The Management of Oppression: Focussing on relationships between refugees and the British state in Newcastle upon Tyne

(Tom Vickers, PhD thesis)

Abstract
This thesis uses an empirically informed Marxist analysis to investigate the role of interests, consciousness and unpaid activity of refugees and asylum seekers in shaping their relationships with the British state, including case studies from the city of Newcastle upon Tyne. I argue that antagonism between the British state and refugees from economically underdeveloped countries is rooted in capitalist relations of production, with Britain occupying an imperialist position. The thesis advances a novel perspective on ‘social capital’, understood as purposive and sustained forms of non-contractual engagement, with implicit norms and values. Social capital is ‘unmasked’ as a way of understanding and intervening in relations at an individual level, in order to influence change at a social level. I argue that the tendency of recent Labour governments’ policy has been to break up social capital formations among refugees which are seen as threatening, whilst actively cultivating formations which engage refugees on an individual basis, as part of managing their oppression. The thesis identifies contradictions and possibilities for resistance within this process, such as simultaneous tendencies for volunteering to contribute to more collective forms of identity and more individualised forms of action.

The multi-level research design explores processes connecting the individual to the global. Empirical data is used to interrogate and develop a theoretical framework which is rooted in classical Marxism, draws on insights developed within qualitative social research methods and anti-oppressive practice, and engages creatively with challenges from post-modernism and feminism. The methodology combines: theoretical research; secondary statistics and literature at an international level; interviews with key participants and archival research on local histories of migration and settlement, including three organisational case studies; four contemporary organisational case studies; and individual volunteer case studies based on semi-structured interviews and focus groups with eighteen refugees and asylum seekers.
The Management of Oppression

Focussing on relationships between refugees and the British state in Newcastle upon Tyne

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Dedicated to the lives and struggles of all those who are denied basic rights in Britain because of their country of birth or heritage. Together we are stronger.

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Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
Chapter 1 - Background and Rationale

This thesis offers a Marxist analysis of the relationship between refugees and the British state, drawing on empirical research conducted in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, a city in the north of England which received dispersed ‘asylum seekers’ between 1999 and 2010. Within this broad focus, particular attention is given to ways in which the state has managed, or failed to manage, the oppression of refugees. The programme of research, between 2007 and 2010, included gathering and analysis of a variety of empirical data, using a methodology described in Chapter 2. This chapter sets out the background to the research and the development of its focus, including the rationale for an engagement with both social capital theory and Marxism. The chapter concludes with definitions of key terms and an outline of the thesis structure.

The starting point for this research was that social work practice, as broadly defined by the International Federation of Social Workers (Appendix i), takes place at intersections of multiple influences and interests, which may at times contradict one another. Practitioners may be paid and qualified professionals. They may also be people engaged in a wide variety of voluntary roles, including political activism. While the resulting thesis is not about social work per se, it is about the broader context of social interventions of which social work is a part, and as such holds strong relevance for social work practice and research. Influences on practice may include state and other funders, projects and agencies, professional bodies, practitioners themselves, and those in whose lives they intervene, all with their own interests, values and goals. I situate myself as a practitioner guided by a Marxist understanding of society, as divided into classes with mutually irreconcilable interests. In my work, I aim to contribute to an internationalist and anti-oppressive programme of social justice. As such, one of my particular concerns has been the negotiation of practitioners’ dual role as both enactors of work roles which possess certain limits and whole social and political actors. By increasing understanding of the nature of this duality through research, I hoped to contribute to the potential for practitioners with anti-oppressive aims to make full use of the ‘creative space between the intentions and outcomes of policy’ (Shaw and Martin 2000: 403), in order to put some of the resources of the capitalist state at the service of working class interests. I decided to focus on an area where the tensions outlined above
are particularly acute at the present time; that of refugees working in the refugee sector.

Over the last ten years, people claiming asylum in Britain have been faced with a myriad of complex problems, frequently including backgrounds of trauma, abuse and health problems. These have been compounded within Britain by factors, mostly driven by the British state, including destitution, periodic detention, and the constant psychological stress of threatened deportation to situations of extreme danger. According to the values considered by many to be fundamental to professions such as social work, community development and youth work, this should call for urgent intervention. However, at the same time workers have increasingly found opportunities to make such interventions being closed to them. The policy approach of recent Labour governments has been characterised as a split approach, combining strategies of forceful assimilation with punitive segregation. This includes, in the case of asylum seekers, removal of rights to many mainstream welfare services, a prohibition on paid work, and forced dispersal across Britain (Humphries 2004: 101; Prior 2006: 7; also see Briskman and Cemlyn 2005). Despite enjoying greater formal freedom than statutory services, voluntary sector projects have also come under growing funding pressures in relation to work with asylum seekers (Fell 2004). It has been argued that social workers are not only providing inadequate support for migrants, but are increasingly playing “a role of constriction and punishment” (Humphries 2004: 93-4), and acting as gatekeepers separating vulnerable people from vital resources (Hayes 2005: 191-2). During a pilot study as part of a postgraduate dissertation (Vickers 2007), I became aware of the extent to which many refugee sector organisations rely on the labour of refugees as ‘volunteers’,¹ most of them currently classed as ‘asylum seekers’, and this helped to focus the research. Hardill et al. (2007: 397) suggest that volunteering holds particular significance in wider processes of social control and resistance, because it “is situated at, and builds bridges between, three levels: the community, the voluntary organisation and the individual”. This leant further utility to the focus on volunteering by refugees.

During initial interviews, the complexity of this situation became increasingly apparent. ‘Wanting to help’ was the most common motivation described by refugees for volunteering, but it was difficult to ascertain beyond a circumstantial level how and why
they had come to undertake a particular form of ‘helping’. This raised the fundamental question of the interrelationship between refugees’ individual and collective histories of migration and other experiences, the influence of class interests and other external forces, individuals’ consciousness or personal perspective and view of the world, and their actions. I realised that to understand this to any significant extent, I would require a greater appreciation of the context of individuals’ current actions in their broader life history and the interrelationships amongst a wide range of factors which had affected them both as they understood them and more objectively.

The central research question became: “What role have the interests, consciousness and unpaid activity of refugees played in shaping relations with the British state?”

Consideration of the researcher’s relationship to the research situation raises questions of whether there is good reason to do the research at all, and if so, who is an appropriate researcher (Lofland and Lofland 1995: 26-7). The latter question will be taken up in Chapter 2 as part of a discussion of reflexive research practice. In response to the former question, I acknowledge the importance of a critical approach, questioning whether further primary research is the best way to proceed in a given case, as opposed to, for example, a review. Likewise, where problems of disadvantage in access or outcomes have previously been established, it is important to consider how we can investigate why this has not been rectified, avoiding tokenism (Atkin and Chattoo 2006: 101). The importance of this is further increased in the case of research with ethnic minorities by the growing perception that, although some ethnic minority communities have participated extensively in research, they have seen very little benefit as a result (Culley, et al. 2007: 107).

I consider there to be good reason to do research in this area owing to the severity in both the situation of refugees in Britain and the contradictions between the values of social work and the role social workers have increasingly been expected to play in relation to refugees and asylum seekers. Understanding the responses made by refugees to their situation is vital to appreciating the human impact of government policies. As will be discussed in detail in later chapters, securing the cooperation of sections of refugees is vital to the effective ‘management’ of wider refugee populations
for the British state. It follows from this that activity by refugees themselves is also vital to overturning their oppression.

**Social capital theory and practice**

In addressing the central research question outlined above, I developed an appreciation of the significance of recent Labour governments’ use of the concept of ‘social capital’ as a framework for many of their interventions, including those with refugees (e.g. Home Office 2005b; Blair 2006; Brown 2006). Social capital has been characterised as an elastic, contested term, covering a range of positions and perspectives and relating to the mechanisms by which groups and individuals gain access to social and material resources (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 34). Previous consideration of social capital has often excluded protest movements and other conflictual mobilisations, which implicitly problematise the assumption in much social capital theory of a harmonious relationship between civil society and the state, and pose the question ‘social capital for whom and to what end?’ (Mayer 2003: 117-18). I therefore include consideration of such activities and draw comparisons with other forms of activity in the voluntary and community sector.

At a more sophisticated level, social capital theory may be understood as an analytical approach to relationships between individuals or groups, dealing with the aspect of society which James Coleman describes as the space between social structure and agency, or mechanisms “facilitating the actions of actors within the structure” (cited in Franklin 2007: 2). Coleman (1993: 6-7) locates social policy research and the programmes it informs within responses to changes in production and the organisation of society, and social capital interventions as a particular response to a progressive ‘erosion’ of ‘primordial institutions’ centred around the family in the most economically developed countries, and attempts to replace them with forms of ‘purposively constructed organisation’ aimed at maintaining social order. In addition to its relevance as a framework used by Labour governments over the recent period, this focus on the relationship of social actors, structure and historical agency gives social capital theory utility for this research, in particular its capacity to investigate relationships between social structures and networks and norms, including the way that norms and values may become “collective properties that transcend individual experiences” (Devine and
Roberts 2003: 94). This approach to social capital as inherently relational is most closely identified with Putnam (2000), but also resonates with the focus on specific social relations which underpins Marx’s labour theory of value and the concept of capital itself (Silva and Edwards 2003: 12).

A comprehensive survey of the history of social capital theory is beyond the scope of this thesis, and has been undertaken in some detail from a Marxist perspective at an earlier date by Fine (2001). While I engage in focused discussion of some elements of social capital theory, my main concern is with social capital practice, or the potential for social capital theory to effectively inform interventions to influence the processes it describes. Fine (2001: 25-9) makes the case that social capital theory implies the possibility of a capital that is not social, and that it therefore contradicts the Marxist understanding of capital as a particular set of social relations, and presents a picture in which class exploitation is stripped from understandings of capitalist production. I agree with Fine’s characterisation of capital, but argue for the utility of social capital as a distinct category, rather than a type of ‘capital’ in the Marxist sense. Combating the social capital theory and practice of the ruling classes requires more than merely abstaining from using their language, it requires engaging to strip their concepts and techniques of their progressive pretensions and placing them at the service of the working classes.

My particular approach to social capital theory has emerged from a critique of social capital discourse and practice by the state under Labour since 1997, and particularly between 1999 and 2010. Gesthuizen et al. (2008: 123) differentiate between social capital involved in formally constituted organisations and informal social capital, based around “social ties between individuals and their friends, families, colleagues and neighbours”. Owing to my interest in conscious interventions to shape social processes, I focus primarily on formalised social capital in the closely circumscribed area around the processes of refugees’ flight and settlement, whilst also remaining alert to the potential for these to interact with other formal and informal social capital formations.

Using the concept of social capital, within a perspective which places the interests of the working classes at its centre, calls for some radical rethinking of its theoretical
frameworks and their underpinning assumptions and class interests. For example, a particular construction of ‘trust’ occupies a key position in much social capital theory, implying a coincidence of interests between all sections of society. For Putnam (2000), trust serves to link ideas of civil society with rational choice theory, offering a measure of social cohesion and voluntary cooperation, and a cushioning of the conflicts arising from economic inequalities and social change. This presents a highly ordered, rational and consensual view of society, within which “anger, creativity, play, power, exploitation, discrimination, dissent, passion, boredom, commitment, love, betrayal, recognition, hatred and anxiety are strangely absent” (Franklin 2007: 4-5). What follows from this is a deeply de-contextualised and dehumanised account of the processes social capital tries to capture, as if to commodify relations outside the market. This distracts from the fact that social capital only exists in the interaction of human beings, and that human beings are diverse and unequal in interests, experiences, capacities, motives and more. Where the importance of context has been acknowledged (e.g. Furbey, et al. 2006), authors have generally still operated on the basis of social capital as having one fundamental character, but producing different outcomes depending on the context ‘it’ exists in, or the degree of access to, or possession of, social capital by different parties. I argue that more adequately capturing the particularities of different instances of social capital requires us to speak of ‘social capital formations’, defined as distinct, dynamic structures carrying particular dominant norms and values and involving particular groupings of socially embedded actors, who may occupy different positions within the formation in terms of influence and outcomes.

There is already a growing critique of arguments for the cultivation of trust and engagement between groups in different positions of power, sometimes termed ‘linking capital’, as not necessarily being to the benefit of less powerful groups, but serving instead to perpetuate forms of tokenism and dependency (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 33). Yet, empirical investigation of social capital from all perspectives has largely been limited to quantitative methods (e.g. Henn, et al. 2007; Gesthuizen, et al. 2008; Brunie 2009), such as compiling statistics on the number of new friends arising from volunteering and using a scale measure of the degree of trust in those friends (Antoni 2009: 362-3). Yet, formal generalisations about the nature and extent of social capital based on quantitative methods frequently fail to take account of the qualitatively
unique contradictions and problems of a specific context (Roberts 2004: 473). They may also miss the impact of particular formations on attitudes and relationships, such as the alienation identified in one piece of research between an activist network and the wider community, due to the network’s close connection to a ‘regeneration’ project which was seen to be promoting ‘workfare at the expense of welfare’ (Devine and Roberts 2003: 95-6). My own research therefore aimed to use qualitative methods to present new perspectives on the concept of social capital, to “open up its power and effect in politics to radical critique, and to explore empirically the salience of its ideas” (Franklin 2007: 1). In carrying this out, Marxism’s attention to concrete processes of power, oppression and struggle offered useful tools with which to critique Labour governments’ use of social capital theory.

Making the case for Marxism
The Marxist analytical method is at present largely marginal and discredited within Britain. From within a similar framework of social justice, many recent critiques of Marxism have adopted some variety of post-modernist approach. Yet, whilst post-modernist critiques emphasising the complex and contingent construction of identities and roles, in apparent opposition to a focus on class, may carry weight against cruder understandings of Marxism, which view class structures as simple and homogenous, they may be amply answered by a rediscovery and critical application of the Leninist framework. The fractured, individualised understanding of the world offered by many post-modernist accounts denies the possibility of conscious, organised action for change in a particular direction. As with various elitist and pluralist conceptions of power, prevalent post-modernist conceptions ignore the fact that social fragmentation, and lack of correspondence between any individual’s or group’s intentions and outcomes, does not imply an absence of discernible patterns of coherence in social development (Therborn 1980: 135-6), which, if understood, can be used to influence the direction of change.

Ager (2003: 3) views the role of social science as offering a potential bridge, between participant-centred accounts of individuals’ ‘lived experience’ and macro-analyses which address ‘political, social and cultural forces’. Marxism has much to offer in achieving this goal. The Leninist approach, that “Theory is tested by reality and its truth
is measured in its contribution to human control of nature and society” (Rayne undated), is deeply contextual, recognising that we all operate in sets of relations, which exist independently of, and prior to, our will (Marx [1859] 1971: 20-1). This offers a way out from the anti-positivist reaction, which has led many to engage in a total delinking of language and meaning from the objective and natural world (Hughes and Sharrock 1997: 143-68). Marxism offers the potential to overcome the dualism of subject and object, ideal and material, via a theoretical bridge between the actual and the ideal - or the future actual - including the necessary role of human action as part of this historical development (Plekhanov [1898] 1940: 17-19).

The central premises of Marxism, derived from empirical and historical study, are that people must produce in order to satisfy basic needs of survival, that the satisfaction of these needs leads to further needs, that people act to reproduce not only themselves but also their species, and that all of this activity is organised socially, depending on the means of production available (Marx and Engels [1845] 1991: 48-52). The Marxist analytic method involves an iterative movement from holistic and concrete living phenomena to a “number of determinant, abstract, general relations” and from there back to a more complex understanding of the living whole. Throughout this process, sight must be maintained of the primacy of the material whole, avoiding confusing the analytic process with the actual formation of concrete phenomena through the action of pre-existing and independent abstractions (Marx [1857] 1973: 100-2). In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin ([1895-1916] 1972) gives a more detailed explanation of this approach, in which science is conceived as an extension of the critique of immediate experience which “begins as soon as attention, thought is applied to it”:

“If the immediate given is represented by a point then, in order to obtain a picture of the real given, one has to imagine that this point is merely a projection of the straight line extending beyond it. This straight line can be broken up into several segments, each of which will embrace, without there being any impenetrable partitions between them, families of relations on which the immediate given depends.” (Lenin [1895-1916] 1972: 474)

This indicates the attention to complexity and interrelations which is central to the Marxist method I aim to apply here.
In contrast to understandings of social capital advocated by rational choice theorists such as Coleman (1993) and Putnam (2000), Marxism does not operate on the basis of ‘economic man’, with each individual assumed to be motivated purely by his own perceived material interest, but recognises that human beings operate on the basis of “diverse psychological motives”, yet are “unable to transcend the laws imposed by the economic substructure of their society”. Whilst motives may be diverse, outcomes are rarely as individuals intend, and the driving force of history does not necessarily coincide with what individuals perceive as the driving force of their motives (Kemp 1967: 14-15). Common misrepresentations of the materialist conception of history in the hands of social scientists have included the acknowledgement of ‘material factors’, but also their isolation, such as into social, political, economic and philosophical aspects, without viewing them in their totality. For example, Hardt and Negri repeatedly refer to Marxism (e.g. 2001: 325-6), but separate economics and politics into principles of ‘capital and sovereignty’, a dislocation completely contradictory to Marxist practice. In other cases, distortions of the Marxist approach have taken the form of crude economic materialism, which lacks a dialectical view and seeks and expects to find a direct economic motive or interest behind every phenomenon (Kemp 1967: 9-10). Marx argued that in order to understand a given society it is necessary to not only examine its subjects or structure, but also to analyse its processes of reproduction (Therborn 1980: 137), and this calls for a systemic view. “Everything is ... mediated, bound into One, connected by transitions [in a] law-governed connection of the whole (process) of the world” (Lenin [1895-1916] 1972: 103, emphasis in the original).

A Marxist analysis of racism

Any consideration of refugees in Britain today is forced to grapple with questions of racism. In developing an analysis of racism, the ‘race relations’ framework is misleading in that it takes as its starting point the idea of race, leading its proponents to address the experience of migrants in purely racial terms and to reify racial categories, rather than beginning from an examination of the material context, within which particular ideas and practices have taken hold and people have been categorised in particular ways (Lunn 1985: 1-2). This can lead to essentialised understandings of ‘race’ and a failure to grasp complex patterns of causation. For example, in the 1991 Census, 4.07 per cent of Newcastle’s population recorded an ethnicity other than ‘white’, and 4.54
per cent of residents were born outside of Newcastle. Yet, whilst ‘new commonwealth’ immigration is commonly associated with black immigration, 16 per cent of Newcastle residents who had been born in a new commonwealth country were white. Similarly, substantial proportions of those classified as ethnic minorities had been born in Britain, including 66 per cent of Black Caribbeans, 25 per cent of Black Africans, 45 per cent of Indians, 53 per cent of Pakistanis, 35 per cent of Bangladeshis, and 22 per cent of Chinese (ONS 1991). This suggests varied and complex patterns of migration between Britain and other parts of the world, which defy simplistic explanations, and refute racist stereotypes equating ‘black’ with ‘immigrant’. These patterns have become even more complex in recent years, with new patterns of migration, including significant numbers of migrant workers from Central and Eastern Europe (Spencer, et al. 2007), and refugees seeking asylum from countries in West Asia and Africa. This increase in diversity is such that a recent mapping exercise in another Northern city identified ninety-two different ethnic/national groupings, compared to just six or seven in the early 1990s (Craig, et al. 2010: 41).

The Marxist approach suggests that the relation of individuals and groups to capital - for example, the particular relationship arising from different categories and origins of migrant labour - may be more fundamental than particular racial categorisations, exerting a decisive influence in how they play out at a given point. Consideration of racism as a process within society as a whole necessarily ‘puts racism into history’, and points to potential alliances with other sections of society oppressed under the same structures (Kundnani 2007: 10-11). I will therefore be working with “the proposition that migration and the forces that produce and shape geographic mobility are also the forces that produce and reproduce class distinctions and differentiations in different locations” (Barber and Lem 2008: 6). This implies less significance for the particularities of dominant conceptions of race, whether through anatomy, culture or genetics, than has been suggested by some theorists (e.g. Gilroy 2001: 14-16). ‘Old’, ‘new’ and ‘post-’ racisms reflect complex shifts in ideological and material conditions, rather than fundamentally new phenomena requiring new theoretical frameworks. The dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin offers a framework for understanding such changes, accounting for structural determination as limiting the range of possible actions and producing outcomes through a dialectical interaction with human agency.
and reflection (Ruben 1977: 5-6; Creaven 2000). Particular traits and talents of individuals are held to have an impact on society, but only to the extent that they are able within their particular position in society, according to its organisation and balance of forces (Plekhanov [1898] 1940: 38-41).

Above all, Marxism is relevant and useful, one might also argue necessary, because the phenomena it exposes and critiques continue to hold a massive power over people’s lives. If we take as the definition of class “three processes underlying the social relations of production: control of labour power, control of the physical means of production and control of investment and resources” (Miles and Phizacklea 1980: 4), then British society is clearly still stratified along class lines, and there is clearly further stratification in the international economy. Theories are required in order to understand and navigate the struggles to which this situation gives rise. Since the turn of this century, but not the for the first time, prominent calls have been made within social work for contextual and international understandings of migration, as an antidote to the inadequacies of individualised models of anti-racist and anti-oppressive practice (Humphries 2004: 95), and professional bodies have made declarations of purpose sharing strong sympathies with revolutionary Marxist approaches to social change:

“Human rights and social justice serve as the motivation and justification for social work action. In solidarity with those who are dis-advantaged, the profession strives to alleviate poverty and to liberate vulnerable and oppressed people in order to promote social inclusion (International Federation of Social Workers, 2000)” (cited in Postle and Beresford 2007: 144)

In a similar vein, some anti-oppressive approaches have engaged in attempts to integrate localised practice “with a ‘globalist’ perspective which emphasises the role of multinational companies and the media in reinforcing ideas of cultural superiority” (Thompson and Betts 2003: 228). So far, however, this has largely been carried out in a vague and under-theorised way, when a massive body of relevant but ignored theory already exists in Marxism. It is necessary to reclaim this, in order to avoid the dangers pointed to by Butler (2000: 264-5), that in the absence of theory, political practice may lose its critical and dynamic edge, with certain areas becoming ‘off limits’ to interrogation. Conditions of deepening economic and political crisis are intensifying the contradictions involved in the relationship of the British state to international
movements of labour, provoking resistance and demanding an analysis as a guide to effective action. At the same time, the growing strength of national liberation and socialist movements, from Palestine to Nepal to Latin America, have begun to open up political and theoretical space for the development and proliferation of a Marxist understanding. This provides the rationale for the theoretical approach taken here.

**Definition of terms**

Discussion of migration, racism and anti-racism necessarily raises questions of the terms used to define people in a context where racialised categories are used to divide and oppress. The use of ‘colour-based terms’, such as ‘Black African’, is contested in Britain, both amongst and outside the people these terms aim to refer to. Some state that their use is outdated, unnecessary and offensive, while others argue for their retention in order to capture experiences associated with racism and power, which may be lost in terms which privilege cultural differences (Aspinall and Chinouya 2008: 187-8). In this thesis, I use a variety of terms. I use the term ‘black’ to refer to people who face specific oppression due to more constantly identifiable features by which people are ‘racialised’ in a particular social and historical context, such as skin colour or cultural or religious styles of dress. I include within the category of ‘ethnic minorities’ not only black people, but also those with pale skin who experience racialised oppression based around factors such as immigration status, accent or religion, such as recent migrants from Eastern and Central Europe. Where possible and relevant, I use more specific categories, such as country of origin or religion. This flexibility allows me to respond to the shifting and contingent nature of racialisation, in which aspects of diversity amongst ethnic minorities may be more relevant in some situations, and shared features of oppression as black people more prominent in others.

Throughout the last decade, the British state has made a sharp distinction between categories of ‘refugees’, who have secured some form of leave to remain in Britain, ‘asylum seekers’, whose cases are still being processed, and ‘failed asylum seekers’ whose cases have been refused. It is important to note that in practice there is considerable movement between the latter two categories, as cases are frequently refused but then appealed, and in some cases fresh claims are made based on new evidence or changed circumstances, but in many cases eventually also fail (Home Office
2010: 11-15). In some cases, there may also be movement to and from other categories of immigration status, and rather than a single, linear journey to seek refuge, there may be multiple movements across and within borders. Due to the inherent mistrust and stigmatisation which has become implicit in the term ‘asylum seeker’ (Dummett 2001), instead of the official definitions above, I use ‘refugee’ to encompass all those who have come to Britain seeking refuge, whatever the status currently accorded them by the British state (as does Williams 2006). On questions where legal status is necessary for proper understanding I specify, using ‘with status’ as shorthand for the various forms of leave to remain which have operated in Britain between 1999 and 2010. Where individuals or other sources are quoted, their terms are left intact. In the majority of these cases, ‘refugee’ is used to refer to someone who has secured leave to remain, and ‘asylum seeker’ to refer to those whose cases are still being processed. It is common usage to include in the latter term those whose cases have been refused, although this is not the legal definition.

**Structure of the thesis**

Following Chapter 2, which outlines the methodology, the thesis is divided into three sections, each of which focuses on a different level of abstraction. The separation between the levels of abstraction is not absolute, and where relevant I draw on evidence at other levels to problematise or expand understanding, such as quoting individual accounts of experiences arising from national legislation. Empirical findings are interwoven with theoretical material. This dialectical movement within the presentation of the findings aims to convey interrelationships between levels of structure and agency. The focus on relations between multiple levels creates limitations in the treatment of each level, however. For example, the analysis of British imperialism presented in the early chapters is largely based around the framework developed by Yaffe (2006) and associated writers. Whilst I have updated statistics in many cases and considered particular implications for the concerns of this research, there has not been scope to make any substantial theoretical developments, and some areas of the framework have received only cursory discussion. By contrast, the later chapters embark in novel directions, but could benefit from larger empirical datasets in order to test and further develop their theoretical proposals. This thesis should therefore be
read as an exploratory endeavour, aimed at opening up lines of enquiry, rather than a complete or conclusive treatment of all areas and levels discussed.

In the first section, Chapter 3 presents an analysis at the level of international processes of oppression and conflict, and considers consequences for international population movements, including refugees. The concepts of imperialism and the reserve army of labour are introduced and elaborated. Chapter 4 examines the position of ethnic minorities in Britain and the operation of racism at a local and national level. Key government policies are analysed for their impact on the social position of refugees, and this is related to their character as a section of the working classes which is breaking ‘norms’ of international divisions of labour under imperialism, in particular by seeking refuge regardless of demand for their labour and by threatening the geographical and social separation between workers of sending and receiving countries.

The second section operates at the level of institutions and other formalised organisations. Chapter 5 discusses the role and class basis of the British state and its historical relation to refugees. Differences are highlighted, between the British state and the state in refugees’ countries of origin, and consequences of these differences are considered, for refugees’ perceptions and responses to the British state. Empirical data on refugees’ experiences is then drawn on to investigate the role of repressive and welfare aspects in the state’s relationship with refugees. Chapter 6 begins to address how the state has managed these relationships at a national and organisational level through a discussion of its longer term relationship with black people in Britain, including discussion of processes of cooption and the creation of a black middle class. This is qualitatively illustrated with three local historical case studies drawing on empirical data. The more recent expansion of the refugee sector is then outlined, and two local contemporary case studies are used to illustrate some of the variety in the roles played by voluntary and community sector organisations, again based on empirical research.

The third section deals primarily with the level of individual consciousness and activity, drawing on accounts of refugees volunteering with four local organisations. Chapter 7 examines recent Labour governments’ interventions aimed at structuring individual
interactions, and adopts a form of social capital analysis to examine the motivations and outcomes involved in various forms of voluntary activity by refugees. Chapter 8 considers the potential for voluntary activity to ‘raise consciousness’ amongst refugees and lead to a qualitative change in both consciousness and activity, and weighs this against countervailing tendencies. The chapter concludes with local historical examples and a contemporary local case study which suggest the potential for social capital formations which are organisationally and politically independent of the state, and therefore capable of more adequately representing the interests of refugees.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis and draws together key implications and possible directions for further development.
Chapter 2 - A Qualitative Marxist Methodology

The process behind this thesis has combined theoretical research and analysis of primary and secondary empirical data. This chapter introduces the ethical and political perspective of the overall research methodology, including both general and particular questions, before outlining the research process and arising issues. The approach taken is part of wider recent developments in migration studies, which have included an increasing use of qualitative methods, an explicitly committed research position involving “an intrinsic transformative social justice agenda, one which does not take the nation-state and its interests at face value and as a point of departure”, the consideration of ethnicity as just one of multiple axes around which migrant mobilisations may occur, and a broad conception of ‘the political’ (Però and Solomos 2010: 11-12).

Ethics and politics
Ethical questions of what the researcher should do and political questions of the researcher’s relationship to others cannot be separated. As producers of knowledge, researchers have the potential to codify myths into “unquestionable certitudes”, thus defending the status quo and sections of society that it privileges, or instead to “criticise” and “imagine other possibilities”, presenting critical spaces for change (Guanche 2007: Parts V-VI). It is therefore impossible to separate knowledge from power and politics from culture (ibid. Part II). No particular method can be relied upon to navigate this minefield and arrive safely at empowering or emancipatory outcomes (Wood, et al. 1999: 164-5), and the utility of ‘ethical canons’, embodied in codes of ethics, in solving concrete questions has been subject to debate (Sjoberg 1967: xi-xii). What is needed is a research practice driven by broader values and an epistemology which informs how methods are employed and is not ‘purely technical’, but reflects back on the purposes of knowledge and who it is produced for (Althusser 1969: 171).

Reflexive and committed research
The methodology was driven by the political and ethical objective to increase the potential for human freedom by contributing to a complex understanding of the world. Lenin ([1909] 1970: 156-7) suggests that the difference between nature and human
society lies not in the absence of causal laws in the latter, but in the potential for human beings to become conscious of them and therefore able to use them to transform the world. This is based on an ontological view of a succession of levels of causes, from the general cause of the development of the productive forces, to the particular causes of historical circumstances, to the ‘accidental’ causes of individual actions, each impacting within a scope of different degree. To the extent that we understand the relationship between these spheres, we are able to influence the course of history:

“If I know in what direction social relations are changing owing to given changes in the social-economic process of production, I also know in what direction social mentality is changing; consequently, I am able to influence it. Influencing social mentality means influencing historical events. Hence, in a certain sense, I can make history, and there is no need for me to wait while “it is being made.”” (Plekhanov [1898] 1940: 58-61, emphasis in original)

As workers engaged in the critique, development and propagation of knowledge, researchers have a responsibility to reflect on the implications and impact of their work.

There is a tendency to regard as ‘objective’ that which fits dominant vocabulary and values, such as Eurocentric accounts in apartheid South Africa (Van den Berghe 1967: 194). The liberal Weberian ideal of the objective and autonomous researcher (Weber [1904] 1949) has been given additional credence by Cold War demonisations of the “committed intellectual” as a “child of collectivist totalitarianism” (Guanche 2007: Part.VI). Similar tendencies have been noted within social work, where a liberal commitment to individual freedom has frequently operated in the absence of any consideration of “societal flaws that are fundamental barriers to individual freedom” (Ahmad 1993: 44). Yet, by necessity of their existence as part of society, researchers are embedded in particular sets of relations and struggles, and will inevitably identify more with the perspectives and interests of some sections of society than others (Colvard 1967: 338-40). Therefore, I make no claims to the objective or neutral nature of this research, but aim to offer an honest and reflexive approach, which will support the reader in contextualising the research and engaging critically with my analysis.

The Marxist understanding of the relationship between material social divisions and ideas makes clear that there is no such thing as ‘objective’ knowledge, but rather
different kinds of knowledge beneficial or dangerous to the interests of different classes, whose members possess different capacities to propagate their kind of knowledge (Marx and Engels [1845] 1991: 64; Bukharin [1921] 1969: 9-10). This highlights the danger of uncritically accepting the account of any individual. Yet, in reflecting on Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, Lenin ([1895-1916] 1972: 98,130) points out that individual perceptions are also objective, in that they comprise an aspect of the objective world, overcoming artificial divisions of subjective and objective: “the movement of a river - the foam above and the deep currents below. *But even the foam* is an expression of essence!” (Lenin [1983-1923] 1972: 130). By openly articulating a perspective based on the experiences and interests of an oppressed and often ‘silenced’ - or more accurately ignored - section of society such as refugees, I aim to contribute to a fuller and more collective understanding of the world, in what Sandra Harding describes as a “strong objectivity”, which, to be fully realised, must be accompanied by a “strong reflexivity” and a “strong method” (Hirsh and Olson 1995).

My commitment to anti-oppressive practice extended to reflecting on my own material, professional and political relationship to the research and participants, and on my emotional responses, safety and health (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000: 127-8). Whilst I am an anti-racist activist involved on a day-to-day basis in actions against racism, in the recent period particularly in relation to refugees, I am at the same time a middle-class, white man on the privileged side of many aspects of oppression in contemporary Britain. Significant elements of this relative privilege include my British citizenship, acquired by accident of birth, which means I do not have to assert my right to remain in Britain, and my ethnicity, which means I do not face racism in the same way as ethnic minorities and in many cases am able to pass with an ‘invisible’ ethnicity as part of the ‘white’ norm (McLean and Campbell, 2003: 57). The impacts of occupying such a position, in contradiction to those in a more oppressed location, are not simply overridden by a subjective and practical commitment to struggle alongside them. My decision to commit to struggle alongside refugees, by participating in anti-deportation campaigns and demonstrations for example, involves an element of risk, but implicitly includes the potential for me to withdraw from these areas of activity, whilst refugees would continue to be implicated whether they chose to engage or not. It was therefore important to attempt to maintain a critical and reflexive attitude towards my own part
in the research, and in particular face-to-face interactions such as interviews, and to maintain openness to the possibility that I may unintentionally engage in racist, sexist or other oppressive attitudes or actions. As Ahmad (1993: 3) points out, good intentions are not always enough. In order to aid such consideration and approve the accountability of the research, I invited participants to a focus group during the last stages of writing up, where I presented the main conclusions of the research for comment, as discussed further below.

I had also intended to establish an advisory group of refugees working in the refugee sector, for additional verification and accountability to the target group. An initial meeting took place with two workers, at an early stage of the research process, where they had input on the initial development of the theoretical framework. However, an increasing overlap between the individuals I had hoped to involve in the advisory group and as participants in other aspects of the research made the continuation of a separate group unfeasible. With hindsight, it may have been more effective to establish the advisory group with individuals from another city, in order to avoid overlap and combine the expertise of workers in the same field with the critical distance of individuals removed from the immediate research setting.

**Relationships with research participants**

The empirical element of the research included interviews and focus groups with refugees and a range of other practitioners and managers. I was conscious of the duty to enable participation (SRA 2003: 37), deepened by my ethical and political standpoint, and was therefore prepared to non-confrontationally challenge oppressive practices where necessary, even where this questioned societal or organisational norms, or elements of my own practice. Efforts were made to balance the individual rights of participants against the interests of wider society, whilst taking into account the contested nature of these interests (SRA 2003: 15). The ‘Statement of Ethical Practice’ of the British Sociological Association (BSA 2002) and the ‘Ethical Guidelines’ of the Sociological Research Association (SRA 2003) were consulted and formal ethical approval was obtained from a university ethics committee in order to ensure professionally agreed standards of conduct and to avoid ‘endangering the field’ by
deterring participants from co-operating with future research (SRA 2003: 22-4; completed ethics forms are included as Appendices ii-v).

Further ethical and political issues relating to the contested nature of knowledge arose, which were particular to this research context and my subjective position. Researchers in any setting have limited power to define their role in participants’ eyes (Van den Berghe 1967: 189-90). My involvement in campaigning against racism in the case city increased the potential for participants to have prior knowledge of me. This may, for example, have influenced refugees to give me answers they thought I wanted to hear, if they perceived me as someone who had helped them in the past. In addition, I was conscious of the heightened potential for participants not fluent in English, or who had recently arrived in England, to have misleading understandings of the consequences of research for them, such as expectations that participation may be linked to continuing or additional receipt of services (Culley, et al. 2007: 110).

Together, these issues increased the importance of methodological rigor and transparency, and clarification of issues of power, including my intentions and my relationship to the British state, which has great power over refugees’ future (McSpadden 1998: 152-4). Following a series of acts, reports and court rulings, it is particularly important to qualify commitments to confidentiality before obtaining consent, and ensure that this is fully understood (Dominelli and Holloway 2008: 1014-15). Introductory letters and verbal explanations were given to managers and individual participants, and signed consent was taken following discussion and opportunities for questions, in an attempt to ensure an understanding of the purposes and limits of the research, including limits to the control of participants over future uses of the data (SRA 2003: 16; Temple and Moran 2006: 203; Appendices vi-viii give examples). This was informed by an ethical commitment to a programme of social justice, which called for attention to the implications for not only the immediate research participants, but all refugees and wider society. This led me to be prepared to balance the views of participants against the potential wider impacts of the research when considering dissemination. In Bowes’ (1996) reflections on a piece of action research in Glasgow, she highlights some of the contradictions and limitations in the degree of control allotted to participants, with researchers at times using their ‘power to disempower’ in
pursuit of emancipatory objectives. This was exemplified in the work Bowes reports, by workers opposing some members of the management committee and local community, who did not support the specific provision sought by some Asian women, and by workers restricting use of project resources by anyone engaged in openly racist behaviour. In my own research, I aimed for a relationship of honesty and effective communication with participants, avoiding exaggeration of the degree to which participants were ‘in control’ of the research, whilst making it clear that they could withdraw at any time and that all comments were welcome. Understanding and communication between researcher and participants were supported by invitations to participants during interviews to suggest extra questions or to ask the reasons behind any questions (Frankenberg 1994: 29-30). Checks were made throughout for ongoing consent, and opportunities were raised to make it easier for participants to withdraw if they wished.

I was conscious of the likelihood of backgrounds of abuse and trauma, the marginal and disempowered positions of many refugees within British society, and the potential for research with minority populations to bring to the fore latent frustrations and aspirations (Moore 1967: 225; Krulfeld and MacDonald 1998: 25). I therefore ensured that emotional debriefing and support were available within case projects or from other relevant organisations following interviews and focus groups. I was equally aware that, in order to address the key issues facing refugees, it would be necessary to open up discussion for participants to raise issues of importance to them, even where this may cause distress (Temple and Moran 2006: 204). As the research was conducted across a multitude of cultural differences, the potential for harm was further compounded by my potential lack of understanding of what would cause or constitute harm for all participants, whether psychologically, socially or politically. For example, in the simple case of different norms of demonstrating emotional distress, I could have passed a point at which a researcher with greater understanding would have discussed with the participant whether to stop the interview or signpost to other sources of support (Fontes 1997: 304-6). This called for respect towards participants to set their own boundaries.
I aimed for a culturally sensitive approach, including: cultural awareness, reflecting on my own culture and how it related to cultures of research participants; cultural knowledge, whilst avoiding essentialist reductions of individuals to cultural factors; and cultural sensitivity, centred around viewing participants as genuine partners in the research process (Papadopoulos 2006: 83-7). Prior to and alongside the research, I have developed a general awareness of cultural issues relating to some relevant national groups through voluntary campaigning with a wide range of refugees since 2005. Other potentially important aspects of understanding included cultural factors relating to the refugee situation and experience, which cut across national groups and, in some cases, may be more relevant than factors such as country of origin, ethnicity, religion or language (Aspinall and Chinouya 2008: 190-1). I responded to possible deficiencies in my understanding by paying attention to the ways in which participants presented themselves in interviews, as well as the content of what they said, and by asking for clarification where necessary on the contextual meaning of metaphors or examples. Information was also provided to all participants on how to contact my supervisor with any concerns that they felt uncomfortable raising with myself.

**Research design**

Particular analytic tools may be useful, but offer little without an overall strategy (Yin 2003: 109-11). Much of the scholarship on migrants’ collective action has addressed it in the abstract and at the macro level, failing to include the perspectives of migrants themselves (Però 2008: 76). Neglecting migrants’ agency, attempts have been made to explain migrants’ actions through one or another mechanistic structural cause, avoiding further investigation (Però and Solomos 2010: 7-8). In an attempt to overcome these limitations, the research sought to identify insights arising from individual accounts that shed light on wider processes and collective agency. Whilst I appreciate the value of calls to ‘respect the other’ in order to ‘give voice to the oppressed’, it would appear that if oppression is to be not only voiced but overturned, an approach is needed, which uses theory to move beyond a simple collection of subjective views (Ager 2003: 17-18). A focused biographical approach was combined with literature and statistical data on the broader material context and relations between class forces, which influence but are not encapsulated in any single subjective experience. Whereas within approaches such as interpretivism, personal understanding and representations may be viewed as
ends in themselves; within this research personal accounts provided a means to understand the interrelationship of material interests, consciousness and action.

Data was sought at a variety of levels. The overall framework was informed by existing theory, viewed as the embodiment of the ‘dead labour’ of previous analysis of empirical data, particularly by those working in Marxist traditions. An important source for this was a political newspaper, *Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism!*, produced on a bi-monthly basis since 1979 and containing regular theoretical articles. While not an academic source, this newspaper represents a relevant body of theory, developed over a period of decades and peer-reviewed by an editorial board accountable to a wider organisation. The near-total absence of a Leninist trend within recent Western academia made such a source of theoretical material particularly necessary for the development of my work. The level of international and national contexts, unsurprisingly, afforded the greatest wealth of secondary data relating to the research topic, and this was drawn on together with primary and secondary data on local history, and primary data on individual perspectives and experiences. Data from these different levels was used to interrogate and cast new light on one another, in order to illuminate the interplay between systemic and structural influences, mass social processes, and individual and collective experience, consciousness, activity and outcomes.

Whilst policy makers often prefer quantitative methods, on the assumption that results produced can be more easily generalised, “the simple responses required by quantitative approaches can iron out some of the uncertainties and complexities of real life” (Ruhs, et al. 2006: 3-4). Full understanding of the impacts of policies requires methods which can go beyond such ‘smoothed’ understandings, to take account of structures and patterns of power and conflict. I have drawn on a range of qualitative techniques not commonly associated with Marxist research, in particular the case study approach and aspects of biographical research, drawing on ‘insider’ perspectives of those subject to policies in order to problematise their impact and underlying ‘outsider’ assumptions (Atkin and Chattoo 2006: 99-100). Whilst largely developed within epistemological traditions very different to Marxism, these techniques offer tools with which to examine the fine detail of processes of power and agency, which are a central
concern of this research, and are open to combination due to their inherently interdisciplinary nature, although not without tensions (Riessman 1993: 1).

Marxist analyses of racism have often been conducted at a theoretical or macro level, emphasising contradictions and struggles, but saying little about human agency or racism as it is experienced (Solomos 1992: 102). Yet Marx himself says of his method that its “premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions”, and that “Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification or speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production” (Marx and Engels [1845] 1991: 46-8). Similarly, Lenin recognised the need for continuous examination and analysis (Kemp 1967: 3-4). Due to the complex and contradictory nature of the phenomena he was trying to analyse, he made no claims to the finality or completeness of his analysis, even for the period in which he was writing (ibid.: 84-5). The essence of the Marxist method calls for attention to contingent and contextual patterns of causation, and rigorous empirical examination, not only of the structural basis of phenomena, but of the processes by which these lead to particular outcomes. To abstain from such examination, and merely infer causation from structural roots, would indeed be ‘mystification and speculation’. Furthermore, as individuals seeking to impact on the world, these social forces are mediated for us by other individuals who compose them. To be of practical use, Marxism therefore requires a systematic understanding of the complex relationship between individuals and mass social forces. Qualitative interviews offer a way of “relat[ing] global forces and intellectual currents to personal experiences (by way of interviews) and their impact on families and communities” (Sivanandan in Kundnani 2007: vii). By combining qualitative techniques with existing literature and quantitative data, the design thus allowed for the exploration of factors operating at global, social and personal levels in order to analyse the interaction between these layers (Ager 2003: 13).

There have been many Marxists who have engaged in systematic qualitative methods and the use of case studies.² Case studies offer to Marxist understandings the opportunity to closely examine processes at work, including human agency, and so overcome tendencies to view human beings as mere ‘passive puppets’, jerked by the
strings of their social position and conditioning (Creaven 2000: 109). This shares much in common with some black feminist perspectives, which move beyond both crude materialism and idealism to call for attention to the “relationship between a Black women’s standpoint - those experiences and ideas shared by African American women that provide a unique angle of vision on self, community, and society - and theories that interpret these experiences” (Hill Collins 1990). Beyond this micro level, the embedded case study approach lends itself to an understanding of society as neither a simple collection of elements nor a static, dehumanised structure, but as a ‘real aggregate’ system of elements mutually interacting over a sustained period, and with the potential for systems within systems (Bukharin [1921] 1969: 84-7).

In the particular case of this research, the nature of the total refugee population in Britain as a ‘hidden population’, for whom researchers lack even basic overall data, makes the construction of a robust sampling frame impossible, limiting the utility of purely statistical methods and increasing the relevance of case studies (Esterhuizen 2004: 10). Against accusations that the case study approach is a ‘soft option’, lacking rigor, objectivity and generalisability (Yin 2003: 10-11), there is a powerful argument that the real ‘hard scientific’ approach to social questions is that which engages in an iterative process of reflection and action in and on the world, in an “eternal, endless approximation of thought to object” (Lenin cited in Ruben 1977: 144), producing claims to practical verifiability, which more detached ‘social sciences’ lack (Greenwood and Levin 1998: 56). The case study approach lends itself well to such an engaged approach. Case studies in the form of anecdotes and illustrations are regularly used in ‘common sense’ processes of understanding and presenting the world, and are therefore accessible to a wide range of audiences (Esterhuizen 2004: 6).³ This contributes to case studies’ ability to motivate change, by ‘bringing to life’ what may seem abstract and distant issues and demonstrating the human consequences of particular policies and practices (ibid.: 22).

The use of multiple case studies, both at the level of organisations and that of individual volunteers, allowed for cross-case analysis, increasing the potential for verifiability and generalisations (Yin 2003: 53-4; Robson 2005: 183). An attempt was made to embed the case studies within existing literature, in order to increase the relevance and usefulness
of the research, and to employ a design that would “address important theoretical considerations that [would] yield important new ideas” (Yin 2004: xiv-xv). The combination of four contemporary case studies with local historical research enabled the research to draw on both the advantage of being able to ask the respondent what they meant by particular terms, references or explanations, allowing them to be part of the process of ‘unpacking’ the text (Riessman 1993: 32), and that of developing a view of longer term patterns and trends.

In attempting to strengthen the case study approach, it was necessary to consider internal validity, construct validity, external validity and reliability (Yin 2003: 33-9). Internal validity was strengthened by cross-case analysis; construct validity was enhanced by the use of multiple sources of data, participant review of findings and the explicit operationalisation of measures; external validity through attempted replication between multiple cases and between empirical data and existing research; and reliability through systematic recording and reporting of methods and sources. In addition to the impact of theory and the technical assumptions it informs on research findings (Irvine, et al. 1979: 214-15), the personal qualities of the researcher were of particular importance owing to the case study approach’s constant interaction between data collection, theoretical issues and analysis. I engaged in reflection and skills auditing on the key qualities identified by Yin (2003: 58-9), including asking useful questions, being a good listener, adapting to take up unexpected opportunities, having a firm grasp of relevant issues and remaining unbiased by preconceived notions, taking action where necessary to develop these.4

**Sampling**

In considering the historical context, the focus was on the period since 1962, as the Immigration Act of that year marked a key turning point in more stringent controls on migration (Williams 1992: 164). The ‘recent period’ has been taken to refer to the period of Labour governments starting in 1997, and particularly since the key policy changes in asylum and immigration in 1999, and ending with Labour’s defeat in the 2010 General Election. The recent change of government provides a useful analytical standpoint here, from which to survey the distinctive approaches which the state pursued over thirteen years of Labour government.
In order to increase the focus and practical relevance of the research, the city of Newcastle-upon-Tyne was used as a case study, both for practical reasons of close proximity to my home, and as a city that has experienced varied migration over different periods, including being the first city in Britain to make a bid to receive ‘dispersed’ refugees while their applications were processed. Attention was paid to the mostly ‘unwritten’ local history of immigration, racism and anti-racism in the case city, guided by the understanding that the history of anti-racism is not a neat, linear progression, but varies geographically and is shaped not only by political action and academic debate, but also by social and economic forces (Bonnett 2000: 145-6). This aimed to include an appreciation of the distinctive identity of Tyneside, contributed to by the area’s physical isolation, with “the Cheviot Hills to the north, Pennines to the west, North Sea to the east and a great swathe of farmland between the north east of England and Yorkshire”, and the area’s longstanding deprivation relative to other parts of Britain, alongside severe inequalities between different areas of the region itself (Robinson 1988: 189-6). Material for this historical research was identified primarily from searches of several local archives and libraries, council and institutional reports and minutes, Census data, and interviews undertaken between 2005 and 2010 with twelve professionals possessing a range of relevant knowledge and experience of the area, including data from interviews conducted as part of an undergraduate dissertation (Vickers 2005), but re-analysed as part of this research.

During an initial survey of the above sources, a mapping exercise was conducted of all projects and agencies over this period demonstrating direct and focused involvement in practical work with ‘race’ and ethnicity. This produced a list of sixty-two organisations, agencies and other bodies, although due to the localised, unreported and, in many cases, transitory nature of many such organisations, the actual figure is likely to have been considerably higher. These were grouped into state, voluntary and community sectors, although in some instances this distinction was blurred, such as voluntary sector organisations funded to a large extent by the state. Local campaigning organisations were grouped with the community sector. In general terms, eleven were directly part of the state, twenty-three were part of the voluntary sector and thirty-one were part of the community sector. Owing to the focus of the research on the
boundaries and intersections between the state and civil society, those fully part of the state were excluded, such as the local authority’s Asylum Seeker Unit and the local office of the National Asylum Support Service (NASS). A purposive sample of three historical examples from the 1970s and 1980s was identified for a limited amount of further investigation, on the basis that they provided well-developed examples of wider historical trends, including between them close partnerships with the state, explicit opposition to the state, and more ambiguous positions. These were Newcastle/Tyne and Wear Community Relations Council (CRC), the Campaign for Black Direction (CBD) and the Black Youth Movement (BYM). 5

In order to compare different forms of action undertaken by refugees, four further organisations were selected from the mapping exercise as a purposive sample of contemporary case studies. Within each case organisation, individual interview participants were considered as embedded cases. Sales (2002: 469-71) groups the main types of organisations working with refugees in the recent period into refugee agencies, charities, churches, legal and advice agencies, campaigning organisations and refugee community organisations. The main criteria for inclusion as case organisations were that between them they represented a range of relationships to the state but were all formally independent, that between them they covered a range of activities, and that they had all existed for more than two years and were still in existence in 2008. Cases were also sought on the basis that they were representative of a more general trend. The selection of projects occupying a range of positions along a continuum from heavily state-influenced to overt opposition to the state opened the possibility both for points of replication and contrast between cases (Yin 2003: 46-53). Case organisations are indicated by anonymised acronyms: VOL, CHUR, COM and CAMP (see Appendix ix for case summaries). Contextual interviews about the organisations were conducted with five individuals in management roles across the four projects, three of whom were also refugees. Organisational literature, such as annual reports and, in some cases, volunteer records, was sought from these individuals.

Significant differences amongst refugees have been found to include relationships to countries of origin, employment and educational backgrounds, family support within Britain, gender, and age (Cowen 2003: 25; Centrepoint 2004; Griffiths, et al. 2005: 17-
Unpaid practitioners from each case organisation were selected for the first round of interviews, in discussion with managers, in an attempt to cover where possible a range of ages, genders and regions of origin (see Appendix x for a breakdown of participants’ attributes). The range of occupational and educational backgrounds was limited by the predominance of individuals from professional backgrounds amongst refugees who volunteer (WLRI 2005: 34), and the range of all factors was limited at some projects by the small number of refugees volunteering there. This imposed limits on the extent of generalisation from the findings to all refugees in Newcastle, as those engaged in organised voluntary activity are, by definition, amongst less isolated refugees. The strength of the sample is that it offered insights into experiences and views amongst a cross-section of refugees engaged in public activity, who may thereby exert greater influence on the wider situation of refugees than less engaged individuals, including playing key roles in the management of oppression and resistance.

Following preliminary analysis of the first round of interviews, including production of a case summary for each participant, a second round of interviews was conducted with the intention of enabling a more in-depth understanding of a sub-sample of participants across all case organisations. This was possible with participants from all of the organisations except for VOL, where, owing to the greater length of time since the original interviews, it was not possible to make contact with any of the original participants. However, an additional focus group had been conducted with this group at the time of the first interviews, and this was used to supplement the data from the individual interviews. Two of the original participants from each of the other organisations were interviewed a second time, producing a total sample of eighteen refugee volunteers, six of whom were interviewed twice, four of whom took part in a focus group including volunteers from VOL, and four of whom took part in a mixed focus group including volunteers from CHUR, CAMP and COM. This produced transcripts of a total of twenty-four individual interviews and two focus groups, in addition to the background interviews described above with five managers and twelve other professionals.
Data collection

Data collection methods responded to the wide range of variables and the complexity of interrelationships under consideration, with triangulation between data sources (Yin 2003: 13-14). The unobtrusiveness of quantitative data from sources such as organisational reports and Census data, and qualitative data contained in archives, was combined with the ability for targeted and in-depth qualitative enquiry in interviews and focus groups (Yin 2003: 86). Secondary data was gathered through online searches, from case organisation managers, through physical and database searches of the local history sections of three local libraries, a library archive and a museum archive, and through consultation with the Research and Information Services division of Newcastle City Council. Newspaper reports relating to race, ethnic minorities and diversity were drawn from thematic cuttings archives held in the main city library archive. Local newspapers were used because of their coverage of local events, representing, in many cases, the only written source, with the additional advantage of enabling a focus on the action of social movements, as well as their organisation (Earl, et al. 2004: 65-6). Issues this created for the reliability of the data are discussed under data analysis.

The first round of individual interviews used a semi-structured approach with a guide list of questions intended to prompt reflection (Appendix xi). This recognised both the importance of personal narratives in “locat[ing] the narrators as well as their experiences in the social context of their everyday lives” (Essed 1991: 3-4), and the important knowledge of the asylum system and refugee sector gained by participants through their own experience, both as refugees and volunteers (Temple and Moran 2006: 204). This also responded to the ethical commitment to expanding human freedom and agency, by attempting to overcome the instrumentalism prevalent in current policy approaches towards refugee volunteering and employment, which has frequently neglected the views of refugees themselves (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 200).

Second round interviews began with an exercise in which participants were asked in advance to imagine that they were writing a book about the story of their life so far, and to consider how they would structure and name its chapters. This took inspiration from a similar exercise, which was used at the end of interviews in research by the WLRI (2005). The structure provided by participants in response to this exercise was used to
invite narratives on particular sections of participants’ lives, which they had highlighted as important, and in particular on the periods of transition between ‘chapters’. This was also used to locate participants’ present activities in relation to the historical context and struggles they had been part of before coming to Britain, under the consideration that these histories may have been as relevant, if not more so, for an individual’s responses than the local historical context of Newcastle.

The mixed focus group was used partly in order to feed back initial findings for participant review, and partly to generate further data of a different kind, with the potential to produce both more critical accounts than individual interviews alone (WLRI 2005: 17-18), and insights into collective constructions of meanings (Culley, et al. 2007: 104). The focus group was also intended to provide a forum for linking discussion of the issues raised to possible actions in response, using mutual storytelling in the tradition of social movements to name people’s injuries, establish solidarity and develop collective solutions (Riessman 1993: 4). The focus group began with a presentation, which aimed to draw out the major emerging themes (for slides see Appendix xii), following which I facilitated an open discussion, in which participants readily took a lead in structuring the discussion in line with the areas of my findings they considered a priority for debate. This began with the kinds of voluntary activity engaged in by refugees, followed by the role of the refugee sector, before progressing to the wider relation of refugees to the British state. In practice, while the focus group provided some useful additional insights, the length of time since the original interviews contributed to a situation in which all participants had moved on from their earlier forms of activity, leaving little scope for implementation of findings. In addition, given my priority to be accountable to all refugees, a more robust check for validity may have been achieved through a focus group with refugees who had no involvement as volunteers, although by the time this became apparent a further focus group with new participants would have been beyond the scope of the research.

In data collection, Clark (2006) cautions against a ‘blanket anonymisation’ at the earliest opportunity, and calls for careful reflection on whether ethnicity characteristics of individuals, which could lead to identification, should be left intact where it may be part of necessary contextual understanding in data archiving, even if they are withheld in
publication. While names were removed at the stage of transcription and storage (SRA 2003: 25-6), potentially relevant attributes including organisation, age, gender, country of origin and year of arrival in Britain were retained in the data for analysis, and have been selectively included in the text alongside quotations where this can contribute to understanding without endangering anonymity. Given the small number of participants, in order to preserve anonymity a limited number of contextual attributes are given alongside any quotation (aggregates of key attributes are given in Appendix x to help the reader in contextualising particular quotations).

Data analysis

Analysis of interview and focus group transcripts took a biographical approach, in which the meaning of text was considered in its context, relating the smallest part to the largest whole, from single words and gestures, to exchanges in the interview situation, to relationships between interviewer and interviewee, to life histories of the two parties, to all relationships of their type, to the structure of the whole society and all relationships. This was intended to allow an appreciation of perspectives and self-representations in the present to be located in the context of a point in personal, interpersonal, social and global historical development (Wengraf 2000: 141-4). Concretely, this meant relating particular experiences or views expressed by individual refugees to the broader history of their life and the wider context, including their position in British society, their relation to the state and the organisation they were volunteering with, relations between their country and Britain, and relations between themselves, the state and other forces in their country of origin.

I was wary of the danger in analysing extended text of being overwhelmed and consequently grasping at conclusions which were overly-simplified or based on only part of the data (Miles and Huberman 1994: 11). As part of the process of coding the first round of interview transcripts, I therefore produced a case-level display for each case, grouping insights and quotations into key analytic themes arising from the literature and empirical data. The data from the case-level displays was then sorted, and summaries were entered into a case summary table. This was used to conduct a cross-case analysis, producing a partially-ordered meta-matrix, which identified emerging sub-categories and illustrative quotations within each theme (Miles and Huberman
1994: 177-82; see Appendices xiii-xiv for table layouts and selected examples). This thematic structure was then entered into Nvivo software and used to recode all transcripts. A thematic group emerged from this analysis, concerning the relation of participants’ volunteering to longer-term trajectories of activity in their life, for which the data from the first round of interviews did not provide adequate answers. This informed the direction of questions as part of the second round of interviews. Data from the second round of interviews was coded in Nvivo using the thematic structure developed by the analysis of the first round of interviews and supplemented with additional themes emerging from the second round (see Appendix xv for the finished thematic structure). One theme which emerged particularly strongly was the way in which refugees helped and drew upon one another for support. The use of social capital theory offered a route to consider this at a higher level of abstraction, repeatedly returning to individual cases in order to both develop a deeper understanding of these cases and develop social capital theory in new directions. Cross-case analysis between participants was supported by the construction of ‘life-trajectory’ timelines, plotting individuals’ movement between different forms of voluntary activity, defined by a combination of four categories of state, voluntary sector, community sector, and politically-based activity, and a conception of that activity by the participant as representing a predominantly individual or collective strategy (a rough representation of these timelines is given in Appendix xvi). These definitions were constructed on a ‘best fit’ basis to suggest possible trends and patterns.

Immigration and race relations legislation was critically considered in the light of the structural and political developments, which have contributed to their formation. In analysing the secondary data, it was important to consider that such data is not ‘given facts’, but is constituted by the research process that produced it (Levitas and Guy 1996: 1). The use of routinely collected data attempted to minimise intrusion, but reproduced weaknesses in data collection tools, such as the particular interests and biases in what and how it is reported in newspapers and minutes. Furthermore, my reliance on the subject-specific newspaper archives of Newcastle City Library limited the reliability of this data, as there may have been inconsistencies over the time period in the criteria or the thoroughness of archivists (Earl, et al. 2004: 68-9). Where possible, such sources were cross-checked with other sources such as interviews with individuals with direct experience of the events under investigation, and are
used in the text primarily to provide a ‘flavour’ and illustration of developments, rather than a comprehensive local history.

The final stage of the analysis involved the coding of the focus group transcripts according to key findings, for verification and further development of the analysis.

**Writing Up**

A writing-up approach advocated by Yin was employed, involving early drafting of chapters and repeated redrafting as the research progressed (Robson 2005: 511), in order to facilitate ongoing reflection and development of the methodological approach. Early drafts were structured according to the process of the research, with earlier chapters elaborating the theoretical starting point and later chapters reporting on empirical findings (Appendix xvii). Following analysis of the second round of interviews, the structure was reorganised to reflect the argument instead of the process of investigation (Marx [1857] 1973). This involved an intertwining of the different levels of data through successive drafts, and the elaboration of the relationship between structural, systemic, policy and local contexts, and personal experience and agency. Owing to the exploratory nature of the research, a ‘theory-generating’ structure was employed in later drafts, with each section establishing a further link in the argument by developing a theme arising from the data (Robson 2005: 513).

Pseudonyms were avoided, because of the implications that both first and second names may carry for an individual’s ethnicity, religion, class and age, which may unwittingly involve researchers in “conforming to stereotyping practices and, potentially, inferring all sorts of connotative baggage onto research participants that may or may not be appropriate” (Clark 2006). Instead, a pseudonym for each project was used, and listed alongside quotations in situations where this was the most relevant attribute, alongside a number to allow the reader to identify patterns in the responses of each participant. In other cases, other relevant attributes were used. Differing levels of spoken English among participants did not prevent effective communication in interviews, where clarification could be sought, but raised issues in writing up, where verbatim quotes in written form may not have been easily understood. I have therefore attempted to find a compromise, between letting participants speak through the text in
their own words wherever possible and resorting to edits and insertions where necessary for clarity. Wherever changes have been made to quoted text, this is made clear with an ellipsis for deleted text and square brackets for inserted text. Abrupt breaks in speech are indicated by a hyphen.

In attempting to defend the wider interests of refugees, I was concerned at the potential for insights gained into oppressed groups to be used by the powerful to maintain or even extend their oppression (Lofland and Lofland 1995: 26-7). I argue that such research is justified, as reliable information is necessary for the oppressed to improve their situation. To minimise the risk of the research being put to oppressive ends, I leant at times towards a focus on exposing mechanisms of oppression, as opposed to exploring current strategies of resistance. I attempted to maximise the opportunity for refugees to make use of the research themselves by making efforts to present the findings in an accessible way and to actively distribute them to refugee and migrant organisations in the case city.6

**Conclusions**

The perspective outlined above implies a need for researchers and practitioners to engage with oppressed individuals and groups in collective struggle, to root out the causes of their oppression, informed by a rigorous and empirically grounded analysis of the interrelationship between all relevant factors. This methodology has attempted to pursue such a goal with a ‘strong reflexivity’ on my own location in structures of power, and the implications of this for my relationships and understandings. Effective anti-oppressive research and practice calls for an appreciation of wider structures that impact on individuals and groups, which set the landscape for the barriers, opportunities and choices faced by the people, whose lives research seeks to understand and practice seeks to influence. In explaining the background and process employed in the research for this thesis, this chapter has presented a framework in which a critical engagement between Marxism and qualitative methods might open the door for us to move beyond critiques of ‘Marxist’ conceptions of class as homogenous and necessarily obscuring questions of racism and gender. Its aim is a new synthesis, combining the empirically grounded methods and attention to process of qualitative social research with the analysis of the material roots of oppression and the focus on
collective action for change of Marxism. Such a synthesis is long overdue, and, I would argue, is in fact a rediscovery of the best traditions of Marxist social research running back to Marx and Engels via Lenin.
Chapter 3 - Imperialism and the Political Economy of Refugee Creation

I will begin consideration of refugees’ oppression within Britain by addressing the context in which people come to represent the conditions, experiences and claims encapsulated in the term ‘refugee’. Experiences of refugee arrival and settlement in Britain can only be understood in the broader context of processes of pre-flight, flight, reception, settlement and resettlement (Ager 2003: 3-13; Moya 2005: 837). Research has begun to pay increasing attention to the role of processes of migration themselves in shaping the reorganisation of social networks (e.g. Eve 2010). This carries particular relevance for the use of state interventions in social capital as part of the management of refugees’ oppression, a theme which will recur throughout the thesis. This chapter explores the particular international context in which millions of people every year are forced to migrate, whether through “crippling destitution, war or persecution” (Hayes 2005: 185). As the receiving country under investigation, particular attention is paid to Britain’s relations to situations of refugee creation. The chapter begins by outlining the key features of a Marxist analysis of the current international situation, including the division of the world into oppressed and oppressor nations, the impetus towards inter-imperialist rivalry and war, and the implications of this for migration to Britain. The functioning of an ‘international reserve army of labour’ is illustrated using historical and contemporary data at local and national levels, interwoven with theoretical reflections, and this is related to material divisions within the working classes in Britain and the historical role of the Labour Party. This sets the context for the relation of interests between refugees and the British ruling classes, and the state policies which follow from this, discussed in Chapter 4.

In exploring the current international context, I use the concept of ‘imperialism’, not “in the most general sense of the naked use of force to impose the will of major powers on smaller states” (Callinicos, et al. 1994: 11), but rather to refer to a specific system, the current stage of capitalism. Within this system, states may employ a range of policies contingent on circumstances, of which the naked use of force is only one possible outcome. It is necessary to discuss the concept of imperialism at length due to its contested nature. Some may argue against use of the term due to its politically-loaded character and prior assumptions. It may be responded that such objections merely
serve to defend the interests and objectives of those people, processes and practices, which theories of imperialism seek to expose and critique, and therefore have no place blocking discussion (Kemp 1967: 1).

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Lenin ([1916] 1975) identified imperialism as a development consistent with fundamental characteristics of capitalism in its earlier stages, but constituting a distinct stage as monopoly increasingly replaced free competition (Kemp 1967: 2). Defining features of imperialism include the fusion of banking and manufacturing capital into finance capital, organised in companies whose operations are multinational but whose control and ownership remain concentrated in particular advanced capitalist countries, which become increasingly wealthy as a result of returns on capital invested in poor and less industrially-developed countries. This creates a situation that, at a high level of abstraction, may be characterised as a division of the world between imperialist, oppressor countries, where ownership and control of capital is concentrated, and oppressed, impoverished countries, whose development is held back and whose labour and resources are systematically plundered to the benefit of imperialist countries (Lenin [1916] 1975). This involves relations of dependency between the two categories of countries on multiple levels, which set the context for modern patterns of migration, settlement, and the relation of refugees to the British state and to other sections of the working classes in Britain.

Over the last half century, the imperialist character of capitalism has intensified, taking on new and expansive forms. Since the 1960s, increasing technology and organisation of communication and shipping have combined with factors in many oppressed countries, such as freedom from environmental and planning controls, restrictions on union organisation, low wages, low health and safety standards, and lax controls on tax and repatriation of profits, to increase the profitability of international capital investment, and there has been a steady increase in capital outflows from Britain and other imperialist countries such as the United States (US) and Germany (Cohen 2006: 155-7). In some areas, these conditions were fostered through institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), in others through direct or indirect military intervention, in many cases operating alongside backing for authoritarian regimes, which were prepared and able to prevent resistance
from disrupting production (Sivanandan 1991: 144-5). Rates of return on investment in oppressed countries have played a crucial role in raising the average rate of profit and thereby generating the incentives to invest, which are necessary for continued capital circulation. This represents super-exploitation, and a parasitic relationship, which is particularly pronounced for Britain. Between 1997 and 2007, Britain’s overseas assets increased more than three times, reaching £6,357.9 billion in 2007, more than four and a half times Britain’s GDP (Yaffe 2006: 7; Madden 2009: 17).

**Capitalism’s tendency to crisis**

In recent years, the international crisis of capitalism, building since the 1960s, has come to public prominence. Beginning with the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, major banks were forced to write-down debts by massive amounts, removing swaths of fictitious wealth. This had knock-on effects throughout the international banking system, with mechanisms of commercial credit collapsing one after another (Palmer 2008: 3). This represented a serious failure of a key measure by which ruling classes had been able to put off or to mitigate imperialism’s underlying tendencies to crisis, with a seemingly endless extension of credit pursued by imperialist countries since the period of post-war rebuilding in the 1940s and 1950s. By 2005 the US was spending 6.4 per cent of GDP more than it was earning, leading to a rising net debt to the rest of the world, estimated at $2.55 trillion at the end of 2005 (Yaffe 2006: 9). As the world’s most powerful economy, this has major implications for the stability of the entire system. The credit system has expanded to encompass an entire ‘shadow banking’ system including unregulated institutions such as hedge funds and private equity, and accounting for large parts of the international economy with what amounts to gambling on an international scale. The temporary solution of these problems, by a massive injection of cash into the financial system by the state, will have massive and sustained consequences for large sections of the working and middle classes in many countries, including Britain, as the money paid out by the state is clawed back through significant reductions in the public sector, including cutting essential services and redundancies for tens of thousands of state employees (Yaffe 2009b; HM Treasury 2010). Meanwhile, the underlying problems in the capitalist system, which the expansion of credit played a role in covering over, remain.
Well before the financial crisis of 2008, it was evident that capitalism was entering a crisis of serious proportions. Comparing the periods 1960-1980 and 1980-2000, world per capita income growth fell from an average of 3 per cent to 2 per cent, a significant fall given the numbers involved. In 54 out of 155 countries for which data is available, average incomes actually fell during the 1990s, and only thirty countries had annual income growth above the 3 per cent necessary to reduce poverty at constant inequality levels (Hoogvelt 2007: 24). By 2005, business investments in Britain were at the lowest level in relation to the rest of the economy since 1967, unemployment was at the highest level for three and half years, insolvencies were at record levels, mortgage repossessions at a thirteen-year high, and consumer debt stood at £1,160 billion, almost the size of Britain’s GDP, and three times the level of the 1990s (Yaffe 2006: 10). The crisis is fundamentally one of profitability. Marx identified that the rise in the organic composition of capital, that is fixed capital relative to variable capital or labour, which proceeds with technological development and capital accumulation, produces a tendency for the rate of profit to fall (Marx [1894] 2006). Strategies to counteract this tendency include increasing the total mass of profits, requiring new markets for the realisation of surplus value, and exporting capital from areas with high composition of capital to those with a low composition, both of which necessitate imperialism (Kemp 1967: 27-8). It is therefore misleading to suggest, as Hoogvelt (2007: 19) does, that “In the past, it was assumed not only by liberal economists but also those standing in the Marxist tradition, that the world market system (or capitalism) was inherently and forever expansive in character”. This characterisation of Marxist analysis ignores the understanding that, whilst perpetual growth is necessary for capitalism to avert crises, history demonstrates that this expansion is uneven in space and time, and periodically breaks down. This produces conditions of crisis in the system, which in the recent period has been expressed in the phenomena of ‘globalisation’.

A key feature of globalisation has been increasingly rapid international movements of capital in search of new sources of profit, which have facilitated the growth in size and power of multinational companies exerting monopoly power (UNCTAD 2007; Felices, et al. 2008). Lenin ([1916] 1975) identified a tendency within capitalism, accentuated at times of crisis, for enterprises to both combine together (Lenin [1916] 1975: 18-20), and be bought up by large banks, resulting in an increased ability to compete with other
firms through a monopoly position, and the distribution of profits over a smaller amount of capital (*ibid.*: 52-3). This tendency was acutely expressed in the mergers and acquisitions boom of the late 1990s, where a large portion of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) investment between imperialist countries represented the combination of existing capital rather than new ‘greenfield’ capital investment (UNCTAD 2001: xiii, 53). By 2002, in the automobile sector the top six multinational companies accounted for more than 75 per cent of the global market, and in information technology hardware the top three firms accounted for 71 per cent of the global supply of servers, two-fifths of the global sales of PCs and three-fifths of the global sales of mobile phones (Hoogvelt 2007: 23). This process has continued the tendency towards centralised ownership and control of capital in a handful of advanced capitalist countries, which, by dint of this, occupy an imperialist position within the wider system. Kundnani (2007) gives an articulate account of this process:

“under the auspices of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘war on terror’, multinational companies have assumed unfettered power over most of the world’s national economies and Western governments have arrogated to themselves the right to openly intervene anywhere in the world.” (Kundnani 2007: 2)

This is strikingly similar to the account provided by Lenin before the First World War:

“A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands of millions, inevitably penetrates into every sphere of public life, regardless of the form of government and all other “details”.” (Lenin [1916] 1975: 55)

In 2008, five countries were together responsible for more than 50 per cent of accumulated outward stock of FDI, and ten countries were responsible for more than 70 per cent. Around 30 per cent of this stock was invested in materially underdeveloped countries (UNCTAD 2009: 251-4).

The increasing concentration of production has taken place together with the combination of banking and manufacturing capital into monopolistic ‘finance capital’, with banks controlling shares in many supposedly ‘independent’ companies, and interlocking with national governments (Lenin [1916] 1975: 44-8; Vincent 2005). Monopoly control of production by finance capitalists ensures monopoly returns on loans to other banks and companies, thus: “With a stationary population, and stagnant industry, commerce and shipping, the [imperialist] ‘country’ can grow rich by usury”
(Lenin [1916] 1975: 51-2). Lenin observed that, whilst monopolies develop in response to capitalists’ attempts to survive crises, their uneven development across different industries and countries increases the anarchy and tendency of the system towards crisis even further, in turn providing more pressure to combine into monopolies (ibid.: 28-9). This has been evident over the last decade, where neo-liberal policies including deregulation of international movements of capital and finance have not only wrecked whole countries, but laid the foundations for the most severe crisis of the international financial system in a century (Yaffe 2009a).

**Imperialism and national oppression**

The establishment of capitalism in the nineteenth century required a massive accumulation of wealth in the capitalist centres, much of which was achieved through the extraction of wealth from areas such as India and the Caribbean through direct colonialism and uneven trade relations (Kemp 1967: 18-19). This was politically enforced through “gun point diplomacy” and “intellectually legitimised by racism” (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 285; see also Kundnani 2007: 26-7). Under colonialism, uneven development and relationships of dependency between countries established an increasingly international division of labour, expanding British capitalism’s earlier use of rural labourers forced off the land to work in the new industrial centres, to create an international reserve army of labour under constant pressure to move wherever capital had a use for them (Miles and Phizacklea 1987: 16-17, 142-3).

In many cases, the success of national liberation movements in the second half of the twentieth century did not signal the end of oppression and exploitation on a national basis. Whilst direct political control may have been conceded, control of economic resources was not. In many cases “prime agricultural land, rights to mineral exploration and exploitation, and ownership of the mines remained firmly in the hands of large, multinational companies located in the West” (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 285). Newly independent states were subjected both to an international economic system which removed any control over their own direction or development priorities, to be subsumed in the needs of multinational capital, and the sponsorship of authoritarian regimes and the use of terrorism, assassination and destabilisation against ‘uncooperative’ states. Ghana, presented by the IMF as one of its few ‘success stories’
in Africa, had its nationalist government led by Kwame Nkrumah replaced in 1966 after a crisis brought about by a fall in the world price of cocoa. Since gaining formal political independence in 1957, the country had been unable to free itself from its dependency on the crop. By 1990, having completed sixteen structural adjustment programmes with the World Bank and IMF, Ghana had an external debt of $3.5 billion and was still reliant on cocoa exports. Following this, Ghana has been opened up for timber extraction, reducing its tropical forest to a quarter of its original size, destroying the wild game, which previously provided food for the majority of the population, and the trees, which were relied on for fuel and medicines. Privatisation of education, forced on Ghana as part of structural adjustment policies, has forced two thirds of children in rural areas to stop attending school, and, as of 2007, plans were in motion for British companies, funded by the British government, to privatise Ghana’s water supply (Kundnani 2007: 28-31).

Lenin ([1916] 1975: 16-17) observed the growth of industry and the concentration of production in ever-larger industries to be ‘one of the most characteristic features of capitalism’, tending towards increasingly uneven development between capital-intensive imperialist countries and underemployed oppressed countries. By an ‘oppressed’ nation, I refer to situations of dependency and systematic and continuing material underdevelopment in relation to dominant imperialist nations. This characterisation does not rule out the potential for oppressed countries to engage in antagonistic and oppressive relations with other oppressed countries, the movement of capital and labour to and from both oppressed and imperialist countries, or the existence of weaker and stronger imperialist countries. It does imply continuing relevance for the location of particular countries within the wider system, and a sustained division of the world into oppressed and oppressor nations. The tendency for the rate of profit to fall as capital accumulates contributes to the necessity for advanced capitalist countries to export not only goods, as in earlier periods, but also capital to less capital-saturated areas of the world, where higher rates of profit are possible (ibid.: 58-9). Agreements by the governments of oppressed countries to allow the remittance of profits by investing multinationals has been observed as a key factor in decisions on where to invest. For example, of US$904.1 million earned from the Bauxite industry in Jamaica in 2004, only US$372.9 million was retained in Jamaica, the remainder going to
the home countries of multinationals (Small 2007: 384). This represents a leaching of
the national product from oppressed countries, the impact of which is accentuated by
the differences in rates of return on investments in imperialist and oppressed countries.
In 2005, Britain received an average rate of return of 5.0 per cent on investments in
oppressed, materially underdeveloped countries, whilst countries investing in Britain
received a rate of return of only 2.6 per cent. Similar differences appear for other
imperialist countries. The difference in rates of return is such that Britain produced a
significant surplus income from increasing net debt in 2005; in other words, an
increasingly greater amount of capital invested in Britain from abroad than Britain
invested in other countries brought a net flow of profits into Britain (Whitaker 2006:
292-3).

The parasitic nature of contemporary British capitalism becomes even clearer when we
consider the changing division of labour between particular categories of productive
and unproductive labour, with a massive restructuring of the economy away from
manufacturing towards the service sector, and in particular the finance sector (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% change in numbers employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All sectors</td>
<td>+13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services</td>
<td>+36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and business services</td>
<td>+111.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All services</td>
<td>+46.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>-52.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures from Yaffe 2006: 9

By 2008, Britain produced 2.9 per cent of world exports, following a steady decline
which placed it ninth internationally (http://wto.org), and 3.1 per cent of global
manufacturing output (UN Statistics Division). The British economy is now massively
dependent on the international financial activities of the City of London, with financial
and business services contributing a value added at basic prices of £397.9 billion in
2007, more than two and a half times that of British manufacturing, with the
contribution of distribution, hotels and catering also exceeding that of manufacturing
(ONS 2009b: 108-9). This massive wealth in the financial sector is not produced there,
but flows through the sector from returns on investments. The wealth of the City of
London is thus drawn to a significant extent from the mines of the Congo, the oil fields of Iraq and the sweatshops of Bangladesh, demonstrating the extent of Britain’s imperialist parasitism on the exploitation of oppressed nations.

Added to the super-profits extracted from oppressed countries through direct and portfolio capital investments, additional profits are made by ‘unofficial’ means such as transfer pricing, unequal exchange, special tax regimes, fees, commissions and debt, channelled into Britain through the financial sector (Yaffe 2006). According to World Bank figures, the total external debt of ‘low and middle income’ countries increased by 67.8 per cent between 1999 and 2008, from $2,216 billion to $3,719 billion, despite these countries having paid back $4,293 billion over the same period (World dataBank). As a counterweight to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as capital accumulates, the extraction of super-profits from oppressed countries is essential to capitalism’s survival. That is, imperialism is not an option but a necessity for capital.

Arguments which attempt to demonstrate that globalisation is a fundamentally new system frequently break down as they move into details. Hoogvelt’s (2007: 17) argument for “a global core-periphery hierarchy that cuts across nation-states” concludes with a presentation of ratios between ‘bankable-insecure-excluded’ sections of society of 40-30-30 in ‘rich countries’, 20-30-50 in ‘poor countries’ in general, and up to 10-20-70 or even 10-10-80 in sub-Saharan Africa (Hoogvelt 2007: 26). Whilst precise ratios between countries are always in flux and open to debate, Hoogvelt’s differentiation between the balance of included and excluded in ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries does not dispute the classic Marxist analysis: of a division of the world between imperialist countries, in which there are large and wealthy ruling classes and also sections of the working classes who receive a certain share of the profits gained from the exploitation of oppressed countries; and oppressed countries, which possess a small domestic bourgeoisie who are nevertheless subordinate to the imperialist ruling classes. Where Hoogvelt’s reformulation diverges from my formulation of imperialism is in the implication of an equivalence between local ruling classes of oppressed countries and imperialist ruling classes, lumped together as ‘bankable’, despite the latter exploiting not only their domestic working classes but whole other nations, and between the working classes of imperialist and oppressed countries, lumped together
as ‘excluded’, despite the more ‘raw’ and intense conditions of exploitation and oppression of the working classes in oppressed countries. This distracts from the crucial class questions thrown up by the phenomena she is observing - in particular the split in the working classes and the importance of national liberation struggles in oppressed countries, both of which are discussed in more detail below.

Overall, the division of world into oppressed and imperialist countries exerts a powerful influence over the character of all population movements in the current period. Additionally, the dependency of imperialist countries on the exploitation of oppressed countries leads repeatedly to rivalries between imperialist countries, culminating ultimately in war, and with it frequently mass population displacement.

**Inter-imperialist rivalries and war**

The tendency for the rate of profit to fall contributes to intensified rivalries between imperialist countries, as they compete over increasingly important foreign sources of profit. Arguing against his contemporary Karl Kautsky’s suggestion that international cartels and other corporate amalgamations could be a force for peace, which follows logically from Kautsky’s conception of imperialism as a mere policy, Lenin points to companies’ tendency to turn to their own national governments for support in times of crisis. Lenin shows the cartels of his day to be transitory alliances based on a particular balance of forces, giving way as conditions changed to a renewed struggle along national lines (Kemp 1967: 73). Lenin ([1916] 1975: 79-82) describes the division and re-division of the world amongst the imperialist countries as fundamental to imperialism, driving both wars of colonial conquest and conflict between the imperialist powers themselves.

A hundred years after Kautsky and Lenin were writing, ownership and control of multinational companies continues to be concentrated overwhelmingly on a national basis, and they have their interests defended by their respective imperialist states. Pressures created by capitalist accumulation thus continue to necessitate competition on a national basis, ultimately leading to militarism and war (Kemp 1967, 58). Powerful economic interests have been linked to the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, following which healthcare, water, electricity, oil, gas and mining in Afghanistan
were all rapidly privatised and bought up by multinationals (Kundnani 2007: 102). Prior to the invasion of Iraq, its government had been making deals with China and Russia, and had begun to trade its oil in Euros. The jockeying that ensued between the major imperialist powers in the lead up to the war, rooted in strategic influence and opportunities for profit, underscored the continuing salience of inter-imperialist rivalries (Rayne 2003). In other cases, wars have not been carried out by imperialist states themselves, but by their proxies within oppressed countries. This is downplayed by arguments which relegate involvement of imperialist powers in conflict between oppressed groups to legacies of colonialisms past, which distract from the far more immediate influences in present inter-imperialist rivalries (e.g. Garfield 2008 on recent French involvement in Rwanda). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a United Nations UN Report in 2002 found that “high level political, military and business networks are stealing the DRC’s mineral resources, and by 2002, they had transferred at least $5 billion of assets from the state mining sector to private western companies, including 18 British firms such as Anglo American, DeBeers, Afrimex and Barclays Bank”. Under cover of the ‘ethnic’ conflict with Rwanda, exports of coltan, casserite, gold and diamonds increased five times, and fifteen flights a day were found to be leaving the DRC to transport these minerals to the European Union (EU) and US via Rwanda and South Africa (UN Security Council 2002; Kayembe 2006).

These contemporary rivalries are rooted in a fundamental shift in the relative economic strengths of the major imperialist powers, which has produced an imbalance between relative strengths in economic terms and in political and military terms (Table 2 gives a selection of indicators).

Table 2: Economic indicators for United States and European Union in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Global GDP</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Global Exports</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Global FDI Accumulated Stock</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
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This presents a clear challenge from EU imperialists to US dominance, but these relative economic strengths have not yet been translated into a corresponding re-division of the
world, and the US will do everything in its power to prevent such a re-division from happening. In the past, such re-divisions have only been achieved with horrific consequences for humanity. As Yaffe (2006: 9) says: “It is important to remember that after the US replaced Britain as the strongest economic power, it took two world wars, the great depression and fascism before the US became the dominant global imperialist power”. The British ruling classes are presently attempting to use their alliance with the US in order to defend and advance their international interests beyond what their own military capabilities allow. It is important to recognise, however, that Britain is a major imperialist power in its own right, as indicated by the figures cited above, with interests independent of the US and not subservient to it. The divisions within the British ruling classes over full commitment to Europe represent disagreements about whether an alliance with the EU or the US will better serve the interests of British capital. As the crisis deepens and rivalries between the EU and US intensify, it seems likely that at some point Britain will be forced to make a more decisive commitment to one side or the other, but this will be based on a calculation of the greatest benefit to Britain’s interests as an imperialist power, rather than on a blind or culturally determined subservience of British interests to either the EU or US.

The crisis of the credit system, which has played a role in averting crises for the past 60 years, can only intensify these rivalries. On 23 January 2008, billionaire speculator George Soros predicted in the Financial Times (Asian edition) that the credit crisis would mark “the end of an era of credit expansion based on the dollar as the international reserve currency”, and have as its longer term consequences a: “radical realignment of the global economy, with a relative decline of the US and the rise of China and other countries in the developing world. The danger is that the resulting political tensions, including US protectionism, may disrupt the global economy and plunge the world into recession or worse” (cited in Palmer 2008: 3).

Numerous writers have recently argued that it is developing countries such as India, Russia and particularly China, rather than the EU, which pose the most imminent threat to US domination. From an avowedly Leninist standpoint, Cerni (2006) argues that “Europe’s challenge to American power is limited by demographic and economic decay”, and that by comparison China possesses rapidly expanding and modernising
productive capacity in a range of stages of production. Further, she points to increasing foreign investment as part of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s ‘Go Out’ strategy, which is necessitating a similar expansion of Chinese military capability in order to defend these interests. However, in 2004, China’s annual outflow of FDI was relatively tiny at $5.4 billion compared to the EU’s $359.9 billion and even the United Kingdom UK’s $91 billion. By 2006, the gap in capital outflows had widened further, and China possessed a total outward capital stock of only $292 billion compared to the EU’s $6,428.7 billion and the UK’s $1,300 billion (UNCTAD 2007). Cerni’s argument also ignores the fact that, whilst an increasingly large amount of productive capital is concentrated in China, the ownership of much of this capital lies in the older imperialist nations in the EU, US and Japan. Accumulated inward stock of FDI invested in China reached $378 billion in 2008 (UNCTAD 2009: 253). According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (2009), between January and October 2009, 87.5 per cent of FDI inflows were accounted for by just ten countries or regions, including the major imperialist powers of the US, UK, France and Germany and others, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, which serve as regional conduits for imperialist capital. Therefore, whilst the current period is witnessing developing imperialist tendencies from countries such as China, it seems unlikely that any of these aspiring countries would be in a position to challenge US imperialist dominance before a major confrontation between the US and EU becomes necessary. What these developments do represent is an added complexity to the fighting out of imperialist rivalries between the established imperialist powers, as aspiring imperialist countries engage in shifting alliances with imperialist countries as they jockey for position and advancement. A recent example was Russia’s opposition to US attempts to use the war in Afghanistan to establish a permanent presence in Central Asia, controlling pipelines from the Caspian Basin and surrounding Russia and China with military bases (Craven and Rayne 2008: 6).

**Imperialism and migration**

Imperialism involves particular international divisions of labour, which both discriminate against and depend on the labour of workers from oppressed countries. In November 2009, then Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced plans to extend the period for which companies must advertise a post for British workers before offering it to migrants from two weeks to a month (Brown 2009). Even without such legal restrictions, in a
survey across industries in the summer of 2009, 27 per cent of employers said they recruit migrants in order to fill jobs for which it is difficult to find British workers (CIPD 2009a: 10), suggesting a widespread preference for British workers. Yet material underdevelopment of countries oppressed within imperialism has historically prevented these countries’ domestic production from fulfilling their own populations’ needs, thus simultaneously generating markets for imperialist exports, and maintaining a reserve army of labour for imperialist countries, which is necessary to allow for the fluctuations in demand for labour brought about by the contradictory tendencies of capitalism (Castells [1975] 2002; Miles 1987; Chinweizu and Jameson 2008).

It may be misleading to see a sharp distinction between refugees as ‘forced migrants’, and economic migrants as ‘voluntary migrants’. We can speak of compulsion in migrant labour in the sense that “the ‘sending’ formation is characterised by structural unemployment and underemployment”, which may leave some with economic migration as their only option for survival (Miles and Phizacklea 1980: 10). In many cases, foreign investment-driven development of export-oriented agriculture and manufacturing in materially underdeveloped countries has displaced rural workers from the land and at times has led to a restructuring of the labour force, by drawing more women into waged employment and creating rising unemployment among men even in periods of high growth, all contributing to the formation of an international labour pool of economically displaced people (Sassen 1988: 94-8). The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union massively increased the numbers and range of skills among this potential reserve army, with high unemployment and the creation of many factors forcing people to emigrate, including street homelessness, even amongst children, and an “alarming rise in the rate of substance abuse, prostitution and criminality” (Hessle 2007: 356-7).

The material underdevelopment of oppressed countries increases the importance of remittances by migrant workers as a source of foreign currency, further increasing the pressure on families to send members to work abroad, and for those abroad to send remittances, often putting up with worse conditions and sacrificing opportunities for advancement, such as longer term strategies of education or saving, in order to do so (Datta, et al. 2007; Lindley 2009: 1326-8). These remittances, which in some cases
exceed a country’s foreign exchange earnings from merchandise exports, provide currency for further imports, simultaneously maintaining the underdevelopment of domestic production in oppressed countries and the demand for exports from companies based in imperialist countries, reinforcing relations of dependency (Small 2007: 384-6). Remittances by migrant workers, amounting to US$167 billion globally in 2005, have recently been conceptualised as supporting development of sending countries and used by some to absolve more powerful agents from responsibility for development and poverty alleviation (Datta, et al. 2007: 45-7). In the context of disparities in wealth between sending and receiving countries, remittances from low paid migrant workers may be understood as subsidising the costs required of capital to maintain the labour power of members of the reserve army of labour in oppressed countries.

Whilst the above describes general trends, exact processes by which migration takes place in particular contexts are complex and various. For example, empirical investigation has suggested that major factors influencing Ethiopian migration to Europe since the 1970s have included the large increase in access to higher education in Ethiopia, which has not been accompanied by a similar increase in numbers of graduate jobs domestically, and the increasing integration of Ethiopia into the world economy, which has contributed to an increase in the idea of the superiority of European democracy and ‘civilisation’ (Tasse 2007: 344-5). Whilst this challenges simplistic accounts of migration based on supply and demand of labour and the needs of capital, the oppressed position of Ethiopia within the imperialist system clearly has consequences for both of the causal factors highlighted above; facilitating a ‘brain drain’ of Ethiopia’s graduates to imperialist countries’ increasingly ‘knowledge-based’ workforces, and achieving the dominance of European values and prestige as a consequence of European imperialist countries’ standards of living and multinational media apparatuses, which are possible on the basis of their dominant material position.

Within imperialist countries, the international reserve army of labour is used to undermine the bargaining power of domestic working classes even in situations of near full employment and cushion against shocks, whilst also enabling a higher rate of exploitation and profit through systematic discrimination, denial of rights and
harassment of ethnic minority labour (Sivanandan 1974: 12; Castells [1975] 2002: 86-94; RCG 1979: 3). Migrant workers in low-skilled jobs frequently only have temporary rights to remain, insecure contractual arrangements, and experience exploitative practices including non-payment or underpayment of wages, unauthorised deductions, non-compliance with health and safety, long working hours and overcrowded, unsafe or otherwise unsuitable housing (Piper 2010: 111-12). The costs of the labour power of migrants to employers is reduced by the subsidy to the costs of its reproduction, which is paid by migrants’ countries of origin, including in many cases the initial costs of training and education, and the costs of care during the periods of non-productivity for capital in infancy and old age. As John Berger puts it: “They are not born: they are not brought up: they do not age: they do not get tired: they do not die. They have a single function - to work. All other functions of their lives are the responsibility of the country they come from” (cited in Kundnani 2007: 62). In some cases, this translates into a direct wage difference, sometimes enacted through immigration controls. For example, in one West London food factory, workers reported a 70 pence difference in the hourly wage for those able to supply a national insurance number (Ahmad 2008: 864), while an independent audit found migrants engaged in engineering construction work in the Midlands had been paid substantially below nationally agreed rates for the industry (GMB Press Release 2010). Beyond this, compensation for labour under modern capitalism consists of both direct wages paid by an employer and indirect wages in the form of rights, protections, services, benefits, and so on, available from the state. Thus importing labour with fewer rights of access to this ‘social’ part of the wage, who are also under pressure to accept lower monetary wages, both enables a faster rate of accumulation and relieves pressure to attack rights and wages of domestic workers, particularly where migrant labour can be secured on terms which allow migrants a temporary right to residence and few rights for dependents to join them (Freeman 1986: 55-6). On this point I concur with Freeman, but I differ when he goes on to argue that:

“Wide-spread migration has reduced the power of organized labor by dividing the working class into national and immigrant camps, by easing the tight labor market conditions that would have enhanced labor’s strategic resources, and by provoking a resurgence of right-wing and nativist political movements” (Freeman 1986: 61)
This neglects the fact that workers are already divided by exploitation on a national basis, which is central to imperialism and lays the ground for chauvinist responses to migration by sections of the working classes in imperialist countries.

It is not migration which divides workers and undermines the position of organised labour, but imperialism that creates a material split in the working classes. Migration holds the potential to develop links between the workers of oppressed and imperialist countries, and in doing so to create the possibility of transforming the system. Workers from oppressed countries will only ‘voluntarily’ agree to play the role of super-exploited migrant labour whilst the material conditions of life available in most in their countries of origin are even poorer. The functioning of the international reserve army of labour is thus interdependent with the division of the world into oppressed and oppressor nations, and the two processes form mutually reinforcing elements of the wider system of imperialism. It is not inevitable that the response of workers in imperialist countries to migration will be a chauvinist, right-wing or ‘nativist’ one - they could instead make common cause with workers in oppressed countries and with migrants in their own, and throw themselves into overturning the system which divides and exploits them all. Whether this happens in a given situation is a political question, which will only be resolved in the course of struggle. This question will be returned to repeatedly through the rest of this thesis, in particular the element of state interventions which serve to impede such anti-capitalist unity from ever taking hold, as part of the management of oppression.

The reserve army and immigration controls

The ‘post-nation state’ view, put forward predominantly within a post-modernist framework and amply theorised by Hardt and Negri (2001), argues that developments in the last decades of the twentieth century, including successes of anti-colonial struggles and the collapse of the Soviet Union, together with technological advances, have resulted in a fundamentally new period, in which no state has genuine sovereignty, even within its own borders. Instead, they argue that we live in a globalised world ruled by “a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule”, in which there are no oppressed or oppressor nations, but instead “we continually find the First World in the Third, the Third in the First, and the Second
almost nowhere at all” (Hardt and Negri 2001: xi-xiii). Within this view the speed of air
travel and instantaneous electronic communications have compressed time and space,
allowing an unprecedented movement and inter-permeation of people and cultures
around the world: “Once nearly impermeable borders are now open to cultural
influences; people can migrate and/or engage in political protest, more than ever
before” (Richmond 2002: 708). This view represents a clear class standpoint. It has been
observed elsewhere that positions of power within social structures may enable certain
individuals to move freely across boundaries between classed and racialised areas,
viewing these categories as welcome ‘diversity’ rather than oppressive (Byrne 2002: 22-3).
If this is true within a British city, it is even more so internationally. Barber and Lem
(2008: 4) point to the way in which borders in the current international context are
marked by class and nation, with a freedom for capital to move across borders, whilst
the movement of workers from particular countries continues to be heavily regulated.
Privileged western academics may find borders ‘porous’ when they travel to give a
lecture or join a protest in another country. For the majority of the world’s people,
however, this is not the reality they face. Instead the majority of migrants from
oppressed countries face a very un-porous and expanding repressive apparatus of
border police, reporting regimes, tagging, immigration prisons and mass deportations
(Briskman and Cemlyn 2005; Kundnani 2007; Hobson, et al. 2008; Gill 2009). Of the
15,040 people the UK Borders Agency reports deporting in the first quarter of 2010,
nearly a third had been stopped at the ‘border’ as they attempted to enter the UK
(Home Office 2010: 16).

Whilst the international availability of mass electronic media may have made images of
the affluence of imperialist countries more visible to the populations of oppressed
countries, this neither reflects an increased ability of members of such populations to
physically travel there, nor represents an accurate picture of the experience for the
majority who do succeed in migrating. Even for those who are forced to flee oppressed
countries as refugees, often risking their lives hidden on trucks or crossing stretches of
sea on rafts, it is predominantly more privileged members of oppressed nations who
have the resources and contacts to leave the country, not for another oppressed
country nearby, but for a wealthy imperialist country (Bloch 1999: 190-1). If doctors,
professors and engineers from oppressed countries are forced to board a raft to cross
borders, what impact does the speed of air travel have for the majority? Although Gilroy (2001: 108-9) argues that ‘cultural processes’, ‘animated and encouraged’ by technological developments, extend beyond those privileged sections that have direct access to them, for the most part, consciousness remains grounded in groups’ immediate material conditions, as evidenced by the emergence of recent anti-imperialist struggles on a national basis from Iraq to Nigeria (Chinweizu 2007a; Harlan 2007). “Our post-national future”, which perspectives such as cosmopolitanism claim to look towards (Cohen 2006: 10-11), may be a long way off for the majority of humanity, and these elite perspectives cannot relate to struggles of the oppressed in the present period.

Hardt and Negri (2001: 326) argue that the severing of ties between workers and particular geographical areas and the creation of “a single cultural and economic system of production and circulation” is intrinsic to capitalism. This ignores the fact that, simultaneous with creating conditions which put pressure on workers to move to areas of greatest demand for labour, legislation is brought in to strictly regulate their movement, strengthening national boundaries and the state. When Hardt and Negri (2001: 233-4) reference Lenin to back up their argument that at a certain point national boundaries may become a block to further capitalist development, requiring the international ruling classes to transcend imperialism, they make the fundamental error of viewing national boundaries of capitalist countries as somehow placing them ‘outside’ imperialism, rather than, as is often the case, playing an essential role in maintaining their incorporation. Indeed, it is telling that a leading theoretician of neo-liberalism like Fukuyama (2004: 5) should argue that problems encountered in the course of neo-liberal reforms are frequently rooted in “a basic conceptual failure to unpack the different dimensions of stateness and to understand how they related to economic development”. Essentially, Fukuyama argues that interventions by the US government and agencies such as the IMF and World Bank need to include not only privatisation of profitable areas, but also the development of certain areas of the state, which, judging from the attention Fukuyama devotes to international security and terrorism, would include a significant investment in the military and other apparatus of state repression. This is a tendency which has been seen in many oppressed countries in recent years, from Colombia (Petras 2001; Isacson and Poe 2009), to the Palestinian
Authority (Frisch and Hofnung 1997; Zanotti 2010), to US policy more broadly (e.g. Commission on Weak States and US National Security 2004). This contemporary history of state building as a central part of imperialist strategy runs directly counter to Hardt’s and Negri’s claims.

The reserve army in practice
A historical survey of trends demonstrates the functioning of the international reserve army of labour in practice. International dynamics of development/underdevelopment and oppression creates a space within which experiences of racism, incorporation and resistance are played out at a local level, as discussed in more detail in later chapters. In the North East, regular visits of seasonal agricultural workers from Ireland took place from at least the mid-eighteenth century, increasing noticeably during the Napoleonic wars and with the advent of the cross-channel steamship, which began regular services in 1818. These seasonal migrant workers were joined in significant numbers from 1823 by more permanent migrants coming to work in the expanding urban centres, where demand for labour was high and far higher wages were available than in Ireland (MacDermott 1977: 154-9). Whilst international movement of labour continues to be driven by such economic needs and conditions, this does not take place freely according to the forces of the market, but has come to be strictly regulated, primarily through the actions of the imperialist state. Wage differentials in themselves have often proved inadequate to facilitate the migration needed by capital, and have frequently required backing up with direct recruitment by companies and states (Tasse 2007: 339-41). For example, in order to man the newly-established welfare state in the 1950s, workers were actively recruited by the state from areas such as the Caribbean (Williams 1992: 164). In common with other parts of Britain following the establishment of the NHS, student registers for Newcastle General Hospital show recruitment of nurses from Africa, the Caribbean and South East Asia between 1940 and 1962 (Newcastle General Hospital 1940-1962).

Migration to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s was also influenced by both the expansion of the service and light manufacturing sectors, which called for an increased workforce for unskilled jobs, and rising international competition, which increased pressure to find workers who would work for lower pay and in worsening working conditions in older
sectors of production such as textiles and metal manufacture (Miles and Brown 2003: 118, 131). Many workers came from South Asia during this period, to cities including Newcastle, although in relatively small numbers compared to many other cities. The 1961 Census shows that out of a quarter of a million Newcastle residents, around 5,500 were born outside Britain, of whom 832 were described as Indian, 370 Pakistani, and 160 Caribbean. For all three groups, this represented more than double the 1951 population (Atkinson 1972: 129-30), and community leaders suggested actual figures were considerably higher (Telang 1967: 6-7). The largest source of migration to Newcastle from Pakistan and India between 1947 and the 1960s was the Punjab region, where migration was driven by a combination of factors in the aftermath of colonialism. This included political and religious conflict following partition, which led to the migration of eight to ten million people, many of them forced to become refugees on one side or the other of the new border, and economic factors in rural areas characterised by unemployment, pressure on the land and fragmentation of holdings. Another contributing factor to this particular period of migration may have been the impending 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which forced a decision for many between returning to their countries of origin for good, or having their families join them in Britain (Atkinson 1972: 130-5). The class position of immigrants played a significant role in influencing opportunities for family reunification, with those coming to Newcastle for more highly qualified jobs or as graduate students having greater resources to bring their families during initial migration, whilst those on lower incomes were often forced to work and save in Britain for a period before they could afford for their families to join them (Telang 1967: 8).

Migrants from South Asia during this period worked predominantly in working class occupations, and were mostly actively employed. Just under a quarter of Indian and Pakistani heads of household surveyed in the West end of Newcastle in 1968 worked in public transport as drivers and conductors, with Newcastle Corporation recruiting immigrants as conductors from 1950 but only later allowing promotion to driver. Trade union concentration was particularly high amongst immigrants working on the buses, with an estimated 81 per cent of immigrant conductors and drivers unionised in 1968, accounting for 64 per cent of all immigrant trade unionists in the city (Atkinson 1972: 163). Most of those working in the private sector worked in factories (ibid.: 157), with
forty to fifty working or training as draughtsmen, clerks or technicians at one factory to
the east of Newcastle, and fifteen to eighteen Pakistani women employed at a sewing
factory in the West end of Newcastle, on the requirement that they speak English
(Telang 1967: 13). A 1968 survey found a very small minority of first generation migrant
women from Pakistan and India in paid employment, but far higher proportions of their
adult women offspring, working as nurses, teachers, secretaries, clerical assistants,
computer operators and machinists (Atkinson 1972: 163-4). Out of eighty-eight families
surveyed, four Indian and one Pakistani resident owned their own shop, and several
others made their living as travelling salesmen, mainly in the drapery business (ibid.: 158).
An East end resident remembers the reception given to one such travelling
salesman when he was a child:

“I can remember one guy coming around ... in the ‘60s, coming round with yer
suitcase full of wares, selling, and I can remember my dad getting a hold of him
and throwing him across the street, and his suitcase after him, you know: ‘you
black bastard, fuck off’ and all the rest of it” (Interview, 2005)

Only four heads of households in the 1968 survey (5.7 per cent) were unemployed,
three of them for reasons of ill-health, despite living in areas of high overall
unemployment (Atkinson 1972: 160). Alongside such high levels of employment, the
experience of immigrants to Newcastle in the 1950s and 1960s seems to fit the broader
national pattern, pointed to by Small (2007: 378), of significant job downgrading
compared to occupations in migrants’ countries of origin, particularly for qualified
professionals. The 1968 survey found no professional or managerial workers, and a
tendency for lower-skilled work than might be expected given levels of experience and
qualifications, with two respondents with university degrees working in Newcastle as a
bus conductor and a travelling salesman (Atkinson 1972: 160-1). Many migrants during
this period were concentrated in the West end, with high levels of multi-occupied,
overcrowded, run-down and derelict properties, and frequent movement in and out of
the area (ibid.: 110-11). The majority of migrants from India and Pakistan living in
Newcastle at that time were owner-occupiers, having bought a house through long
hours of overtime, and only one family out of eighty-eight reported being on the
Council’s housing list (ibid.:142-9). Estate agents in Newcastle at the time denied
discrimination against immigrants in granting mortgages, but admitted taking higher
deposits, on the basis that they viewed immigrants as ‘here today, gone tomorrow’, and
believed immigrants to ‘prefer older properties’ (Telang 1967: 15). Migrants during this period thus faced direct and indirect racism, even as the state and British capital made active use of their labour.

From the 1980s, sweatshops and home-working developed in the shadow of the British textile industry, staffed predominantly by Asian women, and became increasingly important for profit margins in the industry as a whole (Kundnani 2007: 59). Other potential sources of reserve labour who have been drawn on at times to perform ‘undesirable jobs’ and raise the average rate of profit through super-exploitation, such as women in general, have higher values of labour power, which must be paid for by capital. In the case of women this arises from demands for the state to provide childcare, as it was forced to do during the Second World War, when employment of women rose dramatically (Miles and Phizacklea 1980: 12-13). The increasing mobility of capital since the 1980s has meant that where the international reserve army of labour has been employed within Britain, this has mostly been in types of work that are necessarily close to the point of consumption, such as food processing, catering, cleaning, nursing and personal services (Kundnani 2007: 58-9). This has contributed to a policy discourse of ‘managed migration’, with control prioritised over rights, and an increasing polarisation between professional and low-skilled groups of migrants (Piper 2010: 110). For example, employment of ‘domestic help’ in Britain rose significantly in the 1990s, with many migrants employed under the Home Office’s domestic worker registration scheme. A survey in 2002 found that two thirds of respondents had experienced physical abuse from their employers, and 9 per cent sexual abuse. Passports were reported to be regularly withheld by employers and used to enforce harsh working conditions and low wages (Kundnani 2007: 60-1), with workers many forced to turn to employers for shelter from the state, even where they were abusive (Anderson 2010: 62-3).

2004 saw a significant development in the granting of rights to greater freedom of movement and employment - though not necessarily access to state support in case of hardship - for citizens of the ‘A8’ countries in Eastern and Central Europe, with the further addition of the ‘A2’ countries, Romania and Bulgaria, in 2007. Datta et al. (2007: 49) suggest A8 workers may have been a preferred source of labour, both for their
‘whiteness’ and on the understanding that they would be more likely to return to their country of origin than people who have travelled greater distances. In 2007, there were an estimated 1.4 million registered migrant workers in the UK, around half of whom had arrived from the A8 and A2 since 2004, and somewhere between 300,000 and 800,000 unregistered migrant workers, with many of even those registered working in conditions so exploitative as to meet the international definition of ‘forced labour’ (Craig, et al. 2007: 22; Ahmad 2008: 857). Between May 2004 and September 2009, an estimated 1.5 million people entered Britain from the A8, many for short periods, and registered as either self-employed, including many agency workers, or as part of the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS). These migrants work in predominantly low-paid and unskilled jobs, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. The WRS was established, in the words of the Home Office, to provide “transitional measures to regulate A8 nationals’ access to the labour market ... and to restrict access to benefits.” In the first quarter of 2010, 71 per cent of requests by A8 workers for tax-funded, income-related benefits were refused (Home Office 2010: 23-4). Workers must remain on the WRS until they have been in continuous employment for at least twelve months, which, given the predominance of temporary and insecure contracts, may be difficult to achieve. While on the WRS, migrants have severely restricted access to unemployment, child and housing benefits. This gives these migrant workers a distinct relationship to capital, to the benefit of the ruling classes, going some way to explain their preference for Eastern European workers over refugees, who, once they are granted refugee status, have far greater rights to remain in Britain and access state support (Chinweizu 2006).

As of the first quarter of 2008, the total number of workers in the UK who were born abroad was estimated at 3.7 million, or 12.5 per cent of the workforce, including those who had secured British citizenship. This represented an increase of 1.8 million since 1997, accounting for 55 per cent of the total increase in the UK workforce. The largest proportion of workers born abroad were from other European countries, with 0.7 million from the other pre-2004 EU countries, 0.5 million from A8 countries, and 0.2 million from other European countries (Clancy 2008: 19). Over this period, there was also a significant increase in the proportion of migrants from A8 countries in active employment, from 65.3 per cent in 1997 to 82.8 per cent in 2008, indicating the change in the nature of migration towards young, single people coming solely to work rather
than bringing families to settle (ibid.: 22). There were also significant increases in numbers in the UK from other areas between 1997 and 2008, with numbers of UK residents born in Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, and African countries excluding South Africa all nearly doubling, numbers from South Africa tripling, and numbers from the Americas and India increasing by a half (ibid.: 30).

Although the largest proportion of all migrants arriving in Britain between 2001 and 2008 was higher paid workers, the proportion of foreign-born employees within each occupation group increased across the board, the largest increases being for: Elementary Occupations, those involving the most unskilled forms of work (an increase of 10.6 percentage points); Personal Service Occupations (an increase of 7.1 percentage points); and Process, Plant and Machine Operatives (an increase of 6.1 percentage points) (ONS 2008: 6-7). A survey of low paid migrant workers in London found 71 per cent sent money home, and 40 per cent had dependents outside the UK. On average, they remitted 20 to 30 per cent of their income, mostly as contributions to daily subsistence. Remittances took place most regularly among those from poorer backgrounds in African countries, and those with the highest levels of remittances were also those working the longest hours. Strategies to keep up payments included working in multiple jobs, sharing accommodation and minimising consumption, including eating as little as possible (Datta, et al. 2007: 51-9).

Since the 1990s, the low prices and ‘just in time’ methods of British supermarkets have depended on a flexible, low paid and disposable workforce mostly made up of migrants, who could be out of work at times and suddenly called upon to work seventy hour weeks at others according to consumer demand, and who were kept in their super-exploited position by dependency on gangmasters for food, work and board, together with threats and intimidation (Kundnani 2007: 59-60). In July 2009, the Unite union put forward a motion at Tesco’s AGM, backed by the West Yorkshire Pension Fund, demanding action against the exploitation of migrant workers on temporary contracts in its meat and poultry supply chain, who the union said were being routinely paid less and treated worse than permanent staff, most of whom were British (Lawrence 2009). Without migrant labour, it has been argued that British agriculture could not continue in its present form (Craig 2007b: 34). The extent of British agriculture’s dependency on migrant labour is indicated by reports in 2008 of farmers in parts of Britain being forced
to leave produce to rot in the fields as a result of new restrictions on migrant workers from Eastern Europe (Surman 2008). 22 per cent of employers in the East of England, with large areas of agriculture, said they would be recruiting migrant workers in the third quarter of 2009 to meet seasonal demand for labour (CIPD 2009a: 8). Prior to 2004, much of this work was done by workers from Poland. With its inclusion as part of the A8, many Polish workers moved into marginally better-paid and more secure jobs, with their roles increasingly taken over by workers from the A2 countries, under even more restricted labour rights than the A8. In the first quarter of 2010, 9,845 work cards were issued to A2 nationals under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) (Home Office 2010: 24). Thus, the international reserve army of labour has continued to play an important role, even as the countries from which currently employed migrants were drawn has shifted from Britain’s former colonies to the ruins of former socialist countries.

The welfare state also continues to be highly dependent on migrant labour. A 2009 study found that two in three NHS employers recruit from abroad, more often from outside the EU, and four in ten local government employers recruit overseas, with more than one in five employers in the education sector and NHS saying they would be recruiting migrant workers in the third quarter of 2009 (CIPD 2009a: 8). Numbers of work permits issued to healthcare staff from outside the EU rose twenty-seven times between 1993 and 2003. 15,000 of the 20,000 nurses who joined the medical register in 2003-2004 came from overseas and one third of doctors on the register qualified abroad, more than double the proportion in the total British workforce (Jameson 2005; see also Kyriakides and Virdee 2003). In the Philippines, where the government is forced to spend eight times as much on servicing its debt as it does on its health service, nurses and doctors are underpaid and under pressure to migrate. In Britain, they work in large numbers in positions well below their level of qualification, as exemplified in two hospitals in Glasgow, where some migrants were found to be working for effective wages of £8 a day after agency costs. In 2003, Filipinos working in Britain sent home $260 million in remittances (Kundnani 2007: 64-5). Low levels of recruitment of social workers from within Britain and ‘an exodus of experienced social workers from the profession’ have been responded to in recent years by the recruitment of professionals from developing countries, with some coming on their own initiative, some recruited
directly by local authorities in groups, and others recruited via agencies, with widely varying levels of support. Between 1990 and 2007, 10,000 social workers were issued with letters of verification allowing them to practice in the UK. In 2001-2002 overseas-trained social workers accounted for around a quarter of all new social work recruits, and between 2003 and 2004, there was an 82 per cent increase in numbers of trained social workers coming to the UK, with the largest number from outside the EU. Zimbabwe has now lost half of its trained social workers to the UK, and is consequently experiencing severe shortages in welfare provision (Welbourne, et al. 2007, 27-34).

There is substantial involvement of migrant workers in delivering social care, with one study suggesting a fifth of all care workers looking after older people are migrant workers, and 28 per cent of those recruited in 2007, with many employed by agencies. The sector is outside the jurisdiction of the Gangmaster Licensing Authority and exploitation is rife, including excessive hours, rates of pay below the minimum wage, deception about expected wage levels, little to no holiday, and cases of debt-bondage (Wilkinson, et al. 2009: 24-5).

This represents a significant ‘brain drain’ on oppressed countries, as even these countries’ educational resources are plundered to the benefit of imperialist countries (Chinweizu and Jameson 2008). The Department of Health issued a code of practice to statutory employers in 2004, whose stated aim was to restrict recruitment of healthcare professionals from over 150 developing countries, so as to prevent a drain on those countries’ human resources. However, as of 2007, there was no requirement for recruitment agencies to sign up to the code, and no sanction for non-compliance. This may, therefore, only serve to increase the predominance of private agencies in recruitment, operating largely on temporary contracts and offering fewer rights, such as access to training and promotion, than direct recruitment by local authorities (Welbourne, et al. 2007: 34-5).

The economic crisis has lead to a noticeable reduction in employment of migrant labour. In one survey, 39 per cent of UK employers with more than 500 workers said they had reduced numbers of migrant workers employed during 2009, and only 8 per cent of all employers surveyed said they planned to recruit migrant workers in the third quarter of 2009, compared to 27 per cent in a similar survey in autumn 2005 (CIPD 2009a: 8-10).
Already in 2008, it was estimated that as many as 20 per cent of street homeless people in London were migrant workers from Eastern and Central Europe, who had lost their jobs and had neither funds to return home or access to state support (Homeless Link 2009: 5). This is the other side of the international reserve army of labour, to not only be available to work in a super-exploited position when needed, but to be the first to be cast off when demand for labour falls.

**The split in the working classes**

On an ideological level, international divisions of labour are reflected in findings that British workers and their trade unions have frequently felt ‘threatened’ by competition from cheap labour in other countries, as well as migrant workers in their own (Richmond 2002: 215). These feelings are actively encouraged by the ruling classes’ state and media, embodied in a dominant race relations approach, which portrays ‘whiteness under siege’, whilst concealing its privilege (Muller 2001: 13), added to by the recent construction of a distinct and excluded ‘white working class’ (Sveinsson 2009). This continues the widespread use of racist ideas in Britain since at least the late eighteenth century, to “interpret political and economic conflicts in various parts of the world where, for example, the British state, merchants and capitalists had economic and political interests” (Miles 1987: 28), and to represent these as the interests of the whole population. These ideas have gained purchase in the context of an international and domestic split in the working classes, created by imperialist divisions between countries, and compounded, in many cases, by the actions of trade unions in Britain and other imperialist countries (Castells [1975] 2002: 99-100).

In Newcastle, Robinson (1988: 192) describes “the old industrial class-cum-gentry and the Labour Movement” as historically forming the “twin pillars of the local establishment”. Drawing implicitly on the insights of a generation of Marxists, Gilroy (1998) and others (e.g. CCCS 1982) have argued that by the time of the arrival of the Empire Windrush, bringing migrants from the Caribbean in 1948, the British ruling classes had successfully forged an alliance with its domestic working classes, cemented by the economic benefits of slavery and colonialism, and rationalised with reference to racism and nationalism (cited in Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 286). These longer running divides in the working classes were added to by a social policy focus on the ‘needs of
industry’ from the mid 1980s onwards, which contributed to an increased polarisation between a flexible, exploited, disproportionately black and ethnic minority workforce on the one hand, and white, male, highly-paid technocrats on the other (Williams 1992: 172).

In one of the most disputed aspects of modern imperialism among Western Marxists, Leninists have pointed to a significant and long-running split in the working classes within Britain and internationally, between a fluctuating ‘labour aristocracy’, and the mass of the working classes, who have historically lacked their own independent political representation (Clough 1992). Clough argues that this split is not purely economic but also political. It is an active process by which the ruling classes maintain loyal ‘labour lieutenants’ within working-class and progressive movements, isolating and excluding anti-capitalist and revolutionary elements. Lenin’s awareness of the connection between opportunism and imperialism was already evident in his contribution to the debate on ‘socialist colonialism’ at the 1907 congress of the Second Workingmen’s International. The debate was a response to a proposition, backed by members of the International including the British delegate Ramsay MacDonald, that advanced capitalist countries had the right to colonial possessions as part of a broader ‘civilising’ mission. The debate revealed widespread support for such racism in the International, even though the proposal was eventually out-voted. Reporting the discussion, Lenin wrote:

“Only the proletarian class, which maintains the whole of society, can bring about the social revolution. However, as a result of the extensive colonial policy, the European proletarian partly finds himself in a position when it is not his labour, but the labour of the practically enslaved natives in the colonies, that maintains the whole of society ... In certain countries this provides the material and economic basis for infecting the proletariat with colonial chauvinism. Of course, this may be only a temporary phenomenon, but the evil must nonetheless be clearly realised and its causes understood.” (Lenin [1893-1923] 1972: Vol. 13, 77)

This demonstrates the long-running significance of anti-racism within the Leninist trend of Marxism. By the First World War, the creation of an opportunist and social chauvinist trend in the working classes of the major imperialist countries had become entrenched,
based on a privileged position in relation to the mass of the working classes, which was only possible as a result of imperialist profits. The Second International had committed as late as its Basel Congress in 1912 to oppose inter-imperialist war by all means, and, in the event of war, to use the opportunity for the workers of each country to turn the war against their own ruling classes. When war finally broke out, however, the majority of the leaders of the International betrayed this commitment and rallied to support their own ruling classes, including the entire British trade union leadership and the overwhelming majority of the Labour Party (Clough 1992).

There is considerable evidence for the continuing relevance of the concept of the labour aristocracy. Trade unions continue to organise predominantly amongst better-off sections of the working classes. In 2009, 53.6 per cent of trade unionists were managers, professionals or associate professionals, compared to 43.6 per cent of all employees. 48.8 per cent of trade unionists had a degree or other higher educational qualification, compared to 36.7 per cent of all employees (Achur 2009: 36-7). At the end of 2007, when the median weekly wage for all full-time employees was £457, around 60 per cent of trade unionists were earning a weekly wage between £500 and £999 (Clough 2009). From the late 1990s, Britain’s balance of payments deficit and deficit on trade in goods both rose sharply, with the former peaking at £44.9 billion in 2006 and the latter peaking at £93.1 billion in 2008. During this period, the standard of living of the better-off sections of the working classes in Britain could not have been maintained if it were not for the surplus on trade in services, rising to £55.4 billion in 2008 (ONS 2010), and the net earnings on the international investment account, amounting to £29.8 billion in 2005 (Whitaker 2006). This represents wealth “sucked in from surplus value produced in every corner of the world” (Yaffe 2006). The parasitic and imperialist character of British capitalism thus creates the basis for an antagonism towards migrants, not only from the British ruling classes but also from the more privileged sections of the British working classes, whose standard of living is dependent to a large extent on the super-exploitation of other sections of the working classes. This is expressed through the racism prevalent in the Labour Party, which in government has overseen the escalation of legislative attacks on refugees, and which continues to receive backing from much of the organised labour movement (Clough 1992; Jameson 2006).
For much of the twentieth century, there was a general failure by British trade unions to adequately represent black workers, and ambivalent and, at times, racist attitudes have been described as “a common feature of trade union attitudes and activities”, despite high levels of trade union participation by black people in particular areas, and leading roles in some struggles (Perrett and Lucio 2009: 1277). In some cases, trade unions have ignored migrant workers completely, particularly where migrants only have permission to stay on a temporary basis (Piper 2010: 116). Where unions have engaged with migrants, chauvinist tendencies have been expressed in the commonly-held view that their role with migrant workers is to ‘organise the unorganised’, implying a lack of ability or validity on the part of migrants’ own capacity to organise (Perrett and Lucio 2009: 1279; see also Healy, et al. 2004 and Però and Solomos 2010: 3-4). In the recent past, Britain’s largest union, Unite, came into conflict with the Latin American Workers Association (LAWA) over the latter’s support for an unofficial dispute and undocumented migrants, culminating in the expulsion of LAWA from their use of Unite’s London offices (LAWA 2009). Whilst the Trade Union Congress (TUC) launched a campaign for the right to work for all refugees in 2008 (Refugee Council Press Release 2008), questions need to be asked about why it took six years for a national trade union organisation with considerable resources to make such a basic demand for workers’ rights, and why funding for the campaign was reportedly cut after only two years, at a time of rising destitution for refugees prohibited from taking paid work (Interview with campaign member 2010).

The negative impacts of this relationship, between the standard of living of the British working classes and the exploitation of workers abroad, on the international class consciousness of the British working classes and their attitudes to immigrants and black people, cannot be ignored. Yet, whilst Britain’s dominant relation to the world economy and the super-profits it allows the country’s ruling classes to obtain enables the bribing of a section, and to some extent all, of their workers domestically, contradictory tendencies of imperialism exist, which damage the interests of workers in imperialist Britain, such as the prevention of the rational use of resources and hardships brought about by wars and crises (Kemp 1967: 79-80), and the alienation, exploitation and oppression, which are the long-term experience for many in the working classes, even
within imperialist countries. Furthermore, capitalism’s tendencies to crisis mean that for many better-off workers, their relative privileges are only temporary, as has been demonstrated by the unemployment, house repossessions and cuts to public services and wages that are increasingly forcing large sections of the middle classes into material conditions closer to poorer sections of the working classes (Yaffe 2009a), with their future class position uncertain at best (Faccini and Hackworth 2010).

The question is therefore to what extent British workers identify and prioritise their overall long-term interests over short-term material gain and to what extent the poorer sections of the working classes in Britain follow the lead of the more privileged sections. This is a question of consciousness, for which the political influence of different sections of the working classes may be decisive. Miles and Phizacklea (1980: 6) employ the concept of ‘class fractions’ to differentiate “objective position[s] within a class boundary which [are], in turn, determined by both economic and politico-ideological relations”, the exact nature of which at a given conjuncture must be determined by empirical investigation. Added to this must be consideration of the political balance of forces, within which a numerically minority fraction of the British working class may come to exert a dominant influence on the class as a whole, as has been the case with the Labour Party for more than a century. This may help in understanding apparent contradictions, such as the actions of the Labour government of the mid 1970s, which maintained immigration controls whilst professing to campaign against racism and act in the interests of black workers (Miles and Phizacklea 1987: 94-105). The state is forced to actively intervene in relations between sections of the working classes, as part of the management of oppression. While the ruling classes rely on racialised divisions in order to foster national ‘loyalty’ and divide potential resistance, in some situations they must also act to limit the extent of overt racialised conflict avoid destabilisation.

Apparent contradictions in the relation of the Labour Party to racism are rooted in the party’s historical role as the political representation of the interests of a ‘labour aristocrat’ class fraction, which, despite its minority nature, has historically played a dominant role within the working classes (Clough 1992). Despite the measures carried out since 1979 under the ‘New Right’, which combined a general attack on the working classes with specific attacks on its most marginalised sections (Williams 1992: 166-7), at
times widening and increasing the visibility of the material separation of the labour aristocracy from the mass of the working class, the Labour Party has remained dominant. This has helped to ensure that class consciousness in Britain has largely continued in the ‘restricted’ tradition of Britain’s past, with a tendency towards defensive trade unionism focusing on British workers and British capitalism, and paying only lip service to international class solidarity (Miles and Phizacklea 1980: 175-6). This has shaped the kind of networks, norms, values and relationships of trust which social capital refers to, forming an element in the management of oppression beyond the state, as explored in more detail in later chapters. The historical tendency of the Labour Party to reject a principled opposition to racism on the basis that “a small amount of pandering to prejudice in the short term was necessary to clear the ground for a progressive future” has led in the recent period to a narrowing of the gap between its message and even that of the far-right, with the consequence that the arguments of the latter have received public legitimation (Kundnani 2007: 134-5). Where workers and oppressed people have broken out of this tradition, they have been viciously attacked by the dominant sections of the Labour Party, much of the official trade union movement and their supporters on the left. This is exemplified by the miners’ strike of 1984-1985, in which the miners made political demands, were prepared to use force when necessary to defend themselves, and in some areas made common cause with the Irish national liberation struggle and the urban uprisings of three years previously (Reed and Adamson 1985). Gordon Brown appealed directly to chauvinist trends in the British labour movement in his address to the September 2007 TUC conference, promising ‘British jobs for British workers’ (Brown 2007). Whilst the notion of ‘British jobs’ is technically meaningless in an era of capital operating on a multinational scale, it acts here as code for the claim to be responding to the problems of working class British citizens in a particular frame, by counterpoising their interests to those of workers from other countries, and promising continuing privilege in exchange for continued loyalty to British capital.

When confronted with the living reality of racism in Britain, the unwillingness of much of the British ‘left’ to confront British imperialism, which might threaten the interests of the labour aristocracy, has frequently found political expression in a concept highlighted by Bonnett (2000: 5), that has been widespread amongst political anti-racism in Britain
for some time, that racism is an ‘alien import’ forced upon a British nation with a tolerant and egalitarian past. This view was firmly established by organisations and individuals from the mid 1970s, many of them in and around the left of the Labour Party, notably the magazine *Searchlight*, which was founded in 1975, and the Anti-Nazi League, which was founded in 1977 (Gilroy 1998: 119-20). These sections of the ‘anti-racist left’ worked actively to narrow down anti-racist debate and action to ‘anti-Hitlerism’ focused on the National Front (NF), deflecting attention from the state racism then being directed by the British state towards Irish Catholics and black people, and refusing to acknowledge racism within the trade unions and Labour Party (Lentin 2004: 194-5). This redirection of anti-racism fitted the interests of the labour aristocracy, by creating an alternative nationalism centred on a mythologised ‘British struggle’ against ‘German fascism’ in the Second World War, and by shifting the focus to a few pathologised individuals at the margins, diverted any challenge to the imperialist ruling classes to which their interests were tied (Gilroy 1998: 135-148). There is little evidence that this has changed, with a recent survey of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) community and voluntary sector groups and trade unions in the North of England finding very little involvement of trade unions in black communities, and a total lack of approaches by trade unions to form alliances with black organisations, alongside complacent claims that “TUC anti-fascist campaigns showed unions to be addressing race issues” (Perrett and Lucio 2009: 1304).

Newcastle is representative of this national trend. Bonnett (1992: 10-19) argues that dominant anti-racist discourse on Tyneside in the 1980s combined a preoccupation with the “threat of neo-Nazism” with a concern not to alienate the ‘white working class’, and a neglect of the needs and experiences of local black communities. Outside of pathologised fascist groups, racism was not seen as an issue in Tyneside by many local white ‘anti-racists’, although action was being taken by black organisations. Around 1985, racist stickers, graffiti, vandalism and leafleting were discussed at some length within the local authority and an individual was arrested for daubing NF graffiti in the West end (Local Government and Racial Equality Subcommittee 1985: 8; Northumbria Police 1985). Tyne and Wear Council gave official support to the Tyneside and District Anti-Fascist Association (TDAFA) in 1985, with funding for a full time worker and offices (Evening Chronicle 1985). This enabled the state to make claims to be tackling racism,
whilst at the same time attacking the local Campaign for Black Direction and receiving strident criticism from members of the Black Youth Movement over racism in a local authority youth centre (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).

**Conclusions**

This chapter has provided a brief outline of the dominant, parasitic relation of Britain to the oppressed countries from which the majority of refugees flee, including the historic role played by migrants from oppressed countries as workers employed by British capital, both in their countries of origin and within Britain. Impoverishment of oppressed countries, wars and racism, are not the result of arbitrary policy decisions or simply the random accumulation of individual actions. Although the particular forms they take and the timings of particular events will be historically determined and influenced by a multitude of factors, as general recurring features, they are necessary elements of the imperialist system. The smooth running of imperialism depends on the international division of the working classes into a super-exploited majority, mostly located in oppressed countries, and a relatively privileged and loyal fraction within imperialist countries. The relation of British interests to particular driving factors of migration, including war, state repression and poverty in the context of the imperialist system, have been highlighted here for their complex and dialectical relation to situations of racism and refugee settlement in Britain, which will form the focus of the following chapters.
Chapter 4 - Racism and the Political Economy of Refugee Reception

Bowes et al. (2009: 24) point to the continuing racialisation of asylum seeking, and the need to “contextualise micro-level discussion within analysis of broader structures of inequality and exclusion, including those that draw on repertoires of racism”. This chapter discusses the persistence of racism in Britain, with a complex relationship to the management of migration from oppressed countries and the super-exploitation of their inhabitants. This is facilitated by a wider racialised context, such that, although legislation may not itself be explicitly discriminatory, the common understanding of problems within which it is implemented may lead to racist outcomes (Ben-Tovim, et al. 1986: 20-1). Following a survey of the position of black and migrant sections of the working classes, the chapter presents a theoretical analysis of the material basis of modern racism and its relation to nationalism and imperialism. This provides the context for a discussion of key elements of state policy and practice, which have influenced refugees’ position, focusing on the asylum decision-making process, dispersal and the prohibition on paid work for refugees without status. The role of these policies in re-imposing labour discipline among workers from oppressed countries is analysed through a combination of national policy evaluations and other literature, local press reports and individual refugee testimonies. By providing a platform for members of an often marginalised and ignored section of society, who are directly subject to these policies, to speak, this aims to relate international and national systems, trends and policies to local and personal outcomes and experiences, in order to demonstrate some of the human consequences of the division and management of labour under imperialism. Chapter 6 returns to consider the development of middle class elements among ethnic minorities in more detail, as part of the evolution of structures for the management of racism.

It has been argued that Britain has a history of constructing asylum policy in response to non-existent or false evidence (Schuster 2003: 7; Crawley 2010), which forces us to question the real drivers behind policy. Recent approaches by Labour governments under the banners of combating exclusion and building social capital frequently failed to account for how geographical concentrations of deprivation and ethnic density do not occur ‘naturally’, “but are themselves shaped by policy decisions and opportunity
structures”, and cannot therefore be taken as original cause for any related phenomenon (Platt 2009: 677). Similarly, what is frequently missing in discussion of ‘integration’ is the context into which refugees are expected to ‘integrate’, and the positions available for them to occupy (Kostakopoulou 2010: 838). While the material underdevelopment of countries occupying an oppressed position within imperialism has major significance for the causes of refugee creation, as discussed in Chapter 3, the dominant and parasitic relation of Britain to the countries from which refugees flee likewise has major significance for the nature of refugee reception.

The reception of refugees in Britain needs to be understood in the context of interrelated processes of migrant settlement and racialisation. Imperialist states have always been ready to acknowledge the positive value of immigration when it is under their control and benefits their labour markets, but when it is ‘spontaneous’, or out of their control, they express alarm (Borjas and Crisp 2005: 1). As demand for menial labour in the post-war period began to be satisfied, the state passed the 1962 Immigration Act, restricting entry to relatively skilled or qualified workers, or those with jobs waiting for them (Williams 1992: 164-5). Since then, there has been a succession of further acts, which have contributed to the shape of ethnic minority populations, with a decrease in primary immigration from Britain’s former colonies and an increase in the proportion of population growth accounted for by family reunion and births in Britain. For example, whereas in 1951 there were around 30,000 people in Britain designated as West Indian, most of them born abroad, by 1991 there were over 550,000, of whom more than 300,000 had been born in Britain (Small 2007: 372-5). The contemporary situation for many black people born in Britain has been described as ‘integrated yet alienated’, with weakening links to countries members of their family might have migrated from and the highest rate of ‘mixed race’ marriages of any imperialist country, alongside rising levels of racism in areas such as the labour market (Williams 2007: 401). This exemplifies the contradiction within calls for refugees to ‘integrate’, when the terms of integration assign a subordinate position for the majority of black people. This contradiction must be ‘managed’, in order to maintain the smooth running of the imperialist system.

Diversity among ethnic minorities in Britain has rapidly increased in recent years, with new sources and patterns of migration and settlement, leading some to talk about
‘super-diversity’ (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010). This leaves any single basis of categorisation, whether by self-defined ethnicity, country of birth, language group, or citizenship, inadequate. I therefore include consideration of differences in outcomes and experience across various dimensions, including where possible the interactions and divisions occurring across intersections.

**The position of black people in Britain**

Measures of the impact of racial discrimination need to address racism’s multi-faceted nature, including spoken and unspoken, intentional and unintentional, individual, institutional and structural, and that the impact of individual instances of racism may impact on individuals beyond those directly experiencing them (Karlsen and Nazroo 2006: 31-3). As of 2005, 24.4 per cent of ethnic minority households in the UK lived below the poverty line, compared to 9.9 per cent of all households (Morrissens and Sainsbury 2005: 644). Black people in Britain are more likely than white people to be homeless, particularly for those aged sixteen to twenty-four, and financial institutions have been found to apply more rigid criteria in assessing the status of black people when applying for loans for private housing (Small 2007: 377). Butt (2006: 3-4) and Nazroo (2006: 12) survey data suggesting that ethnic minority groups in Britain have notably higher age-standardised rates of long-term limiting illness or disability that restrict daily activities, particularly for ethnic minority women, and also continuing discrimination against older members of ethnic minority groups, those with mental health problems, and families with children. For some ethnic minority groups, combinations of factors such as insecure and exploitative conditions of employment, migrant status, wide geographical dispersal, lack of recourse to public support, increased insecurity and competition as a result of recession, and racism, can render needs and experiences particularly ‘invisible’ to policy and the design of services (Manthorpe, et al. 2008; Wilkinson, et al. 2009). As we are primarily concerned here with the relation of black people in Britain to international divisions of labour, the main focus will be on racism related to employment, although wider conditions of life also carry important implications for the relation of black people to capital. Of particular relevance to migration and asylum is the relation of black people to the British state, which will be taken up in Chapter 5.
Racism in employment

Significant discrimination has been found in employment, both through direct racism and, for migrants, a lack of recognition of experience and qualifications gained in another country and a lack of access to English lessons, often exacerbated by inflexibility of courses to fit round people’s work and domestic commitments (Cowen 2003: 14-19).

There is a considerable concentration by ethnicity and migrant status in particular industries, with the industries with the highest overall concentrations shown in Table 3:

Table 3: Percentage of employed ethnic minority labour by industry in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution, hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, insurance and finance</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration, education and health</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures from Census 2001, cited in Heath and Cheung 2006: 45-6

In the wholesale and retail trade and transport and communications sectors, around nine out of ten employers were employing migrant labour in autumn 2009, particularly from the EU. 41 per cent of employers in the hotels, catering and leisure sector said they intended to recruit migrant labour in the third quarter of 2009 (CIPD 2009a: 8). There are further concentrations by particular ethnic group. Out of those in employment in 2004, three fifths of Bangladeshi men and just under half of Chinese men worked in the distribution, hotels and restaurants industry compared with one sixth of their White British counterparts. One third of Bangladeshi women and two fifths of Chinese women also worked in this industry, compared with one fifth of all women. Over a quarter of Bangladeshi men were chefs, cooks or waiters, and one in seven Pakistani men was a taxi driver, cab driver or chauffeur, the numbers in both occupations comparing with one in a hundred White British men (ONS 2006b). A8 migrants in 2008 were disproportionately concentrated in distribution, hotels and restaurants, and manufacturing, and in the lowest-skilled categories, with the proportion of A8 workers working in elementary occupations and as process, plant and machinery operatives both more than three times that of workers born in the UK (Clancy 2008: 22-4). Between 2007 and 2008, 17 per cent of deaths at work in the construction industry were migrant workers, many of them from Eastern Europe, despite only accounting for between 2.4 and 8.0 per cent of workers in the industry (Mitchell 2009: iv), suggesting concentrations
Concentration in less-skilled work is widespread amongst ethnic minorities and migrants, with indications that many migrants from oppressed countries continue to experience de-skilling in the jobs they find in Britain, compared to their qualifications and experience in their countries of origin (Datta, et al. 2007: 57). Roberts et al. (2008: 29-33) report a range of case studies, which illustrate some of the ways racism can function in employment, despite race relations legislation, with a culture of implicit racial profiling in many companies, such as Kurdish and Polish migrants in one company who were valued by management for their ‘work ethic’ and their availability during periods of rapid expansion, but considered incapable of planning or managing at a more senior level. In 2004, Indian, Pakistani and Black African women were four times more likely than White British women to be working as packers, bottlers, canners and fillers. Pakistani and Indian women were respectively around six times and four times more likely than White British women to be working as sewing machinists (ONS 2006b). Within manufacturing, distribution, and banking, ethnic minorities are substantially under-represented in professional and managerial jobs but are over-represented in semi-routine and routine work (Heath and Cheung 2006: 48). Black people in Britain, therefore, continue to be disproportionately working class.

There continue to be high concentrations of particular ethnic minorities working in the public sector (Table 4):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Percentage in the public sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from Heath and Cheung 2006: 40*

Within these figures, there is variation by occupation. For example, although proportions of Indian men working in the public sector overall were comparable to the
general population, the proportion of Indian men working as medical practitioners, at 4 per cent, was around ten times higher than the rate for White British men (ONS 2006b). There are also significant differences by gender. As of 2004, half of Black Caribbean and Black African women in employment worked in the public administration, education or health sector (*ibid*). Around one in ten Black African women and one in seven ‘Other Asian’ women were working as nurses in 2004, compared with one in thirty White British women (*ibid*).

Overall, ethnic minorities working in the public sector are more likely than white workers to be in managerial and professional positions, and more likely to be in such positions than ethnic minorities in the private sector (Heath and Cheung 2006: 41). However, this masks both diversity within the ‘ethnic minority’ category, and the complex interaction of racism with people’s lives inside and outside the workplace. When comparing individuals of the same gender and level of qualification, ethnic minorities in the public sector earn on average 34 pence less per hour than white people, although this is only half the difference in the private sector (*ibid.*: 44). These aggregate figures also mask divisions in status and opportunity within the public sector, with a black middle class existing alongside super-exploited sections. Within the public sector as a whole, 30 per cent of workers who were born outside Britain are on temporary contracts, which is double the proportion in the private sector. Within the NHS, the figure in 84 per cent (CIPD 2009a: 8). This seems likely to have very serious consequences for concentrations of unemployment as public sector cuts continue.

Overall, there is considerable evidence of persisting racism in employment processes and outcomes, with migration and racialisation interacting in complex ways for different ethnic minorities, but tending overall towards a concentration of the majority of black people in more working class occupations, alongside a black middle class, mostly concentrated in the public sector.

**Racism in the labour market**

There are also racialised differences in access to any kind of paid work. In 2004, men from Black Caribbean, Black African, Bangladeshi and Mixed ethnic groups had unemployment rates around three times that of White British men (ONS 2006a). Using statistical analysis, it is possible to assess the level of disadvantage in employment
associated with being from a particular ethnic group more reliably than simply looking at raw percentages. Ethnicity-associated disadvantage in employment, or the ‘ethnic penalty’, for Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and women, Indian men and women, and Caribbean men, has fluctuated since the 1970s for all of the above groups, but they have remained in a consistently worse position than white people of the same gender (Berthoud and Blekesaune 2007: 27-8). Although unemployment rates for Chinese and Indian people in the recent period have been similar to those for white people, self-employment rates are relatively high among both these groups, as they are amongst Pakistanis, in some cases partly a response to difficulties experienced in trying to undertake waged work (Clark and Drinkwater 1998). Relatively low unemployment rates cannot, therefore, be taken as conclusive evidence that Indian and Chinese people do not experience difficulties in the labour market (Heath and Cheung 2006: 13). When controlling for age, qualifications, marital status, year and region, both men and women of all ethnic minorities except for Chinese experience a higher probability of unemployment associated with their ethnicity, revealing that Black Africans’ relatively high levels of employment are only achieved as a result of their disproportionately higher levels of education, and that, when controlling for educational level, Black Africans actually experience more ethnic disadvantage than other ethnic minorities.

There is only evidence of a marginal change in this for the second generation compared to the first, despite greater access to English language and recognised qualifications and experience (ibid.: 20-2). This suggests a continuing impact of racism, beyond its immediate role in the regulation of migrant labour.

In addition to those listed as officially ‘unemployed’, those listed as economically inactive include those who aren’t looking for work because they have found it so hard to find work in the past, and those who are unable to take work because of long-term illness or disability, which in some cases may be related to poor employment conditions, housing or health. For twelve months up to December 2008, the inactivity rate for non-white working age people across the UK was 32.1 per cent, compared to 20.0 per cent for white people (ONS 2009a: 14). Among reasons for economic inactivity, Chinese and African men report particularly high rates of students in full-time education, whilst Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Caribbean men have particularly high rates listed as ‘other inactivity’. This includes disproportionately high rates of long-term sickness and disability, which may be reflective of poor working and living conditions due to poverty,
whilst amongst Caribbeans it has been suggested that those who are ‘economically inactive’ include significant numbers of ‘discouraged workers’. Experience of difficulty in obtaining work, which is suggested by unemployment rates, might discourage some workers eventually from even looking for work. This means that their situation in the labour market may be even worse than the figures on unemployment suggest (Heath and Cheung 2006: 10-11).

Relative to white women, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women have faced fairly consistent employment penalties for the last thirty years, including being less likely than women on average to re-enter work once they become unemployed (Berthoud and Blekesaune 2007: 2). In 2008, out of the thirty countries of origin with the largest populations living in Britain, women from Somalia, Bangladesh and Pakistan had the highest economic inactivity rates and were also among the top four for unemployment (Khan 2008: 3-4; Table 5):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Economic Inactivity</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from Khan 2008: 3-4*

When controlling for family position, including having young children, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women still face large employment penalties compared to white women (Berthoud and Blekesaune 2007: 28). Together, these figures suggest that the degree of economic inactivity cannot simply be explained by a personal or cultural preference for unpaid work in the home, but that when women from these countries do attempt to find waged work, they are less likely to be successful, discouraging them from trying in the future (Khan 2008: 2-3). What this means is that these sections of ethnic minority women represent a significant potential reserve army of labour, who if work was offered may move from economic inactivity - representing in many cases unpaid domestic work - to also undertaking waged labour.
Racism in earnings

In addition to types and availability of work, there are also racialised inequalities in earnings. In 2004, 45 per cent of employed Bangladeshi men aged 22 or older earned less than the minimum wage, followed by 15 per cent of Pakistani men, and compared to only 4 per cent of white men (Heath and Cheung 2006: 18). In 2008, A8 workers and full-time workers born in Pakistan and Bangladesh had median gross earnings well below workers born in the UK, whilst workers born in some other imperialist countries had far higher median earnings, shown in Table 6 (ONS 2008: 3-5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Relative median income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan/Bangladesh</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/New Zealand</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from ONS 2008: 3-5*

This reflects relations between migration patterns and the relative position of countries in the imperialist system, which results in more privileged migrants from other imperialist countries having the opportunity to travel widely and take higher-paid jobs, whilst many workers from oppressed countries continue to be employed on wages, which many workers born in the UK would refuse to accept.

On the face of it, Indians and Black Africans have earnings above the national average. However, when controlling for qualification, region and industry, all ethnic minorities earn on average significantly less than the white majority. The implications of this in practice are illustrated by predicted earnings given in Table 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Unqualified, Midlands</th>
<th>Unqualified, London</th>
<th>Graduate, London</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>£7.24</td>
<td>£9.49</td>
<td>£19.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>£5.70</td>
<td>£7.46</td>
<td>£15.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>£5.26</td>
<td>£6.89</td>
<td>£14.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from Heath and Cheung 2006: 25-6*

Ethnic minority earnings are also substantially less than those of white individuals within
the same sector, especially in the case of banking (Heath and Cheung 2006: 48). This represents rates of super-exploitation directly associated with a racialised position in the working classes.

**Impacts of the economic crisis**

Some sections of black people have borne a disproportionate brunt of the initial consequences of the economic crisis. As of October 2009, almost one in five Black men in the UK was unemployed (CIPD 2009b) (See Table 8 for increases).

**Table 8: Male unemployment rates by ethnicity in 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
<th>Yearly change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black men</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>+4.6 percentage points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian men</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>+1.4 percentage points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ethnic minority men</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>+2.3 percentage points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White men</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>+3.1 percentage points</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from Stewart and Hopkins 2009*

In Newcastle, for the twelve months up to March 2009, unemployment rates amongst ethnic minorities born in the UK was 23.6 per cent, compared to 9.5 per cent amongst white people born the UK (APS 2008-2009).

At the same time, inactivity rates for ethnic minorities fell 0.9 percentage points between the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, but still stood at 31.1 per cent compared to 20.7 per cent for the overall population (EHRC 2009: 18). Table 9 gives other indicators.

**Table 9: Change in unemployment indicators for ethnic minorities in the year up to Quarter 1 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employment rate</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>ILO Unemployment</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minorities</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>+0.4% point</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>+0.5% point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>-1.2% point</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>+1.9% point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from EHRC 2009: 11*

This is a difference from the recession of the early 1990s, when the employment rate for
ethnic minorities dropped by significantly more than for the population as a whole (EHRC 2009: 17). What this may suggest is that a section of the ethnic minority population who were previously registered as ‘economically inactive’ - for example they may have been doing unpaid work in the home, or been unemployed but not drawing jobseekers allowance, or studying - have now started to seek paid work, and some of these have been successful. For the working age population as a whole, research has demonstrated that the real increase in unemployment since the start of the economic crisis has been under-represented in statistics, because an individual counts as employed whether they are in full-time or part-time work. Large numbers of full-time workers have been losing their jobs, but these have been offset in the statistics by increasing numbers, mainly of women, in part-time work (CIPD 2009c: 2). Applying this to black sections of the working classes, and taking into account the high levels of inactivity amongst some sections of ethnic minority women (Heath and Cheung 2006: 11-12; Khan 2008: 3-4), the changing figures for ethnic minority employment and inactivity as a whole, and the high unemployment amongst ethnic minority men, it seems reasonable to suggest that, as a result of the economic crisis, we may be witnessing a restructuring of the black working classes, with increased unemployment amongst ethnic minority men and an intensification of dual exploitation of ethnic minority women, who were previously engaged in unpaid labour in the home, and are now taking on part time jobs in addition to make ends meet.

Direct experiences of racism
This continued super-exploitation of the labour of black people and migrants in Britain has taken place alongside a rising tide of racist attacks (IRR 2001; Athwal, et al. 2010). In March 2001, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia found that 22 per cent of British people ‘tend to agree’ that ‘legal’ immigrants should be returned to their home country, up from 15 per cent in 1997. According to the report, “British acceptance of genuine asylum seekers is the lowest of any EU country, with only 12 per cent agreeing that ‘people suffering from human rights violations in their country’ should be granted unrestricted asylum in the UK” (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 301-2). This was six months before the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, which was followed by heightened racist government and media propaganda and saw a further rise in racist attacks (Chinweizu 2005; 2007b).
Of 223 ethnic minority residents of Newcastle interviewed in a council survey in 1990, 58 per cent reported experiencing one or more incidents of racial harassment in the previous year, 12 per cent on a daily basis, and one in ten reported physical attacks at least a few times a year (Newcastle City Council 1990: 3). In 1991, following a spate of racist attacks on visitors to a mosque in the West end of Newcastle (Andrews 1998), Khoaz Aziz Miah was beaten to death on his way home from prayers. This contributed to Newcastle City Council taking on the Racial Harassment Support Group (RHSG), which had developed out of a grassroots community response, as a council project with funding from the Home Office. By the mid 1990s, RHSG was undertaking thirty cases every month, compared to around six racist incidents reported to the police each year at the beginning of the 1990s (Interview 2005). 34 per cent of residents surveyed in 1990 and 42 per cent in 1995 said they were not reporting incidents to the police, and of those who had reported incidents, only 33 per cent in 1990 and 31 per cent in 1995 were satisfied with police responses, whilst 38 per cent and 23 per cent were dissatisfied (Newcastle City Council 1995: 3). This suggests a lack of serious attention to racist harassment by police, which can contribute to a sense of isolation and resignation, as expressed by 5 per cent of respondents in 1995, who, in the words of one person, felt that: “Nobody can help with this problem and this is the one things we have to live with” (ibid.: 3). Racial harassment was particularly intense in some areas of Newcastle, with 93 per cent of respondents in one West end ward experiencing some form of racial harassment in the last year compared to 53 per cent in a neighbouring ward (ibid.: 2). There are indications that this prevalence of racism continued during the late 1990s and beyond, as discussed in later chapters. In 1998, racist graffiti was daubed on the building of Newcastle Youth Congress, a voluntary organisation partly funded by Newcastle City Council, which aimed to build bridges between Newcastle’s ethnic minorities. The previous week, a 15 year old black member of the organisation had been beaten up, cut with a knife, had his bike stolen and was told to never return to the West end (McNeill 1998). There is also evidence of high levels of racial harassment during this period in parts of the city with lower ethnic minority density (RHSG(E) 1998).

Feelings of difference based on the idea of ‘race’ are perpetuated by such ‘everyday’ racial harassment, which, in the absence of effective opposition, is often seen as
unchangeable, so that black people are expected to be the ones to adapt. Although often recorded from the point of view of racialised minorities, harassment and attacks also involve significant numbers of white people as perpetrators, reinforcing their own racialisation as they racialise others (Chahal and Julienne 1999: 8-10). Racial harassment is not random, but strategic in that people are targeted not for who they are, but for what they are seen to represent (Hesse, et al. 1992: xxiv). The focus of much racial harassment on people’s homes has a material impact on residence patterns, increasing segregation and forcing racialised minorities to accept poorer housing (Chahal and Julienne 1999: 4-5). Experiences of racism impact directly and indirectly on health outcomes, for example, by depriving people of socioeconomic resources, increasing isolation, and subjecting to higher levels of stress and anxiety (Becares, et al. 2009: 700).

A clear class distinction is apparent within racial harassment, with those with less power in society tending to resort to more direct and often physical expressions and tactics, and direct racial harassment consequently often taking place amongst the working classes (Chahal and Julienne 1999: 12). Vulnerability to racial harassment is heightened for poorer working class members of ethnic minorities, through circumstances such as social housing, unsociable working hours and lack of access to personal transport (IRR 2001: 13). The focus of much state action on individual racial harassment therefore reinforces liberal conceptions of racism as ‘zero sum conflicts’ between sections of the working classes, with the state standing apart and independent (Bulpitt 1986: 19; see also Chahal and Julienne 1999: 1). State policies combine with individual racial harassment on the streets to put pressure on differently racialised people not to associate (Chahal and Julienne 1999: 26-7), curbing dissent and reinforcing individuals’ position within international divisions of labour. In assessing this, there is no clear line between institutional racism and individual racist violence, as failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the latter is itself part of the former (IRR 2001: 17).

There is thus ample evidence that racism continues to impact, in conjunction with borders and immigration controls, to structure the relationship of black people to capital, and to allocate to ethnic minorities in Britain a particular position in international divisions of labour. Physical divisions of labour operate in interaction with political and social dimensions, including ideological discourses of nationalism and
Imperialism, nationalism and racism

Despite the persistence of the idea of races and the evidence of continuing racialised inequalities in outcomes, as Cohen (2006: 4) suggests, “Even the most naive cursory appreciation of the history of migration (reinforced now by the evidence of the Human Genome Project) demonstrates a more plausible alternative proposition”, that of a single human race with common origins in Africa. Despite the fact that much ‘commonsense’ race-thinking functions in terms of skin colour, the assumption that race-thinking is simply rooted in visible difference is shown to be false by examples such as the extreme racialisation of Bosnian Muslims as against Bosnian Serbs, and Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda (Miles and Brown 2003: 6), or closer to home the racism directed in different periods of Britain’s history against predominantly pale-skinned Jews and Irish Catholics. The consistent role of ‘race’ has been as a guiding interpretation of the world, suggesting distinct collectives based on sometimes real and sometimes imagined shared biological and cultural characteristics, with an assumed deterministic relationship between the two (ibid.: 89). The vagueness of the concept contributes to its enduring power, by allowing it to mean different things to different people at different times (Barzun 1965: 2).

The argument that racism is a ‘natural’ response amongst people not used to migration to ‘their’ area has a certain common sense resonance in the case of the North East. Some writers have presented a picture of a ‘monocultural’ white Tyneside, sheltered from contact with immigrants until the 1950s or even later, expressed, for example, in arguments that as of 1980 “Tyneside’s parochial conservatism [had] hardly been challenged by contact with other cultures since the area has such a small ethnic minority population” (Robinson 1988: 190). Yet such a picture is far from complete, and glosses over a much longer history of migration, settlement, racism and resistance. According to archival research, “Black Africans, Americans and West Indians continued to visit, perform, and settle in the North East throughout the nineteenth century” (Archive Mapping and Research Project 2007). In addition to a steady stream of black performing groups visiting Newcastle in the late 19th Century, there is evidence of a
stable black resident population working in a variety of occupations. Black residents of Newcastle were also politically active during this period, including black sailors who played an active role in a notable seamen’s strike in 1866. When the British Association for the Advancement of Science held its national convention in Newcastle in 1863, and two speakers made the claim that black people were not fully human, they were rebutted by a local black man, William Craft, who had lived in England for thirteen years after escaping slavery in the US. Craft warned the two supposed ‘experts’, “not to try it on in Newcastle where a Negro is treated as a man and a brother”. At the same time, racism was evident from the state, with a publican receiving only a small fine from local magistrates for kidnapping a “young man of colour”, Henry Niles, with the intention of forcing him onto an Italian ship in 1861 (Godfrey 1989). Records of black people in Newcastle continue to surface into the early twentieth century. For example, a 1936 obituary records the death of African-American Charles Johnstone, who had worked the night shift on the gate of the Swan Hunter shipyard in Newcastle for forty-one years at the time of his death (The Shipyard 1936: 10). A survey of eighty-eight families in the West end of Newcastle in 1972 found several Indian and Pakistani men, who had moved to Newcastle as early as the 1930s, leaving Britain for a period of years and then returning with their families (Atkinson 1972: 135-6).

Such longstanding histories of migration and settlement, repeated in a diverse tapestry across Britain, raise questions about the persistence of racism at personal, local and national levels. Whilst there is no simple and linear causation between structural factors and particular outcomes of racialised oppression, some structural formations are more conducive to racist outcomes than others (Williams 2005: 40), and play a large role in influencing particular racial constructions. Race may be regarded as a form of myth, carrying social and political force, despite its non-correspondence with material reality. Studies of the role of myth and magic across different societies suggest that where secular understanding and technique is sufficient to meet human needs, myth plays no role. The propagation of racism is therefore intimately tied to material conditions, and to the absence of a scientific understanding of society and the capacity to act on it (Cassirer 1967: 278-9). As Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins (2002: 290-1) point out, “Myths only ever occur as arguments, and as arguments are invariably specific responses to a particular state of affairs or opposing alternatives”, and therefore develop at the
conjuncture of political struggles. Whilst the particular symbolic content of constructions of racism in Britain have shifted in response to changes in socio-economic conditions, including factors such as demand for labour in Britain, the symbolic role of racism in managing bodies in the interests of capital forms a line of continuity (Goldberg 1994: 53-4; Dominelli 1997: 11-15).

Since production and labour relations necessarily entail social relations and labourers as social agents, this requires systems of signification to select and legitimate use of labour, of which race is one historically contingent instance (Miles 1987: 187-8). Saxton (1990: 14-18) locates the ‘pre-race’ basis of race-thinking in the interaction of population and state movements with class relations, relations then requiring justification to fit with Enlightenment morality. Under capitalism, there has been a long history of legislative controls on the movement of poor people, initially internally, with the Poor Law and Vagrancy Laws operating in early British capitalism to control movement from the countryside to the towns, whilst minimising the costs to the state (Gordon and Newnham 1985: 5). These controls, and the systematic exploitation they played a part in managing, were supported and justified at the time by the idea that class characteristics were transmitted through heredity, and that working class people had inherent and degenerate biological differences (Cashmore and Troyna 1990: 43; Lentin 2004: 51). It was only with the development of the imperialist character of British capitalism from the mid nineteenth century that the majority of the working classes in Britain began to be incorporated into the same ‘race’ as the British ruling classes, and the legislative focus shifted to ‘external’ migration controls (Schuster 2003: 175; Kundnani 2007: 12-13), with Irish Catholics an early focus of anti-immigrant hostility (Hickman 1996: 85-9).

Viewed abstractly, there is no necessary conjunction between racism and nationalism, but a particular and close relationship has developed in the context of Britain’s situation as the first fully-developed capitalist country, and its colonial and imperialist relations with other nations (Cassirer 1967: 232; see also Miles and Phizacklea 1987: 133). Since the development of British oppression over other countries began, nationalism has played a dominant role in enabling the ruling classes to present their own interests as the ‘general interests’ of society (Marx and Engels [1845] 1991: 52-3). In this context,
racism towards migrants from oppressed countries is generated by the threat they represent to the divide between ‘our’ wealth and ‘their’ poverty (Kundnani 2007: 3-4).

The early US sociologist of race, Robert Ezra Park, predicted that the increasing integration of the world economic system and interrelationships between modern states would decrease the importance of race in favour of class (Geschwinder 1977: 6-7). Hardt and Negri (2001: 236-7) argue that this has indeed happened, and that nation states have become irrelevant, to the point that class struggle acts, ‘without limits’, directly between an international capitalist class and an international labouring class, without distinction of nation. If this were accurate, then it may be argued that the current stage of capitalism contains no material basis for racism, or that, as Gilroy (2001: 56-7) argues, modernity’s racism dependent on nations as bounded and antagonistic entities has been transcended by qualitatively new and post-modern racisms. On the contrary, as the discussion of imperialism in the previous chapter demonstrates, national antagonisms continue to be a key feature of the present period, and are intensifying as the crisis of the system deepens. In the era of imperialism struggles for national domination and liberation are a fundamental part of the class struggle. Following previous periods in which labour was moved around the world through direct force under slavery and then indenture, today capital is largely reliant on less direct means of manipulating the movement of labour according to its needs (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 285). Racism plays a vital role, informally structuring individuals’ relationship to capital in line with international divisions of labour. At the same time, racism diverts attention from the structural causes of population displacement to racialised and localised explanations, such as “Holy wars, nationalist wars, ethnic conflicts, genocidal threats, and terrorist activities” (Richmond 2002: 710). For example, in the case of Somalia, which provides one of the largest sections of the refugee population in London: “It was more convenient to present the Somalis as uncivilised ‘barbarians’, who had a natural propensity to tribal warfare, rather than to acknowledge the West’s own hand in Somalia’s collapse in the 1980s” (Kundnani 2007: 38).

Arguments against simplistically subsuming raced and gendered oppression within class, which have come frequently, although not solely, from post-modernists, are an
important reminder of the complexity of class in a modern, imperialist world and the necessity of incorporating race in any class analysis, if that analysis is not to be entirely incomplete (Goldberg 1994: 44-5). Post-modernists have done useful work in deconstructing race in order to demonstrate its simultaneous ontological emptiness and concrete oppressive force (Roedigger 1994: 10-11). Yet, post-modernism’s neglect of the material basis of politics and culture presents dominant discourses as entirely subjective and implicitly arbitrary, rather than reflecting the material relations that make them dominant (Goldberg 1994: 9). This objectively serves the interests of those privileged by the status quo, by obscuring the connection between structure and ideology and thus disarming those aiming to overturn oppressive relations. As Bonnett (2005: 784) baldly argues of those who identify themselves as ‘post-race’, “if we imagine that, in the absence of changes within other aspects of society, being ‘post-race’ transports us to some happy place where ethnic prejudice is a thing of the past, then we have failed to learn from the twentieth century”. Nor can post-modernists adequately explain why the destruction of one racialising theory by facts does not prevent the formation of another along different lines of signification (Barzun 1965: 12), or why particular signifiers should become relevant in different historical contexts.

Assimilation and the reconstruction of British nationalism

Recent years have witnessed a drive across Western Europe towards aggressive assimilation, based on the view that violence carried out by a tiny minority of Muslims is rooted in their ‘cultural difference’ (Fekete 2004: 18-19), with the portrayal of “a slippery slope from segregation to extremism to terrorism” (Kundnani 2007: 124). This has been enforced in Britain through a combination of tightening controls on entry, together with official lists of ‘national values’ and tests for language proficiency and national loyalty (Back, et al. 2002: 446; Kostakopoulou 2010: 830). For immigrants to attain membership of the ‘British nation’, they are now required to explicitly support the history of British colonialism, with a handbook published by the Home Office to prepare immigrants for citizenship ceremonies describing how “for many indigenous peoples in Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and elsewhere, the British Empire often brought more regular, acceptable and impartial systems of law and order”, and “disparate tribal areas” were united through access to the English language, healthcare and education. No mention is made in the pamphlet of the massacres and other
injustices carried out under British colonialism (Kundnani 2007: 137-8). These developments have formed part of a reconfiguring of British nationalism to also include some black people and existing migrants as members of a ‘multicultural nation’, alongside continued denial of equal rights to most newcomers (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 299). A particularly stark example of the outcome of this trajectory has been the participation of a small number of black people in the violently anti-Muslim and pro-imperialist ‘English Defence League’ (Adar 2010; FRFI 2010; Taylor 2010).

As part of this shift, multiculturalism has come under attack for interfering with national ‘governance’ (Zetter, et al. 2006: 4-6; Però 2008: 74-6). At the time of the MacPherson Report’s publication, which pointed to institutional racism in areas of the British state, David Blunkett, then Education Secretary, rejected the recommendation for a programme of anti-racist education on the basis that it would undermine national culture (Kundnani 2007: 131). Framed in however ‘friendly’ and ‘welcoming’ a way, assimilationist approaches to help black people ‘adapt to the British way of life’ assume superiority of white culture, render black people’s day-to-day experience of racism invisible, ignore their positive contributions and deny their acts of resistance (Dominelli 1997: 3). The consent of migrants to assimilate is frequently considered unnecessary, as with Gordon Brown’s ‘solution’ to migrant unemployment through the imposition of “mandatory English training” (Brown 2006: 13). Within this context, the overall policy paradigm of recent governments has presented immigration as primarily a security problem (Cheong, et al. 2007: 35). This ideological construction of particularly racialised minority immigration, and the response of ‘defence of the nation’ that it calls for, is enacted through a combination of implicit and veiled ‘cultural’ racism in the formal political arena, together with overt racism employing older, crude ideological formations on the streets and in the actions of the state’s repressive apparatus (Miles 1987: 36-7; see also Gilroy 2001: 246-7).

A decisive point in the turn of Labour governments towards assimilationism was the uprisings in Bradford and other Northern cities in the summer of 2001, which represented a response to decades of racism and poverty among large sections of the Asian population (McGhee 2003). Research on the political engagement of Muslims following the uprisings found that large sections of Muslim people felt they had no
influence on decisions at a local level, let alone nationally (Jayaweera and Choudhury 2008: 88-90), but contrary to the dominant response of the state that followed, research also found that this related at least as much to material inequality and racism as to a lack of willingness to engage (ibid.: 78). The response of Labour governments focused on promotion of a set of ‘British values’ as the defining feature for a reconstructed British nationalism, in an approach summed up by then Labour Chancellor Gordon Brown, in a speech to the Fabian Society:

“If we are clear that shared values - not colour, nor unchanging and unchangeable institutions - define what it means to be British in the modern world, we can be far more ambitious in defining for our time the responsibilities of citizenship; far more ambitious in forging a new and contemporary settlement of the relationship between state, community and individual ... our success as Great Britain, our ability to meet and master not just the challenges of a global economy, but also the international, demographic, constitutional and social challenges ahead, and even the security challenges, requires us to rediscover ... the shared values that bind us together and give us common purpose.” (Brown 2006: 2; see also Blair 2006)

This reconstructed British nationalism served to deflect attention away from economic inequalities and onto the values and beliefs of minorities (Cheong, et al. 2007: 26), uniting different ethnic groups through opposition to the Muslim and asylum seeker ‘other’ (Fekete, 2004: 18-19), at the same time as second and third generation descendents of immigrants continued to suffer racism (Lentin 2004: 311-12). In this process, long-standing cultural racisms are mobilised in response to particular material conditions and struggles. McGhee (2003: 396-400) suggests that the punitive sentences handed out to young Asian people following the 2001 uprisings related at least in part to a view of them as representatives of a ‘dangerous other’, ignoring the context of provocations by heavy-handed policing and far-right activity. A key determinant of these target out-groups is their perceived support for, or simply symbolisation of, forces of resistance to imperialism, and repression of these groups has been brutal and far-ranging, from deportation, to systematic police harassment, to shoot-to-kill (Brickley 2005).
The mandatory reconstruction of migrants’ values, including their readiness to make ‘long term sacrifices’, came to be viewed as essential for the ‘national interest’ under recent Labour governments (Brown 2006: 3). This nationalist agenda was advanced through a citizenship programme involving the re-writing of a historical narrative of Britain as a home of ‘liberty, responsibility and fairness’:

“And we should not recoil from our national history rather we should make it more central to our education ... not just dates places and names, nor just a set of unconnected facts, but a narrative that encompasses our history. And because citizenship is still taught too much in isolation, I suggest in the current review of the curriculum that we look at how we root the teaching of citizenship more closely in history.” (Brown 2006: 14)

The shifting membership of the nationalist project was expressed in the emphasis in the White Paper ‘Secure borders, safe haven’ (Home Office 2002) on the need to cultivate a sense of ‘active citizenship’ in both existing ‘working class communities’ and those entering these communities as immigrants, reinforced by citizenship tests introduced by the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 212-13).

Alongside the careful cooption of those sections of the working class who could be won over, the same white paper announced new powers to strip UK citizenship from people with dual nationality if they were considered to be acting in a way “seriously prejudicial” to the UK’s “national interests”, extending the power of deportation and its potential use as a political weapon (Kundnani 2007: 128-9).

The shift towards assimilation has been supported by attempts to refocus away from anti-racism and a focus on structural elements of oppression, onto a more generalised ‘anti-discrimination’. More or less radical varieties of ‘diversity’ approaches have been promoted in the name of overcoming one-dimensional perspectives, which ignore the interaction of oppression based, for example, on gender and racism, but have been criticised for diverting attention from the specific roots and processes of racism, which are targeted by anti-racist approaches (Butt 2006: 1-2). The conflation of racism with other forms of ‘discrimination’ follows the post-war ‘UNESCO tradition’ on race, based on a scientific discrediting of the biological basis of race, and its replacement by an explanation of human difference based on categories of culture and ethnicity, which serves to dehistoricise racism and hide its connection to the state (Lentin 2004: 74-7).
This view, strongly influenced by liberal humanism and psychological explanations of racism, makes claims to be ‘colour-blind’, but in doing so ignores questions of power and the different treatment and social position of black and white people (Frankenberg 1994: 142-9; see also Saxton 1990: 10; Hesse 1992: 51). When confronted with the reality of racist outcomes, the assimilationist logic of such a perspective is that greater success by white people is due to individual excellence (Dyer 1999: 9), whereas poorer outcomes for black people is due to some deficiency on their part, such as lack of skills or competencies in order to compete equally, and that they should use ‘mind over matter’ to overcome their problems, creating the illusion that black people can ‘earn equality’ if they work hard enough (Williams 2005: 38-44). Simultaneously, racialised depictions of ‘ethnic communities’ as homogenous blocks deny internal struggles, such as those waged by women within Muslim communities. It is suggested that assimilation is the only road to progress, as though women’s oppression was absent from ‘White British’ communities and values, when an average of two women a day die as a result of domestic violence from their partners in mainstream, ‘white’ British society (Kundnani 2007: 138-9). Geschwender (1977: 7-8) describes the assimilationist perspective as concluding in the argument that immigrants themselves, and particularly those showing ‘visible difference’, are the ones responsible for racism (see also Ahmad 1993: 8). The extreme lengths to which the British state has been prepared to carry this argument, when necessitated by their interests, was shown in the late 1930s, when the government refused to accept Jewish refugees from Germany on the grounds that this would increase anti-semitism (Schuster 2002: 54-5).

Links between racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination need to be established through a concrete analysis of each process in interaction, rather than by starting from the assertion that they are all basically the same. At the same time, whilst maintaining analytical distinctions, we must also keep in sight their coexistent and interconnected nature in material reality. This is not to imply that anti-racist and women’s struggles should be subsumed within a simplistic notion of the class struggle, or they should be pushed back to await redress on its ‘conclusion’; rather, it is to argue that the class struggle can only be waged effectively through an explicit focus on the role of gendered and racialised oppression.
Refugees in Britain and the management of migration

A concrete examination of the position of refugees in Britain is impeded by the rigid distinction often drawn between ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive migrants’, and between refugees and other forms of migration (Bowes et al. 2009: 24-5), reflected in a historical divide between refugee and migration studies (Sorensen and Olwig 2002: 7-10).

‘Proactive migrants’ are frequently thought of as making a ‘free’ and independent choice to migrate, whilst ‘reactive migrants’ are assumed to be forced to migrate by external conditions beyond their control. In practice, there is rather a continuum between those who have some freedom of choice whether, when and where to move, and those who have very little (Richmond 2002: 708-9). Even for those classified as ‘forced migrants’, choices are still made, even if within an extremely limited range of options (Crawley 2010: 20-3). Refugees occupy an ambiguous position, simultaneously seeking refuge on the basis of human rights and at the same time forming part of the international reserve army of labour, with the potential to be called on depending on circumstances and the needs of capital (Kay and Miles 1992: 4-7). As Castells ([1975] 2002: 85) suggests, the role of immigration, and by implication immigrants, “has to be explained, not in terms of the technical demands of production, but by the specific interests of capital in a particular phase of its development”. This includes political, as well as purely economic, considerations. Refugees’ situation may be viewed as a particularly acute form of the general contradiction between migrants as units of wage labour and as conscious social and political actors, with interests independent of capital and a spontaneous propensity to form non-market relationships and ‘put down roots’ (Coole 2009: 380). Whilst Zygmunt Bauman and associated theorists (e.g. Barmaki 2009) suggest that refugees are criminalised as part of an ‘underclass’, in a context where a reserve army is no longer necessary for contemporary capitalism, I argue that their criminalisation is instead a reflection of the continuing importance of the reserve army, and the need to discipline those who do not obey its labour market imperatives. This has implications beyond this section of labour, contributing to divisions which make it easier for the state to impose increased discipline on the wider working classes, through measures such as the Welfare Reform Act 2010, which introduced multiple new grounds for withdrawing benefits from people not prepared to accept whatever work was available, no matter how poor the terms.
Whilst asylum applications did undergo a significant increase from around 4,000 per year between 1980 and 1988, to 26,205 in 1990 and 80,315 in 2000 (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 38), the influence of asylum on public discussions of immigration is out of all proportion to the relative numbers of refugees compared to other forms of population movements (Cohen 2006: 5-6; Crawley 2006: 22-4). Between 1995 and 1999, migration to Britain from other advanced capitalist countries totalled 381,000, compared to 282,000 asylum applications, around half of which were rejected. Yet, it is migration from oppressed countries which is problematised in government, media and public discourse (Back, et al. 2002: 451-2). Labour’s five year strategy, outlined in ‘Controlling Our Borders: Making migration work for Britain’ (Home Office 2005a), involved a four-tiered system ranking ‘highly-skilled’ English speaking migrants above ‘low-skilled’, non-English speaking workers, and only allowing settlement after five years for the top two tiers (Cheong, et al. 2007: 35). Initial results of this strategy unsurprisingly showed the majority of those in the top tiers to be from other imperialist countries, whilst the middle tiers were predominantly white Eastern Europeans, and the bottom tiers predominantly black people from longstanding oppressed countries in Africa and Asia (Jameson 2006). In the first quarter of 2010, there were 406,455 visas issued to enter the UK, 229,435 applications for settlement by migrants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), 194,635 applications for British citizenship, 22,810 applications under the Workers Registration Scheme, but only 4,355 applications for asylum (Home Office 2010: 1-2). The majority of non-EU workers with permission to work in Britain exist outside the boundaries of a welfare state based on need rather than direct labour market considerations. As Morris (2007:) describes, instead:

“economic migration is conducted on a largely contractual basis. Entry into an EU member state for non-EEA citizens involves clearly stated terms relating to purpose and conditions of stay. As well as specifying initial duration, these terms usually include any restrictions on the right to take employment, and a condition of no recourse to public funds for a specified period” (Morris 2007: 40)

This represents a fine-tuning of immigration controls, in order to recruit workers with exactly the skills needed by British capital, on the best possible terms, whilst attacking the rights of those fleeing persecution and poverty (Jameson 2006). These controls are not predetermined by fixed racist ideas. Rather, they are determined by the needs of
capital and British imperialism’s economic, legal and political relationships with other countries (Miles and Phizacklea 1980: 14), which are then justified and enforced through racism. Refugees occupy a distinct position in Britain, both in relation to capital and to other sections of the working classes, a position which is mediated by racism. Racism is the ideology and practice around which class struggle takes place, rather than simply the ideology of the ruling classes, with the potential for different fractions of different classes to have interests served or opposed by racism in different instances (examples are offered by Castells [1975] 2002; Miles and Phizacklea 1987; Sivanandan 1991; Miles and Brown 2003). Different sections of capital may have different interests in the movement of labour and capital, for example manufacturing and communications capital moving to the cheapest labour markets in oppressed countries, whilst personal service occupations, construction and agriculture seek immigrants to move to the imperialist centres (Richmond 2002: 714). As different stages and conditions in the economic cycle impact, such as through demand for labour or the ability of capital and the state to grant concessions, so processes of racialisation must shift and adapt (RCG 1979: 4), and historically have taken a variety of forms.

Recent Labour governments’ approach of ‘managed migration’ made no pretence to accord rights to migrants, but viewed them purely in terms of their economic value, with an inevitable fall-out on treatment of refugees, despite claims to the contrary embodied in the UN Convention on Refugees (Kundnani 2007: 7-8). Since the 1990s, there has been a shifting depiction of refugees in Britain, from a group claiming humanitarian protection to ‘economic migrants’ coming to sponge of the welfare state. Following the removal of many benefits, which did not decrease numbers but created a national crisis, refugees became reclassified again, now as ‘illegal immigrants’, and were responded to with tightened border controls, which in turn created a market for international people trafficking, which was used to further increase the image of criminality. Following September 11 2001, they made a final transformation into potential terrorists, with terrorism seen to be based on cultural difference (Kundnani 2007: 4-5). Patterns of racist attacks support the idea that racial signifiers in Britain have shifted away from a more exclusive focus on skin colour to focus on other visual factors and accent (IRR 2001: 13), with the perception of an individual as an ‘asylum seeker’ playing a powerful role. The impact of this is strongly gendered, reinforcing the
oppression of women refugees as a distinct class fraction. Whilst not exclusive to refugee women as opposed to all women, it is significant that 83 per cent of female refugees who participated in a national survey said they do not go out at night because they are scared of abuse and harassment (NERS 2007: 14).

The exploitation of refugees is increased through greater pressure to accept undesirable and low-paid jobs, as a result of poverty and the non-availability of pensions compared to the majority of the working classes, and through the lower costs to the state and capital due to their disproportionately poorer quality and more overcrowded housing conditions (Phillips 2006). Hewitt (2002: 8) describes the way in which:

“Living outside the main social benefits system, recent asylum policy all but worsened their social exclusion and that means that different agencies find themselves struggling to meet asylum seekers’ basic needs.” (Hewitt 2002: 8)

As the metaphor implies, once refugees have ‘put down roots’ in Britain, with access to resources and networks of support, they are in a stronger position to resist the demands of capital. In Britain’s network of immigration detention facilities, Gill (2009) found that regular movement of detainees between centres not only disrupted any attempts by detainees to build networks, but also contributed to a transient view of individual refugees on the part of non-refugees who had contact with them, with little opportunity to form relationships, either with detention centre personnel or local support and activist organisations. This facilitated the dehumanisation of refugees as passive objects to be ‘managed’, with evidence that those trying to complain or organise with other detainees were particularly liable to be transferred. Outside detention, Temple et al. (2005: 23-4) report refugees struggling to make wider links, in a context of high levels of personal racism and disruption by the state of what connections they had established. Refugees’ ability to put down roots and rebuild their lives in Britain has been consistently obstructed over the last decade by key policy interventions, which have combined to undermine resistance to being re-incorporated into international divisions of labour on the terms of capital. Temple et al. (2005: 26) found that along with dispersal, refugees’ attempts to reconstitute communities were restricted by: allocations of resources, which tended to exclude refugees without status from integration initiatives; hostile environments in dispersal areas, which in some cases kept people confined to their homes; and prohibition of paid work. Similar key
factors were identified in my research, framed and given added force by the asylum decision making-process itself.

The asylum decision-making process
The deep-rooted antagonism between the interests of refugees and the British state plays out in various ways, which can be traced in refugees’ accounts of the asylum process. In the first quarter of 2010, 76 per cent of asylum applications were refused at their first hearing, and 68 per cent of appeals against previous refusals were also rejected. This is in a context in which 93 per cent of applications for other forms of settlement during the same period were granted, with an increase of 45 per cent increase from a year earlier in numbers of grants of settlement for employment-related purposes (Home Office 2010). BID (2009: 15) suggests that UK asylum policies are implicitly based around a highly unrealistic ‘model’ refugee, who “arrives in the UK with their identity documents, declares to the immigration authorities ‘I would like to make a claim for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention’, and hands over a dossier of evidence in support of their claim”. The mismatch of reality with this expectation leads to experiences reported by refugees in detention, who talked about “confusion, misinformation, bad advice, fear and shock that they had ended up incarcerated” (BID 2009: 15). Issues raised by participants in my own research can be grouped into the length of wait for their case to be decided, the mistrust many reported experiencing from the state and the inconsistency, unfairness and lack of transparency of decisions.

The length of wait for a final decision was a frequent concern across participants:

“the way they are doing this is very slow. I was having hope, but now the hope again is a bit shaky, because it is just taking [so] long” (CAMP, arrived 2006)

“the immigration [system] is very bad, they keep you waiting ... like me eight years now ... I [have] family and I left my country, I have [been] traumatised and I have so many experiences ... sometimes [it is very] stressful” (CHUR, arrived 2001)

“there is this backlog of all these people who have been in this country like I have for seven years, and I haven’t heard anything from the Home Office yet, and these people are just stuck in the twilight zone, they can’t move on” (VOL, arrived 2001)
Coupled with restrictions on paid work, studying or even volunteering with many organisations, the length of wait many participants reported prevented them from moving on with their life and created serious uncertainty and anxiety which compounded the effects of traumatic experiences many participants went through before coming to Britain. The pressure thus generated from refugees without status for quicker decisions has been an important factor in gaining their support or at least acquiescence for changes to the system since 2007, when the New Asylum Model (NAM) was introduced, which have reduced waiting times for decisions, whilst negatively affecting refugees’ interests in other ways, as discussed further below.

In contrast to the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ in other areas of British law, in asylum law it is up to the claimant to prove they are telling the truth, and, until they do so to the satisfaction of state officials, they are liable to detention, deportation, and denial of other rights. Whilst refugees are expected to place their trust in the British state, Hynes (2009) surveys the ways in which mistrust of refugees is built into every stage of the UK asylum process and is a barrier that must be overcome by refugees without status in order to be granted permission to stay in Britain. One participant expressed their feelings about the unreasonable nature of the state’s demands for written evidence from people who had fled situations of danger, and their frequent refusal to believe that documents were genuine even where they could be produced:

“they will ask you, do you have any evidence, but that’s asking- for example, if there is an earthquake now, suddenly, and you want to save your life, will you take your qualification, will you take your I.D., will you take everything which is important for your life? No, the important thing will be for you to save your life, and then maybe you’ll be going back to your house and search for these important things. So that is what happens to asylum seekers. When they came first, maybe they have been persecuted and they don’t have enough time to take all of these things, [they just] want to be safe. Even some people who are lucky, when they come with these documents, they will just say no, it’s fake”

(DRC, arrived 2005)

Many other participants reported experiences where they felt an arbitrary decision had been made to disbelieve them:
“I went to the Home Office interview. I had proof that I worked for that man and I was in danger. They said we know that is not your picture, they refused [my case], they even said that this isn’t your children ... the baby’s not yours as well” 
(DRC, secured status in 2008)

“they ask you to give them the reason why you left your country ... after that they say the reason is failed, how can a reason fail, I don’t understand.” 
(Zimbabwe, secured status in 2009)

Both of these participants were initially disbelieved, but eventually won their case after a legal struggle.

Related to experiences of wilful disbelief by the state, is the perception expressed by many participants that there is a lack of consistency, fairness and transparency in the asylum process. A perception of lack of consistency between decisions for different individuals contributed to a sense of the process as arbitrary rather than based on a thorough examination of each case:

“Sometimes you can see that the process isn’t fair, because some people will have left the [same] country ... for the same reason as I, and they had their status like straight away, whereas I’m waiting now nine years.” (26 years old, arrived 2000)

A lack of access to proper legal representation and translators was reported by this participant and several others as restricting the fairness of decisions:

“when we went to the airport it was an officer ... her French was very broken, and we were trying to explain to her why we came, and she was very impatient and she was very rude, and she just left, and then another man came, and his French was even worse than hers ... they asked us to sign [to confirm what they had written down], I wasn’t sure but we had to, because we didn’t know about anything, we’re just in the airport and people were crying. So we just signed anything that they gave us. And then a month later we got refused because we didn’t have a good reason to seek asylum. And then we went to a solicitor with an interpreter, and what those officers had written had nothing to do with what we said” (as above)
“a lot of asylum seekers even for the first time they go to the court by themselves, nobody comes with them, it is more than 50 per cent of cases not successful, and of course it is not right” (45 years old, arrived 2002)

Reinforcing the feeling that decisions were arbitrary, was the lack of transparency reported by several participants as to the exact decision making process and criteria:

“you don’t know who is being given papers and who is not. You’ll find that someone has been here maybe for ten years, they’re still struggling, someone who has been here for two years, is given papers. So they don’t have formula really, you never know how they work.” (Zimbabwe, arrived 2006)

Of those participants who were aware of changes to the asylum system since their arrival in Britain, the majority felt that in most cases the changes had been to the disadvantage of those ‘in the system’:

“when I started working the new system came in, just Home Office trying to make it as hard as possible for people to get status” (arrived 2001, started volunteering 2007)

“[the] first year I came here ... everything [was] ok and every year [the government] make [things] a little bit [more] difficult for asylum seekers ... especially for court, and finding solicitor, interpreter or everything, before is very well, but now every year make it too difficult for people” (arrived 2000)

Restrictions on the right to appeal were reported as one particular change reducing refugees’ chances of being granted leave to remain:

“when I first arrived here we could have several appeals if our case was rejected, and we could go to High Court, but now it’s just one appeal, and after one appeal you are either deported or left in limbo” (arrived 2000)

Areas where some participants felt there to have been positive change were the reductions in the time taken for decisions to be taken and the greater clarity and consistency of having the same Home Office caseworker throughout each case:

“I think it’s actually ok, they’re trying to make it better for everybody, not just for themselves. Because at the moment there’s a lot of immigrants, so what they’ve done is introduce new, different models, like now for instance is the New Asylum Model, it’s something different. I think they’re doing it just to help people to get over as many cases as they can” (arrived 2005)
Although this participant expressed many other views in sympathy with the actions and perspective of the state towards refugees, on this point their views were shared by a greater range of other participants. This support for NAM amongst some of those who made applications before 2007 reflects divisions it fostered among refugees, which will be returned to in a later chapter.

Overall, participants’ accounts showed a view of the asylum process as unreasonable, unclear and unjust. The process to which these accounts relate, of a formally ‘fair’ adjudication, whose fog of complexity and bureaucracy covers up for the fact that it is set up to fail all but a few, regardless of their need, fulfils two related but contradictory needs of imperialism, which shape the management of refugees’ oppression. On the one hand, the absolute priority accorded to capital’s demand for labour is reinforced by the likelihood of being refused asylum, necessary for the continuation of the imperialist division of labour. On the other hand, the British state’s image as an upholder of universal human rights and liberty is maintained by the formal fairness of the system, necessary for the claims to moral authority so often used to justify imperialist interference and domination.

**Dispersal**

Following the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, which made local authorities responsible for housing refugees whilst their cases were being considered, pressure developed from local authorities in the South East of England, where a high proportion of refugees at that time were housed, to relocate them to other parts of the country (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1716). The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 made provision for the compulsory ‘dispersal’ of refugees to towns and cities across Britain, echoing assimilationist policies involving the dispersal of ethnic minorities in the 1950s and 1960s (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 38). Other historical precedents include the dispersal of refugees without status in Germany from 1982, which served to impose new restrictions on movement, reduce access to certain social benefits and worsen overall social conditions, in a process that, it has been suggested, was as much about creating a deterrent to new applicants as the stated aim of sharing costs between regions (Boswell 2003: 319). The compulsory dispersal of refugees without status around Britain reflects their status as presently unwanted members of the reserve army of labour, who capital
has no place for within Britain. Dispersal has served to further separate refugees with status from those without, to separate refugees without status from the rest of society, and to separate refugees without status from one another, often just at the point that they were beginning to form new relationships (Hynes 2009).

Political conditions for dispersal were created by a government and media campaign portraying an ‘invasion’ of Dover by ‘asylum scroungers’. This was based on the presence of less than 1000 Czech and Slovak Roma refugees, who were then targeted with a vicious campaign of racism, enabling the government to begin forcible dispersal under the argument that fewer refugees in any one place would ‘provoke’ less racism from local people (Kundnani 2007: 81-3). This was a revival of an argument blaming migrants for racism, which had also been employed to justify dispersing Vietnamese refugees in 1979 and 1981 (Boswell 2003: 320-1). Coordination of housing was transferred from local authorities to the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), operating under the direction of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND). The main priority driving the dispersal process was the need to find cheaper and more available housing, often resulting in refugees being dispersed to largely white areas with ‘high levels of multiple social deprivation, violence and anti-social behaviour’. Reports were common of refugees in NASS accommodation only rarely being moved in the event of problems, and housing contractors getting away with ‘blatant abuse’ (Hewitt 2002: 7; see also Boswell 2003: 324). All seven of the major dispersal areas nationally were in the top twenty most deprived areas in Britain on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1717). In an indication of how unpopular dispersal was amongst refugees, in the initial period, up to two thirds of refugees without status took up residence with family or friends in order to avoid being dispersed (Boswell 2003: 322).

At that time, Newcastle was experiencing serious problems of ‘void’ or unoccupied council housing, and was the first city to bid to receive dispersed refugees through the North East Consortium, alongside considering the possibility of housing refugees without status in prison ships on the Tyne (Evening Chronicle 2000). Whilst acknowledging the lower quality of vacant compared to occupied properties, Newcastle City Council justified dispersal to areas with large amounts of vacant properties on the
basis of “good use of resources available to authorities”, suggesting that “there is a basis for providing accommodation which can be more easily upgraded to suitable provision rather than having to provide addition [sic] new accommodation” (Policy and Research Services 2002). Within five months of setting up an Asylum Seekers Unit (ASU) in December 1999, Newcastle had received 100 dispersed, asylum-seeking families. By 2002, the ASU was housing 500 households and working with 2,500 refugees, whose claims were being processed (Evening Chronicle 2002). Refugees continued to be dispersed direct to Newcastle until April 2007, when the UK Borders Act made significant changes, including reorganising dispersal to Leeds as Newcastle’s local ‘hub’, from where some would continue to be housed in Newcastle.

In selecting areas for dispersal, little consideration was given to social and economic infrastructure or existing community networks or resources (Griffiths et al. 2005: 41-2). In the early period of dispersal, research nationally found that “almost nowhere in the UK is there a coherent, comprehensive local community relations strategy involving a great number of relevant stakeholders in the statutory, voluntary, and community sectors” (Hewitt 2002: 5). This contributed to a situation in which dispersal served to cut off refugees from family, friends, ethnic communities, services and refugee support groups, and to relocate them to areas with inadequate social provision, a lack of qualified lawyers, and high levels of exposure to racism (Boswell 2003: 326; Briskman and Cemlyn 2005: 718; Temple, et al. 2005). This may be viewed as a smashing up of existing social capital formations, and a starting point of extreme weakness and isolation from which refugees tried to rebuild their lives. In Glasgow, members of community-based organisations reported that the rapid housing of refugees in refurbished housing, in areas where maintenance of council housing had been neglected for many years, made integration with local residents more difficult, causing resentment that took some time to overcome (Bowes, et al. 2009: 36). In predominantly white and working-class areas in the East end of Newcastle, seventy empty properties were opened up to refugees. A refugee, who arrived in the North East in the early period of dispersal, described the lack of provision that greeted them:

“no services were set up to welcome them ... just a person in the council who was dealing with that issue, he said ok, we have some void houses ... and unfortunately most of the asylum seekers have been put in the most deprived
areas, even the voided houses [which] no ... British [people would] accept ... So there were that gap ... the cultural barriers [and] a lack of services, even an organisation ... to welcome those people” (COM, arrived 2002)

As in many other dispersal areas, support was left largely to a local church-based organisation, which offered a drop-in free shop offering advice, networking and practical support such as warm clothing and cooking utensils, whilst a local authority-based project focused more specifically on racial harassment (Interview, 2005).

In the West end of Newcastle, a private company, Angel Group, announced plans to turn a former nursing home into a hostel to house 200 single male refugees without status (Young 1999). ‘Angel Heights’ became the site of regular protests by its residents. On 10 May 2000, six refugees without status were arrested following a protest in which dozens of men refused to go back into the hostel, claiming they were treated ‘worse than prisoners’, and were then penned into the courtyard by thirty police. The protest had been sparked by Angel Group’s reduction of the adult residents’ weekly allowance from £7 to £5 per week. On 22 April, a manager at the hostel had claimed in an interview with a local paper how happy those at the hostel were, describing them repeatedly as ‘boys’, and had dismissed accusations that the hostel was ‘like an open prison’, saying that residents were free to leave any time they chose (Heywood 2000). Angel Group claimed the 10 May cash cut was to pay for £600 damage done to the centre, whilst those staying at the hostel said only a table had been broken in previous weeks. Kent Council, at that time still responsible for welfare provision to refugees dispersed to Newcastle, justified the cut, saying that a ‘complete care package’ was provided and that Angel Group were ‘generous’ to give residents any cash at all (Hutchinson and Dickinson 2000). On 17 January 2001, fifteen Afghan refugees were arrested at Angel Heights following further protests, according to the police aimed at expressing dissatisfaction with the accommodation, but according to Angel Group owing to frustration at the time their claims were taking, and tensions between different national groups cooped up together (Charlton 2001).

Since 1999, Angel Group have housed refugee families in areas of Newcastle previously abandoned for demolition, with a scattered number of properties reopened, and break-ins, fires and serious racial attacks a frequent occurrence. According to the levels of
dissatisfaction reported in the council’s own survey of ethnic minority tenants in 1999 (Research and Information Services 1999), it is unsurprising that in many cases ‘upgrading’ of inadequate accommodation does not appear to have been carried out by the time tenants moved in, or for some time after. In fact, dispersal represented a generalisation of much longer-running trends in refugee settlement in Newcastle. For example, in 1972, Ugandan Asian refugees were reported to be housed in the West end of Newcastle in poor quality housing and met with racism from some in the area, with ‘Asians Keep Out’ painted in letters three foot high along the street, and reports of attempts to set fire to one refugee’s door (Evening Chronicle 1972).

The existence of ‘intra-ethnic’ social capital has been pointed to in the case of Pakistani communities in London as a set of structures and strategies, such as employment within the ethnic group or with wider society via specialised ‘middle men’, capable of providing a basic level of subsistence and some degree of ‘buffering’ from the racism of wider society (Ahmad 2008: 856). The dispersal process has played a significant political role in breaking up such diasporic social capital formations, removing their potential as a basis for resistance, or even a degree of independence from the state. Just as the larger numbers of casually employed workers in Britain prior to the First World War required more directly oppressive policing in order to maintain stable capitalist accumulation (Jefferson 1991: 169-71), in the recent period, the presence of refugees within the imperialist heartlands has posed a threat to the stability of the domestic social contract. The existence of coherent and self-conscious diasporas with a sense of shared identity between immigrants in imperialist countries and their oppressed countries of origin, rather than with the national ruling classes of their new home, poses a threat to national borders on both an ideological and practical level (Gilroy 2001: 124). This presents one element of the fundamental concern behind the prominence of ‘social cohesion’ in recent discussions of immigration, the existence of real or perceived threats to the state (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 212-13). Dispersal has played a role in countering this threat to ‘social cohesion’ by physically disrupting such networks.

Attempts have also been made to isolate refugees’ experiences from the consciousness of British workers, with racism playing a central role. The presentation of racialised images of ‘ethnic conflicts’ as the root cause of refugees’ flight covers up the role of
imperialist states in creating refugees in the first place (Foerstel 1996: 1-2), and in doing so obscures the connection between refugees’ situations and the antagonisms between British workers and British capital. Refugees dispersed to Newcastle from 1999 encountered an intensely hostile context. An article in the local *Evening Chronicle* is symptomatic, titled ‘Police hunt four illegal immigrants: Asylum seekers go on the run’, referring to four men who had come from Holland in the back of a lorry and then run away from the driver (Hickman 2002). When a national lottery grant allowed the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns (NCADC) to set up an office in nearby Middlesbrough, Home Secretary David Blunkett responded to a hostile *Daily Mail* campaign by calling for a review of the grant. The Community Fund subsequently made the grant conditional on the organisation ‘toning down’ “aggressive campaigning on its website” (Kennedy 2002), and further National Lottery funding was cut in 2005, resulting in the closure of the Middlesbrough office and redundancies. This contributed to a ‘taming’ of much potential opposition. In 2003, the Chair of the North of England Refugee Service gave backing to a Home Affairs Select Committee Report, which warned that rising numbers of refugees could ‘overwhelm’ Britain and lead to a ‘backlash’ and the election of far right parties, with the Chair quoted as saying “The last thing we want to see is the British characteristic of welcoming people in to this country disappear” (Marley 2003).

Alongside attacks on refugees, the state and organised racists combined to put pressure on black residents of Newcastle during the early period of dispersal. In 2002, the NF leafleted in the West end against a planned mosque, whilst the council threatened to shut down an improvised mosque where people were worshipping whilst the official one was being built (Marley 2002). Between 2001-2002 and 2002-2003, reported race crimes in the North East nearly doubled from 503 to 934, with anti-racist protests taking place in Peel Street, Sunderland, after the fatal stabbing of Iranian refugee Peiman Bahmani (Redvers 2003). In 2004, a black family, who had moved from their previous area because of racist abuse, started to receive attacks within a week of moving into their new home in the West end of Newcastle, despite having specifically asked the local housing provider if there were any problems of racism in the area, and had their windows put out three times, suffered abuse in the street, and finally had their home ransacked while they were away (Armstrong 2004). Such individual racism, fostered by
the state and media, puts pressure on refugees to either accept whatever terms of support the British state might offer, or otherwise leave Britain.

Capital has no interest in refugees remaining in Britain, because they are driven by imperatives that override demand for their labour, and consequently the state has little interest in providing any but the most basic means of survival. The state has even less interest in helping refugees integrate with other working class people. Such integration could both offer solidarity for refugees’ attempts to remain in Britain and advance their rights, and fundamentally threaten the divisions amongst workers of different countries, which imperialism relies on to undermine resistance to the super-exploitation of oppressed countries. By disrupting connections with other refugees, support networks and other sections of workers, the dispersal system has undermined the potential for collective resistance and increased pressure for refugees to accept the positions assigned them in international divisions of labour. It thus forms a key element in the management of refugees’ oppression.

The prohibition on paid work

Whilst migrant workers of particular categories have continued to be encouraged to come to Britain, most refugees without status are prohibited by law from seeking paid work or even accessing work-based training, cutting them off from legal areas of the British labour market (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1721). Prior to the legislative prohibition on paid work in 2002, it had already been largely limited to refugees with status and to ‘primary claimants’, whose cases were being considered and had been in Britain for at least six months (Dumper 2002: v). This excluded many women from paid work as ‘secondary claimants’, and legally enforced their role of unpaid domestic work in the reproduction of their husbands’ labour power, as a super-exploited section of labour.

In a capitalist society, where both survival and self-worth for the majority is tied to the sale of one’s labour power, several refugees spoke about the negative impact on their self-esteem and mental health as a result of forced inactivity due to being denied the right to undertake paid work:
“If they lose their hope they will kill themselves. I didn’t lose my hope yet totally, but sometimes I ... say ok, I finish this university, what [else can I] do when I don’t have permission to work? ... Just to sit at home or just look at the television or something like that, it kills everyone” (45 years old, arrived 2002)

Several refugees also described the legal restrictions on funding for refugees without status in higher education, which blocked the majority from progressing with their studies as an alternative to paid work:

“in August I’m going to enrol for an economy course, because I think I’ve done every imaginable course I could do now and economy and business is left” (20 years old, arrived 2001)

“I went to college when I came here but because of my situation I couldn’t go to higher education” (43 years old, arrived 2000)

Amongst participants’ accounts, the experience of being a refugee, particularly one who has not been granted some form of refugee status or ‘leave to remain’ by the state, was strongly characterised by insecurity and dependency on the state, enforced by the prohibition on paid work:

“the asylum seeker is limited, he’s not allowed to work ... his income is very low, and he doesn’t know the outcome of his decision, so any time he can be deported or can be accepted, so he is in limbo” (arrived 2002)

In 2005, relative household poverty rates for people resident in the UK but lacking UK citizenship suggested inequalities, which were greatest amongst those most dependent on the state (Table 10).

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Primary reliance on wage</th>
<th>Primary reliance on state benefits</th>
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<tr>
<td>UK Citizen</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-citizen</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
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*Figures from Morrissens and Sainsbury 2005: 648*

Several participants vividly expressed the severity of their situation in Britain, compounding traumatic experiences in their country of origin:
“maybe they flee their country because they were persecuted, and when they came here they are experiencing the same thing. Because they will never be at rest, they will never be at peace” (DRC, arrived 2005)

“You come with a really optimistic hope that you will get a peaceful life, and you will get a normal life and you will get rid of all the stressful things in your country, and all the pressure, and all the dangers, but when you come here you face with even more difficulties and more problems. And one of the reasons I had a mental breakdown and I spent fourteen months in a psychiatric ward was because of the problems here, because they rejected my asylum claim and they wanted to deport me ... I saw no hope, I didn’t want to go to my country, because that was even worse, and was much more terrible ... I tried to end my life several times” (Iran, arrived 2000)

Uncertainty over the future was a recurring key feature of anxiety, and in some cases seemed to be deepened by a sense that participants had little knowledge or power to change their situation:

“I don’t have any knowledge to change it; I don’t know what to do” (Zimbabwe, arrived 2006)

This insecurity, and the legal restrictions on many kinds of action which might have improved participants’ situation, contributed to an intense sense of dependency:

“I’ve always been independent ... but now it’s as if I’m in prison ... there’s nothing that proves that I’m an adult, I am just at home, just wait[ing] for somebody to give [things to me]” (Cameroon, arrived 2008)

By coming to Britain under imperatives other than the labour market, refugees have broken discipline with the reserve army of labour. Asylum policies thus combine to disempower refugees and enforce their dependency on the British state, and with it their responsiveness to be re-disciplined into the reserve army. This both keeps them in an oppressed position, and manages this situation by enforcing compliance with the terms of their oppression.

**The long-term impact on refugees with status**

Government policy since 1997 has consistently acted to separate refugees with and without status, despite the lived reality that “what happens to people before their
claims are settled and what faces them in settlement are intimately connected” (Temple, et al. 2005: 7-8). Policies targeting refugees whilst their cases are being considered continue to impact on their experience of the labour market if and when they are granted status. In some cases, refugees have been subjected to repeated re-dispersal in the years since 1999, with one study identifying individuals who had been forced to relocate to three different cities in four months. This leaves a ‘legacy of dispersal’, where applications for credit and employment are jeopardised by so many changes of address (Hynes 2009). The forced gap in employment whilst a person’s claim is being considered, which has now reduced on average, but for some has lasted more than ten years with no response, leads to a loss of skills and, in some occupations such as medicine, makes it particularly difficult to resume a former career. In research focusing on refugees and healthcare professionals in London, 63 per cent of interviewees had professional qualifications but only 15 per cent were working, with significant levels of long-term unemployment, despite 80 per cent having the right to work (Cowen 2003: 4,12). Additionally, increased threats to employers of fines and prosecution for taking on employees legally excluded from paid employment have contributed to a reluctance to take on any refugees in order to avoid having to check documents, or for fear of accidentally breaking the law (Bloch 2007: 22).

This contributes to a situation for those who have been granted some form of refugee status where, although they can legally seek paid work, the work that is available is generally significantly deskilled and limited compared to the work performed in their countries of origin, concentrated in catering, interpreting and translation, shop work and administration and clerical jobs (WLRI 2005: 32), and higher proportions are unemployed than in their countries of origin (Bloch 1999: 190-1). A survey of 1600 refugees dispersed to the West Midlands found high levels of motivation to seek work and a range of qualifications, but also found individuals frequently left with little choice but to accept low-skilled and low-paid work, even where their qualifications and past experience were above this. Of those working, 79 per cent were employed as process, plant and machine operatives or in elementary occupations. Compared to a regional average wage of £19,296, more than half earned less than £9,600 and none earned more than £13,000 (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1725-7). Another study found an average hourly rate of £7.29 amongst refugees, compared with an average of £11.74 for
the general population, and 11 per cent of refugees paid less than the minimum wage. 25 per cent of refugees in work were found to be in temporary jobs, compared with 6 per cent of the working age population, and 35 per cent compared to 23 per cent were working part-time, mostly because they could not find full-time employment (WLRI 2005: 31-2). It is estimated that, on average, refugees in paid employment earn only 79 per cent the level of ethnic minorities overall (Bloch 2007: 24). More than one participant who had secured leave to remain described lack of language skills, deskillling and lack of access to capital as continuing their material insecurity, particularly in comparison to their previous class position:

“I’ve lost my skills at the moment ... I need to improve my English, and then back to finding some choice ... dishwasher, cleaner, I can’t work in [that kind of work for a] long time. For ... higher education my English [is] not [good] enough, for open[ing] my personal acupuncture clinic I haven’t got finance support” (former professional, 39 years old, with status)

Whilst English language skills have repeatedly been identified as a key factor in employment outcomes, in the West Midlands survey cited above:

“one of the issues repeatedly raised by interviewees was the difficulty they had accessing English classes. They often experienced long waiting lists, overcrowded classes, lessons aimed at low levels, limited progression opportunities and a lack of emphasis on vocational language.” (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1726)

In the absence of rewarding paid work, many refugees have little option but to undertake work for no pay, with a Department of Work and Pensions study finding 29 per cent of refugees engaged in formalised voluntary work (WLRI 2005: 34).

Dispersal has been found to further limit access to employment and social networks and decrease opportunities to move to where there are greater opportunities (Bloch 2007: 24). In 2005, unemployment rates for refugees with status were estimated to be around 36 per cent nationally, with far higher levels in particular areas, and estimates of 60 to 90 per cent unemployment amongst refugees in London (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1720-1). In one survey, 43 per cent of refugees had been unemployed for more than six months (WLRI 2005: 31-2). As one participant said:

“once you have your status, you’re like in a golden cage. So you have a better cage, but it’s still a cage ... you can see all the doors that can be opened ... but
Then you can’t open them ... you can work, well look for a job, there’s no jobs. Well you can travel, but if you don’t have your passport you can’t travel. You can send your child in the crèche, but then you have to have health visitor ... if you move from another city there is no health visitor, so you have to look for one”

(Côte d’Ivoire, 26 years old, with status)

Amongst a survey of 400 refugees in five localities around Britain in 2002, women refugees were more likely to be out of work, and of those out of work they were less likely to be seeking work, and more frequently because of childcare or other responsibilities. For those in work, women were more likely to be in different jobs to their country of origin, and on average lower paid and more likely to be in part-time and casualised work. Employment levels were also far lower for those without a UK qualification, and 26 per cent of women compared to 1 per cent of men mentioned lack of available childcare as a barrier to undertaking training or education (Bloch 2007: 27-9). This demonstrates once again the ways in which class, racism and gender oppression have the potential to act not simply as multiple discrete lines of oppression, but to interact and compound one another in complex ways.

Adult refugees to Britain thus experience significant downward class mobility compared to their position in their countries of origin. A combination of factors result in refugees beginning their economic existence in Britain as long-term unemployed, with few prospects of becoming self-supporting, and therefore unlikely to be able to move out of the deprived areas to which they were dispersed (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1730). Younger refugees also encounter significant barriers on entering the British labour market, frequently leading them to accept casualised and insecure work in the hope that this will lead to something better, although often these hopes are not fulfilled (Centrepoint 2004: 27). The inclusion of English for Speakers of Other Languages ESOL classes in the Job Seeker Allowance restriction of sixteen hours of learning a week further limits the kind of jobs many refugees are able to train themselves for (ibid. 11), and the introduction of the ‘five-year’ rule in 2005, only granting five-year leave to remain followed by review rather than indefinite refugee status, further reduces refugees’ sense of security and may discourage some forms of engagement, such as investment in training (Bloch 2007: 22-3). This results in a situation where, even for refugees granted status, for many their acceptance into the British labour force is only
as ‘second class workers’, and they will always bear the mark of the reserve army, under pressure to accept whatever work is offered.

**Conclusions**

The racism required to justify and ‘manage’ international divisions of labour within the imperialist system extends beyond immediate migrants, impacting variously on anybody associated with or identifying with the populations of oppressed countries, including many black people within Britain, as part of a dialect of racism and national oppression. Recent Labour governments promoted a reconfigured British nationalism based on a value-based assimilationism. At a policy level, this has been implemented through a fine-tuning of immigration controls, including declarations of loyalty and demonstrated contributions to ‘the nation’ as prerequisites for admittance. Thus, oppression is managed through a conditional approach to rights which stratifies the working classes along multiple levels.

Refugees occupy an intermediate class status, particularly acute whilst their cases are under consideration. They are part of the international reserve army of labour, but a ‘part out of place’, with a potential to disrupt the normal functioning of the division of labour on a political as well as an economic level. Their trajectory is in most cases from countries oppressed on a national basis, within which they may have occupied a relatively privileged class position. Their present position is amongst the poorest sections of the working classes in Britain, in conditions which hold the potential to forge alliances across racialised divisions. From 1999, government policy specifically mitigated against this, by breaking up existing networks based on refugees’ countries of origin, through dispersal, and impeding the formation of new ones based on common elements of class position within Britain, through prohibition on paid work. With the exception of individuals who ‘escape’ the collective position of the majority, for example through paid employment in the refugee sector, the trajectory of most refugees after arrival in Britain is either inclusion into a more regularised but super-exploited section of the working classes in Britain, or for many deportation back to the situations they have fled.
Chapter 5 - Refugees and the British State

The chapter begins by presenting the Marxist theory of the state in the context of international class struggle, and develops this understanding through a brief overview of the history of the British state’s relation to asylum policy. Literature on the state, imperialism and globalisation is used to reflect on participants’ accounts, in the light of differences in the character of the state in Britain and in refugees’ countries of origin. The chapter then concludes with a more detailed discussion of repressive and welfare aspects of the British state and their relation to immigration and asylum, alternating between the literature and participants’ accounts in order to draw out complexities and contradictions.

Discussions of immigration and citizenship take place within the highly politicised context of the nation. As the ultimate governor of citizenship, it is therefore misleading to view the state as a neutral arbiter in relation to immigration (Ahmad and Atkin 1996: 44). Yet as with the US, the long historical continuity and ideological dominance of bourgeois democracy in Britain has contributed to the lack of an intellectual tradition of conceptualising the state, and even to arguments that the state does not exist (Jones and Keating 1985: 1-2). In particular, there has been a persistent failure within post-war anti-racist movements to historicise the relationship of racism to the state (Lentin 2004: 308-10). As A. Sivanandan put it during the recent Labour government: “the academics, caught up in yesterday’s mantras, are unable or loath to speak truth to power; the think-tanks speak to the New Labour agenda and the activist Left is still ideistically looking for a borderless world.” (Preface to Kundnani 2007: vii). This chapter aims to move beyond these approaches, to situate the relationship between the British state under Labour and refugees within longer-term trajectories of British imperialism. In contrast to liberal political discourse, which frames questions of power within the subjectivist focus of who has power over society, and economic theories that ask how much power different actors have to carry out their objectives, Marxism offers one approach which focuses primarily on the nature of power and how it is exercised (Therborn 1980: 129-32).
The class basis of the imperialist state

The term ‘state’ does not merely describe a set of interlinked institutions, but carries a peculiar claim to legitimacy (Jones and Keating 1985: 1). State courts produce officially sanctioned national narratives (Hirsh 2003: 139), backed up when necessary with the officially sanctioned physical force of the police, military and prisons of various kinds. Alongside this, welfare services both morally sanction class rule through the services they provide and achieve a form of physical coercion through the threat of withholding these services. Diverse aspects of the state thus contribute to the management of oppression. Engels theorised the modern state as not arising from outside society or from an abstract idea, but from within society, and proceeding to alienate itself in order to fulfil its purpose, not of reconciling, but rather holding in check irreconcilable interests (Lenin [1917] 1972: 8). As Roberts (2004) puts it:

“[T]he separation of the state from civil society is in fact based upon the fragmentation of society inherent within the capital-labour relation. Unlike other social relations such as feudalism, capitalism is not structured in the first instance by extra-economic coercion in order to procure surplus-labour. Rather capitalism is structured through the formal freedom of labour to sell its labour power to whoever will purchase it. The state arises as a means to regulate the contradictions and struggles around this relationship. Thus the capitalist form of the state first and foremost emerges internally from the contradictory relationship between capital and labour. At a high level of abstraction we can say that the capitalist state is required to ensure that the dominance of capitalist property remains intact.” (Roberts 2004: 480)

Under capitalism, the capitalist and working classes are interdependent and both alienated, but the capitalist class “feels happy and confirmed in this self-alienation, it recognises alienation as its own power, and has in it the semblance of human existence”, while the working class “feels annihilated in its self-alienation; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence” (Lenin [1895-1916] 1972: 26-7, emphasis in the original). From this arises a conservative impetus on the part of capitalist classes, towards preserving this relationship, and a destructive impetus on the part of the working classes, towards annihilating the same relationship. Whilst the state fulfils the role for the ruling classes of holding these antagonisms in check, it is formed in the midst of class struggles, resulting in the formation of the state as the state of the
most powerful, economically dominant class, who, through the exercise of a state apparatus specifically tailored to its needs, maintains itself as the politically dominant class (Lenin [1917] 1972: 13-14).

This can be observed in practice. As Kemp (1967: 74) states, “Historically the development of capitalism has been inseparable from the formation of national states as the political expression of the various ruling classes”. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established principles of territorial integrity and the right of a sovereign to control entry to their country, including the ability to grant asylum as a gift (Schuster 2002: 45-6). The principle of the right of ruling classes to regulate the territory and inhabitants within ‘their’ country’s borders continues to be a central element of modern states, taking a particularly acute form in the states of imperialist countries. The fusion of banking, manufacturing capital and state apparatus contributes to a particular division of labour within the national ruling classes of imperialist nations (Kemp 1967: 22-3). In comparison to capitalist owners exercising direct control in capitalism’s earlier periods, under imperialism both a large part of the social product and control of capital “seems more usually to lie with men whose special powers derive from specifically financial control and manipulation - particularly control of money capital placed at their disposal by rentier-shareholders” (Lenin [1916] 1975: 24-6). The custodian of these interests is the imperialist state, performing vital and complex roles both within Britain and internationally in order to defend the interests of the City of London and maintain conditions for continued accumulation.

The 1951 UN Convention on Refugees created, at least in principle, a safety net to catch those who fell through the cracks in the supposed care exercised by each state for its citizens, and to reassign them to a nation. This represented an exception, created under exceptional circumstances, to the principle of national sovereignty wherein each nation state is free to govern its borders without any external interference (Kundnani 2007: 24-5). At the same time, it served in principle as a corrective mechanism, assigning displaced people to the responsibility of a state, and by doing so avoiding demands for provision on a universal basis of human need, which might undermine the ideological dominance of the capitalist state’s provision conditional on loyalty as citizens. The Convention has been criticised as inappropriate to contemporary situations, having
been drawn up to respond to specific circumstances during and after the Second World War, and to vary widely in interpretation between states, with a blurring between persecution and systematic discrimination (Richmond 2002: 718). Furthermore, it was drawn up by imperialist states, with no consultation with then socialist countries, and reflects the priority imperialist ruling classes assigned to ‘higher order’ political and civil rights, above rights they took for granted, such as rights to housing, healthcare, food and education (Schuster 2003: 98-101). In practice, British policy has not acted consistently in line with even the limited principles of the Convention, but has followed a conflictual course, often based on more short-term priorities.

The history of British state policy towards refugees

In a speech to the Confederation of British Industry in April 2004, then Prime Minister Tony Blair referred to two cases intended to illustrate Britain’s benevolent history towards refugees, but which actually demonstrate a history of racism and hypocrisy. The first example was the case of Nicholas Winton, who, after visiting Prague in 1938, arranged for special visas to be granted to Jewish children and their placement with foster parents - whilst their parents were refused entry and many presumably died in the gas chambers. The second was the case of ‘East African Asian’ refugees, who were British subjects and sought refuge in the 1960s and 1970s - many of whom were blocked from entering Britain by emergency legislation rushed through by a Labour government in 1968 (Kundnani 2007: 67-8). A survey of other such key points in the history of British asylum policy demonstrates the priority consistently given to the interests of the British ruling classes and the needs of British capital above the interests of refugees.

From the first introduction of the concept of political refugees in Britain, initially for members of the French ruling classes fleeing the revolution of 1789, the British state has constantly shifted its approach depending on political considerations. This has included both the granting of asylum to citizens of other countries, and acceptance of the legitimacy of asylum granted by other countries to citizens of Britain and oppressed countries such as Ireland. For much of the middle part of the nineteenth century, under conditions of growing demand for industrial labour and high levels of emigration to the colonies and America, asylum was championed for the sake of refugees’ labour, carrying
the additional benefit of legitimising class rule by presenting the ruling classes as liberal and humane. By contrast, the Jewish refugees who fled to Britain from Russia and Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth century came at a time of economic crisis and high unemployment. They were met with the Aliens Act (1905), whose provisions only applied to ‘steerage passengers’ on ships carrying more than twenty ‘aliens’. This enabled the Act to specifically target Jewish refugees from Russia and Poland, especially poorer refugees, without naming them (Schuster 2002: 46-50). Immediately after the Second World War, around 75,000 displaced persons were rebranded as ‘European Volunteer Workers’ and brought to Britain to work for a limited period, rather than being granted any kind of leave to remain as refugees (Schuster and Solomos 1999). More than a quarter of the European Volunteer Workers were women, recruited to work in the textile industry and in hospital domestic work, which were areas of high demand for low-paid, unskilled labour (Kay and Miles 1992: 9). The powers confirmed under the 1971 Immigration Act, for the Home Secretary to issue Immigration Rules without the sanction of Parliament, and for Immigration Officers to refer cases to the Home Office, beyond the reach of the courts, have ensured that decisions on immigration have remained “unapologetically subject to domestic and foreign considerations” (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 58). This reinforces the Leninist analysis that, whilst the policies of the state may at times conflict with particular ruling class interests, at the long term level of the whole class system, the state is anchored in the class relations of the society over which it stands, which are in turn shaped by relations of production (Kemp 1967: 13).

From the Second World War up until the 1990s, most refugees arriving in Britain did so under a specific programme, responding to events such as the ‘Bosnian crisis’ or the expulsion of Asians from Uganda. Under pressure from tightening controls on other routes to move to Britain, this changed during the 1990s, with increasing numbers of ‘spontaneous’ or uninvited refugees arriving and applying for asylum (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1715). They were met with a situation in which crisis in the welfare state and unemployment, together with the removal of the ‘Cold War’ imperative to demonstrate the superior humanity and benevolence of liberal democracy, contributed to a reduction in the usefulness of refugees to the state, prompting increasing restriction. Whilst Kosovan refugees settled under a specific programme in 1999 were
portrayed as victims of atrocities by Serbia, with whom Britain was in a state of war, and were automatically given exceptional leave to remain (Sales 2002: 468), refugees outside an organised programme were increasingly excluded and refused leave to remain. This was publicly justified by the ideological construction of refugees as ‘disguised economic migrants’, who it was argued harmed the interests not only of British citizens, by stealing their jobs and resources and placing demands on tolerance, but also ‘genuine asylum seekers’, by clogging up the system and creating mistrust (Schuster 2003: 145-7,173-5).

Since the late 1990s, the increasing replacement of a multiculturalism, based on a view of homogenous ‘ethnic communities’, with an aggressive assimilationism, has contributed to the previous predominance of fragmented service provision by communities themselves being displaced by increased centralisation and state intervention (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 24-6). This has included increased pressure on voluntary and community organisations to fall in line with state priorities (Fell 2004). As with all assimilationist approaches, this has also required forceful means of exclusion, of which deportation is one of the most extreme. From September 2004, the government publicly geared its immigration policy to deporting more ‘failed’ refugees each quarter than the number of new applicants (Prior 2006: 19). As discussed in the previous chapter, other policies have functioned to systematically exclude refugees who remain within Britain’s borders, and to offer narrowly circumscribed conditions for inclusion. These antagonistic structural relations between refugees and the British state do not translate directly into social and political relations, but are mediated by subjective factors, including understandings and priorities arising from refugees’ movement between the states of oppressed and imperialist countries.

The position of states in the imperialist system
The relationship of refugees to the British state is an active process, influenced by refugees’ experience and relationship to the state in their countries of origin (Miles and Phizacklea 1980: 193-5). The particular nature of states occupying oppressed and dominant positions within imperialism needs to be considered in the context of a complex of interacting systems, with states developing as systems situated at different points within imperialism, and social classes and ethnic groupings developing and taking
on meaning within and across these (Geschwender 1977: 2-3). Back et al. (2002: 450) suggest that there is a contradiction between New Labour’s programme for economic growth, based on neo-liberalism and globalisation rhetoric, and a desire to maintain the social integrity of the nation state. Yet, this underplays the centrality of population displacement in state formation and that the history of modern states demonstrates that “the ability to control a citizenry through selective uprooting, removal, resettlement and containment is pivotal in maintaining state power” (McDowell 2005: 1). Thus, recent developments associated with globalisation, which some incorrectly see as transnationalisation leading to the erosion of nation states, are entirely consistent with the history of states, and should not suggest their imminent demise, but rather:

“Just as capital becomes more mobile and ‘fluid’ in the current era of globalisation, so is it the case that states must become more ‘statist’ in their orientation towards policy provision. The increasing dominance of global capital in the world requires local administrative powers to regulate the flow of capital.” (Roberts 2004: 481)

As the modern capitalist state organises and divides its subjects according to territory and creates ‘special armed bodies of men’ apart from society in order to enforce the authority of this separation (Lenin [1917] 1972 10-13), the states of both exploiting and exploited nations facilitate the penetration of foreign capital in search of profit, yet in very different ways.

In imperialist countries in Western Europe and North America, the state expanded massively during the twentieth century, rising from around 10 per cent of GDP at the beginning of the century to nearly 50 per cent by the 1980s (figures from Fukuyama 2004: 3-4). The Second World War facilitated a massive expansion of the British state, with increasingly centralised control over production and massive increases in taxation, which were justified by the war but maintained afterwards, and an influential report ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services’, known popularly as the Beveridge Report, published in 1942, calling for increased state provision. This laid the groundwork for the massive expansion of state welfare and wide-ranging nationalisations in industry following the war. Nationalisations were primarily driven by the needs of capital, concentrated in inefficient areas or those requiring massive capital investment to
survive, and in many cases managed by the same business executives who had run them as private companies (Harling 2001: 156-64).

In oppressed countries, the state frequently acts as the main guarantor of access for foreign capital, where necessary enforcing acceptance of poor terms for the population’s sale of their labour. Hoogvelt (2007: 18) argues that globalisation is exerting contradictory pressures on the state, requiring a reorganisation “to suit global rather than domestic capital accumulation priorities”, which in turn creates a tendency for a break-down in the integrity of some nation-states in countries I would characterise as oppressed, increasing unplanned population movements. She goes on to argue that this in turn creates the contradictory pressure to maintain the integrity of other nation-states in imperialist countries and strengthen their military capabilities to defend their interests directly in regions where local states are breaking down. Recent examples contradict this model, including action by imperialists to also strengthen local states where they are compliant rather than intervene directly, but to intervene to the point of military invasion states may be strong but non-compliant. In the DRC, for example, which has had a high level of both mineral exploitation by multinational companies and ‘unplanned population movements’ in recent years, imperialist countries have not intervened militarily from outside, but have attempted to reinforce and legitimate the local state. EU monitors verified elections in October 2006 as genuine, for which only incumbent President Kabila had been able to use UN vehicles, planes and helicopters for campaigning, and in addition received $450 million in funds via the Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT), which is made up of the US, UK, German, French and Belgian embassies (Kayembe 2007). In Haiti, military action instigated by the US and France in 2004 was prompted, not by a breakdown in the local state, but by a government with a reformist agenda and popular participation, which was seen to threaten imperialist interests (FRFI 2004; Pina 2007). In Iraq, where the largest military intervention of recent years has taken place, this was also not prompted by a break-down of the local state, but by a government no longer compliant with its former US backers (Rayne 2003). Since then, the failure of the US and British-led occupation to re-establish a viable local state has created major problems for their extraction of profits from the region, despite their military presence (Craven and Rayne 2008; Cordesman and Burke 2010). These examples demonstrate that local states in
oppressed countries continue to be important sites of struggle and are crucial to the effective operation of imperialism in the current period.

The relative position of countries within the imperialist system impacts on not only the practice of states, but also their image. Many participants reported the abrupt shock of their treatment in Britain, which stood in stark contrast to their expectations based on dominant conceptions of Britain in their country of origin, with further distress caused at times by the contrast between the politeness of British state officials and the inhuman outcomes of the policies they implement:

“everybody I think all over the world knows Britain because of probably the empire it had ... it was very powerful, I mean still is powerful, economically, politically, and its reach, and the language international. So I think it’s a dream for everybody to live in Britain ... when you come here you realise that it’s completely different, it’s the opposite, especially when your claim with the Home Office and everything is rejected” (Iran, 38 years old)

Crawley (2010: 39-40) found a similar pattern, with many refugees having little or no knowledge of the British asylum system before arriving in the country, and in most cases assuming that if they explained their situation to the authorities, they would be allowed to stay, or in some cases relying on religious faith or the ‘moral responsibility’ of the British government for the causes of their problems. This limited participants’ preparedness to defend themselves against the state’s attacks:

“the problem I was running from, I was expecting to get friendly people, understanding people, things like that, but I found completely the opposite ... After you’ve suffered persecution in your country ... you wouldn’t expect to come and be persecuted with sleepless nights, no future, no hope, no nothing” (Kenya, 28 years old)

Whilst for some participants, comparison with the state in their country of origin encouraged acceptance of their treatment by the British state, for others the contradiction of expectations by reality appeared to contribute to a sense of not only inequality but injustice, which formed part of the motivation for political responses, such as campaigning undertaken by one of the case organisations, CAMP.
Repressive aspects of the British state and refugees

There is a long-running dispute between reformists and revolutionaries as to whether the state is a means of class reconciliation or repression (Lenin [1917] 1972: 9). When considering the disproportionate wealth obtained by members of the ruling classes illegally compared to members of the working classes, through means such as tax avoidance, corporate fraud (Spalek 2007), and the corruption of UK politicians’ expenses exposed by journalists in 2009 (The Telegraph 2009), the harsher treatment and demonisation of perpetrators of ‘blue collar crime’ demonstrate a clear class character of the police in favour of the ruling classes, even in periods of relative social stability, when the working classes do not pose an immediate threat to the state (Jameson and Alison 1995; Bauman 1999: 123-6). In periods of heightened class conflict, such as during the Chartist Movement in the early nineteenth century, or during the miners’ strike of 1984-1985, the police and courts have taken on an even clearer role in the service of the ruling classes, meting out repression collectively to sections of the working classes associated with resistance (Coulter, et al. 1984). This demonstrates the fallacy of Thomas Hobbes’ argument that the monopoly of legitimate power held by the state allows individuals to escape “the war of every man against every man” (cited in Fukuyama 2004: 1). Rather, it is a powerful weapon in the hands of the ruling classes against the working classes in general. The super-exploited position of black workers and the interests of the ruling classes in racism, both outlined in the previous chapter, are reflected and defended by the racism of the police, exhibited by their frequent indifference and insensitivity when dealing with reports of racial harassment, at times treating victims as perpetrators, racially abusing them and detaining them in cells (Hesse, et al. 1992: 66-7; IRR 2001: 14). Historically, black people have been over-represented as recipients of ‘social control’ aspects of state intervention, such as prisons and compulsory psychiatric detention, and under-represented in ‘welfare’ aspects of state intervention, such as counselling, group work, support for carers, and services for the elderly (Ahmad 1993: 31-2). Ethnic minorities continue to be over-represented at every stage of the criminal justice system, from stop and search, to arrests, to prosecutions, to sentencing, with 25 per cent of the prison population from ethnic minorities, double the proportion of ethnic minorities in the general population. This is in spite of offending rates which are equal to or lower than those for white people (Goodman and Ruggiero 2008: 56-8).
A number of well-publicised insights into the internal organisation of the police at a local level also suggest ongoing racism. In Newcastle in 1998, Rishi Johri left Northumbria Police claiming his career had been ruined by racist abuse from other officers (McKegney 1998). Following this, high profile claims of racism within Northumbria police were made by another officer, dating from the mid 1990s (Neil 2004). This fits the national pattern, with a BBC documentary in October 2003 uncovering continuing racism among police trainees in North Wales, and an inspection in the same year by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary into policing in south Manchester finding a sexist and racist culture among officers (Townsend et al. 2003). In 2008, the most senior Asian police officer in Britain lodged a case of racial discrimination, sparking hundreds more complaints (Sawer 2008).

The modern British state employs a complex division of labour, both between and within different agencies. The police are divided internally, with some sections focusing on ‘community relations’ and the negotiation of social order at a local level, whilst other sections are held largely in reserve, to restore order with brute force where necessary, regardless of the law, and the damaging consequences of resort to the latter section being mitigated by employment of the former (Jefferson 1991: 171). Following the urban uprisings of 1980 and 1981, which had significant involvement by young working class black people, the state cultivated the appearance of making concessions by setting up public bodies for monitoring and action on racist harassment and drawing in a section of black leaders into relatively well-paid ‘race relations’ and community posts (Sivanandan 1991: 118-21), as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Alongside these ‘carrots’, the ‘stick’ was deployed in targeted interventions backed by the media to link race to crime, and by doing so to criminalise whole communities that had been the basis of resistance (Solomos and Rackett 1991: 43-5). Parallels can be drawn with the state’s recent approach to the opposition of many British Muslims to British imperialism’s military actions in the Middle East, combining punitive sentencing of peaceful protestors with demands that ‘community leaders’ ‘root out extremism’ (McGhee 2003; Davidson 2006; Irving 2010).
Yet, despite this racist character of the state’s repressive elements, and the specific measures targeted at refugees without status, the relief of finding safety in Britain cannot be underestimated for its impact on refugees’ perceptions of the British state, as emphasised in the mixed focus group:

“We want really to contribute to this great nation ... first of all to be thankful for being accepted ... and given that haven, of safety and security, that was a luxury, from where we come from” (DRC, arrived 2002)

This participant showed a high level of awareness elsewhere of the role of imperialist countries in contributing to the situations which cause many refugees to flee, but was nevertheless grateful for being granted refuge. Despite individual and collective experiences of denial of rights, detention and threatened or actual deportation, several participants spoke positively about the relative democratic rights allowed by the British state:

“It’s very safe to be [in Britain], it’s free to stay, and free to speak, and to work as well, that’s why it’s very good to be here” (Chad, arrived 2001)

Some accounts may have been influenced by what has been referred to as the ‘immigrant story’, where situations of insecurity result in pressures such that: “relative newcomers do not feel they have the right to project anything other than a positive interpretation of their experiences in Britain” (Roberts et al. 2008: 36). This reflects a relationship of dependency, rooted in the material relation of Britain to refugees’ countries of origin, which plays on the vulnerability of refugees as a result of their oppression and is reinforced through specific practices and processes.

Compared to the states of oppressed countries directly repressive elements of imperialist states contain contradictions, rarely acting through naked force. The relationship of the police to the British working classes developed in the period following the First World War, from naked confrontation to increasing negotiation. This took place hand in hand with the consolidation of a ‘labour aristocracy’, as discussed in Chapter 3, and a decline in the numbers of informally employed sections of the working classes, who had more distinct norms of their own for behaviour and law, which were largely independent of the bourgeoisie (Jefferson 1991: 169-71). The absence of these conditions in non-imperialist countries, and the lack of super-profits to buy off a section of the working classes, has frequently resulted in their states operating through more
directly repressive measures, contributing to a tendency for refugees fleeing these states to regard the British state in a more positive light by comparison:

“the police interviewed us ... he asked my date of birth and then I said Christmas day 1969, he smiled and tapped on my back, ‘lucky person’. He was a very good policeman and I ... felt how different ... the policemen [in Britain are compared to] our country. In my country they hit, they swear, they use very, very offensive words, provoking words, but here the police [are] very polite” (Iran, 38 years old)

Another participant described the presence of police at anti-deportation protests in a positive light, viewing their role as protecting protestors from individual racists. This was despite their experiences of having been forced by the British state to live underground and destitute with their small children for an extended period, and later being detained. For some participants, such views had been added to by observing particular instances of repressive agencies of the state playing what they saw to be a positive role:

“these wardens in the streets, from the local authority ... it made a big difference, a big impact in the relationship with the newcomers and the people who were making trouble” (COM 1)

This reflects the state’s need to manage racism, to create structures for ‘mediation’ between oppressed groups and thus remove any impetus towards independent organisation. At the point of immediate experience, however, this is seen by many as the state playing a positive role against racism.

Contrasted with the perceptions outlined above, however, was the reported sense of criminalisation as a result of the asylum process. This perception of a ‘double standards’ in democracy and human rights, with one standard for British people and another for refugees, has been identified elsewhere in research drawing on the views of refugees (e.g. Hynes 2009). The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was the first primary legislation to deal with asylum in the UK. Its measures included reinforcing carrier sanctions and introducing fingerprinting of refugees and their children (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 38-9). The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 extended the powers of search, arrest and detention of refugees without status (Sales 2002: 463). The routine detention of refugees without status, who have been accused of no crime, but at most the infringement or expected infringement of an administrative rule, increased significantly
between 1997 and 2010 (Crawley 2010: 14). One episode in this expansion was linked
to the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001, alongside proposals to
exclude suspected foreign ‘terrorists’ from the asylum process, running together the
categories of ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘terrorist’ in public discourse (Sales 2002: 473). In
recent years, more than 30,000 people have been imprisoned in UK immigration
detention centres every year, 70 per cent of whom had claimed asylum at some point,
many of whom report complying with everything authorities had asked them to do, yet
still had their doors broken in and were forcibly taken into custody (BID 2009: 7-8, 15).
As of 31 March 2010, there were more than 2,800 people being detained solely under
Immigration Act powers, more than half of whom had sought asylum, with 220 people
having been detained in this way for more than a year (Home Office 2010: 19).
Widespread use of administrative detention compounds the trauma, uncertainty and
fear that characterise the backgrounds of many refugees before reaching Britain
(Briskman and Cemlyn 2005: 717). Added to this is the increasing ‘double punishment’
of foreign nationals who have been convicted of a criminal offence, by deporting them
at end of their sentence, which in many cases has included people whose only crimes
are survival related, such as using false documents to enter or leave the UK, or
undertaking paid work without permission (BID 2009: 21-6). BID (2009) collected
accounts of the trauma and terror caused by indefinite detention, with no automatic
right to judicial oversight or application for bail, and found problems in contacting legal
representation, severely restricted access to healthcare, and trauma and health-related
problems continuing in many cases even after release.

The effective criminalisation of the act of seeking asylum itself was established in the UK
through legislation in 2004, making it an offence to be unable to produce a valid
passport when approached on or after arrival in Britain. At the same time, asylum
tribunals took the view that a valid passport constituted proof that the holder was not a
genuine dissident and refugee, as they would not then have been granted a passport
(Kundnani 2007: 69-70). Because of entry restrictions to European countries, it is
impossible for many refugees to enter Britain to claim asylum without using illegal
routes, thus criminalising refugees at the point of entry and fuelling a ‘migration
industry’ of agents providing services to smuggle refugees across borders (Stewart
2008: 224-5; Crawley 2010: 18-19). For many participants, requirements to sign at a
local Immigration Reporting Centre (IRC), for some as often as once a week, provided a powerful material and symbolic experience which deepened the sense of criminalisation:

“when you go to sign you have to put your fingerprint ... they don’t trust anybody” (DRC, arrived 2002)

“this thing of always going to sign, we [are] treated like ... criminals” (Zimbabwe, arrived 2006)

As a convenient and frequently-used opportunity for refugees without status to be taken into detention, IRCs were perceived by many participants to have a very direct link to immigration detention. For areas of the country where there is no local IRC, refugees without status may be required to sign at a police station (UKBA 2005), further emphasising the link between seeking asylum and criminality. Whilst some IRCs include their own short term detention facilities, Newcastle’s local IRC in North Shields has been reported to lack its own facilities and instead place those detained in the cells of the adjoining police station (Loraine 2008, supported by personal account). There was evidence that this impacted on forms of activity, with some CAMP participants expressing a fear of police on demonstrations:

“Sometimes when we are demonstrating ... I find it difficult ... at the end there will be police, you know, you will be scared that they might arrest you or something.” (CAMP 3)

The sense of criminalisation, the constant threat of detention and deportation at a moment’s notice, and uncertainty over the duration and basis of the decision-making process combined to create a sense of fear, anxiety and persecution:

“Being an asylum seeker is torture, they torture you psychologically and physically and all that. And I found it terrorising because of the dawn raids, you can’t sleep at night, it’s very, very traumatising” (Kenya, arrived 2004)

“I’m always depressed, every day, because I’m always thinking we don’t even know what is going to happen tomorrow, and sometimes you get some people being snatched by immigration officers ... you’re always in fear, at night, even if you hear any sound you are scared, maybe it is them coming for you” (Zimbabwe, arrived 2006)
There was a wide range of understandings amongst participants as to the nature and basis of these repressive measures, from acceptance and justification to political opposition. These differences were broadly in line with differences in forms of action. An individual volunteering with several state-related projects and with intentions to pursue a career in criminal forensics expressed one of the most accepting attitudes towards state repression of refugees without status:

“sometimes they can be a little bit harsh against some people, but I suppose they have to follow the procedures and the law” (VOL 1)

On the other hand, a CAMP participant, with an intention to move into an advocacy role after securing leave to remain, related an anecdote indicating denial of rights within the asylum system, and a need for refugees without status to stand up and demand their rights:

“If you call the Home Office, for example, and you say something like I know my rights, they speak to you differently ... There was one woman [working at a local IRC] ... she was being a racist ... she would speak to people as if they were animals, and then a man told her you are not going to speak to me like this, I am not an animal ... she didn’t say anything, but she just did whatever she had to do, but it’s just the fact that he did it in front of people and how she reacted, I think people were just smiling in the room” (CAMP 4)

The participant reported that since this incident, reporting procedures have been changed to require those signing to attend at more specific designated times, forcing them to disperse their attendance and avoiding the potential for acts of collective solidarity and resistance such as the one above. This provides another example of the approach to managing oppression by breaking up potential bases for collective resistance, rather than by simply increasing the severity of repression.

**Welfare aspects of the British state and refugees**

Disagreements with the Leninist conception of the state typically concern the argument that the British state either enjoys ‘relative autonomy’ from capitalist pressures, and is neutral with regard to different sections of society, to be fought over by competing interest groups (Jones and Keating 1985: 2-6), or that it is not coherent, with different interests served by different sections of the state. The latter argument has been associated historically with the Fabians in the Labour Party, who differentiate between
a ‘good’ side of the capitalist state, including social services, health, education and nationalised industries, and a ‘bad’ side, including defence, law and order, and aid to private industry. Yet, in many cases those giving and receiving supposedly ‘welfare’ aspects of the state experience the way things are given as a further means of oppression, regulation and social classification, and a distraction from the question of why people need ‘benefits’ in the first place (LEWRG 1980: 52-3), with an ambiguity in welfare practice between a duty of care and a mission of social control (OU 1978b: 41). This is particularly acute where interventions are made into people’s lives by welfare professionals and agencies in a way that objectifies people into a clutch of ‘problems’, rather than engaging with them in an attempt to increase their agency. This has often included the imposition of middle class values and understandings of the world, delegitimising understandings arising from working class experience and interests. Since the reorganisation of policing in the 1980s, the divide between welfare and repressive aspects of the state has become further blurred, with efforts to “incorporate social and welfare agencies into the policing process” (Kundnani 2009: 32), in line with the emphasis placed on low level intelligence gathering by leading police figures based on experience of counter-insurgency in the North of Ireland (e.g. Kitson 1973).

The impact of the British state has at its best been very far from the welfare state ideal, of an organised effort to modify the outcome of market forces, not only guaranteeing a minimum level of income and provide support at times of crisis, but also access as a right to the best quality services available (Harling 2001: 154). The post-war welfare state’s combination of means testing and universal provision resulted in the maintenance and at times extension of existing inequalities. This was influenced by factors such as the greater confidence with which middle class people could navigate the NHS and make use of the full range of services, and the flat rate national insurance which effectively forced the working classes to pay for their own services, whilst universal benefits were set so low that large numbers of people had to supplement them with degrading means tested benefits (ibid.: 171-4).

Gösta Esping-Andersen uses the concept of ‘decommodification’ to measure social provision by the degree to which individuals or groups are guaranteed access to the necessities of life as a right, independent of the sale of their labour power. Alongside
this, they pose the question of the role of welfare structures in affecting social
stratification (cited in Morrissens and Sainsbury 2005: 639–40). Central to the latter
question, is the impact of welfare provision on political relationships between and
within classes. Welfare regimes across different countries have the common feature of
intervening to structure relations of gender and race, such as the ‘male breadwinner’,
although this structuring differs according to context, and takes place in interaction with
political mobilisations (Williams 1995: 138-9). In Britain, the use of welfare in
conjunction with immigration controls to divide the working classes along racialised
lines has a long history (Gordon and Newnham 1985; Ahmad and Bradby 2007).
Similarly, restrictions in access to welfare services at particular points in history have
played a role in managing gendered oppression, by forcing women either into paid
employment or back into economic dependency on men (Dominelli 1999: 16-17).
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) distinguish between public support for excluding
‘foreigners’ from the country and excluding them from certain ‘rights and privileges’,
and places the latter as temporally following the first, and coming into play when the
former fails. At a state level, Freeman (1986: 53-4) suggests that welfare states may be
seen as a form of national protectionism, underscoring their role in national
competition and the sheltering of privileged levels of wealth within the imperialist
nation.

Historically, a line of continuity can be drawn from the granting of suffrage to working
class men in the nineteenth century to the establishment of the welfare state in 1948,
in a process of incorporating the domestic working classes into a nationalist alliance
with the British ruling classes, through the twin exclusive strategies of citizenship and
welfare. As early as 1596, in what may be considered the pre-history of British welfare,
at a time of economic depression, Queen Elizabeth I ordered the deportation of all
‘negroes and blackamoors’, so that resources of state welfare would only be consumed
by white citizens (Craig 2007a: 608). The first forms of collectivism from 1900 included
old age pensions, school meals and public housing, partly in order to appease an
increasingly militant working class, to ensure a healthy working class for the army and
factories, to control migration, and to create an elevated status of ‘motherhood’,
keeping women tied to unpaid domestic work and in a form closely tied to the ideology
of the development of ‘race and nation’ (Williams 1995: 151-5). The term ‘welfare state’
first appeared in common usage during the Second World War, in order to contrast the 
British state’s care for its citizens with its fascist rivals (Harling 2001: 154). From the 
first, it was thus linked to ideas of national superiority. The welfare state supported 
post-war rebuilding by maintaining mass consumption, drew women back into unpaid 
domestic work under the concept of the ‘family wage’, and afforded limited concessions 
demanded by the balance of class forces in order to pacify the working classes, whilst 
assigning a second-rate status to low paid migrant workers (Williams 1995: 151-5).

The concept of ‘humanitarianism’ as a ‘benevolent duty’ consistently resurfaces within 
the ideology of British welfare capitalism, concealing the fact that inclusion within the 
state’s benevolence also implies excluded groups, serving to maintain the state’s 
legitimacy by relatively privileging the British population (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 
301). The first ‘concern’ with the health of ethnic minorities arose within tropical 
medicine, driven by the aim of preventing immigrants from infecting British citizens. 
This began a tradition in which normal diagnostic approaches in health were sidelined, 
in favour of explanations based on cultural deficiencies, such as the special designation 
of ‘Asian rickets’ in the 1970s, which neglected the lessons of measures that had largely 
eradicated rickets in the 1940s, and more recently attempts to explain away health 
inequalities through unproven culturalist suggestions about marriage between cousins 
(Ahmad and Bradby 2007: 801-2). At its creation, NHS services were formally available 
to anyone present in Britain regardless of their nationality, and exceptional in this 
amongst other countries, but this quickly changed (Kundnani 2007: 18). William 
Beveridge, the founding father of the NHS, made clear the racism underpinning his 
conception of welfare by speaking in unequivocally positive terms about the British 
“pride of race”, and the need for a welfare system “to plan society now so that there 
may be no lack of men or women of the quality of those early days [of Marlborough, 
Cromwell and Drake], of the best of our breed, two hundred and three hundred years 
hence” (cited in Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 287). This demonstrates the direct and 
racialised interest taken by the ruling classes in managing the reproduction of labour 
power, and the contradictory impacts this may have on welfare provision (OU 1978a: 
17-19).
The exclusionary role of the welfare state has been masked by the racialised conception that “certain identifiable categories of individuals are less able to ‘cope’ than others, and that particular groups are more prone towards deviant or anti-social behaviour” (Bryan, et al. 1988: 111). For example, in mental health there has been a history of damaging stereotypes associating black men with physicality, aggression, and dangerousness, which has seriously affected their provision (Newbigging, et al. 2007: 113). Pathologising black families and labelling them as ‘deviant’, in comparison to a supposed white, two-parent, middle-class, heterosexual norm, through a process of being ‘social worked’, has been a key aspect of racialised control by the state. Desires of black people to improve their social position are portrayed as ‘overambitious’, or as pressuring their children. Images are cultivated of black families constantly on the verge of collapse, whilst the context in which immigration controls, poor employment prospects and bad housing severely hamper the self-definition of many black families is ignored (Dominelli 1997: 94-8). Where black social workers have attempted to challenge this, they have frequently come under attack, accused of ‘over identification with the client’ or ‘oppressing the individual with family and community expectations’ (Ahmad 1993: 14-15). One aspect of increasing conditionality in welfare has been the tying of benefits and pensions to earnings, which have reduced access for migrants as they tend to spend a shorter amount of time directly employed in the British labour force, particularly those claiming asylum (Sales 2002: 460). Only 62.6 per cent of elderly migrant households in the UK are in receipt of pensions, compared to 88.2 per cent of elderly non-migrant households, and only 21.2 per cent of unemployed migrant households are in receipt of unemployment benefits, compared to 46.9 per cent of unemployed non-migrant households. Like other imperialist states surveyed, in the UK a far greater proportion of income for migrants is dependent on stigmatised means-tested benefits than universal benefits, and for countries where data is available, this is even more pronounced for ethnic minority migrants (Morrissens and Sainsbury 2005: 650-3).

A range of other recent research has identified a serious lack of information of entitlements and services amongst ethnic minority people across a range of services, even where there are no language barriers, including a particular lack of awareness about direct payments for disabled people, with the consequence in many cases that
people give up on trying to access formal provision (Chahal 2004: 5-6). In social care, assumptions that ethnic minorities, and particularly South Asians, prefer to ‘look after their own’ have served to justify a situation in which ‘nearly one in five Pakistani women aged 30-pension age, and one in ten British Pakistani or Bangladeshi men aged 16-29, are also carers’, amongst some of the most deprived communities in Britain. This seems likely to increase as the trend nationally is one of rising thresholds for entitlement to statutory support, yet “BME carers have been given little attention within legislative and policy documents, with no explicit mention of these groups in any of the Carers Acts and only fleeting references within National Service Frameworks” (NBCWN 2008: 10). Research addressing the lived experience of South Asian carers found that in the majority of cases, rather than a cultural preference for home care, it was rather an absence of support and low expectations based on past experience that contributed to an inclination not to fight for more effective support, and to take the attitude that it was up to them to care for themselves (Mir and Tovey 2003: 471).

The dominant trend amongst participants was towards a narrative of disempowerment, with a minimal level of support combining with prohibition of paid work to create a sense of dependency and powerlessness:

“They give us support, house, all this stuff it’s fine, but the time is going, it’s not good. Because we also want to work for ourselves, and know our future, how our future is going to be. But we’re not allowed to work, we are being asked to go and sign, all those things and they are taking long with the case.” (29 years old, arrived 2006)

“not find a job or not find a hobby, is always sadness and is sometimes like a prison here” (38 years old, arrived 2000)

Hynes (2009) characterises the experience of dispersal by “waiting, not wanting to ‘bite the hand that feeds’ and an unwilling patron/disadvantaged client relationship”. The majority of participants in my own research volunteered examples from their personal experience of the substandard support provided under the separate welfare system for refugees without status, established as part of dispersal:

“They put us in a flat, everything was broken in that flat, and we just came from [a country] where it was 30 degrees, and it was in May ... that year was very cold, and there was no heater or anything, it was just horrible. And then they
moved us to somewhere better, but still things were broken, I think that’s actually why [the private housing provider] lost their contract, because everything was broken in that house, I mean the doors would just fall off” (26 years old, arrived 2000)

Dependency on the state, enforced through government policy, combines with stigmatisation through separate support systems and media portrayals of ‘asylum scroungers’ to fuel racism on a personal level, further isolating refugees, who in some cases have as their first priority avoiding meeting people who may attack them (Temple, et al. 2005: 32-4).

Discrimination and lack of resources were also reported in aspects of the ‘mainstream’ welfare state:

“when I was pregnant the first week they said to me- I mean she said it very nicely, she said oh I hope that you speak English, because we don’t have time to have an interpreter, unless you wait for three more weeks ... it wasn’t her fault, but it’s just how things are happening, and I know some people that have to wait a long time ... and in the meantime they don’t know anything about their pregnancy” (26 years old, arrived 2000)

“when the social services will be coming to your house to check, and when they will say no, this child is not well dressed, he doesn’t have enough toys, [this] happened to one [refugee] ... after that your child will be registered in child protection, and that means you will be in danger, they will say ... this person is a bad person ... when they are doing the legacy cases [if the state has it on record] that you will neglect your child, that you abuse your child, that means you are under this category of person who can pose a risk [to] British society, so they want ... to remove you ... They are ... themselves creating this kind of situation.”
(Founder of local African women’s group)

What this means is that the kind of welfare state refugees and other migrants experience is frequently different on a qualitative level from that encountered by many people born in Britain, and this furthers the super-exploitation of migrants and the material divide in the working classes, with its consequences for undermining international class consciousness and contributing to the management of oppression.
Refugees’ recent experiences of welfare provision have been formed within a wider context which has seen rapid change. Since the 1990s, the British state has undergone a decisive moment in a longer-term transition to a concept of welfare based on surveillance and coercion, away from the concept enshrined in the 1948 welfare state, of welfare as a right rather than a privilege. The welfare state has been reorganised from a professional/bureaucratic order to a conditional welfare state, with a managerialist regime that views service users as individualised consumers and integrates the market into provision of key services (Williams 1995: 151-5; see also Sales 2002: 459). This has combined the privatisation of some areas of state welfare, in order to open them up for the production of surplus value (Byrne 2001: 245), with the delegation of other areas to parts of the voluntary sector willing to work directly for the state, and regulated on a contractual basis, with ‘voluntary sector compacts’ established at a country level in 1998 (Morison 2000). In this process, the scope of activity for the voluntary sector has been shaped largely towards areas “outside the reach of state bureaucracy and beyond the interests of the private sector” (Morison 2000: 105), including areas from which the state wishes to disengage, but which are unattractive for profitable private investment. This restructuring has also impacted on the nature and priorities of the voluntary sector, as organisations have come under pressure to adopt a more professionalised and managerialist approach in order to compete with private companies for contracts (Roberts and Devine 2003: 312-3), with a consequent devaluing of professional decision-making and principles (Banks 2004: 149) and displacement of questions of power (Bunyan 2010: 114-15). Mayer (2003: 120-1) traces a process, beginning in the 1980s in many advanced capitalist countries, of non-state organisations, which began with missions of empowerment and transformation, coming under increasing pressure to provide basic services and substitute for the state, with little time or resources left to do anything else, and a practical focus on ‘inclusion’ in the labour market - often in low-paid and highly-exploitative positions - instead of poverty alleviation. The shifting treatment of refugees and the conception of asylum as a privilege or act of charity instead of a right have gone in line with this trend and provided one of its most extreme expressions (Kundnani 2007: 74-5). Refugees pose an implicit challenge to the conditional and market-tendered approach to welfare, by claiming an absolute right to sanctuary based on membership of humanity (Morris 2007: 50-1).
In the recent period, restrictions on access to welfare have been viewed as a key element of the strategy of reducing asylum applications, under the justification that many refugees without status are attracted to Britain by its welfare provision (Bloch and Schuster 2005: 116; Gibney and Hansen 2005: 75-9). Successive immigration acts have removed access to mainstream benefits and welfare support from those in the asylum process, claiming that their needs would still be met by NASS, despite its own assertions that it was primarily a housing provider, not a welfare service (Grady 2004: 135-8). In 1996 and 2002, Conservative and Labour governments went as far as attempting to remove welfare support from refugees without status who had failed to claim for asylum immediately upon arrival, although in both cases the implementation of these measures were prevented in the courts on human rights grounds (Morris 2007: 52-3).

For those refused asylum, however, British courts have permitted the withdrawal of all support except on severely limited, exceptional grounds. There was a widespread view among participants that, whilst aspects of the decision making process may have improved, the conditions and access for those awaiting a decision or who had been refused had worsened in significant ways during their time in Britain:

“since I’ve been there I think things tend to be worse, for example they will ask you to stay six months before [you can] access ESOL, which was not the case, they will say to you once you’ve been destitute you can’t access ... health [care]” (DRC, arrived 2005)

“When I first arrived here there wasn’t eviction or benefit cut when your asylum claim was rejected, and now if your asylum claim is rejected they stop your benefit and they evict you from your house, they remove you from your flat. And people are really in difficult situations, I’ve seen people who are sleeping in metro stations, parks, things like that, or asking friends to stay over for a couple of nights, it’s very difficult.” (Iran, arrived 2000)

Amongst refugees without status, there are extreme levels of destitution, which have been found to exacerbate existing needs relating to the conditions of refugees’ forced flight, and to also create new ones, such as mothers unable to breastfeed because of lack of food, or mental health problems linked to high unemployment (Patel and Kelley 2006: 5-6). In 2006, there were an estimated 300 destitute refugees without status resident in Newcastle, with twenty to thirty sleeping outdoors on a given night, and
several thousand more who had had their cases refused and support withdrawn, but who were supporting themselves by working illegally, in situations extremely vulnerable to exploitation (Prior 2006: 7). In a situation where reductions to legal aid have reached the point where proper preparation of a case is often impossible, the status of ‘failed asylum seeker’ is the eventual fate of many refugees (ibid.: 15). As of 2009, it was estimated that numbers in Britain in this situation exceeded 500,000 (British Red Cross 2010).

With the exception of those with young children, for refugees who have been refused status, even the limited subsistence and housing support available whilst cases are being processed is withdrawn, usually with twenty one days warning at most, or in some cases as little as seven days due to late notification (British Red Cross 2010). Hardship housing and food vouchers are available to most only if they sign up for a ‘voluntary return’ programme. For many, a return to the situations they fled is an even worse prospect than destitution, and consequently there is a low take-up rate (Prior 2006: 19; Home Office 2010: 17). At the most extreme, poverty and lack of access to services is such, that for some refugees in Britain their health and living conditions are worse than in their ‘third world’ countries of origin (Cheong, et al. 2007: 34). Even for those with a technical right to support, the fear of detention and deportation forces many underground and therefore out of touch with supporting services:

“first time they try to catch me, they didn’t get me, they cancelled all my support, [I] stay one year here with my boy, no support, I was all the time running to people to get eat, get sleep ... in my country I didn’t think I was going to be here one day asking people to give me something to eat, but I try my best after that again, they refuse then they get me and my children, two of them there [and put us in detention]” (arrived 2004, secured status 2009)

Far from being an issue limited to an earlier period, when relatively larger numbers of refugees were applying for asylum each year, there are indications that levels of destitution have increased since the fall in numbers of applicants and the introduction of NAM. Since 2007, Leeds has been Newcastle’s designated local ‘hub’ for dispersal. A four-week survey of four agencies supporting destitute refugees in Leeds in early 2009 found 232 destitute individuals, including twenty-one families, with a total of thirty child
dependents, and cases of long term destitution, in some cases more than two years. This is more than double the level of destitution found in a similar survey in 2006, before the introduction of NAM, and is likely to be an under-recording of actual need or demand, as the survey only recorded those actually receiving services, and these are massively overstretched (Lewis 2009: 8). In early 2009, two hardship funds in Leeds closed as a result of reductions in funds and resources since the start of the recession and simultaneously rising demand (ibid.: 21). The projects surveyed reported that, although the Home Office claim support is available to those who need it under ‘Section 4’, many who are destitute would not qualify under its five conditions, and of those who do, many do not access it because they are either not aware of what is available or are avoiding state agencies for fear of deportation (ibid.: 11-12). The Red Cross reports a similar picture of increasing needs for support nationally, with their centres directly assisting 7,920 destitute refugees in 2004 and 11,600 in 2009, even as numbers of refugees entering Britain declined, and numbers being deported increased (British Red Cross 2010).

During this period, the state continued to reduce its support. Total numbers of refugees without status who received some form of state support in the first quarter of 2010 was 27,455, 17 per cent lower than a year previously, with a steady fall since 2007, and numbers receiving Section 4 support were 8,660, down 20 per cent on a year earlier (Home Office 2010: 14-15). In order to qualify for social services support, refugees who have been refused leave to remain must not only be destitute but ‘destitute plus’ under a community care, community mental health or Section 17 Children’s Act assessment (Islington Local Authority 2007). In contradiction to the government’s stated purpose for these restrictions, a number of studies suggest that most refugees without status have very limited information on entry and welfare policies in the European countries where they later seek asylum, in many cases having little choice anyway over which country they flee to (Bloch and Schuster 2005: 117; Crawley 2010: 26-8), and that even where migrants have left conflict regions for economic reasons, many have sought alternative routes rather than claim asylum (Stewart 2008: 229).

In general, welfare functions performed by the state in imperialist countries are left to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in oppressed countries, the largest of which
are based in imperialist countries. In general, these NGOs have operated within a narrative of benevolent charity, in contrast to the concept of welfare as a right, which has been dominant in the welfare states of many imperialist countries in recent decades (Hessle 2007: 356). NGOs have also played a key role in microfinance and microcredit initiatives, which shift responsibility for poverty alleviation from the state onto individuals engaged through the market. These have had a tendency to divert the focus from structural causes of poverty and collective responses to an ‘active individualism’, in which it is suggested that the cause of people’s poverty is their previous inability or unwillingness to engage in established structures (Burkett 2007: 151-2). Whilst such projects divert challenge from the system’s fundamentally exploitative basis by co-opting leaders into projects designed to allow a successful few to escape its consequences, these projects also contribute to a tendency for members of oppressed nations to view imperialist countries from which the biggest NGOs originate as a source of benevolence, which perpetuates colonial attitudes. As a worker with refugees in Newcastle reported in 2005:

“many of our clients come here thinking we are the mother country, because of our past interference, and our past empire ... they genuinely believe that we are well-mannered, friendly, welcoming”

Far from ‘helping’, ‘community development’ across borders has frequently used scarce resources to employ professionals from imperialist countries on even higher wages than they would receive in their home country, and who may lack approaches appropriate to local conditions and/or a serious commitment to engage local people. At times, such work has been taken over by multinational companies or other organisations whose top priority is to maximise profits rather than meet peoples’ needs (Dominelli 2005: 703-4).

Some participants’ perspectives on the state’s welfare support for refugees without status contained contradictions, which may be seen as arising primarily from such differences between their countries of origin and Britain. One participant reported that even the limited support experienced was beyond anything they had expected:

“when I first came in this country ... my priority was my safety, I wanted just to protect myself, to save my life, I didn’t know that once I come there they will give me accommodation, or that I will be entitled to receive some support”

(CAMP 6)
The oppressed position of refugees’ countries of origin was such, that even substandard conditions in Britain were, for some, an improvement. This in turn influenced participant’s expectations and views of their entitlement:

“I am sure that in all countries ... refugees ... haven’t the same conditions and help which we have here. For example in Iran it is ... more than three million [refugees], one million have papers, and two million are asylum seekers ... nobody gave to them ... buildings or money. And they work, they work very hard, but they were very happy because of that.” (Iran, 45 years old)

“in my country we don’t use benefit, benefit is not part of our daily life, you have to work hard” (DRC, female)

In line with this, some participants viewed the British state as essentially well-meaning towards refugees without status, with instances of lack of support or unfairness of decisions being seen to arise primarily from laziness or inefficiency rather than political intention:

“The British government ... they give me somewhere to sleep ... really they are nice to refugees” (COM 4)

“[At the project there] is too much care, and Home Office is saying ‘Oh, I’m really busy’ or ‘That’s a policy’, or something, and here it’s too much care, [that’s] the difference ... Both of them just looking after the law, but Home Office is just little bit lazy, here is too much care.” (CHUR 2)

These views appeared a powerful factor influencing less confrontational strategies in securing rights against the state, making it easier for the state to manage their oppression.

Amongst those participants who perceived a denial of support to be intentional rather than a result of accident, incompetence or lack of resources, the view was expressed that this was part of a government strategy to restrict settlement of refugees in Britain:

“maybe just to force them to leave the country, make them tired” (COM, arrived 2002)

“the main reason I think is to discourage people who are not in Britain, and who intend to come to Britain ... The other reason is to change people who are already here to get back to their country ... I’ve seen people who prefer to live in their own countries, within war zones or difficult situations, [rather than] stay
here and be destitute or lose their reputation ... I’ve seen people from Iran, from Baghdad, who is still under heavy control of the military, they prefer to go back, even though it’s not- the life is not so easy.” (CHUR, arrived 2000)

The evidence suggests that the primary purpose of welfare restrictions may be less as a deterrent and rather as both a pressure for those already in Britain to leave the country, and a measure for keeping them divided from British working class people, by placing them with separate housing providers, separate benefit systems, and separate offices for signing on. Participants in the mixed focus group reported experiences of exclusion from mainstream welfare provision continuing to an extent even after they achieved status, through a lack of access to information:

“sometimes when I’ve got a problem I just suddenly realise that I have kind of limitations ... people have to get more information, because integration is about also culture, it is about social, it is about economic, it is about politic ... [For example] when I knew about Sure Start it was just when I gave birth, and it was just by random that I met people” (CAMP, arrived 2005)

This demonstrates some of the ways in which the relations of oppression and dependency between refugees and the British state mirror those between Britain and refugees’ countries of origin. The impact of this dependency is reflected in the accounts above, where some participants expressed gratitude for support provided by the state, when they are in need of this support primarily because of the same state’s prohibition on paid work, or where participants were prepared to accept more readily what they considered to be negative aspects of NAM because it also included a shortening of waiting times for decisions, again bringing gratitude to the state for solving a problem it was responsible for creating in the first place. It may be argued that these latest developments in welfare represent a resolution of the tension already identified in the 1970s, between professional values developed in an earlier, more autonomous phase of competitive capitalism, and the need for more direct state manipulation of labour under advanced monopoly capitalism (OU 1978a: 18-19). These earlier values have not merely been rejected, but appropriated and reconstructed, exemplified by the use of ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ to represent the performance of functions delegated by the state (Shaw 2000: 408). That such a resolution of this tension in capital’s favour should be possible at this point in time, may owe in part to the negative
balance of class forces for the working classes following the successful offensive carried out under the Thatcher government and continued under Labour, and the collapse of the majority of the socialist countries at the beginning of the 1990s. This has serious implications for social workers, particularly in light of their assigned role in enforcing immigration controls internally by policing black people’s access to welfare (Dominelli 1997: 27). If social workers are to develop effective and genuine anti-racist practice, an understanding is therefore needed of the context of social work within the state, and of the state’s relationship to racism (ibid.: 19).

**Conclusions**

A contradiction which has been central to the Labour government’s approach is its simultaneous claims to oppose social exclusion as a key factor in inequality, even as it depends on the systematic exclusion of refugees and other migrants in the name of maintaining the privileges of those benefiting from the welfare state (Richmond 2002: 724). As discussed above, this is a general contradiction which has always existed in British welfare, but is being increasingly exacerbated and brought into prominence in response to the intensifying crisis of imperialism. Changes in welfare have reflected a shifting policy approach, from ‘race relations’, through community relations, multiculturalism, and most recently assimilation of selected black people into a reconfigured ‘British nation’ (Craig 2007a: 615-16). Already, before 2002, the existing restriction on refugees without status taking paid work for their first six months in Britain had been identified as a serious contributing factor to divisions between refugees without status and others living in the same area, by preventing contact and reinforcing an impression of refugees as ‘idle’ and ‘scroungers’ (Hewitt 2002: 11). The wholesale withdrawal of the right to work for the majority of refugees without status in 2002, together with the removal of access to statutory housing and forced dispersal around the country since 1999, was a key point in their deepening exclusion and subjection to control by the state, creating strong pressure to conform to official and formalised channels merely in order to survive (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 202). This forced engagement with the state has been of little benefit to refugees and other migrants. This is part of a wider pattern, with an international study in 2005 finding that social policies targeting poverty had far greater impact on the situation of non-migrants than
that of migrants, lifting 70.9 per cent of non-migrants out of poverty compared to 49.8
per cent of migrants (Morrissens and Sainsbury 2005: 646).

It is important to also acknowledge the shifting and unreliable nature of formal
citizenship in Britain, exemplified by instances such as the recruitment to Britain of
black Commonwealth citizens in the 1960s, who were later denied access to the social
rights of citizens (Williams 1995: 143). For refugees without status, occupying an
intermediate position between the international reserve army of labour and a super-
exploited section of the British working classes, the shifting and unreliable nature of
their relationship to the British state may be particularly acute. Participants’ accounts
suggest that refugees’ responses to their experiences of the state are diverse and
complex, with evaluations of the British state both influenced by refugees’ experiences
of the state in their countries of origin and reflecting the relations of dependency and
false ‘benevolence’ characteristic of the relation between Britain and oppressed
countries. That the divides between what may appear clear class fractions are not
absolute or static suggests possibilities both for points of cooption and diversion, and
for points of alliance and resistance. As the recurring urban uprisings of the early 1980s,
early 1990s and 2001 demonstrate, the symbolic reassurances, depoliticisation,
cooption and promises of future reform employed by the state can only be successful
for so long, and resistance will continue (Solomos 1993: 239; FRFI 2001). The state can
not be oblivious to this, and has made careful interventions to structure their relations
with refugees, drawing on longer-standing approaches to the management of black
populations’ oppression through the creation of a race relations industry, which forms
the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 6 - Introducing the Refugee Relations Industry

Since the 1990s, an increasing array of state agencies and voluntary and community sector projects have emerged specifically targeting refugees, extending in national coverage with dispersal from 1999 (Appendix xviii outlines the main components of the refugee relations industry). This did not develop in a vacuum, but built on existing projects and a tradition of ‘ethnic minority’ and ‘race relations’ initiatives through which the British state has intervened to influence the responses of black people to racism over decades, in order to manage their oppression.

The chapter begins by sketching some key elements of the history of ‘race relations’ in Britain since the 1960s, drawing at times on Newcastle’s particular history in order to better illustrate the tensions and contradictions inherent in this process, and to develop a picture of the local context on which more recent developments involving refugees have built. The general line of development of the refugee sector under recent Labour governments is discussed, and local case studies are presented for two different models of organisation, which the state has engaged with in different ways in its attempts to ‘manage’ refugees. Devine and Roberts (2003: 97) point to the importance of first-hand accounts of the experience of participation in networks, in order to fully understand their impact on norms, including trust. Refugees’ experiences of engaging with the state as volunteers are used here to begin a discussion of the wider impact of their role as agents mediating the antagonistic relationship between the state and refugees, and to begin to draw out dilemmas and contradictions in this process.

Contradictory pressures act on the ruling classes and their state, both to accommodate opposition to racism by British-born black people and anti-racist campaigners, and at the same time to maintain a cheap supply of labour at home and abroad (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 299). Just as colonial management depends on the balancing of ‘useful’ consequences of racism with its limiting effects (Allen 1995: 52-66), so racism within Britain may prove a destabilising force to the smooth running of British capitalism. The motivations of the state for engaging with racism can clearly be seen in the comments of William Whitelaw, Home Secretary at the time of the Brixton uprisings, speaking on the benefits of introducing a ‘multicultural’ series of television programmes:
“If you are Home Secretary in any government, you are going to take the view that there are a lot of minority interests in this country, [for example] different races. If they don’t get some outlet for their activities you are going to run yourself into much more trouble.” (cited in Kundnani 2007: 45)

This is echoed by the 1985 Force Goal of the Metropolitan police, where one of the main factors given to support the need for state action against racial harassment was that inaction may lead to organisation and mobilisation within Asian communities (Hesse, et al. 1992: 52). Però and Solomos (2010: 5) survey a range of examples from across Western Europe, in which processes of ‘rolling back the state’ and establishing alternative regimes of governance have included the contracting out of governmental functions to NGOs, offering opportunities for migrants and minorities to enter mainstream political processes, but with ambivalent results, and a dominant trend in which “migrants and minorities were encouraged to organise around ethnicity, forming associations and NGOs in exchange for resources and recognition from the state (national and local) that saw them as governmental tools for social cohesion and status quo maintenance” (Però and Solomos 2010: 5). Some have conceptualised this contradiction as ambivalence around the melancholic desire for an imperial past”, in competition with the need to maintain a social democratic model for economic growth in a globalised economy (Back, et al. 2002: 447). It is argued here that this can be more fully understood as arising from the efforts to maintain an imperialist present.

The historical role of Britain’s race relations industry

Race relations policy and practice began as an integral part of the management of colonial exploitation, combining racism, repression and accommodation (Geschwender 1977: 217). Within Britain, the state has engaged actively since at least the 1960s in defining ‘ethnic communities’ and structuring who should speak as their legitimate representatives (Ahmad and Atkin 1996: 37-41). The ‘race relations’ approach, exemplified by the original Institute of Race Relations prior to its takeover by black staff, places academic endeavour firmly in the service of capitalism, serving not to challenge racism but to manage it in pursuit of profits (Sivanandan 1974: 4-7). Implicit in the race relations paradigm is a myth of assimilation and uniformity in British society prior to 1945, subsuming gender, cultural, regional and class differences in a white ‘Englishness’ (Hickman 1996: 2-4). Implicit in this presentation is a posited threat from internally
homogenous immigrant ‘communities’ (Lentin 2004: 133-5). This implies a common sense ‘naturalness’ to race and the resistance of white people to ‘racial mixing’, suggesting that the ‘race relations problem’ is rooted in immigrants’ presence in Britain, and should be resolved by the dual solutions of repatriation and assimilation, the latter sometimes dressed up as ‘integration’ (Solomos 1993: 193-4; see also Miles and Phizacklea 1987: 4-5).

It may be argued that the modern history of ‘race relations’ interventions by the British state began with the increasingly restrictive immigration acts passed in 1962, 1965, 1968 and 1971, alongside high profile, but ineffective, race relations legislation in 1965, 1968 and 1976. Urban aid programmes targeted at inner city areas where many immigrants had settled were initiated in 1966 and 1968, but had little lasting impact (Bulpitt 1986: 30-33). NHS ‘special initiatives’ were typical of this period, operating on the basis of a crude multiculturalist view of ‘cultures’ as static, homogenous blocs, encouraging the establishment of separate provision as a cheaper and higher profile alternative to ensuring that mainstream services met the needs of all (Ahmad and Bradby 2007: 804). What the early race relations legislation did achieve was the establishment of structures for the co-option of ‘black militancy’, and mediation between sections of the ruling classes, between the ruling classes and black people, and between black and white workers. This contributed to the acceptance of racist power structures by a large part of a generation of black people in Britain (Sivanandan 1991: 118-21). As in the US, in Britain it has frequently been “members of oppressed, objectified groups who are expected to stretch out and bridge the gap between the actualities of [their] lives and the consciousness of [their] oppressor”, while the “oppressors maintain their position and evade responsibility for their own actions” (Lorde 1996: 162-3). Through targeted interventions, the state has influenced racialised identities and classifications, deligitimising oppositional identities and isolating anti-racist movements’ most radical sections. In the 1960s and 1970s, this included attempts to ‘incorporate’ Irish Catholic immigrants by ‘denationalising’ them through the strengthening of a ‘Catholic’ identity, using means such as the fostering of religious schools (Hickman 1996: 13).
A pattern observed in earlier generations of black migrants to Britain is that of adaptation and acceptance of racism by first generations, followed by resistance by later generations. For example, the black movements of the 1980s, who sought to actively position themselves in relation to their parents’ origins simultaneous with their ‘Britishness’, with youth culture playing a key role (Williams 2007: 400). In order to forestall future resistance, the ruling classes must attempt to ensure that “The injunction to be moderate is ultimately the precondition for inclusion within the space offered to minority communities” (Back, et al. 2002: 450), where to be moderate means to accept the racist status quo. This is reinforced by regularly resurfacing attitudes, such as that displayed by police in Waltham Forest in the 1980s, that racial harassment only happens to those who have not ‘integrated well’ (Hesse, et al. 1992: 10-11). Threats to the racialised structure of British capitalism, posed by developments such as the takeover of the Institute of Race Relations in the early 1970s by A. Sivanandan and other staff, who began linking race to class and gender (Lentin 2004: 104-6), and the urban uprisings in the early 1980s, were responded to with the cooption of a section of black leadership into relatively well-paid jobs in the funded projects and local authority posts of the emerging ‘race relations industry’. Crucial to this development was the utilisation of shared experiences of racism, important as a basis for reversing subordination and turning racialisation into a point of pride, expression and solidarity (Gilroy 2000: 12-13), but used by some to build support for the subjectivism of identity politics and black perspectivism, which presented personal experience as the only legitimate source of understanding of racism (Shukra 1995: 10). In practice, identity politics have often operated on the basis of an “inward-looking, reductive and conservative notion of identity”, which could be taken to imply a need to guard against ‘contamination’ between fixed and organic distinct cultures (Kundnani 2007: 49).

These developments contributed to an increasingly dominant anti-racist approach from the mid 1980s, which limited itself largely to a local and personal level, operating mainly through professions and mainstream politics (Shukra 1995: 15-16), focusing on superficial ‘political correctness’ (Skellington 1996: 132-3), and involving “the provision of culturally appropriate services taking the place of campaigning against racism” (IRR 2001: 18). As Kundnani (2007) puts it:
“Multiculturalism in this sense [as an element of government policy in the 1980s] referred to a set of policies directed towards taking African-Caribbean and Asian cultures off the streets - where they had been politicised and turned into rebellions against the state - and putting them in the council chamber, in the classroom and on television, where they could be institutionalised, managed and commodified. Black culture was turned from a living movement into an object of passive contemplation, something to be ‘celebrated’ rather than acted on.” (Kundnani 2007: 44-5)

Approaches advanced under the guise of ‘black perspectivism’, such as ‘celebratory multiculturalism’, were often theorised from the perspective of the ‘white consumer’ (Parker 2000: 74), in a form of domestic tourism that reified racial difference. During the 1980s and 1990s, many groups initially set up by black people in order to resist racism were professionalised and brought under state control, either directly or indirectly through dependence on funding (IRR 2001: 18). For example, an initial wave of community-based racial harassment monitoring and support projects, which had included a substantial focus on harassment by the state, were supplanted in many cases by local authority projects advocating a ‘multi-agency approach’ from 1989, which demobilised grassroots activists and shifted the focus onto individual acts of harassment (Chahal 2003: 4).

Race relations in Newcastle

The history of the early race relations industry in Newcastle points to some of the complexities and contradictions within these developments. Following a meeting at Leicester in September 1965, organised by the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, Newcastle City Council set up a joint committee with representation from Education, Health and Housing “to prepare and prescribe policies for, and also encourage the welfare activities amongst, the Commonwealth immigrant” (Telang 1967: 1). The ‘Special Committee as to Commonwealth Immigrants’, later renamed the ‘Commonwealth Immigrants Working Group’, immediately sought representation from immigrant communities (Special Committee as to Commonwealth Immigrants 1966), and undertook activities such as production of a ‘Handbook for Immigrants’ to inform new arrivals about local services. In April 1968, the working group was criticised as ineffectual by non-council members, in response to which councillors argued that they
saw no racial problems in Newcastle, and that the existence of the working group was proof of the council’s commitment to deal with such problems should they arise (Commonwealth Immigrants Working Group 1968a). Some black residents clearly felt differently, organising a protest march against racial discrimination on 11 May. The working group made the decision to actively disassociate itself from the march, as, although they admitted there was no indication there would be violence, the group felt that the possibility ‘could not be ruled out’ (Commonwealth Immigrants Working Group 1968b). This indicates the refusal of the local state in this period to grapple with the lived experiences of racism among black Newcastle residents, and in particular a fear of organisation by black people outside official structures.

On 26 November 1968, the day the Race Relations Act became law, Newcastle Community Relations Council (CRC) was formally established at a meeting at Newcastle Civic Centre attended by 117 people including representatives of the council, police, Labour, Liberal, Conservative and Communist parties, voluntary sector organisations, religious bodies and black community organisations (CRC 1968). The role of the CRC increased in 1969, when the short-lived local office of the Race Relations Board was closed down (CRC 1969). A conference at Newcastle Polytechnic on 2 May 1970 gives some indication of the degree to which the early CRC was part of the ruling establishment, with sessions on employment led by a Personnel Manager from Rowntrees, on housing led by the Principal Officer from Newcastle City Council’s Housing Department, on youth led by the chair of Tyneside Young Liberals Association, and on education led by the Headmaster of St Paul’s Church of England Primary School (CRC 1970).

In 1971, there was a significant split in the Newcastle CRC, with members of the organisation’s executive council passing a vote of no confidence in the chairman, including the accusation that he had failed to make contact with ‘the black communities’. The representatives of Sikh, Pakistani and West-Indian community organisations opposed this, and at an Extraordinary General Meeting overturned the executive’s motion and passed a motion of confidence in the chairman (CRC 1971). This suggests some potential for the CRC to be contested by different forces. Whilst necessary from the perspective of the state in order to maintain the image of an
‘independent’ organisation, this presents limitations in the reliability with which such a body could be expected to act in line with state priorities. In 1972, the then Community Relations Officer of the CRC described a change in local community relations policy since the CRC’s inception from an “international event, social work approach, to a political campaigning approach” (CRC 1972). Examples of this in practice include support for a campaign by the Supreme Council of Sikhs for exemption from crash helmets, and discussion of organising a demonstration against the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1971’s retroactive elements and calling for an amnesty for all ‘illegal’ immigrants who had arrived prior to 1st January 1973 (CRC 1973a). In 1973, the black CRC Officer, Chris Mullard, was quoted in a local newspaper saying that in the previous decade racists had dictated race policy, and that now a black approach was needed (The Journal 1973: 5).

The CRC’s turn towards political campaigning was short-lived. Mullard (1973) describes the direction the CRC was heading at a national level at this time:

“Less qualified, less controversial, mostly white officers have been appointed, with the effect of lowering both the Commission’s standard of work and its status. The Commission has concentrated on the middle ground of race, pushing forward inoffensive non-policies … black communities have lost all confidence in the Commission and its work” (Mullard 1973: 110)

In 1973, the local CRC faced major financial crisis and had to be bailed out by several local authorities after the wages of the Community Relations Officer, the CRC’s only full time employee, were stopped, with the Chairman reporting that, since its inception, the CRC had “always been labouring under a burden of a considerable financial deficit” (CRC 1973b). Mullard’s (1973: 106-9) account of the eighteen month battle to get his first paycheque from the national office suggests that even this may be understating the problems. It seems likely that this insecurity may have contributed to the maintenance of a marginal and weak position for the organisation, and the effective curtailment of its activities once it began to take a more oppositional and anti-racist stance. Reinforcing this interpretation, the CRC was re-established in 1974 on a basis described by the new Community Relations Officer, who replaced Mullard:

“It was agreed first of all that we would actually work on the principle of cooperation rather than confrontation. And I gave examples; I said people get fed up when we start confronting one another. But through cooperation we can
actually create understanding, and through understanding we can actually take action about the issues that we’re facing in this area.” (Interview, 2008)

In 1975, a youth club was opened at Murray House in the West end of Newcastle by the CRC, specifically targeted at ‘bringing shy immigrants out’ and letting them mix with British young people (Lockley 1975: 13). Other initiatives included the introduction of ‘anti-racist education’ into schools, work with employers and interview panellists, and with religious leaders. On 6 April 1976, the CRC established the Tyneside Committee for Racial Harmony, with the stated aim of involving “prominent personalities in industry, the trade unions, political parties and religious and community organisations” (Northern Echo 1976: 3).

In 1983, a week-long multicultural festival organised by the CRC marked the 25th anniversary of the first ‘People-to-People Week’ in 1968, including “musical entertainment, lectures and talks and special open-house sessions at the places of worship of different religions”, and an exhibition where people from different cultures were asked to set up stalls “showing items they use in the home” (Evening Chronicle 1983: 17), in an intense reification of culture. In September 1984, a scheme set up a year earlier by the CRC involving volunteers teaching people, particularly Asian women in their own homes, reported they had matched 100 volunteers with students. The scheme was described by the CRC as being beneficial due to the fact that many Asian women were so afraid to leave their homes for fear of attacks or break-ins that they could not attend the usual classes (Evening Chronicle 1984: 9). Thus services were brought to black women excluded as a result of racial harassment, without the basis of their exclusion being challenged. The overriding role played by the CRC, in common with much of the rest of the race relations industry across Britain, was to channel responses to racism into official and ‘respectable’ channels, which would not disrupt the status quo. As the CRC’s Officer since 1974 put it:

“Because of all the steps we have taken since those days, since ‘74, we haven’t had one demonstration in Tyne and Wear ... demonstration, flags, walking up the street and all that, and attacking people, saying you’re racist and all that. We told community leaders and representatives if you have a problem let us know ... we went to the authorities and say look we’ve got issues, they said tell us, so we
developed that kind of rapport, relationship, with the key institutions. And whenever we telephone them they say please come, we’ll sit down and talk.”

“We set up a group in 1974, brought leaders from all the main communities together, and the chief [police] officers, and we met for the first time and we said look, lots of things have happened in the past, you have criticised us and we have criticised you, but we really want to work together in partnership ... So whenever something happened in London we did not respond to events ... As soon as something happens [a senior police officer] would ring me and ‘[Name], we’ve got to meet, there was a problem in London, we’ve got to make sure that doesn’t happen here’. So we would just straight away get together and say what is it, he would say it’s the East end, there is a riot going on, or there is a scuffle going on there.” (Interview, 2008)

In particular, this Officer saw a role for the CRC in preventing any political response in Newcastle to events in migrants’ countries of origin, thus explicitly undermining any potential for migrants to contribute an internationalist influence:

“Taking steps before something happens, that was our policy. So if something happens in Nigeria and all that we would bring the Nigerian community in, if something happened in Oman, you know, or Yemen, I would have brought all Yemeni Arabs together.” (as above)

The Officer went on to explain the role of the CRC in encouraging local black people to trust the police and cooperate, and the structures they used to disseminate the views of the police among ethnic minority communities:

“So that kind of relationship between the police and ourselves is even stronger now ... When people know that the police take notice of what we are saying, then they will cooperate with them, provide information, provide support, and again when police want members of the community to know everything, what we say, we’ve got ten shops in Newcastle, and you leave that information, and when the customers come to buy their foodstuff and all that, they tell them, so it’s faster than television” (as above)

Thus the CRC served to form a strong network with high levels of trust, involving both the police and trusted members of black communities, in order to mediate the relation of these communities with the state and manage their oppression, in an approach which would become further perfected and generalised under Labour following 1997.
During the period of the CRC’s existence racism persisted, in Newcastle and elsewhere, taking a myriad of forms. The CRC did not challenge this, but instead managed the responses of black people. Examples of racism in Newcastle’s West end include April 1982, when an arson attack gutted an Asian-owned chip shop (Evening Chronicle 1982b). In the same year, a black tenant was quoted in a newspaper, reporting persistent harassment of local black people, with gangs using two-way radios to track targets and attack with stones and half-bricks, leading to many black people moving out of the area (The Journal 1982). In June, another black family had their flat in the Arthurs Hill area broken into and set on fire, with NF slogans daubed on doors and windows (Evening Chronicle 1982a). During this period, Murray House Community Centre, which had pioneered service provision for black young people in Newcastle, was described as “fortress-like, with windows boarded and bricked up after regular break-ins and racist attacks” (Young 1989), and young people coming under attack on their way to the centre, as a youth worker from that period recalls: “they used to set dogs after them, throw stuff at them, they’d just get abuse” (Interview, 2008).

The CRC’s claims to have prevented demonstrations against racism and increased cooperation with the police do not, unfortunately, reflect a lack of experiences of racism from the state. Instances recorded by the local press include a ‘security operation’, launched in 1971 at Newcastle airport to target Indians entering the country via Amsterdam (The Journal 1971), and coordinated dawn raids on restaurants and workers’ accommodation in 1977, during which around thirty Bangladeshi men were detained until they could prove their right to be in the country. Only five were found to be in the country illegally (The Journal 1977). In 1990, 11 per cent of 223 black Newcastle residents surveyed reported that either they or their families had been investigated by an immigration officer, 65 per cent of whom had been living in the UK for ten years or more, and some of whom had been living in the UK for as long as twenty-seven years. Half of those investigated felt that the investigation had been totally unnecessary, and several reported feeling that questions asked during the investigation were inappropriate and unnecessary, amounting in some cases to harassment and in one case including questions such as: ‘Why did you marry a person from Bangladesh and not someone from here?’ Four reported being held in a detention
centre or prison under Immigration Act powers, two for twenty-five days or more, one of whom was also subsequently deported (Newcastle City Council 1990).

Significantly to the left of the CRC, the Campaign for Black Direction (CBD) developed in the mid 1980s, sparked by the sacking of a black worker from a voluntary sector organisation, as someone working in the sector at the time recalls:

“Single Homeless on Tyneside ... SHOT employed a black worker ... as a homelessness officer, and subsequently finished him. He shouted racism, SHOT said ‘ooh, not us’ ... there was a massive, massive rift in Newcastle from activists and workers, professionals ... there was a massive campaign across the West end ... demonstrations outside of offices and agencies” (Interview, 2005)

The campaign included newsletters, letter writing, demonstrations, posters, graffiti campaigns and meetings, leading to a boycott of SHOT and some of those associated with them by several other voluntary sector organisations. SHOT responded that it was attempting to set up an independent inquiry and had contacted the Federation of Black Housing Organisations in London to ask them to mediate (The Journal 1986), but the worker was not reinstated. Following a high profile campaign, which lasted more than a year and forced anti-racism onto the local agenda, particularly in relation to employment practices, the CBD came under attack from a number of directions and went into decline, as one activist from the period recalls:

“It sort of disappeared. The mechanics of it was the vilification of it really, the vilification of it by a lot of people that I thought should be supporting it, really much on the lines of we don’t use these methods in this country.” (Interview, 2008)

“I think the whole of the Labour group [on the council] had begun to see the anti-racist struggle as an enemy, actually, that these people were their enemies. And so their response to it was to set up the Race Equality Sub-Group, which in essence gave out grants to little community groups to have lunches for pensioners and things.” (as above)

One group that secured funding from the local authority following these developments was the Black Youth Movement (BYM), which had begun as an informal grouping of black and white young people, meeting at a primary school in the West end from 1985,
initially once and then twice a week. In 1986, a confrontation took place involving a spokesman of the BYM at a meeting of Newcastle City Council’s Youth and Community Recreation Sub-Committee. The BYM spokesman reported that black young people were being excluded from current council youth centres in the area, and put forward the demand for separate recreational facilities and support in converting a derelict building in the West end. He said the council had been doing nothing to help the situation of black people in Newcastle, and that people had lost all faith in the CRC after it issued a statement that there was no serious harassment in the area. The BYM spokesman was reported to comment: “Kids are being abused and harassed, doors are being kicked in and people are being beaten up - if that is not large scale harassment I don’t know what is” (Young 1986). By July 1987, attendance at the BYM youth project was regularly eighty to ninety per session, with ages between 6 and 19 (Director of Education 1987: 1). Alongside service provision, the aims of the BYM included: “To promote and organise activities which challenge racism and develop members’ understanding of racism” and “To provide advice and support to members suffering racism and develop activities which promote anti-racist policies and action” (Black Youth Movement 1987). By the time applications were made to the local authority for Section 11 funding in 1987, the BYM had already been receiving local authority funding for more than seven months for a full-time ‘organiser’, and were granted funding for a further full-time youth and community worker and some sessional work, this money being dependent on the submission of a full constitution for the group (Local Government and Racial Equality Subcommittee 1987: 1-3). The securing of local authority funding contributed to what one supporter saw as a diversion away from an approach of political struggle and resistance:

“It was turned into a youth club ... it came round keeping them off the streets, and table tennis, and all that crap, and it stopped being a movement. And in a sense it was ridiculous, because it started in an attempt to get [access to a youth centre where black young people were being excluded], and it got distracted by that, by being given a completely crappy building and a broken table tennis table somewhere else.” (Interview, 2008)

This was part of a trend during the 1970s and 1980s, in which many initially radical initiatives, in Newcastle and elsewhere, were effectively incorporated in state funding regimes and their associated constraints, and eventually completely ‘professionalised’,
with their community and activist base demobilised. Yet the same issues continued to resurface, with complaints over lack of provision for Bangladeshi young people leading to the establishment of a Bangladeshi Youth Forum in August 1998 by five restaurant workers in one of their homes (Dickinson 1999). A similar process was reported in the case of local organisation against racial harassment, which began on the basis of grassroots networks of phone trees and community mobilisations to defend people under attack, but was taken over by the council from 1991. One of its former members reflected:

“Maybe that’s in a sense how you get defeated, in the sense that those sorts of movements are taken over and bureaucratised. So now you have things like [a local authority racial incident reporting service], it is very professional, everybody involved in it is paid, and it’s very much seen as them doing something to a community, whereas the West end Racism Monitoring Group was about communities doing things together.” (Interview, 2008)

In the 1980s, local authority policy in Newcastle largely followed the national trend of increasing legal sanctions against racism. In 1985, Newcastle City Council set a precedent by requiring every chief officer to attend a two-day course on the authority’s duties under the Race Relations Act (CRE 1985: 2), and in 1987 introduced a specific clause into council tenancy agreements prohibiting racial harassment (Local Government and Racial Equality Subcommittee 1987: 5). In the same year, there was a demonstration by Newcastle Community Law Centre, Newcastle University Students Union and the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) outside the Civic Centre, calling on the council to provide funding for immigrant residents who could not afford to pay a new citizenship registration fee before the deadline (The Journal 1987). This demand was granted. There also appears to have been discussion and involvement by the local authority in the Anti-Apartheid Movement, with a representative co-opted onto the Local Government and Racial Equality Subcommittee by March 1987, and the right to take a political stand justified by reference to Hugh Greene, former Director General of the BBC, who had argued that: “a man who speaks in favour of racial intolerance cannot have the same rights as the man who condemns it” (Head of Policy Services 1987). In 1989, Newcastle Council’s Racial Equality Subcommittee sent a letter of protest to the Home Office following the forced removal of refugee Viraj Mendis from the church in
Manchester where he had claimed sanctuary for two years (Evening Chronicle 1989). Together, the role of the CRC, the effective co-option of radical elements into a relatively vocal local state, the vilification and isolation of those who refused to be co-opted, and the strong influence of the local Labour Party, all seem to have contributed to the absence of more radical black or anti-racist movements on Tyneside, in contrast to many other urban areas across Britain during this period, and despite high levels of deprivation and racism (Robinson 1988: 203-4).

Arguments for political advances in combating racism in Britain since the 1960s seem to rest on the questionable impact of race relations legislation and state-sponsored bodies such as the CRC and CRE (Bulpitt 1986: 38-9). The embarrassment to the government of the Stephen Lawrence Enquiry and the uprisings in northern cities in the summer of 2001 (Kundnani 2007: 52-4) contributed to the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003. Amongst other new provisions, these placed specific duties on public authorities to promote anti-racism, and established legal protection from a wide range of racial harassment. However, legislation alone has severe limitations in its ability to tackle racism, and has often lead to an opportunist focus on being seen to do something rather than making concrete achievements, as described by a black professional employed by the local authority:

“some authorities ... talk about equality, they don’t genuinely believe in equality, but they do so because the Act says so, the law says so ... If the councillor happens to represent ... [a ward] which has about 25 per cent electorate from the BME communities, they’ll have equal opportunities. Somebody ... they might have twenty BME [constituents], they don’t talk about it” (Interview, 2005)

Other arguments for advances in the situation of black people in Britain focus on recent Labour governments’ engagement with organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (Back, et al. 2002: 449). However, consultation under this approach may simply reinforce power inequalities, and marginalise issues of racism by compartmentalising it as an ‘issue’, whilst mainstream practices continue its perpetuation (Ben-Tovim, et al. 1993: 202-6). Engagement in consultation exercises and funding regimes by black groups since the 1980s has often included the requirement that, in order to gain recognition and a share of resources, racialised minority people must define themselves as easily identifiable groups in terms of dominant discourses (Shukra 1995: 12-14), in a
process of intense self-racialisation. Paul Gilroy has described this as the “boiling down of groups into their ethnic essences”, with each ethnicised group competing with others to be the most ‘genuinely representative’ (cited in Lentin 2004: 192). Rai-Atkins et al. (2002: 9) make an observation in the case of mental health provision, which is indicative of a wider trend, that involvement of selected black service users in forums and consultations have often operated in a context where a lack of support makes it very difficult to present any perspective other than that of the dominant institution, and particular users are assumed to be representative of the views of all other users of the same ethnic group. This reflects a contradiction within multiculturalism, in which decentralised cultural diversity and expression have combined with centralised and forceful assimilation to the politics of dominant capitalist interests. Although there has been a sharp turn away from multiculturalism towards an assimilationist approach since 2001, elements remain, as in the advocacy by the Labour government for faith schools (Flint 2007), and the overriding need remains for government to balance racism in order to avoid provoking destabilising acts of resistance, as indicated in comments by Gordon Brown locating the need for action against racism firmly in the context of national security (Brown 2006: 13). This has been obscured in many discussions of the relationship between social capital and public institutions, by the assumption that institutions exist prior to and independently of civil society, and may therefore act impartially towards its different sections and interests (Roberts 2004: 479-80), rather than being shaped by the interests of particular groups and their need to manage the responses of those they oppress. Factors that are ignored include the context in which engagement takes place, the balance of forces, and its consequences for the overwhelming dominance of particular discourses.

As in initiatives of previous decades, where public authorities have achieved the appearance of making concessions to the anti-racist critique, this has frequently represented in practice the co-option of black leaders previously struggling against structural causes of racism into “manageable, bureaucratic procedures” (Williams 1992: 102-3). For example, Anderson (2010: 67-9) relates the Labour government’s engagement in 1997 with the self-organised migrant domestic workers group Waling Waling and their supporters’ organisation Kalayaan, in a process of case-by-case regularisation based on a stringent set of requirements. Engagement in this process
combined with new pressures and opportunities for individuals in Waling Waling as a result of regularisation, such as having family members join them, to lead to an individualisation of responses. Forms of activity changed from weekly meetings of more than 200 people in 1997, to Kalayaan becoming a registered charity providing advice and other services, whilst the members of Waling Waling took on the more passive role of clients (Anderson 2010: 67-9). Thus, what some present as the development of ‘linking social capital’, connecting marginalised groups to established power structures to the benefit of the marginalised, may serve to neutralise collective struggles. Others have avoided such cooption, including in the recent period the Latin American Workers’ Association (LAWA) in London, whose founders Però (2008: 83) reports to have been determined to avoid public funding and the political restrictions associated with charitable status and economic reliance on the state, based on a view of the British state as not promoting the interests of workers and, in particular, of migrant workers.

The management of racism and the black middle classes

Formal race relations structures operate in interaction with shifting class structures within racialised minorities, acting together to shape relations with the state. Funded ethnic community organisations in Britain have frequently played a role in covering up for the deficiencies of the local state rather than directly challenging racist institutions, and have protected themselves from challenge through relatively closed memberships (Ben-Tovim, et al. 1986: 69-71). Whereas earlier black movements in Britain had engaged in strengthening group identity in order to engage with wider society from a position of strength, and had begun to challenge oppressive practices within black communities, state-sponsored ‘community leaders’ from at least the mid-1980s sheltered black communities within a static view of their ‘culture’ as a means of maintaining their own power, and in general were neither accountable nor interested in challenging oppressive structures on which their status depended (Kundnani 2007: 47). The incorporation of a section of black and immigrant communities into the ruling establishment has thus facilitated the labelling of understandings of racism concerning factors other than culture, and methods of action other than bureaucratic process, as ‘extreme’ (Ben-Tovim, et al. 1993: 204-5). The theory of the internal colonial or submerged nation model of racism, developed in the US by the Communist Party from 1928-1957 and later taken up by organisations such as the Black Panther Party, offers
important insights here on the importance to the ruling classes of structures for indirect rule, employing a black middle class in a similar role to that the a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ in oppressed nations (Geschwender 1977: 14-15). Even with Britain’s relatively small ethnic minority population when compared to the US, this has relevance to processes of cooption in Britain, particularly given the role of black sections of the working classes at key moments in Britain’s history, out of all proportion to their numbers.

From 1997, Labour went beyond previous governments in its cultivation of ethnic minority middle and even upper classes, to cooperate in ‘managing race relations’. This included the establishment of a Race Relations Forum in the Home Office, bringing together ethnic minority professionals and politicians as unpaid part-time advisers at the heart of government. Of the twenty-six black and ethnic minority individuals with peerages in the House of Lords as of 2002, nineteen were awarded by the Labour government since 1997. Historically, it may be argued that the main influence of ‘ethnic community representatives’ with government has been based on “their capacity to restore social order at times of unrest or their ability to deliver a block vote” (Back, et al. 2002: 449-50). This makes them of particular use to local authorities in their role of managing “confictual pressures and interests” (Solomos 1993: 96), and has doubtless influenced the preference of local authorities employing ‘municipal anti-racism’ to work with “individual ‘race relations’ officers, or ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ of religious or ‘ethnic minority’ communities”, leading to the marginalisation of black anti-racist groups and collective modes of struggle (Lentin 2004: 134).

In Newcastle, alongside ‘adopting’ and bureaucratising RHSG and other projects, the response of the local state to a range of forms of racism in the 1990s seems to have focused largely on the cultivation of a black middle class, through encouragement and support for ethnic minority small businesses. In October 1996, an Asian Traders Working Group was established by the Council’s Racial Equality Working Group (Chief Executive’s Department 1996). The council went on to launch an ‘Asian Business Cluster’ initiative in 1998, to give support to small businesses in the Arthurs Hill area of Newcastle in a stated attempt to ‘arrest decline’ in the area, which at the time had a large number of unoccupied houses, and also made reference to the need to respond to
organised racism in the area (Asian Traders Working Group 1998: 1-3). More recently, the local state has continued to focus on the twin strategies of stimulating ‘ethnic’ businesses and policing individual racial harassment, for example with the construction of a ceremonial arch to attract more business to Chinatown (The Journal 2003; Ashby 2005).

Britain’s black middle classes are based to a large degree on employment in the public, voluntary and community sectors, therefore having a very direct connection between their relative privileges and their relation to the state, either directly as their employer or indirectly through state influence over funding. Their relatively privileged class position mediates, but does not remove, the experience of racism, and there are marked differences between, as well as within, particular ethnic minorities. Those most likely to be employed in managerial or professional occupations are from the Chinese, Indian, White Irish, and other non-British White groups (between 32 and 38 per cent, rising to more than 45 per cent for men). The groups with the lowest proportions of managers or professionals are the Black-Caribbean, Black-African and Bangladeshi groups (between 19 per cent and 22 per cent). Only 17.7 per cent of Bangladeshi men in employment are in professional or managerial roles, while more than 50 per cent are in semi-routine and routine work, including jobs such as sales assistants, operatives and labourers (Heath and Cheung 2006: 15-6; ONS 2006b). Similarly, more than half of employed Bangladeshi women are doing semi-routine and routine work, whilst Chinese, Indian and Black women have relatively high proportions in professional and managerial work. The majority of these women, however, are found in lower managerial and professional roles rather than in the higher levels. For Black-Caribbean, Black-African and ‘Black-mixed’ women, a significant part of these managerial sections are accounted for by those employed at various levels of the NHS (Heath and Cheung 2006: 16).

Whilst on the one hand, there has been recruitment to Britain of highly-skilled workers in professional positions, for many other migrants and for black people born in Britain, there are barriers to advancement far greater than for white people. Even for those in management positions, there is evidence of racial targeting by higher management. The study by Roberts et al. (2008) cited previously found a common management tactic to involve the diversion of attention from racism in the organisation onto conflicts.

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between, for example, Afro-Caribbean and Somali workers, and to present diversity itself as the problem. Where racism was acknowledged in some form by senior management, there was a common tendency for responsibility to be dumped onto black junior managers or team leaders to ‘sort it out’ (Roberts, et al. 2008: 37-8).

Multiple studies have demonstrated an ‘ethnic disadvantage’, not only in direct recruitment to management positions, but also in internal promotion processes, which rely on practical skills and experience more than qualifications (ibid.: 8), and at times include ‘hidden criteria’ favouring white culture alongside ethnic stereotyping by managers (ibid.: 2-3).

Splits within black sections of the working classes have been added to by the points-based immigration system introduced in stages in the final terms of the recent Labour governments’, with 42 per cent of the increase in foreign-born workers from 2001 to 2008 representing workers in higher-paid occupations (ONS 2008: 6), and the indefinite suspension of the lowest-skilled tier following the onset of the economic crisis (Home Affairs Committee 2009). Of employers who stated they were planning to recruit migrant workers in the third quarter of 2009, 43 per cent said they were looking for highly skilled workers, 28 per cent for skilled workers, and 25 per cent for low-skilled/unskilled workers (CIDP 2009a: 8). Within strong intra-ethnic networks, legality of employment has been found to be less important in determining wages and conditions than individuals’ access to contacts or status, which may allow, for example, a movement from the ‘ethnic enclave’ to a job with a ‘middle man’ providing services to wealthier sections of society outside the ethnic group (Ahmad 2008: 864-7). This implies significant power and influence for the ‘middle men’, and demonstrates another way in which a degree of coincidence of interests may develop between a black middle class and the state in cooperating through the race relations industry, alongside the continued existence of a super-exploited and partly unregistered black workforce.

This was the context for the development of the ‘refugee relations’ sector, including a sharp stratification between a ‘refugee elite’, with secure immigration status and well paid posts, an intermediary layer with greater opportunities but in many cases working for free, and finally an increasingly excluded and insecure mass, many of whom are detained indefinitely in immigration prisons.
The role of organisations managing refugees’ relationship to the state

The Home Office has stated that it views strong refugee organisations and ‘involvement in the host society’ as positive signs of integration (Wilson and Lewis 2006: 16). Since the early 1990s, refugee community organisations have been increasingly incorporated into the race relations framework of devolved responsibility from the state, with its discipline of funding regimes (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 22-3), and numerous voluntary sector projects specifically targeting refugees have been established across the country (WLRI 2005). Whilst some voluntary sector organisations publicly criticised dispersal, there was no sustained campaign, and organisations from the voluntary sector, and in some cases Refugee Community Organisations (RCOs), ultimately took the front line in implementing the dispersal process, sacrificing much of their independence from the state and inhabiting “the most visible and contested space within the NASS system” and its intended role as a deterrent to residence in Britain (Hynes 2009). Briskman and Cemlyn (2005) conducted interviews with a range of asylum teams and voluntary agencies and concluded:

“There is a mixed picture among those [NGOs in Britain] with government funding between maintaining independence and advocacy on behalf of asylum-seekers’ rights, and becoming enmeshed in managing an unsatisfactory situation. Individual workers, statutory and voluntary, seek to make a difference, but provision is under-resourced and uncoordinated, leaving basic needs unmet.” (Briskman and Cemlyn 2005: 719)

Participants in the mixed focus group emphasised the importance of collective organisation by refugees, but also the vulnerability created by reliance on funding, with funding empowering but its withdrawal disempowering:

“[We aim] to create a platform for individual groups, RCOs, the refugee-led organisations which are just composed of refugees and asylum seekers, to come and to have one voice, to influence, to bring forward the different evidence with the problem, issues they are facing in their communities ... those small organisations, they were quite empowered through the different funding, so the sector now have lost a big chunk of money” (former volunteer, now a paid worker with an independent RCO forum)
Beyond this vulnerability, two focus group participants, who each had extensive experience across the refugee sector, confirmed the power of funders to influence forms of action:

“when you get funding through some government agency, you are not free, there are so many limitations, it’s the same with ... some refugee community organisations, we’ve got some groups, sometimes we get funding, but there are restrictions, they say to you, you do these things, you can’t do this” (female refugee with status, arrived 2005)

“now the great money which is available is from the government. As a collective voice, how can you really advertise the work and the kind of action we are doing? The government [says]: “I give you my money, but with a string of conditions attached, alright you work for me, because this is the money ... I know that ok, you want to defend people who I oppress, but if I give you money you have to be limited in the action. I can give you a room of action, but no hundred per cent” (male refugee with status, arrived 2002)

Thus, the state uses its monopoly position in granting funding to shape even the activities that aim to oppose its policies.

The context for increased attention to refugee organisations by the state was increased resistance by refugees and their supporters against state interventions, particularly in opposition to deportations and also, at times, targeting the use of vouchers for subsistence payments and the practice of immigration detention (Sales 2002: 470).

From the mid 1980s, the Viraj Mendis Defence Campaign and other high profile campaigns against the deportations of particular individuals drew wide support, engaged in active street campaigning, formed alliances with people engaged in other anti-racist and working-class struggles, and received backing from trade union branches, religious leaders and some Members of Parliament. In Newcastle, such campaigns included opposition to the deportation of Surjit Singh Lally away from his family to India in 1988, in a campaign involving Benwell Law Centre and supported by local MP David Clelland, which collected more than 6000 signatures and won one year leave to remain, after which he could apply for permanent leave to remain (Welford 1988: 9). In 1994, the Tahir family in nearby Blyth were deported to Pakistan despite a campaign supported by thousands of people, including 170 MPs, one of them Tony Blair, but later
managed to return to Britain and were granted the right to stay permanently (Gledhill 2004). In 1998, protests against the deportation of Greg Otigbah to Nigeria, which involved ‘Youth Against Racism in Europe’, forced the transfer of the flight from Newcastle to Teeside airport (Ford 1998). On 30 September 2000, the North East Campaign for Asylum Rights (NECFAR) organised a march through Newcastle from the quayside to a rally in the Bigg Market, involving local, national and international campaign groups and trade unions (Kennedy 2000). In 2004, the Croatian Bamburac family, who had come to live in Newcastle in 1998 and had been refused their asylum application in 2003, secured the right to stay following a campaign and petition submitted by MP Nick Brown signed by 1,400 ‘friends and neighbours’ (Evening Chronicle 2004).

As the numbers dispersed to different areas increased and networks developed and matured, so did forms of resistance (Eskovitchl 2006). Many of the refugees arriving in Britain in the late 1990s and early 2000s came from a greater diversity of countries than earlier periods of migration from predominantly South Asian and Caribbean countries, and as a consequence were often outside the scope of the race relations management structures discussed above. This was a contradictory consequence of refugees’ marginalisation, as they were excluded from vital rights, services and official political channels, but also less liable to have their struggles immediately neutralised and their leaders co-opted by well-developed structures. With a peak between 2005 and 2008, refugees across Britain began to mobilise in collective opposition to deportations, often around a shared country of origin, including in Newcastle significant mobilisations at different points by groups of refugees from the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Iran, Turkey and Iraq, sometimes working with CAMP and sometimes in separate organisations, some of which were directly connected to organisations in refugees’ countries of origin. These responses took place at a time of transition from recognition to assimilation as the dominant approach, contributing to levels of exclusion that provoked political and conflictual forms of mobilisation. In particular, unusually for the recent period, mobilisations by members of ‘new’ migration flows have at times linked ethnicity to class and gender, such as in collective resistance to people’s treatment in immigration detention centres and in low-paid and insecure workplaces (Però and Solomos 2010: 5-6).
Attempts by the state under Labour to influence forms of activity by refugees without status and ‘manage’ responses to racism and oppression extended even to the point of legislating to prohibit unpaid employment for which ‘some non-monetary benefit’ is received, and to restrict voluntary activity to a state-approved “charity, voluntary organisation or body that raises funds for either, or in the public sector”. Removal of the right to work from the majority of refugees without status gave a major boost to the prominence of volunteering (Wilson and Lewis 2006: 18), with many volunteers going to refugee sector organisations as the projects they were most familiar with. Young refugees have also been reported to have been encouraged to volunteer in order to keep them ‘off the street’ (WLRI 2005: 59), as an indirect means of social control. The increasing destitution of refugee communities brought about by state interventions has increased the pressure on voluntary organisations and RCOs to provide basic services, limiting potential to engage in other activities such as campaigning, managing coherent volunteering programmes, or even applying for funding (WLRI 2005: 29). Meanwhile, insufficient resources and funding have been reported to keep RCOs frequently on a ‘defensive’ footing, restricted to filling gaps in basic service provision rather than engaging in community development or long-term integrationist work, and potentially maintaining the marginality of refugees, by engaging in mutual adaptation with statutory services (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 201-2). The politicised nature of asylum further exacerbates the pressure on refugee sector organisations by increasing the vulnerability of funding. Fears of the consequences of mounting a political response grew further following the racist campaign by the Daily Mail against funding for NCADC (WLRI 2005: 29), discussed in Chapter 4.

Following the introduction of NAM in 2007, large sections of refugees with children, who had been at the centre of many anti-deportation campaigns, were granted leave to remain as part of a ‘legacy exercise’, aimed at clearing the backlog of applications, whilst the process under which many new arrivals were refused and deported was made faster and more centrally controlled, with asylum applicants divided into seven categories, predetermining the outcome of claims and speeding up the deportation process (Hynes 2009). In some ways, NAM represented a victory, with the securing of leave to remain for many people who had been engaged in a long struggle, and for
many other refugees around them. Yet, it also carried a negative aspect, in the diffusion of resistance at a time when large numbers of other refugees continued to face deportation, including those arriving in Britain later. Two VOL volunteers described their initial experiences of NAM in a focus group shortly after its establishment:

“When the NAM just came in and we had the training about NAM, it specifically said on the sheet that came from Home Office that NAM ... is there to ensure that there are more refusals, and that there are not such big chances of appeal, and that was what we were told, that NAM is there to make sure that more people are refused and deported, don’t stay in this country, and that people don’t get a chance of appeal.” (VOL 2)

“They won’t leave the asylum seekers to become illegal, they are straight deporting them, and they know straight where they are, and their case worker know everything about them ... the people who arrive in 2001 and 2002 and 2003, they are still living there, but who arrive after 2005, they are not there, they are straight away got kick out of the country if they didn’t have the right to live in this country. And they gave more positive decisions very soon and very quick.” (VOL 4)

While some who had been waiting a long time secured their status through the legacy exercise, for many new applicants it has meant entry into a ‘fast track’ system of claims. Intended in theory to be used for straightforward cases, the fast track involves initial cases being heard in three days, and all appeals completed by twenty one days. BID (2009) reports that people who have been through this system describe feeling like confused bystanders in the process. In the first quarter of 2009, 29 per cent of all applications for asylum were granted, but for those assigned to the fast track the rate was between 2 and 3 per cent. The Labour government’s stated aim prior to losing the 2010 election was to have 30 per cent of all asylum claims considered under the fast track, despite widespread criticism of the process by mainstream bodies including the Independent Asylum Commission, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the National Audit Office (BID 2009: 18-20). The developments around NAM and the legacy exercise contributed to a decrease in political mobilisations by refugees resident in working class communities, whilst inside immigration detention centres hunger strikes, break-outs and other forms of protest have continued at a high level of intensity, although largely ignored by the media and isolated from outside support (Jameson
2010). It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the contemporary situation of refugees fits a wider pattern in which “All the signs are that a migrant aristocracy which does not threaten to puncture the moral limits of the nation will be allowed continued entry, whilst a migrant ‘underclass’ will only be let in on the pretext of ‘benevolent duty’” (Kyriakides and Virdee 2003: 302). Genuine anti-racist practice, precisely because it challenges dominant institutional and societal norms, will continue to be labelled as ‘extreme’ and pushed as far as possible to the margins (Ben-Tovim, et al. 1986: 105).

Two case studies of organisations surveyed in this research illustrate some of the various ways in which voluntary and community sector organisations play a role as part of the refugee relations industry, which has been cultivated to help manage the state’s relationship to refugees.

**Direct contracting by the state: the case of VOL**

In 1999, the Home Office contracted local voluntary sector projects to set up ‘one stop services’ in the areas where refugees without status were being dispersed, as a means of delegated front line contact between refugees and the state. VOL was one organisation which took this role, contributing to a dramatic increase in the scale of the organisation:

“It’s grown so big from a small organisation with a few volunteers and perhaps one or two people to overnight a big organisation with ... fifty-five employees and about 300 volunteers” (VOL manager)

Whilst formally in the voluntary sector, the work of the one stop service at VOL involves a high level of engagement with the state, both in the involvement of refugees as volunteers delivering work contracted by the Home Office, and in facilitating contact between the Home Office and large numbers of other refugees as users. One volunteer reported the organisation’s function as simultaneously facilitating the formation of social capital amongst refugees and acting as a trusted link to the state:

“I think for refugees and asylum seekers, for them [VOL] is just like, for some of them it is just like a social gathering, it’s a meeting point, and it’s a point they feel very comfortable to come, and they have the confidence in whatever they get, that they can come any time, and they come, they complain, you know, they come and they demand, they want the service ... In fact sometimes we have to
explain to them just hang on, I’m also just volunteering ... it’s a place they feel they can go for help, whatever time, anywhere, anytime, or they can just ring”

(VOL 5)

VOL’s role includes provision of vital services for individual refugees, such as translation and help with applying for subsistence support, but also mediation of the conflict and hostility arising from the contradictory interests represented by refugees without status and the state:

“when I am on reception, and people sometimes swear at you, and you can see that they’re angry, and they shout at you like it’s your job, you have to help them ... you can understand why they’re so frustrated ... I’m an asylum seeker myself ... I did all these things for myself and now I’m doing it for other people, it makes it easier.” (refugee without status, 20 years old)

“sometimes [a] client is angry, others they wait [a] long time, and some has children ... I am an asylum seeker ... I’m very, very understanding [of] people ... I know what happened, what they’re worried [about]” (refugee with status, 39 years old)

Thus, trust and understanding amongst refugees, based on shared points of experience, is used to facilitate engagement with the state, sometimes to the point of substituting for the state. This relieves pressure on the local and national state from those affected by their policies:

“If there was not [VOL] office in Newcastle, all asylum seekers and refugees were running to the council, if there were not that office ... the destitute people and everybody was at the door of them and ... the system [would be] totally un-working” (VOL 4)

“If [the council] know they are foreign [and] they are not citizens of the EU, they automatically give them our address and our map and send them to our office”

(as above)

A manager indicated the contradiction that even as VOL uses refugees’ labour to carry out the work delegated by the Home Office, volunteers could disappear at any time as a result of detention or deportation by the Home Office:

“65 per cent of our volunteers are our clients ... And if they’re from the asylum-seeking community, then they’ve not got control of whatever happens to them,
they’re here today, they’re gone tomorrow ... even if you motivate them, and the Home Office wants them gone, it’s like there’s nothing you can do about it”

(VOL manager)

Refugees as users may benefit individually from this engagement, by being able to access a point of contact equipped to understand them, both in terms of language and experience, and who may be highly motivated by a sense of solidarity to try and secure for them the ‘best deal’ available within the limits of the legal system. At the same time, the state benefits from more effective incorporation of refugees into its systems and structures, including those whom it continues to deny official refugee status, with implications for the maintenance of their subordination to the state’s dictates and priorities.

Delegated management of refugees: the case of COM

COM is a community sector organisation, set up by dispersed refugees in 2001, in response to a general lack of preparation and services in dispersal areas and to a specific gap in information and contact between many refugees and established agencies:

“it was a new area for us, we didn’t have any connection ... you have to come in here and communicate in English, was difficult. Even the service provider, we didn’t know how to do, or who to approach and ask about the area.” (COM founder)

The founder related the story of his initial activities in Newcastle, working as a volunteer at VOL. One day a refugee had arrived with a letter refusing her status and giving her a deadline to appeal, but due to a lack of English proficiency and access to translation she had not been able to understand the contents of the letter and did not know where to go for support, and the deadline had expired:

“So [on] that day [a worker at VOL] said ... you know it’s better for you to have your own community organisation, like African, where people can come and maybe ask you as a first contact, ‘I’ve got this issue, what do you think?’ . And then you can look at it ... It’s difficult for us to go there to find out what’s happening to the community. But if you’ve got a community, like this lady if you’ve got a community she could go and ask someone there who speak Swahili and they would say ‘Go and see [the relevant agencies]’” (as above)
COM was therefore initiated as a further support to the development of trust and engagement, or social capital, between refugees and VOL, and through them the state. In addition, the organisation was conceived as developing social capital amongst African refugees in order to achieve a collective confidence and sense of belonging in the local area:

“At the same time as well [we wanted] to think about the social situation, where people can start to feel they are part of this area. Because we felt isolated, even food, everything was new to us, different to somewhere there are a lot of Africans, where you can go and find African food and everything” (as above)

This is part of a much broader trend, with extensive evidence suggesting a tendency across a huge diversity of historical and geographical settings for migrants to form voluntary associations, more frequently compared both to their country of origin and to non-migrants in their destination country, increasing in number particularly rapidly where other institutions are failing to meet social needs such as health-care, leisure and companionship. This suggests an impetus to organise inherent in the migration process itself, related to migration’s potential to sharpen collective identities and interests (Moya 2005: 837-40).

Previous research has found a general tendency within voluntary organisations for the lack of regularity and/or total time of volunteers’ participation to lead to structures involving a core membership, often including paid workers, who interact with a wider periphery of volunteers, but without the individuals in this periphery interacting with each other, creating an informal hierarchy (Pearce 1993: 10). COM appears as a particularly acute form of this, where a single central figure, both the founder and the first paid worker, was reported by multiple participants as a focus of expectations and trust, reinforced by the basing of the organisation in this individual’s house in its early stages:

“for five years I’ve been with [the manager], he really helped me, he kept just encouraging us ... he was always with us, advising us” (COM 4).

“if people had problems, they could call him any time, people were not bothered, any time when there is a problem, yes [the manager] will help” (COM 1)
This role of ‘ambassador and advocate’ has been found to be common among migrant communities, and essential to the development of bridging and linking social capital (Zetter, et al. 2006: 16). Through this central role, extended and reinforced through the organisation, high levels of trust in this individual by other engaged refugees enabled a stabilisation of engagement with the state, despite individuals’ negative experiences of it:

“he kept just encouraging us, he said you have to hang on and wait. He’s been telling us a story, he didn’t want us to go astray ... Sometimes you get tired and you say ‘How, how can I be like this? I used to work in my country’, but [the manager] said ‘You have to wait’” (COM 4)

COM’s leading volunteers are clearly highly motivated and committed to improvements in their local area, and for some volunteers a much wider area. Their preference for gradual and non-confrontational forms of action does not appear to be a result of direct constraint by the state, but rather it is individuals favouring this approach who the state has chosen to support by financial and other means.

**Contradictions and dilemmas in the role of mediating organisations**

For organisations, major pressure to make use of any available voluntary labour is created by the lack of funding and the need to make the best possible use of available resources (WLRI 2005: 58). A broader trend in the voluntary and community sectors, towards the replacement of a ‘volunteering ethos’ with a managerialism favouring work by paid and contracted professionals, exists in tension with a continued reliance on volunteers, both due to a lack of resources and as an important link to communities organisations seek to engage. Morison (2000: 109-10) suggests that a dominant approach to resolving this contradiction has been to reconceptualise “the community as a mobilising focus for collective action in a way that links ‘the sturdy “self-reliance” of the past’ (drawing upon nostalgia for traditional working-class communities) with the ““active citizenry” of community action in the present“”. In the case of the refugee sector, this contributes to a situation where the wider pressures acting on refugees as clients, volunteers and staff keep the work as a whole under constant pressure and instability, and severely limit the potential for support and development (Evelyn Oldfield Unit 2004: 7).
COM provides a case where a lack of preparation by the state prior to dispersal led refugees without status to actively engage with the state in an attempt to deal with hostile elements of the local population:

“our phone used to ring even at 2am, someone [who had] just been attacked by their neighbour used to call, we had to do something, we had to go- to force ourselves to be known to the local authorities, I’m talking about the police, especially the police ... prior to the dispersal programme the government did not prepare the region ... it was like how many beds can you prepare, oh a hundred beds, phew, and people were found in an area where there were no connections, the local community were not prepared for that, and so that’s why [there were] those funny stories about asylum seekers, they have nice phones, whatever” (COM 1)

Yet even with this trust and willingness to engage with the state, the same project found limits to how far up the state hierarchy they were permitted access, and a lack of trust from the state to the point where Home Office representatives would not enter the centre:

“We don’t deal directly with the government, the government always uses it local representation, its regional representation ... and the regional representation using other services to reach us. It’s very rare to have a direct link- I remember one year, I think it was 2005, there were a group of directors from the Home Office, they were touring in the different regions ... they came, but they didn’t want to come in, they were just in the bus, so we had to go in the bus!” (COM 1)

This limitation of participants’ ‘linking’ role, to within boundaries set by the ‘partner’ with greater power, was echoed in reports suggesting the disempowering impact of acting as a ‘messenger’ for the real decision-makers:

“We don’t have any power like the government to decide on their behalf ... We have no power” (COM 2)

“[Being] support workers means that we’re not legal representation, and we are not the decision maker ... we’re taking the client’s enquiry and everything to the Home Office, and we’re taking the Home Office decision ... to the client, and basically we explain to the client what ... the Home Office are saying, what’s
their policy, what’s their law. And we’re sending the client’s everything to the Home Office” (VOL 4)
“you’re just here like intermediate help, but you can’t really do anything much, it’s all up to the Home Office” (VOL 2)

Yet despite this lack of power on the part of volunteers, participants reported the practical linking roles played by VOL as reaching a point where any distinction between VOL as a voluntary project and the state was absent in the eyes of some users:
“I’ve found actually the role of [VOL] very, very useful, just like a bridge. You know, it’s just like the medium, whatever problem people bring in ... they’ll take it on, and they’ll try, and they try to link up with anybody, with the Home Office, whatever it is, [VOL] is there to help these people link up and get help for whatever it is ... some people think maybe it’s the Home Office” (VOL 5)

One recurring theme across different projects was the importance of winning trust through dialogue and the example of organisations’ actions, in order to overcome divisions and build effective collective action. One participant from COM explained the organisation’s initial challenge of winning the trust and understanding of other refugees:
“people used to find it strange ... there were some misconceptions among the community ... that [we were] getting the money from the public funds [and were making money from the project], and we had to explain all the time. But the goodness of what we are doing, beside the explanation, we were showing the work. So we were accountable for whatever work we were doing. And that made us to be strong at a certain point” (COM 1)

Much of the social capital literature follows Putnam’s (2000) argument for a positive correlation between high levels of trust within communities and trust and engagement in established political organisations and institutions (Henn, et al. 2007). Participants’ accounts painted a far more complex picture, with individuals showing a wide diversity of attitudes towards the state, at times containing contradictory elements within the views expressed by a single individual. Several CAMP members suggested the close relationship with the state seriously compromised VOL’s relationship to some refugees,
constituting a weakening of trust between refugees and VOL as the price for the level of engagement between VOL and the state:

“[VOL] isn’t really a group that I particularly trust ... because for me it’s just another face of the Home Office” (CAMP 4)

Several participants, most prominently those volunteering with VOL but extending to volunteers at other projects, reported dilemmas arising from the tension between their position as a refugee and their desire to defend the interests of other refugees, and the requirements in their organisational role to act as a bridge to the state:

“sometimes you are put in a very difficult situation that you’re reluctant to interpret. For example once I spent the whole day, from 10am till 8pm in a hospital for somebody to interpret, he had an operation, and he was asking me difficult questions, he was asking me to interpret difficult things, like saying ‘I know this man is a trainee doctor, he’s going to practice on me’, I said it’s not possible, these doctors are experienced, he said ‘No, ask him’ ... it was very stressful and I didn’t want to upset the doctor, or maybe to upset the client” (CHUR 1)

“We can’t be more supportive of clients than supportive of the Home Office, we’re supposed to be in the middle, but sometimes when you see how the Home Office is trying to make it really hard for people ... it’s really hard to stay detached ... knowing how hard it is for people sometimes you just say ‘oh, forget it’ and you really try to help people ... here people are just in charge of other people’s lives, because it’s so important, like one wrong move can just wreck someone’s life ... you’re always under pressure and tension.” (VOL 2)

In the latter account, this tension may be understood as arising from the attempt to ‘bridge’ simultaneously between interests that stand in objective contradiction to one another, in this case the interests of refugees without status on the one hand and the interests of the British state on the other, and behind it British capital. Thus, by operating through delegated and ‘partner’ NGOs, the state is able to both maintain engagement of many people despite their deep mistrust of the state itself, and at the same time to define the acceptable limits within which refugees may organise in defence of their interests (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 209-10). One thing that has been distinctive about the development of the refugee relations industry, when compared to earlier elements of the race relations industry, is that it has developed in a context of
increasingly direct delegation of tasks by the state to voluntary organisations, enforced through mechanisms such as ‘market tendering’, ‘best value frameworks’ and ‘contractual compliance’, and with a focus on bureaucratic efficiency rather than democratic accountability (Morison 2000: 101-2). There was some evidence among participants that this may have transferred some of the tensions away from the organisational level, where contracts operate, but intensified them at the level of individual volunteers, who, by the nature of their unpaid work, are resistant to reduction of their activity to a contractual basis. This will be investigated further in Chapters 7 and 8.

Conclusions

The history of race relations has represented a dialectic, wherein racialised exploitation provokes resistance, which, where successful, has forced retreats by the ruling classes to new systems of racialised exploitation, which bring them some of the same benefits whilst lowering the costs incurred by resistance, but which inevitably provoke new strategies of resistance (Geschwender 1977: 1-2). In the period since 1962, the British state has developed sophisticated interventions through the voluntary and community sectors, alongside the cultivation of a black middle class, to mediate its relation to black sections of the working classes. Since the 1990s, this has been expanded, albeit with limited resources, to the endorsement of an array of specifically-targeted refugee organisations. Reports of resistance by some refugees to formalise groups or networks in a stated attempt to avoid incorporation into official structures, and the “funding driven political economy of refugee organisation” (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 201-2), suggest a degree of scepticism on their part as to the nature and purpose of these strategies. Similar concerns were encountered by Hynes (2009), who found instances of RCOs turning down significant funding for Home Office contracts on the basis that it would lead to a loss of trust by their members and the expectation that they would have to provide information on their members to the Home Office. However, overall the state has to a great extent succeeded in the management of these intensely oppressed sections of the population.

Another key difference compared to the development of earlier sections of the race relations industry has been the changes to the British state and the Labour Party since
the 1980s. Contracting out areas of provision to private companies, the involvement of parts of the voluntary and community sector in processes of governance, and the reduced activist role of the Labour Party have all contributed to a distinct context. The state interventions outlined above played a role in managing a relationship with refugees, which at times was intensely conflictual, and in particular helped to divert more oppositional and overtly political forms of activity by refugees themselves. It may be argued that this gave the state the breathing space it needed to carry out the fundamental reorganisation of the UK asylum system represented by NAM. Understanding how this has operated at the level of individual refugees calls for greater attention to Labour governments’ social capital interventions, which will form the focus of the final chapters.
Chapter 7 - Social Capital and the Management of Refugees’ Oppression

This chapter focuses on the role and nature of social capital formations connecting refugees to the British state, including the position of individuals within these formations. Following discussion of the basis and character of Labour governments’ interventions in social capital since 1997, reported incentives for refugees to volunteer are explored, and finally outcomes of such activities are considered. This discussion draws heavily on participants’ accounts of their own incentives to engage and the roles they have observed organisations to be playing. Although much of the discussion is structured around themes and concepts drawn from the literature on social capital, volunteering and incentives, insights arising from participants’ accounts have problematised and/or transformed the meaning of some of these concepts, giving the analysis a strong degree of ‘grounding’ in participants’ accounts. This is important in order to gain a better understanding of the role of individual and collective consciousness. Equally important is the ‘step backwards’ taken in the last part of the chapter, in order to present a perspective of the role played by particular social capital formations in refugees’ wider situation, producing outcomes that may include contradictory elements not anticipated, desired, or fully perceived by all parties.

Anyone who is not in complete isolation from other human beings is constantly involved in the development of social capital. Mutual dependence is continually forced upon people by their needs; as Marx says: “it is natural necessity, essential human properties, however alienated they may seem to be, and interest that hold the members of civil society together” (Marx and Engels 1845, cited in Lenin [1895-1916] 1972: 40, emphasis in the original). At its most basic, social capital may be considered as purposive and ongoing forms of engagement, with implicit norms and values. Whilst Marxist concepts of class and capital are also dynamic and fundamentally relational, encapsulating systemic relations together with their social actors, I use the concept of social capital to focus in on processes within the class struggle, and the ways that particular forms of engagement interact with social stratification to produce particular outcomes.

Social capital theory has the potential to play a variety of roles. Social capital explanations that view society as ‘prior to and causative of the production of the
economy’ distract attention from material factors influencing social problems, presenting society instead as composed of ‘communities and individuals’ divorced from a material basis, rather than divided into social categories according to class, racialisation or gender (Franklin 2007: 5-6). For the ruling classes, social capital thus serves a role in abstracting the consideration of social relations away from questions of class and power amongst those involved (Fine 2001: 25-8). For me, social capital serves as an intermediary concept in relation to class, connecting individual experience and agency to historical processes in order to concretely situate the individual in relation to questions of class and power. The question is not only the strength of networks that individuals or groups are connected to, but what forces and interests are involved, the character of social capital in which they are engaged, and their position within it, including differential power relations ‘within’ as well as ‘between’ groups (Anthias 2007: 791-2). Griffiths et al. (2005: 15) identify the role of social networks, based on kinship and friendship and supported by organisational forms, in enabling migrants to “satisfy their most important socio-cultural needs within a community that mediates between them and the larger society”. They argue that such networks are frequently dependent on the involvement of ‘economically well-integrated individuals’ and support from the ‘host society’. Particular social capital formations thus result from a dialectical interaction between particular material interests, the wider objective situation and the differential structural location and subjective qualities of engaged parties.

**Labour’s turn towards social capital**

Putnam’s (2000) suggestion that civic virtue determines economic success has made it attractive to theorists around institutions such as the World Bank, offering a way to explain away economic inequalities between countries, through a racialised discourse of Western superiority:

“Social capital started to play a role in a sort of Western triumphalism towards the East and the South in the sense that Western culture apparently harboured the ‘right’ kind of social capital, which sustained capitalist development and the creation of democracy. The alleged absence of civic virtue, or having the ‘wrong’ kind of social capital (the ‘amoral familism’ type) became emphasised as important developmental explanatory factors.” (Schuurman 2003: 993-8)
Some critics of this approach have argued that it is deregulation of transnational capital that has lead directly to the erosion of social capital, in the sense that the imposition of increased labour flexibility has broken up existing social structures and undermined ‘traditional’ norms (Steger 2002: 266-70). What this omits is the simultaneous increasing need for social control in the period of monopoly capitalism, including the tightening regulation of international labour migration, which has gone hand in hand with loosening regulation of capital. This calls for increased imperialist control of processes of social capital rather than their absolute destruction, with linking capital playing a key role in maintaining social cohesion in conditions of widening inequality. Yet, in attempting to reconstruct social capital, the capitalist state faces contradictions arising from the fundamental relations at the base of capitalist society. These are such that wage-workers are removed from the products of their labour and thereby alienated from one another, interacting through commodities with the result that “social relationships within communities come to be constructed upon conditions of alienation and thereby upon conditions of distrust” (Roberts 2004: 481). More specifically, for refugees from oppressed countries, the products of their countries’ labour have been removed to Britain, adding a national element to their alienation, and this process has been mediated by racism. A spontaneous tendency of such alienation is to provoke confrontation, which may destabilise conditions for capital accumulation.

As outlined in previous chapters, recent Labour governments have been characterised by strategies of devolved responsibility. Zetter et al. (2006: 7) identify a tension in Labour’s social cohesion policy, between the promotion of a national set of ‘shared values’ and a diversity of local conditions and approaches. In the absence of an assumed homogeneity, local communities delegated as ‘guardians of moral worth’ can become instead political battlegrounds over resources (Back, et al. 2002: 447-9). Securing the outcome of these processes therefore requires the state to cultivate particular forms of social capital in working-class communities, in order to structure their participation and representation in ways that do not challenge the status quo. Roberts (2004: 483-7) suggests that social capital played a role for recent Labour governments in socialising the worst consequences of neo-liberalism through a ‘consumer-led’ approach to social policy, where those most excluded are blamed for failing to ‘invest in themselves’. This was achieved through extensive intervention by the state to shape normative processes
influencing the actions of society’s members (Coole 2009: 376-7), with the poorest sections of society assigned the role of nominally political actors within strictly circumscribed limits, not as workers, but as ‘social capitalists’ (Mayer 2003: 124-5). Prefigured in practice with Labour’s ‘New Deal for Communities’ beginning in 1998, from 2001 then Prime Minister Tony Blair began to make increasing references to Putnam’s rosy picture of the potential for engagement by different sections of society in joint formal activities to encourage a propensity to informally ‘help each other out’ when needed (Roberts and Devine 2003: 309-11). Strategies were presented within the ‘synergy’ model of social capital, with an ideal of the state stimulating mutually beneficial cooperation between the state and members of civil society (Brunie 2009: 256).

The overall framework for Labour’s social capital interventions was a form of nationalism sharing a strong affinity with Putnam. Putnam (2007) uses findings of a negative association between ethnic diversity and trust to argue for the need to reconstruct a sense of ‘we’ among immigrants and existing residents, as part of managing migration, “to encourage permeable, syncretic, ‘hyphenated’ identities; identities that enable previously separate ethnic groups to see themselves, in part, as members of a shared group with a shared identity” (Putnam 2007: 159-65). With increasing coherence from 2002, Labour governments engaged in strategies aimed at the restructuring of just such a ‘national consensus’, compliant with the needs of British capital and implemented through a romantic nationalist conception of voluntary activity:

“the Britain we admire of thousands of voluntary associations; the Britain of mutual societies, craft unions, insurance and friendly societies and cooperatives; the Britain of churches and faith groups; the Britain of municipal provision from libraries to parks; and the Britain of public service. Mutuality, cooperation, civic associations and social responsibility and a strong civic society ... at the core of British history, the very ideas of ‘active citizenship’, ‘good neighbour’, civic pride and the public realm.” (Brown 2006: 5)

This was implemented through carefully directed interventions at a micro level, including approaches through the family, such as parenting classes and Sure Start, through religion, with the reframing of faith communities as a means to social inclusion,
and in schools, through citizenship education (Coole 2009: 380-1). An array of new roles was created in the local state, from ‘street wardens’ to ‘ward coordinators’ to ‘participation officers’, intervening in multiple arenas to structure particularly working-class people’s participation and relations with the state. On the basis of a systematic survey of core policy documents between 1997 and 2007, 6 et al. (2010) argue that efforts at behaviour change were central to the domestic policy programme of governments of this period, from Antisocial Behaviour, Curfew, Dispersal and Parenting Orders, to initiatives encouraging community surveillance and reporting of suspected ‘benefit fraudsters’, to regulation of young people on their way to and from school, to encouraging cycling on the way to work, to energy conservation at home. Through such measures, responsibility was delegated, at the same time as control was increasingly centralised, with a tendency for more coercive measures to be used in interventions with poorer sections of the working classes.

The particular historical context in which Labour’s turn towards social capital took place was one urgently calling for the repair of the ‘ideological resources’ of liberal states and the reinvention of means of managing their populations (Coole 2009: 376-7). In Britain, this followed a widening gap in ‘civic participation’ along class lines, with large sections of the working classes who had previously been “incorporated into the political system through a powerful nexus of trade unions, local Labour Party branches, and affiliated associations and clubs” - the classic organisations for maintaining the supremacy of the labour aristocracy - becoming increasingly disengaged (Warren 2009: 100). The ‘New Labour’ leadership did not simply remove the famous Clause IV from the party’s constitution, with its commitment to socialism, but replaced it with a conception of governance through ‘partnership’, which assigned voluntary organisations a significant role. The gap left by a Labour Party active within the working classes, as opposed to merely drawing electoral support, has been filled by a conception of “the third sector as the organised vanguard of civil society”, seen to be playing a role not only in delivering services but shaping the ideas and actions of society (Morison 2000: 105-6). Central to this has been the use of organised activity involving working-class people to shape the development of social capital. For example, interventions in Bradford and Oldham following the uprisings in 2001 involved central, regional and local government, acting through ‘the community’ and associated organisations to break up social capital
formations that were viewed as problematic, in particular targeting “the ‘cultures’ of local neighbourhoods and communities, and the affiliations, allegiances and attachments forged within them”, with the eventual aim of making a reconstructed form of ‘the community’ a ‘means of government’. Implicit in this was the assumption that ‘normal’ processes of socialisation were insufficiently reliable, and that ‘problematic communities’ required state-directed reorientation (McGhee 2003: 389-96).

Interventions in existing communities have combined with attempts to influence social capital at migrants’ point of entry, with requirements of ‘knowledge about life in the UK’ and ‘British values’ introduced for citizenship in 2002 and extended to include those applying for settlement or family reunification in 2007. In 2009, this was extended beyond tests to expectations of ongoing contributions to society over a succession of stages on a ‘pathway to citizenship’, with engagement in particular forms of voluntary activity a key element. In August 2009, a public consultation was announced to discuss proposals to further extend the ‘earned citizenship’ approach, including a broader definition of non-criminal actions which could negatively affect applications and result in punitive sanctions (Kostakopoulou 2010: 832-7). As reported in The Independent on 4 August 2009:

“According to the Immigration Minister, Phil Woolas, ‘migrants who contribute to the democratic life of the country by canvassing for political parties, for example, or who show active citizenship by serving in their communities may have their applications shortened from three years to one. But those who show an “active disregard for UK values” which could include protesting at homecoming parades of British troops, may find their applications blocked’” (cited in Kostakopoulou 2010: 832-7).

Some have suggested that early indications suggest volunteering with smaller and more community-based organisations and those within refugee and migrant communities would not qualify as ‘active citizenship’ activities as they do not represent sufficient inter-group linking (MRCF/MRN 2010: 11-4). This could potentially draw current volunteers away from activities within refugee communities, both further reducing the resources of refugee organisations and undermining formations independent of the state. This represents a clear increase in the social control function of immigration
controls, where permission to remain in the country is conditional on not only obeying laws, but conforming to prescribed forms of political and social activity.

Backing up these somewhat unreliable structures of co-option in oppressed communities stand the police, who, since the 1980s, have played an increasingly political and moral role, taking over various roles previously played by the church and medical profession in defining concepts of social sickness and deviance, including the recurring depiction of an unruly ‘black underclass’ (Cashmore and McLaughlin 1991: 1-3). More recently, the police played a prominent role in lobbying for the extension of the period for which terror suspects can be held without trial, up to ninety days (Home Affairs Committee 2007; Blair 2009). The relation of voluntary activity to the physical enforcement of social control is clear in a further passage from the speech by Gordon Brown cited previously:

“Just as neighbourhood policing - being pioneered here in London as well as elsewhere - is showing, greater local engagement and improved public services can go hand in hand: the police able to respond more quickly to local concerns and local people taking greater responsibility for working with the police to tackle these concerns.” (Brown 2006: 11)

Thus, certain social capital formations promise the potential to not only shape the forms of activity of large sections of the working classes, but to consensually incorporate them in intelligence gathering to guide more direct repression of those who refuse to be incorporated.

The powerful potential of refugees organising collectively created an important context for state intervention. A recurring theme amongst participants was the trust and understanding arising from common experiences of seeking asylum, which gave users more confidence that their needs would be understood and respected:

“I think they trust more a group like [CAMP], where asylum seekers are really present. So it’s easier for them to ask for help, because then they don’t feel inferior to the person who they’re asking for help, they know that the person is not going to feel superior or isn’t going to treat them badly” (CAMP 4)
“I think sometimes it’s better to have at least someone who has been through the process so they can explain to people who haven’t been, to say ‘no this is actually how they do feel, because I went through that same thing’” (VOL 1)

This suggests that the involvement of refugees as volunteers in all the case organisations was an important factor in the development of empathy as a basis for trust and sustained engagement. Such formations may play a role in maintaining refugees’ oppression, as discussed in the previous chapter, by gaining their trust and thus diverting resistance. In other cases, formations formed on a similar objective basis may form the kind of ‘compact social blocs’ which Gramsci ([1929-1935] 1982) argues are a necessary prerequisite for the development of social movements, arising here from a combination of shared experiences and material conditions and an absence of provision ‘from outside’. Such blocs have the potential to “give birth to their own intellectuals, their own commandos, their own vanguard - who in turn will react upon these blocs in order to develop them” (Gramsci [1929-1935] 1982: 204-5). This helps to explain the importance recent governments have placed on participation of refugees in approved voluntary roles, in order to allow the state influence over their activity.

Participants’ accounts indicate that the incorporation of refugees into organisational roles is not passive, but involves an active process, in which individuals assess and test known available opportunities in order to access resources, information and networks they consider to be of benefit in achieving their goals, some relating to material incentives and some non-material. A similar degree of agency and critical approach to services, albeit within severely limited options, has been found in other research that prioritises refugees’ perspectives (e.g. Williams 2006; Bowes, et al. 2009). This underlines the importance of listening to refugees’ accounts of why they enter into particular forms of organised activity, in other words their incentives to engagement in particular social capital formations.

**Refugees’ incentives to engage**

Però and Solomos (2010: 14) call for greater attention to “what migrants seem to get out of mobilising, especially when concrete gains and changes appear clearly out of reach from the outset”. The approach taken here responds to this call, placing overtly political mobilisations in the context of other available forms of voluntary activity.
Whilst highlighting the significance of subjective motivations, it is also important to bear in mind that social capital formations may be contradictory and uneven, and may produce outcomes out of line with the intentions and motivations of some parties. For example, Allen (2009) suggests that “access to co-ethnic social capital that helps refugees find employment could also constrain their labour market activity because of reciprocal obligations and adherence to social norms that accompany the use of social capital” (Allen 2009: 333). It will therefore be necessary to use the analysis of the material basis of the relation between refugees and the British state, developed in previous chapters, to problematise participants’ accounts of the processes in which they are engaged. A distinction also needs to be made at the outset between refugees engaging with organisations, as project users, as grassroots volunteers, or the small number of refugees occupying some of the highest positions in funded organisations, who in the few cases where they do not receive a wage may have firm expectations of a waged position once their status is granted. The latter may be viewed as a kind of ‘migrant aristocracy’, with a direct material interest in continued cooperation with the state, whilst the involvement of grassroots members and volunteers is potentially more complex and contradictory.

In addressing incentives to volunteer, the resources of two distinct research traditions are available. Within Marxist studies of socialist societies, considerable attention has been given to the role of ‘non-material incentives’ and voluntary labour in the transformation of consciousness (e.g. Guevara [1959-1967] 2003; Yaffe 2009). Within organisational studies, wide-ranging discussions have taken place as to the motivations and role of volunteering (e.g. Pearce 1993; Antoni 2009). This chapter will engage with both bodies of work, by extending the Marxist investigation of the relationship between consciousness and voluntary labour into the context of a capitalist society and the formation of social movements. Various typologies have been developed for categorising incentives to volunteer, from material, solidary (including fun) and purposive (Pearce 1993: 20), to ‘giving alms’, ‘giving back’, ‘getting on’ and ‘getting by’ (Hardill, et al. 2007: 400). Although participants’ responses demonstrate that actual incentives rarely, if ever, fall solely into any such category, these typologies provide a useful starting point for considering the range of possible reasons for volunteering among refugees in Newcastle, to be further explored using empirical data.
The meaning of voluntary activity for an individual needs to be understood in relation to their broader biographical trajectory. Volunteering has been conceptualised as having a ‘dual character’, mixing both altruism and self-interest, with dominant contemporary conceptions differing between volunteers who are ‘beyond’ the labour market for reasons such as age, disability or care commitments, and those for whom volunteering plays a role in training and retraining for paid work (Hardill, et al. 2007: 396). The majority of refugees in VOL’s volunteer files in 2007 listed ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘unemployed’ as their occupation status at the time of their volunteer application, whilst among non-refugees, ‘student’ was the most frequent response, followed by ‘retired’ and then ‘employed’ for women, and ‘employed’ for men. There were also indications of a broader spread of ages amongst refugees than non-refugees (Vickers 2007). This may be linked to the most common positions occupied by volunteering in refugees’ and non-refugees life-pathways: for refugees, as a route into paid employment or as the only available option in the context of its legal prohibition, or for non-refugees, as a rewarding activity alongside university studies or retirement. In the case of LAWA cited above, whilst activists shared similarities in the relatively recent experience of international migration, they had gone through a combination of routes into the organisation, including participation in previous organisations, some immediately on arrival and some after a ‘period of withdrawal’, connected to factors including a discouraging social environment and their contingent psychological situation (Però 2008: 83). Similar diversity was found among refugees in my own research.

In general, the amount and range of participation in voluntary activities in Britain has been found to be far greater amongst those with greater wealth and power (Field 2008: 83), suggesting an interaction of material resources with incentives in producing particular forms of activity. In the context of volunteering by refugees, most have little wealth or power. Whether providing services or campaigning for change, it may be argued that for all case organisations, there was a degree of material incentive to volunteer at a collective level, as participants were also part of the target group the activity of the organisation aimed to materially benefit. The potential for non-material incentives for refugees without status needs to be considered within the context of the systematic lack of rights and opportunities, which characterises their situation in
contemporary Britain, including restrictions on many other forms of activity including paid work and higher education. Many participants described their original decision to volunteer as the result of having nothing else meaningful that they could legally do with their time, raising questions about the ‘voluntary’ nature of volunteering for refugees without status:

“[I] had to await my decision from the Home Office ... I had nothing to do, so the only thing [that] could give me value as a human being was to do that work to support others” (COM 1)

“[Refugees who volunteer] don’t get any money, but they are happy that they are useful ... because just to sit at home or just look at the television or something like that, it kills everyone” (CHUR 4)

Such limited options may carry implications for the kind of social capital generated through volunteering. One study went as far as to exclude volunteering with trade unions and churches from measures of formal social capital, on the basis that in some countries participation was more a matter of necessity or practicality than genuine voluntary choice (Gesthuizen, et al. 2008: 126-7). Rather than making such exclusive distinctions, qualitative analysis allows us to explore the complexities of material and non-material aspects of incentives to volunteer, as they operate within the specific context of refugees’ lives.

Survival as a starting point

Marx and Engels ([1845] 1965: 87-8) point to the conditioning of social life by the combination of human needs and the means available for their satisfaction in a particular historical context. Reflecting this, the needs of participants and the resources available for their satisfaction influenced forms of action. Those arriving in Newcastle early in the dispersal process responded to the gulf in provision by engaging in activities aimed at developing links amongst refugees, between refugees and local voluntary organisations, and between refugees and aspects of the local state, driven by the need to increase communication and access to services. Whilst some refugees without status set up their own organisation, COM, others contributed to improve the capacity of existing organisations:

“At first I didn’t realise it was anything important, but once I went in and I saw some people, very nice people there, and by accident somebody from my
country arrived and he couldn’t speak English, and one of the people from [CHUR] asked me ‘Do you speak English?’, I said yes, and he asked me if I could help, and I said no problem, I helped them, and thereafter I volunteered” (CHUR, arrived 2000)

Long-running distinctions have been made by the state, between white, middle-class volunteers, with benevolent motivations and operating largely in the ‘mainstream’ voluntary sector, and black volunteers within the refugee and wider ‘BME’ sector, motivated by community self-interest and associated with ‘the undesirable face of political activism’ (WLRI 2005: 28-9). Such conceptions may operate as an implicit warning to anyone who might engage in volunteering as anything other than obedient cooption, particularly if they are working class and black. Davies (1996: 2) argues that the practice of volunteering in Britain contains contradictory elements, both reproducing the social, economic and political power of those middle-class individuals who predominantly volunteer, and simultaneously assuming an equation between lack of qualification and lack of training and skills. For many participants, volunteering was a means of survival in a position of severely limited social, economic and political power, where existing qualifications, skills and experiences had been deligitimised through a combination of lack of legal recognition and destruction of confidence in a new and hostile environment:

“I realised I wouldn’t be able to work in the travel industry [in Britain], it would be too challenging for me” (former ‘travel rep’, Kenya)

“I have experience, but I can’t use it, physically I’m unable [to do manual work and] to sell things here [would be too different]” (former skilled non-manual worker, Iran)

Involvement in volunteering has also been anecdotally reported in some asylum claims and in the NAM ‘Legacy Exercise’ as an influential factor in securing status, and for many, therefore, physical survival.

One participant described ‘staying busy’ in order to survive mentally as an important factor in their engagement in volunteering:

“I take every bits and pieces [of voluntary work, to stay as] busy as I can, because it’s only when I’m at home and I do nothing that I go crazy, and those thoughts dominate my mind, and I ... enter into a vicious circle ... So I usually go home at
10pm, because I go to college even after work, which is great, and I’m hoping to keep going like this until I get status” (former engineer, Iran)

Schuurman (2003: 1002) suggests that large amounts of bonding capital alongside an absence of bridging could be an indication of resources being withheld and strategies to cope with poverty rather than a vibrant democracy. Participants’ accounts demonstrated that high levels of bridging capital could also reflect such a desperate and deeply unequal situation. Given the background of forced flight followed by a marginal and insecure position, which is characteristic of the contemporary refugee experience in Britain, it is unsurprising that meeting basic needs of survival was a common starting point for diverse forms of engagement. All organisations addressed in this research were reported as playing a role for at least some participants in facilitating social engagement at a basic level, which in other situations, notably in the absence of forced flight, dispersal and prohibition on paid work, might be performed primarily through longer-established networks of family and friends:

“if you’re an asylum seeker and you come to another country it’s really different, firstly feeling lonely and every small thing [seems] very big and very difficult, especially for language or something. But this office has helped me a lot, I’m confident here, I feel when I come here things are nearly [like] my country, out of the stress” (CHUR 2)

“I was working with women, people come with their ideas, so you have to share our ideas as Africans to sort things out ... some people have children and they don’t know how to cook for their children, and so [we] have to sit down and talk because we are parents ... some people are very stressed, then we can help them and explain look, I [have] been through this” (COM 4)

Participants in the mixed focus group emphasised the importance of these non-material aspects of survival, supporting findings by Hynes (2009) of the importance of engaging in social networks to re-establish a ‘sense of belonging’:

“when you’ve left all your family, your friends, you’ve been [living] somewhere for maybe twenty years, twenty-five years, and just suddenly change and come somewhere [else], when you need support it’s not just in terms of finances, but it’s also in terms of mental ... it’s not when I come to your place and you give me money, it’s the way that you welcome me, if you just smile, and it’s a genuine smile” (CAMP 6)
The material, social and psychological situation of refugees, shaped in large part by international conditions and state policy, thus create an imperative to engage in bridging capital with someone as a matter of survival.

**Material incentives**

Pearce (1993: 59) points out that there is no straightforward distinction between motivations for paid and voluntary work, with some volunteers acting on material incentives such as enhancing their CV, and some paid workers working primarily for love of their job. Despite being prohibited from taking paid work during the asylum process and uncertainty over whether their claim would be accepted, many participants without status viewed their volunteering primarily in terms of improving their CV, for future employment within Britain. One participant contrasted the decision to volunteer to improve prospects for future employment with the decision to undertake paid work illegally:

“a lot of people ... prefer to go and work illegally rather than volunteer, because [they think] ‘I’m working volunteering, I won’t get anything out of it, whereas I could go and work somewhere else, the same thing I’m doing here but I’m getting paid, who’s going to know?’ But you do get people who do volunteer, and that’s because they know that in the future it’s going to get them somewhere” (VOL 1)

Considering the disproportionate numbers of refugees from more highly-educated backgrounds who volunteer (WLRI 2005: 34), it may be that the decision to work illegally or volunteer as a strategy of personal advancement is closely linked to aspirations and expectations.

Others, who considered their past career finished, described a role for their volunteering in exploring new options:

“I’m only doing this because I feel it’s a line I would want to pursue in future, because I think it’s very interesting, and very wide, and I like challenges, that’s why I came to volunteer” (former ‘travel rep’, Kenya)

Another participant indicated the role of her volunteering with other organisations, in gaining experience for future employment:
“The main motivation for me to volunteer in [a charity shop] is ... I get different
skills ... If I obtain status I can use the skills. As a cashier there, I can go to work in
any supermarket and say that I’ve been working at [a shop]. So I get motivation
because I can also use them as a reference in future” (CAMP, former computer
technician)

This participant drew a contrast between the incentives for her volunteering with the
charity shop and with CAMP. The material incentive which appeared paramount for
CAMP members was the support offered by other members of the organisation in the
event of them being threatened with deportation:

“If we [have] any problem and we want to demonstrate for it they help you, and
they give you advice what to do” (CAMP 3)

In this respect, CAMP is fundamentally different from the other organisations surveyed.
In this sense holding more in common with a trade union than with the other case
organisations, CAMP provides different kinds and levels of support to members and
non-members. In part, this reflects the political ethos of the organisation, and in part
the fact that, unlike the other organisations surveyed, CAMP has no external funding or
paid workers, and therefore relies on its members as largely its only resource.

“The good things is that everyone there in [CAMP] is there for everybody, if
anybody is snatched we stand up for each other, so it’s like a kind of solidarity
for all the members of [CAMP]” (CAMP 2)

Immediate material incentives in the form of support, information and networks also
featured prominently among volunteers with VOL, owing both to the understanding
offered by its role in administering aspects of the asylum process, and to the number of
introductory connections it afforded volunteers with other projects and institutions:

“when I was not doing volunteering I didn’t know what’s Home Office, what’s
NASS, what’s social services, what’s council, what’s MP, what’s the property
provider ... they’re opening your eyes, and you’re seeing if tomorrow you’re
going and applying for the job ... you’ll have that ability that you did the
volunteering ... you could work in social services, you could work with the
council, you could work with the refugees, you could work with the
reintegration” (VOL 4)

“from volunteering you’d be amazed with how many things I’m involved with at
the moment. If I hadn’t volunteered here, I don’t think I’d even be in college, I
think I’d just be at home doing nothing. But for volunteering I’m involved in youth groups [and other projects]. Especially at [VOL], it’s amazing because they have their hands in everything” (VOL 1)

Volunteering with CHUR, VOL and COM thus all offer direct material incentives in the form of experience and references for future paid employment. In very different ways, VOL and CAMP both offer individual, purposive, material incentives in improved chances within the asylum system, in VOL through specialist knowledge of official procedures and systems, and in CAMP through specialist knowledge and resources for political mobilisation. They thus both reflect the development of social capital as part of a strategy for personal survival, but in the case of CAMP relying more on collective resources and solidarity, and in the case of VOL relying on personal access to networks and information amongst the state and broader ‘establishment’.

Non-material incentives
As volunteers are all paid at the same level - nothing - there is no economic reason to formalise the status of different workers (Pearce 1993: 10-11). Consequently, status and rewards, and their impact on the structure and results of organisations, operate on an informal level, which qualitative methods are well suited to capture. In Hardill et al.’s (2007: 404) qualitative research with four voluntary projects in a working-class area, two distinct themes emerged, “giving to people they perceived as different (and less fortunate) and supporting others with shared experiences”. This was echoed among participants in my own research. A primary form of non-material incentive reported by many participants was the ability to put skills and experience to use to help other refugees. For individuals prohibited from engaging in productive work and with few other resources with which to respond to the oppression encountered by those around them, the opportunity to help others through distinctive skills and experience was a powerful non-material reward in its own right. One of the most widespread forms this took was the use of language skills:

“I’m speaking French, I’m speaking Portuguese, I’m speaking Lingala, those are kind of skills I’ve got, that I can give ... to people, that I can help people through” (COM 2)
“what I’ve learned at school, learning how to speak French and English, and this is really helping out ... in [CAMP] sometimes I sit where there’s someone who speaks French, a person who asks [me because they] cannot really understand what [other people are] saying, but I just translate” (CAMP 1)

Temple et al. (2005: 36-9) found English-language competency to be closely linked, for some refugees, to knowing their rights and developing a wider range of connections. Such language support may, therefore, be closely implicated in aspects of advocacy and mobilisation, particularly given longstanding reports of restrictions on access to language provision as a result of inappropriate venues and a lack of flexibility to refugees’ employment and childcare situations (Temple, et al. 2005: 36-9), compounded more recently by restrictions on ESOL funding for refugees without status for the first six months (Aspinall and Watters 2010: 44-7).

Another aspect of experience that volunteering offered an opportunity to make use of was the understanding of the asylum process developed through refugees’ own experience. This was particularly relevant for participants from VOL, where some volunteers’ work focused directly on supporting asylum applicants through the process, but was also apparent in some other organisational contexts:

“usually I do all our family’s letters and everything that goes through the Home Office, so it was like it would be a nice place to come here and do it ... at a working level” (VOL 2)

“after eight years ... I have known a lot of people who have different problems, so when somebody comes with a problem, I would have known somebody in the past who had that and I can direct them to where I think they should go” (CAMP 4)

Another participant from VOL described the level of motivation and commitment, both in terms of empathy with project users and in learning about the technicalities of the asylum system, which is made possible by the experience of volunteers who are themselves refugees without status:

“being an asylum seeker maybe [I] have got more interest in learning how the Home Office works, how immigration works, and ... what ... experiences other asylum seekers are going through, or even refugees, or even those who are coming here to work ... I can relate to them, their lifestyle or their problems
because of my background, probably if I wasn’t an asylum seeker I would maybe look at things differently” (VOL 5)

Challenging the rational choice underpinnings of the concept of social capital advanced by Coleman (1993), Zontini (2010: 818-19) found many people motivated to participate in networks and engage in reciprocal exchange of resources for reasons other than competition or personal gain, but rather because solidarity and cooperation within the group were viewed as important values and a powerfully emotional part of identity. A common form of non-material incentive reported by participants was the inspiration gained from witnessing the support provided by the organisation, both to themselves and to others:

“they are very helpful and they care about people, so that’s why they gave me too much motivation” (CHUR 3)

“I see [CAMP] like a fighting group and fighting for all refugees without status and immigrants … I view [CAMP] like a human rights group, because they are protecting our rights” (CAMP 1)

This may be viewed as a form of emulation, which has been central to the cultivation of non-material incentives in socialist countries, particularly Cuba (Yaffe 2009: 212-13). Some participants related their motivation to help others directly to their experience of being helped themselves to deal with past trauma and their situation as a refugee:

“I had to see lots of bad things in my country … there’s lots of damage to my life … I just think oh my god, [I] just must be good person, and help [other people] if you can … because lots of people here help me, and now I … feel better about things” (CHUR 2)

“Because I’ve been like them, I couldn’t speak English, so [to] improve their life … that’s one of the things for me, fantastic” (VOL 3)

Another recurring form of non-material incentive across all organisations was the sense of fulfilment gained from contributing towards concrete and visible benefits for individuals. In some cases, the intensity of this fulfilment was described as closely linked to the desperation of those they felt they were helping:  

“you’ll be proud of that service, the hopeless people coming in the office, the people that they don’t have not enough support, they don’t have anything … but
the advising service we don’t make them hopeless, we’ll give them the right advice ... the people are praying to you and saying ... ‘god bless you’, so that’s the things that you want to achieve” (VOL 4)

For some participants, the sense of having improved the feelings of users of the project seemed a major motivation:

“imagine a person who doesn’t speak English at all, I’ve seen a couple of them, very frightened, very nervous, I found it very rewarding to help them, as much as I could. It’s really good, it’s [a] nice feeling to see somebody is happy” (CHUR 1)

This aspect of volunteers’ motivations may be captured by what Antoni (2009: 360-4) describes as ‘intrinsic motivations’, including factors such as ideals and the desire to feel useful to others, and contrasted to extrinsic motivations such as social recognition, improving their ‘human capital’, or increasing their social network.

**Influence of previous forms of social capital**

Turcotte and Silka (2007: 113) suggest that an unproblematised focus on the ‘right’ norms and values can fail to account for forms of social capital in migrant communities, which may be based on norms other than ‘dominant Anglo-European’ ones. Despite the state’s many interventions, social capital does not take shape simply according to its dictates, but as a result of a combination of its interventions with multiple other influences, lending it an uneven character. In a survey across a wide range of immigrant organisations, Moya (2005: 840-51) found particular ways of organising influenced by a combination of current needs, legacies from migrants’ countries of origin, and prevalent forms of organisation in the destination country. An important element apparent in my own research was the legacy of individuals’ experience of previous social capital formations, emerging particularly clearly because of the abruptness of the change in individuals’ situations as a result of forced flight. Several participants commented on the difference in the conception of ‘volunteering’ between their countries of origin and Britain:

“it is very, very poor in our country, people do voluntary work, but it is not like organisation and everything here” (CHUR 4)

Another participant suggested that a key part of this difference was the approach to volunteering in their country of origin as a collective, but informal, response to human need rather individual development and advancement:
“in my country we do volunteer work, not as it has been emphasised here, you know you follow proper procedures, there it just is maybe if someone has a funeral in your area you go and help ... volunteer to do some work, because you sympathise. But here ... you do volunteer work just to gain experience, to learn new skills” (COM 1)

This suggests social capital formations involving norms of reciprocity, which encouraged individuals to act without necessarily expecting anything immediate or personal in return, but instead a generalised expectation that others would offer them help if needed in future. The ‘carrying over’ of such norms from participants’ countries of origin to Britain was evident in explicit references to socialisation by parents or experience of effective strategies. However, these existed in tension with more individualised conceptions, of volunteering as a route to employment, dominant within Britain, and were mediated in particular ways by the refugee experience.

An early member of COM described their experiences of organisational forms in their country of origin, and COM as a new adaptation drawing on these forms but adapted to new and unfamiliar circumstances:

“back home, we always have groups, traditionally in villages there are always a council of elders ... and the council and the chief of the village sit there every day, to treat the day-to-day problems of the village ... So people could come with their issues, and everything could be treated and solved in that way ... [With COM] it was almost the similar thing, a mechanism where people had issues, racism, harassment, and they could not access services, they had different needs, so maybe coming together and being easy to address our issues to the relevant authorities, not only individual cases ... if people have to express concerns or needs it won’t be heard, but when you are united you are becoming stronger, that’s the philosophy behind it ... We were expecting ... elders in the group ... to organise us, but unfortunately at that time that experience could not be applied in a context where we were, because it was a new place for everyone. So we had to find a different way, but at least ... we had an idea in our heads, but how to put that in place” (DRC, arrived 2002)

Here, there is no direct or formal continuation of the form of social capital previously engaged in, and different material circumstances mean that its direct replication proves
unfeasible. Yet, in developing a new form of social capital to enable people to respond more effectively to identified needs in the context of contractual relationships in the modern UK voluntary sector, aspects of the previous form play a role in shaping the response, here based on the principle of collective deliberation guided by pooled expertise.

The definition of people as refugees includes a history of particular relationships to the state in their country of origin, often involving antagonism, a negative balance of forces and forced flight (McSpadden 1998: 147-9), and this carries implications for social capital formation in the destination country. Crawley (2010: 29-31) found significant changes in refugees’ relationships with networks in which they had been engaged in their countries of origin, even where there had been expectations of continued support within Britain, relating to factors such as different conditions that longer-established people in Britain were living in, and changed attitudes towards those networks as a result of refugees’ circumstances of flight. Some have raised the question of whether experience of state repression in refugees’ country of origin may lead people to ‘retreat’, from the public sphere of formal social capital into the private sphere of informal social capital, within networks severely limited in numbers and involving only people they know well (Gesthuizen, et al. 2008: 125). Backing this up, data from Canada and Australia on self-reported participation in a variety of protest activities suggests that experience of political repression in migrants’ country of origin may have a very significant impact, with past experiences of higher levels of repression decreasing the likelihood of migrants engaging in a range of forms of political activity in the receiving country (Bilodeau 2008: 986-91). This was highlighted by participants in the mixed focus group, as a significant factor in deterring even mixing between refugees from different countries in a drop-in waiting room:

“every time when I go there, they say that we are asylum seekers and refugees, [but] you will see Arabic people sitting together, Africans in the corner, and even African English speakers in the corner, and French speakers, or some people from the Congo will sit together just talking in Lingala ... “ (DRC, arrived 2005)

“... it is because most of them came from the countries which is dictatorships, and always they were careful to don’t say nothing which will be a problem ... the
Two participants who had been actively engaged in overtly political social capital formations in opposition to the state prior to coming to Britain, and who had experienced state repression as a result, were no longer engaged in these forms of action in Britain. One described this primarily in terms of their perspectives and preferred forms of action changing with age:

“my generation, we were young and we thought we could change ... not just [our country], that we could change the world ... We didn’t like this one where a [few] people has a lot of money and they have power and they have freedom to do everything that they want, and the rest of the people, they haven’t anything, and they are poor, and they are under pressure of this little group of the people, and police and army, and we saw that ... they are aggressive against the people ... We wanted to change everything ... to have honest society, to have equality in our society” (Iran, 45 years old)

This participant described the change in their expectations as they had grown older and had undergone demoralising experiences:

“when you become a little older and when you lose every hope, [it is not] like when you are young, it is difficult to change the situation in your life” (as above)

Although represented primarily in terms of physical ageing, it seems reasonable to consider that the meaning assigned may be influenced by the outcome of forms of action at previous stages of the participant’s life. This is reinforced by the same participant’s view of the impact of many refugees’ previous experience of repression in deterring them from engaging in oppositional forms of social capital in Britain, which they viewed as having the potential to change if refugees overcame their fear and experienced the power they could exercise collectively:

“usually because of [refugees’] bad experience in their last life, in their country, they don’t go to the demonstration ... because they are afraid, maybe the same problem ... the police ... take them to the prison or deport them or something ... Because of that asylum seekers don’t [get involved in] these activities or show their power. I’m sure that if one day, one time, they saw their power, I’m sure that they would go and go” (as above)
Another participant had been involved in anti-government social capital formations, both in their country of origin and in Britain, but had ended their involvement since securing leave to remain. Their account suggested this was a combination of exhaustion and demoralisation, despite being successful in their most recent struggle:

“I got my papers, yeah, with all the chances I got from people, now they have accepted me, to give me leave to remain. Now my life is safe, I’m going to be quiet with my family, and enjoy my life” (CAMP 5)

“the world is too bleak ... the way my life has gone, what I’ve seen, the world is too big for me ... too strong for me, I can’t lift them up” (as above)

This provides an example of the ways in which forms of activity relate to not only understandings of the world and estimated outcomes, but also factors such as emotional exhaustion, trauma, political confidence, and hope. Social capital formations may both be influenced by these factors, and impact back on them.

**Outcomes of social capital building with the state**

The relationship between trust in the state and trust amongst civil society is presented by Putnam (2000) as a mutually-beneficial one, with a greater density of connections outside of the state and market encouraging trust amongst citizens and having a knock-on effect in increased levels of generalised trust and engagement, including with the state. Within this framework it is assumed both that trusting engagement with the state constitutes a more ‘healthy’ democracy (Schuurman 2003: 995) and that increased trust and engagement increases the range of ‘opportunities’ available to those engaging (Franklin 2007: 6). However, Field (2008: 79) points to the potential for social capital to also be mobilised by opposing interests, problematising the conception of social capital as both neutral in relation to interests of different parties and a universal good. Different social capital formations may contradict one another, such as where the ability of authorities to enforce norms is “jeopardized by the existence of tight networks whose function is precisely to facilitate violation of those rules” (Portes 1998: 9-15; see also Zetter, et al. 2006: 10). Beyond this, there is potential for multiple and potentially contradictory outcomes of the same social capital formation, varying with the position of a given individual within the formation. Allen (2009: 332) offers as a common definition of social capital: “the ability of an individual who is a part of a social network
to access various resources that reside within that social network”. This offers a potential link between individual and collective conceptions of social capital, and raises the question not only of the density and quality of connections within a network, but of the particular position of individuals within the network, and their potentially different levels of access to the network’s shared resources. As Anthias (2007) argues, an individual may be connected to networks and resources, but not be in a position to mobilise them towards achieving their goals. This implicitly introduces questions of power into consideration of the outcomes of social capital.

**Social capital and the asylum context**

Gramsci’s ([1929-1935] 1982: 204-5) ‘compact social blocs’ correspond closely to what others have described as the ‘collective’ model of social capital, assuming dense networks amongst small and mutually exclusive groups (Brunie 2009: 255). It is therefore interesting to note the conception, central to Labour’s approach, of socially and normatively ‘bad’ bonding capital associated with segregation, racism and sectarianism, and opposed to ‘good’ bridging capital associated with integration and inclusion, and through this also national security. The underlying implications of such a conception are made explicit in a report by Camden council in 2006, which expresses concern that close-knit groups could play a role in uniting individuals ‘unwilling to cooperate with the authorities’ (Coole 2009: 389-90). As Portes (1998: 7) points out, “To possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage.” Dependence is thus fundamental in any social capital formation, and who this dependence is on, and on what terms, has important implications for the nature and outcome of engagement in particular social capital formations. Roberts (2004: 486) points to the way in which formalised collective agreements between trade unions and employers have been replaced under neo-liberalism with individualised and informal relationships of ‘trust and reciprocity’, contributing to increased job insecurity and the potential for employers to repeatedly change expectations and ‘cajole’ longer hours of more intensive work from workers. This represents the imposition of class discipline through the restructuring of forms of engagement and their associated norms (Mayer 2003: 124). Likewise, the real question is not of whether refugees engage with ruling structures - their oppressed position leaves them little choice - but of whether they do
so on a collective and therefore more powerful basis, enabled by ‘internal’ social capital formation, or whether they do so as atomised individuals, able to offer little resistance to being effectively ‘integrated’ into oppressive structures on whatever terms the state chooses. It may be argued that neo-liberalism has fundamentally been about breaking up or taking over organisations with an independent politics and class basis. Social capital interventions by the state then represent attempts to reconstruct / include / integrate working-class people on an individualised basis, in formations whose politics and class interests are defined by the capitalist state as the dominant ‘partner’. This offers the potential to manage refugees’ oppression, without the kind of conflict and resistance which may be provoked by more direct repression.

In situations of stable residence of groups of people in the same area, the formation of compact, collective blocs may develop through, or at least be closely tied to, trust and networks arising from extended family relationships. In one study, 63 per cent of refugees had found their most recent job prior to leaving their country of origin through informal kinship or social networks (Bloch 2007: 34). Many participants described family connections and responsibilities as a key factor influencing their activities in their country of origin:

“I was working in a shop where we were selling oils ... like a family business” (Afghanistan, 23 years old)

“the guy that owned the company was my father’s best friend, so he just told me ‘oh come, and I’ll teach you’ ... now I was actually an assistant computer technician to him” (Zimbabwe, 20 years old)

This contrasted with a sense of isolation and dislocation within Britain:

“I haven’t seen my parents for eight years, and if I had money I would have invited them here, but I don’t have money. And if I get status the first thing I’m going to do is to work hard and to earn some money and invite them here to see them” (Iran, 38 years old)

“I’m still struggling, although I speak English but I don’t really understand ... and I struggle to socialise” (Cameroon, arrived 2008)

“I’m alone here; I haven’t got any community here in UK” (China, arrived 2002)

For several participants, the death of a family member emerged as a decisive point in the decision to leave their country of origin, representing an attack on existing
formations around the family as a key element of refugee creation. Some participants, particularly women from CAMP, cited the continued importance of links based on geographically-close family members in Britain:

“after running away from your country when you have suffered in prison, you come here, you have no future, what do you think next? It’s to have a child, because as you are staying, you are not working ... the next thing you should think of is to have a child, take care of that child” (CAMP 1)

“[CAMP] is flexible. I’m having a child, so now it’s very difficult for me to volunteer with [other organisations], because at the moment there is no one who can look after him for me while I’m doing that. So mainly because children are welcome and all that it’s easier to participate in [CAMP] than the other places” (CAMP 2)

The latter experience may suggest that, as an organisation based primarily around political campaigning as opposed to service provision, CAMP is less able to meet the needs of its members, which must otherwise be met through the family. Alternatively, it may reflect a strongly political dimension for family-based networks, with the same individuals prioritising both political activism and family integrity and needs.

As a result of dispersal, opportunities for continuity of support from networks linked to refugees’ countries of origin were further reduced. In the context of the isolation generated by these and other factors, opportunities to develop links based on points of commonality such as religion and nationality appear to have played a prominent role, particularly for participants who arrived in Newcastle early in the process of dispersal. This indicates some of the complexity in considerations of different lines of possible formation for social capital, with connections which may appear from one level as bonding capital in fact representing bridging capital, such as connections between different religious groups from the same country of origin, or between generations with the same religion and country of origin (Jayaweera and Choudhury 2008: 114-15):

“I know [the project manager] because he’s from the Congo” (COM 4)

“as soon as I arrived here, I was at that time in Sunderland, and because personally I was a Christian, I was told there was a Christian community in Newcastle, when I came I met [the project manager]” (COM 1)
This created conditions for the formation of new forms of social capital, such as those identified amongst more established diasporic refugee communities (Lindley 2009: 1324-5). In the case of COM, shared national, religious and cultural elements of experience and identity formed the basis for the reestablishment of bonding capital, which, through the organisation, also connected refugees to the state and other agencies, representing a distinct social capital formation which drew on existing social resources to respond to new needs.

Overall, state policies from 1999 onwards combined with key features of the refugee situation to break up social connections involving refugees independently of the state. As refugees struggled to rebuild their lives from the resulting fragments, the state was able to step into the gap, and in many cases played a dominant role in shaping social rebuilding, producing formations whose norms of engagement can be traced in the experiences of refugees.

**Norms of engagement with the state**

Brunie (2009: 252-3) points to the simultaneous engagement in multiple yet interrelated forms of social capital in everyday life. Several participants’ organisational involvement followed this pattern, with ‘overlapping’ involvement in more than one kind of organisation. Brunie goes on to distinguish between relational, collective and generalised forms of social capital. This distinction has important implications for the different kind of norms and expectations of reciprocity involved for different participants in different social capital formations, in particular the connection between the norms and values of a given situation and their wider context. Norms and values are not formed purely at an individual level, but also through collective action, as they “emerge out of joint endeavours” (Devine and Roberts 2003: 98). The forces involved in a particular social capital formation, their relative strengths and material interests, and the overall basis for their engagement, have major implications for the kind of norms and values produced and for the wider impact on an individual’s understandings and outcomes. Conversely, observations of the norms and values implicit in a given engagement may offer insights into the basis of the social capital being formed, including its impacts on different interests.
One participant’s account of their initial arrival in Britain offers a vivid insight into the nature of the norms and expectations involved in social capital formations between refugees without status and the British state as part of the ‘asylum process’:

“when we came we were just put in the waiting room where there were ... a lot of ... people seeking asylum ... Only us and another man ... were ... accepted to go and enter the country ... everybody was ... envying us, and we felt very bad, because they were going to be sent home, and it was like very, very bad, and then it was just people talking to us as if we were like animals” (26 years old, arrived in 2000)

In this situation, there is strong engagement, and the refugees without status are forced into a position of such disempowerment and dependency that they have no choice but to trust in the state and their personnel. The norms of this engagement, set entirely on the terms of the state, include the expectation that refugees without status will obey all instructions from the state and not stand in collective solidarity with other refugees. In return, refugees without status are told they can expect a ‘fair hearing’ of their claim to be allowed to remain in Britain, despite collective experiences that repeatedly suggest that consideration is anything but fair. Even for those who had secured leave to remain through such engagement, many found the expectations of then enjoying a situation of equality with British citizens to have proven untrustworthy, which is borne out by the continuing experiences of racism discussed in previous chapters. Another participant experienced engagement with the state as so oppressive and degrading, when he was accused by a psychiatrist of making up his symptoms in order to gain state support, that he attempted to reject all further engagement, even to the point of endangering his life:

“[Because I was an] asylum seeker, they suspected everything I said, they suspected even my symptoms ... I said I’m not going to stay under your care, and ... I ran, escaped from hospital with a pyjama and tracksuit bottoms, I had nothing on me, nothing, nothing, they had taken away everything ... I had no phone, no money, no keys ... And I slept rough for three days ... I was really, really suffering under the rain and cold, in a skip, in the open air, it was really cold, my teeth were hitting each other, but I prefer to die, but not to go under his care” (Iran, arrived in 2000)

These examples demonstrate the ways in which individual refugees engaging with the state may have little power to shape the terms of the engagement. Whilst these
participants were embedded in networks with considerable resources, they were in no position to mobilise them, but instead were subject to the state mobilising these resources in order to ‘manage’ and contain them. Participation in these social capital formations was thus a means of power for the state, and disempowerment for refugees. Interestingly, both of these participants went on from these experiences to engage in collective formations engaged in advocacy work, with a prominent role for members of user-groups to shape priorities. Both types of formation connected them with those in positions of much greater power, but the latter formations were experienced as a far more confident and secure relationship because the engagement was carried out collectively, by organisations with users in control.

Disempowering norms of engagement were also evident in less directly coercive areas. One participant described the basis for engagement with state services as based around response to basic need, but with nothing beyond this, and a weak degree of trust:

“there were quite a few services that could support us, but not those services ... where we could feel confident ... to be supported. Yes, there were very few like the housing provider who just came, give you a room, maybe they give you a few information that if you have any problem, this is the place to go, if you have any medical needs, you have to go to such place, and that’s it.” (COM, arrived 2002)

The participant described the norms of these engagements as involving a conditional framework of paternalism:

“those drop-ins are willing to help, but wow, maybe it’s the fact that I’m a grown up, I don’t like to be treated like a young boy, a child, yes people want to help, but do they really understand my needs ... are they going to meet what I’m expecting them to do?” (as above)

Whilst some needs were met within this social capital formation, others were omitted, and the norms of the relationship were experienced as oppressive. This represents an acute form of the general character of reciprocity dominant under capitalism, which Roberts (2004: 476-7) terms ‘isolated reciprocity’; the reciprocity between workers forced to sell their labour to the capitalist in order to survive, and the capitalist forced to buy workers’ labour power in order to generate surplus value. The interests of the ruling classes and their state drive them to attempt to preserve this form of isolated
reciprocity, whilst the interests of working classes drive them to attempt to disrupt it, with the development of new forms of knowledge and understanding by both sides a crucial aspect of this struggle. The position of refugees as displaced members of the reserve army of labour results in particularly acute forms of incorporation and resistance.

In the case cited above, this experience gave rise to the development of new social capital formations, where refugees would be in stronger position to set the terms of engagement, combining norms of commonality of refugees’ situation and mutual respect, in order to mediate continued engagement with state services:

“we thought it could be a good idea for ... a community group like us, who’s composed [of] the same people, and [we] came together to say let’s have a community group where we can help each other, and to play the bridge between the services” (COM 1)

The responses cited above, of a retreat from individual engagement with the state to more collective formations with other refugees, underlines the importance of the state delegating to voluntary and community organisations to maintain effective governance, and the significance of strategies to influence the social capital formations they produce. That is, it is often unfeasible for the state to consensually manage oppression directly, leading it to delegate some functions to agents who are more trusted by those it oppresses.

**Whose interests does social capital serve?**

Compared to financial exchange, “transactions involving social capital tend to be characterised by unspecified obligations, uncertain time horizons, and the possible violation of reciprocity expectations” (Portes 1998: 4). This ‘fungibility’ creates considerable scope for manipulation and shifting of goalposts by the more powerful party in social capital formations. Some conscious consideration of their engagement by all parties, and the relation of their engagement to desired outcomes, is implicit in more focussed conceptions of social capital (e.g. Anthias 2007). The contradictions between the aims of different parties, and the ways in which their intentions interact within a particular balance of forces, may be considered as a defining feature between different social capital formations.
A recurring theme across participants from all organisations was the feeling that their actions simultaneously helped them to cope with their situation, in particular their experience of racism and isolation, and advanced the interests of other refugees:

“people look at them as a foreign or some other not very enjoyable reaction ... on the inside they are very upset, and they feel they are rubbish. But when they do voluntary work they feel ... they are very beneficial people, they have lots of benefits for society ... It helps to feel better and improve their life” (CHUR 4)

“with [voluntary work in a community networking organisation] I think it was about meeting people ... you don’t actually have to say that you are an asylum seeker, you can just pretend that you are like everybody else, just pretend that you are just a volunteer. And that was quite nice” (CAMP 4)

Yet projects such as VOL, performing work directly contracted and funded by the Home Office, are under considerable pressure to act directly in line with government agendas. Whilst devolved elements of governance may stimulate new forms of participation, where new community structures are required to deliver pre-arranged targets or compete for funding, their agency may be severely constrained, and demands originating from within the community driven off the agenda (Roberts and Devine 2003: 314-15). One participant, who was cited earlier as being persuaded to ‘hang on’ and wait by her project manager, expressed the feeling common to many refugees without status of being worn down to a point of desperation where they were more likely to accept whatever was offered:

“I waited for five years ... they just sent me a form, I filled the form, [some] people ... told me not to sign the form because they may send me back, I said I would sign the form, whatever may happen, I’m tired. I didn’t know it was for my paper [to be granted leave to remain]” (COM 4)

Many organisations in the refugee relations industry provide vital services, without which the pressure on the state and the risk of social unrest would be much greater (Griffiths, et al. 2005). As outlined above, without the voluntary labour of refugees without status, many such organisations would have substantial gaps in at least some areas of their provision. This could lead to both more desperate forms of resistance and weaker control by the state, as a result of less willingness by refugees to engage with the state directly, rather than through a more trusted intermediary. Volunteering by
some refugees is therefore important for the management of the oppression of all refugees.

Beyond the general features of insecurity characterising the situation of refugees without status, is the additional uncertainty and ambiguity frequently involved in voluntary positions. Pearce (1993: 29) argues that this frequently includes a double role, as deliverer and user of services, a lack of specificity in job descriptions, and the impact of the charitable connotations of voluntary work in creating uncertainty as to what can be expected from a volunteer. Whilst refugees make up a large proportion of unpaid labour in many refugee sector organisations, it has been suggested that combinations of roles such as ‘woman’, ‘refugee’ and ‘newcomer’ have the potential to render individuals vulnerable in the context of struggles within organisations, severely limiting their say in the direction of activity (WLRI 2005: 38). There was some evidence of this among participants:

“They’re all volunteers, so nobody’s really properly experienced ... at times we just all of us gather there. And I think that’s the only problem really, proper organisation” (VOL 5)

This participant also pointed to a lack of recognition for the contribution of volunteers within the organisation, further contributing to their insecurity:

“I wish [the] effort [of refugees who volunteer] could be recognised ... they play a big role, in the community as well, but probably sometimes they go unnoticed.” (VOL 5)

Alongside such suggestions of a lack of recognition, several participants in the same organisation indicated a huge weight of responsibility, suggesting an absence of clear limits on their organisational role:

“people come and they start crying and you see these faces where people just give up, there is nothing else for them, and you can’t do anything, that’s just really horrible ... I don’t think this job is like any other job ... here people are just in charge of other people’s lives, because it’s so important, like one wrong move can just wreck someone’s life” (VOL 2)

This lack of a definite boundary around voluntary roles is not unusual, with research across a range of organisations finding voluntary workers less likely to have clear divides between their voluntary role and the rest of their lives, leading at times to expectations
to be available and ‘on call’ at any time and to use personal domestic space to support their work (Pearce 1993: 38-9). Volunteers at VOL also reported pressures of volunteering on the rest of their lives, with a lack of resources leading management to make proactive use of the flexibility of volunteers’ availability:

“when I came he just specified some days when he’s really desperate for workers, for some reason, whatever reason, and volunteers can just be available on particular days, and the other days they are not there, so he is very short, and he is always begging ‘I want somebody for this day, please just say you want to work on that day’” (VOL 5)

This was reinforced by a survey of VOL records for two December-May six month periods between 2005 and 2007, which showed that where there were fluctuations in demand for VOL’s services, most of the extra capacity was provided by an increase in the total hours worked by volunteers.

One participant described a situation whilst volunteering with a refugee sector organisation where her position as a volunteer seems to have left her vulnerable to racism from a paid worker at the project:

“the secretary, he used ... to make my life miserable ... all the time he used to call another lady, a white lady, to [to ask her to replace my shifts without telling me] and when I came I would find this other lady ... also because they provide childcare and travel expenses ... one day he was ... checking to say maybe I’ve took too much money ... the coordinator knew the problem, but he apologised and he [said other people were] having the same problem. [He said] he is doing it also to white people, for example ... there was another lady who was from Bosnia, she has the same problem ... the coordinator said to [the secretary] I’m the person who is in charge of [volunteers], and it’s my responsibility to organise [the] rota, so if you want to change something you should let me know in advance” (female refugee without status)

This presents a clear instance of institutional racism, demonstrating the potential for the insecurity of positions of volunteer and refugee without status to act in conjunction to disempower. Instead of taking action, or even acknowledging the racism when brought to the attention of the coordinator, they firstly denied any racial character because the individual had applied the same abusive behaviour to a woman with paler
skin from Bosnia, and secondly employed a bureaucratic measure of asserting their authority over the secretary to set the rota, rather than directly challenge his behaviour. Another instance of the potential for organisations to undermine the agency of volunteers was highlighted in an account of a participant who had gone to an organisation asking for help finding a voluntary job, and expressed a preference for working with animals, but was left with little option other than to volunteer for the organisation itself, with the promise that they may be able to help them find a volunteering post with animals in the future after they had spent some time volunteering there. This seriously undermines the voluntary character of such work, by consciously or unconsciously making use of the insecurity of refugees’ position to link unpaid work to provision of services.

As discussed above, to different degrees, many forms of voluntary activity by refugees may serve the interests of the British state, yet no participant expressed this as one of the desired outcomes from their work, even amongst those who expressed the most positive views about the asylum system or the British state. Engagement in all these social capital formations therefore required some reasonable expectation of benefit to the volunteer themselves and/or other refugees. The degree to which such expectations can be fulfilled in practice, and the forms they take between collective and individual benefit, is determined by the interaction of factors including volunteers’ consciousness, the balance of forces, and the degree of independence or critical distance from the state or other forces whose interests may contradict those of refugees.

**Ideology mediates contradictions**

The apparent contradictions in many participants’ activity, between a declared aim to defend the interests of refugees and a practical implementation of government policy which damaged those same interests, were mediated in some cases by the adoption of a variety of justifications for the state’s actions. This provides an example of the ways in which norms and values implicit in a particular social capital formation may interact with the norms and values of the individuals engaged. This was most pronounced in the case of VOL, where practical involvement by refugees in delivering services on behalf of the Home Office operated for some participants alongside a consciousness which reflected the priorities of the state. There was insufficient evidence to say which came
first, whether refugees who were more sympathetic to the government were more inclined to volunteer at VOL, or whether the experience of delivering these services developed perspectives in line with the state, but it is interesting to note that these views were expressed most fully in disagreements between a very recent volunteer and longer-standing volunteers in the VOL focus group:

“[The government] don’t have a choice, [they] have to let [refugees] in, but [they will] do everything possible not to let you stay here, and the things they do is against the actual human rights law.” (New volunteer)

“No, but still ... we must always remember this is their country, they want to keep it the way- if you put yourself in their shoes, they’re probably thinking they’re sick of having foreigners in their country.” (Long-standing volunteer)

Another participant in the same focus group expressed the contradiction at the heart of VOL’s role, of supporting and helping migrants at the same time as servicing a system which oppresses them, reflected at the level of consciousness. On the one hand, they recognised Britain’s reliance on migrants for their labour and their super-exploited position:

“The cheap job, the shitty job, and they’re all [being done by] migrants, I mean the British people would not do that, I mean they need migrants ... England’s been built on migrants.” (VOL 4)

Yet immediately following this, they spoke about the majority of those claiming asylum in Britain in extremely derogatory terms, discounting the basis for the majority of refugee claims in advance and blaming them for the oppression faced by ‘genuine’ refugees:

“[Refugees are] coming in Sangatte [refugee camp] in France, which is European country, thousands, thousands ... If they want their safety, if they really have a problem in their country, human rights law and the 1951 policy, they say if you’re in your third country you have to claim asylum, where the life is safe for you ... 80 per cent of people coming here for work, for the things that they can’t do in their countries, to support their family, to do other things, and 20 per cent of people they have problems. If I give you an example, it’s a glass of water, if you [put a] bit of dirty water in there it all becomes dirty ... All people are going in one name, and the water, you cannot split it. So that’s the reason they want
to do their law tougher and harder, to show to the people their rules.” (as above)

Within COM, two participants expressed gratitude for what the British ruling classes had ‘done for them’, both in Africa and in Britain:

“I have a very good memory of the government, you know, it’s like you just came in and you don’t know anybody, and they welcome you, that is a good memory for me. Because in my house I never welcome somebody you don’t know, you have to tell me you are coming. But I didn’t tell them I was coming, just flew here and they welcomed me ... I will never forget about that, they welcomed me, they welcomed my son ... It doesn’t mean they can’t be bad, but they are good as well” (COM 4)

“I mean British people traditionally are very good people, welcoming, I mean it’s not all the countries have done what the British have done for us” (COM 1)

In the case of the latter participant, current attitudes towards Britain paralleled a past job in their country of origin:

“I was given the task to develop what we normally call the resource centre about the modern [former colonial country], to sell [its image] in the country where I used to work” (COM 1)

In other cases, participants adopted the government’s own arguments to justify the state’s treatment of refugees, in a narrative suggesting some degree of identification with the British state and its contracting agencies, over and above their identification with other refugees. For example, one participant argued the reduction of legal aid was because previously:

“most of these appointments [weren’t] very important, and people had a lot of problems [that weren’t] even linked to the asylum seeker’s claim, but they went to the solicitor [for] some little thing. [With the government reducing legal aid to] five hours limited, maybe [it’s to try and make it] more professional, and ... better help” (CHUR 4)

Another participant agreed with the removal of the right to legal work, on the implicit basis that allowing refugees to work would encourage more to seek asylum:
“the reason why I will say I agree with the Home Office not giving them work permits is because everybody else would just come in as an asylum seeker knowing they’re going to get a work permit” (VOL 1)

The idea of people lying about their reasons for claiming asylum was echoed by another participant from CHUR:

“this is too difficult situation for this country, because lots of people came here, [who are] not really, really [an] asylum seeker or refugee” (CHUR 2)

Another participant repeated the arguments put forward in sections of the British media portraying Britain as ‘overcrowded’, with services under pressure from migrants:

“As they’re always saying in the newspapers, it has a really big impact on the public services, on the pressure on the health services, pressure on- they say that asylum seekers steal their jobs ... for example buses are full, they say it’s because of the refugees and asylum seekers, NHS is overloaded” (CHUR 1)

These examples are an important reminder that it is not only British people who are subject to state and media propaganda and the dominant racist discourse of self-serving immigrants seeking to ‘sponge’ off a hard working British people. Where refugees perform voluntary roles in organisations that are part of state-sponsored structures of governance, this may create an additional pressure to develop a state-led perspective on other refugees without status, which serves to reconcile the outcome of volunteers’ actions with their good intentions.

Despite the intentions of participants to advance the interests of fellow-refugees, the majority of social capital formations in which participants were engaged thus operated within an ideological framework that reflected the interests of the British ruling classes, one of ‘deserving and undeserving migrants’, without any consideration of the source of Britain’s wealth or Britain’s relationship to the situations refugees were fleeing.

Challenging this may require forms of social capital involving a ‘critical distance’ from the state and a counter-discourse based on the interests of refugees. Using Putnam’s categories as defined by Gilchrist (2004: 6), this may include elements of ‘bonding’ capital, to develop a coherent and confident perspective amongst those with a strong mutual commitment based on shared experiences and needs as refugees. These might combine with elements of ‘bridging’ capital in order to gain necessary support and resources from those with overlapping interests and goals, situate their experiences in wider processes, and effectively implement responses.
Conclusions

Dominant conceptions of social capital have been based on assumptions of shared interests and intentions across society, leading to a declared expectation that increased trust and engagement between those in different positions of power would be to the benefit of all. Participants’ accounts, together with the wider evidence, suggested this may be contradicted by the case of refugees who volunteer, with the development of engagement based on a degree of trust serving to maintain incorporation in the oppressive structures and relationships outlined in previous chapters. In this critique, oppression replaces exclusion as the prime concern of action for change, in order to undermine the claim of ‘inclusion’ to be an inherent social good, when inclusion may mean effective incorporation into oppressive systems and structures.

Labour’s social capital initiatives between 1997 and 2010 represented a less obvious and directly repressive element in a wider strategy, also including increasing physical repression, in an attempt to cope with negative consequences for ruling elites of the destabilisation of international and national orders resulting from neo-liberalism and attendant population movements, which have been rapid and to an extent uncontrollable (Coole 2009: 379-80). Social capital interventions can be understood as a particular approach within longer traditions of cooption and oppression, with conscious strategies to engage refugees in particular social capital formations alongside an expanding apparatus of border police, detention and removal centres, reporting regimes and deportation. Dominant social capital discourse may itself be viewed as an exercise in the shaping of social capital by the ruling classes (Franklin 2007: 5-6), mobilising a wide range of networks and resources in order to consensually incorporate sections of oppressed groups into oppressive structures, espousing values of ‘fairness’ and ‘tolerance’, which are very different to the implicit values and norms encountered by many refugees. Achieving this incorporation involves formal and informal networks, from one-to-one interventions by social practitioners to large-scale consultations, control of material resources needed to maintain current services and fill gaps, and control of large-scale means of production and dissemination of ideas, such as the mainstream media and research and educational institutions.
As demonstrated above, effective management of the UK asylum system during this period also required the involvement of refugees, including those without status, in delivery of services, particularly at a face-to-face level. This has been carried out through interventions by the state and its ‘partners’ to shape the reformation of social structures, which Coleman points out will continue to spontaneously reassert themselves, but are open to conscious influence (Coleman 1993: 10-14). Social capital is not viewed here as a neutral resource that is possessed in greater or lesser quantities by groups or individuals, but as ongoing formations of engagement that mediate intentions and interests of individuals, within given material conditions, to shape processes and outcomes including social, political and economic aspects. By recruiting individual refugees to voluntary positions as they engage in the process of establishing new networks, the state gains influence both over the shape these individuals’ actions and responses take, and through them the activity, understandings and forms of engagement of other refugees.

Complex social capital/market hybrids thus take shape: state institutions engage with voluntary organisations on a contractual basis; voluntary organisations engage individual refugees in a form of linking capital offering a range of material and non-material incentives and opportunities; and refugees, as volunteers, engage wider refugees as users, drawing on bonding capital based on the shared experience of asylum and simultaneously creating bridging capital across aspects of difference such as nationality, age, religion and gender, as they do their best to help others within the confines of the asylum system. At the level of the whole system, this represents the continued compliance of large numbers of refugees with the asylum system, despite ongoing experiences of its oppressive character and, in many cases, deep mistrust. Maintaining this process necessitates offering direct or indirect benefits, not only to the individuals involved, but to the wider communities that volunteers wish to help. This shared intention to ‘help’ may be an area of common ground for the bridging capital formed between refugees volunteering and voluntary sector organisations and RCOs, but one that is not necessarily a priority for state institutions. Yet, by making limited concessions, which do not threaten the interests of the ruling classes, the state can maintain the involvement of refugees in forms of engagement that, in the final analysis, are to their detriment, by managing and sustaining the oppressive structures outlined in
previous chapters, ensuring the continuation of a system involving the deportation, incarceration and enforced destitution of thousands of people every year, thereby containing and disciplining the threat that they pose to imperialist divisions of labour.
Chapter 8 - Building Oppositional Social Capital

This chapter explores elements in participants’ experience of voluntary work which prompt an increased priority for non-material incentives and more collective forms of consciousness, and may hold potential for the development of anti-oppressive social capital formations. ‘Oppositional social capital’ is used to refer to formations which confront the state, perhaps in a limited way around particular policies, but on the basis of a conflict of interests which leads to the rejection of possibilities for mutually-beneficial partnership and necessitates struggle, disrupting the smooth management of oppression. This is followed by discussion of countervailing tendencies, and finally accounts from CAMP are used to demonstrate the potential for the formation of social capital on a political basis of anti-racism, as a way of moving beyond spontaneous elements of unity, to develop forms of engagement at a critical distance from the state, and therefore capable of acting in defence of the collective and long term interests of refugees. This discussion is conducted primarily through cross-case analysis, between case organisations and between volunteers as embedded cases, in order to identify themes that run through multiple cases, suggesting elements of spontaneous development that may be independent of an organisation’s aims, and differences between the cases that may point to the influence of conscious aspects in organisations’ activities or structures. Alongside this, examples from Newcastle’s history are drawn on to broaden the discussion and suggest wider possibilities than those realised in the recent period.

Bourdieu (1995: 32-4) points to the dynamic nature of social capital, only existing in its production and reproduction. Whilst I have reservations about Bourdieu’s argument that social capital can be considered as one of many forms of ‘capital’ in the Marxist sense, the conception of social capital as only existing in movement and change is consistent with the use of social capital to refer to relational structures within class struggles. This implies not only the possibility, but the necessity, for constant change, and poses an open question as to the direction of future change, presenting a space for human agency to influence the shape of social capital through consciously directed intervention. Despite the use of social capital interventions by Labour governments to paper over material inequalities and manage oppression, as outlined in previous
chapters, there may also be potential for the concept to be deployed to support the individuals and organisations, who constitute ‘civil society’, in making demands, mounting challenges and proactively developing solutions to the problems they face (Schuurman 2003: 1008; see also Furbey, et al. 2006: 6). Field (2008: 83) suggests potential for social capital to compensate for a lack of other sources of power in relation to capital. In this way, social capital formations may enable sections of the working classes to merely survive and reproduce their labour power at lower cost to capital, but they may also present resources to overturn their oppression. This echoes longer established notions of collective organisation based on shared interests, trust and solidarity as a means of overcoming oppressive forces, which possess far greater material resources:

"the Putnamian view, of cultural and civic institutions as positive elements, conflicts with the Gramscian view that these are instruments of class domination which must be overthrown in order to establish a more equal society. Social capital may be relevant in both senses, on the one hand as a form of social control and on the other through the existence of tight networks dedicated to the violation of these rules ... This dilemma of whether to support or to subvert is a familiar one in community development" (Shucksmith 2000: 216)

Whilst Anthias (2007: 792) draws a sharp distinction between conceptions of social capital as networks mobilised towards goals and as a means of consensual social control, it may be both in that social capital is fundamentally contested terrain, wherein different parties seek to shape and mobilise formations towards their priorities. The accounts of previous chapters suggest both the extent to which the ruling classes depend on the effective incorporation of members of oppressed groups into their own structures, and the extent to which this relies on contradictions in the consciousness of incorporated individuals and non-material incentives, operating in a context where the range of possible actions and/or outcomes is perceived to be severely limited. This suggests a possibility that social capital may prove a weak point amongst the apparatus of oppression, to be potentially seized and transformed into a weapon capable of opposing other, more physical elements of the apparatus. Indeed, it is precisely the potential threat that trusted networks of particular kinds pose to the ruling classes that make Labour governments’ use of social capital interventions so significant.
The spontaneous development of non-material incentives

Within socialist societies, in particular Cuba, engagement in voluntary labour has been viewed as a means of developing an approach to work as a social duty rather than a private material compulsion (Yaffe 2009: 63-7). Participants’ accounts suggested potential for engagement in volunteering to play a role beyond simply survival or the gaining of experience for paid employment, to develop greater social consciousness. Although initially motivated by a lack of other options, many participants’ accounts suggested that the performance of voluntary work had had a significant impact on their perspectives and later choices, in particular increasing the prominence of non-material incentives within their reasons for volunteering:

“If I had had the right to remain five or six years ago, I would have carried on with tourism. But during this time, when I was an asylum seeker and I wasn’t able to work, I had to do something, and the thing that I chose to do was to work with community groups, so I didn’t want it to be wasted ... And I think that when years go by you grow up and you change, you can change your opinion” (CAMP 4)

This indicates the dynamic nature of social capital, where the act of engagement itself carries the potential to change the nature of that engagement. For some participants, this was apparent in reports of being forced by their situation to reflect on what could give their life meaning. In other cases, a process was reported where individuals began voluntary work from material necessity and a lack of other options, but came to appreciate non-material benefits such as the satisfaction of helping others:

“I came to volunteer because as I said I was bored and stuff ... But now the main reason is to gain experience of how to work with people ... understand people, take time out of my own time. Because I think the best thing in life is to give your time up to some other people, to help them, and it’s brilliant” (VOL 1)

A strong theme runs through these accounts, of the desire to contribute, not only to people from the same country or even other refugees, but to wider society.

The development of collective consciousness

Closely related to the development of non-material incentives is the process by which individuals may come to locate their personal interests within wider patterns of interests. On this question, Gramsci ([1929-1935] 1982: 169-70) observes the ‘dual
perspective’ of politics, with a dialectical relation between the immediate and the universal, and the potential for individuals’ defence of their immediate physical existence to develop, via consciousness and a historical perspective, to an identification with ‘the highest values of civilisation and humanity’. Temple et al. (2005: 26-30) report a range of forms of organisation, from community development networks, to a football group, to a museum group, providing refugees with an opportunity to identify possible new connections, rebuild collectives, and to also link more effectively outside these collectives. Healy et al. (2004) differentiate between utilitarian collectivism and solidarity collectivism, with experiences and information gained from collective activity amongst black women trade unionists demonstrating potential to increase solidary elements. In my own research, some participants’ engagement was part of a conscious attempt to extend their networks and interventions to a broader level, unrelated to a calculated self-interest:

“The other side of our time is when you try to help your fellow comrade, your fellow countrymen, not only countrymen, but people in the same situation”

(COM 1)

Considering the relationship of incentives to individuals’ perceptions of their interests, on a more or less collective level, enables a movement beyond material and non-material incentives as a binary opposition, creating insights into the process by which individuals may come to identify their interests on a progressively wider basis. For example, incentives based purely on individual material gain are something distinct from incentives based on providing for the material needs of one’s family. On another level, voluntary activity to build facilities in an individuals’ local area, such as a new school or health centre, may bring them material benefits, either individually or collectively or both, but is something different again from narrowly prioritising one’s own family. Action motivated by the incentive of benefiting a whole section of the working classes is something different again, as is that aimed at benefiting the entire working classes, and so on, up to the level of action motivated by the incentive of contributing to the whole of humanity. In this way, an investigation of the development of collective incentives allows us to penetrate deeper into the complexities of non-material incentives.
As I have done so far, it is possible to consider social capital in terms of categories of bonding, bridging and linking, but the fit is far from perfect. Participants’ accounts suggest a more fluid, complex and interconnected reality than these discrete categories can explain (see also Anthias 2007: 791). The fluidity of social capital formations may be more adequately approached by also including the direction of movement, to wider or narrower forms of identification, the nature of the shared basis for identification and engagement, and the particular interests involved.

**Spontaneous starting points and individual agency**

Participants provided numerous examples of the evolution of social capital formations, from the starting point of action begun out of personal necessity, towards a view of the need for collective struggle and identification with wider collective interests:

> “I hope to change the situation, because here I’m suffering too much and I have no choice ... I hope they can give everybody papers and everybody can stay, and save their life, because if they send them back it is not very good ... The thing for me I hope to be for everybody, not just myself, for all the people in the same situation with me” (CAMP 5)

Development of networks and trust on new collective bases was often reported by participants as having a strong spontaneous element:

> “we were sent to Newcastle. But we didn’t really care where we went, because we didn’t know England at the time, so it didn’t really matter ... At that time ... there was not a lot of asylum seekers, we were all ... very close, so ... I would have an hour-long conversation with people from Iran, and neither of us would speak English ... I would call that maybe like coming to the unknown” (CAMP, arrived 2000)

> “our neighbours, they were ... Czech, and then there were ... Iranians ... we all had to go to the post office and report ... When we came it was just the third week ... of asylum seekers being forced to come to Newcastle, so there were not a lot [of people from my country], so we didn’t really have a choice ... we just needed that” (as above)

The same participant reported a lasting impact on their wider sense of identification with all refugees, regardless of their country of origin, as a result of this initial forced engagement:
“Once you know all the people, you can’t just go back to your culture ... I would not have been able to say ok- after three years- ok I’m just going now to try and develop [an organisation] with just the [people from my country]” (as above)

The primary social capital formations engaged in by this individual following their initial experience reflected this continuing identification with all refugees, regardless of their country of origin, and contrasted in this sense with some other participants, despite them having gone through a similar experience. This suggests that it is not solely the experience that is important, but the response of the individual to the experience, which may itself be influenced by diverse other factors. One possible influence, which was emphasised in this participant’s narrative, was an ‘accidental’ individual relationship formed as part of their wider engagement, and cemented by other points of shared experience, such as age and time of arrival in Britain:

“my best friend ... in Newcastle ... she came ... a few months after me and she got her status a few months after me, and she’s from Croatia ... so because like we’re almost the same age ... I’m sure that, especially with her, like even thirty, forty years, we’ll still remember that time” (as above)

The participant reflected on their experience as a refugee without status, and the forms of engagement it led them to, as an active learning process, which had influenced their later forms of action:

“I’ve learnt a lot ... I’ve changed my mind about a lot of things ... if I hadn’t been an asylum seeker, I think I’d be like a lot of people who say oh, I don’t really like Iranians ... because I think being an asylum seeker forces you to open up- or it forced us to open up ... it just changed my whole thinking” (as above)

“If I hadn’t been an asylum seeker I wouldn’t even have spoken to all those Nigerian women [in CAMP]. I would have been prejudiced without knowing that I was” (as above)

A participant from VOL suggested that the development of relationships and understanding across nationalities had been central to their volunteering experience:

“If you work with the same people of your same community doing the same thing, you will learn their things and their language in their community. If you work with the council and volunteering and everything, you learn about them, because you’re working with them and everything. And [at VOL] there is a multiculture, there is from around the world, from all countries” (VOL 4)
Thus, the refugee and dispersal process itself was significant for the development of social capital formations on a broader collective basis, in some cases extended through volunteering. This took place alongside, and in interaction with, the forms of social capital developed through VOL discussed in previous chapters. The delivery of services and co-volunteering with refugees of other nationalities developed bridging capital, which supported the role of VOL in engaging refugees as users in linking capital with the state.

Feelings of contributing to a wider community operated on a range of levels, beginning with the closest level of acquiring skills for career development, not primarily for their personal interests, but to provide for their family:

“‘I’m going to work really, really hard, because my son is growing up’ (COM 4)

Several participants described incentives to help operating more intensely because the people they felt they were helping were in similar situations to their own position, either current or past:

“‘I think many people volunteer because it’s ... close to their heart since they’ve been in the process, they know how it works from personal experience, so they are sort of trying to give back to people who are in the same position as that’” (VOL 2)

Such instances may be considered a form of ‘bounded solidarity’, representing social capital formations in which actions are not performed on an instrumental basis, but motivated by an identification with a group based on a perceived ‘common fate’, and rooted theoretically in Marx’s analysis of solidarity among the emergent industrial proletariat (Portes 1998: 7-8). Participants’ accounts also suggested potential for such engagement to move beyond its initial ‘bounds’, with a process of developing consciousness, from defence of personal interests to wider identifications of shared interests, providing a route from personal experience to the formation of Gramsci’s ‘compact social blocs’, as a basis for collective action:

“I knew about [CAMP] when I learned they were going to stop English courses for asylum seekers ... to me that was very unfair, because that’s thanks to the English classes that I started to get involved in things ... so I know how important it is to learn the language of the country. So I went to the demonstration that
[CAMP] had organised with [others] ... And I thought that it was doing the right thing for asylum seekers, so I just joined” (CAMP 4)

A recurrent theme amongst participants’ accounts was the role of volunteering in forming new networks, extending and consolidating these blocs:

“my plan was to work here just for a year or six, seven months ... But after one year, one and a half years, I was very proud what I’m doing, there is respect I receive from the people, and the things I receive from this organisation, to be proud of what I’m doing ... everyone from every country when I’m doing the small basic ... job ... in the office, and [in the] outside world they give me more respect ... I’m becoming proud of myself ... that’s why I’m continuing to do it” (VOL 4)

Thus, engagement in volunteering appears to have potential to do more than merely sustain itself, but to give rise to new understandings and forms of activity.

In addition to forming a sense of solidarity between project users and volunteers, participants also reported the positive experience of working together with others in similar situations within the project:

“since I came to Britain, [VOL] is the only place I’ve worked and felt so comfortable, because I think maybe 99 per cent are ... from outside, they are all like foreigners who have settled here. And you just feel at home. You don’t care how you speak, how you talk, because ... you’ve got so many things in common, and that’s what ... holds me here ... you just feel comfortable, you feel at home ... you don’t feel like you’re the odd one out“ (VOL 5)

This fits with findings on volunteering in other contexts, which point to the importance of sociable and other informal connections to voluntary activity forming an important element, both in the decision to start volunteering and in individuals’ further development (Roberts and Devine 2004: 285-7). Participants’ accounts suggested that in some cases these informal aspects, outside the explicit aims of the organisation, had a significant impact on the development of a collective consciousness, which in turn lessened their sense of isolation:

“[a friend] told me that [at CAMP] I will meet people in my same situation, so that’s why I started going, you know when you share, you feel a little bit of relief, instead of just staying at home and keeping everything inside” (CAMP 1)
The same participant indicated that this had extended outside the organisation’s formal boundaries:

“I’ve made friends from [CAMP] ... I was not a stranger in school, because there are many [CAMP] members” (as above)

In some cases, volunteering facilitated a process of active empathy, leading to a higher level of commitment:

“[When I’m with a client I think] ‘If I was in their position, how would I feel?’ And as soon as I think of that I think ‘Oh’, and I just get calm, and I think ‘If I was in that position, how would I expect that person to understand me’, and I think ‘You have to understand this person’, and I take the time to understand them, even if it means you’re spending the whole day with one client, when other support workers are with five people that day, I’ll spend the whole day, as long as I know that client is leaving the building happy” (VOL 1)

In some cases, this also increased a commitment to a common struggle against the state:

“when people actually say thank you after you’ve helped them, it’s like you’ve made them happy, it does make you feel good about it. I’m just really angry about the government sometimes, this just boosts it up” (VOL 2)

Several participants’ accounts suggested potential for this spontaneous impetus towards collective identification to progress and evolve further through conscious reflection:

“in [CAMP], sometimes everybody [has] some news, everybody [has an] opinion, [which they] give to improve the whole of [CAMP], I like it because everybody [is] free to talk, say the thing you think to develop for our community, because if you bring your opinion they can look at your opinion, take this one, or leave this one, this best one, help the group to grow” (CAMP 5)

In the case of CAMP, this was facilitated by the democratic principles and structures of the organisation, encouraging open discussion and sharing of information and experiences.
In some cases, reflection included relating past experiences to current situations. One participant reported the values and principles that informed their actions as having been influenced by their father:

“to work first of all for my family, maybe originated first of all from my father, who always had this big heart to help people, and he was quite an educated man of his kind” (COM 1)

The participant located this in turn in the environment in which their parents had lived, and drew comparisons between this environment and the city where they were initially dispersed, in order to theorise responses they encountered from local residents in the context of post-industrial decline:

“I always put a similarity between Sunderland and where I used to live, because I know Sunderland used to be a very industrial area, with the shipyards ... The industry where my parents used to work, it was employing ... more than 100,000 people ... in the region ... We used to share the common problems ... it would be different at a certain level, but ... we used to go to the same schools, we used to go to the same hospitals, everything almost was the same ... an area where the company was like a mother” (as above)

In turn, they expressed the aim of creating a shared sense of identity amongst sections of society with whom they were connected variously by geographical location, shared experience of the asylum system, and country of origin:

“our vision really is to ... create a real sense of community belonging, and really to create an atmosphere, a place where it’s quite multicultural. You can hear the voices in the background, you see a mixture of local boys and asylum seeker, refugee boys, who mostly now are well settled ... we don’t want them to get lost ... in a situation where they really forget their roots and they are lost from both sides. Because they are quite in a sensitive position, because there are two cultures clashing, so we have to look at the best way for them to accommodate both of them. And for us, there’s no big problem because we are well settled in our culture and we adopt what is good, but for the new generation, they are learning in their houses, when they go out [it’s] a different culture. So it’s very important to really prepare, to teach them values ... as a human being to respect others ... A place like this one ... where two communities are meeting, it’s also
important because we need to create not an ideal place, but a place where people feel comfortable, they find their values in the same place” (as above)

This extended to the hope to be able to use the experience and opportunities gained in their work in Britain to extend support back to their country of origin:

“the kind of experience we’re gaining here, we want now to cascade it to our [country]. I can go back to my city where I come from with the experience, I hope to be able to pass it to my fellow young brothers, the people we left behind, this is the little knowledge, the work we used to do, let’s try to do it this way, just to improve, I believe it will have an impact.” (as above)

This represents an impetus, arising out of social capital formed on an extremely localised, geographical basis, towards an international social capital formation, based on a sense of identity around a common country of origin.

For some participants, voluntary activities played a role in setting their personal situation in a wider context of collective oppression. The fresh perspective brought to individuals’ own circumstances by a deeper knowledge of the problems, sometimes even greater than their own, faced by others, together with the opportunity to help, was reported by several participants to have helped them cope with their own situation:

“when I come and translate, or interpret, for [CHUR] ... it stops me worrying and thinking, and I see cases that are maybe worse than me, and they are in [a] more difficult situation than my situation, you know they are just made homeless, or they have lost their benefit, and I always reassure them, and I forget all my problems because of seeing these problems” (CHUR 1)

“the ... impact the work I do makes in my life is probably meeting people with different problems- probably with bigger problems than me, and learning how other people are getting on ... and the struggles they go through ... perhaps this knowledge I can use it even to support other people out there, and maybe to channel them, to show them where they could go for help if they needed to” (VOL 5)

For some participants, this more collective response to the problems of refugees without status was linked to a sense of relative privilege:
"I’m a lucky asylum seeker, because I’ve never had my support cut, I’ve never had any problems like I never had to go to court before 2001, so I don’t have the stress that a lot of asylum seekers have ... So it’s nice to be just trying to promote the rights of people and make sure that they know what we can have” (CAMP 4)

Along similar lines, several participants reported a sense of responsibility to contribute to collective organisation because of experience, knowledge and skills developed both since coming to Britain and in their country of origin:

“[I’ve] got a good communication skills, and I think all the time I can explain to people, because of my journalism background, so sometimes it is helpful to them, for me to explain to people, to explain to them what is happening” (CAMP 6)

There was a widespread feeling amongst participants, particularly those from CAMP, of the need to extend networks and united action in order for things to improve:

“I have a role in changing things, but I think one person alone cannot change things. It has to be everybody, solidarity is very important in this case. So yes, I see myself as involved and keeping myself, or playing a part where I can, but I think as many people, they need to play their part so that change can be seen” (CAMP 2)

Implicit in this, was a view of individuals’ problems as being rooted in wider causes, requiring action for change at a national level:

“I think [CAMP] has the potential to make something happen, but again, I think that it has to be national, we can’t just move things from Newcastle or from the North East. So we have to build links with other groups” (CAMP 4)

Another CAMP member pointed to the importance of people from different backgrounds sharing their skills and knowledge through volunteering in the same organisation:

“in [CAMP] we are mixing, and British people, they have some experience about the country where we’re living ... If everything is separate, you are thinking about the way your country, and the people here they are thinking another way” (CAMP 5)
In this case, the common basis was a commitment to anti-racism, the significance of which will be returned to later:

“[CAMP], the way I understand it, even those British people who are against racism, can be part of [CAMP], so I think it’s good the way it is, asylum seekers, refugees and British people” (CAMP 3)

A similar sentiment was expressed by a participant from COM, who saw a significant part of the organisation’s role as breaking down alienation between people living in the same area:

“I need to learn from my neighbour, and my neighbour have to learn, we have to learn ... on a daily basis we’ll be seeing each other, in the morning I wake up, I go to work, I can see my neighbour at bus station but we never talk, and it would be strange, and we would be gossiping, oh this is my neighbour, and we never talk ... So that’s the kind of service [COM] is playing” (COM 1)

In some cases, this tended towards an identification of individual interests on the widest collective level of the whole of humanity:

“since I’ve started going [to CAMP] I know that ... I’m an asylum seeker but I’m a human being and I’ve got my rights” (CAMP 6)

Other forms of identification were evident on the basis of shared elements of experience in migration and in conditions of life within Newcastle, and this formed the starting point for new social capital formations expanding in multiple directions.

There was limited direct evidence of the development of social capital between refugees and other migrants, and some disagreement amongst participants on the relationship between the interests of EU migrants and refugees without status:

“I don’t say that I don’t want the EU, but you have some people on the ground which you can grant and give them a job, people who can speak English, then you take some EU people who can’t even speak good morning” (COM 4)

“I don’t even agree with people who say no, we should make difference between asylum seeker and economic migrant, because even now just look what they’re doing to ... economic [migrants]” (CAMP 6)

Several participants reported a sense of commonality with other migrants arising from shared experiences, such as having been initially unable to speak English, or moving to Britain with children. This was particularly pronounced for participants volunteering at
VOL, whose provision extends beyond refugees to other migrants, and who therefore had many opportunities for direct contact:

“I [am] happy because I help people ... I’ve been like them, I couldn’t speak English ... I just give them my experience, for example I have children” (VOL 3)

This demonstrates the potential, albeit largely undeveloped in Newcastle in the present period, for the extension of identification and joint action between refugees and economic migrants from starting points of shared experience, extended through practical experience in volunteer roles which cultivate the development of information, networks and trust.

**Bridging on a class basis**

The development of social capital was also evident, in some cases, between refugees and other sections of the working classes in Britain, based on points of shared experience and living conditions:

“we don’t look at ourselves as only for Africans, especially this centre, and the irony, nowadays we have more local young people coming in to play, to a certain level we realised even the local parent used to use us [to] take care of their children, when they pick their children up from school they just drop them, they know it is safe for them ... we believe in the work that we have done, in the network we have established and a good relationship we have established with the neighbours, because we are part of this neighbourhood now ... the problems they’re having is the same problems we do have, as long as we’re integrated in the system we’re going the same places, the same GPs, we go to the same shops, we have the same problems” (COM 1)

In this case, the development of organisation amongst refugees had become a trusted resource for wider sections of the working classes, and refugees volunteering with the project had come to identify with the problems faced by others in the same geographical area. This occurred in spite of government policies, which have increasingly erected barriers to people’s contact with refugees without status, as discussed in previous chapters. This created the contradiction that whilst funding enabled COM to build links with other sections of the working classes by providing them services, this simultaneously covered up for the state’s failure to provide these services itself.
In the context of barriers preventing refugees without status participating in many other activities where they would come into contact with non-refugees, the potential was demonstrated for volunteering by British people alongside refugees to play an important role in building links:

“if you come here to work and you don’t have knowledge at all about immigration law and you don’t know anything about asylum seekers, just what you hear on the TV, [volunteering] can really turn everything upside down. Because then you get in closer to people and ... you just see it how it is ... Right now if people don’t know about it they see it as a big problem, all these asylum seekers and everything, they really see people just as leeches on the economy and all that, and many people don’t even know that you’re not permitted to work, many choose to think that you just choose to come here and you just choose to be on benefits, you know you have all these opportunities to work and you don’t want, whereas it’s clearly not how it is. And people who come here [to volunteer] they kind of find it out” (VOL 2)

Another participant felt the involvement of refugees without status in volunteering had an important potential to reverse negative perceptions by some British people of refugees without status as ‘spongers’:

“I think for [people looking at the project from] outside, it’s just not British [volunteers] ... asylum seeker wants to help people, loves helping people, and just [to] volunteer ... because unfortunately people think ... refugees without status [are] coming here for job or benefit” (CHUR 2)

This demonstrates the potential of organisations, frequently connected to both formal and informal social capital formations, to impact on understandings in wider society out of proportion with the number of individuals involved.

COM and CHUR thus both demonstrated processes of social capital formation between refugees with and without status and other working class people they lived alongside. Although at times based on shared political problems facing working class areas, such as poor housing or lack of services, the kind of social capital evidenced above is not explicitly political, focusing on immediate provision of services and making the best use of what is available under the current organisation of society, rather than mounting
political opposition. This leaves well-intentioned initiatives to build social capital, with the interests of refugees at their heart, vulnerable to subversion in the face of powerful countervailing tendencies, which to some extent counteracted these spontaneous prompts towards wider working class unity.

Despite many shared material conditions, there was substantial evidence of continuing subjective divisions within local geographical areas:

“British people come here ... some of them are no good ... the way they talk, their body language, you notice that something is happening, maybe some of them doesn’t like black people, we know it ... we try just to take it and try to ignore it, because it is not all British [people], just try and ignore it and take it”
(COM 4)

Despite the prominence given to ‘community’ in much social capital theorising, such accounts suggest it may be inadequate by itself as a basis for collective action and empowerment. ‘The community’ is divided in practice along multiple lines, and, in most cases, is heavily penetrated by the state. Some participants linked experiences of individual racism directly to the policies of the British government, aimed at dividing refugees without status from British people in order to undermine any potential for joint resistance:

“[the British government] don’t want [refugees without status] to learn English, they don’t want people to make friends with local people, so it’s easy for them to do everything they want to do to them” (CAMP 6)

This is reinforced by a briefing paper, issued in June 2010 by the Head of Service for the Asylum, Refugee & Migration Services of Manchester City Council and leaked publicly, which highlights problems with government proposals to reduce the use of immigration detention for families, citing their experiences of the problems caused in the deportation process by “community protest on the day of removal”, media campaigns and lobbying, all of which they suggest will be more likely where refugees are housed in mixed residential areas instead of detention (Rea 2010).

**Engagement with the state as a learning experience**

There is a prevalent understanding in refugee studies that, because of their experiences prior to seeking asylum, refugees have a weak ‘capacity to trust’ (Hynes 2009).
Contradicting this, participants’ accounts indicated common expectations that the British state would be trustworthy, which were only changed through experience in Britain. There was evidence of engagement with the state providing a powerful learning experience about its character, as part of a process of individual and collective empowerment. This was supported by members of the focus group:

“volunteering by refugees ... was a great opportunity for these communities to ... learn ... the system, in different ways” (COM 1)

As those closest to the decision-making process out of all the projects surveyed, participants from VOL frequently reported that their volunteering had developed a far fuller understanding of the asylum process than they had possessed when merely subject to it. One participant reported that volunteering had primarily developed an awareness of the ineffective nature of the system, decreasing their trust in it:

“when you’re on the other side of the counter you really understand ... but you can get more disappointed in the immigration system, because you see that it just doesn’t work.” (VOL 2)

Similarly, another participant’s involvement in an event attended by the Home Office provided her with a dramatic, if disturbing, insight into the perspective of some decision makers, at a time when there was extensive conflict and loss of life in the DRC:

“I went to the AGM of the [networking organisation] and we spoke to a man ... from the Home Office and he was saying about how the Congolese are very lucky because with everything that is happening in their country a lot of them are going to receive their status ... when you watch what’s happening in Congo you don’t celebrate ... Even if I get my status I know it’s not because they particularly care, it’s because they have to” (DRC, arrived 2000)

In this way, more intimate knowledge of the immigration system, gained through active engagement, contributed to a more informed, but less trusting, attitude towards the state.

This led some participants to focus their activity on acting as mediator or support for other refugees without status, enabling them to not simply engage trustingly across unequal power relations, but to engage from a position of greater strength relative to the state:
“[COM] was in the best position to help, to give advice, to translate some papers, to send ... volunteers to help people, drive them to see GPs ... to the job centre, because some people ... have status, but they don’t know how to start ... if you go to the job centre ... to claim job seekers allowance or income support, they will just give you a form and say you call yourself and sort out your problem, without knowing that some people ... don’t know how to speak English ... people at [COM] can speak and explain.” (COM 2)

Within this role, provision of information on the legal system and people’s rights was cited by several participants as a key feature:

“The [biggest] problem which asylum seekers and refugees have, they don’t know the laws ... they don’t know their rights ... [CHUR], it is ... in between the asylum seekers and the government, in different areas - national health service, Home Office, and they listen [to] their problem, and because they have experience, they know which is the [highest priority] problem, and where they have to go.” (CHUR 4)

One participant also argued for the need to develop knowledge and understanding on the part of individuals working within the state:

“[I want to] help those people who are in the system, to let them know what is the truth. Because some people, they are just working, but they don’t know, [you] will meet someone like the judge or the immigration officer, he will just ask you, and maybe he doesn’t even know what is happening really in [the country a refugee has fled]. Just because they give them a figure. Or because they can’t understand some cultural information ... But, by being there in the system I am helping people from my community, but also helping people who are in the system, because sometimes I can pass them on information to say ‘No, if this person is saying this, don’t take in Britain way, try to understand in African way’” (CAMP 6)

The potential for engagement, both directly with the state and with voluntary projects and grassroots associations, to decrease trust in the state, stands in stark contrast to Putnam’s (2000) suggestion that an increase in trust and engagement amongst members of ‘civil society’ will increase trust in the state. This may reflect the development of particular forms of ‘social intelligence’, arising from engagement in social capital formations with the state (Herreros and Criado 2009: 338-41), where
feedback from previous engagements develops a more informed understanding of whether the state can be trusted and on what basis. This may provide a further impetus towards collective identity, through developing a greater recognition of the shared interests of refugees, in opposition to the state, and encourage the development of oppositional social capital formations which directly challenge refugees’ oppression.

**Countervailing tendencies against the development of collective consciousness**

Healy et al. (2004: 461-3) found engagement in workplace collectivism to be increasingly under threat in recent years, as a result of changes in the broader organisation and culture of work, with identities increasingly focused on individual careers rather than class membership. Against the spontaneous tendencies towards more collective forms of consciousness and action outlined above, powerful countervailing tendencies were apparent among participants, relating to influences including state policies, the wider racialised context, and objective and subjective divisions among refugees. It has been suggested that the effectiveness of faith-based community organising in the US has come from its ability to mobilise existing social capital - in terms of longstanding relationships, dense networks and deep-rooted mutual trust, as well as a moral context and language - towards specific goals (Warren 2009: 102-3). Such ‘pre-existing’ frameworks are less likely for dispersed refugees, and participants’ accounts provided examples of relations to their countries of origin holding the potential to divide as well as unite:

“I [had an] experience in London once ... I can’t speak English, I’ve been [to the] refugee centre, some translator, she is working ... there ... she is Chinese ... she shout [at] me! I’m confused, I’m scared ... I escaped from China, come here, another Chinese state here, I’m not against Chinese people, but ... I’m scared ... so I didn’t tell any truth” (arrived in 2002)

One participant reported their perception that many refugees without status who used the project only seemed interested in their own situation:

“we see about twenty, twenty-five people a day, it’s loads of people, for them it’s their personal problem, and they don’t really care about anyone else ... so you can understand why they get frustrated” (VOL 2)

Subjective divisions based on perceptions of ‘unfairness’ were evident in another participant’s account of the treatment of single refugees compared to families. Other
lines of division resulted from different forms of state support available to different people:

“there are families which are on vouchers, some are on cash ... these vouchers are causing division and separating people” (CAMP 2)

Much consideration of integration has operated on the basis of ethnic groups as homogenous blocs, counterpoised to ‘society’, and where individuals have been addressed, this has normally been as representative of a group (Eve 2010: 1231-2). A very significant question, which such approaches omit, is the different kinds of roles within a group that facilitate different kinds of integration of the group as a whole, and the differential impacts of integration for different individuals. In some cases, participants’ positions with funded organisations appeared to create further divisions between refugees as volunteers and other refugees. At VOL, this took the form of an identification of the project and its volunteers with the Home Office, exacerbated by a lack of understanding of the technicalities of the asylum process among users and inadequate resources on the part of the organisation:

“when you were a client ... you honestly do see these people who work here as an enemy ... you don’t understand the whole process ... it takes longer for one client than it takes for another client ... Clients just see it as ... you did better [for some clients] than you did for me, because you see me just for fifteen minutes whereas you saw them for an hour, so it means that you’ve done a better job for them than you’ve done ... for me” (VOL 2)

In other cases, divisions related to funding regimes, which forced organisations to compete:

“it is not easy because there are many, many organisations now and sometimes people ... think what kind of difference will you add to others” (founder of African women’s group)

This connects to critiques of ‘linking’ capital, which suggest that engagement is not necessarily of benefit to less powerful groups (Griffiths, et al. 2005: 33), but may rather allow at most a few fortunate individuals to ‘get ahead’ (Wilson and Lewis 2006: 16), rather than challenging the basis of their collective oppression. Individualist approaches to escaping social exclusion through personal employment, which dominated the approaches of Labour governments since 1997 (Steinert 1999: 61), contributed to
unrealistic expectations of the likelihood of volunteering leading to employment. In a context where there has always been inadequate funding in the refugee sector to provide a paid post for everybody who volunteers (Evelyn Oldfield Unit 2004: 7), and where what paid work is available is often below refugees’ levels of skills, experience and qualifications (Wilson and Lewis 2006: 39), in many cases volunteering has failed to even allow individual refugees to ‘escape’, but has still contributed to individualist responses on the basis of expected positions.

Participants’ accounts suggested potential for volunteering to increase divisions, between a well-connected, but largely unaccountable, minority and an excluded majority. This echoes the findings of Skidmore et al. (2006: ix-xi), who conducted research in two deprived neighbourhoods and found that governance structures tended towards intensive involvement by a small minority of individuals, who were able to use their connections to make further connections and often remained unaccountable to wider communities, while a number of factors contributed to exclude new people from becoming involved. When comparing the plotted trajectories of individual participants in my own research (Appendix xvi), one of the most striking similarities is the frequency with which forms of activity diversified as time went on, indicating the tendency for voluntary activity to open up opportunities for other forms of action, and increase the likelihood of these opportunities being taken up. The wider impact of individuals developing such multiple connections may be heavily dependent on the kinds of social capital that these individuals prioritise, which may in turn be influenced by individuals’ material position in the longer term, and their subjective relation to it.

**The impact of self-predicted class trajectories**

To understand the relationship between participants’ material position and social capital formations, it will be necessary to explore the relations between class trajectories, as perceived by participants themselves, and their forms of engagement. The impoverished material conditions of the majority of refugees without status and many with status has been established elsewhere in this thesis, and there was no indication that participants lived in conditions anywhere above poorer sections of the working classes in Britain. However, it has been observed elsewhere that refugees from professional or other middle or upper class backgrounds in their country of origin are
disproportionately represented, both amongst those making it to Britain (Stewart 2008: 225-6), and even more so among those who undertake voluntary activity (WLRI 2005: 34), and this was reflected amongst participants. In part, this may be explained by greater confidence and higher levels of education, including language skills, equipping these individuals to take on voluntary roles:

“my father ... was a true professional because he was an engineer in metallurgy. That was my ... thing, to follow in the same path, and I did chemistry, industrial chemistry.” (DRC, former professional)

“We may be a few of those people ... who tried to speak a bit of English, who tried to understand ... the system ... who was quite courageous to express what other people could not say.” (as above)

In another case, a participant described returning home to a situation he had fled in order to resume his previous class position:

“[In the country I was staying] people live poorly and under pressure of the police and army. I said ok, if I must live like that, what’s the difference if I live in my country ... I can make more money than here because I can open my ... private surgery, but here ... everybody must work for [the] government, every doctor” (Iran, former professional)

Although accounts of a downward class trajectory following forced flight were common amongst participants, as discussed in Chapter 4, many also expressed concrete expectations that they would resume a class status close to that enjoyed in their country of origin in the foreseeable future, therefore expressing a subjective belief that, despite their current material circumstances, their longer-term trajectory was a middle-class one, as with the following two participants, who were studying at university at the time they left their countries of origin:

“our parents ... help us ... we have a big family ... they put us in a good school ... I started university but I didn't finish it ... If I was in my country I can finish it ... find a good job and enjoy my country” (Togo)

“I want to go to school, understand English ... writing better, after that maybe I can look for some training, because in my country I was [going] to do accountancy ... I want to be now in accountancy in England, like in working in a bank, be a cashier.” (as above)
“people believe that when you come from Africa you are ... poor and you live in a hut ... but actually we were in a house, and we had everything ... my standard of living there was better than the standard of living I have here now” (Côte d’Ivoire)

“I know a lot of people who didn’t do anything, and it’s only now that they have their status that they have to start thinking about what they want to do. But I’m very lucky that my mum actually pushed us to do things, and my brothers, in their minds they had to do things” (as above)

However, some participants who had secured leave to remain also reported frustrations in realising the upward turn in their class trajectory they had envisaged:

“Are people going to employ someone who has a strong accent? ... that’s when you realise that [getting status is] not the answer to everything, it’s like another struggle starting” (arrived 2000, secured status 2009)

A focus group participant illustrated further the frustrations arising from unfulfilled aspirations based on their previous position and their hopes for their children, even where there was no imminent prospect of their fulfilment:

“The last time I was in the job centre I went to see the ... key worker ... and she was saying to me ‘Ah, you see, what kind of job you want to do’, and I said no, it’s not that I don’t want to work, but I don’t want the kind of job you want me to do ... it’s not because I don’t like this job, it’s not insulting people, but I’ve been someone in my country, I studied ... I want to do education in this country, and I want to have the opportunity, because I don’t want my kids seeing me all the time moaning, being unable to offer them even the tiny things that they’re asking me ... You think that is good, if I can do cleaning job, but I think if I’ve got ambition.. I don’t think I will be able to fulfil all my children’s desires” (DRC, former professional)

Some participants responded to their current situation with the proactive development of social capital, in order to overcome barriers to the resumption of expected class positions. Such an intention seems likely to require social capital formations linking the refugee and those in positions of greater power, in a relationship that prioritises individual advancement above the collective situation of refugees and refugees without status. The mixed focus group confirmed this role of volunteering for many refugees, as
part of a process of ‘proving oneself’, in order to gain acceptance from the middle classes in Britain:

“they may ask what kind of reference do you have, and you say you are a doctor, [but] who knows that you are a doctor, which country are you from? If you are not involved in the voluntary sector where people say ok, they had a chance to see there is some potential in this individual” (DRC, former professional)

Where refugees come from a more privileged class background and anticipate resuming such a position in the future, their forms of action may reflect this overall perceived trajectory rather than their immediate position, potentially producing a class response more in common with middle classes in Britain than the poorer sections of the working classes, either in Britain or in refugees’ countries of origin. Perceptions by refugees of their likely future class trajectory, and which set of interests they prioritise in the light of this, are fundamentally related to questions of political consciousness. However, in determining forms of action, consciousness is mediated by material conditions and a balance of forces that influence the likely outcomes of actions, as can be seen in the impact of securing status.

**Changes in forms of action after securing status**

Bilodeau (2008: 978) suggests that possible barriers for recent migrants to participate in protest activities may include not being “financially stable enough to miss work in order to participate ... they might have concerns other than politics; or they lack the time”.

Such factors may be relevant to many other forms of voluntary activity in addition to protest, and in my own research became far more significant once refugees had been granted status. At that point, refugees in Britain are not only removed from the urgency of their own potential deportation, but must contend with a host of new challenges, often the most pressing of which is searching for work and housing. Reports are common of a total lack of support on receiving leave to remain, with usually twenty eight days notice to vacate accommodation and a sudden shift to having to negotiate with a whole new set of agencies (Hynes 2009).

Of the small proportion of participants who had secured status at the time of the initial interview, a majority made a strong point regarding the differences in rights and circumstances between refugees with and without status:
“as a refugee, you are living like everybody, because you’ve got the same benefits, same housing ... But ... asylum seekers, most of them they have a serious problem. Putting people to live together, people who are coming from different backgrounds ... Another one is when they cannot pay people ... they give them vouchers, which they have pick up every week. They have to sign” (Angola, arrived 2002)

The focus was generally on legal entitlements rather than actual experience, leading to a conception of refugees as having more in common with British citizens than with refugees without status:

“the refugee ... has all the rights as a British person, but the asylum seeker is limited, he’s not allowed to work ... his income is very low, and he doesn’t know the outcome of his decision, so any time he can be deported or can be accepted, so he is in limbo. But a refugee is a person who ... has to make a living, he has to work, he has to face ... the [same] daily problems as a British person, he can go to school, he can work, he has to pay bills, he has to live a normal life” (DRC, arrived 2002)

Another participant in the second round of interviews, who at the time was still without status, pointed to contradictions between formal entitlement based on status and continued experiences of racism, which it was suggested discouraged engagement in collective activities with British people:

“when they have status they are no [longer] asylum seekers ... they go and live their life, just to work, to [make] money ... they’re not interested in ... what’s happening in society or for other people ... they are British now, and must be ... interested in their country and their political and their life society ... however they are not feeling ... British ... everywhere they go they are foreign, and people look at them as [if] they are foreign” (Iran, arrived 2000)

Thus, refugees with status are formally separated from refugees without status, but also, through racism, informally separated from non-refugees. At the extreme of responses to this situation, one participant, who had stopped their voluntary activities since securing status, presented an image of refugees without status which combined many dominant racist themes, and acted as a justification of both the governments’ actions and their own lack of solidarity with those affected:
“as refugees we did very bad things with this country ... You see they’re drunk, these children who’ve got kids in London, they all come [to] England, they try to get involved with many things which can upset the government ... many people, black people, are involved with [drugs and crime] ... Abu Moqtada, who was here, he was [a] refugee [for] ten years, [he had] been granted, but because he [did] something wrong it was very bad for British people. Sometimes you can blame it on the British government, without blaming yourself. We came here, we asked for asylum, you’re alright, you eat well, you sleep well, then you try to do something bad for these people” (DRC, refugee with status)

This may be interpreted as an ‘identification with the oppressor’, which Fanon (1986) discusses at length as one possible response to racism, coming to the surface here, where the individual’s changed immigration status enables a less direct antagonism with the state, together with the potential to distance themselves from those still without leave to remain.

In CAMP’s case, objective and subjective divisions between refugees without status and refugees with status had a significant impact on the organisation. If uncertainty and frequent change in membership is common for voluntary members of many organisations (Pearce 1993: 42-3), then in CAMP the divide between refugees with and without status led to this playing out in particular ways, with a constant shedding of knowledge and experience as veteran members of the organisation secured status, and in the majority of cases ceased to be active members:

“[CAMP] is a huge organisation I can say, because it’s open to everybody, so everybody can come, and I think everybody can come and go” (CAMP 6)

This raises serious questions about the limitations of collective consciousness, when even those who have been active in collective struggle as refugees without status cease to practice active solidarity once their personal situation is secured. In part, this demobilisation may reflect a wider contradiction in many movements for ‘regularisation’ of migrants, where simultaneous with challenging the right of the state to ‘illegalise’ migrants, movements demand inclusion for a particular group. As the state responds to this challenge, it takes the opportunity to re-inscribe its right to draw boundaries around those it excludes and includes (Anderson 2010: 66-7). At an individual level, for many participants demobilisation appeared to result from a
combination of intense material pressures to become self-supporting, which left little
time for anything else, and emotional exhaustion after a long and traumatic struggle.
Anthias (2007: 797-800) points out that particular instances of social capital may meet a
given individual’s needs effectively in one situation, but not in another. Participants’
plopped trajectories of activity (Appendix xvi) suggest a tendency for forms of action to
converge around less overtly political and oppositional activity in the voluntary and
community sectors after securing status. This is where activity over questions such as
housing and employment is currently concentrated, with both a current absence of
more political or activist responses and a perception that these issues represent a less
direct antagonism with the central state:

“I feel like the racism that you get is more from the government when you’re an
asylum seeker, but once you receive your status it’s like it’s from everybody else
... the people with the housing and everything, they make it as difficult as
possible for you.” (Refugee with status, arrived 2000)

The picture of individuals ‘moving on’ after securing status, leaving others behind, was
supported by focus group members, who expressed concern about who would be left to
support newer arrivals:

“those who come after us, you know we will be so busy ... to settle down, to
have at least a certain living, to be connected to a place, and the newcomers, I
don’t think we have that time to say [where they need to go and how things
work]” (COM 1)

**Bridging on a political anti-racist basis**

As discussed in detail in previous chapters, there are important differences in relations
to capital between refugees and other sections of the working classes in Britain, arising
from the relationship between refugees’ countries of origin and Britain, and their
position within imperialist divisions of labour. As a result, it may be unrealistic to expect
a spontaneous identification of interests between refugees and other sections of the
working classes in Britain. One of the strongest findings from the mixed focus group was
the persistence of individual racism from neighbours, even where participants had been
resident in the same house for several years. In some cases, this experience appeared to
contradict expectations of equality once they had achieved refugee status:
“refugees, it’s a person which has been granted the status, obviously who ends up to become British, to some extent ... some of us who’ve been living in areas where we’ve been there for years, but unfortunately relationship with our neighbours ... very few I would always describe as open minded, who have been approachable, but the others have been really quite sceptical ... whatever they used to hear from the newspapers, [they’re in] a frightened state, [they see refugees as] strangers who are within your walls, [they think refugees may have] sickness, or they’re criminals ... a lot of speculation around” (COM 1)

Whilst this participant had other British neighbours with whom they were on good terms, this seemed to come as a surprise to at least one other participant. This informal and personal refusal to accept refugees as citizens parallels the trajectory of legislation under recent governments, with the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 further deferring full citizenship for refugees to completion of a period of ‘probationary citizenship’ lasting up to three years.

Due to the significance of racism in structuring refugees’ relations with other non-state actors, narrowing the range of those who could provide partners for alternative social capital formations, it will be important to consider evidence of bridging capital formed on a political basis of anti-racism.Whilst having a strong structural basis in the system of imperialism, racism is often propagated by local and intimate means, as with the racialised fear of terrorism following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, which was encouraged by the government and media but, as a Newcastle interviewee described in 2005, “filtered right down, people will have been talking about it in homes, and that sort of filtered down into kids”. Such racialisation affects not only those classified as ‘black’, but also implicitly the white majority, who are implicitly constructed as the superior ‘we’ against the inferior ‘other’. It is not purely the material level that determines the development of history, but also “the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out” (Marx [1859] 1971: 21), and which interact dialectically with the material base. The struggle against racism is therefore inextricably bound up with the struggle to transform imperialist relations of production (Williams 1993). Identities, communities and racialisation are constructed through the interaction between social conditions and relations, and the responses that follow, including acts of political
representation and mobilisation (Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002: 289; see also Solomos, 1993: 213). In this way, racist ideologies are actively constructed by all those involved, not only the ruling classes. This implies less ‘magical’ properties for class consciousness arising spontaneously out of broadly shared relations to capital, but also more potential for action and change (Saxton 1990: 388-9).

It has been suggested that proactive engagement may develop ‘social intelligence’, with more frequent testing of trust in engagement with a variety of strangers, resulting in individuals less likely to respond to ‘threat situations’, such as economic crisis, with increased hostility towards immigrants or ethnic minorities (Herreros and Criado 2009: 341,350-1). Attempts to empirically test Putnam’s hypothesis, that ethnic diversity reduces generalised social capital among civil society, have reached mixed conclusions (Gesthuizen, et al. 2008: 131-3). Kundnani (2007: 132) questions whether observed high levels of uneasiness, mistrust and insecurity in ethnically-diverse areas may instead be a result of black populations’ experiences of racism, rather than diversity itself. In my own research, there was evidence of reflective processes in which strategies, themselves informed by previous experiences as discussed above, were tested in the existing material conditions and developed in response to inadequacies in the approach:

“From time to time we used to have eggs, stones ... it was difficult to report to the police, because you say ok, someone stoned me, from which window? We don’t know. So I think the [solution] was to go straight to the people” (COM 1)

“So the idea came to call in one of the footballers, he’s from Congo, he used to play for Newcastle, to drop in” (as above)

“through that process, really we found that it had a very big impact and positive impact on the young people, to have a superstar ... coming in the area and signing autographs ... people start to get interested: ‘Is he coming today?’ , ‘No, [but] come in’, and ... I think [we had] one or two computers, and ... we start talking to them” (as above)

Such mobilisations of social capital are inherently ‘messy’, with the potential for unpredictable outcomes. One participant described their engagement in oppositional social capital formations as leading directly to the situation which forced them to flee their country:
“I was in my country, I was a student, I lived with my family, but I’m a member of a committee ... we make one march, together ... I’m not [the] leader ... but sometimes to make the march somebody has to have the banner ... the people don’t want to hold it, and I just [held] it [and there were] some newspapers taking pictures, like [they do as well in Britain], while you are marching, and after this ... I got problems, one day I got arrested by the government and put in prison, things are getting very difficult there, because you can’t engage ... we want things to change ... I don’t regret, because I’m happy to do it, because I want to save my country’s life back. But I’ve got too much difficulties in these times. But I hope all these things will change, everybody will have freedom to do what he wants, say [what] they want to be ... to save my life, I leave my family, five to six years now, I don’t hear about my family” (CAMP 5)

Thus engagement in ‘bridging’ capital at a grassroots level, aimed at increasing access to structures of power within that country, which could have increased the scope for the development of linking capital on a more equitable footing with the local state, led not only to repression, but also separation from the most basic elements of bonding capital with their family. However, within Britain, it was engagement in very similar forms of social capital, based on grassroots collective organising to engage with the state on the basis of outspoken public opposition, which the participant reported as being a principle factor in the prevention of their deportation and their eventual securing of leave to remain:

“In detention centre I get people who help me, [that’s] why today I’m out, people who help me against [the people who] want to deport me, with TV, newspapers, the [CAMP] members, all these people helped me, why today I’m still in this country” (CAMP 5)

Even within the same form of social capital, outcomes in a given context were determined by a complex interaction of factors, within which the balance of forces between different sets of interests was key. In this case, a further important difference was the greater domestic security of the imperialist British state compared to the state in their country of origin, where the conditions of life for large sections of the population prompted resistance requiring more direct means of repression.
The kinds of spontaneous responses identified in the first part of this chapter, in which a sense of unity begins to be built on the basis of a combination of common experiences and unfulfilled needs and individual human contact and communication, necessarily contain within them and coexist with conscious elements. These must be developed and lead the development of consciousness across wider sections of oppressed groups, in order for forms of action to develop from ‘in itself’ spontaneous resistance to ‘for itself’ action consciously aimed at overturning the roots of oppression (Gramsci [1929-1935] 1982: 196-200). Previous research, pointing to the heavy reliance of recent migrant protests on organisational mobilisations in the absence of dense informal networks, underscores the importance of formal organisational structures in achieving this in the context of recent population movements (Bilodeau 2008: 978).

Organised alliances of different social and political forces on the basis of anti-racism have a long history in Newcastle, as illustrated by some further key episodes. In 1930, joint action was taken involving Arab and white seamen and communists, organised around the South Shields Seamen’s Minority Movement, against the introduction of the PC5 system, which required Arab sailors to register with the National Union of Seamen in order to get work. This was seen as a joint attempt by the employers and union to divide the seamen, as a preparation for major lay-offs in a period of severe economic crisis. In August, there were a series of arrests of speakers at seamen’s meetings and of the local organiser of the Minority Movement. This was followed by an armed attack by two agent provocateurs on a picket line, and when pickets defended themselves police used this as a pretext to baton-charge and then prosecute pickets for rioting (Criminal Investigation Department 1930; Daily Worker 1930; South Shields Seamen’s Committee of Action 1930). Despite the involvement of significant numbers of white seamen on the picket, the court heard that the police baton-charge had specifically targeted Arab seamen. Seamen were given sentences, ranging from three to sixteen months, and all of the accused Arabs except two were recommended for deportation on conclusion of their sentence, with an influencing factor in this described by the judge as the high levels of unemployment, which made “these men dangerous in idleness” and therefore liable to deportation (Durham Assizes 1930). Following this big solidarity meetings were reported in North Shields (Daily Worker 1930).
There is also evidence of a broad range of anti-racist political organising in Newcastle in the late 1970s, indicative of the higher level of politics and struggle during that period compared to the present. On 13 February 1978, a ‘Rally for Unity of Working People; Festival Of Racial Harmony’ was organised at Newcastle City Hall by Newcastle Trade Council, and attended by several hundred people, with speeches from Harry Cowens, MP for Newcastle Central, the bishop of Durham, Rupa Ali, an Asian chef detained for forty-five days without charge in Durham prison on suspicion of being an illegal immigrant, the Chairman of Tyneside CRC, a representative of the National Union of Students, Paul Holborrow, ANL national organiser, and Kamlesh Ghandi, Chair of the Grunwick Strike Committee (Evening Chronicle 1978). The range of speakers suggests a conception of racism far broader than the narrow anti-fascism reported as characteristic of much of the history of ‘white anti-racism’ on Tyneside (Bonnett 1992), also addressing racism by the state and employers. In the same year, a ‘multi-racial festival’ was held by Newcastle Student Union, including music events, meetings and films on apartheid and the Grunwicks strike (The Journal 1978: 6), suggesting a linking of anti-racism in Britain with international solidarity and class struggle. These reflected a wider political context in the period, in which a wide range of organisational forms independent of the state provided a basis to challenge the dominant ideas of the ruling classes.

Whilst the Marxist perspective points to the fact that consciousness is shaped by reality, and that existing reality is shaped by the social intercourse of previous generations, a distinction may be drawn between social relations arising ‘accidentally’ from the actions of men, and conscious interventions aimed at shaping relations and consciousness (Marx and Engels [1845] 1965). It may be argued that collective action on the basis of shared conscious principles and goals represents a decisive point, in the transition of working class and oppressed people, from passive subjects to active agents of history. Healy, et al. (2004: 457-8) found ideas of social justice shaping the meaning and purpose of participation for some union and community activists, lending their activities a different significance from that perceived by other participants. In my own research, conscious action, involving the development of bridging capital amongst different social groups on a political basis of anti-racism, was unsurprisingly found predominantly
amongst CAMP members. Some participants pointed to the role of CAMP’s awareness-raising activities, as part of broader social change:

“normal British citizens ... when you explain to them, they notice that they were maybe misled by what the newspaper was saying or what the government, and they just keep giving you hope” (CAMP 6)

“most of the British citizens, they don’t know what goes on with asylum cases. Like when they dawn raided my house, and there’s kind of a drop-in at the end of the road ... a very nice lady ... she told her granddaughter ... what had happened and the granddaughter was saying does this happen in Britain? She was not aware that anything like that could happen, where somebody’s door could be broken and things like that. So I think really everybody needs to take part in [CAMP] in order for them to be educated and to see what happens behind the state.” (CAMP 2)

This may represent, in embryonic form, what Lenin described as a ‘historical bloc’, involving different “economic, social, and ideological forces combined in a temporary unity to change society”, with its own norms, values and understanding of the world capable of standing in opposition to those of the ruling classes, and contrasted with other sections of society who may be equally oppressed in objective terms, but remain under ruling class hegemony (cited in McLellan 1980: 184-5), for example accepting racist explanations for lack of housing or services.

Particularly amongst CAMP members, the experience of what was perceived as wilful refusal by the state to believe refugees’ accounts appears to have contributed significantly to perceptions of recent governments as motivated by a desire to prevent as many refugees as possible from settling in Britain:

“In my opinion, the British government don’t want to believe the things asylum seekers are saying. Maybe you brought all of the proof that you have, like your card, your passport from your country, they've seen it but sometimes they [act] like they didn’t see it ... if they don’t want to give you [the right to] stay here, they make you suffer” (CAMP 5)

“asylum seekers are feeling oppressed by the British government to be quite honest. Most of them have come from countries where they face persecution, and the danger is still there, but what the state is interested in now is how many
people they are going to deport, so that they can show the British public that they are really, really deporting immigrants” (CAMP 2)

“I don’t think [the British government] like asylum seekers” (CAMP 3)

“I’m just thinking that they don’t want people to come in this country” (CAMP 6)

This understanding informed an approach that considered it necessary to forcefully assert the right to remain in Britain, backed up when needed by tactics of non-violent non-cooperation and developed and sustained through oppositional social capital formations. CAMP members indicated that this perception had not arisen purely from individual experience, but from a collective understanding built up through exchanges of experiences. The conscious action of sharing experience as a means of raising consciousness and mutual support, which appears a central aspect of CAMP’s activities, may therefore be a key factor in this difference between social capital formations arising from CAMP and from the other case organisations. Whilst the more overtly political nature of CAMP, and the involvement of political organisations, may have also played a role in shaping this perspective, its roots in experience are made clear when contrasted with a more abstract, yet political and class-based, perspective on the asylum process expressed by a participant from outside CAMP:

“I think the people who do law they’re really detached from it ... they won’t experience themselves those laws ... law usually benefits people with money ... people who don’t have money don’t have power, they’re always the ones who take the blame.” (VOL 2)

Several CAMP members drew out the practical limitations on how far some organisations were able or willing to support individual refugees without status, when they lacked such a shared understanding of the state:

“if you’ve been taken [by immigration police], [VOL], they can’t do anything really, they can assist you with this paperwork ... but if you’ve got a problem like you are scared to go and sign, all those things, they can’t do anything. But [CAMP] can help you, they can go with you when you’re going to sign, and demonstrate outside there, or even if you get taken by the immigration officers they can- but [VOL], they can’t do that” (CAMP 3)

“sometimes we work with the [local advice project] ... they say ... they can help you. But when they arrest[ed me, the project] ... said ok let me [arrange an
appointment], maybe they can help you, but ... the way [CAMP] do it, ‘Now is emergency, must do it now’” (CAMP 5)

One participant suggested this difference was also due to the sources of funding on which other organisations depended, and the relation of these sources to the state:

“[CAMP] is like a movement of resistance ... the work with [CAMP] is strong, because sometimes you have to challenge the government. [VOL], I think, it is partially funded by the government, so that means the government can control [what VOL does], so you can never challenge [the government], otherwise you will be out” (CAMP 6)

In contrast to assumptions of high levels of trust being of benefit to the development of social capital, this points to the potential for at least partial mistrust of established political frameworks to be an important driving force in certain forms of political engagement such as protests, which Roberts (2004: 475-6) suggests may enhance participatory democracy. From the evidence presented here, I would argue that mistrust of the British state is a very reasonable and healthy response from refugees given their experiences, and that an understanding of the material basis of the state’s fundamental antagonism is a necessary guide to effective forms of action to combat refugees’ oppression.

The bridging carried out through CAMP appears to have provided a link between: firstly, the experience and to a great extent spontaneous resistance of refugees without status; secondly, the direct experience of the conditions and in some cases political movements in refugees’ oppressed countries of origin; and thirdly, the networks, experience and knowledge of the British political and legal system possessed by activists with longer residency in Britain:

“if we [have] any problem and we want to demonstrate for it they help you, and they give you advice what to do. But ... if you’re not with [CAMP] you don’t know what to do, like for instance if something happens to me now I know who to phone and get advice” (CAMP 3)

The bridges created through CAMP were also reported by participants as offering access to wider circles of support and publicity for their situation:
“if I’m not with [CAMP] ... nobody can hear me [if] they arrest me, [but CAMP organised a] march and everything, newspapers, television, all these things who help, people start to sign the [petition]” (CAMP 5)

This bridging was not without its tensions, and at different points in CAMP’s history, intense political debates have taken place over the direction of the organisation, with differences cutting across the line between refugees and non-refugees. One participant suggested that they felt some members lacked confidence to participate in these debates:

“If we want things to change we have to be there at meetings, we have to say what we want” (CAMP 4)

Yet there was also evidence of participants gaining in confidence and assertiveness through their involvement. In a process that may be viewed as similar to Gramsci’s ([1929-1935] 1982: 204-5) development of the ‘organic intellectual’, accounts showed refugees within CAMP taking on roles in supporting the development of other refugees’ understanding:

“Sometimes you will see someone saying ‘You see, [people from your country], they will not deport you, your case is strong’, but it’s not true. My role is not just to tell to them [that it] is not true, we are still in danger. But also to explain to them when someone is doing this kind of thing to you, even you are an asylum seeker ... you still have your rights in this country. So for example if you are entitled to have accommodation, you need to have a suitable accommodation.” (CAMP 6)

This in turn led to concrete victories, producing a sense of collective empowerment amongst refugees volunteering with CAMP:

“[An asylum seeker in CAMP] was taken out, and [CAMP] we did something big ... we went to the Government North East, I think twice, and we did everything that we could, and she came out, that was also a very good thing for us to see, to see that we also have some power, so if we want something we can get it” (CAMP 4)

This also points to the potential for particular forms of action to be sustained through the non-material incentive of a sense of empowerment, in this case gained through engagement in organisation producing tangible results. This was possible on the basis of CAMP’s ‘embeddedness’ in wider refugee communities, drawing strength for particular, oppositional and politicised social capital formations, on the basis of members’
simultaneous engagement in other, less political formations, both formal and informal, which connected them to refugees outside CAMP. Similarly, the effectiveness of LAWA did not arise solely from its own activities, but from its embeddedness in diverse other forms of organisation among Latinos in London, with links to wider communities sustained by members’ participation in other groups, and LAWA’s growth fuelled by word-of-mouth referrals by other organisations for work-related problems (Però 2008: 83). This highlights the importance of social capital formations, which may be linked to organisations but not synonymous with them, in understanding social processes more fully.

A distinctive point that emerged from CAMP members’ accounts was the sense of fulfilment derived from the opportunity to put forward their views and contribute to shaping the direction of the organisation’s work:

“...I need to be there, because I think that I can contribute in one way or the other, just participating in a meeting, joining discussions, so I always feel everybody’s idea is important ... they all have something to gain from me and I also have something to gain from them.” (CAMP 1)

Participants clearly experienced the level of democratic participation in CAMP as empowering, with individuals contributing towards a collective goal, engaged in a process of open debate reaching agreement through exhaustive discussion:

“...what I like [about CAMP is] the level of debate ... it’s well balanced, because people can feel free and express what they are feeling ... sometimes yes I don’t agree with the length of the debate because it is taking sometimes more weeks to debate for one thing ... So it can seem like boring, but on the other hand it is giving the chance to all people, so everybody will agree” (CAMP 6)

Another member described the importance of this process in enabling refugees without status to determine the form of ‘help’ they receive:

“...the nice thing about asylum seekers leading a group is that they know the issue and they know what they want, it’s not about what people want to give them, but what they want” (CAMP 4)

This level of participation by volunteer members of CAMP, and the sense of ownership and control it cultivated in members of an oppressed and insecure section of society, constituted a powerful influence towards not only collective identity, but a degree of
collective agency. Social capital formations sustained through engagement with CAMP thus included a distinct set of norms, based on an understanding of shared interests amongst refugees which contradicted the interests of the state. This manifested as a commitment to mutual support between members and a negotiated and cautious engagement with the state, including official processes of courts and reporting procedures, but backed by collective political action. This was able, at times, to disrupt the effective management of oppression, exposing the state’s actions to public critique and forcing concessions.

**Conclusions**

In the absence of organisation amongst refugees on a wider scale that is financially independent of the state, the deeply unequal positions of power of individual refugee volunteers and the state ensures that the development of trust and engagement between them enables the management of oppression and tends to perpetuate, rather than combat, this inequality and reinforce dependency. Despite a spontaneous impetus toward collective incentives across a range of voluntary activity, powerful countervailing tendencies act to limit their development. Overcoming these challenges requires both a political consciousness amongst refugees, of the nature of systems within which they are operating, and collective organisation powerful enough to offer the potential to challenge and eventually overthrow oppressive elements of those systems. Effective functioning of collective social capital does not require that all members of the group share equally in networks, norms and trust, but that a critical mass does (Brunie 2009: 259). CAMP demonstrates that the development of social capital formations based on an overtly political approach have the potential to not only improve individuals’ situation, but to develop a strong sense of empowerment and inclusion, alongside a high level of mistrust in those in positions of greater power, based on a combination of direct experience and collective reflection.
Chapter 9 - Conclusions and Recommendations

Briskman and Cemlyn (2005: 720-1) discuss some of the challenges in work with refugees, in “realising social work’s transformative potential in a hostile policy environment”, particularly in arguing for citizenship rights for a group excluded from any kind of ‘nationhood’, and finding routes to progress in a situation where disparities in power are so great. They call for greater clarity by social workers of their position, and the development of greater leadership within the profession based on values of humanity, social justice and human rights. This thesis has aimed to contribute to such clarity, by examining the material basis for refugees’ subordinate relationship with the British state and some of the mechanisms which manage and maintain such an oppressive relationship, focussing on the role of refugees as volunteers. By focussing largely on areas beyond the mainstream of professional social work practice, I hope to have offered a new perspective on some of the ways in which social work and related areas of practice may contribute to processes of both social control and transformation.

To recap my argument: Refugees migrate in the context of an imperialist system, driven by factors including exploitation, poverty, war, persecution and environmental destruction. Within this system, the countries from which refugees flee predominantly occupy an oppressed position, whilst Britain occupies a dominant, imperialist position. This is reflected in the position of migrants from those countries within Britain, and in their relation to the British state. Due to its imperialist position, the British economic, political and social system has achieved a degree of stability and ‘social peace’ within its borders, on the basis of the exploitation of oppressed countries. This has included the exploitation of a reserve army of labour drawn from oppressed countries. Maintaining this situation relies in turn on racialised divisions between workers from Britain and from oppressed countries. The presence of refugees in Britain poses an implicit threat to these arrangements, both by moving under imperatives of human rights rather than labour demand, and by offering the potential to build links with British workers and raise their consciousness. This offers a response to the long-standing question of why recent governments have not made more constructive use of refugees’ skills (e.g. Dumper 2002; Phillimore and Goodson 2006; Bloch 2007). Between 1999 and 2010, Labour governments responded to this situation with policies that restructured
dominant forms of engagement and values amongst refugees by breaking up existing networks, both amongst refugees and between refugees and other working-class people, and by integrating refugees into individualised forms of engagement with the state, even as they continue to experience racism long after securing status. This has been facilitated through delegated voluntary and community sector organisations, staffed and in some cases run by refugees, some with status and some without, in an approach consistent with the development of the ‘race relations industry’ in Britain since the 1960s. Refugees’ motivations for participating in state-backed initiatives are varied, and in most cases have required some visible benefits for themselves, and to a greater or lesser extent, other refugees.

Però and Solomos (2010: 10) propose a typology of factors interacting with one another to shape migrant mobilisations in a context of available opportunities, including “the political socialisation, background, experience and values of the migrants; the living and working conditions they experienced in the receiving context (e.g. of exploitation, marginalisation, etc); their networks and social capital, ... their migratory project”, and feelings and emotions. The methodology adopted in this research has enabled exploration of the connection between processes operating at these multiple levels, from the international to the personal. Qualitative techniques have been used to investigate how refugees see the different forms of activity in which they are engaged, and to ask new questions about social capital formations, including the roles they play for different parties and the norms they generate. The use of biographical surveys has allowed the situation of refugees’ present forms of activity in both their previous life history and their anticipated future trajectory. Participants’ accounts demonstrate that engagement by refugees in volunteering provides a powerful means of building social capital, but that the nature and outcomes of this social capital has varied. An unexpected finding was the diverse range of voluntary activity by refugees holding the potential to develop collective consciousness and increase the priority given to non-material incentives. Yet, in spite of intentions and spontaneous tendencies towards a self-identification as part of a wider collective, voluntary activity by refugees in the refugee sector has operated in a context of domination by the state, materially and ideologically, which has tended to produce outcomes that favour its own interests, often to the detriment of refugees. This is reflected in contradictions in the
consciousness of some refugees, where, despite having their rights systematically
denied by the state as part of an oppressed group, some individuals side with the state
in backing this denial, particularly in organisations most immediately under the
direction of the state.

Overall, the case studies demonstrate the ways in which a minority of refugees have
been incorporated into the state’s structures of governance under Labour. At an
institutional level, this may appear a uniform process of cooption and neutralisation of
resistance, but at an individual level, a complex combination of circumstances,
experiences and perspectives combine to maintain the involvement of individuals on
which institutional processes depend. Attention to this level also indicates some of the
tensions and contradictions within these processes, which present possibilities for
renewed resistance, as in the common tendencies across organisations for voluntary
activity to develop more collective approaches, and for refugees’ contact with the state
to have the potential to inform a fuller understanding of its character. This has
contributed to a Marxist analysis by pointing to the need to qualify assumptions arising
from refugees’ material class position with equal attention to their subjective
perspectives, including the impact of their self-perceived class-trajectory. Attention to
the lived experiences of oppressed people, in particular the interaction of racism and
gender with class, was forced onto the Marxist agenda by movements of women and
black people, most prominently in the 1960s and 1970s. These insights, and those of
work which has followed, has been incorporated through the theoretical research and
developed further through qualitative interviews, contributing to an understanding of
refugee participants as neither simply victims nor heroes, but as complex and
contradictory political actors.

Responding to the research question, we can say that at an individual level, the
interests and group membership of refugees do not directly dictate their actions, but
are mediated by their consciousness of these interests and of their relation to the
interests of others, and by choices about what response to make on the basis of this
understanding. Where voluntary activity is tied to promises of comfortable future
employment, this creates pressure for refugees to identify their interests, on an
individual basis, with a class trajectory above their current circumstances, and to act in
line with this expectation, which for the majority is likely to lead instead to the continuation of a subordinate position. Some refugees make a choice based instead on a programme of collective liberation. This can be supported both by education and organisation by refugees, among refugees, in a range of settings, and by support and resources made available to refugees by non-refugees, such as by making refugee sector organisations more accountable to their users.

At a social level, the scope for different forms of individual activity to influence the course of events will be set both by the wider material conditions and the social structures available to individuals for engagement. The actions of individual refugees are not determined in isolation, but through interaction with other refugees and wider social forces. Whilst individual experiences and forms of action possess a degree of randomness, in the relation between them at the level of the social, mediated by consciousness, the actions and experiences of individuals connect to historical processes, and a quantity of individuals undergo a qualitative change to mass social forces (Lenin [1895-1916] 1972: 123-4). This relationship may become particularly clear in “‘transition moments’ in migrants’ engagements - when their tacit resistance ‘comes out’ and ‘scales up’ into manifest and larger-scale collective action” (Però and Solomos 2010: 11-12). The history of mutual aid societies, which have been prevalent among migrants in the absence of a welfare state, suggests that even in the absence of direct state interference, the priority of meeting immediate material needs may contribute to a need for migrant organisations to attract the widest possible number of affiliates and consequently “to shy away from any creed other than the blandest form of patriotism” (Moya 2005: 844). This suggests a need for different kinds of organisations amongst refugees, both those meeting immediate needs and those organising for longer-term change. Sustaining action for change on a wider scale may require the identification of alternative allies, in order to undermine dependence on the state for resources. Però and Solomos (2010: 14) suggest these may be found in ‘civil society’, “especially in those sectors that retain autonomy from government and are not ‘bridled’ or domesticated as a result of participating in the processes of governance and service provision”, and also in areas of the state where there is space to use contradictions to gain a voice or impact on policy. For refugees, these might be found amongst sections of society who have more in common with the interests of refugees, such as migrant workers and other
oppressed sections of the working classes, and amongst other organisations and activists with shared aims.

**Re-interpreting social capital**

This thesis has advanced a novel perspective on social capital theory, ‘unmasking’ it as a way of understanding and intervening to shape the character of interactions at an individual level, in order to influence change at a social level. Whilst we should be cautious about the scope for wide generalisations on the basis of very limited data, several key features of the understanding of social capital developed here may be drawn out:

**Varying Types:** Differences in the nature of engagement and the norms involved, resulting from a dialectical interaction between the wider objective situation and the material interests and subjective qualities of those engaged, for example: the deeply unequal and oppressive character of engagement between refugees without status and immigration officials throughout the asylum process, where norms of reciprocity are set on the state’s terms, involving the expectation of obedience and trust by refugees, and treatment by the state often experienced as degrading and mistrustful; or the consciousness-raising, collective political opposition and mutual support on a range of levels in CAMP, with norms of mutual respect and ongoing, explicit negotiation of aims and methods.

**Potential for positive and/or negative effects:** Depending on factors including the position of a given individual within the social capital formation, with the potential to engage in social capital formations which contradict one’s own interests, for example: the benefit to the British ruling classes and their state of disciplining refugees through engaging them in individualised social capital formations, making it easier to deny them services, isolate their internationalist influence from other sections of the working class, and limit the challenge they pose to international divisions of labour; and the same impacts as a negative consequence for many refugees, as a result of engagement in these same formations.
Uneven: With the potential for individuals to be engaged in multiple, and potentially contradictory, forms of social capital simultaneously, and for particular social capital formations to contain internal contradictions, for example: the role of COM volunteers’ engagement in social capital formations involving refugees and the local state, which increased refugees’ collective confidence and articulation of their needs and strengthened their capacity to survive by bringing material resources and services into the community, whilst simultaneously serving to keep forms of activity within norms acceptable to the state, thereby diffusing any impetus towards more fundamental change.

Dynamic: Constantly reformulated through subjective interaction with material conditions, with the potential to not only increase or diminish in strength, but to morph into different forms, for example: the tendency across organisations towards a progressively wider collective identification of interests; or the simultaneous individualising tendencies of dominant constructions of volunteering as a route to employment, contributing to the erosion of solidary social capital formations when refugees achieve status.

Contextual: Given that social capital is so varied, including factors such as parties’ relative interests and balance of forces, perspectives, and locations in historical trajectories, there are severe limitations on the degree of generalisation possible. The form of social capital theory presented here does not aim at a blueprint for ‘the way society works’, but may suggest the kind of questions to begin asking in order to uncover the connections between material contexts, consciousness, individual action and social development.

Implications for practice and policy
Social workers and other practitioners who are not refugees can support the development of links between refugees and other oppressed groups, offer information on both the underlying interests and the technical workings of the British state, and engage with refugees in building collective anti-racist movements. Integral in this must be respect for the right of refugees to determine their own forms of struggle and to organise separately when they consider it necessary. It is important to reassert the
political agency and conscious decision-making of refugees and other migrants. This is particularly urgent at a time when policy has shifted to ‘victims of trafficking’ as a new priority amongst migrants for state assistance, in a conception that includes requirements of extreme victimhood and ‘helplessness’ as a condition for state support (Anderson 2010: 72), as part of the deeper objectification of migrants. Ahmad (1993: 43) suggests that “For social workers, it is often an easier option to focus on the symptoms of oppression than on causes of oppression”, leading to an approach equating ‘disadvantage’ with clients and therefore working to ‘help disadvantaged blacks’, rather than work with clients to challenge the causes of their oppression. Professionals need to decide whether they are on the side of the state or of refugees, and to acknowledge the fundamental conflict at the heart of the state’s relation to refugees as a collectively oppressed group, and the consequences that follow from this, including the implication that the effective development of trust and engagement with the state may be to the extreme detriment of refugees. Social workers and other practitioners can also play a role in building awareness and support for the struggles of refugees amongst other sections of the working classes and wider society. This could lessen refugees’ isolation, extend their influence and increase the collective resources available to them.

For their part, refugees can struggle to both assert the validity of their particular experience and integrate this with broader understandings and frameworks, offering the potential to create new understandings. Davies (1996: 2-3) identifies the potential for volunteers to provide a politicising and critical voice within organisations and an organic link to users. This potential could be seized on by refugees as volunteers, to use their position in the organisation to extend links with, and between, refugees as users, with the aim of increasing the accountability of the organisation to refugees outside, over and above the priorities of funders or the state. Some refugees could consider more carefully the basis on which they engage with the British state and the relative risks and advantages of different alliances, and, when engaging collectively, whether to accept money from the state, which may be tied to particular forms of activity.

Everyone concerned with the rights of refugees needs to press for an end to the criminalisation of asylum and migration by the state. As argued throughout this thesis,
racialised oppression and exploitation is not the product of arbitrary policy choices, but are fundamental to the imperialist system. Effective action for change in Britain’s asylum and immigration policy therefore needs to be combined with action to transform the wider economic, social and political relations, within Britain and between Britain and other countries.

Wider implications and possible future directions

The fine-tuning of attempts at social control on a consensual basis, analysed in this thesis, have far-reaching implications, representing the efforts of the ruling classes to maintain bourgeois democracy in the context of an intensifying crisis of the system, where the ‘crumbs’ available to buy people off are increasingly scarce. The challenge is not merely to control people by force, but to make them consent to their position. As Coleman (1993: 14) puts it, the natural aspirations of the ruling classes are that:

“The opportunities lie in a future in which social control no longer depends principally on coercion, constraint, and negative sanctions, under the oppressive blanket of closed communities, but instead depends principally on positive incentives and rewards performance.” (cited in Fine 2001: 76)

The Labour Party came into being at a time when increased challenges from other imperialist and developing powers forced a restriction on the numbers of the labour aristocracy and called for a means for this minority to maintain political leadership amongst the rest of the working classes. Social capital interventions have been developed by Labour governments in a period where a combination of deepening economic crisis and the political estrangement of the Labour Party from the majority of the working classes has called for new mechanisms for control. By devolving responsibility for social divisions and poverty onto oppressed communities themselves, Labour’s use of ‘social capital’ has distracted from the economic or structural causes of inequalities (Temple, et al. 2005: 8-9), but, as demonstrated in this thesis, alternative reconstructions of social capital also hold potential for transforming these structures.

The particularly oppressed position of refugees in Britain in the recent period has made these questions particularly acute, and a fruitful area for initial development of this framework. An area which may have been underdeveloped in this thesis due to limited resources is the consideration of particular, as well as general, conditions in refugees’
countries of origin, and the consideration of a wider range of sources on forms of engagement pursued by refugees before arriving in Britain. There may be useful opportunities to engage further with work on transnational social capital formations (e.g. Bloch 2008; Kleist 2008; Triandafyllidou 2009). There is also the question of the relationship of voluntary organisations to economic development, a theme that has featured strongly in research in the US (e.g. Turcotte and Silka 2007), and the way that measures targeted at refugees also impact on others who share cultural characteristics. Since 1999, there has been a proliferation of African shops in Newcastle, and there may be utility in investigating the relation of these shops to voluntary and community organisations, and consequently the broader impact of particular social capital formations, developed through the refugee relations industry, on the structuring of the class composition of refugee communities over time. Further research is also needed into the applicability of this approach to understanding the relationship of the state to other sections of the working classes over the recent period. For example, sections of the Muslim population have exhibited high levels of political activity in protests against Britain’s wars in the Middle East and against British support for Israel, and have been responded to with concerted social capital interventions by the state, such as elements of the ‘Prevent’ programme (Kundnani 2009).

Further monitoring will be needed, where possible involving service users, activists, practitioners and researchers, to see to what extent the approaches with refugees documented here continue to be pursued by the new coalition government. The methodological approach and theoretical framework developed here would be of considerable use in conducting such monitoring, but would likely require constant revision and development, in response to an ever-changing and increasingly complex world. What is certain is that for as long as imperialism continues, giving rise to the kinds of contradictions, divisions and crises which marked the majority of the last century, then the ruling classes will continue to need strategies with which to manage oppressed populations. As Marx and Engels put it in 1845:

“It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at this moment considers as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is irrevocably and clearly
foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organisation of bourgeois society today” (cited in Lenin [1895-1916] 1972: 28).

This thesis has demonstrated the insights that can be gained from an empirically informed Marxist analysis. Direct repression will continue to provoke resistance, and it therefore seems likely that the ruling classes will continue to need approaches such as the social capital interventions of recent Labour governments. Developing a greater understanding of these processes may enable those engaged in struggle to influence events from a more informed and conscious position, thereby increasing their active role as subjects of history. If new movements are to develop, which can genuinely express the interests of the mass of the working classes and fulfil their historical role, they will need to be alert to indirect means of social control and relearn an old motto: ‘Beware false friends’.
Notes

1 I use the term ‘volunteer’ as defined in the United Nations Definition of Volunteering (2001, cited in Packham 2005: 106), as work which is not undertaken primarily for financial reward, is entered into of an individual’s own free will, and which is of benefit to someone else in addition to the volunteer. Complexities, ‘grey areas’ and contradictions in these aspects of volunteering are explored in the later chapters of the thesis.


3 The difference with social scientific case studies is the commitment to selecting, assembling and interpreting evidence in a rigorous manner, including the setting of particular case studies within their context and wider relevance.

4 For example, by taking a course on communication skills offered by the university, and reading literature on black perspectives (e.g. Bryan, et al. 1988; Ahmad 1993).

5 These are identified in the text because unlike the contemporary case studies, the organisations have all ceased to exist, and my research on them relies to a far greater extent on written sources already in the public domain.

6 It is intended to produce a summary of the research written in non-academic language, and to offer workshops introducing its findings.

7 For example, by impeding co-option of a privileged strata and the provision of training necessary for the increased use of technology in production (Allen 1995: 52-66).
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Appendix i: International Definition of Social Work

From the International Federation of Social Workers at:
http://www.ifsw.org/f38000138.html

DEFINITION*
The social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well-being. Utilising theories of human behaviour and social systems, social work intervenes at the points where people interact with their environments. Principles of human rights and social justice are fundamental to social work.

COMMENTARY
Social work in its various forms addresses the multiple, complex transactions between people and their environments. Its mission is to enable all people to develop their full potential, enrich their lives, and prevent dysfunction. Professional social work is focused on problem solving and change. As such, social workers are change agents in society and in the lives of the individuals, families and communities they serve. Social work is an interrelated system of values, theory and practice.

Values
Social work grew out of humanitarian and democratic ideals, and its values are based on respect for the equality, worth, and dignity of all people. Since its beginnings over a century ago, social work practice has focused on meeting human needs and developing human potential. Human rights and social justice serve as the motivation and justification for social work action. In solidarity with those who are dis-advantaged, the profession strives to alleviate poverty and to liberate vulnerable and oppressed people in order to promote social inclusion. Social work values are embodied in the profession’s national and international codes of ethics.

Theory
Social work bases its methodology on a systematic body of evidence-based knowledge derived from research and practice evaluation, including local and indigenous knowledge specific to its context. It recognises the complexity of interactions between human beings and their environment, and the capacity of people both to be affected by and to alter the multiple influences upon them including bio-psychosocial factors. The social work profession draws on theories of human development and behaviour and social systems to analyse complex situations and to facilitate individual, organisational, social and cultural changes.

Practice
Social work addresses the barriers, inequities and injustices that exist in society. It responds to crises and emergencies as well as to everyday personal and social problems. Social work utilises a variety of skills, techniques, and activities consistent with its holistic focus on persons and their environments. Social work interventions range from primarily person-focused psychosocial processes to involvement in social policy, planning and development. These include counselling, clinical social work, group work, social pedagogical work, and family treatment and therapy as well as efforts to help people obtain services and resources in the community. Interventions also include
agency administration, community organisation and engaging in social and political action to impact social policy and economic development. The holistic focus of social work is universal, but the priorities of social work practice will vary from country to country and from time to time depending on cultural, historical, and socio-economic conditions.

* This international definition of the social work profession replaces the IFSW definition adopted in 1982. It is understood that social work in the 21st century is dynamic and evolving, and therefore no definition should be regarded as exhaustive.

Adopted by the IFSW General Meeting in Montréal, Canada, July 2000
Appendix ii: Research Ethics and Risk Assessment Form A (relevant excerpts)

University of Durham
School of Applied Social Sciences

RESEARCH ETHICS AND RISK ASSESSMENT FORM A
All research projects must be assessed for ethical issues and risks to the researcher(s)\(^1\). Form A starts this process and must be submitted by the principal investigator\(^2\) for all projects that staff or students of the School intend to undertake. The form must be approved before any data collection begins. It is your responsibility to follow an appropriate code of ethical practice, such as those of the British Sociological Association or Social Research Association\(^3\), and to acquaint yourself with safety issues by consulting an appropriate reference such as Social Research Update: Safety in Social Research\(^4\). Data should be handled in a manner compliant with the Data Protection Act. Researchers undertaking studies in an NHS or social services setting must abide by the Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care\(^5\).

Section I  Project outline

Name of investigator: Tom Vickers

Dissertation/project title: Experiences of migration to Newcastle

Degree and year (students only): PhD SASS (3 years)

Estimated start date: 15/01/08       Estimated end date: 30/09/10

Summary (up to 250 words describing main research questions, methods and brief details of any participants)

The research will investigate the role played by refugees and asylum seekers as paid workers and volunteers in the refugee sector in towns in the North East of England. By refugee sector I refer to sections of the statutory, voluntary and community sectors specifically targeted at work with refugees and asylum seekers (For subsidiary research questions see supplementary sheet). The research will include up to 5 projects and up to 40 interviewees. Interviews will take place at mutually agreed locations and at times convenient to all parties, and lone working policies of case projects will be fully consulted. Consultation will also be carried out from the early stages of the research with an advisory group of 4-10 paid and unpaid workers in the refugee sector.

I have consulted the British Sociological Association code of ethics (2002) with reference to the methodology. Access will be sought via existing contacts of the researcher and community projects. A written agreement based on informed consent will be

---

\(^1\) See University of Durham School of Applied Social Sciences Research Ethics and Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures, March 2005
\(^2\) In the case of student research, the principal investigator is always the student.
\(^3\) http://www.britsoc.co.uk/new_site/index.php?area=equality&id=63; http://www.the-sra.org.uk/Ethicals.htm
\(^4\) http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/sru/SRU29.html
\(^5\) http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/01/47/57/04014757.pdf
established, both at the level projects and of individual interview participants, before research involving those concerned commences. Written consent to access has not yet been obtained from case projects, but the researcher has existing contacts and access was previously granted to one case project for an MA dissertation in summer 2007. All participants will be informed that they have the option to withdraw from the research at any time without jeopardy to their position in the project or their future access to services, and ongoing checks will be made during interviews for maintained informed consent. Methods will include documentary research, individual semi-structured interviews and focus groups. According to the preferences of the interviewees, interviews will take place either on the premises of the community project or at the interviewee’s home, and project policies on health and safety and risk assessment will be followed. The researcher will ensure there is post-interview support and emotional debriefing available from relevant community organisations should this be required by participants. Access will also be arranged for emotional debriefing for the researcher where necessary. All findings will be anonymised in discussion with participants, including changing names and anonymising all records, both electronic and hard copies. All hard copies will be held in a locked cupboard, and electronic copies will be password protected.

Section 2 Ethics checklist (*please answer each question by ticking as appropriate*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the study involve participants who are vulnerable or unable to give informed consent (e.g. children under 16, people with learning disabilities)?</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge/consent (e.g. covert observation of people in non-public places)?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Could the study cause harm, discomfort, stress, anxiety or any other negative consequence beyond the risks encountered in normal life?</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Will the project involve the participation of patients, users or staff through the NHS or a social services department?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Are appropriate steps being taken to protect anonymity and confidentiality? (in accordance with an appropriate Statement of Ethical Practice).</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you have answered ‘yes’ to any of questions 1-5, you must complete Form B and attach Form A as a cover sheet. Both Form A and Form B must be submitted for approval (see Section 5). Now go to Section 3.

Section 3 Risk assessment checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the study involve practical work such as interviewing that requires the researcher(s) to travel to and from locations outside the University?</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Does the study involve accessing non-public sites that require permission to enter?</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Are there any identifiable hazards involved in carrying out the study, such as lone working in isolated settings?</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If you have answered ‘yes’ to any of questions 1-3, you must consult the University’s Health and Safety Manual Section F1 at: [http://www.dur.ac.uk/healthandsafety/F1-Fieldwork3.htm#App2](http://www.dur.ac.uk/healthandsafety/F1-Fieldwork3.htm#App2)

You must complete two forms available in appendices 2 and 3 at this web site: Fieldwork – risk assessment and Fieldwork health declaration. These forms must be submitted with Form A.

**Ethics Form A Supplementary Sheet**

**Supplement to Objectives**

In working towards the central research question outlined above, the research will explore several key subsidiary questions, including:

- *What role does political analysis and action play in asylum seekers’ and refugees’ current work with other asylum seekers and refugees?*
- *How do professionals relate their own experiences and social location to their work?*
- *What forces and influences impact on the nature of professionals’ work, and how do these interact in supporting and/or conflicting ways?*
- *How do professional roles and their priorities relate to their enactors’ wider roles as whole social and political actors?*
**Appendix iii: Fieldwork Risk Assessment**

**University of Durham**  
**Fieldwork - Risk Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School of Applied Social Sciences</td>
<td>Various in North East England</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PERSONS AT RISK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewing individuals, focus group and documentary review</td>
<td>Researcher (1 person)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DURATION OF ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approx 250 hours (40 1hr individual interviews + 5 2hr focus groups + 200hr documentary review)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POTENTIAL HAZARDS:**
1) Lone working  
2) Behaviour  
3) Sampling

**POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES:**
1) Isolation  
2) Group dynamics, relationships  
3) Legal / policy problems

**EXISTING CONTROLS:**
- Inform someone (girlfriend / friend) of where I am and when inspected to return, and take measures to ensure safe location for interviews and focus groups.  
- Respect for individuals’ views and culture and ensure regular feedback with fieldwork supervisors to address any challenges for communication/safety.  
- Obtain data only with written consent from interviewees.

**RISK RATING (SEVERITY X LIKELIHOOD) WITH EXISTING CONTROLS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Risk Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NEW CONTROLS REQUIRED:**
2) Obtain clear written agreement on purpose and potential uses of interview and establish rapport prior to starting.

**RISK RATING (SEVERITY X LIKELIHOOD) WITH NEW CONTROLS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Risk Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ASSESSOR**

NAME ........................................................... JOB TITLE .................................................
SIGNATURE ................................................ DATE .........................................................
Appendix iv: Fieldwork Health Declaration

University of Durham

Fieldwork Health Declaration

During your course you will undertake one or more periods of fieldwork study, involving visits to locations some of which will require a reasonable degree of physical health and fitness. In order to ensure that each fieldwork study operates with due regard for health and safety - in addition to being rewarding for those involved - all students who expect to participate in fieldwork must declare any medical condition or incapacity which could prevent them from fully participating in the expected activities, or which may endanger the health and safety of themselves and others.

As a condition of joining the study, you must complete the form below after first becoming familiar with the details and expectations of the proposed field activities. All information will be treated in the strictest confidence and used only for determining the suitability of a fieldwork activity.

Please note that answering YES to any of Part B does not automatically exclude you from a fieldwork activity and every effort will be made to provide alternative arrangements where these are necessary, but it is essential that you provide full information. Where YES is answered, or the Part C declaration is not signed, the matter will be referred for a further medical opinion.

PART A
Department of SCHOOL OF APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES

________________________________________________________
Field Course to NEWCASTLE Start and End dates 15/01/08-30/09/10
Name of Student TOM VICKERS Name of Fieldwork Leader SARAH BANKS

PART B
Do you have a medical condition, allergy or intolerance that may restrict your taking part in the expected fieldwork activities?

NO

DETAILS N/A____________________________________________________________

Do you have any physical injury or incapacity that may restrict your taking part in the expected fieldwork activities?

NO

DETAILS N/A____________________________________________________________

Do you take medication to control any of the above conditions?

NO

DETAILS N/A____________________________________________________________

PART C
I declare that I am not knowingly suffering from any medical condition or disability that could prevent me from participating fully in the fieldwork activities.

My last tetanus booster was on UNKNOWN_________________

Signed ____________________________ Date_____________________________
Appendix v: Research Ethics and Risk Assessment Form B (relevant excerpts)

School of Applied Social Sciences
University Of Durham

RESEARCH ETHICS AND RISK ASSESSMENT FORM B

Form A must be attached to this form as a cover sheet. Form B must be completed if you have answered ‘Yes’ to any of questions 1 to 5 in Section 2 of Form A. If your project requires approval from an NHS or Social Services ethics committee, you must first obtain this approval. Once approval has been granted, including meeting any conditions, you must submit the approved form together with evidence of this approval with Form B. If you are submitting an NHS or Social Services ethics form, you only need to complete Sections 1, 2 and 5 of Form B. This form must be approved before data collection begins.

Section 1

1. .........................................................................................................................................................
   Name of Principal Investigator: Tom Vickers

2. Does the research require ethical approval from the NHS or a Social Services Authority?
   Yes ☐ No ☑

3. Might the proposed research meet the definition of a clinical trial? It may do so if it involves studying the effects on participants of drugs, devices, diets, behavioural strategies such as exercise or counseling, or other ‘clinical’ procedures.
   Yes ☐ No ☑

If ‘Yes’, a copy of this form must be sent to the Insurance Officer, Treasurer’s Department. Tel: 0191 334 6968. Insurance approval will be necessary before the project can start and evidence of approval must be attached with this form.

Section 2  Checklist of attachments

For all applicants tick the documents you are attaching with this form:

Form A ................................................................. ☑
An approved NHS or Social Services Ethics Form (if applicable) ........................................... ☐
Evidence that your NHS or Social Services Ethics Form has been approved (if applicable) ................................................................. ☐
Information sheet for participants (if individual consent is to be obtained) ......................... ☑
Consent form (if individual consent is to be obtained) ............................................................... ☑
Fieldwork Risk Assessment (if applicable) .............................................................................. ☑
Fieldwork Health Declaration (if applicable) ............................................................................ ☑
Confirmation of insurance cover (if applicable; see question 11) ........................................... ☐

For students only:

Letter of invitation to participants ......................................................................................... ☑
Letter of invitation to leaders/managers ................................................................................... ☑
Leaflet/Flyer for all relevant parties attached ........................................................................... ☐
Consent form ................................................................................................................................. ☑
Questionnaire ................................................................................................................................. ☐
Interview guide .............................................................................................................................. ☐
Written confirmation from all agencies involved in the study that they agree to participate .................................................................

Section 3 Project details

1. How many research participants will be involved in the study? 60

2. How will they be selected? (e.g. age, sex, other selection criteria or sampling procedure)
A breadth of participants will be sought in terms of age sex, country of origin, immigration status, and paid/unpaid nature of work in the refugee sector.

3. Are there any people who will be excluded? If so state the criteria to be used
Potentially individuals with very low levels of spoken English due to lack of interpreting facilities.

4. Who are the participants? (e.g. social services clients, NHS patients, users of a specific service)
Paid and voluntary asylum seekers and refugees working in the refugee sector.

5. Who will explain the investigation to the participant(s)? Principal investigator, Tom Vickers

6. How and where will consent be recorded?
Signed consent forms accompanied by information sheet and introductory letter, all to be delivered prior to the interview starting.

7. What steps will be taken to safeguard the confidentiality of records and to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act?
Electronic and hard copies will be anonymised by removing names. All electronic records will be password-protected and hard copies will be stored in a locked cupboard.

8. Will non-anonymised questionnaires, tapes or video recordings be destroyed at the end of the project?
Yes [ ] Go to qu. 11  No [✓] Go to qu. 9  Not Applicable [ ] Go to qu. 11

9. What further use do you intend to make of the material?
Potential future use for anonymised publication for the purposes of education and improving services. This will be explained and consent sought in the consent forms. Where informed consent is not given records will not be kept.

10. Will consent be requested for this future use?
Yes [✓]  No [ ]  Not Applicable [ ]
In writing and verbally at the time of initial request for consent prior to interviews commencing, and included in information sheets and consent forms delivered to all participants.
Section 4: Risk or discomfort to participants

11. What discomfort, danger or interference with normal activities could be experienced by participants? State probability, seriousness, and precautions to minimise each risk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk/Discomfort</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Seriousness</th>
<th>Precautions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potentially bringing up distressing memories.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium / High</td>
<td>Ensure understanding that participation is voluntary and that participants can opt out of particular questions or the entirety of the research at any time. Debrief all participants and make arrangements for appropriate post-interview support from case projects or elsewhere, and make participants aware of these.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix vi: Introductory Letter to Organisations

Project Managers Introductory Letter

Dear Sir/Madam:

My name is Tom Vickers, and I am a postgraduate student at Durham University. From autumn 2007 to autumn 2010 I will be carrying out a piece of PhD research on how refugee sector workers who are themselves asylum seekers and refugees respond to dilemmas and contradictions encountered in their work. My supervisor is Lena Dominelli, whose contact details can be found below.

I am writing to ask if it would be possible to use your project as a case study in the research. This would involve an examination of written records and reports held by the project, such as monitoring reports and staff and volunteer files. In addition I would aim to interview a selection of staff and volunteers about their views and experiences. Interviews would only go ahead where full informed consent had been given. It would be made clear to all participants that they may withdraw from the research at any time, without any jeopardy to their position in the project or their access to services. A number of interviewees would then be invited to participate in a series of focus groups.

The final outcomes of the research would be produced as a PhD thesis around autumn 2010, and then made available to all of the participants. As the overriding purpose of the research is to improve the experience of refugees, it will be important to highlight not only cases of good practice but also critical points which may emerge from the findings. Findings may also be published and distributed more widely during and after the research for purposes of education and improving services. In all write-ups details which may reveal individuals’ identity will be removed, and the project will be anonymised by removing details such as the name of the project and the city.

Any concerns or questions regarding the research can be raised with myself or my supervisor, Lena Dominelli, who can be contacted at:

School of Applied Social Sciences
Durham University
32 Old Elvet
Durham
DH1 3HN
Email: lena.dominelli@durham.ac.uk
Phone: 0191 3341505

Your help in this would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Tom Vickers
Email: tom.vickers@durham.ac.uk
Tel: 0781 3073846
Appendix vii: Information Sheet for Interview Participants

Information Sheet for Research Participants

My name is Tom Vickers, and I am a postgraduate student at Durham University. From autumn 2007 to autumn 2010 I will be carrying out a piece of PhD research on how refugee sector workers who are themselves asylum seekers and refugees respond to dilemmas and contradictions encountered in their work.

I would like you to consider participating in interviews and potentially focus groups as part of this research. I would like to hear your experiences and views on your role in the refugee sector.

The final outcomes of the research would be produced as a PhD thesis around autumn 2010, and then made available to all of the participants, as well as any other anonymised publications which the research may contribute to. As the overriding purpose of the research is to improve the experience of refugees, it will be important to highlight not only cases of good practice but also critical points which may emerge from the findings. Findings may also be published and distributed more widely during and after the research for purposes of education and improving services. In all write-ups details which may reveal individuals’ identity will be removed, and the project will be anonymised by removing details such as the name of the project and the city.

It is entirely up to you whether you take part in this research. If you prefer not to take part, this will not cause any problems either with your volunteering or paid role or access to any services you are receiving from projects which may be involved in the research. If you do agree to be interviewed then you have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time you wish, without jeopardising your access to services you may be receiving currently or may seek in the future. You only have to answer questions that you want to, and feel free to ask back to the interviewer or ask for the reasons behind any questions. When the research is written your name will not be used. The only limits to confidentiality are if you tell the researcher about any illegal acts, as they may have a legal duty to report these. But it is up to you what you tell the interviewer.

Any concerns or questions regarding the research can be raised with myself, at:

Tom Vickers  
School of Applied Social Sciences  
Durham University  
32 Old Elvet  
Durham  
DH1 3HN  
Email: tom.vickers@durham.ac.uk  
Phone: 0781 3073846

or with my supervisor, Lena Dominelli, who can be contacted at:

Lena Dominelli  
School of Applied Social Sciences  
Durham University
32 Old Elvet
Durham
DH1 3HN
Email: lena.dominelli@durham.ac.uk
Phone: 0191 3341505
Appendix viii: Consent Form for Interview Participants

Interview Participant Consent Form

I have read / had explained to me by ...................... (delete as appropriate) the information sheet regarding the purposes of Tom Vickers’ PhD research into the role of asylum seekers and refugees working in the refugee sector. I understand the proposal for the research described in the information sheet and consent to participate in interviews and/or focus groups for the purposes outlined, including the publishing and distribution of findings for the purposes of education and improving services. I understand that records of interviews and focus groups in the form of audio tapes, transcripts and notes may be retained for these purposes beyond the end of this specific research project. I understand the commitments made by Tom Vickers to data protection and confidentiality, and that my name will not be used in any publishing or distribution of findings. I understand that my participation in the research is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw further participation from part or all of the research at any time, and that this will not jeopardise my access to services I am currently receiving or may seek in the future. I understand the process for any complaints I might wish to make regarding the research, and have contact details for Tom Vickers’ supervisor at Durham University.

Name:......................... Signature:......................... Date:.../.......

Any concerns or questions regarding the research can be raised with myself, at:

Tom Vickers
School of Applied Social Sciences
Durham University
32 Old Elvet
Durham
DH1 3HN
Email: tom.vickers@durham.ac.uk
Phone: 0781 3073846

or with my supervisor, Lena Dominelli, who can be contacted at:

Lena Dominelli
School of Applied Social Sciences
Durham University
32 Old Elvet
Durham
DH1 3HN
Email: lena.dominelli@durham.ac.uk
Phone: 0191 3341505
**Appendix ix: Organisational Case Summaries**

VOL: A large, regional voluntary sector organisation, delivering substantial front-line contracts for the Home Office since 1999, as part of a wider portfolio of service delivery and integration work. At the time of the research the organisation had premises in several cities and a large number of paid workers, alongside an even larger number of volunteers, mostly in front-line roles but with some in administrative roles including a management committee.

COM: A community advice and signposting organisation, established by refugees mostly from the same country of origin but providing services to refugees on a regional basis and non-refugees in the geographical neighbourhood. At the time of the research the organisation had funding for one full time worker and a building, supported by an active management committee and a small number of formal volunteers, and was in the process of securing funding for a second paid worker.

CHUR: A church-based voluntary sector project delivering signposting, advice and a hardship fund, mainly to refugees without status resident in a particular geographical neighbourhood. At the time of the research the organisation had funding for several full time workers and a building, and also engaged a small number of volunteers, mostly refugees on a sporadic basis as interpreters.

CAMP: An asylum rights and anti-racist campaign group, established by refugee and non-refugee activists, mainly focused on a city-wide basis but with periodic activity in the wider region. At the time of the research the organisation had a large but loose membership, around a core of regular voluntary activists, with very limited funding from individuals and no paid workers or premises.
Appendix x: Interview Participants’ Attributes

Gender:

Men (x9), Women (x9)

Accessed through volunteering with:

VOL (x5), COM (x3), CHUR (x4), CAMP (x6)
(Although some participants had volunteered with more than one of the case organisations, their work with this organisation was the starting point for discussion.)

Year of arrival in Newcastle:


Country of origin:

Afghanistan (x1), Angola (x1), Cameroon (x1), Chad (x1), China (x1), Côte d’Ivoire (x1), DRC (x3), Iran (x3), Kenya (x2), Togo (x1), Ukraine (x1), Zimbabwe (x2)

Age:

20-25 (x3), 26-30 (x3), 31-35 (x1), 36-40 (x4), 41-45 (x2), unknown (x5)

Immigration status at time of interviews:

At first round (2007-2008): 5 with status, 13 without
At second round (2009-2010): 4 with status (of whom 2 had gained status since the first round), 2 without
At mixed focus group (2010): 4 with status (of whom 1 had gained status since the second round), 0 without
Appendix xi: Prompt Questions from First Round of Interviews

Pre-Role:
- What kinds of jobs did you do in the country where you lived before?
- Were there movements for social change in the country you came from? If so what was your relationship to those movements?
- Tell me a bit your experiences of seeking asylum in Britain?
- What have you found most helpful and supportive, and what have been the main barriers you have faced?
- What were your reasons for first coming to work at the project?

Present:
- Are any of your reasons for working at the project now different from when you first started?
- Why do you think other refugees work at the project, both paid and voluntary?
- Are there any particular skills, knowledge or contacts that are important for doing your job?
- Where did you acquire the skills that you use in your work at the project?
- How important do you think it is that refugees and asylum seekers work at the project?
- Do you think having asylum seekers and refugees as volunteers and workers affects what other asylum seekers think about the project?
- What are the good things about working at the project?
- Are there any difficult things about working at the project?
- Do you also work at any other projects? If so do you see any differences in your role in each project?
- What kind of relationship do you think there is between asylum seekers and refugees and the British state?
- How do you see this project fitting into that relationship?
- What impact do you think the work that you do has on that relationship?

Future:
- What changes have you seen to the asylum system since you have been here?
- What prospects do you see for improvement in the situation of refugees in Britain?
- Do you feel you have a role to play in changing things in a positive way?
- Do you see a role for yourself now or in the future in changing things in the country you’re from?
- What would you like to be doing in 5 years time?
Appendix xii: Mixed Focus Group Presentation Slides

Sources
- Four organisations in Newcastle as case studies
- First round of interviews: 13 asylum seekers and 5 refugees (half women, half men)
- Second round of interviews: 4 refugees and 2 asylum seekers
- Background interviews with 6 managers, 3 of whom were also refugees
- Focus group with 5 volunteers at NERS
- Local history archives and newspapers
- National evaluations and academic literature

Purpose of this focus group
- Opportunity to report back
- Opportunity to express disagreement
- Opportunity to clarify
- Opportunity to explore further
- Accountability

Main findings
- Relationship between refugees and the British state
- The refugee relations industry
- Different kinds of volunteering by refugees

Relationship between refugees and the British state
- International context
- Refugees and labour migration
- Asylum process, dispersal and right to work
- Different types of state
- Views of the British state

The refugee relations industry
- Organisations mediating the relationship between the state and asylum seekers
- Context of resistance
- Different types of role
- Different roles within organisations

Different kinds of volunteering by refugees
- Motivations
- Different impacts on volunteers
- Outcomes
- Possibilities for the future
### Appendix xiii: Case Level Analysis Template

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<th>Interviewee Perceived possibilities – Country of origin</th>
<th>Perceived Possibilities - Britain</th>
<th>Class – Country of origin</th>
<th>Class - Britain</th>
<th>Nature of the state</th>
<th>Subjective meaning of actions (individual and collective)</th>
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<tr>
<td>[Year of arrival]</td>
<td>[Age]</td>
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</table>
### Appendix xiv: Thematic Meta-Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Illustration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Perceived possibilities – Country of origin</td>
<td>Contrasting conceptions of causes of problems in country of origin, from ‘ethnic conflicts’ to lack of concern by government for people’s needs, to outside interference.</td>
<td>“Many reasons have surrounded me coming into exile, wars, political ideologies, ethnic cleansing” (COM 1) “People come from here, come from everywhere to steal our things ...The minerals, coltan, diamond, gold, many things, they couldn’t even have for people to get peace, because now Congo gets peace...they will never let us go in there and take something” (COM 4) “In my country, Iran, is every day going very bad, and the regime in Iran is not care about people” (CHUR 2) “You know the Africans, we have some ethnic problems as well” (CHUR 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix xv: Final Thematic Structure Used in Nvivo Coding

- Causes of flight
  - Death of a family member
  - Lack of options in country of origin
    - Option to leave
    - Possibilities relative to aspirations
  - Root causes of problems in country of origin

- Dynamic character of interests, consciousness and action
  - Different types of social capital
    - Class trajectory
      - Linking capital facilitating class mobility
    - Norms of reciprocity – different forms
      - Trust and view of role of organisations by their volunteers
    - Skills or contacts enabling to volunteer
  - Dynamic character of social capital
    - Bonding capital as route to develop collective consciousness
    - Drive of survival behind actions and forms of engagement
    - Transition of incentives from material to non-material through volunteering
  - Potential for positive and/or negative effects of social capital
    - Impact of forms of social capital on different interests, collectively and individually (or on self and on others)
    - Justification for state’s actions
  - Uneven Character of Social Capital, with the potential for individuals to be engaged in multiple and potentially contradictory forms of social capital simultaneously
    - Influence of previous forms of social capital experiences on new formations and understandings in new situations
    - Moderating Influence of Experience and Emotional Exhaustion on Perspective in Influencing Forms of Action

- Incentives
  - Individual vs collective incentives
    - Conscious action to extend solidarity
    - Divisions
    - Collective incentives
    - Individual incentives
    - Tensions and Limitations on Collective Responses to Shared Situations
  - Material vs non-material incentives
    - Negative incentives
      - Insecurity
        - Dependency
        - Expectations and reality of Britain
          - Individual racism
          - Refugee status rights
      - Limitations on range of activities as an asylum seeker
- Non-financial material incentives
- Non-material incentives

- Social capital
  - Bonding capital and bridging as a replacement
    - Bridging to form new capital in absence of old bonding
  - Bridging or linking capital
    - Bridging amongst asylum seekers
    - Bridging on class basis
    - Linking with the state
      - State Relationship to Project and Individual Role
      - Views of the state
        - Asylum process decision making
        - State as liberating
          - Freedom expression in Britain
        - State as repressive
        - State as supportive
        - State denying support
  - On political basis of anti-racism
  - Relationship with other migrants
**Appendix xvi: Participant Trajectories**

**Key to forms of activity over time**
- Collective on a political basis
- Collective with the community sector
- Collective with the voluntary sector
- Collective with the state
- Individualised on a political basis
- Individualised with the community sector
- Individualised with the voluntary sector
- Individualised with the state
- No current voluntary activity
- Indicates move to Britain

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<tr>
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</table>
Appendix xvii: Early Thesis Structure

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Methodology

Chapter 3: The Marxist Analytical Method
- Positivism, empiricism, post-modernism, structuralism and constructionism
- Different conceptions of Marxism
- The changing fate of Marxist approaches in Britain since the 1960s

Chapter 4: The Leninist analysis of imperialism
- Underdevelopment and super-exploitation
- Post-nation, post-state, post-imperialist?
- Imperialism as one of many possible policies?
- Imperialism and the material basis of racism
- Racism and nationalism
- Racism and the international reserve army of labour
- The ideological struggle against racism

Chapter 5: British Imperialism in Crisis
- Globalisation – a crisis of imperialism
- Inter-imperialist rivalries
- The parasitic character of British capitalism
- Immigration to Britain
- Imperialism and the labour aristocracy

Chapter 6: Racism in Britain Today
- Indicators of racism in Britain at the start of the twenty first century
- Racism and the maintenance of class rule
- Racism and immigration
- Challenges to the Marxist analysis of racism
- Racism as a foreign import
- 'Anti-Discrimination' and assimilation
- The present situation of refugees
- The history of Britain’s treatment of refugees

Chapter 7: Imperialism, Racism and the State
- Nation, State and Authority
- The state and crisis
- Division of labour within the British state
- The British state and approaches to immigration
- 'Good' and 'bad' sides of the British state?
- Repressive aspects of the British state
- The class character and political role of the welfare state
- The role of immigrants working in the welfare state
- Welfare and asylum controls
- Immigration, social cohesion and the building of a new national consensus
- The role of the state in oppressed countries
Chapter 8: The British Race Relations Industry
- The history of race relations in Britain
- Labour's cultivation of a black middle class
- Has Britain become less racist?
- Managing racism in pursuit of stability
- The repressive side of the race relations approach
- The refugee relations industry

Chapter 9: Histories of Immigration, Race and Anti-Racism in Newcastle
- Migration before the second world war
- Second world war to 1962
- 1962-1990
- 1990ish-1999
- 1999-March 2007
- March 2007 onwards

Chapter 10: Social Capital of Refugees
- Social capital as a resource for survival and resistance
  - Bonding capital and the asylum context
  - Bridging capital amongst refugees without status
  - Bridging between refugees and other migrants
  - Bridging on a class basis
  - Bridging on a political anti-racist basis
- Engagement, knowledge and trust in refugees' engagement with British state
  - NERS' closeness to the state
  - Refugees' experiences of engagement with the state and mediating interventions
  - Contradictions and dilemmas in mediating the state's relation to other refugees
  - Refugees' views of the asylum decision making process
  - Refugees' views of state support and lack of
  - Refugees' views of state repression and liberation

Chapter 11: Refugees Incentives in volunteering
- Material versus non-material incentives in the asylum seeking context
  - A context of insecurity and dependency
  - Dependency
  - Expectations and realities of seeking asylum in Britain
- Material incentives
- Non-material incentives
  - Putting skills and experience to use
  - Having a say in the direction of the organisation
  - 'Giving something back' – emulation as incentive
  - Achievements and recognition
  - Contribution to a wider community
  - Developing a perspective of collective oppression
- Individual and collective incentives
  - Subjective divisions
  - Changes in forms of action after securing status
o Overcoming divisions, extending solidarity

Chapter 12: Towards a reformulation of 'social capital'

 Different types of social capital
  o Impact of perceived trajectory of class interests
  o Norms of reciprocity
  o Trust and engagement with participants' organisations

 Outcomes of social capital
  o Impact on different interests
  o Justifications for state's actions

 Unevenness of social capital
  o Influence of previous forms of social capital
  o Impact of repression in country of origin on activity in Britain

 Dynamic character of social capital
  o Survival as a starting point
  o Development of non-material incentives through volunteering
  o Development of collective consciousness through volunteering

Chapter 13: Conclusion
Appendix xviii: Components of the Refugee Relations Industry

Immigration Legislation

Race Relations / Community Cohesion Legislation

Home Office Immigration Agencies
Until 2007: Immigration and Nationality Directorate
2007-2008: Border and Immigration Agency
2008-present: UK Borders Agency

Immigration ‘Enforcement’ (incl. Police, Monitoring, Detention)

Local Authorities’ ‘Asylum Seeker Units’

National Asylum Support Service

Sections of the Voluntary Sector

Some Refugee Community Organisations

Refugee Populations

Refugees Volunteering