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**THE TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY
OF ST BASIL THE GREAT ACCORDING
TO HIS "ANATREPTIKOS" AGAINST
EUNOMIUS**

By

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PROLOGUE

This research was undertaken at the suggestion of my supervisor Dr George D. Dragas to whom I am deeply grateful for his guidance and technical assistance. The original idea was much more ambitious, since it included an analysis of Eunomius' response to St Basil's Anatreptikos and the further responses to Eunomius provided by St Basil's brother, St Gregory of Nyssa, and other patristic authors. Having done this wider research and analysis it became clear that a much larger dissertation was required which went beyond the confines of the Master's thesis. Since circumstances did not permit me to embark on such a task I had to restrict myself to St Basil alone. What therefore is presented here is a basis for any further research into the wider topic of the Eunomian Cappadocian debate on God. It has a small claim of originality in that it presents for the first time a comprehensive analysis of a work which has not yet appeared in English translation and which is Basil's first dogmatic theological treatise.

I also want to express my gratitude here for the assistance, financial and moral, which I was given by His Beatitude Archbishop Chrysostomos of Cyprus, by the Rt Reverend Bishop Barnabas of Salamis and by the Very Rev. Hegoumen Nicephoros of the Holy Monastery of Panagia of Kykkos.

Most of all I want to thank my wife Stella who relieved me from family duties and made it possible to me to travel to Durham on several occasions and complete my project.

PART I:**INTRODUCTION****(1) St Basil the Great: A brief biographical memorandum**

St Basil the Great's own writings and especially his Epistles are the most important sources for his life and work.⁽¹⁾ Equally important, however, is the Funeral Oration of St Gregory the Theologian (Nazianzen), which was delivered in AD 381 for his friend Basil, because, in effect, it constitutes a biography of Basil. There are also several important points of biographical information in the rest of the works of the Theologian and especially in his Poems and Epistles.⁽²⁾ Further notable sources for the life and career of Basil are: the Encomiastic Oration on his brother⁽³⁾ and the "Life" of his Sister Macrina⁽⁴⁾ of St Gregory of Nyssa, the pseudepigraphic Life of St Basil⁽⁵⁾ and the possibly pseudepigraphic Oration on Basil⁽⁶⁾ of Amphilochius of Iconium, and the information in the Ecclesiastical Histories of Socrates (4:26) and of Sozomenus (6:15).

Useful biographical material can also be deduced from the Encomiastic Oration on Basil of St Ephrem the Syrian (306? +373) and especially from the Bibliotheca of the Patriarch of Constantinople St Photius the Great (810-897) who supplies very crucial and notable descriptions of the person, the home, the career and the literary talent of Basil the Great.⁽⁷⁾

There is no agreed date on the birth of St Basil. It is calculated by approximation and by comparison with that of his friend, St Gregory the Theologian. Gregory's Epistle 33 informs us that he was a little older than Basil and most probably not more than a year. The same Epistle also informs us that Gregory's father, also called Gregory, was made bishop of Nazianzus in AD 328 and that it was during his episcopate there that his son Gregory the Theologian was born. On this basis and taking into consideration other factors scholars argue that the most possible date for the birth of Gregory is the year 330. Thus Basil too must have been born around this date.

There is no consensus on the place of Basil's birth. The most common view is that he was born at Caesarea in Cappadocia where he also became Metropolitan. Gregory the Theologian does not mention Basil's place of birth and Gregory of Nyssa states that it was possibly in Neocaesarea.⁽⁸⁾ This view is also hinted at by Basil himself on a certain occasion when he went to this region to avoid the attention of Atarvios⁽⁹⁾ and his men and told the people there of his happy memories of the place from his early years and of his joy to be again with relatives who were still there, his sister Macrina and his brother Peter.⁽¹⁰⁾

In other writings of Basil, however, there are strong indications that he was born in Pontus. First of all in his Epistle 37 he writes to an unknown official of Pontus about "a friend who was son of the lady who fed him as a baby" to whom his

family had left a plot of land and servants, asking that the remuneration paid to them should be maintained to the same level. He also hints in this Epistle that he had spent his early years there and that he was possibly born there. On the other hand in his Epistle 36, which he also addresses to an unknown official, possibly the same person with Presbyter Dorotheos, to whom he wrote the Epistles 86 and 87, he refers to an earlier Epistle (i.e. Ep. 86) as an Epistle "sent to the leader of the fatherland" (ἀπέστειλα δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀρχοντι τῆς πατρίδος). The phrase "leader of the fatherland" refers to the Governor of Pontus, and not of Cappadocia since, whenever he referred to Cappadocia he spoke of "our fatherland" (τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν). Besides, the fact that he was 'fostered' by a woman at Pontus indicates that Basil was probably born there and not at Caesarea in Cappadocia which lies many days of travelling away.

Basil's parents were Basil the elder and Emmelia. His father was of noble and rich ancestry who was distinguished for his uprightness and Christian ideals. He exercised the profession of a lawyer at Neocaesarea of Pontus. His mother Emmelia was also descendant from a pious family. Her father had died as a martyr at Caesarea in Cappadocia. Both parents were distinguished by their physical comeliness, their virtues, their philanthropic activities, their wealth and their being blest with a goodly progeny. They had 9,⁽¹¹⁾ or 10 children, four males - Basil (330?), Naucratos (332), Gregory (334) and Peter (345) - and five or six females - among whom the most distinguished was

Macrina (born c. 362). Three of the four males (Basil, Gregory and Peter) dedicated themselves to the ministry of the Church, all of them becoming bishops, while Naucratis became a monk and died at the age of 27.⁽¹²⁾ Macrina dedicated herself to the church as a "Virgin" after the death of her fiancé, and in 345/50 she founded a monastery for females in the family estate by the river Iris at Pontus and became a prototype of an ascetic.

Basil, then, belonged to a noble family of Cappadocia, which offered to the Church some very distinguished theologians and ecclesiastical leaders.

The first teachers and paedagogues of Basil were his mother Emmelia⁽¹³⁾ and his paternal grand-mother Macrina. As he himself tells us in his Epistle 204, the character of his powerful personality, his overall virtuous life and his perfect model as a man, were all formed on the basis of the prototype of his grand-mother Macrina, although Emmelia's contribution to this was also considerable. As far as his education goes, Basil was taught the first elements by his own father,⁽¹⁴⁾ who was a distinguished teacher of rhetoric at Neocaesarea. To complete his *general* paedeia he was sent to Caesarea in Cappadocia at the age of twelve or thirteen (341/343), where he probably stayed with close relatives. This is where he met with Gregory (called later the Theologian), Hilarion⁽¹⁵⁾ and Sophronios,⁽¹⁶⁾ as well as with Julian (called later The Apostate). After the completion of his *general* studies at Caesarea Basil was sent by his pious and rich parents to Constantinople (c. 346/7) for higher studies,

where he met Libanius,(17) who was 35 years old and had already made a name for himself. When Libanius was removed from his position, because his school had double ^{the} number of pupils compared to that of Nicocles who was supported by the imperial court, Basil left Constantinople and went to Athens to continue his studies, since Athens, as Gregory the Theologian says, was the "soil of reason" (τὸ τῶν λόγων ἔδαφος).(18) At Athens, where the study of classical philosophy was still maintained, and with the help of Gregory the Theologian, whom he found there and with whom he formed very close ties of friendship,(19) he came to study at the famous public schools of renown sophists(20) like Himerios(21) and Proaeresios.(22) Gregory spared Basil the tests which the junior students suffered in the hands of the seniors and helped him to find quickly his way around and to lodge in the same house as he; as a consequence of this they became "one soul in two bodies" and "one mind in two, not two"(23). Gregory refers to their studies at Athens, in several of his Poems and Orations, which ended up four or five years later, possibly in July 356, at which point Basil returned to his native land. He did so because he was informed that his father was critically ill.

Tradition and modern research(24) have it that Basil exercised in Caesarea, after his return from Athens, the profession of a "teacher of rhetoric" for a period of four years. It was during this period that his fame travelled all over the region of Asia, because, as his friend Gregory the Theologian

says, he was most successful in his work so that his words were heard like thunder and his life appeared to be as bright as a lightening. Yet, Basil could not continue on this profession, in spite of his tremendous success. He abandoned all civil functions, especially after the announcement of the death of his younger brother Naucratis, who was a monk at Pontus.(25)

The study of philosophy taught Basil the deeper meaning of life and his religious upbringing taught him the secret of youth. Thus we see him taking the great decision to remain celibate. The light of the Gospel shone so brightly inside him that he began to understand the vanity and uselessness of secular pursuits and offices. In 358 he was baptised, whereupon he dedicated himself to the study of Christian literature in which he discovered a different light from that of the pagan classics. As a result he decided to continue his studies on another level and in another direction in order to come to know in a better and more decisive way both Christianity and Christian asceticism. He visited the most important ascetical centres from the Cyrenaic region to the Thebaid. He went round Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt,(26) where he probably met Athanasius who was in exile in the desert and Eustathius of Sebaste. The benefit of these visits was immeasurable. When in 359 he returned to Caesarea he could not help but embrace asceticism and imitate those venerable persons of the desert whom he had met. At the same time he was ordained to the Diaconate, but because his Bishop Dianius of Caesarea moved to the camp of the Arians,

he distributed his wealth to the poor of his country and departed to the Pontic deserts as a monk. This took place around 360 and not earlier, as most of the modern patrologists tell us. In 363/4⁽²⁷⁾ he was persuaded to leave the quiet resort of his hermitage and to return to the service of the Church of his fatherland. He was ordained to the Presbyterate by Eusebius and assumed manifold responsibilities. In 370 Eusebius of Caesarea died and Basil was elected as his successor. As a Bishop he made many efforts to unite the Church from the East to the West, which was being shaken by many disputes. He attempted to bring together all the orthodox Bishops in East and West as a common front against heresy. During the relatively brief course of his episcopate he came to be greatly distinguished for his struggle against the Arians and for his great ecclesiastical, theological and social-political contributions.

St Basil became "Great" not only as an ecclesiastical organizer and teacher, but also as a scientist, inasmuch as he represented a rare combination of a theoretical and a practical spirit, of idealist enthusiasm and down to earth realism, of knowledge and love, which can be found only in exceptional geniuses. Bringing together practical talent, philosophical thought and theological exactness, he delved into the depths of Christian truth and into the secrets of the physical world, "bringing out the magnitude of natural beings" (τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐτράνωσας) as we sing in one of the hymns of his feast, and commended himself to the consciousness of the Church as a

prototype of a pastor, author and theologian.

St Basil inaugurated his literary activity in his hermitage at Pontus, where he studied the works of Origen, as an introduction to his theological studies, and where, together with Gregory, he wrote the *Philocalia* of Origen, consisting of a selection of some of the best passages from Origen's works concerning the right interpretation of Holy Scripture.⁽²⁸⁾ He always tried to structure his writings in a pleasing way to both reader and listener. His integrity of character, his critical mind, his clear and pure spirit, his gifted personality, and also his clarity, natural idiom and brevity, are the particular virtues of Basil's style, which are rarely combined in such a powerful way in any other ecclesiastical author.

In his writings he follows a systematic method and is obviously influenced by his classical education. He is not an atticist, but he uses clear and graceful language, being easy to understand even by the most humble of his listeners. Theologically he is patristic and traditional, following mainly Athanasius, but also going a little beyond him by clarifying his central theological precepts.

St Basil left a variety of writings: dogmatic, apologetic, hermeneutical, ascetical, paedagogical, liturgical, particular treatises and a great number of Homilies and Epistles. The enormous influence exerted by these writings, and the profit gained from them, are fully demonstrated by the plethora of manuscripts which have come down to us and by the fact that

all these works have been transmitted without any serious alterations or corruptions. It is a pity that we do not yet possess a critical comprehensive edition of all the writings of Basil. There are good signs however of such a task becoming more and more possible. Such signs include the comprehensive history of editions and manuscripts of the late E. Amand de Mendieta, and the studies of J. Gribomont and Stig Y. Rudberger (cf. Bibliography).

In view of all this one understands why St Basil is the first Hierarch to be mentioned in the Conclusion of the Divine Liturgy of the Orthodox Church and why Metropolitan John (Mavropous) of Euchaita (11th century) included him, together with St Gregory the Theologian and St John Chrysostom, in the special Feast and Accolouthy of the Three Great Hierarchs of the Eastern Church, attributing to them all the title of "ecumenical teacher" (οἰκουμενικός διδάσκαλος) and to Basil, the designation "one who appeared from heaven" (οὐρανοφάντωρ).

Basil's life was cut short at an early age. This was caused by various factors, including his weak constitution, the severity of his asceticism, the heavy burden of his episcopal duties, the exigencies and disappointments from his clashes with the heretics and the persons of ^{political} power, the efforts and anxiety for the unity of the Churches, the special care and anguish for the poor of the Basileiad and, generally, his struggle for the preservation of orthodoxy. In 378, although he could consolidate his mighty work after the death of Valens in 378, unfortunately he had no

more physical strength left to him. In November and December of that year he was confined to his bed/being critically ill. He died on the first of January of 379, having ordained⁽²⁹⁾ many of his genuine disciples to the priesthood and thus ensuring that they would continue his effort for the Gospel, the World and the Church.

Several scholars ^{have} attempted to evaluate St Basil's character. Most of them recognized the uniqueness of his character and stressed the complexity and resourcefulness of his personality. Erasmus found him comparable to many great personalities of classical antiquity, Pericles, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes.⁽³⁰⁾ The Patrologist Otto Bardenhewer called him a "Roman among the Greeks".⁽³¹⁾ The late Prof. Constantine Bonis of the University of Athens saw him as "the epitome of every synthesis of faith and knowledge". Prof. Stylianos Papadopoulos of the same University sees him as "the answer, from beginning to end, to the challenges and crises of his time, who did what he did in order to heal wounds, usually of spiritual nature, but sometimes material ones as well".⁽³²⁾ But it was Gregory the Theologian, his life-long friend, who gave us the best description of Basil's character. "He had a greater education than his age warranted, and he exhibited a solidity of ethos which was greater than his education. He was a rhetor among rhetors, even before the thrones of the sophists; a philosopher among philosophers, even before the dogmas of philosophy; above all, a Christian Priest, before he entered the priesthood; he was such that he was

acknowledged by all in all!(33)... Virtue was his comeliness; theology, his grandeur; restlessness, which leads as far as God, his way; sowing and spreading of the word, his power".(34) The apolytikion (dismissal hymn) of his feast day, states that "he beautified the manners of human beings", that "he mingled together the virtues of all the saints" and that he emerged as the type of "the royal priesthood". It is not surprising that the Orthodox Church has placed him first in the chorus of the Ecumenical Fathers and Teachers of Orthodox Christianity and calls him "Heavenly appearance" (οὐρανοφάντωρ).

(2) St Basil's chronological charter

- c.320-330 Birth of St Basil at Caesarea, Cappadocia.
- 330-335 Basil's transportation to Annisa of Pontus and delivery to his foster mother.
- 335-337 Basil's return to Neocaesarea for his elementary education which he received from his father.
- 342-346 Basil receives his encyclical education in Caesarea.
- 346-347 Basil departs to Constantinople for higher studies.
- 347-350 Basil's studies with Libanius(?)
- 351/352 Basil departs to Athens to pursue further studies along with his friend Gregory the Theologian.
- 355 Basil and Gregory the Theologian meet with Julian the future emperor and Apostate.
- 356 Basil's return to Caesarea from Athens.
- 356/8 Basil as "Advocate" and "Teacher" of Rhetoric at Caesarea and subsequently pilgrim to various monastic centres in Syria, Palaestine, Egypt and Mesopotamia.
- 358 Basil's return to Caesarea and his invitation to Gregory to join him as a monk at Pontus.
- 359 Basil's baptism by Bishop Dianius of Caesarea, and elevation to the office of Reader.
- 360 Basil joins his Bishop at a synod in Const/nople which dealt with Eunomius. He then departs to Iris to start his monastic career.
- 360/2 Basil is joined by Gregory and writes his first ascetical writings and the Philocalia.
- 362 Basil visits Caesarea on the occasion of Dianius' death and the elevation of Eusebius, who ordains him presbyter against his will.
- 363 Basil returns to Pontus and is joined again by Gregory.
- 363/4 Basil completes his work *Anatreptikos* against Eunomius and is ordained Presbyter by Eusebius.

365 Basil returns to Caesarea on account of Valens' proarian policy and engages in manifold pastoral and literary activity.

367-70 Basil continues his manifold ministry in Caesarea, including care for the poor and the victims of the famine of 368.

370 Eusebius of Caesarea dies and Basil succeeds him in the Metropolitan throne.

372 Basil's dialogue with the Prefect Modestus.

372 Basil ordains his friend Gregory the Theologian Bishop of Sassima and his younger brother Gregory to the episcopate of Nyssa, and rebuilds the Basileiad, the renowned institution of social providence. Valens is persuaded by Modestus to send Basil into exile, but this plan fails because Basil heals Galates the son of Valens.

373 A new edict of Valens sends Basil into exile, which, however, is not put into effect, because the pen of Valens is broken three times as he attempts to sign it.

374 Basil ordains Amphilochius Bishop of Iconium and commences writing his book *On the Holy Spirit* to Amphilochius against the Pneumatomachi.

375 Basil composes canons of church discipline, and completes his treatise *On the Holy Spirit*.

378 The last year in Basil's life. He ordains successors for his work.

379 1 January, Basil's death at the age of c 50 years old.

(3) St Basil's *Anatreptikos*

Basil's *Anatreptikos* (Ἀνατρεπτικός τοῦ Ἀπολογητικοῦ τοῦ δυσσεβοῦς Εὐνομίου) consisting of three Discourses (Λόγοι), is his first dogmatic work and clearly has a dogmatic antirrhetical character. It was written most probably at the ascetical resort of Iris between 363-364. This clearly appears in his Epistle 20, which is dated between 364 and 365, and also in Gregory of Nyssa's *Contra Eunomium* (Κατὰ Εὐνομίου) who, writing in 378, certifies that Basil wrote his work fourteen years ago, i.e. c. 364.

The occasion for the composition of this work was provided by Eunomius himself who published his own *Apologetikos*, according to some in AD 361 (Quasten, Vaggione), i.e. one year after the (predominantly Arian) Synod of Constantinople (360) which vindicated him, or according to others (Kopecek) in 360.⁽³⁵⁾ This work, as Basil calls it in his Epistle to Leontius the sophist, is a "child's play" (παιδιά) or "a little more than a child's play" (μικρῶ παιδιᾶς σπουδαιότερα). It seems that St Basil uses this characterization because he believes, as his *Anatreptikos* shows, that every attempt of the mind to penetrate into the substance of God and to speak about it with rational arguments can only be likened to "child's play". Basil does not allow matters which are ineffable to be approached by rationalism, because the result of such a procedure could only be to the detriment of the person who adopts it. God's

revelation, being such an ineffable matter, can be approached only by faith and as far as God allows, with the means provided by God and not just with the means of human impertinence. The same approach is adopted by all the great theologians of the Church, whose thought is fed by faith and whose faith is based on God's gift of revelation. In our view it is Basil's great commitment to this approach that makes him write with such passion against Eunomius.

The real cause for the composition of Basil's *Anatreptikos* is to be found in the spiritual turmoil and confusion which Eunomius introduced into the faithful through the publication of his *Apologetikos*, inasmuch as he cast serious doubts as to the consubstantiality (ὁμοουσιότης) of the three persons of the Trinity and argued that these persons exist as three 'hetero-ousian' (different in substance) hypostaseis.

Basil's purpose in writing against Eunomius was to persuade him to return to the right faith and to strengthen those who remained faithful to orthodoxy. At the same time he wanted to expose the blasphemy of Eunomius "against the high glory of the only-begotten Son of God" (τὴν βλασφημίαν ἣν εἰς τὸ ὕψος τῆς δόξης τοῦ Μονογενοῦς ἐλάλησεν Or.1.1.) and the Holy Spirit. He believed that he could do this by removing the outward covers of the seemingly rational foundation of Eunomius' views.

It is generally accepted that Basil's work is a continuation of the work of the great Athanasius and constitutes the basis of Cappadocian theology. Its content, which will be fully analyzed

below, can be briefly summarized in the following way:(36)

The First Discourse begins with a brief discussion of Eunomius' faith and his insistence that God's substance (οὐσία) is identical with the notion of "the ingenerate" (τὸ ἀγέννητον) -- which includes other related notions, such as "the beginningless" (τὸ ἀναρχον), or "the eternal" (τὸ αἰώνιον), or "the immutable" (τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον) or "the unpartitioned" (τὸ ἀμέριστον) -- and describes or qualifies the Father alone. St Basil first points out that this notion is not found in Holy Scripture and that its real origin is Aristotle's philosophy, and then argues that it is actually misused by Eunomius because it denotes either the relation of one object to another, or a partial feature of an object itself as opposed to its substance (οὐσία). This means that God's substance cannot be identical with the characteristic feature of the "ingenerate", which, in point of fact, denotes and constitutes an apophatic feature of God, like other related features, such as the "beginningless", the "immutable", etc., which describe and qualify not only the Father but also the Son. For St Basil these apophatic features reveal the weakness of human reason and generally man's incapacity to understand the substance of God. God's substance, therefore, cannot be his ingenerateness because it is utterly incomprehensible and undefinable. Besides, the "ingenerate" denotes operation (ἐνέργειαν) or manner of existence (τρόπον ὑπάρξεως) and not substance (οὐσία) or nature (φύσις). It denotes the relation of one thing to another, namely, of God the Father to the Son and

to the Spirit. It tells us how God is in relation to the Son and the Spirit, but not what he is.

In the Second Discourse Basil defends and elaborates the consubstantiality (τὸ ὁμοούσιον) of the Son with the Father. Eunomius claims that the Son was born out of nothing, before all the other creatures. For St Basil this amounts to a denial of the source of life and leads to atheism (*Anatreptikos* 2.2. PG 29:576B). The substantial feature or property of the "ingenerate" is not denied by the attribution of the property of the "generate" (τὸ γεννητόν) to the person of the Son. To explain the Son's consubstantiality with the Father St Basil argues that the Son is nowhere mentioned in the Scriptures as a "thing made" (γένημα), or "creature" (ποίημα), but as a Son (Υἱός). Far from being a creature the Son is the living icon (image) of the invisible God. He is self-life, preserving exactly the identity of substance with the Father. This means that he is consubstantial with the Father and that as such he is also without beginning and eternal. It also means that the Son is not the product of God's will, nor did he come into being in time, but has been eternally born and exists beside the Father.

In the Third Discourse Basil deals with the orthodox doctrine of the third person of the Holy Trinity, the Holy Spirit, against the views of Eunomius. He argues that the Spirit is not a creature but shares in the same honour and dignity with the Father and the Son. "If one [in this case Eunomius] moves from the creatures to the understanding of the substance of

God, then, one would find the Son to be a creation of the ingenerate and the Paraclete a creation of the Only-begotten". But on the basis of Scripture, tradition and reason, one can easily establish that the Paraclete not only is not a creature, but has the nature of the Father and the Son, constituting a separate hypostasis, and being Lord, as the Son, sanctifying and enlightening. Thus, like the Father and the Son, he too has all in common with them by nature, i.e. goodness, uprightness, holiness, life, etc. He is not numbered with many others, like the angels, but is seen in the Trinity. What, however, Basil does not acknowledge, unlike Athanasius, his mentor, and Gregory the Theologian, his friend, is the *homoousion* of the Holy Spirit to the Son and to the Father. He avoids using this term, as he explains elsewhere, for pastoral reasons, and not because he has doubts about the true Godhead of the Spirit.

**PART II:
INTRODUCTION TO EUNOMIUS**

(4) Eunomius: A brief biographical Memorandum

Eunomius the Galatian⁽³⁷⁾ was born in 325? (or 330? or 333?) at the village of Dakoura in Cappadocia of a father who was some sort of landowner. Gregory of Nyssa who knew him from his youth tells us that his father was a farmer and a very likeable person and that his only impediment was his son!⁽³⁸⁾ Having received his preliminary education from his father, Eunomius went, at the prompting of the Arian Bishop Secundus, to Antioch and later, in 356, to Alexandria, where he studied for nearly two years under the Arian Aetius,⁽³⁹⁾ whom he succeeded in 367 as leader of the Anomoeans.⁽⁴⁰⁾

In 358, having been condemned by the Council of Ancyra (358) and following an invitation by Eudoxius of Antioch, he came, together with Aetius, to Antioch where he cooperated with Eudoxius in spreading the teaching of the Anomoeans. In the same year he was ordained to the Diaconate by Eudoxius, with whom he had been closely associated, and in 360 he was elected by the Arians as Bishop of Cyzicus. Eudoxius had urged Eunomius to conceal the heretical teaching of his teacher Aetius, but he failed to keep the suggestion of his protector. As a consequence he was deposed and then exiled, first under the

emperor Valens (369/70) and later, after his reinstatement, in 379, by Theodosius I. While in exile he went to various places, such as Mauritania, Naxos, Mysia and Caesarea in Cappadocia.

Eunomius died, most probably, during 393-394 at a very old age and the oration on his funeral was delivered by the semi-Arian historian Philostorgius.⁽⁴¹⁾

Eunomius *composed* many writings, most of which were of dogmatic and antirrhetical character. Only a few of these have survived as with those of ^{of the} most condemned heretics. Successive imperial edicts from 398 prohibited their circulation and recommended their destruction. Socrates, the historian, mentions Eunomius' Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and forty treatises in the form of Epistles,⁽⁴²⁾ which were also known to Photius. None of these have survived to this day. The only writings which still survive are: 1) his *Apologetikos* (Ἀπολογητικός)⁽⁴³⁾ which he published in 361 after his elevation to the episcopate and which, according to Photius, was circulated only amongst his followers, because his opponents had banned it from their ranks. In this work he expounded his views on God's "ingenerateness" (ἀγεννησία) and the Son's "anomoeanism" (ἀνόμοιον). 2) The *Expositio Fidei* (Ἐκθεσις Πίστεως) which he handed in to the Emperor Theodosius in 383. 3) His work *Apologetikos for the Apologetikos* (Ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Ἀπολογίας),⁽⁴⁴⁾ which he wrote over a period of years as a response to Basil's criticisms without, however, publishing it as long as Basil was alive, and which is preserved in extensive quotations

by Gregory of Nyssa in his refutation of it, his celebrated *Antirrhethikos*. Photius knew only three books of this Apology,⁽⁴⁵⁾ whereas Philostorgius, much earlier, spoke of five books.⁽⁴⁶⁾

(5) Eunomius's Chronological charter

- 325? Eunomius' birth at Dakoura of Cappadocia.
- 356 Eunomius goes to Alexandria and studies under Aetius.
- 358 Eunomius is ordained Deacon by Eudoxius of Antioch.
- 360 Eunomius is ordained Bishop of Cyzicus by Eudoxius in place of Aetius but is soon removed from there following protests from his clergy and people.
- 361/3 Eunomius writes his *Apologetikos*.
- 365/6 Eunomius is exiled by Valens to Mauritania and subsequently to Naxos because of his relations with the usurper of the throne Procopius.
- 367 Eunomius succeeds Aetius and becomes the indisputable leader of the Anomœans.
- 369 Eunomius is exiled by the Emperor Valens.
- 378 Eunomius publishes his *Apologetikos for the Apologetikos*.
- 379 Eunomius is exiled by Theodosius I.
- 381 Eunomius is condemned by the Second Ecumenical Synod of Constantinople.
- 383 Eunomius participates in the Synod of Constantinople and submits his *Expositio Fidei* to Emperor Theodosius, by whom he is, later on, exiled to Mysia and later to Caesarea of Cappadocia.
- 393/5 Possible death of Eunomius.

(6) Eunomius's *Apologetikos* and his place in Arianism

The occasion for the composition of the *Apologetikos* of Eunomius was allegedly provided by Eunomius' "accusers" (κατήγοροι),(47) who, however, are not mentioned, as well as the "false accusations" which were made of him.(48) There is a double aim in this book: the defence 1) of the monarchy of God and 2) of the harmonious order of the universe. The order of the universe, as he says, could be: God = ultimate cause of the universe. Only-begotten Logos = offspring of God and Creator of all things. Spirit = first creation of the Logos. On this basis he rejected both the *homoousion* of the Logos and the Godhead of the Holy Spirit.

The real reason, however, for the composition of the *Apologetikos* is given by St Basil. He wants to hide the fact that he expounds his dogmas wholly willfully, in case he is not taken seriously by many of his readers, and so he pretends that it was by necessity that he wrote what he wrote.(49) In other words he wanted to have a real pretext for propagating his own blasphemy, which he had accepted for some time. He writes an apology in order to avoid the charge of innovation (καινοτομία) which amounts to heresy and to attract ^a greater audience, since human beings naturally are sympathetically disposed towards those who are persecuted and pay greater attention to their arguments. This becomes very clear in the "Prooimion" of the *Apologetikos* where he explicitly states that he wants to uncover

the lie of the slanderers and evil men and to protect the innocence of the many, upholding the pious tradition of the fathers (τὴν δὲ κρατοῦσαν καὶ κανόνα προεκθέμενοι).(50) To certify this he cites at the very start his confession of faith:

"We believe in one God the Father, Almighty, from whom are all things, and in one only-begotten Son of God, God the Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and in one ^{Holy} Spirit, the Paraclete".(51)

And as he himself goes on to tell, there is one God alone, who is not created either by himself or by anybody else, and consequently he is bound up with ingenerateness and, rather, his substance is ingenerateness itself (ἀκολουθεῖ τούτῳ τὸ ἀγέννητον, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ οὐσία ἀγέννητος).(52)

Eunomius based his teaching on the teaching of Arius, who stressed that God is one, alone ingenerate and ever existing:

"we know of one God, alone ingenerate, alone ever existing, alone without beginning, alone having immortality".(53)

Next to God there is no other being. There is inside him, however, an impersonal power, his Wisdom and Logos. Arius' teaching is derived from the dynamic monarchianism of Paul of Samosata, and it is also related to some extent with the doctrines of the Apologists and with echoes of the teachings of the Gnostics.

According to Arius God was alone only up to a point (apparently a point in eternity for there was no time in God!),

before which he was not a father. "God was not always a father, but became a father afterwards".⁽⁵⁴⁾ He became a father when he decided to create the world, and on this account he created a certain being, who is called Son. This being, as Arius contends, came into existence out of nothing and, hence, he is a creature. "The Logos of God himself came into being out of nothing, and there was when he was not and he was not before he came to be, but he too had a beginning of being created. For God was alone and there was not yet any Logos or Wisdom. Afterwards though, when he decided to create us, then he created a certain being and called him Logos, Wisdom and Son, in order to create us through him".⁽⁵⁵⁾

Consequently, Christ, as Arius contends in his *Thalia*,⁽⁵⁶⁾ is not God. "Neither is the Logos true God", compared to God the Father. This is why not only does he not know the Father perfectly, but neither does he know his own substance. Again Christ is not God, even when compared to human beings. He is only a "perfect creature". He became a "strong god" through moral progress and the operation of divine grace. On the above basis, the present world begins with the creation of the Son. The Son is the first-fruits of creation. God did not create the world directly, but created the Logos so that the Logos may create the world. The Logos was created before all things. Ultimately, however, "the Logos came to be out of nothing and there was when he was not".⁽⁵⁷⁾

The Son, then, is not true God, in relation to whoever or

whatever, and for this reason all his characteristic features are relative, since he has limited knowledge, inasmuch as he neither sees nor knows the Father and, furthermore, is mutable like man. "And as to his nature, like all the rest, the Logos too is mutable, but through his own self-determination, as long as he wills it, he remains good. When, however, he wants to, he can change, being like us of a mutable nature".(58) To defend this teaching Arius used the verse from the book of Proverbs, "The Lord created me, a beginning of all his ways"(Prov. 8:22).(59)

This teaching of Arius, supported by Aetius and Eunomius, caused havoc in the Church. It was regarded as a major assault on Christianity, since Arius and his followers separated God from Christ.

The Church's reaction to the Arian heresy was powerfully expressed through the Council of Nicaea (325) which condemned Arius and his followers and articulated the apostolic and catholic consciousness, the apostolic faith and experience, the apostolic and catholic tradition. The Synod did not create something new, but simply expressed and articulated the ancient faith of the Church which was kept like a sacred earlum in the charismatic life of the Church through the Holy Spirit. This catholic faith was expressed by the strong term *homoousios*.

The word *homoousios* expresses that ^{seemingly} "antinomian" seed of the Christian understanding of life, the "one name", the "name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit", as distinct from the three names of the Father, the Son and the Spirit! The fathers

of Nicaea expressed by this term the substance of Christianity. This is in fact the mystery of theology, namely, the fact that Christ is true God, *homoousios* to God the Father and, hence, Saviour, Redeemer, Lord.(60)

Like Arius, so Eunomius came to say that the Father was a "perfect monad", "a God infinitely one", who does not admit of any kind of participation in his Godhead and no kind of transposition from the one substance to the three hypostases. Birth would have meant for God corruption of his simple substance. Thus birth cannot mean anything else, except creation. Arius, like Eunomius, attempted to adopt the methods and means of philosophy which are according to human perception as methods and means for the knowledge of Christ and God, or to place the fallen human mind as the measure for assessing the work of Christ by grace, or to replace by means of rationalist rules the Christian laws of the Holy Spirit. Both Arius and Eunomius wanted to 'undeify', as it were, the God-man, thus clearly demonstrating that they sided with the opposition of the devil as seen in the Gospel. They tried, as St Athanasius says, to interpret the Holy Scriptures "according to their own mind"(61) and not "according to the mind of Christ".(62) They measured Christ by themselves and thus made Christ like themselves. They measured by their nature the nature of the infinite and thus dragged it down to the level of a created nature. As St Athanasius again says, "the Arians co-enumerate themselves with the Greeks," because "they

worship creation instead of the Creator",⁽⁶³⁾ teaching that Christ is a creature. But it is clear that Eunomius based his own theses on those of Arius, as we mentioned above. If we accept that Christ is not God, then, what else can one suppose, except that he is a deceiver, since he deceives when he says, "I and my Father are One".⁽⁶⁴⁾

Both Arius and Eunomius attempted to understand God in Christ logically. They attempted to move into the central dogma of the faith by means of a predetermined mind-set, forgetting that to attempt to know, or interpret, God with a sinful mind, is to commit adultery of consciousness, since, in accordance again with the thought of St Athanasius, "the God who can be understood is not God". Thus the rejection of the Godhead of Christ and the impiety concerning his divine substance⁽⁶⁵⁾ is regarded by St Athanasius to be a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. Again to reject the *homoousion* of Christ means that you are not Christ's but Judas' because the Church calls Arius "second Judas".⁽⁶⁶⁾

Eunomius' views were critically evaluated and refuted by St Basil, St Gregory the Theologian, St Gregory of Nyssa, St John Chrysostom, Didymus the Blind, Apollinaris of Laodicea, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Cyril of Alexandria, but not all of these critical refutations have survived. It is not easy today to assess critically and objectively the views of Eunomius, not only because his writings have not survived entire, but also because his opponents, however illustrious and important they may be,

present Eunomius in a selective way and evaluate him from their own particular points of view. Yet, compared to other condemned heretics, he seems to be in a better position as regards the objective presentation of his views, probably because he was both outspoken and fairly distinguished as a literary man. This is clearly seen in the various accounts of Eunomius which modern scholars have advanced and not least in his own surviving texts.⁽⁶⁷⁾

Obviously Eunomius' central concern in his teaching was the problem relating to the doctrine of God arising from the combination of this doctrine with the doctrines of the Son and the Holy Spirit. For him, as we have noted above, God is simple and incapable of partition and the main characteristic feature or property of his substance (his being) is his ingenerateness (*ἀγεννησία*) -- the key theological notion of Eunomius' system -- which actually specifies or even defines it. Though a negative or apophatic notion, this ingenerateness of God has for Eunomius a positive content, denoting what is self-existent, the so-called *aseitas*,⁽⁶⁸⁾ that being which in itself is the cause of its existence, if we are allowed to use a term from scholastic theology. Thus the notion of ingenerateness overrides the notion of God's substance so completely that it can be said that God does not know anything more than we already know. As Socrates, the historian, puts it: "As far as his own substance (being) is concerned, God does not know anything more than we do, inasmuch as this substance is not more known

to him and less known to us. Rather, what we may know about it, this is what he too certainly knows; and what he does know, this is what you may also find in us without any difference whatsoever".(69)

Eunomius' opponents controverted this view by exposing his Aristotelian premises. They argued that, like Aetius and Theophronius, he too introduced an unrestricted application of philosophical premises to the doctrine of theology and, as a result, transformed the latter into "technology" (τεχνολογία).(70) Eunomius' theological epistemology reveals his total commitment to rationalism, which reaches its excessive limits but is deprived of the religious element which is typical of the Platonic philosophical thought. His is a dialectic totally intellectualist, which is based on abstract ideas.

Almost inevitably the Cappadocian counter-thesis against Eunomius' position was the emphasis on the incomprehensibility and unknowability of the substance of God, which was defended on biblical and traditional grounds. God is known only through his "energies" which are impressed on the mind by God (hence their name: ἐπίνοιαί) and which are understood as "an heuristic intercourse with what is unknown, through both what precedes and what follows, finding what follows on from the first perception of the object of inquiry", (71) i.e. as an operation which begins with an already existing perception of the object of inquiry and proceeds to a fuller perception of this object. Furthermore, the Cappadocians argued that the names of God

do retain their value, even though they have been found by means of the "perceptions" (ἐπίνοιαι). On the contrary Eunomius rejected both the perceptions and the names. The perceptions, he said, which were the invented or spurious names of human "stochastic" activity, and as such mere conventional signs, had no objective value and could not lead to the knowledge of the object as such. If man was attached only to such perceptions, he would have to remain dumb, because he would not have the possibility to express any reality.

Eunomius also argued that apart from the "perceptions" there are other names which are not products of human thought. These are objective names, or names of rational revelations, expressing the substance of their objects. Such names are given to things only by God himself. Such names, or rational seeds, were given by God in the beginning when he created all things and the human soul. This claim reminds one of Plato's argument in the Cratylus.⁽⁷²⁾

Ultimately, as we shall see in our analysis below, Eunomius' *Apologetikos* stands for the primacy of philosophical theology over against the theology of revelation which is given in the Gospel and the Apostolic kerygma.

PART III**AN ANALYSIS OF ST BASIL'S *ANATREPTIKOS* AGAINST
EUNOMIUS****(1) The Scope of the present research**

What we have gathered in the preceding part from the works of various scholars represents a very general picture of the theological debate between Basil and Eunomius -- a picture which is sufficient to attract our attention to a more thorough theological study. Given the fact that the major work which deals with this debate has not been translated into English and there is no thorough study on it beyond the essay of M. Anastos (cf. Bibliography), which, as he acknowledges, is only a summary and the short notes of Kopecek (cf. Bibliography), it was considered necessary to undertake this study of the original text, with the view to discovering the finer points of Basil's early thought on the Trinity, as that was shaped in dialogue with his most formidable opponent, his Arian compatriot Eunomius, against whom not only himself, but also all other orthodox church leaders felt obliged to write.

The particular task for this research is quite specific and perhaps somewhat limited, but this was deliberately determined by the restricted scope of the MA research programme. It hopefully serves as a beginning for a longer research which

would examine and assess all Patristic reactions to Eunomius.

The method employed here is twofold: analytic and synthetic. We have sought first of all to provide an analytical exposition of the three Orations on the basis of the original text and keeping an eye on Anastos' useful summary, but schematizing the contents of our exposition so as to bring out the main theological theses of Eunomius and Basil's counter-theses. Then second, we have sought to gather together the anti-Eunomian Basilian data on the theme of Triadology with the view to providing a basis, as it were, for examining, in the future, if circumstances allow, the development of Basil's thought on the Trinity.

There are obviously two clear premises, which have guided us in undertaking this research: first the conviction that Basil's views were shaped by his involvement in concrete debates with others, and second, that there is a historical development in his thought, which still needs to be recovered. Against the total contribution of the Great Basil to Trinitarian doctrine, this research is only initial, but as a Greek proverb has it, "the beginning is the half of the whole" (ἡ ἀρχὴ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντός).

(2) AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST ORATION

Introduction

This First Oration is divided into 27 chapters (to be cited as A1,1-27) in which Basil attempts to refute Eunomius' arguments against "the height of the glory of the Only-Begotten" (τὸ ὕψος τῆς δόξης τοῦ Μονογενοῦς). In the Introduction (A1,1-5) he reveals the false or pretentious character of the title *Apologetikos* (Apology) which Eunomius attributed to his work and attempts to expose Eunomius' haughty spirit against the tradition and the earlier Christians. The citation of a Creed at the beginning of his work indicates Eunomius' desire to attract the initial approval of his readers. But his true intention is revealed in what follows: namely, Eunomius' "Aristotelian and Chrysippian syllogisms", as Basil calls them, which eventually lead to the rejection of the Godhead of Christ.

The ingenerate Father

Basil begins in A1,5 with Eunomius' contention that by definition "the ingenerate Father was not born, either by himself or, by anyone else". He points out that, although the characterisation of the Father as "ingenerate" (ἀγέννητος) is conceivable by us, yet it is not met in the Scriptures and should be avoided because it can give rise to blasphemous thoughts; besides the term "ingenerate" is covered by the scriptural term "Father", inasmuch as he who is truly and uniquely "Father" is obviously not derived from anybody else but is "ingenerate". Indeed one

should avoid the designation "ingenerate" in preference to the designation "Father", lest one thinks that he can be wiser than the Lord himself who instituted that one "should be baptised in the name of the Father... (Matth. 28:19)". Clearly Basil's response to Eunomius' "ingenerate" is both biblical and liturgical and reminds one of similar responses of Athanasius to the Arians.

Basil turns next to the Eunomian contention, that, "if neither the Father pre-existed himself, nor anything else", then the "ingenerate" is attributed only to him, or, rather, that his substance (οὐσία) is the "ingenerate". Basil's response exposes a logical falacy in this contention. To argue, as Eunomius does, that the "ingenerate" is attributable to the Father alone, is to acknowledge that this term is attributed to him from outside (ἐξωθεν). In turn, however, what is "from outside" can never designate "being" (οὐσία), but attribute (ἰδίωμα). It is, in other words, Eunomius' own logic which leads to the opposite conclusion from that which he draws. But Eunomius is aware of this and hence he adds to his contention the phrase, "or, rather, that his substance is ingenerate". The problem, however, remains, as Basil points out, inasmuch as the "ingenerate" of Eunomius cannot be both attribute (ἰδίωμα) and substance (οὐσία). The "rather" of Eunomius' construction tones down this identification, but does not remove the contradiction. At the same time this contradictory contention exposes Eunomius' real intention. He wants to identify the substance of the Father with the "ingenerate", so that the Son's generateness might exclude

him from the Godhead.

On the ingenerate and on concepts

One would have thought that this would conclude Basil's disputation, yet Eunomius' subtlety demands further discussion. Eunomius apparently made a plea that the attribution of the "ingenerate" to the Father should not be regarded as a mere or empty concept (ἐπίνοια), but as a confession which acknowledges that he is what he is said to be. Indeed he implied by this, that, if no such acknowledgement was made, then the attribution of the "ingenerate" to the Father would be nothing else but a mere thought, which existed only when it was pronounced.

It is clear, as Basil also observes, that Eunomius wanted by this plea to establish the identification of the "ingenerate" with God's substance and thereby exclude the Son from it who, as Son, must be generate. But Basil is ready to expose this subtlety also, and he does this by examining the notion of "concept" (ἐπίνοια), which lies at the very heart of Eunomius' plea. First of all the problem lies, says Basil, in that Eunomius understands a "concept" (ἐπίνοια) as nothing at all, or as something which exists only when it is pronounced, and also that he does not say whether the "ingenerate" is such a "concept" or not. Basil shows what "concepts" are by the way in which they are used (Cf. A1.6) i) in every day common experience and ii) in the Holy Scriptures (Cf. A1.7).

The common and the biblical usage of concepts

i) "Concepts" are used in every day experience in two ways: a) in connection with things which exist, in which case they are simple or composite, as for example the "body with its parts", or the "grain of wheat with its various effects or uses, on account of which it can be called fruit, or seed, or food"; b) in connection with things which are imaginary constructions of the mind independently of things which exist. In the former case a "concept" is what remains in the mind after the first impression (or conception = νόημα) is made on it as a result of direct sensation or encounter of a real object; but it is also the particular concepts which emerge in the mind as constituents of this object, what Basil calls, what "are seen by/in the concept" (θεωρητὰ ἐπινοίῃ).

ii) The use of "concepts" in the Scriptures, says Basil, is not different from the use of them in common experience. This can be seen from "one and most crucial point" (ένός δὲ μόνου καὶ καιριωτάτου), namely, the way in which they are used to denote the Lord Jesus Christ. Although the Lord is one subject (έν ὧν κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον), Scripture uses several idioms to describe the various aspects of the divine philanthropy and grace, which are derived from his "economy". Thus he is called, door, way, bread, vine, shepherd, light. Yet, the many names do not suggest that he is a "multiple construct" (πολύωνυμος), but remains "one simple and incomposite substance" (μία οὐσία ἀπλή καὶ ἀσύθετος).

Concepts and energies

The different "concepts" (ἐπίνοιαι) implied by the variety of names are in fact connected with "the different energies" (τὴν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν διαφορὰν) and the "different relations to those who are beneficiaries". Thus, as Basil explains, Christ is "light" because he reveals the unapproachable glory of his Godhead and because he enlightens the eyes of the soul of those who have been cleansed by the enlightenment of the divine knowledge. He is "vine", because he feeds those who are rooted in him with faith to do good works. He is "bread", because he sustains the constitution of the soul, keeping it form ^ψpsychical diseases, which result from lack of right judgment. Likewise, says Basil, all the names attributed to Christ are connected with a variety of energies, even though all of them presuppose one simple substance or subject. Basil argues that just as these "concepts" (ἐπίνοιαι) are not empty notions, which are dissolved with the air as soon as they are pronounced, so every attribute that one attributes to God "by way of concepts" (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν) cannot be empty of reality.

The concept of the ingenerate and Eunomius' use of it

The attribute of the "ingenerate" is such a "concept" (ἐπίνοια) which is said of God in certain circumstances or relations. God is "ingenerate" (ἀγέννητος), because "his life transcends every beginning" (ὑπερεκπίπτουσαν πάσης ἀρχῆς εὐρίσκοντες τὴν ζωὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ). Similarly he is "incorruptible" (ἀφθαρτος), because "he is indefinable, infinite and without a

conceivable end" (τὸν ἀόριστον καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ οὐδενὶ τέλει καταληπτὸν προσαγορευόμεν ἄφθαρτον). Basil points out that both attributes, "ingenerate" and "incorruptible", are grasped by way of concepts in the mind (ἐπίνοιαι) and denote idioms which are confessed to be really present in God. Thus, Eunomius' attempt to differentiate the "ingenerate" from the notion of "concept" in order to identify it with the substance of God is totally misleading and unacceptable.

In A1,8 Basil exposes the "hypocrisy" of Eunomius concerning the term "ingenerate". This is most clearly discerned from Eunomius' claim that he is not prepared "to praise God simply, according to human conception (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἀνθρωπίνην), but to proceed further to what is due to God, namely to what he is in substance". The stress on the necessity to give to God what is due to him (ὀφλήματος ἐκτισιν), says Basil, has a double aim: it is a sort of threat, designed to affect the simple Christians, who may take it to mean that, unless they comply with it, they have actually failed to respond properly to God; and it is also a subtle challenge to the more intelligent Christians that to comply with this demand frees them from every obligation, whereas to fail to do so may expose them to the wrath of God.

Basil's response: divine names

Basil's response is initially "rhetorical". He asks whether Eunomius applies the same logic to other attributes of God, for this is the logical conclusion to his argumentation. In doing this,

he also points out how ridiculous it is to think of God's substance in terms of his "providence" (τὸ προνοητικόν), or God's "foreknowledge" (τὸ προγνωστικόν).

The core of Basil's argument is that all the names applied to God (in effect, all the divine attributes), are of equal value, for, as he explains, this is what also applies to the case of human beings, where the many names applied to them, e.g. Simon, or Peter, or Cephas, do not imply difference of value. By the same token, says Basil, whoever hears that God is "immutable" (τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον), will also assume that he is "ingenerate" as well; also, whoever hears that God is "without parts" (τὸ ἀμερές), will be automatically led to God's "ability to create" (τὸ δημιουργικόν). To distinguish the names ^{by} value on account of ^{the} difference of meaning, says Basil, is to introduce absurdity and confusion and to deny the lead of the Spirit.

Basil actually produces a full account of the difference of meaning enshrined in the various names attributed to God, using biblical examples, such as: Ps. 103:24 for God's creative artistry, or Ps. 144:16 for God's providence, or Ps. 17:12 for the invisibility of God's nature, or Mal. 3:6 for the immutability of God's substance. His conclusion is that, in spite of the difference of meaning, these names are of equal value, because they point to the same substance. But this exposes the futility of every attempt to separate any one of these names and identify it with God's very substance. All of them designate God's substance just as they also designate the Son's substance because they are

equally attributed to him. In turn this means that there is no dissimilarity in the Father and the Son as far it pertains to their substance.

On philosophical and biblical grounds

Having clarified this, Basil still realizes that he needs to expose more fully the grounds on which Eunomius has isolated only the name of the "ingenerate", and has completely ignored all other names in his attempt to specify the divine substance. His answer is given in A1.9. Not only did Eunomius claim that the term ἀγέννητος is not an attribute, but he also argued that it should not be understood simply as privative (κατὰ στερησιν), on account of the initial "α" of the ἀ-γέννητος, because privation implies natural deficiency and follows a customary possession of something (ἔξις).

Basil observes that these thoughts are taken from Aristotle's "Categories" (15b and 11b, where there is explanation of στερησις and ἔξις), i.e. from the wisdom of this world, which, in Basil's view, is inapplicable when one deals with the teaching of the Spirit. Basil actually refers to John 8:44 and II Cor. 6:15 to illustrate the radical nature of the contrast between the teaching of the Spirit and the wisdom of this world, and to emphasize that the latter is a lie as derived from one's self or from the devil. But having said this, Basil makes an attempt to discuss further Eunomius's philosophical contention. He observes that what is said about the ἀγέννητος can also be said about other similar divine attributes, such as ἀφθαρτος, ἀόρατος,

ἀσώματος, ἀθάνατος, etc. What is common to all these is the fact that they are privative in character, as the initial "α" indicates, i.e. they indicate what God is not or cannot be, rather than what he is. They are negative or apophatic and do not establish something positive about God. Eunomius' contention that the ἀγένητος is not privative cannot be divorced from the other attributes and must of necessity be applied to them too. Yet he refuses to acknowledge this to be the case because he wants by his peculiar and arbitrary distinction between this and the other apophatic attributes to establish his impious heresy. Indeed he deliberately avoids mention^{ing} any other names for God although there are myriads of them.

Positive and negative attributes

Concluding his argument in A1.10 Basil argues positively, that no divine attribute can be regarded as a definition of the divine nature or substance. Yet all these different names contribute, each in its own way, to the formation of some sort of vague concept of the totality of the divine-human nature. This is achieved both positively and negatively, inasmuch as the names attributed to God express either what 'idioms' God has, or what 'idioms' he does not have. The purpose of negating 'idioms' in any attempt to form some conception of God is, as Basil explains, to avoid forming wrong conceptions, or thinking wrongly about the majesty of God. The positive idioms are attributed to him, not because they offer some sort of full explanation of his nature, but because they are fitting to him.

The "ingenerate" belongs to the former category and denotes the fact that God does not have a "birth". This is what really matters and, therefore, if it is called negative, or privative, or whatever, this is but a matter of indifference, says Basil. By contrast, however, God's "substance" (οὐσία) is not included among what are not God's properties (οὐχ ἐν τι τῶν μὴ προσόντων ἐστί), because it denotes God's very being (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ). It would be sheer madness to place God's being among the attributes and argue that it is identical with that which does not exist! That would imply the denial of all the divine attributes!

The ingenerate and the divine substance

In A1,11 Basil discusses another contention of Eunomius which builds upon his previous contentions. According to this "if the ingenerate is neither a concept, nor a privation, nor a part (because God is ἀμερής = without parts), nor something different from himself, then, the ἀγέννητον must be "an ingenerate substance" (οὐσία ἀγέννητος). This, says Basil, is Eunomius' ultimate aim, namely to identify the substance of God with the ingenerate. But he adds here something which he did not mention before, something, that is, which he needs in order to reach his ultimate conclusion. This is the claim that God is "without parts" (ἀμερής).

Basil agrees with this claim, but he also notes that Eunomius wrongly distinguishes this attribute of God, i.e. τὸ ἀμερές = his being without parts, or his incompositeness, from

his other closely related attribute, τὸ ἀπλοῦν = his simplicity. Eunomius insists on the ἀμερές, because he wants to stress that God is not partly (ἐν γένει) ἀγέννητος and partly γεννητός, or that τὸ ἀγέννητον is something which exists inside God and is not God's substantial attribute. Basil finds this way of argumentation totally incompatible with common thinking and regards it as foolish by pointing to Prov. 26:4. The case is the exact opposite, since the ἀγέννητον can never be identified with God's οὐσία, because it is perceived conceptually (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν), and is privative (στερητικόν) in its meaning. Eunomius' claims are quite unacceptable because they are unwarranted, and have not been at all substantiated.

The definition of God's substance

In A1,12f Basil assesses Eunomius' claim of having defined the substance of God. This claim, he says, is in fact a matter of haughtiness which surpasses that of the devil who, as Isaiah 14:13 says, wanted "to establish his throne above the stars". It could not be a claim of common sense, because the human mind can only grasp the fact that God is (or exists, i.e. τὸ εἶναι τὸν θεόν), but never "what he is" (τὸ τί εἶναι). Nor could it be the teaching of the Spirit, for the great saints who were enlightened by the Holy Spirit, such as David (Psalm 138:6), Isaiah (53:8) and Paul (Rom. 11:33), claim the exact opposite, while Moses who spoke about creation was even unable to specify the substance of the earth (saying that it was without form and invisible) and restricted himself to simply stating the

fact of creation. But even the holy men of old, who were honoured so much by God, that he linked his name to theirs, being called "their God" (Hebr. 11:16), or "God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob" (Ex. 3:6, 15:16), were not able to know the substance of God.

It is only Eunomius, says Basil, who, rising above the Saints, Moses and the Apostles, not only claims to possess exact knowledge of the name and substance of God, but also dares to reveal it to all human beings through his writings. What he has actually achieved is to delude himself with the view that his mind has been raised above the substance of God, whereas for everybody else this substance is acknowledged to be beyond the reach of every human mind and every human knowledge.

The unknowability of God's substance

Continuing his discussion of the same theme in A1,14 Basil teaches that knowledge of the divine substance surpasses the abilities not only of human beings but also of all rational beings, i.e. of all creatures. The Father, he says, is known only to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, since, as Scripture says "no one has known the Father save the Son" (Phil. 4:7) and "the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God" (I Cor. 2:10-11). God's substance, says Basil, is invisible to everyone, except to the Son and to the Spirit. Human beings, however, acquire some sense of God's wisdom and goodness, when "through his energies they rise to him and through the created things form a sense of the Creator". This is "what is known of

God (τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ), which God has revealed" (Rom. 1:19) to all human beings.

God's substance is not perceived to be something material, says Basil, as it happens to be the case with the atheists amongst the Greek sages (i.e. the naturalist Ionian philosophers, who put forward the dogma that matter is composite, consisting of four elements, fire, air, water and earth), who even thought that it could be composite. The immateriality of God's substance can also be deduced from the prophet Ezekiel's description according to which God is fire and amber (cf. Ez. 8:2). But Basil concludes with the statement of the Apostle in Hebr. 11:6 which indirectly prohibits speculation about the divine substance as it stresses one's duty to believe "that God exists and rewards those who seek him".

Salvation says Basil is granted to human beings not on the basis of their discovering "what God is", but on the basis of confessing "that he is". This being the case, i.e. having established that God's substance is totally incomprehensible to human beings, Basil turns next to an exact investigation of the meaning of Eunomius' key text connected with the "ingenerate".

The true meaning of the ingenerate

The ἀγέννητον says Basil in A1,15 does not reveal "what God is", but "how he is", namely, that he is derived from no one, or that he is without beginning (ἀναρχος). This is similar to the genealogies in the beginning of Luke's Gospel, which do not say what human beings are, but whence they are derived.

This means that the ἀγέννητον has nothing to do with God's οὐσία but with his manner of existence (τρόπον ὑπάρξεως) and, therefore, Eunomius' contention is wrong.

The ἀγέννητον, says Basil in A1,16, teaches us that God's life is always above and beyond our thoughts, because we cannot locate any principle from which it was derived. Yet Eunomius has employed it dialectically, contrasting it to the γεννητόν and arguing that God cannot be both. His real intention was to use it against the Only-begotten. Basil's objection to Eunomius' use of this term is two-fold. On the one hand he objects to Eunomius' subordination of the saving names of Father and Son to the names of "ingenerate" and "generate". On the other hand he finds totally unworthy of God, and even blasphemous, Eunomius' assertion that God's ingenerateness prevents him, or even excludes him, from any involvement in giving birth. Indeed this second point implies, as Basil explains in A1,17, that God cannot be Father at all and that there can be no communion between the God who cannot be Father and the Son who cannot have been born of him. This, however, stands in stark contradiction to the teachings of the Apostles, the Gospels and of the Lord Jesus Christ himself, as one can clearly see in John. 14:9 and 12:45.

Comparison or communion of Father and Son

If the Son does not admit of comparison or communion with the Father, says Basil, he would not have said that the former is *in* the latter. Since, however, the opposite is the case,

the Son has said what he has said, because it is the relative that reveals the relative, or the seal which bears the imprint of the one who imprinted it, or the icon through which the archetype is made known. Such is the Son, says Basil in A1,18, as one can gather from John 6:27, and Colos. 1:15. He is a "living icon" (εἰκὼν ζωσα) and a "self-existing life" (αὐτοοὔσα ζωή) which always retains the unchangeability of the substance and not something which is lifeless, or created, or ^αwork of art and conceptualization. "To be in the form of God" (Phil. 2:6) is "to exist in God's very substance". "To have taken the form of the servant" (Phil. 2:7) means to have become human in substance and "to have been in the form of God" means to possess the idiom of the divine substance. This is why, says Basil, he can say "whoever has seen me, has seen the Father" (John 14:9). Yet Eunomius, by refusing to recognize him for what he is, interrupts the advance of human beings to the knowledge of God which is effected through him, since the Lord himself says, that "Whatever the Father has are the Son's also" (John 16:15) and, that "Just as the Father has life in himself, so he has given life to the Son to have it in himself" (John 5:26).

Eunomius, however, claims that the Father has nothing to do with the Son as born of him and that there is no comparison between the one who begets and the one who is begotten. Through this, says Basil, Eunomius a) cancels out what is said about the Son as the icon (image) of the Father and b), rejects the statement that the Son is the radiance and character of the

hypostasis of God (Hebr. 1:3).

Equality and difference of Father and Son

In A1,19 Basil responds to Eunomius' contention that it is not possible to accept both that the divine substance is common to the Father and to the Son and that they are differentiated as to order (τάξις) and "seniority of time" (χρόνου πρεσβείοις), the Father being first and the Son, second, because God's substance does not admit of time, or priority and posteriority. As regards the point that the Father and the Son have the divine substance in common, he explains that it would be totally unacceptable, if it was conceived of in terms of a prior substance which was split into Father and Son, a sort of ditheism. It would be acceptable, however, if it referred to one manner of being (τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν θεωρεῖσθαι), i.e., if, for example, the Father was light and the Son was also light in the same way. In this case the common substance would not exclude the difference in the number and the peculiar properties of each one of them (ἀριθμῶ τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ταῖς ιδιότησι ταῖς χαρακτηριζούσαις ἑκάτερον).

Father and Son, order and seniority of time

In A1,20 Basil responds to the other point of Eunomius concerning "order" (τάξις) and "seniority of time" (τοῦ χρόνου πρεσβεία). These categories, he says, are not applicable to those who have a common substance. This is all the more so in the case of the Father and the Son, who are understood in terms of

God and his Image, and of whom it is said that there never was a time when God's image was not with him (cf. Jud. 25; the statement in the Creed that "he is before all ages", as well as the designations of the Son as God's effluence and character of his existence, ἀπαύγασμα καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, Hebr. 1:3).

As regards the category of "order", Basil observes that it can be used in two ways, either naturally or conventionally (technically). The former refers to the order of creatures in accordance with their appearance at creation, or to the order in the series of numbers, or to the order in the relation between causes and effects. The latter refers to that which is constructed in a series of lessons, in offices, in numbers and the like. Eunomius, says Basil, was silent about the first and chose to argue only against the second, because he realized that only the second suited his argument. As a matter of fact, it is the first which is applicable to the Father and the Son, because it does not imply any contradiction to the fact that they share a common substance.

Basil insists that there is a type of "order", which is identified with its natural consistency *per se*, as, for example, the order in the relation between fire and the light which is derived from it. In this example, says Basil, the cause comes first and the effect, or what is derived from it, second, without, however, any division between the two by way of a temporal distance. The priority of the cause over the effect is only in

thought. Consequently, when the Father is placed before the Son, this is done according to the type of order which pertains to the relation of cause and effect and not on account of some natural difference between them, or because of some temporal superiority of the one over the other. Not to do so, says Basil, may very well lead to the denial of God as Father, since the difference of substance destroys every natural conjunction. This, in fact, is Eunomius' choice.

St Basil goes further in his response to Eunomius' contention, by conducting in A1,21 a discussion into the notion of time and contesting Eunomius' definition of it in terms of the motions of the stars. Pointing to the first days of creation, before the creation of the stars (Gen. 1:16), and also to the time when Jesus of Nazareth made the sun and the moon stand still, Basil distinguishes between the notion of time which comes with creation and is embedded in the life of the creatures, and the ways in which time is measured, to which belongs Eunomius' definition. Thus he argues that days and nights are not elements of time, as Eunomius thinks, but ways of measuring time, while time is the space which is expanded along with the constitution of the world (χρόνος δέ ἐστὶ τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τῇ συστάσει τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα). It is by this time that the motions of the stars, ^{of} the animals and of any moving creature are measured and are said to be faster or slower in comparison with one another.

The simplicity of God's substance and John 14:28

In A1,22f Basil turns to the other contention of Eunomius which relates to the simplicity of God's substance which excludes the presence in it of kind (εἶδος), or volume (ὄγκος), or size (μέγεθος). As he explains, Eunomius stresses this point because he wants to combine it with the statement of John 14:28 (that the Father is greater than the Son) and thereby exclude the Son from the Godhead and affirm only the One God of all who is ingenerate and incomparable. His real intention is to introduce his notion of the incompatibility between the ingenerate and generate substances of the Father and the Son. The problem with this is not only the failure to perceive that the substance of the Son is also simple in the same way as the Father's, but also in that he compares a substance which is without kind, volume or size, to a substance endowed with all these elements, i.e. an incomposite substance to a composite one! Actually Eunomius connects likeness to kind (i.e. to external form) and equality to volume, and thus argues that the Father is neither equal, nor like anything else, because he is without kind and without volume.

The case is, however, says Basil, that the Son too is simple and incomposite and, therefore, his likeness should not be connected with his kind but with his substance. Whatever beings have form and shape, their likeness is connected with kind, whereas the divine nature, being free from kind is formless and shapeless. As such it has the likeness connected with its

substance and the equality with the identity of power, as opposed to the measurement of size. As Scripture says, "Christ is God's power and God's wisdom" (I Cor. 1:24), because the Father's power has been placed on him. This is why "the Son does what he sees the Father doing" (John 5:19). Thus, Eunomius' rejection of the Son's equality with the Father can only be based on his deliberate decision to adopt false premises and, thereby, commit some sort of spiritual fornication (Jer. 3:3).

The true meaning of John 14:28

Eunomius, says Basil in A1,24, tries to support his contention on the basis of John 14:28. He forgets, however, the statement of Phil. 2:6 which speaks explicitly of the Son's equality with the Father. It is arbitrary on his part to explain John 14:28 in terms of the ingenerate, i.e. as if it said that "the ingenerate is greater than me"! It is also arbitrary to take the name Father as designatory of energy rather than substance and to argue that the energy is greater than, or assymetric to, the effect produced by it, or that energy and product cannot be equal.

For Basil the name Father denotes substance and on this basis the whole syllogism of Eunomius concerning equality or inequality falls to the ground. If the name Father designates substance, then the Father is not greater than the Son because every energy is symmetric to its effect, as there is no external obstacle. What then, is the orthodox meaning of this "greater"

of John 14:28? Basil explains this in the following chapter (A1,25).

Basil first notes that the comparative "greater" is usually applied to a cause of excelling power, or superior office, or superior size. All these are inapplicable in the case of John 14:28, because of the simplicity of God's substance, and because Father and Son are explicitly said to be "one" (ἐν) in John 10:30. "One" here means "equal or identical in power". So does the other statement in John 10:29 which acknowledges the Father to be above all and the Son to be the unfailing custodian of those who were delivered to him by the Father. To strengthen this point Basil also turns to other related verses to emphasize the equality of honour of the Father and the Son: Ps. 109:1, Acts 2:34, Hebr. 8:1, 12:2, Matth. 25:31. Thus, he concludes that the "greater" of John 14:28, simply refers to the fact that the Father is the cause and principle (αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή) of the Son, i.e. to what the Father is as Father and not to the Father's substance.

Eunomius' inconsistency

In the final chapters of this first discourse, A1,26 and 27, Basil employs all his dialectical eloquence in order to expose the inconsistency of Eunomius in relation to God's peace to others and even to himself. This inconsistency appears in the Eunomian statement that all his contentions are proved by the fact that there is only one God who is ingenerate and incomparable (ὅτι μὲν εἷς τῶν ὄλων θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀσύγκριτος).

How, asks Basil, can one establish that God is "greater" than the Son if he is incomparable? Can one compare the incomparable? Is this not a contradiction in terms? By what logic does Eunomius explain the "greater" of John 14:28 in terms of the Father's substance and does ^{not} also claim that the Father is incomparable to the creatures as to his honour and glory, except that which is invented by himself and which demands of him the denigration of the Son to the level of the creatures and his differentiation from the Father with respect to substance?

Eunomius' logic represents a new and pioneering way of impiety because it involves the exaltation of the Father through the denigration of the Son, in spite of the clear statements of John 5:23 ("he who does not honour the Son, does not honour the Father"), Luke 10:16 ("he who disobeys me, does not disobey me but the one who sent me") and John 10:30 ("I and the Father are one"). This is especially to be seen in Eunomius' attempt to expose on the one hand, the incomparability of the Father to the Son, and on the other hand the comparability of the Son to the creatures. Claiming that the Son falls short of the glory of the Father, like the other creatures, he establishes that he is equal with them and, indeed, one of them. In fact, says Basil, what Eunomius accomplishes by this manner of arguing is to please both Jews and Greeks, the former, because he speaks as a monotheist about ^{the} one and only God, and the latter, because he admits as a polytheist the existence of other

lower 'gods', the Son and the Spirit. His fundamental error is that he fails to listen to the logic of the statement of John 10:30 which unites the Son to the Father without denying the fact that the one is prior to the other as cause. His inconsistency lies in the fact that he acknowledges the Father to be incomparable, and yet establishes the Son's dissimilarity of substance by comparing the one to the other!

(3) AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND ORATION

The second Oration of St Basil's *Anatreptikos* consists of 34 chapters (to be cited as A2,1-34) and deals critically with Eunomius' doctrine of the Son, which amounts to an open attack on his Godhead and follows the blasphemies which were implicitly directed against the second person of the Trinity in the previous theological section.

That as an offspring the Son is a creature

A2,1 begins with a typical Christological extract from Eunomius' *Apologetikos* which accepts that the Son is one, since he is μονογενής, i.e. of a unique species, but insists that, according to the saints, he is "Son and offspring and creature" (Υἱὸς καὶ γέννημα καὶ ποίημα). These names indicate that he is different in substance from God the Father in spite of the fact

that there are some who wrongly understand his birth in a corporeal sense. Basil regards this statement as false and pretentious, a sort of fighting against shadows (σκιωμαχία), since what is claimed to be an apology has no real opponent or accuser, and believes that it is not worth engaging in any detailed examination of it. Nevertheless, he is going to proceed with such an examination for the sake of those who suspect that Eunomius cares for the truth, but will do this on the basis of the teachings of the Holy Spirit, i.e. the teachings of Holy Scripture.

The Eunomian argument from Acts 2:36 and the Biblical basis

In A2,2-3 Basil not only challenges Eunomius to produce scriptural evidence for his claim that the Son is called a "creature" (ποίημα), but also explains why Acts 2:36 cannot be used as such evidence. The ἐποίησεν of this verse refers to God the Father and does not imply that the Son is a ποίημα, for this kind of inference is excluded by the Holy Spirit (in the very text under discussion) as ^{an} unfitting description of the Only-begotten. Ποίημα is used by Scripture for creatures, but never for the Son (e.g. Gen. 1:1, Ps. 142:5, Rom. 1:20), who is sometimes called figuratively "axe", or "corner-stone", or "stambling-stone" (Luke 3:9, Eph., 2:20, Rom. 9:32-33). The statement of Acts 2:36, says Basil, does not refer to the substance of God the Logos who has been with God from the beginning, but to God the Logos "who emptied himself in taking to himself the form of the servant (Phil. 2:7), becoming

assimilated with the body of our humility (Phil. 3:21) and being crucified on account of weakness" (II Cor. 3:4). In other words, the point made here by the Apostle is not intended for the theology but for the economy of the divine Son.

Eunomius is wrong to relate the ἐποίησεν to the beginning of the Only-begotten, because the name κύριος to which the ἐποίησεν refers does not signify substance, but authority (οὐκ οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐξουσίας ὄνομα). This is clearly indicated in the Scriptures, as Basil promises to show later on, but Eunomius' misuse is deliberate and based on the "false sophistry" (σοφίσματα κιβδήλω) that difference in name necessarily implies difference in substance (ταῖς τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφοραῖς καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραλλαγὴν συνεκφαίνεσθαι). It is precisely this false sophistry that Basil goes on to attack in the following chapters.

On names and on the names of Father and Son

In A2,4 Basil argues that the names Peter and Paul do not imply difference of substance, but clearly refer to peculiarities (ιδιότητες) which characterize these particular human beings. Peter's name refers to his peculiar identity as son of Jonah (John 1:42), a man from Bethsaida (John 1:44), a brother of Andrew (John 1:41), ... etc., and as such it denotes his particular existence (*hypostasis*). Likewise Paul's name refers to his peculiar characteristics as a man from Tarsus (Acts 9:11), a Hebrew person (Phil. 3:5), a Pharisee according to the Law (*ibid.*), a disciple of Gamaliel (Acts 22:3), ... etc. If these names implied different substances then Peter and Paul should not be

homoousioi but *heteroousioi*. By the same token those who are called "perfect according to virtue" and, therefore, "gods" (in Col. 1:28 and I Cor 2:6), should be *homoousioi* with God and not *heteroousioi*.

On the above basis, Basil concludes in A2,5ff, that the names of the Father and the Son do not denote their substances but their peculiarities (ιδιώματα). If the opposite applied and Eunomius was right, then, as Basil points out, the names γέννημα and ποίημα, which are applied to the Son, should designate the existence of two different substances in him! But Eunomius is not wrong only on this account. He is also wrong because he does not produce any Scriptural witnesses concerning the attribution of the term ποίημα to the Son and, also, allegedly argues against those who understand the Son's generation in a corporeal sense, even though such a view is nowhere to be found in the Holy Scriptures.

On the names offspring (γέννημα) and creature (ποίημα)

The fact is, however, as Basil explains in A2,6, that Eunomius pretentiously attempts to drive out this last error in order to cover up another, namely, his alleged attribution of the term ποίημα to the Son by the Saints. What he fails to understand is that the true understanding of the birth of the Son implies identity of substance between the begotten one and his begetter, which drives out Eunomius' view of the Son as ποίημα. Eunomius, says Basil, is aware of this contradiction, and thus attempts to overcome it by insisting that he takes the

scriptural term γέννημα as denoting the hypostasis and the substance of the Son. What he does now in the case of the Son is not any different from what he did earlier in the case of the Father. Just as previously he identified the ingenerate with the Father's substance, so now he identifies the generate with the substance of the Son, so that he may establish his dogma of the difference in substance between the two. He forgets, however, that neither the ingenerate nor the generate are terms which the Spirit used in the Scriptures.

Scripture, Basil points out in A2,7, does say that the Father gave birth to the Son, but does not call him γέννημα, although he is called "angel of great counsel" (Is. 9:6) and "Christ the Son of God" (Matth. 16:16). Basil insists that one cannot change the names given in the Scriptures because they have distinctive connotations. He clearly demonstrates this in A2,8 by referring to many cases in the Scriptures (e.g. Ps. 2:7, Matth. 21:28, Gen. 22:8, Prov. 3:11, 10:1) where to give birth to a being which is endowed with a soul is never linked with the word γέννημα but with the words τέκνον or υἱός. On the contrary γέννημα is used to denote an embryo which is aborted before it is formed, while Scripture explicitly uses this term (γέννημα) to denote fruits of the earth, or offspring of animals (Matth. 26:29 and Matth. 23:33). It is the case, then, that neither in common, nor in scriptural usage is the term γέννημα used as Eunomius uses it.

In A2,9 Basil turns to an examination of the term γέννημα itself in order to assess Eunomius' claim that this name reveals

the very substance of the Son. He distinguishes two kinds of terms, those that are absolute and refer to things in themselves (τὰ ἀπολελυμένως καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ προφερόμενα τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτοῖς πραγμάτων σημαντικά) and those that refer to their relations to other things (τὰ πρὸς ἕτερα λεγόμενα τὴν σχέσιν ἐμφαίνοντα τὴν πρὸς ἃ λέγεται). So, he mentions the terms man, ox, horse, as examples of the former and the terms son, servant, friend, as examples of the latter. Thus he contends that he who hears the term γέννημα does not think of a substance but of a relation between the thing in discussion and something else. This is clearly to be seen in the fact that this term never stands on its own but is always a complement of something else. Whenever something is said to be γέννημα it is always said to be such in relation to something else. Indeed even the absolute names, says Basil, do not refer to the substance of things but to the things themselves as denoted by one or more peculiarities of their substance.

In A2,10 Basil produces a rhetorical argument which constitutes an inversion of Eunomius' contention, in order to expose the absurdity of it. If, he says, every γέννημα denotes substance, then all of them must be *consubstantial* to each other and, consequently, the Creator should have the same substance with whatever was created. This, however, stands in direct contradiction to Eunomius' unique understanding of the Son as γέννημα. Thus the only way left to Eunomius to avoid this contradiction, says Basil, is to accept that γέννημα does not refer

to the substance of the begotten but to his relation to the one who begat him. In this case to consider the Son as γέννημα along with other beings does not demean the divine substance of the Son which is eternal and immortal in contrast to the other γεννητά . To fail to distinguish οὐσία and γέννημα, says Basil, is ultimately to accept that the γέννημα is the substance of the ἀγέννητον.

Divine generation in relation to existence and non-existence

In A2,11 Basil proceeds further into Eunomius' doctrine of the Son. Eunomius' teaching on the γέννημα is only the prelude to what he wants to assert. This emerges now with Eunomius sophistic argument that

"the Son's substance did not exist before it was formed and that it was born before all things by the will of the Father".

Basil exposes not only the real intention of Eunomius in propounding this sophistry, namely, the belief that the Son was born out of nothing, but also his fallacy in this claim which consists of two things: that he first compares the Son's substance with itself, and second, that he subordinates it to the category of time attempting to understand the meaning of what is temporally prior on the basis of this comparison! If Eunomius' "before" (πρό), says Basil, is a temporal reference to the substance of the Son, then, the Son must have been born "out of nothing". This implies, however, two obvious errors: a) that the Creator of the ages is posterior to time and the ages,

although Holy Scripture recognizes him to be anterior to the ages (cf. I Cor. 2:7, Col. 1:26 and Hebr. 1:2); and b) that the Father was not Father from the beginning, but became Father later on! Basil discusses this last point in A2,12, beginning with St Athanasius' contention, that if to be Father is good and fitting for God, then not to have been always Father is bad and unfitting. Basil teaches that God "has been Father from all infinity and has never began to be Father" (ἐξ ἀπείρου ἐστὶ Πατήρ, οὐκ ἀρξάμενός ποτε τοῦ εἶναι Πατήρ). His eternity is on a par with his paternity. Consequently the Son always existed along with the Father and never began to be Son. Paternity and Sonship go hand in hand, the only difference being that the former is the beginning (ἀρχή) of the latter, not as preceding temporally but as being "cause" (αἰτία). If one can show that the communion of Father and Son is eternal and there is nothing that can interfere between them, then Eunomius' blasphemy becomes apparent, because it amounts to the belief that the Son came out of nothing.

Divine generation in relation to time

In A2,13 Basil explains why Eunomius' contention concerning the Son's derivation out of nothing implies the priority of time over both the Son and the Father. To compare the Father to the Son temporally, as Eunomius does, is, says Basil, to introduce time between Father and Son and, worse still, to measure both of them, or their relation to each other, by temporal measure. But then, how does Scripture teach that

he created the ages (Hebr. 1:2) and that all things were made through him (John 1:3), including, of course, the ages? What is the space, asks Basil, which is implied by the phrase "before the substance of the Son was created", if there is nothing that was not created through him?

It is obvious that on the evidence of the statements of Holy Scripture there has never been, nor will there ever be any notion which is older than the hypostasis of the Only-begotten. Thus the existence of God the Logos, who "was in the beginning towards God" (John 1:2), is beyond anything that can be conceived. Even if our mind, says Basil, is deceived through its endless imaginations, recreating through thought non-existing realities, it will never be able to surpass the beginning of the Only-begotten and see "empty ages" of the God of the ages (αἰῶνας ἐποπτεῦσαι ἐρήμους τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν αἰώνων)!

Basil further exposes Eunomius' subtlety in A2,14 as he argues that the latter's exaltation of the Son through acknowledging his priority over all the creatures is vain, once he ^{has} robbed him of his real divine glory by alienating him from communion with the Father as far as he could. But there are further sophistries in Eunomius armoury which Basil does not shrink from taking up.

Further Eunomian arguments on generation and existence

Eunomius asks "whether God gave birth to a Son who existed, or to a Son who did not exist?" If the latter is the case, then no one could accuse him of impiety. If, on the other

hand, he did exist, then this teaching is both absurd, blasphemous and exceedingly stupid, because whoever exists does not need to be born. Basil explains that this old Arian argument implies in fact what Eunomius criticised earlier, namely the use of a corporeal understanding of birth. It is with reference to the birth of animals, says Basil, that one can say that the animals which were born did not exist before they were born. That this logic is inapplicable to the case of the Son can be seen from the opening statement of the Gospel of St John, "that the Logos was in the beginning and the Logos was towards God and the Logos was God" (John 1:1). Here the term "beginning" is absolute and without implying any relation because it refers to the highest nature. This absolute status is extended to the word "was" (ἦν), which does not imply some beginning in time, as in the cases of Job 1:1, or I Kings 1:1, or Gen. 1:2, but has the same import as the word "who is" (ὢν), as in Rev. 1:8. Both the "who is" and the "who was" denote what is eternal and timeless. Thus, to hold that the "one who is from the beginning" is "out of non-being" is to reject the meaning of "beginning" and to refuse to connect it with the existence of the only-begotten. But according to the teaching of Scripture, it is impossible to think of anything which is older than the beginning, as it is impossible to separate the beginning from God the Logos.

In A2,15 Basil elaborates the teaching of the Gospels on the Son. Matthew speaks of his birth according to the flesh, since it

is a book dealing with the "generation of Jesus Christ, son of David" (Matth. 1:1). Mark begins with the *kerygma* of John the Baptist concerning him (Mark 1:1). Luke begins with the corporeal things and rises to the heights of theology. It is John who raised himself above everything that falls captive to the senses, including time which is connected with such sensible things. He has given a knowledge of Christ which is best described by Paul (in II Cor. 5:16) as going beyond the knowledge which is according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα). By going beyond the beginning of Mary and the beginning of time and by introducing the ultimate beginning of all beginnings John clearly taught the eternal existence of the Logos, his impassible birth, his co-existence with the Father, the majesty of his nature and everything connected with him in a matter of a few syllables! He used the "was" (τὸ ἦν) in such a way that he excluded the "was not" (τὸ οὐκ ἦν), since he united the "was" with the beginning and, thus, the birth of the Only-begotten with the eternity of the Father. And all this exalted theology was sealed with his teaching about this Son as the Life and Light of the world. It is in this light, says Basil, that one can assess the magnitude of the blasphemy of the Eunomian claim that he "was not in the beginning" (τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ οὐκ ἦν) which stands in stark contradiction to the Gospel.

The meaning of the Son as God's Image

In A2,16 Basil elaborates his assessment of the Eunomian blasphemy against the Only-begotten. This blasphemy is derived

he says from a mind which resembles the eye of a blind person, a mind which is deprived of the light of the Only-begotten and has, therefore, fallen into the snares of arbitrary imagination. Eunomius has fallen from the theological stance of the Scriptures which is presented in the statement, "In Thy Light we shall see Light" (Ps. 35:9), which has a direct reference to the Logos, since he is the Light of God who enlightens the world (John 1:9). The truth of the Son's generation cannot be measured with corporeal senses, because it is "without passion, without separation, without division, and without time".

The Son is "the Icon (Image) of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15), not as a mere picture of art, later constructed according to some preexisting archetype, but as a living icon co-existing with the prototype, since the entire nature of the Father was entirely imprinted upon the entire Son. This type of imprint excludes the mediation of time even within the movements of the mind.

Continuing his expostulations on the same theme of the Son as God's Icon in A2,17 Basil says that this is a "generated icon" (εἰκὼν γεννητή) in the sense of being "effluence of the glory of God" (Hebr. 1:3), or "wisdom and power of God" (I Cor 1:24), or "righteousness of God" (I Cor 1:30); and this is not as custom or convention (ἔξις, or ἐπιτηδειότης), but as "living and active substance" (οὐσία ζῶσα καὶ ἐνεργής). The Son is for Basil "the effluence of the glory of the Father", because he shines forth the entire glory of the Father in himself" (cf. Jn.

14:8).

Thus Basil can put forth the statement, "He was because he was born" as the truth against the lie of Eunomius' sophistry, according to which, "if he was, he was not born". In the teaching of the Scriptures the Son's existence, explains Basil, is not ingenerate, yet he was always coexisting with the Father who is the cause of his existence. Otherwise, one would have to affirm that God the Father could have glory without effluence, or could be deprived of wisdom or power, etc. Thus the generation of the Son is eternally conjoined to the ingenerate-ness of the Father. This, says Basil, is the clear teaching of the Spirit which one gathers when he puts together the ἦν of John 1:1 and the ἐγέννησά σε of Ps. 109:3, which refer respectively to the Son's timeless and pre-eternal existence and to the cause of it.

In this light Eunomius' argument, that "if the Son pre-existed his birth should have been ingenerate", is an absurd and non-existing construction of his imagination, or else it is linked to the notion of ages which exist before the Son and which is impossible for the Scriptures. Thus it is as absurd to enquire about what existed before the generation of one who has always been with the Father as it is to enquire about what was prior to the ingenerate and beginningless. Such an enquiry is not different from asking, a) what will there be after the death of the deathless? or b) what was there before the generation of the eternal?

The heart of the problem of Eunomian reasoning, explains Basil, is the false identification of the ingenerate with the eternal. The fault consists in the misunderstanding of their meanings. Ingenerate means without beginning or cause of existence. Eternal means older than any kind of time and age. The case of the Son demonstrates that ingenerate and eternal are not identical because he is generate, having the Father as his beginning and cause, and eternal because he was before all time and every age. Thus, concludes Basil, just as it is absurd to attribute eternity to creation, so it is absurd to deprive the Master of all creation from eternal status.

The Eunomian ingenerate and generation

In A2,18 Basil discusses another Christological argument of Eunomius which is again designed to denigrate the Son. If, says Eunomius, the Father's substance is ingenerate, then it does not admit of generation, and if the generation of the Son is not from a pre-existing substance, he must have been born from the Father having had no existence previously. Basil's response is quite vehement, because he calls Eunomius an atheist! This is due to his understanding of the Son as "the one who really is" (ὁ ὄντως ὢν), who gives being to all creation and has revealed himself to be such to the saints. He elaborates and defends this with a whole barrage of evidences from Holy Scripture: Ex. 3:14, 3:2, 3:6, 3:14, Is. 9:6, Gen. 3:11, 31:13, 28:13 Ps. 2:7 and John 1:2. At the same time he lists several other scriptural evidences in the first part of A2,19 and applies them to

Eunomius in order to expose him and prove that he stands condemned as a follower of one who has not being always in existence but has come out of nothing (Ps. 52:2, Gal. 4:8, Jerm. 5:7, Esther 4:17, I Cor. 1:28).

In the second part of A2,19 Basil exposes Eunomius' attempt to present the Son as a created being above all other created beings on the grounds that he is their Creator. This alleged superiority of the substance of the Son over that of creatures which were brought into being out of nothing by him, says Basil, is only a pretext for covering up the creaturehood of the Son. Given the examples which Eunomius uses to explain this superiority (it is like that of the potter over the clay, or that of the shipbuilder over the wood), it is clear that, ultimately, the difference of substance between the Son and all other creatures amounts to nothing, for as Basil says, the Son does not cease to share with all creatures in the fact of having been created.

The Eunomian understanding of the term Only-begotten

In A2,20 Basil attacks another pretentious Christological argument of Eunomius which is connected with his distortion of the meaning of the term Only-begotten. For Eunomius this term means that he alone became the most perfect minister of the Ingenerate God, having been born and created of him through his power. This meaning, says Basil, is contrary to both common and scriptural usage and is deliberately propounded by Eunomius who wants to show that the Lord is God's Son like

the rest in the sense of Is. 1:2, Ex. 4:22, Phil. 2:9. What, however, he uses above all is Prob. 8:22ff, which constitutes Eunomius fundamental exegetical basis. Basil supplies three reasons against this basis: a) that it appears only once; that the book of Proverbs is full of obscure or hidden meanings and riddles; and 3) that other translators who understood better the original Hebrew text use the term ἐκτίσαστο instead of ἐκτίσειν, which, as Gen. 4:1 shows, means ἐγέννησεν.

Basil produces further arguments against Eunomius' understanding of the μονογενής in A2,21. If, as Eunomius says, Only-begotten is used for one who is born of another alone (in this case of the Son from the Father alone), then this term should be banned from human usage because human beings are born of two parents and not of one. The fact is, however, that in ordinary usage only-begotten denotes one who is unique because he has no brothers. If Eunomius is right, then, even creation must be only-begotten, and everything in it, because, according to him, everything was created by the Son alone. This is in fact suggested by the Eunomian description of the Son as "the most perfect minister of God". But this contradicts, says Basil, the scriptural reference to other ministering spirits. The point is, however, that Eunomius wants to interpret the term "only-begotten" in such a way that it implies "one who is created".

The Eunomian usage of the names Father and Son

It is this same point that Eunomius wants to establish, says

Basil in A2,22, when he proceeds to admonish his readers that one should not take the names of Father and Son literally, lest he falls into the error of introducing anthropomorphic participation and passions into God. As far as his denial of participation (μετουσίᾳ) is concerned, Basil explains that it is intended to establish the point that the substance of the Son is different from that of the Father. It is for this same reason that Eunomius also radically distinguishes the meanings of the names which are different to each other. But the terms of Father and Son, says Basil, are the most distinctive dogma of the Gospel on which the Jews and Greeks stumbled and fell. Christians, however, seal their faith in Father and Son, rather than Creator and creature, through their baptism. To say that the Father is not really Father and that the Son is not really Son, says Basil, is to annul the power of the Gospels. The opposite, however, is the case, for the names of Father and Son are not only real but denote the relation which pertains between them. Father is one who gives beginning of existence to another by a way which is akin to his nature. Son is one who receives beginning of existence from another by way of birth.

In A2,23 Basil responds to the Eunomian claim that the terms Father and Son imply passions. Such an anthropomorphic imposition, says Basil, is inapplicable to the divine nature, which is immutable and unchangeable. It is animals that give birth with passion and it is quite impossible to think of a similar process in God. This, however, does not exclude a notion of

birth which is appropriate to God's nature. Such a notion is in fact suggested by the very names of Father and Son which, in the light of what the Lord says in Matth. 23:9, cannot be taken as conventional. Nevertheless Basil admits that there is ^a conventional use of these names in Scripture, when it comes to describing the relation of God to creatures. Such a usage is suggested in Job 38:28, where God is said to be father of (lit. to have given birth to) "drops of dew". The point that Basil wants to make is that the sons by *adoption* cannot be used for denying the Son by nature and far less the true Father. God is Father of the Son by nature and Father of us by convention, or by grace. Thus Eunomius is utterly pretentious in denying passionate birth in God, because he does it in order to deny to God every kind of birth, including the natural one of his Only-begotten Son. That the names Father and Son and even Only-begotten can be used conventionally, says Basil, without however implying a rejection of their real use, is clearly shown in the Holy Scriptures: Rom. 8:29, Mark 3:31-35.

In A2,24 Basil points out that the metaphorical language of Holy Scripture, which speaks of God as getting angry, sleeping, flying, etc., does not cancel the expressions of the Holy Spirit, nor is it understood corporeally. Thus when one encounters words relating to birth in God, one should try to understand them as it is fitting to him. One should not proscribe and accuse only these words, when he knows that there are countless others which are also applied to God even though they

emerge out of human experience. Actually, says Basil, the notion of birth has in Scripture two meanings: a) the passion of the one who begets and b) the relation of the begetter to the begotten. Whenever it is connected with God the Father, as in Ps. 2:7 and 109:3, it obviously carries the second meaning, not only because there is no passion in God, but also because this birth is inexplicable and incomprehensible. To attempt to explain it away in order to accept it is to employ the method of the pagans who followed what seemed to them reasonable and disobeyed the *kerygma* of the Spirit.

Basil returns in the same chapter to the earlier Eunomian point which sees the Son as a creature but different from, or prior to, the other creatures. He objects to it using Eunomius' own principle, namely, that different names imply different substances. If that principle is correct, he says, then the opposite must be the case: i.e., identical names should imply identity of substance. But then, how could the Son be creature and yet different from all other creatures? It is obvious that Eunomius uses or reverses his principles in accordance with the circumstances so that he may establish only his preconceived points of view.

The Nicene Light from Light ... and the Eunomian ingenerate/generate

In A2,25 Basil contrasts Eunomius' point of view to that of the Fathers at Nicaea saying that the former employs sophistic arguments in order to defend his opposition to the latter. Nicaea

spoke of Father and Son as divine lights, or light from light, affirming at the same time that the divine light is one. Eunomius separates the Father as light from the Son as light using the contrast or difference between the ingenerate and the generate. He does exactly the same with the related notions of life and power.

Responding to the above in A2,26f, Basil insists that the true difference is not between light and light, or life and life, or power and power, but between light and darkness, life and death, power and impotence, and, therefore, Eunomius' claim is false. Nor could Eunomius take the Nicene language of light from light, or life from life, or power from power, and subordinate it to his contrast between ingenerate and generate, because the language of light, life and power is borrowed from the Holy Scriptures. The Son is called "true light" in John 1:9, "life" in John 16:6, and "God's power" in I Cor. 1:24. If such terms, says Basil, cannot be contrasted to themselves, then, Eunomius' attempt to do so represents but a crafty ploy which is founded only on sophistic syllogisms.

The presupposition which governs his entire argumentation is his view that the substance of the Father is different from the substance of the Son. This is what makes him propound a radical difference between ingenerate and generate, and makes him subordinate to it the notions of light, life, power and everything else that is attributed to Father and Son, including these very names. By contrast, says Basil, the presupposition of

the orthodox faith is that, from a good Father a good Son has been derived, from an ingenerate light an eternal light has shown forth, from the true life a life-giving source has been supplied and from the self-sufficient power a power of God has been revealed. As regards darkness, death and impotence, these are characteristics of "the leader of this world" (John 12:31), of the "world rulers of darkness" (Eph. 6:12), of "the spiritual hosts of wickedness" (*ibid.*) of the entire power which is hostile to God. None of these, says Basil, has its antithesis to what is good as a characteristic of their substance. They are such in the sense that they turned to evil, having lost the good by their own will. It is impossible, says Basil, to agree with Eunomius in placing the Only-begotten with these.

The true understanding of ingenerate and generate

In A2,28 Basil interprets his understanding of the terms "ingenerate" and "generate" in contrast to that of Eunomius. For him the difference between them is not one of greater to lesser, but one which pertains exactly to what separates two incompatibles. Nor is it right that something which is what it is by nature may be later changed into something opposite, i.e. the generate to become ingenerate and *vice versa*. For Eunomius, however, the difference is one of degree, as that which distinguishes the light itself from its image which is deemed and lesser in intensity. In Basil's view, then, a substance cannot be contrary to another substance in whatever context of being. This, says Basil, is also acknowledged by the secular philo-

sophers, whom, in this case, the Eunomians deride, simply because they do not agree with their argument.

According to Basil "ingenerate" and "generate" are cognitive 'idioms' or properties (γνωστικαὶ ιδιότητες), considered to be in the divine substance and helping us to understand that the Father and the Son cannot be confused. They are attributed to the substance as some sort of "characteristics or forms" (χαρακτήρες τινες καὶ μορφαί) which differentiate what is common by means of peculiar characteristics (ιδιάζουσι χαρακῆρσι) without, however, interrupting the homogeneity of the substance. Thus the Godhead denotes the common (κοινή) substance, whereas Fatherhood and Sonship are peculiar properties (ιδιώματα). It is by combining what is common (τὸ κοινόν) and what is peculiar (τὸ ἴδιον) that we come to understand the truth. When we hear about "ingenerate light" we should think of the Father, and when we hear about "generate light" we should think of the Son. Inasmuch as Father and Son are light and light, there is no contrast between them. Inasmuch as one is ingenerate and the other generate they are contrasted to each other. The contrast reveals the different idioms of their existence, but the unity of substance is not broken.

In A2,29 Basil clarifies further his distinction between what is common and what is peculiar by elaborating his objections to Eunomius' contentions. For Eunomius, he says, the light could not be any different from the ingenerate, for otherwise God would be composite. On this basis he transfers to the substance

the difference which is applicable to the idioms (properties). Basil responds that the ingenerate is not part of God's substance and therefore the charge of a composite God is false. The ingenerate and the generate, he says, are "cognitive idioms" (γνωστικαὶ ιδιότητες). But the names of light, life, goodness, etc., are indicative manners of the peculiarity of divine substance (δεικτικοὶ τῆς ιδιότητος αὐτοῦ τρόποι) which do not destroy its simplicity. This is especially to be seen in I Tim. 6:16 and Ps. 103:2, where "light" is connected with the substance of God and not with the ingenerate, because it is in the former and not in the latter that God is said to dwell.

The real difference of Father and Son

In A2,30 Basil responds to another related argument of Eunomius which is, as he says, so designed as to push the Son as far away from the Father as possible. Eunomius says that

"The substance of God is above his kingdom and entirely exclusive of generation ... and thus, by virtue of the law of nature, it pushes away any comparison of itself with anything else (i.e. the Son)".

Basil finds this syllogism quite unacceptable because, in the last analysis, it deprives God of his freedom and restricts him to limits or laws of necessity, since it subjects him to the law of nature. The contrast between nature and freedom is applicable here inasmuch as Eunomius uses the example of fire to illustrate his theological point. The case of God's substance, being ingenerate and excluding generation, is similar to the case of

fire which has by nature, rather than by choice or will, the property of heating and excludes coldness. Thus Eunomius wants God's substance to be totally alien to the Son by virtue of the necessary laws of nature.

In A2,31 Basil points out that Eunomius uses his above argument to reject the so-called semi-Arians who argued that the Only-begotten is like in substance with the Father (ὁμοιον τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῷ Πατρὶ). Eunomius' problem with the Homoiousians was that

"they dare to compare the unruléd substance (ἀδέσποτον οὐσίαν), which is above all cause and free from every law, with the substance which is generate and subject to the laws of the Father, as if they have never considered the substance of creatures, or cannot think about existing things with a clear mind."

Basil argues that it is Eunomius who contradicts himself, inasmuch as he wants on the one hand the substance of the Father to be unruléd, above all cause and absolutely free, and yet to be subjected to the law of its own nature, and on the other hand, he wants the Son's substance to be servile and subject to the laws of the Father, although he has the characteristics of lordship and ruling authority. The fact is, says Basil, that the Son is servile to the Father's laws according to Phil. 2:8, not because he has a lower substance, but because he condescended to become such for the sake of humanity, even though he was King and Lord. Furthermore Eunomius further

contradicts himself by placing the Son beyond any comparison with the Father with respect to substance, inasmuch as he admits that the energy of the Father's substance is in accordance with his dignity (i.e. his ingenerateness), but fails to see that the Only-begotten, who is called by him, God's energy or icon of God's energy, should also be in accordance with God's dignity, i.e. his substance, or (in Eunomius' view) his ingenerateness!

Do the different operations of the Trinity imply different substances?

In A2,32 Basil critically assesses Eunomius' other related contention: that

"if one is to proceed from the created beings to substances and if one considers that differences in energy imply difference in substance, the fact that the ingenerate God created the Only-begotten and the Only-begotten created the Paraclete, should imply that the substances of the Father the Only-begotten and the Paraclete are different".

For Basil this procedure from created beings to substances is wrong, because created beings indicate the power, wisdom and artistry of the Creator and not his substance. Besides, they may not indicate the entire creative power of the Creator, because it is possible for a Creator to use only part of his creative power. Even if the Creator, says Basil, were to reveal all his power in the creation of a created being, he would still have revealed only his power and not his substance. But here, says Basil, Eunomius focuses on the simplicity and incompositeness of the

divine substance so that he can identify, as he thinks, substance and power and, thus, using the difference in power of the three persons in creating one another, he might differentiate their substances and argue that the one is greater than the other.

The real problem in this case, as Basil points out, is Eunomius' inconsistency, for here he identifies substance and power, whereas earlier he asserted that power is unlike substance. In any case for St Basil, whereas in the case of an artist his substance is not known from his works, in the case of a begetter his substance is known from the nature of his offspring. Thus if the Only-begotten were a creature of the Father, he would not have revealed the Father's substance. If, however, he makes the Father known through himself, he cannot be a creature, but a true Son and Image of God and "character of his existence (hypostasis)" (Hebr. 1:3).

The Spirit as the Son's creation

In the final chapters A2,33-34 of this second Oration St Basil takes up Eunomius' Pneumatology as it emerges from his above contentions and prepares the way for the third Oration which is totally dedicated to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Ignoring Matth. 12:31 (the blasphemy against the Spirit), Eunomius, says Basil, asserts that the Holy Spirit is a creature, almost suggesting that it is lifeless, since the name "spirit" is applied to inanimate objects. He previously did the same with the Son, when he asserted that he was a creature of the Ingenerate. By treating the Spirit as a creature which did not

exist Eunomius attempts to prove the lower status of the Only-begotten. Although the heavens declare the glory of God (Ps. 18:2), for Eunomius the Holy Spirit declares the diminution of the glory of God. Even though the Lord said about the Paraclete that "He would glorify him" (John 16:14), Eunomius insists that the Spirit is an obstacle when it comes to comparing the Son to the Father, since he does not suggest any special honour for his Creator. For Basil, however, there is no energy of the Son which is separated from the Father, just as there is no characteristic of the Son which is alien to the Father, because, as the Lord says, "all that is yours [the Father's] is mine [the Son's]" (Lk 15:31 and John 17:10). Eunomius, says Basil, alienates the Spirit from the Father and deliberately connects his origin with the Son so that he can diminish the glory of the Only-begotten. Does he forget that the two different origins of Marcion and Manichaios led to their downfall? or that there is only one origin in God, who is the cause of all, although it is acknowledged that everything is made through the Logos? The NT clearly declares that the Spirit is connected both with the Son (Rom. 8:9) and the Father (I Cor. 2:12), and that he is the Spirit of Truth (John 15:26), i.e. of the Son, who proceeds from the Father.

(4) AN ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD ORATION

The third and shortest *Oratio* of Basil's *Anatreptikos* consists of 7 chapters (A3,1-7) and is dedicated to a critical discussion of Eunomius' doctrine of the Spirit, according to which, in the teaching of the saints, the Spirit is third not only in order and dignity but in nature and substance as well.

In A3,1 Basil discusses Eunomius' claim that in his Pneumatology he does not follow the views of the many but of the saints. In condemning the many he resembles the philosophers who elevate themselves above the many, and in claiming the saints he is devious because he does not mention them. For Basil the truth is that as the Son is second in order (τῆ τάξει) and dignity (τῷ ἀξιώματι) in comparison to the Father, as having the Father as his beginning and cause, but is not second with respect to substance, likewise the Holy Spirit is not third in substance, because he is third in order and dignity.

Does difference in order and dignity imply difference in substance?

In A3,2 Basil employs the example of the angels, who differ in dignity, since some are protectors of nations (cf. Deut. 32:8, Dan. 10:13 and 10:20) and others of believers (Matth. 18:10), but share the same name and the same nature, to argue that something parallel applies to the Holy Spirit. There is no

explicit statement anywhere, he says, stating that the Spirit is third in nature. Nor could one classify the Spirit with the lower nature of creatures, which is servile, and admits of sanctification or acquisition of virtue, because the Spirit sanctifies (II Thess. 2:13) and is by nature good (Ps. 142:10). Nor could one include the Spirit among the ministering spirits of the angels which are mentioned in Hebr. 1:14, because the Spirit is hegemonic (Ps. 50:14) and is not enumerated with the creatures, but with the Trinity (Matth. 28:19). Unlike the principalities and the powers who admit of sanctification, the Spirit is holy by nature (Jn 14:26) and supplies sanctification to everything else, being himself "source of sanctification" (II Macc. 14:36). It is, therefore, wholly unacceptable to count the Spirit among the creatures.

The biblical names of the Spirit show him to be God

In A3,3 Basil continues his argument for the true Godhead of the Spirit by citing relevant biblical evidence pertaining to the names of the Spirit. Such names are common to the Spirit and to God, the Father and the Son.

The Spirit is holy as the Father and the Son are holy, according to Isaiah who bears witness to this through his vision of the thrice holy hymn of the Seraphim (Is. 6:3). What lies behind this is the one sanctification which is naturally supplied by the Holy Trinity.

Not only the name "holy" but also the name "spirit" is shared by the Trinity, says Basil, since "God is spirit and those

who worship him should worship him in spirit and in truth" (John 4:24), or "Spirit before us is Christ the Lord.." (Lament. of Jer. 4:20), or "The Lord is the Spirit" (II Cor. 3:17).

Far from indicating difference of substance, the use of these names demonstrates the congeniality of the Spirit towards the Father and the Son. Besides, God is called good (Lk 18:18-19) and the same applies to the Holy Spirit (Ps. 142:10). At the same time the glory of the Spirit is not different from the glory of the Son if he is called another Paraclete besides the Son (John 14:16).

The energies of the Spirit show his Godhead

In A3,4 Basil attempts to show the Godhead of the Spirit from the kind of energies that issue from him. Referring to Ps. 32:6 he says that the Spirit supplies to the heavenly powers the concreteness and firmness of their virtue. He also points to the verse from Job which states, that "the Spirit of the Lord is the one who made me" (Job 33:4), and claims that this refers not to Job's creation but to his perfection in virtue. Isaiah, speaking on behalf of the Lord about his incarnation, states: "the Lord has sent me and his Spirit" (Isaiah 48:16); and the Psalmist, wishing to reveal that the power of the Spirit fills all things, states: "Where shall I go from your Spirit? and where shall I flee from your presence" (Ps. 138:7)?

Basil also refers to the energies of the Spirit which are granted to human beings and to their magnificence. The Holy Spirit, he says, is the "Spirit of adoption" (Rom. 8:15). He is, as

the Lord himself revealed, the teacher of all the believers in the name of the Lord, for as the Lord revealed, He is "the Paraclete ... whom the Father shall send and who shall teach you all things" (John 14:16).

As regards the distribution of the various dignities of ministry, it is clearly stated, says Basil, that the Holy Spirit, like the Son, is the author of them all to those who are worthy to receive them, for "there is a variety of charisms, but the same Spirit, a variety of ministries, but the same Lord, various kinds of energies, but the same God who operates all things to all" (I Cor. 12:4-6). This shows that the energies of the Holy Spirit are placed on the same level with the energies of the Father and the Son.

The same applies to the substance of the Spirit, for it states that all these things are put to effect by one and the same Spirit, dividing them up to each one in particular according to his will" (I Cor. 12:11). This statement also shows the divine authority and lordship of the Spirit, which is also revealed in the solemn statement of Acts 21:11: "thus says the Spirit, the Holy One".

Another energy of the Spirit, which reveals his Godhead and excludes the view that he is alien to God, is that he "searches the depths of God" (I Cor. 2:10), or that "just as no one among human beings knows what things belong to the human being, except the spirit of the human being which is inside it, likewise no one knows what things belong to God,

except the Spirit of God" (I Cor. 2:10-11).

Finally the Spirit is the giver of life, for as Paul says, "He who raised Christ from the dead shall vivify your mortal bodies through his Spirit who dwells in you" (Rom. 8:11).

The inconsistency of Eunomius' Pneumatology

In A3,5 Basil points out the inconsistency of Eunomius with all the above teachings which place the Spirit in the same order and dignity with the Father and the Son and demonstrate that he is not alien to the Godhead. For Eunomius the Spirit 1) does not have a share (ἀμέτοχον) in the Godhead, 2) is third in order and substance, 3) was created at the command of the Father but through the operation of the Son, 4) is the "first" and "greatest" of all the other creatures, because he is honoured with the occupation of the third place, 5) is not endowed with God's character, not with his creative power.

In his response Basil argues that Eunomius seems never to have believed that the Godhead "dwells in us" (I Cor. 3:16), in spite of John's statement, that "it is from this that we know that he is inside us, from the Spirit whom he gave us" (I John 3:24), and Paul's question, "Do you not know that you are the temple of God and that the Holy Spirit dwells in you?" (I Cor. 3:16). It is an apparent heresy, says Basil, to hold that "the Spirit has no share in the Godhead", when Holy Scripture itself says, that God "dwells in us" through the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:11, II Tim. 1:11). How can it be, he asks, that he who perfects others is himself deprived of the Godhead? It is a great impiety to claim

that the Spirit has been "honoured" with divinity "by participation" (κατὰ μέθεξις) in the same way as human beings have, and not rather that the Godhead co-exists by nature with him. When one is deified by grace, one is understood to retain the possibility of falling away from this benefit. This, however, could not be applied to the Spirit, because in the tradition of the saving Baptism the grace of deification is granted "in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit". The gift of deification is completed by the divine Trinity and not by the Father and the Son and a created Spirit.

That the Spirit is neither Father nor Son but Spirit

In A3,6 Basil discusses Eunomius' contention that "the Spirit must be a creature and a thing made, since he is neither ingenerate, nor generate". He finds the first problem with this way of arguing in its rationalism and explains that most things in life cannot be explained in rigid rationalistic terms. Neither the impressions of our eyes, nor the concepts that are formed in our mind are sufficient for explaining things away. Thus we normally confess ignorance about the majority of things which we encounter. For example no one can tell with accuracy if one begets or creates our soul. The same applies to the Holy Spirit, of whom we are ignorant, but whom we glorify, in accordance with the witness which has been given to us concerning him. It is from the Scriptures that we gather the superiority of the Spirit over the creatures, since he who sanctifies, teaches, reveals, must be greater than those who are sanctified, taught

and receive revelation from him. It is absurd to argue that the Holy Spirit is not ingenerate as God, or Only-begotten as a Son, when it is clearly revealed that he is the "Holy Spirit" (John 14:26), or "Spirit of God" (I Cor. 1:11,14), or "Spirit of truth" (John 14:17), or "the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit who is sent by the Father in the name of the Son (John 14:26), or "the Paraclete who is sent by the Son from the Father and proceeds from the Father" (John 15:26), who is not "servile" but "holy" (John 14:26), "good" (Ps. 142:10), "hegemonic" (Ps. 50:14), "life-giving Spirit" (John 6:13), "Spirit of adoption" (Rom. 8:15), "Spirit who knows all the things of God" (I Cor. 2:10). Basil insists that on this evidence the Spirit is accepted for what it is and that the unity of Godhead is preserved in the Trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The alleged biblical foundations of Eunomius' Pneumatology

Finally in A3,7 Basil offers a critical discussion of the biblical grounds of Eunomius for claiming that the Spirit is a creature, namely the exegesis of Amos 4:13 ("... who creates spirit") and John 1:3 ("... through whom all things were made"). Following Athanasius' exegesis of the same verse in his First Letter to Serapion Basil argues that the verse from Amos has nothing to do with the Holy Spirit. The word "spirit" used in it may have two possible meanings. In fact it can mean a) "breath" or "wind", in which case it is well coordinated with the preceding word "thunder", and refers to the natural phenomena which are created by God for the edification of humanity, and

b) it can have a metaphorical, prophetic meaning related to the appearance of Christ who is subsequently mentioned in this verse and who is revealed through the natural phenomena of thunder (John 12:28,29) and "wind" (Matth. 14:32, Mk 4:39, 6:51).

As for the verse John 1:3, Basil explains that the Holy Spirit is not included in the phrase "all things", for he is acknowledged to be holy and unique, i.e. to belong to the unique nature. He also affirms that to reject the view that the Spirit is a creature is not to reject that he has a distinctive subsistence (ὕπόστασις), and concludes that the pious mind does not go beyond what is revealed in Scripture about the Spirit, but waits for the new age when one shall be freed from seeing the truth through a mirror and in a riddle and shall see him face to face.

In this Oration also, as in the two preceding ones, Basil argues against Eunomius' Arianism in a very similar way to that of Athanasius. He primarily employs the teaching of Holy Scripture but he does also acknowledge the priority of certain philosophical precepts, or common sense, which he uses to expose Eunomius' 'rationalist' arguments. Basil's contribution consists in the brevity of his arguments and in the clarity of his terminology.

PART IV

THE MAIN THESES OF ST BASIL'S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY AS CONTRASTED TO THOSE OF EUNOMIUS

In the previous part of this thesis we attempted to analyse the contents of the three Orations of St Basil's *Anatreptikos*. We shall now try to present these contents in a synthetic, systematic way. We shall do this by stating and contrasting alternatively the Eunomian and Basilian points of view.

(1) The ingenerate (ἀγέννητον) in relation to the Father and the Son

Triadology is the first major point that Basil discusses in his first Oration. He actually presents Eunomius' view and offers his critical response to it. Eunomius' Triadology is stated in his so-called traditional Confession and in two statements concerning the substances of the Father and the Son. All these are cited by St Basil in the beginning of his first Oration:

- 1) "We believe in One God, the Almighty Father, and in one Only-begotten Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, and

in one Holy Spirit, the Paraclete";

2) "We believe that ingenerateness (ἀγεννησία) is the substance of the God of all"; and

3) "We believe that the Only-begotten is dissimilar (ἀνόμοιον) to the Father with regard to substance".(1)

Basil argues that on the basis of these statements only the Father is true God, while the Son is differentiated from him as his creature. The position of the Holy Spirit is similar to that of the Son, with the only difference that the Spirit is not created by the Father, but by the Son, and as such he is a creature of a creature.

Two further points should be noted here; firstly that Eunomius identifies God's substance with "ingenerateness" and, consequently, argues that the "ingenerate" is not a mere concept (ἐπίνοια) and, secondly, that he makes a radical differentiation of the Son from the Father with respect to substance and considers this to be analogous with the radical differentiation of the names of the Father and the Son.(2)

In his response to this Eunomian doctrine St Basil concentrates on the concept of "ingenerateness", arguing that it is external to God and it should in no way be identified with God's substance.(3) Indeed it is a human conception of God, similar to many others, such as, God's "beginninglessness", "providence", "creative power", etc., all of which refer to God's characteristics (ιδιώματα, ιδιότητες) or energies (ἐνέργειαι) which are distinguished from his substance. Thus he argues that

if the "ingenerate" were to be identified with God's substance, then all the characteristics or energies of God would have to be regarded as his substance. The fact is, however, that this is quite impossible, inasmuch as the particular conception of the "ingenerate" is inconceivable not only as a positive notion conceived by the mind (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν) but also as a privative notion (κατὰ στέρησιν).(4) Basil can only admit that God's substance is "ingenerate", but not, that the "ingenerate" is God's substance, the reason being that he distinguishes clearly between substance and attribute. A substance is characterized by an attribute but is not identified by it. At best ingenerateness is a positive conception, and at worst, it is a privative conception. In neither case, however, could it be identified with God's substance.

As regards Eunomius' radical claims about the names of "Father" and "Son", Basil argues that they do not denote substances, but peculiar idioms or peculiar properties (οὐχι οὐσίαν παρίστησι τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων εἰσι δηλωτικά), and should, therefore, be understood in a similar way as the names Peter and Paul, which denote two peculiar existences sharing the same substance.

This discussion leads to the second major point of contention between Basil and Eunomius, the use of concepts in theology.

(2) The use of "concepts" (ἐπίνοιαι) and names (ὀνόματα) in theology.

According to Eunomius there are two types of terms, which denote objects of knowledge: "concepts" (ἐπίνοιαι) and "names" (ὀνόματα). Actually concepts are fictitious names, devoid of objective value and do not lead to the knowledge of an object *per se*. For Eunomius a "concept" does not mean anything specific, for it exists only at the moment when it is pronounced and that is why it cannot be explained.⁽⁵⁾ As regards "names", they are cognitive revelations, which express the substance of objective realities. God has such an objective name, which is identified with the term "ingenerate" (ἀγέννητος) and the notion of "ingenerateness" (ἀγεννησία).

In his response to this contention Basil explains that the term "concept" (ἐπίνοια) means 1) the finer and more exact reconstruction in the memory of what had been previously grasped by the mind, i.e. a primary thought of something that was understood, and 2) a secondary thought, emerging in the mind as a result of the formation of a primary thought and explaining further what was initially understood. It is in this sense that Jesus uses concepts (ἐπινοίας), when he talks about himself such as "door", "way", "bread", "vine", "shepherd", "light", without suggesting that he has many names, since each one of these names has a different meaning, representing a particular concept (ἐπίνοια) and constituting a particular idiom

or characteristic. Thus, the term "ingenerate" (ἀγέννητος), like the term "incorruptible" (ἀφθαρτος), represents a concept, and at the same time, constitutes a confession of an 'idiom' which truly belongs to God.⁽⁶⁾ As a negative concept, however, the "ingenerate" does not have a particular meaning and is, therefore, inadequate for glorifying God. Basil explains that the same applies to the terms "incomposite" (ἀμερές) and "simple" (ἀπλοῦν), which cannot be radically distinguished, as Eunomius contends.⁽⁷⁾ Basil believes that these terms represent the same concept, inasmuch as the former denotes that which has no parts and the latter, that which is not constituted by different parts.⁽⁸⁾

(3) The knowledge of God

and the distinction between substance and energies.

The above discussion leads Basil to expose a fundamental theological premise of Eunomius and to replace it by one of his own which became a distinctive feature of orthodox theology. Eunomius made no distinction between God's 'idioms' and his substance. As a result of this he claimed that we can know the divine substance as completely as God himself knows it.⁽⁹⁾ He actually claims that he himself conceived of the divine substance in his own mind.⁽¹⁰⁾ Basil considers this claim to be false because God's substance is totally inaccessible, to the extent that every attempt on the part of man to speak about God's

substance by means of rational deductions or arguments is but a sort of childish game. This does not mean, however, that God cannot be cognitively reached by man. Man is led to his Creator through the divine energies which reach down to creaturely beings and are specified as God's idioms or attributes. Thus for Basil the knowledge of God's idioms does not imply the knowledge of his substance. God's idioms, referring to God's energies, are clearly distinguished from God's substance, inasmuch as they qualify, or characterize it, but never define it.⁽¹¹⁾ Indeed for Basil even the unknowability and unapproachability of God's substance is realized through the divine energies. Basil was to make this point one of the most distinctive theses of orthodox doctrine. As he would put it later on in one of his Epistles to Amphilochius, "We claim to know God through his energies, and never promise to approach anywhere near God's substance; for God's substance remains unapproachable, whereas his energies descend upon us".⁽¹²⁾ The same was to be stressed in several places in his other great systematic theological work, the famous treatise *On the Holy Spirit*.⁽¹³⁾

Basil's doctrine of the distinction of the divine energies from the divine substance⁽¹⁴⁾ is crucial for later theological doctrine in Christian Byzantium, especially for hesychastic doctrine, which was chiefly expounded by the great saint and theologian Gregory Palamas. Palamas clarified this point most eloquently by saying that God's existence is not identical with

his substance, "for he 'who is' is not from a substance; rather, substance is from him who is; and indeed he 'who is' has encompassed in himself the entire being".⁽¹⁵⁾ This means, in turn, that God can come into communication with human beings as the one who is, while remaining unparticipated and unapproachable for them as substance.⁽¹⁶⁾ Similar points are made by Basil's brother, Gregory of Nyssa, against Eunomius,⁽¹⁷⁾ and by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.⁽¹⁸⁾ It is true that the distinction between the uncreated substance of God and his uncreated energies was not fully developed by the early fathers. It was mainly used by them to safeguard the simplicity of the human nature and to secure the real communion of God with his creatures without detriment to the transcendence of the divine nature. In Basil's, and generally in patristic teaching, knowledge of God by human beings is achieved through God's grace, which has to do with God's energies which are issued out of God's substance, but are not identical with it. Participation in God's energies is the way of deification, which includes the knowledge of God.

(4) Communicability or incommunicability of God's substance

To secure the ontological distinction between the true God, the Father, and his created God, the Son, Eunomius argues not only about the ingenerate as the substance of the former, but also about the incommunicability of this substance to the latter

(Or.1:19ff). By claiming this to be the case he rejects the notion of one divine substance which is common to the Father and to the Son. The first reason he adduces for this is the thesis that God is beyond all composition or synthesis, which, in turn, means that there is no form, volume, or quantity in God's substance. Thus he argues that the notion of a common substance for the Father and the Son would necessarily imply the composition of two substances, one ingenerate and another generate, since the Son's substance is identical with his generateness just as the Father is identical with his ingenerateness. It would also imply the Son's equality to the Father, which is contradicted by John 14:28 ("The Father is greater than I"), and the Son's likeness to the Father, which is contradicted by the fact that God is without quantity (ἄποσος) and without form (ἀνείδεος), for likeness is an external notion and refers to form and volume.

Eunomius further argues that the Son is an image of the Father's counsel and not an image of the Father's substance, because he was created by the Father's will. Thus, on the basis of the above premises, Eunomius holds that the Son cannot be equal to the Father. If the Father is "greater" (μείζων) than the Son, as the Son himself says, then the Father has superiority over the Son in the sense that he has superior power, superior office, superior quantity, as a cause is superior to an effect. Consequently the one and only God of all is not only ingenerate but incomparable to all else.

In view of the above the Son falls short of the glory of the Father, being unequal to him as a creature "who was born, not as already existing, but as non-existing"!(19) Although he is superior to all the creatures, he is not equal with God, because his substance was created directly by the Father's will before all other creatures were created indirectly through him.(20) Inasmuch as the Son followed after the Father, the Father's substance is incompatible not only with generateness, but also with any other preexisting substance from which the Son was allegedly born, since the Son did not exist before he was born.

As regards the Son's superiority over the rest of the creatures, Eunomius argues that the substance of the Only-begotten is incompatible with any identification with the substance of the rest of the things which came into being out of non-existence, because "meontic" existence ($\tau\acute{o} \mu\eta \delta\upsilon\nu$) is not a substance ($\sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}$). On the contrary such superiority ought to ^{be} attributed to him as needed by a Creator in contrast to his creation. It is on the basis of this consideration, says Eunomius, that one should understand the Son as Only-begotten (Μονογενής = of a unique gender), since he was revealed as ^a uniquely perfect "administrator" ($\upsilon\pi\omicron\upsilon\rho\gamma\acute{o}\varsigma$) of God in the work of Creation, having alone been born and created by the Father alone, through the power of the ingenerate.(21) This means that there is no likeness between the generation of the Son from the Father and the generation of human beings, for God is not subject to terms and passions of participation.(22)



In line with the above way of thinking and using the image of light Eunomius clarifies further the incompatibility of the ingenerate substance of the Father in relation to the generate substance of the Son. This incompatibility, he says, is similar to the one which applied to the ingenerate light in relation to the generate light, which is total and absolute.⁽²³⁾ The reason for this lies in the fact ~~that~~ God's kingdom does not admit of generateness, whereas that of the Son does, according to the law of its generate nature.⁽²⁴⁾ Thus, Eunomius contends, that those who dare to compare the "unruled" (ἀδέσποτον) substance, which lies above every cause and is free from any law, with the substance which is generate and subject to the laws of the Father, either have never considered the substance of creatures, or do not pass judgment concerning these substances with a clear mind".⁽²⁵⁾ Similarly, "anyone who investigates the data which creatures supply and attempts to rise from them to the highest substances, not only will he ascertain that the Son is a creation of the Ingenerate being and the Paraclete of the Only-begotten being, but also will find confirmation of the distinction and superiority of the Son's energy over that of the creatures and ultimately of the difference of the Son's substance from that of the rest of the creation."⁽²⁶⁾

Basil's response to these arguments can be summarized as follows:

1. Basil agrees with Eunomius' thesis that God is beyond all composition and synthesis, except that this applies both to the

Father and to the Son. This is because the Son is not a creature and not unlike (ἀνόμοιος) but like (ὅμοιος) the Father. Thus as the Father is simple and incomposite in his substance, so is the Son who is incorporeal, without form and shape in his substance. It is clear that the crucial point in Basil's response has to do with his distinction of 'idioms' from substance. This distinction enables him to hold that ingenerateness and generateness are not substances, but 'idioms' and, as such, they are distinguished from God's substance and are in no way able to divide it.

2. As regards Eunomius' 'syllogism' that the Father is "greater" than the Son, Basil explains that the term "greater" does not denote superiority but cause or beginning. It denotes the cause of the Son since the Son is derived from the Father. In the same way Basil rejects the other syllogism of Eunomius which posits the incomparability of the Father to the Son. Here Basil charges Eunomius with inconsistency, not only because he is alien to the Peace of God, but he is also a blasphemer, inasmuch^{as} his contention stands in direct contradiction to the statement of John 10:30, "I and the Father are one", which reveals the Son's substance as undifferentiated from that of the Father.

3. As regards Eunomius' claim that the Son's substance is superior to that of the rest of the creatures, Basil points out that it makes no sense and, indeed, is useless, because by disallowing the subjection of the Son's substance to the category

of time, it makes it pre-existent of time and therefore eternally existing. He has always been in existence inasmuch as the Father has always existed.⁽²⁷⁾ For Basil the Father is Father of one Son and therefore the Father has no beginning. The Son, however, has the Father as his beginning. Yet there is nothing that interferes between them, and so the Father is not temporally superior but is honoured first as being cause of the Son. This means that the communion of Father and Son is eternal. Indeed eternal means nothing else than existing prior to all time and age. That the Son is eternal in this sense is clearly attested to in the Scriptures which teach that "all things came to be through him", including time and ages.⁽²⁸⁾

As regards Eunomius' claim that the Son is more ancient than creation, Basil qualifies it as a sophistry, because it presupposes an understanding of the Son's generation which is anthropomorphic or literally anthropopathic.⁽²⁹⁾ Furthermore this claim stands in direct opposition to the Gospel statement John 1:1, "In the beginning was the Logos and the Logos was with God... and the Logos was God," since "nothing can be prior to the beginning".⁽³⁰⁾ The word "was" (ἦν), says Basil, does not imply that he existed since a certain point of time, but that his existence is extended as much as that beginning which is unsurpassable. For Basil the "was" (τὸ ἦν) is like the "who is" (τὸ ὄν), denoting, that is, who is eternal and timeless. Thus in these few words one has to include the Son's eternal existence, the Son's impassible birth from the Father, the Son's

co-existence with the Father, the Son's magnificent nature and everything that concerns his Godhead. By this little word "was" not only is the Son raised to the "beginning", but also has his birth united with the eternity of the Father. This means that the Son has always existed along with the Father.

4. Basil also qualifies as sophistry Eunomius' understanding of the Son as Only-begotten which rests on the Son's functioning as God's perfect "administrator" in creation. Indeed it is a blasphemy to place the Son among the "administrative spirits" (λειτουργικά πνεύματα) which came into being out of non-existence. The Son, says Basil, who is revealed to Moses in the burning bush as "the One Who Is" (Ex. 3:14) cannot be characterized as God's administrator. Although he is called by the prophet, "an Angel of great counsel", he is also called "a Mighty God, a Leader of peace, a Father of the future age" (Is. 9:6). These statements clearly expose as blasphemy every attempt to characterise the Son as a creature, even a unique one or Only-begotten one. If the term Only-begotten was applicable to the Son as creature, then the Son could not exhibit to us the being of the Father, but if he is a true offspring as he is then he is "the character of the Father's subsistence" (according to Hebr. 1:3).

As regards Eunomius' statements concerning the ingenerate and generate Lights, Basil argues that there is no difference between them since the word light implies a concrete identity both as a gift or a concept. We cannot differentiate light from

light. The only legitimate differentiation is that of light from darkness. Thus the differentiation of ingenerate from generate does not correspond to a differentiation of light from light. The Fact is that the Son as Light has come forth from the Father as Light, and since the latter is eternal, the former must be eternal too; similarly if the latter is known as life, the former must be known as life too. This is in fact the teaching of the Evangelist John, who speaks of the Son as "the true Light" (John 1:19) and of the Lord himself, who says in the Gospel, "I am the life" (John 16:6).

(5) Distinguishing οὐσία from ὑπόστασις, φύσις from ιδιότης

Being a faithful follower of Arius, Eunomius made ample use of Aristotelian philosophy. Thus he argued that, "It is impossible to understand [the Son's] substance to be one thing and the name which designates it to be another. Rather, [his] substance is his hypostasis which is designated by his name [Son] and so his designation is proved to be true by his substance".⁽³¹⁾ This argument is based on the following, "When we say *Ingenerate* we do not think that we must honour [God] only in name according to human conceptual invention; rather we ought to repay to him, in accordance with the truth, our most necessary duty, namely the confession of what he is".⁽³²⁾ All the above clearly indicates that Eunomius identified idiom (ιδιότης) and hypostasis with substance (or nature) in God.

God's name as ingenerate, i.e. ingenerateness, is nothing else but the substance of the Father, his nature. When therefore one speaks about God's ingenerateness one understands by it the species of the nature of the Father and not a characteristic idiom of his substance. Similarly the designation of the Son as generate or offspring is nothing else but his substance, his nature. Thus generateness is the species of his nature.

On the basis of this understanding Eunomius concluded that, since the ingenerate is different from the generate and since the former denotes the substance of the Father and the latter the substance of the Son, it is clear that the natures of the Father and the Son must be different. Consequently the Son cannot be eternal as the Father, nor *homoousios* with the Father. It was probably the 'logical' basis of this thinking, combined with the spiritual restlessness of the people of that time that attracted many people in the fourth century to the Eunomian position. This would have carried the day, had it not been for Basil who fought against it in a decisive way as he exposed the inadequacy of metaphysics for understanding revealed theology.(33)

Basil's main weapon here was the distinction between the divine substance and the various names attributive to the three divine persons. Thus he argued that ingenerateness and generateness are some kind of cognitive properties (γνωριστικαὶ τινὲς ιδιότητες),(34) designating manner of existence and not the nature of the subject (of the Father and of the Son). They denote, as he says, either the reference of one subject to

another, or the properties of a given subject. "For this is the nature of the properties, to show where the difference is in the identity of the substance; and it often happens that these properties are radically differentiated from each other and even contrasted as opposites, without, however, dividing the unity of the substance".(35) Therefore, the words ingenerate and generate denote the peculiar properties of two different persons who share the same nature, rather than God's substance. They are energies of God, like the designations beginningless, creator, unchangeable, all-mighty, etc. The terms ingenerate and generate are in no way the substance of God, but ^{The} peculiar property of God, since the nature of the Father and the Son is denoted by the term Godhead. This is why Basil divides the properties into properties which properly belong to God and properties which do not belong to him. He makes this distinction because he wants to prove that the ingenerate is included among the properties which do not belong to God, since the generate does not belong to him either.(36)

Basil's distinction between the substance and the properties opens the way for his other distinction between substance and hypostasis, the former being applicable to the unity and the latter to the Trinity. This appears very clearly in his second Oration where he states that "the different designations of particular human beings [like Peter and Paul] do not divide the human substance which remains one... and hence these designations do not denote substances but peculiar properties (αἰ

προσηγορία οὐχὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν εἰσὶ σημαντικαί, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδιοτήτων, αἱ τὸν καθ' ἓνα χαρακτηρίζουσι ... ὧν οὐδέν ἐστὶν οὐσία, ὡς ἡ ὑπόστασις νοουμένη)... which imply the hypostases.(37)

Basil's theological distinction between substance and hypostasis led him to propound the formula "one substance, three hypostaseis". By "substance" Basil means the general sense of every existence; the common element in all individual existences, which belong to the same genus. To say, then, that in God the substance is one means that the definition of its existence is not differentiated. By contrast the term "hypostasis" specifies individual or particular existence. "Hypostasis" is the particular being which includes the substance; that which is individual, peculiar, or particular existence. It is the relation between the the general and the particular, and, as such, it does not come into any antithesis with what is common; nor does what is common extinguish what is peculiar. This can be perfectly illustrated by reference to the human being. All human beings participate as human in the nature of the human being, but, at the same time, they exist through their peculiar characteristics as particular persons, e.g., Athanasius, Demetrios, Maria, etc. Likewise in the Holy Trinity the three persons of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit participate in the their common nature, in holiness, goodness, godhood, etc., but, at the same time, retain respectively the peculiarities of fatherhood, sonship and sanctifying power.

Basil employed the term "common" (κοινόν) as equivalent to substance and "peculiar" (ἰδιον or ἰδιόζον) as equivalent to hypostasis so that he can distinguish the unity of the Godhead from the Trinity of the persons, in his *De Spiritu Sancto* which he wrote in 374/5.

Substance and hypostasis differ between them as the common differs from the particular, or as the human being differs from the particular human being. Thus in the case of the Godhead only one substance is accepted, so the the logic of existence may not be attributed differentially, as Basil explains in his *Epistle* 236 (ch. 6). At the same time peculiar hypostaseis are accepted so that the meaning of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be employed without confusion, but lucidity.

To avoid the usual confusion of these terms, Basil calls the three hypostaseis *homoousios* and applies this understanding liturgically through the formula: *Glory to the Father, with the Son together with the Holy Spirit*. The one glorification of the Trinity in this formula is based on the identity of the divine nature.

(6) The Doctrine of the Spirit

Both Eunomius and Basil extend their arguments concerning the Son's relation to God to the Spirit as well.

Eunomius argues that the order and dignity of the Spirit indicate his ontological status as a third kind of being. Indeed not only is he third in relation to the Father and the Son but he is a creature, created by the Son as the first of his creations.

Basil's first response is to distinguish between order and nature or dignity and nature. He does, however, go on to construct his defence of the true Godhead of the Spirit by focusing, like Athanasius before him, on the work of the Spirit as this is revealed in the Scriptures. Here he emphasizes the powers of adoption, revelation, vivification, divine indwelling and sanctification of the Holy Spirit and the fact that his holiness is his natural property and not a property acquired by participation as it is the case with creatures. Indeed creatures are sanctified by partaking of the Holy Spirit, who never partakes of anyone in order to be holy.

Furthermore Basil reinforces his anti-Eunomian pneumatological views by examining the divine names which specify the Spirit in the Scriptures and which indicate his Godhead because they are equally used to specify the Father and the Son as well. He also argues against the two 'biblical' arguments of Eunomius based on Am. 4:13 and Jn 1:13 following the same hermeneutical tradition as Athanasius who had argued similarly against the Egyptian Tropicists.

Finally, as regards the Spirit's peculiar 'idiom', Basil prefers to acknowledge pious ignorance, although he does point to the relevant Johannine and Pauline teaching in order to establish the mystery of his divine identity.

EPILOGUE

In many ways the general viewpoint of St Basil's theological doctrine against Eunomius is not very different from that of St Athanasius against Arius. He too defends the unity and the Trinity of God insisting that the one is not undermined by the other.

What is different in St Basil is the way in which he systematizes and expresses this doctrine in a more lucid and succinct way. This is probably due to the fact that, unlike St Athanasius who avoided discussion of philosophical points, St Basil did not shrink from using philosophy in order to expose both the philosophical inconsistencies of his opponents and the limits of philosophy when confronted with the mystery of God.

This is especially seen in his discussion of Eunomius' distinction of two kinds of names which correspond to two kinds of conceptions, i.e. conceptions which define the ontology of a given reality (even of God) and conceptions which arise only in the mind and constitute empty inventions. Basil's rejection of this distinction and his clarification of the relation of concepts to reality enabled him to restate the Nicene Athanasian theology of God's unity and Trinity in 'new terms' which opened the way for the classical formulation of Christian Triadology.

Basil's Nicene orthodoxy, like that of Athanasius, is based on Scripture and the experience of the faith in the Church, but his way of formulating it not only refutes the error of

Anomoian Arianism but also reconciles the Homoiousian position to that of the orthodox Homoiousians. St Athanasius had attempted this in his *De Synodis*, but it is Basil who finalizes the Athanasian legacy.

Particularly significant in this connection is his use of the term *idioms* and his distinction between two kinds of *idioms*, those which are common and characterize nature in general and those which are peculiar and characterize particular beings. Athanasius had used the related terms *idion* and *idios* to describe the same distinction but had never presented it as sharply and clearly as Basil does in these Orations. Indeed such a distinction is only reached by inference. Basil, however, not only states this distinction in quite unambiguous terms, but also clarifies its content by linking it on the one hand to the distinction between the divine substance and the divine activity or energy and on the other hand, to the distinction between the one divine substance and the three hypostaseis of the Trinity. Admittedly this last distinction emerges in a very preliminary way. But it is here stated clearly for the first time and it is going to become later on the most important contribution of St Basil's and of the Cappadocian's 'new' Nicene orthodoxy.

Basil's method is biblical and ecclesiastical like that of Athanasius. His distinctive contribution lies in the employment of new terms which clarify and establish the theological viewpoints of Nicene orthodoxy.

FOOTNOTES TO PART I

(1) Migne, PG 29-32.

(2) Migne, PG 35-37.

(3) Migne, PG 46: 787-818

(4) Migne, PG 46: 910-1000

(5) Pseudepigrapha of the eighth century, Combefis, SS Patrum Amphilochii Iconiensis, Methodii Patarensis, et Andreae Cretensis. *Opera*, Parisii 1644, 155-225.

(6) Syriac, Zettersteen, *Eine Caesarea Festschrift Sachan*, Berlin 1915, 223-247, probably pseudepigraphic.

(7) Migne, PG 103: 420-1, 633.

(8) Gregory of Nyssa, Εἰς τὸν Βίον Μακρίνης, PG 46: 281.

(9) Atarvios, Bishop of Neocaesarea, a Sabellianizer, a relation of St Basil (cf. Epp. 61, 126, 204, 207, 210).

(10) Epist. 210 Τοῖς πολιτευομένοις Νεοκαισαρείας, 1.

(11) Gregory of Nyssa, Εἰς Βίον Μακρίνης, PG 46: 965, 980.

(12) *Ibid.* 965-968.

(13) Cf. Epp. 204:6, 210:1, 233:3.

(14) Gregory the Theologian, *Oratio* 43:12.

(15) Epp. 271, 212.

(16) Ep. 272.

(17) For Libanius see *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1970, pp. 605f.

(18) Gregory the Theologian, *Oratio* 43:14.

(19) *Ibid.* 19. and *Carmina* 2:1,11.

(20) Cf. Socrates' *Eccl. Hist.* 4:26 and Sozomen's *Eccl. Hist.* 6:17.

(21) On Himerios see *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1970, p. 516.

(22) On Pro(h)aeresios see *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1970, p. 883.

(23) Gregory the Theologian, *Περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου*, 229ff.

(24) Cf. for example, K. Bonis, *Βιβλιοθήκη Ἑλλήνων Πατέρων καὶ Ἐκκλησιαστικῶν Συγγραφέων* (Library of Greek Fathers and Ecclesiastical Authors), Athens 1975, vol. 51, pp. 6:29-32; P. Christou, *Ὁ Μέγας Βασίλειος* (St Basil the Great), Thessalonica 1978, p. 36.; and Y. Courtonne, *Un témoin du iv^e siècle oriental, Saint Basile et son temps d'après sa correspondance*, Paris 1973, pp. 51-52.

(25) Gregory of Nyssa, *Εἰς Βίον Μακρίνης*, PG 46: 965-968.

(26) Ep. 223.

(27) This date is accepted by the Greek patrologist Bonis,

op. cit. p. 50. Christou accepts the year 364 as the year of Basil's ordination to the priesthood, *op. cit.* p. 56.

(28) Gregory the Theologian, Ep. 115.

(29) Gregory the Theologian, *Oratio* 43:78.

(30) Oskar Ring, *Drei Homilien aus der Frühzeit Basiliius des Grossen*, Paderbon 1930, pp. 12ff.

(31) *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, Freiburg i. Br., 1932 vol. iii, p. 135.

(32) Styl. Papadopoulos, Μέγας Βασίλειος, Βίος και Θεολογία (Basil the Great, Life and Theology), Athens 1981, p. 110.

(33) Gregory of Nyssa, Λόγος εις Μέγαν Βασίλειον, Migne, PG 36:512.

(34) *Ibid.* 584.

(35) In his study *A History of Neo-Arianism* T. A. Copecek discusses the available historical data on the circumstances of the theological debate between Basil and Eunomius and on the two key works in this debate, Basil's *Anatreptikos* of Eunomius' *Apologetikos*. Copecek argues for an early date for the debate and for the authorship of these two works. He defends the view that Eunomius probably delivered his work as a speech at the Council of Constantinople in 360 and that Basil, who was present at the Council and fled to his monastic resort at Pontus before it ended, wrote his work of refutation shortly afterwards, in 360 or in 361 (on this see his elaborate argument in vol. 2 pp. 364-372).

(36) Copecek's schematic review of the contents of Basil's *Anatreptikos* is as follows:
 Oration 1: Against Eunomius' doctrine of the Father [*Apol.*1-11]
 1-4 Eunomius: historical and theological introduction [*Apol.*1-6]
 5-11 Against Eunomius' doctrine of God [*Apol.*7-8]

- 12-18 Basil's doctrine of God
 19-27 Against Eunomius' anti-homoiousian theology [*Apol.*9-11]
 Oration 2: Against Eunomius' doctrine of the Son [*Apol.*12-24]
 1-21 Against Eunomius' view on the generation of the Son
 [*Apol.*12-15]
 22-29 Against Eunomius' view on Father/Son language
 [*Apol.*16-19]
 30-34 Against Eunomius' two ways of discovering the truth
 [*Apol.*20-24]
 Oration 3 Against Eunomius' doctrine of the Spirit [*Apol.*25]
 1-7 Against Eunomius' Pneumatology.

PART II

(37) Basil probably calls him Galatian to save the honour of his country, for he knew that he was a Cappadocian, or perhaps because he wants to insinuate that he opposes the truth as the Galatian heretics had opposed the great Apostle to the Nations.

(38) Gregory of Nyssa, *Antirrhētikos Contra Eunomium*, 1.

(39) On Aetius see *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity*, Everett Ferguson (ed), Garland, New York & London 1990, pp. 13f.

(40) On the Anomoeans, i.e. the extreme Arians whose leader was Aetius, see *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity*, Everett Ferguson (ed), Garland, New York & London 1990, pp. 45f. The major modern work on them is T. A. Kopecek' *A History of Neo-Arianism*, vols. 1-2, Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, Cambridge, 1979, vols. 1-2.

(41) Philostorgius, *Eccl. Hist.* 3:21.

(42) Socrates, *Eccl. Hist.* 4:7.

(43) *Eunomius, The Extant Works*, Text and translation by Richard Paul Vaggione, Oxford Early Christian Texts, Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1987.

(44) For the former see Mansi, ACO iii, 646, and for the latter see, Vaggione *op.cit.*

(45) Photius, *Bibliotheca* 138.

(46) Philostorgius *Eccl. Hist.* 8:12.

(47) *Anatreptikos* 1:2, PG 29:504A.

(48) *Ibid.* 1:2, PG 29:504B.

(49) *Ibid.* 1:1, PG 29:500CD.

(50) *Ibid.* 1:4, PG 29:509CD.

(51) *Ibid.* 1:4, PG 29:512A.

(52) *Ibid.* 1:5, PG 29:517D.

(53) Arius' *Epistola ad Alexandrum*, in Athanasius' *De Synodis* 16.

(54) Arius' *Thalia*, in Athanasius' *Contra Arianos* 1:5.

(55) *Ibid.*

(56) *Thalia* was a collection of poems by Arius which was designed to propagate his theological views in a popularized way.

(57) Arius' *Thalia* in Athanasius' *Contra Arianos* 1:5.

(58) *Ibid.*

(59) Proverbs 8:22.

(60) Cf. G. V. Florovsky, *The Eastern Fathers*.. 1987, pp.93ff.

(61) Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* 1:37.

(62) I Cor. 2:9-16.

(63) Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* 3:16.

(64) John 10: 30.

(65) Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem* 4:12ff.

(66) Sunday of the Fathers, *Stichera of Vespers*.

(67) For Eunomius' doctrine see T. A. Kopecek's *A History of Neo-Arianism*, vols. 1-2 (Patristic Monograph Series No 8), The Philadelphia Patristic Foundation Ltd, Cambridge Mass 1979; R. P. C. Hanson's *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy*, T & T Clark, Edinburgh 1988, pp. 611-636. Cf. also, *Eunomius, The Extant Works*, Text and translation by Richard Paul Vaggione, Oxford Early Christian Texts, Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1987.

(68) *Aseitas* = a philosophical term derived from the phrase *a se* = from itself and corresponding to the Greek notion of self-existent.

(69) Socrates, *Eccl. Hist.* 4:7.

(70) Theodoret, *Αἰρετικῶν Κακομυθίας Ἐπιτομή* 4:4.

(71) Basil's *Anatreptikos* 1:7, PG 29: 525.

(72) Plato's *Cratylus* 383ab and 388b.

FOOTNOTES TO PART IV

(1) *Anatreptikos* 1:4, PG 29:512B.

(2) *Ibid.* 1:8, PG 29:529A.

(3) *Ibid.* 1:4, PG 29:512B.

(4) *Ibid.* 1:9, PG 29:532A-533C.

(5) *Ibid.* 1:5, PG 29:520C.

(6) *Ibid.* 1:7, PG 29:525C.

(7) *Ibid.* 1:5, PG 29:521C.

(8) *Ibid.* 1:11, PG 29:537B.

(9) Socrates, *Eccl. Hist.* 4:7.

(10) *Anatreptikos*, 1:12, PG 29:540A.

(11) *Ibid.* 1:24, PG 29:546C-565B.

(12) *Epist.* 234,1, PG 32:896A.

(13) *De Spiritu Sancto*, 1:6, PG 29: 561-574 and 2:4, PG 29:577-580 and 2:32, PG 29:648.

(14) *Epist.* 234:1.

(15) Gregory Palamas *In defence of the holy Hesychasts*, 3:2,12.

(16) J. Meyendorff, *Introduction à l' étude de Grégoire Palamas*, Patristica Sorboniensia collection dirigée par H.-I., Marrou, No. 3, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1959, p. 292.

(17) Gregory of Nyssa, *Antirrhethikos contra Eunomium*, Or. 12, PG 45:960.

(18) Dionysios the Areopagite, *Περὶ θεῶν ὀνομάτων* 2:7, PG 3:645A.

(19) *Anatreptikos* 2:14, PG 29:597B.

(20) *Ibid.* 2:11, PG 29:592B.

(21) *Ibid.* 2:20, PG 29:613D.

(22) *Ibid.* 2:22, PG 29:620B.

(23) *Ibid.* 2:25, PG 29: 629D.

(24) *Ibid.* 2:30, PG 29: 641C.

(25) *Ibid.* 2:31, PG 29:644B.

(26) *Ibid.* 2:32, PG 29:648A.

(27) *Ibid.* 2:12B, PG 29:593B

(28) John 1:3.

(29) *Anatreptikos*, 2:14, PG 29:597B.

(30) *Ibid.* 2:14, PG 29:600A.

(31) *Ibid.* 2:9, PG 29:588B.

(32) *Ibid.* 1:5, PG 29:520C.

(33) *Ibid.* 2, PG 29:577C.

(34) *Ibid.* 2:29, PG 29:640A.

(35) *Ibid.* 2:28, PG 29:637C.

(36) *Ibid.* 1:10, PG 29:536B.

(37) *Ibid.* 2:3,4, PG 29: 576-586

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