Doctrine and speculation in Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre

Curran, Thomas Heinrich

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Friedrich Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* is a work dedicated to the autarky of Christian dogmatic theology. Schleiermacher, we are told, establishes the independence of religion: he secures its life free from the constraints of metaphysics and morality by planting its roots in "feeling" or more exactly in "immediate self-consciousness". The guiding principle of the *Glaubenslehre* is to secure its borders against the incursion of alien, illicit speculation, theological as well as philosophical. This ambition is doomed to failure, as is demonstrated with reference to: Schleiermacher's *Open Letters*, theology's anterior disciplines (which provide the *lemmata* of the Introduction), the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* itself and the work's conclusion. The *Glaubenslehre* describes itself as a "system" of Christian doctrine. As such the beginning and the end must form a coherent whole, and the movement between piety and its interpretation must in principle be reversible. It is not self-evident that either of these conditions has been met.

G.W.F. Hegel understood Schleiermacher's theology to be representative of the "unfulfilled" Enlightenment: Schleiermacher demands that modern faith find its slot in a divided consciousness, subjective and objective, religious and speculative, theological and philosophical. According to Schleiermacher, it should be possible to run both forms of consciousness on parallel tracks indefinitely, without their falling into ruinous conflict. The perspective of this dissertation is more adequately captured by F.C. Baur's contention that the subjective standpoint of Schleiermacher's *Religionsphilosophie* must convert itself into the objective standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy of religion.

We follow public opinion in nineteenth-century Berlin, in believing that the conflict between Hegel and Schleiermacher can be made to shed light on both their systems:

*Philosophen denken dunkel, aber schimpfen sehr deutlich.*
Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre

by

Thomas Heinrich Curran

Hatfield College,
March 1991

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Philosophie...Sie wird häufig für ein formelles, inhalteloses Wissen gehalten, und es fehlt sehr an der Einsicht, daß, was auch dem Inhalte nach in irgendeiner Kenntnis und Wissenschaft Wahrheit ist, diesen Namen allein dann verdienen kann, wenn es von der Philosophie erzeugt worden; daß die andern Wissenschaften, sie mögen es mit Räsonnieren, ohne die Philosophie, versuchen, soviel sie wollen, ohne sie nicht Leben, Geist, Wahrheit in ihnen zu haben vermögen.

*Vorrede, §67.*
Dedicated

to

all my friends in Durham

"Dein eigentlicher Beruf ist die Freundschaft"
Friedrich Schlegel to Friedrich Schleiermacher
August 1798
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Bibliography
Preface

The primary text under consideration in this dissertation is the second edition of Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith* (identified as *Glaubenslehre*). I have employed the 1928 translation of this second edition throughout, and I have indicated by means of footnotes any deviations from the English text which was edited by H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart.

I have undertaken to provide one standard orthography for the English and German cited in this dissertation. I have transliterated all archaic nineteenth-century German spelling into modern German usage (where this has been practicable, and with the rigid exception of the titles of all books and articles), and I have adopted standard English spellings for all quotations taken from American sources.

The endeavour has been to produce a fluid, unbroken and clear body of text. Consequently the details have been relegated to the footnotes, which the reader should employ as an interpretative commentary on the main argument. Had I attempted to incorporate this detail into the mainstream of my argument, the text would have become unreadable; had I neglected the comprehensive detail provided by the footnotes, the scholarship upon which this dissertation rests would have remained obscure.
Acknowledgements

The brevity of the following remarks is in inverse proportion to the help I have received from countless friends and colleagues over the years. May I summarize my gratitude by applying three headings.

i) No research whatsoever could have been undertaken without the generous support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada in the form of a doctoral fellowship.

ii) This research would never have been brought to completion a) without the unflagging goodwill of Dr. James Barber, Master of Hatfield College—may I thank all my friends at the College through him; b) without the encouragement of Dr. Ann Loades, Chair of the Department of Theology at the University of Durham—may I thank past and present staff of the Department through her.

iii) This research could never have been sustained without the grace of a family unafraid to speculate: sapere aude.
### Abbreviations

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<td><em>Ästhetik</em> (1819/1825); <em>PhB</em>, Volume 365.</td>
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<td>OED</td>
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<td>ET</td>
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Introduction:
Text and Context

Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) became the first Dean of the Faculty of Theology at the newly-founded University of Berlin in September 1810.¹ His subsequent academic work at the University decisively affected the future study of Protestant Christian theology. The text which gives the most comprehensive statement of this quite monumental change in the methods and character of Protestant German dogmatic theology is Schleiermacher’s famous The Christian Faith, a two-volume work which appeared in two editions in Schleiermacher’s lifetime (1821/22 and 1830/31).

The full title of these volumes (which is not even alluded to in the English translation of 1928!) needs to be given its due, if Schleiermacher’s purpose is firmly to be grasped. The complete title actually reads—The Christian Faith: Represented according to the Principles of the Protestant Church in their Interconnection.² Schleiermacher’s lengthy title (which still gives a very good sense of the content therein) has been supplanted in all popular and scholarly discussion by the designation Glaubenslehre, a term Schleiermacher himself used in referring to this epoch-making theological publication. Glaubenslehre is neither a word that Schleiermacher coined, nor is it properly speaking the title of any book; Glaubenslehre is first and foremost a theological method, a way of doing theology, of which Schleiermacher’s The Christian Faith may justly be considered the paradigmatic manifestation.

This dissertation—which will have as one of its fundamental tasks the careful dissection of this concept—follows the whole German theological
tradition in keeping *Glaubenslehre* as the rubric which denotes Schleiermacher's most significant scholarly legacy, both in the general sense of his dogmatic method and in the particular sense of his two-volume *The Christian Faith*. (I have not inclined to the practice of translating *Glaubenslehre* by the ugly phrase "faith-doctrine," which is un-English both in expression and content.)

Schleiermacher inherited the term *Glaubenslehre* both from Pietism and eighteenth-century theology. In 1688 the famous pietist Philipp Jakob Spener published a collection of sermons under the title *Evangelische Glaubens-Lehre*, a phrase then adopted to identify a three-volume dogmatic treatise published in Halle in the years 1759/60. What Schleiermacher sensed in this new terminology, and then developed further and more systematically than any of his forebears, was a complete re-orientation of the theological task. If, formerly, the intended subject of any dogmatic theology was clearly to be the absolute subject, God, his nature and his attributes, then, in *Glaubenslehre*, the initial subject (at any rate) was, by contrast, the Christian faith itself. *Glaubenslehre*, "the doctrine of faith", arises from the reflection upon faith, and the special achievement of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* is that in it this reflection is systematically prepared and ordered.

Of course, the systematic ordering and presentation of Christian dogmatics was not something Schleiermacher either single-handedly recovered or invented. But the unique qualities of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* do emerge in the proposition that his dogmatics offer a *self-representation* of the Christian faith, which is achieved with the "help" of the conceptual language of theoretical reflection and disciplined scholarship. The auxiliary status of this conceptual language is the *sine qua non* for the integrity of Schleiermacher's theological method. *Glaubenslehre* is supposed to be the "analysis of Christian piety", not its systematic substitution or transformation. Where the primary character of the faith and the ancillary character of the systematic language are not strictly adhered to, there we confront the
danger—again and again—that the conceptual formulation will replace or
displace the very piety which it was originally meant to clarify.

Schleiermacher went to enormous lengths to guard the borders of his
Christian Glaubenslehre against the possibility of such a "speculative" usur­
pation. By focusing decidedly on "the realm of inner experience", Schleier­
macher hoped to ensure that "nothing alien" would be able to "creep" into
the body of his theological exposition. How far this will take us away from
what had hitherto been assumed to be the theological task becomes apparent
in §30.2, where Schleiermacher declares "the description of human states" to
be "the fundamental dogmatic form". What kind of theologia (in the sense
of a doctrine of God) such a dogmatic source can possibly yield remains to
be seen.

II.

It had been Schleiermacher's intention to dedicate the first edition of his
Glaubenslehre to the venerable German philosopher and man of letters,
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. This dedication was forestalled by the philo­
sopher's death on March 10, 1819, some two years prior to the publication
of the first volume of Schleiermacher's magnum opus. Schleiermacher had
hoped to confer this honour upon Jacobi both in recognition of the philo­
sopher's enormous formative influence, and as a means of furthering their
more recent correspondence and philosophical conversations. Schleier­
macher's letters reveal that he was already familiar with Jacobi's writings as
a student at Halle—over thirty years earlier; and it was through Jacobi's
important On the Doctrine of Spinoza (1st edition, 1785) that Schleiermacher
made the initial acquaintance of another lifelong philosophical influence.

How appropriate it would have been for the author of the Glaubenslehre
to have dedicated his representation of the Christian faith to the German
thinker who has come to be known as the Glaubensphilosoph. Jacobi was
awarded this epithet for his vigorous presentation of the irreducibility and
necessity of faith. Jacobi's treatment of faith as an aspect of feeling (Gefühl)—
independent of the constraints of the human understanding—brings him in
obvious alignment with one of Schleiermacher's most cherished principles.
Another major point of agreement between them would have been Jacobi's deep suspicion of any system of thought which sought to be complete just in itself. As early as 1789, Schleiermacher had informed his father of his constitutional aversion to "system-mania"—which certainly remained an ingredient of his intellectual make-up throughout his lifetime. In the same communication to his father, Schleiermacher added this fateful assertion:

I do not believe that I shall ever bring things to a fully developed system, so that every question one can raise can be answered decisively and in connection with all the rest of my knowledge.

We shall want to consider the degree to which this youthful prediction is actually reflected in Schleiermacher's mature, scholarly output.

Schleiermacher would not have drawn much comfort from the fact that G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) also detected a great affinity between Jacobi's philosophy and the anonymous (!) publication which secured Schleiermacher's reputation—On Religion: Speeches to the Cultured among its Despisers (1st edition, 1799). In an early study, Faith and Knowledge (1802), Hegel claimed to find in Jacobi's philosophy an approach towards the "subjective beauty of Protestantism", an approach raised "to a higher power" by the anonymous publication of the "Speeches on Religion". Hegel's identification of Jacobi and Schleiermacher in this way has been labelled an estimation of "considerable insensitivity", but Schleiermacher shows himself aware of Hegel's opinion in a letter written in October 1803. There Schleiermacher acknowledges that Jacobi's mantle has been conferred upon him, and that his Speeches supposedly elaborate and "exponentially" extend Jacobi's philosophy. He wonders why Jacobi has not responded to this conflation of their views, and he hopes that Jacobi has not been stung by the injustice of the charge.

Whatever the merits or shortcomings of Hegel's analysis in this essay at the beginning of his career, there is an uncanny intuition in seeing Schleiermacher as the enlarger and extender of the master's philosophical principles. Schleiermacher's reverence for Jacobi is well attested, and yet the proposed dedication of the Glaubenslehre was not simply intended as an act of homage. The dedication was to serve as a small reminder of their
relationship, but it was also meant to further a discussion they had been having both in correspondence and in a personal meeting. Schleiermacher had hoped that his *Glaubenslehre* might bring to light—to the best of his ability—"Jacobi’s real relation to Christianity". 19

How the publication of Schleiermacher’s *Glaubenslehre* might possibly clarify Jacobi’s "relation to Christianity" is rehearsed in a famous letter Schleiermacher wrote to Jacobi on March 30, 1818. The occasion for this letter was some private remarks which Jacobi had in the first instance directed towards another German philosopher, K.L. Reinhold of Kiel. A copy of this communication was in time passed along to Schleiermacher, 20 and to say that Schleiermacher found Jacobi’s remarks a little insufficient and rash would be rather to understate the case. According to Jacobi’s pithy analysis, we are presented with a series of stark and ineluctable alternatives—between which there can be no possible mediation, and beyond which there exists no third term. The Pillars of Hercules which confront each other in pure antagonism are: paganism and Christianity, philosophy and Catholicism, pantheism (*Naturvergötterung*) and anthropomorphism, shaky philosophical Christianity and the concrete, historical original upon which it preys. Summing up this unhappy dichotomy, Jacobi declares himself a pagan in his understanding, but a Christian with his whole heart (*mit dem ganzen Gemüte*); and Jacobi represents himself as swimming between two currents, two bodies of water, which for him can never unite. 21

For Schleiermacher this divided consciousness, this bifurcation of the human personality, is quite simply intolerable. To concede such a schism as the inescapable condition of modern life is to surrender any hope of a truly intellectual relation to one’s Christian faith—and that is precisely the quandary which Jacobi’s letter exposes.

A decade later, when Schleiermacher was preparing his public for the second edition of his *Glaubenslehre*, he penned a sentence which once again threw up this very Jacobian antinomy; he asked his readers the famous rhetorical question, "Must the knot of history so unravel that Christianity becomes identified with barbarism and science [Wissenschaft] with unbe-
It was Schleiermacher's unswerving conviction that there could be a disciplined presentation of the Christian faith, which would not bring it into immediate, ruinous conflict with free, secular inquiry. Even more significantly, it would be the explicit task of such a dogmatic theology to show that Christian piety is not simply maintained in opposition to, or in spite of, whatever secular research might uncover, whether in reference to the natural world or the character of Christian origins. For Jacobi (on the basis of what he sent to Reinhold) no such possibility appears to be envisaged. But for many of those who were able to read Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, it has been Schleiermacher's supreme genius to demonstrate how "it is still possible to be both devout and intellectually honest".

Jacobi's list of irreconcilable alternatives represents the Scylla and Charybdis which the Glaubenslehre will have to negotiate, if it is to succeed in carrying us beyond Jacobi's quite impossible position. Inasmuch as Jacobi gives such a concise account of the dilemma in which the "cultured" believer finds himself caught, Schleiermacher's intended dedication of his great dogmatic work is not just a courteous nod in the direction of a revered philosopher, but it must be seen as taking up the challenge which Jacobi's letter lays down. The German critic Emanuel Hirsch extends our theme in praising the skill with which Schleiermacher manages to find "the narrow way" between sceptical atheism and mythical orthodoxy, those same bleak alternatives we find in Jacobi's testament to Reinhold.

Schleiermacher's preliminary answer to Jacobi's perplexity can be found in the letter which he wrote to the philosopher in the year before Jacobi's death. Schleiermacher rejects the notion that a pagan understanding can coexist with a Christian feeling—a Christianity of the heart—because the understanding can do no more than interpret or translate the feeling that it already finds present. Schleiermacher says explicitly in this letter that "dogmatics" is nothing other than the interpretation (Dolmetschung) of the religious feeling by the reflective activity of the understanding, and as a consequence a pagan interpretation, or exegesis, of a Christian feeling would be a contradiction in terms.
Schleiermacher has chosen his words carefully. Not only is this word *Dolmetschung* used to describe the general appropriation of Christian piety by the understanding, but it also acts as the clue to the abiding authority of the Christian New Testament scriptures. In Schleiermacher's account, the Bible is the original and originative "interpretation" of Christian feeling, so firmly established that one is always driven to understand the New Testament better and develop it further. The sense which Schleiermacher wishes to convey by his repeated use of "Dolmetschung" is illuminated when we consider Schleiermacher's trenchant definition of this term some five years earlier.

In 1813 Schleiermacher had delivered a lecture to the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin on the problems which confront anyone who has ever tried to translate a text from one language into another. This lecture "on the different methods of translation" draws a crucial distinction between the activities of interpretation and translation, between *Dolmetschen* and *Übersetzen*. The former, Schleiermacher describes as a "mechanical" business, because interpreters are employed in the fields of tourism, diplomacy, commerce and natural science, where everyone speaks "the same language", even if we continue to use different words. "Translation" by contrast is more complex; there is no assumption here of an easy fit between the literary, historical and philosophical conventions and concepts of any two developed languages, and the problem is always how to make the moods and ideas of one culture intelligible to another—without gross distortion. Whereas the techniques of "interpretation" can be refined to the point of the "simultaneous translation", *Übersetzen* (translation proper) is always an unending task, a continuing effort to build a bridge between essentially incommensurable cultures and the forms of expression which they adopt.

In light of this fundamental distinction, which Schleiermacher's lecture actually builds into the German language, we can presume that Schleiermacher has adopted the terminology of "Dolmetschen" in his response to Jacobi with some care. Understanding's "interpretation" of Christian feeling, like the original "interpretation" offered in the New Testament, implies a
close "fit" between original experience and reflected description, between the "religiosity" of feeling and the "religion" of the understanding. What Schleiermacher appears to be suggesting is that when the understanding reflects upon the piety it already finds at hand, there can occur something like the "simultaneous translation" which we find at international conferences or at the United Nations: apparently there can be a transposition of Christian piety into a higher register or a new key without distortion and without remainder.

Here we have come to the crucial point. Schleiermacher's dogmatics, his Glaubenslehre, is supposed to be the "interpretation" of Christian piety, not its translation; philosophical "translations" of the Christian faith exist in sufficient numbers. Schleiermacher set out to provide the Protestant German Churches with dogmatic propositions understood as not more and not less than "logically ordered reflection upon the immediate utterances of the religious self-consciousness". In stressing that this reflection remains a Dolmetschung, Schleiermacher signals that his dogmatic procedure is to be free of those alien speculative and philosophical concepts which would necessarily translate Christian piety into a philosophical language, divorced from Christian origins. Schleiermacher explicitly repudiates this form of philosophical translation. In the Postscript to §16 of his Glaubenslehre, he claims:

The Protestant Church in particular is unanimous in feeling that the distinctive form of its dogmatic propositions does not depend on any form or school of philosophy, and has not proceeded at all from a speculative interest, but simply from the interest of satisfying the immediate self-consciousness solely through the means ordained by Christ, in their genuine and uncorrupted form.

If Christian dogmatic theology is understood according to these criteria, then Schleiermacher may be right to argue that there is no inherent conflict between piety and understanding, between head and heart. The reflection upon faith takes place entirely within the realm of faith, and the understanding here operative produces a religion or theology "within the limits of piety alone".
There seems no escaping the conclusion here that Christian piety like Holy Scripture is *sui ipsius interpres*: Christian piety is its own interpreter. Luther had wanted the Bible, the Word of God, "to be sovereign—interpreted neither by his own spirit nor by anyone else's", but understood through itself and according to its own spirit. 34 This same sovereignty is what Schleiermacher now hopes to commandeer for the Christian self-consciousness. Christian piety must be shown capable of generating out of itself the concepts, categories and language which theology needs to analyse it. Indeed in his hermeneutical manuscripts Schleiermacher actually refers to Christianity's power of formulating new conceptual language: these new concepts are said to have arisen from the distinctive Christian stimulation of the affections. 35 Alongside the New Testament, the various Christian creeds and confessions are evidences of that self-interpreting Christian piety upon which the theologian in turn reflects. It is this self-interpreting capacity which frees Christianity from falling subject to alien speculative ideas and philosophical categories. And just because Christian piety is self-interpreting, Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*—"logically ordered reflection" upon the Protestant piety of nineteenth-century German-speaking peoples—is a discipline which can proceed without "speculative aids". 36

### III.

Schleiermacher's letter to Jacobi has provided us with a useful introduction to the dogmatic method that his *Glaubenslehre* will employ: dogmatic theology is the "interpretation" of Christian feeling by the reflective understanding. But as this letter is being addressed to a philosopher, it is hardly surprising that Schleiermacher now opens up the discussion to include a more general consideration of how theology and philosophy might be related. Schleiermacher announces that, like Jacobi, he too is a philosopher with respect to his understanding, and this admission brings with it a significant new complication. While *within* the realm of religion, understanding and piety need not fall into ruinous conflict—the one becomes the means of interpreting and clarifying the other—surely it is impossible to maintain that the *only* function of the philosophical understanding is the

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*Introduction*  
*Text and Context*
pious interpretation of Christian feeling or Christian self-consciousness. The real issue raised by Jacobi’s communication still remains: the potential conflict between secular philosophical understanding and the Christian religion (now duly interpreted).

The significance of Schleiermacher’s response to Jacobi here emerges with greater clarity. We have chosen Schleiermacher’s famous letter as a useful place to "take our bearings" before entering into an analysis of the Glaubenslehre proper, not least because Schleiermacher had hoped through the publication of his dogmatics to throw some light on "Jacobi’s real relation to Christianity". The letter then serves as a tool in establishing Schleiermacher’s dogmatic intentions; but equally the interpretation of the letter can give the first indication of how a critic intends to treat Schleiermacher subsequently. Richard Crouter, for instance, warns (before beginning his own interpretation) that "personal" correspondence cannot be accorded the same weight as more formal material. This caveat has a slightly hollow ring, when we remember how many essential Schleiermacher texts have been reconstructed after his death from his manuscripts and fragmentary notes. Further, this letter cannot be regarded as ordinary correspondence, for in it Schleiermacher challenges, in detail, the opinions of a man whom he holds in the highest esteem. The fact is that the letter, and especially the images it employs, have entered into the Schleiermacher literature quite irreversibly.

The most important reference to Schleiermacher’s letter in recent years comes from Gerhard Ebeling. He contended that the way in which Schleiermacher relates theology and philosophy is the key issue (das Kernproblem) in the interpretation of his thought. In support of this claim Ebeling then cites (from the letter) the celebrated ellipse which Schleiermacher proposes to draw around the dual foci of his existence. The controversy arises when we try to establish precisely what these foci represent.

One school of thought would have us restrict the use of this focal imagery to the immediate context of the letter. According to this analysis, the primary polarity within Christian consciousness is between "deep relig-
ious feeling (Gefühl)" and "keenness of intellect (Verstand)." There is no requirement to see this polarity as in any way destructive of the Christian life, since within the sphere of religion, the one can clarify and enhance the other. Indeed, Schleiermacher's letter goes on to envisage a kind of "galvanic operation, in the feeling of understanding and in the understanding of feeling", which he describes as "the innermost life of the human spirit". The argument is that the understanding, and the piety it interprets, can live harmoniously; they are able to work together, while yet remaining distinct.

This attractive picture is shattered when we recall that Schleiermacher is still addressing his remarks to a philosopher. Perhaps Jacobi was pleased to learn that the critical intellect could offer such distinguished service in the cause of piety—but it can hardly be suggested that this account exhausts what Schleiermacher means by being a "philosopher" with respect to the understanding. The striking thing about Schleiermacher's use of this metaphor of the ellipse is that he concludes its discussion with the statement that his philosophy and his dogmatics, then, "are firmly determined not to contradict each other". Obviously, there is more at issue here than the limited discussion of how the understanding can be of assistance to piety. Ebeling is perfectly justified in identifying the foci of Schleiermacher's ellipse as his theology and his philosophy, for these are two sides of Schleiermacher's personality which he sought "to attune" right until the very end of his lifetime.

Our interpretation of Schleiermacher's letter is limited in scope and purpose. We are using this piece of correspondence both as a convenient introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* and to the central question of this dissertation, viz. the relation of philosophy to theology within Schleiermacher's dogmatics. Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile what we wish to emphasize about Schleiermacher's letter with some of what we read in his ablest interpreters. So, for instance, Hans-Joachim Birkner argues that not only Schleiermacher's image of the ellipse, but indeed the whole letter, is really about the relation of understanding to feeling. Since the relationship of philosophy to dogmatics is not really the subject under discussion, the only
thing that can be taken from the letter in this regard is Schleiermacher's statement that for him his theology and his philosophy will always attempt to remain free from contradiction, while simultaneously they will constantly seek a viable rapprochement. If this is "all" that may legitimately be taken from the letter on this matter, it is not hard to see why in the relation of philosophy to theology Ebeling discovers the quintessential Schleiermacherian ellipse. Like the foci of an ellipse, Schleiermacher's theology and philosophy are two centres of his thought, which are neither permitted to pull further apart, nor are they ever to collapse into each other. Their relation is one of distinct, harmonious separation.

Brian Gerrish's discussion of this letter is in some ways more troubling. He too wishes to underscore that the letter (used as an introduction to the Glaubenslehre) is about the "dialectical" operation that obtains between Christian feeling and the critical interpretation of it by the understanding. Yet, when Gerrish refers us to Schleiermacher's effort "to attune the two sides of his personality" in this operation, he gives no indication that this "attuning" is what Schleiermacher intends for the relation of his philosophy to his dogmatics. That these two sides of Schleiermacher's personality also require their reconciliation, Gerrish is happy to acknowledge in other contexts. So, for instance, he first drew my attention to one of Schleiermacher's most extraordinary pronouncements—words recorded by his wife as he lay dying in February 1834. According to her report, Schleiermacher is supposed to have called out, "I must think the most profound speculative thoughts, and they are for me identical with the innermost religious feelings." With characteristic humour Gerrish observes that these words were uttered while Schleiermacher was "under the sedative effects of opium"; but then he adds, "the sentiment was not out of keeping with the principles and practices of his life." There is evidence here that Schleiermacher struggled to maintain these two sides of his personality (i.e., deep religious feeling and speculative profundity) throughout his life. That Gerrish does not see this as an issue in Schleiermacher's letter to Jacobi has a direct bearing, in my opinion, on his interpretation of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. This dissertation will
take the position that the polarity in Schleiermacher's intellect must make an inevitable appearance in his greatest scholarly work.

That this polarity cannot be avoided is a topic actually discussed in §28.3 of the *Glaubenslehre* itself. There Schleiermacher makes the revealing acknowledgement that

the same members of the Christian communion then, through whom alone the scientific form of the *Glaubenslehre* arises and subsists, are also those in whom the speculative consciousness is awakened. Now just as this is the highest objective function of the human spirit, so pious self-consciousness is on the other hand the highest subjective function.47

In Schleiermacher these two functions of the human spirit (the subjective and the objective) have apparently been developed to a very high degree. Nonetheless, Schleiermacher maintains that his *Glaubenslehre* has been constructed in such a way as to leave hardly any opening through which philosophical speculation can "force its way" into the body of his dogmatic theology.48 In view of the intimate relation between speculative consciousness and the drive for a scientific (*wissenschaftlich*) treatment of Christian doctrine, which has been sketched above, Schleiermacher's assurance on this matter cannot be taken at face value.

IV.

It is through his letter to Jacobi that three grand images become part of the way in which Schleiermacher is discussed by his critics. One of these images is adopted by Schleiermacher directly from Jacobi's initial communication to Reinhold. This is Jacobi's suggestion that he is swimming between two currents, two bodies of water which, for him, can never merge. The two currents represent Jacobi's pagan understanding and Christian heart (*Gemüt*)—while he is being "buoyed up" by the one, he is being "pulled under" by the other.49 Schleiermacher both accepts and rejects the appropriateness of this image. On the one hand, Schleiermacher says that these two currents cannot merge for him either—and that he is satisfied that they should remain separate; but then on the other hand, Schleiermacher also wants to speak of establishing an "equilibrium" between these great bodies of water, and in order to bring out his sense here, as Brian Gerrish rightly
says, Schleiermacher now "changes the metaphor". While these two great principles (understanding and feeling) remain "side by side", they also "make contact", and in that contact, they create what Schleiermacher calls a "galvanic pile".

What Schleiermacher labels as a "galvanic pile" is properly a reference to the scientific discovery made public in 1800 by Alessandro Volta of the means of constructing an electrical battery—the first source of continuous electrical current. A confusion occurs because Volta actually constructed the battery on the basis of principles directly in opposition to the theories of L. Galvani. What Volta discovered was that two dissimilar metals (e.g., zinc and silver) could, if combined with some fluid (acting as a conducting agent), generate electricity continuously. This battery was known as a "pile" or column, because such combinations of the two metals were stacked on top of one another, always with a moistened pad between each pair of the two different metals. The height of the column determined the strength of the current.

If Schleiermacher’s image here is to be taken seriously, then what he is proposing is that understanding and feeling, coming into contact with one another, are both discrete and continuous. On the one hand, they remain separate elements, but on the other hand, they can be united and, in their co-operation, produce a new living energy, which Schleiermacher calls "the innermost life of the spirit". Here we see precisely where Schleiermacher accepts the conditions imposed by Jacobi and where he wants to go beyond them. What he accepts fundamentally is the notion of the two spheres or two "poles" (another description used in Schleiermacher’s letter)—these two poles representing, for want of a better way of putting the matter, the broad realms of understanding and feeling. What Schleiermacher does not accept is that these two realms, the objective and subjective functions of the human spirit, must persist in an antagonistic relation, so that the truth of the one can only be achieved at the expense of the other.

Here we see why Schleiermacher’s image of the ellipse, a geometrical figure with two "centres", assumes a dominant position in the literature.
about Schleiermacher. The advantage of this image is that it is able to support the conception of harmonious bipolarity. Indeed, the elliptical figure was a favourite image of German Romanticism, nowhere more clearly evident than in the "Philosophical Fragments" of Friedrich Schlegel, who exercised a considerable, early influence upon Schleiermacher. For Schlegel both life and philosophy can respectively be described as ellipses with two centres.52

Schleiermacher adopts from Jacobi the essential duality of understanding and feeling but does not accept as readily the notion that these two realms need to be in intrinsic opposition. The beauty of the elliptical image becomes evident: the two elements, each with its own centre, must be in perfect balance and harmony if the ellipse is to be constructed. The ellipse itself reveals the equivalence and equilibrium of the two foci around which it is constructed. The transformation of Jacobi's initial metaphor of the two currents, unable to merge, into the images of the galvanic pile and the geometrical ellipse shows that Schleiermacher is prepared to accept the duality, but not the division which Jacobi's position implies. In the galvanic pile the two dissimilar elements create a new force; in the ellipse, the independence and unity of two separate but equal principles are perfectly maintained.

Yet the disputed point remains: what are these two "centres", how are the two foci of this ellipse best described? At one level, it is true that Schleiermacher affirms the harmonious relationship of understanding and feeling within "the sphere of religion",53 but then again this letter is addressed to a philosopher and it does allow that philosophy is the understanding's own independent and original activity.54 The independence of this activity consists in more than simply enabling piety to understand itself. As was stated above (p. 11), Schleiermacher's reference to the ellipse concludes with the assertion that his philosophy and his dogmatics are "firmly determined not to contradict each other"; for Schleiermacher this means that both must remain open-ended.55 They may come to approach each other asymptotically, but they cannot collapse into each other. Human existence is described, by Schleiermacher, as an "oscillation"56 between the poles or
centres of one’s life. The image of the ellipse is favoured because of the tension between the foci around which the ellipse is drawn: the metaphor is dynamic and not static. Our argument is that the fundamental polarity in this letter, in Schleiermacher’s life, in the age of German Romanticism and Idealism is not that between understanding and feeling within the realm of religion, but rather that it is the polarity of religion and philosophy, of feeling and speculation. If our judgment is right, then we shall expect to find significant evidence of this polarity in Schleiermacher’s greatest completed work, his Glaubenslehre. In fact, the question we shall want to put to Schleiermacher may be stated as follows: what kind of "galvanic operation" can occur between speculation and theology? That is, we wish to inquire how philosophy and theology can be combined—without contradiction—in a single human life and in a particular historical period.

We follow Schleiermacher’s own principles in undertaking this "analysis" of his personality. In a contribution to the final volume of Athenäum edited by the Schlegel brothers, Schleiermacher describes a process in which the constituent parts of an individual are separated "chemically", in order that "the inner principle of their combination, the most profound mystery of individuality" may be uncovered. To use Schleiermacher’s own words, we wish to "reconstruct" his intellectual personality "in an artificial way".57 We find our motive in the knowledge that Schleiermacher’s account of the relation of religion and philosophy is a great deal more subtle than Jacobi’s. We may wish to treat with great care Richard Crouter’s statement that Schleiermacher "sees himself as the proper heir (though also the reviser) of a ‘philosophy of faith’".58 Yet, as the image of the ellipse directly confirms, there is to be in Schleiermacher’s thought some genuine reciprocity between the dogmatic and the speculative, between religion and philosophy. In Schleiermacher’s lecture notes from his first university appointment at Halle, we discover that Schleiermacher did consider the possibility of reciprocal relations between philosophy and religion, in which each is advanced through the other.59 Friedrich Schlegel appears to follow a similar line of thought; but, not surprisingly, for him the dominant pair are poetry and
philosophy. These are said to "penetrate each other ever more intimately". Schleiermacher’s initial approach cannot be identical with Schlegel’s, and yet it seems right in this dissertation to ask in what respect theology and speculation, religion and philosophy can be understood in terms of this reciprocity (Wechselseitigkeit), in terms of this mutual interpenetration.

We have been trying to set the stage for our critical reading of Schleiermacher’s *Glaubenslehre* by establishing the mood or the tone of the work. We have already alluded to both the title and the subtitle of this work *The Christian Faith* (p. 1), which offer a significant hint of what the text intends to treat, and how it intends to go about it. Then we justified our use of the term *Glaubenslehre* in referring to this theological treatise, both because we were following Schleiermacher’s own practice and because this too offered some insight into the actual subject-matter being considered. From there, we moved to explore why the philosopher Jacobi (der Glaubensphilosoph) was to be honoured by the publication of Schleiermacher’s greatest work, and how this *Glaubenslehre* might bring to light Jacobi’s "real relation to Christianity" (p. 5).

This scrupulous preparation of our reading brings us into step with the exacting practice of contemporary literary criticism. Gérard Genette stresses the contribution which title, subtitle, preface, afterword, quotation, etc., can bring to the proper analysis of the text under consideration. He refers to these as "signaux accessoires", which the true interpreter ignores at his peril. A substantial criticism must be levelled against the authoritative English translation of the *Glaubenslehre* in this regard. Not only (as indicated) have the translators ignored the text’s informative subtitle, but they have also chosen to overlook the Latin quotations from Anselm which appeared on the title-pages of both editions published in Schleiermacher’s lifetime. No reference is made to these quotations anywhere in the English translation.

The use of Anselm as a kind of mast-head for the reading of the *Glaubenslehre* is in fact highly ambiguous. The famous phrase "credo ut intelligam" presumably expresses the priority of actual Christian belief for
this kind of Christian dogmatics. The second quotation, taken from Anselm’s *De fide trinitatis*, seems to bring into focus the place of personal experience for the new dogmatic method being pursued. This is suggested in the *experietur* and *expertus* of the quotation.63 Indeed, it seems to imply that without the experience, there will be no understanding. Now the irony is that the source of the first quotation (the *Proslogion*) is the home of the infamous ontological argument, a form of argument than which nothing more alien to Schleiermacher’s method can be conceived. Proofs for the existence of God are anathema to Schleiermacher’s whole enterprise.64 The second quotation from *De fide trinitatis* offers its own ironic comment on the disputed question of the actual relevance of a trinitarian understanding of God for concrete Christian piety. Schleiermacher will certainly suggest at the end of his *Glaubenslehre* that the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity is *not* an "immediate utterance concerning the Christian self-consciousness, but only a combination of several such utterances" (§170. Proposition).65 Indeed, the eternal distinctions upon which the doctrine was thought to depend could *never* appear in the pious self-consciousness (§170.2). There is a strong hint here that the traditional doctrine of the Trinity depends on the dreaded incursion of "alien" speculation (§170. Postscript)! Schleiermacher’s manifestly lukewarm treatment of this doctrine at the conclusion of his *Glaubenslehre* has led to repeated charges that, far from being the keystone (§170.1) it claims to represent, the doctrine of the Trinity with which Schleiermacher concludes is in fact nothing more than an appendix in the literal sense—superfluous.66

The constant shadow of Schleiermacher’s great dogmatic exposition is the spectre of the Hegelian philosophy, and especially the Hegelian philosophy of religion—which was being worked out in repeated lecture series contemporaneously with the first publication of Schleiermacher’s *Glaubenslehre* and its revision in the second edition. It must not be left unstated that Hegel also cites Anselm in Latin in the Introduction to his lectures of 1827. Here Anselm’s authority is invoked to expose the negligence of those who do not seek to understand what it is they believe.67 Hegel’s distinct advant-
age over Schleiermacher here is that he is known to have significantly more sympathy for the scholastic theology than his great rival. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Schleiermacher almost finds the scholastic approach absurd.\(^68\) Hegel, by way of contrast, finds the scholastic method most congenial, for as he asserts:

Scholastic philosophy is identical with theology; theology is philosophy, and philosophy is theology. ... These great men—Anselm, Abelard, etc.—built up theology out of philosophy.\(^69\)

Inevitably it seems, even by Schleiermacher’s casual appropriation of Anselm, we are led back into the core of our investigation: the precise relation of philosophy to theology within Schleiermacher’s dogmatics.

**Excursus:**

Schleiermacher’s lectures on church history offer a fascinating commentary on the quotations from Anselm which ornament the title-page of his *Glaubenslehre*. These lectures were first delivered in the academic year 1821/22, the very year of the publication of his first edition of *The Christian Faith*.\(^70\) All our favourite Schleiermacher themes make their appearance in the course of his relatively short treatment of Anselm’s Christian scholasticism. So we learn to distinguish medieval philosophy and theology by assessing the relation of the scholastic writing to the interests and needs of the Christian Church. If a work (e.g., the *Proslogion*) is judged non-ecclesiastical in origin, it falls on the philosophical side; whereas Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo*, by way of contrast, is properly theological—it refers everything back to its ecclesiastical roots. Nonetheless, Schleiermacher also acknowledges the artificiality of such a distinction: in Anselm, philosophy and “positive” Christianity are completely one, and the engine driving the whole scholastic enterprise—philosophical and theological—is speculation. But Schleiermacher adds an important proviso: the theological speculation, while ignoring the Bible, is grounded in faith (*Glaube*) and inner experience. This, of course, makes it more palatable!

The neglect, even the decline, of proper Biblical interpretation is one of the two major criticisms that Schleiermacher will level against the medieval theologians. They restricted their exegesis to the Vulgate translation, they had little Greek, even less Hebrew, and they were unable to develop their interpretations beyond what could be discovered in the commentaries of the Latin Fathers. The other enormous
deficiency of scholastic theology, according to Schleiermacher, is that it never found a systematic method which enabled it to move significantly beyond the isolated treatment of specific questions and topics, so that the whole had more the character of an aggregate than a genuine system.

Schleiermacher makes specific mention of the quotations from Anselm which appear at the beginning of his *Glaubenslehre*. Anselm is honoured because for him faith and experience, understood as original, inner experience, have the priority—indeed Anselm makes believing a condition of understanding, very much in accordance with Schleiermacher’s own principles. Anselm is praised for not reversing the proper order (as the philosophers are wont to do): he does not make his faith dependent on his knowing (γνώσις)—his faith is not subordinated to his theology, his theology is an expression of his faith.

There is an end of praise, however, when we come to Anselm’s treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. Here the priority of the inner experience is violated; "the law of thought" is made to precede the inner experience, and Schleiermacher concludes rather darkly: "It is not possible to bring the essence of Christianity, the inner experience, into the form of thought." Whether this stricture is to be understood only as a comment on Anselm, and medieval scholasticism more generally, or whether it has a far wider application, is a question this dissertation has undertaken to explore.

Schleiermacher’s journey to the mature position he adopts in the *Glaubenslehre* is not without dangerous flirtations along the way. His first opportunity to lecture on dogmatic theology at the University of Halle in 1804/5 is characterized by Schleiermacher as teaching the listeners to discover the idea beneath the concept (Begriff)—whatever this may mean, it certainly exposes a youthful enthusiasm for philosophical vocabulary. For his lectures on "Christliche Glaubenslehre" offered at Halle during the following academic year (1805/6), Schleiermacher expresses the hope that he will be able to help those studying under him to have a clear perception of the relation of "speculation and piety". And finally in the year before the founding of the University of Berlin, Schleiermacher offered lectures on Christian theology, not intended exclusively for "theologians", because this course of lectures was also designed to provide his listeners with a "speculative critique" of its subject-matter. We cannot therefore assume that Schleiermacher always maintained consistently the distinction between dogmatics and philosophy (or speculation) that defines his mature work,
and in part his harsh criticism of some scholastic excesses might be understood as the repudiation of his own earlier lofty assessment of the prestige of speculation.

VI.

In §1.2 of his *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher discusses the help which an introduction can offer the discriminating reader. He explains that a successful reading may be achieved if the reader is already acquainted with the method the work will pursue and the order in which the topics will be treated. Likewise, our discussion of Schleiermacher will proceed most persuasively if we indicate clearly from the outset what *our* reading of Schleiermacher is intended to demonstrate. At some point every reader of the *Glaubenslehre* must make a decision as to what the work is finally about. Following Schleiermacher's own explicit injunctions, we declare that the integrity of the *Glaubenslehre* stands or falls with the determination whether philosophical speculation—supposedly alien to religious self-consciousness and the dogmatic method which seeks to grasp that consciousness—has been excluded from the "account" of Christian "religious affections" with which the *Glaubenslehre* presents its readers.

Schleiermacher's vigorous repudiation of all alien philosophizing in his systematic representation of Christian doctrine has the effect of rather (over)emphasizing what we are asked to believe is extrinsic to the work in any case. Schleiermacher draws our attention, so to speak, to the potential "fly in the ointment": the more vigorous the denial, the more certain we can be that there is something worth investigating. His manful assertion in §28.3 that "there scarcely remains any point at which speculation could force its way into the *Glaubenslehre*" is simply too good to be true.

It is one of the great insights of the Hegelian dialectic that we are bound together in one movement of thought with our bitterest enemies. In fact, the very act of eliminating a point of view, or completely repudiating an opponent's argument, has the (paradoxical) effect of highlighting the very thing we wish to discount. So the uncompromising opposition to theological speculation actually forces the reader to consider what it is precisely that needs to be eliminated. In order to do away with speculation within dog-
matic theology, we need to identify our adversary very closely. Schleiermacher himself forces us to define this speculative tendency, so that we may the more successfully contrast it with the legitimate "scientific" exposition of the Christian faith, which is the proper task of the Christian theologian. As one very sympathetic Schleiermacher commentator has written: "Schleiermacher knows full well that a rejection of metaphysics is itself a strange and inconsistent form of metaphysics." This strangeness and inconsistency is the very thing we want to examine.

The Hegelian discourse makes such a procedure central: we find ourselves in a dialectical relationship with our adversary the moment we engage him in combat; and the more determined the opposition, the more firmly the opponents become identified in and through each other. It will be our contention that in his Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher forgets "the community that binds opposite ideas together"; he has suffered a certain astigmatism in advancing his case so firmly—he has lost sight of the "power which is working in him" and his greatest adversary alike.

It is very difficult to overlook the fact that from 1818, Hegel and Schleiermacher were colleagues and rivals at the University of Berlin—while Schleiermacher continued to hold the chair in theology, Hegel was invited in that year to occupy the chair in philosophy (which had been held by Fichte). So Schleiermacher's lectures in Christian dogmatic theology, or Glaubenslehre, in 1818/19, 1820/21, 1821, 1823/24, 1825, 1827/28 and 1830 may be regarded as running in tandem with Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion given in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. Hegel was certainly familiar with the first edition of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, and there is some suggestion that his initial decision to lecture on the philosophy of religion may have been provoked by the imminent publication of Schleiermacher's first volume in June 1821. Schleiermacher's acquaintance with Hegel's writings is less clear—although he was only too well aware of the savage criticism of him in Hegel's Introduction to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie, and furthermore he had an avid Hegelian as a colleague (Marheineke) in the faculty of theology and in the pulpit of the Dreifaltigkeitskirche. While
there is no evidence that Schleiermacher had a detailed knowledge of Hegel's publications, there will be no danger in asserting that Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion represent the pinnacle of that style of speculative theology, which Schleiermacher would have regarded as the ruination of proper Christian dogmatics.

The essence of the dispute between these two great teachers is most readily accessible in their vastly differing appraisals of the fruits of scholasticism. In Hegel's infamous Introduction to the above-mentioned work by Hinrichs, as always, he praises the scholastic theology of the Middle Ages. For Hegel this theology has proved itself as a science which developed religion on the side of thought and reason and endeavoured to grasp the deepest teachings of the revealed religion in thought.83

As we might expect, Schleiermacher's assessment is by no means as enthusiastic. For him the real harvest of the Middle Ages is the so-called "double truth" which rent the University of Paris in the 1270s. The heretical position that seemed to be emerging from the Faculty of Arts was the notion of a revealed truth which might not be a truth for unaided human reason, or a theological proposition which might not be true for philosophy. The inverse could as easily apply, and all aspects of this teaching were formally condemned in 1277.84 Schleiermacher refers explicitly to this distinctive medieval conundrum in the Postscript to §16. There he distances his dogmatic method from the medieval "confusion" of speculation and dogma, which results from the unhealthy blending of the scholastic "conglomerate-philosophy" with the language of the Christian religion. In Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology, liberated from this unholy mixture, it will not be possible to ask the "strange question" (wunderliche Frage), "whether the same proposition can be true in philosophy and false in Christian theology, and vice versa." Despite Schleiermacher's total lack of sympathy for this medieval attempt in the Faculty of Arts to free philosophy from the strictures of the revealed (and therefore certain) truths of theology, we shall want to return to this question of the "double truth" in our appropriation of Schleiermacher. Notoriously, Schleiermacher is the man who sought to be "speculative" in
his philosophy, while "positive" in his theology; what he achieved thereby was the authoritative introduction of a "double method" (if not a "double truth"), which he would require of the modern intellect, if religious propositions were to be taken seriously, and on their own terms.

Whatever the faults of medieval scholasticism, the waning Middle Ages—corrupted as they were by theological speculation—nonetheless kept hold of that dialectical unity which "lies beneath all opposition". We have another instructive account of this whole conflict in Canto X of Dante's Paradiso. There, in the heaven of the Sun, Dante is introduced to the circle of the wise men by Thomas Aquinas, who did his utmost while in Paris to quash the heresy of the "double truth". Appropriately, next to him on his right, is his great teacher and master, Albertus Magnus; Thomas continues to introduce the twelve members who make up this circle, including Peter Lombard, Solomon, Boethius and Bede, until his introductions are completed in announcing the "eternal light" of Siger of Brabant, the circle's last member. This is the same Siger "who, lecturing down in Straw Street, hammered home invidious truths, as logic taught him to." Straw Street is where Siger, as a Master of Arts, addressed his Parisian students, and he is one of the chief targets of the condemnations issued by the Bishop of Paris in 1277. His "invidious" teaching was that of the "double truth", which is wholly incompatible with Thomas' Summa in which nature is perfected by grace. Thomas never slackened in his opposition to Siger's repugnant doctrine.

Dante's insertion of Siger in this circle of the doctors of the church is therefore all the more remarkable and, because Siger is the last of the theologians to be introduced, it becomes clear that he closes the circle on Thomas' left, a circle which began with Albertus Magnus on Thomas' right. What are we to make of this? Only that Dante understood the eternal significance of the earthly conflict between Siger and Thomas: that there was a fundamental unity underlying their opposition, that the teachings of each could only fully be understood in contrast with that of the other, that their
intractable opposition at the University of Paris was an earthly expression of a more fundamental, ideal harmony.

Obviously, we have introduced this passage from *The Divine Comedy* to illustrate something of the opposition between Hegel and Schleiermacher. If Siger's primary motivation was to find a new freedom for philosophy released from the confines imposed by *sacra doctrina*, then *mutatis mutandis*, Schleiermacher's central motive could be characterized as the attempt to discover a freedom for theology released from the domination of speculative reason. In searching for this independent theological territory (theology's "eigener Grund und Boden"—Postscript to §16), Schleiermacher inevitably distorts and exaggerates. In passionately establishing this autonomy for Christian doctrine, he forgets or overlooks the unity which binds him tightly together with his greatest foe. If Hegel's lectures in Berlin can be understood as a kind of refutation of Schleiermacher's "invidious truths", then we know that Hegel's philosophy of religion was also a *response* to what he judged to be the future course of Protestant German theology.

There are modern critics who tell us that we are perfectly justified in reading Hegel and Schleiermacher "side by side" in this way. The effect of this parallel reading will be to show how and why Schleiermacher has overstated his case in his search for a non-speculative, fully, "positive" dogmatic theology; our task in this dissertation will be to concentrate on the exaggeration in Schleiermacher's argument. The "cunning of reason" will use our endeavours to bring out Schleiermacher's lasting significance. For the truth is that by our careful criticism of his theology, we shall make manifest, paradoxically, what it is in Schleiermacher's achievement, that must be taken into account by every subsequent, comprehensive theological thinker.
Introduction:

Footnotes


   
   i) This work will be cited in the following editions:
      
      
      
   
   ii) Schleiermacher’s *The Christian Faith* will be cited by paragraph number, and all paragraph references are to the second edition (Glaubenslehre), unless otherwise indicated.
   
   iii) The difficulty of rendering this work’s title into intelligible English commends the caution of the 1928 translation. The key words which we shall have carefully to consider in the interpretation of this systematic theology are “im Zusammenhange dargestellt”; here—“represented in their interconnection”. I have decided to translate “evangelisch” by “Protestant”. The translation “Evangelical” can only be misleading. Schleiermacher makes clear in the Prefaces to both editions of *The Christian Faith* that he intends this work of Christian dogmatics to serve the union of the two great German Protestant (evangelisch) traditions, the Lutheran and the Reformed. See Prefaces: Glaubenslehre i, pp. 6 and 7; Glaubenslehre 1, pp. 4 and 5; CF, p. vii.


7. "die Analyse der christlichen Frömmigkeit" (§30.3).

8. "... so ist klar, daß Beschreibungen menschlicher Gemütszustände dieses Inhaltes nur aus dem Gebiet der innern Erfahrung hergenommen werden können, und daß sich also unter dieser Form nichts Fremdes in die christliche Glaubenslehre einschleichen kann... Daher müssen wir die Beschreibung menschlicher Zustände für die dogmatische Grundform erklären..." (§30.2).


14. Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern. This work will be cited in the following editions:
   b) All editions of this work are available in the critical volume: Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Reden Uber die Religion edited by G.C. Bernhard Pünjer. Braunschweig: C.A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1879.


17. Letter: Schleiermacher to Karl Gustav von Brinkmann; October 19, 1803. Aus Schleiermacher’s Leben: In Briefen (hereafter Briefe), Volume IV, edited by Wilhelm Dilthey and


21. "Dr. Schleiermacher über seine Glaubenslehre, an Dr. Lücke": Zwei Sendschreiben. This work will be cited in the following editions:


"Soll der Knoten der Geschichte so auseinander gehen? das Christentum mit der Barbarei, und die Wissenschaft mit dem Unglauben?" (Lücke, p. 347; English translation, p. 61.) The translation of the German word "Wissenschaft" poses a perennial difficulty. In the context of this quotation Gerhard Spiegler suggests "culture" as the appropriate translation for "Wissenschaft". See his The Eternal Covenant: Schleiermacher's Experiment in Cultural Theology. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. p. 17. We shall postpone our own discussion of this vexing term until we come to consider in what sense Schleiermacher understood his Glaubenslehre to be a Wissenschaft (Glaubenslehre &2, §1).

22. "... der nach allen Seiten freigelassenen, unabhängig für sich arbeitenden wissenschaftlichen Forschung..." (Lücke, p. 351.)


25. The definitive edition of Schleiermacher's letter to Jacobi of March 30, 1818, has been provided by Martin Cordes, "Der Brief Schleiermachers an Jacobi: Ein Beitrag zu seiner Entstehung und Überlieferung" in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (hereafter ZThK), Volume 68, 1971. pp. 195-212. The letter itself can be found on pp. 208-211: "..."
was wir zum Unterschiede davon Religion nennen, was aber immer mehr oder weniger Dogmatik ist, das ist nur die durch Reflexion entstandene Dolmetschung des Verstandes über das Gefühl." (p. 208.)

27. "Die Bibel ist die ursprüngliche Dolmetschung des christlichen Gefühls und eben deswegen so feststehend, daß sie nur immer besser verstanden und entwickelt werden darf." (Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.)

28. Schleiermacher's lecture "Ueber die verschiedenen Methoden des Uebersezens" was read on June 24, 1813 and can be found in Friedrich Schleiermacher's sämtliche Werke (hereafter SW), Volume III/2. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1838. pp. 207-245. 

29. See George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation. Oxford University Press, 1975. pp. 251-252. In Friedmar Apel, Literarische Übersetzung, we are told that Schleiermacher's lecture is perhaps the most-discussed essay in the whole history of translation theory. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1983. p. 56.)

30. "Die Religiosität ist die Sache des Gefühls; was wir zum Unterschiede davon Religion nennen..." (Cordes, op. cit., p. 208; cf. n. 26.)

31. "... aus der logisch geordneten Reflexion auf die unmittelbaren Aussagen der frommen Selbstbewußtseins entsprungen sind..." (§16. Postscript.)

32. "... Befriedigung des unmittelbaren Selbstbewußtseins allein mittelst der echten und unverfälschten Stiftung Christi..." (§ 16. Postscript.)


36. "... ohne spekulative Hülfsmittel" (§50.1).


statement: "die beiden Brennpunkte meiner eigenen Ellipse" (see Cordes, op. cit., p. 209).


42. "Meine Philosophie also und meine Dogmatik sind fest entschlossen sich nicht zu widersprechen..." (Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.)

43. Hans-Joachim Birkner, op. cit., p. 36: "Über das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Dogmatik, das als solches ja gar nicht Gegenstand der Erörterung ist, kann man dem Brief lediglich die autobiographisch stilisierte Widerspruchsfreiheits- und Annäherungsbekundung entnehmen." Birkner offers no comment on the fact that the letter changes from a contrast of Verstand and Gefühl to a contrast of Vernunft (reason) and Gefühl before the discussion of the ellipse is introduced. The distinction of Verstand and Vernunft was a major topic in the German philosophy being taught during Schleiermacher's lifetime.

44. Brian A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleiermacher", op. cit., p. 125. In Schleiermacher's letter to Jacobi we read: "Meine Philosophie also und meine Dogmatik... so lange ich denken kann haben... immer gegenseitig an einander gestimmt und sich auch immer mehr angenähert." (My italics; Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.)

45. Briefe, Volume II, pp. 510-513 contains his widow's account of Schleiermacher's last days; here pp. 511-512: "... ich muß die tiefsten spekulativen Gedanken denken und die sind mir völlig eins mit den innigsten religiösen Empfindungen."

46. This is the contrast that Gerrish (following Biedermann—see n. 40) suggests cannot be found in "Schleiermacher's response to Jacobi" ("Friedrich Schleiermacher", op. cit., p. 125).

47. "Dieselbigen Glieder der christlichen Gemeinschaft nämlich, durch welche allein die wissenschaftliche Form der Glaubenslehre entsteht und besteht, sind auch die, in denen das spekulative Bewußtsein erwacht ist. Wie nun dieses die höchste objektive Funktion des menschlichen Geistes ist, das frommes Selbstbewußtsein aber die höchste sub jektive..." (§28.3). In view of the central importance of this quotation for the development of my thesis, I have translated more literally here than the Mackintosh/Stewart text—in particular I want to draw the reader's attention to Schleiermacher's use of the word Glaubenslehre in this context; this is obscured if Glaubenslehre is translated as 'Dogmatics' (CF, p. 122). Usually I render 'frommes Selbstbewußtsein' as 'pious' rather than 'religious' self-consciousness.

48. "... kaum ein Ort übrig bleibt, durch welchen die Spekulation sich in die Glaubenslehre eindrängen könnte." (§28.3).


51. In a footnote to his article "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-Sided Debate" (op. cit., p. 41), Richard Crouter informs us: "The image of electricity generated from a galvanic pile was fresh in Schleiermacher's day, the procedure having been invented around the time of his birth by the Italian anatomist Luigi Galvani." In fact, Galvani had advanced a theory concerning "animal electricity", which Volta showed was actually the result of the "mutual contact of metals of different kinds". These are Volta's words cited by Alexander Mauro, "The Role of the Voltaic Pile in the Galvani-Volta Controversy concerning Animal vs. Metallic Electricity" in Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, Volume 24, 1969. pp. 140-150; here p. 149. Schleiermacher was born in 1768. See also Dietrich von Engelhardt, Hegel und die Chemie: Studie zur Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Natur um 1800. Wiesbaden: Guido Pressler Verlag, 1976. p. 73. The entries under "Galvanic" in The Oxford English


54. "Ich bin mit dem Verstande ein Philosoph; denn das ist die unabhängige und ursprüngliche Tätigkeit des Verstandes..." (Cordes, op. cit., pp. 208-209.)

55. "Meine Philosophie also und meine Dogmatik sind fest entschlossen sich nicht zu widersprechen, aber eben deshalb wollen auch beide niemals fertig sein..." (Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.)

56. "... die Oszillation ist ja die allgemeine Form alles endlichen Daseins..." (Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.)


61. The theme of "Wechselseitigkeit" in Schleiermacher's thought was taken up by Heinz Kimerle in his address to the Internationaler Schleiermacher-Kongreß in Berlin in 1984: "Schleiermachers Dialektik als Grundlegung philosophisch-theologischer Systematik und als Ausgangspunkt offener Wechselseitigkeit". The Conference Proceedings are published in two volumes as part of the Schleiermacher-Archiv by Walter de Gruyter of Berlin, 1985 (hereafter Kongreß); Kimerle's address appears in Teilband 1, pp. 39-59.

62. Gérard Genette, Palimpsestes: La Littérature au second Degré. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982. p. 9. (It is quite remarkable in this context that Schleiermacher himself points out how his title begins the work of defining the content of his Glaubenslehre. So in §1.1 he writes, "Auch die Überschrift dieses Werkes... enthält Elemente zu einer Erklärung": Having translated this passage, the editors of the English version then ignore its significance!)

63. The quotation from St. Anselm's De fide iritatis (Migne, Patrologia Latina, Volume 158, col. 264) reads: "Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur; et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget." See, for instance, §33.3. Everywhere in his writings Schleiermacher echoes Jacobi's famous assertion: "Gott könne nicht gewußt, sondern nur geglaubt werden. Ein Gott,
The Proposition for an equivalent section in Glaubenslehre (§187) is significantly less cautious: "Der kirchliche Lehrrats aber, daß in dem Einen und ungeteilten göttlichen Wesen drei Personen von gleichem Wesen und gleicher Macht bestehen, hat, so gefaßt, nicht gleichen Wert mit den übrigen eigentlichen Glaubenslehren, sondern ist nur ein verknüpfender Satz."

The most vigorous, recent attack of "appendicitis" (a phrase suggested by S.W. Sykes) is contained in Jürgen Moltmann's Trinität und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980. pp. 18-19.


See, especially, the end of the Postscript to §16.


Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, edited by E. Bonnell in SW, Volume 1/11, 1840. See, especially, pp. 466-476 and 491-493. The Preface to this volume explains that this lecture series was given in the Winter Semester of 1821/22 and 1825/26 (p. viii).


Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, op. cit., p. 473: "Das Wesen des Christentums, die innere Erfahrung, in die Form des Denkens zu bringen, geht aber nicht; das Gesetz des Denkens soll der Erfahrung vorangehen."


Letter: Schleiermacher to E. von Willich; December 1, 1805. Briefe, Volume II, pp. 43-44, here p. 44: "... den Studierenden das Verhältnis der Spekulation und der Frömmigkeit recht anschaulich zu machen..." It is from Martin Redeker's Introduction to Glaubenslehre that I learned of Schleiermacher's title for these lectures as "Christliche Glaubenslehre" (p. xviii).

Martin Redeker's Introduction to Glaubenslehre, pp. xviii-xix.

§15. Proposition: "Christliche Glaubenssätze sind Auffassungen der christlich frommen Gemütszustände in der Rede dargestellt."

"... kaum ein Ort übrig bleibt, durch welchen die Spekulation sich in die Glaubenslehre eindrängen könnte." (§28.3).


Schleiermacher lectured twice on dogmatic theology at the University of Halle (1804/5 & 1805/6), once in Berlin before the founding of the University (Winter 1809), and three times more before the series of dates given in the text marking Hegel's
arrival (1812/13, 1816, 1818). If the lectures were held in the Winter Semester a double date is given (i.e., 1804/5), a single date indicates the Summer Semester. Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of religion were always offered in the Summer Semester. Schleiermacher did not employ a consistent title for his lectures on Christian dogmatics. He started to use “Christliche Glaubenslehre” in 1805/6; he also used this designation in 1823/24 & 1827/28. Otherwise he simply advertised his lectures as “Dogmatik”. (See Martin Redeker’s Introduction to Glaubenslehre, pp. xv-xix, and Walter Jaeschke’s Preface to VPR, Teil 1, pp. x-xii.)

The evidence for this view is discussed by Walter Jaeschke in his Preface to VPR, Teil 1, pp. x-xii.

Schleiermacher mentions this unfortunate attack in a letter to de Wette written in the summer of 1823: Briefe, Volume IV, pp. 309-312; here p. 309.


There is significant scholarly opinion that neither Siger of Brabant nor Boetius of Dacia (the two teachers in the Faculty of Arts at Paris most commonly identified with the doctrine of the “double truth”) ever taught the propositions for which they were condemned. That need not concern us here; our only interest is what they were held to have taught, i.e., the position to which Schleiermacher makes reference in the Postscript to §16. Representative treatments of this extraordinary chapter in the history of medieval thought can be found in Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. London: Sheed and Ward, 1955; Armand Maurer, “Boetius of Dacia and the Double Truth” in Mediaeval Studies, Volume 17, 1955. pp. 233–239; and Michael Haren, Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century. London: Macmillan, 1985. The Prologue to the Condemnation of 1277 (which mentions the Faculty of Arts) is in no doubt concerning their teaching: “Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosopham, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint due contrarie veritates...”. The Condemnation is document 473 in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, Volume I, edited by H. Denifle. Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1964 (2nd ed.). Here I am citing p. 543.

I have in mind here §1 of both editions of Schleiermacher’s Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen (hereafter KD1 for the 1811 edition & KD2 for the 1830 edition). The critical edition of this text was edited by Heinrich Scholz in 1910, and has been reprinted in 1977 by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft in Darmstadt. The English translation by Tice (Brief Outline) is mentioned in n. 3, §1 in both KD1 and KD2 defines "Theologie" as "eine positive Wissenschaft"—we shall consider both of these terms in Chapter Two. "Positive" carries with it the notion of practical orientation. See, for instance, John E. Thiel, God and World in Schleiermacher’s "Dialektik" and "Glaubenslehre". Bern: Peter Lang, 1981, p. 39.

I have discussed this question of the "double truth" in relation to Schleiermacher in my contribution to the Schleiermacher-Kongress in Berlin in 1984. See Kongreß, Teilband 2 (1985), pp. 997-1001, "Schleiermacher wider die Spekulation". More recently Professor Walter Sparn has suggested that a self-contradictory "double philosophical and theological truth" is one of the unattractive alternatives facing modern theology. He makes this point in the conclusion to an article on Leibniz: "Das Bekenntnis des Philosophen: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz als Philosoph und Theologe" in Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Volume 28, 1986, pp. 159-178; here p. 176. This must be Schleiermacher’s alternative—the central object of our inquiry.

This is Dorothy L. Sayers’ translation, which is not the most accurate, but very appropriate in this context. The Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Cantica; Paradise, translated by Dorothy L. Sayers and Barbara Reynolds. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin

essà è la luce eterna di Sigieri,
che, leggendo nel Vico de li Strami,
silogizzò invidiosi veri.

88. This point is made very succinctly as a section heading in Hermann Peiter’s Introduction to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s *Christliche Sittenlehre: Einleitung* (Wintersemester 1826/27). Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1983. p. xviii: "Die Freiheit der Philosophie von der Theologie als mittelalterliches und die Freiheit der Theologie von der Philosophie als neuzeitliches Desiderat."

89. So Heinz Kimmerle in *Kongreß*, Teilband 1, p. 53: "Aus dieser Sicht wären Hegel und Schleiermacher vollkommen parallel zu lesen."
Chapter One:  
The Definition of Speculation

For speculation turns not to itself  
Till it hath travell'd and is mirror'd there  
Where it may see itself.  
William Shakespeare,  
Troilus and Cressida  
Act III, iii

The red thread\textsuperscript{1} which will guide us through the labyrinth of Schleiermacher’s \textit{Glaubenslehre}—from our entry into a theological discipline which "pertains solely to the Christian Church" (§2. Proposition) to our exit with a (preliminary) doctrine of the Trinity finally secured against the "infiltration of speculative elements" (§172.3)\textsuperscript{2}—is Schleiermacher’s implacable opposition to anything that smacks of "speculation" within a connected, ordered presentation of the current doctrine to be found in the Christian (Protestant) Church, that is, the doctrine "just now" applicable.\textsuperscript{3} It is the cardinal principle of Schleiermacher’s "zusammenhängende Darstellung", of his coherent representation of Protestant doctrine, that it be realized \textit{without} "speculative aids" (§50.1), \textit{without} recourse to alien philosophical concepts (the "philosophemes" of the Postscript to §170), whose origin cannot be traced to the pious self-consciousness that Christian dogmatics has undertaken to explicate. But if we are to eliminate the enemy, we must identify him first; and so we need to proceed with our definition of this strange concept of "speculation", a concept which, as our title indicates, expresses the deep tidal pull underlying the whole of this dissertation.

"To speculate" (Latin: \textit{speculari}) means literally—in its root sense—"to spy out, watch, examine, observe". From this basic meaning it is easy to adopt the transferred senses of "to speculate" as "to consider, examine, or reflect upon with close attention; to contemplate; to theorize upon...\textsuperscript{4} While these acquired senses of the infinitive are listed as equivalent, they will in the history of the use of this word tend to fly in opposite directions. Thus, while "pure speculation" might quite happily—in terms of the etymology of
this word—indicate the highest form of contemplative activity (Greek: \(\theta\alpha\omicron\omega\rho\iota\alpha\omega\)), in common parlance "pure speculation", like "idle speculation" and "mere speculation", suggests a wholly abstract, unreal, futile flight of fancy which has lost track of the concrete data of human existence. "To theorize"—this infinitive has a Greek etymology again suggesting vision and contemplation—is at best a derivative activity at one remove from the certain facts of ordinary life. Following this usage, we may say of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* that it theorizes upon or reflects upon the concrete expressions of actual Christian faith for the benefit of the government of (in this case) the Protestant German Church. Dogmatics is thus described as a "positive science", it is a theoretical undertaking with a practical aim, i.e., the "cohesive leadership of the Christian Church". Indeed, Schleiermacher will go so far as to lump the academic discipline of theology with law and medicine as "positive faculties", whose "need to establish an indispensable praxis securely on theory" would seem to shut out the speculative, purely theoretical, pursuit of the knowledge of God, for its own sake alone, as an alien, non-ecclesiastical, and essentially abstract diversion.

**Excursus:**

It is difficult to avoid a comparison here with the modern academic practice of distinguishing "pure" from "applied" scientific research. The former, it might be suggested, is conducted without reference to possible practical results, the latter is, by contrast, specifically assessed by its ability to aid industry in the solution of contemporary technical problems. Of course, the theoretical study of natural science, the "speculative" side of this pursuit, while not necessarily investigated with any specific, technical problem in view, cannot fail in the end, however long it takes, to produce results which will have a practical application.

A useful illustration of this dynamic has been offered in a recent statement issued by the House of Bishops of the General Synod of the Church of England. The "positive" inclinations of this august body representing the English "Kirchenregiment" cannot be doubted. Indeed, this report on "The Nature of Christian Belief" is itself an eminently practical response to a controversy which had been raging in
The Definition of Speculation

the English Church for two years before the statement was published. The statement\(^7\) declares (§67) that

Bishops thus have a twofold task. They are to 'guard, expound and teach' the faith as they have received it. They are also to be 'apostolic pioneers'.

If this is to be taken seriously, then it would seem that this "Kirchenregiment", at any rate, regards "informed and legitimate speculation" (§28) as an integral part of its task of "presenting the treasures of faith in a contemporary way". Dr. Robert Runcie (the then Archbishop of Canterbury) declared that the House of Bishops had no desire to exclude "doctrinal explorers" from amongst their number\(^8\)—while such explorers "search for idioms which will touch and persuade each of many different audiences ..." (§68).

This Report reflects (unconsciously) the very concerns at the heart of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, i.e., the "presenting of the treasures of faith in a contemporary way"—an acknowledged "pioneering" activity. Whether this pioneering work can be tackled without recourse to speculation remains to be seen.

Speculation has another related root meaning in the Latin word for mirror, speculum. Perhaps this usage will be most familiar from St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians—"now we see through a glass, darkly". The "glass" to which St. Paul is referring is actually a looking-glass, a mirror (Greek: ἑσπαρπόν, Latin: speculum). The problem with ancient mirrors (and Corinth was famous for their production)\(^9\) was that they were not made of glass at all; the desired effect was achieved by highly polished metal. As a consequence, the reflection these mirrors offered was only a poor copy of the original: as St. Paul says, in aenigmate, that is darkly, in a riddle. In this famous passage (1 Corinthians 13:12), the sense of vision is preserved by the videmus (Greek: βλέπομεν), and yet the vision obtained in the speculum, in the mirror, is flawed and conceals as much as it reveals. From here our evaluation of the "speculative" vision can move in two directions. We can accept the popular assessment of the speculative activity as abstract, unreal, obscure, enigmatic—a meddling in things beyond our understanding, a purely theoretical pursuit, liberally assisted by a fertile imagination! Or, conversely, we can follow a great Western philosophical tradition which
treats the human mind as a kind of mirror, a "glassy essence", a *speculum* in which the whole of reality can be reflected and comprehended. Appropriately, St. Anselm leads the way: in his *Monologion*, the mind is described as a *speculum* in which it is enabled to see the image of that "supreme being", which it cannot see "face to face". Furthermore he argues that it is in self-examination that the mind comes to a knowledge of this "supreme being"; in self-neglect the mind falls away from the contemplation of that highest being it seeks to apprehend (*ab eius speculatione descendit*). This notion—that the mind in reflecting upon itself is rewarded with a *speculatio* of the divine reality—again makes Schleiermacher's perception of Anselm as a precursor to the theological method of the *Glaubenslehre* highly ambiguous.

The vocabulary of "speculation" is inextricably bound up with this image of reflection in a mirror; the power of this imagery is easily explained. Suppose we were to conjure up the picture of a castle reflected in a lake, the surface of the lake would then throw back or "bend back" the impression of the castle that it received: for any observer present, there would now be the duplication of what is, in essence, one reality. The challenge for the observer is to discover the truth behind the appearance, to uncover the unity of what appears as divided before him. This picture accords very well with the central "speculative" idea of a unity which precedes or underlies all distinction and difference. Indeed, "speculative" thinkers will go so far as to claim that the very idea of "difference" is literally unintelligible, unless one has (at least) an implicit idea of the identity, which alone gives the talk of "difference" any substance. For Hegel, the speculative thinker *par excellence*, the very endeavour to think "difference as difference" is to be driven by a pre-emptive logic to acknowledge an identity which underlies and is the basis for all the "differences" that we commonly take for granted. The other attraction of the language of "reflection" has already been indicated by Anselm: it is the mind turned back upon itself in self-reflection that has unique access to the highest reality. This self-reflection implies a confidence that the mind can be equally the mirror of nature, and the mirror of the eternal, divine truths—in discovering itself, the mind is thus
able to discover the whole of reality. This notion of the universality of mind can be traced back to Aristotle's teaching that the soul is "in a way" everything that exists. The "speculative" philosophy cannot rest until the sense of this "in a certain way" (νόμ) has been made explicit. For in taking hold of its own limitations, the "speculative" mind is no longer simply subject to them. This preliminary summary is offered to give the reader some impression of the strange power of the Hegelian philosophy. Hans-Georg Gadamer calls this Hegel's "Reflexionsphilosophie" and concedes that it has no "Archimedean point" from which it can be "toppled": no position is available which is not drawn into the motion of consciousness coming to itself through reflection.

The other great Western assessment of speculation, its via negativa so to speak, receives authoritative status for Protestant theology in Luther's robust denunciation of the speculative hubris of the medieval schoolmen. Far from being an aid to piety, as the medieval theologians vainly imagined, speculation is "a stumbling block" to be shunned like the plague. In a polemical work published in 1521, Luther offers a young man the advice that he "avoid scholastic philosophy and theology like the very death of his soul". Speculation is quite simply of the essence of medieval theology, and this had been the case from the writings of Boethius onwards. For Boethius, theology is understood as a speculative discipline, and he first explicitly identified the Latin philosophia speculativa with the Greek θεωρια. The medieval speculatio offers a conception of the knowledge of God as a kind of vision, and Peter Lombard is even able to describe "the speculation of the theologians" (theologorum speculatio) as "studious and modest", a point of view Luther is unable to endorse! In Luther's writings "speculation" has acquired a wholly negative sense, it is just another expression of man's apparently limitless capacity for self-deception and sinful pride. Following an ironic tradition that reaches back into antiquity, Luther describes the one who speculates "concerning the divine majesty", as one whose life is lived snatching at "clouds". In other words, the wages of speculation—where they do not demand a headlong rush into the abyss—offer only the nebulous conclusions to be obtained when our feet are no longer firmly planted on
the ground. But there is related to this ridicule of "cloudy" speculation the serious charge of the sin of curiositas, the source of Eve's fateful difficulties. The idle attempt to conjecture about things beyond our ken is also thoroughly condemned in the writings of John Calvin, the other great doctor of the Reformation.

Schleiermacher's Protestant dogmatics are firmly rooted in this aspect of the Reformation heritage. In a work which explicitly bans philosophical and theological speculation, the subject-matter is confined to the actual contents of the present state of pious (Protestant) self-consciousness. In this dogmatic undertaking there will not be any "higher guesswork" about the divine nature which extends beyond the strict limits of what is given and known to the Christian piety then obtaining in German Protestantism.

This attractive summary, while true to the spirit of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, as usual, tells only half the story. We need to recognize that Schleiermacher's ban on speculation in his dogmatics does not imply any reluctance to engage in "speculation" in other aspects of his intellectual activity. Most strikingly, when we begin the reading of his Glaubenslehre, we are immediately made aware of "concepts" derived from a speculative science called Ethik (§2.2 is the first mention), a discipline characteristic of Schleiermacher's thought, upon which he laboured throughout his lifetime. In refusing to turn his back on speculation ("the highest objective function of the human spirit"—§28.3), Schleiermacher was, of course, fully a creature of his time. The first decades of the nineteenth century in Germany were in every sense as "speculative" as the high point of scholastic speculation in the Paris of the 1270s. How "speculation" was understood by Schleiermacher's philosophical contemporaries (especially in Berlin) will be our next line of inquiry.

As one might expect, the place to begin is with some attempt to outline Kant's critical use of this term. This is not so very easy, since definitions appear in a variety of works, and the word "speculative" can have the restricted application of serving as a synonym for "theoretical". Nevertheless, in a handbook for his lectures on logic (published under his authority in 1800), Kant offers the clear explanation, that a knowledge of the universal
in abstracto is speculative knowledge, whereas a knowledge of the universal
in concreto is common knowledge; therefore "philosophical knowledge is the
speculative knowledge of reason." Speculation might then be regarded as
a legitimate aspect of philosophical procedure. But a discussion of the same
phenomenon in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B 662-663) is to be discovered
in a section with the inauspicious heading: "Critique of all Theology based
upon Speculative Principles of Reason". Here Kant identifies "theoretical
knowledge" as speculative "if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an
object, which cannot be reached in any experience." Kant's conclusion is that

all attempts to employ reason in theology in any merely speculative
manner are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void
... (B 664).

Schleiermacher's opposition to speculation in his dogmatics is significantly
informed by this Kantian "Critique of all Theology..."; Schleiermacher's
explicit intention is to provide a systematic elaboration of what he discovers
in concrete Christian piety. Theological notions "which cannot be reached
in any experience" are said to have been banished from the theological
method of his Glaubenslehre. In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant alludes
to "the restriction of speculative folly"—Schleiermacher's dogmatics intend
to comply.

In the same section of the Critique of Practical Reason from which the
above quotation was taken, Kant alludes to the impossibility of simply
placing speculative and practical reason side by side. The practical must
always have the greater authority, "because every interest is ultimately
practical, even that of speculative reason"; where this higher authority of
practical reason is not recognized and where the speculative reason is not
subordinated, "a conflict of reason with itself would arise". I draw attention
to these highly fecund remarks by Kant—of which no complete interpreta-
tion can be offered here—because of the profound echo that they carry into
Schleiermacher's thinking. Nothing could be more central to Schleier-
macher's enterprise in the Glaubenslehre than avoiding a division in what he
calls "das Wesen des Menschen" (§28.3: man's essence), where this division
may be threatened by a conflict between the objective and subjective func-
tions of the human spirit, viz. speculation and pious self-consciousness. Schleiermacher's solution to this problem of the potential competition between speculation and piety is to give each its unique sphere, without subordinating one to the other.

As early as 1799 in the first edition of his *Speeches on Religion*, Schleiermacher was showing a marked reluctance to engage in this subordination of one kind of reason to another. He holds out for some kind of "parallelism between the theoretical and the practical", between what he here calls "Metaphysik und Moral". To these Schleiermacher wants us to add a "necessary and indispensable" third term, which he identifies in this first edition as "Religion". However, it is of considerable interest to note that Schleiermacher challenges the reader with the proposition that unity in this whole ("die Einheit in diesem Ganzen") is only possible on the basis of what is "the highest in philosophy", namely religion. If the theoretical and practical reason are understood as "two different but opposed concepts", then they must find their unity in a higher principle, to which they both belong. This principle can only be religion.

While this is no more than an aside in a diffuse and complicated argument in the Second Speech of this first edition, there are once again considerable points of contact with Hegel's nascent "philosophy of spirit". As Richard Kroner has pointed out, Schleiermacher's discussion of "two different but opposed concepts" places special emphasis on the word "but" (aber). In this phrase, aber is given the crucial task of indicating that the concepts of the theoretical and practical reason are not only different, but also opposed, which is to say that they are also related: their dialectical opposition provides them with the opportunity of being united under the higher concept of religion.

There are grounds for believing that in the years immediately following this first edition of the *Speeches on Religion*, Hegel not only approved of the method employed above, but also adopted the conclusion. In unpublished manuscripts from the very first years of the nineteenth century, Hegel was proposing to show the conclusion of his systematic endeavours in the concept of religion: after the "idea" central to his philosophy had found its
elucidation in logic, nature and ethical life, it would return to "the primitive simplicity" of its beginning, in religion. This makes for a striking parallel: while Hegel's concept of religion here offers "the resumption of the whole into one", Schleiermacher's concept of religion above could offer the whole of reason its "unity". Borrowing Schleiermacher's own phrase, we are endeavouring to see Schleiermacher and Hegel as "two different but opposed" thinkers. It will be imperative in everything that follows to bear in mind Schleiermacher's strong sense of this phrase: "different but opposed" means that in their opposition, Hegel and Schleiermacher are also related. Their unity must, therefore, be as much our subject-matter as their opposition.

II

If the danger inherent in theological speculation is the invention of doctrines inaccessible to any "experience", then the zenith of this speculative divorce from "reality" is commonly located in the Hegelian philosophy. How remarkable for our argument that precisely this philosophy was being formulated contemporaneously with Schleiermacher's dogmatics! A position more alien to the principles of the Glaubenslehre can hardly be imagined. As early as 1807, with the publication of his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel was declaring that God could only be grasped in pure speculative knowing, and that this speculative knowledge is nothing other than the knowledge available to the revealed religion, i.e., Christianity. Hegel never swerved in his allegiance to the necessity for speculation in Christian theology. In his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (the authoritative statement of the system as a whole), Hegel reaffirms the centrality of speculation for a Christian knowledge of God: thoroughgoing speculation is required in order to grasp God as spirit in thought (§564). The challenge to Schleiermacher's position is now complete!

Any passing acquaintance with the literature on Hegel will confirm that the words "speculation" and "speculative" are liberally sprinkled into any text or discussion. Given the nearly total imprecision in the use of this word, it is pleasant to discover that Hegel himself defines the term "speculation" in a manner that we can easily reproduce. So in the Introduction to
his *Science of Logic*, first published in 1812, Hegel says that the speculative consists in the grasp of unity in difference—in grasping the unity with ourselves of what is set over against us, in grasping "the positive within the negative". In his *Philosophical Encyclopedia*—notes used to educate young men in philosophy at the Nürnberg Gymnasium(!)—Hegel defines the speculative or "the rational" as that which discovers the unity of concepts (*Begriffe*) in their opposition and grasps "the positive in their dissolution and transition" (1808). In 1812 Hegel sent an outline on the teaching of the philosophical curriculum to his friend and patron F.I. Niethammer, a civil servant with responsibility for school reform in Bavaria. In this "personal assessment" (*Privatgutachten*) Hegel writes that the properly speculative is the knowledge of opposites (of what is opposed) in their unity, or to say the same thing, the knowledge that opposites are in principle truly one. From this variety of sources, it may be demonstrated that Hegel sustains a consistent usage of the term "speculative", which from these definitions emerges as the highest form of "thought". In his notes on Logic produced for students at the Gymnasium (1810/11), Hegel defines thought or thinking (*das Denken*) as "the apprehension and bringing together of the manifold into unity". Speculation, therefore, represents the highest form of thinking, because it brings into unity not only what is diverse (manifold), but indeed those things which stand in opposition, those things which appear to exclude each other.

Hegel's dialectical method finds its foundation in the statement that "an out-and-out Other simply does not exist" for mind or spirit (*Geist*). Speculation is that activity of mind, which in grasping the unity of opposites, enables us to see for ourselves the truth of this crucial proposition which can be found in the Addition to §377 of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. In emphasizing the "speculative" character of this dialectic, Hegel's philosophy of religion makes the epithet "dialectical theology" unintelligible when applied to some twentieth century forms of thought.

The most extraordinary feat of the Hegelian philosophy from the point of view of this dissertation is the way in which speculation and Christianity are intimately connected. For Hegel the Christian revelation is in essence already speculative, in the sense defined above. As Hegel understands the
incarnation (*die Menschwerdung Gottes*), it can be nothing other than the concrete discovery of that unity in difference which is also the task set for speculation. In the Christian religion the difference to be grasped is actually allowed to proceed to its full term in the death of the God who has become a man. For Hegel's philosophy the mark of the life of Spirit (*Geist*) is that it does not "shun" death, but rather that it "endures death and in death maintains its being". In such an understanding of the Christian dispensation, Jesus literally shows us the way in the life of Spirit, and Hegel is able to tell his students at the Nürnberg Gymnasium that Christ's pain, the pain of the Son of God, reveals "the depth" of the unity of the divine and human nature in life and suffering.

While it is mostly assumed that—in accordance with Kant's definition—speculative knowledge is abstract, where common knowledge is concrete, Hegel turns the tables on this common assumption: he argues that the concrete truth of the indissoluble unity of God and man can only be convincingly proclaimed, if Christianity maintains its speculative rigour. Only "thoroughgoing speculation" is able to grasp the supreme content of what he calls "the absolute religion": speculation avoids a one-sided explication of the unity of God and man, just because it simultaneously declares the difference, without which the discussion of "unity" becomes incoherent.

Ironically, the same reversal may be applied to a popular account of the relative merits of Hegel's "abstract" philosophy when it is compared with Schleiermacher's supposedly "positive", concrete theology. What is said to make Schleiermacher's theology positive (or concrete) is that it renders in systematic form the actual Christian piety it discovers to hand—and furthermore, this analysis is undertaken for a practical end, i.e., to serve the needs of the Church. It might then come as a surprise to discover that in this concrete, positive analysis of Christian piety, Christ's passion has no systematic place or function. By contrast, Hegel's "abstract" philosophy of religion can find the meaning of Christianity in nothing else: "in living suffering" is "the depth" of the union of God with man alone revealed.

Hegel does not now avoid his own most offensive conclusion: if the content of Christian revelation is really "speculative", then Christian wor-
ship (Andacht) is in principle already a form of speculation, even if this is unconscious. Hegel tells his students at Nürnberg that the "main function" (Hauptbestimmung) of religion

is to raise the individual to the thought of God, to bring him into union with God and to assure the individual of that union.47

As the "thought of God" requires speculation if we are to grasp, at one and the same time, the unity and difference of God and man (the profoundest mystery of the Christian religion), then we know in what sense to understand Hegel's declaration that philosophy is as much "divine service" (Gottesdienst) as religion is.48 Philosophical speculation offers the religious consciousness the thought of God in a form which does justice to the religious content: God and man united in their distinction.

III. Schleiermacher's use of the word "speculative" does not lend itself to a single, absolute definition. In most cases, it probably indicates nothing more exact than a "higher" form of knowledge; "speculation" may then be used as a synonym for philosophy, or more specifically for that branch of philosophy commonly called metaphysics.49 Depending upon the context in which it appears, speculation may be something actively to be embraced or strenuously to be avoided. Likewise, "speculation" may be a term of opprobrium or the one thing needful. As we are already aware, there is in Schleiermacher's thought a constant recognition that religion and philosophy have the task of developing one another reciprocally (p. 16). So, in his programmatic work on universities in a German situation (published in 1808 in anticipation of the founding of the University of Berlin), Schleiermacher pens a sentence which should dispel any lingering doubts about the necessity for this present study. There he defines "speculation" as "pure philosophy", which concerns itself with the unity and the interconnection of all knowledge (Erkenntnisse), and with the nature of knowing (Natur des Erkennens) itself. And then Schleiermacher adds the fateful assertion that there cannot be any capacity for scientific development without the "speculative spirit".50
This sentiment is perfectly consistent with the view of objective and subjective consciousness which Schleiermacher articulates in his *Glaubenslehre* (§28.3); it is also of a piece with his discussion of "philosophical theology" in §67 of his theological encyclopedia, the so-called *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology* (2nd edition). Here we are informed that each person's philosophical theology contains within it the principles of that person's "whole theological way of thinking". It follows that *philosophical theology*, a discipline with an avowedly theological aim, must require theological work to be bound together with that "speculative spirit", without which there can be "no outstanding progress in any discipline".

This reciprocity between speculation and religious consciousness is particularly emphasized in the elucidations which Schleiermacher tacks onto the First Speech of the 1821 edition of his *Speeches on Religion*. In these "Explanations" appended to the text, Schleiermacher claims to hold a minority view in advocating a "deeper speculative formation" (*Ausbildung*) amongst spiritual leaders (No. 1). Schleiermacher's second addition to this First Speech discusses the speculative "impulse" (*Drang*) or drive "to annihilate anthropomorphism in the conception of the Highest Being"; and he suggests that this "impulse" is "clearly expressed in the writings of the profoundest Christian teachers". We need hardly add that Schleiermacher experienced the same "impulse" to a high degree. The sixth addition seeks to avoid talk of primacy in the relation of piety and "scientific speculation"; Schleiermacher's characteristic view of their proper relation is that "the more closely they are conjoined the more both advance".

All these elucidations prepared for the third edition of 1821 are balanced by the vital first addition to the Second Speech, which makes it clear that the Christian religion is not to be confused with "the highest knowledge" or "metaphysical speculation". The ideas which emanate from speculation have their origin in a different part (*Ort*) of the soul from the "representation" (*Vorstellung*) which is appropriate to the religious consciousness. To maintain this entire series of additions is to display the fulcrum of Schleiermacher's intellectual personality. If we could discover "the inner principle of their combination", we would expose "the deepest mystery" of his indi-
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viduality. This vocabulary which dates from 1800 (cf. p. 16) is applied by Schleiermacher in a letter written to his friend Brinkmann in 1803. Here Fichte is criticized for his rigid separation of philosophy from life, which yields only "a great, one-sided virtuoso". The humanity, it seems, is missing. In this letter, Schleiermacher follows Friedrich Schlegel in suggesting that poetry is the appropriate contrary to "rigorous philosophy" (die strenge Philosophie), and he asks what we shall call that indisputable higher entity, which binds both together. Schleiermacher's typical concern is that both sides be fully acknowledged, and he locates "the unity of life" or "the living personality" in seeking "to overcome" this antithesis, even if such a goal can never be fully realized.\textsuperscript{56}

From this letter we are able to glean another formulation of Schleiermacher's own most fundamental tenet: the unity of his "living" intellectual personality depends upon a recognition of the strict separation of philosophy from theology, yet each must be given its due and allowed to advance with the help of the other, if a "one-sided virtuosity" is to be avoided. This explains why in his own life, Schleiermacher set out to separate the religious consciousness from the confusions of metaphysical speculation, while unflinchingly developing the philosophical side of his academic work. One always works to overcome the opposition between them, while recognizing that their final reconciliation is something which forever eludes our grasp. Here, I suspect, we have put our finger on Schleiermacher's continuing attractiveness for contemporary thought: he rigorously refuses any claim to finality; he does not expect to bring the relationship between philosophy and theology "to completion", even while he strives "to overcome" the dichotomy between them.

One must suppose that Schleiermacher would have had severe reservations about the scholastic precept, "distinguish in order to unite".\textsuperscript{57} And yet there is hardly another phrase which could so neatly encapsulate the inner dynamic we discover at the core of Schleiermacher's intellectual endeavours. The uncompromising segregation of religious consciousness from philosophy has the inevitable effect of highlighting how much they have in common. They are sharply distinguished in order to avoid a facile
appropriation (or misappropriation) of the one by the other. Nonetheless they are also known to express two aspects of one and the same human spirit, and it is when both are pursued simultaneously, that the most remarkable developments in "Wissenschaft" can be expected to occur. If philosophy and theology are so distinguished as to be rendered incapable of interfering with one another, they are by the same token rendered incapable of assisting one another, and any notion of their "Wechselseitigkeit" (their reciprocity and interpenetration) would have to be abandoned. In his strictly theological stance Schleiermacher will declare that the difference between a philosophical statement and a dogmatic statement "must always be presupposed" (§16. Postscript: "immer vorausgesetzt werden muß"). But such a "difference" must also be established, and it is here that Schleiermacher leaves his indelible mark on the Protestant theology of the German tradition.

In the defence of the first edition of his Speeches on Religion, he wrote:

My ultimate purpose has been to exhibit and establish, in the present storm of philosophical opinions, the independence of religion from every metaphysics.

Twenty years later Schleiermacher introduces the injunction that the philosophical and the dogmatic are not to be "mixed up" or blended as the governing idea (Grundgedanke) of the first edition of his Glaubenslehre (§2. Note b). A.D.C. Twisten, Schleiermacher's successor at the University of Berlin, felt that Schleiermacher had actually accomplished this separation; Twisten argued that his predecessor had so established

the inherent and independent source of religion in the human disposition, and placed in so clear a light the original difference of philosophy and dogmatic theology

that a sufficient guard against the encroachment of either into the territory of the other had been set in place. This dissertation aims to expose the precipitate character of Twisten’s judgement.

Schleiermacher's firm commitment to the separation of dogmatic theology from philosophy prompts us to ask about their relation. Certainly, we are permitted to ask a historical question about their "original difference" (ursprüngliche Verschiedenheit), since so many great theologians seem not to
have known about it. In the above-mentioned Postscript to §16 of the *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher maintains that in the first centuries of the Christian era there was *no* speculative influence on "the content of dogmatic propositions"—if "the quite unecclesiastical Gnostic schools" are discounted. However, by the scholastic period a "confusion" (*Verwechselung*) and "blending" (*Vermischung*) of the speculative with the dogmatic had become "practically unavoidable" (*fast unvermeidlich*). Schleiermacher's lectures on church history repeat the refrain: the scholastic age is characterized by the "coincidence" (*das Einssein*) of philosophy and theology. This unhappy marriage was dissolved after the Reformation, when "positive theology" was severed from philosophy. 62 In the course of his discussion of Hugo of Rouen (died 1164), Schleiermacher makes his central point with admirable precision:

> But the entanglement [with speculation] occurred everywhere in the higher theological learning, because that which philosophy was supposed to be and remain (grounded on speculation) became confused with the theological (grounded on inner experience). 63

The question of the relation of philosophy and theology may then be raised for historical reasons, but a more compelling consideration (internal to the argument) makes the investigation imperative: if all forms of philosophical speculation are to be banished from the theologian's stock-in-trade, the theologian must first equip himself with an adequate and precise acquaintance of the potential hazard. In order to secure his theology against a "speculative incursion", the theologian must have an actual knowledge of the enemy he wishes to eliminate. Nor can the theologian expect philosophy to present him with a single, monolithic, universally valid, self-definition, since the discipline of philosophy is constantly changing in its understanding of itself, in just the same way as theology is continually redefining its methods and aims. For all we know, speculation is discovering ever more subtle ways of "forcing its way" (perhaps surreptitiously) into religious reflection.

In this way the theologian, in asserting his independence from philosophy, is actually establishing his *dependence* on the very same discipline. He must know what philosophy thinks it is and thinks it will become, if he is to
have any success in achieving his stated aim of disentangling theology from it. The separation of theology from philosophy keeps bringing us back to the question of their relation.

The coherence of the human personality requires that we understand the unity between philosophy and theology, between speculation and religious consciousness, even while we are drawing the distinction. It is as if we are drawing a bow to its fullest extent: the force increases the further the bow is stretched, but go one inch beyond the limit and the bow "ceases to be stretched at all".64 So too the distinction between philosophy and theology can be advanced to its limit; but the distinction does have a limit, because the distinction drawn must always be able to account for the relation implied in the distinction. Any "distinction" incapable of directing us towards this implicit relation ceases, in fact, to be a distinction at all. The tensed bow string goes slack.

In just this sense the distinction of theology from philosophy is the disclosure of their relation to one another: they are defined against one another, and their assertion of independence is the exposure of their concrete dependence upon one another. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Schleiermacher's vision of a parallel development of philosophy and theology, separate but equal, is one we choose to embrace: what, apart from a profounder understanding of their unity, enables us to suppose it possible to harness these two in parallel formation? Why should they not rather pull in opposite directions, in light of their putative independence? Schleiermacher bases their relation upon their distinction from one another, but the relation must be maintained both for "the unity of life" and the coherence of the argument.

It is only because Schleiermacher has brought the conundrum of the relationship between philosophy and theology into such clear focus that Hegel's solution to this problem seems (to us) such a tiny speculative step: Hegel says in answer to Schleiermacher that philosophy and theology are both identical and distinct. It is the comprehension of their "speculative identity and non-identity"65 which alone does justice to their distinction and relation, their differentiation and unity. Speculative thinking, Hegel tells us,
"consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its own self". Here Hegel is asking us to engage in the highest speculative effort: he asks us to think the "unity of differentiatedness and non-differentiatedness, or the identity of identity and non-identity". This is Hegel's so-called "speculative proposition", a proposition which requires us to see unity and difference as a single operation of mind.

The identity of philosophy and religion is consistently upheld in the Hegelian corpus, but nowhere more vividly than in Hegel's Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1827. Here Hegel declares that philosophy and religion hold the same content "in common", as

the object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is only explicating itself when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. For the thinking spirit is what penetrates this object, the truth; it is thinking that enjoys the truth and purifies the subjective consciousness. Thus philosophy and religion coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself the service of God [Gottesdienst], as is religion. But each of them, religion as well as philosophy, is the service of God in a way peculiar to it...

This is a poignant passage, if read as a comment on the identity and difference of Hegel and Schleiermacher. The notion that philosophy and religion help "to explicate" each other is not so very far removed from some of Schleiermacher's assertions of their "reciprocity". The notion that both are forms of "Gottesdienst" (properly "divine service" or even "worship") looks more offensive to the pious self-consciousness, even if similar sentiments were not unknown amongst the early Romantic school. But the real difficulty finds its seat in Hegel's conception of religion, and a fortiori of theology; Hegel obviously continues to function with an understanding of theology as a science which yields an actual knowledge of God and the divine life. If it makes any sense to describe Schleiermacher as "the Kant of Protestant theology", then we may suppose that modern German theology will want to give a very different account of its endeavours and possibilities.

Hegel's explanation of the distinction between philosophy and religion does not derive from a difference in content—the content is what philosophy and religion hold "in common". The basis for the distinction is the form under
which this content is held. In the religious life the truth is known under the form of "Vorstellung", which may be translated as "representation" or "figurative thought". The sense of this term "Vorstellung" is best captured, however, by the brilliant paraphrase "imaginative representation". The criticism which a philosopher may level at this "imaginative representation" is that it has not yet attained the status of a purely conceptual language. In other words, "Vorstellung" is not able to render its content in the form which the highest truth requires. In Hegel's technical vocabulary, "Vorstellung" must be contrasted with "Begriff" (translated as "notion" or "concept"), the only sufficient expression of absolute, universal truth.

In §573 of his Encyclopedia, Hegel alludes to the remarkable solidarity which obtains between philosophy and religion. Just as the content of religion is already "essentially speculative", so philosophy, in its turn, is "religious", in virtue of its speculative content. Yet everything in their relation (Verhältnis) hinges upon "the difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms" of representation and reflective understanding. What distinguishes religious representation from philosophical speculation is that the former operates somewhere between "immediate sensible intuition" and "thought properly speaking". Representation is then a form of thought, but one that has not yet managed to cast off the encumbrance of sensuous imagery. Hegel suggests that, because of this "entanglement" of sense with thought, "figurative thinking" is in a state of "constant unrest". Representation will from this perspective be understood as an unresolved form of thinking: a thinking which will only find its truth in pure thought, or speculation. In the words of one commentator, representation is "a medium between sense and thought", between subjectivity and objectivity.

We offer here the baldest statement of the chasm which separates Hegel from Schleiermacher: for Hegel, religion is actually a mediating moment between subjective consciousness and the fully speculative self-comprehension offered by philosophy. For Schleiermacher, religion and philosophy are two modes of consciousness (subjective and objective) which can never be "mediated", even if the "unity" of the human personality demands that they
be reconciled in some way. For Hegel, as for Schleiermacher, there is a reciprocal "traffic" between religion and philosophy, between "Vorstellung" and "Begriff". At the same time the increasing disclosure of the "speculative" character of the religious content makes the speculative grasp of that content inevitable.

Schleiermacher purports to find this speculative appropriation of religious truth utterly alien, but his own theological method is a kind of objective, scientific appropriation not so very dissimilar from Hegel's speculation. In §3 of the first edition of his Glaubenslehre, he sketches the two moments by which pious Christian emotions (Erregungen) can be transformed into a Glaubenslehre. The first transformation is that these pious emotions are converted into doctrine (Lehre), and secondly the doctrines so adduced are arranged according to a definite order showing their interconnection (Zusammenhang). However one may want to describe this "scientific" process, there occurs within it some movement from subjectivity to objectivity, from the religious emotions to systematically ordered doctrines. It is equally significant that Schleiermacher is not averse to some "purifying" of the subjective consciousness along the way. To mention obvious examples, his account of the doctrine of miracles or the doctrine of the creation of the world is not simply a description of what he finds in the ordinary self-consciousness: these doctrines must be "clarified" and "purified", so that, at the very least, they do not come into open conflict with the contemporary conclusions of natural science. The "impurities" which dogmatic theology may uncover in the pious self-consciousness must be excised to whatever extent possible.

Hegel suggests that "religion is the truth for all men". By this he means that the Christian religion offers the highest speculative truth in a form which all men can grasp: it does not follow from this that religion offers the truth in a form to which all men can assent without qualification. Inasmuch as figurative and imaginative representation continues to adhere to this absolute, speculative content, there is always the possibility that accidental, historical accretions will be presented as belonging to the "essence" of the Christian religion. Hereby, a peripheral doctrine might be accorded a dig-
nity, which a systematic and "scientific" treatment of Christianity would expose as unjustified. Once again, I suggest that Hegel and Schleiermacher have rather more in common than their public clashes might indicate. There is nothing for which Schleiermacher labours with greater conviction than a presentation of the Christian faith which will allow it to coexist with contemporary sciences (natural and historical) and philosophy. To this end, his theology must be formulated in the light of the current teachings of those disciplines: having taken these teachings into account, theology will then be able to demonstrate its (suppositional) independence from them. But this will be a costly business. As Schleiermacher himself puts it in the preparation for the second edition of his Glaubenslehre:

For this reason, I can only anticipate that we must learn to do without what many are still accustomed to regard as inseparably bound to the essence of Christianity. 85

Schleiermacher would be made very uneasy by our attempt to reconcile him with Hegel. He seeks to avoid the collapse of his theology into just another mode of speculation by establishing a distinction between religious or theological thinking and metaphysical or philosophical thinking. 86 These forms of thinking are represented as being independent of one another. By contrast, we have been attempting to show that despite their vaunted independence, these forms of thinking actually influence one another; the more radical Hegelian challenge is how, as forms of thinking, philosophy and theology are in point of fact related to one another.

Schleiermacher's lasting contribution to the theology of our time is his attempt to present "a purely religious account of the Christian faith." 87 This dissertation will be able to acknowledge the centrality of that aim in everything Schleiermacher does theologically; further, we shall emphasize Schleiermacher's consistency in seeking to realize this goal. However, the reader will by now be aware that we regard this "purely religious account of the Christian faith" as a fiction. And Schleiermacher's concern for a balance between the subjective and the objective consciousness is only the first indication of how this "purely religious account" will unravel.
Schleiermacher regularly contrasts speculation with "Empirie", speculative knowledge with empirical knowledge (Erkenntnis). The clearest summary that Schleiermacher offers of these different forms of knowledge is contained in the introduction to his lectures on Psychology. Basically, the difference between the empirical and the speculative boils down to a distinction between knowledge a posteriori and knowledge a priori. Hence, empirical knowledge presupposes a given, external reality, whereas speculative knowledge is purely inward and finds its origin in the act of thinking itself. In direct consequence, sciences can be designated as empirical or speculative in character.

This general division of knowledge strictly reflects the most fundamental antithesis in all being and knowing: the antithesis between the real and the ideal. In his lectures on Dialektik, Schleiermacher describes these as two modes of being and suggests that they run in parallel formation ("parallel neben einander"). Here he supports a more general opinion that the real and the ideal are as fundamental to our understanding of the world as the distinctions of body and soul, nature and reason.

From this "highest antithesis", the distinction of speculative and empirical knowledge proceeds quite naturally: whereas speculative knowledge is defined by its preoccupation with "das Sichgleichbleibende" (the unchanging), empirical knowledge attempts to grasp the world in a state of flux. Whereas the method appropriate to the former is deduction, empirical thinking (which begins with "the receptivity of sensuous intuition") advances inductively from what is externally presented. Whereas speculation is concerned with what abides, "Empirie" tries to comprehend the change and variety everywhere around us.

These two forms of knowing are then subsumed by Schleiermacher under the forms of judgement (Urteil) and concept (Begriff), which proceed from opposite ends, so to speak. Only knowledge which proceeds from both directions at once, from the natural and from the spiritual, would be capable of grasping the totality of being. According to Schleiermacher, judgement and concept presuppose each other. For neither form of know-
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ing is able to grasp the whole of reality. Just as it a principle of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre that speculation will never be able to deduce out of itself (out of the "spontaneity of reason"), the positive, historical reality of faith, so "Empirie" will never be able to achieve the idea or concept, simply through its own effort. The two forms of knowing complement each other: together they offer the totality of knowing. Neither can replace the other, neither can be subsumed under the other. Empirical knowledge delivers the material, speculative knowledge offers the theoretical organization. With the help of this antithesis, Schleiermacher is now able to introduce his "critical method" ("eine wissenschaftliche Kritik"), which consists in the correct application of both forms of knowing at once. It will be Schleiermacher’s contention that Christian dogmatic theology can only be properly served by a "scientific" method which employs both forms of knowing (the "higher" and the "lower") simultaneously.

This highly theoretical account of the combination of speculation and "Empirie", gleaned from the Dialektik, comes to life right at the beginning of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre (§2.2 of the second edition). There we are told that we must learn to unite a general concept of the institution "Church" with "a proper comprehension of the peculiarity of the Christian Church". Just as the general concept "Church" is not available to a purely empirical form of knowing—since it has no criteria by which to distinguish the contingent from the essential—just so the proper conception of the Christian Church is not available to "pure" science, since "no science can by means of mere ideas reach and elicit what is individual"; there can be no "a priori constructions in the realm of history". The neatest statement of the proper combination of these two forms of knowing is offered in Schleiermacher’s "philosophy of religion", where the endeavour is to maintain a sufficient "balance between the historical and the speculative".

Schleiermacher’s lectures on Aesthetics also offer an illustration of these two forms of knowing. Conforming to what has been sketched above, the lectures are divided into two major parts. The first part Schleiermacher labels as the "general speculative" portion of the lectures (allgemeiner spekulativer Teil); this part treats the arts in their identity. The second portion of the
lectures is called the "more empirical", because its brief is the representation of the individual art forms, and so it considers the arts in their difference from one another (Differenz der Kunst).\textsuperscript{104} It is no surprise to discover that the "speculative orientation" of the first part finds its fulfilment in the establishment of a "general concept of art".\textsuperscript{105} According to Schleiermacher's Dialektik,\textsuperscript{106} there are three fundamental forms of thinking and of speech: commercial (or practical) thinking, artistic thinking, and pure thinking. Commercial or practical speech has some external aim that it is trying to achieve—it is seeking to bring about some change in the relation of our environment to ourselves. Artistic thinking is particularly concerned with the subject, his moods and feelings. Pure thinking (i.e., speculation) is a thinking for the sake of knowledge alone;\textsuperscript{107} it remains within itself (in contrast to commercial thinking) and carries us up to what is universal and invariable\textsuperscript{108} (in contrast to artistic thinking, which continues to express the individuality of the artist).

This account of the forms of human speech sets up an interesting problem: to which category does religious speech belong? In its evangelistic mode, religious speech certainly wants to effect a change in the world that surrounds it. As a manifestation of deepest inner feeling and piety, religious speech must belong to the artistic realm; but as an expression of eternal truth, only pure thinking or speech can be adequate. This problem is partially addressed in Schleiermacher's lectures on Aesthetics (the 1819 manuscript). Here Schleiermacher suggests that the permanence of religious feeling seeks to express itself in two fundamental forms: as dogmatic reflection and as religious art. The desire to express itself in dogmatic language nudges feeling in the direction of thought, because dogma is (in Schleiermacher's account) "thought about feeling";\textsuperscript{109} artistic representation is contrasted to this form of "objective thinking" because of its active spontaneity. Art and dogmatic reflection are relative opposites: the more religious teaching seeks systematic expression, the greater the retreat of the artistic representation\textsuperscript{110} of religion. Schleiermacher chooses the scholastic period as an appropriate illustration of this inverse exchange between system and art! The fascinating possibility that Schleiermacher explores in this context is that religious
dogma should be conceived as a middle term (Mittelglied) between the profoundest art and philosophy properly speaking (i.e., pure philosophy). If we were to apply the same principles to the identification of religious dogma in the Glaubenslehre, we would have to regard dogma as a mediating term between "Empirie" and "Spekulation".

V.

Speculative Theology

In Schleiermacher's terminology, then, the word "speculation" does not in itself carry any negative connotation. On the contrary; it implies an upwards movement, an "ascent" on the part of reason. It is when this movement upwards is applied to dogmatic theology that all the problems arise. "Speculation" is not necessarily a synonym for "obsessive abstraction", nor is it to be shunned as an unreal flight of fancy. However, if we can accept Schleiermacher's fundamental division of the modes of being into real and ideal, and the corresponding forms of knowing into "Empirie" and "Spekulation", knowledge inductive and deductive, knowledge a posteriori and a priori, then in every case Christian dogmatic theology must fall on the side of the former.

For Schleiermacher, "speculative theology" can be nothing but a monstrous hybrid, an inexcusable confusion of categories, a violation of the fundamental principles governing human knowledge. "Speculative theology" is the misguided attempt to turn knowledge a posteriori into knowledge a priori, to recast the real according to the categories of the ideal. And Schleiermacher is remarkably acute in his identification of what the consequences of such a transformation might be. In his Open Letters to his friend Lücke, with which he prepared the way for the publication of the second edition of his Glaubenslehre, he describes (in perfect conformity with what has been said above) the essence of speculative Christology; to wit, the sublime proposition

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\text{that the divine and human natures are not at all separate, that the divine nature is the truth of human nature and that human nature is the reality of the divine ...} \]

The clarification of Schleiermacher's use of the word "speculation" does raise a major question in the correct interpretation of this author. The more precise definitions we have discovered in his Dialektik and Aesthetics are in
a certain sense privileged sources. That is to say, they are found in texts not available to Schleiermacher’s reading public, and they remained unpublished in Schleiermacher’s lifetime. They cannot be essential for the understanding of his *Glaubenslehre*, unless we are to suppose that Schleiermacher made the interpretation of this work dependent upon unpublished lectures accessible only to those who had heard him as a teacher in Berlin (on non-theological topics). To make the interpretation of Schleiermacher’s theology dependent on such “esoteric” teachings would be to tar Schleiermacher with the same brush that he wishes to apply to the authors of the “sublime” doctrines of speculative theology. We have to assume that Schleiermacher’s intended reader needed no more familiarity with the results of speculation than was generally available to the public of that time. In the above quotation from his *Open Letters*, Schleiermacher offers a terse summary of the possible (unacceptable) implications of speculation for Christian theology.

It is one of the pleasant ironies of this stupendous chapter in the history of German philosophy and theology that, within the next generation, some theologians actually undertook the mediation between Hegel and Schleiermacher, between philosophy and theology, which the genius of both men demands. Perhaps the most famous of these theologians was I.A. Dorner (1809-1884, also in due course Professor of Theology in Berlin), who was convinced of the necessity of that mutual interpenetration of Christian faith and idealist philosophy, which was anathema to Schleiermacher. Often these theologians were ranked under the rubric of *Vermittlungstheologie*, which, as one commentator has argued, would be an appropriate designation for all significant representatives of German theology in the nineteenth century: they all sought to establish a balance (*Ausgleich*) between Christianity and modern culture, between theological science and the contemporary philosophy. It is particularly striking that in 1841 August Twesten, Schleiermacher’s confidant and immediate successor at the University of Berlin, claimed to discover in Schleiermacher’s lectures on *Ethik* an equivalent work to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*—however different these works might seem in terms of method and result. In the era following Hegel and
Schleiermacher, there is the heterodox desire on the part of theologians such as A.E. Biedermann (1819-1885, from 1850 Professor in Zürich) to be at one and the same time both "speculative" and "ecclesiastical"—in Schleiermacher's assessment, a simple contradiction in terms.

This suggests intriguing possibilities: Hegel thought that church doctrine was already a form of speculation; Schleiermacher, while advocating both, wanted to keep philosophical speculation and church doctrine in separate compartments. If A.E. Biedermann sought to combine them again, then D.F. Strauss (1808-1874)—who was arguably neither "speculative" nor "ecclesiastical"—gave up any attempt to mediate between Hegelian philosophy and Schleiermacherian theology, because he saw himself as transcending the inadequacies of both positions. After Hegel's death "speculation" fell into severe disrepute, and to this extent Schleiermacher's strictures appear to have been heeded. But the real gravediggers of the speculative theology are D.F. Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), and Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), all roughly contemporaneous, and all more or less developing their positions by passage through "the stream of fire" ("der Feuer-bach"), the "purgatory" of the speculative philosophy. In what follows we may limit our discussion to Friedrich Strauss, only because in his Life of Jesus (first published in two volumes in 1835/36) we have the most dramatic announcement of the obsolete condition of the theological endeavours of both Hegel and Schleiermacher. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote an "Untimely Meditation" devoted to D.F. Strauss, which contains the apposite remark: "Wer einmal an der Hegelei und Schleiermacherei erkrankte, wird nie wieder ganz kuriert"—a passage I cite to show that the inability to hold Hegel and Schleiermacher apart is a disease characteristic of all those who are heirs to their joint legacy.

Strauss is particularly interesting, as he fell under the spell of both Schleiermacher and Hegel in turn; he studied Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre intensively in 1827/28 and then travelled to Berlin in 1831, just in time to learn of Hegel's death during the cholera epidemic—ironically, he learned this news during an appointment with Schleiermacher! From the start, Strauss perceived Schleiermacher's pride in having established an "everlast-
ing peace treaty ... between philosophy and theology", which the next generation would come to judge as no more than "a precarious armistice", a kind of phoney war, a lull in the action before the real conflict broke out.¹²⁰ In his notorious masterpiece, Strauss had no doubts about his ability to reach beyond the shortcomings of Hegel's philosophy and Schleiermacher's theology in a synthesis that he would establish at the expense of both.

Bearing these remarks in mind, we turn to §146 of the unadulterated first edition of Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, which carries the heading "The speculative Christology*. This succinct account of the significance of speculation for Christian doctrine has the merit of confirming Schleiermacher's own statement of the "sublime" speculative proposition, as this is put forward in his apologia to Lücke. First Strauss gives a summary of the life of Spirit, as this is understood by speculation:

> It is the essential characteristic of Spirit to remain identical with itself in the distinction of itself from itself, that is, to possess itself in others.¹²¹

Having laid the groundwork, Strauss now draws the consequences for a speculative understanding of the Christian religion:

> The infinite spirit is real only when it discloses itself in finite spirits; as the finite spirit is true only when it merges itself in the infinite. The true and real existence of spirit, therefore, is neither in God by himself, nor in man by himself, but in the God-man; ... If God and man are in themselves one, and if religion is the developing consciousness of this unity: then must this unity be evident to man in religion, and become in him consciousness and reality.¹²²

Strauss also makes plain that, despite its reputation, the "speculative Christology" is surprisingly "concrete". The reality of the incarnation is discovered in the death of this "God-man". And speculation does not shirk from the violence of this death—an aspect of Christianity with which the more "ecclesiastical" Schleiermacher is distinctly uncomfortable.¹²³

In the introduction to this same section of his *Life of Jesus* (§146), Strauss incorporates a reference to Schelling's Christology; he informs us that in Schelling's understanding of the incarnation, the infinite "appears as a suffering God, subjected to the conditions of time" ("als ein leidender und den Verhältnissen der Zeit unterworfener Gott erscheint").¹²⁴ Strauss' foot-
note in this section refers us to Schelling's *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, in which the philosopher does make mention of "ein leidender ... der Zeit untergeordneter Gott". But this exact phrase has an interesting history, for it may equally be a reference to the Latin inaugural dissertation presented by F.C. Baur (1792-1860), after he became Professor at the University of Tübingen. This dissertation was originally published (while Strauss was studying in Tübingen) under the title, *Primaes rationalismi et supranaturalismi historiae capita potiora* (1827) and contained the charge that Schleiermacher too had distinguished the God who stands above all change from the God made subject to time ("... a Schleiermachero a Deo tempori subjecto Deus omnis temporis mutatione superior distinguitur"). This criticism irritated Schleiermacher, and he refers to it in the course of his *Open Letters* to Lücke. He rejects the claim:

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\text{daß ich, 'von dem i.ber alle Veränderung erhabenen Gott den der Zeit unterworfenen Gott unterscheide'.}
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Commentators might argue that Baur's appropriation of Schelling's phrase is only to be expected: he proved incapable of reading Schleiermacher except with the spectacles which he borrowed from Schelling. In just this spirit, Carl Hester writes that Baur's early enthusiasm for *The Christian Faith* betrays rather a tendency to freight Schleiermacher's text with Schelling's meanings. Baur misunderstood Schleiermacher from the beginning. ... Baur's interpretation of Schleiermacher prior to 1830 reflects more confusion than insight.

Schleiermacher would not have quarrelled with Hester's assessment. Furthermore, he objected to other criticisms from Baur's inaugural dissertation, and he claimed himself unable to recognize the Schleiermacher with whom Baur and other critics from Tübingen were engaged. The most serious charge which Baur makes in this early work, and which Schleiermacher also cites, is that

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\text{there could be nothing in the historical part of the Glaubenslehre that was not already present in the ideal or philosophical part.}
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This observation, which Schleiermacher rejects out of hand, goes to the very heart of the method which Schleiermacher adopts in his *Glaubenslehre.*
Unfortunately, Baur saw no reason to revise his youthful impressions later in life. Indeed, in a volume of his *Lectures on the History of Christian Doctrine*, published posthumously in 1867, Baur continued to discuss "the speculative meaning" (*die spekulative Bedeutung*) of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*. Baur argued that philosophy and theology had so penetrated one another in Schleiermacher's thought, that it was no longer possible to separate the one from the other.\(^{131}\)

Schleiermacher does, however, display a certain sensitivity to Baur's criticism later in the *Open Letters*; there Schleiermacher claims:

> If I had separated the dangerous Introduction [to the first edition] more clearly and sharply from the body of the work, I surely would have prevented that most serious and glaring misunderstanding that detects in my *Glaubenslehre* a speculative tendency and a speculative foundation.\(^{132}\)

How the equally long (revised) Introduction to the second edition reduces the "danger" of this misunderstanding remains to be seen. In the German version of his inaugural dissertation (1828), F.C. Baur requested "the famous author" to explain more definitely and directly, in a possible second edition of his *Glaubenslehre*, in what relation historical and ideal Christianity stand to one another, according to his conception (*nach seiner Idee*).\(^{133}\) Certainly, Schleiermacher would have rejected this plea as utterly inappropriate; we, however, intend to ask the Introduction what light it can throw on this putative relation between the historical and the ideal.

We now know from Schleiermacher's own writings that the discovery of a "speculative basis" upon which his *Glaubenslehre* is supposed to rest is the "worst and most glaring misunderstanding" (*das schlimmste und grellste Mißverständnis*) that one can have of his theology. The origin of this false impression seems to lie in the Introduction to his *Glaubenslehre*, and to that Introduction we must now turn. If we read the Introduction correctly, we shall apparently discover (with Brian Gerrish) that Schleiermacher "held dogmatics to be neither speculative nor authoritarian but empirical".\(^{134}\) How so many of Schleiermacher's critics could have failed to agree to this central tenet, about which Schleiermacher is so emphatic, is a question we shall want to raise from within the Introduction itself.
Chapter One: Footnotes

1. "The red thread" is a German expression indicating basic idea or Leitmotiv. Apparently a red thread was to be found in all ropes and rigging of the British Navy for the purpose of identification. See the entry under "Faden" in Duden; Volume 7: Etymologie, p. 151. Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1963.

2. "mithin dem Eindringen spekulativer Elemente" (§172.3); CF reads "the influx of speculative elements".

3. KD₁: "mit der zusammenhangenden Darstellung des in der Kirche jetzt grade geltenden Lehrbegriffs" (H. Scholz, op. cit., p. 74). Schleiermacher refers his readers to the 1811 edition of the Kurze Darstellung at the beginning of the 2nd edition of his Glaubenslehre. I translate this crucial phrase "im Zusammenhang dargestellt" (which also appears in the subtitle to The Christian Faith) as "represented in their interconnection". In LPR, Volume I, n. 8 on p. 3, Peter C. Hodgson offers the translation "cohesively set forth" for the same part of the subtitle. This may not sufficiently stress the "systematic" character of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre.


5. "eine zusammenstimmende Leitung der christlichen Kirche" from KD₂, §5.


16. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p.326: "Das gerade macht die formale Qualität der Reflexionsphilosophie aus, daß es keine Position geben kann, die nicht in die Reflexionsbewegung des zu sich selbst kommenden Bewußtseins einbezogen ist." The English Translation (op. cit., p.308) was consulted and rearranged.


21. Martin Luther, Tischreden (Volume 5) in WA, 1919. No. 5534: “So ist die menschliche natur! Was man vorbeutt, das will sie thun; das ander lest sie wol aussen und kommt denn auff das quare, quare, quare! Wenn die philosophia in die theologiam kumbt, so gehts also. Da der Teuffel zu der Eua kam mit dem quare, da war es aus.”


concreto gemeine Erkenntnis. Philosophische Erkenntnis ist spekulative Erkenntnis der Vernunft. . ."


27. Über die Religion (1799), Zweite Rede in KGA, Volume 1/2, p.209.

28. Ibid., p. 212: "das notwendige und unentbehrliche Dritte zu jenen beiden".

29. "Wo ist denn die Einheit in diesem Ganzen? wo liegt das verbindende Prinzip für diesen ungleichartigen Stoff! Ist es eine eigene anziehende Kraft, so müßt Ihr gestehen, daß Religion das Höchste ist in der Philosophie, und daß Metaphysik und Moral nur untergeordnete Abteilungen von ihr sind; denn das worin zwei verschiedene aber entgegengesetzte Begriffe eins werden, kann nichts anders sein, als das Höhere, unter welches sie beide gehören." Über die Religion (1799), op. cit., p. 209.


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36. "... das eigentlich Spekulative, d.h. die Erkenntnis des Entgegengesetzten in seiner Einheit, oder genauer, daß die Entgegengesetzten in ihrer Wahrheit eins sind." Volume 4 of the Theorie-Werkausgabe: "Privatgutachten für den Königlich Bayrischen Oberschulrat Immanuel Niethammer" (October 23, 1812), pp. 403-416; here p. 415. A translation of this document can be found in Hegel: The Letters, translated by Clark Butler and C. Seiler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. pp. 275-282; here pp. 281-282: "the truly speculative form, i.e., knowledge of what is opposed in its very oneness, more precisely the knowledge that the opposites are in truth one."


39. Hegel’s philosophy is best described as "speculative" rather than "dialectical". Although the two cannot be separated (cf. n. 34 above), in the broadest terms speculation "holds fast" to the contradiction which dialectical thought exposes. Dialectical reason is a stage on the way to the speculative philosophy. Wissenschaft der Logik (1812/1813) l.Band— Volume 11 of the Gesammelte Werke, op. cit., p. 287: "Das spekulative Denken besteht nur darin, daß das Denken den Widerspruch und in ihm sich selbst festhält ..." The definitions offered in Robert C. Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", Oxford University Press, 1983, are worth consulting. Solomon claims that in Hegel’s study of logic, speculation is understood as "the total comprehension of the dialectic and the unity of propositions in their opposition" (p. 284) In this sense speculation is "higher" than dialectic, and dialectical thought is a necessary pre-condition for the 'speculative philosopher' (pp. 277-278).

40. If dialectic is rightly defined as a "conversation back and forth", as a "process" (Robert C. Solomon, op. cit., pp. 277-278), then there will not be much "dialectic" in a theology which tells us: "Gott aber sei der ganz Andere, der Fremde und Unbekannte, er bleibe in seinem Wesen dem Menschen unzugänglich." So Gerhard Sauter in "Die ‘dialektische Theologie’ und das Problem der Dialektik in der Theologie", pp. 887-915 of Volume 21 (1968) of Studium Generale. Sauter does not shirk from the unavoidable conclusion: "Theologie, im betonten Sinne dieses Wortes, wird darum zu einer unmöglichen Aufgabe ..." (p. 895).


Akzent gelegt wird, während doch in der Tat das Subjektive und das Objektive nicht nur identisch, sondern auch unterschieden sind."

44. Cf. nn. 5 & 6 above. A full discussion of the term "positive" will be found in Chapter Two.


46. This is the suggestive translation of "im Leben und Leiden" by A.V. Miller, The Philosophical Propaedeutic, p. 169. See n. 38 above.


48. "Die Philosophie ist in der Tat selbst Gottesdienst, wie die Religion." From Hegel's Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1827 (VPR, Teil 1, pp. 63-64).


50. GG, p. 557: "die reine Philosophie, die Spekulation, die Beschäftigung mit der Einheit und dem Zusammenhang aller Erkenntnisse und mit der Natur des Erkennens selbst ... es gibt kein wissenschaftlich hervorbringendes Vermögen ohne spekulativen Geist ..." The keyword "Zusammenhang" will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

51. KD2, §67: "Da die philosophische Theologie eines jeden wesentlich die Prinzipien seiner gesamten theologischen Denkungsart in sich schließt ..."; Brief Outline, p. 39.

52. This is S.W. Sykes' interpretation of the passage from GG, p. 557, cited in n. 50 above. See S.W. Sykes, 'Theological Study: The Nineteenth Century and After', op. cit., p. 105.


54. "Erläuterungen zur ersten Rede", (No. 6) in Pünjer, p. 31: "Auch konnte es mir an dieser Stelle nicht darauf ankommen, den Primat herauszubeheben, den meiner Überzeugung nach Frömmigkeit und wissenschaftliche Spekulation miteinander teilen, und der beiden um so mehr zukommt, je inniger sie sich miteinander verbinden." I have consulted the translation by John Oman throughout. In this passage his translation is not literal, but he has captured Schleiermacher's sense very well. See On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, op. cit., p. 25.

55. "Erläuterungen zur zweiten Rede", (No. 1) in Pünjer, p. 134. Schleiermacher is comparing the Christian "Vorstellung" of the Trinity with a philosophical account of the Trinity; he argues that because this latter is a speculative idea, it must have "an einem andern Ort in der Seele ihren Ursprung". Schleiermacher's reference to "unsere christliche Vorstellung der Dreieinigkeit" is striking, because it once again brings him in line with Hegelian terminology.

56. Letter: Schleiermacher to Karl Gustav von Brinkmann; December 14, 1803. Briefe, Volume IV, pp. 86-95; here p. 94: "Wenn nun aber die strenge Philosophie der Gegensatz ist zur Poesie, wie soll man das unstreitig Höhere nennen, was Beide verbindet? ... bei uns ist es eben, was Du die Einheit des Lebens nennst, die lebendige Persönlichkeit, die auch nachbildend jenen Gegensatz in sich zu überwinden sucht,
wenn dies gleich nie völlig zu Stande kommt. Wer nun aber die Philosophie und das Leben so streng trennt, wie Fichte tut, was kann an dem Großes sein? Ein großer einseitiger Virtuose, aber wenig Mensch." Albert L. Blackwell supplies a translation of a short passage from this letter in Schleiermacher's Early Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 158. He translates "eineseitiger Virtuose" as "one-sided virtuosity"; this captures the sense well, although the literal translation must be "one-sided virtuoso". For evidence of Schlegel's influence, cf. n. 60 to the Introduction.


60. Glaubenslehre, §2. Anm. b; "und daß Philosophisches und Dogmatisches nicht vermischt werden dürfte, ist der Grundgedanke der vorliegenden Bearbeitung."


62. SW, Volume 1/11: Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, p. 471: "Nach der Reformation sehen wir beides deutlich geschieden; das scholastische Zeitalter ist das Einsein von diesen beiden, von denen sich das eine nachher als Philosophie, das andere als positive Theologie sonderte."

63. Ibid., p. 493: "Aber in dem höheren theologischen Wissen tritt die Verwirrung überall ein, weil das, was Philosophie sein und bleiben sollte und sich auf Spekulation gründete, mit dem theologischen, das sich auf die innere Erfahrung gründet, verwechselft wurde."

64. I have taken this telling illustration from Edward Caird's Hegel, op. cit., p. 135.

65. Gillian Rose employs this Hegelian phrase in relation to "the state and religion"; see Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. p. 5. There is no reason it should not be applied with equal appropriateness to philosophy and religion.


68. "Der spekulative Satz"; see G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 51.


79. Glaubenslehre, §3. Proposition: "Die Glaubenslehre beruht also auf zweierlei, einmal auf dem Bestreben die Erregungen des christlich frommen Gemütens in Lehre darzustellen, und dann auf dem Bestreben, was als Lehre ausgedrückt ist, in genauen Zusammenhang zu bringen."

80. I am alluding to Hegel’s "Reinigung des subjektiven Bewußtseins". VPR, Teil 1, p. 63; see above p. 52.

81. So, for instance, Martin Redeker in his Friedrich Schleiermacher: Leben und Werk, op. cit., p. 178: "Infolge dieser Läuterung und Reinigung der Schöpferrtheologie muß auch der Wunderbegriff erneuert werden und von den verfehlten Vorstellungen der supra-

82. See Schleiermacher’s discussion of this point in *Lücke*, p. 346: "aber der Schöpfungsbegriff ... wie lange wird er sich noch halten können gegen die Gewalt einer aus wissenschaftlichen Kombinationen, denen sich niemand entziehen kann, gebildeten Weltanschauung?" (English Translation, pp. 60-61.)


85. *Lücke*, pp. 345-346: "Und deshalb will mir nun nichts anderes ahnden, als daß wir werden lernen müssen uns ohne vieles behelfen, was Viele noch gewohnt sind als mit dem Wesen des Christentums unzertrennlich verbunden zu denken."


87. See Alister E. McGrath, *Justitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, Volume II. Cambridge University Press, 1986. p. 149. Here McGrath is distinguishing Schleiermacher’s "religious" account of the Christian faith from a "moral" account. It could apply just as well to a distinction from a "philosophical" or "speculative" account of the Christian faith.

88. *Psychologie*, edited by L. George in SW, Volume III/6, 1862. pp. 13-14: "Es gibt hier einen Unterschied ... das ist der des a posteriori und des a priori, des empirischen und spekulativen. ... Da ist nun die erstere eine Erkenntnis, die von außen kommt und ein äußerlich gegebenes voraussetzt, die andere eine rein innerliche, die in dem Akte des Denkens selbst ihren Ursprung und zureichenden Grund hat ..."


The Definition of Speculation


Beides muß sich nun im Sein ebenso verhalten, d. h. das endliche Sein muß dargestellt werden können in einem System von Ursache und Wirkung, entsprechen dem Flusse, d. h. unter der Form des Urteils; aber auch als Totalität der substantiellen Formen, entsprechend dem Sichgleichbleibenden, d. h. unter der Form des Begriffs. Das endliche Sein muß in beiden aufgehen."


95. See Gunter Scholtz, *Die Philosophie Schleiermachers*, op. cit., p. 110, cited in n. 93 above.


98. See Gunter Scholtz, *Die Philosophie Schleiermachers*, op. cit., p. 110, cited in n. 93 above: "Das spekulative Denken, das primär in der Spontaneität der Vernunft gründet ...

99. See Schleiermacher's statement in *Lücke*, p. 349: "Niemals aber werde ich mich dazu bekennen können, daß mein Glaube an Christum von dem Wissen oder der Philosophie her sei ..." Schleiermacher sets his face against all forms of proof and deduction in Christian dogmatics. The statement at the beginning of §14.2 of *The Christian Faith* is characteristic: "The attempt has often been made to demonstrate the necessity of redemption, but always in vain."


103. *Glaubenslehre*, §2.2: "Das Eigentümliche der christlichen [Kirche] kann weder rein wissenschaftlich begriffen oder abgeleitet noch bloß empirisch aufgefaßt werden. Denn keine Wissenschaft kann das Individuelle durch den bloßen Gedanken erre-

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ichens und hervorbringen. . . . Wie alle sogenannten Konstruktionen a priori auf dem geschichtlichen Gebiet immer an der Aufgabe gescheitert sind . . . " CF translates "durch den bloßen Gedanken" as 'by means of mere ideas'; properly this should read "thought."

104. Schleiermacher lectured on Ästhetik three times during his Berlin career: 1819, 1825, 1832/33. There are three competing editions of these lectures to choose from. The best critical edition of Schleiermacher's manuscript for the lectures in 1819 is provided by Thomas Lehnerer in Ästhetik (1819/25) & Über den Begriff der Kunst (1831/32). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984 (PhB, Volume 365). Fuller versions of his lectures on Ästhetik have been edited by Rudolf Odebrecht, Friedrich Schleiermachers Ästhetik. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1931 (this version has as its basis the 1819 manuscript); & the edition prepared by Carl Lommatzsch for the Sämtliche Werke (SW, III/7, 1842). This version is based on students' lecture notes of the 1832/33 presentation. See Ästhetik (ed. Lehnerer), p. 7: "Aus dem angenommenen Gegensatz gehen die beiden Hauptteile hervor; der erste, der mehr spekulative, der es mit der Identität, der zweite, der mehr empirische, der es mit der Differenz der Kunst zu tun hat."


106. Dialektik (ed. Odebrecht), "Friedrich Schleiermacher's Einleitung in die Dialektik", §1.2, pp. 5-8; here p. 5: "Der Ausdruck reines Denken bestimmt sich in der Unterscheidung desselben vom geschäftlichen Denken und vom künstlerischen Denken . . ."

107. Ibid., p. 7: "das reine Denken sei das Denken um des Wissens willen . . ."


110. "Darstellung"—Hegel would have said "Vorstellung"! In Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes, the revealed religion of Christianity is placed between "the spiritual work of art" (das geistige Kunstwerk) and absolute knowledge.

111. Ästhetik (ed. Lehnerer), p. 34: "Wir müssen uns nun entscheiden, wie weit wir hier abwärts oder aufwärts zu gehen haben; unter dem hinauf verstehe ich das Spekulative, unter dem hinab das Technische."


113. Cf. Lücke, p. 350. (English Translation, p. 64.)


121. D.F. Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, 1st ed. Volume II. Tübingen: C.F. Osiander, 1836. p. 729: "... da der Geist wesentlich dies ist, in der Unterscheidung seiner von sich identisch mit sich zu bleiben, im Andern seiner selbst zu haben ..." I have employed the translation of this passage in The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, edited by Lawrence S. Stepelevich. Cambridge University Press, 1983. pp. 21-51; here p. 44. The excerpts in this anthology have the merit of conforming to Strauss’ 1st edition, and they restore deleted material. The original translation of the 4th ed. (1840) was by George Eliot, the translation has been revised by Marilyn C. Massey. However, I must object to the translation of "im Andern" by "in others"; properly speaking, this is singular and should read "in the other".

follows the structure of the 4th ed. (1840), so that the section on "The Speculative Christology" becomes §150.

123. D.F. Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, 1st ed., Volume II, op. cit., p. 731: "Nein: der Gottmensch stirbt, und zeigt dadurch, daß es Gott mit seiner Menschwerdung Ernst ist ..." This passage is untranslatable, and so neither Hodgson's revision (p. 778), nor Massey's revision (p. 45) tries to incorporate it. Both revisions read: "No: the God-man dies, and thus proves that the incarnation of God is real ..." But this emphasis is wrong; the death of the God-man proves that the incarnation is real for God—the serious consequences of the incarnation are the ones that God must suffer. This is completely in line with Hegel's teaching at the Nürnberg Gymnasium: "Sein Schmerz war die Tiefe der Einheit der göttlichen und menschlichen Natur im Leben und Leiden." §207 of "Philosophische Enzyklopädie für die Oberklasse (1808ff.)", op. cit., p. 68.


126. Ferdinand Christian Baur, Primaerationalism et supranaturalismi historiae capita potiora; Part 2: "Comparatur Gnosticismus cum Schleiermacherianae theologiae indole". Originally published in Tübingen in 1827, excerpts from this work are most readily available in KGA, Volume 1/7, Part iii: Der Christliche Glaube (1821/22): Marginalien und Anhang, edited by Ulrich Barth. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. Here p. 254. Baur did publish a German summary of this dissertation in Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie in 1828. This summary, which is not as complete as the Latin original, also appears in KGA, Volume I/7, Part iii.

127. Lücke, p. 315. (English Translation, p. 37.) The italics are mine.


129. Lücke, p. 315. (English Translation, p. 37.)

130. Lücke, p. 315. See also KGA, Volume 1/7, Part iii, p. 248: "nihil in historica parte esse posse, quod non antea fuerit in ideali, sive philosophica." Schleiermacher renders this: "es könne nichts in dem historischen Teile, der Glaubenslehre nämlich, sein, was nicht zuvor in dem idealen oder philosophischen gewesen". The English Translation (p. 37) turns this last phrase into "the ideal or philosophical parts". As this conforms neither to the Latin nor the German, I have maintained the singular to avoid confusion.


The Definition of Speculation

Zweifel bald zu erwartenden zweiten Ausgabe über das Verhältnis, in welchem nach seiner Idee das historische und ideale Christentum zu einander stehen sollen, sich bestimmter und unmittelbarer zu erklären, als bisher geschehen ist."

Chapter Two:  
Positive Theology: Systematic and Practical

I. Fichte's Aphorismen

In 1790 Johann Gottlieb Fichte composed some fragments which have survived as his "Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus". These early jottings by the first Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin (Schleiermacher's colleague until his death in 1814) exude an almost programmatic authority for the generation of thinkers that was to follow him. Among the principles that Fichte's aphorisms lay down, we may discover the following: we must imagine a collection of the propositions of the Christian religion without even the "slightest admixture of philosophical Räsonnement" (§2), so that all investigations into God's objective being are cut off from the start. God's being in relationship with man is the only proper subject of religion (§3). The fundamental principles of this religion are located in sensibilities (Empfindungen) rather than convictions (Überzeugungen), and so Christianity is destined to be a religion for the heart rather than for the understanding (Verstand);¹ Christianity will not "obtrude itself" through demonstrations (§12). The investigations or "speculations" of a purely "deistic system" (i.e., a system based entirely on reason) will pose no threat to Christianity, because these speculations will allow it "its complete subjective validity".² And a "deistic system does not falsify" Christianity, because there cannot be any place where it comes into "collision" with it (§16).

Fichte's conception here is of a Christianity which respects its own boundaries or borders (Grenzen—§14), and the only "religious" hope for the thinker who is inclined towards deistic "speculations" is to cut off these
speculations "beyond the borderline". Fichte, however, does express some uncertainty about whether the speculative thinker will be able to do that just when he wants (§18)—a question we shall want to put to Schleiermacher also. The most extraordinary thing about these fragments is that their teaching embraces simultaneously the unlettered convictions of the Christian apostles of the first century with the philosophical conclusions of "the greatest thinker of the eighteenth, Kant"; they draw the boundary for the Christian religion in the same place—"with investigation of the objective being of God" (§13)!

Schleiermacher accepts the challenge which these aphorisms lay down. He will seek to give an account of the Christian "propositions" (Sätze), which will rescue them from any pretence to "demonstration", and which will preserve them from any possibility of "collision" with philosophical or theological "speculations". But, as always, the fascinating thing is that Schleiermacher hopes to travel down both tracks at once. The tracks are meant to run parallel to one another, without ever running into each other. One doctoral study of Schleiermacher's thought boldly concludes that Schleiermacher intended to develop both "a philosophical doctrine of God and a dogmatic doctrine of God". These two doctrines are to be "independent" of one another, and yet remain in agreement. How these two doctrines—religious and deistic, if we may speak this way—are to be made to stay within their own proper boundaries, without either of them infringing on the territory of the other, is the major question posed by the present dissertation.

Fifty years later the issues raised by Fichte's Aphorismen were just as vibrant as ever. In the final version of Strauss' Life of Jesus (the fourth edition of 1840), the concluding section (§152) rehearses Schleiermacher's dilemma as this can be discovered in his Open Letters of 1829. There the possibility is mooted of having to choose between scientific criticism and philosophical speculation, so that either the mystical aura which surrounds Christian history will have to be surrendered to historical criticism, or faith will become a kind of "loan" from speculation. It is not incidental that Schleier-
macher's personal preference would be to pursue the latter course, but it is his understanding of himself as a "church theologian", which rescues him from following this "esoteric" path.

In stressing the practical nature of the theological enterprise, Schleiermacher aligns himself firmly with the Protestant, Reformed tradition which turned its back on abstract, useless speculation. In 1602, the Reformed philosopher and theologian, Bartholomäus Keckermann, declared that dogmatics is a "scientia practica", inasmuch as this science has the task of "bringing people to salvation". Schleiermacher remains equally loyal to his own Moravian origins in defining the "positive", practical nature of Christian theology. Count Zinzendorf's praise for "practical philosophy" combines neatly with the anti-scholastic, anti-speculative stamp of his thought—and the resonance with Schleiermacher is profound. Schleiermacher would certainly have approved Zinzendorf's struggle to liberate religion from the stultifying embrace of men of "intelligence" and persons "who have the greatest reason". For Zinzendorf, the universality of religion is guaranteed because it "can be grasped without the conclusions of reason"; consequently, "religion must be a matter which is able to be grasped through experience alone without any concepts". In accordance with this doctrine, Zinzendorf posits two kinds of understanding: the understanding which arises out of concepts and the understanding "arrived at from experience"—the former understanding is subject to all manner of change, the latter can only be enhanced. Here we find in embryonic form Schleiermacher's great conviction that the reflective understanding may be of service to religious experience without thereby usurping the primacy of that experience. Whether there can be an "understanding" without the aid of concepts is another matter.

A turn towards the practical in theology is simultaneously a turn away from the speculative. The great scholastic theologies, by which we mean Protestant Orthodoxy just as much as the celebrated medieval systems, regard speculation as synonymous with contemplation: i.e., speculative theology is undertaken for its own sake alone, it has no end outside itself.
At the beginning of his *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas Aquinas asks, "Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?" The answer states that *sacra doctrina* is both speculative and practical (*speculativa et practica*), but that, in virtue of its being a science having to do with God Himself, it is primarily speculative.\(^{10}\)

Schleiermacher, the theologian, wants nothing to do with a science that treats exclusively, or primarily, of divine things (*de rebus divinis*), since this rarefied, abstract form of theology is detrimental to the life of the Church, and "speculative" only in the bad sense of being purely conjectural. In its place, he wishes to set the positive science of Christian theology, the precise meaning of which it is the further responsibility of this chapter to explore.

We need to put down three markers before we embark on this essential investigation:

i) Although Schleiermacher is frequently (and justly) spoken of as "the father of modern theology", he himself eschewed the terminology by which his discipline is normally identified, viz. systematic theology. While the "systematic" character of his theology is never in doubt (it is implied in the *science* of theology), Schleiermacher feared that this designation might give over-zealous philosophical spirits the misleading impression that theology is part of some great "system" of human knowledge,\(^{11}\) and that Christianity can be comprehended (and thereby superseded) by purely "scientific" means.

ii) Protestant Orthodoxy made an interesting and important distinction between *theologia catechetica*, the instruction required of every Christian before baptism and confirmation, and *theologia acrioamatica*, which is a "higher theology"\(^{12}\) reserved for the academic theologians, and those whom they train at the universities and seminaries. While the former can be described as *rudior* (the rougher, the baser, the less cultivated), the latter is understood as *accuriator* (the more accurate, the more exact, the more careful).\(^{13}\)

What this implies, and Schleiermacher is certainly aware of this
practical distinction, is that the "esoteric" character of theological study is not expunged by the simple device of banning speculation: there must be a higher theological learning reserved for the initiates, even if this higher science has no taint of "speculation".14

iii) If we continue to use the language of Protestant Orthodoxy, then Schleiermacher wishes to restrict the *usus philosophiae* in theology to what they called the *usus organicus*; philosophy was in this garb fundamentally a tool for clarity of concept and argument. Its use was thus "instrumental" only,15 without affecting the content of what was taught. Whether or not Schleiermacher has succeeded in limiting the use of philosophy to this modest ancillary status is the question we have undertaken to examine.

In light of Schleiermacher's famous statement of §1 of both editions of his *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* (1811 & 1830) that theology is "a positive science" (*eine positive Wissenschaft*),16 we shall need to ask four closely related questions: i) What does "positive" signify in this context? ii) Why should this term be applied to theology? iii) How does theology qualify for the status of a science (*eine Wissenschaft*)? iv) What makes Schleiermacher's treatment of the science of theology "encyclopedic"? This last question requires a word of explanation: Schleiermacher's *Kurze Darstellung* arises out of an eighteenth-century tradition of "Fachenzyklopädien", a form of literature providing handbooks or compendia for students of a particular discipline. Significantly, it is Schleiermacher's "positive faculties" (theology, jurisprudence and medicine) which lend themselves to this "encyclopedic" treatment, and the intention is, of course, to give an "overview" of the subject under discussion.17 Schleiermacher explicitly identifies his own *Kurze Darstellung* as within this genre in §20, which begins, "Die enzyklopädische Darstellung, welche hier gegeben werden soll..."18 As the question whether Schleiermacher's presentation of the science of theology can justly be regarded as "encyclopedic" is the most comprehensive of the four questions...
that we have set ourselves above, it would make a systematic beginning to our inquiry.

Obviously the use of the term "encyclopedia" implies some attempt at the "totality" of knowledge: the word's Greek etymology suggests a "circle" of education or culture. But the crucial thing is the way in which this totality is conceived, how this circle is to be constructed. The great encyclopedias, those modelled after the extraordinary achievement of Diderot and d'Alembert, are organized upon an alphabetical basis. These encyclopedias are reference works, which offer the reader competent summaries of discrete topics, arranged according to the accident of spelling. This accumulation of vast quantities of information under separate headings is very far removed from Schleiermacher's intention in his Kurze Darstellung. Schleiermacher's text is a manual rather than a reference work; its topics are continuous rather than discrete; it is comprehensive in a formal rather than a material sense (i.e., it is written largely in the form of definitions and propositions), and finally it follows a principle of organization that the subject itself demands. Its unity is not imposed externally by means of the accidental device of how a word or concept happens to be spelt.

The palpable intention of the more familiar encyclopedias is to provide "compendia" of human knowledge, where discrete topical discussions do not depend upon any context or "Zusammenhang". Hence, alphabetical arrangement is strictly a matter of convenience. But the concept of the "encyclopedia" is not really fulfilled by such a procedure: there is evidently an attempt to be exhaustive as regards content, but the "circularity" of education or culture is not really addressed. While the usual encyclopedia may be exhaustive with regard to content, the question of method can be left aside entirely.

Schleiermacher's theological encyclopedia does in one aspect have a higher right to use this designation than the more massive works, for the simple reason that it has a beginning, a middle and an end, i.e., it has a methodical construction. This construction in turn allows us to grasp the principle of its organization. Armed with this principle, we are in a position
for the first time to judge the comprehensiveness of the work before us—any \textit{lacunae} are exposed when we ourselves apply the same principle to the material which is under examination.

The universality implied in the use of the term "encyclopedia" is only partially realized in Schleiermacher's compendium. There is in this sober work no flirtation with the "encyclopedistics" of the earlier much admired Novalis. In his collected fragments and aphorisms, there is a Romantic longing for a "universal method", which will continue the work of transforming the world in accordance with the Bible; for Novalis, this is the proper introduction to a true "encyclopedistics".

The notion of a "Fachenzyklopädie", then, turns back on itself in a rather paradoxical fashion. For the claim of any particular "encyclopedic manual" must be that it is exhaustive, but not universal: there are other "circles" beyond its borders. This consideration requires us to bring Hegel's "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences" as an exhibit into our inquiry. His "encyclopedia" is a compendium for students of philosophy, in precisely the sense in which Schleiermacher's "encyclopedia" is a compendium for students of theology. But there is this important qualification, that philosophy is by its nature (\textit{wesentlich}) "encyclopedic", since the truth can only exist in the form of totality. Philosophy must employ a universal method, if it is to grasp its universal content, and so the philosophical encyclopedia overcomes the inadequacies of both the discretely organized reference works and the subject compendia. The universality of Hegel's \textit{Encyclopedia} is immediately evident, if one examines its contents: Logic, Nature, Anthropology, Phenomenology, Psychology, Law, Morality, Social Custom, Art, Religion and Philosophy.

We can now appreciate that the justice of Schleiermacher's claim to have written an "encyclopedia" rests on the exhaustive formal treatment of his subject, but not on the universality or range of topics, that one might discover in the Romantic fragments of either Novalis or Friedrich Schlegel. Oddly enough, Hegel's \textit{Encyclopedia} incorporates both the formal comprehensiveness of the "Fachenzyklopädie" and the desire for a universal method.
and content of the Romantic fragments. We note Schleiermacher's characteristic endeavour to maintain the treatment of individual subjects in their respective spheres (hence his appropriate use of the device of a "Fachenzyklopädie"); and we contrast this with Hegel's manipulation of this same genre into a kind of "absolute encyclopedia" which, in treating philosophy, treats all things. This in turn accords with the great Hegelian principle that "the truth is the whole." Here, in miniature, we recall the difference between Hegel and Schleiermacher, which dominates every section of this dissertation. It is fascinating to discover that Hegel has in some sense taken up the challenge of those Romantic aphorists, in whose circles Schleiermacher himself found nourishment.

III. The question of how theology qualifies as a "science" (Wissenschaft) develops neatly out of our discussion of the concept of the encyclopedia. Theology is a science, Schleiermacher explicitly affirms in the opening paragraphs of both his Kurze Darstellung and his Glaubenslehre (in both editions respectively). We shall now show that the very method by which we distinguish a Fachencyklopädie from the massive encyclopedias, which we more commonly consult, also enables us to identify the traits of a "science", in the rigorous understanding of that word.

What chiefly characterizes the "scientific" organization of knowledge is its antipathy to the (indiscriminate) accumulation of information in the form of an aggregate. The kind of heaping up of knowledge, which we identify with the massive encyclopedias, is the exact opposite of the scientific search for necessity and unity within our knowledge. The French encyclopédistes were not oblivious to the fact that their principle ("mettre la raison par l'alphabeté") is not the highest expression of rational organization. It would certainly not be enough to satisfy any thinker who had fallen under the influence of Kant. His pivotal judgement that there is a complete contrast between aggregate and Zusammenhang in the presentation of knowledge (Erkenntnis) is decisive for all subsequent German thinkers. The aggregate
has only a contingent, accidental quality, whereas the system hangs together "according to necessary laws".

It is so easy in the various English translations we employ to overlook the crucial (and technical) use of the word Zusammenhang, when we read the insipid English "connection". Schleiermacher's own usage is certainly informed by this Kantian distinction: in handwritten lecture notes discovered in Schleiermacher's own copy of the Glaubenslehre, he indicates that his use of the word Zusammenhang is in contradistinction to the "aggregate", that is, a jumble of accumulated "facts" without apparent scientific order. It is this discovery of a "connection" between the parts of the science of theology which allows him to write an "encyclopedic" Kurze Darstellung—a sketch of the whole of the science. We have, then an essential feature of "Wissenschaft", when we insist upon the careful elucidation of the German Zusammenhang: in a "science", the information is not presented as an arbitrary conglomeration of bits but must be offered to the inquirer according to its necessary interconnection. Only with this interconnection explicitly in view can the reader possibly decide whether anything is missing—for the second crucial characteristic of any "science" is its systematic presentation.

Again, we must summon the great intellectual influences upon Schleiermacher into our discussion. We learn from Kant that a teaching or doctrine may be called a "science", if it is submitted in the form of a system. This Kant defines as "a whole of knowledge" (ein Ganze[ls] der Erkenntniß), ordered according to principles (1786). In The Critique of Pure Reason we are told that what transforms "ordinary" knowledge into a science is the forging of a system out of an aggregate of information. Our reader will not be surprised to learn that Fichte takes up this theme in his explanation of how philosophy is a "science". He, in turn, declares that a science has systematic form: all the propositions in a science "hang together" according to a single principle, and they are united through that principle into a whole. Hegel's assertion that his own philosophical encyclopedia is distinguished from a "vulgar" encyclopedia by "the science of the necessary connection" (Zusammenhang) as this is determined by the concept (Begriff)
falls fully within Schleiermacher's own *Gedankenwelt*, the world of ideas in which he was formed.

This coupling of the theory of the system with the definition of "science" dovetails neatly with our concerns. If one considers the Greek ancestor of our word "system"—σύστημα means things assembled or collected together—it is already apparent that in our precise usage the "collection" cannot be in the form of a collage but must rather imitate the college (a body of individuals organized by some common purpose). In our technical understanding of the "system", it will not be enough to have a *Zusammenstellung*. We seek the *Zusammenhang*, because this alone can explain how the parts of the system are dependent upon one another and how they cohere. Without the *Zusammenhang* which binds everything together, Schleiermacher's *Kurze Darstellung* might as well be regarded as a loosely connected fund of aphorisms.

Hegel is scathing in his condemnation of "unsystematic philosophizing", which is at best "arbitrary and fragmentary". This type of thought cannot accomplish anything "scientific", as it only gives "expression to personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation of its contents." While the common wisdom portrays Schleiermacher as antagonistic to Hegelian formulations, here again we arrive at common ground. In Schleiermacher's statement on university education, which anticipated the founding of the university in Berlin, he argues that the entire syllabus must be based on "das enzyklopädische". This he defines as the general overview of the range and the interconnection (*Zusammenhang*) of the subject, which is the necessary foundation for all instruction at the university. It is presumably just this "general overview" which his own "theological encyclopedia" offers the student in Berlin. Here Schleiermacher takes his stand against "unsystematic theologizing".

How Schleiermacher understands his own dogmatic theology as a "science" follows directly from all that has been said above. Kant and Fichte decree that a science must have a systematic character, which means that the science is organized in the light of some necessary principle (or principles).
This explains how the parts of the system inhere and cohere, so that the inquirer is obliged to move forwards and backwards from any individual proposition. Only in this way will it be possible to understand how each part relates to the whole; without this one cannot grasp the context which alone does justice to any portion.

It has been said that there are two species of system; the first is constructed as a vertical sequence from "an indubitable first principle". This may be the sense in which St. Thomas Aquinas can declare "sacred doctrine" to be a science (scientia): it proceeds from principles (principia) revealed by God. In such a linear system, subsequent propositions receive their authority from propositions established earlier, "and not conversely". The second kind of system is called circular, because all propositions are "mutually supporting", and the propositions at the beginning of such a system only achieve their authority as the system unfolds. As the system "gains weight", so to speak, the tacit implications of the earliest propositions are made explicit and elucidated. The supreme instance of this kind of circular system is Hegel's philosophy, where the truth can only be known at the end as the result of the whole process. While a circular system also proceeds from one proposition to another, and therefore has a linear presentation, it may be profitably compared to a parataxis, as Northrop Frye chooses to define this term, viz.

a linear sequence that accumulates as it goes on and presents the reader with a whole that is more than the sum of its parts.

We shall try to establish which of these two species of system is more adequately the model for Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. The answer to that question will reveal a great deal about Schleiermacher's method.

In anticipation of our more detailed exposition, it may be useful to state that certain problems emerge when we undertake to read Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre "systematically" (as we are presumably required to do if his theology is scientific or wissenschaftlich). First we shall have to establish the principle by which the system is governed; we shall need to discover by what principle the various strands of the argument inhere and cohere. Secondly,
we shall need to see how the system "develops", how it proceeds from its beginning through its middle to its end. This journey presents us with a *prima facie* embarrassment. When we arrive at the last pages of the *Glaubenslehre*, and their doctrine of the Trinity, we may find ourselves presented with less of a conclusion and more of a conundrum. Indeed, there will be grounds for saying that the strands of his system are *not* tied together by this final series of propositions. On the surface, it would seem more reasonable to say that the argument simply peters out. It may be that we shall discover in this final exposition an example of what makes Schleiermacher so popular with modern thinkers, strongly opposed to the "totalizing" demeanour of the Hegelian system. We may ultimately decide that Schleiermacher has constructed a so-called "open system", which does not exclude what it cannot consider. Perhaps we shall learn to appreciate the *Glaubenslehre* as an example of the only kind of system that can have a future: a system flexible enough to incorporate arguments and experiences which do not form part of its immediate frame of reference. Schleiermacher's concern may be to offer an alternative conception of system, one more suitable for the modern awareness of individuality and particularity, with the attendant fragmentation and diversity which this implies. Schleiermacher may yet be seen to inherit Schlegel's mantle. Schlegel not only advocated a "system of fragments", but also a repudiation of rigidity and finality. The alleged "exclusivity" of the Hegelian system would then be overcome by this conception of an "open system" which moves towards its completion as a *progressus ad infinitum*. For the more rigorous Hegelian understanding of "system", all such pliability will tend towards the arbitrary and "unsystematic".

Having worked our way backwards from a consideration of theological encyclopedia to theological science, we are now able finally to tackle our initial question of the "positive" nature of this science. A useful point of departure is provided by the French philosopher Condillac, whose *Treatise on Systems* (1749)

distinguished between systems based on *speculation* ('abstract principles', 'gratuitous suppositions', 'mere hypotheses') and those based upon *experience*.47
Schleiermacher's own emphasis on the positive nature of his theology suggests some affinity with this distinction. This impression is reinforced when we enlarge the discussion to include the "negative" outcome of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: its primary impact is to restrict "speculative reason" to the limits of possible experience. This "policing" of speculative reason—so that it does not venture "out beyond its proper limits"—has the "positive" advantage of removing an "obstacle...in the way of the employment of practical reason", which in its moral application "inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility". Since all "possible speculative knowledge of reason" is confined to "mere objects of experience", the speculative reason will not have grounds to contest the operation of practical reason beyond this boundary. This regulation of the speculative reason is vital then, so "that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself" (um nicht in Widerspruch mit sich selbst zu geraten). 48 While the terms may be changed in Schleiermacher's configuration to dogmatics and philosophy, 49 or "christliche Glaubenslehre" and speculative philosophy, or "das fromme Selbstbewuβtsein" and "das spekulative Bewuβtsein", or subjective and objective functions of the human spirit (§28.3), the intention is exactly the same: to avoid a contradiction (Widerspruch) which would "touch essential human nature".50

The Glaubenslehre only realizes the negative moment: a form of dogmatic theology must be found which will not bring it into ruinous conflict with speculative philosophy. However, Schleiermacher knows that this cannot be enough.51 The intellectual (der Wissende) needs to discover that the two can be brought into "positive" harmony. This is the Zusammenstimnung which is suggested in Schleiermacher's famous letter to Jacobi,52 where he says that his philosophy and his dogmatics are not only firmly determined not to contradict each other (sich nicht zu widersprechen), but they are constantly in the process of drawing closer together and becoming "attuned". We need to underline two points in relation to this mooted harmony: first, Schleiermacher suggests that the harmonization of his philosophy and his dogmatics is a never-ending process, so that neither discipline will ever be brought to a conclusion.53 This would seem to support the thesis
that Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* represents an "open system". Secondly, Schleiermacher's own lecture notes to his *Glaubenslehre* make it clear that the "task" of discovering the concordat between speculative consciousness and pious self-consciousness, or between speculative philosophy and *Glaubenslehre*, is absolutely personal.54 Here we ascertain the full force of Hegel's strictures on unsystematic philosophizing. Such rumination can only embody a subjective disposition, "personal convictions", sentiments and opinions.55 We need hardly add that this "absolutely personal" enterprise is not what Hegel understands by *Wissenschaft*; Schleiermacher could hardly disagree.

This, then, is the heart of Schleiermacher's concern to establish the positive science of Christian theology. His theological system will be the representation of actual Christian experience (and belief), as this can be discovered in the Protestant community of his time. His emphasis upon the Church as the locus of this Christian experience is the safeguard against extraneous speculative discourse about God which, by definition, exceeds actual human experience. This also secures a strongly practical direction for his theology, as it is tied to his concept of the Church (*Kirchenbegriff*) and to his understanding of Church government (*Kirchenleitung* or *Kirchenregiment*). In his *Kurze Darstellung*, Schleiermacher makes it clear that theology is the special responsibility of those involved in the supervision of the Church, and that any knowledge (*Kenntnisse*) "acquired and possessed" without reference to the *Kirchenregiment* ceases to be theological.56

This signifies a revolutionary shift in the history of Christian theology. His theology does not begin with a concept of God (*Gottesbegriff*), because as Gerhard Ebeling correctly points out, the concept of God brings with it a strongly metaphysical orientation (*Ortsbestimmung*), which it is the whole purpose of his *Glaubenslehre* to avoid.57 If his "theology of experience" can find its home in the representation of the concrete life of the Protestant Christian community, then, apparently, no conflict with philosophical speculation need occur.
Schleiermacher's summons to the positive science of Christian theology will demand the strict demarcation by which his theology is preserved from all "rational theology" and speculative science. In Schleiermacher's words, positive theology must be understood as completely different (ganzlich verschieden) from these other forms of intellectual activity.\textsuperscript{58}

The word "positive" is derived from the Latin positus, and the less common positivus, and conveys the sense of something having been placed or given, of something having been "put there". In more familiar usage, we know that "positive law" is contrasted with natural law, natural justice and natural rights.\textsuperscript{59} The importance of natural law is its universal applicability. For example, it has been thought there was some kind of natural taboo against incest, and the validity of this universal law does not depend upon whether individual communities spell this out in formal statutes or not. The appeal to natural justice is based on the view

that there are certain unchanging laws which pertain to man's nature, which can be discovered by reason, and to which man-made laws should conform.\textsuperscript{60}

The crucial thing about natural law and natural justice is its freedom from any particular historical enactment or formulation. It is thus possible to think about natural law or natural justice without reference to particular individuals, particular statutes, or even particular societies. Indeed, individual positive laws might then be judged by the extent to which they instantiate and conform to the natural law which can be discovered by reason, as it analyses human nature. Already it will be clear that positive theology, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, must be understood in contrast with the natural theology and natural religion which Schleiermacher utterly repudiates. High-falutin thinking about religion in general is what Schleiermacher wishes to exorcise entirely from his dogmatic theology.

As the theory of positive law develops, especially in the writings of Hans Kelsen, its chief exponent, we learn to distinguish clearly and decisively between a natural law based on "pure reason"\textsuperscript{61} or "the nature of man"\textsuperscript{62} and positive law which is "always the law of a definite community".\textsuperscript{63} Positive laws are the laws actually "laid down" by monarchs, sovereign
bodies or communities of men and women, and it is wrong to judge them as more or less imperfect copies of a "transcendental idea". Positive law refers to the actual, concrete laws established or enacted and understands itself as totally distinct from "metaphysical jurisprudence", which is based on "ideal" or moral considerations at best, and speculation at worst.

The application of all of this for Schleiermacher's understanding of positive theology is obvious. His theology cannot be concerned with the scientific representation of the tenets of natural religion, since there is no "natural church" in which such a religion could be anchored. His positive theology is entirely concerned with what he calls "bestimmte Religion", the definite or particular religion which is concretely historical.

The beauty of this word "positive" is that it can be understood to have so many opposites. In its root sense, the opposite of the positive is the natural. But a second form of opposition to the positive is the speculative. This sense is nicely conveyed in The Oxford English Dictionary, where an alternative definition of the positive is "having relation only to matters of fact...actual, real; sensible, concrete". What is positive is therefore "practical, realistic; not speculative or theoretical". This second explanation of the "positive" is a suitable complement to Schleiermacher's positive theology.

But there is a third, related understanding of the positive, whose opposite is, of course, the negative. This use of the positive has a striking philosophical provenance. Significantly, Friedrich Schelling's formulation of his "positive philosophy" is a reaction to what he regards as the emptiness of Hegel's concept (Begriff) which excludes all empirical reality. Summoned to Berlin in 1841, Schelling was able from Hegel's own chair to demonstrate the shortcomings of "negative" idealism. Hegelian logic is only able to think about the a priori conditions of existence, it can never make the transition to existence itself. This "negative" philosophy proceeds entirely in the realm of possibility or potentiality (Möglichkeit), and everything is known by it in "pure thought", independent of all existence. This philosophy is negative because it is "abstract", in the precise sense of that word. It "separates out" what is universal from the historically contingent,
thereby this philosophy transforms reality into a conceptual possibility.\textsuperscript{72}

The positive philosophy, by way of contrast, proceeds from existence: it begins with what is real.\textsuperscript{73}

Hegel's speculations are idle, because they can never become concrete, they can never come down to earth. His concept is "negative", because it must remain lifeless. This application of positive and negative to philosophy is first mooted by Schleiermacher's mentor Jacobi. A famous formula of his reads:

In nature, in reality and truth generally, everything is positive. In understanding and its possibilities, everything is negative, for in the understanding everything is found in concepts, and the most universal are always the emptiest.\textsuperscript{74}

Having enlarged our understanding of "the positive" to include all three related opposites, we need to return to the question of "positive law". The real issue is the application and interpretation of positive law by the judiciary. "Legal positivism" tries to bind the legal community to the law as it is, without reference to justice (for Hans Kelsen, "an irrational ideal"\textsuperscript{75}), or the law as it ought to be.\textsuperscript{76} Judgements, then, are to be passed solely on the basis of posited law, without reference to ideal or moral considerations.\textsuperscript{77} In this way, legal positivism shuts the door on any speculative manoeuvres by either judges or lawyers, since no revision of the law in the light of some higher or deeper insight is possible. In Kelsen's view, there is no higher court of appeal, as "the transcendent" is beyond experience, "unknowable, uncontrollable, and therefore a scientifically useless hypothesis".\textsuperscript{78} In just the same way, positive theology is the endeavour to restrict the discussion of Christianity to the concrete, historical religion without "speculative" judgements as to what it ought to be.

Contemporaneously with this transformation of theology into a positive science, a last attempt was being made in Schleiermacher's own university to preserve theology for speculative reason. It is therefore not without interest that in Hegel's so-called "early theological writings" the "positivity" of religion was not embraced enthusiastically. Because "the positive" suggested something laid down, the implication seemed to be that religion was
something external and derived exclusively from authority. Thus Jesus himself is seen as the foe of the legal "positivity" of the Pharisees. 79 Remember that the various senses of "the positive" convey something concrete, objective, real and fixed. With this in mind, we can see how a distinction arises between "a positive religion of the letter—subservience to authority—and a true religion of the Spirit". 80 While Hegel's more mature philosophy learned to value the "positive" character of Christianity, 81 it is nonetheless true that the "speculative" work of the Hegelian system is the transformation of the externality of religious content into the inward life of the Spirit. 82

Ironically, here, once again, we discover that Hegel and Schleiermacher are not so very far apart. Despite Schleiermacher's firm insistence on the "positive" character of his science, it will emerge in our reading of the Glaubenslehre that the "positivity" of the Christian tradition is not given greater weight than the needs of the contemporary human spirit. Many aspects of the historical teaching of the concrete, Christian tradition are transformed, in the Glaubenslehre in the light of what Schleiermacher perceives to be the needs of the present. Schleiermacher wants to construct a Christian dogmatics which does not offer any scope for a calamitous quarrel with contemporary culture. 83 When we state this thesis more fully, we shall want to return to the question whether Schleiermacher's science of theology is primarily practical or theoretical.

In a recent study, Hans-Joachim Birkner, the chief editor of Schleiermacher's collected works, has asserted that Schleiermacher did not consider his dogmatic theology a practical undertaking. The purpose of his Glaubenslehre is instead a historical comprehension of the present state of Christianity. 84 Furthermore, Birkner claims that the Glaubenslehre does not present us with "a system of dogmas"; in his Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher "renders an account" of the faith, 85 as he discovers it. Birkner's article (in which he contrasts Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre with the theology of Troeltsch) seems to fly in the face of most of what we have been trying to establish in this chapter. But we need to ask whether the Glaubenslehre can really be a descriptive, historical document. At the very least, Schleiermacher assures
us that the *Glaubenslehre* is presenting us with a "science", which means the historical material must appear in a systematic order (*im Zusammenhange dargestellt*), so that the parts of the discipline properly cohere. The *Glaubenslehre*, then, cannot be purely descriptive.

Birkner shies away from the practical implications of the *Glaubenslehre* because of his reading of the *Kurze Darstellung*. In Schleiermacher's encyclopedia, dogmatic theology is classified as the third instance of historical theology; it follows the study of Christian origins ("exegetical theology") and church history proper. Historical theology, as a whole, takes its "organization" from philosophical theology (the root), dogmatic theology (as "the knowledge of doctrine that now has currency" in the Protestant Church) forms the immediate bridge to practical theology (the crown). Historical theology is distinguished from both its antecedent and its successor (logically speaking), because these divisions of theology are "immediately" concerned with application (*Ausübung*); historical theology is "purely" (*rein*) a matter of reflection (*Betrachtung*).

The "purity" of this reflection (Birkner's careful argument speaks of *Rechenschaft*) is endangered by three considerations; i) Schleiermacher's *Kurze Darstellung* informs us that there is an ambiguity in the attempt strictly to divide the theoretical from the practical. ii) §196 of the theological encyclopedia asserts:

> A dogmatic treatment of doctrine is not possible without personal conviction [*eigne Überzeugung*], nor is it necessary that all treatments which relate to the same period of the same Church community [*Kirchengemeinschaft*] should agree among themselves.

To put our objection mildly, this conception of a dogmatic treatment of doctrine which depends upon "personal conviction" and can yield "different" interpretations "side by side" suggests a peculiar, if not idiosyncratic understanding of *Wissenschaft*. iii) The fact that doctrine as a "theological discipline" is so absolutely tied to the Christian Church, that it ceases to be "theological" without this connection, hardly gives us the impression of a detached and disinterested scientific scrutiny of Christian doctrine. As numerous statements in the *Kurze Darstellung* confirm, the whole theological
enterprise is undertaken with the leadership of the Church in mind. Indeed, Schleiermacher (in his discussion of Church "statistics", the study of the social condition of the Church) will go so far as to say

A detailed inquiry into the present condition of Christianity that does not proceed from ecclesial interest or assume any relation to Church leadership could produce only an uncritical collection of information, especially if it is also pursued in a non-scientific spirit. The more scientific its character, however, the more sceptical or polemical it would tend to become.

On account of the nature of the subject, the impetus cannot originate from a purely scientific interest.

This discussion of Church "statistics"—a companion study to dogmatic theology, which also yields "historical knowledge of the present condition of Christianity"—makes it clear that theological "science" has a strongly partial origin. There is even a hint there that disinterested observation is capable of nothing more disciplined than an "aggregate". The understanding of theory implied in these considerations is highly individual.

In a sense, the object of this dissertation is the attempt to discover how Schleiermacher’s "philosophical dilettantism" actually informs his dogmatic theology, and, specifically, how it informs his *Glaubenslehre*. Schleiermacher would question the legitimacy of any such investigation on two grounds: first,

- it is neither necessary nor profitable to know which philosophical system a theologian adheres to, so long as his language is correct and self-consistently formed.

Secondly, the investigation is irrelevant in Schleiermacher’s case, as, whatever his philosophical views might be, he has not deviated from his "maxim" in the *Glaubenslehre*—those views have not been allowed to exercise any influence over its content.

The deft way in which Schleiermacher disarms his critics in advance instils admiration. Theology is a discipline which must be referred to the Church and its government, and it can only be pursued on the basis of personal commitment. Additionally, the question of how theology and philosophy might coexist in harmonious relation to one another is "absolute-
ly personal”, and it is therefore presumably not a suitable topic for scientific scrutiny. And yet we are unable to ascribe to the "authorized" testimony that Schleiermacher’s dogmatics had for its stated purpose simply to interrogate and to describe the religious sensibility common to all devout Christians, himself included.  

Any treatment of Christian dogmatics which can be described as "divinatory heterodoxy" is not exhaustively summarized by the innocuous word "empirical". The real challenge is provided by Schleiermacher’s introduction to his Glaubenslehre, which certainly troubled his contemporary critics, and which was completely rewritten in the second edition to reiterate that his dogmatic theology was not a species of philosophy and did not rest upon "a speculative foundation". What the "authorized" interpretation demands is that we accept his introduction as nothing more than an "Ortsbesimmung", i.e., a purely formal placement of Christianity "among the various possible modifications of the religious consciousness". This means that propositions borrowed from "Ethik", philosophy of religion, and apologetics have no material effect on the content of his doctrinal theology. "Ethik" would seem to be an absolute pre-condition for Schleiermacher’s theology, since it provides "the general concept of church" (der allgemeine Begriff der Kirche) without which his science could not be called theology. Indeed, we are told by Hans-Joachim Birkner that "Ethik" is the fundamental "speculative" science for all disciplines which deal with human history. As "Ethik" is, therefore, also the primary science for theology in all its divisions, we discover in it the speculative basis for dogmatic theology’s empirical activity.

In his Open Letters, Schleiermacher claims that his new introduction to the Glaubenslehre will provide the reader with some precise indication of the meaning of his terms. Following that lead, we shall now make our own attempt to provide a glossary of the designations which identify the assorted disciplines surrounding the Glaubenslehre: Dialektik, Ethik, philosophical theology and philosophy of religion, Apologetik are all in some sense anterior to the Glaubenslehre, as are exegetical theology and church history. Kirchliche
Statistik, christliche Sittenlehre, practical theology are in some sense posterior disciplines. In a bid to be fair to Schleiermacher, we shall try to clarify this bewildering series of disciplines, in order to reveal the Glaubenslehre standing its own ground, unsullied by the philosophical implications which this constellation of disciplines raises.

V.

Dialektik is one of the three main divisions of philosophy which also include Physik and Ethik. But it is the highest of these three disciplines because of its endeavour to discuss the transcendental pre-conditions of all knowledge. In Schleiermacher's own words, Dialektik must contain the principles of philosophizing. It is his theory of thinking and knowing, and it functions as "organon and criterion" for all individual segments of human knowledge. We note with special interest that Dialektik is to restore the classical unity of logic and metaphysics which has been obscured since antiquity. Schleiermacher prepared an introduction to his Dialektik for publication, and there we find this authoritative definition: Dialektik establishes the principles for expert discourse in the realm of pure thought.

In the more particular context of the Glaubenslehre, Dialektik refers less to principles of philosophy than principles of rhetoric. This makes sense of Schleiermacher's claim to employ Dialektik after the manner of Greek philosophy, i.e., it is a rhetorical discipline. Inasmuch as Dialektik develops "the principles and rules" which govern genuine thought (richtiges Denken), it is a Kunst or a techne or a skill which can be acquired with practice. This is neatly conveyed in the manuscript of the lectures for 1811, where we can discover the following untranslatable formula:

\[
    \text{Dialektik} = \text{Kunst des Gedankenwechsels, Kunst mit einem andern in einer regelmäßigen Konstruktion der Gedanken zu bleiben, woraus ein Wissen hervorgeht.}
\]

In §16.1 of the Glaubenslehre "dialectical" is understood as equivalent to the logical, and in §28, the dialectical character of its language is, with its systematic arrangement, one of the two conditions which confirm dogmatic theology as a "science". (The language [Sprache] of the Glaubenslehre must be dialectically formed [§28.2], and its "dialectical language and systematic
arrangement require one another, and...promote one another"). In my view, the discussion of this in *Glaubenslehre* is clearer: one speaks *Kunstgerecht* (according to the rules, i.e., dialectically) in order to express and communicate knowledge.\footnote{117}

While the division of dogmatic theology from philosophy can never extend to the point where exact philosophical language is just abandoned, the *Glaubenslehre* must nonetheless ensure that, in its employment of philosophical language, philosophy does not become the secret mistress and judge in matters theological. Theology without *Dialektik* can at best be the popularizing of the conclusions achieved by the science of theology, which is identified by its systematic order and exactitude of language.

**VI.** Whereas *Dialektik* offers the formal structure of pure thought without *actual* content, *Physik* and *Ethik* are "real sciences" which divide our speculative knowledge into a knowledge based on nature (*Physik*) and a knowledge based on reason (*Ethik*).\footnote{118} To speak more precisely, the sciences based on nature should be divided into a speculative *Physik* and an empirical natural science, and the knowledge based on reason should be divided between a speculative *Ethik* and an empirical historical science. Hans-Joachim Birkner speaks here of a quadrant of parallel "real" sciences, humane and natural, which in turn are each divided into speculative and empirical components.\footnote{119}

This then is how Schleiermacher appropriates the "classical" divisions of philosophy:\footnote{120} *Dialektik* treats the "presuppositions, boundaries, structures" and the possible combinations of pure thought,\footnote{121} whereas *Physik* and *Ethik* operate within the realm of "real" knowledge,\footnote{122} albeit in a speculative fashion. It is peculiarly characteristic of Schleiermacher that this distinction between *Physik* and *Ethik*, between the knowledge of nature and reason, must not be regarded as absolute, but more exactly as two sides of the same coin; this enigmatic formulation is completely typical: "Und wahrhaft philosophisch ist nur jedes ethische Wissen, insofern es zugleich physisch, und jedes physische, insofern es zugleich ethisch ist."\footnote{123} How are we to under-
stand this, if not as a kind of residual "scholasticism" governed by the great maxim, "distinguish in order to unite"? The philosophical truth is never either reason or nature, thought or being, subject or object, but always the affirmation of both together (even as we distinguish them). This follows the highest principle of "dialectical" thought, that just because we do distinguish them, we know that they belong together. All of this somehow points back to "der höchste Gegensatz" of Schleiermacher's Dialektik, not the contradiction, but the contradistinction of ideal and real. (We need to understand "Gegensatz" in this context as the original difference or distinction.) Once we have asserted that Physik belongs more to the "real" side and Ethik more to the "ideal" side of this equation, our discussion of Physik is at an end. Schleiermacher did not (again in contrast to Hegel) develop the "philosophy of nature" that more precision would require.

VII.

In a letter to Karl Heinrich Sack in March 1816, Schleiermacher suggested that a few years of uninterrupted good health should make possible the publication of his Ethik, his dogmatic theology, and his Dialektik in quick succession. At the end of his life, Schleiermacher still hoped to be able to publish his Dialektik and his "christliche Moral" in some form—not now in as full a version as his Glaubenslehre, but perhaps in the more propositional form of his "encyclopedia". His Ethik is not mentioned. Although Schleiermacher lectured frequently on Ethik throughout his career, it is hard to suppress the feeling that his actual doctrine of Ethik never achieved the coherence that publication would require. Even the name of this discipline is bound to confuse an English reader: variously known as Ethik, philosophische Ethik, and Sittenlehre, this discipline is poorly served by the usual translation of "ethics". While not totally unrelated to the study of "ethics", as we understand it, this designation is too restrictive for what Schleiermacher has in mind.

Let us try to give some flesh to this elusive concept: it is a "Grundwissenschaft"—a fundamental or "foundational" science—for all the humane sciences. It is the "science of the principles of history" and therefore
essential for dogmatic theology understood as a subsection of "historical theology". Although not itself a historical science, Ethik is crucial for the study of history, because in it history is understood as the material effect of the activity of human reason upon nature. Ethik assumes a more familiar disposition when in Schleiermacher's writings it divides into his tenets concerning the good, virtue and duty. Obviously, pride of place goes to his doctrine of the highest good (summum bonum), which is the "organic connection" of all (lesser) goods, so that the whole of ethical life finds its expression under the concept of the good. It is exceptionally important to note that Schleiermacher's Güterlehre cannot be translated as his "doctrine of property" without severely misleading the reader. This mistranslation does, however, have the merit of exposing the confusion which surrounds Schleiermacher's Ethik in English-language scholarship. The "goods" which Schleiermacher wishes to bring under the purview of the "highest good" are all those things which have come to be through "ethical activity"—that is to say, through the action of human reason upon nature. While these goods might indeed be "property" (Eigentum), realized through the "productive" side of reason's activity, there is also a "creative" activity of reason which gives rise to language, art and religion. If this production or creation is studied in its communal aspect, then we see how Schleiermacher's Ethik moves to a discussion of family, state, and church. For this reason Stephen Sykes has referred to Schleiermacher's Ethik as offering "a particular kind of (non-reductive) sociology of religion", when it is read in conjunction with his Glaubenslehre. This will be a useful tag for our future discussion of the use of Ethik in dogmatic theology, as long as the reader is absolutely clear that Schleiermacher's Ethik is not a science restricted either to the study of religion or institutions. It will by now be evident why the translation "ethics" is so misleading: Schleiermacher's Sittenlehre is not a practical doctrine of morals, but if anything a speculative teaching about customs (the Latin mores) or culture. His Ethik does not offer the reader injunctions (Gebote) but renders an account of the totality of the real activity of reason upon nature.
Schleiermacher's student, friend and successor at the University of Berlin, August Twesten, brought out a version of the Ethik in 1841. In the introduction to this edition, Twesten suggests that Schleiermacher has succeeded in giving the concept of "goods" (Güterbegriff) a completely new meaning, whereby legal relationships and communication, language and science, religion and art, family, state and church can all be described as "goods" realized by the action of human reason. In light of this universality of Schleiermacher's Ethik, it is possible to make sense of Twesten's extraordinary comparison of this work (not published by Schleiermacher) with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. And this comparison also has the effect of highlighting the "speculative" character of this science: his philosophische Sittenlehre is not about what man ought to do, but rather it is about what reason has done. With the help of the Ethik, the student of history will be able to see that human progress is not "a play of chance", but that it requires the necessary development of institutions (including church communities). Without this insight all possibility of "a science of the spirit" is destroyed.

Here we encounter a conundrum: Schleiermacher's philosophische Ethik, a speculative knowledge of the effects of reason, can provide the theologian with the concept of "church"—one form of reason's self-expression. And yet, the common "consciousness" by which the members of a church can actually be identified must not be regarded as an expression of this selfsame reason. Anything which has its origins in reason or philosophy is not suitable material for the Christian theologian: "was aber aus Vernunft und Philosophie geschöpft ist, kann nicht christliche Theologie sein." This leaves us in the odd position of developing the concept of "church" speculatively, while we simultaneously affirm that what binds a church together, its beliefs and its doctrines (which are reflected forms of those same beliefs) is not an "activity of reason". This peculiar conclusion is an excellent illustration of the point of conflict between Hegel and Schleiermacher—a conflict which can only intensify when we examine what Schleiermacher means by "philosophy of religion" (Religionsphilosophie).
Chapter Two: Positive Theology: Systematic and Practical

VIII. Religionsphilosophie

Of no small consequence is the distinction that Schleiermacher makes between Religionsphilosophie and philosophical theology (philosophische Theologie), which should not be confused and must not be taken as identical. Allegedly, philosophical theology, a subdivision of Christian theology, takes its orientation from Religionsphilosophie and what it has established about Christianity. This hierarchy is preserved in the Glaubenslehre, where the propositions borrowed from Religionsphilosophie follow directly upon the propositions borrowed from Ethik.

In his Ethik (1812/13), Schleiermacher defines Religionsphilosophie as that "critical discipline" which fixes the individual difference of each "church" (Kirche) in a comparative framework. This relatively straightforward definition remains intact in the Glaubenslehre and in the Kurze Darstellung, except that in §2.2 of the Glaubenslehre, this critical discipline is identified as "a special branch of historical science" (wissenschaftliche Geschichtskunde), the principles of which are taken from Ethik. The exceptionally important function of the Religionsphilosophie is to employ the speculative insight gained from Ethik in its understanding of the historical appearance of the positive religions. Religionsphilosophie compares the religions and identifies their differences. Sykes has neatly summarized the work of Religionsphilosophie as "the categorization according to type of the different religions" and has suggested "comparative religion" and "phenomenology of religion" as disciplines not unrelated in their intention. Schleiermacher realizes that this is not how the term Religionsphilosophie is commonly understood. Indeed, if we emphasize the "historical" nature of this discipline, we might be left to wonder how it is "philosophy" at all.

While the function of the Religionsphilosophie for the Glaubenslehre is clear enough from the preceding, we must not be tempted to skate over what Schleiermacher means by calling it a "critical discipline". This, unhappily, is more complicated. Critical disciplines [aesthetics is another example mentioned in the Ethik (1812/13)] identify positive phenomena which can neither be constructed speculatively (i.e., rein wissenschaftlich) nor can they be grasped in a purely empirical manner. This is very tidy, because...
it suggests that in our move from *Ethik* to *Religionsphilosophie* we proceed from speculation to concrete empirical reality by means of epistemological steps: a critical discipline is not yet purely historical. Somehow, critical disciplines relate the speculative and the empirical realities, which Schleiermacher does not regard as simply contiguous. Schleiermacher's untranslatable German tells us: "Das untersuchende oder kritische ist die weltweisheitliche Beziehung des Beschaulichen und Erfahrungsmäßigen auf einander." (*Das Beschauliche* is obviously a reference to conceptual reality, whereas "das Erfahrungsmäßige" lies on the side of empirical reality.)

The important thing to note here is how "the critical" is bound up with *Weltweisheit*, a term which is given the uncomplicated translation "philosophy" in *The Christian Faith*. However, this too has the status of a technical term. In the *Ethik*, the "idea" of *Weltweisheit* is the complete interpenetration of the ethical and the "physical" (*des ethischen und physischen oder des beschaulichen und empirischen*). And the *Dialektik* (1814/15) confirms that this mutual interpenetration of the speculative and the empirical is "die wahre reale Weltweisheit": this makes it the genuine heart of the philosophical enterprise ("der eigentlich gesuchte Begriff von Philosophie"). The representation of this mutual interpenetration is the task of scientific criticism (*wissenschaftliche Kritik*), and the *Ethik* adds the clarification that the Hellenic name *φιλοσοφία* applies where the two tracks, the "physical" and the ethical, are still being pursued separately—side by side, as it were; by contrast, the German *Weltweisheit* signals the attempt to grasp the world through their interpenetration. This is characteristic of Schleiermacher: *Religionsphilosophie* proceeds by a critical method in which there is a constant back and forth between the empirical reality and its corresponding speculative idea: the comparison of the one to the other, even as they draw closer together, supplies this discipline with its distinctive form of knowledge (*Erkenntnis*). Schleiermacher's *Ethik* is of further assistance in explaining that the "critical disciplines" are suspended between history and *Ethik*, but that they are primarily dependent on speculation for their unity.
the "technical disciplines" (like pedagogy and practical theology) also float between experience and speculation but they receive their unity from the practical or empirical.\textsuperscript{164}

\section*{Philosophical Theology}

Despite the precision of Schleiermacher's definition of \textit{Religionsphilosophie}, it makes no appearance in his published works or unpublished lectures apart from §§7-10 of the introduction to his \textit{Glaubenslehre}, and in a certain form in the last of his \textit{Speeches on Religion}.\textsuperscript{165} In striking contrast, the whole first section of the \textit{Kurze Darstellung} (§§32-68) is devoted to "philosophical theology", which we know from the first edition to be the root of theology as a whole.\textsuperscript{166} Both editions of Schleiermacher's encyclopedia confirm that philosophical theology is the apposite beginning for theological study.\textsuperscript{167} Its priority is clearly affirmed in the first edition of the \textit{Kurze Darstellung}, where Schleiermacher avails himself of the troublesome formula that philosophical theology takes its standpoint outside of or above Christianity (\textit{über dem Christentum}), whereas historical theology orients itself from within Christianity.\textsuperscript{168} The second edition makes this same point slightly more carefully by asserting that philosophical theology takes its point of departure from above Christianity "in the logical sense of the word".\textsuperscript{169} This formula will come back to haunt Schleiermacher, and a similar sentiment in the first introduction to the \textit{Glaubenslehre}\textsuperscript{170} is carefully excised in the second.

Martin Redeker's comment on this expression is instructive and brings us to the very heart of this dissertation. Redeker asserts that the taking of a standpoint \textit{über dem Christentum} "in order to define the specifically Christian" has only "a logical-theoretical meaning" and does not imply "transcending in the sense of overcoming".\textsuperscript{171} This is a particularly sensitive issue, because with it we again return to a more idealist conception of \textit{Religionsphilosophie}, and the common accusation that in Hegel's philosophy of religion there is an actual "overcoming" or supersession (\textit{Aufhebung}) of the Christian religion: in Hegel's philosophy the standpoint taken "above" Christianity is not just "logical" but is one that the philosopher actually presumes to occupy. It is
essential to Schleiermacher's credibility, that he not be discovered in the same philosophical camp.

From the perspective of this dissertation, the charge of Hegel's "supersession" of Christianity is a gross distortion, but we remain keen to emphasize the extent to which Hegel and Schleiermacher appear to share a common methodology. We propose in this thesis to subject to rigorous scrutiny the suggestion that it is possible to stand above Christianity in only a logical, theoretical sense—without dire "idealist" pretensions. Stephen Sykes has attempted to show how this might be possible—in a discussion which could as easily apply to Hegel as to Schleiermacher. In reflecting upon Schleiermacher's definition of Christianity, Sykes asks:

But what is a religion? In pressing this question on Schleiermacher...we become aware of an interesting circularity in his argument; Christianity is indeed a religion, but religion is something described and perceived from the standpoint of Christianity.

As we have tried to argue earlier, Hegel's speculation is not an attempt "to overcome" Christianity but rather must be seen as the endeavour to be true to Christianity in precise, exacting and systematic thought. Should we want to make any other claim for Schleiermacher's philosophical theology? The problem may be that "in pressing this question upon Schleiermacher" (i.e., the precise nature of his philosophical theology), we might discover ourselves unable to affirm the empirical character of his Glaubenslehre with much conviction. In the division of his sciences, Religionsphilosophie orients itself towards the speculative, whereas something called "historical theology" must fall on the side of the empirical. Presumably a discipline identified as philosophical theology will also tend towards the speculative, and we shall in time come to question the justice of his relegation of the Glaubenslehre to a division of historical theology.

But what exactly is the role of philosophical theology within Schleiermacher's systematic classification of the theological disciplines? First, we know that it provides both exegetical and dogmatic theology with the concepts which they need if they are to proceed as sciences. More particularly, its function (of special significance for the Glaubenslehre) is to
develop a definition of the "essence of Christianity", and specifically "das Wesen des Christentums, wodurch es eine eigentümliche Glaubensweise ist, zur Darstellung zu bringen". Please note the use of the word Darstellung here: as it is the job of philosophical theology "das Wesen des Christentums darzustellen", so is it the job of the Glaubenslehre "den christlichen Glauben darzustellen".

Philosophical theology is also a critical discipline, since it hangs suspended between the purely scientific and the strictly empirical: the essence of Christianity can neither be deduced speculatively nor comprehended empirically. Despite what has been mooted above, philosophical theology is supposedly distinguished from Religionsphilosophie in that it is less speculative and more "earthed". In its scientific constitution, it has the character of Kritik, but in view of its object (positive, historical Christianity), it adopts the mode of "geschichtskundliche Kritik". This is a very important proviso, since Geschichtskunde is yet another Schleiermacherian technical term: it forms a contrasting pair together with Ethik: whereas Ethik is the "science of the principles of history", Geschichtskunde is the actual empirical study which we might recognize under the term "history" itself. We should pay careful attention to Schleiermacher's gradual weakening of the philosophical component in both Religionsphilosophie and philosophical theology. The next proposition of the Kurze Darstellung (§38) shows why this is required: as a theological discipline, philosophical theology "must be determined by its relation to Church leadership".

The cogency of the definition offered is not enhanced by the discovery that philosophical theology does in fact stand in the same relation to historical theology as Ethik does to Geschichtskunde. §65 asserts:

Die philosophische Theologie setzt zwar den Stoff der historischen als bekannt voraus, begründet aber selbst erst die eigentlich geschichtliche Anschauung des Christentums.

The Kurze Darstellung next enunciates one of Schleiermacher's most cherished formulas: every theologian must produce a philosophical theology for him- or herself (ganz für sich selbst). Here we are bound to raise the same question that troubled us above (p. 96): what conception of philosophy
underlies a *philosophical* theology which is purely individual, something which each person works out for himself or herself? The issue comes to a head in this oft-cited §67: each individual's philosophical theology "essentially includes within it the principles" of that individual's "whole theological way of thinking" *(wesentlich die Prinzipien seiner gesamten theologischen Denkungsart in sich schließt)*. Can this really be the appropriate foundation for a "dogmatic theology" which is supposed to stand on its own "proper ground and soil with the same assurance with which philosophy [*die Weltweisheit*] has so long stood upon its own"?\(^{184}\) Surely my readers will share my perplexity in discovering that "philosophical theology" is Schleiermacher's means of handing on "Luther's legacy of a theological theology" to posterity.\(^{185}\) Schleiermacher's "philosophical theology" provides the theologian with the *theological*, not the *philosophical*, format of his whole "way of thinking". Is this not a most remarkable example of philosophy's status as *ancilla theologiae*? Philosophy and theology are subject to a rigorous bisection in Schleiermacher's classification of the sciences, and yet he has here found a form of "philosophy" utterly subservient to the needs of the theologian.\(^{186}\)

I do not think it is misguided to speak in terms of Schleiermacher's attempt to establish a "theological theology", but it may be that the crucial difference between Luther and Schleiermacher on this matter is that Luther did not in any sense produce what we might call a "systematic theology". The issue is aptly summarized by Sykes:

> Philosophical theology, in short, is the focus of different interests, which may conflict, though it is the duty of the theologian to make them harmonize. Philosopher and theologian are here to be unified in the systematician.\(^{187}\)

> It would not be inappropriate to regard the rest of this dissertation as an extended comment on this rather enigmatic unification of philosophy and theology. Presumably, "systematician" is a way of designating the "systematic theologian", the individual who crafts the interconnected dogmas of the Christian religion into a science through the application of the common principles of reason,\(^{188}\) but is it necessary to assume that this "systematic" work occurs only on the side of theology? Why may the "systematician" not
be a philosopher (someone for whom philosophy is not just a tool) who forges the dogmas of the Christian religion into a system "speculatively"—as was being done by Schleiermacher's colleagues at the University of Berlin (and in his own theological faculty)? Schleiermacher's very use of the term "philosophical theology" (a kind of oxymoron, if I understand him correctly) suggests a deeper puzzle that remains to be explored.

Whatever "philosophical theology" may turn out to be in the end, we must assume from the above that it provides the theologian with the principles which govern Christian theology as a science. If some such definition is acceptable in a preliminary way, then we might with justice regard the whole of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the \textit{Glaubenslehre} as a work of "philosophical theology"—in essence a "Fundamentaltheologie" following the Catholic tradition.\footnote{190} This conclusion is immediately controversial in the sense that, according to the \textit{Glaubenslehre}, "philosophical theology" is apparently relegated to §§11-14 of the Introduction, and there restricted to a discussion of \textit{Apologetik} (one of the two subdivisions of this discipline, along with \textit{Polemik}). To my mind, it suits Schleiermacher's purposes rather well to suppress the designation "philosophical theology" in his Introduction, even if what it represents is still a burning issue. As Hans-Joachim Birkner rightly suggests:

\begin{quote}
Da nun \textit{Ethik} und \textit{Religionsphilosophie} in Schleiermachers Wissenschaftssystematik als philosophische Disziplinen figurieren, scheint sich für das Phänomen der Lehnsätze die Formel anzubieten, daß in ihnen die Theologie eine philosophische Grundlegung empfange. Eine solche Formulierung wäre jedoch ungenau, ja irreführend.\footnote{191}
\end{quote}

Imagine the potential confusion, if the reader were also to be confronted with "philosophical theology" in Schleiermacher's Introduction! Birkner perceptively acknowledges Schleiermacher's "quasi privaten Definitionen" of all these disciplines and wonders if Schleiermacher has really achieved his intention of avoiding misconceptions thereby.\footnote{192} Personally, I do not find Schleiermacher's restriction of "philosophical theology" to tame theological uses very convincing.\footnote{193} And with the speculative tradition, in philosophy \textit{and} theology, I maintain that the "philosophical" implications of this discipline have not been exhausted. As yet we cannot be very sure of the
philosophical component in either Religionsphilosophie or "philosophical theology".

According to the Kurze Darstellung, both Apologetik and Polemik are concerned with "an authentic representation [Darstellung] of the essence of Christianity" (in its Protestant expression for the benefit of Protestant Church leadership). They are distinguished by their orientation: the outward face of philosophical theology is manifested in Apologetik, while Polemik is the same discipline with an internal ecclesiastical function. This means that Apologetik is used for the communication (Mitteilung) of the essence of Christianity to the community beyond the Church, while Polemik enables the Church leadership to bring to light "deviations" from, and "diseased" expressions of, this essence: the neglect of these "deviations" threatens the bond (die zusammenhaltende Richtung), by which the Church is "held together". Whereas Apologetik has as its chief object to show how the Church maintains "the unity of its essence" in and through historical change, Polemik has, for the Church leadership, the more immediately practical obligation of helping it to recognize and cope with heresy and schism, actual and potential. The Church leadership must be able to discover those aspects of its doctrine and polity which threaten to contradict or dissolve the essence of Christianity, as this is established in "philosophical theology".

The Glaubenslehre does not mention any "borrowed propositions" from Polemik, yet they do seem to appear in §§21 & 22 of the introduction, where the natural heresies which threaten the "distinctive essence of Christianity" are discussed. This is an anomaly of exceptional significance since, to my mind, it puts paid to Schleiermacher's cherished declaration that the introduction to the Glaubenslehre is not itself to be confused with "dogmatics"; Schleiermacher's theological ancestors would have been surprised to learn that a discussion of the Pelagian heresy was not strictly speaking dogmatic theology! In §23 the "polemical" nature of Schleiermacher's "philosophical theology" is given special prominence, as we are
informed that the Glaubenslehre cannot adopt an "indifferent" attitude with respect to the fundamental divisions in Christendom, between Greek East and Latin West, between Catholic and Reformed Christianity. This is again a mark of Schleiermacher's very peculiar understanding of the philosophical component of his "philosophical theology"—whereas the "philosopher" strives in principle to see the truth of all positions, irrespective of personal commitments, Schleiermacher makes it incumbent upon the "philosophical theologian" to advance "the distinction" (Differenz) between Protestant and Catholic theology "as still valid", and to "profess" the confessional theology, to which any individual's representation (Darstellung) of Christian doctrine best conforms. This is apparently required if one wishes to remain "within the realm of Dogmatics". The Glaubenslehre cannot proceed "indifferently" with respect to the great schism which arises out of the Protestant Reformation.

It is worth remarking that this systematic foundation for the Glaubenslehre by way of propositions borrowed from Ethik, Religionsphilosophie, and Apologetik reflects the structure and terminology of Schleiermacher's (heavily revised) Introduction to the second edition. There can be little doubt that the chief object of this revision was "to bring out the independence of dogmatics in relation to philosophic or other modes of nontheological reflection". This explains why the epithet "philosophical theology" would have been so inconvenient a usage, one which might easily perplex the reader. Nonetheless, we wish to maintain that both subdivisions of "philosophical theology" (Apologetik and Polemik) make their appearance in the Introduction, and we applaud Professor Gerrish's refusal to adopt Schleiermacher's legerdemain: Gerrish drops all pretence by speaking matter-of-factly about "propositions borrowed from philosophical theology".

However, we still need to retrieve and reinstate Schleiermacher's use of the term Apologetik: if this discipline is really an attempt to discern the "continuity of what is essential in Christianity" in and through historical change, then it would not be misleading to regard the whole of the Glaubenslehre (and not just a portion of its Introduction) as a work of Apologetik.
Heinrich Scholz makes a suggestion like this when he talks of "die apologetische Haltung der Glaubenslehre". A necessary element of this "apologetic" stance is the critique of dogma (undertaken to root out what is "unclear, narrow and impure" in the religious representations [Vorstellungen], as these have arisen from within Christianity itself). 206

We shall, of course, be returning to this crucial argument later in our dissertation; here we need only remark that a certain "philosophical" element in Schleiermacher's Apologetik may be becoming discernible. If the Glaubenslehre does indeed contain "Kritik des Dogmas", then the purely "historical" understanding of theology seems somewhat fanciful. In a peculiar way, Schleiermacher alerts us to the difficulty at his first mention of Apologetik (after the proposition to §2 of the Glaubenslehre). There he refers the reader to the first five propositions of Karl Heinrich Sack's Christliche Dogmatik of 1829. Sack's proposition to §3 announces:

Die Quellen der Apologetik liegen in derjenigen Auseinandersetzung der Philosophie und Geschichte, welche durch das christliche Glaubensleben zu bewirken ist.

And the text of the proposition confirms that philosophy is indispensable "zur Erzeugung der Apologetik", since this discipline is supposed to be a construction (eine Auffassung) of the essence of the Christian religion. 207 If "apologetic" considerations extend into the body of the Glaubenslehre proper, then it would seem that the "philosophical" half of philosophical theology may yet reappear within the domain of dogmatic theology. In any case, we cannot take as settled that we have yet been offered a clear explanation of the relation of philosophy to theology within this crucial subspecies known as Apologetik. 208

The transition from Religionsphilosophie and philosophical theology to historical theology should correspond to the descent from Ethik to Geschichtskunde, as we now move completely away from the speculative to the empirical—apparently. The basic partition of historical theology is tripartite, where the knowledge of Christian origins is provided by exegetical theology, and the knowledge of the historical development of Christianity falls
under the auspices of what Schleiermacher calls "church history". The knowledge of the present state of Christianity is available jointly in the *Glaubenslehre* and Schleiermacher's "kirchliche Statistik".\(^{209}\) It is worth interrupting our narrative to underline that, in Schleiermacher's account of exegetical theology, the study of the New Testament canon is a highly privileged discipline, since it offers "the original, and therefore for all times normative, presentation of Christianity".\(^{210}\) It also belongs to the very essence of Schleiermacher's continuing appeal that in the critical pursuit of this discipline

the most pure, simple faith, and the keenest investigation are one and the same thing, inasmuch as no one can wish to believe illusions, whether old or new, whether of others or his own...\(^{211}\)

Schleiermacher offers an attractive sequence in which exegetical theology, church history, and dogmatic theology are made to run a kind of "relay race"\(^{212}\) from primitive Christianity to the present; the sequence appears to confirm that Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* can be accepted as an *empirical* statement of the present condition of Christianity. Just as church history (understood as *Geschichtskunde*) is a description of the development of the church and its doctrine, so *Glaubenslehre* and *kirchliche Statistik* together provide the relevant contemporary description. As we study the doctrines of the past, so we study doctrines in the present. While it might be possible to conceive of such a purely descriptive "phenomenology" of the present state of doctrine in the church (in the form of a handbook or manual), the reader will not be surprised to discover my categorical denial of this apology for Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*. Since the rest of this dissertation is about the *Glaubenslehre* understood as "dogmatic theology", the further treatment of this matter need not detain us here, once we have noted that not a single major German theologian of the nineteenth century followed Schleiermacher in regarding dogmatic theology as a subdivision of "historical theology".\(^{213}\) But we cannot proceed if we do not say at least a brief word about the three disciplines which are apparently posterior to dogmatics (in the scheme laid down in Schleiermacher's theological encyclopedia).
Kirchliche Statistik is another Schleiermacherian benefaction which suggests a kind of ecclesiastical sociology or ecclesiastical polity; it examines a church's "inner constitution and its external relations". Among specific items mentioned, we find canon law, ecumenism, the relation of the church to the state and even the relation of the church to the academy.\(^{214}\) This last field of consideration brings kirchliche Statistik into its closest alignment with contemporary sociology: the church's relation to the university, the mass media, etc.

In the general framework of Schleiermacher's encyclopedia, christliche Sittenlehre is represented as a subsection of historical theology and as a companion discipline (Nachbardisziplin) to the Glaubenslehre.\(^{215}\) Properly speaking, only these two disciplines together can deliver what we know as "dogmatic theology". Even so, the sketchy treatment we find in the Kurze Darstellung goes little beyond the information that the two disciplines are distinguished by the theory and praxis which are appropriate to Christian piety:\(^{216}\) as Christian piety generates certain states of consciousness, it generates in equal measure certain forms of activity (the proper subject-matter of christliche Sittenlehre). Schleiermacher is not satisfied that the distinction between the two forms of dogmatic theology is properly comprehended by separating out the theoretical from the practical, but he does concede that Glaubenslehre draws its terminology from that metaphysical discipline known as "rational theology". By contrast, the fountain-head of the christliche Sittenlehre may be discovered in the discussion of duty (Pflichtenlehre) in the philosophical Ethik.\(^{217}\)

It is difficult to untangle exactly how these three "posterior" disciplines relate to one another. On the one hand, dogmatic theology and kirchliche Statistik provide the "historical knowledge of the present condition of Christianity".\(^{218}\) (Schleiermacher lectured on Statistik in 1826/27, but his further reflections on this aspect of the theological syllabus are not available.)\(^{219}\) On the other hand, it is only in the confluence of Glaubenslehre and Sittenlehre that the discipline he calls "dogmatic theology" receives its proper embodi-
The practical theologian, like Schleiermacher's "prince of the church", unites an ecclesiastical interest with a scientific spirit. The necessity of this scientific spirit is stressed at the end of the *Kurze Darstellung*, where a complete and developed philosophical theology is said to be a pre-condition for the right determination of tasks in the field of church government. The needs of the church at a local and at a universal level both fall within the remit of the practical theologian; the major division between *Kirchendienst* and *Kirchenregiment* which we find in Schleiermacher's lectures (Parts I and II) conforms to the separation of these levels. As we might expect, practical theology is concerned with the cure of souls, and the contents of this posthumous volume reflect the cure of souls in all its variety—without neglecting the cult: sacraments, feast days, singing, etc. With the whole...
of the theological undertaking geared in this way towards the practical needs and government of the Christian church, we have the ultimate justification of the first proposition of the Kurze Darstellung. There the positive science of Christian theology was taken up for the solution of a practical task: the discovery of that secure foundation of praxis in theory which Schleiermacher proposed for the "positive faculties" at the University of Berlin as early as 1808.

Our extended glossary has been an attempt accurately to fix the location of dogmatic theology within the whole complex of Schleiermacher's theological disciplines, and more particularly to discover its relation to the speculative, non-theological disciplines, viz. Dialektik, Ethik and philosophy generally. This effort is justified when we consider the breezy approach taken in some of the secondary literature. For instance, we might be told that Schleiermacher's philosophical theology is the connecting link (Bindeglied) between these two disciplines—^not a statement that this dissertation would be inclined to leave as an uncomplicated indicative!

Our principal dispute with the "reception" of Schleiermacher is neatly summarized in the writings of Hans-Joachim Birkner, an outstanding and esteemed interpreter. He purports to discover in Schleiermacher's technical "nomenclature", that the relationship of philosophy and theology is not accorded the status of being a "fundamental" concern for this theologian. In this judgement Birkner has remained perfectly consistent: a decade earlier than the statement above, Birkner was arguing that a careful reading of the Kurze Darstellung would reveal that the "general" question of the relation of philosophy and theology was not pertinent to the "specificity" of Schleiermacher's position. The "only precise meaning" this question might have is in the polarity (das Gegenüber) of speculation and history, of Ethik and Geschichtskunde, of philosophical theology and historical theology. A few pages later Birkner explains that, in accordance with Schleiermacher's schema of the scientific disciplines, dogmatic theology can "only" appear as a
"historical", and not as a speculative, discipline. Our dispute is not, and cannot be, with the ideology, the theory of this assessment; what we dispute is the practice,—the concrete realization—of which Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* is the definitive expression.

Birkner also draws our attention to the "curiosity" (Kuriosum) that "ethics" appears twice in the organon of Schleiermacher's theological sciences: first as the *philosophische Ethik* which is the foundation for philosophical theology and then again as the *christliche Sittenlehre* which is a subdivision of dogmatic theology. This is worth pursuing, and we are fortunate to have the means of doing so. Schleiermacher delivered lectures on the *Sittenlehre* twelve times during his university career, and a posthumous edition of these lectures appeared in 1843. We know that Schleiermacher actually intended to bring about the publication of the *Sittenlehre* (as a companion to his *Glaubenslehre*) during his own lifetime, and that shortly before his death he commissioned his editor to complete the task. As we might expect, Schleiermacher himself takes up the question of the two forms of "ethics" in the introduction to these lectures, and what he says there about the relation of the philosophical and theological *Ethik* (as the *Sittenlehre* is sometimes called) is a kind of emblem for the relation of philosophy and theology in his thought as a whole.

Schleiermacher's argument runs like this: either the philosophical and theological *Ethik* are the same (gleich) or they are not. If they are the same in content, then one of the two is superfluous, and it would be "unscientific" to have two disciplines doing the job that one of them does adequately. But if they are genuinely different as regards content, then we are presented with the equally unpalatable alternative, that piety and philosophy are at variance with one another. The consequence would be that either the philosophical person could not be pious, or the pious individual could not be philosophical. Schleiermacher's total opposition to such a state of affairs is well known to us from his crucial reply to Jacobi in 1818. In the same vein, Schleiermacher would also reject the prospect suggested by Kant in his lectures on "moral philosophy", namely, that an individual might be an
atheist in theory (in the realm of pure speculation), but not in practice.\textsuperscript{237} The reader will already know that all such options are anathema to Schleiermacher.

If the two forms of \textit{Ethik} are actually different in their content, then in order to maintain piety we shall have to say farewell (\textit{Lebewohl}) to philosophy. But this would, in fact, be disastrous for piety because it would also entail saying farewell to theology: the scientific presentation (\textit{die wissenschaftliche Darstellung}) of theology depends on principles which can only be taken over from philosophy. (Schleiermacher is, as always, quick to add that this need for philosophical principles applies only to the \textit{form} of theology's presentation, not its content.)\textsuperscript{238} The actual resolution of this dilemma is slightly opaque, even as it epitomizes what is distinctive in Schleiermacher's thought: it is characteristic of both philosophy and religion that throughout their respective histories they have—as a plain matter of fact—generated their own ethical doctrines, from which we must "assume" that these two forms of "ethics" can stand side by side, even if the "how" of this parallel development eludes us.\textsuperscript{239} Furthermore, it is an article of faith in the Schleiermacherian dispensation that these two doctrines, developed independently of one another, must "in the end" have the same content, if the theologian is not to fall into hopeless self-contradiction—being required to perform and not to perform the same ethical action.\textsuperscript{240} This is so typical of Schleiermacher's whole approach as to attain the rank of a "classical" statement of his ideology.

Schleiermacher's lectures on the \textit{Sittenlehre} considerably enhance our grasp of this theological discipline: it is the representation (\textit{Darstellung}) of the community with Christ inasmuch as this is the motive for Christian actions (\textit{Handlungen}). It is a description of the mode of acting which arises from Christian religious self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{241} Whereas the "dogmatic" task is the systematic description of religious affections (\textit{Gemütszustände}), the question posed in the \textit{Sittenlehre} is what the religious self-consciousness must \textit{become} and what must come to be through it.\textsuperscript{242} But none of this eases the conundrum of the \textit{two} manifestations of the \textit{Ethik}.\textsuperscript{243} It is immensely
difficult to see how a speculative discipline (which provides the foundation for dogmatic theology) can regard an empirical discipline (a subsection of dogmatic theology) as its counterpart.

Martin Redeker would draw our attention to the lapidary assertion of 1809 that the object of both forms of the Ethik is the same. This he explains with reference to §46 of the Glaubenslehre, which allows the world to be an object of divine creation for the religious self-consciousness, and nature to be an object for natural science—both forms of consciousness are trying to understand the same phenomenon, without thereby falling into contradiction with one another. Mutatis mutandis, the object of the two forms of Ethik is the same, but "the mode of knowing is different": one is based on reason (Vernunft), and the other on revelation (Offenbarung). But this neat summary does not really address our overriding difficulty, which is how two forms of Wissenschaft, one speculative (as a form of Vernunfttätigkeit), the other empirical, can possibly be regarded as equivalent?

We are, in fact, deeply suspicious of the supposedly "empirical" character of Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology. How could an empirical science possibly answer the question, what must be and what must come to be because of the existence of religious self-consciousness? We also vigorously challenge the supposedly "historical" character of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. We shall see that it too has a strong component of what Christian dogmatic propositions ought to be and ought to become, if Christian self-consciousness is not to fall into ruinous conflict with modern science, both humane and natural. And this is how we should understand Schleiermacher's repeated insistence upon a "divinatory" component in his dogmatic theology. In his Kurze Darstellung, he writes: "A dogmatic presentation is the more complete as it possesses alongside its assertory character a divinatory character as well." If Schleiermacher's theology is to have a "prophetic" ingredient, then we can begin to see how the speculative can begin to "creep" its way into this allegedly "empirical" science.

Wherever we turn in our study of Schleiermacher, we are constantly stopped short by his great hallmark: disciplines with quite different methods
sharing a common subject-matter, but doing so without coming into conflict with one another. Hans-Joachim Birkner confirms that Schleiermacher's Sittenlehre has the "whole realm of human activity" as its object, just as the philosophical Ethik does. But whereas Schleiermacher ascribes to the Ethik "a purely speculative tendency", the Sittenlehre is characterized by a "completely practical" orientation. What undermines their parallelism is that the theological Ethik must borrow its categories from the philosophical Ethik, which suggests a hierarchy and a measure of dependence. We shall not forget this conclusion as we continue to probe Schleiermacher's "philosophical theology".

The whole of this chapter has been an endeavour to draw out the implications of Schleiermacher's designation of theology as "a positive science" (no doubt intended as an antidote to the suggestion of a "philosophical theology" as is the case above). Schleiermacher's most telling discussion of this occurs in the introduction to his lectures on "practical theology", where the character of the positive is described in the following fashion: "scientific elements, which do not belong together in the deliberation [Be­handlung]" are nonetheless "drawn together in reference to [in Beziehung auf] a specific praxis". How the heterogenous elements are actually held together is not really clear, especially when they involve both philosophy and theology! Stephen Sykes has rightly said:

The precise nature of the relationship of theology and philosophy is, however, for Schleiermacher decisively qualified by the peculiar character of theology as a 'positive science'.

We shall see whether this qualification is able to deliver the freedom from "speculative intrusion" that Schleiermacher requires for his dogmatic theology.
Chapter Two:
Footnotes

1. Hegel and Schleiermacher would both have agreed that religion's only concern is God in the relationship that He has established with man; anything else would be an abstraction—in the terms of Fichte's *Aphorismen*, "pure deism". It is "the union of the Divine Essence with human nature" which Schleiermacher makes the subject of his *Glaubenslehre*, not some doctrine of "the being of God per se" (das Sein Gottes an sich—§170.1&2). Hegel would also have agreed that religion is not a suitable object for the understanding (Verstand). This is not because Christianity has anything to fear from the critical understanding, or because Christianity must find its separate place in the human heart. For Hegel, the understanding rigidly adheres to concepts in their definiteness and distinction from one another: it can never rise to the speculative unity-in-difference which is the conceptual basis of all religion. [See §12 of Hegel's "Philosophische Enzyklopädie für die Oberklasse (1808ff.)", op. cit., pp. 11-12.] The most dramatic difference between Hegel and Schleiermacher is that, in Hegel's account of the matter, God's relationship with man is identical with the forbidden "objective being" of God!

2. "Dieses rein deistische System widerspricht der christlichen Religion nicht, sondern läßt ihr ihre ganze subjektive Gültigkeit..." (§16—the italics in the English translation are mine.) Fichte's "Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus" can be found in Volume V of *Fichtes Werke* in the edition prepared by his son I.H. Fichte, pp. 3-8. This edition was reprinted by Walter de Gruyter of Berlin in 1971.

3. Fichte here (§18) speaks of "Rettungsmittel", which has the sense of "means of rescue" or "means of recovery". Garrett Green translates using the word "remedy". I am indebted throughout this discussion to the valuable contribution made by Garrett Green's Ph.D. dissertation for Yale University (1971), entitled: "Positive Religion in the Early Philosophy of the German Idealists". His examination of Fichte's *Aphorismen* (pp. 113-117) has been consulted at every point.


6. See Gerhard Sauter, "Begriff und Aufgabe der Eschatologie: Theologische und philosophische Überlegungen" in *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie*, Volume 30, 1988. pp. 191-208; here p. 194. It must also be said that for Keckermann the end for which theology is undertaken (finis theologiae) is nothing less than God Himself—which is where Schleiermacher firmly parts company with this Reformed tradition. (Keckermann's "practical" theology was understood as a movement towards God—als Bewegung auf Gott zu.)

7. Ludwig Graf von Zinzendorf (1700-1760) is discussed by Eilert Herms in *Herkunft, Entfaltung und erste Gestalt des Systems der Wissenschaften bei Schleiermacher*. Gütersloh:


11. See Friedrich Schleiermacher's Christliche Sittenlehre: Einleitung (Wintersemester 1826/27), op. cit., p. 5. In the manuscript prepared by M. Bindemann we read that "Schleiermacher aber den Ausdruck systematische Theologie ganz vermieden hat..."

12. See the entries under theologia acroamatica and theologia catechetica in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, op. cit., pp. 299-300.


14. Edward Farley criticizes Schleiermacher's "clericalization of theology" and sees "the modern narrowing of theology" at work here. In Schleiermacher's "clerical paradigm", theology "as a faculty of science is unified by church leadership as its telos".

15. See the entry under usus philosophiae in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, op. cit., pp. 321-322. The entry under usus rationis (p. 322) should also be consulted. In Heinrich Schmid's textbook, op. cit., p. 39, we learn that our reason (ratio) brings with it "dialecticam ordinis observationem". Schleiermacher insists upon this use of reason in his Glaubenslehre (§28.1).

16. We have already referred to this famous definition on pp. 24 & 36 above.

17. An essential study of every aspect of this question is provided by Ulrich Dierse, Enzyklopädie: Zur Geschichte eines philosophischen und wissenschaftstheoretischen Begriffs. This was published as Supplementheft 2 of the Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1977. The discussion of "Fachencyklopädien" begins on p. 73. Edward Farley's Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) should also be consulted, but the discussion of "theological encyclopedia" is less detailed than in Dierse.

18. I hesitate to use T.N. Tice's translation of the Kurze Darstellung entitled Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study, op. cit. The enormous compression of Schleiermacher's text has forced the translator to take interpretative liberties. This desire to get at the "sense" of Schleiermacher's argument may obscure the force of some of Schleiermacher's actual words. My problems begin with the title: a literal translation would read "Brief Representation of Theological Study". The crucial word is "Darstellung", a form of which appears in the title of three of Schleiermacher's most important theological works, viz. Glaubenslehre, Christische Sitte, Praktische Theologie. How to translate the phrase "im Zusammenhange dargestellt" of these titles is not self-evident. The important English translation, The Christian Faith, obviates the problem by omitting the work's subtitle altogether. Peter C. Hodgson makes the useful suggestion...
"cohesively set forth" (cf. above, n. 3 of Chapter One). Tice's translation of "outline" for "Darstellung" is too free, and completely inapplicable in the context of the other titles. It also makes the adjective "kurz" of the title redundant—outlines are meant to be brief!

19. The usual Greek derivation is εγκυκλος παθετα; παθετα translates neatly into German as "Bildung". (See, for instance, Dierse, op. cit., pp. 2-3.)

20. KD2: "Eine solche Darstellung pflegt man eine formale Enzyklopädie zu nennen..." (§20). The "brevity" of the Kurze Darstellung consists in its "formal" character, not in its being a "brief outline".


24. In the 1st edition of Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1817), Hegel writes in §7: "Die Philosophie ist auch wesentlich Enzyklopädie, indem das Wahre nur als Totalität...sein kann; sie ist also notwendig System." Heidelberg: August Oßwald. (p. 9.)


26. As late as 1807, Friedrich Schlegel was describing the "encyclopaedische Streben der Deutschen" as "alle Wissenschaften und Künste zu einem ganzen System zu verbinden und den Geist des Idealismus darüber zu verbreiten." The reader will by now be well aware that we are trying to establish how much Schleiermacher (and his theology) have fallen under the spell of the "Geist des Idealismus". This remarkable quotation comes from Schlegel's (as yet unpublished) lectures on German language and literature held in Cologne. It is cited by Ernst Behler in "Friedrich Schlegels Enzyklopädie der literarischen Wissenschaften im Unterschied zu Hegels Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften" in Hegel-Studien, Volume 17. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1982. pp. 169-202; here p. 200. From this same article, we may learn (p. 199), that Schleiermacher corresponded with Schlegel about the latter's "Enzyklopädieprojekt".

27. Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 21: "Das Wahre ist das Ganze."

28. Voltaire's gibe is cited by Ernst Behler in "Friedrich Schlegels Enzyklopädie...", op. cit., p. 176.


32. *The Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., B 860: "Weil die systematische Einheit dasjenige ist, was gemeine Erkenntnis allererst zur Wissenschaft, d. i. aus einem bloßen Aggregat derselben ein System macht..."


34. §§5 & 6 of "Philosophische Enzyklopädie für die Oberklasse (1808ff.)", op. cit. In Hegel’s distinctive usage, Begriff is more than an "idea"; his understanding of the "concept" is dynamic and speculative. In §9 of *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830): 1. Teil, op. cit., Hegel makes it clear that the 'speculative' concept is not to be confused with the "concepts" of the vernacular. In §159 the concept is designated as the truth of being and of essence, and in §161 the characteristic motion of the concept is identified as "development".

35. Cf. Liddell and Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon* (9th ed.), op. cit., where "college" is one of the senses in which ἀθρόος is employed. The most general definition is a "whole compounded of several parts or members".

36. See Hegel’s 'Privatgutachten fur den Königlich Bayrischen Oberschulrat Immanuel Niethammer’, op. cit., p. 411: "Das unsystematische Philosophieren ist ein zufälliges, fragmentarisches Denken...

37. §14 of *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830): 1. Teil, op. cit. This exceptionally free translation is taken from Hegel’s *Logic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. (This is the 3rd ed. of the translation by William Wallace.) While this (p.20) is more an interpretation than a translation, the sentiment certainly belongs to Hegel.


41. See the Preface to Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit., p. 21.

42. This is Northrop Frye’s definition of "parataxis" in his review of Paul de Man, *The Rhetoric of Romanticism*. New York: Columbia University Press. The review was published in *The Times Literary Supplement*, January 17, 1986, pp. 51-52; here p. 51. This unusual description of parataxis does not even accord with the definition provided in Northrop Frye’s own *The Harper Handbook to Literature* (Sheridan Baker and George Perkins are co-authors with Frye). New York: Harper & Row, 1985. There parataxis is defined in a more pedestrian way (p. 336): "The placement of words, phrases, clauses, or sentences in coordinate grammatical constructions..."
43. "Totalization" is Sartrean in usage. (See Arthur C. Danto’s review of Sartre’s Critique de la raison dialectique, Volumes I & II in The Times Literary Supplement, July 11, 1986, p. 753.) In Sartre’s account of the life of Gustave Flaubert, The Family Idiot (translated by Carol Cosman and published by Columbia University Press), we discover the following striking formulation: "beauty is the imaginary totalization of the world through language..." (Cited in the review by Julian Symons in The Sunday Times, "Books", p. 12 on November 29, 1987.) When George Steiner speaks of Levinas’ effort to "refute Hegelian ‘totality’", he is actually referring to a commonplace in philosophical circles since at least the time of Kierkegaard’s visit to Berlin in 1841. Steiner’s summary is neat: "To Levinas, as to Adorno, a totality is, by definition, a falsehood. Authentic philosophical investigation and proposal are transcendental precisely in their rejection of closure..." (See Steiner’s article "Levinas" in PN Review, Number 74, 1990, pp. 24–26; here p. 24.) The ubiquity of this “totalizing” charge which has been levelled against Hegel can be inferred from the 1986 Conference Report by Nicholas Walker in the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, Number 13, 1986. pp. 8-19. Professor C. Menze of Cologne depicted "Hegelian thought as a holism with no appreciation for the individual and which sacrifices subjectivity to the claims of the universal" (p. 14). Otto Pöggeler emphasized "the problem of justifying any all-encompassing teleological perspective on world history from an allegedly absolute standpoint..." (p. 9). This tallies nicely with the conclusion to Pöggeler’s essay "G.W.F. Hegel: Philosophie als System" in Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen: Philosophie der Neuzeit II, 2nd ed., edited by Josef Speck. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1982. pp. 145-183. Pöggeler concludes his treatment of Hegel this way (p. 182): "Es ist offenkundig geworden, daß wir zwar einzelne Wissenszusammenhänge systematisch in sich abzuschließen vermögen, daß diese Fragmente sich aber nicht in ein letztes, allumfassendes System der Philosophie als Wissenschaft integrieren lassen."


45. See Ernst Behler, "Friedrich Schlegels Enzyklopädie der literarischen Wissenschaften im Unterschied zu Hegels Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften", op. cit., p. 201: "...daß SCHLEGEL nicht, wie Hegel, in Begriffen der Ausschließlichkeit dachte..." Another calumny against Hegel is contained in the entry under "System" in Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, 2nd ed., edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1955. pp. 598-599: "Das Systemidee kann aber auch sinnwidrig werden,...wenn es zwar denkend erarbeitet ist, aber nicht offenbleibt, sondern sich bewußt sperrt, abriegelt gegen neue, weitere Möglichkeiten, wie beim späteren Hegel..." Trevor H. Levere suggests much the same sort of thing, when he contrasts Hegel (unfavourably) with Coleridge: "The more complete a system is, the more it describes and classifies knowledge, and the less it encourages new kinds of inquiry." Hegel, we are informed, was "concerned more with the arrangement and organization of existing knowledge than with its development.” Poetry realized in Nature: Samuel Taylor Coleridge and early nineteenth-century Science. Cambridge University Press, 1981. p 221.


48. All these formulations are taken from The Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B xxiv-xxvi (Preface to the Second Edition).


50. The Mackintosh/Stewart translation of "Widerspruch" as "conflict" in this context dilutes the sense, if my interpretation has any persuasiveness.
51. "Nun ist es auf der einen Seite freilich nicht genug, daß nur ein solcher Widerspruch nicht sei, sondern für den Wissenden entsteht die Aufgabe, sich der Zusammenstimmung beider positiv bewußt zu werden..." (§28.3).

52. Cordes, op. cit., p. 209: "...immer gegenseitig an einander gestimmt..."

53. Ibid., p. 209: "Meine Philosophie also und meine Dogmatik...wollen auch beide niemals fertig sein..."

54. "Diese Aufgabe ist eine schlechthin persönliche." Schleiermacher's annotation to the passage from §28.3 cited above in n. 51. See C. Thônes, op. cit., p. 27.

55. §14 of Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 1. Teil, op. cit. Wallace's free rendering of "subjektive Gewißheit" as "personal convictions" makes good sense.

56. KDz, §§3 & 6. "Dieselben Kenntnisse, wenn sie ohne Beziehung auf das Kirchenregiment erworben und besessen werden, hören auf, theologische zu sein..." (§6).


58. KDz, §1.


61. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, tr. by A. Wedberg. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949. p. 114: "This constituizes the difference between positive law and natural law, which, like morality, is deduced from a presumably self-evident basic norm which is considered to be the expression of the 'will of nature' or of 'pure reason'."


64. See the entry under "Positive law" in The Oxford Companion to Law, op. cit., p 969.

65. See the entry under "Metaphysical jurisprudence" in The Oxford Companion to Law, op. cit., p. 837.


67. See the entry under "positive" in the OED, Volume VII (1933), p. P 1152.


69. Ibid.


71. See the entry under "abstrahieren" in Duden; Volume 7: Etymologie, op. cit., p. 9: "das Allgemeine aus dem zufälligen Einzelnen begrifflich herauszöndern..."


73. F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophie der Mythologie, op. cit., p. 563: "Positiv dagegen ist diese; denn sie geht von der Existenz aus..."

74. F.H. Jacobi, Werke, Volume 6. Leipzig, 1825. p. 166. The whole paragraph reads: "In der Natur, überhaupt in der Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit, ist Alles positiv. Im Verstande und seiner Möglichkeit ist Alles negativ, denn im Verstande steht Alles unter Begriffen, und die umfassendsten sind immer die leersten. Das Weiße, wohin der Verstand zielt, das er treffen will, ist das Nichts; oder das All, minus Diversität, Individualität, Personalität." This is an important text for understanding the impetus of Schleiermacher's positive theology.

75. Hans Kelsen, op. cit., p. 13. His actual words: "Justice is an irrational ideal."


82. Every Christian engages in this "speculative" work at the Holy Communion. The externality of the host is overcome in its being consumed. Hegel calls this externality das Ansichsein: "Es wird vorgestellt, in dem Sakrament werde Christus ewig geopfert und im Herzen sei er auferstehend; dies ist richtig; das ewige Opfer ist dies Sich-zuzeigenmachen des Einzelnen, dies Vergehen des Ansichseins." VPR, Teil 3 (Volume 5 of Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte, edited by Walter Jaeschke, 1984), p. 166. This extract is taken from the lectures of 1824.


86. KD2, §24 & KD1, Einleitung §26: "Die philosophische Theologie ist die Wurzel der gesamten Theologie."

87. KD2, §195.

88. KD2, §85 & KD1, Einleitung §31: "Die praktische Theologie ist die Krone des theologischen Studiums."

89. KD2, §66.

90. KD2, §223: "Weder die Bezeichnungen theoretisch und praktisch, noch die Ausdrücke Glaubens- und Sittenlehre sind völlig genau."

91. KD2, §196 (translated by T.N. Tice in Brief Outline, p. 99).

92. Ibid.


94. KD2, §§5 & 198: "Die dogmatische Theologie hat für die Leitung der Kirche zunächst den Nutzen..."

95. KD2, §95: "Die Darstellung des gesellschaftlichen Zustandes der Kirche in einem gegebenen Moment ist die Aufgabe der kirchlichen Statistik."

96. KD2, §247 (translated by T.N. Tice in Brief Outline, p. 125).

97. KD2, section heading for the second part, third division, which incorporates both dogmatic theology and Church "statistics": "Die geschichtliche Kenntnis von dem gegenwärtigen Zustande des Christentums". See Brief Outline, p. 97.

98. Lücke, p. 390.

99. Glaubenslehre, §28.1: "...wenn nur die Sprache richtig und in sich zusammenhangend gebildet ist." (My italics.)

100. Lücke, p. 390: "...würde meine Maxime doch dieselbe geblieben sein, keinen Einfluß auf den Inhalt der Glaubenslehre gestattet zu haben."

101. Brian A. Gerrish, "From Calvin to Scheiermacher: The Theme and Shape of Christian Dogmatics" in Kongreß, Teilband 2, pp. 1033-1051; here pp. 1041-1042. (My italics.)

102. Lücke, p. 334; English Translation, p. 53: "inspired heterodoxy". The English version suppresses the "divinatory" aspect, which a literal translation would signal. This is surprising, since one of the English translators of the Open Letters also collaborated on the English version of Schleiernacher's Hermeneutics, op. cit., where "divination" and "divinatory" are technical terms. See, for instance, p. 150.

103. Lücke, p. 324: "...als ob die in meiner Glaubenslehre aufgestellte Analyse des Selbstbewusstseins etwas Anderes sein wollte, als ganz einfach und ehrlich nur empirisch!"

104. Lücke, pp. 370 & 342.


107. Glaubenslehre, §2.2.


111. Dialektik (ed. Jonas), §3: "Dialektik muß irgendwie die Prinzipien des Philosophierens enthalten." (p. 2.)


114. Einleitung zur Dialektik (1833), op. cit., p. 117: "Dialektik ist Darlegung der Grundsätze für die kunstmäßige Gesprächsführung im Gebiet des reinen Denkens." This definition is the first sentence of the introduction and can also be found in Dialektik (ed. Jonas), p. 568.

115. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 36: "Da Schleiermachers Dialektik sich die Aufgabe stellt, Grundsätze und Regeln für das richtige Denken zu entwickeln, kann sie ebenfalls als Kunstlehre bezeichnet werden." See also Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p. 6: "So wird hier die Dialektik besonders aus dem Gesichtspunkte der philosophischen Kunstlehre erscheinen."


118. See "Einleitung, Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13): Mit späteren Fassungen der Einleitung, Gitterlehre und Pflichtenlehre, op. cit., p. 205: here Dialektik is described as "das gehaltlose Abbild des höchsten Wissens". See also Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., pp. 32-33: 'Gegenüber den 'realen Wissenschaften' der Natur und der Vernunft hat so die Dialektik ein durchaus formales Gepräge.' (p. 32.)

119. Ibid., p. 33. See also "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 203 (§58): "Die beiden Hauptwissenschaften zerfallen also in ein Zwiefaches, indem die Natur sowohl als die Vernunft gewußt werden kann auf beschauliche Weis und auf erfahrungsmäßige." §59 makes it clear "daß Wissenschaft mehr das Beschauliche, Kunde mehr das Erfahrungsmäßige bezeichnet..." This represents the distinction between speculative and empirical in less exalted terminology.

120. Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p 5


122. Dialektik (1814/15), op. cit., p. 48: "Das Wissen in der Form des Begriffs umfaßt das ganze Gerüst unseres realen Wissens Ethik und Physik." See also Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p. 34.

123. "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 205. See also "Lehnsätze aus der Dialektik in der Ethik (1812/13)" in Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p. 81 (Lemma 11): "Also in der Vollendung ist Ethik Physik und Physik Ethik."


127. Schleiermacher is reported to have told Ludwig Jonas (the editor of both the *Dialektik* and *Die christliche Sitte* [SW 1/12]): "Ich wollte nämlich, wie Du weißt, meiner Dialektik und meiner christlichen Moral die Form geben, welche die Dogmatik hat. Das habe ich aber aufgegeben. Ich werde eilen, sie etwa in die Gestalt zu bringen, die die Enzyklopädie hat." That was on February 4, 1834. Schleiermacher died on February 12. Cited by Andreas Arndt in his Introduction to *Dialektik* (1811), op. cit., p. xvi; and by Hans-Joachim Birkner, *Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre*, op. cit., p. 14.

128. Schleiermacher lectured on *Ethik* five times in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin [see Hans-Joachim Birkner’s introduction to Schleiermacher’s *Brouillon zur Ethik* (1805/06), op. cit., pp. xviii-xix]. Alexander Schweizer, who brought out the first version of Schleiermacher’s *Ethik* in 1835 (SW, Volume III/5: *Entwurfeines Systems der Sittenlehre*), states in his introduction (pp. vii-viii) that, in his final years, Schleiermacher seems to have given up the idea of publishing the *Ethik*. I am not alone in finding the *Ethik* fragmentary and incomplete: see Trutz Rendtorff, *Kirche und Theologie: Die systematische Funktion des Kirchenbegriffs in der neueren Theologie*, 2nd ed. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1970. p. 144. One friend of Schleiermacher’s kindly opined that "because of the time and energy...always devoted to his friends", his ambition to publish the *Ethik* was never realized. (Henriette Herz, as cited by Albert L. Blackwell, op. cit., p. 90n.)


130. *KD*, §35: "Ethik als Wissenschaft der Geschichtsprinzipien". In one set of notes available to Schweizer *Ethik* is synonymous with "Geschichtswissenschaft" (SW, Volume III/5, p. 35n.).


132. See the table of contents to *Ethik* (1812/13), op. cit., pp. v-via.


134. "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in *Ethik* (1812/13), op. cit., p. 220 (§113): "Höchstes Gut...der organische Zusammenhang aller Güter, also das ganze sittliche Sein unter
dem Begriff des Gutes ausgedrückt." See also Martin Redeker, *Friedrich Schleiermacher*, op. cit., p. 233: "das höchste Gut...der Vernunftgehalt des gesamten Lebens."

135. As translated by Reginald H. Fuller in Trutz Rendtorff's *Church and Theology*, op. cit., p. 141.


141. "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in *Ethik (1812/13)*, op. cit., p. 213 (§95): "Die Sätze der Sittenlehre dürfen also nicht Gebote sein...sondern sofern sie Gesetze sind, müssen sie das wirkliche Handeln der Vernunft auf die Natur ausdrücken."

142. August Twesten's introduction to *Friedrich Schleiermachers Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik*, op. cit., p. xxxv: "Schleiermacher fand eben in der Erhebung zu einem höheren Standpunkte der sittlichen Betrachtung das Mittel, dem Güterbegriff eine ganz neue Bedeutung zu geben, indem sich ihm Recht und Verkehr, Sprache und Wissenschaft, Religion und Kunst, Familie, Staat und Kirche auf verschiedene Weise als unter denselben enthalten, und in ihrer Gesamtheit derselben erschöpfend darstellen." My own inelegant translation "legal relationships and communication" only hopes to convey the general sense of "Recht und Verkehr".

143. Ibid., p. xivn. See n. 116 for Chapter One.

144. "Über den Begriff des höchsten Gutes" (Erste Abhandlung), op. cit., pp. 467-468: "ethical" insight avoids the danger "den Gang des menschlichen Geschlechtes auch im großen als ein Spiel des Zufalls anzusehen, als wodurch alle Wissenschaft des Geistes zerstört wird." This last phrase (employed in 1827) displays Schleiermacher's continuing "idealistic" credentials.


146. *Glaubenslehre*, §33.3.


148. *Ethik (1812/13)*, op. cit., p. 125 (§231): "Es ist die Sache der kritischen Disziplin, die man gewöhnlich Religionsphilosophie nennt, die individuelle Differenz der einzelnen Kirche in comparativer Anschauung zu fixieren..."

149. *KD2*, §23.

150. The use of the word "Geschichtskunde" is familiar from the *Ethik* [see "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in *Ethik (1812/13)*, op. cit., p. 217 (§§108 & 109)]. It offers a clear signal that here a transition to empirical reality is taking place, and it has the effect
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of weakening the "philosophical" component in Religionsphilosophie. We shall need to look at this conspicuous term again.

151. See the precision of the definition in Dietz Lange, Historischer Jesus oder mythischer Christus, op. cit., p. 72: "...Religionsphilosophie. Diese ist eine kritische Disziplin, deren Aufgabe es ist, den zunächst spekulativ gewonnenen Begriff der Frömmigkeit mit der Empirie zu vermitteln, indem sie die positiven Religionen miteinander vergleicht, also ihre individuellen Differenzen erhebt und ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis anhand des Begriffs der Frömmigkeit untersucht."


154. Fig. 2.2.

155. See Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., pp. 34-35: "Die spezifische Aufgabe der kritischen Disziplinen...Ihnen allen ist die Aufgabe gemeinsam, das Wesen der individuell-konkreten historischen Erscheinungen, das weder spekulativ konstruiert noch einfach empirisch aufgefaßt werden kann, im kritischen Vergleich zu bestimmen."


161. Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre (SW, Volume III/5, §61), p. 36: "Der hellenische Name philosophia bezeichnet mehr, daß dieses nur als Bestreben vorhanden ist, und umfaßte gleichermaßen ihre physischen und ihre ethischen Bemühungen; der deutsche Name Weltweisheit bezeichnet mehr, daß nur vermittelst dieser Durchdringung alles Wissen Ausdruck der Welt ist."


165. Gunter Scholtz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers, op. cit., pp. 127-128: "Die Literatur zu Schleiermachers Religionsphilosophie füllt eine halbe Bibliothek...Um so erstaunlicher ist es zu erfahren, daß Schleiermacher das, was er selbst 'Religionsphilosophie' nannte, nirgends ausgearbeitet oder eigens vorgetragen hat. The terminology 'Reli-
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gionsphilosophie' is not employed in the equivalent section of the Introduction to Glaubenslehren (§§14-17).

166. See n. 86 above.

167. KD₂, §29; KD₁, Einleitung §38 is particularly clear: "Für eines jeden theologischen Studium müßte der philosophische Teil, wenn er schon zur Diziplin ausgebildet wäre, der erste sein."

168. KD₁, 2. Teil, Schlußbetrachtungen §7: "Die philosophische Theologie nimmt ihren Standpunkt über dem Christentum, die historische innerhalb desselben." (Schleiermacher’s italics.)

169. KD₂, §33: "Die philosophische Theologie kann daher ihren Ausgangspunkt nur über dem Christentum in dem logischen Sinne des Wortes nehmen..."


171. Martin Redeke, Friedrich Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 160: "Der Religionswissenschaftler müsse seinen Standpunkt "über" dem Christentum nehmen, um das spezifisch Christliche bestimmen zu können...Der Begriff 'über' hat nur logisch-theoretischen Sinn und bedeutet nicht die Transzendierung im Sinne der Überwindung." (English Translation, p. 111.)

172. The distortions of Hegel’s philosophy of religion are too numerous to mention. We might, for instance, be told that "Hegel’s philosophical system carried him beyond theism" and "that, for Hegel, philosophy takes priority over religion and gives it a subordinate place in the development of spirit" (Brian Hebblethwaite, The Problems of Theology. Cambridge University Press, 1980. p. 66). Or again: "...Hegel subsumed theology under philosophy, and gave reason the highest place" (Alasdair I.C. Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology. Guildford, Surrey: Lutterworth Press, 1980. p. 38). Worst of all: "Thus the Hegelian ontology itself in which everything can be grasped by reason because everything is founded on rational necessity is ultimately incompatible with Christian faith. Hegel’s philosophy is an extra-ordinary transposition which 'saves the phenomena' (that is, the dogmas) of Christianity, while abandoning its essence" (Charles Taylor, Hegel. Cambridge University Press, 1975. p. 494). All these positions derive their authority from Hegel’s alleged "conceptual Aufhebung (exaltation or nullification) of religion", as we find this formula in the influential translation of Karl Löwith’s From Hegel to Nietzsche (translated by David E. Green. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967. p. 24). My own views accord precisely with those of Professor James Doull. See, for instance, his reply to Quentin Lauer in Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Darrel E. Christensen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. pp.279-283. Doull writes: 'Hegel neither reduces religion to philosophy nor does he undertake a 'speculative transformation of revealed religion'." (p. 279.)

173. The useful diagram in P.H. Jørgensen’s Die Ethik Schleiermachers. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959. p. 34. According to Jørgensen’s chart, Religionsphilosophie belongs to the category "spekulativ-kontemplative-allgemein", whereas Theologie is "empirisch-wahrnehmend-besonders". In one respect, Jørgensen has made things easy for himself: by using the generic term "theology", he avoids the sticky problem of determining the most suitable category for "philosophical theology".

175. KD₂, §252: "Denn alle leitenden Begriffe werden in den Untersuchungen, welche die philosophische Theologie bilden, definitiv bestimmt."

176. KD₂, §24. It is interesting to compare this paragraph with its equivalent in KD₁, Einleitung §25: "Hieraus das Wesentliche in der gesamten Erscheinung der christlichen Kirche zu verstehen, ist die Aufgabe des philosophischen Teiles der Theologie."

178. KD2, §37: "...so ist diese ihrem wissenschaftlichen Gehalt nach Kritik, und sie gehört der Natur ihres Gegenstandes nach der geschichtskundlichen Kritik an."


180. KD2, §24 offers this justification for the use of the terminology "philosophical theology": "Die Benennung rechtfertigt sich teils aus dem Zusammenhang der Aufgabe mit der Ethik, teils aus der Beschaffenheit ihres Inhaltes, indem sie es größenteils mit Begriffsbestimmungen zu tun hat.

181. Cf. KD1, 1. Teil, Einleitung §17: "Als theologische Disziplin nimmt die philosophische Theologie ihre Form von dem Interesse an dem Wohlbefinden und der Fortbildung der Kirche." If one wants to minimize philosophy's harmful effects, the best method is to redefine philosophy's purposes in line with one's own intentions. In a masterpiece of disingenuousness, Schleiermacher acknowledges (in the Open Letters) the use his Glaubenslehre makes of Religionsphilosophie, but quickly adds "ein Wort, welches Andere anders brauchen" ("although others use that term differently"). See Lücke, p. 374 (English Translation, p. 78). A similar tactic has recently been used by Richard Rorty in his discussion of Heidegger's flirtation with the Nazis: "a philosopher's moral character" does not help one to "evaluate his philosophy...That name [philosopher] has been appropriated for other purposes, to name the people who write about, for example, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, or about the issues these men discussed." See Rorty's review of Victor Farias, Heidegger et le Nazisme in The New Republic, April 11, 1988. pp. 31-34; here pp. 32-33. Tzvetan Todorov has assessed Rorty's position in The Times Literary Supplement of June 17-23, 1988 ("NB", pp. 676 & 684). His summary appears to me correct: "Chess-players and microbiologists are not surprised to learn that philosophy has nothing to do with wisdom; he is simply a specialist in Plato or Aristotle, Kant or Hegel." (p. 676.) Some of those named would have been surprised to learn that philosophy has nothing to do with wisdom, but then "others use the term differently". Rorty's article also has the beneficial function of excusing in advance any imperfections in my account of Schleiermacher: "...the works of anybody whose mind was complex enough to make his or her books worth reading will not have an 'essence'...those books will admit of a fruitful diversity of interpretations,...the quest for an authentic reading is pointless. One will assume that the author was as mixed-up as the rest of us..." Since, according to Rorty, I need make no pretence in this dissertation to offer an "authentic interpretation", it should suffice the reader if I manage to pull out "from the tangle we find on the pages, some lines of thought that might turn out to be useful for our own purposes." (Ibid., p. 34.) My readers may by this point agree that "tangle" is not an inappropriate reference to Schleiermacher's constellation of disciplines. I trust that my extended treatment of them has exposed some serviceable "lines of thought"!

182. T.N. Tice's translation of KD2, §65: "Philosophical theology...lay[s] a foundation for the properly historical perspective on Christianity" completely suppresses the German "Anschauung", a word which also appears in the equivalent paragraph of KD1 (1. Teil, Schlüsselbetrachtungen §2). In the Dialekt (ed. Odebrecht, p. 157), Anschauung is defined as the equilibrium (Gleichgewicht) between "organische Tätigkeit"
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(Wahrnehmen) and "intellektuelle Tätigkeit" (Denken im engeren Sinne). "Absolute reine Anschauung" (p. 273) would lead us to "das vollständige Ineinander des Spekulations und Empiriums". So the critical discipline of philosophical theology brings about the "geschichtliche Anschauung des Christentums" (KD1 & KD2).

183. KD2, §67: "Da die philosophische Theologie eines jeden wesentlich die Prinzipien seiner gesamten theologischen Denkungsart in sich schließt: so muß auch jeder Theologe sie ganz für sich selbst produzieren." Tice carefully renders the pronoun "sie" (referring to philosophical theology) by the phrase "this part of his (sic) theology". Even though we are told just above that each individual's philosophical theology contains within itself essentially the whole of an individual's "theological way of thinking", is Tice trying to reassure us that philosophical theology need not be given too much weight? It is, after all, only a "part" of what a theologian does.


186. This "harmony" of philosophy and theology can be discovered even though "Theologie und Philosophie repräsentieren in der Tat zwei Traditionsströme grundverschiedener Herkunft und Art." See Gerhard Ebeling, Luther, op. cit., p. 83.


188. I admit that "systematic theology" is not preferred Schleiermacherian usage. But despite the caveat of §97 (KD2) that this terminology "conceals...not only the historical character of the discipline but also its aim in relation to Church leadership", it has become so universal as to be almost unavoidable. For Wolfhart Pannenberg, theology is "synonymous with systematic theology" as "the history of Christian theology is...essentially the history of the systematic interpretations of Christianity." (Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977. p. 350. English Translation by Francis McDonagh: Theology and the Philosophy of Science. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976. p. 347.) In the same vein Stephen Sykes concludes that "Schleiermacher was an unrepentant systematician." (The Identity of Christianity: Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from Schleiermacher to Barth. London: SPCK, 1984. p. 101.) Schleiermacher's hesitation may be justified when we read of "Die Tendenz 'Dogmatik' als Umschreibung für den engeren Bereich kirchlich gebun­dener Lehre, 'Systematische Theologie' dagegen als Begriff für das Ganze des Glaubens und des Glaubenswissens anzusehen." So Gerhard Sauter, "Dogmatik I", op. cit., p. 54.


190. "Die Fundamentaltheologie erarbeitet Voraussetzungen und Grundlagen der katholischen Theologie...wodurch das Wort 'Apologetik' meist durch 'Fundamentaltheologie' ersetzt wurde." (See the entry in Volume II of Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, edited by J. Ritter and K. Gründer. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972. cols. 1135-1136; here col. 1135.) Pannenberg makes this identifica-
tion of "philosophical theology" with Fundamentaltheorie in Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, op. cit., p. 328. The most ambitious identification of this sort has been undertaken by Michael Eckert, in Gott—Glauben und Wissen: Friedrich Schleiermachers Philosophische Theologie. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987. The following statement (p. 29) is representative: "In Schleiermachers Konzept der Philosophischen Theologie fällt die wissenschafts-theoretische und sachlich-inhaltliche Übereinstimmung mit Ansätzen katholischer Fundamentaltheologie ganz unmittelbar auf."

192. Ibid., p. 34n.
193. Michael Eckert is very useful on this point: "In der Frage nach dem Wesen des christlichen Glaubens bestimmt Schleiermacher die Philosophische Theologie wissenschaftstheoretisch nicht als philosophische, sondern als theologische Grunddisziplin, d.h. als allgemeine theologische Prinzipienlehre." (Gott—Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., p. 25.) Eckert confirms our view that philosophical theology gives the theologian his theological principles.
194. KD2, §§39 & 40.
195. KD2, §41.
196. KD2, §§39 & 40.
197. KD2, §47. This discussion is consistent with the definition of Apologetik provided in Glaubenslehre, §2.2, although there explicit reference is made to Apologetik as proceeding out of Religionsphilosophie. Hence the emphasis upon the "description of the peculiar essence of Christianity and its relation to other 'Churches'." This aspect is not neglected in KD2 (see §43). The summary by August Dorner in his Geleitwort to Volume I of Schleiermachers Werke, op. cit., pp. xix-xx, is very helpful: "Die Apologetik, als ein Teil der philosophischen Theologie, hat dann das empirische Christentum seinem eigentümlichen Wesen nach im Verhältnis zu den anderen Religionen mit Hilfe der aus der Ethik gewonnenen Gesichtspunkte zu fixieren, und die Polemik hat die diesem Wesen widersprechenden Seiten der empirischen Ausgestaltung des Christentums kritisch zu beleuchten.
198. KD2, §§58 & 60. Michael Eckert, Gott—Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., p. 21, supports our interpretation: 'Ist die 'Apologetik' nach außen gerichtet, so fällt der 'Polemik' die Aufgabe zu, in der Kirchengemeinschaft auftretende Kontroversen über das eigentlich Christliche klären zu helfen.'
199. Glaubenslehre, §22.2.
200. In Lücke, Schleiermacher complains that K.H. Sack has confused the task of the Introduction and dogmatics proper (p. 374), and that he has not taken sufficiently seriously "the distinction between Introduction and the work of dogmatics itself" (p. 376): "Habe ich also nicht Grund genug zu glauben, daß auch hier der Unterschied zwischen der Einleitung und dem Werke selbst nicht scharf genug gefaßt worden ist?" (English Translation, pp. 78 & 79). Hans-Joachim Birkner takes up this point (Theologie und Philosophie, op. cit., p. 33n.) in discussing the substantial revision of the Introduction in the 2nd ed. of the Glaubenslehre. "Schleiermachers Begründung für die Neugestaltung der Einleitung nennt die Absicht, den Unterschied zwischen Dogmatik und Einleitung deutlicher zu markieren... Michael Eckert (Gott—Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., p. 11) makes the same observation: 'Seine strukturell-formale Umgestaltung der 'Einleitung' der zweiten Auflage gegenüber der ersten Auflage begründet Schleiermacher mit dem Hinweis, daß Dogmatik und 'Einleitung' deutlich voneinander abzuheben seien... The shortcomings of Sack's interpretation do not prevent Schleiermacher from referring readers to Sack's Christliche Apologetik: Versuch eines Handbuches (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1829) in §2 of Glaubenslehre. While Sack, in turn, acknowledges his debt to Schleiermacher (Vorrede, p. x), I would have thought there was some danger in Sack's desire for German theology, "daß die spekulativen und die historischen Forschungen in Bezug auf das Fundament des..."
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Christentums inniger vereinigt, gleichsam näher zusammengerückt würden, als bisher geschehen..." (p. viii).

201. *Glaubenslehre,* §23: "...wenn er innerhalb des Gebiets der Dogmatik stehenbleibt..."
This is an exceptionally important proviso, since it prescribes a "partial" methodology (in both senses of the word). Richard Kroner has said, "...daß der Philosoph erst dann seinen Beruf ganz erfüllt, wenn er nicht nur scheidet, sondern das Geschiedene auch wieder vereinigt." (*Von Kant bis Hegel,* Volume 2, op. cit., p. 46.) It is hard to imagine that a philosopher could ever be satisfied with just one side of a two-sided coin, not least because "men are mostly right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny": division of the confessional sort requires both affirmation and denial. This maxim is employed by F.D. Maurice and ascribed variously to Coleridge (by A.R. Vidler, *The Church in an Age of Revolution: 1789 to the Present Day.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962, p. 84) and Leibniz. Presumably the task of the philosopher is to rise above all partiality. In a paradoxical sense, Schleiermacher's insistence on sharpening the distinction between the branches of Christianity must ultimately bring into clearer focus the inadequacies of any particular, segregated position. Schleiermacher seems to hint at something of this sort in §23.2, without saying so explicitly. Again, one is reminded of the Scholastic tag: 'distinguish in order to unite'! (See p. 48 above.)

202. *Glaubenslehre,* §23. Proposition: "...nicht gleichgültig verhalten..." The problem of *Indifferenz* is defined in §56 (KDz) as "Gleichgültigkeit (sic) in Bezug auf das eigentümliche Gepräge der christlichen Frömmigkeit..."


204. See Brian A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleiermacher", op. cit., p. 131.

205. *KD2,* §47: "die Stetigkeit des Wesentlichen im Christentume..."


208. Michael Eckert's summary of his theme in *Gott—Glauben und Wissen,* op. cit., p. 33, could just as well serve as a statement of the task we have set for ourselves in this dissertation: "Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie in Schleiermachers Werk, der das Hauptinteresse der Interpretationsgeschichte gilt, stellt sich in der vorliegenden Arbeit als die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie in Schleiermachers Philosophischer Theologie dar."


210. *KD2,* §103: "für alle Zeiten normalen Darstellung des Christentums..."

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211. See the Vorrede to Schleiermacher's "Ueber die Schriften des Lukas, ein kritischer Versuch" in SW, Volume 1/2 (1836), pp. xiii-xiv: "die kritische Bearbeitung der heiligen Bücher...der reinsten einfältigsten Glaube und die schärfste Prüfung eins und dasselbe sind..." This Preface was written in 1817 and was translated by Connop Thirlwall in A Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke. London: John Taylor, 1825. p. iv.


216. KD2, §223.

217. KD2, §226: "...so rührt doch die Terminologie der eigentlichen Glaubenslehre großen-teils aus der philosophischen Wissenschaft her, die unter dem Namen rationaler Theologie ihren Ort in der Metaphysik hatte..."


219. See the editorial note to §95 of Brief Outline, p. 54.


221. Glaubenslehre, §3.4: "...daß es Wissen und Tun gibt zur Frömmigkeit gehörig..."


223. KD1, Einleitung §31.

224. KD2, §9: "die Idee eines Kirchenfürsten" & §258: "Die praktische Theologie ist also nur für diejenigen, in welchen kirchliches Interesse und wissenschaftlicher Geist vereinigt sind."

225. KD2, §336: "Die Aufgaben, zumal im Gebiet des Kirchenregiments, wird derjenige am richtigsten stellen, der sich seine philosophische Theologie am vollkommensten durchgebildet hat."

226. KD2, §274.

227. KD2, §263: "Seelenleitung".


229. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Theologie und Philosophie, op. cit., p. 29: "In Schleiermachers Nomenklatur zeichnet sich nämlich ab, daß für ihn das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie nicht die Würde eines Grundthemas hat."}


231. Ibid., p. 59: "Unter Voraussetzung von Schleiermachers Aufruf des Wissenreiches ergibt sich so die notwendige Folge, daß die dogmatische Theologie nicht als spekulative, sondern nur als historische Disziplin in die allgemeine Wissenswelt eingehen kann..."

232. Ibid., p. 58.
233. Ibid., p. 12.

234. See the useful discussion in ibid., "Werden und Gestalt der christlichen Sittenlehre", pp. 11-20. In the Introduction to SW I/12, the editor, Ludwig Jonas, relates how Schleiermacher entrusted him with the task of bringing the Sittenlehre to his public just days before his death in 1834 (p. vi).

235. SW I/12, Die christliche Sitte, p. 25: "Und schließlich festhalten die Sittenlehre, in der Praxis aber kann ein solcher ein Theist, oder ein Verehrer Gottes sein..." Kant reckons Spinoza among this number. The quotation above is taken from the lecture manuscript by Collins. A delicious variant is provided in the manuscript by Mrongovius; according to his notes the word is not Theist but Theolog, thereby heightening the offence to Schleiermacher: an atheistic philosopher, but a practising theologian! See Volume XXVII/2-2 of Kant's gesammelte Schriften (1979), p. 1456.

236. SW I/12, p. 25: "Denn wollten wir, und anders könnten wir doch nimmer, die Freimütigkeit festhalten und der Philosophie Lebewohl sagen: so müßten wir zugleich auch der Theologie Lebewohl sagen, welche nur aus der Philosophie herübergenommen werden können." (My emphasis.)

237. See Vorlesungen über Moralphilosophie in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Volume XXVII/1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974. p. 312: "Der Atheismus kann in der bloßen Spekulation sein, in der Praxis aber kann ein solcher ein Theist, oder ein Verehrer Gottes sein..." Kant reckons Spinoza among this number. The quotation above is taken from the lecture manuscript by Collins. A delicious variant is provided in the manuscript by Mrongovius; according to his notes the word is not Theist but Theolog, thereby heightening the offence to Schleiermacher: an atheistic philosopher, but a practising theologian! See Volume XXVII/2-2 of Kant's gesammelte Schriften (1979), p. 1456.

238. SW I/12, p. 25: "Und dennoch müssen beide, die philosophische und die religiöse, neben einander bestehen können. Sehr schwer aber ist es, im allgemeinen das Wie dieses Nebeneinanderbestehens anschaulich zu machen."

239. Ibid., pp. 26-27: "Und dennoch müssen beide, die philosophische und die religiöse Sittenlehre, ihrem Inhalte nach gleich sein, wenn wir als Theologen nicht in den unaufloslichen Widerspruch geraten sollen, ein und dasselbe zu tun und nicht zu tun uns verbunden zu fühlen."

246. See n. 137 above.

247. SW I/12, p. 23: "Was muß sein und Was muß werden, weil das religiöse Selbstbewußtsein ist?" (Original emphasis.)

248. KD 2, §202: "Eine dogmatische Darstellung ist desto vollkommener, je mehr sie neben dem Assertorischen auch divinatorisch ist." Cf. the equivalent proposition in KD 1, 2. Teil, 3. Abschnitt §19: "Keine Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs kann treu sein, die nicht zugleich divinatorisch ist."


250. Glaubenslehre, §30.2: "...daß sich also unter dieser Form nichts Fremdes in die christliche Glaubenslehre einschleichen kann..."


252. Beilage C (1828) in SW I/12, p. 66: "Die philosophische Ethik hat eine rein spekulative Tendenz, den Geist als Prinzip der menschlichen Tätigkeit anzuschauen. Die christliche Sittenlehre hat eine ganz praktische Tendenz..."


254. SW I/13, Die praktische Theologie, p. 8: "Wir sehen also ganz deutlich, das ist der Charakter des positiven, daß wissenschaftliche Elemente, die in der Behandlung nicht zusammengehören, zusammengestellt werden in Beziehung auf eine gewisse Praxis."


256. Glaubenslehre, §28.3: "...kaum ein Ort übrig bleibt, durch welchen die Spekulation sich in die Glaubenslehre eindrängen könnte."
I.

In his lectures on philosophical theology, delivered in the early 1780s, Kant provided his students with this definition: "theology ... is the system of our knowledge of the highest being." As Kant's lectures make clear, this system of knowledge is not an aggregate "in which one thing is placed next to another", but a knowledge in which the "idea of the whole rules throughout". This telling discussion of "systematic theology" is followed in Kant's lectures by a reference to theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa, the division of theology into the knowledge of His own being that only God can have (archetypa), and the knowledge that human beings can have of God ("was von Gott in der menschlichen Natur lieget" — ectypa). Kant has taken over this theological distinction from Protestant orthodoxy, as we might find it, for instance, in the great theological textbook by J.A. Quenstedt, which Schleiermacher also consulted in the preparation of his own dogmatic theology.

For Quenstedt, theology is the teaching about God and divine things (sermo de Deo et rebus divinis), and he, in his turn, cites a beloved tag by St. Thomas Aquinas, which says that "theology is taught by God, teaches God, and leads to God". Quenstedt then distinguishes between theologia archetypa ("that very same infinite wisdom of God by which God knows Himself in Himself") and theologia ectypa, which is a communicated knowledge (scientia communicata) — finite and created — and a kind of emanation or image of the knowledge that God has of Himself.
This now largely unfamiliar distinction continues to have an important Nachleben, even in our own day and especially with respect to Schleiermacher. In a justly celebrated article on "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the Divine Attributes", Gerhard Ebeling claims that the old bifurcation of theologia and oikonomia must be transcended. In this context, theologia is understood as "metaphysical" assertions about the divine nature, and oikonomia is a largely historical account of the traces of the divine in the world, i.e. the knowledge that we can have of God through his revelation of Himself in historical time and activity. Broadly speaking, this "false" distinction conforms to the earlier one above, and we note that in Schleiermacher's "historical theology" there is no room for any metaphysical assertion about God. If speculative thinkers must talk about the highest reality, it would be as well for them to speak of "the supreme being", so that their concept cannot be confused with the "God", who is the object of religious consciousness. It will be one of our main aims to discover in what sense (if any) Schleiermacher's own understanding of theology transcends this ancient distinction — an unfriendly assessment might speak more readily of a "suppression" than a transcendence.

In Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology there is no theologia archetypa, as this surpasses any knowledge of God that we might possibly possess. Since we have no access to that knowledge which only God has of Himself, it is impossible for us to speak about it. Just at this point, we can anticipate the enormous difficulty that Schleiermacher had in formulating any coherent doctrine of the Trinity at the end of his Glaubenslehre, since such a doctrine, by its very nature, must be an endeavour to say something about the inner divine life. As I.A. Dorner correctly argues in his System der christlichen Glaubenslehre, theology cannot rest with an "economic" discussion of the Trinity cut loose from God's actual being. Theologia ectypa is either an actual trace of the divine life as it is in itself or it is not. If it is not an actual trace, theology in any form ceases to tell us much about God, its putative object.
This, of course, touches the nerve of Hegel's great dispute with Schleiermacher. The scandal of modern theology in Hegel's view was its inability actually to tell us anything about God, the supposed subject of the discipline. Given the temerity of his theological colleagues at the University of Berlin, Hegel invited students of Christian theology to attend lectures in the philosophical faculty, where the traditional content of the Christian faith was still taken seriously.\(^{15}\) For Hegel, Schleiermacher was a representative of "die unbefriedigte Aufklärung",\(^ {16}\) a form of consciousness best described in Nietzsche's pithy assertion that modern philosophy has successfully brought us to the point where we can know with absolute certainty that we cannot know the thing we most want to know.\(^ {17}\) In defiant contrast to Schleiermacher, Hegel asserts that his lectures on the philosophy of religion have no other object than the knowledge of God (Gott zu erkennen).\(^ {18}\) In this, Hegel understands himself as completely out of step with "the modern standpoint".\(^ {19}\)

The undisputed embodiment of the modern standpoint is, of course, the Kantian philosophy. In Kant's lectures on moral philosophy, he is reported to have said, "Religion has no need of any speculative knowledge of God".\(^ {20}\) The whole of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre is an attempt to show how this can be true. In Kant's Critique of Judgement, we may find a further principle to which the Glaubenslehre conforms. There, Kant speculates that even if a religion could be constructed along theoretical lines, it would be wholly different from one based on "disposition" or "sentiment"\(^ {21}\) (Gesinnung — wherein the essence of religion lies).\(^ {22}\) This accords perfectly with Schleiermacher's "theoretical" admission of a speculative — "dialectical" would conform more closely to his own usage — knowledge of God, which would, paradoxically enough, have nothing to do with "religion". Apart from Schleiermacher's well-attested desire not to have religion reduced to a theoretical underpinning for morality,\(^ {23}\) he would also dispute Kant's assertion that it is possible for the same individual to be an atheist in the realm of speculation, but a theist (or theologian!) in practice, i.e. one who honours God (see pp. 118-119 above). The reader now knows very well that this state
II. Protestant Theology

of affairs would be typical of the divided consciousness which Schleiermacher rejected in his correspondence with Jacobi. There is in Schleiermacher a genuine attempt to move beyond the "divided consciousness" which is the legacy of the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{24} But in contrast to Hegel, this is achieved by moving down the strictly divided tracks of speculation and religious consciousness \textit{simultaneously}.\textsuperscript{25} For the engine to advance, both tracks must be travelled together (and in the same direction), although the tracks always remain divided in this life.

It is of considerable interest to learn from Schleiermacher that the Reformation itself puts down the tracks along which modern scholarship may in future travel. In his \textit{Open Letters}, he assures his readership that the aim of the Reformation must be seen to be the drawing up of a lasting "contract" between

\begin{quote}
the living Christian faith and completely free, independent scientific inquiry, so that faith does not hinder science and science does not exclude faith . . . \textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

However difficult this view may be to reconcile with actual Reformation sentiments like those Luther expressed concerning the "independent scientific inquiry" of an Aristotle ("the very devil himself"),\textsuperscript{27} it further underlines the strongly confessional understanding of Christianity which this armistice and concordat presupposes. It is presumably the Reformation's emphasis on "justification by faith alone" which gives other forms of human activity free rein. If justification by faith establishes the independence of religion from the prevailing cultural milieu,\textsuperscript{28} it cannot then prevent the independence of our common culture from the prevailing religious milieu. But here we have no more than the conditions which obtain during a "cold war"; we do not yet have the circumstances which make possible the "parallel" development presupposed by Schleiermacher's \textit{détente}.

It is as Protestants, then, that we may proceed down our dual carriage-way of religious and philosophical consciousness with complete integrity and with a clear conscience! This rather allegorical journey may acquire a human face if we, as Protestant "systematic theologians" (see p. 109 above),
attempt to travel down the paths that Hegel and Schleiermacher simultaneously laid for future generations—after all, we are the heirs of both! Although we have recently been told that "their systems were completely different", this apparently has not prevented "modern liberal theology" from combining them.29 We know that the tracks must be parallel and that the wheels for our journey must run in tandem (otherwise human consciousness will become hopelessly divided), yet this can only be possible if each track continually influences the other's direction of travel. We need to discover how the tracks may be divided and yet united at one and the same time. In the first instance, the question must be directed towards two forms of consciousness, objective and subjective, but there are compelling reasons to identify these forms of consciousness with the names of Hegel and Schleiermacher (just as the first generation of their common heirs in fact did),30 to see whether they do exhibit features of a parallel development, and whether they can actually be made to run in tandem.

The place to begin, as we have already clearly suggested, is with the discipline of "philosophical theology", where we may find united that which in principle is meant to be distinct. It has been rightly said that this discipline, which acts as a kind of "fuse" between the conceptual and the empirical, between the speculative and the positive, still awaits its detailed explication in Schleiermacher's great system of the disciplines. Yet the necessity of some de facto meeting of what is notionally distinct has been established. I have spoken of its being a "fuse" quite deliberately: it establishes the principle of a union, while building in a safeguard against illegitimate traffic. (Schleiermacher would, of course, want to protect his dogmatic theology against the intrusion of "alien" speculative elements. Any unwarranted overloading would "blow" the fuse.)

From the insinuations offered above, it cannot be a matter of indifference to this dissertation that philosophical theology and dogmatic theology (or Glaubenslehre) find a common home in the Introduction to Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith (as they do also in a very sketchy form in the introductory material to his lectures on church history).33 How well
this discipline actually functions as a "fuse" is in effect our central question. (It would be churlish even at this late stage not to acknowledge that, according to the "authorized" Schleiermacher tradition, there is no "dogmatic theology" as such to be found in the Introduction to his Glaubenslehre. Nonetheless, they are still two types of theology, in some state of interdependence, and it seems that one cannot get going without the other. Schleiermacher may be right that "philosophical theology" must not be confused with "dogmatic theology", but apparently a Glaubenslehre cannot be written at all until philosophical theology has made the Procrustean bed into which it will fit. German scholars nowadays prefer to speak of a Rahmen or a Raster within which "dogmatic theology" may properly be located. The latter term suggests a "grid" or "screen" where this theological discipline may find itself welcome, just because it cannot now exceed its limits.

III. A very different kind of correlation has been proposed by Ingolf Dalferth of Tübingen. He suggests that the two forms of consciousness are best portrayed as complementary (or "competing"!) perspectives. These are the internal and external perspectives, which reflect whether one is standing inside or outside the community of faith. The distinction recognizes the subject's self-understanding within the faith, and the understanding others may have of the subject (from outside the faith). This leads Dalferth to formulate the principle of the double description (Prinzip der doppelten Beschreibung): there is then the inner perspective of the participants and the external perspective of the spectators. For the Christian there is the perspective of faith, yet for those outside the community of faith, the phenomenon of faith still exists from the perspective of the world at large.

My immediate problem with this "perspectival" language is that one might be lulled into thinking that a rough equivalence obtains between these two perspectives. Everything has this inner and outer quality, and description occurs according to where one stands. While it is certainly true that there is a community of faith, and also a body of individuals who firmly situate themselves outside that community's life, where are we to place individuals
whom the community of faith may repulse, but who nevertheless understand themselves as within its portals? Where, for instance, would we locate Hegel’s perspective? Is his perspective internal or external? (And what would this perspectival language be able to tell us about D.F. Strauss?)

But the more serious difficulty occurs when we jump to the so-called Weltperspektive. Are we seriously to entertain the possibility of an external perspective with relation to it? As every one of us is a citizen of the world, presumably we must all hold this Weltperspektive internally! And what would be implied by the notion of holding an external relation to philosophy, for example? In Schleiermacher’s own language, presumably, Weltperspektive finds its closest affinity to Weltweisheit (see p. 105 above). Could the man of faith formulate a persuasive account of it from an "external" perspective?

Dalferth’s handy analysis of "the principle of double description" may be a useful diagnostic tool when discussing faith, but it is hardly capable of the universal application for which the author gives it credit. One function of this "principle" is to demonstrate that a faith—and its theological expression—which ignores the external perspective will be the weaker for it, and to that extent the "principle" helps to highlight one of Schleiermacher’s very great strengths. Not only did Schleiermacher endorse the everlasting "contract" between "living Christian faith" and modern scientific research (in the sense of Wissenschaft), but he was himself party to both sides of the contract to a singular degree. Furthermore, Dalferth’s principle rightly reminds us that the whole organization of Schleiermacher’s theological and extra-theological disciplines has about it this sense of a movement from external to internal. If the reader recalls the movement from Ethik, Religionsphilosophie, philosophical theology to dogmatic theology, it is instructive to think of this as a movement from what is external to what is internal. But this can also be misleading, because again I doubt whether the movement can be reversed. Is it really possible to think of moving from practical theology to historical theology to philosophical theology to Religionsphilosophie to Ethik? The movement as it is laid out for us is from the root to the crown, from the general to the particular, not vice versa. Certainly, as Schleiermacher pres-
ents his *Glaubenslehre*, the theological principles cannot be worked out inductively as one goes along.  

Stephen Sykes makes an opportune allusion to Schleiermacher's "double-sided" theory of Christianity. This theory, as Schleiermacher develops it "critically", is neither purely external and speculative—as speculation can only proceed in abstraction from the concrete givenness of piety—nor is it simply the *empirical* (presumably internal) "reading off of the essence of Christianity directly from its history". Sykes concludes that the critical method employed in Schleiermacher's philosophical theology (in so far as that discipline really comes to life in any of Schleiermacher's publications or lectures) is a *via media*, in which the speculative and empirical are played off against one another and provide the necessary "checks and balances" for one another.

In Dalferth's discussion of inner and outer perspectives we have not yet escaped the necessity of developing a *Metaperspektive*, in which the internal and the external can be reintegrated theologically. If this is possible anywhere in Schleiermacher's thought, it can only occur in his philosophical theology (this *Bindeglied*) with its finely tuned balance of speculation and *Empirie*. While Schleiermacher insisted that Christian theology must be developed from the standpoint of Faith ... the external perspective of Reason is the necessary correlate of the internal perspective of Faith. He therefore proposed to integrate the internal and external perspectives on faith ... in a carefully balanced way. Although irreducibly different because of their different starting points and contexts of plausibility, theology and philosophy perfectly correspond to each other.

With this convenient conclusion we seem to have arrived back at our starting point on a dual carriageway of Weltweisheit and faith, philosophy and theology, running their parallel courses, separate but united. However, we must not ignore the determination that Dalferth finds in both Luther and Barth to have a truly "theological theology". As far as I understand this notion, this seems to be what Schleiermacher is also seeking in his dogmatic or historical theology—a theology free of all alien speculative ingredients and distractions. However, there cannot be any dogmatic theology with-
out philosophical theology at its foundation. We know from Schleiermacher's own writings that philosophy and theology cannot be kept strictly separated, and we shall in time be led to query whether the highest forms of subjective and objective consciousness (Glaubenslehre §28.3) can really maintain a relation of stable equilibrium. With the great F.C. Baur, we shall be forced to ask whether subjective consciousness—in its highest expression—must not ultimately transform itself into that objective consciousness—which alone is able to provide the unity of internal and external perspectives.

IV.

Schleiermacher, as we know, prepared his public for the second edition of his Glaubenslehre by publishing two "open letters" as a general statement of intent. I should like to provide my readers with two items of background information which might serve the same purpose. It is not incidental to this debate that Schleiermacher retained for himself the right to give university lectures widely beyond the confines of the Faculty of Theology, in virtue of his membership of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Nor is it without significance that Schleiermacher effectively barred Hegel from membership in the Academy, nearly to the end of his life. The Academy was founded in Berlin in 1700 by Leibniz, so that it both considerably predated the University and also provided a basis upon which the University of Berlin might be built. Prussia had suffered a crushing defeat by the Napoleonic forces and the explicit intention in the founding of the University was that (in the King's words) the state was to make good by means of spiritual energy (geistige Kräfte), what had been lost materially. The Academy had one outstanding feature which distinguished it from all the other academies dotted around Europe, viz. its section devoted to speculative philosophy (Klasse für spekulatieve Philosophie), established in the Academy during its reorganization under Friedrich the Great in 1744-1746. It was only fitting that Germany's greatest speculative philosophers (Fichte and Hegel) should have been the first two occupants of the chair of philosophy in Berlin. But it is surely a supreme irony that Berlin possessed this unique forum for
speculative philosophy a) of which Schleiermacher was the most famous member—of which, indeed, he became the secretary; b) from which Hegel was excluded; and c) of which Schleiermacher managed to engineer the dissolution in 1828. These historical rivalries convey very well with what zeal Schleiermacher, philosopher and theologian, sought to keep the speculative philosophy (endemic to Berlin) firmly in its place.

Berlin, then, had won for itself an international distinction as a city which advanced the cause of speculative philosophy, and the city was in due course rewarded by becoming the venue for the greatest lectures ever given in the subject. Schleiermacher, who drank deeply at this well, characteristically struck out on his own independent course by pursuing the speculative in philosophy and the empirical in theology, with an integrity no one has ever matched before or since. Hans-Joachim Birkner perfectly captures the spirit of the man:

Sein Lebenswerk ist gekennzeichnet durch eine Universalität und in ihr durch eine Verbindung von philosophischer und theologischer Arbeit, die ungewöhnlich, ja einzigartig anmutet ... Man kann dieses Nebeneinander, diese 'Symbiose' geradezu als eine durchgängige Signatur seines Werdens und seines Wirkens ansehen.

Our second point relates directly to this "symbiosis", which we may regard as Schleiermacher's trademark. What can this imply but that—whatever he says to the contrary—Schleiermacher's theology is inevitably polluted by the great speculative spirit of the age? And so his own contemporaries thought. One of the most interesting passages in his *Open Letters* is the acknowledgement that some of Schleiermacher's readers have claimed to see him on the high road of the speculative theology. This theology has its similarities to the Ebionite heresy, where the historical uniqueness of Christ the redeemer is softened, presumably to make room for some abstract and general philosophical account concerning the *essential* relation of God and man. The philosophical trappings make this road a "highway" which looks down upon the crudities of the Ebionite position: it is on that exalted path that Schleiermacher is supposed to have been seen. He assures us, however, that this could only have been his phantom, his *Doppelgänger*.
At its most primitive, this striking image conjures up no more than a case of mistaken identity through a physical resemblance. In this sense, many dogmatic propositions in the *Glaubenslehre* will have their "doubles" in the speculative theologies of Schleiermacher’s colleagues. But this primitive sense of *Doppelgänger* was being made to give way to a deeper, more psychological interpretation by the Romantic authors who were Schleiermacher’s contemporaries. First in Jean Paul’s *Siebenkäs* (1795), and then in the novels and short stories of E.T.A. Hoffmann, *Doppelgänger* came to refer to the self-projection of the dark, hidden, unresolved side of a human personality. Under Hoffmann’s skilful artistry, the *Doppelgänger* appears over and over to confront the original with the concrete actualization of inner hidden longings and most secret thoughts. The *Doppelgänger* then is the one "who walks always beside", and it is to that shadowy figure that this thesis is dedicated. Our subject claims not to recognize the Schleiermacher with whom his critics are locked in combat: they have confused the authentic theologian with his "double". Our aim is to untangle the confusion; we believe there to be a case to answer.

Schleiermacher has already told us that a great deal of the responsibility for the appearance of this phantom hangs upon the "dangerous Introduction" to his *Glaubenslehre* which needs "more clearly and sharply" to be separated from the body of the work. It is in the less empirical aspects of the Introduction that shadows cast by the *Doppelgänger* have their origin. F.C. Baur certainly believed that the "speculative" principles of Schleiermacher’s Introduction governed everything that followed in the body of the work. With "misunderstandings" of this sort in mind, the Introduction to the second edition is apparently "structurally recast in order to bring out the independence of dogmatics in relation to philosophic or other modes of nontheological reflection". The haunting figure of the *Doppelgänger* suggests that this independence is not yet complete. One of the problems with establishing your independence from "modes of nontheological reflection" is that you have be sure exactly what they are, and so the necessity for an Introduction cannot be obviated. At the very least the properly theological
and the genuinely "nontheological" have to be distinguished, so that no illicit traffic occurs between them. In what form of reflection is it possible to distinguish the theological and the nontheological from one another? Presumably this involves some kind of "metaperspective" which can do justice to both sides of the equation. To free yourself of all philosophical influences, you have to know precisely what they are, and to that extent you remain dependent on the very discipline from which you seek your independence! You must know the enemy's exact location, if you are to avoid stumbling into the opposition camp unwittingly.

The position is, of course, drastically complicated by the fundamental article of Schleiermacher studies, which can be stated just as baldly as this: "Ein Gegensatz zwischen Philosophie und christlicher Theologie findet in Schleiermachers System nicht statt." 66 This principle cannot be articulated solely or simply from a theological perspective; it will be necessary to ask the philosophers what they think as well. Only when we know the actual content of relevant philosophical propositions shall we be in a position to judge their indifference to, their compatibility with, or their contradiction of our cherished theological propositions. A notorious recent novel has described a revenant ghost as "unfinished business": 67 it is the spectre of Schleiermacher's dependent independence of speculative propositions that has me in thrall.

Schleiermacher himself recognized the problems created in this regard by the non-dogmatic Introduction to his Glaubenslehre, which also contained "modes of nontheological reflection". This required two immediate responses both of which are suggested in Schleiermacher's Open Letters: i) a clearly visible crevice or chasm (Kluft) 68 must be established between the Introduction and the body of the work, the dogmatic theology. This would minimize the dependence of the latter on the former. ii) We have to learn to view the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre as a particular kind of theological discipline, 69 something it must be, of course, if philosophical theology is properly located there. Michael Eckert's summary of these two points cannot be paraphrased:
Seine strukturell-formale Umgestaltung der 'Einleitung' der zweiten Auflage gegenüber der ersten Auflage begründet Schleiermacher mit dem Hinweis, daß Dogmatik und 'Einleitung' deutlich voneinander abzuheben seien, da die 'Einleitung' als 'besondere theologische Disziplin mit denjenigen allgemeinen Wissenschaften, an welche sie sich ihrer wissenschaftlichen Form wegen vorzüglich zu halten hat' auf spezifische Weise zusammenhängt.

The difficulty here, as we have been repeating ad nauseam, is not how philosophical theology relates to the other sciences, of which there is no doubt; the difficulty is how philosophical theology relates to the Glaubenslehre—how it can "govern" dogmatic theology without introducing speculation into dogmatic theology.

The dilemma we are confronting here goes right back to "first beginnings" of the Reformation, where the groundwork for the "eternal contract" was laid. Luther articulates the principles very clearly: philosophy and theology are different and they must be carefully distinguished from one another. But the speculativa vita is not on this account to be discarded:

Christus non potest concipi, spectari nisi ratione, intellectu. Das ist vere speculativa vita. [1531] ... Et illa apprehensio Christi per fidem proprie est Speculativa vita ... Et illa speculatio qua Christus apprehenditur ... est Theologica ... [1535] 75

Schleiermacher himself never abandoned the speculative life (except apparently in theology). It may be that a life devoted to "the apprehension of Christ through faith" need not be locked in mortal combat with speculation.

V.

One of Schleiermacher's most successful passages in the Open Letters is formulated in direct opposition to F.C. Baur. The claim is that the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre has nothing to do with any a priori demonstration of Christianity: the propositions of the Introduction are intended "only" to enable "the specification of the place of Christianity" ("... in den Sätzen der Einleitung ... nur die Ortsbestimmung ... daß es hier nur darauf ankomme, dem Christentum seinen Ort zu bestimmen"). As Brian Gerrish explains this rather obscure concept of "placement", the work of the Introduction is actually twofold: i) to find the place of piety "among the various functions of the human spirit"; and then ii) to find the place of Christianity (ultimately
in its specifically Protestant manifestation) "among the various possible modifications of the religious consciousness".\textsuperscript{78} We must assume that it is the task of \textit{Ethik} to secure the former, and the task of \textit{Religionsphilosophie} and philosophical theology to bring the latter into scientific focus.\textsuperscript{79} It follows automatically from the above (if this summary is correct) that "not even a single properly dogmatic proposition" is to be found in the whole of the Introduction.\textsuperscript{80} In this sense, then, the Introduction is only a formal framework in which dogmatic theology will be embedded.\textsuperscript{81} As we are now in a position to know very well, this work of "location" is speculative as well as empirical, and we shall still want to ask whether this (partly) speculative procedure will prove a genial "introduction" to a "wholly" empirical theology.\textsuperscript{82} What cannot be legitimate is Gerhard Ebeling's neat evasion of the problem by this simple declaration:

Für SCHLEIERMACHER ist aber philosophische Theologie nicht eine philosophische, sondern eine spezifisch theologische Disziplin, partizipiert also an den Merkmalen der Theologie als positiver Wissenschaft.\textsuperscript{83}

Presumably Ebeling would call §24 of the \textit{Kurze Darstellung} into the discussion as evidence. There Schleiermacher explicitly classifies philosophical theology as a "division" (\textit{Teil}) of Christian theology. Nonetheless it is "built up" from the principles of \textit{Religionsphilosophie} (\textit{von diesen Grundlagen aus}), principles which, by definition, reach beyond the confines of a Christian discipline. §24 also makes clear that the two primary functions of philosophical theology are i) the fixing of concepts (\textit{Begriffsbestimmungen}) and ii) the task of organizing the theological sciences.\textsuperscript{84} We do, of course, agree that both activities have positive, practical consequences, but surely the "philosophical" element in the title is more than just a (misleading) convention.\textsuperscript{85} The organization of theological disciplines has a "scientific" as well as a "positive" necessity; the science which undertakes this organization is formed from two directions—external and internal, if you will—and therefore "philosophical theology" is no misnomer.
The same dynamic applies to dogmatic theology, as is rather well illustrated in §4.1 of the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre*: the ecclesiastical worth of a section of the *Glaubenslehre* is determined by the fullness, the exhaustiveness of the treatment. The versatility (*Vielseitigkeit*) with which these sections actually lead into one another establishes their scientific worth. Each section must in its scientific mode be able to point backwards and forwards at once (§4.2), because the discipline becomes a science, as we know, only through the principle of *Zusammenhang*. Nothing can stand in the *Glaubenslehre* just for the sake of systematic coherence (*des Zusammenhangs willens*), each proposition must represent positive pious emotion. On the other hand, propositions which are unable to contribute to this systematic coherence should only be regarded as preliminary; these propositions are ripe for either revision or excision (§4.3). In this way the demands of both perspectives, internal and external, are catered for at the same time.

It is worth consulting the final paragraph of the equivalent section of the second edition (§17.3), since this makes clear that propositions concerning the faith only become "dogmatic" with reference to their "scientific" character. Then Schleiermacher concludes the section with a truly subtle distinction, which indicates that the ecclesiastical utility of dogmatic propositions increases in proportion to their "Wissenschaftlichkeit". Equally, those propositions attain their fullest stature, as their scientific content (*der wissenschaftliche Gehalt*) can be seen as "bearing traces" of an origin partial to the church's requirements. This deftly unites the ecclesiastical partiality with the scientific necessity and does begin to indicate how the discipline of dogmatic theology can—from an internal, ecclesiastical perspective—appropriate the scientific tools it needs to carry out its work. The "positive" internal perspective can in this way bring the method (acquired externally) into alignment. Ironically enough, the more definite the ecclesiastical commitment governing the discipline, the less likely it is that dogmatic theology—and *Glaubenslehre*—can be seen to be "ganz einfach und ehrlich nur empirisch!"
VI.

No better summary of the complex issues raised above can be given than in this instructive catalogue provided by Gerhard Ebeling (and cited in full):

Es war die Leistung Schleiermachers, in enger Nachbarschaft zur idealistischen Philosophie eine Konzeption theologischer Enzyklopädie zu entwerfen, die den Charakter der Theologie als positiver Wissenschaft entschieden bejaht, sie also nicht spekulativ in der Idee der Wissenschaft begründet sein läßt und dennoch mit vorbildlicher Strenge an der Aufgabe einer formalen Enzyklopädie festhält, einer Rechenschaft über die Wissenschaftlichkeit und innere Organisation der Theologie.90

While Ebeling’s obvious concern here is with the notion of the theological encyclopedia, we do no great violence to Ebeling’s conclusions by substituting the term "philosophical theology" ("the principles of one’s whole theological way of thinking")91 in its place. In accord with this line of argument, Schleiermacher’s philosophical theology was being worked out in a "speculative climate", without losing its "positive" origins, and without simply grounding the discipline in speculation. Furthermore, philosophical theology is concerned with "Wissenschaftlichkeit" and the organization of the theological sciences.92 Ebeling’s summary occasions two further observations: i) it appears as if the theological encyclopedia can only be constructed from within the discipline of philosophical theology (drawing upon the sciences external to theology as it sees fit). ii) As philosophical theology provides a Rechenschaft of the science of theology in general, dogmatic theology’s brief is to provide a Rechenschaft of the Christian faith (in its present manifestation) in particular. The term Rechenschaft has attained the status of a shibboleth in contemporary Schleiermacher studies,93 because a Rechenschaft, which is descriptive, guarantees the positive (and therefore non-speculative) intent of the theological method.

Ebeling’s account is in complete harmony with the principles which Schleiermacher enunciated consistently throughout his life. Schleiermacher’s first address to the Berlin Academy of Sciences (after being elected to membership in 1810) acknowledges that the Germans have the highest concept of philosophy and the deepest respect for it as a subject;94 nonethe-
less the only appropriate treatment of the subject in the philosophical section of the Academy is by way of a "historical and critical" method. The Academy's work is apparently less suitable for those philosophers who are establishing or perfecting new "systems", which might lead the Academy into conflict with itself. 95 This is of considerable interest on two counts: i) it explains that Schleiermacher's hostility to Hegel's membership of the Academy is based on objective grounds, as well as personal hostility. The dissolution of the division for speculative philosophy into a "philosophisch-historische Klasse" (1828) therefore realizes a principle that Schleiermacher first enunciated in 1810! ii) Schleiermacher's suggestion of how philosophy should be treated—so apparently out of step with a "division for speculative philosophy"—is perfectly consonant with his insistence that dogmatic theology is a historical discipline, the correct treatment of which requires "theological reflection" as well as historisch-kritische Wissenschaft. 96

In discussing the address to the Academy in 1810, Richard Crouter states that Schleiermacher "formally disassociated himself from speculative philosophy". 97 Although Schleiermacher does not directly allude to speculative philosophy in the course of the address, it is true that Schleiermacher modestly suggests that he has not and will not produce a new system of philosophy. 98 This statement stands in so far as Schleiermacher did not manage to publish his Dialektik in his lifetime. But in these unpublished lectures, he typically struck out on an individual course (which attracted considerable attention at the University), 99 and which subsequent generations have come to regard as a salutary antidote to the Hegelian dialectic, which supposedly suppresses both individuality and difference. 100

Schleiermacher's humble disclaimer must not, however, obscure the fact that in his secular embodiment he was seeking a Weltweisheit, in which the speculative and the empirical would find the mutual inter-penetration they need in order to provide "der eigentlich gesuchte Begriff von Philosophie". 101 It does not do justice to Schleiermacher's notion simply to equate Weltweisheit with philosophy (as Crouter does), 102 since this actually suppresses the important role given to speculation not only in Dialektik, but also
in establishing the theological disciplines. The speculative mode of thought is active and spontaneous and proceeds deductively in its attempt to grasp the phenomena in their essences. The empirical mode of reflection is more readily allied to a passive receptivity; it proceeds inductively, and grasps the phenomena as manifold, changeable, and in the process of becoming. 103

The significance of this interpenetration for the science of theology is obvious: as philosophical theology, the science seeks the abiding essence of Christianity; as dogmatic theology it seeks to discover the manifold expression of that essence (phenomenologically) in the historical doctrines of Christianity, as these may be discerned in the Church's contemporary life. It goes without saying that these doctrines are subject to variation, alteration and even abolition. 104

This is how Schleiermacher proposed to neutralize the speculative challenge he faced in nineteenth-century Berlin (first from Fichte, and then from Hegel). His insistence on a "positive" orientation was to be the bulwark against speculation in the dogmatic theology, just as his insistence on historical-critical method would prove the defence against the "despotism" of the Hegelian philosophy in the Academy. 105 But we need to be clear that the problem is not with speculation as such, but more correctly with a speculative reason which usurps the prerogative properly reserved for empirical reflection.

It must have been with a heavy heart, then, that Schleiermacher noted the degree to which the first edition of his Glaubenslehre had been misunderstood—especially with the extensive references to the "speculative" nature of his dogmatic theology. 106 The strong insistence on a "chasm" between the Introduction and the system of doctrines (the Glaubenslehre proper) is an attempt to redress this misunderstanding, so that no one will again be able to conclude that there is in the Glaubenslehre any attempt "to demonstrate or deduce Christianity"—the identifying characteristics of a speculative method. The Introduction, which is only intended as "a preliminary orientation", and is not properly speaking dogmatic theology at all, 107 has been mistaken as the heart of the matter. 108
It is highly instructive in this regard that §6 of the first edition is dropped in the revision of the *Glaubenslehre*. This section contains the notorious remark that we have "to proceed beyond Christianity and take our standpoint above it", in order to be able to compare it with other forms of faith. Richard Crouter gives this sympathetic interpretation of what Schleiermacher intended by this proposition:

In order to get started, dogmatics is dependent on a frame of reference that lies beyond the dogmatic and confessional perspective pure and simple. The problem of determining the essence of Christianity and 'the nature of Christian piety' must be settled before dogmatics proper can get started.¹⁰⁹

This is by now very familiar: the talk of "frame of reference" must be allied with something we can only acquire "externally"—always with the positive service of Christian theology in mind. In order to get started, we shall need the services of philosophical theology, which provides each one of us with "die Prinzipien seiner gesamten theologischen Denkungsart."¹¹⁰ It would then be quite absurd to argue that philosophy has been totally banished from the *Glaubenslehre*. But it must be shown that its influence has been restricted to certain clearly defined portions of a theological introduction. Under no circumstances must traces of this philosophical theology be discovered in the body of the text.

VII. In a famous letter in which Schleiermacher mentions the revision of his *Glaubenslehre*, he informs his friend (J. Chr. Gaß), that although everything is being rewritten, the contents of his dogmatic theology remain completely the same.¹¹¹ This assessment of the revision has not received universal support. Surely the most radical dissenting voice is that of Eric von der Luft, who regards the two editions of the *Glaubenslehre* as so different in style and substance that the later version should have been retitled; the *Glaubenslehre* was rewritten "from scratch".¹¹² Martin Redeker's own introduction to the second edition assesses the situation more moderately: the later edition, of course, takes into account comments and criticisms from friends and opponents alike. As a consequence, the first edition is less inhibited and more
immediately expresses Schleiermacher's intention. Even so, despite all the differences between the two editions, the material dissimilarity (just as Schleiermacher himself indicated) is not overwhelming. 113

But we shall need to take particular account of the argument that in the second edition of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher's Introduction is "structurally recast in order to bring out the independence of dogmatics in relation to philosophic or other modes of nontheological reflection". 114 The same point may be extracted from the marginalia to Schleiermacher's own copy of the first edition. The note in question alludes to the hostile review of the Glaubenslehre, which appeared in Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (1823). This review not surprisingly accuses Schleiermacher of cultivating a kind of philosophy of religion and theological speculation, about which he does not want to be completely open. 115 The marginal comment states explicitly that dogmatic theology's Wissenschaftlichkeit is strictly a matter of form, i.e., it does not impinge upon the content. 116 The refrain is taken up in the Open Letters, where Schleiermacher assures his readers that he will not allow his "philosophical dilettantism" to exercise any influence on the "content of the Glaubenslehre". 117 This argument that "the scientific character of dogmatics was related to its form only" occasions real difficulties. First, it does not tally at all with §17.3 of Glaubenslehre, where the fullness of dogmatic propositions is related to their "scientific content", as this "bears traces" of their ecclesiastical origin. Secondly, the marginal note is set beside §1.2 (Glaubenslehre), in which Schleiermacher argues that it is only the demand for the "wissenschaftlicher Zusammenhang" which separates dogmatic theology from more popular forms of church instruction, such as catechism. These are not wholly bereft of Zusammenhang either, but as popular forms of instruction, they do not require the scholarship or the systematic arrangement which we expect of dogmatic theology. 118 If this is to be taken seriously, we should then expect to find in the Glaubenslehre an account of Christian faith fully consonant with popular catechetical teaching: its substantial distinguishing characteristic will be the rigour of its presentation. This, too, accords with Schleiermacher's testimony in the Vorrede to Glaubenslehre: the
originality of his dogmatic theology is confined to the systematic order in which it is presented, and to some of the terminology. There are therefore no grounds for placing Schleiermacher at the head of a new school of theology. This modest disclaimer is so far removed from the actual reception of Schleiermacher's work that it is hard to believe the author is not, in this matter, dissembling.

Even Schleiermacher's erstwhile colleague and lifelong champion, W.M.L. de Wette, would have found it difficult to support the diffidence expressed in the Preface. Initially, de Wette had suspected Schleiermacher, the preacher, of masking the real import of his theology, but was persuaded to give up this view by the same Friedrich Lücke, to whom the exceptionally important Open Letters are addressed: Lücke argued that Schleiermacher was neither "two-faced" as a preacher or as a theologian, nor was he subject to a divided consciousness. De Wette paid Schleiermacher the extreme compliment at the end of his career of writing a dogmatic theology, which reflected the very essence of the master's method. The title of this work alone shows the extent of the debt to Schleiermacher, viz. Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkte des Glaubens (1846). It is, therefore, of great interest to read de Wette's assessment of the first edition, which he regarded as unquestionably the "first genuine systematic theology" since Calvin. He acknowledges that Schleiermacher excludes any philosophical treatment of the Trinity, but declares firmly that the first part of the Glaubenslehre is essentially philosophical or universally applicable to humanity.

In the Open Letters, Schleiermacher is forced to acknowledge that it is not only the Introduction but also the first part of the Glaubenslehre ("ein bloßes Außenwerk") which have caused misunderstandings as to the real intention of his "system of doctrines". Schleiermacher discusses the possibility of reversing the order of dogmatic presentation, so that the "natural attributes of God" would follow the sections on Christology, redemption and the kingdom of God. If we honestly accept this line of reasoning, we are approaching the point where nearly half of the Glaubenslehre can be said to be leading readers away from its real intention! The dilemma is com-
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Schleiermacher's Rational Theology

pounded when we learn that Schleiermacher would have preferred to revise the *Glaubenslehre* by dispensing with all the propositions concerning attributes of God and "characteristics of the world" (*Beschaffenheiten der Welt*): these propositions are incidental (*Nebenformen*) and do not affirm anything essential that is not already contained in the fundamental form (*Grundform*) of dogmatic proposition, i.e., descriptions of human states.\textsuperscript{124} It must therefore be possible to establish all dogmatic propositions as formulae for definite states of mind.\textsuperscript{125} The secondary forms (*Nebenformen*) of dogmatic proposition were only left in the first edition, because without them the *Glaubenslehre* would lose its "proper historical position and so its ecclesiastical character". Nonetheless, they could have been dispensed with (so können jene beiden anderen ja gemäß werden), and sooner or later our (sic) *Glaubenslehre* will indeed learn to manage without them.\textsuperscript{126}

The second edition is not quite so forthright; in principle, a theological reduction to propositions characteristic of the *Grundformen* is the only means of preventing the unwelcome intrusion of alien, "purely scientific propositions" into the *Glaubenslehre*. The other two forms of dogmatic statement would, from the point of view of this reduction, be superfluous. However such consistency in Schleiermacher's presentation of Christian doctrine would be unzeitgemäß, i.e., inopportune, because such a dogmatic theology would be without historical anchorage (*ohne alle geschichtliche Haltung*) and consequently it would be without a properly ecclesiastical character. Hence, a dogmatic theology strictly adhering to the principles of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* "könnte auch, wie vollkommen treu es immer den Inhalt der christlichen Lehre wiedergäbe, doch den eigentlichen Zweck aller Dogmatik nicht erfüllen."\textsuperscript{127} Is it any wonder then that F.C. Baur complained of "ein unstetes Hin- und Herschwanken aber zwischen verschiedenartigen Prinzipien", and asks Schleiermacher "sich bestimmter und unmittelbarer zu erklären, als bisher geschehen ist".\textsuperscript{128}

To summarize what Schleiermacher has told us: i) the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* is not the real beginning of the work;\textsuperscript{129} it is a form of theological discipline, but it must be radically separated from the actual
dogmatic theology; it is the source of massive misinterpretation as to the real intention of the *Glaubenslehre*. ii) The first part of the *Glaubenslehre* is only an outstation (*Außenwerk*) on the way to the heart of the matter; the doctrines developed in the first part could have been articulated after Christology and ecclesiology, and if this had been done they would have been seen "in a properly Christian light"; the Introduction and the first part together have duped the unwary as to the true nature of Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology. iii) The real purpose of the whole enterprise is "die Darstellung des eigentümlich christlichen Bewußtseins"; indeed the fundamental form of dogmatic proposition is the unmediated description of human religious consciousness; this tenacious link with "the realm of inner experience" is the only guarantee against the insinuation of "purely scientific propositions" into the *Glaubenslehre*; the other two forms of dogmatic proposition are incidental (*Nebenformen*) and must be referred back to the *Grundform*; it is not possible at present to write a dogmatic theology which adheres strictly to the *Grundform*, because such a *Glaubenslehre* would be isolated from the contemporary Church, and (b) would therefore be unable to "fulfil the real purpose of all Dogmatics". As set out, Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* may be misleading its readers, but a more consistent treatment of the subject-matter, viz. "the description of the consciousness distinctive to Christianity" would be unecclesiastical, and hence in Schleiermacher's sense undogmatic. What can we conclude, then, but that we are left with a theological work which, by its very construction, obscures its real intention just as much as it clarifies it?

**VIII.**

Schleiermacher's dogmatic method is dedicated to the divorce of *christliche Glaubenslehre* from speculation, but, by its very nature as a "science", dogmatic theology cannot avoid some interaction with contemporary philosophy. The central discussion of this point occurs in §31 of *Glaubenslehre*, and this may be usefully contrasted with the equivalent section of the second edition (§28). Both versions agree that "scientific" structure (*wissenschaftliche*)
Gestaltung) is essential (wesentlich) to dogmatic theology. This defining quality is achieved by means of the "dialectical character of the language and the systematic arrangement". Presumably the latter requirement is realized in each (ecclesiastical) systematician's "philosophical theology";\(^ {133}\) the former, "the suitable management of language in dogmatic presentation"\(^ {134}\) is, however, fraught with difficulties. Dogmatic theology has no option but to employ the terminology it finds available in the world of science, scholarship and research, but just for that reason the greatest caution is required.

The language which the church employs in any dogmatic theology is as much a given and ready-to-hand as the faith which it will be the duty of that language to describe. As Schleiermacher admits, a theologian's vocabulary must be chosen from a bewildering variety of ages and systems (§28.1); nevertheless through a skilfully selected glossary it should be possible for such a theologian to devise adequate linguistic tools for dogmatic usage. Schleiermacher's perfectly consistent conclusion is that in this way "the danger of an influence hurtful to the interests of Christian piety completely disappears".\(^ {135}\) It is very much the task of this dissertation to throw such a convenient conclusion into doubt.

A timely rejoinder to the above is Walter Kasper's (self-evident) concession that the church cannot be "Herr der Begriffsgeschichte"\(^ {136}\)—the concepts and technical vocabulary without which Christian piety would remain speechless come to have a life of their own, quite apart from their ecclesiastical utility (or otherwise). The most obvious illustration of this point is provided by the central Christian mystery with its talk of one God and three persons, or indeed one substance and three persons. The Greek concept of the hypostasis has been replaced by the Latin persona,\(^ {137}\) and as this fateful transfer of concepts has helped us to develop our Latin Christian understanding of the nature of personhood, so in turn the implications of divine personhood are drawn by the advance of the philosophical concept. That is the actual "dialectical" nature of human language: we adopt certain terms in order to describe a subject; in time those same terms help us to discover what the subject really is. However unpalatable this conclusion is
in the present context, Schleiermacher understands how language works very well: in his seminal address on translation (before the Berlin Academy in 1813), he describes this "dialectical" process with real precision and insight:

In diesem System der Sprache muß die Weisheit eines jeden aufgehen. Jeder schöpft aus dem vorhandenen, jeder hilft das nicht vorhandene aber vorgebildete ans Licht bringen. 138

IX. Surely the most memorable entry in Schleiermacher’s theological thesaurus must be "das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl", the seminal topic of §4 of the Introduction. 139 Hans-Joachim Birkner has described this exposition as the "Leitbegriff" of Schleiermacher’s theory of religion; it is a "Wesensbestimmung" of religion, and provides the foundation both for Schleiermacher’s theory of Christianity and his interpretation of the tradition of Christian doctrine. 140 According to Schleiermacher’s division of the text, this section on "the feeling of absolute dependence" falls within his attempt to define the cultural phenomenon of "church" and belongs beside those propositions borrowed from the speculative science that Schleiermacher calls Ethik. 141 If we can accept the rough definition of Ethik as "Schleiermacher’s equivalent of social science", 142 then it might not be too great an impertinence to suggest that while the definition of a community like "church" is properly a topic for the science called Ethik, the definition of Abhängigkeitsgefühl as the essence of religion finds a more appropriate home in Schleiermacher’s Dialektik—where indeed Gefühl is defined as "unmittelbares Selbstbewußtsein" or "immediate self-consciousness". 143

This is not a negligible qualification, as this dissertation would tend to view Schleiermacher’s "feeling of absolute dependence" as the speculative bedrock of the whole of Schleiermacher’s "philosophy of religion" or, if one prefers, his philosophical theology. This more philosophical account of Schleiermacher’s Leitbegriff is in no way diminished by the injunction not to translate schlechthinnig by the philosophical sounding word "absolute". Claude Welch suggests we substitute the more neutral terms "utter" or "unqualified". 144 But in doing so, he ignores Schleiermacher’s own stated
equation of schlechthinig with absolut, as we may discover from Schleiermacher's lecture notes for the *Glaubenslehre*. The difficulty in finding the correct interpretation of Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology begins right here in these opening propositions of the introduction: "the piety which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is ... neither a knowing nor a doing", but, as the feeling of absolute dependence, it is a consciousness of being "in relation with God" (*Beziehung mit Gott*), the "Whence of our receptive and active existence"—as the English translation expresses it. The translators, finding an easy equivalence in "active", do not linger over the prefix in the word "selbsttätig", nor do they bother to translate the word *mitgesetzt* in the crucial phrase "das in diesem Selbstbewußtsein mitgesetzte Woher". As Schleiermacher explains in his appended lecture notes, the word God designates precisely this "in dem ursprünglichen, schlechthinigen Abhängigkeitsgefühl Mitgesetzte." This is not a trifling editorial omission: only if we give this term *mitgesetzt* its proper due, can we grasp how "God is given to us in feeling in an original way". This feeling, which is the basic type (Grundform) of all piety, has God as its co-determinant (Mitbestimmende). Alongside the "absolute dependence ... there is given to man the immediate self-consciousness of it, which becomes a consciousness of God". This is the "original revelation of God to man or in man" by means of which it is possible to launch this work of theology, this *Glaubenslehre*.

It is ironic that this severely compressed discussion of Schleiermacher's daunting argument can be perfectly summarized in this way: "Thus to know oneself to be absolutely dependent and to be conscious of God is one and the same thing." The irony is that if the feeling of absolute dependence has any distinct function in this analysis it must be to get us away from the notion that dogmatic theology begins with God as "a rationally established idea", something conceivable in itself, but of no concern in a work dedicated to *Glaubenslehre*, the explication of Christian piety. With perfect consistency, Schleiermacher concedes that such an original knowledge of God is entirely possible, but of no interest here, since there is no necessary correlation of knowledge with piety—and here the subject-matter is piety. This neatly
confirms the position that he adopted in his *Open Letters*, viz. it is possible to drain the chalice of speculation, without discovering piety at the bottom.\(^{152}\) And yet even in the pithy summary offered above, it is impossible to get away from the sense of "knowing" something in one's self-consciousness. We may feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent, but we are made conscious of our "being in relation with God".

To avoid entanglement with "rationally established" ideas, it is absolutely imperative that Schleiermacher do away with any *impious* explanation of this feeling (*unfromme Erklärung dieses Gefühls*),\(^{153}\) where "impious" is understood as any philosophical interpretation of this same consciousness which is "an und für sich ein Mitgesetztsein Gottes in Selbstbewusstsein" (§30.1).\(^{154}\) It may then distress some to discover that the terminology of *Abhängigkeitsgefühl* has a venerable provenance in Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*: a very early reference occurs in Fichte's *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* of 1794. There Fichte alludes to "das Gefühl der Abhängigkeit unseres Ich",\(^{155}\) but this idea is considerably enhanced in the context of Fichte's *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre* (1801/1802), where there are repeated references to "das unmittelbare Gefühl der Gewißheit (d.i. Absolutheit, Unerschütterlichkeit, Unveränderlichkeit des Wissens)".\(^{156}\) Emanuel Hirsch claims that it is impossible for anyone to deny that "Schleiermachers Lehre vom religiösen Gefühl in dem entscheidenden Punkte erkenntnistheoretisch-formal hier vorgebildet ist".\(^{157}\) The legion of theological commentators who have discussed this *Leitbegriff* hardly ever recognize or discuss this anomaly.\(^{158}\) Once this "coincidence" of Schleiermacher's *Leitbegriff* with Fichte's speculative concept is acknowledged, it will never be possible—in my opinion—to go back to a cosy description of the feeling of absolute dependence as "the preliminary, quasi-scientific yet common-sensical" systematic principle which governs the *Glaubenslehre*.\(^{159}\)

We cannot leave this patently inadequate discussion of pious feeling (properly a dissertation topic in itself) without reference to Hegel's infamous attack on Schleiermacher in his introduction to Hinrich's *Religionsphilosophie* (1822).\(^{160}\) This notoriously bad-tempered passage argues that if Schlieier-
macher intends us to take him seriously, then we are forced to conclude that of all God's creatures the dog must prove to be the best Christian, since the dog has this feeling of dependence pre-eminently. And for good measure Hegel cannot resist adding to the dog's other virtues the feelings of redemption (Erlösungsgefühle) the animal experiences when it is offered a bone. This violent criticism did little to improve the already strained relations between these two great professors at the University of Berlin, but there is much more at issue here than the convenient assertion that Hegel simply misunderstood what Schleiermacher meant by "feeling".  

At a superficial level, Hegel is only echoing the sentiment of Professor Baumgarten-Crusius, whom Schleiermacher cites in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre: "Das Gefühl wird niemand zum Grund der Religion machen, der sich selbst versteht ...!" (§8. Anmerkung). The bitterness of Hegel's polemic indicates the gravity of what he thinks is at stake.

In the second edition of the Glaubenslehre (i.e., published long after the appearance of the Hinrichs' Preface), Schleiermacher characterizes absolute dependence as that quality which adheres to all of finite existence, man differing only in possessing it as a matter of "immediate self-consciousness". My sympathies are with Hegel in not understanding why this form of self-consciousness should be identified as a type of "feeling", unless, of course, the whole point is to put the "co-determinant" of this feeling beyond the reach of what Hegel would call "die denkende Vernunft". The real question that Hegel is posing is whether any theology can actually be constructed from this foundation in feeling. Hegel suggests in the Preface that the essential legacy of the Kantian philosophy is a

God deprived of all definite character, predicates and properties, lifted into a beyond where we cannot know Him, or rather reduced to an abstraction void of all content.

Hegel suspects that from this starting point in feeling all that the modern theologian will be able to discover is the "caput mortuum of a merely abstract Being", so that the Enlightenment leaves the Christian religion bereft of its crown jewels: "a truth that is known, an objective content, a doctrinal theology".

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The real vehemence of Hegel's remarks in this Preface can be attributed to both aspects of Schleiermacher's *Leitbegriff*. Hegel objects as much to the notion of "dependence" in religion, as he does to establishing a theological system upon the basis of "feeling". As Walter Jaeschke explains, this talk of *Abhängigkeit* is (for Hegel) really a sign that the theologian is "hanging onto" the moment of finitude in religion,¹⁶⁶ the exact opposite of what the coming of the Son of God is meant to accomplish: the breaking down of the dividing wall between God and man, between the infinite and the finite.¹⁶⁷ With this reflection we have arrived at the nub of the conflict between these two great intellects: Schleiermacher refuses to draw the consequences of the "Menschwerdung Gottes":

Schleiermacher certainly does teach "that finite spirit has the consciousness of God within the finite itself"—¹⁶⁹—the feeling of absolute dependence is his means of affirming this—but Hegel condemns Schleiermacher's squeamishness in refusing to draw the consequences in a robust statement of Christian theology. Hegel alludes to Schleiermacher's theology in a letter to Hinrichs, and, clearly in some anger, denounces the first published volume of the *Glaubenslehre*: Hegel is aghast at the suggestion that this could claim to represent the theology of the (not yet) united branches of Lutheran and Reformed Protestantism. He regards what is presented there as arrogant and insipid.¹⁷⁰ Hegel cannot reconcile himself to this elevation of *Abhängigkeit*, which he can only regard as a refusal to take seriously the freedom of the spirit which every Christian is offered. These words follow directly upon the infamous passage which extols the pious virtues of the dog:

Jaeschke rightly concludes from passages like these, that there is more at work here than just a bad-tempered squabble with an unpopular colleague:

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what is really at issue is "eine prinzipielle Kontroverse um den Gottes- und Religionsbegriff". To complete this discussion it is only necessary to add that the controversy applies with equal force to the "Begriff der Theologie".

One is entitled to ask the question how a theology is actually to be constructed from such an unpromising point of departure as that offered by the feeling of absolute dependence. Erik Schmidt suggests that Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre is able to offer the reader more than a psychology of the religious consciousness just because those illicit and unwarranted "metaphysical" elements (supposedly banished from the work in principle) are readmitted "through the back door", as it were. Schmidt is sure that, in the event, Schleiermacher proceeds to interpret the feeling of absolute dependence as "geistiges Gefühl", where Geist has to be understood in the same untranslatable sense that it carries in Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes.

It has been said in praise of Schleiermacher that his towering stature in Protestant theology derives from the fact that he was the first to recognize the need for, and was the first theologian to formulate, "dogmatics without dogmas". While finding this formula quite incomprehensible, Hegel would certainly be the first to agree that this is what Schleiermacher has presented us with. This naturally led to further conflicts.

We know that Hegel probably decided to lecture on the philosophy of religion for the first time in 1821 because of the impending publication of the first volume of the Glaubenslehre, but the crossfire with Schleiermacher’s dogmatic theology continued unabated until Hegel’s criticism achieved its "canonical" form in lectures given in 1827: Hegel laments the demise of doctrines like the Trinity and the miracles, which have been put in the shade by theology itself, with the ironic consequence that "much more of dogmatics has been preserved in philosophy than in dogmatics or in theology itself as such." Hegel identifies the source of this irony in "the finite thinking" of the theologians; that is, they continue to hang onto that finitude in thought and being which Hegel regards as incompatible with Christianity and which renders them incapable of comprehending the divine. Hegel now reverses the common judgment which casts philosophy in
the role of the "spoiler" of faith: it is the contingent, finite thinking characteristic of modern theology which places the eternal verities of the Christian religion in jeopardy:

As a result of such a finite thinking and comprehending of the divine, or of what is in and for itself, as a result of this finite thinking of the absolute content, the fundamental doctrines of Christianity have for the most part disappeared from dogmatics. Philosophy is preeminently, though not exclusively, what is at present essentially orthodox; the propositions that have always been valid, the basic truths of Christianity, are maintained and preserved by it.177

X. As we know, heterodoxy has a systematic function in Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre (see page 98). His conviction that the "divinatory heterodoxy" at the heart of his theological method will provide the "orthodoxy" of future generations178 is the central "speculative" tenet of this whole enterprise. If speculation can be defined as investing in the future, as investing against the prevailing market sentiment or as "betting on an idea";179 then it is perfectly proper to award Schleiermacher the accolade of "speculative theologian" par excellence. Surely, no one will be able at this stage to argue that a theology with this "divination" as its mainspring is "ganz einfach und ehrlich nur empirisch"! An evident occasion for our scepticism is provided by Schleiermacher’s distinctive introduction of a bewildering variety of preparatory and proto-theological disciplines. Schleiermacher himself says of their first appearance in the Kurze Darstellung that these newcomers may be reckoned as "Gespenster ... theologische Disziplinen, die es nie gegeben habe und nie geben werde."180

The real dialectical subtlety of Schleiermacher’s thought can here be given its full due. In a marginal note to the first edition of his Glaubenslehre, his summary of the function of heterodoxy is masterful: "Die Dogmatik ist vorzüglich durch das häretische entwickelt worden ist sie aber gebildet, so muß sie die Entstehung des häretischen verhindern ..."181 This may be understood in two complementary senses: the first incorporates the old saw that the impetus for the development of church doctrine was provided by the trinitarian and Christological heresies of the Church’s first five centuries.182 Edmund Burke’s formula puts this most succinctly: "Our antagon-
ist is our helper." But Schleiermacher also recognizes that element of "perpetual revolution" which Protestantism requires; the principle *ecclesia semper reformanda est* applies just as forcefully to the doctrinal life of "reformed" Christianity. Schleiermacher's remarks here on the "oriental" Christianity (*der morgenländischen Kirche*) need to be given their full weight: its doctrinal development has come to an end, frozen, as it were, into an authentic example of "historical theology", and incapable of any genuine conversation "in den Zusammenhang des geistigen Weltverkehrs" (§23.1). It is just this attempt to grapple with the *aporiai* thrown up by modern secular consciousness which is a signal of the context within which the doctrinal "conversation" is taking place. If the context is to be provided by the *Weltgeist* and the *Zeitgeist*, then it is not so difficult to see how today's heterodoxy may become tomorrow's orthodoxy, and why we may have to learn "to do without" what to this point we have been "accustomed to regard as inseparably bound to the essence of Christianity".

There is a double challenge here: i) to retain the reforming instinct for *Reinigung* (Proposition to §24), the cleansing of Christian doctrine from the corruptions of scholasticism & ii) to respond (in part) to the heterodoxy of the present age by showing how Christianity might relate to religious positions at "different stages of development" (Proposition to §7) and subordinate levels of religious consciousness (which by an inner logic strive for the "purest form of monotheism" in Christianity). Schleiermacher's *Religionsphilosophie* (a fragment of a discipline in §§7-10) exhibits an extraordinary affinity with the Hegelian dialectic, and we note with interest that once "the absolute standpoint" is attained in Christianity, no "wholesale relapse" is envisaged, nor will there occur any retreat into prior stages of religious consciousness—except as expressions of individual pathology: "Einzelne Ausnahmen werden immer mit krankhaften Gemütszustände zusammenhängen ..."! Christianity, it turns out in this phenomenological account, is "in der Tat die vollkommenste unter den am meisten entwickelten Religionsformen" (§8.4).
But the really important dialectical insight embedded in Schleiermacher's *Religionsphilosophie* is the notion that Christianity cannot be content to relate to prior or divergent forms of religious consciousness, as if they were nothing more than aberrations, just false forms of piety by contrast with the truth of Christianity. As Schleiermacher rightly explains (§7.3), all these positions contain elements of truth, and all represent stages on the way to "the purest form of monotheism". From this (dare I say) speculative perspective, all forms of religious consciousness make their peculiar contribution towards the highest expression of that consciousness, and none of these prior forms can rest content until they see the justice of their claims realized in the form that makes sense of them all. I am convinced that this dialectical programme which Schleiermacher adopts with reference to religious consciousness must be allowed to shed light on his attitude towards the prevailing *Weltweisheit* and *Weltverkehr*—with which all instances of contemporary religion have a certain traffic, and which cannot (from the principles just enunciated) ever be considered (in a smug, uncomplicated way) simply as false forms of consciousness (or as Sartre would have said "bad faith"). This I take to be the sense of Schleiermacher's approval of ancient Rome in his *Speeches on Religion*:

Das neue Rom, das gottlose aber konsequente schleudert Bannstrahlen und stößt Ketzer aus; das alte, wahrhaft fromm und religiös im hohen Styl war gastfrei gegen jeden Gott, und so wurde es der Götter voll. 189

In just this sense we need to understand Schleiermacher's attempt "to rehabilitate" the concept of heresy: 190 Rome's ancient piety was "hospitalable to every god". Now to return to Schleiermacher's marginal notation as cited above, we still need to retrieve the other side of his proposition: once heterodoxy has helped the religious consciousness to establish its orthodoxy, the aim of further theological effort must be to prevent doctrinal decay back into heterodox positions. Here again, Schleiermacher provides us with a scheme of things which is unusually subtle. His own treatment of "natural heresies" in the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* is both well known and justly praised. Having established (§22.2)
the distinctive essence of Christianity ... in the fact that in it all religious emotions [alle frommen Erregungen] are related to the redemption wrought by Jesus of Nazareth ...

Schleiermacher can with little effort develop a schema whereby the "natural" Christian heresies are ones in which either the Redeemer cannot accomplish redemption (Docetism and Ebionism), or human nature is understood as not requiring redemption (Pelagianism) or as incapable of receiving it (Manichaeism). To any untrained eye a great deal of what has been said above might be mistaken for dogmatic theology, even though we have not yet emerged from the Introduction. However, Schleiermacher assures us that his definition of the essence of Christianity is established "as it were by way of experiment" (als geschah es versuchsweise), and the elaboration of the same has its proper home within the narrower orbit of the Glaubenslehre. Stephen Sykes calls the theological activity outlined above an "experimental inquiry"; we might be inclined (with less deference to Schleiermacher's sensibilities) to refer to it as a piece of theological speculation!

One of Schleiermacher's great nineteenth-century successors at the University of Berlin, I.A. Dorner (1809-1884), has pointed out that these polar heresies, which neatly encapsulate the parameters of Christian orthodoxy, are restricted to anthropological and Christological doctrine without making any reference to the properly theological doctrine which concerns the actual nature of God—surely not a matter of indifference to that religious self-consciousness which forms the subject-matter of the Glaubenslehre. Dorner suggests that a suitable pair of theological heresies would be pantheism and deism, where pantheism would align itself with Manichaeism and Docetism, and deism would align itself with the other pair of Pelagianism and Ebionism. Dorner understands Schleiermacher's reluctance to widen the discussion in this way, since both pantheism and deism could be regarded as purely philosophical conceptions, and therefore should not arise within the circle of piety. As philosophical constructions, these additional "polar heresies" are of no concern to Christian self-consciousness, since they could never—presumably unlike the other heresies catalogued above—
give rise to ecclesiastical communities. Here the strength and weakness of Schleiermacher's position come into view at once: he is undoubtedly right that it is hard to conceive of religious communities forming themselves around pantheism and deism (the freemasons being the exception who prove the rule!), yet Dorner is also quite correct in observing that these heresies, inasmuch as they endanger the Christian understanding of God, do have "a religious, nay, a fundamental importance". Schleiermacher has dedicated his whole dogmatic effort towards showing it is possible for a theologian to avoid the confusion (Verwechselung) and the mingling (Mischung) of dogmatic and speculative propositions (§16. Postscript)—but Dorner now makes us acutely aware of the cost. Dorner puts the matter succinctly; he thinks he has uncovered "ein folgenreicher Mangel in Schleiermachers System. Er hat keine ausgebildete Gotteslehre." This is no incidental consequence of Schleiermacher's method, but goes to the heart of the whole enterprise. What makes Schleiermacher's theology "rational" rather than speculative is its restriction of dogmatic labour to theologia eectypa (correctly, precisely and fatefully) defined as "was von Gott in der menschlichen Natur lieget" (see p. 142 above). And, of course, this in turn explains the priority of "descriptions of human states" (Beschreibungen menschlicher Lebenszustände) as the "fundamental dogmatic form". As we know from Schleiermacher's Open Letters, in principle, it should be possible to dispense with the other two "historical" forms of dogmatic proposition altogether (i.e., attributes of God and characteristics of the world). That Schleiermacher has not done so, is strictly a matter of convenience; the time is not ripe. The extraordinary existential quality of this work is now coming properly into view: indeed, it must be set down to Schleiermacher's everlasting credit, that a full decade before Kierkegaard attended lectures in Berlin, he was able to describe the religious feelings, which are the stuff of the Glaubenslehre, in this way:

was ich unter dem frommen Gefühl verstehe, gar nicht von der Vorstellung ausgeht, sondern die ursprüngliche Aussage ist über ein unmittelbares Existentialverhältnis...
It is no exaggeration to speak of Schleiermacher's initiative here as "bahn-brechend"; he was anticipating theological positions which would not come into their own for another century.

What we cannot do is to share Schleiermacher's confidence that what he has been laying down as the proper procedure for theology, has just as a matter of course been the case right from the start: his bald assertion that

in the dogmatic developments of the earliest centuries, if we discount the quite unecclesiastical Gnostic schools, the influence of speculation upon the content of dogmatic propositions may be placed at zero. (§16. Postscript.)

is simply breathtaking in its ingenuousness. It also appears to be contradicted by a later assertion in the Glaubenslehre that the ruinous "confusion" (Verwechselung) of dogmatic theology with philosophy is a nasty hangover we inherited from Patristic times.

It can hardly be the object of this dissertation to remind the reader that any religion which identifies its sole avatar as the Logos—in the best known passage of its sacred Scripture—must be thought to have more than a passing relation with Hellenistic philosophical culture. The few awkward references made to the Greek λόγος which occur in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre, seem to have been reduced to a single reference by the time we get to the second edition. In fact the Prologue to John's Gospel gets rather short shrift in the Glaubenslehre altogether. According to Martin Redeker's index of Biblical references, it is only accorded five passing references in the whole of the Glaubenslehre.

It has been said of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Glaubenslehre, that in it we are provided with the concept (Begriff) and the structure (Aufbau) of Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology. As an "empirical" science, this dogmatic theology interprets the data furnished by Scripture (especially the New Testament), Confessions (especially of the Reformation era) and the historic doctrines which express the "common piety" of the Church in its public life (in den öffentlichen Verhandlungen). Dogmatic theology achieves "scientific" status by the systematic structure given to this data, which means concretely, "daß sie [die Dogmatik] die vorgegebene Lehre kritisch darstellt
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It is at least possible to ask whether this "critical" (see pp. 104-105) transformation of Christian doctrine into an expression of Christian self-consciousness will not be providing it with a "speculative" gridiron uncongenial to at least some of the data.

The Introduction is quite clear about Schleiermacher's "agenda": i) "the feeling of absolute dependence" which is "a co-existence of God in the self-consciousness" (§30.1) is the conceptual bedrock of the whole theological enterprise. ii) If we hold fast to this Mitgesetztssein Gottes im Selbstbewusstsein, we shall have no trouble understanding why "descriptions of human states" (Lebenszustände) are the fundamental dogmatic form. iii) If we can resist the temptation to move away from this first and fundamental dogmatic form, we shall at last free Christian theology from the danger of "spekulative Überfremdung", by which the independent existence of subjective, pious self-consciousness is completely submerged. iv) This Introduction to the Glaubenslehre finally offers the means by which we can realize the principle consistently enunciated by Schleiermacher from the first edition of his Speeches on Religion: "daß auch Religion nur durch sich selbst verstanden werden kann". v) Heterodoxy has a systematic function within this elaboration of Christian doctrine: it sustains the flexibility of "the conception of doctrine" (den Lehrbegriff beweglich zu erhalten) and makes room for other means of receiving its data (und anderen Auffassungsweisen Raum zu machen). Whatever else can be said about Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, it is surely not possible to deny that it is "heterodox" in precisely this sense: it brings a whole new Auffassungsweise to bear on the work of Christian doctrine.

In the first edition of the Kurze Darstellung, this need for heterodoxy is worded rather more exactly:

Jedes Element, welches in dem Sinne konstruiert ist, den Lehrbegriff beweglich zu erhalten und neue Darstellungen von dem Wesen des Christentums zu eröffnen, ist heterodox.

Schleiermacher is quite right here as well: his heterodoxy cannot be assessed as doing anything less than equipping us with eine neue Darstellung of the essence of Christianity. In Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology, the mobility
of the letter (Beweglichkeit des Buchstaben)\textsuperscript{213} cannot be in any question either; and I have no doubt that this dialectic of heterodoxy and orthodoxy, this dynamic of spirit and letter, and this constant renewal of Christianity's dogmatic forms is the justification for Schleiermacher's calling Christianity the most "completely idealized" (vollkommen idealisiert) of religions.\textsuperscript{214}
Chapter Three: Footnotes


2. See Martin Redeke’s Introduction to Glaubenslehre, p.xix.


5. Luther Poellot, op. cit., p.23.


7. Luther Poellot, op. cit., p.28.

8. Ibid., p.24. We can find the following summary in Heinrich Schmid (p.28): "Th. extrauox dictur scientia de Deo et rebus divinis cum intelligentibus a Deo ad imitationem theologiae suae ...”


10. See ibid., pp.462-463: ‘Das Wort ‘Gott’ gehört, strenggenommen, nach Schleiermacher überhaupt nicht ins Gebiet der Spekulation, sondern nur begriffliche Umschreibungen wie ‘das höchste Wesen’, ‘das absolut Gute’ oder ‘das ursprüngliche Seiende’.” (ET, pp.129-130.) In part, Ebeling’s case is based on Glaubenslehre, §50.1: “Von der Spekulation aber lehrt die Geschichte, daß, seitdem sie sich das göttliche Wesen zum Gegenstande gemacht, sie ... sich nur daran gehalten hat, Gott als das ursprünglich Seiende und das absolute Gute zu bezeichnen...”

11. See the influential essay by Hans Frei, "Niebuhr’s Theological Background" in Faith and Ethics: The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr, edited by Paul Ramsey. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1957. pp.9-64; here p.36: "Schleiermacher's theological intention was fundamentally realistic in the sense that he rejected the notion that the mind is capable of concrete comprehension of the internal relation between the Absolute (the 'transcendental ground') and finite mind or ideation."

12. "Economy" is a technical term in theological usage derived from the Greek οικονομια —("management, organization, dispensation"). "... classical patristic usage distinguishes 'economy' from 'theology', the former being concerned with the 'exterior' manifestation of God's being and purposes while the latter refers to the inner life of the most holy Trinity." See Syrmeon Lash, "Economy" in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, op. cit., pp.171-172; here p.171.

13. See I.A. Dorner, System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre, Volume II/1. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1880. §100.1 (p.388) begins: "Das christliche Bewußtsein, wenn es über seinen Inhalt sich selbst klar geworden ist, hat das Bedürfnis, die Lehre von Christi Person an die christliche, d. i. trinitarische Gottesidee anzuknüpfen." The subtitle for this section (§100.1) reads, "Die Ankünftigung der Christologie an die immanente Trinitätslehre". Dorner argues that Schleiermacher is prevented from moving beyond a doctrine of the "economic" Trinity to a doctrine of the "immanent" Trinity by his "Begriff von der abstrakten Einfachheit Gottes". (§98.2; p.360.)


15. See Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume I (1799-1870). New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972. p.87: "Hegel ... was proud of redeeming the ancient dogmas, especially of Trinity and Incarnation, for which even Schleiermacher, to say nothing of the Enlightenment, could find no adequate justification." Welch is especially kind to our theologian: it would be possible to write "in particular Schleiermacher" instead of "even Schleiermacher"! Cf. VPR, Teil 3, p.188.

16. G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., pp.406-407: "Der Glaube ist in der Tat hiermit dasselbe geworden, was die Aufklärung, nämlich das Bewußtsein der Beziehung des an sich seienenden Endlichen auf das prädikatlose, unerkannte und unerkenbare Absolute; nur daß sie die befriedigte, er aber die unbefriedigte Aufklärung ist."


19. See the n. above: the pronoun "er" in the quotation refers to "der Standpunkt unserer Zeit" (pp.8-10 of Hegel's manuscript). Cf. the lectures of 1824: "Man kann dies als den Gegenstand der jetzigen Zeit ansehen, daß es um Religion, Religiosität, Frömmigkeit zu tun ist, wobei es auf das Objektive nicht ankomme. Die Menschen haben ver-
schiedene Religionen gehabt, aber jedenfalls [sagt] die jetzige Dogmatik, darauf kommt es nicht an, wenn sie nur fromm sind; man kann Gott nicht wissen als Gegenstand, nicht erkennen, sondern nur die subjektive Weise sei es, worum es zu tun, worauf es ankomme. Dieser Standpunkt ist in dem Gesagten zu erkennen."

(VPR, Teil 3, p.101.)

20. See Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Volume XXVII/1, op.cit., p.308: "Die Religion hat keine spekulative Kenntnis Gottes nötig."

21. See the entry under “Gesinnung” in Volume III of Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, op.cit., cols. 536-539. Lessing used Gesinnung as an equivalent for the French sentiment, and in Kant’s usage Gesinnung is intimately tied to "Sittlichkeit" and duty.


23. Albert L. Blackwell, op. cit., puts this very nicely: "... we shall find Schleiermacher distinguishing morality from religion as carefully as Kant here identifies the two." (p.103).


25. See Hans Frei, "Niebuhr’s Theological Background", op.cit., p.36: "Schleiermacher’s positive philosophical position as it is outlined in his lectures on Dialektik was precisely that which romantic philosophers and metaphysical Idealists held in common, i.e., he sought to develop a principle of mediation in which the epistemic and ontic gulf between finite and infinite would be transcended. But in this work, as in others, he finally came to the conclusion that philosophy and theology, despite their intimate relations, are ultimately technically independent of each other." This is an apposite summary of our topic. I see no point in the formulation "finally came to the conclusion", since the separation of dogmatics from philosophy is Schleiermacher’s most consistent contribution to modern theology. (See A.D.C. Twesten, n. 61 on p.70 above). What is the implication of the wording: "are ultimately technically independent of each other"? Is the "actual" state of affairs somehow different?

26. Lücke, pp. 350-351: "Wenn die Reformation, aus deren ersten Anfängen unsere Kirche hervorgegangen ist, nicht das Ziel hat, einen ewigen Vertrag zu stiften zwischen dem lebendigen christlichen Glauben und der nach allen Seiten friegelassenen, unabhängig für sich arbeitenden wissenschaftlichen Forschung, so daß jener nicht diese hindert, und diese nicht jenen ausschließt..."; English Translation, p. 64. It is worth recording the apposite objection by John Clayton to the usual translation of Schleiermacher’s "ewiger Vertrag" by the words "eternal covenant". See his "Theologie als Vermittlung — Das Beispiel Schleiermachers" in Kongreß, Teilband 2, pp. 899-915; here p. 908. A further problem with the English translation of this passage is usefully indicated by Martin Ohst in Schleiermacher und die Bekennnisschriften: Eine Untersuchung zu seiner Reformations- und Protestantismusdeutung. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989, p. 188n.

27. In his correspondence Luther refers to "Aristoteles, vere diabolum eum fuisses". Letter to Joh. Lang in Erfurt, dated Wittenberg, February 8, 1517. See WA: Briefwechsel (1930), p. 88, line 22. Luther’s aversion to profane speculation is well-attested. Nonetheless, the 50th thesis from his Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam from 1517 is still worth our attention: "Breviter, Totus Aristoteles ad theologiam est tenebrae ad lucem." See
WA, Volume 1, 2nd ed. (1966), p. 226. This has usefully been translated by Heiko A. Oberman as "Der ganze Aristoteles verhält sich zur Theologie wie Schatten zu Licht." See his Luther: Mensch zwischen Gott und Teufel. Berlin: Siedler, 1987, p. 169. While Schleiermacher would agree that philosophical speculation would be fatal for theology, he cannot allow that they have a purely adversarial relation. They become a wedded pair in "philosophical theology".

28. See Martin Ohst, op. cit., p. 189. Ohst credits E. Troeltsch with the expression "Selbstständigkeit der Religion".

29. See Alistair Kee, Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology. London: SCM Press, 1990. Kee credits Schleiermacher with being "the most influential theologian in the modern world". Although Hegel and Schleiermacher were colleagues at the University of Berlin, "their systems were completely different" (p. 43). "We are told that modern liberal theology combines Schleiermacher and Hegel." (p. 178.)

30. The finest example of this can be found in F.C. Baur's Die christliche Gnose, oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Tübingen: C.F. Osiander, 1835. See p. 668: "Dem Schleiermacher'schen Standpunkt der Subjektivität gegenüber, stellt sich die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie, auf welche uns der Gang unserer Untersuchung hier noch führt, auf den Standpunkt der Objektivität. So groß, in dieser Allgemeinheit betrachtet, der Gegensatz dieser beiden Standpunkte ist, in so naher gegenseitiger Berührung stehen demungeachtet die beiden Systeme der Religions-Philosophie... diese gleichzeitige Darstellung der Religions-Philosophie in diesen beiden Formen, von welchen jede mit der andern im engsten Zusammenhang steht..." This dissertation will be confident in having achieved its purpose if it can persuade the reader to take just a small step in the direction of Baur's expert opinion.

31. See Martin Ohst, op. cit., p. 191.

32. See ibid., p. 191: "Ein solches 'Fragment' hat Schleiermacher innerhalb der 'Einleitung' der Glaubenslehre vorgelegt. Daß philosophische Theologie und Dogmatik auf diese Weise unter einem Dach Wohnung finden..."

33. See SW I/11, Beilage A: "Einleitung in das Studium der Kirchengeschichte". It is interesting to note the general consistency of Schleiermacher's views. Take, for example, this extract from the 1806 manuscript: "In dieser Beziehung gehörte die Kirchengeschichte den theologischen Disziplinen an; sie mußte die eigentliche Vollendung derselben sein und die historische Ansicht sich auch hier als die Einheit zwischen Spekulation und Empirie bewähren." (p. 625.)

34. So Walter E. Wyman, Jr., "Troeltschs Begriff der Glaubenslehre" in Troeltsch-Studien, Volume IV, op. cit., pp. 352-373; here p. 359: "...obwohl Schleiermacher ausdrücklich verneint, daß die Einleitung das System der Lehre begründet." Wyman is presumably reinforcing Glaubenslehre, §1.1: "Es folgt übrigens hieraus von selbst, da das, was der Erklärung einer Wissenschaft vorangeht, nicht zur Wissenschaft selbst gehören kann, daß alle Sätze, welche hier vorkommen werden, nicht selbst auch dogmatische sein können."

35. Martin Ohst, op. cit., p. 191. See also Dietz Lange, op. cit., p. 59: "Schleiermacher fordert deshalb eine neue theologische Disziplin, die philosophische Theologie, der er die Aufgabe zuweist, die Theologie in den (als formalen Rahmen aufgefaßten) philosophischen Entwurf des Systems der Wissenschaften einzubeziehen..." The addition of the adjective "formal" to the frame is crucial to the standard Schleiermacher interpretation. Its effects are only formal not material. Our research must lead away from this premise.

36. The best account of this position can be found in Ingolf U. Dalferth, "Theologischer Realismus und realistische Theologie bei Karl Barth" in Evangelische Theologie, Volume 46, 1986, pp. 402-422; here p. 413: "Alle kulturellen Phänomene — und also auch Kirche und Theologie — existieren in der Differenz von Selbstverständnis und Fremdverständnis und unterliegen damit dem Prinzip der doppelten Beschreibung." I hope that my comments ensure that this statement is not simply taken at face value.
37. See Hegel's "Vorrede" to the 3rd edition of his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), reprinted in Volume 8 of the Theorie-Werkausgabe. Hegel attacks "the monstrous assumption of seeking to decide by arbitrary decree as to the Christianity of individuals". See pp. 33-34: "Jener Angriff des Persönlichen auf den Grund sehr spezieller Äußerlichkeiten der Religion zeigte sich mit der ungeheuren Anmaßung, über die Christlichkeit von Individuen aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit absprechen zu wollen und ihnen damit das Siegel der weltlichen und ewigen Verwerfung auszudrücken." This is a reference to the "Hallischer Theologenstreit" of 1830. Hegel is apparently defending two members of Schleiermacher's old theological faculty at Halle. They were subjected to an attack in a journal called the Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, edited by Ernst Hengstenberg, a colleague of Schleiermacher's in theology at Berlin. Although Schleiermacher originally supported the anti-Hegelian stance of this journal, it was not long before the editor got around to attacking him in turn: "Hengstenbergs 'Evangelische Kirchenzeitung' behauptete 1830[!]... Er vermißte Pantheismus und Christentum, seine Dogmatik sei theol. sch. Schwindel." See Friedrich Wilhelm Kantzenbach, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: In Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1967. p. 135. See also Hegel's Logic, op. cit., p. xli; John Edward Toews, op. cit., p. 247; Hegel: The Letters, op. cit., p. 542; Martin Ohst, op. cit., p. 158.

38. Michael Welker discusses the propriety of including an essay on Schleiermacher in a series entitled Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen: Philosophie der Neuzeit III, edited by Josef Speck. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983. pp. 9-45. Welker mentions Schleiermacher's lasting influence for his Plato translation and for his highly original work in Hermeneutik, Ethik, and Dialektik. He also observes that Schleiermacher lectured in both philosophy and theology at the University of Berlin (pp. 11-12). Welker gives a mighty impetus to our thesis with two preliminary conclusions: i) Welker suggests we are driven to ask how Schleiermacher, the theologian, came to develop "eine radikale Außenperspektive auf die Philosophie" (p. 11). The main question we are posing is whether this Außenperspektive is really sustainable, and what its tangible characteristics might be. ii) Welker actually suggests that the problem of the relationship of theology and philosophy in Schleiermacher's thought has now been fundamentally settled ("als grundsätzlich geklärt gelten"). Why? Because Hans-Joachim Birkner says so. Birkner has declared that "für den Theologen Schleiermacher ‘das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie nicht die Würde eines Grundthemas hat’" (See n. 229 of Chapter Two above & Welker, op. cit., pp. 12-13.) I submit that there are still a few loose ends that need to be examined before this issue can finally be dispatched. Certainly, the terms of the settlement remain extraordinarily vague.

39. See KD1, Einleitung §26: "Die philosophische Theologie ist die Wurzel der gesamten Theologie." §31 states: "Die praktische Theologie ist die Krone des theologischen Studiums."

40. In his Open Letters, Schleiermacher suggests that the characteristically "Christian perspective" (im eigentümlich christlichen Licht) of his Glaubenslehre would have been more obvious if i) "the dangerous Introduction" (die gefühlte Einleitung) had been "more clearly and sharply" separated "from the body of the work", and ii) "if the propositions now in the first part... were to follow the Christology". He claims that he was and remains "fondly attached to this alternative arrangement!" The reader will already know that I am deeply suspicious whether any such alternative arrangement is actually possible. Schleiermacher offers two reasons for not pursuing the alternative: whim and inability (eine Grille & eine Unfähigkeit). Our critical reading will certainly assume the latter. Also we shall need to examine in what sense the propositions of the first part can really be described as ein bloßes Außenwerk to the true aim (der eigentliche Zweck) of his Glaubenslehre: "the description [Darstellung] of the consciousness distinctive to Christianity". See Lücke, pp. 342-344 (English Translation, pp. 58 & 59).

42. See Ingolf U. Dalferth, "Theologischer Realismus und realistische Theologie bei Karl Barth", op. cit., p. 416. Dalferth showed quite clearly how the "Metaperspective" is supposed to combine the internal and external perspectives in a lecture entitled "Karl Barth's Eschatological Realism" given at the University of Durham on May 7th, 1986. The argument runs along these lines: for an "internal" Barthian perspective the language of "religion" is the language of unbelief. From an external perspective, where Christianity is treated phenomenologically, it can only be understood as a "religion". From a "metaperspective", Christianity "as a religion" could become a useful tool for piety.

43. Hartmut Burbach, op. cit., p. 26. See also n. 228 of Chapter Two above.


45. Ingolf U. Dalferth, "Theologischer Realismus und realistische Theologie bei Karl Barth", p. 416: "Beide [Luther & Barth] haben ... für eine theologische Theologie plädiert." See also Dalferth's essay "The Visible and the Invisible: Luther's Legacy of a Theological Theology" & n. 185 of Chapter Two above.

46. Schleiermacher refers to that "most serious and glaring misunderstanding that detects in my Glaubenslehre a speculative tendency and a speculative foundation". See Lücke, p. 342 (English Translation, p. 58).

47. See, for instance, Hans-Joachim Birkner, Theologie und Philosophie, op. cit., p. 27: "Diese Philosophische Theologie hat unverkennbar die Funktion der theologischen Grunddisziplin. Sie ist, wenn man so will, Fundamentaltheologie." See also the "Einleitung" to Michael Eckert, Gott — Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., passim.

48. See Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung; 3. Teil. Tübingen: C.F. Osiander, 1843. pp. 885-886: "... um so beachtenswerter ist aber, wie die Glaubenslehre, indem sie die religiöse Gemeinschaft, das Gesamtleben, das den Einzelnen trägt und hält, zur Voraussetzung des subjektiven Bewußtseins macht, doch wieder die wesentlichen Momente enthält, von welchen aus die Subjektivität ihres Standpunkts zur Objektivität hinüberstrebt ... die Frage ist nur, wie der als Prinzip in der Menschheit wirkende Geist; in die Menschheit selbst hereingekommen ist? eine Frage, die sich auf dem Boden der Schleiermacher'schen Glaubenslehre nicht mehr beantworten läßt, deren Beantwortung aber gleichwohl in ihr so vorbereitet ist, daß sie mit innerer Notwendigkeit über sich hinausführt." It is with these words that Baur introduces his discussion of Hegel's treatment of this doctrine.


50. The best source for the history of the Prussian Academy of Sciences is Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Volume I, Parts 1 & 2. Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1900. The Academy finally agreed to Hegel's admission in the Summer of 1830 (and only after the disbanding of the philosophical division). Hegel died in November 1831. (See p. 753.)

52. See Adolf Harnack, op. cit., p. 309: "Die wichtigste Neuerung in den Statuten von 1744 und 1746 war die Errichtung einer besonderen Klasse für die spekulative Philosophie." The head of the Academy was the scientist Maupertuis and the language of the Academy was French. The division for philosophie speculative (only one of four) had no rival for nearly fifty years anywhere else in Europe. Ibid., p. 311; see also Hans Aarsleff, "The Berlin Academy under Frederick the Great" in History of the Human Sciences, Volume II/2, June 1989. pp. 193-206; here p. 196.

53. "SCHLEIERMACHER ist der zweite große Philosoph gewesen, der die Akademie geleitet hat..." Adolf Harnack, op. cit., p. 627. This assessment puts Schleiermacher on a philosophical plane with Leibniz. Harnack makes the astute point "aber in SCHLEIERMACHER ist SPINOZA, der Rivale von LEIBNIZ, wieder lebendig geworden..."

54. Schleiermacher was elected as Secretary of the philosophical division in October 1814. He was primarily responsible for its dissolution into the "historisch-philologische Klasse" in 1828. In vain did Altenstein, the Minister responsible for bringing Hegel to Berlin, write to the Academy (September 3, 1819): "Wie soll man die philosophische Klasse aufheben, da doch LEIBNIZ der erste Präsident der Akademie war?" Adolf Harnack, op. cit., pp. 663 & 708. See also "Akademie, akademisch" in Volume I of Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, edited by J. Ritter. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971. cols. 121-124; here col. 123.

55. Lücke, p. 324: "Doch was soll ich noch Einzelnes anführen, wo mir zuletzt ein so allgemeines Mißverständnis entgegentritt, als ob die in meiner Glaubenslehre aufgestellte Analyse des Selbstbewußtseins, etwas Anderes sein wollte, als ganz einfach und ehrlich nur empirisch!" (My italics.) This uncompromising statement of principle leaves us gasping. I find it hard to believe that Schleiermacher could expect anyone to take this at face value.


57. Lücke, p. 348: "...er ist viel höher angelegt, und so stattlich, daß man von da aus auf jenen eben so sehr, als auf die bisherige Heerstraße mit einem höheren Bewußtsein herabschauen kann. Das ist eben der, lieber Freund, auf dem ich auch gesehen worden sein soll, es ist aber nur mein Gespant gewesen, mein Doppelgänger; ich meine die spekulative Theologie."


61. With apologies to the last section of T.S. Eliot's "The Waste Land" (1922):

But when I look ahead up the white road
there is always another one walking beside you...


63. Ibid., p. 342: "Hätte nun volleins die gefährliche Einleitung noch stärker und ausdrücklicher von dem Werke selbst gesondert werden können..."
Ll'lapter Three

Schleiermacher's Rational Theology

64. Ibid., p. 315: Schleiermacher cites Baur’s offensive judgement "es könne nichts in dem historischen Teile, der Glaubenslehre nämlich, sein, was nicht zuvor in dem idealen oder philosophischen gewesen". This reading of the first edition of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre, which goes back to 1827, has never (in my opinion) been comprehensively answered.


68. Lucke, p. 372: "Wie wäre also mein scharfsichtiger Analytiker dazu gekommen, von der Einleitung zu for dern, was durchaus nur in der Dogmatik selbst seinen Ort haben kann, wenn er nicht doch die Kluft zwischen beiden irgende wie überehen hätte?"


70. Michael Eckert, Gott — Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., p. 11.

71. KDz, §67: "Da die philosophische Theologie eines jeden wesentlich die Prinzipien seiner gesamten theologischen Denkungsart in sich schließt ... Vornehmlich aber wird gefordert, daß die philosophische Theologie in jedem ganz und vollständig sei ... weil nämlich hier alles grundsätzlich ist ..." KDz, 1.Teil, Schlüßbetrachtungen §4 is even clearer: "Da der philosophische Teil die beiden andern [den historischen Teil und den praktischen Teil] bedingt ..."

72. Lucke, p. 350: "... die Reformation, aus deren ersten Anfängen unsere Kirche hervorgegangen ist ..."

73. WA, Volume 39/ii (1932), p. 6, line 26: "Differunt philosophia et theologia."

74. "In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius" in WA, Volume 40/i (1911), p. 410, lines 14-15: "Diligenter discerni debent Philosophia et Theologia." This volume contains Luther’s lecture notes of 1531 and the published text of 1535. The citation above stems from 1535.

75. Ibid., p. 447, lines 1-3 & 16-19.

76. There has been at least one recent attempt to bring Hegel into closer alignment with Luther than is usually considered appropriate. See Ulrich Asendorf, Luther und Hegel: Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung einer neuen Systematischen Theologie. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982. Asendorf acknowledges Luther’s wish to liberate theology from philosophy (cf. Schleiermacher), but he does not think this exhausts the topic (p. 109). I should like to believe that there are grounds for the following conclusion (p. 382): "Die Berufung auf das Dogma in Hegels Sinne ist daher nur als das tiefe Begreifen des Glaubens selbst zu verstehen."

77. Lucke, p. 371 (English Translation, pp. 76-77).


79. See the useful summary by S.W. Sykes in "Schleiermacher and Barth on the Essence of Christianity — an Instructive Disagreement", op. cit., p. 94. It is important to note that philosophical theology "builds on the previous two disciplines" (i.e., Ethik & Religionsphilosophie).

80. Lucke, p. 372: "... und in der ganzen Einleitung kein einziger eigentlich dogmatischer Satz zu finden ist!" The English Translation (p. 77) does not bring out the sense of this particularly well; not even the exclamation mark is retained!

81. See n. 35, above.

82. Lucke, p. 324.

Gerhard Ebeling, "Erwägungen zu einer evangelischen Fundamentaltheologie", op. cit., p. 493: Ebeling claims that the designation of this discipline by the title philosophical theology is "easily misunderstood".


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85. Gerhard Ebeling, "Erwägungen zu einer evangelischen Fundamentaltheologie", op. cit., p. 493: Ebeling claims that the designation of this discipline by the title philosophical theology is "easily misunderstood".

86. Glaubenslehre, §4.1: "Hieraus geht ein zweifacher Wert der einzelnen Teile hervor, die Vollkommenheit, mit welcher sie ein Gebiet frommer Erregung ausdrücken, dies ist ihr kirchlicher Wert ..." The equivalent section of Glaubenslehre (§17. Proposition) also states: "Dogmatische Sätze haben einen zweifachen Wert, einen kirchlichen und einen wissenschaftlichen ..."

87. In Glaubenslehre, §17.2, Vielseitigkeit becomes Fruchtbarkeit, "nämlich wie vielseitig er [der dogmatische Satz] auf andere verwandte hinweist".

88. Glaubenslehre, §4. Proposition: "... Nichts als Lehre darzustellen, was nicht in dem Ganzen frommer Erregungen, dessen Abbild das Lehrgebäude sein soll, gewesen ist ..."

89. Glaubenslehre, §17.3: "... so sind dogmatische Sätze desto vollkommener, je mehr die Wissenschaftlichkeit ihnen einen ausgezeichneten kirchlichen Wert gibt, und je mehr auch der wissenschaftliche Gehalt die Spuren davon trägt, aus dem kirchlichen Interesse hervorgangen zu sein." (My emphasis.) I prefer to paraphrase this remarkably subtle passage, as I believe the Mackintosh/Stewart translation obscures the crux of the matter. We shall want, in due course, to give more attention to this notion of wissenschaftlicher Gehalt — presumably distinct from wissenschaftliche Form.


91. KDz, §67.

92. See ibid., §24 & Glaubenslehre, §17.3.


94. SW III/3 (1835), pp. 3-8: "Am 10. Mai 1810" (Beim Eintritt in der Akademie). See p. 4: "Unter allen neuem Völkern haben unläugbar wir Deutsche den höchsten Begriff von Philosophie, die tiefste Ehrfurcht für sie ..." Richard Crouter, "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin", op. cit., p. 33, gives the date of this address as 1811.

95. SW III/3, p. 5: "... und daß für eine Akademie sich weniger diejenigen eignen, die neue Systeme gegründet oder vollendet haben, als die, welche die Philosophie historisch und kritisch zu behandeln bemüht sind."


98. SW III/3, p. 5: "Wie wenig ich mich rühmen kann ein solches Werk erzeugt zu haben, weiß jeder, ich aber auch, daß ich nie eins hervorbringen werde ..."


100. See, for instance, Gunter Scholtz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers, op. cit., p. 1.


103. This summary draws heavily on the admirable precision of Gunter Scholtz's analysis in *Die Philosophie Schleiermachers*, op. cit., p. 110.


106. Just to give one example: in the first entry of the marginalia to Schleiermacher's own copy of the first volume of *Glaubenslehre*, he notes K.G. Bretschneider's criticism that: "Die Schrift sei eigentlich keine Dogmatik sondern eine Philosophie über das Christentum oder eine Verarbeitung des christlichen Glaubens zu einer Philosophie" (*KGA*, Volume 1/7-111, p. 3). This is almost a direct citation from one of Bretschneider's articles in *Journal für Prediger* (Volume 66, published in Halle in 1825). Bretschneider suggests that the difficulty of Schleiermacher's language can be explained "teils aus dem Reichtum und der Tiefe seiner Spekulationen . . ." (Ibid., pp. 369-370).


108. *Lücke*, p. 339: "Oder ist etwa nicht die Einleitung, mit der ich doch nichts anderes beabsichtigte, als eine vorläufige Orientierung, die, genau genommen, ganz außerhalb unserer Disziplin selbst liegt, als die eigentliche Hauptsache, als der rechte Kern des Ganzen angesehen worden?" Walter E. Wyman, Jr., "Troeltschs Begriff der Glaubenslehre", op. cit., p. 359, picks up this point: "... obwohl Schleiermacher ausdrücklich verneint, daß die Einleitung das System der Lehre begründet. Während für Schleiermacher das Zentrum des Interesses die Darstellung der Lehre bildet, wobei das Prolegomenon den Status einer Einführung zugewiesen bekommt . . . " Schleiermacher acknowledges the problem that the Introduction has caused in giving rise to the suspicion that a "philosophical construction" is intended. But the Introduction is not the "actual beginning of the work". If the *Glaubenslehre* had been reorganized, "Keiner hätte dann verkennen können, daß die Darstellung des eigentümlich christlichen Bewußtseins wahrhaft und wirklich der eigentliche Zweck des Buches sei." (*Lücke*, pp. 341-342.) The use of the subjunctive here suggests what might have been if the order of the book had been reversed; it wasn't. Even if the Introduction is not the "actual" beginning (der eigentliche Anfang) of Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology, could this dogmatic theology have been written without it? Even though Schleiermacher's central interest is the dogmatic theology, could so many critics (up to the present day) have been wrong in judging the Introduction as the most challenging and original feature of Schleiermacher's theology? No student of Schleiermacher is able to avoid the issue of the position that the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* must occupy in the organization of Schleiermacher's theological disciplines. To claim that the Introduction is not the real beginning of the work has not proved a particularly effective argument.


112. See Eric von der Luft, "A Scholarly Note" in *The Owl of Minerva*, Volume 14/1, 1982, p. 10. This position was broadly condemned by Robert R. Williams in the next issue: see "A Scholarly Note?" in *The Owl of Minerva*, Volume 14/2, 1982, pp. 9-10: "... there is no basis for the claim that the 1830 edition is a different book altogether." (p. 10.)
However, von der Luft remains unrepentant; see his Hegel, Hinrichs, and Schleiermacher on Feeling and Reason in Religion: The Texts of their 1821-22 Debate. Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1987. p. 283n. He does make the useful (but obvious) point that Hegel's attacks on Schleiermacher are based on Hegel's reading of the first edition of the Glaubenslehre. "... it is the first edition alone which must be taken into account when studying the relationship between Hegel and Schleiermacher." This is an incoherent injunction, if, as von der Luft alleges, the second edition "was an improved text much better able to withstand any Hegelian confrontation." (ibid.) We shall obviously want to know why!

113. See Martin Redeker's "Einleitung" to Glaubenslehre, p. xiii: "... Gegenüberstellung zeigt, wie groß die Unterschiede in der Textgestaltung der beiden Auflagen sind, wenn auch die sachlichen Differenzen, auch nach Schleiermachers eigenen Aussagen, nicht allzu bedeutend sind."


115. See KGA, Volume I/7-iii, pp. 282-283: "... daß Hr. Dr. Schl. eine Art von Religionophilie und theologischer Spekulation hege, mit welcher er nicht ganz offen hervortreten mochte." The review is by C.F. Böhme.

116. See ibid., p. 8: "Schon hieraus sieht man daß sich die Wissenschaftlichkeit nur auf die Form beziehen soll."

117. Lücke, p. 390: "... daß ich dem Vorsatz treu geblieben bin, meinem eignen philosophischen Dillettantismus ... keinen Einfluß auf den Inhalt der Glaubenslehre gestattet zu haben."

118. Glaubenslehre, §1.2: "Die Forderung eines wissenschaftlichen Zusammenhanges scheidet das dogmatische Gebiet von dem der volksmäßigen zum gemeinsamen kirchlichen Unterricht bestimmten Darstellung in Katechismen und ähnlichen Werken, welche auch nicht ohne Zusammenhang sein darf, aber weder auf Gelehrsamkeit noch auf systematische Einrichtung Anspruch macht."

119. Glaubenslehre, p. 4: "Ich entsinne mich nämlich nicht, etwas erfunden zu haben, ausgenommen die Anordnung und hie und da die Bezeichnung ..."

120. Friedrich Lücke, "Zur freundschaftlichen Erinnerung an D. Wilhelm Martin Leberrecht de Wette" in Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Volume 23, 1850, pp. 497-535; here p. 516: "Seine [de Wette's] Meinung war damals, daß in Schleiermacher der Prediger auf der Kanzel die Theologen auf der Kathedra Eintrag tun müsse; die reine Wahrheit, welche dieser zu erforschen und zu bekennen habe, könne, dürfe jener vor der Gemeinde nicht aussprechen, und so komme eine verhüllende, nicht rein aufrichtige Theologie heraus. Als ich ihm erklärte, daß mir dieser zwiespaltige, verhüllende Schleiermacher weder auf der Kanzel, noch in seinen theologischen Schriften erschienen sei ... " I am indebted to Professor John Rogerson of the University of Sheffield for bringing this remarkable passage to my attention.

121. W.M.L. de Wette, Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkte des Glaubens. Basel: Schweighauser'sche Buchhandlung, 1846. The last section of this work (§100) is a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. (De Wette died in 1849.)

122. Letter: W.M.L. de Wette to Schleiermacher; June 11, 1823. Briefe, Volume IV, pp. 312-313; here p. 313: "Die Glaubenslehre ist unstreitig nach Calvin die erste wahrhaft systematische Dogmatik ... Dein erster Teil ist doch eigentlich philosophisch oder allgemein menschlich." This letter is a reply to the famous letter in which Schleiermacher mentions Hegel's attack upon him in the introduction to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie (ibid., pp. 309-312).

123. For this discussion, see Lücke, pp. 342-345.

124. For this discussion in Lücke, see pp. 361-362. Glaubenslehre identifies the dogmatic Grundform as "Beschreibungen menschlicher Zustände" (§34. Proposition). In Glaubenslehre this becomes "Beschreibungen menschlicher Lebenszustände" (§30.
Proposition). The Mackintosh/Steward translation renders "Beschaftigkeiten der Welt" as "constitution of the world" (cf. p. 125). I prefer this vocabulary, but it has the disadvantage of suppressing the plural. Reluctantly, I have decided to go along with the now more common usage. See "Open Letters," p. 70 and B.A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleiermacher" op. cit., p. 133.) To give this abstract notion some flesh, cf. "Glaubenslehre," §90.1. The subject here is redemption, and Schleiermacher shows how difficult it is to draw a distinction between "the first, or the direct [unmittelbare] description of the gracious state of the redeemed, and the second, or the description of what has come into the world through redemption," viz. "the corporate life founded by Christ" (das durch Christum gestiftete Gesamtleben). Although these "two spheres seem to be exactly the same", it is when it is "considered as, an organization" that "it belongs to the second form of presentation." Its significance for the world is "only through its organization".

125. "Glaubenslehre," §30.1: "eine Formel für einen bestimmten Gemütszustand".
126. "Lücke," pp. 361-362 (English Translation, pp. 70-71); here pp. 362 and 71, respectively: "... die rechte geschichtliche Haltung und also sein kirchlicher Charakter fehlen würde." Cf. "Glaubenslehre," §34.3.


129. Cf. "Glaubenslehre," §30.1: "die unmittelbare Beschreibung".
130. "Glaubenslehre," §30.2: "... so ist klar, daß Beschreibungen menschlicher Gemütszustände dieses Inhaltes nur aus dem Gebiet der innern Erfahrung hergenommen werden können ..."
131. "Glaubenslehre," §111.1: "... wird beabsichtigt die Trennung der christlichen Glaubenslehre von der Spekulation einen Schritt weiter zu führen."
134. "Glaubenslehre," §28.1: "... wobei die Gefahr eines der Sache der christlichen Frömmigkeit verderblichen Einflusses ganz verschwindet ..."
136. See St. Augustine's de Trinitate, V. x.: "Dictum est tamen: Tres personae, non ut illud dicetur, sed ne tacetur." As the translation of this text in Volume 15 of Oeuvres de Saint Augustine, edited by M. Mellet and Th. Camelot, confirms, we adopt the language of "trois personnes ... pour ne pas rester sans rien dire". Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1955. pp. 448-449.
137. "Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens", SWIII/2, p. 239.
gebildete Ausdruck ist Leitbegriff seiner Theorie der Religion ... Diese Wesensbestimmung bildet die Grundlage für Schleiermachers Theorie des Christentums und für seine Interpretation der christlichen Lehrüberlieferung.


144. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume I (1799-1870), op. cit., p. 65n. John E. Theil, God and World in Schleiermacher's Dialektik and Glaubenslehre, op. cit., p. 138, n. 64, sees Welch's alternative translations as a way of avoiding "any philosophical connotation in the expression of what Schleiermacher considered to be religious experience and the object of dogmatics."

145. Schleiermacher's handschriftliche Anmerkungen zum ersten Theil der Glaubenslehre, op. cit. Annotation to §4: "Schlechthinigkeit gleich absolut."


147. Glaubenslehre, §4.4.

148. Schleiermacher's handschriftliche Anmerkungen zum ersten Theil der Glaubenslehre, op. cit. Annotation to §4.4: "Das Wort 'Gott' wird hier dargestellt als in unserem Sprachgebiet nichts anderes bedeutend, als das in dem ursprünglichen, schlechthinigen Abhängigkeitsgefühl Mitgesetzt."

149. Glaubenslehre, §4.4. "... das zum Gottesbewußtsein werdende unmittelbare Selbstbewußtsein ..."

150. See S.W. Sykes, "Absolute Dependence" in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, op. cit., pp. 1-2; here p. 2. (My emphasis.)


152. Lücke, p. 389: "... daß Mancher den Becher der Spekulation ganz kann geleert haben, ohne daß er die Frömmigkeit auf dem Boden gefunden."


154. The English editors' reluctance to translate mitgesetzt in the first instance has them in difficulties here. CF reads "a co-existence of God in the self-consciousness". I prefer John Wallhauser's formula "the co-presence of God in self-consciousness". See his translation of Martin Redecker's Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, op. cit., p. 115.


159. See Hans Frei, "Barth and Schleiermacher: Divergence and Convergence", op. cit., p. 82.

161. Hegel’s comments here are often called a caricature: see, e.g., Robert R. Williams, “A Scholarly Note”, op. cit., p. 10. Also Alasdair I.C. Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology, op. cit., p. 26: “Obedient passivity and emotional dependence are not at all what Schleiermacher was talking about, though some of his language, taken out of context, could give that impression.” Erik Schmidt’s comments in Hegel’s System der Theologie are highly recommended. He suggests that Hegel has not really done Schleiermacher justice (Schleiermacher darum nicht ganz gerecht wurde). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974. p. 10.

162. Glaubenslehre, §4.4: “... daß dem Menschen mit der allem endlichen Sein nicht minder als ihm anhaftenden schlechthinnigen Abhängigkeit ...”

163. Hegel’s Vorwort to Hinrichs’ Religionsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 132: “... die Philosophie ... die Wissenschaft der denkenden Vernunft ...”

164. Ibid., p. 133: “... Gott bestimmunglos, ohne alle Prädikate und Eigenschaften, in das Jenseits des Wissens hinaufgesetzt, oder vielmehr zur Inhaltslosigkeit herabgesetzt.” (A.V. Miller’s translation of Hegel’s Vorwort, op. cit., p. 235.)

165. Ibid., pp. 130 & 131: “Nach dem Gesagten bestimmt sich das Übel, in welches die Aufklärung die Religion und die Theologie gebracht hat, als der Mangel an gewisser Wahrheit, einem objektiven Inhalt, einer Glaubenslehre.” Notice Hegel’s use of the word Glaubenslehre (p. 131) in this context.” (A.V. Miller, p. 233.)


168. VPR, Teil 3, p. 236n.


170. Letter: Hegel to H.F.W. Hinrichs, April 4, 1822. Briefe von und an Hegel, Volume 2 (1813-1822), edited by J. Hoffmeister (PhB 236). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1953. pp. 303-304: ‘ob denn das die Dogmatik der unierten evangelischen Kirche sei, was man uns,—freilich nur in einem erst ersten Teile, ...— als solche zu bieten die Unverschämtheit und Plattheit gehabt hat.” Schleiermacher indicates that he has tried ‘das Wesen der evangelischen Glaubens- und Lebensansicht in seinen eigentümlichen Grenzen als in beiden Confessionen dasselbe darzustellen ...’ (Glaubenslehre, Vorrede, p. 6). He returns to the same point in Glaubenslehre, Vorrede, p. 4. I do not believe that Hegel was disturbed by the "superficiality" of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre—how could one call a work of this density and length superficial?—I think he objected to its "banality", which is how I choose to translate 'Plattheit' (pace Hegel: The Letters, op. cit., p. 486).

171. Hegel’s Vorwort to Hinrichs’ Religionsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 137.

Chapter Three
Schleiermacher's Rational Theology

173. Erik Schmidt, op. cit., p. 10, deserves to be cited in full: "Eine Theologie ist auf diesem Standpunkt eigentlich nicht möglich; Schleiermacher konnte nur darum eine Glaubenslehre schreiben, die mehr als Psychologie des religiösen Bewußtseins war, sondern auch Metaphysik enthielt, weil er den Begriff des 'Gefühls' nicht eindeutig psychologisch faßte, sondern im Sinne eines 'geistigen' Gefühls deuteute."

174. See Brian A. Gerrish, Review of KGA, Volume I/7-1, 2 & 3, op. cit., p. 240: "The Glaubenslehre of 1821-22 attempted for the first time a dogmatics without dogmas."

175. Walter Jaeschke reiterates the comments he made in his Vorwort to VPR, Teil 1, pp. x-xii, in "Paralipomena Hegeliana zur Wirkungsgeschichte Schleiermachers" in Kongrefß, Teilband 2, pp. 1157-1169 (here p. 1160), and in 'Schleiermacher und Hegel: Neue Ausgaben und alte Fragen", op. cit., pp. 335-336: Hegel's decision to lecture on the philosophy of religion was a "prenatal" influence exerted by Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre.

176. LPR, Volume 1, p. 168; VPR, Teil 1, p. 78: "... solche Dogmen, wie die von der Dreieinigkeit, den Wundern, sind von der Theologie selbst in Schatten gestellt worden... und so ist in der Philosophie viel mehr von Dogmatik enthalten als in der Dogmatik, der Theologie selbst als solcher."

177. LPR, Volume 3, pp. 261-262; in VPR, Teil 3, this extraordinary passage from 1827 reads (p. 188): "Durch solch endliches Denken und Erfassen des Göttlichen, dessen, was an und für sich ist, durch dies endliche Denken des absoluten Inhalts ist es geschehen, daß die Grundlehren des Christentums aus der Dogmatik größtenteils verschwunden sind. Nicht allein, aber doch vornehmlich die Philosophie ist es, die jetzt wesentlich orthodox ist; die Sätze, die immer gegolten haben, die Grundwahrheiten des Christentums werden von ihr erhalten und aufbewahrt."

178. Lücke, pp. 334.


181. KGA, Volume I/7-iii, p. 82.


185. Lücke, pp. 345-346. (English Translation, p. 60.)

186. Glaubenslehre, §8.4: "Das Christentum ... behauptet sich als die reinste in der Geschichte hervorgetretene Gestaltung des Monotheismus. I am sure that the cleansing of Christian doctrine has everything to do with keeping this Gestaltung "pure".

187. The English word "relapse" is made to express two different Schleiermacherian terms: Rücktritt and Rückfall (CF, §8.4); and Gemütszustände is rather inexactely rendered as "states of mind".

194
There is a hint of Hegelian terminology here. Hegel also speaks of "die vollkommene Religion" [see his Vorlesungsmanuskripte I (1816-1831), op. cit., p. 83], although his preferred usage is "die vollendete Religion" (cf. VPR, Teil 3: Die vollendete Religion passim).

See KGA, Volume I/2, p. 217. There is merit in consulting the new translation of the 1st edition of Schleiermacher’s Speeches on Religion (1799) undertaken by Richard Crouter: On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Cambridge University Press, 1988. (The title is literally translated, the subtitle is not.) Mysteriously, John Oman does not choose to translate the phrase "und so wurde es der Götter voll" (p. 55), a liberty which the Crouter translation (p. 108) does not appear to regard as justified.

This is an addition to the 2nd edition of the Speeches on Religion (1806) and is difficult to translate; see Pünjer, op. cit., p. 257: "um ein Wort zu gebrauchen, das wieder sollte zu Ehren gebracht werden, eine Haresis ..." John Oman’s literal translation of this passage (p. 223) is eclipsed by the superior interpretative skills of Peter L. Berger, to whom I owe the excellent notion of "rehabilitation"; this captures the sense exactly. See Berger’s The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation. London: Collins, 1980. p. 132.

Glaubenslehre, §11.5.

Glaubenslehre, §11.4: "Die nähere Entwicklung dieses Satzes, wie nämlich durch Jesus die Erlösung bewirkt wird und in der christlichen Gemeinschaft zum Bewußtsein kommt, fällt der Glaubenslehre selbst anheim ...


I.A. Dorner, Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, op. cit., p. 809.

Glaubenslehre, §30. Proposition; cf. §30.2: "Daß müssen wir die Beschreibung menschlicher Zustände für die dogmatische Grundform erklairen ...

Glaubenslehre, §30.2: "Aussagen von Beschaffenheiten der Welt". This terminology is not perhaps the clearest way of referring to a whole host of doctrines beginning with "the original perfection of the world" (§59), moving through evil (§75), and ending with doctrines of redemption and ecclesiology (§113ff.). An elegant account of the structure of the Glaubenslehre is provided by Horst Stephan and Martin Schmidt in Geschichte der evangelischen Theologie in Deutschland seit dem Idealismus, op. cit., p. 125.

This wholly unconvincing argument is presented in Lucke, pp. 361-362: "Und das ist auch in der Tat meine Überzeugung ... daß unsere Glaubenslehre einmal lernen wird, sich ohne sie zu behelfen ... daß, ohnehinach die beiden letzten Formen, streng genommen, eigentlich überflüssig wären, doch einem Lehrgebäude, welches sie übergehen wollte, die rechte geschichtliche Haltung und also sein kirchlicher Charakter fehlen würde." F.C. Baur makes this astute comment about this passage: "Bilden nur solche Sätze den eigentlichen Inhalt der christlichen Dogmatik, welche die innern Gemütszustände beschreiben, und aus dem unmittelbaren Selbstbewußtsein genommen sind, so ist der historische und kirchliche Charakter wenigstens keine wesentliche und notwendige Eigenschaft der Glaubenslehre." (Selbstanzeige" in KGA, Volume I/7-iii, p. 269.) Baur always suspected Schleiermacher of dissembling. Cf. Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, 2nd ed., Volume V. Leipzig: Fues’s Verlag, 1877. "Oft genug kann man, bei der gar zu großen Vorsicht, mit welcher der Schleiermacher die Glaubenslehre den Widerspruch mit der Kirchenlehre so viel möglich zu umgehen und zu mildern sucht, und bei der gesuchten Künstlichkeit, mit welcher sie die kirchlichen Lehnsätze und Formeln in einem Sinne deuten, welchen Schleier-
macher unmöglich für den wahren und eigentlichen halten konnte, den Gedanken an eine absichtliche Täuschung nicht unterdrücken." (p. 216.)

200. Lücke, p. 318.


202. *Glaubenslehre*, §33.3. Here Schleiermacher cites with disapproval from St. Augustine's *De vera religione*: "Sic enim creditur et docetur, quod est humanae salutis caput, non aliam esse philosophiam, id est sapientiae studium, et aliam religionem." This quotation from Augustine should really be the motto of this dissertation: "Wir Christen glauben und lehren ja, und unser Heil hängt daran, daß Philosophie, das heißt Weisheitsstreben, und Religion nicht voneinander verschieden sind." (Literally: "that it is not the case that philosophy is one thing and religion another"). See *De vera religione*, edited and tr. by W. Thimme. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1983. pp. 18-19.


204. The instances from *Glaubenslehre*, §§117.3 & 119. Postscript 3 appear to have vanished, but *Glaubenslehre* adds a cursory reference in §13.2. Despite the fact that Schleiermacher declares John 1:14 to be "der Grundtext der ganzen Dogmatik" (Lücke, p. 343). I feel relatively secure in suggesting that the "Logologie des Johannes" (*Glaubenslehre*, §187.4) hardly qualifies as the central concept of the *Glaubenslehre*. (Cf. *Glaubenslehre*, §170.2.)


207. *Glaubenslehre*, §19.3: "Darstellung der gemeinsamen Frömmigkeit".


211. KD2, §203.

212. KD1, 2. Teil, Die dogmatische Theologie §11.

213. KD2, §207.

Conclusion:  
A Priesthood of Speculation

I. The Keystone of the Glaubenslehre

One of the really remarkable documents extant from this monumental chapter of German intellectual history is Hegel's extracts from and marginal notations to the second volume of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre (as published in 1822). Hegel's notations to the conclusion of the first edition ("Schluß: Von der göttlichen Dreieinheit") make for provocative reading. The general thrust of Hegel's remarks is that Schleiermacher operates with a "dialectic of the understanding", which is dry, hollow and barren,¹ that is to say, his theology is governed by a decidedly non-speculative, finite thinking (purer, ideenloser Verstand),² which rigorously separates the Glaubenslehre off from any speculative intuition.³ As a direct consequence, there is hardly anything that could be identified as a doctrine of the Trinity to be found in it, a fact the more remarkable as this dogmatic theology is supposed to be an empirical, descriptive account of the actual content of Christian faith. As Hegel notes in exasperation, the Trinity has a central role to play in the whole ecclesiastical history of Christian piety,⁴ but by the time we get to the end of the Glaubenslehre, there doesn't seem to be any room at the inn!

Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity at the conclusion of his Glaubenslehre constitutes the rigorous and systematic application of Schleiermacher's theological principles to the outstanding Christian teaching about the nature of God. Schleiermacher has already made it clear that he is turning his face against any philosophical or metaphysical—and therefore abstract—treatise de Deo, of which the doctrine of the Trinity could be counted the chief example. Schleiermacher wants his Glaubenslehre to be the doctrinal exposition of pious self-consciousness, which can be called
theology, only because God is the co-determinate of the feeling of absolute dependence. God is co-present (mitgesetzt) in religious self-consciousness, which is why man can be endowed with actual Gottesbewußtsein, i.e., "das Sein Gottes in dem Menschen".\(^5\)

We need to elaborate this point in two directions: i) Christ apparently possesses a "unique and archetypal God-consciousness",\(^6\) which is why the Glaubenslehre can speak of "ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm" (§94. Proposition). Christ is distinguished from the rest of us by "die stetige Kräftigkeit seines Gottesbewußtseins",\(^7\) which is unimpaired by sin and contagion. His God-consciousness is never submerged (as it is in us) by what Schleiermacher calls sinnliches Selbstbewußtsein (§94.2) and by what Paul would have called "the flesh".\(^8\) Schleiermacher's conclusion reads that the ascription to Christ of "ein schlechthin kräftiges Gottesbewußtsein" and "ein Sein Gottes in ihm" are one and the same thing.\(^9\) Redemption therefore occurs through the communication of this God-consciousness to the faithful. In a striking phrase, Schleiermacher describes this "implanting" (einpflanzen) of "das kräftige Gottesbewußtsein" as "only the continuation of the creative divine activity out of which the Person of Christ arose".\(^10\) (The formulation of this same theme in the first edition is even more dramatic.)\(^11\) Some of us may, however, be disappointed to learn that Christ's redemptive activity has been compared to

a process substantially analogous to the formation of a human society around a charismatic leader, who unites them by his vision of their future state.\(^12\)

One immediate consequence of this understanding of Christology is that Christ's passion is appropriated by this doctrinal system as an "element of the second order", and the peak (Gipfel) of his suffering is understood as "sympathy with misery".\(^13\) Christ's passion now becomes an expression of solidarity (§104.4)! Werner Schultz extends our discussion by pointing out that Schleiermacher's Passiontide sermons all display a tendency to strip the bitterness from Christ's sorrow and passion.\(^14\)

ii) Schleiermacher emphatically denies that "Gottesbewußtsein" can be understood as God Himself, anymore than "Weltbewußtsein" should be
understood as the world itself.\textsuperscript{15} God-consciousness, as has been explained above, is "das Sein Gottes in dem Menschen", and doctrinal theology is therefore very precisely concerned with God as He is known in our human God-consciousness.\textsuperscript{16} Now if we couple this qualification with the highly potent Proposition to §50, it should be fairly clear why a doctrine of the Trinity in the traditional sense can hardly be on the agenda in a work called \textit{Glaubenslehre}. The Proposition reads:

All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to Him.\textsuperscript{17}

The concrete, empirical character of the \textit{Glaubenslehre} is here allowed to come into its own. All talk of God "as He is in Himself", as He might exist apart from our relation to Him, is banished. That would be to deal in pure abstraction, "to speculate" in a region unknowable and unknown. Schleiermacher pushes the argument further: Christian speculation—for Schleiermacher an oxymoron—on the essence of God\textsuperscript{18} can only ascertain generalities, such as God is "das ursprünglich Seiende und das absolut Gute" (§51.1). For the Word to become flesh, Christian theology must represent (in systematic, dialectical language)\textsuperscript{19} the God present to our pious self-consciousness.

In just this sense, Dilthey is right to bestow upon Schleiermacher the accolade of "the Kant of Protestant theology".\textsuperscript{20} The distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon\textsuperscript{21} now governs Schleiermacher's "critical" theology just as surely as it governs the critical philosophy. But not all theologians have been happily reconciled to the cost. We have already mentioned the severe reservations expressed by I.A. Dorner. In our century, Karl Barth has been the most influential critic. He regards Schleiermacher's distinction between "Gott, wie er ist ... [und] Gott, wie er erscheint" as a disaster for Christian doctrine: this way of doing theology leaves the impression that the phenomenal reality with which the \textit{Glaubenslehre} is concerned is the screen behind which another, higher divinity is concealed. Are we not then forced to accept Barth's lament that—from this perspective—"Gott in seiner Offenbarung nicht eigentlich Gott ist."\textsuperscript{22}
Hegel is, of course, lurking in the background of this discussion. He would naturally agree that to speak of a God apart from revelation, apart from what we can know about Him, is nothing but an abstraction. But he would argue with conviction that it is equally abstract to posit such a divine noumenon in the first place. This is not a distinction evident in "the nature of things", but a distinction for mind; it is a distinction in and for consciousness, and as such, neither absolute nor final. Hegel solves this dilemma in quite another way. He agrees that we are only in a position to speak of God because we stand in a spiritual relation to Him. However, our God-consciousness, our spiritual life, is also a consciousness which God has of Himself—precisely in and through our consciousness of Him. Consequently, there is no God lying hidden behind our God-consciousness—in our God-consciousness we are united with God's consciousness of Himself. This is exactly how he defines "the consummate religion", Christianity:

Die Religion nämlich ist Wissen des Geistes von sich als Geist ... Wir haben die Religion näher bestimmt als Selbstbewußtsein Gottes ... Das endliche Bewußtsein weiß Gott nur insofern als Gott sich in ihm weiß ...

Hegel makes the same point forcefully at the conclusion of his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (§564):

God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is, further, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God.

Hegel is ready to agree with Barth that Schleiermacher has constructed a *Bewußtseins-theologie,* but he would also say that this "theology" has not yet speculatively grasped its own principle: Schleiermacher's *Bewußtseins-theologie* rests in a "rational" distinction of finite mind; it does not make the imaginative, speculative step into the centre of the Christian religion, the unity forged between God and man in Jesus Christ.

The two directions we took above in analysing Schleiermacher's concept of God-consciousness now begin to merge. This can be seen very clearly in §97.2, where Schleiermacher argues that Christological doctrines should
be developed quite independently of any doctrine of the Trinity. At this stage (§99.1), we cannot really go further than to assert that

the redeeming efficacy of Christ depends upon the being of God in Him, and faith in Him is grounded upon the impression that such a being of God indwells Him ... where this impression (Eindruck) becomes quite detached from the facts (Tatsachen) of the resurrection, ascension and the return in judgment of Christ, since the disciples could not have known of these when they first gained their impression of Him. Schleiermacher does not suppress the historical prominence of these doctrines (he cites their inclusion in the Nicene Creed), but he does relegate them to the status of a second order of doctrine: they do not represent an "immediate utterance of Christian self-consciousness" (§170. Proposition). The doctrine of the Trinity, like the doctrines of the resurrection and ascension of Christ, is in some sense "optional". It is not a Glaubenslehre at all,

in the really original and proper sense of that phrase ... our faith in Christ and our living fellowship with Him would be the same although we had no knowledge of any such transcendent fact, or although the fact itself were different. ... Hence it is important to make the point that the main pivots of the ecclesiastical doctrine—the being of God in Christ and the Christian Church—are independent of the doctrine of the Trinity.

Schleiermacher's use of the phrase "kirchliche Lehre" in this context cannot go unremarked. Certainly those who were accustomed to use the so-called Athanasian creed as a test of Christian orthodoxy—awarded sufficient authority by Schleiermacher to be placed at the beginning of his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity—would have been unhappy to discover that the essential truths of the Christian faith can be had without reference to this doctrine. Nor did they understand the phrase fides catholica as expressing something other than "ecclesiastical doctrine"!

Schleiermacher's opposition in principle to the doctrine of the Trinity is now able to emerge more clearly: any instance of this doctrine requires some kind of statement about the divine essence, a form of doctrine which is (by definition) ultra vires in a work dedicated to the systematic representation of the God-consciousness in finite human beings. There is then
considerable sense in asking the question: "Inwiefern gehört die Trinitätslehre noch in die Glaubenslehre?" The one unambiguous answer to the question reads: certainly not in its "ecclesiastical" expression! As Schleiermacher himself acknowledges in the *Glaubenslehre* of 1822, the doctrine assumes a place "fast außerhalb des eigentlichen Körpers der Lehre". Its only justification for being mentioned at all is that it is apparently a combination of several immediate utterances of the pious self-consciousness (Verknüpfung mehrer solcher)—in virtue of which the doctrine may be regarded as "(der wahre) Schlußstein der christlichen Lehre". With considerable skill our English translation of the *Glaubenslehre* has chosen to render this phrase as the "coping-stone" rather than the "keystone" of Christian doctrine; even though either term might offer an acceptable translation, they are not synonyms. Whereas coping-stone (or cope-stone) derives its status from the cope of a wall (which is its top), the keystone is the stone placed "at the summit of an arch, which being the last put in, is looked upon as locking the whole together". This means that the "coping-stone" may be considered as the crown or completion of an edifice, but it need not carry any stronger sense than "finishing touch". The keystone has a more decidedly architectural function: by analogy, it becomes "the central principle of a system ... upon which all the rest depends". The translators were right to steer us away from this sense of Schlußstein; as we have explained above, the doctrine of the Trinity should be considered independently of Gottesbewußtsein, and only appears in the *Glaubenslehre* at all for two reasons (apart from the important one of convention).

i) It remains (in however imperfect a form) the fundamental ecclesiastical expression of

the doctrine of the union of the Divine Essence with human nature, both in the personality of Christ and in the common Spirit of the Church, with which the whole view of Christianity set forth in our Church teaching stands and falls.

ii) Its treatment at the conclusion of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* is undertaken in the interests of the doctrine's transformation (*Ungestaltung*), and reconstruction (*Umbildung*), a process which is given firm impetus by
Schleiermacher's "thoroughgoing criticism" of all aspects of its dogmatic terminology. This terminology is too prone to "philosophemes" and to scholastic speculation. If there is one single polemical purpose for which Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology is designed, it is that "die Glaubenslehre sich vom Scholastischen immer mehr reinigen soll", and what he proposes to this end is "einen wissenschaftlichen Ausdruck zu organisieren", which will finally secure for Christian theology that doctrinal expression of its essence without any admixture of "alien" speculation.

This leaves the conclusion of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre peculiarly "up in the air". On the one hand, Schleiermacher wishes to affirm as fervently as any believer that, with the coming of Christ, "das höchste Wesen war in den Menschen hereinversetzt"; on the other hand, the adequate doctrinal expression of this fact has somehow eluded the Church over centuries, and the whole thrust of his Glaubenslehre is to "deconstruct" the classical statements of how this could be so. To sort out this dilemma we need to call to our assistance one of Schleiermacher's additions to the 1821 edition of his Speeches on Religion. There he tackles the question whether Christianity would have been in any way impoverished if theologians had never come upon the idea "die christlichen Vorstellungen in einem geschlossenen Zusammenhange darzustellen". He has not, he claims, in his later years betrayed the anti-systematic rhetoric of the Speeches; he continues to oppose that "system-mania" which repudiates anything foreign, anything that might endanger the system's preconceived harmony. His own systematic work is carefully governed by two key principles: i) not to treat either Vorstellung or Begriff as what is constitutive and original in the representation of religion, because as we know in this sphere (auf diesem Gebiet) "Gefühl" is primary; ii) to build into the "letter" of the system a living mobility (die lebendige Beweglichkeit), so that the spirit continues to animate the system and the letter does not become just a fossil or a relic.

This ties in rather directly with what has been called "die apologetische Haltung der Glaubenslehre" (see page 113, above). This apologetic stance is in its turn realized in two moments: α) the attempt to discover the essential continuity of Christianity in and through historical change; and β) the
critique of dogma so as to expel what is "unclear, narrow and impure". If we were to apply this apologetic stance to the conclusion of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre, we should have no trouble locating the critique of dogma this implies, but, I would suggest, considerable difficulty in identifying much continuity with tradition in the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity—a doctrine which can hardly come to life if the divine essence is declared beyond the competence of Christian theology. Further, the systematic integrity of the Glaubenslehre is placed in very great doubt by this open-ended conclusion. We have indicated (see page 89, above) that there is merit in the notion of an "open system", a system which not only tolerates difference but makes it a constitutive element—54—but we need to be convinced that Schleiermacher has actually achieved his aim. It is one thing to be open to the future and quite another to peter out inadvertently. If there is any merit in the suggestion that the conclusion of a system provides coherence for the whole,55 then very grave misgivings must attend these final paragraphs of the Glaubenslehre. In no sense do they provide the "keystone" which assures the stability of the arch. They constitute no more than vague critical suggestions, the precise merit of which has been under discussion ever since.

As for the beginning of the Glaubenslehre, many of the same reservations apply. It is impossible for me to understand that the concept of Gefühl and schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl, which form the basis for Schleiermacher’s "theory of Christianity" (see page 166), does not fall under the categories of Vorstellung and Begriff. For Hegel, what all of the above demonstrates is α) Schleiermacher has not grasped the speculative nature of his own entry into dogmatic theology; β) die bewegliche Lebendigkeit which Schleiermacher requires of the system is only possible through dialectic—of which there is no evidence at all in the concluding paragraphs of the Glaubenslehre; and γ) the only condition under which a doctrine of the Trinity is conceptually possible is in and through speculation—56—not an alien intrusion into Christian life, but the only form under which the truth can be had in thought.
Despite Schleiermacher's constant opposition to the scholastic confusion of philosophy and theology, in one point, at least, he would have found a considerable ally in St. Thomas Aquinas. The question that Thomas poses is whether the relation between God and man, between creature and creator, can be said to be a reality in God. Thomas denies this. The reality of the relation rests entirely in the creature since "all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely". God is no more affected by our relation to Him than the pillar is by the fact that we move from its left to its right. Thomas holds rigorously to the conclusion that the relationship of effect to cause, of creature to creator—by which finite mind is able to come to a knowledge of the divine essence—is no real relationship to God;\textsuperscript{57} despite the relativity of these terms to one another, it is only to the creature that they are posited really (\textit{secundum rem});\textsuperscript{58} in God their occurrence is strictly logical (\textit{secundum rationem}).\textsuperscript{59} However unfamiliar the vocabulary, Schleiermacher's introduction to the discussion of the divine attributes (in the Proposition to §50) is just the modern form of this same argument:

All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to Him.

This division between reality and idea\textsuperscript{60} appears to be absolute, but as Hegel never tires of pointing out, the distinction between what is \textit{secundum rationem} and what is \textit{secundum rem} is a distinction known to mind and and made by mind: if it were an \textit{absolute} distinction mind could not articulate its content.

The peculiar irony of this situation is elegantly summarized by Harnack's epigram "'Nicht zu spekulieren' führt unter Umständen auch zu einer Metaphysik":\textsuperscript{51} what begins as the (apparently) strictly enforced avoidance of speculation is achieved only by positing speculative or metaphysical distinctions in and for mind. The effort to escape the fantasies of speculation is achieved in the metaphysical distinction of phenomenon and noumenon, an order of reality \textit{secundum rem} and \textit{secundum rationem}.
The essential problem with this crypto-metaphysical division of the order of reality is that by it God is destined to lose his infinite and absolute character—now apparently standing outside of and apart from a whole order of reality to which he cannot be related. One striking consequence of this—as it happens—metaphysical distinction is that the being of God in man (since it is not to be referred back to the unknowable essence of God) can only enter the finite sphere in and through the world. I.A. Dorner finds the foundation for this entry in "der eigentümlichen Empfänglichkeit der Menschheit Jesu", which means that we find here the same "idealist" elevation of humanity through *Gottesbewuβtsein* which we identify with Hegel, except that (because of the strictures of Schleiermacher's theological method) the agency of that elevation is now the human rather than the divine! To maintain the proper economy of salvation (and the priority of the divine), this characteristic idealism must be inverted. We follow F.C. Baur in declaring that the human subject can only be conscious of God (or the Absolute), "because it is essential to the Absolute itself to give this consciousness". The crucial point that Schleiermacher's theology is unable to appropriate (since this is a speculative insight) is that the Absolute cannot realize its own nature unless it is "the Absolute for subjective consciousness as well".

Hegel then establishes the soundness of his own position in a confident interpretation of St. Athanasius' famous dictum that the Word "became man that we might become divine". In similar fashion he intends to keep to a faithful and strict interpretation of Thomas' guiding principle (adopted from Aristotle) that God "knows things other than Himself by His essence". Again Hegel would understand this as a characteristically speculative insight and will seek to interpret it by means of speculative reason. J.N. Findlay is able to spell out the ultimate implication: he says of Eriguena that he "anticipates Spinoza and Hegel in making man's knowledge of God be God's self-revelation in them, thereby giving man a theological function". In just this sense man becomes a true instrument of the divine will.
II. It will by now be quite evident why, from this perspective, religious devotion is treated as a kind of speculation and why speculation is treated as a kind of religious devotion. Philosophical speculation has bound itself to the Christian dispensation, whose chief doctrine is the unity of the divine and human natures as revealed in the person of Jesus Christ. Hegel summarizes the speculative character of this doctrine in the following formula: "Mensch und Gott, die subjektive Idee und die objektive Idee sind hier Eines". If the modern German Idealist philosophy (in which Hegel and Schleiermacher were equal participants) has one single central principle it is this unification of subjectivity and objectivity. For Hegel, there is no truth in religion if God is not understood as Geist, as that absolute first principle which relates its own identity in otherness, in the negative, in the contradiction and in the division of the world. Therefore, as he says, if the word Geist is to have any content at all, God must be grasped as the Trinity, the God who can experience the extremes of alienation, suffering and death. It is the genius of the Christian religion that God condescends to become a man, even becoming a slave to men; this is what God vouchsafes to do in man and for man and, in recognition of this condescension, God demands that we acknowledge, worship and honour Him. It follows that it can only be the greatest absurdity—Hegel uses the term ungereimt—to say from within Christianity, "daß sich Gott geoffenbart habe und daß er das offenbart habe, daß er sich dem Menschen nicht offenbare".

We have been trying throughout this dissertation to argue that Schleiermacher's claim to have written a Glaubenslehre free of speculative influence is incoherent. In seeking to avoid philosophy, it actually makes metaphysical claims; in establishing a concept of Gefühl and schlechthiniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl as the bedrock of Christian theology, it takes a speculative, not an empirical stance. But in the highest, final and profoundest sense, it is perfectly true to say that the Glaubenslehre is not speculative, because it shies away from, avoids and refuses to grasp the central speculative Christian idea of God's maintaining Himself and His own nature in the extremity of otherness, even to the point of death—that central fact of Christian
revelation which Hegel in no sense deserts; he turns around to embrace it. Unlike Schleiermacher, who sought to avoid the apparent vanities of abstract speculation, Hegel's speculative method is dedicated to the proclamation of the concrete truth of the indissoluble unity of God and man.

Schleiermacher's opposition to speculative religion is clearly laid out in his Open Letters. He fears the development of an esoteric Christianity, a gnostic religion, a hierarchy of intellectual culture and "a priesthood of speculation". He leaves aside the intriguing question of any possible relation Christian piety might have to a work as abstract, dry and abstruse as Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. Hegel nowhere pretends that the speculative appropriation of Christianity is a requirement for ordinary Christian consciousness. Far from it! Religion is the form of consciousness in which the truth can be known by every human being. But this religious consciousness does not yet have, in the form of image and cultic elaboration, the form truly adequate to its own content. It is not yet in this form science (Wissenschaft) and does not in this form have the persuasive coherence of a system—something it must acquire in order to assert its truth in the face of a dominant secular and intellectual culture. Hegel offers his own potent metaphor: the content is the same for the ordinary believer and the speculative philosopher or theologian, what differs is only the form—just as in Homer's Iliad, some objects have two names, one name in the language of the Gods and another in the language of ephemeral mankind. In the same way there are two languages for this Christian content: the language of Vorstellung and the language of Begriff. All theology (including Schleiermacher's) makes the transition from one to the other.

It is another irony of considerable interest, that there is at least one aspect of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre which is more "speculative" than Hegel's philosophy. Hegel is absolutely clear that philosophy has nothing whatsoever to do with predicting the future; its only object is to grasp conceptually that which has actually appeared historically and that which can be known as material or spiritual fact. Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, by way of contrast, is addressed to the future Gestalt of Christianity: it is a tentative suggestion of how Christian theology should be constructed in
order to maintain its integral truths in a secular culture increasingly hostile to its claims. From this perspective, much of what actual Christian piety takes to be a necessary expression of its content is best described as ballast, soon to be jettisoned in order to keep the ship of faith afloat. In this precise sense, and all appearances to the contrary, Schleiermacher’s theology is less concrete and empirical than abstract and speculative.

I suspect that Hegel would have accepted the opprobrium of "a priesthood of speculation" with considerable pride. In the conclusion to his first series of lectures on the philosophy of religion (1821), he suggested that it might be necessary for philosophers to establish "an isolated order of priests" or a "priesthood apart", and that to maintain its truth, religion must now flee into philosophy’s concept. Philosophy has no particular insight into the future course of the world, but philosophers like Hegel were able to see with their own eyes the vacuity of contemporary Christian theology and the evaporation of Christianity’s central doctrines under the pressure of modern secularity. (Nothing illustrates this point better that Schleiermacher’s vapid treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity at the conclusion of the Glaubenslehre.) For Hegel, the truths of Christianity do represent a Heiligtum, and if the theologians are incapable of the speculative insight necessary to keep watch over this "hallowed ground", then let its preservation fall to the philosophers. As Hegel famously concludes "How things turn out" in the end cannot be the concern of philosophy.

In his brief account of the history of philosophy (in the Metaphysics), Aristotle explains that the study of philosophy is a function of leisure, and that the priestly caste in Egypt were the inventors of mathematics, because they alone had the leisure and independence to undertake this esoteric pastime. Hegel cites this remark in the second preface (1831) to his Science of Logic, just as in the first preface of 1812, he talks of the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without metaphysics—like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies. Theology, which in former times was the guardian of the speculative mysteries and of metaphysics (although this was subordinate to it) had given up this science in exchange for feelings, for what was popularly matter-of-fact, and for historical erudition.
In these tragic (or absurd) circumstances, where "the salt has lost its flavour", Hegel sees no alternative but that the philosophers will be forced to provide the refuge to keep the speculative truths of the Christian religion alive, until such time as help comes from on high.\(^\text{91}\) When this may be is not for philosophy to determine.

Schleiermacher's solution to the contemporary crisis of Christianity is completely different. He requires that modern Christian souls learn to live with two forms of consciousness side by side: the subjective and the objective, where dialectical philosophy is the supreme instance of the latter, and Glaubenslehre is the highest expression of the former. This is not actually a new solution: its most famous articulation occurred in the thirteenth century, where religious thought was also threatened by the scepticism of a new secular philosophical freedom. This double consciousness makes extreme demands upon religion by forcing it to excise all aspects of Christian faith which cannot be borne\(^\text{92}\) by the subjective consciousness alone.\(^\text{93}\) Theologians are required to be equally at home in both spheres, Christianity and science, theology and philosophy. Theologians are left in the peculiar situation of having to become experts in the very modes of thought from which they are trying to extricate the Christian religion!\(^\text{94}\) Unless they are completely familiar with these modes of thought, they will be incapable of the reconnaissance which the defence of religious consciousness requires.

The reader will not be surprised to learn that, in my view, Schleiermacher's refusal to grasp the speculative nettle means that his position ultimately collapses into incoherence. This demand that we live in "two cultures", in two kingdoms, with two truths, each fully justified within its own sphere of competence begs the question of how we are to find their relation.\(^\text{95}\) Is the Hegelian standpoint not more coherent in suggesting that theology and philosophy, doctrine and speculation do not merely exist alongside each other, but stand in so essentially internal a relation that they can be conceived only in terms of each other, or only as parts of one and the same whole?\(^\text{96}\)

Schleiermacher's "philosophical theology" suggests that he understands the intimacy of this relationship very well. Even the apparently simple attempt
to provide a rigorous statement that theology is not philosophy inevitably directs the attention towards their (in this case only negative) relation. But they do have a relation, and sooner or later consciousness will want to know what it is. It is not credible that we shall be able to hold these two forms of consciousness in perfect parallel construction for ever. To mix these forms of consciousness and to combine philosophy and theology may expose religion to hidden dangers, but there is no evidence that individuals have shied away from this course for the simple reason that, whatever the consequences, no one (not even Faust) can rest in a divided consciousness. The logic of Schleiermacher's own position carries the argument forward.

Hegel repeatedly claimed that philosophy is divine service, a form of worship. This seeming impiety results from Hegel's conviction that the central Christian truth is the dialectical overcoming of all forms of divided consciousness, subjective and objective, religious and speculative, theological and philosophical, even human and divine. The conclusion of Hegel's lecture notes for 1821 contain the abbreviated formula: "Statt Vernunft und Religion sich widersprechen ... Versöhnung in der Philosophie". It is remarkable here that Hegel speaks of Versöhnung: this is not just "reconciliation" but implies atonement as well. Where, for whatever reason, this truth cannot be comprehended, it is the task of a philosophical priesthood to keep this final speculative intuition alive, until men and women are once again able to hear and apprehend a truth "which passeth all understanding".

One of Schleiermacher's most dogged critics, D.F. Strauss, insisted that the task of theological speculation was far from exhausted by the merely formal ordering of the theological material. It was also necessary, he maintained, "den theologischen Stoff ... begreifend zu durchdringen". Schleiermacher's skill with respect to the first dogmatic task cannot be in any doubt; but as to the the second, die spekulative und begriffliche Durchdringung, this is less in evidence, and least of all in Schleiermacher's account of the doctrine of the Trinity. While this may be the Christian doctrine par excellence, it is not clear whether in Schleiermacher it even rises to the level of a doctrine. It must be one of the great historical ironies that Schleiermacher's own theological faculty at the University of Berlin was hardly unanimous in accepting
his account of Christian dogmatics. In fact, the very conflict of perspectives with which we have been concerned was being played out by Schleiermacher's *theological* colleagues. A famous student of theology in Berlin at this time sent a revealing letter to his brother about the divisions in the faculty of theology, which he described as the Hegel-Marheineke adherents on one side, and the majority, clustered around Schleiermacher, on the other. Von Altenstein, the Minister responsible for education, had become involved in the dispute, and as the letter says:

Schleiermacher hat man wissen lassen, er solle nicht immer philo­sophische von den theologischen Collegia gesondert, sondern philoso­phisch-theologische halten, worauf er geantwortet hat, solches nicht zu verstehen.  

While Schleiermacher may not have understood what the Minister meant by this request, I hope my readers will by now recognize the perspective from which it originates.

The end of a dissertation is a good place in which to acknowledge the port and starboard lights which have allowed this vessel to keep a straight course and to dock safely in the port. On the one hand, I have yet to be convinced that anyone, in the whole history of the interpretation of Friedrich Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, read that work more carefully than F.C. Baur. Baur read the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre* in the summer of 1823 (long before he was acquainted with Hegel!), and wrote a famous letter to his brother giving a preliminary analysis and first impressions; these were later to be developed into Baur's inaugural dissertation for the University of Tübingen (see p. 63), and in due course elicited an (unfriendly) response from Schleiermacher in his *Open Letters*. To that penetrating criticism Baur eventually added a firm Hegelian perspective, according to which "philosophy and theology are similar modes of consciousness, expressed, however, in different forms". And from this standpoint he came to the conclusion that:

the relation of the two disciplines—the history of Christian dogma and the history of philosophy—has taken shape recently in such a way that a history of Christian dogma which was not at the same time essentially a history of speculative thinking in relation to religion and theology
would be in contradiction with the whole scientific consciousness of the age. 107

It is only necessary to remove the word "history" from the assessment offered above, and Baur's proposition offers the appropriate summary of our thesis. In other words, Schleiermacher's concern with the clear delineation of doctrine and speculation reflects "the moving principle" of the age; but as Schleiermacher refuses to grasp their relation, the Spirit is unable to rest in the divided consciousness that results.

On the other hand, I must here redeem a debt to a great teacher of philosophy, ancient and modern, who set the initial compass bearing for the whole voyage. Without there being any explicit reference to Schleiermacher, the following remark of his is none the less of immediate application and relevance:

For the subjective reconciliation of Protestant faith can only become objective when religion again becomes speculative as in medieval Catholicism. 108

I hope that my dissertation may come to be seen as an extended commentary on this advice.
Conclusion: Footnotes


2. Ibid., p. 688.

3. Ibid., p. 686: "Wer heißt ihn solche Verstandesbestimmungen hineinbringen und die Glaubenslehre von der Spekulation trennen?"

4. Ibid., p. 684: "Vgl. über Dreieinigkeit, die im ganzen frommen Bewußtsein der Kirche vorkommt."

5. Lücke, p. 325.


9. Glaubenslehre, §94.2: "ganz eines und dasselbe ist ..." (My emphasis.)

10. Glaubenslehre, §100.2: "Und so ist die gesamte Wirksamkeit Christi nur die Fortsetzung der schöpferischen göttlichen Tätigkeit, aus welcher auch die Person Christi entstand."

11. Glaubenslehre, §121.3: "So daß man sagen kann, die erlösende Tätigkeit Christi ist nur die Fortsetzung der personbildenden Tätigkeit der göttlichen Natur in Christo."


13. Glaubenslehre, §101.4: "ein Element der zweiten Ordnung ... daß wir als den Gipfel des Leidens das Mitgefühl der Unseligkeit setzen."

Bedeutung, welche die Kirche diesem beilegt, sind für Schleiermacher ein sichtliches Ärgernis. Er will vor allem die Erlösung von jeder speziellen Beziehung auf den Tod Christi lösen und sie allein nur auf die höhere Natur Christi begründen ..."


Glaubenslehre, §50. Proposition: "Alle Eigenschaften, welche wir Gott beilegen, sollen nicht etwas Besonderes in Gott bezeichnen, sondern nur etwas Besonderes in der Art, das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl auf ihn zu beziehen."

Glaubenslehre, §50.1n.: "Da natürlich hier nur von christlicher [Spekulation] die Rede sein kann ..."

Glaubenslehre, §28. Proposition: "Der dialektische Charakter der Sprache und die systematische Anordnung geben der Dogmatik die ihr wesentliche wissenschaftliche Gestaltung."


See the entry under "Noumenon / Phaenomenon" in Volume VI of *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, edited by J. Ritter and K. Gründer. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984. cols. 986-987. See also S. Körner, *Kant*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1955. p. 94: "Kant calls the things in themselves 'noumena' because they are entities of the understanding to which no objects of experience can ever correspond, and contrasts them with 'phenomena' which are or can be objects of experience."


Hegel must be targeting Schleiermacher in VPR, Teil 1, p. 72: "Zugleich aber liegt in der Behauptung des unmittelbaren Wissens, daß wir bei der Betrachtung der Religion als solcher, näher bei der Betrachtung dieser Beziehung auf Gott stehenbleiben sollen. Es soll nicht fortgegangen werden zum Erkennen Gottes, zum göttlichen Inhalt, wie dieser Inhalt göttlich, in ihm selbst wesentlich wäre. In diesem Sinn wird weiter gesagt, wir können nur unsere Beziehung zu Gott wissen, nicht, was Gott selbst ist ..." & p. 74: "Ebenso wird auch behauptet, man solle Gott andererseits nicht für sich selbst betrachten, denn das könne man nicht; man wisse von Gott nur in Beziehung auf das Bewußtsein. Das, was gesagt worden, sind die Grundbestimmungen, die wir als unmittelbare Zeitvorstellungen, Zeitüberzeugungen ansehen können ..."

This is the argument of Hegel's "Introduction" (Einleitung) to *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit., pp. 63-75. See p. 71: 'Untersuchen wir nun die Wahrheit des Wissens, so schien es, wir untersuchen, was es an sich ist. Allein in dieser Untersuchung ist es unser Gegenstand, es ist für uns; und das Ansich deselben, welches sich ergab, wäre so vielmehr sein Sein für uns ... Das Bewußtsein gibt seinen Maßstab an ihm selbst, und die Untersuchung wird dadurch eine Vergleichung seiner mit sich selbst; denn die Unterscheidung, welche soeben gemacht worden ist, fällt in es.' Lawrence S. Stepelevich has provided the most useful English edition of Hegel's *Preface and Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind*. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1990. See pp. 133-134.
A Priesthood of Speculation


29. In a marginal notation to his manuscript for his lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel makes a reference to "die unendliche Idee der Menschwerdung Gottes—dieser spekulative Mittelpunkt ..." See Vorlesungsmanuskripte I (1816-1831), op. cit., p. 75n. See also p. 280 for these cryptic jottings: "Vereinigung des unendlichen Gegensatzes—sondern das wahrhaft und allein Spekulative der Natur Gottes—des Geistes—dies ist der Inhalt und die Anschauung—und ist für das gewöhnliche ungebildete Bewußtsein. Gegensatz: Gott und die Welt, Ich dieser homuncio—Alle Menschen sind zur Seligkeit berufen ..." LPR, Volume 3, pp. 140-141, undertakes a "speculative" translation! "On the contrary, [the Christian religion is] the unification of the infinite antithesis, the one and only genuinely speculative [enjoyment] of the nature of God, or of spirit. This is its content and its vision, and it is there for the ordinary, uneducated consciousness. The antithesis is: God and the world, I this homuncio [manikin]." (I have removed some of the editorial markings.)

30. Glaubenslehre, §97.2: "Weit sicherer ist daher ... die Lehre Christo unabhängig von jener Lehre festzustellen."


32. Glaubenslehre, §99.1n.

33. Glaubenslehre, §170.3: "...aber ebenso wenig eine Glaubenslehre in dem ursprünglichsten und eigentlichsten Sinne des Wortes, wie die Lehren von der Auferstehung und Himmelfahrt Christi; und auch darin diesen ähnlich, daß unser Glaube an Christum und unsere Lebensgemeinschaft mit ihm dieselbe sein würde, wenn wir auch von dieser transzendenten Tatsache keine Kunde hätten, oder wenn es sich mit derselben auch anders verhielte. ... und darum ist es wichtig, die Unabhängigkeit jener Hauptangelpunkte der kirchlichen Lehre, Sein Gottes in Christo und in der christlichen Kirche, von der Trinitätslehre festzustellen."

35. See Wilfried Brandt, *Der Heilige Geist und die Kirche bei Schleiermacher*, op. cit., p. 227: "in ihrer kirchlichen Gestalt geht sie aber entschieden über den Bereich der Glaubenslehre hinaus ..."


42. I have made a slight alteration to the translation of this citation from *Glaubenslehre*, §170.1; I have removed the semicolon which does not appear in the original.


45. Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* is dedicated "zu der wissenschaftlichen Vollkommenheit des dogmatischen Ausdrucks" (*Glaubenslehre*, §96.1).


47. *Glaubenslehre*, §96.3. Cf. Martin Redeker, *Friedrich Schleiermacher*, op. cit., p. 191: "Schleiermacher will die biblische Bildersprache und das altkirchliche Dogma nicht beseitigen, aber für die heutige Theologie einen neuen 'wissenschaftlichen Ausdruck organisieren'."

48. See *Glaubenslehre*, §30.2.

49. See Schleiermacher's essay "Über den Gegensatz zwischen der Sabellianischen und der Athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität" (1822) in KGA, Volume I/10, pp. 223-306; here p. 227: "Diese Unvollkommenheit war verschwunden, das höchste Wesen war in den Menschen hineinversetzt; dies war der Zweck der göttlichen οὐκομολογία in Christo, und der christliche Glaube war sich bewußt, er sei erreicht."


51. Ibid., "... so darf ich auch glauben, in vollkommner Übereinstimmung mit mir selbst zu sein."

52. Pünjer, p. 67: "Jene dürftige Systemsucht freilich stößt das Fremde von sich, oft ohne seine Ansprüche gehörig zu untersuchen, schon weil es die wohlgeschlossenen Reihen des Eigenen verderben, und den schönen Zusammenhang stören könnte ..."

53. Ibid., p. 139: "diejenige systematische Behandlung religiöser Vorstellungen die vorzüglichste ist, welche auf der einen Seite die Vorstellung und den Begriff nicht für das Ursprüngliche und Constitutive ausgiebt auf diesem Gebiet, und auf der andern Seite, damit der Buchstabe nicht ersterbe und den Geist mit sich in den Tod ziehe, die lebendige Beweglichkeit desselben sicher stellt ..."

54. Ibid., p. 139: "... die eigentümliche Verschiedenheit nicht etwa nur zu dulden versichert, sondern zu konstruieren versucht." Schleiermacher has been paid the supreme compliment of modern (or post-modern) times of anticipating Derrida's vocabulary of différence. See Manfred Frank, *Das individuelle Allgemeine: Textstrukturierung und Interpretation nach Schleiermacher*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977. pp. 103-104.
55. See Wilfried Brandt, Der Heilige Geist und die Kirche bei Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 66: "Anders die Glaubenslehre: Das Prinzip ihre Einheit, der Glaube, liegt außerhalb ihrer selbst, will von ihr erst eingefangen werden, indem sie die Sätze einsammelt, in denen sich der Glaube ausspricht. Sie ist also nicht, wie jenes spekulatives System, schon durch den Anfang, den sie sich gibt, einheitlich, sondern sie wird erst einheitlich durch den Abschluß, den sie sich zu geben versteht." I am certainly not the first Schleiermacher commentator to have expressed reservations about the "systematic" persuasiveness of Schleiermacher's conclusion. Cf. F.C. Baur, Vorlesungen über die christliche Dogmengeschichte, Volume III, op. cit., pp. 469-470: "In welchem Gegensatz die Schleiermacher'sche Auffassung der Trinitätsidee zur Hegel'schen steht ... Was bei Hegel objektiv der immanente Prozeß des göttlichen Wesens ist, hat bei Schleiermacher nur die formelle Bedeutung einer logischen Zusammenfassung der Hauptmomente der Dogmatik, weswegen auch diese Lehre bei Schleiermacher ganz an das Ende der dogmatischen Darstellung als der Schlußpunkt derselben verwiesen ist."

56. See Hegel's Vorlesungsmanuskripte I (1816–1831), op. cit., p. 221: "Gott ist Geist,—d.i. das, was wir dreieinigen Gott heißen; Rein spekulatoriver Inhalt, d.i. mysterium Gottes..." The translation of this passage in LPR, Volume 3, p. 78, is helpful: 'God is spirit—that which we call the triune God, a purely speculative content, i.e., the mystery of God.' Cf. VPR, Teil 1, p. 43: "Wenn Geist nicht ein leeres Wort ist, so muß Gott mit dieser Bestimmung (gefaßt werden), wie vormals in der Kirchenlehre des dreieinige Gott genannt wurde. Dies ist dasjenige, wodurch die Natur des Geistes expliziert ist."

57. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae I, Q. 13, a. 7, Respondeo: "sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas..."

58. There is a passing reference to this equivocation in Peter C. Hodgson, God in History: Shapes of Freedom. Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 1989. See p. 68: "Thus the task of a speculative doctrine of the trinity is to destroy, that is, deconstruct, the childlike (kindlich), figurative (bildlich) forms—the 'persons' of 'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit'—in which the doctrine has been representationally expressed. This is necessary in order to release and retrieve the truth of the doctrine, which concerns God's 'real relations', not just internally (as Thomas maintained) but externally as well." By my reading of Hegel's philosophy of religion, he would have found the notion that he was 'destroying' or 'deconstructing' religious Vorstellung totally abhorrent: he did not come to destroy religious thought, but to fulfil it! Hodgson's use of quotation marks suggests that the religious language concerning God's nature had very little authority for Hegel; this is hardly evidence, since we are provided with nothing more than a rhetorical device, which has not risen to the level of a real argument.


60. This is how the English Translation undertakes to render secundum rem and secundum rationem. See, for instance, Summa Theologicae I, Q. 13, a. 7, Ad 4.


67. Hegel's *Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie*, op. cit., p. 246. Hegel calls this "das germanische Prinzip, diese Vereinigung der Objektivität und der Subjektivität". This is not meant in any crudely nationalistic sense, but is a catch-all term for post-classical Western Europe, just as one might speak of Indo-Germanic tribes and languages. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Die Vervunft in der Geschichte*, Volume I of Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, 5th ed., edited by J. Hoffmeister (PhB 171a). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980. See, for instance, p. 62: "Erst die deutschen Nationen sind im Christentum zum Bewußtsein gekommen, daß der Mensch als Mensch frei ist, die Freiheit des Geistes seine eigenste Natur ausmacht. Dies Bewußtsein ist zuerst in der Religion, in der innersten Region des Geistes aufgegangen..." It is, of course, the argument of this entire dissertation that Hegel has made this same principle the central idea of his whole philosophy.

68. I particularly like the following statement (p. 228) from Otto Pöggeler's doctoral dissertation for the University of Bonn; it was published in 1956 and entitled "Hegels Kritik der Romantik": ... aus dieser Generation war es zwei Männern, Hegel und Schleiermacher, vergönnt, ihre geistige Arbeit zur Systematik zu läuten und — so über alle Romantik hinauswachsend — möchte den Zeitgeist zu bewegen.


70. See *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830): 3. Teil, §382. Zusatz: "Das Andere, das Negative, der Widerspruch, die Entzweiung gehört also zur Natur des Geistes. In dieser Entwiegung liegt die Möglichkeit des Schmerzes. Der Schmerz ist daher nicht von außen an den Geist gekommen... Der Geist aber hat die Kraft, sich im Widerspruche, folglich im Schmerz (sowohl über das Böse wie über das Übel) zu erhalten." (pp. 26-27.)

71. See n. 56, above.

72. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830): 3. Teil, §382: "Das Wesen des Geistes... er kann die Negation seiner individuellen Unmittelbarkeit, den unendlichen Schmerz ertragen, d. i. in dieser Negativität affirmativ sich erhalten und identisch für sich sein." (pp. 25-26.)
73. See Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes (1829), op. cit., p. 47: "die christliche Religion lehrt, daß Gott sich zu dem Menschen herabgelassen habe, bis zur Knechtschaft, daß er sich dem Menschen geöffnet habe..."


75. The Levinas Reader (p. 167), edited by Seán Hand, offers the tag, "Not to philosophize is still to philosophize." Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. This is the marker that we are trying to pin on Schleiermacher.

76. See Lücke, p. 319: "eine Hierarchie der intellektuellen Bildung, ein Priesterum der Spekulation" & p. 350: "Kurz die spekulative Theologie bedroht uns mit einem den Äußerungen Christi, welcher will, sie sollen Alle von Gott gelehrt sein [John 6:45], gar nicht gemäßen Gegensatz esoterischer und exoterischer Lehre; die Wissenden haben allein den Grund des Glaubens, die Nichtwissenden haben nur den Glauben und erhalten ihn daher wohl nur auf dem Wege der Überlieferung. Läßt hingegen jene ebionitische Ansicht nur wenig von Christo übrig; so ist doch dieses wenige allen gleich zugänglich und erreichbar, und wir bleiben dabei bewahrt vor jeder immer noch, ist die Römische hinüber spielenden Hierarchie der Spekulation." Even the Ebionite heresy is preferable to any position of intellectual privilege, which would set Schleiermacher the (speculative) theologian over and above "thousands", who do not possess this ground of faith! (English Translation, pp. 63-64.)


78. At the time of writing, the newly installed Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George Carey, weighed into our debate with views expressed in the journal Reader's Digest—of indubitable exoteric pedigree! Dr. Carey is reported as saying, "The Church is more likely to die of intellectualism than of simplicity." (The Independent, February 28, 1991, p. 28.) While Schleiermacher would undoubtedly find the sentiment attractive (see n. 76 above), we should not be tempted to forget the extent to which the whole Schleiermacherian project from the Speeches on Religion to the Glaubenslehre is an attempt to find a form of Christian apologetic which will see it through "the impending crisis" occasioned by the modern, secular Wissenschaft, which Schleiermacher had no intention of excluding from his life. (See Lücke, p. 349 & p. 63 of the English Translation.) While many churches, sects and denominations may be sustained (and grow) in the simplicity of their convictions, it can at least be argued that what gets lost is the Christianity! Simplicity might just serve as a euphemism for fanaticism, and the antonym for fanaticism should not be "restraint"; it should be "moderation" or "compromise". As Hegel also says with great perspicacity, the incorporation of the Christian principle into secular existence is only possible by way of "a long and arduous" intellectual exertion. ("...aber dies Prinzip auch in das weltliche Wesen einzubilden, dies war eine weitere Aufgabe, welche zu lösen und auszuführen eine schwere, lange Arbeit der Bildung erfordert." See Volume I of Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, op. cit., p. 62. I have consulted the translation of this text by H.B. Nisbet: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (Introduction: Reason in History). Cambridge University Press, 1975. p. 54. (I owe the contrast between "fanaticism" and "compromise" to Georges Roditi, The Spirit of Perfection. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988. p. 5.)

79. See Hegel's Vorrede to the 2nd ed. (1827) of his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften as reprinted in Volume 8 of the Theorie-Werkausegabe, op. cit., pp. 13-32; here pp. 23-24: "Die Religion ist die Art und Weise des Bewußtseins, wie die Wahrheit

Cf. Glaubenslehre, §17.2: "Es ist aber der dogmatischen Begriffsbildung nicht gelungen, ja man dürfte wohl sagen, es kann ihr auch des Gegenstandes wegen nicht gelingen, den eigentlichen Ausdruck überall an die Stelle des bildlichen zu setzen; und der wissenschaftliche Wert dogmatischer Sätze beruht also von dieser Seite größtenteils nur auf der möglichst genauen und bestimmten Erklärung der vorkommenden bildlichen Ausdrücke." Even though the "figurative" expression is the original one (and therefore cannot be eliminated), the intent of dogmatic theology is to "substitute" den eigentlichen Ausdruck für das figurative eine, in order to achieve precision and to avoid contradiction.

See the famous passage from Hegel's Vorrede to Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Volume 7 of the Theorie-Werkausgabe edited by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel; here pp. 27-28: "Um noch über das Belehren, wie die Welt sein soll, ein Wort zu sagen, so kommt dazu ohnehin die Philosophie immer zu spät. Als der Gedanke der Welt erscheint sie erst in der Zeit, nachdem die Wirklichkeit ihren Bildungsprozeß vollendet und sich fertig gemacht hat." Cf. p. 26: "Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein Sohn seiner Zeit; so ist auch die Philosophie ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt. Es ist ebenso töricht zu wähnen, irgendeine Philosophie gehe über ihre gegenwärtige Welt hinaus, als, ein Individuum überspringe seine Zeit, springe über Rhodus hinaus."

See Lücke, pp. 345-346.

In his New Year's Day address for 1991, Václav Havel points out how (under communist dictatorship) "the people" were always being required to sacrifice (real) present benefits and freedoms "for the abstract future of a utopian ideology." The translation of Havel's speech by Paul Wilson is available in The New York Review of Books, March 7, 1991, pp. 19-20; here p. 20.

The cryptic conclusion to the manuscript for the lectures of 1821 reads: "Religion in die Philosophie sich flüchten... Aber Philosophie partiell—Priesterstand isoliert—Heiligtum—Unbekümmert wie es der Welt gehen mag—mit ihr nicht zusammengehen—Dieses Besitztum der Wahrheit—Wie sich gestalte ist nicht unsere Sache". See Vorlesungsmanuskripte I (1816-1831), op. cit., p. 300. The succinct expression of a "priesthood apart" was suggested by John McCumber, "Hegel on Habit" in The Owl of Minerva, Volume 21/2 (Spring 1990), pp. 155-165; here p. 163.


See n. 84 above.

LPR, Volume 3, p. 162.

The Works of Aristotle, edited by David Ross. Volume VIII: Metaphysica. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928. Here 981b: "This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure."

See Wissenschaft der Logik (1832); 1. Band, op. cit., p. 12.

Ibid., p. 6: "das sonderbare Schauspiel...ein gebildetes Volk ohne Metaphysik zu sehen... Die Theologie, welche in früheren Zeiten die Bewahrerin der spekulativen Myste-
rion...war, hatte diese Wissenschaft gegen Gefühle...aufgegeben." Hegel's Science of Logic, op. cit., pp. 25-26.


92. Cf. Heinrich Scholz, Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, op. cit., p. 198: "Der Glaube scheidet alles aus, was er nicht selber tragen kann."


94. See this excellent summary by Heinrich Scholz, Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, op. cit., pp. 200-201: "Der Dogmatiker muß in beiden Welten zu Hause sein: Christentum und Wissenschaft, Theologie und Philosophie müssen sich ihm erschlossen haben; er muß die treibenden Kräfte kennen, die hier und dort am Werke sind, er muß ein sicheres Auge haben für das, was sich verschmelzen läßt, und das, was nur nebeneinander bestehen kann."

95. Cf. Walter Sparn, "Doppelte Wahrheit?", op. cit., p. 55: "Allein die Aussage, es gebe zweierlei Wahrheit, verknüpfte unvermeidlicherweise selber, was sie für nicht verknüpfbar ausgab."

96. Ferdinand Christian Baur on the Writing of Church History, op. cit., p. 319. While Baur is actually talking about "the relation of the history of dogma to the history of philosophy" the same applies, mutatis mutandis, for dogma and philosophy: "The history of dogma has a very close relation to the history of philosophy, one that includes the relation of philosophy to religion and theology." Cf. F.C. Baur, Vorlesungen über die christliche Dogmengeschichte, Volume I, op. cit., p. 78: "Zur Geschichte der Philosophie steht die Dogmengeschichte in einer sehr nahen Beziehung, wie dies das Verhältnis der Philosophie zur Religion und Theologie von selbst mit sich bringt."

97. Goethe's Faust, Part I, lines 1112-1113: "Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust, Die eine will sich von der andern trennen...."

98. Ferdinand Christian Baur, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, 3rd ed. (1867). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1979. p. 354: "In der SCHLEIERMACHER'schen Theologie... sie hat, was sie besonders charakterisiert, in ihrem christlichen Bewußtsein als Prinzip erfaßt, was längst, nur noch nicht mit dieser allgemeinen Verständlichkeit ausgesprochen, der tiefere Gedanke der Zeit war, die Innerlichkeit des Christentums, oder das Christliche als ein wesentliches Element des Bewußtseins selbst; aber sie ist auf einem Punkt stehen geblieben, auf welchem die Bewegung, deren Produkt sie selbst ist, nicht ruhen kann, sondern durch die innere Macht der Konsequenz weiter getrieben wird." For a similar discussion, see Baur's Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 3. Teil, op. cit., pp. 885-886.

100. Vorlesungsmanuskripte I (1816-1831), op. cit., p. 300. The whole of this passage is of considerable interest: "Statt Vernunft und Religion sich widersprechen—diesen Miss­ton auflösen auf diese Weise für uns—Versöhnung in der Philosophie—Wie sich die zeitliche Gegenwart herausfindet, ist ihr zu überlassen—In der Philosophie selbst partiell—hiezu die Anleitung zu geben, ist was diese Vorlesungen versucht haben."


103. F.C. Baur, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, op. cit., p. 355: "Ist der Inhalt des Christentums wesentlich die Lehre von dem dreieinigen Gott, so ist die Dreieinigkeit, als das Wesen Gottes, das Wesen des Geistes selbst..."


"Die Abgrenzung zwischen Kultur und Technik ist, ähnlich wie jene zwischen Glauben und Wissen, eine Voraussetzung der geistigen Sauberkeit. Ohne sie wird das Leben zum Trauerspiel."

Schleiermacher's reference to the "galvanic pile" in his celebrated letter to Jacobi in 1818 deserves some detailed consideration. Schleiermacher is obviously attracted to this recent scientific discovery because the "pile" or battery is taken to be an illustration of the kind of "polar oscillation" which occurs between feeling and understanding, or between faith and knowledge (Glauben und Wissen). John Clayton, in an article of special relevance for this discussion, argues that the metaphor of "polar oscillation" runs throughout all of Schleiermacher's writings, philosophical as well as theological. It would then be instructive to discover just how the galvanic pile or battery (invented by Volta) functions in reality.

In modern terms, Volta created the first electrochemical cell by allowing two dissimilar metals (like zinc and silver or zinc and copper) to come into contact in a saline solution. Salt (as an electrolyte) heightens the conductivity of the current. (Even the hands of the human body may become the conducting agency, as the salt and moisture of human hands is sufficient to make the transfer of an electrical charge possible.) In the event, Volta placed pads moistened with salt water between the pairs of metals.

The real interest in examining the operation of a "galvanic pile", or this electrochemical cell, is the discovery that the electrical current is in fact produced by the corrosion of one metal, and the "anti-corrosion" of the other. The transfer of ions that takes place in the cell is the same as that which occurs in the process we know as "rusting". Indeed were there sufficient solution available, one of the two metals would, over time, corrode completely—it
would fully dissolve in the solution—and the effectiveness of the cell would altogether cease. While we have no interest in censuring Schleiermacher for failing to possess an exhaustive understanding of electrical currents, we may nonetheless muse over the implications of this account of the "pile" or the battery for the polar relation which is thought to exist between understanding and feeling. If these two faculties are to be seen as equivalent to the two metals, then the current between them is not in fact produced by their being held in balance, but actually by the corrosion of one of the pair and the "strengthening" of the other. In terms of our argument, of course, feeling moves in the direction of its comprehension, but the opposite movement can also be envisaged: understanding sacrificed in the interests of feeling.

Modern industry has found remarkable applications for these characteristics of the "bimetallic couple", and the "galvanic corrosion" which occurs when two dissimilar metals are placed together in solution. The most dramatic application now occurs, for instance, on oil rigs located in the North Sea. There zinc anodes are attached to the legs of the platform and these rust or corrode "sacrificially"; their corrosion leaves the main structure unaffected. One metal is literally spared from corrosion by the sacrificial rusting of the other. Of course, given the vastness of the sea, these zinc anodes must from time to time be renewed. The same principles lie behind the process known as "galvanizing": here iron or steel is dipped in molten zinc in order that a thin layer of zinc will protect the metal underneath from corrosion. In essence, this means that even

if the zinc layer is scratched, the iron does not rust because zinc ions are formed in solution in preference to iron ions.³

In effect then, the "galvanic pile" is probably a very poor illustration of the kind of "polar oscillation" or "polar reciprocity" which Schleiermacher was advocating in his letter to Jacobi. In fact, if the pile teaches us anything, it may be the opposite of what Schleiermacher intended: brought to its natural conclusion, the pile would, in the end, effect the complete dissolution of one of the two metals which constitute its dynamic productivity. The movement of the ions is from one metal to the other; while one metal
corrodes, the other metal undergoes the exactly opposite process. This may, in fact, accord with our common sense understanding of the matter; we may suspect that understanding and feeling, or faith and knowledge, cannot actually be held in perfect balance: while one increases, the other diminishes.\(^4\) Faith may seek understanding, or understanding may seek faith; whichever alternative one pursues, the movement is always from one to the other. Of course, the enormous interest of Schleiermacher’s efforts rests precisely here: in total contrast to the above, Schleiermacher argues that, in their reciprocal relation to one another, each strengthens the other, neither usurping the unique place of the other. We are well acquainted with this argument from the body of our dissertation.

While we have now said enough about the actual operation of the "galvanic pile", we still need to explore more adequately that notion of "polarity" of which the pile was supposed to be an illustration. And here Hegel’s comments once again prove of considerable interest. In his *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel argues correctly that the galvanic circuit is not occasioned simply by the contact of two dissimilar metals, but only by their contact within a solution—the opposites are connected "by a third, a solvent, neutral substance in which the difference can enter into existence ..."\(^5\) And here we hit upon a fundamental disjunction in the way in which "galvanism" is systematically appropriated by Hegel and Schleiermacher. "Galvanism" is the term used to describe the electricity produced by a primary battery;\(^6\) and a primary battery, like that first discovered by Volta, is one in which the chemical reaction is irreversible. In other words, the battery can only be restored by a fresh supply of metal and/or solution.\(^7\) In their respective discussions of "galvanism", we are offered a touchstone for comprehending the basis of the disagreement between Hegel and Schleiermacher.

Years earlier than any of the writings under discussion here, Novalis defined "galvanism" as "Wechselvernehmung heterogener Körper"—and this understanding of the galvanic process is still very much in the background of Schleiermacher’s allusion to the "galvanic pile". Others have shown how, for the Romantic school to which Schleiermacher belonged, the whole age
around 1800 could be described as "ein chemisches Zeitalter" and how chemical "Mischung und Scheidung" are the essential forces which make this notion intelligible. Here Schleiermacher has remained true to his roots, for he wishes to demonstrate that feeling and understanding, Glauben und Wissen, are both in essence separate and united, discrete and continuous. In Novalis' terms, they are heterogeneous, yet capable of a reciprocal relation.

For Hegel, there is a fundamental incoherence in this Romantic account of the relationship between heterogeneous elements—were they strictly heterogeneous, there would be no justification in placing them side by side. They would have nothing more in common than a square and a circle, and we could no more discover their unity than we could imagine a square circle: the terms would simply exclude each other. And, of course, Schleiermacher does not just see them (faith and understanding) as heterogeneous: he might agree that, however heterogeneous they are in form, they have the same final object in view. Hence his insistence that, even though they cannot ever be united, neither can they ultimately fall into contradiction.

As we have shown above, the "galvanic pile" might not be the best illustration of the kind of polarity that Schleiermacher seems to be advocating. Galvanic electricity is only possible by means of the solvent "in which the difference can enter into existence", an assertion in which the familiar Hegelian logic is already at work. Towards the beginning of his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel makes this logic explicit:

There has been a lot of talk in physics about polarity. This concept is a great advance in the metaphysics of the science; for the concept of polarity is simply nothing else but the specific relation of necessity between two different terms which are one, in that when one is given, the other is also given. But this polarity is restricted to the opposition. However, through the opposition there is also given the return of the opposition into unity, and this is the third term which the necessity of the Notion [die Notwendigkeit des Begriffs] has over and above polarity.

Hegel also took up the theme of polarity earlier in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and from this discussion it emerges that a purer statement of "polarity", in Schleiermacher's terms, might have been realized if he had used the magnet to illustrate his point. There we have the two
opposites inextricably bound together, and even if we were to cut a magnet "in two", we would not then have "a north pole in one piece, and a south pole in the other". But if we substitute the magnet for the "galvanic pile" as a more successful instance of polarity, this in no way diminishes the opposition between Hegel and Schleiermacher; on the contrary, it makes it even clearer. As Hegel says: "In opposition, the different is not confronted by any other, but by its other". He goes on to say quite explicitly that

the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to ascertain the necessity of things ... all true thinking, we have already said, is a thinking of necessity.

Hegel's intention is to discover the necessity of the relationship that is established between faith and reason, not simply to assert their polarity. What is it about them that enables them to undergo this polar oscillation? The bare determination of their heterogeneity does not take us very far in understanding their relationship to one another.

Hegel is certainly able to praise Schleiermacher because he is not caught within the logic of the "abstract understanding": Schleiermacher is not content with the bald "either-or" which the understanding demands, and which reaches its purest statement in the Law of the Excluded Middle. Schleiermacher, we might say, is dedicated to the discovery of the "middle", the "mediation", which obtains between feeling and understanding, between Glauben und Wissen: this mediation is implied in and through the reciprocity of their "polar oscillation" (Novalis' "Wechselnehmung heterogener Körper"). But in Hegelian terms, Schleiermacher is unable to rise to the higher insight of their essential unity, that is to say,

the specific relation of necessity between two different terms which are one, in that when one is given, the other is also given.

Hegel pushes this argument to the limit in his discussion of magnetism: for him, the magnet actually displays in "simple, naïve fashion" the concept (Begriff) at the heart of his system. Viewed philosophically, the poles of the magnet surrender their "sensible, mechanical reality" and adopt instead an "ideal" one: the poles of the magnet are "absolutely inseparable" (sie sind..."
And it is precisely in their "ideal" inseparability that the magnetic poles illustrate the true relation of Glauben und Wissen.

In conclusion, it may be instructive to see how ordinary dictionaries actually define the word "polarity". In German, "Polarität" can be succinctly defined as "Gegensätzlichkeit bei wesenhafter Zusammengehörigkeit". This definition provides in a shorthand form the conceptual thrust of the whole preceding argument; according to this definition, polar opposition presupposes an "essential" underlying unity: in their opposition to one another, the poles are bound together. The *Oxford English Dictionary* also offers us a tiny nugget: among the references provided we find S.T. Coleridge's contribution to the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*. Coleridge's statement that the law of polarity is the "manifestation of one power by opposite forces" inevitably requires us to ask after the nature of that "one power".
Appendix A: Footnotes

1. John Clayton, "Theologie als Vermittlung—Das Beispiel Schleiermachers" in Kongreß, Teilband 2, pp. 899-915; here p. 905: "Der metaphorische Gebrauch von polarer Oszillation durchzieht fast das Ganze von Schleiermachers Schriften, sowohl das der philosophischen als auch das der theologischen." Any discussion of a "Vertrag zwischen Glauben und Wissen" (ibid.) places us firmly within the perspective from which this dissertation is being written. Hegel's early study Glauben und Wissen (1802), op. cit., mentions Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion in his discussion of Jacobi's philosophy.

2. See The Times, June 1, 1987, p. 21: "New N Sea platorm suffers severe damage".


4. The letter to Jacobi does mention a form of "equilibrium", which involves an alternate lifting and sinking; this is in reference to Jacobi's original communication (Cordes, op. cit., p. 209). John Clayton (op. cit., p. 909) describes this "Wechselbeziehung" as follows: "... wenn die eine Seite zunimmt, die andere notwendigerweise abnimmt." However well this form of "equilibrium" accords with our argument, this can hardly be the kind of reciprocity that Schleiermacher had in mind for the twin foci of his own ellipse!


10. On this point, see the exhaustive study by Peter Kapitza, Die frühromantische Theorie
I owe this telling observation to John Caird's discussion of the incarnation in his Gifford Lectures: _The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity_. Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1899. Volume II, p. 105: "If our notions of divinity and humanity contain heterogeneous or contradictory elements, it is a truism to say that we can no more combine them in the conception of one and the same personality than we can think of a square circle, or a quadrilateral triangle, or a straight curve."

This somewhat Hegelian formulation is taken from Peter Kapitza, _Die frühromantische Theorie der Mischung_, op. cit., p. 64: The affinity of poetry and philosophy is said to rest upon a heterogeneity of form "bei gleichem Ziel".

This German formulation is very clear; the Law is referred to as "der Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten".


Appendix B:
Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1768</td>
<td>F.D.E. Schleiermacher, born 21. XI. 1768, Breslau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>G.W.F. Hegel, born 27. VIII. 1770, Stuttgart</td>
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<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>Kant's <em>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</em> (1st ed.)</td>
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<td>1785</td>
<td>Jacobi's <em>Über die Lehre des Spinoza</em> (1st ed.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1787</td>
<td>Kant's <em>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</em> (2nd ed.)</td>
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<td>1789</td>
<td>Storming of the Bastille (14. VII)</td>
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<td>1790</td>
<td>Fichte's &quot;Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus&quot;</td>
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<td>1794</td>
<td>Fichte's <em>Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre</em></td>
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<td>1799</td>
<td>Schleiermacher's <em>Reden</em> (1st ed.)</td>
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<td>1800</td>
<td>Notification of Volta's Battery</td>
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<td>1802</td>
<td>Hegel's <em>Glauben und Wissen</em></td>
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<td>1803</td>
<td>Schelling: <em>Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums</em></td>
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<td>1804</td>
<td>Schleiermacher appointed to University of Halle</td>
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<td>1806</td>
<td>Battle of Jena; Halle closed; <em>Reden</em> (2nd ed.)</td>
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<td>1807</td>
<td>Hegel's <em>Phänomenologie des Geistes</em></td>
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<td>1808</td>
<td>Schleiermacher's &quot;Gelegentliche Gedanken&quot;</td>
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<td>1810</td>
<td>Foundation—University of Berlin</td>
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<td>1811</td>
<td>Schleiermacher's <em>Kurze Darstellung</em> (1st ed.)</td>
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<td>1812</td>
<td>Hegel's <em>Wissenschaft der Logik</em></td>
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<td>1813</td>
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<td>1814</td>
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<td>1818</td>
<td>Hegel Professor of Philosophy in Berlin; Schleiermacher to Jacobi</td>
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<td>1822</td>
<td>1st ed., 2 Vols. Preface to Hinrichs: <em>Die Religion</em></td>
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<td>1824</td>
<td>Hegel's 2nd <em>Religionsphilosophie</em></td>
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<td>1827</td>
<td>Hegel's 3rd <em>Religionsphilosophie; Beethoven's Missa Solemnis</em>, Op. 123</td>
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<td>F.C. Baur's <em>Antrittsprogramm</em></td>
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<td>Closure: Philosophische Klasse, Akademie der Wissenschaften</td>
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<td>1830</td>
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<td>1840</td>
<td><em>Religionsphilosophie</em> (2nd ed. by Bruno Bauer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>Kierkegaard attends Schelling's lectures in Berlin</td>
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