The role of moral education in the teaching of history in secondary schools

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THE ROLE OF MORAL EDUCATION IN THE TEACHING OF HISTORY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

BY

KATHRYN ELIZABETH MCNEIL

Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in Education to the University of Durham 1993

This study examines the role that moral education and values issues have played in the teaching of history in this country from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present day. It takes as its main thesis the view that moral aims were explicitly part of the subject's rationale in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but in the decades following the Second World War these aims were to a large extent disavowed and history teaching underwent a revolution in its content, purpose and processes. In recent years the agenda of history has changed yet again and with the introduction of a national curriculum in history, once again personal, social and moral aims have been expressed as part of that subject's purpose in the curriculum.

The first part of the thesis offers an overview of the teaching of moral education in schools and examines the issues concerned and looks at definitions of the terms involved. It then looks at various theories of moral development and curricular responses to them.

The second and third chapters examine the moral elements of history curricula throughout the past two hundred years and seek to identify main areas where history may with integrity be taught to further the aims of moral education. Chapter four examines the issues discussed within the framework of the National Curriculum.

The fifth chapter deals with the views of academic historians on moral concerns within history and their responses to this dimension in the National Curriculum. Chapter six takes a broad survey of history textbooks and their moral assumptions and use within the classroom. It also considers some of the implications of the National Curriculum on book resources.

The conclusion draws the strands of the thesis together and tries to take a common-sense stance in the 'history debate'.
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-2 JUL 1993
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A FRAMEWORK OF MORAL EDUCATION

Background and Definitions

Such a vast topic requires a multi-faceted treatment. The debate about moral education has exercised the minds of philosophers and educators since the time of ancient Greece.

Throughout history, moral education theorists have been explicit. For Socrates, virtue was knowledge of the good and, in Plato's development of this theme, the role of education was to help people - those at least who had the intellectual capacity for it, to acquire the kind of knowledge that would, of itself, bring virtue and lead to that wisdom that results from knowledge of the good. All other forms of intellectual activity were seen as means to that end. Morality was not only the cornerstone of education, 'goodness' was regarded as a focal point of all human knowledge. The fusion of classical thinking and Judaic tradition resulted in a Christian emphasis on moral character and a way of living in the path of goodness.

As a result, most of the great educational theorists have seen moral education as the hub of any activity deemed educational. The term 'humanities' as used to designate part of the curriculum, indicates that relations between man and man were seen as the central, or even the only, concern of education in the full sense.

Comenius said that the curriculum should include 'all those subjects which are able to make a man wise, virtuous and pious'. Locke claimed, 'It is a virtue, then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education'. These sentiments are echoed by writers from Rousseau, where Rousseau asserted 'Life is the trade I would teach him', Herbert 'The one and the whole work of education may be summed up in the concept - morality', to Froebel's recommendation that the main purpose of education should be to bring out, and develop to the full, the innate goodness of the child. This area can be more fully explored in the work of Rusk (1957) from where these references are taken.
However, before we can look meaningfully at what contemporary thought is on 'Moral Education', we need to be clear about what the main protagonists define as being 'virtuous', 'good' or 'moral'.

Peter McPhail (1982), makes the point that the word 'moral' in English, has an unhappy history. Its connotations are generally negative and have to do with repression. "Moral" is used almost exclusively by the media, to refer to sexual behaviour or, more accurately, the condemnation of certain kinds of sexual behaviour' (p.29). This negativity is not only confined to sexuality, the word depresses because it is understood as prescriptive and restrictive - people telling us how we 'ought' to behave, based either on an interpretation of religious codes or beliefs, or on details of societal customs or etiquette. McPhail comments 'Trivia cease to be trivial - consider the passion devoted to the issue of the length of boys' hair ..... This alienates the young and distracts their attention from the key issues, which concern well-being and happiness' McPhail (1982, pp.30-31).

Philip May (1971) speaks of the difficulties of definition. 'Words like "moral", "morality", "ethics", "character", are not easy to define and they have overtones of meanings which vary, depending upon the context in which they are being used.' May (p.16).

The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'moral' as 'relating to character or disposition'. In particular, it relates to the distinction between right and wrong, as regards the nature of a person or something he does. Consequently, moral sense is the ability to grasp the difference between right and wrong. Most people would agree that a person is acting in a moral way if his behaviour is freely determined by himself (although one must acknowledge that free determination is, itself, conditioned by context and circumstance). However, the element of conscious choice must be present. Moral virtue refers to particular excellence of character.

The term 'morality' has three main meanings, according to the Oxford English Dictionary. Firstly is the meaning knowledge of moral science; secondly it refers to moral qualities or endowments; thirdly it means 'moral discourse or instruction, a moral exhortation'. The most common popular meaning of 'morality' is 'acting in accordance with the accepted standard of society' May (1971 p.17).
John Wilson says that 'morality is about what we ought to desire for its own sake and not, essentially, about what we ought to do in order to achieve what we desire.' Wilson et al (1967, p.65).

For some, moral education can be equated with the study of ethics. Ethics is the science of morals. It refers to the manner of life of people and to their conduct. The Oxford English Dictionary further says that it is 'the science of human duty, in its widest extent including, besides ethics proper, the science of law, whether civil, political or international'.

The literal meaning of 'character' is a 'distinctive mark; a brand; stamp'. Usually, the word is used with the implication of worth or goodness behind it. A person of character is considered to have integrity and to follow a 'moral' way of life. May speaks of teachers developing character in their pupils. 'They (parents) want the teachers to bring out the positive distinctive qualities which make each child an individual person and they also want their children to become good, honest, reliable people' May (1971 p.19).

Other writers have spent much time in trying to define 'moral' and 'morality'. Hare (1952) gave a formal definition - based on overriding prescription and universality, whereas as Baier in 'Ethical Pluralism and Moral Education' (1971), gave one based on the range of issues involved - fundamentally utilitarian in character. John Wilson and his colleagues (1967) have attempted to analyse the constituent elements of morality, each of which is given a technical label, derived from classical Greek, and represents specific moral attributes, as Wilson sees them.

This is a brief descriptive summary:

PHIL is an attitude denoting concern for other people, including showing respect for others, treating them fairly and according them equal rights (PHIL 1), as well as showing benevolence towards them and being able to make their interests part of one's own (PHIL 2). EMP signifies the ability to be aware of feelings and emotions in others (EMP 1) and in oneself (EMP 2). GIG refers to factual knowledge about moral issues (GIG 1). A further aspect to this factual knowledge is knowing how to do certain things, for example, how to sympathise with, console or assist others (GIG 2).
In order to bring to bear one's respect for others (PHIL), one's awareness of their feelings (EMP) and one's knowledge of the facts relevant to a particular situation (GIG), one needs to develop a further set of skills - KRAT. This implies first being aware of a situation, thinking about it and deciding on a course of action to be taken (KRAT 1). However, since it is possible to be too scared or embarrassed to carry this out, a further aspect is needed to translate one's decisions into courses of action (KRAT 2). The last two components needed for a morally educated person; DIK, the ability to formulate principles relating to other people's interests and PHRON, relating to personal prudence and ideals; represent stages at which a person can make a firm moral decision.

Wilson, Williams and Sugarman (1967) admit that this scheme is vague and logically vulnerable, but it forms a helpful basis for discussion about what constitutes morality. Wilson was trying to produce a universal conceptual structure for moral thinking, into which content could be fitted. Moral content is necessarily value laden and Wilson wanted to enable schools to teach pupils to think in moral terms without prescribing a value position. The moral elements he and colleagues arrived at, by philosophical analysis, to some extent parallel the conclusions about how teenagers make moral decisions that sociologists came to as a result of sociological analysis.

However, on the whole, sociologists have either ignored or given low priority to the task of defining 'moral'. Examining the work of Ossowska (1971), Durkheim (1961) and Mueller-Deham (1944), Musgrave in 'The Moral Curriculum' defines 'moral'in a way that builds on Mueller-Deham's emphasis on interaction, but also allows the possibility of examining change in moral codes. 'Morality will be seen relating to the principles concerning how we choose to act in situations, where there are consequences for others.' Musgrave (1978 p.22).

What then, is moral education? Writers and thinkers, in this field, address themselves to various aspects of the subject but, on the whole, it can be seen that there are two main areas of discussion. Firstly, how it is that people become moral, or grow in morality or cognitive development; and secondly, the educative processes whereby teachers can aid the progress of moral development. From the 1970's there has been considerable debate in both areas.
Research Into Moral Development

In the field of moral development and the gaining of autonomy, there are two distinctive aspects to the process. The first is the development in the child of the capacity for moral reasoning and judgement, a development which culminates in an understanding of the autonomous nature of the moral domain. The second is the development of moral obligation as a motivation, disposition or behavioural tendency to act in accordance with moral prescription. As Derek Wright says 'These can, and should, be regarded as two aspects of a single developmental process, although the relationship between them is not simple and may involve a degree of dissociation'. (1982, p.83).

It is the achievement of Lawrence Kohlberg and his colleagues that they have laid an empirical and theoretical basis for an understanding of the development of moral reasoning and judgement. In turn, Kohlberg owes a debt to the work of Kant, Piaget and Durkheim. Durkheim (1961) claimed that we are moral beings only insofar as we are social beings and concerned with the individual's eventual autonomy within a social structure. Piaget (1932) used Kant's distinction between 'heteronomy and autonomy' of the will to show a practical application in the contrast he wished to make between conventional morality and a rational moral code. Piaget's main aim was to explore the nature of children's moral judgements and established that growth in moral judgement is a gradual developmental process. To put his conclusions briefly, Piaget distinguished between two kinds of morality. Conventional morality is reflected in an obedience to adult command and an uncritical adherence to rules. This is described as a stage of moral realism or heteronomy, characterised by respect for an dependence upon others for guidance in moral issues. Rational morality is reached where children are able to formulate their own moral rules by mutual agreement and to apply them according to circumstance, rather than rigidly. May (1971) sees this kind of morality as creative, that is applied flexibly according to the set of circumstances in operation at the time.

Piaget (1932) argued that children do not practise either conventional or rational morality to the exclusion of the other, but move from one to another by a process of maturation, development and cognitive restructuring. He concluded that moral development occurs in fixed stages, although not all children pass through them at the same rate, or end up at the same level. Progression from one stage or another does not simply involve an addition to
what went before, but implies a reorganisation or restructuring, enabling the child to see problems and thus make moral judgements from a different and more complex perspective.

Kohlberg has taken Piaget's work further. By putting children, and others in very different societies, a number of moral dilemmas and analysing their responses, he argues that these reveal three distinct levels, each subdivisible, making six stages in all, to which types of moral judgements belong. These stages constitute a sequence through which an individual's judgement can progress, which is invariable and which is universal for all cultures. The sequence of levels progresses from the egocentric; good and bad, right and wrong are labels fixed to actions because of the pleasure or pain, punishment or reward they bring. Deference to power is right merely because of its consequences to the individual and any element of justice is simply a question of 'you be nice to me and I will be nice to you'.

The sequence of level ends, where right and wrong are defined by self-chosen principles of a universal, comprehensive and consistent character, concerned with justice, equality and respect for persons. Not only are moral judgements so developed, but also the development or morally significant emotions. Kohlberg also claims that there is a close relationship between more developed moral judgement and the actual actions carried out. This must all necessarily provide a framework for moral education.

What does Kohlberg see as being the implications of his theory of moral development for moral education? The values he sees common to all societies can be taught without the child joining in society's institutions, but they arise out of the child's experience in dealing with adults and peers, and operate as conceptual modes for regulating social interaction. A commentator says, in promoting Kohlberg's views, 'As long as you think of basic moral values as having to be taught to children, you will end up by focusing on the particular culturally bound rules of behaviour that children learn in each society. Once you consider that the function of value concepts is to regulate social behaviour and that children develop moral concepts by having to get along with other people, you will see that the development of value concepts can be a universally common experience'. Hersh, Miller, Fielding (1980, p.94).
Can this code be translated into a formal school curriculum? Kohlberg insists that a concern for the discussion of moral issues, and the stimulation of moral growth, must be incorporated into the curriculum and that the school environment must be restructured to allow for greater democratic participation by pupils in the school's governing process. Underlying these two efforts are two assumptions central to Kohlberg's philosophy of education: One, that school inevitably involves the transmission of values and two, the aim of education should be the development of a pupil's inherent capacities. On the basis of his experience with such methods, Kohlberg has concluded that moral change is most likely to occur when discussions succeed in arousing 'cognitive conflict' among participants. When exposed to a higher position, a pupil does not merely switch, he restructures his own way of reasoning about moral issues. However, this is only apparent when a person is exposed to the level immediately above his own, not that of several stages higher.

There are criticisms to be made of this theory, and Hirst (1974) has expounded them clearly. The very form of the situations that Kohlberg put to his subjects determines, to some extent, the view of morality they express. There are also difficulties in judging subjects' responses as to whether they hold the beliefs expressed or are merely expressing what they consider the questioner requires. Do the judgements have conclusive reasons behind them or merely relevant considerations? What exactly is going on in the mind of the subject when he responds is highly relevant to the significance of research findings and this is far from clear. Another important consideration is that although Kohlberg regards his stages as mapping out a logical sequence, he has not demonstrated in any logical analysis that this is the case. 'His results are based on empirical investigation, and logical relations are not verifiable in this way, even if one may be alerted to them by empirical evidence' - Hirst (1974, p.97). Another powerful point is that Kohlberg does not take up the consideration that a significant body of substantial moral principles can be rationally justified, using the very form of autonomous reasoning that he sees at the last stage. The outcome of forms of reasoning is not his concern, yet this outcome is, in a very real sense, what morality is all about. It is true that consciously deliberated rational and autonomous judgement will provide the right conclusions, but most of our judgements cannot be so made. Social life has, of necessity, to be conducted on some substantive rules and principles. Hirst comments, 'Many people are not capable of autonomous judgements; they are therefore dependent on a body of substantive conclusions. It is also the case that the very social
situations that Kohlberg sees as critical, in moral education, presuppose substantive moral rules of some kind, both logically and as providing a context for suitable role-taking to occur. For these reasons, whilst seeking maximum appropriate autonomy, education is, to my mind, thoroughly justified in working within a framework in which behaviour, habits and dispositions are promoted, that conform to the most defensible body of substantive conclusions we have got.' (1974, p.98)

R.S. Peters (1981), has many criticisms to make of the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg. He accuses them of not accounting for a fundamental principle as he sees it - consideration for others. Piaget tells how the development of concrete operations coincides with the ability to take the point of view of another, but never shows why the child should care about the other person. Peters also believes Kohlberg has made a glaring omission in that he does not include the content of morality and that he repeatedly says that a 'bag of virtues' is unimportant in a person's moral equipment, although apparently employing them at levels five and six. His list of principles is not thoroughly justified and, again, appears to omit several important ones. Kohlberg admits that, although progression from stage to stage in moral development cannot be directly taught, content can be, and so as Peters remarks 'We return full circle to the picture presented by Skinner and his advocacy of systematic teaching of basic social virtues, backed up by positive reinforcement'. Although Peters does not profess to being a Skinnerian, he says, 'I see virtue in the systematic holding up of standards, to young children, backed up by approval' Peters (1981, p.179), and he ponders on how to encourage the embryonic principles, and how to teach a basic content, so that Kohlberg's progression will take place.

Curricular Responses to Moral Education

The transition, from the theories of developmental processes in morality, to the actual transmission of moral goals, i.e., moral education, was the subject of a great deal of research in the 1970's. Taking up Peters' criticism of Piaget and Kohlberg, as not examining the principle of caring for others, Peter McPhail's Lifeline programme makes caring for others the pivotal point of his material, but he was concerned with devising suitable materials for adolescents, not with developmental progression. His emphasis on the rewarding character of this type of behaviour, to the individual who
practises it, suggests that he is catering for those not far advanced in Kohlberg's stages; but Peters believes he is right in emphasising 'consideration for the needs, feelings and interests of others' in morality, even if he rather underplays the importance of more rational principles such as justice.

Here, we are nearing the issue that taxes most thinkers in the field of moral education; leaving aside the question discussed above, of how a child develops 'morality', who should decide what is 'good' or what 'we ought to do'? John Wilson (1972) says of moral educators, that they have committed one of two errors. Firstly, failure to realise the difficulties that attach to the justification of any set or moral values and to the whole notion of imposing one's specific moral and religious views on other people, which could lead to indoctrination, and secondly, to assume that definitions can be arbitrary. Wilson states that without a clear and adequate interpretation of 'moral education' a good deal of research and practical work in this field is likely to miss the point. To make a definition adequate, as well as clear, calls for 'philosophising', for he believes there is no way of getting an adequate definition except by examining the use and meaning of words, and ways in which those uses and meanings are interconnected. After this, Wilson comments that it is relatively easy to produce a definition, but unless it really tackles the issues involved in morality, then the form of words, as a practical guide and methodology, is useless.

In his research, McPhail et al (1972) offers a detailed description of the qualities a considerate adult shows, but gives little analysis of the moral components a pupil needs to understand to distinguish between. For example considerate behaviour that is truly moral and that which is merely expedient. Intentionality is an important facet of moral behaviour. Also, as Peters (1973) points out, consideration for others is emphasised at the expense of other aspects of morality, such as courage, determination, justice and impartiality.

However, McPhail's work cannot be thus dismissed. His Lifeline project was prepared by himself, Ungood-Thomas and Chapman (1972), as part of the Schools Council Moral Education Curriculum Project. In 'Moral Education in the Secondary School' McPhail argues that an exclusively philosophical approach to moral education, consisting largely of an analytical approach to moral concepts is too far removed from practice and neglects the problem of motivation. Instead, he claims that the moral education we need to provide
is that which is concerned with how people live, how they see themselves and how they treat others. They need to understand their own behaviour, its consequences and the effects it may have on other people. The emotional dimension to interpersonal problems is highlighted, 'but being more intelligent does not necessarily mean that you are better able to find and apply solutions to interpersonal problems, where the key is so often emotional'. McPhail et al (1972 p.5)

McPhail and his associates researched extensively to anchor moral and social education in the actual experience of boys and girls. Brian Wakeman (1984) in his book 'Personal, Social and Moral Education - a Source Book', says 'I think that among the facts explaining the popularity of Lifeline must be the favourable reactions of the pupils ..... it was about them ..... In addition, it fitted in with what schools wanted for their pupils, a theory of morals in which concern for another's needs, interests and feelings, as well as one's own, is cheered and lack of consideration is booed' (p.36).

Lifeline also provided a pattern for projects to follow, such as 'Startline 8 - 13 Moral Education Project' (1978), and the 'Health Education Council Project 12 - 18, Living Well' (1977).

It is the philosophy underlying McPhail's work that concerns professional philosophers such as R. Straughan (1982). He echoes Peters' objections, as already expressed, about setting up 'consideration for others' as a sole motivation. McPhail appears to fall into the naturalistic fallacy, deriving values from facts; the 'ought' from the 'is'. This may be possible, but in order to do so, we must identify others' needs, interests and feelings with empirical enquiry.

The practical implementation of the Lifeline programme is derived from the view that moral education cannot be taught as a separate subject, since the 'considerate life' concerns the whole life of the school. The programme is thus conceived as one which spans a five year course and is strongly backed by the organisation and structure of the school, making for its democratic running. The materials provided are graded according to the needs of different pupils' ages. Although McPhail does not want teachers' views forced onto their pupils, he is convinced that pupils should clearly identify teachers' value positions. He talks with great perceptions of the role and difficulties facing the teacher, and makes it quite clear that the role is a
vital one. McPhail claims his programme will lead to greater motivation, integration and intellectual achievement.

Downey and Kelly (1978) criticise the project. Their findings showed that adolescents preferred adults who led the considerate life, but it is a large jump from this empirical finding. The criticisms already made by Peters, (1981), Straughan (1982), Downey and Kelly (1978) are echoed by Hersh, Miller and Fielding (1980). McPhail, however, pre-empts these criticisms and has been supported in his work by Wakeman (1984) and many practising teachers.

John Wilson follows the theoretical work of Kohlberg on moral reasoning as the basis for moral education. This work is known as the Farmington Trust Project and is in contrast to the work of McPhail et al. This approach has grown out of philosophy rather than psychology. Skills in moral thinking are the priority, rather than imparting specific values. Wilson wants to acquaint children with morality, as an area of thought, and make them aware of the techniques, skills and qualities required to get answers to moral questions. We have already looked at Wilson's list of moral components, which he argues are required by logic to designate what it means to be educated in morality. He claims that just as pupils are taught to think historically or scientifically, they are able to think morally and should be able to become sensitive to others; be logically consistent; know the facts relevant to specific moral issues and be able to translate these skills into appropriate action.

Wilson suggests pupils search through cases of 'moral misdoing' to see which particular components have been omitted. This produces familiarity with the components and points to the ways pupils should behave. The discussion of the validity of inappropriate ways of moral thinking is likely to show pupils the inadequacy of their own reasoning. This is clearly reminiscent of the work of Kohlberg. Wilson lays great stress on the correct use of language so that discussion will be profitable and that practical applications of Wilson's teaching will be beneficial to the school community.

Wilson's concept of a morally educated person encompasses three broad areas: Firstly, intellectual factors concerned with rational thinking, knowledge of facts relevant to a moral situation and awareness of alternatives and consequences of an act; secondly, social skills required to put such knowledge into practice, with due regard for others; and thirdly, the emotional or affective component involving not only a knowledge and
understanding of others' feelings, but also care and concern for them, and the ability to respond emotionally oneself to moral issues.

This work, as can be expected, has attracted a great deal of criticism. Allen Brent, writing in the Journal of Moral Education (1973), attacks the philosophical basis of Wilson's work. 'It is my contention that the method by which Wilson seeks to give philosophical justification to these criteria, which is so central to this position, is basically unsound, since it rests upon an illegitimate conflation of two or more conflicting systems of ethics .... a synthesis of two or more ethical systems is justified in seeking a viable concept of Farmington Man, whereas a patchwork mosaic of fragments of ethical systems is not. It is my contention that Wilson has produced the latter'. Brent (1973, p.203)

This is a fundamental criticism, but most of the attack on Wilson centres on the area that he does not tie up his complex moral concepts with the developmental stages described by Kohlberg, nor does he offer any methods of assessment. Children could always respond with that which they believe teachers want to hear. McPhail points out that it is possible to score highly in formal tests in 'morality', but does it make a 'moral' person? He also argues that the Farmington Trust Project is a 'weak motivation theory which limits its educational value', that the components are not necessarily, in practice, separate skills to be cultivated by separate educational tasks and that the majority of moral causes of actions are not the result of conscious mental arithmetic. Wakeman believes that the criticism of Wilson's work; being like a GCSE examination in moral education, is rather unfair. 'The methodology does offer a way of teaching moral reasoning, and studying topics such as "euthanasia" and "how do I know what is right in a given circumstance?" is a useful activity.' Wakeman (1984, p.35). However, the point that Wakeman, in agreement with McPhail makes, is that emphasis on moral reasoning does not address the central question of knowing what is right, but not being able to do it. As St. Paul said, 'For what I do is not the good I want to do; no, the evil I do not want to do - this I keep on doing'. Most of the difficulty in being moral stems from lack of will, not knowledge.

The work of Sugarman (1973) and Musgrave (1978) is based on the sociological aspects of school and morality. Sugarman worked with Wilson in the early stages of the Farmington Trust research but, unlike Wilson, does not support direct teaching of moral issues. Accepting the broad definitions provided by
Wilson, Sugarman accepts that the school ethos has an important role to play in a child's moral development. The school occupies a bridging position between the home - where children are treated in a personal fashion - and the broader social environment - where are treated more impersonally. Rather than advocating a particular type of school structure, as Wilson and McPhail both do, Sugarman (1973), points to particular qualities within the school and particular opportunities that can be provided in the interest of moral education. Three areas of concern are discussed - teacher:pupil relationships, the rule system, and the nature of learning situations. Sugarman finds little empirical evidence so far, to indicate the superiority of any one type of school or learning situation, over any other. The problems of evaluating the effects of a school on moral development are, of course, enormous - not least in the task of reaching agreement on the specific attributes of a morally educated person.

Amongst schools themselves, there are many different definitions given of moral education, and whereas some institutions give no formal position to it in the curriculum, others have timetabled periods for Personal and Social Education, Lifeskills, Political Literacy, Health Education or tutorial time. Until the passing of the Education Reform Act 1988 there was no common approach, and the issues and processes involved in moral education were often confused and sometimes contradictory. Any subject is value laden and can be used as a vehicle for personal and social development as the National Curriculum Cross Curricular themes attempt to demonstrate; but until very recently, subjects that deal explicitly with human actions and consequences such as History, Geography, English and Religious Education did not often appear to in practice. 'In fact, it is a sad commentary upon the teaching of humanities that, in so many schools, a separate subject has been established called Personal and Social Education, or Health Education, as though a primary concern of the humanities did not lie in the exploration of distinctively human areas of concern.' Pring (1984 p.119).

Often in schools, much moral education which is attempted formally results in discussion of moral and social issues such as capital punishment or abortion. There are many problems inherent in the conduct of a topics or issues based lesson, and the teacher's role is a vital one. There are many aspects to consider such as the 'neutrality' of the teacher, the reasons behind children's stated opinions, the 'chemistry' of the group, and indeed, the content material. It is not in the scope of this thesis to discuss them here, but they will be considered later when examining the role of conflict...
and the debate of issues involved in the teaching of history. However, the topics or issues based lessons are a curricular response to the demands of moral education, however incompletely considered, and as such, should be mentioned.

With the advent of the Education Reform Act 1988 there is now a statutory responsibility upon schools to 'promote the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of society'. E.R.A. (1988). Under the guidelines for the foundation subjects, moral values are mentioned, but there is no explicit framework for their transmission. Cross curricular themes are to be highlighted such as Citizenship, Health Education, Economic and Industrial Understanding and Environmental Education, which are believed to make a major contribution to personal and social education. The National Curriculum Council's Curriculum Guidance pamphlet 3 'The Whole Curriculum' (1990), states that the whole curriculum contributes to a child's development as a person and citizen, but is very vague about how this should be done, and lists five timetabling arrangements 'based on existing practice' N.C.C. (p.13) to combine foundation subjects and cross curricular themes. Obviously, a great deal more research and planning needs to go into the design and transmission of a curriculum with so many demands laid upon it, but we must note that much moral education is now advocated in the form of the inculcation of mores, or moral issues discussion, although some is in the style of McPhail's 'consideration for others'. We have yet to see how this will develop in the curricula of our schools and how the Education Reform Act aims and objectives will be fulfilled in this sphere. Chapter four will examine briefly the links in the National Curriculum between history and citizenship and values teaching.

In this survey, we have looked at definitions of 'moral' and 'morality', at the developmental theories of morality, various curriculum projects and attitudes towards moral education in schools, and issues for the future. It is now the intention of this study to focus upon the teaching of history as a discrete academic subject in the secondary school, to see if its rationale for inclusion in the curriculum includes moral purpose both today (chapter two) and in the teaching of the subject in the past (chapter 3).
CHAPTER 2

HOW THE AIMS OF MORAL EDUCATION MAY BE SERVED BY THE TEACHING OF HISTORY

If the study and teaching of history contributed in no way at all to the moral development of an individual, its credentials as an area of study and as a field of human endeavour would still remain impressive. However, if an educator maintains that intellectual and personal qualities or capabilities are closely linked, then the value of history to the aims of moral education must be immense. The relationships of students of history, both collectively and individually, with actors in history, again both collectively and individually, provide fertile ground in terms of content material and developmental models for the field of moral education.

If the poet Paul Valéry was correct when he said 'L'histoire est le produit le plus dangereux que la chimie de l'intellect ait élaboré', then we have a duty to analyse its dangers as well as its uses for the benefit of school pupils. This must surely be one of the greatest moral aims there can be. This chapter will explore various ways in which the aims of moral education may be furthered by the study of history.

The 'Bad King John' Use of History : Moral Exemplars and Visions of Goodness

'Teach us how we ought to live by taking the heroic figures of the past as models and profiting thereby'. Ordericus Vitalis.

The saying that 'history is a philosophy that teaches by examples' is so ancient that its author cannot be identified and as we have seen, history from its beginning has been in some measure a division of moral science.

Trethewey (1974) has shown how in the colony of Victoria in the middle of the nineteenth century, history texts were merely another kind of reading book. However, the 'heroes' depicted or the stories told could be used to point out the moral qualities desired in children. Just as love is the central quality associated with many New Testament stories used today in primary schools, so such culturally important qualities such as bravery and patriotism were seen
as important in the last century. In its discussion of history 'The Handbook of Suggestions' (1946) carried this passage concerning its moral effect on children:

....it is a record writ large of the influence (of real men and women) for good or evil .... Without any laboured exhortations (pupils) will feel the spendour of heroism, the worth of unselfishness and loyalty, and the meanness of cruelty and cowardice; and the influence of their lessons in history will be at work long after the information imparted to them has been forgotten. (p.403)

This 'moral exemplar' use of history was at its height in the textbooks of the last century but it is by no means extinct even today. What we must explore is whether the holding up to admirable characters of the past to children actually aids their moral development. There are several issues to identify.

Firstly, is it a valuable exercise merely to tell the stories of good men and women from the past and hope that pupils will identify what was 'good' or moral about their actions? Stories about Alfred the Great, Lord Shaftesbury and Florence Nightingale contain moral pointers and most children have straightforward and rather simplistic ideas about what society holds to be decent, moral and desirable, thus are able to identify what the teacher may desire to be identified.

One writer who would claim that this is a worthwhile exercise is Marjorie Reeves in 'Why History?' (1980). 'Great men of all times and nations can be a source of power today. A small boy, introduced for the first time to a historical hero, exclaims with shining eyes, "I might be great one day!"' (p.40) However, there is a more familiar ring about Carolyn Steedman's words when writing about primary children learning the past, 'what is carried to secondary school is a profound sense of the unimportance of most peoples' lives'. (1984). This is one danger of the 'great men and women' theory of history, that in Shemilt's phrase encourages 'this sense of personal powerlessness' (1980, pp. 21-2).

What then of more complex stories of the past displaying a moral message? Roy Hallam (1969) looked at the child's understanding of moral questions in relation to history based on Piaget's work in moral development. There have
been many criticisms of this research focused largely on his methodology, in particular his explicit use of the notion of God. However, his findings showed that children at the same age make judgements on more complicated historical stories than Piaget found when using simple and identifiable fictions.

John Cockburn (1981) when studying Hallam's findings and replicating his empirical research found that 'children refract complex histories into identifiable realities to be confirmed .... the statistics show a clear evolution of maturing moral thought' (p.16). For the moral educator these findings are very encouraging for much of Hallam's and Cockburn's work demonstrate that while the intellectual aspects of an abstract and even to an extent a concrete nature will be beyond their grasp, the moral issues in history are to children a concrete reality. 'Thus the history will register with them, interest them, and enhance their motives to explore further' Cockburn (1981, p.17).

However, how far is this use of History compatible with the aims of the history teacher faithful to the subject's rationale?

As pupils proceed through the primary and secondary school they learn what are historical questions and historical answers. The statement 'King John was a bad man' is not a historical answer of any kind and pupils discover this by asking more questions. On what evidence was he a bad man? What do you consider bad? By what standards is this judged to be bad? By his contemporaries? and so on.

Ann Low-Beer uses this example and states, 'He (the pupil) has certainly had a historical instance of where he cannot make moral judgements without reference to criteria, in this case partly historical criteria. And he has perhaps had his moral awareness increased by considering the morality of kinds of behaviour which he might never encounter in his own life' (1967, p.157). Low-Beer, however, gives no evidence for this hypothesis and given the developmental theory of morality one wonders how effective this direct transfer and use of knowledge or second-hand experience is, especially when the child's developmental stage is not known. She makes it quite clear however, that the historical skills must be at the core, or the integrity of the history studied is at risk. It is to be wondered if all facets of this issue were explored when the authors of the Schools Council 'An Approach Through History' stated 'They (struggles of great men) exemplify the fact
that the study of History has a bearing on the development of the moral sense in that it causes pupils to examine occasions when men have faced moral problems and made decisions, and thereby gives them an indirect experience and a preparation for facing their own moral problems' (1969, p.15). Perhaps the case can be stated no more strongly than in the Newsom Report 'It is important to know bad company and avoid it' (1963).

The Role of Empathy

Empathy has been variously defined. Freud (1949) labelled it as 'the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all toward another mental life'; Fenichel (1945) stated that 'empathy involves both an identification with another person and an awareness of one's feelings after the identification', and the Oxford English Dictionary defines the word as 'the power of projecting one's personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation'. John Dewey and Piaget demonstrated the value of empathy as crucial to moral development. It is essential to be able to see someone else's viewpoint before appreciating their status as a human being and modifying behaviour to encompass their existence as well as one's own. It is this ability which enables us to rise through the levels of moral development from acting through fear of retribution to acting out of altruism.

The National Criteria require all history teachers of G.C.S.E. examination courses to teach their children to think empathetically, thus the ability to look at events and issues from the perspective of people in the past is now an assessment objective. It would appear that this area is a fruitful one for the aims of both history and moral education. The importance of empathy in history is twofold. Firstly, it addresses the problem of the 'strangeness' of much of the past and attempts to deal with it; and secondly, it helps to create a habit of mind in which strangeness or difference is not immediately dismissed as silly or stupid but is approached with openness and with a desire to collect evidence and improve understanding. This surely links with the aims of moral education in which pupils need to realise that different standpoints and perspectives are to be tolerated and respected, not attacked or jeered at.
It might be argued that we can understand the perceptions of the past by learning about the way people thought, rather than by trying imaginatively to share their thoughts. It may be contended that this sharing of thought is almost impossible to achieve since we are twentieth century people and must, as teachers and pupils, retain a foothold in our own age from which our interest in history derives.

However, learning about other people's ideas is never enough. For instance, we might say that people in an ancient civilisation watching an eclipse accepted magical and mystical ideas, but it is only by trying out such ideas in our own minds as explanations of particular actions that we can grasp them properly and see how they relate to the other hopes, fears and assumptions of the historical characters and their society. This imaginative process is central to our activity as historians. If a pupil can be encouraged to try out these experiences for himself, then the possibilities for moral development are many and can be encouraged in the classroom through discussion, role-play and researched assignments.

Marjorie Reeves (1980), Frederick Thompson (1986) and Vivienne Little (1987) have researched and developed many historical empathy exercises and are committed to modes of imaginative recreations of human situations to enhance pupils' understanding of the past. Care must be taken, however, to maintain the historical integrity of the imaginative framework and to base it on evidence and informed inference.

The capacity to imagine and empathise in this way will vary from one individual to another and according to the historical situation to which one is being asked to respond. Thus, most children will find it easier to imagine and empathise with a lonely trapper in 19th century coal mines than with the thoughts of Napoleon on the eve of battle because children have experience of being frightened in the dark but not of being a battle commander.

The historian who has studied a particular period for years and is fully acquainted with the people, thoughts and actions of a certain situation will make much more sense of an empathy exercise than a thirteen year old pupil with limited language, experience and perhaps intelligence. However, the educational and moral exercise is still extremely valid as long as the teacher gives out as much information as possible and curbs the child's
wildest excesses with practical and relevant historical background material. It is not difficult to show pupils the difference between knowing what a situation was like (e.g., life in the trenches) and trying to get them to empathise with the soldiers in how they felt about their experience.

However, the true difficulty arises in trying to help pupils perceive the difference between what may be called everyday empathy and historical empathy. Many pupils will apply their own twentieth century motives, attitudes, feelings and values to the behaviour of previous societies. What is termed the "Flintstones" syndrome needs to be exposed to children for their own critical self-assessment. They need to recognise the limitations of ascribing to past peoples their 1990's notions of right and wrong, wealth and poverty, pleasure and pain, and so on. Such recognition then needs to be compared to genuine attempts to recreate the views of previous peoples which are quite distinct from those of modern society. It is this genuine attempt which will enhance not only children's views of the past, but of each other; surely an educational objective of both the historian and the moral educator.

Culture and Relativism

The idea that past peoples and societies must be considered on criteria different from contemporary values, is a very pertinent one for the student of morality. The question must be asked whether situations alter moral judgements and that intentionality is the important consideration.

One exponent of unconditional cultural relativism is Peter Winch. He claims in 'The Idea of Social Science' (1958) that all social explanation must be put in the form of culturally internal accounts and cannot be based on regular, coercive and external general laws or social facts of the kind Marx or Durkheim sought to establish. He argues that only those who participate in the way of life are able to understand it, let alone judge it. If astrology or magic is practised in a society its validity cannot be properly established by reference to concepts of logical coherence or empirical data derived from western science, but only through the criteria afforded by the astrology or the magic.

This view is held by historians such as Collingwood who maintained that the historical viewpoints of past historians such as St. Augustine and Gibbon may
only be considered in the light of their own time. 'There is no point in asking which was the right point of view. Each was the only one possible for the man who adopted it' (1946, p.12).

Ann Low-Beer supports this view, 'it seems clear that for a moral judgement to count as fair it has to be in relation to the values of the period, as well as in the context of an actual situation and its possibilities. Justice to the past is the basis of the historian's task' (1967, p.147).

What a task she has set the historian - it is not always possible to know the values of the period, or to know fully the context of an actual situation. Is therefore, any form of judgement impossible? Partington (1980) claims that the central question is whether we can make any judgements about historians' work as historians which are not unconditionally relative to their own individual circumstances or to our own.

E.H. Carr proposed the view that history must be judged by subsequent success or failure of individuals or groups and their ideas or policies; 'the historian of the past can make an approach towards the understanding of the future' (1965, p.123). To this assertion, Partington enjoins us to be suspicious about 'the moral positivism and moral futurism which Carr exemplifies' (1980, p.72). He goes on to give Karl Popper's summary of moral positivism as the theory that there is no moral standard but the one which exists; that what is, is reasonable and good; and therefore that might is right, and moral futurism as merely another form of moral positivism which substitutes caring for present might as the arbiter of right. This is seen in such phrases as 'history will be our judge'. How can these ideas be translated into the experience of the classroom? A common extension of unconditional relativism is the argument that since no evidence is complete and all people have a point of view it is inevitable that all historical explanations will be biased and prejudiced. This is linked to the claim that no harm results in giving children a specific interpretation of History as long as the teacher acknowledges holding a particular set of beliefs. The idea of the 'neutral' teacher advocated by Lawrence Stenhouse and his colleagues in the Humanities Curriculum Project is variously dismissed as being impossible, as 'a hypocritical device for sedulous instead of open proselytising or as evidence of indifference of apathy to the historical issues at stake' Partington (1980, p.73).
It is important for children to see and appreciate standpoints and perspectives of the teacher and to understand that historians do not simply investigate and leave moral judgements to others, but often make moral judgements themselves. Partington (1980) makes the point well that unacknowledged judgements are likely to be more dangerous and insidious than those which are explicit and open to examination. This channel between moral dogmatism and unconditional moral relativism is a narrow one. Although rare in formal education in England, moral absolutism was dominant until recently in Communist states, for example, Lenin's doctrine that 'morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle and the proletariat'. Other examples are areas of Islamic and Christian fundamentalism, and right-wing totalitarianism.

In the English-speaking world unconditional relativism holds sway, and school teachers usually assume that moral judgements only really depend on your point of view and that they are uncertain and arbitrary. Nevertheless, a great deal of time is spent in the classroom on the passing of moral judgements on the past, and care is taken to bound them in time, place and class. This work is clearly linked to Kohlberg's theory of moral development as examined in chapter 1 of this thesis. Kohlberg asserts that the stages of development are sequential and stages cannot be omitted. He also claims that his theory holds for groups as well as individuals. Partington contests this by giving the example of the deterioration of the moral level of public life in Germany after the Depression which is 'one of many examples of regression by considerable populations' (1980, p.88). He holds this is mirrored in the individual where many adolescents do not proceed past stage four ('law and order' orientation) to stage five ('social contract/legalistic' orientation). 'Most people in our society become aware of the conventional and contingent dimensions of rules and laws, but fail to advance in moral reasoning as a result of this awareness. Instead, there is frequently a reversion to Kohlberg's stage two (instrumental relativist orientation), in which earlier explicit and naive egoism is veneered by semi-sophisticated arguments' (1980, p.88). Partington quotes no real evidence for this assertion, but even allowing his hypothesis to be correct, the study of history will nevertheless expose children to different ages, cultures and dilemmas, and encourage the externalising of moral judgements; even if as Piaget and Hallam asserted, this involves personalising and internalising judgements before reapplying them to historical situations.
Values in History

In the area of personal morality there are any number of options open to individuals, and many are equally valid in terms of life, but may at times come into conflict. History is obviously a rich field of moral and values conflict, and in terms of moral education one can examine hierarchies of value and the importance of adopting any given course of action - a transferable skill.

We have seen that traditionally, it has been claimed that the values dimension is central to school history and makes it distinctive, but there is a great deal of confusion of thinking on the matter. Coltham and Fines (1971) admit 'knowledge of values' in 'Educational Outcomes of Study' (p.25). The Lancashire Educational Committee stated that history 'encourages an openness to the possibilities of change in attitudes and values in relation to historical evidence' (1980), and the 'Place, Time and Society 8-13 Project' (1976) talked of the 'fostering of a willingness to explore personal attitudes and values', and 'the encouragement of an openness to the possibility of change in attitudes and values'. The concept of 'attitudes' leads to problems. Rokeach wrote that 'an attitude is a relatively enduring organisation of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to react to it in some preferential manner' (1973, p.112). It follows that it is possible they will interact with one another as the work of Heise (1979) on undergraduates' attitudes demonstrated. Knight makes the point that 'while reference to attitudes is a part of the litany of History's curricular claim, many of the faithful may hope that exegesis is not sought of them' (1987, p.47).

At least one difficulty can be resolved by using the concept of values, rather than that of attitudes. Rokeach explained that 'assuming that values are less embedded in particular temporal or socioeconomic contexts, we use the word "value" to describe either a desirable end state of existence ..... or a desirable mode of behaviour. In a sense, values are the source and foundation of attitudes and behaviour towards specific events, people or situations. A person can have thousands of attitudes but only a few values that transcend and dynamically determine these thousands of attitudes' (1973, p.67).

This direction points to an extensive literature on values clarification led by Raths, Harmin and Simon (1978). The values clarification epitomizes a
wide range of contemporary 'social education' in its emphasis on the direct personal experience of children. Acceptance of existing perceptions of pupils as the critical definition of relevance is seen as similar to Hegel's identification of the rational with the real, or Andreski's 'promiscuous crypto-conservatism' (1972, ch.5) which values what is already there.

Raths, Harmin and Simon (1978) list possible outcomes for values clarification but add that they will not all hold true in all situations. The procedures described are consistent with historical procedures involving pupils considering what they cherish and what they might value; weighing consequences and seeking alternatives; and making free choices whenever possible.

Raths, Harmin and Simon (1978) give examples of tasks that they believe are relevant to values clarification and history teaching. One such example is the American Civil War in which many moral questions are asked, such as: 'Do you consider the Civil War a just war?' 'Under what circumstances would you kill someone?', and 'How are disputes settled in your family?' These questions, however, have little specifically historical about them, and even less acceptable are Simon and Carnes examples from the case of slavery (1973). The intention of clarifying the pupil's existing values has crippled the chance that the pupil might come to understand very different values. McLaughlin (1983) writing about the pastoral curriculum, and Egan (1983) writing about school Social Studies in America, have expressed a similar concern that dwelling on the known and present may limit the pupil's values and vision.

Another valid criticism is that pupils may come to think that any value is as good as any other. Values - clarifiers reject that charge, and history teachers may well feel that an emphasis on the procedural values of their study offers a strong defence against values anarchy. But what are these values?

Crick and Porter (1978) identify five in political education: freedom, tolerance, fairness, respect for truth and respect for reasoning. Knight (1987) would add for history: respect for the individual and the particular. Also, in history the child has to work from evidence, rather than deduce from a model. History's particularising trait is of special note because 'correct historical thinking is the implacable enemy of unexamined and stridently asserted stereotypes' (D.E.S. 1985a, p.32), not least because 'the procedures
of history ..... are objective, as they cannot be modified either by the ideas being examined or by the conclusions we may hope to reach'. It may often happen that the evidence makes it impossible for the historian to go beyond a stereotype, but the important point is that his procedural values leave him aware of its fallibility. History is also inimical to stereotyping because it and its procedures are based upon the assumption that actions, however strange they may seem, may be explained in terms of the rationality of the agent in the past, seeing the situation as he did. (See section on Cultural Relativity.)

The procedures of history may not directly weaken prejudices but 'this abrading of generalised stereotyping by demonstrating the contextual rationality of even the oddest actions constitutes a necessary part of any direct attack upon such prejudice' Knight (1987, p.50).

In this process, information is obviously a key element in developing values, and then being able to reason about them. Therefore, content and its volume and availability are central when discussing history's role in values clarification to attack blind prejudice. 'Historical skills may not open closed minds; but they may plant a nagging grain of doubt in them' (D.E.S., 1985b, p.32). A small return, but one to be valued and developed.

Moral Judgements in the History Classroom

Through the study of history the pupil will learn that he cannot make moral judgements without reference to historical criteria. Perhaps he will have his moral awareness increased by considering the morality of kinds of behaviour which he might never encounter directly in his own life. 'Through historical instances he may discover what humility meant to a medieval monk, what the heroic ideal meant to the Greeks, or what patriotism meant to nineteenth century Englishmen. In this secondary and incidental fashion, learning history contributes to pupils' moral awareness.' Low-Beer (1967, p.157). When handling historical material, pupils will have presented to them moral judgements presented as facts. More intelligent pupils will find these distorted and some less mature or less intelligent pupils will be able to recognise that these judgements are facile and lacking in substance. 'Many middle-school pupils, for instance, can find unsubstantiated moral judgements on how 'good' Shaftesbury was, how 'bad' Hitler, or how 'valuable'
are international relations, uninspiring and boring, for just this reason, that the real complexities of moral judgements have never been adequately presented to them.' Low-Beer (p.157). We see, therefore, that moral judgements have to be sifted as carefully as evidence. Simon and Ward (1971) produced a study to obtain data on the relationship of age and sex to children's ability to judge historical narratives with a moral content, and to see whether performance in History was related to the level of moral judgement made by pupils. Three hundred and thirty-four pupils (166 pupils in the 13 year old range) were studied. Pupils were given a historical morality test and their history grades were also obtained. Findings showed that older and more intelligent pupils performed better than younger and less intelligent pupils, and no significant differences occurred between the sexes. It is easy to be critical of this study, such as we have no means of judging the quality of history grades supplied to the researchers by the school's head of the history department, and whether other school subjects are as equally valid as history in moral education (only Environmental Studies was examined), but at least there is now a start to the empirical research of the correlation between history and moral judgements.

In this chapter it has been demonstrated, however imperfectly, that history teaching has a role to play in the aims of moral education. The next chapter will examine how history has been taught and studied towards these ends particularly over the past two hundred years in the guise of indoctrination, education or 'improvement'.
CHAPTER 3

A HISTORY OF HISTORY TEACHING - A MORAL PERSPECTIVE?

Background

In this chapter the history of the teaching of history is being considered and, by history, we are concerned only with the western tradition of that subject.

Prior to the 19th Century, much history was studied, not for its own sake, but for extrinsic purposes, usually religious and moral.

Bede, William of Malmesbury and Matthew Paris, studied 'to perpetuate noble events in writing, for the praise of God and in order that posterity should be instructed, by reading how to avoid those things which deserve punishment, and to engage in the good things which are rewarded by God' (Paris). It was this spirit of instruction that prompted members of religious houses to expound God's will from historical stories.

Throughout past ages, politicians have had a lively interest in the historical context in which posterity will judge their own deeds. Historical biography is said to feature prominently in the reading of British politicians and a few have written works of this kind; for example, Winston Churchill and Roy Jenkins. One reason for the politician's study of history is that he expects to find a guide to his own conduct, both through moral example and through practical lessons in public affairs. This was particularly so during the Renaissance when the record of classical times was treated as a storehouse of moral and practical examples. Machiavelli's prescriptions for his native Florence and his political maxims in 'The Prince' (1513) were based on Roman precedent. He was rebuked by his younger contemporary, the historian Guicciardini:-

How wrong it is to cite the Romans at every turn. For any comparison to be valid, it would be necessary to have a city
with conditions like theirs and then to govern it according to their example .... the comparison is as much out of order as it would be to expect a jackass to race like a horse.

This is a common criticism of the citing of precedent, that it usually shows little regard for historical context. This reason was often given for the teaching of history in past ages: that of learning lessons. However, for a precedent to be valid, similar conditions would have to prevail and from a future perspective, an old problem or a familiar opportunity requires a different analysis because attendant circumstances have changed.

The 18th Century saw the Enlightenment where historians and philosophers interpreted the past according to the idea of progress which, for them, meant that reason could improve mankind morally and materially. John Tosh (1984) believes there is an element of 'wishful thinking' about the theories and predictions of history in the 18th and early 19th Centuries and that writers, philosophers and historians had only a crude notion about what wrought change in the past and might do so in the future. The modern academic discipline of history originated as a sharp reaction against this practice in the early 19th Century, initially in Germany. It is known as historicism, that is that each age has a unique manifestation of the human spirit, with its own culture and values. Historicists believed that their own institutions and culture could only be understood historically and that historic development was vital to a present-day analysis of society. History, not reason, was the key to comprehension. The greatest proponent of this school was Leopold von Ranke. 'History has had assigned to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of the ages to come. To such lofty functions my work does not aspire, its aim is merely to show how things actually were.' Ranke (1970 quoted).

The main task of the historian was to find out why people acted as they did, by stepping into their shoes, and as far as possible judging events by their standards. Ranke helped to found the modern discipline of academic history because he developed the techniques of research necessary for the fulfilment of the historicists' work, especially the use and interpretation of primary source material.

The question of empathy and judging past events, by whatever criteria, is by definition, a moral concern and is a subject of debate by 20th Century historians. The uses (and abuses) of history as a school subject are very
different from those of academic history in illuminating times past and present. It has been useful to look briefly (albeit crudely) at the moral dimension of historical scholarship in past ages because that necessarily reflects on why history has been studied and taught at all; but from now onwards our concern will be confined to the teaching and studying of history by children and young people of secondary school age. This does not mean, however, that the areas of academic and school history are mutually exclusive, nor does it mean that one is a watered-down version of the other.

The Nineteenth Century

At the beginning of the 19th Century political power was largely in the hands of aristocrats and landed gentry; the influence of wealthy industrialists was to emerge gradually throughout the century. The traditional education for the leaders of society was by private tutor, then on to a Public School, followed by a couple of years at Oxford or Cambridge University.

Academies, which began to flourish, offered a fuller education but were patronised less by the aristocracy and gentry, than by those who wished their children to join the higher reaches of society. In these circumstances education, in general, and the teaching of history in particular, came to be valued partly as a training for statesmen and partly as cultivation of 'gentlemen' for whom learning was also a pleasure. In writing to his son Lord Chesterfield said, 'An intimate knowledge of History, my dear boy, is absolutely necessary for the legislator, the orator and the statesman, who then deduce their morals and examples, speaking and judging of the present, and by it the past, prognosticating the future' (1810). Hannah More, in her advice to the daughter of George IV declared, 'History, which is the amusement of other men, is the school of princes' (1805, p.15).

The idea that history was an innocent and elegant amusement and a high-level means of training for the mind, persisted late into the 19th Century, but gradually a new attitude to the study of history was to emerge. One writer in the Educational Guardian remarked that history was no longer 'a mere amusement' as it had been in 'the days of our fathers'. Educational Guardian, Vol. 1V, (1861 p.65). Reform in some Public and Grammar Schools provided a wider and, perhaps, more suitable education. This movement was given impetus after the Reform Act of 1832 which 'confirmed and enforced the
rise to political power of the professional and commercial middle classes'. As education was perceived to have a more utilitarian role, the study of history appeared necessary to fit the pupil for some particular career or, as Herbert Spencer believed, to elucidate for him the 'causes of social progress' (1911, p.26).

Education, however, was seen not only as a tool for social progress but as a means of repression, or at least of setting parameters. The later 19th Century view was that since 'their haste, their irresponsibility, their openness to deception and their inevitable ignorance' The Economist (1848) made the lower classes dangerous to the order and prosperity of society, they must be educated to different ways. The Education Act of 1870 was partly a result of the realisation that the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 had made the prospect of manhood suffrage more imminent. The expansion of popular education which followed the Education Act of 1870 was, in part, designed to educate a future electorate to use its political power more wisely. As Chancellor says, in 'History for their Masters', 'Of all school subjects, History is perhaps the most obviously a vehicle for the opinions of the teacher and of the section of society which he represents' (1970, p.8). It would perhaps be more useful to talk of the class aspired to, rather than actual class, when talking of 19th Century text book writers.

An analysis of textbooks of the period 1800 - 1914, shows that certain traditions were considered vital to be upheld. Mrs. Sarah Trimmer in the 'Guardian of Education' criticised the 'Chronicle of the Kings of England' - 'It was evidently composed with the most profane and invidious design, to depreciate the sacred writings and to bring contempt and ridicule upon the memory of the sovereigns who have successively filled the English throne, and through them to glance derision upon the monarchy itself' (1802, p. 68). The Quarterly Journal of Education (1831), commended 'Stories From English History' by Mrs. Hack (1820). Its achievement was 'to impart correct historical knowledge and, at the same time, to convey beautiful lessons of morality, the highest and best use of History' (1831, p.220).

Some of the messages conveyed in history texts will be examined in Chapter six, but 'the beautiful lessons of morality' were all too obvious. Men and women of the past were praised for good, glorious and noble deeds, and others were cast down for their lack of faith, their cowardice, their lack of patriotic fervour and promotion of 'evil'.

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Such was the concern that 'correct' ideas and ideals be promoted in texts, that by the 1870 Education Act, newly elected School Boards were drawn to consider the selection and censorship of history books. John Baker Hopkins wrote 'In History only names and dates are trustworthy and the former are frequently corrupted and the latter are generally wrong' (1872). He went on to stress the importance of teaching history in the shaping of young minds. 'Very few men forsake the religious creed they are taught in childhood; and it is not less usual for men to cleave to the political creed they learn from histories'. School Board Chronicle (13th April 1872, p.279).

However, the Reverend J.A. Picton in the School Board Chronicle (30th March 1872, p.56) stressed patriotism and opposition to revolution, as desirable attitudes to be found in history books, but was enlightened enough not only to oppose censorship but also excessive moralising.

In general, the textbooks of the 19th Century reveal an attack on frivolous extravagance, a praising of commerce and trade and a concentration of the rise of Parliament, the middle class and the power of industry; thus reflecting the concerns of the age. Only few radical writers, such as William Cobbett, spoke for the working man but, in general, the radicals' doctrines were turned against them. As Chancellor says 'It is perhaps rather the nature of education in society and the study of History as part of this, that we may see how the forces of conservatism and conformity were, perhaps, necessarily over-represented' (1970, p.139).

As will be demonstrated later in an analysis of history textbooks, values put forward throughout the 19th Century concerned social class, morality, politics and Britain's place in the world. History as an academic subject which can develop intellectual, cognitive faculties, was ill-served but then that was not what was required of it.

The First Half of the Twentieth Century

After 1900, increasing attention to history as a channel for the aims of Citizenship or 'education for democracy' was paralleled by a continuing decline in the value placed upon history as an agent of moral education. Brendan Elliott in his Ph.D thesis submitted to Sheffield University (1975) claims, 'This decline, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, was most
probably a part of the general movement away from a classical-theological theory of education towards that based on scientific enquiry and individualism' (1975, p.55). However, an examination of handbooks on history teaching reveal that the moral dimension was very much part of the aims of history in school until the 1950's. 'It (history) deals with the subject matter which illustrates moral ideas and obligations. It teaches morals concretely both in individuals and in communities or states. But moral ideas always express the higher social relations between man and man. History, therefore, is pre-eminently a social and moral study' McMurry (1915 p.10).

'Good History teaching should undertake to teach morality, and this should constitute one of its principal aims ..... of the normal subjects of the school curriculum, two alone, Scripture and History, are in a position to foster the inculcation of virtue'. Walker (1935, p151). In 1950 the Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters in Secondary Schools published a handbook entitled 'The Teaching of History'. Although the authors warn of the dangers in using history to inculcate moral virtues, they state, 'This is not to say, however, that moral issues should be excluded from the classroom, or relegated to religious instruction'. I.A.A.M. (1950, p.5). It is certainly true to say that the emphasis given to the aim of moral instruction shifted in the first half of this century, but it still featured prominently, albeit phrased, in more guarded language. 'There has certainly been a change in our approach to the element of personal greatness in history, but it would be very far from true to say that we have abandoned the view that the example of famous men and our fathers that begat us is one of history teaching fundamental values'. Ministry of Education pamphlet Teaching History (1952, p.12).

However, let us look at the more critical thinking about the transmission of morality through the teaching of history. H. Ann Drummond, a history teacher and lecturer in Education, writing in 1929 said, 'A superficial glance through the pages of history, however, would soon show that this reason (teaching moral lessons) is strangely inadequate, for surely it is easy to see the wicked flourishing in the past as well as in the present, and in the history lesson the wicked have to be dealt with as well as the good ..... No-one nowadays, I suppose, would seriously suggest that the teacher should draw moral lessons from the history he teaches, yet it is important to notice that this is not his business even if he would like to do so'. Drummond (1929, p.16).
The London County Council Conference of 1909-11 agreed that history 'could not be made a satisfactory basis for teaching morality'. (1911, p.34.) Professor Archer (1925) pointed out that history was not the only subject which might develop moral thoughtfulness and Professor Cock did not want to force History lessons into 'a sermon, secular or regular'. (1921, p.31.) The force of the arguments of cultural and moral relativists can be seen in the Hadow Report which pointed out the difficulties of teaching about 'standards of action and conduct when what in one age is regarded as an evil may, in another, come to be looked on as a benefit'. Board of Education, Education of the Adolescent. (1926, p.195.) However, the same report re-emphasised the dominant role of history in the development of citizenship and Professor Fred Clarke saw citizenship as 'the most real and essential behavioural objective with which the teacher is properly concerned' (1929, p.20). Moral education and citizenship are not synonymous, but the latter may be seen as a facet of the former. In the first half of the century, some authors who denied moral aims in the teaching of history would espouse the 'cultivation of civic spirit, patriotism, citizenship and the devotion to public service' Findlay (1923, p.31). Not a very far cry from the position of history in the National Curriculum today.

Dr. Walker thought the aim of good history teaching was 'to take a major part in the training of an intelligent citizen, one who by his integrity of thought and high moral purpose is fitted to take an honourable and useful place as a true patriot' (1935, p.159). Elliott (1975) claims that the justification for teaching citizenship amongst the aims of history had received an impulse in the early 1930's, with the world-wide economic depression and the replacement of democratic government in Germany and elsewhere by dictatorships. This perceived need was so pronounced that by 1934 the Association for Education in Citizenship had been founded. However, this is not to say that all educationalists saw citizenship as a school aim. An anonymous writer in 'The Times Educational Supplement' of 4th August 1937, pointed out that the outside world and 'the effects of direct instruction (in citizenship) may be small'.

The issues involved in citizenship expressed in handbooks on teaching such as Helen Madeley's 'History as a School of Citizenship' (1924), and Hubback and Simon's 'Education For Citizenship' (1932) may be different from those outlined by the National Curriculum Council, but both sets of criteria or concerns meet perceived societal needs. As Europe faced war this century, 'the nation looked to its moral and patriotic defences' Aldrich and Dean
The emphasis on historical process was challenged, and history teachers were prompted 'to give precedence to ethical over intellectual values' Worts (1935, p.3). Until the recent 'revolution' in education, this values concern within history teaching has been disavowed over the past half century or so. 'Such uses of history have come to be regarded as an unjustifiable mode of indoctrination' Partington (1980, p.68).

Finally, therefore, let us examine how attitudes towards history teaching and moral purpose changed in the decades after the Second World War.

From the Second World War to the Education Reform Act 1988

In this period the pace and extent of changes in Britain increased, both in education and society in general. Broadly speaking, these were the quickening decline of Britain as a world power in both political and economic terms, the birth of the feminist movement, the development of popular teenage culture, entry into the European Community and the advent of increasing numbers of peoples of other races and faiths. 'A new awareness of the present and of the future necessitated a new awareness of the past. Three issues which achieved particular prominence were those of race, gender and class' Aldrich and Dean (1991, p.105).

As history by definition deals with groups of people and their relationships with each other through past times, whole new questions and problems were thrown up in history lessons in Britain which largely had concentrated upon Britain's place in the world. Awkward passages in imperial history needed another perspective, as did topics dealing with traditional historical treatment of gender and social class. The 1960's ushered in a period of profound social and educational change and this is reflected in syllabi where emerged 'a series of new, and potentially conflicting and competing histories' Aldrich and Dean (1991, p.105). Feminist historians wrote about women in the past, Marxists and neo-marxists wrote about the working classes and were shored up by John Kenyon's 'The History Men' (1983) whose tenet was that largely the story of the past is by men and about a male-dominated society in which all women and working-class men are excluded. Aldrich and Dean remind us that 'the new emphases were neither essentially conspiratorial, nor revolutionary. Rather, they represented participation
and the broadening of democracy, the urgent filling of gaps in what would otherwise remain a partial and one-sided history' (1991, p.106).

New Universities and Polytechnics added immensely to the teaching and research of academic history, and local history societies peopled by enthusiasts of all backgrounds sought to reconstruct 'history from below'.

In schools, a revolution in methods of history teaching was under way. In 1971 the Historical Association published two pamphlets entitled 'The Development of Thinking and the Learning of History' (1971), and 'Educational Objectives for the Study of History' (1971). In the first, Jeanette Coltham argued that the selection of topics for study should be based upon the developmental processes in children's thinking outlined by Piaget. In the second, Coltham and John Fines (1971), influenced by Bloom (1956), provided a new emphasis on the purpose of teaching history. The area of this work which concerns us here is the 'Educational Outcomes of Study' in which is included 'Knowledge of Values' (p.25). Coltham and Fines state that a pupil should realise that 'firstly, value acceptance enters into human actions and decisions; and secondly, that an individual has opportunity for choice and that such opportunity can be limited in a variety of ways; and thirdly, that accepting and acting on certain values is likely to have certain consequences. The outcome intended is an understanding of the part played by values and value judgements in human affairs' (1971, p.26). However, they say that specific values should not be indicated, and they do not address themselves to the methods by which they would set out to achieve the above.

The Schools Council History Project (1972) embodied the skills based approach to history teaching and gained wide acceptance throughout schools in Britain. David Sylvester, the Project's first director, 1972-75, was appointed to the inspectorate, and Keith Joseph was counted a supporter of the Project's aims. In 1985 the stamp of approval was provided by the opening paragraph of 'History in the Primary and Secondary Years: An H.M.I. View' which stated that 'History is concerned not with the conveying of accepted facts but with the making of informed judgements, and to the displaying of the evidence on which those judgements are made' D.E.S. (1985b, p.1).

Since the Education Reform Act (1988), the ground has again shifted on the position of History in the curriculum. The implications of National Curriculum History regarding a moral purpose will be examined in the final chapter of this thesis.
The movement since the 1960's towards a skills/process orientated approach to school history has tended to eschew a view of it as a medium through which to convey moral learning. This dimension of history teaching has been wrongly believed to be a facet of indoctrination or a way of purveying mores or a cultural view upon pupils. This is completely the wrong way to approach the admittedly difficult subject of history and moral education. Education in this sphere involves the bringing-out or development of innate abilities in the child, not an artificial imposition of values. This is clearly not incompatible with the aims of most history teaching which seeks to develop children's intellectual abilities through the use of evidence. The following chapter of the thesis examines developments in this area from the Education Reform Act (1988) and offers an examination of a social, personal and moral dimension of history in the National Curriculum.
CHAPTER 4

HISTORY IN THE NATIONAL CURRICULUM - A MORAL PERSPECTIVE?

This chapter will look at the creation and implementation of a national curriculum in history from the perspective of issues of values teaching and moral judgements. This examination will fall loosely into the areas of the rationale given to the study of the subject; the content itself and the skills being assessed throughout the History Study Units. In the following chapter is included a section on the views of academic historians on the National Curriculum in history.

The Final Report of the National Curriculum History Working Group

The above Report was published in April 1990 and emphasised the teaching of British history without seriously compromising a European and world context, and offered a clear warning of 'official' history if specified historical information is placed within a separate attainment target. The Group wrote:-

'Many people have expressed deep concern that school history will be used as propaganda; that governments of one political hue or another will try to subvert it for the purpose of indoctrination or social engineering. In some other societies the integrity of the teaching of history has been distorted by such objectives and there will always be those who seek to impose a particular view of society through an interpretation of history. We hope our recommended attainment targets may allay such fears'.

(Final Report of History Working Group, April 1990. Para. 3.29,p.11)

Although this was the clearly stated belief of the Group, the Report ushered in a long and on-going debate on "skills versus knowledge" between academics, politicians and other interested parties such as the Campaign for Real Education. This will be examined in the section on 'The Debate Over History in the National Curriculum'.

In a short section on 'History and Values' in the Final Report it said that 'Teachers should not hold back from dealing with controversial questions of
morality, or of values which unite or divide people .... Material should be introduced at a time when pupils have sufficient maturity to possess the critical faculties to handle it appropriately'. (Final Report, 1990 p.183) There were many concealed assumptions here. It was assumed that there is a generally recognised level of maturity characterized by an understood appropriateness, although for whom and for what was not stated. It also assumed that young people, whatever their experience of life may have been, have insufficient maturity to cope with related moral issues and value judgements and that, presumably, the adult world in general, and teachers and educators in particular, constantly demonstrate their ability to do so. This section showed a confused grasp of the issues of moral education with a nod towards Kohlberg and his levels of moral judgements. To make sense of the 'History and Values' section depends on the supposition that there are identifiable and generally understood terminal points in the development of pupils' understanding and that teachers can recognise and differentiate between them. More than that, that they have available appropriate teaching material. History, unlike much of Mathematics or Music, does not consist of a hierarchy of targets which must be met before further progress can take place. Any teacher who has used the National Curriculum Attainment Targets when assessing pupils' work will attest to that. There were also some dubious statements on values in the section on 'The Purposes of School History' (Final Report, 1990 p.1) which needed explanation, clarification or omission. References to 'understanding shared values' and later to 'broadly shared values' needed to be developed and not left as glib catch-all phrases. This was much of the weakness of the Report; its lack of definition and development of ideas. Words such as 'balance', 'breadth' 'objectivity', 'relevant', 'appropriate' and 'sufficient' are weasel words and demand acceptance. Who can gainsay them? 'Balance' suggests two contrasting views equally valid, and justifies a simplistic study of complex issues. These words demand a kind of compatibility of worth and they can inhibit commitment and threaten moral outrage. Surely some historical phenomena cannot be viewed 'objectively' and seen in perspective; for example, the Holocaust or chemical warfare. The Report also saw 'balance' in terms of content - the modern balanced by the ancient, the rich by the poor, men by women. A balance of dimensions was also justified by the History Study Units' P.E.S.C. formula (political; economic, technological, scientific; social and religious; cultural and aesthetic). Did these categories create distinctions, separateness and comparability often where they did not exist? A 'balance' of points of view was how the word was used in the Education Act
No. 2 1986 and to which the Report referred. However, it was also explicit in the 'General Rationale for School History' section in the Report when, under the heading of 'balance' (Final Report, p.15), reference was made of the preparation of young people to be citizens and their need 'to make up their own minds with the knowledge and skills to do so' (Op. cit., para.4.10, p.16). To make up their minds about what? Between what? The assumption is made of a 'balance' of opposing views. Again, a metaphor which could have been used to clarify concrete examples was used prospectively as a rather suspect criterion for selection and planning.

It was clear from the Final Report that members recognized the incompleteness of historical evidence, the variety of interpretations of the past, the value-judgements made in selecting, or omitting, content, the changing perspectives of the past resulting from the changing circumstances of the present, and the absolute need to base historical statements on available evidence. However, on issues such as historical truth and objectivity the views of the Working Group were not spelt out clearly. In the Report it stated that 'historians cannot describe the past with the objectivity of natural scientists' (para. 3.6, p.7) but earlier we were told of 'the search for truth' (para. 1.7, p.1) and that 'pupils should come to understand that historical objectivity is an ideal always to be pursued, although it may never be completely realised' (para. 3.29, p.11). The 'may never' suggests 'just might' - was it doing more harm than good to persuade pupils to pursue unachievable ideals? Unlike much of the internal consistency of the Report, these comments reflected contrasting points of view allowed to remain in conflict on the page, neither clarified nor omitted.

When it came to the content of the History Study Units, the Working Group filled out the framework with lists of concepts, necessary knowledge and themes, all of which had to be taught. Many were not concepts at all, but historical ideas or terms. One great concern was the relation of concepts to particular Key Stages. Why should some concepts not be considered by pupils under fourteen years old, such as 'propaganda' or 'patriotism'? There were also some curious omissions such as 'emigration', 'censorship' or 'heresy' in apparently relevant History Study Units. It was assumed that all listed concepts had to be studied, but nothing to suggest they could be added to or considered at other Key Stages.

However, the Report was much more sensible in its approach to a provision of a solid framework of the past to be studied, and resisted attempts by some
historians and interested parties to provide a series of 'maps of the past' and lists of official information. The members realised that it is much more important that pupils understand what they are doing when they are compiling their own framework of the past, the varieties of it and uses to which they may be put.

On the vexed subject of empathy, the Report made no reference or considered examination of it. This had been a frequent subject of debate as discussed earlier in the thesis, and often a cause of misunderstanding. Empathy and historical imagination depend on evidence and disciplined historical skills. Merely to comment on the need to study peoples and cultures of the past through their own eyes is too vague as are references in the Report to a disciplined imagination. The members of the Working Group needed to give this a much more serious consideration.

In July 1990, the Secretary of State, John MacGregor, published his responses to the Final Report. In general, he accepted the recommendations of the Report, but asked for significant alterations. These were concerned principally with the strategies for selecting and delivering History Study Units and with the revision of the four proposed attainment targets.

The P.E.S.C. formula was no longer to apply to optional units in Key Stage Two and Mr. MacGregor's proposals for Key Stage Four would give the National Curriculum Council considerable problems in the design of a teachable examination syllabus from the morass of content of 'Twentieth Century World History'. The four attainment targets were to be reduced from four to three. Attainment Target Four 'Organising and Communicating the Results of Historical Study' was abandoned as the skills were seen as permeating the other attainment targets. The new Attainment Target One was proposed as 'Knowledge and Understanding'.

The immediate press reaction to this will be discussed in the next section. It was this proposal concerning Attainment Target One which affected the content study of the History Study Units. The Secretary of State recommended higher weighting for A.T.I. against the advice of the Final Report which stated: 'There was no compelling theoretical or practical basis for applying different weightings (to attainment targets). If pupils responded to a question in terms of a lower-weighted attainment target then they could be disadvantaged if they had unwittingly emphasized this attainment target. We
therefore recommend that the attainment targets and the strands within them be given equal weight' (Final Report, 1990 : para. 8.15, p.168).

It was the rejection of this advice that led Mr. MacGregor, the Working Group and other parties more deeply into the 'knowledge versus skills' debate which continues to this day.

The Debate Over History in the National Curriculum

When the Final Report was published, the debate over what history should be taught in schools was given fresh impetus. Politicians, historians and teachers agreed that history should be taught, but on the questions of what and how, the unanimity collapsed.

Peter Lee in his chapter on 'Historical Knowledge and the National Curriculum' (ed. Aldrich, 1991) gives an excellent analysis of how historical knowledge may be defined and to what ends it may be used. Much of this of course has a moral perspective and not just in terms of selection. What happened in the past and learning about it is difficult on two counts; not everything that happened can be learned and agreement on what happened (interpretation) is not guaranteed. As Lee says, 'The consequences of these problems are most serious for those versions of the 'knowledge of the past' approach which most explicitly go beyond history in search of social and political goals' (1991, p.40). It is certainly naive to say as the editor of the Times did on October 3rd, 1992 that 'Mr. Major's ambitions should be more modest and more focused : a history syllabus which prepares the young citizen for life in a rich and complex culture. This does not mean moral instruction. It does mean facts, dates, major personalities and the study of national identity, the tools without which any historical analysis is a waste of time'. Handing on a common heritage is not learning history : it is using the past for practical, social and political ends. As Lee says, 'This kind of historical past is not necessarily illegitimate, but it is not to be confused with history' (1991, p.41). On the aspect of learning history to create or reinforce patriotism, Lee points out that this is inimicable to genuine historical study, but not that it is illegitimate to create, were it possible, patriotic children. Once again the current debate on history has polarised between those who want history to be studied for its own sake, and those who see it as a means to further ends. The labels hung around the necks of each extreme of the debate have been 'traditionalist' and 'new history'. The difficulty again is in interpretation because both terms can
be used negatively and positively by their respective supporters and opponents. Lee puts the point succinctly,

Those who wish to change society through history teaching in one direction are sometimes accused of social engineering. Those who wish to change it in another, or who strive to prevent change, are clearly no mean engineers in their own right. Neither group deserves any credence in serious discussion of school history, because the basis of their proposals lies in political concerns extrinsic to teaching history. Socialisation, the creation of confident patriots or even of 'good citizens' (a spuriously neutral phrase usually devoid of explicit substantive content) cannot justify handing on knowledge of the past or determine how it is done, because these goals are contested slogans, not appeals to historical criteria Lee (1991, pp.41-42).

This puts the 'debate' firmly in its place. The history that is taught must not be perverted to provide a range of possible social, cultural, political or economic ends, but to provide perspectives on that history itself and taught to develop pupils in a variety of educational and historically valid ways. What these may be is again open to definition and argument but it must remain the child that is the focus of the fruits of a study of history not a vague and woolly notion of what society ought to be as a result of this study. In an attempt to be less controversial the P.E.S.C. formula remains in the history document but in a a far less prominent form of guideline.

Whatever the stance of a participant in the history debate may be, one thing is common to all protagonists: the fact that knowledge must be taught. Many people make strong statements about the necessity for pupils to know the facts, and about the futility of attempting much else in school history. However, occasionally such a point will be supported by the assertion that pupils can only explain, analyse or evaluate anything in history after they have acquired the facts. The difficulty with this is that facts cannot stand alone. They are used to support narratives, judgements, accounts, etc. They do not per se, say anything about the past or impart knowledge and understanding. This is why the lists of names and concepts in the Final Report do not actually amount to a specification of facts to be learnt. Once again, Lee puts the case well by demonstrating that specified facts become either simply annals and subject to ridicule, or become an account of some
kind. He then asks the question 'what democratic government in its right mind is going to lay down the account of the past which children must learn? The experience of authoritarian dictatorships of every colour makes such a step to Party history inconceivable, quite apart from the fact that it would be in direct conflict with the nature of the discipline'. Lee (1991, p.45)

Such a reasoned and reasonable argument should surely lay to rest the fears of the Campaign For Real Education and Stewart Deuchar [the author of 'The New History : a Critique' (C.R.E., 1989) and 'History on the Brink' (C.R.E., 1992)]. On the subject of knowledge in the National Curriculum, Stewart Deuchar has this to say,

'We should have no truck with "criteria for the selection of content"! All history should be available simply on the grounds that it actually happened ..... Nor should we have any truck with "history from below" or any of the other fashionable notions ..... All the sound and fury generated by school history in the recent past appear to originate in feelings of class guilt, post imperial angst, and other ephemeral moods. We have to get back to a situation where we can look at the past coolly and realistically'. 'History on the Brink' (C.R.E., 1992 p.13)

Is Mr. Deuchar really the man who could point out the way in this direction? As he himself says, 'To foist these "new history" skills on to our children under the guise of "history" is like giving a stone to those asking for bread. It is altogether something of a different order of magnitude. I have seen it'. Teaching History (January 1988, p.36).

The debate on history in the National Curriculum continues. Martin Roberts, Chairman of the Historical Association's Education Committee wrote in 'The Historian', 'critics of National Curriculum History from the Right are convinced that it has been hijacked by a "malevolent educational establishment" ..... The problem is that there is no such thing as this "educational establishment", least of all where history is concerned. But if you point this out to the conspiracy theorists of the Right you are seen as part of the conspiracy - which does not aid rational discourse'. (The Historian, no. 36 Winter 1992 p.22) It does, however, give fuel to certain journalists, politicians and all who would like to use history in the National Curriculum as a political and social vehicle to purvey their own idiosyncratic and pejorative views of the past to fashion the future. These issues are truly pertinent to a study of a moral and values dimension in the
creation of a National Curriculum in history, but what of the subject as it now appears in its key stages one to three being currently implemented in our schools? The next section will be a brief look at the themes discussed in this thesis as they relate to history in the National Curriculum laid out in the statutory orders.

The Introduction of History in the National Curriculum

On 1st August 1991 history in the National Curriculum at Key Stages One, Two and Three came into force in schools with the weight of statute law behind it. Non-statutory guidance was provided, in the words of Duncan Graham, the Chairman and Chief Executive of the National Curriculum Council, to 'help teachers through the process provide challenging and constructive ideas and help to lighten the load'. (From a letter to colleagues prefixed to the Non-Statutory Guidance, 1991.)

This thesis has examined the moral dimension of the teaching of history in schools and other educational establishments throughout times past. Never before has the weight of statute law been placed behind the teaching of history with all that means for the transmission of potentially explosive ideas. In the 'General Requirements for Programmes of Study' it is stated that 'pupils should have opportunities through the programme of study to ..... develop knowledge, understanding and skills related to cross-curricular themes, in particular citizenship .....' (The History Document 1991, p.11). At the beginning of each key stage we are reminded that every H.S.U. should 'involve study from a variety of perspectives: social; religious; cultural and aesthetic' (1991, pp.15, 33 and 49). In the introduction to the programme of study for Key Stage Four it is written that, 'Through their historical studies they (the pupils) should have opportunities to prepare themselves for citizenship, work and leisure' (p.49). Although content is not specifically directed towards these requirements it is obvious that the P.O.S.s have to provide for them. This has been of great concern to those involved in the 'history debate'. How is this direction of pupils towards these specified goals to be achieved? The statutory orders for history are mute on this point, but do set out certain content areas where moral education and values teaching is possible. For example, the unit on 'Britain since 1930' in Key Stage Two states that 'pupils should be taught about religious changes and their effect on everyday life' (p.25); the unit on 'Expansion, Trade and Industry: Britain 1750-1900' in Key Stage Three states that 'pupils should be taught about Parliament, political parties and key
political issues' (p.43) also in Key Stage Three, 'The Era of the Second World War' states that 'pupils should be taught about the Holocaust' (p.45). In the not yet implemented Key Stage Four, the core study unit of 'The Development of British Democracy 1900 to circa twenty years ago' states that 'pupils should be taught about the changing role of the state in British society, including ..... differing ideas about the state's responsibility for individuals' (p.51). Just from these few examples quoted it becomes immediately obvious that a teacher may take a variety of perspectives on these issues and slant them towards a range of particularist viewpoints. Of course this has always been possible with history curricula, but the National Curriculum is backed by the law and will be scrutinised by the government, professional bodies and interested parties far more rigorously than ever before. To a great extent this is dictated by the assessment procedures with Standard Assessment Tests at the ages of seven, eleven, fourteen and sixteen and on-going teacher assessment.

In terms of the content of a national curriculum in history, creators of the Document have described and selected areas which on the whole allows scope for the talents of teachers, is relevant to pupils' experience and background and mirrors any possible ethnic diversity of the school population and society at large.

The programmes of study provide a balance of historical content. Each of Key Stages Two, Three and Four involves the study of British, European and non-European history ..... The history of the British Isles acts as the spine of each programme of study. Pupils should ..... understand how events in British History can be seen from different perspectives. Non-Statutory Guidance (1991, p.810, paras. 5.12 and 5.13)

These general but clear statements about a core of British, including local history in a European and world context together with a mix of periods and perspectives and including studies of other cultures through their experiences offer a simple and, on the whole, acceptable framework. The framework for assessment remains contentious but is not truly within the scope of this study although Attainment Target Two (Interpretations of History) poses particular interesting concepts for those interested in moral education and values teaching. For example, level nine 'explain why different groups or societies interpret and use history in different ways' and level ten 'show an understanding of the issues involved in trying to make
history as objective as possible' are prompts for a great deal of classroom discussion on the uses of history in both times past and the present day. It is to be regretted that these important concepts are locked into an assessment procedure aimed at only the brightest children in the older age ranges. Nevertheless, these issues will need to be tackled as will problems of causation (the second strand of Attainment Target One - 'Knowledge and Understanding') which are, as discussed previously in this thesis, always of interest to a moral educator.

Although there is much that is relevant to issues of moral education in the National Curriculum for history, nowhere are these issues stated more explicitly than in the Non-Statutory Guidance (1991). However, before considering this, we must remind ourselves that in Section One of the Education Reform Act 1988 (ERA) a statutory responsibility was placed upon schools to provide a broad and balanced curriculum which 'promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of society'. History is very much part of that curriculum. The National Curriculum Council suggested that these dimensions of a curriculum should be covered in five cross-curricular themes and of all the foundation subjects only history has as part of its general requirements for programmes of study that 'pupils should ..... develop knowledge, understanding and skills related to cross-curricular themes, in particular citizenship, environmental, health and careers education, and education for economic and industrial understanding' (The History Document, 1991, p.11). The Non-Statutory Guidance (1991) goes on to develop this more fully in section C12, paras. 6.0 to 6.10 where the P.O.S.s are dissected to show how various content areas are related to the different themes. Thus the teaching of history has been given a rationale which most clearly embraces personal, social and moral aims, and although this rationale can be criticised for being broad, general and open to wide and various interpretation, at least it is there.

Were these personal, social and moral perspectives more rigidly defined in National Curriculum history there would rise a howl of protest from both the Left and from the Right of the political spectrum. As it is, a dimension has been added to the teaching of history in this country which must surely be welcomed by the teachers who have to teach the subject and who care, both in academic and pastoral terms, for the pupils in their charge.
On Moral Judgements in History

'To the living to do justice, however belatedly, should matter' Mattingley (1959, p.375).

Having looked at ways through which the aims of moral education may be served through the teaching of History, it would repay our purpose to examine briefly what some historians themselves think about the making of moral judgements on the past, particularly in the light of the National Curriculum.

Herbert Butterfield (1951) is one of the strongest upholders of the view that the historian should definitely not judge the past, and that it is not his business to ascribe good, bad, virtue or vice in history. Butterfield suggests that the historian only has the professional jobs of building up a narrative and explanation of past events, and that this does not involve the making of moral judgements, but only descriptions and analyses in terms of what the evidence may lead him to believe. Thus, 'the "technical" historian performs an act of self-emptying in order to see the kind of truths ..... which the evidence forces us to believe whether we like them or not' (1951, p.101). The historian is committed to 'an attempt to learn all that can be learned by the scientific study of just the observable interconnections of events and nothing more' (1951, p.103).

Secondly, Butterfield believes that a moral viewpoint is inimical to historical writing, for example, religious belief when writing a study of the Reformation. 'A great danger rises if moral judgements are incorporated in the structure of the narrative, if they control the mounting of the story, and if they become embedded in the very fabric of historical thinking' (1951, p.105).

Thirdly, Butterfield suggests that man is not capable of finally valid moral judgements and feels that many 'moral' judgements in history are really political judgements.
'Moral judgements are apt to be political ones in disguise and some Whig historians would seem to have reserved the severest judgement for the men who support what they describe as 'absolutism'. Or else such judgements are trivial and only pseudo-moral judgements and 'in the world of pseudo-moral judgements there is a general tendency on the one hand to avoid the higher regions of moral reflection, and on the other hand to make moral issues out of what are not really moral issues at all' (p.115).

As a Christian, Butterfield claims only God can judge on moral issues; since man's knowledge is limited, his judgements are often incorrect and always incomplete. Despite this stern attitude, Butterfield hints at broad moral tolerance acquired in the effort to remove moral pre-conceptions; he acknowledges that the struggle to objectivity is hard and one needs humility. Ann Low-Beer makes the point that these sentiments mean that the special effort required is in itself a moral effort resulting in a certain kind of moral outlook - a greater breadth and fairness. 'The point is that moral attitudes in history do not seem to be as irrelevant as, it is urged, they ought to be' (1967, p.139). Other historians, such as Cobban (1961), advance the theory that moral judgements should not enter history. A common attack is that it is impossible to reach agreement on any standard to apply. The criteria for moral judgements must be either absolute and impossible, or they are likely to be thoroughly relativist - relative to the standards of the historian, or to a particular time, or to overall interpretations of history as in a Marxist or a Whig view.

However, when one leaves theory behind and comes to the practicalities of writing history, the problem is not so easily dismissed. Judgements of a moral kind, suggesting attitudes of approval and disapproval, are easily found in 'reputable' history. Butterfield may be right in feeling the intrusion of moral attitudes hinders objective contemplation of past events, but it is evident that it is difficult to remove them completely. Many 'technical' historians do not succeed. This is an important point for the teacher, who necessarily draws upon what historians at present do, even if the theoretical position of moral judgements in history remains arguable.

Sir Isaiah Berlin (1954) makes clear this difficulty in opposing Butterfield's and similar views. History is written in everyday language which is shot through with evaluative notions. Only a severely technical language can escape these general and often loose moral connotations implied in our everyday speech. And, as Berlin points out, it is impossible to
conceive of descriptions of men and their acts, of narrative or story, in some entirely neutral technical language.

R.M. Hare (1951) in 'The Language of Morals' substantiates the view that many ordinary words which we use descriptively also carry an evaluative and a moral meaning. The moral meaning may be secondary but it is seldom entirely removed. Butterfield would maintain that the historian should only describe and explain phenomena such as 'religious persecution' or 'military atrocities', but should not judge them. Berlin (1954) and Dray (1964) point out, however, that a moral judgement is implied in the language used.

Low-Beer states that a fallacy in part of Butterfield's argument is the view that the technical historian can give a precise or technical meaning to ordinary language. Even terms used entirely in context and correctly such as 'Fascist' 'Socialist' 'Radical' 'Dictator' and 'Communist' have moral connotations. The precise start of the moral overtone depends upon the historian, the historical context and the reader. It is thus, in one sense, impossible to be free of moral judgement.

What about the claim that historians should not indulge in moral judgements because they are liable to be incomplete or incorrect? Historians not only describe past events but attempt to give a significant and meaningful narrative, that is to interpret and explain. In doing this they refer to their own judgements, values and points of view. Low-Beer points out that positivists and some advocates of the 'covering law' theory of explanation insist that different explanations in history do not necessarily mean that each historian has his subjective set of values. Differing accounts of a situation do not mean 'partisan narratives' but may represent different and complementary points of selection. However, judgements of what are important or vital explanatory components often appear to rest on the historian's set of values, including moral values. This does not necessarily mean that these are personal values, but all historical explanations rest in an interpretative framework, which is value-structured and may include moral principles. Fixed and possible causes of historical events are naturally value-laden when selection is taking place in an explanation.

The fact that a distinction can be made between propaganda and reasonable assessment is an important one in history. Historians do dispute about such judgements and there are general criteria for appearing to settle the discussions.
Firstly, distortion of the facts is inadmissible. Secondly, simple personal bias in moral judgements should not occur (although this is difficult to attain). Thirdly, individual actions should be weighed intelligently against deterministic factors of environment and situation. We must not praise or condemn in abstract, but in relation to a given situation. Fourthly, the detection of a point of view from which history is written. Here moral judgements are only intelligible within the limits of a clearly articulated and rationally formulated point of view - an interpretation. We may reject a judgement because we do not accept the basic general principles, although we might agree that given those principles, such a judgement is rational.

Finally, and this last criterion is most often disputed, do historians judge past actions in relation to the moral standards of the past or the present? The issue has been discussed in chapter two and is one of great relevance to the teacher and pupil in school history. Low-Beer points out that the 'great' historian is distinguished by the way he translates the meaning of the past in relation to the present. This relation to the present is complex, and is not a simple utilitarian connection. As Low-Beer says 'this weighing of a moral judgement in relation to both past and present values will include, of course, the basic principles and outlook of the historian, but transcends the merely personal' (1967, p.147). Renier (1950) would agree with this to a degree, but gives far more florid expression to 'the outlook of the historian'. 'If ethical considerations loom large in his (the historian's) spiritual equipment, there is no reason for his keeping silence on the subject. His right to pronounce judgement is as clear as his right not to do so. Indignation may compel him to speak, or moral disgust, or mere amazement'. Renier (1950, p.254). However, Renier admits the historian 'must bow before a universal imperative which leaves no room for exceptions' (p.255). How possible this is in practice, of course, is impossible to say.

On the National Curriculum

The call for a national history curriculum prompts the fear in some historians of a return to a celebratory 'drum and trumpet history', an emphasis on great men and great events with no space for the alternative narratives of women, the poor, blacks, in our country's history. ..... The History Debate continues. Juliet Gardiner (1990, pp1-2).
When the Final Report of the History Working Group came out in April 1990 it was widely welcomed by academics in the discipline for being a fair and clear basis for history teaching in schools, but it had its critics. Robert Skidelsky complained about the lack of prescribed facts to be taught and proposed an alternative, more 'factual' syllabus (Robert Skidelsky and Others, 'The National Curriculum. G.C.S.E. History - an alternative approach', May 24th, 1989). However, Keith Thomas voiced concern with the excessive factual information ('The Future of the Past', T.L.S., June 8-14 1990). The Report was also criticised for an idiosyncratic unevenness in coverage in various aspects by, amongst others, Janet Nelson (1990) and P.J. Marshall (1990). Naturally a great deal has been written about history in the National Curriculum by academic historians, but what concerns this study is what they have written about the moral and values dimension of that curriculum. Roy Porter (1990) believes that history has a utilitarian function and that a national curriculum in history must perform a service - to enlighten a disorientated generation about its own identity. He sees this happening through a study of perspectives on the past encouraging informed discussion and decision-making on many public issues. Hence his statement, 'it is doubly important that historians don't pen themselves up in ivory towers, spinning sophisticated philosophical denials of the continuities between past and present, and insisting that history teaches nothing (except that it teaches nothing). Renaissance scholars believed the historian must necessarily be a good citizen. We might do well to learn that lesson' (1990, p.19). This reveals a stance a long way from the 'techno-historian' described in the previous section.

J.C.D. Clark (1990) discusses the history debate on the subject of national history. He believes the debate not to be about the history of rigorous academic study, but about popular history and its interpretation by both the Left and the Right. 'The argument turns not on whether history should be patriotic ... but on what form the patriotism should take : should it be a story of achievement, advance, enlightenment? Or should it emphasise a dark side - exploitation, suffering, poverty? Nothing in the methods of scholarship can answer this question: it is essentially political' (p.38). However, Clark believes that the actual protagonists in the debate are arguing over a set of false issues: 'the malaise addressed by the idea of a standardised national syllabus is a plural society, not a socialist society' (p.39). He thinks the Left and the Right are arguing over a set of assumptions wrongly taken up by both sides. 'Patriotism is alive and well as long as such arguments go on. If so, it is unperceptive to dismiss the Left
as unpatriotic or the Right as jingoistic. They both care. The problem really comes when the formula has to be amended to include those who are not British by lineage, inheritance or bequest' (pp.41-42). However, from this we must acknowledge that Clark has a short perspective from which to define being 'British'. Nevertheless, it is a point well made. When looking for a national identity it can no longer be in terms of race, religion or regional identity, but a 'variety of regional and ethnic cultural ideals seeking hegemony' (p.43).

This aspect of the National Curriculum is a obvious focal point for critical comment. The History Working Group was working to a brief that pupils should be educated to combat racial and other forms of prejudice. It was felt that there remained relics of an 'imperial curriculum' in history. 'The essential racism of the official version of our history is seen above all in its glorification of the British empire and its arrogant attitude to those who were the empire's subject' Peter Fryer (1988). This may seem exaggerated, but in 1985 the Swann Report 'Education For All' criticised the survival of what it termed anachronistic views of the world and recommended that racism in schools or elsewhere be identified and countered. The History Working Group strongly endorsed the contribution that history can make to the objectives of multi-cultural education. While P.J. Marshall (1990) feels that although the Group could be accused of not giving a positive counter-programme to the old imperial history, teachers are free to do so in accordance with the attainment targets. In the Final Report (1990) a Key Stage Three optional H.S.U. on 'The British Empire at its Zenith: 1877-1905' (pp. 72-73) was set out. Part of it included the South African War of 1899-1902 and the involvement of three controversial men: Rhodes, Kruger and Milner. As Marshall points out:

In trying to make up their minds about this episode and the roles of these people, pupils would be engaged with issues that deeply divided contemporaries and that raise fundamental questions about the use and abuse of power. Yet in some press discussion of the curriculum these choices appear to have been interpreted as an attempt to affirm some kind of 'imperial' values.


This merely confirms the notion that it is not only the issue under consideration which is sensitive, but the way in which it is handled. The
government took note of this when exemplary information and issues were taken out of the Final Orders in history. However, a study of the rewritten supplementary H.S.U. on 'The British Empire and its impact in the last quarter of the nineteenth century' Non-Statutory Guidance (1991, F21) shows that the issues remain albeit in broader and blander terms. As we have seen, the moral issues concerned with views of 'British history' are those most fully explored by academic historians. Some of the best founded criticisms of the Final Report were directed at its relative neglect of European history; a direct consequence of the instructions given to the Group to give at least fifty per cent of the curriculum to British history. Keith Robbins (1990) does not believe that this is bad of itself, only if 'Britishness' is thought to be embodied most purely in a particular tradition. Hence the concern, as seen, of P.J. Marshall (1990) about 'imperial history'. As Robbins points out, 'Rootedness must be matched by an awareness of external diversity. The problem is to find the right balance and context as "British history" moves from being a self-contained universe in itself to a different order of existence in the late twentieth century' (1990, p.24). He goes on to argue that it is rather meaningless to talk of Britain and Europe in separate compartments and that children should somehow bridge the gap and learn of the 'European past'. Robbins would rather have 'a "Britain-in-Europe" historiography which appears to meet the needs of the hour' (p.26). It is hard to disagree with this view, but the implementation of it in a national curriculum is another story as teachers are currently discovering.

The debate continues and has resurfaced invigorated in the pages of the national press (see the second section of chapter four of this study). It engages not only academics but politicians, journalists and those concerned with issues of heritage, culture and 'national character'. As Juliet Gardiner says, 'No wonder setting the agenda for history is a political prize to be fought for. History is for life buffs and it's hardly surprising that this is a debate that will run and run' (1990, p.5).
'There is no reason why topic books should not take a stand now and then, although not without regard to historical evidence or the mendacities of language'. J. Wilkes writing in 'Teaching History' (number eighteen, June 1977 p.19).

There can only be limited value in concerning ourselves with value judgements in the teaching of history if the textbooks used in lessons are not examined to tease out their moral judgements and recommendations, both explicit and implicit.

Over the period 1800 until today very different criteria have been variously employed by textbook writers and their reviewers and it is the purpose of this chapter to scan very broadly the way in which school book writers have tackled the task of delivering the raw material of many lessons. However, it must be borne in mind that the material in books is only a tool in the hands of the teacher. Controversial and judgemental material may be a stimulating focus to the lesson of a balanced and skilful history teacher, but it will cause problems when simply given to pupils to digest and use uncritically. Over the period considered, this problem has certainly been addressed, but one might contend that even today it is unresolved.

In the nineteenth century history was often considered to be the nursery of patriotism and public virtue and it is very noticeable that displayed in history textbooks of the period 1800 - 1914 is a rigid and apparently unvarying set of ethical standards. Chancellor (1970) suggests that these standards were those of the class to which the writers belonged, but we cannot know whether those values were espoused or merely acknowledged.

The explicit moral messages contained in textbooks did not, however, meet with universal approval. This reticence is best observed amongst the reviewers who were called upon to read and comment upon history textbooks for educational journals. A reviewer in 'Transactions of the Education Society'
(1854) was vehement against the moralising of Dr. Ince whom he accused of foisting his ideas of morality onto his young readers. A reviewer in the 'Educational Times' advocated a 'plain unvarnished narrative' as preferable to the moral lessons contained in 'Henry's First History of England' (1st October 1868, p.161).

In textbooks the values promoted were those such as thrift and industry, but on the whole writers of the last century concentrated more upon a list of vices than virtues. Barrow (1802) devoted twenty-three pages to a description of the vices to be expected in his pupils. Cruelty in all its forms was deplored and so was the sort of ambition which showed itself in rulers in their love of flattery and desire for conquest. Many writers deplored war and those who took part in it. James Simpson (1836) regretted the fact that history had, as taught to him, resulted in an admiration of war and plunder. Although dislike of war was expressed throughout the nineteenth century and up until the outbreak of the First World War, it does appear that there was less insistence on the moral evils attendant on fighting by the end of the period. By the turn of the century the warrior appeared the hero rather than the villain of society. Chancellor (1970) talks of the many instances where King Alfred's character and achievements are praised where 'he was working for his people's welfare' Cassells (1833, p.51) and 'his wars were conducted in self-defence and his victories were never stained by cruelty' Morris (1883 p.18). Mrs. Markham (1874) stressed the moral responsibilities of the commander and nearly everywhere military leaders were condemned if they exhibited cruelty, for example William the Conqueror and Richard I. Legge (1864) described Richard 'as destitute of every moral quality' (p.74) and Edward I when he advanced on Scotland was judged to have 'left his better self behind him' Yonge (1890, Book 3, p.124).

At the end of the century, a less guarded admiration for the soldier comes through. This is especially true of the readers intended for use in elementary schools, based as they were upon the requirements of the school code. Chancellor (1970) quotes the 'C.U.P. Reader' (1911) where twenty-four out of the forty historical figures selected for study are mainly notable for their military prowess. However, if opinions about killing in war changed, the feeling that killing and cruelty on any other grounds were wrong persisted in general throughout the period, as might be expected. A particular example of this is disapproval of the racial and religious persecution of the Jews during the Middle Ages [see Curtis (1875) and Collier (1875)].
Persecution on religious grounds was also condemned, particularly in passages dealing with Mary I. It is true that opinions about Mary were largely governed by protestant religious bias, nevertheless, they do reveal a moral revulsion against cruelty in general and bigotted cruelty in particular. Other areas which reveal censure from textbook writers of this period are sexual misconduct, but references to it were often guarded, especially in Victoria's reign. The identification of chastity with a happy and secure background for children was most clearly stated in Mrs. Markham's history where Henry II's infidelities are blamed for the delinquency of his sons: 'My own opinion is that they acquired habits of disobedience to their father by seeing how little harmony subsisted between him and their mother'. Markham (1874, p.87). Charles II was particularly singled out for criticism because of his perceived lack of love for religion and because of his mistresses. In Brewer's 'Allison's Guide' (c.1880) the question was put, 'What was the character of his reign?' followed by, 'It was the most immoral and disgraceful in English history'. However, some writers had good things to say about him and writers such as Mrs. Trimmer (1849) and Miss Yonge (1890) admitted that he may have been easily led and was clever and witty, despite being unprincipled.

The stress on extravagance which we find in the descriptions of Elizabeth, Charles II and others was part of what might be termed 'the middle-class morality' of the text book writers. Apart from sexual licence and waste were deplored a whole range of vices which included idleness, lying, over-indulgence in food and drink, smoking, swearing and gambling. Other instances of dishonesty and its evil consequences were described, for example for the life of Henry II. Miss Yonge described how 'the king did not keep his word, so that at last no one had any trust in what he said and he did almost as much harm as if he had been a bad, cruel man, like his father King John'. Yonge (1890, vol. 3 pp 35-6).

Chancellor, however, reminds us that we cannot assume that these generally expressed views on morality were those adopted by society as a whole. The number of text book readers as a percentage of society was small and as we have said, there is no way to calculate the effect of the textbooks on their readers. One thing is worth noticing, however: 'The moral tone of society is firmly identified in most text books with virtues such as sobriety, industry and thrift, rather than with care of the weak and under-privileged'. Chancellor (1970, p.88). Opinions about the poor tended to be unsympathetic and although concern was expressed for African slaves, there was far less
comment on the plight of factory children in England. Of course, we must make the point that we cannot know exactly what contemporary knowledge there was by the middle-classes of the working-classes. However, even if this was little, that fact alone is condemnatory.

One aspect of text books of the period 1800-1914 that must be mentioned is the explicit use of a situation in the past to condemn a current practice. One example is from Percy Dearmer's 'Everyman's History of the English Church' published in 1909. Here he is talking of the fifteenth century church:

> These services were for the most part in Latin. But even here fairness obliges us to admit that the common people loved and understood the services when they were in Latin better than they do now that they are in English. It is a sad confession, for our noble English services ought to be far more intelligible; but the reason is that the parsons of those days were exceedingly diligent teachers, whereas our parsons are now only reviving the work of catechizing; and also they had a willing and loving people to teach (1909, pp 91-2).

This passage is historically suspect, but this does not appear to be the perspective from which it was written. A further example from the same book is as follows: 'There is not an intelligent Nonconformist at the present day who does not repudiate Calvinism as heartily as we churchmen' Dearmer (1909, pl21).

After the First World War it was increasingly unlikely for a pupil to meet with such blatant moralising. Valerie Chancellor's analysis of history textbooks in the nineteenth century makes the point that they reflect a world of changing rather than dogmatic moral judgements. 'While it is true that many of these (moral judgements) such as the strictures against laziness, dishonesty, gluttony, drunkenness and unchastity accorded well with the Victorian concern to "civilise" the working-classes into law-abiding workers and citizens, there is very little difference in the character or in the force of moral opinions expressed in books for middle and working-class children, as one might possibly expect if writers had had a propagandist aim' (1970, p.89). We must not be too quick to condemn however, for we must not transpose the requirements of a late twentieth century textbook on to that of an earlier time; one with a different rationale.
The period following the First World War saw an emphasis in history teaching upon the processes of peace and a call for patriotism. The following is a typical extract from a handbook on history teaching: 'The teaching of History is a preparation for human fellowship. The self-regarding individual must become a person. He must learn to love his neighbour as himself. He must find out that other people do things in ways different from his, and have a different point of view'. Firth (1932, p.170). This passage was from a chapter on the League of Nations Union.

There can be no doubt that for most of the first half of the twentieth century much British school education on the subject of the empire was intended to be indoctrination and social engineering. Much of the rhetoric of public schools was stridently imperialistic. Awareness of empire and pride in it was consciously incorporated into syllabi for elementary schools as Pamela Horn (1988) has shown. Overtly pro-empire text books remained in common use in British schools until well after the Second World War. By the end of their life these books no doubt looked dated and were not necessarily taken seriously by teachers or pupils, but the point can be made that it was not specific statements in particular books that were significant so much as implied assumptions.

As the century has progressed, the developments in history teaching discussed previously have been mirrored in the contents of history textbooks. They have become more 'technical' in language and content although there are exceptions to be noted. Wilkes has commented: 'One of the reasons why textbooks are so grey is that, with occasional exceptions, they are not encouraged to make value judgements. This convention reflects a distorted view of "history as objective science" just as the supposed need for coverage stems from obsolete theories of pedagogy' Wilkes (1977, p.19). Over the last twenty years or so there has been much more interest in value judgements in school texts in America and Europe, than in Britain. In the United States there have been several campaigns against racism and various forms of ethnocentrism, particularly in accounts of domestic American history and society, and against sexism. One example of this work is the work of the Council on Inter-racial Books for Children in New York. Robin Richardson (1983) contends that in Europe there have been thorough attempts to remove nationalist bias from history books 'particularly, of course, books about intra-European relationships' (1983, p.33), but he maintains that in Britain, although analyses of textbooks have come out there has been 'little or no
significant change so far in the quality of books being produced by commercial publishers' (p.33).

One history text book in common use in schools is 'A Course Book in Modern World History' by P.F. Speed (1982) which is full of implicit value judgements. Here follows several examples randomly taken from this book:

The Hindu religion affected Indian society in a number of unpleasant ways. Here we will touch on just three - the caste system, marriage customs and sacred cows (p.377).

Unfortunately, giving up colonies, or decolonization as it is sometimes called, can cause problems. It is rather like parents leaving home for good. Everything depends on the children. If they are grown up and friendly with each other, all will be well. If they are immature and hate each other, they will fight and the home may be ruined (p.376).

'The European Economic Community has been a success'. (p.318). Reasons are given to back up this view, but no evidence is offered for a legitimate opposite opinion.

On budget contributions to the E.E.C.:

...Britain has to pay the largest sum, and apart from Eire and Italy, she is the poorest country in the community. Eventually, and after a lot of argument, Mrs. Thatcher had Britain's contribution reduced, though even then, she and West Germany remained the only states to pay more into the E.E.C.'s funds than they received from them. However, had Britain joined at the beginning when she had the chance, she could have made sure the rules were more in her favour (p.319).

Of course, one may be criticised for taking extracts out of context and for focusing on this one book, but judgements such as these, often used uncritically by school pupils, are not uncommon. Here is another example,

Dorothy Samuels lives in Cascade .... on the north coast of Jamaica .... The islands were discovered by Christopher Columbus. Hubley (1982, p.3)
The judgements demonstrated in Speed are easy to spot, but the Hubley's book points to a more subtle and 'hidden' curriculum, implying a Eurocentric view. Writers on sexism in history find many examples in texts implying women's relative unimportance both by value laden statements, or by the simple fact of omission.

Thus far in a consideration of history texts in recent years, we have assumed that value judgements when they appear, are relatively sophisticated in that they are often hidden or implied. This is not to suggest that they are any less influential. Indeed, it may be argued that the result on children is all the more insidious because of the assumptions made. Not only must the effect on pupils be considered. Richardson (1983) reminds us that text books are purchased by, and therefore marketed to, teachers, and that the messages which teachers receive from them are perhaps even more significant and formative than those which are received by children.

As we have said, the effect of textbooks is hard to gauge but we are a product of the sum of all influences received and as textbooks are implicitly sanctioned by the teacher, then their particular influence must not be discounted. Writing to the press in 1914, Bertrand Russell enumerated with characteristic eloquence, some of the causes of the war which had just started. The litany ended with the war having been 'encouraged by a whole foul literature of glory and by every text book of history with which the minds of children are polluted'. Admittedly this was written at the end of a period in which moral judgements were at least partly acknowledged to be part of the rationale of a text book. This is no longer accepted as being a desirable aim of history teaching in the latter part of the twentieth century. However, the division between theory and practice is not to be dismissed. Examine the following passage from a history text book published in 1991 for the purpose of delivering Key Stage Two for history in the National Curriculum. This is from the introduction:

The Tudor and Stuart monarchs themselves match their age, providing enough eccentricity, malevolence and curious twists of personality to keep biographers busy for the foreseeable future. Henry VII was a conniving miser, Henry VIII a vindictive, selfish egomaniac, Mary I a religious fanatic, and Charles II a spectacular profligate. Only the last two Stuarts, Mary and Anne were dull. Goodman and Kent (1991. p6).
If the last were presented merely as an extract of a history textbook, and one were invited to provide a date, then suggestions from the early nineteenth century would not be so ludicrous.

As more and more textbooks are rushed out to meet the demands of the National Curriculum and as they cover content areas hitherto relatively unacknowledged by textbook writers, then wider becomes the scope for implicit moral and value judgements to be found in their pages. History campaigner Chris McGovern has made this area of investigation one of his main priorities. One of the first books to concern him was John Aylett's 'History Fast Track' (1992) in which an exercise contrasting two different teachers is used to demonstrate concepts of change. The national press commented on this and used it as yet another opportunity to reopen the rather barren 'knowledge versus skills' debate. McGovern commented, 'There is not a scrap of historical fact in the whole piece. It is pure fiction'. Daily Mail, 15th October 1992. This is illustrative of another point, that not only may textbooks carry hidden and implicit moral messages, but if they are intentionally innocent but are perceived to take up a particular slant by certain groups predisposed to infer messages, then they become another weapon in the hands of protagonists in the 'history debate'.

Yet another potential cause for concern from textbooks is the fact that now the Final History Orders (1991) require pupils to study history from a wide variety of perspectives the very inclusion of Welsh, Scottish, Irish, European and world dimensions can create an air of 'marginalisation' that hitherto may not have existed. The abrupt introduction of a H.S.U. on Medieval Islam may indeed counteract the very noble ends for which it was intended. Other H.S.Us which will create a demand for hurriedly written textbooks are 'Black Peoples of the Americas' and 'Indigenous People of North America' to name but two more. However, although the need and demand for National Curriculum history textbooks is undoubtedly here, what of the question of whether school budgets are able to meet the challenge? The Educational Publishers' Council have estimated the cost of books for the National Curriculum in history at £58 million and this may well be an underestimate as they may have assumed too high levels of usable books in stock at present in schools. Conrad Russell (1990) makes the point, 'If the requirement is introduced without the means to make it achievable, demoralisation will be the only result. The effect of teaching children that requirements need not be met is unedifying, and not conducive to good citizenship'. (p.51)
Although these points are tangential to the question of moral judgements contained within textbooks, they are worth making. Finally, it is important to note that in the rush for textbooks to appear, care must be taken to ensure that content is scrutinised as carefully for value judgements as for the other criteria which will be required by teachers and pupils to meet the assessment objectives and programmes of study dictated by the National Curriculum. Although history in the National Curriculum now openly espouses personal, social and moral aims and this is to be applauded, it is now even more incumbent upon academics, teachers and professional bodies to ensure that the transmission of that history in textbooks is scrupulously rigorous and true to the integrity of the discipline.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION - HISTORY AND THE MORAL DIMENSION

History is the story of peoples throughout the past. It is the study of behaviour, motivation, ideas, conflict, beliefs and culture. It is concerned with the need to understand and explain. It can be studied at many levels and by many different types of enthusiast. It can remain at the level of an enjoyment of country houses or be the ruling passion of a life devoted to historical scholarship at the highest academic level. However, in whatever fashion history may be defined, one concept permeates the whole process: that of the examination of values and their transmission.

This thesis has been an attempt to study the dimension of values within the history studied in school, particularly by pupils in the secondary school age range, and of the impact of that dimension upon children's own values system and moral education. Debate has ranged long and hard over what history can teach children in this area and the importance of that debate can be effectively measured by the ferocity and protracted nature of the discussions involving academics, teachers, politicians and other interested parties. This debate has been given a yet more prominent platform in recent years due to the introduction of a National Curriculum in history and has left the well-structured battlelines of dispute in academic journals for the rough-and-tumble of the tabloid press. As the debate has widened, so the arguments contained therein have been polarised, simplified and, in some cases, been reduced almost to unintelligibility.

This thesis has been, in some measure, an attempt to look at the debate in its much wider context and to trace the historical perspective of the issues concerned as far as the scope of this study allows.

It was useful to define the ideas and concepts involved in the teaching of moral education and to see how connotations of the word 'moral' have been used particularly in the latter part of this century. It was in the putting together of that overview that it became apparent that the role of specific subject areas, and of history in particular, have contributed little in the formal sense to 'Moral Education' in schools. Informally this has been far from the case and as has been seen in chapter three, moral purpose was given
as an explicit and frequently expressed rationale of the subject's study in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. How this purpose was expressed and how this expression declined over the period after the Second World War has been most enlightening of the whole educational process. The character of history teaching went through something of a revolution in the 1960's and 1970's and as it did so the whole values and moral dimension of the subject's educational role was down played if not explicitly denied. It has been of the greatest interest to see in the National Curriculum History Working Group's Final Report (1990) and in the Non Statutory Guidance for the Final Orders in History (1991) an explicit statement of the aims of the teaching of history in personal, social and moral terms. This was considered in this study together with the responses of academics, politicians and journalists. It seems as if the wheel has turned full circle; but has it?

Although history cannot fail to deal with values, it is not a values-system. It should not seek to sustain or devalue tradition, heritage or culture. It should not assume that there are shared values waiting to be defined and demanding to be supported. It should not require us to believe that a society's values are always valuable and that they should be transmitted in the history classroom. If history does attempt any of these things then it ceases to be history and becomes indoctrination. This is what critics of the Right have believed that the 'new history' has introduced, and what both critics of the Left and the Right have sometimes accused the architects of the National Curriculum of doing. In this study it is to be hoped that these concerns have been examined and to some extent put into context. However, the vagueness of some of the calls for history to develop values and to prepare pupils for citizenship within the National Curriculum documentation itself, has lead John Slater (1991) amongst others to ask for rigorous definitions and for suggestions of good practice within the content and assessment frameworks to be described. 'Does the virtual silence of the Group on these issues contain some hidden messages and lurking assumptions?'

In chapter two this study has looked at some ways in which the aims of moral education, and not indoctrination, may be legitimately served by the teaching and learning of history. It has been unfortunate that teaching methods involving values and empathy have been treated as political and educational footballs. H.M.I. described empathy as 'the ability to enter into some informed appreciation of the predicaments of people in the past: it depends on the ability to interpret evidence, be aware of anachronism, and to forget what we know about the outcome of past events' (1985b, p.3).
It is not the same as wholly identifying with people in the past, which is impossible or with sympathising which as Slater points out 'could be morally as well as historically dubious' (1988, p.7). Empathy should lay down the intellectual procedures and limits to enable pupils to ask questions of cultural, social and moral importance and thus redefine their own position in the world and reflect on matters of prejudice, mockery and violence. This is one of the highest aims to which a history teacher can aspire; but, it must be reiterated that it is only one of the aims and not a full rationale of itself. When considering history as part of a curriculum however, this element has been latched onto most frequently by critics as explored in this study. As Slater says:

Some of the critics question the motives and professionalism of some teachers, examiners and curricula developers and accuse them of putting political aims above professional obligations. These generalised accusations are not supported, for example, by the evidence of H.M.I. For historians, of all people, to make unsubstantiated charges about the abilities of pupils and the professionalism of teachers is not only impertinent but irresponsible. (Slater 1988, p.9)

As discussed, the selection of content in a history course is as value-laden as the skills employed to study it. As Butterfield (1951) suggested, content cannot be value free as the selection procedure itself confers status on what is studied and diminishes what is not studied. Also when that content is explored and framed within textbooks the messages and language contained in those books need to be examined just as carefully as the content of that curriculum selection for implications and slants neither perceived nor intended by the teacher. This issue was explored in the last chapter of this study.

However, it is not particularly helpful to talk of content of itself, but of it allied to procedures. The same evidence can produce any amount of interpretations; it does not justify any one interpretation. It is also useful to comment that these interpretations and even the content itself cannot be purged of moral dimensions as historians and teachers are not exempt from those social and moral pressures with which they seek to explain the behaviour of others. Every person's view of the past is profoundly, if not wholly, affected by his circumstances and cannot be cleansed of subjective viewpoints. There is less danger from these historians and
teachers who recognise this than those who deny they possess them at all.

The architects of the National Curriculum in history are to be applauded for consideration of many of these concerns. They encourage a study of history from many perspectives; national, international, women's, multi-cultural, economic, etc. There is much to be criticised or commented upon, but that would have been the case of whatever curriculum was produced. Some demands in the Final Orders are vague and unsubstantiated, but at least they are there to be interpreted and implemented by the teachers themselves with their professional judgement and knowledge of the pupils in their charge. Changes of indoctrination, bias, and social engineering levied against the teaching of history in schools can never be avoided, but the issues have been put into a fresh context by the National Curriculum which has ensured the place of history in the life of schools and education in general. It is to be hoped that the moral dimension of the subject will now be given the rigorous treatment and status it deserves.
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