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**Landownership and Rural Development in
Theory and Practice:
Case Studies from the North Pennines in the
19th and 20th centuries**

by

Olivia J. Wilson

**A Thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

Department of Geography

**The University of Durham
1990**



25 JUN 1991

Abstract

This research sets out to examine the influence of landownership on rural development in Britain. It is proposed that an analysis of the historical development of any region under specific landownership forms will enable a better understanding of its contemporary rural development problems and land use conflicts. It is hoped that the research findings will be of both academic interest and practical value.

A conceptual framework of the ways in which landownership can influence rural development is constructed from an analysis of continuity and change in landownership and rural society over the 19th and 20th centuries at the national level. The framework is then tested in relation to case studies of landownership and rural development in the North Pennines. This is an upland region of Britain with a highly traditional pattern of landownership, dominated by landed estates and common lands. The development of three landed estates, under different landownership forms, over the 19th and 20th centuries are studied in detail, whilst a broader range of landownership forms are considered for the contemporary period. Finally, the relative importance of landowners and policy-makers in the current rural development of the region are evaluated.

It is concluded that change in landownership at the national scale has not been as great as is commonly assumed. Landowners are still an important group in society, both at the national and local levels, and can exert a considerable influence on rural development, although today, at the local level, this is contingent upon the specific economic, social and geographic characteristics of the area. In the North Pennines, an understanding of the landownership structure is of fundamental importance for an understanding of the region's historical development and contemporary land use issues.

A historical perspective on the development of rural areas enables a deeper understanding of contemporary issues and provides a 'behavioural' perspective which, if incorporated into the policy-making process, could improve the effectiveness of rural development policies.

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Acknowledgements

My thanks go especially to Dr. B.K. Roberts, without whose constant advice and encouragement this thesis would never have materialised. I should also like to thank Dr. P.J. Atkins and all the staff and postgraduates of the Durham Geography Department who have helped me in innumerable ways.

I warmly thank all the people who have assisted me with my research. I should like to thank in particular Mr P. Woodward, Mrs J.M. Drury and the staff of Durham County Record Office.

Finally, I could not forget my parents for their long-suffering patience and invaluable help with proof-reading.

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Abbreviations

AONB Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty.
CEGB Central Electricity Generating Board.
CGT Capital Gains Tax.
CLA Country Landowners' Association.
CLF Common Land Forum.
CoSIRA Council for Small Industries in Rural Areas.
CPRE Council for the Preservation of Rural England.
CTT Capital Gains Tax.
DCC Durham County Council.
ECs for Eng Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England.
ECCP East Cumbria Countryside Project.
ESA Environmentally Sensitive Areas.
HIDB Highlands and Islands Development Board.
JRAS Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society.
LASDO Landscape Special Development Order.
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
MSC Manpower Services Commission.
MoD Ministry of Defence.
NCC Nature Conservancy Council.
NFU National Farmers' Union.
NPRDB North Pennines Rural Development Board.
NWA Northumbrian Water Authority.
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
RCC Rural Community Council.
RDA Rural Development Area.
RDP Rural Development Programme.
SSSI Site of Special Scientific Interest.
YHA Youth Hostels Association.

Chapter I

Introduction

"How land is owned and controlled is fundamental to our understanding of rural society". (Newby, 1980, 31)

1.1 Introduction

The hypothesis which this thesis sets out to test is that landownership has been in the past, and continues to be, a major influence on the development of rural areas, and that an analysis of the development of any area under specific landownership forms provides a historical and structural perspective which leads to a deeper understanding of that area's rural society and contemporary development problems. The thesis is, therefore, concerned with three interrelated and recurring themes: landownership, rural society and rural development.

It is undisputed that British society in the 19th century was dominated by an élite group whose power was based on the ownership of land, and it is generally accepted that their influence permeated political, social and economic institutions from the village community to Whitehall and Parliament (Caird, 1967, 58; Bourne, 1986, 16). It is also widely believed that over the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this landed élite disappeared, both through the break-up of their estates and through their loss of control over the institutions of power (Thompson, 1963, 24). The dominant pattern of large landed estates in the 19th century has, apparently, been replaced by a more equitable and diffuse pattern of landownership in the 20th century, whilst British society today appears to be dominated by a more diffuse élite, including commercial and industrial as well as landed interests (Sarre, 1989, 67). The activities of landowners today are, in theory at least, controlled by the State to such an extent that it has been claimed (Douglas, 1976, 219), that it is no longer necessary to consider the role of the private landowner in studies of land use.

These assumptions would appear to be corroborated by the following statistics: in 1873, 24% of the land of England was held in estates of over 10,000 acres (4,167 hectares), and 40% of the land area in estates of over 3,000 acres (1,250 hectares). In 1908, 88% of the agricultural area was rented. Today over 50% is owner-occupied. The dominant model of landownership has, apparently, altered from the landed estate to the family farm [1].

Over the same time period, fundamental structural changes in rural society have taken place. First, Britain has changed from a predominantly rural society in the 19th century to an urban-industrial society in the 20th century. The urban population of England and Wales first exceeded the rural population in 1851 (see Table 1.1), and the level of urbanisation has continued to increase ever since. Not only has rural land been lost to urban development, but the growth of the urban population has placed new pressures on the countryside for recreation and leisure.

Table 1.1 — Population of England and Wales, 1851 to 1911


- URBAN DISTRICTS -			RURAL DISTRICTS -	
Year	population	% total	population	% total
1851	8,990,809	50.2	8,936,800	49.8
1861	10,960,998	54.6	9,105,226	45.4
1871	14,041,404	61.8	8,670,862	38.3
1881	17,636,646	67.9	8,337,793	32.1
1891	20,895,504	72.0	8,107,021	28.0
1901	25,058,355	77.0	7,469,488	23.0
1911	28,162,936	78.1	7,907,556	21.9

Source: Rowntree (1913, 11).

Second, agriculture has changed out of all recognition. In the 19th century, agriculture was the backbone of rural Britain. Over the 20th century, however, the

absolute and relative numbers employed in agriculture have dropped dramatically (see Figure 1.1) because of the mechanisation and capitalisation of farming. The numbers of farm holdings have decreased through amalgamation. Agriculture is now a highly productive industry, but is no longer the dominant source of employment in rural Britain.

Figure 1.1 — Farm Workers in England & Wales



Sources: MAFF (1968); MAFF (1986)

Third, the 19th century structure of local politics, based on patronage and status, has been replaced by a democratic structure of county and district councils. The democratisation of local politics, and the break-up of landed estates, have both acted, apparently, to reduce the influence of the landlord on rural society. Finally, the State has assumed a greater role over rural land use and the rural economy and society with the introduction of comprehensive legislation in the post World War Two period.

On the surface, therefore, it would appear that there are few points of comparison between rural society in the 19th century and rural society in the 20th century. Why then carry out a study of landownership and rural development today, and what value can a historical perspective have for the present? The following section will review the academic context within which this research is carried out, and show why such a study is necessary.

1.2 The Academic Background

To a large extent, the academic literature confirms this generally held belief that landownership is no longer an important factor in rural society. Landowners figure prominently in studies of 19th century society, economy, and politics at both local and national levels. There is a large body of material on the 19th century landed élite (for instance Brodrick, 1881; Spring, 1963; Thompson, 1963; Caird, 1967; 1968; Sutherland, 1968; Douglas, 1976; Offer, 1981; Stone, 1984). Agricultural historians (for instance Ernle, 1961; Orwin & Whetham, 1971; Mingay & Chambers, 1976; Thirsk, 1985) have studied the role of landlords in 19th century agricultural innovation and in the enclosure movement. Only a small number of historical geographers have studied 19th century landownership. Tate and Turner (1978); Mills (1980) and Kain and Prince (1985) have experimented with 19th century data sources for reconstructing landownership patterns, whilst studies have also been carried out into the 19th century estate landscape and architectural styles (Prince, 1967; Girouard, 1978; Clemenson, 1982). The many disciplines in which 19th century landownership has been studied reflect its wide-ranging influence on the society, economy and politics of 19th century Britain.

Although in the period leading up to the 1947 Agriculture Act land nationalisation was a real political issue (Smith, 1989), academic studies of rural Britain in the post World War Two period have tended to ignore, or at best make fleeting reference to, landownership as a factor in rural development [2]. The academic literature has been dominated by three approaches. In the 1930s and 1940s, much empirical work was carried out by rural geographers into national land use patterns and resource needs. There was a recognition of the increasing pressures on the countryside, and the need for a national co-ordinated land use strategy (Stapledon, 1935; Stamp, 1962). Landownership was referred to only so far as it was seen as an obstacle to agricultural improvement (Stapledon, 1935, 189).

During the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, the hallmark of rural sociology was the community study (for instance Arensberg & Kimball, 1940; Rees, 1950; Williams, 1963). The community study approach was based on theoretical assumptions about urban and rural society. Truly 'urban' and 'rural' societies represented opposite ends of a sociological spectrum. Urban society was a 'Gesellschaft' (literally, 'society') whilst rural society was a 'Gemeinschaft' (community) [3]. Whilst the definition of community has never been satisfactorily established, the key features of a community are: kinship, neighbourhood (attachment to place) and friendship (social interaction) . . . Within this theoretical conception of the rural community, the family farm played an important part (Marsden et al., 1986a).

A similar conception of rural society was the human ecology approach, which was adopted by both sociologists and geographers (for instance Hawley, 1950; Darling, 1955). This approach emphasised the role of the environment. The community and the environment were conceptualised as an organic whole, living in a symbiotic relationship [4]. Community studies were, by definition, case studies of individual, usually isolated, communities, with little or no consideration of the outside world. The emphasis of these studies was on uniqueness rather than generality.

Geographical conceptions of the countryside were influenced by this perceived dichotomy between urban society and rural community, and the relationships between them. Rural communities were conceptualised as unchanging and traditional, whilst urban society was dynamic and expansionist. Rural change was, therefore, the result of the encroachment of urban society. This encroachment was seen as a gradual process of diffusion outwards from urban centres. Thus, rural communities in the most peripheral areas were least affected by urban influences. A geographical 'rural-urban' continuum could be identified (Bell & Newby, 1971, 42). Many attempts have been made by geographers to classify Britain into 'rural' and 'urban', and then into different degrees of 'rural', on the basis of socio-economic and land use data (Cloke & Park, 1985, 6) [5]. Although there is no standard classification, the existence and significance of geographical variation within rural Britain is recognised. A spectrum can be identified between two extremes: the uplands and the rural-urban fringe. These areas face very different sorts of land use conflicts and socio-economic problems (Harrison, 1981, 223). The uplands suffer from an inhospitable environment, inaccessibility, and socio-economic decline,

although certain areas are now popular tourist destinations. Land use conflicts arise from competition between industrial, recreation and conservation interests. On the rural-urban fringe, the urban influence is very strong in terms of land use, employment and social composition. These areas face intense land use pressures for housing development.

The third strand in post-war rural studies has been the tendency to sectoralise rural Britain into discrete categories: settlement, population, agriculture etc (Clout, 1972; Tarrant, 1974; Cherry, 1976). This tendency to compartmentalise the countryside is epitomised by agricultural economics, an academic discipline which has emerged in the post-war period and which pays little attention to the individual or the uniqueness of place (Newby, 1986). These approaches reflect the sectoral nature of the rural planning framework. Certainly, academics have influenced government policy and vice versa, although it is difficult to say which side has had the greater influence. Carter (1979) argues that rural studies have suffered from the close alliance between academics and policy-makers:

“the ‘problems’ requiring investigation have often been defined for the rural sociologist by these agencies rather than by him for the theoretical progress of his discipline....” (Carter, 1979, 579).

Recently, both the community study and the sectoral approaches have been criticised for propagating misconceptions about the countryside, and failing to identify real problems (Carter, 1979; Marsden et al., 1986a; Newby, 1986). The community study approach has been criticised for its descriptive, subjective nature, and for the lack of theoretical content. Often researchers have been blinkered by ideological preconceptions (Bell & Newby, 1971, 44). The sectoral approach has also been criticised for going to the other extreme and looking for general spatial patterns, with little or no consideration of local variation. In addition, this approach has also been criticised for concentrating on economic variables, with little or no consideration of social factors (Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 197). Both approaches have lacked a theoretically informed framework, and have sought explanation within the existing structure of society. There has been an implicit acceptance of the status quo.

A dramatic shift in academic thinking has taken place over the last 25 years, which has questioned many formerly held assumptions about the countryside and has opened up new research horizons. Several factors have influenced this academic 'revolution'. Pahl's (1964) account of social change in Hertfordshire villages on the urban fringe of London challenged traditional views about rural and urban societies. He showed that a society could be 'rural' in form but 'urban' in nature. The term 'metropolitan village' was coined to describe villages which had been 'urbanised'. At the same time, the incorporation of radical theories of third world underdevelopment into development sociology influenced thinking about rural development and regional inequality in Britain (Carter, 1979).

Rural sociology was brought into the mainstream of theoretical developments in sociology, however, through the work of Newby and his associates (1975; 1976). Newby's work on farm workers and farmers in East Anglia has disproved many assumptions formerly held by sociologists about rural society and rural development. His work has shown that rural communities, in the strict sociological sense of the word, rarely, if ever, existed. Rural societies are subject to the same class and status divisions and power conflicts that have long been recognised in urban societies, and share many of the same problems of poverty and deprivation, albeit with a 'rural flavour' (Shaw, 1979, 182). Rural societies are not, and probably never were, isolated and unchanging, and cannot be studied in isolation from the non-rural world. There can be no theory of rural sociology without a theory of society (Buttel & Newby, 1980, 4). Political and socio-economic theories, such as marxian and weberian theory, formerly applied only to the study of urban society, can help towards an understanding of the rural society and economy.

These theoretical developments in rural sociology have been mirrored by theoretical developments in human geography (for instance Gregory, 1978; Urry, 1981; Harvey, 1982; Massey, 1984; Sayer, 1984; Thrift, 1987) and developments in both disciplines have influenced rural geography. Moreover, the boundaries between the social sciences have weakened as each discipline becomes more receptive to ideas in neighbouring subjects. Today, there is a considerable overlap in subject matter and theory between the work of rural geographers, rural sociologists, anthropologists, and even agricultural economists (Bowler, 1987).

Not only have former problems been reanalysed, events in the 1980s have opened up new areas of study. After forty years of planning, few improvements in rural society have been achieved and the existing planning framework is recognised to have many failings (Shoat, 1987; Ambrose, 1986). The crisis of agricultural over-production in the EEC has led to a critical re-examination of British agriculture, and criticism of the environmentally destructive practices which have been allowed in order to increase productivity (Bowers & Cheshire, 1983).

Current research on rural Britain can be divided into three interrelated themes (Buttel & Newby, 1980, 18): farming (Marsden et al., 1986a; 1986b; Gasson et al., 1988), the environment (Lowe et al., 1986) and rural development (Carter, 1980; Hoggart & Buller, 1987). In all these themes, landownership is now recognised as being an important factor. Assumptions about the decline of the landed interest have been questioned. Newby (1980), for instance, identifies landownership as being the fundamental factor in the social, economic and political structuring of contemporary rural society.

There has been a reassessment of process and pattern in rural development, and of the relationship of rural Britain to the State. The traditional classification of rural Britain into zones, or a continuum, has been replaced by a more fluid conceptualisation of geographical variation.

"There is now, surely, a general awareness that what constitutes 'rural' is wholly a matter of convenience and that arid and abstract definitional exercises are of little utility" (Newby, 1986, 209).

Rural societies are not isolated from the external world but are linked by vertical ties, and the relationships between the local and national levels are constantly changing. Rural development in any area is the outcome of national influences and locally specific conditions (Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 183). The concept of a 'locality' has been put forward as a more dynamic and flexible alternative to 'region' (Urry, 1981).

Many of
All these recent theoretical approaches can be described as 'structuralist' [6]. Although structuralist approaches offer many advantages for the researcher, Newby (1986) points out certain dangers. There may be a temptation to describe how

areas differ from the national picture without analysing the underlying processes which cause those differences. On the other hand, localities should not be seen as objects of study in their own right, but as laboratories for the testing of theoretical and empirical issues. Political economy theory, especially, tends to be blinkered, and may lead to a temptation to concentrate on those features which conform to marxist theory, whilst ignoring other, perhaps contradictory, but equally important processes. Moreover, there is a temptation to simplify or gloss over the nature of the links between the national and local scales which in reality are very complex.

Indeed, recent academic research has concentrated on the development of theoretical ideas about rural Britain, which have yet to be assessed against empirical research. Despite the assertion made above that it is unnecessary to classify rural Britain into zones, there are fundamental differences between rural society and rural development problems in upland and lowland Britain which should be recognised. There has been an emphasis in recent research on lowland Britain. This is understandable, as change in agriculture and rural society has been more rapid in lowland England, and therefore appears to offer more material for study. It is also, perhaps, a reaction against the community studies which were mainly carried out in upland Britain. Nevertheless, there is a perceived need for more empirical work to ^{be} carried out on upland Britain. The findings must only add to the on-going structuralist debate about processes of change in rural Britain.

Recent developments in rural studies can be summarised as follows: there has been a shift from a sectoral to an integrated approach; there is a greater awareness of process rather than pattern; and greater criticism and questioning of the existing institutional framework. Social factors are given as great as, or even greater importance than economic ones. These developments have questioned many formerly held assumptions about rural society and rural development, and have recognised that landownership could still be a potentially important influence. At the same time, there has been a re-evaluation of the role of the State in rural development.

1.3 Thesis Structure, Aims and Research Design

This thesis has three main aims. First, it aims to contribute to an understanding of the operation of the processes by which continuity and change in landownership take place. Second, it is hoped to evaluate the importance of landownership as a

factor in rural development, both in the 19th century and the 20th century. Third, it is hoped that the results will be of interest both to academics and to people practically involved in rural development.

The research design and the methodology have been influenced by two practical constraints. The constraints on time and resources, inevitable in a three year PhD programme (Phillips & Pugh, 1987; Renouf, 1989), require that the potentially vast subject matter of this thesis be whittled down to a manageable size. In addition, the choice of methodology is constrained by the nature and limited availability of data on landownership (see Appendix A).

The research design consists of two connected spatial scales, the national and the local, and a historical dimension covering the period from the early 19th century to the present day. The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One consists of a general discussion and examination of landownership and rural development in 19th and 20th century Britain, based on the analysis of secondary material. The aim of Part One is twofold. First, to establish the national structure of landownership and the position of landowners within British society in the 19th century; and to identify the factors which have caused change, and the processes by which change has taken place over the 20th century. This establishes a broad national level context for the following, more detailed, study. The second aim is to move from the national to the local level, and to identify the ways in which landownership has influenced rural development in the past, and can exert an influence today. From this more detailed analysis a conceptual framework of landownership and rural development is constructed, which is then applied to the empirical case studies of landownership and rural development in Part Two. By adopting this research design, it is possible to draw conclusions of more general significance from the case studies. The experience of the North Pennines can be contextualised and evaluated against the national experience.

Although no one particular theoretical approach has been adopted, the research has been influenced by the recent theoretical developments in rural sociology and rural geography. The thesis contains much empirical material, but adopts a broadly structuralist method of interpretation, in that the emphasis is on process rather than pattern, and explanation is sought below surface patterns, at the deeper level

of political, legal, social and economic structures. Indeed, the whole question of landownership and rural development is political, and a consideration of society and the State is unavoidable.

Despite the emphasis which has been placed on the generality of the research design, certain qualifications should be made. Even with the dual-level approach adopted, an equally comprehensive appraisal of all landownership forms and all rural development problems is beyond the scope of the thesis. The conceptual framework is developed with particular reference to the landownership forms and rural development problems of upland Britain, of which the North Pennines forms a part. The North Pennines was selected for several reasons. It has a distinctive upland landscape and upland economy. It also faces typical upland socio-economic problems: a marginal agricultural sector, unemployment, inaccessibility and poor service provision. The North Pennines is one of the few upland areas of England and Wales not to have been designated as a national park, and has only recently been designated as an Area Of Outstanding Natural Beauty. It has developed with relatively little public intervention, and landowners have, until recently, enjoyed a large degree of autonomy. Moreover, recent attempts at public intervention have met with conflict, thereby suggesting that there are powerful local vested interests.

The landownership structure of the North Pennines is dominated by landed estates and common land. It has a highly traditional landownership structure, and is a region of Britain where continuity in the landownership structure has been more marked than change. The case studies focus on the development of landed estates and their influence on rural development over the 19th and 20th centuries, although common land and public landownership are also considered. The landed estates are owned by a variety of different landowners, providing the opportunity to compare estate management under different ownership forms. Private, institutional and charitable landownership are all considered. Whilst the general discussion of landownership and rural society considers the whole spectrum of landownership forms and rural development problems, in order that the conceptual framework be applicable to the case studies, the discussion focusses on the landed estate and the development problems of upland Britain.

A historical dimension has been incorporated into the research for two main rea-

sons. First, more detailed information is available on 19th century landownership than is available for the 20th century. It is possible, therefore, to carry out an in-depth study of landed estate management in the 19th century, which enables better understanding of present day estate management. Second, a historical perspective may help the identification and understanding of the processes which underlie contemporary development problems. However, it should be remembered that different processes may produce similar outcomes (Norton, 1982). At what point in history the analysis should begin was a somewhat arbitrary decision. 1800 was chosen as a starting date since at this time the hegemony of the landed interest at national level was still unchallenged, and upland Britain was experiencing a period of prosperity. In the North Pennines, the early 19th century was a period of change in the agricultural landscape when much of the land was enclosed (see 4.1).

An important theme in the thesis is continuity and change over time: in landownership structures and rural society, at the national and the local level. The terms continuity and change can be used to describe surface patterns over time, or to analyse the dynamics of underlying processes (Gregson, 1984, 17). Just as relationships between observable phenomena at one point in time can be analysed and explained on either an empirical or theoretical level, so can continuity and change in these phenomena over time be analysed on two levels. It is important to remember that continuity is as important as change and requires just as much analysis and explanation (Redclift, 1986).

Before moving on to outline the content of each chapter, some of the terms frequently used in the thesis should be defined to avoid later confusion. The terms 'landownership' and 'land control' are both used in the analysis. The former is self-explanatory, the latter refers to the actual control of a piece of land. As will become apparent later, ownership does not necessarily imply control. For instance, common land is a form of land control, but is not owned in the normal sense of the word. The term 'development' is difficult to define (Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 18). In this research, rural development is used in its widest sense. It merely refers to changes in the rural economy and society over time, whether positive or negative, induced or natural. The term 'rural society' is also used in its widest sense, and should not be confused with any theoretical conception of 'community' or 'society'.

It is used to refer generally to the inhabitants of rural Britain and more specifically to the inhabitants of a particular locality. Finally, the term 'public intervention' refers to any action by the State, public agency, or the community, which affects the economy or society, at any spatial scale, in either a positive or negative way.

As was stated above, Part One takes the form of a general essay on landownership and rural development, based on an analysis of the secondary literature. Chapter Two looks at changes in the pattern of landownership and the nature of landed society at the national level over the 19th and 20th centuries. Chapter Three then identifies the processes by which landownership may influence rural development at the local level, with a detailed analysis of landownership decision-making, the structure of rural society and the interaction of private and public interests in the rural development process. From this discussion, a conceptual framework is developed.

Part Two, which is the main section of the thesis, includes the empirical work on the North Pennines. Chapters Four to Six follow the historical development of the North Pennines from 1800 to the present day, using case studies of landownership and land control. Chapter Seven considers certain recent public intervention measures in the region, and evaluates the interaction of private and public interests in the determination of land use. Chapter Eight draws together all the many issues which have been considered in the thesis and presents the final conclusions.

Many of the issues raised in this brief discussion will be elaborated in later chapters. The aim of this introduction has been to outline the aims and structure of the thesis, introduce the main themes, and to show how the study fits into the academic and historical context. It should be emphasised once more that the empirical findings are not representative of the whole of rural Britain, or even of upland Britain, and are not presented as such. They illustrate events in one particular region Britain, but this does not mean to say that parallels cannot be drawn with the experience of other parts of upland Britain, or even rural Britain as a whole. The more general significance of the work lies in the identification of processes underlying rural development. At a more fundamental level, the themes of land use and land control are of universal significance.

Notes

1. It is important at this point to state that, although owner-occupied farms are, by definition, family farms, the term 'family farm' refers to the farm business structure rather than the ownership form. Tenant farms may also be family farms.
2. Although land nationalisation was part of the labour party manifesto in the 1945 general election and received widespread support, the policy was never implemented, despite the fact that the government nationalised other politically contentious industries such as coal and steel. Smith (1989) suggests three explanations for this:
 - the elected labour government rejected some of its more radical policies after election.
 - It was thought that the provisions of the 1947 Agriculture Act and Town and Country Planning Acts offered adequate controls over agriculture.
 - Political pressure from the agricultural policy community forced the question off the political agenda.
3. The terms 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' were introduced by Tönnies, who is known as the father of the community study (Bell & Newby, 1971, 23).
4. Darling (1955, 2) writes of this approach:

"Ecology is the study of the organism in relation to its environment, but in any study of a higher animal species, environment must always include those mental and social factors which exert such profound influence on biological economics, especially in communities of human beings".
5. The difficulty of defining what is rural is discussed by Cloke & Park (1985, 9). It depends for what purpose the definition is needed. It can be defined functionally (in terms of land use, population etc.), or negatively (i.e. anything that is not urban), or perceptually (what people think of as the countryside).
6. Structuralism can be defined as:

"A set of principles and procedures....which involve moving beneath the visible and conscious designs of active human subjects in order to expose an essential logic which is supposed to bind these designs together in enduring structures" (Johnson, 1986, 461).

Part I

Landownership and Rural Development in Britain

Chapter II

Landownership in 19th & 20th Century Britain

*“Land: A part of the earth’s surface, considered as property. The theory that land is property subject to private ownership and control is the foundation of modern society, and is eminently worthy of the superstructure. Carried to its logical conclusion, it means that some have the right to prevent others from living; for the right to own implies the right exclusively to occupy; and in fact laws of trespass are enacted wherever property in land is recognised. It follows that if the whole area of terra firma is owned by A, B and C, there will be no place for D, E, F and G to be born, or, as trespassers, to exist.” (Bierce, 1967, *The Devil’s Dictionary*, 202).*

2.1 Introduction

The aim of the first part of the thesis is to establish a framework within which the influence of landownership on rural development can be conceptualised in general terms. The framework will then be applied to the analysis of landownership and rural development in the North Pennines in Part Two. In order to develop a conceptual framework it is first necessary to identify the components which should be included within it, and to establish their inter-relationships. The framework should include the processes by which landownership can influence rural development at the micro-scale, and the linkages between these processes operating at the micro-scale and the macro-scale. It was stated in the introduction that local societies are linked to the national state by many complex ties, so that development in any one area cannot be understood without reference to, and an understanding of, the external environment. Moreover, a framework which includes two spatial scales, the local and the national, enables the experience of the local society to be compared with and evaluated against the national experience, thus giving the findings a more general significance. Furthermore, the framework should include a temporal dimension, since the study covers the period from the early 19th century to the 20th century. The identification of the processes acting to cause continuity

and change in landownership, rural society and the relationships between them at the local and national scale is also required.

The following two chapters will, therefore, seek to identify the variables to be included in the framework and to establish the relationships between them. The basic assumption of the framework is that landownership can influence rural society and rural development in two ways. First, landowners exert a direct influence through the ownership, control and management of land. How they manage their land can materially affect the lives of those people living on, or dependent upon, their land. It is vital, therefore, to identify the factors which influence how landowners manage their land. Second, landowners may exert an indirect influence on rural society and rural development through the exercise of political power at national and local level. To understand this second form of influence, it is necessary to examine the structure of rural society and the political process. These two forms of influence are related but require separate consideration. The analysis will look at each form of influence in turn and then at the relationships between them.

Because of the interrelationships of many of the themes which will be considered in Part One, it has proved difficult to divide Chapters Two and Three into discrete sections. Inevitably, the material covered in each will overlap. The aim of Chapter Two is to look at landownership and landed society at the national level, and at continuity and change over the 19th and 20th centuries. Chapter Three will then adopt a more 'applied' approach, looking at how landownership affects rural society and rural development at the local level, and at the processes linking the local and national scales.

2.2 Landownership in the 19th Century

2.2.1 The Structure of Landownership

The dominant model of landownership in 19th century Britain was the landed estate. The land of Britain has never before, nor since, been concentrated in so few hands as it was in the 19th century. Table 2.1 shows the national structure of landownership in 1873 [1]. The analysis of the 1873 Return of Owners Survey by Bateman (see Appendix A) found that 24% of the land area of England was held

Table 2.1 — Landownership in England & Wales, 1873

NUMBER OF OWNERS	CLASS	EXTENT (hectares)
400	Peers & Peeresses	2,387,074
1,288	Great Landowners	3,540,708
2,529	Squires	1,799,696
9,585	Greater Yeomen	1,992,761
24,412	Lesser Yeomen	1,726,780
17,049	Small Proprietors	1,638,252
703,289	Cottagers	62,978

Source: Bateman (1881, 187)

in estates of over 4,167 hectares (10,000 acres). The Duke of Sutherland, reportedly the richest man in Britain, owned estates in Shropshire (5,416.6 hectares), Yorkshire (833.3 hectares), and the Scottish Highlands (520,833 hectares). When the 1st Duke died in 1833, the annual income from his English agricultural estates was £27,545, but this was only one fifth of his total income (Robinson, 1988, 135). A further 40% of the land area was held in estates of over 1,250 hectares (3,000 acres). The majority (95%) of the land area was within private ownership, the remaining 5% being owned by public institutions such as the Crown, the Church, colleges and charities (Brodrick, 1881, 170).

The 1873 Returns enable some comparisons of the regional pattern of landownership to be made. Table 2.2 shows the number of large landowners, greater gentry and great landowners by region, whilst Table 2.3 shows the percentage of the land area owned by 'great landowners' and 'greater gentry' by county. It can be seen that the percentage of each county owned by great landowners varied from over 50% in Northumberland and Rutland, to under 10% in Essex, Middlesex and Herefordshire. The regional distribution of greater gentry was less variable, and nowhere did they dominate a county as did the great landowners. In Scotland there was a sharp geographical contrast in the structure of landownership between

Table 2.2 — The Regional Distribution of Landownership

REGION	LARGE LANDOWNERS	GREATER GENTRY	GREAT LANDOWNERS
North	150	103	47
North West	208	159	49
East	193	143	50
Midlands	223	171	52
South East	335	266	69
South West	227	163	64

Source: Clemenson (1982, 24)

the Highlands and the Lowlands (see Figure 2.1). The largest estates were clearly concentrated in the Highlands, reflecting that area's historical development under the clan system [2].

2.2.2 The Land Law of the 19th Century

In the 19th century, land could be held by one of four tenures: freehold, leasehold, copyhold and customary. Freehold tenure granted the owner the highest degree of control over his land, and by the 19th century amounted in practice to absolute ownership [3]. On most freehold estates in the 19th century the freeholder did not occupy the land himself but rented it out on leases. As well as agricultural leases, other land rights could also be leased such as sporting rights and mineral rights [4]. The terms of the leasehold were governed by a lease, a contract between the lessor and lessee (Simpson, 1976, 31) [5]. Copyhold tenure was a residual form of tenure from the manorial period, but was still widespread in 19th century Britain. Copyholders fell between freeholders and leaseholders in the degree of control over their land. Although holding the land from the lord of the manor, they enjoyed inheritance rights and, with the exception of a small annual money payment, enjoyed virtually exclusive enjoyment of their lands [6]. Much land was

Table 2.3 — The Distribution of Landownership by County

County	Great landowners % Area owned	Greater gentry % Area owned
Bedfordshire	25.8	17.3
Berkshire	18.7	21.7
Buckinghamshire	21.8	19.8
Cambridgeshire	11.9	9.6
Cheshire	29.7	22.6
Cornwall	26.7	21.7
Cumberland	19.1	9.9
Derbyshire	28.0	19.9
Devon	22.1	14.1
Dorset	36.7	20.3
Durham	30.8	10.7
Essex	9.2	18.2
Gloucestershire	17.4	18.4
Hampshire	21.1	25.6
Herefordshire	9.5	24.4
Hertfordshire	20.9	17.8
Huntingdonsire	19.2	21.9
Kent	11.1	21.2
Lancashire	21.9	18.5
Leicestershire	18.6	19.8
Lincolushire	26.9	14.5
Middlesex	3.7	10.7
Norfolk	19.6	22.8
Northamptonshire	27.7	21.4
Northumberland	53.7	14.6
Nottinghamshire	38.4	18.7
Oxfordshire	14.4	25.5
Rutland	51.8	17.6
Shropshire (Salop)	24.9	29.2
Somerset	23.5	15.1
Staffordshire	29.0	21.0
Suffolk	21.9	17.7
Surrey	12.2	16.1
Sussex	24.0	21.1
Warwickshire	21.0	19.4
Westmorland	22.6	16.0
Wiltshire	35.6	19.7
Worcestershire	15.5	20.3
Yorkshire	27.6	21.3
England	24.4	19.0

Source: Clemenson (1982, 229)

Figure 2.1 — Landownership in Scotland, 1873




Figure 2.2 Landownership in Scotland, 1873

a) % area owned by Great Landowners (5000 acres); b) % area owned by Squires (1000-4999 acres); c) % area owned by Yeomen (100-999 acres); d) % area owned by Small Proprietors (1-99 acres).

Source: *Owners of Lands and Heritages 1872-73 (Scotland)*, House of Commons Accounts and Papers, 72(3), 1874.

Source: Robinson (1988, 18)

also still held on a wide variety of customary tenures. These tenures also had their origins in the past and the occupiers of these lands also enjoyed largely unfettered rights [7].

Tenure determined the degree of control over a piece of land at any one time and the estate determined the duration of this control. A freehold tenure could exist in one of three different estates. The estate of greatest control was the fee simple, an estate of inheritance which could be passed on to the owner's heirs general. The generality of inheritance more or less guaranteed that an eligible heir could be found in every generation. An estate granted in fee tail was subject to strict restrictions as to who could inherit. Inheritance was usually limited to the immediate family and succession was, therefore, dependent on each generation producing an heir [8]. A life estate could be created for the lifetime of the owner, who in effect became a life tenant. Just as more than one tenure could exist in the same piece of land so could more than one estate [9].

Much land in the 19th century was still subject to non-exclusive or common rights [10]. Common land was an ancient form of land control dating from the manorial period (Hoskins & Stamp, 1963, 6). The area of common land in England and Wales had been greatly reduced by the 19th century by enclosure, and many further enclosures were made during the first half of the 19th century, but it was still an important land resource [11]. Freehold and leasehold interests could exist in common land, but their owners' right to exercise them were constrained by the rights of the commoners.

The freedom to enjoy freehold and leasehold interests in the 19th century was also constrained by financial burdens (overriding interests) [12] such as rates and land taxes. The most burdensome land payment in the 19th century was the tithe. Although the last tithes in kind were commuted by the Tithe Commutation Act in 1836, tithes were still collected as a money payment (Evans, 1976) [13].

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the land law for an understanding of the landownership structure in the 19th century was the fee tail or strict family settlement (Brodrick, 1881, 130). This was the main mechanism by which the landed élite had preserved and enlarged its estates. The principle behind the fee tail was

the preservation of the whole estate within the family from generation to generation. Inheritance within the family must be ensured and each successive owner of the property must be barred from selling any part of the estate. These two goals were achieved as follows. A strict settlement could be drawn up for three generations to include father, son and the son's heirs. The legal title to the estate would be vested in trustees, so that the father would act as a life tenant. The terms of the settlement stipulated that the life tenant pass on the property intact to the son and his heirs. The settlement could be renegotiated in every generation so that it never lapsed. It was estimated in 1848 that more than two thirds of the land of Britain consisted of estates under settlement (Garnier, 1911, 459). Families became highly adept at retaining the family name on the estate, even if a surrogate heir had to be found [14].

.2.3 The Landed Interest

The classification which Bateman used in his analysis of the 1873 returns, reflects the social status which was attached to landownership. In the 19th century a distinct 'landed interest' could be identified (Thompson, 1963, 7). It was a 'vertical' interest group, identified by the ownership of land, but internally differentiated according to the amount of land owned. Dominating this landed interest were the aristocracy and the great landowners. They formed a 'landed élite', which controlled Britain politically, socially and economically. Below the landed élite were the landed gentry. The estates of this group were less extensive and their political and social power concentrated at county and local rather than national level. Below the greater gentry came smaller landlords, owner-occupiers and tenant farmers. The base of the landed interest was formed by the landless agricultural labourers, and all other labourers dependent upon the land for their livelihood.

The landed interest was the dominant group numerically and economically in Britain in the early 19th century. There were other 'interests' in 19th century Britain, such as a commercial interest and an industrial interest, but, in the early 19th century at least, these groups presented no challenge (*ibid.*, 1963, 4)[14a]

The power of the landed élite in British society could be attributed to political, economic and social factors. The landed élite controlled the national political

process. The British aristocracy being without exception a landed aristocracy, the House of Lords was:

“the direct institutional expression of the landed aristocracy” (Thompson, 1963, 45)

The landed élite also exercised a high degree of control over the House of Commons through patronage and the selection of parliamentary candidates. For instance, in 1820, 87 peers were accredited with the return of 213 members, as opposed to 137 members who were returned by 90 commoners (*ibid.*, 1963, 45).

At county level, the political power of the landed élite and landed gentry was also unquestioned. Of the two major political figures in the county, the Lord Lieutenant and the High Sheriff, the former was, without exception, a great landowner of the county, whilst the latter position, being more arduous and costly, tended to be held by a member of the lesser gentry or the commercial class [15]. Most of the business of local government was carried out by the Justices of the Peace. They were appointed by the Crown, but on the recommendation of the Lord Lieutenant, and were drawn mainly from the landed gentry class (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 44). They were responsible for highways and bridges, prisons, licensing of public houses, the police force and local rates. None of these positions received payment, but this was compensated for by the political power and social status which they carried.

The landed élite also held a dominant, although not exclusive, position in the British economy. By virtue of their ownership of land alone, landowners commanded vast resources of land and minerals [16]. The wealth of the landed élite was based first and foremost on agriculture which, until the mid-19th century, was the dominant economic sector of the country, but the estates of many landowners also included urban property and mining and industrial enterprises. For instance, as well as an agricultural estate at Woburn, the 7th Duke of Bedford owned a 49.5 hectare estate in London, which included the valuable properties of Bloomesbury, St Pancras and Covent Garden, and copper and arsenic mines in Devon. In the 1830s, the rents from the London estate provided 72% of the Duke's total income (Spring, 1963, 13).

The role that the landed élite played in the economy ranged from passive rentier landlords at one extreme, to active capitalists and entrepreneurs at the other. The degree of involvement largely depended on the individual. The landed interest as a whole played an important role in agricultural innovation, mining and industrial enterprises, the development of the railways and urban development in the 19th century [17]. As the century progressed, the economic dominance of the landed élite began to be matched by other interests, particularly the commercial and industrial classes. The social and political power that the landed élite exercised, however, enabled them to retain their dominant position in British society after their economic dominance had declined (Thompson, 1963, 2).

An understanding of the social power of the landed élite is essential to an understanding of the role of landowners in British society in the 19th century, but the basis of this power is more difficult to define. It was linked to political and economic power but was more than this:

“land possessed a symbolic significance that stretched far beyond its economic or political significance” (Newby, 1980, 35).

It can, perhaps, best be understood with reference to Weber's social theory (Gerth & Mills, 1970). Weber differentiated between status groups and classes within society. Whilst classes are defined by economic activity, a status group can be identified by the following characteristics: the ownership of property for consumption rather than production, a characteristic lifestyle, intermarriage within the group and distinctive moral and social values. The power of a status group is based on inherited wealth rather than economic success and on its exclusiveness. Many features of the British landed élite appear to confirm that they were a status group. For instance, the 15th Earl of Derby listed the attractions of landownership in the following (decreasing) order of importance: political influence, social importance (territorial possession and visible wealth), power (within the estate), residential enjoyment, sport and lastly income (Douglas, 1976, 17). Stone (1984, 8) identifies the English landed élite as enjoying great wealth, a lavish and educated lifestyle, a country house and an inherited right to exercise authority in politics.

The social power enjoyed by the landed élite also depended on the recognition of their superior status by other sections of society. Not only was the social status

of the landed *élite* recognised, it was also aspired to, for although membership of the landed *élite* was exclusive, it was not a closed group. The means of entry to the landed *élite* was through the acquisition of a landed estate or marriage into a landed family, and the adoption of the characteristic lifestyle described above. Thompson (1963, 20) points out that admission to the landed *élite* was mostly through marriage. In the 19th century many marriages took place between the landed *élite* and daughters of bankers, lawyers, brewers and even plantation owners.[17a]

Those who could not aspire to the landed *élite* could aspire to join the landed gentry, a group who emulated the landed *élite* in a smaller and less ostentatious way. The landed gentry were a more fluid class, and inter-married more freely with non-landed classes, particularly with the professional classes: the clergy and merchants, for instance (Thompson, 1963, 21). Younger sons of the landed gentry took jobs in the church, army, civil service, the law and in trade, and thus represented a reverse flow from landed society to non-landed society (*ibid.*, 22). The intermixing of the landed interest with other interests prevented the isolation of the landed gentry from the rest of society. The landed gentry also protected the landed *élite*, acting as a 'buffer' class between the aristocracy and the workforce.

The power of the British landed *élite* can be better understood when compared to other European landed *élites*. The British landed *élite* differed in several respects from their European counterparts. First, the power of the British landed *élite* was firmly based in the countryside and, in England at any rate, most landowners were resident on their estates (Spring, 1971, 11). The Prussians were the only other landed *élite* to value residence on the estate. The Russian *élite*, for example, were largely absentee, preferring town to country life. This factor, plus the absence of a powerful peasant landowning class in Britain, prevented the emergence of land-based opposition as occurred in France and Russia (*ibid.*, 6). Second, the relative social 'openness' of the British landed *élite* in comparison to their European counterparts prevented the emergence of major social divisions in society whilst, in addition, the admission of members of the industrial and business classes to landed society brought not only capital but also expertise and innovation to estate management. Third, the British landed *élite* was not solely a rentier class, it took a leading role in 19th century economic development (*ibid.*, 1971, 13). Thus the British landed *élite* was a status group, but not in the strict weberian sense. The

overlap with over social and economic groups preserved its strength long after the power of other landed élites in Europe had declined.

There is no doubt that Britain in the early 19th century was dominated by a landed interest, and ruled by a landed élite. The power of the landed élite rested on the hierarchy of the landed interest. The dominance of the landed élite was protected by the land law which prevented the sale of estates, and legislation which guaranteed their right to rule. Although the landed élite was a status group rather than an economic class, it was not as isolated from the rest of society as were other European landed élites, a fact whose significance will emerge in the following discussion of the decline of the landed interest.

2.3 The Decline of the Landed Interest

Over the late 19th century and the early 20th century the power of the landed élite declined, as did their territorial control, with the break-up and sale of many landed estates. By 1850, all the conditions on which the power of the landed élite had been based were gone (Thompson, 1963, 2). Agriculture was no longer the dominant source of employment, Britain was no longer a rural society and landowners were no longer the only wealthy members of society. The actual decline of the political power of the landed élite and their territorial possession, however, took place gradually over a long period. The main period of land sales was not until the 1920s. Between 1920 and 1922 it is estimated that more than one quarter of the agricultural land area of England and Wales changed hands (*ibid.*, 1963, 332). The decline of the landed élite was, therefore, a long drawn out process. This section will look at the factors which caused the decline of the landed élite, and the processes by which the decline took place.

The decline of the landed interest has been studied and interpreted in a variety of ways. The major study, from the point of view of the landowners, is that by Thompson (1963); whilst Douglas (1976), Offer (1981) and Lindert (1987) concentrate on the political attacks on landownership in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Massey and Catalano (1978) interpret changes in landownership within a marxist framework of analysis. The main arguments and findings of these works will be discussed in the following analysis.


Thompson (1963) asserts that the key feature of the decline of the English landed élite was the willingness, and even participation, of landowners in their own demise. This factor is often concealed by the political attacks on landownership which were made in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and which were more popularly attributed to be the cause of the decline. In a sense, the events of the early 20th century were paradoxical; what was thought of as the beginning of the decline:

“may more profitably be seen as the natural culmination of the whole trend of the preceding generation” (Thompson, 1963, 325).

The primary cause of the decline of the landed élite in Thompson's view, as was stated above, was economic. Over the 19th century the economic value of agriculture declined in relation to other sectors of the economy. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, which opened up the British market to foreign imports, symbolised an acceptance that agriculture could no longer receive preferential treatment in the economy [18]. The economic effects of the repeal were delayed by the economic boom in the world economy in the mid-19th century (Perry, 1974, 19). Indeed, the mid-19th century was a time of great prosperity in British agriculture, the period of so-called 'High Farming' (Chambers & Mingay, 1976, 170). It was not until the 1870s and the onset of a world recession (the so-called 'Great Agricultural Depression') that the full impact of foreign competition on British farmers was felt [19]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the gradual decline of wheat prices over the century, and the low prices during the 1880s and 1890s. Thompson (1963, 317) points out that the impact of the depression varied geographically. The arable areas of lowland England were hardest hit. Landowners in pastoral areas of the country were less affected, although this may partly be attributable to the fact that the incomes of many landowners in northern and upland Britain were supplemented by mineral rents.

Although the economic basis of the landed élite's power had gone by the mid-19th century, the removal of their political and territorial power was a much more difficult process. Both sources of power were protected by the law, and reform had to be initiated by the landed élite themselves. The political power of the landed élite was only gradually eroded over the 19th century. The Reform Acts of 1832, 1867 and 1884, and the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894, were both important steps in the democratisation of national and county politics, which

Figure 2.2 — UK Wheat Prices, 1800 to 1966



Source: Ernle (1961, 488)

culminated in the abolition of the supremacy of the House of Lords in 1911 [20]. Not until 1885, however, did the number of MPs from commercial backgrounds overtake those from landed ones (Thompson, 1963, 276). Somewhat ironically, over the whole period of parliamentary reform the peerage actually expanded (*ibid.*, 1963, 49). The number of hereditary peers in the House of Lords increased from 350 in 1832 to 570 in 1914, although many of the new peers did not come from landed backgrounds.

Legal reform was also required to break the hold of the landed élite on the land resources of the country. It was recognised by the mid-19th century that many features of the land law actively obstructed agricultural improvement (Caird, 1968). In particular, the practice of entailing estates, by which each successive owner was prevented from selling any part of his estate, meant that many estates were irre-

vocably encumbered with debts (Garnier, 1908, 459). The lack of security of the tenantry under the prevalent system of yearly tenancies was also seen as a barrier to improvement; farmers were unwilling to invest capital with such a short-term interest (Caird, 1968, 503). In 1875, the first Agricultural Holdings Act was passed to give greater security to farm tenants (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 171) [21]. The Settled Land Act of 1882 abolished the power of entails to prevent land sales and thereby opened up the opportunity for free trade in land (Thompson, 1957) [22]. The passing of this act did not, however, result in an immediate growth of the land market (although Thompson claims that many landowners would have put land on the market if there had been sufficient demand to buy) [23].

Massey and Catalano (1978) analyse the break-up of landed estates within a marxist economic framework. Like Thompson, they ascribe a more active role to landowners. They argue that landowners were capitalists in their economic role. By mixing with the emerging capitalist industrial classes of the 19th century, landowners retained a degree of political power which enabled them to continue to influence the nature of change undergone by political institutions (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 5). Therefore the decline of the landed interest was economically induced, but by controlling this decline themselves, the landowners managed to retain a greater power than would otherwise have been possible.

The more visible and dramatic political attacks on the landed élite of the late 19th and early 20th centuries have been popularly attributed as being the main cause of their downfall (Douglas, 1976, 20). The 'land question' took the form of calls for the nationalisation of land, and for the imposition of taxes on land values (Bateman, 1988). The introduction of death duties in 1894 added to the financial burdens faced by many landowners [24]. The culmination of the land question was the 'People's Budget' of 1910 (see Appendix A). The relative significance of political attacks and economic change as causes of the decline of the landed interest is debated by Howell (1977). He sees the political attacks on the landed élite of the late 19th and early 20th centuries as being founded not on fact but on the need to make political capital. Landlords were generally not 'political tyrants' as they were often portrayed. Misrepresentation of landlords was particularly prevalent in Ireland, Scotland and Wales because of the strength of separatist feelings in these regions. Howell writes:

"It is contended that the 'Welsh Land Question' - the agrarian indictment against the landowners - was largely the invention of Welsh Nonconformist Radicalism towards achieving political democracy and national fulfilment" (Howell, 1977, 149).

This leads to another significant point. Politics may not have been the root cause of the break-up of landed estates, but this does not undermine the significance of political action as an catalyst of change, even if change was inevitable. Although their arguments were largely based on ideology rather than fact, the politicians of the time reflected or manipulated public opinion. Certainly the attacks did much to undermine the confidence of the landed élite in the future of landownership.

Lindert (1987) argues that the importance of the land question can only be understood with reference to the specific conditions of the period. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries land could be directly equated with wealth. The hegemony of landed power could not survive once the vote was extended to a wider, non-landed population. After the Second World War, the wealthiest sections of the population were not necessarily landowners, whilst ownership of land broadened (especially through the growth of owner-occupied housing). Land, therefore, lost its political significance. The People's Budget of 1909 would not have been politically feasible thirty or forty years on.

Douglas' (1976) analysis of the People's Budget of 1910 supports the contention of Howell (1979) that the land question was exploited by politicians as a source of political capital. Financially, the taxation of land values was the least important aspect of the budget, but politically it proved to be an explosive issue. Like Lindert, Douglas sees the period between 1910 and 1914 as a period when land reform and taxation were the main political issues, ended dramatically by the First World War:

"By the time that war came to an end, all the apparently fixed points of politics had shifted beyond recognition" (Douglas, 1976, 166).

After the war, land no longer attracted the political interest that it had beforehand [25].

Thompson (1963, 323) is sceptical of the importance of the land reformists in the decline of the landed élite. The sudden spate of estate sales between 1910 and 1914 was as much due to a new demand for land as to fears over the taxation of land values. Improvements in the agricultural market made farm tenants more willing to buy their holdings, and many estates were broken up and sold piecemeal to the sitting tenants. The First World War induced further sales and is seen by Thompson, like Douglas, as a catalyst of change in British society. Many landed families lost elder sons and heirs in the war. The introduction of higher taxes after the war, and the fear of further political attacks on land, undermined the attraction of landownership even more.

By the end of the First World War, all the laws which had enforced the political power of the landed élite had been reformed, and in the new post-war political climate land was no longer a burning issue. Precipitated, perhaps, by the spate of land sales in the early 1920s, there was a long overdue reform of the land law with the 1925 Property Acts [26]. Amongst the many reforms achieved by these acts were the abolition of tithes and customary and copyhold leaseholds, the introduction of land registration and further measures to simplify the transfer of land (Holdsworth, 1927, 319).

Thompson (1963, 337) suggests that the land sales which took place in the early 1920s were not as dramatic as they appeared. In fact much land that was sold consisted of outlying estates. Those landowners who retained their estates were probably in a stronger position in the inter-war period than they had been before. Many landowners emerged from this land crisis with rationalised estates and more diversified income sources. However, the general economic depression of the 1930s led to further falling incomes and was followed by another spate of estate sales after the Second World War.

2.3.1 Summary

This analysis of the causes of the decline of the landed interest and the processes by which it was achieved, raises^s some significant points about the relationship between landowners and the rest of society, and the nature of change in landownership structures. The power of the landed élite in the 19th century was based on social, economic and political factors. It is important to distinguish between these sources

of power since, although interrelated, they played different roles in the decline of the landed élite. It was the economic power base which was first undermined, with the relative decline of agriculture in comparison to other sectors of the economy, and which is generally attributed to be the root cause of the decline.

However, economic change was not enough to undermine the power of the landed élite at once, because of their control of the political and legal order, and the social importance of landownership. There was, therefore, a time lag between the actual cause of change and its effect. Many reforms had to be carried out before the social and political power of the landed élite was also undermined. Another factor in the time lag between cause and effect was the acquiescence, and even participation, of the landed élite in their own demise. This enabled them to retain some control over the nature and pace of reform.

It is important to be aware of the difference between ascribed cause and actual cause in the decline of the landed élite. The actual cause was economic, but has been popularly ascribed to political action. Both explanations are necessary to the analysis, however, for while politics was not the root cause of the decline of the landed interest, it was a powerful and necessary catalyst in this decline. It is also important to note how slow landownership structures are to react to social and economic changes. A widespread change in the landownership structure did not take place until landowners had relinquished their hegemonic political influence. Part of the reason for this was the barrier to the land market of strict settlements. Reforms of the land law were required to free the land market and enable change to take place.

The question of the decline of the landed interest is, therefore, very complex. Change in the external structure of landownership followed changes in landed influence. It can be observed that the economy, society and the political and legal order changed at different rates. The political and legal order lagged behind economic and social change, and could only be reformed once they had become generally recognised as unworkable. The decline of the landed interest was not an even process. It can be seen as periods of gradual change interrupted by shorter periods of rapid change.

2.4 Changes in Landownership Post 1945

World War Two marks a turning point in this discussion of landownership and its position in society. The discussion of the post-war period is carried out in a very different context to the preceding account of the pre-war period. Agriculture has been transformed into a thriving industry through the intensification of production. Agricultural policy in the post-war period has been a major factor in the capitalisation of the industry, and has played an important role in changing the landownership structure. This section will look at the emergent pattern of landownership in the post-war period, and will examine the causes behind the development of new forms of landownership and the processes by which these changes have taken place. The question will also be asked: do landowners exert any political, social or economic influence on British society today and, if so, what form does this take?

Today 90% of the agricultural land area of Britain is still privately owned, compared to 95% in 1873 (see Table 2.4), but, in contrast to the 19th century, the owner-occupied farm rather than the landed estate is the dominant model of private ownership. Between 1914 and 1960, the percentage of agricultural land owner-occupied as opposed to rented rose from 12% to over 50% (see Table 2.5). Landownership by government agencies has increased and now, together with traditional landowning institutions, accounts for 8.5% of the total agricultural area. In 1978, 1.2% of the agricultural area was owned by financial institutions, one of the newest and most controversial forms of landownership to have emerged in the post-war period. Although copyhold and customary land tenures were abolished under the 1925 Property Acts, common lands have been protected by legislation since the late 19th century [27]. It is estimated that there are 600,000 hectares of common land remaining in England and Wales (Aitchison, 1987).

Because of the dearth of statistics relating specifically to landownership (see Appendix A), the contemporary structure of landownership can only be inferred from MAFF data relating to land holdings, sales, and purchases, on income data from the Inland Revenue, and from one-off surveys. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of farm holdings by size in England, Wales and Scotland. It can be observed that the majority of farm holdings are less than 200 hectares in size, but it is significant

Table 2.4 — Agricultural Landownership in Great Britain, 1978

Category of Landowner	Area Owned	% of Total
-	(million hectares)	-
Public, semi-public & traditional institutions	1.5	8.5
Financial institutions	0.2	1.2
Private individuals, companies & trusts	16.0	90.3
All owners	17.7	100.0

Source: Northfield (1979, 63)


Table 2.5 — Agricultural Land Tenure in Great Britain, 1908 to 1985

-	Rented/Mainly Rented	-	Owned/Mainly Owned	-
Year	%Area	%Holdings	%Area	%Holdings
1908	88	88	12	12
1922	82	86	18	14
1950	62	60	38	40
1960	51	46	49	54
1970	45	42	55	58
1977	44	37	56	63
1985	39	30	61	70

Sources: MAFF (1966, 1978, 1985) [27a]

to note that holdings of over 700 hectares are recorded, particularly in Scotland. Although inferences about ownership based on holdings data should be made with utmost caution, it would appear that the holdings figures underestimate the size of the landownership structure. This inference is supported by an independent survey of landownership in Scotland, which found that 140 individuals and companies own almost half the land area of the Highlands, and just 56 own 33% (MacEwan, 1975).

Figure 2.3 — Distribution of Holdings by Size in the UK, 1985



Source: MAFF: Agricultural Statistics, 1985.

Not only would it appear that the landed estate has survived, but it also seems that land is still a considerable source of private wealth. Table 2.6 shows the distribution of wealth by assets in 1975. 27% of people in the highest wealth category, with assets worth more than £200,000, are landowners. Since land forms only 6% of the total private assets, it can be seen that landownership is still an exclusive form of property ownership. This raises the question whether change in the structure of landownership has been as significant as is popularly believed? The following section looks in more depth at the different forms of landownership.

2.4.1 Owner-Occupation

Owner-occupation as a landownership form has expanded in response to both negative and positive factors. In the early 20th century expansion took place largely through the break-up of landed estates. Because of the depression in the land

Table 2.6 — Landownership by Private Individuals, 1975

Range of	Percentage held	No of Holders	Percentage held	No of Holders
Wealth (£)	in each group	('000s)	in each group	('000s)
> 200,000	27.4	13	6.4	29
100,000 - 200,000	19.4	25	5.8	69
50,000 - 100,000	23.7	53	9.6	252
20,000 - 50,000	20.4	106	22.0	1,412
< 20,000	9.0	164	56.2	19,259

(Based on evidence presented by the Treasury to the Northfield Committee; includes urban land as well as agricultural)

Source: Northfield (1979, 58)


market at that time, many landlords sold to sitting tenants. This was, therefore, a negative response to economic circumstances. Since 1945, two other negative factors have contributed to the expansion of owner-occupation.

Taxation has encouraged owner-occupation at the expense of tenanted land. Post-war fiscal policy has differentiated between working farmers and landlords. Estate duty allowed all landowners (whether farmers or landowners) a tax rebate of 45% on agricultural land and property, but the rebate for landlords was withdrawn by the introduction of Capital Transfer Tax (CTT) in 1974. Capital Gains Tax (CGT) was introduced in 1962 (Northfield, 1979, 71). Again, working farmers are eligible to a tax rebate of 50%, but landlords are liable to the full amount. Landlords have sought a variety of ways to minimise their tax liabilities. Many landlords have reduced their tenanted land holdings by either selling land, or taking it in hand as tenancies fall vacant (Northfield, 1979, 73).

Landlords have also reacted against landlord-tenant legislation. Since the 1875 Agricultural Holdings Act, a series of Agricultural Holdings Acts have increased the rights of the tenant against the landlord, culminating in the 1976 Act which guaranteed tenants security of tenure for three generations (Marsden, 1986, 135) [28]. As a policy to help tenants, it has completely misfired. Landlords, fearful of

being unable to evict troublesome tenants and of becoming liable to huge compensation claims, have again either sold land or taken farm holdings in hand as they fall vacant (*ibid.*, 1979, 223).

Figure 2.4 — Land Prices in Great Britain, 1983



Source: MAFF (1986)

The price differential between tenanted and vacant possession land in the market has also led to a reduction in the tenanted sector. The lower value of tenanted land reflects its perceived disadvantages. The difference in price is known as the 'vacant possession premium' (see Figure 2.4). To a large extent, therefore, the expansion in owner-occupation has been due to the government policies which have been directed against private landlords. It is significant to note in this context that much of the expansion in owner-occupation has been due to landlords taking land in hand.

The one factor which has positively encouraged the expansion of owner-occupation has been agricultural policy. Post-war agricultural policy has shown a strong ideological commitment to owner-occupation, and many policies have aimed at the expansion of this ownership form (Marsden et al., 1986a). Since 1945, credit for farmers has become more readily available, and many farm improvement schemes have enabled farmers to equip and modernise their holdings (see 3.4.1). There is no doubt that many owner-occupiers would not have been able to enter the land market without the intervention of the State.

2.4.2 Landed Estates

The landed estate (under private and traditional institutional ownership) has survived as a significant landownership category, but not without changes in its internal and external form. Many of the trends in landed estates have been a response to the same factors which have encouraged owner-occupation. Massey and Catalano (1978) argue that there has been a trend towards taking land in hand, an increase in private forestry, (both of which can be seen as tax avoidance measures) and a more commercial attitude to the management of urban property.

Tax avoidance has become a full-time occupation with private landlords (Harrison, 1981, 153) and several new legal forms of ownership have been devised in an attempt to minimise tax liability. The general trend in the redefinition of traditional landownership is for greater flexibility and informality:

“as the legal regime becomes more rigid, so the forms of ownership will become more informal” (Harrison, 1981, 129).

The result is more of an external redefinition of private landownership than the emergence of a new group of landowners. Trust ownership has been the most widespread response and a whole variety of trust forms have been devised (Harrison, 1981, 114) [29]. A trust enables the family to remain in possession of the estate without owning the legal title to it. For instance, the landlord may occupy the estate as a life tenant and one of the trustees may be a member of the family. It is estimated that at least 35% of the agricultural area is held in trust ownership, and that 70% of estates over 405 hectares are trusts (*ibid.*, 1981, 118). The

expansion of trust ownership is another way in which the true extent of landed estates is obscured.

To avoid the strictures of formal tenancy agreements, both traditional landlords and financial institutions have also looked towards less formal forms of land occupancy. Agricultural licences have become a popular alternative. As long as the licence is for less than one year the licensee can claim no legal security in the land. The tenant must depend on the goodwill of the landlord for his security, but conversely the landlord benefits from having someone else farm his land. The land also retains its vacant possession premium (Harrison, 1981, 202).

2.4.3 Public Landownership

Public landownership is the most direct expression of public control over land. The expansion of public ownership of land began at the turn of the 20th century (Gibbs & Harrison, 1973). The government has had two main aims in assuming direct control of land. First, it has been a response to the need to expand and control vital national resources such as timber and water. For instance, the Forestry Commission was established in 1919, following the First World War which had exposed the vulnerability of Britain's timber supplies (Stamp, 1962, 174). Second, as in the case of coal, nationalisation was necessary because of the inefficiencies caused by private ownership. The private ownership of coal was thought to greatly add to the expense and trouble of coal-mining [30].

Table 2.7 shows the extent of landholdings by public bodies whilst Table 2.8 shows landownership by traditional (semi-public) institutions (the traditional institutional estates fall between the public landownership category and the landed estate one). The largest public landowner is the Forestry Commission, with almost one and a quarter million hectares of land, mostly in Scotland. Of the traditional institutions, the Crown has the largest agricultural estate, followed by the universities and colleges and then the Church Commissioners. The three main government agencies owning land are the Ministry of Transport (375,000 hectares), the Ministry of Defence (237,240 hectares), and the Water Authorities (231,495 hectares).

The county councils also own a considerable estate (155,186 hectares). An important function of public landownership earlier in the century was the provision of

Table 2.7 — Landownership by Public Bodies in Great Britain

LANDOWNER (Date)	AREA (hectares)
FORESTRY COMMISSION (total holdings, 1986)	1,165,590
England	285,685
Wales	147,751
Scotland	732,154
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (total holdings, 1971)	855,486
Ministry of Defence	237,240
Ministry of Transport	375,000
Department of Trade & Industry	2,636.6
MAFF	12,264.5
DAFS	186,680
COUNTY COUNCILS (smallholdings, 1976)	365,000
NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES (total holdings, 1971)	448,996
British Airports Authority*	2,524
British Rail	91,666
British Water Board*	5,416
National Coal Board*	111,742
Water Authorities*	231,495
Central Electricity Generating Board	1,916
British Gas*	4,237
RESEARCH COUNCILS (1971)	7,546
NATURE CONSERVANCY COUNCIL (total holdings, 1980)	33,333
England	7,368
Wales	1,878
Scotland	24,087

** indicates that this industry has been privatised since the survey was carried out.*
Source: Gibbs & Harrison (1973); Forestry Commission (1985/86); Nature Conservancy Council (1979/80); Hodge (1988).

Table 2.8 — Landownership by Semi-Public Bodies

LANDOWNER (Date)	AREA (hectares)
THE CROWN (total holdings, 1986)	139,750
England	71,589
Wales	363
Scotland	39,882
Unenclosed Waste	27,916
CHURCH COMMISSIONERS (1971)	6,875
UNIVERSITIES & COLLEGES (1971)	86,555
NATIONAL TRUST (England & Wales, 1976)	71,371
NATIONAL TRUST FOR SCOTLAND (1976)	15,690

Source: Gibbs & Harrison (1973); Crown Commissioners (1985/86); National Trust (1976).

smallholdings by county councils [31]. The aim of these smallholdings was to provide an entry into the farming industry for young farmers (Northfield, 1979, 190), but in recent years most local authority holdings have been sold off (Hodge, 1988). Indeed, public landownership is the landownership form most susceptible to government policy. The last ten years have seen a diminution in the extent of public landownership because of the change in government policy. The British Airports Authority, National Coal Board and recently the Water Authorities have been privatised, whilst privatisation of the CEGB is imminent at the time of writing.

2.4.4 Financial Institutions

Financial institutions have aroused the most interest of all the new landowners (Munton, 1976; Newby et al., 1978; Whatmore, 1986). The financial institutions which have been looking to enter the land market are pension funds, property unit trusts and life assurance companies. Financial institutions have had an interest

in the land market for some time as providers of credit or mortgages, but only recently have they taken on the role of landowners (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 123). Their venture into landownership followed the rapid inflation in land values in the early 1970s, when land became a profitable long-term investment. These institutions have concentrated their activities in the agriculturally most profitable areas of the country. Between 1972 and 1974, they spent 83% of their money in East Anglia and the mid-south of England (Munton, 1976). Financial institutions have also invested on a smaller scale in commercial forestry. Although the growth of this form of ownership has been seen as a return to the landlord-tenant system of farming (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 140), financial institutions have introduced more flexible forms of tenancy, such as the sale and leaseback arrangement, where the institution buys land from a farmer and allows him to remain in occupation whilst he buys back the land over a period of time (Northfield, 1979, 126).

4.5 Common Land

Because of the peculiar nature of common land rights and the legislation by which common land has been protected since the late 19th century, there has been little change in the extent of this form of landed control. However, by the mid-20th century many commons, particularly those around metropolitan areas had fallen into disuse. In 1955, a royal commission was held into common land, with the intention of reassessing the role of this land resource in 20th century Britain [31]. The first recommendation of the royal commission was to carry out a registration of the extent, ownership and other common rights of all the commons in England and Wales, as a preliminary to drawing up new legislation as to the use and management of these lands. The Commons Registration Act was passed in 1965, and the registers are still being finalised. The next stage is in progress at present with the Common Land Forum (see 7.4).

4.6 Summary

It would appear from this brief overview of landownership forms in the post-war period that the structure has diversified rather than undergone a complete transformation, although trends identified from official statistics should be treated with caution. Changes in the structure of landownership are far more complex than official statistics suggest. The growth of owner-occupation began as a response to

economic forces, but has since continued due to government policy. Indeed, government policy has been a major cause of change in the national landownership structure, not only in the expansion of public landownership, but also in precipitating new legal forms of trust ownership. Only the entry of financial institutions into the land market appears to be a pure response to market forces. Although this is perceived to be a significant change in the structure of landownership, as yet the extent of financial landownership is limited and it is difficult to draw definite conclusions. Moreover, the low annual turnover of land (about 2%) means that trends are slow to emerge (Munton, 1976).

5 A Structuralist Interpretation

The processes underlying these changes in the post-war structure of landownership have been analysed within a political economy theoretical framework (Massey & Catalano, 1978; Marsden et al., 1986a; Whatmore, 1986). According to political economy theory, land is an essential prerequisite for any economic activity, but in agriculture land is an integral part of the means of production. Whilst changes in the methods of agricultural production and the landownership structure can be seen as a response to capitalism, agriculture and private landownership do not fit easily into the capitalist formation. Firstly, when land is rented the owner does not create surplus value himself but appropriates a part of the profits merely from his position as owner. Rent is therefore a redistribution of surplus value, and the fact that landlords may earn their income from rents distinguishes them from other property owners in capitalist society. Secondly, the organisation of capitalist society is based upon an ever increasing centralisation of capital and concentration of ownership. Land presents a barrier to this process, since land is always owned in a fixed geographical location. Political economy theory therefore interprets changes within methods of agricultural production and the structure of landownership as a response to the attempts by capital to overcome the barriers posed by landownership to the centralisation and accumulation of capital. Whatmore (1986) identifies three ways in which landownership has changed in response to capitalism in the post World War Two period. First, the natural differentials of land quality have been reduced through the industrialisation of agriculture, with massive injections of capital into the land. This process has been

aided by agricultural policy. It can be seen as a way of minimising the importance of land as a factor of production. Second, owner-occupation can be seen as a response to the contradictions posed by rent, since the owner-occupier is both owner and producer. He is, therefore, a capitalist rather than a rentier. Third, the barrier to the concentration of capital posed by landownership is being overcome by the capitalisation of higher stages in the food chain. Large agribusinesses are gradually taking over the processing and marketing stages of the production process, and thereby reducing the autonomy of the farmer (Marsden et al., 1987).

Massey and Catalano (1978) agree that the underlying process of change is capitalism, but argue that different groups of landowners have reacted in different ways:

“all forms of landownership will have effects on the process of accumulation, but the nature of these effects will vary with the specific form of landownership and the associated forms of rent” (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 52).

They classify landowners into three groups based on their relation to capitalist society: former landed property, industrial landowners and financial landowners. Former landed property includes the traditional privately owned and institutional landed estates. The changes in the nature of this group, noted above (2.4.2), can be considered as adaptations to the capitalist system rather than products of the system:

“the overwhelmingly dominant characteristic of this group and the basis on which its other economic activities depend and are designed, is the ownership of land” (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 78).

The industrial landownership group includes those landowners who derive their income directly from the land, i.e. owner-occupiers (tenant farmers could also be placed in this group). The main features of owner-occupation are: a high level of capital inputs in the land, small farm sizes (although holding sizes are gradually increasing) and an absence of other external sources of capital. The main advantages of owner-occupation to the capitalist system are, therefore, the greater willingness and ability of owner-occupiers to invest capital in their land in comparison to tenant farmers, the fact that they are direct producers, and the


flexibility a small farmer has to respond to market forces. Most owner-occupiers use family labour and so have low labour costs.

Owner-occupiers are, however, by no means a homogeneous group, and the nature of owner-occupied farming is constantly changing. Marsden and his associates (1987) identify several recent changes in the structure of family farming which they ascribe to the capitalist process. They suggest a four-fold classification of family farms based on the degree of capitalisation on the farm and ties with outside capitals (such as credit institutions and agribusiness companies). The first category, the marginal closed unit, includes the traditional family farm, where capital costs are minimal and links with outside capital few or non-existent. Generally, these farmers pursue a 'survival strategy' in order to maintain economic viability. The second category, the transitional dependent unit, refers to farms where the farmer has developed some outside financial ties and where his independence of decision-making begins to be 'subsumed' by outside financial obligations. These farmers also operate on the margin of economic viability, but are taking positive action to improve their position, often through off-the-farm diversification. The third category, the integrated unit, includes family farms which have built up complex business ties with outside capitals and are expanding. These farmers follow an accumulation strategy on the farm and may also be developing off-farm sources of capital. Finally the subsumed unit represents the extreme situation where family ownership has given way to corporate ownership and management. This is the most capitalist form of family farm.

The third category, the financial institutions, are seen by both Massey and Catalano (1978) and Whatmore (1986) as the most recent phase in the capitalisation of agriculture. These institutions buy land not for its short-term agricultural yield but for its long-term financial returns. They thus represent a fusion of landed with banking capital (Harvey, 1982, 367).

The emergence of owner-occupation in the post-war period has, therefore, been a response to the capitalist process, but also to the intervention of the State. The combination of State intervention and the contradictions posed by land to capitalist society have had some unforeseen and undesirable consequences, which now threaten the future of this landownership form.

Figure 2.5 — UK Land Values



Source: Rose, Bell, Saunders & Newby (1982, 74).

One of the major effects has been an inflationary rise in land values. Figure 2.5 shows the trend of land values from 1790 to 1980. Land has always fluctuated in value, but until 1940 land values fluctuated around a average value of about £60 a hectare. Since the 1940s, and particularly since 1970, land values have rocketed to an average, in 1978, of over £2,000 per hectare. During the 1970s, land values rose faster than the rate of inflation (Northfield, 1979, 92). Munton (1976) attributes the escalation of land values to two main factors. First, land was seen to be a safe long-term investment at a time when other sectors of the economy looked unstable. At the time there was general optimism in the agricultural industry. Second, landowners selling land on the urban fringe for development were entitled

to 'roll-over' tax relief, providing the money was reinvested in agricultural land within a certain time period. Thus demand for agricultural land suddenly rose, but the supply remained constant and land values spiralled upwards. Despite the high value of land it continues to remain a price-inelastic commodity. High land values have not led to any upsurge in the land market. Financial institutions have been popularly blamed for this inflation, but it seems more likely that the entry of financial institutions into the land market is a symptom rather than a cause of the rising value of land (Munton, 1976).

Although the inflation of land values has increased the wealth of farmers on paper, land values now bear no relation to the agricultural productivity of the land or to farm incomes (see Table 2.9). The discrepancy has grown even greater in the 1970s and 1980s. It means that owner-occupiers can no longer afford to buy land to expand their holdings, and the number of young people entering the farming industry is very low. Many owner-occupiers now face serious debts, having over-borrowed when prospects looked brighter.

2.5.1 Summary

What can be concluded from this discussion of landownership in the post World War Two period? At an empirical level, it has been observed that the structure of landownership has diversified but has not been transformed. Many of the changes have been adaptations of existing landownership forms. Change in landownership structures takes place on two levels: internal adaptation and external change. Landownership forms may adapt internally whilst retaining the same external form. Conversely, landownership structures may alter externally whilst the internal form remains unchanged. Both these forms of change show why official statistics may be misleading as indicators of trends in landownership. The discussion has indicated that, although broad landownership groups can be identified, there is much internal variation within each group. Furthermore, different forms of landownership will respond in different ways to the same external influences. Thus, while it is possible to generalise about the forces causing change and to generalise about new forms of ownership at the national level, in reality, at the local level change is much more complex and geographically uneven.

Table 2.9 — Index of Farm Incomes & Land Values, 1937 to 1966

Year	Index of	Vacant	Pocession	Tenanted	-
-	Farm Income	£/hectare	Index	£/hectare	Index
1937 - 9	-	13	34	10	47
1940 - 2	-	17	46	12	57
1943 - 5	-	23	60	13	65
1946	-	-	-	-	-
1947	63	34	91	18	86
1948	74	-	-	-	-
1949	96	-	-	-	-
1950	101	40	106	19	94
1951	89	-	-	-	-
1952	108	40	106	18	90
1953	111	35	92	17	84
1954	110	35	95	18	90
1955	100	38	100	20	100
1956	112	36	97	20	98
1957	109	35	93	17	82
1958	120	39	104	22	108
1959	106	46	122	28	139
1960	116	55	147	28	137
1961	126	55	147	34	165
1962	136	58	155	32	157
1963	144	70	187	41	200
1964	130	93	249	52	257
1965	152	100	265	63	306
1966	149	103	273	64	314
<i>Index based on 1955 values</i>					

Source: Clayton, Harrison & Hill (1967, 7)

Explanation of the processes underlying post-war landownership change from a political economy perspective, reveals that change has been induced by a combination of capitalism and State intervention. There has been a strong ideological commitment to the owner-occupier. As a result of market forces and government policy, much capital has been invested in agriculture and land values have soared, which in turn have induced further changes in the structure of landownership. Despite legal reforms which have removed barriers to the transfer of land, land still remains a price-inelastic commodity and changes in landownership are slow to emerge.

Political economy theory enables changes in the structure of landownership to be related to the wider economy, and provides a theoretical explanation of change over time. It provides a macro-level framework, but has limited explanatory value for changes on a micro-scale.

So far, the discussion has focussed on landownership structures without mention of landed influence. The next section will consider whether landowners exert an influence on national politics today and, if so, what form this influence takes.

3 Landed Power in the 20th Century?

1 The Farming Lobby

With the democratisation of local and national politics, the decline of agriculture as the major economic sector of the economy, the urbanisation of the population and the break-up of so many landed estates, landowners are no longer able to exert such a strong or direct political influence as they did in the 19th century. Critical analyses of rural society and land use politics (Cox et al.; Lowe et al., 1986; Shoad, 1987) suggest that, whilst landowners have certainly lost their hegemonic position in urban and industrial issues, they still exert a powerful, if less direct, influence in rural areas. This power, it is claimed, is asserted at local and national level through the control of the formulation and implementation of land use policies.

Nowhere is this power more evident than in the formulation of agricultural policy (Self & Storing, 1962; Cox et al., 1986). Agriculture is the only industry to have its own government department (MAFF), and MAFF is the only ministry in

which lobby groups have such a direct role in policy-formulation (Cox et al., 1986, 189). Moreover, the agricultural industry receives more government funding than any other state-supported industry (Boddy, 1982, 1) and yet farmers are subject to only minimal controls over their actions. Agriculture and forestry also enjoy privileged positions in relation to local rating and planning controls compared to other land uses.

In order to understand how the agricultural lobby obtained and maintains its powerful position, it is necessary to look at the actions of their two main lobby groups: the National Farmers Union (NFU) and the Country Landowners Association (CLA). Both groups were founded at the beginning of the 20th century, the NFU in 1908 and the CLA in 1907. Today, the NFU is the larger and more powerful group with 140,000 members, the CLA having 50,000 members (Lowe et al., 1986). The membership and political affiliations of the two groups differ. The NFU traditionally represents working farmers, whilst the CLA represents the more traditional landowning interest, but there is some overlap in the membership of the two groups. Scotland has always had its separate organisations (the Scottish Farmers' Union and the Scottish Landowners' Association), whilst Welsh farmers broke away from the NFU in the 1950s to form their own Union. In 1982, a Tenant Farmers' Association was formed (Marsden, 1986, 140), but none of these smaller groups pose a real threat to the NFU and CLA.

These two groups exercise a considerable ^{influence} over the formulation of agricultural policy (Cox et al., 1986, 181). They have a statutory right (enshrined in the 1947 Agriculture Act) to advise government, especially in the annual price review (ibid., 184). The relationship between MAFF and the agricultural lobby has variously been described as ^{'corporatism'} 'symbiotic', a 'closed policy community' and 'clientelism' (ibid., 184). Although the power of the agricultural lobby is most directly seen in its relationship with MAFF, it has also infiltrated other institutions such as the European Community, local government, parliament and the mass media (Lowe et al., 1986, 88). Massey and Catalano (1978) found that the CLA has close links with the House of Lords, and that financial institutions have powerful interests in the House of Commons.

The continuing influence of the NFU and CLA depends upon their maintaining

the support of their members and their being able to present a unified front on policy issues. Although it might be expected that the interests of the CLA and the NFU would differ on certain issues, in practice conflict has rarely surfaced. The unified front which the agricultural lobby has managed to preserve has depended upon satisfying the diversity of interests that it represents. This has largely been possible through an efficient and active organisation. Both the CLA and NFU have county branches which offer free advice and support to their members.

It can be concluded that a 'landed interest' has been replaced by an 'agricultural interest', consisting of both farmers and landowners. The power of the agricultural influence is more narrowly based than that of the landed interest in the 19th century, and the exercise of power has changed from informal patronage to formal political lobbying. The influence of farmers and landowners on contemporary rural society at local level will be considered in the following chapter, but Newby and his colleagues (1978) found that farmers in East Anglia occupied a disproportionate number of positions on the local councils, especially 'key' decision-making positions. They concluded that, whilst the external form of local control had changed, its nature had not:

"there has been a slow but progressive shift in the mode of authority of the traditional rural élite from that arising out of tradition and custom towards that vested in formal office" (Newby et al., 1978, 226).

The same could be said, in relation to rural politics at least, of the influence of farmers and landowners on national politics.

2.6.2 The Environmental Lobby

An important explanation for the success of the agricultural lobby has been the absence of any effective opposition group. The main opposition to the farming lobby in rural areas is the environmental lobby. In contrast to the agricultural lobby, this is an 'open' policy community, has no direct representation in parliament and has suffered from a lack of financial resources. Recently, however, the strength of the environmental lobby has grown and is now seen as a real threat by the agricultural interest.

There are several reasons for the recent gains in the strength of the environmental lobby. The agricultural surpluses of the 1980s have attracted public and media attention to the environmentally destructive practices of the farming industry (Waller, 1986, 51). The media in particular have been sympathetic to the environmental cause and have given it much publicity (North, 1987). In addition, recent efforts to co-ordinate and integrate public intervention measures in the countryside (see 3.4.4) have exposed the power and organisational self-interest of the agricultural policy community (Cox et al., 1986, 181). There is now increasing pressure to widen the basis of decision-making in rural areas.

Perhaps the most serious threat to the power of the agricultural lobby are the divisions which have begun to appear amongst their members. There is, for instance, a growing divide between 'corn' and 'horn' (arable versus livestock interests), as illustrated by the furore over the sudden imposition of milk quotas in 1984 (Browne, 1985).

How has the agricultural interest responded to these threats? Cox and his colleagues (1986) argue that it has been seen to make concessions on many of the issues demanded by the environmentalists in order to control the way these concessions are implemented, and to protect two fundamental rights which it certainly does not wish to lose: the autonomy of MAFF in formulating agricultural policy, and the autonomy of the farmer in making production and land use decisions. This strategy is remarkably reminiscent of the way landowners in the 19th century presided over their own demise (see 2.3).

What concessions has the farming interest made to the environmental lobby? The CLA has been the more willing of the two groups to embrace conservation issues, but only those which exclude the public (Newby et al., 1978, 241). It has played on the ideology of stewardship, claiming that some of the most beautiful parts of the countryside have been preserved by the care of landlords. Much of the CLA's involvement in conservation is for reasons of self-interest (Lowe et al., 1986, 105). For instance, landowners justify the continuation of game shooting on the basis that it conserves the landscape. The annual Game Fair, instituted by the CLA in 1958, has been highly successful in promulgating the conservation ethic. Landowners have tended to ally themselves to those conservation groups which wish to exclude

the public from the countryside, such as the RSPB and the NCC. The NFU has also made concessions to the conservation interest but none of these concessions is enforceable. Most take the form of advice (on environmentally sound practices) and voluntary schemes (see 3.4.4).

One of the most serious threats which the environmental lobby poses for the agricultural interest is their campaign for greater public access to the countryside. It is perceived by the agricultural interest as a direct infringement of private rights, and by the environmental interest as a fundamental public right (Shoad, 1987, 537). On this question, as will be illustrated later, the farming interest is ill-prepared to make concessions.

7 Continuity or Change?

This chapter has looked at the structure of landownership in the 19th century and the political, social and economic influence of landowners at the national level; and the processes by which the structure and influence of landownership has changed over the 19th and 20th centuries. Several important points have emerged from this analysis.

The structure of landownership is related to the influence of landowners at national level. In the 19th century, Britain was dominated by a landed élite. Its influence was based on the ownership of land, its control of the nation's land and mineral resources gave it economic power. Its influence was also based on the social status attached to the ownership of land, and its control of all the major political institutions of British society. The dominance of the landed élite was legitimised by the legal and political order. It was possible because, at the beginning of the 19th century, Britain was still a predominantly rural, agricultural society. The majority of the population were dependent in some way upon the land. Agriculture was the most powerful source of wealth in the country.

The relationship between landed influence and the landownership structure is also apparent in the simultaneous decline of the power of the landed influence and the break-up of the great landed estates at the beginning of the 20th century. The dominance of the landed élite was undermined by economic, social and political events. Two factors should be recognised in a consideration of the decline of the

landed interest. First, there was a time lag between the causes of change and their realisation. Second, because of the time lag between cause and effect there are two levels of explanation: ascribed cause and actual cause, both of which are important. The root cause of the decline of the landed interest was economic, but politics was an important catalyst of change.

The effects of economic restructuring on landed power were delayed by several factors. First, the general economic boom of the mid-19th century delayed the impact of the repeal of the Corn Laws on the British agricultural market. It was not until the agricultural depression of the late 19th century that the impact was brought home. Second, land retained a social value long after its economic value had declined, so that the acquisition of a landed estate remained the aspiration of those with new wealth, hoping to achieve social and political distinction. Third, because landed power was protected by the political and legal order, political and legal reforms were needed to achieve change. In particular, the protection of landed estates afforded by the land law acted as a barrier against land sales. Legal reform was needed to open up the land market. Finally, the fact that the landed élite themselves co-operated in and even instigated many of these political and legal reforms, enabled them to retain control over the nature and pace of change, unlike many of their European counterparts.

The factors popularly ascribed to the decline of the landed interest: the anti-land movements, and the People's Budget, should be seen more as catalysts of change than causes of change. The First World War was also a catalyst of change, not only in landownership but in British society as a whole. Between the First and Second World Wars many landed estates were broken up. Further long overdue reforms of the land law were effected by the 1925 Property Acts.

The Second World War also marked another turning point, with the establishment of a new social, economic and political order. Britain is now an urban, industrial, and supposedly democratic state. New forms of landownership have emerged in the post-war period. Owner-occupation is now the dominant form of ownership, but recently financial institutions have entered the land market. Public landownership serves a specific purpose and, while an important new form of ownership, is not likely to expand. Change in the post-war period can be explained at two levels.

At an empirical level, the changing structure of landownership can be ascribed to the market and State policy. Agriculture has become a thriving industry, and the effect, intended or unintended, of State policy and legislation has been to encourage owner-occupation and discourage the rented sector. The appearance of financial institutions is attributed to rising land values, which make land and property attractive investment propositions. Trends in landownership are slow to emerge, however, because of the low annual turnover of land. There is still a time lag between cause and effect in landownership change.

On a theoretical level, the emergence of owner-occupation and financial landownership can be seen as the progress of capitalism [33]. They are forms of landownership more amenable to the centralisation and accumulation of capital, but because of the contradictory position of landownership within a marxist interpretation of capitalist society, and the intervention of the State in market forces, owner-occupation as a landownership form is facing many economic pressures and must change to survive. Already, internal change within this ownership form is taking place. Financial landownership is seen the a ownership form most amenable to capitalist society.

Despite the emphasis on change, a high degree of continuity is evident in the landownership structure of Britain. Many landed estates have survived, although their true extent is disguised by the widespread adoption of a trust ownership form and the taking of tenanted land in hand. Landed estates have adapted internally and externally to survive against external pressures. Thus, although the landownership structure has diversified, it has not changed out of all recognition.

The contemporary political influence of landownership is harder to establish. Certainly, the hegemonic political power of the landed élite in the 19th century has gone. However, in a more narrow sphere, landowners still exert a large degree of power, albeit in different form to the 19th century. An agricultural rather than a landed interest can be identified, which effectively controls the formulation of agricultural policy and the nature of rural land use politics. Its power is based on an organised political lobby which has close links with the government. This power until recently has been unquestioned, but in the last few years questions

about the role of agriculture in rural development and the growing power of an environmental lobby have challenged the agricultural interest.

What factors can be identified from this chapter which can be included in the conceptual framework? Different forms of landownership have been identified: private and traditional institutional landlords, owner-occupiers, financial institutions and public landowners. The processes which have affected continuity and change in these landowning groups have also been identified: the agricultural market and technological innovations in farming methods, legal and political reform, agricultural policy, taxation, the land market and land values. Changes in the structure of landownership are closely linked to changes in the political influence of landownership, which in itself is linked to changes in the wider economy and society. The framework must recognise these interrelationships. The concept of a time lag between cause and effect, the differing roles of actual and ascribed cause in initiating change and the concept of 'internal' and 'external' change in landownership form should be incorporated within the framework. External continuity does not mean that change is not occurring internally and, conversely, external change does not imply internal change.

Other factors have been touched on in this chapter but have not been fully examined. For instance, it has been implied that continuity and change in the landownership structure, and the nature of landed influence at local level is geographically uneven. It has also been implied that different forms of landownership are differentially affected by the same external factors, and that even within the same landownership group, different landowners will respond to a given situation in different ways. A consideration of landownership and landed influence at national level cannot explain the infinite variety of circumstances found at local levels. Chapter Three will, therefore, move on to look at the importance of landownership form and individual motive in estate management at the local level, and will look in more detail at landed influence and the development of upland Britain.

Notes

1. Landowners were divided into the following categories by Bateman:

- Peers & Peeresses: titled landowners.

- Great Landowners: with estates of over 1,250 hectares (or with an annual rental of over £3,000).
 - Squires: with estates between 416.6 and 1,250 hectares.
 - Greater Yeomen: with estates between 125 and 416.6 hectares.
 - Lesser Yeomen: with estates between 41.6 and 125 hectares.
 - Small Proprietors: with estates of 0.3 to 41.6 hectares.
 - Cottagers: with under 0.4 hectares.
2. Further information about the history of Highland landownership can be gained from Carter, 1980; Hunter, 1976; and Darling, 1955.
 3. Simpson (1961, 1-23) dates the origins of Crown ownership to the Norman Conquest and the establishment of feudalism. Lands were granted by the Crown in return for military or other services. Lands would be forfeited to the Crown as a punishment for treason. During the Medieval period, there were constant legal battles between the Crown and the landowners over the level of payments due to the Crown as incidents of tenure. Feudal exactions were abolished under the Commonwealth and forfeiture was abolished in 1870 (33 & 34 Vict, c.23). Holdsworth (1927, 128) states that by the 18th century an abstract right of ownership was recognised by the law.
 4. Strictly speaking, sporting and mineral rights belonged to the Lord of the Manor, but most large landowners also owned manorial interests.
 5. See Simpson (1961, 229-238) and Clay (1985, 212-230). Originally, the lessor required feudal services or payment in kind from the lessee, but after the demise of the manorial system these came to be replaced by money rents. By the 19th century, the standard agricultural lease was the yearly tenancy.
 6. See for example Kerridge (1969, 38); Clay (1985, 198-208); Simpson (1961, 146-160). Copyhold and other customary tenures originated in the feudal period. Lands were held from the Lord of the Manor in exchange for services or payments in kind. These tenures were controlled by the manor courts and were not recognised by the common law courts. During the 14th century, most of these payments in kind and services were converted into money payments, which improved the status of the tenants. The term 'copyhold' comes from the practice of alienation. The land would be surrendered to the Lord of the Manor, who would re-grant it to the in-coming tenant. A copy of the transaction was made in the manor court rolls. The tenant was said to hold 'by copy of the court roll'. The copyholder was normally required to pay a fine on taking over the property equal to one or two times the annual rent.
 7. See for example Kerridge (1969, 41-47); Thompson (1976, 325-360); Simpson (1961, 20) and Holdsworth (1927, 131). Three regions of Britain had their

own peculiar customary tenures: Wales ('free customary tenure' or 'husbandry hold'); Cornwall ('tenants in free conventional'); the Scottish Lowlands and Northern England ('tenant right'). Two other distinct forms of customary tenure were 'gavelkind' (partible inheritance, which was practised in Kent), and 'borough English' (where the inheritance went to the youngest son).

8. Three general rules governed the inheritance of landed estates (Stone, 1984, 109):
 - Males took priority over females, although transfers to women became more common in the 18th century.
 - The property passed downwards in preference to upwards or outwards. The order of inheritance was (in descending order): eldest son, younger sons, nephews, uncles. If all these failed, then the search would move to the paternal grandfather and his branch of the family.
 - The strength of claims to inheritance diminished with the antiquity of the branch of the family.
9. Simpson (1976, 31) gives a contemporary example of how three estates can exist simultaneously in the same piece of land. 'A' (the owner of the fee simple) makes a grant to 'B' for life and then to 'C' in tail. 'B' then receives a life estate, he is in possession, but 'C' has the estate in remainder when 'B' dies. 'A' still holds a reversionary interest in the land, since the land will revert back to him or his descendants if 'C's specified class of descendants die out.
10. Common rights antedate the idea of private property in land (Hoskins & Stamp, 1963, 6). There are six generally recognised rights of common, the most important of which is the right of grazing (Campbell, 1971, 7). The other rights are:
 - pannage (to graze stock in woodlands).
 - Estover (to take underwood for fuel).
 - Turbary (to dig peat or turf for fuel).
 - Piscary (to fish in another man's lake or stream).
 - Common in soil (to take sand, gravel, stones and minerals for the commoner's personal use).
11. Three general enclosure acts were passed in the early 19th century: in 1801, 1836 and 1845 (Tate, 1967). The aim of these acts was to facilitate the process of enclosure, and reflected the national perception at the time of the need to increase the cultivated area.
12. Simpson (1976, 18) defines overriding interests as *"certain rights and liabilities which it is not practicable to register on the title deeds to a property, but which*

nevertheless retain their validity”.

13. A tithe was the tenth part of the annual produce of agriculture which was paid to support the priesthood. Originally tithes were paid in kind, but most were converted to money payments by the 19th century. Tithes could be commuted in three ways (Evans, 1976, 95):

- by giving the tithe owner an allotment of land in lieu.
- by a straight cash payment.
- by exchanging payments in kind for variable payments, which were tied to the prevailing price of grain.

14. See L. & J. Stone (1984, 128). If no male heir was found there was a danger that the family name would die out. If a daughter inherited the estate she would assume her husband's name. If the estate passed to a male relative through the female line the surname would also change. Landed families often used to cheat in order to preserve the family name, by producing surrogate heirs. The heir might take on the family name as a first name; where a daughter inherited the estate her husband might have to assume her name as a condition of marriage; the names of the husband and wife might be linked as a double-barrelled surname.

* [14a]

15. See B. & S. Webb (1924, 373). The position of Lord Lieutenant was generally held for life. It demanded little expense and few duties, but carried with it powers of patronage and social status. The High Sheriff, on the other hand, was usually appointed for a year. He had to attend the Judges of Assize and incur considerable expense. It was not, therefore, a desirable position.

16. The ownership of minerals was clarified by a law passed in 1688, which stated that only mines of gold and silver belonged to the Crown, all other minerals belonged to the owner of the surface (Spring, 1971, 17).

17. The role of landownership in industrial development is clearly illustrated by the Durham coal industry (Spring, 1971b, 18). Some of the principal landowners in the county (Sidney & Edward Wortley, Thomas Ord, Sir Henry Liddell & George Liddell, George Bowes and William Cottesworth) formed a partnership in 1726 for 99 years, to work certain collieries on the Tyne in order to obstruct competition and to control output. They were known as the 'Grand Allies'.

* [17a]

18. See Orwin & Whetham (1971, xix-xx). Corn Laws were brought in to protect British farmers following the Napoleonic Wars. They were repealed by Sir Robert Peel in 1846 (9 & 10 Vict c.22).

19. Perry (1974, 53) ascribes three causes of the agricultural depression:

- The influx of cheaper foreign imports onto the British market.
- A general world economic depression linked to falling gold prices.

- A series of bad harvests in the late 1870s.
20. Several Reform Acts were passed in the 19th century, and the right to vote was extended only gradually. The 1832 Act gave only farmers paying more than £40 per annum rent the vote; the 1867 Act extended the vote to householders in towns; and the 1884 Act gave householders in the countryside the vote (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 42). County Councils were established under the 1888 Local Government Act, whilst urban and rural district councils and parish councils were set up under the 1894 Act. See Douglas (1976, 148) for a description of the 1911 Parliament Act.
 21. The 1875 Agricultural Holdings Act (38 & 39 Vict c.92) gave tenants the right to claim for unexhausted improvements, although landlords were not bound to accept the claim. The 1883 Act (46 & 47 Vict c.61) made compensation compulsory (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 171).
 22. The Settled Land Act (45 & 46 Vict, c.38), 1882 gave full powers of management (including the right to sell) to the life tenant. It made it impossible to keep landed estates within a family by the traditional method of a strict family settlement (Simpson, 1961, 258).
 23. Thompson (1957) quotes the Duke of Marlborough as saying in 1885:

“were there any effective demand for the purchase of land, half the land of England would be in the market tomorrow”.
 24. Estate duty was introduced by the 1894 Finance Act (Cragg & Marchant, 1901, 988). It consisted of three taxes: estate, legacy and succession duty. Succession duty had been introduced in 1780, but until 1853 was charged only on personal property. Probate duty had also been charged only on personal property (Brodrick, 1881, 250).
 25. Paradoxically, it was also a Liberal Government under Lloyd George which abolished land valuation in 1920 (Douglas, 1976, 179).
 26. 15 & 16 Geo V, c.20 (Law of Property) 1925. There were in fact seven acts dealing with different aspects of reform (Simpson, 1976, 45):
 - Law of Property Act.
 - Settled land Act.
 - Trustee Act.
 - Land Charges Act.
 - Administration of Estates Act.
 - Land Registration Act.
 - Universities & Colleges Estates Act.

27. There was a change in legislative emphasis in the late 19th century (Campbell, 1971, 5). In the 30 years following the 1845 Inclosure Act, strong economic and social forces began to work against enclosure. The Metropolitan Commons Act of 1866 and the Commons Act of 1876 were passed to protect and preserve the remaining common lands.

*27a

28. Successive Agricultural Holdings Acts have increased the rights of the tenant against the landlord. The 1906 Act prohibited the inclusion of land use covenants in the tenancy contract so long as the fertility of the soil was maintained (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 300). The Acts of 1910 and 1914 gave tenants the right to claim disturbance costs if a tenancy was terminated by the sale of the holding. Full security of tenure was granted to farm tenants by the 1947 Act, whilst the 1976 Act granted tenants the right of succession for three generations. This provision has been amended by the 1984 Act, so that tenancies created since 1984 offer security only for the lifetime of the tenant.

29. A trust is formed when the legal title to an estate is vested in a body of trustees who hold the land for another's benefit (Simpson, 1976, 34). The beneficiary of a trust estate holds an equitable interest in the land (equitable interests are enforceable against other persons but do not exist in law as rights in the land itself). Trusts originated in the 13th century with the Franciscan monks. They were prohibited from owning any property, and so relied on benefactors to allow them to live on estates. Private landowners soon saw the advantages of the trust form of ownership, and also began to adopt this ownership form. The most common form of trust is a discretionary trust. Other ownership arrangements which have been adopted by private landowners include strict settlements, fixed interest trusts for sale, accumulation and maintenance trusts, charitable trusts and employee trusts (Harrison, 1981, 120).

30. The Samuel Commission reported that, on average, to open up a mine a company had to obtain leases from no fewer than five mineral owners (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 15).

31. County Council Smallholdings were established by three acts (Northfield, 1979, 190): the Smallholdings Act, 1892; Land Settlement Act, 1919; and the Smallholdings and Allotments Act, 1926. Between 1908 and 1914, over 83,333 hectares were acquired by county councils and over 14,000 smallholdings were created (Offer, 1981, 356).

32. *Report of the Commission on Common Land in England & Wales (1957/58)*. Cmnd 462. London, HMSO.

33. The claim that owner-occupation is a capitalist form of landownership has been criticised (see Winter, 1981). It is a very varied landownership group, which includes subsistence peasant proprietors as well as capitalist farmers.

24a The nature of the landed élite, and the reasons for its decline, have been the

subject of recent academic debate (see Anderson, 1987; Daunton, 1989; Rubinstein, 1981 & Wiener, 1981). More recent research on 19th century financiers, merchants, industrialists and landowners has produced evidence which questions some of the propositions made by Thompson. It would seem that the class structure of 19th century Britain was far more complex than generally believed, and did not in fact fit neatly into the vertical interest groups identified by Thompson.

7a ~~25~~ Recently the Stones (1984) and Rubinstein (1981) have questioned the openness of the landed élite. They suggest that fusion of landed and financial interests only took place after the Great Agricultural Depression of the 1880s, and that inter-marriage was a **consequence** rather than a **cause** of this fusion.

7a ~~32~~ The 'rented' category includes only land let on full agricultural tenancies for a period of less than 30 years. Lands held in partnership, occupied by the beneficiary of a trust, held on short-term grazing licences or held on a lease of over 30 years are classified as owner-occupied (Northfield, 1979, 41). The number of farm holdings combining rented and owner-occupied lands doubled between 1950 and 1977. The majority of farm holdings now fall into the 'mixed tenure' category (*ibid.*, 49). Official statistics should, however, be treated with caution as they do not allow for the complexities of land tenure arrangements. Rose *et. al.* (1977) found that farmers in East Anglia had entered land held under similar tenurial arrangements inconsistently. Interestingly, they found that the real extent of owner-occupied land was under-estimated in the official figures.

Chapter III

Landownership, Rural Society and the State

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will analyse the relationships between landownership, rural society and rural development in individual rural localities, although, as has earlier been stated, localities cannot be studied in isolation from the national context. The analysis in Chapter Two was concerned with continuity and change in the national landownership structure, and in the political influence of landowners at national level. National trends are the aggregated effect of many individual decisions, and, inevitably, hide the variety of circumstances and experiences found at smaller scales. In an analysis of continuity and change in landownership and landed influence at a smaller scale; new factors, processes and relationships become apparent which fit into and complement the conceptual framework. An understanding of landownership and rural development at the micro-level should also add to an understanding of the operation of national-level processes.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 3.2 looks at the direct influence of landowners on rural development, through estate management and landownership decision-making. It examines the many factors which influence the way land is managed, and pays particular attention to the importance of landownership form and motive. Section 3.3 analyses the structure of rural society, and the changing role of the landowner within rural society over the 19th and 20th centuries. The final section (3.4) looks at the role of the State in the rural development of upland Britain. Particularly since 1945, the State has come to play a larger role in the affairs of rural areas. Today, landownership decision-making and rural society cannot be understood without reference to public intervention. As in Chapter Two, continuity and change, in the nature of estate management, and in the role of landownership in rural society, are important themes, although the role of the State is largely a feature of the post-war period.

A comprehensive consideration of rural society and rural development problems in upland and lowland Britain, and of the decision-making frameworks of all the landownership forms identified in Chapter Two is, for reasons stated in the introduction, beyond the scope of this thesis. The analysis will, therefore, focus on the issues which will be developed later on in relation to the North Pennines: the management of landed estates; the rural society of upland Britain; and public policies for the development of upland Britain. Much of the material used, however, relates to lowland Britain, and many of the processes which will be identified are equally applicable to upland and lowland Britain.

3.2 Landownership Decision-Making

In Chapter Two, different categories of landownership were identified on the basis of ownership form and economic strategy. It was indicated that these groups are characterised by differing attitudes to landownership, and are differentially liable to external influences, but that within each group individuals will vary in their behaviour and circumstances. This section will look in more detail at the factors which influence how individual landowners manage their estates, and the extent to which generalisations can be made about landownership decision-making.

Landownership decision-making and estate management in the 19th century has been studied by contemporary writers and agricultural historians (for instance Caird, 1851; Spring, 1963; Robinson, 1988), and in the 20th century by agricultural geographers and economists (Gasson, 1973; Ilbery, 1983), land economists (Denman, 1957; 1959; 1972), and rural sociologists (MacGregor, 1988). Most studies have conceptualised decision-making as an individual choice made within a framework of possibilities and constraints. Choice is therefore constrained, but the final decision reflects the individual motive of the decision-maker. Obviously, the factors involved in the decision-making process will vary according to the time scale and issues involved [1], but all studies agree that non-economic factors play an important role in the decision-making process.

This section will address three interrelated questions. First, what factors should be included in the decision-making framework, and to what extent can they be generalised? Second, to what extent can generalisations be made about landownership motive? Third, what are the implications of land management decisions

for rural society? The findings should not only enable a better understanding of the implications of landownership for rural development, but should also further an understanding of the processes of continuity and change in different forms of landownership.

3.2.1 The Proprietary Land Unit

The almost infinite variety of possible decision-making situations relating to land management makes it extremely difficult to develop a single conceptual model. The model would need to encompass the many legal combinations of ownership and control by which land can be held, the different types of owner, and the range of physical environments in which an estate can exist.

One model which meets these requirements is the Proprietary Land Unit, devised by Denman and Prodano (1972). In order to avoid the preconceptions attached to frequently used terms, Denman and Prodano have developed their own terminology for the various components of the model. The basic unit of management is the Proprietary Land Unit (PLU) [2]. The PLU consists of legal, ownership and geographical variables which, together, form a decision-making framework. An adapted version of this framework is illustrated in Table 3.1

The 'possibilities' consist of abstract and physical 'attributes'. There are two sorts of physical attribute: the physical resources contained within the PLU (including the land and its fixed equipment, timber, water, minerals and other physical resources), and the existing organisation and use of these resources. The resource use within the PLU may be homogeneous (in that it is dominated by one use), or heterogeneous (multiple land uses).

The abstract attributes consist of three components. The first factor is the geometry of the unit: its size and shape. A compact estate will be easier to manage than one that is scattered, particularly if scattered over a wide area. The second factor concerns the number and nature of legal land rights possessed by the proprietor. This obviously affects his degree of control over the land. The third factor is the 'proprietary character form' itself, the legal title to the land. Denman and Prodano identify three separate, but not exclusive, proprietary forms: simple, fictitious and fiduciary (Denman & Prodano, 1972, 31). The simple form corresponds

Table 3.1 — The Proprietorial Land Unit

PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES		- ABSTRACT ATTRIBUTES -				CONSTRAINTS
Resource Base	Resource Use	Size & Shape	Duration of Title	Land Rights	Proprietary Character Form	- -
land	homogeneous	compact	determinate	entire	simple	contiguous/derivative
fixed equipment	heterogeneous	scattered	indeterminate	derivative	fiduciary	collateral rights/ predisposing functions
-	-	intact	-	partial	fictitious	consociate wealth
-	-	-	-	-	-	universal constraints

Source: from Denman & Prodano (1972, 34)

to private individual ownership. The fictitious form corresponds to ownership by trusts or shareholders (the ownership form is 'fictitious' in that the owner of the title is, for legal purposes, immortal). Finally, fiduciary ownership is where the holder of the legal title to the land, as a condition of ownership, is obliged to use it for the benefit of another. This corresponds to ownership by trusts and charities [3].

Together, these physical and abstract elements of the PLU form the positive elements of the decision-making framework. These are balanced by constraints. Denman and Prodano identify five main constraints within the decision-making framework: two arising from the PLU itself, and three external constraints. The internal constraints upon the proprietor's freedom of decision-making result from the existence of other legal interests in the PLU and historical inertia. In the first case, derivative interests (leases and tenancies) act as constraints upon the proprietor (Denman & Prodano, 1972, 75) [4]. In the second case, the legacy of former owners and management practices are termed 'predisposing functions' (*ibid.*, 99). Ancient land rights which have lost their original function but are still binding on the present owner, such as common rights, are a form of predisposing function termed 'collateral rights' (*ibid.*, 104). Other predisposing functions might include financial burdens inherited from a former owner; ancient legal conditions attached to the proprietorship; or leases granted before the commencement of the present proprietorship.

The three external constraints upon the proprietor's freedom of decision-making relate to other land units surrounding the PLU, the position of the PLU within the proprietor's total property portfolio, and the influence of public policy. Neighbouring land units (either horizontal, or vertical where ownership of minerals is separated from surface ownership) may affect decisions relating to the PLU. These are termed 'contiguous' rights (*ibid.*, 52). If the proprietor commands other external sources of capital ('consociate wealth'), decisions relating to the PLU will be taken in a wider context. Contiguous wealth also includes estates which are managed separately from the PLU (*ibid.*, 145). Finally, all forms of public policy which impinge directly or indirectly on land use and landowners constrain the landowner's options and are termed 'universal constraints' (*ibid.*, 136).

The nature and range of alternative strategies open to the decision-maker are, therefore, the product of opportunities offered by the PLU, plus constraints arising from and imposed upon it. The final decision, however, will reflect the proprietor's individual motive. Denman and Prodano do not analyse the question of motive in depth, but state that proprietors will have varying attitudes to their property in terms of consumption and production. For instance, proprietors may identify with particular physical assets within the unit (the 'soil affinity' factor), such as a house or parkland, and wish to preserve it, even if it could more profitably be turned to another use (Denman & Prodano, 1972, 47).

The main value of this model is the light it throws on how the legal structure of ownership affects land management in practice. It shows that it is important to look not just at ownership but also at control. Land management is not only affected by the structure of ownership and control within an estate, but also by the ownership and control of surrounding estates. The fact that past management decisions can fundamentally affect present decision-making, emphasises the need for a historical perspective in order to understand contemporary land management. It is also important to be aware of the proprietor's total property portfolio, as the possession of consociate wealth may affect the decision-making framework. The model certainly highlights the number of possible influences on decision-making. So many variables are involved indeed, that, at a detailed level of analysis, the decision-making framework will be different for every individual landowner. The model also points out that estates should be classified not only by their legal and ownership form, but also by physical characteristics, such as shape and size and resource use (these two factors will be discussed below).

As an explanatory or predictive model, however, the PLU is of little value. The generality of the concepts means that it is far removed from actual decision-making situations. This may account for the scant attention paid to landownership motive, and also to the effects of universal controls on decision-making. It does not indicate the relative importance of the different variables on the decision-making process, nor the relative significance of different factors for different landownership forms. These are, naturally, contingent upon each particular situation. It can be concluded that the some of the concepts put forward in the model could help towards an understanding of landownership decision-making, but these concepts

need to be tested against actual case studies. The emphasis of the PLU on the individuality of each situation should be complemented by studies which look for more general patterns of decision-making.

2.2 Defining and Describing an Estate


It is evident that a working definition of an estate is required, since ownership alone may not be sufficient criteria. Does a landowner with many geographically dispersed properties own one estate or several? An estate can be classified in many ways, depending on the purpose and scale of the study. Denman's earlier works (1957; 1959) on the management of landed estates in England pay more attention to the classification of estates by size, shape and resource base.

Denman (1959, 132) considered that management structure is an important factor. If geographically scattered estates are managed as a single unit under the same management, then they can be treated as a single estate. If the various properties are managed independently, then they should be treated as separate estates. These three situations are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 3.1. However, it should be remembered that in the latter case, the other estates will form part of a landowner's consociate wealth, and, therefore, will still have an influence on the management of the estate in question. Generally, the larger the estate, the more complex the management structure, although estates with multiple resource bases may also require complex management structures.

The term 'estate' can, therefore, be used descriptively to refer in general terms to a landowner's total landholdings, but for a more detailed study should only be used to refer to a discrete management unit.

Estates can also be classified according to resource use. Denman (1957, 141), for example, identified four categories of landed estate in his survey: an agricultural estate; a residential estate (containing a family seat and/or a village); a ^hivicultural estate (where over 25% of the estate's value lies in standing timber); and a mixed estate. This classification is merely illustrative of the way estates can be described, it does not cover the whole range of possible estate resource types.

Figure 3.1 — Defining an Estate



3.2.3 Estate Structure and Management in the 19th Century

It is not surprising, given the landownership structure in 19th century Britain, that most studies of land management have concentrated on the landed estate (Spring, 1963; Thompson, 1963; Caird, 1967; Howell, 1979). An analysis of these studies enables some observations to be made about the factors influencing the management of landed estates at this time.

The vast size of the great landed estates required a complex management structure. Spring (1963) recognised three forms of estate organisation based on estate size. On the smallest estates of under 5,000 acres (2,083 hectares), the landowner himself

usually took a leading role in management (Spring, 1963, 5). He might employ a bailiff who was usually one of his tenant farmers. As the century progressed, many smaller landowners paid professional firms of land agents or surveyors to help with the management of their estates (Thompson, 1963, 178). These firms would manage several such small estates and were cheaper than the employment of a full-time resident agent. Normally, these smaller estates would be geographically compact and so lend themselves to a simple administrative structure.

The second group of estates ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 acres (2,083 to 4,167 hectares) in size and were characterised by a three-tiered management structure. On these estates, the daily managerial role would normally be devolved from the landowner to a resident full-time land agent, with a bailiff under him to liaise with the tenant farmers. These estates were normally large enough for workmen to be employed full-time (Spring, 1963, 6).

The third group, the so-called 'great estates' of over 10,000 acres (4,167 hectares), demanded a much more complex administrative structure, not only because of their larger size, but also because these estates normally consisted of geographically dispersed properties, and often a diversity of resources. On these estates, the landowner presided over a chief land agent or auditor, who in turn presided over land agents on the various properties, with bailiffs and workmen below them (*ibid.*, 10). The landowner and chief agent would be responsible for long-term structural decision-making, whilst the sub-agents would take responsibility for short-term management decisions.

Landlords of estates with diversified resource bases, including mines or urban property for example, would require the aid of specialist agents. Depending on the amount of work involved in the management of these resources, these agents would be employed full-time on the estate or would act as occasional outside consultants (Thompson, 1963, 171). To protect the family's legal interests and to settle legal disputes over land rights, a solicitor would be required, again either on a full- or part-time basis. The solicitor rarely resided on the estate.

The landed estate in the 19th century could be a large, complex business. The 'actors' in 19th century estate administration were, in decreasing order of status: the landowner; the land agent; the solicitor and the specialist agent; the bailiff, the

tenant farmers; and finally the estate labourers and workmen. The management requirements of an estate depended on its size, shape and resource base.

The turn of the 19th century marked a general change in the management of landed estates. In the 18th century, estates were regarded more as units of consumption than production (Thompson 1963, 153), but as the 19th century progressed estate management became a more professionalised and efficient activity.

There were several inducements to improve estate management. The parliamentary enclosures of the 18th and early 19th centuries brought more land into agricultural production and enabled a rationalisation and improvement of farm holdings on many estates (Chambers & Mingay, 1966, 79). Estate management and agricultural improvement became fashionable interests and many landowners entered enthusiastically into the 'spirit of improvement' (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 28). In 1839, the Royal Agricultural Society was established, which did much to encourage and diffuse agricultural innovation (Ernle, 1961, 359). The period from 1840 to 1870 is known as the period of 'high farming', when many estates were improved by land drainage, farm enlargement and the introduction of better quality stock (Caird, 1967, 15). These improvements were facilitated by the introduction of public loans, introduced to overcome the barrier posed by strict settlement to the improvement of land (see 2.3). The Board of Inclosure Commissioners, set up under the 1845 Inclosure Act, were also given the powers to oversee agricultural improvement schemes (Spring, 1963, 158). The Improvement of Land Act of 1864 enabled landowners to borrow from any source, public or private. By 1882 and the Settled Land Act, it was estimated that altogether about £15 million had been spent on agricultural improvement schemes, of which £8 million had been advanced by the State and £7 million by private companies. A fifth of the land in need of draining had been drained with the aid of loans (Caird, 1967, 82).

The two major barriers to the improvement of land were generally recognised to be strict settlement and lack of tenant security (Garnier, 1911, 447). As has been stated earlier (see 2.4), the effect of strict settlement was that many estates were heavily encumbered with debt, leaving little or no capital free for agricultural improvement. This obstacle was partly overcome by the introduction of loans, but it was not until the Settled Land Act of 1882 that the obstacle was finally removed.

In England, the normal practice was to grant tenancies from year to year (Caird, 1967, 104). Although tenants were rarely evicted at the end of the year, they had no long-term legal security in the land, and consequently were loath to expend capital on agricultural improvement. In Scotland, where leases were often granted for 21 years, Caird (1967, 99) observed that the farms were of a superior standard, although, as the lease drew to an end, it was difficult to induce the tenant to maintain his holding. It was generally agreed that legislation was needed to give the tenant more legal security. The 1875 Agricultural Holdings Act was the first step towards this goal.

Tithes and other land charges were also identified as constraints upon estate investment. Although the burden of tithes was lessened by the Tithe Commutation Act of 1836, tithes and other rent charges were still felt to be an unwelcome financial burden [5].

Despite these general trends, estate management also depended on the individual motive of the landowner. The background of the landowner was important. Howell (1979, 56) observes that towards the end of the 19th century, many landed gentry had professional backgrounds in banking, the law or industry, and owned an estate for its status rather than income value. Those landowners who had come from business backgrounds, however, tended to base their relations with tenants on far more commercial and less paternalistic lines. Management also depended on the financial circumstances of the landowner. The small landowner with no other income source would seek to maximise the profit from his estate.

Caird (1968, 493) emphasised the importance of both the landlord and the agent in the management of the estate:

"An experienced sensible agent, with the aid of a willing tenantry, will effect as much with £100 as an inexperienced or incompetent man can with £200"

Estates were not always owned for their agricultural function. Orwin & Whethan (1971, 46) noted that game shooting grew in popularity over the 19th century. Some estates were neglected by their owners, particularly if the owner was absentee. Research on landed estates in Wales and the Highlands of Scotland (Howell, 1976; Hunter, 1976; Carter, 1980) indicates that landowners in the uplands were more

often absentee than their lowland counterparts. On the Highland estates, the factor (land agent) wielded a considerable amount of power (Hunter, 1976, 121).

There has been little analysis of the estate management policies of institutional and charitable landowners in the 19th century. Robinson (1988), in a comparison of decision-making by different landowners during the Great Agricultural Depression, suggests that resource base was a more important explanatory factor of estate management policy than ownership motive. The estate structure of Guy's Hospital (a charitable estate) did not differ markedly from neighbouring private estates (Robinson, 1988, 125), although he goes on to add that landlords could exert an important influence over their tenant farmers (*ibid.*, 145).

The market unquestionably had an important influence on the management strategies of landowners. All landowners faced financial difficulties during the last quarter of the 19th century, but the arable lowland estates fared worse than the upland pastoral areas (*ibid.*, 120). The Great Agricultural Depression put economic pressure on landowners to seek more efficient methods of estate management.

The power of landowners to influence society, both at the local and national level, was noted by Caird (1968, 493):

"the landlord's influence for good or evil extends to his tenants and labourers, and in its general results regulates, in no unimportant degree, the productiveness and welfare of the country".

He went on to point out that although the responsibility of the landed interest was enormous, landowners received no specialist training, and there were no public regulations as to how estates were managed.

This brief discussion has shown that the size and diverse resources of many 19th century estates demanded a complex management structure. As the century progressed, changing fashions and changing economic circumstances resulted in landowners placing far more importance on efficiency and production, and less and less emphasis on consumption. However, the landowner was rarely the sole decision-maker, and it is important to be aware of the influence of other actors in the decision-making process. Although widespread agricultural improvements were achieved, the strict family settlement, lack of tenant security and financial

burdens on the land all acted as constraints to improvement. Individual motive was also important. Some landowners owned their estates for their recreational rather than their agricultural function, and absenteeism was seen to be associated with poor estate management.

3.2.4 Estate Management in the 20th Century

More information is available for the 20th century about the factors which influence different types of landowner in their decision-making, and about estate management in specific areas of the country.

In an earlier study (1957) of the management of landed estates in England, Denman compared three types of landowner: the private landlord, charitable trust and corporate business. The study provides some interesting conclusions about the decision-making framework in general, and differences in the motives of these landowners.

The aim of the study was to analyse the economic efficiency of landed estates, and to identify factors which could explain differing levels of efficiency. The estates were classified into three groups: competent, partially competent and incompetent. This classification was based on the ability of an estate to generate enough income to meet normal out-goings (such as maintenance costs, taxes, rates, management and insurance) and to invest in estate improvements. Estate income was measured as rental earnings (actual rent received plus the estimated rental values of any farms and other lands in hand). All other sources of income and capital were classified as consociate wealth (including revenue from estate resources managed in hand as well as interest on stocks, shares and other non land based income sources). The income of each estate was calculated from average earnings over a ten year period to iron out the inevitable yearly fluctuations in income.

Denman found that only 21% of the estates in the survey were competent whereas 45% were incompetent. Therefore the majority of the estates were either neglected or were subsidised by outside sources of capital (Denman, 1957, 45). On the incompetent estates, rent levels had not kept pace with the rising costs of maintenance (*ibid.*, 50). He found that consociate wealth was essential for the maintenance of

most estates over the short-term. Indeed, 80% of the estates were supported by an external fund in the same ownership (*ibid.*, 64).

Denman then looked at the decision-making frameworks of the landowners, to identify the main factors which could explain differing levels of estate competence. He found certain factors were common to all landownership groups, whilst other differences could be attributed to landownership motive. Two major constraints on estate investment experienced by all landowners were taxation (Denman 1957, 93) and tenant right (*ibid.*, 91). Landlords in the survey said that they feared that improvements to farm holdings would only lead to higher claims for compensation from out-going tenants at the end of the tenancy. The necessity to maintain good relations with the tenantry, and fear of arbitration, meant that landlords were reluctant to raise rents following improvements, although the costs of maintenance had risen rapidly (*ibid.*, 100). The low short-term return on capital invested in land was also identified as a constraint. Landowners wishing to make short-term gains preferred to invest their money elsewhere (*ibid.*, 89).

Three general incentives to invest were identified. First, tax rebates were an important incentive. Under the 1945 Income Tax Act, landlords were entitled to a tax rebate of a tenth of the capital invested in agricultural improvements over a ten year period, and were entitled to a 45% rebate on agricultural land farmed in hand (*ibid.*, 57). Second, government grants for agricultural improvement had encouraged capital investment. Third, land was perceived to be a secure long-term investment. An interesting point which emerged from the survey was that the Agricultural Holdings Acts have introduced minimum acceptable standards of estate management, and have to some extent ironed out differences between landlords (*ibid.*, 75).

The most competent estates were those owned by companies (*ibid.*, 155). There was an inverse relationship between the level of personal identity with the estate and level of commercialisation. Thus, privately owned estates were, in general, the least competent. There was also an inverse relationship between the amount of consociate wealth and level of competence (*ibid.*, 69). Some private landlords admitted that old age and apathy were reasons for lack of investment, whilst many cited other non-economic factors such as commitment to residence, historical

tradition, social responsibility, moral duty and a simple love of the land (*ibid.*, 98). Length of title was also a factor. 'Old titles' were generally more traditional than new ones (*ibid.*, 151) [6]. On the other hand, some privately owned estates were highly competent. Many private landlords were trained in land management and took a professional interest in their estates (*ibid.*, 109).

Differences in sources of consociate wealth were also attributable to landownership form. Corporate landowners were prepared to take greater financial risks with their capital. They tended to invest mainly in farm stock and non-farm based business enterprises (Denman, 1957, 155). Private landowners predominantly invested in farm stock (on the home farm) and stocks and shares. Private landlords were the only group in the survey to invest in sporting enterprises. Charitable landlords were found to prefer investments in stocks and shares, reflecting their need for financial security rather than profit maximisation.

Charitable landlords also expressed a strong attachment to their estates arising from a sense of historical tradition, but their main motive towards owning land was financial (*ibid.*, 173). Charitable estates were found to have the lowest outgoings and to be the most deficient in investment. For instance, on charity estates outgoings formed 38% of the annual revenue, of which only 21% went on improvements (the corresponding figures for non-charity estates were 97% and 27% respectively). Charitable landlords also expressed a preference for financing improvements to farm holdings themselves, and charging the tenant interest. This practice avoided liability to subsequent claims for tenant improvements. This cautious management of estate and investment capital is attributed to a charity's overriding need for long-term financial security. Charitable ownership is 'fiduciary', in that it places a requirement on the owner to use the estate income for a specific purpose (see 3.2.1). The charity's function as a landowner is secondary to its charitable function.

As well as differing individual motives, the three landowning groups were also found to be differentially affected by certain external constraints. For instance, liability to taxation depends on the form of ownership. Charity estates were exempt from both income tax, surtax and estate duty (*ibid.*, 173). Companies were liable to

taxation on revenue but, of course, avoided death duties (*ibid.*, 157). Private landlords, however, were liable to both forms of taxation.

The analytical approach adopted in this study has many similarities with the model of the Proprietorial Land Unit, and shows how, by applying a conceptual model of constraints and opportunities made up of 'estate' factors and 'external' factors to actual case studies, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the decision-making process. The study shows that differences in estate management may be attributed partly to the nature of the estate itself, and partly to the ownership form, although in the end a decision may only be comprehended by looking at the individual landowner. Nevertheless, Denman does point out some general characteristics of different landownership groups concerning attitudes to investment, profit-making, risk, and landlord-tenant relations. There are differences in the motives of these different landowners in owning land, and they are differentially liable to external influences.

3.2.5 Estate Management in the Highlands

Denman's 1957 study of landed estates was not a geographic study in that it did not study any one particular area. Other studies of landownership decision-making have looked at the interaction of landownership and the environment in the determination of land use in specific areas. MacGregor (1988) looks at ownership motivation and land management in the Scottish Highlands. This study is of particular relevance to this thesis for two reasons. First, parallels may be drawn between the Highlands and the rest of upland Britain. Second, MacGregor evaluates land management policies in terms of their implications for rural society. Although the uniformly harsh environment of the Highlands restricts land use opportunities, MacGregor has found that many landowners do not manage their estates to their full potential.

Twenty seven privately-owned estates were surveyed and were classified into four estate types according to the dominant land uses: 'crofting' (where more than half the land is under crofting tenure); 'sheep' (where sheep rearing is the dominant activity); 'sporting' (with a high deer cull intensity); and 'mixed' (with a medium to high intensity of grazing for both sheep and deer). MacGregor found that non-economic motives were stronger than economic ones amongst the landowners

surveyed. 69% of the landowners cited sport for private enjoyment as their main motive, while only 41% claimed they owned land for its agricultural function or as a capital asset. The profit motive was strongest on mixed and sheep estates, whilst amenity and environmental factors scored more highly on sporting estates. The profit motive was more important on estates recently purchased, however, which indicates that rising land values are pressurising new purchasers to generate income.

MacGregor explains this general absence of a profit motive among Highland landowners by the following factors. First, absenteeism would appear to be significant. 52% of the landowners are absentee so that daily management decisions are left to the factor (land agent). Absentee landowners take less interest in their estates, especially owners of sporting estates. Most of the landowners also own land elsewhere, mainly outside the Highlands. These are generally managed separately, and on more commercial lines. The Highland estates are, therefore, 'outlier' estates and not economically important to the owner. This is particularly true for owners of sporting estates, who are found to possess large external sources of capital. The sporting estates are units of consumption rather than production, often subsidised by external capital (consociate wealth). Government policies to encourage agricultural improvement have had little impact on these estates.

Although most of the landowners recognised that their estate offered potential for development, few had plans to realise these opportunities. Tourism, sheep rearing, forestry, angling, fish farming, permanent grass, deer forest and cattle rearing were all mentioned as possible developments. When asked why they had no plans to develop new resources, lack of capital, old age, apathy and lack of interest were all given as explanations.

It seems that in the Highlands most landowners possess enough consociate wealth not to have to manage their estates on commercial lines. MacGregor points out the serious implications of this under-use of land for the population of the Highlands. Land which could be put to more profitable uses is tied up in these estates. MacGregor's study is a clear example of how landownership can affect rural development in negative ways. The Highlands are, perhaps, an extreme case, but the

study indicates that much land in upland Britain may be tied up in large, absentee estates which are managed for recreational rather than commercial purposes.

Absenteeism was also found to be associated with under-use of land in southern Spain. Maas (1979) compared land use intensity in two areas with similar environments in southern Spain (Seville and Cordoba). Cordoba had much higher productivity levels than Seville, although both had similar resources and a similar landownership structure. Maas found that absenteeism appeared to be a significant explanatory factor. A much higher percentage of landowners in Seville were absentee and took less interest in their estates.

A summary of the external factors and landownership motives identified by Denman and MacGregor as acting as inducements and constraints on the efficient use of estates, is given in Table 3.2. Estates managed by landowners who are able and motivated to invest are likely to change, but estates whose owners are either unwilling or unable to invest, are likely to display a high degree of continuity over time. It would appear that private landlords are more likely to be influenced by motives of continuity, and corporate landowners by motives of change. Traditional institutional and charitable landowners fall somewhere in between.

The findings of Denman and MacGregor are corroborated by Massey and Catalanos' (1978) analysis of landownership. They observed that owners of 'former landed property' (traditional institutional and private landlords) are, primarily, motivated by a symbolic attachment to their land:

"Landownership is not a question simply of owning land, but of owning specific tracts of land with which they have a historical connection" (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 79).

They also observe the tendency by private landlords to turn to sporting activities. This, from a marxist perspective, is a significant point. Sport is not a form of production in the capitalist sense, but, rather, involves the consumption of property. It is interpreted as a fusion of the landed and non-landed bourgeoisie classes (*ibid.*, 1978, 78).

Table 3.2 — Landlord Motive & Estate Investment

CONSTRAINTS	INDUCEMENTS
Tenant right	Legislative standards
Taxation	Tax rebates
Lack of capital	Consociate wealth
Old Age/Apathy (Absenteeism)	Entrepreneurship (Residence)
Short-term planning	Long-term planning
Consumption:private enjoyment	Production:profit motive
Social responsibility	-
Moral duty	-
High level of personal identity	Low level of personal identity
Old title: historical tradition	New title

3.2.6 Summary

This discussion of landownership decision-making has been wide-ranging, and has touched on many factors which are of relevance. How an estate is managed depends upon the ownership form; the legal and managerial division of ownership and control within the estate; the estate geometry; the resource base; the liability of the owner to external influences (including the influence of neighbouring estates); the owner's total property portfolio; State policy; and the market. Estate management cannot only be analysed with reference to the present; historical inertia is an important influence on management policy, especially on those estates which have been within the same ownership for a long period. Past management decisions affect present options which, in turn, will affect future management choices. These are general factors, applicable to any estate at any point in time, although their precise nature and influence will of course vary.

These factors form a framework of possibilities and constraints, but the final decision depends on the motive of the landowner. To a certain extent, generalisations

can be made about the behaviour of different forms of landowner, but the final decision depends on many individual factors which cannot be predicted.

There are many points of similarity between the decision-making frameworks of landowners in the 19th and 20th centuries. In both periods, tenant right, taxation, and lack of capital for investment have been factors of constraint, whilst public loans have encouraged investment. In the 20th century, however, tenants have gained a greater legal security; taxation levels have risen; and the costs of maintenance have risen much faster than rent levels. There is a greater degree of public influence as to how land is managed. The general trend in estate management over the 19th and 20th centuries has been towards a more efficient use of resources, but this is not true of all areas of the country. In upland areas, many estates are owned for their recreational function, and this would appear to be an expanding trend in contemporary private landownership.

It can be stated with certainty that the best interests of the local community are not given a high priority in the decision-making framework of most landowners. This is particularly true of the sporting estates in the Highlands, where vast areas of land are withheld from productive use.

To conclude, it can be said that the management of land can materially affect the development of an area, but decisions relating to land management are often influenced by factors which bear little or no relation to the local area. The significance of landownership on land use in any one locality will depend on the structure of landownership (how many estates are there in the area?); and the dependence of the area's inhabitants upon these estates. There may be other economic activities of equal or greater importance to the local community. This leads on to the question of political influence and social structure within the community, which will be addressed in the following section.

3.3 Landownership and Rural Society

The second way in which landowners have the potential to influence rural development in a locality is through the exercise of local political power. The degree to which landowners exert an influence on local politics in any particular society, and the form that this takes, will depend on the structure of the society and the

issue in question. This section will discuss the position of landowners within rural society, and the influence of landowners upon rural society and rural politics, in the 19th and 20th centuries. As far as possible the discussion will focus on the uplands, although much of the material is drawn from studies of lowland Britain.

3.3.1 Landowners and Rural Society in the 19th Century

There is no question that landowners exerted a visible influence on rural society in the 19th century. Just as the landed interest enjoyed a hegemonic control over society at the national scale in the 19th century, so too was their right to govern at county level unquestioned (see 2.2.3). However, below county level, landed control was less hegemonic. Landed estates did not cover the whole of the country, and areas outside the control of an estate developed very differently. Mills (1980) argues that from 1750 to 1850 there was a direct relationship between rural social structure and the pattern of landownership:

“There were two kinds of rural England, one interwoven with the other spatially and sectorally, yet each distinct and recognisable” (Mills, 1980, 134).

This two-fold division he terms the ‘estate system’ and the ‘peasant system’. Areas under the control of one or two landowners belonged to the estate system, whilst areas with no dominant landowners belonged to the latter system. Mills coins the terms ‘open’ and ‘closed’ to differentiate between settlements within the estate (closed) and peasant (open) systems [7]. Open and closed settlements were characterised by marked differences in population size, housing, employment, religion, political and social control (see Table 3.3).

Open villages tended to be associated with large, rapidly growing populations, whilst the populations of closed villages tended to be static and small. This difference is attributed largely to the Poor Rate, and could be enforced by the landlord’s control of the housing stock [8]. The Poor Rate was levied on occupiers of property, and the amount of the rate depended on the number of poor within the parish or township (Mills, 1980, 25). Obviously it was in the interests of landlords to keep down the poor rate on their properties (since then tenants could afford to pay higher rents). Where a landlord had a monopoly control of the housing in a village he could easily control the housing supply and literally exclude the

Table 3.3 — A Summary of Open and Closed Characteristics

SUMMARY OF OPEN AND CLOSED TOWNSHIP CHARACTERISTICS	
OPEN	CLOSED
Large populations	Small populations
High population density	Low population density
Rapid population increases circa 1851	Slow population increases
Many small proprietors	Large estates
Peasant families	Gentlemen's residences
Small farms	Large farms
High poor rates	Low poor rates
Rural industries and craftsmen	Little industry and few craftsmen
Shops and public houses plentiful	Few shops and public houses
Housing poor, but plentiful	Housing good, but in short supply
Non-conformism common	Strong Anglican tradition
Radicalism and independence strong in politics and social organisations	Deference strong in politics and social organisations
Poachers	Gamekeepers

Source: Mills (1980,¹¹⁹₁₄)

poor from the village. In open villages where housing was owned by many small landlords, such exclusion was neither possible nor always desired (many landlords might be small property developers). The poor tended to collect in these villages and, consequently, the poor rates were much higher. The differences in housing quantity between open and closed villages were also reflected in housing quality (Mills, 1980, 124).

The two societies differed in their economic structure. Closed villages were predominantly farming communities. The economy of open villages, however, was more diverse. Open societies were associated with manufacturing and mining as well as agriculture. Dual employment was prevalent in open communities. For

instance, many residents combined farming with a second activity (Mills, 1980, 120). On the arable lowlands, open and closed villages were economically interrelated. The exclusion of the poor from closed villages meant that at harvest time there was a shortage of labour. Open villages acted as pools of casual labour for the estates. This temporary importing of labour was known as the Gang System (Clemenson, 1980, 82) [9].

Not only could the landlord control employment, housing and, therefore, population levels on his estate, he could also influence the social lives of the inhabitants, by controlling the provision of such village institutions as public houses, schools and reading rooms (Mills, 1980, 127). Allegiance to the Church of England was far greater in closed villages. There was a strong alliance between the Church of England and landed society, and many church livings were in the hands of landowners [10]. The inhabitants of open villages often turned to non-conformist religions as a form of social protest against the establishment (Mills, 1980, 125). Although the secret ballot was introduced in the early 19th century, deferential voting was still associated with closely controlled estate villages. Rural protest tended to erupt in open communities, but no direct correlation has been identified. Hobsbawn and Rudé (1969), in their study of rural unrest and the Swing Riots, found that residence by the landlord was far more significant than size of estate in the enforcement of social control [11].

Landownership was not the only factor which determined the nature of rural society; the geographical environment and historical legacy were also important factors. The characteristics of open and closed villages differed geographically. Mills qualifies his model by a further division of England into 'champion' and 'hamlet' areas (Mills, 1980, 17). Champion England included areas of early settlement, mainly in lowland England, which were associated with nucleated, tightly knit communities. These areas had a historical legacy of a strong common field tradition and tight manorial control. Hamlet England included areas of later settlement, mainly in upland areas, but also on other marginal lands. In these areas, settlement was dispersed and tight social control more difficult to enforce. The characteristics of open and closed villages thus varied geographically. It is apparent from Table 3.4 that hamlet England tended towards a more open society. Even closed settlements within hamlet England displayed open characteristics.



Table 3.4 — A Typology of Rural Society in 19th Century Britain

A TYPOLOGY OF RURAL SOCIETY IN 19th CENTURY BRITAIN	
<p>OPEN HAMLET SYSTEM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Preponderance of open communities<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Large parishes and townships derived from wood pastures and moorland settlement- Common field and manorial systems weak<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Late survival of common lands- Economy based on pastoral farming and rural industries	<p>CLOSED HAMLET SYSTEM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Scarcity of closed communities- Extra parochial areas common, also lost villages deparochialised<ul style="list-style-type: none">-- Absence of a common field tradition- No common lands except in the special sense of grazing in royal forests, etc- Economy based on pastoral farming or late establishment of arable
<p>OPEN CHAMPION SYSTEM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Mixture of open and closed hamlets<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Importance of settlement laws- Large townships with nucleated villages and dispersed populations- Parliamentary enclosure usual- Late survival of common lands- Economy based on arable farming with labour-intensive specialities	<p>CLOSED CHAMPION SYSTEM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Mixture of open and closed hamlets<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Importance of settlement laws- Small compact townships with strong manorial tradition<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Early enclosure usual, lost villages- Loss of commons at an early period- Economy based on general arable farming

Source: Mills (1980, 117)

Mills (1980) and other writers (for instance Caird, 1967; Orwin & Whetham, 1971) have observed a fundamental difference in class structure between upland and lowland Britain. In lowland Britain, the estate system was associated with a three-tiered social structure. Landowners formed the upper class, but beneath them was a substantial middle class of tenant farmers. Some tenant holdings, particularly on the arable lowlands, were of a considerable size. These tenant farmers might hire their own labourers and not engage in manual work themselves

(Hobsbawn & Rudé, 1969, 33; Mills, 1980, 28). The uplands, on the other hand, were characterised by a dual social structure of a landowning upper class and a farming working class (Howell, 1979; Mills, 1980, 171). There was thus a wider social gulf between landlord and tenant in the uplands, but less or no social divide between the farmers and agricultural labourers.

Howell's (1979) study of landownership in rural Wales indicates that rural communities, both within and outside estates, were predominantly open. Farm sizes were much smaller than in champion England. Farms both within and outside estate areas were under-capitalised, and provided little more than a subsistence living. Howell attributes the poor condition of the farms on Welsh estates to four factors. First, tenant farmers often lacked capital to stock their holdings. Second, farm tenants lacked any incentive to improve their holdings; they would not receive compensation at the end of the tenancy and would probably face higher rents. Third, the farmers were motivated by a 'peasant mentality', their aim was to farm as cheaply as possible with low expenditure and low rents (Howell, 1979, 150). Landlords also lacked any incentive to invest in the estate, since there was always a demand for smallholdings. A land hunger was generated by rapid population growth coupled with a low turnover of farm holdings. Once in possession of a holding, families rarely left them. In Howell's opinion, therefore, accusations that Welsh landowners were absentee and neglected their estates were exaggerated (*ibid.*, 45) [12].

In contrast to lowland England, Welsh rural communities were characterised by a dual employment structure. Many farmers supplemented their farm income with a second employment, often in the quarries (*ibid.*, 69). Most farms relied on family labour, although Howell notes the somewhat surprising number of live-in servants in these small households (*ibid.*, 94) [13]. There was little social demarcation between the farm family and the farm servants. It was an arrangement with many advantages for the small farmer. Livestock farms required labour to be constantly on hand, and live-in servants could be paid partly in kind.

Non-conformism was widespread in both estate and non-estate areas. Howell (1979, 11) attributes this to the social and cultural divisions between landowners and the established Church on the one hand, and the rural population on the other. The

social divide was accentuated in rural Wales by a language barrier (*ibid.*, 42). Non-conformist preachers usually came from the local area, and filled the vacuum of leadership in the community due to the absence of a middle class. Non-conformist preachers were active in inciting tenant unrest against the landlords.

Many of Howell's and Mills' observations are corroborated by other studies. Appleton & Symes (1986), in a study of an upland farming area in Yorkshire, found that the family farm was the dominant farm business form, but, like upland Welsh communities, many farms had resident servants. They also observed a remarkable continuity in the 'core' farm families, in contrast to the periodic incursions of non-farming households into the area which were associated with mineral extraction.

Similar observations can be made about 19th century rural society in the Highlands of Scotland. It was also characterised by a wide social gulf between landlord and tenant, and an absence of a middle class. The crofts that were laid out after the Highland clearances were smallholdings and most crofters supplemented their income with a second employment, either kelping (Carter, 1980), or fishing (Darling, 1955, 109). Many of the Highland landlords were absentee, and were perceived to be remote and exploitative figures (Hunter, 1976, 120). Living conditions in the crofting communities were poor and, not surprisingly, the rise of evangelism in the 19th century was a symbol of protest against the establishment (Hunter, 1976, 96). Rural unrest over the poor conditions on the Highland estates was widespread (Douglas, 1976) [14].

From these studies, it would seem that the relationship between landownership and rural society was less direct in the uplands than the lowlands, and was expressed in different ways. The upland economy and society in the 19th century displayed marked differences to lowland areas. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the uplands were important areas of mineral production (Collins, 1978, 18). For instance, in 1850 over half the world's production of copper, zinc, lead and iron came from Britain. In addition, many manufacturing industries, such as textiles, initially located in the uplands to use water power (Hoskins, 1985, 217). The industrial character of much of upland Britain could account for the dual employment structure, land hunger and rapid population growth.


Mills admits that the open and closed model is highly generalised in comparison to the diversity of social conditions that existed in reality. The estate and peasant systems represented two opposite ends of a spectrum. Pure open and closed societies were, in fact, rare (Mills, 1980, 94). Most parishes displayed a mixture of open and closed characteristics. For instance, an open village was often surrounded by landed estates, and was therefore not entirely free from their influence (Hobsbawn & Rudé, 1969, 183). Although a village might be free from the control of a landlord, politics at county level was controlled by the landed interest (see 2.2.3).

As Hobsbawn and Rudé (1969) point out, residence by the landlord was a major prerequisite for the enforcement of social control. The harsher physical environment, the more industrial character, and the different historical legacy of the uplands, made it harder for landlords to enforce the tight social control which was possible in the lowlands. The upland-lowland divide seems to have been as important as the estate-peasant divide in the rural society of 19th century Britain.

3.2 Changes in Rural Society in the 20th Century

Profound social and economic changes have taken place in rural society since the mid-19th century as a result of the social and economic restructuring of Britain (see 1.1). The changes which have taken place in rural society have not all been beneficial; many new socio-economic problems have emerged, and these have been exaggerated in the uplands. Although the total population of upland Britain has increased since the 19th century (see Figure 3.2), large areas of the uplands have experienced depopulation (Dunn, 1976, 21; Collins, 1978, 14). The population density of many upland areas in the 19th century was much higher than it is today. The causes of depopulation were largely economic. As Britain expanded her trade with overseas colonies, upland mineral producers could no longer compete with cheaper foreign imports. Mining declined, and manufacturing moved to other locations as water power was replaced by coal. In addition, the remote and inaccessible nature of most upland areas discouraged industrial activity because of high transport costs. The uplands failed to respond to the decline in their traditional economies, with the result that no new significant forms of employment were created to replace traditional activities (Collins, 1978, 23).

Figure 3.2 — The Population of Upland Britain & GB, 1801 to 1961



Source: from Collins (1978, 73)

Employment decline and depopulation have had knock-on effects in the uplands. Settlements have not been able to support essential services such as schools and shops (Clope, 1983, 26). Upland agriculture suffers from a legacy of small, under-capitalised farm holdings. The poor farm structure, coupled with the harsh physical environment, has meant that upland farming remains an economically marginal activity.

A counter-trend to the depopulation of rural Britain has been selective repopulation. The countryside around urban centres has become a commuting hinterland. Villages in the rural-urban fringe have experienced an influx of mainly middle class ‘immigrants’, who have upset the former social structures of these villages and have created a new local élite group. This ‘urbanisation’ of the countryside has created new social divisions within rural communities [15].

In upland Britain, particularly in the more scenic areas, the growth of tourism has led to social change in some communities. A controversial trend has been the growth of second home ownership, which has been a source of conflict between holiday-makers and local residents (Phillips & Williams, 1984, 110).

Opinion is divided as to the role of landowners in contemporary rural society. Newby and his associates (1978), based on their findings in East Anglia, assert that landowners and farmers are still an identifiable and politically dominant class, and effectively control the local political process. Their assertion has been challenged by Barlow (1986) and Hoggart and Buller (1987, 239), however, who suggest that **property** ownership rather than **land** ownership structures rural class relations. Farming is no longer the main economic activity in most rural areas, and ownership of non-agricultural property may be more significant. This is particularly the case on the rural-urban fringe. They argue that East Anglia is atypical of contemporary rural Britain, being still an important agricultural area. Barlow (1986) argues that, even in the 19th century, rural settlements were sometimes controlled by industrial capital or an alliance of landowning and industrial interests [16].

It would appear that, as at national level (see 2.6), a landowning interest has been replaced by a farming interest in local politics. Landownership today is, therefore, only potentially an important factor in rural society. Its influence depends on the structure of the local economy, and the presence or absence of other property-owning groups within the rural population. The influence of landownership would appear to be greatest in agricultural, peripheral regions of the country..

Another way in which to assess the importance of landownership within contemporary rural society is to examine the actual process by which decisions concerning land use and local planning are made; to look not only at who occupies key positions on local councils, but also at how decisions are made and whose interests they serve [17]. The analysis of situations of conflict and consensus in the rural politics of East Anglia by Newby and his colleagues (1978), provides a significant insight into the balance of power in local politics, and the mechanisms by which that power is enforced.

Newby and his colleagues (1978, 232) found that local councillors, farmers and other property owners in East Anglia had a common interest in preventing housing

development. Their reasons were, undoubtedly, ones of self-interest: to keep down the rates, prevent rises in local wage levels, and to preserve an attractive living environment for themselves. The justification used for this policy was, however, that the preservation of the countryside was in the national interest. The local élite, therefore, used an ideological argument to justify personal self-interest (*ibid.*, 240). This 'anti-growth' policy acts to the disadvantage of the rural workforce, by raising the cost of local housing and limiting employment opportunities.

Three strategies are identified by which the local élite avoid opposition to their interests. First, most local councillors adhere to the ethos that politics should be kept out of local government. According to this view, the independence of local government can only be maintained by preserving harmony, agreement and reasonableness. Hence, the local council tends not to be politicised. Secondly, the workforce fail to assert their interests because of the anticipation of failure (Newby et al., 1978, 262). The political apathy of the rural population is indicated by low turn-outs in local elections. Thirdly, decisions by local government tend to be made informally by personal contact and patronage rather than formally through the democratic process (*ibid.*, 267).

This analysis suggests that rural societies are characterised by conflicts of interest, but that these conflicts are rarely expressed. Newby and his colleagues (1978) identify three situations in which conflict can develop. The first situation is where a split develops within the ruling élite. For instance, the farming and property-owning groups may conflict over environmentally damaging farming practices. This type of conflict, however, never undermines the essential alliance of interests of these two groups. The second situation can be described as 'tactical' conflict, where the local élite allows conflict to develop over some minor issue to hide more fundamental sources of conflict:

"the more fundamental the issue, the less likely it is to manifest itself into a political conflict" (Newby et al, 1978, 274).

This tactic is reminiscent of the strategy employed by the CLA and NFU to make small concessions in order to maintain overall control (see 2.6). The third situation in which conflict can develop is where an outside agency interferes in local affairs. In this case, all sections of the rural society may unite in their opposition

to the 'external threat'. The rural society is bound together by an 'ideology of community'. This is propagated by the local élite to emphasise:

"common interests based upon a common area of residence" (ibid., 269).

The ideology of community fosters a local distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' and is called into play when outside interests threaten the interests of the local élite. This is the only situation where the working class are involved in the decision-making process, although this involvement may be somewhat illusory.

The inability of the rural workforce to become involved in the local planning process has been noted by others (for instance White, 1980; Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 186). It appears that resistance to change and adherence to a traditional way of life are important contributory factors, and may explain why an ideology of community is so easily created.

This analysis of rural élites and power in East Anglia implies that rural societies have a considerable degree of local autonomy over their own development, and that it is in the interests of élite groups to prevent development. This is not always the case. Markusen (1980) point outs that, in more industrial rural areas, the élite may wish to encourage development in order to further their interests. Barlow (1986) adds that the means of production in rural areas may not be locally owned, in which case decisions will be taken outside the local political arena.


Hoggart & Buller (1987, 192) distinguish between three types of locally initiated development. First, where the initiative comes from the local community, but outsiders are used as a resource. Second, when the initiative comes from the local élite. Third, when the whole community are involved in the decision-making process. With the growth of public intervention in rural areas, however, many decisions relating to rural land use and planning are now taken at a national level.

3 Summary

In the 19th century, variations in rural society in Britain could be attributed to the structure of landownership, the geographical environment and differing historical legacies. Landownership certainly was a powerful influence on rural society in lowland Britain, but could not exert such a direct influence on upland Britain.

In the 20th century, landowners no longer exert the direct power which they enjoyed in the 19th century, but are able to influence the local political process by formal and informal means. Today, landowners are not the only powerful group in the countryside. The hegemonic power of the landed interest in the 19th century has been replaced by a more fluid alliance of property owners. Alliances between these élite groups vary according to the issue in question. Possible alliance groupings are illustrated in Figure 3.3. In most cases, the working classes are excluded from the decision-making process, except when all groups come together to fight an external threat.

Figure 3.3 — Alliances of Interest in Local Politics



There are visible socio-economic differences in the rural societies of upland and lowland Britain, partly attributable to historical divisions, but also the result of new processes. Instead of the open and closed model of 19th century Britain, a distinction can be made between rural societies in which local issues are decided by a local élite, by an external élite, and by outside agencies. In all cases, however, it is important to look at the class structure of the rural society in question in order to understand the development of that society.

In upland Britain, which faces the most serious socio-economic problems, many decisions relating to land use and development are now taken at national level. The final section of the chapter will look at public intervention in upland Britain, and its role in rural society and rural development.

3.4 Public Intervention and the Development of Upland Britain

The intervention of public agencies in the rural development of upland Britain has grown in the post-war period as the socio-economic position of the uplands relative to the rest of the country has worsened. Public attitudes to, and conceptions of, the upland 'problem' and its solution have changed over this time, and a whole variety of different policies have been launched with varying degrees of success. Although responsibility for rural development has been moved from the local to the national level, this does not necessarily mean, however, that decisions are made in favour of the rural workforce, or that it is unnecessary to take the structure of the local society into account in the analysis of local development. Often, public policies reflect the interests of local élite groups, since their representatives at national level influence the formulation of policy (see 2.6). Neither are upland areas free from conflicts over land use and rural development. This final section of the chapter critically analyses public intervention measures for the uplands, to assess the impact which these measures have had, which sections of the population have benefitted, and what effect the local society can have on the formulation and implementation of policy.

As was stated in the introduction, public intervention measures cover a whole spectrum of policies. Public intervention varies greatly in nature, aims and effects. A broad classification of public intervention measures is given in Table 3.5. First, policies can be classified according to policy-orientation. Policies either promote

growth or prevent it. Policies may be sectoral, in that they are concerned with only one aspect of rural development, or integrated, dealing holistically with a whole range of issues. Second, the scale at which policies are formulated and implemented is also important. Policies may be formulated at the national, regional or local level. A policy formulated and implemented at national level is likely to have a different impact to one formulated and implemented at the local level. Third, policies may be uniform, in that they do not differentiate between regions and/or members of the eligible population, or they may be targetted to specific regions and/or specific sections of the eligible population. Fourth, policies may be permissive, in that they enable development (usually with financial aid), or restrictive, in that they prevent actions. Fifth, a policy may be voluntary, giving the eligible population the choice as to whether or not to participate, or compulsorily enforced. Policies of all these types have been directed at one time or another to the uplands.


Table 3.5 — Classification of Public Policy

POLICY-ORIENTATION	Pro-Growth	Anti-Growth
SCALE	Sectoral	Integrated
AIMS	Local/Regional	National
APPROACH	Targetted	Uniform
POWERS	Permissive	Restrictive
	Voluntary	Compulsory

Although the plight of upland farmers and upland communities was recognised in the 1930s (Stapledon, 1937), the upland problem did not gain official recognition until after World War Two (Collins, 1978, 16). Before the war, public intervention in the uplands was confined to national resource development needs. The Forestry Commission acquired a large estate in upland Britain, particularly in the Highlands (see Figure 3.4) [18].

Figure 3.4

FORESTRY COMMISSION CONSERVANCIES AND MAIN
HOLDINGS IN BRITAIN. 1986



Source: Forestry Commission (1986)

Early planning measures to facilitate rural development in upland Britain were taken within the national planning framework. This framework was established by three acts passed in the late 1940s: the Town and Country Planning Act (1947); the Agriculture Act (1947); and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act (1949). From the beginning, a sectoral approach to rural planning was adopted. Public intervention was divided into three separate areas of development: rural settlements, agriculture and the environment.


3.4.1 Agricultural Policy and the Uplands

Of the three strands of rural policy, agricultural policy has probably had the greatest impact on upland Britain, for the main reason that agricultural policy-makers have commanded the greatest financial resources and exercised the greatest political power (see 2.6). In line with the aims of the 1947 Agriculture Act, the solution offered by policy-makers to the problems of upland farmers has been to modernise and capitalise the farm structure. A programme of subsidies and grants for the improvement and modernisation of farm holdings was launched by the 1947 Act, and has continued ever since. In 1984/5, £137 million of public money was spent on upland agriculture (Whitby, 1986, 44).

Before Britain's entry into the European Community, the main policy directed at upland farmers was the system of headage payments [19]. In addition, upland farmers were able to claim grants for improvements to farmland and buildings under the AHDS scheme [20]. Since entry to the EEC, the main plank of upland policy has been the designation of Less Favoured Areas (LFAs) [21], within which farmers are eligible for higher rates of subsidy. The first LFAs were designated in 1975, but in 1982 and 1986 they were further extended, and now cover 53% of the agricultural area of Britain (see Figure 3.5).

What have been the effects of agricultural policy on upland farmers? Agricultural policy has been criticised on social, economic and environmental grounds (Bowers & Cheshire, 1983, 133). Although the LFA scheme has social objectives, in practice it has acted, in Britain at least, to increase inequality amongst the farming community. The lion's share of the payments have gone to larger farmers on the edges of the LFAs. 4% of eligible farms have received 22% of the payments in the

Figure 3.5



Source: from Robinson (1988, 220)

UK (Robinson, 1988, 221). So-called farm 'improvement' schemes have had disastrous consequences for the landscape of upland Britain (Boddy, 1982, 78). Old stone barns have been replaced by new farm buildings, and stone walls have fallen down through neglect and field amalgamations. The headage payments have encouraged farmers to increase their stock levels. The area of pasture has expanded, but over-grazing has also resulted (Countryside Commission, 1983b). The effect of modernisation policies has been to put farmers on a 'technological treadmill' (Dexter, 1977).

Agricultural policies for the uplands have led to a paradoxical situation, whereby supposed 'development' has actually led to degeneration and decline (Lowe *et al.*, 1986, 333). Although the farming interest enjoys so much power at national level (see 2.6), the national farming interest has not served the best interests of upland farmers. The effects of agricultural policy on upland farmers have been to increase their dependence on State support and other external sources of capital (Marsden *et al.*, 1986a).

3.4.2 Rural Settlement Planning and the Uplands

Whilst agricultural policy has been criticised for its effectiveness, rural planning has been criticised for its ineffectiveness. The Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 set up a hierarchical planning structure for rural settlements, with the Secretary of State for the Environment, the county councils and the district councils all having a say in the final plan (Cloke 1983, 79) [22]. Although it differentiated between rural and urban planning needs, the act assumed an urban model of development (*ibid.*, 85). This has led to a predominantly centralist approach to rural planning, whereby investment has been concentrated in central locations (key settlements), from which benefits have been expected to somehow spread out to the surrounding communities [23]. This policy approach has, naturally, discriminated against the sparsely populated uplands, and has not prevented the further closure of rural services.

As well as the closure of services, another problem of rural areas is that of housing (Rogers, 1983, 122). The 'country cottage' fashion has been criticised for causing a reduction in the housing stock available for local residents (Capstick, 1979). The demand for second homes has raised local house prices and forced local residents

out of the housing market (Cloke & Park, 1985, 244). Local authorities, dominated as has been seen in the last section by élite interests, are unable or unwilling to respond to the rural housing problem (Shucksmith, 1980).

The centralist approach to rural settlement planning has been widely criticised (Cloke, 1983, 86; Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 212). First of all, benefits do not necessarily spread outwards to surrounding villages. Secondly, planners have lacked the powers to implement their policies. Development in the countryside is still largely dictated by private investment. Planners can only react to the demands of the private sector (Cloke & Park, 1985, 415). Planning policies have been largely restrictive and 'anti growth' in orientation, in sharp contrast to agricultural policies.


3 Conservation Policy and the Uplands

The National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of 1949 was a recognition of the growth in public demand for recreation in the countryside, and the need for statutory protection of the environment against increasing pressures for development. The act introduced the concept of preserving spatially designated rural areas (MacEwan & MacEwan, 1981, 13). The task of designating and managing these areas was given to the newly established National Parks Commission (reformed in 1968 as the Countryside Commission).

The 1949 National Parks Act established a two-tiered system of environmental protection. The highest protection was given to National Parks. Ten National Parks were designated between 1950 and 1955, nearly all in upland areas (Shoad, 1987, 464). A lesser degree of protection was afforded to Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs). Thirty six AONBs had been designated by 1985 (see Figure 3.6). These are areas of great landscape value, but which are not thought suitable for national park status (Countryside Commission, 1983a). In addition, the 1949 Act gave the newly established Nature Conservancy the power to designate National Nature Reserves and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) [24]. By 1986, 4,842 SSSIs had been designated, covering 132,555 hectares, 6% of the land area of England and Wales (Shoad, 1987, 439).

Responsibility for planning and agriculture within National Parks initially remained with the local authorities and MAFF, but in 1973 the management of

Figure 3.6



Source: Countryside Commission (1985)

National Parks was improved by the setting up of an authority for each park, consisting of members of the local authorities concerned, but with separate funding (Blacksell & Gilg, 1981, 208). Each authority was required to submit a running five year management plan to the Countryside Commission. This was the first time that land use within National Parks could be planned in an integrated fashion. Since 1950, special controls over agricultural land (LASDOs) operate in National Parks [25]. Public controls over land use within AONBs are extremely limited. Responsibility for settlement planning within AONBs remains with the local authorities, and agricultural land use is unaffected by the designation.

The effects of National Parks on upland Britain have been greater than the AONBs. Within the parks, recreation and tourism have greatly increased, bringing with them new land use problems and pressures (MacEwen & MacEwen, 1981; Cloke & Park, 1985, 187).

The two main agencies controlling the conservation of the countryside are the Countryside Commission and the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC). The Countryside Commission has three main responsibilities: to conserve landscape beauty, to develop and improve facilities for recreation and access to the countryside, and to advise government on matters concerning the countryside. The main functions of the Nature Conservancy Council are to establish and maintain SSSIs, to advise government on nature conservation policy and to advise and inform all other interested parties (Rogers et. al., 1985, 33). Both bodies are smaller and less powerful than MAFF (MacEwen & MacEwen, 1981, 17; Rose, 1986, 67).

Conservation policy in Britain has been criticised from a number of different angles. First, conservation has taken a backseat in national land use priorities to agriculture and economic development. This can be seen in the relative powers and financial resources of MAFF, the local authorities and the Countryside Commission. The Countryside Commission, even within National Parks, has little control over the activities of landowners and farmers (MacEwen & MacEwen, 1981). A second criticism is that all conservation policies which involve some form of constraint on a landowner's management options, have pandered to the landowning

interest by offering compensation. For example, landowners and farmers are entitled to compensation for management or access agreements made over their lands [26]. The hypocrisy of compensation is pointed out by Cloke and Park (1985, 400). It is paying landowners for not doing something which they probably would not have done anyway without government subsidy. This can involve a considerable waste of public money. The most extreme example of this hypocrisy was the provision of the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act that the NCC negotiate management agreements with all landowners within SSSIs (Rose, 1986, 57). Under this provision, landowners were entitled to claim for foregone land uses. The original cost of the consultation procedure was estimated at £1.2 million, but by 1983 the NCC had already spent £18 million in compensation.

A third criticism is that conservation by zoning does not adequately protect the countryside (Shoad, 1987, 464). It merely diverts public attention away from the rest of the countryside whose preservation is equally important.

4 Critique of the Sectoral Approach

Public intervention in the development of rural Britain has displayed schizophrenic tendencies under this sectoral approach. On the one hand, agricultural and forestry policies have sought to modernise upland agriculture and expand the area of commercial forestry; on the other hand, conservation policy has tried to preserve the countryside in the interests of the environment, and to promote recreation and tourism. In the middle, local authorities have had little impact on upland rural communities, and have not been able to stem socio-economic decline in these areas. Part of the problem has been that the administrative areas over which planning agencies have control often bear little or no relation to geographical factors (Harrison, 1981, 224).

The sectoral approach has been criticised for the lack of co-ordination and even outright contradictions in the policies of the main agencies. Policies have tended to increase rather than resolve conflict, by moving land use issues from the local to the national agenda (Cloke & Park, 1985, 421). Upland Britain, characterised by multiple land uses, has been the scene of many conflicts between competing land use interests.


Conflict in upland Britain has generally arisen between the growth and anti-growth lobbies, between the agricultural and environmental interests, but also between environmental and mining and forestry interests. Three situations can be identified where conflict can develop. First, conflict may arise over a local issue between national agencies, reflecting the national power struggle between agricultural and environmental interests discussed in the previous chapter (see 2.6). Conflict may also develop when the national representatives of a local élite group fail to protect their local members' interests. Finally, conflict can develop when a rural community protests against a national policy, causing an insider-outsider split.

In recognition of the failure of the existing planning framework to tackle the problems of rural communities in the uplands and to solve land use conflicts, there have been calls for a more integrated approach to rural development. The idea of integrated rural development (IRD) has been coined from third world development theory (Lea & Chaudri, 1983), but has been applied in Britain in modified form. The key features of IRD is that it is a multi-faceted project bringing together many different interests, power is decentralised and involves local participation. Integrated policies have placed as much emphasis on social as on economic objectives.

The most famous IRD project in Britain is the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB). Set up in 1965, the HIDB was given greater powers than any other public agency to promote socio-economic development in the Highlands of Scotland. It was given powers of land control, and the financial backing to fund development projects (Carter, 1975). At the time, the HIDB was seen as offering real potential to solve the problems of the Highlands, and its work has been praised (Clout, 1972; Blacksell & Gilg, 1981), but it has also been criticised for failing to live up to its promise (MacGregor, 1985). Apart from the help which the HIDB has given to the fishing industry, the HIDB has failed to provide any sustainable or locally-controlled development. Most significantly, it has not used its powers of land control to seek improvements in the way privately owned land is managed.

Another policy which could be classed in this category is the Rural Development Programme (RDP), administered by the Development Commission [27]. Although the Development Commission was established in 1909, its remit has altered in the

Figure 3.7



Source: Development Commission (1984)

last thirty years to include more explicitly social goals (Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 175). In 1984, rural areas with particularly severe socio-economic problems were designated as Rural Development Areas (RDAs), (see Figure 3.7). These areas are eligible for higher rates of grant aid, and the RDP represents an attempt to find an integrated solution to problems of employment and service provision (Development Commission, 1984).

With signs of change in the balance of power at national level (see 2.6), the agricultural policy community may be forced to make concessions to environmental interests. In 1986, the EEC approved an Environmentally Sensitive Area Scheme (ESA) at the instigation of Britain (see Figure 3.8). The ESA scheme combines agricultural and conservation objectives. It pays farmers to farm traditionally, and as such is a revolutionary departure for MAFF. To date, ten ESAs have been designated covering almost 300,000 hectares, and the scheme has received widespread approval (see 7.7.3).

4.5 A Critique of Public Intervention in Upland Britain


Despite recent moves towards more integrated, socially-aware planning schemes, their ability to achieve real progress in rural development has been questioned. Hoggart and Buller (1987, 176) claim that these schemes are merely:

“conscience-absolving palliatives for the problems of peripheral rural localities, rather than serious attempts to alter their socio-economic standing”.

MacGregor (1985) identifies private landownership as being the root of the rural development problem, and argues that no public agency has yet produced any policy which fundamentally challenges the hegemony of private interests in the countryside, especially those of landowners. This goes back to the question of estate management and land use (see 3.2.5). To date, landowners have largely succeeded in protecting their interests against those of the public. This situation reflects, firstly, the influence of landowning lobby groups in the policy-making process, and secondly, the alliance between landowners and planners at the implementation level.

Carter (1980) goes further, and argues that the fundamental ideology underlying public policy towards the Highlands in particular, but which can be extended

Figure 3.8



Source: MAFF (1986)

to upland Britain in general, is imperialist. Successive governments have misinterpreted the nature of upland problems, and therefore have offered the wrong solutions. Far from upland areas being backwaters which have missed out on the economic development of lowland Britain, the uplands are products of that very development. The relation of upland to lowland Britain has always been one of dependency:

“The economic history of the upland zone therefore is reflective of changes in the structure of the national economy and in the pattern of international trade” (Collins, 1978, 16).

The uplands have never been able to control their own development. Moreover, development policies have failed because they only recognise one model of economic development based on the western experience. Carter (1980) argues that there are alternative economic models. For instance, the structure of the kelping industry in the Highlands of 19th century, although archaic in appearance, was a commercial response to a given situation [28]. In Carter’s view, the application of a western-style development model to upland areas will only act to:

“increase underdevelopment rather than promote development, since present underdevelopment is itself the result of just those market forces that dual economy theorists see to be an economic panacea” (Carter, 1980, 369).

The only real solution to the problems of the uplands, according to this view, is to break away from the influence of the central state and internalise development along appropriate lines. This involves some form of land reform, or even land nationalisation (Sillars, 1975).

3.4.6 Summary

This consideration of public intervention has shown the complexity of the processes by which rural development takes place. Decisions relating to land use and development in the uplands have been decided in the national interest, or in the interests of local élites (campaigning at national level through their representative organisations). Public intervention has done little to alter class divisions within rural societies at the local level, neither has it avoided conflicts over land use. In-

creasingly, as the environmental lobby grows in strength, the uplands are becoming a battle ground on which national power struggles are fought.

Public intervention in the development process has failed to achieve any long-lasting improvements in the rural economy and society of upland Britain. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the existing structure of public intervention is inappropriate and even harmful to the interests of rural communities. Solutions to the failure of past planning policies range from more integrated development measures, to a radical challenge to private property rights. In the uplands, private property is still seen to be a fundamental barrier to development.

3.4.7 Landownership and the Rural Development Process

The relationships between landownership and rural society, and the processes which have caused continuity and change over the 19th and 20th centuries in Britain, have now been discussed at the macro and micro levels. Is it possible, from this wide-ranging discussion, to develop one conceptual model which contains all these components, and which can be applied to actual case studies? Rather than one conceptual model, a series of linked conceptual models would appear to provide a better working framework. It has been established, that the development process in any one locality is contingent upon the relative importance of landed control and land management in the local economy and society, as opposed to non-landed activities and social groups, and upon the division of power over local affairs between local and national levels. Landownership, rural society and the State are linked in many complex ways.

The first conceptual model is that of the landownership decision-making process (see 3.2). The decision-making framework can be conceptualised as consisting of factors of constraint and factors of opportunity. The final decision, however, reflects the individual motive of the decision-maker. The factors which make up the framework come from both within the estate and from the outside. There are many points of comparison between the decision-making frameworks of landowners in the 19th and 20th centuries, although many of the internal and external factors have altered in nature. The discussion has also illuminated the processes of continuity and change in landownership structures. It has shown that internal adaptation in estate structure can take place without any change to the external form. External

factors will differentially affect different landownership groups, and, to some extent, generalisations can be made about the motives of different landowners. Finally, the historical inertia of land rights and other legal burdens is a fundamental constraint upon change in estate form.

The second conceptual model is that of landownership and rural society (see 3.3). Again, the nature of rural society and the local political process have, apparently, altered out of all recognition; but the analysis has shown that the essential distribution of power in rural society has remained constant. In the 19th century, geographical variation in rural society could be explained by landownership, the physical environment, and the historical legacy. Landowners enjoyed a hegemonic control of politics at county level, but their power at local level was uneven. The unquestioned authority of the landed interest in the 19th century has been replaced by more fluid alliances of power in the 20th century. The role of landownership in rural society and local politics today depends on the importance of agriculture in the local economy, and the presence or absence of non-landed élite groups. Landowners will assert their interests more forcefully over issues which directly concern them. There are still geographical variations in rural society, which reflect both past divisions and new socio-economic forces. The decline of traditional rural industries, the depopulation of the countryside, and now the reverse movement of urbanites into the countryside, are all important processes.

The third conceptual model is that of public intervention and the development process. This represents a loss of local autonomy over development. Today, the development of upland Britain cannot be understood without the consideration of public intervention. Alliances of interest can be identified between local élite groups, and their representatives at national level. The influence of landownership is seen most clearly in issues of direct concern: agriculture, the environment, and public access; but, despite the plethora of policy types which have been formulated for the uplands, no policy has yet been implemented which threatens the interests of the landowning and property owning élites. Public intervention to date has been unco-ordinated, sometimes contradictory, and even downright harmful in its results. There is no consensus as to the causes of rural problems or their solution. Attitudes to rural development can be classified into three broad groups: those against any form of change to the traditional upland economy (traditionalists),

those who wish to prevent environmentally damaging development and promote the public enjoyment of the countryside (conservationists), and finally those who believe that sensitive development can be combined with conservation and tourism (pragmatists).

What processes can be identified which link these three models, and which can link development processes at the micro scale to the national level? Four main links can be identified. First, the local structure of landownership can affect the local power structure. Localities dominated by large estates, particularly where the landowners are resident, are likely to have a local élite dominated by a landed or farming interest. Second, how landowners manage their land can materially affect the lives of the population dependent for their livelihood on the land. Third, the interests of the local élite are supported by their representatives at national level. Fourth, government policy and market forces affect both the decision-making framework of landowners and the socio-economic development of rural localities.

Although landownership is not the only factor of importance in the rural development process, on certain issues, and in certain areas, landownership can have a fundamental impact. In the uplands of Britain, rural society has been less influenced by the influx of new social élite groups, and agricultural land uses still dominate the rural economy. Although the intervention of the State is greatest in upland Britain, public policy has failed to present any direct challenge to private property rights. It can be concluded, therefore, that landownership would appear to be a factor of fundamental importance in the understanding of rural development in upland Britain.

Notes

1. Robinson (1988, 250), for instance, distinguishes between two levels of decision-making: long-term structural decisions, and short-term management decisions.
2. 'Proprietor' replaces 'owner' and 'land unit' replaces 'estate'.
3. A landowner can possess all these three characteristics. For example, a Bishop is an individual and has a personal interest in the estate, and yet the Church is immortal and therefore is a fictitious owner. Finally, the Bishop is required to manage the estate to meet certain purposes so the ownership is also fiduciary. Ministers of State as owners of Crown lands also combine all three functions (Denman & Prodano, 1972, 33).

4. Conversely, it can also be said that the lessee faces constraints from the superior interest.
5. Caird (1967, 132) observed that landlords actually benefitted from tithe commutation. After the Commutation Act, tithe payments were linked to the septennial average of wheat prices, but the amount was based on the 1836 value and production level of each holding. Between 1836 and 1878, it was estimated that land rentals had increased by 50%. This represented a loss to the Church of about £2 million. Brodrick (1881, 245) adds that many of the local rates were paid by the occupiers rather than the owners of property, he did not believe that these could constitute a serious obstacle to investment.
6. In his 1957 survey, Denman defined an old title as one which dated from before 1900.
7. 'Open' and 'closed' were originally terms used by the Poor Law Commissioners to classify settlements outside and within estates (Mills, 1980, 23; Clemenson, 1982, 81).
8. The Poor Rate was a tax developed in the Tudor period for maintaining the poor (Hobsbawn & Rudé, 1969, 49). The rate was locally administered, but was reformed in 1834 when a central authority was set up to regulate the local administration. The Poor Laws had been abused in the late 18th century. Many farmers employed labour on wages so low that the workers also qualified for poor relief. Thus farmers used the Poor Rate to subsidise their labour costs. This practice caused great poverty amongst the agricultural labour force and reduced productivity. After 1834, the practice was prohibited and receivers of poor relief were required to enter the workhouse (Ernle, 1961, 330).
9. The Gang System became a matter of public moral concern, and ultimately led to a parliamentary commission in 1867 into the employment of women and children in agriculture (Clemenson, 1982, 82).
10. Many of the Church livings controlled by landowners were given to younger sons, to provide them with a safe income source (Bourne, 1986, 86).
11. The Swing Riots (called after a legendary 'Captain Swing') broke out in the 1830s (Hobsbawn & Rudé, 1969). It was an agricultural labourers' movement, but protest took many forms, from arson and assaults on employees to the destruction of farm machinery. The rioters demanded a higher minimum wage and an end to rural unemployment. The riots were concentrated in the south eastern counties of England.
12. Howell (1979, 45) points out that absenteeism grew less frequent as the 19th century progressed. Railways improved access between Wales and London, so enabling Welsh landowners to spend more time on their estates.
13. Howell (1979, 94) notes that the practice of having live-in servants was found

in Scotland and in Northern England, but had disappeared from the rest of England in the early 19th century. However, the custom continued in many Devonshire farm households until World War Two (Bouquet, 1985, 76).

14. See Douglas (1976, 60-96) for a full discussion of the Highland 'Land War'. It was caused by the insecurity of tenure and poverty amongst the crofting communities. Disturbances took place throughout the 1880s. In 1883, the Napier Commission reported on the state of the Highland communities, as a result of which a Crofters Commission was set up in 1886 to ensure fair rents and security of tenure for the crofters.
15. Pahl (1965, 72), in his study of Hertfordshire villages, identified the following impacts of in-migration on rural society:
 - a segregation in housing type.
 - A new middle class (in-migrants were mainly from the mobile middle classes).
 - A collapse of former geographical and social hierarchies within the society and a polarisation of interests.
16. Barlow (1986), in a study of Glemsford in Suffolk, found that by 1851, more of the working population were employed in manufacturing (weaving) than in agriculture. The weaving industry was owned by London-based capitalists, but there was also some locally-based manufacturing. In the second half of the 19th century a 'business aristocracy' emerged through a fusion of local capitalists and landowners. Many landowners were involved in housing development for the expanding industrial base.
17. Newby and his colleagues (1978, 243) state that it is legitimate to infer interests contextually. What people say to be in their interests may not actually be in their interests. This may be intentional, or they may be unaware of alternatives.
18. The Forestry Commission was established in 1919, with the general duty of promoting the interests of forestry (the development and expansion of Britain's forests and the production and supply of timber). The duties of the Forestry Commission have been amended by the 1967 Forestry Act and the Wildlife & Countryside Act Amendment (1985). These later acts place on the Forestry Commission the duty to endeavour to achieve a 'reasonable' balance between the interests of forestry and those of the environment.
19. In the 1940s, subsidies for hill cattle and sheep were introduced. In 1968, the Hill Cow subsidy was replaced by the Beef Cow subsidy. Since entering the EEC, this has been replaced by a Suckler Cow Premium. In 1980, the Sheepmeat Regime was brought in to raise production levels. Farm modernisation has been aided by the Hill Farming and Livestock Rearing Grant, introduced in 1946. This policy met 50% of the costs of capital expenditure on improvements to the social and economic fabric of upland farms. This was replaced by the

Hill Land Improvement Scheme in 1967, and the Farm Capital Grant Scheme in 1970.

20. The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme provides preferential rates for buildings and fixed equipment. The farmer must enter into a farm management plan for up to 6 years (Robinson, 1988, 219).
21. LFAs were established in 1975 under EEC directive 75/276. Within ESAs, farmers are eligible for Compensatory Allowances which are paid per head of cattle.
22. Modern planning legislation has its roots in the Public Health and Housing Acts of the 19th century (Cloke, 1983, 74-79). The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act was influenced by three government reports: the Barlow Report on urban areas (1940); the Scott Report on rural areas (1942) and the Uthwatt Report on compensation and betterment (1942). The 1947 planning framework was reformed in 1968 by a new Town and Country Planning Act. This replaced the old county-level development plan with a dual-scale planning process. County councils draw up a broad structure plan which must be approved by the Secretary of State, and the district councils are responsible for more detailed local plans.
23. The 'key settlement' concept is a broad term covering a whole range of different policies (Cloke, 1983, 95). It has generally been applied by counties with high levels of rurality rather than those with strong pressures for development. The most infamous and extreme key settlement policy was Durham County Council's 'D' village policy of village rationalisation in the 1950s (Barr, 1979).
24. In 1973, the Nature Conservancy was reformed and divided into two bodies: the Nature Conservancy Council (whose role is mainly managerial) and the Institute of Terrestrial Ecology (concerned with scientific research). Rose (1986, 67) claims that the NCC has been hi-jacked by the farming and timber interest. Most of its directors come from the private landowning lobby.
25. Landscape Special Development Orders (LASDOs) were introduced in the 1950s in National Parks to reduce the exemptions from planning usually granted to agricultural- and forestry-related developments. LASDOs have been used successfully on only three occasions (Cloke, 1983, 290). Since 1986, farmers and landowners wishing to construct buildings or roads must first notify their national park authority, and may be required to meet national park building specifications (Shoad, 1987, 461).
26. Under part V of the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, a local planning authority is allowed to make an access agreement with a landowner. In return, the landowner or occupier is entitled to claim compensation for disturbance. Access agreements may only be made over open country (mountain, moor, heath, down, cliff or foreshore). In 1968, the Wildlife and

Countryside Act broadened the definition of open country to include woodlands, rivers and canals. Local authorities have, in theory, powers of compulsory acquisition, but, in practice, these are rarely used (Gibbs & Whitby, 1974).

27. At first, the Development Commission concentrated on agricultural research. In 1921, a Rural Industries Intelligence Bureau was set up to encourage rural industry, which was replaced by CoSIRA in 1968. The Development Commission has also been responsible for setting up RCCs to encourage community level development (Development Commission, 1983/84). In 1984, the Development Commission was re-established as a Grant in Aid body, and merged with CoSIRA in 1988 to be renamed the Rural Development Commission.
28. Kelp is an alkaline ash obtained by burning seaweed, and was used in the manufacture of fertiliser, soap and glass. The kelping industry was labour intensive. The crofts were subsistence smallholdings, provided by the landlords to retain the workforce. Subdivision of crofts was encouraged to maximise the workforce (Carter, 1980, 372).
29. Figure 3.2 shows only the total population of upland Britain. A breakdown of the figures is given in Collins (1979), which shows that in certain areas of upland Britain there has been a absolute decline in population. Although the total population has increased, it has grown at a much lower rate relative to the total population of Britain.

Part II

Case Studies from the North Pennines

Chapter IV

Landowners and Rural Society in the 19th Century

4.1 Introduction

This second part of the thesis will examine case studies of landownership and rural development from the North Pennines over the 19th and 20th centuries. Using the conceptual framework developed in Part One, it is aimed to test the value of this approach as a method of understanding rural development. Not only should the findings throw new light on the development of the North Pennines, they should also add to a more general understanding of continuity and change in landownership structures, and of the motives of different landownership forms.

The analysis is divided into three time periods: the early 19th century to the late 19th century (Chapter Four); the late 19th century to the mid-20th century (Chapter Five); and the mid-20th century to the present day (Chapter Six). Chapter Seven is concerned with public intervention and the contemporary development problems of the North Pennines.

As has been earlier stated (see 1.3), this is not a comprehensive analysis of the development of the North Pennines, but a selective examination of case studies of landownership within the region. There are two aims in the analysis: to gain a deeper understanding of the region's development and to test the general concepts proposed in Part One. In Chapters Four and Five, the analysis focuses on three landed estates in the North Pennines under different forms of ownership. The experiences of these estates are evaluated within the context of the wider development of the region and the national experience. In Chapter Six, the analysis broadens with a consideration of four privately owned landed estates, common land and public landownership. Finally, in Chapter Seven, the analysis focuses on the public intervention measures which have most directly affected landownership interests in the region.

4.1.1 An Introduction to the North Pennines


The North Pennine region is a part of upland Britain. It is a geological rather than an administrative region, so that the boundaries must be somewhat subjectively fixed. In the definition used by this thesis, the North Pennines covers an area of approximately 2,320 square kilometres (see Map 3.3) [1]. It stretches about 58 kilometres from north to south, and 40 kilometres from east to west; from the Tyne Gap in Northumberland to the edge of the Yorkshire Dales National Park, and from Hamsterly Forest in County Durham to the Vale of Eden in Cumbria. The North Pennines extends over three counties: Durham, Cumbria and Northumberland, although the largest part, 50%, lies in County Durham. Before the reorganisation of local government in 1973, the North Pennines spanned five counties: Durham, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland and North Yorkshire. In the 19th century, the region was divided into ecclesiastical parishes, chapelries and townships, but following the Local Government Act of 1888 these were reorganised into civil parishes (see Appendix B).

The geology of the North Pennines is carboniferous (250 - 300 million years BP). Carboniferous limestone is overlaid by millstone grit, and in places thin seams of coal lie between the limestone and the millstone grit (Raistrick, 1968, 34). The modern geological structure has also been formed by subsequent earth movements and the ice age. The whole area is tilted in an easterly direction. A faultline runs north to south along the western edge to form a steep escarpment, dropping down to the Eden Valley. Localised doming of the rocks at Alston has caused rock-fracturing and mineralisation. In this mineralised area, lead, zinc, iron, quartz, calcite, fluorspar and barite deposits are found (Raistrick, 1968, 43). At the end of the carboniferous period the Great Whin Sill was formed. This is a band of doleritic rock which runs across the Pennines in a north-easterly direction (Smailes, 1968, 273).

Figure 4.1 illustrates the relief and river pattern of the present day landscape. The landscape of the North Pennines region today consists of two main components: the fells (high moors), and the dales (river valleys). The fells are capped by millstone grit, and lie between 300m above sea level and 893m at the highest point on Cross Fell. The soils on the fells are sandy, acidic and infertile (Raistrick, 1968,

Figure 4.1

THE CENTRAL NORTH PENNINES :
RELIEF AND DRAINAGE



Source : Smailes (1968,272)

46). On the highest fells, patches of arctic alpine vegetation are found, but the characteristic vegetation of the fells is cotton grass (on poorly-drained plateaus associated with peat deposits), and heather on the better drained moors.


The dales dissect the fells, and lie below 210m. Here, the soils are more fertile (clays, sands and gravels). Six main rivers drain the area: the South Tyne, the West and East Allen, the Derwent, the Wear and the Tees. These rivers give their names to the main dales: South Tynedale, West and East Allendale, Derwent Valley, Weardale and Teesdale respectively. All the rivers rise near the summit of Cross Fell and all but the first three flow eastwards (the South Tyne, East and West Allen flow northwards), (Dunham, 1948, 1).

Climatic conditions are harsh, with high rainfall all year round and heavy snow in winter. Rainfall is highest on the western edge. Cross Fell receives over 1,500mm per annum, while Stanhope and Middleton receive about 900mm (Raistrick, 1968, 49). Similarly, snowfall is heavier on the western edge, lying for 100 to 140 days a year on Cross Fell. The high relief and harsh climate of the North Pennines are severe constraints on agricultural activity, particularly so in the highest central area. At Moor House in Upper Teesdale (561m) the length of the growing season is 165 days, whereas below 210m it is over 200 days (*ibid.*, 49). Agricultural activity is concentrated in the dales, where the soils can be improved for pasture and meadow land. Crops can only be grown on the lower, eastern edge of the region. Further up the valley sides and on the fells, the soils become rapidly less improveable, and these areas are used largely for extensive rough grazing (Smailes, 1968, 277).

4.1.2 Economy and Society in the 19th Century

"The soil of the greater part of this lead mine district is poor and thin, in places being composed of vegetable substances imperfectly decomposed. It presents us with large tracts of peat, in which we find every here and there, from want of draining, wet spongy flats, provincially called mosses or flows. Here all is wild and uncultivated. It cannot be called an agricultural district. The lettings are very small and the moors not half stocked. The chief dependence of the inhabitants is upon the mines, the care or cultivation of the land is with them a minor consideration. A horse to bring coals for the family, a cow to supply

Figure 4.2 — Lead Production in the UK & North Pennines, 1845 to 1912




Source: Burt (et al., 1983, xv)

milk, or a few sheep, if he borders on the common, is all that the householder desires" (Bell, 1856, 92).

At the turn of the 19th century, the North Pennines had a dual economy based on lead mining and farming. Of the two industries, lead mining dominated the socio-economic development of the region in this period, and it is the lead industry which dominates the literature about the region (Hughes, 1963; Raistrick & Jennings, 1965; Hunt, 1972). From the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the 1880s, lead mining in the North Pennines was at its height (Dunham, 1948, 4). Figure 4.2 shows lead ore output in the North Pennines and the UK. Between 1845 and 1913, Durham and Northumberland alone were responsible for nearly a quarter of the total lead ore production of the United Kingdom (Burt et al, 1983, ix). Some indication of

Figure 4.3

THE LEAD DALES : LEAD MINING AREA,
SMELT MILLS AND COMMUNICATIONS



Source : Smailes (1968,275)

the scale of the lead industry is given by the following statistics: in 1810 in County Durham there were reported to be 4 working lead mines in the Derwent Valley, 38 in Weardale, and 48 in Teesdale (Bailey, 1810, 38). On Alston Moor, there were 62 working mines in 1822 (Neasham, 1893, 228), whilst in Allendale, 12,000 bings of ore were raised in 1797 with a value of £50,000 (Bailey & Culley, 1797, 21) [2]. At the peak of mining activity, over 4,000 men were employed in the lead mining industry (Smailes, 1968, 278). An understanding of the organisation and control of the lead industry would, therefore, appear to be essential to an analysis of the rural development of the North Pennines at this period.

Table 4.1 — Total Recorded Production of Metallic Minerals, 1666 to 1938 (tons)

District	Lead	Zinc	Copper	Iron	Barytes	Fluorspar
Escarpment	25,832	-	-	-	61,900	-
Alston Moor	817,137	190,757	1,583	52,021	1,043	987
West Allendale	208,791	56,561	-	-	-	-
East Allendale	305,594	90	-	-	-	-
Weardale	920,136	-	-	1,480,519	1,838	608,120
Derwent	51,429	-	-	-	-	15,269
Teesdale	377,228	737	-	3,981	150,751	-
Haydon Bridge	143,990	-	-	-	397	-
TOTAL	2,850,137	248,145	1,583	1,536,521	215,929	624,376

Source: Dunham (1946, 6)

The lead ore field is located in the central, highest part of the North Pennines around Alston Moor, Allendale, Upper Weardale and Upper Teesdale (see Figure 4.3). Although lead has been the most sought after mineral; zinc, copper, iron, barytes and fluorspar have also been mined. Table 4.1 shows the total mineral

output from the North Pennines from 1666 to 1938. Lead has been mined in the region since Norman times, but in the mid-18th century, lead mining was transformed from a small scale activity to an organised, highly productive industry (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 183).

What role did landowners play in the lead mining industry, and how did the industry affect the lives of the inhabitants? The ownership of all minerals excepting gold was vested in the lords of the manors (see 2.2.2). Owners of manorial interests in the lead mining area were, potentially, in a very powerful position. From Figure 4.4, it can be seen that ownership of the manorial rights over the lead mining area was dominated by four landowners: the Blackett-Beaumonts in Allendale [3], Greenwich Hospital on Alston Moor, the Bishops of Durham in Weardale and the Earl of Darlington in Teesdale [4]. Smaller owners of mineral rights included Lord Crewe's Charity in the Derwent Valley, and the Earl of Strathmore south of the River Tees in North Yorkshire.

All these landowners were involved to some extent in the lead mining industry, but the strategies adopted for exploiting the lead varied from active exploitation to arms-length control (Hughes, 1963). The Blackett-Beaumonts were the only landowners to take direct control of their lead, controlling the whole process from extraction and processing to marketing. As well as their lead in Allendale, they also leased the mineral rights in Upper Weardale from the Bishops of Durham. Allendale and Upper Weardale, being contiguous areas, could be managed as a single unit. Smelt mills were built at Allenheads, Rookhope and Dukesfield to process the ore from Allendale and Weardale before marketing.

Greenwich Hospital adopted a partly capitalist, partly rentier strategy towards its lead resources on Alston Moor. When Greenwich Hospital acquired the Alston Moor estate in 1735, it was in a very dilapidated condition [5]. The Hospital's first policy was to grant many small mining leases and divide the control of the lead. At first, therefore, mining was carried out on a small scale, unco-ordinated basis, with minimal direction from the Hospital. In 1760, the Hospital took over the processing of the lead ore, and so assumed greater control over the lead (Hughes, 1963, 54). In 1767, they built a smelt mill at Langley to process not only their own lead, but lead ore purchased from other concerns. They also attempted to improve

**LORDS OF THE MANOR
AND PRINCIPAL LANDOWNERS
IN THE NORTH PENNINES, 1850**

This map illustrates the land ownership and manorial structure of the North Pennines region in 1850. The land is divided into numerous manors, each associated with a specific landowner. Key landowners include the Earl of Carlisle, Lord Leconfield, Lord Hothfield, Lord Barnard, Lord Bownes, Lord Crewe's Trustees, and the Bishop of Durham. The map also shows the locations of several hospitals, including Greenwich Hospital, and various other estates and manors such as Hope-Wallace, Musgrave, and Crackenthorpe. The map is a black and white line drawing with labels for each landowner and manor.

the extraction of lead by commencing work on the Nent Force Level in 1776 [6]. In 1768, there were 119 active mines on Alston Moor with an annual output of 20,610 bings (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 144).

The other owners of lead in the North Pennines all adopted a rentier position, devolving all rights to extract, process and market the lead to mining companies. The major mining company, apart from the Blackett-Beaumonts, was the London Lead Company. This quaker-owned company was formed in 1692 (Raistrick, 1977, 10). It also acquired mineral interests in Wales and Derbyshire, but after 1790 consolidated its operations in the North Pennines. The London Lead Company was the major lessee on Alston Moor, but because of Greenwich Hospital's policy of granting many small leases, the London Lead Company could only slowly expand its interests there. In 1765, the company managed 35 separate leases. Management was simplified in 1820 when the Hospital decided to rationalise its leasing system, and granted the London Lead Company two large leases (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 188). The London Lead Company also leased the lead mines in the Derwent Valley from the trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity until the early 1800s. In 1753, the company took the lease of the Teesdale mines from the Earl of Darlington, and in 1800, the lease of the mines and smelt mills at Stanhope and Bollihope from the Bishops of Durham. The Teesdale lead ore was smelted at Eggleston.

The degree to which landowners benefitted financially from the lead depended on the balance of ownership and control. Both the capitalist and the rentier approaches offered advantages and disadvantages. Direct control of the mining process by the landowner entitled him to appropriate the full profits, but provided no safeguards in times of depression. Where ownership and control of the lead were divided, the lessor was assured of a regular guaranteed income, but only a share of the profits in times of prosperity. The standard mineral lease consisted of a certain rent, which the lessee paid every year regardless of the production level, and a royalty rent, which was linked to production. The lessee then had to pay a duty on the amount of ore raised of up to a fifth. The lessors could control the activities of the mining companies to some extent by attaching conditions to the lease. For instance, Greenwich Hospital stipulated that each lessee work his mine for at least nine months a year (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 192).

The Blackett-Beaumonts and the London Lead Company dominated lead production in the North Pennines [7]. There were many other smaller mining ventures, but none challenged the supremacy of the two main companies. The lead industry carried unavoidable financial risks, due to the frequent fluctuations in prices (see Figure 4.2). Lead prices were generally high during the first thirty years of the 19th century, but from 1831 to 1841 there was a depression due to competition from Spain, and prices dropped dramatically. The larger mining companies were better able to survive than small mining concerns during these slumps in the lead market, having greater capital resources to draw on [8]. During the 1830s depression, for example, two thirds of the mining operations on Alston Moor were halted (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 302).

The Blackett-Beaumonts and the London Lead Company were at the forefront of technical advances in the industry [9]. However, the geological conditions in which lead ore occurs constrained the organisation of the industry (Hughes, 1963, 60). Lead mines were small, and mainly located high up the hillsides in the upper dales. Despite the virtual monopoly over the industry exerted by the two big companies, the industry retained a high element of entrepreneurship. Miners worked in small groups of not more than twelve men. They negotiated bargains with the mining company at quarterly intervals, when the company would grant the men a vein to mine and would agree a payment in advance based on the expected value of the vein. The bargain system was mutually beneficial to the mining companies and the miners (Hunt, 1972, 35). For the mine owners, it gave the miners an incentive to work hard, it spread the financial risks (the miners had to speculate as well as the owners), and it maintained a very flexible workforce. For the miners, they retained their independence and sometimes, if they were lucky, the vein would prove to be richer than expected, and they would make a profit.

The two main mining companies required complex management structures. The Blackett-Beaumonts employed a chief agent based in Newcastle, and under him three agents based in Weardale, Allenheads, and Coalcleugh (Hughes, 1963, 56). The London Lead Company had a similar system, with a chief agent at Nent Head and agents based at Nent Head, Stanhope, Hilton, Dufton, and Lunedale (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 262). During the 19th century, the companies imposed more regulated working practices on the miners in the interests of greater efficiency

and control (Hunt, 1972, 47). Miners had to work regular hours and mines were inspected frequently by the agents.

Over the course of the 19th century, the mining companies and landowners invested large amounts of capital in developing a transport network to link the mining areas to the surrounding lowlands. In the 18th century, the lead had had to be carried by pony along drovers' tracks, which were often impassable in winter [10]. In the early 19th century, roads were constructed along all the lead mining dales. Between 1815 and 1865, the London Lead Company spent £25,000 on road building (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 272). Later, in the 1850s and 1860s, a more limited rail network was developed, with branch lines terminating at Stanhope (1834), Alston (1852), Allenheads (1856), and Middleton (1867). Because of the difficulty of constructing roads over the fells, few transport links were developed between the dales. Besides, the landowners and mining companies were more interested in expanding their links with the outside, than with their neighbours within the region.

Lead mining had a fundamental impact on the structure of farming (Smailes, 1968, 276). Although lead mining was the major sector of the economy, farming played an important economic and social role in many mining households. The harsh climate and poor soils placed strict limits on the agricultural potential of the region. It is likely that much of the mining area would have remained unenclosed but for the land hunger generated by the mining population. Perhaps because of the extensive organisation of the lead industry, whereby settlements were small and scattered, and perhaps because of the need to ensure a food supply in such an inaccessible region, the custom grew up amongst the miners of combining farming with mining. These farms were generally little more than smallholdings. They provided a subsistence living for the miner and his family and were a safeguard against times of depression (Hunt, 1972, 147).

The custom was encouraged by the landowners, who were thus able to let land for which, in normal circumstances, there would have been no demand. Granger (1794, 21) noted that miners were prepared to take smallholdings at extravagantly high rents. The custom was also encouraged by the mining companies, since it increased the security of the workforce. Those miners that could not afford a smallholding had a garden (Hunt, 1972, 159). The London Lead Company provided each house

Figure 4.5




in the mining village of Nenthead with a garden. The land hunger generated by the miners was undoubtedly a factor behind the enclosure of much of the region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (see Figure 4.5) [11]. Enclosure resulted in an extension and reorganisation of the farmed area (Hunt, 1972, 152). The harsh environment of the region, however, limited the amount of land which could be enclosed, and most of the fell tops remained unenclosed as common grazing lands.

The lead mining industry had a major impact on the population of the North Pennines. The population over most of the region grew dramatically over the first half of the century (see Figure 4.6). The particularly high rate of population growth in the lead mining field reflects the growing employment needs of the industry in the first half of the 19th century. Altogether, the population of the lead mining area increased by over 75% between 1801 and 1831 (Hunt, 1972, 189). Different areas of the lead mining field developed at different rates (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 281). Production at Allendale and Alston Moor peaked in the 1820s; in Weardale peak production was from 1840 to 1860; whilst in Teesdale production did not peak until the 1850s, and remained high until 1870. The population growth associated with the mining industry influenced the settlement pattern. The existing market towns in the region, Allenheads, Stanhope, and Middleton, all grew, but also new mining villages grew up closer to the mining areas in the upper dales. The mining companies took an active role in the provision of housing for their employees. The villages of Nent Head and Garrigill were planned and developed by the London Lead Company [12], whilst the Blakett-Beaumonts developed Allenheads and Coalcleugh. The location of the lead mines explains the high altitudes, of between 1,000 and 1,500 feet (304.8 and 457.2 metres), at which these mining settlements were located (Hunt, 1972, 161). One farmstead in Teesdale was situated at over 2,000 feet (609.6 metres).

What kind of society developed under such conditions? The highly concentrated ownership and control of land and lead, together with the extensive nature of the mining industry and settlement pattern, produced a somewhat contradictory mixture of open and closed characteristics. The mining companies exercised a strong influence over the social lives of their employees. This was particularly true of the London Lead Company, which practised a:

Figure 4.6



"comprehensive social policy derived from a marriage of Quaker philosophy and sound business principles" (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 292).

In the village of Nenthead, the company showed their enlightened paternalism by providing a water supply, baths and public washhouse for the miners, plus a ready money shop selling goods at subsidised prices, a school, reading room, post office, library and public house (Raistrick, 1977, 138). The company provided free schooling and medical services for all their employees' families. The Blakett-Beaumonts seem to have followed the example set by the London Lead Company, by providing schools, libraries and medical services (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 321).

The predominant features of this society were, however, open. The rapid population growth, a dual employment structure and an under-capitalised farm structure, all correspond to the open model (see 3.3.1). In addition, non-conformism was widespread. Methodism arrived in the North Pennines in the 18th century [13], and by the mid-19th century most mining settlements supported Wesleyan, Primitive Methodist and Quaker chapels. The London Lead Company obviously encouraged the spread of quakerism, but the growth of the other religions was a reaction against the Establishment. This was particularly true on the estates of the Bishops of Durham in Weardale, where the Church was regarded as a remote and exploitative institution. The Rector of Stanhope was reportedly the best paid parish priest in the country, with a salary in 1835 of £4,875 (Hunt, 1970, 217). He was absent from the parish most of the time and apparently appropriated the income for his personal enjoyment.

The following passage indicates the strong attachment of the lead miners to the region, despite the harshness of the miners' lives:

"the natives of the dale grow up with an attachment to their native land and their own people which nothing can overcome. Hence it is that, although by removing only 20 miles down into the coal country a young man might nearly double his income, and have the prospect of adding many years of health and strength to his life, he cannot remove. He clings to his beloved dale, and follows an occupation which in most instances allows but a short life, the last years of

which are spent in sickness and sorrow" (Poor Law Commission Report, 1842, 722; quoted from Hunt, 1970, 194).

Average life expectancy for a miner was only 30 years. During depressions in the lead trade, great distress was caused in the mining communities. Before the 1834 Poor Law Act, distress was compounded by a ruling of 1816, which exempted the proprietors of the lead mines from the payment of poor rates (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 297). The burden of maintaining the unemployed miners thus fell on the occupiers of lands. The mining companies and landowners did often relieve short-term distress, by providing distress work in land improvements or road building (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 303). In 1832, Greenwich Hospital even subsidised the passage of 124 miners emigrating to Canada.

Not all the estates were equally dependent on lead mining, however. The Raby estate, for instance, was predominantly an agricultural estate. A report on this estate by Caird in 1851 indicates that in the midst of the rapid changes associated with the mining industry, agriculture had changed very little. He was critical of the management policy of the Duke of Cleveland. Although on the surface the policy of the Duke appeared benevolent (rents had not been raised for 50 years, tenancy was hereditary and the landlord maintained the estate in good condition), in practice this approach led to 'indolence' on the part of the tenantry. In Caird's view, the estate's resources were under-utilised. The continuity of this estate stood in stark contrast to the changes in County Durham as whole. Rapid population growth due to the coal-mining industry had created a large demand for food and should have provided an incentive to increase agricultural production:

"In the midst of this activity and industry we find a great estate standing nearly still for half a century, the landlord declining to prevail himself of the natural and legitimate benefits of his property" (Caird, 1968, 349).

4.1.3 Summary

This brief overview of the physical geography of the North Pennines and of its economy and society in the early 19th century, provides a context for the following detailed case studies. The North Pennines is a geological rather than a political

region. Although linked by a common economy, there was little social interaction between the dales:

"In human terms, the area consists not of one unit, but of several distinct units of similar type" (Smailes, 1968, 270).

In the 19th century, the region was divided by administrative boundaries and by the estates of the major landowners and the control of the mining companies. The ownership of land and lead, the two principal resources in the North Pennines, was concentrated in a few hands. The region was dominated by landed estates under private (Raby, Allendale and Strathmore); institutional (Greenwich Hospital and the Bishops of Durham); and charitable (Lord Crewe's Charity) ownership. These landowners were in a powerful position with respect to the lead, but adopted different strategies of exploitation. The lead mining industry is an example of the role of landed capital in the development of industry (see 2.2.3). Where the mineral rights were leased, the mining company exerted as much, if not more, influence over the lives of the inhabitants.

In the early 19th century, the North Pennines was experiencing a period of prosperity, but little of the profit accrued to the working population. The economy was unstable due to the frequent fluctuations in the price of lead and it was the miners who were the first to suffer during periods of depression. Lead influenced the farming structure and the society of the region. Farming was characterised by small, under-capitalised holdings, although on the outskirts of the mining area farming played a more important role. Despite the concentrated ownership of land and lead, the society displayed many open characteristics. A wide social gulf existed between the miners on the one hand, and the landowners and mining companies on the other.

The lead mining field did not cover the whole of the North Pennines, however, and it would be expected that the influence of lead-mining would have been less on the margins. It can be seen from Figure 4.6, for example, that the rate of population growth was lower around the edge of the region. Little has been written about the socio-economic conditions, or the role of landownership, in these border regions. Neither has much been written about farming in the region at, and after, enclosure. The estate case studies which form the core of the following three sections of

this chapter aim to redress this imbalance. They were selected to represent the diversity of landownership forms and estates found throughout the whole region. The Wemmergill estate, owned by the Earls of Strathmore, is located on the edge of the lead mining area, and is an example of private ownership. The Blanchland estate, owned by the trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity, is an example of charitable ownership in a declining lead mining area whilst, finally, the Stanhope estate, owned by the Bishops of Durham, represents institutional ownership at the centre of the lead mining area.

The following analysis concentrates on the landowners rather than the mining companies, and the effect of ownership form and estate structure on estate management. The conceptual models of landownership decision-making and rural society outlined in the previous chapter provide a framework for the analysis.

4.2 Case Study One: The Wemmergill Estate

4.2.1 Introduction

The private estate which has been chosen as a case study is the Wemmergill estate, belonging to the earls of Strathmore [14], a Scottish family, whose ancestors, the Lyons, were granted the thanage of Glamis in the 14th century. Glamis Castle became the family seat, and in 1677 the family were awarded an earldom, afterwards being known as the earls of Strathmore. The link with County Durham was forged in the 18th century, when the 9th Earl of Strathmore married Mary Eleanor Bowes. The Bowes were a Durham landowning family who had made their fortune in the coal trade. The mineral-rich estate of Gibside in North Durham was bought in the 17th century by Sir William Bowes; and his son, George Bowes, was a founder member of the Grand Alliance (see 2.2.3). George Bowes' daughter, Mary Eleanor, was an only child and so inherited her father's estates on his death in 1760. The inheritance was conditional upon Mary Eleanor's husband assuming the surname Bowes, a request that was readily met by the 9th Earl, who thereafter was known as John Bowes [15]. John and Mary Bowes took up residence at the Bowes family seat, Streatlam Castle. They had two sons: John and Thomas. John inherited the Scottish and English estates on his father's death in 1776, and in 1815 received the title Baron Bowes of Streatlam Castle and Lunedale.

4.2.2 The Strathmore Estates

Table 4.2 shows the extent of the family’s landholdings in 1873. The Strathmores were, without doubt, one of the great landowners of the 19th century (see 2.2.1). The size, geographical distribution, and varied resource base of their landholdings required a complex management structure (see 3.2.2). The estates fell into two blocks: the Scottish estates and the English estates. The Scottish estates were managed by a land agent based at Glamis Castle. The Streatlam, Gibside, and Yorkshire estates were under the control of a land agent based at Streatlam Castle. However, the management demands of the Gibside estate differed to such an extent that it should be treated as a separate estate [16]. Although the Streatlam and Yorkshire estates were controlled by the same land agent, for all administrative purposes they were treated as separate estates and so will be divided in this analysis.

Table 4.2 — The Strathmore Estates, 1873

Estate	Area (has)	% total area	Annual Value (£)	% total value
Forfar	9,417	33.3	24,280	49
Perth	113	0.4	455	0.7
Sussex	7	0.02	298	0.6
Herts	750	2.7	3,569	7.2
Yorks NR	14,536	51.4	5,283	10.6
Durham	3,464	12.2	15,788	31.8
TOTAL	28,286	100	49,573	100

Source: Bateman (1883)

The Yorkshire estate was known as the ‘Wemmergill’ or ‘Highland’ estate. It was located south of the River Tees and covered about 12,500 hectares (see Figure 4.7). It can be seen from Table 4.2 that the Wemmergill estate formed over half

of the family's total landholdings by area, but contributed only 10% to the total income. Economically, it was of minimal importance compared, for example, with the Durham estates which were situated on the coal field, but the size of the Wemmergill estate gave the earls of Strathmore political and social control over a considerable area, especially as the estate lay adjacent to the Streatlam estate, forming a large compact block of control.

In the early 19th century, the Wemmergill estate lay within the ecclesiastical parish of Romaldkirk (see Appendix B). The parish was subdivided into eight manors, over seven of which the earls of Strathmore owned manorial rights: Lune, Lonton, Holwick, Crossthwaite, Cotherstone, Mickleton and Hunderthwaite [17]. As Lords of the Manor, the earls owned mineral, sporting and customary land rights over the whole estate [18]. In addition, they were the principal landowners and, therefore, commanded a virtual monopoly of control over the estate. Each manor was administered separately as a subunit of the Wemmergill estate. Most of the tenanted farmholdings were located in the manors of Holwick and Lune, and the following analysis will concentrate on these two units, as they were of greatest economic importance to the earls, although their development will be placed within the wider framework of the Wemmergill estate and, where appropriate, the other estates.

4.2.3 The Wemmergill Estate, 1800-1830

At the turn of the 19th century, the 10th Earl of Strathmore was the landlord of Wemmergill and the land agent was George Colpitts (see Appendix C). The first 30 years of the 19th century saw great changes on the Wemmergill estate. Between 1811 and 1820, the whole estate was enclosed. Separate awards were made for the manors of Lune, Holwick, Romaldkirk, Mickleton, Cotherstone and Hunderthwaite (D/St/E3/19/77,78).

Table 4.3 sets out the lands in Lune and Holwick which were to be divided and enclosed, a total area of almost 3,000 hectares. As the principal landowner, the 10th Earl of Strathmore was entitled to the largest share of the land to be enclosed, but altogether 35 claims were submitted for allotments on Lune Moor, 11 claims were made for Thringarth Pasture, and 13 for Sleights Pasture (D/St/E3/19/95). The enclosure award also made provisions for the commutation of tithes, The




Table 4.3 — The 1820 Enclosure Award

Area to be Enclosed	Hectares
Lune Moor	1,399
Lune Town Fields	17.5
Thringarth and Sleights Pasture	225
Holwick Moor	1,096
Holwick Town Fields	104
TOTAL	2,842

Source: D/St/E3/19/78.

Rector of Romaldkirk being awarded land in lieu [19]. The award was carried out, apparently, with the consent of most proprietors. The main bone of contention was over the rectorial allotment [20].

Enclosure provided an opportunity for the 10th Earl to rationalise and enlarge the leasehold farm holdings on the estate. The number of tenanted holdings was increased by three [21], and the total area of leasehold land was increased by the enclosure of allotments on Lune Moor, which were later divided and added to the existing holdings. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the size of the Lunedale farms before (1810) and after (1821) enclosure. There were 31 farm holdings, ranging in size, in 1821, from 2.7 to 290.8 hectares, although most of the holdings were under 25 hectares. There was little change in farm size between 1810 and 1821, but by 1860 it can be seen that most of the holdings had increased in size. Table 4.6 enables a comparison to be made between the farm structures of the different subunits of the Wemmergill estate in 1860 (the exact hectarages of the Holwick, Mickleton, and Hunderthwaite farms are given in Appendix D). It shows that the Lunedale, Holwick and Mickleton farm structures were all dominated numerically by smallholdings (under 25 hectares).

It took some time, following the award, for the division of the allotments at Lunedale to be completed. Much work and expense was involved in building stone

Table 4.4 — Lunedale Farm Sizes

FARM	1810	1821	1841	1860	1911	1920	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	Allotment	Enclosed
Close House	10.5	38.4	23.5	47.0	51.5	147.9	68.3
Arngill	28.2	-	27.9	-	-	-	-
Lune Head	59.8	59.8	58.2	58.4	58.2	86.2	24.1
Wythes Hill	17.5	9.8	202.5	202.1	187.5	162.0	52.9
Grains O' Beck	39.7	39.7	63.6	87.3	86.4	63.7	47.0
Scar House	21.2	21.2	23.6	-	-	-	-
Old Gate	21.5	21.5	-	-	-	-	-
Blake House	14.7	16.6	18.1	36.4	36.4	31.6	35.4
Dow Hill	20.5	20.5	20.5	-	-	-	-
Scar Head	17.7	17.6	25.7	25.7	30.7	5.8	35.8
Stackholme	2.8	29.4	54.3	66.1	66.1	-	66.2
Corbush	-	6.5	11.6	-	-	-	-
Intake	26.5	13.3	-	-	-	-	-
Low Wemmergill	9.7	39.7	78.7	69.8	69.4	-	72.5
High Soulgill	15.7	15.7	15.7	15.7	15.7	32.5	16.2
High Grain	8.7	18.9	56.7	33.3	28.4	-	33.3
Low Soulgill	15.3	-	18.7	-	-	-	-

Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 13/17; 11/6; IR/1/146; E3/9/33.

walls and improving the land. By 1821, only Low Wemmergill farm had increased significantly in size (from 10 hectares to 40) [22]. The total area of tenanted holdings increased from 895.1 hectares in 1810, to 951.6 in 1821, and 1,317 hectares in 1841 (see Tables 4.4 & 4.5). The enclosure award initiated changes which were to continue throughout the century.

Although the purpose of the enclosure award was to improve the value of the estate,

Table 4.5 — Lunedale Farm Sizes

FARM	1810	1821	1841	1860	1911	1920	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	Allotment	Enclosed
Wemmergill Hall	100.5	90.1	87.5	78.6	77.7	87.0	76.6
Grassholme West	6.9	14.1	25.5	53.7	13.3	20.8	12.0
Grassholme Mill	21.5	2.7	-	-	-	-	-
Stack	8.3	9.7	34.7	34.7	33.6	-	35.0
Rigg	8.8	8.8	9.4	9.4	12.5	-	29.5
Grassholme East	6.9	6.3	25.5	25.5	15.4	-	-
Grassholme Middle	-	19.0	-	-	-	-	-
East Close	5.6	5.6	5.1	5.6	-	-	-
West Stake Hill	14.8	14.8	15.8	25.7	29.6	10.8	20.4
East Stake Hill	9.3	9.7	9.7	-	-	-	-
West Park	24.6	24.8	24.8	24.8	46.2	25.4	22.0
Thringarth	10.5	8.4	8.9	8.7	-	-	9.1
East Park	69.8	70.9	70.9	75.8	62.2	-	64.5
Chapel House	-	7.3	8.3	8.0	3.5	-	5.0
Cronkley	277.6	290.8	291.6	291.6	295.8	251.2	29.5
TOTAL	895.1	951.6	1,317.0	1,284.5	1,228.8	924.9	755.3

Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 13/17; 11/6; IR/1/146; E3/9/33.

the realisation of this aim was impeded by two events which occurred immediately after the completion of the award: one internal and one external to the estate. The first event was the death of the 10th Earl in 1820. He had never married, but had produced a son, John, by his mistress Mary Milner of Stainton [23]. They married shortly before the Earl's death, but too late to secure the legitimacy of his son's claim to the inheritance. The Scottish branch of the family disputed John Bowes' claim to the earldom, and in 1821 the case was referred to the House of Lords. John Bowes lost his case, but he was awarded the right to enjoy the Durham and Yorkshire estates during his lifetime [24]. The earldom and control of the Scottish estates passed to his father's younger brother Thomas, and the title of Baron Bowes was extinguished. At the time of his father's death John Bowes was

Table 4.6 — Size Distribution of the Wemmergill Farms, 1860

Farm Size (has)	Lunedale	Holwick	Mickleton	Hunderthwaite
< 25	6	14	6	3
25 - 50	8	2	2	1
50 - 75	4	1	1	0
> 75	5	3	2	4
TOTAL	23	20	11	8

(In the following tables acres have been converted into hectares to one decimal place).

still only 9 years old and so too young to come in to his inheritance. The estates were, therefore, managed for an interim period by trustees until 1832 when John Bowes came of age [25].

The second occurrence was the onset of a national depression in agriculture following the end of the Napoleonic Wars [26]. This depression, coinciding with the enormous costs of enclosure and the death of the 10th Earl, placed a considerable financial burden on the estate.

Three reports written soon after the enclosure award suggest that there were conflicting views as to the best use of the estate's resources. These reports not only discuss estate management strategies, but also describe the state of the farm holdings at the time and the extent of agricultural distress during the depression.

Specialist advice was sought by the trustees immediately after the award from the surveyors Thomas Bell and Edward Clint [27]. They were obviously 'improvers', and made several suggestions as to how the value of the estate could be increased. Specifically, they recommended that the tenants reduce the land under tillage and turn it over to stock, as the land was too poor for arable; and that altogether 16 farm holdings be amalgamated, thereby reducing the total number of farm holdings by almost 50% [28]. They saw two advantages in the amalgamation of the farm

holdings. First, all the farm buildings were found to be in a very poor state of repair. The cost of repairing and improving all the holdings would be astronomical as well as time-consuming. It would be more efficient to concentrate resources on a few holdings. Second, they wished to see a better class of tenantry on the estate, and felt that this could be achieved with the creation of viable full-time holdings:

"We feel the more convinced that to insure the future letting of this property to advantage etc considerable sacrifice must be submitted to, for unless buildings and fences are erected, gates and gate posts supplied, much draining done and plantations judiciously placed for shelter and profit, we fear a more substantial and improving tenantry cannot be induced to take the Highland farms, nor can the small farms be united or laid to others with that prospect of advantage we anticipate" (D/St/E3/11/3).

They criticised the existing tenants, who were mainly miner-farmers, for managing their holdings at subsistence level: growing potatoes and corn for their own consumption without improving the land. They also lacked the capital to stock the moors to their full capacity. Bell and Clint illustrated the benefits to the estate of commercial farming, by praising the new tenants of Low Wemmergill farm for:

"conducting this farm in a superior manner, shewing the necessity of selecting tenants capable of similar improvements and by their example stimulating others to a like creditable course of management" (D/St/E3/11/3).

The ensuing agricultural depression probably cast a different light on Bell and Clints' proposals. In 1825, Joseph Watson, the Lunedale bailiff and himself a farm tenant on the estate, carried out a farm valuation and survey, and came up with very different recommendations (D/St/E3/11/5). He argued that the class of farmer envisaged by Messrs Bell and Clint would never take a farm in Lunedale because of the harsh climate. Of Cronkley farm in the upper dale he wrote:

"its remote and lonely situation, the difficulty in getting to it, (and even danger when the brooks are swollen, the tenant's life having been more than once in peril in attempting to get home), the climate also, and distance from market, render it not at all a desirable farm" (D/St/E3/11/5)

He pointed out that the tenants at Low Wemmergill had only taken the tenancy

at a proportionately lower rent, and resided outside the area. Miner-farmers, on the other hand, were prepared to rent grassland at higher rents than could otherwise be obtained. Watson made three practical recommendations as to how land management could be improved within the existing farm structure. First, he agreed with Messrs Bell and Clint that the area of tillage should be reduced, and that the growth of subsistence crops be confined to the tenants' gardens. Second, he advised that the pastures be improved by the application of lime in the proportion of 360 to 480 bushels per hectare [29]. Third, that trees be planted on the worst lands and river banks to act as wind breaks and to bind and fertilise the soil.

Watson described the economic effects of the depression. Rent rebates had been allowed to the tenants in 1821, 1822 and 1823. Farms in the upper dale had suffered the most (reflecting the harsher environment). The lowland farmers had been given rebates of 20%, 22%, and 25% respectively over the three years, whilst the highland farmers had received a 25% rebate each year. The prices of the principal agricultural products on the lowland farms, compared to 1820 prices, had fallen by 20% in 1821 and by over 30% in 1822. For the Highland farms the fall had been even greater, although the depression weighed most heavily on those farmers with tillage land. 1823 was the worst year, with low prices compounded by a bad season. In 1824 there was a slight improvement in prices to 12% below the 1820 level for the lowland farms, and 20% below for the Highland holdings. Most landlords, Watson observed, recognised that farmers would require two or three seasons with good prices to restore the damage done before conditions returned to normal. He felt that allowances to the tenants were essential to sustain:

"that proper feeling of attachment to their landlords and their farms, so conducive to the general good management and prosperity of the whole concern".

Watson in fact spent some time discussing the importance of management, both by landlord and tenant. For instance, the value of a farm depended not only on farm prices, but also on the quality of management. He commented that even within five years:

"a great change may be occasioned (by good or bad management) in the letting value of land".

Many tenants had managed their holdings in a superior manner despite the depression. It was, however, also the responsibility of the estate to ensure good management. The farm holdings were still in a poor condition. The buildings and fences had been “formerly neglected” and “gone to decay from age”. Good fences were essential for the proper management of the farms [30]. Watson criticised Messrs Bell and Clint for advising that tenants be responsible for the upkeep of fences:

“on most large estates where a consistent and liberal administration prevails, the tenantry are generally willing to contribute towards any permanent improvements projected on their farms”

Perhaps his comments on the responsibility of landlords were made for the benefit of the trustees. Although Watson states that the trustees allowed rent rebates during the worst years of the depression, their leniency only stretched so far. It was estate policy in bad cases of tenant debt to evict the tenant and reclaim the debts by an auction of farm stock. This obviously soured landlord-tenant relations. One particularly publicised eviction took place in the 1820s at Holwick (D/St/E3/9/103). A Mr Ancaster took the tenancy of Step Ends Farm in 1822 for an annual rent of £320. The farm consisted of 73 hectares of enclosed land, plus 208 hectares grazing on Crossthwaite Pasture and grazing rights on Mickle Fell. From the beginning, Mr Ancaster faced economic problems due to the depression and the poor quality of his land. He asked for a reduction of the rent which Bell and Clint, following a valuation, advised against, although they found the farm to be worth only £282:

“It is evident that nearly all the tenantry are much worse off than the tenant of Step Ends. He should be treated the same as all the tenants” (Bell & Clint to Richard Dobson, 25/3/1823)

Confusion followed, Mr Ancaster claiming that the second valuation gave him a right to a rent reduction. By 1828 he owed an arrears of £510. He was duly evicted and his farm stock auctioned. The tone of the following letter from Mr Ancaster suggests anything but clemency on the part of the trustees:

“If you quit me now you ruin me, and I think from what all parties say that you have it in your power to save me. It is possible you may find another

tenant but I am sure there is not one in this neighbourhood that has a capital sufficient to stock it and manage it as it ought to be, he may indeed take it and, like my predecessor, run it out for a year or two and then leave it very much in debt and in the wilderness-like state I found it, or you may let it to a stranger. He like me may be deceived by the surface and not duly considering the many disadvantages belonging to this farm, but if he take it on my original rent he like me will in a few years find his capital wasted and himself ruined and should you have to reduce the rent, had you not better give me an opportunity of saving myself alive? There can be no pleasure arise to the mind of a landlord on reflecting that one man after another is ruined upon the estate and I am sure Sir John you will not find a tenant more diligent or anxious to do his duty to the land and everything belonging to the estate than is your obedient servant" (Mr Ancaster to Sir John Paul, 19/10/1827).

Mr Ancaster died shortly after this incident. Had he lived, he might have derived some satisfaction from the knowledge that in 1859 the rent of Step Ends was still only £332 (see Appendix D).

Obviously, great distress was caused by the disruption arising from enclosure and the agricultural depression. The farms were in a very dilapidated condition at this time. The conflicting views of Bell and Clint on the one hand, and Watson on the other, not only reflect the different light which the agricultural depression cast on the estate's potential, but also differing motives towards estate management. Bell and Clint were professional surveyors, and adhered to the improvers' school. Watson, on the other hand, was himself a tenant of the estate and so spoke from local knowledge and self interest. However, his arguments would seem to have been based on sound principles. Notwithstanding the agricultural depression, the physical constraints posed by poor land quality and harsh weather conditions, were too great for any fundamental change in the estate structure.

In the end, a compromise strategy was adopted. Some rationalisation was achieved by multiple letting [31], thereby keeping the option open to subdivide the holdings again in future. Gradually, these multiple lets acquired a greater permanency, resulting eventually in amalgamation. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show that despite enclosure there was a high level of continuity in the farm tenants. On 13 holdings there was

Table 4.7 — Lunedale Farm Tenants, 1810 to 1860

FARM	1810	1821	1825	1841	1860	1865
Weinmergill Hall	in hand	ditto	ditto	W. Collinson	ditto	ditto
Grassholme West	J. Elliot	John Addison	ditto	H. Allinson	H. Allinson's exors	H. Allinson
Grassholme Mill	J. Hind	John Elliot	Joseph Watson	-	-	-
Stack	J. & G. Alderson	ditto	John Smith	Thomas Smith	ditto	ditto
Rigg	-	J. Alderson & W. Beckworth	Thomas Allison	ditto	Richard Watson	ditto
Grassholme East	Philip Elliot	Francis Smith	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
East Close	Thomas Addison	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
West Stake Hill	Henry Alderson	J. Addison	ditto	John Dowson	ditto	ditto
East Stake Hill	J. Kipling	ditto	ditto	-	-	-
West Park	J. Bainbridge	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
Thringarth	William Sowerby	ditto	ditto	ditto	Joseph Sowerby	ditto
East Park	J. Raine	Matthew Walton	ditto	ditto	John Dent	Thomas Allinson
Chapel House	-	William Wallis	ditto	ditto	William Raine	ditto
Cronkley	Thomas Allinson	ditto	ditto	A. & J. Allinson	ditto	ditto

Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 11/5; 13/17; 9/48.

Table 4.8 — Lunedale Farm Tenants, 1810 to 1860

FARM	1810	1821	1825	1841	1860	1865
Close House	Joseph Shields	ditto	ditto	J. Watson	William Collinson	George Collinson
Lune Head	Robert Coatsworth	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Henry Sowerby
Wythes Hill East	Francis Smith	Matthew Raine	J. Watson	ditto	J. Watson's Exors	J. Watson
Wythes Hill West	Joshua Dent	ditto	-	-	-	-
Grains O' Beck	Robert Dent	Joseph Dent	Messrs Dent	Joshua Dent	ditto	ditto
Blake House	J. Forster & J. Tewart	Joseph Watson	ditto	John Watson	ditto	ditto
Dow Hill	Margaret Watson	ditto	ditto	-	-	-
Scar Head	Margaret Tallentine	Issac Bayles	ditto	ditto	Robert Bayles	ditto
Stackholme	Joseph Kipling	ditto	ditto	ditto	John Kipling	ditto
Corbush	Elizabeth Langstaff	in hand	Joseph Watson	-	-	-
Intake	-	William Robinson	-	-	-	-
Low Wemmergill	J. Allison	in hand	Messrs Clarke	Henry Dent	ditto	ditto
High Soulgill	William Addison	ditto	George Raine	ditto	ditto	ditto
High Grain	Jacob Walton	-	-	-	-	-
Low Soulgill	Henry Sayer	Thomas Sayer	Henry Sayer	Thomas Sayer	ditto	ditto

Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 11/5; 13/17; 9/48.

no change of tenant between 1810 and 1821, and on 8 holdings, the same family remained in occupation from 1810 to 1841. There was some movement of farm tenants within the estate. For instance, Francis Smith, the tenant of Wythes Hill in 1810, moved to Grassholme East. Bell and Clint's plans to attract a "*substantial and improving*" tenantry were not realised. Messrs Clarke, the tenants they praised in 1823, had left the estate by 1841.

Despite the agricultural depression and the dilapidated condition of the estate, Table 4.9 shows that rents on nearly all the farms in Lunedale were raised in 1821. In 1810, total rental income from the Lunedale farms came to £796.70; in 1821 it had risen to £1,478.65. Certain repairs were carried out to the farms in the 1820s. A new dwelling house and stable were built at Grassholme Mill in 1824, and repairs made to three byres at a cost of £137. In 1827, building work was in progress at Soulgill, Lune Head and Thringarth Park. Improvements to Stack farm were completed in 1831 at a total cost of £323.

Agriculture was the dominant land use and the main source of income on the Wemmergill estate. Timber was not a significant resource. In Lunedale, the largest plantation was at Wemmergill Hall (20 hectares), and there is no evidence that the estate sought to expand the area of timber. The Wemmergill estate lay to the south of the main lead ore field (see Figure 4.3), and although there were some lead deposits under the estate, lead mining was never an important resource on the estate. There was one lead mine in Lunedale at Lune Head at the top of the dale, and the London Lead Company leased the lead rights for most of the 19th century.

4.2.4 Estate Development: 1830 to 1880

Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show the layout, land use and land values of the Lunedale farms in the mid-19th century. Comparing the figures with Tables 4.5 and 4.6, it can be seen that there was a gradual increase in farm size from the lower to the upper end of Lunedale. The main reason for this geographical pattern was land quality, which deteriorated up dale. For instance, pasture land at Lune Head was valued at 60 pence to £1.20 per hectare, whereas lower down the dale it was worth £1.80 to £2.40. Similarly, meadow land valued at £1.44 to £2.40 per hectare at

Table 4.9 — Lunedale Farm Rents, 1810 to 1880

FARM	1810	1821	1825	1859	1860	1870	1875	1880
Close House & Arngill	41.90	48.00	42.35	62.00	78.00	78.00	78.00	78.00
Lune Head	51.80	55.00	53.20	67.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	80.00
Wythes Hill	45.4	55.30	129.25	131.45	150.00	150.00	150.00	150.00
Grains O' Beck	32.6	57.00	56.70	139.70	164.70	164.00	164.00	164.00
Scar House	36.65	69.65	42.8	-	-	61.00	-	-
Old Gate	-	-	23.55	-	-	-	-	-
Blake House	-	32.30	33.70	70.35	82.75	82.00	82.00	82.00
Dow Hill	21.45	26.00	25.75	-	-	-	-	-
Scar Head	-	38.10	40.00	49.50	61.05	61.05	61.00	61.00
Stackholme	29.65	39.30	45.90	99.05	112.00	112.00	112.00	112.00
Corbush	11.10	11.60	11.45	-	-	-	-	-
Intake	-	0	26.35	23.15	-	-	-	-
Low Wemmergill	-	114.60	158.20	138.85	153.00	153.00	153.00	153.00
High Soulgill	-	32.00	30.85	40.00	43.40	43.00	50.00	50.00
High Grain	24.75	33.00	34.85	71.95	87.50	87.00	87.00	87.00
Wemmergill Hall	-	216.35	-	88.50	138.00	216.00	138.00	138.00
Grassholme West	42.60	32.05	30.30	97.85	118.00	118.00	133.00	133.00
Grassholme Mill	34.40	27.85	-	-	-	-	-	-
Stack	-	35.00	55.40	75.20	81.00	81.00	81.00	81.00
Rigg	-	26.65	25.35	29.35	31.50	31.00	31.50	42.00
Grassholme East	23.2	-	63.2	60.25	70.25	70.00	70.00	70.00
Grassholme Middle	-	64.70	-	-	-	-	-	-
East Close	-	16.25	16.75	17.60	18.75	19.00	18.70	18.70
West Stake Hill	30.10	43.45	43.65	77.70	91.75	90.00	91.70	91.70
East Stake Hill	26.4	25.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
West Park	46.65	75.05	72.25	79.90	91.30	93.00	93.40	93.40
Thringarth	41.00	32.40	31.30	32.00	40.60	41.00	40.60	40.60
East Park	126.15	152.45	151.00	169.95	189.00	174.00	173.00	173.00
Chapel House	-	34.50	30.30	41.50	46.50	37.00	36.90	24.18
Cronkley	130.90	85.00	88.30	83.65	110.00	110.00	110.00	110.00
TOTAL	796.70	1,478.65	1,362.70	1,746.45	2,039.05	2,151.05	2,034.80	2,032.58

Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 11/5; 11/6; 9/47 (*In the following tables pounds, shillings and pence have been converted into decimal currency*).




Figure 4.8

Figure 4.9

MIDDLE LUNEDALE, LAND USE, 1860





Figure 4.10



the top of the dale, was worth over £2.40 further down. Hence farms at the top of the dale were compensated for the poorer quality of the land by larger quantities.

An additional land resource available to the tenant farmers was the land which remained unenclosed. After enclosure, the Wemmergill estate still contained three major open moorland areas: Lune Forest and Moor (about 4,688 hectares), Holwick Fell (1,085 hectares) and Cotherstone Moor (2,500 hectares), a total of approximately 8,273 hectares. These areas were high (from 350m to over 700m on Lune Forest), and unimprovable. In addition, several smaller pastures of better quality land, such as Crossthwaite Pasture and Mickle Fell, remained unenclosed.

These unenclosed moors and pastures played an integral role in the farming economy, and were managed by stinting agreements [32]. Table 4.10 shows the distribution of stints between the Lunedale farms in 1825 and 1858, and Table 4.11 the distribution of stints on the Holwick farms in 1852. The moors were grazed by many farmers, whilst the pastures were grazed more selectively. For instance, Crossthwaite Pasture was grazed by two tenants and Mickle Fell by three. The farms that rented stints were those with greatest ease of access to the moors, situated in the middle and upper dale. Cronkley farm, with a total area of almost 290 hectares, was an atypically large holding for the Wemmergill estate because rough grazing was incorporated within the farm holding.

Stint rents were included in the total farm rent. The Wemmergill farms consisted of three resource components: improved land, allotment land and stints. The rent of a farm, therefore, did not reflect land quantity alone, but also the quality of the lands and the number of stints. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the composition of land resources and rent on all the Wemmergill farms in 1920. Although the figures relate to a later period, they show clearly how farm size can be a misleading indicator of the value of a farm in the North Pennines [33]. It can also be seen that the balance of the three land elements varied between the farms. Allotment lands and stints were more important to the farms in the upper dale.

By the end of the 1820s, the agricultural depression was lifting and the following forty years of agricultural prosperity enabled the much needed improvements to be carried out, with resulting rental increases. In 1836, arrears of rent totalled

Table 4.10 — Stint Levels, Rents & Fines at Lunedale, 1810 to 1860

FARM	1825	Rent	1858	-	Fines	1876	1890	1920	Rent
-	no.	(£)	no.	allowed	(£)	no.	no.	no.	(£)
Close House & Arngill	50	25.00	160	50	0	80	80	80	70.00
Lune Head	50	25.00	96	50	13.95	90	70	70	61.05
Wythes Hill	20	10.00	0	0	0	20	0	0	0
Grains O' Beck	40	20.00	144	96	14.40	142	100	60	57.50
Scar House	56	28.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blake House	25	12.30	100	40	18.00	85	85	70	61.05
Dow Hill	15	7.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Scar Head	15	7.30	63	15	14.40	55	55	55	48.10
Stackholme	25	12.30	81.5	45	10.95	80	60	60	52.50
Corbush	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intake	15	7.30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low Wemmergill	-	-	60	100	0	80	40	40	35.00
High Soulgill	30	15.00	34.5	30	1.35	54	54	54	47.25
Low Soulgill	20	10.00	54	30	7.20	50	50	50	43.75
Wemmergill Hall	50	25.00	-	50	120.00	80	80	80	70.00
Grassholme Mill	0	0	28.5	15	4.05	25	0	0	0
Stack	25	12.00	48	25	6.90	45	35	35	30.60
Grassholme East	15	7.30	30.5	15	4.65	25	20	20	17.50
West Park	10	5.00	22	10	3.60	25	0	0	0
Thringarth	8	4.00	24	20	1.20	16	-	-	-
West Stake Hill	15	7.30	17.5	-	-	-	20	-	-
TOTAL	489	134.35	964	591	220.65	952	749	674	594.30

Sources:D/St/E3/13/5; E3/13/9

£1,186.80, but by 1855 the arrears were down to £50.05, indicating more prosperous conditions. A continuous set of estate accounts provides detailed information

Table 4.11 — Stint Levels at Holwick, 1852 to 1894


FARM	1852	-	1870	-	1894	-	-
-	allowed	occupied	allowed	occupied	present	reduced	compensation (£)
Holwick Head	20	23.5	45	62.5	43	11.2	20.95
Hield House	20	24.5	26	37.5	30	11.2	12.30
Mire House	10	9.5	10	13	10	6	2.60
Mizzies House	25	26	25	23	20	7.8	8.00
Pikestone (main)	15	12.5	25	31	15	15	-
Close House	12	8.5	12	12.5	2	2	-
Pikestone (small)	15	12	15	16.5	17	9.4	4.95
Castles	-	-	5	5	5	5	-
Holwick West (small)	15	12.5	25	34	25	11	9.15
Holwick West (main)	15	22	33	44.5	26	7.2	12.30
Holwick Cottage	-	-	10	8	10	8.2	1.15
Holwick Middle	-	-	40	19.5	40	39.6	0.25
Holwick East	-	-	30	28.5	10	10	-
Hungry Hall	20	25	40	31.5	30	17	8.50
Park End	20	9.5	20	4.5	-	-	0.75
TOTAL	250	256	361	371.5	283	80	80.90

Sources: D/St/E3/13/5; E3/13/9

on the Wemmergill estate budget from 1841 to 1885 (see Table 4.12) which, in conjunction with other documents, enables the development of the estate over the mid-19th century to be pieced together [34].

Table 4.12 and Figure 4.13 show that, between 1840 and 1860, expenditure was particularly high on the Wemmergill estate. Indeed, in 1850 and 1860 expenditure exceeded the income from the estate. It appears that John Bowes was an active improver. Between 1836 and 1840, almost £300 was spent on drainage on the

Figure 4.11 — Resource Composition of Lunedale Farms, 1920




Source: D/St/E3/9/33 See Appendix D for farm key

Lunedale farms (see Table 4.13), and a further £251 was expended on drainage on the Wemmergill estate in 1841. Wemmergill may have been the first of John Bowes' estates to be drained. He made use of external funds to finance the drainage, although was reportedly dissatisfied with the cost of obtaining a loan [35]. However, in 1849 he entered into an agreement with the newly formed Lands Improvement Company (see 3.2.3) to take out a loan of £5,000 (D/St/E4/13/3). The loan was initially intended for the Wemmergill estate, but in 1851 £1,800 was substituted for the Cockfield estate (D/St/E4/13/8). The loan was paid back in half-yearly installments of £93.

In 1856, John Bowes was praised by Thomas Bell for the improvement of his English estates (JRAS, 1856, 115). Almost £43,000 had been spent on the improvement of land and buildings between 1842 and 1853 (see Table 4.14). Of the Streatlam

Figure 4.12 — Rental Composition of Lunedale Farms, 1920



Source: D/St/E3/9/33 See Appendix D for farm key

estate Thomas Bell wrote:


"This estate many years ago had, from various causes, got into a very bad condition during the lifetime of the late Earl of Strathmore, and the Trustees, during Mr Bowes's minority, laid out from £20,000 to £30,000 upon the estate, previous to and altogether irrespective of the above liberal outlay by Mr Bowes himself... Not another word need be added to set forth the laudable attention of this gentleman to the improvement of that portion of the county of Durham which belongs to him"

As well as drainage, improvements were also made to farm buildings and fences. Fencing was obviously a considerable expense: allotments had to be subdivided and existing fences maintained. A land use survey of the Lunedale farms in 1841 suggested that some of the larger enclosures be subdivided to encourage land im-

Table 4.12 — Income & Outgoings on the Wemmergill Estate, 1841 to 1885

RECEIPTS	1841	1845	1850	1855	1860	1865	1870	1875	1880	1885
Agricultural rents	4,931.80	4,961.35	4,808.90	4,887.40	4,832.85	5,619.05	5,799.50	6,438.80	6,509.65	7,260.55
Customary Rents	50.50	115.50	265.65	130.95	124.70	75.95	94.95	112.80	82.90	65.05
Mining rents	-	161.40	39.80	11.80	93.05	258.75	146.45	80.40	50.50	11.60
Timber	43.75	105.35	141.45	76.85	134.20	74.30	64.11	108.20	33.70	14.60
Miscellaneous	-	8.45	7.70	20.20	1.90	1.25	93.90	229.80	83.85	-
TOTAL	5,026.05	5,352.05	5,263.50	5,127.20	5,186.70	6,029.30	6,198.91	6,970.00	6,760.60	7,351.80
OUTGOINGS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drainage	251.80	11.15	10.20	7.10	51.20	0.80	3.85	0.75	10.05	22.70
Fencing	32.95	176.85	104.10	49.20	596.20	5.20	28.35	32.45	120.65	98.75
Repairs	376.15	436.45	695.85	839.40	433.95	411.65	667.70	590.30	839.10	756.80
Woods	93.40	37.90	41.50	18.15	127.70	91.10	27.65	53.80	24.85	76.85
Taxes, Rates etc	294.00	472.50	532.50	817.75	420.45	371.70	338.65	100.3	178.30	213.35
Agencies	111.75	135.75	131.40	135.65	128.55	131.20	123.30	141.05	139.65	125.25
Estate Subscriptions	48.40	50.40	50.40	39.45	43.00	58.10	70.60	124.10	69.10	71.10
Remittances	3,800.00	3,800.00	4,291.00	2,600.00	3,700.00	4,900.00	4,900.00	5,300.00	5,100.00	3,000.00
TOTAL	5,008.45	5,121.00	5,856.95	4,506.70	5,501.05	5,969.75	6,160.10	6,342.75	6,481.70	4,364.80

Figure 4.13 — The Wemmergill Estate Budget, 1841 to 1885



provement (D/St/E3/13/17). In 1860, it was reported that fences had been much altered since the last survey of the estate (in 1841?), and several new intakes had been made (Thomas Bell to Ralph Dent, 1/10/1860).

The bulk of the estate income was made up of farm rents. Rents from the customary leaseholds, from timber and from lead mining were low and variable. As stated above, there were no plans to expand the area of timber, and the potential to expand the lead mining was limited. A report by Thomas Sopwith (the Blackett-Beaumont's mineral agent) in 1867 concerning a mining lease, found that the London Lead Company had lost £2,600 in 1866, and £5,000 had been lost over the previous five years. Over the past 23 years, annual production of lead ore had not exceeded 250 tons per annum in Lunedale (D/St/B2/100). Therefore, John Bowes looked to increase his income from the farms.

The capital invested in the farm buildings and land was reflected in higher earnings.

Table 4.13 — Expenditure on Drainage, 1836 to 1840

FARM	AMOUNT (£)
Close House & Arngill	27.25
Lune Head	1.40
Grains O' Beck	9.60
Scar House	6.00
Blake House & Cote House	29.70
Scar Head	8.60
Stackholme	1.50
Low Wemmergill	21.50
High Grain	13.90
Low Soulgill	21.60
Wemmergill Hall	43.50
Stack Farm	28.00
Grassholme West & Mill	19.15
Grassholme East	11.55
Stake Hill	13.15
West Park	4.95
East Park & Bowbank	6.10
TOTAL	267.45

Source: D/St/E4/13/2

In 1860, Thomas Bell was requested to survey and value the farms, as a result of which farm rents were raised considerably. Between 1860 and 1865, the total income from farm rents increased from £4,832.85 to £5,619.05. Farm rents on the Lunedale farms increased from £1,746.45 to £2,039.05 and rent levels continued to rise until 1885.

The other main expenses on the estate were taxes, rates and management costs.

Table 4.14 — Estate Investment, 1842 to 1853, by John Bowes

Streatlam Estates	Buildings	12,074
-	Drainage	11,198
Gibside Estate	Buildings	7,716
Hylton Estate	Buildings	3,176
-	Drainage	8,777
-	TOTAL	42,942

Source: Bell (1856)

A bailiff was employed on a salary of £80 per annum, but the agent's salary was paid from the Streatlam account. By far the largest payment, however, was the remittance paid to John Bowes as a personal salary. This was paid twice yearly to John Bowes' bankers in London. It was never less than £2,500, and in 1880 was almost £6,500.

Although revenue from sporting leases was not recorded in the Wemmergill accounts at this time, sporting rights were leased in the 1860s. At this time John Bowes was living in Paris and so could not shoot the moors himself. The moors were let in three main leases: Wemmergill (Lune Forest and Moor), Cotherstone and Holwick. Wemmergill was the most prestigious shoot, with 4,688 hectares of open moorland and 1,917 hectares of enclosed lands. It was generally let with Wemmergill Hall for use as a shooting lodge (D/St/E3/20/1). Cotherstone Moor was generally let in two sections: the low moor (833 hectares) and the high moor (1,667 hectares). Finally, the Holwick shoot covered 4,833 hectares.

The Wemmergill shooting lease was taken by a Mr F.A. Milbank in 1867 for £250 in the first year, and £350 per annum thereafter (D/St/C2/15/51) [36]. In 1866, the Holwick shoot, plus Mickle Fell and Close House, was let to a General Hall for £200 for the first year and for 4 years thereafter for £300 a year (D/St/E3/20/1).

4.2.5 Landlord-Tenant Relations and Rural Society

The dispute over ownership in the early part of the century was followed by a period, from 1840 to 1880, of remarkable stability in the management of Wemmergill. John Bowes was landlord for 65 years (including the period of interim trusteeship), from 1820 until 1885, whilst the agent, Ralph Dent, held office for 32 years from 1840 to 1872 (see Appendix C). Even the Wemmergill bailiff, George MacKenzie, served for at least the 30 years from 1851 to 1881.

As has been observed, John Bowes took an active interest in the improvement of his estates. At the beginning of his landlordship he was also involved in national and local politics. He was elected as MP for the South Durham Division in 1832, and was re-elected in 1841 and 1846 (D/St/C1/16/275). After 1850, however, he left politics and spent little time on his estates, for in 1854 he married a french actress (Josephine) and they settled in Paris.

Landlord-tenant relations appear to have been generally cordial except on the question of the stinted moors. Possibly due to the more prosperous conditions of the mid-19th century, several farmers in both Lunedale and Holwick exceeded their stint allowances (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11). There were found to be 6 over-stints on Holwick Fell in 1858 and 10.5 in 1870. On Lune Moor and Forest the problem was more serious. In 1858, 964 stints were counted, an excess of 373 over the agreed number (D/St/E3/13/5). William Collinson, tenant of Close House and Wemmergill Hall farms, at first refused to give a return on his sheep numbers, but was found to have an excess of 60 stints (D/St/C2/15/42). The estate objected to the over-grazing, not only because they did not receive rents for the extra sheep, but also because over-grazing damaged the heather. The moors were used for both sheep grazing and grouse shooting, and a balance had to be maintained between the two requirements.

John Bowes and Ralph Dent decided that stricter regulations were called for, and in the 1860s and 1870s new rules of management were issued for Lune Moor and Forest (1868), Holwick Fell (1871), and Cotherstone Moor (1873) [37]. Although differing in detail, all imposed fines for over-stocking. For example, in 1858, fines on over-stints in Lunedale cost the offending farmers £220.65. As well as tighter restrictions, the trend in the second half of the 19th century was towards a decrease

in the number of stints. Table 4.11 shows that after 1870, the number of stints allowed on Holwick Fell declined. In 1894, Holwick Fell was actually re-stinted to reduce the number of stints from 283 to 80, due to the *“rapid deterioration and threatened extinction of the ling upon Holwick Fell”* (D/St/E3/13/9). The farmers received 15 pence compensation for every head of sheep lost.

In addition to the reasons given above for the tighter restrictions on grazing, two other possible factors suggest themselves. First, it is possible that the area of the moors had been reduced by further intakes, although no reference to this has been found. A reduction in the area would obviously reduce the carrying capacity of the moors. Second, a more likely explanation is that grouse shooting was becoming a more important activity on the estate, and the interests of the shooting lessees were given priority over the interests of farmers. A sporting lodge for the use of shooting parties was built at Holwick by a consortium of lessees in the 1860s (Respondent A) and it was the Holwick shooting tenant who instigated the reduction of stints in 1894.

Disputes between tenants over stints were also common. For instance, a letter from George McKenzie to Ralph Dent in 1871 reports that William Dent of Grains O' Beck and Henry Dent of Low Wemmergill had argued over sheep heafs [38]. Apparently Henry Dent:

“bought some 40 or 50 sheep at William Alderson's sale and has bred them up and now he finds they are pinched for room on the heaf they formerly had and has been driving William Dent's sheep off the ground which they have had for a long period. I have tried to make peace between them and have failed...I am inclined to think that a great number of our Lune tenants are further wrong in regard to their stints than the Holwick people were, and I would suggest that you give them the same treatment and I think that will settle them for some years to come...” (Mackenzie to Dent, 20/5/1871).

Considering the difficulty of managing the stinted moors, and the small income that stint rents brought in, it is not surprising that the estate was urged to do away with stints by Thomas Bell:

“We are of the opinion that the more of the stinting that can be done away with the better it will save much trouble and annoyance” (Bell to Dent, 11/8/1860)

Contrary to this advice, however, in 1866 an act of parliament was obtained to turn Cotherstone Moor into a regulated pasture (D/St/E3/19/144) [39].

The Wemmergill estate displayed a mixture of open and closed characteristics (see 3.3.1). Table 4.15 shows that the populations of all six manors in the Wemmergill estate remained relatively stable. The populations of both Lunedale and Holwick increased steadily until 1871. The most marked growth was at Mickleton, where the population increased from 330 in 1801 to 651 in 1871. It is likely that the population growth in Lunedale, Holwick and Mickleton was linked to the lead mining industry across the river in Teesdale. Table 4.16 indicates that the influence of mining was stronger in Holwick than Lunedale, and was probably strongest in Mickleton.

Table 4.15 — Population Change on the Wemmergill Estate, 1801 to 1871

Date	Lunedale	Holwick	Mickleton	Cotherstone	Hunderthwaite	Romaldkirk
1801	307	196	330	636	334	276
1811	283	182	337	688	320	302
1821	265	201	356	706	313	377
1831	308	208	500	631	297	380
1841	339	205	513	566	280	338
1851	321	237	653	607	239	357
1861	389	253	688	561	304	327
1871	400	232	651	583	302	312

Although lead mining was not economically important to the estate, it provided many of the inhabitants with employment and fulfilled a social role from the point of view of the estate. In 1867, Thomas Sopwith advised John Bowes to renew the lease to the London Lead Company with lower rates of duty because of the strategic importance of retaining its presence on the estate:

Table 4.16 — Employment in Lunedale & Holwick, 1851 & 1881

-	1851	-	1881	-
OCCUPATION	Lunedale	Holwick	Lunedale	Holwick
Farmer:	-	-	-	-
>12.5 hectares	26	14	31	14
4-12.5 hectares	12	7	8	6
<4 hectares	2	1	1	-
Lead Miner	11	35	11	25
Lead Washer/ Dresser/ Smelter	1	-	1	2
Shopkeeper/ Tradesman	-	2	1	1
Blacksmith	-	1	-	1
Tailor/ Shoe/Clogmaker	2	4	-	-
Dressmaker/ Straw Bonnets	2	-	5	4
Labourer/ Mason/ Joiner etc	5	4	8	3
Agricultural Labourer	17	12	14	3
Gamekeeper	1	2	3	1
Female Servant/ Housekeeper	16	14	14	14
Mine/ Quarry Agent	1	-	1	-
Land Agent/ Bailiff	1	-	1	-
Schoolteacher	1	1	1	1
Vicar	2	-	1	-
Doctor/ Nurse	-	1	-	-
Policeman	-	-	-	-
Widow (head of house)	1	3	1	1
Retired Male (head of house)	2	-	2	2
Toll Bridge Keeper	-	1	-	-
Railway workers	-	-	-	4
Number of Households	54	45	60	42
Males	158	106	166	128
Females	163	101	160	122
TOTAL POPULATION	321	237	326	250

Source: Census Enumerators Books

"the discontinuance of the present works would to a certain extent be disadvantageous to the inhabitants of the district - but on the other hand a large extension of mining operations would be highly beneficial. A mining population under the judicious control of the Lead Company would be a material addition to the value of property and the more so as it is well known in what an admirable manner that Company has promoted the well being of the workmen employed by it and the education of their children" (D/St/B2/100).

On all the manors within the Wemmergill estate there was a separate farming class. They enjoyed a better standard of living than the miners, although they did not form a separate social class. The constraints of the environment were too severe to attract a more prosperous tenant class. The 1851 census indicates that the inhabitants of Lunedale conformed in several respects to the observations on upland society made in 3.3.1. Family continuity was the norm on the farm holdings (see Tables 4.7 and 4.8). Several of the farms had live-in farm servants (Wemmergill Hall, Stackholme, Thwaite, Stack, and East Park). Household size was generally large (for instance Wemmergill Hall had 13 inmates, Thwaite 11 and West Park 10). Some of the smaller farmers are noted in the census as having a second employment (for instance Joseph Sowerby, Thringarth, and Thomas Addison, East Close, were also stone masons). At West Park, two sons were employed as lead miners, but dual employment was the exception rather than the rule on the larger farm holdings. The most influential tenant in Lunedale was William Collinson, who rented Wemmergill Hall and Close House farms and was recorded as employing 7 labourers as well as having 2 live-in servants.

The farms provided a subsistence living as well as an income. The land use surveys of 1825 and 1841 show that the predominant land uses were, as today, pasture and meadow. However, many farmers cultivated a field of vegetable and cereal crops, presumably for home consumption. Farming was based on livestock rearing (cattle and sheep), and dairying, but most farms also kept pigs, hens, horses and geese. In 1860, Lune Head farm was reported as having a hen loft, pig house, goose house and a three-stalled stable as well as three byres for cattle (D/St/E3/11/6).

Donations and patronage were required of John Bowes as a landlord. In 1875, for instance, £124 was spent on local activities: including a subscription to the

schools and clothing fund, the organ fund, to Holwick and Mickleton schools, to Cotherstone school, Grains O' Beck school and Carlbeck school, to the Hurytup show and the Middleton-in-Teesdale Agricultural Society and, finally, to the Reverend Cleveland to be distributed in charity (D/St/E3/5/78).

4.2.6 Summary

Many changes took place on the Wemmergill estate during the first half of the 19th century. The enclosure of the estate enabled farms to be enlarged and improved, but the environment placed constraints on the extent to which the farm sector could be modernised. Although distress was caused in the 1820s by the simultaneous disruption and expense caused by enclosure, the onset of the agricultural depression, and the legal dispute over ownership; in the mid-19th century the value of the estate was greatly increased.

The Wemmergill estate was primarily an agricultural estate, and although mining was an important source of employment, it was not a major factor in the estate's decision-making framework. The society seems to have conformed in several respects to the features identified in other studies of upland societies, although there was a separate full-time farm sector and the population was relatively stable. Relations between the estate and the tenants seem to have been cordial, except over the regulation of the stunted moors and pastures.

4.3 Case Study Two: The Blanchland Estate

4.3.1 Introduction

Lord Crewe's Charity takes the name of its founder, Nathaniel Lord Crewe, who lived from 1623 to 1721. During his lifetime, Lord Crewe combined a career in the Church with considerable political opportunism, to obtain a high degree of influence in the court of King Charles II, and later King James II (Stranks, 1976, 3). He rose from the post of fellow at Lincoln College, Oxford, to the post of Rector at the College, and then to the position of Bishop of Oxford in 1671. In the following year, Lord Crewe was offered, and accepted, the Bishopric of Durham, which he held until his death. As well as presiding over the Durham Bishopric estates in his official capacity, Lord Crewe was also a landowner in his own right. He inherited

his brother John's estate at Newbold Verdon in Leicestershire, and the barony and estate of Steane in North Yorkshire. Through his second wife, Dorothy Forster, he inherited lands at Bamburgh and Blanchland in Northumberland, which were later to form his charity. These estates had been acquired by the Forster family after the Reformation, and by the 18th century were so heavily encumbered that the Court of Chancery was petitioned to sell them in order to discharge the debts (Stranks, 1976, 5). Instead, Lord Crewe intervened and purchased the estates, probably already with the intention of founding his charity.

Lord Crewe seems to have been a controversial character. The following description does not fit the image of the founder of a charity:

"The meanness of Bishop Crewe's political conduct is well known to have thrown a deep and lasting shade over his many splendid qualities" (Surtees, quoted in the Vict. Hist. Northumberland, 1893, Vol. 1, 166)

The charity was, perhaps, a means of atoning for his sometimes questionable conduct.

4.3.2 The Charity: Structure and Administration

Detailed instructions as to the purpose, income sources, and administration of the charity were set down in Lord Crewe's will. A consideration of the will is, therefore, essential to the analysis of the charity. The charity's income was to be derived from Lord Crewe's Northumberland estates, the annual value of which in 1721 was estimated at £1,312. Lord Crewe intended the charity to reflect his life and work, by supporting primarily educational and religious institutions located in the dioceses of Durham and Newcastle; Lincoln College, Oxford; and Newbold Verdon. The guaranteed annual charitable payments came to over £776. In addition, up to £200 of any surplus income was to be given to the Chancellor of Oxford University to be disposed of for charitable purposes, and up to £100 was to be given to the City of Durham to help poor apprentices. All the income from the estates, therefore, after the deduction of necessary expenses, was to be directed towards charitable purposes [40].

The charity had close links with the Church. Lord Crewe stipulated that the charity be administered by five trustees, in whom the legal title to the estates

was vested. The first five trustees named by Lord Crewe were all churchmen [41], and all trustees appointed thereafter were to be churchmen, one always to be the Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford. The appointment of officers to administer and manage the estates was left to the discretion of the trustees. Although allowed no personal interest in the estates, the trustees were entitled to recoup expenses incurred whilst carrying out their duties.

The charity inherited a diverse property portfolio; including fisheries, mines, mills and quarries as well as farmlands. It owned the manorial rights to the manors of Bamburgh and Blanchland, and held the church livings of Bamburgh and Shotley (which entitled the trustees to the tithes of these two parishes). There were eight estates which were located geographically in two areas: the Northumberland coast and the North Pennines. The areas and incomes of these estates in the late 19th century are set out in Table 4.17 [42]. The Bamburgh, North Sunderland, Shoreston, Fleetham and Thornton estates were all located on the Northumberland coast, and together made up 72% of the charity's total income in 1877. There were three contiguous estates in the North Pennines: Blanchland (1,995 hectares), Heatheryburn (119 hectares), and Hunstanworth (1,789 hectares). Despite their size, these estates together contributed only 26.6% of the total charity income in 1877. For administrative purposes, the eight estates were divided into two units: Bamburgh and Blanchland, and will be referred to by these names in the following analysis.

Bamburgh Castle was established as the administrative centre of the charity in the late 19th century, following the restoration of the castle by Dr John Sharp [43]. Here, the trustees met at least twice a year to discuss the charity's business. The meetings were chaired by one of the trustees (a chairman was elected each year), and a quorum of three was required at each meeting. The main business of the charity was carried out by a secretary and a receiver. The former decided the business of each meeting and took the minutes, whilst the latter was responsible for the collection of the estate rents and the charity accounts. Two land agents were employed to manage the estates: one at Bamburgh and one at Blanchland. They were assisted by bailiffs. It was the responsibility of the bailiffs and the agents to inform the secretary at Bamburgh of matters concerning the estates to be discussed by the trustees. The trustees' approval was required for all management decisions;

Table 4.17 — Lord Crewe's Charity Estates: Area & Income

ESTATE	AREA (has)	RENTALS (£)	
		1877	1896
-	1896	1877	1896
Bamburgh	-	2,049	4
North Sunderland	183.5	1202	783
Shoreston	197	981	600
Fleetham	236.5	846	683
Thornton	559	1,984	1,576
Blanchland	1,992.9	1,424	1,302
Heatheryburn	118.7	100	76
Hunstanworth	1,787.6	1,091	851
Tithes	-	136	576
Harbour Dues	-	-	632
Interest on Investments	-	-	3,130
TOTAL	5,079	9,813	10,213


Source: 1877 Account; 452/C5/44

such as the selection of new tenants, repairs and improvements to the estate, rent levels, and the resolution of disputes. However, from the evidence in the minute books, it would appear that the trustees concerned themselves mainly with the charitable functions and left the practicalities of estate management to the agents. It would also seem that by the early 19th century, the trustees had adopted certain features of private landlordism. For instance, since 1794 they had taken it in turns to reside at Bamburgh Castle in order to supervise the various activities carried on in the castle and to entertain the estate tenants. For this purpose a coach was put at their disposal.

4.3.3 The Blanchland Estate Structure and Income Sources

The Blanchland estate is located in the Derwent Valley (see Figure 4.14). Al-

Figure 4.14



though no figure has been found of the farm layout in the 19th century, a fairly accurate picture can be gained from Figure 4.15 which shows the farm layout of the Blanchland estate in the 1950s [44].

The economy of the Blanchland estate in the early 19th century was based on rents from farms, mines and timber. The estate was already enclosed in 1800 [45]. The farm structure is shown in Table 4.18 There were fourteen full-time farms and several smallholdings. For instance, the occupiers of the Baybridge Inn also rented 9.8 hectares of land. Nookton was by far the largest holding with over 800 hectares. There were two holdings of over 400 hectares (Acton and Cowbyers), and two of over 300 hectares (Birkside and Buckshott). Farm holdings on the Blanchland estate were on average larger than those on the Wemmergill estate. This can be explained by the fact that at Blanchland, rough grazing land was incorporated within the farm holdings.

As well as the farms, there were three stinted pastures where villagers could graze cattle. Park and Shildon pastures were located near Blanchland village, whilst Close Pasture was located at Hunstanworth. No reference to the Park and Close pastures has been found until 1839. Part of the Park Pasture (about 13 hectares) was formed on the eviction of a tenant, Joshua Blenck, from Cowbyer cottage in 1839 (B.a.2, 1/2/1839).

Lead was an important resource on the estate in the 18th century, but ownership of the lead was divided. When the estate was forfeited to the Crown in 1709, the lead rights were sold to a certain Mr Skottowe's ancestors, although the lands were bought by Lord Crewe. Mr Skottowe's ancestors retained the ownership of the lead found under the land which was at the time unenclosed, although Lord Crewe owned the lead found under the ancient enclosures (452/E3/3). The trustees, therefore, did not command total control of the lead under their estate although, as owners of the surface, they owned the smelt mills. The division of ownership was to cause problems at a later date.

In 1708, the London Lead Company had taken on a lease of mines at Shildon and Jeffrey's Rake from the Forsters, and opened up two new mines at Ramshaw and Whiteheaps (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965). The company also built two smelt mills: Acton in 1710 and one near Jeffrey's Rake in 1713. By 1800, the lease

Figure 4.15

THE BLANCHLAND ESTATE, 1957




Table 4.18 — Blanchland Farm Structure, 1896

FARM	SIZE (hectares)
Acton	486.4
Birkside	301.5
Burntshieldhaugh	398
Cotehouse	74.4
Cowbyer (main)	482.6
Cowbyer (smallholding)	-
Fellgrove	12.7
Penny Pie	108.6
Allenshields (main)	367
Allenshields (smallholding)	6.9
Buckshott	373
Bale Hill	14.8
Gibraltar	11.9
Nookton	824.3
Heatheryburn	117.2
COMMON PASTURES	
<i>Park Pasture</i>	37.6
<i>Shildon Pasture</i>	2.1
<i>Close Pasture</i>	24.5
PLANTATIONS	
Blanchland	65.8
Heatheryburn	1.2
Hunstanworth	52.9

Source: 452/C5/44

had lapsed for some years, but a lease of the mines and the mills was taken up in 1805 by Easterly Hall and Company, who were later reformed as the Derwent Mining Company. They rented Allenshields farm from 1810 until 1835 and used

the farmhouse as the company office. Until 1850, the certain rent of the mines and smelt mills came to £150 per annum. A royalty rent was also charged of 1/7 of total production.

Three plantations were managed in hand: 52.9 hectares at Hunstanworth, 1.2 hectares at Heatheryburn and 65.8 hectares at Blanchland. The lead mining industry created a local demand for timber and the Derwent Mining Company was the main purchaser [46]. Timber was also needed for repairs on the estate. The remaining income from the Blanchland estates came from cottage rents and grouse shooting rents. Grouse shooting was not an important estate resource at this time, but a gamekeeper was employed to clamp down on poachers [47]. In 1837, shooting over the manor of Blanchland was let with 'reasonable' rights of shooting reserved to the trustees (B.a.2, 28/4/1837).

4.3.4 Estate Management

As is clear from Table 4.19, the bulk of the income from the Blanchland estates came from farm rents. The Blanchland estates were, apparently, prospering at the turn of the century, due to the inflation in agricultural prices following the Napoleonic Wars. Between 1800 and 1815, the total farm rental almost doubled. This prosperity is reflected in the high level of investment in the estate at this time. Between 1813 and 1818, almost £3,500 was expended on repairs and improvements to the farms and the village (see Table 4.20). A new school was built and a road to the village. £2,000 was expended in 1815 alone (see Table 4.21).

The sharp decline in rents between 1815 and 1820 indicates the onset of the early 19th century depression. Rents were reduced on most farms in 1818 (452/E2/37). The rent of Acton farm was initially reduced by over 50% to £60, but this was also due to the re-opening of Acton smelt mill [48]. Most of the farms were held on yearly tenancies, but a few were held on longer leases, and on these holdings rent reductions were delayed. A six year lease for Nookton farm was taken in 1813 at an annual rent of £182. The farm's value was increased by extensive improvements between 1813 and 1818 totalling £251 (see Table 4.20) and the rent was still £182 in 1820, but by 1815 it had fallen to £146. Allenshields farm was leased by the Derwent Mining Company in 1815 for three years at a rent of £176. When the lease was renewed in 1818, the rent was reduced to £135.

Table 4.19 — Blanchland Estate Receipts, 1800 to 1860

FARM	1800	1805	1810	1815	1820	1825	1830	1835	1845	1850	1855	1860
Acton	50.00	80.00	80.00	125.00	80.00	72.00	72.00	72.00	72.00	72.00	72.00	77.15
Cowbyer (main)	100.00	130.00	170.00	150.00	125.00	100.00	90.00	75.00	75.00	75.40	76.00	74.10
Cowbyer (small)	-	-	-	20.00	20.00	16.00	16.00	16.00	16.00	32.00	25.00	26.10
Penny Pie	30.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	26.00	23.40	23.40	23.40	23.40	25.40	25.40	26.00
Burntshieldhaugh	95.00	130.00	130.00	151.50	100.00	85.00	85.00	85.00	85.00	85.40	85.40	85.50
Birkside	55.00	55.40	80.00	90.00	75.00	68.00	77.00	77.00	77.00	77.40	77.40	78.70
Cotehouse	42.00	50.00	50.00	66.00	74.00	66.00	66.00	66.00	66.00	76.00	77.10	79.10
Allenshields (main)	45.00	52.50	172.00	173.25	136.20	136.20	76.20	76.20	115.00	122.00	136.25	150.00
Allenshields (small)	-	40.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.00	21.40	21.40	21.40
Fellgrove	-	16.70	16.70	17.50	17.50	13.50	13.50	15.00	15.00	16.70	16.70	16.70
Heatheryburn	33.00	33.40	50.00	51.00	66.00	56.00	36.00	56.00	70.00	70.00	70.00	70.00
Nookton	120.00	120.00	180.00	182.00	182.00	146.00	146.00	167.00	167.00	132.00	173.20	175.70
Gibraltar	-	5.60	12.00	13.70	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.20	13.40	13.40	13.00
Bale Hill	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
Buckshott	60.00	60.00	135.00	100.70	75.00	67.50	67.50	67.50	68.00	60.00	77.70	80.00
SUBTOTAL	630.00	803.60	1,105.70	1,170.65	987.00	860.60	779.60	807.10	891.50	889.10	957.35	983.85
Timber sales	-	-	-	208.75	49.75	134.65	73.00	482.00	131.00	23.00	251.00	282.00
Game rents	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80.00	100.00
Mines & Smelt Mills	75.00	75.00	175.00	175.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	135.00
TOTAL RECEIPTS	1,654.60	1,799.65	2,324.80	3,113.00	2,678.00	3,057.00	1,410.85	2,302.40	2,048.85	2,295.75	2,000.00	2,325.45

Source: 452/B.b.3-B.b.6

Table 4.20 — Expenditure at Blanchland, 1813 to 1818

WORK	EXPENSE (£)
Expended in building a bridge & making an access road	741.30
Expended at the Inn	490.85
Expended at the Church	473.70
Expended at the new school	20.00
Estimate for the necessary repairs of the farm houses (exclusive of cottage repairs)	1,289.50 -
Paid towards the above repairs	1,255.20
Yet to finish	43.30
Expended at Nookton farm in building walls	251.00
Expended in draining Buckshott, Acton, Allenshields & Cotehouse farms	144.40 -
TOTAL	3,410.75

Source: 452/E2/37

The depression continued into the 1820s, and farm rents continued to fall. In 1822, the tenants were granted a return on their last two years' rents. The trustees also recommended that:

"the tillage ground be reduced in each farm to the proportion of one third of the inclosed ground, or as near thereto as circumstances will admit, and that such assistance be given to the tenants towards laying down the tillage lands as Mr Fenwick (the agent) shall think fit" (B.a.2, 16/10/1822).

This implies that much land had been ploughed up during the inflated demand of the war period, but once normality was restored, the marginal quality of the land was not economic for arable production [49]. Distress amongst the tenantry in the 1820s is indicated by the high levels of rent arrears. In 1823, arrears amounted to £877 (452/E2/35), but in 1828 the total arrears were reduced to £298. By the late 1820s, the worst of the depression seems to have passed. After 1830, rent levels slowly picked up, although in 1860 they were still below the level in 1815. In 1846, rent arrears amounted to only £57 (452/B.b.5).

Despite the reduced income in the 1820s, necessary repairs and improvements were carried out. In 1819 the trustees decided that:

Table 4.21 — Expenditure at Blanchland, 1815 to 1865

-	1815	1820	1825	1830	1835	1845	1850	1855	1865
REPAIRS & IMPROVEMENTS	638.40	255.60	290.00	146.35	122.55	218.80	180.15	655.55	750.55
DRAINS & WALLS	263.00	52.60	30.70	54.65	35.95	76.80	140.25	47.15	242.85
PLANTATIONS	77.05	122.95	75.55	55.45	121.70	80.05	94.50	135.15	212.35
CESSES & TITHES	188.05	24.35	19.00	8.70	6.85	9.95	9.20	4.70	52.05
SCHOOL	-	101.30	80.55	81.45	74.10	79.90	78.80	81.70	105.70
INCIDENTS	328.35	289.95	306.70	208.35	269.50	303.90	217.50	336.85	182.15
MISC	548.85	175.55	182.65	-	46.50	72.45	36.75	-	79.55
TOTAL	2,043.70	1,022.30	985.15	554.95	677.15	841.85	757.15	1,261.10	1,625.20

Source: 452/B.b.3-B.b.6; E2/45-51

“a sum not exceeding £800 be applied for putting the farm holdings upon the estate at Bamburgh and Blanchland into sufficient repair and when a tenant shall apply for any new buildings that he be required to pay after the rate of 7% for the money expended upon such additional buildings” (B.a.2, 25/11/1819).

There were several other sources of expenditure as well as the upkeep and improvement of farm buildings and farmland. The plantations had to be maintained and salaries had to be paid as well as rates, tithes and other miscellaneous charges. The high payment on rates and tithes in 1815 can be attributed to the heavy taxes that were imposed during the Napoleonic Wars. After 1815, this was a minor expense. Table 4.22 shows the estate employees and their salaries in 1825. The bailiff succeeding Edward Blenck, William Colpitts, was dismissed in 1841 for misconduct, and the schoolmaster, Thomas Hey, was appointed as bailiff on an annual

salary of £20 in addition to his salary as schoolmaster. Miscellaneous payments included disbursement of taxes, expenditure on the church, the new road, water works, irrecoverable debts, and improvements to the stinted pastures. Between 1845 and 1849, a total of £313.50 was spent on the improvement of the Park Pasture. (452/E2/38-44)

Table 4.22 — Salaries of Blanchland Employees, 1825

NAME	POSITION	WAGE (£)
Edward Blenk	Bailiff	36.40
Thomas Elliot	Gamekeeper	25.00
Thomas Fenwick	Agent	100.00
John Herring	Schoolmaster	25.00
John Blenck	Ditto	25.00
Jane Wright	Schoolmistress	10.00
Mary Ireland	Ditto	10.00

Source: 452/B.b.4

The balance remaining after maintenance and management expenses were deducted went towards the charitable payments. It can be seen from Tables 4.19 and 4.21 that even during the depression the balance of income and expenditure remained positive. As the agricultural economy improved in the mid-19th century, the trustees were again in a position to improve the farm holdings. In 1860, the trustees requested Mr Henry, the Blanchland agent, to make a full report on the condition of the Blanchland farms. The resulting survey of 1861 (452/E3/21), comments on the poor state of many of the farms and the urgent need to carry out repairs. For instance, Heatheryburn farm was in such a bad state of repair, Mr Henry recommended that the farmstead be resited and rebuilt:

“There is a cowbyer for eight cows and a stable with two stalls. The dwelling house is above the cowbyer and stable, with very imperfect flooring, consequently

the stench from the cattle when housed in winter makes a very unwholesome dwelling, a new house is much needed here”.

The report also describes the poor state of the farm buildings, such as the following description of Acton farm:

“They (the tenants) would like new pig houses, the present ones dark and without ventilation and damp. The byer is bad, the stable loft is bad in places”

The harshness of the weather caused buildings to dilapidate rapidly, as a later report records:

“The repairs on the Blanchland estate generally will be large as the situation is high and many of the houses and buildings are in exposed positions and suffer much from the weather” (452/E3/24).

Some of the repairs, however, Mr Henry attributed to the poor quality of former repairs:

“if the principal timbers of the rooves etc had been of foreign timber and properly ventilated they would have lasted many years longer” (452/E3/21).

Following the survey, repairs and improvements were carried out to the farm buildings and lands (see Table 4.23). As was normal practice, the tenants were required to pay interest of 5% on improvements. Land drainage was obviously a major task, for although £378 was expended on drains and walls between 1864 to 1865, it was estimated in 1867 that a further £600 was needed to complete the necessary drainage [50]. Part of the money was met by a loan from the Lands Improvement Company (B.a.2, 22/4/1863). Once the soil had been drained, lime and artificial manure had to be applied to improve its fertility. The trustees usually gave the tenants an allowance towards these inputs on request (B.a.2 24/10/1865).

Figure 4.16 shows land use and land values at Acton farm, circa 1860. The figure shows four fields newly laid to pasture which indicates that these lands had recently been drained. A surprisingly large area (9 hectares) is under root and cereal crops (turnips, barley and clover). This could be for consumption by farm stock, or the lands could be in the process of being turned over to grass [51]. The value

Table 4.23 — Dilapidation Account, 1867

PROPERTY	REPAIRS (£)	IMPROVEMENTS (£)
Acton	160	-
Cowbyer	50	-
Cowbyer Cottage	5	-
Penny Pie	50	-
Cotehouse	100	150
Birkside	240	140
Burntshieldhaugh	50	-
Fellgrove	2	-
Blanchland Inn	448.50	130
Heatheryburn	200	-
Nookton	20	-
Allenshields	80	70
Allenshields Cottage	2	-
Buckshott	80	70
Gibraltar	15	-
Bale Hill	70	-
Various Cottages	155	-
TOTAL	1,727.50	560.00


Source: 452/E3/21-24

of pasture land varies from 60 pence to £1.80 per hectare; whilst the best meadow land is valued at £3.60 per hectare.

In 1855, legal advice was sought by the trustees over the management of the lead mines. The Derwent Mining Company wished to continue the lease of Jeffrey's Rake and Shildon mines. The mines were no longer worked, but the company wished, apparently, to block out competition from other companies. It transpired

Figure 4.16

ACTON FARM : LAND USE CIRCA 1860



in the course of these negotiations that the last lease had expired in 1826, but the company had continued to act as lessees and had paid an annual rent of £100. A further problem was that Mr Skottowe was found to have transgressed his rights by building a smelt mill at Jeffrey's Rake. The lawyer advised the trustees to renew the lease because:

"It is not desirable for trustees to allow mineral property which might turn out to be of great value to be held by tenants without a regular lease" (452/E3/3).

The outcome of this dispute was that the lease was renewed and Mr Skottowe was granted ownership of the smelt mill.

4.3.5 Landlord-Tenant Relations and Rural Society

The Blanchland estate, being the more geographically isolated of the charity estates, was rarely visited by the trustees. Contact between the trustees and the Blanchland tenants was limited to the twice yearly rent days, and the ceremonial riding of the manor boundaries [52]. Unlike the Wemmergill estate, the incorporation of rough grazing into the farm holdings at Blanchland meant that no conflicts arose over stinting. The Park Pasture was managed by a committee of stinholders (452/B.b.80). Two stewards were appointed to regulate the grazing. Most of the stinholders grazed cattle, which indicates that the pasture was of reasonable quality, and that it was used by smallholders. In 1880, 80 pence was charged for each stint. The total number of stints on the pasture was 30, each stinholder being allocated from one to six.

The influence of lead mining was strong on the inhabitants of Hunstanworth and Blanchland. The population of both settlements increased over the first half of the 19th century (see Table 4.24). The increase was most dramatic at Hunstanworth, where the population grew from 215 in 1801 to 778 in 1861. It can be seen from Tables 4.25 and 4.26 that the employment structures of both settlements were dominated by lead mining. Many of the miners rented a smallholding, or grazed a few cattle on the stinted pastures. For instance, in 1870 there were 15 smallholders at Jeffrey's Rake, with holdings ranging in size from 9.6 to 1.2 hectares. In 1880, 18 stinholders grazed 30 stints on the Park Pasture.

Table 4.24 — Population Growth At Blanchland & Hunstanworth

Date	Blanchland	Hunstanworth
1801	366	215
1811	518	186
1821	481	411
1831	514	511
1841	532	567
1851	559	615
1861	523	778

Although both the Blanchland and Hunstanworth estates had a separate farm sector, many of these farmsteads had cottages which were often occupied by miners. In 1851, for example, Allenshields farm had four adjoining cottages: two lived in by miners, one by a lead ore carrier, and the last, Allenshields smallholding, was occupied by two brothers. One managed the farm, the other was a smelt mill agent. Nookton farmstead had three adjoining cottages, two lived in by mining families and one by a shepherd. Therefore it would seem that the mining and farming families were closely integrated. However, it was only the smaller farm holdings where a second income source was necessary to support the family. For example, the son and daughter of Joseph Bulman, Bale Hill, worked as a blacksmith and a grocer. John Lambert at Gibraltar was also a slater and quarryman.

Tables 4.27 and 4.28 show that there was a remarkable continuity amongst the farm tenants over the period 1800 to 1865. Most farms seem to have been passed down from father to son. The Pickering family occupied Acton farm from 1805 to 1860 and the Johnson family occupied Cotehouse farm throughout this whole period. The 1851 census shows that several of the farms had live-in servants (Cowbyer, Acton, Cotehouse, Allenshields, Buckshott and Nookton).

At Blanchland, the Church appears to have played a prominent role in the community. The vicar often reported cases of poverty and distress to the trustees, and organised the distribution of beef and coals to the poor of Blanchland at Christmas

Table 4.25 — Employment at Blanchland, 1851 & 1881

OCCUPATION	1851	1881
Farmer:	-	-
> 12.5 hectares	9	7
4-12.5 hectares	3	2
< hectares	2	2
Lead Miner	72	13
Lead Washer/Dresser/Smelter	29	3
Shopkeeper/Tradesman	8	15
Blacksmith	4	5
Tailor/Shoe/Clogmaker	7	4
Dressmaker/Straw Bonnets	7	3
Labourer/Mason/Joiner etc	17	17
Agricultural Labourer	6	14
Gamekeeper	2	2
Woodman	1	1
Shepherd	1	3
Female Servant/Housekeeper	11	24
Mine/Quarry Agent	2	3
Land Agent/Bailiff	1	1
Schoolteacher	1	3
Vicar	2	1
Non-conformist Preacher	1	0
Doctor/Nurse	3	1
Policeman	0	1
Widow (head of house)	17	13
Retired Male (head of house)	3	6
Number of Households	104	78
Males	284	205
Females	275	165
TOTAL POPULATION	559	370

Source: Census Enumerators Books

Table 4.26 — Employment at Hunstanworth, 1851 & 1881

OCCUPATION	1851	1881
Farmer:	-	-
> 12.5 hectares	10	10
4-12.5 hectares	7	11
< hectares	1	6
Lead Miner	111	48
Lead Washer/Dresser/Smelter	40	21
Shopkeeper/Tradesman	4	7
Blacksmith	11	6
Tailor/Shoe/Clogmaker	2	2
Dressmaker/Straw Bonnets	3	6
Labourer/Mason/Joiner etc	19	32
Agricultural Labourer	10	7
Gamekeeper	1	-
Woodman	-	1
Shepherd	3	4
Female Servant/Housekeeper	23	20
Mine/Quarry Agent	6	-
Land Agent/Bailiff	1	1
Schoolteacher	3	1
Vicar	-	1
Non-conformist Preacher	-	2
Doctor/Nurse	-	-
Policeman	-	1
Widow (head of house)	13	9
Retired Male (head of house)	4	6
Number of Households	104	109
Males	330	265
Females	285	237
Total Population	615	502

Source: Census Enumerators Books

Table 4.27 — Blanchland Farm Tenants, 1800 to 1825

FARM	1800	1805	1810	1815	1820	1825
ACTON	Joshua Archer	T. Makepiece & H. Pickering	ditto	ditto	Henry Pickering	ditto
COWBYER (main)	Joseph Makepiece	T. & R. Makepiece	ditto	ditto	R. Makepiece	William Adamson
COWBYER (small)	-	-	-	Joshua Blenk	ditto	ditto
PENNY PIE	Robert Makepiece	Matthew Robson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
BURNTSHIELDHAUGH	Michael Hutchinson	ditto	ditto	John Whaley	Thomas Saunderson	ditto
BIRKSIDE	John Curry	ditto	Mary Curry	ditto	Robert Curry	John Curry
COTEHOUSE	Cuthbert Johnson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
ALLENSHIELDS (main)	Robert Colpitts	ditto	Easterly Hall & Co	Messrs Moore & Co	Derwent Mining Co	ditto
ALLENSHIELDS (small)	-	Robert Graham	-	-	-	-
FELLGROVE	-	Messrs Hutchinson & Smith	ditto	ditto	W. Dean & Smith	William Dean
HEATHERYBURN	John Oliver	ditto	ditto	ditto	George Oliver	J.& W. Graham
NOOKTON	Matthew Fairless	ditto	ditto	Jobbing & Surtees	ditto	ditto
GIBRALTER	-	James Clement	T.& J. Charlton	Thomas Charlton	John Lambert	ditto
BALE HILL	-	-	-	-	-	-
BUCKSHOTT	William Rochester	ditto	E.& J. Colpitts	George Rolland	Matthew Robson	ditto

Table 4.28 — Blanchland Farm Tenants, 1830 to 1860

FARM	1830	1835	1845	1850	1855	1860
ACTON	H. Pickering	ditto	G. & H. Pickering	ditto	ditto	ditto
COWBYER (main)	William Adamson	Robert Bell	Widow Bell	Ann Bell	ditto	ditto
COWBYER (small)	Joshua Blenck	ditto	William Colpitts	ditto	ditto	Elizabeth Colpitts
PENNY PIE	Widow Robson	John Brown	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
BURNTSHIELDHAUGH	Thomas Saunderson	ditto	Widow Saunderson	Jane Saunderson	ditto	ditto
BIRKSIDE	George Carr	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
COTEHOUSE	Cuthbert Johnson	ditto	Robert Johnson	ditto	ditto	ditto
ALLENSHIELDS (main)	Derwent Mining Co.	ditto	Jasper Stephenson	ditto	Thomas Robson	George Collinson
ALLENSHIELDS (small)	-	-	R. & W. Price	ditto	ditto	ditto
FELLGROVE	William Dean	T. Morpeth & W. Dean	Thomas Morpeth	ditto	ditto	ditto
HEATHERYBURN	William Graham	ditto	William Cooke	ditto	ditto	ditto
NOOKTON	Surtees & Jobbing	William Stephenson	Jasper Stephenson	ditto	ditto	ditto
GIBRALTER	John Lambert	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
BALE HILL	-	-	Joseph Bulman	ditto	ditto	Rev John Gibson
BUCKSHOTT	Matthew Robson	ditto	Widow Robson	ditto	Matthew Keenleyside	Phoebe Keenleyside

(B.a.2 4/12/1832).

4.3.6 Summary

Few changes took place to the structure of the Blanchland estate in the early 19th century. The estate was already enclosed. The estate was based primarily on agriculture, but lead mining, although economically of little importance to the charity, was a major influence on the society. The 19th century saw rapid population growth, particularly at Hunstanworth. There were full-time farms on the estate, although farming families lived side by side with mining families, and the value of the farms was increased in the mid-19th century by land and building improvements. The charity had close connections with the Church, and the Church played an important role at Blanchland. There would appear to have been few points of conflict between the tenants and the trustees over this period.

4.4 Case Study 3: The Stanhope Estate

4.4.1 Introduction

The Stanhope estate [53] differs markedly from the former two case studies in ownership form, land control and estate and management structure. It could, perhaps, be better described as a case study of land control than of an estate in the normal sense of the word. The development of the Stanhope estate in the 19th century cannot be understood without reference to the historical origins of the ownership form and land control.

Durham was, until 1836, a Palatinate kingdom [54] over which, until the 16th century, the Bishops of Durham ruled with powers equivalent to the Crown [55]. The Bishops were also great landowners and owned extensive estates in the county. In 1662, the annual income of Bishop Cosins came to almost £4,000 (see Table 4.28) [56]. The estates were administered for the purposes of collecting the rents in five units: Darlington, Chester, Easington and Stockton Wards, and the High Forest of Weardale. Rentals from these estates produced an annual income of £2,129, plus another £536 from the Bishopric desmesne lands. As well as land rents, the Bishops received rents from coal mines, quarries and urban property in London. They therefore commanded a diverse resource base.

Table 4.29 — The Bishopric Estates: Certain Annual Income, 1662

INCOME SOURCE	ANNUAL RENTAL (£)
Darlington Ward	728.45
Chester Ward	459.90
Easington Ward	431.55
Stockton Ward	341.55
The High Forest of Weardale	-
with the three parks of Wolsingham, Evenwood & Bedburn	169.65
<i>Subtotal</i>	2,131.10
Old escheat lands	0.75
Foreign receipts	5.20
Rents of coal mines	280.00
Rents of stone quarries	2.00
Rents upon Tyne Bridge	3.00
Pensions of churches	62.00
Stamfordham impropriation	26.65
rent of Creake manor	51.45
<i>Subtotal</i>	431.05
Desmesne lands reserved to the Bishop:	
Bishop's meadow & pasture at Frankland	36
Desmesnes at Auckland	160.00
Desmesnes at Stockton	280.00
Deerpark at Auckland	60.00
<i>Subtotal</i>	536.00
Howdenshire estate	430.00
London: Durham House & the new Strand exchange	240.00
Uncertain annual prerequisites	-
& profits belonging to the Bishop*	about 200
TOTAL	3,968.15
* includes prerequisites & fines from the ten halmote courts, the county court from the assises & sessions, & from chancery. & forfeitures from various crimes	

Source: Bishop Cosin's Survey

The Stanhope estate lies within the manor of Wolsingham, over which the Bishops of Durham owned manorial rights. The estate was, at the turn of the 19th century, divided into four quarters (see Figure 4.17, overlay). The High Forest of Weardale, alluded to above, included the Park and Forest quarters in the upper dale. The High Forest originated as a deer forest and hunting ground for the Bishops [57]. Within the forest, an enclosed park stretched from Eastgate to Westgate and was used by the Bishops for stock breeding (Drury, 1987, 72). The Bishops maintained a castle at Westgate as a hunting lodge. The Park and Forest quarters were controlled by a forest court, and developed quite separately from the other two quarters of the estate: Stanhope and Newlandside. These were located lower down the dale, and were controlled by a halmote court.

Until the union of Scotland with England in 1707, the northern border of Weardale formed part of the border between the two countries (Kerridge, 1969, 43). It was a wild, unsettled area, subject to raids. The Stanhope estate therefore served military and sporting purposes, and these two functions influenced the nature of early land settlement and tenure.

Early tenancies in the area were granted by the Bishops in order to secure military protection for the border, and assistance with the management of the hunting. Surplus grazing within the park was let on a seasonal basis from May Day to Michaelmas. The grazing was managed by a Master Forester (Drury, 1987, 72). These lettings required military and hunting services as a condition of tenure [58]. The following passage describes a hunting expedition in the 16th century:

"He (the Bishop) was accompanied by a great retinue and by the numerous freeholders and others his vassals, who held their lands in various parts of the County Palatine by this service and attendance amongst other rents and services, on the great chase or hunting in Weardale and lived and kept open house in Baronial splendour in his then Castle at Westgate in Stanhope Park"
(1828 Case)

By the 1500s, the Bishops' use of the park had declined and gradually these seasonal lettings took on a greater permanency. The park walls and Westgate Castle were demolished, and the forest court was held at very infrequent intervals (1828 Case).

In its early history, therefore, the Bishops of Durham had shown little inclination to develop the Park and Forest quarters, or to consolidate or actively exercise their rights. At the same time, the tenants gradually increased their control of the land. They occupied their estates on a form of customary tenure called tenant right or ancient freehold [59]. Under this customary tenure, the tenants enjoyed the right of inheritance (subject to a nominal fine on entry paid to the forest court), and, apart from an annual quit rent paid to the Bishop, had the same powers as freeholders over the surface lands [60]. The balance of control over the land of Weardale thus tipped slowly towards the side of the tenants. This was not a satisfactory situation for the Bishops. Even before the Union of Scotland with England obviated the need for military services, the Bishops attempted on several occasions to reassert their control over these ancient freeholders, not just to gain economically, but also to increase their political control over the inhabitants. In 1511, Bishop Ruthall carried out a survey of all holdings in the Park and Forest, and tried to convert the customary tenures into ecclesiastical leaseholds (Drury, 1987, 76). This policy of coercion backfired on the Bishop. The matter was contested in court, and the customary rights of the tenants upheld. The position of the tenants thus changed in the 16th century from one of customary privilege to legal right (*ibid.*, 1986, 94).

Some tenants, under obligation to the Bishops or hoping to obtain favours from them, agreed to accept ecclesiastical leaseholds [61]. Furthermore, nearly all the estates granted by the Bishops from the 16th century onwards were granted by this tenure. Ecclesiastical leaseholds were granted for either 21 years or 3 lives. In the latter case, 3 persons were nominated by the lessee to act as 'lives'. The lease continued for the duration of these lives. On the death of a life, a new life could be instated for a fee.

The lands in Newlandside and Stanhope quarters were largely held on copyhold tenure (see 2.2.2), regulated by a halmote court. In addition, the Bishops owned some freehold lands. The right to work the minerals was leased to a Moor Master at a fixed rent of £150 per annum. This position was held by the Blackett-Beaumont family from 1698 onwards. The lease was for three lives, again subject to a fine on the renewal of each life (Hughes, 1963).

Two political events in the 16th and 17th centuries altered the ownership and

management of the Bishopric estates. The first event was the Reformation in 1536. All church lands were appropriated by the Crown, and returned to their owners with strict conditions attached as to their management. Every property was valued, rent levels agreed and set down in a schedule (Musset, 1987). The purpose of these schedules was to regulate the powers of the Church, and balance the income and expenditure requirements for each Church estate. Perhaps to avoid further antagonising the Crown, church leaders took these schedules as financial blueprints, and despite subsequent inflation, maintained the rents of their properties at the 1541 levels.

The second event was the creation of the Commonwealth in the 1640s (Clay, 1985, 156). All Church and Crown lands were sequestered by Parliament and sold to laymen [62]. Following the restoration of the Monarchy in 1660, the Church lands were returned, but this period must have greatly undermined the control of the Bishops over their estates.

4.4.2 The Early 19th Century: Ownership and Control

At the close of the 18th century, approximately 5,000 hectares of the Stanhope estate out of a total of 29,000 hectares were enclosed. Of the enclosed lands, about 208 hectares were held by freehold tenure, 250 by copyhold, 2,083 by customary freehold and 2,458 by leasehold tenure (Barrington to Mowbray, 30/10/1797). The enclosed lands were located adjacent to the villages on the valley floor and sides and were reported to be let for £4.80 to £7.20 per hectare or even more (Bernard to Barrington, 19/9/1796). The unimproved parts of the estate consisted of stinted pastures on the upper valley sides, and common lands on the open fells. Grazing on the stinted pastures was controlled, and the pastures were fenced in large allotments. The commons were subject to general grazing and other rights of common (see 2.2.2). Despite its vast size, the total value of the estate was reported to be only £3,760 (Mowbray to Barrington 9/10/1797).

Bishop Barrington, moreover, received only a fraction of the full value of the estate in rents because of the system of land tenure which had developed. The fixed annual rents from the customary properties within the Park and Forest came to only £47.15 and £33.25 respectively, whilst the fixed rents from the leaseholds came to £36.55; the amount set by the 1541 schedule. The leasehold rents were

supplemented to a certain extent by fines. To recompense the Church for the ever dwindling value of the fixed leasehold rents, a system of fines had been devised (Musset, 1987). A fine was a payment made on the renewal of a lease, equal to about one and a half times the market rental value of the property. Fines could, therefore, be raised to keep pace with inflation. However, even this system did not fully reimburse the Church, for fines could only be charged at a renewal which took place every seventh year, in the case of twenty one year leases, and on the death or replacement of a life. With rising life expectancy, the length of these leases for lives also increased. Ecclesiastical leaseholds were, therefore, not only far longer than normal agricultural tenancies, they also granted the lessee practically full security of tenure [63].

As well as depriving the Bishops of their full potential income from the estates, the leaseholds were accused of obstructing good estate management (Bell, 1856). Because the annual income from fines was so variable, it was almost impossible for the Bishops to set an annual budget. Despite the security of tenure which the lessees enjoyed, neither lessor nor lessee had any incentive to invest in the land. The Bishops were reluctant to invest any capital since they would not benefit from the full increased rent. On the other hand, the lessees had no incentive to improve their estates, for then the fine payable on the next renewal would be higher. The timber on the leasehold lands was reserved to the Bishops, so that the lessees took no interest in planting their lands either (Bell, 1856, 97).

The financial disadvantages of ecclesiastical leaseholds had been recognised by Bishop Cosins back in the 16th century. In his 1662 survey of the Bishopric estates, he urged his successors to reform the leaseholds:

"I direct my successor to take special notice hereof and wait till all the lives of those tenants leases become void, which will be a great advantage to him and a just, if he maketh use of his rights to let the leases".

An insuperable barrier to the reform of the leaseholds, however, was the nature of ownership itself. Each successive Bishop depended on the rental from the estates for his personal income. The phasing out of the leaseholds would have involved a short-term loss of income whilst the leaseholds lapsed, and since each Bishop held only a life interest in the estate, no Bishop could afford to, or was prepared

to, forego his personal income for the benefit of his successors. A report into church leaseholds in 1837 (c. 692), found that Bishop Thurlow (1787 to 1791) had exchanged many lives on the best properties in order to improve his personal income. His successor, Bishop Barrington (1791 to 1826), therefore earned very little income from the renewal of lives. When Bishop Van Mildert took office in 1826, the lives had grown old again and so he benefitted from fine payments.

The customary freeholds and ecclesiastical leaseholds, therefore, posed major problems for the Bishops, and were to be a recurring theme in the history of this estate in the 19th century. Another problem faced by the Bishops related to the lead mines. By the end of the 18th century, the Blakett-Beaumonts were reaping vast profits from the lead mines, of which but a fraction was paid to the Bishops. Arthur Mowbray (Bishop Barrington's receiver) estimated that from 1778 to 1798, not less than 20,000 bings of lead per year had been raised, which must have yielded them an annual net profit of £63,000 [64]. Of this, the Bishops received only the £150 annual fixed rent plus a low rate of duty.

In order to increase their control of the estate and income from it, the Bishops needed to reform the leaseholds, instigate major land improvements, and renegotiate the lead mining lease with the Blakett-Beaumonts. Of these three aims, the first was not attempted, the second was attempted through enclosure, and the third met with some measure of success.

4.4.3 The Weardale Enclosure Award

The Weardale enclosure award was initiated in 1799 by Bishop Barrington. The size of the area to be enclosed (altogether over 8,000 hectares), together with the numerous interests involved, meant that the enclosure was a long drawn out process and was not finalised until 1815.

The main purpose of the enclosure was to improve the quality and value of the land. The Bishop's motives appear to have been altruistic. It was going to be of benefit to all the occupiers of Weardale and to the rest of the county:

"I am convinced that the enclosure of Weardale will add to the prosperity and plenty of the County of Durham by the great quantity of land which it must bring into cultivation" (Barrington to Mowbray, 21/12/1797).

Arthur Mowbray (who offered his services as an inclosure commissioner free of charge) estimated that the value of the lands could be increased by over fourteen times to the region of £44,000 by enclosure (Mowbray to Barrington, 9/10/1797).

The Bishop also had his own interests in mind, no doubt hoping to win back some of the control which had been lost over the estate. The Bishop's main concern was the size of the allotment he would receive in compensation for the loss of manorial rights [65]. Mowbray replied that the Bishop, as Lord of the Manor, was entitled to a sixteenth part of the unregulated commons, but not to the stinted pastures (Mowbray to Barrington, 19/9/1797). He pointed out that the size of the allotment should not be the primary concern. The main advantage of enclosure to the Bishop, would be the opportunity to ascertain the exact extent and value of the leaseholds and, through the improvements which enclosure would bring, to increase the fines chargeable on these properties (Mowbray to Barrington, 9/10/1797). Mowbray estimated that the fines would more than double in value. It was important, therefore, in the Bishop's view, to ensure that the leaseholders enjoyed enough security of tenure to fully improve the allotments which they would receive from the award. He suggested that Mowbray meet privately with one of the longest serving and most loyal leaseholders, to discuss the possibility that the leaseholders buy their allotments from the Bishop for nine years purchase (Barrington to Mowbray, 21/12/1797). The delicacy of relations between the Bishop and the leaseholders is indicated by the emphasis the Bishop places that the suggestion should be seen to come from the leaseholders rather than the Bishop.

Another problem was to obtain the agreement of all the proprietors in Weardale to the enclosure. Although the majority were in favour, there was, inevitably, some suspicion that the Bishop would attempt to reduce their rights. In order to overcome this opposition, Mowbray suggested to the Bishop that they obtain the support of Colonel Beaumont. He, being the most influential proprietor in Weardale, would, they thought, bring the other dissenters round (Mowbray to Barrington, 22/1/1798). There was also the question of tithes. The Bishop was anxious that the tithe payments be commuted into money payments, or that land be given to the Rector of Stanhope in lieu. The latter option was thought to be the more acceptable, as it would not burden the other proprietors with extra pay-

ments, but the Rector was initially opposed to this idea (Barrington to Mowbray, 21/12/1797).

Finally, the agreement of all concerned was obtained and the award went ahead. The stinted pastures which were divided under the award are listed in Table 4.31, together with the number of claimants for allotments and the existing stint levels on the moors. The costs of enclosure were met partly through the sale of Westernhope and Swinhope moors (see Table 4.30). Allotments were awarded in proportion to existing land rights and stint levels, and Bishop Barrington was thus given equal treatment with the other tenants. The areas which were decided to be unimproveable, a total of 5,337 hectares, were restinted according to rules laid down in the award [66]. The award, therefore, gave Bishop Barrington only 52 hectares plus 32 2/3 stints [67]. Enclosure did not materially improve the Bishop's landed control in Weardale.

Table 4.30 — Areas to Remain Undivided

AREAS TO REMAIN UNDIVIDED
Killhope, Wellhope & Spark Shield
Middlehope Moor
Sunderland Moor
Linzgarth Moor
Redburn Moor
Eastgate Pasture
Sunderland Pasture
AREAS TO BE SOLD BY PUBLIC AUCTION
Westernhope Moor
Swinhope Moor

4.4.4 Reform of the Mineral Lease.

Bishop Barrington had more success in his attempt to win back control over the lead mines. In 1807, whilst the Weardale enclosure was still in progress, Bishop

Table 4.31 — The Weardale Enclosure Award, 1815

STINTED PASTURES (to be divided)	HECTARES	NO OF CLAIMANTS	STINTS
Billing Pasture	425	9	226
Westernhope Moor*	1378	10	813
Easter-Lee Pasture	143	8	82
Wester-Lee Pasture	144	12	65
Swinhope Moor	555*	17	?
Windyside Pasture	129	17	61.5
Windyside Moor	210	14	217
Chapel Pasture	170	22	71
Chapel Moor	284	23	164
Harthope Moor	380	10	195
Ireshope Moor	834	21	286
Burnhope Pasture	125	18	80
Burnhope Moor	1663	22	333
Moss Moor	153	19	40
Puddingthorne Moor	313	10	120
Burtree Moor	327	18	186.5
Sedling Pasture	101	14	75
Sedling Moor	311	14	176
Newhouse Pasture & Moor	205	15	197
Carrbrow Pasture & Moor	221	54	185.5
Westgate Height	131	13	58
Westgate Side	15	8	-
TOTAL	8218	-	-
* excluding the areas to be sold by public auction (see below)			

Source: Durham Chancery Records

Barrington brought a law suit against the Blackett-Beaumonts over the level of

composition payments (Hughes, 1963, 47). The Blackett-Beaumonts decided to settle out of court, and agreed to pay a rate of composition of £4,000 per annum, plus a lump sum of £70,000 to cover short-falls in previous years. This action substantially improved the income of the Bishops. By 1859, the Bishops were receiving £7,700 per year from the lead mines (although the Blackett-Beaumonts' profits were still well above this).

4.4.5 Income Sources and Management

Figure 4.17 shows the location of the main settlements, the unenclosed moors, and the working lead mines on the Stanhope estate in the mid-19th century. A survey of the Bishopric estates in 1859 [68] found that the ecclesiastical leasehold properties covered 3,245 hectares (see Table 4.33) and the Bishopric freehold estate was 460 hectares (see Table 4.34). There were also 210 properties held on ancient freehold tenure, leased by 172 persons (CC 134875).

Table 4.32 — Stanhope Shooting Leases, 1859

MOOR	TENANT	AREA (hectares)	ANNUAL VALUE (£)
Bollihope	John Hilyard esq	3,039	150
Ireshope, Burnhope	William Fenwick	1,903	100
Harthope & Moss Moor	ditto	-	-
Reahope & Stanhope	ditto	3,190	-
Middlehope & Sedling Fell	ditto	512	-
Puddingthorne	Samuel Parker	179	5
Hangingwells Fell,	George Curry	250	10
Smallburn & Northgate	ditto	-	-
Chapel Fell	George Gregson esq	292	5
Wolfcleugh & Redburn	W.B. Beaumont	1,675	40
TOTAL	-	11,040	310

Source: Stanhope Report (1859)

Figure 4.17




Table 4.33 — Ecclesiastical Leasehold Estates, 1859

LEASE	TENANT	ANNUAL FIXED RENT (£)	DATE OF LEASE	SIZE SIZE (hectares)	ANNUAL VALUE (£)	RENT (£) (date)	SIZE (hectares)
Lanehead	John Robinson & others	4.00	1850 (lives)	225.7	225.40	-	-
-	Robert Robinson	0.40	1847 (lives)	2.0	17.75	-	-
Burtreeford Mill	Joseph Beck	0.40	1849 (years)	1.3	37.15	43.00 (1814)	1.5
High of the Park	Messrs Bainbridge	9.05	1837 (lives)	336.4	600.00	580 (1823)	331
Lintzgarth	T.W. Beaumont	0.30	1824 (lives)	212.6	148.15	18.00 (1820)	3.7
Killhope. Wellhope	T.W. Beaumont	1.85	1824 (lives)	1,714.3	467.90	282.00 (1824)	876
& Spark Shields	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lodgefield	Wilson Lee & Co	0.20	1848 (lives)	11.3	28.85	20.50 (1820)	9.5
Long Lee	Henry Maynard & others	2.65	1852 (years)	50.2	129.85	150.00 (1817)	46.2
New Park	Henry Maynard & others	5.00	1855 (years)	101.8	205.00	250.00 (1819)	100.3
Parrock	Walton & Wooler	0.50	1846 (lives)	1.6	16.50	16.60 (1817)	1.5
Spring House	Messrs Curry	1.20	1852 (lives)	23.7	54.50	80.00 (1817)	18.2
Sunderland	Joseph Featherstone	1.65	1848 (years)	78.8	76.00	90.00 (1835)	70.6
Sunderland	Mary Redsham	1.65	1853 (years)	48.2	38.90	76.70 (1824)	45.8
Wearhead	Joseph Harrison	1.00	1850 (years)	8.6	26.4	33.55 (1817)	7.5
Windyside	Mrs Walton	0.40	1853 (years)	5.7	28.55	44.05 (1817)	38.1
Stanhope Park	Miss Sowerby	5.25	1853 (years)	132.2	198.8	140.45 (1817)	131.6
House & garden	Thomas Dobson	0.05	1847 (years)	-	5.00	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	-	2,954.4	2,304.70	-	-

Source: Stanhope Report (1859)

Table 4.34 — The Bishop's Freehold Estates, 1859

ESTATE	SIZE (hectares)	ANNUAL RENTAL (£)
St Andrews Auckland	990.3	2,888.50
Ryhope	215.5	1,566.75
Stockton	200.1	1,050.00
Stanhope	460.5	513.00
Stanhope: <i>individual farm holdings</i>	-	-
<i>Oliver</i>	187.7	180.00
<i>Bowman & Madison</i>	146	135.00
<i>Hoggett & Forster Little</i>	59.5	104.00
<i>Dawson</i>	2.5	13.05
<i>Watson</i>	1.3	16.10
<i>Robinson</i>	5.9	23.10
<i>Dawson</i>	7	42.00
<i>Stinted Pasture</i>	49.80	-
Newton & Darlington	473.6	1,524.00
Woodham	439.7	714.00
Sherburn	119.6	552.00
Shotton	90	168.75
Cassop	121.2	217.00
TOTAL	3,110.6	9,194.00

Source: CC 60/31609

As well as the farms and the lead mines, the estate contained certain plantations which were managed in hand: 172 hectares on the Stanhope Castle estate and 93 hectares in Upper Weardale and Rookhope. The lead industry, of course, stimulated an enormous demand for timber. The Bishops processed their timber at a sawmill in the town of Stanhope. Shooting rights were let over 16 moors and, in

1859, shooting leases generated an income of £310 (see Table 4.32).

There were 18 leasehold properties, of which 11 were held on leases for 3 lives, and the rest for 21 years. It can be seen from Table 4.33 that these properties ranged in size from smallholdings to sizeable estates. They were frequently valued by the Bishops' agents in order that fines could be accurately calculated. All were surveyed by Thomas Davison, the successor of Arthur Mowbray, between 1817 and 1824, shortly after the enclosure. A comparison of the values of these estates in the early 19th century and 1859 provides inconclusive evidence as to the trend in the value of the leasehold estates over this period. It is noticeable that some of the properties had altered in size, making comparison difficult (both the estates leased by Colonel Beaumont had increased in size, as had the property at Windyside). There is no doubt, however, that two properties, Long Lee and New Park, decreased in value. This decrease in value was probably due to neglect by the lessee. Both properties were leased by a Mrs Ann Smith. In 1834 Thomas Davison wrote of Long Lee:

"Since the above survey (no date) was made the river has washed away (as near as I can judge) about 7 acres of land and land bed.... and I apprehend a further waste as the lessee, who it is presumed has only a life interest in the estate, does not expend any money in piling and jettying to prevent it" (1817).

Of New Park, Davison wrote:

"The farm... is still capable of further improvement if the lessee...could give the tenant a sufficient term to induce him to lay out his money in improvements" (1819).

Subleasing was common practice on the leasehold properties, and this example illustrates the problems associated with this form of tenure.

The largest leasehold property was the Killhope, Wellhope and Spark Shield estate at the top of Weardale, which was granted to Sir Thomas Blackett in 1662 for three lives. Table 4.35 illustrates the fine system, by showing fines charged on the exchange of lives on this estate. It can be observed that the fines increased in the first quarter of the 19th century, indicating the rising value of this estate. In 1824, the estate covered 876 hectares (118 hectares of enclosed lands, and 762 hectares

of stinted moors). It was divided into 16 smallholdings (see Table 4.36 and Figure 4.18). The rental of all these holdings rose between 1820 and 1824, from £242 to £280. Considering that this was a period of agricultural depression in the region, it is likely that the rental increase was due to the prosperity of the lead mines and the land hunger associated with population growth.

Table 4.35 — Lives & Fines on the Killhope, Wellhope & Spark Shield Estate

DATE	LIFE	AGE	FINE (£)
1736	Fenwick Bowman	47	-
1736	Walter Blackett	24	-
1736	Ralph Clark	26	-
1762	George Robson	19	82.10
1783	William Sykes	30	260.95
1783	Richard Brooke	24	-
1802	Thomas Bayldon	17	183.20
1805	Joseph Widdop	16	276.05
1824	Christopher Bird	8	350.75

Although the documentation relating to the leasehold properties is limited to these periodic valuations, it would appear from the rental evidence that no significant improvements in land quality were achieved in the early 19th century.

The enclosure award did not put an end to the legal disputes over land rights on the Stanhope estate. In 1828, the ancient freeholders brought a case against Bishop Van Mildert, arguing that under the terms of the award they were now entitled to all mines (excepting lead), quarries, timber and sporting rights over their lands. Legal opinion was sought by the Bishop [69]. The lawyer, James Griffiths, found that the enclosure award left several finer points of tenure unresolved. It could be stated with certainty that the Bishop was entitled to all the lead, and the right to make wayleaves for working and carrying away the lead. It was also certain

Table 4.36 — The Killhope, Wellhope & Spark Shield Estate, farm holdings

TENANT	FARM SIZE (hectares)	STINTS	1820 RENT (£)	1824 RENT (£)
J. Batey	3.1	4	4.50	6
T. Peart	3.9	10	8	10
T. Peart	4.1	11	10	12
J. & W. Graham	2.8	12	10	12
T. Peart (jnr)	6.1	18	14	15
Widow Peart	11.4	28	21	24
J. Vickers	0.6	5	4	5
C. Vickers	19.1	32	23	26
J. Vickers	28	30	25	28
J. Kidd	1.2	11	6	7
T. Emmerson	10.3	19	11.50	14
Messrs English & Garrick	14.6	30	24.50	28
T. Emmerson	25.4	30	24.50	28
J. Elliot & J. Milburn	15.9	10	17	20
I. Batey	6.6	10	10	13
H. Rain	16.4	40	29	32

Source: HC M10 321764

that the owners of the new allotments and the owners of the stints on the stinted moors and pastures had sole enjoyment of these lands. The award also gave the owners of the allotments the right to get coal, stones, slates and clay from their allotments and to cut timber. He concluded that even if the Bishop did technically retain a residual interest in these lands, so many provisos were contained in the award that, in practice, the Bishop's interest was so constrained as to be, for all practical purposes, extinguished. As for the sporting rights over the newly enclosed allotments and over the stinted moors and pastures, these were dependent on past custom, whether the Bishops had kept up their ancient rights of sporting.

4.4.6 Landlord Tenant Relations and Rural Society

Lead mining was the dominant influence on the economy and society of Stanhope in the early 19th century, particularly in the upper dale. Table 4.38 shows the 1851 employment figures for four hamlets in the upper dale, and clearly illustrates the importance of lead mining. It is surprising that only two farmers were recorded by the census. Several of the miners were probably smallholders, but only their main occupation was recorded. The total population of Stanhope grew rapidly in the first half of the 19th century (see Table 4.37), from 5,155 in 1801 to 8,882 in 1851, an increase of 72%. Population growth was especially rapid in the forest quarter, which was the main mining area.

Table 4.37 — Population Growth in Stanhope, 1801 to 1851

DATE	FOREST	PARK	NEWLANDSIDE	STANHOPE
1801	2,143	1,169	604	1,239
1821	2,987	1,321	693	1,375
1831	3,735	1,259	763	1,584
1841	3,531	851	854	1,827
1851	4,358	991	988	2,545

Because of the great influence of mining, the Blackett-Beaumont family must have exerted as great an influence as the Bishops, if not greater, over the inhabitants of the dale. It is difficult to state with certainty what were the feelings of the inhabitants towards these two landlords. Relations between the Bishop and the Blackett-Beaumonts, however, seem to have been strained. The following account from Arthur Mowbray to Bishop Barrington paints a very poor picture of the mining lessee:

“Some of the Colonel’s agents in Weardale are old, born on the spot and (I have been told) think it best to keep that part of the county, where their chief mines are, as much in darkness as possible and also to prevent the inhabitants

Table 4.38 — Employment in Upper Weardale, 1851 & 1881

OCCUPATION	1851	1881
Farmer	2	8
Lead Miner	152	78
Lead Washer/ Dresser/ Smelter	-	11
Shopkeeper/ Tradesman	2	5
Innkeeper	-	2
Blacksmith	5	1
Tailor/ Shoe/Clogmaker	3	2
Dressmaker/ Straw Bonnets	1	3
Labourer/ Mason/ Joiner etc	11	21
Agricultural Labourer	-	-
Gamekeeper	1	-
Woodman	-	-
Shepherd	-	-
Female Servant/ Housekeeper	17	11
Mine/ Quarry Agent	1	1
Land Agent/ Bailiff	-	-
Schoolteacher	2	9
Vicar	1	1
Non-conformist Preacher	-	-
Doctor/ Nurse	-	-
Policeman	-	-
Widow (head of house)	11	14
Retired Male (head of house)	-	3
Number of Households	106	101
Males	291	218
Females	287	243
TOTAL POPULATION	578	461
<i>*Cowshill, Burtreeford, Heatherycleugh & Kilhope</i>		

Source: Census Enumerators Books.

from turning themselves to agriculture, but continue, as many of them now are little if any better, than slaves and dependents” (Mowbray to Barrington, 15/2/1798).

Undoubtedly, the life of the miners and their families was harsh. In 1818, the miners petitioned Walter Beaumont for a rise in wages, claiming that many could no longer afford to support their families, and 400 had had to accept parish relief (Hunt, 1972, 260).

Bishop Barrington seems to have genuinely had the best interests of the inhabitants at heart during the enclosure process. He was anxious that provisions be made in the award for the erection of chapels and schools (Barrington to Mowbray, 30/10/1797). He later suggested that the Rector of Stanhope, whose income would be vastly improved by the enclosure, should apportion some of this income for the support of churches and the incomes of ministers in the parish.

It appears, however, that Bishop Barrington was more benevolent than his successors. He used the money awarded from the dispute with the Blackett-Beaumonts over the mineral lease to establish schools throughout the county, and to provide a fund for poor clergymen and their widows (Whellan, 1894). Bishop Barrington was, perhaps, able to show his benevolence since he enjoyed a personal income of £12,000 per annum as well as his income from the Bishopric estates (Cmd. 692, 1837). As with private landlords, every Bishop adopted a different approach to the management of their estates.

4.4.7 Summary

Although the Bishops were, in theory, the principal landowners in Stanhope, in practice they had very little control over the estate because of the strength of collateral rights. The division of ownership and control of the estate's resources seems to have had a negative influence on the development of the estate. Great changes were effected by the enclosure award, but it seems that the award did not lead to any significant improvement in the value of the farmlands.

Lead mining dominated the economy and society of the Stanhope estate. It was the principal income source for the Bishops and the major source of employment.

Although little information is available about the lives of the inhabitants, it seems that the society displayed many open characteristics.

Because of the strength of collateral rights, and the nature of the Bishops' interest in the estate, the management policy adopted by the Bishops was short-term and exploitative, although each individual Bishop varied. However, despite the inefficiency with which the Bishopric estates in County Durham were managed, their vast size meant that, in 1856, Bishop Longley's annual income (on an average of three years) was still £21,991 (Bell, 1856). Together with the Dean and Chapter estate, the Church in Durham was receiving an annual income of £71,431. Thus the Church dominated the landownership structure in County Durham and was a very powerful institution. In the first half of the 19th century it must have been a major barrier to the region's economic development.

4.5 Landownership and Rural Development in the 19th Century

This consideration of the development of the North Pennines in the 19th century, under three landownership forms, has highlighted several points relating to the landownership decision-making framework and the nature of rural society in this upland region of Britain. It has also indicated some of the processes by which continuity and change in landownership over this period took place. The three estates have been considered separately in the analysis so far. In this final summary, comparisons and contrasts between the estates will be made to bring out the more general significance of the findings.

Similarities and differences in the structure and development of the three estates have been observed. What internal and external factors can be identified which have influenced the development of all three estates, and what factors can explain differences between the estates? Can differences be attributed to ownership form and, finally, what factors have influenced the nature of rural society on each estate?

Comparisons can be drawn between the estates. All three formed part of a wider property portfolio which included lowland estates, so that decisions relating to the North Pennine estates were taken in a wider context. The economy of all three estates was based on the same resources: land, lead, timber and grouse. The rural society of all three estates displayed a mixture of open and closed characteristics.

At a more detailed level of analysis, however, differences between the estates outweigh the similarities. Significant differences have been observed in resource use, estate development and rural society.

Although all three estates formed part of a larger property portfolio, the total landholdings of the three landowners differed in scale and structure. The earls of Strathmore were great landowners, and their estate was scattered over several geographically separate locations. The Bishops of Durham were the principal landowners in County Durham, but owned no significant estate outside the county. Both landowners, incidentally, held interests on the Durham coalfield. The estate of Lord Crewe's Trustees was much smaller. It was confined to the North East, and the Blanchland estate was also the smallest of the three case study estates.

The ownership form of the three estates differed. The Wemmergill estate was held by private ownership (except for a short period of trust ownership). The Stanhope estate was owned by an institution and Blanchland by a charity. Using Denman and Prodanos' (1972) classification of ownership, the ownership of Wemmergill was simple, the ownership of Stanhope was both simple, fictitious and fiduciary, whilst the ownership of Blanchland was fictitious and fiduciary. The ownership form had an influence on management. John Bowes had the greatest freedom of management (although this freedom may have been limited by a settlement). He depended on the estate for a personal income, and so profit was an important short-term goal; but, although only holding a life interest in the estate, his management policy was influenced by the longer-term wish to preserve the estate within the family for his successors. The Bishops of Durham held only a life interest in their estates and depended on the income from their estates for their private salary. Short-term profit was, therefore, the primary factor in their management policy. Although the Bishops held fiduciary responsibilities, these were not laid down, and the paternalism of the Bishops depended to a large extent upon the individual. The fiduciary element was uppermost in the management policy of Lord Crewe's Trustees. The latter held no personal interest in the estate.

Land control was also an important factor in estate management, and control was related to past and present ownership forms. Although all three landowners owned manorial rights over their lands, the earls of Strathmore and Lord Crewe's

Trustees were also the principal landowners and enjoyed almost entire control of their estates. The Bishops of Durham, on the other hand, were the principal landowners in Stanhope in theory, but not in practice. On this estate, derivative interests had gained dominance over the principal interest. This loss of control on the part of the Bishops had historical origins back in the Medieval period. The ownership form prevented the Bishops from reforming the ecclesiastical leaseholds. No Bishop could afford to forego his short-term income to benefit his successors. Lord Crewe's Trustees did not suffer unduly from collateral rights, since their estate had been founded at a later date, and had been, previous to the foundation of the charity, within private ownership.

As well as the role of the landowner, the role of others concerned in the management of the estates was also important. The landowners relied on land agents, lawyers and surveyors for advice, and these agents could have a considerable influence on the management policy of the landowner. Occasionally, the landowners would receive differing advice from their advisors. The surveyors and the estate bailiff clashed, for example, in the 1820s as to how to manage the Wemmergill estate.

To what extent was estate management policy dependent on the environment and resource base, and to what extent did ownership form, land control and management structure affect the management of the three estates in practice? Certain differences in the economy of the estates can be attributed to the resource base. The greater reliance of the Stanhope and Blanchland estates on lead reflected the fact that these two estates lay within the lead mining area, whilst the Wemmergill estate lay on the edge. Differences in farming, however, can be attributed to estate policy. The environment obviously placed basic parameters on the farming systems, but it was the result of estate management that the Blanchland and Wemmergill estates both had a separate full-time farm sector, whilst the Stanhope estate had a farm structure of small, under-capitalised holdings.

Both the Wemmergill and the Stanhope estates were enclosed at the turn of the 19th century, but the experience of enclosure and its effects were very different on the two estates. The process of enclosure in the former estate was controlled by the earls of Strathmore. Farms were enlarged and rationalised, and the enclosure initiated changes which eventually led to a substantial improvement in the value

of the estate. On the latter estate, in contrast, whilst Bishop Barrington initiated the enclosure, he had no control over its implementation, and had no power to instigate land improvements. The value of the Bishops' leasehold lands remained static, or even declined, in the period following enclosure.

On the Wemmergill estate, it was in the interests of the earls of Strathmore to maximise the value of the farm sector, as this was their principal resource and income source, although the environment placed constraints on the farm structure. The farm structure on the Blanchland estates was inherited from the former owner and few changes were made to it. On the Stanhope estate, the Bishops had little control over the farm structure of their leasehold properties. Many of the leaseholds were sublet and subdivided by the lessees.

Although both estates had full-time farms, the farm structure of the Blanchland and Wemmergill estates differed. On the former, rough grazing land was included within the farm holding whilst on the latter, the open moors were grazed in common by the tenants according to stinting agreements. The unenclosed moors in Stanhope were also stinted but, whereas on the Wemmergill estate the stints were owned by the earls of Strathmore, on the Stanhope estate the stints were owned by the farmers. The earls of Strathmore could, therefore, exercise some control over the grazing of the moors. This enabled the earls to retain some degree of flexibility in the management of the farms, and the moors served a dual purpose as both grazing resource and grouse breeding habitat. The management of the stinted moors was, however, the principal source of conflict on the estate.

Two general points have emerged from this analysis about land management in an upland environment. First, farm size is a misleading indicator of farm value. Indeed, large farms tended to be composed chiefly of poor quality grazing land. The stinted moors provided an extra land resource in addition to the farm holding. Second, upland resources are interrelated. Lead mining was closely related to the farming economy, due to the practice of dual employment. The lead industry generated a demand for timber and the open moors could be used for rough grazing and grouse shooting.

Although all the societies on the three estates displayed a mixture of open and closed characteristics, the balance between the two varied. None of the estates were

free from the influence of lead mining, but lead mining dominated the Blanchland and Stanhope estates to a greater extent than the Wemmergill estate. The lead industry was the main cause of 'open' characteristics. It was associated with rapid population growth, small, under-capitalised farm holdings, ill health, poverty, unemployment and non-conformism. The Wemmergill and Blanchland estates, which had a separate farm sector, had a core population which was stable. In contrast to the mining population, the farming population displayed a great continuity. The farmers on both estates, although more secure than the miners, were of the same social class. The farms were family farms and there were close links between farming and mining households. There was a wide social gulf on both estates between the landlord on the one hand and the tenants on the other. On the Stanhope estate, many of the ecclesiastical leaseholders formed an intermediate rentier middle class. This was not beneficial to the development of the region as the leaseholders displayed little paternalism towards their tenants.

Absenteeism was not an important factor in determining the degree of openness and closedness on the estates. All the landowners were absentee, although John Bowes lived for much of the time on the neighbouring estate of Streatlam. Contact between landlord and tenant was rare on all the estates, and was least on the Stanhope estate. Far more important were differences in resource use, land control and motive.

So far, the analysis has looked at factors specific to the landed estates and the North Pennines. What were the influence of external factors on the estates? The economy had an important influence on the management of all three estates, but differentially affected their development. The 1820s agricultural depression affected the Wemmergill estate more than the Blanchland estate. The Wemmergill estate had fallen into a dilapidated condition and the process of enclosure had only just begun. The Blanchland estate, on the other hand, had benefitted from the high prices at the turn of the century and was in a much better position to ride out the depression. One effect of the depression, on both the estates, was to reduce the area under tillage. The economy of the Stanhope estate was more dependent on the lead market than agricultural prices.

The values of the Wemmergill and the Blanchland estates were increased during the

economic prosperity of the mid-19th century by investments to the farm buildings and lands. Although the influence of the State was minimal in the 19th century, both John Bowes and Lord Crewe's Trustees made use of public loans to finance drainage improvements on their estates. For reasons stated above, the Bishops neglected the farms on the Stanhope estate in favour of the lead. It appears that the burden of taxes was higher on the Wemmergill than the Blanchland estate, although whether this was due to ownership or other factors is unclear.

What can be concluded about the processes of continuity and change in the three landownership structures in the early 19th century? The dominant feature of Lord Crewe's Charity and the Blanchland estate was continuity. There were no major changes in the estate structure or the administrative and charitable functions of this estate. Its charitable structure effectively prevented change. This inertia does not, however, seem to have had any negative effects on the development of the estate. The ownership form of the Stanhope estate prevented any changes to the structure of control (with the exception of the reform of the lead lease), but ownership did not, indeed could not, prevent changes in the economy and land use of the estate. Changes did take place on the Wemmergill estate under the direction of John Bowes, and conform most closely to the model of 19th century landownership outlined in section 3.2.3

Finally, it can be concluded that the main barriers to change at this period were collateral and derivative rights, fiduciary and fictitious ownership forms, short-term motives and economic depression. The main factors which instigated change were entire ownership and control, enclosure, agricultural prosperity and a long-term outlook.

Notes

1. This definition includes the area designated as an AONB and the Durham Dales (Weardale, Teesdale & the Upper Derwent Valley).
2. A bing = 8 cwt.
3. The Allendale estate belonged to the Blackett family, but in the early 19th century Diana Blackett married Thomas Beaumont, and the two surnames were joined.
4. The owners of the Raby estate have received several titles, including the Earls of Darlington, the Dukes of Cleveland, and Lord Barnard.

5. This estate formerly belonged to the Earls of Derwentwater, but their lands were forfeited to the Crown because of their part in the Rising of the North. The estate was given to Greenwich Hospital in 1735 (Hughes, 1963, 17).
6. The Nent Force Level was a 5 mile long underground channel which was built in order to improve underground drainage and to open up new lead veins. The level was begun in 1776, but work was stopped in 1830 because of the expense (Hughes, 1963, 55).
7. In the second half of the 19th century the Blakett-Beaumonts and the London Lead Company together produced 70% of the total output of Northumberland and Durham; about 1/7 of the total UK output (Burt et al, 1983, x).
8. The miners suffered more than in mining companies during this depression. For instance, between 1820 and 1834 the London Lead Company's output was reduced by 20%, but the labour force was cut by 40% and wages by 20% (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 279).
9. Innovations introduced during the 19th century included the hydraulic engine; 'cross cut levels'; and underground haulage levels (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 202).
10. This was called carriage work, and was mostly undertaken by part-time farmers. Transport was seriously disrupted during the harvest (Hughes, 1963, 68).
11. See Appendix F for tables of enclosure.
12. A detailed description of the building of Nenthead is given in Raistrick (1977) *Two Centuries of Industrial Welfare*.
13. Wesley preached at Blanchland in 1747 (Hunt, 1970, 218).
14. The Strathmore family tree and tables of landlords and agents at Wemmergill are given in Appendix C. The background information about the earls of Strathmore is taken from Durham County Council (1980) *Streatham & Gibside: the Bowes and Strathmore Families in County Durham*.
15. This is an example of how 'surrogate heirs' were created (see 2.2.3). It is likely that the 9th Earl was pleased to change his surname, since Thompson (1963, 11) notes that Scottish peers were eager to obtain an English peerage.
16. The Gibside estate was on the Durham coalfield.
17. The Rector of Romaldkirk owned the manorial rights to Romaldkirk Manor.
18. In the manors of Lune, Mickleton and Holwick several properties were held on longleaseholds. These were granted for 1,000 years at a small reserved rent of 1 to 6 old pence a year. In Cotherstone and Hunderthwaite, the earls of Strathmore also owned several customary leaseholds. These ancient tenures were financially of minimal benefit to the earls, although as lords of the manor

- they were entitled to a fine on the death or change of a tenant worth 20 years reserved rent, similarly on the death of the lord of the manor.
19. The Rector was awarded an allotment on Lune Moor worth £210 a year, but exchanged this with the trustees for lands at Mickleton. The allotment was divided between the Lunedale farms, part going to Wythes Hill.
 20. See Evans 1976 (106).
 21. The estate acquired the freeholds of Blake House, Stack and Low Wemmergill farms, which had formerly been held on customary longleaseholds.
 22. Wemmergill Hall, Low Wemmergill and Corbush farms were kept in hand. Low Wemmergill and Corbush were both let by 1823, but Wemmergill Hall was still in hand in 1825. The Hall was kept as a shooting lodge, but part of it was later let out as a farm.
 23. Mary Milner was an employee at Wemmergill Hall.
 24. It was somewhat ironic that, had the case been tried in a Scottish court John Bowes might have had a legitimate claim to the whole inheritance, because of differences in the Scottish legal system.
 25. The trustees were Mary, Countess of Strathmore (John Bowes' mother), Henry Jadis, James Blackburn, James Farrer, James Dundas, James Steadman and John Dean Paul (D/St/L1/4/1).
 26. Ernle (1961, 319) ascribes three main causes to the agricultural depression:
 - an artificially high demand for food during the war, stimulating agricultural production and inflating land values and wage levels.
 - A post-war drop in prices as trade returned to normal. Between 1812 and 1815, the value of farming stock declined by almost 50%. The depression first hit the corn-growing districts, but later spread to pastoral areas.
 27. Thomas Bell was the surveyor for the enclosure of the Wemmergill estate, and took over from John Roddam as the Inclosure Commissioner on the latter's death.
 28. Their specific proposals were to:
 - Amalgamate Intake farm with Stackholme.
 - Convert the eastern half of Wemmergill Hall from a public house into a farm.
 - Add 29.1 hectares to Slack farm from Sleights Pasture.
 - Add 16.6 hectares to Stackholme farm from the Cocklake Allotment and to let the rest of the Cocklake Allotment (1,038.7 hectares) as a stinted pasture.
 - Amalgamate Arngill House with Grains O' Beck.

- Amalgamate Scar Head and Corbush farms.
 - Consider whether to let Old Gate and Scar House Farms with Grains O' Beck.
 - Amalgamate Dow Hill with Blake House.
 - Let Grassholme Mill Farm and West Farm together.
 - Amalgamate the Rectorial Allotment with Wythes Hill Farm.
 - Divide Rigg Farm between adjoining farms.
 - Let East Close and West and East Stake Hill Farms together.
 - Divide Thringarth farm between adjoining holdings.
 - Amalgamate Bowbank West Wood, West House, East Farm and Chapel House holdings.
29. Liming was necessary after draining. After four to five years, Watson reported, the annual value of the land would increase from 24 pence to £1.20 per hectare, and the benefits would last for about twenty years.
30. Watson reported that many of the Highland farms lacked gates, openings to fields being blocked by a temporary wall, a piece of old house timber or some brush wood. He recommended that all farms be supplied with gates by the landlord.
31. Throughout most of this period the following farms were let together, although minor changes took place:
- Close House & Arngill.
 - Grains O' Beck, Scar House & Old Gate.
 - Blake House & Dow Hill.
 - Stackholme, Corbush & Intake.
 - High Grain & Low Soulgill.
 - Grassholme West & Grassholme Mill.
 - Rigg, Grassholme East and Grassholme Middle.
 - West Stake Hill & East Stake Hill.
32. Denman, Roberts and Smith (1967, 466) define stinting as:
- "a term used in a traditional manner to quantify the number and kinds of animals a common right holder is entitled to put on a common".*
- Hoskins and Stamp (1963, 6) note that lowland commons were regulated before the upland commons, due to the greater abundance of land in the uplands. Land use pressures were less.

33. This finding is corroborated by other studies of upland farming (see Stapledon, 1937, 74; Howell, 1979, 69).
34. The estate accounts were sampled at roughly five-yearly intervals. This provides a broad view of the estate budget over this period, although it hides yearly variations.
35. In 1840, Philip Pusey passed a public bill to 'Enable the Owners of Settled Estates to Defray the Expenses of Draining the Same'. John Bowes applied for a loan of £8,000 under the Act, but incurred £740 in procedural costs (Spring, 1963, 143).
36. Mr Milbank had definite views about the sport of grouse shooting, which he expressed in the following letter to Ralph Dent:
"I do not approve of the wholesale slaughter of grouse by driving, it is certainly not sport as long as birds can be got any other way, that is, a legitimate way by shooting to dogs. Most certainly, grouse driving ought not to take place before the middle of September.....I look upon driving grouse in August, indeed before the 15th September, as murder" (Milbank to Dent, 23/8/1871).
37. The stinting regulations for Holwick, Wemmergill and Cotherstone Moors are printed in full in Appendix G.
38. A heaf or heft is an unmarked unit of grazing on a common. The boundaries of heafs often follow natural boundaries such as watersheds.
39. The freehold of Cotherstone Moor was not owned by the earls of Strathmore. It was converted into a regulated pasture under the Act of 1866. 4,494.75 stints were awarded (one stint=one ewe), of which John Bowes received 281. It seems that regulation was necessary to solve conflicts over grazing.
40. The first trustees appointed were John Montague (Lord Crewe's nephew), Rev. John Dolben, Rev. John Morley (Rector of Lincoln College), Rev. William Lupton and Rev. Thomas Eden.
41. The charitable payments of 1721, 1896 and 1974 are listed in Appendix H.
42. The 1896 data can be taken as being representative of the estate structure at the beginning of the 19th century except in one respect; the Bamburgh estate was sold shortly before this survey was carried out.
43. Dr John Sharp was a trustee from 1772 to 1792. He is famous for instigating many improvements to the charity; in particular, for restoring Bamburgh Castle so that it could be used for charitable purposes. A school was set up in the castle, and a weekly surgery was held there. Its most famous use was as a base for the rescue of shipwrecked sailors and their cargoes (Stranks, 1976). John Sharp bequeathed much of his own property, including a valuable collection of books, to the charity on his death. This is managed as Dr. Sharp's Fund.

44. The farm layout has changed little over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. The figure does not, however, show Nookton, Heatheryburn or Gibraltar farms, which were sold in the 1920s, nor the stinted pastures which had, by the 1950s, been amalgamated with the full-time farm holdings.
45. There was an act in 1774 for the enclosure of the manors of Bamburgh, Shoreston and Sunderland which also contained provisions for settling the boundaries of the manors of Hexham and Blanchland (Tate & Turner, 1978). However, no copy of the act survives. It is likely that some enclosure at Blanchland took place at an earlier period, possibly whilst the estate was under monastic control, since certain documents refer to ancient enclosures.
46. In 1825, for instance, the Derwent Mining Company purchased £134.65 of timber and in 1835 paid £112 for timber.
47. In 1828, the Blanchland gamekeeper was instructed by the trustees to draw up a list of all persons seen shooting on Blanchland Moor, and to warn anyone found shooting without permission to desist (B.a.2 21/11/1828).
48. This was due to the fumes from the mill. Rent reductions due to disturbance from fumes were also noted by Hunt (1972, 142).
49. During the Napoleonic Wars much land in Western Durham was ploughed up for arable, but the fall in prices after the wars resulted in much of this land being turned back to pasture (Hodgson, 1979, 95).
50. The expense of drainage depended on the type of soil and availability of stones to fill the drainage channels. An outlet was built at the bottom of the field to carry off the water. Once built, drains had to be maintained against blockage. The shallow method of constructing drains was used on the Blanchland estate until 1850, but by the 1860s had become unusable (Martin, 1864, 14).
51. Bailey (1810, 180) describes the process of laying land to grass. On moist soils a crop of wheat is sown after summer fallow, together with red, white and yellow clover, rib grass and rye grass. On dry soils, first turnips and then barley are planted.
52. The custom of riding the boundaries was a considerable expense. In 1839, one riding cost £305.85 (Martin, 1864, 12).
53. The definition of the Stanhope estate used in this thesis refers to all the lands of the Bishops of Durham located in the present day parish of Stanhope. This was not an estate unit recognised by the Bishops, however. In early records, the lands in the Park and Forest quarters were variously referred to as the 'High Forest', 'Park and Forest' or 'Alta Foresta', whilst the lands in Stanhope and Newlandside quarters were included in Darlington ward. When the Ecclesiastical Commissioners took over the administration of the Bishopric lands, Stanhope was administered as a separate estate.

54. A Palatinate is a territory within a state. The ruler of a Palatinate is not the sovereign of the state but enjoys equivalent powers. There were three Palatinates in England: Durham, Chester and Lancaster, but the former survived longer than the latter two. The Durham Palatinate extended beyond the 1844 borders of County Durham to include the manors of Craike in North Yorkshire and Northamptonshire and Bedlingtonshire in Northumberland. The Bishops ruled their kingdom from the castle at Bishop Auckland. (Vickers, 1988, 9).
55. The Bishops of Durham enjoyed the following powers of sovereignty:
 - 'in imperio': the Bishops were head of civil government and had the right to lands forfeited for treason.
 - 'In domino': all landowners were tenants in chief under the Bishops.
 - 'In jurisdictione': the Bishops had judicial authority over Palatinate courts (Vickers, 1988). Many Palatinate powers were abolished by Henry VIII. In 1536, the powers of criminal jurisdiction were transferred to the Crown, and in 1570 the right to forfeited land was also transferred to the Crown.
56. A list of the Bishops of Durham is given in Appendix E.
57. The Bishopric forest originally stretched as far as Bedburn, and contained three parks, at Stanhope, Wolsingham and Bedburn.
58. The tenants were required to do 14 days military service, to keep constant watch upon the border, to pay rent to the Bishop twice a year and to serve at the Forest Court (Weardale Chest, item 44).
59. Tenant right is the general term applied to customary tenures in the North of England. Ancient freehold was the form of tenant right practiced in Weardale.
60. They did not own mineral rights and their claim to the sporting rights was later disputed (1828 Case).
61. Two of the earliest ecclesiastical leaseholds to be granted were Horsley Head (1507) and Eastgate (1507), (Drury, 1987, 75).
62. The Manor of Wolsingham was purchased by Sir Arthur Hesilrige in 1650. He also tried to reform the ancient freeholds, but had no more success than the Bishops had done. He had misinterpreted the legal nature of the estate which he had bought (Drury, 1980).
63. Only if a leaseholder was badly in debt was he evicted. It was reported that a farmer, who owned a freehold property contiguous to his church leasehold, had channelled all the profits from the latter property into the former, and was duly evicted (1837).
64. Mowbray to Barrington, 18/12/1798. He arrived at this figure by calculating the gross profit, which at 4 guineas a bing was 84,000 guineas, minus 20,000

guineas for the costs of working and payment of wayleaves.

65. It was usual for the lord of the manor to be awarded an allotment equal to one sixteenth of the area still unenclosed after the award had been made in compensation for his loss of manorial rights.
66. See Appendix G for stinting regulations.
67. These lands and stints were divided between Westernhope Moor, Swinhope Moor, Windyside Pasture, Burnhope Moor, Newhouse Pasture and Newhouse Moor.
68. This survey was carried out by Smiths Gore on behalf of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners on taking over the control of the estate.
69. *Case on behalf of the Lord Bishop of Durham respecting his Lordship's rights upon and over lands within and parcel of the Park and Forest of Weardale.* W.L. Tindal, Lincoln's Inn (10/10/1828).

Chapter V

Continuity and Change

5.1 Introduction

Over the period from the late 19th century to the mid-20th century, the North Pennines has undergone major socio-economic changes. It has also been a period when, at national level at least, the structure of landownership has altered dramatically. This chapter analyses continuity and change in the landownership structures and estate management policies of the three case study estates over this period, and examines the role that landownership has played in the transformation and decline of the North Pennine economy.

The decline of lead mining in the late 19th century was rapid and dramatic. Perhaps the worst conditions were faced in the 1880s. A depression in lead prices due to foreign competition from Spain, Rumania and Germany, coincided with the Great Agricultural Depression, causing distress in both sectors of the upland economy. Whereas on previous occasions the two major mining companies, the Blakett-Beaumonts and the London Lead Company, had ridden out the depression, this time both companies decided to pull out of the area. The Blakett-Beaumonts surrendered their Weardale lease in 1884 to concentrate on their interests in Allendale. The London Lead Company withdrew from Alston Moor in 1882, but continued to operate in Teesdale until 1904 (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 155). Looking back to Figure 4.2, it can be seen that total lead production decreased, both in the North Pennines and nationally, after 1880.

The disastrous effect of the mine closures on local employment is clearly illustrated by the falling population figures after 1880, especially in the lead district (see Figure 5.1). Between 1851 and 1901, there was a decline in population in all the former lead mining districts. Decline was particularly severe on Alston Moor (-54%), Allendale (-65%), Stanhope (-35%) and Hunstanworth (-64%). In contrast, the parishes in North Yorkshire showed a greater stability, and in some cases even

Figure 3.1 — Population Change, 1851 to 1901





Figure 5.2



slight growth. The greatest population growth took place on the fringes of the North Pennines, around Barnard Castle and Lanchester [1].

Although mining continued into the 20th century, it never regained its former importance. New industrial demands have created markets for other minerals besides lead, especially fluorspar, barytes and zinc. The Weardale mineral lease was taken over by the Weardale Lead Company, which operated until 1917 and was then taken over by the Weardale Iron Company. In 1924, this company also took over the last Blakett-Beaumont mines in Allendale. On Alston Moor, zinc mining became important, controlled by the Nent Head and Tynedale Zinc Company who had taken over the lease from the London Lead Company. In 1906, the lease was taken over by the Vielle Montagne Zinc Company. The last lead ore smelt mill to close was at Rookhope in 1919 (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 329).

Figure 5.2 shows that between 1901 and 1951 the rate of population decrease slowed down, although decline continued (the population of Allendale declined by a further 42%). There was even a slight increase of population in Stanhope (1%). The highest rates of population growth continued to be around Barnard Castle.

The lead mining industry bequeathed a legacy of smallholdings and an under-capitalised farm sector. The farm sector had to readjust to the demands of the 20th century. It was reported that in Allendale many farmers turned to dairying (Pawson, 1961, 81). Milk was transported to Hexham for production into butter.

With the decline in the mining industry, the area became less accessible. In the 1950s and 1960s all the branch railway lines closed down (Rounthwaite, 1965). The passenger service to Allendale stopped in 1930 although the line continued to carry freight until 1950. The passenger service to Wearhead ceased in 1957 and the line closed in 1967.

5.2 Case Study One: The Wemmergill Estate

5.2.1 1885 to 1900: Change on the Wemmergill Estate

In 1885, John Bowes died and the landlordship of the Wemmergill estate reverted to the Scottish branch of the family. Claude, the 13th Earl of Strathmore, became the new landlord (see Appendix C). This meant that control of Wemmergill reverted

Table 5.1 — Wennergill Estate Receipts, 1885 to 1939

INCOME SOURCE	1896	1900	1905	1910	1914	1920	1925	1930	1937	1939
Agricultural Rents	5,372.80	5,326.00	4,959.45	5,130.20	4,999.35	4,868.25	2,802.90	2,498.55	2,663.85	2,373.20
Customary Rents	62.70	67.15	66.45	62.85	62.20	59.80	63.90	-	-	-
Quarry Rents	2,769.60	3,121.55	3,160.30	3,425.55	2,693.70	3,402.75	4,695.40	14.15	6.75	15.15
Shooting Rents	3,012.00	3,012.00	4,212.00	4,512.00	4,462.00	3,314.50	281.00	2,519.00	2,500	360.50
Customary Fines	77.70	-	135.95	18.55	4.05	-	5.85	-	-	-
Timber	-	-	-	-	16.70	258.15	22.25	25.95	29.25	88.95
Surface Damages	31.50	-	54.50	42.00	42.50	42.50	42.50	-	-	-
Misc Receipts	55.20	29.90	10.55	00.60	12.60	39.75	537.00	121.90	45.30	48.75
(Balance From Previous Year)	-	-	-	(2,108.30)	-	-	-	-	(1,268.95)	(1,893.70)
Return of Property Tax	-	-	-	-	36.90	158.45	92.90	208.55	-	65.30
(Remittances)	-	(1,420.50)	-	-	-	(148.30)	-	(2,985.75)	(2,964.15)	(3,557.15)
TOTAL	11,381.50	(12,977.10)	12,599.20	(15,300.05)	12,330.00	(12,292.45)	8,543.70	(8,373.85)	(9,478.25)	(8,402.70)
<i>brackets indicate additional receipts</i>										

Table 5.2 — Expenditure at Wemmergill, 1885 to 1939

EXPENSE	1896	1900	1905	1910	1914	1920	1925	1930	1937	1939
Tithes	9.35	8.70	8.95	9.00	9.65	12.60	10.45	-	-	-
Property Tax	353.00	382.40	597.10	847.60	971.40	3,423.30	1,814.60	698.10	972.75	893.25
Local Rates	3.95	7.55	11.25	70.35	75.20	114.85	217.90	276.35	200.30	540.35
Buildings	1,056.50	1,099.70	841.00	1,253.55	1,047.10	791.95	584.60	742.85	568.50	814.60
Drains	177.65	4.65	9.05	119.65	115.20	24.05	65.20	8.90	-	1.00
Fences	174.45	245.50	203.85	202.20	218.40	411.55	119.70	191.50	176.75	353.20
Plantations	67.05	54.35	25.40	35.30	92.00	282.25	31.70	6.50	41.80	16.10
Misc Repairs & Improvements	205.20	107.20	87.00	61.10	10.75	2.45	20.45	15.15	20.80	42.45
Allowances to Tenants	43.75	41.50	69.50	79.05	73.85	42.25	36.15	5.00	27.75	12.50
Sundry Labour	31.80	81.45	59.60	123.90	70.80	135.15	351.40	140.45	180.40	180.50
Gamekeeper's Wages	80.00	5.00	99.75	209.75	207.75	459.35	1,475.70	1,037.20	1,089.50	826.45
Agencies	95.00	95.00	95.00	95.00	95.00	222.40	525.00	213.20	270.20	270.20
Estate Subscriptions	130.25	135.30	55.50	144.20	65.90	60.80	89.95	2.00	29.35	34.80
Insurances	45.55	49.10	48.15	50.00	62.90	82.55	104.70	145.65	153.05	150.75
Misc Payments	202.80	1,639.50	132.75	154.15	193.30	216.70	64.55	3.35	5.65	2.75
Remittances	7,100.00	8,000.00	9,250.00	8,000.00	11,000.00	6,148.30	3,000.00	4,872.35	4,954.20	2,643.65
TOTAL	9,776.30	11,956.90	11,593.85	11,454.80	14,309.20	12,430.50	8,512.05	8,358.55	8,681.10	6,782.55

Source: D/St/E3/5/100 - 145

from Streatlam Castle to Glamis. Ralph John Dent, the agent, died in 1889, when William Ralston took over as agent.

These changes in the management of Wemmergill took place at the same time as the onset of the late 19th century depression in lead mining and agriculture. The balance and composition of income and expenditure on the Wemmergill estate from 1885 to 1939 is shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The depression in lead mining does not appear to have had a major impact on the revenue of the Wemmergill estate or on the inhabitants. It can be seen from Table 4.16, that the employment structure in Lunedale and Holwick had not changed significantly between 1851 and 1881 [2], and Table 5.3 shows that there was no noticeable depopulation from the estate. This reflects that fact that lead mining had never been a dominant part of the estate economy. However, after 1891 there was a steady decline in the population, which may be linked to the withdrawal of the London Lead Company from Teesdale in the early 20th century.

In 1887, general rent reductions were made across the estate. Total receipts fell from £7,260.55 in 1885 to £5,372.80 in 1896, a drop of 25% in ten years. On the Lunedale farms, rents also dropped by 25%, from £2,110.30 in 1885 to £1,796.60 in 1895 (see Table 5.4). The further decline of rental income from the Lunedale farms in the early 20th century was due to the creation of three reservoirs on the estate.

In 1876, an act was passed to allow the Stockton and Middlesborough Water Board to supply water to the boroughs of Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough (D/St/C2/16/8). As a result, three reservoirs were created on the Wemmergill estate: Hury and Blackton reservoirs in Baldersdale, and Grassholme Reservoir in Lunedale (see Figure 4.7). The creation of these reservoirs involved a substantial loss of in-bye land, for which the water board was required to pay compensation.

A surveyor, Samuel Rowlandson [3], was requested to report on the implications of the reservoirs for the estate (D/St/C2/16/8). The Grassholme reservoir involved a loss of 33.7 hectares of farmland in Lower Lunedale. In all, seven farms and one stinted pasture were affected. The farm buildings of East Grassholme farm and Grassholme Mill were completely flooded. High rates of compensation were requested by the estate: £312 per hectare for the farmland, £1,000 for East

Table 5.3 — Population Change on the Wemmergill Estate, 1881 to 1951

Date	Lunedale	Holwick	Mickleton	Cotherstone	Hunderthwaite	Romaldkirk
1881	345	231	707	638	266	297
1891	257	237	665	940	409	287
1901	326	193	655	665	258	251
1911	303	192	566	644	249	240
1921	249	173	520	701	240	233
1931	230	187	475	611	179	205
1951	182	140	415	503	177	169

Grassholme farm, and £1,800 for Grassholme Mill. The Baldersdale reservoirs flooded a larger area, 54.1 hectares, but since the estate only held customary rights over these lands, a compensation payment of only £1.80 per hectare was demanded. The report goes on to state the 13th Earl's position concerning his other rights:

"The mines and minerals to be reserved throughout the whole. The timber to be taken at a valuation, regard being had to premature cutting for which due consideration must be made in the price; say 50%. The reservoirs to be properly and substantially fenced round and so to be maintained by the corporations. The quantities are assumed in each case, subject to admeasurement when the boundaries are properly defined. The right of shooting, fishing, fowling etc reserved over the reservoirs. Proper access to be made for salmon passing up the rivers Lune and Balder".

The reservoirs were completed by 1900 [4]. As a result, the lands of Grassholme East and East Close farms were greatly reduced, and were amalgamated with Rigg farm. Table 5.5 shows the rent reductions that were made on the affected farms. Although the sporting rights were at first reserved, they were later sold to the water board.

Table 5.4 — Lunedale Farm Rents, 1885 to 1946

FARM	1885	1890	1895	1900	1911	1920	193?	1946
Close House & Arngill	78.00	69.50	69.50	69.50	69.50	69.00	55.00	108.00
Lune Head	80.00	65.50	69.50	69.50	72.50	69.00	69.00	111.00
Wythes Hill	155.00	128.00	128.00	128.00	128.00	128.00	130.00	151.00
North Wythes Hill	32.00	28.00	28.00	28.00	-	-	-	-
Grains O' Beck	164.00	138.30	138.30	110.00	110.40	120.00	99.00	99.00
Blake House	82.00	76.50	76.50	65.00	65.40	65.00	40.00	29.00
Scar Head	61.00	52.00	52.00	66.00	66.00	67.00	67.00	130.00
Stackholme	112.00	88.00	88.00	88.00	81.00	100.00	88.00	92.00
Low Wemmergill	146.00	125.00	103.00	103.00	103.40	103.00	94.00	104.00
High Soulgill	50.00	45.00	45.00	45.00	50.25	70.00	70.00	85.00
High Grain	87.00	80.50	80.50	80.50	74.75	80.00	80.00	100.00
Wemmergill Hall	180.00	150.00	150.00	148.50	150.00	147.00	142.00	177.00
Grassholme West	133.00	105.00	105.00	105.00	52.20	52.00	56.00	73.00
Stack	81.00	73.00	73.00	72.50	77.00	87.00	90.00	104.00
Rigg	47.00	34.30	34.30	34.30	34.10	66.00	66.00	77.00
Grassholme East	70.00	62.00	62.00	62.00	22.75	-	-	-
East Close	18.70	15.20	15.20	15.20	8.10	-	-	-
Stake Hill	91.70	78.00	78.00	78.00	67.35	60.00	63.00	71.00
West Park	93.40	87.00	87.00	87.00	80.25	70.00	76.00	83.00
Thringarth	40.60	16.80	16.80	16.80	32.25	31.00	32.00	32.00
East Park	173.00	158.00	158.00	158.00	144.00	134.00	137.00	160.00
Chapel House	24.90	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	24.00
Cronkley	110.00	96.00	96.00	96.00	112.50	100.00	100.00	120.00
TOTAL	2,110.30	1,796.60	1,778.60	1,750.80	1,626.70	1,643.00	1,579.00	1,930.00

Sources: D/St/E3/9/47-50; IR/1/146; E3/9/33; E3/9/37

Table 5.5 — Rent Reductions on Lunedale Farms, 1901


Holding	Original Rent (£)	Reduced Rent (£)
Grassholme West & Mill	105.00	50.00
Grassholme East	62.00	35.00
East Park	158.00	134.00
West Park & Thringarth	118.80	101.80
Stake Hill	78.00	60.00
East Close	15.25	6.00

Source: D/St/E3/9/31

The reduction in farm rents was, to a large extent, offset by two major changes in the composition of the estate's income in the late 19th century. After 1896, as can be seen from Table 5.1, the Wemmergill estate ceased to be dependent for its revenue solely on farm rents. The income from quarry and shooting rents shot up, and between 1886 and 1920, the total estate income was composed almost equally of these three sources of revenue. The increase in quarry rents was due to the opening of a stone quarry across the river from Middleton, worked by Ord and Maddison.

Despite the agricultural depression, expenditure on repairs and improvements to the farm buildings and lands was actually higher in 1896 than in 1885. It can be seen from Table 5.2 that total expenditure more than doubled between 1885 and 1896. This was mainly due to the remittance payments, which rose from £3,000 in 1885 to over £7,000 in 1896. It seems that under the 13th Earl, the accounting procedure altered. Figure 5.3 shows that in five years during the 1890s there was a deficit. Presumably, in these years the deficit was made up by cross-subsidisation. In 1900, expenditure increased even more, but this was largely due to the purchase of property worth £1,420.50 at Bowbank (E3/5/102).

Figure 5.3 — Income & Expenditure at Wemmergill, 1890 to 1939



5.2.2 1900 to 1940: Political Pressures, Survival Strategies

A more serious threat, which threatened the survival of the Strathmore's whole estate, was posed by the political attacks on the landed élite in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (see 2.3). In 1904, only ten years after the introduction of estate duty, the 13th Earl died, and left his son to inherit an estate valued at £716,150 but burdened with estate duties of £14,903 (D/St/C2/20/41). This amount might seem small in relation to the size of the inheritance, but it appears to have caused problems for the new earl. Correspondence between the 14th Earl and William Ralston (the agent) is much taken up with discussion as to which societies the new earl should support, and what minimum level of payments would be acceptable. (D/St/C2/19/261). The tone of these early letters indicates that the new earl held Ralston in considerable respect, and he consulted Ralston frequently about his duties as a landlord.

With the seat of control now at Glamis Castle, it was decided to put Streatlam Castle to some productive use, and from 1904 onwards the castle was let as a sporting lodge with Cotherstone Moor (D/St/C2/20/41).

The 14th Earl stood as the conservative MP for his home constituency of Forfar, and so was personally involved in the growing conflict between the government and the landed élite in the period leading up to the 1910 Finance Act (see 2.3). He describes the political tension of the time in his letters to William Ralston. The threat of a taxation on land values had caused land values to fall:

"the property market is in a very depressed state owing to expectation of forthcoming legislation" (Strathmore to Ralston, 12/3/1909)

It appears that landowners were forming a protest lobby group:

"Will you let Colonel Vane (Raby Estate) know that I think that our association (Durham Conservative Association) should get into communication with the Budget Protest Association, as they will give us the right lines or any how suggestions as to how to form our protest" (Strathmore to Ralston, 23/6/1909)

The 14th Earl was unhappy about the ineffectiveness of the landowners' protest:

"landowners are even now apathetic and there are the Liberty and Property Defence League and other bodies rather overlapping each other" (Strathmore to Ralston, 19/5/1910)

The following outburst indicates the personal strain on the earl:

"I am still paying death duties and the budget makes an enormous difference to me.... (he should know that) I don't spend much on myself, and (that) I do not race, yacht, hunt or play cards and (that) I do not even go to a theatre or smoke a cigar... apparently all my income goes in labour bills, improvements and subscriptions" (Strathmore to Ralston, 6/6/1910)

As well as death duties and the threat of higher land taxes, a further financial pressure on the estate was posed by increases in other property charges. From 1890 onwards, property taxes increased to become a considerable annual expense, particularly after 1914 (see Table 5.2). Although an annual return on the property tax was made after 1914, the return was less than 10% of the total expenditure.

The exceptionally high tax levied in 1920 could include the implementation of the 1910 land tax [5]. Local rates also increased steadily after the First World War.

These political and financial strains on the 14th Earl in the early 20th century were compounded by the continuing depressed state of the agricultural market. Many tenants faced economic difficulties. The 14th Earl wrote to Ralston in 1909 concerning rent arrears, due to the low price of wool and mutton (Strathmore to Ralston, 20/3/1909). Two Lunedale tenants (Dawson of Stake Hill and Dent of Low Wemmergill) were badly in arrears with their rent, and the earl was uncertain of what strategy to adopt in order to recover the arrears:

"I see now that your plan of compromising the arrears would not affect the tenants adversely. On the contrary, they will be getting something for nothing. In fact I think a 'time limit' should be fixed, otherwise the result would not be of much use to the executing, as matters should be wound up before very long... How would it do to let the tenants in question know that all the amounts of arrears that they paid off during the next three or four years would count as double the amount they actually paid off; just as you suggest in fact, only with the time limit added... They should be told that it is the executing of the late Earl that requires some payment of arrears, and not the present management of the estate" (Strathmore to Ralston, 31/3/1909).

It should be noted that the earl excuses himself for this action by putting the blame on his father.

The importance of grouse shooting to the Wemmergill estate economy continued to increase, and it assumed a prominent position in the management of the estate in the 20th century. In 1914, for instance, shooting was let on Cotherstone Low Moor and High Moor, Mickleton allotments, Wemmergill and Holwick (D/St/E3/20/20). The shooting was the only resource in which the earls took a personal interest. It is important to analyse the management of the grouse shooting, since it played such a large role in the development of the estate in the 20th century, and is revealing about the motives of the earls towards the estate.

Grouse shooting was a status sport. The lessees of the shooting were of a much higher social class than the farm tenantry. A memo written by William Ral-

ston in 1906 describes the organisation of the shooting on Cotherstone Moor (D/St/C2/19/163). The low moor required thirteen drivers in a single line. Up to seven drives could be managed in a day and the moor could support about nine days shooting in the season. It was suggested that the two moors be shot alternately on four consecutive days, leaving at least ten days between shoots. The low moor had five lines of butts with six butts per line and there were four lines of six butts on the high moor. It was shot using a 'double drive', with drivers approaching from two different directions, so that the party could shoot first one way then the other. This needed 21 drivers. The low moor yielded, on average, 500 brace [6] of grouse per season, and the high moor 600. The drivers were paid 6 old pence a day (with no beer!). Table 5.6 shows statistics from the 1915 shooting season on Wemmergill Moor. There were, altogether, 13 shooting parties from late August to early September, although the numbers of grouse shot on each occasion declined as the season progressed. The majority of grouse were sent to London for sale, but a number were given as goodwill presents to the farm tenants and other local residents [7], and some were consumed by the shooting parties at Wemmergill Hall.

From Table 5.7, it can be seen that 1915 was a moderate year for grouse shooting. Although grouse shooting could bring in a considerable income, it was not a reliable income source. The value of the moors depended on the quality of the shooting, and this varied enormously from year to year. Looking at the number of grouse killed on the three moors from 1893 to 1915, it can be seen that 1901 and 1912 were bumper years, with over 9,000 head of grouse shot on Wemmergill moor, and over 7,000 on Holwick. 1913 was a disastrous season (only 620 and 153 head were shot on Wemmergill and Holwick moors respectively).

As well as being an unreliable income source, grouse shooting was also a considerable expense. Table 5.2 shows that gamekeepers' wages increased considerably between 1920 and 1925, which indicates the growing importance of grouse shooting on the estate. The increase may have been due to the employment of more gamekeepers, or to a change in management practice. In 1917, the estate was responsible for keeping the moors and paying all local rates and taxes, but the tenants were expected to provide drivers and beaters (D/St/C2/19/163). In 1925,

Table 5.6 — Grouse Killed on Wemmergill Moor, 1915

Date	Brace	Killed	-	Disposed	of	-	-
1915	shot	picked up	total	London	presents	Hall	damaged
<i>August</i>							
28th	582	32	614	537.5	37	-	39.5
30th	584	34	618	497.5	100	-	20.5
<i>September</i>							
3rd	11	-	11	-	11	-	-
15th	16	-	16	-	-	16	-
18th	199.5	10.5	210	196	-	-	14
20th	312.5	7.5	320	293	10	-	17
21st	157.5	4	161.5	149.5	4	-	8
22nd	147.5	4	151.5	108	30	-	13.5
24th	3	-	3	-	3	-	-
<i>October</i>							
18th	17	-	17	-	2	14	-
20th	95	-	95	93.5	-	1.5	-
21st/22nd/23rd	171.5	8	179.5	151	10	9	9
25th	61.5	5	66.5	66	-	-	0.5
27th	108	8.5	116.5	100.5	9	3	4
28th	8.5	-	8.5	-	-	-	8.5
30th	120.5	3.5	124	117	-	7	-
<i>November</i>							
4th/5th	95	3.5	98.5	85.5	-	13	-
TOTALS	2,689.5	120.5	2,810	2,395	217	72	126

Source: D/St/E3/20/65

Table 5.7 — Head of Grouse Killed on the Wemmergill Moors, 1893 to 1915

Year	Wemmergill	Holwick	Cotherstone	Cotherstone
-	-	-	High	Low
1893	8226	5166	-	-
1894	7421	4602	-	-
1895	1895	2227	-	-
1896	9144	5672	-	-
1897	7728	3591	-	-
1898	5750	4407	-	-
1899	3979	3457	-	-
1900	8270	6346	-	-
1901	10072	7725	-	-
1902	6135	1965	-	-
1903	3504	977	-	-
1904	1415	1012	-	-
1905	4559	2127	-	-
1906	3930	3508	838	660
1907	1106	2624	568	925
1908	584	1508	unlet	805
1909	4373	1747	783	957
1910	5731	5177	956	1028
1911	7463	6045	1172	1029
1912	9633	7098	1486	890
1913	620	153	805	902
1914	3241	-	965	874
1915	5620	2431	-	-

Source: D/St/C2/19/163

the estate met the cost of drivers' wages, gun and dog licences, and all the costs of maintaining the shooting lodges (D/St/E3/5/129).

It was hard to let the moors during the 1914 - 1918 war, not least because of the difficulty of obtaining ammunition. By 1918, there was a scarcity of lead for civilian purposes (Strathmore to Ralston, 12/5/1918). Thus, Wemmergill Moor was let for only £1,250 in 1915 instead of the advertised £2,500. Holwick shooting was advertised for £1,000 in 1917, but finally let for only £650 (D/St/C2/19/163). Even the 14th Earl had problems obtaining game [8].

From Figure 5.3 and Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen that in the period leading up to the First World War, receipts from the Wemmergill estate continued to decline, and in several years expenditure exceeded income. In these years, the deficit was made up by cross-subsidisation from the earl's other properties. It is unclear whether the greater instability in the Wemmergill budget following the death of John Bowes was due to new accounting procedures, or to actual changes in the estate budget. The percentage of the total receipts which were put back into repairs and improvements remained relatively constant at around 10%, and the percentage of the income which went towards remittance payments actually dropped under the 13th and 14th Earls. It should be remembered that when ownership of the Wemmergill estate reverted back to the Scottish branch of the family, the Wemmergill estate became part of a much larger property portfolio.

Major structural changes to the Strathmore family's total landholdings took place in the 1920s, when the 14th Earl decided to, or was forced to, sell a substantial amount of property. His letters to William Ralston at this time show the bitterness he felt at having to reduce the estate. He talks about:

"the folly of keeping up two large places in these days" (Strathmore to Ralston, 13/4/1920)

Property prices were depressed, and of the sale of Gibside Hall in 1920 the earl writes:

"It is sad that a house such as Gibside should go for the small sum of £7,500, as I dare say it would cost £50,000 to erect now" (Strathmore to Ralston, 16/4/1920).

In 1922, Streatlam Castle was sold along with a 2,792 hectare estate, including a 167 hectare deer park (D/St/C2/20/42). After the sale, new estate offices and an agent's house were found in Barnard Castle. The Westwick estate (in South Durham) was also sold to the sitting tenants in 1922 [9].

A continuing depression in the land and agricultural markets in the 1920s caused further economic problems for the Wemmergill estate. Table 5.4 shows that total rents from the Lunedale farms dropped by 4% between 1920 and the 1930s. A major blow was dealt to the total estate revenue by the closure of the Middleton stone quarry in the late 1920s. Following the 1925 Property Acts (see 2.2.2), income from customary rents ceased. After 1920, it can be seen from Table 5.2 that the level of donations to local societies, and the level of remittances paid to the earl dropped, both indications of financial strain. The depressed conditions showed no sign of easing in the 1930s. It was a time of considerable personal strain on all concerned in the management of the estate. In 1931, the Lunedale bailiff, John Brown, wrote to Thomas McQueen (the agent):

"I would not like you to think I was not keeping expenses down... I do my best to keep them down, and will do so... But, in your letter you have chosen what is a very big month, and one that will not occur again this year" (J. Brown to McQueen, 13/8/1931) [10].

A letter from a Cockfield tenant (South Durham) to McQueen in 1931 describes the agricultural distress:

"I am endeavouring to do my best during this depression to keep the business going, and I may tell you it has cost me all I possessed in the hopes of this depression passing away. Everybody seems to be curtailing expenses, horses here are going on the land without shoes, farmers accounts that used to run from £8 to £14 per half year are from 30/ to £2" (G. Harrison to McQueen, 1931).

In 1932, the 14th Earl decided to divide the ownership and control of the Durham and Wemmergill estates between himself and his eldest son and heir, Lord Glamis (D/St/C2/20/28). The division was made as follows: the earl retained surface interests at Evenwood and manorial rights to Holwick and Gibside. Lord Glamis received the surface rights to Holwick and Gibside, plus surface and manorial

ownership of the Wemmergill (i.e. Lunedale) and Cockfield estates. The reasons for the division of the estate were, probably, due partly to the old age of the 14th Earl (he was 77), and partly to the desire to alleviate the burden of death duties by transferring property during the earl's lifetime. It also smoothed over the transition of management from father to son (on the death of the father, the 15th Earl assumed the ownership and control of all these estates).

After this date, therefore, Lord Glamis took over the management of the Wemmergill estate. Rent rebates were allowed to the tenants in 1933, and John Brown describes their appreciation at the rent audit dinner:

"They (also) made a unanimous and special request that I should let you know they all appreciated the allowance made to them today, and they wished you to let their Lordships both know how grateful they were, and they hoped that if times did not improve before the next rent audit that they would again make allowance" (J. Brown to McQueen, 10/4/1933)

A dispute over rents may have been the subject of this following letter from Lord Glamis to McQueen:

"I quite agree that the Holwick tenants must be treated firmly at the moment. Moreover, I fancy that if it came to what the Americans call a 'show down', very few would be prepared to throw up their farms. You confirm my suspicions that there is a ring-leader and he must be closely watched" (Lord Glamis to McQueen, 22/9/1933)

Lord Glamis placed as great, if not greater, importance on the management of the grouse moors in comparison to his father. He was prepared to exploit the estate's historical associations in order to publicise the moors and obtain good lettings. 1933 proved a difficult year in which to let the moors, because a grouse disease in 1931/32 had reduced the population. By June 1933, the moors were still not let, and Thomas McQueen recommended that the estate should place an advert in the newspapers which glamorised the history of the moors:

"If (an advert) were worked up on the famous guns that had been attracted to the Teesdale grouse moors since the visit of the late King Edward and his party in August 1866, and later the German Emperor to Wemmergill, and in more

Table 5.9 — Lunedale Farm Tenants, 1870 to 1946

FARM	1870	1880	1890	1900	1911	1946
Close House	George Collinson	ditto	William Collinson	ditto	ditto	Sowerby & Addison
Lune Head	Henry Sowerby	ditto	Thomas Sowerby	ditto	ditto	ditto
Wythes Hill	J. Raine & R. Watson	J. Watson	William Coatsworth	J. Coatsworth & T. Gibson	J. Coatsworth	W. Addison
Grains O' Beck	William Dent	Joseph Dent	W. & R. Dent	Joseph Peacock	ditto	W. Dowson
Blake House	John Watson	ditto	Joseph Peacock	ditto	Matthew Peacock	Tallentine & Beadle
Scar Head	Robert Bayles	ditto	ditto	ditto	I. & J. Bayles	W. Dawson
Stackholme	John Kipling	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	N. Williamson
Low Wemmergill	Henry Dent	J. Hind & H. Dent	J. & H. Dent	ditto	ditto	T. Dent
High Soulgill	George Raine	ditto	ditto	ditto	W. & J. Bell	-
Low Soulgill	Thomas Sayer	ditto	T. Sayer's Exors	T. Sayer	ditto	H. Staley

Table 5.9 — Lunedale Farm Tenants, 1870 to 1946

	1870	1880	1890	1900	1911	1946
Wemmergill Hall	William Collinson	ditto	G. & H. Collinson	ditto	R. Bainbridge's Exors	
Grassholme West	Henry Allinson	ditto	ditto	Mrs Allinson	J. Stokeld	ditto
Stack	Thomas Smith	ditto	ditto	John Smith	ditto	T. Dent
Rigg	Richard Watson	J. Bainbridge	ditto	Abel Smith	ditto	J. White
Grassholme East	Francis Smith	ditto	F. Smith's Exors	J. & A. Smith	A. Smith	-
East Close	Ann Addison	T. Addison	T. Addison's Exors	T. Addison	ditto	T. Addison's Exors
West Stake Hill	John Dowson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	J. Collinson
West Park	J. Bainbridge	ditto	William Cameron	ditto	ditto	J. W. Collinson
Thringarth	Joseph Sowerby	ditto	W. Cameron	ditto	G. Cameron	T. Addison
East Park	John Dent	ditto	ditto	M. & J. Dent	J. Dent	R. Raine
Chapel House	Valentine Raine	William Raine	ditto	ditto	John Jackson	B. Teward
Cronkley	Arthur Allinson	ditto	ditto	M. Allinson	J. Natrass	A. Bell

recent years mention of HRH the Duke of York's visit to Holwick, and that it was on Wemmergill Moor that driving was first seriously adopted, with Sir F. Milbank's record bag in 1872...." (MacQueen to Glamis, 4/7/33) [11].

Despite this glamorous portrayal, however, the Wemmergill shooting was finally let for only £1,000.

Unfortunately, no information is available on tenancy changes between 1911 and 1946, but Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that several changes in tenancy took place during this period. Up to 1911, however, there were very few changes in tenancy, indicating a high degree of stability and continuity in the farm sector.

5.2.3 Summary

Several changes in ownership, control and resource use took place during this period, not only on the Wemmergill estate but also to the Strathmore family's total estate. The Wemmergill estate was not unduly affected by the lead mining depression, but the agricultural depression led to a fall in farm rents. The creation of three reservoirs on the estate caused a loss of in-bye land and a reduction in the number of farm holdings.

Possibly due to the return of the ownership of the Wemmergill estate to the Scottish branch of the family, and possibly due to falling agricultural rents, the resource base of the Wemmergill estate broadened in the late 19th century. Rising rents from quarrying and grouse shooting offset falling agricultural receipts. Grouse shooting was to play a very high profile role in the development of the estate over the 20th century.

Like other members of the landed élite, the 14th Earl faced financial pressures from the political attacks on private landownership and the rising burden of taxation. In the early 1920s, the Streatlam, Westwick and Gibside estates were sold, but the Wemmergill estate survived. In the 1930s, the management of the Wemmergill estate was taken over by Lord Glamis, the heir to the estate. He placed an equal, if not greater emphasis on the development of grouse shooting.

5.3 Case Study Two: Lord Crewe's Charity

5.3.1 1860 to 1900: Change

External pressures, both political and economic, were responsible for changes in the administration, charitable function and estate structure of Lord Crewe's Charity in the late 19th century. Lord Crewe's Charity was attacked politically not for its landownership, but for its charitable functions. During the 19th century, charities like Lord Crewe's began to attract public attention and criticism. Many charities had lost sight of their original purpose, and were accused of being anachronistic and even corrupt institutions. In 1818, the Brougham Commission was set up to record and report on all educational charities for the poor, and to instigate proceedings against those thought to be maladministered [12]. In 1828, Lord Crewe's Charity was investigated by the commission and was praised for its sound management (Stranks, 1976, 17).

This temporarily silenced public criticism until the mid-19th century, when public interest in charities was again aroused. In 1853, the Charitable Act established the Charity Commissioners as an official body, with an Official Trustee for charitable lands and Official Trustees of charitable funds. The aim was to make charities publicly accountable, by setting up a higher regulatory body. The Charity Commission was given the power to issue schemes of management to individual charities. In 1862, the Charity Commissioners ordered an inspector, a Mr Martin, to investigate Lord Crewe's Charity (Stranks, 1976, 18). His findings were critical. The total income from the estate had increased from £1,312 in 1721 to £10,006 in 1877, yet few changes had been made to the level of charitable payments. He claimed that the charity was poorly administered and that much of its income was mis-spent, concluding:

"The history of this Charity suggests many other observations:- enough has been said to prove the necessity of an entire change and of the interference of the Court of Chancery if not Parliament. The number of the trustees should be increased and an admixture of laymen would be desirable, the prohibition of the increase of the fixed payments should be rescinded and after such an augmentation of these as the altered value of money has rendered equitable, the surplus should be devoted to some specific purpose instead of being frittered

away in small payments frequently of little use if not occasionally mischievous"
(Mr Martin, 1864, 23) [13].

Lord Crewe's Trustees protested against the findings of the report, and the matter was brought to the Court of Chancery [14]. The outcome of this public investigation was the issue of a scheme of management, which was approved by orders of the Court of Chancery in 1876 (452/C5/36) [15]. The scheme enabled the administration of the charity and the charitable payments to be updated. A hospital account was set up under the new scheme, into which any surplus funds could be placed. It was planned at a future date to found a hospital for sufferers of scrofula (consumption) in Bamburgh Castle [16]. The castle was only to be let at an economic rent, so ending the preferential use of the castle by the trustees. There was no change in the number of trustees, but the estate accounts and business matters were to be administered and regulated by a receiver, a secretary and a banker. The trustees were to meet twice yearly at Bamburgh Castle.

The new scheme did lead to an improvement in the administration of the charity. In 1876, a new secretary and receiver were appointed (B.a.3, 29/9/1876). The secretary was Christopher Rowlandson, the former agent for Blanchland and son of the former secretary to the charity, Samuel Rowlandson. Later, in 1878, an auditor for the accounts was also appointed. The extra scrutiny of the estate accounts was proved to be necessary, for in 1883, the receiver was found to have made errors and consequently resigned (B.a.3, 29/9/1876). Thereafter, Christopher Rowlandson also performed the role of receiver.

Although the new schedule effected an improvement in the administration of the charity, the charity soon faced pressures from another quarter. The economic depression of the late 19th century resulted in falling revenues on all the charity's estates, with the result that the trustees were hard put to it to keep up the charitable payments. In the 1870s, the trustees had decided to develop North Sunderland harbour as a centre for the herring industry, and for the export of corn and lime (Stranks, 1976, 22). The project had proved far more costly than expected and added an extra financial burden on the administration of the charity. The total income of the charity fell from £13,215.75 in 1875 to £11,764.40 in 1880 and

£10,896.70 in 1885 (B.b, 26,27,28). In 1887, the trustees decided to reduce their payments to schools:

“In consideration of the depression in agriculture and the consequent reduction of the income of the charity, the grants to schools will be reduced” (B.a.3, 29/6/87).

The Charity Commissioners recommended that the trustees sell part of the estate (B.a.3, 29/7/1894), but, fortunately, Lord Armstrong’s offer to buy Bamburgh Castle saved the trustees from having to take this step. The castle was sold in 1894 for £60,000, and Lord Armstrong also offered to house the charity’s muniments and Dr Sharp’s Library (B.a.3, 29/7/1894).

With such a major loss to the charity’s property portfolio, the Charity Commissioners decided that a new scheme of management was required. This second scheme of 1896 (452/C5/44) was jointly drawn up by the Charity Commissioners and the trustees. For instance, the suggestion by the Charity Commissioners that the number of trustees be increased to eleven, was amended to seven following protest from the trustees (B.a.3, 29/11/1895). The new scheme effected two main changes in the administration and ownership form of the charity. First, the number of trustees was increased from five to seven, with the inclusion of two laymen, bringing new management skills to the charity. The first laymen to serve were Lords Armstrong and Barnard. Both were local landowners and so had experience of estate management. Second, the charity became more accountable to the Charity Commissioners. The legal title to all the charity’s real estate was vested in the Official Trustee of charity lands, whilst the personal property was vested with the Official Trustees of charitable funds. All the accounts were from now on audited annually by the Charity Commissioners.

The dramatic change in the composition of the charity’s revenue following the sale of Bamburgh Castle can be seen in Table 4.17. The sale resulted in a drop in rents from the estates of 20%. The charity diversified its investment base into stocks and shares. The purchase money from the castle was invested, and the interest from stocks made up 15% of the charity’s income in 1896. The income contribution from the Blanchland estates, it can be seen, remained almost unchanged at about 25%

The effects of the 1896 scheme seem to have been beneficial. The trustees now met regularly on the last Wednesdays of April and October. After the sale of Bamburgh Castle, the offices of the charity were moved to an office in Newcastle. Charitable payments were decided and approved by the Charity Commissioners every April. The sale of Bamburgh Castle freed money that had formerly gone towards the upkeep of the school and shipwrecked sailors there. The scrofula hospital project was also abandoned. Instead, the trustees were authorised to divide the residue of the income into nineteen parts, of which eleven were to be applied in the Diocese of Durham and eight in the Diocese of Newcastle (see Appendix H).

5.3.2 The Blanchland Estate in the late 19th Century

How did the changes taking place to the structure of the charity affect the management of the Blanchland estate? With the appointment of Christopher Rowlandson to the post of secretary, the Blanchland estate ceased to have a separate agent, although a bailiff continued to reside on the estate [17]. The secretary and the bailiff corresponded frequently on matters concerning the management of the estates.

In the 1870s it appears that the farms were prospering. In 1875, Thomas Hey (the bailiff) informed Christopher Rowlandson:

"We have had fine harvest weather which I hope will continue. The fair on the 24th was a good selling one" (Hey to Rowlandson, 6/9/1875)

And in another letter soon after:

"The fair on Monday was only thinly attended but all was sold and at good prices. We have a nice day for harvesting" (21/9/1875).

In the late 1870s, a significant change took place in the letting of the Blanchland farms. Perhaps as a result of the 1876 scheme, the trustees issued the order that:

"no person be accepted as tenant unless he can give at least two good surities for the payment of rent and the proper management of the land" (B.a.3, 24/10/1876).

Previously, no farmers of capital had taken the Blanchland farms and each farm had been let as a single holding. It can be seen from Table 5.10, however, that by

Table 5.10 — Blanchland Farm Tenants, 1865 to 1885

FARM	1865	1870	1875	1880	1885
ACTON	J. Pickering	J Pickering's Exors	J.& H. Pickering	J. Pickering	ditto
COWBYER (main)	Ann Bell	George Bell	ditto	ditto	ditto
COWBYER (small)	Elizabeth Colpitts	-	-	-	-
PENNY PIE	Edward Pattinson	Mrs Hutchinson	William Hutchinson	ditto	Messrs Hutchinson
BURNTSHIELDHAUGH	Jane Saunderson	ditto	ditto	Jasper Stephenson	ditto
BIRKSIDE	George Carr	John Johnson	ditto	ditto	ditto
COTEHOUSE	Robert Johnson	Mrs Johnson	ditto	ditto	ditto
ALLENSHIELDS (main)	George Collinson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
ALLENSHIELDS (small)	R & D Price	William Price	ditto	ditto	ditto
FELLGROVE	Mary Morpeth	ditto	ditto	ditto	Jane Morpeth
HEATHERYBURN	William Cooke	Jasper Stephenson	ditto	ditto	ditto
NOOKTON	Jasper Stephenson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
GIBRALTER	Matthew Taylor	ditto	ditto	Jasper Stephenson	ditto
BALE HILL	Mrs Gibson	George Taylor	ditto	ditto	ditto
BUCKSHOTT	Phoebe Keenleyside	ditto	ditto	Matthew Keenleyside	ditto

Table 5.11 — Blanchland Farm Tenants, 1890 to 1911

FARM	1890	1895	1900	1905	1911
ACTON	J Pickering	ditto	ditto	J Pickering's Exors	J.W. Pickering
COWBYER (main)	J. Vipond	ditto	ditto	J. Vipond's Exors	J. & J. Vipond
COWBYER (small)	George Bell	-	-	-	-
PENNY PIE	Messrs Hutchinson	J. Hutchinson	ditto	ditto	ditto
BURNTSHIELDHAUGH	Thomas Stephenson	ditto	ditto	J.A. Stephenson	J.W. Stephenson
BIRKSIDE	John Johnson	ditto	J. Johnson's Exors	J.W. Robson	ditto
COTEHOUSE	J. Johnson	ditto	J. Johnson's exors	J.W. Robson	ditto
ALLENSHIELDS (main)	George Collinson	Joseph Collinson	ditto	J. Collinson's Exors	Ann Collinson
ALLENSHIELDS (small)	J.&D. Jones	Matthew Keenleyside	ditto	ditto	J. Johnson
FELLGROVE	Jane Morpeth	ditto	Thomas Morpeth	ditto	ditto
HEATHERYBURN	Joseph Stephenson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
NOOKTON	Joseph Stephenson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
GIBRALTER	Joseph Stephenson	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto
BALE HILL	Thomas Robson	ditto	J. Robson & J. Bell	W. Paul	ditto
BUCKSHOTT	Matthew Keenleyside	ditto	ditto	J. Keenleyside	ditto

1880, Jasper Stephenson occupied four of the farm holdings. His father, William Stephenson, had taken the tenancy of Nookton farm in 1835 (see Table 4.28). In 1840, Jasper Stephenson took over the tenancy from his father and in 1870 had the occupancy of Heatheryburn farm as well. In 1875, the tenancy of Burntshieldhaugh farm fell vacant. At first, it was assumed that the son of the former tenant would take over the tenancy:

"A son, Joseph, who has been shepherd for Mr Stephenson at Newbiggenhope, is managing for the present for them at the Haugh. He is very desirous to become the new tenant and Mr Stephenson thinks that he might manage it, he is a very steady man and his family is grown up with two sons quite men who would assist him, whether he will be able to bring capital to invest in stocking it I do not know, he thinks that with the assistance his own family can give him that he can, a son that is married would be able to lend him some money, but there will be time to consider about that if you are inclined to treat with him", (Hey to Rowlandson, 19/8/1875).

However, it appears that Mr Stephenson also had designs on the holding, and was considered a much more attractive proposition by Thomas Hey:

"I have seen J. Saunderson since you were last here and he proposes to pay half a year's rent in advance if you accept him as tenant. But I think he wants energy for the management of a farm properly. Mr J. Stephenson can do it in quite a different manner. (Hey to Rowlandson, 19/10/1875).

In the end Jasper Stephenson was selected as the new tenant, and on taking over the holding, began to improve the land by drainage. He was also anxious to take over the tenancy of Gibraltar farm:

"Mr J. Stephenson wishes to have the draining at Burntshieldhaugh commenced with, also he is desirous to know if he is to become the tenant of Gibraltar, if so he would take the winter eatage and also prepare some manure for it without delay so as to be able to improve it" (Hey to Rowlandson, 11/1/1876).

It would appear that Jasper Stephenson was a very different class of tenant to the others on the estate, although his origins were in the North Pennines (he was born in Allendale in 1819). His higher status is indicated by the fact that he was

the only farm tenant in the 19th century to rent shooting rights (he rented the shooting on Nookton Fell from 1875 onwards). He also enjoyed a greater security of tenure than the other tenants. He was given a lease of 21 years for Nookton in 1859 and held Heatheryburn and Burntshieldhaugh farms on leases for 14 years. After his death in 1889, his son took over the tenancies of the four holdings, so that the Stephenson family retained a high profile on the estate.

In 1880, a depression in both the mining industry and agriculture began to be felt on the Blanchland estates. The closure of the mines was foreseen in the mid-1870s, and the estate was concerned for the welfare of the miners:

“The Derwent Mines Company have determined to cease working them.... this will cause a dispersion of the working inhabitants into other places in search of work” (Hey to Rowlandson, 16/11/1875).

The company finally gave up its lease in 1884, and Christopher Rowlandson pointed out to the trustees the financial implications of their withdrawal:

“The Derwent Mines are closed and the plant sold and I doubt if they are to be repaired, this causes an immediate loss of £135 per annum to the Trustees, besides the contingent loss of cottages standing empty and the reductions of the rent of other cottages from want of competition for them” (Rowlandson to the trustees, 13/10/1884).

165 jobs were lost at the Jeffreys mine alone (Burt et al., 1983, 45). At Blanchland, 101 men were employed in lead mining in 1851, but only 16 in 1881 (see Table 4.25). At Hunstanworth the fall was equally dramatic, with 151 men employed in the lead mining industry in 1851 and only 69 in 1881 (see Table 4.26). The total populations of Blanchland and Hunstanworth fell from 551 and 615 in 1851, to 276 and 271 in 1881 respectively (see Table 5.12).

The agricultural depression did not lead to out-migration, but it did cause some distress amongst the charity's tenants. In 1879, tenants at Blanchland sent a petition to the trustees to ask for a revaluation of their farms and a return on rents (B.a.3, 22/4/1879). By 1884, the farm holdings were in a very neglected condition:

**Table 5.12 — Population Change at Blanchland & Hunstanworth,
1881 to 1951**

Date	Blanchland	Hunstanworth
1871	501	704
1881	367	502
1891	276	271
1901	232	220
1911	229	247
1921	217	200
1931	207	208
1951	170	173

“Fences are very bad, I would like your opinion on them. Some of the fields are getting very poor for want of manure, the hay has been sold and no manure of any amount made, some parties have not put on what little has been made. At present one person has left last year’s crop and the year before’s too in the yard, not having had any animals during the winter” (Rutherford to Rowlandson, May 1884).

Ten per cent rebates were granted to the tenants in 1887, and were continued until 1893 (B.a.3, 29/6/1887). Table 5.13 shows that between 1885 and 1895, rentals dropped from £1,387.90 to £1,161.35, a drop of 17%. On most holdings, the 1895 rent was equal to or less than the 1870 level [18].

Despite the agricultural distress and the out-migration of lead miners, it can be seen from Tables 5.10 and 5.11 that over the period from 1865 to 1911 there was a remarkable continuity in tenancies. With the exception of the Stephenson family, very few changes in tenancy took place.

Although revenue from farms and mines continued to fall, the income from shooting rents rose. From 1885 to 1900, the shooting was let in three leases: the Nookton shooting (Jasper Stephenson, £50); the Allenshields shooting (various tenants

Table 5.13 — Blanchland Receipts, 1865 to 1925

FARM	1865	1870	1875	1880	1885	1890	1895	1900	1905	1911	1925
Acton	77.30	108.50	113.15	130.00	130.00	130.00	110.00	110.00	110.00	136.00	152.20
Cowbyer (main)	74.50	113.00	113.00	114.00	114.00	80.50	125.00	125.00	125.00	127.00	160.00
Cowbyer (small)	26.30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Penny Pie	32.00	45.00	45.00	45.00	45.00	38.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	33.40	67.40
Burntshieldhaugh	85.50	95.20	95.00	100.00	120.00	100.00	90.00	90.00	90.00	90.00	130.00
Birkside	78.80	99.00	102.35	102.35	102.35	102.35	92.00	92.00	235.00	210.00	200.00
Cotehouse	79	100.00	100.00	100.00	103.25	103.25	93.00	93.00	-	-	-
Allenshields (main)	150.00	155.15	160.75	160.75	128.60	128.60	120.00	110.00	110.00	110.00	140.00
Allenshields (small)	26.00	28.05	30.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	16.15	21.00	21.00	24.00	-
Fellgrove	16.70	16.70	16.70	16.70	16.70	16.70	16.70	16.70	16.70	16.75	43.10
Heatheryburn	70.00	95.60	100.00	100.00	100.00	85.00	76.50	76.50	-	-	-
Nookton	178.70	230.00	230.00	230.00	230.00	200.00	180.00	180.00	345.00	345.00	509.40
Gibraltar	14.50	14.50	14.50	15.00	15.00	15.00	13.00	13.50	-	-	-
Bale Hill	12.00	20.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	34.00	42.00	38.00	34.00	59.40
Buckshott	80.00	92.30	93.90	94.55	97.80	97.80	80.00	80.00	90.00	77.00	135.40
SUBTOTAL	1,001.30	1,213.00	1,240.15	1,264.35	1,258.70	1,153.20	1,080.35	1,083.70	1,214.70	-	-
Timber sales	154.55	43.00	149.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55.00
Game rents	150.00	185.00	160.00	110.00	310.00	310.00	310.00	325.00	275.00	437.00	-
Mines/ Other	135.00	135.10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	360.00	-
TOTAL RECEIPTS	2,227.65	2,348.00	2,452.00	2,646.00	2,490.00	2,483.00	2,188.00	2,192.00	2,500.00	2,280.00	2,740.00

Sources: 452/B.b.8-B.b.33; IR/1/21; B.b.35

including Christopher Rowlandson, £60); and shooting over the Blanchland moors (J. Joicey, £200).

5.3.3 1900 to 1940: continuity and change

The 1896 schedule appears to have put the charity on a far more efficient footing. However, the charity still had to adapt and respond to the changing political and economic climate of the 20th century. Changes were made in the charitable payments. For instance, the Board of Education Act of 1899 removed the charity’s obligation to provide funds for schools. Instead, the trustees set up a separate Educational Foundation. In 1909, further changes were made to the administration of the charity at the recommendation of the clerk and receiver (B.a.4, 28/4/1909). The office of the charity was moved from Newcastle to Durham where it has since remained.

Table 5.14 — Blanchland Wood Account, 1910 to 1950

DATE	RECEIPTS (£)	EXPENSES (£)
1910	-	430
1915	222	222
1920	127	587
1925	55	-
1930	171	-
1935	99	-
1940	502.50	301
1945	207	112.50
1950	191	231

Sources: 452/B.b.35; B.b.36.

The appointment of Lord Barnard as a lay trustee after 1896 had a positive benefit for the Blanchland estate. He took a personal interest in the management of the

plantations. On his advice, part of the Old Park and Deborah plantations were cleared, and new equipment was purchased for sawing the timber and replanting (B.a.4, 27/4/1910). Table 5.14 shows receipts and expenditure for timber from 1910 to 1950. Although expenditure exceeded receipts in some years, it should be remembered that the timber was also used on the estate. Estate receipts were also increased after 1902 by revenue from the Presser Pumping Station. This was an underground reservoir at Heatheryburn, managed by the Weardale and Consett Water Company. In 1911, the company paid £360 rent to the trustees.


In the 1920s, pressures to sell parts of the Blanchland estates came from private and public interests. In 1918, the Blanchland estate was very nearly sold when a Messrs J.D. Wood and Co. of London, and a Messrs Bramwell, Clayton and Clayton of Newcastle, offered to purchase part of the estate (B.a.4, 24/4/1918). The trustees refused to sell a part, but were prepared to favourably consider an offer for the whole estate. On reflection, however, they refused to sell. In 1925, an offer was made for the Blanchland plantations and the lease of certain farms on the estate for 999 years by the newly formed Forestry Commission (B.a.5, 20/4/25). This was declined, but in 1936 a further offer was made to buy Acton, Penny Pie, Cowbyer, Cotehouse, Birkside and Burntshieldhaugh farms for £17,000 (B.a.5, 28/10/1936). This second offer the trustees also refused [19].

In 1926, the Nookton estate (including Nookton, Heatheryburn and Gibraltar farms) was sold to Colonel Joicey, a neighbouring landowner, for £11,000 (B.a.5, 27/10/1926). The reasons for the sale are uncertain. It was not in the tradition of the charity to sell land, and Nookton seems to have been one of the more profitable holdings. One factor was, undoubtedly, that the three holdings had for some time been let as a unit to the Stephenson family. There may well have been some informal political pressure put on the trustees to sell.

Figure 5.4 shows the total receipts from the Blanchland estate from 1910 to 1970, and the amount expended on repairs and improvements to the Blanchland properties. The receipts rose slowly over the first 25 years of the 20th century to £2,740 in 1925, but had dropped again to £2,243.50 by 1940. In 1920, it was reported that rent increases on all the charity's properties totalled £556.85 (B.a.4, 24/4/1820). However, depression hit the farm sector again in the 1930s. All the Blanchland

tenants were granted a 10% rebate on their half year's rent in 1933, and rebates continued through the decade. The trustees appear to have been lenient to the tenants during the depression. They wiped off two cases of tenant debt [20], and gave allowances of artificial fertiliser in cases of special hardship [21]. Essential repairs to farm houses were carried out (see Table 5.15) although, as can be seen from Figure 5.4, expenditure was low. On the outbreak of the Second World War, it was decided to set up a reserve fund to meet the cost of repairs which might not be carried out during the war (B.a.5, 25/10/1939).

Figure 5.4 — Receipts & Expenditure at Blanchland, 1910 to 1972



Sources: 452/B.b.35; B.b.36

Between 1945 and 1955, it can be seen from Figure 5.4 that expenditure on repairs and improvements to the Blanchland estate increased sharply, and receipts also gradually increased, indicating that the worst of the agricultural depression was over.

Table 5.15 — Expenditure at Blanchland, 1930s

Year	Farm	Type of Work	Expenditure (£)
1931	Birkside	Draining	?
1931	Cotehouse	Repairs to farmhouse	298.80
1932	Acton	New hayshed	350.00
1932	Penny Pie	New hemel & loose box	?
1932	Allenshields	New byer & hayshed	?
1932	Bale Hill	Cow byer & calf hutches	120.00
1933	Burntshieldhaugh	Draining & roof repairs	75.00
1937	Buckshott	New byer & draining	220.00
1938	Acton	Roadside fencing	97.00
1939	Allenshields	New hayshed	80.00

Source: 452/B.a.5.

Various other small but significant changes took place to the management and structure of the Blanchland estate in the 20th century. With the closure of the lead mines, there was no longer a demand for the stinted pastures. Between 1880 and 1900, the number of stinholders on the Park Pasture dropped from 18 to 12. In 1911, the Close Pasture was leased with Cowbyers farm to J. & J. Vipond, and in 1922, a golf course was laid out on the Close Pasture with the help of a neighbouring landowner, Colonel Cowie, but was closed down soon afterwards in 1925 (B.a.5, 28/10/1925). Mining, quarrying, and grouse shooting continued to bring in a small income. At least eight leases were granted for the extraction of ganister, barytes, fluorspar and barium between 1917 and 1940. These were mostly small scale, entrepreneurial enterprises [22].

5.3.4 Summary

Over the late 19th century, changes in the administration, charitable payments and property holdings were imposed on Lord Crewe's Charity by outside events,

both political and economic. No structural changes were made to the Blanchland estate, although the closure of the lead mines caused hardship for many of the inhabitants. In the first half of the 20th century, parts of the Blanchland estate were sold but, otherwise, continuity has been the overriding feature of this estate, especially of the farm tenants.

5.4 Case Study Three: The Stanhope Estate

5.4.1 Political Pressure: reform of ownership

From the late 18th century onwards, the Church was criticised both for its role as landowner and for its spiritual role in the community. Firstly, there was general dissatisfaction with the way the Church estates throughout the country were managed and, in particular, with the ecclesiastical leaseholds. Secondly, with a growth in the number of urban parishes, the income distribution of parishes throughout the country had become highly unbalanced, and the need for a central fund to regulate church incomes was recognised (Sutherland, 1968, 131).

As a result, a central body known as the Ecclesiastical Commissioners was set up in 1836 to manage all the Church's estates and to regulate the distribution of income. The commissioners included two archbishops, five members of government, all the bishops of England and Wales, three deans, six common law, equity and ecclesiastical judges and eight permanent lay commissioners [23]. The takeover of the various church estates by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners took a number of years to complete. In 1840, the commissioners assumed control of the Dean and Chapters' estates in Durham, but the Bishopric estates were not taken over until 1856 (Musset, 1988, 13). Bishop Longley (1856 to 1860), in return for the loss of the estates, was given a yearly salary of £8,000 and retained the palace at Bishop Auckland as his official residence [24].

Following the establishment of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the Stanhope estate became part of a nation-wide landed portfolio. Therefore any questions concerning its management were taken in a national context. The day-to-day management of the estates was handed over to two firms of land agents: Smiths Gore and Cluttons. Smiths Gore managed the Stanhope estate from an office in Darlington, so that neither landlord nor land agent resided on the estate. Smiths

Gore were given a fair degree of independence in management, although expenditure over a certain amount had to be authorised by the commissioners in London (Respondent B).

Two main structural changes to the Stanhope estate were effected by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners in the 1860s and 1870s. First, ecclesiastical leaseholds were phased out. The abolition of ecclesiastical leases was a national policy of the commissioners. It obviously caused a short-term disruption to the total income whilst leases lapsed. Lessees were given the option to purchase the freehold of the property, or to take out a new tenancy at market rates [25]

Obviously, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners faced financial constraints during this transitional period. Bishop Longley wrote to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners in 1860, expressing his concern that they meet their duties as landed proprietors in County Durham by increasing beneficial payments, especially since other landed proprietors met their responsibilities. Apparently, County Durham suffered disproportionate problems of poverty, distress and 'spiritual destitution' compared to other sees:

"The parties who are thus consciously fulfilling their own obligations not unnaturally enquire why they should be asked to aid in providing the ministrations of the Church and the means of Christian education" (Bishop Longley to Sir James Chalk, 1860).

The Ecclesiastical Commissioners justified this short-term neglect of their spiritual duties by promising better long-term gains:

"in one of the worst endowed parishes in the County of Durham one fine of £1,500 and an annual rent of less than £10 are all that the Bishopric has derived in 80 years from a property which, since the renewal of the lease in 1832, is believed to have yielded to the lessee £80,000, the lease being still held upon three good lives".

Although this policy may have prevented the Ecclesiastical Commissioners from meeting all their duties as landlords in the short-term, the effects were financially beneficial in the longer term. Between 1861 and 1891, for example, the total income from their estates increased from £147,000 to £1,107,000 (Sutherland, 1968, 134).

A second, but related, structural change to the Stanhope estate resulted from the decision by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to expand their freehold estate in Stanhope. The reasons for this were strategic, as the following report describes:

"it is desirable that the interests of the Commissioners in the surface of the lands of the parish should be increased as much as possible. Their income from the mines will be more secure and less liable to be interfered with exactly in proportion as they possess a larger control over the surface of the enclosed lands and there will also be less chance of any agitation for the enclosure of the commons. Their interests and those of Mr Beaumont the lessee of the lead mines are for this purpose identical during his lease.... The Commissioners have on my advice already purchased 1,100 acres of freehold over which questions of wayleave had begun to arise, and I advise that, with the exception of small detached parcels, the reversions of the leasehold lands be retained and the leasehold interests purchased. About 800 acres have already been agreed to be purchased...." (Smiths Gore to the ECs, 1859).

The report went on to state that there was no reason to suppose that the mines would decline in prosperity, improvements in tenure and better infrastructure counteracting the partial exhaustion of the lead. It would appear that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners were optimistic about the future of mining in Weardale, and were determined to increase their control over the operations.

The decision to purchase lands in Stanhope led to the paradoxical situation, whereby the commissioners were purchasing lands of which they were, in theory at least, already the owners. The Bishops had never sold the ancient freeholds in upper Weardale, they had merely lost control over these lands. Altogether, 30 ancient freehold properties were purchased by the commissioners in the late 19th century (CC 134875). Sir Walter Beaumont decided to purchase the Killhope, Wellhope and Spark Shield estate from the commissioners but, despite the loss of this property, the Church had become, for the first time in 500 years, the principal **landowners and controllers**.

The economic benefits of this new policy were short-lived, however, for the simultaneous depression in agriculture and mining in the 1880s was disastrous for the economy of Stanhope. It was the mining depression which was the major cause of

distress, but the depression in farming served to exacerbate the situation, particularly since the two sectors were so closely connected. Problems began in 1879, when a dispute between the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and the Beaumonts over the level of royalty rents resulted in a temporary closure of the lead mines. The scale of the distress which this event caused amongst the population of Stanhope, is indicated by the following newspaper articles reporting on the dispute [26]:

"The leasehold lead mines belonging to Mr WB Beaumont, MP, in Weardale have been closed since the New Year, and there is naturally considerable anxiety in the Dale as to when they are likely to be reopened. It appears that the lessee considers that the rents now payable to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners from these mines are too high, and that there appears to be no probability of their being reopened until some arrangements are come to on this point between the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and Mr Beaumont. Whatever this matter be between the lessors and the lessee, the condition of Weardale needs speedy consideration" (1879, n.d.)

The next article points out the wider repercussions of the lead mine closures:

"Dear Sir - the struggle between capital and labour in the Durham coal trade affects such large numbers as to excite universal attention, but there may be suffering to a far greater extent, of which the country knows little or nothing, and this is the case with Weardale and the Weardale Miners. Born and reared in the Dale, it has come to have a fascination for them, which makes it exceedingly painful for them to tear themselves from it, even when the force of circumstances clearly indicate that it must be done. But when hopes are thrown out that works may recommence at any time, even at a few days notice, the power of home and its associations lead men to trust on and on and on, that the works will be reopened and they will be saved the painful necessity of breaking up their homes. It is thus the men of Weardale are lingering on unemployed. Some have been out of work since last June, and the whole works have been closed for several months, and yet they indulge in a phantom of a hope, which no-one dispels. Why cannot Mr Beaumont tell the men frankly that he does not want them?" (letter to the editor, Northern Echo, 17/4/1879).

The dispute was not resolved, however, and in 1884 the Beaumonts finally surrendered their lease and retreated to Allendale, where they continued to mine until 1924 (Dunham, 1948, 5). The Ecclesiastical Commissioners repurchased the Killhope, Wellhope and Spark Shield estate from the departing mineral lessees [27].

The withdrawal of the Beaumonts from Stanhope left a legacy of small, under-capitalised farm holdings, and the poor condition of the farm sector was exacerbated by the agricultural depression. The Royal Commission into the causes of the agricultural depression (HMSO, 1881, cmd 2778) gave the following report on the state of the farms in the upper dale:

"Between Stanhope and Westgate, farms range from 30 - 200 acres. Beyond this, holdings are occupied by miners at low rents of £15 to £30 per annum. The depression in lead mining has caused great distress... Land hunger ensures a constant demand for land. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners have recently built lime kilns of which the tenants are allowed free use and free caw coal. Little liming has been done to date and what has been done is due to individual tenant enterprise. There is some arable land up to Eastgate, beyond this it is all grass".

The commissioner thought that the withdrawal of the mining population would be beneficial for the farming economy:

"As to future prospects, if the lead industry declines (not unlikely considering the competition from Spain, Germany and Rumania) changes will take place in the upper dale. Holdings will be enlarged and more land improved. At present tenants can't afford the outlay and lack horsepower for work."

Perhaps he hoped that a better class of tenantry might be induced to take the farms, or that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners would rationalise and improve the farm holdings?

The following report on the state of the farms from the Smiths Gore agent for Weardale, Mr Minter, paints a similar picture:

"Very nearly the whole of the lands are pasture and as such have not suffered during the past seven years from the unpropitious seasons in the same way as arable lands, but during the past two severe winters of 1879/80 and

1880/81, serious losses have occurred to all the tenants by the unusual severity of the weather, want of food and being overblown by the snow, one tenant, (W Stephenson), lost over 200 sheep and another one, (J Oliver), nearly 150... All the tenants have suffered in common with other occupiers of land and this year the hay has not reached half a crop, but the great number of the small occupiers have had to contend against a most formidable and almost insuperable difficulty in the closing of the lead mines, the great staple of the district, which wholly ceased working in 1879, remaining so for some time and have not been opened out since but to a very limited extent... The district has become deplorably poverty stricken, all the savings are exhausted and many there are who do not get a sufficiency of food. Migration to the coal and iron districts have drawn some away, emigration is continually sending forth all who can raise the means to depart and this state of things has materially depreciated the values of the smaller occupations which may be regarded as accommodation lands" (Mr Minter to the ECs, 10/10/1881).

What action did the Ecclesiastical Commissioners take to alleviate the severity of the distress? The Royal Commission of 1881 reported that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had initiated a programme of land improvements; providing 200 jobs in drainage, wall building and planting for the unemployed miners, but that they had no systematic policy of land improvement. In 1878, £5,000 was expended on drainage between Stanhope and Cowhill, and in 1880, over £3,500 was expended on building works and drainage. Mr Minter recommended to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners that they erect two to three limekilns in the upper dale to encourage land improvement as the lands were badly in need of drainage (5/5/1879). Apparently, many of the larger allotments had never been divided following the enclosure award and were still unimproved. It is clear that the improvements which Bishop Barrington predicted would result from enclosure had not been realised; indeed the condition of the agricultural estate had deteriorated.

In 1881, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners granted their farm tenants rent allowances of 20%, for those whose rents were less than £25 per annum, and 15%, for those paying over £25 (30/12/1881). Economic conditions continued to deteriorate, and in 1882 the tenants of Heatherycleugh and St John's Chapel sent a petition to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, demanding further rent reductions

(17/7/1882). The petition pointed out how the harsh climate, marginal land and heavy rates, as well as the closure of the mines, all contributed to the economic and social distress. They demanded a permanent reduction of 25% in farm rents, otherwise many tenants would be forced to give up their holdings. Certain reductions of rent were allowed, (reductions made in 1886 represented a reduction of farm rental income of 15%, see Table 5.16) and rent rebates continued throughout the 1880s.

Once it became clear that the depression in lead mining was not temporary, many families decided to migrate. Looking back to Table 4.38, it can be seen that the population of Cowshill, Burtreeford, Heatherycleugh and Killhope declined from 578 in 1851 to 461 in 1881, the decline being largely attributable to a fall in the number of lead miners from 152 to 78. The total population of Stanhope continued to grow until 1871, but dropped from rapidly from 10,330 in 1871 to 8,793 in 1881, and was only 5,801 in 1901 (see Table 5.17). Many of the unemployed miners migrated to the Durham coal field for employment, but in the 1890s it was reported, in a letter to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners from the Weardale Miners Relief Committee, that a strike by Durham coal miners had compounded the distress of the unemployed lead miners:

"On former occasions the inhabitants of the Dale have often been able to betake themselves to the pit districts and obtain temporary employment. In the present case, however, every avenue to work is closed. Much suffering has been caused by the increased price of coals. The want of fuel has been felt all the more keenly on account of the long continued cold weather. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners have always shown special concern for the material welfare of the valley and if some way of easing the present burden of hardship could be found in affording some means of employment for those who are anxious for any chance of earning a little money, another cause of gratitude would be added to strengthen the ties existing between the Commissioners and the inhabitants of the Dale" (Thomas Watson, to the ECs, 25/4/1892)

5.4.2 1900 to 1940: Estate Decline

Despite the financial loss incurred by the closure of the lead mines and the distress which this event caused to the inhabitants of Weardale, the Ecclesiastical Com-

Table 5.16 — Farm Size & Rent Reductions at Stanhope, 1886

AREA (has)	ORIGINAL RENT (£)	REDUCED RENT (£)	AREA (has)	ORIGINAL RENT (£)	REDUCED RENT (£)
11.3	28.80	26.00	5.4	25.00	21.00
3.9	13.60	12.00	11.7	19.70	18.00
18.75	83.00	75.00	2.1	17.00	14.00
9.8	24.60	23.00	11.4	35.85	32.00
2.0	13.60	11.00	4.0	11.50	9.00
12.10	14.30	13.00	31.10	16.90	15.00
6.3	17.90	15.00	30.05	26.95	10.00
7.05	10.90	10.00	5.6	24.60	22.00
6.0	23.85	21.00	11.9	23.60	21.00
2.5	16.10	13.00	0.6	8.80	7.00
4.0	17.00	14.00	1.9	8.50	7.00
4.2	15.50	21.00	5.9	12.00	10.00
1.4	8.50	7.00	6.2	15.30	13.75
1.4	6.40	6.00	2.7	10.00	9.00
1.3	11.10	10.00	21.5	21.20	17.00
3.5	8.35	7.50	4.0	14.65	13.00
3.7	22.10	17.00	3.5	18.80	15.00
11.1	44.00	35.00	4.1	22.10	17.00
1.2	9.00	8.00	5.3	16.50	15.00
12.2	27.20	24.00	6.2	13.60	12.00
15.9	30.60	27.00	5.6	14.50	13.00
6.9	34.00	30.00	3.6	21.20	17.00
1.25	7.60	6.00	1.4	8.00	7.00
3.4	24.05	19.00	7.9	8.00	7.00
3.7	22.50	20.00	-	-	-

Source: Stanhope farm files

missioners continued to base their estate management policy on mining, and it was obviously hoped that the mining industry would recover. The adherence to this policy may have been influenced by the commissioners' interests on the Durham coal field. Their receipts from mining in Durham rose from £300,000 in 1888 to £370,000 in 1917 (Ward, 1971, 67).

Table 5.17 — Stanhope Wood Account, 1895 to 1910

YEAR	RECEIPTS	ESTATE USE	EXPENDITURE
1895	259.00	-	-
1896	384.45	40.05	278.70
1897	210.70	-	243.05
1898	235.85	30.75	273.10
1899	353.95	11.30	276.15
1900	564.50	7.65	304.35
1901	124.90	24.85	341.30
1902	147.60	73.25	275.55
1903	-	-	-
1904	25.10	39.75	333.20
1905	58.10	83.60	319.00
1906	138.20	35.10	356.75
1907	141.30	46.85	318.50
1908	2.75	14.85	347.25
1909	37.35	108.95	322.05
1910	20.60	38.65	333.75

Source:CC 48175

The Ecclesiastical Commissioners continued to manage the plantations in Stanhope in hand. Receipts from the plantations were particularly high between 1895 and 1900 (see Table 5.17), which may be linked to the activities of the new mineral

lessee. After the withdrawal of the Beaumonts from Weardale, a 60 year mining lease was taken out by the newly formed Weardale Lead Mining Company (Burt et al., 1983, x). The company's profits were low to start with, but in 1900 the company was reformed, and an improvement in the market raised its profits dramatically. Between 1901 and 1913 the Weardale Lead Company produced 40% of the total UK output (ibid., xii). There was another small boom in the local economy:

"The Dale is probably more prosperous than it has ever been. The various mining and quarrying undertakings are in a state of healthy activity, all capable workmen find ready employment, actually the supply of labour is insufficient and it is therefore extremely desirable to do what may be possible to increase the resident population...." (Alf Pegler to Sir Alfred de Bock-Porter, 15/7/1907).

There is no small irony in the fact that, 25 years after the closure of the Beaumont mines, there was actually a shortage of miners to work the mines. The Weardale Lead Company wished to open up Rookhope as a mining area, but this plan was contingent upon an improvement in the accessibility of the dale, not only for transporting the ore, but also for securing a workforce. The company, therefore, put great pressure on the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to provide £1,000 towards the building of a new road from Rookhope to the railway station at Eastgate [28]. The following extract, from the secretary of the Weardale Lead Company to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, describes the competition with the Allendale estate for skilled miners and the absolute necessity of the road:

"Rookhope, and particularly Boltsburn, is the centre of the lead mining industry. This Company has more than 250 men employed there, but there is living accommodation for but a small part, about 50, of these in Rookhope. This is, naturally, very disadvantageous to the regular working of the mines, and at the moment it is a source of much anxiety to my Directors, as it is reported that working is likely to be recommenced in the Allendale mines. About 200 men of our Rookhope miners are 'wallet men' from Allendale and if work becomes available there, by the restoring of the Beaumont mines, these men will cease to travel to Boltsburn and the present prosperous work of this company will be seriously restricted and completely disorganised. It is evident a much needed supply of resident labourers is urgently required. So far as we can learn, every

dwelling in Boltsburn and even in Eastgate is fully occupied and our lodging shops are crowded and over crowded. If easy access were opened up from the main valley, there is but little doubt new houses would be built at Boltsburn and at Eastgate, and there would be a considerable addition to the resident population of the valley. It is very clear to all who are locally acquainted with the situation that additional labour is indispensable to the continued satisfactory working of the minerals of the district" (Alf Pegler to Sir Alfred de Bock-Porter, 15/7/1907) [29].

The Ecclesiastical Commissioners finally agreed to donate the required amount and the road was built. Not only did the mining industry make a partial revival by the opening of new mines, but changing industrial technology also created demands for new minerals such as fluorspar, barytes and iron. The mining industry thus diversified, but the prosperity of the lead mining boom in the 19th century was never regained. The revival in lead mining was short-lived, and in 1917 the Weardale Lead Company gave up its Weardale lease (Burt et al., 1983, xii).

Despite the optimism of Mr Coleman in 1881, there is no evidence that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners made any substantial improvements to the farms on their estate as a result of the decline in mining. An inspection of dairies and cowsheds in Stanhope by the county medical officer in 1900, found that on many of the farms the condition of the farm buildings was so insanitary as to be a positive health hazard:

"all of them were very badly ventilated and in nearly every case the air space allowed per cow was too little. The walls of the byres were rough and dirty and the floors badly paved and generally defective... None of the cowsheds had any proper drainage and the midden heap was usually placed immediately under a dwelling house occupied by several persons, the roof of the byre being unceiled so that all the smell and exhalations passed from the byre through the floor into the dwelling and dairy... (the) conditions must seriously affect their (the cows) health and favour the development and spread of TB among them" (County Medical Officer's report, para 59, 23/7/1900).

The condition of the farms continued to deteriorate, with no alteration in the management policy of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. In the 1930s, another de-

pression hit the mining industry, causing further unemployment in the dale. The Weardale Rural District Council expressed their concern and asked the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to provide the out of work miners with temporary employment in land improvement schemes and afforestation (22/5/1934).

5.4.3 1940 to 1965: The Sale of the Stanhope Estate

Another reform of the ownership structure of the Stanhope estate took place in 1948, with the replacement of the Ecclesiastical by the Church Commissioners. This measure was a response to the increasingly commercial demands of land management. The old Ecclesiastical Commissioners did not possess the necessary expertise, and the new Church Commissioners included qualified professionals (Sutherland, 1968, 137).

The Church Commissioners adopted a more explicitly commercial approach to estate management than the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had done, and decided to shift their investment base away from low-yielding assets, such as agricultural land, to stocks and commercial property developments. The Church Commissioners inherited approximately 118,750 hectares of agricultural land from the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, but by 1954 their agricultural holdings had been reduced to 90,417 hectares through sales. At the same time, their income rose by 68% between 1948 and 1957 (Hamnett, 1987, 408) [30].

Several farms in Stanhope were sold off under this new policy (see Table 5.18). It can be assumed, from the bad state of repair into which the farms in the upper dale had fallen in the 1950s, that few improvements or repairs to the farm sector had been made in the 1930s or 1940s. For instance, a report on Low Cornriggs farm in 1949 described the poor state of repair of the buildings:

"There are two cottages, separated by a store, and some small and very poor buildings. The cowbyer could not be made to conform with regulations. The only reasonable solution is to move the tenants to another holding as soon as one becomes available, and to incorporate this farm in another holding, leaving the buildings and cottages to decay. In the meantime, the minimum work necessary to give the tenants reasonable living accommodation should be done. At the

Table 5.18 — Sales of Stanhope Farms, 1950s

FARM	DATE OF SALE	AREA (has)	RENT (£)	SELLING PRICE (£)
<i>Lanehead</i>	-	-	-	-
Low Corn Rigg	1949	22.9	77.55	amalgamated
Greenfield Hush	1952	?	?	(vacant possession)
The Rush	1952	13.0	?	500 (sitting tenants)
High Lanehead	1953	25.0	28.50	1,000 (vacant possession)
Corn Rigg	1955	28.3	77.55	900 (sitting tenant)
<i>Westgate</i>	-	-	-	-
Spot House	1951	2.2	?	550 (sitting tenants)
Westgate Farm	1951	51.5	64.80	1,600 (sitting tenants)
Shields Close	1952	22.5	125.30	550 (sitting tenants)
& Park House	-	63.0	-	-
Field Head	1953	117.0	158.85	2,100 (sitting tenants)
& Green Head	-	-	-	-
Field Stile	1955	47.1	97.05	1,800 (sitting tenants)
Crooks Alter	1956	53.9	?	5,600 (sitting tenants)
& Longlea Farm	-	46.4	-	-
White Hall	1957	20.9	-	950 (sitting tenants)

Source: farm files (Lanehead & Westgate)

present time six persons occupy one cottage, which has two bedrooms, one very poor" (file 60832, 1949).

Most of the holdings were sold to the sitting tenants, but this would appear to have been from necessity rather than choice, as the following remarks about Corn Riggs farm indicate:

"The tenants have been unwilling to buy and attempts have been made to find

them another farm and so be able to sell Corn Riggs with vacant possession. These attempts have failed and in view of the very poor state of the fixed equipment, we recommend that the farm be offered for sale subject to tenancy rather than that money should be spent on keeping the farm in repair pending obtaining vacant possession." (file 34788, 1955).

The Church Commissioners, in fact, obtained very low prices from the sale of these farms. The farms in Stanhope had not been revalued for some time, and consequently rents did not reflect their market value. Since sale price was related to rental, most of the tenants were able to buy their holdings for a price well under the market value (Respondent C).

The Church Commissioners' final land interests in Stanhope were sold in the 1960s [31]. The decision fitted into the general policy of selling low-yielding farm land, but was precipitated by the need to raise capital quickly due to a fall in the stock market (Hamnett 1987, 472):

"Owing to the present state of the Stock Exchange Market, the Commissioners find themselves in an embarrassing position in so far as they are having to find regular and substantial sums of money in order to pay for developments which are in progress in London" (report of a meeting of the Church Commissioners and Smiths Gore, 26/7/1962).

The process by which the estate was sold reflects on the motives of the Church Commissioners as landlords, and on the specific characteristics of the Stanhope estate.

In 1962, The Church Commissioners announced the need to raise £23 million within two years to finance developments and new investments, £5 million of which was to come from sales of agricultural land. It was decided that the responsibility for raising the £5 million should be proportional to the respective management responsibilities of Smith's Gore and Cluttons. Smith's Gore managed the larger estate area (see Table 5.19) and were, therefore, requested to raise £3 million.

The Church Commissioners issued certain instructions as to the sale procedure. Only low-yielding estates were to be sold, i.e. those which were forecast to give less than a 5% return over the next ten years. In addition, the sitting tenants

Table 5.19 — Area Managed by Smiths Gore & Cluttons

-	Hectares	Rental (£)
Smiths Gore	50,416.6	427,000
Cluttons	30,000	332,000

were to be given first refusal on the purchase of their farms. Only if the tenants failed to make sufficient offers were the estates to be offered for public sale. Apart from these two stipulations, Smiths Gore and Cluttons were free to decide which estates to sell and to negotiate with the tenants concerned. This was seen as an advantage by Smiths Gore, since by having control over which estates to sell they could minimise the damage to their own interests (3/8/1962). Their policy was to sell off whole estates rather than scattered parcels, on the grounds that it was better to close an office rather than lay off staff in several offices. Smiths Gore decided to include normal management sales in the total, to minimise the amount of land to be sold (11/10/1962).

In order to decide which estates to sell, a vast amount of data had to be collected on rents, acreages, and tenancies. Table 5.20 shows the estates which were finally chosen by Smiths Gore for sale. In total, twenty four estates were to be sold, including properties in West, Central and South Durham and Tyneside (the West Durham estate included the two North Pennine estates: Stanhope and Muggleswick). Each property then had to be valued. The Church Commissioners were anxious to obtain the best price possible and requested that three valuations be made:

- 'A' - 32 to 30 years purchase, (vacant possession price).
- 'B' - 26 to 25 years purchase (sale subject to tenancy).

- 'C' - 20 to 21 years purchase (investment price). They feared that many tenants would buy at the investment price and then sell their farms with vacant possession. The 'B' value was meant to represent the value of the farm to the sitting tenant which should be greater than to an investor. Smiths Gore was sceptical about this 'B' value:

"'B'...represents purely our own guess, presumably with the help of a crystal ball (as to) how much we can screw out of the tenant" (10/1/1963).

With regards specifically to the sale of the Stanhope and Muggleswick estates, the Church Commissioners directed that the sporting and mineral rights over the enclosed lands be reserved. The grouse moors were to be offered to the current sporting tenants, again reserving the mineral rights. The mineral rights were to be tendered separately, as were the plantations and other properties. The tenants were then given two months in which to submit offers above or below this price.

The motive of the Church Commissioners towards the sale of the estate can be described as a mixture of paternalism and commercialism. The Smiths Gore agent for Weardale believed that the commercial interests of the Church Commissioners would be best served by selling the Stanhope and Muggleswick estates as entire units. He argued that the estate as a whole was worth more than the sum of its parts because of the interrelatedness of the estate's resources: land, minerals, grouse and timber (Smiths Gore to the Church Commissioners, 6/11/1962). Specifically, four reasons were put forward in favour of selling the estates intact.

First of all, most of the farmers had grazing rights on the adjoining commons. If the rental value of these farms was to be maintained, it was essential that the grazing rights were preserved. This would be easier if the farms and manorial rights to the commons remained under one ownership. Many of the commons were overstocked with sheep because of the activities of a few owner-occupiers. There was a danger that tenant farmers would lose their grazing rights unless they had the support of a landlord.

Secondly, sporting interests would suffer most of all from severance. It was essential for the preservation of the heather that the graziers co-operate with the gamekeepers. If the owners of the sporting rights were also the graziers' landlord,

Table 5.20 — Sales of Church Estates, 1963

ESTATE	RECEIPTS (£)	BALANCE REMAINING	AREA SOLD (has)
Dumfries	480,000	-	2,267.5
West Durham	7,711	340,000	65
Tyneside	116,770	268,800	153
Central Durham	9,965	88,000	12
South Durham	107,500	80,000	103
Northallerton	6,250	9,000	3
Ripon	50	-	0.4
North Riding	1,805	104,965	0.8
York	38,250	69,000	121
Scrooby	55,750	-	232
East Lincolnshire	33,360	29,560	211
South Lincolnshire	9,000	-	5
Southwell	1,850	101,000	4
Foremark	29,200	-	118
Peterborough	9,000	-	3
Kings Lynn	1,250	-	5
Norwich	15,000	-	8
Ely	5,820	36,180	32
Huntingdon	92,600	2,600	375
Worcester	139,835	-	1732
Corfton	24,100	262,600	104
Longden	3,370	119,900	0.8
Miscellaneous	5,150	35,500	15
TOTAL	1,193,586	-	4,574
<i>Estates still to sell:</i>	-	-	-
Dissington	-	175,000	-
South Anston	-	40,000	-
North Lincolnshire	-	45,000	-
Wollaston	-	32,000	-

Source: file 49/4

they could call on the tenants' loyalty, or exercise coercion to maintain the right balance. Mineral lessees could also disturb grouse; again a balance could best be achieved by overall control.

The third reason concerned minerals. Mineral ownership could be severed from surface ownership and still worked, but when minerals and land were in the same ownership access and surface damage were less contentious issues. Moreover, the mineral interests extended beyond the limits of the existing surface interest. If the estate was sold piecemeal to sitting tenants, the commissioners would still be left with ownership of the minerals in Upper Weardale.

The fourth point related to woodlands. To be a viable proposition, woodland areas needed unlimited extraction rights over adjoining farm and common lands. When all were under one ownership, access was not a problem. Woods also harboured many farm and sporting pests such as rabbits and foxes. Control of these pests would be easier under one ownership. It might be that no-one wished to purchase the woodlands alone, (the Forestry Commission had already indicated that it was not interested). Forestry investment companies preferred bare land to standing woodlands and the Stanhope woodlands were at too high an altitude to be a commercial proposition.

Despite these arguments, the Church Commissioners stuck to their national policy and upheld their decision to give the tenants first refusal on their holdings.

After the required two months, the tenants of both Muggleswick and Stanhope had submitted their offers. Comparing Tables 5.21 and 5.22, it can be seen that the offers made by the Muggleswick tenants were, on average, 15 years purchase, whilst for Stanhope the average was 23. Six of the Muggleswick tenants failed to put in an offer for their holdings, while in Stanhope offers were received for all but four holdings. In contrast to the earlier sales in the 1950s, all the holdings had been recently revalued (in 1961 and 1962) so that the offers of over 22 years purchase equalled the market rate. It seems that the Muggleswick tenants deliberately submitted low offers to try to get their holdings cheaply (15/2/1963). It was, however, decided that the offered prices were too low to be accepted, and the Muggleswick estate was offered for sale as a whole. The Stanhope tenants, however, were able to purchase their holdings, and so that estate was broken up (18/3/1963).

As predicted by Smiths Gore, it proved very hard to sell the woodlands at Stanhope. Various packages were considered, such as including woodland in with the grouse moors, but in the end the Church Commissioners had to accept that the woodlands did not represent a commercial proposition (they were eventually bought by the Forestry Commission). The sporting rights on the commons were bought for the most part by the existing sporting tenants. In the end, the Church Commissioners retained ownership of the minerals.

Table 5.22 — The Muggleswick Estate Sale, 1962 (preliminary schedule)

FARM	RENT (£)	AREA (has)	TENANT'S OFFER (£)	YEARS PURCHASE
Birkhott &	453	169.5	12,000	19
Carp Shield	173	41.7	-	-
Dyke House &	80	6.3	1,500	?
East Cot House	77	24.7	?	?
Eddy's Bridge	433	55.2	6,500	15
Gold Hill	334	63.5	5,500	16.5
Grange	238	65.7	3,000	12.5
Healyfield	718	94.1	10,500	14.5
High Horsleyhope	184	30.2	3,000	16
Home	220	30.0	?	?
Horsleyhope Mill	41	9.5	?	?
Limerick	110	33.2	2,250	20.5
Low Horsleyhope	504	91.4	7,000	13.5
Middles	336	116.3	4,000	12
Priory	280	38.0	3,000	11
Shield	265	37.0	3,500	13
Shooting Box	180	31.2	?	?
Springwell House	217	34.5	4,000	18
TOTAL	4,843	890.2	65,250	-

Source: file 49/4

Table 5.21 — The Stanhope Estate Sale, Preliminary Schedule, 1962

FARM	RENT (£)	AREA (has)	DATE OF TENANCY	LAST RENT REVIEW	TENANT'S OFFER (years purchase)
Ambling Gate	291	80.4	1937	1961	22.5
Belle Vue	221	45	1937	1961	22.5
Brandon Walls	244	52	new	1962	16.5
Chestergarth	196	32	1960	1962	25.5
Glenwhelt	572	708.7	1942	1961	26
Greenhead	295	44	1946	1961	24
Greenhead	50	3.7	1960	1955	32
Hall	494	51.6	1961	1961	24
High House	285	54.5	1959	1962	26
Hole House	264	47.9	1961	1961	no offer
Horn Hall	228	27	1945	1961	25.5
Hanging Wells	300	108.7	1941	1961	24
Lintzgarth House	335	229	1961	1961	24
Low Greenhead	65	7.9	1925	1961	35 (vacant possession)
Stanhope Mill	94	3.3	1960	1961	21
Noah's Ark	254	45.8	1959	1961	17.5
Old Park	252	62.5	?	1961	27
Park House	136	41.6	1936	1961	26
Pease Myers	243	50	1943	1961	25
Snailsburn	233	143	?	1961	23.5
Shield Hurst	75	3.7	1960	1961	no offer
Spainsfield	45	15.3	1906	1961	no offer
Wolfcleugh	792	198.7	1933	1961	no offer
Woodcroft	410	88	1947	1961	24
TOTAL	6,568	2,266	-	-	-

Source: file 49/4

Following the decision to sell the Mugglewick estate as a unit, an offer was received from Lord Lambton (a Durham landowner). Here, the woodlands were a more commercial proposition, but the primary attraction of the estate was the grouse moor. The sale was finally agreed in 1963 for a price of £145,000.

From evidence available, at least two alternative ownership scenarios could have followed the sale of the Stanhope estate. First, the Stanhope and Muggleswick estates could have been sold as a whole, (offers were made for this). This estate would have been a considerable size, (13,307 hectares) with a rental value of over £13,263. It is likely that the purchaser would have been a private individual. Second, if the Stanhope tenants had failed to submit acceptable offers, the Stanhope estate might have been sold as a whole, in which case its development over the last 20 years might have been very different [32].

5.4.4 Summary

Great changes have taken place in the form of landownership and in the nature of rural society in Stanhope over the late 19th and 20th centuries. Altogether, over a period of 100 years, ownership has changed four times: from the Bishops of Durham, to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, to the Church Commissioners and, finally, to the sitting tenants. The Church Commissioners, however, retain the ownership of the mineral rights.

The 1880s depression in lead mining dealt a very sudden and unexpected blow to the economy of the dale. Right up to this time, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners were planning to expand the industry and increase their control over it. The chief sufferers of the depression were the miners themselves, and the commissioners did little to alleviate their distress. Out-migration resulted.

In the 20th century, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners continued to give priority to the mining sector and there was a short revival in the fortunes of the mining industry. The farm sector was never improved and, after years of neglect under the Bishops and then the commissioners, was beyond repair. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Church Commissioners took over the ownership of the estate, it should be a victim to their more commercialised approach to the management of the estates.

5.5 Conclusion: Landownership, Continuity and Change

In this discussion of continuity and change in landownership and rural society in the North Pennines in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, many issues have emerged which throw light on the processes of continuity and change in landownership forms, and the emergence of socio-economic problems in upland Britain. What factors and processes can be identified which appear to have been of most significance, and how do the experiences of these estates compare to the national experience?

Yet again, comparisons and contrasts can be drawn between the three estates. Continuity and change has been apparent in the ownership form and management of all three estates. All three landowners have experienced political and economic pressures for change, all three have sold property and reduced their total land-holdings. Changes have been instigated by factors both internal and external to the region. However, the causes of change, and the processes by which change has taken place, have differed substantively. In the end, the Wemmergill and the Blanchland estates have survived to the present day whilst the Stanhope estate has been broken up and sold.

The actions of the State and market forces are factors which have caused change; and ownership form, land control, resource use, motive and historical inertia are all factors which have influenced the way change has taken place. The first difference that can be observed, is a distinction in the cause and nature of political pressure faced by the three landowners. Institutional landowners were called to public accountability before attacks were made on private landowners. Moreover, it was not the landowning function of the institutions which was the primary target for attack. The Church was attacked on two fronts: for its role as landowner and for its spiritual role in society. Lord Crewe's Charity was attacked for its charitable rather than its landowning function. The earls of Strathmore were, however, attacked entirely for their landowning function.

The political attacks on the institutional landowners were related to ownership form. It was observed in the previous chapter (see 4.5) that institutional ownership form is an obstacle to internal change. The Bishops of Durham were unable to alter the level and composition of the charitable payments. Changes were imposed from

the outside. In the case of the Bishopric estates, ownership by the Bishops was replaced by an entirely new and more institutionalised ownership form. In the case of Lord Crewe's Charity, the ownership form was retained, but the administration and the charitable payments were updated. What effects did these externally imposed changes have on the management of the Stanhope and Blanchland estates? The Ecclesiastical Commissioners were able to, and did, adopt a new strategy in relation to Stanhope, by reforming the ecclesiastical leaseholds and expanding their freehold estate. The Blanchland estate was little affected by the change.

In contrast to the national experience, it was the depression in lead prices in the 1870s and 1880s which, initially at least, had a more devastating effect on the economy of the North Pennines than the agricultural depression. The impact of the mining depression varied within the region, however, according to the degree of dependence on the industry. Distress was, therefore, greater in Stanhope and Hunstanworth than in Lunedale. The impact also depended on ownership motive and historical inertia. Lord Crewe's Trustees were less affected financially than the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. For the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, mineral rents were the primary income source and the scale of the industry was much greater in Stanhope than in Hunstanworth and Blanchland. The farming sector was in a better state on the Blanchland estate than the Stanhope estate. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners had been unable to remedy years of neglect by the Bishops, and smallholdings were never an economic proposition. Major structural reforms to land use and organisation were required.

Another factor in the distress was landed control. It would appear that the division of the ownership and control of the lead in Stanhope had negative consequences for the inhabitants. The Beaumonts felt far less commitment to the miners in Weardale than they did to their own men in Allendale, and had little compunction in withdrawing from Weardale when lead prices dropped. All responsibility for the welfare of the unemployed miners fell upon the Ecclesiastical Commissioners.

Pastoral farming areas in Britain were not as severely affected by the late 19th century depression as lowland arable areas, and this was true for the North Pennines. Farm rents were lowered on all three estates in the 1880s, but it does not appear that farmers on the Blanchland and Wemmergill estates suffered undue distress.

However, falling rents on all Lord Crewe's Charity's estates made it difficult for the trustees to meet their charitable payments. It was economic pressure which led to the sale of Bamburgh Castle and the introduction of yet another scheme of management in the 1890s.

The economic pressure of falling farm rents on the Wemmergill estate was offset by a concomitant rise in the contribution of grouse shooting and quarry rents to the Wemmergill estate budget. After 1890, grouse shooting became a major facet of the estate, a development which can be attributed partly to the quality of the moors, and partly to the ownership form and motive. It was a status sport and most attractive to private landownership. The earls of Strathmore took personal responsibility for the management of this resource.

Following the closure of the lead mines, Blanchland became predominantly a farming estate, but the Ecclesiastical Commissioners tried to preserve the industrial character of the Stanhope estate. They continued to promote mining at the expense of farming.

The earls of Strathmore undoubtedly suffered from the political attacks made on the landed élite in the early 20th century, both from the imposition of higher taxes and a loss of confidence in the future of landownership, but like Lord Crewe's Charity, changes resulting from these attacks were more apparent in the consociate wealth of the earls than in the Wemmergill estate. The sale of the Streatlam and Gibside estates contributed to the revolution in landownership in the 1920s (see 2.3). Possibly due to taxation, ownership of the Wemmergill estate was divided between father and son in the 1930s, and can be interpreted as a first indication of the trend in private landownership towards a more flexible approach to ownership (see 2.4.2). Lands were sold on the Blanchland estate in the 1920s. This was not, apparently, a sign of economic pressure but seems to have been connected to the influence of the tenant, Mr Stephenson.

The continuing agricultural depression of the early 20th century had a cumulatively negative effect on the farm sectors of the Wemmergill and Blanchland estates. Basic repairs were carried out but there was no surplus capital for investment. The legal commitment of Lord Crewe's Charity to maintain the estate was reflected in a more stable budget. In no year was there a deficit. On the Wemmergill estate,

however, there was a budget deficit in several years, and the Wemmergill estate was being supported partly through cross-subsidisation.

The second reform of the ownership of the Stanhope estate in 1948 was internally instigated by the Church in response to the more challenging demands of the 20th century. The Church Commissioners adopted a new motive to estate management which was less traditional and placed a greater emphasis on commercial development and the Church's urban properties. The Stanhope estate was a victim of this new approach. It was a low-yielding agricultural estate and was sold as part of a national policy.

The experience of the three estates over this period reveals more about the nature of upland resources. The experience of the sale of the Stanhope estate, showed once again that the interrelatedness of land, minerals, grouse and timber (already noted in 4.5) lends itself to the landed estate form of ownership. The endurance of landed interests can be seen in the fact that the Church Commissioners did not relinquish all their interests in the Stanhope estate but have retained the mineral rights.

Although the influence of landownership was clearly seen in the formation of rural society in the North Pennines in the 19th century, landownership has been a passive force in the economic and social decline of the region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Landowners did not attempt to stem the out-migration following the closure of the lead mines. They have not provided any new forms of employment in the area. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners made no attempt to improve the farms on the Stanhope estate. Changes in the nature of rural society have been dramatic and negative, but on closer inspection, all these changes have been linked to lead mining. Farming has displayed a high degree of continuity, both in farming families and in farming practices.

Notes

1. The high population growth around Lanchester was due to the extension of coal-mining (1871 census).

2. In 1867, a railway was built from Barnard Castle to Middleton, which explains the employment of four Holwick tenants on the railway (as a station master, passenger guard, platekeeper, and porter) (D/St/C2/15/38).
3. Samuel Rowlandson was also the land agent for the Durham Cathedral estate and Lord Crewe's Charity estate.
4. It was planned to complete the Hury reservoir by 1890, the Blackton reservoir by 1894 and Grassholme reservoir by 1900 (D/St/C2/16/8).
5. The land tax introduced by the 1910 Finance Act was not abolished until the Budget of 1920.
6. One brace = 2 head of grouse.
7. In 1915, grouse were given as presents to:
 - each Lunedale tenant (2 brace).
 - The Earl of Strathmore (4 brace of young birds).
 - William Ralston (3 brace).
 - The tenants of Lunehead Mines (2 brace).
 - The station master, policeman (one brace each). (D/St/E3/20/20).
8. In 1918, the 14th Earl, who was at his London residence, requested Ralston to send him some rabbits. They had to be paunched, skinned and put in a small box, as officially food was not allowed to be sent due to rationing! (Strathmore to Ralston, 22/2/18).
9. This estate was apparently offered first as a whole unit to a local landowner:

"I can't conceive a man in Mr Pearce's position allowing a charming little estate to escape him which lies at his door and has no mansion house on it and is so excellent for sporting purposes" (Strathmore to Ralston, 22/10/1920).
10. Thomas McQueen retired in 1934 due to nervous strain from overwork (Messrs J. Wood to Messrs Lindsey, Jamieson and Haldene 12/5/1934).
11. More details of this 'record bag' are given in another letter:

"a party of 5 guns shot 2,070 head in one day, and at one stand Sir F. himself shot 191 grouse in 23 minutes, and during the day 728 birds to his own gun. The total bag for the season was 17,064 head". (29/7/33)
12. Nathan, Lord, Chairman (1952/3) *Report of the Committee on the Law and practice relating to Charitable Trusts*. Cmnd 8710. London, HMSO.
13. Two trustees were too old to carry out their duties effectively. Examples given of 'unnecessary' expenses included the trustees' residence in Bamburgh Castle

with all the costs involved, and the upkeep of Dr Sharp's Library, which was used only by the trustees.

14. (Attorney General v. Liddell, 9/11/1865). The trustees received the support of the local clergy for their case:

"The trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity are most gratified by the resolution unanimously adopted at a meeting of the clergy of the Deanery of Bamburgh.. expressing their entire confidence in the general management of Lord Crewe's Charity.. whilst the trustees do not presume to claim for such management all freedom from error, and whilst they would gladly adopt suggestions for the extension of the charity, yet they agree with the clergy in deprecating any diversion of the funds from the purposes contemplated by the founder" (B.a.3 24/10/1865).

15. *Scheme for the Future Regulation and Management of the Charities of Lord Crewe and the Rev. J. Sharp.* 17th June, 1876, (452/C5/42).
16. A sum of £10,000 was needed for the establishment of the hospital.
17. On assuming the post of secretary, Christopher Rowlandson was given a small gift by the Blanchland tenants:

"The salver was small but the tenantry are not wealthy and gave it with hearty good will" (Hey to Rowlandson, 17/3/1877).

18. It can be seen from Table 5.13 that rents actually rose at Cowbyer farm. This was due to a change of tenancy. The former tenant of Cowbyer, G Bell, had neglected the holding and it had fallen into a bad state of repair (Thomas Hey to Christopher Rowlandson, 31/8/1877).
19. A 999 year lease of the plantations was finally sold to the Forestry Commission in 1955 (Respondent D).
20. Two tenants died in debt to the trustees. Mr Robson of Cotehouse was served a notice to quit because of rent arrears in 1932 (B.a.5, 17/4/1932). He died shortly afterwards and the trustees cancelled his debts of £46.75. Mr Collinson of Allenshields farm also died in debt to the trustees to the amount of £67.50, but these debts were also cancelled.
21. For instance, the new tenants of Cotehouse Farm in 1934 were allowed £20 for artificial manure for the first two years of their tenancy (B.a.5, 25/4/34).
22. For instance, a lease was granted to General Refractories Limited in 1929 to work sandstone, sand, ganister and clay at Dead Friars Quarry at an annual certain rent of £20 plus a royalty rent of 8 old pence a ton for ganister and 6 old pence a ton for the other minerals.
23. *1st Annual Report of the ECs for England, 1846.*

24. *Articles of Agreement, 27th October 1859, between the Right Reverend Charles Thomas, Lord Bishop of Durham, and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England on the other.*
25. *1st Annual Report of the ECs for England, 1846.*
26. The information presented in the following pages largely comes from records kept by the Church Commissioners at Milbank. Matters related to the general management of Stanhope were placed in a general management file (CC 49175).
27. This estate was apparently in a very poor condition. It was reported by Smiths Gore that the buildings were old and dilapidated, many lacked privies, and the road to the farms needed repairs (21/3/1884).
28. The road would cut down the distance needed to travel from Eastgate station to Rookhope from 6 miles to 3 miles. The former route was via Boltsburn, and involved climbing to 417.8 metres (Alf Pegler to Sir Alfred de Bock-Porter, 15/7/1907).
29. 'Wallet men' were temporary single migrants. They lodged in mine shops by the mines or with families (Hunt, 1972, 162).
30. In 1956 the Church Commissioners formed the Church Estates Development and Improvement Company (CEDIC) to enable the commissioners to participate in development schemes in collaboration with property developers.
31. Information about the sale of the Stanhope estate has been obtained from the Smiths Gore office at Corbridge (file 49/4). Actual names have not been recorded in this research.
32. It was reported that an offer had been submitted by a Roman Catholic order (2/4/63).

Chapter VI

Contemporary Landownership and Land Management

6.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have looked at continuity and change in landownership, and at the development of the North Pennines over a period which, at the national level, saw the decline of the landed interest. The post Second World War period has seen the emergence of new forms of landownership at the national level. This chapter will look at contemporary landownership and land management in the North Pennines, and identify the factors and processes by which continuity and change in both ownership forms and management practices are taking place.

Table 6.1 — Land Use in the AONB, 1985

Common land	24.9
Agriculture	56.6
Forestry Commission woods	1.7
Water Authority reservoirs	0.6
Residual	16.3

Source: Whitby (1986, 56)

It is possible to build up a general picture of the contemporary landownership structure of the region, using the MAFF June census, the common land registers (see Appendix A), and recent reports. Table 6.1 shows land use in the North Pennines AONB in 1985. Over half the total area is within some form of agricultural use. A further 25% of the area is designated common land, a surprisingly high


figure. Information about the pattern of landownership and the distribution of common land can be gained from Figure 6.1. It shows that a large proportion of the agricultural land area is rented. In 16 parishes, over 50% of the agricultural land area is rented, whilst in five of these parishes (Midgeholme and Geltsdale, Hunstanworth, Blanchland and Westwick), over 80% is rented. These areas indicate the location of landed estates. Although, undoubtedly, owner-occupation has expanded as an ownership form, the area of landed estates is under-represented by the agricultural returns for two reasons (see Appendix A). First, land which is farmed in hand by the estate owner is entered as owner-occupied land. Second, privately owned moors do not appear in the MAFF returns or the common land registers, but yet form a large part of the area under estate ownership. It appears, therefore, that much of the residual category in Table 6.1 is, actually, privately owned moorland.

Common land forms a very high percentage of the total land area of the North Pennines, particularly in comparison to the national average, but it is not evenly distributed. In 8 parishes (Milburn, Murton, Kaber, Dufton, Warcop, Stanhope, Eggleston, & Cockfield) over half the land area is common land.

Forestry and water together make up only 23% of the land area of the North Pennines. These areas are owned mainly by the Forestry Commission and the Northumbrian Water Authority. The Ministry of Defence and the Nature Conservancy Council also own land in the region, but these holdings are not identified separately in Table 6.1. Compared to other upland areas of Britain, however, the percentage of land owned by public agencies is very low. Nevertheless, although public agencies own only a small percentage of the land area of the North Pennines, they represent an important change in the landownership structure.

It would appear that landed estates and common lands dominate the contemporary pattern of landownership in the North Pennines, with owner-occupation and public landownership forming a smaller but still significant part of the structure. This chapter will examine three of these landownership forms: landed estates, common lands and publicly owned estates. Although owner-occupation is, undoubtedly, an important part of the overall structure, its influence is more narrowly agricultural, and is not given separate consideration in the analysis, although many of the factors

Figure 6.1



Sources: MAFF June Census Parish Data (1985); Common Land Register

of importance to owner-occupiers will be touched on in relation to estate tenants and common land.

6.2 Landed Estates

The information presented in this section comes from interviews with the land agents of four landed estates in the region: Lord Crewe's Charity estate at Blanchland and the Strathmore estate at Wemmergill (whose histories have been traced in the earlier chapters), Lord Barnard's Raby estate in Teesdale and Lord Allendale's estate in Allendale [1]. Further interviews were conducted with tenant farmers on the Wemmergill and Blanchland estates, and with Lord Barnard, the landlord of the Raby estate. In addition, interviews were conducted with the geological agent for Weardale Minerals, the main mining company in the region, and with the mineral agents for Wardell Armstrong, a mining agency which manages the mineral interests of Lords Barnard and Allendale, and the Church Commissioners (see Appendix I). A range of views were, therefore, obtained on the way in which these estates are managed and the factors which influence estate policy.

6.2.1 Estate Structure, Resource Use and Ownership

The estates vary in size, shape, resource use and ownership form. By far the largest of the estates is Raby, the estate of Lord Barnard. It covers about 20,833 hectares, stretching from Piercebridge in the east to the border with Cumbria in the west, and from the River Tees in the south to the watershed with Weardale in the north. The Raby estate is compact in shape, except for the Eggleston estate which forms a small wedge in Lord Barnard's otherwise monopolistic control of Teesdale. The Raby estate includes both a pastoral upland sector in the west, and an arable lowland sector in the east, so is by no means just an upland estate (indeed it is not perceived as such by the owner). The Raby estate is managed in three blocks: Upper Teesdale, Raby and Marwood. There are 171 tenanted holdings on the estate in all, ranging in size from 2 hectares to 1,875 hectares. There is no common land on the estate but several open moorlands which are used for rough grazing and grouse shooting. The Raby estate is primarily an agricultural estate, 90% of the estate's income comes from agricultural rents, but other minor sources of income include (in decreasing order of importance): grouse, tourism, mines and

quarries, property and forestry. Lord Barnard also owns an estate in Shropshire but this is managed separately.

The Allendale and Wemmergill estates are roughly comparable in size. The Wemmergill estate covers about 9,583 hectares of fell land (this is private moorland rather than common land) and 2,083 hectares of enclosed land. It contains 20 tenanted farm holdings, ranging in size from 33 to 254 hectares. The size of the Wemmergill estate has been reduced by sales in the 1950s and, recently, the sales of Cronkley and Step Ends farms [2]. The Allendale estate consists of 2,154 hectares of enclosed farmland and 10,417 hectares of common land, with 23 tenanted farm holdings ranging in size from 33 to 292 hectares. Both are upland estates, but the Allendale estate is situated close to the family's lowland estate in the Tyne Valley and Hexhamshire in Northumberland, whereas the Strathmore family resides at Glamis Castle in Scotland where they also own a 4,167 hectare lowland estate. The Allendale estate is more diversified in its income sources than the Wemmergill estate. Farm rents make up about 60% of the estate income, but there is a 208 hectare plantation managed in hand, three working mines and income from residential property and grouse shooting. There is no commercial forestry and practically no residential property on the Wemmergill estate. The bulk of the Wemmergill income comes from farm rents and the grouse shooting, with a small rental from the Closehouse barytes mine and a stone quarry in Lunedale.

The Blanchland estate is the smallest estate, covering just 3,750 hectares. It comprises 8 farms and 2 moors (Blanchland and Hexhamshire). Agricultural rents form the main income source, but the owners of the estate, Lord Crewe's Trustees, also earn income from property rents (they own the village of Blanchland), grouse shooting and variable mine and quarry rents. The composition of the charity's total income in 1974 is shown in Table 6.3. It can be seen that the income from Blanchland and Hunstanworth contributed 41.7% to the total income. Farm rents from all the properties make up 63% of the charity's income, rents from residential property 14%, game rents 4% and mineral and quarry rents 0.8%.

All four of these landed estates, therefore, form part of a wider property portfolio, and all four landlords command external sources of consociate wealth. The legal ownership form of the three privately owned estates has altered in response to fiscal

Table 6.2 — Lord Crewe's Charity; Sources of Income 1974

INCOME SOURCE	AMOUNT (£)	%
<i>From the estates</i>		
Hunstanworth	2,944.10	10.7
Blanchland	8,720.23	31
Bamburgh	101.83	0.3
North Sunderland	2,962.17	10.7
Shoreston	3,000.08	10.9
Fleetham	3,038.40	11.0
Thornton	5,877.30	21.3
River Tweed	850	3.0
TOTAL	27,494.21	100
<i>By economic activity</i>		
Farm rents	18,703	63
Residential property	4,133.81	14
Mines & quarries	235	0.8
Mineral royalties	variable	-
Game rents	1,300	4
Plantations	24.95	0.08
Fisheries	850	2.9
Water pumping station	285.85	0.9
Inns, hotels	1,000	3.3
Interest on investment	3,130.67	10.5
TOTAL INCOME	29,663.28	100

Source: 1974 Schedule

policy. Raby is a settled estate (see 2.4.2) and Lord Barnard is the life tenant. The Marwood subunit of the estate has been granted as a discretionary trust for Lord Barnard's children, but will revert back to Lord Barnard when the period

Table 6.3 — Improvements to the Blanchland Estate, 1957 to 1972

FARM	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Acton	-	220.20	327.00	-	-	-	795.20	916.65	67.85
Birkside	-	-	363.70	-	295.80	29.25	17.00	2,216.05	20.10
Burntshieldhaugh	-	125.40	329.85	-	303.25	-	151.50	454.95	70.95
Cotehouse	524.35	-	-	-	1,133.25	-	2.55	98.85	-
Cowbyer (main)	-	3,351.65	444.40	444.40	3,156.55	2,604.00	107.70	-	226.60
Penny Pie	-	-	-	-	285.00	12.00	-	840.15	67.35
Allenshields	232.20	502.00	428.75	17.90	306.05	-	894.95	1,185.30	-
Buckshott	-	-	-	142.45	318.80	-	442.45	275.00	573.85
Rape Barn	-	-	-	555.30	547.30	585.65	18.70	-	1,416.75
Blanchland Village	-	1,050.30	-	508.35	11.65	234.20	-	739.50	6,221.00

FARM	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
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Birkside	-	-	363.70	-	295.80	29.25	17.00	2,216.05	20.10
Burntshieldhaugh	-	125.40	329.85	-	303.25	-	151.50	454.95	70.95
Cotehouse	524.35	-	-	-	1,133.25	-	2.55	98.85	-
Cowbyer (main)	-	3,351.65	444.40	444.40	3,156.55	2,604.00	107.70	-	226.60
Penny Pie	-	-	-	-	285.00	12.00	-	840.15	67.35
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Buckshott	-	-	-	142.45	318.80	-	442.45	275.00	573.85
Rape Barn	-	-	-	555.30	547.30	585.65	18.70	-	1,416.75
Blanchland Village	-	1,050.30	-	508.35	11.65	234.20	-	739.50	6,221.00

Source: 452/B.b.36

of the trust runs out. The Wemmergill and Allendale estates are private trusts (see 2.4.2). A trust was set up for the Strathmore estates following the death of the 17th Earl in the summer of 1987. Of the three trustees, two are members of the family so that, in effect, management of this estate remains within the family. Similarly, the Allendale estate trustees are family and friends. The ownership form of the Blanchland estate has not altered since the late 19th century (see 5.3.1). In 1974, a new schedule of management was drawn up on the instigation of the former land agent. This does not change the ownership form but allows the charity more flexibility in its expenditure [3].

6.2.2 Management of the Farms

Farming practices on all four estates are broadly similar, and, although changes have occurred, still highly traditional. Agricultural policy and technological innovations have enabled an intensification of stock. The use of artificial fertilisers and silage allow more stock to be reared on the same area, and farmers can claim subsidies for every head of sheep and cattle. Several farms have had modern out-buildings built for wintering stock alongside the old stone byres. The Wemmergill estate requires its tenants to provide 50% of the capital if they wish to construct a new out-building. A cow shed was built for Grains O' Beck farm in 1988. Many improvements were carried out to the Blanchland farms in the 1960s (see Table 6.3). The considerable amounts of capital expended at Blanchland in the 1960s can be seen as a concerted effort to invest in the estate and improve its value. This expenditure is reflected by the dramatic rise in rental income from Blanchland after 1955 (see Figure 5.4). The total income rose from £4,931 in 1960 to £10,015 in 1970, although this rise is also partly due to a general inflation of land values.

Dairying on the estates has declined since Britain's membership of the EEC. For instance, the tenant of Allenshields (Blanchland estate) took the 'golden handshake' offered to out-going dairy farmers in the 1970s [4]. Today, he concentrates on sheep and cattle breeding. The upland farms are the start of the breeding cycle for lambs, which are then sold to lowland farmers for fattening. The imposition of milk quotas in 1984 raised fears that the lowland farmers would turn to intensive sheep production and squeeze out the upland farmers, but at present upland farmers are in a strong position. On the Raby estate, the tenant farmers in the

upper dale can sell the lambs to tenant farmers lower down the dale for fattening, so that the whole cycle of sheep rearing is internalised within the estate.

Farm management on some of the Wemmergill and Raby farms in Upper Teesdale has been altered by the designation of part of the area as a SSSI in 1963, and a larger area as an ESA in 1986 (see 3.4.4). Farmers within the SSSI are obliged to follow management practices laid down by the NCC in return for compensation, but participation in the ESA scheme is optional. The Wemmergill estate supports the ESA scheme for the sake of the farmers although the agent points out that the estate itself receives no financial benefits. Indeed, it is actually more expensive, since the estate must use traditional materials for repairs, for example slate instead of corrugated iron. The tenant of Hield House Farm joined at the beginning because he felt that, with such poor quality land, the offer of a secure income could not be refused. He has had to reduce the application of fertiliser on his meadow land from 600 cwt/hectare to 240 cwt/hectare, but he maintains the same number of stock by buying in extra feed. Part of his farm also lies within the Upper Teesdale SSSI and so is subject to a management agreement with the the NCC. His only complaint is that the SSSI contains a juniper forest which is a breeding ground for rabbits, and the SSSI has made it more difficult to control the rabbit population.

Although farm business strategy is dependent on agricultural policy, the landlords exert an influence on the tenant farmers through their control over farm holding size, rents, selection of new tenants and farm repairs and improvements. All four estates stressed that landlord-tenant relations have been formalised and standardised by the Agricultural Holdings Acts. Many aspects of estate management are now governed by statute. Farm rents are reviewed every 3 years by the land agents. Rent levels are set according to likely farm income rather than land values (Respondent A). A holding's productive capacity is measured by livestock units and farm prices rather than area (the unreliability of farm size as an indicator of business size for upland farms has already been noted in section 4.2.3). Rent as a proportion of a farm's expenses has declined. The tenant of Allenshields (Blanchland estate) says that his rent today only forms about 10% of his farm expenses. This is due to the increase in livestock prices. Most of a farm's capital is now tied up in its stock.

Tenant right is seen as a major constraint on estate management. With the security of tenure awarded to the tenant farmer by the Agricultural Holdings Acts it is virtually impossible to evict a tenant unless he commits "one of the seven deadly sins" (Respondent E) [5]. The 1976 Agricultural Holdings Act awarded all sitting tenants, and all new tenancies created up to 1984, security of tenure for three generations (see 2.4.2). Although the estates complain about the constraints which legislation imposes on them, it seems that it merely formalises what was the custom anyway. It is the fact that landlords are compelled to follow certain codes of behaviour, rather than exercise free choice in estate management, that angers landowners and agents.

On all the estates family succession is the norm. The Raby estate gives the impression of having the most commercial outlook. The agent looks for experience of upland farming and sufficient capital when choosing new tenants. All vacant tenancies are advertised and some are awarded to outsiders (outsiders can usually afford a higher rent). On the Wemmergill estate, about 40% of the estate tenants are sons of former tenants, and others also have estate connections. The tenants must fit the 'estate image' and agree with the way the estate is run. The tenant of Grains O' Beck farm was formerly an employee at Wemmergill Hall, and the tenant of Hield House took over the holding from his brother-in-law. Similarly, at Blanchland the last change of tenancy was at Allenshields farm in 1977 when the former cow herd took over the holding. This preference for local tenants is not just an example of paternalism on the part of the estates. The Allendale agent stressed that it was essential that new tenants have experience of hill sheep farming, and sons of former tenants were often the best candidates.

The size of the farms at Blanchland have changed very little since the time of Lord Crewe, although the stinted pastures have now been incorporated into farm holdings. The farm holding structure has altered on the other estates, however. The Allendale estate, which inherited a farm structure of small holdings from the lead mining period, has amalgamated holdings into manageable units for family farms. The Wemmergill estate deliberately maintains some smaller farms as 'starter farms' for younger tenants. The youngest tenant on the estate in 1988 was only 21 years old. Hield House is one such starter farm. The present tenant

has occupied the holding for 8 years, and has plans to move on, either to a larger holding on the estate or to a holding elsewhere. In the 1950s, more in-bye land was lost in Lunedale on the creation of Selset Reservoir (see Figure 4.7), which has further unbalanced the ratio of fell to in-bye land. Now, the area of in-bye is too small to support the full use of the moorland area. The ratio of the in-bye to fell lands at Holwick is more balanced. The agents says that it is too expensive to buy more in-bye land in Lunedale. The demand for good land is such that it fetches the same prices as good land in lowland areas.

Traditionally, many of the tenants of the smaller farms in the upper dales have supplemented their farm income with a second employment (see 4.1). This is still a common practice, but with fewer alternative employment opportunities today, the future of these smaller holdings may be under threat. On the Wemmergill estate about 30% of the tenants have a second employment, which ranges from farm contracting to veterinary work. Examples of second employment on the Raby estate include farm contracting, quarrying, lorry driving, and one tenant is a post man.

6.2.3 Grouse Shooting

The trend towards grouse shooting, noted in the previous chapter in relation to the Wemmergill estate, has continued in the latter half of the 20th century, and is an important income source on all the estates. The growing profitability of grouse shooting is due to scarcity value. The Scottish moors have deteriorated in quality so that the North Pennine moors now offer some of the best shooting in the world. Demand is now international. Grouse shooting as a source of revenue is probably most significant on the Wemmergill estate where, in a good year, it can be as high as 75% of the total estate income. The shooting is managed in hand and let on a daily basis, mainly to foreigners. The conditions on the Wemmergill moors are said to be some of the best in the area, and Lune moor now has an international reputation. Weather conditions are usually good, and the size of the moors ensures a long shooting season. The Raby and Allendale estates keep some of the shooting in hand and let the rest. The Raby shooting is let to a local shooting syndicate. The Blanchland moors are let to a syndicate which includes some of the tenant

farmers [6]. The 6 year shooting lease was renewed by the trustees in 1989 for a sum of over £22,000, more than twice the former rental value.

Although a day's shooting can earn an estate about £1,000, the management costs of grouse shooting are high. The annual cost of maintaining the shooting at Wemmergill is £150,000. The moors must be kept throughout the year and six full-time gamekeepers are employed (five are employed on the Allendale estate). During the shooting season (from August 12th to December), the estates and shooting parties take on casual labour for beating the moors and looking after the shooting parties. Each estate offers accommodation for the shooting parties: at Holwick lodge for Wemmergill, Allenheads Hall for Allendale, Lord Crewe's Arms Hotel for Blanchland, and Eggleston Hall is often used by the Raby estate. These buildings must be maintained out of season. All the estates pointed out the positive spin-offs of grouse shooting for the local community in terms of employment and increased visitor spending. For instance, there is a hotel in Allendale which caters specifically for shooting parties, and other hotels in the town also report good business.

Although grouse shooting has substantially improved the financial position of these estates, it remains an unreliable income source. Grouse are vulnerable to disease which seems to run in roughly three-yearly cycles. Every few years the grouse population is decimated and the estates cannot let the shooting. The income from grouse shooting at Wemmergill can vary from 75% in a good year, to only 10% in a bad one. A cold winter may kill the baby grouse, but a warm winter increases the risk of pests. In 1989, a mild winter led initially to a high grouse population but an epidemic of a pest in July resulted in a disastrous season.

6.2.4 Other Income Sources

The role of mining on the estates is now minimal, but is probably of most importance on the Allendale estate. The estate is reluctant to rule out the possibility of reopening mines if economic conditions improve in future, but mining is a skilled activity and it is difficult to retain the miners with necessary experience when employment is so uncertain (see 5.4.2). The industry is totally market-led. Some miners have emigrated to use their mining skills overseas. Mining is also constrained by the past. In the 19th century, mineral rights were sometimes traded

in the interests of efficient lead mining. This causes legal difficulties today. For instance, at Fraser's Grove mine in Upper Weardale where fluorspar is being worked, the Church Commissioners own the fluorspar but Lord Allendale owns the lead. He is, therefore, entitled to a compensation rent for the loss of the lead (Respondent F).

Lord Allendale, Lord Barnard and the Church Commissioners employ a firm of specialist mineral agents to manage their mineral interests. None of the landowners play an active role in mining operations. The main mining company in the North Pennines today is Weardale Minerals, which operates three fluorspar mines in Weardale and two in Allendale. The Fordamin company works a barytes mine at Closehouse on the Wemmergill estate. The mining leases generally devolve all responsibility for working and restoring the mines on the company, but prohibit the subleasing of mine working [7]. Periodically, short leases or licences are granted to speculators, but these are all small scale, short-term concerns. The agent for Weardale Minerals feels that the mining companies must cause the estates more trouble than the economic returns justify.

Attitudes to forestry vary between the estates. The Allendale estate agent is most in favour of forestry, and believes that forestry will take over from farming in the future as the main land use of the uplands. There are three very ancient sawmills on the Allendale estate to process timber for estate use, but most of the timber is sold standing to firms of professional foresters. He would like to expand the timber resource, but complains that opposition to both mining and forestry operations from conservation interests is a major constraint on the expansion of these resources. The Wemmergill estate, on the other hand, has never had a policy of afforestation (see 4.2.4). There are some small plantations on the Raby estate, but these are mainly deciduous trees and are not managed commercially, although they can be considered as a long-term investment. The estate uses timber for its own repairs and owns a sawmill. Lord Crewe's Trustees no longer manage any forestry at Blanchland (the plantations were sold to the Forestry Commission in 1955). The present agent points out that plantations require careful management, and are not such an easy alternative as is sometimes thought. Much of the land available for planting is too poor in quality to be suitable.

Tourism is an underdeveloped income source on all the estates, and none of the landlords have plans for future developments. The Raby estate contains two major tourist attractions: Raby Castle and High Force Waterfall, but the castle is only open for the minimum number of days necessary to obtain a grant from English Heritage. Smaller ventures, such as bed and breakfast, are left to individual tenant initiative. The agent for Raby is cynical about the potential for tourism in the North Pennines. For five months of the year Upper Teesdale is snow bound. Generally, the farmers up there have chosen a harsh, isolated lifestyle and are, therefore, unlikely to welcome tourists. Most of the farmhouses have no extra rooms for guests, and all the farm buildings are used for farm purposes. The Allendale estate agent also thinks that weather conditions are too harsh for tourism. On the Wemmergill estate one tenant has got a grant from the Countryside Commission for a bunk house barn and another runs bed and breakfast, but again this is the result of individual tenant initiative. The tenant of Cotehouse Farm (Blanchland estate) lives with his family in the farm cottage and rents out the main farm house to earn some extra income.

Not surprisingly, mining interests in the region are dismissive of the region's potential for tourism. They wonder who would want to come to a place "*in the middle of nowhere*" (Respondent F), and quote the saying "*where there's muck there's brass*" (Respondents G).

It can be extrapolated from discussions with the agents and the tenants that one of the main reasons for the opposition of all the estates to tourism is the question of public access. The main attraction of the upper dales is for walkers, who are not appreciated by the estates or the farmers. The usual management problems caused by walkers are mentioned: gates are left open and dogs and people stray from the paths. In principle, Lord Barnard is in favour of public access, but is not prepared to maintain the footpaths himself and states firmly that all responsibility for the upkeep of footpaths should be taken by the county council. The Pennine Way runs across the Wemmergill and Raby estates. Both estates' attitude to this well used footpath is passive; there is no attempt to exploit its tourist potential.

6.2.5 Estate Management and Landlord-Tenant Relations

Landlord-tenant relations and estate management practices vary between the es-

tates, depending to some extent on estate size but also on the personality of the landlords and land agents. On all the estates the role of the agent is of as great, if not greater, importance than the landlord. The land agent performs a managerial role and has the most contact with the estate tenants. Three of the estates (Raby, Allendale and Blanchland), are managed by an individual full-time land agent. The Wemmergill estate is managed by an individual, but he is attached to a firm of land agents based in Newcastle. The Blanchland and Allendale land agents also manage their employers' other estates. The Blanchland agent in fact manages the Cathedral's estates in addition [8].

Blanchland, which is the smallest estate, has the most personalised approach to management. The present agent has managed the estate for 26 years and knows all the tenants personally. He is the sole decision-maker now since there is no longer a bailiff on the estate. The charity cannot afford to employ full-time workmen on the estate but must employ contract workers when necessary, a situation which the agent regrets, since contract workers lack sufficient loyalty to the estate and are unreliable. Some repair work is carried out by the farm tenants. The tenant of Allenshields, for example, is a professional stone-waller and works for the estate. The agent seems to be well liked by the farm tenants, but says it is difficult to manage the estate commercially when the tenants are personal friends. He is not prepared to antagonise the tenants by constantly raising the rents to keep in line with the market value.

The agent for the Wemmergill estate is younger, and has only managed the Wemmergill estate for two years. He is considered by the tenant of Grains O' Beck farm to be fair because he is prepared to listen to the tenants. There are, however, points of conflict between the estate and the tenants. The main conflict concerns stinting levels on the open fells. The estate is anxious to reduce stint numbers, in order to prevent over-grazing and improve the grouse shooting. Every time a farm falls vacant, it is re-let with reduced stints. Sheep are no longer allowed to graze on the fells in winter to prevent the trampling of the heather at feeding points. The tenant of Grains O' Beck has had his flock reduced by 200, and says that this is the only change to have taken place on the estate for "*donkeys years*" (Respondent H). Every year the sheep are counted by the agent to ensure that farmers do not exceed their stint allowances, which creates an atmosphere of suspicion. The estate

is now trying to increase its control over the tenanted farmland by encouraging the tenants to sign contracts giving up their right of succession. The tenant of Grains O' Beck claims that the estate is using coercive tactics to put pressure on the tenants. For example, he wanted to buy 100 stints on Cronkley Fell in 1988, but was told he could only do this if he signed a contract. He took advice from the NFU who offered to pay legal costs if necessary, but he decided not to buy the stints.

Although the Strathmore family are absentee landlords, they appear to be well liked by the tenants. The tenant of Grains O' Beck recounted an occasion when the late 17th Earl held a New Year's Eve party in Holwick Lodge for the tenants, and greatly amused them by appearing at the end of the party in a pair of red longjohns. The connection with the Queen Mother through the Bowes family also engenders a loyalty to the estate. The Queen Mother has been to visit the estate, and on her 80th birthday the tenants were bussed down to Buckingham Palace to attend the official party. The agent says that the family still takes a great interest in the estate. Estate loyalty also takes the form of antagonism to other estates. The tenant of Grains O' Beck farm was dismissive of the Raby estate's attitude to their tenants (he described the estate as *"tight"* and *"stand-offish"*).

Stints have also been reduced on the Allendale estate by 50%, in order to conserve the heather and reduce over-grazing. However, the agent points out the danger of upsetting the balance between sheep and grouse essential for the successful management of the commons. If sheep on one farmer's heaf are reduced, then sheep from neighbouring heafs may stray. The Allendale estate employs some full-time workmen and some contractors who, in practice, are nearly full-time employees. The agent is the manager of several estate departments, including a forestry department with head forester and woodland staff, a farm manager for the home farm at Bywell, and an estate works department. Expenditure on repairs is particularly high because of the harsh weather conditions (see 4.3.4) and the age of the farm buildings. Many repairs require specially made materials which adds to their cost. The agents of the above three estates liaise with the owners, but seem to be allowed a large degree of freedom in the day to day management of the estates.

The Raby estate, because of its size, has the most complex and formal management structure. Lord Barnard acts as a director with ultimate responsibility for the estate's management. Under him is the chief land agent, who is responsible for the day to day management of the estate. He presides over the various estate departments, such as finance and estate works. It is a hierarchical system of control. Each department has its own staff. The chief land agent describes himself as "*a jack of all trades and a master of none*" (Respondent E). His role is managerial, and he must pacify many different interests. Lord Barnard attends all meetings where long-term strategic decisions concerning the estate are decided. Frequently, outside specialists are invited to attend these meetings as consultants. Lord Barnard recognises that often a landlord will have a pet interest, so he tries to maintain a balanced interest in all aspects of the estate. He does not have any contact with the tenants except on an incidental basis. He used to have more informal contact when he hunted, but has not done so since the 1960s. He also feels that the landlord-tenant relationship has become more formalised through legislation and the unionisation of farmers.

Three of the estates (Raby, Allendale and Blanchland) contain estate villages which are wholly owned by the estates. Both the agents of Allendale and Blanchland say that owning residential property is not profitable in this area. The buildings require constant repairs, and rents only just cover the costs of upkeep. The village of Blanchland is let on fair rents. There are two shops which, the agent believes, could not stay in business if they were not heavily subsidised by the estate. The new tenant of the post office recently asked for repairs to the building, but the agent does not think this is feasible at the present rent. Many of the cottages surrounding Allenheads village are let as holiday cottages, and the estate plans to sell these off, retaining a nucleus of properties in the village centre. Five workshops are rented in Allenheads village, but before the estate agrees to rent a workshop it must first ensure that the tenant can be housed in the village.

It does not seem that any of the estates have a policy to regenerate the village communities. The population of Blanchland is ageing, and only recently Allenheads village was featured in the Sunday Times as an example of a dying upland village (see 7.7.2). Lord Barnard, however, mentioned that recent housing legislation had enabled the estate to raise cottage rents to a more economic level.

6.2.6 Continuity, Change and the Future

How do the estates perceive themselves, and how do they view the future? Lord Barnard is more forthcoming than his land agent about the changing role of the landlord and estate management. He would like to see changes in the decision-making process. For instance, he would prefer to be on a board of directors than to be sole decision-maker. He would also like to introduce a less hierarchical management structure, and give each department more autonomy. He feels that the profession of land agency has changed since the Second World War. Today, increasingly, estates employ a firm of land agents rather than an individual, and the career of land agency has become more structured. Agents no longer stay on the same estate for life.

Taking a broader view of the role of the landlord, Lord Barnard sees a cyclical pattern in the demands of landownership. In the 18th century, landlords took an active role in land management. In the 19th century, landlords distanced themselves from their estates. Today, they have to fulfil a more active role again. The profitability of agriculture also runs in cycles. The greatest threat to the future of the estate, in Lord Barnard's view, is taxation. The estate is slowly being whittled away by financial demands. His freedom of decision-making is constrained by the fact that he is only a life tenant of the estate. For instance, he would like to diversify his investments into non-landed property, but the terms of the settlement are too restrictive for this to be a feasible proposition. The settlement prevents risk-taking on the part of the landlord, but prevents change.

The agent of the Allendale estate also believes that taxation is the greatest threat to landownership, but for different reasons. The trend away from individual private ownership to more informal and flexible arrangements threatens to undermine the custom of primogeniture. Ownership by a family trust does not engender the same loyalty to an estate that individual ownership ensures. Divided ownership increases the possibility that the decision-makers will disagree and the estate will break up.

Opinions differ on the question of the future of the estates. The Allendale agent is pessimistic about upland farming, although he says that the 'peasant element' in the EEC is a safeguard for small farmers. The Wemmergill agent is optimistic as long as grouse shooting retains its profitability. As to the future of hill farming, in

the present short-term political climate, no-one is prepared to predict the future. The Blanchland agent says that he is not prepared to invest in the farm sector until the future is more certain.

None of the estates make much of an economic return, it is said. The agent for the Wemmergill estate claims that the costs of estate maintenance have rocketed upwards, and that repairs and improvements are the major expenses. On this estate, grouse shooting profits now fund the upkeep of the farms. As long as grouse shooting remains profitable, the future of the estate looks safe. Changes in estate policy may also take place with changes in management. The Blanchland agent will retire next year, and says that the trustees will probably employ a firm of land agents to manage the estate. If the trustees were to adopt a more commercial policy, the village of Blanchland could make a very profitable sale.

6.2.7 Summary

Similarities and differences can be observed in the estate management policies of these four landed estates. The overwhelming impression of all three estates is the continuity of resource use, management and motive. What changes have taken place conform to Massey and Catalano's observations on the adaptations of former landed property (see 2.5). There has been a reduction in the size of the estates, there has been a redefinition of ownership on two of the estates, and there has been a growth in commercial sporting activities, but these are all insignificant in comparison to the fundamental changes which have taken place in the national landownership structure.

Many of the issues considered in this discussion have been raised in the past. The management of the stinted moors and pastures has been a recurring source of conflict on the Wemmergill estate and taxation and tenant right are not new constraints. The reasons for this continuity of ownership and management can be found in the decision-making frameworks of the estates. Many of the factors mentioned by the estates are factors which constrain change (see Table 3.2). Tenant right and taxation seem to be the major factors of constraint, a finding which corresponds to Denman's 1957 study. Rising maintenance costs, low profits, and an inability to keep rents in line with inflation are also significant constraints. Of course physical resources are an unavoidable constraint on land management

options, but it is significant that none of the estates wish to develop tourism, although the moorland landscape is a highly suitable resource. Other constraints which were mentioned included environmental controls, which obstruct mining, quarrying and forestry activities.

As well as these constraints, continuity in the landed estates is largely due to motive. The estates do not want to change. They are all traditional, and display a strong attachment to the land. Although none of the estates actively promote employment opportunities, they show a degree of paternalism towards their farm tenants (for instance the Wemmergill estate maintains 'starter' farms).

There are differences in motive which may, partly, be attributed to historical tradition. The Allendale estate's emphasis on mining and timber may reflect its more industrial history, whilst the Wemmergill estate has actively promoted grouse shooting since the late 19th century.

6.3 Common Land

The analysis now moves on to consider a very different, but equally important, form of land control to landed estates. Common land has been touched upon in earlier sections of the thesis. In sections 2.2.2 and 2.4.5, the legal basis of common land and its present day extent were discussed. Common land has also been referred to in the analysis of the historical development of the Stanhope estate in relation to enclosure (see 4.4.3). As yet, however, common land has not been considered as a form of land control in itself. It is a key part of the overall landownership structure of the North Pennines and, therefore, deserves special attention.

Common land is the last surviving ancient form of land control. It has its origins in the manorial period, and the law relating to common land has evolved over centuries. Indeed, the law of the commons has never been formally written down, and the legal control of commons has evolved differently in different parts of the country according to local custom. As this discussion will show, common land is a general term which covers a variety of customary legal forms. In the last 25 years, public attention has focused on the remaining common lands, and their role in the contemporary rural society and economy has been reassessed with a view to reform. Of all forms of land tenure, common land displays the highest degree of

historical inertia. Change is constrained by the non-exclusive nature of common rights (every commoner must respect the rights of other interests in the common) and, since the late 19th century, by statutory legislation (see 2.4).

The commons in the North Pennines today are, almost without exception, located on the open fells. They are the lands which were considered too poor to be improveable at the time of enclosure. Not all the open fells, however, are commons. The distinction between commons and private moors in terms of land use is very fine, but in terms of control is very significant. The commons are located in the parishes where, at the time of enclosure, there was no principal landowner. The great extent of common lands in Stanhope, for example, reflects the fact that the Bishops of Durham were not the principal landowners and so could not claim freehold ownership of the moors (see 4.4.3).

As stated above, the land use of the North Pennines commons is very similar to that of the private moors, already discussed in earlier sections. Both are stinted, and both are characterised by dual use for sheep grazing and grouse breeding. The legal interests which are most actively exercised in these commons are, therefore, grazing rights and shooting rights. The commons represent an important additional grazing resource for many farms and, just as the popularity of grouse shooting has increased on the landed estates, so too has the value of grouse shooting on the commons grown. Unlike the private moors, however, there is no overall control to regulate the use of the commons.

The Commons Registration Act of 1965 has been a major issue in the North Pennines, because of the extent of commons in the region, and because, in recent years, there has been a revival of interest in the economic potential of the resources of common lands. Management practices which have evolved by custom over centuries are now being reassessed in the light of new demands on and public interest in this land resource. This section of the chapter will examine the ownership, control and management of three commons in County Durham, to show the impact of recent legal and economic pressures on this ancient form of land control. The information has been obtained from interviews with the agents for the shooting interests on Bollihope Common and Bowes Moor (see Appendix I), and from

the analysis of the Commons Register for County Durham and the report of the Commons Commission concerning ownership of Burnhope Moor.

Burnhope Moor and Bollihope Common are located in Stanhope parish (see Figure 4.17) and are, therefore, located within the former estate lands of the Bishops of Durham. Burnhope Moor is 1,670 hectares in area, and at registration rights to graze 1,517 sheep (320 stints) were made by 16 persons. Bollihope Common is 2,988 hectares, and at registration rights to graze 11,670 sheep were recorded by 42 persons. Today, Bollihope is owned by a private individual as part of an estate which encompasses two other commons: Pikestone Fell and Hamsterley, plus 166.6 hectares of enclosed land. Bowes Moor is located south of the Wemmergill estate and covers, altogether, 5,000 hectares. It is divided into two sections: the north moor and the south moor. At registration, rights to graze 5,781 sheep were registered by 107 persons.

6.3.1 The Commons Registration Act

The history of the Commons Registration Act has already been described (see 2.4.5). Tables 6.4 and 6.5 provide a summary of the data available for each common which was registered in the North Pennines [9]. Owners of commons in County Durham include private individuals, syndicates, MAFF, an investment company and the Public Trustee. It can be seen that ownership of four commons in County Durham were contested, and on 13 commons the claims of stintheolders were disputed. All cases of disputed ownership were referred to the Commons Commission for resolution, and in many cases disputed stints were also referred. The registration of the North Pennine commons has been a lengthy and controversial process, and in some cases registration has still not been finalised.

Bowes Moor and Burnhope Moor were both commons where ownership was disputed. The freehold ownership of Bollihope common was claimed by a shooting syndicate at registration, although the Church Commissioners claimed manorial and mineral rights over the common [10]. Bollihope was subsequently sold to a private individual, and in 1984 changed hands again and was purchased by its present owner. The owner also owns the sporting rights over the common, but the grazing is controlled by the stintheolders and the mineral rights are reserved to the Church Commissioners.

Table 6.4 — Commons in County Durham

PARISH	COMMON	HECTARES	OWNERSHIP	STINTHOLDERS	SHEEP
Stanhope	Bollihope	2988	Individual	42*	11670
Stanhope	Stanhope	3103	Syndicate	34*	7768
Stanhope	Burnhope	1670	Public Trustee*	16*	1517
Stanhope	Ireshope	413	Individual	16	418
Stanhope	Harthope	264	Public Trustee	5	355
Stanhope	Windyside Moss	22	Public Trustee	2	56
Stanhope	Westernhope	1068	Syndicate	3	1797
Stanhope	Chapel Fell	174	Public Trustee	6	414
Stanhope	Linzgarth	167	Syndicate	2	290
Stanhope	Northgate Fell	174	Syndicate	5*	?
Stanhope	Burtree Fell	6	Investment Co.	1	?
Stanhope	Sedling Fell	80	Public Trustee	7	?
Stanhope	Puddingthorne	172	MAFF	4	234
Stanhope	Killhope	510	MAFF	1*	30
Stanhope	Wellhope	575	Individual	1	2482
Stanhope	Moss Moor	100	Public Trustee*	4	80
Wolsingham	Pikestone Fell	1500	Individual	15*	3675
Wolsingham	Waskerley Park	769	Individual	1	700
Wolsingham	Wolsingham Park	852	Individual	7*	?
Edmondbyers	Edmondbyers	732	Syndicate	9*	2458
Muggleswick	Muggleswick Park	299	Syndicate	3	44
Muggleswick	Muggleswick Common	2232	Syndicate	9*	1490
Cockfield	Cockfield Fell	557	Trustees*	54	428
Hamsterley	Hamsterley	834	Individual	11*	2284
Cotherstone	Cotherstone Pasture	1275	Public Trustee	39	3892
Bowes	Bowes Moor	2732	Public Trustee*	107*	5781
Barningham	Barningham	395	Individual	4*	357
Eggleston	Eggleston	1951	Individual	32*	2482
* indicates dispute over stints or ownership					

Source: Common Land Registers

Table 6.5 — Commons in Cumbria & Northumberland

PARISH	COMMON	HECTARES	STINTHOLDERS	SHEEP
Stainmore	East Stainmore North Moor	1508	29	1121
Stainmore	East Stainmore South Moor	1043	23	693
Winton & Kaber	Winton & Kaber	2220	47	4745
Warcop	Kentland	48	8	518
Warcop	Sandford	16	3	20
Warcop	Burton	1418	25	2048
Milburn	Milburn Forest	2033	19	2627
Murton	Murton Fell	1348	25	5183
Murton	Hilton Fell	1440	39	9276
Murton	Brackenber Moor	169	34	6528
Murton	Pasture End	19	17	1902
Murton	The Ghyll	5	18	2446
Hartley	Hellgill Howe	46	14	1993
Hartley	Hartley Fell	461	6	1459
Long Marton	Knock Fell	17	21	3709
Duften	Duften Fell	4617	34	11066
Duften	Duften Fell (disputed)	21	53	15010
Nateby	Nateby	285	15	2904
Ousby	Melmerby Fell	935	16	4055
Ousby	Ousby Fell	1449	39	6780
Culgaith	Skirwith Fell	880	28	4521
Culgaith	Kirkland Fell	439	17	3321
Culgaith	Blencarn Fell	280	19	3451
Culgaith	The Rigg	29	20	2508
Ainstable	Croglin Coombes	35	1	100
Ainstable	Seavy Holmes	5	1	3
Allendale & West Allendale	Allendale	4312	96	2699
Hexhamshire	Hexhamshire	1275	13	1054

Source: Common Land Registers

The ownership of Bowes Moor was unknown at the time of registration. Claims to ownership were submitted by two parties: the owners of the grazing rights (the stinholders), and the owners of the sporting rights. An investigation was held by a commons commissioner in 1985 to decide the matter. The decision was based on historical evidence dating back to the 17th century [11]. In 1657, the Manor of Bowes (including the villages of Bowes, Boldron, Sleightholme and Spital) was purchased by several individuals as a trust. In 1681, lands within the manor were controlled by a court leet and court baron presided over by five Lords in Trust. In 1845, an act for the enclosure of the manor of Bowes was passed and the award was made in 1859, turning the moor into a regulated pasture. Altogether 5,781 stints were awarded, of which 361 were awarded to the Lords in Trust:

“in full compensation for the right and interest in the soil of the said lands, but excluding all mines, minerals, stones and other substrata”.

Thus the stinholders became the freehold owners of the moor and the Lords in Trust the owners of the sporting rights. The commons commissioner upheld the stinholders' claim to the ownership of the moor, but stated that the stinholders as a body could not be registered as the owners, so ownership was vested in the Public Trustee [12].

On Burnhope Moor in Stanhope, ownership was also disputed between the stinholders and the owners of the shooting rights, but this case differed in several respects from that of Bowes Moor. In the initial registration period, the claim for ownership of Burnhope Moor was submitted by the Burnhope Moor Stinholders Association, but was disputed by a shooting syndicate who owned the shooting rights. The case was heard by a commons commissioner in 1988 [13]. The shooting syndicate claimed that they had been the lessees of the shooting rights on Burnhope Moor since 1936. In 1959, they had purchased the moor from the Church Commissioners on the understanding that the conveyance gave them both the rights of sporting and freehold ownership. They apparently were not aware of any other claims to ownership. Since the purchase, they claimed that they had exercised the rights of ownership without protest from the stinholders; for example, making an access road, maintaining a shooting cabin and grouse butts, burning heather, griping [14] and draining. They also claimed that they had regularly informed the stinholders of the days when they were going to shoot. Their case, therefore, rested on the

grounds that they had purchased the freehold as well as the sporting rights in 1959, and had since acted as owners. They also thereby implied that the Church Commissioners before them had also owned the freehold of the moor.

The stintheolders, on the other hand, claimed that the ownership of the moor was divided between the stintheolders according to the number of stints. This had been determined by the Weardale Enclosure Award (see 4.4.3), and each successive farmer had stated that this was the case. One witness said that when his father had bought his farm from the Church Commissioners in 1955 he had purchased the stints and with them a share of the ownership of the moor. Moreover, the stintheolders disputed the fact that the shooting syndicate had acted as owners of the moor. The stintheolders had never even thought that the syndicate claimed ownership. The syndicate had never given the stintheolders formal warning of when they were going to shoot, and the stintheolders had also renewed fences and cut ditches on the moor without seeking permission from the syndicate.

The commons commissioner, in making his final decision, stated that neither side had produced sufficient evidence to support their claim to ownership. He based his decision on the Weardale Enclosure Award of 1815. The essential question was whether the Bishop of Durham had then, or beforehand, been the freehold owner of the moor. The commissioner found that the Bishop of Durham had been awarded 17 stints on the moor out of a total of 320. The small percentage of the total stintage awarded to the Bishop did not suggest that he was being compensated for foregoing the rights of sole proprietor of the moor, but that he was granted stints according to his freehold interest on the same basis as the other proprietors. The Bishop was, therefore, granted part ownership of the moor along with the other stintheolders. The Church Commissioners had subsequently sold the farms to which these stints were attached, so that the Church could no longer claim even part ownership of the moor. As to the confusion over the 1959 conveyance:

“My guess is that someone in the office, not realising or forgetting that stintheolders could have a share in the ownership of the soil, and persuading himself that a stint could not be more than a right of grazing, concluded, without much consideration either of the 1799 Act or the 1815 Award, that because he could think of no other owner and because the Bishop had owned so much land in the County, the whole of the Burnhope unit (except so much of it as had between

1867 and 1885 been acquired by conveyance) must have been in some seignorial capacity owned by the Bishop" (51).

The commons commissioner concluded that the stintheolders owned the freehold of the moor but, since the freehold could not be registered in a body of stintheolders, it would be registered with the Public Trustee on behalf of the stintheolders.

The establishment of the number and ownership of stints on the commons also caused confusion at registration. In most cases, more stints were registered than could possibly be supported by the common. For instance, 11,500 claims were made for stints on Bollihope common at registration which was a gross overestimation of the grazing capacity of the moor, but only 5,000 of the claims were substantiated. Where disputed claims came before a commons commissioner, decisions were again often based on historical documents relating to past stinting regulations.

The registration of the commons has had two effects. First, it has increased the importance of ownership in common land, and has formalised the division of ownership and control. Second, registration has also formally distinguished common lands from private moors. There were attempts to register private moors. The Ramblers Association, for instance, submitted applications for the registration of the moors on the Wemmergill estate; including Lunedale and Holwick Moors, Holwick Fell, Hunderthwaite Moor, Crossthwaite Moor and Mickleton Moor, but the applications were rejected.

The conflict and controversy which has characterised the registration process is partly due to the inappropriateness of the legislation. The diversity and complexity of the ways in which common lands can be owned and controlled was not appreciated at the time. Common land, perhaps more than any other form of land tenure, shows the significance of historical inertia. Many of the disputed claims could only be resolved by reference to the enclosure awards, or even earlier agreements.

6.3.2 Grouse Shooting and Sheep Grazing

This section will look at changes in the management of common lands, and how the recent revival of interest in sporting rights has altered traditional land management

practices and generated new conflicts. The dual use of the commons, for rough grazing and grouse breeding, has been successful because of the complementarity of the two activities. The sheep maintain the heather at different stages of growth for the grouse to feed on, and many of the land improvements such as griping [14] and draining necessary for the grouse also benefit the sheep (Denman, Roberts & Smith, 1967, 36). The balance between the two activities is very delicate. Over-grazing may destroy the heather, whilst under-grazing may allow bracken and other weeds to spread. No-one knows, however, what the optimum balance should be.

Changes have taken place in the management of the grazing of the commons. Stint levels for most commons were worked out under the enclosure awards of the 18th and 19th centuries, but over the 20th century most of these traditional management systems have broken down. There has been a trend towards greater exclusivity in common grazing. As farm holdings have amalgamated and the total number of holdings has decreased, so stints have become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Although several commons have many registered interests, the number of registered stintheolders is misleading. In practice, the bulk of the stints are owned and used by a few farmers. On Bowes Moor, for instance, the majority of the stints are occupied by five farmers.

There has also been a trend towards higher stocking levels on the moors. Agricultural policy is partly blamed for this, since headage payments encourage farmers to maximise the size of their flock. Overstocking is also linked to the concentration of stint ownership. In the past, when commons were stinted, regulations for the management of the stinting were drawn up and enforced by a stintheolders committee (a similar practice was observed on the landed estates in the 19th century). Most committees appointed a shepherd as an independent body to manage the sheep. Nowadays, many stinting committees have lapsed or lost their original self-regulatory function. Expense and easier access (many farmers now own small tractors which provide speedy access over rough terrain) mean that shepherds are no longer employed.

Both Bowes Moor and Burnhope Moor have stinting committees, but these have lost their regulatory function. On Bowes Moor the five farmers who own the stints also act as the field reeves for the regulation of the grazing. They therefore

regulate themselves, which means that there is no higher body to ensure that the moor is not over-grazed. Burnhope Moor is grazed by six farmers who also have a stinholders committee which meets once a year. The committee funds the cost of repairing fences and cutting drains by levying fines on overstints (one overstint is allowed for every ten stints). There was no active organisation to manage the grazing on Bollihope Common when the present owner purchased the estate in 1984, but since then the owner has set up a commons grazing committee.

The commons are now subject to the same conflicts between shooting and farming interests as the moors on the landed estates. Like the landed estates, the owners of the shooting rights wish to cut down on sheep numbers to preserve the heather, but unlike the owners of the private moors, shooting interests on the commons lack the overall control to achieve this goal directly and have had to seek alternative methods of reducing the number of stints. The solution adopted has been to take stints in hand, by buying up neighbouring farms with stints as they come on the market and then selling them with reduced stint levels. As well as the 361 stints awarded to the Lords in Trust of Bowes Moor by the Enclosure Award, they had acquired by 1988 a further 174.5 stints. Of these, 144.5 are kept in hand and the rest are let to farmers. The ones in hand are not used to ease the pressure on grazing. In the spring of 1989, the Lords in Trust acquired a further 400 stints which will considerably reduce the grazing on the moor. The Bollihope estate has also pursued a policy to buy up stints in order to increase its control over the grazing.

The value and popularity of grouse shooting today is such that the owners of shooting rights are prepared to invest capital in land improvements. The Bollihope estate has initiated a research programme into the improvement of heather moorland. A ten year project with Liverpool University has been set up, to experiment with the impact of different land management practices, such as liming, spraying bracken and making water courses, on grouse numbers. Winter foddering of sheep causes localised trampling of the ground and kills off the heather. In order to prevent this damage, the estate has got the permission of the farmers to carry out land improvements (although the estate finances the improvements, it has allowed the farmers to claim MAFF land improvement grants in order to win their co-operation).

Although the stinholders have little power to prevent the buying up of stints, they can obstruct the activities of the sporting interests. For instance, the Bollihope estate wished to put up some temporary fencing on the common as part of the heather management project. They needed the assent of all the commoners, but because of an objection from one commoner could not proceed. On Burnhope Moor several actions by the shooting syndicate have been stopped by the stinholders since commons registration.

The Bollihope estate is an example of a new trend in landownership in the North Pennines generated by the growing reputation of the grouse moors. It has been purchased primarily as a sporting estate and has caused something of a local sensation because of the nationality of the buyer [15]. The management policy of the Bollihope estate can only be understood with reference to the vast capital resources which the landowner commands. Local landowners complain that the estate has upset local wage levels by paying its employees above the going rate, but the Bollihope agent defends the estate's management policy. The present owner has the capital resources to carry out real improvements to the moor which will, he says, benefit local farmers and create local employment from grouse shooting. He also claims that although initial capital output is high, it is profitable in the long-term to improve the moor. For instance, £1/2 million expenditure will generate a return of £1 to £11/2 million in ten years. Perhaps because of the initial adverse reaction, the estate is anxious to be seen to contribute positively to the local community.

6.3.3 The Common Land Forum and the Future

Another recent event which may change the balance of control over the commons in the future is the Common Land Forum (CLF). The CLF has decided to press for legislation to, firstly, allow general public access to all common lands and, secondly, to ensure that management committees are set up for every common so that their use may be regulated not just by common right owners but by other interested bodies.

The second proposal, to set up management committees, is accepted by shooting and grazing interests. Many of the North Pennine commons already have management committees, so that the legislation will have the effect merely of formalising

what is already normal practice. It is the first proposal, to allow general public access on all commons, which could upset the present balance of land management. Shooting interests fear that general public access could destroy grouse shooting. It would make the task of keeping the commons far more difficult, there would be the danger of littering and fire, and the commons would have to be closed off for large parts of the year, including the grouse breeding and shooting seasons, and during tupping and lambing. These issues are considered in more depth in the next chapter (7.4).

6.3.4 Summary

This analysis of common lands is interesting, both for the light which it throws on the process of continuity and change in land control, and because of the implications of the commons for the economy of the North Pennines.

Common land is an extreme example of continuity in land control. Ownership of common land is meaningless in terms of ability to control or change. Until the 1965 Registration Act, the management of common land was governed more by practice than law, and the legal right of different interests was often undefined. The 1965 Act has sought to formalise the division between ownership and control, and has thereby increased the importance of ownership.

Despite the unchanging external form of common land, however, the management and control of common lands has altered in response to changing external conditions. Grazing rights have become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands and traditional management systems have broken down. The recent desire on the part of sporting interests to reduce the number of sheep grazing on the commons has led to a tendency for the control of sporting and grazing rights to coalesce. At present, the balance of control over the commons is tipped in favour of the shooting interests because of the economic value of grouse. Farmers may well fear that, once lost, the stints will never be regained. However, if the proposal of the CLF goes ahead to allow public access on the commons, the advantage may once again go to the grazing interests, or to new recreational interests.

The discussion has also shown that, in contrast to commons in other parts of the country, the commons of the North Pennines are actively used and fulfil an impor-

tant economic role in the local economy. There may be conflicts between sporting and grazing interests, but neither side wishes to see common lands reformed. This raises the question whether national policy can be uniformly applied to commons in all parts of the country as is at present proposed, a question that will be addressed in the following chapter.

6.4 Public Landownership

Four public agencies own land in the North Pennines today: the Forestry Commission, the Northumbrian Water Authority (NWA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC)[16]. In comparison to other upland regions of Britain, the area within public landownership is small, lands under Forestry Commission and NWA control form only 2.3% of the total land area (see Table 6.1). Nevertheless, the growth of public landownership has been an important change in the landholding structure, and an understanding of the decision-making frameworks which influence estate management by these landowners is significant for an understanding of contemporary land use and rural development in the region. It is also important to ask why public landownership in the North Pennines is not more extensive.

The decision-making framework for public landowners differs in certain general respects from private landownership (see 2.4.3). Public landowners own land for a specific function (although this main use may be compatible with other land uses). Decisions are made according to national rather than local considerations. Their actions are governed by statute, and of all landownership forms are most directly accountable to the State. With a constantly changing national political climate, the management requirements of public landowners have altered over the years. Two changes have occurred in the recent past. Over the past ten years, all public agencies have come under pressure from central government to become more commercially viable and generate revenue. Over the last 20 years, public landowners have been pressurised to take environmental and social factors into account in their management policies, due to demands from the conservation lobby to take more account of the environment, and from the rural development lobby to place more importance on their social responsibilities to rural areas. All these external pressures have resulted in changes in the management strategies of public

landowners. The following information comes from interviews with representatives of the Forestry Commission, NWA, MoD and NCC (see Appendix I).

6.5 The Forestry Commission

The Forestry Commission is the largest public landowner in the region. The North Pennines is divided between four Forestry Commission districts: Durham, Kielder, Border and South Lakes, all within the North England Conservancy (see Figure 3.4). In 1986, the Forestry Commission managed 77,440 hectares of land (see Table 6.6) in the four districts, although much of this is outside the North Pennines itself. The most extensive forestry plantation in the North Pennines is Hamsterley Forest in the Durham Dales. The Forestry Commission's other holdings consist for the most part of scattered parcels of woodland (such as the plantations at Blanchland).

Table 6.6 — Forestry Commission Holdings in the Northern Region, 1986

District	Total Area (ha)	Planted Area (ha)
Border	12,982	11,436
Durham	5,788	5,396
Kielder	50,671	40,180
South Lakes	7,999	6,983

Source: Forestry Commission (1985/86)

Each district has its own director and staff. The Forestry Commission plays the market like any private company. Timber can be sold at different stages of growth, on the open market, or by contract with a processing company. The Forestry Commission does not process the timber itself, and until recently cut timber was being exported to Scandinavia to be processed [17]. With its dominant position in

the market, the Forestry Commission has an advantage over smaller private timber growers in the market place because it can guarantee a supply.

The changing requirements and pressures on the Forestry Commission are reflected in the management of the Forestry Commission's estates in the North Pennines. Hamsterley Forest, the largest plantation in the region, was bought by the Forestry Commission in 1927 from the Surtees family (Walker, 1987). The 2,083 hectare estate originally consisted of three farms, a shooting lodge and a grouse moor. The initial planting phase reflected the Forestry Commission's original remit to expand Britain's timber as quickly and as cheaply as possible. At Hamsterley, initial planting took place between 1927 and 1951. Today, those trees have matured and 86% of Hamsterley Forest is coniferous woodland (see Table 6.7). Hamsterley is an example of the early mistakes of the Forestry Commission which have aroused opposition from conservationists (see 3.4.3).

Table 6.7 — Hamsterley Forest: Land Use 1986

Land use	1987 (%)	Forecast (%)
Coniferous woodland	86	82.5
Broadleaved woodland	4	8
Pastures & meadows	4.5	4.5
Conservation area	0.5	2
Recreational grassland	1	1
Forest rides & roads	4	2

Source: Walker (1987)

The Durham District's policy today reflects the Forestry Commission's concern to improve its image with the general public, and shows a greater responsibility for the environment and the needs of the community. Now up to 5% of the Forestry Commission's revenue is set aside for landscaping purposes and the Forestry Commission employs a professional landscape architect. Five per cent of the saplings now planted are broad- leaved deciduous trees. These are planted for maximum

effect along footpaths and rivers. It is a slow process of change, but eventually it is hoped to reduce the percentage of coniferous woodland to 82.5% and double the percentage of deciduous woodland to 8% (see Table 6.7).

The Forestry Commission now has a big commitment to tourism, which both earns revenue and improves the commission's image with the general public. Hamsterley Forest is the most visited spot in County Durham, with 150,000 visitors a year. Most are day-trippers, and many come for specialist sports such as cycling, car rallies, cross-country skiing, horse riding and wildlife. The Forestry Commission is considering building log cabins to attract overnight visitors, but recognises that it must first do some market research into what the public wants.

Part of the opposition to the Forestry Commission's forests has come from other public agencies such as the Countryside Commission. Another way in which the Forestry Commission aims to improve its image, is to encourage formal inter-organisational co-operation. The Durham District director chairs an environmental panel of non-foresters as a platform for discussion. The panel includes representatives from many other agencies and lobby groups, such as the Nature Conservancy Council, the RSPB, Durham County Council, the Countryside Commission and the Sports Council. The director admits that public opinion has had a big influence on policy.

Why has the Forestry Commission not acquired more land in the North Pennines? One of the arguments the commission has used to promote the expansion of forestry is its job-creating role. The Durham District employs thirty full-time workmen and frequently employs up to ninety private contractors. The Forestry Commission claims (DCC, 1984, 23) that afforestation is the cheapest and most effective way to create jobs in the region. Durham County Council, however, is less optimistic, estimating that only one job is created for every 100 hectares planted (DCC, 1986, 22). The Countryside Commission is even more pessimistic. It calculates that it costs £29,000 to create even one job in forestry, and is, therefore, the most expensive method of job creation (DCC, 1984, 18).

There has undoubtedly been opposition to further afforestation by the environmental lobby, but the chief clue as to why expansion has not taken place lies in the previous two sections. The common lands and landed estates in the region act

as an effective barrier to any change in land use. A further problem is that the lands which are most freely available, the open fells, are not suitable for planting. The most suitable lands for planting, the valley sides, are also required for farming. Durham County Council (1986, 21) have estimated that 3,500 hectares is the maximum area which could be planted in the Durham Dales, and this would involve the co-operation of private landowners.

Now any expansion in the Forestry Commission's holdings is unlikely. The present government wishes to see an expansion of the private rather than the public sector in forestry. The Forestry Commission must now rationalise its estate, and is selling off many of the smaller holdings such as the plantations at Blanchland. These were, originally, acquired with the intention of expanding them as land came on the market, but this has not happened.

In the future, the Forestry Commission looks likely to reduce its landholdings and promote tourism and conservation on its remaining estates.

6.5.1 The Northumbrian Water Authority

The NWA owns several reservoirs in the North Pennines: Burnhope, Waskerly and Tunstall reservoirs in Weardale, and Grassholme, Selset, Hury, Blackton and Cow Green in Teesdale, but the main reservoir in the Northumbrian region, Kielder, lies just outside the study area [18]. The Northumbrian Water Authority was set up under the 1973 Water Act and has recently been privatised under the 1989 Water Act [19]. The ownership and management structures are, therefore, in a state of change.

Unlike other upland water authorities such as North West and Yorkshire, NWA owns very little non-operational land around the reservoirs. Its function as a landowner is limited. What land is owned is let out to farmers on short-term grazing licences. The relatively small and scattered nature of NWA's total estate (there are some 900 separate properties covering 5,833 hectares), places a major constraint on land management options. However, the water authorities have also been influenced by the political climate and public opinion. Like the Forestry Commission, NWA's remit now includes a greater commitment to increase revenue and to improve its image with the general public.

Since NWA was established in 1974, its policy has been to allow public access to and use of its reservoirs. NWA owns the fishing rights to most of its reservoirs (Cow Green is an exception), and stocks many of them (but not Balderhead or Selset). The revenue from fishing comes to about £180,000 per annum. Recreational use of the reservoirs is greatest at Kielder because of its size. NWA has built a club house there which is let to a sailing club, and there is also a sailing club at Selset. However, the sailing clubs struggle to attract members as demand is lacking. During the dry summer of 1989, the water level at Kielder fell below the level of the slipways, and at Selset the surface area of the reservoir was so reduced that it was not feasible to sail.

Public opposition to the creation of reservoirs has been strong. Kielder Reservoir has been the only new reservoir to be created by NWA, but its size ensured that it was a controversial issue. The whole process took eight years, during which time two public enquiries were held. NWA was probably helped by the fact that the landscape had already been altered dramatically by Kielder Forest, and the Forestry Commission was the main landowner. This simplified negotiations. The creation of Cow Green reservoir in Upper Teesdale by the then Water Resources Board in 1967 was also a controversial issue [20]. Part of the site chosen was an SSSI, and part was common land. The Water Resources Board had to obtain a private bill to authorise the reservoir, since the provisions of the Water Resources Act, 1963 were insufficient to cover these circumstances.

NWA takes conservation issues into account in its management policy, but does not let them interfere with its primary purpose of water provision. In 1988, the Nature Conservancy Council carried out a survey of all NWA's properties to identify areas of special ecological interest and *"whilst its only advice, we do listen to a lot of what they have to say"* (Respondent J). NWA tried planting trees at Selset for landscaping purposes, but the project was unsuccessful due to the unsuitability of the ground.

Now the Northumbrian Region has a water surplus, and no new reservoirs are planned in the foreseeable future. The land agent for NWA would like to diversify and expand NWA's estate, but this is unlikely, and any expansion will be located on the lowlands rather than in the North Pennines. The privatised company will

be under greater pressure to generate revenue, and may look to diversify its investments (the waste disposal business is one possibility). The privatised company may also give conservation a lower priority, especially in the next five years or so when the company will have to invest in the upgrading of its water supply and sewage equipment.

NWA has had an impact on landowners in the North Pennines in terms of the reduction of in-bye land, but otherwise its impact is minimal. It is likely that, once again, the landed estates and common lands have acted as a barrier to the expansion of the water authority's non-operational landholdings.

6.5.2 The Ministry of Defence

The Ministry of Defence manages three training sites in the North Pennines (a fourth at Stainmore has recently been acquired after a public enquiry) [21]. These sites are part owned and part leased. Warcop is the largest holding. Here, nearly 6,250 hectares are owned and a further 3,750 are leased. At Battle Hill army rifle range, 45.8 hectares are owned and 175 leased. The MoD also owns 83.3 hectares on Bowes Moor. In addition, the MoD has training rights over a far wider area, including Hamsterley Forest [22]. The MoD's function is to provide military training, and the MoD must show that there is a genuine operational need for all its property. It cannot hold land in reserve.

The North Pennine estates are managed from Catterick Camp in North Yorkshire by the MoD's estates department (like the Forestry Commission and NWA, the main estate of the MoD is outside the North Pennines) [23]. Military use of land falls into two categories. On live training areas, live ammunition is used, whilst on dry training areas less dangerous ammunition is used such as flares, small pyrotechnics and trip wires. Although undoubtedly the MoD enjoys the greatest State protection of all public landowners, it too has had to change its management policy in response to government and public pressures.

The MoD now looks to increase revenue from its estates, and "*will take any commercial opportunities available*" (Respondent K), although military training must always come first. On most of the sites, military use is compatible with agricultural grazing. Land is let on normal agricultural tenancies, although training rights are

always reserved in the agreement. On the Catterick estate, the MoD manages a 750 hectare plantation. This serves both economic and military purposes. The timber is used for estate repairs and can be sold on the open market, and the woods are used for military training exercises. Landscaping often enhances an estate's training potential.

The MoD's policy towards conservation and public access was altered dramatically by the Nugent Report [24]:

"Pre Nugent the bye-laws used to be 'you cannot do anything, but very generously we'll allow you to walk along that path'. After Nugent it became much more general saying 'look, you've got access to the area but you can't actually damage things or go into danger zones'" (Respondent K).

The agent emphasises that the MoD cannot guarantee public safety, and he cannot understand the attitude of the public who will stray off paths in danger zones, and who object to any re-routing of a path, even if it improves the public's safety. Pressures for public access in the North Pennines, however, are far less intense than in the more populated south of the country. The MoD's sporting facilities are rented out to local groups, which both earns revenue and improves local relations.

The agent also claims that the MoD has a good record on conservation. Since the Nugent Report, the MoD has employed a conservation officer to co-ordinate MoD conservation policy throughout the country. Most districts have a conservation panel which is staffed by military personnel, but which co-opts representatives of conservation groups onto it. This at least ensures that the MoD makes informed decisions. The agent points out that the extensive nature of the land uses on the MoD estates must benefit conservation interests, and keeps down destruction by vandalism. Part of the newly acquired Stainmore site is a rare example of a sugar limestone pavement and has been designated an SSSI. The MoD will maintain and preserve it accordingly.

Whilst the MoD has no statutory duty to promote local employment, it can have a tremendous impact on the local community. In the northern region this influence is concentrated at Catterick. Employment benefits to the North Pennine communities, however, are limited.

The landownership structure of the North Pennines has not been such an obstacle to the expansion of the MoD's landholdings as it has been to the former two public landowners. This can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the MoD is able to manage much of its land on leases. Secondly, many of the MoD's land use requirements are compatible with the existing land uses on the open fells. Military land use is preferable from the point of view of landowners to public access.

Any reduction in the MoD's landholdings in the foreseeable future is unlikely. If anything, the MoD will need to expand its estate. As weapons get larger so more space is needed to test them, but the size of the MoD's landholdings will always be a political issue. Military use on the whole has no long lasting effects on the land, and military lands could easily revert to their former uses. However, in some cases effects are long-term. For instance, the Bowes Moor site was used for storing toxic materials in the Second World War and is still contaminated by mustard gas (Respondent I).

6.5.3 The Nature Conservancy Council

The final public landowning agency that will be considered in this chapter is the NCC. Like the MoD, the NCC both owns and leases land. The statutory function of the NCC is to designate, monitor and manage areas of special ecological interest. It is strictly a conservation body and has no socio-economic commitments.

The NCC owns two main sites in the North Pennines: Moor House (3,894 hectares) on Stainmore Common which is owned outright, and Upper Teesdale (3,497 hectares) which is leased from the Raby and Wemmergill estates. Besides these two properties, the NCC manages several small SSSIs (which may be only one or two hectares in size). The most recent SSSI to be designated in the region is on Bowes Moor, the first site to be designated on ornithological grounds (Respondent I).

The acquisition and expansion of the NCC's interests in the North Pennines has not been unduly obstructed by the existing landownership structure. Like the MoD, the NCC manages much of its lands on leases. Furthermore, the management policies of the NCC are largely compatible with existing land uses. A large part of the Upper Teesdale SSSI is grouse moor, and the management of the grouse shooting coincides exactly with the wishes of the NCC. Heather burning maintains heather

at different stages of growth for both grouse and wild birds, such as the golden plover, merlin and birds of prey, to feed on. The requirements which the NCC places on farmers within the SSSI are also fairly similar to existing practices. The harshness of the environment in the upper dale has constrained the modernisation of farming. As was observed in section 6.2.2, farmers are, on the whole, happy to receive a regular guaranteed income.

So closely do the management objectives of the NCC and landowners coincide, that the NCC is even prepared to help grouse shooting interests to reduce sheep numbers on the stinted moors. For example, the NCC has given the owners of the sporting rights of Bowes Moor a grant to enable them to buy up stints (Respondent I).

6.5.4 Summary

It can be concluded from this examination of public landownership in the North Pennines, that private landownership to a large extent has determined the location and extent of public landholdings in the region. This finding corroborates MacGregor's (1975) criticism that public landowners are unwilling to exercise their powers of compulsory purchase against private interests (see 3.4.5). The explanation is not as clear cut as this, however. For instance, the expansion of the Forestry Commission's holdings has also been constrained by opposition from the conservation lobby. The question of public ownership cannot be separated from the rural development debate.

The public landowners which have caused least conflict in the North Pennines have been those whose management policies most closely correspond to those of private landowners. The MoD and NCC have both been accepted by the landed estates because they do not necessarily need to own their land outright, their land use requirements do not conflict unduly with those of private landowners, and they are all united in their opposition to public access. Although the landholdings of these public agencies are not extensive, public landownership has influenced private landownership in other ways. The Forestry Commission, for instance, has promoted private forestry planting.

Of all the public landowners, the Forestry Commission is the only agency which can

claim positively to contribute to the rural development of the region. It has created jobs, and is the only landowner actively to promote tourism. Public opinion has had a big influence on the management policy of this agency. In the near future at least, an expansion in public landownership does not seem likely in the present political climate.

6.6 Contemporary Landownership & Rural Development

The discussion in this chapter has focussed on continuity and change, both internal and external, in the landownership structure and land management practices of the North Pennines. In this final summary, a separate but related question will be asked: what are the implications of these estate management policies for the rural development of the region?

In Chapter Three (see 3.2.5), MacGregor's (1988) study of landownership in the Scottish Highlands was discussed. This study concluded that the landownership structure was a fundamental barrier to the economic development of the region. The land was under-used. Could this criticism also be applied to the landowners of the North Pennines? To answer this question requires a value judgement, and must be to some extent subjective.

Employment is one measure with which to assess the present effectiveness of land use against its potential. All the landed estates would appear to be committed to traditional forms of employment. Agriculture is the main source of employment on all the landed estates, and it would seem that the estates offer certain advantages over owner-occupation. It is possible that tenant farmers enjoy greater financial security than owner-occupiers. By maintaining a variety of farm sizes, the estates provide an opportunity for young farmers to enter the farming industry. Tenant farmers have less security of tenure than owner-occupiers, but the estates are paternal towards their tenants, and family continuity on the farm holdings is the norm.

Although mining and quarrying provide employment, labour force requirements in these two industries are sporadic and offer no long-term security. No estate has turned to forestry on a major scale, although the Allendale estate would most like

to expand this resource. The estates certainly have a far higher potential to expand forestry than owner-occupiers. An expansion of forestry would increase local employment, but would reduce the farming population. The estates claim that grouse shooting benefits the local economy by providing seasonal employment and generating increased visitor spending. The benefits to the community, however, are minimal compared to the benefits to the landowners. The growth in grouse shooting has negative implications for the farming community. On both the private moorlands and the commons, sheep numbers have been reduced.

As to residential property, perhaps the estates charge rents below the market rate, but they are passive landlords. None of the estates has sought to promote social or economic development in its settlements.

The main contribution of the landed estates to local employment in the North Pennines would appear to be farming. The main barrier to employment creation which the landed estates pose is in their opposition to tourism. Tourism would create jobs and generate revenue in the local communities more directly than grouse shooting does. The only landowner in the region which positively wishes to develop tourism is the Forestry Commission. The potential demand for tourism in the region is indicated by the fact that Hamsterley Forest is the most visited spot in County Durham.

Thus, in terms of local economic development, landowners in the North Pennines could be accused of under-use of their lands. The fault, however, does not lie entirely with the landowners. Today, many issues concerning land use and rural development in the region are made by external public agencies. Certain public intervention measures have not been in the best interests of rural employment. For instance, the expansion of the Forestry Commission's estate has been constrained by the opposition of conservation interests. The same is true of forestry, mining and quarrying on the landed estates.

The next chapter will consider the relative impact of landowners and public policy-makers on the rural development of the North Pennines, with an examination of the most significant public intervention measures in the region.

Notes

1. In 1906 the Beaumonts were created Lords Allendale.
2. Today, the Wemmergill estate has been reduced to the Lunedale and Holwick sectors. The Cotherstone, Mickleton and Hunderthwaite properties were sold in the 1950s. Recently, Step Ends Farm (Holwick) and Cronkley Farm (Lunedale) were also sold.
3. The main change effected by the 1974 schedule was to set up an extraordinary repair fund, into which a yearly sum of money is transferred:
“for the purpose of providing for the extraordinary repair, improvement or re-building of the property belonging to the charity”.
4. Between 1973 and 1979, the EEC ran a Dairy Herd Conversion Scheme which offered farmers a financial incentive (golden handshake) to give up their dairy business.
5. There are 7 grounds on which a tenant can be evicted (Northfield, 1979, 105):
 - Where a landlord has obtained the Agricultural Land Tribunal's (ALT) consent, prior to serving the notice to quit.
 - Where the land is required for non-agricultural use, for which planning permission has been granted.
 - Where the landlord has obtained a certificate of bad husbandry by the tenant from the ALT.
 - Where the tenant has failed to comply with a previous demand from the landlord to pay rent that is due from him, or has failed within a specified time to comply with a written demand to remedy a breach of his tenancy agreement.
 - Where the landlord's interest in the holding is materially prejudiced by a non-remediable breach of the tenancy agreement by the tenant.
 - Where the tenant has become bankrupt.
 - Where the notice to quit is given on the death of the tenant (although this does not apply under the terms of the 1976 Act).
6. The tenant of Allenshields jokingly suggested that it would be more profitable to drive sheep across the butts than to raise them for meat.
7. Subleasing is prohibited so that the owners can retain some control over the activities of the lessees; the owners are ultimately responsible for their actions. There is no standard lease, the terms of each lease depend upon the particular circumstances. The normal period of a mining lease is 21 years, but the Church Commissioners grant leases for 42 years (Respondents G).

8. This is now an established tradition. It was noted in Chapter Five that Samuel Rowlandson, the agent for Lord Crewe's Charity, also managed the Cathedral estates.
9. Table 6.5 shows ownership, whilst Table 6.4 shows stinting levels only. The data on Durham commons was compiled from the Commons Registers by the author. The data on the Northumberland and Cumbria commons is taken from Whitby (1986).
10. The Church Commissioners claimed manorial rights over all the Stanhope commons, although in practice these residual powers are of negligible significance.
11. The historical information on Bowes Moor was given by Respondent I.
12. The position of Public Trustee was created by the 1965 Registration Act. All unclaimed commons and stinted pastures (such as Bowes Moor and Burnhope) are vested in the Public Trustee.
13. Commons Commission (1988) *In the matter of (1) Burnhope Moor and (2) Moss Moor*. Stanhope, Wear Valley District, Durham.
14. Griping is a northern term for cutting ditches.
15. The new owner of Bollihope Common comes from the royal family of Dubai. The purchase of the estate was publicised in the local press under headlines such as 'Shooting Sheik buys £1 million moor' (The Journal, 1985, n.d.).
16. From 1972 until October 1988, all Crown properties were managed by a government land management body called the Property Services Agency, responsible to the DoE. Now control of the MoD lands has been given back to the MoD.
17. In the early 1980s there was no home market for pulp wood and much was exported to Scandinavia for processing, but recently several processing plants have been opened in Britain.
18. Kielder Reservoir is both the largest and the most ambitious of NWA's projects. It is a multipurpose scheme. Water storage is combined with forestry, recreation and electricity generation (the CEGB operates an electricity generator from water passing through the dam).
19. See the 1989 Water Act for details of privatisation.
20. Cow Green was chosen from one of three sites on the grounds of cost-effectiveness (Water Resources Board, 3rd Annual Report, 1966).
21. A public enquiry was called for over the Secretary of State's decision to allow the MoD site on Stainmore Common. Opposers to the scheme included residents of Stainmore, Eden District Council, Stainmore Parish Council and Cumbria and Durham County Councils (Independent, 8/6/89).
22. The MoD owns training rights over all Crown lands.

23. The Catterick Camp estate is 9,583.3 hectares. The agent likened the effects on local employment of closing down Catterick Camp to the impact of the steelworks closure at Consett.
24. Nugent, Lord, Chairman. (1971/73) *Report of the Defence Lands Committee*. Cmnd 5714. London, HMSO.

Chapter VII


Private Landownership and Public Intervention

7.1 Introduction

This chapter moves on from the analysis of land management under different landownership forms, to consider the interaction of private interests and public policy-makers in recent debates concerning land use and socio-economic development in the North Pennines. In common with other upland areas of Britain, responsibility for solving the rural development problems of the North Pennines has been shouldered by public agencies. Public agencies now play a major role in decisions concerning land use and rural society in the region. There is now a national interest in the development of the region.

The question of public intervention in the rural development process has already been considered (see 3.4). It has been established that the term 'public intervention' covers a variety of policies, differing in their orientation, aims, scale, and methods of implementation (see Table 3.5). It was also established that there is no consensus as to what the 'public interest' is, or as to what path rural development should take. Many different policy approaches have been attempted since the Second World War. After more than forty years of planning, public agencies have yet to achieve any lasting improvements in rural areas. Old problems still remain and new problems have emerged. The failure of public intervention can be explained at different levels. The sectoral approach of British planning and organisational self-interest have been blamed for producing unco-ordinated and even contradictory policies. A more radical interpretation places the blame on a public misinterpretation of, and failure to tackle, the root problems of rural areas. Private interests, including those of landowners, still exert a large degree of influence over the formulation of policy and its implementation. It is important, therefore, to be aware of the class structure of rural societies, and to understand the nature of the relations between the local élite and national policy-makers.

Figure 7.1



Without doubt, the North Pennines faces serious socio-economic problems. The economy has continued to decline, as have population levels in the majority of parishes, with the exception of certain parishes on the fringe of the region (see Figure 7.1). With only 21,000 inhabitants in 1981, the North Pennines is the most sparsely populated area of England (Whitby, 1986). The population is also ageing, which creates new demands for public services. In 1981, 35% of the population was aged over 50 years (DCC, 1985, 3). Employment in the traditional industries of mining and agriculture has contracted. Agricultural employment has decreased by 24% since 1971 (DCC, 1986, 7), whilst employment in manufacturing has declined from 16% in 1971 to 3% in 1985 (see Table 7.1). Today, the majority of employment opportunities are in the service sector, including jobs in the tourist industry. The male unemployment rate stood at about 12.7% in 1981 (DCC, 1985, 4). The economic problems of the North Pennines have been compounded by the economic decline of the traditional industries of County Durham: coal, steel and ship-building. Unemployment in County Durham as a whole was 19% in 1985 (DCC, 1985, 5).

Table 7.1 — % Employment in the Durham Dales, 1985

EMPLOYMENT	% TOTAL
Agriculture	35
Services	45
Mining & Quarrying	14
Manufacturing	3

Source: from DCC (1986)

The analysis concentrates on the period from the late 1960s to the present day. Before this period, rural development policies were formulated within the national sectoral planning framework established after the Second World War (see 3.4). Rural settlement planning was carried out by the five respective county councils, with

no overall co-ordination of policy. Indeed, the North Pennines was not perceived as a planning region by policy-makers until the late 1960s.

Agricultural policy has had an influence on the structure of farming in the North Pennines. The agricultural economy of the North Pennines is still predominantly pastoral. 97% of the agricultural area is under some form of grass (rough or improved pasture), but there has been a change in the farm business structure. Livestock rearing is now the main activity, and both sheep and cattle numbers have increased since the 1960s. At the same time dairying has declined (see Table 7.2). The number of farm businesses has declined by 31% since 1967, whilst the average farm holding size has increased by 42% (see Table 7.3), but still the majority of farms are classed as part-time holdings under MAFF specifications, although the number is dropping.

The role of public landownership in the region has already been discussed in Chapter Six (see 6.4). Public landholdings in the North Pennines are limited in extent and have had a limited impact on local employment opportunities. Until the 1960s, no serious moves were made to protect the environment of the region. The North Pennines, albeit a reduced area of 653 square miles, was considered for National Park designation by the Dower Committee (HMSO, 1945), but was later rejected [1]. Two National Nature Reserves were designated by the then Nature Conservancy in 1963: Moor House on Stainmore Common and Upper Teesdale, as well as several smaller SSSIs (see 6.4.4) .

In the late 1960s, the first policy specifically relating to the North Pennines was launched with the North Pennines Rural Development Board (NPRDB), since when the region has increasingly been treated by policy-makers as an administrative unit which faces common problems needing common solutions. The analysis will consider in detail three policies which have had a direct impact on landowners, and which have caused local controversy: the NPRDB, the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) and the Common Land Forum (CLF). In addition, the policies of the local authorities and the Development Commission towards rural development in the region will be more briefly examined. Finally, three smaller development projects will be discussed which have achieved a high degree of success:

Table 7.2 — Farm Businesses in the AONB, 1971 to 1983

FARM TYPE	1971	1978	1983	% CHANGE
Specialist/Mainly Dairy	319	195	160	-50
Mostly Cattle	59	49	39	-34
Mostly Sheep	94	65	78	-17
Cattle & Sheep	342	383	392	+15
Part Time	553	547	515	-7
Others	71	31	27	-72
TOTAL	1438	1270	1211	-16

Source: Whitby (1986, 75)

Table 7.3 — Farm Size in the AONB, 1971 to 1983

FARM SIZE (ha)	1967	1974	1983	% CHANGE
0 - 19	726	443	364	-50
20 - 39	511	404	306	-40
40 - 200	477	469	481	+1
over 200	9	11	18	+100
TOTAL	1723	1327	1169	-31

Source: Whitby (1986, 73)

the East Cumbria Countryside Project (ECCP), Allenheads Village Trust and the Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) scheme.

The information presented in the following discussion has been obtained from interviews with key individuals from public agencies which are involved in policy-making

in the region, and from the analysis of reports concerning the areas's development. The enquiry will focus on the following issues: have local private interests affected the way national policies are formulated and implemented? Are national policies suitable for the specific conditions of the North Pennines? What factors explain the degree of success or failure of different policies? Is landownership an explanatory factor? What light does the analysis throw on the nature of rural society in the North Pennines?

7.2 The North Pennines Rural Development Board

The Rural Development Board (RDB) concept was proposed in a government white paper (*The Development of Agriculture*, 1965), and was passed into legislation in the Agriculture Act of 1967. The main purpose of the RDBs was to tackle the problems of upland agriculture in an more integrated fashion than former agricultural policies had taken. It was proposed that a separate board would be set up for each region, in order that policies could be specifically targetted. Administered by MAFF, the primary aim of the RDBs was to regenerate upland farming by rationalising and enlarging the farm structure through farm amalgamation. This was only part, however, of a broader goal to develop farming and forestry as complementary land uses, to improve the infrastructure of rural areas, and to encourage tourism and other appropriate enterprises. The RDB concept, with its integrated and regional remit, was, therefore, a radical departure from previous government thinking about the uplands.

The RDB concept was similar to the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB) which was set up in 1965 (see 3.4.4). Although a RDB was proposed for Mid Wales, the NPRDB was the only board to be established under the act, and came into being on the 1st of August, 1969. The NPRDB covered a vast area (41,667 million hectares), stretching from the Craven Gap in Yorkshire to the Scottish border. It covered two national parks (Yorkshire Dales and Northumberland) and parts of seven counties. It was, therefore, far larger than the current administrative definition of the North Pennines. The boundaries were drawn largely on the basis of the upland agricultural economy. It was estimated that the area contained 6,246 farms, of which approximately 37% were of insufficient size to support

a viable full-time farm business (NPRDB, 1970, para 28). There was considered to be a pressing need for structural reform to the farm sector.

The NPRDB was run by fourteen staff, including a professional land agent and two sub-agents. Its headquarters were centrally located at Ormside near Appleby, and the estimated budget for the first year of operations was £280,000 (NPRDB, 1970, para 23). What were the actual implications of the NPRDB for the inhabitants of the North Pennines, and how was it received by the area's inhabitants? The NPRDB had both positive enabling powers and negative controlling powers. The positive powers included financial resources to improve the rural infrastructure; for instance, to subsidise rural bus services and improve electricity, water and gas supplies. The board also hoped to fund other projects of benefit to the local economy such as caravan and camping sites (MAFF, 1967b, A23).

The main aim of the NPRDB was, however, to improve the region's farm structure by enlargement and rationalisation. In order to achieve this goal, the board was given the power to control all transfers of agricultural land [2]. All sales of agricultural land had to be notified to the board, who could then veto the transaction if they felt it would lead to the creation of an unviable holding. The board had limited powers of compulsory purchase, but it was hoped that an improvement in the farm structure could be obtained by voluntary co-operation rather than statutory coercion (MAFF, 1967b, A2). The board could, however, purchase land on the open market to form a land bank. The board also had negative controls over forestry. All applications to plant more than four hectares of forest had to be first approved by the board. The NPRDB's remit did not stretch to settlement planning, and the local authorities retained all their normal powers. Finally, the NPRDB had an advisory role. All members of the board were expected to be experts in land management and rural development and to have a good knowledge of the local area (MAFF, 1967b, A4).

In its first year of operation the NPRDB considered 129 land transfer applications, of which 69 resulted in farm amalgamations (an area of 1,214 hectares). Of the other 60 applications, 7 transfers were to forestry and the others concerned small amenity land parcels not of interest to the board. No application was refused (NPRDB, 1970, para 34). The board also issued licences to plant 1,937 hectares

of forest and envisaged further planting in future. Spread over such a wide area, the impact was, therefore, modest. Furthermore, the small size of the first year's budget limited the board's options to initiate infrastructural improvements.

There is a lack of information concerning local reaction to the NPRDB. The first annual report states that opposition had been encountered largely from outside amenity groups (NPRDB, 1970, para 25). The report emphasised that all decisions would be made with close consultation with other interested organisations, and that a balance would also be striven for:

"between the whole potential of the land and the number of human beings who depend upon it for a livelihood" but that "nothing in life stands still and the Board's views must reflect the harsh economic circumstances of life" (NPRDB, 1970, para 26).

Opposition to the NPRDB must have been great, however, for the NPRDB folded just one year after its creation. The official reason given for the decision was that the NPRDB was not cost effective and was a victim of the government's economy drive, but it is highly likely that local opposition was a major contributory factor. ^[2a] From the farming community, opposition focused on the board's powers of control over land transfers. This corroborates MacGregor's opinion (1988) that any measure which threatens private land rights will be blocked by private landowners (see 3.4.5).

In retrospect, farm enlargement would not have been a beneficial policy for the area. Even the NPRDB in its annual report expressed doubts about this policy; there were already fears about the future prosperity of hill farming, and most farmers did not possess the necessary capital to finance enlargement schemes. The social benefits of a diverse farm structure were recognised; smallholdings provided an opening into the industry for young farmers, whilst older farmers often had no wish to manage a commercial farm unit:

"what is needed is a variety, not only of size and of type, but also of age, skill and outlook in the members of a village or hamlet" (NPRDB, 1970, para 33).

Capstick (1979), in a retrospective evaluation of the NPRDB, criticises the board's emphasis on farm structure as a panacea for the economic problems of the North

Pennines. It would have been better to look at ways of developing ancillary rural enterprises and improving the basic infrastructure of the region. At the time, opposition to the NPRDB's policies also came from the environmental lobby. Environmentalists were particularly worried about the likely increase in afforestation. The board's decision to allow planting in Upper Langstrothdale in North Yorkshire was particularly controversial (Guardian, 19/1/71).

In the final analysis, the NPRDB seems to have aroused negative reactions from many different quarters. Farming and landowning interests opposed the board because it represented a threat to private land rights. Conservationists opposed it on landscape grounds, fearing an increase in afforestation. Neither of these fears were grounded on fact but on suspicion and fear of the future. In retrospect, the concept of farm enlargement as the solution to rural development problems has been criticised. Farm enlargement was perhaps not the most appropriate policy for the region.

There are some people, on the other hand, who feel that the NPRDB did achieve some positive developments; it subsidised four rural bus services (which subsequently had to close), and the board rejected more forestry planting schemes than it accepted (Guardian, 19/1/71). An integrated rural development board could have provided a valuable framework for other integrated initiatives (Quayle, 1985).

7.3 The Area Of Outstanding Natural Beauty

Five years after the NPRDB folded, a proposal was made to designate the North Pennines as an AONB (see 3.4.3). Twelve years later, the designation was finally confirmed after a long and emotional battle, culminating in a public enquiry. Although in policy terms the AONB has had minimal impact on the region, it has aroused greater local opposition than possibly any other policy, and has become endowed with great symbolic significance.

The proposal to designate the North Pennines as an AONB coincided with a major review by the Countryside Commission of the purpose of AONBs [3]. From the beginning, therefore, the purpose and implications of designation were issues of confusion, and, not surprisingly, aroused local suspicion. A preliminary map of the proposed North Pennines AONB was submitted to the Countryside Commission in

1975 and discussions were held with the local authorities concerned. The proposed area covered 2,304 square kilometres: from the Tyne Gap in the north to the edge of the Yorkshire Dales in the south, and from Hamsterley Forest in the west to the Vale of Eden in the east (DCC, 1977, para 2.1).

The local authorities gave their provisional support in 1976 and formal consultations commenced in 1977, but in 1978 proceedings were halted due to the national reappraisal of AONB policy. Following certain suggestions that were made in the AONB discussion document [4], Cumbria County Council and Eden, Carlisle, Teesdale and Weardale district councils all withdrew their support. The Countryside Commission then resubmitted the designation order in 1979 (this time excluding North Howgill and Mallerstang), but the Secretary of State decided to delay his decision until the national AONB review was completed.

The Countryside Commission published a new policy statement on AONBs in 1983, which clearly set out the implications and objectives of designation. The North Pennines designation process could then recommence. But the story was still not over, for although Cumbria County Council then gave its grudging approval, local opposition was such that a six week public enquiry was held in October 1985, the only case of a public enquiry being called over an AONB designation (DoE, 1985, 96). The enquiry finally decided in favour of the AONB (with further exclusions) and designation was confirmed in 1988.

Following the 1983 policy statement, what implications did AONB status pose for the North Pennines? The Countryside Commission claimed that the effects of designation in terms of added controls on land use were minimal, particularly since 1968 when many of the powers exercisable in AONBs were extended to the countryside at large. The Countryside Commission identified four benefits deriving from designation. First, designation would provide a label which could be marketed, if desired, to promote tourism. It created an identity for the area. Second, in cases of disputed land use, the AONB status could add weight to objections against obtrusive developments. Third, grants of up to 75% were available for conservation projects within the AONB (as opposed to 50% outside). Fourth, landowners within AONBs would be more likely to qualify for exemption from Capital Transfer Tax. [5].

As with the NPRDB, the AONB would not curtail the planning powers of the local authorities, although they would be expected to take account of the AONB when considering environmentally damaging development applications. However, since most AONBs crossed several local authority boundaries, the Countryside Commission suggested that the authorities in question set up joint advisory committees (JACs), or appoint an officer to co-ordinate policies within each AONB. The commission emphasised that no extra controls were to be placed on agricultural land use.

AONB designation can be classed as an 'anti-growth' policy (see Table 3.5), since it adds extra controls against environmentally damaging developments, and it can help to promote tourism, although there are no specific provisions made for this purpose.

How then did the AONB come to be such an emotive issue? At the public enquiry 20 groups/individuals gave evidence in support of the AONB, and 23 spoke against it [6]. Those in favour fell into two groups: the county councils and 'outsider' conservation/amenity groups. The opposition fell into five groups: the district and parish councils, public landowners, private landowners' lobby groups, mining interests and landed estates. A pronounced 'insider-outsider', private-public sector split was evident between the opposers and the supporters of the AONB. An analysis of the arguments put forward by each side at the enquiry suggests that ideology played a significant part in the opposition's evidence, so that it is necessary to distinguish the real motives underlying the ideological arguments [7]

Arguments put forward by the pro-AONB lobby basically covered four points. First, the area contained some habitats of outstanding ecological value which should be preserved in the national interest. Second, the conservation of the landscape would attract tourism and thereby create local jobs. There was no future in mining or agriculture. Third, the designation would bring perceptual advantages. By raising the profile of the North Pennines and creating an identity for it, the AONB would not only help the North Pennines but would have positive spin-offs for the surrounding areas. Finally, it should be designated because other areas of similar landscape quality had been.

The district and parish councils, which most closely represent the interests of the non-élite inhabitants of the North Pennines, argued for the opposition that the landscape of the North Pennines did not merit the label 'outstanding'. It was a working landscape created by the people of the dales. Wear Valley District Council felt that Weardale differed from other upland areas because of its industrial character:

'It was a one-off, a very unusual area' (Wear Valley District Council, 50).

A strong feeling of local autonomy and pride emerged, almost of stewardship:

'It was the people of the Dales who had cared for the area and who would care for it in future' (Teesdale Parish Council, 51).

The local community clearly valued their independence and resented the interference of an outside body. A strong ideology of community was apparent within the rural society of the North Pennines, based on a feeling of local uniqueness, historical tradition and belonging. Their loyalty to an industrial way of life, and hostility to the idea of tourism indicates a 'traditionalist' attitude to rural development. There was also criticism of the Countryside Commission for allowing the local inhabitants no say in the decision-making process.

The three public landowners giving evidence (the Forestry Commission, the MoD and the NCB) argued that their activities were in the national interest, but made no reference to the local interest. Neither did they oppose the principle of an AONB. To paraphrase their opinion:

'we don't care what you do to the area as long as you leave us alone'.

The MoD and NCB both requested modifications of the AONB boundary to exclude their sites [8]. The evidence given by these agencies throws no light on the nature of the local society, although it does reinforce the observation made earlier (see 6.4) that public landowners, with the possible exception of the Forestry Commission, are not concerned with rural development. It also illustrates the fundamental conflict within the public policy community between development and conservation.

Interorganisational conflict was also apparent in the evident antagonism between

the Forestry Commission and the Countryside Commission over the AONB. When the AONB boundaries were drawn Hamsterley Forest was pointedly excluded. This conflict perhaps explains why the Forestry Commission opposed the AONB. The AONB designation would give the Countryside Commission greater powers over forestry planting, since any plan to plant more than ten hectares in an AONB would first have to be approved by the Countryside Commission. The Forestry Commission in its evidence even suggested that the North Pennines should be regarded as a control area, with which to compare other designated uplands.

Neither does the evidence of the landowners' lobby groups throw any light on the nature of local society. However, the NFU, CLA and Timber Growers UK showed their support for their members' interests and a fundamental antagonism to the Countryside Commission. The NFU attacked the Countryside Commission directly. They implied that the commission were a bunch of audacious amateurs to believe that they knew better than local professional landowners and farmers, who had managed their lands for generations. The Countryside Commission's evidence was not scientific:

'The Commission's case, based on subjective opinion by people who were not experts, was totally inadequate' (NFU, 53).

They also attacked the Countryside Commission for being 'outsiders':

'The idea of a Commission in Cheltenham with an outpost in Newcastle telling the locals what to do, with the implication being that outsiders know better than the locals, was totally objectionable' (NFU, 57).

The AONB was seen as a totally negative measure. The region needed positive support rather than negative controls, and the lobby groups feared that the AONB might be a stepping stone to more stringent negative controls in the future. The Countryside Commission had failed to assuage people's fears.

Four mining companies gave evidence for the opposition: Blue Circle, Weardale Minerals, Fordamin and the National Association of Licensed Opencast Operators. They argued that it was in both the national and the local interest to oppose any further restrictions on mining activity. The mining companies provided valuable resources for the nation's industrial needs, and much needed local employment.

Like the district and parish councils, the mining companies pointed out that the distinctive Pennine landscape had been created by mining activity in the past, and was a working landscape. The close links between farming and mining were also emphasised. The National Association of Licensed Opencast Operators even went as far as to use an ideology of stewardship, claiming to have been:

‘good housekeepers over generations’ (74).

Noticeably, the mining companies did not mention self-interest as a factor in their opposition to the AONB, although this was undoubtedly the principal factor.

Last but by no means least, three landed estates gave evidence for the opposition: Allendale, Raby and Strathmore [9]. All three used ideologies of paternalism, stewardship and community in their arguments; they had looked after the land for generations and knew what was best for the area. They claimed that all sectors of the community were unified in their opposition to the AONB. Raby estates claimed that the AONB would:

‘change everything that local customs, people and nature had achieved over so long a period’ (Raby Estate, 77).

The Allendale estate showed the greater importance it attached to its mineral resources, by supporting the mining companies in their opposition to the greater controls which the AONB would entail. The Raby and Strathmore estates picked up on the questions of public access, and the damage that increased tourism might inflict on the local economy, or rather on the grouse shooting.

Self-interest was not a factor mentioned by any of the three landed estates that gave evidence, although like the mining companies, it was unquestionably the main factor in their opposition. The real motives of the estates in opposing the AONB may be inferred from the evidence presented in the previous chapter (see 6.2.6). The Allendale estate has the greatest commitment to mining, and would also like to expand its forestry resource. Both of these actions would be constrained by the AONB. All the estates are opposed to tourism and public access, issues which are both supported by the Countryside Commission. A further significant factor in their opposition is, undoubtedly, that they do not wish to be answerable to a

public agency, and value their independence. The AONB would increase the local power of the conservation lobby.

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the AONB became such a highly charged issue, not because of its actual implications for the region, but because it sparked off deep-seated conflicts of interest at local and national level. First, with the possible exception of the Forestry Commission, no local élite group in the North Pennines favours tourism, and all are, therefore, antagonistic to any measure likely to promote it. Tourism and the traditional North Pennine industries of mining and quarrying are mutually exclusive activities, and the latter is the locally preferred option, even though prospects for the mining industry are bleak. The inhabitants of the North Pennines are 'traditionalists' whilst the Countryside Commission epitomises the 'conservationist' attitude to rural development.

This fundamental antagonism over rural development is also seen in the relations between MAFF and the Countryside Commission. The AONB controversy is an illustration of the power struggle between these two organisations (see 2.6.2). The mining companies, farmers and landed estates, on the other hand, opposed the AONB out of self-interest. Their freedom of decision-making would be constrained by environmental controls. Despite the differing motives, all classes in the North Pennines could present a unified front in their opposition to the AONB.

Extrapolating further from this analysis, it should be asked why there does not appear to be any articulated conflict within the society of the North Pennines, since the potential for conflict undoubtedly exists. For instance, employment in mining is highly uncertain, and it was shown in the previous chapter that there are several sources of conflict between the tenant farmers and estate owners. Internal differences of interest are hidden by the ideology of community engendered by external threats to the existing order. The absence of any vocal 'immigrant' middle class to challenge the local élite has helped to preserve this ideology of community, which can easily be exploited by the estates and mining companies when the need arises. The power of the landed estates, and to a lesser extent the mining companies, in the local society is shown by the way the local inhabitants identify themselves with the estates and allow their interests to be defined by them.

The Countryside Commission picked up on some of these points in its reply to the objectors:

"The Commission did not judge that any objector had gone beyond identifying a potential prejudice to his own interests" (92).

They also blamed:

"those who gave a lead to public opinion in the Area" (88)

for swaying majority opinion in Teesdale and Weardale.

The Countryside Commission was also at fault for the way it handled the designation process. Had the commission involved the local inhabitants in the designation process from the beginning and been less antagonistic to local interests, they might have had a better reception. The Countryside Commission appears to have a fundamental dislike of the farming community. Trying to persuade farmers to accept a policy has been likened to trying to turn the Queen Mary in a 10 mile stretch of water (Respondent L).

The inspector at the enquiry also recognised the 'paradox' of the AONB; the fact that its actual significance was minimal in comparison to its perceived importance. He laid the blame partly on the Countryside Commission, who had a lot of *"fence-building"* (116) to do in order to restore public confidence, and partly on the intangible nature of the AONB which made it such an emotional issue. He concluded that the fears of the opposition were exaggerated and largely unfounded, and that the benefits of the AONB would outweigh the disadvantages.

7.4 The Common Land Forum

An issue which follows on from some of the points raised in the discussion of the AONB, and which is closely related to the analysis of common land in Chapter Six, is the proposal of the Common Land Forum (CLF) to pass legislation allowing general public access to all common land. It is a national measure, but opposition to it has been strongest in the North Pennines, so much so that the landowners of the North Pennines have formed a lobby group to fight the proposals. Why are the North Pennine landowners isolated in their opposition to the CLF and what arguments do they employ against it?

The CLF is the last stage in the reform of the management and use of common lands initiated by the Royal Commission in 1958 (see 2.4.5 and 6.3.1). It is not a development initiative as such, but a statutory measure which will curtail private land rights in favour of the public interest. The CLF was set up in 1984 by the Countryside Commission, but many different interest groups were represented on the forum, including the NFU and the CLA [10]. The forum made two proposals which it is hoped to pass into legislation. The first proposal is that management associations be set up for every common to represent public and private interests, so that the public can have a voice in the management of each common. The second proposal is to allow unrestricted public access to all commons for the purpose of quiet enjoyment [11].

Not surprisingly, it is the proposal to give the general public a statutory right to walk freely on all commons that has roused the opposition of both grouse shooting and farming interests in the North Pennines. It was observed in Chapter Six that the recent profitability of grouse shooting has greatly increased the economic value of common lands in the region. Many owners of shooting rights have invested a large amount of capital in improving the moors, and fear that if the public gained access they could destroy the prosperity of grouse shooting.

Why did the CLA and NFU, who in the case of the AONB wholeheartedly supported their members' interests, fail to lend their support in this case? There are two related reasons, claim the Moorlanders Association. First, representation on the forum was biased towards southern interests; the members of the CLA who took part in the forum were all from the south. Second, the forum did not understand that the northern commons differ from the commons found in south and lowland England. Whereas commons in southern England and many other upland areas have lost their economic function, in the North Pennines the commons are still actively used and fulfil an important economic function in the local economy.

In 1986, a lobby group called the Moorlanders Association was formed to fight the CLF. Its members own 163 moorland commons, mainly in the North Pennines, North Yorkshire and Northumberland, covering over 250,000 hectares of the estimated 291,666 hectares of heather moorland still remaining in England and Wales. These commons also support 1,248 farmers who have common rights. In 1987, the

Moorlanders Association produced a statement setting out their arguments against the proposal for public access [12]. They employ three lines of argument against the CLF's proposal to allow general public access: factual, ideological and practical.

The factual argument concerns the management of the commons in the North Pennines which has already been described (see 6.3.2). Public access, the moorlanders argue, would upset the delicate balance between sheep, grouse, and other wildlife species to the detriment of all three. The heather moors are a valuable but threatened ecological resource. Private landowners have the capital to invest in their upkeep, but only whilst they have confidence in the land (para F3). The quality of moorland has deteriorated rapidly in areas where unlimited public access has been allowed, such as the Peak District, so that the northern moors are the last haven for grouse south of the Scottish border (para G8) [13]. The Moorlanders Association also claim that the CLF has misinterpreted the intentions of the Royal Commission of 1958. The commission never intended that all commons be treated in the same way [14].

The report also adopts an ideological argument, claiming that the national interest is best served by **excluding** the public from the commons, since where conservation and public access conflict conservation should be given priority (para G10). The report goes on to argue that grouse shooting benefits the local economy, both directly through the employment it provides, and indirectly through visitor-spending. Table 7.4 shows the association's estimate of the money generated by grouse shooting in the local economy in 1986.

Conservative Party interests are appealed to when the Moorlanders Association imply that the proposal for public access is a 'socialist conspiracy' which will eventually lead to calls for unlimited public access to all unenclosed land (para C9) [15]. This again displays the strength of opposition to, and fear of, any move which might curtail private land rights. The Moorlanders Association is lobbying hard to win its battle before the next general election, whilst a conservative government is still in power (Respondent M).

Finally, the Moorlanders Association states the practical objections to public access (which were discussed in section 6.3.3). They point out that public access might involve considerable public expense if, as the CLF suggest, landowners receive

Table 7.4 — Estimated Capital Generated by Grouse Shooting, 1986

Expenditure	Amount (£)
Hotels	340,000
Catering	51,000
Shops	53,000
Restaurants	15,000
Domestic Help	63,000
Car Hire	23,000
Temporary Employees	240,000
Other	712,000
TOTAL	1,497,000

Source: Moorlanders Association (1986, 35)

compensation for any economic loss incurred by public access. The moorlanders have estimated that land values could fall by £300 per hectare on the best moors, and £108 on the poorer ones. The total cost of compensation could run into £ millions. In addition, there would be costs of fencing and the administration of wardening to be born by the local authorities.

The arguments of the Moorlanders Association conform in many respects to the lobbying tactics identified in earlier sections of the thesis. For instance, the Moorlanders adopt the exclusive interpretation of conservation (noted in 2.6.2) by claiming that the national interest is best served by excluding the public from the grouse moors. In addition, the Moorlanders demand the right to compensation (see 3.4.3) in the event of the public gaining a right of access, and stand to receive a substantial sum of money if the proposal goes ahead.

Despite the fact that some of the arguments are ideological covers for self-interest, they raise some important issues. There would appear to be a valid case for distinguishing between commons which are under- or mis-used, and those which fulfil an important economic function. Should common land be treated as a blanket

issue, when in reality it is such a varied resource? It is interesting that, as with the AONB enquiry, the controversy takes the form of an 'insider-outsider' division. This time, however, the 'outsider' group includes members of the moorlanders' own landowning lobby groups. This could be an indication that, with the growing pressure on the agricultural lobby to embrace environmental goals, the CLA is prepared to make concessions to the environmental lobby on an issue that, in national terms, is of minor significance.

The Moorlanders Association does suggest an alternative strategy to improve public access to the commons. They are not opposed to public access on well defined footpaths and suggest that a footpath network be established (para I.2). This need not necessarily follow existing rights of way, as many of these are neither necessarily scenic nor circular. New paths can be established. They also point out that the public interest in the future of commons will be adequately represented by the management committees, to ensure a fair deal for ramblers.

7.5 The Local Authorities

7.5.1 The County Councils: Durham

As early as 1947, the importance of recreation in the Durham Dales was recognised (DCC, 1947), although it was expected that the main demand would be from day-trippers from the urban areas of County Durham. There was not thought to be a future in mining. In the late 1950s, the Durham Dales were designated by the county council as an Area of Great Landscape Value, but no separate policy was formulated for the area. Durham County Council still adhered to a traditional attitude to rural development.

During the AONB designation controversy, the three county councils with planning authority for the North Pennines underwent a change in their attitude to the region. In 1976, Durham County Council first proposed the necessity for a separate policy to tackle the problems of the dales (DCC, 1976). Whilst the overall population of the county was static, an internal redistribution of the population was taking place, with migration from the west to the centre. A policy was needed to combat depopulation in the dales by providing more jobs. The council realised that such a policy would face the dilemma between conservation and development.

Should tourism and recreation be promoted, or jobs that might involve negative consequences for the environment?

The change of attitude in the part of the county councils was undoubtedly a factor in the ultimate success of the AONB. Why did this change of heart come about, and what is Durham County Council's policy for the Durham Dales? It is attributed to both 'push' and 'pull' factors. The 'upland debate' had come onto the national agenda, so that the political climate favoured upland initiatives. With constant pressure from the Forestry Commission for further afforestation on the one hand, and opposition from conservationists on the other, Durham County Council recognised the need for a co-ordinated land use policy. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries of the county also pressurised the council to look for alternative development policy approaches.

At the same time, changing social trends made tourism a more promising prospect. In the 1960s, tourist traffic consisted of local day-trippers, and caravaners and campers in the summer holidays. Today, visitors come from further afield and stay overnight. The tourist season has lengthened as people pursue all-weather activities. As well as the planners in County Hall, the Council employs a countryside ranger for the dales who lives locally and can act as an intermediary between the local residents and the planners. The present ranger comes from a local farming background and has lived in the area for over 15 years. He claims that his job has changed "*out of all recognition*" over the 15 years he has held it (Respondent N).

In 1984, Durham County Council held a seminar on the future of the Durham Dales at which the opinions of many land use interest groups were aired [16]. The aim was to stimulate discussion about future policy for the area. Leading on from this the *Durham Dales Report* was published in 1986, setting out Durham County Council's policy for the area until 1996. The document assesses the likely contributions of different economic sectors to future employment creation, and sets down all the various agencies which have an interest in different land uses. The emphasis of the document is on moving away from the reliance on the traditional primary industries of farming and mining, to small scale manufacturing and tourist developments, promoting policies which correspond with the aims of the AONB. The orientation of the policy is towards achieving growth which is sensitive to

the environment. In the same year (1986), Durham County Council launched the *Land of the Prince Bishops*' campaign to promote tourism in the whole of County Durham, thereby strengthening its commitment to the development of tourism.

Durham County Council believes that the dales people have a different perception of their environment to outsiders. Whilst the latter tends to be idealised and aesthetic, the former is strictly utilitarian. For instance, the CEGB have proposed building a wind farm which will cover 208 hectares on Stainmore Common. At a meeting between the CEGB and the local inhabitants, the local MP stood up to say how privileged they felt that this site had been chosen [17]. The opening of the Blue Circle cement works at Eastgate was also welcomed by the residents.

The council certainly recognises the influence of the estates on the area's development. The powers of the county council planners are constrained by the dominance of the Raby estate in Teesdale. It adds an "*extra dimension*" to planning (Respondent N). The way the estates are run is medieval, and they are only just being dragged into the 20th century (*ibid.*). It is noticeable, for instance, that all the caravan and camping sites are located in Weardale rather than Teesdale.

The three county councils are also involved in the Rural Development Programme, an integrated socio-economic project promoted by the Rural Development Commission (see 3.4.4). There are three Rural Development Programmes running within the North Pennines RDA, each administered by the respective county council. The aims of the RDP are to achieve growth which does not detract from, or even enhances the physical and social environment. Although the Durham RDP has only been running since 1985, it has already achieved developments in workshop provision, transport services, community services and community training schemes [18].

The Rural Development Programme is a national policy which is formulated and implemented at regional level. Because of this tiered approach, each programme can be tailored to local needs. Because so many local agencies are involved in formulating policy in each RDA [19], it has enabled a higher degree of co-operation than could otherwise be achieved. Although most of the projects are very small in scale they can be seen as positive developments. The success of the RDPs can be largely attributed to these factors. The programme is, of course, primarily

concerned with rural settlements rather than agricultural or afforested land, so that it does not affect the interests of farmers and landowners, another likely explanation for its success.

7.5.2 The District Councils: Wear Valley

Wear Valley District Council has undergone an even more dramatic change of policy direction than Durham County Council. In 1967, the then Weardale Rural District Council predicted that tourism would be a growth sector of the local economy, and that mining and manufacturing industries were on the decline (Weardale Rural District Council, 1967). Until recently, however, its approach to planning was traditional. In 1986, the council put forward a proposal to build the world's largest dry ski slope in Weardale as part of an Alpine village, together with hotels, an ice rink, golf course and other leisure facilities. Although the site will only cover 17 hectares, the ideas and capital involved in the project are big. The estimated cost of the project is £30 million, but part of this will be met by private investors as the council plans to hand the project over to private developers once the groundwork has been prepared.

A change in policy direction has, to some extent, been forced on Wear Valley District Council by the decline of mining and other traditional industries in the area, but the council has also taken active steps to change its image. Visible symbols of change are the new council buildings which are modern and open-plan. In 1986, a new Department of Leisure was created, and in May 1988 this was merged with the Planning Department to form a Department of Leisure and Economic Development. This department now controls one third of the total council budget. The Alpine village project itself is attributable to one individual within this department. His philosophy is that leisure is not only a growth industry, it is also a new way of life. People benefit from sport both mentally and physically, and widening access to sport is a genuine way to improve the society and economy of Weardale. Under his direction, Wear Valley District council built a dry ski slope at the leisure centre in Spennymoor which has proved to be a popular attraction for both local residents and visitors.

Whilst the proposed alpine ski resort aims for international recognition, it is also planned to be available for local use. There are many logistical and political

problems which must be overcome if the ski resort is to go ahead. First, there is the problem of finding a suitable location. The original idea was to locate the village at Rookhope at the top of Weardale. This site had to be abandoned because it included some common land, and it would have taken at least two years to get the land deregistered. Indeed, the extent of common land in Weardale has constrained the choice of locations. The council is now looking at sites lower down the dale, preferably where they need negotiate with only one or two landowners. They would prefer to buy the land outright if possible. The weather is also a locational factor. At the lower end of Weardale snow cover is less predictable, but at the top of the dale the harsh conditions would deter many visitors.

Local reaction to the proposal has been reported to be mixed, with those under forty supporting the scheme, those between forty and fifty undecided and those over fifty opposing it (Respondent O). Certainly, other organisations, including Durham County Council and the Countryside Commission, have been vocal in their opposition to the scheme. The initiator of the project does not hide his exasperation with planners. Planners are by nature controllers. In his view, tourism and planning are totally incompatible activities, and he believes that development should take precedence over conservation. Tourism must be visionary. In the same vein, he says he will not wait for Durham County Council to provide the necessary infrastructure, but expects that they will follow once the scheme is completed. It is still undecided whether or not the project will go ahead.

7.5.3 Summary

The development of the North Pennines in the last 20 years has been characterised by controversy. The two main sticking points seem to have been, firstly, that policies have been too ambitious; the scale of the policies has been too large, and they have tried unsuccessfully to integrate too many groups. Secondly, integrated packages have been wrongly marketed. They have been perceived as being too negative.

This analysis has clearly shown that the society of the North Pennines is traditional. It is dominated by a powerful local élite of landowning and mining interests, but 'traditionalists' would appear to be becoming increasingly isolated and are now fighting a losing battle against conservationists. Part of the problem has been that

there is not just an insider-outsider split, but that 'outsiders' have been divided. The final section will look at some alternative development initiatives which might point to a way ahead for future policies.

7.6 Small Scale Policy Initiatives

This final section will look at three recent development initiatives in the North Pennines which differ from those previously discussed in scale, aim and implementation. New approaches to rural development are ever emerging in a constantly changing political climate, and these three schemes illustrate some contemporary alternatives. Two of the examples, the East Cumbria Countryside Project and the Allenheads Village Trust, are local level initiatives, whilst the Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) scheme is run by MAFF.

7.6.1 The East Cumbria Countryside Project

The East Cumbria Countryside Project (ECCP) took over from an earlier scheme (the East Fellside and Alston Moor Project) and has been running since 1985. The ECCP is funded mainly by the Countryside Commission, but is also supported by Eden and Carlisle district councils. The aim of the ECCP is to enhance the environment, and public enjoyment of it, through co-operation with landowners and the public. More specifically, its work can be divided into five areas. First, the project can offer advice. The project employs a woodlands and countryside officer to advise farmers on tree planting schemes. Second, the project promotes public access. It has already opened up several circular footpath walks with accompanying interpretive guides, using MSC Community Programme labour to improve the footpaths. In order to create a footpath network, the project has managed to negotiate permissive access routes with farmers [20]. The walks are geared primarily to local users, although it is also hoped to attract visitors away from the more crowded Lake District. Third, the project promotes the local area and runs a series of guided walks using local volunteers. At present forty volunteers participate. Fourth, the ECCP organises special events for educational purposes such as farm open days. These are intended mainly for school parties. Fifth, the project plans to develop a data base on the area, which can be used to devise a management plan. This part of the work is more experimental and exploratory.

The ECCP has modest aims and resources. Its projects are low key and its organisers invite local input and ideas. Carlisle District Council initially opposed the ECCP, but due to the project's success it now enjoys general backing and has been promised funding for another five years. The project organiser believes that the small scale of the scheme is the reason for its success. The staff have made an effort to build good working relations with local residents and to establish trust. Continuity of staff is extremely important in this respect. The project has also been small enough to avoid the constraints of institutionalism. It can exercise flexibility in its relations with external organisations. For instance, when talking to local authorities the project can stress the local benefit of a scheme, but when talking to national agencies national benefits are emphasised.

The ECCP liaises with a committee of the local authorities (which avoids most of the bureaucratic red tape), and periodically holds a land management advisory panel, to which landowning interests are invited. The meetings are always controversial, but it seems that the project enjoys the support of most of the groups attending.

7.6.2 The Allenheads Village Trust

A problem encountered by many public agencies has been the difficulty of involving the local community in the development process (Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 186). The project to revitalise the village of Allenheads (which was referred to in the previous chapter in the consideration of the Allendale estate), is a true community initiative and the only scheme of its kind in the country. It is important, therefore, to examine how the community was activated on this occasion, and to see how the scheme was formulated and implemented.

The idea for the project originated in 1985 following a series of articles in the Sunday Times about the decline of upland Britain, which used Allenheads as:

"a classic example of a village that was absolutely dying on its feet" (Respondent P).

This stirred the population of Allenheads into action and a village meeting was held, at which it was decided to carry out a village appraisal. A questionnaire was

sent out to all village residents and the results were analysed and presented as a report: *Allenheads - the way ahead*.

A village trust was set up to raise money and administer the project, and eventually it is hoped that the trust will be self-supporting. The three basic aims of the project are; to create employment, provide new housing and improve village services. The project has depended on advice and financial support from outside agencies. Once a plan had been formulated, outside agencies were invited to a presentation evening. This stage depended on being able to communicate with these agencies and to sell the idea as a commercial proposition. The organisers succeeded, and the project received widespread support and national publicity (including a well publicised visit from Prince Charles).

The first stage of the project was to renovate three old barns in the village centre for productive use. One of these was donated to the trust by the Allendale estate. Using MSC Community Programme labour, one barn was converted to house a new village shop and post office at one end, with a community/conference centre upstairs, and a holiday cottage at the other end. Another barn was converted into workshops, and the third into a café and workshop. Rentals from the workshops and holiday cottage will provide revenue to finance other developments. This stage is now almost completed. In addition, a new barn is being built to house one of the first electricity generators (made in 1846) which has been donated to the trust by Lord Armstrong [21]. This should be an additional tourist attraction. The second stage of the project is now about to begin. It is planned to build ten new retirement homes.

Due to the tremendous publicity received, the project has had positive spin-offs for other local businesses such as the village pub through increased numbers of visitors. The project's organisers have, however, had to overcome many difficulties along the way, and their experience indicates why more such schemes are not initiated. Firstly, skill, knowledge and energy are required in the fund-raising stage. It is essential to know how to:

"work the system" and "talk to them (the agencies) in the language they understand" (Respondent P).

The success of the project has depended upon having key individuals with relevant experience of business and finance in the community. The local authorities and government agencies will only ever fund up to 50% of any project, and need much convincing that a project is worthwhile. Private organisations (such as Business ~~in~~ and the Community) have:

“stacks of influence, loads of contacts” (Respondent P)

if they are on your side. The biggest problem that the trust has faced has been the ending of the MSC Community Programme in 1988. The replacement Employment Training Scheme does not provide enough funds to attract or train a voluntary workforce. The project has had to raise an extra £40,000 as a result and thinks that it now would not be possible to start such another scheme (presumably, the East Cumbria Countryside Project has also faced similar problems of manpower since the ending of the community programme).

The other main obstacle to the scheme has come from local residents. Opposition is inevitable:

“you’ve got to learn to live with it” (Respondent P).

One individual went round the village with a petition against the new houses. The trust decided to hold a referendum which it won. The project’s organisers defend themselves against critics by emphasising that they are local people doing voluntary work. They stress that the trust is a non-profit making institution.

The Allendale estate, which owns all the properties in Allenheads village, has supported the scheme passively rather than actively (although it did donate a barn to the project and has rented land and buildings in the village centre to the trust at a nominal rent). The land agent for the Allendale estate rather patronisingly referred to the project as a *“valiant effort”*, adding that he would not put his own money in it (Respondent M). However, the project has appreciated having to deal with only one landowner.

7.6.3 The Environmentally Sensitive Areas Scheme

The final policy to be considered returns to the national level, but displays some important differences to other national policies which have been considered in this

chapter. The ESA scheme is, in fact, a policy devised by the EEC but administered at national level and implemented at regional level (see 3.4.4). Like the RDA scheme, ESA policies may be tailored to meet the specific needs of each area. Only a small part of the North Pennines has been designated as an ESA, so that its impact is limited, but the main significance of the scheme lies in the fact that the policy has been devised jointly by MAFF, the Countryside Commission and the Nature Conservancy Council and has won the approval of farming and conservation interests. It is administered by MAFF and represents a dramatic new departure for this agency.

There are, in fact, five Pennine dales within the ESA: Dent Dale (Cumbria), Wharfedale, Langstrothdale, Waldendale and Swaledale (North Yorks), Teesdale and Weardale (County Durham), but only the latter two are in the AONB (see Map 3.5). Together, they cover 7,500 hectares. In 1987, 200 farmers in the Pennine dales ESA joined the scheme (*Farmers Weekly*, 1/1/1988). The valued features of the Pennine ESA are the species-rich hay meadows and the traditional stone barns and stone walls. Farmers who join the scheme are limited in applications of fertiliser, lime, herbicide and pesticide on their meadow land. Cutting dates for hay and silage are stipulated, to allow for flowers to pollinate (in Teesdale and Weardale it is July 15th). In return, farmers receive at present £96 per hectare compensation payment (to be reviewed in 1990). They are also entitled to grants for the upkeep of stone barns and walls.

For the farmers, membership of the scheme means that their productivity drops, so that to maintain the same number of livestock it is necessary to buy in extra silage. At first, uptake was limited to farmers in the upper dales who did not feel they would lose out financially. Farmers on better quality land lower down the dale still felt they could make more by continuing to farm intensively. Uptake was higher in Teesdale than Weardale, a fact attributed to the higher percentage of tenant farmers in the former who were, perhaps, more prepared to adopt a less capital intensive farming system. Tenant farmers may apply for the scheme but are required to inform their landlord of the action. Landlord and tenant may also enter jointly.

The scheme, not surprisingly, attracted initial suspicion, and there was opposi-

tion to the lateness of the cutting date. However, farmers have come round to the idea; so much so indeed that farmers outside the ESA complain about their exclusion (Respondent H). It has been described as the jewel in the government's crown (Bell, 1989). The success of the ESA scheme has been attributed to three factors. Firstly, it is price affordable to the government. Secondly, it is acceptable to farmers because it is voluntary, and thirdly, it allows them to carry on farming (as opposed to the set aside policy). It also releases participants from the 'technological treadmill' (see 3.4.1) and may fit the traditional view of farming many small farmers held but were afraid to express (Bell, 1989). Undoubtedly, external events have been the major factor behind the success of the scheme. Recent events in farming policy, such as the imposition of milk quotas in 1984, have seriously undermined the confidence of the farming community in a growth-orientated agricultural policy (Respondent N)

7.7 The Politics of Development: conclusion

This discussion has considered many different development issues and policies. What conclusions can be drawn about the nature of rural society in the North Pennines and the interaction of local and national interests in the region? What degree of success have policies achieved to date, and what hope is there for future improvement?

The experience of the NPRDB, the AONB and the CLF reveal several points about the rural class structure of the region. The society of the North Pennines is dominated by a landed élite whose power is strengthened by an alliance with mining and farming interests. There is no 'immigrant' property owning middle class to challenge their interests. Although there are several potential conflicts of interest between the workforce and the élite groups, these conflicts are subordinated to the 'external threat' from outside public intervention measures. The local élite has fostered an ideology of community to which the workforce readily subscribe. Any issue which threatens the interests of the local élite may be turned into an 'insider outsider' split.

What are the interests of the local élite? They are to protect the autonomy of their control over their estates and to protect their income sources. Since mining

and forestry are important estate resources, the landowners tend to be more pro-growth than the outside agencies. Conflict has emerged in the North Pennines because of the growing power of the national conservation lobby in recent years. The fact that the North Pennines was not designated as a national park or AONB in the 1950s perhaps intensifies the conflict today. The landowners have had more time to develop income sources based on exclusive land control.

Associated with the conservation lobby is the issue of tourism, which is seen by outsiders as a future growth area. The question of public access poses a direct threat to the hegemony of private land rights and is a particular threat to the grouse-shooting interest. It is significant that in respect to common land the CLA have abandoned their members' interests in the North Pennines in order to make concessions to the conservation lobby.

Any policy, therefore, which threatens to constrain land use, or to challenge the exclusiveness of private land rights, will be opposed by the landed élite, who are not afraid to resort to using ideological arguments to justify their position. On the other hand, policies which do not threaten these interests, including rural settlement planning, have met with relatively little opposition. Conflict in this area is more likely to result from interorganisational disagreement than from public-private differences.

Of all the agencies concerned in the development of the North Pennines, the Countryside Commission has the worst relations with both the local élite and other public agencies. This agency advocates conservation and tourism, issues which are anathema to the 'traditionists'. The also somewhat undefined position of the Countryside Commission within the policy community poses a threat to other organisations.

Today, the North Pennines certainly does not lack for public policies. It has been described as a classic case of 'initiatives' (Respondent Q). Its a case of having so many agencies that they need to be co-ordinated and then the co-ordinators have to be co-ordinated. In the final evaluation, it is necessary to ask the question: have all or any of these initiatives actually resulted in improvements in the standard of living of the resident population? This same question was asked by Alec McNicol of CoSIRA (DCC, 1984, 26):

"The Development Commission has been responsible for a policy of increasing the number of employment potentials in the rural areas for about 75 years and with CoSIRA and other agencies, a considerable effort has been mounted and yet here we are today".

There is no simple answer. Firstly, most policies have been blocked by opposition interests, either from the local community or from other organisations. Certainly the local élite has played a significant role in fighting to protect its economic interests, and has had a considerable degree of success. Secondly, what is thought of as development at any one time may be regretted later on. With a constantly changing political and economic climate, it is impossible to plan for the long term or make any certain predictions.

The solution to rural development problems can be interpreted in different ways (see 3.4.5). Taking a pragmatic approach, it would seem that for any scheme to have success, the support and co-operation of the local élite is needed. Indeed, the local élite possess financial resources which, if channelled in the right direction, could enable substantial positive developments to take place. It would appear that two approaches could usefully be adopted in future development initiatives. First, small scale policies using personal contact, such as the East Cumbria Countryside Project and the Allenheads Village Trust, can achieve far more than any number of planners sitting in offices (Respondent N). Development must be 'on the spot'. Second, policies must be seen to be positive and to come from within the system rather than be imposed from the outside. The ESA and RDP schemes would appear to offer a real chance of positive development.

Planners and agencies should not necessarily be constrained by conventional approaches to development and, whilst the Alpine Village Project may not be feasible, schemes of this sort should not be dismissed out of hand. Finally, the greater degree of success which recent schemes appear to have achieved could also be due to a change of heart amongst the local élite:

"With a changing agricultural climate affecting the fortunes of the great North Pennine estates, there are signs of change in the attitudes of local decision-makers and landowners towards traditional types of development" (Quayle, 1986).

Notes

1. The CPRE stated at the AONB Public Enquiry that, in their opinion:

“had it not been for the fact that the North Pennines were being actively considered as a National Park, the area would have become an AONB long ago” (34).

2. The NPRDB’s powers over land transfers did not extend to dwelling houses and gardens, public bodies, transfers within the family or transfers under the terms of a settlement (MAFF, 1967a).
3. Countryside Commission (1978) *Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty: a discussion paper*.
4. The inspector at the Public Enquiry referred to the following examples (106):
 - that management plans for AONBs should be comparable to National Park plans.
 - That agricultural notification procedures already established for National Parks should be extended to AONBs.
 - References to public access.
5. Tax relief is available to landowners whose land is considered to be of outstanding scenic interest. In making the decision, the Inland Revenue relies on the advice of the Countryside Commission. Participating landowners must enter into a management scheme.
6. Those supporting the AONB included: Durham, Northumberland and Cumbria County councils, Derwentside District Council, Northumbria Tourist Board, Ramblers’ Association, Durham County Conservation Trust, Northumberland Wildlife Trust, Open Spaces Society, CPRE, British Mountaineering Council, YHA, Derwent Valley Protection Society, Friends of the Lake District, Cumbria Trust for Nature Conservation, Wear Valley and District Trades Union Council and three individuals. Those giving evidence against the AONB included: Eden, Teesdale and Wear Valley District Councils, Stanhope and Teesdale Parish Councils, MoD, NFU, CLA and Timber Growers UK, Forestry Commission, Institute of Chartered Forestry, National Coal Board, Blue Circle Industries, Weardale Minerals, Fordamin, National Association of Licensed Opencast Operators, Allendale Settled Estates, Raby & Marwood Settled Estates, Strathmore Estates, Bowes Moor and five individuals.
7. The following information comes from the AONB Public Enquiry (page numbers are given after quotes).
8. In the final designation Battle Hill and Bowes Moor MoD sites were excluded, as was Weardale east of the western boundary of the Eastgate cement works.

9. The Strathmore estates spoke on behalf of several other owners of grouse moors in the region including; Sir J. Nickerson (Stublick Moor), Mr H.C. Torbuck, Rotherhope Moor, The John Brazil Trust, Broadland Properties Ltd (mineral and shooting interests), Mr R.N. Burton (Bracken Bank Lodge Ltd, Burnhope Moor), and J.P. Hall (Cotherstone High and Low Moors).
10. The following organisations were represented on the forum: Association of County Councils, Association of District Councils, Association of Metropolitan Authorities, British Horse Society and Byways and Bridleways Trust, Council for National Parks, Council for British Archaeology, Council for the Preservation of Rural England, Council for the Protection of Rural Wales, Country Landowners Association, Countryside Commission, Crown Estate Commissioners, Dartmoor National Park Officer, National Association of Local Councils, National Farmer's Union, Nature Conservancy Council, National Trust, Open Spaces Society, Ramblers' Association, Sports Council, Association of Welsh Commoners.
11. The forum avoided the phrase "*a universal right of public access* because it was too permissive (Aitchison, 1987). "*A right of access to persons on foot for the purpose of quiet enjoyment* was a more cautious choice of wording.
12. Moorlanders Association (1987) *Proposals for further legislation on common land*. Lancaster.
13. The Moorlanders Association claims that the Peak District moors used to produce the most concentrated grouse population in England (over 640 birds per 1000 acres in the 1930s), but today the average is only 250 (G8).
14. The Moorlanders Association quote the following passage from the report to show that the royal commission intended that commons should be treated differently:

"Some finding their place in the agricultural economy of the country, some serving for forestry, and some providing recreational facilities, and that schemes of management would need to be prepared for each according to their peculiar needs"
15. The Ramblers Association and the Open Spaces Society are campaigning for general public access to all open spaces. In 1988, the Durham Ramblers Association organised a mass trespass on Mickle Fell (Wemmergill estate).
16. The following groups spoke at the seminar: NFU, NCC, Countryside Commission, Forestry Commission, Blue Circle, CoSIRA, Northumbrian Tourist Board, Durham Rural Community Council (RCC).
17. The independence and intransigence of the inhabitants of the dales was also noted by the inspector at the AONB Enquiry, who described them as:

"possessing a rugged independence of mind and attitude which they have needed

over the years to live and work in the harsh environment of the North Pennines" (106).

The Chairman of the NPRDB also talked about:

"a sturdy non-conformism and a profound faith in man's independence and his ability to stand on his own two feet" (NPRDB, 1970, para 53).

18. The following schemes, for example, have received funding from the RDP: Teesdale Enterprise Agency; Burnhope Community Minibus; Weardale Villages Playscheme and sports coaching project (DCC, 1989/90).
19. The following agencies are involved in formulating the RDP: Durham County Council, all the district councils concerned, the Development Commission, CoSIRA, English Estates, Durham RCC (in 1988 the Development Commission and CoSIRA were amalgamated to form a new body, the Rural Development Commission).
20. Shoard (1987, 396) discusses permissive footpaths at more length.
21. An earlier Lord Armstrong bought Bamburgh Castle from Lord Crewe's Trustees (see 5.3.1).
22. It was a conservative government which took the decision to fold the NPRDB. The concept of a RDB, particularly its powers over land transfer, was alien to the conservative philosophy (Clout, 1972, 194).

Chapter VIII

Summary and Conclusions

In this final chapter, the aim is to summarise the main findings of the thesis, and then to consider some of the issues that have emerged from the research which appear to have a more general significance. The thesis has considered landownership and rural development in general terms, and the specific influence of landownership on the development of the North Pennines over the 19th and 20th centuries. In the final analysis it should be asked; has the study of the North Pennines enabled a better understanding of the general processes and relationships identified in Part One? To what extent has the experience of the North Pennines conformed to the national picture, and in what respects has it differed? How valuable is this approach for an understanding of contemporary rural development problems?

It was established in Chapter Two that the apparently dramatic transformation of landownership and its role in rural society in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, is not as fundamental as it appears. Many changes have been external only, hiding an essential underlying continuity. The landownership structure has diversified but has not been transformed. Similarly, the political power of landowners has changed but has not vanished. In the 19th century, the rights of landowners to exercise power were enshrined in the law. Today, a landed interest has been replaced by a farming interest, an alliance of working farmers and rentier landowners. The power base of the modern agricultural interest is, however, narrower than that of the landed interest in the 19th century. Today, it is most directly seen in the formulation of agricultural policy, although it spills over into other aspects of rural planning. Furthermore, land still remains a source of economic power. Land is the only private asset whose ownership is concentrated in the upper wealth brackets.

Landowners have managed to retain much of the economic, social, and political power which they enjoyed in the 19th century despite the political and fiscal attacks against them. This is due to two factors. First, landowners were never an isolated

group, economically or socially, in British society. Second, their acquiescence in, and even instigation of, their own demise enabled them to control the pace and nature of change.

The relationships between landowners and rural society at the local level, and the processes by which landowners can influence local level development were discussed in Chapter Three. It was proposed that landowners can influence the rural development process in three ways. First, they can exert a direct influence through the management of their estates. How they use their land will affect the local environment and local employment opportunities. Second, landowners can exert a less direct influence through the exercise of formal and informal power in local politics. Third, landowners can influence the nature of public intervention in rural areas. Farming lobby groups can influence national policy formulation, and local landowners can influence the implementation of policy through the exercise of local power. The degree to which landowners can influence the rural development process in any one locality is, however, contingent upon a number of factors, and the relationships between landownership and rural society have altered over the 19th and 20th centuries.

It was shown that the landownership structure can exert a significant direct influence on local development. Different types of landowner will manage the land in different ways and will be differentially affected by external influences. To some extent, generalisations can be made about the motives of different landownership groups towards owning land, but at the most detailed level of analysis, it is impossible to predict the behaviour of an individual landowner. No two decision-making frameworks will be alike. However, in most cases, the welfare of the local community is not given a high priority in the decision-making framework, particularly today when local authorities are meant to shoulder this responsibility. The importance of this type of influence depends upon the structure of landownership (landed estates or owner-occupied farms?) and the influence of landowners in the local economy (what is the local employment structure?). This direct form of influence is likely to be greatest where the landownership structure is dominated by landed estates, and where agriculture is an important sector of the local economy.

In the 19th century, it was shown that landownership was the main influence on

rural society in lowland England. Clear socio-economic differences were apparent between estate and non-estate areas. In the uplands, the distinction was less marked. Social control by landowners was harder to enforce, because of the more scattered nature of the population, the more industrial basis of the economy and the historical legacy in which landowners played little part. The society of upland Britain displayed predominantly open characteristics. Public intervention in rural development was not an issue in the 19th century, although the external economy certainly was an important influence.

In the 20th century, it was observed that three factors have acted to reduce the power of landowners at the micro-scale. First, landed estates no longer cover such a large area of the countryside. Second, the unquestioned position of landowners as the local *élite* class has been challenged by the influx of a non-landed property owning class. Third, the State has come to play an increasingly important role in the development of rural areas. The political power of landowners in rural areas today is contingent on the importance of agriculture in the local economy, the presence or absence of other property owning groups, and the degree of intervention by the State. These processes and their effects, however, have been spatially uneven. The property owning *élite* is most dominant in lowland Britain whilst the importance of farming in the local economy (in terms of employment) is greatest in upland areas, which would suggest that, today, the farming interest is most dominant in upland Britain. However, public intervention is also greatest in upland areas. There is a national interest in the development of upland Britain which does not always coincide with the farming interest. This divergence of interests has led to conflict, particularly over questions concerning the environment and tourism.

Despite the number and variety of public intervention measures which have been directed to solving the socio-economic and land use problems of the uplands, none have, as yet, achieved any lasting improvement in the economy or society of upland Britain. This failure has been interpreted in different ways. On one level, the sectoral framework of British planning has been blamed. There is no consensus between agencies with an interest in rural development as to how the uplands should develop. Policies have been unco-ordinated and often contradictory. On another level, it has been claimed that private landownership is the major barrier to rural development, and that no progress can be made until the hegemony of

private land rights is challenged. The current planning framework has failed to do this. The public interest has been aligned to the interests of the bourgeois classes. Similarly, there has been a misinterpretation, conscious or otherwise, of the solution of the upland problem. The western, capitalist model of development, which has been applied to the uplands, has been inappropriate or even harmful in its effects.

It is clear that the whole question of rural development is far more complex than might appear on the surface, and the problem can be construed at many different levels. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the role which landownership plays today in the rural development process, both because of the lack of official statistics on landownership, and because, up to now, little attention has been paid to landownership as a factor in the rural development process.

The case studies of landownership and rural development in the North Pennines have enabled the conceptual framework to be applied in practice. Three sets of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis; some specific to the North Pennines, some of relevance to upland Britain, and some of more general relevance.

First, conclusions relating specifically to the North Pennines will be considered. There is no doubt that landownership has been in the past, and continues to be, a major influence on the rural development of the region. From the outside, the North Pennines might appear to be a homogeneous region in terms of land use, rural society and landownership. At a more detailed level of analysis, differences in landownership form, motive and land control have caused differences in resource development and rural society within the region which have been, and still are, important to the people living there.

In the 19th century, although the society was predominantly open, differences were apparent between the estates. On the estates where the mineral rights were leased, the mining companies exerted as great an influence, if not greater, on the inhabitants. A difference in openness was observed between the mining community and the farming community. Those estates with a separate farming community were less open, although they could not be described as closed. The harshness of the environment effectively prevented the emergence of a rural middle class of tenantry (although it is significant that the earls of Strathmore considered this possibility

after enclosure). Therefore, in the North Pennines landownership did exert an influence on the nature of rural society, although the nature of this influence took a different form to that observed in lowland Britain. Furthermore, in the North Pennines absenteeism does not seem to have necessarily been a negative influence on rural society. All three landowners studied were absentee. Motive, resource use, and land control were all factors which exerted a greater influence on rural society than absenteeism or residence.

More recent developments and land use conflicts in the North Pennines cannot be understood without reference to other specific features of the region. In comparison to lowland Britain, and many other areas of upland Britain, landowners in the North Pennines have faced relatively few alternative land use pressures. The North Pennines was not designated as a National Park or an AONB following the 1949 Act, and did not attract a non-landed middle class to present a challenge to the traditional élite. The autonomy which landowners within the region have enjoyed until recently, has enabled them to develop management policies based on exclusivity. The estates have altered from the industrial image of the 19th century, to a recreational image in the 20th century. In comparison to the labour-intensive demands of the lead mining industry, grouse shooting is capital intensive and is an extensive, exclusive land use. The growing profitability of grouse shooting has been a major factor in the survival of the landed estates, and has also brought new landed capital into the region. There are, therefore, powerful local interests to prevent development measures which may affect the future prosperity of this resource.

The economies of the landed estates today are based primarily on farming and grouse shooting, and to a lesser extent on forestry and mining. The landowners are not anti-growth as such. They support the continuation of mining and forestry, but they oppose any development over which they have no control, which threatens their autonomy of decision-making, or the hegemony of private rights. This explains their opposition to recent moves by external agencies, by the Countryside Commission in particular, to impose added environmental controls on land use within the region, and to encourage tourism and public access. Conflict is all the greater because it has come at a later date than in other upland areas of England and Wales.

Although the landed estates claim that grouse shooting is in the public interest (in terms of conservation and the local economy), there is no doubt that it benefits private interests far more than public ones. In some ways, it acts against the interests of the local community. Shooting interests are seeking to reduce grazing on the open moors and commons, thereby reducing the farmers' grazing resources.

The furore that Commons Registration and the Common Land Forum have aroused in the North Pennines can also only be understood with reference to the specific conditions of the region. The commons not only make up a large part of the land area, they also play a vital role in the local economy. Commons Registration has, perhaps, increased the conflict between grazing and shooting interests noted above, but both farmers and shooting interests are united in their opposition to any external threat to this land resource. Neither interest wishes to allow public access to the commons.

The political influence of the landowning élite on the society of the North Pennines is evident in the ideology of community that was displayed at the AONB public enquiry. The society is traditional in its outlook on rural development, an attitude which the local élite do nothing to dispel.

Second, certain conclusions can be drawn about landownership and rural society which may be applicable to other upland areas of Britain. The research has considered continuity and change in rural society and landownership. It would appear that change in rural society has been associated with industry, continuity with farming. Continuity in farming has been largely due to the environment, which has limited the degree to which change can take place.

Reliance on industry would also appear to be a reason, although not the only reason, for changes in upland landownership. For instance, once lead mining declined, the Stanhope estate was no longer of economic interest to the Church Commissioners. Other factors can be identified which have preserved continuity in landownership. Continuity has been most marked in privately owned, traditional landed estates. Historical tradition, attachment to the land, the attraction of game shooting, and a lack of alternative land pressures are all factors of importance. Since the decline of the industrial economy of upland Britain, it certainly cannot be said

that profit is an attraction of ownership, as evidenced by the growing popularity of sporting estates.

Although many land use conflicts in upland Britain are attributable to the intransigence and self-interest of local élites, these groups are not entirely to blame for the failure of many public intervention measures. Certain pragmatic criticisms of public intervention can be made, and suggestions put forward, from the lessons of the North Pennines. Many 'uniform' policies have been inappropriate to the needs of individual areas, as shown by the Commons Registration Act and the Common Land Forum. Policies which are targetted to the specific needs of an area (such as the ESA and RDP schemes) are much more effective. Many policies suffer from the way they are implemented, and the image of the implementing agency (for instance the NPRDB and the AONB). Small-scale policies which do not threaten élite interests (such as the ECCP and Allenheads Village Trust) are far more likely to succeed than large-scale, externally imposed ones.

Furthermore, conflict over upland development is not just a question of private versus public interests. There are conflicts of interest between public agencies and alliances of interest between private landowners and public agencies. Private landowners share a common interest with the NCC and the MoD, for example, in wishing to exclude the public from their lands. The Countryside Commission has antagonised both private interests and other public agencies (for instance the Forestry Commission) in its campaign to control land use. The ability of local élites to preserve their interests is to a large extent dependent upon maintaining an alliance with their national lobby groups. This alliance is showing signs of strain in the face of the growing power of the environmental lobby, and it may be that, at national level, the farming interest is more prepared to make concessions to the environmental lobby over questions concerning upland land use in order to preserve the autonomy of lowland farmers.

Finally, certain issues of a more general relevance to an understanding of landownership decision-making and continuity and change in landownership forms have emerged from the research. The comparison of the three case study estates has revealed important differences in the motives and the decision-making frameworks of private, institutional, and charitable landlords. These concern the interrelated

issues of internal and external change, historical inertia, and the significance of **control** as well as ownership.

Institutional landownership forms have only a limited ability to adapt internally to changing external conditions. The most extreme example is charitable landownership, where strict management and administrative practices are laid down by the charitable foundation. The inability to effect internal change means that, after a time, the institution becomes unable to fulfil its functions. Change in this landownership form must be imposed from the outside. In the case of both Lord Crewe's Charity and the Bishopric estates, changes in estate structure, administration and ownership form were imposed from the outside. Private landowners enjoy a greater, although by no means total, freedom of decision-making which gives them a limited ability to change internally. A further difference between institutional and private landownership, which is important in understanding continuity and change, is that institutional landowners own land for a specific purpose, they are more than landowners, and their fiduciary purpose will affect their management of the land. The primary motive of the trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity, for instance, was to meet the charitable payments, rather than to maximise the profits from their estates.

The research has clearly shown that land rights are enduring, and that historical inertia in land rights may be a very great constraint on a landowner's control of his estate. Two extreme examples of historical inertia have been considered in this thesis. The Bishops of Durham, in the 19th century, faced the unenviable position of being principal landowners in theory, but in practice having little control over their surface lands, due to the legal protection which customary tenants had received in the Tudor period. It is ironic that, in the late 19th century, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners bought back many of the lands of which they were, in theory, already owners.

Common land is the most extreme form of historical inertia in land control to have survived up the present day, and until the 1965 Commons Registration Act, individual commons were regulated by custom rather than law (although common land as a whole was protected by statute). It is the only form of tenure where the owner may be unable to exercise any control over the land. The Commons Reg-

istration Act has clarified the legal position of common land and, by reawakening an interest in this land resource, has also increased the importance of ownership. It remains to be seen what changes will result from the Common Land Forum.

In the final analysis, how valuable is this conceptualisation of rural development to an understanding of current rural development problems? First, certain qualifications should be made about its applicability. It was formulated with specific reference to upland Britain, and has been tested in a region where the landownership structure and political power base are both highly traditional. The framework is, obviously, today most applicable to regions where farming is still a dominant activity in the local economy, and it has proved to be more helpful in understanding contemporary land use conflicts than questions concerning rural settlements. However, these qualifications apart, this approach places contemporary rural development problems in a new light, and could facilitate a better understanding of rural development.

An understanding of past land management practices may throw light on current land use issues. For instance, in the North Pennines, the analysis of 19th century stinting regulations could provide a basis for the establishment of management committees under the terms of the Common Land Forum. A historical perspective also puts many contemporary land use and development conflicts into perspective. Over the time period considered in this thesis, there have been several changes in resource use, but these have not altered the essential underlying continuity of landownership in the North Pennines. Certain themes have been recurring, such as the use of the moors and the defence of land rights. Looked at in a historical perspective, the present day emphasis on conservation and tourism may be just another passing trend. In the future, other resource conflicts will emerge. There may even be a resurgence of mining. The whole question of rural development is extremely complex and contradictory. It is ironic, for instance, that the landscape which is valued today is the result of mining activity in the past and the traditional farming methods which have been preserved by the landed estates, yet mining today is opposed on conservation grounds, and landlords are the most vocal in their opposition to tourism.

This is a rather negative view of the whole question of rural development, but

perhaps one that is held by the landowners. However, this approach also suggests a more positive and practical possibility for achieving rural development. A historical analysis of rural development in any locality under specific landownership forms provides a behavioural perspective, which enables a better understanding of that locality's society, and which, in turn, should help policy-makers to predict how different policies will be received, and what effects they will have.

This thesis has been wide-ranging in subject matter, and, consequently, it has been impossible to consider all the issues in as much depth as might be desired. The PhD is primarily a learning process and, inevitably, much of the work is exploratory in nature. There are several lines of research which have been touched on in the thesis, which might yield valuable results if pursued in more detail. Firstly, the analysis of the historical development of three landed estates has suggested that local variations in development could be explained by ownership motive, land control and resource use. An examination of the experience of other estates in the region would add validity to these observations. Did Greenwich Hospital's estate on Alston Moor resemble the Stanhope estate or the Blanchland estate in its development? How did the Blackett-Beaumonts, who were more dependent on lead than the Bishops in the 19th century, adapt to the loss of mining income in the 20th century? Owner-occupation in the North Pennines has not been considered in this thesis, but an analysis of this ownership form could address the questions; has change been greater on owner-occupied farms than on the estates? How do farm sizes in estate and non-estate areas compare? The growth of grouse shooting in the North Pennines would appear to be a significant trend in the contemporary development of the region, and parallels can be drawn with Scotland. This could be an important area for further investigation.

Secondly, there would appear to be a need for further research into the nature of rural society in upland Britain, and the influence of landownership upon it. The estate archives, census records and parish records offer possibilities for more detailed studies of household composition, migration, marriage and living conditions. An ideology of community was identified amongst the present day population of the North Pennines, and it would be valuable to examine in more depth the extent to which this ideology is adhered to, and whether attitudes towards development are changing.

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Letters to Ralph Dent (and replies) re. Grouse Shooting (1866 - 1871). (D/St/C2/15/51).

Letters from Thomas Sopwith to Ralph Dent re. the survey of lead mining in Lunedale and Baldersdale (1867). (D/St/C2/15/102).

Correspondence with the Stockton and Middlesborough Water Board (1872 - 1889). (D/St/C2/16/8).

Correspondence with the Lands Improvement Company for a loan plus printed brochure about the company (1886). (D/St/C2/16/21).

The Wemmergill agent's letter files (1927 - 33). (D/St/C2/18/70 - 76).

Correspondence re. the leasing of Wemmergill Hall and Shooting Rights on High and Low Cotherstone Moor and Holwick (1915 - 1917). (D/St/C2/19/163).

Letter from the 14th Earl Stathmore to William Ralston re. buying sheep stints on Cotherstone Moor (24/5/1904). (D/St/C2/19/240).

Letters from the 14th Earl to William Ralston (1904 - 1925). (D/St/C2/19/261 - 283).

Correspondence re. maintenance claims for tax relief on necessary payments at Wemmergill (1933 - 1940). (D/St/C2/22/9).

Wemmergill estate receipt accounts (1841 - 1889). (D/St/E3/5/72 - 75).

Wemmergill estate expenditure accounts (1841 - 1890). (D/St/E3/5/76 - 79).

Estate abstracts of payments and receipts (1890 - 1941). (D/St/E3/5/100 - 145).

Balance of receipts and payments, Wemmergill estate (1890 - 1919). (D/St/E3/5/102).

Notices to Quit (1811 - 1885). (D/St/E3/8/43).

Customary, Longleasehold & Free Rents at Wemmergill (1822). (D/St/E3/9/18)

List of reduced farm rents on Lord Strathmore's Wemmergill estate (6/4/1903). (D/St/E3/9/31).

Draft analysis of the area and rentals of the agricultural holdings on the Wemmergill estate (1/6/1920). (D/St/E3/9/33).

Rentals for the Holwick and Wemmergill estates of Lord Glamis and the Earl of Strathmore (1947). (D/St/E3/9/37).

Wemmergill estate rent ledgers (1841 - 1902). (D/St/E3/9/47 - 50).

Dispute between Strathmore Estate and Mr R. Ancaster of Step Ends Farm. Correspondence and Sale of Goods (1827). (D/St/E3/9/103).

Sales of Goods on Farms (1816 - 1830). (D/St/E3/9/107).

Valuation of farms in the townships of Hunderthwaite, Mickleton, Lune and Bowes, belonging to the trustees of the late Earl of Strathmore, by Thomas Bell & Edward Clint (2/3/1821). (D/St/E3/11/3).

Report on the present state of the farm buildings on the estates of the late Earl of Strathmore by Thomas Bell and Edward Clint (12/6/1823). (D/St/E3/11/3).

Valuation of the Streatlam and Highland estates by Joseph Watson (1825). (D/St/E3/11/5).

Detailed valuations of John Bowes' estates in Lune, Holwick, Hunderthwaite and Mickleton townships by Thomas Bell & Sons (21/11/1860). 4 Vols. (D/St/E3/11/6 - 7).

Valuation and rents of Highland farms (1861). (D/St/E3/11/8).

Field book for the Highland farms, survey of state of cultivation (1841). (D/St/E3/13/17).

Misc. lists of livestock and stints on Hunderthwaite Moor, Holwick Moor, Holwick Fell, Lune Moor, Crossthwaite Pasture and Mickle Fell (1847 - 1871). (D/St/E3/13/5).

Rules for stinting the commons in the parish of Middleton, belonging to the Duke of Cleveland (1860). (D/St/E3/13/6).

Reports in connection with meetings of stint owners and field reeves, regulations, scales of stints and other papers concerning Cotherstone regulated pasture and Cotherstone Moor (1873 - 1920) (D/St/E3/13/7)

Misc. papers concerning stints on Holwick Fell (1894, 1895, 1920). (D/St/E3/13/9)

Misc. papers concerning stints on Wemmergill Moor and Wemmergill Allotment (1898 - 1925). (D/St/E3/13/10).

Proposals for repairs to farm buildings by Messrs Richardson and Wilson (1826). (D/St/E3/14/3).

Note of Poaching on Holwick Moor (1803). (D/St/E3/14/22).

Act for inclosing and exonerating from tithes lands in the townships of Lune, Holwick and Romaldkirk, 51 Geo. III (1811), and act for consolidating provisions usually inserted in acts of inclosure, 41 Geo III, c cix (1801). (D/St/E3/19/78).

List of proprietors with their opinion on enclosure in Holwick and Lune (11/1/1811). (D/St/E3/19/79).

Enclosure award for Cotherstone Moor by C.R. Moorson, valuer (1866). (D/St/E3/19/142)

Note of the terms for letting the Wemmergill shooting and Cotherstone Moors (1915). (D/St/E3/20/20)

List of game to be given away by Lord Strathmore's orders (16/9/1915). (D/St/E3/20/20).

Details of grouse killed at Wemmergill (1915). (D/St/E3/20/65)

Drainage ledger account of outlay for draining on Streatlam and Wemmergill estates during Mr Millner's agency (1833 - 1841). (D/St/E4/13/2).

Government drainage loan application book, with details of applications and particulars of the drainage of Streatlam, Wemmergill and Westwick estates (1846 - 1886) (D/St/E4/13/3).

Application to Inclosure Commissioners for transfer of drainage loan in the parishes of Cockfield and Romaldkirk, with subsequent substitution orders and related papers (3/7/1846 - 1851).

Note of terms for letting Streatlam Castle and shooting in conjunction with Cotherstone Moor (1911). (D/St/E4/18/9).

Lune and Holwick farm field plans (1841). (D/St/P4/4/12).

Lune Division enclosure maps drawn by Thomas Bell. (D/St/P4/7/11 - 15).

Census Enumerators Schedules for Lunedale, Holwick, Stanhope & Hunstanworth (1851 & 1881).

Domesday Books for Mickleton, Lunedale, Holwick, Hunderthwaite, and Cotherstone parishes (1911). (IR/1/147,146,142,143,156).

Domesday Book for Edmondbyers & Hunstanworth (1911). (IR/1/21).

Chapter Office (Durham)

The Charities of Nathaniel Lord Crewe, Bishop of Durham, and Dr John Sharp.
Report of Mr Martin (17th June 1864).

Scheme for the Regulation of Lord Crewe's Charity (1974). Charity Commission.

Northumberland Record Office

The Minute Books of the Trustees for Lord Crewe's Charity:

- 1800 - 1875, (452/B.a.2).
- 1876 - 1896, (452/B.a.3).
- 1896 - 1920, (452/B.a.4).
- 1921 - 1940, (452/B.a.5).

The Account Books of Lord Crewe's Charity:

- 1800 - 1822 (452/B.b.3).
- 1823 - 1840 (452/B.b.4).
- 1841 - 1852 (452/B.b.5).
- 1853 - 1862 (452/B.b.6).
- 1865 - 1869 (452/B.b.8).
- 1870 - 1874 (452/B.b.25).
- 1875 - 1879 (452/B.b.26).
- 1880 - 1884 (452/B.b.27).
- 1885 - 1889 (452/B.b.28).
- 1890 - 1895 (452/B.b.29).
- 1900 - 1904 (452/B.b.31).
- 1905 - 1909 (452/B.b.33).

Lord Crewe's Charity Summary Accounts:

- 1910 - 1938 (452/B.b.35).
- 1939 - 1972 (452/B.b.36).

Lord Crewe's Trustees, Rental Book (1883-1894). (452/B.d.5)

Lord Crewe's Trustees, Rental Book (1894 - 1907). (452/B.d.6)

Minute and Account book of Blanchland Park Pasture Stintholders (1880-1911). (452/B.b.80).

Blanchland Rent Audits (1909 - 1930). (452/B.d.12)

Letters from Thomas Hey to Christopher Rowlandson. (January 1875 - August 1877). (452/C3/22-24).

Attorney General v. Liddell (9th November 1865). (452/C5/36)

Scheme for the Future Regulation and Management of the Charities of Lord Crewe and the Rev. J. Sharp (17th June, 1876). (452/C5/42).

Report of C. Rowlandson to the trustees on taking over the post as receiver (1884). (452/C5/43).

it Scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the Future Regulation of Lord Crewe's Charity (1st January 1896). (NRO/452/C5/44).

Schedule of Estates. K.C. Bayley (1908). (452/C5/45).

Lease of sporting rights at Hunstanworth (1870). (452/E1/3)

Rent levels on Blanchland Farms (Mayday 1805). (452/E2/35)

Expenditure at Blanchland for incidental work since 1813 to May 1818. (452/E2/37).

An account of the Blanchland rents belonging to the trustees of the late Lord Crewe (January 26th 1819). (452/E2/37).

Half-Yearly Account Book of Thomas Fenwick. (1823 - 1828). (452/E2/38-44).

Estate rentals and expenses for Blanchland and Shotley tithes (1843-1860). (452/E2/45-51).

Report of S. Rowlandson and Messrs Dickson as to state of mines (1855). (452/E3/3).

Copy of Lead Mining Rentals (1801 - 1856). (452/E3/3).

Thomas Fenwick's Report on Blanchland Farms (August 1816). (452/E3/12).

Surveys of farm and cottage buildings (1860, 1861, 1867 & 1871). (452/E3/21-24).

Cropping Sheet for Acton Farm (circa 1860). (452, unsorted box)

Blanchland Accounts for Audit (1860 - 1865) (452, unsorted box).

Census Enumerators' Returns: Shotley High Quarter, (1851 & 1881).

Domesday Book, Shotley High Quarter (1911). (IR/2000/85).

Department of Paleography and Diplomatic, Durham

Copy of presentments concerning custom of Forest of Weardale (26/5/1601). (Weardale Chest, item 44).

Bishop Cosin's survey of the Bishopric of Durham (1662). (Sharp Collection no. 167).

Weardale enclosure correspondence (file of letters). (CC 34457a & 34459a).

The Weardale Enclosure Award (1815). (Durham Chancery Records).

Notitia Book for the Darlington Ward properties (late 16th - early 19th centuries). (CC 54007).

Notitia Book for Darlington Ward with plans (early 19th century). (HC M10 321764).

Articles of agreement between the Rt. Rev. Charles Thomas, Lord Bishop of Durham and the ECs for Eng on the other (27/10/1859). (CC 60/31609).

Darlington Ward customary rents (1856-57). (CC 134875).

Smiths Gore, Corbridge

Case on behalf of the Lord Bishop of Durham respecting his Lordship's rights upon and over lands within and parcel of the Park and Forest of Weardale. W.L. Tindal, Lincoln's Inn (10/10/1828).

Land tenure and rights on the Bishop's Stanhope estates. Smiths Gore to James J. Chalk Esq. (1859).

Church Commissioners sale of land, Stanhope (1962-3) (File 49/4).

Church Commissioners, Milbank

Stanhope General Management files (1876 - 1943). (48175).

Stanhope estate farm files:

- a) Lanehead:
- Greenfield Hush Farm (47969).
- Peaceful Cottage Farm (34677).
- The Rush (82265).
- High Lanehead Farm (49880).
- Low Cornriggs Farm (60832).
- b) Westgate:
- Spot House Farm (81984).
- Crooks Alter Farm (94861).

- Westgate Farm (42006).
- Field Head Farm (40008).
- White Hall Farm (54450).
- Field Stile Farm (80249).
- Shields Close (43163).

Appendix A

Sources of Landownership Data

Landownership belongs to that group of 'sensitive' subjects where availability of data decreases with closeness to the present day. Far more material is available on landownership in the 19th century than in 20th century. This situation has several drawbacks for a study of continuity and change in landownership over the 19th and 20th centuries. There are no continuous data sets which cover the whole time period, and for the time-series of data which do exist, changes in definition and methods of collection normally constrain comparability over time. In general, data on landownership in the 19th century tends to be very detailed and place-specific, whereas contemporary landownership data tends to be available in aggregate and generalised form. These discrepancies, not surprisingly, influence the methodology employed in a study of continuity and change. The main data sources on landownership available to the researcher will be briefly discussed in this section, stating the advantages and disadvantages associated with each.

A.1 19th Century Data Sources

Landownership data sets can be classified into four groups according to their spatial and temporal coverage. The first group includes data sets which provide detailed, place-specific information, relating usually to a single case study. The second group includes data relating to a larger area. Larger scale data sets must be easily aggregated and, therefore, lose much specific detail. The third group includes one-off surveys of landownership at one point in time, whilst the fourth group includes data sets which cover a certain time span. The table below is a rough classification of landownership data sources using this grouping.

For a detailed, in-depth study of continuity and change in landownership, individual estate archives are by far the most valuable data source. Although the amount and nature of data which was recorded and which has survived will vary from one estate to another, most archives contain information on estate income, expenditure, tenancies, land use and the style of management over a period of time. Obviously, accessibility to private estate archives varies, depending on whether

Landownership Data Sources

<i>DETAILED/CONTINUOUS</i>	<i>GENERAL/CONTINUOUS</i>
Estate Archives (various dates up to 1950)	Land Tax Returns (1780 to 1820)
Census Enumerators Books (1841 to 1881)	Population Census (1801 to 1981)
-	Local Directories (various dates)
-	MAFF June Census (1866 to 1989)
Enclosure Awards (various dates up to 1834)	Return of Owners Survey (1873)
Tithe Commutation Maps (1836)	Domesday Books (1910)
Commons Register (1967)	-
<i>DETAILED/ONE-OFF</i>	<i>GENERAL/ONE-OFF</i>

or not they have been deposited at county record offices, and whether they have already been catalogued. For those estates which are still in private ownership, access to estate records relating to the period after 1945 is limited or prohibited for reasons of confidentiality.

Two important data sources on landownership in the early 19th century are enclosure awards and tithe commutation awards. The scale of coverage of both data sources is generally the township or parish, but they offer possibilities for larger scale analysis of landownership over a region.

Enclosure has taken place in Britain over a long time period (Kerridge, 1969, 94), but many enclosure awards were made in the early 19th century following parliamentary enclosure acts (Tate, 1967, 139). The awards usually refer to a single township, but in some cases only part of a township was enclosed, whilst in other cases several contiguous townships were enclosed in one award. The awards give information on landownership (but not necessarily land occupancy), rights of way, roads and field patterns. The awards were always accompanied by plans (*ibid.*, 52).

Often tithes were commuted from payments in kind to money payments at the same time as enclosure (Evans, 1976, 95). All remaining tithes were commuted by the Tithe Commutation Act of 1836. The act demanded that all tithes in kind

be commuted into a fluctuating money payment known as a tithe rent charge. This was adjusted each year on the basis of the seven year average price of wheat, barley and oats. The tithe surveys required detailed maps to be compiled of landownership, occupancy and land use. Summaries of owners and occupiers in each parish were published separately (Kain & Prince, 1985).

Kain and Prince (1985, 230) have advocated the use of the tithe surveys as a historical data source, in their own right or in conjunction with other data sources. The coverage of the country by the tithe surveys is not comprehensive, however, and the data obtainable have limited value in a study of change.

One data set which Kain and Prince suggest could be used in conjunction with the tithe surveys is the population census. From 1841 to 1881, detailed information is available from the census enumerators' books. These give information on each individual's age, sex, employment, marital status and place of birth, as well as information about household composition (Norris, Townsend & Dewdney, 1983, 24). After 1881, population data is only available aggregated to parish level. It should, perhaps, be mentioned here that although much data is available at the level of the parish, parish boundaries have changed over time. Widespread changes to parish boundaries took place in the late 1880s following the reorganisation of local government (Darling, 1955, 73). This must be taken into account when comparing parish-level data over time. Land tax returns could also complement information gained from enclosure and tithe awards (Mills, 1980, 71). These records, spanning the late 18th and early 19th centuries, list landowners and occupiers by parish with the taxable value of their property but not the acreage.

The most comprehensive survey of landownership in the 19th century was the Return of Owners Survey or Second Domesday, carried out in 1873 (Thompson, 1963, 27; Stone, 1986, 60). Commissioned by Lord Derby, the object of the survey was to confound the popular opinion that landownership was concentrated in too few hands. The survey had the opposite result. The returns revealed that four-fifths of the land of Britain was owned by less than 7,000 persons:

"As a weapon in political controversy it proved to be a boomerang" (Thompson, 1963, 27).

The survey was carried out at county level. Each landowner was entered alphabetically in the register. His seat of residence, extent of landholdings within the county and their annual value were recorded. The value of this survey for studies of landownership below county level are limited, since landownership was not mapped. The survey also has drawbacks for an analysis of the national structure of landownership. The larger landowners, whose estates covered several counties, were entered two or three times and the total extent of their estate was underestimated. London was not covered by the survey, nor were woodlands, wastes or common lands entered (Brodrick, 1881, 158). The most accurate analysis of the Returns was made by Bateman (1883), who compiled a register of all the major landowners from the survey (those owning 1,250 hectares or more).

An easily accessible data source on 19th century landownership are the county histories, local directories and family genealogies. These documents were often commissioned by landed families who, in return, expected to be mentioned by the compilers (Stone, 1986, 84). The directories provide useful information about population and services by parish.

A.2 20th Century Data Sources

A more recently discovered potential data set are the Land Valuation or Domesday Books of 1910 (Short, 1986). These were compiled following the so-called 'People's Budget' of 1910 (Douglas, 1976, 144). The 1910 Finance Act called for a tax to be placed on the incremental value of land (the value arising purely from locational benefits). In order to calculate the tax, a complete inventory of the ownership, occupation and control of land was required. The survey was carried out on a parish basis and the information recorded in what are known as Domesday Books (Short, 1986). Like the Return of Owners Survey and the Tithe Commutation Awards, the Domesday Books provide a wealth of information on the landownership structure at one point in time, but do not indicate processes or patterns of change. No large scale analysis of the Domesday Books has yet been completed.

The major, but perhaps least satisfactory, data source on landownership in the 20th century are the agricultural statistics, collected by MAFF on a yearly basis in the June Census. The census was instigated in 1866, but comparisons over time are limited because of many changes in the way the data is collected and published

(Coppock, 1978, 16). The major failing of the census, however, is that it does not collect data on ownership but only on occupancy. This omission does not only affect the researcher on landownership, but also agricultural policy-makers:

"It is disturbing that so little is known about the pattern of acquisition, ownership and occupancy of agricultural land, and that governments should have to take decisions with far-reaching effects on agricultural structure, on the basis of incomplete or non-existent data" (Northfield, 1979, 109).

The smallest level at which the census data are published is the parish, in order that individual holdings may not be identified. Again, inaccuracies in the data may result when a farm holding crosses a parish boundary (Coppock, 1978, 23).

Another potential source of contemporary data on landownership is the Land Registry, but the registers are not open to public inspection. This is a pity, since the registers record information on the geographic location and extent of each registered property, with details of leases, the nature of the legal title and details of any registered mortgages or other financial burdens (HM Land Registry, 1982). Coverage of the country by the land registry is as yet incomplete, however, especially in rural areas (Northfield, 1979, 56).

More specialised but accessible data sources are the Common Land Registers. These registers contain information on the ownership, common rights, location and extent of all common lands in England and Wales (Aitchison & Hughes, 1986). The registers were compiled on a county basis in the late 1960s and early 1970s following the Commons Registration Act of 1965. There are problems associated with using this data set. The drawing up of the registers proved to be a highly contentious issue, and the legal validity of many of the data entries is questionable (*ibid.*, 1986). Changes in ownership since registration have often not been recorded.


Finally, several surveys have been carried out into particular aspects of landownership and occupancy, which provide useful and easily accessible information on national patterns and trends. In Scotland, Millman (19??) and McEwan (1979) have both mapped the pattern of landownership in the Highlands. In England and Wales the two major surveys of contemporary landownership are the Northfield Report (1979) and the Commission of the European Community into farm

ownership and occupancy (Harrison, 1981).

North Pennines: Administrative Divisions



NORTH PENNINES
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES,
PRE 1974




PARISHES IN THE NORTH PENNINES



**NORTH PENNINES
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES : 1989**





Landlords at Wemmergill

Landlord	Dates of Landlordship	Number of Years
John, 10th Earl Strathmore & Baron Bowes	1800 - 1820	20
John Bowes (Durham only)	1820 - 1885	65
Claude, 13th Earl Strathmore & Baron Bowes	1885 - 1904	19
Claude, 14th Earl Strathmore	1904 - 1944	40
Patrick, 15th Earl Strathmore	1944 - 1949	5
Timothy, 16th Earl Strathmore	1949 - 1972	23
Fergus, 17th Earl Strathmore	1972 - 1987	15

Agents at Wemmergill

Agent	Period of Agency	No. of Years
George Colpitts	1799 - 1812	13
Richard Dobson	1812 - 1833	21
Charles Millner	1833 - 1840	7
Ralph Dent	1840 - 1872	32
Ralph John Dent	1872 - 1889	17
William Ralston	1889 - 1929	40
Thomas McQueen	1929 - 1935	6
Ernest Kirkup	1935 - ?	?

Appendix D

The Holwick, Mickleton & Hunderthwaite Farms, 1860

Farm Size & Rentals at Holwick

FARM	HECTARES	No. OF STINTS	RENT (£) (1859)	RENT (£) (1860)
-	-			
Holwick Head	12.2	45	50.50	54.60
Hield House	19.7	26	39.00	43.65
Mire House	12.1	10	17.00	20.25
Mizzies House	24.4	25	48.00	54.10
West Close	4.2	12	17.00	18.70
Pikestone (main)	11.8	25	37.00	41.10
Pikestone (small)	11.3	15	29.00	33.35
Holwick West (main)	10.5	33	45.40	53.70
Holwick West (small)	5.8	25	29.50	34.10
Holwick Cottage	7.0	10	25.50	31.25
Holwick Middle	26.8	40	123.30	144.00
Holwick East	13.7	20	60.00	70.50
Hungry Hall	16.6	40	63.00	65.00
Park End & Unthank	76.7	120	224.30	265.5
Crossthwaite West & Middle	49.5	98	156.60	185.50
Step Ends	255.3	(1/3 Mickle Fell)	332.55	382.00
Lonton South	65.4	-	114.60	130.00
Lonton Limekiln	23.3	-	77.00	80.00
Lonton East	76.2	-	145.20	165.00
Lonton smith's shop	4.3	-	11.70	15.50
TOTAL	726.8	544	1,646.15	1,887.80

Source: D/St/E3/11/6

Farm Size & Rentals at Mickleton & Hunderthwaite

FARM	HECTARES	No. OF STINTS	RENT (£) (1859)	RENT (£)
-	-	-	-	-
MICKLETON	-	-	-	-
Mickleton stinted pasture	167.3	-	53	70
Howe & Beck Head	63.8	-	115	128
Kelton East Wham	44.4	-	53.30	60.50
Lane or Sonning Head	12.2	8	26.05	29.40
Kelton Three Chimnies	27.1	19	55.10	60.70
Bink House, West Wham & Knowle	94.1	-	120.95	140
Mickleton Public House & land	19.4	-	94.50	94.5
Mickleton High & Low Mill	13.3	-	98	112
Mickleton Haugh	5.7	-	33	33
High Cross	49.2	-	57.50	60
Low Green & Dukes	18.9	-	79	85
Thatcher's House	11.2	-	17.50	20
TOTAL	526.6	27	802.90	893.10
HUNDERTHWAITE	-	-	-	-
Hunderthwaite	13.8	-	35.95	40
Gill House	32.6	-	70.35	77
Thorngarth Hill	13.9	-	39.65	45
Hury Mill	5.1	-	37.35	40
East New Houses	109.2	32	60.05	72
West New Houses	340.8	31	170.35	183
Birk Flat	99.1	45	64	75
East Carnigill	477.6	110	120.05	147
TOTAL	1,092.10	218	597.75	679

Source: D/St/E3/11/6

Abbreviations of Lunedale Farms

- C Cronkley.
- CH Close House.
- LH Lune Head.
- WH Wythes Hill.
- GB Grains O' Beck.
- BH Blake House.
- SH Scar House
- SM Stackholme.
- LW Low Wemmergill.
- HS High Soulgill.
- HG High Grain.
- WH Wemmergill Hall.
- GW Grassholme West.
- SK Stack.
- R Rigg.
- SKH Stake Hill.
- WP West Park.
- T Thringarth.
- EP East Park.
- CH Chapel House.

Appendix E

Bishops of Durham, 1509 to 1990

Thomas Ruthall	1509 to 1523
Thomas Wolsey	1523 to 1528
Cuthbert Tunstall	1530 to 1559
James Pilkington	1561 to 1576
Richard Barnes	1577 to 1587
Matthew Hutton	1589 to 1595
Tobias Matthew	1595 to 1606
William James	1606 to 1617
Richard Neile	1617 to 1628
George Montaigne	1628
John Houson	1628 to 1632
Thomas Morton	1632 to 1659
John Cosin	1660 to 1672
Hon Nathaniel Crewe	1674 to 1721
William Talbot	1721 to 1730
Henry Chandler	1730 to 1750
Joseph Butler	1750 to 1752
Richard Trevor	1752 to 1771
John Egerton	1771 to 1787
Thomas Thurlow	1787 to 1791
Hon Shute Barrington	1791 to 1826
William Van Mildert	1826 to 1836
Edward Maltby	1836 to 1856
Charles Thomas Longley	1856 to 1860
Henry Montague Villiers	1860 to 1861
Charles Baring	1861 to 1879
Joseph Barber Lightfoot	1879 to 1889
Brooke Fosse Wescott	1889 to 1901
Handley Carr Glyn Moule	1901 to 1920
Herbert Hensley Henson	1920 to 1939
Alwyn Terrell Peter Williams	1939 to 1952
Arthur Michael Ramsey	1952 to 1956
Maurice Henry Harland	1956 to 1966
Ian Thomas Ramsey	1966 to 1972
John Stapylton Habgood	1973 to 1983
David Edward Jenkins	1984 -

Appendix F

Tables of Enclosure

Northumberland, Cumberland & Westmoreland

ENCLOSURE IN CUMBERLAND			
PARISH	AREA (hectares)	DATE OF ACT	DATE OF AWARD
Culgaith	661	1773	1775
Farlam	909	1777	1780
Cumwhitton & Cumrew	2,500	1796	1801
Castle Carrock	792	1801	1805
Alston Moor	8,333	1803	1820
Kirkoswald	22,00	1806	1816
Ainstable	2,458	1808	1815
Hayton	83	1807	1814
Croglin*	2,458	1808	1815
Kirkoswald	1,042	1814	1818
Ainstable	833	1818	1823
Alston	55	1840	1843
Alston	85	1854	1856
Ousby	530	1855	1858
Glassonby	648	1857	1860
Ousby	667	1858	1863
Glassonby	390	1861	1867
Kirkoswald	1,053	1861	1864
Kirkoswald	1,029	1862	1877
Glassonby	625	1865	1868

Source: from Tate & Turner (1978)

ENCLOSURE IN DURHAM			
PARISH	AREA (hectares)	DATE OF ACT	DATE OF AWARD
Bowes	850	1766	1768
Wolsingham	83	1769	1770
Hamsterley	3,720	1758	1760
Staindrop	221	1764	1765
Wolsingham	4,637	1765	1767
Lanchester	6,793	1773	1781
Stanhope	6,312	1799	1815
Mickleton	1,815	1802	1810
Barningham	134	1803	1807
Egglestone & Middleton	2,495	1805	1817
Stanhope	976	1809	1816
Romaldkirk	2,833	1811	1827
Woodland	942	1814	1825
Middleton	3,844	1834	1841
Cockfield Fell	258	1845 & 1863	1868
Hunderthwaite	1,705	1856	1858
Bowes Moor	5,215	1857	1859
Cotherstone Moor	2,118	1863	1867
Edmondbyers	397	1864	1870

ENCLOSURE IN NORTHUMBERLAND			
PARISH	AREA (hectares)	DATE OF ACT	DATE OF AWARD
Hexham & Allendale	16,801	1792	1800
Hexhamshire	1,730	1753	1755
East Coanwood	673	1808	1814
East Coanwood	659	1845	1851
Knaresdale	4,167	1853	1859
Kirkhaugh	1,028	1859	1862
Plenmellor	1,303	1862	1865
Hartleyburn	1,042	1864	1869
Kirkhaugh	715	1864	1868

ENCLOSURE IN WESTMORELAND			
PARISH	AREA (hectares)	DATE OF ACT	DATE OF AWARD
Long Marton	417	1770	1772
Warcop	na	1772	1773
Warcop	300	1790	1791
Long Marton	417	1804	1809
Milburn	490	1812	1820
Milburn	1,175	1812	1820
Warcop	300	1815	1831
Long Marton	1,325	1815	1823
Dufton	958	1827	?
Milburn	69	1855	1857
Hilbeck Fell	417	1857	1859
Great Musgrave	576	1857	1859
Stainmore	1,698	1879	1890
Winton, Kaber & Hartley commons*	-	1911	1915

Appendix G

Examples of Stinting Regulations

G.1 Stinting Regulations for Cotherstone Pasture, 1873

1. All owners or occupiers of stints having stock on the pasture should, by the 6th April each year, give the Field Reeves a statement of the number of stints owned or rented, the kind of stock, the brandings, tar, other marks. Penalty for not doing so: 1 shilling per stint.
2. The owner of all animals put on the pasture must mark them with a Manor mark: an 'X' for cattle, made with tar and put on top of the hind quarters; for geese a mark of tar on the top of the head. Penalty for default up to 1 shilling per animal.
3. No owners/occupiers of stints may herd their stock, except during lambing season (16th April - 16th May). If any stinthead disturbs other peoples' stock he will forfeit a fine of up to £5.
4. Stintheaders who frequently withdraw stock from the pasture and replace it must pay compensation for the additional labour involved as well as normal expenses.
5. Any stinthead wishing to change his stock must give three days advance warning to the shepherd appointed to attend the said stock, must state the kind of stock intended, and will be liable to a fine of up to 1 shilling for each animal put on the pasture without notification.
6. On and after the 10th October each year, each lamb will be counted as one sheep stint.
7. No rams are allowed on the pasture between January 6th and April 6th of each year, and between September 1st and November 23rd. Any ram put on the pasture during these times will be charged up to £1.
8. No persons are to put any infectious animal on the pasture.
9. The Field Reeves are to employ as many shepherds as they think fit for the proper herding of the stock upon the said pasture; some of them to be engaged the whole year round as necessary.
 - To give instructions to the shepherds as to their duties and ensure due performance of them.
 - To see that no stintheaders put more stock on the pasture than their allowance.
 - To order and direct the distribution of stock over the pasture according to the

quantity and quality of the pasture in the Field Reeves' judgement.

- To attend to the opening of ditches and water courses, keeping the pasture in good order, may distrain all stock and animals found thereon contrary to the regulations, and do all other acts of maintenance and improvement as the Field Reeves think fit.
- 10. The Field Reeves shall prosecute any persons who shall interrupt them in the execution of their duties, the costs of such prosecutions to be paid out of the rate.
- 11. For defraying all expenses in and about the management of the said pasture, the Field Reeves to set a rate, not exceeding 6d in the pound, and to collect it from all the stinholders, with power to take action against non-payments.

G.2 Conditions for stinting ^LHowick Fell, 1895

1. From 15th. April - 1st. October only summer stock allowed in allotment viz; ponies and cattle.
2. From 1st. October all ponies and cattle must be taken from allotment and put into enclosed land.
3. From 1st. October - 25th. December the gates between the allotment and the moor will be thrown open. No driving up from the allotment to the moor will be permitted.
4. From 25th. December - 20th. March, all sheep must be brought into the allotment. The gates shall, upon the first named date, be closed for the winter.
5. From 20th. March - 15th. April, the gates between the allotment and the moor will be thrown open.
6. After 15th. April, the gates will be closed for the summer and for lambing.
7. During every snowstorm, at any period in the year, all sheep must be brought into the allotment, the gates of which will be closed until the conclusion of such snowstorm.
8. All ewes must be lambed in the allotment, or upon enclosed land.
9. No foddering will be allowed outside of the allotment at any time of the year.
10. A common shepherd shall be appointed, whose duties shall commence upon April 6th. in each year, to be appointed by the Earl of Strathmore or his agent.
11. After 15th. April none but the common shepherd will be allowed on the moor.
12. No dogs allowed on the moor, except upon particular occasions such as collecting sheep, clipping and washing, or any other necessary purposes.
13. All sheep to be distinguished by their owners' initials, or by a stock mark.

14. An official list of the number of sheep belonging to each stint-holder to be kept by the estate bailiff, who has powers to check the truth of the lists.
15. The stinthead to render assistance to the above in the collection and enumeration of the stock.
16. If any stinthead is caught overstocking, he must remove the surplus at once, and a reduction in stint allowance equal to the surplus will be made from the next day.

G.3 Conditions for Grazing in the Wemmergill Allotment, 1901

1. Rent one shilling per sheep, to be paid in equal half yearly installments to the Chief Agent of the Earl of Strathmore at the Agricultural Rent Audit.
2. Grazing from 15th.March - 15th.November in each year. If the ground is covered in snow at any time, the tenant shall remove all sheep from the allotment immediately upon receiving notice from the Wemmergill Head Keeper.
3. No cattle or horses to be grazed in the allotment.
4. No foddering to be allowed at any time in the allotment.
5. No shepherding to be done in the allotment without permission from the Head Keeper. No dogs allowed under any circumstances in the allotment.
6. Control of sheep to be exercised wholly by the Head Keeper.
7. Tenant to provide shooting lessee of Wemmergill whenever required with one driver for every fifty sheep, or fractional part thereof, grazed by the tenant in the allotment, at a wage of five shillings a day.
8. All sheep grazed in the allotment must be distinguished by their owners' initials or a distinctive stock mark.
9. The right of grazing hereby conferred is distinct from the agricultural tenancy, and is to be terminated by three months notice prior to the 15th.March in any year.

G.4 Weardale Enclosure: Regulations as to the Stinted Pastures

1. If anyone is found to have exceeded their stint allowance, they are to be fined 20 shillings per excess, and the excess cattle are to be impounded until the fine is paid.
2. Some persons(s) shall be elected by the occupiers to act as impounder to control stint numbers, but if it looks as though the extra stints were due to accidental escape the Impounder is only to charge 1 shilling per extra stint. Each occupier of the stints is to give the Impounder an account of the stock they intend to put on the pasture and to give notice of any changes, otherwise they will be

liable to a fine of 5 shillings.

3. Stinting definitions:

- Every beast above 2 years old shall be counted as one stint.
 - Every mare or gelding above 2 years old equals two stints.
 - 5 sheep above 1 year old equal 1 stint.
 - 8 lambs above 1 year old equal one stint.
 - Every colt or filly between 6 months and 2 years equals 1 stint.
 - Each young beast under 2 years equals half a stint.
4. The majority attending each meeting to reflect the number of stints rather than the number of occupiers.

G.5 Rules of Management for Blanchland Park Pasture

1. Scaling to be done by tender.
2. Persons recouping the stints by stirks are to pay 25 shillings for each stirk.
3. If anyone wishes to withdraw a cow or replace it by a stirk, they must tell the stewards by the 29th March of that year.
4. Commoners should also give notice to the stewards if they wish to put stirks on the common. If there are more applicants than vacancies, allocations will be decided by casting votes.
5. So long as vacancies can be filled up by stinholders, no other parties are to be admitted into the pasture.
6. If a cow is bulling, the owner has a duty to take the cow out of the pasture within 3 hours of being told, otherwise others are allowed to do this.
7. Cows are not to be changed once they have been put into the pasture at Mayday without a good and valid reason.
8. Cows are to be put into the pasture on the 13th day of May and to be taken out on the 29th September.
9. If any stinholder wishes to put a cow or stirk into the pasture during the winter, they must pay 9 shillings for a cow and 6 shillings for a stirk, and the cattle must be out of the pasture on the last day of February.
10. Two stewards are to be elected each year.
11. Rent is to be collected twice yearly and is to be recorded in the accounts, as well as repairs and improvements.

12. Accounts are to be checked by the Blanchland agent.

Appendix H

Lord Crewe's Charity: Charitable Payments

PAYMENT PER		ANNUM £	CHARITABLE PURPOSE
1721	1896	1974	-
20 each	240 total	720 total	12 exhibitions at Lincoln College
for up to	total	total	Oxford (to natives of the Diocese of Durham,
8 years	-	-	Northallerton, of the parish of Newbold).
-	-	-	Verdon, or the Diocese of Oxford.
40	40	40	Minister of Bamburgh church.
30	30	30	Minister of St Andrews Auckland.
10 each	120 total	120 total	12 poor livings in the Diocese of Durham.
10 each	40 total	40 total	4 livings belonging to Lincoln College.
10 each	40 total	40 total	8 poor scholars of Lincoln College.
10	-	-	Bible Clerk, Lincoln College.
20	20	20	Rector, Lincoln College.
10 each	120 total	120 total	12 Fellows of Lincoln College.
2 each	40 total	60 total	Armspeople of Durham, Auckland,
-	-	-	Brackley, and Hinton.
20	20	50	Schoolmaster, Newbold Verdon.
10 each	10 each	25 total	Relief of widows and children
-	-	-	of clergymen at Sparkenhoe, Leics.
6 each	6 each	25 total	Charity school, Daventree, Northampton.
20	20	50	Schoolmaster for Bishop Auckland.
30	30	-	To clothe 30 poor boys at Bishop Auckland.

DATE (S) OF INTERVIEW (S)	NAME	ORGANISATION	POSITION	REFERENCE IN TEXT*
29/1/87; 19/4/88	Alec Peart	-	Weardale Farmer	-
3/2/87	Mr Tomlinson	CoSIRA	Durham Director	-
27/2/87	Simon Fisher	NFU, Durham Branch	Vice-President	-
13/7/87	Mr Kirton-Darling	Lambton Estates	Land Agent	-
16/7/87	Mr Woodward	Lord Crewe's Charity	Agent	Respondent D
11/1/88	Mr Sandys-Clarke	Raby Estates	Agent	Respondent E
12/1/88	Keith Buchanon	Countryside Commission	Director, North East	Respondent L
24/2/88; 13/2/89	Mr Jamieson	Strathmore Estates	Land Agent	Respondent A
25/2/88	Mr Stubbs	-	Weardale farmer	-
25/2/88; 11/7/89	Major McGowan	Allendale Estates	Land Agent	Respondent M
11/3/88	Mr Pritchard	Forestry Commission	Director, Durham District	-
7/4/88	Isobel Duun'	East Cumbria Countryside Project	Organiser	-
11/4/88	Charles Dent	Bollihope Estates	Land Agent	-
14/4/88	Robert Stavely	Lightwater Estates	Owner	-
3/5/88	John Barrett	Nature Conservancy Council	Assistant Director (NE)	-
27/5/88	Les Morgan	Weardale District Council	Alpine Ski Resort Promoter	Respondent O
2/6/88	Roy Lemberger	MAFF	Pennine Dales ESA Coordinator	-
21/6/88	David Strutt	Weardale Minerals	Surveyor	Respondent F
* References are only given for direct quotes				

List of Respondents

Appendix I

DATE (S) OF INTERVIEW (S)	NAME	ORGANISATION	POSITION	REFERENCE IN TEXT*
23/6/88	Robert Windle	Smiths Gore	Land Agent	-
1/7/88	Mr Dickenson & Mr Cooper	Wardell Armstrong	Mineral Agents	Respondents G
6/7/88	Mr Morton	Stanhope Parish Council	Clerk	-
31/8/88	Mr Hancock	Durham County Council	Team Leader, Local Plans	Respondent Q
-	& Simon Hodgson	ditto	Countryside Ranger, West Durham	Respondent N
8/9/88	Len Pattinson	-	Retired Lawyer, Weardale	Respondent C
21/9/88	David Flush	Allenheads Village Trust	Organiser	Respondent P
22/9/88	Mr Bourne	Smiths Gore	Former Agent, Weardale	Respondent B
8/2/89	Mr Kennedy	Blanchland Estate	Tenant, Birkside	-
8/2/89	Mr Graham	Blanchland Estate	Tenant, Allenshields	-
8/2/89	Mr Makepiece	Blanchland Estate	Tenant, Cotehouse	-
20/3/89	Mr Walton	Strathmore Estate	Tenant, Hield House	-
20/3/89	Mr Foster	Strathmore Estate	Tenant, Grains O' Beck	Respondent H r
5/5/89	Major McBain	Lords in Trust of Bowes Moor	Agent	Respondent I
16/3/89	Lord Barnard	Raby Estates	Owner	-
8/8/89	Mr Hollister	Ministry of Defence, Catterick	Estates Agent	Respondent K
13/11/89	Mr Rippon	Northumbrian Water Authority	Estates Agent	Respondent J

