties in interpreting the factors.

This was the first of the two main techniques developed in the course of the research. In order to gain a deeper insight into the children's evaluations, a series of interviews were also conducted. A procedure was devised in line with the assumption that values can be justified, and are organised into value networks with justificatory connections. In addition, it was hoped that interviews might reveal ultimate values.

The analysis of the interviews needed the application of a content analysis system. This involved the imposition of a set of categories by the investigator, and thus violated one of the desirable features sought in a measure of values, but this was thought to be unavoidable. The influence of the subject sample was increased by producing a content analysis system based upon their interview replies rather than using an existing system. It was hoped that the system of categories would strike a balance between having too few categories which are so broad as to be unable to detect
important value phenomena, and too many narrow categories with the result that the data are not reduced enough to enable general age and sex effects to be seen. It was also intended that the system should be comprehensive of the range of values, and be capable of application in future studies, able to deal with variations in subjects, objects, contexts, and method of data collection.

A theoretical advantage of the interview method and content analysis system was the distinction made between values attached and criteria applied. The nature of the values being surveyed was not always clear in other studies using content analysis.

7.3 THE TECHNIQUES USED AND THEIR THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

7.3.1 Factor analysis of evaluations

Factor analysis is a statistical means of expressing a set of data in terms of the operation of a number of underlying variables, known as factors. Its potential usefulness to the study of value can be illustrated by considering the 'factor equation', which is basic to factor analysis. In terms of evaluation, the equation relates to the evaluation of a word by a single subject.

\[ z_j = a_{j1} F_i + a_{j2} F_2 + \ldots + a_{jm} F_m + d_j U_j \]  

Where,  
- \( z_j \) = Score of S on word j in standardised form.  
- \( F_i \) = Factor scores for S in standardised form.  
- \( U_j \) = Unique factor for word j.  
- \( a_{ji} \) = factor loadings for word j.  
- \( d_j \) = factor loading of word j on \( U_j \)

In terms of value, \( z_j \) represents an evaluation. This is thought to be influenced by the application of various criteria, which are represented by the factors. Factor scores give the values attached by each subject to each criterion, and factor loadings give an estimate (for all subjects combined) of the extent to which words are judged in terms of each criterion. In terms of the process model of evaluation, the \( a_{ji} \) and \( d_j \) loadings give the criteria applied profile for value object 'j', combined with the degree and direction of the relationship between the object and the criterion that
would be the outcome of the examination of the features of the object. As
the number of subjects is increased, so the effects of subjects’ criteria
profiles would decline, and the loadings would begin to approximate to the
criteria profile of the value object combined with a generalised view of its
degree and direction of relationship with each criterion. Likewise, the
subject’s criteria profile may be modelled by the proportion of total
variance accounted for by the factors, and the greater the number of value
objects, the closer these would be to the ‘true’ profile. The factor
equation can be applied to groups as well as to individuals, to subject
groups (e.g all 15 year olds) or to all subjects combined.

It should be noted that the identification of a factor (or value
criterion) depends upon the presence in the word sample of an adequate
number of words which are evaluated by reference to it. Thus it could be
the case that the ‘unique factor’ disguises criteria that fail to be
recognised for want of a suitable word sample. Alternatively, a criterion
may be over-stated because the word sample contains an unusually high
proportion of words to which that criterion is applied.

When factors are interpreted as indicators of criteria applied, it is
necessary to discover a common feature of the words that factor together.
This feature must itself be amenable to evaluation in such a way as to
account for the high loadings on the factor. In bipolar factors, the common
feature of one pole must be the opposite of, or in some way be antagonistic
to, the common feature of the other pole.

It can be seen from the above that factor analysis provides a method
whereby the simple evaluations of a variety of words, can be analysed in
terms of an assumed underlying structure, taken to represent the criteria
applied when making the evaluations. Much potential knowledge about the
content of value systems in therefore available when this method is
employed, assuming that the premises for its use are valid.
This technique was developed through being used in two studies of children’s values, involving a total of 346 subjects aged between six and fifteen years. Subjects were presented with lists of words and asked to evaluate each word in terms of a good - bad scale. Two different formats for this scale were used. One of these consisted of a continuous line with the words 'good' and 'bad' printed at either end. This was found to be suitable for twelve and fifteen year olds. Pilot tests with six and nine year olds, however, indicated the need for a categorised scale. These tests were also used to ensure that the subjects could read, understand, and correctly order the category labels. The resulting format can be consulted in the appendix, together with the format of the undifferentiated scale and the instructions used with the scales (A5 and A6).

The word lists were normally presented in a group setting. This was not advisable for six year olds, however, because the pilot tests had shown that most of them were unable to read the words on the list. The lists were presented to the six year olds individually, sessions taking place either in a quiet corner of a classroom or in a separate room. At the beginning of each session the six year olds were asked to read aloud the descriptions of the response categories. When it seemed that the subject understood the task, the first word was presented. Each word was read aloud by the experimenter and pointed out on the sheet. When the subject indicated that he did not understand a word, its meaning was explained.

The words were presented on pre-printed pages, and so it was not practical to have a completely random order of presentation. It was possible to produce a number of different versions of the lists, however, in which the same words appeared in a different order. The good - bad scale was positionally reversed in half of the lists in order to reduce the effects of position bias. Each subject had an equal chance of receiving either type of scale, and in those conditions where subjects had two sessions, the scale on the second list was always positionally reversed as
compared with the first list.

The content of the word list is evidently an important influence on the identification of criteria applied. The choice of the words is therefore of major importance and should be made carefully in relation to the aims of the study. In the first study the emphasis was on exploring methods and the content of children's values. An estimate of the prominent 'naturally occurring' value criteria applied by the subjects was aimed for. It was thought that this might be achieved by using a wide variety of words and by avoiding the deliberate choice of words based upon prior assumptions about the content of children's values.

The words were therefore chosen by a quasi-random procedure, drawing on the most frequent words in word frequency manuals (Kucera and Francis, 1967; Thorndike and Lorge, 1944). Ambiguities, synonyms, and other inappropriate items were omitted, and steps were taken to avoid an excess of abstract words.

The choice of words for the second study was based on the results of the first study and the associated interviews. Ten categories were established to reflect the criteria found to be important or worth investigating further. Three sets of published norms (Osgood, May and Miron 1975; Jenkins, Russell and Suci 1958; Heise, 1965) were scanned and words fitting into the ten categories were extracted.

As well as exploring these categories, it was also thought desirable to achieve an even spread across the good - bad range (the first study had contained an excess of positive words). In addition, words were chosen on the basis that they should be understood by six year olds and be capable of being read by them.

Pilot tests showed that the nine year olds had few difficulties in reading and understanding the words. The six year olds were able to understand most of the words, but regrettably the majority were unable to read them. As it was impossible to compile a similar list of easier words,
it was decided to retain the existing list and to present the words to the six year olds by reading each word aloud. The lists of words used in both studies may be consulted in the appendix (A7 and A8).

In the first study subjects' evaluations were translated into numerical form by dividing the good - bad scale, after completion, into seven equal sections. A score of -3 was given to the category at the extreme 'bad' end through to +3 for the category at the extreme 'good' end. Any responses that fell on the borderline between two sections were rounded alternately up and down. In the second study the five response categories were scored -2 for 'very bad' through to +2 for 'very good' responses.

One of the aims of the first study was to investigate any differences that there might be in the way in which subjects use the good - bad scale. Subjects were indeed found to differ in this respect and this seemed to be related to age. The twelve year olds tended to make more use of the extremes of the scale, while the fifteen year olds were inclined to make finer judgements. It is therefore possible that response style has distorted the factor analysis and might significantly affect comparisons between subjects, particularly if they differ in age.

The term 'response style' is used here to refer to the preferential use of parts of the good - bad scale which is independent of the particular word being evaluated. It is assumed that an evaluation is influenced partly by the 'real' value attached to the word, and partly by a tendency to respond in a certain way. Just as it is assumed that the average evaluation of a group of subjects can be obtained after adequate sampling of the subject population, so it is assumed that a reasonable estimate of response style is reliant upon adequate sampling of both the subject and the object (in this case 'words') populations.

Age-related differences in response style were also found in the second study. The difference between ages twelve and fifteen was repeated, and there was also a distinct difference between ages six and nine. Nine and
twelve year olds had similar response styles.

A combined consideration of these observations, together with related findings from the interview studies and from early Semantic Differential research (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957; Stagner and Osgood, 1946; Kerrick, 1954; Bopp, 1955; Arthur, 1966; Neuringer, 1963; Luria, 1959), suggested that cognitive factors lay behind differences in response style. Those with more complex cognitive organisations tended to make finer judgements. Thus there was a trend away from the use of the extremes toward more use of the middle portion of the scale between ages twelve and fifteen, and six year olds were inclined to use only two categories (one positive and one negative).

From the viewpoint of the study of value, the age-related changes in response style reflect genuine features of the development of value systems, and are not to be seen merely as cognitive influences on the expression of values. It is held that value systems change in their complexity over the age range studied. This makes more value criteria available, which is in turn associated with the ability to make finer and less 'extreme' evaluations along a good - bad dimension. The study of response style thus falls within the study of the structure of value.

Various methods of adjustment were used in both studies and the general conclusion from these is that response style, despite being an important factor in evaluation, has only had a small effect on the factor structure, and on the comparisons between subject groups which were of interest in the studies. This observation should not be generalised, however, into a global assertion that response style can safely be ignored when studying values. It would be wise to assess its effects in each particular case.

In the second study, for example, it was decided that the response style for the six year olds was so different from that of the older children that no satisfactory method of adjusting for, and assessing the effects of, response style was possible. Six year olds were not, therefore, included in
the overall factor analysis. This highlights the difficulties of producing general techniques for the study of value that are appropriate for use over a wide age range.

7.3.2 Interviews and content analysis

The interview method and the related content analysis system that were developed during the research were found to be applicable to the entire age range, however. The interviews were conducted in a one-to-one situation, out of the hearing of any other person. They were recorded on audio tape and the subjects were made aware of this. The starting point was an evaluation previously made by the subject which he is asked to explain. The value object (e.g. 'teacher') is referred to as the 'root concept'. A typical question asked in this context would be: "I see that you've marked 'teacher' as being 'not good or bad', can you tell me why that is please?".

The replies usually implied other evaluations, and explanations for these were also sought. The interview continued in this manner until the line of enquiry was exhausted. This occurred when the subject either referred to values that had already been covered in the interview, or when an ultimate value was reached (see below). Subjects were then asked to think of any other reasons why the word in question might be considered good or bad. Again, the evaluations implied by subjects' replies were followed up. Several 'root concepts' were investigated in the course of an interview. The six year olds were found to tire or become bored after about thirty minutes, while the upper time limit for the fifteen year olds was found to be approximately forty-five minutes.

It was found necessary to make notes of the subjects' replies while the interview was occurring. This aided the conduct of the interview, in that the interviewer was able to remind himself of lines of enquiry that needed to be followed up and could also identify values that had already been covered. Furthermore, these notes were found to be of use when the audio
tapes were later analysed in detail.

The interviews were analysed by first translating them into a network, where each evaluation made during the course of the interview was included as a 'node', joined to the nodes which it justified, and the nodes which justified it, through various types of relationship. The network is thought to be representative of the value system of the subject and will be referred to as a 'value network'.

The magnitude of evaluation was not assessed during the interviews and therefore nodes were only represented in directional terms as either good, bad or neutral. Detailed accounts of the procedure for recording value networks, and of the types of relationships found to exist between 'nodes' are given in the appendix (A2).

Further analysis of the value networks required the development of a content analysis system. The first requirement was to produce a number of categories into which the items could be placed. This was an extremely complicated process involving the repeated inspection and classification of the value networks, the gradual refinement of the categories and the criteria for inclusion, and the definition of boundaries between categories. The number and breadth of the categories were influenced by the considerations described in 7.2 above.

The final system as used in the exploratory research contained thirty-one categories. These were deliberately organised so as to range from concern for the individual to concern for others, and on to general social principles. Thus there is a transition from a concern with physical well-being through personal abilities and social interactions to concern for others and the assertion of general principles. This is not to be treated as an 'egocentricity' dimension because the method used did not provoke subjects to talk about themselves, but about things which could happen to people in general. For example, when a concern with danger was expressed, this indicated that the subject was worried about damage to the physical
person. This would presumably include himself, but not explicitly so. A subject who made a high proportion of 'survival' evaluations, for example, could be said to be preoccupied with the maintenance of the physical functions of individuals but is not necessarily 'egocentric'.

The full list of categories together with their codes may be consulted in the appendix, together with examples of each category and the coding procedures that were used (see A3 and A4).

An index of inter-coder reliability was not obtained. The calculation of such an index was thought to be inappropriate at this exploratory stage of research. It was considered to be a refinement which would be relevant to some specific practical application of the interview method and content analysis system. Inter-coder reliability could then be studied in relation to such factors as the amount and quality of training available to coders, the time available for coding and the characteristics of the coder population. A meaningful reliability index would need to be related to these practical constraints. Appropriate changes would be made to the content analysis system and coding procedures if necessary.

The importance of ultimate values to the study of value was discussed in chapter three (3.2.1 C3), and its place in the model of the process of evaluation was described in chapter four (4.3.1 D). The interviews investigated ultimate values in practice, being conducted so as to allow their expression. An operational definition of ultimate values was adopted. An ultimate value was deemed to have been observed when any one of the following occurred:

- self-justification.
- justification by reference to a synonym.
- justification by reference to the class of liked things.
- subject unable to give a justification.

Ultimate values were classified by reference to the content analysis system.
It is probable that many items caught by the operational definition are not genuine ultimate values (e.g. the reason for a 'no reply' could be shyness, temporary blockage of thought, or a desire to conceal something). Further work is therefore necessary on investigating the factors and conditions that influence the expression or concealment of ultimate values.

In this connection it should be noted that the findings suggest that the level of complexity of a value system might affect the expression of ultimate values. It was found that about 40% of the 15 year olds displayed very few ultimate values. It appears that their value systems have so many inter-connections that justifications for evaluations can usually be found within the system. This could mean either that they genuinely have fewer ultimate values than subjects with less complex value systems (justifications for evaluations being ultimately circular), or that the current interview technique is unable to identify sufficient ultimate values for individuals with value systems above a certain level of complexity. Again, further research is required to enable an informed choice to be made between these alternatives and to improve the ability of the interview technique to identify genuine ultimate values.

7.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF VALUE

Having described the two main techniques and their relationship to the present approach, I will now present a broad survey of some of the empirical studies that can be carried out with the aid of these techniques. The section is organised around the concepts of structure, content, and process introduced in chapter four.

7.4.1 Studies of the structure of value

Two aspects of the structure of value were investigated in the exploratory research: complexity and stability. Response style, as discussed above, is thought to reflect the level of complexity in a value
A study concentrating on complexity might therefore look at the pattern of response category usage over a large number of evaluations and a wide variety of objects and contexts. This might be done for single subjects or for groups. In the exploratory research, for example, many six year olds, particularly boys, tended to use only two response categories.

Another way of estimating complexity is through the interviews. The number of content analysis categories recorded for each 'root concept' is a possible indicator of complexity, as is the average number of unprompted criteria applied to each 'root concept'. When using interviews for this purpose, however, it is important to ensure that the length and style of the interview is kept constant. Curtailed interviews, for example, might lead to an underestimate of complexity. In addition, the social background to the interview must be considered. The gender or perceived class of the interviewer might affect comparisons between subjects who differ on these variables.

Stability can be studied by investigating the same item on two or more separate occasions. This can range from the evaluation of a single concept through to a criteria profile, and the identity of ultimate values. An inherent problem in the measurement of stability is the need to disentangle errors of measurement from genuine instability in values. If the same means of measurement are used on different occasions, then any differences in the outcome may be due to the unreliability of the technique used. In the exploratory studies, for example, it was found that the correlations between the evaluations of twenty words made on two separate occasions increased with age, ranging from 0.50 for six year olds to 0.68 for fifteen year olds. A tentative interpretation of these data is that they reflect an increasing stability in evaluations with age. This stability is represented by the difference between the measured correlations and an as yet unknown underlying test-retest reliability of the procedure, which is likely to be in excess of 0.70.
When conceiving of the studies that might be made under this heading it is important to remember that a 'subject' as defined in the approach can refer to groups as well as to individuals. It is possible to investigate any aspect of value at either level. Groups may be studied by obtaining appropriate information from a sample of the individuals that make up the group. By summing and averaging, estimates of the values of the group can be obtained. This procedure can also be applied to the situation where a group is made up of sub-groups. For example, the values of 'nine year olds' can be estimated from the values of 'nine year old boys' and 'nine year old girls', the subgroups themselves being based on the values of individuals.

This schema can be used in the study of criteria applied, values attached, and ultimate values. For all three concepts, research can focus either on obtaining an 'overall' picture for some inclusive group, or might concentrate on studying variability within this group. Individuals might be compared with group parameters, for example, or sub-groups might be compared and contrasted.

In the exploratory research, for example, the most prominent criteria applied by children in the nine to fifteen years age range was studied by using both factor analysis and interviews. The factors emerging from factor analysis of the evaluations of a wide range of concepts was thought to provide an insight into criteria applied. From the interviews, the prominence of criteria applied was assumed to be directly proportional to the frequency of usage of the content analysis categories.

Following analysis of the findings from both techniques and a comparison with the work of other researchers who had made comparable studies, it seemed that the nine most prominent 'overall' criteria applied for this age range were: 'well-being', 'adulthood', 'hedonism', 'friendship', 'authority', 'rebellion (early childhood)', 'rebellion (adolescence)', 'achievement', and 'family'.
The investigation of age and sex differences provides an example of the examination of variability in relation to categories and parameters established from the study of a more inclusive 'overall' group. It was found, for example, that girls were more likely than boys to apply the 'friendship' criterion.

As outlined above (7.3.1), the application of factor analysis to evaluation not only enables criteria applied to be identified, but also allows the values attached to these criteria to be estimated via 'factor scores'. There is a technical problem with this procedure, however, in that the mean factor score for each factor is always standardised (i.e. set to zero). 'Overall' values attached must therefore be estimated by other means. The technique is more suited to the study of variability between sub-groups. For example, it was found that the value attached to 'authority' declined steadily between the ages of six and fifteen years.

Ultimate values can be investigated through the interview technique as already indicated (7.3.2). The identity of ultimate values can be studied by comparing their frequency distribution across the content analysis categories with an equivalent distribution for other values. Again, an 'overall' picture can be obtained. For example, in the exploratory studies it was observed that 'hedonism' was the most prominent ultimate value, and that there was some evidence that 'health-illness', 'altruism', and 'using one's life' were also important as ultimate values. Variability in ultimate values between groups or individuals can also be studied using this method.

Another possibility opened up by the use of factor analysis is the investigation of the factor structures of individuals and groups and the comparison of factor structures. By factor structure I mean the factors emerging from a factor analysis together with their relative importance as estimated by the percentage of variance accounted for. If a sufficiently large and broad sample of evaluations is used as the input to the factor analysis, then the factor structure is assumed to give an estimate of the
criteria profile of the subject.

This study of factor structures has the potential for gaining an idiographic understanding of the subject whereby the investigator aims to understand the constructs used by the subject when evaluating (see 4.3.2 E). Instead of, for instance, comparing boys and girls in terms of the relative importance of the value criterion 'friendship', a concept derived from a broad 'overall' analysis, the researcher might look in more detail how the nature of the concept differs for boys and girls.

In the exploratory studies, when factor structures were obtained for each age group and for both sexes, a great deal of variation was observed. For example, for the girls, 'well-being' seemed to be bound up with family life, whereas the boys seemed to link 'well-being' with success and enjoyment. These findings are an important reminder that sub-group comparisons or comparisons between individuals using concepts derived from 'overall' studies involve a simplification of more complex differences.

Research into values can also focus on individual concepts or groups of concepts. Depending on the interests of the researchers, the values attached or criteria applied to the concept or concepts can be studied for individuals, sub-groups, or some more inclusive group of subjects. Comparisons between these may also be made. The value attached to a concept can be estimated by the subject's response on a good - bad scale, whereas the criteria applied can be obtained either from interviews or from factor analysis.

In the latter, the target concept must be evaluated along with many other concepts. The criteria applied will be estimated by the loading of the concept on the factors. In an interview a subject is simply asked why he attaches a particular value to the concept. Criteria applied profiles for groups can be estimated by summing and averaging the replies made by individuals.
An example of this type of study is the focus on the evaluation of 'school' that was part of the exploratory research. The interviews indicated that the outstanding 'good' criterion, was the development of personal knowledge and skills. A division of this overall finding in terms of school 'likers' and 'dislikers' revealed that the 'likers' placed more emphasis on this criterion, while the 'dislikers' were more inclined to evaluate school in terms of the opportunities for making friends and for playing, which school was thought to either provide or deny.

7.4.3 Studies of the process of evaluation

The model of the process of evaluation opens up many opportunities for quantitative studies focusing on particular parts of the process. In the exploratory research the focus of attention was on the application of the idea of numerical analysis which was developed in section 4.2.4. It was found useful to limit the analysis to the evaluation of a single concept ('school' in this case).

It emerged that numerical analysis was of use in modelling and predicting the subjective evaluations of individuals and groups, and could provide a detailed breakdown of some aspects of the process of evaluation. The relative contribution of each criterion to the subjective evaluation could be estimated, an insight into the sources of the differences between the evaluations of subjects was provided, and the relative importance of criteria applied and values attached in accounting for these differences could be examined.

Numerical analysis assumes that a subjective evaluation is composed of three elements, criteria applied, feature scores, and values attached. A criteria applied profile of the object for a given subject can be obtained from interviews as already outlined. Values attached can then be estimated for each of these criteria from evaluations made on a good - bad scale. Feature scores can be assessed by using factor analysis, and observing the
loadings of the object on factors representing the criteria applied. Simplified estimates of feature scores, giving their direction only, and omitting information as to their magnitude, can be obtained from comments made by individuals during interviews.

These procedures can be used to analyse the subjective evaluations of individuals and groups, and can also be applied to comparisons. School 'likers' and 'dislikers' were compared, for example, as were groups of children of different ages. The decline in the evaluation of school between ages six and nine years was found to be mainly due to a decline in the importance of 'personal knowledge and skills' as a value criterion. The value attached to this criterion actually increased slightly between these ages.

The subjective evaluations estimated by numerical analysis can be compared with directly measured evaluations of the object being studied. When this was done for 'school', it was found that for both the likers/dislikers analysis and the comparisons between age groups, the estimated subjective evaluations produced similar findings to the directly measured evaluations.

Numerical analysis has thus been found to be useful in analysing group evaluations of a single value object 'school'. Further research is required in order to discover if this usefulness generalises to the study of individuals, and to other objects. It should also be noted that the use of numerical analysis is an heuristic device. There is no intention to assert that the scaling of the measures used or that the level of the data implied by the measures (e.g. a ratio scale for values attached) are exact representations of evaluation. The measures and scaling best suited to the model of the process of evaluation have yet to be established.
CHAPTER EIGHT

AN OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH:

IMPLICATIONS, FURTHER STUDIES, AND CRITICISMS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains a broad overview of the approach. The implications of the empirical work are discussed, suggestions are made for further research, and some fundamental criticisms are considered. The approach has proved useful and is worthy of further development. It provided the guiding framework for the empirical studies and their interpretation, and is strengthened to the extent that it has led to useful techniques, meaningful results, and informative insights. Chapters six and seven illustrated that the approach can be successfully used in gaining an insight into children's values, in both idiographic and nomothetic studies. Furthermore, it can produce findings of theoretical relevance, providing information concerning possible modifications or additions to models of value.

Section 8.2 summarises the main implications of the research. The main theoretical messages of the empirical work are abstracted. The focus is on summarising those findings that were contrary to prior expectations, and on stressing that the research confirms the extensiveness of the field. As a consequence, a full understanding of value requires a multi-faceted approach.

Although a high degree of similarity between subjects' values attached was noted, perhaps indicating common cultural influences, deeper analysis revealed a greater than expected diversity in the content of value (8.2.1). The involvement of context in evaluation was also found to be more varied than anticipated, while ultimate values were observed to be more complex than originally thought as well.

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A comprehensive understanding within the empirical branch of the field would need to include both idiographic and nomothetic approaches, the use of both static and dynamic models, and a detailed sub-analysis of evaluation. The latter could enable the traditional oppositions of the empirical branch (e.g. between cognitive and non-cognitive views) to be analysed in more detail.

Generally, a dynamic and fruitful interaction between theory and research has occurred. This has included the emergence of two new concepts, core values and focal values, which could be important in the further development of the field.

The main implications have general methodological consequences. The more specific messages that the exploratory research has for methodology are incorporated into section 8.3, as part of my suggestions for further studies. An extensive programme of methodological research is recommended. This should be part of a more general research strategy, however, in which theory, techniques, and findings are developed together through a series of stages. I discuss the policies that will need to be adopted in the early stages of research when assessing techniques and findings. The exploratory research may be regarded as the first stage of the research strategy.

In section 8.3.3, attention is focused on specific areas of development in the field. The techniques used in the exploratory research could be fully assessed, and further study of ultimate values is likely to be rewarding. The ways in which the process and structure of value might be further studied are also described. As regards the content of value, both idiographic and nomothetic studies will be needed.

I envisage the study of children’s values passing through two phases, aimed firstly at obtaining an ‘overall picture’ of value development, and secondly at applying the ‘value point of view’ to particular areas of concern in the study of child development.
Up to this point I have been advocating the usefulness and future potential of the approach in creating a coherent understanding of values that includes both theoretical and empirical aspects. In section 8.4, I consider some criticisms of the approach that threaten to damage this coherence. As regards the appropriateness of empirical research, I note that there is a constant interaction between theory and research, and that the background to our observations and interpretations is not immutable. This interaction can be seen in the present work.

Criticisms of the two main techniques used in the exploratory research are also considered, and this leads on to a discussion of the theoretical differences that might underly the criticisms (8.4.3), and a restatement of some aspects of the empirical approach to the study of value developed in chapter four.

The approach can be successfully defended against these criticisms, but the most effective reply to criticisms generally would be to develop the approach along the lines suggested, building up an interconnected web of theory, methodology, and empirical findings. I feel that the approach needs to be given a chance to grow and to prove its worth rather than being stifled at an early stage.

In the final section of this chapter (8.5), a broad perspective is taken of the field of value as a whole. Some recent work and issues are discussed, illustrating the continuing vitality of the field, and reiterating the usefulness of the present analysis of the field.
8.2 MAIN IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

8.2.1 The varied nature of the content of value

When the present approach was formulated, it was assumed that subjects would vary as regards their readiness to apply criteria, and would differ in the values that they attach to these criteria, but that there would be little variation in the conceptualisation of criteria. A common pool of potential value criteria was envisaged, and subjects were seen as being differentially inclined in the relative usage of the available criteria.

Some aspects of the exploratory research, however, indicate that there are noteworthy differences between subjects in the way that criteria are conceived. In chapter six, for example, (6.3.5) it was noted that similar ultimate values shared by individuals can have different nuances of meaning and associations. The comparison between GA and MH used to illustrate this point shows that while their respective concepts of 'friendship' overlap, there are also important differences. To maintain that they both apply the same criterion would be an oversimplification.

The investigation of group values also revealed this unexpected variety. The comparison of the factor structures of groups differing in age and sex suggested that criteria take on different forms for each group. In addition, when comparing the findings with those from other studies, a great deal of variety was noted in the way in which values were classified. Sometimes this seemed to be mainly the result of the experimenter's value categories, and at other times due to subjects.

This variety will have the effect that even when closely similar criteria are applied, differences in the connotations of the criteria can be an important source of differences in evaluation. 'Enjoyment' for one subject may be joined with 'family life' while for another it may be linked to 'excitement'.

Although this was an unexpected source of variation, it does not affect the background assumptions of the present approach. Ideas concerning the
process of evaluation, the linking of concepts by relationships of justification, and the role of ultimate values can all be maintained despite the greater than expected inter-subject variation in the concepts acting as value criteria.

Difficulties are raised, however, for the practice of combining subjects into groups and comparing between them. This is problematic without a set of common criteria that could form the basis for comparison. Despite these difficulties, however, such combinations and comparisons can be valid and useful procedures. The use of the concept of core values as discussed below (8.2.2) could go some way toward clarifying and overcoming the problems involved.

8.2.2 There are two main modes of understanding values
The exploratory research found evidence both for a strong common influence on values and for a surprising degree of variety in the conceptualisation of criteria applied. These observations perhaps reflect the operation of two types of influence on values. Values are affected by shared, common factors, but are also influenced by the unique and varied experiences and interpretations of individuals.

This observed dichotomy leads me to suggest that there should be two main modes of understanding values, and that a balanced comprehension of values must give due weight to these modes of understanding, recognising both the uniformity and the variety of values. The idiographic mode would try to understand the subject 'from within', attempting to grasp the nature of the categories used by the subject when evaluating. In contrast, the nomothetic mode would employ constructs imposed by the investigator. A more detailed account of nomothetic and idiographic approaches was given in chapter four (4.3.2 E).

At this point it will be useful to introduce the concept of core values, which I anticipate will be of use to both modes of understanding. This
concept arose out of both the empirical and the theoretical aspects of the present work. Despite the diversity of criteria applied, I formed a strong impression, when looking across many subjects, or at the work of several investigators, that the concepts employed revolved around a relatively small set of common concerns. These concerns will henceforth be referred to as core values, hypothetical abstract entities that may be envisaged as 'elements' which combine together in complex ways to produce the criteria that are actually used by a subject.

Core values can act as anchoring points, providing the necessary common basis for comparisons to be made between individuals or groups. Some data reduction and simplification is necessary if this mode of understanding is used. It is possible to obtain important information, however. Subjects could be compared in terms of core values along the lines of the investigation of age and sex effects for criteria applied and values attached in the exploratory studies. The degree of overall similarity between subjects could also be a focus of study.

The usefulness of the core values concept is not limited to nomothetic studies, however. When attempting to understand and describe the uniqueness of individuals' values (as in chapter six, for example), I became aware of the inevitable need to use terms which were imposed from without rather than derived from the individual. GA's concept of friendship, for example, was said to be intimately bound up with the idea of happiness.

This mode of understanding can provide some valuable insights into individual variability, but it is important to be aware of its general form. Individual uniqueness is understood in terms of an implied set of value concepts existing independently of the person. Analysis by reference to the various combinations and sub-divisions of these 'imposed' concepts enables individuality to be grasped. This implied set of value criteria may be replaced by core values.
More generally it should be noted that this mode of understanding deals with the complexity of values by two processes, simplification and reconstruction. Firstly, the variety of an individual's values is simplified by applying a set of analytical constructs (core values). The complexity is then reconstructed in terms of these constructs.

This type of analysis could be an important and valuable general procedure for grasping the complexity of values. It has already been applied in chapter six (see 6.3.1) where the complexity of children's replies to my questions was reduced through analysis in terms of a value network. The complexity was then reconstituted, being understood in a way which was informed and organised in terms of the value network. By these means something of the unique 'flavour' of each person's values might be conveyed, but it should be borne in mind that understanding and communicating people's values in this way inevitably involves simplification and codification. The end product is a transformation of the raw material.

As mentioned in chapter four, the current approach enables idiographic studies to be made not only for individuals but also for groups. The criteria profile of a group could be identified (perhaps in the form of a factor structure), and the particularities of the criteria might be analysed in terms of the combination or sub-division of core values.

This idiographic understanding of groups also opens the way for another type of nomothetic analysis. Individuals' values could not only be understood in terms of concepts imposed by a researcher (e.g. core values), but they might also be seen in relation to the value criteria that are typically employed by the groups of which they are members. Thus, for example, if 'success and safety' were to be an important value criterion for eleven year olds, two children of this age might be compared in terms of the value that they attach to this concept.

This nomothetic analysis can also be applied to a group/sub-group relationship. Fifteen year old boys and girls might be compared, for
example, in terms of the frequency with which they apply criteria that have been identified from an idiographic study of fifteen year olds overall.

Such analyses of the 'typical' values of, for example, fifteen year olds might seem stereotyped and remote from the richness of the values of an individual fifteen year old. The evidence for a large common influence on values should be kept in mind, however. Group membership could be an important source of this influence, and the study of group values and their similarities and differences as compared with the values of sub-groups and individuals could provide important information.

Moreover, stereotyped views of the values of a group, as perceived by an individual, may play a part in the dynamics of value acquisition or change. An individual may wish to identify with, or distance himself from the values of a particular group. A fifteen year old may, for example, reject what he sees as the 'typical' values of this age group.

The study of the 'typical' values of groups, both as inferred from the values of the group members, and as perceived by others, could thus be an important area in the study of the content of values. It is one of many areas in which workers in the field may specialise. Such specialisation should always be carried out, however, with an awareness of the main message of this section. A balanced view of values needs to incorporate both commonality and uniqueness.

8.2.3 Both dynamic and static models of value are required

The value network model is a static model of value. It may be regarded as a 'snapshot' of the person's value system at a given moment, relative to the circumstances in which this view was obtained, for example the social context. In chapter six it was found that this model could be of use, both in describing individuals' values, and in exploring the differences between them. Certain limitations of the model were also noted, however. Concepts needed to be defined in greater detail, a temporal component seemed to be
required, and the model was unable to incorporate mixed feelings.

In general, these observations may be interpreted as reflecting the limits of the medium through which values are being understood. A static model finds it difficult to encode all aspects of a phenomenon that is fundamentally dynamic. When using the value network model to understand values, it will always be necessary to compensate for these limitations. The knowledge obtained from the model might be supplemented by qualifications and informal ideas concerning the operation of dynamic factors.

It may be possible to modify the value network model to make it more dynamic. 'Nodes' might be thought of as being in a state of flux, for example, sub-dividing and combining according to the contingencies of an evaluation, the purposes of the person, and so on. Likewise, one could envisage the value system 'flipping' from one state to another depending on context. A temporal component may be introduced in this way. Nodes may take on one set of values if the person is evaluating in relation to the present and another set of values for an orientation toward the future.

Rather than attempt to build a single model to account for all value phenomena, however, it may be more fruitful to employ complementary models. This has been the policy of the present approach. Both the value network model and the model of the process of evaluation are used to understand values. The former is a static model, best suited to describing the relatively stable aspects of a value system, while the latter is a more dynamic model which can account for the specific contingencies that surround a particular evaluation. It is capable, of dealing, for example, with the changes in context associated with evaluating by reference either to the present or to the future.
8.2.4 The sub-analysis of the process of evaluation is fruitful

Part of the potential of the present approach lies in the opportunities that it opens up for a detailed analysis of evaluation in terms of its concepts. The exploratory studies confirmed this potential. The idiographic work, for example, suggested that it was possible to separately identify the influence of subject and context on evaluation. It was also found that differences between subjects in the evaluation of an object could be analysed in terms of the relative contributions of beliefs about the object and criteria applied.

The effects of changes in context could also be divided into changes in beliefs and changes in criteria applied, while the distinction between subjective and reported evaluations was found to be another source of important differences within the process of evaluation.

The usefulness of sub-analysis was also illustrated in the nomothetic studies. Numerical analysis, for example (see 7.4.3 7X), allowed differences between subjects' evaluations to be analysed in terms of each criterion. In addition, the relative contribution of each criterion to a subjective evaluation could be estimated, and the relative importance of criteria applied and values attached could be ascertained.

Sub-analysis has also enabled more light to be thrown on the main issues of the empirical branch (see 3.2.3 C, 4.3.2). Social approaches receive some support from the present findings through the observation of a high level of similarity between groups of subjects in their values attached, taking a broad sample of objects. This is in accord with earlier research (see section 5.5). At least some of this similarity is likely to reflect a general cultural influence, and thus supports cultural approaches to value and the social cognition view. It is possible, however, that these similarities have other origins (e.g. evolution, human universals).

Whereas similarities in values attached to objects indicate a commonality of values, more detailed analysis provides support for individual
approaches. The evidence for individuality was reviewed above (8.2.1). The nature of the concepts that make up criteria applied can be considerably different from subject to subject.

As regards cognitive and non-cognitive approaches, the general message of the findings reiterates my earlier theoretical conclusion that both cognition and affect must be included in a full account of value. The importance of cognition in evaluation was illustrated by the analysis of evaluations made on a good–bad scale. These typically involve rapid, pre-reflective responses. The fact that these are meaningful when analysed using factor analysis supports the operation of 'low-level' cognition. In addition, the interview studies indicated that subjects as young as six years are generally able to give considered reasons for their evaluations ('high-level' cognition). In both cases, the idea that values can be justified is supported. This was also observed in the idiographic studies (6.3.3).

The many indications in the exploratory studies that ultimate values are important in evaluation provides support for non-cognitive approaches. The interview studies indicated the importance of ultimate values in underpinning value systems. While it has been seen that subjects' values are generally justifiable, at both high and low cognitive levels, they tend to be based upon a set of non-justifiable ultimate values.

The research indicates that ultimate values function as the source of the affective aspects of value which then flow through channels etched out by cognition, becoming 'attached' to concepts along the way. This portrayal illustrates the interdependency of cognition and affect in value, and the need to incorporate both sides of this issue.

The findings indicate the involvement of both cognition and affect. In line with the general position on such oppositions that is taken in the present approach, much work remains to be done to establish more precisely the conditions under which evaluation is mainly affective or mainly
cognitive.

As regards the sub-analysis of evaluation in general, it is important to acknowledge that in its 'everyday' occurrence evaluation is a seamless phenomenon, but in order to understand it in a 'cold', systematic manner (see 4.3.2 F), the use of analytical concepts is necessary, and it is not helpful to overemphasise its interconnectedness. To the extent that the present approach has led to an improved understanding of evaluation through conceptual analysis and the accompanying measurements and techniques, the sub-division of the field is justified.

8.2.5 The role of context in evaluation

The effects of changes in context were investigated during the idiographic studies, and the findings were summarised in chapter six (6.4.4). The studies imply that the role of context is more intricate than the model of the process of evaluation suggests. Context does not only affect the criteria applied through the influence of its criteria profile, but it can, under some circumstances, change beliefs as well.

It should be noted, however, that these changes in belief only occurred when the context consisted of an imaginary perspective that the subject was asked to adopt. When the social context was altered, and the child's schoolteacher was present, changes in beliefs were not observed. In this case the findings were in accord with the model in that the criteria applied tended to be different as a result of a change in context.

The imaginary contexts tended to affect beliefs in two ways. Firstly, there were changes in beliefs about the details of a criterion. In terms of the model, the person being asked to take the perspective of the imaginary 'subject' seems to be not only imagining what criteria will be applied, but also supposing that the details of what constitutes these criteria will be different.
The second class of changes in belief concerned the direction of the link between the object and a criterion. Here it appears that the person being asked to take the perspective of the imaginary 'subject' supposes that beliefs about the object would differ from his own beliefs.

The findings suggest that there are at least two classes of context, and that the model needs to be adapted to incorporate situations where one person evaluates from the perspective of another. The amended model would need to include the operation of the values and beliefs of the imaginary subject, while still allowing for the influence of the values and beliefs of the 'real' subject.

A third aspect of context may also need to be included in the model, however. This concerns the social context of the process of studying values. The importance of social context in relation to cognitive development in general was highlighted by Rogoff (1984). As noted above, the model seems to be capable of coping with the changes in criteria applied that might follow from changes in social context.

The model has so far been concerned with outlining the process of evaluation as it would 'naturally occur', in a situation in which the subject is unaware that he is being observed. The empirical study of evaluation is, however, dependent upon situations in which the subject knows that he is being observed. The reactivity that may occur as a result of this awareness is part of the social context of the process of studying values.

The observations made about values should be seen in relation to the social context within which they were made. The present interview studies, for example, were carried out in schools by a male researcher working alone. It is possible that the children reacted to the researcher much as they would to a teacher, expecting him to require answers to his questions in a particular form and manner. In addition, any sex differences observed should be seen in relation to the possible influence of the sex of the
interviewer.

Social context need not always be an unwelcome distortion, however, seen as a barrier between the researcher and the 'truth'. In the present work, for example, it could be the case that the social context has operated to advance the purposes of the study by producing open, compliant subjects who give honest replies to questions about their values.

Research into values is inevitably set within a social context, however, and the outcome must be judged in relation to this context. An important part of future empirical work in the field of value would be to vary details of the social context of the situation in which values are studied, observing the effect on the findings. As noted below, (8.3) social context is also an important aspect in the assessment of techniques to be used in the study of value.

8.2.6 Ultimate values

Various observations made during the exploratory studies have implications for the concept of ultimate value. In the nomothetic studies, for example, it was found that 'hedonism' was the most prevalent ultimate value, while 'health-illness', 'altruism', and 'using one's life' were also notable ultimate values.

Although these values often functioned as ultimate values, for many subjects they only had the status of instrumental values. Likewise, the values that tended to be instrumental, taking an overall view, might serve as ultimate values for some subjects. In this latter case, however, the finding is subject to verification and further research. It is suspected that at least some of the ultimate values identified in the interviews were due to 'don't know' or 'don't care' responses being incorrectly coded as ultimate values because of the wide operational definition adopted. In the idiographic research it was also found that an ultimate value for one person might be instrumental for another, and vice versa.
These findings cast doubt upon a strict division of value criteria into 'instrumental' and 'terminal' such as that made by Rokeach. This division may be no more than an intellectual exercise with little basis in the facts about people's value systems. The dichotomy between those values which are justified by other values ('instrumental') and those which are self-justified ('ultimate' or 'terminal') is one of function, and the rigid sorting of values as being either instrumental or terminal seems mistaken. As Dewey recognised, a particular value may dwell in either camp.

Criteria may thus function as either type of value, but this should not conceal the important finding that some are more likely to be ultimate values than others. This was found to be particularly true of 'hedonism'. It is suggested that the idea of self-reference within the criteria profile of a value object introduced in section 4.3.1 D remains a useful way of conceiving of these differences.

Another aspect of the exploratory research provided some support for Rokeach, however. During the idiographic studies some children made comments suggesting that their ultimate values were ordered into a hierarchy. The evidence for this was summarised in chapter six (6.3.4). The present approach had assumed that all ultimate values would be located at the extreme good or bad end of the good - bad scale. The ranking of these values suggests that this cannot be the case, however, because they must have unequal values attached to them.

It is possible, however, that the children who rank their ultimate values are similar to those value theorists who attempt to produce a hierarchy of 'fundamental' values (see 3.2.1 C3). They might be relying, either explicitly or implicitly on a yet more fundamental principle, a principle that was not identified during the interview.

The findings from the idiographic studies also suggest that ultimate values may not be the only class of higher-order values which function to organise lower-order values. In some cases it was noted that a particular
value criterion possessed a high degree of importance and prevalence in a value system, but was still justifiable, finally by reference to an ultimate value. Such values acted as intermediate organising principles, as the 'hub' around which a number of lower-order values revolved. Such values might be appropriately called focal values.

An example was the concern expressed by VG that poverty should be eliminated and material resources should be shared equally. This image of an ideal state of affairs was a major focus of her value system. Its value was derived, however, from an adherence to Christianity.

The prevalence of focal values will need to be ascertained in future empirical studies, and their place in the value network model and the model of the process of evaluation decided upon. They seem to share some of the features of ultimate values, but not the vital defining feature of being non-justifiable. It is possible that their existence is a factor in the observation made in chapter seven (7.3.2) that it was difficult to identify ultimate values for some subjects. The role of focal values as quasi ultimate values may mask the latter during an interview.

8.3 FURTHER STUDIES OF VALUE

8.3.1 Methodological research

It is clear that the empirical study of value as suggested by the present approach is at an early stage of development. Its further progress will depend upon the development and refinement of suitable techniques. A major part of future research effort should therefore focus on methodology, with the ultimate aim of producing a set of techniques and measures of value with known strengths and weaknesses. Researchers would then be able to select the techniques and measures that suit their purposes.

Extensive research into the reliability and validity of techniques is required in which factors such as age and sex are examined, together with the type of question, topic area, style of interview, social context of the
study, and so on. The main aim of examining these factors would be to
discover the conditions under which the techniques are appropriate, rather
than to use the factors as independent variables.

Having established the characteristics of techniques and the ways in
which they vary with particular conditions, their validity and usefulness
depend upon the purposes of a researcher. Even if it is found that a
technique encourages socially desirable or stereotypical responses, it could
be of use to a researcher whose intention is to study these phenomena.

This need to develop techniques was indicated both by the exploratory
research, and in my review of previous work. A variety of methods are
likely to be needed to study values. Within the series of studies it was
noted that the factor analysis and interview methods had particular
strengths and weaknesses, for example as regards the detection of criteria
applied. This was also observed in relation to the different methods
employed by other researchers. Some criteria (e.g. those concerned with
authority and transgression) seemed more detectable using factor analysis,
whereas others (e.g. 'well-being', 'hedonism', 'friendship') were more
likely to occur when content analysis methods were used.

A variety of techniques are likely to be required to cover all aspects of
the empirical study of value. A range of options will be needed in order to
suit the purposes of particular research, or to overcome specific problems.

This need for a varied range of options is particularly relevant to
developmental studies. It will often be necessary to choose or to adapt a
technique, ensuring that it is appropriate for use with the age range being
studied. When reviewing existing measures of children’s values (see 7.2) it
was found that these were often limited in their age range.

These considerations indicate that standardised measures of value must be
used with caution. (See 5.4.3). The researcher should ensure that they are
suitable for use with the class of subject that he is studying, and
appropriate to the aspect of value that he is interested in. The empirical
study of value has tended to be framed in terms of the use of popular
techniques, such as the RVS and the Study of Values (Allport, Vernon and
Lindzey, 1951; Rokeach, 1973). Excessive reliance on a few techniques could
result in 'knowledge' about values being distorted according to the
strengths and weaknesses of those techniques.

Moreover, it may be unwise to propose a fixed set of values (such as
those used in the RVS) for use in general comparisons. This could
oversimplify differences as well as encourage the false notion that the
values mean the same thing for all subjects. As noted in section 8.2.1,
there is a great deal of inter-subject variability. Furthermore, the value
categories used should be derived from studies of children if the instrument
is intended for the investigation of children's values.

These reservations about the use of standardised measures and the need to
use age-appropriate techniques were among the important methodological
points that were indicated during the exploratory research and in the review
of previous work. Other issues that were found to be important, and which
require consideration in further research include response style, and the
need to use techniques which facilitate the expression of genuine values
rather than those which might encourage false values to be expressed.

In 7.3.1 it was reported that children of different ages tended to have
different response styles. The researcher who intends to make comparisons
between the values of children differing in age, and who uses good - bad
scales should be aware of this factor. It would be advisable to control for
the effects of response style or to adjust for its influence on the findings
as appropriate to the circumstances. More generally, it is possible that
differences in complexity can affect comparisons between individuals or
groups. The investigator needs to be aware of this possibility and, if
appropriate, should either take steps to control its effects or to assess
its impact on his findings. As noted in 7.3.2, complexity of value systems
can influence the identification of ultimate values, for example.
Another important methodological issue requiring consideration during the development of techniques concerns the balance that may need to be struck between, on the one hand, setting conditions in which subjects may 'tell more than they know' and, on the other hand, using techniques that may fail to detect important aspects of the subject's values. In the exploratory research, for example, it was found that prompting children to give additional reasons why 'school' was good or bad resulted in a different criteria applied profile as compared to that obtained with unprompted replies. The possibility of making friends, for example, became more prominent when prompted replies were included. It was possible that prompting helped to reveal important criteria that would otherwise be withheld by reticent subjects. On the other hand, prompting might have encouraged subjects to imagine criteria that they would not normally apply.

Similar considerations apply to the investigation of ultimate values. In the idiographic studies it was found useful to conduct two interviews. The ultimate values suggested by the analysis of the first interview were explored in more detail in the second. This produced fruitful results, but the possibility that the children have been prompted to construct values that they do not possess must be kept in mind.

In section 8.4.2 I consider criticisms that the techniques used in the exploratory research do not reveal children's values. Nisbett and Wilson (1977), for example, might argue that the interviews encourage children to express not their own values but values that they have drawn from a 'culturally supplied pool'.

This position may be contrasted with that found in the Turiel tradition (see 5.2) as exemplified by Shweder et al (1981). Here it is assumed that children are 'intuitive moralists', that they 'know more than they tell'. The workers in this tradition are convinced that young children's moral competence, which is normally hidden, is revealed through the use of the techniques that they have developed.
This contrast illustrates the point that the assessment of techniques is not made in isolation, but in relation to a theoretical perspective. One position is inclined to believe that techniques purporting to study values only succeed in producing artifacts, while the other position contends that techniques can be devised to facilitate the expression of values which are normally hidden from view.

The present approach holds that general statements of this kind are unwise. Questions concerning whether or not techniques facilitate the expression of values or produce artifacts should be answered for each technique separately, in relation to the particular conditions surrounding its use and the purposes of the research. It is hoped that relevant information might be provided by the extensive research into methodology that I am advocating.

8.3.2 A strategy for empirical research

Answers to such questions, and to other queries about the effectiveness of techniques, depend upon the adoption of a perspective that goes beyond the methodological domain. One’s theoretical approach, as already noted, is an important element of this perspective. The assessment of a technique will require the application of experience and judgement, in which a complex mixture of evidence is considered. The findings produced by a technique will, for example, be compared with ‘established’ findings taking into account the degree of confidence in the techniques that were used to produce them. The correspondence with everyday knowledge would also be considered. The degree of coherence within a set of findings produced by a technique would also be taken into account, as would the perceived authenticity of the technique. (For example, is the social interaction that takes place when the technique is used likely to encourage the expression of genuine values?).
Such considerations have led me to believe that the appropriate strategy for the empirical study of value is to progress on several fronts simultaneously. The development of techniques is important, but this must be done in concert with theoretical development and the building up of a body of empirical findings. In this way an interdependent framework of knowledge might be constructed, in terms of which techniques can be assessed. This strategy could be taken through a number of distinct steps. Stages of development of the approach could be defined, and a broad assessment made at the end of each stage.

The exploratory research may be regarded as the first stage in this strategy, and provides an example of the way in which it might operate. An approach to the study of value has been formulated and techniques devised in relation to this approach. The techniques have been applied and a number of empirical findings produced. These were looked at in terms of their internal coherence, by comparison with the findings of other researchers and in relation to everyday knowledge about children's values. By comparing the findings produced by different techniques and taking into account the conditions under which the findings were obtained, an impression was gained of the strengths and weaknesses of the techniques. The techniques were also assessed by considering the fundamental criticisms that could be made of them. The findings also indicated that some modifications were needed to the empirical approach that had guided the research.

The earliest stages of research are hampered by the lack of both a body of established empirical findings and of the availability of proven techniques. The assessment of techniques and of the findings that they produce makes relatively more use of external evidence such as the findings of others and everyday knowledge. Internal coherence is also important, however, and it may be advisable to use several different techniques. If similar findings emerge, and these are consistent with the external evidence, then confidence is increased both in the techniques and in the
findings.

Where contradictions occur, however, then at least one of the methods has shown a weakness. If criteria applied are being identified, for example, then a technique which identified a criterion could have made a 'type one' error, registering the presence of a non-existent criterion. Alternatively, the other techniques might have failed to identify a genuine criterion.

Generally, the early stages of research should be inclined toward accepting findings rather than rejecting them. The consequences of making type two errors are potentially more serious than those of making type one errors. A higher proportion of false findings should be tolerated in order to reduce the possibility of failing to identify genuine phenomena. This would raise the threshold for rejecting techniques, and would help ensure that potentially valuable sources of information about values are not prematurely ignored. The merits of each technique should be fully explored.

This does not entail adopting an unquestioning and gullible approach to findings and techniques, however. Rather, I am suggesting an approach in which promising techniques are first taken at face value and pushed to their limits. This would be followed by a period, at the end of a stage of research, of critical reflection. The findings would then be looked at from a broader perspective, taking into account the earlier leniency. Likewise, a healthy dose of scepticism would be applied to the techniques. Excessive scepticism, however, at too early a stage of research could be counter-productive and hinder the development of the field.

As an example of the application of this policy, consider the finding that 'hedonism' was identified as a criterion in the interview studies, but not by factor analysis. A strict approach might reject the criterion because of the inconsistency. By being inclined to accept its existence, however, an explanation was sought for its non-occurrence in factor analysis. This has led to an interpretation which provides information about the techniques. 'Hedonism' represents a different level of
abstraction than many other criteria. The words that could have factored together to form a pleasure--pain dimension have tended to group together in factors which imply pleasure or pain (e.g. danger, well-being), but which were not mainly concerned with its direct experience. In contrast, the interviews probed more deeply into subjects' value systems and enabled this criterion to be expressed.

The production of this thesis has provided a pause for critical reflection on the findings of the exploratory research and the techniques used. The findings have been subjected to close scrutiny and the results of this may be glimpsed indirectly through the observations, recommendations and conclusions reported in chapters six to eight. As regards the techniques, these have been assessed partly in conjunction with the findings, but they have also been examined in terms of the fundamental criticisms raised against them (see 8.4 below).

Having taken these criticisms into account, compared across different studies, made comparisons with the work of others, and also made more informal judgements based on commonsense knowledge, I consider that the techniques used in the exploratory research, while needing some improvement, have the potential for being important means of studying values. They do not produce the gross distortions that would occur if the criticisms discussed in section 8.4 were substantially correct.

8.3.3. Areas of development

These techniques are in need of refinement, however, and I see this task as being important in the initial stages of the methodological research. The reliability and validity of the techniques needs to be examined together with the age range for which they can be appropriately used. The effects of the social context surrounding their use also needs to be studied. This research would involve extensive replication work and studies in which the relevant factors are systematically varied.
This programme could be combined with efforts to identify and establish 'core values', and would also aim to throw light on some of the controversies discussed above. For example, research could be conducted aimed at assessing rival claims as to the meanings of the factors produced by the factor analysis technique.

Moving now to research aimed at obtaining empirical data or providing information of theoretical importance, there are several areas in which the field might be developed in the immediate future.

Ultimate values (UVs) have been found to be of special importance in evaluation, and these should be studied in more detail. Investigations which specifically focus on UVs would enable more detail to be obtained, and aid the production of more rigorous methods of identifying them in which the "don't knows" and "don't cares" are reduced. The UVs of individuals could be explored, their function in the person's value system examined, and the occurrence and consequences of changes in UVs observed. Nomothetic studies of UVs could include an investigation of the identity and relative prominence of UVs as related to age and sex. The incidence of ranking of UVs could also be studied.

The distinction between UVs and focal values could also be of empirical and theoretical interest. Developmental trends in the relative prominence of these two organisational features could be studied, and the identity of the values functioning as UVs and focal values examined.

More interestingly for the wider theory of value, adult subjects could be probed more deeply and questioned as to their ideas on the origins of their UVs. This would provide useful information concerning the question 'How is value known?' Subjects' implicit theories of value might be revealed, and it may be possible to classify these in terms of philosophical traditions. Furthermore, subjects' comments concerning how obligatory and universal they consider their values to be could form the basis of a method of identifying UVs.
Further study of the process of evaluation might also be rewarding. This research would mainly involve the detailed study of individuals and particular objects. The potential usefulness of numerical analysis indicated in the exploratory research could be followed up. In addition, more investigations could be made into the effects of changes in context, and appropriate amendments made to the model.

Other aspects of the process model needing investigation include the role of the examination of the object's features and its relationship to contextual evaluation, and further studies of the differences between subjective and reported evaluation. The usefulness of the model in accounting for factual judgements (see 4.3.3) could also be explored (e.g. fitness for purpose, marking or judging performances, magnitude estimation). Sources of subjective influence might be identifiable in terms of the model.

As regards the structure of value, more detailed and extensive studies of changes in the stability of evaluation throughout childhood are required. Non-verbal studies of value could be developed and used to disentangle the effects of linguistic ability and cognitive development on the complexity of value systems. Investigations into the factors underlying response style could also be carried out.

The empirical study of value should proceed along both of the complementary routes to understanding set out above (8.2.2). Both nomothetic and idiographic investigations are required. The application of value theory to the study of children's values has a great deal of potential. The possible benefits were discussed in chapter five. I see the development of this area as passing through two phases. Firstly, research will be aimed at obtaining an 'overall picture' of value development. The exploratory research was oriented toward this aim. Secondly, research will focus on particular problems in child development, and on building a values approach to topics which developmentalists have used to categorise their area of study. The research strategy as outlined above would be used during
each phase.

In the first phase, the main aims will be to estimate 'overall' parameters, and to identify age and sex effects. For example, the identity and relative prominence of criteria applied over a wide range of objects and contexts will be studied. This will be done for the class of 'children' as a whole, and variations with age and sex will be noted. Similar studies could be conducted for ultimate values and for values attached, and also as regards stability and complexity of values.

Section 7.4 gives details of how the techniques used in the nomothetic research might be used in this work. In chapter five (5.4), the relevant child development literature was reviewed and organised in relation to the proposed agenda of this first phase. It is important that the research is not limited to nomothetic and cross-sectional studies, however. Longitudinal and idiographic studies will also be required in order that an accurate overall picture of value development can be obtained.

It is hoped that the research carried out in the first phase will provide fundamental information about the development of values that will be of use as reference points when conducting studies that have a narrower focus. In addition, this research could improve knowledge about the nature of transitions between age categories and about socialisation generally. It may eventually be possible to account for socialisation in terms of the interactions between group values and the values of the individual.

In the second phase, the emphasis will be on exploring the usefulness of applying the present approach to particular areas of study in child development. The potential benefits of adopting the 'value point of view' were discussed in chapter five (see 5.2), while the existing areas which already focus heavily on values, and where the present approach might be usefully applied were mentioned in section 5.4.1. Again, I envisage that research will involve both idiographic and nomothetic studies.
In general, the values approach holds the promise of providing an account of child development from the child's viewpoint. The relative importance to children of areas such as moral development, friendship, and achievement, can be assessed, and this might provide some interesting comparisons with the relative importance of these same areas to the community of developmental psychologists. Furthermore, areas which psychologists have previously neglected might be revealed. The adoption of a broader perspective, such as that provided by the present approach, could enable separate areas of study to be related together, and the interactions between them in children's lives could be studied.

An initial insight into the potential of 'phase two' research was gained when considering the evaluation of school in the exploratory research. When comparing school 'likers' and 'dislikers' it was noted that likers tended to apply the criterion 'personal knowledge and skills' whereas dislikers tended to evaluate school in relation to friends and playing. Both groups were found to be aware of the main criterion applied by the other group, however.

This is a simplified account of the findings, but they can be interpreted as indicating that an important aspect in the evaluation of school is the conflict between the values of achievement on the one hand and play and friendship on the other. Those children for whom achievement is prominent as a value criterion will tend to like school, whereas those for whom play and friendship is prominent will tend to dislike school. As noted in chapter five, these have tended to be treated as separate areas of study by developmentalists.

The idiographic studies indicate that other values can lay behind the liking or disliking of school for particular children. The above-mentioned values still tend to be important, however. It is instructive to note that the ten and eleven year olds studied in depth were inclined to regard school as a provider of play and friendship rather than as an inhibitor of these values. Also, some children anticipated that when they were fifteen they
would view school as a hindrance to their recreational activities.

These findings hint at a possible account, in terms of the underlying values, of the general decline in the liking of school during adolescence. Part of this decline is due to changes in the direction of the linkage between school and the values of friendship and play/recreation. Children for whom these values figure prominently as criteria applied will tend to show a greater fall in their value attached to school than those for whom achievement is prominent. This fall might be offset in some cases, however, by children changing their criteria applied. As noted in 6.4.4 A, ten and eleven year olds tended to anticipate that at age fifteen they would be evaluating school in terms of obtaining employment.

Among the practical applications of such an analysis is the possibility of identifying potential school dislikers at an early age. Those who stress friendship and play as reasons why school is good, rather than school as a means of self-improvement and a route to a job, might be more likely to subsequently dislike school. In addition, educationalists could be better informed for the purposes of attempting to make school more attractive to adolescents. They could either focus on the school, devising ways of forging positive linkages between school and friendship and play/recreation, or they could work on the child, attempting to increase the prominence of achievement in the criteria profile.

8.4 CRITICISMS OF THE APPROACH

The topics covered in this chapter so far are based on the assumption that the exploratory research has some merit. In this section I will consider some fundamental criticisms of the present approach. If these criticisms have any substance they threaten at worst to rule out any empirical research, and at best to undermine specific techniques. It is therefore necessary to reflect on these criticisms at some length.
8.4.1 Is empirical research appropriate for the study of value?

Smedslund (1978a, 1978b, 1979) argued that ordinary language contains conceptual relationships which are prior to both theory and research. These relationships may be expressed in the form of 'ordinary language theorems', which are necessarily true and not amenable to empirical testing. Smedslund suggested that psychologists should concentrate more on producing basic theorems and less on empirical research, which was often aimed at 'proving' theories which were either necessarily true or contingent upon specific circumstances.

As regards the present approach, Smedslund's position suggests the possibility that the two models used are reformulations of truths that are present in ordinary language. The study of value would be best served if the effort were expended on producing 'ordinary language theorems' about values, rather than carrying out empirical research. The latter can only succeed in demonstrating some of the myriad ways in which values vary with particular circumstances.

The present approach accepts the idea that commonsense knowledge provides a background against which empirical findings can be judged. This idea is incorporated into the research strategy suggested in 8.3.2. The researcher's commonsense knowledge can function as a final arbiter of truth. Any findings which challenge this knowledge will be disbelieved. It may indeed be possible to construct a set of 'ordinary language theorems' to represent knowledge about values.

There are two main points which distinguish my position from that of Smedslund, however. Firstly, commonsense is not the only source of background knowledge against which findings are judged, and secondly this background is not immutable. There is a constant interaction between theory, commonsense knowledge, and observations, whether formal or informal.

A vital function of intellectual enquiry is to challenge established views. Inquisitive minds may question some commonsense knowledge, point out
inconsistencies and paradoxes, and form theories. These theories, together with those parts of commonsense knowledge that are accepted, form a new background for the assessment of findings, which may itself be challenged.

Theories have limited lifespans. They may be modified as a result of empirical findings. In this regard I am in agreement with Bandura (1978) in suggesting that a dynamic interaction takes place between theory and research. In the longer term, theories are judged in terms of criteria such as usefulness, fruitfulness, and inclusivity. Theories are also subject to cultural, social, and historical forces operating both within the research community and in the wider culture.

Commonsense knowledge may also be regarded as a set of theories, albeit subject to less formal means of modification and assessment. The susceptibility to change of commonsense knowledge is a major weakness in Smedslund's position. On the one hand, he asserts that commonsense can be modelled on Euclidean Geometry. On the other hand, he holds that commonsense psychology is acquired during socialisation and that his theorems are linguistically bound. These foundations do not appear to provide the stability required for logically necessary truths. His position is based upon a false analogy with geometry.

An approach such as Smedslund's may be useful in the short term as a systematisation of the background to judgements about empirical findings, but in the longer term I fear that it would produce stagnation and a stifling of enquiry.

8.4.2 Criticisms of the techniques used in the exploratory research

Having asserted the usefulness of empirical research to the study of value, I will now consider criticisms of the specific techniques used in the exploratory research.

Criticism of the relationship between factor analysis and the study of value suggested in section 7.3.1 focuses on the issue of the meaning of the
factors. The interpretation of factors is notoriously problematic, being
vulnerable to subjective influences, while the labelling of factors could
produce a tendency to over-simplify the information that they contain.
Claims about the meanings of the factors as indicators of the criteria
applied by subjects when evaluating, should therefore be kept under constant
review.

There is a more fundamental objection to the present view of the
relationship between factor analysis and the study of value, however.
Whereas my position asserts that factors provide an estimate of the criteria
applied profile of a subject or group of subjects, a rival view suggests
that the factors reveal little or nothing about the values of individuals.
According to this view, value is a part of the meaning of words, and the
factors represent the subjects' perceptions of the way in which words are
used in their linguistic community.

The criticism of the use of factor analysis only affects the nomothetic
studies. Criticism of the interview technique strikes at both the
nomothetic and the idiographic research. An opponent might call into
question the validity of the interview findings by citing the work of
Nisbett and Wilson (1977). This work contends that people have little or no
direct introspective access to their higher-order cognitive processes.
Despite surface appearances, the children interviewed might be drawing on a
'culturally supplied pool' when justifying their evaluations. Such an
opponent could assert that there is nothing of psychological relevance in
the findings from this technique.

These criticisms are discussed in detail in the appendix (A1),
concentrating on differences that are resolvable by empirical
investigations. It is important to acknowledge, however, that the disputes
are based on theoretical differences as well. These differences are
examined in the following section.
8.4.3 Theoretical aspects of the criticisms of the techniques

Even if it could be proved beyond any doubt that a given technique could not provide psychologically relevant information about values, my response would be to develop another technique which would be more adequate for my purposes. The underlying theory would not be seriously questioned at this stage. The critic, however, might interpret the failings of a technique to be symptomatic of the inadequacy of the theory that spawned it, and might claim that all similar efforts must fail.

There seem to be two main strands to the objections to the techniques, and I will now examine the theoretical differences that underly these objections by using the device of postulating 'strong' versions of the opposing positions. In doing this I intend that the details of the differences will be made clearer, and that the present approach will be clarified by way of contrast with the 'strong' positions.

A strong sociocultural determinist position is the first of these opposing positions. This might state that there cannot be anything of psychological relevance in any technique, because values are overwhelmingly influenced by the social and cultural conditions of the person. Any demonstration that values are substantially the result of psychological processes, are likely to be due to errors. Subjective experiences that values derive from personal thoughts and feelings are illusory.

The second main objection might be called the lack of self-awareness position. Expressed strongly, this would hold that people have no insight into their values. When they are asked questions about their values they give replies that do not relate directly to their values, but to their socially-inspired ideas about the nature of values. The inadequacies of Nisbett and Wilson's evidence do not support the position that people do have access to their higher mental processes. It merely means that the case must be made more convincingly. Values cannot be studied through the use of interviews and self-reports.
I will consider the lack of self-awareness position first. The present approach holds that people's awareness of their values is variable, and that demonstrations of a lack of awareness should not be interpreted as supporting the position that people are never aware of their values. They are more likely to be aware of some aspects of their values (and the influences on these values) than other aspects. Furthermore, this awareness can vary with the surrounding conditions. In what follows, I set out those aspects of the present approach that are relevant to the self-awareness issue.

Subjects need not be aware of the basis of their evaluations at the time that they make these evaluations. Values may become attached to objects as a result of reflective deliberation which can become pre-reflective and automatic for the purposes of acting efficiently in everyday life. Alternatively, values attached may never have been reflected upon, perhaps being the result of some form of intuition, or the unreflective absorption of the values of the surrounding community. In all cases, however, with the exception of the special case of ultimate values, the present approach contends that values attached have a rational basis. A distinction must be made between the origins of values and the way in which they are organised in a functioning value system. Regardless of their origins, values become enmeshed together, along with factual knowledge, in the justificationary relationships that make up a value system. It is this organisation that the present approach focuses upon, rather than on how values are formed or change.

The approach does not require that the person be aware of the process of evaluation. Even if Nisbett and Wilson had been able to prove their point successfully, it would have been irrelevant to the present approach. It is assumed, however, that people can and do have access to the content of their values. If people are asked to justify their evaluations, they generally have access to their criteria applied, given appropriate conditions, and
will reveal these to a third party, given appropriate conditions. It is anticipated that knowledge of what are appropriate conditions, and of the circumstances under which distortions might occur, will be improved if the research outlined above (see 8.3.1) is carried out. As has already been argued, the exploratory research is encouraging, but not conclusive. It indicates that children as young as six years old can express the content of their values, but also points to the need for further research.

While recognising that people can normally express the content of their values, however, it is also necessary to acknowledge that this expression is likely to be less than perfect. A subject may not have access, under any conditions, to the 'true' rationale for an evaluation, or he may be unwilling to reveal, under any conditions, this rationale. The investigation of the content of value systems is likely, therefore, to need to include indirect and unobtrusive techniques which do not encourage guarded responses. The use of such techniques might not only reveal criteria applied that are not accessible to more direct methods, but could also provide independent evidence that the direct methods are providing authentic information. The factor analytic technique used in the exploratory studies, or some improved variant of it, might be suitable in this regard.

The approach also allows for the operation of influences on evaluation of which people are highly unlikely to be aware. These may be general influences which are an integral part of the value system, such as response style, or tendencies which are external to the domain of value, such as the inclination to favour objects which are on the right rather than the left.

These effects will need to be studied by using techniques appropriate to their nature. Simply asking subjects to give their reasons for a choice, for example, is unlikely to produce replies that refer to the position of an object. If a genuine position effect can be demonstrated, as in Nisbett and Wilson's 'stockings' study, the 'failure' of the subjects to mention the
effect, does not constitute evidence that they do not have insight into their values, and should not lead to a general wariness of self reports about values. Instead it demonstrates a lack of insight into the nature of evaluation by the researchers as well as the use of an inappropriate technique.

As regards the strong sociocultural determinist position, my general stance on the issue of the relative influence of social and individual factors was outlined in chapter four (4.3.2 A). I maintain that social and cultural factors do not operate in a simple manner, merely determining the value attached to an object, which a subject absorbs, stores, and expresses in this simple form as an 'affective charge' of a specific direction and magnitude. The present approach recognises the importance of social and cultural factors, but assumes that they operate in a more complex manner. They can influence any of the elements of value networks and the process of evaluation, affecting both relatively stable elements, such as the criteria profile of an object, and sub-processes of evaluation, for example in the processes that occur between a 'subjective' and a 'reported' evaluation. Knowledge of the extent of these influences, and the conditions which magnify or diminish them awaits the appropriate empirical research.

The theoretical difference seems to be partly due to differences in the level of understanding of values which is felt to be satisfactory. The sociocultural determinist would seem to be satisfied if an individual's values could be linked to the values of the cultures and social groups that he has been exposed to. Individual differences might be explained by examining the different 'mixtures' of influences that may have occurred. This level of understanding is unsatisfactory from the present perspective, however. The complex interweaving of social and cultural influences within the individual's unique value system needs to be studied with the aid of concepts such as those developed in the present approach. Moreover, the role of the individual in determining his own values, and in deciding which
social and cultural values to accept and which to reject, needs to be given
greater prominence.

The present approach stands firmly against an overemphasis of the social
in the study of value. In one respect, therefore, it is contrary to the
recent trends in the social psychology of value described in 2.3.13. It is
not alone in this opposition, however. Schwartz (1990), for example,
suggests that individuals can transform the values of social institutions.

Apart from the reservations concerning social cognition, however, the
present approach is generally in tune with recent trends. It is a unifying
approach because it offers new conceptual frameworks which enable the main
issues in the empirical study of value to be seen in a new light. Both
sides of the traditional oppositions might be reconciled or analysed in
greater detail in terms of a common structure. The present approach is also
in accord with recent trends in focusing on the cognitive organisation of
values, in carrying out a conceptual analysis of the field, and in
recognising the importance of idiographic studies of value.

8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this final section a broader viewpoint is adopted, away from empirical
matters and toward the field of value as a whole. The themes covered in
recent work testify to the continuing vitality of the field, and I am
encouraged by the way in which my analysis of the field is capable of
assimilating this work. Brief comments are also made to indicate how the
study of value is intertwined with some important topics in the philosophy
of psychology.

There is a continuing interest in the field of value. Recent work, for
example that of Schwartz (1990), Sperry (1988), and Flew (1990), show a
diversity of concerns and approaches, and demonstrate the vitality of the
area. They also demonstrate the need for clarification and integration
mentioned in chapter one, however (see 1.4). The broad analysis of the
field presented in this thesis provides a useful analytical tool which can be used to gain insights into the work of other writers, enabling their contributions to be organised and compared in terms of a common perspective.

Schwartz (1990) argues that a science of value might model itself on the natural sciences and mistakenly come to believe that its findings and theories are laws of nature, when in fact they are contingent upon historical and social circumstances. He suggests that the views of those involved in studying values (which could include the idea that their theories are laws of nature) can affect these historical and social processes.

This idea of a mutual interaction between the study of value and the wider culture is shared by my analysis of the field. The student of value may carry out research within the empirical branch of the field, and he will perhaps examine the historical and social influences that affect those whom he studies. The process of studying values itself takes place within a value context, however, which includes the impact of historical and social factors.

In addition, the researcher's theories of value formed from empirical studies can affect the way in which he subsequently conducts his work. This is one aspect of the 'reflexive branch' of the study of value. Value theories can also become integrated into the wider culture and thereby influence the study of value. It is proposed that the study of the involvement of values in the study of value itself should be the main focus of the reflexive branch.

The warning by Schwartz against a 'natural science' of value can thus be interpreted as including a call for the reflexive branch to be considered in the study of value. His summary of the tasks of a genuine science of value represent the remaining branches. 'Making the historical contingency of values clear' reflects a position taken within the theoretical branch. 'Encouraging discussion of what values people ought to
have' falls within the normative branch, while 'discussion of the social arrangements that would best contribute to the development of those values' requires work within the empirical branch.

Sperry's recent work (Sperry, 1988) can also be analysed to advantage from the present perspective. He holds that the 'cognitive revolution' has brought the concept of consciousness within the ambit of science. Conscious mental states are emergent properties of brain processes, but cannot be fully explained in terms of these processes. Consciousness exerts 'downward' causal control (macro determinism) over states of the brain. Value is seen as an important element of this controlling function.

This aspect of Sperry's position may be seen as a contribution within the theoretical branch of the study of value, capable of giving rise to empirical research. Sperry explicitly states, however, that he believes that his approach allows him to go beyond description to a prescriptive science of value, and a science-based ideology.

When analysed in terms of the present broad view of the field, however, the flaws in Sperry's approach become apparent. His ideology is based on the premise that values can be derived from facts. He argues, for example, that scientific facts shape understanding and beliefs which then determine values. This position fails to take heed of the naturalistic fallacy. Values do not only emerge from factual knowledge, but involve other values as well. In addition, he fails to consider the 'reflexive' aspects of value. Values can shape ideas about what is a scientific fact, which 'facts' should be believed and which ignored. Furthermore, Sperry does not distinguish between the intermingling of value and fact that occurs in individuals and the philosophical question of the relationship between value and fact. This leads him to the erroneous belief that his neuropsychological approach to value provides support for his philosophical naturalism.
Sperry emerges with a version of evolutionary ethics in which the focus of the ultimate good is extended beyond human survival to the long-term quality of the biosphere. This may be viewed as a contribution within the normative branch, where its reliance of the specification of a closed-criteria system becomes clear. It is not founded on fact alone, but also on a set of unchallengeable ultimate values. Sperry’s Utopian vision of reconciling long-standing intellectual dichotomies and solving social and political problems should be viewed with an appropriate degree of caution.

Sperry’s distinction between ‘below upward’ determinism (micro determinism), corresponding to the traditional reductive scientific agenda, and ‘above downward’ determinism (macro determinism), which allows for conscious control, draws attention to the affinity of the concept of value to the concepts of free will, determinism, and causation.

Schwartz (1990) points out that values both guide behaviour and are created or destroyed by those whose behaviour is guided. Flew (1990) identifies two senses of cause and determinism. The first of these is as used in traditional natural science. The second sense relates to human affairs, and allows for the operation of free will. Normally behaviour is relatively unconstrained, but even if it is said to be ‘caused’, this causation is distinct from that of the natural sciences. Even if there is no tolerable alternative or if it would be unreasonable to act otherwise, the opportunity to make other choices is present.

These aspects of the work of the cited authors reflect the tension within the human sciences between the search for explanations and the need to admit free will. The latter has been given a higher priority in recent thought, and the authors can be seen as being concerned to produce formulations which give human purposes and values an appropriate degree of importance.

The approach to the study of value being advocated in this thesis is vitally involved in these issues. Values have antecedents, but the operation of free will and choice prevent them from becoming determinants of

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behaviour and experience. This formulation allows that individuals, while being influenced by their social and cultural background, may in turn affect the values of other individuals, of groups, and of their culture.

The empirical study of value can focus on revealing the antecedents of values, but can also be concerned with the consequences of having particular values, studying the ways in which they influence behaviour and are involved in social issues.

The focus on the consequences of values involves treating value as primary, and this is a central theme of the present work. I am concerned to explore the usefulness of taking the value point of view, pushing the associated ideas to their limits, and seeing if new insights are achieved.

Treating value as primary involves, for example, taking the position that an observed decline in the value attached by a person to ‘authority’ is not just a reflection of the contingencies in a person’s life, but a potential source of change in the nature of a person’s interactions with the world.

This aspect of the study of value is concerned with understanding other people. It goes directly to the heart of one of the main aims of psychology. It attempts to understand what people do, say, think, and feel in terms of their values. It is hoped that this form of understanding will cohere with everyday understanding and be accessible to the layman. It is aimed at systematising and expanding existing knowledge rather than seeking understanding in terms of the operation of hidden and uncontrolled factors, such as inheritance, the unconscious, and stimuli. The use of esoteric concepts is avoided, but disciplined thought and working concepts with clear definitions are still required.

The field of value is ordinary, trivial, obvious, and simple, while also being extraordinary, insightful, complex, and significant. Its roots extend both into ordinary life and deep into philosophy. The result is an area of study which requires careful scholarly analysis while remaining accessible to the layman.
APPENDIX
A1. Criticisms of the techniques used in the exploratory research

A. Factor Analysis and the study of value

Several factor analyses were made during the research, based upon the evaluations by subjects of lists of words. Subjects were asked to rate each word in terms of a good-bad scale. The evaluations of 100 words by 180 boys and girls aged nine, and twelve, and fifteen were factor analysed, for example. The first factor consisted of fourteen positive loadings, the first six of which were greed, cheat, fail, dirty, pain, and murder. This factor was interpreted in terms of the self-as-agent, causing various undesirable outcomes which invite punishment. The shorthand label 'Transgression/Fear of punishment' was used to refer to the factor.

The interpretation of factors in this way can be challenged by the assertion that the factors reveal little or nothing about the values of individuals. According to this view, value is a part of the meaning of words, and the factors represent the subjects' perceptions of the way in which words are used in their linguistic community.

Support for this position can be found in the rank order correlations between subjects divided into age groups, shown in table A1.1. These are based on the evaluation of 100 words with 60 subjects in each age group. The position is also supported by a comparison of these same subjects' evaluations with three sets of published norms. (see table A1.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A1.1: Rank order correlations between age groups</th>
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<tr>
<td>(second factor analysis study)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 9 12 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 x 0.95 0.90 0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 x 0.95 0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 x 0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 x</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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Table A1.2: Rank order correlations between median evaluations of subjects in second factor analysis study and three sets of published norms

<table>
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<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>N</th>
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<th>9</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
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<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high correlations can be interpreted as supporting the construct validity of this measure of value, but they also suggest a strong cultural influence on value. The high correlations with the published norms are remarkable in that the norms are all based on adult responses, and were collected in the U.S.A. These findings support the rival position because they are based on the evaluations of people who share a common language. They tend to attach the same values to the words of their language.

These high correlations are also in accord with the present approach, however, as is the view that value is a part of the meaning of words. Indeed, the approach acknowledges the work of Osgood and his collaborators on the Semantic Differential as being an important strand in the development of the present approach.

The correlations between groups of subjects are based upon the rankings of median evaluations for each group. They are therefore estimates of the extent to which groups of subjects are similar in the average evaluations that they make for a given range of objects. The high correlations suggest that the combined effects of variables that are common to all groups produce similar median evaluations for all subject groups. This may be due in large part to cultural or linguistic factors, but further research is required on this issue.
The intercorrelations between age groups (Table A1.1) provide evidence that these factors are not the whole story, however. The influence of age can be seen in figure A1.1.

Figure A1.1: Rank order correlations between age groups  
(second factor analysis study)

In this figure a perfect correlation has been plotted where an age group coincides with itself, in order to clarify the consistency in the pattern of relationships. Without exception, this pattern shows that the closer the subjects are in age, the more similar are their median evaluations. These regularities can be explained in terms of the current approach by assuming that age is one of the influences on median evaluation.

According to the present view, evaluations are influenced both by individual factors and by factors which people share. This latter class may have several sources, among which are culture and language. When evaluations of an object are collected from a group of people, then measures
of central tendency (e.g. the mean) give an estimate of the combined effect of the shared influences, whereas measures of variability (e.g. the variance) give an estimate of the degree to which individuals differ from the common view. This variation is doubtless partly made up of errors of measurement and random factors, but it is also proposed that it is due to the systematic operation of a number of factors which underly the evaluations (See 7.3.1 for an account of the assumed link between factor analysis and evaluation).

It is vitally important to realise, when assessing the rival position, that the factor analysis procedure used in the current research (R-technique) is based not on mean evaluations but on variations from the mean. The identification of factors relies upon consistencies between subjects in their tendencies to evaluate words either above or below the mean. For example, if subjects who evaluate 'life' above the mean, also tend to rate 'home' above the mean and 'blind' below the mean, and vice versa, then a factor in which 'life' and 'home' are in one pole and 'blind' is in the opposite pole is likely to occur. This was the case for factor four of the 180-subject factor analysis referred to above.

Using R-technique, the evaluations are standardised across words. Each word is given a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Subject's variations about this mean are expressed in terms of z-scores. The factor analysis is only calculated on the variance (which I assume to include the influence of individuals), and the mean evaluation for each word (which I assume reflects the common influences), is eliminated from the analysis.

Further evidence for this view of the meaning of the factors is provided by examining the results of factor analyses which work on the intercorrelations between subjects rather than words (Q-technique). Two such analyses have been made, using 96 subjects in both. There were an equal number of boys and girls, and each of four age levels was equally represented (six, nine, twelve, and fifteen years).
In this type of analysis, evaluations are standardised across subjects. Subjects will tend to factor together if they evaluate the same words either above or below their personal mean evaluation. With this analysis large first factors were found, accounting for 80% and 78% of the rotated variance (58% and 55% of the total variance). The second factors only accounted for 3% of the total variance.

From the viewpoint of the present approach, these findings are another indication of the large size of the shared influences in evaluation, an observation that is in accord with the approach. There appears to be a difficulty for the rival view, however. If the shared influences on evaluations are identified using Q-technique, and if R-technique excludes shared influences, then it is difficult to see how the factors obtained using R-technique can reflect subjects' perceptions of the way in which words are used in their linguistic community. If the rival view were correct, then a large first factor would be expected, containing those words with high intercorrelations (mostly highly positive and highly negative words). This was not found in any of the eight main factor analyses carried out in the research.

It may still be possible for the rival view to maintain the fundamentals of its position, however, by modifying its assertions. It could acknowledge that there is a meaningful structure to the variance in a factor analysis, but it could interpret this structure as reflecting the influence of various sub-cultures in the sample. On this view, those who tend to value both 'life' and 'home' above the mean, and 'blind' below the mean belong to a common sub-culture in which the perception of the value meaning of words differs in a systematic way from the wider culture. The factors should therefore be interpreted in terms of the sub-cultures that are identified. The position that there is nothing of psychological relevance in evaluation is maintained, and the analysis of value that is the aim of the present approach is irrelevant.
B. Interviews and the study of value

The above position presents a challenge to the present approach that will be an important influence on any further empirical work. Other aspects of the exploratory research, however, provide additional evidence in support of the position that there is something of psychological relevance in evaluation, and that values cannot be reduced to sociocultural phenomena. This evidence comes from the interview studies:

- Subjects were generally able to successfully answer questions about the reasons for their evaluations. The children were normally open and co-operative in providing these reasons in a manner which strongly suggested that they were revealing something about themselves rather than automatically reporting their idea of what they should be telling an adult in that situation. There were exceptions, of course, and some children were perceived as being bored or inattentive and perhaps not prepared to express their own values. These seemed to be in the minority, however.

- Evaluations tended to be justified in terms of the other values that might be promoted, encouraged, hindered, and so on. No instances were recorded, in 176 interviews, of children making statements such as 'everybody knows it's good' or 'my parents say it's bad' as reasons for their evaluations. This indicates that, regardless of the strength of sociocultural influences, values are organised in terms of the justificationary relationships that make up an individual's unique value system.

- Analysis of the reasons given for the evaluation of the same word by different subjects (criteria applied) indicates that the
degree of variation between children is greater than would be expected if their replies were mainly determined by their common cultural background.

The criteria applied in the interviews were found to be in accord with the factor analysis in many instances. For example, in the first study between 58% and 65% of the criteria applied to the words 'fruit', 'eyes', and 'home' were in terms of health. All three of these words loaded highly on factor one, which had been interpreted as a 'well-being' factor. This coherence gives strength to the view that the factors reflect criteria applied and that the interviews also provide psychological information.

The present approach does not deny that there are large cultural and social influences on values. The interviews suggest, however, that these influences do not dominate the experience and organisation of an individual's values, which are far more varied than a cultural determinist might expect.

The validity of the interview findings might be questioned, however, by reference to the work of Nisbett and Wilson (1977). Furthermore, the opponent might point out that the conduct of the interviews might somehow encourage the children to falsely convey the impression that they are individualists rather than conformists. They may be aware of the impact of their social and cultural environment on their values, but the contingencies of these interviews may lead them to suppress this awareness.

Nisbett and Wilson suggested that people have little or no direct introspective access to their higher-order cognitive processes. People will readily answer questions about their behaviour and evaluations and give convincing replies. These do not reflect a great deal about themselves, however. Nisbett and Wilson's research indicated that people tend to give
plausible explanations which are salient to the subject matter. These explanations are independent of the 'real' influences on their actions and values. Observers, who have not been exposed to the same conditions, tend to give substantially the same plausible and salient explanations. Nisbett and Wilson suggest that subjects do not draw on a "fount of privileged knowledge" (Bem, 1967) when providing explanations for their behaviour and values. Instead, both subjects and observers draw on the same "... pool of culturally supplied explanations for behaviour..." (p 248).

This work raises serious doubts about the validity of the interview studies. Despite surface appearances, the children might be drawing on a 'culturally supplied pool' when justifying their evaluations. Again, my opponent could assert that there is nothing of psychological relevance in the findings from this technique.

To counter this assertion I will need to point out some of the many flaws in the evidence produced by Nisbett and Wilson in support of their position. I will first summarise the main points of weakness, and then illustrate some of these points by considering some of their evidence in more detail.

- The basic form of their argument is:

  If S's comments suggest that he is unaware of the cognitive processes that E assumes to occur (in order to explain his results), then S has no access to his higher mental processes.

  Thus the position is based on the assumption that 'E knows best'.

  If a mismatch occurs between the explanations of E and S, then Nisbett and Wilson assume that E is correct.

- Powerful motivational forces may incline S to conceal his awareness from E. If S knows that he has changed his attitude
without sufficient justification, for example, he may be motivated to deny that this has happened.

- S might be aware of his higher cognitive processes, but may lack the vocabulary necessary to express this awareness, or otherwise be unable to articulate his knowledge to Nisbett and Wilson's satisfaction.

- Experimenter bias could have occurred in such a way as to persuade S that he is not expected to express an awareness of his higher cognitive processes.

- When observers and subjects are found to give similar explanations for behaviour or values, this could reflect the ability of people to accurately predict behaviour and values, together with their causes and reasons in given contexts. Both subjects and observers could be giving the correct explanations, while E's account is incorrect.

- Many of the studies cited by the authors use methods, such as the use of placebo pills or of electric shocks, which may discourage either the operation of higher mental processes, or the awareness of these, or both.

- The use of group data is inappropriate as evidence for the assertions being made. These pertain to the psychological functioning of individuals, and data relating to individuals would therefore be more appropriate.
Some of these points are illustrated by the study in which subjects were asked to choose the best quality items from four identical pairs of stockings (see p243/4). Nisbett and Wilson observed a position effect and noted that subjects were unaware of this effect, giving other reasons (not reported) for their choice. The authors conclude that the subjects have no insight into the 'real' factors behind their choices and invent spurious justifications. This interpretation betrays a lamentable lack of insight by the authors themselves. Faced with a forced choice in a public place and the assumption that there are real differences between the items, subjects may project qualities on to the items, which are then used as the basis for their judgement. The stockings may be identical to E, but are different to S, and the reasons given for their choice may be psychologically genuine and reflect the criteria that S normally applies when choosing stockings.

Another strategy when faced with the social pressures of this situation and the apparently minimal difference between the items would be to choose the last item to be 'read' in the array (the rightmost) and to invent a reason for the choice in order to avoid appearing non-compliant, unintelligent, irrational, etc.

Finally, it should also be pointed out that the researchers might not have ensured that the stockings do in fact appear physically identical to the subjects. The two pairs in the middle of the array are 'sandwiched', while those on the outside have only one competing pair next to them. In addition, the ambient conditions in the store, the lighting, noises, smells, and distractions might have had different effects for each position in the array.

Another example of the flaws in Nisbett and Wilson's evidence can be found in their report of the Goethals and Reckman (1973) attitude change study. Here, subjects could be motivated to deny that others affect their attitudes. Moreover, Nisbett and Wilson's intentions would be better served if the data were analysed at the level of the individual rather than looking
at group means. After all, the point is to demonstrate that individuals have little or no awareness of their higher cognitive processes. It would seem appropriate to examine evidence that pertains to the psychological functioning of individuals rather than to group people together. The use of group data might introduce unnecessary complications which could cloud the issue. Nisbett and Wilson seem unaware of this point, however. Even in their own work they persist in using group data. (e.g. Nisbett and Bellows, 1976).

Other studies cited by Nisbett and Wilson in support of their case can be shown to suffer from procedural or analytical weaknesses, or to be open to alternative interpretations. In general, their evidence does not support the idea that people have little or no access to their higher mental processes. The insights that subjects report to investigators may be genuine (despite the opinions of these investigators to the contrary) or they may be motivated to conceal their awareness. The authors themselves acknowledge the weakness of their evidence on page 246 of their paper. For example: "...subjects may often have been correct in asserting that some other stimulus was a more important determinant of their responses".

Even if Nisbett and Wilson had been able to show that their proposals were supported in many or most of the studies that they examined, psychologists should avoid making blanket generalisations about the authenticity of verbal reports and the access of subjects to their higher cognitive processes. A preferable strategy might be to examine the particular features of each case and to look for the factors that might facilitate or inhibit the authenticity of reports and subjects' self awareness. I suspect that in many of the studies cited by Nisbett and Wilson, the researchers would either not have expected subjects to be aware of their cognitive processes, or this awareness was not a necessary part of the explanatory framework.
Returning now to the present interview studies and the associated approach to the study of value, what are the main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of Nisbett and Wilson's work? These might be summarised:

- In the absence of any substantial evidence to the contrary, and considering the points made above (p324/5) it seems reasonable to assume that the replies and comments made by children in the interviews are authentic and reveal psychological truths.

- The assessment of the authenticity of verbal reports should be made in relation to particular conditions. No general rule stating that people have little or no access to their cognitions or, indeed, that they have a perfect intuitive knowledge of their mental processes, can be relied upon.

- The scepticism concerning Nisbett and Wilson's position should not, however, deflect attention from the need to be sufficiently mistrustful of the interview technique. This technique remains open to criticisms such as that mentioned above. It may incline subjects against making comments that imply that they are not in control of their values, that they are influenced by, for example, cultural factors. As part of the continuing development of methods of studying values, the possible distortions that the technique might cause should be kept under review.
This section is intended to illustrate, and to provide a record of, the system used for producing value networks from interviews.

A simple colour coding scheme was used, 'good' nodes (positive evaluations) were coded as red, 'bad nodes' were coded black, and the few neutral nodes that occurred were placed in brackets. When a node represented a general principle inverted commas were placed around the node.

Several types of relationships between nodes were identified. These are given below together with the symbols used to represent them in the value networks. 'A' and 'B' are used to represent the nodes being connected.

A leads to B.
A leads away from B.
A implies B.
A is better than B.
A is worse than B.
A is defined as B.
A is part of the wider class, B.
A is self-justified.
A justified by a synonym.

Connection used where the same node appears in different parts of the network.
Value reversal. Circumstances under which good (bad) node is bad (good).
Neutrality. Circumstances under which good (bad) node is neutral.
The following symbols were used to represent various instances where replies did not relate to a node in the value network.

A ——— T  Line of enquiry terminated, usually due to lack of time.
A ——— ?  Reason for value of node A not known.
A ——— NR  No reply given.
A ——— NO  There are no reasons why A is good (bad)
A ——— D  Reply given was a diversion from the issue.
A ——— I  Reply given was incomprehensible.

An example of a value network is given below, taken from a 15 year old 4th stream girl.

```
G ———> self-protection

GUN ——— killing people ——— killing innocents ——— unbalanced killers

B ——— killing animals ——— animals suffering ——— T

——— children playing ——— injury ——— with guns
```
This subject evaluated 'gun' at the extreme bad end of the scale in SD1. When asked to give reasons for this she replied that guns were bad because they could kill people and animals. The killing of people was further defined as the killing of innocents which in turn implied the existence of unbalanced killers. These were bad because they might kill innocent people. Killing animals was bad because the animals would suffer. This line of enquiry was terminated. When asked to give reasons why gun might be good, the subject replied that it provided self-protection. This was good as an end in itself. When asked to give other reasons why gun might be bad, a situation where children were playing with guns was defined. This was bad because it could lead to injury, which was evaluated in terms of a synonym.

Many of the symbols used were not included in this network, and so each remaining symbol will now be illustrated.

Wide streets — Motor accidents

Play — Work

Killing < Beating enemies in competitions

Death — Things disliked by the Pope

Wide streets are good because they lead to an avoidance of motor accidents.

Play is better than work.

Beating enemies in competitions is preferred to killing one's enemies.

Death is bad because it is one of the things disliked by the Pope.
life ➔ food and ➔ health
drink

TREE ➔ G ➔ fruit ➔ health

Connection of same node appearing in different part of the value network.

winning ➔ R ➔ getting
fights ➔ hurt

Value reversal. Winning fights is good, but not when it involves getting hurt.

Bad opinion ➔ (Bad opinion of
of others ➔ N ➔ others)

Neutrality. The bad opinion of others is neutral if one is not concerned about it.

Attractive ➔ ?
face

Reasons why an attractive face is good are not known.

Being ➔ NR
hurt

No reply given to the question 'why is being hurt a bad thing?'

BOY ➔ B ➔ NO

No reasons why boy might be bad.

Wrongdoing ➔ D

Reply given to the question 'why is it bad to do wrong?' was a diversion from the question.

Being late ➔ I

Reply to the question 'why is it bad to be late?' was incomprehensible.

Class warfare ➔ "This is unnecessary. There is enough fighting already."

Justification in terms of a general principle.
A3 : The Content Analysis Categories

List of content analysis categories

Survival
Sur1 : Danger---Safety
Sur2 : Health---Illness

Hedonism
H1 : Pleasure---Pain

Personal potential
P1 : Knowledge and skill
P2 : Wealth---Poverty
P3 : Personal freedom
P4 : Personal convenience
P5 : Using life---Wasting life

Personal activity
Act1 : Activity---Inactivity

Personal justice
J1 : Fairness---Unfairness

Social interaction
Soc1 : Friends
Soc2 : Family
Soc3 : Social status (adult)
Soc4 : Social status (child)
Soc5 : Personality
Soc6 : Personal appearance
Soc7 : Problems

Conformity
C1 : Obedience and punishment
C2 : Criminal---Law abiding

Altruism
Alt1 : Concern for others

Aesthetic
Aes1 : Beauty---Ugliness

General Principles
G1 : Justice and equality
G2 : Law and order
G3 : Pacifism
G4 : Economic
G5 : Knowledge
G6 : Religion
G7 : Freedom
G8 : Survival of mankind
G9 : Progress and achievement

Unclassified
U : Unclassified

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Description of content analysis categories

SURVIVAL

Sur 1: Danger-Safety

This category includes evaluations made in terms of threats to the physical well-being of individuals and safety from such threats. The circumstances envisaged typically have a sudden onset and include threats from various sources, e.g. dangerous events, animals, objects, people and activities.

Examples

Being lost is bad because it can lead to being attacked and killed.
Criminals are bad because they might murder people.
Fires are bad because they can injure.
Fighting is bad because you might break a bone.
The police are good because they protect people from harm.

Sur 2: Health-Illness

Evaluations falling into this category were concerned with the long-term physical welfare of individuals. Subjects spoke of the necessity of attaining the essential physical requirements for health and life, and of the malevolent consequences of a lack of these and of unhealthy practices.

Examples

Food is good because it enables us to live.
Exercise is good because it leads to health and strength.
Parents are good because they look after you.
Starvation is bad because it leads to death.
Eating sweets is bad because you get bad teeth.

HEDONISM

H1: Pleasure-Pain

Responses were placed into this category, when there was an evident concern for the direct experience of pleasure or of pain and displeasure. Included are physical and emotional pleasure and pain either attributed to specific causes or are those of a generalised nature.

Examples

Being punished is bad because it is painful.
Being out with friends is good because you enjoy yourself.
Living in drab surroundings is bad because you get bored.
Ice cream is good because it tastes nice.
The death of a relative is bad because you would feel upset.
Being called lazy is bad because I don’t like it.
PERSONAL POTENTIAL

P1: Personal Knowledge and Skill

This category was used for responses concerned with gaining, maintaining, losing, or the lack of knowledge and skills.

Intellectual, social and physical knowledge and skills are all included, and the typical aims of respondents are to possess the capacity to fulfill everyday tasks or to excel in some specific area.

Examples

Watching television is good because you learn things about the world.
Being handicapped is bad because you won't be able to learn.
Going to school is good because you learn how to get on with people.
School is good because you can learn how to do metalwork.
Doing sums is good because it helps you when you go shopping.

P2: Wealth-Poverty

An item was placed in this category when evaluations were justified in terms of obtaining, keeping, losing, or the lack of wealth and possessions.

Examples

Having a job is good because of the money.
Friends are good because they give you presents.
Pride is good because you will look after you things.
Being injured is bad because you become poor.

P3: Personal Freedom

This includes physical freedom (the ability to move around unimpeded, to avoid crowding, confined spaces, and imprisonment), and to care for oneself and social freedom (being independent of parents, being able to choose one's own activities).

Examples

Being old is bad because you are dependent on others.
Living in a small house is bad because you are cramped in.
Going to school is bad if you are forced to go.
Having money is good because you can be independent of your parents.
Being educated is good because you will have a wide choice of jobs.

P4: General Personal Convenience

Included here are responses relating to conditions which help or hinder the individual in a general way. Thus these are not especially connected with safety, personal skills, or any other category. These responses are usually framed in terms of the facilitation or hindrance of the smooth running of everyday life.

Examples

Having a car is good because you can save time.
Breaking your pen is bad because you won't be able to do your job.
Missing a train is bad because you won't reach your destination.
A teacher is good because she can help you with your work.
Girls are bad when they nag you and interrupt you.

P5: Using Life - Wasting Life

This refers to evaluations made in terms of ‘getting the most out of life’. Most responses were negatively phrased being concerned with the fear of wasting, or not having the opportunity to use, one’s life.

Examples

Dying young is bad because it means a wasted life.
Having no pride in yourself is bad because your life will be worthless.
Inactivity is bad because you are wasting your life.

PERSONAL ACTIVITY

Act 1: Activity - Inactivity

Many evaluations were justified by reference to the opportunity or lack of opportunity to engage in activities of various kinds, including games, pastimes, and outings, and therefore this emerged as an interview category. The criterion of inactivity occurred relatively rarely and includes having nothing to do, and having to stay in or go to bed early.

Examples

Life is good because you can play.
School is good because we do art.
Meeting people is good because you can go out with them.
Being ill is bad because you will have to stay in.
Being on the dole is bad because you won’t have anything to do.

PERSONAL JUSTICE

J1: Fairness - Unfairness

The category was used when evaluations were made in terms of the fairness or unfairness of various situations for those involved.

Examples

Being punished at school is bad if you didn’t do anything wrong.
Needing help is bad because you could be making unfair demands.
Hitting is good if it is justified.
Stealing is good when you are stealing your own property back.
Getting a bad reputation is bad because you become singled out by the police.
SOCIAL INTERACTION

Soc 1: Friends

Included here are all value criteria which pointed to a concern for making, keeping, and seeing friends, with being friendly and sociable, together with the opposites of these aims.

Examples

Staying in is bad because you won't be able to be with your friends. 
Being naughty is bad because you will lose your friends. 
Talking is good because you will get on with people. 
School is good because you can make friends there.

Soc 2: Family

This category refers to evaluations justified by their impact on the family, and to responses implying the desirability of being part of a family unit.

Examples

Love is good because it leads to marriage and children. 
Babies are good because they are an addition to the family. 
Being in prison is bad because you won't be able to see your family. 
Being at home too much is bad because it leads to family arguments. 
Being an orphan is bad because you don't have a family.

Soc 3: Adult Social Status

Refers to getting a job as following a particular occupation, achieving a place in society, keeping a respectable home, being seen to be adequately respectable, and being successful in adult life.

Examples

Education is good because it helps you to get a job. 
Being filthy is bad because you will lose the good opinion of others. 
Having a job that you like is good because you will be successful. 
Doing games is good because you could become a sportswoman. 
Making your home attractive is good because you will impress your visitors.

Soc 4: Child Social Status

Includes evaluations made by reference to the concept of status in a child's social world: being highly regarded, approved or disapproved of by other children, by teachers and parents; success or failure in a childhood context.

Examples

Being strong is good because you can be a good fighter and win fights. 
Being a spoilsport is bad because people will make fun of you. 
Drawing is good because you can show them to your parents. 
Learning how to catch is good because you might become the best catcher.
Soc 5: Personality

Relates to criteria concerned with relatively long-lasting features of personality.

Examples

Being bored is bad because you will become lazy.  
Being treated badly is bad because you will become grumpy.  
Working for your money is good because it means you are honest.  
Hurting other people is bad because it means you are self-centred.

Soc 6: Personal Appearance

This category was used when evaluations were justified in terms of outward appearance: attractiveness and tidiness of hair, face, clothes, etc.

Examples

Eating fattening foods is bad because you will look unattractive.  
Being fat is bad because it is ugly.  
Being lazy is bad because you will look untidy and dirty.  
Buying new clothes is good because you won’t look shabby.

Soc 7: Problems

This refers to the occurrence of evaluations in terms of the creation or relief of problems associated with social relationships.

Examples

Friends are good because they can help you with your problems.  
Reading is good because it helps you to forget your problems.  
Being alone is good because you can think things out and resolve your problems.

CONFORMITY

C1: Obedience and Punishment

This category was used when evaluations were made by reference to the goodness or naughtiness and the attendant rewards and punishment of the act or thing being judged. Most of these evaluations were concerned with naughtiness and punishment rather than goodness and reward.

Examples

Being lazy is bad because its naughty.  
Being late for school is bad because you will be told off.  
Being clean is good because you won’t be punished.  
Knowing the standards of right and wrong is good because you will not get into trouble.
C2: Criminal - law abiding

This refers to evaluations which focused upon the legality of the act or thing being considered. As with C1, the negative aspects were most apparent.

Examples

Poverty is bad because it leads to theft.
A criminal at large is bad because he will perform criminal acts.
Paying for things is good because you are obeying the law.
Stealing is bad because you will get fined.

ALTRUISM

Alt 1: Concern for others

This category was used when the emphasis of the evaluation was on the potential benefit or harm to others.

Examples

Vandalism is bad because it spoils other people’s pleasure.
Expressing your views is bad when it hurts other people’s feelings.
A champion is good because he provides enjoyment for others.
Death is bad because it upsets the relatives of the dead person.

AESTHETIC

Aes 1: Beauty - Ugliness

Evaluations made in terms of the beauty or ugliness of the value object were placed in this category. Most of the items were concerned with the attractiveness of nature.

Examples

Plants are good because they have bright colours.
A lake is good because it looks attractive.
Being in prison is bad because you won’t be able to see nature.
Hearing is good because you can hear the sounds of the countryside.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

This group of categories relates to instances where justifications for evaluations took the form of the espousal of general principles rather than relating to the specific circumstances being considered. Nine areas of concern were identified, and these are illustrated below.

G1: Justice and Equality

It is bad that the innocent should be wrongly imprisoned.  
The rich should not benefit at the expense of the poor.  
All people are equal in themselves.  
It's right to replace an object that you have broken.

G2: Law and Order

The police should keep law and order.  
Criminals should be apprehended and imprisoned.  
The stability of a country is preferable to disorder.

G3: Pacifism

It is wrong to wage war.  
Peace is preferable to fighting.  
Mankind should pursue world-wide peace.  
Peace implies universal love which is better than hatred.

G4: Economic

Society should be organized to produce the essentials of life.  
A simple economy is preferable to high technology.  
A reduction in population is undesirable because there will be fewer workers.  
Sickness is bad because it leads to reduced production.

G5: Knowledge

Knowledge should be passed along the generations.  
Knowledge and the recording of knowledge are desirable aims for mankind.

G6: Religion

All things created by God are good.  
It is good to follow the way of Jesus.  
It is good to go to heaven, bad to go to hell.

G7: Freedom

Slavery and oppression should be opposed.  
One should not impose one’s beliefs on others.  
People should be allowed to make their own decisions.  
Nations should defend themselves against being taken over by others.
G8: Survival of mankind

The population should be replenished in order to avoid the extinction of mankind.
War is bad because it could lead to the extinction of the species.
Disease is bad because it could mean the end of mankind.

G9: Progress and Achievement

Civilization should be maintained and promoted.
New discoveries and advances should be encouraged.
Material progress should be an aim of humanity.

U: Unclassified

All responses which could not be placed into one of the above mentioned categories were recorded as unclassified and coded 'U'.
(1) Coding procedure

Following the translation of the interview transcripts into value networks, the value networks were then coded in terms of the content analysis categories. The coding procedure used mostly a straightforward process of inspecting each item, deciding to which category it belonged, and coding it accordingly. There were, however, two additional features of the procedure which should be noted.

Firstly, if the category did not change throughout a chain of justifications, only a single score was given to that category, regardless of the number of 'nodes' included. For example, in:

```
money → food → life ← > death
```

money was coded as P2, and food, life, and death were all coded as Sur 2. Only one score was counted toward Sur 2, however. It was thought that such chains reflected a single concern with the matter in question and to count each node would involve over-estimating this concern (category) relative to the others. In the above example, the chain from food to death was considered to represent a single instance of a concern for health.

Secondly, the appearance of the same node in different parts of the value network required special coding procedures. It was sometimes found during the course of the interview that the same chains of justification repeated themselves. It was therefore decided as a matter of policy to terminate a line of questioning when a repeated node occurred and to code the network as if the same replies as previously given had occurred. For example:

```
friends → helping with problems
          \  |  |
          \  v  v
          \    
      having a conscience
```

had been elicited when the following occurred:

```
job → getting on friends in life
```

'Helping with problems' and 'having a conscience' were, therefore, included again in the value network and coded once more.

Occasionally these repetitions resulted in a complete circle in the value network. Where this occurred only a single circumference of the circle was counted for coding purposes.
(2) Category boundaries

There were many occasions during the evolution of the content analysis system when it was unclear as to which category a particular item belonged. Some of these instances will now be discussed in order to illustrate the categories and the boundaries between them in more detail, as well as to throw more light on the coding policies used.

Sur 1 and Sur 2

The main distinction here is in the time scale and the causative agent. In Sur 1, the concern is with sudden dangers arising from accidents, natural disasters, and the activities of the self and others. In Sur 2, the focus is on long-term health and illness arising from various beneficial or adverse conditions which tend to operate over a longer time span than those of Sur 1.

Items such as 'food poisoning' might cause confusion between these categories. On the one hand, this has a detrimental effect on health, but on the other hand, it is an isolated event of an acute nature. It has therefore been coded as Sur 1. Sur 1 items will tend to have effects on health, but their sudden occurrence define them as Sur 1 rather than Sur 2.

Sur 2 and PI

Items such as 'strength', 'resting' and 'tiredness' have obvious effects on Personal Skill and Knowledge (PI), but they are to be distinguished from that category because they relate to the physical capability to perform, and not to the skill or knowledge itself. Such items are therefore more appropriately coded as Sur 2. The distinction is between competence and performance: a person may have the competence to drive a car but be temporarily unable to do so because of tiredness.

Soc 3 and Soc 4

The important issue here is whether an interviewee is referring to some image of an adult role or referring to his present situation. Some borderline cases occurred where the circumstances of the evaluation were left vague, but generally Soc 4 items were easily coded because of the child's concern with being (dis)approved of by friends, parents, and teachers.

HI and Act 1

Many Act 1 items involved enjoyable activities, but nevertheless a distinction from HI was maintained. This was because activities are not necessarily evaluated in terms of enjoyment. For example, 'going out' might be valued because it leads to 'meeting friends', and 'going swimming' might be valued because it 'pleases my parents'. Only when an item was evaluated in terms of an immediate sensation or feeling was it coded as HI.
HI, Sur 1 and Sur 2

Many Sur 1 and Sur 2 items are concerned with injury, illness and death, which almost always include the experience of pain. This raises a problem for this system of content analysis - should these items be coded as Sur, as HI or as both? The resolution of this problem must be made in relation to the purposes of the research. It was intended to use the content analysis system in order to identify, and to assess the relative importance of, each subject’s criteria of evaluation. It was thought that these aims would be best served by only coding what was specifically mentioned by subjects. Thus if 'injury' was mentioned, without any mention of the pain involved, a coding of Sur 1 was given, it being assumed that the concern was more with the physical damage to the person than with the experience of pain.

Alt 1 and Sur 1

The borderline between these categories was found to be very difficult to define for some items. In particular, when circumstances were mentioned which involved danger or injury, it was difficult to decide if the main concern was with the threat to well-being or with an empathic reaction to the fate of others. This matter was resolved by taking note of the relation between the interviewee and the imagined circumstances of the evaluation. When the subject spoke of threats from dangerous people, animals, and events (the victims of which could clearly include himself), the item was coded Sur 1. If, however, the subject seemed to be speaking of the effects of his own actions on others, or if subsequent comments indicated an altruistic concern (e.g. 'innocent people would be hurt'), the item was coded Alt 1.

Soc 5, and C1 and C2

Soc 5 items (a concern for one’s personality) tended to reflect a desire to have culturally approved personality traits (e.g. honesty, not lazy, not bad tempered, politeness).

C1 and C2 items tended to refer to specific acts of disobedience or criminality (e.g. being late, stealing), although personality traits evaluated in terms of disobedience (e.g. laziness is bad because it is naughty) received a 'conformity' coding. Soc 5 items did not necessarily reflect a concern with conformity, however.
General principles and others

An item was coded as a general principle when the justification given clearly indicated an application beyond the specific circumstances being considered. For example, when discussing the bad things about 'gun' one subject said "nobody has the right to take another's life". This clearly had implications beyond the possible dangers of a gun.

It is evident that many of the values expressed during interviews could be indicative of a 'general principle'. For example, "education is good because it helps you to get a job" might be taken to mean 'it is essential to have a job in today's society'. No doubt all expressed values and disvalues have some generality of application and thus can be expressed in terms of general principles. However, the purpose of collecting instances of the use of general principles was to achieve a measure of the extent to which subject groups differ in the application of such principles within their value systems. It was thought that the best way of fulfilling this purpose was to code an item as a general principle only when the reply given clearly had an application beyond the specific circumstances being considered.

It was hoped that this strict criterion, in which a clear verbal expression was required, would be a measure of the degree to which value systems are organised by highly abstract principles rather than being tied to specific circumstances.

Act 1 and Soc 1

Many activities coded as Act 1 usually involve other people (e.g. playing, doing sports). A score for Soc 1 was not registered, however, unless friends were specifically mentioned. Thus 'going to school is good because you can play' was coded as Act 1, whereas 'playing with friends' was coded as both Act 1 and Soc 1.

Soc 1 and Soc 2

In some instances, evaluations were made in terms of the interactions with both family and friends (e.g. being in hospital is bad because you will not see your family and friends). In such cases a coding was made for both categories.
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Spoken instructions

(Introduction by class teacher)

I'm doing some research at Durham University into people's values. I would like you to help me with this research by judging the value of various words. Each of you will be given a list of words. When you get your list, fill in the details at the top of the first page, and read the instructions, but do not turn over the page until I tell you to start.

(Lists handed out)

Has everybody filled in the details at the top of the page? Has everybody read the instructions? I'll just explain the instructions on the board, in case anybody isn't sure as to what to do.

Each word has a line beside it with the ends of the line marked 'good' and 'bad'. For some of you 'good' is on the left and 'bad' is on the right, and for others 'good' and 'bad' are the other way round.

(Sample scale drawn on blackboard)

I want you to put one mark on each line according to how good or how bad you think the word is. For example if the word is truth, and you think truth is extremely good, put a mark near the 'good' end of the scale.

(Sample response made)

If you think truth is good, but not very good or extremely good, you might put your mark on the good side, but not very far over. Likewise, if you think that truth is bad, you might put your mark here, or here, or here, according to how bad you think it is. If you think a word isn't good or bad, then put your mark in the middle of the line.

Are there any questions?

(Questions dealt with)

Work your way through the list as quickly as possible while still making an accurate judgement. Don't spend a long time over each word. I want you to mark down your first reaction to the word rather than a carefully thought out judgement. Work through the words in the correct order, don't miss out any words, and don't compare your judgements of different words.

When you have finished, put your list to one side and I will collect it. Do not go back over your judgements checking or altering them. Sit quietly until everybody is finished.

Are there any questions?

(Questions dealt with)

Now turn over the first page and start the list.
A6: Format and spoken instructions used in the second factor analysis study

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FOOD</th>
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<td>or Bad</td>
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</table>
(Introduction by class teacher, general introductory comments by researcher)

Let me explain these lists to you and what I want you to do. If you look at the first page you will see that there are some words down the left side here (indicate). Beside each word is a line which looks like this:

(point to example on blackboard)

For some of you 'bad' will be on the left and 'good' on the right.

(the following sentence was emphasised)

* I want you to look at each word in turn and then to show me how good or bad you think it is by putting a mark on the line beside it.

I'll give you an example. Suppose that the word is 'black'. If you think that 'black' is very good, put a mark here, above where it says very good.

If you think that 'black' is good, but not very good, put a mark here, above good.

If you think that 'black' is bad, but not very bad, put a mark here, above bad.

If you think that 'black' is very bad, put a mark here above very bad.

If you think that 'black' isn't good or bad, then put a mark here, above 'not good or bad'.

I want you to do this for each of the words that you've got on your list. Do not put your marks on these lines (indicated) that divide the categories.

Has anybody got any questions?

(Questions dealt with)

I just want to say a few things before you start. First of all, I want to make it clear that it is the thing represented by the word, and not the word itself that I want you to think about (Example given: 'money'). Also, this isn't a test. There are no right or wrong answers. It's what you think about these things listed here that I want you to mark down.

Work through the list as quickly as you can whilst still giving your true opinions. I want you to mark down your first reaction rather than a carefully thought out judgement.

Work through in the correct order. Don't miss out any words, and don't compare your judgements of different words.

I don't want any talking or looking at your neighbours' lists while you are doing your own list.

When you have finished, turn your list over and sit quietly until everybody has finished. Has anybody got any questions?

(questions dealt with)

Please begin.
### A7: Words used in the first factor analysis study

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A8 : Words used in the second factor analysis study

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Abelson, R. (1967)  
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