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The Scottish campaign of Edward I, 1303-4.

Abstract.

The campaign of 1303-4 was the longest expedition led by Edward I, and involved the longest siege of his reign. Previously, however, its part in bringing about the Guardians' surrender early in 1304, has been understated.

Based on an in-depth examination of a wide range of surviving documents, the importance of the military element in conquering Scotland has been re-evaluated. Crown strategy was planned with great care and executed with rigour. In gaining access to Scotland north of the Forth, by use of the pre-fabricated bridge built at Lynn in the early part of 1303, Edward proceeded to occupy the eastern ports, effectively placing a barrier between the Guardians and the continent. This proved to be the turning point of the campaign.

Because so many cavalry served unpaid, and do not figure largely in the evidence, exact numbers are impossible to ascertain. However, by using the varied sources, reasonable estimates have been put forward for numbers throughout the fifteen months. As regards the infantry, by using the payrolls, it has been argued that more were present for longer than had previously been thought.

The efforts to obtain and transport supplies, whether victuals, arms or monies, has also been examined in great detail. The evidence for purveyance suggests that it was not the poor who were burdened, but those of some status in local society. Altogether, the evidence suggests that, in England, many may have benefited from the war by the employment of their skills or the purchase of their goods. Many, however, would also have suffered, especially with regard to shipping. Lowland Scotland and northern England were the worst affected areas because they were the main theatre of operations.
The Scottish campaign of Edward I, 1303-4.

Michael Alexander HASKELL

MA (University of Durham)

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I would like to thank Michael Prestwich for all his guidance in my work; my grandmother, for making this thesis possible; and my wife, for all her support.

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I would like to apologize to the reader regarding the state of the colour diagrams. This was due entirely to an error by the binders. I have tried to replace any missing details.
Abbreviated references.

<table>
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<td>Barrow Bruce</td>
<td>G W S Barrow Robert Bruce and the community of the realm of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1965 (Third edn, 1988)).</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIHR</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical research.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Calendar of Close Rolls (1892-).</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Calendar of Fine Rolls (1911-).</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Calendar of Patent Rolls (1891-).</td>
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<td>EcHR</td>
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<td>Flores Historium iii ed. H R Luard (Rolls series, 1890).</td>
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<td>Guisborough</td>
<td>The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough ed. H Rothwell (Camden society, Third series 89(1957)).</td>
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<td>SC HR</td>
<td>Scottish Historical Review.</td>
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Note on money and the regnal year.

The accounts not only use the standard £ s d (twelve pennies to the shilling and twenty shillings to the pound) but also the mark; this was worth 13s 4d or two-thirds of a pound.

The regnal year was the period on which wardrobe accounts were based. During Edward I's reign, it ran from 20 November to 19 November (Henry III having died on 16 November 1272). Thus regnal year 31 began on 20 November 1302 and regnal year 32 on 20 November 1303.
Introduction.

On 25 August 1304, Edward I left Scotland after a successful campaign that had begun fifteen months previously; it would be the last time the king was to set foot in Scotland, although not the last expedition he initiated north of the border. Between 1296 and 1306, six campaigns were launched against the Scots (as well as hostilities against the French, which only formally ended in 1303).\(^1\) This thesis concentrates on the campaign of 1303-4, from which two themes are drawn out.

Firstly, the army and the vast logistical exercise needed to keep it in the field are examined to a greater level of detail than has been done previously; the results show that there were larger numbers of troops with the king for longer than had been thought, and that the effort of supplying these troops was extensive.\(^2\)

Secondly, it is argued that the surrender of the remaining Scottish 'rebels' early in 1304 was a direct consequence of the

\(^1\)The two best modern accounts of the Scottish campaigns are to be found in Prestwich Edward I and Barrow Bruce.  
\(^2\)However, the drawback with this approach has been that it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons with other Scottish campaigns. The only secondary source providing a certain amount of detail is Prestwich War, Politics.
military achievements of the English forces. The current opinion north of the border, voiced by Professor Barrow, is that it was the loss of French support that was the important factor; 'the massacre of the French feudal host at Courtrai on July 11th [1302] did more to make Scotland an English province than any other single event of these years'.³ Putting the emphasis on Courtrai allows Barrow to then go on and declare that 'it was nearly two years before the Scots admitted defeat'.⁴ Professor Prestwich, writing from the south side of the border, while not endorsing Barrow wholeheartedly, does argue, and rightly so, that Courtrai was important in ending the Anglo-French conflict and aiding Edward in his attempt to fulfil his ambition.⁵

Throughout, the thesis is document driven in its approach. Despite the loss of a large proportion of crown manuscripts, those that remain yield much information and enable a clearer picture of the campaign to emerge. Because the accounts were not finally audited, the exchequer kept all subsidiary documents. Perhaps we should be grateful for the crown's financial difficulties; without them, far fewer documents would have had the chance to survive the test of time. The first part outlines the important political and military movements prior to the opening of the campaign, and then narrates the events of the following fifteen months.

The remaining five chapters are divided into two parts. Part II deals specifically with the army; the cavalry and infantry are each allotted a chapter. The Irish contingents are not being dealt with in the same detail as the English forces because this task has already been done.⁶ Part III contains three chapters

³Barrow Bruce 124.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Edward I 515.
⁶Lydon 'Edward I, Ireland' 43-61.
examining in turn the navy, the logistical support and lastly, the skilled labour employed during the expedition. The conclusion, as well as pulling all the threads together and restating the arguments, examines the financial, economic and social costs of the campaign and considers the price of Edward's success.

In terms of population, there were perhaps 400,000 to 500,000 people living in the Scottish kingdom in 1300;\(^7\) in England, probably between five and six million.\(^8\) The bulk of the Scottish population, due to the physical geography, was distributed between the areas south of the Forth and the east coast.\(^9\) However, the nature of the terrain and the comparatively small population did not mean a backward or underdeveloped economy;\(^10\) this is shown by the fact that 'when Edward embarked upon the conquest of Scotland in 1296, he found a road system not inadequate for his purpose'.\(^11\)

Scotland too was a unified kingdom, with a developed sense of political identity.\(^12\) Militarily, there were already many strategically sited, solidly built castles. Yet for all that, the pressure brought to bear by Edward almost succeeded in achieving a 'United Kingdom'.

Initially, the Scottish magnates attempted to conduct the war with Edward on equal terms; Dunbar revealed the numerical

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\(^7\) T M Cooper 'The Numbers and the distribution of the population of Medieval Scotland' *SchR* 26 (1947) 2-9; Barrow Bruce 2.


\(^9\) A map of the principal routes and the areas of land over 1,200 feet can be found in Barrow Bruce 14.


\(^12\) See Barrow *Kingship and Unity*, 122-143; N Reid 'The Kingless Kingdom: Scottish Guardianship 1286 - 1306' *SchR* 61(1982) 105-129.
disparity. It was left to a social inferior, William Wallace, to
demonstrate the art of surprise tactics (at Stirling Bridge, 1297)
and the effect of offensive raiding.\textsuperscript{13}

However, the military strategy of the Guardians between 1298
and 1304 has been set in an unfavourable light compared to that of
Robert Bruce in the years between the confrontation at Greyfriars'
kirk and Bannockburn;\textsuperscript{14} the implication being that the Guardians
did not pursue their course of action to its logical conclusion in
the way that Bruce did; and that an indeterminate state of warfare
existed between Falkirk and their submission at Strathord.
However, the conditions under which Bruce operated were in stark
contrast to those of the Guardians; Edward II, unlike his father,
did not exhibit the will or stamina to succeed. In the
circumstances, the Guardians gave a good account of themselves, as
is shown by their successes before the English campaign began in
May 1303.

Scotland, south of the Forth, spent much of the period from
1298 either under English occupation or influence, and it has been
argued that resistance to Edward came primarily from north of the
Forth; the earl of Buchan and the Red Comyn ruled ‘vast and
warlike districts from Buchan to Lochaber, and it was these areas
which provided the strength of resistance’.\textsuperscript{15} While Barrow has

\textsuperscript{13} His most recent biographer has argued that he did not intend to
stand at Falkirk, but that a scout or spy supplied information
which enabled Edward to force his hand. The argument is
However, to describe Edward as ‘evil’ surely oversteps the mark of
considered judgment necessary for work of an historical nature.
\textsuperscript{14} The Scots ‘could neither bring into the field an army which was
remotely equal to a pitched battle with the English nor, as yet,
push to its logical conclusion their half-learned lesson that
scorched earth and incessant guerrilla attacks might make it
impossible for the English to stay north of Lothian’; Barrow \textit{Bruce}
127; see also 202.
\textsuperscript{15} E M Barron \textit{The Scottish Wars of Independence. A critical study}
(Inverness, 1934) 188.
redressed the unequal emphasis on highland over lowland effort, it is still felt that 'the loss [of the north broke] the back of Scottish resistance in 1303'.

English strategy had undergone a transformation once Edward realised that success on the field of battle did not translate into victory in the war. Primarily, the 'self sufficient, strongly sited castle' was the key to any military solution. The first chain of fortifications to secure were those spanning the border; Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Lochmaben and Carlisle; then the main Scottish strong points of military and political importance: Edinburgh, Stirling and Dumbarton, the Forth-Clyde 'thin isthmus'. 'Control of the Firth of Forth lay with the possessor of Edinburgh; control of the Clyde lay at Dumbarton; control of the neck of Scotland itself lay at Stirling. With control of all three and with reasonable vigilance, Edward could hold Scotland'. At the beginning of 1303, of the castles mentioned, only Stirling was held by the Scots. Further inland, a similar pattern of castles holding key areas can be seen; Urquhart, Inverlochy and Inverness controlled the route of the Great Glen, for example. What is evident is that the English commanders had adequate knowledge of the terrain they were operating in. Edward's intention in 1303 'was to march up the

16 Nicholson Scotland. The Later Middle Ages 80.
17 As had been the case with Norman warfare; G W S Barrow The Kingdom of the Scots: Government, Church and Society from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century (London,1973) 146.
19 S Cruden The Scottish Castle (Edinburgh,1960) 39. It is possible that Urquhart may have been besieged in the autumn of 1303; see Part I below.
20 Barrow The Kingdom of the Scots 370-371.
east coast, occupying the principal towns and castles...leaving
English garrisons behind him’; these garrisoned castles supplied
the means by which the sheriff, 'that omni-competent local
official', was able to rule the surrounding area.

An important factor that has not featured prominently enough
is the position of the natural leaders of Scotland as the truce
ended in 1302. The magnates had been rent asunder by constant
English campaigns, and they no longer formed a solid bloc of
military opposition. In effect, there were four main groupings;
those who were in France, those who were prisoners in England,
those who fought for Edward, and those who were still actively
resisting.

To counter the change of diplomatic direction at the French
court, the Scots had been forced to send 'an extraordinarily large
and powerful delegation' across the North Sea; John de Soules
resigned the Guardianship (taken up by John Comyn) to lead the
party. With him went Bishop Lamberton, the earl of Buchan, James
Stewart, Ingram de Umfraville and William Balliol. This loss at
a critical point was a significant, but necessary one. Only three
earls remained active with Comyn; Atholl, Strathearn and Menteith.

As for those serving the king, some, like the earl of Dunbar
and Reginald le Cheyne, had done so since the outbreak of
hostilities, but it cannot be ascertained whether it was for fear
of losing estates in England, because of a belief in Edward's
claims, or because they believed in English strength and
consequent rewards. Others had at various points transferred

\[21KW i 416.\]
\[22Reid 'The Kingless Kingdom' 116.\]
\[23Barrow Bruce 124. On the question of Soules, Comyn and the
Guardianship, see Reid 'The Kingless Kingdom' 115.\]
\[24Though surely not a 'cynical' belief in English power, rather a
realistic one; Barrow Kingship and Unity 164. Cheyne received oaks\]
their allegiance. Of these, Bruce was the most important, but there were others such as Robert Keith and Thomas de Morham. Edward also used duress; Alexander de Balliol's son was kept prisoner to ensure his father's continued support. A more colourful character was Adam de Swinburn; early on in the wars, he was 'described as having ridden with the Scots with banners displayed, plundering and burning in Northumberland and Cumberland, especially the priory of Hexham'. He was later captured and after a short spell as a prisoner in Berwick, served both Edward and his son between 1297 and 1315.

Finally, there were those held prisoner. The most notable of these was the earl of Ross, but again there were others. James de Ros was held at Carlisle castle, and both Herbert de Morhams, father and son, were prisoners.

from the royal forests of Damaway and Longmorn in order to construct his fortified manor at Duffus; Cruden The Scottish Castle 14, 126.

The particular details are discussed in Chapter 1 below.

See CDS ii 1409 where Keith was attempting to enlist the king's support with regard to some land he had purchased 'long before he was captured in the war'.

BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.12v, 14, 15, 19 deal with Balliol junior's journey from Bamburgh to London, 28 August to 26 October 1304. SCi 45/129 is a letter dated 1 April 1304 ordering that Balliol junior be brought to Bamburgh and CDS v 359 is another, dated 2 April, to the constable of Bamburgh castle dealing with the conditions of his guest; 'have him guarded by trustworthy persons in the castle, not in irons, and with freedom to play within the castle walls provided he is well guarded'.

M F Moore The Lands of the Scottish Kings in England (London,1973(1915)) 45-6. His lands suffered from attacks under Bruce, and sometime after 1315 he threw in his lot with the Scottish king. He died in 1318.

CDs ii 1401, 1403, 1416; CCR 1302-7 59.

CDs ii 1329 is a letter dated 6 October 1302 in which the Crown is asked for financial aid because the area was 'so wasted and destroyed by the Scottish war' that it 'was not possible to levy money for the cost of keeping the prisoner'.

The younger Morham had been at large in the autumn of 1301, but it is not known when he was captured; Barrow Bruce 121, 357 n61. Geoffrey de Mowbray, clerk, was detained at Dover sometime in the spring of 1304 because he had no letters of conduct, but in April,
Despite the loss of important leaders, those who remained were still perceived as a threat by the crown. Indeed, this is an important point. We do not know exactly (and almost certainly never will) what military threat Comyn posed; all we have is the perception and reaction of the English government to go by. The Scottish host would probably have been a combination of feudal military service and the pre-feudal 'common army'; certainly landowners played an important role. The one advantage this force had over the English was the fact that it operated virtually all year round. During the latter half of the fourteenth century, Froissart described the Scots as 'a bold hardy people, very experienced in war', a description not out of place for the opening years of the same century. But, in the face of the relentless efforts by Edward, what motivated the Guardians to continue to resist?

Firstly, there was the continued existence of the king of Scotland. Edward may have deposed John Balliol (in 1296), but he was still regarded as the legitimate king by the community of the realm. His transfer, first to the custody of the Papacy, and then to that of the French had continued to raise hopes. But while he was released. Presumably he was on his way back from France.

SCI 12/65, 12/66.

In 1301, the keeper of Lochmaben castle had estimated the Scottish army as 14 bannerets, 240 men-at-arms, and 7,000 foot 'or more', led by John de Soules and Ingram de Umfraville; H Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 1284 - 1307 (Manchester,1946) 79.

The foot would have been armed with spears, Lochaber axes, short bow and swords; Nicholson Scotland. The Later Middle Ages 48.


A Z Freeman stated that Edward could keep his armies in the field for longer than the Scots could; this though was clearly not the case; 'The King's Penny: the headquarters paymasters under Edward I, 1295 – 1307' Journal of British Studies 6(1966) 2.

Balliol's presence was important, in the last analysis, it was not undisputed.

International support, primarily in the form of French and papal backing, was also an inspiring factor, but not pivotal. Papal support had been lost with the conflict between Pope Boniface VIII and Philip IV, the former seeking to cultivate Edward's support in the dispute. Papal support had been lost with the conflict between Pope Boniface VIII and Philip IV, the former seeking to cultivate Edward's support in the dispute. 37 The alliance with France had not produced military aid since the end of active hostilities between England and France in 1298. While French diplomacy had been instrumental in negotiating the truce in 1302, and in securing the custody of Balliol, once the French feudal host, not for the first time, had fatally thrown themselves against a dismounted defensive force, the whole question of support for the Guardians across the water faded fast, despite the French king's initial assurances to the contrary. 38

However, the most important factor lay nearer to home. Edward's inability to cross the Forth was crucial in the continuing resistance put up by the Guardians. Contact with Flanders and Germany was essential for imports, especially of arms, and as an outlet for the wool crop; indeed, once Berwick was taken in 1296, the eastern ports became even more vital.

37 Perhaps in some senses, the most tangible sign of papal disapproval, the pope's letter to Edward in 1299, did more to aid the king by uniting the magnates in formulating their response.
38 Philip IV's 'dilemma [of wanting peace with England, but also wanting his Scottish allies included] was solved when King John made a last disastrous decision; in a letter written from Baileul on 23 November 1302 he consented that Philip should have a completely free hand in his negotiations with the English. With this letter in his hand Philip could face the Scottish ambassadors'; Nicholson Scotland. The Later Middle Ages 65.
39 The significance of this can be seen in the licence to export wool granted by Edward I to Alexander de Abernethy on 1 April 1304; SC1 32/67. Abernethy had only recently surrendered (sometime before Michaelmas 1303, earlier than most of his fellow 'rebels'; CDS ii 1694), and it testifies not only to the importance of the wool crop but also to the strength of the economy in the face of the effects of war.
'When Scotland found herself at war with England the struggle to keep open the lines of communication to the continent became of the greatest importance'. Even Wallace had recognised the necessity to keep mercantile contact going if Scotland was to fend off the English. For his part, Edward was also aware of this particular strut supporting the Guardians and various measures were taken to break it; an active, though fairly ineffective, blockade of Scottish ports was attempted; English merchants were forbidden to export anything that would aid the enemy; merchants supplying English forces north of the border 'were required to give security that they would not communicate with the enemy'; and the king even tried to prevent the Flemings from trading with Scotland.

In commissioning the construction of the pontoon bridge before the campaign got underway, Edward signalled his intention to place his forces between the Scots and their important eastern ports. In this, he was remarkably successful. Comyn clearly felt that his foremost responsibility lay with the peace and security of the community of the realm. That had been the case in 1291 when, however reluctantly, the Guardians had then allowed Edward to press his claim of overlordship. Loss of French and papal support would no doubt have sapped the Guardians' will to resist, but not to the extent that they were ready to give in. The real turning point came in June 1303, when Edward crossed the Forth.

40 W Stanford Reid 'Trade, Traders and Scottish Independence' Speculum 29(1954) 210. This article highlights perfectly the importance of the continental links and of the north eastern ports, especially Aberdeen, once Berwick had been lost. See also Barrow Bruce 9-10.

41 Stanford Reid 'Trade, Traders and Scottish Independence' 214, 217.
PART I.

Chapter 1. The Campaign of 1303-4.

In the autumn of 1302, the truce between Scotland and England, negotiated by the French, expired. Both sides had already begun to prepare for renewed hostilities, yet two important events had given Edward cause for hope. The French defeat at Courtrai enabled the king's negotiators in Paris to renew the truce with France (in December 1302 and then again the following March);\(^1\) by May 1303, peace was agreed.\(^2\)

Closer to home, Bruce had transferred his allegiance. Much has been written on the reasons behind the move;\(^3\) the transfer of Balliol and the subsequent appointment of Soules may have been influential. Another factor may have been the Bruce estates south of the border. Robert's father, who died in April 1304,\(^4\) had been staunchly pro-English since the beginning of the war. Indeed, it appears he performed his service personally, having letters of protection and of respite of debts issued on 28 May, the former to

\(^1\)CCR 1302-7 65-6, 180.
\(^2\)Prestwich Edward I 397.
\(^3\)E L G Stones 'The submission of Robert Bruce to Edward I c1301-2' SchHR 34(1955) 122-34; A A M Duncan 'The community of the realm of Scotland and Robert the Bruce. A review' SchHR 45(1966) 184-201; Barrow Bruce 172-4.
\(^4\)Barrow Bruce 142.
last until 14 October, the latter until Michaelmas. Bruce himself does not appear to have joined the king until the winter of 1303-4. Perhaps there was a rift between father and son? The agreement with Edward certainly reveals Bruce's concern for his inheritance. Barrow suggests that the 'Ulster alliance may have been enough to tip the scales of Bruce's indecision'. Whatever Bruce's motivation, his loss to the Guardians' cause would have been another setback, and entailed a revision of their strategy, though not their tactics.

However, these new developments did not mean the military struggle would be any the less intense. Before Edward was able to make his personal presence felt, English forces had already suffered some reverses. In a writ dated 20 January 1303, directed to various northern magnates, the king commanded that they remain in John de Segrave's service, at crown expense, because the Scots were attacking 'territories occupied by the king', had taken 'certain castles and towns and perpetrated other excess' and 'it is feared they may invade England' and that therefore Edward himself would advance 'sooner than had been at first intended'.

Already an unusual agreement had been reached with the community of Northumberland whereby 'all persons able to serve as footsoldiers 16-60 years old' were to assemble at Berwick with fifteen days provisions to serve for eight days at their expense, at the crown's for longer. At the same time it seems Segrave was given power to muster after eight days notice the men of

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5 CDS v 2450; 1466.
6 CDS ii 1385.
7 Barrow Bruce 121.
8 PW i 60; CDS ii 1342; CCR 1302-7 71. See also the translation given in D W Burton 'Politics, Propaganda and Public opinion in the reigns of Henry III and Edward I' (Oxford University DPhil. thesis, 1985) 325.
Northumberland. Cumberland, Westmoreland, Lancaster, Annandale, the Marches and the bounds of the county of Roxburgh 'to execute his command for the work and defence of the realm against the Scots'.

Selkirk peel was captured early in 1303; the Scots 'evidently destroying its newly completed defences, for after the fall of Stirling in 1304 the king gave orders for it to be rebuilt'. However, the Scots' major success was the defeat of an English force at Roslyon on 24 February.

Edward had already 'ordered John de Segrave and Ralph Manton, the cofferer of the wardrobe, to make a mounted foray past Stirling, as far as Kirkintilloch'; nothing is known regarding this expedition, but another one was planned for early spring. However Comyn and Fraser clearly got wind of this raid, made a forced march from Biggar and surprised the English. Langtoft states that sixteen knights and 30 sergeants were 'undressed' when the Scots attacked. Ralph de Manton was killed, Segrave was captured but almost immediately rescued by a counter attack led by Robert de Neville. This débâcle, which could have been more disastrous than it was, caused Edward to change the assembly point

9 The Northumberland agreement is dated 3 January 1303 in CPR 1301-7 101, and 4 January in PW i 60; the general muster agreement was also dated 4 January, at Odiham; CPR 1301-7 103. On the same day, Segrave was made 'cheventain' of Northumberland and John Botetourt was made 'cheventain' of Cumberland, Westmoreland, Lancaster, Annandale and the Marches; PW i 60.

10 AW i 415. It is possible that Edinburgh castle may also have been taken the previous summer; Barrow Bruce 351 n98. If that was the case, it must have been retaken by the spring of 1303.

11 Documents ed.Stevenson 624; Prestwich Edward I 498.

12 Barron The Scottish War of Independence 189. John de St. John wrote to Manton informing the cofferer that he was too ill to respond to the summons, but that he was sending representatives to Roxburgh; SCI 50/32.

13 Rishanger 124-5; Guisborough 352.
English activity was not solely confined to eastern Scotland; John Botetourt had command of a large number of troops. On 9 January, he wrote to James de Dalilegh, the receiver of victuals at Carlisle, commanding him to pay the wages of his men intending to 'foray on the enemy'. The force itself was composed of three bannerets and thirteen lords with their retinues, amounting to six knights and fifty-eight esquires as well as forty-two valets and men-at-arms, nineteen hobelars and 2,736 foot with captains from Cumberland, Westmoreland and Lancaster. To assemble such a force in winter was a considerable feat, though what it achieved is unclear. It was not just the Guardians who were capable of executing ambushes; on 15 March, 'Edward had rewarded with money certain Scots who had been involved in an attempt to ambush [Wallace] and Fraser'.

In February 1302, initial agreements had been made regarding the involvement of the Irish lords, but final details were not sent out until November, when magnates from England were also summoned to gather at Berwick-on-Tweed on 26 May 1303. Spring marked the beginning of the campaigning season; previous attempts at winter expeditions had failed to have the desired effect.

The decision to make Berwick the assembly point indicated Edward's intention to at least begin the campaign along the east coast. Confirmation of this is the building over the winter at King's Lynn of a pre-fabricated pontoon bridge which was to enable the army to cross the Firth of Forth without taking Stirling.

14 PW i 61 note; CPR 1301-7 132.
15 CDS ii 1437.
17 PW i 58.
Previous campaigns had sometimes been hampered by long sieges and in 1302, Edward had been limited to operating south of the Forth because the planned bridge was not completed in time. It seems that this time the king was intending to push his way further into Scotland. With the Irish contingent operating in the west, this campaign built on its predecessor of 1301-2. The king, having realised that bringing the Scots to battle would be virtually impossible to achieve, decided that the only option was to place his forces between the Scots and the continent in an effort to sap the 'rebels' will to resist.

Formal declaration of the coming campaign had taken place in the autumn parliament of 1302 where the 'renewal of the Scottish war was considered to be a matter of paramount importance'; Walter Langton, treasurer and important royal councillor, was 'to think about our Scottish business so that our interests may prosper there'; to ensure that 'wages are to be well and promptly paid to our men who stay in those parts'; 'to have the castles of Scotland, the fortresses and the other places which concern us there...to have plenty of stores'; and to see that 'the new castles we are having constructed there are to have the best they can have in order to finish the work'. Of course, some of the measures necessary for running a campaign were already in place; for example, the exchequer was still situated at York; and it seems that posting stations were already set up on the routes between London and Scotland.

18 Prestwich Edward I 494.
19 Ibid 493.
20 Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 83.
22 In 1303, Robert Rideware took twenty-one days to travel from
Scotland through the autumn and winter of 1302-3 despite parliament. 23

Between the Michaelmas parliament and the opening of the campaign, the king and his council formulated strategy and issued orders. The records indicate that there were two crucial meetings. The first took place early in the new year at Odiham. What exactly was discussed is not known, but it must have been a meeting involving substantial and important participants. 24 The king himself was present at Odiham for more than three weeks; much wardrobe business was conducted especially concerning payments and debts to lords due to the Scottish wars; indeed, a number of these transactions were received 'by their own hands'. 25 The second meeting was held at Lenton early in April. The king was again present, this time staying for no more than a week, and again much wardrobe business concerning the Scottish wars was dealt with. Apart from a surviving memorandum of infantry requirements, there are no records to indicate other areas discussed. Strategy for the following campaign would no doubt have been on the 'agenda' throughout both meetings, but with the construction of the bridge already in hand, it would appear that at least Edward's initial plan of action had been decided before Christmas 1302, probably when orders were issued early in November for the service of

Dover to the king in Scotland; London to York took on average six days. There were risks; Alan Courier and another man travelling to the king in February 1304 were set upon and wounded by the Scots; M C Hill The King's Messengers 1199 - 1377 (London, 1961) 60, 108, 111.

23 William le Latimer, father and son; Robert de Clifford; John de Segrave; Alexander de Balliol; Walter de Huntercumbe; and Edmund de Hastings; CDS v 291; CCR 1296-1302 599.

24 Sayles The Functions of the Medieval Parliament 27.

25 E101/364/13. For example, William Russel on 25 December; Philip de Vernaco the day after; William de Bello Campo on 27 December; Robert de Banent on 29 December; and William de Leyburn on 8 January.
various ships.

The king, however, did not have to be present at council meetings. Just after Easter 1303, Edward sent Droxford to York with instructions regarding the provision of money and victuals for the coming enterprise, as well as measures to prevent the problem of desertion, for the council members to gather and discuss.26

Financial pressures may have necessitated a lower muster of infantry than had been summoned in previous campaigns, but the new measures designed to reduce the desertion rate showed Edward's desire to keep an impressive force in the field for as long as possible. At the beginning of April, commissions of array were sent out. In all, 9,500 troops were requested from Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Lancashire, Westmoreland, Cumberland, Durham and Northumberland.27 Interestingly, a memorandum has survived of decisions taken by the king and his council at Lenton on 7 April 1303.28 It was decided to summon 7,500 men from the English counties mentioned above, and 1,600 from Carrick, Galloway and Angus and the garrison of Berwick. At some stage between the council's decisions and the letters being written, the demand for men from Yorkshire doubled. For the Scottish troops requested, notes in the memorandum state that Bruce was to be given discretion over the muster, and both he and Richard Siward, who

26 Prestwich Edward I 438-9; J F Baldwin The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages (Oxford,1913) 466-7. On 26 January 1304, Langton had written to Edward concerning finance, victualling and shipping for the war; he informed the king of a council meeting to discuss the papal tenth and mentioned that Droxford's presence at York to aid exchequer business would be desirable; SCI 55/25.
27 CPR 1301-7 132.
28 CDS ii 1356 where it is attributed to sometime in April; E101/11/11.
was responsible for assembling 300 men of Nithsdale, were to be informed by letters close. The earl of Angus, who was also requested to gather 300 men, seems to have attended the council since there is no known reference to an official letter being sent to him. There is no record of any troops being supplied by Bruce or Siward, while numbers generally fell short of the targets, in particular Yorkshire's contribution. Why there was a sudden change of heart regarding the Yorkshire muster is unclear. Perhaps it was thought that the Scottish troops summoned could not after all be relied upon to appear. Or maybe Edward decided he wanted more men; he had been known to make extravagant demands before. Whatever the reason, the troops arrived over the last few days of May. Thirty men coming from Lancashire were killed or wounded between 6 and 11 May, presumably in an encounter with a Scottish force. The king himself reached Roxburgh on 16 May.

The itinerary of Edward I appears to show the king almost constantly on the move, while the rate of progress of the bulk of the army was tied to the rate of march by the infantry. The army left Roxburgh on 30 May and reached the Forth via Lauder, Newbattle and Falkirk. Sometime between 8 and 10 June, the river was crossed. Curiously, Langtoft stated that the bridges were not needed; Edward had crossed the Forth quite early, and this suggests that perhaps small numbers of mounted troops could ford the river, while the bridges were required to enable the bulk of the army to follow. Guisborough suggested that Stirling castle

29 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.72v.
31 E101/364/13 f.23v.
32 KW i 417 n1 suggests 8 June; I would put the crossing on 10 June. See Appendix A.
33 ii 349.
Map 1. The Scottish campaign, 1803-4.

--- Edward's route, May to October 1803.
was deliberately left to act as a deterrent against deserters; more likely it was a beneficial side effect of the king's strategy. By 8 June, Edward had reached Perth. The army did not reach the town until about 18 June. It was here that the progress of the campaign was temporarily halted, as it was not until the end of July that the army moved on to Brechin.

After successfully crossing the Forth, why should the king have spent nearly two months at Perth? On 18 July, Edward was at Coupar Angus, but he appears to have stayed there for only three days; on 20 July he was back at Perth, and he did not leave again until 28 July, en route for Brechin. The army almost certainly did not travel with the king to Coupar Angus; rather, they would have taken the coastal road, perhaps leaving Perth at the same time as the king.

It is possible that Edward was ill for a time; but his movements tend to argue against this. The cause of the delay was more likely due to the renewed threat of Scottish action. In June, Comyn, Wallace and Fraser 'with great power of men and foot' led an attack that took in Annandale, Liddesdale, Cumberland and Westmoreland; primarily, it was an attempt to divert Edward's attention, but it was also aimed at punishing Bruce by raiding his lands. By mid-June, Edward was aware of the attack, and measures were taken against it.

34 Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 90.
35 Flores iii 114 stated that the siege of Brechin lasted for twenty days, the garrison surrendering on 9 August; this would have meant that the troops would have had to have left Perth on 17 July at the latest. It would be strange for Edward not to have been present personally during the initial stages of the siege, but there is no record of his presence there until 4 August. Considering all the evidence, the Flores is probably inaccurate on this point.
36 CPR 1301-7 146; CCR 1302-7 91; CDS ii 1374; Fisher William Wallace 107-8.
The bishop of Durham, newly restored to favour, was commanded to defend England 'where the Scots were harrying the marches'. On 14 June, Walter of Huntercombe was sent to empower the men of Northumberland to resist any possible Scottish threat. Likewise, Aymer de Valence in his role as commander of Berwick garrison and Thomas Multon of Egremont, were sent to empower the men of Cumberland, Westmoreland, Annandale and the Marches.

At the same time, various reconnaissance expeditions were undertaken; the Prince of Wales led a foray into Strathearn lasting a fortnight in July. The horse rolls list at least six horses killed in a conflict with the Scots; presumably a skirmish. The pause at Perth may also have been due to the need to deliberate on the treaty provisions agreed with France (it was ratified on 10 July). Finally, the forthcoming siege of Brechin may also have necessitated this suspension of progress. On 5 June, Richard of Chester, one of the king's engineers, took receipt of two springalds and 400 quarrells at Berwick. On 15 July, Edward wrote from Perth to the constable of Edinburgh castle requesting that the engine 'Esplente' with all its accoutrements be sent to Montrose as soon as possible. Five days previously,

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38 PW i 676, 753, 878.
39 With him went William Wild and eleven foot archers; Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 90. There were also probably several cavalrymen.
40 E101/612/11 mm.1, 3; this took place either on 13 or 23 July (possibly on both days), and Athol is given as the location in one instance. Those named are Arnold Fytous (who in fact lost two horses), Martin Garsy, Bernard de Grisnak, John de Tardeys (all sergeants-at-arms) and Henry Folet (valet of Edmund de Cornwall).
42 CDS ii 1366.
43 Ibid 1386.
the king had requested prayers from the order of Chartreuse for his family, subjects, adherents and the expedition to Scotland. Perhaps the outcome of the campaign was weighing heavily on his mind.

Clearly this time at Perth was a crucial one; military as well as political decisions had to be taken. By mid July, it had been decided to move against Brechin castle. With the treaty settled, with measures taken to counter the Guardians' actions, and with information gathered in, the king was once again ready to pursue his strategy.

Brechin castle put up strong resistance and only surrendered 'on 9 August when its constable, Thomas Maule, was unexpectedly killed by a ricochet from a stone hurled from an English engine. The measures taken by Edward to put resistance to an end were exemplified by the (perhaps first) recorded use of gunpowder in a siege and the stripping of lead from the roof of Brechin cathedral for weights for the engines.

From Brechin, Edward began a march around north eastern Scotland. The king 'advanced by daily stages of moderate length, taking much plunder, burning and destroying everything'; the king went east and 'on every side he burnt hamlets and towns, granges and granaries, empty or full; so did the prince, unsparingly. The king went far into the north of his chase of the Scots, where never an English king had borne his banner before'. Confirmation

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44 Perhaps one from the Esplente? Floreis iii 114; the Merton Flores states that the siege lasted for 40 days.
45 Prestwich Edward I 499; Barrow Bruce 127; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.7. On 12 August, various jewels of unknown worth were delivered into the wardrobe; CDS ii 1434.
46 Guisborough, quoted by Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 89.
47 Langtoft 349. The prince may even have taken a caged lion with him; Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 86.
of at least a certain amount of destruction comes from a letter sent by Walter, dean of the cathedral church of Elgin, in which he requested 'a gift of timber to repair his own houses at Elgin burned by the prince's army'.

The route that Edward took was similar to the one he had taken seven years before. In 1296, Edward had reached Aberdeen by 14 July, and travelled via Banff, Elgin and Kildrummy to be back at Brechin by 4 August, a progress in which he took many homages, while his lieutenants had moved further west and north to secure the lands and continue the process of obtaining fealty to the king. In 1303, however, the situation was different. At this point, there had been no surrender of the insurgents. The lengthy stay at Perth and the siege of Brechin castle also meant it was late in the season. Edward did not reach Aberdeen until 23 August. He left there on 28 August, and, via Daviot and Kirktown of Auchterless, reached Banff on 3 September. From there, he progressed along the coast through Cullen, Rathven and Elgin (where he stayed for five days) to Kinloss, reached on 13 September. The king seems to have stayed there for eleven days but on 24 September he had moved on to Lochindorb. From then until 6 October Edward appears to have travelled much between Kinloss, Lochindorb and Boat of Garten.

This period is of extreme importance, yet current scholars have given Edward's movements only a cursory glance; Barrow briefly relates the journey and suggests that Edward 'sojourned at

48 CDS ii 1396.
49 On 24-5 September, Lochindorb; on 28-30 September, Boat of Garten; on 30 September, Kinloss; on 1 October, Lochindorb; on 1-2 October, Boat of Garten; on 3-4 October, Lochindorb; on 4 October, Kinloss; and on 6 October he travelled some 40 miles from Lochindorb via Kinloss to Mortlach.
Lochindorb and Garten. In 1296, Edward had travelled from Elgin to Kildrummy in three days whereas in 1303, he left Elgin on 13 September and did not reach Kildrummy until 7 October. With the campaign at such a critical juncture, it seems unlikely Edward was resting; his movements tend to suggest that rest was not uppermost in his thoughts. So what was the purpose behind spending more than three weeks around Lochindorb?

The lands Edward had penetrated were significantly those of Comyn. There have been suggestions that Edward besieged Lochindorb castle and that he afterwards made some structural improvements there. It has also been suggested that Edward's troops moved further north and west and took other castles, notably Urquhart and Cromarty. There is no official indication of any of these sieges. The infantry pay rolls list three payments made at Boat of Garten. The first is to Walter de Bedwin to replace money he had given to a group working on the bridge at Perth; the other more interesting payments are to Eliot le Brun and five mowers who went on 28 September with the earl of Lancaster to gather corn in the lands of Comyn. Eliot went again with nine mowers the following day under Hugh le Despenser (a total payment of 5s 4d). The army where possible travelled near the coast. When it moved inland, victualling problems were usually encountered, and this occasion seems to have been no

50 Barrow Bruce 127; Prestwich only relates the king's progress, Edward I 499.
52 Cruden The Scottish Castle 61.
53 Barrow Bruce 127; Barron The Scottish Wars of Independence 192-4.
54 E101/11/15/f.27.
55 The classic case was in 1298 where such problems almost prevented Edward from coming to grips with Wallace.
different. More important perhaps, at least one of the king's siege engines was taken by sea from Montrose to Banff, where wages were paid on 3 September. Two other ships had brought engines to Aberdeen in August and these may have gone by land with the army from there. This though neither confirms nor denies the possibility of a siege.

Lochindorb castle is situated on a small island in the middle of a lake (also called Lochindorb), and if any siege was to have taken place it would surely have required some form of amphibious attack. No record survives of any boats being either used or built for such a purpose, though of course local boats could have been impounded. Certainly the army did travel as far as Lochindorb, not only from the evidence of victualling needs above and the slow progress made by Edward, but also from the fact that the main bulk of troops were paid at Inverurie at the end of August and then not until the middle of October at Dundee. The circumstantial evidence does seem to point to a siege taking place.

It is possible to make certain tentative judgments regarding the traditions of Edward's troops besieging Urquhart and Cromarty castles. Payn de Tibetot was issued a writ of protection on 19 September in which it is stated he was with the king. The next day, letters of respite of debts were written for him in which he

56 E101/364/13 f.99v.  
57 Alexander Macdougall died at Lochindorb in 1303; the Comyn - Macdougall alliance 'made a notable contribution to the Scottish resistance to Edward I down to 1304'. Could Macdougall have been killed in an ensuing siege? Barrow The Kingdom of the Scots 378. It is also interesting to note that in 1336, 4,000 men-at-arms and 400 hobelars and mounted archers devastated the highlands around Aberdeen and relieved Lochindorb castle; P Morgan War and Society in Medieval Cheshire 1277 - 1403 (Chetham Society Third series 34(1987)) 41. Edward's force, while not as mobile, was more numerous.
was noted as being with the prince. On these days, Edward was at Kinloss; could it then indicate a command for the prince to besiege one of these castles? The king was keen to see his son’s military prowess, and securing the Cromarty Firth, the lower reaches of the Moray Firth and Loch Ness would have made sound strategic sense.

From studying dates and places in the pay rolls, it appears that the army travelled on average about fifteen miles in one day. Taking these factors into account, and assuming the army divided at Kinloss, then the maximum time available with which to invest Urquhart would have been in the region of three weeks; less would have been available to besiege Cromarty castle, possibly just over two weeks. Edward’s problems at Brechin and later at Stirling demonstrated how a well organised, well led and determined garrison could hold out. Since the traditions speak of brave defences, this suggests that it was unlikely that these castles were seriously beset by English troops; however, these theories must remain mere conjectures.

Between the end of the first week of October and the end of the first week in November, Edward travelled back south. He stayed for a few days at Dundee and Cambuskenneth and, on 5 November, took up winter quarters at Dunfermline. He was there until 1 March 1304. The burden this placed on the abbey was considerable. It has been alleged that the English did much

58 CDS v 2474, 1494.
59 Rates of march have been calculated before. For example, in the 1359 expedition in France, progress took the following pattern: 6 October, 25 miles; 7 October, rest day; 8 October, 10 miles; 9 October, rest day; 10 October, 11 1/2 miles; 11 October, 25 miles. Even then, the two heavy days of marching caused the loss of many horses; R Hardy Longbow. A social and military history (Cambridge,1976) 88.
60 See J R H Moorman ‘Edward I at Lanercost Priory 1306-7’ EHR
deliberate damage. However, on 16 June, Richard de Bromsgrove, receiver of victuals at Berwick, was ordered to deliver 50qu of wheat by the king’s gift to the abbot of Dunfermline; in August, Bromsgrove sent 20qu of wheat, 20qu of malt and a cask of wine to the abbot as part compensation for the losses incurred during the king’s stay; and the abbot received three casks of wine by three bills and one cask as a gift from the king sometime in regnal year 32. The evidence does not support the argument that the king sanctioned any acts of destruction. Certainly though, the imposition of king, household and army would have caused material loss to both religious and secular inhabitants of the town.

While Edward concentrated his efforts in the east during the summer and autumn of 1303, there was also much English activity in the west. The forces from Ireland weighed anchor on, or about, 9 July, and were in action early in August. This was a large force (the earl of Ulster, eleven bannerets, twenty-eight knights, 281 squires, 503 hobelars and 2,633 foot) as well as the forces that Botetourt and, later, Valence had. On 14 August, the king ordered Dalilegh to pay Botetourt as he ‘has been for some time in his [the king’s] service in Scotland with a great force of men-at-arms, to his heavy cost’. It would appear that

61 The current guide to the abbey and palace of Dunfermline (written by R Fawcett and published by Historic Scotland (1990)) relates English damage four times and states that Edward ordered the domestic buildings to be destroyed (2, 19, 20).
62 CDS ii 1547.
63 E101/11/15 m.1.
64 E101/11/29.
65 Lydon ‘Edward I, Ireland’ 50.
66 CDS ii 1389.
substantial numbers of men who were with Botetourt at the beginning of the year may still have been with him. Together with the Irish troops, this gathering constituted an effective deterrent against the Scots. Rothesay and Inverkip castles were taken. At the end of September, the bulk of the Irish forces departed; those that remained travelled to Linlithgow.

It was only after the withdrawal of the Irish forces that the Scots began to threaten again; Comyn sent, according to the countess of Lennox, 100 mounted men and 1,000 foot to raid Lennox. At the same time, Valence sent a report in which he stated that 'the Scotch have openly assembled with all their force in the lands'. He further stated that the Irish were staying at Linlithgow because 'they perceive plainly that no one cares for them nor their lives', and that because of this state of affairs, he was unable to act against the 'rebels'.

On 26 September, Valence, writing to the chancellor from Linlithgow, said that he was 'treating with the great lords of Scotland to bring them to the king's will and hopes to be successful by God's help; but cannot say for certain'. This contact appears to have been somewhat tentative; two days later, he was sending a report of the renewed Scottish threat noted above. Comyn was clearly attempting to carve out a possible

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67 Not because of the Scottish threat as stated by Lydon ('Edward I, Ireland' 50), and not because they were harassed by the Scots as Barrow writes (Bruce 127). The evident lack of pay for the Irish troops may not necessarily have been due to crown negligence; the paymaster at Berwick, John de Weston, 'had incurred expenditure, largely on wages, of over £10,000, but had only about £600 in cash with which to meet his obligations'; M C Prestwich 'The Crown and the Currency. the Circulation of money in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth century England' Numismatic Chronicle 142(1982) 61.

68 Documents ed.Stevenson 626.

69 CDS ii 1393.
negotiating position by reiterating the Scots' military threat; Edward had already successfully demonstrated English power by striking at the very heart of Comyn's estates.

The winter of 1303-4 was a critical phase in the campaign. The Scottish forces had been unable, since Roslin, to inflict serious damage, while the English had imposed their presence, something previous campaigns had singularly failed to do. More importantly, Edward was still in the field, again something he had failed to effectively achieve before. Without foreign pressure or a domestic crisis to distract the monarch, and with a military solution seemingly impossible, the Guardians showed great awareness of the military and political reality, and sought to bring the struggle to an end.

The negotiations were concluded early in the spring, though for how long they had been going on is unclear. On 11 January, a letter reveals that the process was getting underway. At this time Comyn was 'beyond the mountains', but he apparently wanted to open a dialogue. Valence, who had already been involved in the autumn, was to meet with Comyn at Kinclaven (along with the unknown addressee of this letter). The earl of Ulster and Hugh Despenser with 200 men-at-arms were also to rendezvous there as protection. It is interesting to note that it was the writer's party who were attempting to contact Comyn and his company. This letter also reveals dispositions of Scottish troops. The clerk sent by Comyn revealed that his lord had not been back across the Tay since the middle of November (1303), though some of his men were still there. The writer's lord had also recently received correspondence from the abbot of Coupar in which the cleric related how a 'a great part of the enemy who had gone towards Strathearn have now returned to Angus'. He also reported on the
badly damaged bridge at Perth.\textsuperscript{70}

There was clearly much to debate, and the final terms, while not returning Scotland to 'the good old days of King Alexander' were 'not excessively harsh'. Wallace was excluded from the submission as much by his own choice as by Edward's reluctance to extend terms to him. Fraser too rejected the terms offered. For the English, the prince was involved with the negotiations,\textsuperscript{71} but it was the king and his council who approved the proposals.\textsuperscript{72} Presumably Edward's council would have constituted those key magnates and royal officials with him at Dunfermline. Comyn conducted much of the business, 'on behalf of the community of Scotland'. It was the protection of that community that was paramount, as well as securing conditions for the restoration of seized estates. Running parallel to the redemption scheme for the disinherited was the successful demand for the protection of the laws, customs and liberties; importantly, if laws were to be amended, it was to be done with 'the advice and assent of the responsible men of the land'.\textsuperscript{73} Comyn and the other main leaders formally surrendered at Strathord on 9 February.\textsuperscript{74}

With the final end of the Guardians' resistance, Edward set about confirming his rule by calling parliament. It would seem that the customary forty days notice was not given; a privy seal writ to Nicholas de Hey requesting his attendance was dated 5

\textsuperscript{70} CDS v 346.
\textsuperscript{71} Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 92.
\textsuperscript{72} CDS ii 1449.
\textsuperscript{73} Docs. Hist. Scot ed. Palgrave 279-285; Barrow Bruce 130.
\textsuperscript{74} Those who were present with Comyn at the surrender were Edmund Comyn of Kilbride, John de Graham, John de Vaux, Geoffrey de Rosse, John de Maxwell 'le einzniez', Pierre de Predergist, Walter de Berkley of Kerdaan, Hugh de Erth, James de Rosse and Walter de Rathven, all knights; CDS ii 1741.
March. The parliament was held at St. Andrews. It opened on, or about, 11 March and may have lasted a fortnight or longer. Practically every man of note in Scotland seems to have been present, except the irreconcilables (Wallace, Fraser and the garrison of Stirling castle) and those excused attendance for reason of ill health or because their services were required elsewhere.

This parliament was clearly not Scottish, but neither was it English. Circumstances had dictated its composition. Perhaps the terminology of 'English' and 'Scottish' in this instance does not aptly describe the occasion; rather, it was the king's parliament, Edward summoning it to put a seal on his success and confirm his lordship over not the kingdom of Scotland but simply the 'land' of the Scots. 'Those who had entered the king's peace formally submitted to the king's will' and judgment was given against those who continued to resist. Edward formally declared his intention to besiege Stirling, while the pursuit of Wallace and Fraser was to continue; indeed, James Stewart, John de Soules (who, in fact, either stayed in France or returned there soon after coming back to Scotland) and Ingram de Umfraville were not permitted safe conducts until Wallace was captured. English military efforts in

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75 Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 93 stated 9 March as the opening date, but Edward was not present at St. Andrews until 11 March; he remained there until 6 April. Also, the earls of Strathearn, Menteith and Lennox, the abbot of Dunfermline, Alexander de Abernethy and William Biset were not notified about the parliament until 11 March; CDS ii 1471.

76 H G Richardson and G O Sayles 'The Scottish Parliaments of Edward I' SchR 25(1928) 311. John fitz Cynan, Tarthelahg fitz Cynan and Morghugh fitz Cynan did not attend as they were bid; draft privy seal letter dated 22 March; SCI 12/190.

77 Richardson and Sayles 'The Scottish Parliaments' 311; CDS ii 1478.

78 Barrow Bruce 130. Comyn, Alexander Lindsay, David Graham and Simon Fraser were later also commanded to capture Wallace. Barrow regarded such decisions on Edward's part as disgraceful, yet in
the first few months of 1304 were aimed at both Wallace and Fraser, and in making preparations for the forthcoming siege.

As early as 27 January 1304, the prince was crossing Perth bridge and moving against the Scots.\textsuperscript{79} With the negotiations taking place, the action may perhaps have been against Wallace. In the spring, a chevauchée launched by Edward under Segrave, Clifford and Latimer routed Wallace and Fraser at Happrew in Stobo, near Peebles. Stern measures had been taken to ensure that no spies accompanied the raid (an indication perhaps of the cause of the ambush the previous spring).\textsuperscript{80} In March, the earls of Strathearn, Menteith and Lennox, the abbot of Dunfermline, Alexander de Abernethy and William Biset were commanded to secure the fords at the Forth and the surrounding lands 'so that the enemy on the other side cannot injure the people on this side at the king's peace'.\textsuperscript{81} The enemy was presumably Wallace and his remaining companions, who may well have crossed the Forth going north after their defeat the month before.

On 2 March, Edward wrote to the earls of March and Dunbar a letter in which he criticised them for delaying 'to proceed against our enemies'. The king issued new instructions. They were 'to watch the enemies as thoroughly as possible [with their] own troops and those of the district (around Dunipace, Torres\textsuperscript{82} and

the circumstances, how else could the King effectively test the commitment of his new subjects?\textsuperscript{79}CDS ii 1441.

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid 1432; Barrow Bruce 127. The English force were instructed to travel only 2 or 3 leagues (6 to 9 miles) from Dunfermline towards the Forth; in the event, they were some 30 miles from the king.

\textsuperscript{81}CDS ii 1471. Abernethy with 40 men-at-arms had been sent by the prince into Strathearn and Menteith towards Drip (Barrow Bruce 87) in late February 'to complete the guard which is appointed there'; Documents ed.Stevenson 631, CDS ii 1462.

\textsuperscript{82}Torwood; Barrow Bruce 103.
Polles so that [the enemy] should not by any means be able to regain Stirling castle, nor come near...you, without their great loss'; the earls were to encourage the people around Stirling to 'raise the cry against the enemies, if they come upon them'; and finally, the earls were to prevent a possible sally from Stirling castle itself because 'the country thereabouts now remains so void of inhabitants and of forces that [the garrison] may attempt perchance to cross the Forth to do some damage'. Edward was confident, 'for should [the garrison] make such a sally,...they would assuredly lose some of their men on their return, either through you [the earls] who would come in their rear, or by your other people [Alexander de Abernethy], who keep the country there in front of the fords there'.

On the following day, Edward wrote to Abernethy in response to correspondence he had sent to the king. Edward confirmed his task of guarding the Forth, offered the assistance of William de Biset, sheriff of Clackmannan, if required, and requested further news of the state of the region. Edward then addressed the question Abernethy had raised regarding the offer of peace to Wallace. The king wrote 'know this, that it is not our pleasure by any means that either to him, or to any other of his company, you hold out words of peace, unless they place themselves absolutely and in all things at our will, without any exception whatever'.

It does seem that Wallace was still an active threat around Stirling; on 5 March, Edward sent yet another letter dealing with the situation, this time to his son. The letter reveals that as

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83 The 'Pows', 'the flat, boggy carse beside the Forth'; Barrow Bruce 88; also known as the Carse of Stirling.
84 Documents ed.Stevenson 632; CDS ii 1461.
85 Documents ed.Stevenson 633; CDS ii 1463.
well as the movements of the earls of March and Dunbar and of Abernethy noted above, the earl of Carrick was also 'advancing with all...power...towards the Torres and the Polles' and towards the other parts near Stirling castle, to follow the enemies who have resorted thither'. Edward commanded his son to reinforce and support these manoeuvres, to report back 'hastily', and to send Payn Tibetot and John de Dovedale 'new knights', because the king did 'not know where they would more honestly gain their shoes or their boots than by their expedition there'. This last point reveals just how difficult it had been for English troops to engage Scottish forces, not only throughout this campaign but since Falkirk.

Military measures were taken right up until the beginning of the siege of Stirling castle; on 20 March, the sheriff of Stirling was ordered to bring all his forces 'both horse and foot of his bailiwick' to castle Kary. On 5 April, the sheriff of Clackmannan was instructed to scout in his bailiwick; five days later, Edward wrote to him again to continue 'carrying on the war' until he arrived at Cambuskenneth.

Fraser, soon after the rout at Happend it seems, finally submitted to Edward, leaving Wallace to his own fate. Wallace eluded capture in the autumn of 1304, but a year later, he was

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86 See previous page.
87 Documents ed. Stevenson 634; CDS ii 1470.
88 He was to exclude taking troops from the lands of the earl of Lennox; CDS v 353; SCI 61/11. The castle mentioned is also spelt 'Cary'.
89 SCI 12/72, 12/71.
90 John de Musselburgh, a Scot, had received 10s for guiding forces pursuing Fraser sometime during regnal year 32; M C Prestwich 'Royal Patronage under Edward I' in eds. P R Coss and S D Lloyd Thirteenth Century England I (Woodbridge, 1986) 45.
91 On 10 September, a skirmish between Wallace and forces acting on behalf of the king resulted in the death of at least two horses;
caught and suffered the fate of a traitor. The treatment of Wallace by Edward lies outside the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that the attitude of both men revealed how war had brought out the darker side of their personalities, both believing their cause to be the just one.

As well as countering the remaining threat Wallace posed, Edward also turned his attention to the forthcoming siege of Stirling castle. Already, the king had attempted to prevent contact between the garrison and Wallace; on 1 April, Edward had to write to the earls of Strathearn, Menteith and Lennox commanding them to prevent any of their people 'going to the castle of Stirling, selling or buying provisions or merchandise, holding any communication with the garrison, or carrying victuals to them'; it was clear where the hearts of the Scottish people lay.92

On 9 April, Edward wrote to William de Felton in response to the latter's request for thirty men-at-arms 'to harass the garrison of Stirling'. The king, however, was not going to send the men firstly, because they were 'dispersed foraging', and secondly, because Edward was intending to come to Stirling soon. Felton was to inform Comyn 'and other good men in those parts' of the enemies' plans, and, together with the garrison of Kirkintilloch and 'others he can hire', they were to do the best they could.93 On 17 April, five days before the siege proper got

Fisher William Wallace 116. The horses probably belonged to two men who were in Thomas de Umfraville’s retinue; E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.49v.
92 CDS ii 1489; C J Neville ‘The Political allegiance of the earls of Strathearn during the War of Independence’ SchHR 65(1986) 141.
93 CDS v 363; SCI 63/43. The strain on Comyn of the last few months must have been immense, for on 19 April, Edward was writing to him saying he understood 'his failure to join him because of illness'; SCI 12/131.
underway, the king was 'pleased to learn' that John Bisset had taken the boats belonging to the garrison. 94

As has already been noted, Stirling held a key strategic position, both in military and political terms. Differing views have been taken regarding the nature of the castle construction itself, with some suggesting that it was still largely a wooden structure. These have been based on the accounts of Wallace dismantling it after his defeat at Falkirk, then Edward having it rebuilt after he had arrived in Wallace's wake, and finally, after Bannockburn, Bruce having Stirling razed to the ground. 95 However, these arguments are not very convincing; the indications point to Stirling being a well fortified stone structure. The Flores spoke of walls which were attacked by at least one battering ram as well as by trebuchets hurling stones, and towers which appear to have supported both ballister and trebuchet. The rock on which Stirling rests had some caverns and apparently, stores were kept there for protection. 96

The siege lasted longer than any other siege on Edward's campaigns. It began on 22 April, and ended on 24 July; ninety days that sorely tried Edward's patience. The initial stages involved the customary exchanges. William Oliphant declared his intention of resisting until he was able to communicate with his master, John de Soules. It is unclear exactly where Soules was at

94 CBS ii 1515. Incidentally, Edward had also been informed of disturbances in the place where Henry de Percy's 'people' (household presumably) had settled; again, this reveals the damage created by an invading army.
95 Mackenzie The Mediaeval Castle in Scotland states that the first stone wall was being built in 1288 (39). In 1335-7, the walls were 'torn up' to build new ones; a new crosswall was built, the inner bailey defences were elevated and a peel built; other buildings were given stone foundations with the gaol being the only all stone construction (62).
96 iii 317.

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this point in time. Barrow accuses Edward of a lack of 'chivalrous decency', but if, as the *Flores* states, Soules was still in France, then Oliphant's request was quite clearly out of the question. Both sides then formally stated their justifications; Oliphant, that he had not personally sworn fealty and homage to Edward, and the king, that he was overlord of Scotland, as demonstrated by Balliol's homage.

According to the *Flores*, Oliphant had 120 men to defend Stirling. At the end of the siege, there were just over fifty men who were distributed between several castles in England. Extensive measures were taken, many of which are fully illustrated in the following chapters. Fourteen siege engines were transported or constructed for the siege. At least one of them was a battering ram. Lead was taken from the churches near Perth and Dunblane to act as weights for the trebuchets. Greek fire was again used; and considerable supplies of bows, arrows, crossbows and quarrels were sent. Victualling was always a problem. On 29 June, Bromsgrove was ordered to send all the king's stores in Berwick 'in haste by night and day' because 'they can find nothing in these parts'.

97 And as Prestwich believes; *Edward I* 501.
98 *Flores* iii 315.
99 Several documents deal with the prisoners; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.10v, 12, 14, 16, 17, 17v, 19; *CDS* ii 1567, 1572, 1586, 1644, 1668, 1674; iv 1812; SC1 45/132; *Documents* ed.Stevenson 648. More detail concerning the defenders of Stirling castle can be found in G W S Barrow 'Lothian in the First War of Independence 1296 - 1328' *ScHR* 55(1976) 157-64.
100 See also accounts of the siege in *KW* i 417-8 and Freeman 'Wall-breakers and river-bridgers' 12-5, though there are some minor errors of interpretation in the latter's account.
102 CDS ii 1553.
relieve the castle, 'but nothing came of it, as troops under the earl of Hereford...easily routed it'.

Despite all Edward's efforts though, it was exhaustion of supplies that caused the surrender, as had been the case in 1299 when the roles were reversed. The king himself twice came near to receiving a serious or even fatal injury. Firstly, a javelin from a sling or crossbow fired from one of the towers missed him, lodging instead in his saddle. Secondly, a stone hurled from the battlements landed perilously close, causing Edward's horse to throw his master. Both these incidents occurred because the king was riding too close to the walls, but they are indicative of Edward's desire to set an example to his men; 'for not once, but a hundred times, weapons directed at him fell to his right and to his left, never harming him but frequently wounding those around him'.

Edward's actions at the end of the siege have come under attack and similarly, have been defended. When Oliphant preferred the castle's surrender on 20 July, the king caused him, and his fellow defenders, to remain there until the recently constructed engine called Warwolf had been fully tested. An exchequer account, noted by Barrow, records the cessation of items of equipment for all but three engines (the Parson, Belfrey and the above mentioned Warwolf) on 20 July. These three, however, were supplied continuously between 19 and 23 July. Warwolf itself

103 Prestwich Edward I 502.
104 The Flores paints a grim picture of the situation then, with the English garrison forced to eating even captured mice; probably not dissimilar to what happened five years later; iii 113.
destroyed an entire wall. It is interesting to note that perhaps it was not of Warwolf that the garrison were afraid, but an engine being built that was 'higher than [the] castle walls'. Even the discovery of the postern gate by two archers had not enabled the king to bring the siege to a military conclusion.

The notarial instrument of surrender was dated 24 July. Edward had clearly been irritated to the point of great vexation. Initially, he had wanted to disembowel and hang the defenders, but pleas from both Oliphant and those around the king's person spared their lives. The constable of Stirling castle and his men had to come forth barefoot and with ashes on their heads, submitting totally to the king's will. The man who had betrayed Stirling to the Scots four years previously was still in the castle and he alone suffered a traitor's fate. An interesting petition survives showing how the changing military fortunes of both sides affected the population. In 1299, Evota of Stirling supplied the English garrison with victuals for which she lost her land, was thrown into prison and later banished from the country ('all of which can be testified by the garrison who are now the king's archers'). In the summer of 1304, she wrote to the 'chancellor of Scotland to re-seise her in a messuage and three acres of land in

107 Langtoft ii 357, where it is called Ludgar (Loup de guerre).
108 The Flores, translated in Hallam Chronicles of the Age of Chivalry 156. This must have been the Belfrey. Regarding Warwolf, Freeman 'Wall-breakers and river-bridgers' 8-9 states that an engine called Warwolf was sent to the siege of Caerlaverok, but arrived late, and that when the garrison capitulated, they were forced to stay inside until a few shots had been fired from the engine. Surely he has got his sieges mixed up.
109 Prestwich 'Royal Patronage under Edward I' 45; the two men were rewarded with 4s.
110 Only twenty-five men were named of the fifty-one eventually taken to England.
111 Barrow Bruce 129; CDS ii 1560.
112 Prestwich Edward I 502; Hill The King's Messengers 120.
the town of Stirling which she had held during the siege [of 1299].

Despite the lack of Scottish success after Roslin, Edward must have been conscious of the risks involved in travelling so far north. The Flores regarded the king's stay at Dunfermline as miraculous because 'he was neither harmed by the Scots nor betrayed'. With the prince accompanying his father, the possibility of a dynastic disaster must surely have been addressed. The earl of Lincoln, a stabilizing force at the beginning of the reign of Edward II, was in France along with Otto de Grandson. Valence, another moderating influence in the next reign, had been due to embark on the embassy in the autumn of 1302, but by the spring it appears his services were required elsewhere. Much of his time was spent in the south and south west of Scotland. John Botetourt was the king's lieutenant of the north west counties of England, and the wardrobe book records that as well as the king and the prince, he had a bodyguard. Like Valence, Botetourt seems to have been operating in the south; on 14 July, he and Bruce received prests at Edinburgh castle. It is possible that Edward had marked Botetourt out as a key figure in any future minority government; he was already an important royal councillor. This lends credence to the possibility that he...

113 CDS iv 1800. The outcome of her petition is not known.
114 Translated in Hallam Chronicles of the Age of Chivalry 154.
115 Thomas of Brotherton, Edward's next eldest son by his second marriage to Margaret, was only three years old.
116 CPR 1301-7 56, 67, 105.
117 While Edward was at Perth in the early part of the summer of 1303, Valence was at Linlithgow; SCI 48/116.
118 BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.73, 75, 75v; William de Cestri, vintenar, and 19 archers for 33 days in May and June 1303.
119 CDS ii 1385.
was an illegitimate son of the king, though this is only hypothetical. 120

This chapter began with Bruce and perhaps it is appropriate to end it with the future king of Scotland. The earl's contribution to the campaign appears to have been somewhat short of Edward's expectations. He spent much of 1303 in the south west. 121 On 3 March 1304, Edward was encouraging Bruce, amongst others, regarding certain 'business they have begun so well'; 'as the cloak is well made, also to make the hood'. 122 The earl was also involved in sending siege engines to Stirling. On 14 June, during the siege operations, he performed homage for his lands. 123 Three days previously, Bruce and Bishop Lamberton 'entered into a solemn bond of mutual friendship and alliance against all men'. 124 We may never know exactly when Bruce made the decision to seize the Scottish throne, but this agreement, vague though it was, was clearly a response to the changed political climate. Once Stirling castle fell, and Wallace was captured, an English king would be master over the land. When Edward recrossed the border in the summer of 1304, preparations were in hand for its governance. The king must have felt that, this time, his military conquest had succeeded.

120 On the question of Botetourt's illegitimacy, see Prestwich Edward I 131-2.
121 Barrow Bruce 141-3.
122 CDS ii 1465.
123 CFR 1272-1307 495.
124 Barrow Bruce 131.
PART II. The Army.
CHAPTER 2. The Cavalry.

'There is no simple way of describing the cavalry forces of the armies of Edward I's reign; they cannot with justice be termed either mercenary, feudal or contractual'.¹ This verdict sums up the situation, and the problems of analysing the cavalry forces. In theory, the feudal system should have provided Edward with the forces he required. In practice, it did not. Feudal quotas had been 'renegotiated', and there were disincentives to taking up knighthood; arms had become more expensive, and the tasks of knighthood more onerous. Ultimately, campaigns were far longer than the stipulated forty day service catered for. Of course, the crown could appeal to its tenants to defend the realm if threatened, though it is questionable whether the situation in Scotland was perceived as such a threat. However, the measures taken by Edward, such as varying the level of librates of land necessary for knighthood and, more importantly, the extension of pay, revealed the very real military need, and the feudal system's weaknesses in the face of the changing military landscape.

Much material has survived from this campaign, enabling a greater understanding of the feudal, contractual and voluntary

¹Prestwich War, Politics 91.
services rendered. However, it has been difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy the total numbers involved. This chapter, by using the full breadth of the material, hopes to show in more detail the composition of the forces serving the king; their arms; the supplies they required; the arrangements for those in pay regarding loss of mounts; and how numbers fluctuated, which, by implication, can give some estimate of the total numbers.

Firstly however, it is necessary to discuss the documentary evidence and establish each record's positive and negative attributes. With regard to the feudal component of the army, there were individual summons to ten earls, eighty-nine other lords and many ecclesiastics. These names, however, are not necessarily indicative of the crown's major military tenants. Writs were also sent across the Irish Sea to Richard de Burgh, earl of Ulster, and eighty-three other 'fideles' of Ireland.

Only three documents have survived covering the 'servicium debitum'; E101/612/29, C47/5/6 and E101/612/10. E101/612/29 comprises two manuscripts sewn together. Its most interesting feature, apart from the list of those proffering and performing

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2 M C Prestwich 'Edward I's Wars and their financing 1294 - 1307' (Oxford, D.Phil, 1968) 79 suggested about 2,000; in War, Politics 91 he estimated that for the Falkirk campaign of 1298, there were possibly 3,000 cavalrymen.

3 The index in PW states that the earl of Oxford was summoned to send his service, not perform it personally, while the main text makes no mention of this. In fact, the earl did not serve in person, but sent his son, Thomas, with four others (Robert Poer, Robert de Hastings, John de Dukesworth, and Alphonse de Veer) CDS v 2443.


5 PW i 59; Lydon 'Edward I, Ireland' 41.

6 Both copies of the main roll; see Prestwich War, Politics 80 n2. The latter of the two is not discussed here.

7 This is a record of a subsidiary muster; ibid.
service due, is the occasional detail given of arms and armour. E101/612/10 is a single manuscript, with two attached seals and is conspicuous in that it is written in French.

However, most of the evidence, unsurprisingly, concerns the paid elements of the cavalry, the enlarged household, on a war footing. Writs were sent to twenty-seven northern magnates, as well as the archbishop of York, in the spring of 1303. Pay was offered but little evidence survives to enable us to know exactly who responded. Strictly speaking though, this force was assembled for special circumstances. For the main campaign, the wardrobe book for the latter stages survives covering regnal year 32, while its predecessor has only survived in the form of a draft. This latter document is constructed of five membranes and divided into three sections; the first two are small and contain summaries of wardrobe receipts and expenditures; the bulk of the document is composed of lists of prests, many of which tie up with a surviving book of prests for that year. Prests were essentially advances of wages, though they could also be payments of wages due. However, it is quite difficult to establish which cavalrymen served for pay because all the household, regardless of rank, are intermixed and only rarely is it noted that so and so was the king's falconer as against a hobelar, squire or knight. Thankfully, other sources have survived which deal with those serving for pay. The first group of these are the horse lists.

E101/612/9 is the earliest; its two membranes deal with horse valuations from 19 December 1302 until 17 April 1303, and it

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8 E101/612/9, a horse list covering the winter-spring of 1302-3 is the only source of real help.
9 BL. Add. MS 8835.
10 E101/364/14.
12 E101/612/7, 8, 9, 11.
covers men serving in various garrisons and also some of those present for Segrave's expedition. This roll is also different in that many names have actually been crossed out and the marginal notation *perdit* is much used. For example, Ralph de Manton and his retinue of fourteen valets are recorded; five of them with their names crossed out, and three of those also noted as *perdit*. Could this act of obliteration have meant the death of the person deleted, and if so, why is Manton himself not included; and could the marginal notes refer to horses missing (a reasonable explanation considering the expedition culminated in an ambush, causing horses to panic, and ending in an English withdrawal from the field).

The other three rolls, E101/612/7, 8 and 11 are all horse valuations for the opening months of the campaign. By far the largest is E101/612/11. Composed of six membranes sewn together with two smaller pieces of parchment attached to the left-hand margin, it lists horses from 18 May 1303, and while most of the valuations were conducted during the next three months, there are further additions and insertions from later on in the campaign and indeed beyond the war. It also contains many marginal notations relating to the fate of the valued steeds. Because of the chronological ordering of the roll, some retinues are divided, but this merely reflects the fluid state of many retinues, with departures and arrivals across the border a common feature during this campaign.

E101/612/8 consists of just one membrane, and follows the same format as E101/612/11; even the date when horse valuations were first noted is the same. There seems to be only a small overlap

13At the end of the roll, Arnald Saux and Richard Campion, both sergeants-at-arms, have their horses valued for service in regnal year 33. The mount of the former is recorded as having died on 27 July 1306.
of names with the larger roll, but it is quite clearly a companion to E101/612/11. E101/612/7 is a set of three small membranes. The first records valuations of two horses for a certain John de Aton (one of the horses having died). This is interesting because he is a valet in Henry Cantok's retinue where he has already had two different horses valued. This suggests the possibility that despite the wealth of marginal detail supplied, the main rolls do not contain complete records of the fate of horses. The second manuscript records the deaths of two horses, but these details are present and correct in the main roll. The most interesting of the three contains horses valued for John de Cromwell and his retinue. They do not appear on either E101/612/8 or E101/612/11 and this raises the question of whether we can be certain that other horse lists have not been lost in the course of time.

One way to perhaps answer this is to compare the complete wardrobe book for the latter half of the campaign with both the draft wardrobe book and the book of prests covering the first part of the campaign. A handful of names can be established as being in pay from November 1303 onwards, and appear to be in pay before that date but are not found on the surviving horse lists.

14 For example, Thomas de Norfolk, minstrel, had his horse valued for 6m on 19 May 1303 (E101/612/8) while he appears later with another horse valued in mid-November 1303 (E101/612/11). Altogether, four names exist on both rolls.
15 On the reverse of E101/612/7/1 are half a dozen or more monetary figures, all crossed out.
16 E101/612/11 m.2.
17 The place where the valuations took place is undecipherable, but it was in regnal year 31.
18 John de Champvent and his retinue consisting of one knight and five valets (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.57v; he left the army on 30 November 1303; E101/364/13 f.64v; he also took out protections on 23 March, 21 May and 4 September 1303; CDS v 2419, 2447, 2467); John de Luda with one squire (BL. Add. MS 8835 f58v; E101/364/13 f.66), and he was also a member of the garrison at Linlithgow later on in 1304 (E101/11/19); Adam de Swinburn and two squires.
Further names can be gleaned from other sources and together, they seem to indicate that at least one modestly sized horse list has not survived.

The last range of documents to discuss relates to the evidence dealing with the whole of the cavalry forces in the field. There are substantial lists of protections, letters of respite of debts, and letters of attorney as well as two 'independent' lists of those with the king at Dunfermline during the winter of 1303-4, and those present at the siege of Stirling. These latter two lists, because of their nature, have been key documents used to establish the presence of large numbers of unpaid troops. They...

BU. Add. MS 8835 f.58v); Ralph le Convers, sergeant-at-arms,(BL. Add. MS 8835 f.61v); John le Convers (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.61); Hugh d'Audley (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.58v; though he did not have a protection until 6 January 1304; CDS v 2503); and Richard de Merewell (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.66; and he had a protection dated 18 April 1303; CDS v 2430).

Simon de Tadetz appears in a victual list for regnal year 31 (E101/10/25), is recorded in pay in the following regnal year (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.61v), but is not in the horse lists; Robert fitz Payne took out a letter of protection on 26 May 1303 (CDS v 2449), appears in the wardrobe book for regnal year 32 (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.55v) with one knight and ten squires, but again, he is not in the horse lists; Henry de Urtiaco took out a letter of protection on 8 April 1303 and a letter of respite of debts on 4 June 1303 (CDS v 2423, 1470), appears in the wardrobe book (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.59), but not on the horse lists; Henry Nasard and John de Hibernia (Ireland) both appear on E101/612/9, were in pay on 20 November 1303 (BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.61v, 63v) but absent from the horse lists for the opening of the campaign. With regard to these last two, there were plenty of men who had their horses recorded on the pre-campaign roll, and then again when the main campaign got underway (for example, Walter de Bures; Simon de Cokefield; Richard de Havering (a valet under Manton but by May, a valet under Walter de Bedwin); Thomas de Morham (all from E101/612/11); William and John de Difford (E101/612/8)). This suggests that fresh valuations were made for those who continued in pay.

More names will emerge as potential candidates for inclusion in the missing list. Of course, those already identified may have declined to participate in the restoration scheme. This, however, is unlikely. While a few magnate leaders apparently have not had their own mounts valued but their retinues have, there is no evidence of whole contingents not participating.

CDS v 2392-2578; 1405-1571.


Prestwich 'Edward 1's wars and their financing' 31-2; War,
were probably drawn up to record the key magnates with the king at these two particular times. 'On the day after the siege ended, the fourteen leading magnates in the army were asked how those who had taken part in the campaign might best be rewarded. Lists of those present were prepared'. However, both these lists need to be carefully scrutinised. The first one, those present with Edward at his winter quarters, contains 136 names; the second, those at the siege of Stirling, 164. There are nine men in both lists who appear in the horse rolls and not in the wardrobe book. This suggests that either these men had left the campaign, making these independent lists inaccurate, or that they had left royal service. However, five of these men were present at some stage in regnal year 32 according to two victual rolls, which suggests that they had simply withdrawn from pay. The second of these two printed lists, showing those present at Stirling, contains all those named in the first list in addition to twenty-four men from the Irish contingent, the earl of Lincoln, John de Droxford, John de Benstead and Hugh Bardolf. Apart from the nine previously mentioned above, one of the Irish knights, Neal le Brun, left the army on 6 January 1304 but he is named here; and Matthew de Mont Martin had left the campaign on 31 January 1304 yet he is also

*Politics* 70-1.

24 A committee set up to deal with the issue of rewards met on three occasions 'but to no avail'; M C Prestwich 'Colonial Scotland: the English in Scotland under Edward I' in ed. R A Mason *Scotland and England 1286 - 1815* (Edinburgh, 1987) 9. The king had a 'certain distaste for the whole business' of patronage; Prestwich 'Royal Patronage under Edward I' 49.

25 Walter de Beauchamp, John de Colombiers, Roger de St John, Robert de Ufford, Thomas de Bikenore, Ebulo de Montibus (Montz), Edward Charles, and Jacob de la Rike (who was a Spaniard, real name Jamie, señor de Gerica; Prestwich *War, Politics* 46 n3).

26 E101/11/29, E101/12/19.

27 Edward Charles, Ebulo de Montibus, Jacob de la Rike, Robert de Ufford and Thomas de Bikenore.

28 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.56v.
named as being present at the siege of Stirling.  

Further documents of use in establishing numbers and the composition of the cavalry element are three victual rolls. Both E101/10/25 and E101/11/29 are comprised of four membranes sewn together, while E101/12/19 is a collection of ninety-four warrants for the delivery of corn. Apart from the evidence of the names supplied, the documents also give an indication of victuals consumed, and where the consumer is not in pay, it can supply an idea of retinue size.

A clutch of four miscellaneous documents also warrant attention and, to finish off this discussion of the available evidence, a group of eleven manuscripts, all from different campaigns in Scotland. Of the eleven, six relate to the years 1303-4. All these will be discussed in more detail below.

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29 BL.Add. MS 8835 f.55v.
30 E101/10/25; E101/11/29; E101/12/19.
31 E101/11/9, 17, 26; E101/12/15; E101/612/12.
32 Of the rest of E101/612/12, the first relates to the Falkirk campaign 1298. The third lists 22 horses valued between 12 and 23 August. No year is given, but it is clearly not 1303-4; John de Langeford is here with a £10 horse, but we know he served with a 5s horse and a 24s horse in 1303-4; this suggests 1306-7 as he did not serve in 1300 or 1301 (Prestwich War, Politics 81), and the dates are too late for it to have been 1298. The fifth is from regnal year 35. The seventh, from regnal year 33. The ninth, and last, has again no regnal year. Dated 18 December, it lists 34 men divided into two parts. The first 11 entries are couched in the following terms: 'Walter de Belthorp for (per) William fitz Thomas and associate having one horse...' or 'William de ClareNous of the county of York for himself and associate having one horse...'. The next 23 entries are simply names with horse details and valuations. Virtually all the entries note down a county; nearly all from Yorkshire, but there are four from Nottinghamshire. However, none of the names appear anywhere else in the records for 1303-4. In the spring of 1303, when the summons for infantry were being issued, Richard le Brun was sent by the king to speak to knights and those able to bear arms about the forthcoming expedition and they were required 'to give full faith to him accordingly' (PW i 61). The counties involved were Cumberland, Westmoreland, Coupland, Lancaster, Durham, Northumberland and York. It is possible that this list represents some of the response given to Edward's plea, but the fact that some of the men came from Nottingham, a county not involved in Brun's brief, and that Yorkshire is the only other county mentioned, suggests the
This brief survey of the evidence has revealed how few records have survived from what would originally have been written, but also how fortunate we are in what has come down to us. Incomplete and lost records, questionable independent lists, all these problems make hazardous the task of ascertaining the nature of the cavalry forces. Hazardous, but not altogether impossible. The best starting point must lie with those men who, for one reason or another, took up the crown's offer of a wage reward.

Apart from assessing total numbers in pay at various stages throughout the campaign, the evidence throws up three further issues. The first relates to some evidence of magnates receiving prests yet not apparently serving for pay, which suggests a wage status prior to the king's arrival at Roxburgh on 16 May; the question is to what extent this occurred. The second relates to the restoration scheme for lost horses; and lastly, the collection of documents already mentioned, as well as dealing with further issues on the restoration of horses, also raises the role of the wardrobe clerks in the whole process.

But to begin with, numbers. The main horse list, E101/612/11, contains 640 names; seventy-eight are leaders of retinues, forty-nine are knights, 334 valets, forty-eight are termed associates and 131 are a mixture of sergeants-at-arms, clerks, contrary.

33 E101/11/9, 17, 26; E101/12/15; E101/612/12.
34 A unwieldy but indicative category. We thus have Robert de Clifford with his large retinue of six knights and nineteen valets as well as Jacob de la Rike with just one valet.
35 The terms valet and squire have been used interchangeably. As a general rule, valet is used more often in the records written contemporaneously with the campaign, while squire is more prominent in the records written later such as the complete wardrobe book (not finalised until well into the reign of Edward II).
36 The term it appears can relate to a knight or a valet, and there seems to be no indication of its significance over and above the other descriptions.
and, the bulk, those not given any indentification. The smaller horse list, E101/612/8, contains 128 names; fifteen leaders; eight knights; sixty-five valets; two associates; and thirty-eight ‘others’. If we add Cromwell's retinue, we get a total of 771 men. As has already been suggested, there is the strong possibility of more men in pay being located on a missing roll. With all the evidence gathered for those taking royal wages, it appears that possibly 900 to 950 men were serving at crown expense. With the survival of the wardrobe book for the later stages of the campaign, the number in pay in the winter of 1303-4 can be established with accuracy; in all, nearly 600. Examining the horse lists and the wardrobe book reveals the names of key magnates who left royal service before Edward set up his winter quarters at Dunfermline. Virtually all of those still in pay in November 1303 remained with the king until after the siege of

37 The 'others' category is made up mostly of unattached individuals, but there are some household officials (such as cooks and pavilioners); a few sergeants at arms; and a handful of clerks (Droxford, Master John de Arderne, William de Leyburn and the prince all had them; the king's butlery had one whose horse was valued), and even a minstrel.

38 Recorded separately; E101/612/7.

39 Ninety-four leaders; fifty-eight knights; 404 valets; fifty associates; and 169 'others'. The four names that overlap between E101/612/11 and 8 have been accounted for.

40 Prestwich War, Politics 52.

41 Among some of the lords who illustrate this feature are John de Cromwell (one knight and five valets; E101/612/7); Hugh d'Audley (three valets, one associate); John de Carbonel (two valets); William de Cantilupe (two knights and eight valets); John de Fulbourne (two valets); William fitz Glay (two valets); Thomas de Hauvill (one knight and four valets); John de Merk (two valets and one clerk); Warin Martyn (one valet), although according to the two 'independent' lists, he was present through to the siege of Stirling; Thomas de Querle (two valets); Walter Reginald (four valets); and Robert de Scales (two knights and seven valets) (all of these from E101/612/11); Hugh de Doddingseles (one valet, one associate, and one sor' (?) ); Walter de Gloucester (four valets); Walter de Faucombege (one valet); John de Latimer (two valets); and Stephen de la Mare (one valet) (all of these from E101/612/8).
While there was an appreciable fall in the number of infantry requested, Edward still seems to have been keen to secure large numbers of cavalry. The suggested figure of 900 to 950 'forinsec' and regular household troops is on a par with the levels reached for the three previous campaigns.

What were the motivations behind the decision whether or not to take pay? There were common attractions for all; access to writs of protection (delaying pending legal action); letters of respite of debts (a common fact of life for many a magnate); and the propaganda card of defending the realm played by the crown. Of course, there was also fear of incurring the king's displeasure. For those who did not receive wages, there was the prospect of a share in the spoils of war; in particular, land. For those troops who accepted the crown's offer of pay, the general consensus is that they were financially unable to sustain the expense involved in going to war. Ultimately for all magnates, war was their allotted role in the order of life, and if some had to forego the possible rewards in exchange for a crown salary, it was a price they were quite ready to pay.

Before moving on to the discussion of the three issues raised by the material, questions of wages and 'promotion' need to be touched upon. Bannerets were paid 4s a day; knights, 2s; and squires and crossbowmen, 12d a day if they had a barded horse, and 8d a day if they did not. These wage levels, though, did not

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42 Prestwich War, Politics 53; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.55v-59v (excluding 56v). Of the forty-seven lords and retinues listed, only seven left before the end of the siege (20 July). Many continued to receive wages until 21 August, the eve of Edward recrossing the Scottish border.

43 In 1298, just under 800; 1300, about 850; and 1301, nearly 1,000. Prestwich War, Politics 52.

44 Prestwich 'Edward I's wars and their financing' 59-62; War, Politics 64.

45 For example, Basculus Balistarius, sergeant to the king, was in
reflect actual costs involved in going on campaign. Agreements between military contractors to provide feudal service owed by ecclesiastics was based on £100 for five knights over forty days; that is 10s a day. An interesting case is Henry de Beaumont's retinue. In the horse list, it comprises one knight and five valets, but a marginal note for the knight, Gerard de Frenay, and one of the squires, William de Mille, states 'wages for himself', and this agrees with the pay accounts; Beaumont and four squires were paid separately from Frenay and his squire (these two left in March 1304). An unusual arrangement not found elsewhere.

Indications of promotion are very rare. Payn Tibetot appears twice in the pay accounts of the wardrobe book. Up until 2 February, he and his retinue are written in the 'squires' section of the cavalry, but from 3 February to the end of July, he appears in the 'banneret and knights' section; indeed he is called a banneret. At the outset of the campaign he had one knight and four valets, but according to the wardrobe book, on the same day as Tibetot's rise in status, one of his valets, George de Thorp, was made a knight.

There was a perceived difference when it came to taking wages in the absence of the king on campaign, though its full extent cannot be satisfactorily established. The twenty-six northern magnates summoned, along with the archbishop of York, to serve under the command of Segrave 'at the king's request' were to be paid 'such wages as shall be due to them for the time that they pay for the whole of the (leap) year of 366 days; 264 with a valued horse (at 12d per day) and 102 days without one (at 8d per day).

Prestwich Edward I 485.

Gerard de Frenay, or Garnier de Frenay, was prévôt of La Rèole, Gascony, in 1301.

E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.58, 58v.

The campaign in Wales in 1287 is an excellent example of this.
shall remain in actual service in Scotland'. It is impossible to determine if they all served. Only Ralph fitz William appears on the horse valuation list for the winter-spring of 1302-3. Segrave himself does appear on the horse roll with just the one knight and eight valets. There are other retinues who had had their horses valued who may have taken part in the expedition.

To study further the differing feudal attitudes to wages in the presence or absence of the king, it is necessary to turn to the draft wardrobe book for 1302-3. Mention has already been made of its nature and composition. It is part way through the second membrane that the list of prests begins to refer to the mounted military men, but it is also clear that several of the names belong to the non-military element of the household, which, as has already been noted, makes it more difficult to analyse. Bearing that in mind, and eliminating where possible these household functionaries, there are 523 named individuals receiving prests; 132 of these can be traced in either the horse lists or the later wardrobe book; twenty-nine appear in the pre-campaign horse list (though eight reappear again in pay amongst the aforementioned

50 Writ dated 20 January 1303, PW I 60. Most secondary sources state twenty-seven, but a close inspection of the list reveals that Ralph fitz William's name appears twice. The index confirms that he is not a possible son and that it is therefore a mistake either in the original document or in the process of printing.
51 E101/612/9. Assuming his son, Robert, was a knight, then his retinue consisted of two knights and six valets.
52 Walter de Huntercombe (with ten valets); Robert de Mauley (with two valets); Thomas de Morham (with two valets); Walter Burdon (with six valets); William Ridel (with four valets); Henry de Bosco (with four valets); Thomas de Novavilla (with two valets); and last but not least, Edward's illfated paymaster of this force, Ralph de Manton, (with fourteen valets). Morham and his men's horses were valued on 19 December 1302 and thus may not have participated. Others such as Novavilla (horses valued on 20 February) and Mauley (his horses valued on 21 February) probably did. Manton and his retinue's steeds were assessed on 16 February; E101/612/9.
53 E101/612/7, 8, 11; BL. Add. MS 8835.
finally, a further seventy-three are recorded as taking letters of protection or of respite of debts. This leaves some 297 names still unaccounted for. Of course, many will be household staff as anticipated, but there are a handful of names where additional information has been noted; William Spynok, hobelar; Robert of Newcastle, soldar; Peter de Lubaud, sergeant-at-arms; and Nicholas Trimenel, knight with one valet. These men received prests, but the question is whether it was for service prior to Edward’s arrival, or after (and hence part of the possible missing horse list)? This dilemma exists not only because of the seventy-three known to have been on campaign and apparently not in pay (at any rate not by the autumn of 1303), but also the 297 unaccounted for.

Perhaps the best starting point is to note that these prests did not represent the total wages ‘earned’. One example will suffice to illustrate this point. Peter de Colingbourne and his two valets had their horses valued on 20 May 1303, and they were all still in pay between 20 November and 21 August 1304. That latter period, 274 days, cost the crown £40 4s (and that despite Colingbourne himself leaving the army for nearly four weeks in March 1304). For the former period then (20 May to 19 November, 183 days), we would expect wages in the region of £27. However, Colingbourne is recorded as receiving one prest of only £10. This picture is similar for others.

With these cases in mind, we turn first to look at the

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54 E101/612/9.
55 E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.66v.
56 Guy Ferre and his retinue of one knight and four valets are only recorded as receiving 50s 7 1/2d in a prest, yet their horses were valued on 28 May 1303, and they remained in pay until 9 August 1304; William le Latimer junior, with a similar retinue to Ferre’s, received £6 18s, and he was a banneret; E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.56, 58.
seventy-three we know were present and receiving prests. The most important figures among these men are John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, and Guy de Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. The former is recorded as receiving a prest of only 53s 4d, the latter receiving not only victuals but also three prests totalling £99 15s 11/2d, a not inconsiderable sum. These are the only English earls noted, but nonetheless, in view of the current understanding regarding earls in crown pay, it is interesting; were they at Roxburgh and its environs before the king, or did they take wages for at least the opening stages of the campaign? We are able to study this problem further because two other lords, Guy d'Argentan and Patrick, son of the earl of Dunbar, actually had their retinue's horses valued on 10 March 1303. Both received prests, yet neither of them appear to have been in pay, certainly not by the autumn. The fact that they had had their horses valued and were receiving prests indicates a wage status, but we cannot be certain for how long this lasted. The draft wardrobe account unfortunately does not provide dates and places of the prests. There are other figures of importance apart from the three men singled out so far.

57 E101/364/14.
58 While the views took place at Berwick, it is unlikely that these lords were part of its garrison; E101/612/9.
59 66s 8d and £15 13s 6d respectively.
60 Eliminating those receiving prests of less than £5, and ignoring shillings and pence, we get the following; the earl of Dunbar (who received prests totalling £63); Robert de Bruce, earl of Carrick (£34); William Biset (£47); William d'Eyncourt (£5 and a cask of wine); Fulk Extraneus (receiving victuals and £12); John d'Engayne (£5); Edmund Foliot (£10); William de Grandson (£7); Robert de Insula (£26); William le Latimer senior (£50); John Lovel (£10 in two parts along with two casks of wine); Henry de Lancaster (£17 and 8qu of oats); Robert de Mauley (£8 and two casks of wine); Roger de Mortimer (£5); Peter de Mauley (£15); Hugh de Mortimer (£10); John fitz Marmaduke (£10); Jacob de la Plauence (£14); William de Rude (£33); Robert fitz Roger (£6); Amaury de St Amando (£62); Nicholas de Segrave (£10); Robert Squier (£11); Hugh de St Philbert (£8 in two parts); Richard Siward (£11); Robert de Tony
However, the evidence still remains tantalizingly vague. If we examine the remaining 297 men, there are only thirty-one receiving prests of £5 and over. Some of these, however, were Gascons, who returned to the continent from exile in March 1303. Edward was determined to discharge his debts to them.

The book of prests itself can be used to study this issue further. Under the section titled ‘knights’, there are sixty-five names. Forty-two can be identified as being in pay at some stage during the campaign. Of the remaining twenty-two, eleven had taken out protections; ten of them before 16 May 1303, and the

Roger de Ashrig (£10); Lambert Bartholomew (£5); Nicholas de Blund, harper (£8); Walter de Burghdon (£14); Richard le Brun (£5); John de Kalentyr (£28); Pons de Castillion (£20); Robert Cissorik (£5); Robert de Cantilupe (£20); Peter de Chauvent (Pierre de Chauvent) (£9); Nicholas de Cokefield (£6); Master Walter de Clare (£11); John de Depe, trumpeter (£10); Arnold Fluvian (£12); Augustin le Glou’e of London (£5); Peter de Lubaud, sergeant-at-arms (£6); Geoffrey de Loreigne (£5); William de Mortimer (£5); William de Maclesden (£5); Montasino de Novailles (£49); Master Reynund de Planell (£6); Ebulo de Podio Guilli (£24); Griffith de la Pole, who was also a centenar for some of the campaign (£6); Richard de Pyrras (£13); John de Peyncoyt (£5); Patrio le Sauter (£5); John de Sandale (£14); Nicholas de Trimenel, knight, and his valet (£9); John Vamie (Jean Vaune) (£5); Robert de Villers (£10); and Nicholas de Warwick (£5). Nicholas de Trimenel and Peter de Lubaud have already been mentioned.

M Vale The Angevin legacy and the Hundred years war 1250 - 1340 (Oxford,1990) 218-9. In the book of prests, Pons de Castillion is noted as receiving on nine occasions more than £8 and a cask of wine, though no exact dates and places are given (clearly far less than the £112 recorded in the draft wardrobe account); Montasino de Novailles, £15 and £23 on two horses (again less than the £49 he is noted as receiving in the draft wardrobe account); and Gaillardo de Drygnak, only 13s 12d on two occasions. This demonstrates the incomplete state of the book of prests. E101/364/13 ff.66, 68v. Castillion and Novailles certainly left England; Drygnak, Pierre de Chauvent, Jean Vaune and others probably did so.

Thirty-five in the horse lists E101/612/7, 8, 11; a further seven in the wardrobe book for regnal year 32, BL. Add. MS 8835.
eleventh, Walter de Teye, appears to have already been on campaign as he had been summoned to serve in Segrave's expedition. So again, there is a strong case for several magnates being paid before Edward took to the field. The monetary amounts involved are not large, giving an indication of the crown's financial problems. Another example will suffice; William de Leyburn's wages for service in regnal year 32 came to more than £220. Considering he had had more knights and valets earlier on in the campaign, something in the region of £180 should have been earned during the previous regnal year. However, the book of preists records Leyburn receiving a total of only £48 6s on nine occasions. Again, it is impossible to establish if these were all the preists Leyburn would have received, but the spacing of the dates and places suggests that the hard pressed crown administration was not paying its noble forces anything like the amounts they were due. This situation is similar for all those recorded here, and a pattern of peaks emerges (see Figure 2.1). There were initial payments at Roxburgh during the last days of May; the next group of payments occurred at Perth, mainly in the last week of June; then immediately after the end of the siege of Brechin; at the end of August and the beginning of September; in the middle of October at Dundee; and lastly, in the days when Edward was settling down at Dunfermline for the winter. This pattern is also repeated as far as payments to the infantry troops are concerned.

64 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.56.
65 E101/364/13 ff.64, 66. The dates and places are; 28 May, Roxburgh, 100s; 16 June, Auchterarder, 66s; 27 June, Perth 10m; 10 August, Brechin, 100s; 17 August, no place given, 10m; 30 August, Daviot, 10m; 17 October, Dundee, 100s; 3 November, 100s, 11 November, 100s, both at Dunfermline. Leyburn did receive £23 on three occasions before the campaign began (27 November 1302, 8 January 1303 and 31 March).
Figure 2.1. Protests paid to weights, royal year 21.

(After map from the book of protests E2010110515, p. 64-65.)
Further light can be shed on the issue of those cavalry in the field in the king's absence by looking at those serving in the garrisons. A memorandum drawn up in 1304 noted that John de Segrave, banneret, was owed £239 for wages for himself, five knights and twenty-four squires of his own retinue, and a further four squires, eight crossbowmen and eight archers, all in the garrison of Berwick from the beginning of regnal year 31 until 16 May, the date of Edward's arrival at Roxburgh. From then until 25 December, only the four squires, eight crossbowmen and eight archers were in receipt of wages; Segrave was not in pay. This pattern can be seen in other garrisons. 66

In the final analysis, we cannot be absolutely certain whether the large numbers of men receiving prests, but not emerging as taking wages in the surviving sources, were in pay because Edward was not present, or were actually receiving royal wages for a period during the opening stages of the campaign. Of the two cases, the former is most likely.

The surviving horse lists also present an excellent opportunity to study in more detail the crown's scheme of reimbursing owners for any loss or depreciation in value suffered by their mounts. Both E101/612/8 and E101/612/11 have marginal notes on the fate of various horses. There are four formulas used; mortuus itself; redd(itus) ad elem(osina), literally given for alms; redd(itus) ad carv(annum), given for the baggage train; and, occurring only once, redd(itus) ad carrecta gard(erobe), given for the wardrobe carts. The evidence for these explanations needs to be pieced together but it appears that not only did the crown pay for the physical loss of a horse (whether it was lost, as in the pre-campaign horse roll, or whether it died) but also the

66 CDS v 383.
physical exhaustion suffered by the beast. These horses were then either used as alms or relocated to carrying supplies. Considering that there was no major engagement, the large numbers of horses involved highlight the rigours of campaigning in a harsh environment.

An interesting feature of the horse valuations is that a handful of retinue leaders did not actually have their own mounts valued. There was probably an element of personal or feudal pride.

Grouping the three horse lists for the beginning of the campaign, we arrive at a total of 806 horses valued where the valuation amount has been noted. Figure 2.2 lays out the details. All the mounts are either described as horses, rounceys, or destriers. The use of rouncey as a description only emerges in the main roll and it raises questions regarding accuracy.

Altogether, there are thirteen rounceys, but eight of them are the mounts of valets in William de Cantilupe’s retinue. It is quite probable that there were more rounceys valued and that the scribes in this respect were not wholly accurate, though the question of whether the mount was a horse or a rouncey may have been regarded as immaterial so long as there was enough detail for

67 Thomas de Bikenore; Henry de Cauttor; John de Droxford; John de Fulburn; John de Godele; Eustace de Hacche; Master John de Kerle; Richard Lovel; John de Leek; Warin Martyn; Ebulo de Montibus; Thomas de Umfraville (E101/612/11); Hugh de Doddingseles; Walter de Gloucester; Walter de Faucomberge; John de Latimer; Stephen de la Mare; Theobald de Verdun; and Aymer de Valence (though he himself was not in pay, and the two men noted here as simply being in his retinue, Roger de Aldeham and Ralph Wase, may well have taken wages because their lord was not present) (E101/612/8).

68 It is unlikely to have been scribal error; there are few similar scattered omissions of other troop types. Block omissions did happen though; see footnote below.

69 Towards the end of E101/612/8, several entries have everything in place, including the horse details, but no price recorded. Why this is so, is a mystery.

70 E101/612/11.
Figure 2.2 House values.
(Taken from 616/69/31, 8, 11)

Note: the financial divisions are not equal (i.e., the basic ranges are $2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 120, 150, 180, 200)
future identification. It is interesting to note the example of two knights from Droxford's retinue: Thomas de Chaucombe and Richard de Borhunt. The horse of the former died on 9 January 1304 while that of the latter died on 29 October 1303. They are both then recorded as having rounceys as mounts; however, these died on 31 April and 24 May respectively, both at Stirling. The two lords did however stay on until 1 August, though presumably they either had no more mounts and were unable to get any more or perhaps they decided that there was not much point in having another valuation done at this late stage of the campaign.

Ten leaders had destriers; Robert la Warde and Robert de Clifford (120m); Walter de Beauchamp and John Carbonel (100m); William de Leyburn and Robert de Mohaut, the latter's horse actually dying in November 1303 (90m); Henry de Bellomont, William de Cantilupe and John de Sulleye (his horse also dying, in March 1304) (80m); and Payn Tybetot (80m). Two knights also had destriers; Reginald de Grey (100m) and Guy Ferre junior (70m), both members of the prince's household. However, the clerk's terminology comes into question again. Adam de Welles had a horse valued at 100m; Matthew de Mont Martin had his priced at 80m; and Hugh Bardolf had a mount worth 90m. Yet none of these are noted as being destriers, merely plain horses. There is even the case of Thomas de Erleye, valet to Ferre junior, whose second horse was valued at 80m. It is also interesting to note that the horses valued for Scottish magnates were overall worth far less than for their English cousins. For example, in the pre-campaign horse

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71 E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.58.
72 All from E101/612/11 except Mohaut who is found in E101/612/8.
73 Both from E101/612/11.
74 His first mount, valued at £20, had died at Perth on 19 June 1303.
roll, Patrick, son of the earl of Dunbar, had a horse worth 25m, while his four knights had steeds worth 10m, 6m, 6m, and 100s.  

If we take the campaigning season as beginning in May 1303 and ending in August 1304 (covering virtually all of the horses listed), then we get 124 horses actually dying; eighty-one redditus ad elemosina; seventy-eight redditus ad carvanum; and the one case of redditus ad carecta garderobe. The details are shown in Figure 2.3. Altogether then, the crown had to reimburse the owners of 284 mounts. Using the valuations given (and noting that eight of these have no price recorded) the sum total comes to £3,558.

The survival of the wardrobe book for 1303-4 allows us to test the marginal notes for accuracy and completeness. It also raises again the question of definition. There are several examples where the wardrobe book differs from the horse rolls; Henry de Appleby is recorded in the former with a 40m destrier, not so in the latter; similarly with John de Champeyne and Alexander de Cheveral. There are more than a dozen examples where the wardrobe book uses rouncey where the horse lists simply use horse. There are only two cases of a difference in valuation and in both, the amount is slightly higher in the horse rolls. There are also a handful of cases where the definition of a horse's fate differs; two mounts are recorded in the horse rolls as given for the baggage train while in the wardrobe book, they are noted as given for alms. This may well mean that initially these horses were used to carry munitions and later, given as alms. Also, one of John le Waley's horses is noted in the horse rolls as given for alms, but in the wardrobe book, it is recorded as having died. The inexplicable case is a horse belonging to Adam de Baldok. In

75 E101/612/9.
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the horse rolls, his mount is recorded as having died on 31 April 1304. However, the wardrobe book first notes the horse as given for alms, and then, in the wages section, as given to the baggage train.76

The gifts section of the wardrobe book contains the details of the restoration of horses, and the Irish contingent's losses are included here, as well as eight men whose mounts appear to be of a non-military nature.77 Leaving these eight and the Irish aside for the moment, there are 176 separate reimbursements made; 145 of them are correctly recorded on the horse rolls. Ten of them have their owners named in the horse lists but the details regarding the loss of these particular steeds are absent. One of the horses had died at Edinburgh over the winter of 1303-4; another while accompanying a convoy carrying 2,000m north. The location of these two deaths may explain why they did not figure in the horse rolls. On the other hand, there are at least four horses which had died, and probably more, which, for one reason or another, have not been recorded in the wardrobe book.

Lastly, there are twenty-one horses whose owners are not present in the horse rolls; Robert fitz Pain and his retinue of one knight and eleven valets lost between them five horses;78 Henry de Urtiaco and his four valets lost three horses;79 two valets of Alexander de Bikenore's retinue lost horses;80 there are two horses noted as being valued in regnal years 29 and 30; and one horse belonging to Elias Stel, which is recorded on the main horse rolls, is noted as dying in one of the manuscripts that make up

76BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.50, 67.
77All of these appear in E101/612/12 m.10. See below for further analysis.
78BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.46v, 47, 55v.
79Ibid ff.50v, 59.
80Ibid.
E101/612/12 (discussed further below). The remaining four appear to be men who joined the campaign after the initial phases. It is interesting to note that in the horse lists, John de Bokland did not appear to have had his horse valued while his valets did, yet he received compensation for the loss of a horse.

On the whole then, the marginal notes regarding the horses valued do seem to be substantially accurate and complete. Because of the survival of the wardrobe book for regnal year 32, we can be precise on the cost to the crown in reimbursing owners. In all, this amounted to some £3,287. If we take out the Irish element, and compare the result with that accumulated from the horse lists, the total for the former is £2,592 (176 horses), and £3,558 (284 horses) for the latter; a difference of £966. For regnal year 31, the draft wardrobe account only provides a total, which includes gifts, of £4,474 7s 8½d. If the proportions of gifts in this total is as it was a year later, roughly a quarter, then some £3,355 accounted for the restoration of horses. Even allowing for a larger loss of horses amongst the Irish unit, it is still a larger figure than the difference obtained above of £966. This is further confirmation of a missing horse list.

Before moving on to examine the feudal and unpaid sections of the army, the four miscellaneous manuscripts and the six relevant documents in E101/612/12 need to be raised. E101/11/26 is a roll of victuals supplied at Edinburgh and Linlithgow, April to May 1304. Most of the names recorded appear to have been members of the permanent household, be they the king's physician (Master John de Kerle), master poulterer (Thomas Brown), clerk (of which there

81 Excluding the previously mentioned eight non-military mounts, and duplications (which accounted for £62 lm), but including the Irish contingent, itself amounting to £695 lm.
82 E101/364/14.
83 E101/11/9, 17, 26; E101/12/15; E101/612/12 mm.2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11.
are several), sergeant at arms (three being identified as such), or lord. The prests of victuals made are for the horses of these men, and it appears that these steeds had been withdrawn from the siege operations at Stirling. For example, Peter de Colingbourne's boy, John, had prests for 121/2qu of oats for fodder for his lord's horses, resting at Edinburgh and Balerno, May to June 1304. In fact, a number of 'boys' are mentioned; Ralph le Convers, sergeant at arms had a boy called Nicholas; Kerle, mentioned above, had one named Richard Wodenot; and Walter Hakelute, named in this roll as a valet to the king, had a boy called Richard de Kiderminster. None of these boys were specifically in pay in the sense that the crown noted their presence and paid them accordingly; rather, they would have been dependent on their lord.

The second of this ad hoc group, E101/12/15, is a roll of receipts and payments made at Berwick during August and September 1304. The receipts of £236 4d are detailed and show the numerous sources drawn on for small sums; then payments of more than £239 are listed. Most of these prests appear to be going to the permanent rather than the forensic element of the household. Nine

84 On 10 May, the king's and queen's 'somers' were sent to Berwick 'until the castle...is taken or surrendered'; CDS ii 1533. See also CDS ii 1395; this is an account of those escorting and guarding the earl of Ross on his journey to Scotland in the autumn of 1303. It reveals that there was one groom for each horse listed. However, this one to one ratio may not have applied on a military campaign.

85 Since this roll relates to regnal year 32, it is interesting to note that Hakelute is recorded on the horse rolls with an associate (Robert de Gobion), took out protections on 16 May and 30 December 1303, and a letter of respite of debt, 13 April 1303, yet does not appear in the complete wardrobe book as being in pay. Hakelute's horse actually died on 25 July while at Edinburgh. (E101/612/11; CDS v 1457, 2443, 2500).

86 For the record, the thirty-six retinue leaders named had prests drawn against them for a total of 31qu of beans; 54qu of malt; 48qu of wheat; 309qu 1bu of oats; 20 'Aberdeen' fish; 303 stockfish; and 2,000 herrings.
lords are in receipt, but there are another thirty or so others, mostly cavalrymen. The amounts were small; William de Baliol, a valet of the prince, received 1m, like many others recorded here.

The third, E101/11/9, is a brief memorandum of wages owed to John de Luda and two squires (Ralph de Kirkeby and Nicholas de Apluktere (Appletree)) for service performed as part of the garrison of Linlithgow late on in regnal year 32. The wardrobe book reveals that he was in royal pay with one squire from the beginning of the regnal year (and probably before) until 21 August 1304, and that he then served in the garrison at Linlithgow peel.

The final manuscript of this miscellaneous group, E101/11/17, is a badly damaged and much faded note containing two sets of payments, one of which is of interest. The name has been obliterated, but some of the details can be read. Wages are noted for two periods; 27 May to 19 November 1303, £8 17s, and regnal year 32 beginning (20 November 1303) to 21 August 1304, £13 16s. Payment is also noted for the death of two horses (one at Elgin, 9 September 1303, the other in Selkirk forest, August 1304). Finally, a note of wages owed brings the total to some £40. With the detail regarding the two horses, it is possible to identify the recipient as John de Caumpdene (Caupenne).

87 William de Leyburn; Eustace le Poer; Henry de Appleby; Hugh d'Audley; Robert de Haustead; William Inge; William de Bevercoates; Robert la Warde; and Audremus de Montgomery.
88 E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.63v.
89 BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.53, 54v, 58v.
90 The other appears to be wages for a cowherd and two boys looking after twenty-seven cows, but it is impossible to establish dates or places.
91 In 1305, a kinsman of the lord of Caupenne told Edward I that during a truce in Aquitaine, the French had burnt his house and all his goods, including documents relating to his wages of war. He asked that the rolls be searched by the king's clerks so that payment might be made. John Sandale and Thomas de Cambridge were accordingly ordered to 'search their books' to certify the amount owed. Could this kinsman be one and the same as John de Caupenne, and this manuscript perhaps a draft of the clerks' findings? Vale
survive for Robert de Clifford\textsuperscript{92} and Edmund de Cornwall.\textsuperscript{93} Attention has been drawn to these manuscripts on two counts; first of all, because of the fact that wages were still owed. There is no indication as to whether these sums were paid when the account was drawn up, or whether they were simply records of the state of the crown's debt to the men. Secondly, the mere existence of such accounts raises again the realisation of the bulk of material destroyed, which means we are unable to establish how extensive such notes were. Their presence in amongst the records suggests they were copies drawn up for crown purposes.

The first of the six documents from E101/612/12 gives no year. It is a small list of fifteen individuals with their horses valued at Berwick on 31 May 1303, and is enrolled. The retinue concerned is that of Robert de Mohaut and tallies almost exactly with his retinue in E101/612/8. Even the one horse which died is noted in

\textit{The Angevin legacy and the Hundred years war} 110.

\textsuperscript{92}CDS v 402. This account was drawn up on 27 March 1305. Clifford and his retinue of six knights and eighteen squires had their horses valued on 19 May (E101/612/11 though, has nineteen squires named; a marginal note records that Eble de Alderwick was a centenar, and perhaps received his wages with the infantry). It appears that from 26 May to 27 September, he was in the company of the bishop of Durham and did not receive wages. However, he received six prests between May and November 1303, which suggests firstly that Bek travelled with the king, and secondly, that Clifford still required money while on campaign (E101/364/13 ff.65, 66v, 67). Between 29 September and 1 August 1304, Clifford had four knights and fifteen squires (which agrees with the wardrobe book BL. Add. MS 8835 f.56). The value of three horses were to have been restored, but the horse roll actually notes five that qualify. Cash receipts and the value of victuals delivered at various times are countered against the crown debt to Clifford, which stood at £180.

\textsuperscript{93}CDS ii 1571; the details tie up with the wardrobe book and the horse rolls (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.68; E101/612/11). On 12 January 1304, a grey (\textit{ferrand}) horse which was valued in regnal year 31 for his brother, Geoffrey (who was a squire) was given to the almonry (Bain translates the Latin as being sent to the infirmary at Dunfermline; Johnstone \textit{Edward of Carnarvon} 76 gives the case of Roderick of Spain (a kinsman of the prince) who had to give his horse to the almonry and obtain another). At the outset of the campaign, Henry Foillet was also serving Edmund, but it appears that he was killed by the Scots in Atholl (Bain has transcribed the word as Achetele, but the horse list clearly has Atholl).
both lists. The only differences are the value of the horse ridden by John de Bracebridge and the description of Ruis (?). Wase's horse. In this roll it states 35m for Bracebridge's horse while in E101/612/8 it states 30m, and Wase's horse is a morell here but a black one in E101/612/8. These are probably scribal errors. However, the purpose of the document is not apparent. It appears to have been written from the main horse roll and, since only names and not roles are mentioned, as well as the fact that the one horse that had died is noted, it is perhaps a record drawn up for Mohaut himself, which somehow remained with the crown.

The next document is made up of two lists of horses. The first is about the retinues of Richard le Brun and John de Langplough which took part in a tournament on the Monday after Ascension 1303, (22 May). The second list is of Richard Kirkebride and his retinue of five valets whose horses were valued at Lauder on the Thursday after the feast of Pentecost (30 May). None of the names mentioned appear in either the main horse rolls or the pre-campaign roll. Kirkebride's name reappears in a victual list where he is in receipt of two iron barrels of new wine. With respect to the first two retinues mentioned (nine others with the lords, of whom only one is noted as a valet), it is very interesting that a tournament was taking place. On 16 July 1302, Edward had issued a proclamation to all the sheriffs in England to prevent, and if necessary arrest, any knights, esquires and other persons found 'tourneying, tilting, making jousts, seeking adventures or otherwise going armed without the king's special licence'. Seven lords were later found guilty of

94 E101/612/8, 9, 11.
95 CCR 1296-1302 588. In June 1304, a similar proclamation was issued, but only to the sheriffs of York and Leicester; CCR 1302-7 210.
breaking the proclamation, and apart from having their lands transferred to the king's custody, they were also to serve under Segrave in Scotland, and did so. The list may have been drawn up because these two retinues were caught breaking the proclamation. On the other hand, it may have had the king's permission. A tournament so close to the start of the campaign may perhaps have been used to sharpen up the necessary skills, or simply as a diversion while the campaign machine lumbered into action.

The third document is another set of valuations. This time, the horses were examined by Langton in December 1302. No location is given, but, because of the treasurer's involvement, it may perhaps have been York or Berwick. The four retinues concerned are John Botetourt (with four knights and nineteen valets); John de St. John (one knight and sixteen valets); Richard Syward (two knights and nine valets? - the scribe has not indicated who were knights and who were valets); and Walter de Comyn (himself described as a knight, with three valets). Only Botetourt was in pay later on in the campaign; St. John appears to have been present at the same time, but not in pay; Syward and Comyn have left no record indicating their whereabouts after May 1303, the

96 Giles de Argentan; Henry de Leyburn; Bartholomew de Badlesmere; Robert de Mohaut; Robert de Tony; William de Creye; John Joce. The date given is 26 November 1302; CCR 1302-7 66. Only Argentan and Tony appear in the pre-campaign roll (E101/612/9); the former's horses being valued in March 1303, the latter's, on New Year's Day.

97 It seems that a tournament may have taken place over the winter of 1303-4 while Edward was at Dunfermline as Aymer de Valence made an indenture with Robert fitz Payne on 8 November 1303, whereby the latter was to remain with Valence 'for the tournament at Christmas next'; CDS ii 1407. Provision was made for Payne's equipment. The indenture was to last until a year after Easter.

98 E101/612/12 m.6.

99 Between 1 May and 2 August 1304, with five knights and twenty-one squires.

100 Indeed, there is no other indication of his taking wages at any stage during the campaign.
assumption being that either they operated in the west of Scotland for the duration of the campaign, or they retired from the field having taken part in whatever preliminary manoeuvres this document indicates.

The fourth manuscript amongst this collection\(^{101}\) is a small list of thirteen names. There are details of horses, but only six of them have a figure noted for the valuation. One man, Elias Stel, has a marginal note that his horse died in Selkirk forest in March 1304. However, he does not appear in the horse rolls, but some of the other names do. There is no date recorded, and the men do not appear to be part of a retinue. Thomas de Umfraville is noted as having an associate, Cuthbert Capu, but he does not appear in the two other recorded occasions of Umfraville's retinue.\(^{102}\) The best hypothesis that can be advanced is that these men were assigned a certain task that merited this special record.

The last two documents are probably the most interesting of the group.\(^{103}\) The first manuscript is a roll of Karvannum for regnal years 31 and 32. There are sixty-six names listed along with 101 horses, but these are not steeds for mounted combatants. There are four descriptions used to describe these horses; somerarius, pack horse, (72); the term equus itself, (17); runcinus, a rouncey or nag, (7); and hakeneius, a hackney, (5). There is no value noted on the roll except, in one case, a brief description as if they had been viewed. A date has been given for the death of each horse, as well as a place in most cases. Twenty-three of the names do not appear in either the wardrobe book or in the horse rolls. There is no indication that restoration fees were involved. Only one case has any figure;

\(^{101}\)E101/612/12 m.8.
\(^{102}\)E101/612/9, 11.
\(^{103}\)E101/612/12 mm.10, 11.
Geoffrey de Monte Revelli had two horses who died in November and December 1303 at Dunfermline, and 40s has been noted for each. On this manuscript the four formulas regarding the fate of horses are used: mortuus (35); perdidit, lost, (8); redd(itus) ad elen(osina) (55); and redd(itus) ad carv(annum) (3). The nature of the document suggests that it was an administrative record for household use. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect is that in the wardrobe book for regnal year 32, at the very end of the restoration of horses section, there are nine horses recorded (belonging to eight owners) whose details match those in this manuscript. Further, all the reimbursements are 40s per horse. Why only nine are noted when about sixty horses of the 101 were lost in that regnal year cannot be answered. Some of the losses are nevertheless interesting.

The last manuscript in this miscellaneous collection again has no year, just a date, 28 May. The list is composed of the king's and the prince's households. The details tie up with El01/612/11, but there is only one marginal note and that is not concerned with the death of any horses. While the year must be 1303, no place is mentioned nor who conducted the valuations, but the document does return us to an earlier problem; was this roll written up first and then transferred to the main roll, or vice versa, and was it designed to be an unadulterated copy for the record? Considering

104 One horse which pulled the long cart belonging to the kitchen and which was under William de Char, carter, was noted as having died at Yetholm on 23 August. Master Peter Cook lost four horses (three pack horses and one plain horse) on 25 May at Roxburgh, 28 September (both 1303), in January at Dunfermline, and on 2 October at Alveton (both 1304). Master Peter Cirurgicus (the Surgeon) lost a pack horse at Kildrummy on 8 October 1303. Gerard Dorum lost six pack horses, more than any other noted; on 31 May at Lauder; 28 August at Aderdeen; 8 October, when he lost two; 14 February; and in March at Bothwell. Nicholas Malemeynes lost five, as did Walter de Kingshead; Peter Radi lost four, Master John Glemyn lost three and John de Newenton, a harper-minstrel lost two. Several others lost two or three pack horses.
the date, it is possible that this manuscript was written first as several valuation sessions may have been going on at the time each requiring separate parchments. There are no obvious differences or mistakes, though Piers de Gaveston seems to be described as a valet on this roll (the word has been slightly smudged) while in E101/621/11 he is described as an associate of the prince. 105

Much has been written above concerning those taking wages, mainly because most of the surviving material relates to them. To sum up, the numbers serving Edward were on a par with previous campaigns and, while many retired from the field, significant numbers were kept in pay for fifteen months or so. However, many did not actually receive payment either for their service or for the restoration of their horses until some time after the end of operations, as the records clearly reveal. 106 There were also many magnates who apparently took pay before the main campaign got underway, though the extent of this and the accuracy of the evidence cannot be satisfactorily deduced. The cost to the crown was high. The draft wardrobe book and the complete wardrobe book give totals for cavalry and crossbowmen of £12,308 and £13,576 respectively. 107 If to that is added the estimated total cost for the restoration of horses (something in the region of £6,500), a total figure of about £32,500 is reached. Finally, the

105 J S Hamilton Piers Gaveston, earl of Cornwall, 1307 - 1312 (Michigan, 1985) 30 stated that on this campaign Gaveston was no longer a squire but an associate. However, the evidence is inconclusive.

106 CDS v 378 is a memorandum of wages owed to Robert de Cantilupe, dated 9 August 1304; v 385 is another memorandum of money owed to John de Kingeston for wages and restoration of horses.

107 These figures can be used in a very rough and ready fashion to confirm numbers. Since we know there were almost 700 cavalrymen in pay in November 1303, we can calculate average monthly cost (November to August, eight months); about £1,508. Using that figure, and counting the first part of the campaign as six months (May to November), we can work out that there were approximately 950 cavalrymen taking wages at the outset of affairs.
A miscellaneous collection of documents that has survived the ravages of time merely lays bare the extent of material that has been lost, and the many questions that can be raised but ultimately not answered.

Very little evidence for the feudal element of the mounted arm has survived. Apart from the individual summons to ten earls and eighty-nine lords, all the bishops of England and Wales were summoned except Rochester, Ely, Worcester and Salisbury; the archbishop of York was requested to send his service, Canterbury was not. Fifteen abbots and four abbesses were likewise summoned to send their service. All the sheriffs in England were instructed to notify those holding fees to make provision for their service; all those summoned, 'in fide et dilectione', to perform their service were also 'exhorted to come so powerfully accompanied as to overcome the contumacious resistance of the enemy'. The king was clearly keen to have more than just the feudal numbers. There were two key groups reflecting those who were first summoned in the Welsh wars and those who were first summoned in the years 1297-1299. A curious point arises over the date and place for the feudal forces to assemble. The muster had been set at Whitsuntide (26 May) at Berwick. The debacle at Roslyn caused a change in these arrangements recorded for the infantry summonses, to 12 May at Roxburgh. However, writs sent a week later to the bishops and abbots regarding their service strangely confirm the original instructions. But, on 19 April, another writ to the commissioners of array for Durham again gave the altered date and place.

The three documents dealing with the feudal muster detail

108 Not the classic form 'in fide et homagio'.
110 Ibid 58, 61, 62.
service performed by fifteen knights, 267 sergeants and twenty lightly armed horsemen. Examining one of the copies of the main muster roll reveals some interesting features. Only a handful of those liable for service actually performed it themselves, despite the fact that many were on the campaign. John de Beauchamp owed three knights' fees for which six men, presumably sergeants or valets, performed service even though he was present (he took out letters of protection and of respite of debt in May 1303). On the other hand, Thomas de Scales owed two fees for which he performed service with two valets, Thomas de Moygne and Gerard de Hurst; all three ended up taking wages as part of Alexander de Balliol's retinue. This was fairly usual, but it is curious that while the magnates wished to uphold their feudal rights, they did not want to fulfil feudal service themselves. As far as the range of fees, the highest belonged to the bishop of Hereford (five), and, at the lowest end, there were several fractions.

If we examine those who owed service and those who performed it in relation to the campaign as a whole, the emerging results are very interesting. 106 sets of fees were proffered, mostly by individuals, but also by couples or brothers. If we exclude those from ecclesiastical sources (fourteen) and those where a lady was involved, either in her own right or as a wife (ten), we get a total of eighty-two of whom fifteen can be identified on the horse rolls. Another fifteen took out protections, and a further four
are recorded receiving summonses in November 1302. This leaves forty-eight; can we assume they did not personally take the field? The figures are also revealing for those who performed service, those we know were in Scotland in May and June 1303. Altogether, there are 242 individuals on this roll performing feudal duty. Of these, forty appear on the horse rolls; one is noted in the pre-campaign horse roll; and twenty-eight took protections. This leaves 173; (one of these, Wrennok de la Pole, became a centenar later on in the campaign). Of the twenty-eight with letters of protections, fifteen have them dated prior to June 1303 (mostly just the one occurrence) while the other thirteen have letters after that date, indicating their continued presence on campaign. Can we assume that the 172 joined the king merely to perform service; surely not. Certainly there would have been those who fall into this category; the example of those taking out protections shows this. But many would have stayed, serving an unknown period of time, without royal wages. Forty did choose this route in order to continue to serve their king.

If we look at the smaller subsidiary muster, a similar picture arises. Sixty-one men performed feudal service; only one of them appears to have taken pay later on; eight had letters of protection and one had letters of attorney; thus leaving fifty-one unaccounted for. Of course, without the complete data it is impossible to establish either the total number of fees proffered or the number of knights, sergeants, valets and others who performed that service. But the existing records show the potentially large numbers of unpaid troops present at least in the opening couple of months of the campaign.

The last important source to examine is the list of those who

took out letters of protection, respite of debts, or of attorney. Taking all the names from these lists we arrive at a total of 1,018 individuals. We can use the letters of protection (accounting for 979 men) to give a rough indication of the fall in numbers during the campaign. During the months of April and May 1303, 676 individuals took these letters (many others are also recorded in June), but only 174 were renewed after May. We have already established that there were certainly 771 men in pay, but probably nearer 950. If we exclude those who took out protections before March 1303 (a total of 24, giving a total of 995), we know that at least 206 of them were taking wages (using the horse rolls). If 206 out of 771 took protections (26.6%), then using the same ratio, 955 would suggest a cavalry force 3,600 strong. The basis for these deductions is very imperfect; we know that there is a missing horse list, several of whose occupants would have taken out protections, thus lowering the ratio; and it is also questionable to include valets, associates and 'others' for calculating the figures. But nonetheless, this is a useful indicator as to the actual strength of the cavalry Edward had under his command.

Apart from estimating numbers, the various records also yield up other information of interest. One of the feudal muster rolls supplies occasional details of weapons and armour. The lance was the standard cavalryman's weapon (indeed, the unit of ten men from Spain were responsible for carrying the prince's lances). As far as the horses go, the terms barded and unbarded are used, but obviously these descriptions encompass a wide range of actual

117 *CDS* v 1405-1571, 2392-2578.
118 Of the 94 leaders, 53 took out protections; for the knights, 46 of 58; for the valets, 75 out of 404; for the associates, 8 out of 50; and for the rest, 23 out of 165.
horse armour. The details given on this roll, including the horse armour, do not seem to have been noted as aberrations from the norm; rather they are fortunate accidents of scribal annotation. Since such detail is rarely found in these records, all such incidents are worth noting.

Walter de Wodeton had a barded horse and, armed with a crossbow, served for one sergeant’s fee; John de Ragasle, valet to, and serving for, Hugh de Louthre (for land in Cumberland) had an unbarded horse, aketon (padded tunic), axe, light helmet (bacine) and capello (probably a helm), again for one sergeant’s fee; another sergeant’s fee was fulfilled by Robert Vigerous with an unbarded horse, aketon, hauberk and lance; Richard de Havering served with a hauberk, helm (capello ferro) and lance; Thomas de Elford performed service for an unspecified number of fees for forty days for Robert de Elford (his father?) with bow and arrows; John de Lancaster owed one knight’s fee and twenty parts of one for his lands in Ridale and Barton (Westmoreland and Northumberland) for which William de Kirkebride with a sword, aketon, axe, gorget, helm, lance and an unbarded horse as well as John fitz le Hunter with a sword, bow and arrows performed service; and finally, Adam de London, performing the service of Roger Brabazon with bow and arrows. There is also the curious case involving the knight John de Langeford, already come to light but worth looking at again. His ‘tenure committed him to serve on a horse worth 5s carrying a wooden stick with a sack for holding armour, and indeed he is noted here with a 5s horse, one saccus and one brochus. After performing his service, it appears he joined the retinue of Robert de la Warde where he had a horse valued at 24m. He was absent between 23 February and 16 April.

119 Prestwich War, Politics 81.
1304, and remained in pay until 24 July. His feudal service may not have been much use to Edward, but his paid service would certainly have been.\textsuperscript{120}

In the multitude of examples given above, retinue sizes have been indicated where possible. Of course, the fullest details occur for those in pay. In the bannerets and knights section to the wardrobe book, Robert Clifford had the largest retinue (six knights and nineteen valets);\textsuperscript{121} several lords had only two squires.\textsuperscript{122} Taking those bannerets and knights who are found in both the horse rolls and the wardrobe book, the average retinue size at the beginning of the campaign was 1.1 knights and 6.8 valets; at the beginning of regnal year 32 it was 0.8 knights and 5.5 valets.\textsuperscript{123} It is also possible to use the surviving victual lists to yield up indications, albeit imperfect ones, of the size of retinues of those serving unpaid.

The first of the three is the only one concerned with regnal year 31; it is a roll of deliveries of victuals made by Peter de Chichester. More than 200 names are listed as recipients, but if we exclude those who were not cavalry and those we know were in pay (either in the horse rolls or in the complete wardrobe book), we arrive at a sum of ninety-six men. The next roll, a list of provisions issued, covers regnal year 32. This particular list includes not only members of the cavalry force but also centenars and ship masters. If we for the moment ignore these last two categories, then there are 102 men listed; forty-two in pay...

\textsuperscript{120}E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.56; CDS v 2423, 2479, 2540.  
\textsuperscript{121}E101/612/11.  
\textsuperscript{122}For example, Alexander de Frevill; E101/612/11.  
\textsuperscript{123}E101/612/8, 11; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.55v-59v (except f.56v). Of the thirty-two lords who are found in both these sources, there were a total of 35 knights and 218 valets at the beginning of the campaign, but by November, 27 knights and 175 valets.
according to the wardrobe book; another thirteen recorded on the horse rolls, but not in the wardrobe book. This still leaves forty-seven. One of those, however, happens to be the abbot of Dunfermline. The last item is ninety-four warrants for the delivery of corn, again during regnal year 32. Sixty-three men were the beneficiaries but again, only twenty-five appear in pay while thirty-five had had their horses valued at the outset of the campaign.

Table 2.4 first details ten lords who were in pay throughout the campaign as examples, and then proceeds to list all the earls and virtually all of the lords who were unpaid. Using the limited evidence to support retinue sizes is very hazardous, and no weight can be placed on any conclusions; the suggested numbers are only an indication.

However, the figures tentatively put forward do bear some resemblance to those found in other sources. Peter de Mauley agreed in an indenture of 1287 to serve with ten men-at-arms; John de Segrave made an indenture in which he agreed to serve with five knights and ten troopers; John Bluet had made an indenture in which he had two fees to fulfill; the earl of Lincoln had twenty-four men with protections in his retinue in 1300, and fifty-two in 1307; in the winter of 1297-8, five earls and Henry Percy drew up a contract with the government for service in Scotland (Norfolk served with 130 men; Warwick, with only thirty,

124 See Part I.
128 Prestwich War, Politics 63.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>35% Yield</th>
<th>50% Yield</th>
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<tr>
<td>William de Leghorn</td>
<td>18/12</td>
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<td>4 casks</td>
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<td>18/12</td>
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<td>15/15</td>
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<td>14/13</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
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<td>12/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pascal de Valencea</td>
<td>6/16</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Cantel</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles Pichard</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2/2</td>
<td>4 casks</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph de Monthermer, earl of</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick, earl of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey de Bolone, earl of</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Hensy, earl of Duker</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Despenser</td>
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<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Warre, earl of Sorley</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Beauchamp, earl of</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick, earl of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger de Mortimer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Braye</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Brouxin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Percy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Fitz Merin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger de Clarendon, earl of</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricardo de More</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Courtenay</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piers de Malry</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Leclerc, earl of</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter de Yogson</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Leighton</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Mortimer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2 casks</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piers de la Brown</td>
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<td>1 cask</td>
<td>1 cask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Ross</td>
<td>100 drs., 2 barrels wine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Tony</td>
<td>100 drs., 3 barrels wine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert Malherbe</td>
<td>100 drs., 2 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Dognaourt</td>
<td>50 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Nostic de</td>
<td>50 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Halantiz</td>
<td>50 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurence de la River</td>
<td>50 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Felist</td>
<td>50 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip de Vernay</td>
<td>50 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Eustice</td>
<td>100 drs., 2 barrels wine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hone</td>
<td>100 drs., 2 barrels wine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Talbot</td>
<td>100 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lampceuth</td>
<td>100 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Cantilupo</td>
<td>100 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Furnival</td>
<td>100 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Bacon</td>
<td>100 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reginald de Chegne</td>
<td>100 barrels wine, 200 drs. flour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the incomplete nature of the victual rolls, it is impossible to determine to what extent the crown was supplying the needs of the magnates. In 1303, John Lovel of Titchmarsh arranged for his supplies to come by sea. No doubt, other magnates made similar arrangements. Presumably those who took pay relied more on the crown for victuals though, as the evidence indicates above, this was by no means exclusively the case.

In the final analysis, credit must go to the crown for assembling large numbers of cavalrymen and supplying their needs where required. Even before the opening of the campaign, significant numbers were assembled, though of course, the expedition they embarked on almost ended in disaster. For the campaign itself, certainly something in excess of 3,000 cavalrymen

129 Prestwich War, Politics 64. There is a surviving indenture drawn up between Robert de Mohaut and John de Bracebridge in 1310. However, the relationship had been longstanding (M Jones 'An Indenture between Robert Lord Mohaut and Sir John de Bracebridge for life service in peace and war, 1310' Journal of the Society of Archivists 4 (1972) 384-94). On this campaign, Bracebridge served in Mohaut's retinue with a 30m horse (E101/612/8. His status as a knight has been omitted by the clerk); he also took out a protection (on the same day as his lord, 9 April 1303, until Michaelmas (CDS v 2424)). A certain William Marmyun is recorded taking a letter of protection in which it was noted he was with Bracebridge (16 May 1303, until Michaelmas (CDS v 2443)); however, Marmyun appears in the horse rolls as a valet to Adam de Welles (E101/612/11). More details concerning indentures can be found in J M W Bean From lord to patron. Lordship in late Medieval England (Manchester, 1989) 41-8.

130 Unfortunately, the ship was arrested and held for eleven days in Scarborough, much to Lovel's annoyance; Prestwich War, Politics 117.

131 For the record, totals of victuals on the list for regnal Year 31 came to 39 casks of flour (247qu 1bu); 2121/2qu of wheat flour; 189qu 1bu of flour; 10qu of wheat; 1481/2 casks, 461/2 iron barrels, 193 sexta and 94 pica of wine. For the cavalry element of the roll of provisions, regnal year 32, the totals are; 369qu 6bu of wheat; 13qu of wheat flour; 9qu 5bu of malt; 52qu 7bu and 2 casks of flour; 1631/2 casks, 302 iron barrels and 22 sexta of wine. And finally, the totals for the warrants for the delivery of corn come to 5261/2qu of oats and 7qu 2bu of beans. These figures in themselves are quite substantial, but without any idea of their relation to the total amount of victuals consumed, they must remain as information to be noted only.
converged on Roxburgh in May 1303. Of these, just under a third were in pay. The opening two months saw feudal duties performed, though what effect, if any, this would have had on the structure of retinues is unknown. 132 At the end of Edward's sojourn at Perth, he would have had a much clearer picture of the numbers intending to continue serving, both paid and unpaid. As has been seen, several magnates appear to have left before the autumn of 1303, almost certainly before Edward moved north after the siege of Brechin. Perhaps a force of 1,800 or more accompanied the king around the north east of Scotland.

We know that numbers in pay declined only slowly between the start of Edward's winter retreat at Dunfermline and the end of the siege of Stirling. Our only evidence for those not in pay comes from the two printed lists. Despite some reservations about these sources, a brief examination of the composition reveals that in the first list, forty-two out of the listed 136 names were in pay according to the wardrobe book; but there were another nine who had had their horses valued earlier on (noted of course in the horse rolls); and there were a further three who had had their steeds valued in the pre-campaign roll. There are a further nineteen lords who appear not to have been in pay at any stage during the campaign, did not take out any form of letters available, and do not appear in the surviving feudal rolls. This merely illuminates the problems of assessing numbers, but it does lend weight to putting forward higher figures. The second roll is not that much different from the first in terms of the array of names, except that the Irish troops are included. It does divide the cavalry into thirty-five companies, split between the king and

132 Prestwich 'Cavalry service in early Fourteenth century England' 151 suggested that these feudal quotas were probably integrated into the rest of the cavalry force.
his son. Of those heading each company, only ten were in receipt of wages according to the wardrobe book. The evidence then continues to point to a rough 3:1 ratio of those in pay to those serving voluntarily.

Perhaps the best way to end the chapter is with a case study. Peter de Mauley II (d1279) had five sons; the eldest, given his father's name; Edmund; John; Robert; and Stephen. The youngest brother found his niche in the church; he was a parson and held prebends in a handful of parishes in the North East.

Before the campaign began, Peter was summoned to serve in Segrave's expeditionary force. It seems he did not, but his brother Robert, did, perhaps fulfilling Peter's role. Robert himself is recorded on the pre-campaign roll as a knight with two valets; all of their horses were lost. Ominously, the two valets do not reappear, though with the lack of evidence, nothing definite can be drawn from this fact. Robert appears to have had another mount valued afterwards, though the roll is not at all clear on this.

When the main campaign began, Peter, his son (continuing the family tradition by also being called Peter), and two of his brothers, Robert and John, all served without wages. Peter senior was the retinue leader, and his two knight's fees, for land in Yorkshire, for which he was personally summoned, were fulfilled by himself and John (who actually held land from his brother).

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133 Robert fitz Pain; William de Rithre; William le Latimer junior; Hugh Bardolf; John de Sulleye; William de Leyburn; Robert de Clifford; John de Droxford; John de Benstead; and the earl of Ulster (a special case already noted). Prestwich War, Politics 71 calculated there were twenty-eight companies and only five leaders taking wages.


135 John de Riper and Richard de Blakeburn.


137 PW i 58; E101/612/29.
Apart from the three Mauleys in Peter's service, Robert de Colevill, Hamo de Heworth and Thomas de Multon all had protections naming them with the senior Mauley. The retinue served throughout the campaign. Edmund however found service as a household knight. He served throughout the campaign with three valets (William de Sarum, Edmund de Todehara and Geoffrey de Upsale); his own horse was valued at 35m.

The Mauley family served Edward well throughout the king's military ventures. Indeed, both John and Robert had already endured being French prisoners in 1296. But the interesting feature is the way the continuous wars opened up opportunities for younger brothers; Edmund left the fold, and Peter was able to grant land to John (and probably Robert), and in return, they served him. When Peter was summoned on 20 January 1303 to join Segrave, it was one of his younger brothers who went, on what must have been a hazardous task at a less than pleasant time of year.

One can quite imagine the brothers, even Edmund when he could get away from court, descending on their younger brother Stephen as they traversed their way to and fro across the Scottish border. No doubt, news of the campaign was related, providing one of the channels through which information of Edward's deeds flowed down the levels of society and added to the development of a national identity, with the perceived enemy in this case being the Scots.

138 Peter and his son (it is difficult to decipher one from the other) had between them seven protections (CDS v 2415, 2436, 2441, 2456, 2503, 2524, 2535); John had one (ibid, 2456); and Robert had two (ibid, 2415, 2456). See also Docs. Hist. Scots ed.Palgrave 125, 126. Incidentally, Peter had four letters of respite of debts issued, his son, one (CDS v 1459, 1493, 1531, 1564).

139 E101/612/11; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.58v; CDS v 2437; Docs. Hist. Scots ed.Palgrave 125, 126. He was to lose his life ten years later at Bannockburn.
CHAPTER 3. The Infantry.

The infantry payroll for the years 1303-4 provides an excellent insight into the foot serving the king. Previous work done on the infantry during the Scottish wars has suggested that 'in all but the last campaigns of the reign' Edward was trying 'to crush the enemy by sheer weight of numbers'. This particular campaign, though, saw a reduction in the number of foot requested. The chapter will analyse the numbers and composition of the infantry forces during the expedition. By implication, levels of desertion will be determined. Pay, victuals and the use of criminals are also examined.

On 9 April 1303, commissioners of array were sent out to eight northern counties requesting infantry. The muster point was set at Roxburgh; and the date was 12 May. Provision was made for their pay; indeed, in the memorandum made at Lenton in April 1303, the necessary costs for the numbers involved had been calculated and noted. The crown used local men to select and assemble the troops, and appointed more of them than previously; a policy that

1 Prestwich War, Politics 93.
2 CPR 1301-7 132.
3 E101/11/11.
had been settled upon at the turn of the century. The commissioners were to choose 'strong' and 'well tried' foot. An interesting letter sent to Richard le Brun (sole commissioner for Cumberland) stated that he was 'to induce said men to come by all means that he shall deem fit', that 'he is enjoined to conduct himself...in executing [the commands] as to earn the king's commendation for his diligence and probity', and that he was to make a note of those who refused or feigned to go, making 'known to them...that the king will punish [them]...as disobeying him and breaking their faith due to him'. Similar letters were sent to the commissioners for Westmoreland, Coupland, Lancaster, Durham, Northumberland and Yorkshire. This demonstrates that despite the crown's apparent new thinking on the effectiveness of infantry, it was still determined to get quality troops in significant numbers. The crown also established a 'harsh new ordinance for the punishment of deserters'. ‘Those suspected of leaving the army without permission were to be imprisoned, and the wages paid them recovered by distraint'. If they were found guilty, they were to serve the king at some later date, at their own cost. Bailiffs too were to suffer if they were caught accepting bribes from those wishing to avoid service. These provisions were aimed at county foot, but it has been observed that there was little evidence of legal action. Clearly, these measures were an added weapon in the crown's armoury and, as shall be seen, they appear to have had a considerable influence in keeping men in the field.

The numbers are given in Table 3.1 below with assembly points,

4 CCR 1302-7 85, mistakenly recorded as 9 May; should be 9 April.
5 CPR 1302-7 133-4.
6 Prestwich War, Politics 93, 107.
7 Ibid 97-8.
dates and the number of commissioners appointed. In addition, the Lenton memorandum also made demands for infantry from Galloway (1,000 at Bruce’s discretion), Nithsdale (300), the earl of Angus' lands (300), and unspecified numbers from the garrison of Berwick.

Table 3.1. Infantry summons, 1303.
(taken from CPR 1301–7 132).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>York: North Riding</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>Northallerton</td>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Riding</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Riding</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottingham and Duffed forest</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Blyth</td>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmoreland and parts of Kendale</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Appleby</td>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland (except Coupland)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Carlisle</td>
<td>7 May</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts of Coupland</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishopric of Durham</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Gateshead</td>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland (except Durham)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Wooler</td>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.2 shows the strength of Edward's army based on the payrolls. The royal guards for both the king and the prince have been included, as have all the smaller units. The large number of criminals have not. These units will be discussed later. Compared with the graph arrived at by Prestwich, it shows there were more men present for longer; in other words, that the rate of desertion was not as pronounced as he suggested. This contrast rests on differing interpretations of sources. Prestwich, largely influenced by the wardrobe book, based his figures on the dates the men were being paid for, rather than the date when they were paid. One example will illustrate this difference. On 24 April 1304, wages were disbursed to the infantry for service performed between 23 September and 20 October 1303. Prestwich, by using

8Prestwich War, Politics 98.
9Ibid 97.
10E101/11/15 m.17.
Figure 1.4. Infantry numbers. May 1861 to June 1865 (Taken from 60th/115th).

Key:
- Up to 1864, number of infantry at Richmond; thereafter, at subsequent intervals.

Suggested attention to the curve.
- Number of miles travelled by the army:
  - A to B, the advance journey, measured from Richmond.
  - B to C, the retreat journey, taking Richmond as the base point (involving 125 miles for the route between Richmond and Fort Hill).
  - C to D, taking Chickahominy as the base point (including 95 miles for the route between Richmond and Chickahominy).

Loss of infantry per day between battles.
the wardrobe book which does not note when payments were made, worked on the basis that the troops being paid were present that autumn. However, there is no record of regular musters taking place in order to record the numbers of infantry to then pay the constable at a later date. It is hard to see the crown being that generous to deserters in light of the financial predicament it was in. The evidence points to these infantry being present in the spring of 1304. This revision enhances the crown’s success; instead of the 2,000 or so men Edward was thought to have had when he left Aberdeen, the real number is nearer 4,000.

There is, though, one minor issue thrown up by this interpretation. One of the payrolls\textsuperscript{11} is a list of infantry receiving both pay and victuals. No date is given, but it was sometime between January and March 1304, probably February. In it, the clerk has recorded for each unit payments for two periods of service.\textsuperscript{12} In all cases, the number of men is exactly the same (the reason for the division seems to be because in the latter period, victuals were provided and accounted for), supporting the argument above. There is, though, a small insertion in which it is noted that Robert de Marton, an archer from Yorkshire, received wages for the first period of thirty days, but there is no record of his receiving wages for the next twenty-two, and there is no indication of his incorporation into any of the other units. That the entry is clearly an addition suggests he may have appeared before the paymasters at some later date for his wages, but it is suspicious that his wages tie up neatly with the periods established. There is evidence of soldiers returning to the army; twelve men were paid in June 1304 and the scribe has noted that

\textsuperscript{11}E101/11/15 m.20.
\textsuperscript{12}10 August to 8 September and 9 to 30 September.
they had been absent and had returned to stay in the king's army. This, though, is the only instance where the theory above does not hold, and in the view of the likelihood of some scribal omission or change, it cannot seriously challenge the interpretation.

Figure 3.2 also attempts to show the average loss of infantry between the dates when total numbers can be ascertained with some confidence. The results, to a great extent, match what would have been expected. It is almost impossible to ascertain the extent of fatalities as against desertions throughout the campaign. Any major losses would probably have occurred at the two main sieges, Stirling and Brechin, and at any others that may have taken place. The only case actually recorded occurs in the wardrobe book where thirty men from Cumberland were killed on their way to Roxburgh, presumably in a skirmish with the Scots.

Desertion was low to begin with, partly due to regular pay. The Scottish threat which had caused the king to make provision for the defence of the border region, affected all the northern counties. Looking at Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.7 and 3.9, dramatic falls in the number of troops between the end of June and the beginning of August can be seen for Westmoreland (nearly 75%), Lancashire (41.1%), Cumberland (38.9%) and Northumberland (37.9%). Were these men released from their service to support the measures taken to resist the Scots, or did rumour take hold and cause mass desertion? If the former case, then they could not have left before 25 June, when they were paid for the first fourteen days of that month. However, there is no record of lost wages for at least the nine days (14 to 25 June) the men might have served but

13 E101/11/15 m.12.
14 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.72. This particular incident does not emerge in the payrolls.
not been paid for, which suggests the latter case as being more probable. Certainly, the long stay in Perth would have encouraged many to take the opportunity to slip away, no doubt encouraged by the pull factor of the Scottish threat. The desertion rate of just over sixty men per day reached in the middle of August may well have been caused by the end of the siege of Brechin and the realisation that not only was their king intending to take them further north than probably most had anticipated but that more importantly, the harvest season was at hand. The loss for the next two and a half months is small and reflects the deterrent of an unknown and hostile land between the men and their homes. Once the army had come south again, and Edward began to make winter preparations, the rate rises as the push factor of the onset of winter caused many to strike for home while they still could. Using the evidence of desertion rates and the distances from home, suggested alterations to the graph have been drawn, though it must be stressed, they have no basis in fact.

The breakdown of the contingents by county, shown in Figures 3.3 to 3.12, is revealing. Most of the foot managed to arrive at Roxburgh by the deadline date of 12 May. Some of the men from Cumberland did not arrive until 19 May and Northumberland did not manage to get all its contingents to the field until near the end of June (possibly because some of the men arrived with the garrison from Berwick).

The following evidence bears out the conclusion in J E Morris *The Welsh Wars of Edward I* (Oxford, 1901) 296, where he stated that the men of Cumberland and Northumberland were afraid to leave their homes (and were thus not efficient); that the men of Durham and Yorkshire constantly mutinied and deserted; and that it was the men from Lancashire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire who were properly organised, willing to stay in the field and were good fighters (he put this down to the experience gained during the Welsh wars).
Just over 2,700 men of the exceptionally high figure of 4,000 foot requested from the three Ridings of York managed to make it to Roxburgh (68.6%). Westmoreland's achievement was similar (68.8%), and Nottingham's only slightly better (70.4%). Cumberland, Derby and Lancashire were the most successful (85.9%, 90.4% and 96.3% respectively), while the men of Northumberland, as well as some of them arriving late, only supplied just over 50% of their target. The policy of paying troops before they left their home parts may have induced many to serve, but it allowed others to take the wages and leave. The men from Yorkshire seem to have been the worst offenders. John de Insula was commanded by the king to seek out those who had been elected for the war, been paid, and subsequently withdrew without licence; he was in the county as early as 20 July 1303.16

The key periods regarding desertion suggested above, namely July and November/December, can be seen quite clearly in many counties (York, Northumberland, Lancashire and the Various Counties unit), but there are exceptions. The men from Derbyshire did not appear to suffer stages of significant haemorrhaging in the way other counties did. Berwick garrison too must be noted for its staying power. These were the exceptions.

Once the levels of early November had been reached, there appears to have been little change to numbers remaining right through until the following summer. County units, though, are difficult to follow in the pay records. As men left the army, units were agglomerated, and eventually the county divisions were, to all intents and purpose, lost. Scribes still noted which county a particular centenar and his men were from, but by then

16 He spent thirty days on this particular part of the king's business; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.16v.
numbers were fairly static. Quite early on, county divisions were being crossed. At the end of May 1303, nineteen men from Lancashire came under the auspices of the York contingent. On 11 December, 300 men and five constables\(^\text{17}\) were sent to join the prince at Perth. Most of them were part of the Berwick garrison unit, but the remnants of the contingent from Nottingham were also present (hence the premature ending to Figure 3.8). It is interesting to note that the constable who headed the specialist slingers detachment was also present with forty-four foot; presumably slingers.

According to the surviving pay rolls, the only unit that came from Durham was one of 40 men who appear to have joined the Cumberland contingent.\(^\text{18}\) The wardrobe book, however, records that 200 men from the liberty were arrayed in February, and notes their pay for three days travelling from Gateshead to Roxburgh where they joined the company of John de Segrave, William le Latimer and Robert de Clifford for the defence of the Marches.\(^\text{19}\) That same month, Edward 'had indemnified them for the service in Scotland which they had promised to perform contrary to custom'.\(^\text{20}\) This could have taken place either before or after Roslin, and perhaps because of that, and their continuing resistance to service beyond the Tees, there were no units forthcoming later on in the spring.

There were other corps present apart from the main northern counties. The earl of Angus did furnish the army with 138 men and two valets out of the requested 300 (46.7%). Berwick garrison proved to be Edward's most reliable unit; at its peak there were

\(^{17}\) Constable and centenar are interchangeable terms.
\(^{18}\) E101/11/15 m.33.
\(^{19}\) BL. Add. MS 8835 f.72.
\(^{20}\) Fraser A History of Anthony Bek 185; CPR 1301-7 112.
729 men, eventually dropping to around 350. Perhaps the most curious of the large contingents is one the pay rolls and wardrobe book merely denotes as 'Various Counties'. At its peak, there were 765 men. The indication as to its identity may lie with the named constables, three of whom suggest that the unit may have comprised men from Wales and its Marches. There are three small units that can confidently be ascertained as coming from Wales, all of them from lordships: sixteen Welsh archers from Robert de Tony; twenty-five foot from Roger de Mortimer; and twenty-four foot from Robert de Montalt.

There are two other possible, but highly unlikely, options. Firstly, that they represented the numbers requested from Bruce's lands and from Nithsdale. But if the unit from the Angus estates warranted the special attention the wardrobe clerks ascribed to it, then surely such would have been the case with the other Scottish contingents. Apart from that, the title of the unit is inappropriate. Secondly, that these men were in fact the criminals Edward took with him on this campaign. Surely, though, the criminals would not have been paid; their reward was the pardon at the end of their service. The pay rolls record only one

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21 David de Hereford, William de Bridwood, Ralph de Leghton, Robert de Nottingham, Robert Lewer, Robert de Kellan, Wrennok and Griffith de la Pole.

22 In 1297 he had been requested to raise 100; H Walden Some Feudal Lords and their Seals (Trowbridge, 1984(1903)) 115.

23 In 1287, he had been ordered to raise 400 soldiers from his lordship in response to Rhys ap Maredudd's rising; ibid 88.

24 In 1297, he had been requested to raise 300 foot soldiers from his demesnes, for service in Scotland; ibid 153. Of these three small units, only the foot from Mortimer's lands served for any length of time, leaving at the end of August 1303 (E101/11/15 mm.27, 28, 29, 31, 32); the men from Tony's estates were present from May until July (BL. Add. MS 8835 f.72; E101/11/15 m.31) and there is only one recorded payment for the foot from Montalt's lands (E101/11/15 m.30).
payment specifically noted as being for outlaws. It would seem then, that all we can deduce is that this contingent came from a number of unspecified counties.

Mention has already been made of three of the smaller units on campaign, but there were others. The small force guarding Botetourt noted above was paid until the end of June when they then disappear. Throughout the campaign, a unit of crossbowmen was present, varying in numbers from twenty-three to thirty-three men. A very small unit of five, then four, archers who had been guarding the duchess of Brabant (Margaret, the king's daughter) were present with the army until early June, and then they do not appear in the pay records again until October. While the army was at Perth, a handful of hobelars and soldars received lump sum wages, the suggestion being that they were serving on a task orientated basis, presumably, in the circumstances, a reconnaissance role. Strangely, they do not appear again and in the wardrobe book, only three are recorded as being in receipt of wages at the start of the campaign in May 1303. Apart from men raised from the Welsh lordships, there were six men from the lordship of the earl of Lancaster. This unit, however, is paid at Brechin for twenty-one days service in June and July, and then disappears.

Of course, because of the somewhat confused state of the payrolls, it is impossible to deduce how long these smaller companies resided with the army; they may have been amalgamated with one of the larger units. On the whole, the clerks seem to

25 Nine archers, paid on 24 February 1304 for fourteen days service the previous November; E101/11/15 m.25.
26 See Chapter 1.
27 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.73.
have been fairly accurate, but there were mistakes. At the end of
the siege of Brechin, when the foot were paid wages for service
performed in June and July 1303, two contingents who had, up until
this point, been paid as part of the men from Cumberland were paid
as part of the Various Counties unit. We know this must have been
a mistake because the next time they were paid, and indeed until
the end of the campaign, they were back as part of the Cumberland
contingent.

The king's bodyguard consisted of twenty-four archers who had
been part of the English garrison of Stirling castle when it was
starved into submission by the Scots in 1299. They seem to have
been with Edward on a permanent basis, and not just the length of
the campaign.28 The prince's bodyguard was more numerous and
diverse, consisting as it did of several small units, thus making
it difficult to follow in the pay rolls. From early June, a small
unit from Spain (seven crossbowmen, three foot carrying the
prince's lances and one 'constable') were present. One of the
foot had left by August 1303; the following July, three more had
left. The rest of the prince's guard was made up of archers and
crossbowmen. A small note that fifteen archers came from the
forest of Alnwick is the only clue to home origins. By the end of
May 1303, there were some 140 men with the prince (excluding the
Spanish unit); only three were crossbowmen. By the end of June,
100 men (no indication of any crossbowmen); by the middle of
August, eighteen crossbowmen and sixty-four archers. In the
middle of October, only forty-two archers and twenty crossbowmen
were present.

28 E101/364/13 ff.58-59v. To add to the evidence of grooms given in
Chapter 2, in January 1303, these archers went to Linlithgow; with
them went their twelve grooms (CDS ii 1399) who presumably stayed
in service when the archers rejoined the king.
The last major part of Edward’s infantry force that needs discussing is the role of the garrison troops. While space has prevented an examination of the numbers and dispositions of the English garrisons holding Scottish castles, the king did call upon them to provide foot for his army. In late June, seventy-one foot and one constable from Lochmaben and Dumfries garrisons were paid wages at Perth. By the end of the siege of Brechin, 144 men and two constables were present (though hereafter they were recorded as being only from Lochmaben garrison). This number fell steadily until there were fifty-four men and one constable present at the beginning of the siege of Stirling. It was as the siege began that Edward appears to have summoned contingents from other garrisons in Scotland. A lot of these reinforcements were crossbowmen, of much more use in siege situations than archers. Eighteen came from Lochmaben again, as well as a further five archers; six from Edinburgh; nineteen from Kirkintilloch (in addition to twenty-six archers and one hobeler vintenar); forty from Linlithgow (as well as fifty-five archers). Newcastle provided eight crossbowmen; Roxburgh, twelve crossbowmen, five archers and four watchmen (vigilator); Jedburgh, four crossbowmen, nine archers and one watchman; and Bothwell supplied just one single crossbowman. Despite the problems in tracking these units through the pay rolls, these figures do seem to have been the maximum strengths but at differing times during the siege. Once the garrisons were present, numbers did not appear to fall until the unit left, indicating the absence of any casualties during the

29 E101/11/15 m.30.
30 Ibid m.28.
31 Ibid m.17.
32 Ibid mm.7, 10, 12, 15, 17.
Amongst the pay rolls, there survives an interesting folio. It records payment of two units in the retinue of Aymer de Valence between 6 and 23 July 1303, probably operating in western Scotland, the account being drawn up in the same month. It is not so much the numbers involved (two constables and 319 men) as the detailed breakdown given that is of interest. Each unit was headed by a centenar, and further subdivided into smaller units led by vintenars; the first unit of 149 men had eight vintenars (three units of eighteen and five of nineteen); the second unit, of 151 men, also had eight vintenars (one unit of eighteen and seven of nineteen). The second centenar, John de Blaunmouster, was equipped with the banner of St. George, while both units had standard bearers (paid at 4d per day). Also present was John de Hereford, crier of the king's army across the sea (he too was paid 4d per day).

How long this unit stayed together cannot be established from surviving sources. The only reference is that one of the vintenars, Hamo de Wenlock, appeared again with his nineteen archers when they were paid £4 18s sometime in mid February, 1304, for an unspecified twenty-eight days service, and then on 22 March at St Andrews when seventeen archers and William de Wigan, vintenar, were paid 44s 4d for a further fourteen days, again unspecified (Wigan had replaced Wenlock). The clerk also recorded that these men had been part of Valence's retinue over

33 E101/11/15 m.21.
34 This date has been established from the surrounding entries on the folio; ibid m.19.
35 Ibid m.18. Three quarters and two bushels of malt is also recorded as well as 6d in money, though whether this was to buy supplies or for wages is unclear.
the Scottish sea. Assuming the archers were the same between July
1303 and Spring 1304, then this unit was remarkable in staying
together in royal service.

The detail revealed for these units is not present in the pay
rolls for the main body of troops. Contingents were recorded with
their constable, but it is clear that the theory of 100 men for
each centenar was not the practice. At the start of the campaign,
most centenars had in the region of ninety to a hundred men. For
example, the Yorkshire units paid on 17 May 1303 consisted of
thirty-one constables; the largest unit had 153 men, the smallest,
fifty; twenty-five units had eighty men or more, and the average
was just over eighty-seven. When the contingent was paid at the
end of August, there were twenty-five constables; the largest unit
now was seventy-six, the smallest just seventeen; fifteen units
had between thirty and fifty men and the average came to just over
forty-one. This pattern is similar for the other counties.

It is difficult to assess the numbers of vintenars in the
payrolls because they were infrequently mentioned. They are
present when pay is calculated, but without knowing exact numbers
it is difficult to establish how many. The payroll for the end of
August is the first occasion when at least a handful of vintenars
are specifically mentioned; Nicholas de Preston (Lancashire) had
seventy-eight men and four vintenars with him; Thomas de Farnhill
(Yorkshire) had thirty-six men and two vintenars; Roger de
Ravensdale (Berwick garrison) had 117 men with six vintenars; Adam
de Bakford (Lochmaben garrison) had fifty-six men with three
vintenars; and William Harle had thirty-nine foot from the Angus
land with two vintenars.\(^{36}\) Thus, the theoretical proportion of

\(^{36}\)E101/11/15 m.27.
twenty to one seems to have been adhered to fairly well. Changes over time are difficult to detect for the reason stated above, but it is worth pointing out that these examples did occur three months into the campaign. It does seem that very occasionally, a vintenar could command his own unit. John de Bradele was such a man with the garrison from Berwick; at one point, he had eighty-four men in his charge. 37

Infantry arms and armour are difficult to fully ascertain. Most of the centenars had barded horses; the few without received lower wages. The pay rolls reveal two centenars who later joined mounted retinues; Roger le Tailleur had been with the Derbyshire contingent, but on 30 November, his horse was valued, and he became part of Robert de la Warde's retinue; John de Upsale, had been a centenar archer with the men from Yorkshire, but on 11 December, his horse was valued and he joined Miles de Stapelton as a squire. 38 It is interesting to note that Upsale was described as a centenar archer; if many of these constables were mobile bowmen, could they, along with the hobelars, have been the forerunners to the mounted troops so successfully used by Edward III during the early stages of the Hundred Years War?

The wardrobe book, whose final draft was not written until the reign of Edward II, describes virtually all the men as archers except the slingers. However, the pay rolls, whilst being written at the time, do not help much either. On the whole, most units are described as archers; at the next muster, though, they could just as easily be termed foot. At the end of the day, the clerks were only interested in numbers. It is not clear if the use of the word 'foot' actually indicated the presence of significant

37 E101/11/15 m.28.
38 Ibid m.22.
numbers of non-archers. Any estimates of proportions would be at the best a shot in the dark, and not really worth attempting on the evidence for this campaign. The Statute of Winchester (1285), reinforcing the Assize of Arms laid down by Henry II, stipulated the arms every man between fifteen and sixty years old should possess, based on his wealth; however, 'its primary intention was not to provide an army but to preserve the peace'.39 One final point to note is that the slingers had been called upon before. In November 1301, as Edward fruitlessly attempted to extend the life expectancy of his campaign, he requested more troops; 900 were to come from Nottingham and Derby, of which 100 were to be armed with slings.40 The king clearly regarded them as a useful addition to his military endeavours.

The question of wages is an important one. While the numbers of men assembled did not reach the heights previously achieved in the reign, the army was in the field for a much longer period of time than had been the case before, and thus required payment more often. Wage rates were fairly standard. A centenar received 12d a day if he rode a barded horse, otherwise it was 8d a day. A vintenar got 4d a day41 and the ordinary infantryman, 2d a day. The king's archers received 3d a day. Crossbowmen got 4d a day; a vintenar crossbowman, 6d a day.

In May 1303, pay was regular (on 17, 24 and 31) and up to

39 A L Brown The Governance of late Medieval England 1272 - 1461 (London, 1989) 93-4; Powicke The Thirteenth Century 543. Interestingly, those with £2 to £5 of land as well as those with very little were to have bow and arrows.
40 CPR 1301-7 1.
41 This, though, was not always the case. Nicholas de Preston, centenar, four vintenars and seventy-eight men were paid 102s 8d at the end of August for seven days service. If Preston had a barded horse (and the rolls usually note when a constable did not), then the vintenars were only receiving 2d a day; E101/11/15 m.27.
date. Thereafter, the crown struggled. On 13 June, wages for the first four days of June were paid; then, on 25 June, for the next ten. The army was not paid again until 9 August for the period 15 June to 5 July, and then again at the end of the month for the six days to 12 July. It was not until 8 November, when Edward was settling down at Dunfermline, that the next instalment was paid for the twenty eight days between 13 July and 9 August. In the new year, wages arrived, sometimes in the form of prests, at fairly regular intervals of about once a month until September. It is interesting to compare dates between large sums of money arriving from the south and being distributed to the troops. Unfortunately, this can only be done for regnal year 32. In February, a great effort appears to have been made to make up the arrears. Possibly as much as £6,500 was received at Dunfermline, and the pay rolls note wages being paid for fifty-two days (10 August to 30 September). Around the middle of March, money received was disbursed at St. Andrews on 21 March. On 13 April, £4,000 was received at Stirling and paid to the foot eleven days later; on 6 June, 2,500m was received and paid out only three days later. However, the crown failed to catch up on its arrears. On 29 August 1304 at Stirling, long after the siege had ended, and indeed after Edward himself had recrossed the border, infantry were still being paid for service performed the previous November. Audremus de Montgomery was paid to escort the foot from Stirling to Newcastle via Jedburgh and Berwick in August and September.

42 Money had been received at Dunfermline on 4 December 1303, but it does not seem to have been for the foot. However, 5,000m was sent at various times in January and February, and prests were made on 2 January.

43 El01/11/15 mm.13, 17, 18, 20, 22; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.7-9, 23v.
where they were to be viewed and paid.\textsuperscript{44}

However, the infrequency of pay was not applicable to all the foot. Not surprisingly, those who served in Edward's bodyguard and that of his son received better treatment. Between May 1303 and June 1304, the king's bodyguard were paid on at least sixteen occasions; the picture is not dissimilar for the prince's guards either. Even these troops, however, did not always receive up to date wages. Thirty-one archers with the prince were paid some of their wages on 28 October at Cambuskenneth for forty-four days service; they were paid the rest in further instalments at St Andrews in April 1304 and at York, a year after the original service, on 7 October. This situation was repeated for many of the small units comprising the prince's guard.

As another indication of wage problems, the unit operating under Valence's command on the west side of Scotland were due £52 10s for eighteen days service. They received £11 3s 3d at various places during November and December 1303; 20s on 12 January 1304 at Dunfermline; a further £20 on 10 February at the same place; another £20 on 20 April at the siege of Stirling; a further half a mark on 11 June, still at the siege; and, finally, on 17 September at Tynemouth, 12d.\textsuperscript{45}

The book of prests for 1302-3 also supplies interesting details regarding pay. A number of hobelars\textsuperscript{46} from Berwick garrison are recorded as receiving prests in June 1303, and a handful appear to have remained with the king, receiving further

\textsuperscript{44} BL. Add. MS 8835 f.16.

\textsuperscript{45} This comes to a total of £52 10s 11d; there may be an error in my transcription.

\textsuperscript{46} On the nature of these particular troops, see J F Lydon 'The Hobelar; an Irish contribution to Mediaeval warfare' \textit{The Irish Sword} 2(1954) 12-6.
prests in September and November, despite the evidence presented in the payrolls. 47 Centenars are named as receiving advances but whether they are on behalf of their unit or not is unclear. Hugo de Norton, centenar with the Berwick garrison, provides the most unusual example; it was his wife, Marjorie, who received prests on his behalf on 18 and 30 October (5s and 3s) and 21 and 23 December (4s and 13s 4d for expenses). She is the only indication of the camp followers that would have followed the army, and surely not the only wife amongst them. 48

As well as three membranes from the payrolls, a roll of provisions issued in regnal year 32 records victuals supplied to the infantry. 49 While Chapter 5 below will deal with the collection of victuals from source to the field of operations, this evidence here is our only indication of the link between the crown’s provision for securing supplies and those for whom it was partly intended. Taking the three membranes first, it seems that the victuals supplied to the contingents were over and above their wages. ‘In theory there was no obligation on the crown to provide food for soldiers who were paid wages. Their pay was intended to be sufficient for their subsistence’. 50 Edward, though, was reluctant to allow his men to live off the land in Scotland. Prestwich believes that the king ‘was anxious not to alienate the local population’. 51 This may well have been the case; for example, Edward’s desire to prevent the neglected Irish troops

47 E101/364/13 f.101v.
48 These dates do not tie up with those in the pay records, but it is further evidence that the crown was attempting to supply regular amounts of money when and where it could; ibid f.102v.
49 E101/11/15 mm.4, 18, 20; E101/11/29.
50 Prestwich War, Politics 114.
51 Ibid 114-5.
robbing loyal Scottish supporters for supplies. But it was also a combination of the cumulative effects of the scorched earth policy pursued by the Guardians, the general dislocation of rural life brought on by the advent of war, and the relative lack of victuals available to the invading army to commandeer.

Table 3.13 lays out the information from the payrolls. The crown clearly had accepted standards of consumption; 'twenty men were expected to eat one quarter of wheat in a week and to drink the ale made from two quarters of malt'. However, these figures related to garrisons and would thus have included their families. Bearing this in mind, the weeks it would have lasted the number of men involved has been calculated. It is not certain that the malt was used for brewing; surely the time factor involved in the process would have prevented the army from making ale except perhaps for the long stays at Perth, Dunfermline and during the siege of Stirling.

The victuals noted in the roll of provisions have only been allocated to centenars; only once have infantry numbers been noted. By examining the names, it can be deduced that these victuals were distributed some time between January and March 1304. Against all the names, one to three bills (billa) are noted, which suggests these victuals were paid for. The highest amounts went to Thomas de Stockton and Richard de Melles; the

52 Ibid 115.
53 M C Prestwich 'Victualling estimates for English garrisons in Scotland during the early Fourteenth century' EHR 82(1967) 536.
54 E101/11/29.
55 Robert de Dalton with twenty-five associates.
56 The former, a Cumbrian constable, was in receipt by three bills of 32qu 2bu of wheat, 23qu of malt and two casks of wine; the latter, a constable from Berwick garrison, received, also by three bills, 28qu 2bu of wheat, 27qu of malt and two casks of wine.
Table 1.3. Infantry victuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emissaries</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
<th>Date and place of embarkation</th>
<th>Wheat:</th>
<th>Mult:</th>
<th>Wine:</th>
<th>Herring:</th>
<th>Salted meat:</th>
<th>Salted fish:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>amount</td>
<td>eating</td>
<td>amount</td>
<td>eating</td>
<td>amount</td>
<td>eating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>22 (July)</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>26th</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>(February £00, 1500)</td>
<td>150.4</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30th</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Based on twenty men consuming 7% of wheat in seven days.
2. Based on twenty men consuming 5% of salt in seven days.
3. Based on one man consuming 13% of salt in one day.
4. Based on one man consuming 10% of salt in one day.

lowest to John Backepure and William Hachov'.\textsuperscript{57} In total, 397\textit{qu} 5\textit{bu} of wheat, 334\textit{qu} of malt and 18 casks of wine were delivered.\textsuperscript{58} The nature of the evidence makes it very difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding victualling the troops. In some senses, it is disappointing that all the supplies recorded occur in 1304, when the army was relatively stationary, although whether this points to anything significant is impossible to tell. The only indication to any problems in feeding the moving forces is given by the mowers hired while Edward was at Lochindorb the previous autumn.\textsuperscript{59} If the basic assumptions regarding consumption are more or less accurate, and regarded as applicable to the army by the crown, then it is interesting to note that one small unit had nearly two-thirds of a year's wheat recorded for it. Two other units also had similar large amounts set against them. However, there is an important qualification that needs to be taken into account. The 172 men recorded at Perth were the remains of the unit of 300 sent to the prince in mid-December 1303. If, as it seems, it was the prince's victualer that supplied them, then the wheat, malt and wine was really for 300 to 172 men over several weeks. On the face of it, the smaller units were in receipt of more victuals than their larger counterparts. Ultimately, while these figures are of interest, it is impossible to base anything substantial on them.

There were at least 539 known named criminals present during

\textsuperscript{57} Both unidentified amongst the named constables given in the pay rolls; the former receiving, by one bill, 1\textit{qu} of wheat and 1\textit{qu} of malt; the latter, by one bill, 2\textit{qu} of wheat.

\textsuperscript{58} Divided by the 33 named centenars gives 12\textit{qu} of wheat and 10\textit{qu} of malt each. Only fifteen centenars received wine, four of them two casks, the rest just one.

\textsuperscript{59} See Chapter 1.
1303; these added to the curve in Figure 3.2 would raise the total over the 8,000 mark for May 1303. Edward had made use of outlaws before, and it seems that right from the outset, his intention was to do so again. As early as 23 February 1303, Thomas son of Robert Haliday of Bedford was pardoned for the death of William Haliday of Bedford (his brother?) as long as he served the king in Scotland with a barded horse. On 7 May, when Edward was at Newcastle, he commissioned Richard Oysel, bailiff of Holderness, to allow those who had fled to the relative sanctuary of the liberty of Beverley to redeem themselves by serving at the king's pleasure in Scotland because he was 'in great want of men able to bear arms'.

Examine the pardons reveals that a number of place names, where given, were in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire. The breakdown of this mass of miscreants makes interesting reading. Thomas de Richemund owed his chance of pardon to a request made by the earl of Hereford and Essex; John son of Adam Osbern of Carleton owed his to the queen. Analysing the indictments shows that 92.2% were charged with murder (many of the victims are named). Was this what Edward meant by being 'able to bear arms'? The king had a potentially dangerous unit on his hands. Walter de Asshewell, chaplain, may well have been a victim, but Thomas de Isham, chaplain, was certainly a perpetrator. Clerks too are recorded as victims and offenders. There are a few cases of brothers indicted for the same murder;

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60 CPR 1301-7 139-43, 166-84.
61 CPR 1301-7 138.
63 Ibid 137.
64 Ibid 170. This was a traditional role for the queen.
65 He needed the intervention of John de Chauuvent for a pardon for the death of Peter son of Isolda and for robberies; ibid 170, 173.
John de Goseford suffered at the hands of William, John and Thomas, all sons of Richard son of Geoffrey de Louswater. Women were occasionally victims. Beatrice was killed by her husband, William de la Haye of Newark; William Toutman of Neuton was charged with the death of Matilda, daughter of Walter de Neuton. This is another interesting feature, that where the locations are given, very often those of the victim and his or her murderer are the same. On the other hand, there seem to have been a few criminals who were well travelled in their crimes; Thomas Unthank was committed for murders and other deeds in England and Ireland.

While most entries specify the nature of the crimes, some, like the case just mentioned, use an 'etc' in a catch-all form. Most of those named are indicted for only one murder; quite a few are indicted for death and robberies. John son of Simon de Westpirye, however, must have been a particularly unsavoury character; he was indicted for the death of Walter Waldegrave, for other homicides, for larcenies, felonies, robberies, burglaries and other trespasses, for breaking out of Plumpton prison, Northamptonshire, and for good measure, any consequent outlawry. Breaking out of prison was a not infrequent offence; breaking into parks and houses, though, was not very common; there were only two men indicted for rape in addition to other crimes. However, while these figures are interesting, they cannot be used to ascertain the level and nature of violence in society at this time.

The few agreements made at the outset of the campaign indicate that these malefactors were to serve either with a barded horse or

66 Ibid 170.
67 CPR 1301-7 168.
68 Ibid 175.
69 Ibid 165.
with fitting arms, and at the king's pleasure. A very small handful even managed to secure someone else to perform their service. For example, William le fitz Neel served Edward for Henry le fitz Neel (his brother?) who had committed two murders and other trespasses. As with the county foot, it is impossible to assess what positive contribution this criminal element made. While a strong ordinance was in place to deter infantry deserting, there is no indication of its applicability to the outlaws. They were not paid wages, and the imprisonment threatened would only have put them back where they came from. There is no evidence, though, of criminals deserting the king. Would they have exerted a negative influence? Was crown manpower diverted to keeping an eye on them? Did they pose a criminal threat, for example, during the king's stay at Perth? To these questions there are sadly no answers. That so many received pardons in November suggests that perhaps they remained loyal to their promises.

The infantry assembled for this campaign were small in numbers, but the crown was successful in keeping more of them in the field for longer than it had done before. This achievement was probably due to both the distance factor and the tough ordinance established. The circumstantial evidence derived from the desertion rates suggests that the foot did not come from the poorest sections of society; rather, they came mainly from the ranks of the modest landowners. It is interesting to note that even in Scotland, it was perceived 'that le menzane, the middle folk, would be ruined by Edward's purpose to send them overseas in

70 Ibid 139-43.
71 CPR 1301-7 140.
72 Prestwich War, Politics 97-8.
his army'.\textsuperscript{73} Overall, it seems that the king was generally satisfied with the foot; there is no surviving letter, directed by an angry king, berating the infantry's tendency to desert the royal cause.\textsuperscript{74} While there was no field action involving infantry, they would have been of use during the sieges conducted throughout the campaign. The morale effect too of significant numbers of men traversing the relatively well populated eastern seaboard must have been considerable not only on the indigenous Scots but also on the Guardians.

\textsuperscript{73}Duncan 'The community of the realm of Scotland' 193.  
\textsuperscript{74}Prestwich War, Politics 95-6.
PART III. The Auxiliaries.
CHAPTER 4. The Navy.

The navy played an important role during the campaign of 1303-4. Its main charge was to supply the army with the required victuals and munitions, but it also fulfilled other functions; it carried the pre-fabricated pontoon bridge and various siege engines north; it also ferried the large Irish contingent across to the west of Scotland; and there was the ongoing duty of guarding the Scottish coasts to prevent external aid reaching the Guardians.

This chapter will first outline the resources available to the crown, the actual demands it made for ships, and the problems initially encountered by the clerks commissioned to take them into royal service. A brief discussion of the documents follows, and then the evidence will be more fully examined. Other topics covered will be the nature and amount of the cargoes involved; the time taken to travel to Scotland; wage rates; general costs involved in the shipping process; and the victuals supplied to the sailors. Finally, the three barges built especially for the campaign will be examined.

There was no national navy in the modern sense at the end of the thirteenth century. Two main sources of ships were available to the crown. According to the charter to the Cinque Ports of 1278, fifty-seven ships from these ports were to perform fifteen
days service at their own expense, and the crown had the option to retain them for wages.¹ The crown also had a variety of rights from other town ports, but despite the fact that they 'were supposed to answer his [the king's] call by providing shipping and supplies', Edward had to resort in his wars to other forms of persuasion.²

These sources were all used during the years of 1303-4. As far as the Cinque Port fleet went, their services were requested on 7 November 1302, the king only wanting twenty-five ships, but with a total complement of men as if the full fifty-seven ship service had been called upon (similar to 1301, the previous occasion when they had been summoned), and it probably reflected the need to have well manned ships in Scottish waters.³ The Cinque Port fleet was to be at Ayr by 15 August. In the event, they took part in the operation to bring the Irish troops across. Even so, Edward was not satisfied with their service during the campaign because a commission was set up to enquire into the desertion of men both from the Cinque Ports and from other Kentish sea ports.⁴

As for the other ports, another seventy-five ships were requested in November 1302; Walter Bacon, one of the king's clerks, was appointed to select fifty ships from the east coast,⁵ while his fellow clerk, Peter de Dunwich, was to act in

¹M Oppenheim A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in relation to the Navy (London, 1896) 2; the seven Cinque Ports were Hastings, Dover, Hythe, Romney, Sandwich, Winchelsea and Rye; F W Brooks The English Naval Forces 1199 - 1272 (London,1933) 80.
³CCR 1296-1302 612; Prestwich War, Politics 143.
⁴Prestwich War. Politics 144.
⁵The counties of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge, Lincoln, York and Northumberland.
conjunction with the sheriffs of Sussex, Southampton, Somerset, Dorset, Gloucester, Devon and Cornwall to select twenty-five ships from forty-one specified ports and two ecclesiastics. The details are laid out in Table 4.1. The ships were to be ready by Ascension (16 May) with men and other necessary provisions.

Both clerks, however, experienced problems in their recruitment campaigns. Bacon had to enlist the support of Robert de Clifford, then keeper of the palatinate of Durham, to take security from the towns of Hartlepool, Wearmouth and Jarrow to ensure that the four ships chosen would go. By a letter Close dated 2 March, Clifford was also ordered to spread the cost involved to the adjoining ports not specifically called upon to provide ships. On the same day, the mayors, bailiffs and men of York, Beverley, Lincoln, Cambridge, Norwich and the bishopric of Ely were likewise instructed to spread the burdens imposed by Bacon's choices. By the middle of April, another clerk, William de Walmesford, was appointed to help Bacon, and hasten the task in hand because Bacon had 'been negligent in the matter'.

Bacon's difficulties, though, were matched by Dunwich. On 10 March 1303, the constable of Bristol was commanded to induce certain men of the town and adjoining ports capable of providing the two ships requested, by 'all means that he shall deem fit, and to distress them if need be'. Four days later, further letters were issued to most of the ports Dunwich was dealing with, in response to certain matters they had relayed to the clerk, who had

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6 CCR 1296-1302 612; CPR 1301-7 75-6; the two ecclesiastics were the abbot of Battle and the prior of Christchurch (to supply a ship apiece). There is a slight difference between the letters Close and Patent; the latter has Yarmouth and Lymington (one ship) while the former does not.

7 CCR 1302-7 76.

8 Ibid 131.

9 Ibid 76.
Table 41. Ships requested by the crown, November 1302.
(taken from CPR 1301-7 25.6; CCR 1296-1302 64).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seafield and Westbourne</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoreham, Hove, Brighton and Aldrington</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsmouth and Gosport</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamble and St. Helens (on the Isle of Wight)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priory of Battle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarmouth (on the Isle of Wight) and Yarmouth</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priory of Christchurch</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poole, Wareham and Bournemouth Island</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weymouth</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyme Regis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaton and Sidmouth</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter and Exmouth</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teignmouth and Dawlish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dartmouth, Portsmout and Berry Somers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth, Plympton and Yealmout</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnstaple and Alfencombe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lostwithiel, Bodmin, Fowey and Polruan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looe, Saltash and Portygyn</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgewater</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in turn passed them back to higher authorities. Edward's response was that they were to provide the service demanded of them, and, should the expedition come to a 'desired effect', then their affairs would be dealt with.\(^\text{10}\) The cohesive approach by the ports to the crown is noticeable. A week after that letter, a writ was sent to the sheriffs who had responsibility for the ports of Southampton to Cornwall to help Dunwich 'and William de Monte Acuto, the king's yeoman appointed to supervise shipping'. This writ also indicated that the ships furnished were to have 'men capable of bearing arms'. There was much need to hasten the whole operation.\(^\text{11}\) Evidently, the burden was too much for some ports.

On 10 April, the towns of Looe, Ash and Portpyhan, having petitioned the crown, got help from four other towns and ports to help share the cost of supplying the one ship stipulated.\(^\text{12}\) As late as 3 May, Dunwich was writing from Exeter to Edward requesting that 'the bailiffs and men of Liskeard and elsewhere in the county of Cornwall...be compelled to contribute ships for the king's service'.\(^\text{13}\)

Quite clearly, both royal clerks encountered resistance to their efforts, and both ended up with a fellow royal official to speed up the process. Bacon was actually accused of being negligent, though perhaps, in the light of the obstacles, it was an external not internal cause. Mariners appear to have been difficult to control at the best of times; the sailors from Bristol, Poole, Warham, Lyme and Bridgwater had all been punished for taking wages, and then withdrawing from royal service during

\(^\text{10}\)\text{CCR 1302-7 78-9.}
\(^\text{11}\)\text{CPR 1301-7 128.}
\(^\text{12}\)\text{Liskeard, Downhead, Launceston and Portpiera; CPR 1301-7 131; CDS ii 1357.}
\(^\text{13}\)\text{SCL 28/59.}
As with the Cinque Ports, the king was not happy with the performance of the ports involved in the crown's requests. Commissions were set up in late November 1303 to enquire into the lack of ships from several counties. Bacon was amongst those appointed, and the deserters and rebellious mariners were to be punished in proportion to their crimes. In the following spring, Edward wrote to the constable of Dover, Robert de Burwash, stating that 'the disobedient men of Dover [were] to be made an example of'.

However, not much evidence has survived to allow us to accurately gauge the level of success Dunwich and Bacon achieved. Indeed, generally, records dealing with the fleet are few. Various clerical and shrieval accounts concerning the transportation of victuals and supplies yield up details of loads and journey times. The only evidence for shipping in the opening phases of the campaign comes from the book of preists for regnal year 31. There are also two sources that deal with the operations to bring the earl of Ulster and fellow lords across the Irish Sea; E101/10/30 is a roll concerned with payments to make the ships ready and the costs of keeping them for the duration of the tasks in hand; and E101/11/2 is a book of payments concerning sailors engaged during all the Scottish wars. For the second half of the campaign, regnal year 32, the wardrobe book is

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14 CPR 1301-7 53, 56.
16 CFR 1272-1307 485; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.16.
17 Dated 15 April 1304 at Inverkeithing; SC1 12/63. See also SC1 12/66, an earlier letter dated 28 March 1304 at St. Andrews where the King wanted the 'men of Dover to be dealt with firmly, as instructed'.
19 Though it has been badly affected by fire damage.
obviously the primary source. An account of wages paid to sailors at various points during this year also survives. 20

Dealing first with the ships traversing the Irish Sea, the roll of payments (E101/10/30), appears to be a complete picture of that particular operation. 21 The opening entries concern the costs involved in converting many ships to take horses. An interesting aspect of this is two sub total entries which are in themselves separate accounts that have survived; E101/10/29 is the account of Master John de Dover and his deputy, William de Caterham; E101/11/3 is the account of William de Moenes. Again both reveal the mass of material that has not survived, remaining brief sub totals on a higher level account.

Dover and Caterham's account shows that they received an indenture from Alexander Bikenore for £19; they purchased approximately 2,500 boards, 1,000 spikes and 11,360 nails, 22 and paid for the conversion of sixty-five ships. The interesting feature here is that the number of horses for fifty of the ships has been specified; the range is from eight to thirty-two steeds, and the total is 820. The other fifteen ships are noted separately as being provided by Gervase Alard, admiral of the Cinque Port fleet, but there is no indication as to how many horses they were to convey, even though they had been converted. Thirteen of them are described as cogs, and they are not all from the Cinque Ports; there were ships from Bournemouth, Fowey, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Exmouth, Seaton, Poole, Portsmouth and Seaham. This reflects the area under the admiral's command, Dover

20 E101/612/13.
22 The actual number of boards is difficult to ascertain from the roll.
to Cornwall. The whole operation came to £17 13s 8½d. The work was carried out in Ireland. Moenes's smaller account details his outlay of £6 18s 5½d on harnesses and hurdles, and clearly shows again how many men's lives a small operation such as this could touch.

Moving back to the roll of payments, about 140 different ships were employed at various stages. Between 16 June and 8 July, there were sixty-one ships, each with their own master, 750 sailors, fifty ship's boys and four constables; the range of men to ships was from eight to sixteen. From 9 July to 23 July, ninety ships were used, falling into two distinct categories. Firstly, there were twenty-four ships from the Cinque Ports, manned by twenty-four masters, 965 sailors and 58 constables. The range of men to ships was forty-seven (in each of the ships from Rye) to thirty-three (in each of the three ships from Sandwich). These, from the evidence, were not for transporting horses, and judging by the number of mariners and constables aboard each vessel, they probably fulfilled a guardian role, escorting the flotilla across the Irish Sea.

The second category, the remaining sixty-six ships, had, as well as masters for each vessel, 1,039 sailors, twenty-seven ship's boys and nineteen constables. The range of mariners to ships was from thirty-one to ten. One of these ships, La Margaret de Youghal, had twenty-eight sailors, one boy and one constable, and housed thirty-two horses; another, La Marie de Caenarfon, had nine sailors and a boy, and had the capacity to take ten horses;

23 CPR 1301-7 111.
24 Not the 173 stated in Lydon 'Edward I, Ireland' 48.
25 Winchelsea supplied four ships (forty-three sailors per ship); Hastings, two (forty per ship); Romney, two (forty-three per ship); Hythe, another two (thirty-five per ship); and Dover, with nine ships (at forty-one per ship).
indeed, throughout, this one man to one horse equivalent holds fairly well. Three ships from Chester, La Nicholas, La Naudia and Blackbot had a total of twenty-nine sailors and two boys between them; but we also know that the former two were kitted out to take ten horses each, while Blackbot could hold eighteen, indicating that it was the larger of the three.

Twenty-one ships were used in late July and early August. It is difficult to assess if they had all previously been in service because sometimes the only details supplied are the numbers of ships; no names or ports of origin. However, many that can be identified do seem to have been continuing their service. 401 sailors, ten ship's boys and eight constables were involved; and at least four of the ships were from the Cinque Ports of Sandwich and Winchelsea. The one ship from Winchelsea, the Cog Edward, had a crew of fifty-seven men and two constables.

Finally, eight ships are named, but it is not clear where they are from. Unlike all the other seagoing vessels noted, these merely state the number of horses each ship carried (158 in all, with a range of sixteen to twenty-six). What is unusual is that the cost was calculated at £1/2m per horse, a formula not used for the other ships (which are calculated by wage costs).

The total amount spent on this roll came to just under £1,000. The book of payments for sailors engaged throughout the Scottish wars reveals that for this regnal year, apart from Bickenor's account entered here, there is a further sum noted as owing to Robert Foghhe and John de Weston for the passage of Theobald de Burgh, Edmund de Burgh, Simon de Geneville and Thomas de Maundeville, with 296 associates and a total of 468 horses.

26 It is interesting that a figure of £1,922 was paid at various times to the Irish forces, while a sum of £5,237 was still owed to them; again demonstrating the crown's financial predicament. £4,000 was sent from Berwick for which Bickenor arranged the
However, some crews did not receive full payment immediately. Michael Jeosne, captain of the ships from Sandwich, had to petition the king because none of the ships under his command had received wages.  

The evidence that has survived for regnal year 31 exists in the book of prests, E101/364/13. Altogether, there are twenty-four ships and two barges specified. These were not all the ships used during the opening part of the campaign; where dates are given, the time span covered is early June to early September 1303. The details of these ships are interesting, but because of their incomplete nature, no weight can be attributed to them. The crew sizes of twenty-five ships are given; La Blythe of Yarmouth had the highest (47); La Blythe of York, the lowest (7). In all, as well as a master for each ship, there were 670 sailors and twenty-four constables in pay (only nineteen vessels had constables), an average of almost twenty-seven mariners per ship. The book of prests also indicates the length of employment; thirteen ships were in pay for one week; two for ten days; seven for two weeks; and two for three weeks. Twelve ships also have victuals as part of their prests; four casks of wine, six casks of flour, five bacon and 2qu of wheat (the bacon was all assigned to the forty-five sailors and two constables of La Lynn of Hartlepool). One of the barges continued to serve in the next ships, but it is not clear where the final destination was to have been (Goldingham?). E101/11/2 ff.3, 5.

27 *CDS* ii 1425. In the event, all that happened was that the debt was 'entered among the debts of which the barons of the Cinque Ports are bound to acquit the king'.

28 Almost all of the entries stated are also found in the draft wardrobe book for the same regnal year, E101/364/14. There are no details in the draft that do not exist in the book of prests.

29 All of these victual details are confirmed in notes of their delivery (E101/10/22 mm.2 (much damaged), 3 (much faded), 4 and 5).
regnal year (La Goodyear of Keynardsey) while the other, Cuthbert of Berwick, manned by forty-four sailors, apparently did not.

The ports of origin of these vessels are; Colchester, Brightlingsea (two ships from here) and Harwich (Essex); Ipswich and Orford (Suffolk); Yarmouth (Norfolk); Spalding, Boston, Lincoln, Grimsby and Barton-upon-Humber (again, two ships from here) (Lincolnshire); Kingston-upon-Hull, Hedon, Paull, Ravenser, York and Scarborough (Yorkshire); Hartlepool (Durham); Newcastle (three ships from here) and Berwick (Northumberland); and Keynardsey (?) (two from here). This suggest that the ships Dunwich engaged were used to bring the Irish troops across, while the ships that Bacon secured were employed on the eastern Scottish seaboard.30

While the evidence that has survived for regnal year 31 is inconclusive, except that relating to the Irish element of the campaign, for the following year, the wardrobe book survives as well as an account of sailor's wages. The wardrobe book firstly has details of five ships and one barge employed during the last part of regnal year 31. Why the details should appear here is not clear. For the regnal year the book is actually concerned with, there were altogether thirty-nine ships and three barges used. Apart from one barge, which according to these records was in pay between 18 November 1303 and 10 August 1304,31 there were no other ships employed from the start of the regnal year (20 November 1303), to 29 January, evidently due to the winter season, although it may not have been a situation of the crown's choosing.

As expected, the cargoes were comprised of a variety of victuals as well as siege engines and other munitions for a siege

30 The figures derived from the draft wardrobe book differ from those in Prestwich War, Politics 146.
31 La Goodyear of Keynardsey; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.99, 102.
operation. Some interesting journeys can be brought out from the accounts. The king's tents were taken by La Margaret of Ravenser from Inverkeithing to St. Andrews between 19 February and 13 March; the same ship brought them back to Stirling, 14 to 31 March; and finally, they were taken to Newcastle in La Rose of Brommuth between 29 July and 7 August. Five ships were specifically appointed to seek for lead for the king's siege engines at the beginning of May; four of them were paid for five days and the other for ten days; these were lightly manned ships with crew sizes of only three and four men. On the whole though, victuals and siege engines were the main cargoes.

The four barges had the largest crews (twenty-five; twenty-two; eighteen; and seventeen) as well as a ship's boy and constable each. They were also employed for the longest; La Goodyear of Keynardsey has already been noted; La Nicholas of Yarmouth was in service from 25 March until 15 August; La Blythe, also from Yarmouth, from 25 March until 8 August; and La Goodyear of Newcastle from 11 April until 4 June.

For the other thirty-nine ships, crew sizes varied from three to fifteen; the average being just over seven. As far as periods of employment were concerned, the shortest were the five in search of lead; the longest, fifty-seven days (La Margaret of Jarrow taking flour from Berwick to St. Andrews, 4 March to 30 April); the average, just short of three weeks. Of course, this does not give any true indication of the length of journeys. Loading and unloading had to be accounted for, and the weather may have prevented sailings, while the crown would still have been paying wages. It is interesting to note a payment of 2s for piloting a

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32 BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.100, 100v, 101v.
33 Ibid f.101.
34 Ibid f.100v.
ship from Blakeness to Stirling.

Again, the home ports of these ships are of note; Winchelsea (Sussex); Colchester, Wivenhoe and Brightlingsea (Essex); Dunwich (Suffolk); Yarmouth (accounting for eight ships) and Lynn (Norfolk); North Coates, Grimsby and Swinefleet (also two ships from here) (Lincolnshire); Paull (two ships), Ravenser (three ships) and York (Yorkshire); Hartlepool, Easington (two ships), and Jarrow (Durham); and Newcastle (five ships) and Berwick (Northumberland). Apart from the frequently mentioned barge which served in both regnal years, there are only another four ships found in the book of prests and in the wardrobe book. Of these, three have different masters (assuming unique ship names, which of course was not necessarily the case in practice). Only one, La Janette of Colchester, is present in both records.

There were many other ships used during this regnal year, which do not show up directly in the wardrobe section dealing with ships. The receiver of victuals at Berwick, Richard de Bromsgrove, employed sixty-five transport vessels, with most having crews greater than ten, to take victuals and munitions to various Scottish ports such as Aberdeen, Perth, Montrose and Blakeness. Two documents, an indenture and a memorandum, give an indication of the nature of the journeys and tasks Bromsgrove organised; the 'Leuyerebord' of Berwick-on-Tweed (with a master and a crew of five) and La Welfare of Newcastle-on-Tyne (with a master and a crew of seven) took some of the king's engines from

35 There are a further six unidentified ports; Keynardsey; St. Helen; Cheseye; Nortescun; Heth; and Brommuth.
36 John Boyden, her master, received a prest for 77s for seven days service beginning on 22 June 1303. He had a crew of thirty-eight and two constables. In the wardrobe book, he took wine to Inverkeithing, and was in pay for three weeks (29 January to 18 February 1304); his crew then was only fifteen; E101/364/13 f.99v; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.100.
37 Prestwich 'Edward I's Wars and their Financing' 257.
Edinburgh to Stirling between 6 and 19 April 1304. Many others appear in the accounts of sheriffs. The case of the two ships from the Isle of Wight will be dealt with below. There are other examples where details survive; twenty-seven ships were employed by the bailiff of Holderness to transport victuals north; and fourteen ships were employed by Ralph de Dalton in sending the supplies from Yorkshire.

Perhaps one of the keys to Edward's success was the pontoon bridge built before the campaign. Thirty ships were assembled between 10 February and 22 March; initially, they were crewed by a master each and sixty-three sailors. However, once the bridge was ready to begin its journey, 240 sailors were employed from 24 May to 20 June. Since it has been calculated that the army, if not the king, crossed the bridge on or about 10 June, and allowing at least a day, and surely more, to reconstruct the bridge parts, then the journey from Lynn must have taken just over three weeks. It is easy to see where the burden fell for providing these thirty ships; fifteen came from ports near Lynn itself (thirteen from Wiggenhall, one from Boston and one from Burnham); nine came from the Humber estuary (three from Grimsby, three from Swine, two from Humber and one from Whitton); finally, six came from York. There were also several ships and boats employed to bring various items to Lynn for the construction of the bridge. Indeed, the sheriff of Lincoln 'arrested' nine ships; three of which later became part of the fleet of thirty that eventually went to Scotland. Finally, two ships, La Scarlet of Hartlepool and La Goodyear of Grimsby, with a crew of twelve apiece, were paid for the twenty-eight days

38 CDS ii 1498, 1499; see also 1491.
40 E101/12/8.
41 E101/11/4; CDS ii 1375.
service, their charge being to supervise and ensure that all thirty ships safely made the journey.

E101/612/13 is an account of wages paid to sailors at various ports. This one manuscript, written in French, appears to have suffered from heat damage. It has been allocated regnal year 32, but the one date given states regnal year 33. On the face of it, it does appear to relate to regnal year 32; at the end of the roll, after the given total, is a note of an outstanding sum, and it is here that the date regnal year 33 is attached. The ships listed are from the south west of England; four from Burstwick (119 sailors, six boys); three from Fowey, including two cogs (twenty-seven sailors, three boys); twenty from Plymouth, including three cogs (184 sailors); four ships and one cog from Ilfracombe (forty-nine sailors); three from Looe (the number of sailors is unclear); three from Nadlestone (?)(twenty-four sailors, but much of the other detail is lost); one from Falmouth (with nine sailors); another from Bideford (eleven sailors); a cog from Bridgewater (eight sailors); two from Barnestaple (twenty-six sailors); and finally, one from Newton Ferrers (with eight sailors). Altogether, there are forty-four ships, and for the forty-one with legible details, 465 mariners and nine ship's boys. Crew sizes varied from thirty-nine to six, but eight to ten were the most usual numbers. The four ships from Burstwick stand out from the rest in terms of the number of mariners.

The clerk heading this roll, William de Warlok, received £105 from the treasurer and chamberlains of the Irish exchequer. The cost of these ships and other small expenses came to just over £78, leaving Warlok with £27 remaining (in regnal year 33). It seems likely these ships were employed either to bring back the

42 Forty-two, forty-two, twenty-three and eighteen.
Irish contingent from Scotland or to transport victuals; the latter is more probably the case. It is interesting to note the comparison between the number of ships on this roll and the requests (and subsequent problems) of the crown; for example, Plymouth (along with two other ports) had been requested to provide only one ship; here, there are twenty. Barnstaple and Ilfracombe had also been requested to supply a ship, and on this roll, seven ships are noted from these two ports.

The records that have survived rarely allow us to calculate the length of journeys with any accuracy. Several related documents concerning the transportation of corn from the Isle of Wight survive and have been examined. Various expenses were involved; gathering in the corn; carting it to the port; storing it if necessary; measuring the amount; fitting out the ships (dunnage); loading the grain; and the freightage charges. In some instances, guards had to be paid to ensure the cargo reached its correct destination. The surviving indenture for La Mariote of Portsmouth shows what was purchased for dunnage work; thirty-six timbers (tingn ?); thirty nails; 150 hoops (circulus); 600 lathes; 300 spiking nails; and 1,800 lathenails. Two carpenters were employed for six days at 4d each a day. The actual journey from the Isle to Berwick took just over three months for one ship, and even then, some of the cargo had to be thrown overboard when a storm threatened the vessel. However, it is worth pointing out that the journey took place during the winter months, increasing both the risk and length of the journey. Indeed, storms were a

44 E101/612/14. Several other small tasks and consequent expenses are also recorded; for example, the grain was stored in a granary for six weeks, then put in boats, which in turn transferred the grain to the ship.
very active threat as the following catalogue of incidents shows; a ship travelling to Berwick from Yorkshire lost 81qu of wheat and a cask of flour due to a tempest; some ships taking grain collected by the royal clerk, Richard de Dalton, north some time between February and April 1304 were driven to Norway by storms, and lost 86qu of wheat; another ship coming from the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was actually lost at sea, and with it 120qu of wheat and 126qu of malt; one ship sent by the sheriff of Northamptonshire put down its losses to a long stay at sea, due no doubt to inclement weather; finally, a ship travelling from Lynn was forced to put in at Scarborough for six weeks due to a storm (presumably causing damage that needed repairing).  

Generally, the accounts, whether for a sheriff or a royal official, do not indicate the length of time taken to transport victuals; the former could assemble the grain, charter and prepare ships, and appoint guards to ensure the grain's safe arrival; the latter, taking receipt, could record the amounts coming in, and note any losses; but between these two stages, neither had any control over the matter, and perhaps therein lies the explanation of the absent data.

The costs of sending grain were calculated according to the amount of victuals conveyed. There does not seem to have been a difference in cost between the types of grain; rather the destination was the determining factor. Ships from Hull were paid 6d a quarter for transporting grain to Berwick, but 8d a quarter if Dunfermline, Perth or Inverkeithing was the port of discharge. One vessel carrying 590 gallons of honey in four casks, in addition to other victuals, was paid 3s per cask for the trip to Inverkeithing. The freightage rates of grain coming from

45 BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.26, 27, 29, 30, 30v.
Southampton was 14d per quarter of wheat, beans and peas, 12d per quarter of barley and 10d per quarter of oats;\textsuperscript{46} from Hartlepool, some wheat cost 8d a quarter for the trip to Stirling, while some cost 6d a quarter.\textsuperscript{47} Of course, with this pay structure, it would have been in the ship's master's interests to do the journey in as short a time as possible. The freightage rates appear to have been comparatively high; in 1297, a quarter of grain cost a shilling to transport to Gascony. Presumably, whereas wine could be brought back on the return journey from the continent, there were no similar opportunities for trade in Scotland, and hence the price was higher.\textsuperscript{48} It is also interesting to note that many ships had to have some conversion work done (dunnage), perhaps due to the harsher environment of the North Sea, though the cost of this was relatively small (in the cases already noted, not more than 10s, and usually around 4s).

Clearly, there were two methods of paying for seaborne journeys; the freightage option has already been discussed. Where the ships were paid according to their complements, ships masters and constables received 6d a day; sailors, 3d a day; and ships' boys, 11/2d a day. The admiral of the Irish fleet, Peter de Paris, received 12d a day.\textsuperscript{49}

Some of the sailors' wages were paid in the form of victuals; fifteen ships appear at the end of a roll of provisions\textsuperscript{50} and altogether received 281/2qu of wheat and 64qu 5bu of malt. Crucially however, only seven of these ships appear in the wardrobe book. What of the other eight? It is possible that they

\textsuperscript{46} BL. Add. MS 8835 f.25v.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid f.31.
\textsuperscript{48} Prestwich \textit{War, Politics} 149.
\textsuperscript{49} E101/10/30; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.99-102.
\textsuperscript{50} E101/11/29.
were ships directly hired by sheriffs, that had not been paid all their costs until delivery had been made, and then subsequently took some of the arrears in grain. This is unlikely. Firstly the roll makes it clear that the provisions were part of their wages, not arrears of freightage charges. Secondly, it appears that ships hired by sheriffs received their full costs before they set out. Thirdly, the very fact that foodstuffs were being issued to mariners suggests that these ships were in Scotland on a longer term basis than the delivery of victuals would entail.

If this is the case, then the conclusion must be that the wardrobe book accounts are not complete. It was noted above that a handful of ships employed in the previous regnal year had appeared at the beginning of the section dealing with ships, so perhaps these eight 'absent' ships appear in the account for regnal year 33.51

What is also interesting is the fact that apart from the barges, all the ships mentioned in the wardrobe book were employed to transport victuals and munitions. The four barges are apparently the only vessels acting as guardians of the Scottish seas. It has been argued that the blockade attempts of both Edward and his son failed, for a variety of reasons.52 Again, on the face of it, the efforts made by the crown in this campaign were not extensive. Any successes at impounding ships bound for Scotland with goods to aid the Guardians were due mainly to chance; a tempest drove a ship travelling from Lübeck to Aberdeen into Newcastle-upon-Tyne on 11 December 1303. Its cargo included three Scotsmen as well as various goods. The master, and presumably the crew, were still under arrest when an inquisition

51 Which, sadly, has not survived.
52 See Stanford Reid 'Trade, Traders and Scottish Independence' 210-222.
was set in motion five months later. Another ship had been seized off the Yorkshire coast on 6 December 1302. Its cargo, bound for 'the Scottish rebels' comprised 'clothes, armour and other goods'; two burgesses of Aberdeen had been in charge and were imprisoned at York, their release only coming after the Guardians' capitulation and on the personal intervention of the earl of Athol.

The crown clearly regarded barges as a useful addition to its seaborne operations. At least two were employed during the first part of the campaign, and one of these, in addition to another three, served in the latter half of the campaign. Indeed, it has already been noted that during the winter of 1303-4, the only vessel operating in Scottish waters was a barge. On 24 January 1304, the bailiffs and burgesses of Yarmouth were charged with the task of constructing two barges, and on 14 February, the mayor and bailiffs of Newcastle-on-Tyne were likewise requested to build a barge as quickly as possible. Particulars for both obligations survive. The two barges built at Yarmouth, one described as a great barge, the other, a small one, cost altogether £42 5s. Eighteen carpenters were employed for six days at 4d per day; twelve clinkers (six for five days and six for six), also at 4d per day; and twelve rebaciores (again, six for five days and six for six) for 2d a day. When built, these two barges were manned by a master each and forty-six sailors, and had begun to serve in Scotland by the end of March 1304.

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53 E101/11/10. The writ and subsequent inquisition are very faded and much damaged, but have been translated; see CDS v 329.
54 CDS ii 1479.
56 E101/12/6/m.1, 2; CCR 1302-7 122.
57 E101/12/6 m.3.
58 John Sweetapple was master of La Blythe. Throughout the period of
The barge built at Newcastle was to have twenty-four oars and a crew of twenty-six. At one point, more than twenty men were employed, mostly carpenters, several of them for nearly three weeks. But a glance at the detailed account which records many names of those affected, whether supplying the purchases made, or with a more direct involvement, demonstrates just how many men such a crown directive touched. The cost of the whole operation was £22 13d and the barge began service in Scotland on 11 April 1304.

Once the necessity for these barges was over, they were dispensed with. The ship from Newcastle was granted to the two masters of the Yarmouth barges as part payment of their wage arrears. The bailiffs and ‘good men’ of Yarmouth were charged with the task of selling the two barges originally built there, at a price that would be ‘to the king’s greatest advantage’. The cost of these three barges could not be considered substantial. Compared to the costs of barges built at the beginning of the Anglo-French conflict, they pale into insignificance.

service, there was a constable and a ship’s boy; the crew level fluctuated; 25 March to 21 July, eighteen; 21 to 26 July, sixteen; and 28 July to 8 August, fifteen. Stephen de Treye was master of La Nicholas. Again, one constable and a ship’s boy were present; between 25 March and 14 April, there were twenty-two sailors; 14 to 21 April, twenty-one, and it is noted that on the 21 April, one crew member died; 21 April to 10 June, twenty; and 11 June to 15 August, seventeen. BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.101v, 102.

^1 ElOl/11/28; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.10.

^2 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.102. Despite the apparent request for a capacity for twenty-six men, the crew was only nine to begin with (11 to 17 April), then seventeen, with one constable and a ship’s boy (18 April to 29 May); and finally, sixteen, again with a constable and a ship’s boy (29 May to 4 June). See also CDS iv 1798; an indenture of payment for wages and other expenses to do with this barge.


^4 The galley and barge built at Ipswich cost £223 18s 6½d, at Dunwich, £277 5s 1½d, at Southampton, £246 13s 5½d,...the galley built at Lynn, which only cost £116 9s 1½d, including twice refitting...was a much smaller vessel, of only 50 oars’. R J Whitwell and C Johnson ‘The ‘Newcastle’ Galley, 1294’ Archaeologia
What of the cost of naval operations? The draft wardrobe book total for ships came to £1,657; in the wardrobe book for the following year, the total was even less; £307. These figures however, exclude the numerous vessels employed by sheriffs and crown servants to send supplies north. Even allowing for these, the total would still fall well short of the levels of expenditure achieved during the four years of the Anglo-French conflict in the mid 1290's.63 What of the economic cost to the ports? The several instances of ports requesting aid from other neighbouring towns and ports clearly reflects the burden imposed; the ports themselves had to meet the costs of the vessels going to, and returning from, Scotland, the crown only paying for service once the ships were there. For example, the surviving agreement between the mayor, bailiffs and community of Exeter and the five owners of La Sauveye of Exmouth shows that the costs of hiring the vessel and freightage were to be paid by the civic authorities.64 It has already been noted that pilotage, freightage and other trading costs were higher when a state of war existed.65 In 1305, the men of Dunwich put forward a claim for the loss of ten ships during the war, estimating their value at £1,000.66 But it has been pointed out that this claim was an exaggeration, and that there were relatively few losses.

The navy, then, played a crucial role in securing success for

_Aeliana_ Fourth series 2(1926) 145. This article also deals in greater detail with the affect and impact such an operation had. See also W R G Whiting 'The Newcastle Galley' _Archaeologia Aeliana_ Fourth series 13(1936) 95-116.

63Prestwich War, Politics 141.

64Jones 'Two Exeter ship agreements' 315-6. Incidentally, the agreement was sealed on 30 April 1303, sixteen days before the ship was due at Newtown (CPR 1301-7 75-6). However, it ended up as one of the ships crossing the Irish Sea.


66Prestwich War, Politics 148.
Edward; they ferried men, machines and munitions north. But the service required of them had to be doggedly extracted, and here, the royal clerks did admirably well in the face of many difficulties.
CHAPTER 5. Logistics.

'The task [of victualling] was a considerable one, and of all the administrative problems which were involved in putting an army into the field, this bulks largest in contemporary records'. The campaign of 1303-4 covered fifteen months and included perhaps the longest journey that any of Edward's armies undertook, as well as several sieges. Throughout, victuals were needed to feed the troops (to prevent them living off the land as much as possible, thus alienating the native population), money was needed to pay them (to arrest, if possible, the rate of desertion), and arms (to replace losses incurred during the sieges, especially the three month siege of Stirling). This chapter will examine each of these three areas, although victualling will dominate simply because of the weight of primary material.

The chapter will also demonstrate by illustration that the efforts expended on this campaign have perhaps been underestimated; that these efforts touched a large number of people, acting both as a stimulant and a hindrance to the economy at a local and regional level; and that, with regard to victuals, it was not necessarily the poorer elements in society who contributed most (even though the withdrawal of large amounts of

1 Prestwich War, Politics 118.
grain from the market may have had a detrimental effect on availability).

The main task of establishing how successful sheriffs were in gathering the amounts of grain requested of their counties has largely been done.\(^2\) However, there is more detail that can be added, and in order to set the scene, this area will be re-examined. The documents covering victuals themselves fall into three broad categories covering either or both regnal years of the campaign. Firstly, the accounts of the two receivers based at Berwick and Carlisle (Richard de Bromsgrove and James de Dalilegh).\(^3\) Secondly, the operations of the sheriffs and other crown servants who had had demands placed on them. In particular, documents exist of the accounts and other records of the bailiff of Holderness,\(^4\) the constable of the Isle of Wight,\(^5\) the sheriff of Northumberland,\(^6\) the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset,\(^7\) the sheriff of Nottingham and Derby\(^8\) and several items relating to the sheriff of Lincoln.\(^9\) The third group is comprised of miscellaneous documents relating to the collection and transportation of victuals.\(^10\)

From these records, the extent of shrieval time and effort

\(^2\)^{Prestwich War, Politics 114-136.}
\(^3\)^{E101/10/28; E101/11/19.}
\(^4\)^{E101/11/13, E101/12/36, 67.}
\(^5\)^{E101/11/23; E101/11/24 (which is a draft of E101/11/23); E101/612/14.}
\(^6\)^{E101/12/2, 21.}
\(^7\)^{E101/585/6.}
\(^8\)^{E101/12/4.}
\(^9\)^{E101/568/17, 18, 20.}
\(^10\)^{E101/11/21 is an account of beasts purchased in the county of Edinburgh; E101/12/7 is a receipt of victuals sent to Berwick by Master John de Weston and Robert Heroun; E101/11/30 is an account of wheat and malt purchased and sent by the collectors of Tallage in Ravenser; and E101/12/8 is the account of Ralph de Dalton of corn purveyed in Yorkshire.}
expended in securing the crown's targets, and its cost, is apparent; where the detail survives (which it does in a number of places), analyses have been made to try and determine from whom victuals were actually purveyed.

Despite the theory that those who received pay secured their own victuals, in practice, the crown had to supply large quantities of foodstuffs to keep the troops in the field. Prises, or purveyances, were a much resented burden. Lack of payment was one of the causes, and for this particular campaign, Edward attempted to alleviate the problem by re-directing the aid due to be collected for the marriage of his eldest daughter to pay for the victuals. In 1303, 'orders were issued that no corn was to be taken from anyone who did not possess at least £10 worth of goods'; more specifically, in Lincolnshire, it was agreed that no prises would be taken unless payment had been made. The problems and unpopularity are clearly evident.

The best starting point is perhaps to outline the crown's wishes. On 10 December 1302, seven clerks were appointed to oversee the collection of victuals in ten eastern and midland counties. It was not until 16 March 1303 that Somerset and Dorset were also called upon to supply victuals (an indication that the

11 The lack of regular pay by the crown must also have been a determining factor in the provision of victuals.
12 It had been suggested that the use of the word purveyance in the records had replaced prise because of political pressure; W R Jones 'Purveyance for war and the community of the realm in late Medieval England' Albion 7(1975) 311.
13 Prestwich War, Politics 128-136.
14 CCR 1302-7 68. Already the bailiwick issues had been earmarked to pay for the victuals; CPR 1301-7 99.
15 Prestwich War, Politics 135; CPR 1301-7 158.
16 Prestwich War, Politics 132.
17 See ibid 132-3 for three cases in 1303-4 of non-payment by officials, as well as physical threats to, and excommunication of, officials.
crown officials were running into the sorts of problems encountered by their fellow clerks Bacon and Dunwich, over shipping). The amounts of corn requested and the amounts actually received have been laid out in Table 5.1. Quite clearly, the view 'that the sheriffs were on the whole efficient in providing supplies' needs to be re-examined. The sheriff of Somerset and Dorset apparently supplied only a third of the wheat and none of the oats, beans and peas he was requested to purvey; the sheriffs of Cambridge and Huntingdon between them sent only half the amount of corn, barely a fifteenth amount of oats, and no malt; the sheriff of Suffolk and Norfolk did well to nearly attain his targets for wheat, oats, and salt; but he failed with the malt, flour, beans and peas. The totals demonstrate this lack of success despite the fact that the harvest of 1302 had been a good one. As early as March 1303, Droxford had written to the chancellor regarding a commission into the purveyances from Essex and Hertford. Indeed, by the summer of 1304, an inquiry had been set up over defective corn being sent from these two counties.

A careful study of Bromsgrove's account reveals the other sources for victuals; he had quite substantial amounts remaining from the previous year; he made several purchases in his own right; some victuals purveyed for the previous regnal year only appeared in this year; and victuals supplied by the bailiff of

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18 Prestwich War, Politics 124-5.
20 SC1 28/68; 60/58.
21 E101/10/28.
22 For example, 844qu of wheat, 1,546qu of oats, 406qu of beans and peas, 186qu of malt, 169qu of rye, 107qu of barley and 29 casks of flour.
23 385qu of wheat and other smaller quantities of oats, malt, barley, beans and peas.
24 CPR 1301-7 35; the sheriff of Nottingham and Derby supplied 475qu
Table 5.1: Victuals requested and received, report year 31.

(Taken from CRO (101.7 98-9, 100, 126, 129, 127, 126) / 4th/10/22). Note: all amounts in quarters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th></th>
<th>Oats</th>
<th></th>
<th>Malt</th>
<th></th>
<th>Beans and peas</th>
<th></th>
<th>Flour</th>
<th></th>
<th>Salt</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordered</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Ordered</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Ordered</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Ordered</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Ordered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>4,428</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex and Huntingdon</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk and Norfolk</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntingdonshire</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals**: 3,250 4,428 57.1 8,000 2,556 32 4,000 924 20.6 7,600 812 32 1,150 630 50.4 500 400 80
Holderness. In fact, these other sources together accounted for half of the oats going through Bromsgrove's hands during this regnal year, half of the beans and peas, and significant proportions of the other types of corn.

Of course, the amounts the sheriffs collected and sent and the amounts that actually reached Berwick were often entirely different. Without the wardrobe book for this regnal year, we can only turn to the few remaining sheriff accounts to ascertain this difference.

The expenses incurred by the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset for regnal year 31 survive. Bearing in mind that Master John Gerberd, the sheriff concerned, was not notified until March 1303, it is clear that more victuals were purveyed, but that they did not reach Bromsgrove during that accounting year; the 336qu of wheat are noted as being delivered in regnal year 31, but it is also noted that in the next regnal year, in the months December to February, a further 378qu of wheat, 915qu of oats and 380qu of beans were received. Losses due to decay and transportation were high; 84qu of wheat, 83qu of oats and 17qu of beans. This could well have been due to the winter season itself and the longer journeys that would have ensued. Even so, the victuals collected by Gerberd were short of the demand.

However, this shrieval account is interesting because two documents survive listing those who supplied the corn to the

of oats and 48qu of rye while the sheriff of Cambridge and Huntingdon supplied 143qu of wheat and 114qu of oats; it is unclear whether these were late consignments or late deliveries due to the weather.

478qu of oats; 240qu of beans and peas and 82qu of wheat.

798qu of wheat compared with 1,000qu requested; 998qu of oats, almost the 1,000qu requested; and only 398qu of beans to the 1,000qu wanted. The prices of these victuals will be dealt with below.
The details are laid out in Figures 5.2 to 5.4, and clearly show that a small number of men were responsible for large amounts of the various grains purchased; the abbot of Glastonbury, the only ecclesiastic to participate, gave 100qu of beans, more than a quarter of the whole amount purchased and sent; the constable of Taunton, Philip de Paunton, provided 200qu of wheat; he also gave 13qu of wheat and 9qu of oats in his own right as opposed to his official capacity. The number of individuals called upon is also small; at most, 240. This evidence suggests that the sheriff had problems raising the necessary victuals, hence his reliance on the abbot and the constable. It also suggests that it was not the poor who were being burdened. These lists are significant because similar documents exist for the following regnal year for Lincolnshire and, as shall be seen, there are distinct similarities.

Another document dealing with supplies from Nottingham and Derby reveals that of the 247qu of wheat and 290qu of oats collected from various parts of the two counties, all the oats went directly to Adam de Blythe, one of the king’s officials in charge of the household mounts. Clearly, the amounts received by Bromsgrove did not necessarily reflect all the victuals purveyed by the sheriffs. But, at the same time, the crown looked to other sources to supplement the availability of victuals. The evidence for regnal year 32 is more substantial than for its predecessor, and a sharper picture can be drawn not only of the towns and

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28 E101/11/21 mm. 62, 63.
29 Bearing in mind the loss of some of the details, only another six people purveyed two types of corn in addition to Paunton; wheat and oats, John de Bromhull (20qu, 40qu), Richard le Maker (5qu 2bu, 15qu), Herbert de Marisco (1qu, 1qu 4bu), Robert atte Malle (1qu 4bu, 6bu) and Imbert Stangley (1qu, 1qu 4bu); oats, beans and peas, Philip de Cressewild (10qu, 24qu 4bu).
30 E101/12/4 m. 14. The cost of gathering together these particular victuals came to £5 7s 1d.
Figure 5.2. Breakdown of wheat ownership in Somerset in 1377, regnal year 31.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Wheat Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>3 x 5 bu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>1 x 3 bu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom</td>
<td>8 x 7 bu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>19 x 8 bu.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 139

759 bu. of wheat

The diagram illustrates the breakdown of wheat ownership among various individuals in Somerset in 1377. The percentages and quantities are shown for each individual. The diagram includes various symbols and notations, such as arrows and labels, to represent the data. The legend at the bottom of the diagram provides a key for interpreting the symbols used in the diagram.
Figure 5.4: Breakdown of hearse importance in Somerset and Dorset, regnal year 31.

(* from Coulson p. 162*)

**Total:** 25 named individuals.

23 = 92%

2 = 8%

(a) Heavily worn.

(b) The least worn, at the bottom and probably up to 15 wears are lost. The total is also 25, 25 of 50 (50% states 25% than as the total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavily worn</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less worn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weight Range</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5 lbs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10 lbs</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 15 lbs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 20 lbs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 25 lbs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 lbs +</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
counties called upon to supply grain and other foodstuffs, but also of those who actually contributed.

Orders for supplies went out on 23 September 1303 while the king was at Kinloss, suggesting that Edward was preparing to keep the campaign going into the following spring.\(^{31}\) The bailiff of Holderness was sent a letter on 17 October in which the king stated his intention to stay in Scotland over the winter, and requesting the bailiff to purchase and send, 'with all speed', victuals 'necessary for the maintenance of him [the king] and his subjects'.\(^{32}\)

Using the wardrobe book for regnal year 32, Table 5.5 lays out the details of what was requested (where applicable), what was collected (again, where applicable), and what was actually received. On the face of it, the various sheriffs were more successful in attaining, and even surpassing, the targets set than in the previous year; this perhaps is partly due to the lower demands made.\(^{33}\) It is interesting that four counties were not called upon again; Nottingham, Derby, Somerset and Dorset; this highlights the continuous burden placed on the eastern grain producing regions by the crown.\(^{34}\)

There are many existing accounts which yield further interesting details. Perhaps the two most significant are shrieval accounts from Northumberland and Lincolnshire.\(^{35}\) The main

\(^{31}\) CPR 1301-7 158. Lynn and Barton-upon-Humber were not requested for victuals until later on; CCR 1302-7 120-1; CPR 1301-7 201.

\(^{32}\) CCR 1302-7 63.

\(^{33}\) For regnal year 31, 7,200qu of wheat had been required from twelve eastern counties; in the following year, only 4,200qu were requested from ten counties, two towns, and Ireland. It is a similar story regarding oats (almost halved in demand), beans and peas (a third of the previous levels required), and malt (the fall less significant; 4,000qu to 3,100qu).

\(^{34}\) See Prestwich War, Politics 133-4.

\(^{35}\) E101/12/2, 21; E101/568/17, 18, 20.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Malt</th>
<th>Oats</th>
<th>Beans and peas</th>
<th>Barley</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>448</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td>534</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex and Hertfordshire</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>509</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td>484</td>
<td></td>
<td>289</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk and Suffolk</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td>324</td>
<td></td>
<td>359</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambridge and Huntingdon</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>583</td>
<td></td>
<td>173</td>
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<td>Delivered</td>
<td>539</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>500</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
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<td>451</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td>434</td>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northamptonshire</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>293</td>
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<td>291</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynn</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>293</td>
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<td>Lancaster, Windermere</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<td>205</td>
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<td>Requested</td>
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<td>740</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>9 (Gye)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>9 (Tim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>9 (Tim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isle of Wight</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>136</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collected</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>Delivered</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Richard Denton)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>Delivered</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>92</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grimsby</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarborough</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Peterborough</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster, Woodhouse</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table is taken from CPR 1301-7; 138; 220; CPR 1302-7 (20-1); St. Add. MS 685 ff. 25-36. Notes: all figures are in quarters.
account of Luke Tayleboys, sheriff of Northumberland, is quite extensive and covers much more than just victuals; the king's falcons were his responsibility for a period; he had to house the king's daughter Elizabeth's horses; numerous household officials descended upon him for supplies of all sorts; he had to store (at Newcastle) and account for the king's tents at the end of the war; and he also had to provide for various Scottish prisoners from Stirling as they passed through his jurisdiction. 36

The memorandum listing the breakdown of the purchases is divided into five wards, and within each, it is the vill and not the individual that supplied the wheat, oats and oxen. Map 5.6 has identified the vills, and noted the amounts supplied from each ward. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 display the data in diagrammatic form. Sixty-three vills were involved, and the map shows that the northern end of Northumberland supplied relatively little; no doubt partly due to the cumulative effect of Scottish raids and passing English troops. The amounts overall from Northumberland are in themselves small, but within the county, regions furthest from the border were evidently better off. The vills in the two wards in the south each had two cattle purveyed, except for Heddon-in-the-wall; there are only two persons named on the roll; Edmund de Molender from North Charlton (in Bamburgh ward) supplied 5qu of malt, and Ingemo de Caldinerton had sixteen sheep purveyed.

The surviving accounts dealing with Lincolnshire are even more forthcoming about who actually supplied the victuals. The county was called upon several times by the crown during the Scottish wars, and much resentment had been built up to the extent that

36 It is interesting to note that the first few items of his account, dealing with the corn, were copied into the wardrobe book verbatim.
Map 5.1. Villis where certain area were surveyed, Wiltshire, 1800-1810, n.g. year 32.

(Cross from ext. file.)

Note: the ward divisions are arbitrary indications only; I was unable to trace the actual boundaries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glendale ward</th>
<th>Castledale ward</th>
<th>Tildale ward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nether</td>
<td>23. Fowberry</td>
<td>35. Welbington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ford</td>
<td>27. Ingram</td>
<td>39. Chalderton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dodgington</td>
<td>30. Allnham</td>
<td>42. Corbridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Horton</td>
<td>32. Whitfingham</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Holburn</td>
<td>33. Shilbottle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Hesley</td>
<td>34. Lebottle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bamburgh ward</th>
<th>Yettington ward</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Casington</td>
<td>39. Workworth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Belford</td>
<td>40. Acklington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Spindlesstone</td>
<td>41. Cheffett</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Budel</td>
<td>42. Woodburn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Bamburgh</td>
<td>43. Hartington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Elford</td>
<td>44. Throplill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Fleetham</td>
<td>45. North Middleton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Tugnell</td>
<td>46. Boleam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Rock</td>
<td>47. South Middleton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Great Charlton</td>
<td>48. Milburn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. South Charlton</td>
<td>49. Brenchley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Denwick</td>
<td>50. Cramlington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Great Houghton</td>
<td>51. Elam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Lesbory</td>
<td>52. Scratch de Lavae</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53. Lardon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54. Great Benton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.3. Breakdown of wheat price in Westerhever, 17th century. 32.

Totals: 65 villas
1350.125 hundredweight

46 = 33%  
92 = 50%  
17 = 27%

48.955
48.604
48.604
Figure 5.4: Breakdown of oat consumption in Northumberland, 1597-1604.

(From M. E. L. S.)

Total: 6,376 bushels

- 4,914 bushels = 77.8%
- 1,498 bushels = 22.2%
- 8 bushels = 0.1%

- 7,391 bushels = 57.7%
- 2,925 bushels = 42.3%
payment for victuals had to be immediate; the previous sheriff had also had problems, due partly to an inquiry into past purveyances interfering with his ongoing attempts to gather more supplies. An interesting development occurred in regnal year 31 when a group of merchants offered to purchase and supply the corn required as long as security could be found for their efforts; the king wrote to the sheriff instructing him to proceed with the merchants' plans as long as they could find the 'quantities of corn at a reasonable price'. Unfortunately, nothing is known of the outcome of this scheme.

For regnal year 32, a complete list of all those from whom victuals were purveyed survives; and not only has the scribe recorded names and amounts, but in many cases, the individual's home town or village has also been noted. The analysis of the individual contributions (Figures 5.9 to 5.11) presents a similar picture to that encountered in the lists for Somerset and Dorset in the previous regnal year. Almost 270 sources, mostly individuals, were affected. In stark contrast to Somerset and Dorset, thirty-three religious houses supplied between them nearly 18% of all wheat, 6% of all the beans and peas, and nearly 2% of

37 Prestwich War, Politics 132.
38 SC1 27/15.
39 CCR 1302-7 10.
40 E101/568/17.
41 Only eighteen gave combinations of more than one type of corn; wheat and oats, Thomas, prior of Alvingham (5qu, 1qu) and Luke Peeche (3qu, 4qu); wheat, beans and peas, Nicholas de Baumburgh (7qu, 9qu), the abbot of Park Luda (91/2qu, 5 qu), the abbot of Kirkstead (81/2qu, 1qu), the village of Luda (4qu, 2qu), Antony de Lissington (1qu, 1qu), William Davre of Horncastle (3qu, 3qu), John de Paunton (1qu, 2qu), the abbot of Revesby (6qu, 2qu) and Ralph de Skinner of Wainfleet (2qu, 141/2qu); oats, beans and peas, Edmund de Bohn of Bevington (2qu, 2qu), John fitz Edmund of Biker (10qu, 2qu), John Miles of Quappelade (20qu, 5qu), Ralph Pygot of Dunington (2qu, 3qu), Ralph Soke of Leviton (1qu, 11/2qu), William de Thorp (4qu, 1qu) and the abbot of Thornton (5qu, 1/2qu).
Figure 5.9: Breakdown of wheat storage in Lincolnshire, overall year 15\(5\).

Total: 189 named individuals or communities

417.56 thou. bushels of wheat (the current state, 409.75 thou. as the total)

15 = 8.1%
185 thou. bushels = 44.8%

119 thou. bushels = 34.6%

148 = 79.8%

63

2 x 66
66 x 14

54

1 x 166
3 x 88
50 x 23

58

24 = 13%
90 thou. bushels = 21.4%

49 thou. bushels

24

16 x 34
1 x 85

21 x 23

32

8 x 15
23 x 22

7

2 x 11
2 x 11

15

2 x 47
1 x 84

1 x 35
5 x 34

23 thou. bushels

25

1 x 34
5 x 45

20 thou. bushels

5

1 x 25
1 x 10

2 thou. bushels

11

6 x 2\(\frac{1}{2}\)
5 x 4

6 thou. bushels

6

1 x 34
5 x 5

5 thou. bushels

3

1 x 14
1 x 10

2 thou. bushels

10

1 x 6
2 x 3
Figure 5.11. Breakdown of beans and pea presence in Linsol and, regional year 32.
(from Eton 1518/19).

Totals: 44 unnamed individuals or communities
11/3 beans and peas

(* The document states 1/3 as the total; there is one name with no amount recorded.)

30 = 68.2%  
31 1/3 = 76%  

44 = 31.8%  
91 1/3 = 64.2%
all the oats; while the amounts are small, the very fact that so many houses were involved is interesting.42

Again, the sheriff of Lincoln, Thomas fitz Eustace, had to rely on a few individuals supplying a large share of the victuals; fifteen out of 187 contributions (8%) supplied 44% of all the wheat; nine out of fifty-five (16.4%) supplied 48% of all the oats; and fourteen out of forty-four (31.8%) supplied nearly two thirds of all the beans and peas. Because so many home villages and towns have been given, Maps 5.12 to 5.14 have been constructed showing the extent of the purveyances across the county; it is clear where the main area for oats existed, to the virtual exclusion of wheat judging by the respective maps.43 But more importantly, it is clear that the whole county was covered, not selective areas.

In addition, if the list of men that emerges from the Lincolnshire Assize Roll of 129844 is compared to these victual lists, twenty-eight names match, another eight are possibilities, and a handful of names could plausibly be sons. These men are sub-bailiffs, sub-taxors and jurors. This also suggests the possibility that it was not the poorer elements of Lincolnshire society that were involved. Thomson himself appeared surprised that information regarding the structure for collecting prises was scarce, and he suggested the structure for assessing taxes may have been used, in whole or in part. He does note a writ for corn in 1296 directed solely at the sheriff and his sub-bailiffs.

42 'In proportion to its size, Lincolnshire had more monasteries than any other county apart from Yorkshire'; J V Beckett The East Midlands from AD1000 (London,1988) 31. It was also one of the wealthiest counties; ibid 24. See also G Platts Land and People in Medieval Lincolnshire (Lincoln,1985) 37.
43 This bears out Beckett's view that oats dominated in the fenlands and that wheat and barley were grown on the higher lands; The East Midlands 50.
Map 5.13. Identifiable locations given in the Lincolnshire parochial lists, megacrease 32, for wheat
(taken from RO/568/13).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18. West Rasen</td>
<td>23. Fulston</td>
<td>28. Freiston</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Middle Rasen</td>
<td>24. Lutborough</td>
<td>29. Kirton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Walesby</td>
<td>27. Alvingham</td>
<td>32. Stamford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Techby</td>
<td>28. Louth</td>
<td>33. New Place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Owstersby</td>
<td>29. Maltby</td>
<td>34. Briscoeborough</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Netleton</td>
<td>32. Hainton</td>
<td>37. Hacconby</td>
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<td>28. Caistor</td>
<td>33. Panton</td>
<td>38. Dunby</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Searby</td>
<td>36. Baumber</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Bigby</td>
<td>37. Horncastle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Swinstead</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 5.3. Identifiable locations given in the Lincolshire purveyance lists, regnal year 32, for ods.

(taken from E101/568/17).
1. Beake
2. Wrangle
3. Leverton
4. Benington
5. Butterwick
6. Freiston
7. Boston
8. Skirbeck
9. Toft
10. Wiberton
11. Hertton
12. Swineshead
13. Bicker
14. Wigtoft
15. Sutterton
16. Donington
17. Quarrington
18. Gosberton
19. Pinchbeck
20. Surfleet
21. Spalding
22. Weston
23. Folney
24. Crowland
25. Moulton
26. Whaplode
27. Holbeach
28. Gedney
29. Sutton
30. Tydd

Taken from [source].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Snelland</td>
<td>16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Lissington</td>
<td>17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Panton</td>
<td>20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Thornton</td>
<td>23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Alvingham</td>
<td>25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Holth</td>
<td>26.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>South Boston</td>
<td>27.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Langton</td>
<td>29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Thorp</td>
<td>30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Markby</td>
<td>31.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Cumberworth</td>
<td>32.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since only 270 or so men were involved, and since thirty-three were ecclesiastics, and several others were officials themselves, it could well be that the structure for the purveyance of corn was one of a personal network of contacts, whether on an informal or formal basis. The evidence though is not conclusive, and similar lists would have to be studied (should they exist) for other campaigns. But clearly, this particular purveyance was not on the scale that taxation would have entailed, and the limited evidence suggests that it was men of at least a certain level of wealth in Lincolnshire society who were affected.

The remaining accounts that deal in detail with victuals in regnal year 32 are those where no specific targets were set by the crown. The main source was Holderness (used in the previous regnal year as well); but the accounts of Richard de Dalton's efforts in Yorkshire and the collectors of the Tallage at Ravenser are also worth examining.

The bailiff of Holderness, Richard Oysel, was requested to send various victuals as early as 17 October 1303. In the event, his contributions were an important part of the victuals going north. His account details what each of the twenty-seven ships were carrying; altogether, excluding the custom of merchants advantage, he purchased 705qu of wheat, 7qu of rye, 784qu of beans and peas, 125qu of barley, 499qu of oats, 259qu of salt, 100 beef carcasses, 70 bacon, 700 sheep carcasses, eighteen loads of herrings, 19,996 hardfish, 622 '(mill) stones', twenty-one copl (measures of dried fruit?) and 1,010 gallons of honey. He also purchased wine, although the roll does not detail quantities; however, while £1,080 was spent on the victuals, their transportation and other related costs, £793 was spent on the

45 CCR 1302-7 63.
wine, and all the involved expenses, so the purchases must have been fairly substantial.

Documents also exist detailing purchases made by the two collectors of Tallage in Kingston-upon-Hull, Richard Gretford and Robert de Barton. Ralph de Dalton was involved in the process, but these victuals were in addition to his own efforts, and they were delivered straight to Perth. 100qu of wheat and 92qu 6bu of malt were bought, and there survives a breakdown of the people from whom the grain was purchased (Figure 5.15). All the amounts were relatively small compared to the evidence already examined for Somerset, Dorset and Lincolnshire, and all of those listed supplied both wheat and malt. The amounts of grain involved indicate perhaps the smaller landholdings these ‘urban’ dwellers would have had, though this is pure conjecture.

Dalton's own account of his expenses, E101/12/8, does not include the corn from Hull. But again the detail given, set out in Table 5.16, provides a fascinating insight into the workings of these operations. The four ecclesiastical houses are conspicuous by their contributions, but so are the several individuals, especially the four lords. Nonetheless, Dalton still sought for small contributions, as is implied in the cases of York and Merksland, and no doubt with Kilham, Beverley and Scharltown. Presumably the market was the forum by which the clerk would have made his smaller purchases, while personal contact with the abbot, priors, deacon and lords would have been the method used to purchase the larger amounts. It is interesting to note that the sale of 100qu of oats by Stephen de Redness was on the

46 E101/12/37.
47 BL Add. MS 8835 ff.33, 34.
48 According to the wardrobe book, Dalton received 2s per day for the period 18 December 1302 to 30 September 1303 (287 days) and 24 December 1303 to 20 August 1304 (241 days); BL. Add. MS 8835 f.16.
Figure 5.15, Breakdown of sheet and mat personal 1 at Kingston-on-Hull, regal year 52.
(from City of Hull f.3)

Totals: 64 named individuals
100 go, sheet
98 go, mat.
Table 5.6: Details of Ralph de Dallan's possessions in Yorkshire, regnal year 132 (taken from Gesta).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th></th>
<th>Meat</th>
<th></th>
<th>Penn and Penn</th>
<th></th>
<th>Oats</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kilham town</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4s</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverley town</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbot of Helmsley</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheriff's town</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Ralph de Brandon</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>William de Bolecise</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>John de Mackham</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry de Killeford</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>William Chapman of Houlton</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicholas de Patesell merchant</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prior of Beverley</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>5s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>John de Aslaphy</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>5s 6d</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
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<tr>
<td>John de Cillerker</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prior and Canons of Beverley</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>William de Hamilton</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dean and Canons of Hamilton</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Various persons in Holderness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen de Roders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Metham</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Thornecest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men of York</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Large ed.
The account contains much detail relating to the costs of bringing the corn to Hull. For example, the wheat from Kilham was first taken to Thornholm by sea, and 8s 4d was paid for four tolls en route; it was then taken to Hull, a further 8s 4d; and finally, stored for some time in the king’s granary from where it was eventually sent north. Again though, the evidence points to a small number of wealthy landowners meeting the king’s needs; in this case, the abbot of Melsa, the priors of Guisborough and Beverley, the deacon of Howden and the five lords between them supplied 35% of the wheat Dalton purchased and 66% of all the oats. As far as prices are concerned, the variations in the price of wheat are interesting, the impression being that larger amounts secured a higher price per quarter; for the oats, if we exclude the ‘large’ oats, it is interesting to note that the price secured for the oats supplied by Droxford’s orders was 2d higher per quarter than the rest. There is other evidence of royal officials getting a better price. The sheriff of Essex and Hertford purchased 505q of wheat; 275q at 4s 6d or 5s a quarter, and 230q which came from John de Sandale, at 6s a quarter.

Lastly, only a brief account survives concerning the grain from Ravenser. The officials involved here, Roger Maletak, Richard Trunk and Richard de Doncaster were collectors of Tallage.

49 Can Redness have been bailiff of some of Droxford’s lands?
50 Of the five lords, Thomas de Metham was one of the commissioners of array for the East Riding (CPR 1301-7 132); there was a William de Hamleton who had his horse valued on 4 March 1303 (E101/612/9; no price was noted); he was one of the chancery officials and in fact became chancellor in 1305. Whether he is one and the same as the William de Hamleton here cannot be established; there is no indication that the other three lords either sent any service or were present at any stage during the campaign themselves.
51 In his defence, he also sold 130q 5bu of oats from land in Tey (Great, Little or Marks) and Winbish (Wickham Bishops?) at the same price as the sheriff obtained from other sources.
This was not the only occasion where officials were ‘commandeered’ to organise another task; the collectors of the New Custom at Hartlepool were also charged with purchasing grain. Usually at county level, the sheriff was responsible, and at town level, mayors and bailiffs. It is not known when the three collectors were approached to carry out the purchases, but they bought 118qu of wheat and 104qu of malt; the cost came to £44 15s. £7 9s 41/2d was then spent on all the expenses involved in sending the grain to Perth; the two ships were La Mary of Ravenser and La Joyland of Skotmouth (?), the former taking all the wheat and arriving on 11 February 1304, the latter taking all the malt and arriving on 21 February.

While most of the records deal primarily with victuals going to the army in the eastern part of Scotland, supplies were also required for the smaller forces in the west as well as the garrisons (such as Ayr, Lochmaben and Dumfries). The responsibility for this task fell to James de Dalilegh, and his extensive account survives covering the whole of this campaign.

Virtually all of the victuals he received came from Ireland; in regnal year 31, thirteen ships were engaged, in regnal year

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52 Examples from the wardrobe book include the mayor and bailiffs of Newcastle and Lynn; the mayor and community of Grimsby; and the bailiffs of Scarborough, Barton-upon-Humber and Holderness.

53 E101/11/30 mm.1,2,3.

54 E101/11/19.

55 In regnal year 31, 505qu of wheat, 509qu of oats and 17 casks of wine; in the following regnal year, 649qu of wheat, 564qu of oats, 203qu of beans and peas, 314qu of malt and 62 casks of wine; ibid ff.6v, 7, 10v, 11.

56 Most of the ships are not named, and it is possible, due to the layout of the account, that a ship could have been counted twice. For example, la Mariot of Drogheda took 73qu 6bu of wheat as well as 5 casks of wine, but appears twice in the records. Of the three ships named, one did not originally come from Ireland; la Michael of Whitehaven (Cumberland). The other two named ships were la Cog St Mary of Ross (Ireland) and St Crucis of Kemeys; ibid ff.6v, 7.
It is interesting to note that Dalilegh had large amounts of grain and wine remaining from regnal year 30; at the end of regnal year 32, significant amounts were still remaining. Between these two regnal years, the amounts crossing from one accounting year to the next were much smaller, reflecting the increased demand for supplies. In regnal year 31, Dalilegh also accounted for 298 fish, cuttlefish (*sicca*) and salt (sent to Ayr castle); 21 qu of salt (all of which was carried forward into regnal year 32); 1,482 horseshoes (1,200 of which were sent to the king at Roxburgh); thirty-three measures (*mays*) of herrings (remaining from regnal year 30 but with 300 herrings having decayed); two old carts and five horses (which were sold); and finally, ten handmills.

The most interesting point emerges when those who were in receipt of these victuals are examined. Garrisons figured largely; in regnal year 31, of the 836⅓ qu of wheat going through Dalilegh’s hands, 725⅓ qu were sold to various garrisons; of the 818 qu of oats, 788 qu were sold to the garrisons; of the 276 qu of malt, only 60 qu were sold; and out of the 102 casks of wine, 67½ were sold. The picture is the same for the following year. The price at which the grain was sold varied; in regnal year 31, 220 qu of wheat was sold at 4s a quarter; 100 qu at 5s 6d; another 100 qu

None of these are named, and again, there is the distinct possibility of duplication; E101/11/19 ff.10v, 11.

362½ qu of wheat; 309 qu of oats; 276 qu of malt; 29 casks of wine; *ibid* ff.6v, 7.

356 qu of wheat; 91 qu of oats; 121 qu of beans and peas; 123 qu of malt; and 55 casks of wine; *ibid* ff.10v, 11.

Ibid f.7v.

Ibid f.1v.

Of the 681 qu of wheat, 310 qu were sold; of the 570 qu of oats, 479 qu were sold; of the 209 qu of beans and peas, 88 qu were sold; of the 433½ qu of malt, 270 qu were sold; and 19 casks of wine were sold from the 81 going through Skinburness.
at 6s; 265 qu at 6s 8d; and 40 qu at 8s. The price of oats was likewise varied; 18d to 3s. Malt was sold at 2s 8d a quarter while the fish was sold at 4s a quarter. Bruce himself purchased two casks of wine at 6m each, but the garrisons paid less for their wine; between 34s 8d and 60s (4l/2m).

In regnal year 31, the rest of the issues were made to magnates; those named are John de Hudleston, keeper of the marches of Annandale and Galloway; John de Wigtown, knight in Hudleston's retinue; Patrick, earl of Dunbar, keeper of the county and castle of Ayr; Hugh de St. Philibert, knight with Aymer de Valence; John de Cromwell; John de Mules, knight with Hudleston; Hugh de Multon, knight; Simon de Lindsey, in Hudleston's retinue; John de Kirkby; Richard le Boun, knight in Botetourt's retinue; and Robert de Clifford. Matilda, Robert de Clifford's wife, received two casks of wine, and the abbot of Holm Cultram received one cask with which to celebrate mass. There is no indication that any of these victuals found their way to the Irish forces operating in these western parts of Scotland. The lack of victuals and the consequent effect on these troops has already been remarked upon, but Dalilegh's account gives no specific indication as to why this

63 110 qu at 3s a quarter; 216 qu at 2s 6d; 180 qu at 2s; 80 qu at 20d; and 120 qu at 18d; E101/11/19 f.1v.
64 20 qu of fish was actually sold.
65 8 1/2 casks were sold at 34s 8d each; 12 at 46s 8d (3l/2m) each; 22 at 50s each; 15 at 53s 4d (4m) each; and 8 at 60s (4l/2m) each; ibid f.1v.
66 He received 11 qu of wheat, 20 qu of oats and two casks of wine.
67 He received 4 qu of wheat and one cask of wine.
68 He received 59 qu of wheat, 4 qu of oats and 96 qu of malt.
69 He was in receipt of 10 qu of wheat and a cask of wine.
70 All receiving one cask of wine.
71 Each receiving three casks of wine.
72 Ibid f.7. 27 qu of wheat was noted as lost or decayed in this regnal year; in regnal year 32, 15 qu of wheat and 40 l/2 qu of malt fell into this category.
situation arose; the best suggestion that can be advanced is that with the resources available to him, the receiver had to deal with what were regarded as the priority needs first (the garrisons and the English troops), and that concern for the needs of the Irishmen was low down his list.

The level of expenses involved in sending the corn to Scotland was dependent on a variety of factors; the wider the dispersal of the purchases made, the more it would cost to centralise them at the port, or ports, of loading; the number of carts and boats necessarily employed; once at the port, some or all of the grain would have to be stored in a granary until either all the corn had been assembled or until a ship could be hired; then of course, the costs of fitting out the ship and conducting any repairs (dunnage) had to be undertaken; finally, freightage charges based on the destination and amount of corn would have to be paid. A few examples will illustrate these costs.

The wheat from Newcastle cost £24; 9s was spent on dunnage; £4 on all aspects of loading and freightage; and 6s was spent on wages for one man guarding the wheat for twenty-four days. The sheriff of Southampton used three ports to assemble his grain; he spent £625 on victuals, £112 on bringing them to the three ports, and £167 on seven ships to take them to Scotland. The mayor and bailiffs of Lynn had to pay for the storage of grain for six weeks after one of their ships was forced to shelter in Scarborough; the cost was 7d per week. The amount Dalton spent on carriage and other expenses in relation to the actual cost of the victuals was quite low; about 18%, reflecting not only his close proximity to Scotland but also the fact that his purchases were not widely

73 Dealt with above in Chapter 4.
74 Southampton itself, Newport (on the Isle of Wight) and Emery (on the Beaulieu River).
By contrast, the sheriff of Northamptonshire spent 29% of his account in the operation to take the victuals he had purchased north; this probably reflecting his landlocked situation as well as the greater distance to Scotland.

Grain was not the only foodstuff purchased for the army and the household. For example, Oysel also bought 259 qu of salt (at 4s a quarter), 100 cattle carcasses (8s apiece), 70 bacon (3s 6d each), 700 sheep (presumably carcasses, 12d each), eighteen loads of herrings (at 56s 8d a load), 19,996 hardfish (100s per 1,000), and 1,010 gallons of honey (6d a gallon). In the previous regnal year, he had also provided Bromsgrove with 121 1/2 qu of salt. In that year, Bromsgrove had purchased four sheep carcasses and 380 salmon; he also received 168 bacon from the sheriff of Yorkshire, thirty and a half from the sheriff of Warwick and Leicester, and 1841/2 purveyed from Roxburgh. Sixty bacon and forty-three cattle were also purchased by indenture. The keeper of the prince's wardrobe made several purchases from London; 164 bacon (3s 8d each); at least ten loads of herrings (60s per load); 1,000 stockfish (costing £40 10s altogether); six barrels of sturgeon (£8 16s 2d altogether); 8 qu 6 bu of white fish and 9 qu of salt to go in the casks to keep the fish fresh (altogether, something in the region of £4 spent); and four dozen lampreys (18s per dozen).

At the beginning of the campaign, the sheriff of Cumberland sent twenty wagons (drawn by 124 oxen) loaded with victuals and a further fifty oxen and 120 sheep. In early spring of 1304, a letter, probably sent by Droxford, begged the unknown recipient to purchase as much fish as possible, to salt them and then send them.

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75 £384 on victuals, but only £85 on everything else.
76 BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.27v-28v; E101/11/13.
77 E101/10/28.
78 This particular operation cost £80; CDS ii 1439.
to Bromsgrove, who would then send them to St. Andrews for the period of Lent. On 10 April 1304, the sheriff of Fife was ordered to purvey eighty oxen, forty swine and 100 sheep for the household; he seems not to have carried out the instructions judging by the wardrobe book. However, the sheriffs of Lancashire, Westmoreland, Cumberland and Northumberland all sent oxen, cows, sheep and pigs; much of this livestock was delivered during the siege of Stirling.

Two detailed accounts of purchases other than grain survive; E101/11/21 m.61 is a list of cattle purchased in the county of Edinburgh in regnal year 31. Altogether, there were sixteen oxen and twenty-four cows bought from thirty-four individuals and the men of Pemboby (?). The prices for cows ranged from 43s to 5s; for oxen, it was 5s to 6s 8d. These prices are less than those in Holderness, but quality is the unassessable factor making these sort of comparisons tricky. There is no indication as to who conducted these purchases or at what time of the year they occurred. But it does show that the crown was not averse to receiving its supplies from Scotsmen, though this appears to be on an occasional basis rather than a systematic one.

The other detailed account concerns purchases of bacon and salmon made by Master John de Weston and Robert Heroun at Berwick. The details are set out in Figure 5.17. The terms *baconus* and *porcus* are both used, but there does not seem to be an obvious difference between the two definitions. Only one purchase is

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79. *Porpoise and lampreys were mentioned by name; CDS ii 1458.
80. *CDS ii 1503.
81. Westmoreland sent 35 cows and 180 sheep to Stirling in June (two horse and four foot acted as herders); Cumberland sent 12 oxen and cows to Stirling in the same month (four horse and two foot acted as herders); Lancashire sent 178 oxen and cows (eight boys were the herders); and Northumberland sent 47 oxen, 46 sheep and 12 pigs to Stirling in June; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.10v, 11, 18v.
Figure 5.13: Breakdown of the unit of price purchased by other sales clerks and Robert Harris.

(Stolen from C.N.N. in 1.)

Note: Two will be the same purchased at 20 and 30, each.

[Diagram showing price breakdown with labels and bars for different price points.]
noted as being a wild boar (*senglarius*), and cost 30s. There is another purchase of 23s which must also have been a wild boar in view of its price. There are sixty individuals contributing; six of them were women.  

The variation, as can be seen, was 4d to 6s each, but clearly the majority were around the 2 and 3s mark. Several individuals sold more than just one.  

219 salmon were also bought from four individuals, one of whom, Ralph de Holm, had also sold five *porcus*. John de Rotheby, chaplain, accounted for eighty salmon, though his were only worth 12d each; Holm's sixty-five sold for 3s each.  

It has already been seen that the levels of grain requested as purveyance from the sheriffs were reduced for the latter half of the campaign; but it is also clear that other sources were tapped, most notably towns. What can the economic impact have been? 'Purveyance was often arbitrary and indiscriminate, and seems to have fallen especially heavily on the poor and defenseless'.  

Purveyance was certainly unpopular, but the burden did not always fall on the poorer elements of society. 'We can frequently say how much a particular man lost in prises; we cannot say what proportion of his total produce this constituted'. This is borne out in the evidence; we have been able to determine numbers affected by the purveyance, what they sold, and what the price they received was, but ultimately, we cannot say how they were actually affected. Tentatively, the evidence drawn from Lincolnshire points to a network operating, which by implication...  

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82 One of which is only recorded as the wife of Reginald de Danham.  
83 Three sold five; one sold four and a half; seven sold four; seven sold three; fourteen sold two.  
would not entail detriment to those involved. The prices for
grain paid by various officials do appear to have reflected market
conditions; there is no evidence of a crown imposed pricing level.
Table 5.18 draws on the wardrobe book for regnal year 32 and the
accounts of Bromsgrove and the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset for
regnal year 31 to give an indication of prices paid by the crown.
The tendency does seem to be that the further north you went, the
higher the price was. It also shows little deviation from average
price levels.\(^{86}\) The loss of livestock could be more harmful than
the loss of grain,\(^{87}\) but the evidence for this campaign cannot add
any new dimension to the argument; the purchase of cattle in the
sherifffdom of Edinburgh could possibly have been a forced
imposition by crown officials, but this is pure conjecture.
Ultimately, the numbers involved are perhaps the most revealing;
together with the estimates of acreages covered,\(^{88}\) they suggest
that it was the wealthier ranks of society who were called upon to
provide for the royal expedition.

Providing victuals may have been the primary task involved in
supporting the army, but the necessity for arms and other
munitions was also an important area. Bromsgrove's account for
regnal year 31 clearly shows this range; for construction
purposes, he purchased such items as 7,000 nails, 80qu of coal, 14
ropes, 490 estland boards, and 800 spikings. The sheriff of
Lincoln supplied two springalds with 307 quarrels, while the
sheriff of Essex and Hertford supplied another two with 412
quarrels, and a further 1,983 quarrels for these springalds were
sent from London. The sheriff of Durham provided sixteen two foot

\(^{86}\) D L Farmer 'Some grain price movements in Thirteenth century
England' \textit{EcHR} Second series 10(1957-8) 212.

\(^{87}\) Maddicott \textit{The English Peasantry} 31.

\(^{88}\) \textit{Ibid.}
Table 6.18. Cost of grain, 1583-6.

Note: where there are two or more prices per quarter, the highest and lowest have been given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region &amp; Year</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Malt</th>
<th>Oats</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tr>
<td>Royal year 31</td>
<td>6s 2d</td>
<td>5s</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>4s 1d</td>
<td>6d (Barley)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>6s 9d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal year 32</td>
<td>2s 4d</td>
<td>2s 6d</td>
<td>3s 4d</td>
<td>4s</td>
<td>3s 6d (Barley)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isle of Wight</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3s 4d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Essex &amp; Westmorland</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>2s 6d</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Suffolk &amp; Norfolk</td>
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<td>2s</td>
<td>2s 6d</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>2s 6d</td>
<td>3s 4d</td>
<td>4s</td>
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<td>3s 6d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bardo &amp; Upper Humber</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>5s 6d</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yorkshire (near by Ralph de Balthe)</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>4s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holderness</td>
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<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>2s 6d</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ravensea</td>
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<td>3s 6d</td>
<td>4s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4s</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartlepool</td>
<td>5s</td>
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<td>3s</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>6s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>6s 3d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. £10 10s 10d = permanently at Berwick.
2. £10 5s 6d.
crossbows (and 10,000 bolts) and sixty one foot crossbows (but only 1,000 bolts). 89 Twenty-four carts and seventy-two horses were supplied by the sheriffs of York, Warwick, Leicester and Durham. 90 Surviving indentures of receipt show that further carts and horses came from Lincoln and Northumberland and that Durham, Leicester and York also sent more. 91 Unspecified work at Dunfermline necessitated the purchase and delivery of forty-seven loads of coal and tools for masons and diggers. 92

However, most of the evidence that survives relates to the task of sending arms for the siege of Stirling. The weeks before the siege began (22 April 1304) saw much activity, primarily the gathering of various siege engines (an aspect which will be dealt with in the next chapter). On 30 March, the constables of Edinburgh and Berwick were ordered to send equipment for the forthcoming siege. 93 However, it seems that it was not until the siege was a month old that new orders began to go out for further arms; on 20 May, the sheriffs of London, York, Lincoln, Nottingham, Derby and the constable of the Tower of London were ordered to send all crossbows, quarrels, bows and arrows 'exposed for sale'. 94 The sheriffs of London sent eighty-five crossbows (2s 2d each), eighty-seven bows (8d each), thirty-three bows (9d each) and 200 quivers of arrows (7d each). The journey from London took sixteen days, Stirling being reached sometime in June; the arms together cost £19 3s 7d while all the expenses involved in transporting them came to £7 13s 5d. Three carts were used, and

89 Two foot and one foot crossbows refer not to the length but to the number of feet necessary to reload them.
90 E101/10/28.
91 E101/10/27.
92 BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.7v, 18.
93 SCI 63/42 (i), (ii).
94 CCR 1302-7 140; E101/12/5; E101/568/19 m.4.
four boxes and an empty cask were purchased to store the arms for the journey. The sheriff of Lincoln also purchased thirty-six crossbows (sixteen at 3s 4d each, twelve at 2s 6d each, and eight at 2s each); 1,200 quarrels (3s 6d for each 100); 286 bows (140 at 12d each, 100 at 8d each, forty-six at 6d each); and 100 dozen arrows (51/2d per dozen). Together, these cost £20 16s 10d, but the expenses for the journey came to £6 17s 2d. A breakdown of the costs incurred survives; twenty separate items are recorded; for example, one of the carts cost 20s and the two horses 32s 8d; rope and cloth was purchased to cover the cart and to act as padding, costing 3s; expenses for the twenty-four days for one clerk came to 24s; two carters and four horses were likewise employed with their own carts (various related items coming to around 30s); and each horse received 2d a day expenses, the same as each of the carters. The journey took around twelve days and Stirling was reached on 21 June. Considering that the writs for arms went out from Stirling on 20 May, the sheriffs of both London and Lincoln could only have had just over a week to purchase the requirements and make the necessary arrangements to send them north, a clear indication of the priority attached to the crown's request.

The sheriff of Newcastle, by virtue of his proximity to the scene of operations, had longer to carry out his instructions. In his case, it would appear that he was unable to lay his hands on ready made arms, and thus had to pay various men to make the crossbows, bows, bolts and arrows. His account survives and

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95 E101/12/5; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.8v.
96 E101/568/19 m.1; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.8v.
97 E101/618/19 m.5.
98 Ten days after the feast of St. Barnabas as stated in the memorandum E101/568/19 m.1.
again, it presents a fascinating insight into the number of men
touched by crown demands. Because of its nature, part of this
document deserves to be detailed.

John Wallais made ten crossbows (28.8d each) and twenty-three
bows (8d each); Robert de Talkari made six crossbows (25d each)
and twelve bows (7d each); Roger Bower made ten crossbows (2s
each) and twelve bows (6d each); Hugh Bower (brother to Roger?)
made three crossbows (2s each) and twelve bows (8d each); Roger
Fletcher made eight sheafs of bows; Eymer Fletcher (brother to
Roger?) made another eight; William de Oseward made five sheaves;
and Roger and Eymer made three more between them (all at 8d a
sheaf); 501 staves for arrows were made by Emerico Bower, John de
Osewich, Richard Fletcher of Gateshead, and William de Oseward (2s
1d altogether); John de Oseward provided 360 feathers for 3d; and
398 goosewings were provided by Thomas Cook, Henry Tarter and
Roger Bower (altogether 2s 1d). The usual expenses were involved
in carting the finished products to Stirling; Robert Sorais was
paid 9d for twelve days conducting the items to Stirling,
presumably six days each way; five boys with five horses were paid
for only eight days (20s) as were Henry, Roger and John de Oseward
and Thomas de Hog (4d a day) and William de Oseward and Michael
Garcoi St. Emericia (2d a day). The total came to £4 3s 6d
(compared to £5 19s 3d for the arms). The sheriff had managed to
send thirty-one crossbows in June which were received in the
following month, but at 4s each, the cost was a high one.

A further wardrobe entry shows that Gilbert de Bromley, clerk,

99 These figures taken from E101/12/12 differ from those in the
wardrobe book BL. Add. MS 8835 f.9v. See also CDS ii 1589, where
some of the figures again differ.
100 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.18v; costs for taking these crossbows north
was based on five days going and returning; however, since carts
are not mentioned, the three horses used presumably carried the
crossbows and this may explain the much shorter journey time.
was instructed to make arrows; he purchased staves and pennons (3s 3d) and paid Thomas Fletcher of Newcastle with three associates (3d a day) and two pages (2d a day) for forty-four days (8 June to 21 July). Presumably, they were working in or around Stirling. The royal clerk also purchased thirty-four bolts for crossbows at a cost of 33s. 101

Not surprisingly, Bromsgrove was heavily involved in the task of providing arms. As early as 3 April, a matter of days after Edward's formal decision to besiege Stirling, the receiver sent 'lead, iron, crossbows and crossbow bolts' north. 102 On 24 May, he sent twenty-four crossbows (four of which were two foot ones), twenty-four baldricus (belts for bending crossbows), 6,050 quarrels for two foot crossbows and 18,000 quarrels for one foot crossbows. All the quarrels were packed in nine coffers. 103 On 3 July, the king was still demanding arms; Bromsgrove was 'to send with the utmost haste to Stirling, 500 [crossbow] quarrels...and other necessaries for crossbows as the bearer will instruct him more fully'. 104 Bromsgrove did indeed respond quickly; on 8 July, '60 sheaves of steel, each containing 30 pieces,...65lbs tow for bowstrings, 10lbs of bow strings, 10lbs glue for crossbows, 56lbs horsehair for springalds in 2 canvas sacks; and in 4 baskets 400 quarrels for crossbows 'ad turn', 950 for crossbows of 2 feet' were received at Stirling. 105

Perhaps the most interesting entries in the wardrobe book regarding arms are purchases relating to the use of Greek fire; Gerard Dorum and Jean de Lamouilly purchased sulphur for the siege

101 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.21v.
102 CDS ii 1491.
103 Ibid 1539.
104 Ibid 1556.
105 Ibid 1559.
of Brechin (3s);\textsuperscript{106} for the siege of Stirling, they bought 400 arrow heads with cotton (3s 4d), purchases made incidentally, in December 1303, four months before the siege began; in June and July 1304, Lamouilly paid the wages of five people for making Greek fire, and for bowls, sheet (luteis), sulphur, canvas and other items, the total cost coming to 47s 8d.\textsuperscript{107} Arrows were the vehicle by which the Greek fire was conveyed into the castle; on 31 March 1304, the king wrote to the treasurer and barons of the exchequer at York to send 'with haste...a horseload of cotton thread, one load of quick sulphur, and another of saltpetre, and a load of arrows well feathered and ironed...and let not this be neglected by any means'.\textsuperscript{108}

As well as the need for arms, other military materials were required. At the outset of the campaign, the prince visited Holburn to inspect the work of John de Somerset and sixty-three tent makers who made in all twenty-eight tents and pavilions.\textsuperscript{109} Banners were also important; the prince's army in 1303 had twelve standards each with the arms of St. Edmund, St. Edward and St. George as well as 800 pennons bearing the arms of St. George.\textsuperscript{110}

The final area to be examined relates to the provision of money to pay for not only the troops but also various household expenses incurred \textit{en route}. We have already seen that during the first part of the campaign, wages for both paid cavalry and

\textsuperscript{106}This entry relates to regnal year 31 and there were undoubtedly other purchases made.
\textsuperscript{107}BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.7, 21v.
\textsuperscript{108}Documents ed.Stevenson 639. The view that it was arrows tipped with Greek fire differs from that taken by Prestwich; he suggests 'earthenware pots which could be hurled into the castle'; Edward I 501.
\textsuperscript{109}Johnstone \textit{Edward of Carnarvon} 87.
\textsuperscript{110}Burton \textit{Politics, Propaganda and Public opinion} 340-1.
infantry was irregular and incomplete. For the later stages, which most of the evidence relates to, the situation was better, perhaps partly because the army did not travel great distances but remained for long periods of time at various places; chiefly Dunfermline, for the winter; St Andrews, for the parliament; and Stirling, for the siege. According to the wardrobe book, 2,000m came across the border in November 1303; 200m in December; 5,000m in January and February 1304; a further 2,000m and £2,000 in February; £4,000 in April; and 2,500m in June. Three brief records survive noting the deficiencies of the coin delivered into the wardrobe; the £4,000 received at Stirling on 24 April 1304, carried in fifty sacks, was short by 42s 8d; out of the eleven sacks holding the 2,500m received on 7 June, there was a shortfall of 25s; finally, the six sacks holding 2,000m, delivered by John de Kime on 7 July, were short by 39s 1d. The account of the expenses involved in transporting the £4,000 from York to Cambuskenneth in April survives, and provides much detail on the process, precautions and routes involved. The total cost came to £7 18s 8d. Five carts were used, six carters, twelve archers and two clerks were employed. They left York on Monday 13 April and reached Easingwold; on Tuesday, they reached Darlington; on Wednesday, Chester-le-Street; on Thursday, Morpeth; on Friday, Bamburgh; on Saturday, Berwick; on Sunday, Dunbar; on Monday, In 1303, £666 13s 4d was transferred by the Bellardi company from London to Durham from where it was taken further north by the cofferer of the wardrobe.

111 In 1303, £666 13s 4d was transferred by the Bellardi company from London to Durham from where it was taken further north by the cofferer of the wardrobe.
112 BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.7-9, 23v.
113 E101/12/31.
114 E101/12/30.
115 E101/624/6.
116 E101/12/31. In the wardrobe book, £6 18s 8d has been recorded, but this excludes the 20s wages incurred by John le Convers and William de Gilling, which were added to the total in the separate account.
Edinburgh; on Tuesday, Linlithgow; and on Wednesday 22 April, the money reached Blakeness from where it went by barge to Stirling. Eight barrels had been purchased to store the fifty sacks. All the carters and guards received 2d a day; the two clerks, a shilling a day; and on Wednesday 15 April, six mounted squires were also employed just for the one day at a shilling each. The route that day was Chester-le-Street to Morpeth, perhaps regarded as the most dangerous part of the journey in view of the presence of the squires.

A brief account of money received and disbursed by Richard de Havering at the opening of the campaign provides an insight into the mechanics of collection and disbursment. On 21 May 1303, he received 1,000m from the treasurer and chamberlains of the exchequer at York. The previous day, he had received 100m from the abbot and convent of the Virgin Mary, also at York, as part of the papal tenth granted to Edward. On 23 May, he received a further 110m, this time from the abbot and convent of Newminster at Bothal (near Morpeth). On the same day, he had received 36m from the men of Newcastle (in part payment for exemption from supplying men-at-arms and foot?). On 24 May, at Roxburgh, Havering handed over £797 5s 1d to the wardrobe. Two days previously, while at Newcastle, John de Cromwell's chaplain, Richard de Rotherham, had received 100s for his lord's wages; William de Reale had received a 20s prest, also for wages; and John de Sulleye, one of the king's chamberlains, received a prest of 100s. Havering's expenses, including taking the money to Roxburgh, came to £15 14s 11d. This account details some of the

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117 One barrel held £500; Prestwich 'The Crown and the Currency' 57. £1,000 could represent some 240,000 coins; ibid 58.
118 E101/10/24.
119 Prestwich Edward I 532.
crown's financial sources and how the monies, in this case £824, were spent. 'Clerical taxation provided Edward with much needed funds in the last six years of his reign', and this is reflected in Havering's account, in the many letters sent out to hasten the process of raising the money and in the various journeys undertaken by Droxford.

Again, the task of fulfilling the king's aspirations fell on the various officers of the crown, both in the localities and at the centre. There were problems in 1303 in securing the requisite amounts of grain, but they were not insurmountable, and several sources were used. Despite the victualling measures taken, difficulties were still encountered. In the autumn of 1303, as the army was travelling from Brechin, supplies ran short and the merchants at Aberdeen were called upon. Over the winter of 1303-4, Bedwin was sent to Berwick to hasten supplies. Arms and money, while taking up less time and energy in proportion to the task of supplying victuals, were no less important, especially once the siege of Stirling began to take weeks rather than the days that had been hoped for. The impact of the crown's intervention in securing grain is difficult to establish. From the limited evidence, the numbers involved were small, and it was only a few key men, religious and secular, who contributed the bulk of the requirements. But there were still problems; the

120 Prestwich War, Politics 532.
121 CCR 1302-7 62-3, 113; CPR 1301-7 162-3; CFR 1272-1307 478.
122 He was absent for much of the winter of 1303-4 dealing personally with the task of getting the proceeds of the papal tenth to the army; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.14. For the seventy-seven days he was absent, (20 November, and probably earlier, to 4 February) he received one pound a day. The energy of the keeper of the wardrobe has previously been remarked upon; Prestwich War, Politics 133-4.
123 Prestwich Edward I 499.
124 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.7. He went on to Newcastle and Durham on other matters of the king's business.
sheriff of Norfolk was instructed to bring those who had resisted the purveyors in Lynn before the exchequer. The withdrawal of large amounts of grain from the market place would probably have created localised problems. However, since large numbers of magnates were present for many months on this campaign, with most of their households, the grain from their estates would no doubt have found its way onto the market, and this may have been some compensation. The scope of the material does not allow for more than tentative conclusions to be drawn, but taking the logistical operation as a whole, the crown servants again emerge as one of the keys to the success of the campaign.

125 Burton 'Politics, Propaganda and Public opinion' 358.
CHAPTER 6. Skilled Labour

Edward's military successes throughout his reign were attributable as much to the skilled labour forces he assembled as to the armies themselves. The classic example of this is the use of woodcutters during the first two Welsh wars to literally cut roads through the forests of Gwyendd, thus creating lines of communication and reducing the risk of ambushes. Outside the campaigns, the king also used skilled workmen, most notably to build the chain of magnificent castles in North Wales.

But the situation in Wales was rather different from that in Scotland, and the crown's finances were under greater pressure. Yet before, during and after the campaign, masons, carpenters, smiths, diggers and other skilled men (and women) were employed on a variety of projects. The building and reassembling of the pre-fabricated bridge to cross the Forth was perhaps the key to the whole campaign. There was a precedent in the bridge constructed across the Menai straits, but that was not a pre-fabricated one. The account of its construction still

1In August 1277, 1,800 axemen were being paid to cut a road from Chester to Rhuddlan; Prestwich War, Politics 111.
survives and again provides fascinating detail. The bridge was not the only construction undertaken. Several siege engines were employed during the three month siege of Stirling and several documents exist regarding the cost of making them, transporting them and supplying ammunition for them. Throughout the campaign, several skilled men travelled with the army. Numbers over the fourteen months can and have been worked out using the various pay accounts and again, many interesting features emerge. Finally, a brief account survives of work carried out on Stirling castle after the end of the siege.

At the beginning of 1303, Master Richard, the engineer from Chester, visited the king at Windsor. Having established Edward’s requirements, he went back to Chester, collected various fellow carpenters and then travelled to Lynn. Work began on the bridge on 3 February and by 22 May, it was ready to be loaded onto the assembled ships. There were actually three bridges; major pons, medius pons and minor pons. The largest bridge was probably for carts, the two smaller bridges for foot. The account of the operation reveals the extent of materials purchased and the number of officials and traders involved. John de Nottingham, clerk to the sheriff of Lincoln, purchased several beams at Boston; Master John le Belqet of Lynn bought 220 pounds of hardwood; Robert Heward, sheriff of Norfolk, supplied thousands of nails, hodnails

\[2\] E101/11/4; CDS ii 1375; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.22-23v. E101/676/31 is a list of most of the purchases made for the bridge. See also KdW i 416-7; Freeman ‘Wall-breakers and river-bridgers’ 10-12.

\[3\] E101/11/7; E101/579/6 is the expenses of constructing a springald.

\[4\] E101/12/9 and several entries in CDS ii, iv and v.

\[5\] E101/12/28 and again, several entries in CDS ii, iv and v.

\[6\] E101/11/15; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.18v; 75-98.

\[7\] E101/12/14; the document has been torn on the right hand edge obliterating some of the details.
and spikings, and seventeen chaldrons of sea coal; William Pace
and William le Getour bought 240 different ropes from various
merchants of Lynn and Roughton; Simon Kyne, sheriff of York,
purchased several beams, boards and joists; and John Gubaud,
sheriff of Lincoln, also purchased several items of timber.

But most of the purchases, especially those of timber, were
made in Norfolk. The bridge cost £940 altogether, and £280 of
that was spent by the sheriff of Norfolk on timber, anchors and
cables; indeed, a separate account of these purchases was made. Table 6.1 lays out the details. In addition to the tabulated
information, thirty anchors and forty-five cables were also bought
from fifty-four men and one woman. The timber dealers and other
traders of Lynn were clearly the main sources for purchases for
the bridge, but timber and other items were obtained from further
afield.

Several carpenters and smiths were employed; throughout the
period, Master Richard de Chester and Master Henry de Ryhul,
sub-master, were present. Twenty-three carpenters and one sawyer
from Chester and Norfolk were also present for all the 110 days it

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8 John de Shipton of York sold 12 joists (12d each); various men of
York sold 91 alder beams (31/2d each); Robert de Midelton of
Kingston sold 200 melning boards (25s per 100); Alan le Feryman of
Cawood sold 14 joists (9d each), 6 great joists (2s 9d each) and
200 Wostr' boards (25s per 100); five ships were charged with
transporting these supplies to Lynn.

9 John le Fen of Boston sold 40 great beams (an average of 7s 4.4d
each); Stephen de Portenay sold 55 joists (13.1d each); Henry de
Talington sold 15 alder beams and 5 oak beams (6d each); and 600
estland boards were purchased in Wainfleet (19.4s per 100).

10 E101/676/31.

11 20 long anchors were purchased (one 5 foot (5s); one 6 foot (6s);
three 61/2foot (6s to 9s); eight 7 foot (6s to 11s); and seven 8
foot (10s to 18s)); ten ordinary anchors (4s to 10s); thirty-two
long cables (three 40 fathoms (4s to 10s); seventeen 50 fathoms
(3s to 13s 4d); one 54 fathom (11s); two 55 fathoms (10s each);
and four 60 fathoms (8s to 16s)); two Harropes 30 fathoms (20d
each); and eleven ordinary cables (5s to 18s). The one woman,
Alice Gerveys, sold a cable costing 62 8d.
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<th>S. Price</th>
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<th>S. Num</th>
<th>Total Num</th>
<th>M. Price per 100</th>
<th>S. Price per 100</th>
<th>Total Price per 100</th>
<th>M. Length</th>
<th>S. Length</th>
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<th>M. Price per 100 ft</th>
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Figure 6.2 graphically maps out the numbers paid. The reason for the break early in April cannot be established. Once the bridge was finished, thirty carpenters and four smiths as well as Masters Richard de Chester, Henry de Ryhul and Walter de Barton (who had been in charge of all the smiths) were appointed to accompany the parts and reassemble them across the Forth. Curiously, the numbers and dates noted in the account for the bridge do not tally with those in the infantry pay rolls, where payments to the men reconstructing the bridge are noted. Only twenty-six carpenters are named, but there are seven smiths with two servants; payment began on 8 June for one week; then only fifteen carpenters and all but one of the smiths continued at crown wages for a further period of ten days. After 24 June, the carpenters begin to depart and by the end of July, only six remained in the field; but the smiths apparently continued to serve until the middle of November. The bridge itself remained in position until August and was then taken to Berwick. In December, five ships took the maior pons and the brattice of the medius pons to Blakeness, but these part of the bridge were returned to Berwick by the end of the year; 'what use was made of the bridge at Blakeness does not appear'. All the carpenters and smiths have been named, and this shows that several of them came from Norfolk. There are a couple of carpenters whose names suggest they came from the Marches of

12 E101/11/15 m.31.
13 Ibid mm.25-29.
14 KW i 417.
15 Adam and Stephen de Walsoken (smiths); John de Scottow, Roger de Lynn, Ralph de Gressenhall, Roger de Walsingham, Henry de Gayton, William de Winch, Hugh de Hindringham, John de Norwich and John de Aldreford (carpenters).
Wales. Interestingly, one carpenter, William Wade, came to work in Scotland in December 1303 and there is a William Wade amongst the carpenters who came with the bridge; possibly one and the same.

While the main work was done at Lynn on the bridge, two springalds were also constructed at Norwich under the charge of Master John de Yarmouth, engineer, for the two bretasches of the bridge; they were then brought to Lynn. As far as wages go, Master Richard de Chester earned 18d a day for his efforts; Master Henry de Ryhul, 12d a day; most of the carpenters were on a rate of 4d a day, but there were some on 2d and 3d; Master John de Yarmouth only earned 6d a day; Master Walter de Barton, smith, was paid 8d a day, while most of the other smiths received wages of between 2d and 4d a day.

It has already been seen how some of the carpenters and smiths who travelled north with the bridge stayed for various periods of time with the army. Significant but small numbers of skilled workmen were employed throughout the campaign and were clearly regarded as an integral part of the military operation. At the council meeting held at Lenton early in April 1303, apart from establishing the numbers of infantry needed, forty masons, forty carpenters and 200 diggers were also noted as being required from the counties of York and Northumberland; however, there are no letters Close or Patent, suggesting that these resolutions were not implemented. On 22 April, the sheriff of Nottingham and the steward of Sherwood forest were commanded to select and send 120

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16 Robert de Hadley and William de Barewood, both near Hereford; likewise with Master Henry de Ryhul (Ryall)?.
17 E101/11/15 m.24.
18 E101/11/11; CDS ii 1356. See Chapter 3 for a brief discussion of this point.
woodmen to reach Roxburgh by 12 May.  

The eventual pay records do not always make clear where the carpenters, masons, and diggers came from, but as can be seen from Figures 6.3 and 6.4, the numbers did not match the crown’s expectations. By the end of the first week in June, there were thirty-seven masons, twenty-six carpenters and only nine diggers. Both graphs pick up the arrival of the carpenters and smiths from Lynn; for the rest of the summer and into the autumn, numbers fell slowly but steadily, with the briefest of rises for the siege of Brechin in early August. With the army almost constantly on the move for three months after leaving Perth, there was not a great need for more than a small contingent of these skilled workers. Diggers and woodcutters had certainly been targeted for recruitment, but with apparently no further effort expended to secure such labour, the crown perhaps had decided they were not crucial to the enterprise. The siege of Brechin lasted a matter of days and any subsequent sieges did not require additional manpower, a reflection perhaps of the state of the opposition as well as of the king’s military strategy.

However, once Edward had settled down at Dunfermline, there was a sharp increase in the numbers of carpenters employed on various tasks associated with building accommodation for the household. The king 'appears to have found an unfortified town, so he decided to surround it by a ditch surmounted, no doubt, by a

19 They were to be paid royal wages once they reached Blyth; CPR 1301-7 136; CCR 1302-7 324; CDS ii 1355; SCI 29/27.

20 For diagrammatic reasons, in Figure 6.4 quarrymen have been included with the masons; the handful employed working with lead have been included with the smiths; all those involved in making ropes and working leather have been put with the carpenters; and the few plasterers have been put with the diggers.

21 E101/11/15 m.32.
Figure 6.3. Skilled workers employed by the Crown, May 1941 to July 1944.
(Chosen from R101/15 and Ul. 9543/1945 ff. 75-80.)
On 10 November, Edward commanded the sheriff of Edinburgh to send sixty carpenters and 200 ditchers with their tools and interestingly, to send them by sea to Dunfermline by 20 November. Eleven days later, Edward again wrote to the sheriff stating that if there was no master carpenter with him, then he should just send as many carpenters as possible 'in his bailiwick and about Haddington', with their tools, provide them with food, and inform the crown how many were coming. Edward was clearly annoyed; he had been 'informed that none would come unless compelled by force, for the king owed them so much for the works at Linlithgow that they would rather leave the country than work for him'. In the event, it was the sheriff of Linlithgow who sent twenty-two carpenters (sixteen reaching Dunfermline by 28 November and the remaining six by 7 December); no ditchers appear to have been sent. Forty men from Dunfermline were also found to carry out the work. This period also saw the prince settling at Perth and some masons were sent there; no doubt other workers were likewise employed there and the pay accounts make it clear that they do not cover all those who were working at Perth, so the figures for these winter months are probably higher. More problems occurred over wage arrears when some carpenters who had gone to St. Andrews to make preparations for the court's coming went on strike for three days 'because they did not have their

\[22\] KW i 417.
\[23\] CDS ii 1408.
\[24\] Ibid 1414.
\[26\] E101/11/15 m.24.
\[27\] On 11 December, a 40s gratuity was paid to the bailie and burgesses for these men; KW i 417.
wages as they wished. It was also during the winter that the scribes first began to make occasional notes of the origins of some of these units. Two masters (Adam de Glasham and Reginald the Engineer) arrived in November with twenty-seven carpenters from Berwick, and in the following month, a large contingent of forty-one carpenters arrived from Northumberland and Durham. The only smiths employed for much of the winter at the king's quarters were led by Master Geoffrey de Dunfermline; his service ended in May 1304 suggesting that his role was a static one, working while all or part of the king's court was in residence.

The low point of recruitment coincides with the parliament held at St. Andrews; at this juncture, Edward may not have been absolutely clear what his next military move would be or even if one would be needed, hence the apparent winding down of operations. But as the siege of Stirling was decided upon, and as preparations got underway, the number of workmen increased rapidly. It is at this stage in the campaign that the various skilled workers, and the siege engines they created and repaired, come into their own. It is therefore best to conduct a detailed analysis of the machines first before examining the human element of the equation.

The proper starting point is in the building of these engines of war. One account survives, dealing with the construction of a siege engine called Segrave at Berwick early in 1302. Bromsgrove was commissioned in a letter dated 1 February but it is clear

28 KW i 417.
29 See also J Harvey English Mediaeval Architects. A Biographical dictionary down to 1550 (Gloucester, 1984(1954)) 117-8.
30 E101/11/15 m. 24.
that, initially, the engine was for the benefit of the defence of Berwick itself as he was also to set about strengthening and repairing the castle. The memorandum that survives curiously has some of the carpenters and masons receiving wages from 7 January; perhaps the order was an official notification of what had been verbally conveyed previously. The two tasks, work on building the engine (and making ammunition for it), and on the stone keep, came to £80 17s 8d. Nine carpenters were employed from 7 January to 25 April; two sawyers, from 14 January to 31 March; seven smiths and a boy servant, from 14 January to 20 April (the boy and one of the smiths continued in pay for a further ten days); eight masons, from 7 January to 20 April; three quarrymen, from 2 January to 15 April; six porters for long periods of time from January to April; Thomas Plumber and William, his associate, producing lead, from 20 January to 30 April; and finally, seven porters engaged for a handful of days carting lead. Wages varied from 6d a day (received by Richard de Karll, carpenter, Thomas de Alegate, master smith and Henry de Leicester, master mason), 4d a day (wages paid to the bulk of carpenters, smiths and masons), 2d a day (for the porters and carters) to 11/2d a day (for Robert Querdelion, the boy servant to the smiths).

Purchases of various items were made from thirteen individuals; four of them were burgesses of Berwick. Timber was the primary material bought; for example, four rafters of oak for the balance arm of the siege engine (brachiis) (3d each); ten beams for joists for the tower (3s each); 490 estland boards (25s per 100); 4,000 pieces of wood were used for burning lime (1s per 1,000), and a further 950 were for the use of the two men working
with lead (550 at 1s per 100, the rest coming from a royal store). Other purchases of note included two great ropes (26s 8d each); three smaller (minor') ropes (5s each); two small (parvis) ropes (4s 4d each); two 'ordinary' ropes (one costing 16s 6d, the other, 13s); four ox skins (42d each); and 800 spikings (6d per 100). Because of the dual nature of the work, it is difficult to ascertain how much time and money was spent specifically on the engine; what we can say however, is that 'Segrave' was almost certainly a trebuchet, as the masons were employed to make petras rotundas as well as to work on the stone keep.

The only other detailed account of the construction of siege engines relates to the building of two springalds at Newcastle sometime during regnal year 31. The cost came to £8 for both, and a further £12 for 400 quarrels pennoned, iron tipped and feathered (pennis ferreis pennatis). Breaking down the cost of the two springalds shows that 77s 8d (48.5%) was spent on labour; 72s 6d (45.3%) on various purchases; and 9s 10d (6.2%) on the costs involved in bringing the timber from Bywell wood to Newburn, and then by a boat (which was purchased for the task) to Newcastle.

Four sawyers were paid for four days (at 4d a day); presumably initially to fell the required trees. Only one carpenter and his associate were employed, but they were paid in all 46s 8d; one smith was also used, at a total cost of 13s 4d. Finally, one sewer (filacione) was employed, but interestingly, instead of a set amount of wages per day, he (or she) received 8d for each rope

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32 E101/579/6; CDS ii 1398.
33 Assuming the smith was paid 4d a day, then his wages represent forty days work; on that basis, the two carpenters were receiving between them 14d a day. More likely is that the carpenters were in pay for longer than the smith.
made from the materials purchased. As regards the main material items, 24s was spent on timber from Bywell wood; forty 'iron stones' (petras ferri) (4d each); various items to make rope; two ropes for tendendra (a device for bending crossbows) (9d each); and four bows, also for tendendra (8d each). It is unclear when and where these springalds were used, but they were built at the king's command.

The last bit of evidence of the construction of siege engines is a brief paragraph in the wardrobe book; £12 2s 6d was spent in building one engine and repairing another in Edinburgh castle during February, March and April 1304; Master Thomas de Houghton was in charge, and the work was initiated at the king's behest, which sheds further light on Edward's train of thought. When this order went out, the final surrender of the Guardians was probably not settled, all of which suggests that Edward was considering a siege of Stirling castle.

Throughout this long campaign, much use was made of the many siege engines at Edward's disposal; obviously they really came into their own with the three month siege of Stirling. For the siege of Brechin, there is no surviving source revealing how many siege engines were used; however, on 3 January 1304, Thomas de Coting delivered the following engines to Bromsgrove at Berwick: the timbers of two engines which were made at Brechin; the engine Segrave; an engine called Vernay; an engine called Robinet; sixteen beams of an engine called Forster; and eighteen beams of

34 Twelve petz canab (?) (8d each); sixteen petz pili (?) (12d each); and six poleynas ermeris (?) (12d each).
35 E101/589/6 m.1.
36 See also Harvey English Mediaeval Architects 150; A J Taylor 'Thomas de Houghton: a royal carpenter of the later Thirteenth century' The Antiquaries Journal 30 (1950) 28-33.
37 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.17v.
an engine which came from Aberdeen. 38 Evidently, some of these engines had been engaged at Brechin. It has already been noted that two ships took an unspecified number of the king’s engines to Aberdeen, and that one ship took an engine on to Banff. 39

It is, however, the engines used to prosecute the siege of Stirling castle that dominate the surviving records. As soon as Edward finally decided on the siege (on or just before 21 March), orders began to flow regarding these key instruments of the king’s success. On 20 March, the constable of Edinburgh, John de Kingeston, was instructed to ensure that the engines at the castle were repaired; timber from Newbattle was to be used where necessary. 40 Seven days later, Kingeston was ordered to send all the great targes (shields or screens), which Edward felt ‘were suitable for assaulting a castle’, to be at Stirling for the king’s coming; 41 the crews of the ships that were to transport these engines from Edinburgh to Stirling were paid on 6 April; presumably the engines would have been ready for the beginning of the siege; 42 an engine called Kingeston was listed as one of those present at the end of the siege. 43 As for the engines in the keeping of Bromsgrove, they were all transferred to the care of Master Reginald the Engineer between 3 January and 6 April. 44

38 Also delivered were two great cords and two small cords for stretching the engines; two hawser; five little cords; one old cord; 784 balls of lead; and 600 round stones; Documents ed.Stevenson 630; CDS iv 1797.
40 CDS ii 1475. Master Thomas the Engineer (in other words, Thomas de Houghton) was again in charge.
41 CDS v 356.
42 CDS ii 1498, 1499.
43 E101/11/15 m.7; CDS ii 1599.
44 CDS ii 1500; in addition, all the stores originally delivered were passed on as well as purchases made at Berwick of four ropes; one long rope (of 72 fathoms); six white horse hides; 10 pieces of
Because a list of engines present at the end of the siege was made, it can be established that the two called Segrave and Robynet were used; it is also likely that one or more of the three unnamed engines were also used. Incidentally, Thomas de Coting, who had initially delivered these siege engines to Bromsgrove, was later ordered by the king to go to Berwick and bring engines, men to use them, lead, weights and rope to Stirling. While we do not know when he was given this brief, the wardrobe book records that he was engaged on the task from 14 March to 24 July, and that his expenses also included the oversight of the construction of an engine, although the location is not stated. 45

Apart from Berwick and Edinburgh, the great engine from Linlithgow was also sent for on 9 April 'with stones and other appurtenances'; it was to go by sea. 46 Fortunately, the account of the journey of this particular engine survives, and shows that it actually reached Stirling by land. 47 Twenty-one wagons were used to transport not only the engine itself, but also unspecified amounts of lead and stones; each wagon was driven by one man. The journey, covering no more than twenty miles, began on Monday 20 April and took four days. Accompanying the convoy were Master Adam de Glasham and Nicholas de Ricardeston; the latter, however, was only present for three days of the trip; his task was to carry out any necessary running repairs to the wagons, and his wages were set at the standard 4d a day. Two servants, paid 4d a day, were also with the wagons. 48 A handful of carts carried out canvas; and 124 iron stones (weighing 15lbs).

45 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.9v; he received 41/2d a day for 122 days service.
46 CDS v 363; SCI 63/43.
47 E101/12/9; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.21v.
48 Patrick Cas and Adam del Cro.
various tasks after the delivery of the engine on 23 April; two carts, for example, were employed in the carriage of stones and *pelota* (balls or pellets discharged from crossbows), a task that occupied them for ten days. These few carts that remained in service actually have names ascribed to them, presumably the place of origin. Bearing in mind the shorthand nature of the document, with several abbreviation marks, the names seem to be; Dundas; Bathket (Bathgate); Toloch; Bochan; and Leki. Finally, a further twelve wagons from the county of Edinburgh brought more stones and timber; this time, the journey took only two days (6 to 7 June).

The transport of even one engine a short distance was a major operation and the cost in this case was something in the region of £6. In the wardrobe book, there is a curious entry of 7s received by William de Felton, constable of Linlithgow, on 14 March for the carriage of an engine from there to the king. It is possible that this was another engine, a smaller one considering the cost, and the date is probably incorrect (either a clerical or transcription error).

The great engine of Inverkip was also requested along with 'timber, stones and all the other things which appertain to the engine'; however, on 21 April, five days after the original letter, Edward had to write again after 'learning that his [Robert de Leyburn, constable of the castle] bailiffs and people there are neglecting the commands of the king's officers in regard to necessaries, especially the engine and stones for the siege...whereby the siege is greatly delayed'. Leyburn was to

49 Monday 27 April to Wednesday 6 May.
50 The figures at the bottom of the roll have been corrected at least twice.
51 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.7v.
paid for seven, indicating that they were performing a day a week as part of a feudal duty. Finally, Master Patrick Morselmouth, with three associates and one woman, Matilda Scot, began work on 19 May; by the beginning of June, the roll records only three men making rope and the one woman, and they continue right up until 22 July.\(^{58}\) Interestingly, this last group appears again in pay between 11 and 18 August working under the jurisdiction of the mayor and bailiffs of Newcastle, and are named; Patrick Morselmouth (receiving 6d a day), Adam son of William 'le Ropere', Henry Bokk', Alexander Scot (all receiving 3d a day) and Matilda Scot (receiving 2l/2d a day).\(^{59}\)

Ropes and cables costing £10 were purchased by Richard Oysel from Martin de Rascemburgh, a German merchant, on the king's orders specifically for the siege.\(^{60}\) Again, this demonstrates the extent to which the crown's demands were met. Since many of the letters coming from Stirling talk of a great need and the necessity of haste with regards to all aspects of the siege, the king may not have been able to prosecute the siege as he would have wished, and this may have been a contributory cause to the failure of the military efforts to take the castle.

As Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show, large numbers of men, especially carpenters, were employed for the duration of the siege. Because of the level of detail, it is possible to establish where some of them came from. Edmund de la Mare, clerk, was sent from St. Andrews to Northumberland to bring masons, carpenters and smiths to Scotland. He managed to bring eleven masons, seventeen smiths

\(^{58}\)E101/11/15 mm.7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16.
\(^{59}\)CDS ii 1589; the wages were the same when they were at Stirling.
\(^{60}\)BL. Add. MS 8835 f.15.
and eleven carpenters in mid-April. On 28 April, Edward, 'having determined on some works where he is for the castle of Stirling', instructed Langton to 'see how many [carpenters] he can send from the county of York and the bishopric of Durham'. Between 11 and 17 June, Luke de Barry was sent to the county of Strathearn by Edward to find carpenters and bring them to Stirling to work on the engines. On 30 June, the mayor, bailiffs and sheriff of York were requested to send 'the best and strongest' forty crossbowmen and forty carpenters.

Again, it is difficult to establish from the pay accounts the level of success of some of the king's orders. At the beginning of the siege, four smiths and five carpenters are identified as coming from Roxburgh; three smiths from Kirkintilloch; three carpenters from Jedburgh; two carpenters from Bothwell; and a smith from Edinburgh. Initially, the workers from Northumberland secured by Edmund de la Mare are recorded, but because they did not remain as distinct units, it is not possible to trace the length of their stay during the siege. The recruitment efforts in Strathearn produced, according to the pay accounts, nineteen carpenters and four sawyers; they were in pay from 25 May until at least the end of the month, and quite probably longer. Quite often, the clerks record when certain workers were new, but not

61 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.18v. William de Stamfordham (about six miles north east of Corbridge) and ten masons (paid 4d a day), 18 to 23 April; William de Stathe, Robert Scraf (both 4d a day) and ten smiths (3d a day), between 19 and 23 April; a further five smiths (4d a day), between 20 and 23 April; and Master John fitz Ralph (3d a day) and ten carpenters (4d a day), between 21 and 23 April.

62 CDS ii 1524.

63 BL. Add. MS 8835 f.18v.

64 CCR 1302-7 152; CDS ii 1554; Documents ed. Stevenson 643.

65 E101/11/15 mm.12, 16.

66 Ibid mm.13,14.
always from where they came. When places of origin are given, they show that Scotsmen were not averse to working for the king. Five carpenters were noted as coming from Perth; one of the two smiths engaged in making tools is named as Richard de Linlithgow; late on in June, a certain Walter de Lanark and nine carpenters arrived; and one of the carpenters, Geoffrey de Edinburgh, under Master Stephen the Engineer, was noted as not at work for three days. However, on the face of it, only a small proportion of the skilled labour appears to have actually come from Scotland, and even then, they are from the south of the Forth, the area that had been under English influence the longest.

Because the last pay roll relating to these workers lists the engines, it is possible to work backwards and establish the numbers of carpenters working on each one. Perhaps the best engine to start with is the infamous Warwolf. It first makes an appearance by name when five master carpenters, sixty-six carpenters and four pages were employed on it between 24 May and 14 June; five master carpenters, forty-nine carpenters and four pages were working on it between 15 and 21 June; then, less one master carpenter, from 22 to 28 June; four master carpenters, thirty-four carpenters and four pages, 29 June to 2 July; then only two master carpenters, thirty-four carpenters and two pages from 3 to 12 July; and finally, less two carpenters for the period 12 to 23 July. All the carpenters, rope makers and smiths working with siege engines had wages up until 22 July (except for

67 E101/11/15 m.13.
68The other is simply described as his associate, ibid m.11.
69Ibid m.9.
70Ibid.
71Ibid mm.7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13. The four pages it seems were attached to a master.
the few who stayed on to dismantle the engines), and the fact that
those working on Warwolf were paid to 23 July is further evidence
of Edward’s wish to see the machine in action before the defenders
could surrender. Those engaged on the engine were clearly
favoured by the king; Thomas de Greenfield, the engineer in
charge, was given £40 while the workmen were given 10s in addition
to their wages. 72

However, the largest number of carpenters to be employed on a
single task were those building and maintaining the many
mantelets. Curiously, this work is only specifically noted as
getting underway in late May, more than a month after the
beginning of the siege. Presumably, the targes sent from
Edinburgh sufficed until then. By 31 May, fifty-nine carpenters
were employed on the job; by 7 June, seventy-two and one page; by
14 June, eighty-five and the page; by 21 June, seventy-six and the
page; by 28 June, eighty-one and the page; by 5 July, eighty-three
carpenters and four sawyers; by 12 July, seventy-eight carpenters,
four sawyers and the page; by 19 July, sixty-nine carpenters and
the page; and by the end of the siege (22 July), seventy-six
carpenters and the page. Quite clearly, the work entailed
consistently large numbers of carpenters for over two months.

There were ten other teams of carpenters. 73 Master Thomas de

72 Prestwich ‘Royal Patronage under Edward I’ 45.
73 E101/11/15 m.7 lists the remains of eight teams responsible for
dismantling thirteen engines; this leaves two smaller teams who
would have been in charge of an engine, but once the siege ended,
they were discharged and one of the larger teams would have taken
over responsibility for their engines.

These two smaller teams were firstly, John fitz Ralph, in the
field with ten carpenters, 20 April to 24 May; with nine
carpenters 25 May to 7 June; and thereafter (until 22 July) with
eight carpenters. The other team was headed by Hugh fitz
Bartholomew and John fitz Alan. This team is difficult to pick out
from the records; Bartholomew had replaced Eustace de Belagh, who
had led the men from Strathearn late in May, while Alan had
replaced Kesly fitz Gally in mid-June. It was not until early June
Houghton was in charge of the engine called Lincoln, and had at most, eleven carpenters and four sawyers (in the first week of July). Master Reginald the Engineer and his team were responsible for the three engines called Segrave, Robinet and le Vikere. At its peak, between 22 and 28 June, his team consisted of fourteen carpenters. Master Adam de Glasham was in charge of the engine from Linlithgow; the peak in numbers for his team occurred in late May and early June with nine carpenters and four sawyers. Master Robert de Bedford was in charge of the engine called Kingston. He initially had ten carpenters with him, and then numbers fell gradually to six.

that these two units appear to have been combined into one team, consisting at that point of eleven carpenters and four sawyers. Through the three weeks 22 June to 12 July, three carpenters joined the team and two left; from 13 to 22 July, six carpenters and two sawyers were in pay, indicating that even before the formal end of the siege, some of the teams were being wound down; E101/11/15 mm.8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14.

On 16 July, a team of ten carpenters led by Master Hugh of York appear in the pay accounts, and are paid until 27 July. These new arrivals seem strange in the face of the decline in carpenters overall; perhaps it was the Crown acting to ensure that sufficient numbers would be present, once the siege ended, to dismantle the engines; ibid mm.7, 8.

For much of the time this team was in the field (early May to 22 July), there were ten carpenters and four sawyers.

For most of the length of the siege, eleven or twelve carpenters were employed. Master Reginald himself appeared briefly in the pay accounts 24 July to 18 August 1303, bringing engines for the siege of Brechin (ibid m.27); he reappeared in mid-December (ibid m.24).

Again, for much of the rest of the siege, numbers were slightly less, between five and eight carpenters, but always four sawyers between 20 April and 22 July. Incidentally, for the first eighteen days in the field, Glasham also had six men making rope (ibid m.16); Glasham himself had made a brief appearance the previous autumn (20 August to 20 September 1303) when he went by sea with an engine, presumably in support of the king's march around the north east coast of Scotland (ibid m.27). He joined Edward on a more permanent basis very late on in November (ibid m.24).

See also Harvey English Mediaeval Architects 16-7.

Bedford had made a brief appearance the previous autumn (exactly the same dates as Glasham), and then reappeared again late in November (noted as coming from Linlithgow; E101/11/15 m.24).
Master Stephen de Northampton, also called an engineer, was the only master carpenter in pay from the start to the finish of the campaign (28 May 1303 to 8 August 1304). At the end of the siege, he and his team were responsible for taking apart the engines called Gloucester, Dovedale and Toulemonde. His team, at its peak, numbered thirteen carpenters (between 15 and 28 June). The last master carpenter paid by the crown was Nicholas de Bothwell. He was in charge of the engine from Bothwell and the prince's engine, and at its peak, his team consisted of six carpenters and one page (13 to 19 July). Robert de Bonkyl, although simply described as a carpenter, was in fact an engineer, and was in charge of the engine called Parson. His team had twenty-five carpenters in early June. Finally, the last team of carpenters was led by Henry le Berwick, in charge of the two engines Warwick and Belfrey. He had come from working at the peel at Linlithgow in February with two carpenters, and during the siege, he had eleven carpenters and a page under him (19 May to 21 June).

Of course, while carpenters were the predominant craft

79 Of course, as has already been noted, during the siege itself, either of the two smaller teams probably had responsibility for one of these engines.
80 During the rest of the siege, between ten and twelve carpenters were employed.
81 However, for much of the time, five carpenters and a page were employed. Only one other carpenter of this team was named, and interestingly, it was a certain Walter de Bothwell.
82 Ibid m.16.
83 Earlier on during the siege, he was in pay with just one associate, and it was not until the end of May that more carpenters were assigned to him. Beyond the peak of early June, numbers fell steadily to fourteen carpenters on 22 July.
84 Ibid m.19.
85 For the rest of the siege, ten carpenters; and for the period 21 June to 22 July, the one page.
represented at the siege, others were present. Those making rope have already been identified above, but there were other specialists. Adam de London, saddler, was employed in making and repairing slings for the Linlithgow engine between 27 April and 22 July. William Plumber and an associate were employed working lead from 15 May to 26 July.

There were significant numbers of masons employed throughout the period of the siege, as Figure 6.4 shows. On 7 March 1304, Master Walter de Hereford was ordered to choose and bring masons to serve in Scotland. The writ was to remain in force until 17 May (Whitsun). Figure 6.4 shows clearly a steady rise in the number of masons between the middle of March and the first week in May. Some of the masons came from Northumberland; another group were led by Robert de Coupland, which suggests Cumberland. It is possible that masons from Nottingham and Derby also saw service. By the spring of 1304, Hereford was working in Edinburgh castle. He does not appear to have been present at the siege of Stirling. In the pay accounts, the masons were quickly amalgamated into one unit. At various times, two master masons were in charge; Giles de Thurmeston and Edward de Appelby. Thurmeston, like Master Stephen de Northampton, was present throughout the whole campaign.

86El01/11/15 mm.8, 9, 10, 13. He had a boy with him for all this period.
87Ibid mm.7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16. For a couple of days, a further three men were engaged on the same task (3 to 4 May); Ibid m.16.
88A J Taylor 'English builders in Scotland during the war of Independence. A record of 1304' EHR 34(1955) 44-6; SCI 45/123. See also Harvey English Mediaeval Architects 136-7.
89El01/11/15 m.16.
90Taylor 'English builders in Scotland' 45.
91The payrolls do not, however, note the presence of Master James de St. George, yet he was present; Hereford, by virtue of his status, may thus have also been present at the siege.
Presumably, the main task of these masons was to make the many stones required for ammunition. This is borne out by the number of quarrymen employed; between 1 to 7 June, twenty-three were in service.\(^{92}\) As to the masons themselves, three peaks are visible from Figure 6.4; early May, late May to early June, and a very brief rise late in July. This latter feature is associated with the sudden employment of large numbers of quarrymen between 14 and 18 July. The first peak involved just over 100 masons for the first week in May, while the second more sustained peak, lasting from 19 May to 7 June, saw about eighty to ninety masons in service.\(^{93}\)

The smiths, while for much of the siege few in number, were nonetheless important for their contribution to the war effort. Initially, at the outset of the siege, there were sixty-eight smiths, the peak in terms of numbers, and this no doubt reflected the necessity of reconstructing the various engines sent to the scene of operations. Once the task became primarily one of running repairs, numbers were reduced, although not dramatically so. Three teams emerge in the pay accounts as early as the second week in May. Master Walter de Burton had been in service since

\(^{92}\) E101/11/15 m.13. Throughout the siege, however, numbers fluctuated widely; the turning point seems to have been 8 June; only four were in pay; then only three (between 15 and 21 June); and the lowest point of two (22 June to 13 July, and 19 to 22 July). For the first three weeks of the siege, only one quarryman was present, indicating that the stones supplied with the engines were sufficient. On 15 May, eleven quarrymen came anew, and the number rose steadily over the next two weeks to the peak of early June. However, a sudden flurry of activity took place between 14 and 18 July; on 14 July, nine masons (this is a scribal error; they are meant to be quarriers) were employed; on 15 July, twelve; on 16 July, sixteen; on 17 July, twenty-four; and on 18 July, thirty-two; \textit{ibid} mm.8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16.

\(^{93}\) For the first weeks of the siege, as with all the other crafts, the pay accounts appear to be somewhat confused, with several small units receiving pay. It was not until mid-May that these smaller units were conglomerated.
his arrival with the pre-fabricated bridge the previous June. During the siege, he had with him twelve smiths and two pages for virtually the whole time. Between 25 May and 14 June, he also had a man working with coal. Master Thomas de Alegate also had twelve smiths, but only one boy, with him, all from Berwick; they began service at Stirling on 11 April. One smith joined him on 22 June for the next month; for the period 22 June to 22 July, he also had two smiths working specifically on tools; and for the two weeks after 29 June, he had two men working with coal.

The last of the teams of smiths was headed by Master Henry de Gateshead. For much of the duration of the siege, he had fifteen or sixteen smiths with him, and a page. An indication that they came from different places is found in the pay account where they make their first appearance; one was paid from 11 to 30 April; four were paid from 17 to 30 April; and eight were paid from 20 to 30 April. Several smiths were also employed up until 1 August, no doubt in the dismantling process.

The final set of workmen to consider is the diggers. Figure 6.4 shows clearly a steady rise in numbers up until early June, then a steady fall with one very brief rise. Plasterers have been included in this category, and all of them (eight was the highest number) and some of the diggers were working at the king's court at Cambuskenneth. Between 29 May and 7 June, three master

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94 E101/11/15 m.31. He is absent for a brief period over the winter doing work for the Prince at Perth; *ibid* mm.19, 25.
95 *Ibid* mm.11, 13.
96 *Ibid* m.16.
97 *Ibid* mm.8, 9.
98 The scribes do not appear to have been consistent with regard to his status; some note he is a master, some do not.
99 *Ibid* m.16.
100 *Ibid* mm.13, 16.
diggers and sixty-six diggers were in service at the siege, but after this, numbers fell. The brief rise was due to twenty diggers being employed to make a road.101

The crown does not appear to have had to provide many tools to the various workmen; most of the labour brought to Stirling came with their own tools. The only evidence of crown action is an indenture of various tools received at Edinburgh (and sent on to Stirling). Ninety-eight 'picks', 155 'ameraxes' and 'stonaxes', ten 'males', six 'gaveloks', 200 'cheselles' and 'pounzons', eighty 'coignes' and 100 'trouelles' were supplied on one occasion (2 March). Further deliveries were made on 6 April and 15 May.102

The last aspect of work carried out during the siege of Stirling relates to the large number of people employed making nails.103 Figure 6.5 lays out the details. The first point to deal with is where all these people came from. It is impossible to be certain, but it is not unlikely that it would have been a combination of camp followers and local inhabitants. Whoever they were, they received 2d a day wages. Another interesting feature derived from the graph is that after the first Sunday where a few workers were employed, for the next seven Sundays, none were. Perhaps Edward had come under some criticism from the ecclesiastical elements of his army. Whatever the explanation, the policy, if it was one, was dropped for the last month of the siege. The other curious feature is the absence of workers on 24 June. No obvious reason for this is apparent; it can be surmised

101 E101/11/15 m.7.
102 CDS ii 1536. On 15 May, 103 pickes, 136 stonaxes and ameraxes, 7 maless, 5 gaveloks, 198 cheselles and pounzons, 50 coignes and 100 trouelles were received.
103 E101/11/15 mm.8, 10, 14, 16; BL. Add. MS 8835 ff.87, 88v, 92, 94v.
Figure 6.5. People employed, making sails, May to July 1848
(Taken from S101/155 nos. 90, 91, 92 and 93, 93A/155 nos. 94, 95, 96, 97).
that either the stoppage was induced externally (the garrison sallying forth or Wallace carrying out a raid) or internally (the king holding a council meeting on the future conduct of the siege). The final point to note is that throughout this particular task, Andrew de Montgomery was in charge.

The one man the pay rolls did not note was Master James de St. George. He was present throughout the whole operation; it may well have been he who directed the construction and erection of the siege works; the wardrobe books preserve the names of a number of the engineers, master carpenters and masons employed upon them, and to none was a higher wage paid than Master James.

At various points of the analysis above, wages have only been briefly mentioned. On the whole, 4d was the average sum paid by the crown, but the range was 12d to 2d. Masters such as Walter de Barton, Giles de Thurmeston, Stephen Northampton, Thomas de Houghton, Adam de Glasham, Nicholas de Bothwell and Robert de Bedford all received 12d a day; but so did John de Hartlepool, ropemaker. Master Thomas de Alegate, Henry de Gateshead, William Plumber, Adam de London (with his boy) and Hartlepool's unnamed associate were all paid 8d a day. Carpenters' wages varied from 3d to 6d; smiths mostly received 4d. Masons' wages varied between 4d and 8d; but diggers almost without exception got 2d a day (even a master digger only qualified for 4d a day). Pay was obviously related to status, and there is no evidence of any changes during the campaign of the wages of an individual (although it is of course difficult to be absolutely certain).

104 See also Harvey English Mediaeval Architects 265-8; A J Taylor 'Master James of St. George' EHR 65(1950) 433-57.
105 A J Taylor 'Master James of St. George' 452 n2.
106 Ibid 452.
Despite the occasional wage problems and resultant strikes noted above, pay was, on the whole, regular, far more so than was the case with the infantry; again, another indication of the crown's priorities. Because some units had clerks attached to them, a more formal basis of pay seems to have been operating, rather than the almost ad hoc situation regarding the foot. As has been seen, once the summer months of 1303 were over, pay was fairly regular; but even before then, serious attempts appear to have been made to ensure wages were more or less up to date. Comparison of dates on the infantry rolls shows that pay for these skilled workers was never very far in arrears. When wages were disbursed at Inverurie on 29 August 1303, the infantry were being paid for service performed between 6 and 12 July; the various carpenters, masons, smiths and diggers were being paid for, in most cases, work done during the four weeks up to 24 August. 107

There is reference to victuals on only one of the infantry rolls; the small group of masons who went to Perth during the winter of 1303-4 to the prince's court were provided with 12qu of wheat flour (at ½m (6s 8d) a quarter); the small unit of carpenters still present received 5qu 2bu of wheat flour (at the same price); one cask of wine was delivered to these masons and carpenters (costing 5m). 108 These references are the only indication of the crown supplying victuals; presumably with regular pay, these workers were able to secure their foodstuffs satisfactorily by other means and what was provided above may have had more to do with the Christmas season than anything else.

Much detail has been expended on these workers, primarily because the pay accounts allow such an effective examination to

107 E101/11/15 m.27.
108 Ibid m.25.
take place. The work entailed was largely based on the war effort during the siege and around the courts of the king and his son, though not exclusively so. In late March and early May 1304, a handful of masons and carpenters were paid for work carried out at the castle of St. Andrews. 109

Perhaps one of the most interesting documents concerns work undertaken on Stirling castle immediately after the siege. 110 It is an account of expenses incurred by Reginald le Porter for work done on the castle. Firstly, 25,800 faggotts were purchased (2s 2d per 100) and transported (12d per 1,000); 504 hods were also bought (21/2d each). Secondly, wages were paid for hodbearers and expenses for horses during the period 24 July to 4 August; the numbers are worth detailing; Friday 24 July, ninety-two hodbearers; Saturday 25 July, 100; Monday 27 July, 140 and a horse (expenses of 6d a day); Tuesday 28 July, 158; Wednesday 29 July, 204 and two horses; Thursday 30 July, 315 (and some horses, probably two; part of the right-hand side of the manuscript has been lost); Friday 31 July, 551 (and again, some horses, with expenses of 8d each); Saturday 1 August, 604 and two horses (expenses rising to 9d a day); Sunday 2 August, 600 (and some horses, expenses of 8d each); Monday 3 August, 506; and finally, Tuesday 4 August, 568 and five horses (expenses of just under 8d each). This manuscript is tantalising in that clearly work was done to repair the damage inflicted during the siege, but were the efforts restricted to eleven days work and were only hodbearers used? Surely not. Some masons were employed up to 1 August, and since they were unlikely to have been occupied in dismantling the

109 E101/11/15 m.19.
110 E101/12/14.
siege engines, they may perhaps have also been involved. The costs of this particular account came to nearly £39. An interesting postscript to the siege and subsequent repair of Stirling castle comes from a petition from William Byset to the king and his council asking for the gate of Stirling castle, which was 'a great deal' broken, to be replaced. The precise date cannot be established, merely sometime between 1304 and 1306. Nonetheless, it is yet another indication of the certainty of victory felt by Edward.

This chapter has attempted to highlight the king's use of craftsmen in furthering his military ambitions. The product of their skill provided Edward with access north of the Forth, and the means to prosecute sieges, even if success in this department was somewhat mixed. Small but important numbers of these craftsmen travelled with the army throughout the summer of 1303, but it was really the siege of Stirling that was their showpiece. Acts of construction as well as of destruction were practised as they worked over the winter, spring and summer of 1303-4 at the king's court (be it Dunfermline or Cambuskenneth) and at the castles of St. Andrews and Stirling. Ultimately, they were yet another component of the military machine assembled by the crown to fulfil the ambitions of the ageing monarch.

111 E101/11/15 m.7; twelve masons and three quarrymen were paid for the ten days 23 July to 1 August.
112 CDS iv 1825. Possibly 1305; see CDS ii 1705.
Conclusion.

The actual political settlement that was arrived at in 1305 lies outside the scope of this study. In the final analysis, the system of government that was created "offered few, if any, benefits to the Scots". The settlement of the land issue was harsh in its application, though it did prevent the formation of a disinherited group. The king initiated a castle building programme, but on a far less lavish scale to the one begun after the second Welsh war. Selkirk peel was to be rebuilt, and three new castles were to be constructed. However, as with the political settlement, these castles were not allowed time to become established.

The cost of this campaign was considerable, due mainly to its length. The price, however, cannot just be measured in purely financial terms; economic and social damage was suffered by both countries. Even when calculating the expense to the crown, it

1 Prestwich Edward I 515; CDS ii 1691, 1692.
2 Barrow Bruce 130. Some individuals did receive royal favour; the bishop of Glasgow received 50 oaks from the royal forests of Selkirk and Maudslie; the canon of Elgin received 20 oaks from a neighbouring forest; and the bishop of Aberdeen had 40 oaks from Drum forest, 30 from Kintore forest and 30 from Buchan forest; Mackenzie The Mediaeval Castle in Scotland 32.
3 KW i 410, 418-9. There was not necessarily the need to build castles on the scale of the Welsh programme as Scotland was endowed with several castles holding strategic sites already.
must be borne in mind that the final accounted figure derived from the wardrobe books did not reflect the actual amount of cash disbursed in the years 1303-4. However, the best place to start is with this accounted sum.

Prestwich calculated that expenditure was probably in the region of £75,000 to £80,000. According to the wardrobe accounts, at least £33,000 was spent on the cavalry; £9,000 went on infantry and skilled labour; about £3,000 went on the navy; and about £12,000 went on victualling. All these figures err on the cautious side, especially in view of the incomplete nature of the wardrobe books themselves. There were, of course, a host of other costs. The pre-fabricated bridge cost almost £1,000. At the other end of the scale, messengers' fees would have been higher. The garrisons were a continuous drain on the stretched resources of the crown. All these factors make a figure difficult to arrive at with any precise accuracy, but from the breadth of material examined above, perhaps the estimate given by Prestwich could be raised a bit; possibly as much as £90,000 was spent in all.

This sum though, as has been pointed out, was not spent during 1303-4. The infantry, skilled labour and mariners received wages during the campaign, even though the foot's wages were constantly in arrears. For the cavalrymen, the situation was different. As the various prests testify, most of those in pay only received a small proportion of their wages while at war. As with the scheme for compensation of lost horses, settlement of arrears occurred after the end of the campaign. For many of the nobles in pay, the wages provided did not cover the expenses involved in going to war, but without such financial assistance, many would not have been able to participate. The crown was bridging the economic gap.

\[\text{Footnote: } \text{Prestwich War, Politics 176.}\]
in a partnership which enabled it to maximise England's military capacity.

It has been suggested that 'much of the money was spent in Scotland, which would not have affected...England'. This, though, is not true. Munitions, transport, the pre-fabricated bridge, all these entailed payments in England. When many of the cavalry's accounts were settled, this was done in England; mariners, if not paid before they set sail, would have certainly brought their wages back; and even though 'much was paid to English troops, [they] presumably took a part at least of their wages home with them'. Perhaps between a quarter and a third of the total accounted figure was actually paid out in Scotland; most was spent south of the border. The bulk of royal expenditure in the years 1303-4 did not, however, go to the wealthy; rather, it was, for want of a better word, the middling classes who benefitted. Taking the full accounting cost of the campaign into consideration, much of the money spent by the crown did end up in the hands of the wealthiest sections of society, but not the bulk.

These campaign figures need to be put into perspective. Possibly as little as £600,000 of coin was in circulation in 1304. Normal levels of household expenditure were in the region of £8,000 to £12,000; in 1284, crown revenue had been estimated at around £27,000 a year. On any previous Scottish campaign, not

5 Mate 'High prices in early fourteenth-century England: Causes and consequences' EcHR 28(1975) 9; 'One effect of the heavy expenditure on war in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries was to transfer funds from England to the campaigning areas of Wales, Scotland and the borders'; Prestwich 'The Crown and the Currency' 60. But the actual amounts in relation to what was spent in England were small.

6 Prestwich 'The Crown and the Currency' 60.

7 Ibid 63.

8 Certainly no more than £1,000,000; ibid 52.

9 M C Prestwich 'War and taxation in England in the XIIItth and XIVth centuries' in eds. J-Ph Genet and M Le Mené Genése de l'état
more than £60,000 had been spent. What were the revenue sources that enabled the crown to pursue the war?

There had been no lay tax since 1301, but half of the papal tenth of 1301 was due to the king. Various problems had delayed its collection so that the effects of its yield coincided with the 1303-4 campaign; in all, nearly £42,000 was raised. In 1303, the crown had renegotiated the conditions for foreign merchants trading in England; the increased export duties and new import duties came to about £18,000 per year between 1303 and 1307. Tallage was collected in 1304, raising about £5,000. Scutage fines came to only £1,800; this, however, meant 'that more tenants [had] availed themselves of the opportunity for compounding for their service in 1303 than on the previous occasion'. The crown also pursued its policy of exacting prizes where it could.

10 Prestwich 'The Crown and the Currency' 53; Mate 'High Prices in early fourteenth-century England' 9 has incorrectly given £60,000 as the average annual cost of the war in Scotland.
11 Prestwich Edward I 532. The crown's need for money is testified by Edward's letters to the collectors of the tenth. On 23 September 1303, while at Kinloss, Edward requested that 2,000 l be lent to Droxford as the king 'greatly needs money for the stay of himself and men in Scotland for the hastening and completion of the expedition there which he intends to bring to a desired end shortly'; on 1 November, the prince requested a loan of 500 l; at the end of the same month, Edward wrote again because he needed a 'great sum of money'; CCR 1302-7 62-4, 113. See also CFR 1272-1307 478. Droxford's revenue collecting tours have already come to light; BL. Add. MS 8835 f.14; see also Prestwich War, Politics 153-4. For Canterbury cathedral priory, taxes between 1292 and 1307 represented 8.63% of money received by the treasurers; M Mate 'The impact of war on the economy of Canterbury cathedral priory, 1294 - 1340' Speculum 57(1982) 767-8. For Bolton priory, taxes between the years 1287 and 1305 represented 4.4% of total expenditure; Kershaw Bolton priory 167.
12 Prestwich War, Politics 199.
13 J F Hadwin 'The last royal tallages' EHR 96(1981) 345-6, 349.
14 Payments, though, were exceedingly slow; H M Chew 'Scutage under Edward I' EHR 37(1922) 333.
15 Between 1294 and 1307, annual average revenue was in the region of £75,000; Miller 'War, taxation and the English economy' 21-2.

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Another measure adopted was the redirection of shrieval revenues by the wardrobe to pay for victuals and other necessary expenses; 'this [change of] system had distinct advantages; the money was available as it was collected, not as it was paid to the treasury, which meant that it could be spent several months before it was due under the old system. The king was also saved the risk and expense of transporting it to Westminster. Time, labour and money were saved by this decentralization'.\(^{16}\) Even the royal forests were utilized; 'massive sales of wood [were] ordered [by the king] when he needed large sums of money for his military adventures'.\(^{17}\) But the inevitable shortfall in revenue was met by borrowing. Between 1302 and 1310, the Frescobaldi of Florence lent annual sums in excess of £15,300; 'loans on this scale provided vitally important relief from the worst financial pressures which so troubled the first two Edwards'.\(^{18}\)

Despite the fact that 'the situation demanded...every effort be made to raise what revenue there was as fast and efficiently as possible',\(^{19}\) Edward 'steadfastly refused to follow the example of his continental contemporaries and debase his coinage'.\(^{20}\) Clearly the crown was maximising its sources of revenue, but not excessively so; with all the financial demands it faced, it was still acting in a responsible fashion.

However, the crown could not prevent the Scottish wars from

17 C R Young The Royal forests of Medieval England (Leicester,1979) 123.
19 M C Prestwich 'Exchequer and wardrobe in the later years of Edward I' BIHR 46(1973) 6.
20 M Mate 'Monetary policies in England, 1272 - 1307' British Numismatic Journal 41(1972) 74; M C Prestwich 'Edward I's monetary policies and their consequences' EcHR Second series 22(1969) 413.
having an impact on both countries; the cost was not one that could be measured in purely financial terms. There is much disagreement on the scale of the effects of war. Within the overall effect on the economy, three areas have been centred upon; taxation, purveyance and the recruitment of infantry. This study, however, cannot shed any new light on the first of these areas.

Supplying the army with its logistical needs involved the crown administration in drawing upon England's resources. Victualling in particular was unpopular, partly because the system was open to abuse. The issue was given a high political profile, which is perhaps not that surprising. The evidence from this campaign suggests that it was not the poor who were burdened but rather those of a middling status in county society. Since these were the sort of men who had local political influence, and purveyance was something that affected many counties, this may explain the national prominence of this issue.

The Lincolnshire evidence shows that the whole county was affected by crown purveyances. Prices paid for victuals were not markedly different from those at the market, and, where payment was forthcoming, there can have been little detrimental impact. The harvest of 1302 was a good one, and presumably the opportunity to sell surplus grain would have been welcome. Indeed, the attempt by a group of merchants to provide the grain required from Lincolnshire is perhaps indicative of this.

Indeed, in some areas, crown intervention must have stimulated local economies. The commissioning of the pre-fabricated bridge


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involved not only the labour of several carpenters and smiths but also the purchase of much material. Another less dramatic example is the employment of bowyers to make bows, crossbows and ammunition for them. These kinds of purchases can be multiplied. At the outset of the campaign, tents were made or repaired; horses were purchased, along with their housings, saddles and reins; new crossbows and bows were bought 'in considerable numbers'; old ones were cleaned and repaired; armour was likewise restored. All this entailed the crown in providing work. And these kinds of campaign preparations would have also taken place for the magnates' needs, all providing employment for the local labour force. Even on campaign, purchases were necessary; in July 1303, packsaddles and nails were bought at Perth for the prince's horses.

Those who benefited from these sorts of crown expenditure were those with skills to offer. Merchants too probably did well. Several travelled with the army to supply its needs. They were certainly called upon in the autumn of 1303 when supplies ran short. The crown also generated business for the timber merchants around Lynn.

'The foot soldiers must have come from the poorer elements of the population; they were the only ones who had anything to gain by serving in the army. This...fits well with what we know about recruiting methods; usually a district was simply ordered to provide a certain number of men. The easiest way out would be to send the most useless members of the community; they would never be missed and could not resist' One historian declared that the

22 Johnstone Edward of Carnarvon 87.
23 CDS ii 1382.
24 Prestwich Edward I 499.
25 Strayer 'The costs and profits of war' 280.
campaigns 'did little more than provide an outing for the unemployed'.

The evidence for this campaign suggests that this was not the case. Desertion was ever present, but there were two key periods. Firstly, large numbers of men from Cumberland, Westmoreland and Northumberland had left by the end of the siege of Brechin. The only viable explanation is that the fear of Scottish raids, knowledge of which must have spread as the king took counter measures while at Perth, was strong enough to pull the men back to their homes. Secondly, the greatest loss of men per day occurred between 9 and 29 August, at a time when Edward was travelling further away from England. Again, the only consistent explanation must lie with the need to bring in the harvest. If the infantry was comprised of those with little to lose, then why did so many desert? Wages may not have been regular, but at least they were in employment, with victuals provided, and were undergoing an experience few, if any, of their fellow men would have had. Ultimately, if the commissioners of array had not produced well armed, competent troops, the king would have shown his displeasure. Edward may have fretted at the desertion rate, but he seems not to have expressed dissatisfaction at the quality of the foot.

One effect of recruiting infantry that cannot be measured is that of the development of a national identity.\(^\text{27}\) Not only would many of the troops have not traversed such distances before, but they would not have had the opportunity to interact with men from so many other counties. Coupled with the tales that would have emerged for home consumption, all this would have aided the

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\(^{26}\) Bridbury 'Before the Black death' 400.

\(^{27}\) See B C Keeney 'Military service and the development of nationalism in England 1272 - 1327' Speculum 22(1947) 534-49.
development of national awareness. For the nobles, the opportunity provided by the campaigns allowed an unparalleled level of social contact.

Successful as the campaign was, not all of those called upon by the crown to serve the king were willing to do so. On 20 July 1303, a wide ranging inquisition was commissioned into the following counties: Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, York, Lancaster, Nottingham and Derby. 'Footmen, hundredors [centenars] and twentymen [vintenars], ditchers, masons and carpenters chosen...to come to...Scotland at the king's wages...stayed at home or after coming...and receiving their wages, secretly withdrew'. The centenars were believed to have received bribes to allow men to return home. The sheriffs, clerks, bailiffs and ministers were also suspected of accepting bribes as well as 'the removal of the names of the strong men and substituting others less sufficient'. They were thought to have taken bribes instead of carrying out purveyances, or even neglecting the 'purveyances entirely or in great part, overburdening the poor and sparing the rich'; also, of arresting 'more horses, wagons, carts and other carriages than was necessary', or of extorting money instead. These were extensive accusations and by no means indicated widespread corruption. The fact that those who had already deceitfully received royal wages were to pay a 'heavy ransom' may indicate why the commission was instigated. But the crown did perceive that war provided opportunities for the unscrupulous, despite all its precautions.

War, though, was, and will remain, primarily a destructive not a constructive force. Scotland bore the brunt of this for most of Edward's reign. Wallace had successfully inflicted damage south

of the border in 1298, and the Guardians also ventured into the northern counties, but it was not until Bruce's raids that sustained damage occurred. Up until that point, it had been trade that had primarily suffered. That is not to say that damage was not done. Devastation accompanied both armies. The English army, along with the camp followers, constituted a peripatetic community, interacting with the static communities in its path. The influence of such a force must have been felt, especially in the regions traversed north of the Forth. There may have been some positive benefits to certain Scots, but these would have been far outweighed by the negative effects the army would have exerted. For their part, the Scots carried out a scorched earth policy, first used by Wallace. This is evident from Edward's remarks about the region around Stirling. Only a few specific cases of damage emerge in the records; the abbot of Jedburgh requested twenty oaks from the crown 'to repair the church and houses of his cell of Rustinoth, in great part destroyed and burned in the war'. The dean of Elgin had two houses destroyed when the prince and his army stayed there for a time. On 17 April 1304, Edward actually had to order that the waste of the earl of Ross' lands was to be prevented. Trade must have been seriously disrupted, especially in the areas south of the Forth.

30 An inquisition held at Carlisle in 1303 heard how the lands of Walter de Corri had been made 'waste and burned by the Scots and worth nothing'; CDS ii 1402.
31 CDS ii 1428. The prior and convent of St. Andrews also needed twenty oaks to repair the priory houses; ibid 1704.
32 He also wanted twenty oaks; Documents ed.Stevenson 625.
33 SC1 13/147 (ii).
In 1305, the king ordered that 'the issues of a certain passage at Stirling' were to be used to repair the bridge there. Edward, when he withdrew from Scotland in the summer of 1304, left a dislocated country in a state of unrest. Organised resistance was at an end, but it was still difficult to carry out effective government; as early as April 1304, Edward was writing to the sheriffs of Fife, Clackmannan and Kinross to give assistance to the commissioners inquiring into disturbances at Lindores in county Fife.

In England, apart from the northern counties, what were the ways this campaign affected the economy? Current opinion is divided on the issue. One view is that the effects of war 'were not remarkable for rendering difficult conditions intolerable for the overwhelming majority of ordinary men and women by imposing upon them a burden of charges they simply could not bear'. However, taxes were a major imposition; victualling abuses could inflict serious economic hardship on the poor; local communities could be burdened with the need to arm those selected to go to war; and the loss of ships would have disrupted trade. The evidence for this campaign has demonstrated how the war effort could disturb local economies. All these effects, when combined, and when applied over a number of years, did amount to a significant influence on the economy; 'the needs of war, possibly for the first time in English history, brought a fall in the living standards of individuals'. Society was also affected

34 CDS ii 1705.
35 Barron The Scottish War of Independence 196-200; Powicke The Thirteenth century 709; the unrest was not on the coordinated scale suggested by Barron.
36 SC1 12/20 (i), (ii).
37 Bridbury 'Before the Black death' 410.
38 E King England 1175 - 1425 (London, 1979) 149.
by the increasing level of disorder. The crown could not address itself to the needs of war and the needs of justice at the same time; its resources were too limited. When one took precedence, the other was neglected. By using the expedient of giving criminals their freedom in exchange for serving in Scotland, the crown was only adding to the unsettled situation. Indeed, in the later years of Edward's reign, there was even a fear of a rising due partly to the vagabond problem. This amount of violence affected all levels of society. William de Latimer's wife was taken from his manor; Maurice de Berkeley complained in 1305 that while he was serving in the war, a gang had sacked his house in Bedminster. Walter Frest and Alice, wife of the late Ralph Bishop, had their ship seized by the bailiffs of Southampton to take victuals to Scotland. The bailiffs handed it over to Robert de Wyton for that purpose, but he sold it and refused to restore or pay for it 'to the damage of the said Walter and Alice and the retardation of the Scottish expedition'. Ralph Dubbel had his goods at Ersham, Norfolk, carried away by certain persons while he was serving in Scotland and under the king's protection. Cases such as these abound in the records; one wonders to what extent they were the tip of the iceberg.

Ultimately, when Edward died, he not only left the crown in debt, and a realm to some degree in turmoil, but he also left an

40 Ibid 172.
41 CCR 1302-7 126; on 16 February 1304, the sheriff of York was ordered to find her.
43 CPR 1301-7 187.
44 Ibid 194.
unresolved situation in Scotland. His son did not possess the
capabilities to face these problems. Had he done so, and quelled
Bruce's bid for the Scottish crown, then the verdict on his
father's campaigns might have been altogether different. To a
large extent, we judge the father by his son's failings. The
campaign of 1303-4 had been a major military success. The aged
king's single-minded determination had galvanised the
administration and inspired the army. Significant numbers of
horse and foot had been assembled at the start of the campaign,
and were kept in the field for a longer period of time than had
been the case during previous expeditions. The strategy had been
planned before the start of the campaign, and was executed with
rigour. The logistical exercise in both men and materials was
impressive, coming to the fore during the siege of Stirling
castle. Edward must have felt that at last, he had conquered
Scotland. He was not the only one.

When Robert de Reymes returned home from the campaign, he
obtained a licence to fortify his two manor houses of Aydon and
Shortflatt and he got permission to hold a weekly market and
annual fair at Bolam (he already held Bolam castle). These were
the actions of a man who felt that the war had come to an end.
Instead, he spent the rest of his life fighting for the crown.
When he died in 1322, 'after a lifetime's labour in the north,
[his] lands were devastated'. Therein lies the ambition of
Edward I, the failure of Edward II, and the destructive impact of

Some would say 'savage determination'; Neville 'The political
allegiance of the earls of Strathearn during the Wars of
Independence' 152.

He was the son of an Ipswich merchant who had purchased land in
Northumberland in the 1290's; P Dixon *Aydon Castle* (English
Heritage guide, 1988) 8-9. He had one letter of protection, dated
21 May 1303, with Henry de Percy; CDS v 2447.

Dixon *Aydon Castle* 11.
war.
Appendix A. The army's itinerary.

Below is a suggested itinerary for the army from the end of May until the beginning of November 1303 based primarily on the pay rolls and the king's itinerary. Where the pay rolls show payments being made, the assumption has been made that on most of those days, the army would not have been on the move.

Key: PR = E101/11/15.
MD = E101/612/12 f.10.
Re = Suggested rest days.

30 May 1303 left Roxburgh (E101/364/13 f.23v).
31 Lauder (PR; MD).
1 June
2-3 Newbattle (PR; MD).
4-5
6 Falkirk (Re; Edward at Linlithgow) (PR; MD).
7 (Re)
8 (Re) (PR).
9 (Re) (PR).
10 Cross Forth (PR; MD).
11 (Re) (PR).
12-14 Clackmannan (Re 13-14) (PR; MD).
15
16 Auchterarder (E101/364/13 f.64).
17
18-27 July Perth (Re) (PR; KI).
(The infantry were paid here on 25 June and 7 July. Edward was at Coupar between 18 and 20 July; payments were made there on 23 July and at Auchterhous on 27 July (MD)).
28 left Perth (KI).
29 Strathdighty (Re) (KI).
30 left Strathdighty (KI).
31-2 August Arbroath (Re) (KI).
3 left Arbroath (KI).
4-14 Brechin (siege ends on 9 August) (PR; KI; MD).
15 left Brechin (KI).
16
17-8 Kincardine (Re) (KI).
19 reached vicinity of Laurencekirk (KI).
20
21 Glenbervie (Re) (KI).
22-23
24-27 Aberdeen (Re) (KI).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>left Aberdeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Inverurie (Re) (Edward at Daviot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-31</td>
<td>Kirton of Auchterless (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>Kirton of Auchterless (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Banff (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>left Banff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cullen (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rathven (Re 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>Elgin (Re 9-12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-12</td>
<td>reached Kinloss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Kinloss (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-22</td>
<td>Kinloss (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>reached Lochindorb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-3 October</td>
<td>vicinity of Lochindorb (siege?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kinloss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>reached Mortlach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kildrummy (Re 8-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>reached Banchory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fettercairn (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12</td>
<td>Dundee (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>reached Banchory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>Dundee (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>Scone (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Dunblane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23</td>
<td>Cambuskeenist (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-26</td>
<td>Dunfermline (Re)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-2 November</td>
<td>Dunfermline (Re)</td>
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