The Christology of saint Epiphanius of Cyprus according to his work Angyrotos

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THE CHRISTOLOGY OF SAINT EPIPHANIUS OF CYPRUS ACROSS TO HIS WORK ANGYROTOS

By

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ABSTRACT
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ST. EPIPHANIUS OF CYPRUS
ACCORDING TO HIS ANGYROTOS
by Nicos Nicolaides

This thesis attempts to produce a systematic exposition of Epiphanius’ Christology on the basis of a close analysis of his major systematic work Angyrotos (Ancoratus) - a task which has not been previously undertaken by any scholar. It starts with a brief account of Epiphanius’ life and works and an overview of the contents of the Ancoratus. It then, offers an account of the dogmatic sitz im Leben of Epiphanius, which includes: a) the connection between Christology and Triadology in the 4th century and the Arian challenge, and b) the post Nicene trends and heresies relating to the formulation of the Christological dogma until the time of Epiphanius, making special reference to the doctrines of Athanasius and Apollinaris. This first part is followed by a very close analysis of the Christological doctrine of the Ancoratus on the basis of its contents which are extensively utilised under three major headings: a) The Divine Logos who is confessed to be God’s true and natural Son against the background of the teaching of Arius; b) The Logos’ incarnation or inhomination which includes sections on Epiphanius’ use of key terms like “flesh” and “man”, as well as his use of the phrase “Kyriakos anthropos” as an anti-docetic and anti-apollinarian device; and c) The One Christ, which expounds Epiphanius’ understanding of the union of the two natures, the divine and the human, united in the one person of Christ and the consequences that follow from it, including such topics as “exchange of properties and names”, the “Theotokos” as a dogmatic description of the Virgin Mary, the worship of Christ incarnate and man’s salvation and glorification. What emerges from this analysis is that Epiphanius Christology is not only in line with that of the major orthodox fathers of the period, but is able to speak with greater clarity on several points relating to the Christological dogma which are of crucial importance. These include his clarifications concerning the heretical Christologies of Docetism, Arianism and Apollinarism and the orthodox understanding of the union of the divine and the human in the one Christ, the “communicatio idiomatum” especially in the context of the suffering of Christ, and generally the soteriological consequences of orthodox Christology. Thus it is established that Epiphanius’ theological exposition places him among the great orthodox fathers of the fourth century who influenced decisively the development of the Christological dogma.
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If the fourth century is supposed to be the most crucial but also the most important one, as far as the evolution and formation of the doctrine of the Trinity and of Christology are concerned, this can only mean that it was during this period that strong accusations and provocations arose against the interpretation and formulation of these doctrines, which required powerful responses. The history of the Church records the appearance and expansion of both Triadological and Christological heresies during this period and points out the dangers they represented for the members of the Church, while at the same time it testifies to the struggles of the Church for the establishment of the right dogma and the protection of her members from these heresies. The contribution of the holy fathers in this struggle of the Church was essential, for, animated as they were by the Holy Spirit, they became outstanding steersmen of the Church's spiritual ship. Such was Epiphanius, Bishop of Constantia and Archbishop of Cyprus, who lined up with other distinguished fathers in the sacred army of the Church.

As a father of the Church, Epiphanius is included among the first, because by his deeds and words he proved to be a genuine spokesman of the faith of the Church and a staunch defender of her orthodox dogmas. His multifarious struggles, his literary productions and his immense zeal have rendered him, even during his life-time, "a father and a teacher of the Catholic Church".

The present thesis is probably the first systematic examination of the Christological framework of Epiphanius' work *Angyrotos* (or
Ancoratus). It is an attempt to show what St Epiphanius' Christological teaching was, on the basis of this work, as well as how it compared with the general dogmatic teaching of the Church. In addition, this thesis seeks to provide a 'factual', as it were, assessment of the importance and size of Epiphanius' contribution to the formation of the Church's dogma. It is in the process of doing this that we discovered in St Epiphanius not only the bearer and defender of the truth of the faith but also the profound interpreter of the truth which Jesus Christ himself taught, the Apostles interpreted and the Church received and appropriated in her life.

This first attempt of ours, written in Greek and then translated into English, has reached its completion after much time and effort, thanks to the generous guidance and advice of the Very Reverend Protopresbyter Dr George D. Dragas of the University of Durham. For all his fatherly heart has offered me I express my deepest thanks. I should also like to thank the Head of the Church of Cyprus, His Beatitude Archbishop Chrysostom, whose fatherly and continuous interest in me supported me during the writing of this work.

Finally I consider the completion of this work as a fulfilment of a personal obligation towards St Epiphanius who invested the throne of St Barnabas the Apostle with fame and glorified the Church of Christ. May his prayers liberate my suffering country and support Christ's Church in Cyprus in the years to come.

Nicosia, 12 May 1993, St Epiphanius Day,

N.I.Nicolaides
INTRODUCTION

1. Concerning the Life and Works of Epiphanius

1.a Epiphanius' Life

Cyprus was the first country, apart from the geographical region of greater Palestine and Syria, to receive Christianity. The word of the New Testament had been spread by Christians a long time before the Apostles Barnabas and Saul (Paul) (1) who, after Stephen's persecution (2), came to Cyprus and became the precursors of Christianity on the island (3). Indeed, many martyrs and saints adorn the calendar of saints of the Church of Cyprus in the first centuries AD (4). The 4th century, however, constitutes a landmark in the history of the Church of Cyprus because it is during this period that the personality of the Bishop of Constantia (Salamis) (5) and Archbishop of Cyprus, Epiphanius, dominates and honours this Church.

According to existing information, Epiphanius was born in Besanduc of Palestine, "in the region of Eleutheroupolis" (6). In spite of the fact that his students, Polybius, Bishop of Rinocura, and Johannes, Senior, who are supposedly the authors of his biography (7), mention, among such other information, that Epiphanius was of Jewish origin (8), this information, which is accepted by many others, is put to the test by one of Epiphanius' own allusions: "we who have been called from among the gentiles were not baptised in the name of the unbegotten and the begotten, but in the name of the Father and the Son" (9). In this way there can be no certainty about his origins. The use of the verb 'were baptised' (ἐπατρισμένοι) in the first person plural, as well as his very name 'Epiphanius', a Greek name, strengthen the view that he was not a Jew but a gentile. As far as the date of his birth is concerned, many Patristic scholars believe it should be the year 310, on the basis of a reference of the Latin Father Jerome,
an admirer of Epiphanius who says that the latter was already very old when he visited Jerusalem in the year 392 (10). Nevertheless, Palladius’ reference (11) to Epiphanius as Archbishop of Cyprus for 36 years, coupled with the fact that he died on 12 May 403, leads us to the conclusion that 367 must be the date of his election as Bishop of Constantia.

There is no sufficient information about the period before Epiphanius’ arrival at Cyprus and his accession to the throne of Constantia. The few references relate that his family (12) was Christian and that as a young man of twenty he visited Egypt, where Gnostic groups attempted to entice him (13) into joining them, which gave him the opportunity to condemn these heresies to the Bishops of this area. It is not unlikely for this event to have also produced the urge for his beginning his study of heresies.

During his study in Egypt, Epiphanius came into contact with monasticism, which was then flourishing in that area, and it could well be that it is from that time that one should date his acquaintance and friendship with Athanasius, whom he mentions in many places in his writings and whose texts or excerpts of texts he often cites (14).

His stay in Egypt also allowed him to get first hand knowledge of the Arian heresy, while it is likely that he also had personal contact with Arius, if one is to judge from the way he describes him in his Panarion (15). His experiences from Egypt’s monasticism and undoubtedly the influence which was exerted on him by Hilarion, the great father and initiator of monasticism in Palestine, turned out to be decisive factors in Epiphanius’ life, for he followed a monastic life and eventually became the founder and abbot of the Palaion Monastery near Besanduc, where he stayed for thirty years (16).
The ascetic life and devotion to the right faith and teaching rendered Epiphanius known to both those who lived near him and those far away, to the extent that many started visiting him and gaining great benefits from this. His prestige was so strong that, despite his being a stern supporter of Nicaea and Athanasius the Great, no one among the proto-Arians, nor even any of the Emperors, ever dared threaten him (17) or create any obstacles to his work, either before his accession to the throne of Constantia or after it. It is characteristic that whereas the Emperor Vallens (364-378) ventured in persecuting Athanasius and Basil, he did not raise a finger against Epiphanius, precisely because he was aware of, or even deterred by, his universal authority. Indeed, this spiritual and ecclesiastical authority was the impulsive factor behind the Cypriot bishop's decision to elect him (367) as Bishop of Constantia and Archbishop of Cyprus (18). Also, it was this authority that made those "from Suedra" in Pamphylia appeal to him. These Christians, due to Athanasius' death and in the absence of any other abler than him, as it appears from their letter (19), as well as because they considered Epiphanius equal to Athanasius, "asked him to expound to them the right and sound faith", which he did and this work of his became known as "Ancoratus", because it aligns the inquiring mind about life and salvation like an anchor" (20). Similarly, those from Coele Syria wrote to Epiphanius in order to urge him write his other major work "Panarion": For it is acknowledged, not just by us, but by all who listen, that Christ has in this generation raised you as a new Apostle to us and a preacher, a new John" (21). Besides, it was this very authority that the later accuser of Epiphanius, the Patriarch of Alexandria Theophilus (22), exploited, in order to induce him to move against John Chrysostom because of the "Tall Brethren".
Epiphanius as head of the Church of Cyprus, shepherded it for 36 years (376-403). During his tenure as Archbishop all the heresies in Cyprus, especially the Jewish and Gnostic ones, were suppressed, and idolatry finally ended, if one judges from the inscription, dating from Epiphanius’ time, on the mosaic floor of a Bishop’s house in the archaeological area of Courion, near Limassol, which bears witness to the replacement of Apollo’s worship by that of Christ (24). Again, all that is mentioned about Epiphanius’ life by his biographers which relates to the decrees of the Emperor Theodosius the Great (25), namely that Epiphanius’ views were considered as laws by the Cypriots, is historically supported and attests, once more to the truth about the greatness of his authority. This fact was indeed the threshold and the basis of the role which the Church of Cyprus was destined to play through the persons of her leaders during the long and eventful life of God’s people in Cyprus. Another sector of Epiphanius’ activities was the foundation of Monasticism in Cyprus. Since, as has already been mentioned, he had been a disciple of the famous monk Hilarion as well as the founder of a monastery, there can be no doubt that it was he who laid the foundations and systematised Cypriot Monasticism, as far as its coenobitic aspect is concerned (26). Moreover, his love for the monastic life could be established by his behaviour after his meeting with the “Tall Brethren” in Constantinople, whose explanations he accepted, after he had listened to them, and by his immediate departure for Cyprus before the arrival of Theophilus (27), whose intentions he had already sensed.

In spite of the fact that Cyprus, being an island, did not at that time facilitate comfortable communication with the other churches, Epiphanius, who seems to have been naturally endowed with exceptional health and strength, was able to maintain close relations
with them and to retain his solidarity with other fathers of his time. Thus, he had first hand knowledge of the ecclesiastical affairs and theological problems of every local church and of the universal church as well. Indeed, the citation within his own work of direct information on and even texts of other fathers, such as Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Athanasius the Great, et al., or even the citation of the decisions and minutes of synods, or his correspondence, such as his epistle to Basil the Great (28), or, even, his transposition to Antioch, probably around 374 in order to act as mediator in the dispute between Vitalius and Paulinus (29), or, his visits to Rome (382), Jerusalem (393) and Constantinople (403), all bear ample witness to the wide range and the immediacy of his communication with the whole Church. His ability to speak five languages - a detail which is known to us from Jerome who calls him pentaglott (πενταγλωσσος) - namely, Greek, Syriac, Hebrew, Egyptian and Latin (30), the multitude of historical and geographical citations, all that he says about the heresies, and also the comparison of citations from the biblical texts, of the Old and the New Testament, or of the ecclesiastical tradition, all confirm the fact that he was gifted with a multifaceted mind, a powerful memory and an exact knowledge of the orthodox faith, as well as wondrous ability.

Whether Epiphanius took part in the 2nd Ecumenical Synod (381) is not certain. Indeed, this Synod, which was originally an endemic one, was summoned by Theodosius the Great with the ultimate purpose "to deal with the serious problem of filling in canonically the 'most distinguished' throne of the Church of Constantinople" (31). The Minutes of this Synod (32) contain the signatures of 4 Cypriot bishops without mentioning the name of Epiphanius. What can be conjectured, however, is one of two things. He either did not go to Constantinople at all for the purpose of
participating in the said Synod, simply because he was not invited, given this Synod’s initial character, in which case the four Cypriot bishops who happened to be in Constantinople at that time signed its decisions, knowing, however, full well that what was decided was in full accord with Epiphanius’ opinion, or one may put forth the other conjecture, that Epiphanius did go to Constantinople and did take part in the meetings, but departed for Rome before the final stage of the proceedings was over, having first instructed the Cypriot bishops to sign, so that he could participate in the other Synod which was summoned by Pope Damasus (382) in order to recognise Paulinus as the lawful bishop of Antioch instead of Flavian and to condemn Apollinarism (33).

As regards Epiphanius’ position not only against Origen but also against the other heretics, it is not right to see it as an expression of personal empathy. His stance is determined by his primary aim which is to preserve the orthodox faith from any attempt to adulterate it and to guard and protect the members of the Church from the danger of deceit. He is fully conscious of his attitude and this is why he places in the beginning of his *Panarion* the following statement: “*We beseech you further [to forgive us] if you should ever find us speaking in anger or calling certain people deceivers or impostors or wretches, even though it is not our custom to ridicule or make fun of people; it is just our zeal against the sects and our desire to turn our readers from them. The very need of the verbal contest imposes this labour on us, that we may turn our readers away from them and show that their deeds, rites, and teachings are completely foreign to our way of thinking, so that from our words and the keenness of the debate we may both give evidence of our freedom of spirit and turn some people away from them, even if it is through language that seems severe*”
In his *Ancoratus*, addressing himself to a certain heretic, he says: 

"Tell me, my dear, for I call you dear, because I do not hate anyone, except the devil and the works of the devil and false belief; as for you, I pray that you may come to God's truth and may not perish in blasphemy against God" (35). Even in the case of Origen, in making a comment on his allegorical method, Epiphanius calls him θεηλατον, i.e. "a person who is driven mad or pursued by God" (36). Elsewhere he will say: "This Origen, whom may God forgive" (37).

Thus, if Epiphanius turns against Origen, he is fighting Origenism and basically all those who, misusing Origenist ideas, attempted to create or even to justify their heretical views. It is in this context that one should place his visits to Jerusalem (393) and to Constantinople (403), as well as the clashes he had during these visits with John of Jerusalem and John of Constantinople. The fact that he felt obliged, while in Palestine, to ordain to the presbyterate Jerome’s brother Paulinianus, on account of which he was blamed for uncanonical action, is explained by Epiphanius himself in his epistle to John of Jerusalem (38). In his apology Epiphanius explains that the ordination took place in a monastery, which did not belong to the pastoral jurisdiction of the bishop of Jerusalem and, recalling the spiritual needs of the monastery, refers to similar events in Cyprus which do not require any restrictive policy (39).

Epiphanius’s advice during his visit to Palestine, found in an epistle (40), to deliver to destruction a veil bearing the image of Christ at the village of Anablatha, in the region of Bethel, gave rise to the view that he opposed iconic representations of the person of Christ, of the angels and of the saints. Besides, the extant texts which are attributed to Epiphanius, even though there are doubts as to their precise paternity, make him appear as an opponent of iconic
representations (41). Since, however, this matter requires special study, which would involve extensive research, not envisaged in the present effort, we shall restrict ourselves, in putting forth our disagreement with the view of the iconoclastic stance of Epiphanius in the context of the 7th and 8th century iconoclastic debates, to stressing that the entire teaching of Epiphanius on the subject of Christology, and especially the chapter on the relations and exchange of properties of the two natures in the person of Christ, supply no basis for any suspicion that there is in Epiphanius a tendency towards monophysitism, which was, as is generally known, the bedrock and substratum of iconoclasm. In addition, the extant dialogue (42) between the iconophile deacon Epiphanius and the iconoclast bishop Gregory during the discussions of the 7th Ecumenical Synod, put to question the view that Epiphanius was an opponent of iconoclastic representations. Finally, the construction of the basilica of St Epiphanius in Salamis (43) and the inclusion of iconography in it portraying even Epiphanius himself - at the request of his disciples - and the total lack of any reference to iconoclasm among the 80 heresies of Epiphanius' *Panarion* constitute additional grounds for questioning the alleged view of Epiphanius' opposition to icons. As for the case of Anablatha, it could be that Epiphanius opposed a bad representation of Christ rather than the representation as such.

As regards Epiphanius' visit to Constantinople, which was undertaken in response to what Theophilus of Alexandria had said concerning the protection of the Tall Brethren by John Chrysostom, it was clearly due to his zeal for the maintenance of the faith (44). In spite, however, of the fact that this visit contributed to some extent to the condemnatory decision of the Synod of the Oak (403) against John Chrysostom, Epiphanius himself did discern the aim of Theophilus and
departed from Constantinople before the Synod was held (45). It was during his return journey to Cyprus that he met with his death on 12 May 403.

Epiphanius was recognised as a father and teacher of the Church while still in life. This was due to his sanctity, which was revealed in the miracles he performed while alive and also to his strict attachment to the orthodox faith and the authentic interpretation of the dogmas in accordance with the Church’s tradition. He was distinguished not only as a dogmatician and antiheretical father, but also as a biblical commentator, as his extant works show. That he was also a liturgist is indicated by the extant Armenian version of his Prayer of Anaphora (46). He is justly, then, characterised by his contemporaries as “a remnant of the ancient sanctity and father of all bishops” (47), as “renown for his piety” (48), as “the most distinguished bishop of his time” (49), as an upholder of the uncompromised line of the Church of the martyrs and confessors (50), but also as the person who, on account of his immense reputation, upheld and secured the autocephaly of the Church of Cyprus (51), in spite of the critical rearrangements which took place during the 4th and the 5th century.

1.b Epiphanius’ writings

Apart from the Ancoratus, which will be discussed below, Epiphanius’ writings comprise the following:

a) The Panarion

A dogmatic and antiheretical work, like the Ancoratus, which Epiphanius began to write in 374 (52) and completed in 377. The title Panarion (53) means, according to Epiphanius’ own explanation “a medical box against beastly bites” (54), i.e. a first aid kit which contains remedies for those bitten (55) by the heresies of the snake.
Epiphanius wrote this work in response to a request from the co-presbyters Acacius and Paul, the archimandrites-hegoumens of Monasteries and the people of Coele Syria. It comprises 80 heresies, of which 20 predate Christianity and 60 are connected with the Christian faith. At the end of it there is a synoptic exposition of the orthodox faith entitled *A Discourse on the Faith* (56). The contents of this work are summarised in the chapter entitled *Anakephalaiosis* (Recapitulation) (57), which constitutes an epitome of the topics treated in the *Panarion*. The *Anakephalaiosis* is probably not the work of Epiphanius, but of someone else. Although it was based on other similar works by Justin, Irenaeus and Hippolytus, the *Panarion* is a work of tremendous effort, involving lots of time and labour. It is an invaluable mine of historical-dogmatic information on the structure and activities of the early heresies which serve as starting points for explaining the faith and life of the Church. The originality of the work consists in the fact that it preserves texts from the ancient ecclesiastical literature which would otherwise have been lost (58).

b) **On Measures and Weights**

This work of Epiphanius was issued around 392. In spite of its misleading title, it represents an introduction and encyclopaedic study of the Old Testament. Only the first part and some extracts from the second part of the Greek original survive (59). There is extant, however, a full Syriac translation (60). The work refers to the canon of the books and the translations of the Old Testament, to Jewish and Gentile measures and weights and to the geographical place names of the Old Testament.

c) **On the Twelve Stones used as decoration by Aaron**

In this work, written around 393, Epiphanius explains the meaning of the twelve stones which were placed on the breast plate of the Jewish
High Priest. The full work survives in a Georgian translation (61). There are also two epitomies of it in Greek and Latin (62).

d) Epistles (63)
1. To John of Jerusalem
2. To Jerome (2 epistles)
3. To Eusebius, Marcellus, Vivianus and Carpus and to the Egyptians
4. To the Presbyters of Pisidia
5. To Basileianus
6. To Magnus the Presbyter of Antioch
7. To the Antidikomarianites of Arabia
8. To the Clergy of Egypt
9. To Theodosius the Emperor
10. A Martyrion to co-citizens
11. A Dogmatic Epistle

2. The Ancoratus: Its content and scope

This work (64) was written as a response to a letter sent by the presbyters "from Pamphylia, the city of Souedroi" Matidius, Tarsinus, Neon and Numerius (65) and the "politician" (politeuomenos) Palladius (66), on account of certain heretics, who, "leaving aside the blasphemy against Jesus, commit irreverence against God in another way raising their own tongue high against the Holy Spirit" and "speaking unjustly in the highest" (67). The Ancoratus is placed chronologically "in the time of Valentinian and Valens the kings and in the tenth year of their reign" (68), which means that it was written around 374. The name of the work 'Ancoratus', as we mentioned previously means, according to the synopsis of the work itself, "that it serves as an anchor in leading the mind in its search about life and salvation" (69), due to the many dangers which the heresies cause.
The Ancoratus is divided into 120 chapters (70). The classification of the subjects in the Ancoratus according to chapters is not very strictly or absolutely specified. Although it is a fact that the epistolographers, as we noted above, ask Epiphanius to expound for them the teaching of the Church concerning the Holy Spirit, apparently because of the activity of the group of Pneumatomachoi, Epiphanius, instead, expounds in a precise way the general dogmatic faith of the Church.

The first chapters of the Ancoratus basically examine the subject of Triadology and go on, in many parallel occasions, to discuss the subject of Christology. At the same time it draws the attention of the faithful to the dangers deriving from heresies. Thus, we would say that the Ancoratus is basically occupied with subjects relating to Triadology and Christology, but not in the way which one would expect from a contemporary systematic Theology. Epiphanius’ theological thought and perspective conjoins the subject of the Trinity with that of the economy in Christ and considers the second one, in particular, as an absolute given with the first, while he gives the impression that the chapter of Trinitarian theology is directly interpreted and influenced by the Christological one. This attitude explains why in the Ancoratus there is a parallel treatment of these two subjects, as we have already noted. He does not fail, since his work is anti-heretical in character, to supply the names or even the list of the heresies (chapters 12 and 13) or even additional information, such as chronological and genealogical lists (ch. 110) etc. In order to construct his teaching or to oppose the heretical positions, he draws his argumentations from the Holy Scripture, the traditional faith and even the liturgical and sacramental praxis and life of the Church. Thus, in the Ancoratus we come across baptismal statements, as for example
the statement, "we seal in the name of the Father and in the name of the Son and in the name of the Holy Spirit, the one seal of the Trinity" (71), as well as liturgical prayers, as for example the prayer, "He, therefore, the holy Logos who is living and enhypostatic, the heavenly king, the genuine son, who is always with the Father, who came forth from the Father, "the effulgence of his glory and character of his hypostasis", "the eikon of the Father" in truth, the one who sits on the same throne with the one who naturally begat him" (72)... or, even, the prayer, "this is the knowledge that the Holy Spirit taught us, this is the perfection which the Father revealed to us, this is indeed the life which the Logos incarnate granted to us, this also the habitation building which the Holy Spirit constructed for us" (73). More analytically the whole structure of the Ancoratus can be summarized as follows:

In chapters 2-29 he develops the teaching concerning the Holy Trinity. God is one, one in his essence (ousia) but a Trinity according to his hypostases ... "true Father and enhypostatic and true Son and enhypostatic and true Holy Spirit and enhypostatic, three beings one Godhead one essence one doxology one God" (74). The three persons are not understood "as a coalescing, for the Father is Father, the Son is Son, the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit, but the Trinity is not alienated from the unity and the identity" (75). The names of the persons are mononyms and are born eternally. "For the Trinity is always Trinity and never receives an addition" (76). "The Father, then, is unbegotten... and the Son begotten but uncreated ... and the Holy Spirit is always, neither begotten nor created ... but from the same essence of the Father and the Son..." (77) and "proceeds from the Father" (78).
In chapters 30-52 he develops again his teaching on the Trinity, but now he refers to the work of the Trinity through the economy of God the Logos which he undertook for the sake of the human being, and so he calls the heretics to perceive “the depths of the work of God and not to turn the grace into disgrace” (79). Thus, the incarnation and “every consequence” “of the incarnation which took place economically for us”, cannot be misinterpreted and misused against the Godhead of the Logos, because God had to keep the whole economy “of the flesh”, so that he might not “wipe out the character of the truth” (80). Strengthening the Godhead of the Logos and at the same time interpreting the work of the economy in these chapters, he elaborates most aptly the aspects of the subject-matter of both Triadology and Christology. Thus, his statement is typical: “For how could the economy be found to be in truth, if it did not have the consequence of the need of the incarnation?” (81) The Logos, then, “possessed the whole economy when he came, namely, flesh and soul and whatever there is in man” (82). In this way he actually explains the progress (83), the thirst and the hunger (84), the passion and the death of Christ (85) and underlines the fact that all these occur in the sense that “his Godhead having taken up the suffering of the flesh, is impassible and was and remained such, without suffering any loss of impassibility nor any alienation from eternity” (86). Whereas he opposes those who deny the Godhead of the Logos, the Arians and others, at the same time he supplies answers to all those who misinterpret orthodox Christology, Apollinarists, Docetists, and others. Thus we understand why in these chapters (30-52) he still speaks about the propriety of rendering worship to the “flesh” of Christ (87). He presents, in other words, a wonderful connection between theology and economy and at the same time he achieves an
apposite transition from Economy to Theology. As a climax he will stress emphatically, that if the Son is a creature "why does he come to be with us? and what benefit is this to us" (88)?

Chapter 53 constitutes in a sense a respite in his teaching. Here he attempts to offer an explanation of the transgression of the heretics and to express his wonder "why indeed the lovers of disputes turned to allegory and made the mistake of taking as true what was said in a manner of speaking (tropically)" (89). This position of his will give him the opportunity to turn against the Origenistic theses, and speak, above all, against the allegorical method, which Origen adopted and which Epiphanius deems to be an erroneous interpretation of the Scriptures and a fundamental principle of his errors (90).

Thus from chapter 54ff he will basically speak about the _imago dei_ in man at his creation, he will lay down the genealogical and chronological lists of the Roman Emperors, dwell upon the construction of the human body, turn to the reason for the weakness of the "flesh", i.e. of human nature, and will lay stress again on the mission of the Saviour, who came "in the likeness of the flesh of sin" in order to fulfill the economy (91) and to be made "a vessel of the wisdom and the Godhead as the Christ" (92). He will conclude, however, once again with his initial thesis that the work of the economy is the result of the synergy of the three persons of the Godhead (93) and will crown his subject with the thesis concerning the "enhypostatic" existence of the Holy Spirit, "who proceeds from the Father" (94), and concerning the Son, as the natural, true, genuine Son, one and only from one and only (95), and will emphatically point out that, "the Father is always, and the Son always, and the Holy Spirit always" (96).
In chapter 74 Epiphanius will observe that up to this point "we the weak and uninstructed make no pretence for possessing any wisdom on the Trinity and the consubstantiality of God the Father and the Holy Spirit, nor do we leave ourselves exposed to the trickery of human beings" (97), but rather proceed to gather from the divine Scriptures witnesses so that we may bring together those who wish to be faithful and reject the false and vain believers" (98). This is why, as he himself will say again, "because the safe confession of the Saviour's inhomination and incarnate presence is security of our salvation and confirmation of the hope of our resurrection from the dead and regeneration, we shall in a short while add to our labour so that those who wish to look more accurately into the divine Scriptures may persist in gathering and elaborating the word" (99). What he means is that he will dwell further on the subject of Christology which he regards as security of salvation.

Thus, in chapter 75 he will turn his teaching to the context of Christology and will place his subject concerning the one Christ within orthodox parameters, as follows: "For, this Saviour, the holy one, who came down from heaven, who was born again having been conceived by the Holy Spirit, who took up flesh, who is the Logos become flesh, without having his nature altered, who with his Godhead took up humanity, who being perfect from the Father came to fulfill a perfect economy, came into this world for us and for our salvation. He was the one who took up human flesh and soul, being perfect from the Father, inhominated among us not in appearance (docetically), but truly, who recreated in himself a perfect man from Mary the Theotokos through the Holy Spirit" (100). This is the text which Epiphanius puts first in chapter 75 amongst the many another Christological texts which will follow, so that he may focus in a few
lines on the whole content of his Christological and Soteriological teaching.

Following on this, Epiphanius will develop in chapters 75-81 the topics of the “incarnation” (ἐνσάρκωσις) and “inhomination” (ἐνανθρώπωσις) of the Logos, in order to combat the Arian theses, and will defend the view that Christ is perfect man, i.e. that he possessed soul, body, mind “and whatever else is human” (καὶ εἰ τι ἔτερον) (101) “without sin” (ἀνευ ἀμαρτίας) (102), or tendency towards sin (103), in order to dethrone not only the Arian but also the Apollinarian error and to teach that the inhomination was full and perfect and not in appearance, and thus, may shut the mouths of the deceit of the docetists (104). The extent of his soteriological Christology will reach its climax at the point where he will place by anticipation the problems of the two natures, the divine and the human, as well as the exchange of properties or even the names of the one nature with those of the other, and will become an accurate and clear interpreter of the faith of the Church while emerging as anti-Nestorian and anti-Apollinarian. His teaching at this point is rather amazing, because, as we further explain in the “Appendix” of this thesis, it is completely identical at many points with the Definition (Horos) of the Fourth Ecumenical Synod (451). As a token of the Christological shape of his teaching we may refer to the following text: “The same one is God and the same one is man, for he did not produce a confusion, but combined the two in one; he did not enter into non-existence, but empowering an earthly body by the Godhead he united it with one power and gathered it into one Godhead; he was one Lord, one Christ, not two Christs not two Gods; there was in him a spiritual body and in him too an incomprehensible Godhead, what suffered was not corrupted and what was impassable remained
incorruptible and the whole was incorruptibility; God the Lord, sitting at the right hand of the Father, without abandoning the flesh, but uniting it into one reality and the whole reality into one Godhead sitting at the right hand of the Father" (105).

In chapter 82 he will maintain that whatever he mentioned previously is in fact the teaching which is developed by the Law and the Prophets, i.e. in the Old Testament, by the Gospels and the Apostles, i.e. in the New Testament, and that it is directly connected with the confession of faith "which has been immaculately preserved in the catholic Church from the time of the Apostles to our own times (the time of Epiphanius)" (106), i.e. the tradition of the Church. He will then go on from there to introduce (in ch. 82) the topic of the teaching of the Hieracites "who think and speak about the resurrection of our own (flesh), but not of our very flesh, but of another in its stead" (107). Again he says that "he is compelled to speak out" (108).

Thus, he starts in chapter 83 his teaching on the resurrection, gathering arguments and examples, apart from the Holy Scripture and the faith of the Church, even from mythology and the natural world. In developing his views he will oppose the Manichaeans, who say "that there will be no resurrection of either body or soul" (109), and the Origenists, who think "that this flesh ... shall not rise again, but another one will be given in its stead by God" (110), and will speak, at the same time, about the resurrection of Christ and develop with clarity his teaching as to how "the passion was reckoned to the Godhead" of Christ (111), and how the "Lordly man" suffers (112). He will further defend the point "that in his sojourn with us the Lord took up flesh from our flesh and God the Logos became a man like us, so that he might give salvation to us in his Godhead and might
suffer for us human beings in his humanity, dissolving suffering by
his suffering and putting to death through his own death” (113). This
is why Christ becomes, by virtue of his resurrection, the “firstfruits of
those fallen asleep” (114). And so, “we worship the crucified one,
the one who was buried and rose again” as Lord (115).

Epiphanius is firmly attached, in his exposition of his faith, to
what Holy Scripture says, what the tradition of the Church preserved
and what the Fathers have interpreted. “For Scripture always says the
truth” (116) and “this is what the Church of God has always upheld”
(117). Indeed, this is what “her children (the Church’s) received from
holy fathers, namely, to keep the faith of the holy Apostles” (118). As
for his teaching, he will say, that he acts “without curiosity and
without quarrelsome intention” (119), not because he advocates “for
God, but because he understands with true piety, so that we may not
perish and may not speak as those who do not understand; for we
speak as human beings of what we have understood” (120). He
concludes with the thesis, that it is as if “he draws the knowledge of
God as a drop from an ocean” (121) when he acknowledges the
magnitude of his economy, which is operated for us and is fulfilled
“by the Father’s good pleasure and the Son’s will together with the
will of the Holy Spirit” (122). In this way he reaches a conclusion
which brings together again Christology and Triadology.

At the end of the Ancoratus two Baptismal Symbols of Faith are
included (chapters 119-120, according to J.P. Migne’s edition, and chs
118-119, according to K. Holl’s edition) the first corresponding to the
Symbol of Nicaea-Constantinople and the second being an elaboration
of the first. The existence of these two Symbols (Creeds) has been a
matter of intense treatment by the scholars. There are contrasting
opinions about this among the specialists. Some argue that the first
Symbol belongs to the Church of Cyprus or/and to Epiphanius, with regard to the articles which the Synod of Constantinople (381), the Second Ecumenical, formulated, and that it was received and endorsed almost unedited at this same Synod. The same scholars argue that the second Symbol constitutes an elaboration of the first, which was made by Epiphanius, so that various heresies may be effectively opposed (namely, Arianism, Sabellianism, Docetism, Apollinarism, Pneumatomachianism, etc.). Others, on the contrary, defend the view that the first Symbol, as far as the terms of Constantinople are concerned, has no relation to Epiphanius or to the Church of Cyprus and that it was later introduced by some other hand into the Ancoratus, sometime after the Fourth Ecumenical Synod, when the Second Synod was recognized as Ecumenical.

Unfortunately the scope of this research does not envisage a full treatment of this discussion. We restrict ourselves, however, to saying that the views which do not attribute this Symbol to Epiphanius cannot sufficiently exclude the possibility of the existence of an identical Symbol, parallel to this Baptismal one, which was in use in the Church of Cyprus and which Epiphanius sends to the recipients of his epistles. Thus, it is possible that the Synod of 381 could have taken in absolute or relative consideration the Symbol which already existed in the Ancoratus. It is also possible that the Symbol of the Ancoratus was later on revised by some other hand, so that it might fall in line with that of Constantinople. If this view is rejected, then one is left with the view of an arbitrary interpolation into the text of the Ancoratus which occurred at a belated time, since the Second Ecumenical Synod was much later recognized. In any case, as we previously mentioned, here we can only point out this matter and acknowledge that an exhaustive investigation of the relevant texts and the use of the existing
bibliography on this matter (123) may shed further light and lead to firmer conclusions as to the origin of these Symbols of the Faith and their relation to Epiphanius.

Recapitulating what was said about Ancoratus, we note that the whole structure and purpose of this writing shows it as an attempt to produce an epitome of the dogmatic teaching of the Church on the fundamental subjects of Triadology and Christology as they are extended to the subjects of salvation and deification within an anti-heretical context, while at the same time it conjoins in mutual interdependence theology and economy. The perspective of Epiphanius is specified by the viewpoint that the truths of the faith constitute a unified, undivided and unbroken whole, and for this reason when a principle of faith is cancelled then the whole edifice is threatened, just as when one term of faith is shaken then its defence brings into view the concurrence of all the principles of the faith. It is exactly within such a context of a theological way of thinking that the whole structure of Ancoratus should be placed, inasmuch as it presents the convocation of all those elements which relate both the Triadology and Christology and have salvation as their first and main consequence.

Having in mind this perspective of Epiphanius in our treatment of the subject, we brought together at the start the parameters of Triadology and Christology (in chapter I), as they are shaped at the time of Epiphanius. We then turned to the scope of our attempt, namely, to the particular subject-matter of our research, which is Christology, since it could not be divorced from theology in general, with the view to elaborating its various aspects, as they are given to us in the Ancoratus and as their historical context combines them.
CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL-DOGMATIC FRAMEWORK OF THE CHRISTOLOGICAL DOGMA OF THE 4TH CENTURY

1. The connection between Christology and Triadology
1.a. The Christological dogma as theme/question related to Triadology

Before we turn to our main theme, the Christology of Epiphanius according to his Ancoratus, we consider it necessary to offer in broad outline the historical dogmatic context of the Christological dogma, as shaped in the fourth century, so that Epiphanius' position as expounded in his work Ancoratus may be better understood.

The idea that the Christological dogma presents itself as a problem of formulation and development after the Synods of Nicaea and Constantinople, i.e. after the formulation and development of the Triadological dogma, is erroneous (1). Already since the first apostolic and postapostolic times, as well as afterwards, we observe the development and elaboration of the Christological dogma (2). It was natural that the entire form of this dogma would not have remained undeveloped, inasmuch as the Christological dogma is connected directly with the Triadological one and whatever development the second undergoes, i.e. the Triadological, has an immediate effect on the first, the Christological. Besides, during the entire ante-Nicene period the examination of Triadology always occurred in conjunction with, or rather by means of, Christology. According to Irenaeus, the representative of this tendency, "the invisible aspect of the Son is the Father and the visible aspect of the Father is the Son" (3). Since Athanasius the Great, who is the first and main representative, the
examination of the persons and the essence of God is made by the
fathers for its own sake and without any reference to the form of the
economic work of the Persons of the Trinity (4). The extent to which
Triadology was connected with Christology appears from the problem
which the heresy of Arius created as we shall see immediately below.

1.b. The heresy of Arius as Triadological and Christological
challenge

The matter which Arius raised with his views, as regards the
hypostasis of the second person of the Trinity, offended crucially not
only the Triadological but also the Christological dogma. Arius
declared that "he (the Son) came to exist by will and counsel before
times and ages ... The Son has a beginning, whereas God is
beginningless" (5). Thus, the Son, not having the beginninglessness,
has a beginning, hence he is a creature and not God. "For as all
things came into being out of non being, and as all existing beings
are creatures and things made, God's very Logos has also come to
be out of non beings, and there was when he was not; and he was not
before he came to be, but he too had had a beginning of his creation"
(6). With these views Arius rejected the Godhead of the Son. For
Arius, the Son is God in a metaphorical manner, by grace and not in a
metaphysical sense. This took place because of his ascension to the
divine glory and because he remained firmly attached to the good
according to God's foreknowledge (7). He maintained the glory which
God granted him by foreknowledge even during his incarnation, i.e.
during his union with the human body. According to Arius, the
incarnation of the Logos was to be understood as a union of the Logos
with a human body, which was deprived of a soul. The place of the
soul was taken by the Logos, who finally became the soul of Christ the man. Arius' position concerning the incarnation of the Logos, helped him enormously and was most convenient for his doctrine of the Logos as a created being. According to Epiphanius, “... they (those of Arius) praise him as having obtained a true flesh from Mary, and everything that there is in a human being with the exception of a soul; so that when he hears about hunger, or thirst, or tiredness ... they might tell you afterwards, that the flesh does not operate these things by itself, if it does not have a soul” (8). Arius' 'exploitation' of the deliberate human attributes of Christ is quite obvious. He used these attributes to support his view concerning the creatureliness of the Logos. Trouble, sorrow, joy etc. are psychological attributes, and hence attributes of the Logos, since the soul of Christ is this very Logos. Therefore the Logos is a created being. This view of Arius, however, concerning the inhomination of the Logos, while helping him in his teaching about God, led him at the same time to a peculiar Christological scheme, according to which Christ consisted of a created Logos, who was a soul, and a body (9). In Arius' view, however, we do not have an inhomination but a humanization (a conversion into a human being) of the Logos. Thus, in this way the entire teaching of the Church concerning Christ as the inhominated Divine Logos and Saviour was overturned. “What benefit, then, asks Epiphanius, could the creature offer; or what use could he be for our salvation” (10)? This is why in the reactions of the fathers the stress is laid on the uncreatedness and beginninglessness of the nature of the Logos while at the same time they secure the integrity and completeness of the assumption of the human nature by the Divine Logos. Otherwise, with Arius' view, a semi-perfect being was introduced, a sort of being that was of a semi-
divine kind, who was neither truly Divine nor really human, and who most plainly could not deliver redemption and salvation to humanity (11).

It is a fact that Arius' theological rationalism was incubated within a climate which favoured its development and expansion. The problem of the relation between God the Father and God the Son as well as of the inhominated Divine Logos, would have moved towards its solution through Arius' doctrine which satisfied the sceptics of his time. Platonism and Neoplatonism found an ally in the quarters of Christianity, a powerful Christian thinker, Arius, whose ideas about God and mediators were related to their own. Christ would finally be accepted within the context of the philosophical and religious thought of Arius' times, because Arius' views would facilitate the identification of the God of the Christians, i.e. of Christ, with some sort of higher being (12). Besides, the views of the Gnostics concerning theogony and the transcendent God, middle enhypostatic substances, which were emanated out of the infinite substance of God, and about the aions, on the head of which one found the Creator, who was identified with the God of the Old Testament and of the Law (13), now found with Arius the ground for penetrating more easily the quarters of Christianity (14). In addition, the known system of subordinationism, which Origen had supported (15), as well as all these things which were taught by Sabellius on the one hand and Paul of Samosata on the other, although not their entirety, did find, in one way or another, in the teachings of Arius, a most welcomed identity or convergence (16). Arius, therefore, created with his teaching a problem which was theological, Christological and ecclesiological. The point was that a dispute about the Godhead of Christ incurred the total collapse of Christianity. It was the pupil, then, of Paul of
Samosata and his successor Lucian, who had been teachers in the school of Antioch, that was going to create an enormous uproar not only in the Church of Alexandria but also in the entire Church for a rather long time.

The occasion, then, of the rise of the Arian heresy, which represented not just an attempt to distort the dogma of the Church but a complex operation which brought together a multitude of heretical inclinations and conditions, provided the opportunity and the crucial basis for the fathers of the Church to clarify not only the Trinitarian dogma, but also to specify the Christological dogma, which is absolutely dependent on the former one. The consubstantiality of the Logos with the Father is specified by the first General Synod of the Catholic Church, the First Ecumenical one, summoned at Nicaea in Bythinia in 325 (17). The proceedings of the Synod, which were guided by Alexander of Alexandria and his deacon Athanasius, among many others, led to the condemnation of Arius and to the declaration of the dogma of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father on the basis of the catholic ecclesiastical and biblical perception of the Son and his relations with the Father. The Symbol of Nicaea was based on one of the oldest baptismal Symbols of the Church of that time (18).

All this made it subsequently necessary to clarify and solve the problem of the two natures of Christ, the divine and the human, as well as their relations with each other, and also the role of the one Christ with reference to the salvation of humanity. As was stated earlier, Christological problems had also arisen in previous times and had been connected with aspects of the doctrine of Christ. Now, however, this matter was posited in a direct way and a deeper examination of its inner logic was a pressing need. It is to these developments concerning the Christological dogma as they emerged
after the decision of Nicaea, that we shall turn next and try briefly and
generally to outline them, beginning with Athanasius the Great, whose
contribution constitutes a turning point in the formation of patristic
Christological doctrine.

2. Post-Nicene trends and heresies and the formulation
of Christology
2.a. The framework of Athanasius’ Christology

Athanasius the Great is deemed to be one of the first theologians to
grasp the fact that Arianism constituted a serious challenge both to the
Christological dogma and to the Church, because it introduced entirely
opposing views to those which the Church promoted and had lived
with up until then. Athanasius’ Christology, when viewed generally, is
in essence soteriological, because this father always sought to show
how humanity is saved through the mystery of Christ. This is why he
stressed the point: “for he (the Logos) became inhominated that we
might be deified” (19). Athanasius’ soteriological Christology is
centred on the argument that humanity’s salvation and deification
becomes a reality only when it is based on the dogma which teaches
the union of the created (human being) with the uncreated (God). If
the Son is created, of equal honour with man in the final analysis, then
he could not offer to man what he did not have: “If the Son were a
creature, then man would have remained mortal, for he would not
have been conjoined to God. For a creature cannot conjoin creatures
to God” (20). Athanasius was always dominated by the perception
which clarified his thought, namely, that “man was made in order to
see God” (21). This is why the rise to God cannot be achieved
otherwise, except when it becomes possible through the creator Logos
(22). The divine image, which was imprinted through the Logos on man at his creation and which was obscured through sin, becomes the point of reference and interference of God’s ‘philanthropy’, so that it may be renewed and recreated and start operating again. The creator Logos reforms his image in the persons of man and “reprints” it again (23). Epiphanius will lay down a similar stress as far as the purpose of the incarnation is concerned, namely, that Christ came to re-imprint “the image of the Creator as himself” (24).

However, Arians’ theory concerning a created Logos and a mere incarnation rather than inhomination of the Logos, i.e. that the Logos assumed only the place of the human soul, constituted the pinnacle of their Christological heresy (25) and resulted in overthrowing and corrupting the faith and experience of the Church. Typical here is the confession of Arius’ disciple Eudoxius, who, summarising the error of the Arians, declared: “We believe ... in one Lord the Son ... incarnated, not inhominated; for he did not take up a human soul but became flesh ... (we hold that there are) not two natures, because he was not a perfect man but there was God in the flesh instead of a soul; all this is one nature by virtue of a synthesis, ...” (26). The Arian error finally ended up with an excessive monophysitism. This was attacked by Athanasius the Great, in his treatment of the Arian Christological error, according to which, as we said earlier, the Logos was debased to the position of the soul, so that Arius could build up his case and secure his teaching concerning the createdness and mutability of the Logos. He attributed the transferred natural human passions to Christ, as belonging to the Logos, who had taken the place of the soul (27), and held the view that these passions refer only to the human nature which is specified by the biblical references to the words “flesh” and “body” (28). Thus, St.
Athanasius specified that the body of Christ also had a soul, because it was "by nature human" and because the purpose of the divine economy in the incarnation was the assumption of the soul, because the soul too was in need of salvation (29). Again at this point Athanasius' soteriological Christology is confirmed. For Athanasius, the assumption of the flesh by the Logos, according to the biblical statement "the Logos became flesh" (30), means a full and perfect assumption of the whole man by the Logos (31). This "custom" (ethos) of Scripture to denote man by the term "flesh", constituted a hermeneutical position for Athanasius, who at the Synod of Sardica (343) like other fathers refused to give his consent to the Christological formulation proposed by the Westerners, We believe ... the man whom he put on, whom he assumed from Mary ...” (32), because he feared that the term "man" might lead one to the adoptionist views of dynamic monarchianism (33). This is why he stresses the point that "he became man and did not come to a man" (34). This means that the Logos did not come to indwell in some man, nor did he assume such a man, nor, indeed, did he inspire a man, as in the Old Testament the Logos inspired the prophets, but himself created for himself a man in the womb of the Theotokos and was himself inhominated. "Being always God and Son and being Logos also and effulgence and wisdom of the Father, he afterwards took flesh from the Virgin Mary the Theotokos and became man" (35). Thus, according to Athanasius, Mary is truly called Theotokos (God-bearer), because of the union of the divine and the human in her womb, even though the birth of Christ concerns the human nature (36).

The problem of the two natures in Christ and especially the subject of the humanity of the Logos is not greatly developed in Athanasius' works. His views, however, supply the basis for further
theological clarifications in the sphere of the two natures of Christ (37). Athanasius’ thought is dominated by the statement “The Logos became flesh” and he held that the nature of the Logos was not “changed” at the union “for he did not cease to be God because he became a man. Nor does he avoid the human reality because he is God” (38). The Christological scheme of the two natures, for Athanasius, excludes both the confusion of the natures and the creation of a composite nature, in the Apollinarian sense, or even a separation, in the later sense of Nestorius. The divine and the human elements are inseparably united in the one person (39) of the Logos in the incarnation, so that the human attributes or names do not refer to a certain man, but are applied to the one person of Christ, without implying any alteration in the integrity of the human nature, even though it accepted the illumination and guidance of the divine nature. Athanasius says characteristically: “he upheld the weaknesses of the flesh as his own; for the flesh was his; and the flesh administered his divine works, because he came to be in it; for the flesh was God’s body” (40). This is how he understood the communion of the two natures in Christ. When he spoke of his passion, he explicitly referred to the human nature of Christ, because it is the “body”, or the “flesh”, that suffers, and not the composite nature, as Apollinaris says. Due to the hypostatic union, however, of the divine and the human, the passion is attributed to the Logos: “When the flesh suffered, the Logos was not outside it; this is why the passion is said to be his” (41). Yet, this sense of the “passibility” of the Logos, due to his incarnation, differs from theopaschitism which was introduced by Apollinaris. It was parallel to the case of worship being rendered to the “one Christ” (42) on account of the communication of attributes.
At this point it is perhaps expedient simply to note that in their attempt to specify the sense of the role of the two natures, the divine and the human, in the person of Christ, certain theologians argue about a development of two Christological types, which correspond respectively to the Alexandrine and the Antiochian Christology. According to them the first type, the Alexandrine, was developed on the basis of the scheme “Logos-Flesh”, and attributes all the human attributes of Christ to the person of the Logos. In other words, it applies both human and divine attributes to the one person of Christ, without, however, failing to realize that the human attributes are characteristics of the human nature alone. The second Christological type, the Antiochian, following the Christological scheme “Logos-man”, attributes all the human attributes of Christ to his human nature, and all his divine attributes to the divine nature, and consequently lays greater stress on the existence of two natures in Christ. (43) Athanasius the great, as certain scholars argue, was the representative of the Alexandrine scheme “Logos-flesh” emphasizing the one person of Christ. By contrast the main representative of the Antiochian Christological type, “Logos-man”, is for the same scholars, Eustathius of Antioch, who, in his attempt to refute the Arians, defended the view that in the historical Christ the uncreated and impassible Logos is distinguished from the created and passible man, in whom the Logos dwelt as an “accredited temple” (44): “The Logos put on man having made him his temple, and descended to human beings with a body” (45). In Eustathius’ Christology stress is laid on the independence or self-sufficiency of the natures, while the bodily and natural passions are attributed, according to the Antiochian Christological type, to the man Christ. It is a fact, however, that Eustathius cannot be accused of initiating the notion of the dual hypostasis of the Logos. On this matter
a sufficient and clear answer has been provided by Dr G. D. Dragas, who, examining the data of Athanasius’ texts, demonstrates “that in the case, at least, of Athanasius the Great the above mentioned Christological schematisation is one sided and consequently, misleading” (46). Dr Dragas points out that, on the basis of Athanasius’ Christological terms and semantics, the word “flesh” does not occupy an exclusive position in the Christology of the Great Athanasius. Besides, the term “man”, which is said to be typical of the Antiochian type of Christology, “presents in the Athanasian Christological texts the same consistency and frequency as the terms ‘flesh’ or ‘body’ which are synonymous” (47). Thus, as Dr Dragas correctly demonstrates, Athanasius follows in his Christology the context of the terms of the symbolic formulation of Nicaea “incarnated and inhominated” (σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπίσαντα), wishing exactly on the one hand to interpret the orthodox sense and on the other to refute the Arians, who explained the incarnation of the Logos in their own way and forgot his inhomination.

Concluding this brief reference to Athanasius the Great, we note his substantial contribution to the subsequent formulation of the Christological dogma and clarify at the same time, that the lack of fully developed Christological schematisations in his writings was due to the fact that at this early period the great Christological problems arise after the weakening and retreat of the Arian heresy which comes at the end of Athanasius’ career. Besides, the dominant Christological thought at that time, which was clearly established by Athanasius, was based on the fact of the full and perfect salvation of the whole man in Christ, which was achieved by the assumption of all the elements that constitute the human reality by the true and natural Son of God (48).
What remains now to be done, before we turn to Epiphanius, is to look briefly and in broad outline to the formulation of the Christological dogma as it was shaped by the challenge of Apollinarism and the various patristic reactions which arose against it, because Epiphanius’ Christological teaching presupposes these developments. It is a fact that with the emergence of Apollinaris’ school the struggle for Christology is intensified and the presuppositions for a deeper and clearer formulation of this dogma are exposed. Epiphanius wrote his Ancoratus being fully aware of the problems of Arianism and Apollinarism and of the answers which the fathers before him had given to these heresies.

2.b. The challenge of Apollinarism

The fervent supporter of the faith of Nicaea and opponent of Arius, the defender of the "homoousios", the friend of Athanasius and the Cappadocian fathers, who is much respected by Epiphanius (49), was nevertheless to end up in a terrible error with regard to the Christological dogma, and to be himself condemned as a heretic or have his teaching condemned by the synods of Alexandria (362), Rome (377 and 382), Antioch (379), Second Ecumenical (381). Apollinaris presented through his teaching a peculiar Christological dogmatic context, as regards the two natures of Christ. Starting as an opponent of Arianism and wishing to secure the integrity of the divine nature of Christ, he fought the Arian teaching about the creatureliness and mutability of the Logos. The Logos, as immutable, according to Apollinaris, had to take up "an immutable mind which did not fall prey to sin" (50). This was based on the view of Apollinaris and his followers that "the mind has been made subject to sin" (εἰς τὸ
Thus, the place of the mind in the man Christ was taken, according to Apollinaris, by the Logos himself, so that no human mind, which is the bearer and stimulus of sin in man, would have a place in the sinless Christ. In this way, however, Apollinaris repeated, on another level of reference, the teaching of Arius, because he interpreted the term "flesh", as the body of Christ in a sense naturally curtailed. It was this "mindless" flesh that was assumed by the Logos, who, as uncreated and immutable was united with an irrational soul and body. The absence of a mind from the assumption of humanity by the Logos in the incarnation Apollinaris attributed to the fact that that the human nature of Christ could not be perfect, because, "if God was united to a man, a perfect one to a perfect one, there would be two, one natural Son of God, and one adopted" (52). The fear of Apollinaris of a conjunction of the perfect divine nature with the perfect human nature was rooted in his view that this would inevitably entail two persons and, therefore, the existence of two Sons. Thus, being clearly influenced by Aristotle’s philosophical views (53) and by those of other philosophers, he identified in his hermeneutics the terms “nature” and “person”, or “substance” and “hypostasis”, and rejected the union of two perfect natures. Thus, he stressed that “two perfect things cannot become one” (54). In the place of hypostasis Apollinaris placed the mind. The mind is for him identical with the human hypostasis and had to be absent, so that the human existence would be imperfect. Besides, as a self-determined agent (lit. “autocrat”) it was impossible for him to have his autonomy subdued and to have his decisions changed. At the same time the mind is a carrier of the sinful conditions in man. Consequently, “if every mind is self-determined (autocratic) by virtue of the fact that it moves naturally according to its own will, it is
impossible in one and the same subject that two would co-exist whose wills are mutually opposed, each of them operating according to a self-moving impulse what it wills” (55). Anything sinful, then, had to be absent from the sinless Christ, according to the above logic of Apollinaris, and that obviously applied to the mind and to the mind’s self-determination (“autocracy”), which stood naturally opposed to the will of God the Logos, for otherwise there would be in Christ two opposing wills. As a result, then, the flesh of Christ, endowed with a mindless soul, did not possess its own hypostasis, and as such it could easily be united with the Logos, whose hypostasis and will would make its own. In this way Apollinaris resolved the problem which was put forth by those in the tradition of Paul of Samosata concerning two Sons, one Son of God and another Son of man, and that Christ, is not to be worshipped as far as his human nature is concerned. At the same time Apollinaris was able, through the Christological theory, to secure a more essential interference of the Divine Logos in the work of the salvation of human beings. Thus, he believed that he refuted Paul of Samosata and Photinus of Sirmium, who argued that man’s salvation and redemption were deficient, because they were the work of the man Christ, since it was he, the man Christ, who suffered and died. In his attempt, then, to refute erroneous Christological views, or to explain Christological issues, Apollinaris resorts to a peculiar explanation of the union or, rather, mixture of the divine and the human (56). The Logos assumed a “soulless” and “mindless” body. Christ himself is an “incarnate God”, a “flesh-bearing God”, and his flesh is “divine flesh” (57). Thus, we have a natural union of the Logos with the “flesh” and the formation of another nature, of another person. In this way he was able to ascribe all the attributes and properties and passions of the flesh to the Logos (58). The uncreated and the created
are united "according to substance" and "according to nature" (59). The scheme with which Apollinaris concluded was: "one nature (he meant a composite nature) of the Divine Logos incarnate" (60). Thus, in his Confession to Jovian Apollinaris says: "We confess ... the Son to be not two natures, one to be and another not to be venerated, but one nature of the Divine Logos incarnated and venerated with his flesh in one veneration" (61). Through this Christological scheme Apollinaris managed to resolve the problem concerning the veneration of the creaturely human flesh of Christ, to support his view about a more intense, as we said, interference of the Divine Logos in the work of redemption and the salvation of human beings and to resolve every fear and danger of Christ’s fall into sin (62). He also managed to avoid the scheme of the union of "two perfect things into one", which was philosophically impossible and hence he cried: "O new creation and wondrous mixture! God and flesh made up one and the same nature" (63). Nevertheless, Apollinaris’ Christological perspective constituted a challenge of equal force with that of Arius with respect to the Christological dogma. This is primarily connected with his presentation of the human nature which was united with the divine as incomplete and essentially without a hypostasis, which had had very dangerous soteriological consequences and clearly led to monophysitism, monoenergism and, what is far worse, ended up with theopaschitism.

The way the Church met this challenge of Apollinarism and the whole ecclesiastical perspective on Christology which emerged as a result of this new conflict shall be briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs, so that Epiphanius’ immediate patristic Christological context may be revealed, and his views, which are the particular subject of our present examination, may be better understood.
The challenge of Apollinarism, in spite of the turmoil which it caused in the Church and which Basil points out (64), had also a positive import. It prompted orthodox patristic opinion to examine critically the content of Apollinaris’ suggestions and to interpret the traditional faith of the Church with greater accuracy and consistency. Thus the new contributions of the fathers in this area became determinative for the formulation of the Christological dogma. Not only the Cappadocian fathers but others also reacted promptly to the Christological context of Apollinaris’ teaching, exposing it as heretical. The first reactions came from Athanasius, as we saw in a very brief way. As regards the Cappadocians, the first one to note the problem connected with Apollinaris was Basil the Great who pointed out the turmoil which Apollinaris caused in the Church, but who did not wish to go any further (65). With regard to the Christological dogma in particular Basil had the opinion, that “no labour was necessary about the dogmas which related to that faith [of Nicaea] on the inhomination of the Lord, as they were deeper than the capacity of our understanding...” (66). Thus, seeing the doctrine of the inhomination as lying beyond the human grasp, he suggests, that “one should remain silent” and “should hold firmly what has been believed” and “cease to speculate about what has been given in silence” (67). Yet, he does not fail to stress the reality of the “flesh”, i.e. of the human nature of Christ (68), and even to explain the manner of the union of the two natures, using the example of the iron which has been heated up in a fire (69). He stresses emphatically the existence of a soul in the
man Christ, for he says, "there was not a soulless flesh, but a Godhead using a flesh endowed with a soul" (70). It is generally accepted that on the subject of the soul of Christ Basil follows the position of Athanasius. Particularly notable is Basil’s phrase as to what the Logos assumed and saved: “for if what was ruled by death was one thing and what was assumed by the Lord, another, death would not have ceased to operate what is within its grasp, nor would any benefit have been derived for us from the sufferings of the Godbearing flesh” (71).

Those who reacted vigorously to the heretical Christological context of Apollinaris and clarified further the Christological dogma are the two Gregories, Gregory the Theologian and Gregory of Nyssa. The first one, denouncing the Apollinarist notion of a union of the Logos with human flesh which results in a “composite nature” (σύνθετας φύσις), points out that the flesh entailed the true humanity of Christ. He accepts at the start the terms of “fusion”, “co-mixture”, “mixture” (κράσις, σύγκρασις, μίξις) (72), which he abandons later, but he is clearly opposed to confusion or annulment of the two natures and of the communication of their attributes: “for there are two natures, God and man, because there is also a soul and a body; but not two sons, nor gods; for here there are not two men either” (73). Thus he specifies the co-mixture of the two natures, clarifies the existence of soul and body, forestalls the Nestorian distinction of two sons, or even rejects the position of adoptionism and at the same time refutes the monophysite view of the body of Christ. It is in this same connection that he points out: “and if we must speak succinctly, the things from which the Saviour is (τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ Σωτήρ) are one thing and another (ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο), for indeed the invisible and the visible are not the same, and likewise what is timeless is not the same
with what is under time, there is not one and another [person](οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ ἄλλος), God forbid! For both things are in the co-
mixture, on the one hand an inominated God, and on the other 
hand, a deified man, or as one might like to speak” (74). By this 
reference Gregory produces a Christological formulation which entails 
a specific clarification. The Godhead is one thing and humanity 
another. Thus, two elements stand out in Christ, the divine and the 
human, which, however, are simultaneously united “essentially” into 
one person, without any confusion, and communicate fully their 
attributes (75). This is exactly what Gregory’s “co-mixture” 
expresses, first and foremost the communication of attributes but also 
the unity of the two natures. His opposition to Apollinaris, however, is 
centred on the latter’s view concerning the existence of a rational soul 
in Christ. He argues against Apollinaris that the mind is not the first 
cause of sin but the first victim of it (πρωτοπαθες) (76). Thus, if the 
mind was not assumed by the Logos and the flesh was deficient in this 
respect, then only half of humanity is saved. What the Logos did not 
assume, that was not saved. "For what was not assumed was not 
healed and what was united to God that also is saved” (77); “if half 
of Adam transgressed, then this half would have been assumed and 
saved; but if the entire, then the entire was united to the one that was 
born and that was entirely saved” (78). He relates, then, the fact of 
the salvation of all the constitutive elements of the human nature to 
their assumption by the Divine Logos. The Cappadocians follow the 
principle of “the same by the same” (τὸ ὁμοίον τὸ ὁμοιόν), i.e. the 
salvation of the human nature through the human nature. Besides, 
Gregory the Theologian stresses the point that Mary is “Theotokos” 
(79). These Christological positions became the basis for the 
formulation of the terms of the 3rd and 4rth Ecumenical Synods (80).
Gregory of Nyssa formulated a parallel position to that of Gregory the Theologian, as he underlined the existence of a soul in Christ and stressed the unity of the two natures and the exchange of their attributes. "For the human nature having been united to the Lord is raised up with the Godhead .. becoming through exaltation both Christ and Lord ... for the two have become one through the mixture (διάκρασις); and it is for this reason that he is called God even in his humanity" (81). Beyond the fact of the unconfused union and the exchange of attributes of the two natures, it is typical that Gregory of Nyssa, like the other Cappadocians, does not exhibit any special attachment to the investigation and explanation of the meaning of the various Christological terms, such as "hypostasis", "person", "nature". This is why he attributes the union of the two elements, the divine and the human, to the level of the natures and not to the unity of the person, without, of course, appearing to deny the unity of the person (82).

Noteworthy also are the views of Amphilochius of Iconium, the fervent friend of Basil the Great, on certain subjects which relate to Christology. Amphilochius, even though he distinguished himself as an antihetical father, without a systematic treatment of dogmatic subjects, does, as the opportunities emerge, give answers that clarify fully the Christological problems of his time and express his agreement with the other fathers of the Church. Replying to Apollinaris, Amphilochius underlines the assumption of the soul by the Logos and rejects the existence of monotheletism or monoenergitism in Christ, while stressing the unity of the two natures in the one person of Christ. He states characteristically: "the natures concur into one person" (83). The union of the natures is a fact which occurred in the womb of Mary (84). In Christ there is a "concurrence" (συνδρομή) (85) and
distinction of the natures and not a confusion. The Godhead is impassible, and yet "it did suffer with the passible body" on account of the union. The participation of the divine nature of Christ in the passion does not imply theopaschitism, as Apollinaris concluded, because, as Amphiloctius explains, "God's nature does not fall into passion", just as by becoming man the Logos did not fall from "being God" (86). Another important reference of Amphiloctius to the Christological dogma is his expressed statement that the body of the risen Christ is not other than that which was crucified, which is designed to express, as Amphiloctius explains, the maintenance of the two natures in unity and to demonstrate the renewal of the human nature which implies its becoming incorruptible (87).

There are certainly other fathers and ecclesiastical authors, both in the East and in the West, who dealt with the Christological problems, which were created by the two great heresies of Arianism and Apollinarism. Particularly noteworthy are Marius Victorinus' statements which he advances against the position of Marcellus of Ancyra and which state that the Logos himself "became man" and "did not enter into a man" (88). Similarly, Hilary of Pictavium states that it was the Logos himself who created inside the womb of the Virgin, at her conception, his own body, which was endowed with a soul, and united it with himself (89). Undoubtedly the Synod of Alexandria (362), although it avoids mentioning Apollinaris (90), specifies the existence of a soul in the humanity of Christ and condemns its denial; and so does the Synod of Antioch (362) in discussing Christological subjects which arose through the activities of Apollinarist groups, headed by Vitalius and other anti-Apollinarist groups which represented Paulinus of Antioch (91).
From all that we said above, the framework of the Christological tendencies and positions which emerge during the fourth century and especially after the Synod of Nicaea becomes apparent, as does the contribution of all the Christological data and challenges which played a significant role in the investigation and formulation of the Christological dogma. It was exactly this historical-dogmatic context which undoubtedly constituted a powerful impulse for Epiphanius, whose character seems to have been such that he was particularly sensitive to subjects relating to heresies, while at the same time, again because of his temperament, he appeared to be intensely attached to the dogmas of the orthodox catholic Church. His *Panarion*, which constitutes an analytic exposition and refutation of 80 heresies, and his *Ancoratus*, which constitutes an epitome of the dogmatic teaching of the Church, demonstrate that Epiphanius, although he lived in Cyprus for a very long time (367-403) -- he was Bishop of Constantia (Salamis) and Archbishop of Cyprus for 37 years --, retained a lively contact with the other Churches and followed the various tendencies and trends on dogmatic issues, managing to be fully informed even about local disputes on matters relating to order and operation of the Churches. Thus, Epiphanius, on the basis of the above-mentioned works, appears to have been a church leader who experienced the climate of all the dogmatic fluctuations and was concerned to the highest degree for their development. It is for this reason that the examination of his position, as regards the Christological dogma, which has not been undertaken before the present research, will give us further information about the whole historical and dogmatic context of the fourth century, and about Epiphanius' own teaching and that of the Church of his time in general.
CHAPTER II
EPIPHANIUS' CHRISTOLOGICAL TERMINOLOGY AND TEACHING

1. The Divine Logos
1.a. The Godhead and Sonship of the Logos

It has been concluded, on the basis of our first chapter, that the doctrine of Christ is inseparably connected with the doctrine of God, especially as regards the Godhead of Christ (1). Epiphanius follows the same tradition and develops it on the basis of the dogma of Nicaea and the traditional faith of the Church. Besides, like the other fathers before him, especially Athanasius, Epiphanius links his Christology with Soteriology. Thus, he asks, "why does he come to be in us? what benefit would this bring to us" (2)?

For Epiphanius the Logos is God. He defends this view on the assumption that this is the faith of the Church which is rooted in the Scriptures and the Apostolic tradition. He refers to the statement of the Psalm, "The Lord said to my Lord, sit at my right hand, until I place your enemies as a footstool under your feet" (3), and to the other statement of the prophet, "Behold the Virgin shall conceive and bear a son and you shall call his name Emmanuel, which is translated God with us" (4). Epiphanius points out that these verses were spoken of before the "economy of the flesh" (5) and consequently constitute a sufficient basis for dispelling the confusion or the misinterpretation which is connected with the Lord's statement "my God and your God" (6). Thus, the terms "Lord" and "Emmanuel" indicate that the Logos is God, while Christ's reference to his God and our God, is a schema which refers to him after his incarnation and is directly connected with his humanity.
Another powerful Scriptural foundation, which Epiphanius employs, this time from the New Testament, is the mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son (7). This knowledge and especially that of the Son is interpreted as an exclusive characteristic and privilege of the Son alone, who, exactly because he knows the Father, is equal to the Father and, therefore, God. "For among us human beings such a thought is not applicable and we do not regard the sons any lesser or lower in honour than their fathers (for the sons' dishonour is transferred in some measure to their fathers), how much more would God the Father be unwilling for his Son to be ever lower than him" (8)? Since then, among human beings such a thought is not applicable, i.e. to alienate their children from such an honour, how much more would this be also the case with God the Father? To the embarrassment of those who deny the Godhead of the Son and appeal in support of their view, as far as the Son's knowledge is concerned, to the words of Christ, "For nobody knows the day or the hour, neither the angels of heaven, nor the Son, except the Father" (9), Epiphanius replies: "For who is greater, the Father or the day, about which he speaks? you will certainly do not dare to say that the Father is not greater! If, then, the Father is greater ... how, then, could he who knows what is greater (i.e. the Son) be deprived of the knowledge of the lesser? If, therefore, he knows the Father, he certainly knows the day and there is nothing of which the Son is deprived as far as knowledge is concerned" (10). Consequently, Christ's ignorance "concerning that day" of the second coming, or his questions, "where have you placed Lazarus?" (11) and "who touched me?" (12) and "who do you seek to find?" (13) and "who do people say that the Son of Man is?" (14), all these and several others are, according to Epiphanius, "said from [the perspective of] his flesh and humanity"
(15). Christ, says Epiphanius asks questions, not because he is ignorant, "but because he rebukes as he tests and he shows his love for humanity" (16), and because he speaks "in order to make a point" (νοηματικώς) (17). Epiphanius mentions similar cases of "ignorance" from the Old Testament, exactly in order to show the divine purpose and God's love for humanity. How are we to take, he asks, the case of God who asks Adam, "where are you" (18), or the case when he asks Cain, "where is Abel your brother" (19)? Do these questions of God express ignorance on his part? No, says Epiphanius, this could not be the case, for "he who says that the Blood cries out was not ignorant, but wanted to give him place for repentance and hence he asked him to give a response" (20). That the Logos is God is explicitly stated, for Epiphanius, in the first verses of the Gospel of John, where it is explicitly stated that "the Logos was God" (21).

Once the Godhead of the Logos is accepted, then, one has to explain the sense of his Divine Sonship and how it is related to his Godhead. It is clear that Sonship and Godhead cannot be contrasted. This is in fact the stumbling stone of the heretics: the affirmation that the Son is born of the Father. The very name Father, says Epiphanius, which is used to denote the first person in the Godhead, indicates that "he truly gave birth to the Son" (22). If the Son is not God but a creature, then, not only the person of the Logos is debased but also the person of the Father, who is affected in an indirect way in his spiritual identity. For one cannot speak of the Father as a spirit, because the spirit does not give birth to creatures: "As, therefore, the Father is spirit, so he spiritually gave birth to God the Son and Logos in a manner which is timeless, incomprehensible and beginningless" (23). The Godhead of the Son, however, is not secured only by the spiritual nature of the Father, but also by his natural, as opposed to an adoptive,
sonship. For the Logos "is a genuine Son, born of the Father, a natural Son, as opposed to an adopted one" (24). Thus, although he is a Son, at the same time "he is God too ... born by nature as a genuine Son" (25).

As regards the time of the Son's birth, "God the Father gave birth to the Son without beginning" (26) and there was never a time when the Son did not exist, because there was never a time either when the Father was not 'Father': "the Father is and the Son is, "the one who is" (27) towards the one who is, born from him, not being identified with the Father, nor having a beginning of his being, but having always been a genuine Son with the Father, always Father who gave birth to the Son" (28). Thus, the Logos is "a natural Son, a true Son, a genuine Son, an only one from an only one ... a Father always, a Son always, a Holy Spirit always" (29). Consequently, God does not acquire attributes in time, nor is he subject to time (30). What he has, he has always. He is "always Father" and "always Son". This is why the Son can call God "Father", because he is eternally "by nature genuine" (31) and because of "the incomprehensibility and genuine character of his birth, since he is truly his Father, having begotten him timelessly and beginninglessly with respect to his Godhead" (32). That the Son calls the Father God is due to "... the economy which he did for us" (33). Furthermore the Logos' Sonship does not entail any diminution of his hypostasis as compared with the Father's, nor any deficiency with regard to the divine attributes which he shares with the Father. Is the Father creator? "The Logos too is co-creator with the Father" (34). Did the Father make man? "Yes, but he [the Father] created man with the Son and the Holy Spirit" (35). And, "As the Father has life in himself, so the Son has life in himself" (36). Or, as the Lord says and Epiphanius points out, "what is my
Father's is mine also” (37). Thus, recapitulating his position, Epiphanius will say: “The name God is the Father's, and it is also the Son's; life is the Father's, and this too is the Son's; light is the Father's, and that is obviously the Son's too"; immortality is the Father's, and likewise it is the Son's; incomprehensibility is the Father's and the Son's. All that is the Father's is also the Son's” (38).

That for Epiphanius Sonship does not entail any diminution of the Godhead of the second person, nor does it suggest debasement of the Logos, is clear from this father's many references in which the names 'Logos' and 'Son' are identified and are expressed synecdochically in the formula “Son, God, Logos" (39).

The Godhead of the Logos is also based, according to Epiphanius, on the Son’s attribute that he is “only-begotten, (and) there is none who is equal to him, or could stand beside him, one who is like the son among sons of God” (40); “for he knows that these are sons by grace and no one can be equalled to him in his being naturally a son; for it is clear whence he is derived from and whence the election is” (41). But even beyond the descriptions that the Logos is “only-begotten” and “unequalled”, Epiphanius introduces one further description which is of identical import: this is the description of the Son as “the wisdom of the Father, which is one in kind (μονοειδής) and has no one else standing beside it” (42). It is, then, this only-begotten and unique Son and Logos of God and God, who did not wish to become equal with God “by robbery” (43) - “he did not consider it a robbery to be equal to God" - (44), “because he is by nature God” (45), who put on the form of the servant. Otherwise, had he not been God but God’s creation, then how would one interpret the fact that he took the form of the servant? In other words, how did he take what he already had (46)? Thus, the fact that he took the form
of the servant expresses, according to Epiphanius, on the one hand, the "kenosis" of the Logos of God, or his condescension to become a human being, and on the other, specifies temporally the actual occurrence of this event: "for this [the fact that he took on the form of the servant] meant that it occurred recently and from this he showed his wonderful excess of love for mankind, for being equal with God he emptied himself" (47). Thus, with the incarnation he is truly human even though at the same time he is also God; "because he partakes of human beings on account of the [divine] incomprehensibility" (48).

As to how this act of divine "philanthropy" occurs, Epiphanius believes that the human mind is unable to grasp it. The incomprehensibility of the incarnation is due to the fact that the Logos appears to human beings exactly as one of them, even though he is also God. "For he is a man, and who can understand him?" (49), says Epiphanius, recalling Jeremiah's prophesy, and adds, "that two aspects are indicated simultaneously in the divine scripture, the visible and the invisible" (50). Thus, the manner of the incarnation of the Divine Logos is a mystery, but the purpose is clear. It is on this last point that Epiphanius lays particular stress, following Athanasius, and so he firmly places his Christological doctrine within a soteriological context. The assumption of human nature by the Logos took place exactly "not in order to enslave a free being, but in order that he might free the obedient servants in the form which he assumed" (51). This operation of the Logos did not take place under any constraint, for it was "on his own accord (iδιώ ϑελήσει)" (52), that "the holy Logos came and assumed our burdens" (53), in order to accomplish "the entire economy" (54) for the sake of human beings and, according to Paul's expression, that he might be "the one God,
the One Mediator between God and human beings, Jesus Christ the man” (55).

The entire argumentation of Epiphanius in what we said above is aimed at demonstrating that the Logos is Son of the Father, who was born without beginning from God the Father, while being God himself. The defence of the Godhead of the Logos constitutes the basis of the Christological dogma, the foundation of the Church and the fundamental chapter of the salvation of human beings. Any unsettling of this dogma of the Godhead of the Logos constitutes an attack on the basis of Christianity. This is what Epiphanius believes and this is why he fights so vigorously against Arius and his followers who are the initiators of such an unsettling. For Epiphanius the Godhead of the Logos is the presupposition to his condescension for the work of the economy of salvation which restores to humanity the possibility of deification. Arianism attempts to destroy all this by attacking this fundamental presupposition. To bring this out in a more elaborate and analytic way, we shall turn to Epiphanius' anti-Arian positions as they are outlined in his Ancoratus.

1.b. Epiphanius' anti-Arianism

The Arian disputation concerning the Godhead of the second person of the Holy Trinity and the corresponding Arian teaching concerning the creatureliness of the Logos constituted a powerful challenge for the Church as a whole. At the same time the Christological context which Arius constructed and which had direct implications for the incarnation of the Logos, subjected to serious controversy the very existence and purpose of Christianity and dealt a crucial blow to the fundamental chapter of the salvation of humanity. Arius’ theses, especially those which we expounded
synoptically in the beginning of the present work (56), became the object of serious questioning by Epiphanius. In his Ancoratus, of course, he does not expound, in any particular or systematic way, the Arian system so as to turn afterwards to a systematic refutation of it, as it happens in his other systematic theological work, the Panarion (57).

The Ancoratus, as we noted in our introductory chapter, represents an attempt to expound systematically the faith of the Church “concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit as well as the other parts of the faith, together with the resurrection from the dead and the inhomination of Christ” (58). This means that the 119 chapters of this Book refer to the main topics of theology and economy. Indeed, it is important to observe at this point that, in spite of the fact that the invitation which prompted the composition of the Ancoratus was that “the heretics (the Arians in particular) passing over the blasphemy against Jesus showed their impiety towards God in another manner, by raising the same tongue against the Holy Spirit” (59) “uttering injustice on high” (60) - for this is what those from Pamphylia wrote, which means that they were much more interested in the refutation of those who blasphemed against the Holy Spirit, just as the other epistle of Palladius advanced a similar request (61) - yet, Epiphanius, in order to supply a clearer image of the dogma and to show the mutual interdependence and indissolubility of the dogmas, finally proceeds to a wider dogmatic exposition which includes, of course, the dogma concerning the Holy Spirit, but relates it to the dogmas of Triadology and Christology. Thus, by this way of thinking Epiphanius demonstrates the inner connection between the Triadological and Christological dogma.
In his confrontation of the Arian problem Epiphanius stresses that their error, like those of the other heretics, is the result of their failure to participate in the grace of the Holy Spirit (62). This is why the Arians refuse to confess Jesus as “Lord” and call him “an adopted God” and “not a true God” (63). Nevertheless, whoever becomes a vessel of the Holy Spirit, confesses “that Jesus is truly Lord and truly God and truly Son of God and truly King of the ages” (64).

Epiphanius bases the Logos’ Godhead on the fact that his birth from the Father is “genuine”, “true” and “natural”, namely, on the fact that he is Only-begotten. Thus, “since God the Father is spirit, he begot God the Logos spiritually, timelessly, incomprehensibly and beginninglessly” (65). It is exactly the peculiar feature of the “eternal” birth of the Logos from the Father which incurs the perpetual and beginningless co-existence of the Logos with the Father and at the same time interprets the eternal character of God the Father. According to Epiphanius the fatherhood of the first person of the Godhead and the generation of the second person are two notions which are perceived incomprehensibly and yet reveal the eternal mode of existence of the two persons of the Trinity. This is why to the argument/obstacle of the Arians expressed in the statement, “we know one and only unbegotten God, who is alone eternal, alone beginningless, alone true” (66), Epiphanius responds: “When, then, can you dare say that the Father was not Father, so that you may dare say that the Son was not [Son]?” (67) Such thinking is unthinkable for Epiphanius, because the Father was always Father and because “the divine exists in identity and does not admit of any addition, not glorification, nor advance” (68). And if no addition or advance is perceivable in relation to the Father, the same and to the
same extent is applicable to the other two persons of the Trinity; "For the Trinity is always and never received any addition" (69). Or, putting the point more schematically, there is no point when the Father "was not called Father" (70). Thus, since the Father was "always and truly" Father - "always" referring to the very nature of the Father as a characteristic of his very existence -, then, the Son too, as Son "always was with the Father who is truly" - "truly" referring in the case of the Son to what is applicable to the existence of the Father and to the Father himself (71).

This ontological existence of Father and Son constitutes the genuine ground of the eternal co-existence of these two persons. Yet, the "always coexistent", i.e. the eternal co-existence does not imply any "co-mixture" (συναλοιφή) of the Son with the Father, nor a "co-fraternity" (συνάδελφον) of the two persons, nor ever a "consubstantiation" (συνουσιότης), but the genuine and eternal generation of the Son from the Father confesses the consubstantiality of the persons (72). As for the "homoousios, it denotes one hypostasis (73); and it also denotes that the Father is enhypostatic and the Son enhypostatic and the Holy Spirit enhypostatic as well" (74). The enhypostatic character of the three persons, however, does not imply that there are three Gods. God is one, as Moses stresses (75). The three persons do not represent polytheism, because "through the three names the one Godhead of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit [is denoted]... being always one Trinity of the same substance" (76). Consequently, there is one Godhead of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit (77).

To the Arian argument that the Only-begotten spoke of the Father as "the only true God" - "that they may come to know you the only true God" (78) -, which means that Christ could not have been
included in this statement, Epiphanius replies that the Son’s intention in saying this was to oppose “polytheism” while aiming at excluding any “division in the vivifying knowledge” (79). At the same time, Epiphanius observes that a similar statement is made elsewhere about the Son, who is called “the true light” (80) even though God is simply called “light” (81). So, as it is impossible to argue that the Father “is not true light” (82), by the same token it cannot be argued that the Son “is God but not true God” (83). The indissolubility and interdependence of the notions of Holy Scripture is the presupposition of Epiphanius’ argument which entails the thesis that Scripture is interpreted by Scripture and it is, therefore, unacceptable to isolate Scriptural passages from the rest of Scripture and elaborate their meaning as such. This attempt leads to arbitrary interpretations which ultimately stand in opposition to the revealed truths of God. The Son, says Epiphanius, is both “true light” and “God”, while the Father is both “true God” and “light”. Thus, “conjoining the two statements concerning the Godhead, the true God concerning the Father and the God concerning the Son, we may proceed to confess on the basis of the terms ‘light’ and ‘God’ the one Godhead and from the terms ‘true light’ and ‘true God’ the one unity of power” (84).

In attempting to secure its teaching concerning the beginning of the Son which excludes him from being co-eternal with the Father, Arianism put forth the question: “Did the Father give birth to the Son willingly or unwillingly”? (85) This sophisticated question of the Arians, which hides a designed pitfall, is very astutely answered by Epiphanius with much exactitude and orthodox theological prudence. If we accept that it was “unwillingly” that the Father gave birth to the Son, then, “we are bound to surround God with necessity” (86) which is totally unacceptable, since God is never subject to necessity.
What remains for us, then, is to accept the opposite, namely, that God gave birth to his Son "willingly". This is, however, what the Arians hoped for, so that they could go on to argue that "the Son did have a beginning" (87) and that this happened "before eternal times" (88). Thus, Epiphanius says that, "if we say willingly, then we admit that the will was before the Logos" (89). For this reason "even if this might be an undivided unit and a wink of an eye, or even a tiny fraction of time, the slightest time would imply priority over the Logos and thus we would fall into their reasoning" (90). Hence, "He gave birth neither willingly nor unwillingly, but through an excess of nature" (91). What the phrase "excess of nature" (ὑπέρβολη φύσεως) really means is explained by himself, in saying that the divine nature "transcends" (ὑπερβαίνει), lies beyond, or above and beyond will, or any kind of necessity. These schematisations and accidental occurrences are applicable to human things, because we never do anything before we think about it. Indeed we first decide and then "act". In God, however, all things are plain and all are fulfilled in him" (92). Consequently, this perfection and absoluteness of the nature of God excludes and dissolves the Arian sophistry, and this is why the Father "neither willingly nor unwillingly gave birth" to the Logos, because the Son is always existing with the Father and is "the Logos and God who was born of him" not out of necessity or will; but "in his excessive and ineffable nature" (93).

Due to the magnitude of the problem which the Arian challenge created, through undermining the faith of many people, clergy or laity, Epiphanius does not hesitate to use heavy characterizations for the founder of this heresy. Arius, he says characteristically, "was inspired by a devilish operation" and "using bold and shameless language" (94), attempts, amongst other things, to interpret the verse, "the Lord
created me beginning of his ways for his works, he established me
before this time, he gave birth to me before all the mountains” (95).
Commenting on this verse, Arius “did not feel shame” in calling a
creature “him who created all things” (96).

Here again Epiphanius responds by placing this text into its
proper context and connecting it with its revelatory content. Since the
answer advanced in Ancoratus (97) is somewhat abbreviated, we shall
consider it in conjunction with that advanced in the Panarion (98), so
that our presentation of it might be clearer and more analytical. This
verse has for Epiphanius two senses: The one is connected with the
Logos’ incarnation and his saving work, and the other refers to the
Son’s eternal generation. In order, however, to respond to the Arians,
he puts forth a distinction concerning the meanings of the word
“wisdom” as they occur in the biblical texts. On the one hand, wisdom
denotes the energies of God which are many and refer to the fact that
“God accomplishes all things in wisdom” and, on the other hand,
wisdom denotes the One Wisdom of the Father, “God’s enhypostatic
Logos” (99) which is clearly distinguished from the former. Indeed, to
make this distinction plain, he cites the entire text of Proverbs (100),
so that he can review the meaning synoptically and centre his
dogmatic hermeneutical task on the crucial verses 8:12f and 25. How
careful he is in advancing his distinctions on the basis of the biblical
data can also be seen in the fact that he extends his investigation to the
following chapter, the 9th chapter of the book of Proverbs, so as to
present the total import of the biblical text.

Epiphanius cites the statement, “Wisdom built a house to itself”
(101), and interprets it with reference to the incarnate presence of the
Logos in order to explain that the same applies to the text under
discussion. Thus, the statement “the Lord created me” is interpreted
by Epiphanius in terms of the statement, *He built me in the womb of Mary*" (102), while the statement "beginning of his ways..." refers to his saving work for mankind (103). Again the phrase "He established me" means "He established me in the soul" (104), while the phrase "He begets me before all the hills" most clearly shows the "birth from above" (105). Commenting again on the same text in his Ancoratus (106) and opposing the Arian interpretation, Epiphanius discusses the distinction between the terms "created" (*κτιστός*) and "born" (*γεννητός*). When they give birth, says Epiphanius, human beings do not build. Generation and creation are not the same. In the case of human beings, of course, generation is creaturely because human beings are themselves creaturely. In the case of God, however, generation, which is indeed from his own substance, is uncreated and cannot be understood in terms of creation and establishment, since God himself is uncreated: "in the case of the uncreated God, then, the offspring is not created" (107).

In order, however, to refute the Arian erroneous contention concerning the creatureliness of the Son and to strengthen further his interpretation of Prov. 8:22, Epiphanius challenges the Arians to show him "where in the OT or the NT did the Father say 'I built a Son to myself', or where did the Son say, 'the Father created me'?" (108). The teaching of the Arians on the creatureliness of the Son was based, for Epiphanius, on the "stupid" syllogism that "if I do not speak of a creature, then, I attribute a diminution to the Father" (109). The creature, for the Arians, does not diminish the Father, whereas what is born by nature" causes some sort of "contraction" or "enlargement" or "diminution" or "partition" to the begetter, since, generally, "anyone who begets, undergoes a sort of passion" (110). For Epiphanius, however, "such thoughts have not been entertained by
anyone, not even by the demons” (111). The confession alone of the first person as “father”, leads to the acceptance of the true generation of the Son. The divine is not specified by material measures, since “it has no volume” (112) and has no body which could become pregnant, and since it is spirit (113) lying beyond any types of passions like those that matter is subjected to, although the connection between passion and matter is not apparent in all material occurrences. The last point is connected with Epiphanius’ understanding of the light which is not diminished when it goes forth and accomplishes its effects as energy as becomes apparent in the case of the sun or even in the case of a candle which passes on its light to many other candles without suffering diminution. Thus, if in the case of created things it is possible that no ‘passion’ occurs, how much more should this be the case with the infinite and incomprehensible God, who, being spirit, “begot without corruption out of himself [his own substance]” the ineffable, incomprehensible and incorruptible Divine Logos (114)! “Truly did the impassible God give birth to the Son who was born out of him impassibly” (115). Consequently, the Arian thoughts are purely human and arise from earthly conceptions. As a result they fail to perceive that “it is religiously untenable to apply the passions of human beings to God” (116). This is indeed the chief characteristic of Arius’ teaching, its rationalistic starting-point, which infiltrates the entire Arian theological system. And it is to this that Epiphanius will direct some of his sharpest statements, including the divine warning, “Your thoughts are not my thoughts” (117) and “God is not as man is” (118). The creatureliness of the Logos was the main characteristic of the Arian Christological teaching and therefore all their care was given to the discovery of reasons, logical or biblical ones, to establish and support it.
One further popular argument of the Arians was the following: "How did he come to dwell in flesh, if he was from the substance of the Father?" (119) They put forward this question against the supporters of Nicaea who upheld the consubstantiality of the Logos with the Father following from his birth from the Father's substance. "If he is from his [the Father's] substance ... how did he come to the flesh ... how could that uncontained nature put on flesh, if it was from the Father by nature?" (120) The argument of the Arians which they use against the orthodox is that the incarnation of the Logos would be impossible if the Logos were God, because the uncircumscribed God is irreconcilable with the circumscribed flesh. Thus, while they confess the Son's sonship, they reject his natural sonship and, consequently, "confess him only nominally, denying him in fact and in thought and, thereby, showing their intention of calling him illegitimate and not true (121). The Arians also pile up arguments "as the most impious of all", says Epiphanius, so that "they may divide and alienate the Son from the paternal substance ... [and] they make no claim of any equality of honour for the Son towards the Father nor of the Son's generation from the Father" (122). Thus, then, because of their position they construct their teaching concerning the creatureliness of the Son, saying that they know only one God, unbegotten (i.e. the Father), who begot "an Only-begotten Son ... not in appearance but in truth; whom he brought into existence by his own will ... a perfect creation of God, but not as one of the creatures, an offspring but not as one of the things made" (123). Epiphanius contrasts to these thoughts of the Arians a multitude of arguments in order to maintain the central notion of the genuine and natural sonship of the Logos, due to his birth from the Father which provides the ground for his true Godhead (124). The event of the creation of man
alone is sufficient, according to Epiphanius, for demonstrating the identity and, consequently, the consubstantiality of the persons of the Godhead: "For in [the Father] saying 'according to our image' (125) he did not distinguish the Son's likeness from the Father's nor did he deny anything from the identity of the Father with the Son" (126). Consequently, if the identity of the human person was based on the Trinitarian prototype, this means that the prototype is unified and undivided. It also means that the phrase "according to our image" reveals "the one substance and Godhead" of the three persons. It is characteristic, says Epiphanius, that he said "according to our own" and not "my own" or "your own" image which would have implied an essential distinction in the identity of the divine persons (127). It was said, then, as it was said, "for you [Arius] who claim that the Son is dissimilar (ἀνώμοιος) to the Father" (128). Thus, the Son is God, consubstantial to the Father, as the Holy Spirit is. If the Son was creature, then, what is the point of the Arian claim that he is "above other creatures"? "For whatever creature he may be, he is a creature; and even if he happens to have a name which is a thousand times higher, he is still the same with the other creatures equalized with them as to creaturehood" (129). Consequently, the Logos himself is not a creature but rather all things in the universe are servile to him (130). Also, as his word is truth and he has the possibility of liberating those who put their trust on it (131) and keep it, then "how much more should he himself be free, since he is truth" (132)? The fact that he became a man specifies exactly his extreme condescension, so that "he - who is perfect God - might take up our own weakness and through him the whole salvation of the world might be achieved" (133). This is the point, according to Epiphanius, that exposes the ignorance of the Arians concerning the perfection of
the Logos which turns them into "ungrateful" blasphemers "of their own Master" (134).

In addition to the above, Epiphanius points out that the unity and consubstantiality and equality of the three persons of the Godhead is based on the baptismal invocation. The commandment "Go and baptize in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit" (135) (sic) which the Church uses in Baptism, denotes exactly the one triadic seal, the one power "of the Godhead in Trinity" (136). If the persons did not constitute one consubstantial Godhead and one person, the Father, was God, while the other two, the Son and the Spirit, were creaturely, then, "by what reason could the two be conjoined into one by the seal of perfection" (137)? If, in other words, we were sealed only in the royal name of the Father, and the other two names of the Son and the Spirit are not royal, then, two things would apply: either that, although baptized, we would continue to be enslaved to the elements and creatures of this world, since the Son and the Spirit, into whom we were baptized, would be creatures according to the Arian claims, or that there would be a certain impotence in the Father, who would not be able to preserve his name alone but needed to attach it to two other elements which he created (i.e. the Son and the Spirit)" (138) in order to save and redeem the man he made from his sins. Yet, neither of these is applicable, according to Epiphanius.

The Arian innovation went further still and, as we saw in chapter one, the Logos became man not through inhomination (ἐνανθρώπησις) but through incarnation (ἐνσάρκωσις), since he only assumed a soulless flesh. The position of the soul in this curtailed humanity was taken by the Logos, who was essentially turned into a soul. In this way Arianism was able to explain the various sufferings
of Christ, such as hunger, thirst, sorrow, etc. In this way they were also able to explain why the term ‘incarnated’ was more acceptable than the term ‘inhominated’. It was for this reason that the First Ecumenical Synod put into the Creed both terms ‘incarnated’ and ‘inhomminated’, in order, that is, to combat the erroneous doctrine of the Arians. Epiphanius suggests this when he writes: “Lucian and all the Lucianists [i.e. the Arians] deny the assumption of a soul by the Son of God and say that he only had flesh in order to allege the existence of passion in God” (139). Thus, the logic and the aim of the Lucianists is quite clear. They rejected the existence of a soul in Christ and denied the assumption of a soul by the Divine Logos at his inhomination, alleging that he himself took the place of the soul in order to argue for the passibility of the Logos on the basis of his “thirst, hunger, physical exhaustion, tears, sorrow and psychological trouble” (140). In turn the Logos’ passibility served to establish his creatureliness, since only the impassible is Divine. Epiphanius’ position on this point is quite clear. “The Son of God did not assume only flesh, but also a soul and a mind and everything else that might exist in human beings except sin” (141). He stresses in particular the perfection and sinlessness of the human nature assumed by the Logos explaining it in the light of biblical and ecclesiastical tradition. If the Logos did not have a soul, then, how did Christ confess, “my soul is troubled” (142)? Or again, how does he say on the cross to his Father, “into Thy hands I deliver my spirit” (143)? Thus, the Logos did not have the place of the soul in Christ. To begin with, Epiphanius does agree with the reasonable thought, that the flesh, as such, does not eat, does not drink or do other things. “I too agree that the flesh by itself does not possess these things” (144). Yet, all the above ‘passions’ are not characteristics of a soulless flesh, nor of a fleshless
soul, for in the case when one of the two constituent parts (soul or body) is not present, then, there is no human being either. This is why the ‘blameless passions’, according to Epiphanius, do not constitute one-sided characteristics of either the soul or the body, but “it is to both soul and body that hunger and fatigue, or thirst and sorrow and all the rest, belong” (145). Consequently, Christ’s ‘passions’ are characteristics of his entire, unified and inseparable human existence. The reason for this being so is that God so willed to assume these characteristics as to show “that it was not in a docetic manner but in truth that he put on the body” (146) and thus, dispel the suspicion, above all of the Manichaeans, of a docetic incarnation of the Logos (147). At the same time, however, God’s dispensation is essentially geared towards the accomplishment of our own salvation. The work of the dispensation is a work of real and saving divine operation. Christ’s inhomination would have been effective, as Epiphanius emphatically stresses, only if it was perfect and complete “in everything”; if, in other words, it comprised the entire human being “in body, soul, mind and heart, and in all those elements which constitute a human being, except sin” (148).

Epiphanius’ theological perception and insight at this point, including his consensus with the other fathers and with the ecclesiastical mind in general, is typical of his entire work. There is a fullness of argument and an exactness of thought in the answers he supplies to crucial questions of doctrine and theology. Thus, while he speaks about human nature in a way that demonstrates his full knowledge of its integrity, at the same time he does not fail to recognize that the event of salvation can only be achieved by the power of the Godhead of the Logos. “The Son took flesh and the entire position of humanity” (149), but it is “in the Godhead” (150).
that the salvation of human beings is achieved. Thus, through all the
above, Arius’ logic is refuted. The truth of the incarnation is focused
on the following: “The Logos came to the flesh although he was God”
(151) in order to save humanity for ever.
2. “The Word became flesh”

2.a. The terms “flesh” and “man” in the Ancoratus

From the study of all the relevant references in the texts of the Ancoratus, it appears that the meanings of the terms “flesh” (σάρξ) and “man” (ἄνθρωπος) are not radically differentiated within the Christological formulations. These terms, as well as those of “body” and “soul”, are extensively used in the Ancoratus. Especially the terms “flesh” and “man” are very often used interchangeably in a way that suggests identity of meaning. As in the case of Athanasius, which was explored by Dr George Dragas (1), so in the case of Epiphanius neither of these terms is used exclusively and therefore the differentiation propounded by some modern scholars between an Antiochian “Logos-man” and an Alexandrine “Logos-flesh” Christological schemes is not applicable to Epiphanius either (2). Generally speaking we can say that Epiphanius’ Christological teaching is in agreement with that of Athanasius and is rooted in the Nicene formulation σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπίσαντα which implies the use of both terms “flesh” and “man”. It is this perspective which permeates the entire teaching of the Ancoratus as we hope to show in this thesis.

To begin with, Epiphanius turns to the Johannine formula “The Logos became flesh” in order to express the ineffable mystery of the incarnation of the Divine Word (3). The term “flesh” is understood here as referring to the entire human nature, which comprises all the elements that make up the human constitution. Thus, contradicting the argument of the Arians, according to which the Logos assumed mere
flesh, he says: “There is no doubt that the Lucianists, i.e. the Arians, confess the existence of the flesh; but they say: ‘The Logos became flesh’ said he, and not ‘The Logos became flesh and soul’; to this unlearned contradiction of theirs I also say that just as in the statement ‘God made man taking soil from the earth’ (4) the word made comprises all [aspects of man’s creation], so in the statement ‘The Logos became flesh’ everything is included” (5). Here Epiphanius attributes to the term “flesh” the sense of “the entire content” (πάν τὸ περιεχόμενον) of man, i.e. the whole man. Because, as he explains, since by the verb “made” (ἐπιλασσε) we perceive “one whole man hammered all through”, likewise the term “flesh makes it obvious that the Saviour assumed a soul as well” (6). Going on, he becomes even more explicit, saying: “If then he assumed soul and body as it has been demonstrated, then, it was not the Godhead that was curtailed from the Father’s substance, being encompassed by passions, such as thirst and toil and hunger and whatever else falls within the needs of a human being; and therefore [God] ‘does not get tired nor can one find his understanding’ (7), but when the Saviour is found to be tired ... it should be assumed that he was not tired above but in the flesh” (8). It is quite clear here that Epiphanius by the term “flesh” he means both soul and body and that he attributes the human passions to the human nature - “whatever else falls within the needs of a human being” and “he was tired in the flesh” - except that, in his wish to preserve the unity of the person of Christ, he attributes ... toil to the Saviour Logos by using the phrase “when the Saviour is found to be tired”. In another text he will clearly assimilate the notions of “flesh” and “man” and will demonstrate the identity of their content: “When the holy Logos came ... he both took flesh and was found to be a man” (9). He produces a similar yoking
together in another case in discussing the statement ‘The Logos became flesh’. Christ, he says, being the vessel of wisdom and Godhead, atones in himself by mediation all things with God, not counting sin” (10), (sic) “fulfilling hidden mysteries by the trustworthiness of his covenant which had been foretold by the Law and the Prophets, he is proclaimed Son of God although he is called son of David; for he is both, God and man, mediator between God and men” (11), “true house of God” (12). In this case too the term “flesh” is replaced by the term “man”, expressing the same meaning. The coordination of these two terms will be seen again in the same connection, as soon as he returns to the statement “the Logos became flesh”: “He became flesh in Mary and was found to be a man in the seed of Abraham according to the promise” (13). Thus, the yoking of these two terms, “flesh” and “man”, and the absolute coordination of their meanings is quite obvious in the Ancoratus and there are no grounds for any dispute over it. This is once again seen in Epiphanius’ comments on the verse from Jeremiah, “he is a man indeed and who shall understand him?” (14), where he renders the term “man” of this verse by the term “flesh”. “He said this, when he partook of the flesh and formed the same holy flesh in himself without the seed of a man but from Mary the Theotokos - according to what has been said ‘born of a woman’ (15) - and thus partook of what is ours through what is ours...” (16). He will return to the hermeneutical context of the same verse with greater clarity in another unit, in order to present exactly the same interpretation: “The divine letter suggests these two together, the visible and the invisible” (17). Thus, Christ is both “a man from Mary in truth and one who has been born without the seed of a man” (18). The identification of the terms “flesh” and “man” by Epiphanius is quite striking. Referring to the Logos’ unoriginate
birth from the Father and correlating it to the birth "from Mary the holy virgin", he says: "Being always with the Father, since the Logos was born unoriginately, and being in the flesh, since he was born at the end of days from Mary according to the flesh..." (19). The terms "in the flesh" (ἐν σαρκί) and "according to the flesh" (κατὰ σάρκα) certainly denote the same thing, but they do not constitute a redundant tautology. The first one expresses the notion of the incarnation of the Logos in time and hence it points to Hebr. 1:1 ('at the end of days') and to the similar reference in Psalm 2:8, while the second certainly denotes the fact that the incarnation took place "according to man" or "according to the human condition" which are corollaries to his human birth. Thus, the incarnation is amply specified by the two phrases "in the flesh" and "according to the flesh".

Epiphanius’ insistence on understanding the term “flesh” as denoting the whole man is of fundamental importance, because it is used to affirm the work of the divine economy. This work is none other that the salvation and deification of the whole man. The teaching of Arius, and of the other heretics, did not have its starting point in "the disputation of the ecclesiastical dogmas. On the contrary [the heresies] formulate themselves their peculiar theses which come to contradict the ecclesiastical experience. The characteristic feature of all heresies ... lies in the fact that they dispute wholly or partially the truth of the renewal and deification of man in Christ" (20). This is why Epiphanius, in his description of the economy in Christ, focuses on man and what this economy means for man. "Indeed the Logos came to take on the whole economy, both flesh and soul and whatever else is in man" (21). The limits, then, of the economy, as well as its point of reference and centre, are to be found in whichever elements man consists of, or whatever elements constitute man. He assumed
alienation and differentiation from God and his subjection to the opposite condition of sin” (29). The fact of the “fleshy” man, i.e. of the man who falls under the power of evil, and “the flesh” as a condition and event of subjugation, keep him in captivity, not only to “the law of sin” (30), but also to works of fleshly appetites and desires (31). This is clearly spelled out and explained in the Ancoratus. For Epiphanius, Christ assumed flesh, i.e. the human nature, “not as one who was conquered by the flesh” (32). Clearly, then, the distinction between “flesh” in the sense of “man”, and “flesh” in the moral sense which is connected with sin, is well established in Epiphanius’ mind. This is actually based on what the New Testament teaches: “… as the Divine Scriptures explicitly declare … against the flesh. ‘for the fruit of the flesh’ (33), they say, ‘is fornication, adultery, indecency and the like” (34), and “those who are in the flesh cannot be liked by God” (35), and “the flesh desires against the spirit” (36). The assumption of the human nature by the Logos, i.e. of the human flesh, does not necessarily imply the assumption of sin. Christ “dwelt in us” (37) and became “the justification of the law” (38), “giving us the spirit so that we may come to know him and what concerns him as beginning and end of life, law of righteousness” (39), “law of faith” (40), “law of the spirit” (41), “freedom from the law of flesh and sin” (42). Thus, instead of the assumption of sin and corruption by the Logos at his incarnation, “inasmuch as he remembered the oath taken many generations before” (43), as David says, “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself not counting their transgressions” (44), “because he was pleased that the entire fullness should dwell in him and that he should reconcile all things to himself, making peace through the blood of the cross” (45) “and so he came to bring about
the economy of the saving times” (46). The work of the economy, then, is accomplished “through the flesh”, through the incarnation” of the Logos, but the end result is “against the flesh”, i.e. against the sinful condition of man. In Christ “all things are recapitulated” (47) and a redemption is brought about “in the body of his flesh” (48), while “the middle wall of partition” (49) is abolished, i.e. the enmity between man and God “in his flesh” (50). Thus, according to Epiphanius, the incarnation, which is the likeness of the flesh of sin, comes to hit this very “flesh”, which has become the centre of corruption and the destructive power of sin. Here we discover a theological principle, which is not only Epiphanius’ but also of other fathers and especially the Cappadocians. It is the principle of “the same by the same” (τῷ ὅμοιῳ τῷ ὅμοιον), i.e. “the salvation of the human nature” (51).

In addition, Epiphanius also clarifies the point that the “flesh” that was assumed by the Logos did have the possibility of corruption, because it was “a nature of mortal [creation]” (52). This is because “The Logos of God became flesh in Mary and was found to be a man in the see of Abraham” (53). Consequently, as far as the flesh went, Christ was man’s prodigy, Abraham’s, and “his body was from Mary” (54), i.e. from a woman. Yet this possibility of corruption would have been understandable if the incarnation was restricted only to the limits of the natural conditions and parameters. This, however, was not the case, because, “it was the holy Saviour himself that came down from heaven, and considered it right to work out our salvation in a virginal laboratory, having been conceived through the Holy Spirit and having then been born of Mary, having taken up the flesh, and having become flesh he who is the Logos, without suffering any mutation in his nature, but assuming the humanity along with the
Godhead ..., and having taken both human flesh and soul, he who is perfect with the Father, having become inhominated among us not in appearance but in truth, and having reconstituted in himself a perfect man from Mary the Theotokos and through the Holy Spirit” (55).

This text of Epiphanius recapitulated and summarizes at the same time the chapter of the Divine economy which was accomplished by the Logos. The participle “having become” (γενόμενος) is interpreted and attributed by Epiphanius through the participle “having taken up” or “having assumed” (λαβών). Thus, the statement “the Logos becoming flesh” is correlated with the statement “the Logos taking up flesh” or “taking up humanity along with his Godhead” and this again indicates the semantic correlation of the terms “flesh” and “man”. This assumption is not an event comparable to those occurring in the Old Testament with the prophets who took up divine inspiration and divine enlightenment, nor could it be interpreted as an indwelling of the Logos in an already created man. “He did not dwell into a man, as he used to speak in the prophets having dwelt and operated in power” (56). In becoming man, it was the Logos himself who recreated from the beginning a perfect man from Mary through the Holy Spirit, “not changing his being God, nor converting the Godhead into manhood, but including his being man and what is man to his own fullness of his Godhead and to the peculiar hypostasis of the Divine and enhypostatic Logos” (57). This recreation, then, of the perfect “man” in the “laboratory of the Virgin”, with the cooperation of the Holy Spirit, and his assumption by the perfect and enhypostatic Divine Logos, as well as his union with him, i.e. with the fullness of his Godhead, specifies that, “this is the man whom the only-begotten came to assume, so that in the perfect man everything that concerns our salvation might be perfectly worked out by him who is God,
leaving out no part of man, so that no left over part might partially fall again prey to the devil” (58). This means that the possibility of sin in the “flesh” of Christ is unthinkable.

The use of the expression “recreated” (ἀναπλάσας) by Epiphanius is particularly important. It is designed to convey the theological position that the Logos is the creative person of the triune Godhead, i.e. that he is the one who initially created man and who, now that sin has darkened him, attempts in a similar way to recreate him or reshape him. Thus, this recreation of man is again worked out by the Creator Logos, but this time his method is quite different from what it was the first time. The person of Mary “found grace” (59), because “it was in her that the holy flesh was chosen” (60). The characterization of the humanity of the Logos as “holy flesh” (ἁγίαν σάρκα) denotes again with clarity the absence of every trace and tendency of sin. This is not, however, the only designation that Epiphanius uses to convey this point. Turning to Psalm 46, he borrows other messianic expressions, in order to express the purity of the “flesh” of the Logos. “He chose us as his inheritance, the beauty of Jacob, whom he loved” (61), namely, “the entirety of his beauty”, the beauty of the whole Jacob, the flesh which was chosen through the Holy Spirit from Mary” (62). It is very interesting to note here that the “beauty of Jacob”, and the other synonymous phrases refer to the “flesh” which the Logos chose through the Spirit from the blessed Virgin. In another place he expresses the same thought in a most striking way: “... and Mary absorbs the Logos in the conception, as the earth does with rain” (63). Thus, the appropriation of humanity by the Logos, which is characterized as “economy of the flesh” (64), is confirmed and approved as a desirable and welcome event which occurs in time especially during Christ’s baptism. If, in other words,
"the flesh" of the Logos was sinful, the Father would not have expressed his pleasure. "The event of the economy of the flesh was shown to John the Baptist from above by the Father; for the Father was well pleased in Christ's incarnate presence" (65). According to Irenaeus, the event of Christ's baptism does not reveal only God's trinity, i.e. it does not constitute only a theophany - revelation of the three persons of the Trinity, but reveals at the same time the Father's good pleasure for the "economy of the flesh", the assumption of the "holy flesh" and the recreation and salvation of the human race by the Logos.

That the "flesh" of the Logos was holy is confirmed by the fact that Christ was "a natural genuine man from Mary who had been born without the seed of a man" (66). He assumed "what there are in man, from mind and body to soul, and the entire inhomination without sin" (67). All these things took place, because the Logos, in spite of taking up "mortal flesh" (68), he himself, being God, "clothed it with the Godhead" and made it to be "incorruptible" (69). Before God's almightiness there is no weakness and no necessity that could interfere. "all things are possible to God" (70) including "the transformation of what is corruptible to being incorruptible and all that is earthly coming to dwell in incorruptibility; and none should wonder about this... for who could question God about this?" (71) says Epiphanius. Besides, Adam's body, as Epiphanius again points out, had been made of soil and the same matter as our own. And yet we too have the hope of eternal life and incorruptible inheritance. Thus, "the body of the Saviour too was from Mary and was spiritually conjoined to the heavenly incorruptibility of the Logos" (72).

Speaking by way of conclusion and considering the Christological terms which Epiphanius employs in the Anchatus and which
refer to the human nature of the Logos, it appears that the term "flesh" is often rendered or replaced by the term "man" or with synonymous terms, words and concepts. We observe, in other words, the same phenomenon as in Athanasius (73). Thus, in Epiphanius the terms that dominate his discourse are as follows: "the Logos becoming flesh", "the incarnate Logos", "he who was born in the flesh", "he who truly became man" (74), "the Logos ... took up flesh and was found to be a man" (75), "a man from Mary truly ... born" (76), "incarnate presence" (77), "assuming flesh" (78), "in Mary he became flesh and was found to be a man" (79), "assuming the form of a servant (i.e. of man)" (80), "he assumed from humanity" (81), "he appeared in the flesh" (82), "the Christ according to the flesh" (83), "inhominated in us" (84), "raising a perfect man in himself" (85), "comprising being man and whatever man is" (86), "having a perfect man" (87), "whichever are in man and whatever make up man" (88), "our Lord inhominated" (89), "the incarnate presence of Christ" (90), "the divine Logos becoming flesh from Mary, and inhominated in us he communicated with us" (91), "assuming flesh" (92), "the Logos becoming in the flesh" (93), "he who was inhominated in us" (94), "uniting what is fleshly and what is divine" (95), "he assumed the flesh... from our flesh and became man like us" (96), "coming in the flesh" (97), etc. All these imply a real incarnation and inhomination of the Logos.

At the same time Epiphanius, in putting forth his Christological statements, sometimes goes beyond the conceptual identification of the terms "flesh" and "man" and their synonyms, words or concepts, attempting another conceptual distinction or even concurrence of the same terms and their synonyms. More specifically, he sometimes identifies the term "flesh" with the term "body", as for example when
these elements, exactly because this is what the economy of the Divine Logos is all about and because this is the way that man could be saved. "Indeed our Lord assumed all [human elements] completely in having inhonimated himself into human life" (22). Consequently, the full and complete assumption of the human nature, i.e. of the "flesh", secures and guarantees the full and perfect salvation of mankind. The necessity of this assumption was dictated, as it were, by the fact of "the weakness of the flesh". Original sin, not as a fact that convicts one of guilt, but as a 'weakness' (or sickness, ἀσθένεια) inherited from the first human couple was transmitted to the whole human race. This again is a point which Epiphanius presents with admirable clarity, expressing the general patristic point of view concerning the consequence of the fall of Adam. Patristic theology saw original sin as a 'weakness' or 'sickness' and did not speak of an inherited guilt, except for an inherited corruption and death" (23). What was to be expressed a little later, i.e. in the beginning of the fifth century, with much clarity by Cyril of Alexandria, namely, that "nature became affected with illness ... through the disobedience of the one, i.e. of Adam ... [and] man's nature became sick through Adam's disobedience" (24), was formulated earlier by Epiphanius who wrote in the same spirit: "thus 'in what I was weak through the flesh' (25), the Saviour was sent to me 'in the likeness of flesh of sin' (26), to fulfil this economy, so that I may be 'purchased' (27), so that I may be delivered from corruption, from death" (28).

The varied semantics of the term "flesh" does not escape Epiphanius' attention. He recognizes that sometimes it has a different content from that of being synonymous with the entire human nature, which conveys a moral and existential content. Thus the term "flesh", beyond denoting man, "denotes", for Epiphanius, "man's full
he says: “the Logos by his coming [acquired] flesh and soul and whatever are in man” (98). Thus, in this case the word “flesh” really denotes the “body”. He formulates his statement in this way, because he wants to respond to the Lucianists, as he says in this context, and also to the Arians who “deny the assumption of a soul by the Son of God, and argue, instead, that he had taken up only flesh, so that they may attribute the human passion to the divine Logos” (99). He produces a similar formulation in another instance when he interprets the verse Proverbs 8:22 (100). “For beginning of ways of righteousness of the Gospel [means] that the Logos became flesh to us in Mary and a soul was established in her flesh” (101). Responding here to Origen’s teaching, who interprets allegorically the event of the creation of man, he says: “Origen, may God forgive him, allegorizing with human fancy, introduced in speaking the view that the coats of skin which Scripture says that God made for Adam to put on were not actually made of skin; but that this, he says, is the coat of skin the fleshly cover of the body, or the body itself; for after the disobedience, he says, and after the eating from the tree he clothed the souls with these bodies, namely the flesh” (102). That here too the word “body” denotes the soulless flesh is quite obvious. This is why his response to Origen is couched in the same idiom: “for if the flesh was created after Adam’s eating from the tree, then how did God take from his side before he had eaten? and how did Adam say when he was raised from his ecstasy “this is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh?” (103). In another case, in attempting to combat the Apollinarists (104), he says: being God and being mind in himself, he also had the mind of man with the flesh and he assumed a soul” (105). Thus it is once again shown that the term “flesh” is conveyed by the term “body”. Again writing against the Hieracites (106) and
against "those who think and speak about a resurrection of our flesh, and not only of it, but also of another one instead of the present" (107), he returns to the conceptual yoking together of the terms "flesh" and "body", in order to bring back the same frame of reference for those claims also of the Manichaeans (108) who thought and said that "there will be a resurrection not of the body but of the soul" (109) and to stress that "we do not bury the souls in the tombs, but the bodies, because the souls do not fall as the flesh does" (110).

Apart from this sense of the "flesh", however, which denotes the soulless body, we find in the Ancoratus Epiphanius sometimes using the term "body" in order to express the notion of man or of the human nature: "For the Saviour's body was from Mary and was spiritually conjoined to the heavenly incorruptibility of the Logos" (111). Certainly the meaning of the term "body" here does not imply any Arian doctrine, namely that the body united with the Logos was without a soul, because if that were the case there would be a direct contradiction between this case and all the other cases which we come across in Epiphanius. By body here he means no mere body but the entire human nature of Christ. Speaking also, in another case, and making a comparison between the period before Christ and the period of the grace, he says: "The ancient Sabbaths, therefore, have passed away" (112) "and a true Sabbath is proclaimed with us; while the first circumcision, which involved only a tiny particle, has become redundant, and what is in far better operation is the heavenly circumcision which involves the entire body; for the waters and the divine invocation (epiklesis) are not done on one member of man but the whole body of man is sealed, purified and circumcised in order to be freed from all evils. This is how the holy Church received these mysteries" (113). The interchange of the term "body" with the term
“man”, implies the whole man, who is renewed by the mystery (sacrament) of holy Baptism, and clearly denotes the semantic identity of the terms “body” and “man” in Epiphanius.

Finally, Epiphanius’ teaching on the fulfillment of the “hidden mystery” (114), which will be revealed with the “restoration of all things in heaven and on earth” (115), provides a further characteristic case of the content of the meaning of the terms under examination. During this eschatological time “it is he [namely, Christ] who shall transform the body of our humiliation so as to become conformed with the body of his glory” (116). Consequently, this transfiguration which will take place and will be realized in Christ, does not concern only the bodily aspect of the human existence, but has to do with the fulfillment of the whole man, the entire human nature, according to the prototype of the transfiguration of the whole man which was put forth by the Logos with the incarnation. This is because with the incarnation, as Epiphanius says, following St. Paul the Apostle, “it is in him [namely, in the man] that the whole fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily” (117).

It is particularly interesting to note that, while Epiphanius, as the above texts show, repeatedly uses the terms “flesh”, “in the flesh”, “took up flesh”, “chose a holy flesh”, “Christ’s incarnate presence”, “coming in flesh”, etc. in order to refer to the full and perfect “inhomination” of the Logos, yet he never leaves these terms alone, but almost always conjoins them or renders them in terms of “he was found a man”, “he is a man”, “he emptied himself again into humanity”, “natural and genuine man”, “whichever or whatever is in man”, “inhominated”, “inhomination”. He does this because he knows too well the doctrine of the Arians who confessed through Eudoxius’ mouth: that they “believe ... in one Lord the Son ... who
became incarnate, but not inhominated; for he, not take up a soul but became flesh, in order that through the flesh as a veil he might be for us our God; not two natures, because he was not a perfect man, but God in the flesh instead of a soul; the whole thing being one nature by composition (synthesis), passible on account of the economy; for the world could not be saved by the suffering of soul and body” (118), but also because “flesh” conveys the same things as “man” as we have already shown.

As regards the exchange of properties (communicatio idiomatum) or the names of the one nature of Christ, the divine, with the other, the human, full discussion shall be undertaken below. Suffice it to say here that for Epiphanius the so-called “sufferings” of Christ are attributed by Epiphanius to Christ’s person, although it is fully acknowledged that it is “the Lordly man” (ὁ Κυριακός ἄνθρωπος) that suffers, so that it can be concluded that he is truly a man (119). “If the impassible Logos of God suffered these things, then the suffering is a matter of the body, it lies outside his impassibility but not outside him because he was well pleased to take it up; the suffering is attributed to him even though he does not suffer and it is like a stain on a garment which does not reach the body of the person who wears it and yet the stain is attributed to the person who wears the garment; it is in a similar way that God suffered in the flesh, inasmuch as his Godhead did not suffer anything and yet the suffering of the flesh was attributed to the Godhead which had put on that flesh, so that salvation might be granted to us in the Godhead” (120). It is with distinctive discernment and profound theological insight that Epiphanius expounds here the passion of the “flesh” of Christ, or “bodily passion”. Although it has to do with the human
nature of Christ it is in fact attributed to his Godhead because it is “in the Godhead that salvation is secured”.

Reaching our concluding paragraph in this chapter, we observe that, according to Epiphanius, the incarnation and inhomination of the Logos is firmly understood as a real and fundamental event which excludes both a simple indwelling as well as a docetic incarnation of the Logos. For Epiphanius the Logos was inhominated having assumed all elements that constitute man, except sin, and it was in his humanity, or “flesh”, and as man that he suffered for the salvation of human beings, although this suffering is attributed to him as Saviour God.

2.b. The “Lordly man” (Κυριακός ἄνθρωπος),

Epiphanius’ anti-docetism and anti-Apollinarism

If Arius’ doctrine constituted an attack on the divine hypostasis of the Logos, turning the Logos into a creature and striking a crucial blow against the saving work of Christ, Apollinaris’ doctrine over-emphasized the reality of the divine nature of the Logos, overlooking the integrity of the human nature and holding the view that the Logos “did not assume a complete human nature but a curtailed one as to the element of the mind” (121) since the “mind”, or “hypostasis” of this nature was taken by the Logos. “And there are certain people, who, wishing to make the incarnate presence of Christ and the perfect economy which was established in him deficient, I do not understand what they had in mind, wrongly said that Christ did not take up a mind ... because they think that the mind is a hypostasis” (122). By the words “certain people” Epiphanius certainly refers to the Apollinarists and he certainly has in mind his meeting with Paulinus and Vitalius in Antioch (123). During the discussions between Epiphanius and the Apollinarist Vitalius, the latter confessed Christ as “perfect
man” in the sense that “if we put the Godhead instead of the mind and include the flesh and the soul, then we shall have a perfect man, consisting of flesh and soul and Godhead, instead of mind” (124). This Apollinarist teaching, however, essentially led to the conclusion that “in Christ the creature is united essentially (κατ’ οὐσίαν) and naturally (κατὰ φύσιν)” (125). Thus, the basic slip of Apollinaris is his “expulsion” of the human mind from the “incarnate presence of Christ” (126), including, of course, all the far-reaching implications of this position for Christology and Soteriology. It is this error that Epiphanius has in kind in promoting in his Christological doctrine the notion of the “lordly man”, to which we shall now turn.

The term “Lordly man” (Κυρίακος ἀνθρωπος) does not occur only in Epiphanius. Although Epiphanius makes a wider use of it, the term is also used by other fathers, e.g. Athanasius (127), Gregory the Theologian (128), Cyril of Alexandria (129), etc. The general sense of this term is connected with the “human nature of Christ”, or the notion of “Christ as man” (130). In his use of this term Epiphanius moves on three levels:

a) Having in mind the view of the Marcionites, the Manichaeans and the other heretics who promote docetism and “wish to exclude the conjunction of the flesh” (131), teaching that the incarnate presence of Christ was docetic” (132), he turns against docetism, emphasizing that “the sequence of the incarnate presence” (133) of the Logos was true and real.

b) The teaching of Apollinaris on the curtailed human nature of Christ, involving the absence of a “mind” from Christ’s “flesh”, because the “mind” is considered to be “the seat of sin in us” (134), constitutes another parameter for Epiphanius’ use of the term “lordly man”. The “Lordly man” was not simply a true man, but had had “a
perfect inhomination" because he assumed all elements that constitute man, "all that man is" (135).

c) Having in mind the docetists and the Apollinarists and the refutation of their erroneous views, Epiphanius builds up his own position and explanation using as his compass the preservation of "the sequence of our life and confirmed confession, which has been incorruptibly kept in the Catholic Church from the times of the Law and the Prophets, the Gospels and the Apostles, to the present day" (136).

In our analysis of the Epiphanian notion of the "Lordly man", which we shall present in the following paragraphs, we shall move on these three levels, using, of course, the relevant texts of the Ancoratus.

The researcher of Epiphanius' works and especially of his Ancoratus cannot but observe the striking feature of using certain stereotype words and phrases. Such terms, for terms they are, even though they appear at first glance to be simple words, are the following: "all" (πᾶσα) (137), "all" (πάντα) (138), "in truth" (ἐν ἀληθείᾳ) (139), "the true case" (τὸ ἀληθὲς) (140), "true" (ἀληθινὸν) (141), "the perfect one" (τελείαν) (142), "perfect" (τέλειον) (143), etc. These terms are joined together, or specify, or even express and interpret corresponding Christological terms, which refer to the event of the economy or the inhomination. Epiphanius does this on purpose in order to refute the heretical Christological deviations of the docetists or the Apollinarists and to establish the orthodox dogma on a first ecclesiological basis. "By his advent the holy Logos ... became tangible and took up flesh and was found to be a man and was captured by the scribes ... and he even wept, as it is explicitly said in the uncorrected copies of the Gospel according to St. Luke, as saint Irenaeus bears witness in his work 'Against the Heresies' in
arguing against those who say that Christ's appearance was docetic" (144). He actually stresses and establishes with biblical witnesses both the reality and the truth of the inhomination so that he may counteract the arguments of the docetists. "If, indeed, he was not a man, how was he called a man? for certainly, everyone who is derived from men is known by men, the woman who bears him and the relatives, the close friends and neighbours, the cohabitants in the same tents or co-citizens, and it is impossible to have these things fulfilled in a mere man" (145). The reality and truth of the humanity of Christ is witnessed to by the fact that "he was born of a woman" (146) "so that the phrase 'of a woman' might fulfil the phrase 'he became flesh'" (147). For this reason, the birth of Christ "from a woman", and even the sending of the angel Gabriel, "not simply to a virgin, but to a virgin who had been betrothed to a man", "so that the man of the betrothal might show Mary to be truly human" (148). Scripture, according to Epiphanius, supports even more strikingly the truth of the humanity of Christ by stressing the child-birth, the swaddling-clothes, and the breasts which were sucked (149), as well as the circumcision (150) and the arms of Symeon (151). It was possible, says Epiphanius "to spell out words" on account of the union of the human nature with the divine which resulted from the assumption of the former. "For, if, having been born from a womb, he had been able to speak and clearly spell words like a growing boy, his incarnate conception would not have been regarded as true but rather as a mere appearance (δόκησις); and so he endures the growth in stature, so that he might not curtail the truth of the sequence" (152). Epiphanius' argumentation against the docetists is both clear and intense. It brings out the true reality of the incarnation against any suggestion of docetic appearance by drawing attention to the many events from the
Lord's sharing earthly life with other human beings. Indeed Epiphanius uses the whole range of the economy in order to establish the truth of the inhomination. "He got tired, but in the flesh; for the flesh had to become tired, so that it might not appear to be docetic but true; and all other similar events have the same import, to become sleepy and to lie asleep indicate a human being, and to be in touch; for he took up all these and was found to be a man" (153). Epiphanius is not restricted to references to the body alone, nor does he speak onesidedly of the bodily aspect of the manhood of Christ. He adds references to other aspects as well. "'My soul is troubled' (154), he says, ... and 'to be troubled' is said so that the kind of the truth of his incarnate presence might not be curtailed; for the incarnate presence was not a mere appearance (docetic)" (155). Epiphanius defends the fullness and reality of Christ's humanity against those who raise doubts, because he wants to connect it with the truth and reality of the economy. If these things did not take place, then, neither the Logos' divine economy would have been accomplished. "For how would the economy be found to be true, if it did not have the needed mode of the inhomination?" (156) It was necessary, then, that in his advent the Logos "should assume the whole economy, flesh and soul and whatever else there is in man; and that includes hunger and fatigue, or thirst and sorrow and all such like, as parts of the soul and the flesh; and so he weeps in order to expose the deception of the Manichaean and indicate that he did not put on a body only in appearance; and he gets thirsty too, in order to show that he does not just have a mere flesh but a soul also; since it was not his Godhead that got thirsty (but in the flesh) and in the soul he felt the thirst and the fatigue due to the sequence of the journey through the flesh and the soul" (157). The whole "sequence" of the
elements of the flesh and the soul is witnessed to by all the events that occurred to Christ. For "these events ... that occurred to him were proved to have had a good reason for his incarnate true presence" (158). Epiphanius goes further on this as he includes the passion of Christ in his present argument. For the docetists, Christ did not really suffer because everything occurred as a "mere appearance" (δοκήσει). Thus, since "the incarnate presence is not a mere appearance" (159), the passion of death and death itself constitute a real event. "But if you hear that the Lord died, take cognizance of the place where the passion of death was fulfilled" (160). It is the chief of the Apostles, says Epiphanius, who interprets this death for us in saying, "[the Lord] was put to death in the flesh" (161). Thus, Epiphanius emphasizes the reality of the suffering and death of Christ, as he did with the incarnation, as crucial for man's salvation. "What, then, shall we say? is Christ not a man? it is obvious to everyone, from what we said above, that we confess beyond doubt, that the Lord and God and Logos became man not in appearance, but in truth; for he did not come as a man for the improvement of the Godhead; and because it is not in a man that we have placed the hope of our salvation; since there has been no man from amongst those who were derived from Adam who was able to work out our salvation, but God the Logos became man, so that our hope may not be on a man, but on a living and true God who became man" (162). It was, then, in the flesh that Christ died" (163) and dissolved the sufferings of human beings "through his own suffering", so that through death he might destroy death (164). Christ, however, not only died, but also rose again from the dead and ascended into heaven and sat at the right hand of the Father (165). Although, according to Epiphanius, the body of the risen Christ was a "spiritual body" (166), which was able "to
enter in through closed doors” (167), yet it was one that Thomas could touch, “so that none might conjecture that it is in imagination, but in truth” (168).

Apart, however, from docetism, Epiphanius’ Christology also includes a chapter of response to Apollinarism. As he says himself, he prefers other heresies to this one, perhaps because he foresees its far-reaching consequences. “Much more preferable are for us the Manichaeans and Marcionites and the other heretics, who do not wish to attach a flesh to him, so that they can avoid any diminution of his Godhead” (169). It is certainly a fact, that the Apollinarists, beyond their denial of the integrity of the inhomination, which resulted from their determination not to see a human mind in Christ, they went further, since, as Epiphanius says, “some of them” taught the “homoousion” of the flesh with the Godhead, the passibility of the Godhead and/or chiliasm (170). It is important to note that Epiphanius is quite lenient towards Apollinaris himself, calling him “most erudite”, “one who had no casual education”, “one who was well versed ... in Greek teaching”, “one who had been trained in all dialectical and sophistic paideia”, “one who in the rest of his life was most modest, and was always placed in the first rank of those who love the orthodox ... and who endured exile because he refused to be counted with the Arians” (171). This is why he is grieved and mourns for him. Yet, when it comes to the refutation of his teachings and of the teachings of his followers, he moves onto the same frame of reference as he does with other heresies. At first Epiphanius’ interest is centered on Apollinaris’ teaching which regarded as deficient, “mindless”, the human nature that was assumed by the Logos.

Thus, in order to lay down the subject which was foremost in his mind and which had a direct reference to Apollinaris’ teaching, he
raises the crucial question: *What, then, is man?*” (172) And he answers: “*soul, body, mind, and whatever else might be*” (173). Indeed, he goes on: “*What then, did the Lord come to save? certainly a complete man; and so he took up all that are in him completely*” (174). Epiphanius’ answer is clear and complete. If the Lord came to save the complete man, then, man’s complete and full salvation presupposes man’s complete and full assumption. Christ saves the whole man, and this is why he assumed him whole. This assumption, however, of the whole man, which implies that all the elements “*which exist in man, in mind and body and soul*” do not include the assumption of sin by the Logos (175). Apollinaris’ teaching, which was derived from the Aristotelian principle, “*two perfect (complete) things cannot become one*” (δύο τέλεια ἐν γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται) (176) finds a clear reference in Epiphanius. Christ’s humanity was, for Apollinaris, curtailed, because it was deprived of one of its constitutive elements, its hypostasis, its mind. “Mind”, however, does not constitute, for Epiphanius, man’s hypostasis, as Apollinaris believed (177). This is refuted, says Epiphanius, by the fact that, had that been the case, then, “*we would have found ... four*” (178) constitutive elements in man: “*one hypostasis of the mind, and another hypostasis of the soul, and another hypostasis of the spirit and another hypostasis of the body*” (179). Consequently, the mind cannot be understood in any other terms - and certainly not in terms of an hypostasis -, than “*as eyes in the soul as there are eyes in the body*” (180). The clarity of Epiphanius’ position is quite striking. Any acceptance of the mind in the sense of an hypostasis, would have led to a “multiplication” of the constitutive parts of the human being. Apart, however, from this approach to the notion of the mind, Epiphanius goes further still in his answer to the Apollinarist
challenge, which accepted an ensouled humanity but deprived it of a rational soul. In other words, Apollinaris separated soul from mind. The Apollinarist Vitalius in his answer to Epiphanius stated that “Christ was a perfect (complete) man” (181). But, then, he proceeded to add that whereas he had flesh and soul, he was deprived of a mind (182). Thus, Epiphanius, refuting this thesis too, says: “For they consider the mind to be an hypostasis and they dare say that this is by nature what Scripture is accustomed to call spirit in man, as the Apostle says, ‘so that our whole spirit and the soul and the body might be preserved on the day of our Lord Jesus’” (183). They are certainly mistaken; for, if the spirit is mind and the mind is spirit, there are no longer two hypostases in man brought together into one hypostasis, no longer an enhypostatic soul alone and an enhypostatic body, but we find that there are four elements; one hypostasis of the mind, another hypostasis of the soul, another hypostasis of the spirit, another hypostasis of the body; and we search again, we shall find even more of these; because man is the possessor of many names (184). Thus, Epiphanius rejects a four-fold or multi-fold division of man, does not separate the mind from the soul, does not regard the mind as a hypostasis, but as it was previously said, he gives him the place of “the eye of the soul” (185). He actually stresses that “in his inhomination into our life our Lord assumed all elements completely, or rather he took up his own body to himself becoming creator, and he took up the soul to himself, namely put the soul on” (186). In this perspective man’s constitutive elements are the body and the soul, with which the mind is closely bound up. These are exactly the elements which express the full and complete assumption of the human nature by the Logos. The full assumption constitutes in turn the complete economy and this in turn secures the perfect salvation.
Apollinaris approximated with his teaching the position of the docetists, since he essentially minimized Christ’s human nature as docetism did. In his attempt to save the unity of the person of Christ, he taught that Christ “was perfect with the divine perfection and not with the human” (187). Epiphanius, however, teaches that “When the Logos became flesh ... taking up manhood along with his Godhead, and being perfect from the Father, fulfilled also the perfect economy, he came into the world for us and for our salvation; he took up human flesh and soul, he who is perfect from the Father, and was inhominated amongst us not in appearance but in truth recreating a perfect man in himself ... so that in one perfect man he, being God, might perfectly work out the whole task of our salvation, so that no remainder part may become part of the devil’s prey” (188). The Aristotelian view, that there can be no impersonal nature or hypostasis, constituted the fundamental basis and also the deviatory starting point of the Apollinarist Christological doctrine. Apollinaris upheld this view and used it as the staring-point of his Christology (189). Thus, since “two perfect things could not become one”, Apollinaris was led to the thesis of an imperfect, mindless, human nature in Christ (190). This is why Epiphanius returns, in the above text, to the “perfect” Logos and to the “perfect” character of the “assumed humanity”. Christ “... included his being man and whatever else man is, in the fullness of his own Godhead and in the particular hypostasis of the divine and enhypostatic Logos; and when I say being man I mean all that are in man and whichever [constitute] man” (191).

Epiphanius also opposes the other Apollinarist doctrines which state: that “it is impossible in one and the same subject to have two to coexist which entertain wishes opposite to each other” (192); that the
mind as an hegemonic principle moves and leads the flesh, which is passively led and moved by the mind (193); that "it is impossible for two mindful and volitional [faculties] to dwell in the same, so that none of them might turn against the other by virtue of its own volition and operation" (194). His rejection is based on the negation of Apollinaris' trichotomic view on man which is borrowed from Platonic sources (195). For Epiphanius, the mind "was not given to us that we may sin, but that we may observe the perfect things which are reviewed in us from both sides ... For the mind distinguishes the words, just as the larynx tastes the foods; indeed the eye understands and the mind sees. Seeing then and tasting and distinguishing is what the mind is in us, having been granted to us by God. Thus, the mind condescends to what constantly takes place, even if man does not wish it to do so" (196). Consequently, as Epiphanius points out, the mind is not the first cause of sin, nor did Scripture ever turn against the mind, but "the Divine Scriptures explicitly declare themselves ... against the flesh, in saying, that 'the fruit of the flesh comprises fornication, adultery, indecency and the like', that 'those who are in the flesh cannot please God' (197) and that 'the flesh desires what is against the spirit'" (198). The meaning of "flesh" here is, of course, not literal, but "it relates to what is done by it against reason, as the Apostle explained in saying, 'for I know that in me, i.e. in my flesh, no good dwells' (199), because of what the flesh does" (200). Obviously Epiphanius is a great master of clarity of language and argument, which enables him to provide clear answers to the problems raised by the Apollinarist heresy. Thus, in dealing with the Apollinarist argument which turns the mind into a seat of sin and therefore excludes its assumption by the sinless Logos, he reemploys it and put forth in another context in order to show its absurdity: "If to
have assumed a mind is understood to mean to have assumed sin, much more should this be the case if we allowed him to have assumed flesh, which is never kept free of sin” (201). Indeed! if the mind leads to sin, as the Apollinarists claim, how much more risky it must be for the flesh to lead to sin? Yet, neither the mind, nor the flesh turned or reached out to irrational sinful desires, on account of their assumption by the Logos. In addition, no one would dare say that “it was because the Saviour assumed the flesh, that the flesh was captured so as to do what is not obvious to it” (202). Thus, no comparison is allowed between the human sequence of the Logos and what happens to man through the flesh and the mind. Since, although the Lord did truly become man, being God, and “acted with the flesh and the soul and the mind and the entire [human] vessel” (203), yet, he did abstain “from every useless and fleshly act” and only “gave in to reasonable bodily needs which were fitting to his Godhead” (204). Neither could one observe any deviation of the human mind of Christ “to irrational desires, nor did he do, or considered in his thought, the same deeds of the flesh with us” (205). So Epiphanius confesses that “Christ became a perfect man from Mary”. The fact that he had a human mind expresses the completeness of his human nature and in no way leads to any necessity for him to submit to sin, “God forbid that this should be considered to be so!” (206). He “did not commit any sin, nor was any guile found in his mouth” (207), “for if he breathed into the saints his own power and if those who were inspired by him are witnesses of holiness and righteousness and blamelessness to an advanced age, how much more is this, indeed, the case with the Logos himself” (208). Had he been weak and subject to sinning, how could he have imparted the power of holiness to others? Christ’s role in such a case would have been useless and insufficient and ultimately
unnecessary and the whole divine economy for the salvation of the human race would have been powerless (209). The extensions and consequences of Apollinaris’ position convey a crucial blow to the purpose of the inhomination. The question which is naturally raised against him is the question his doctrine implies about the necessity of the incarnation. For Epiphanius, however, in spite of taking up true flesh and "truly human soul and a mind and whatever else there is in man, he upheld all in himself and as God was in control of all not letting them be partitioned by evil, nor broken up by the evil one, nor lost in unlawful pleasure, nor submitting to Adam’s transgression" (210). Interpreting Gal. 4:4 ("being born of a woman, born under the Law"), and Phil. 2:7 ("being found in the mould as a man"), Epiphanius says: "Both phrases ‘in the mould’ (‘as a man’) and the ‘being born under the Law’ point to perfection and signify impassibility, the phrase ‘being born’ indicates perfection and the phrase ‘under the Law’, that he did not just appear, while the phrase ‘in the mould’ confirms the idea and finally the phrase ‘as a man’, that he was sinless" (211). Consequently, these things are interpreted in such a way that the readers of this work “may never be led astray by empty myths” (212).

Another parameter of the position of Epiphanius, which goes against Apollinarism in the first instance, but also against docetism, is that which on the basis of Biblical evidence demonstrates the perfection and the reality of the human nature of Christ. Clear reference and confirmation of the perfection of the human nature of Christ is provided by several Biblical statements: “the child grew in stature and strength” (213) and “advanced in age and wisdom” (214). If the Logos had not assumed a human mind, then, says Epiphanius, “how did he grow in strength and stature? and if he was
deprived of a human mind, how did wisdom advance in soul and body?” (215) The Logos being “God’s wisdom, is not in need of wisdom” (216). It was the human mind in Christ which made possible the natural and spiritual advancement in him. Indeed, Epiphanius uses this growth and advancement in order to argue against the docetists “that these narratives point to flesh and humanity” (217) and not to a docetic appearance. Although Christ was able from the beginning of his birth to speak, since he is “the Father’s wisdom” and to articulate words, since he “articulated a tongue for human beings”, and also to understand, since he is the one “who planted the ear” (218), he chose not to do so. For what reason? “Because, if, having been born from a womb, he could be shown to be able to speak out immediately and if he could articulate himself clearly like a growing boy, his incarnate conception would have been regarded as untrue and rather docetic; this is why he endured the growth in stature little by little, so that he might not abolish the truth of the sequence” (219). Thus, his very birth, which took place according to the prophesy, “he shall bear a son” (220), as well as the fact that “he was born of a woman” (221), and “was hungry and thirsty” (222) and “came to be in agony” (223) and “was put to death in the flesh” (224), leave no doubt that “the economy was in truth” (225), that “when in his advent the Logos took possession of the entire economy, including flesh and soul and all that exist in man” (226), that he accomplished “a perfect economy” (227). The “perfection”, however, as well as the “truth”, the “wholeness”, the “fullness” of the “economy”, of the “sequence”, of the “incarnate presence”, of the “inhomination” are centered on the meaning which Epiphanius attributes to the key term of “Lordly man” (228). The “Lordly man” summarizes for Epiphanius, the fact that Christ is “true man” (229), “natural” (230) man who was united to
the Godhead of the Logos and was deified on account of his union with it. He is natural and true man, because, being Lord, "he assumed the flesh from us" (231) and, being God's Logos, "he became man like us, so that he might give us salvation in the Godhead and might suffer in his manhood for the sake of us human beings" (232). The fullness and truth of salvation is achieved on account of the full and true economy which is affirmed by the "Lordly man". Thus, Epiphanius concludes his relevant teaching with the pinnacle of the passion and resurrection of the "Lordly man": "Christ suffered in the flesh, I mean, in the Lordly man himself, whom he recreated [in himself] in his advent from heaven of this holy and divine Logos... As the blood is counted to him who bears it, so the passion of the flesh was counted to him as God, though his Godhead did not suffer at all, so that the world may not have its hope in a man, but in the Lordly man, as the Godhead permitted the attribution of the passion to it, so that the salvation for the sake of the world might be achieved by the impassible Godhead ... He was crucified, then, The Lord was crucified and we venerate him crucified, buried and risen on the third day and ascended into heaven" (233).
3. The One Christ
3.a. The Union of the two natures

The problem of the union of the two natures in the one Christ began to appear and to acquire major proportions around the end of the 4th century. The occasion was provided by Apollinaris, whose teaching, as we already noted, finally led to monophysitism. It is a fact that the reaction against Apollinarism provided the impetus for the emergence of both Nestorianism and excessive monophysitism. The leader of the excessive monophysitism was the Archimandrite Eutyches, who found, in some sense, his patron and protector in the successor of Cyril of Alexandria, the new Patriarch Dioscorus. The person who gave expression and became defender of Nestorianism was Nestorius himself, Patriarch of Constantinople, supported by Theodore of Mopsuestia. Eutyches and Nestorius, however, in spite of finding themselves on diametrically opposite positions as regards the teaching of the natures of Christ, shared identical views on the terms “nature” (φύσις) and “person” (πρόσωπον). Both held the view that the terms “nature” and “person” were inseparable and the one presupposed the other (1). Thus, Eutyches, believing that he had to accept with the union of the two natures two persons as well, came to teach that the incarnation brought about a certain “mixture” (κρασίς) (2) of the two natures into one (3) and so, the human nature was absorbed by the divine. It was on this account and at a synod at Constantinople in 448 that he was first condemned as a heretic (4). Nestorius, on the other hand, taught that in Christ there were two unchangeable and immutable natures which were united only externally or ethically and not essentially or substantially (5). The teaching of the two natures, however, led Nestorius to accept two
persons as well (6). Nestorianism was officially condemned at the 3rd Ecumenical Synod of Ephesus in 431/3 and Eutychianism suffered the same fate at the 4th Ecumenical Synod of Chalcedon in 451.

As regards the yoking together of the terms "nature" and "person" in the Ancoratus, we observe that there is no case where this occurs in the context of the Christological dogma! It is possible that this is deliberate on the part of Epiphanius, who certainly was aware of these terms being used together by others and especially by Apollinaris who fell into error on this account. He particularly avoids using the term "person" for there are certainly references to the term "nature" which are not identical with the former term (7). Yet, Epiphanius does not fail to point out the existence and difference of the two natures as well as the exchange of properties between them, but he does this with great care and discernment. He teaches the union of the two natures but maintains their integrity and peculiarity. He clearly indicates that this union took place in the one person of Christ. How he does this will be the subject-matter of the following paragraphs.

Epiphanius' starting point is the fundamental principle, which we encountered earlier, that the Logos is "enhypostatic, derived from the Father, through whom all times and seasons were made ... and everything else that was made, and who is uncreated and ever existing" (8). This Logos, "who is God in truth" (9) became man "in truth" (10). In describing the event and reality of the inhomination or the economy, as he often calls it, or in specifying the time and the manner of the Logos’ birth into humanity and assumption of the human nature, Epiphanius uses the term "kenosis" (emptying). The "kenosis" of the Logos, cannot, in his view, be interpreted as a diminution or debasement or mutation of the Godhead. The Logos
became man "without any change in his nature and without any alteration in his Godhead" (11). By "undertaking the kenosis to himself (emptying himself) and assuming the form of a servant" (12) his fullness was not diminished; but he did it in order to show that his kenosis is a transposition from heaven into humanity, namely, into the laboratory of Mary" (13). Thus the "kenosis" acquires the sense of the assumption of humanity by God the Logos, i.e. it specifies the event of the incarnation, with the exception, of course, of the element of sin. As regards the time and place where this takes place Epiphanius points to what he calls "the laboratory of Mary" (τὸ ἑργαστήριον τῆς Μαρίας) (14). "The Master recreates himself into his own creation 'taking the form of the servant' (15) and Mary absorbs the Logos in her conception, as the earth does with rain" (16). It is the Logos himself, then, who, as creator of all, proceeds with making and creating man anew, using as first-fruits of this recreation his own humanity, not outside the body of the Virgin, but inside her. "For it was the Saviour himself, the holy one who came down from heaven, who condescended to work out our own salvation in a virginal laboratory, who was instantaneously born of Mary having been conceived through the Holy Spirit, who took up flesh, who became flesh, without changing his nature, who took up manhood along with his Godhood, who is perfect from the Father, who fulfilled the perfect economy, that came to the world for us and for our salvation" (17). The immutability of the divine nature of the Logos - and we note here the use of the term "nature" as a designation of the Godhead - in the event of the assumption of manhood, the instantaneous creation of the "flesh" with the cooperation of the Holy Spirit in the virginal laboratory of Mary and the fullness and completeness of the economy, on account of the assumption of the
perfect human nature, constitute, for Epiphanius, the guarantee of salvation. Had these not occurred and had the inhomination not taken place “in truth” but in mere appearance, salvation would not have been real and complete. This, however, is not the case, because the Logos, “being God, has accomplished the entire work of salvation in a perfect man” (18).

The study of this text, and of other similar texts, easily leads to the conclusion, that what Epiphanius wrote is an anticipated refutation of Nestorius’ teaching before its time. The problem, which Nestorius caused and in which he had his priest Anastasios from Antioch as his close collaborator and consultant, was very acute. Anastasios preached publicly before Patriarch Nestorius that no one should call Mary Theotokos (Bearer of God): for Mary was man and it is impossible for God to be born of man” (19). The term “Christotokos” (Christ-bearer) was proposed by Nestorius as a substitute to the term “Theotokos”, so that his views might be better understood. Apart from rejecting the term “Theotokos” as unbiblical, Nestorius also claimed, “that divine Scripture nowhere says that God was born from the Christotokos virgin” (20), and also, “that Scripture teaches us God’s going forth (or going through) the Christ-bearing virgin, but there is no teaching anywhere of God’s birth from her” (21). A comparison of the position of Nestorius and the teaching of Epiphanius reveals exactly where their difference lies and why Nestorius was condemned by the Church. Against Nestorius’ view that the Logos “passed through the Virgin” and, therefore, was not really born of her, nor was he truly incarnated, Epiphanius affirms, that the Logos “took up flesh and soul and, being perfect from the Father, he became inhominated in us not in appearance but in truth, recreating in himself a man from Mary the Theotokos (God-bearer)
through the Holy Spirit; he did not come to dwell in a man, as he used to dwell and speak in the prophets ... but the Logos himself became flesh, not changing his being God, nor transforming the Godhead into manhood but including in the fullness of his own Godhead and in his own hypostasis, as God's enhypostatic Logos, his being man and whatever man is" (22). Here Epiphanius defends the doctrine of a real inliomination with vigour. The inliomination "is not equalized with an entry into being, a temporal assumption of a new historical ego, an exodus from the Godhead and a confusion with humanity" (23).

If the thesis that the Logos was "really" inliominated found in Nestorius complete opposition, the thesis that a confusion occurred at the inliomination found in Apollinaris and his monophysite successors fervent support. Epiphanius stirs a middle course between these two theses by affirming a real and substantial assumption of a perfect human nature without any change of the divine or confusion of it with the human. Although he does not employ the terms "nature" and "person" to argue his position, which propounds a union of Godhead and manhood in the one person of the Logos, Epiphanius does speak of the "nature" of the Godhead of the Logos. The Logos "become flesh", he says, which means that "he took up flesh", does not imply any change "in the nature" (24) of the Godhead, but the fact that it was "in his own fullness of Godhead and in the divine Logos' peculiar hypostasis" (25) that he assumed "the perfect man" (26). In another similar context he will stress that the Logos "being truly God" and "having truly become man", was not altered in "his nature", nor did he alter his Godhead (27). Yet, along with the term "nature" which he attributes to the Godhead of the Logos, and in teaching about the event of the inliomination, he will not avoid using
again the same term, “nature”, in order to specify the humanity which was assumed by the Logos. Thus, interpreting the statement, “There is one God and there is one mediator ...” (28), as well as the statement, “He took the form of the servant” (29), he will stress that “he was a natural and genuine man from Mary” (30) and will go on to yoke together the two natures of Christ, putting forth as a conjunctive theological basis of the union of the two natures the fact that Christ is “mediator between God and men” (31). He will actually say, that Christ is “one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ ... because he mediates from both sides, to his Father being God by nature and genuine offspring, and to men as natural man and genuine offspring of Mary without the seed of a male; for this is how he is mediator between God and men, being God and having become man, not altered in his nature, but mediating according to each side and to each side” (32). The unity, as well as the lack of change or mutation, or even the lack of confusion of the natures, and also the perfection and peculiarity of each one of the natures, are guaranteed by the role which was undertaken “by Christ, the vessel of wisdom and the Godhead .. who is both God and man” (33), “the Logos of God, who assumed to himself that nature of the mortal” (34). Epiphanius’ insistence in characterizing the Logos as God as “by nature and genuine offspring” of the Father and as man, as “natural and genuine offspring of Mary without the seed of a male” (35), is indicative of the notion of the two natures, the divine and the human, which he has in mind and which have been united in Christ. In speaking, however, about the two natures, Epiphanius will always stress, “that the Logos of God became man in Mary and ... was found to be a man” (36), “that the Logos of God showed himself to be a holy fruit in taking up the nature of a mortal” (37), and “that
he took flesh, when the Logos became flesh ... assuming humanity along with his Godhead, being perfect [offspring] from the Father, and inhominating himself in us not in mere appearance but in truth, recreating in himself a perfect man from Mary the Theotokos through the Holy Spirit” (38). These affirmations of Epiphanius clearly reveal that the Logos, as a perfect God from the Father, but also as “an enhypostatic holy Logos” (39), became man, recreated and assumed a perfect man from Mary through the Holy Spirit, without enduring any alteration or mutation in any of his two natures, but retaining for both natures in their union their integrity and peculiarity, exactly because he wants to accomplish, through the perfect Logos of God and his true inhomination, as well as through the perfect assumption by him of the human nature, “the whole [spectrum] of salvation” (40) and fulfill the perfect [task] “of the economy” (41). Thus, Epiphanius emerges as a teacher of the Church and upholder of what Scripture says. At the same time he emerges as a great apologist against the heresies, because he is able to intercept some of them, before they appear, or to forewarn about their appearance. His stance which is repeated in a stereotyped fashion is summed up in the statement: “For this is how the holy Church of God has always held” (42). Inasmuch as he keeps to this, he wants simply to be an interpreter and defender of the faith of the Church and a witness to the fact that “divine Scripture is always true; but there is need of prudence in order to see that God is true and to believe in him and in his words” (43).

As regards the issue of the assumption of the human nature by the Logos and the union of the two natures, Epiphanius emphatically stresses that the Lord “assumed all that are in him [i.e. in man] completely” (44), because he came to save “man surely and completely” (45). At the same time he clarifies that “the whole
inhomination” (46), while referring to body, soul, mind and “whatever else there is” (47) in man, he clearly excludes the notion of any element of sin (48). Thus, he is able to counteract effectively the rationalism of Apollinaris and his Aristotelian syllogism which excludes as impossible the conjunction “of two perfect [things] into one”, to condemn proleptically the teaching of Nestorius concerning the union of the two natures and the teaching of Eutyches concerning the absorption, change and fusion of the two natures after the incarnation. It is true, of course, as we have already noted, that in doing this Epiphanius does not employ the terms “nature” and “person” as they were used later, but his texts and their import leave no doubt that these terms are implied at least conceptually. A pivotal statement of Epiphanius’ doctrine concerning the union of the two natures is the following text of the Ancoratus: “The same is God, and the same is man, not producing confusion, but combining the two into one; not moving into non-existence, but empowering an earthly body with the Godhead, he united them into one power and he brought them together into one Godhead; he is one Lord and one Christ, not two Christs, nor two Gods; the same one has a spiritual body and an incomprehensible Godhead, that which suffers without becoming corrupted and that which is impassible and incorruptible, an incorruptible whole; he is God and Lord, sitting on the right of the Father, not leaving aside the flesh, but uniting it into one and sitting on the right of the Father in one Godhead as a whole” (49).

These statements of Epiphanius certainly express his own Christological principles, but they do not deviate from the teaching of the Catholic Church and do not cease to be a perfect example and prototype of a man’s position and interpretation as regards the Christological question about the two natures of Christ and their
union, which was under much discussion and development. The unity of the person of Christ, even though the term does not occur as such, constitutes his fundamental teaching concerning the one Christ. For Epiphanius there are not two Christs. On the other hand, in spite of the union of the two natures, the one Christ remains very God and very man. The two have been combined into one, not in the Apollinarist or in the Eutychian sense, because the human element did not proceed to extinction, but, although earthly the body became spiritual because of its union with the Godhead. It was on account of this union that it became incorruptible and, remaining for ever united with the Godhead, was made worthy of sitting on the right of God the Father. There is, then, in Christ a natural and real union of two natures which is realized in the “laboratory” (50) “of Mary the ever-virgin” (51). Cyril of Alexandria will characterize this union as “a true and hypostatic union” (52).

All the above clearly demonstrates that Epiphanius is anti-apollinarian, anti-monophysite and anti-nestorian, while at the same time he puts forth, or rather prepares, the way for the decisions of the 3rd (431) and 4th (451) Ecumenical Synods. How far his Christological position is in accord with the dogmatic definition of the 4th Ecumenical Synod is demonstrated in the special “Appendix” at the end of the present study by listing the parallel verses of the Ancoratus. But here we ought to add that the 4th Ecumenical Synod did not only meet the challenge of monophysitism, but also provided an answer to the Christological heresies as a whole, of whom others misunderstood the meaning of the perfect inhomination of the Lord and, consequently, “corrupted the mystery of the Lord’s economy”, and others “introduced confusion and mixture and one nature of the flesh and the Godhead, recreating mindlessly and monstrously
qualifying as passive the divine nature of the Only-begotten on account of the confusion” (53).

3.b. Consequences of the unity of the person of Christ

3.b.1. Exchange of properties and names of the two natures

The doctrine of the consequences of the union of the two natures in Epiphanius does not present the same character as it does in the later period, due to anti-nestorian and anti-monophysite causes. The terms “person” and “nature” are not used in Epiphanius’ Ancoratus to express either the one person of Christ or the union of the two natures, the divine and the human, which constituted the one person of Christ by their ineffable union in an immutable and undivided manner. Yet, Epiphanius does teach the union of the two natures and clearly presents the one person of Christ. In his statement “the same is God, and the same is man, not producing confusion, but combining the two into one” (54) he supplies a clear indication that he accepts the unity of the person of Christ and the union of the two natures, the divine and the human. It is in the same context that he goes on to affirm: “not moving into non-existence, but empowering an earthly body with the Godhead, he united them into one power and he brought them together into one Godhead” (55). Thus he appears to be teaching the unity of the person of Christ and his identity with the divine Logos. This is why, he says elsewhere: “the Logos himself became flesh, not changing his being God, nor transforming the Godhead into manhood but including in the fullness of his own Godhead and in his own hypostasis, as God’s enhypostatic Logos, his being man and whatever man is” (56). The one person of Christ is for Epiphanius a primary concern and this is why he says, “he is one Lord and one Christ, not two Christs, nor two Gods; the same one has a spiritual body and an incomprehensible Godhead” (57). The
expression "the same one ... the same one" indicates the person of Christ, which includes both God and man. He will come back to this in another text, where he will present again in his own way the unity of the person of Christ and his identity with the Logos: "He, then, who is Only-begotten, perfect, uncreated, immutable, unchangeable, incomprehensible, invisible, was inhominated in us and rose again ... uniting what is fleshly with what is divine, one Lord King Christ, the Son of God, who sits in heaven on the right of the Father..." (58).

Thus, the one person of Christ, in the sense which is specified above, is Epiphanius' cherished affirmation: "God and Lord, sitting on the right of the Father, not leaving aside the flesh, but uniting it into one and sitting on the right of the Father in one Godhead as a whole" (59).

Epiphanius clearly holds that the unity of the person of Christ and his identity with the divine Logos is the basis for his understanding of the exchange of properties between the two natures, the divine and the human. It is on this account that he does not hesitate to use terms and expressions which could be misunderstood and characterized as Apollinarist. One such instance is his statement, "that the passion of the flesh was attributed to the Godhead" (60), and another, "that the Lord died" (61). The case is, however, that divine properties and human names are ultimately attributed to the person of the one Christ. We may now turn more specifically to some of Epiphanius' most striking statements.

Speaking about Christ's birth he says, "born from above from the Father truly, he was also [truly] born from Mary" (62). He certainly means the birth of Christ according to his humanity, not in the Nestorian sense, but in the sense of the unbreakable and undivided and unconfused real union of the two natures. Thus, the element of
birth as a property of the "flesh" of Christ is referred to the divine nature as well, since it is the one Christ who is born, having his two natures, the divine and the human, united unbreakably. This handling of the properties is observed not only in the event of the birth but also in the other stages of the economy. "Thus, the Logos assumed in his advent the whole economy, flesh and soul and whatever else there is in man; and that includes hunger and fatigue, or thirst and sorrow and all such like, as parts of the soul and the flesh; and so he weeps in order to expose the deception of the Manichaean and indicate that he did not put on a body only in appearance; and he gets thirsty too, in order to show that he does not just have a mere flesh but a soul also; since it was not his Godhead that got thirsty (but in the flesh) and in the soul he felt the thirst and the fatigue due to the sequence of the journey through the flesh and the soul" (63). The properties of hunger, fatigue, thirst, etc., which are connected with the purpose as well as the truth and reality of the sequence of the inarnation are attributed to the Godhead too, although this is not done literally. "It would be acceptable custom if these were to be attributed to the Godhead of the Son" (64).

In a similar way Epiphanius will explain the agony, the passion, the death and the resurrection of Christ: "the Saviour is found to be tired, but this does not mean that he is not Logos from the Father's substance who came down from above; for he did not become tired when he was above but in the flesh; because it was necessary for the flesh to get tired ... and all the rest ... to get sleepy, to get to sleep ... for he took these up and was found to be a man" (65). The reality of the incarnate presence is revealed in the properties which characterize the human nature. Finally, however, the assumption of the human nature and its union with the divine, as well as the expression of the
divine and the human nature through the one person of Christ constitutes an ineffable and incomprehensible mystery (66). Even the human nature of Christ by itself is incomprehensible. "For, we have found, he says, the Messiah, of whom Moses wrote" (67); as for them they found him through the incomprehensible nature, i.e. the incarnate one" (68). It is for this reason, i.e. for the reason of its union with the divine nature of the Logos, that the humanity of Christ is characterized by Epiphanius as "Lordly man". This "Lordly man", being a true man and being at the same time united with the person of Christ, the Divine Logos, "came to be in agony" (69) ... so that he might show that he was true man and the agony was not from the Godhead" (70). Similar events occurred at the time of the passion of Christ, because the passion is purely a property of the human nature. Thus, Christ suffered not only "bodily" (71). Since, however, the person of Christ is one, undivided and inseparable, and since in this person the natures exchange their properties and names, it is possible to explain how human properties come to be attributed to the Logos and vice versa.

This inhominalational frame of reference for the exchange of properties excludes, for Epiphanius, any Apollinarist or Nestorian perception. As Epiphanius states: "If the impassible Logos of God suffered these things, then the suffering is a matter of the body, it lies outside his impassibility but not outside him, because he was well pleased to take it up; the suffering is attributed to him even though he does not suffer" (72). This is because "when the Logos became flesh ... it was in the peculiar hypostasis of the divine and enhypostatic Logos that his being man was included" (73); "he was not changed from being God, nor did he change his Godhead into manhood" (74), but willed to accept as his own these passions "outside, of course, his
impassibility, but not outside himself". This self-willed condescension of the divine Logos - "for it was willingly that his Godhead came to this" (75) - took place "not in order to enslave what was free, but in order to free the obedient servants in the form which he received" (76). So, then, "the impassible Logos of God suffered; but how? ... it is like a stain on a garment which does not reach the body of the person who wears it and yet the stain is attributed to the person who wears the garment; it is in a similar way that God suffered in the flesh, inasmuch as his Godhead did not suffer anything" (77). But why is the passion attributed, on account of the union of the natures and the exchange of properties, to the Logos as well? "the passion of the flesh was attributed to him as God, though his Godhead did not suffer at all, so that the world may not have its hope in a man, but in the Lordly man, as the Godhead permitted the attribution of the passion to it, so that the salvation for the sake of the world might be achieved by the impassible Godhead, so that the suffering of the flesh may be attributed to the Godhead although, did not suffer anything" (78).

The passibility of the impassible Godhead is what Epiphanius repeatedly stresses. Although the Godhead of the Logos is impassible, yet, on account of its identification with the person of Christ, as it has been explained, allows Epiphanius to interpret both how and why the passion is attached to the impassible Logos. Epiphanius' doctrine of the death of Christ moves along similar lines. The perception of the one Christ and the unconfused and unchangeable union of the two natures in Christ allow Epiphanius to make the solemn declaration "that the Lord died" (79). Yet, he asks, "where was the passion of the death fulfilled" (80)? His answer is borrowed from Peter, the chief of the Apostles (81): It was "in the flesh" (82). If it was the Logos
himself who underwent the passion after his inhomination, then, the assumption of the human flesh would have meant that the Godhead itself had been changed into flesh, which is absurd. "for his Godhead, assuming his passion in the flesh, is impassible and was impassible and remained impassible, and no change occurred to the impassibility, nor was there any alteration of the eternity" (83).

Finally the scheme of Epiphanius' doctrine which specifies the unity of the person of Christ is not far apart from the dogmatic frame of the definition of the 4th Ecumenical Synod. This can be seen in the following statement: "..."The same is God, and the same is man, not producing confusion, but combining the two into one; not moving into non-existence, but empowering an earthly body with the Godhead, he united them into one power and he brought them together into one Godhead; he is one Lord and one Christ, not two Christs, nor two Gods; the same one has a spiritual body and an incomprehensible Godhead, that which suffers without becoming corrupted and that which is impassible and incorruptible, an incorruptible whole" (84). This text constitutes the pinnacle of his doctrine concerning the ineffable union of the two natures and their unconfused operation in the one and unique person of Christ.

At the same time Epiphanius, while expressing the exchange between the two natures, stresses also the peculiarity and integrity of the two natures of Christ in the context of this exchange. Especially lucid and methodical is Epiphanius' teaching on the union of the two natures in the context of Christ's death and resurrection. "... the soul condescended to enter with the Godhead into the three day-period (along with the flesh), in order to show the flesh to be holy, and in order that the Godhead with the soul might unrestrainedly complete the mystery in Hades" (85). The unbreakable and constant union of the
natures is necessary so that the mystery of God’s economy for man might be operational in all the events which concern the stages of the life of man. The work of the economy becomes unfulfilled and inoperational if it is not extended to Hades. Actually Christ becomes triumphant in Hades, because “he arose from the dead, being no longer divided in the tomb into body and Godhead and soul in the underworld” (86). The resurrection and the ascension of Christ recapitulate and guarantee the unshakable conjunction and operation of the natures as well as the exchange of their properties. Epiphanius states it characteristically: “‘God and Lord, sitting on the right of the Father, not leaving aside the flesh, but uniting it into one and sitting on the right of the Father in one Godhead as a whole” (87).

It is important to note, however, that with the union of the two natures the exchange that took place was basically an attribution of the names of the human nature to the divine, for it would be impossible to suppose that the Logos was changed into humanity on account of the inhomination - “for the divine Logos having been derived from above, from the Father, was pleased to come to be in the flesh ... and submitted to the bodily needs which are reasonable and fitting to his Godhead” (88). There occurred, however, a real and literal transmission of properties from the divine side to the human nature, without any alteration or abolition of the peculiarity and fullness of the human nature. “... so that keeping the whole sequence of the inhomination which was undertaken as an economy for us, he might not abolish the character of the truth” (89). The task of the economy, the character of the true salvation of humanity, comprised the full assumption of the human nature, “a participation of our own through our own” (90). This movement too “of the nature of God is ineffable
and incomprehensible” (91) and constitutes a task of “God’s plan” (92) for mankind.

Epiphanius explains the real transmission of the divine properties to the human nature starting from the beginning of the assumption of the latter inside Mary. “… for this is what he came to show in taking up corruptible flesh and putting on his Godhead and demonstrating it to be incorruptible” (93). He actually prefers to specify the character of this union as follows: “for the Saviour’s body was from Mary and it was spiritually united to the Logos’ incorruptibility in heaven” (94). Epiphanius proceeds, however, even beyond the moment of the union and the exchange of properties of the divine to the human nature, since he sees the effect of the economy of God vis-a-vis its preparation, so that “the flesh” which is adapted to the divine Logos might be fore-chosen. Returning to the messianic statement from the Book of the Psalms, he praises the “holy flesh” (95), for which the Father would indicate “his good-pleasure” (96) at the moment of Christ’s baptism. The Father’s pleasure for Christ will be expressed because in his person two perfect natures, the divine and the human, shall be united. “… it was in her [the blessed Mary] that he chose the holy flesh … the beauty of Jacob which he loved (97), namely the pinnacle of his beauty, the beauty of the whole Jacob, the flesh which was chosen from through the Holy Spirit” (98).

Christ’s “flesh”, if it could be considered per se, i.e. outside and beyond the event of its assumption by and union with the divine, is regarded by Epiphanius as corruptible and inglorious. However, its assumption by and union with the divine nature lent to it incorruptibility and glory. The basis for this is, of course, the will and power of the Godhead. “All things are possible to God” (99), including changing what are corruptible to incorruption and making
what are earthly to dwell in incorruption; indeed no one should wonder about this; for this is why he came and demonstrated the assumption of a corruptible flesh which he put on his Godhead presenting it as incorruptible” (100). Here the use by Epiphanius of the term “put on” (ἐνδύσαμενος) can not express any external conjunction of the natures or simply a moral union between them, as Nestorius taught (101), but denotes an internal and real union which makes possible the acquisition of incorruptibility by the human nature. Epiphanius will be even clearer, as regards the manner of the union of the two natures, when he comes to state, that “the Saviour’s body was from Mary and was spiritually conjoined with the Logos’ incorruption in heaven” (102). The term “spiritually” (πνευματικῶς) teaches on the one hand that the union ultimately remains an ineffable and incomprehensible mystery in its depth and, on the other hand, that the union is essential. At the same time, however, Epiphanius clarifies the truth concerning the literal and real manner of the exchange of properties from the divine to the human nature, since it was on account of the union that incorruptibility - a divine property of the Logos - was transmitted to the human nature. It is true, of course, that the transmission of divine properties to the humanity of the Logos is not tied to any necessity, but points to the creaturely imperfection and deficiency of this humanity. It was precisely because he wanted to save “man complete” that the Logos “assumed completely all that are in him” (103).

The one Christ speaks sometimes in a manner that befits God and sometimes in a manner that befits man, because he is both God and man. This is why, says Epiphanius, the Jews were offended at him. “For the Jews, seeing the only-begotten Son of God to have come in the flesh and to perform divine signs and not having
acquired heavenly knowledge, said, 'who is this man, who speaks such blasphemies?'" (104), and on another occasion, "if this man was from God, he would not break the Sabbath" (105); "clearly, then, they were ignorant of the Godhead and thought of him as being only a mere man" (106). Indeed it was not only the Jews that stumbled on the person of Christ. Epiphanius points out that there are many others who do so and who, "being ignorant of his perfect glory ... and ... being mistaken, hold erroneous views about his Godhead; for their mind has misled them" (107). He actually locates their ignorance and error on the fact that they misunderstand and misinterpret Christ’s deeds in the context of the economy; "perceiving these deeds as purely human, they are deeply disturbed and turn to their destruction what are [said] to our edification" (108). It is characteristic that the whole economy of Christ expresses, according to Epiphanius, the fact of the unbreakable and undivided union of the two natures in the person of Christ in a way that, what belong to the Logos may also come to belong to his humanity according to the human measure, and what belong to his humanity may also come to belong to his Godhead according to the divine measure, so that man’s salvation may be firmly established (109). This is why these heretics, hearing Christ saying, "I go to my God and your God and my Father and your Father" (110), "they blaspheme saying that he too is one of the creatures" (111). Christ can say, that "no one knows the day" (112), and can ask, "where is Lazarus laid?" (113), or "who has touched me?" (114), or "who do you seek?" (115), or "who do people say that I am, the son of man?" (116), yet none of these statements reveals any ultimate ignorance on the part of Christ. "The Son (i.e. Christ) speaks intentionally (νοηματικῶς)" (117) "and in a human fashion (ἀνθρωποπαθῶς)" (118) and expresses his "stories from the stand-
When he asks, "he asks not because he is ignorant, but because he wants to reprove by testing and to show his love for humanity" (120) and "in order to urge others to believe" (121). Epiphanius presents similar cases of "ignorance" from the Old Testament, cases which "appear to come down from the person of God the Father ... with the purpose of persuading human beings, and which imply ignorance, although God is not ignorant of them ..." (122). Such is the case of Cain, which presents God asking him the question "where is your brother?" (123) "not because he [God] who said that the blood cries out was ignorant, but in order to give him [Cain] space of repentance through offering an apology" (124). Thus, "what were said after a human fashion were not empty of foreknowledge" (125). The human expressions and deeds of Christ indicate the reality of his "incarnate presence" (126) and the sheer fact of his divine love for humanity. In all other respects, the one Christ, having two essentially different natures united undividedly and inseparably in his person, is called "Emmanuel" (127), is installed "in the flesh" (128) as High-priest and becomes "mediator between God and men, as the man Jesus Christ" (129), "because he mediates from both sides, to his Father, being God by nature and genuine offspring, and to men, as natural man and genuine offspring of Mary without the seed of a male; for this is how he is mediator between God and men, being God and having become man, not altered in his nature, but mediating according to each side and to each side" (130). Thus, although they are distinguished, so that their distinctive peculiarity might be expressed, the two natures are in no way separated in the one Christ, as if they were autonomous. There is a clear difference between autonomy or sharp separation and distinction (131). "It is only in
thought that are they distinguished after the union, and not in reality, although they retain their natural otherness and differentiation after the union" (132).

The place, however, where the real transmission of divine properties to, and appropriation by, the human nature occurs, is the sequence of the passion, death, resurrection, ascension and sitting on the right of the Lord Jesus Christ. "It is the unbelievers who say that he did not rise at all, and those of bad faith who say that it was not that which was and fell asleep that rose again, whereas it is the believers who say that this very body rose again and that from this body which he raised our own came to acquire the hope of truth” (133). The assumption of the human nature and its union with the Godhead “co-strengthened it” (συνεδυνάμωσε) (134) and gave it a permanent attachment “to the Godhead” (135), so that what was “fleshly” could be raised “spiritual” and incorruptible, “not another than what it was, but that which was, conjoined to the Godhead, adorned with the refinement of the spirit” (136). The Lord preserved the marks of the nails and the mark of the lance exactly “in order to show that our corruptible [nature] was truly clothed with incorruption (for although it is mortal, it was clothed with immortality)” (137). Epiphanius insists, in commenting on the Lord’s saying “unless the seed of wheat falls to the ground and dies...” (138), that “the Saviour demonstrated this by himself with the seed of his body” (139). Just as the Logos assumed the whole man and transmitted to the whole man properties of the Godhead and so which made humanity incorruptible, so the whole man was truly endowed with resurrection. It was the Logos himself “who changed the body into a refined condition and commingled the resurrection with spirit, that did not abolish the marks of the nails nor the imprint of the
lance, but demonstrated that which died on the cross to be none other than that which rose again, and not another that was derived from it, but that the one that underwent the passion became impassible and that he was the seed that fell rose again, and that it rose again incorruptible; and in order that we may not think that only some part of it was risen, he arranged it that the whole may not see corruption, (for it says, ‘you shall not let your holy one see corruption’) (140), and that the whole might rise again (for it says, ‘it is risen, it is not here’) (141); and so, if it was raised up and is not here, it has been truly resurrected” (142). It is to be concluded, then, that the assumption of the human nature by the incorruptible and immortal Logos eventually resulted in the abolition of corruption and of the power of death. Corruption, which as an event accompanies man throughout his time span, on account of the sin of his first ancestors, and death, which constitutes the triumph of corruption over man, are abolished and the corruptible is clothed with incorruption, since the Logos “united” and “gathered into one Godhead the earthly body”, so that these two might constitute “one Lord”, “one Christ”, “not two Christs, nor two Gods” (143). “In him [i.e. in Christ, we have], a spiritual body, in him [we have] an incomprehensible Godhead ... a Lord God, sitting on the right of the Father, not abandoning the flesh, but uniting in one and into one Godhead the whole, one who is sitting on the right of the Father” (144).

3.b.2. Theotokos (145)

As we explained above the first consequence of the unity of the two natures in the one person of Christ is the exchange of properties from the divine nature to the human and vice versa. The distinction and differentiation of the natures becomes only a “matter of thought” (ἐπίθετα), while their true and real union excludes the notion of any
mixture, or confusion, or mutation, or change, or alteration of the natures. It is in the person of Christ, which “commingled the two into one without confusion” (146), that the two natures were united and the exchange or communication of their properties or names is only a consequence of their union. One such consequence is the name “Theotokos” which is attributed to the virgin Mary. Epiphanius employs this term for a good cause, without, of course, making any particular plea for it, because no dispute had been raised about it when he was writing his Ancoratus. This shows that the use of this term by Epiphanius was an acceptable matter within the Church for it was based, as he says, on St. John’s statement, “the Logos became flesh” (147). Thus, when later on Nestorius, raised objections to the use of this term, because of his particular Christological position, his friend John of Antioch hastened to warn him about the risks he was taking through his propositions and called him to maintain the traditional stance of the Church (148). Nestorius, however, believing that in the last analysis Christ was a man, since he divided Christ into two sons, distinguishing their two natures, refused to accept a real union and communion of the two natures and, as a result, refused to accept the term “Theotokos” (149). Inevitably Nestorius’ position led to a denial of the divinity of Christ, hence his request for the use of the term “Christotokos”. For Nestorius, the virgin gave birth to a man, who was “homoousios” with her, and who could not have been an offspring alien to her nature. Since, however, the assumption of the human nature by the divine and their inseparable union took place right from the start inside the virgin Mary at the moment of conception, and since the two natures, once united, remained inseparably and unconfusedly in a state of communion, then, the term “Theotokos” is both right and properly used. The Logos, says
Epiphanius, “who was born from the Father above, was truly born from Mary as well” (150). The unceasing communion of the natures and their unbreakable but unconfused operation allows the use of the term “Theotokos”. This is because of the supreme premise of the unity of the person of Christ, which was constituted by the unbreakable and ineffable communion of the natures. It is precisely this unity that is expressed by the application of the term “Theotokos” to the virgin Mary. Besides, the biblical term “Emmanuel” (151), which Epiphanius stresses, expresses the union of the natures from the moment of conception and the subsequent maintenance of this undivided union throughout the various stages of the economy, starting with Christ’s conception and the birth and including the cross, the tomb, the resurrection and the ascension on the right of the Father (152). The Logos, then, “became tangible in his advent, and assumed flesh and was found to be a man” (153); “he partook of flesh and recreated in himself the holy flesh itself from Mary the Theotokos without a [male] seed (for as it is written, ‘he was born of a woman’)” (154). The election of Mary as a unique contributor in the divine plan, which makes possible the attribution of the unique title of “Theotokos” to her, finds in Epiphanius its highest praise, “for there were myriads upon the earth, but only Mary “found grace” (155); “and it was in her that the holy flesh was elected; this is why he said ‘I was well pleased’, as David also says on behalf of the Apostles who believed in the Lord and joyfully indicated his grace to the nations, ‘he subdued peoples to us and nations under our feet; (he chose us as his inheritance), the beauty of Jacob, which he loved’ (156), namely, the truth of his beauty, the beauty of the whole of Jacob, the flesh from Mary which was elected through the Holy Spirit” (157). Thus, according to Epiphanius, “the beauty of Jacob”, “the truth of his
beauty” and “the beauty of the whole of Jacob” find fulfillment in Mary, who was the supreme person that contributed to the election through the Holy Spirit of the “holy flesh” of the Logos and to the realization of the event of “the economy of the flesh” (158). Throughout his teaching, however, Epiphanius never fails to point out that the virgin Mary gave birth to Christ according to the flesh and that, as far as his Godhead is concerned, the begetter is only the Father. Christ’s birth as inhominated God is connected with “the economy which he made for us” (159). “The Father begot him timelessly and beginninglessly as far as it pertains to his Godhead .. and he is always with the Father, as Logos who has been born without beginning, but he was also born in the flesh at the end of days from Mary as far as it pertains to his flesh, although he was from this holy Mary through the Holy Spirit” (160).

Epiphanius’ support for the term “Theotokos” is clearly revealed in a number of his Christological texts. For him the fact that “the Son emptied himself in taking the form of the servant...” does not mean that “he was diminished in his fullness, but is rather designed to show that he emptied himself from heaven into humanity, namely, into the laboratory of Mary; ‘for your name is to you like a myrrh, has been emptied’ (161), he says; he did not say poured out, but emptied from heaven into earth, so that [he might be emptied] from earth into Mary; it was from Mary, then, that he is carried in becoming flesh, and in Bethlehem that he is born” (162). Seeing the Inhomination of the Logos in this perspective, as an emptying of the Logos from heaven into Mary’s laboratory, where he is carried and born, clearly suggests that the attribution of the term “Theotokos” to Mary is most appropriate.
In another relevant text Epiphanius will stress, that “Christ speaks in an angel, recreates himself in his own creation, though a Master ‘he takes the form of a servant’ (163), and Mary absorbs the Logos in her conception, like earth does with rain, while the divine Logos shows himself to be a holy fruit as he appropriates to himself the nature of a mortal [being]; he was from her, absorbing as earth and fleece, the fruit of true hope, expectation of the saints; as Elizabeth said, ‘blessed are you among women and blessed is the fruit of your womb’” (164). The acceptance and reception of the Logos by Mary so that he could be conceived as a man from Mary’s flesh, becoming a holy and blessed human offspring, the “fruit of the true hope” of the saints, makes Mary blessed as well.

Epiphanius’ views on Mary as “virgin” and “Theotokos” are firm and clear. They are consistent with his Christological teaching according to which the Logos himself became “flesh” at the conception, since it was himself who formed through the Spirit in the laboratory of Mary “his own flesh” with which he remained united for ever without mutation or confusion for the sake of the “perfect economy” (165) and the salvation of human beings (166). It is on the basis of such a Christology that he asserts in another text: “that it is the Saviour himself” (167), who, having been instantly born from Mary having been conceived through the Holy Spirit” and “being perfect from the Father” was inhomimated “not in mere appearance but in truth, recreating in himself a perfect man from Mary the Theotokos through the Holy Spirit” (168). This man was not a “mere human being” (ψιλός) (169), not was the incarnation a case of indwelling in a particular man “as it was the custom in the case of the prophets to speak, to dwell and to act through them, but ‘the Logos [himself] became flesh’” (170). He did so without any change in his
Godhead, but assuming a perfect man "so that in a perfect man he might as God work out fully the whole [plan] of our salvation" (171). The perfect assumption of the human nature, the immutability of the Godhead, the unbreakable and unceasing essential conjunction and communion of the natures whose border point begins inside the womb of Mary and is extended to all the stages of the economy and beyond, provide an explanation and confirm the term "Theotokos" as a term which provides a focal point in the event of salvation. If no perfect and permanent union of the two natures takes place in Mary’s laboratory, then, the unity of the person of Christ is automatically removed, the natural and harmonious function of the divine and human natures is canceled out and the work of salvation becomes ineffective.

The term "Theotokos" is simultaneously Christological and Soteriological. This indeed was the reason for the rise of such a great reaction to Nestorius which led to the summoning of the Third Ecumenical Synod and the condemnation of Nestorianism as a heresy that stood in sharp contradiction to the Soteriological perspective of the work of Christ. This is why Cyril of Alexandria asked Nestorius in one of his famous Epistles to reconsider his position, "so that the ecumenical scandal may cease; for if the word has escaped ... do condescend to grant a word to those who have been scandalized by calling the Holy Virgin by the term "Theotokos" (172).

Even the term "ever-virgin" (ἀειμαρθηνος) (173), which Epiphanius uses and which seems to be an ancient tradition of the Catholic Church, lends further support to the term "Theotokos". As the conception is above understanding and nature, so is the virgin at the moment of the birth and afterwards. If Christ was indeed a "mere man", which would mean that his Godhead "would have been unknown" (174), then, his birth from Mary would have had the
characteristics of the birth of common man. Christ, however, as "God-Logos from above, become flesh from Mary and inhominated" (175) and as "the enhypostatic Logos of God from the Father who sojourned in the race of human beings from above" (176), who was born by taking "to himself true flesh from the ever-virgin Mary" (177) and "uniting in himself the fleshly and the divine, one Lord King, Christ" (178) and who was "born from above, from the Father truly", and also "from Mary" (179), has a birth which in the last analysis surpasses every human and natural birth and therefore his mother Mary can be reasonably called both "Theotokos" and "ever-virgin". It is obvious that the rejection of the term "Theotokos" leads to the denial of Christ as one Lord and one Christ and the acceptance of two Christs (180). Thus, the term "Theotokos" affirms the unity of the person of Christ in the communion and cooperation of the two natures and bears primary witness to the work of the full and perfect fulfillment of the economy of God, which is the salvation of the human race.

3.b.3. The One worship

What has been analyzed so far has clearly shown us that Epiphanius' Christological doctrine is specific and constant. Epiphanius is clear about the reality of the divine incarnation. He emphasizes the unity of the person of Jesus Christ, elaborates with his teaching the true union and communion of the two natures, the divine and the human in the one person of Christ, clarifies the distinctive peculiarity of the two natures, excluding any confusion of the natures, and, in a specific way, specifies the consequences which follow from the union of the two natures. We have also seen that Epiphanius employs the term "Theotokos" and that in using this term, as his texts indicate, he expresses the faith of the Church, according to which the
virgin Mary gave birth to the inhominated Logos as far it pertains to his humanity, and this birth is in no way to be confused with the Logos being Son of God, “truly born from the Father” and “consubstantial with the Father” (181).

Here we want to stress another consequence of the unity of the two natures in the one person of Christ which has to do with the issue concerning the worship rendered to Christ. Epiphanius does not discuss extensively this issue, but his teaching, as we hope to show is in line with that of the other fathers of the Church, which was ultimately and officially formulated through the Definition of the Fourth Ecumenical Synod at Chalcedon. According to Professor G. Martzelos, “R. V. Sellers was the first scholar to point out the relation that exists between the dyophysitic formula of Basil of Seleucia and the Definition of Chalcedon and to defend the view that the dyophysitic formula of the Definition is most probably based on that of the Confession of Basil. Later on Th. Sagibunic elaborated and established this discovery of Sellers, demonstrating more clearly the Cyrillian background to the dyophysitic formula of Basil and by extension, to that of the Definition of Chalcedon” (182). It is clear to us, on the basis of a survey of the original texts, that Basil of Seleucia’s formula -“we worship our one Lord Jesus Christ acknowledged in two natures” (183) - not only finds its source in Cyril of Alexandria’s letter to John of Antioch (184), but also emphasizes along with the two natures of Christ the one worship which is to be rendered to him. This one worship is obviously related to the one person of Christ and to the consequences which follow its constitution as the single point of reference of the two natures which are united in him. This is exactly what Epiphanius also affirms, when he explains that the name “Christ”(Χριστός) denotes “both” (ἀμφότερα):
"that he is Son of man in the same, and Son of God in the same; for Christ is called Son in both together" (185). The name "Christ", then, denotes his undivided and unique person and, therefore, there are not two Christs, nor two Sons, but "one Lord, one Christ" (186) and, as a consequence, one worship is rendered to him, referred to Christ's one person in both his divine and his human nature. It is clear that Epiphanius' view on this one worship is identical with that of Basil of Seleucia (187).

More specifically in his opposition to the Arian doctrine of the creaturely nature of Christ, Epiphanius argues that "if the Son is created, then he cannot be worshipped" (188). In his Panarion he adduces further arguments: "For if he [i.e. the Son] is not true God, he not worshipful either; and if he is creaturely, he is not God; and if he is not worshipful, then, why is talked about as God?" (189) But the Logos, says Epiphanius, is not creaturely, precisely because he is worshipful. He was worshipped by his disciples and is even worshipped by the angels of God (190) - "and all the angels of God shall worship him" (191) and "I will worship you, Lord, my strength" (192) -. Thus, the worship of the divine Logos is well established in Scripture. Yet, as Epiphanius points out, the controversial heretic transposes his argument to another level, attacking the person of Mary in order that he may ultimately assault her offspring: "Do you worship the Saviour in a body or do you not worship? How can I not worship? for if I do not render worship, I do not have life. But then, you worship a creature, the body" (193). Epiphanius' position here is quite typical. He knows full well that the body of Christ is creaturely because he truly took it from our side which is creaturely. Indeed, as we have seen, in comparing it to his divine nature, he likens it to a royal garment which a king puts on, or even to a throne, which is
inside a church building and on which a king sits. Thus, he argues that as the garment and the throne have no value unless the king uses them, so does the body, unless it is used by the Lord. The honour belongs to the king, but the people often acknowledge it by venerating either his garment or his throne. They do not ask the king "to come out of the throne in order to worship him" (194). Rather, "those who render worship render their worship to the king in his own temple and in his own throne" (195). The same applies, in a relative way - for this case is the highest possible - to the Saviour who is worshipped in his body. The undivided and unbreakable unity of the divine and the human nature in the one person of Christ entails the one and the undivided worship of the person of Christ, in which the two natures cooperate and communicate without separation and without confusion. How else, says Epiphanius, could one render his worship to him? No one can say "leave your body that I may worship you, but worships the Only-begotten with the body, the uncreated One in his temple which he assumed. Likewise, no one says to a king: rise up from your throne, so that I may worship you without the throne, but worships the king with the throne. Christ, then, is worshipped with the body which was buried and rose again" (196). The worship of the body along with the Lord, i.e. of the human nature together with the divine, is a consequence of its assumption by the uncreated and worshipful Divine Logos, who communicates (exchanges) the attribute of worshipfulness to the human nature on account of the communication of the natures in the one person of Christ. The one worship never comes to an end, not even when it dies, but remains for ever, because the union of the natures in Christ remains for ever intact. "He was crucified then, the Lord was crucified and we worship the crucified, the one who was
buried and rose again on the third day and ascended into heaven” (197).

Epiphanius’ insistence on the worship of the human nature of Christ is particularly significant. This is most striking in his answer to the question: “Do you worship the Saviour in a body, or do you not worship? which says, “How can I not worship? for if I do not render worship, I do not have life” (198). The connection here of salvation with worshipping or not worshipping “the body”, or “the holy temple” (199) as he calls it, which the Logos “assumed in his advent”, is a powerful and eloquent expression of Epiphanius’ soteriological Christology. Not to render worship to the human nature of Christ indeed constitutes a denial of its real assumption by the Logos, and of the “hypostatic union” (200) of the natures as well, as Cyril of Alexandria will explain later on and, besides, it excludes the unconfused co-operation and communion of the two natures in the one Christ. Above all, however, it expresses a denial of the communication of the divine attributes or properties of the Logos to the human nature. In such a case the event of salvation remains ineffective or inoperational and man is deprived of the saving grace of God. Nevertheless, inasmuch as worship is actually rendered to the human nature as well, in the sense that all worship is rendered to one and unique person of Christ, then, the impossibility of appropriating the salvation offered in Christ is averted, for human nature has been indeed assumed by the Logos and due to the exchange of properties from the divine to the human nature, all human beings are given the possibility to be “partakers of the divine nature” (201).

3.b.4. Man’s salvation and deification

The greatest and lengthiest point of reference in the Christology
of Epiphanius and especially in the consequences of the union of the two natures, the divine and the human, in the person of Christ, is the salvation of man. For Epiphanius, Christology and soteriology are expressed together and exist together, as his texts easily demonstrate. This framework of interdependence and concurrence of Christology and soteriology constitutes the main target of the teaching programme of the majority of the fathers, especially of those belonging to the epoch of Epiphanius. Epiphanius himself is able clearly to grasp the tragedy of the consequences for man of the rejection of the true Godhead of the Logos and of its implications for the doctrine of the incarnation and, therefore, to raise the agonizing question: "Let them tell us, then, what is the use of calling him a creature? ... why does he become a creature in us? what use is this to us?" (202) Epiphanius has no doubt that the incarnation of the Logos is useless for man, if the Logos is not God but a creature. In such a case the powerlessness of the creature to achieve salvation for the human race becomes fatal, for finally human beings "are servile to elements and creatures" (203), since even at Baptism they invoke the name of the Trinity so that the "seal of perfection" may be placed on them (204).

Epiphanius, however, hooks, man's salvation, and even makes it dependable, not only upon the faith in the true Godhead of the Logos, but also upon the events which are expressed and actualized by the unity of the two natures in the person of Christ. The events which constitute the reality of human existence and life are for Epiphanius indisputably given data, for they make possible the entry of the Logos into the world and its history so that "the whole economy" might be fulfilled (205). Docetism, which is quickly found out by the Church as extremely dangerous, is also pointed out by Epiphanius as constituting
a serious deviation, because it finally militates with its theses against a true redemption. The "truth of the incarnate presence" (206) provides the composition, according to Epiphanius, of the event of redemption, as well as the confirmation of the fact that "the economy exists in truth" (207). The perfect economy (208) is centered on the perfect salvation (209). The achievement, however, of salvation relied on "the whole sequence of the incarnation" (210), which constituted a unique and unrepeateable event in the history of the given human data. "Having sojourned into the human race from above, the Logos of God who is enhypostatic from the Father" (211), came to be "in true flesh" (212) without the cooperation of any man, so that "the economy may not be from men" (213), but, "partaking of flesh he recreated in himself from Mary the Theotokos without the seed of a man his holy flesh through the Holy Spirit" (214). "By his inhomination the Lord perfectly assumed all things" (215), "reconstructing a perfect man" (216), so that "in this perfect man he may perfectly work out as God the whole [reality] of salvation, leaving out nothing belonging to man, so that the left out part may partially fall prey again to the devil" (217). Thus, according to this father, whoever teaches that "the incarnate presence of Christ is deficient and ... the economy" (218), "he also makes deficient our salvation through these thoughts" (219).

The reconstruction and assumption by the Logos of the human "flesh" in no way suggests the assumption of the element of sin. "God forbid" (220), says Epiphanius, for we teach that "Christ became a perfect man from Mary; nor should we think that because he has a mind he must have fallen into sin, because 'he did not commit any sin, nor was any guile found in his mouth' (221); for if he breathed into the saints his own power and if those who were inspired by him
are witnesses of holiness and righteousness and blamelessness to an advanced age, how much more is this, indeed, the case with the Logos himself... who, upholding all in himself, was as God in control of all, not letting them be partitioned by evil, nor broken up by the evil one, nor lost in unlawful pleasure, nor submitting to Adam's transgression” (222). Christ, then, is a full and perfect man free from original sin and not “yielding” (ὑποτιπτων) to sin, nor receiving in any sense vexations or self-willed temptations and desires towards sin, so that he is able to inspire and to grant sanctification. As man, says Epiphanius, Christ was “sinless” (223). Christ “is perfect above and perfect below” (224). It is precisely this perfection of the natures that, being in operation in Christ from the first moment of the conception and being upheld unbreakable and unconfused for ever, makes possible the participation and communion of the human nature in the attributes of the divine. Thus, even though the Lord “became flesh in Mary and was found to be a man in the seed of Abraham” (225), and even though, being “a Master, he took the form of the servant” (226), finally assuming “the nature of mortal [man]” (227), he not only remained immutable as God, “not being changed from being God” (228), but also did not succumb to the weakness of the flesh, “changing his Godhood into manhood” (229), but “in what I was weak through the flesh” (230) “a Saviour was sent to me ‘in the likeness of flesh of sin’ (231), fulfilling such an economy, that I might be ‘purchased’ (232) from slavery, from corruption, from death and he might become for me ‘righteousness and sanctification and redemption’” (233).

For Epiphanius, however, the event of salvation is not interpreted only as a catharsis or delivery from sin or reconciliation of man with God. Man’s salvation surpasses the limits of mere
forgiveness and is extended to a deifying conversion or elevation by grace to the extent that he is transformed in "the body of his humiliation", so that it becomes "conformed to the glory" of the Son of God (234). The deification by grace of the human nature of Christ, which was achieved through its real union and communion with the divine nature, is not explained as a mixture or outpouring into the Godhead, as monophysitism taught, but as the means for upholding it within its natural limits and clothing it with the glory of God, so that it could be transformed and embellished to the extent that its natural potential allowed and its natural receptivity warranted. The purpose of the incarnation was to reprint "the icon of the Creator in himself" (235). "Christ", says Epiphanius, "was himself God and himself man", without any commixture occurring on account of the communion of the natures. These two were combined without confusion into one, into the person of Christ. The weak part, the human element, not only was it not led to oblivion, but also received from the Godhead such possibilities and powers, that, united with it, became "a spiritual body" even though it was previously "an earthly one", and put on incorruptibility as it found itself united with the incomprehensible Godhead to the extent that Christ the God-man came to be thought of as "incorruption as a whole" (236). Exactly this incorruption cannot exist outside the framework of deification. Christ, "sitting on the right of the Father [and] not leaving out the flesh" proved that he united it "into one Godhead as a whole" (237). Epiphanius can use the verb "deify", as Athanasius the Great did, emphatically stressing that, "he became inhominated, so that we may become deified" (238), yet the exact meaning of his Christological teaching is the salvation and deification of man. For, what other meaning could one give to his words: "this Only-begotten one, who is
perfect, uncreated, immutable, unchangeable, incomprehensible, invisible, who became inominated in us ... who united what is fleshly to what is divine, who is one Lord King Christ, the Son of God, who sat in heaven on the right of the Father” (239), except that “in Christ” a deification by grace of the human nature and an incorporation of the human race in the mystical body of Christ has taken place? “Our corruptible [body] puts on incorruptibility in truth (for even though it belongs to a mortal one, it puts on immortality)” (240), as Epiphanius will underline elsewhere. The deifying event of the human nature begins at the time of the conception and moves into all the expressions of human life. That the Lord assumed the so-called blameless passions, such as hunger, thirst, fatigue, pain, does not express any imperfection or impediment or deprivation of the human nature, but, on the contrary, as Epiphanius underlines elsewhere, it expresses the fact that the Lord assumed “the whole sequence of the inomination” for our benefit, including “suffering all these things for us” (241). It is for the sake of effecting a full and complete salvation, then, that all these things take place. Indeed the Lord assumes in his incorruptible flesh even the consequences of sin, namely, the passion and the death, and he does it again for our own benefit. “He assumed the flesh from us, so that for us and instead of us he may become an offering to his own God and Father” (242), says Epiphanius. Elsewhere he adds: “... it was from our flesh that the Lord assumed flesh in his advent and became a man like us though he is God the Logos, so that he might offer us salvation in the Godhead and suffer for us human beings in his own humanity a passion through which he dissolved death, putting it to death through his own death” (243). Epiphanius’ soteriological teaching is maintained throughout the entire length and breadth of his Christology. Particularly striking is his
insistence on the event of the passion, the death and the resurrection of Christ. While Christ accepts and undergoes the passion for reasons pertaining to the economy and man's benefit, and while his Godhead "suffers nothing at all ... in accepting the passion to be counted to it" (244), yet corruption, to which the fallen nature of Adam was subjected, remained an event foreign and unfamiliar to the all holy and deified body of Christ. Thus, Christ's body "did not see corruption in its entirety ... but was resurrected in its entirety ... and was resurrected in truth" (245). Furthermore it was the same body of Christ that rose again, because it was this body that had been united with his Godhead and not another (246). This exactly explains how Christ is the "firstfruits of those who fell asleep" (247), because "this body is one and firstfruits of those who are being raised" (248).

Epiphanius asks those who claim that the flesh that dies is other than the flesh that rises again, first of all to look at the resurrection "of the Lord's body, which is that holy one that was taken up from Mary" (249) and, secondly, to consider that if they were right then "the Lord's judgment would not be just ... for the flesh to be judged would be other than that which sinned and/or the body to be brought into the glory of the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven would be other than the one which laboured in fasts and vigils and persecutions for the name of God" (250). Thus, the acquisition of incorruptibility and life by the human nature which was deified by the Logos is a direct consequence of the communication of properties which occurred in the context of the incarnation. "Christ is the 'firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep' (251), because having risen again 'he no longer dies, death has no longer mastery over him' (252) according to what is written; for he died once, enduring the passion on account of our passions; and tasted death once, 'the death of the cross' (253), for
the Logos willingly came to death, so that by death he may put death to death; in becoming flesh the Logos did not suffer in the Godhead, but co-suffered with the humanity inasmuch as the passion was counted to him who remained in impassibility; death was counted to him who remains in immortality, or rather is wholly immortality himself; for he said 'I am the life'” (254). This last clarification of Epiphanius concerning the immortality of the whole Christ is particularly typical of his thought. Corruption and death are conditions totally foreign to the human nature of Christ. This is why in the new life of human beings, which is inaugurated by Christ, “the dead have a hope of eternal life” that “those in the graves shall rise again” (255). Furthermore, it is because the saints will acquire glory after their resurrection, “since they are destined to be brightened and altered in glory” (256), that there is no need for them to care for “clothes for the day of judgment” (257). Finally, it is not only man who has been blessed with the greatest and unique beneficence by the inhomination of the Logos, but the whole earth is exposed to the divine energies and attributes through the presence of Christ after it was subjected to the pollution of sin on account of the human sickness. As Epiphanius puts it, “Christ's presence from heaven has sanctified the whole of the earth” (258).

As capping-stone, then, of our reference to the exchange of attributes from the divine to the human nature of Christ, and of the more general chapter on the Christology of Epiphanius, which has a clear soteriological character, we wish to use in our conclusion the following superb text of this great father: “For he came, indeed, as our life and instantly exposed us to the light, having found us wondering astray; for we were, indeed, in pride and blasphemies, in likenesses of idols, in atheisms of evil spirits, baptised into all sorts of
injunctions ... and as sin was serving me in this manner, the holy Father sent his holy Son and in his very mercy he saved me and delivered me from all my corruptions ... showing instantly the light of life, stretching his hand, opening the way, indicating the supporting foundations of heaven, instantly claiming paradise as a dwelling place” (259). Now, then, is the period of keeping the second kind of Sabbaths to the Lord, because “the ancient Sabbaths have passed away, and a true Sabbath is now being preached by us” (260).
SYNOPSIS
The following synopsis serves as a summary of Epiphanius' Christological doctrine as this is expounded on the basis of his Ancoratus:

1. Epiphanius develops his synoptic exposition of the faith of the Church on Trinity and Christology in response to an invitation from Pamphylia to explain the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He does this, because he believes, as he tells us, that the truths of the faith are mutually conjoined and interdependent. The rejection of the faith in the Logos as God - a dogma which is connected with the doctrine of the Trinity - automatically affects the whole Christological context and its extension into the sphere of soteriology.

2. Epiphanius' doctrine of the incarnation, i.e. of the inhomination of the Logos, as far as this is expounded in his Ancoratus is very clear. The terms "flesh" (σάρξ) and "man" (ἀνθρωπός) are used interchangeably and with the same broad sense and semantic content, without any particular concern for the so-called Antiochene or Alexandrine types.

3. Epiphanius sees the incarnation taking place in time. The Logos becomes "flesh" in the sense that he himself, through the Holy Spirit, reconstructs his human nature "in the belly" (ἐν τῇ νησσῷ) of the virgin. The "flesh" of Christ is "the beauty of Jacob" and the "pinnacle of his beauty".

4. The assumption of the human nature is a real event and not a mere appearance. The Logos assumes true human nature and, indeed, the whole human nature: body, soul, mind and "whatever man is", without, however, the element of sin or the tendency towards sin. Thus, he is able to answer the objections of the Arians and the Apollinarists. The reality and fullness of the human nature of Christ is
consistent with the reality and truth of the economy. If "the economy of the flesh" is deficient by way of docetism, or if the Logos occupies the place of the soul in Christ, or if the man Christ does not have a mind, then the work of salvation is deficient, incomplete and ineffective.

5. In the person of Christ there is from the moment of the incarnation of the Logos a cooperation of the two natures, the divine and the human. The union of the natures takes place once and for all and their communion in the one Christ has the sense of an exchange of properties (attributes, *communicatio idiomatum* or *ἀντίδοσις* *ἰδιωμάτων*) from the divine to the human nature and an exchange of names (*ἀντίδοσις ὅνομάτων*) from the human nature to the divine, although the integrity and distinctive ontological peculiarity of the two natures is maintained without any mutation or confusion or absorption. In this way Epiphanius emerges as antinestorian and antimonophysite. This means that he maintains and correctly interprets the faith of the Church.

6. In the case of the birth of Christ too, although it constitutes an event which is connected only with the human nature, Mary is called *Theotokos* (*Θεοτόκος*), because she begets the one Christ and because neither the conception nor the birth itself take place according to the normal human method. It is for this reason that Epiphanius calls Mary "ever-virgin (*ἐβιπάρθενος*)."

7. The exchange of properties from the divine to the human nature is the basis for worshipping "Christ in the body", which is a case similar to the veneration which is given to the King and his purple robe or throne.
8. The presence of human passions in the “Lordly man” indicate the truth and exact reality of the economy and do not express any sin or weakness.

9. Christ suffers in his human nature, but the passion is counted (attributed) to the Godhead of the Logos as well, “like a spot in a garment”, which is counted to the person who wears the garment although it is only on the garment itself. This is the way, then, to understand how “the impassible Logos of God suffered” which stands in direct contrast to the view of Apollinaris and the Theopaschites. The result is that men do not place their hope on a common man, but on the “Lordly man”. The case of the death of Christ is parallel to that of his suffering. Although the “Lordly man” experiences death, the power of corruption is in no way effective on the body of Christ. All these things take place exactly, in order to demonstrate that through his passion and suffering Christ dissolved all passion and through his death abolished death, while through the power of his incorruptibility he triumphed over corruption.

10. When Christ’s soul descended into Hell, his body was preserved incorruptible in the grave. Thus, through his descent into Hell a new Sabbath is established and through his resurrection he emerges as the firstfruits of the dead and as the guarantor of our own resurrection. His ascension into heaven demonstrates our own exaltation and deification. In this way the economy is completed and the old passes away.

11. In his exposition Epiphanius constantly retains an anti-heretical stance and, therefore, moves within the scheme of challenge and answer.

12. Epiphanius is firmly established on two parameters: the first one is his agreement with what Holy Scripture lays out and with what the
Church received and appropriated. The second parameter has to do with the way in which the divine truths are understood and interpreted only in the Holy Spirit. Since the Holy Spirit is granted only to the Church, heretics are deprived of it and are, therefore, deceived and unable to understand the "deep things of God".

13. Epiphanius is totally convinced that he does not need to offer any apology for God, but to think and to teach in a "truly pious manner" (εὐσεβῶς), so that he may shed light on the true faith and offer protection from deceit and perdition.
AUTHORS'S NOTE: In the Greek original of this thesis we have quoted Epiphanius texts, but here we have provided English translations with the help of our Supervisor. Ideally the original texts should have been included in the footnotes. This, however, was avoided because of the word limit restrictions for the Durham MA. As regards secondary literature, we have made extensive use of what is available in Greek theological literature, translating it and citing it in English, but full references to books and articles in Greek and English are given in the Bibliography.

INTRODUCTION 1.

(2) Acts 11:19
(4) On the Cypriot saints see, “Saints de Cypre”, in Analecta Bollandiana, 26 (1907) and Archbishop Makarios’ Cyprus the Holy Island, Athens 1968 [in Greek]. That the Church of Cyprus was able to retain its independence from the Bishops of Antioch during the first centuries was due to the holiness of its Bishops. Cf. A. Papageorgiou, A Brief History of the Church of Cyprus, Nicosia 1962, pp. 19-20 [in Greek].
(5) The city of Salamis which was built by Telamon Teukros after the Trojan war (Stravo, 16,6,3) was renamed Constantia in honour of Flavius Constantinus II (AD 337-361), who offered money for its renovation after it was destroyed in AD 343 by an earthquake.
(7) PG 41: 21ff.
(8) PG 41: 25.


(14) He writes in his *Panarion 77 Αγαντός the Dimoiritai* concerning Apollinaris the following: “Ο πρεσβύτερος καὶ σεμνοπρεπής, ὁ ἀεὶ ἡμῖν ἀγαπητός, καὶ τῷ μακαρίτη πάπα Ἀθανασίῳ, καὶ πάσιν ὅρθοδόξοις, Ἀπολινάριος ...”, PG 42: 641; cf. also 644-660, where he cites Athanasius’ *Epistola ad Epictetum Cornithii episcopum*. Cf. also PG 42: 388 and 397.


(18) Hilarion’s intervention in favour of Epiphanius must have been significant on this occasion; cf Jerome, *Vita beati Hilarionis* 41, PL 23:50.


(21) Epiphanius, PG 41: 156.

(22) Palladius, *Dialogus* 16, PG 47: 56.

(23) Hackett-Papaioannou, *History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, Athens 1923, vol. 1., p. 21 [in Greek].


(25) According to his biographers, Polybius, bishop of Rinokouroura and John, presbyter, Theodosius the Great issued an edict which said: Εἰ τις τῷ πατρὶ Ἐπιφανίῳ, τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ τῆς Κυπρίων χωρᾶς, οὐχ ὑπακούει διὰ τῶν θείων λόγων, ἐξερχέσθω τῆς νήσου καὶ ὅπου θέλει κατοικεῖτω, PG 41: 100.


(28) This epistle was lost, but Basil’s reply is still extant, cf. Basil, *Epistola* 258, PG 32: 948-949.


The Minutes of the Second Ecumenical Synod have not survived. The so-called minutes in Mansi's *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio* iii: 586-572, cite the signatures of Julius of Paphos, Theopombus of Tremithus, Tychon of Tamasos and Mnemonius of Kition.


Cf. Chr. Papadopoulos, "Saint Epiphanius of Cyprus", *Ekklesiastical Herald*, 1 (1911), 604ff [in Greek].


K. Holl, Ἀὔγουστος κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδεύοντων ποιεῖν ἑδωλικό τις μή αἱ ἐκκόνας, Tuebingen 1928, pp. 356-359. G. Ostrogorski (Studien zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Bilderstreites, Breslau 1929, pp. 68-71) regards these extracts as spurious. This issue is thoroughly examined by A. N. Mitsides in his work, *The presence of the Church of Cyprus in the struggle in support of the Icons*, Nicosia 1989, pp. 105ff [in Greek].


What is attributed to Epiphanius in relation to ordination to holy orders is totally without foundation. Cf. P. Chrestou, *Patrologia*, vol. 4, Thessaloniki 1989, p. 242 [in Greek]. Cf. also K. Dyovouniotes, “Participation of Epiphanius of
Constantia’s in the condemnation of John Chrysostom of Constantinople”, 
Epeteris Etaireias Byzantion Spoudon, year 3, Athens 1926, p. 72 [in Greek].
(45) What are said to have been exchanged between Epiphanius and Chrysostom are not historically founded. Cf. P. Chrestou, Patrologia, vol. 4, Thessaloniki 1989, p. 242 and O. Bardehewer, Patrology, The lives and works of the Fathers of the Church, Vienna (Translation) 1908, p. 321.
(47) Jerome, op. cit. 12.
(48) Socrates, op. cit. 6,10, PG 67: 696.
(49) Sozomenus, op. cit. 8,14, PG 67: 1552.
(51) B. Englezakes, op. cit. p. 312.
(52) K. Holl, op. cit. Ancoratus 13, 10ff and PG 43: 40.
(53) PG 41: 173.
(54) PG 41: 157.
(55) PG 41: 157.
(58) Epiphanius, Panarion 33 Against the Ptolemies (Ptolemy’s letter to Flora), PG 41: 557ff, 72 Against Marcellians, PG 42: 389ff, 73 Against Semiarians (Epistle of the Pseudosynod of Ancyra), PG 42: 404ff etc.
(61) PG 43: 293-304 (Greek epitome) and 305-366 (Latin epitome).
(62) For a fuller information see the exhaustive Bibliography of G. D. Dragas, Memorandum, op. cit. vol. 41 Athens 1992, pp. 18ff.


(67) K. Holl, *op. cit.*, p. 3 and PG 43: 13; Ps. 11: 5 and 72: 8.


(70) The division of the *Ancoratus* into 120 chapters is also mentioned by Migne, PG 43: 233, while in Holl’s edition it is divided into 119 chapters.


(94) K. Holl, *Ancoratus*, 72: 11-12, PG 43: 152

(98) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 74: 8-13, PG 43: 156
(99) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 74: 14-21, PG 43: 156.
(102) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 78: 9, PG 43: 164.
(103) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 80: 3-7, PG 43: 168.
(106) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 82: 24-26, PG 43: 172. For more analytical information on this subject see our relevant references in the present exposition.
(108) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 82: 5-6, PG 43: 172.
(110) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 87: 1-2, PG 43: 188.
(111) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 93: 16, PG 43: 188.
(112) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 93: 3-4, PG 43: 188.
(113) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 93: 12-16, PG 43: 185-188.
(114) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 92: 8, PG 43: 185.
(115) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 94: 9-10, PG 43: 188.
(121) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 94: 13-14, PG 43: 188.
(122) K. Holl, Ancoratus, 94: 15-16, PG 43: 188.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1.


(2) Cf. Clement of Rome, I Cor. 1:1: Thus we must think concerning Jesus Christ, as God and as judge of the living and the dead”; cf. also the Christological formulation of the Shepherd of Hermas (Parable IX, 11) where Christ is identified to some extent with the Holy Spirit or with the Archangel Michael as to his divine nature (see here Harnack, History of Dogmas, vol. 1, p. 211, ft 2); Ignatius, Ephesians xx, 1 and Smyrnaeans ii, 1ff; Justin Martyr, Apology I, 13: 1-14; Irenaeus, Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, 3 and 6 (Greek edition by I. Karavidopoulos, Thessaloniki 1965); Origen, De Principiis 1,3,5 and Contra Celsum 6:17; Athanasius, Epistola de Deceretis Nicaeni Synodi 27, PG 25: 465ff, etc.

(3) Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 4,6,6, PG 7: 989 (invisibile etenim Filii Pater, visible autem Patris Filius).

(4) Athanasius the Great distinguished with much clarity the two notions of “theology” and “economy” “so that it is no longer permissible to examine the

(5) Epiphanius, *Panarion 69 (Against the Arians)*, 6, PG 42: 212.


(10) Epiphanius, *Panarion 69 (Against the Arians)*, 36, PG 42: 257.


(14) It is certain that Arianism was in deep disagreement with the various Gnostic schools, especially regarding their views on matter. Yet, Arius was clearly related to them on account of his view on the ontological subordination of the Son to the Father.

(15) Origen, *De Principiis*, 1,2,13 and 1,3,5, as well as *Contra Celsum*, 1,6,4.

(16) Paul of Samosata represented Judaising tendencies in the doctrine of God. Arius agreed with both Paul of Samosata and Sabellius in considering God as a single person. He disagreed, however, with Paul inasmuch as he accepted a Son who was God’s first and unique creation, designed to carry out God’s plan of economy. Athanasius clarifies the relation between the heresy of Arius and the heresy of Paul of Samosata in his *Contra Arianos*.

(17) The Minutes of the Synod are not extant. Gelasius of Cyzikus, however, did compose in AD 475, on the basis of information provided by his predecessors, a particular writing, entitled: *Syntagma on what took place at the Synod of Nicaea*, PG 85: 119ff.


(22) Cf. Athanasius, *Contra Gentes*, 13, PG 25: 20ff where he points out the necessity for the grace of the *imago dei* to be renewed by the Logos of God who is God’s very Image.
(25) Eustathius of Antioch, *On the Soul against the Arians (Extract)*, PG 18: 261ff, where he indicates the Arian insistence on a soulless body in Christ.
(30) Jn 1: 14.
(37) Cf. here his *Contra Arianos* III which contains very important material on this issue.
(44) Eustathius, *Diagnostic look into ventriloquism against Origen*, PG 18: 652.


(47) G. D. Dragas, *op. cit.* especially pp. 47-8 in the Greek version.


(49) Epiphanius, *Panarion 77 (Against the Dimoiritai)*, PG 42: 644 where he says that Apollinaris has been "always beloved to us and to the blessed Pope Athanasius and to all the Orthodox".


(53) Cf. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 1039 a 9-10, where he says that "it is impossible to have one from two or two from one" and St. G. Papadopoulos, *Patrologia*, vol. 2, Athens 1990, p. 543ff.


(64) Basil the Great, PG 43: 980.


(67) Basil the Great, *op. cit.*
(70) Basil the Great, *Epistle 236 to Amphilochius*, 1, Y. Courtonne, III, 49: 49 and PG 32: 877.
(74) Gregory the Theologian, *ibid*.
(76) G. Martzelos, *History... op. cit.*, p. 63.
(78) Gregory the Theologian, *ibid*.
(79) Gregory the Theologian, *ibid*.
(82) I. Kalogerou, *History... op. cit.*, p.62.
(84) *Ibid*.
(85) Amphilochius of Iconium, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
(87) Amphilochius of Iconium, PG 39: 108.

**FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2:1**

(1) See chapter 1.1 of the present thesis.
In his *Panarion* (PG 41 and 42) Epiphanius follows the same method for all the heresies. He first writes the historical structure of the heresy and specifies it geographically, i.e. where it emerged and spread, and then, he goes on to refute its tenets.


(60) *Ibid*.


(73) Epiphanius uses the terms “hypostasis” in the sense of “ousia”.


(78) Jn. 17:3


(80) Jn. 1:9.
(81) I Jn. 1:5.
(82) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 4, Holl 4: 5-6, PG 43: 21.
(86) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 52, Holl 52: 8, PG 43: 108.
(87) Epiphanius, Panarion 69 Against the Arians (Epistle of Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia), PG 42: 212.
(89) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 52, Holl 52: 8-9, PG 43: 108.
(90) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 52, Holl 52: 9-12, PG 43: 108.
(94) Epiphanius, Panarion 69 Against the Arians, PG 42: 221.
(96) Epiphanius, Panarion 12, PG 42: 221.
(100) Prov. 8:12 and Epiphanius, Panarion, op. cit., PG 42: 233.
(104) Perhaps this phrase denotes the reality of the humanity of Christ which includes the body and the soul and which was formed inside Mary’s womb. Cf. Epiphanius, Ancoratus 43, Holl 43: 2-5, PG 43: 93-96. Epiphanius does not think here of the eternal birth of the Logos. He does the same in Ancoratus 43, PG 43: 93-96.
(107) It is a fact that Epiphanius maintains certain reservations regarding the interpretation of this verse. He says that “some of our orthodox fathers connected it with the incarnate presence ... and if any of the orthodox do not wish to accept it, he will not be forced to so”, (Panarion, op. cit., PG 42: 240). His view on this verse (Prov. 8:22) seems to differ from that sponsored by the patristic mainstream. Turning to the Hebrew text and especially to the phrase Adonai which is
interpreted Kyrios’ and ‘kanani’, he says that ‘he created me’ could also mean ‘he obtained me’ (ἐνόσσεως, or ἐκτίσατο, Panarion, op. cit., PG 42: 241; also Holl 44: 15-16 and PG 42: 241). Epiphanius finds support for his view in Aquila (Panarion, op. cit., PG 42: 214), which, in the last analysis, allows him to argue that Prov. 8:22 refers to the eternal generation of the Son from the Father (Ibid. 241-244).

115) Epiphanius, Panarion, op. cit., PG 42: 244.
118) I Kings 15:29.
124) We have already cited such arguments in chapter 1.1a.
131) Jn. 8:31.
137) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 8, Holl 8: 24-25, PG 43: 32. “Seal of perfection” is the sacrament of Baptism.
(140) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 33, Holl 33: 22-23, PG 43: 77.
(146) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 33, Holl 31, PG 43: 77.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2:2

(2) G. D. Dragas, Ibid. pp. 45-66. For further details see G. D. Dragas, St Athanasius 'Contra Apollinarem', Athens (Church and Theology vol. vi) 1985 (especially ch. vii).
(3) Jn. 1:14.
(4) Gen. 2:7.
(7) Is. 40:28.
(10) II Cor. 5:18.
(11) I Tim. 2:5.
(15) Gal. 4:4.
(20) G. Mantzarides, The Dogmas of the Church as Life Sign-posts, Pyrgos 1985, p. 206 [in Greek].


(23) N. Matsoukas, *Dogmatic and Symbolic Theology*, vol. 2, Thessaloniki 1985, p. 206 [in Greek].


(30) Rom. 7:25.


(36) I Cor. 4:15, Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* 76, Holl 76: 3-4, PG 43: 160.


(41) Rom. 8:2.


(44) II Cor. 5:19, Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* 68, Holl 68: 8-10, PG 43: 133.


(57) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 75, Holl 75: 4-8, PG 43: 157.
(60) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 49, Holl 49: 1, PG 43: 104.
(61) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 49, Holl 49: 5-6, PG 43: 104.
(64) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 49, Holl 49: 8, PG 43: 104.
(67) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 78, Holl 78: 8-9, PG 43: 164.
(68) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 61, Holl 61: 12, PG 43: 125.
(75) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 31, Holl 75: 7-8, PG 43: 72-73.
(76) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 32, Holl 32: 22-23ff, PG 43: 76.
(82) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 69, Holl 69: 15-16-17, PG 43: 145.
(83) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 69, Holl 69: 15.16-17 PG 43: 145.
(94) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 81, Holl 81: 2.8, PG 43: 169.
(95) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 81, Holl 81: 2.8, PG 43: 169.
(97) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 100, Holl 100: 23, PG 43: 197.
(101) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 43, Holl 43: 3-4, PG 43: 93.
(104) See further “The antiapollinarism of Epiphanius” in chapter 2 of the present thesis.
(106) Epiphanius, Panarion 67 Against the Ierakitai, PG 42: 172ff.
(108) Epiphanius, Panarion 66 Against the Manichaeans, PG 42: 29ff.
(110) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 86, Holl 86: 13-14, PG 43: 176. It is interesting to note here that Epiphanius attributes the fall to the body rather than the soul! “Πόσ γάρ ψυχή ἀναστήσεται ἢ μὴ πεπτωκυῖα;”
(111) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 61, Holl 61: 24-26, PG 43: 123.
(112) II Cor. 5:17, Epiphanius, Ancoratus 116, Holl 116:8, PG 43:228.
(115) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 65, Holl 65: 4-5, PG 43: 133.
(117) Col. 2:9, Epiphanius, Ancoratus 65, Holl 65: 9, PG 43: 133.
(119) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 36, Holl 36: 3-6, PG 43: 81.
(123) Epiphanius, Panarion 77 Against the Dimoiritai, PG 42: 669ff. He must have visited Antioch around 373 (?) to try to persuade bishop Vitalius to reject
the heresy of Apollinarism. Vitalius clashed with Paulinus whom he accused of Sabellianism.

(125) G. Martzelos, op. cit., p. 40.
(127) Pseudo-Athanasius (?) *Expositio Fidei*, PG 25: 204 and *Oratio De Fide*, PG 26: 1265 and 1285, etc.
(146) Gal. 4:4.
(151) *Ibid*.
(154) Jn. 12:27.
It is certain that the Apollinarists did not want to diminish the Godhead of the Logos in any way. On the contrary Apollinaris had attempted to exalt the Godhead. Yet, as Epiphanius observes, the Apollinarists constituted a group of heretics, who, included some “who claimed that the incarnation of the Lord was not perfect and that he did not become a perfect man” (Panarion, PG 42: 669), and certain others, who, again according to Epiphanius, “dared to say that his flesh was homoousios with his Godhead” (Ibid. 677) and “that his Godhead had died, for they dared to point to the verse: ‘if they knew, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory’ (Ibid. 688).

Aristotle, Metaphysics 1039, a 9-10.

It is clear from the dialogue between Epiphanius and Vitalius that the Apollinarists equated hypostasis and nous (mind): Epiphanius, Panarion 77 Against the Dimoiritai, PG 42: 673.
(191) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 75, Holl 75: 5-8, PG 43: 160.
(193) H. G. Lietzmann, op. cit., Fragment 107, p. 150.
(195) A. Theodorou, The Christological terminology ... op. cit., p. 13.
(196) Epiphanius, Panarion 77, op. cit., 680.
(197) Rom. 8:8.
(198) Gal. 5:17, Epiphanius, Ancoratus 76, Holl 76: 3-4, PG 43: 160.
(199) Rom. 8:18.
(200) Epiphanius, Panarion 77, op. cit., 681.
(203) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 79, Holl 79: 16-17, 10-12, PG 43: 165.
(204) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 79, Holl 79: 16-17, 10-12, PG 43: 165.
(208) Epiphanius, Ibid.
(210) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 80, Holl 80: 3-7, PG 43: 168.
(212) Epiphanius, Ibid.
(215) Epiphanius, Panarion 77, op. cit. 680.
(218) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 40, Holl 40: 24, PG 43: 89.
(219) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 40, Holl 40: 4-8, PG 43: 89.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2:3

1. I. Karmires, The Dogmatic and Symbolic Monuments of the Orthodox Catholic Church, Athens (2nd ed.) 1960, p. 159.


3. I. Karmires, op.cit., p. 159.


5. “He insisted that the two natures of the incarnate Christ remained unaltered and distinct in the union”, Kelly, op.cit., p. 312.


10. Epiphanius, Ibid.


(19) J. Mansi, op.cit, iv 1014. Cf. I. Kalogerou, Mary the Ever-virgin Theotokos according to the orthodox faith, Thessaloniki 1957, pp. 30ff [in Greek].
(20) J. Mansi, op.cit., iv 1197.
(22) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 75, Holl 75: 30, PG 43: 160.
(23) A. Theodorou, The Christological terminology ... op.cit., p. 25.
(39) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 74, Holl 74: 25, PG 43: 156.
(40) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 75, Holl 75: 10, PG 43: 160.
(49) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 80, Holl 80: 24ff, PG 43: 168.


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(128) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 41, Holl 41: 10, PG 43: 92.
(130) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 45, Holl 45: 4-9, PG 43: 97.
(137) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 91, Holl 91: 8-10, PG 43: 184.
(145) Epiphanius develops his views on the Theotokos in his Panarion 78 Against the Antidikomarianitai (PG 42: 700ff) and in his Panarion 79 Against the Collyridiani (PG 42: 740ff).
(147) Jn. 1:14.
(148) E. Schwartz, op.cit., I, 1 p. 95.
(149) I. Karmires, The Dogmatic and Symbolic Monuments... op.cit., pp. 117ff.
(156) Ps. 46:4.
(157) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 49, Holl 49: 4-6, PG 43: 104.

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(172) J. Mansi, *op.cit.*, iv, 885.
(191) Ps. 96:7.

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Ps. 17:1.


(231) Rom. 8:3, Epiphanius, Ancoratus 64, Holl 64: 24, PG 43: 133.
(232) Gal. 4:5, Epiphanius, Ancoratus 64, Holl 64: 24-5, PG 43: 133.
(233) 1 Cor. 1:3, Epiphanius, Ancoratus 64, Holl 64: 26, PG 43: 133.
(234) Phil. 3:21, Epiphanius, Ancoratus 65, Holl 65: 6-7, PG 43: 133.
(235) Epiphanius, Panarion 44 Against the Apelleanoi, PG 41:825-8.
(239) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 81, Holl 81: 4-8, PG 43: 188.
(244) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 95, Holl 95: 2-4, PG 43: 188.
(246) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 87,90, Holl 87:22ff, 90:21ff, PG 43:188.
(250) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 87, Holl 87: 5-9, PG 43: 177.
(251) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 92, Holl 92: 8, PG 43: 185.
(256) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 90, Holl 90: 4-5, PG 43: 181.
(259) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 64, Holl 64: 10-29, PG 43: 132.

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APPENDIX

Comparison: Texts of Ancoratus and of the Chalcedonian Definition

A. The Chalcedonian Definition (1)  B. Texts of Ancoratus

1. Ἐπόμενοι τοῖνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν 1.α. "Πάσα γὰρ σεβασία ψεύδεται μὴ λαβοῦσα πνεῦμα ἁγίον . κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν πατέρων ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ καθολικῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ" 2.

β. "... οὕτω γὰρ δοξάζει ἡ ἁγία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνέκαθεν" 3.

γ. "... παρέλαβον γὰρ οἱ ταύτης (ἐνν. τῆς ἁγίας ἐκκλησίας) παῖδες παρά ἁγίων πατέρων τουτέστι τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων πίστιν φυλάττειν, ὅμα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐαυτῶν τέκνοις παραδίδοναι..." 4.


3. τὸν Κυρίον ἡμῶν Ὁ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν μὴ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ 5. τὸ μὲν γὰρ Ἰησοῦς ὄνομα καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κύριον ἠγούνται. καὶ
4. συμφώνως ἀπαντεῖς ἐκδίδασκομεν, ἀρειανοὶ λέγουσιν τὸ ὄνομα καὶ θεόν, θετὼν δὲ λέγουσι καὶ σοὶ ἁληθῖνον ... εάν γὰρ μὴ τις δέξηται πνεῦμα ἁγιον, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ἰησοῦν κύριον ὄντως καὶ θεόν ὄντως καὶ ὑ'Iὸν θεοῦ ὄντως.*6.

5. τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι

5.α. "... τέλειος ὁ υἱὸς..." 7.

β. "...ὡς θεός οὐν τελείον προσέλθε τῷ υἱῷ καὶ (ὡς) υἱῷ γνησίῳ ὧν παρὰ πατρός...*8.

γ. "αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ σωτὴρ ὁ ἁγιος ὁ ἁπλοὶ οὐρανῶν κατελθὼν ... ὁ τέλειος ὃν ἀπὸ πατρός..." 9.

δ. "... Χριστὸς δὲ ὁ ἄνωθεν Θεός

λόγος ... 10.

ε. "... εἶ δὲ ἄνω ἐστί τέλειος, καὶ κάτω ἐστὶ τέλειος..." 11.

6. καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι

6.α. "...ὁ τέλειος ὃν ἀπὸ πατρός ὁ τῆν τελειαν οἰκονομίαν πληρώσας... τέλειον εἷς ἐαυτὸν ἀναπλάσας ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ Μαρίας τῆς θεοτόκου διὰ πνεῦματος ἁγίου... συμπεριλαβών τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπος καὶ εἰ τι
7. Θεόν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀληθῶς
7.α. "... μανίαν ἐαυτοῖς ἐπισωρεύομεν, εἰ
tολμήσουμεν βλασφημήσαι καὶ μὴ εἴπειν τον
ὑίον θεόν ἀληθινὸν ..." ¹⁴.
Β. "Αὐτὸς τοῖς ὁ ἄγιος λόγος ὁ Ἰ ῶν ὁ
ἐνυπόστατος ... ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐν ἁλήθειᾳ
gεγονὼς καὶ θεὸς ἐν ἁλήθειᾳ
ὑπάρχων ..." ¹⁵.

8. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς
καὶ σώματος
8.α. "... τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ
γνωσκέτωσαν, δι’ ὃν θεὸς καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄν
νοῦς, εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου νοῦν μετὰ τῆς
σαρκός καὶ ψυχῆν εὐληφθεν" ¹⁶.
Β. "... τί τοῖς ἠλθεν ὁ κύριος σώσαι; ἀνθρώπου τέλειον πάντως, ὥσπερ οὖν πάντα τὰ
ἐν αὐτῷ τέλειως ἔλαβεν, ἐπεὶ πόθεν ταῦτα
9. ὁμούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα

9.α. "... ὑπὸ γὰρ ἄδει (συνὸν) οὐ συναλοιφῇ ἑστίν τῷ πατρὶ, οὐ συνάδελφος, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ γνήσιος ἐκ πατρὸς γεγεννημένος, φυσικὸς ὑπὸ, οὐ θετὸς, ὑπὸ ὁμούσιος τῷ πατρὶ, οὐ συνούσιος, ἀλλ’ ὁμούσιος, τούτοστιν οὐκ ἔξωθεν τοῦ πατρὸς γέννηθείς, ὡς τινες εἰρωνεῖα φέρονται θέσει θελόντες εἶναι τὸν ὑὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀληθεία, σύνεξαμος δὲ τῆς πίστεως ὁμούσιον λέγειν".  

9.β. "... ὅταν δέ τις ὁμούσιον λέγῃ, οὐκ ἀλλότριον τῆς αὐτῆς θεότητος σημαινεῖ, ἀλλὰ θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ τὸν ὑὸν "... "

10. ὁμούσιον ἡμῖν τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα,  

10-11.α. "... ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸν κύριον θεον λόγον ἀνθρώπων γεγονότα οὐ δοκήσει,
11. κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἦμιν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας.

ἀλλ’ ἀληθεία ... ἀπὸ τῆς ἤμων σαρκὸς ἀνέλαβεν ὁ Κύριος ἐλθὼν τὴν σάρκα καὶ ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν ἦμιν ὅμοιος ὁ θεὸς λόγος ... 21.

Β. "... αὕτε γὰρ ἔχον τὸν νοῦν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ, ὀπερ δὴν τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ εἶχεν, ὁ νοῦς ἐπεκτείνετο εἰς ἀλογοὺς ἐπιθέμιας ...". 22.

γ. "... αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχον τὰ διὰ (ἐνν. τὰ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον) κατείχε θεὸς ὡς μὴ μεριζόμενα πρὸς τὴν κακίαν, μὴ βρυπτόμενα ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ, μὴ ἀλισκόμενα ἐν τῇ ἡδονῇ, μὴ ὑποπιπτοῦσα τῷ τοῦ 'Αδάμ παραπτώματι" 23.

δ. "... πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἐνν. τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ) τελείως ἐλαβεν ... ὁ εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ πάσης ἐνανθρωπίσεως ἄνευ ἁμαρτίας ... " 24.

12. πρὸ αἰῶνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα

12.α. "... ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πατήρ, γεννήσας αὐτὸν ἡχόνως καὶ ἀνάρχως κατὰ τὴν θεότητα ..." 25.
13. ἐπὶ ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν

14. τὸν αὐτὸν δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν

15. ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα

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αἰτεπαρθένου καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπεῖαν ἄληθινῶς καὶ νοῦν ..." 32.

δ. "... γεννηθεὶς κατὰ σάρκα, ἐκ Μαρίας δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἁγίας παρθένου..." 33.

ε. "... ἔλαβε κατὰ κλήρον τὴν ἁγίαν παρθένον Μαρίαν, ἡς ἡς κατὰ σάρκα ἐγεννηθῆ 34
ο Ὀλυμπίος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ...

16. Ἐνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν υἱὸν κύριον μονογενῆ

17. ἐν δύο φύσεσιν

18. ἀσυγχύτως ἀγρέπτως ἀδιαίρετως

ἀκαταστάτως γνωριζόμενον,
19. οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορὰς ἀναπλάσασας ἀνθρωπον ... οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ οἴκησας, ὡς εἰσέθεν ἐν προφήταις λαλεῖν κατοικεῖν τε ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος σάρξ γενόμενος, οὐ τραπείς τοῦ εἶναι θεὸς, οὐ μεταβαλῶν τὴν θεότητα

20. σωζόμενης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ἱδιότητος εἰς ἀνθρωπότητα, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῇ ἱδιᾳ ἐκατέρας φύσεως πληρώματι τῆς αὐτοῦ θεότητος καὶ τῇ ἱδιᾳ ὑποστάσει τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐνυποστάτῳ συμπεριλαβών τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρωπος καὶ εἰ τί ἐστιν ἀνθρωπος ἀνθρωπον δὲ λέγω τέλειον (ἕχοντα) διὰ ἐν ἀνθρώπῃ καὶ οίᾳ ἐν ἀνθρώπῃ. 37

21. καὶ εἰς ἐν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης

22. οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον,

23. ἀλλ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν εἰς Χριστός, οὐ δύο Χριστοὶ οὐδὲ δύο θεοὶ.

μονογενὴς

24. Θεὸν Λόγον Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν,
The above harmony of the Epiphanian texts with the Chalcedonian Definition, which is quite remarkable, especially on certain cases, explains why the Synod accepted the Definition as an expression of the faith of the apostles and the fathers. Particularly significant at this point is the response of the Synod to the question of the Emperor Marcian: “... thus we all believe ... This is the faith of the fathers. This is the faith of the apostles. This is the faith of the Orthodox ...”(40). Epiphanius is clearly included among these fathers and so he is justly called “teacher of the catholic Church”(41).
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX

(1) The arrangement in verses was made by Ignatio Ortiz de Urbina S.J., in his study “Das Symbol von Chalkedon sein Text, sein Werden, seine Dogmatische Bedeutung”, *Das Konzil von Chalkedon, Geschichte und Gegenwart, Band I der Glaube von Chalkedon*, Wurtzburg (2nd ed) 1959, pp. 389-390.


(35) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 60, Holl 60: 3-4, PG 43: 124.
(36) From verse 16-27 we observe no corresponding parallelism of the Definition with texts from the Ancoratus. Yet, the sense of texts of St Epiphanius with that of parallel texts of the Definition presents a clear concurrence.
(38) Epiphanius, Ancoratus 80, Holl 80: 24ff, PG 43: 168.
(40) E. Schwartz, Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, ii,1,2, p. 115.
(41) J. Mansi, op.cit., xiii, 296.