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ABSTRACT

LOSING FACE:
The British Foreign Service and the Question of Tibet
1904 - 1922

This thesis deals with the evolution and conduct of British policy towards Tibet from the Younghusband Expedition in 1904 (in itself the most extreme example of the 'forward policy' on India's frontiers in this period) to the Washington Conference of 1922 (which called for a more subtle approach to the definition and defence of essential British interests). It examines the interaction, in a complex quadrilateral relationship, of the four branches of the British foreign service primarily involved in Tibetan policy: the Foreign Office and the India Office in London, the Viceroy and the Government of India, and the China service based in Peking. It seeks to elucidate the ways in which British policy-making sought to accommodate the interests of India with the imperatives of policy towards other major powers, notably Russia, China and Japan.

Considerable emphasis is placed upon the problems and contributions of those charged with the implementation of policy 'on the spot', and the ways in which their ability to act independently (as Younghusband had done in 1904) was eroded by the increasing control of their activities by the growing official bureaucracies in London, in a world made smaller by the extension of the rapid growth of communications. Finally, the effects of the new international climate after the First World War are evaluated in terms of their impact upon Britain's Tibetan policy.

Since this thesis is primarily about the evolution of policy making within the British foreign service, it is based largely on British primary sources, both official and private, and upon the extensive memoir literature produced by the participants. It does not purport to represent or analyse in detail the views of the Tibetans themselves or seek to pass judgement upon the impact of great-power politics upon their aspirations, though the radical differences in their values and priorities will be apparent.

Declaration

This thesis was carried out at the University of Durham Department of History. No part of the text has been published before, or submitted for any other degree.

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1. Thubten Gyatso, The Thirteenth Dalai Lama
LOSING FACE

The British Foreign Service and the Question of Tibet
1904 – 1922

by

Wendy Palace

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INTRODUCTION
The secret waits for the insight
of eyes unclouded by longing;
Those who are bound by desire
see only the outward container.
Lao Tze.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT.
In 1904 Tibet was a 'waiting secret', an ill defined region of exotic reputation and stark physical and climatic contrasts of which the British Foreign Service knew very little. There was great uncertainty about where its borders began and ended, but a firm belief that they must touch those of Russia in the extreme north fuelled concern that secret understandings must therefore exist between the two nations which might ultimately threaten the security of India's borders.

Writing about British perceptions of what constituted Tibet in 1904, Eric Telchman, a Senior Consular Officer in the China Service, divided the country into three distinct political regions which were subject to varying degrees of control by the Dalai Lama's government in Lhasa, and the Manchu government in Peking. The first, thought to be the actual Kingdom of Tibet where the Dalai Lama's spiritual and temporal will was thought to be uncontested, extended north as far as Kokonor, and east as far as the ancient Burma frontier with China. It included the states of Chamdo, Draya, and Nyarong which in 1904 came under the direct political control of Lhasa. The second area, known to the China Service as East Tibet, and to the Tibetans as Kham, was composed of states bordering China including Tachienlu (Chala), Batang and Litang. These were under direct Chinese control but also included states like Derge which had recently fallen under the political influence of Lhasa. The nature of Chinese political control in this region was extensive but purely nominal as Peking took only limited interest in the outer regions of the Empire, having long ago handed control of its administration there to the Provincial government of Szechuan, whose own interest in the region had waxed and waned over the centuries. In East Tibet the Dalai Lama's government exercised little temporal control and his spiritual influence was challenged by the
abbots of the powerful monasteries of East Tibet who, as members of the older Red Hat Sect, resented any interference from the more recently formed Yellow Hat Sect to which the Dalai Lama belonged. This did not affect his ability to move freely in the region however since he was much loved by the local people and was useful to the abbots who used his reputation as a means of reinforcing their own credibility with the people. Apart from a few major cities and towns and the network of trade routes crossing it, this area was largely uninhabited and often effective power lay in the hands of local chieftains and brigands. The third region, known as Kokonor, was a vast and largely uninhabitable desert, thinly populated by nomadic peoples of mixed Mongolian and Tibetan blood. Like East Tibet it was controlled by a variety of native chieftains but the Manchu had their own representative, or Amban, based in Sining, who by 1904 could exercise only nominal political influence at a time when the once powerful Manchu Dynasty was beginning to collapse.

The Kingdom of Tibet was known to be a theocracy with a dual system of government, membership of which composed lay and ecclesiastical officials who met together in a National Assembly or Tsongdu summoned periodically by the Dalai Lama. Beyond this little was known about the functions of government since few westerners had ever visited Lhasa in circumstances where they had time or opportunity for study.

The greater problem for the British Foreign Service in 1904 lay in determining the status of Tibet and the system of allegiances that tied it to the other countries of Central Asia. Few people were aware of Tibet's great imperial past when, for over two centuries, her fierce armies had created a vast Empire in Central Asia. When this ended in 836 AD Tibet had become a unified, predominately Buddhist state, engaging in active relations with the neighbouring Himalayan States of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim as well as with Mongolia, China, and Russia. When Kublai Khan established some control in Tibet in the second half of the thirteenth century he made Buddhism the predominant religion in his Eastern Mongolian Empire, establishing a unique interdependence between the Mongol Emperors and the Tibetan rulers. These strong bonds, forged between the Buddhist Churches of Tibet and Mongolia at this time, were still in place in 1904, and were
not known to the British. This Buddhist alliance also made it possible for Russian Buriats like Agvan Dorjiev to establish contact with the Dalai Lama, creating much alarm in British ranks, where the strong religious ties between Russian and Tibetan Buddhists were not fully appreciated, and where Dorjiev's nationality was considered of greater importance than his religion. The shared religion also made it easier for Japanese Buddhists like Kawaguchi Ekai and Nomi Kan to travel and study in Tibet, after 1902 when Britain had signed an alliance with Japan, these travellers were regarded as a positive help to British intelligence. Apart from these Japanese sources, and those acquired by the Indian pundits who had risked their lives to travel secretly in Tibet between 1865 and 1888, there was little reliable information to be had about the country, and little opportunity to investigate its status in Central Asia. As well as the confusion created by Tibet's possible relations with Russia, Britain's rival in the great game of the previous century, there was also considerable confusion over the exact nature of Manchu relations with Tibet. First official contact between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor had been established when the fifth Dalai Lama, widely known as the 'Great Fifth', had accepted an invitation to visit Peking in 1653. The visit had been well documented and was known about in the west largely as a result of researches undertaken by William Rockhill, an American diplomat and celebrated Central Asian traveller who had discovered that, during the visit, the Great Fifth had been treated with the respect usually accorded to the sovereign of an independent state. At this time the Cho-yon relationship between the Manchu Emperor and the Dalai Lama was also affirmed. This symbolic relationship was based on a personal understanding between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor under which the Dalai Lama became the Emperor's 'spiritual adviser' and the Emperor became the Dalai Lama's 'protector', a role which gave him effective control over Tibetan foreign policy and allowed him to place Chinese officials and garrison Chinese troops inside Tibet. Since the British knew and understood nothing of this arrangement it was difficult for them to appreciate why the Manchu administration still operated inside Tibet at a time when their control was visibly weak.
On the eve of the British Expedition to Lhasa therefore very little was known about Tibet that was not based on travellers' tales and information supplied by spies and missionaries which was often second or third hand.*13 Earlier contacts had been made with the country by the East India Company which had administered India until 1858 when India came under the protection of the Crown, and by the British controlled government of Bengal, which for mainly commercial reasons had been anxious to establish links with the Lhasa government. In 1774 Warren Hastings had sent a 'mission' led by George Bogle to the Sixth Panchen Lama at Shigatse, the second most important political and spiritual centre in the Kingdom of Tibet. The aim of the mission had been not only to develop commercial and friendship links with the Tibetans, but was also an attempt to persuade the Panchen Lama to use his influence with the Manchu Emperor, in order to allow the development of trade between India and the wealthy Chinese province of Szechuan, where stories of mineral wealth and vast gold fields had excited the imagination and whetted the appetite of East India Company Traders. Bogle spent six months at the Panchen Lama's Court at Tashilhunpo at a time when Tibet was ruled by a Regent following the death of the previous Dalai Lama, and while the new incarnation was still waiting to be found. In the absence of a Dalai Lama the Panchen Lama became the highest spiritual authority in Tibet, and as a man already much admired and respected for his spiritual qualities, even by the Manchu Emperor himself, Bogle formed an entirely false impression of his status during his relatively short visit. When he then returned to India with presents that included gold dust, and with promises from the Panchen Lama that he would be able to secure guarantees from the Manchu Emperor that he would not obstruct British trade and commercial developments in Szechuan or Tibet, there were high expectations in India that a fruitful relationship with both China and Tibet would result. Although the death of the Sixth Panchen Lama and the discovery of the new Dalai Lama a few months after Bogle's visit made these promises meaningless, the idea that the Panchen Lama could help India persisted, and was confirmed by a second mission to Tibet led by Samuel Turner, who stayed with the Seventh Panchen Lama in 1783. The tendency to exaggerate the power of the Panchen Lama at the Dalai Lama's
expense persisted in 1904 despite all obvious signs to the contrary.*14
In the last decade of the eighteenth century a fierce and bitter war
between Nepal and Tibet had resulted in a Treaty signed in 1792 in which
both sides had asked China to act as mediator. The Treaty terms included
an agreement for both countries to submit future disputes to the Amban at
Lhasa, and gave China powers to close Tibetan borders to foreign influence
at a time when the East India Company was becoming increasingly active in
trade on the Indo-Tibetan borders.*15 This move, fully supported inside
Tibet, began to generate frontier tensions which intensified after 1858
when the East India Company relinquished control to the Government of
India, but in circumstances where the independent government of Bengal was
still anxious to continue to try to retain and develop existing commercial
links with the country. The annexation of Sikkim by the Indian government
in 1890, and the failure to implement Anglo-Chinese trade agreements in
1890 and 1893, further exacerbated tensions, making British involvement
increasingly political as the Indian government fought to preserve its
existing commercial gains.*16
Under the terms of the Chefoo Agreement signed with China in 1876, the
Manchu had reluctantly agreed to issue passports for a British overland
commercial mission to Lhasa but this had not been followed up until 1886,
when a mission was organised under the leadership of Colman Macauley,
previously Financial Secretary to the government of Bengal. The Bengal
government had sanctioned the venture following pressure from British
traders, and on the strength of seemingly reliable reports of favourable
trading opportunities in Tibet. When the party finally assembled in
Darjeeling there seemed to be every hope of success. However, on the eve
of its departure it was suddenly cancelled, London having received
information that the mission would not be welcome, and it subsequently
emerged that the Dalai Lama had ordered his troops to block the entrance to
Chumbi Valley, a move which the Chinese were unable to prevent. In order to
save face the Chinese offered the Indian government territory in Burma,
confirmed in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1886, which would later create
great problems for the China Service who were required to monitor and
protect the new Sino-Burmese borderland, an area of dense
jungle and unwelcoming tribal peoples. As well as blocking the Macaulay mission the Tibetans also refused to withdraw their troops from the area. By 1904, with the Chinese still unable to oust them, it became apparent to the Indian government that their power in Tibet was dangerously weak and that they really had no influence with the Tibetans who were now openly violating the trade agreements of 1890 and 1893. It became obvious that positive action needed to be taken in order to bring the situation under control.

The situation in East Tibet was monitored by the China Service administered by the British Legation in Peking. Little was known about the region beyond the fact that it was under varying degrees of Chinese control and subject to the Dalai Lama's influence, but as long as the frontier remained relatively stable they were not particularly interested in how the arrangement worked. In the late 1880's various schemes had been explored with the aim of developing trade routes across Tibet to India. These had included plans to build a railway linking India with the Chinese province of Yunnan, and a proposal to take steamships into the upper reaches of the Yangtze to the very borders of East Tibet. Both schemes had to be quickly abandoned however once the dangers and the full cost of the ventures had been fully explored.

During the 1890's the entire nature of Anglo-Tibetan relations was transformed by the emergence of two powerful men who, in 1904, dominated the policies of their respective governments. The first was Thubten Gyasto, who became the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1894, and the second was Viscount George Nathaniel Curzon, who became the youngest Viceroy of India in 1899.

Thubten Gyasto had been the first Dalai Lama for many years to attain his majority and at eighteen had survived a plot to poison him at a time when powerful factions inside China and Tibet opposed his right to exercise temporal rule over Tibet. He quickly became a dangerous threat to the powerful forces surrounding him because he had a political mind and had already been made aware of western diplomatic practice as a result of his involvement with Aghvan Dorjiev, his tutor for part of his childhood,
and now a trusted friend. This made him a threat not only to China, but also to India, since in previous years the Dalai Lama had played a negative role in Tibetan government, Tibet having been ruled by Regents who, unable to combine their political power with the spiritual powers of the Dalai Lama's, had allowed real control in the country to be divided between the three great monasteries of Ganden, Sera, and Drepung, which had fought each other for political control in Lhasa. Religious links between the Ninth Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama were potentially very strong since the former acted as spiritual advisor to the latter, and in this period they were made even stronger by the fact that the Panchen Lama was only four years younger than the Dalai Lama. True friendship between them was prevented however by the very different nature of their characters, the Panchen Lama being less worldly, a fact confirmed in 1902 when he travelled to Lhasa to receive the Dalai Lama's blessing. Thubten Gyasto's arrival had given great hope to those who believed that Tibet might once again become an independent sovereign state free from all Chinese influence, a fact well appreciated by Curzon who realised that it might now be possible to deal directly with the Tibetan ruler without having to consult the Chinese. He had come to India convinced of the need to promote contacts with Tibet for political and commercial reasons. For him, already an acknowledged expert on Central Asia, Tibet's strategic position in the Himalayas made it vitally important for Britain to establish formal contacts with the Tibetans, especially as he had become convinced that Russia had an understanding with Tibet which might threaten Indian security. In the belief that the Dalai Lama was exercising full political control in Lhasa, he resolved to write directly to him, and on 11th August 1900 sent a personal letter which was returned unopened six months later. In June 1901, this time employing the services of the Bhutanese spy Ugyen Kazi, he sent a second letter which was also returned unopened on the grounds that the messenger had been unable to find an official reliable enough to carry it on to Lhasa. It was impossible to say whether Ugyen was telling the truth or had simply lost his nerve, but with the Russians advancing further into Central Asia, and in the knowledge that the Chinese could do nothing to control Tibetan aggression, Curzon decided
that a mission to Lhasa was the only effective means of establishing contact with the Dalai Lama. It was against this background that the Younghusband Expedition set out in 1903.

2. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Sir John Jordan described Tibet as a 'running sore' in Anglo-Chinese relations and until the Younghusband Expedition entered Lhasa in 1904, the Foreign Service in London and China had tended to place the country in the wider context of relations with China.[20] In India this had not been the case and here Tibet was regarded as part of a wider strategy which aimed at loose administrative control over the Indian borderlands including Burma, Assam, and the Himalayan States of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. The idea behind this was to provide commercial gains for India by developing trade in these areas and also to offer an effective buffer against any invasion of the Indian subcontinent by Russia.

The Younghusband Expedition was essentially the brainchild of George Curzon, but it also had powerful backing from a number of vested interests in India, and as conflict began to develop between supporters of this Curzonian forward policy and successive governments in London with little interest in becoming involved in this remote part of the world, the issue itself became part of a wider debate between the Government of India, the India Office, and the Foreign Office, over the control of Indian frontier policy.

The Younghusband Expedition itself acted as a catalyst for change within the Foreign Service, provoking alarm in London, and initiating a period of rivalry between the China Service and the India Service which would complicate all future negotiations about Tibet. In one sense this rivalry was purely commercial for, like the Curzonians, some members of the China Service were also interested in the possibility of developing the commercial potential of Western China, but in the main, British policy was concentrated on the development of commercial interests in the Yangtze Basin, and British Ministers regarded the exploration of resources on the Sino-Tibetan and Sino-Burmese borders as a waste of manpower and resources.
The main problem which the Younghusband Expedition would create for the China Service had more to do with the disruption of its harmonious relations with the Manchu government which had been severely strained by the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and which they had worked hard to restore. If they thought about Tibet in 1904 therefore, they saw it as a problem artificially created by an ambitious Indian government which they did their best to contain.

The Foreign Office in London had also done its utmost to prevent Younghusband from setting out, partly because they thought that the expedition would provoke a crisis with the Russians, with whom they were still competing for territory in Central Asia, and with whom they now wished to effect a truce. By 1904 they were therefore at loggerheads with India over the issue, with the India Office caught between the two as the effective organ of central government in London.

Bremen Addy portrayed Tibet as a pawn on the imperial chessboard and as a helpless victim of the Great Game played out between the major powers in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{21} In many respects this analysis is correct. However, although a victim of imperial policy, Tibet exacted her own revenge for Britain's failure to comprehend her existing status and importance in Central Asia, and involvement in Tibet eventually became a very real threat to British prestige there for a number of reasons. The climate and terrain made the country quite inaccessible except to the most hardened and determined invasion force. Areas of East Tibet had been informally part of China for many years, but the Szechuanese troops who tried to move into territory over which they previously exercised nominal control found the opposition formidable, and the troops and officials they left stranded in isolated garrisons along the main road to Lhasa to administer and retain a presence tended to marry Tibetan women and become Tibetanised. Effective missionary work was also hampered by the strength of the Buddhist religion, and even dedicated missionaries found it virtually impossible to acquire converts among the Tibetans, with the result that one possible avenue of contact between Europeans and Tibetans was closed. Invasion from India was virtually impossible for most of the year since the few passes into Tibet were
blocked by snow, but when it was possible to use them, altitude sickness and exposure took their toll on those unused to the mountain environment, and although the difficulties of travelling into Tibet were one of its greatest attractions, those drawn to this remote wilderness rarely appreciated the scale of the hardships they would face. Involvement in Tibet also highlighted a number of problems which in the long term would have grave implications for the very survival of British imperialism in South and Central Asia. Firstly, the problem of maintaining prestige in remote areas like Tibet, where credibility was vitally important, and where any loss of face might have life threatening implications for those on the spot. Secondly, involvement in Tibet exaggerated conflicts already developing between the bureaucracies in London and the men on the spot, as imperial commitments grew, and as the need for Foreign Office experts was deemed increasingly essential. This process, aided by the rapid introduction of speedier communications between London and Asia, allowed telegraph messages to reach Calcutta and Peking within a day, but was introduced at the expense of the men on the spot who now found themselves in the same dangerous situations, but without the ability to use their initiative for fear of having to risk their career and account for mistakes for which, in the past, greater allowances had been made. This had the effect of undermining confidence without providing necessary backup, for although messages from London might reach Calcutta or Peking within a day, passing them on to remote hill posts on the North East Frontier inevitably took far longer, and the gradual erosion of trust between colleagues on the spot and in London, already exacerbated by tensions between the Services, had an increasingly damaging effect on the overall administration of the Empire. A third quite separate problem was created by the need to define the boundaries of Tibet. This provoked a clash of ideas between East and West because much of the land, which appeared to the British as uninhabited wilderness, was actually divided up by treaty understandings between China and her neighbours. Interest in the development of an international law after 1918 seemed to make it imperative that every
frontier be defined and delimited, even though the wilderness which greeted the outsider was really a network of trade routes collectively owned by the nomads and herders who moved across it, and who deeply resented foreign intrusions, the whole concept of land ownership being entirely alien to their culture. The activities of the great powers were also now closely monitored by the burgeoning newspaper industry which reported every failure and misdemeanour to an increasingly critical body of world opinion and which, by the beginning of the twentieth century, had begun to question the rationale of imperialism. This led in turn to the need for politicians to justify their involvement in Tibet, leading them to define the area geographically and politically in order to establish ownership. This had the effect of encouraging the Chinese to do the same, since after 1900 China was in danger of being divided up into spheres of influence between the great powers, and the Manchu were anxious to establish themselves as a great power in their own right.

The nature of the problem posed by Tibet was therefore large and fundamental in creating division between the various branches of the British Foreign Service, and in challenging the strength of British imperialism as their resources became increasingly stretched. In the following chapters I will explore in detail the nature of the problem which involvement in Tibet presented for the British and Indian Foreign Services at a time when political change and developments in international diplomacy were posing increasing challenges to the future of British power and prestige in Asia.
2. Curzon soon after his appointment as Viceroy in 1898
This introductory chapter examines the changes that took place in Britain's Tibetan policy, both on the frontier, and within the various departments of the Foreign Service, between September 1904, when the Lhasa Convention was signed, and April 1906 when China's adhesion to it was successfully completed.

During this period accepted values and beliefs about the frontier were challenged, and debates about policy generated serious conflicts that were to affect the way in which future policy was conducted.

1. THE YOUNGHUSBAND EXPEDITION AND THE LHASA CONVENTION

There was a strongly held belief, reflected in the testimonies of the men who went with Younghusband to Lhasa in 1904, that they were returning to Tibet in order to complete the work begun by the Government of Bengal which, with the support of the Hastings administration, had sought to establish trade and friendship links with Tibetans in the late 18th century. This 'friendly' forward policy had later been abandoned for one of 'forbearance' after the Nepalese Treaty of 1792 had effectively closed all doors to the country. *1. After 1858 the Government of Bengal fought a long and fruitless battle with the newly created Indian Government to get this policy reversed however the tensions generated by the 'Great Game' on India's frontiers made the sanctioning of any change of policy unlikely, and the cancellation of the Macaulay Mission to Peking on the eve of its departure in 1886 finally put paid to their attempts to get the forward policy reinstated.2*. For members of the Younghusband Expedition therefore, the official sanctioning of their venture by the British Government was both a triumph and a vindication for the position taken by the Government of Bengal, as well as a spectacular diplomatic coup for their mentor, the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, who had taken office in 1899 determined to prevent Tibet falling into Russian hands. *3.
As an acknowledged expert on Asian affairs with a well thought out plan for the frontier Curzon came to regard the Lhasa Expedition as a personal crusade. He looked upon the Dalai Lama's apparent rejection of his overtures of friendship as a calculated insult and was able to convince himself firstly, that Chinese claims to Tibet were a fiction, and secondly, that the Dalai Lama himself was in league with the the Russians. He had carefully selected the team for Lhasa, and its leader Francis Younghusband was already well known to him as a friend. The Expedition members were bound to each other by a mutual commitment to his policy and his views coloured their perceptions, giving the Expedition itself the aura of a vendetta.

Beyond the indirect attack on British prestige afforded by the Tibetan refusal to respond to Curzon's letters, there were genuine fears in India about the safety and security of the north-east frontier, and there was sufficient hard evidence of Russian intrigue in Tibet to convince them that further investigation was warranted. The discovery in 1902 of what appeared to be a secret understanding between Russia and China over the future of Tibet, and the knowledge that the Chinese could no longer influence or control Tibetan behaviour, finally convinced doubters in London of the need to send an Expedition since there now seemed a real possibility that, in the absence of Chinese control, Tibetans might turn directly to Russia for future support, an option which the latter might find too attractive to resist.

The decision to send the Expedition was finally agreed, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, by parties in London and India, when it was realised that the Trade Convention of 1890, set up to regulate frontier trade, was simply not being implemented and that a more forceful approach was required to settle the frontier. Younghusband's initial task was therefore to attempt negotiations with the Tibetans at Kambajong, the nearest inhabited territory just within the Tibetan border. It was only after the failure to reach a settlement at Kambajong that the order to advance into Tibet was issued, and then only after further delays and obstruction by Tibetans, did the party eventually secure official permission to move on to Lhasa in order to effect a settlement.
Many suggestions have been made about the reasons why the Younghusband Expedition was sent to Lhasa. At one level it can certainly be seen as a punitive invasion whose purpose was to show Tibetans that they could not simply ignore friendly approaches made by British India. At another level, it was a mission of investigation, with the aim of discovering the true facts about Russian penetration in the region. On yet a third level, it really was the commercial venture it purported to be, prompted by India's need for cash and fuelled by travellers' tales of rich gold deposits in Tibet and beyond, in the so far unexploited regions of South-West China. There was also a fourth and less tangible reason for the sanctioning of the Expedition, and this had to do with the growing importance given to scientific discovery and the acquisition of knowledge, and each member of the team was involved in some kind of scientific or cultural activity.9 Finally, the Expedition was an adventure. The journalists accompanying the group, and the newspapermen covering the story at home, ensured that their readers were able to enjoy a 'ripping yarn' from the relative comfort of their own armchairs. 10

For all these reasons, to satisfy curiosity, allay fears, and establish some British claim to Tibet, the expedition eventually moved on to Lhasa where the ultimate purpose of the venture for Younghusband was to sign a formal Treaty which would bind Tibet to India and ensure the security of India's frontier in the long term.

The Lhasa Convention signed on 7th September 1904, was ostensibly a commercial document. The Indian Government were anxious to increase their political influence in Tibet as much as possible in order to counter any continuing Russian involvement which could threaten frontier security. They therefore pushed to get a representative permanently stationed in Lhasa, and when this tactic was opposed in London, concentrated on establishing trading marts inside Tibet to co-ordinate commercial activities and monitor political events there. 11 Two such marts were set up under the terms of the Convention, at Gyantse, near Lhasa, and at Gartok in Western Tibet.12 Under Article IX of the Convention, representatives from other powers were prevented from having any commercial or political dealings with Tibet, and although the
intention of this article was to exclude Russia, it greatly annoyed the Chinese who saw it as a direct challenge to what they regarded as their own legitimate rights there. Article IX marked the beginning of a souring of Anglo-Chinese relations over Tibet that were to become a major issue during the subsequent talks to secure Chinese Adhesion to the Convention in 1905 #13. The additional indemnity clause, personally negotiated by Younghusband himself, also created an explosion of hostility in London that was followed by a full scale enquiry into his behaviour, which he and his colleagues bitterly resented. #14

There was considerable controversy in London and Peking about the status of the delegates who signed the Lhasa Convention. The following names appeared as signatories: Colonel Younghusband (British Commissioner); Ti Rimpoche (Representative of the Dalai Lama); Representatives of the Three Monastries of Sera, Ganden, and Drepung; and Members of the Tsongdu. The signing ceremony had taken place inside the Potala itself. Copies of the document, in English, Chinese and Tibetan, were then sent on to London, Calcutta, and Peking, for ratification. The signing ceremony lasted for one and a half hours and afterwards Younghusband made a formal address to the Tibetan people, stressing friendship between Britain and Tibet. #15

After the tensions surrounding the Convention, the signing had been effected with remarkable good humour and with accompanying sighs of relief all round; the Expedition members spent the rest of their time in the city, visiting temples and monasteries and befriending the local people. #16. Despite the appearance of legality however the Convention was highly unorthodox, and the status of the signatories questionable. Although Younghusband had the authority to negotiate a bilateral treaty with the Tibetans, he was himself very unclear about how much flexibility he had been given. #17 The additional complication of the approaching winter, coupled with pressure from Macdonald, military head of the expedition, whom Younghusband suspected of trying to seize control, meant that decisions had to be taken quickly. #18 The extent to which he acted in ignorance of instructions given remains a matter for speculation; however it is a fact that, despite the trappings of officialdom, Younghusband's position was no longer as secure as it had once been for Curzon himself was now under
investigation, following a prolonged and bitter conflict with Lord Kitchener, Military Advisor to his Council, and had left India before the Convention was signed.\(^ {19}\)

As Tibetan Regent Ti Rimpoché's position was an extremely delicate one. The Dalai Lama had fled the capital on the eve of the Expedition's arrival and Ti Rimpoché had been very reluctant to receive the official seal which made him in effect responsible for the outcome of any talks with the British.\(^ {20}\) Although he was still able to maintain some contact with the Dalai Lama, communication in such a mountainous region was erratic, leaving him in much the same position as Younghusband who was experiencing similar difficulties trying to keep contact with India. In addition, he was at the mercy of powerful monkish factions within Lhasa who had their own disputes with the Dalai Lama, and who took this opportunity to attack Ti Rimpoché, his official representative, voicing their hostility to the Convention with great force as soon as the expedition left Lhasa on the morning of 23rd of September 1904.\(^ {21}\)

In terms of achieving what it had set out to do, namely establishing an agreement with the Tibetans that would keep foreign powers out of Tibet, the Lhasa Convention clearly failed. The Tibetans rejected it, and the Manchu Government in Peking queried its legality. The British Government was particularly embarrassed by it, and the indemnity clause in Article 19 drew much international criticism.\(^ {22}\) The disappearance of the Dalai Lama provided additional complications and, far from settling the frontier as intended, the Convention left it even more disturbed.\(^ {23}\) Chinese criticisms of the agreement drew British attention to the problem of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet, a factor not previously taken into account in their Tibetan policy, and helped to crystallise the two factions within British ranks, split between those promoting, and those opposing, a forward policy in Tibet. Officially, the Indian Government resumed its policy of forbearance but, within its ranks, the powerful Curzonian lobby fought on with a well orchestrated campaign in London and India that kept the option of having a forward policy very much alive.\(^ {24}\)

The Lhasa Convention, and the events leading up to it, placed Tibet momentarily in the international spotlight, forcing Britain to define
Diagram shows altitude between Siliguri and Lhasa
(approx 400 miles)

Map No. 3
her Tibetan policy in a way not previously thought necessary. Tibet had also captured the public imagination and was no longer the rather nebulous geographical region it had been before the expedition had set out, and the need to delimit borders and establish status became an important end in itself. Although the Indian Government had previously made determined efforts to define and explore the area, they had done so as a means of determining the Indo-Tibetan border rather than as an attempt to define Tibet's border with China, and the considerable interest that developed in this border region as a result of Chinese attempts to define the nature of their own interest there will be the subject of future chapters. The first stirrings of Anglo-Chinese tensions began to emerge as soon as the Convention was signed since the Treaty left the British with a number of loose ends. On the one hand it removed the hysteria surrounding the Russian threat to frontier security that had been a major reason for the despatch of the Expedition, while on the other it highlighted a completely new set of problems posed by the growing menace of Chinese expansion in East Tibet.

2. CHINESE FORWARD POLICY IN TIBET 1904-6

Before 1904 Britain found it convenient to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet because it complemented their own relationship with territories under British control in other parts of the north-east and north-west frontiers of India. Younghusband for example likened his role as Resident in Kashmir to the Amban's role in Lhasa, often using the term 'Resident' to describe the Amban during his discussions about the Convention in Lhasa. Moreover, one of the reasons why Curzonians felt able to justify the Expedition on moral grounds was because they felt that, having been unable to control the Tibetans, the Chinese had forfeited their suzerain rights to the country. This view persisted within the Indian Government throughout the talks aimed at gaining Chinese adhesion to the Convention, and led to a tendency to discount what was essentially a forward policy conducted by the Chinese on the Sino-Tibetan borders and inside Tibet throughout the period of the talks between 1904 and 1906, even though this activity began to affect life on the frontier.
In 1904 Manchu claims to Tibet were based on the Cho-yon relationship, a personal understanding between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor, under which both parties agreed to look after the interests of the other in specific ways. The Dalai Lama became the Emperor's spiritual advisor and in return, the Emperor undertook the role of patron, looking after Tibet's defence and foreign relations. The Emperor's failure to fulfil his role as patron had led the Dalai Lama to look elsewhere for a replacement. He turned initially to Russia, since his links with Russian Buddhists were strong, but also to Nepal with which, despite past wars and mutual suspicion, Tibet had a long term understanding. *27

Few people in the British foreign service understood very much about the Cho-yon and this ignorance resulted in misunderstandings which the Tibetans and the Chinese were able to exploit both before and after the Convention was signed. China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and their inability to oust Tibetans from Sikkim, exposed their weakness to the west and upset the status-quo on the north-east frontier. *28

In the decade before 1904, the Chinese had fought hard to retain their existing position in the region in an attempt to restore their flagging prestige although they were hard put to do this, especially in East Tibet and on the China-Burma border. Chinese prestige there was in fact so low after Tibetans had captured the village of Lingtu on the border with Sikkim in the early summer of 1886, that when the Chinese Viceroy of Szechuan sent for troops to help him with a local border dispute, the Tibetans were powerful enough to prevent such help from coming and were able to put pressure on the Lhasa Amban to refuse the request. *29 Similarly, on the Burma-Tibet border, Chinese troops had found themselves unable to control tribal uprisings, and alarming reports were received from the British Consul in Chengtu that described the ease with which the Lolos were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese troops sent from Szechuan to quell them, a very real indication of Chinese weakness on the eve of the Expedition in 1903. *30

Throughout the slow progress of the Expedition to Lhasa, Britain and China had each played a double game. The British government had sanctioned every stage of the Expedition, and had supported the signing of the Convention.
including the omission of any reference to Chinese suzerainty, and the
Chinese, fully aware of their inability to prevent the expedition moving
forward, had sought wherever possible to thwart its progress whilst
remaining outwardly co-operative.*31 Although to some extent this tactic
worked to the advantage of both sides, each having a vested interest
in gaining control of the politically ambitious and 'troublesome'
Dalai Lama, they were really pursuing different aims; Britain wishing to
preserve Tibet as an independent buffer state, and China wanting to
reaffirm the Cho-yon and bring the Dalai Lama to heel. Expedition accounts
of the Lhasa negotiations for the most part indicate an equitable
relationship between the newly appointed Amban, Yu Tai, and Expedition
members.*32 Younghusband and O'Connor were particularly impressed with his
sophistication following months of frustrating dialogue with 'uncivilised'
Tibetans; tending to view the Expedition in terms of Anglo-Russian
relations, they were oblivious to possible Chinese motives.*33
Waddell, the expedition doctor, was more sceptical, and his expedition
account accuses the Chinese of a variety of hostile acts not mentioned in
other accounts for which he was later criticised by colleagues. *34.
Chinese obstruction took a variety of forms. Firstly, they used delaying
tactics, changing delegates to hold up proceedings at Chumbi, and
taking an interminable time to appoint and install Yu Tai as new Amban
in Lhasa. *35 Secondly, they gave out misinformation to both the British
and the Tibetans, making extravagant and spurious claims for the
significance of the Cho-yon to the former, and telling the latter that
Younghusband had been forced to leave Lhasa hurriedly after receiving
reports that the Emperor was to send a grand army to oust him. They also
failed to warn the British of a Tibetan attack on them at Gyantse even
though they knew about this well in advance. *36 Thirdly, they punished
key Chinese officials who had had any dealings with the British.
Ironically Yu Tai and his secretary were later both arrested after being
accused of collaboration with Britain by allowing the expedition to enter
Lhasa, despite the fact that there was little they could have done to
prevent it. *37
Within two months of the signing of the Convention the British Minister in Peking, Sir Ernest Satow, began to report strong rumours that the Chinese were planning to make Tibet a Province of China. This news marked a turning point in Anglo-Chinese relations over Tibet and led to a real awakening of British interest in the problem that the expedition had apparently created for future Tibetan policy.

In December 1905 conflict developed between British and Chinese officials at the new trade marts. In Chumbi the Chinese posted proclamations announcing their intention to pay the Tibetan indemnity which the British Government chose to regard as a direct challenge to their authority in the valley.*38 In January 1906 Frederick Bailey arrived as temporary replacement to O'Connor at the Gyantse trade mart and found himself in open conflict with Mr. Gow, the Chinese official stationed there. Gow told Bailey that in future he could not deal directly with Tibetans but must channel all communications through him. This was an open violation of the terms of the Convention signed with Tibet and led to an intensification of conflict between them.*39 Before 1906 however, these wrangles were discounted by the British as minor local incidents and were not seen as part of a more sinister programme of wider Chinese expansion. Meanwhile, a second Chinese front continued to develop in East Tibet. In 1905 Feng Chu had taken up the newly created post of Assistant Resident or Amban for Chamdo in East Tibet, with his headquarters at Tachienlu, an important trading centre on the East Tibetan border. Feng had been appointed with specific instructions to curtail the powers of the native rulers in the region and prepare the way for a Chinese take over. When he was murdered in April 1905, during an attempt to escape from an anti-Chinese rising at Batang, widespread unrest followed which the Chinese were hard put to suppress.*40 When the native Tibetan rising spread to the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan, Chinese garrisons there were overwhelmed and British consuls in the China Service began to report serious concern for the safety of Chao Erh Feng, the recently appointed commander of Chinese troops in East Tibet.*41 The situation worsened in February 1906 when Bailey reported from Gyantse that the Chinese had occupied the East Tibetan state of Nyarong, using Feng's murder as a pretext, and that his Tibetan sources further suggested
that China intended to use the state as a base from which to control the area around Lhasa. Despite the obvious activity in East Tibet, the Foreign Office continued to ignore Chinese infiltration mainly because the area was a wilderness, loosely controlled by local tribal chiefs which had been the subject of disputes between China and Tibet for centuries, but also because British interests had been traditionally concerned with West Tibet and in particular with those areas bordering India.

Chinese forward policy was a fact well before 1904 but its nature changed as a result of the Lhasa Expedition. Before Younghusband set out, the Chinese had based all their claims to Tibet on the Cho-yon; after the Convention was signed in Lhasa however, they began to redefine their claim in western terms, claiming sovereignty as well as suzerainty over the country. In a sense therefore the Lhasa Expedition can be seen as a direct stimulus to Chinese forward policy for it led to a re-evaluation of the Cho-yon by the Chinese, and a redefinition of the relationship in terms compatible with western international law. This helped Britain to clarify her own attitude towards Chinese claims to Tibet, and from this time forward Chinese motives began to be viewed in ways that could be easily understood in British terms, prestige and status being shared concepts. It also made Chinese claims to Tibet seem more dangerous and threatening to British interests. When the Chinese had first offered to pay the indemnity in 1904 British fears had been alerted, although even before the Liberals took office in December 1905, the policy had been to allow Chinese infiltration into Tibet to go unchecked. The reasons for this were complex, involving a need to play down tensions on the frontier in order to prepare the ground for a settlement with Russia which was to form the basis of Liberal policy in Central Asia between 1906 and 1907. Beyond this there was a subtler set of reasons for if examined, Chinese, or indeed Russian claims to Tibet were as valid under international law as those put forward by the Indian Government, and rather than look at the relative merits of those claims in detail, it was easier to ignore them. Between 1904 and 1906 therefore this was precisely what happened, making it possible for the Chinese to build up what amounted to an invasion force in
3. The Ninth Panchen Lama

4. Agvan Dorjiev
East Tibet which passed almost unnoticed except in the reports from British consular officials in the China Service stationed in remote posts near the East Tibetan borders with China.

3. BRITISH FRONTIER POLICY 1904-6

At the beginning of the Chapter I described the way in which the motives behind the despatch of the Lhasa Expedition were inspired by Curzon's frontier policy and how both the Foreign Office and the India Office were pushed into accepting it by the pressure of events. In this next section I will look at the way in which Curzon's approach to Tibetan frontier policy was continued by his successor Lord Minto in the period between the signing of the Lhasa Convention in September 1904, and the signing of the Adhesion Treaty with China in April 1906, despite the fact that a Liberal Government had come to power in December 1905 committed to a policy of non-involvement to be fronted by John Morley, the new Secretary of State for India.\cite{47}

Evidence of a continuing Curzonian approach towards Tibetan policy and the effect of a sustained campaign mounted by Curzon and his supporters in Britain were to become even more obvious after 1906, but in the period under discussion they revealed themselves in three ways. Firstly, in the continuing hostility directed towards the Dalai Lama and the promotion of the Panchen Lama as an alternative ruler. Secondly, in the attempt to hold Chumbi Valley in British hands for as long as possible and thirdly, in the sustained support for exploration on the frontier.

Gyatso Thubten, Tibet's Thirteenth Dalai Lama, posed a particular problem for Britain and China. Having been the first Dalai Lama to survive to maturity since the seventeenth century, he had acquired a certain amount of political acumen which had been reinforced by contact with the Russian Buriat Dorjiev, who had first introduced him to western ideas and had been his tutor during his formative years.\cite{48} Unlike his predecessors therefore Gyatso Thubten was better equipped to exploit the situation in Tibet's favour and reports of his intrigues, although exaggerated, had some basis in truth. His non-confrontational approach, and his sudden disappearance shortly before the Younghusband Expedition
had entered Lhasa, both confused and alarmed his opponents, and his subsequent travels on the frontier and in Mongolia during his period of exile from the city between 1904 and 1909 were carefully monitored by western and Chinese observers. The Indian Government were particularly anxious to be rid of him and co-operated with the Chinese in a plan to supplant him with the Panchen Lama, although the latter was never willing or able to take on the role.

In 1905 a plot was hatched by the Curzonian faction within the Indian Service to invite the Panchen Lama to India to coincide with an official visit by the Prince and Princess of Wales, when he might be presented to the Royal couple as the ruler of Tibet. The Panchen Lama had been held in great affection by the Indian Government since the time of Bogle's visit to Tibet in 1774 and since that time there had also remained genuine confusion about his status and position in the Tibetan hierarchy, in which he seemed equal to the Dalai Lama in some respects, having his own palace and administration at Shigatse, and being described as the Dalai Lama's 'spiritual adviser'. In view of the special bond that was felt to exist between some members of the Indian Service and the Panchen Lama, it became convenient for the Indian Government to assume a higher status for him and quite natural, after discussions with Tibetans themselves, to see him as a rival ruler, especially after the Dalai Lama had fled Lhasa in 1904.

Furthermore, when the Panchen Lama accepted Curzon's invitation to visit India with apparent enthusiasm and willingly left his palace at Shigatse, despite the misgivings of many of his followers and without seeking the Dalai Lama's permission, these assumptions seemed justified, although in fact, as his subsequent behaviour was to show, fear of the British had proved a stronger inducement for departure than anything else. He left Shigatse, accompanied by his friend O'Connor in October 1905, reaching Rawlpindi in India a month later. Once there he received a joyful reception from Indian Buddhists and spent a happy time visiting various religious sites which was the official reason given for the visit. Whilst in Rawlpindi he also took part in a review of British and Indian troops, together with the official representatives of the neighbouring Himalayan States of Bhutan, and Nepal, causing some amusement...
when he sent his secretary to look behind the front ranks of troops, apparently unwilling to believe that such a number could be mustered for parade.*55 It was also further decided that, during his stay, he would be granted the honours due to Indian Ruling Princes and he was accordingly given a seventeen gun salute, making him higher in rank than the Tsonga Penlop, ruler of Bhutan, who had only received fifteen.*56 During the course of the visit he was formally introduced to the Prince and Princess of Wales as Tibet's official representative, and on January 10th 1906 he was allowed to pay a private visit to Calcutta to meet the new Viceroy, Lord Minto. He took the opportunity afforded by this visit to make three requests to the Viceroy that were clearly aimed at covering himself in the event of reprisals from either the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Emperor, and he made them in the belief that they would be accepted, based on assurances given him by O'Connor before he set out and while Curzon was still in India.*57

His first request was that he might be given a letter promising British assistance in the event of hostile actions from China or Tibet towards his visit. The second was that, in the event of any such attack, the Government of India would undertake to supply him with arms with which to defend himself; and the third asked that British officers at Gyantse might continue their present friendly relations with him. Minto's reply was clearly not what he had been led to expect however, and he was politely informed that, since India had already explained to the Emperor that the nature of his visit was private, it was highly unlikely that the Chinese would proceed to acts of oppression against him, although in the event of any problems occurring 'the good offices of the British government would doubtless be exerted on China on his behalf'.*58 The request for arms was firmly denied, again with the explanation that an armed attack was so unlikely as to be not worth discussing. The third request was accepted and the Panchen Lama told that instructions would forthwith be issued to Gyantse. Clearly 'disappointed' by the replies he received, there was little he could do or say to influence events, and his decision to go to India later created great problems for him.*59
Although approved in principle by London, Minto's guarded replies were later modified in terms even less favourable to the Panchen Lama, and in a telegram dated 5th February 1906, British officers at Gyantse were instructed to confine their communications with him to 'the narrowest possible limits' avoiding any action which the Chinese Emperor might interpret as an interference in the internal affairs of Tibet. The telegram was a clear indication that, despite Minto's promise to retain links between British officers at Gyantse and the Panchen Lama, London had no wish to become involved in any dealings with Tibetans that might jeopardize their relations with China.*60

The Panchen Lama left India in January 1906 a sad and confused man, the journey back to Shigatse proving an adventure in itself as Chinese and Tibetan officials monitored the progress of the party very carefully.*61 The visit had caused considerable embarrassment to the Foreign Office in London, not only because it roused official protest from Peking and St. Petersburg, but also because it exacerbated the growing tensions between the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama in such a way as to implicate Britain, the Panchen Lama having defended his visit to India on the grounds that he had been coerced into leaving Shigatse by the Indian Government.*62 White and O'Connor, the two officers in the Indian service responsible for organizing the delivery of the invitation, were later officially reprimanded for their part in the affair and were certainly heavily implicated in the organisation of the venture. O'Connor had referred to the visit in letters to White as 'our little plan', and although the invitation had been supposedly delivered without the official knowledge of the Indian Government, they were obviously in accord with Curzon's wishes.*63

The whole affair was Morley's first introduction to the Tibetan problem as new Secretary of State for India and he was dismayed that the India Office had not been consulted. The incident confirmed his growing belief that the Indian Government could not always be trusted to take advice from London, especially in frontier matters and that, even if the Viceroy was willing to obey orders, he could not always control the behaviour of his men on the spot whose initiatives could easily be delivered as a fait accompli.*65
5. Drepung Monastery

6. Gyantse
As new Viceroy Hinto was to prove more sympathetic to independent initiatives from his frontier staff, but because he was nervous about the implications of their actions for frontier defence, as well as for his own role as Viceroy, he tended to adhere more closely than his predecessor to instructions from London, and this was to have important consequences for the conduct of frontier policy after 1905. The visit ultimately proved an unfortunate blunder for all concerned for not only did it fail in its objective of getting official support for the plan to enhance the status of the Panchen Lama by gaining royal as well as political approval, but it also succeeded in degrading him. His unorthodox behaviour in India often made him appear quaint and naive thus undermining his credibility as a potential ruler of Tibet, as well as placing him in great personal danger. The venture did not end in total disaster for the Curzonian faction however since it created a number of loose ends which kept the Tibetan question on the boil. An embarrassing conflict between the Indian government and the Foreign Office in London over related issues like the occupation of Chumbi Valley for example, provided fresh opportunities to question and reassess aspects of British Tibetan policy that many would have preferred to abandon.

The occupation of Chumbi Valley was a goal very dear to the hearts of Curzonians, having been urged upon the Indian government by the Bengal government since the late 1880's. The Valley was of great strategic importance to India since it controlled the passes in and out of Tibet and, quite apart from any wider political considerations, it was vital to the promotion of Indian trade in the area. After Younghusband had left Lhasa in September 1904, Chumbi valley had been administered by the Indian Government using a handful of officials stationed at the trade marts in Yatung, Gartok, and Gyantse. These men were Curzonians, and since they now exercised virtual control of trade in the Chumbi valley with instructions to behave as commercial agents, their work was clearly of a more political nature and they themselves regarded these minor, isolated postings, as significant career moves.

Having gained control of the Chumbi Valley the Indian Government fought a long battle to retain it as Indian territory in spite of the immense
difficulties involved. Firstly, there was overt hostility from Chinese officials who soon began to challenge British authority at the marts, and both Bailey and O'Connor, who were stationed at Gyantse during this time, were to experience this hostility at first hand in the confrontational approach adopted by the Chinese official Mr. Gow. *69

Secondly there was a problem with the Tibetans themselves, and especially with the Jongpens in nearby Phari, who had previously operated their own monopolies and resented British and Chinese attempts to interfere with their lucrative trading practices. *70 This hostility was usually manifested in attacks on the telegraph lines. Cut lines caused considerable inconvenience as well as endangering the lives of British personnel by preventing regular contact with India. *71 Perhaps the most embarrassing problem for the Curzonians stationed on the frontier however was the tension generated by the presence of Chinese Customs officials whose role was to monitor trade for the Peking government. Officers of the Chinese Customs service had been stationed on the frontier since 1880 and were for the most part British or European, a deliberate Chinese policy to ensure a good working relationship with British officials in India. *72 Although officially on good terms, there had been a long history of resentment between the employees of the Indian and Chinese Governments, and with British control over trade more firmly established, overt conflict became inevitable. O'Connor at Gyantse, and White at Gartok for example, experienced particular difficulties in their relations with Paul Henderson, the Chinese Customs official responsible for the Tibetan frontier, since by virtue of his position, Henderson could travel anywhere on the frontier without British permission, and O'Connor frequently complained that he 'meddled' in Tibetan affairs, behaving in a high-handed and arrogant way towards Tibetans that generally undermined the goodwill it had taken him so long to create. This irritation quickly turned to fury when Henderson took it upon himself, on behalf of his Chinese employers, to publicly declare the Lhasa Convention invalid. *73

The tension need not necessarily have been such a problem had British trade agents like O'Connor been acting within their legal remit; however, in a situation where they were seeking to establish informal political as
well as commercial control at the marts, their roles inevitably came into conflict, and Tibetans were treated to the confusing and no doubt rather amusing spectacle, of 'British' officials in open disagreement. For the Indian Government this conflict was serious because it created a situation that challenged British credibility in an environment where such loss of prestige could be fatal.*74

As well as encouraging attempts to retain Chumbi Valley in British hands for as long as possible, Curzonians made real efforts to initiate a forward policy on the frontier. After the Lhasa Convention was signed, Younghusband arranged for three parties to return to India by different routes. The first aimed to explore and locate the source of the San-po river, by following the Brahmaputra river into Assam. The second were initially to follow the same course but with the separate aim of discovering a direct route to Gartok in western Tibet. The third party were to take a quite different route through East Tibet to Szechuan in an attempt to discover a direct overland route to south-west China which India might later exploit for trade.*75

In the event only the Gartok party received permission to proceed since their mission was more obviously tied to existing trading links, but the scale and scope of the missions that failed reveal the true purpose and scope of Curzonian plans for the development of this vast area stretching from Assam to western China.*76 This ambitious forward policy eventually collapsed as a direct result of Liberal non-involvement policy which restricted frontier travel and made permits increasingly difficult to acquire. Much resentment was caused by the fact that the ban was not uniformly applied since only those travellers regarded with suspicion by the Indian government failed to get permits while others, whose credentials often seemed far shadier, often did. The Times correspondent David Fraser, and the mysterious Dr. Zugmayer of the Bavarian Academy of Science for example, gained permits denied to China Consul, Eric Wilton, and to Charles Bell, a paid employee of the Indian Government. Such decisions seemed irrational but were a true reflection of the paranoia surrounding the problem of assessing who could or could not be trusted to maintain British security on the frontier at this time.*77
7. Chumbi Valley

8. Wool Traders of Chumbi Valley
The new non-involvement policy caused resentment not only because it restricted exploration of Tibet and its frontiers, but more importantly because it undermined a basic philosophy that had for years drawn many people to the India service, and which viewed the frontier as a sort of adventure playground in which it was possible to indulge freely in the acceptable pleasures of hunting and exploration in comparative safety. It has been argued that the frontier was in itself a subtle kind of forward policy and the Younghusband expedition was simply another way of preparing the area for British occupation.78 British claims to western Tibet were already well developed, and part of the reason why Chumbi Valley was so dear to India was because so much time and trouble had been taken to explore and record its geography and fauna as well as the location of its trade routes and passes.79 Throughout the duration of the Liberal ban on frontier travel between 1906 and 1907 however exploration continued discreetly, and with Minto's full knowledge, if not his official sanction. In pursuing this line the Viceroy was jealously guarding his right to control and determine his own frontier policy increasingly in defiance of directives from London.80

4. THE CHINESE ADHESION TREATY APRIL 1906

After the signing of the Lhasa Convention in September 1904, the Amban Yu Tai, who had witnessed the ceremony on behalf of his government, telegraphed Peking to record that, in his opinion, the Convention contained 'nothing subversive of Chinese suzerainty'; and Britain's Minister in Peking Sir Ernest Satow was accordingly instructed to press the Chinese to sign an Adhesion Treaty acknowledging their acceptance of the Convention as soon as possible.81 Until the time of Younghusband's departure from Lhasa on September 23rd 1904, Yu Tai had received no word from Peking to indicate that they might have any objections to signing an Adhesion agreement, a view confirmed by Satow in a telegram to London on 27th September, containing the news from Peking that Tang Shao Yi, a former customs official from Tientsin, had been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Deputy and ordered to Lhasa with instructions 'to investigate and conduct affairs' in the city.82 At this stage there seemed every reason to believe that
the Chinese were happy to sign an agreement and Satow was asked to reassure them concerning 'certain points in the Convention about which they had expressed misgivings', while at the same time hint to them that the British government would allow the Convention to stand with or without Chinese adhesion.*83 Despite this promising start however negotiations soon began to go wrong. Younghusband had left Lhasa four days after Tang's appointment as 'official investigator' for the Peking Government thus cancelling out any opportunity for the two men to meet and sign an Adhesion Agreement on the spot. Moreover, it soon became apparent that the Chinese were totally unprepared to accept the Lhasa Convention as it stood, for not only did it challenge their rights under the Cho-yon relationship to conduct Tibetan foreign affairs, but it also prevented them from enjoying exclusive trade within Tibet itself, involving them in a serious loss of face, and exposing their weakness to other foreign powers who might use the opportunity to make fresh concession demands inside China itself. In Peking even Satow had some sympathy for the Chinese predicament.*84 The Indian government were more content than London to leave the situation as it was and to allow the Convention to stand without Chinese adhesion which they believed would only involve protracted and difficult negotiations, harmful to both Anglo-Chinese relations and to long term frontier security; a belief that was later to be confirmed by events.*85 The Foreign Office were more than a little alarmed by the reports from Satow of the increasingly extravagant Chinese claims for Tibet and, in addition, were having to contend with mounting international criticism of the Younghusband Expedition, the debacle at Guru having been subjected to extensive coverage in the world's press.*86 As 1904 moved into 1905 therefore, the need to secure a Chinese adhesion seemed crucial. Some felt it was setting a dangerous precedent to allow Tibet to conduct her own affairs without any reference to Chinese suzerainty, but this view was not shared by the Indian government who continued to believe that Chinese adhesion was both undesirable and unnecessary. A bitter rift then began to develop between London and Calcutta which would eventually lead to open conflict during the course of protracted negotiations for the Adhesion Treaty.
Having lost the battle to prevent the talks opening, India continued to
fight to salvage as much as possible of what they felt were Indian gains
secured by the Lhasa Convention. Their first triumph was to succeed in
having the talks held in Calcutta instead of Peking as initially proposed.
They opened there in March 1905, continuing in stormy session until the
following November when they broke down, both sides unable to reach
agreement over the status of Tibet.*87 At first the Chinese insisted that
their suzerainty be recognised. This was not a problem in itself, since
Chinese supervisory rights in Tibet had been acknowledged by Britain under
various Treaties since the Treaty of Chefoo in 1876. The real problem was
that the exact nature of those rights had never been clearly defined, the
terms 'sovereignty' and 'suzerainty' being used randomly even in official
 correspondence.*88 By July 1905, months before talks eventually broke down
altogether, progress was still blocked over this question with British
delegates, the Indian Foreign Secretary S. M. Fraser, and Eric Wilton of
the China Consular Service, defining Chinese rights as 'suzerain', and the
Chinese delegate T'ang Shao yi, defining them as 'sovereign'.*89 At this
point the Indian Government decided to force the issue and ordered Fraser
to present T'ang with a draft agreement for signature. T'ang's response was
to acquire what most people even at the time believed to be a 'diplomatic
illness'. He left Calcutta almost immediately, after petitioning Peking to
be allowed to return to China, and his place was taken by his own former
secretary, Chang Yin Tang. Within days Fraser completed his term of
office and was replaced by the new Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis Dane.*90
Since Chang had renewed the lease on the house being used by the Chinese
delegation in Calcutta for a further six months, it looked very much as
though, having acquired this breathing space, the Chinese expected talks to
resume as before with the new delegates. On November 14th 1905 therefore,
three days before finally leaving for England, Curzon arranged for Chang to
be presented with the draft previously offered to T'ang for signature, and
when Chang also refused to sign, talks collapsed.*91
Alastair Lamb has argued that, had the political climate of 1904-5
remained and Curzon continued as Viceroy, the matter might have been left
there, with the Convention standing without Chinese adhesion.*92
Although the new Liberal government had altered policy dramatically since taking office in December 1905, the new Viceroy Minto remained in sympathy with the frontier policy of his predecessor and was no more willing than Curzon to enter into discussions with China about Tibet, let alone treat with China about territory bordering India, and soon after taking office, he pressed for the internment of the Dalai Lama and for indemnity payments to be met in full by Tibet, a position in direct opposition to the new policy. Liberals however, saw the settling of the Tibetan 'problem' in terms of securing Chinese adhesion to the Convention and were prepared to push ahead with talks at whatever cost to their future relations with the Indian Government, an approach that served only to further exacerbate tensions between India and London. #93

This presented an immediate problem for Satow as British Minister in Peking, for it was now felt, even by the India Office, that the talks might have a greater chance of success if they were to be reconvened in China. Satow knew that such a move would place an intolerable burden on his staff at the Peking Legation and that indeed, 'more might be expected of him', than 'he would be able to perform' and, no doubt remembering Younghusband's similar predicament in Lhasa as the man on the spot left to use his initiative, he insisted that he be given latitude over dates, as well as 'some general indications' as to 'how far His Majesty's Government would go in the way of concessions in order to secure a speedy solution' to the matter. #94 The Indian Government had expressed no firm objection to the resumption of talks in Peking, and this time, there being no mention of the suzerainty/sovereignty issue that had contributed so much to the collapse of talks at Calcutta, Morley was able to inform Minto in early April 1906 that a draft treaty might be anticipated, if India were agreeable. Minto accepted the new draft on April 14th, together with certain modifications, and the treaty was eventually signed in Peking on April 27th, and ratified in London three months later. #95

The success of the second round of talks was partly due to the fact that they had been held in Peking and not Calcutta, but they were also affected by India's decision to concentrate upon an aspect of the talks over which they could exercise some control. Throughout the course of the discussions,
9. Younghusband and Friends

Front Row: Younghusband centre in black greatcoat with Macdonald on his left. Back Row: Bailey (with cane) on extreme left with O'Connor beside him (hands in pockets)

10. Sir Francis Younghusband
and for some time after they were concluded, a long battle was waged between the Indian government and the Foreign Office to determine the way in which the Tibetan indemnity should be paid. 96 During the final stages of the negotiations leading to the signing of the Lhasa Convention in 1904, the payment of the indemnity was the most serious source of friction between the British and the Tibetans. The Tibetans had always insisted that they could not afford to pay it and were clearly under the impression that the situation was negotiable. They argued that in any normal bargaining situation as they understood this to be, if one party got only half the things they asked for they would be satisfied, and that in asking for full payment the British were being unreasonable. During his time in Lhasa Younghusband had pursued the question of the indemnity obsessively, refusing to retreat an inch, despite attempts by Bhutanese ruler Tsonga Penlop and others to persuade him to compromise. 97 It was difficult for him not to see the indemnity issue in personal terms since, having been the butt of what he felt to be quite unnecessary aggression, he believed it only just that the Tibetans be asked to pay for the suffering endured by the members of his Expedition during its progress through Tibet. In his mind the payment of the indemnity was linked to Indian claims to Chumbi, and by making the payments as high as possible, he hoped to ensure that the British occupation of the Valley would be an extended one. 98 The fierce criticism of his behaviour at Lhasa was deeply resented, both by himself, and by all those associated with the Expedition, being seen as an overt challenge to the traditional view that the 'man on the spot' might be left to exercise his initiative in such delicate situations. Younghusband later blamed the pressure generated by the emotive campaign waged against the indemnity in the Liberal press for mobilising public opinion against him, and for exposing conflicts between London and India that questioned the wisdom of allowing the Viceroy the right to retain personal control of Indian frontier policy. 99 Matters reached a crisis over the indemnity payments when the Liberals took office and it was discovered that the Chinese had posted proclamations in Chumbi Valley Valley offering to pay the indemnity on Tibet's behalf. 100 In
forwarding this information to London and Calcutta, Sir Ernest Satow recommended that Britain should not agree to accept the Chinese offer on the grounds that it was merely the first stage in a wider plan seeking to gain sovereignty over Tibet. The Foreign Office endorsed Satow's view, as they had no wish to further annoy the Indian government who clearly saw the payments as a punitive measure against Tibet; and because they believed that China would in any case be unable to meet the costs of the payment in view of the severe financial problems being experienced by the tottering Manchu administration. The effect of this British refusal to accept the Chinese offer to pay the indemnity however was to have harmful repercussions for future Anglo-Chinese relations. *101

The Indian Government continued to insist that the full cost of the indemnity should be met by the Tibetans, and a demand for the first payment to be made at Gyantse on January 1st 1906 was sent out. The Chinese reacted immediately to this demand, suggesting that the payment might be made at Calcutta where the Adhesion talks were then being conducted. Minto quickly countered this by arguing that China's offer to pay on Tibet's behalf had made this impossible because, under the terms of the Lhasa Convention, Tibetans had to pay. At the India Office Morley was less happy about this response and, while agreeing in principle that China should not pay the full amount at this stage, he suggested that, as an incentive to ensure a successful conclusion to the Adhesion talks, they might be allowed to pay eventually. In later telegrams he reaffirmed this view when he stated that a direct payment of the indemnity by China could not be refused once the Adhesion treaty had been signed, and by late 1906 the principle of Chinese payment had been accepted by the Foreign Office *102

Following on from this success the Chinese then offered to pay the indemnity off in three instalments, a device which Minto particularly distrusted, believing it to be aimed at forcing the return of Chumbi before all payments had been completed. Even Morley hesitated before accepting this offer but he came to believe that ultimately, the advantages of occupying Chumbi valley for so long were outweighed by the disadvantages of having to enforce the direct annual payments of 1 lakh for seventy-five
11. The Amban Yu-t'ai

12. Ti Rimpoche
years under the terms of the existing agreement with Tibet. When the Adhesion Treaty was signed therefore Britain agreed to accept three instalments of 25 lakh, and in doing so, completely destroyed any of the advantages gained in Tibet under the terms of the Lhasa Convention. This created great bitterness in India, and had the effect of dangerously undermining British prestige on the frontier at a time when Chinese confidence was growing.

CONCLUSION

Although Russian forward policy had been a significant factor in prompting the despatch of the Younghusband Expedition in 1903, its importance declined significantly thereafter. Anglo-Russian tensions certainly increased elsewhere on the frontier between 1904 and 1906, but the immediate threat to Tibet disappeared as soon as Younghusband reported that the rumours of a Russian arsenal in Lhasa were unfounded. The Russian threat lost even more impact after their humiliating defeat by the Japanese in 1905, although fears about Russia did not entirely disappear. Even after 1906, when Grey made friendship with Russia a central plank in his Central Asian policy, there was continuing concern about the possible links between the Russian Tsar and the Dalai Lama which were reflected in official correspondence between 1904 and 1909, the year in which he eventually returned to Lhasa. The prevailing tendency however was to minimise this problem in an effort to secure a successful outcome to the Anglo-Russian talks that were to lead to the signing of a Convention in 1907.

The period between 1904 and 1906 was a time of great change and flux in Tibetan frontier policy. The drama of the Younghusband 'invasion' was replaced in Lhasa by a period of confusion as rival monkish factions fought for control in the absence of the Dalai Lama. In East Tibet serious fighting had broken out when Tibetan monks and tribesmen fought Chinese soldiers, as the first effects of Chinese forward policy made themselves felt in the area. Within the Foreign Service a dogged struggle had developed between the Indian government and the Foreign Office over control of Tibetan frontier policy, and a second more insidious challenge was
issued by the Foreign Office which came in the form of an attack on the
ability of frontier officers to handle situations on the spot.
Younghusband was one of the first victims of this policy but there were
to be many others. The challenge was not as successful as it might have
been however since Curzon's successors guarded their right to dictate
frontier policy, and Minto continued to pursue a discreet but firmly
independent line, turning a blind eye to frontier activity, and giving
support to the increasingly positive role played by the Curzonian elite who
had taken posts as frontier agents and officials inside Tibet.

Before going on to examine the effects of the non-involvement policy on
frontier administration after 1906, it will be helpful in the following two
chapters to look at the way the in which the Foreign Service operated in
London, India, and China, and to show how these three institutions
interacted with each other in shaping and implementing policy on India's
north-eastern frontier.
13. Sir Edward Grey
CHAPTER TWO

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE CHINA SERVICE 1904 -1914

In this chapter I will say something about the organisation and the role of the Foreign Office in London, looking at the way in which the Far Eastern Department supervised the running of the British Legation in Peking. I shall then go on to discuss the nature and organisation of the China Consular Service and the way in which that was co-ordinated by the British Minister in Peking. The next chapter will describe the rather more complicated procedures involved in the running of the India Service, and in particular look at the delicate balance of power between the Secretary of State for India, who worked from the India Office in London, and the Viceroy with his own council in India.

1. THE FOREIGN OFFICE

The purpose of the Foreign Office in Whitehall was to organise and conduct British Foreign policy. In 1782 the growing volume of work had forced the formation of a separate Diplomatic Service to liaise with foreign heads of state, and in 1825, a third, Consular Department was created to deal exclusively with what were then regarded as less important commercial and trading matters, involving the running of Consulates all over the world. The Consulate in Peking for example was supervised by members of the Consular Service, although the British Minister there was a member of the Diplomatic Service. Any discussion about the nature of the British Foreign Service between 1904 and 1914 must therefore take into account the very different functions of these Services, as well as the tensions that developed between them.

During the 1880s, international relations had been transformed by the political, technological, and commercial developments of the 'new imperialism', and the expansion associated with it had a profound effect on the Foreign Office, enhancing its prestige, yet increasing the volume of work without raising staffing levels. Archaic methods of copying letters and reports by hand and often in triplicate further hampered efficiency and, by 1902, the situation was so bad that a programme of reform was initiated
aimed at updating the service which culminated in the Crowe/Harding Reforms of 1906. *1  
Two men held the important post of Foreign Secretary between 1904 and 1914. Lord Lansdowne, an ex Viceroy of India at the end of a distinguished career, who served between 1900 and 1905; and Sir Edward Grey, a constituency MP who managed to combine one of the most prestigious posts in the country with routine constituency work, and who served between December 1905 and 1916. *2.  
When Grey took up his appointment the nature of the job was already changing. Increasing paperwork, combined with the almost unendurable burden of responsibility eventually took their toll on his health, but his ability to delegate enabled him to steer the Office effectively through the turbulent pre-war period, when press criticism of its performance was often scathing. *3  
During the period of Hardinge's tenure between 1906 and 1910, the post of Permanent Undersecretary became a very powerful and pivotal one. Grey relied upon Hardinge to advise and handle much of the European workload, and the smooth running of the Office depended very much on the harmonious relationship that developed between them. *4 When Hardinge left to take up the post of Viceroy of India in November 1910 his place was taken by Sir Arthur Nicolson, another career diplomat who had previously been Ambassador to St Petersburg. Unlike Hardinge, Nicolson was unhappy in his new post and begged to be released within eighteen months of taking office. Although he stayed on until 1916 to provide continuity during the war period, unlike his predecessor he did not avail himself of the opportunity to exploit his powerful position, and many junior clerks like Vansittart found him remote and unnapproachable. *5. The Senior Clerks, who were responsible for the smooth running of the departments inside the Foreign Office under the guidance of Assistant Secretaries, were the acknowledged experts of the service since they often remained with departments for long periods and were able to acquire specialised knowledge of a particular part of the world. This made them indispensable, giving them a superior status within hierarchy. In 1906, when the new reforms threatened their unique position by encouraging junior clerks to prepare minutes and comment on the
reports and memoranda they had copied, Senior Clerks opposed this move on the grounds that these extra duties would provide Juniors Clerks with an opportunity to influence decision making. Their response was a perfect example of the way in which entrenched attitudes within the office resisted change and prevented improvement in working conditions. Despite the good intentions therefore, a vast potential was wasted, and the job of Junior Clerk stayed much as before, most clerks enduring years of dull, unchallenging work with little hope of promotion. By 1914 the extra volume of work created by the war was to bring dramatic short term changes as special wartime departments were formed. *6

Diplomats held a very special and privileged position in the Foreign Service. Many were the sons of aristocrats who had achieved their position through royal or high political influence. Although there was a tradition of transfer between the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic service at higher levels lower grades hardly ever transferred, and the few Clerks who came from the Diplomatic Service to work in the Foreign Office found that they were rarely placed in departments where their overseas experience was useful *7

Some diplomatic posts carried considerable weight and influence. The Paris and Washington Embassies were generally regarded as the most prestigious postings, while posts in Africa and Asia carried far less weight, with the result that diplomats in the remoter embassies and consulates often felt very isolated. In the past this had had the effect of allowing the men who occupied these posts a great deal of independence; however, as developments in communication after 1880 increased the speed at which information could be exchanged, this largely disappeared. *8 Christened the 'Cinderella Service', the Consular Department was generally considered a far less glamorous option for men embarking on a diplomatic career because of its association with trade. *9 In 1903 strenuous efforts had been made to rectify this image but these had failed, merely increasing the consular workload without enhancing the prestige of the service as a whole. Consuls and their staffs worked in the most remote and politically sensitive parts of the world and often in the most appalling and stressful conditions, yet their contribution and potential were often undervalued. *10
The reason why the Consular service enjoyed such a poor reputation can in part be explained by the way in which recruitment to all three services was conducted. Foreign Office entrants were recruited from the top five public schools. Most were employed before, instead of going to university, since academic excellence was not generally regarded as an essential pre-requisite for a diplomatic career. Although it was no longer the case as in Salisbury's day, that prospective candidates had to come from families personally known to the Foreign Secretary, between 1904 and 1914 recruitment patterns resisted all attempts to reform them and the number of recruits from Eton actually increased at this time. In the Diplomatic service standards were also determined very much by personal wealth since many posts were unwaged and carried a property qualification of £400. This meant that even wealthy men like Hardinge struggled to afford the kind of social expenditure required.

Entrance to the Consular Service was often the only option for men wishing to secure a career in the Foreign service who did not have suitable family connections. In his study of the China Consular Service, P.D. Coates established a tendency for recruits to be drawn from the professional and commercial classes, most having received a minor public school education. A high proportion of the recruits accepted also came from missionary families and were already aware of the hardships they might be expected to face. These men had already some competence in the languages of the country to which they had applied to serve, which gave them an advantage since linguistic skills were considered an important qualification by the service. Competition to enter all three services was very stiff and many were refused entry. Strict adherence to tradition in the selection process helped to perpetuate the innate snobberies within each service, and the tendency to promote by age rather than by merit militated against initiative. The narrow social base from which each service took its recruits also ensured that its members shared the same values and outlook which in itself produced a further barrier to change.

Between 1904 and 1914 the Foreign Office underwent considerable internal adjustment, as well as experiencing great pressure from outside to adapt to the demands of the twentieth century. Successful attempts to reform it were
14. Morrison and servants in Peking c. 1900

15. Beilby Alston

16. Sir Walter Langley

17. J. D. Gregory
restricted to the improvement of administrative procedures designed to cope with the increasing workload, and they failed to influence the elitist attitudes which remained much as they had been in the previous century.

THE CHINA SERVICE

The China Service was administered in London by the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office which supervised the British Legation in Peking as well as liaising with the Chinese Legation in London. The consular section of the Service was run by a separate Consular Department, but inside China itself the British Minister in Peking was responsible for Consular Officers in his care.\footnote{15} The Far Eastern Department had always enjoyed a considerable measure of freedom within the Foreign Office, partly because it dealt with an area far from Europe and because British interests in China had always been largely commercial, but also because it was administered efficiently by a team with proven experience. F. A. Campbell, Assistant Undersecretary in charge of the Department in 1904, was a man of wisdom and ability who had served under Salisbury and had steered the Department through the crisis generated by the 1900 Boxer Rebellion when the eyes of the world had been trained on China. \footnote{16} As Foreign Secretary after December 1905, Grey was particularly interested in the Department, partly the result of his concern for the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with its implications for British commercial and naval security both inside China and in the Pacific and Indian oceans, and partly because of his implicit faith in Campbell and his team. \footnote{17}

The remoteness of China, and Grey's protection, were twin factors ensuring the Department's continuing independence which helped to keep it safe from the unwelcome attentions of Hardinge and his associates whose main area of concern in this period was Europe. \footnote{18}

As well as enjoying an harmonious relationship with Grey inside the Foreign Office, Campbell also found himself on excellent terms with the British Ministers in Peking, Ernest Satow and later John Jordan who both welcomed his weekly reports and letters. When Campbell died suddenly from a kidney infection in December 1911 continuity was maintained when his assistant
Walter Langley, was promoted to the post, and took on his new role with the inbuilt advantage of already knowing Jordan because the Far Eastern Department had worked closely with China, one of the few benefits of a system which usually promoted by seniority rather than by merit.  

Campbell and Langley ran the Far Eastern Department with the help of a very experienced team which included Beilby Alston, John Duncan Gregory, and William Grenfell Max-Muller. All three men played key advisory roles at various times and Max-Muller and Alston both served in Peking as Charges d'Affaires during Jordan's leave periods. Alston in particular benefited from this experience, rising from Senior Clerk in 1914, to become British Minister in Peking by 1921, a remarkable achievement by Foreign Office standards.  

The British Legation in Peking was part of a larger complex of Legations that occupied nearly one quarter of the city. The Legation quarter had survived the Boxer Siege of 1900 with minimal physical damage, although the psychological effects of the siege lingered long after the Legations were relieved. By 1904 the British Legation had turned in upon itself, creating a small oasis of Englishness in what many now felt to be an alien and hostile environment. It was headed by a Minister appointed from the Diplomatic Service who lived rather grandly, in a green tiled Chinese Palace, known as the Tinghri, and rented from a Chinese prince. His three secretaries occupied three detached bungalows within the compound and the remaining staff, consisting of a Vice Consul, fifteen student interpreters, and a marine guard, all shared a mess in each of three large outbuildings.

There was a chapel, a theatre, and a bowling alley also within the compound, and a few miles away, a golf course and racecourse shared with the wider Legation community. In such a male dominated environment, very like the minor public schools many of the student interpreters had only recently left, the presence of the Minister's wife and family were an important stabilising influence. and during Satow's tenure this female influence was much missed, despite the many attractions of the social life shared between the Legations.

The Post of Chinese Secretary was an important and prestigious one demanding special language competence in
Chinese, both spoken and written. Most of the daily Legation correspondence and translation was in his hands, and it was also his duty to organise and care for the student interpreters who spent two years in his care. *24 The Minister's work was primarily diplomatic and much of his day was spent interviewing and consulting with the Chinese Foreign Office or Wai-Wu-pu as well as with other Legation heads. During his tenure Jordan became 'Doyen' or head of the Legation Committee and this kept him particularly busy outside the Legation compound making the burden of responsibility for the daily running of affairs fall even more heavily on his staff. *25

Student interpreters were recruited from Britain to serve two year apprenticeships at the Legation during which time they were expected to learn Chinese. Since competition for places was intense, those selected were usually very grateful to get accepted. At the end of their two year training period they sat an examination which, if they passed, would determine their future career with the Service. During their time in Peking they enjoyed a relaxed and rather sporty life. In the summer they rented disused Chinese temples in the hills, where they wiled away their time learning Chinese with their individual tutors and generally enjoying themselves. However, the Legation experience was no preparation for the life to come and it was a bitter standing joke within the service that out of every four recruits, one went mad, one became an alcoholic, one died, and one was promoted to Vice-Consul. *26 During Jordan's tenure as Doyen from February 1911 British influence was pronounced, the position providing an opportunity to foster stronger links with emerging Chinese leaders and especially with Yuan Shih Kai, who became President after the Manchu collapse in 1911 and to whom Jordan formed a special attachment. *27 During this time diplomatic practice changed dramatically as the Wai Wu pu was reorganised and renamed the Wai Chaio Pu. Many interviews now began to be conducted at reasonable hours and often in English, a stark contrast to Manchu days when the time allotted to the discussion of foreign affairs often involved the Minister in talks that began at two in the morning. *28 The Chinese Legation in London operated from rather dilapidated premises in Portland Place. It had been set up as a concession to western diplomatic
tastes in 1895, and its exotic occupants initially proved rather a shock to many diplomatic visitors who found the accommodation unexpectedly dim and dirty. One dismayed visitor even arrived to find the Chinese Minister smoking opium. After 1911 the situation changed as western educated diplomats more attuned to British diplomatic practice were posted to London, and Anglo-Chinese relations began to be established on a more comfortable, if not always harmonious footing.*29

Between 1904 and 1914 two men held the post of British Minister in Peking both of whom had broken with previous tradition by being middle class and having transferred from the Consular to the Diplomatic Service some years earlier. Transfers of this kind happened rarely and are an indication that in China, where commercial advancement was vital, experience and expertise were valued more than status and family connections.

Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister between 1900 and 1906, was an intellectual with considerable linguistic ability who had already enjoyed a distinguished career in Japan which was to prove invaluable in strengthening Anglo-Japanese co-operation in China in this period. Sir John Jordan, British Minister between 1906 and 1921, had previously served in the Peking Legation as an assistant secretary before becoming Consul-General in Seoul and took office with a well developed understanding of oriental diplomacy and a healthy respect for Japanese efficiency.*30

Both men were unimpressed by the administrative standards of the China Service and sought to improve conditions. Jordan in particular was very concerned about the hardships experienced by his Consuls, and although to many junior staff he could seem a harsh taskmaster, demanding comprehensive annual report, and berating them for slackness; his concern was genuine and based upon his own early gruelling experiences in the Service. *31 Years without leave had tested his endurance and were to leave a legacy for later years, and he often experienced bouts of illness and suffered constant fatigue that was to lead to a complete breakdown in 1915 and an enforced period of retirement.*32

Jordan was a great champion of centralisation and believed that operating posts in the remoter regions of China was a waste of manpower and resources. This makes his support for the opening and maintenance of a post at Tachienlu on the
18. Sir John Jordan
border with East Tibet in 1913 all the more intriguing, since for him, it represented a dramatic shift in policy. *33

For much of the period between 1904 and 1914 there was concern about the calibre of the candidates coming forward and both Ministers noted a decline in linguistic skills which Jordan tried to improve by sending his student interpreters to a missionary school in Peking. This proved unsuccessful in the long term, since the Chinese vocabulary taught by missionaries for use in the field was quite inappropriate for diplomatic purposes and the scheme was abandoned. After 1911 the problem began to solve itself as western educated Chinese diplomats were willing to use English and it no longer became necessary for new recruits to aspire to the linguistic skills attained by Satow and Jordan. Few twentieth century entrants managed to learn enough written Chinese to read it well, and further attempts to enhance the prestige of the Service by reforming the examination system before 1914 met with similar failure. Examination results for the China Service produced only just enough candidates to fill vacancies and recruits continued to be drawn from the same narrow middle class elite as before, most coming to China as their second or third choice.*34

Until Tachienlu was opened in 1913, three posts had served as bases from which events in Tibet were monitored. Two of the posts, at Tengyueh and Yunnanfu, were situated near the Burma border in the Chinese province of Yunnan. The third at Chengtu in the Chinese province of Szechuan, was originally established to monitor French activity in the region as well as to gain readier access to the Viceroy of Szechuan who was a powerful and independent ruler in his own right, Szechuan being one of the remotest and wealthiest provinces in the loosely controlled Chinese Empire. *35

The Consulate at Chengtu had been opened in 1902 by Sir Alexander Hosie, Consul-General at the treaty port of Chungking. The Chinese did not like foreign Consulates operating outside treaty ports, and it had therefore been agreed that, while Hosie should live in Chengtu, he would continue to operate the official Consulate from Chungking. In 1903 a similar arrangement was made for the French Consul, and an unofficial French Consulate was set up in Chengtu. Compared to Chungking, a damp, misty and rat infested city built on a rocky promontory overlooking the
CHINA CONSULAR SERVICE
POSTS IN MAINLAND CHINA,
FORMOSA, AND KOREA

The international and internal boundaries shown are those of 1910. The consular post at Kashgar was a Government of India post.
busy Yangtze river, Chengtu was paradise. Cosmopolitan and sophisticated, it was the capital city of Szechuan and by all accounts a very beautiful place. The journey to Chengtu by river from Chungking was extremely hazardous however, and Consuls posted to Chengtu were reluctant to submit their wives to such danger with the result that wives rarely accompanied their husbands, making the posting a dubious pleasure. Campbell and Goffe, who held posts as Consuls in Chengtu in 1904 and 1907, both left wives behind, and their loneliness may have influenced Goffe's successor Fox, who in 1908 decided to bring his wife, but who begged to leave when ill health forced her to return within weeks of their arrival.

Although Twyman, who became Chengtu Consul in 1909 was a widower, he also found himself unable to cope with the strains imposed by the posting and he returned to Britain within a year after suffering a complete nervous breakdown. Wilkinson, his replacement, lasted longer. Although wifeless and full of complaints about poor housing conditions, he stuck the posting with the able assistance of Eric Teichman, both men living through the chaotic and dangerous revolutionary disturbances of 1911 and 1912 that followed the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty, when most Europeans chose to leave the area. Although his bravery earned him a commendation from Jordan, Wilkinson could also be officious and petty, in 1911 arranging for the kidnap and deportation of an Englishwoman who had married a Chinese because he felt that her behaviour was immoral and harmful to British interests. He was subsequently condemned by Jordan and Hosie for this act, but his conduct in both situations reflects all that was good and bad about the British presence in this remote part of China.

Between 1904 and 1914 the China Service remained much as it had always been despite the valiant efforts to reform it. There was always strong resistance to any attempt made to improve standards from within, and the service continued to function as a holding operation for the promotion of British commercial interests in China. During his tenure the respect Jordan enjoyed within the Far Eastern Department, and the trust placed in him by Grey, enabled him to exercise his initiative and judgement freely. This unusual degree of independence, and the way he used it to promote his policy in East Tibet will be the subject of later chapters.
CHAPTER THREE

THE INDIA OFFICE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 1904 - 1914

The India Office and the Government of India were created by the 1858 Government of India Act under which the assets and functions of the East India Company were transferred to the Crown. The relationship between the two separate administrations soon became a difficult and complex one. In this Chapter I will describe the organisation of each institution between 1904-1914, with particular reference to the sensitive relationship that developed between the Secretary of State at the India Office and the Viceroy in India, before finally looking at the way in which the Indian Service operated inside Tibet itself.

2. THE INDIA OFFICE 1904 - 1914

Although confined to the supervision of purely Indian affairs, the India Office ran a huge and diverse administration which was effectively, a government in its own right, with its own War Office, Home Office, and Board of Trade, as well as a variety of other smaller departments handling specialists aspects of Indian policy. Funded from Indian revenues, it cost the British taxpayer nothing and, unless it needed to raise revenue for specific projects, it escaped the attention of the British Treasury. The Office itself was situated close to the Foreign Office in Whitehall, its affairs conducted from a vast labyrinth of long dark corridors and its business so complex that Arthur Godley, who worked there as Permanent Undersecretary for twenty-six years claimed that, even with his 'barrister's mind', it had taken him ten years to understand the nature of the job, and another sixteen 'to feel at ease with it' #1

For over sixty years following its creation the India Office remained under the control of the Secretary of State for India and his Council. This important Crown Post was usually given to a serving politician and most appointees had never set foot in India. In order to conduct Indian affairs, the India Office worked closely with Foreign Office Departments
with whom it shared some responsibilities, including a commitment to provide copies of correspondence and information. This relationship was gradually weakened during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as more and more territory was lost to India in disputes with other powers. This meant that by 1904 they were directly concerned with the administration of Afghanistan, Nepal, the Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia, Sikkim, and Bhutan, and had an informal interest in Tibet and Assam.

Relations between the India Office and the Government of India were often mercurial. Operating six thousand miles apart, there was tremendous scope for friction between the Secretary of State in London, and the Viceroy in India. Developments in cable communication, plus the increased amount of paperwork involved in the provision of biannual reports for Parliament brought Calcutta closer to London, but at the cost of a deterioration in the quality of the relationship, and initiatives by men on the spot were increasingly challenged. Like the Foreign Office, the India Office was self-sufficient, having its own career structure and mores. While the Indian Civil Service (ICS) attracted the cream of the public schools, posts inside the London Office were less keenly contested and did not tend to attract the adventurous. At higher levels, vacancies were often filled by retired ICS men who had spent their working life in India, and this limited promotion prospects for young entrants which further deterred them from seeking a career in London. There was also little interchange between the India Office and the ICS for, while comparatively junior ICS staff might, by virtue of their Indian experience, prove very useful to London, the situation did not work in reverse, as India Office clerks needed to first learn the language, legal code, and customs of the Province to which they were assigned before they could even begin to understand the work in India; a process that could take many years.

The post of Secretary of State for India was a very arduous and exacting one and full of hidden pressures. Responsible for the conduct of Indian affairs in London, the Secretary of State was expected to monitor events inside India with the help of a small Advisory Council without disrupting the work of the Indian Government. In practice, the limited experience of both Viceroy and Minister usually ensured that each tended to stay in
their separate corners, relying on trusted advisors amongst their individual staffs; but where there were conflicts between them, these were exacerbated by mutual inexperience. In addition to his other duties the Secretary of State was also responsible to Parliament and was required to report regularly to the House of Commons on Indian matters. Where, as in Morley's case, the postholder was also a sitting MP, this could be a crippling addition to the workload.*5 Between 1904 and 1914 the post of Secretary of State was held by three men. St. John Brodrick (1902-1905), John Morley (1905-1910), and Lord Crewe (1910-1914).*6

As with the Foreign Office the Permanent office holders were able to develop areas of expertise denied their Parliamentary counterparts whose term at the Office only averaged a year to eighteen months. Of all the permanent posts, that of Permanent Undersecretary was the most exacting because the work involved acting as mediator in the developing power struggle for control of policy between the Viceroy in India, and the Secretary of State in London.*7 Three men held the post between 1904 and 1914. The first, Arthur Godley served for twenty-six years from 1883 until 1909. Godley had come to the Office with no previous diplomatic experience and had acquired the position through family connections. Between 1904 and 1909 he served two Viceroyys and two Secretaries of State. He developed a particularly close, but not always harmonious relationship, with John Morley, who was Secretary of State between 1906 and 1910, and he became heavily embroiled in the power struggle between Morley and Minto. Godley found himself outclassed in his dealings with Morley, for although the two men shared a common intellectual and political background, they grew more and more estranged as conflict escalated between them, and Godley grew very resentful about the way in which he felt Morley was deliberately rejecting his advice. He eventually left the Office in 1909 a sad and embittered man having endured years of stress, serving in a vitally important role that brought little fame or public recognition. *8

His place was taken by his own Private Secretary Raymond Ritchie. Related to the novelist William Thackeray, Ritchie had literary ambitions of his own and his written reports were regarded as models of excellence by colleagues. His appointment set a precedent since it was the first time
that a man had been appointed to such a high position from within the
service, and his early death in 1912 was much regretted by those who had
worked with him.\(^9\) Ritchie's place was taken in 1912 by Thomas Holderness,
a retired Indian Civil Service man with considerable Indian experience.
Immediately before becoming Permanent Undersecretary, Holderness had been
Revenue Secretary and like Ritchie, was appointed from within the
Office.\(^10\)

In 1899, the arrival of George Curzon as Viceroy destroyed an understanding
between the India Office and the Government of India about the way in which
Indian frontier policy should be organised which was to lead to a serious
struggle for control between Calcutta and London affecting the relationship
between successive Viceroy and Secretaries of State. In order to
appreciate the nature of this struggle it is necessary to understand the
way in which the Government of India worked, and in particular to examine
the role played by the Viceroy.

2. THE VICEROY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

The Government of India was responsible for a vast land mass roughly the
size of Europe, and for the welfare of its people. By 1904 the novelty
of administering India had begun to pall as many began to appreciate
the scale and expense of the commitment. Between 1895 and 1906 a series
of widescale famines prompted the setting up of a Royal Commission whose
recommendations included the building of extensive irrigation schemes, and
a vast network of railways across India to enable food and water supplies
to reach famine stricken areas quickly. Under the terms of the 1858 Act the
Indian Government were expected to fund such projects and Curzon in
particular resisted all attempts to make India pay for initiatives emanating
from London; a battle continued by successive Viceroy and Secretaries after his departure
from India in 1905.\(^11\)

The further problem of how to afford frontier defence, which had proved a
great financial burden to the Indian Government as well as a drain on
military resources, did not disappear with the official ending of the
'Great Game' rivalry with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. New enemies
emerged, and fears formed about Chinese, and even Japanese
encroachment on the frontier.*12 By 1890 a third, more insidious threat to Indian revenue surfaced in the attempt by big business interests in London and India to persuade the Indian Government to fund extensive road, bridge, and railway building projects to encourage commercial development in the sub-continent. Schemes to develop the tea and timber industries, for example, required the setting up of semi-permanent military posts to monitor tribal activity and protect businesses for which the Indian Government would not only be financially, but also politically liable, in the event of frontier disturbances. *13

The vague character of the 1858 Government of India Act allowed the Indian Government to retain much of the independence it had enjoyed under the East India Company as well as many of its institutions, which by 1904 had become seriously inefficient. During his period as Viceroy, Curzon's passion for administration led him to attempt a complete reform of the Indian administration as well as an updating of routine office procedures, and between 1899 and 1905 he reorganised the system of reporting and tried, less successfully, to improve the quality of recruitment. *14

Between 1904 and 1914 three Viceroy's held office, Lord Curzon; (1899-1905) Lord Minto; (1905-1910), and Lord Hardinge; (1910-1916). The very nature of the Viceroy's role in India created its own peculiar tensions. Some Provinces enjoyed virtual independence, while others came under direct Indian government control, and this created special problems for the central Indian Administration, especially as improvements in global communications brought India closer to London. There was also heated debate about the role of the Viceroy within the British Constitution itself; some arguing that he was the agent of the British Government in India, while others suggested that as 'Emperor' of India he was responsible only to the King. *15

The Viceroy's ruled with the aid of a Council composed of five members and since the Military and Legal Members of that council were limited only to those functions defined by their title, and the Public Works member was usually preoccupied with the administration of the many new railway, road and irrigation projects, this left only two council members who were
available on a full time basis to cope with the remaining extensive workload which, in Britain, occupied half the Cabinet. Traditional practice had always been to defer to the man on the spot, and the effect of this policy had been to encourage Viceroy's to behave as independent sovereigns in India, often hosting elaborate courts in order to reinforce their status. The need for this was understandable, and arguably also practical in view of the loss of confidence that had been engendered, firstly by the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and secondly, by the burgeoning independence struggle that had begun to develop after 1900. Curzon's court was particularly ostentatious and generated much criticism in Britain for its extravagance. Minto was more restrained, but the tendency towards ostentation was reintroduced by Hardinge, and the lengthy and costly preparations for the Delhi Durbar in 1911 again drew adverse comment. In the hot summer months the Viceregal administration moved to Simla leaving only a skeleton staff in Calcutta. Perched some six and a half thousand feet above sea level, and only fifty miles from the Himalayan foothills, Simla took on the atmosphere of a holiday camp during the season as the families of Indian Government employees enjoyed the hectic social life that Curzon and his wife Mary detested. During the Simla season they occupied a bungalow nearer the mountains which successive Viceroy's also used as a retreat from the claustrophobic inertia of the Simla Offices and the emotional demands of the frivolous social scene. As well as presiding over a central government in Calcutta and Simla, the Viceroy was required to supervise the independent Provincial governments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and the six hundred Princely States that covered one third of the subcontinent. Most Indian Princes were willing to accommodate a British Resident at their court in return for military aid in times of political crisis, and were encouraged to visit Britain as often as possible, despite the fact that the royal treatment these exotic visitors received in Britain could be counterproductive and often created problems for the Viceroy on their return to India. Links were also cultivated with frontier Chiefs and Rulers during the Viceregal Tours in the spring and autumn of each year, and the close friendships formed during these tours was often rewarded by loyalty.
to the Government during periods of frontier tension.
The Viceroy's had complete control over frontier policy for practical reasons. Situations on the frontier could develop very rapidly and demanded an immediate response to avert possible crisis. Following Curzon's initiative in Tibet however, the British Government attempted to challenge Viceregal control of frontier policy which it was felt had now got out of hand. This exacerbated conflict between the Viceroy and Secretary of State already created by the failure of the 1858 Act to effectively define their respective roles. Particular problems arose in situations where Indian security seemed threatened by possible invasions from Russia or China, and in the next section I am going to examine in more detail the nature of the conflicts between respective Viceroy's and their Secretaries of State, and the implications that this had for the formation of Tibetan policy.

3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VICEROY AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

St. John Brodrick became Secretary of State in October 1903 'with serious misgivings' about the post. He had previously worked at the War Office, a well established Department where his role was clear cut, and he found it a sharp contrast to the recently created India Office. His misgivings might have been considered initially misplaced however, since he was to have as his Viceroy George Curzon, an old boyhood friend with whom he shared a common social, educational, and political bond. *21 There was no necessity for the very personal antagonism that developed between them, yet the ill-defined nature of their roles, combined with Curzon's ruthless political ambition and his obsession with Tibet, ended their friendship and drove a wedge between their respective departments.*22 From the start there was some distrust on both sides, Curzon acknowledged that he felt threatened by his Secretary of State whom he believed, quite correctly, to have easier access to a much higher and broader range of expertise than was available to him in India. David Dilks has suggested that Curzon was deliberately kept ignorant of Parliamentary and press opinion during his Viceroyalty, however this may have been partly his own fault, since the very arrogance that made him so self reliant, also prevented him seeking or accepting advice or information from others.
In addition, the burden of office, together with his obsessive interest in the new science of office management, kept him heavily immersed in a sea of paperwork for much of his time in India. Brodrick meanwhile resented Curzon's attitude towards him and felt that he was regarded in India as no more than a rather unprofitable servant of the Indian Government.

As Viceroy Curzon was well equipped to exploit any available opportunity to take an independent line, and the decision to press ahead with the Younghusband Expedition in the face of high level opposition during 1903 brought him into direct conflict with Brodrick for, while as Viceroy he was quite at liberty to implement his own frontier policy, he chose to do so on this occasion without any attempt to respond to advice from London. In adopting this high-handed approach he overstepped the mark, breaking the traditional gentleman's agreement between previous Viceroys and the India Office, and raising issues that would create problems for his successors. When Minto tried to continue Curzon's Tibetan policy after 1905 for example, he found himself immediately facing forceful opposition from his Secretary of State, John Morley.

Much has been written about the battle between Morley and Minto between 1905 and 1910. That the conflict was bitter and often petty is undeniable, and even a cursory study of the weekly correspondence between them confirms a fundamental clash of outlook. However, the more personal aspects have sometimes been exaggerated and the tensions between them had more to do with the nature of their respective roles than with any differences in political and social background. Speedier communication, and ideological conflict served only to inflame the debate over the conduct of frontier policy that had first surfaced during the Brodrick/Curzon period.

Morley had previously met Minto while on holiday in Ottawa in 1904 when the latter was Governor-General of Canada. This first meeting had been brief but equitable, and had allowed each to form an impression which influenced their view of the other when they finally began to work together after 1905. Morley described Minto as a perfect example of 'a gentleman of the old ruling class', although his own radical background made this rather a
dubious compliment; and Minto saw Morley as a 'little Englander' because of his association with Gladstonian Liberalism. Minto initially feared that his new Secretary of State might try to apply Gladstonian principles to Indian affairs but these fears were unfounded and Morley compromised his radicalism on many occasions, being far more concerned to prevent the development of links between the new Labour Party, who had begun to take a keen interest in India, and the leaders of the developing Indian independence movement. As a man renowned for his intellectual and political ability, Morley at first appeared the more able of the two, yet he was already well past his political prime when he came to the India Office, and despite a more prosaic career as a soldier and bureaucrat, Minto had the greater experience of high office, a factor that evened, yet deepened the contest between them.

The problem of who controlled Indian frontier policy was an issue that quickly divided them. By 1905 Britain was heavily, but reluctantly, involved in Tibetan affairs and had a well defined policy of non-involvement. Soon after taking office Morley began to actively intervene in frontier policy on a regular basis and to openly state his long held belief that India should be governed from the India Office, with the Viceroy and his Council acting simply as agents for the British government in London. This unwarranted interference generated great anxiety within India amongst Provincial Indian Governors, as well as with Minto and his Council, who all regarded such outside, and ill-informed meddling, in the complex and politically sensitive affairs of India, as dangerous in normal times, but as positively suicidal in the period of heightened tension and terrorism which they experienced as the independence movement gained strength. Many in Britain also had sympathy with this view, and by 1910, the interference was so overt that an article in 'The Times' newspaper condemned Minto for allowing Morley to 'fill the vacuum he created by his weakness' in opposing him, and in the July of that year Edward Montagu, then Under Secretary of State for India, referred to Minto in the House of Commons as an 'agent of the India Office Policy'. These accusations were perhaps a little unfair since Minto's response to Morley's interference was not totally negative, and in fact he played a rather
skilful game, adopting a deliberately non-confrontational approach in a successful attempt to deflect critical scrutiny which would allow him to continue an independent line. Between 1907 and 1910, both sides employed spies to inform and report upon the activities of the other, Minto engaging in correspondence with Morley's colleagues, and even securing the services of his own private secretary, Morley acquiring, what he later described as 'backstairs information', from officers and civil servants who visited him at the India Office during leave from India. Described by Stephen Koss as a 'French farce', these behind the scenes manoeuvres had a more serious side, indicating the lengths to which both sides were prepared to go in order to promote their particular view in the widening party political debate about the future of the British Empire.*31

Although their tenure was dominated by problems arising from internal Indian affairs, the conduct and control of frontier policy was an important source of contention. Minto, as Curzon before him, regarded the maintenance of a stable frontier as vital to the safety of India and like Curzon, he felt that the promotion of friendship with frontier chiefs was an excellent way to deter invasion and infiltration. Morley was highly critical of what he condemned as, this 'traditional Viceregal approach to the frontier' and like many Liberals in Government, he was prepared to search out and destroy what he considered to be any trace of this Curzonian approach in Minto's policy. Minto's reaction to these intrusions was measured, and he continued to follow strategies that enabled him to keep a discreet political presence inside Tibet, whilst officially supporting the non-involvement policy. To this end he upheld frontier initiatives whenever possible, and collected data about Tibetan infringements of the Lhasa Convention which he stored for future use.*32

Correspondence between Morley and Minto in February 1908 however, reveals that Morley did have some sympathy with the need to provide effective frontier defence which he saw as important, but ultimately unaffordable without huge subsidies from Britain. *33 This financial problem was well appreciated by all Viceroys, and Curzon and Minto in particular made great efforts to promote and develop trade and commerce across the frontier wherever possible in an effort to raise revenue for frontier defence.
Eventually Morley was able to win the battle for the control of Indian frontier policy, not because Minto was weak or inept, but because the economic, political, and intellectual climate of opinion between 1905 and 1910 began to go with him. Although Curzon continued to head a strong opposition within Parliament, by 1910, the focus of public and political attention was concentrated on British domestic and European policy, especially as the naval rivalry with Germany gained strength in the years before 1914.

The partnership between Crewe and Hardinge was always a far more controlled and sedate affair. This was primarily because, although politically in opposition, Hardinge a Conservative, and Crewe a Liberal, both men were experienced career diplomats who had known each other for more than forty years. Beneath the outward accord however, deep divisions developed over the conduct of frontier policy that were never openly addressed but which created considerable friction between them. Like Minto, Hardinge had nourished childhood dreams of becoming Viceroy and of following his grandfather's distinguished career in India. His appointment had aroused much controversy with supporters of Lord Kitchener, the favoured candidate for the post, and Hardinge came to India determined to prove himself. Upon arrival there in November 1910 however, he was rather disappointed to discover that reality did not match his dreams and, after a successful diplomatic career culminating in an Ambassadorship St. Petersburg, and a Permanent Undersecretaryship at the Foreign Office, he was dismayed to find himself quite unable to establish a dialogue with the tribal chiefs and Indian princes with whom he was required to associate. Finding himself out of his depth, he appointed Henry McMahon to take on these negotiations, while he devoted his early years in India to the extensive preparations for the Delhi Durbar, and the controversial transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi which took place in 1911. Crewe took over at the India Office in the first week of November 1910 within days of Hardinge's arrival in India. He had previously held high office as Viceroy of Ireland, and had come to the India Office from the Colonial Office where he had held the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies and had reputedly run a 'calm and efficient' organisation.
This experience gave him a much fuller understanding of the nature of the Viceroy's position than any of his predecessors. In addition to his role as Secretary of State for India he continued to act as Liberal leader in the House of Lords, but he was no longer a young man, and the extra strain involved damaged his health. In November 1911 he collapsed during a social occasion with what many believed to be a stroke, and his place was taken by Morley during the six months it took him to recover. Morley's brief return to public life was an excuse for Curzon to raise Indian affairs in Parliament once again and at this time there was much debate about the issues that had been allowed to lapse since Morley had left the India Office in 1910. On Crewe's return however the force of the attack subsided, and although the dispute over control of frontier policy continued with greater force, it did so less publicly as Crewe and Hardinge found themselves forced to deal with the grave frontier crisis generated by the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. In February 1910, some months before Hardinge and Crewe had taken office, the Chinese had invaded Tibet and occupied Lhasa. During July and August of that year, Charles Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim, had reported increasing Chinese activity on the frontier near the borders with Assam and Burma. Although alarming, these reports had simply been noted by the India Office who, under Morley's direction, were still sticking closely to the non-involvement policy. Continuing reports of Chinese infiltration in the Assam Hymalayas, and growing unease about the situation however eventually convinced Hardinge that the Chinese were now a real threat to security and in June 1911 he introduced a new tribal policy for the Assam area aimed at the control of frontier tribes, which McMahon co-ordinated and which Crewe initially agreed to sanction only as an informal and temporary arrangement. By September 1911 the non-involvement policy was officially abandoned, following news of an incident that had taken place in Assam during the previous March in which a British Officer had been allegedly attacked and murdered by Abor tribesman while conducting an investigation into the frontier disturbances. In response to furious public outcry in London, Hardinge announced the launch of a series of punitive expeditions into the tribal frontier areas with the aim of
bringing the culprits to justice and restoring British prestige.
To reinforce British credibility, he then set up a number of semi-permanent administrative posts along the Himalayan foothills from which it was possible to monitor further disturbances, and this led to the creation of formal administrative districts, a policy which went ahead despite Crewe's continued opposition, forcing a full re-assessment of frontier policy to settle the matter. This complex and confused situation, and its implications for Tibetan frontier policy will be examined fully in a later chapter. #44
Until now I have concentrated upon the official policies pursued by the India Office in Whitehall and the Indian Government in India, but now, in this final section, I shall describe the way in which frontier policy was implemented on the frontier itself and in particular, look at the work of the political department responsible for the administration of policy on the spot.

4. THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT IN INDIA
The men appointed to administer the frontier came from the prestigious Political Department, and were known as 'The Politicals'. The Politicals enjoyed a freedom and status denied to others, since they came under the direct jurisdiction of the Viceroy himself. #45 A post with 'The Politicals' offered a fascinating alternative to a boringly predictable career in other Departments for the adventurous young man willing to take a gamble. The lucky few appointed served as Political Agents in the various Indian States; as Administrative Officers on the North East, and North West frontiers; and as Consular Officials on the Indian borders and in Persia. Although the North-West frontier was considered more glamorous, it was also far more dangerous, and after the Younghusband Expedition reached Lhasa in 1904, the attractions of the remoter and more exotic North-East frontier and Tibet fired the imagination. Posts on the frontier offered adventure without obvious danger, as well as the excitement of the unknown since much of it was still unexplored, and it soon attracted the cream of the service, and young men from good families, with the right connections, competed eagerly for places. #46
There were four possible routes into the Politicals. The first was through the army. Two thirds of all recruits entered the service in this way and young army Officers like Frederick Bailey were drawn to the frontier as an antidote to the claustrophobic and anonymous army barrack life. 

A second more obvious route was by way of the Indian Civil Service, and the majority not recruited from the army came this way. The Politicals offered men like Charles Bell an opportunity to escape both the climate of the Plains, which had ruined his health by the time he was thirty, and an office posting at Simla which could easily have destroyed his sanity.

A third route was via the Indian Medical Corps, where men of high calibre competed for postings which offered the possibility of a substantial career enhancement, either by becoming surgeon to a wealthy and grateful Mahrajah or alternatively, by opting for the excitement and independence of a frontier post, which might involve intelligence work for the Indian Government. Once on the frontier these men enjoyed a particular prestige earning along with medical missionaries, the gratitude of Tibetans who came to value western medical care. During the Younghusband Expedition for example, Dr. Waddell and his medical team had treated Tibetan prisoners who were so grateful that they had remained with the party throughout the trip to Lhasa, making it much easier for doctors later appointed to the trade marts at Gyantse and Yatung to treat the sick without hindrance.

In 1908 a dispensary was also allowed to remain in the Chumbi Valley after the British garrison withdrew in order to treat the local population, an indication of the goodwill they had earned, and an opportunity for medical workers to monitor the situation in Chumbi after the British had left.

Finally, engineers and surveyors from the Public Works and Engineers Department could sometimes transfer to the Politicals in order to build the transport and cable systems badly needed by the British on the frontier. Claude White came to the service by this route, by his own admission sacrificing a promising engineering career in order to take on the difficult task of becoming the Political Officer in Sikkim between 1889 and 1908.

Members of the separate native Indian Civil Service and army worked alongside British personnel, sharing the work in remote posts as clerks and assistants although, like the Indian pundits
before them, their names were rarely recorded in official correspondence.® 52
With few exceptions, British appointees to the Politicals came from
public schools some of which, like Clifton and Winchester, specialised in
educating men for service in India. The reasons for this were at once
practical and emotional. Snobbery dictated the public school, but there
were also practical reasons, since the language curriculum at these
schools ensured that a candidate's aptitude for language learning had
already been tested before he came out.® 53 Many recruits came from Indian
army families who had sent their sons into the Indian army or the
I.C.S to escape a career in trade, although ironically, many who went
to join the Politicals looking for adventure, found that the greater
part of their work involved, officially at least, the promotion and
supervision of frontier trade. Most 'Politicals' embraced the Rugby ethos
of 'muscular Christianity' and revered General Gordon as the archetypal
Christian hero, feeling like him that they were going to serve on the
frontier in order to battle for God, monarch, and country. They therefore
developed a great antipathy towards Gladstonian Liberals like Morley whom
they felt had denigrated their hero and sacrificed their values in the
name of non-involvement.® 54 In addition to a sense of purpose and
belonging, the 'Politicals' offered young men the possibility of
storybook adventure, for not only was it possible to experience the
freedom of the the hills but also, included in the package, was the
possibility of becoming an explorer and discoverer of untold treasures
upon which lasting and lucrative reputations might be built.® 55
The frontier also provided opportunities for personal pursuits and
although for most this invariably meant some form of sport, many engaged
in more esoteric scientific and cultural activities. Younghusband for
example found that the frontier provided the mystical experiences on which
he was able to base the remainder of his life, while O'Connor collected
folk tales, Waddell researched Tibetan Lamaism, and Bailey began to
discover and collect plants.® 56 Social Darwinism encouraged the study of
other cultures, and linguistics became a popular preoccupation as
travellers gradually made contact with tribes in the North-East frontier.
Most travel books of the period contain a chapter about language,
especially after the discovery that contrary to earlier rumours, most tribes were friendly and willing to trade with Europeans. #57

Under the terms of the Lhasa Convention, two new Trade marts had been established at Gyantse and Yatung, and together with Gartok in West Tibet, they formed a complex of Posts from which Politicals attempted to advance Indian interests in the country. The men appointed to these trading centres faced danger, hardship, and great frustration since having fought so hard to gain these prestigious posts, they found themselves running trading stations as viable economic concerns, and usually in competition with Chinese, Nepalese, Tibetan and tribal traders, in conditions where their inexperience made them seem clumsy and foolish. Some were able to rise above this to form powerful friendships with Tibetan leaders, as well as with the rulers of the neighbouring Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim however their bad experience with the Chinese, and the absence of support from their own government, left many of them vulnerable to physical and verbal attack.*58 After 1908 the great tragedy for this group, most of whom had been supporters of Curzon and members of the Younghusband Expedition, was that, having been placed in this precarious position, they were then abandoned to a dangerous and unpredictable fate, following the adoption of the Liberal non-involvement policy in 1905 and the bitter humiliation of the withdrawal from Chumbi in February 1908. The revival of a kind of forward policy during 1911, and the opening of the Simla Talks in 1912, however, kept the Politicals involved with frontier matters throughout the difficult and dangerous period between the departure of the Yonghusband Expedition in September 1904, and the outbreak of the First World War in September 1914.
Between the signing of the Adhesion Treaty in 1906, and the evacuation of Chumbi Valley in 1908, a kind of British administration survived in Western Tibet. This Chapter describes the efforts of Curzonians to retain an influence in the country, despite Whitehall's policy of non-involvement, and the extent to which they were helped in this by Minto's Indian administration. It is primarily about the people who lived and worked on the frontier at this time, and in particular, about the way in which the Politicals coped with the harsh conditions, as well as with what they saw as increasing Chinese interference.

The Chapter is divided into three parts, the first looking at the way in which formal attempts to settle the frontier by treaty succeeded or failed in their aim; the second examining the way in which the Politicals coped with hostility from the Chinese, the Tibetans, and from the Foreign Office in London; and the third and final part, looking at the completely different situation facing the men of the China Service in East Tibet who had to cope firstly, with Chao Erh Feng's campaign that was to culminate in a full scale Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1910, and secondly, with the quite separate problem created by the presence of the exiled Dalai Lama, who between 1906 and 1909, traversed the frontiers of East Tibet and Western China in an attempt to gain allies for his country.

In this chapter I will explain and describe the way in which policy was implemented by governments in India, London, and Peking, but I will also look more closely at diplomatic practice on the spot, examining specific incidents in detail in order to illustrate particular points. Inevitably this will make the chapter disproportionately long, but hopefully it will still prove interesting and illuminating enough to hold the reader's attention.
FORMAL ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE FRONTIER:

(1) THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION.

Grey became Foreign Secretary on 11th December 1905 convinced that an agreement with Russia over Central Asia would complement the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. It was decided that Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three areas of conflict in Central Asia between Britain and Russia, should each form the subject of a separate treaty which could then be combined for ratification. Since it was felt by both sides that Tibet might be the easiest issue to settle first, talks about the country began in St. Petersburg on 7th June 1906, between the Russian Minister Aleksander Petrovitch Izvolsky, and the British Minister, Sir Arthur Nicolson.

Initial optimism was quickly dispelled by a cooling in Anglo-Russian relations during 1906, the result of two minor diplomatic crises which meant that the talks failed to make headway. By the end of the year however, Nicolson began to detect a change of heart on the Russian side, and on August 31st 1907, the separate Treaty about Tibet was signed. Although in the context of the agreement talks on Tibet were relatively uncomplicated, they did involve some bitter disputes about a number of related minor issues which were part of the legacy of the 'Great Game' rivalry of the previous century. The Russians were very perturbed about continuing British occupation of Chumbi Valley, and Izvolsky openly 'sceptical' of British promises to adhere to the Treaty conditions imposed in 1904, and 1906, which had promised a withdrawal of British garrisons following payment of the indemnity. When Nicolson began to suggest that Chumbi was not a suitable subject for discussions, Izvolsky therefore pressed for a redefinition of British policy, hinting 'obscurely' that, if British occupation of the Chumbi Valley continued, Russia might be 'entitled to concessions'. Anglo-Russian wrangles over Chumbi are indicative of the continuing climate of suspicion that surrounded their relationship at this point in the talks which were not helped by Russian awareness of the hostile attitude being adopted by the Indian government, who had opposed the idea that talks about Tibet should take place in Russia.
British attempts to introduce a clause into the proposed Treaty banning scientific missions to Tibet created such friction that at one stage it jeopardized the very survival of the talks. Morley had already secured Parliamentary sanction for the principle of a ban on travel in the interests of frontier security. However he felt strongly that a similar ban should be applied to Russian travellers, and all the more so since there had already been some controversy over this very issue with the Lhasa authorities.*8 In July 1906 the Russians had suggested that the ban might apply for no longer than five years, and Izvolsky had expressed concern about the effect of allowing it to go ahead at all at that time since he felt it would inevitably antagonise powerful factions inside Russia which would place him politically in a very awkward position.**9

Although Nicolson went to great lengths to reassure him that the reason for the ban was neither to thwart Russian scientists, nor to accuse the Russian Government of intrigues with Tibet, but was merely to rule out any possibility of upsetting the authorities in Lhasa by risking incidents on the frontier still unsettled after the Younghusband Expedition, Izvolsky remained unconvinced. He suggested as a compromise that the clause banning travel might simply not be 'formally stated'.**10

As a fellow diplomat Nicolson had some sympathy for Izvolsky's position. He managed to persuade Grey to abandon attempts to include the ban in the final agreement on the grounds that it would be impossible to get the Russian government to include it as a formal clause.**11 Eventually, as an alternative course, both parties agreed to approach China as Tibet's suzerain in order to ask her to intervene and ban foreign travel inside Tibet. When Jordan put this to the Wai Wu Pu on 22nd August 1907 however, the Chinese response was unhelpful. Claiming to be much 'perplexed' by the request, they explained to him that it was also quite inappropriate, since it was already well known that the Emperor did not allow any unauthorised travel within the Empire.*12 In the absence of Chinese support it was mutually agreed between Britain and Russia that a three year ban on travel be imposed and that after that, a review of the situation should take place.*13 As Grey was later to observe, attempts to ban travel permanently would have run into difficulties as it was quite impossible to determine
whether Russian scientists were spying and, as Izvolsky had often pointed out, if the Russians had really wanted to create friction on the frontier there were far easier ways of doing so than by mounting expensive scientific missions. In the end the problems experienced by the Indian government when they tried to prevent the famous Swedish explorer Sven Hedin from travelling on the frontier, convinced all sides that ultimately, the ban was unenforceable.

A third point of conflict over the routes that Russian traders and travellers might legitimately use threatened the success of the Anglo-Russian talks and convinced both sides of the need to define Tibet and its borders. The problem of defining Tibet had first been raised by Izvolsky when talks began in June 1906. Previous British treaties relating to the country had contained no references to limits or boundaries and, although a small part of the Indo-Tibetan border had been defined as a result of earlier friction with Sikkim, and there was a fairly clear idea about where the Indo-Tibetan border was in that part of the Himalayas, the northern border of Tibet was an acknowledged wilderness. East Tibet was also a complete mystery and its status was now further confused by Chinese claims that the territory was to form part of a new Chinese Province to be known as Sikang.

Since it was known in London that the Indian government were still unwilling to accept any definition of Tibet based on Chinese suzerainty, which Curzon had earlier described as a 'constitutional fiction', and that it would be impossible to get them to change their minds without creating further tensions which might inhibit the success of the agreement, the Foreign Office felt very reluctant to press for a definition from China. It was also believed that, in view of their recent attitude such a request might encourage the Chinese to make even more extravagant claims for sovereignty in the region. When Izvolsky raised the possibility of a definition of Tibet therefore, there was very little British interest in trying to settle the matter with reference to China, and the possibility of asking the Tibetans themselves did not seem to occur to anybody as an option.
Having failed to get a definition in the summer of 1906, Izvolsky allowed some months to elapse before raising the subject again in January 1907. On this occasion however he acknowledged that, although he felt that a definition was needed, he also accepted that it would be difficult to produce one, since the Chinese had no clear or 'positive' ideas on the subject. 

In February 1907, in an effort to solve the problem, Nicolson included in a note to the Russians a definition of Tibet based upon information supplied by the Indian government which included Upper Tsaidam and Tahji, both areas, which at the time, were being directly administered by the Chinese. This definition was overtly contentious and, as Izvolsky commented, was a 'considerable extension' of the limits previously understood to have been part of Tibet. He therefore requested time to study the maps. Uncertain of how to proceed in the light of Indian proposals, both governments agreed once again to consult with China. The Chinese response was no more helpful than before, and Jordan was informed in no uncertain terms by Liang Tun-yen of the Wai Wu Pu, that China found 'no necessity to define Tibet since there had been no change made to her limits'.

Faced by this obvious stalemate, neither Jordan nor Kolikov, the Russian Minister in Peking, felt able to raise the matter for a third time, and in the end the Treaty was concluded without the issue being settled. Like the Younghusband Expedition, the attempts to define Tibet had the effect of increasing Chinese interest in the area, since the very fact that the issue had been raised at all forced them to assess their own definition, and in the process see the possibilities for greater territorial gain. Attempts to define Tibet therefore created a new problem for Anglo-Chinese relations, while at the same time failing to solve the position for Britain and Russia.

There is no mention of Mongolia in the final treaty, yet for a while discussions about Mongolia threatened to widen the scope of talks. Nicolson was well aware that for Russia, Mongolia and Tibet were linked issues and that Russian interest in the Dalai Lama was partly a by-product of their Mongolian policy. At first they had wanted him to return as soon possible to Lhasa in order to help them retain their existing influence over their Mongolian subjects. However, by November 1906, they had changed
their minds and appeared happy for him to remain at Kumbum Monastery where they felt better able to enjoy the fringe benefits of his close contact with the Mongolian Princes.\textsuperscript{25} On 9th July 1906 Russia made a first attempt to link Mongolian and Tibetan affairs to the Anglo-Russian talks when M. Poklevsky, the Russian Minister in London, called on Hardinge at the Foreign Office. After preliminary pleasantries he asked Hardinge what he thought about Russian policy in Mongolia. Hardinge's reply was guarded, and after first stating that, in his opinion, the military party in Russia were promoting a forward policy in Mongolia, a charge that Poklevsky quickly denied, he went on to put forward his belief that Japanese agents inside Mongolia were encouraging the Chinese to 'tighten their control' as a means of fending off Russian activity in the area, a suggestion that Poklevsky allowed to stand without comment.\textsuperscript{26} In January 1907 Izvolsky reintroduced the subject of Mongolia during the course of further discussions in St. Petersburg, asking if Britain might be willing to discuss the matter after agreements on Tibet had been settled. On this occasion, and in this context, Nicolson felt quite unable to reply arguing that since this was a 'new idea' raised unexpectedly, he would need time to consult with Grey. Izvolsky immediately withdrew the question, explaining that it was 'merely a suggestion' and need not be raised officially.\textsuperscript{27} In a subsequent interview with Nicolson on the following day however, he again requested that Mongolia be made a matter for formal discussions.\textsuperscript{28}

For Minto, a recognition of Russian interests in Mongolia was not a great price to pay for a mutual recognition of British rights in Tibet. Grey was less enthusiastic about the idea, believing that any attempts to widen the talks by including Mongolia was not only unwise, but possibly even dangerous, since it might further antagonise the Chinese and make it more difficult to extricate Britain from Tibetan affairs. The most that he was willing to offer Russia therefore were vague 'diplomatic assurances' that Britain would approach the Chinese respecting Russian territory on the Mongolian border, and would also try to persuade their Japanese allies to do the same.\textsuperscript{29} Meanwhile, at the India Office, Morley put a further convincing argument against linking Mongolian and Tibetan affairs by suggesting that any concessions made to Russia in Mongolia might not
necessarily guarantee a reciprocal arrangement for Britain in Tibet, since by signing the Adhesion Treaty with China in 1906, Britain had forfeited all rights to move freely north of the Himalayas.\textsuperscript{30}

On the afternoon of 18th January 1907 events took an interesting turn when Nicolson received a visit from Ichiro Montono, the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg, who expressed concern about the slow progress of talks taking place with between Japan and Russia at the time. He spoke about unwelcome Russian interest in Japanese activities in Mongolia and explained to Nicolson that, although he 'understood' Izvolsky's 'apprehensiveness' about the matter, in fact his fears were misplaced and that there was really nothing for Russia to worry about. In transmitting this message he also managed to insult Izvolsky by suggesting that he was over reacting to the situation by adopting an 'unprofessional' approach that clearly showed that he did not have 'sufficient strength of character' to rise above the false rumours being fed to him, and that he was therefore creating an artificial crisis which the world's press had exploited to the detriment of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{31} Nicolson defended Izvolsky, arguing that in his view his colleague's attitude was understandable, and the matter was discreetly dropped. The Japanese were clearly unhappy about the situation and in March 1907, Baron Komura, Japan's Ambassador in London, called on Hardinge in order to deny rumours that Mongolia was to feature in the Russo-Japanese talks \textsuperscript{32}

The Mongolian issue was eventually resolved between Britain and Russia when Hardinge informed Poklevesky that Britain would be 'unable to restrict' or 'interfere' with what were essentially private Chinese concerns in the country. As Britain's ally in Asia however Japanese involvement in Mongolia, and Britain's inability to control or discover the full extent of her interest, proved a continuing source of embarrassment, as well as another loose end that would create complications for future Anglo-Japanese relations and in turn have implications for Tibetan Policy. \textsuperscript{33}

A further issue that hovered on the edge of the talks but which ultimately remained unsolved, was the problem of trade on the frontier. On 12th February 1907 Nicolson had presented Izvolsky with a draft Convention, together with agreed changes to points which the Russians had raised
about trade. He was concerned that some agreement be reached on
the issue since there was already a well-established and lucrative trade
between Russia and Tibet, and although only one large Russian caravan
crossed into Tibetan territory annually, many smaller traders operated
in the Tibetan border area whose safety needed to be guaranteed.
Nicolson immediately took the view that the problem was 'of no immediate
moment' since the Chinese were supposedly regulating trade on Russian
goods in the area. Izvolsky was not convinced that Russian interests
were safe however and drew his colleague's attention to a recent article
in a British journal in which reference had been made to 'towns' and a
'railway line' being opened up in Tibet, this time by the British
themselves. Nicolson saw the obvious reference to the new trade marts which
he was able to justify, but dismissed the railway as 'rumour', but Grey
then forbade any further discussion about trade, with the result that there
was no attempt to define it further in the final Treaty.*34 British
refusal to discuss the organisation of trade, which at the time was an
integral part of the economic and social life of the frontier, as well as
an important source of revenue for Tibet and her neighbours including
Russia and India, was to have important political consequences, generating
petty future conflicts that might otherwise have been avoided.
The problem posed by the presence of Russian Buddhists and their need to
retain physical and spiritual links with the Dalai Lama was primarily a
religious issue that for a time became political. Russia claimed special
interest status in Tibet because of the 'spiritual needs' of her Buddhist
subjects and tended to link this in importance with the 'political
claims' that Britain was making there. Since 1904 however, the Dalai Lama
had lived, not always harmoniously, in Mongolia, as the guest of various
princes and lamas, and by November 1906 the Russians had felt it in their
best interests to keep him there. Once it was realised that he had
no immediate plans to return to Tibet, and certainly not before the
Anglo-Russian treaty had been signed, it was easier to come to some
arrangement that might include provision for Russian Buddhists to visit
Lhasa. The first draft of the treaty therefore contained a reference to the
'spiritual concerns' of Russia for Tibet, together with the granting of
extra privileges for Russian Buddhists which included the right to travel on the frontier on 'religious business'. Although both sides eventually accepted the proposal, which seemed at last to have put an end to the damaging conflict that had previously surrounded the movement of Russian pilgrims on the frontier, its acceptance did not altogether remove British suspicions, as reactions to any news of the presence of the Russian Buriat Dorjiev on the frontier were to prove.

In addition to these peripheral problems there was great controversy within British circles about the wisdom of including Tibet in any agreement with Russia. In Peking for example, Jordan felt that any Anglo-Russian Agreement would ultimately prove injurious to British interests in Tibet, since it would automatically strengthen Chinese power in the country. Meanwhile in India, Minto was equally distressed about the venue for the talks, regarding India and not Russia as the more appropriate location for discussions about Tibet which he saw as an Indian frontier problem; and despite the fact that Morley did not agree, he continued to try to impede the progress of the talks on every possible pretext.

The strong support for some agreement with Russia on Tibet came from London. At the India Office, Morley saw in the talks an ideal excuse to remove the last vestiges of Curzonian forward policy and did his utmost to encourage and promote them wherever possible; and at the Foreign Office, Grey considered an Anglo-Russian Agreement in Tibet to be a way of preventing further Russian advances in the direction of the Indian frontier. Although the Anglo-Russian Convention succeeded to a great extent in achieving what it had set out to do, namely to settle Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, the course of the discussions had also drawn attention to a whole range of other issues that were not solved by the treaty and, as Alastair Lamb has argued, it gave Russia a right to involve herself in any conflict on the frontier between Britain and Tibet which would effectively block any further British progress there.

It also had the powerful additional effect of increasing Chinese power in Tibet as well as encouraging Japanese forward policy elsewhere in Asia. The Convention, eventually signed in St. Petersburg on 31st August 1907, dealt a severe blow to the ambitions of the Curzonian faction. However, it did not
succeed in totally destroying their plans to develop the frontier, at least until the Chinese invasion of Lhasa in February 1910, and Indian officers continued to implement policy as though the Chinese Adhesion Treaty of 1906, and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, had never been signed.

(ii) TRADE REGULATIONS 1908

On 27th April 1906 Frederick O'Connor, on leave from the frontier, addressed a long, impassioned, and uncommissioned report on trade issues in Tibet from his hotel in London to his employers. In this unsolicited report he begged them to remember the vital part played by trade in their original plans for Tibet, and urged them to consider various recommendations to improve the existing situation. His recommendations included plans to open a new trade mart in South-East Tibet, and the building of a road linking Chumbi Valley to India. His ideas were not innovatory but had formed part of a wider campaign for development in Tibet which O'Connor and fellow Curzonians had felt were implicit in the terms of the Lhasa Convention. In the event the report was simply 'noted', since by this time trade was no longer regarded by the Foreign Office as an important issue and official policy was directed towards extricating Britain from Tibetan affairs. For Trade Agents on the spot, and the businessmen who desired the development of trading links for commercial and economic purposes however, trade remained a vital issue, and the need to tidy the loose ends left by the Trade Regulations of 1893, was for them a top priority. These Regulations had aimed to establish trade marts in Tibet, and originally Phari had been selected as a suitable base from which a network of trading stations could be opened up across the country. Tibetans already had a tax office at Phari and its position just inside Tibet, at the head of Chumbi Valley, made it seem an ideal site for a British Mart. However, the strength of the opposition coming from both the Phari Jongpen, and the Chinese who also stationed trading agents in the town, had forced the Indian government to reconsider, and eventually Yatung had been agreed as a suitable alternative site, although its unsuitability was already acknowledged, and was speedily confirmed by the British trade agent's first report soon after it opened in May 1894.
Having agreed to the establishment of a mart, and having yielded over connected issues like the parity of status between British, Indian, and Tibetan traders using it, it was expected that the Chinese might also prove flexible about the tea and wool trade to be conducted there. This was not to be, and in an effort to calm tensions, James Hart of the Chinese Customs Service, who represented China in the 1893 trade regulation talks, was successful in securing approval for a clause in the treaty allowing for a review of the situation after five years; a suggestion which defused the situation at the time but had the effect of blocking further important discussions about the organisation of trade until 1899. *45 The Trade Regulations had taken three years to negotiate and were eventually signed on 5th December 1893. It was hoped that they would herald a new era for Indo-Tibetan trade as well as for Anglo-Chinese co-operation on the frontier, but this was to prove a vain hope as soon after signing, the situation rapidly deteriorated, and neither White, as Political Officer in Sikkim, nor the Chinese, were able to control the tensions as Tibetans ignored and flouted the Treaty, creating a situation that was to lead to the despatch of the Younghusband Expedition in 1903.*46

By late 1904, and throughout 1905, city syndicates and Indian traders pressed for a revival of the trade talks. Their interest had been further stimulated by the discovery of gold and other precious metals on the frontier, confirmed in Trade Reports on Szechuan and East Tibet compiled by Alexander Hosie after 1904.*47 Since the 1880's individuals had been sent out by private companies in Britain and India to excavate and explore possible trade routes across Tibet in order to bring Chinese and Tibetan wealth to India, and during the Younghusband Expedition, Waddell had compiled a very comprehensive report in which he had cited the precise location of a number of gold mines in Tibet itself, together with the tantalizing information that they were underworked.*48 O'Connor's report from London had also confirmed this, going on to stress the importance of opening trade marts across Tibet in order to tap the hidden resources of the region for the benefit of India.*49

All these reports, together with enthusiastic proposals for the development of the tea and wool trade inside Tibet, were suppressed by the Foreign
Office who were unwilling to accept the degree of involvement such development would necessitate. The Indian government however, mindful of the revenue implications if such trade were encouraged, continued to display considerable interest in the proposals, and throughout the talks called to renegotiate a new trade treaty between 1904 and 1906, they continued to advance the cause of trade development at every available opportunity.*50

As well as a keen interest in gold there was a growing preoccupation with tea, and in particular with the idea of challenging the Chinese monopoly in brick tea which Tibetans drank in great quantities. For many years Indian Tea companies like the Cess Tea Company Limited, had been experimenting with methods of brick tea production, and in 1906 had sent their Commissioner, Mr Hutchinson, to Szechuan in order to study the process at first hand.*51 Campbell at Chumbi, and Bailey at Gyantse, had both been actively involved in the promotion of Indian tea and were not averse to using devious and sophisticated means to persuade the Tibetans to accept it, often disguising it as brick tea to make it more palatable. *52

The development of the tea trade was also becoming vitally important to a number of very powerful vested interests in Britain and, by the summer of 1906, the Indian government felt themselves pressured enough to draw up a list of provisional points that might be considered in a formal review of the 1893 Trade Regulations.

As a result of this positive action, talks were reconvened and delegates assembled in Simla on 24th August 1907 to begin the review. Much to British consternation however, Chang Yin-tang, a man already disliked for his hostility to British trade agents at the marts, was appointed as Chinese representative to the reconvened talks on the grounds that he was already well known to the British. The Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis Dane, and Eric Wilton, of the China Consular Service, represented British interests, and O'Connor was recalled from Gyantse especially to advise the Tibetan representative Tsarong Shape. *53 From the outset, it was obvious that discussions were not going to be restricted to trade, and attempts were quickly made by Chang to use them as a means of tying up the loose ends from the previous treaties with Britain in 1904 and 1906. China was
particularly anxious to establish a political claim to Tibet that would be recognised by Britain, and was matched in this desire by the strength of Grey's need to disentangle Britain from her existing Tibetan ties. In this sense trade itself became a political issue and for India also an economic one, since she saw a need to develop frontier trade as a means of raising revenue for her flagging economy quite separate from any forward policy planned for Tibet by the Curzonian faction. Minto used the review as a weapon in his campaign to retain a British presence in Chumbi, and Grey used it as a way of extracting promises of co-operation from the Chinese over the still unsettled and contentious issue of the indemnity payments. Morley adopted a similar approach to the one he had taken over the Anglo-Russian talks, and was determined that these negotiations would mark an end to Curzonian influence on the frontier reflected in O'Connor's report of 1906. He also felt that, in the Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis Dane, he had found the man best able to help him achieve this aim.

The question of the status of the Tibetan delegate was one of the first problems to develop into a major point of conflict. The Chinese had been extremely reluctant to accept Tsarong as a fully accredited delegate, and although both Dane and Wilton were forceful in defending his status, in the end, and as always in their dealings with the Chinese at this time, Britain conceded ground and agreed a 'compromise' entirely suited to Chinese plans to upgrade their claims on Tibet. Tsarong therefore became Tibet's 'fully authorised representative to act under the direction of Chang' and, as Parshotam Mehra has argued, was little more than 'Chang's puppet' for the duration of the talks.

The trade talks were quickly tied to the issue of the indemnity payments, which China wanted to make on Tibet's behalf, and the date to be set for the evacuation of Chumbi. Minto deliberately used this issue as a way of protecting what he saw as Indian gains made by the Lhasa Convention, and to this end he told Morley in December 1906, that he wanted the second instalment paid by the Tibetan delegate at Gyantse, in strict accordance with the terms set by the Lhasa Convention. Although not keen to press the point, Morley did so on this occasion, with the result that Minto got
his wish, and subsequently used this victory to persuade Grey to issue formal complaints to Peking about the behaviour of Chinese officials in Tibet and in particular, that of Chang Yin-tang, the Chinese delegate to the trade talks who had recently been appointed Chinese High Commissioner for Tibet. *58 Chinese responses to these formal complaints were predictably non-committal, possibly because they were unable to control Chang's activities themselves. It was therefore more than a year before Jordan could report any positive proposals from the Chinese side, and it was not until December 1907 that they announced that they were ready to go ahead with the final indemnity payment on Tibet's behalf, and were anxious for the preparations for a British withdrawal from Chumbi to go ahead as soon as this final payment had been made. *59 Minto once again seized the opportunity afforded by these discussions to raise further strong objections to Chang's behaviour, warning London that the situation on the frontier was deteriorating to a point where conditions would soon be as difficult as those experienced immediately prior to the despatch of the Younghusband Expedition in 1903.*60 Further escalation of the conflict was only prevented by the payment of the final instalment of the indemnity by Chang at Gyantse on 21st January, over three weeks later than agreed, and then only after an abortive last minute attempt to pay it in person in Calcutta.*61 On this occasion the Chinese had given in to British diplomatic pressure and had failed to support Chang, an obvious indication to a government less obsessed with the need to withdraw from Tibet that they might have taken far more from the talks than they did, and a further source of exasperation to the Indian government, who felt cheated out of concessions they might have gained from the talks that might have enabled them to ensure the safety of their frontier officers and the developing commercial interests in the region. In February 1908, when Indian troops finally withdrew from Chumbi therefore, it seemed to many in India that they took with them a last opportunity to retain and extend the gains made under the Lhasa Convention which had been seen as a triumph for Curzonian forward policy leaving a legacy of bitterness that would create problems for their future relations with London. *62
After the evacuation, the talks became involved with wider political issues, and it was over six months before they were finally concluded, on 20th August 1908. The Indian government were particularly annoyed by the way in which the talks had been conducted, as well as with the terms which, like the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, had seemed to them to give even greater power to China at India's expense. In their view the talks were a disaster, resulting in the dismantling of their future plans for the development of Indo-Tibetan trade, as well as failing to regulate existing trade. After they were signed their fears were confirmed as trade relations deteriorated yet further, especially after 1908, when Henderson was replaced as Chinese Custom's Officer for the frontier by Mr. Chueng, one of Chang's supporters, who immediately began to harass and obstruct Indian traders. Despite their protests, India did derive some benefits from the 1908 Trade Regulations, since they enabled many of the irritating minor daily conflicts, that arose as a result of misunderstandings between officials at the trade marts, to be sorted out by recourse to the treaty. The limits of Gyantse mart were defined, and the telegraph to India was completed, allowing speedier communication with India and ensuring that troops could be quickly summoned to defend British personnel in the event of a sudden crisis. However, in terms of the gains they had expected to make, these benefits seemed meagre indeed, leaving the Politicals still powerless to either administer existing trade, or develop commercial initiatives. With Chinese interference increasing rapidly and dramatically soon after the regulations were signed, and with British prestige at such a low ebb, the personal safety of their staff now became an issue of very real concern to the Indian government.
2. LIFE ON THE FRONTIER: WEST TIBET

(1) WHITE AND THE AFFAIR OF THE BOUNDARY PILLARS

While others tried to solve what they saw as problems created by the Lhasa Convention, the Politicals who lived and worked at the trade marts inside Tibet, struggled with the daily business of administration in the face of increasing psychological and political pressure, and in the growing awareness that their government could give them little practical help in the absence of support from London. The political tensions that had generated conflict before the Convention was signed still remained unsolved, and in an attempt to settle the west Tibetan frontier, Claude White, Political Officer in Sikkim, wrote to Curzon at the end of 1904 about the continuing friction created by the absence of boundary pillars along the frontier, suggesting that pillars might now be erected along the boundary above Giangong in accordance with the Lhasa Convention and the earlier Sikkim Agreement of 1890.*66

Curzon responded with a request for more information, expressing particular concern about effects on grazing rights and the possibility of opposition from the authorities in Lhasa. After official enquiries made directly to Lhasa by O'Connor had ascertained that there was no objection either from the Lhasa authorities, or from men of the Lachin Valley where the pillars were to be erected, White felt further emboldened to suggest to India that they invite the Tibetans to send representatives to meet him at the erection site. At this stage, with the possibility of embarrassing incidents thus avoided, the situation looked quite hopeful and a speedy settlement of this troublesome border area seemed assured. All was not as it seemed however, and on 28th August 1905 O'Connor received a visit from the Gyantse Jongpen who came with a message from Lhasa which stated that, due to the lateness of the request, it would now be impossible to supply delegates before the rains and that any meeting would therefore have to be postponed until the following spring.*67 In view of O'Connor's news, and since there was no urgent need to erect the pillars before winter, White was content to accept the Tibetan decision, and the matter was thus deferred until March 1906, when it was once again raised by Minto, this time in response to the need to remind the Tibetans of their obligations.
under the Lhasa Convention and the Trade Regulations of 1893, which required a clear demarcation of the border.*68 Minto's support for the erection of the boundary pillars was to lead him into a direct confrontation with Morley during the course of 1906, and was in itself a foretaste of the conflict that was to develop between the India Office and the Indian government over frontier policy between 1906 and 1908. In June 1906 Morley replied caustically to Minto's requests for boundary pillars by asking him to supply evidence that practical problems had been created by their absence and requesting details of White's communications with Lhasa on the subject. Minto replied in similar vein observing that, if the India Office did not think it important that Tibetans observe Article One of the Lhasa Convention requiring the erection of pillars, then so be it.*69 This brought a strongly worded response from Morley, containing a clear policy statement that would finally end discussion, and setting the tone of future correspondence about the frontier which in time was to seal the fate of those working there between 1906 and the evacuation of Chumbi in February 1908. Morley's policy statement supported the 'judicious action' of the previous government and further added that, 'since no practical inconvenience has been caused by the absence of pillars', he was therefore of the opinion that, providing the Tibetans observed Article One of the Lhasa Convention by not infringing it, it was 'neither necessary nor expedient to raise the question of erecting pillars'. The statement ended with a warning to Minto that he should now be aware that official policy towards Tibet was to 'avoid all necessary causes of controversy with the Lhasa Government' and, after receiving this message, Minto never again exposed himself in this way to open castigation but continued to support Curzonian initiatives less obtrusively. *70 During the following October White was forced to relinquish his post as Political Officer in Sikkim, by now a sad and embittered man. After 1904 he had been well aware that he could never again count on the support of his government in disputes with Lhasa, and after 1906, he remained persona non grata in official circles after his part in the 'plot' to bring the Panchen Lama to India was revealed. Although not always a tactful man, White had served his government well in a difficult and challenging post and had
sacrificed a promising engineering career to work with the 'Politicals'. His experience was to typify the treatment meted out to many of those involved with the Younghusband Expedition who, handpicked by Curzon for their special talents, were subsequently sacrificed to the twists and turns of the new government policy.71

(ii) CHANG YIN-TANG AND CHINESE FORWARD POLICY

In 1906 the Chinese sent a Cantonese called Chang Yin-tang to the frontier ostensibly to head a 'Trade Mission' but in reality to implement their new forward policy and in the process to issue a direct challenge to the prestige of the Indian government and their men on the spot.72 Chang had previously acted as Tang Shao Yi's locum tenens during the Adhesion talks and was already known to be a tough negotiator. His appointment, announced in a telegram to Minto from the British Charge d'Affaires in Peking on 15th June 1906, was greeted in India with some apprehension, and the telegrams passing between Minto and Morley that referring to his appointment, reflect similar concern at the India Office.73 The original telegram to India announcing Chang's arrival had contained news that he would be embarking on a journey to Tibet in order to 'arrange the opening of trade marts there' and it asked them to provide transport and facilities for his party, and also to arrange an interview between Chang and the Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis Dane. This simple request created great problems for the Indian government. Firstly, if they allowed Chang's party to use the quickest and easiest Shipki route that entered Tibet from Simla, they might be setting a dangerous precedent for the future, a view strongly supported by Morley at the India Office.74 Secondly, the implications for any discussion about trade with Chang would inevitably endanger Anglo-Tibetan relations at the marts, since the Chinese would almost certainly wish to exclude the Tibetans from any talks. With this in mind therefore, Morley supported Minto's proposal to supply Chang with both transport and permission to use the Shipki route, but under the strict understanding that this was to be a 'special occasion' and only if Mr. Calvart, Assistant Commissioner at Kulu, might be allowed unrestricted travel on the on the frontier as a concession for this favour.75
Morley felt that Chang might be allowed to open trade discussions with India, but only on the clear understanding that the Indian government would enter into no commitments with China without consulting London.76 The panic created by the announcement of Chang's appointment is in itself indicative of the high degree of uncertainty and tension on the frontier at this time, despite the recent signing of the Adhesion Treaty with China, and also because of it for, under this Treaty, Anglo-Chinese frontier relations now had to be redefined and reassessed.

The interview between Chang and Dane took place as arranged in Simla on 25th June 1906.77 Chang began by informing Dane that he had been promoted High Commissioner for Tibet, with instructions to visit Gartok in West Tibet before going on to Lhasa in order to examine 'trade conditions' there. The interview then continued with a discussion about the relative merits of journeying to Gartok. Dane explained that, not only was the Gartok road 'unsuitable' for a High Chinese Official, being merely a path across the frontier normally used by Indian traders, but that it would also be 'undesirable' to establish a precedent for its official use by Chinese dignitaries. He explained that, although Gartok enjoyed a good trading reputation, its trading figures were based on takings from the Annual Fair which, being the final fair of the season, always did well and was not therefore a reliable yearly indicator of trading levels in the region. He also told Chang that Gartok's importance as a social and administrative centre depended on the fact that it was a base for the Tibetan Garpons, traditional representatives of Tibetan authority in West Tibet, who were now not nearly as important as they had once been.78 When Dane then continued to explain that the Gartok region was also important to the Indian government for purely religious reasons, since it held Lake Manasowar, sacred to Indian Hindus, Chang appeared quite willing to drop the idea of going there altogether although, as Dane noted 'from one or two remarks' he subsequently made, he was anxious not to appear to have failed in his stated intention to open a mart in the area.

Having now apparently abandoned the idea of going to Gartok, Chang began to press Dane on the wider subject of frontier trade, the official reason for his appointment. He asked Dane about the advisability of installing
a Chinese resident at Gartok, a move which the latter was quick to reject, explaining the difficulties involved in the collection of dues as the town was spread over several routes, and local Tibetans were already organised to collect what could be collected. Chang persisted with this request however, seeking Dane's help with the administration of trade in the area, and repeating this 'several times', insisting that a high degree of co-operation was now possible since the Adhesion Treaty between Britain and China had been signed and negotiations were complete. *79

What was the true purpose of Chang's visit? His mission had much to do with trade, since the development and control of trade on the frontier meant real political power in an area whose culture was, to a large extent, based upon it. However, he was also very anxious to establish his own credentials with the Indian government in order to test their attitudes in the wake of the Adhesion treaty, and Dane particularly noticed that he seemed 'anxious to avoid the possibility of any failure to carry out the obligation of opening the mart', yet was willing to drop the idea altogether when pressed. The intention to go on to Lhasa was barely mentioned and was not raised as an item for discussion by either side, yet it seemed that plans to go there were well thought out, and Chang actually mentioned that he was prepared to wait in Simla for companions if the Gartok plan fell through. It is possible of course that the Chinese had allowed him a great deal of flexibility in his interview with Dane. His announced intention to go to Gartok for example, was almost certainly a red herring designed to divert interest from his intention to travel on to Lhasa, the true purpose of his visit.*80 During the course of the interview, Chang behaved with almost abject humility, an attitude possibly calculated to convince Dane that he was not a threat to Indian interests, yet his subsequent behaviour on the frontier quickly dispelled this earlier impression, and he showed himself capable of being rude and overbearing with anyone he considered an inferior, yet totally charming with those he wanted to impress. Clearly he knew exactly what he was doing and had received extensive briefing for his role. Jordan felt initially that he was merely a tool of Tang Shao Yi, whom he believed to be the real driving force behind the new Chinese forward policy in Tibet.
However, he came to feel as the policy developed, that Chang was often acting alone, and sometimes appeared to be quite out of control. Chang's arrival on the frontier created particular problems for the Politic peace officers at the trade marts, and in the next section I will examine these problems in more detail.

(iii) CHANG'S OFFENSIVE IN CHUMBI

In July 1906 Walter Campbell, Assistant Political Officer at Chumbi, was 'summoned' to Simla to meet Chang Yin-tang as China's newly appointed High Commissioner for Tibet. Campbell was a very experienced officer seconded from the China Consular Service, and been highly recommended by Ernest Satow as someone with a superior knowledge of the Chinese language and diplomatic practice which it was felt would make him particularly suitable for the role he was to play in Chumbi. Despite his previous experience however, Campbell was to find himself totally ill equipped to face the problems created by Chang's arrival since, as he later explained, the man to whom he had been introduced in India was completely unlike the opponent he was to face in Chumbi. The relationship that developed between the two men, which I shall now examine in some detail, provides a valuable insight into the way in which diplomacy was conducted on the spot. Although both men acted in what they believed to be the best interests of their respective governments, their behaviour endangered the fragile stability of the frontier, and each found himself out of his depth in the absence of support and supervision from his government. Campbell had already discussed the arrangements for Chang's arrival at Chumbi 'some weeks' before with Mr. Sung, the local Pon Pon at Pipitpang. From the beginning, perceptions about the importance of the visit differed. Campbell's refusal to accept Mr. Sung's suggestion that he 'chieh' or welcome Chang, by riding out to greet him on the road in accordance with traditional Chinese custom, was at odds with the British practice of paying an official courtesy call soon after his arrival and this misunderstanding was to affect their first encounter, quickly souring relations between them. Campbell believed, quite correctly, that Chang's status as High Commissioner for Tibet issued a direct challenge to British authority on
the frontier. All his subsequent actions and utterances were therefore based on this premise, and he was supported in this view by Charles Bell, his superior officer, as well as by Minto. Whitehall was less supportive of this attitude however, and later accused him of adopting an inflexible and pedantic approach that played right into Chang's hands, causing British prestige in the area to suffer.\textsuperscript{84}

When Campbell had first spoken to Sung neither had any idea where Chang would be staying, and Campbell therefore offered a dak bungalow which Sung instantly rejected.\textsuperscript{85} When it soon became apparent that the Yamen at Pipitpang was being completely refurbished for Chang's benefit, the inappropriateness of Campbell's offer became obvious although, whether Sung himself had initially expected to have to go to such lengths in order to prepare for the visit is uncertain. What is certain however is that when Campbell rode over from his headquarters in Chumbi to 'inspect' the Yamen, his offer to provide a pair of red candles to match the red tablecloth, as his sole contribution to the decor, was taken by the Pon Pon as a deliberate insult. Etiquette was further confused during the course of a subsequent conversation with Sung over tea in what was to become Chang's bedroom, when the Pon Pon let slip that he too would not be riding out to 'chieh' Chang since he was very busy with the final preparations for his stay. Obviously the importance of the 'chieh', so heavily stressed before was, like other aspects of Chinese diplomacy, very flexible.\textsuperscript{86}

As there was still no definite information as to the exact date and time of Chang's arrival, Campbell rode out to Yatung to take tea with Annie Taylor, a British missionary who lived there.\textsuperscript{87} During his visit Campbell was invited by the local Chinese Tsungli or general to join a dinner party in Yatung that evening, an offer which he gratefully accepted. Until this time Campbell's relations with local Chinese officials had been relaxed and fairly informal, and any suggestion that they might have been involved in a deliberate attempt to embarrass him seems unlikely. From the moment of Chang's arrival however, Campbell's relations with the Chinese began to go wrong. During dinner that evening a messenger arrived to say that Chang had already passed through Yatung and was now en route for Pipitang and the Tsungli announced his immediate intention of riding out
to welcome him in the hills above the town. This information subsequently proved to be incorrect and Campbell heard the following day that Chang had not yet arrived at Yatung but that when he did, he was planning to stay there for an unspecified period of time. This unexpected change of schedule gave Campbell considerable cause for concern firstly, because he was unsure of Chang's motives for visiting the town and secondly, and more importantly, because he feared that the High Commissioner might be intending to interfere with the running of the trade mart and his own authority there. In view of the previously unreliable information supplied about Chang's movements, he wisely decided to await his arrival in Pipitang in order to avoid the possibility of giving any official sanction to a visit to Yatung.\textsuperscript{88} Since Campbell had received no word from Bell and was therefore acting entirely on his own initiative this was a very testing time for him.

On Monday 24th September he rode over to Pipitang, having finally received word that Chang would shortly be arriving there. In order to ensure that he had timed his visit precisely to allow Chang time to unpack and prepare himself, he sent a peon ahead to give warning of his arrival. At 2.30pm the peon reported the sound of celebratory firecrackers and, after what he judged to be an appropriate interval, he rode up to the Yamen, once again sending the peon ahead with his calling card as a precaution. There was no sign of any official reception for him on arrival and Campbell, in full dress uniform for the occasion, was now unsure of how to proceed. Matters then grew worse when a servant eventually appeared and he was invited to enter the Yamen by a side door instead of by the middle door, in accordance with the accepted Chinese custom when receiving important official guests. At this point Campbell chose to be insulted and was subsequently accused by the Foreign Office of over-reacting to the situation.\textsuperscript{89} However, he was anxious to behave correctly in a very delicate situation, and in the absence of guidance from his superiors, and he had to think quickly as Chang was clearly flouting established custom. Had he agreed to enter by the side door in full dress uniform, not only would he have looked ridiculous, but he would also have demonstrated to both Chinese and Tibetans that he was prepared to bend to Chang, at this
stage a very dangerous precedent to set. While he waited outside the Yamen, nursing his anger and uncertain of what to do next, a message came from Chang to say that he was not at home and at that point Campbell decided to withdraw as far as he was able with dignity, and maintaining 'a stiff demeanour' appropriate to the occasion. He then returned to Chumbi village in order to compose himself and await further developments which were not slow to present themselves. At Chumbi village the Tibetan headman admitted that, contrary to British orders, he had supplied Chang's men with grass for their ponies. He explained that he had done this because Chang was 'a powerful official' and because he was not prepared to disobey orders from the Chinese unless the British were willing to protect him from their wrath. Campbell was forced to concede that he was unable to do this as he had only five men available for police duty, all of whom were occupied elsewhere. The Tibetan view of the state of play is very revealing since it clearly shows how little control the British really had in Chumbi, and after this conversation the situation rapidly deteriorated for Campbell.

On the following morning he rode into the nearby town of Phema in order to supervise the installation of a guard for the stores there. He then rode on to Yatung where he discovered that two Tibetan houses, used as stores by the British, had been 'broken into' and used to house the Chinese servants in Chang's party. As Campbell had quite improperly regarded these houses as British property, he lodged a 'sort of formal protest' with Henderson of the Chinese Customs Service who was then on special attachment to the Chang Mission. Although British, Henderson was first and foremost an employee of the Chinese government, and to Campbell's dismay, he responded by informing him that the houses were in fact the property of the Chinese Customs Service and, since Campbell had no desire to challenge him or engage in debate over the issue, the conversation then turned to other matters. He later claimed however that Henderson had even 'apologised' for what he described as Chang's earlier 'mistake' at Pipitang in offering the side door, and he also sensed that Henderson seemed 'weary' of the Chinese, and was particularly upset by the High Commissioner's 'impossible ideas'. As a British subject working
for the Chinese, Henderson was in the unenviable position of being a servant with two masters. On the one hand he had to explain to Campbell that Chang had been invited by the Lhasa authorities to investigate Tibetan complaints that they had been intimidated by Indian government officials in Chumbi, while on the other, he had to explain Campbell's apparent discourtesy to Chang. Matters grew worse on the following day when Henderson called to see Campbell to lodge a formal complaint from Chang that he had prevented supplies of food and fodder being sent to the Pipitang Yamen. Campbell strongly denied this charge, but sensing that Henderson had 'understood at once' what was going on, he allowed the conversation to drift onto other topics and relations between them seemed cordial. However, at 4 p.m. on the same day, Campbell came across Henderson standing beside the telegraph pole in the town looking 'very worried' having apparently just received a telegraph report that Campbell's men had arrested and mistreated Chinese and Tibetan soldiers and that Chang was now accusing Campbell of playing a 'double game'. Although this story turned out to be a gross exaggeration of the events at Phema, where the men involved were in fact Tibetan soldiers out of uniform arrested by mistake following Chinese complaints about their behaviour, reactions to this incident reveal the volatile nature of the situation.

By the following morning when he rode out to meet his superior officer Charles Bell, who was en route to Chumbi, Campbell was at the end of his tether and quite confused by what he felt to be Chang's unpredictable behaviour. Having received conflicting reports from Campbell and the Chinese, Bell had been anxious to investigate the events of the last few days for himself, and was particularly concerned about Campbell's situation. Chang's behaviour was miraculously transformed as soon as Bell arrived and, as he explained to him privately, he had not regarded Campbell's visit to the Yamen as official, since he was expecting Bell himself as senior Official and equal in rank, to make the first 'official' visit. He went on to accuse Campbell of conducting himself in a 'strange and unseemly manner' by creating an 'embarrassing scene' outside his Yamen in full view of the Tibetans. *91 Campbell was now forced to defend himself, and he vehemently denied Chang's charges suggesting that, since he had only
just informed Henderson that Bell was coming to Chumbi, it was hardly possible that Chang could have been expecting him and was therefore deliberately exploiting the situation to embarrass him. Although he was able to convince Bell that Chang was lying, Campbell was obliged to present a detailed report to the Indian government in which he was forced to defend and justify his own behaviour. In itself this was a humiliating excercise, since it was clear to him that the High Commissioner's intentions were to undermine British prestige which he had done his upmost to protect and foster.

I have chosen to examine this incident in such detail because in many ways it encapsulates the kind of problems experienced by the those charged with running the British administration in Tibet. The considerable confusion over policy created a general atmosphere of uncertainty, providing ample opportunity for individual manoeuvre on all sides. Chang's desire to establish Chinese sovereignty, and Campbell's need to reinforce British authority, created administrative confusions which the Tibetans were able to effectively exploit in order to preserve their economy and defend their way of life. Although Campbell was strongly supported by Bell and subsequently by Minto, Morley and Grey were less anxious to condone the wider implications that his dispute with Chang had involved. They therefore issued orders that he behave in a a 'conciliatory manner' towards his rival, an instruction which, in itself, implied criticism of his conduct. *93 Although Chang was also eventually rebuked by the Wai Wu Pu for this and for subsequent incidents at Gyantse, his career was not affected, and he later received promotion to the Wai Wu Pu, going on to represent China as delegate to the Trade Regulation talks of 1908. Campbell received no such promotion, and although he remained in the service, returning to China shortly after the incident, his treatment is yet another reminder of the dangers of becoming involved in a policy not supported by London. *94
On 23rd January 1906 Bailey became acting trade agent at Gyantse while O'Connor took his first leave for eleven years. Although the post was a very lonely and isolated one, Bailey found solace in hunting and sport and quickly settled into the routine of the trade mart. When Chang arrived on the frontier in the summer of 1906 however, this cosy lifestyle quickly changed and he soon found himself in conflict with his Chinese counterpart Mr. Gow, a man with whom he had previously enjoyed a reasonably amicable working relationship. The first problem arose over Gow's status. In a report to the Indian Government on 5th December 1906, Bailey had stated that Gow had told him 'privately' that he had recently been promoted to Sub-Prefect and that his full title was now 'Chinese Commissioner in Charge of the Chinese Trade and Diplomatic Agency'. Gow had also told Bailey that he had received this appointment from Chang himself who had then later informed Peking. If accurate this made Gow the superior official at Gyantse, but Bailey was not unduly worried at this stage because he knew that the information had never been officially confirmed by Peking, and that India had no word of the appointment. He was nevertheless now faced with the problem of how to respond to Gow, who had become very aggressive since his 'promotion'. In what was quite a test of courage and endurance for an inexperienced young officer on his first posting, Bailey managed to prevent any escalation of the conflict by the simple tactic of ignoring Gow's increasingly bizarre behaviour as far as he was able. The most immediate problem facing him was that the ambiguities present in terms of the Adhesion Treaty with China now made it difficult to hold any dialogue with Gow without creating further misunderstandings. The Chinese believed that in signing the treaty they had resumed suzerain rights to Tibet, which for them revoked the rights given to Britain to administer trade under the terms of the Lhasa Convention. In the light of this assumption no matter what Bailey did, Gow could now accuse him of interfering with the 'internal affairs' of Tibet and therefore undermining Chinese control of her suzerain state. On one occasion for example, he accused Bailey of exacting supplies under 'duress' simply because he had not posted officers to supervise the trade
Bailey managed to survive this and other insults by ignoring the malicious tone of Gow's correspondence, and responding politely to his communications. Although at times he felt that Gow's behaviour was 'impossible', he must have been comforted by the knowledge that this was not his permanent post, and that he would soon be handing back to O'Connor.

O'Connor's return from leave in November 1906 coincided with Chang's first visit to Gyantse. As permanent officer O'Connor's arrival inevitably escalated the tension in Gyantse, and in his autobiography, he described how he responded to the new situation initially by refusing to communicate with Gow until he had apologised to Bailey.

O'Connor's tone with Gow and his subsequent behaviour at Gyantse were later strongly condemned in London. Until his return, he had been regarded as one of the great experts on Tibetan affairs, and he had therefore not expected to have to give ground to a person whom he regarded as simply a minor official with delusions of grandeur. He was astute enough to realise however that, since government policy had changed following Curzon's departure in November 1905, he could no longer expect the same level of support from Simla that he had previously enjoyed, a fact which had been confirmed for him during the course of 'several interviews' with Morley during his leave in London in which he had been told that the British government had no intention of involving themselves in any 'undesirable obligations' in Tibet.

As with Campbell this lack of support enabled Chang and Gow to exploit O'Connor's vulnerability in a series of incidents in which he was powerless to defend himself and which, during the first months of 1907, was to lead to open warfare between them. Like Bailey he soon found himself involved in a series of petty conflicts with Gow who had grown in confidence since Chang's visit, and which, in the claustrophobic atmosphere of the trade mart, quickly escalated out of control. British observers in London and Peking were less sympathetic to his plight and were clearly embarrassed by what they judged to be his gross overreaction to events. Jordan, who was forced to deal with formal Chinese complaints about O'Connor's behaviour, felt that he was more than a little to blame for what he described as 'a storm in a teacup' and commented...
wryly, that it would be some time before trade at the mart could pay the telegraph bill that the friction in Gyantse had caused. This view was heavily based on information received from Henderson however, who for reasons of his own, tended to minimise Gow's obstructions. *104 By March 1907, there was deadlock at Gyantse, with O'Connor's pleas for direct action against Gow matching Gow's complaints to Peking. Although he had the support of the Indian government this was of no immediate help to him although ultimately protracted discussions between India, London, and Peking, did eventually lead to Gow's recall in July 1907.*105 This triumph was shortlived however as by August 1907, O'Connor himself was called away to act as Advisor on Tibetan Affairs during the Trade Regulation talks in Simla in 1908; an obvious, and thinly disguised attempt to remove him altogether from the scene which Chang was later able to successfully exploit as a sacking, arguing that Britain had been forced to recall one of their most experienced officers to fill a relatively minor position as a Conference Advisor, an accusation confirmed by the fact that O'Connor never returned to Tibet. Like Chang, Gow was also rewarded for his services in Tibet and was later promoted to a prestigious post as Director of Railways in Mukden.*106 O'Connor was perhaps one of the saddest victims of the non-involvement policy since he had been placed in an impossible position at Gyantse. For him this had been an important career posting, and like White, he later became very bitter about his treatment. Although he never returned to Tibet, he continued a warm correspondence with the Panchen Lama for many years after he left and this helped to keep him in touch with events there.*107 What Jordan, Grey, and Morley saw as O'Connor's overreaction at Gyantse produced quite a different response from India. Minto and Bell had supported him as best they could throughout his ordeal, and although the support given by Minto had been of necessity more guarded, O'Connor's plight had convinced him of the need to maintain an Indian presence at the Trade marts, not only to safeguard the lucrative trade that had been carefully built up, but also as a means of monitoring Chinese encroachments which he felt might ultimately pose a threat to Indian security.*108
(iv) THE ATTACK ON BELL

It is impossible to discuss relationships on the frontier between 1906 and 1908 without reference to Charles Bell who, as Political Officer in Sikkim, was ultimately responsible for the daily conduct of British frontier policy. As the senior official Bell enjoyed greater respect from Chang than Campbell, Bailey, or O'Connor, but he was to experience different kinds of pressure from another quarter and his experiences throw some light on the subtle and pervasive influence that Minto was able to exert as Viceroy on Tibetan policy during these years. Bell initially took up an appointment as Acting Political Officer in Sikkim in April 1906 while White was on an official visit to Bhutan.109 He had been on the frontier since 1900 and, as a veteran of the Younghusband Expedition, he shared with O'Connor, White, and Bailey, a vision of a commercially developed frontier which would serve India as a barrier against invasion, as well as being a source of prestige. Although only thirty, he had acted as father protector to Campbell, rushing to his aid during the conflict with Chang in September 1906, and despite his own suspicions of Chang's motives, he managed to retain cordial relations with the him throughout this difficult and volatile period.110

By 1906 he was an acknowledged authority on Tibet and the decision to send him to Sikkim as White's Assistant had been a carefully calculated one. Grey regarded him as the ideal man for the delicate task of fronting the non-involvement policy, although with hindsight he seems an odd choice in view of his support for Curzonian policies which he made no attempt to conceal. This honeymoon period was predictably shortlived, and it was not long before he fell foul of the Foreign Office. In November 1906, only two months after his arrival, and without seeking permission from his superiors, Bell organised what he described as 'informal talks' with Chang.111 Although he claimed that he had made it clear to Chang that he had no powers of ratification, the two men discussed a range of sensitive issues relating to the trade marts, including the resiting of the bazaar and the building of the new Agency Headquarters at Gyantse, as well as wider topics, like the possible relocation of the Yatung mart to Phema, and the handing over of dak bungalows to the Chinese. In the closed world of
the trade mart all these seemingly petty issues had created great conflict and badly needed to be settled in the interests of frontier security. The Indian government were very concerned however that the talks had been conducted firstly, without consulting O'Connor, as trade agent for Gyantse, and secondly without mentioning them to any of the Tibetan representatives at the mart.\footnote{112} Since the talks were unauthorised, and had included in discussions the possibility of handing over Indian property to the Chinese, they had set a dangerous precedent especially in view of Chinese forward policy. Minto was also embarrassed by the fact that, although Bell had claimed to have made it clear to Chang that the talks were unofficial, Chang had declared himself empowered to make decisions without reference to Peking, and indeed seemed anxious to formalise agreements on the spot. As London were quick to point out, by doing this he had clearly outwitted Bell, acting as senior partner throughout, despite the fact that Bell had initiated the talks. Beyond this obvious blow to prestige however, it was difficult to see what actual harm had been done, and Bell himself was very pleased with the outcome, feeling very aggrieved that he had been both criticised by London, and admonished by his own government, for simply using his initiative.\footnote{113} He reacted to this official hostility by giving increasing support to O'Connor's demand for direct military intervention against Gow at Gyantse, and for a while, Morley and Minto were daggers drawn over the issue. This battle continued until the evacuation of Chumbi Valley in February 1908, when Minto's argument for an increase in trade agency escorts to protect those of his staff still working on the frontier became impossible for Morley to resist.\footnote{114}

Bell's approach nearly always received Minto's tacit, and sometimes quite open support, and this was most obvious in matters involving the Panchen Lama. Like others in the Indian government, Bell believed that one of Chang's key directives was to isolate the Panchen Lama by weakening his ties with India and with the Dalai Lama; a process much helped by the latter's absence, and by the apparent lack of coherent government in Lhasa.\footnote{115} The Dalai Lama was still distrusted by the Indian government and the 'plot' to present the Panchen Lama as an alternative ruler during his
visit to India in 1905 had been an overt attempt to unseat him.\textsuperscript{116} There was also confusion about Chinese motives, and the Panchen Lama continued to fear reprisals from the Emperor as well as from the Dalai Lama for the visit long after his return, making him anxious to placate both, while still keen to retain his friendly links with India. To this end he had expressed a strong desire to receive visits from his British friends and so, despite Morley's ban on frontier travel, and after repeated requests, Bell was eventually able to obtain permission to visit him at Tashilhunpo in October 1906.\textsuperscript{117} It has been suggested that Minto gave this permission because he felt sympathy for the Panchen Lama's plight and for his part in causing it.\textsuperscript{118} However, his support for Bell was also very typical of his general response to initiatives from frontier officers. He had previously supported their demands for action against Tibetan infringements of the Lhasa Convention and had pressed for full payment of the indemnity by Tibet, despite the fact that this had antagonised Morley, who was prepared to give little support to frontier initiatives for fear of precipitating a crisis. Bell's argument for visiting the Panchen Lama was based on the fact that Henderson, whom he described as 'a European in Chinese employ', was able to travel quite freely on the frontier, whereas Indian employees could not, although they too had important legitimate business there, and that this constituted a dangerous loss of face for the Indian government who were supposed to be administering the region. This convincing argument helped to sway Morley and enabled Bell to visit the Panchen Lama twice during late 1906. Although on both occasions their conversations concentrated on the Panchen Lama's fears of Chinese reprisals for his Indian visit, Bell was able to establish a meaningful dialogue with him, managing to also convince his many Tibetan supporters that India intended only friendship with Tibet, a minor diplomatic coup which more than compensated for his previous bad showing with Chang in Chumbi.\textsuperscript{119}

Bell's contribution to Tibetan policy was a very positive one. His knowledge of the Tibetan language and culture, together with his powerful political position as Political Officer in Sikkim, enabled him to move quickly and effectively to defuse much of the tension with the Chinese
which, in the claustrophobic conditions of the marts, had inevitably become personal and petty. Unlike O'Connor and Campbell, who became very depressed and confused as a result of the constant pressure, Bell was able to be more dispassionate and this helped him to maintain cordial contact with the mercurial Chang who saw him as an equal. With Minto's support, Bell was able to survive both Morley's censure and rejection by the Foreign Office which threatened to render him virtually ineffective, and in spite of the fact that his Curzonian outlook was officially out of favour, he managed to retain his status as Tibetan expert to a much greater extent than any of his colleagues. This was because he tended to understand and sympathise with the Tibetans more than they did, and also because his position gave him a status denied to them, as well as a much wider grasp of the frontier situation than they could possibly hope to acquire.

(vi) THE TIBETAN PERSPECTIVE
Between 1906 and 1908 the leaderless Tibetans put up a good fight against British and Chinese attempts to interfere with their trading administration, and the Torowas and the Jongpens of Chumbi Valley in particular fought hard to retain the monopoly of trade they had built up after 1902.*120
In May 1905 White had investigated complaints made by Campbell about the aggressive conduct of the Jongpens at Phari, whom he had accused of imposing taxes on British trade passing through the town. On this occasion British complaints had not been supported in London since, as Grey argued, the Jongpen were not actually interfering with Indian trade as such, and that on balance it was best to leave things as they were.*121
This official attitude was later reinforced by the Indian Government when Dane played down problems between British and Tibetan officials at Gartok during his interview with Chang in June 1906.*122 Despite such official attempts to defuse the situation however, Tibetans continued to 'obstruct' Indian trade to Gartok as before, and by 1908 reports from Gyantse confirmed that the situation was no easier despite this flexible approach to trading matters. *123
The Tibetan view is not difficult to understand since trade was life to the frontier, and as the new trade marts were not sited on key trading routes, tensions were easily generated when goods travelling on routes not passing through the marts escaped the scrutiny of British officials. The Politicals well appreciated this fact, and for this reason they pressed for a relocation of the marts to more suitable sites at every available opportunity.

One of the major problems affecting the smooth running of the marts from the British point of view was the fear of the Chinese that many Tibetans felt. There had been a long history of conflict over trade in Chumbi and, like the Bhutanese and Nepalese, the Chinese were traditional rivals. Bell’s reports are full of references to ‘alarming rumours’ in the bazaars of Chumbi about an imminent Chinese invasion of Lhasa, and the Chinese began to produce ethnic newspapers which they used to promote themselves as powerful rulers, running a virulent anti-British campaign, and issuing threats of reprisals against any Tibetans who helped the British. Some reports even alleged that Chang had arranged for Tibetan leaders at Gartok to assemble the local people together in order to ‘threaten’ them into making false petitions against British trade agents.

In addition to overt Chinese opposition to British control at the trade marts, there was genuine confusion on all sides about the levying of rights and duties, and misunderstandings about the rights gained by China following the signing of the Adhesion treaty in 1906. Soon after the signing Henderson had informed O’Connor that Chang believed the Treaty had restored suzerain rights to China, and this issue had formed the subject of many of the protracted debates between Chang and Bell. Tibetans were similarly confused about the content of the treaties and, as the Jongpens of Chumbi and Gyantse explained to Campbell and O’Connor on many occasions, they felt that, in the circumstances, it was in their best interests to placate both sides for fear of offending the other. Those Tibetans like the Phari Jongpens who had prospered as a result of the Chinese and British presence in Chumbi, did not hesitate to exploit the situation at every available opportunity, but in general Tibetans had much to fear, especially from the Chinese who were prepared to take punitive
action against a people they had always considered inferior, and whom they treated like children. Tibetan officials in Lhasa were punished if they were discovered to have been too helpful to the British, while others were rewarded if they were found to have obstructed them. For the Tibetan people therefore the message was quite clear: China regarded the British as an enemy presence in Tibet which they were expected to resist if they wished to preserve their way of life.*129

At first Tibetans had ignored the Lhasa Convention in their dealings with the British as they had ignored previous treaties with them, since to a large extent their way of life was dictated by climatic conditions rather than by any man made laws. However, although they either ignored or quibbled over aspects of the Convention, Tibetan Authorities in Lhasa, and officials at local level, were well aware of its implications. The Garpons at Gartok for example, knew that Indian traders were not permitted to travel beyond the trade marts and further into Tibet, as the case of Shadi La illustrates, and when Ti Rimpoche received British complaints about Tibetan infringements of the Convention at Lhasa, he was quick to point out that Britain also had obligations to fulfill.*130 Many Tibetans were completely unaffected by the new regulations and for the most part were able to tolerate British and Chinese officialdom because they operated away from their traditional trading centres, much as they had always been able to tolerate the token Chinese garrisons located along the frontier, where soldiers, rarely paid, and isolated from their peers, had gradually become Tibetanised.*131 The need to survive the harsh frontier climate in any case overroad all other considerations, and as winter blocked passes for months, all trade ceased and any foreign presence seemed irrelevant.*131
3. ON THE FRONTIER: EAST TIBET

(1) THE SITUATION IN EAST TIBET

The frontier in East Tibet bordered the Chinese Provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan and was entirely different in character to the West Tibetan frontier with India, being subject to greater Chinese influence and control. It was peopled by a variety of tribal groupings, many of whom were not Tibetan, and lived a nomadic, or semi-nomadic life as traders and herders. From the 1880's British commercial companies had made efforts to investigate the trading potential of the area, and were particularly interested in its gold and mineral resources. In addition there was much scientific interest in the cultural life and language of the various tribes who lived there and many attempts were made to woo them. Although not completely cut off from all communication with West Tibet, the Politicals saw this area as quite separate from the rest of Tibet, primarily because the eastern frontier was staffed by men of the China Consular Service and there was little direct communication between them.

From the time of Feng's murder in 1905, until after the Chinese invasion in 1910, East Tibet was dominated by the policies of the Szechuan government and by the personality of Chao Erh Feng, Commander of the Chinese forces in East Tibet. Chao had been personally appointed by the Szechuan Viceroy Hsi Liang in 1905 in order to undertake the 'pacification' of the East Tibetan Marches, a scheme very dear to the provincial government in Szechuan for many years, but only sanctioned by Peking after the murder of their Amban. The terms of Chao's appointment and the nature of his job meant that he was able to issue a direct challenge to the Lama rulers of East Tibet who, in the absence of the Dalai Lama, were in a weaker position than they might have been, his spiritual influence having given their political control credibility. At first Chao had enjoyed the approval of those missionaries working in the area who welcomed this challenge to priestly authority as an aid to their missionary work. This view was not shared by J. H. Edgar of the China Inland Mission at Batang. In a lengthy report commissioned by Jordan, he described the situation in East Tibet in rather different terms. As a man with many years of experience of the frontier, Edgar was extremely sceptical about the pacification
 programme which Chao was ordered to implement, and his report detailing Chao's progress in East Tibet stressed the foolhardiness of the venture in a land of 'barren steppes' and 'dangerous passes', amongst a population of 'nomads, traders', and 'official soldiers' many of whom were 'wild and unruly', and given to 'chronic bickering'. The region was in fact so lonely that Chinese officials and soldiers there regarded it as a banishment and were replaced every three years in order to preserve their sanity. Edgar also found it incredible that Chao might be expected to operate in such an inhospitable area when there were 'eminently more suitable places' much closer to Chengtu, and he further observed that, in a place where 'anyone aquainted with the histories of Chinese border towns would understand how easily the Chinese were absorbed by the native tribes of the area.'*136 Jordan and Grey were already well aware of the implications of Chao's venture from Consular reports received from Chengtu. In February 1906 for example, Goffe, then Acting Consul-General in the city, had reported a conversation he had with Chao on the subject of the latter's plan to build a railway across East Tibet to India. It had been immediately obvious to Goffe that this was an ill planned scheme that did not have explicit approval from Peking and suggested that the proposal had not gone beyond Provincial Government level. *137 Furthermore, evidence from edicts and memoranda issued by Peking at the time and subsequently studied by Suchita Ghosh, reveal that the Peking government was less than enthusiastic about the colonisation programme which the Szechuan government was promoting and which Chao was attempting to implement, because for them its ambitious aim of transforming the culture of the frontier by importing Chinese farmers from neighbouring Provinces to cultivate and settle the land, was essentially a continuation of the very programme that had generated the anti-Chinese riots of 1905 which had led to Feng's murder.*138 Whatever reservations Peking might have had about the wisdom of Chao's venture, his forceful personality and the myths surrounding him made a big impact on the East Tibetan frontier, enabling him to quickly gain a reputation as a powerful military commander. Within five years he had created an army of veterans numbering some 6,000 men who, according to Alastair Lamb, brought China greater power on the
frontier than she had enjoyed since the 1790's.*139 In January 1906 Chao launched an attack on the monastery of Sanpiling in the district of Hsian Ch'eng which was then a stronghold of Lama opposition. After a lengthy siege lasting six months the monastery fell, and Chao had over two thousand monks murdered and the building destroyed.*140 This spectacular victory enabled him to begin to implement the first of many reforms that were to have a huge impact on the frontier and which were initially quite popular with ordinary Tibetans, who received the benefits of an education and medical care for the first time as well as Chinese protection against the monks and tribal chiefs, whose harsh and repressive methods they had often deeply resented.*141

Chao's greatest achievements were military ones and his most spectacular successes were all in Tibetan states like Derge and Nyarong, which had previously been under Chinese control, and where the local population had felt oppressed by the Lhasa authorities. His forces entered Derge in 1908 on the pretext of settling a domestic dispute between members of its ruling family. The Chinese occupation of this, the largest and wealthiest of the Tibetan controlled states of East Tibet, passed without incident but greatly alarmed the Lhasa authorities and by the end of that year, Chao seemed poised to take the neighboring states of Nyarong and Chamdo, the latter a strategic area controlling the main road to Lhasa, and a further indication to them that his ultimate goal was an invasion of their city. *142

British attitudes towards events in East Tibet were not as well formed as those in West Tibet. Jordan's China Service were less concerned with this area which had always been a region where Chinese control came and went. They therefore accepted Chao's invasion as a temporary phenomenon and, although they followed his progress as best they could, their main concern was in monitoring the movements of the Dalai Lama as he progressed across the remote frontier region like a mediaeval monarch with his vast retinue of followers. *143
(ii) THE DALAI LAMA AND THE CHINA SERVICE

Between 1906 and his arrival in Peking in September 1908, the Dalai Lama created special problems for both Britain and China. In a document probably written in 1912, soon after the revolution which toppled the Manchu dynasty, Yuan Shih Kai traced the evolution of Chinese attitudes towards the Dalai Lama after 1904, citing what he described as his 'march across Chinese territory' in this period as a time of particular anxiety for the Chinese government. Although obviously a biased account, it is never the less revealing since, as a member of the Wai Wu Pu at the time, Yuan was well aware of the kind of problems his presence created. Firstly, he travelled with a huge retinue of devoted followers who 'preyed on the country like a swarm of locusts', proving a huge drain on the resources of those chosen as hosts for his extensive, and often unsolicited visits. Secondly, the Chinese feared the Dalai Lama's political influence since he was regarded 'with veneration and awe by large sections of the Chinese people' who were therefore inclined to treat him with 'great clemency'. They also blamed him for the embarrassing disturbances in East Tibet which had resulted in the deaths of Feng and a number of French missionaries and Catholic priests during 1905, for which costly reparation had to be paid to the French government. Moreover his 'intriguing' with Dorjieiv was held to have been indirectly responsible for the despatch of the Younghusband Expedition which had necessitated the payment of an expensive indemnity on Tibet's behalf. Their annoyance at having to make reparation for what they considered to be the Dalai Lama's 'misdeeds' was however tempered on this occasion by the satisfaction of knowing that their claim on Tibet now had greater moral and legal force.

For Britain the Dalai Lama presented a different set of problems. Both Jordan and Grey regarded him as an irrelevant nuisance, and were alarmed by his behaviour which had upset the Chinese and Indian Governments and continued to threaten the future stability of Anglo-Chinese relations. Since February 1905, the Tibetan government had expressed anxiety about his return, but until 1908 the Dalai Lama had always insisted that he would not return to Lhasa until after he had completed what he described as his, 'tour of the holy places in Asia', and although this was partly an
offical face saving excuse, he used his 'tour' as a means of cultivating foreign representatives and encouraging sympathy for the Tibetan cause. As he was willing to see almost anyone, including the press, and was quite unable to determine which of the Europeans he received were empowered to treat with him, many diplomats feared that he might unwittingly give out secret and sensitive information to whoever happened to gain an audience with him. *148 Jordan in particular was keen to ensure that his behaviour did not jeopardize the completion of the Trade Regulation talks and he therefore resolved to have as little to do with him as possible.*149

Although the situation seemed more or less under control, a further problem emerged once it became known that the Chinese Emperor had issued an edict calling the Dalai Lama to Peking. There had been many rumours that the Chinese intended to do this, as well as a great deal of speculation about their motives, and when they finally issued the edict Jordan experienced great difficulty in getting accurate information about Tibetan reactions. Reports from the frontier were taking six to eight weeks to reach him, and events moved so quickly that they were often reported in the press before news reached Peking since many journalists had attached themselves to the Dalai Lama's party.*150 That the Dalai Lama intended to obey the edict was at first by no means certain. Various unsubstantiated reports that he intended to return to Lhasa in response to pleas from his Church were quickly discounted however since by this time, both the Dalai Lama and his fellow Tibetans were well aware that Chao's victories in East Tibet had made it dangerous for him to return to Lhasa without Chinese permission as in order to do so he needed to cross captured territory. He must also have known that he was unlikely to get any backing from foreign powers since all those he had approached had been friendly, but like Jordan, anxious not to get involved.*151 The Wai Wu Pu had officially informed Jordan in May 1908 that the 'possibility' of the Dalai Lama returning to Lhasa was 'under consideration', and in August British support for his plight had gone as far as allowing Jordan to issue a statement saying that his government 'did not desire to prevent the Dalai Lama returning to Tibet'. However this was only after it had first been agreed with Russia privately that, should he
approach either country for help, their response would be non-committal. Unable to get support from any quarter the Dalai Lama was therefore forced to obey the Emperor's summons, and on the morning of 30th September he arrived in Peking by train, very uncertain about the fate awaiting him.

In many ways the period between 1906 and 1908 was a defeat for the Curzonians since it led ultimately to the withdrawal of Indian troops from Chumbi, an event which effectively put paid to the aspirations embodied in O'Connor's London report of April 1906. However, as 1909 dawned, there were still Curzonians at the trade marts who were actively promoting the type of commercial developments that had formed the second strand in their planned forward policy and who, with the support of the Viceroy and powerful vested business interests in London and India, had not completely abandoned all hope of success.

The Dalai Lama's arrival in Peking marked the ending of a phase in Anglo-Chinese policy on Tibet. From the moment he was carried from his train he became a virtual prisoner of the Chinese who from this time on, tried to use him as a pawn in their plan to 'reclaim' Tibet that was to lead to the eventual occupation of Lhasa in 1910. The circumstances leading to this invasion, and the British response to it, will form the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

HOLDING ON: THE SURVIVAL OF CURZONIAN POLICY IN TIBET

1908 - 1910

This chapter looks at the situation on the frontier during the final years of Minto's Viceroyalty and at the way in which the loss of prestige, following the withdrawal from Chumbi, combined with growing Chinese confidence, and the Dalai Lama's 'escape' to India, created special problems for the Indian government both inside and outside Tibet, and for the policy makers in London.

I. CHINESE FORWARD POLICY AND EAST TIBET.

The action that appeared to British observers to culminate in an invasion of Lhasa in February 1910 was in fact part of a much wider campaign aimed at the subjugation of an area that was to become part of the new Chinese Province of Sikang.¹ According to Chinese sources the occupation of the Tibetan capital had not been integral to this campaign but had been bought about entirely by the reactionary attitude adopted by the Dalai Lama when he had opposed all their attempts to modernise his country. As Ministers of the Wai Wu Pu explained to Jordan, China had obligations under the Adhesion Treaty they had signed with Britain to ensure that Tibet was bought under manageable control.²

British observers took a rather different view of the events however, and they began to see the escalating campaigns in East Tibet as a potential threat to British interests on the frontier, especially in the light of accumulating evidence of Chinese activity near the Indian border which the Indian government monitored with increasing alarm.³
The campaign to 'modernise' the area that became known to the Chinese as Sikang had begun tentatively in 1904 when Feng Chuan was appointed Assistant Amban for the region. A programme of reform based on the colonisation of Batang by Chinese peasant farmers mainly from Szechuan was to culminate in the whole of East Tibet coming under direct Chinese control by 1911. The nature and progress of this campaign was influenced by three factors. Firstly, by the decision to appoint the brothers Chao Erh-feng and Chao Erh-hsün as Border Commissioner and Viceroy of the region respectively. Both were men of stature who raised the profile of the campaign by their involvement. Secondly, by the escalation of the disturbances generated by Tibetan resistance to the military campaign in East Tibet, and in particular, the resentment surrounding the Chinese occupation of the Tibetan State of Derge in December 1908. And finally, by what the Chinese regarded as the unreasonable attitude of the Dalai Lama, who would not co-operate with the Chinese plans for his country.

Chao Erh-feng used the occupation of Derge as a precedent to extend his control and influence to other parts of Tibet, and he resigned his post as Border Commissioner in order to give himself the freedom to concentrate on the military aspects of what, for him, had become a personal campaign of conquest. Between March and June 1909 his armies took control of a vast area of East Tibet that included the states of Chamdo, Chaya, and Markham. In taking this course he had deliberately cut himself away from the main campaign by then poised to take Lhasa which for him was now secondary to his real objective which lay in the conquest of East Tibet and the creation of the new Chinese Province of Sikang. The three battalions of the modern Szechuan army which entered Lhasa on 12th February 1910 were therefore not led by Chao as originally planned, but by a young and ambitious General called Chung Ying who was to play a major role in the events that followed.

Before going on to examine British reactions to Chinese forward policy and its implications for their relations with Russia and Japan, I want to look at the role played by the Dalai Lama, and the effect his behaviour was to have on Anglo-Chinese relations and frontier stability.
2. THE DALAI LAMA IN PEKING AND INDIA.

Jordan was among the representatives of the diplomatic community who assembled at Peking railway station to greet the Dalai Lama when he arrived there on the morning of 30th September 1908 and noted that his reception was unimpressive. Although the details of etiquette had been adhered to, and the Chinese had gone to great lengths to ensure that their guest was treated with the courtesy and respect shown to his previous incarnation who had visited the city in 1653, the Great Fifth had not arrived by train, and the reception in the confines of the station platform might therefore have appeared prefunctory. Jordan might have been more impressed had he been allowed to accompany the Dalai Lama as he was carried in state to the Yellow Temple that had been especially constructed for the Great Fifth just outside the North Gate of the city. There was considerable confusion amongst western diplomats about the treatment given to the Dalai Lama throughout his stay in Peking that was rooted in their ignorance of the Cho-yon, and although the various disputes about etiquette where known to the Legations, the subtleties of the arguments were not fully appreciated. Jordan in particular was left with the distinct impression that the Dalai Lama was a weak and rather pathetic pawn in Chinese hands, and he dismissed him as a man of little importance. However, although the Dalai Lama's position was not a strong one, and in one sense he was a virtual prisoner in Peking, his influence was such that initially at least the Chinese went to great lengths to please him, and their 'guest' stated publicly that he was 'overwhelmed by the benevolence of his reception'. Despite outward appearances however, tensions quickly developed as the Chinese realised that their guest was neither impressed nor intimidated by the grandeur of their court and they soon began to take steps to put him firmly in his place. Within five days of his first audience with the Emperor on October 14th, the Wai Wu Pu issued a note to the Legations giving precise instructions about the nature of their future contact with him. Jordan saw in this a rather obvious attempt to reduce the Dalai Lama's intercourse with foreign governments, and felt this to be a rather unnecessary, and even clumsy move, in view of the fact that there appeared
to be nothing to be gained by antagonising someone who seemed to be already powerless. In taking this view however he failed to appreciate the true depth of Chinese concerns that the Dalai Lama might be able to influence international opinion, and his inability to understand the nature of the Dalai Lama's status affected his whole approach to what he described as the 'Tibetan Problem' in future years.  

Unaware of its implications, the Legations allowed the note to pass unchallenged, agreeing to the Chinese terms for contact with the Dalai Lama, and in the process sealing his fate and the fate of his country by giving the Chinese sufficient confidence to issue a direct challenge to his status as ruler in the form of a Decree, dated 4th November 1908. By simply adding four characters to the Dalai Lama's official Chinese title, they awarded themselves sovereignty over Tibet, depriving him of his temporal powers, and placing him in an inferior position to that of the Lhasa Amban, by taking away his right to memorialise the throne direct.  

All his subsequent attempts to reverse this decision were rejected by the court, together with requests that a Tibetan delegation might be left in Peking to retain direct links with the court after his return to Tibet. The final insult was delivered when the Provincial government in Szechuan were ordered to provide him with a small annual increment, making him in effect a paid employee of the Chinese Empire.  

With the situation still unresolved, the Dalai Lama and his party left Peking by train on 21st December, having agreed a route to Kumbum in Kansu where where he would stay and await Chinese permission to return to Lhasa, a provisional date for this having been set for the following May.  

Although the Chinese were obviously wary of treating their guest with anything other than the utmost respect at the start of his visit they had become much bolder in their dealings with him once they discovered that, although the world's press were sympathetic to his situation, foreign governments were unwilling to help in any positive way. Jordan had been particularly reluctant to get involved for fear of jeopardizing treaty undertakings with China and Russia, and had refused all invitations to
meet the Dalai Lama informally, eventually seeing him for the shortest possible time at a very formal interview. Unlike many of his contemporaries, who were quite captivated by the Tibetan ruler, Jordan was distinctly unimpressed, describing him as 'delicate work' and finding him a positive threat to harmonious Anglo-Chinese relations.*17

Jordan's attitude undoubtedly went a long way toward finally convincing the Dalai Lama that the British government would never give any practical help to Tibet. However, less formal contacts made with O'Connor in Peking, who was there as escort to the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, convinced him that the Indian government might prove more sympathetic to his plight.*18

The Dalai Lama finally returned to Lhasa on Christmas Day 1909, over six months later than planned. He had used the breathing space afforded by this delay in order to collect as much information as possible about Chinese movements inside Tibet and gain as much sympathy and support as possible from Russia. In doing this he had abandoned the itinerary agreed with the Chinese, causing some concern to both British and Chinese governments, who found themselves quite unable to monitor his movements.*19

Meanwhile, in the absence of the Dalai Lama, the interim government in Lhasa had begun to adopt a pro-Indian stance and were worried by their ruler's attempts to approach Russia which created obvious difficulties for them in their dealings with India. Rulers of the Himalayan states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan also found themselves unwittingly drawn into this new conflict as the Tibetans increasingly sought their views on the new situation, and also because they had policy considerations of their own which affected their relations with China, India, and Britain.

The relief at the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa was soon offset by the trouble that followed as soon as he arrived. Apparently confident of Russian support, he launched a vitriolic campaign against the Chinese Amban Lien Yu, accusing him of plotting against the Tibetan people by deliberately refusing to pass on messages to the Emperor attacking the legality of the November Decree.*20 As well as a sign of his political astuteness, the Dalai Lama's actions were deliberately designed to show his own people that he was once again in control in Lhasa.
They were also intended to demonstrate to the Chinese that he would not accept their ruling, and would show western powers that he was well aware that their actions were suspect under international law.\textsuperscript{21}

The illegallity of the Chinese actions was confirmed by what was generally perceived in India to be Lien Yu's hysterical overreaction to the situation, graphically recorded in lengthy reports to the Indian government from Bell and his agents at the trade marts.\textsuperscript{22} The nature of the Tibetan appeals for help, and in particular their use of what, to western ears, seemed naive and rather distressing metaphors describing Chinese threats, enlisted the sympathies of the Indian government who responded, though cautious as always in framing their official response.\textsuperscript{23} Minto was initially anxious that any direct approach to the Chinese on the subject might risk the delicate frontier status quo but, like Morley, he eventually came to favour approaching the Chinese on the grounds that the problem needed to be sorted out quickly. Grey was also willing to support this view after seeking advice from Jordan in Peking.\textsuperscript{24} By 9th February 1910, only three days before Chinese troops entered Lhasa, all sections of the British Foreign Service were united in favouring a direct appeal to the Chinese, if only to establish the true nature of their plans for Tibet and how these might affect British interests.\textsuperscript{25} The situation was suddenly and dramatically affected at this point by the Dalai Lama's decision to flee Lhasa in the early morning of 12th February, only hours before the Chinese invasion force entered his city.\textsuperscript{26} He subsequently explained to Bell in India that he had taken the decision to leave Lhasa because he believed that the Chinese would exploit him as a puppet ruler, and because he had come to believe that the Emperor had now broken earlier promises made to him privately in Peking, that he would be able him to retain his temporal powers, despite the November Decree.\textsuperscript{27} His fears were confirmed by the behaviour of the Chinese invaders who gave chase as soon as they discovered he was missing, and who issued rewards for the death or capture of his Ministers. The size of the force sent to retrieve him also seemed to suggest that Chinese intentions were to take over the administration of the city and use both him, and his government, for their own ends. Chinese troops soon overtook and ambushed the Dalai Lama's party at Kangma, where
a pitched battle took place, during which ten Chinese soldiers were killed, but the Dalai Lama himself evaded capture.\textsuperscript{28} When he reached Phari on 19th February, lots were cast and Gnatong selected as his next destination. On the following day his party was reported to have entered the Chumbi Valley, reaching the trade mart at Yatung later that day with an escort of one hundred men.\textsuperscript{29} At Yatung he left a message with British trade agent David MacDonald announcing his intention to travel to India in order to 'negotiate' with the Indian government.\textsuperscript{30}

To British eyes the situation seemed volatile. First reports of the Dalai Lama's flight had reached Minto via trade reports from the British agents at Yatung and Gyantse, and news of the battle at Kangma alarmed him. He ordered MacDonald to give no positive help to the Dalai Lama for fear that the situation might escalate further and possibly involve the Indian government in conflict with the Chinese. MacDonald was to offer temporary overnight accommodation in the agency dak bungalows, but only on the strict understanding that they were not to be regarded as places of sanctuary.\textsuperscript{31} In the absence of reliable information, most reports being second or even third hand, his caution was understandable, and even more so in view of the continuing confusion about the nature and scope of Chinese movements in the area. British agents were themselves unsure about the attitudes of local Chinese officials who seemed to be entirely out of touch with the campaign.\textsuperscript{32} There were also fears that the situation might adversely affect relations with the Himalayan States of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal, each of which had separate agreements with both Tibet and China. Even before the Dalai Lama arrived in Yatung, Indian government policy was therefore still unformulated.

On 22nd February Minto received an account of events surrounding the Dalai Lama's stay at Yatung from MacDonald. The visit had created great problems for him since his guest had refused to receive a Chinese delegation which had apparently been sent to 'discuss' his situation. Finding himself compromised, MacDonald was forced to support the Dalai Lama and reject Chinese requests to see him, and his integrity was further tested by reports that a Chinese army of some three hundred men was at that moment en-route for nearby Phari, and that the situation for the Dalai
Lama was looking precarious. In solving this delicate problem by allowing the Tibetan party to slip quietly away from the mart, MacDonald created even more problems for his government, as the effect of this decision was to encourage his guest to believe that he might find sanctuary in India.*33 It is possible that the Dalai Lama's contact with O'Connor in Peking might also have led him to this conclusion, and as Minto did not condemn MacDonald for his action in telling the Tibetans to escape, it is possible that he too had supported the plan for him to come to India, despite the fact that it would create tensions with both the Chinese, and with Grey; yet another sign that he was discreetly promoting Curzonian forward policy in direct opposition to London.*37

In Peking meanwhile, the problem of how and when to approach the Chinese about the situation in Tibet remained one of great concern to the British Charge d'Affaires Friedrich Max-Muller who had replaced Jordan during the latter's leave of absence.*34 Max-Muller had suggested that, in view of the events at Yatung, the time was not yet ripe for an official approach to Peking, and that instead a less direct attempt should be made to clarify the British position vis a vis their treaties with both Russia and China.*35 Morley felt that one option might be to tactfully explain to China that Britain could not be indifferent to events on the frontier and that therefore, the nature and scale of Chinese activity in Tibet must be explained, since it appeared to contravene existing treaty agreements between Britain and China. He was especially keen moreover to ensure that any attempt made by the Chinese to take political control in Lhasa must be actively opposed by Britain, in spite of the non-involvement policy, since it represented a serious threat to the settled frontier which had been the long term goal of British policy.*36 Before Max-Muller could approach the Wai Wu Pu with these observations however, matters were dramatically altered by the announcement of a new Imperial Decree from Peking denouncing the Dalai Lama, and stripping him of his powers and titles.*37

The Chinese foreign minister Liang Tu-yen had always denied knowledge of a Chinese invasion, arguing that Chinese troops were merely acting in accordance with the Treaty obligations requiring them to 'police' the Lhasa area effectively, and although he admitted that he had known about
the Decree, he told Max-Muller that he had simply 'forgotten' to mention it to him. Despite the furore occasioned by the Decree, Minto believed the Dalai Lama's spiritual role to be quite unaffected, and he pressed ahead with a plan to invite him to India as spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, sending Bell to Darjeeling to meet and welcome him. The Dalai Lama's flight had dramatically altered the frontier situation by creating an obvious vacuum in Lhasa that could not be ignored. It also had wider political implications for India, because on this occasion he had not disappeared into the hinterlands of Mongolia, but had chosen India as a refuge, and in so doing had involved Britain in unavoidable conflict with the Chinese which in turn could not help but have implications for future relations with Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.

Bell was in Bhutan negotiating a Treaty when the Chinese invasion of Lhasa took place, and he did not hear about the invasion, or about the Dalai Lama's dramatic flight until a few days later when he was urgently called to Darjeeling. His first meeting with him, in a Darjeeling hotel room, was unremarkable, and the 'squat figure' before him, about whom he had heard so much, did not look much like a 'King'. In the months that followed this impression altered and soon a deep and long lasting friendship developed between them that was to have long term consequences for Anglo-Tibetan relations. Bell felt that Morley's non-involvement policy had helped the promotion of China's forward policy, and as Political Officer in Sikkim responsible for a vast area covering Bhutan, Sikkim, and Tibet, he both resented and feared the prospect of a permanent Chinese presence there. His earlier friendship with the Panchen Lama had made him initially suspicious of the Dalai Lama's motives, but as their friendship grew he became increasingly exasperated by his own government's Tibetan policy, believing that Tibet's interests were being ignored.

He supported the Dalai Lama's analysis of events, agreeing that the problem was much wider than Tibet and accepting that the Chinese planned to claim feudatory rights in Bhutan and Nepal. He also knew that, although the Dalai Lama's influence was extensive in Mongolia and Siberia, as well as inside China itself, it was not sufficiently powerful to convince the reforming elements within the Manchu Court to reverse their policy.
For these reasons, he was very worried about Chinese behaviour in Tibet, fearing that its implications for India's relations with the Hymalayan States were discounted in London where everything was still being sacrificed to the pursuit of non-involvement.*44

Three months after his arrival in Darjeeling, Bell was told to inform the Dalai Lama that the Indian government could not intervene between Tibet and China. He experienced considerable difficulty in getting this message across because his friend simply refused to accept the decision, and continued to press for British help.*45 In support of this cause a number of Buddhist protests were organised by the Dalai Lama's supporters and sympathisers in Darjeeling and although, as Bell observed, the protests themselves had little immediate effect on wider public opinion in India, they did lead to considerable public speculation about Chinese motives particularly as, in the past, the Chinese themselves had complained about the type of foreign aggression they now appeared to be inflicting on Tibet. The exotic presence of the Dalai Lama and his extensive and growing retinue in Darjeeling kept the issue very much to the fore, creating concern for the safety of trade and commerce in the area, as well as giving the world's press ample opportunity to publicly dissect Britain's role. Had the Dalai Lama not come to India, Chinese activity in these remote mountain regions would not have excited nearly so much attention and the opinions of men like Bell, who had openly warned of the dangerous consequences involved in ignoring Chinese forward policy, would have gone unheeded.*46

Bell continued to visit the Dalai Lama almost every week during the course of 1910, and although he knew that there was little he could do politically to help Tibet, he was able to acquire a sound understanding of Tibetan attitudes and customs which proved invaluable to his government and enhanced his personal standing as the acknowledged expert on Tibet, a position previously held by Younghusband.*47

Minto had dutifully complied with Morley's instructions not to intervene in Tibetan affairs and had continued to treat the Dalai Lama as a private guest of the Indian government. In a way the Decree deposing him had helped in this, since it was now possible to welcome the Dalai Lama as a visiting spiritual leader, and the whole issue about what the Chinese could or
couldn't do in Tibet could be ignored.*48 Fears that the flight might provoke a response in Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan were uppermost in Minto's mind, outweighing concern he might otherwise have had for the Dalai Lama's personal predicament. He was not blind to the obvious fact that, by 1910, there were at least two thousand Chinese troops in Tibet, and he could now accept the Dalai Lama's argument that they were not merely there to guard their Tibetan interests.*49 Comprehensive reports from trade agents in Gyantse and Yatung served only to reinforce his fears and confirm his opinion that something needed to be done to prevent the Chinese moving even closer to the Indian frontier. He also knew that Bell possessed copies of the correspondence between the Dalai Lama and those of his ministers still in Lhasa confirming Tibetan allegations that the Chinese had put a price on the heads of ministers who had fled to India to be with their leader, and he believed that the Dalai Lama and his followers should be given some political support; firstly, because their lives were in danger, but also because, if he returned to power in Tibet, India would again be dealing with him as leader of the Tibetan government.*50 Partly with this in mind he had collected a substantial body of evidence relating to Chinese infringements of treaty obligations which he was prepared to use to promote the Dalai Lama's case if necessary. His sense of urgency was further alerted by reports coming from his military advisors of a further build up of troops in the Assam Himalayas and of renewed activity at the Chinese garrison in Yatung, both of which he felt constituted a serious menace to Indian security which could no longer be ignored. He therefore suggested to Morley that the Chinese be asked, not only to reduce the size of their garrison at Yatung, but that they recall their Lhasa Amban Lien Yu, whose unpopular policies and attitudes he believed had provoked the Dalai Lama's flight.*51 Morley however had come to feel that the 'feeble rule of the Dalai Lama' would be better replaced by a stronger Chinese controlled government in Lhasa, and was less enthusiastic about giving support to the Dalai Lama's return. He asked Minto to monitor the frontier situation closely, and encourage his guest to lie low. In accordance with the spirit of this request, and in an attempt to keep him occupied, Minto therefore invited the Dalai Lama to Calcutta for a private audience.*52
The Dalai Lama's visit to Calcutta on 14th March 1910 followed much the same pattern as that of the Panchen Lama in 1905. Lady Minto's diary recalled the occasion as a sad parody of the Panchen Lama's earlier interview, the visitor making a series of requests for support, which her husband politely but firmly rejected. Even this official rebuff did not deflate the Dalai Lama however, and upon returning to Darjeeling, he continued to bombard Bell with demands that a British representative be sent to Lhasa to plead his case with the Chinese. On 18th April he asked the British to intervene directly to stop Chinese aggression in his country and, when this failed, he resorted to begging for any kind of help.

Younghusband's account of this period comments wryly on the spectacle of the Dalai Lama begging for a further interview with the Viceroy, when only a decade earlier their roles had been reversed. The more sympathetic attitude adopted by Bell and Minto towards the Dalai Lama at this time is in itself a reflection of the changing attitude of the India service towards Tibetan problems, fostered by Bell's burgeoning friendship with the Tibetan Leader. This new approach was not adopted by the men of the China service however, and Jordan in particular continued to regard the Dalai Lama as a barrier to successful Anglo-Chinese relations, an attitude that was to have serious implications for future British dealings with Tibet.

Having examined the role played by the Dalai Lama and the way in which his flight to India acted as a catalyst in frontier relations, revealing the indecision and uncertainty of frontier diplomacy, as well as the unwillingness to accept Chinese forward policy as a threat in London, I want to go on in the next section to look at the effects of this policy on the frontier itself, and in particular the implications it had for the men on the spot and for the Indian government.

3. THE NORTH EAST FRONTIER

Between 1908 and 1910 there was a general perception amongst British personnel living and working on the frontier that the non-involvement policy had served only to increase Chinese influence there to a point where it threatened Indian security, fears exacerbated by the developing
Chinese interest in the Himalayan States and in the Assam Himalayas. O'Connor was particularly concerned about the loss of Chumbi Valley which he had regarded as 'an area of peculiar significance and importance', since it now provided the Chinese with an easy access to India. The Valley, bounded on either side by Sikkim and Bhutan, enabled the Chinese to retain sizeable garrisons within one hundred miles of the Indian border from which they might send out troops and officials to 'worry' British agents, and 'intrigue' with the rulers of the Himalayan States, whose relations with the British were still tenuous and ill-defined.*55 O'Connor's fears were supported by Wilton, who also agreed that British frontier policy ought to be prepared to face the possibility that the Chinese might use this as a convenient base from which to launch an attack on India.*56

The Politicals were not the only people able to appreciate this potential Chinese threat however, and reports by the China Inland missionary Ridley French in Kansu, revealed widespread fear amongst British missionaries working on the frontier that Chinese prestige had been gained at British expense. Although Jordan was quick to disassociate himself from this extreme view, he too was concerned about the lack of a Consular presence in the region.*57 The situation was becoming so dangerous in fact that even foreign observers like the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, who had himself suffered the effects of the non-involvement policy, felt that this state of affairs looked very ominous for future British interests on the frontier.*58

In Simla, concern turned to widespread alarm as the months passed, and in a confidential report written in November 1910, at the close of Minto's Viceroyalty, Indian Foreign Secretary Harcourt Butler described the deteriorating frontier situation in great detail, stressing the Chinese advance as a positive threat to Indian security. His report recommended an urgent redistribution of the army on the frontier since, as he pointed out, the territory there was little more than a wilderness, with 'nothing to speak of between Nepal and Calcutta'. Like Bell, Harcourt Butler was convinced of the need to establish formal treaty ties with Bhutan, and to strengthen existing links between India and the other Himalayan States in
order to avoid a repetition of the events of 1903, when the main threat to
Indian security had appeared to come from Russia.  
There were three main factors in frontier policy between November 1908 and
November 1910 which I believe to be important and which I will now examine
in detail. Firstly, the direct threat to Indian security posed by apparent
Chinese interests in the Himalayan States. Secondly, the effects of the
increase in Chinese prestige and influence on British trade and commercial
development. And thirdly, the re-emergence of what many believed to be an
unhealthy Russian interest in the frontier made in August by the Kozlov
Expedition, and the threat which this seemed to pose for the future of the
Anglo-Russian Convention as well as to the maintenance of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance.

4. INDIAN POLICY AND THE HIMALAYAN STATES

British relations with the Himalayan States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan
had never been adequately defined by treaty, despite the fact that they
were regarded by India as important aspects of their north-east frontier
policy, providing a buffer beyond India's frontier, and affording
opportunities for commercial and industrial development and the safe
expansion of British influence in the area. As Chinese forward policy
began to affect these states, British fears for the safety of the frontier
resurfaced, especially after the appointment of Chang Yin-tang as High
Commissioner for the frontier, whose obstructive activities in Tibet have
been described in Chapter Four.  
Nepal was already heavily obligated to China under the treaty of 1792,
signed after her humiliating defeat at Tibetan hands, that required her to
send a tribute to Peking every five years, and, although she always denied
that this made her a vassal of the Chinese, the Indian government
were concerned that, if the Chinese made any formal claims for suzerainty,
the Nepalese fear of China as the more powerful state would override
any informal commitments made to them. This concern increased as Chinese
influence developed, and tensions were not eased by Chang's announcement
that he proposed to make a 'friendly' visit to Katmandu in 1907.  
The Nepalese meanwhile had their own reasons for resisting China's
attentions since, under the terms of the 1792 Treaty, Nepal had agreed to come to Tibet's aid in the event of a foreign invasion. The Nepalese, professed to take this obligation very seriously, and although they had failed to provide military support during the Younghusband 'invasion', offering only mediation services, they had maintained strong links with Tibet through their official Representative in Lhasa, and enjoyed a thriving frontier trade with them which they could ill afford to jeopardize. In contrast, Nepalese links with Britain were informal. In April 1908 the Nepalese Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher Jang had visited England accompanied by Colonel Manners-Smith, the British Resident at Katmandu, whom he regarded as a personal friend, and Nepalese Gurkhas had already made themselves quite indispensable to the depleted Indian army charged with the task of guarding the vast Indian frontier.

Wilton, seconded from the China Service in 1907 to act as advisor to the 1908 Trade Regulation talks in India, had written a substantive report on the North-East frontier in that year, and had concluded that Nepal had every reason 'to show China enmity'. By 1910 however, the situation had changed, and Harcourt Butler was reporting increasing Chinese pressure and a deteriorating situation in the area as Chinese threats to the Nepalese/Tibetan trade were putting Chandra Shamsher Jang in danger of losing the support of his people. Butler advised therefore that India should 'consult him freely' lest 'he take offence' and since his loyalty to Britain was being severely tested by these events.

Relations with the British protected state of Sikkim were still extremely delicate in 1907. During his tenure as Political Officer in Sikkim, Claude Whitehad experienced great problems in his dealings with the ruling Rajah and his Tibetan Rani. The Rani was openly hostile towards his government and fiercely opposed his programme of 'reform' for her adopted country. The introduction of a number of Nepalese colonists whom he had invited to work the potentially arable land in Sikkim had involved extensive felling of the forests and, together with the ambitious mining, bridge building and road building schemes he introduced, had generated much popular ill-feeling because they interfered with the traditional patterns of farming and grazing, being based on a popular western misconception that
land which was not settled was not used.*66 When Bell took over in 1908 the situation remained tense, and despite the fact that, in Bell's opinion, Sikkim's ruler remained a 'mere puppet' in British hands, the Rani's overt hostility was an obvious danger that could not be entirely ignored.*67 In the event Bell's fears proved unfounded because, as Wilton had discovered during a trip to Gantok in 1906, Sikkim had resisted Chang's attempts to enter into secret talks with him just as firmly as they had earlier resisted British reforms.*68 However, because no Chinese lived there, and because they had no feudatory rights of any kind in Sikkim, Harcourt Butler was able to conclude in 1910 that the country was not under threat from China.*69

Relations with Bhutan were less straightforward. In 1907 Wilton had described the country as 'a small poor state with a dwindling population of some 350,000' most of whom were 'ignorant and backward' and isolated from other parts of the region by 'poor transportation links'.*70 Tsonga Penlop, who had become Maharajah in 1907, had previously visited Britain in 1905, and like the Nepalese Resident had made himself available to the British as a mediator during the Younghusband Expedition and in the difficult period of negotiations with the Tibetans that followed. Unlike the Rani in Sikkim, Tsonga Penlop was an enthusiastic supporter of British plans to improve and update his country, and he gave full support to White's programme of reform in Bhutan. Seizing the opportunity this goodwill afforded, Bell had therefore led negotiations for a friendship treaty with Bhutan in 1909, a treaty which Harcourt Butler and Eric Wilton had been foremost in promoting, and which was intended to cement existing ties with Bhutan and bring them under formal British protection.*71 This was all the more urgent since the Chinese threat to Bhutan was stronger than that of any other Himalayan state and was pressed far more vigorously. Bhutan's position close to Chumbi Valley made her particularly vulnerable to Chinese attack. Bhutanese traders had always been aggressive in their dealings with Tibetans, and there was a history of frontier incidents which China had been frequently called upon to help resolve.*72

In his report on the North-East frontier in 1907 Wilton had established that Chang had threatened to send an army into Bhutan to reaffirm Chinese
rights, and Bell had intercepted documents passed to him by the British agent Ugyen Kazi in which the Chinese appeared to assume that they had suzerain rights there. By April 1908 alarming reports also began to reach the Indian government that a Chinese official known as Ma Chi Fu was en route to Bhutan with a 'small army' of about twenty Chinese soldiers. Although Chang's 'army' and Ma's 'invasionary force', proved to be further examples of wild rumours possibly perpetuated by the Chinese themselves, they served to further highlight the vulnerability of the area after the British withdrawal from Chumbi, and by 1910 British trade agents, with the support of Harcourt Butler, began to press even more strongly for a road that would directly link Bhutan to India, and for 'local experts' to advise them on how they might best respond to future Chinese interference.

As well as the problems in the Himalayan States, the situation in Assam became increasingly tense for the Indian government as a result of Chao Erh-feng's activity in the region. From 1909 Bell's reports were starting to demonstrate an appreciation of the extent of this activity as well as the nature of the threat it posed to the security of that part of the frontier.

5. THE TIBETAN TRADE MARTS

After the withdrawal from Chumbi and the conclusion of the Trade Regulations in 1908, British Trade Agents working on the frontier were left in an invidious position. Although the Indian government was able to support them and Chinese officials were willing to tolerate their continuing presence, a conflict soon developed between London and India, the former still anxious to limit all frontier involvement, and the latter keen to press for more adequate protection for their employees and for the valuable trade they were promoting. As Chinese prestige grew and British prestige diminished after 1908, the situation for the Politicals became progressively hazardous.

In February 1908 Trade Reports from the marts at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, contained graphic accounts of direct interference with Indian trade by Chinese and Tibetan officials which British trade agents
found themselves powerless to prevent. The Indian government was willing to accept that at Gyantse, the volume of trade alone was not sufficient to justify the retention of a British agent; however, much time and effort had already been expended in sorting out the Trade Regulations, and such trade as there was in tea and wool was valuable to them. In addition, powerful vested interests in London and India favoured the retention of British Trade Agents at the marts to protect their stock and their traders.

At Gartok a sort of compromise had been achieved with the appointment of a native officer. Trade in West Tibet was flourishing and the interference of local Tibetan officials did not present such a positive threat to Indian trade as it did elsewhere, the levying of what the British referred to as 'illegal' local dues, being really a symptom of local Tibetan confidence rather than a manifestation of greater Chinese control. The situation at Yatung and Gyantse was more volatile. At Yatung the British Trade Agent, David MacDonald, was subjected to almost daily verbal abuse as his authority at the mart was overtly challenged, and at Gyantse, the situation looked equally ominous. With the threat to the personal safety of his officers growing, Minto began to demand stronger military escorts at the marts instead of agreeing to the immediate withdrawal suggested by London. He did this for three reasons. Firstly, because he knew that the Chinese were already willing to accept escorts of up to fifty men at each mart which, though inadequate by Indian standards, was larger than the existing escort. Secondly, because the Chinese considered what they described as the 'lawlessness' at the marts to be a temporary phenomenon and the result of false Tibetan confidence that would quickly evaporate as the reality of Chinese control became accepted. And finally, because he felt that unless the roads and tracks leading to the marts were made safe, Indo-Tibetan trade would cease almost entirely as had been the case in Chumbi, where Tibetan traders had feared Chinese reprisals for their willingness to co-operate with the British during the occupation of the Valley. When Morley agreed to support Minto, Grey was finally persuaded that unless protected, the trade marts were potentially vulnerable targets for Chinese
and Tibetan aggression and would therefore ultimately pose a threat to British security. For India the issue of trade was sufficiently important in itself to justify the risks involved in protecting it, even in the face of opposition from London, and additional pressure from tea companies in India and London eventually persuaded Morley to re-open talks on the frontier tea trade, deferred since 1893, on the grounds that the 1908 Trade Regulations had completely failed to settle the issue. Problems over the trade had come to a head in February 1909 when Chinese officials at Yatung had seized, and returned to India, four cases of Indian tea that had arrived at the mart for sale. By 1910 the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that Grey seriously considered raising the matter directly with the Chinese. However, the situation was complicated by the difficulties involved in trying to convince the Chinese to do something about improving trade when they were keenly promoting their own product inside Tibet. By June 1910 therefore Grey decided that a better approach might be to link the question of tea with the wider issue of levying a general trade tariff, in order to secure agreements with the Chinese which would ensure that there could be no further 'incidents' concerning trade disputes on the frontier which might threaten the safety of Indian government employees. He also felt strongly that this willingness to co-operate on Britain's part could be presented as a bargaining tool in future dealings with the Chinese on other issues connected both to Tibet, and to the Himalayan States.

The link that developed between the tea question and wider political issues in Anglo-Chinese talks also suited Minto who, thwarted in his attempts to introduce O'Connor as a trade delegate to the talks, was subsequently able to exploit the situation by insisting that a general solution be found to other niggling trade issues, like the Tibetan monopolies over certain aspects of trade which were preventing the smooth development of India's commercial ventures in Tibet. Trade thus became an important political reason for the maintenance of a British presence on the frontier, just as trade in traditional commodities like wool and tea became vitally important to the tottering Indian economy. The persistent interest in trade, as well as the development of the mining
and tourist potential of the relatively safe north-east frontier, also continued to provide a real incentive for the continuance of British interests in Tibet at a time when political withdrawal was being advocated in London. 88

The problem of providing effective protection for Indian government employees at the trade marts became more acute between 1908 and the summer of 1910. As tensions escalated, and as an insurance against sudden outbreaks of violence against his men, Minto proposed, and Morley sanctioned, a sizeable build up of Indian troops on the frontier which became a source of major concern, not only to China, but also to the Russians and Japanese who monitored the situation closely.89 By the summer of 1910 the tension was to some extent diffused by the willingness of the Chinese government to provide written guarantees to protect the trade marts, and in August 1910 Morley ordered Minto to organise the disbanding of this frontier force. For the moment at least the fear of direct conflict between Britain and China seemed to have been averted.90

6. THE KOZLOV EXPEDITION AND THE PROBLEM OF KOKONOR

The Kozlov 'Mongolian Expedition' of 1907-10 re-opened the whole subject of scientific mission which had been neatly shelved by the 'Notes' attached to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Grey had been well aware at the time of signing that this would not be the end of the matter as the Notes were really a compromise, adopted as much to allay Morley's anxiety about frontier involvements than as a real attempt to solve the problem, which now resurfaced within months of their expiry on 31st August 1910.91

The Kozlov Expedition focused attention once again on the need to define and record the boundaries of Tibet, exposing the potential fragility of the Anglo-Russian settlement. Colonel Kozlov already enjoyed a considerable reputation in Britain as an experienced Central Asian traveller and had been a member of two previous expeditions to the area in 1886, and in 1889. He had subsequently led his own expedition to Mongolia in 1900, and while there he had explored parts of Eastern Tibet. His previous Mongolian Expedition had already aroused British concern, and when news of his second Expedition reached London and India in 1906, there was a reawakening of old concerns. By 1908, a year after the Mission had actually left
St. Petersburg, British anxiety about its progress increased when reliable reports reached them that Kozlov had altered course and was moving in a direction not published in his itinerary. The Expedition had been the subject of wild and inaccurate press speculation which served to further complicate the issue, but its status and aims had been officially sanctioned by the Tsar himself who had also helped to fund it, and the detailed itinerary published in the press had initially helped to calm fears of intrigue which, in the past, had aroused suspicions in the case of less publicised missions.\(^92\) The declared purpose of the Expedition was to undertake 'geographical, ethnographical, and physiological researches into the more inaccessible regions of Mongolia'. It was to consist of thirteen scientists, including botanists and topographers, and was to take three years to complete; leaving Moscow on 24th November 1907, and returning there in December 1910. It was to be split into three 'periods'. The first, christened the 'Mongolian', would explore the Alashan area of South Mongolia between November 1907 and early autumn 1908. The second, or 'Kokonor' period, beginning in autumn 1908, and ending in spring 1909, would explore the Kokonor region of East Tibet and would include a study of the sacred Kokonor lake. The third and final period, known as the 'Szechuan' would explore the region around Sung-pan-t'ing from spring 1909, after which time the party would make their way back to Moscow.

The venture created a number of problems for Grey. Firstly, he was anxious that as most of the Expedition members held army rank, there might be more to the mission than its stated aim of scientific investigation. Secondly, it was already known that Kozlov had gone out of his way to meet and talk with the Dalai Lama during his period of exile at Urga. Thirdly, and of most concern to Grey, was his plan to explore the still undefined Kokonor wilderness which Izvolsky had agreed that Kozlov would not enter when the matter had been raised during the negotiations for the Convention in 1907.\(^93\)

To some extent the involvement of military personnel in such an expedition could be easily explained since, as Izvolsky told Grey, most official posts in Russia were filled by military personnel and that the British were in no position to complain, since the Younghusband Expedition had also been
dominated by men of military rank. Kozlov's unscheduled visit to the Dalai Lama presented both sides with greater problems however, particularly in view of reports from the British missionary French-Ridley, based in Sining, who claimed that Kozlov was already 'very friendly' with the Dalai Lama, having met him 'at least twenty-five times' in Urga during 1907. French-Ridley also reported that he had himself entertained Kozlov at Sining and had been very impressed by his fluent Mongolian which allowed him to move freely around Kansu without obstruction from Chinese officials. He also believed that the presence of Buriats in the Kozlov party had helped to increase his credibility with the Dalai Lama and his followers.

In a second, even more alarming report, the missionary described the way in which Kozlov had left the main party and had taken a special detour in order to see the Dalai Lama at Kumbum. On this occasion he had stayed for several days, enjoying 'a series of interviews' with the Dalai Lama which French-Ridley found particularly distressing, since it was obvious that the Russian was now providing much needed support and friendship to the Dalai Lama at a time when he was feeling relatively isolated, having out-stayed his welcome at Kumbum and having quarrelled with the Abbot. Ridley French further suggested that their new found intimacy might even lead to a fostering of unhealthy links between Russia and Tibet, although he was quick to discount the rumours that Dorjiev had been with the Kozlov party.

Jordan was keen to disassociate himself from some of the more overtly political comments in the French-Ridley reports, the tone and content of which reveal a distinctly Curzonian approach to frontier politics, but these views were shared by many other missionaries who worked in the remoter parts of the frontier, many of whom felt strongly that the fruits of the Younghusband Expedition had been wasted by the non-involvement policy that had harmed British prestige, making their work even more difficult and dangerous than it might otherwise have been.

In August 1909 the War Office in London addressed a communication to the Foreign Office on the subject of Kozlov's presence in Kokonor which contained an article from the Russian newspaper 'Russki Invalid' describing the work of the Kokonor period. The War Office was mainly worried about
the possible effect that the Expedition might have on the local population, who regarded the Kokonor lake as sacred, and who were already referring to those members of the Russian party who had sailed on the lake and survived as 'magicians'.*97 Although for the most part a barren wilderness inhabited by hostile tribes, many of whom were not Tibetan in origin, the area had strategic and possible commercial value for Britain, and the War Office were anxious to avoid any 'incidents' amongst the volatile local population as a result of the Russian presence there. The first stirrings of the fierce debate about Kokonor that would divide the British during the Simla talks of 1912 began to emerge at this time as it became obvious to all concerned that the region needed to be accurately defined either as part of Tibet or part of China, and is in itself an indication of the way in which western diplomatic practice had begun to affect even the remotest regions of the world which had hitherto comfortably survived without the need to formally belong to any organised state or country.

The Kozlov Expedition had been the subject of great diplomatic and press attention, but it was not the only scientific expedition in the area at the time. Rumours and counter rumours about other ventures helped to raise the level of suspicion between Russia and Britain which disturbed the delicate relationship between them during and after the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The Kozlov issue also raised the whole question of the way in which future diplomatic relations should be conducted on the frontier and what might be considered by both sides to be an acceptable level of interest in the area. Jordan and Grey were both agreed that the Expedition had strayed into Tibetan territory during its exploration of Kokonor and in doing so had contravened the terms of the Convention however, they both felt that there was nothing to be gained by pursuing this point since no formal territorial claims to the region had subsequently been made by Russia. The matter was therefore discreetly dropped after a brief exchange of correspondence with St. Petersburg, in which the Russians confirmed that the purpose of the Expedition had been purely scientific.*98

The commercial possibilities of Kokonor had already been exploited by American companies who had agents posted in key villages and towns
throughout the region from which they organised the transportation of the raw product to California. For Britain the possibilities of developing trade in Kokonor were outweighed at this time by the need to ensure that an area of such an strategic importance should not be allowed to fall exclusively into Russian or Chinese hands and the area was not forgotten. In 1911, and again in 1917, therefore steps were taken by the British to further explore and chart it.*99

CONCLUSIONS

The period between September 1908 and November 1910 was a time of tension and frustration for the Politicals working on the frontier when British prestige appeared to have reached an all time low, and when ensuring their personal safety became a real problem for the Indian Government. Political events inside China, and in particular the Chinese forward campaign being conducted by the Chao brothers from Szechuan, were interpreted by both the British and Indian governments as a threat to their plans for the Hymalayan States, as well as a potential danger to the security of the Indian frontier.

British policy in Tibet began to change as soon as it became obvious that the non-involvement policy could not be continued in the face of this overt Chinese advance and the obvious fragility of the Anglo-Russian Convention, exposed by the events surrounding the Kozlov Expedition, and by persisting rumours of continuing links between the Dalai Lama and Russia. The need to take stock and decide what future British Tibetan policy was really to be about became a matter of some urgency as the Chinese advanced further into the Assam Hymalayas.

In the next Chapter I will examine the way in which these problems were addressed by a change in British frontier policy after Morley's and Minto's departure in 1910, and by the positive attempt to define the boundaries of Tibet.
During November 1910 Lord Hardinge and Lord Crewe replaced Minto and Morley respectively as Viceroy and Secretary of State for India.*1 As both were men with considerable experience of high office, it was anticipated that their political maturity would lead to a peaceful continuation of the status quo in Tibetan policy and an avoidance of the conflicts that had helped to prevent effective decision-making during the Minto/Morley administration. Within months of their taking office however, Indian frontier policy had been completely altered as London began to accept that Chinese forward policy was becoming a real threat to Tibetan security which they could no longer ignore, and as revolutionary events inside China started to directly affect the frontier.

In this Chapter I will firstly examine the events surrounding the decision to abandon the non-involvement policy. Secondly, discuss the nature of the changes to the frontier bought about by the Revolution of 1911 and its implications for Anglo-Tibetan policy; before finally looking at the way in which the conflict that developed between the British Foreign Office and the new Chinese Republican Government led directly to the opening of the Tripartite Talks at Simla at which India, China, and Tibet came together to try to solve the problem of delimiting the frontier and establishing clear boundaries for Tibet.
1. CHINESE INFILTRATION IN ASSAM

One of the main reasons behind the decision to abandon the non-involvement policy was the result of the escalation in Chinese activity in areas close to the Indian border in Assam and Tawang, both remote tribal regions of the Himalayas about which little was known.  

The Chinese invasion of Lhasa in February 1910 had made it theoretically possible for them to launch an attack on Assam and Central Tibet, using the city as a base. It was already known that they had planned to occupy Lhasa as part of their scheme to create the new Chinese Province of Sikang and between February 1910, and the outbreak of revolution inside China in October 1911, Indian concerns were mainly centred on what they saw as the dangerous implications of Chinese campaigns in Assam and on the Burma frontier, both remote areas with undefined borders that were particularly vulnerable to attack.

The extent to which this was a co-ordinated invasion campaign, as many believed, was highly questionable however, since various factions within China in the dying years of the Manchu dynasty appeared to be pulling against each other. In Lhasa for example, Amban Lien Yu was operating in a way which seemed to be totally at odds with the instructions issued to him by the Central Government in Peking, and the increasingly powerful Provincial governments of Yunnan and Szechuan were already behaving like independent states. Finally within Peking itself, the newly created Board for Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs and the Wai Wu Pu operated in apparent ignorance of each other's existence.

Despite some awareness of these internal divisions, based on information received from the Chinese Legation in London, Indian observers continued to believe in the wider co-ordinated invasion plan seemingly confirmed by the appearance of Chinese troops so close to the Indian and Burmese borders.

Between September 1910 and March 1911 these fears increased as Chao Erh-feng's forces moved into Zayaul and Pome, two tracts of tribal land in the Assam Himalayas under informal British control. Until the time of their invasion this wilderness region had attracted little British interest but both areas were of vital strategic importance to Chao: firstly, because
they provided him with a shorter supply route between Szechuan and Lhasa; and secondly, because they contained fertile land and a climate for rice growing which offered him a possible site on which to establish a Chinese settlement. By August 1911 Chao's army had settled in Zayaul, establishing a garrison at Chikang near Rima, the main administrative centre in the region, and disturbingly close to the Indian border.  

When Hardinge and Crewe took office in November 1910 there were therefore two quite separate areas of concern arising from Chinese activities on the frontier that were to lead to an abandonment of the non-involvement policy. The first was the situation that had developed in the Assam Himalayas as a result of Chao's campaigns, and the second was the tension generated by the conflict with the Provincial government of Yunnan over what Britain had come to regard as her territory in Burma that came to a head during 1910, in what became known as the Pienma Crisis.

In late 1910 the Indian government had no reliable information about the Assam Himalayas or the extent of Tibetan influence amongst the tribes who lived there. Various traveller's reports had seemed to indicate extensive Tibetan influence in neighbouring Tawang, and in June 1908 Minto had authorised some limited exploration of the area for the purpose of mapping and surveying the territory. He had been fully supported in this by Sir Lancelot Hare, Lieutenant Governor of East Bengal and Assam, who together with Noel Williamson, the Political Officer at Sadiya, believed that the area should be brought under direct British control. The reasons for this interest were not entirely political as great pressure had been put upon them by British owned tea and timber companies in Assam who had a large financial stake in the area and who expected their investments to be protected. Having experienced similar problems as Political Officer in Sikkim, Bell also strongly supported the idea that his government should explore the hill country further in order to make contact with the tribes who lived there with a view to persuading them to accept British protection and, if necessary, imposing treaties on them which could be legally defended in the event of future Chinese or Tibetan aggression. Bell had proposed the creation of two frontier districts to be directly supervised by British officers responsible to the Indian government.
Hare was prepared to go even further, recommending that full British sovereignty be established over the whole Lohit Valley, and in his last weeks as Viceroy Minto had agreed to consider an advance, suggesting in October 1910, that the best solution to what he described as the 'Assam problem', would be to 'gain a buffer' by 'extending the outer line towards Tibet'.

Like Morley, his predecessor, Crewe felt very uneasy about the situation in Assam but was reluctant to agree any departure from the non-involvement policy before consulting with his new Viceroy. Hardinge had already discussed the situation with Hare soon after his arrival in India but he too was cautious about launching an advance, although he did accept that punitive missions were a possibility in the event of proven attacks on British subjects in the area. Whilst acknowledging the need to collect information and maintain friendly relations with the tribes, if only for commercial reasons, he was nevertheless unwilling to sanction any activity on the frontier which might involve India in long term political or financial commitments there. He regarded Chinese infiltration as a worrying new development, and continuing reports that the Chinese had been interfering with trade in the region forced him to the conclusion that some British action was necessary.

The Chinese occupation of Pome and Zayaul had meanwhile posed a serious threat to frontier stability. The people of Pome were of mixed Tibetan blood but had preserved their independence, mainly because the region was too remote to attract the attentions of the Lhasa government. Pome had fiercely resisted the Chinese occupation, and in late 1910 they had murdered a Chinese official stationed there and repelled a punitive mission sent against them by the Chinese government. Despite further successive attempts to subdue them during the course of 1911, the people of Pome had held out, and their successful resistance marked the beginning of a humiliating Chinese withdrawal from the area.

The combined effects of the events in Zayaul and Pome, and Chinese attempts to woo the local Assam tribes like the Mishmi, Miri, and Abor, were but minor irritations compared to the hysteria engendered by the murder of Noel Williamson, the British Political Officer at Sadiya, during an
exploratory mission in the Assam hills in March 1911. Williamson, an ambitious young officer, and a strong promoter of British forward policy in the Assam foothills, had requested and received permission for a mission to explore the region. His murder, allegedly by members of the Abor tribe, provoked furious public outcry in Britain and led to demands for revenge that were quite impossible for the British government to ignore, since not only had a white officer been murdered, but the whole weakness of Indian frontier policy had been exposed. During the months that followed, consistent reports of Chinese infiltration in the area seemed only to fuel speculation that the Chinese themselves were involved and that the murder itself was part of a much wider plan to threaten British interests there. Events in the Assam Himalayas however were only partly responsible for changes in British frontier policy during 1911. A situation developed at Pienma, a village on the borders of Burma, that was to lead to a complete re-evaluation of the non-involvement policy, and was directly related to Tibetan policy because the problem of establishing a clear Sino-Burmese border affected the whole Indian frontier, and the area was seen as part of a whole. The problem on this border had originated in 1886 when Britain had annexed part of Burma, including within the new borders a part of the ancient kingdom of Mandalay, which the Chinese had always regarded as one of their tributary states. Tensions came to a head in the spring of 1910 when Chinese forces were rumoured to have occupied Pienma, now just inside the new disputed border. In July 1910 a Chinese official with a military escort was reported to have established what was described as a 'cultural centre' in the village which included three schools. These rumours were subsequently investigated by Archibald Rose, the British Consul-General at Tengyueh, who reported finding what he described as a modern army of Yunnanese troops stationed there. At this point the Governor General of Burma, Sir Harvey Adamson, became very anxious about the situation, and sanctioned his own expedition of investigation under the leadership of W.F. Hertz. However, when Hertz and his party arrived at Pienma in January 1911, he discovered that Rose's reports had been grossly exaggerated, and that in fact there was only one school there staffed by an elderly schoolmaster whom he ordered back to Yunnan.
At this point Hardinge became very uncertain about Adamson's obvious overreaction to the situation and he ordered the recall of Hertz. The Chinese then responded to what they described as an invasion of their territory, by boycotting British trade to the area and lodging an official protest with the British Foreign Office. Within a month of Hertz's departure however they had re-occupied Pienma and Adamson was once again requesting permission to send Hertz back.*16

The incident had created a poor impression of British competence and was very damaging to prestige, and the India Office, the Peking Legation, and the Foreign Office were all united in opposing Hertz's return. Adamson was therefore forced to allow the matter to drop. Pienma had not only threatened to create a grave crisis for Anglo-Chinese relations, but had exposed to the world the indecisiveness of Indian frontier policy, and in the process reflected badly on the Indian administration, which now became the butt of many Foreign Office jokes. As a result of this incident, which Jordan condemned as a dangerous and humiliating waste of government resources, Grey forbade any similar attempts to send British expeditions into areas where they were unable to control the territory they had occupied.*17

The Pienma fiasco and the Williamson murder, together with the threats of Chinese infiltration into territories bordering India, all played a part in promoting the Policy Review commissioned by Hardinge and presented to Crewe in September 1911. Its recommendations were ostensibly based upon a need to punish and control the Abors, deemed officially responsible for Williamson's death, but they were also designed to frustrate what many were now convinced was a well orchestrated Chinese campaign to take the frontier. Although many of the new proposals had originally been put forward by Minto shortly before he left office in late 1910, and were based on the idea that the hill country should be subject to a system of informal control, the new policy represented a real change of heart on the part of the British government, which had forcefully promoted non-involvement since 1905. It was not as radical as many in India would have liked however, since the idea was merely to stake out British claims to tribal territory in the event of Chinese infiltration, and was not an attempt to
create an extended permanent northern boundary for India. Grey particularly disliked the concept of a 'tribal frontier' which he felt could only increase the possibility of further embarrassing incidents like Pienma, and he had no desire to annex territory that might prove impossible to control.*19

Having agreed the new policy, Grey was now faced with the problem of how and when to launch it in order to minimise any damage to Anglo-Chinese relations. He favoured informing the Chinese directly, but felt it wiser not to inform either the Lhasa government, or the Dalai Lama in India, on the grounds that it would be impossible to predict their reaction to what they might see as a British advance into territory which had previously been under informal Tibetan control. Hardinge also believed that any word to the Chinese before the despatch of the proposed missions to the Mishmi, Miri, and Abor tribes of the Assam foothills would be unwise, as their findings would need to be studied. His military staff were also very anxious about the strategic implications of any Chinese occupation of Tawang.*20 In the event the new policy was rendered unenforceable as a result of the confusion generated by the Chinese revolutionary disturbances in the area, but it did have important repercussions for British Tibetan policy and led to a renewal of official British interest in Tibetan affairs, making it no longer simply a clandestine aspect of Indian frontier policy.

2. CHINESE CLAIMS TO BHUTAN AND NEPAL

During 1910 a crisis threatened to develop over Chinese claims to the Hymalayan States of Bhutan and Nepal which re-opened the debate on their status.*21

On 8th August 1910 Bell reported receiving a communication from the Maharajah of Bhutan containing a letter from the Amban Lien Yu appearing to suggest that China was now claiming sovereignty over his country. Bell felt that the letter was both impertinent and disrespectful, since it was addressed to what Lien Yu evidently felt were the key figures in Bhutan, and not directly to the Maharajah as ruler of the state. It was also presented as an order from the Amban 'not to listen to
instructions from other people' and announced that Chinese soldiers would be stationed at the key Bhutanese towns of Lhoka and Konbu in order to provide what he described as 'protection' for the country. The Bhutanese were also warned to 'stay peaceful as before' or risk 'bringing trouble' to their country by 'acting unlawfully'. Bell felt, and Minto agreed, that the letter had probably been an independent initiative on Lien's part, and a desperate show of strength, aimed at countering the effects of the recently negotiated revision treaty which Bhutan had signed with Britain; particularly as in respect to British enquiries earlier that year, Peking had officially stated that she did not claim suzerainty over Bhutan. Bell therefore recommended that a strongly worded letter be sent to the Wai Wu Pu protesting at the tone of the letter and stating that its message was 'not understood'. The Maharajah of Bhutan, naturally alarmed by the sudden turn of events, was promised British support and, in return, asked not to reply to Lien Yu on the grounds that the letter was 'not proper'. Despite this undertaking however, and no doubt feeling equally vulnerable to attack from China and Britain if he did not comply with their apparently contradictory demands, the Maharajah did his best to exploit the situation in his country's best interests by playing one off against the other, loudly proclaiming Bhutanese independence to the British, whilst secretly expressing a willingness to co-operate with Chinese demands. Minto believed that, under the terms of the revised Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty, India now controlled Bhutan's foreign affairs, and he therefore felt that the Chinese should be firmly told that in any future dealing with Bhutan, they should first consult with Britain before taking any action beyond that which could be described a 'trivial' or 'routine'. Grey agreed, and Max Muller was instructed to write to the Wai Wu Pu accordingly. His letter expressed the hope that there was no foundation in the rumours that China was despatching missions to Bhutan and Nepal for the purpose of presenting 'titles' and 'presents' to their rulers, since this would lead to a renewed debate over their status. In this way the debate about Bhutan and Nepal, which Britain had struggled so hard to settle in the interests of frontier security during 1910, was once again re-opened on the eve of the Chinese revolution.
When the rumours that Chinese envoys were planning to visit Nepal and Bhutan continued, the Indian government became convinced that they constituted positive moves on China's part to extend her influence in the Himalayas and, in the process, threaten territory which India wanted to control. They therefore felt that they had no option but to meet this advance, with force if necessary, and despite the already tense situation on the frontier, Grey and Morley were agreed that as a first step Nepal should be advised to consult with Britain before accepting any 'titles or gifts' from the Chinese.  

Meanwhile the situation in Bhutan began to look very ominous. On 29th October 1910 Max Muller had received a reply to his letter of protest which explained that Bhutan was 'a vassal state of China' and had been so since the 'time of Yuncheng' when the Bhutanese had paid regular tribute to the Chinese Emperor from whom they had frequently received 'sealed orders'. The letter also went on to say that in 1891 they had also accepted the Imperial seal, and that from that time on the Lhasa Amban had always addressed his letters to Bhutan in the form of a manifesto, receiving replies in the form of petitions to the Emperor. The Chinese claimed that the style of the Amban's letter to Bhutan had therefore been quite proper and that Lien Yu had not interfered illegally in Bhutanese affairs. What was even more disconcerting from the British point of view was the absence of any reference in the reply to the revised Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty, which had supposedly given Britain the right to conduct Bhutan's foreign affairs. Bell also discovered in consultation with the Bhutanese agent Ugyen Kazi, that they took a completely different attitude to their relationship with the Chinese. They agreed that they had accepted a seal and a hat 'with a false coral button' from them in 1891, but denied that it had ever been used, and rejected any suggestion that Bhutan had paid Tribute to the Emperor. They further contested the Amban's right to use the manifesto form of address in correspondence to them since they had never petitioned the Emperor, although they did agree that some confusion may have arisen in 1909 when the Chinese official Ma had presented them with a letter written in manifesto form from Lien Yu, which they had accepted. They insisted that the Ma party had only been allowed to enter a few miles
inside the Bhutanese border and that as they had not been permitted to see
the Maharajah, this meant that the mission had not been regarded as
official. They firmly rejected any use of the Chinese seal in Bhutan and
any Chinese or Tibetan claims to suzerainty over them. Bell was able to
confirm and support this argument based on his own experiences of the
situation, and he directly reminded his government of a letter from the
Chinese in April 1910 that had denied Bhutan's vassal status.26
The Nepalese responded to Chinese claims of suzerainty with similar
indignation, and Chandra Samsar expressed 'great astonishment and concern'
at what he described as an 'unwarranted fiction' on China's part.
He argued that the Chinese had always borne the full cost of the
Quinquennial Missions, which had only been sent in the spirit of
friendship, and on the strict understanding that there were no obligations
involved. The Missions had always carried 'presents' and not tribute and
this, he explained, was the crucial difference. He went on to suggest
that, if there was any confusion, it was the Chinese who were confused, and
cited as further evidence the fact that, when their missions had entered
Peking, they had not been required to perform the kowtow.27 The Indian
government had themselves previously undertaken extensive research into the
nature of China's relations with the Himalayan states as part of their own
plans to control the area, and could confirm that the Nepalese Mission was
not obligatory on the grounds that it had not always take place. In 1905
for example, it had not been sent because the previous Mission had been
badly treated by the Chinese during the course of their journey across
China. Their research had identified three distinct types of Mission, the
Quinquennial falling into the category described as 'an independent mission
capable of claiming assistance', and on the basis of this information they
therefore felt that, if there was any confusion, it was being deliberately
fostered by the Chinese who were using the Missions as an excuse to claim
vassal status over a number of weaker neighbouring states without telling
them. This situation had previously suited weaker states like Nepal as it
meant that they could call upon Chinese protection when it was convenient
to them and, as the Nepalese were quick to point out, since the Chinese met
the full expenses of the Missions, and gave presents infinitely more
expensive than those they received, the whole exercise ultimately benefitted Nepal whose traders particularly welcomed the opportunity to trade in China.*28

Nepalese and Bhutanese arguments were enough to convince Grey that the Chinese had no legal case for suzerainty over either Bhutan or Nepal, and he therefore had no hesitation in advising both states not to accept any further titles from the Chinese. With this decision finally made, he felt more confident about the legal status of these states, and when a further crisis threatened during the following year, he was able to respond immediately and decisively.*29

The second crisis threatening the Himalayan States came in October 1911, when Manner-Smith reported from Katmandu that the Nepalese had received instructions from Ambar Lien Yu to send the Quinquennial Mission without delay.*30 Grey favoured issuing immediate instructions to the Nepalese not to send it; however, he was prevented from doing this by Hardinge who feared that such a move might upset the Nepalese, whose gurkha troops were badly needed for frontier defence. The situation, which looked as though it might become a protracted and divisive issue between Britain and China, was quickly shelved however as revolutionary disturbances began to directly affect the frontier.*31

The debate over the status of Nepal and Bhutan provides an interesting example of the way in which both the Chinese and the leaders of the Himalayan states were able to exploit British ignorance of their traditional frontier alignments which were often based on vaguely formulated understandings. Nepal and Bhutan used them in attempts to establish independence for their state as well as to fend off what they regarded as Indian interference, and the Chinese used them as an excuse to argue for more concessions in the Himalayas, based on what they claimed as traditional custom and practice.
3. FRONTIER PROBLEMS

On 1st September 1910 Morley had ordered the withdrawal of British troops from the Indo-Tibetan border following assurances from the Peking Government that they were now in a position to afford adequate protection for the trade marts. Grey had also been able to reassure both Japanese and Russian consuls that Britain had 'no selfish ambitions' in Tibet, and life on the frontier seemed set to return to what passed for normality following the hysteria generated by Chinese activity in the region during the previous year.

1. WEIR AT GYANTSE

The months before the Chinese revolution began to disturb the relative peace of the frontier in November 1911 produced tensions of their own, as trade agents at Yatung and Gyantse were faced with an increasingly delicate situation when the Manchu administration began to collapse. At Gyantse Lt.Col.J.L.R. Weir came into conflict with Ma Chu-Fu, the newly appointed Chinese Superintendent of the trade marts, and the second most powerful Chinese official in Tibet after Lien Yu. Controversy had been building for some time over rents payable for the land on which the Indian government proposed to build the much needed new accommodation for their trade agency, and Weir had already put in an urgent request for new buildings at the end of September 1910, although the need for them had been appreciated long before this as the existing accommodation was in a very poor state. Weir had earlier negotiated with Ma's predecessor, the Tao Tai Lu, a Chinese official of the old school, but now Tibetans were demanding compensation for the loss of land in the form of higher rents which the Indian government were quite willing to pay, despite the fact that in the past, they had always resisted such expenditure on the grounds that they were not planning to extend or develop their base in Gyantse. Beside the dispute over rents, Weir was also engaged in battle with Ma over the purchase of a water mill near the Tsechen Temple, just outside Gyantse, which he needed as a 'base for transport' and as a secure store for wheat supplies which could be guarded against thieves. Ma was unwilling to sell the mill on the grounds that he had already received complaints from Ku Zu
Ta, the Tibetan Superintendent at Gyantze, that the mill was outside the commercial limits of the mart, and was therefore unavailable for British use under the terms of the 1908 Trade Regulations. Despite the risks involved in pressing ahead with this relatively minor request however, Veir persisted in his attempts to buy the water mill, arguing forcefully that Ma himself had contravened Article 2 of the same Trade Regulations by negotiating directly with Ku Zu Ta without first consulting him.*37 Why, in view of the delicate frontier situation, did the entire Foreign Service, including Grey and Morley, support Weir in these seemingly minor disputes? Firstly, there was an obvious and pressing need to support and preserve the safety of their staff. The dilapidated state of the Agency buildings was, in itself, a reflection of British prestige which could not afford to be undermined at a time when the Chinese were continuing to appoint powerful new officials like Ma to key frontier posts. Secondly, for the Indian government at least, the retention of the trade marts and a trading presence in the area was an important economic and political end in itself. Powerful investors were not willing to allow their developing trade to wither away, and in the interests of political security it was unwise to allow trade routes to close or come under Chinese or Tibetan control, since this might well jeopardize the peaceful relations between India and the many tribes who traded in the area. Thirdly, it was essential for the Indian military authorities to at least ensure that, if an escort were to be maintained at the mart, it should be adequately accommodated and equipped, perhaps with a view to increasing the size of the force in the event of a crisis. This idea created tension with the military over who would be expected to foot the bill for new barracks at Gyantse, but the principle of having new buildings there had never been contested, even by Morley.

What is perhaps even more remarkable about the situation is the fact that both the Foreign Office and the India Office were willing to put such great pressure on the Chinese government in order to persuade them to hand over the land at Gyantse and grant permission for building to go ahead before the start of the cold season at the beginning of October. Morley even supported moves to 'blackmail' the Chinese into granting permission
by using Minto's carefully compiled lists of their various treaty infringements at the mart, a move which was ultimately successful, as Jordan was able to report to Grey in April 1911 that the land had been handed over and permission granted for building under terms demanded by Britain. The conflict proved very divisive for the Chinese as tensions developed between their officials on the spot and their masters in Peking, and despite instructions from Peking ordering him to co-operate with Weir, Ma continued to obstruct the progress of the building at Gyantse by insisting that he consult with Lhasa before any land could be handed over, thus delaying the start of the building for two months and making it impossible to complete them before the onset of winter that year.

Although in many ways this attitude had been typical of the way in which events had unfolded at the marts between British, Tibetan, and Chinese officials, the conflict over the new agency land is an interesting example of how the local practice of Chinese frontier officials was increasingly at odds with Peking and more in line with the independent policy then being adopted by the Lhasa Amban, Lien Yu. This situation created many problems for the Indian government and was itself a reflection of how far the political system in China had collapsed by this time.

(11) THE TRADE AGENCY ESCORT

A second related problem involving the trade marts in the months before the revolution concerned the debate about whether it was safe to withdraw the agency escort. The issue had been under review since late 1910, when Minto had encouraged the build up of a sizeable army on the Indian borders that he had eventually withdrawn with great reluctance. By 1911 Crewe believed that formal preliminaries for the withdrawal of the escorts from Gyantse and Yatung should include guarantees from the Chinese government to assure the safety of British agents and staff who were to remain there. The tense relationship which had developed between Weir and Ma at Gyantse during late 1910 and early 1911 seemed to indicate that this would not be the case and that clearly Peking were unable to exercise complete control over their own officials at the marts, let alone give guarantees for the safety of Indian personnel.
Reports from Gyantse and Yatung received during March 1911 however seemed to suggest that the Chinese were regaining some control of the area, and by June 1911, agents themselves acknowledged that the routes to Gyantse and Yatung were being energetically policed by the Chinese, making the case for withdrawal convincing.*43

Despite his own reservations, Crewe was willing to withdraw the escort if Jordan thought it wise, but the latter felt that an immediate withdrawal would not be a good idea since, for him, the issue was becoming increasingly tied to the wider problem of Chinese infiltration in the Burmese borderlands, and he was wary of giving China too much too soon. He felt that it would be better to wait for the Chinese to request a withdrawal, thereby gaining a concession with which to bargain with them over the Burmese frontier.*44 Haringle felt that an unprompted withdrawal was, in itself, a concession that could be used as evidence of India's goodwill. By July 1911, with the decision of whether or not to withdraw the escort still unmade, India began to receive reports from the marts that Chinese control was once again breaking down and that earlier optimism about their ability to police the marts effectively had been misplaced. Crewe now came to believe strongly that the situation on the frontier could never be truly settled until the Dalai Lama had returned to Lhasa, and he supported Jordan's view that an immediate withdrawal would endanger British lives, a view confirmed in India in the light of reports received from the trade marts.*45

With India keen to retain their escorts and begin work on the new Agency buildings at Gyantse before the start of the cold weather, and a Chinese presence building up along the frontier, Grey also came to believe that an immediate withdrawal was inadvisable. His reluctance to come to a decision in this situation of conflicting views and rapidly changing events was an indication to many old Foreign Office hands, that in such circumstances, it was more effective to simply leave the matter in the hands of the men on the spot, and was itself a triumph for the Politicals whose courage and tenacity had kept British prestige alive in difficult and dangerous circumstances.
THE POSTAL SERVICE

A third set of problems were created for the marts in the immediate pre-revolutionary period by the Chinese decision to increase the size and scope of its postal service inside Tibet. Under Article 8 of the 1908 Trade Regulations it had been agreed that, if the Chinese managed to organise and run an efficient postal service in Tibet, the private arrangements made by British trade agents for the despatch of mails to and from the Indian frontier would cease, and all post would have to use the Chinese service. The Politicals, the Indian government, officials at the India Office, and Jordan in Peking, all took a very jaundiced view of the Chinese postal service based on past experiences, and writing to Grey in February 1911, Undersecretary of State, Raymond Ritchie, had already made reference to the fact that the Chinese service was dangerously unreliable, citing as evidence at least two cases where important British papers had gone astray. On one occasion, letters travelling to the Lhasa Regent in Tibet, containing British protests about Tibetan infringements of the Lhasa Convention had simply failed to arrive, and on a second occasion, letters for the Foreign Office, travelling by the same route, but in the opposite direction, had met the same fate. Jordan felt particularly sceptical about the claims for excellence made by the Chinese Board of Communications, but there were more than doubts about the efficiency of the Chinese service involved. Fears that the Chinese might find it much easier than before to vet all British correspondence travelling across the frontier were uppermost in the minds of British trade agents, for the proposed new arrangements would now prevent them despatching their own mail privately. As this had been the only safe way to transmit sensitive information without Chinese knowledge, they were understandably reluctant to forfeit this advantage.

Further complications arose early in 1911 when the Chinese announced that they wished to install telegraph lines from Chamdo to Gyantse and open 'post offices' at Shigatse, Cartok, and Gyantse, to establish what they described as an 'exchange service' for the Lhasa mails at Yatung. Harding was especially concerned that the siting of an 'exchange service' at Yatung was too near the Indian border for comfort, and he suggested that Jordan
might be asked to find out why this site had been chosen, and to recommend Gyantse as a possible alternative which India might support, on the condition that the Chinese could demonstrate their ability to run an efficient service.*49 Grey and Crewe agreed that this request was reasonable, and in 1911 began to demand that the Chinese show that they could provide an effective service.*50 Hardinge was reluctant to pursue the matter further however as he had no interest in negotiating terms for any expansion of the frontier telegraph system at that time, and had indeed abandoned plans for a telegraph link between Lhasa and India altogether because of the difficulties involved in maintaining and protecting it. The idea that the Chinese might install and control telegraph lines between Chamdo and Lhasa was also not one that he wished to encourage by opening a dialogue on the subject.*51 The issue was to be further complicated by the on-going and quite separate official correspondence being conducted between the Director-General of the Indian Postal Service, and the Director-General of the Chinese Imperial Post. The Chinese Imperial Post was part of the Chinese Customs Service, which at the time was headed by Francis Aglen, like Henderson a British subject in Chinese employ. The existence of this quite separate dialogue was particularly worrying for Jordan who was most anxious that 'outsiders' should not become involved in frontier issues, and because in the past employees of the Chinese Customs Service had created problems for British trade agents.*52 By April 1911 he was also under heavy pressure from Prince Ch'ing at the Wai Wu Pu to agree firstly, to the opening of Yatung as an 'exchange service', and secondly, to an extension of the Chinese postal service across Tibet, involving the inevitable loss of the private mail service which Aglen had made it quite clear he disliked, preferring that all mail passing to and from Tibet should use the Chinese service.*53 This pressure made Jordan unwilling to raise Indian demands at a time when there were more important frontier matters to settle, not the least of which was the embarrassing Pienma crisis on the Burma frontier.*54 However, as the year wore on and the stalemate continued, he asked Grey to request that the correspondence between the heads of the Indian and Chinese Postal Service should cease in order to allow time for him to handle the
situation directly with the Wai Wu Pu.*55 Once again the revolution intervened to prevent an effective settlement of this troublesome issue and both governments turned their attention to more pressing concerns. The dispute over the postal service is an interesting one because it shows the complexity of the frontier situation and the tensions in the months before the revolution, which made it quite impossible to settle any problem without triggering a reaction elsewhere.

(iv) THE DALAI LAMA'S RETURN TO LHASA

During the latter half of 1910 much diplomatic time was devoted to the problem of whether to encourage the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa. The Chinese were anxious for him to return because they were already unable to control the territory they had taken in Tibet and felt that his presence in Lhasa would help them settle the country. With this in mind they therefore began to make moves which might prompt his return. In August 1910 Lien Yu had sent his envoy, Lo Chang, to talk with him in Darjeeling. Some alarm about the status of the envoy and the purpose of his visit were soon expressed by Minto, following the telegram from Lien Yu in which he described Lo Chang as a 'Special Commissioner'. Max Muller was therefore instructed to make it quite clear to the Chinese that Britain did not recognise any special status for Lo Chang who, so far as they understood at the time of departure, did not even hold the rank of Taotai.*56

Oblivious to this correspondence, and having apparently failed to make any headway with the Dalai Lama, Lo Chang next approached Bell for help.*57 It then became clear to the Indian government that what Lo Chang was really offering did not accord with the terms given to Max Muller, who had understood that the Dalai Lama was to be offered a full restoration of his rights and titles. By probing further Bell also discovered that in fact all that was offered really only amounted to a guarantee of protection for the journey home, plus the right to live in the Potala on a modest annual 'allowance' of 10,000 taels, to be paid to him by the Chinese government. Understandably the Dalai Lama had been unimpressed with these terms, which would have made him once again little more than a prisoner of the Chinese. Having failed to gain Bell's support Lo Chang next announced his
intention of visiting Minto at Simla in order to discuss his offer further. Minto, no doubt remembering a similar tactic attempted by Chang in 1906, refused to see Lo Chang personally on the grounds that, as 'expectant Taotai', he was not high ranking enough to merit a personal interview. As a gesture of good will however, he offered the envoy instead a civic reception and a possible interview with the Indian Foreign Secretary, if he ever came to Simla.

The situation became even more intriguing when, during the course of a conversation with Max Muller at the Wai Wu Pu, Grand Secretary Na T'ung firmly denied any knowledge of Lo Chang's plan to visit Minto, and stated in a subsequent interview that the envoy had never been made a 'Special' Commissioner as Lien Yu's telegram had claimed. This information confirmed to many what had long been suspected, namely that Lien Yu had been acting quite independently, and certainly without the official support of the Wai Wu Pu. The Indian government then began a long and sustained campaign to unseat the Amban, whose imperious attitude and unpredictable behaviour, they had long considered a dangerous threat to frontier security. The Lo Chang mission was concluded soon after Crewe took office in November 1910 when the envoy was hastily recalled by Peking before he could prepare for his journey to Simla.

Having indirectly failed with the Lo Chang mission, from whose success they might have benifitted even if they did not officially support it, the Chinese now began to explore other ways of persuading the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa. These were to prove equally unsuccessful mainly because, after his years in India, he had been able to update his knowledge of western attitudes, and had acquired an appreciation of his powerful bargaining position. In September 1910 he had received a letter from the Panchen Lama purporting to be a plea for his return to Lhasa, accompanied by an oral message biding him to stay put, and explaining that the letter had been written under duress. Since Tibetans always regarded oral messages as more important than written ones, such a blatant attempt to influence the Dalai Lama by engaging the unwilling services of the Panchen Lama in this way was doomed to failure. A second attempt, this time employing the services of a delegation of Mongolian Buddhists
who were said to have travelled to Yatung for the specific purpose of
leaving a similar message was equally unsuccessful, this time because
MacDonald became suspicious of their claims to represent the 'peoples' of
Mongolia, who were known to be composed of warring factions and could never
have presented such a united front.*63

The continued presence of the Dalai Lama at Darjeeling meanwhile began to
create problems for the Indian government as well as for the Chinese,
especially as the Dalai Lama himself had made it quite clear that he had no
intention of returning to his capital without a full restoration of his
secular and religious titles. British attitudes towards him had also begun
to change during his exile, and in the months before the revolution he
increasingly came to represent a solution to the problem of frontier
security, instead of the liability he had been when he had first arrived
in India. Although still not entirely trusted by the British, he was now
seen as a powerful and influential figure, and as a man fully capable of
settling his country and establishing a strong and stable government in
Tibet.*64

On the eve of the revolution therefore the British, Indian, and Chinese
governments were broadly united in a desire to see his return to Tibet,
albeit for very different reasons.
4. THE REVOLUTION AND THE FRONTIER

The revolution, which had begun in Wuchang in October 1911, created immediate confusion and panic on the frontier. Chao Erh-feng quickly lost contact with Peking, and in the ensuing chaos many Chinese troops mutinied, having been stranded without food and pay in isolated garrisons along the frontier. In December Chao Erh-feng himself was murdered by an organised mob in Chengtu, and his death signalled the outbreak of open rebellion in East Tibet, with the area of Hsiang Cheng completely breaking from Chinese control.※65

Chao's death was a severe, but not a fatal blow for Chinese plans in East Tibet, since his successor, an energetic young Japanese trained officer called Yin Ch'ang-heug, was both anxious and well able to continue his campaign. By June 1912 therefore, with the help of Hu Ching Yin, the Military Governor of Szechuan, Ch'ang was able to relaunch the Chinese offensive under the guise of a peaceful mission of enquiry to Lhasa, the real aim of which was believed to be an attempt to reconquer the territory lost to East Tibet during the weeks after the outbreak of the revolution, and to recapture and secure the city of Lhasa for the Szechuan government, who by now were now seeking total independence from China.※66

The revolutionary disturbances in the Assam Himalayas had the unlikely effect of reducing tensions there since the events in Pome had led to the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the area which, during 1911, had threatened to cause a direct confrontation between the Chinese and Indian governments. The revolution also provided an opportunity to make a fresh start in the negotiations with a new Republican government who might reasonably be expected to be at odds with the policy of the Manchu whom they had overthrown.※67 Before negotiations could go ahead however there were two worrying obstacles to talks that needed to be urgently addressed. The first was the widespread panic created by the remnants of the old Chinese army. Soldiers, still unpaid and without regular supplies, were looting and murdering their way across the frontier en route to join their comrades at the Lhasa garrison. A second more insidious problem was created by the many civilian refugees and fugitives, including European
missionaries, who now flocked to the trade marts seeking British protection. The effect of the revolutionary disturbances on the vulnerable trade marts was dramatic but shortlived. By November 1911 India began to receive the first reports of fighting from Yatung and Gyantse, which, though fierce, did not affect the marts directly. The serious threat to security came from the many refugees who had gone there for protection and the difficulties in determining who were genuine refugees and who were deserters or spies to be handed back to the Chinese. By December 1911 even this problem had been resolved however, and Bell was reporting the frontier relatively calm.

In Lhasa events were far more dramatic. In December 1911 Chinese troops had deposed Amban Lien Yu, replacing him with their Chinese general Chung Ying in an attempt to remove all traces of the Manchu administration in the city. This proved to be an unwise move and the new Amban soon found himself quite unable to control the ensuing chaos as Tibetans, with specific orders from the Dalai Lama to kill as many Chinese soldiers as possible, clashed with the embittered survivors of the disastrous Pome campaign who, since their arrival in Lhasa, had made it their sole purpose to loot and kill as many Tibetans as possible in an effort to exact revenge for their loss of face.

The deposed Lien Yu, having discreetly fled the city soon after his deposition, now found himself in a very precarious position and forced to decide whether to remain in the Lhasa vicinity in the hope that events might soon right themselves, or return to Peking to await whatever fate might chose to grant him. He eventually decided upon the former course, remembering no doubt what had happened to others who had attempted to return to China after failing in similar circumstances.

By the beginning of May 1912 both sides in Lhasa had tired of fighting, and Chung Ying made it clear that his Chinese troops would welcome a ceasefire, a course which the Tibetans were now more than willing to consider since, besides the strain of battle, the clash between Drepung Monastery, (who had always favoured a more moderate approach towards the Chinese invaders), and the Monasteries of Sera and Ganden, (who both wanted
to carry out the Dalai Lama's orders to the letter), was now threatening to set Tibetans against each other. A temporary three day ceasefire was therefore successfully negotiated within days, but it was not until the following August that a lasting truce was effected, this time with the help of Lal Bahadur, the Nepalese Representative in Lhasa.*72

The difficulties involved in organising the safe evacuation of Chinese troops from Tibet, and the future administration of the country, now became major issues in the months before the Simla Conference opened in October 1913. The first of these problems was solved when the Indian government agreed to organise the evacuation of Chinese troops through India, which, though a lengthy and painstaking process, was eventually successfully completed by the end of 1912 despite Chung Ying's dogged resistance.*73

The second problem of the Dalai Lama's return and the future status and administration of Tibet, were for India far less easy to solve because so many other factors were involved. It is to these factors that I now want to turn.

6. THE DALAI LAMA AND ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

After the revolution the problem of what to do about the Dalai Lama's return became urgent. He had written at least two letters to the the Tsar during his period of exile in India, and in December 1911, after much prevarication and consultation with St.Petersburg, Hardinge had allowed the Russians to send a formal reply directly to him in Darjeeling, where Bell was asked to act as translator.*74

In February 1912 the Dalai Lama had spoken openly of his earnest desire to return to his capital and had moved his vast entourage to Kalimpong in order to be nearer the border and to await a suitable moment for an entry into Tibet.*75 Apart from the few people who had been with his party since his arrival in India, (including Bell and a Sikkimese agent known as Laden La, who had loyally supported him throughout his stay), there was still limited sympathy for his plight. Indeed, many people felt that he had not helped his cause by issuing orders for Tibetans to kill Chinese soldiers in Lhasa and further alarm had been created by rumours of his association with Russia, and in particular, with his reputed preoccupation with a plan to revise the Anglo-Russian Convention.*76
As well as bombarding Bell with requests for talks with Hardinge and King George V on the subject, he had also sent his personal representative, Lonchen Shatra to Calcutta with a letter to be presented to the Indian Foreign Secretary Henry McMahon, containing a request for British arms and an escort for his return journey to Lhasa. Although a harmless request in itself, the letter had also hinted that failure to comply would almost certainly result in a similar request being made to the Tsar, and this implied threat, coupled with the Dalai Lama's obvious intention to return to his capital as soon as possible, stimulated debate about how best to help him achieve his purpose without coming into conflict with either Russia or China. Hardinge, who had served as British Ambassador in St. Petersburg during the Anglo-Tibetan crisis of 1903-4, was already very sensitive to the implications of the Dalai Lama's threat to approach the Tsar for help, and was fully prepared to offer an escort, arms, and a formal guarantee of political support for Tibet after his return. Grey argued however that in view of the Convention, an escort would be quite out of the question, but he was willing to send a message of goodwill, along with the services of a 'native agent in lieu of an escort, as evidence of British goodwill. The native agent selected for this purpose was Laden La, a Buddhist who spoke good Tibetan, and a man with considerable experience of diplomatic work, having been a member of the Younghusband Expedition in 1904, and also one of the party who had accompanied the Panchen Lama to India in 1905. He was also the nearest equivalent to Dorjiey that the Indian government could muster and was well known to have sympathies with the Curzonian faction. His future role was not only to act as companion to the Dalai Lama on his journey home, but more importantly, to help oversee the evacuation of those Chinese troops still remaining in Tibet and to ensure that the temporary ceasefire in Lhasa became permanent.

The Laden La Mission, as it became known, was soon withdrawn by Grey who, like Crewe, realised that it might be easily misinterpreted by the Russians as an attempt to install a British representative in Lhasa and so contravene the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention. This view was not shared by Hardinge who was in fact so determined that the mission should go ahead, that he gave permission for its departure before the final
confirmation of orders for its cancellation could arrive in India, with the result that Laden La reached Gyantse before he was finally forced to halt, creating great problems for Britain, since withdrawal at this point, so close to Lhasa, would have serious implications for British prestige and meant that the Chinese would almost certainly claim that it was they who had ordered the party back to India. After lengthy discussions it was therefore agreed that Laden La should remain at Gyantse to act as an advisor for the Dalai Lama after his return.*80

The Dalai Lama had been ready to leave India since February 1912 and Hardinge was now faced the thorny problem of how to word the official farewell address from the Indian government without offending the Russians. In the message he proposed to send he had planned to include a promise that India would 'welcome letters from the Dalai Lama in Lhasa' in order to ensure that 'the internal economy of Tibet was preserved from China'. Grey and Nicolson both felt however that this wording contravened, both the Anglo-Russian Convention, and the Trade Regulations of 1908, but Hardinge insisted that to send the Dalai Lama home without some British assurances would be equally disastrous for frontier security, since it would leave him vulnerable to future Chinese interference and would prevent him establishing a stable and independent administration in Tibet. After further discussions a compromise message was agreed with the final wording expressing the desire of the British government to see the internal autonomy of Tibet under Chinese Suzerainty maintained without Chinese interference, so long as the Dalai Lama was willing to uphold the Treaty obligations with Britain and maintain friendly relations.*81

Despite the vague wording of the farewell message the Dalai Lama proved content with even this level of British support, and soon after returning to Lhasa, sent messages of thanks to Hardinge in India in which his expressed desire to learn English seemed to indicate that he intended to retain his friendly links with the British.*82

The wrangles over the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet served to further demonstrate the very different approaches to the problem adopted by British governments in London and India. For the Foreign Office in London, Tibet was but a small part of a wider Asian policy requiring the maintenance
of harmonious relations with China and Russia. For the Indian government, the Anglo-Russian Convention was an unnecessary obstacle to the business of pacifying and consolidating the frontier which had really begun when Younghusband had negotiated the Lhasa Convention in 1904, and which had since been undermined by the non-involvement policy orchestrated from London. Even Hardinge, whose very appointment as Viceroy had been made in order to ensure that the London view prevailed in India, found himself reluctant to leave the frontier to the mercies of the Chinese and began to pursue policies that aimed to stabilise Tibet and provide a buffer against Chinese infiltration along India's borders. While the Dalai Lama remained a volatile threat to Asian stability for London and Peking, his return to Lhasa, and the presence of Laden La as Indian representative at Gyantse, represented a triumph for India and a victory for the Curzonian faction who had now achieved most of what Younghusband had been asked to do in 1904, namely, to establish friendship links with the Dalai Lama, and a new understanding with his people.

7. ANGLO RUSSIAN RELATIONS: MONGOLIA AND TIBET

By 1911 Anglo-Russian relations were starting to improve. The decision, made at the end of the year, to allow the Notes attached to the Anglo-Russian Convention relating to Scientific Missions to lapse, had alleviated much of the friction created by the Kozlov Expedition and the other less published ventures and had even survived the Dalai Lama's attempts to enlist the Tzar's help in his dealings with India. A much more serious threat to Anglo-Russian relations now surfaced over Mongolia and the attempts by Russia to try once again to link the two issues once again. During December 1911, Sir George Buchanan the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, drew Grey's attention to two articles that had been published in the Russian newspaper 'Vroe Vremya' that related to Mongolia. The first article took the form of a reported conversation with a person described as a 'diplomat' who claimed that the Mongols, incensed and alarmed by China's treatment of the Dalai Lama, were now working to establish their own independence and had already organised a strong freedom movement in
North Mongolia under the leadership of the Bogdo in Urga who, in the absence of the Dalai Lama, was now regarded by the Chinese as the Head of the Buddhist Church in Central Asia. The article concluded by emphasising the Dalai Lama's devotion to Russia and the fact that he had 'always sought close union with Mongolia'. The article also reported that a Mongol deputation had recently arrived in St. Petersburg requesting Russian protection for Mongolia as the only means of securing for their country 'peaceful developments and commercial resources'. A second article in the same newspaper argued that the pull towards nationalism being felt by many of the states on the borders of the Chinese Empire made it now appropriate for China to recognise Mongolia as a 'new' and independent state.*85

The concern engendered by these articles in London was then intensified by information that a meeting had taken place at Phari in July 1912, between Dorjiev and the Dalai Lama, which lead to fresh fears that Russia was proposing to take advantage of the obvious confusion on the fringes of the old Manchu Empire in order to pursue her separate interests in Mongolia, Sinkiang, and possibly in Tibet itself, fears seemingly confirmed in August 1912 by British reports of disturbances in Sinkiang.*97

The revolution in China had placed the status of Mongolia and Sinkiang in question and in doing so had created an entirely new set of problems in central Asia because most of the understandings between China and her neighbours in this region had been based on treaties signed with the Manchu who were no longer in control.

The implications of these new developments for frontier security as well as for Anglo-Russian relations were obviously serious, especially after Mongolia had declared herself independent in December 1911 and had announced that Chinese interests Mongolia were 'abolished'. It was clear that the information contained in the articles published in Vroe Vremya had been accurate and that the new Mongolian government had indeed turned to Russia for support and protection. In late 1912 London received news that a formal treaty, signed between Mongolia and Russia, had given the latter substantial commercial and political rights in Mongolia as well as rights to advise them in matters of foreign policy.*87
In the light of these events, the need to revise the Anglo-Russian Convention became a pressing concern to both Britain and Russia, and in September 1912, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov had visited Britain with a view to requesting that discussions about Tibet and Mongolia might be included in their tabled talks on Persia. Upon arriving in Britain however, Sazonov told Grey in a private interview between them at Balmoral, that Mongolia could not be regarded by his country as a suitable or equal exchange for British interests in Tibet, and at a subsequent private interview with Crewe at Crewe Hall, he said that the Russian people would not tolerate any alteration of the situation in Tibet as far as British involvement was concerned, and that a far better exchange might be considered if Afghanistan were to be included in discussions.

For Grey this suggestion was quite out of the question for one of the aims of the Anglo-Russian Convention had been to prevent the further development of Russian interests in Tibet, and when Sazonov persisted with attempts to involve Afghanistan in talks, he refused to discuss the matter with the result that the issue lay dormant until 1917. Meanwhile, the problem created by Russian interest in Mongolia remained and the close ties between Tibet and Mongolia, re-affirmed by the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty reportedly signed in January 1913, caused further concern to the Foreign Office. In October 1912 the Tsongdu had formally broken all ties with China. In signing the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, each country had signed as independent states, the Dalai Lama having formally declared Tibet independent soon after his return to Lhasa. What worried London far more than the treaty however was the rumour that Dorjiev had acted as the Dalai Lama's representative during the negotiations at Urga, having travelled there after his alleged talks with the Dalai Lama at Phari. He had then apparently returned post haste to St. Petersburg after the treaty was concluded, presumably to report the details to his government. Although Lonchen Shatra, the Dalai Lama's official representative, later denied that Dorjiev had participated either in the signing of the Treaty or the negotiations beforehand, the Russian connection was reinforced by the presence of a Mongolian delegation in St. Petersburg whose arrival appeared to co-incide with Dorjiev's return.
Sazonov later stated officially that his government believed the Treaty was a fiction, but suspicions of Russian involvement remained strong and were compounded by the fact that Russians were known to be supplying Lhasa with Winchester rifles via their agents in Urga, and that Russian officers were helping to train a new Mongolian army. It was also known that two Russian burials, trained in Urga as consular officials, had been posted to Kumbum in Kansu very close to the Tibetan border, providing Russia with a direct line to Lhasa.*91 In view of this information Grey decided that the true extent of Russian involvement in Mongolia and Tibet needed to be established, but he was faced with the problem of how to do this as all direct attempts to negotiate with Russia had failed.

Although only indirectly involving Tibet itself, the nature of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia came to be dominated by the Tibetan question and in many ways the tensions that the Anglo-Russian Convention had set out to solve continued to generate misunderstandings and confusions between Britain and Russia, which were to make what the British increasingly referred to as the Tibetan 'problem' even more complicated. It also made a definition of British Tibetan policy an urgent priority and eventually led to the issuing of a policy statement to the Wai Wu Pu in August 1912 which will be fully discussed in the next chapter.*92

8. THE NEW REPUBLIC AND CHINESE CLAIMS TO TIBET

On 16th March 1912 Yuan Shih Kai became President of the new Chinese Republican Government in Peking, ushering in a period of closer cooperation between China and the western powers, and increasing the personal power of Jordan and Morrison, who were both well known to the new President.*93 Yuan's Presidency was welcomed as a means of easing Anglo-Chinese tensions in general, and it was also believed that his influence might bring about greater opportunities for talks with China about Tibet. An optimism unfounded as subsequent events were to show.*94 Alastair Lamb has argued that the change in the Republican government had little effect on China's Central Asian policy, and this is true to some extent since, on taking office, Yuan's government continued to hold
territories in Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet acquired under the Manchu. However, Chinese forward policy in Tibet, and more particularly the creation of the new Chinese province of Sikang, had not been a Manchu initiative, the main driving force behind the policy having come from the Provincial government of Szechuan where Yuan had many supporters and who had often acted in defiance of Peking. The changes in foreign policy, which appeared to the British to be unexpected and dramatic departures, were therefore simply extensions of policies already begun in Szechuan in the dying days of the Manchu dynasty.  

New Republican policy was most obviously reflected in the 'Five Races Decree' of May 1912, an attempt to enhance the status of those previously regarded as the subject races of China, by declaring them Chinese subjects. As one of the five races covered by the Decree, Tibetans now had the right to representation in the new Republican Assembly in Peking, but this was a dual edged sword whose implications were not lost on the British Foreign Office, since to all intents and purposes it meant that China could now claim Tibet as part of China proper.  

A second, and perhaps less obvious manifestation of this new approach was the appointment at the beginning of 1913 of Yuan's close associate Lu Hsing-Chi as 'Pacificator of Tibet', the Republican equivalent of Amban under the Manchu. Lu had been secretly engaged in promoting ties with the Tibetans throughout the period of the Chinese evacuation in 1912, but his new role was to front the new humane policy, and to open up dialogue with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government about the future status of Tibet in the new Republic. In order to do this, however, he had to persuade both the Dalai Lama and the Indian government to allow him to enter Tibet and this was proving understandably difficult.  

Yuan had not expected his new policy to sour his friendly relations with the British and he added their increasing hostility to the other problems he experienced during his first year as President, the greatest of which was how best to hold together the disparate Provinces of the old Manchu Empire who were now jealously guarding their new found independence, enhanced by the breakdown of communication with Peking during the course of the revolutionary struggle.  

Yuan was not helped in solving this problem
by his own lack of political experience, his rise to power having been accomplished by an ability to survive court intrigue and ally himself to the right people at the right time. His popularity with Sinophiles like Jordan and Morrison, who agonised over the slow decay of the Manchu Empire, was based on their belief that he would try to restore the old China to former greatness. Their confidence in the ability of the Republican government to do this however was not shared in London and India where the Republic was seen as an unstable and untrustworthy left wing force with whom it was going to be difficult to achieve an understanding. The new approach, manifested in the Five Races Decree, was further regarded by them as an attempt to intervene illegally in Tibetan affairs as well as a deliberate strategy aimed at overturning all previous treaties with Britain concerning Tibet. The Chinese were further incensed by Britain's decision to link the Tibetan issue with their willingness to officially recognise the Republic, and before going on to discuss the way in which they attempted to do this, I want to look briefly at the nature of the Republican claims to Tibet and British reactions to them.*99

Following the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911 Tibetans felt themselves to be independent of all ties with China since the Cho-yon had bound them only to the Manchu. The Dalai Lama's formal declaration of independence in 1913 was simply a recognition of the fact that, with the passing of the Manchu, China had forfeited all rights to intervene in Tibetan affairs. Yuan had come to the Presidency prepared to restore the Dalai Lama's full powers and titles and from his point of view the Five Races Decree was nothing more than an attempt to elevate the Tibetans by making them equal Chinese subjects. In support of this policy he had even recalled his Chinese Commander from East Tibet and had made attempts to dismantle Chinese installations in areas occupied by Chinese troops. His ability to control troop movements from Peking was however highly questionable in view of the fact that the occupied areas were under the direct control of the virtually independent Provincial governments of Szechuan and Yunnan, and his aim was probably merely an attempt to halt the further advance of Chinese forces. His attempts to defuse the situation in East Tibet were received with great scepticism in London and India,
where it was felt that these moves were simply stages in a pre-prepared plan for the total absorption of Tibet into China proper. This confusion about Yuan's motives therefore exacerbated Anglo-Chinese tensions further instead of relieving them. Greater complications also arose when, in return for re-instating the Dalai Lama, he began to claim what he now referred to as 'sovereign' rights in Tibet, marking the beginning of the fierce semantic debate about what constituted sovereignty which would dominate discussions at the Simla Conference, convened in 1913 partly in an attempt to resolve this problem. The Foreign Office had previously accepted that China had 'suzerain' rights to Tibet but India had always strenuously rejected even these limited claims. By 1912 however it became clear to India that unless she was willing to accept some compromise there would be no possibility of negotiating with China over Tibet and therefore no prospect of stabilising the frontier and protecting Indian borders. They agreed reluctantly therefore to accept the idea of talks with China over the issue.100

Although London and India were now broadly united, the main barrier to talks about Tibet was Yuan's obvious inability to control both his own Republican government in Peking, and the Provincial governments in Szechuan and Yunnan, who had traditionally taken charge of Tibetan frontier matters and who were clearly keen to continue with the Chao offensive. To this end the Szechuan Expedition had set out in April 1912, and from this time on a race began between India and China which aimed to organise effective talks on Tibet before the Expedition reached Lhasa, any Republican prevarication now being seen in India as yet further evidence of Yuan's attempt to stall talks until the Szechuan Expedition reached its target.101

The extent of Yuan's involvement in what to the Indian government was seen as a sinister plot to re-invade Lhasa, is unclear. He often stated openly that he did not support forward movements in Tibet, and it was obviously not in his own political interests to grant even more power to the Szechuan government who had organised and promoted the new Expedition to Lhasa. However, he was clearly unable to control events, and his opinion, though important to the British, had little real impact on what was happening by
this stage. The British response to events in East Tibet and Szechuan was thus divided between those in India advocating force, and the more diplomatic approach recommended by Jordan in Peking who, having a much greater appreciation of Yuan's situation than most of his colleagues, felt that there was nothing to be gained by directly challenging his authority. He was therefore totally opposed to Crewe's suggestion that a British force might be stationed somewhere between the British post at Sadiya in Assam and the frontier with East Tibet in order to halt further Chinese advances, because he felt it extremely inadvisable to link Tibetan frontier problems with those of the Burmese borders, where Yunnanese troops were continuing to threaten Indian security, and which had been a constant source of worry to him for many years. In the end Jordan's view prevailed and on 12th August 1912 he delivered a Memo to the newly formed Wai Chaio Pu containing Britain's terms for a settlement of the Tibetan issue. Although Jordan had won the case for settling the issue diplomatically, Hardinge came to resent what he perceived as an intrusion into matters that he regarded as purely Indian, and from this time on he questioned Jordan's ability to act in the best interests of Britain, often accusing him unfairly of identifying himself too closely with Yuan Shih Kai.

9. THE AUGUST MEMORANDUM AND THE PREPARATIONS FOR SIMLA

The document which Jordan presented to the Wai Chaio Pu, and which became known as the August Memorandum, sought to establish an understanding with the new Republican Government over Tibet. Couched in firm and unambiguous language, the document hoped to make it clear to the Chinese that Britain would not tolerate any action that might threaten the independence of Tibet and referred to the launching of the Szechuan Expedition as an act of aggression. It marked a complete departure in the London attitude towards Yuan's government, which had previously made a point of not interfering with Chinese plans for Tibet, and it displayed undisguised disapproval of his policy which had sought to integrate Tibetans into the new Republic by granting them equal citizenship. Jordan called for Tibetan status to be once again restated in accordance with the terms of the Lhasa Convention
of 1904 and the Chinese Adhesion Treaty of 1906, and he further condemned the actions of Chinese officers and officials inside Tibet which had contravened the terms of the treaty. Whilst accepting that the Republican government had a right to station a permanent representative in Lhasa, he argued that the size of the escort should be substantially reduced and stressed the importance of what he described as 'friendly negotiations'. Implicit within the document was a strong suggestion that, if its views were not complied with, Britain would be unwilling to recognise the new Republic. The new Wai Chaio Pu behaved in much the same way as their Manchu predecessors when confronted with ultimatums from the British, and like them, they chose to ignore it. As on previous occasions the Foreign Office were now faced with the problem of how to proceed. The impasse was eventually broken when Jordan received an invitation for talks at the Wai Chiao Pu from Dr. Yen, Vice Foreign Minister, and leader of the powerful youth faction known as the Young China Party, who amongst other things had been responsible for revolutionising the Chinese Foreign Office. The interview which took place between Jordan and Yen on 14th December 1912 revealed how far from contact with the real source of power Jordan had been and how weak Yuan's ability to determine foreign policy actually was. Yen made it clear from the start of the interview that his policy was not only to resist any suggestion that China surrender any gains made in Tibet, but that moreover, he saw the fertile lands in East Tibet as an ideal solution to the problems created by overpopulation in some of the Chinese Provinces. In response to accusations from Jordan that China was behaving aggressively in East Tibet, Yen replied that he regarded the British closure of the Indian border with Tibet as a hostile act, and as a sign that India were no longer prepared to display the same generosity towards China that they had previously shown during the evacuation of Chinese soldiers in 1912. All discussion broke down at this point and was followed by a total rejection of the August Memorandum by the Chinese soon after. In addition to this, and to Jordan's intense irritation, they then completely misrepresented his conversation with Yen by claiming that he had shown sympathy for the idea that Tibet might become one of the five races, an idea which Jordan found abhorrent.
By late 1912 the new British policy towards Tibet had been clearly shaped, and in early 1913 the Indian government had drawn up the draft agreement which they hoped would form the basis of a proposed treaty which they wanted China to sign. Jordan felt that if talks were to take place with China they must be pushed forward as quickly as possible and certainly before the Chinese had a chance to consolidate their advances in East Tibet, and this was unanimously agreed. In spite of criticism that he was losing touch in the face of the almost overwhelming pressure that his post demanded, Jordan's opinion continued to carry weight in London, and the key role he played in setting up the Simla talks is demonstrated by the fact that his idea for tripartite talks, based on the precedent established by negotiations for the 1908 Trade Regulations, was the option eventually taken up.

The idea behind the tripartite talks was that India might be able to act as a 'benevolent assistant' in negotiations between China and Tibet. This it was hoped would have the effect of relieving them of the problems involved in negotiating a separate treaty with Tibet which they would then have to persuade the Chinese to sign, and which had caused so many difficulties on a previous occasion when the Chinese had prevaricated over the signing of the Adhesion Treaty in 1906. Hardinge was quite happy with the idea for tripartite talks, seeing them as a more natural development and as a better opportunity to secure India's borders than any Anglo-Chinese Treaty signed in London or Peking that might widen the scope of discussions.

Before talks could be begin, however, the Chinese signalled that they preferred to conduct bipartite talks with Britain in London, employing the services of Wen Tsung-Yao, the Assistant Amban in Lhasa, who was already well known for his sympathetic attitude towards Tibetans. When this offer was rejected, they refused to even consider the idea of tripartite talks, stating that they found the idea of a Tibetan delegate entirely unacceptable. Yuan's subsequent offer to provide the notorious Chang Yin Tang as an alternative delegate was also firmly declined and, after consultation with Jordan, agreement was reached to appoint Ivan Chen, a Chinese diplomat with British experience who was eventually accepted as Chinese delegate to the talks.
Chen's appointment, which at first had seemed so appropriate, now threatened to jeopardize the start of the talks following reports received by the Foreign Office that he had been named as one of two Republican 'Pacificators' in Tibet. Since this title had only been previously applied under the Manchu to postings in Chinese Dependencies, this announcement had obvious implications for Yuan's sincerity and for Jordan's competence, and Crewe was further alarmed by rumours that the Pacificators were already in East Tibet engaged in negotiations for a quite separate Treaty with the East Tibetans. Although these rumours could not be confirmed, they raised doubts about the viability of a tripartite conference in such circumstances, especially as Yuan had previously agreed to halt all Chinese activity in East Tibet, both before and during the conference and, even though Jordan explained that Yuan had no effective control over Chinese activities in East Tibet, the situation on the eve of his leave looked ominous. When Beilby Alston became Charge d'Affaires in June 1913 he was already aware of the very delicate state of Anglo-Chinese relations but understood less about Yuan's plight than Jordan. He was therefore willing to take a much firmer line with the President, warning him that, unless Chinese troops ceased activity in East Tibet, there could be no further dialogue. Although this prompted Yuan to issue orders, once again, for a ceasefire, this was only a token gesture and British efforts to open talks were further thwarted by Chen's belated arrival in Peking with fresh proposals for talks that delayed the opening of negotiations for a further two weeks and helped counter allegations made by Jordan's critics that it was his 'soft approach' towards the President which had allowed the Chinese to prevaricate.

The problems surrounding the organisation of the Simla Conference reveal the true complexity of Britain's relations with the New Republican government. Firstly, there was confusion about the role that Yuan played in determining and directing policy outside Peking which led to unfair criticism of Jordan's handling of the situation. The extent to which the Chinese prevaricated over talks had varied considerably. Yuan could do very little to control what was happening in East Tibet, neither could he...
reveal the true extent of his weakness, and his attitude therefore appeared to outsiders to be inconsistent and insincere. He was also worried that attempts to create the new Province of Sikang, which he had previously supported, could only undermine his own position as President since the new Province would now inevitably become a power base for forces in Szechuan from which to extend their already powerful influence in western China at his expense. Finally, the Tibetans themselves were not united in their aims. Certain parts of East Tibet had always been hostile to rule from Lhasa, preferring to tolerate informal control from the Chinese which, in the past, had allowed them a greater independence.*110

It soon became a matter of urgency for all sides to find some sort of solution however, and the Indian government were particularly concerned that some definition of their borders be agreed, if only to put an end to the costly business of defending them. In Chapter 8 I will discuss the extent to which attempts to solve the problem diplomatically both succeeded and failed in their aim, but before doing this I will take time to document the changes that took place within the British Foreign Service between 1914 and 1922, and in particular, the effect that the outbreak of war had upon the Service in Asia.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FOREIGN SERVICE 1914-1922

This Chapter seeks to explain the broad changes in the British Foreign Service between 1914 and 1922. The aim is simply to provide a brief background against which changes in British Tibetan policy may be understood and is not an attempt to give a full description of events.

I. LONDON: THE FOREIGN SERVICE

The declaration of war in August 1914 had a profound psychological effect on the Foreign Office. Grey and many of his colleagues had entered the war with an inbuilt sense of shame at their failure to prevent it which only increased as the full horrors of trench warfare became known and senior staff lost sons in the fighting. The Office had enjoyed unprecedented prestige in the immediate pre-war period which was significantly undermined by their failure to avert the catastrophe, and it was easy for many to cite 'old diplomacy' as a major cause of the war.¹

As well as the psychological battering inflicted on individuals, the war itself acted as a catalyst for change within the Service. By 1913 it was generally acknowledged that the 1906 reforms had not kept pace with the demands generated by the increasing workload, and in that year the MacDonnell Commission began a detailed investigation into office procedures. In their lengthy Report, published soon after the war, the Commissioners made a number of recommendations that were intended to reduce the cost and exclusivity of the Service and bring it into line with 'new diplomatic' practice. This included proposals to amalgamate the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, as well as plans to upgrade the Consular Department in order to reflect the increasing importance given to trade and commerce in international affairs.²

Besides the discussions about the future organisation of the Office, debates about the nature of diplomacy began to question the traditional approach of diplomats like Hardinge, who returning from India in 1916 to resume his old Post as Permanent Undersecretary, found the Office much changed. No longer regarded as a pushy young reformer, and
disillusioned as the result of his experiences in India, Hardinge found himself ill-equipped to handle the changes needed to update the Office and like Nicolson, failed to appreciate the extent to which economic considerations were increasingly determining international policy. Balfour, who replaced Grey as Foreign Secretary in 1916, was more willing to accept the new situation than his successor Curzon. Grey had been very disparaging about the 'new diplomacy' and his views were supported by Curzon who, as Foreign Secretary after 1919, was strong enough to carry this opposition against all odds, ensuring that 'old diplomacy' survived well into the 1920's, and allowing the exclusivity of the diplomatic service to be preserved.

2. THE INDIA SERVICE
As Viceroy of India in 1914 Hardinge was presented with the immediate problem of deciding what contribution India should make towards supporting Britain in the conflict. At first he had totally rejected the idea of sending any troops to Europe, and had resisted any suggestion that India had an obligation to what he saw as a European struggle. By 1913 however, his attitude began to change as he realised that, as an alternative to sending troops to Europe, India might be expected to help meet British Naval expenses, a far more costly option. By the end of August 1914 therefore he had sent sixty thousand troops to fight in Europe, the largest force to leave India since those sent to relieve the Peking Legations during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. In spring 1915 this number had increased even further, making the size of India's contribution to the war effort very impressive indeed. This level of support was provided at great cost to frontier security but Hardinge reasoned that if Britain were to lose the war, India would inevitably be lost, and the rest of the British Empire put at risk. Like many of his contemporaries he believed that the war could only last a few months and that therefore the sacrifice would be affordable.

The outbreak of war had also produced unexpected support for Britain from Indian Princes in the Independent States, as well as from the governments of Nepal and Tibet, who each offered troops for Europe. When the leaders
of the Independence Movement inside India also declared their intention to halt their campaign for the duration of the war. Hardinge felt that the sacrifice of troops previously engaged in frontier defence would not present as many problems for the maintenance of frontier security as he had previously feared. In the event however this proved falsely optimistic and the Indian army soon became embroiled in serious fighting on the borders of Afghanistan at a time when their forces were seriously depleted.

On 27th May 1915 Crewe retired from the India Office and the post of Secretary of State for India was taken by Austen Chamberlain. When the war started Chamberlain had been out of office for nearly nine years, having earlier failed in a bid to lead the Conservative Party in 1911. After years in the political wilderness Chamberlain was grateful for this opportunity to resume his political career, and as a passionate believer in the British Empire, he took a keen interest in the work of his new department, managing very quickly to establish a good rapport with Hardinge who had reluctantly agreed to extend his term in India until the appointment of Viscount Chelmsford as Viceroy in April 1916. Chelmsford had previously been Governor General of Queensland and New South Wales and, although he was not Chamberlain's favoured choice as successor to Hardinge, the new Secretary of State was pleased to discover that the new Viceroy was less 'blinder' and more flexible in approach than his predecessor.

With control of all military operations now transferred to the War Office, Chamberlain had time to turn his attention to the domestic problems, as the Independence Movement resumed its activities and gained in strength, and as India became increasingly difficult to govern. By the time of his resignation over the ill-fated Mesopotamia Campaign in 1917 he was giving serious thought to the mechanics of limited devolution, a move supported and continued by Lord Montagu, who replaced him as Secretary of State in August of that year, and which would culminate in the formulation of the Chelmsford/Montagu Reforms and the Government of India Act of 1919.
Treaty of Versailles. This had been partly granted in recognition of her great contribution to the war effort, but was also a manifestation of the new internationalism which attempted as far as possible to give each country a separate status. In British terms this was really the beginning of an open acknowledgement that she could no longer afford India, either morally or financially, and made progress towards the granting of full independence inevitable.*11 The dramatic events in Europe and India between 1914 and 1922 had little direct effect on the routine policy of the North-East frontier, and with the outbreak of war in 1914, British and Indian governments turned their attention to more pressing matters, abandoning attempts to settle the Tibetan problem for the duration of the war. For the men still serving on the frontier this withdrawal of support presented special problems and made their uphill struggle to maintain British interests and prestige even more difficult and dangerous, especially as the revolutionary disturbances inside China continued to threaten the security of Indian borders, presenting the same problems of control as before. These disturbances were most keenly felt in East Tibet and in those areas monitored by the men of the China Service and it is the character and conduct of this Service that I now want to discuss.

3. THE CHINA SERVICE

(1) THE FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT IN LONDON

As Head of the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office from Campbell's death in 1911, Walter Langley had pursued a policy very similar to that of his predecessor, based on the promotion of co-operation with other powers in capitalist ventures inside China. During 1911, both he and Campbell had liaised with Japanese allies on railway projects in the Yangtze Basin, realising that it would no longer be possible to get recognition for such a vast area as a purely British sphere of influence. As Japanese power grew inside China they began to challenge British interests overtly and this policy became difficult to sustain. By 1914 Langley therefore found himself increasingly isolated within the Far Eastern Department as opposition to Japanese activity hardened.*12

Sir Beilby Alston had been Charge d'Affaires during the summer of 1913
and his experiences at this time had made him vehemently anti-Japanese. His strong conviction that they coveted British interests in the Yangtze Basin was reflected in his colourful reports of Japanese aggression during this period but their impact was reduced because they were countered by more sober accounts from Britain's Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Congyham Greene.*13 Alston's credibility was only preserved by the support he subsequently received from Jordan in London, and from the experienced Senior Clerk J.D. Gregory, who by 1913 was exercising some influence on the formulation of policy in London.*14 By 1914 therefore the poor state of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was becoming a source of great concern to the Far Eastern Department, but the demands of war, and the need to preserve it for strategic reasons, prevented the development of any direct confrontation. Jordan found this situation increasingly tiresome and he resented Japanese attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of China, especially as they appeared to be acting as a barrier to fruitful dialogue with the Chinese over Tibet, for whenever the subject was mentioned in Peking, the actions of Britain's Japanese allies became part of the discussion.*14

The war years were difficult times for the Far Eastern Department. Like the rest of the Foreign Office they suffered depletions of staff as well as the frustrations of trying to conduct routine business in war time. From the declaration of war until his retirement in December 1916, Grey's failing eyesight forced him to take long absences from London, leaving the Far Eastern Department to their own devices during a period when events inside China were moving swiftly and required prompt diplomatic attention.*15 The appointment of Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary in 1916 did not help the situation and 'old China hands' like Morrison were dismayed by what they saw as his failure to appreciate the importance of Far Eastern questions at such a critical period for Anglo-Chinese relations.*16 Hardinge's appointment as Permanent Undersecretary in May 1916 was warmly applauded by the China Service and by Jordan in particular, as it was well known that, unlike Nicolson, who had displayed a marked lack of interest in Far Eastern matters, Hardinge at least understood the problems of the frontier, having experienced them at first hand during his time as Viceroy in India. His
ability to influence events was much reduced by this time however, because he was forced to devote most of his attention to the European front.¹⁷ After initial misgivings, Curzon's appointment as Foreign Secretary in 1919 was eventually welcomed and his great interest and experience of Indian affairs were to lead to a much firmer approach towards Japanese forward policy in China in the post war period.¹⁸

(ii) THE PEKING LEGATION

Between 1914 and 1918 Jordan and his overworked staff at the Peking Legation struggled to cope with the dual crisis created by Yuan's attempt to get himself crowned Emperor, and increasing Japanese interference in Chinese affairs. The workload at the Legation was enormous in the first months of the war, and even Jordan found it very difficult to cope. He complained bitterly to London that he was forced to carry the full burden of diplomatic meetings and decide on courses of action, without the benefit of advice from London, and as war progressed, and communications with the outside world became even more erratic, his papers reflect his growing sense of isolation.¹⁹ His health had been impaired even before the war as a result of the stress and additional workload created by the volatile situation inside China during the post revolutionary period, which called for his constant tact and vigilance, and on occasions his life was clearly in danger.²⁰ Contemporaries like Morrison had also noticed how difficult it was for him to refrain from coming to Yuan's aid as Japanese hostility towards the Republican government intensified, and London increasingly sought to distance itself from the confrontation.²¹ In these circumstances the sudden and unexpected death of Yuan Shih Kai in June 1916 came as a severe blow, and the close relationship Jordan subsequently developed with Paul Reinsch, the American Ambassador to Peking, helped to restore his own confidence and ability to cope, as well as giving a boost to Anglo-American co-operation in China in this tense and difficult time.²² In 1918 the death of his much beloved only daughter after a short illness, and the continuing anxiety for the safety of his son and son in law, both serving on the Western Front, added even greater strain, and it is a tribute to his sense of duty and the strength of his personality that he managed
to carry the Legation through the crisis following Yuan's death without incident.*23

Rumours of Jordan's impending retirement had begun to circulate in the early summer of 1916 and Alston was seen as the man most likely to succeed him as British Minister. Alston's candidacy was regarded with scornful amusement by many with experience of Chinese affairs, and Morrison branded him a 'buffoon' who was to acquire the post by the 'side door', and by virtue of his close association with Langley.*24 As Jordan appeared to him to become less and less effective however, Morrison later modified this earlier view of Alston slightly, but he continued, with others, to feel that the 'stammering' though amiable contender was never a worthy man for such an important job and that what was really needed was someone like Younghusband, who seemed to him to have both the stature and ability to lead the Legation with integrity through this volatile period.*25

Jordan's credibility began to be seriously challenged as the result of his outspoken hostility towards the Japanese during the Demands crisis of January 1915 which had led to Japanese requests for his removal.*26 These requests had created considerable embarrassment for the Foreign Office at a time when Japanese co-operation was considered essential to the war effort, and while Grey continued to support Jordan until he retired in 1916, his position once Balfour took office was no longer inviolate. Following Grey's departure, and in the face of Balfour's apparent lack of interest in the Far East, Langley was able to exercise a greater influence over policy than before, and for the first time, Alston's appointment on Langley's recommendation looked probable. It was confirmed for many by Jordan's emotional overreaction to Yuan's death in 1916, and by his continuing open hostility towards the Japanese, which became so overt that some felt he could no longer be trusted to obey London without question.*27 In late 1916 he left Peking for what his critics believed to be a well deserved retirement however, less than a year later, he had persuaded London to allow him to return. The reason why he was able to do this had much to do with the arguments which, in the past, had prevented the Peking Legation from being upgraded to an Embassy. British interests in China had remained purely commercial, and her ability to influence events there were now
entering a slow decline; it was therefore easier to leave things as they were, rather than risk any change that might upset the delicate balance of Anglo-Chinese relations at such a critical time. Jordan's experience and his close association with the American Legation, an increasingly powerful counter to Japanese aggression in China, also helped to restore Foreign Office confidence in his ability to handle affairs in Peking, and so, despite Japanese protests, Jordan remained in post, looking and feeling his age until March 1920 when Alston, who had waited in the wings for so long, was finally able to take over.28

After his return to Britain Jordan continued to serve the Foreign Office as advisor to Curzon's sub-committee formed to make recommendations on Asian policy in the lead up to the Washington Conference of 1922. This gave him an opportunity to give full vent to his anti-Japanese views, which by this time were shared by most members of the Foreign Service who had had any dealings with China.29

Morrison portrays Jordan in his diaries and letters as a timid yet 'devoted servant of the Foreign Office' in his later years, but this judgement is a little harsh. Jordan had worked through one of the most difficult and dramatic periods of upheaval in Chinese history when, on at least one occasion, his life had been threatened, and when his health had been at risk from the constant stress and the burden of overwork. He had remained an astute diplomat, much respected and admired by Chinese diplomats as well as by the British community, and many mourned his departure from Peking in 1920. Even in his later years, when his health was seriously beginning to fail and his Irish temper growing shorter, he was still well ahead of many contemporaries in his understanding of the Chinese situation and of the nature of Britain's future role there.

After 1918 and against this background of violent and dramatic change, further attempts were made to settle the Tibetan problem. In the final Chapters, covering the period 1914 to 1922, I will discuss the nature of these attempts and the extent to which they succeeded.
Ivan Chen’s arrival in Simla in early October 1913 was greeted by the Indian government with a mixture of resentment and relief, since it was now possible for the talks to go ahead following weeks of procrastination by the Chinese.¹

When Conference opened a week later on October 13th, Chen’s advisors included T. H. Shah, his Chinese Secretary, T. C. Wang his Tibetan interpreter, and his English Secretary, B. D. Bruce, of the Chinese Customs Service, whose controversial appointment created problems for the Indian government, who were unwilling to accept European employees of the Chinese Customs Service as part of the Chinese delegation and who therefore launched strong protests leading to his removal before the talks got started.² Chen was already well known to the British Foreign Service, having worked in London for a number of years, and it was therefore hoped that his familiarity with western diplomatic practice would enable talks to proceed without the misunderstandings which had dogged all previous negotiations with China about Tibet.³ Chen’s experiences at Simla were not to be happy ones however, and he complained in letters to Morrison that he felt that he was working alone in very difficult circumstances.⁴ This was firstly because, although the Conference was conducted in English, the dialogue with Peking had to be relayed in Chinese, often leading to differences of opinion over the translation of many legal and technical terms with which the Chinese were unfamiliar. Secondly, although Chen himself spoke excellent English, Bruce’s removal meant that he now had to wade single-handedly through the vast amount of paperwork covering the conference. Thirdly, he had clearly been poorly briefed and was not provided with the kind of detailed evidence he needed to promote Chinese claims to Tibet; and finally, the additional presence of Lu Hsing Chi in Simla to try to effect a separate deal with the Dalai Lama, did not
help him present his case, especially as details of Lu’s mission had not been revealed to him by the government in Peking.*5

Facing him across the conference table was the British Plenipotentiary Sir Henry McMahon, a man of formidable experience, who had already made an exhaustive study of the Tibetan situation and had a long and distinguished career in India behind him.*6 The Tibetan delegate Lonchen Shatra might initially have appeared less of a threat, but it was soon obvious to Chen that such appearances were deceptive. At the first meeting of the Conference it appeared forcibly to him that the Tibetan Delegate was ‘entirely in the hands of the English’ and that in any case, all chances of enjoying his co-operation had been destroyed by the behaviour of the last Chinese Amban, Lien Yu, against whom Lonchen appeared to be harbouring a personal grudge which Chen later discovered was because the Amban had moved into his house during his period of exile with the Dalai Lama in India, and had finally left Tibet in 1912 taking with him all of Lonchen’s household furniture and valuables. Chen was also aware that Lonchen Shatra already had a valued reputation with the British and was well known to them as a senior aristocratic officer of the highest rank with considerable diplomatic experience, having been chosen to act as close adviser to the Dalai Lama while he was in India. He was also reputed to have a great knowledge of the geography of the North-East frontier and of Sino-Tibetan history, and before coming to the Conference, and with Bell’s help, had amassed a vast collection of documents relating to the various claims to territory which the Chinese had periodically occupied but which had reverted to Tibet, as well as a detailed history of Sino-Tibetan relations across the centuries.*7 The information which Lonchen was thus able to present to the Conference was impressive in both bulk and depth of detail and Chen therefore felt very ill equipped, having at his disposal only the details of Chao Erh-feng’s most recent Tibetan campaigns with which to contest them.*8 Besides McMahon, the British delegation to the Conference included Charles Bell, specially commissioned as his Tibetan advisor, and Sir Archibald Rose of the Chinese Consular Service, who was to advise on Chinese matters.*9 Unlike Chen, the British team were
well briefed and had a very clear idea of what they wanted from the talks and the way in which they proposed to get it. This was partly because the idea for the Conference had come from Britain, and partly because Tibetan and Chinese claims were both unrealistic and totally incompatible. These factors allowed McMahon to establish himself in the role of mediator early on and when elected President of the Conference at its first meeting, he proceeded to throw himself enthusiastically into the task of finding an easy, rational solution to an apparently unsolvable problem. The Simla Conference had six further meetings over the following six months, conceding failure to reach agreement in April 1914. The detailed Tibetan claims, prepared well in advance of the Conference, had been presented before the first meeting apparently on the mistaken assumption that they would be supported by Britain. Lonchen Shatra had been ordered by his government to be firm in upholding all the points and in particular to ask that China acknowledge the Dalai Lama’s right to jurisdiction over all Tibetan peoples and that all lands taken from Tibet during the Chao campaigns should be returned. It soon became obvious to him however that the McMahon did not intend to support these proposals, which would give Tibet everything she wanted at China’s expense, and was in fact following a very specific and quite separate agenda of his own. The counterclaims which Chen presented to the Conference were similarly inflexible and showed that the Chinese were not only keen to establish an active presence inside Tibet, but were adamant in wanting the return of a permanent representative in Lhasa. It was of immense psychological importance to the powerful Young China Party within Yuan’s government that Chao Erh Feng’s gains should not be lost to China, and as well as pressing for an Amban in Lhasa, they were keen to retain Batang, Litang, and Chamdo, taken by Chao in 1910. Although the Chinese were quite happy not to press sovereign claims to Tibet, their insistence on maintaining a loosely controlled network of Chinese officials inside the country, together with the right to control the main routes to Lhasa, threw out ominous signals that they might later use these advantages to re-invade Lhasa as they had previously done in 1910, and this inevitably
coloured McMahon's attitude towards Chinese proposals for the duration of the Conference.*13 News reaching Simla soon after the talks had opened that hostilities had been resumed in East Tibet, together with reliable confirmation that a 'deal' had been struck between the Kalon Lama (as leader of the Tibetan forces in East Tibet), and the Chinese Commander in Chief, further served to reinforce these beliefs, making it very difficult for either the Tibetans or the British to accept the sincerity of Chen's proposals. This attitude became a real obstacle to effective discussion and led to their eventual breakdown in April.*14 McMahon's idea for Tibet to be divided into 'Inner' and 'Outer' zones was based very obviously on a solution that had previously proved successful in Mongolia. The Outer zone was to involve the placing of a wide area west of the historic Yangtse frontier under Tibetan jurisdiction, allowing no Chinese interference of any kind. The Inner zone was to extend northwards to the Altyn range and eastwards to the borders of Kansu and Szechuan, where the population was predominantly Tibetan. In this zone China was permitted to station officials and call in troops in times of crisis but was to have no power to colonise the region or in any way try to turn it into a Chinese Province.*15 What to McMahon and his colleagues seemed a sensible and neat solution, however, provoked fury from the Tibetans and the Chinese, for it offended both sides by offering neither what they really wanted. In Peking Jordan was also scathing in his opposition to the proposals, describing them as a highly unsuitable solution in view of Yuan's weak political position, and offering terms that would make it impossible for Yuan to accept.*16 From the Tibetan point of view there could be no acceptance of a solution which effectively rendered large parts of East Tibet helpless in the face of future Chinese aggression, and which even threatened Lhasa, since Chinese promises not to reinvade the city could never be trusted. Despite protests from Jordan, McMahon's draft Treaty was put to the delegates at the seventh meeting of the Conference on 27th April 1914. By this time the Tibetans had been persuaded to sign, Lonchen Shatra having been made aware that there would be no British concessions
and no additional support after the Conference for his country if he refused. Chen had also agreed to initial the document after a period of reflection, but only 'on the clear understanding that to initial and to sign were regarded as two separate actions'. The crisis generated by Chen's decision to initial and not to sign the Treaty was made even worse when he received a strongly worded rebuttal for his actions from Peking on the following day. He was clearly mystified by the force of these instructions and, in an attempt to save face, he tried unsuccessfully to argue that there had been some 'misapprehension' of his actions due to the 'impossibility of correctly expressing in Chinese what the act of initialling means'. Suggestions made after the event that Chen, who was obviously keen to make a success of the Conference, was in fact being intimidated by McMahon seem improbable. It is far more likely that, in making this distinction between initialling and signing, he was simply humouring the British Plenipotentiary in an attempt to prolong the discussions and play for time. Once the rebuttal had been issued however Chen knew that he had been abandoned and that there had been no serious intention in Peking to sign any Treaty. From now on he lost all credibility as a representative of the Chinese government and although Morrison continued to defend him from Peking, Jordan still believed that he had been 'coerced' into initialling, either by McMahon or by his own government, and fearful lest this act might endanger British lives and threaten her commercial interests inside China, he also condemned him. McMahon was taken aback by the speed and hostility of the Chinese response and when Chen asked him what reply he should give to Peking he expressed himself 'unable to formulate an answer to so unusual a message'. McMahon's response reflects the very wide gap in communication between the Indian Government, so secure in the belief that it had proceeded calmly, sensibly, and reasonably, in attempting to organise the complex situation in terms which might be acceptable to both sides, and the Chinese government who, divided amongst themselves, seemed to view the Tibetan situation as an exercise in boosting prestige and winning popular support at home.
Meanwhile, in this increasingly desperate situation, the Tibetans did what they could to placate both sides by negotiating with Lu in Simla, and with Chinese representatives in East Tibet throughout the entire course of the Conference, while at the same time continuing with efforts to persuade the Indian government that they were worthy of support.*22 The Simla Conference is commonly regarded as a failure because it did not result in the conclusion of a Tripartite Treaty; however this view is based very much on a British view of events and the Convention can only really be assessed in terms of what the three participants wished to get out of it. For China, Simla had never been a serious initiative, but merely one of several holding operations aimed at keeping Yuan's government afloat in difficult circumstances. Although Yuan himself subsequently expressed a keen interest in securing an understanding on the Tibetan situation, his ability to effect any kind of compromise compatible with the aspirations of the powerful Young China Party was never a real possibility. The luckless Chen was therefore left to the mercy of the negotiators, and without adequate staff or information he was to linger on in Simla trying to establish some kind of understanding with the British months after the Conference ended. When he did eventually return to Peking during the summer of 1914 he faded into political obscurity, meeting much the same fate as the Tibetan delegate Lonchen Shatra who was also accused of failing his government.*23 Of the three main delegates only McMahon was able to continue with a successful political career. His 'solution' was regarded as a triumph by his government who had seen the Conference as a means of securing the goals of the Younghusband Expedition aims that were largely satisfied under the terms of the Bipartite Declaration signed with Tibet in July 1914.*24 The Conference did result in some indirect gains for the Chinese who had been able to use the breathing space afforded by the Conference to effect a truce in East Tibet. However, this was an initiative mainly orchestrated by the Young China Party over which Yuan had no control. For Yuan, heavily in debt throughout the course of the negotiations, and fearful for his own political future, the Simla initiative was a nightmare.
In despatches to London and India Jordan made no secret of his belief that the Chinese could not come to any compromise solution and that Yuan had little control over events in East Tibet. In private discussions with Jordan, Yuan had consistently invoked China's ancient connections with the conquered territories of Litang and Batang in East Tibet and had persuaded Jordan that the Chinese had a good claim to these areas. In the light of this 'evidence' therefore, both Jordan in Peking, and Langley in London, became highly critical of what they considered to be McMahon's failure to see any merit in the Chinese case. Jordan summed up the feelings of the China Service by describing the sense of unreality which they felt had surrounded the proceedings and their belief that, not only had the Chinese and Tibetan governments 'known each others cards throughout', but that Chen had also not been 'too loyal to his own government'. He described the methods of the Indian government as 'obsolete' and was clearly irritated by the tortuous procedures which he and his colleagues had been forced to monitor with increasing frustration in Peking. Long after the Conference was over he continued to rail against their poor handling of the negotiations and was particularly vitriolic about what he believed to be their ineptitude in failing to negotiate a deal with Yuan while the latter was still well disposed towards Britain. This had confirmed his view, formed during the days of the Pienma crisis, that the Indian government were not equipped to deal with the problem of Tibet, a view that would soon have implications for his own forward policy in East Tibet after 1916.

For Langley in London there was the immediate and rather daunting problem of when to officially inform the Russians that the Simla talks had failed, since Anglo-Russian relations had suffered a setback during the summer of 1914, following a crisis in Persia, and once again diplomats on both sides were faced with a fresh round of negotiations and compromise. The failure to secure Chinese assent had also created further discord in Anglo-Chinese relations which placed additional strain on Jordan and the China Service.
2. THE BIPARTITE TREATY WITH TIBET - JULY 1914

Hardinge had watched the slow collapse of the talks with a heavy heart and had felt very pessimistic about the possibility of persuading the Chinese to sign a Tripartate Agreement. He believed that they had already been offered a good deal in securing agreement for a permanent representative and escort in Lhasa which had been one of their main objectives, but he strongly suspected that Jordan had not done enough to persuade them to sign and felt that, once again, India was being made a 'cats paw' for the sake of British commercial success in China.\(^3\)

He welcomed the authorisation to close the Sino-Tibetan negotiations in East Tibet, issued by Yuan on 2nd July 1914, as the best means of pulling China into line, but again blamed Jordan for the excessive delay in getting him to do this, and further accused him of giving Yuan the impression that Britain might be prepared to modify her demands.\(^3\)

In order to remedy the situation, and in the lull before delegates left Simla in the summer of 1914, he therefore seized the opportunity to sign a Bipartite Agreement with Tibet which enabled India to secure a large portion of the unprotected frontier running from Bhutan to Assam and offered an opportunity to revise the 1908 Trade Regulations. The frontier between Assam and Burma, stabilised by the new British policy of loose political control, was by now paying dividends for India providing, in Hardinge's words, areas of 'great richness and wealth', and although he had not yet completely given up hope of securing a Tripartite Agreement, the Viceroy felt that a Bipartite Treaty with Tibet might not only prove useful to India, but might even induce China to sign a Tripartite Agreement at a later date. He was also keenly aware of the need to organise a separate arrangement with Tibet in order to tie up what he described as a number of 'loose ends' that had been 'plaguing the frontier harmony' since the official British withdrawal in 1910.\(^3\)

The Tibetan government were still very unhappy about the terms contained in the Simla draft agreement which they had been virtually blackmailed into signing, but they were also divided amongst themselves because, under McMahon's proposals, they were set to lose the important fertile areas of Nyarong and Derge in East Tibet as well as

\(^3\) The terms of the Tibetan-Sino agreement in Simla, which Britain had failed to ratify, had already been included in a tripartite agreement signed by the Chinese and the Tibetans in 1913.

\(^3\) The authorisation to close the Sino-Tibetan negotiations in East Tibet was given by Yuan, the Chinese premier, on 2nd July 1914.

\(^3\) The Bipartite Agreement with Tibet was signed on 2nd July 1914 and was negotiated by Hardinge and the Tibetan representative, Trinchen Dorje Dorje, in Lhasa.

\(^3\) The Tibetan government were not happy about the terms of the Tripartite Agreement with China and Tibet, which had been signed in Simla in 1913 and was not yet ratified by China.

\(^3\) The Viceroy of India, Hardinge, was keen to secure a Bipartite Agreement with Tibet which would enable India to secure a large portion of the unprotected frontier running from Bhutan to Assam and offered an opportunity to revise the 1908 Trade Regulations.
the whole area of Tawang. At the root of the problem was the fundamental misunderstanding between the Republican Government and the government of India about the nature of Tibetan rule and of the spiritual and temporal divide that allowed the Dalai Lama to exercise varying degrees of control and influence from region to region across Tibet. The Tibetans were particularly unhappy about the loss of Tawang for example, where the Dalai Lama’s powerful influence had allowed them to enjoy safe passage and trading rights without interference from the often hostile tribes who lived there.*37 Once the Simla talks had collapsed however, and the Chinese had refused to sign, the Tibetans were left with a dilemma and were forced to decide whether to risk further reprisals from the Chinese by signing a separate agreement with Britain. They eventually decided to sign on 3rd July in order to protect what rights they had, and to ensure continuing British friendship and protection. Once signed, copies of the initialled but unratiﬁed Simla Treaty were attached to the document and both parties then agreed upon, and signed, a new Tibetan Trade Agreement to replace the Trade Regulation Agreements of 1893 and 1908.*38 By completely removing the Chinese presence at the trade marts, believed to have been the main cause of friction in the past, the new trade agreements effectively gave India what she needed in order to develop her trade and commercial interests inside Tibet. In addition, the Dalai Lama was now even more anxious to secure British aid for his country and had given Bell to understand that he also wanted to develop the potentially lucrative gold, silver, and other metal mining industries which Indian entrepreneurs had coveted for so long. Within the Bipartate Treaty itself there was a further clause relating to the troublesome Bhutan/Assam borderlands between India and Tibet which allowed India to move her frontier from the foothills to the crests of the Himalayas, enabling her to extend her borders from Kashmir to Assam and in doing so achieve one of the major objectives voiced by McMahon at the start of the Conference. Under this new arrangement India now acquired Tawang, an area of approximately 200 square miles, much of it fertile, which now became a buffer zone running along the whole northern frontier from
Assam to Tibet. The agreement also favoured India by binding Tibet to the terms of the Simla Draft without allowing the Chinese any of the benefits to which they would have been entitled had they signed. Tibet for example had agreed to uphold Article 4 of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 under which she had agreed not to levy tariffs or taxes without permission but, since Article 3 of the 1906 Adhesion Treaty was now invalid as a result of China's failure to sign the Simla draft, she no longer had equal rights to station trade representatives at the marts, with the result that India now had full rights to obtain all trading concessions inside Tibet without any interference. In return for these concessions the Tibetans were given a formal assurance by McMahon that they 'might depend upon the diplomatic support of His Majesty's Government' and on 'reasonable military assistance' in the event of continuing Chinese aggression.*39 Although, as Walt Van Praag has observed, in diplomatic terms Tibet had secured for herself what he described as an 'international personality' by signing the Bipartite Treaty, the Tibetan government was somewhat dismayed by the subsequent events which now appeared to leave East Tibet entirely unprotected. Valueless to India, it had not been mentioned in the Treaty, and so this part of Tibet remained unsettled.*40 Tibetan fears were shortly to be confirmed, for as soon as the delegates had left Simla during the summer of 1914, the Chinese resumed their efforts to secure a separate Sino-Tibetan Treaty in East Tibet.*41 With the situation neatly organised in India's favour, what diplomatic attention could be spared following the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1914 now switched to East Tibet, and it is to events in this area that I now want to turn.
3. JORDAN'S INITIATIVE IN EAST TIBET

(1) THE PEKING MEMORANDUM SEPTEMBER 1916

During the run up to the Simla Conference the Indian government had put considerable pressure on Jordan to establish a 'watching post' at Tachienlu on the borders of East Tibet in order to monitor the situation there and provide detailed information about Chinese activities. They were especially interested in news of any successful attempt by the Chinese to sign a separate Treaty with the Tibetans. Jordan had never been happy about locating Consular Posts in remote areas because they placed excessive demands on the mental and physical health of the staff expected to run them as well as saddling the Legation with an extra administrative burden, and the Post at Tachienlu was in a particularly sensitive position, being just within Chinese territory on the disputed Sino-Tibetan border. Situated 10,000 feet above sea level in mountainous terrain and twelve days journey by road from Chengtu, its very remoteness afforded greater protection than might have otherwise been anticipated, but this was offset by the explosive political situation in East Tibet, and by the difficulties of establishing contact with Peking in the event of a sudden crisis. The city itself was an important administrative post for the Chinese who had recently installed a new Frontier Commissioner there, and was also a thriving commercial centre for the Chinese tea trade, although the majority of its population were Tibetan.

The Indian government was to be especially grateful for the detailed reports produced by the Consuls at Tachienlu, who between 1913 and 1923 risked their lives and their sanity to produce them. Louis King for example, the first occupant of the post, was commended for the excellence of his reports as well as for the 'conspicuous tact, ability, and presence of mind' which he had displayed, and his replacement Eric Coales, who took over in 1916, was able to use the superior strategic position that Tachienlu afforded him in order to produce comprehensive reports countering Bell's rather hysterical accounts of Chinese aggression in the area which were often based on second or third hand sources. All the reports issued by the Consular staff from Tachienlu
are masterpeices of detail about the geography and complex politics of this otherwise inacessable region. Eventually Tachienlu proved its worth, even to Jordan, providing him with a far more comprehensive picture of what was actually happening at a time when wild rumours were circulating inside China in the period following Yuan's death in June 1916, and when the country was entering a period of warlordism and civil war in which all central control appeared to have broken down.*45 As the war in Europe diverted official attention away from events on the North-East frontier, Jordan found that he now had greater freedom to implement his own solutions to the problem of East Tibet and he began to organise a forward policy of his own. The discovery that talks had taken place between the Chinese and the Kalon Lama at Chamdo in November 1913 and the reawakening of interest in Tibetan affairs by Japan and Russia, both of whom were helping to train Tibetan troops for the Dalai Lama's new modern army, made the Indian government and the Foreign Office very anxious to discover the true state of Sino-Tibetan relations. They were particularly concerned that if the situation deteriorated further into full scale war between the countries, Tibet would be keen to involve Britain as protector, in accordance with the terms of the Bipartite Agreement.*46 Moreover, the unofficial war, conducted in East Tibet throughout the period of the Simla talks, had continued despite an agreed truce, each side complaining bitterly that the other violated its terms.*47

Following his return to Tibet in 1913, the Dalai Lama and his closest advisors Chamba Tendar, and Tsarong Shape, had modernised and increased the size of the Tibetan army, locating four out of five of their newly created battalions on the East Tibetan frontier, where their modern arms and tactics were already proving successful against the Chinese.*48 These military successes, involving the recapture of territory recently taken by the Chinese, had proved very expensive however, and the Tibetans were naturally anxious to settle matters to their advantage while they were still winning. In the spring of 1915 they therefore resumed talks with the Chinese at Shupando in East Tibet, despite
vehement opposition from the powerful pro-Indian monasteries of Sera and
Ganden which seriously threatened any successful outcome.*49
Having regained some control of his armies after the set backs of 1913
and 1914, Yuan had made an arrangement with the Provincial governments
in Szechuan and Yunnan to place Kokonor under the command of the Chinese
Muslim, General Ma Wu. Since 1911 the Muslims had dominated Kansu
Province, pursuing a forward policy in the Kokonor region, an area whose
remoteness had previously always protected it from the worst effects of
Chao Erh-feng's campaigns.*50 Unlike the Szechuanese troops, who
disliked fighting in such harsh terrain, Ma's men were hardy horsemen,
well suited to the kind of campaigning necessary in Kokonor. They were
soon able to establish a loose control of the region, previously shared
between a variety of independent Tibetan Chieftains whose hatred for
each other prevented them offering united resistance to the Muslim
invaders. By spring of 1916 Ma was in a position to issue a
Proclamation outlining his plans for Kokonor.*51 This activity in
Kokonor was to confirm a view already held by Jordan that, had the
region been formally offered to them, the Chinese might well have signed
the Simla Treaty, and the escalating crisis in East Tibet might have
been avoided. He cited this as further evidence of the incompetence of
the Indian government and in his opinion it provided even further
justification for an independent initiative of his own, which led to the
production of his important Memorandum on the Tibetan situation written
in September 1916.*52
Towards the latter part of 1915 Yuan's ability to control events began
to fail, and what amounted to a civil war between the independent
Provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan began to seriously affect the
frontier.*53 Despite his failure to secure desperately needed financial
aid from the British government to bolster his flagging economy, Yuan
still regarded Britain as the most powerful country in Asia, and he
continued with attempts to re-negotiate a revised form of the Simla
Treaty with Jordan. By 1916 however, events had turned against him, and
the prospects of any Anglo-Chinese agreement became very remote
indeed.*54 His sudden death in June 1916 led to a greater escalation of
of the frontier conflict, although the news of his death relieved
the situation at Tachienlu, the scene of intensive fighting between
rival factions. In reporting to the Indian government, Bell
claimed that Chinese aggression in East Tibet had intensified in the
months following Yuan's death, (claims that were confirmed in Coale's
reports from Tachienlu), as soldiers, often themselves confused and
without food or pay, ran amok in the areas in and around the city and,
by 1917, the last vestiges of order had broken down in the area. Jordan
had been profoundly shaken by Yuan's death, and was now convinced that
the Foreign Office had lost all confidence in China's ability to control
her own affairs. This prompted him to produce a Memorandum as a
statement of his own thoughts and ideas about the situation in East
Tibet and how it might best be solved in Britain's interests.
The Memorandum acknowledged a need for a positive British initiative to
try to sort out the crisis created by Yuan's death, since for
Jordan Tibet was one of the 'running sores' of Yuan's administration
which needed to be healed before China could even begin to function as a
modern state in the western sense. It called for Britain to abandon
the Simla agenda entirely and embark upon fresh negotiations for a new
Anglo-Chinese Treaty on Tibet, suggesting as a starting point for talks
that Britain accept Chinese control of Kokonor under General Ma, as well
as the retention of those parts of Eastern Tibet taken during Chao's
campaigns which had previously had a long history of involvement with
China. He further argued that the creation of the inner and outer zones
in the Simla Treaty should be abandoned since they were quite
unworkable, the whole concept of zones being entirely alien to all
previous Chinese and Tibetan thinking about the region. It warned
of the dire consequences of a successful separate Sino-Tibetan agreement
on Tibet from which Britain would be excluded, and it recommended that
the Dalai Lama retain his spiritual influence over the monasteries in
Kokonor and Kansu which could remain under the political control of a
representative of the Republican government. Although an official
Legation document the Memorandum was a clear statement of Jordan's views
on Tibet, and showed a deep understanding of the Tibetan situation,
as well as an appreciation of its significance for future Anglo-Chinese relations.*60

The document was clearly at odds with what has been described as the 'Simla position' which came to dominate Indian Government thinking about Tibet, and which viewed the country as a 'subordinate of China' but with an 'extensive autonomy' over which India had a duty to keep a 'watchful eye'.*61 The Indian government were also quite anxious to shelve further discussion about Tibet and were not prepared to take the Memorandum seriously, for Jordan's credibility, as well as his health had been obviously affected by Yuan's death, and the extra stress created by the wartime conditions. In order to even consider a revision of the Simla provisions therefore, the new Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, needed to be sure that Tibet was strong enough to keep China at bay and that the Tibetans would want to maintain close contact with Britain after a treaty had been signed.*62 There were also additional fears about Russian intentions, for although by September 1917, Russia was in the throes of the domestic crisis that would eventually lead to the successful Bolshevik takeover in November, there were no guarantees at this point that the chaos inside Russia would be more than temporary. If a Tsar resumed control, Britain might still be called to account for what he might choose to regard as violations of the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. In London on extended leave, and following Grey's retirement in December 1916, Jordan found himself less able to influence events as he had done before, and with the civil war in China worsening, and the war in Europe preoccupying the Foreign Office, settling Tibet became important only to a handful of diplomats.

The Tibetan question now entered a new phase with the appointment of Eric Teichman to the post at Tachienlu in November 1917.*63 Jordan had left Peking for what many assumed to be the last time, and Belby Alston had again become Charge d'Affaires, this time with strong expectations of finally becoming British Minister. Within a year however, Jordan had requested, and been given permission, to return to Peking and in November 1917 he arrived back at the Legation with a coherent plan to settle the affairs of East Tibet.*64
Eric Teichman's appointment as Consul in Tachienlu was confirmed in September 1917, but had been known about well in advance. As a first class diplomat with a promising career ahead of him, many found him an odd choice for this essentially low key position, although his experience as Vice Consul in Chengtu in 1911, and his travels in remote areas of Kokonor and Kansu in 1912 more than fitted him for the task.*65
Since the post at Tachienlu had initially been created at the request of the Indian government simply to monitor events on the East Tibetan frontier, it is not difficult to see that in appointing Teichman, with whom he had recently worked closely in Peking, Jordan intended to use his expertise for more important matters than the compilation of regular reports, the kind of work that even a new recruit might handle; and Teichman's subsequent behaviour at Tachienlu can only be understood in the context of the rejected Memorandum of September 1916, with its aim of settling the Sino-Tibetan boundary dispute by opening up discussions with the Chinese on a fresh basis.*66
When Teichman eventually arrived in Tachienlu in November 1917, the Sino-Tibetan conflict had entered a new and intense phase following the collapse of a temporary truce which had been negotiated at Riwoche.*67 Between 1916 and 1917 Louis King and Eric Coales had been carefully monitoring the situation, often placing themselves in great danger when they left the city to travel to the areas of fighting.*68 Tachienlu itself could be a claustrophobic place in which to work, being surrounded by mountains on all sides, and affording little opportunity for escape. It was also a place in which minor incidents could quickly become serious, and during 1916 Coales had reported an incident in which there had been widespread looting in the city by three hundred hungry Chinese soldiers, aided and abetted by Tibetan women.*69 As a major administrative centre for the new Republican government in East Tibet Tachienlu had inevitably attracted conflict, and in 1914 the city had been captured by Tibetan forces, only to be retaken in 1916 by General Yin who then took on the new appointment of Chinese Frontier Commissioner there, a Republican decision not much to Coales liking since Yin soon proved a very difficult man with whom to liaise, being in
Coale's words 'cruel' and 'opium addicted'. In the small confines of a city like Tachienlu, where good relationships between liaising officials was vitally important, this was a dangerous problem for Coale's whose own position was, to say the least tenuous, at a time when it wasn't always clear whether Peking, Yunnan, Szechuan or Tibetan forces were in control. Yin's position was equally fraught. Originally from Yunnan, he was now the new official representative of the Peking Central Government at Tachienlu when the real power in the wider region was in the hands of the Szechuan Provincial Government, who by this time were in conflict with both Yunnan and Peking. In this situation Coales found himself under much the same kind of pressure as that experienced by O'Connor at Gyantse, and Campbell at Chumbi only a few years earlier, and it was therefore with some relief that he witnessed Yin's flight from Tachienlu in the summer of 1917, when intense hostilities between Szechuan and Yunnan had resumed after a lull. He welcomed Yin's replacement, Ch'en Hsai-Ling, a veteran of Chao Erh-feng's campaigns, who as Acting High Commissioner at Tachienlu, was still in post on the day of Teichman's arrival.

Teichman's progress to Tachienlu had been a deliberately slow one and he had taken the opportunity afforded by the tortuous journey in order to study the frontier situation at first hand with the result that, soon after his arrival, he was able to present Jordan with a very detailed account of what was happening on the frontier, containing proposals for a realignment of the border between Autonomus Tibet and Chinese Szechuan, based on his own 'private investigations'. Although Louis King and Eric Coales had both previously made recommendations in their monthly reports to Peking, what was clearly different about Teichman's status was that, from the beginning, he had not only felt confident in producing such an audacious proposal, but had also felt able to acknowledge it as his own idea. His regular correspondence with Jordan in the months between his arrival in Tachienlu and his departure for the frontier in March 1918 on what he described as a 'peace mission', reveals the close relationship with Jordan which had developed when they worked together in Peking, and leads to the unavoidable conclusion that Teichman was in fact responding to orders from Jordan, although he was always to deny any collusion between them.
Although he left Tachienlu in March 1918 without waiting for official sanction, his behaviour was not as unreasonable as might first appear since the difficulties involved in acquiring written permission in such circumstances were always exacerbated by the length of time any correspondence took to reach Tachienlu from Chengtu, the nearest Consular post; and because the problems created by any crisis that could spontaneously erupt in this war torn and volatile region made it impossible for officers to survive without some ability to exercise initiative. The sheer monotony of life at Tachienlu had previously ensured that past Consuls had also welcomed any opportunity to escape the city on similar missions of investigation despite the dangers involved, simply as a more interesting means of passing the time. In December 1916 for example, Coales had set out on such a mission to the Chamdo area in the company of Mr. Clements of the China Inland Mission, and was able to offer valuable information about Chinese activity there.*75 Unfortunately, although Coales, as King before him, had received commendation for these excellent first hand accounts of the situation, his presence on the frontier had also generated embarrassing friction with the Peking Authorities when Frontier Commissioner Yin, who had opposed the journey from the start, suggested that Coale's 'irregular behaviour' had led to problems with the Szechuanese Authorities, and soon awkward questions began to be asked in Peking about Britain's right to station a Consular official at Tachienlu.*76 Even in this context Teichman's journey was unusual however, not simply because, like his predecessors, he was going to the frontier to record the scene, but because, in describing the journey as a 'peace mission', he had a more definite aim in mind and had claimed to be acting upon a request from the Chinese themselves to mediate in their dispute with the Tibetans.*77 Teichman's detailed report of December 1917 had been based on his personal account of events on the frontier during the late summer and early autumn of that year which were the main reason why he had taken so long to reach his post. Between his arrival at Tachienlu in November 1917 and his departure in March 1918 however, events had taken a dramatic turn, and, as he left the relative security of his consulate, he would have been unaware of the great personal dangers ahead.
Chinese forces in East Tibet were well organised under the leadership of three Generals or Frontier Commissioners, having headquarters at Tachienlu, Chamdo, and Batang. As British Consul in Tachienlu Teichman was expected to liaise with Acting Frontier Commissioner Ch'en about his journey, but on this occasion he had been prevented from doing so by Chen's absence from the city at the time of departure. Each of the three Commissioners was empowered by the Chinese to exercise full military control in the area assigned to them, and they did this with varying degrees of success. Of the three, General P'eng, whose base was in Chamdo, was allegedly the most feared and despised, not just because he was cruel and arrogant towards his own men, as well as to the Tibetans, but also because of the part he was alleged to have played in the destruction of the great monasteries at Chamdo, Draya, and Yemdo during the Chao campaigns some years earlier. For many Tibetans this had made him a personification of Chinese oppression. His handling of what was essentially a minor frontier incident was to lead to an escalation of the Sino-Tibetan conflict during which the Tibetans would make significant gains, enabling them to alter the balance of frontier power in their favour. P'eng's actions were partly the result of his blind personal ambition to lead an assault on Lhasa, and were conducted in the misguided belief that the East Tibetans so disliked and resented the authority of the Lhasa government that they would not be prepared to resist the Chinese.

The incident which lead to the escalation of conflict began during August 1917 when a party of Chinese troops in P'eng's service went out to cut grass for their ponies in a remote valley in the disputed area near the Chinese held town of Riwoche. Here they were approached and challenged by two Tibetan soldiers who questioned their right to be there. Following a scuffle the Tibetan soldiers were 'arrested' and taken to a temporary Chinese camp established nearby, from where they were subsequently transferred a few days later to Chinese headquarters in Riwoche. Their Tibetan Commander, quite unaware that his men had been taken to Riwoche, then approached the Chinese camp demanding the release of his men. At this stage the incident might have been sorted out amicably if the
Chinese Camp Commander, Chang, had not panicked and referred the matter on to P'eng at Chamdo. Driven to exasperation, the Tibetans now attacked and destroyed the Chinese camp before moving on to try to organise the release of their men imprisoned at Riwoche. Meanwhile P'eng, having received Chang's message, had decided to turn the whole affair to his own advantage. The situation is confused at this point by the differing accounts of the incident provided later by Teichman and King, and by the fact that Teichman's account further differs from his original first report written in January 1918 and that given in his 'Travels' published in the following year. The points of comparison centre on the different interpretation given to P'eng's motives by each writer. Teichman's original report had been based partly upon evidence supplied by Chinese soldiers whom he met shortly after the incident in the late summer of 1917 while he was en route to Tachienlu, and on the assumption that P'eng was very keen to renew talks with Tibetans and would therefore not have wanted to exacerbate tensions. His later account in 'Travels' however, reveals far less sympathy with Chinese actions and was possibly written in an attempt to present the Chinese as aggressors for purely diplomatic reasons. King's account in his book 'China in Turmoil', published in 1928, tends to present a more balanced view, arguing that there were faults on both sides. Although he later married a Tibetan and adopted a very pro-Tibetan stance as a result, King's sympathy for P'eng is further evidence that the General's actions had more to do with stupidity and ignorance than with any malevolent intent.

Teichman had previously had the dubious pleasure of meeting P'eng before coming to Tachienliu and although he did not approve of P'eng's behaviour in Tibet, he did feel that the General genuinely believed that East Tibetan hostility toward the Lhasa Authorities would make them loath to repel a Chinese advance on the city. Whatever the true facts, events moved very quickly as a result of a quarrel over the incident between P'eng and the Kalon Lama, Commander in Chief of the Tibetan forces in East Tibet. P'eng had previously refused to answer the Kalon Lama's polite requests for the return of the arrested Tibetan soldiers and had then responded to a subsequent written communication from him by placing dung inside an
envelope and posting it back to him. Undeterred by this gross insult the Kalon Lama had sent a third letter, this time receiving a reply in which it was stated that P'eng's men were already in the process of advancing on Lhasa.\(^87\) Having despatched his troops to Lhasa, P'eng had apparently also given orders for the Tibetan prisoners to be brought to him in Chamdo and, on hearing this, Tibetan troops had given chase, seizing Riwoche and breaking the temporary truce before moving on to Chamdo and laying siege to the town.\(^88\)

The siege of Chamdo lasted many months and P'eng, forced to defend his headquarters against far stronger opposition than he had anticipated, suffered a humiliating defeat in April 1918, only weeks after Teichman had set out from Tachienlu.\(^89\) The successful siege of a large and important administrative centre like Chamdo gave the Tibetan forces a huge boost of confidence, especially as the Chinese army had been shown to be divided, and P'eng had been deserted by his fellow Commissioners at Tachienlu and Batang, who had refused to come to the aid of someone they perceived as a dangerous potential rival. He had been humiliated further by his own forces, who immediately disowned him after the siege had ended, leaving him to the mercy of the Kalon Lama.\(^90\) With victory in his grasp however, the Kalon Lama was unwilling to press his advantage and advance on Tachienlu, despite the Dalai Lama's approval and the enthusiasm of his own troops; the siege having been viewed generally as a great victory that had swung the balance of power in Tibet's favour.\(^91\) As the declared purpose of Teichman's mission was to settle the frontier enough to make a settlement between Britain and China over the Tibetan boundary possible, this unexpected development created both an opportunity and a problem for him, since this was now a volatile situation requiring very tactful handling. There was no doubt that at this point Teichman's life was in danger, for although he had an excellent knowledge of Chinese, and was noted for his ability to communicate with Chinese officers on a man to man basis, his knowledge of the Tibetan language was minimal and he was now entirely dependent on the goodwill of the Tibetan people in order to succeed in a mission which could not possibly work to their advantage or gain them more territory.\(^92\)
When he wrote of the mission in his 'Travels' a year after the event, and with the benefit of hindsight, Teichman defined one of its aims as the stemming of the Tibetan advance, which he believed, 'threatened to submerge the country up to Tachienlu'.

He felt no personal animosity towards the Tibetan people, and indeed had some sympathy for their plight, as well as a great respect for the Kalon Lama whom he had met before arriving in Tachienlu, and whom he described as 'a majestic presence' who 'overshadowed all other figures on the frontier'.

As a loyal and ambitious servant of the China Consular Service however he believed that, for peace to last, the balance of power had to be restored in China's favour. His account of his peace mission first to Batang, then on to Chamdo and Rongbasta, is rich in detail, and provides a fascinating, yet controlled description, of a vast and little known land, in which the experience of war varied greatly from region to region.

One of the greatest problems facing any foreign traveller on this frontier was the opposition he might receive from the nomadic tribes who lived there and who had made it virtually impossible for either the Tibetans, or the Chinese, to administer the frontier effectively, especially where Tibetans withheld ula and it became impossible to replenish horses needed for the long journeys between administrative centres.

The area through which Teichman was to pass on the first stage of his journey from Tachienlu to Jyekundo in Kokonor was particularly notorious for the hostility of its tribes and he observed how, when he passed through this country, the increase in rifles acquired from Muslim traders in recent years had made the tribesmen appear far more formidable than on the occasion of his previous visit to the area in 1912.

A few miles from Jyekundo itself however he found the area quite peaceful in comparison with most of the other districts through which he had passed which had seemed to be 'either in open rebellion, or on the verge of revolt'.

He had also observed great differences between those areas in which the Chinese skeleton administration held firm because the officials here were of 'good character', and those where the officials were 'military adventurers of low origin' who exploited the people and where, as a result, all law and order had broken down.

At Jyekundo, an important administrative and trading
centre for Southern Kokonor, he found the local Tibetans resentful but forced to accept the dictatorship of General Ma, who at the time of his arrival was still in the process of establishing control of the region by levying new taxes and organising the appointment of his own magistrates to administer justice.*99

Teichman described Kokonor as almost entirely 'nomad grassland' mostly 'too high to be inhabited', but the area had always been strategically important to the Chinese because its geographical position made it an effective buffer between Tibet and China; and in recognition of this the Manchu had established an Amban at Sining, an important spiritual centre for Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhists living a few miles away at the great monastery of Kumbum.*100 Teichman's account was much influenced by his great admiration for Ma's soldiers, whom he described as 'sturdy fighters, stiffened by their religion', and 'skilled horsemen', well used to the hardships of Tibetan conditions, and he compared them favourably with the Szechuanese troops who seemed weak and 'always pining for their opium pipes'.*101 He found that Kokonor had been remarkably unaffected by the fighting and he attributed this to the good working relationship between General Ma and the Kalon Lama, both of whom he judged to be men of wisdom and integrity.*102 Having left Jyekundo he found that he was able to obtain yaks to replace his exhausted horses under the ula system largely because ula was less unpopular, being less regularly requested due to the remoteness of the region*103

On the evening of 8th May events took a dramatic and unexpected turn when a horseman arrived in Teichman's camp with a message from the Kalon Lama bringing news that Chamdo, his next port of call, had fallen to the Tibetans. This message had taken nearly a month to reach him and it took a further twelve days for his party to reach the city but, even prepared for chaos, he did not expect the terrible sights that greeted him, and his first impression of the great religious and administrative centre of Chamdo was of a 'miserable place', consisting of a 'a few yamens and temples and a village of mud hovels', its depressing appearance further emphasised by the tragic ruins of Chamdo monastery, formerly one of the greatest and wealthiest monasteries in East Tibet, which dominated the plateau above
the town and which had once been of great spiritual and commercial
importance to Tibetans of the region. The city lay halfway along the
ancient Lhasa-Tachienlu road and was over one month's journey from Lhasa
for travellers, although Lhasa couriers could get urgent messages through
to the city in ten days because they rode without stopping. Teichman
formed the distinct impression that, had Chao Erh-Feng been able to press
ahead with his programme of reform in 1908, Chamdo might have accepted
Chinese rule, but that the chaos subsequently generated by the Republican
government's grand, but half-formed plans for the area, had allowed the
city to lapse into a state of virtual anarchy in the months before the
siege, giving Tibetan forces an easy victory. By the time he arrived
there on 19th May, Chamdo was still suffering the after effects of the long
siege and half buried corpses still lay everywhere. Having spent most of
his life behind a Legation desk, Teichman naturally found this very
shocking. He was particularly struck by the fact that the Chinese soldiers
remaining there were also very shocked and seemed completely out of
control, divided amongst themselves, but united in a common hatred of their
leader, P'eng, who had disowned and forgotten them in an attempt to save
his own skin. Like Jordan, Teichman was clearly under the impression
that the Batang-Litang area was Chinese by right and, according to his
sources, the territory had been under nominal Chinese rule for two
centuries. He was therefore much alarmed by the reverence and respect
given to the Kalon Lama by the Tibetan forces and thought that they would
have advanced to Batang without a moment's hesitation had their leader
given the word. For Teichman, who believed himself there to effect
a truce, one of the most immediate and pressing problems was to find a
replacement for P'eng who, when he set out from Tachienlu, had been the
person he had assumed would act as Chinese negotiator for his peace talks.
He was also well aware that he needed to act quickly in the short 'breathing
space' provided by the ending of the siege if he was going to organise a
truce and prevent any resumption of hostilities, which at this stage would
almost certainly have resulted in a Tibetan victory; and he therefore
determined to approach General Liu, Garrison Commander of the Chinese forces
in Batang and, in these peculiar circumstances, the nearest person of status who might be persuaded to represent the Chinese at the talks. After lengthy discussions' with the Kalon Lama, who agreed to accept Liu as an accredited Chinese delegate, Teichman set out for the Chinese held city of Batang.*109 When he arrived there however he found that Liu had left the city for Markham Gartok, a town to the south west of Batang, where, with the help of Dr. Shelton of the American Baptist Mission, he hoped to effect a truce with the Teji, the Lhasa official commanding the southern flank of the Tibetan troops in East Tibet, who ranked only second in importance to the Kalon Lama himself.*110 Teichman eventually met up with Liu and Shelton in Markham Gartok on 4th June. However, Liu insisted on signing a temporary month long truce with the Tibetans before he would agree to return to Batang in order to help Teichman negotiate with the Kalon Lama, who had travelled to the city for the express purpose of conducting peace talks aimed at settling the frontier.*111

Teichman's position in this situation was now a very strange one. Although a representative of the British government, he was a self-appointed mediator and, unlike Shelton, who had been approached directly by Liu, he could not claim to have been formally approached by either side to intervene once P'eng had been discredited.*112 He was therefore now completely dependent upon Shelton as the only foreigner known and trusted by both sides. He subsequently failed to acknowledge this fact fully in his later account of the events, possibly in an attempt to exaggerate the importance of his presence there to his own government, but also as a need to justify to a wider public the necessity for British intervention in a situation which, in such anarchic conditions, could only be negligible.*113 Ironically, his very position at this time reinforced his original argument for going to the frontier, for in these circumstances only a treaty negotiated on the spot, and between people acknowledged as authorities on the situation, could expect to have any impact on events.

His optimism about the successful completion of peace talks at this point is reflected in a letter to Jordan, written en route to Batang, in which he expressed the view that, at last, 'the unpleasant sore' that Tibet had created in Anglo-Chinese relations could be satisfactorily healed.
This approach to the situation, which both men shared, would be severely tested in the coming weeks.*114

When he returned to Batang with Liu and Shelton on 15th June, Teichman's first objective was to secure official recognition from the Chinese Authorities in Szechuan and Peking that would confirm Liu's status as official delegate to the talks. Batang was the headquarters for Chinese troops on the southern frontier and contained a garrison composed of the remnants of the old Pien Chun forces who had been there since Chao's time and were now, in Teichman's words, 'worn out, sodden with opium, and generally demoralised'. He considered them to be 'nearly useless as a fighting force' and he realised that the city had now become a 'dumping ground for all the disabled, sick, and destitute Chinese in Eastern Tibet', particularly as the number of wounded entering the city had increased as a result of the recent fighting.*115 He discovered that the Tibetans living in Batang had an entirely different attitude towards the Chinese under whose nominal rule they had lived for many years, and seemed to fear the Lhasa Authorities to such an extent that they were prepared to resist any attempt to return them to Lhasa rule by force. In this situation, where there were strong rumours that Tibetans might attack and almost certainly take the city at any time, Teichman knew that he must act quickly, and could not afford to wait for a reply about Liu's status from Chinese authorities so far away. He therefore determined to return immediately with Liu to Chamdo where the Kalon Lama had his base, and which was strategically the most important centre from which to negotiate a successful truce. News had also reached him on 29th June that the temporary month long truce negotiated by Liu and Shelton at Markham Gartok had almost elapsed, and that the Teji was planning his own advance on Batang.*116 He was also very aware that what was left of the Chinese forces at Batang were now discussing the possibility of a general evacuation to Tachienliu, despite the fact that this involved a dangerous retreat through 'brigand infested' country. However, he was comforted by the news that the Kalon Lama, who was himself anxious to ensure that peace talks took place for reasons of his own, had ordered a ceasefire until the party safely reached Chamdo and when he arrived there on 15th July, and much to his amazement,
he was greeted by an official reception of Tibetan dignitaries, and a guard
of honour. He was also further encouraged by a message from the
Chinese Authorities in Szechuan and Chengtu two weeks later which gave
permission for Liu to act as Chinese delegate to the talks, and
included a proposal for a temporary frontier along the historic Yangtze
boundary which Teichman was able to accept, although he was mindful of the
fact that it might not be acceptable to Tibetans who had only recently
re-occupied Derge and Nyarong, a fact confirmed by the Kalon Lama's
hesitant response to Liu's initial approaches. Events now took a
rather unexpected course when, on 20th July, Teichman received an official
letter from Tachienlu announcing the imminent arrival of the Prince of
Chala, described as an official 'peace emissary' who would act on behalf of
Frontier Commissioner Ch'en. The Prince of Chala was already well known
to the missionaries at Batang and had been a puppet leader for the Chinese
since the disturbances began. He had previously been sent as Ch'en's
peace emissary to the Kanze front, where in the company of a Chinese
magistrate from Tachienlu called Han Kuang-Chung, he had successfully
organised a temporary ceasefire, despite the fact that the Depon commanding
the Tibetan troops had refused to liaise with him because, like many other
Tibetans, he thought Chala was a traitor. Upon receiving his summons to
Chamdo, Chala left Han Kuang-Ching at Kanze, where the magistrate felt much
safer behind Chinese lines, and travelled to Chamdo where Ch'en hoped he
might have better success than Liu in negotiating a permanent ceasefire
with his fellow Tibetans.

Meanwhile, Teichman had given a great deal of thought to the terms of the
settlement he wished to effect, and on 26th June, while still in Batang,
he had written a personal letter to Jordan in which he included what he
described as a 'rough draft' of the 'sort of proposals' he intended to put
forward. In doing this he was obviously certain of Jordan's support, and
when talks opened in Chamdo on 11th August, he felt confident in
negotiating with Liu as Chinese delegate, especially as the Prince of Chala
had still not arrived in the city. Liu was a relatively minor Chinese
official with no real diplomatic experience however and soon proved very
ignorant of Tibetan procedures. He was also by this time extremely nervous
about his own situation, and began to prove a liability, being reluctant to discuss terms for fear of reprisals. A further difficulty was created by the fact that Liu had no contact with the Szechuan Authorities, who by now had completely broken from Peking Central government and declared themselves an independent Province. As traditional guardians of the frontier under the Manchu this gave them credibility as the real power in the area. Teichman's own problems were further complicated by the fact that he too was out of touch with Peking since all his communications had to pass through Chengtu, by now the scene of really serious fighting between the provincial armies of Szechuan and Yunnan.*123 Despite all these difficulties however a treaty was somehow put together and signed on 19th August 1918 by Teichman, the Kalon Lama, and Liu. The Chamdo truce as it became known, successfully defined the geographical boundaries of East Tibet but failed to reach agreement over the duration of the truce and Teichman was now faced with the problem of how to proceed.*124 A decision was soon made for him however when, on 22nd August, three days after the Chamdo treaty had been signed, he received a letter from Jordan dated 10th May ordering him to consult with Ch'en in Tachienlu before going ahead with talks. A second letter from Simla, included in the same mailing, requested that he remain in Chamdo in order to effect the truce.*125 As the man very much on the spot Teichman was clearly confused and probably quite shaken by these contradicting opinions from Simla and Peking, especially as the situation had looked so positive only a few days before. In a private letter to Meyrick Hewlett, British Consul in Chengtu, which managed to reach him through war torn East Tibet within a few days of writing, Teichman described his feelings of total isolation and his own sense of uncertainty, and asked Hewlett to inform the Szechuan Authorities that the Tibetan forces were only prevented from attacking and destroying Batang by the promise of a successful outcome to the talks with the Chinese.*128 Like Younghusband before him, Teichman found himself faced with the dilemma of having to make an important decision in isolation and without being sure that it would receive official approval, since it was now obvious to him that Jordan had disagreed with the Indian government about the role he was to play.
After this agonising period of indecision he must have welcomed the arrival of the Prince of Chala from Kanze on 29th August, since his presence immediately helped to settle the problem. Chala had brought with him letters from Chinese officials reporting the arrival of three thousand 'good' Chinese troops from Tachienlu at Rongbasta in Kanze, the scene of recent bitter fighting. Although the successfully negotiated ceasefire which Chala had helped to organise still held, the arrival of fresh Chinese troops from Tachienlu had placed an unbearable strain on the situation, which now threatened to erupt into violence at any moment. Attempts by both sides to negotiate by letter had also apparently failed, partly the result of Chinese reluctance to treat the Tibetans as any more than 'naughty children', but also because Tibetan confidence, boosted by the recent victory at Chamdo, had made them 'itching' to press ahead with their advantage. As Liu's nerve had completely failed him by this stage Teichman was now prepared to accept Chala as the Chinese delegate and left with him at once for Rongbasta. He reached the Rongbasta front on 19th September, and accompanied by Chala, he first visited the Chinese camp, where he was introduced to Han Kuang-Chung, the Chinese magistrate from Tachienlu, who had been awaiting Chala's return with some trepidation. The Chinese camp at Rongbasta was situated in a remote valley on one of the main roads from Tachienlu to Jyekundo which led on to the main northern road to Lhasa, and as such was a very sensitive spot. After a subsequent visit to the Tibetan camp, Teichman was surprised to discover that most of the Tibetan officials, or Fan Kuan, were 'most civilised'. This impression was later confirmed in his own mind when he learnt that some of them had previously visited India and carried 'kodak cameras', and 'field glasses' among their possessions. Armed with this knowledge he became extremely hopeful that the Fan Kuan would see sense, although the enemies they faced were, by comparison, very narrowminded, and despite their apparent sophistication, most had never before travelled outside Szechuan. In the light of this he found their attitude to the Fan Kuan quite ridiculous, especially as the men they labelled 'barbarians' appeared to him to have far more western sophistication than the Szechuanese who derided them.
During the course of his investigation at both camps Teichman noticed that the sides were evenly matched in strength and that despite the bravado, both were 'getting uneasy' about the forthcoming battle. Unlike the Tibetans, who could exist quite easily on a simple diet of barley, ferried to them across the difficult terrain in sacks tied to the backs of yaks and mules, the Szechunese soldiers required a more refined rice based diet which was costly and difficult to provide in this remote situation.

The Tibetans were equally unsure of their ability to endure a sustained period of fighting so far from their base, and were quite dismayed by the arrival of fresh Chinese forces from Tachienlu. Taking all these factors into consideration, therefore, Teichman felt that negotiation with both sides was possible and on 20th September called a conference to discuss a truce which both sides agreed to attend and which was convened in a large tent erected in a field between the lines. Having got the two sides together however there followed what he later described as 'interminable discussions', in which a great debate ensued about the correct procedure for a mutual withdrawal, both sides demanding that the other withdraw first. The fresher Tachienlu force, who had always been more willing to fight, were particularly anxious to establish the point that they were making peace with the Tibetans, not because they feared them, but simply because they had no wish to 'chastise or humiliate them' any further. This sentiment was obviously not much appreciated by the Tibetans, who were equally keen to stress that their recent victory over P'eng had made them the victors, and that if necessary, they were quite willing to resume hostilities. Eventually some agreement was reached and both sides accepted a simultaneous withdrawal of one days journey from Rongbasta that would take the Chinese to Kanze, and the Tibetans to a point just within the Derge border. The truce was then duly signed and messages were sent to Ch'en at Tachienlu, and the Kalon Lama in Chamdo, to secure their official approval.

After establishing that local Tibetans could now return to their valley in order to harvest their ripened crops, the Conference then adjourned and both sides retired to their respective camps to await the official ratification which, given the remoteness of the area, could not be expected for at least three weeks. It was not until 10th October therefore
that talks were re-convened following news that the Kalon Lama and the Szechuan Frontier Authorities had both approved the truce. The Rongbasta Agreement was then formally ratified on that date.\textsuperscript{132}

After the ceremony the Prince of Chala held a huge banquet at which, according to Teichman, 'everyone participated despite the previous angry talk'. The Prince was much relieved when talks ended successfully for his own sake for, had they failed, he would almost certainly have been called to account by his own people for having helped the Chinese at their expense. His own role as mediator now over, Teichman spent his remaining days at Rongbasta sitting on a 'flat roof' with field glasses and watching, with some amusement, the very gradual withdrawal, as both sides continued to argue and procrastinate about who should be the first to leave. He also noted the joy of the local Tibetan farmers who were now able to gather in their harvest and return to their uneventful, but peaceful existence, in this remote part of Tibet.\textsuperscript{133}

The Rongbasta truce differed from the Chamdo truce in that it set out a clear time limit of one year from the day of signing and was ratified by authorised representatives on both sides. Unlike Chamdo it was a bipartite agreement since Teichman had insisted that he was there only as mediator and witness. Although intended as a temporary settlement, it remained effective until 1930, partly because both sides had no wish to resume fighting over what was really a wilderness, and partly because an additional article in the treaty defined a point at Beri beyond which the Chinese could not advance without violating the truce.\textsuperscript{134} The truce was hailed as a great diplomatic victory in Britain, as well as a great personal triumph for Teichman himself, and he was always careful to take full credit for the venture. His pivotal role as mediator is highly questionable however, for without the support of the Kalon Lama, General Liu, and Dr. Shelton, he would have been lucky to have survived unharmed in areas where it was quite possible, even for a British official, to vanish without trace.

Teichman's 'Travels', which he was encouraged to publish soon after his return to Peking, gives a very massaged account of events, and was probably deliberately distorted in order to present a view acceptable to the Foreign
Office, since Teichman's own official reports are sometimes at odds with this later account. For him, Chamdo and Rongbasta were both successful attempts to establish a fresh basis for talks with the Chinese, and after signing the truce and supervising the withdrawal, and no doubt heady with his own success, he decided to take off on an impromptu survey of the East Tibetan Marches, apparently unaware of Jordan's repeated requests that he return immediately to his post at Tachienlu.*135

In Peking the situation had been dramatically altered by events in East Tibet that had taken place during the course of Teichman's peace mission, and in particular by the formal declaration of independence by Szechuan. Jordan himself, disillusioned and dispirited by the death of his daughter in May 1918, as well as by the extra burden of war work, had begun to find his subordinate tiresome, especially as conversations with Tuan, the new Republican President, had revealed that the Chinese were now more concerned with regaining control of Szechuan, than with the resumption of campaigning in East Tibet.*136 He was even more worried by Chinese attempts to challenge the status of General Liu during the talks preceding the signing of the Chamdo truce, and became very angry indeed when Chelmsford, with no obvious opposition from Montagu at the India Office, began to request that Teichman remain in Chamdo in order to settle the truce.*137 His irritation was increased by Teichman's refusal to obey orders to return to Tachienlu and by his unauthorised decision to tour the East Tibetan marches after signing the truce at Rongbasta. Despite this insubordination Teichman's behaviour went entirely unpunished, and he was able to return to Peking and continue with a successful diplomatic career at the Peking Legation.*138

The truce at Rongbasta settled the area for many years and marked the effective ending of all British interest in East Tibet. Although the post at Tachienlu remained technically open until 1928, mainly due to pressure from the Indian government, it was not fully maintained after Louis King left in 1921, and in 1924 all its correspondence was lost to bandits.*139

In the final chapter I want to look at events in India and Peking that were to lead to a reawakening of British interest in Central, and Western Tibet in the post war years, and at the involvement of Britain's Japanese ally in Tibetan affairs.
27. George Curzon, Foreign Secretary
In the period between the ending of the Rongbasta Truce in 1918 and the start of the Washington Conference in 1922, British Tibetan policy was dominated by attempts to resume talks with China, thwarted by Chinese refusal to sign the Tripartite Agreement at Simla in 1914.¹

The nature of the negotiations for the resumption of talks with China over Tibet exposed the very different position Britain found herself in in the postwar world, as powerful new forces intervened to prevent their successful outcome. The growing strength of America and Japan in Chinese affairs, coupled with the Dalai Lama's awareness that he might exercise greater influence on events in the new climate of international diplomacy, and above all the confusion generated by the chaos inside China itself, all helped to prevent the achievement of a solution to what the British continued to see as their 'Tibetan problem'.

In this final chapter I will trace the course of the attempts to settle the 'Tibetan problem' with China and examine in greater detail the reasons why the Chinese refused to negotiate with the British Government.
I. THE MAY PROPOSALS

On 30th May 1919 the Chinese presented a set of proposals to the British government in an attempt to settle the stalemate created by their refusal to sign the Tripartite Agreement in 1914, which the latter felt able to accept on the following day. After months of speculation it finally looked as though there was a real chance of reaching some agreement with China on a problem which had been haunting Jordan since Teichman's unofficial mission to East Tibet in 1918, and there was also strong feeling in London and India that no time should be lost in getting the Chinese to the negotiating table before they had an opportunity to change their minds. Indeed the sense of urgency was so great that it was unanimously decided in London, India, and Peking, to go ahead with talks without consulting Tibet.

As Foreign Secretary Curzon was quite willing to duck the 'knotty question' of consulting Russia on the proposals, feeling it unwise to raise the validity of these talks in the context of the 1907 Convention, a treaty which he himself had vehemently opposed and which had been a barrier to talks with China about Tibet after 1907. As a strong supporter of a permanent presence in Tibet he was even prepared to temporarily abandon his plan to station a British Representative in Lhasa in an attempt to get talks moving, although he continued to press for this as a possible future option.

He therefore issued instructions to go ahead with talks and on June 1st 1919, after a visit to Mr Ch'en Lu, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Jordan was overjoyed to report that the Chinese themselves were still 'most willing' to open discussions on the terms outlined, and were even ready to debate the boundary issue that had been stated as the reason for the breakdown of earlier negotiations.

When talks opened in Peking on 13th August Jordan reported that the Chinese still 'appeared reasonable' and that a further meeting had been planned for the following week. It came as rather a shock therefore when negotiations suddenly collapsed a few days later on 27th August, and the Chinese refused to continue discussions. The official excuse given was that 'the situation in China had changed' since the Proposals had been put forward at the end of May, but a feeling that the Japanese were somehow at the bottom of the breakdown created a crisis between Britain and her ally.
which undermined hopes of effecting a settlement. Faced with the immediate problem of the breakdown, there was now considerable confusion about the best way to proceed in the face of obvious Chinese prevarication and it became obvious, during the attempts to re-open talks between August 1921 and October 1922, that the Japanese were only a part of the problem. By November 1919 Curzon questioned Jordan's view that the Japanese were a major obstacle to the resumption of talks and he became convinced that Jordan's presence in Peking would prove a liability. He therefore began to suggest to Jordan that he should retire before the re-opening of talks which he had expected to initiate as a grand finale to his long and distinguished diplomatic career. It is obvious at this point that it was Curzon's intention to carry forward the Tibetan policy alone, and it therefore seems likely that he had deliberately shelved discussions about Tibet at this point in an attempt to secure Jordan's removal, and despite protests from Chelmsford and Montagu that their equally positive suggestions for settling the issue were being ignored.

By December 1919 Curzon had clearly taken the decision to handle talks from London after conversations with Alfred Sze, Chinese Minister at the London Legation. This complete confidence in his own ability to solve problems by adopting a 'hard line' was typical of the sort of approach that had caused him so much grief in India, and in these new circumstances this tactic fared equally badly. He was evidently so determined to bludgeon the Chinese into talks by this time that he was willing to leave the Legation in Peking without an experienced Minister in an attempt to make the Chinese believe that the issue was of no consequence to Britain. This was a blow to Chinese prestige which Jordan, and anyone with any real experience in Chinese matters, would not have inflicted, since offering solutions which enabled them to retain prestige had hitherto been regarded an essential pre-requisite for harmonious relations with the Chinese. The fact that Jordan's suggestion for a Chinese Mission to be sent to Tibet to discuss proposals had also been ignored, despite the fact that Montagu and Chelmsford were supporting the idea, leads to the inescapable conclusion that Curzon was deliberately dispensing with Jordan's services in order to handle matters himself. When Jordan eventually left Peking for the last
time in March 1920 he did so with the situation unresolved, although by then Curzon had belatedly accepted his suggestion for a China Mission in principle. Montagu had been incensed by the way his advice had been ignored, and from this time on the India Office began to play a more positive role in Tibetan negotiations, culminating in the despatch of the Bell Mission to Tibet in November 1920.\(^{14}\) In February 1920, shortly before his enforced retirement, Jordan had informed London that the Central Government in Peking had disowned earlier announcements of a possible resumption of talks over Tibet, and the situation was thus deadlocked until April 1921, when hopes were once again raised by a fresh Chinese approach on the matter, Bell's presence in Lhasa by that time having added a new dimension to the situation.\(^{15}\)

Meanwhile Curzon was by now anxious to go ahead with the new plans for talks since his first initiative with Sze had failed, and his relationship with Sze's successor, Wellington Koo, was proving equally unproductive.\(^{16}\) On the pretext of a 'change of events in China' he therefore ordered the new British Minister in Peking, Beilby Alston, to approach the Chinese without delay, in order to secure a date.\(^{17}\) Alston had neither the confidence nor the experience of his predecessor however, and felt far less sure of his ability to secure an agreement with the Chinese. Following a preliminary meeting at the Wai Chaio-Pu, he had reported that the Chinese Foreign Minister, 'though friendly', was 'not at all reliable', and had begged Curzon to attempt to initiate discussions from London.\(^{18}\) Curzon was more than willing to do this and documents were accordingly prepared. During the course of a subsequent interview with Wellington Koo in London on 26th August 1921, he managed to find 'an opportunity' to present him with a statement together with some 'explanatory' observations of his own.\(^{19}\) Alston also approached his Chinese counterpart in Peking with the statements and observations which Curzon had copied to him, and on 31st August, the Japanese were informed of what had taken place.\(^{20}\) Despite these hopeful signs however it soon became obvious that, even if they had wanted to, the Chinese Central Government in Peking were in no position to negotiate with the British. In London, Wellington Koo admitted that China was so riven by internal divisions that all Central Government
control had broken down and that they were no longer able to control their own affairs, let alone to determine the fate of another nation. In addition to Chinese weakness, two new elements contrived to block further discussion. The first was Koo's announcement that his government would not be prepared to discuss the Tibetan situation until after the Washington Conference. The second was the attitude adopted by the Dalai Lama who, with Bell's full support, had declared that he did not wish Tibetan affairs to be discussed in a faraway city like Washington, where any decisions could have no meaning or relevance for Tibet. It was the moral force of his argument in the new post war climate, favouring international solutions to diplomatic problems, which became a powerful factor leading to a British agreement to defer the talks on Tibet until after the Washington Conference was over.

Attempts to re-open talks after the Conference had convened in 1922 were once more rebuffed by the Chinese, but this time the British were aware that the opportunity to settle the Tibetan 'problem' had possibly been lost forever in a situation where they were no longer a force to be reckoned with in China, and where Japan and America now competed for the spoils. There was thus an inevitability about the failure to re-open the Simla Talks which was far wider than the inability of Britain and China to work together, and it is to these wider aspects that I now want to turn.

2. JAPANESE FORWARD POLICY AND TIBET 1904 - 1922

Growing Japanese interest in Tibet became a great source of concern to the British Foreign Service between 1918 and 1922. It had been believed for some time that Japanese 'agents' were operating in Lhasa, a fact apparently confirmed by Bell during his visit there in 1921. Before the first world war however their presence there had never been regarded as a particular problem. Since the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, Japanese agents had co-operated with British agents inside Tibet, passing on information about Russian activity quite successfully because, as Buddhists, they were able to travel freely in the country and often studied for long periods in Tibetan monasteries. Despite this tentative policy of co-operation in Tibet however, wider consultation with the Japanese on
Central Asian policy in general was not encouraged, especially when Japan began to become increasingly involved in Central Asia following their decisive victory over Russia in 1905. While it was recognised as worthwhile to inform Japan about 'what was passing in Tibet', this was only done in the belief that, as allies, they were entitled to know about what were considered to be legitimate British interests there.

During the negotiations leading to the Anglo-Russian Convention however this view was revised as a result of growing Japanese interest in Mongolia, about which the Russians were very concerned. Russian agitation about the presence of Japanese agents in Mongolia, and attempts by them to link Tibet with Mongolia in the course of discussions with Britain, had made it necessary to involve the Japanese in talks about Tibet to a much greater extent than before, and even more so when it became known that the Japanese themselves were actively pressing for more information.

After signing the Convention with Russia in 1907, Grey was at great pains to ensure that the Japanese were kept well informed about the frontier, often in advance of the Russians. Japan's status as Britain's ally thus allowed her to legitimately pursue a number of projects in Central Asia without raising undue comment and, after 1909, leading China hands like Jordan were writing privately of their concerns about growing Japanese influence there.

After the overthrow of the Manchu in 1911 Japanese foreign policy, always factional, became even more divided over what role it should now assume in China. Japanese Nationalists like Miyazaki Torazo became closely associated with Chinese Nationalists like Sun Yet-sen, but Jordan began to be most concerned about the attitude and behaviour of the Japanese military party in Peking, which soon became openly hostile towards Yuan Shih-Kai and critical of Jordan's support for him, and as a result, a serious rift developed between Jordan and Ijuin, the Japanese Minister in Peking.

This rift created problems for Jordan diplomatically, as Japanese influence increased in China, and as their pronounced opposition to Yuan Shih Kai deepened. The conflict also exposed grave weaknesses in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although Grey continued to honour the obligations to the Japanese by keeping them well informed of British movements in Tibet.
As tension mounted between Russia and Japan in Mongolia however, the credibility of the Alliance became increasingly difficult to maintain and it was not long before cracks began to show, even in their dealings with Tibet. In 1913 Grey became aware that the Japanese were intriguing with a Tibetan called Lungshar, who had become the self appointed guardian to four Tibetan boys who had been specially selected to receive an education in Britain. The Japanese were apparently attempting to persuade the boys to reject the British offer in exchange for an education in Japan and although not a serious problem in itself, as Lungshar was notoriously ill-equipped for his role and was openly attempting to profit financially from his position, Japanese moves began to be seen as part of an overall pattern of overtly anti-British behaviour. #33 This was to be further confirmed by the conduct of Japanese agents in Simla during the run up to the Conference in 1913, when officials from the Japanese Legation in Simla had contacted Ivan Chen, demanding that he supply them with detailed information about the course of the negotiations. Although Chen had refused to do this, the Indian government were very alarmed by this blatant approach to the Chinese delegate, and even more so when Chen claimed to be 'uncertain of what his attitude should be toward the Japanese in the future'. #34 The problem of what to do about the activities of these Japanese Consular Officials led to additional friction with the Indian government, and Crewe became anxious that Hardinge might overreact to the situation by publicly denouncing the Japanese before he could approach their government for clarification. Although frayed tempers were eventually cooled, the incident uncovered the great uncertainty about the security of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance within Britain as well as a keen awareness of the increasing Japanese interest in Tibet. #35 Alston's own experiences as acting Charge D'Affaires at Peking in 1913 had confirmed his growing dislike of Japanese behaviour, a view which confirmed Jordan's own private reservations and did little to ease the tensions. #36 The outbreak of war in 1914 and the need to court Japan, finally prevented the alliance from disintegrating, but during the course of the war Japanese interest in Tibet increased to the detriment of Anglo-Chinese relations, and in 1915, a further crisis developed over her promise to supply Tibet with arms.
In March 1916 the Indian Government reported to Chamberlain, who had replaced Crewe as Secretary of State in 1915, that a Japanese emissary known as Aoki had just returned from a visit to Lhasa, having apparently promised to supply the Tibetans with arms through the Japanese Consulate in Calcutta. Tibetan Ministers had already written to Bell in Sikkim requesting machine guns from India stating that, if necessary, they would be prepared to travel to Japan to get them. The Indian Government now found themselves in an extremely delicate position, since firstly, they were in no position to supply the arms requested, even though the Tibetans could argue that they had an obligation to do so under the terms of the Anglo-Tibetan Bipartite Agreement of 1914. Secondly, they could not afford to upset their Japanese allies, whose support was vital to the war in Asia; and thirdly, they could not allow the Japanese to go ahead and supply arms in case much wider issues about their transportation developed and Russia chose to become involved. Chamberlain had a more positive approach to the situation than Crewe but had little experience in handling Tibetan affairs. He agreed with India that an immediate reaction was called for, and it was therefore decided to disallow the passage of any arms through India, which it was felt might be construed as a violation of wartime agreements on the supply of arms, while at the same time arrange for Bell to initiate separate talks with the Tibetans with a view to persuading them to drop their request altogether, a project many experienced India hands realised was doomed to failure since the Tibetans were now very well aware of their strong bargaining position. In the event Britain was forced to supply the Tibetans with guns and ammunition in order to prevent the Japanese from doing so, and this incident reveals the extent to which the Japanese were prepared to involve themselves in Tibetan affairs, even at the risk of jeopardizing their existing Alliance with Britain. In 1917, Japan and America exchanged notes defining the extent of their mutual 'special interests' in China. This news was greeted philosophically by Montagu at the India Office who argued that, although the agreement between Japan and America could not be said to represent a direct challenge to British interests in China or Tibet, if Britain were to contemplate
adhering to such an alliance as a third partner, it might be better to attach to the agreement 'a formal reservation on the subject of Tibet'. As Foreign Secretary Balfour agreed that any arrangement that might recognise Japan's 'special interests' in 'certain parts of China' could not be said to affect the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or treaties already signed between Tibet and Britain, but that India would need to be sure, even informally, that Montagu's reservations had been taken into account in any tripartite agreement with the Americans and Japanese.*42 These views reflect an increasing anxiety about what Britain's post war position in China would be in the face of obvious Japanese and American desires to carve the country into spheres of influence along traditional imperialist lines.*43

British fears about Japanese behaviour in the post war period were soon confirmed by the crisis generated by Japanese attempts to prevent a resumption of the Anglo-Chinese talks on Tibet in 1919.*44 In a Memo dated the day after talks had broken down in August 1919, R. H. Clive of the Peking Legation exposed what he believed to be a concerted attempt by the Japanese controlled press in Peking, to 'grossly misrepresent the nature and scope of the Tibetan negotiations' by deliberately comparing the Tibetan situation with Japanese actions in Shantung as a way of minimising Japanese outrages, and presenting British designs on Tibet as malevolent.*45 Jordan had already reported that a series of pamphlets accusing the British of scheming to include in Tibet 'the Chinese Province of Kansu, half of Szechuan, part of Yunnan, and Kueichow' had been published in Peking, and he was particularly alarmed by the scale and vehemence of the press campaigns, which included articles in the Japanese press in Tokyo, as well as in Peking, and he had taken the precaution of issuing a statement to Reuters denying the allegations. By this time Jordan's personal antagonism towards the Japanese was well known, and his tendency to try to blame them for the downfall and death of Yuan Shih Kai made it increasingly difficult for him to lead discussions on the issue from Peking, despite the fact that he continued to have the full support of his Legation.*46

Clive's Memorandum certainly reflected the views of the Legation staff who believed that the whole campaign to discredit Britain had been orchestrated from Tokyo, and although Clive himself accepted that he had no direct
evidence to this effect, such strong condemnation of an ally was a further indication of how problematical future dealings with Japan might become.47

As Foreign Secretary in 1919 Curzon was faced with yet another crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations, and following conversations with Chindra, the Japanese Ambassador in London, who strenuously denied suggestions that Japanese interference in Chinese affairs had endangered the future of Anglo-Chinese talks on Tibet, he attempted to defuse the situation by sending for the Chinese Minister and presenting him with Japanese denials. When confronted in this way the Chinese Minister expressed great surprise at Japanese reactions, and agreed to telegraph Peking for a reaction. This further attempt by Curzon to handle Chinese affairs from London was also destined to fail however, as events were to show that both Japanese and Chinese representatives were clearly out of touch with the rapid changes of policy in their respective capitals, and Curzon's attempt to arrive at a balanced view in London only complicated matters even further.48

On the same day as their first interview, Chindra returned to Curzon with 'a special message 'from his Government in which he developed, at considerable length', arguments about 'the political and economic claims of Japan' to regions within the Chinese Empire in which they had legitimate interests. Mongolia in particular was mentioned, as were the 'hardships' endured by the Japanese during the course of recent wars which had created the need for them to set up 'barriers' against the possibility of future aggression in Asia, either from a recovered China, or from a restored Germany. He explained that the Japanese were now fully aware of their new international role and felt that the balance of power in Asia had swung in their favour to the detriment of British interests there. When Curzon eventually pressed for a response to allegations that the Japanese had deliberately engineered the breakdown of Anglo-Chinese talks, Chindra 'broke in' on his questions, denying that Obata, Japan's Minister in Peking, had had anything to do with such proceedings, and expressing a willingness to telegraph to Tokyo for confirmation of Obata's innocence. Curzon had already noticed however that Chindra himself appeared to 'have
some suspicions about the political prejudices and the character of Mr Obata' whose behaviour, he told Curzon in confidence, seemed strange, especially in view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and he went on to say that he believed his Government were probably unaware or 'did not believe' the reports which they had received about it. Finally, he denounced the Japanese military party and their conduct in Korea, which had provoked international condemnation, and went on to explain the great divisions in Japanese politics which were now preventing coherent policy making.*49 Despite Obata's protestations in October 1919 that the two issues were linked, Jordan had experienced at that time 'a feeling of intense nervousness about touching Tibet while the problem of Shantung remained unsettled'.*50 Meanwhile Curzon's concern over the delayed resumption of talks had led to further interviews with the Chinese Minister and a stern warning that Anglo-Chinese relations were being threatened by their continued refusal to talk in the face of official Japanese denials.*51 By this time Chinese prevarication was seen as a primary cause of the failure to resume talks, and Jordan's reputation and standing in London had undoubtedly suffered as a result of his refusal to drop his hostility towards the Japanese, whom he continued to blame for the failure of talks. He went on to express these views at a special Conference in London in 1920, called to debate British policy in the lead up to the Washington Conference, where he acted as an advisor on Chinese affairs following his retirement from the China Service.*52 Shortly before Jordan had left Peking, Japanese attention began to turn to America, their main rival in China, and tensions between the two countries increased as Britain's ability to influence events steadily declined.*53 During the tensions generated by the crisis inside China the Indian government and the India Office, under the more forceful regime introduced by Montagu and Chelmsford in 1919, were beginning to realise that, if the Tibetan question were to be settled, India would need to take a more active part in any future negotiations. Taking as a lead Jordan's proposals for a China mission therefore, they began to work toward a solution based on Indian initiatives. In the next section I will look at the way in which they did this by sending their own Mission to Lhasa in November 1921.
3. THE REVISED FORWARD POLICY: BELL'S MISSION TO TIBET

OCTOBER 1920 - NOVEMBER 1921

Within a year of the Rongbasta Truce, reports of fresh fighting began to be received from Tachienlu. What was particularly worrying to the Indian Government in 1919 however were strong rumours that a Mission from Kansu was already making its way to Lhasa, under the leadership of a mysterious 'Tibetan Lama'. Although the Wai Chaio pu insisted that the Mission was an independent provincial initiative launched by General Ma, Jordan felt it unlikely that the Chinese Government in Peking would be willing to entrust such 'serious negotiations' to a 'Tibetan Lama, however pro-Chinese he might be', and suspicions about the nature of the Mission grew, as further information was supplied by Bell, and later by Bailey in Sikkim.

Knowledge of the existence of the Kansu Mission prompted immediate calls from India for a British Mission to be sent to Lhasa in order to establish a presence in the city in the event of any attempt by China to initiate independent discussions with the Dalai Lama, and thus the Kansu Mission was directly responsible for the despatch of Bell's Mission to Lhasa in October 1920.

The mission from Kansu appeared to be a very low key affair, and from information received about it during his time in Lhasa, Bell discovered that it had apparently consisted of two Lamas named Ku Lang Tsang, and Lab Trulku, and two Chinese officials called Li Chung Lien and Chu Hsin. According to reports given to Macdonald at Gyantse the Lamas were accompanied by their 'wives' and seemed to be fairly ignorant about any deeper purpose behind their Mission beyond that of extending the hand of friendship to the Tibetan people. Bell and Chelmsford soon became convinced that there were deeper motives involved, and as more information came to light about the nature of the talks with the Dalai Lama, it seemed increasingly probable that the Chinese accompanying the party had tried to persuade two Tibetan 'representatives' to return with them to Peking if possible, or failing that to Kansu, for further discussions.

The Dalai Lama's initial reluctance to discuss the Mission with him after his arrival in Lhasa alarmed Bell, as did the failure to inform him about the date of its departure from the city. Once aware that an impending British Mission...
was a distinct possibility, the Dalai Lama had apparently been very keen to urge the Kansu party on its way and although, as Bell was to discover, the mission had spent three and a half months in the city, giving strong encouragement to the pro-Chinese faction in the Tsongdu, any lasting damage to Anglo-Tibetan relations had been offset by the Dalai Lama's very pro-British stance.\#60

Bell had been retired for nearly nine months and was living in Darjeeling studying Tibetan literature and Buddhism when a call came in January 1920 asking him to return temporarily to special duties. Although his retirement had been necessitated by ill health and other unspecified reasons, he was willing to go to Lhasa, provided it was on his own terms. In particular he wanted to offer practical help to the Tibetans in the form of arms, especially as the Kansu Mission, and the fresh disturbances in East Tibet, had made them both very nervous about the future and anxious to test the reality of British promises to help them defend themselves in the event of renewed Chinese aggression.\#61 As Bell would soon realise, the Dalai Lama's withdrawal for over three years of intensive meditation between 1916 and 1919, had fuelled insecurities amongst his people which the pro-Chinese factions in Lhasa had been quick to exploit.\#62 Once the unanimous decision to send Bell to Lhasa had been taken however, an immediate conflict arose between the Peking Legation and India over the length of his stay. Having sanctioned and supported the Mission, the Indian Government was now beginning to worry about the implications of the visit for Anglo-Tibetan relations, for it soon became apparent that, the longer Bell stayed in Tibet, the greater would be the opportunity for Tibetans to press their requests for British arms and for a permanent British official to be stationed in Lhasa.\#63 The despatch of the Mission had come initially from Jordan, but his successor Beilby Alston also tended to see the Tibetan problem in the wider context of Anglo-Chinese relations and Alston believed that the longer Bell stayed in Lhasa the better were the chances of alarming the Chinese and thus forcing them to resume talks over Tibet.\#64 Bell himself, having already booked a return ticket to England for December, did not want to stay too long in Tibet initially; however,
once he had arrived in Lhasa in November 1920, he found himself unable to resist the warm entreaties to stay from the Tibetans, and began to press his employers to let him stay on, using a variety of excuses that were apparently convincing enough to ensure an extension of his stay until October 1921, nearly a year after his arrival. Bell's own account of his time in Lhasa provides a fascinating insight into his deep and continuing friendship with the Dalai Lama who insisted that he take up residence less than a quarter of a mile from the Potala, and who entertained him in places never previously open to non-Tibetans, even extending an invitation to Bell's wife to join him in Lhasa in order to meet and socialise with the wives of high ranking Tibetan officials. Bell was so impressed by this hospitality, and so convinced of his own ability to influence the Tibetans, that he stayed, despite the threats to his own personal safety posed by the disturbances and near rebellion in Lhasa during the spring and summer of 1921. His reports about the cosmopolitan nature of Lhasa life were not only interesting in themselves, but were a vital source of information for the Indian Government, as well as for Alston, whose confidence in the reports he was receiving from Louis King in Tachienlu at that time was not great. Bell eventually left Lhasa on October 19th 1921, having delayed his departure, as he had his arrival, in order to leave on a day regarded as auspicious by his hosts. During his time there his own views about Tibet and her future role in the modern world changed and he left feeling very uneasy about British attempts to control Tibetan affairs believing that, ultimately, Tibet should have the authority to determine her own policies. Despite the praise heaped on Bell, the achievements of the Mission itself were later strongly questioned, especially in India, where demands for his return had continued throughout the duration of his stay. As a public relations exercise however the Mission had undoubtedly been very successful in re-establishing Tibetan confidence in British support, and eventually providing the Tibetans with the arms they needed to defend their country against the Chinese.
Bell's own reputation was also enhanced and when he finally returned to India he acted as advisor to talks aimed at establishing a new and even 'friendlier' policy towards Tibet. Alastair Lamb has argued that, although the Bell Mission did not return with any formal Treaty, it did pave the way for great changes in Tibetan life, and although there is much truth in the argument that Bell's visit had acted as a catalyst for changes in the country and that British 'experts' were increasingly called upon to help with the modest modernisation programme resumed by the Dalai Lama after his return from meditation in 1919, this should be set against the help given to Tibet from other countries, and more particularly the willingness and ability of the Tibetans to help themselves.

The Dalai Lama had been anxious to strengthen and modernise his army as one of his top priorities after his return to Lhasa in 1913, and although willing to accept British aid, he was not averse to accepting help from other quarters. Japanese soldiers had been employed in training Tibetan soldiers for many years, and the close links between Mongols and Tibetans had allowed Japanese arms to reach Tibet via Mongolia. Many of the initiatives resulting from the Bell Mission, however, such as the British school in Gyantse; the mining survey, and the granting of permission for the Everest Expedition of 1924 to climb the mountain from the Tibetan side, all ended in failure. What the Mission did accomplish in British terms was a breathing space, enabling Peking, India, and London to take stock of their position, and reassess Tibetan policy in the light of the new information which Bell had supplied. The Mission did not, as many hoped, result in the resumption of talks with China, but this was hardly surprising in view of the very serious obstacle to successful dialogue posed by the growing tensions between Chinese Central Government and the newly independent Provincial Governments of Yunnan and Szechuan.

4. EAST TIBET 1919–1922

Although the Treaties of Rongabasta and Chamdo had enabled the Sino-Tibetan frontier to settle into a long period of comparative peace, disturbances and the rumours of disturbances persisted. These were largely due to the exaggerated accounts from agents employed by the India and
China Services who were often simply observing provincial troop movements, as tensions between Yunnan and Szechuan mounted.\(^76\) Between 1918 and 1922 various accusations of Tibetan aggression were made by China, and it was certainly true that a strong Tibetan presence had been maintained on the frontier in these years, made even more formidable by the modernisation of the Tibetan army, and by the supply of superior arms from Japan, and from Britain after 1921.\(^77\) The situation was further complicated for Britain by her inability to make direct contact with the various forces involved, since by 1919 it was clear that the Chinese Central Government in Peking had no control over the activities of Provincial Governments in Szechuan or Yunnan, whose 'warring armies' they had themselves come to believe were a main cause of frontier disturbance.\(^78\)

Frontier tension had also been generated by General Ma's statements from Kansu voicing his opposition, both to the negotiated boundary, and to the Simla proposals. In the light of these, the despatch of the Kansu Mission in late 1919 had appeared as sinister to the governments of Peking and Szechuan as they had to the Government of India.\(^79\)

In addition, the modernisation of the Tibetan army, very successfully organised from Lhasa by the Dalai Lama and his Commander in Chief Tsarong, was now bearing fruit, and Chinese reports of Tibetan aggression were now to some extent justified. In May 1920 for example, the Nepalese Resident in Lhasa, who was monitoring Tibetan movements closely for reasons of his own, had reported that Tibetans had occupied the Lakuang Lama Monastery on the frontier and were 'busy mobilising troops'; and from Tachienlu, King was reporting on the 'unpopularity' of the new Tibetan administration in Draya, Chamdo, and Markham, claiming that the local people were demanding a return to Chinese rule.\(^80\) Despite this mounting evidence however, Curzon tended to dismiss these reports as exaggerated, or as simply isolated incidents generated by the presence of soldiers in the region, and he was still unwilling to believe the Tibetans capable or desirous of organising a massive mobilisation programme in East Tibet, partly the result of his failure to understand the changes in the political philosophy of the Dalai Lama with whom he had first had dealings in 1903.\(^81\) He had nevertheless taken advantage of Bell's presence in Lhasa.
during 1920 and 1921 to confirm or deny reports of Tibetan aggression coming from King and other sources. The fact that Bell had been quite unable to supply the kind of information requested about the real state of affairs in East Tibet from his isolated position in Lhasa, was never really acknowledged. During his visit the city had been flooded with rumours and counter rumours of an impending Chinese invasion, and Bell himself bombarded with requests from the Dalai Lama for British arms to defend his country, and it was unlikely that he would have been informed of any Tibetan military successes in circumstances where the Tibetans needed to present themselves as helpless victims of Chinese aggression.*82

Lack of confidence in King, who by this time was believed by the Peking Legation to be not only unreliable, but unprofessional in his approach, was a major source of concern for the Service. King had returned to Tachienlu (a post he had opened and successfully manned between 1913 and 1916), as a replacement for Teichman, who had returned to Peking in 1918. To some extent he suffered from the reckless behaviour of his predecessor, since Jordan had eventually blamed Teichman for creating further problems for Britain as a result of his uncontrolled behaviour in East Tibet.*83 However King was happy to resume his duties at Tachienlu despite the 'barnlike rooms' and 'icy draughts' of the remote Consulate, and the presence of a Frontier Commissioner, whom Teichman had previously described as 'not entirely normal'; because to him, Tachienlu was a prestigious, exciting, and unusual posting, which he viewed as an opportunity to advance himself.*84 During his second period of service there between 1918 and 1922, he found his integrity significantly undermined by the complete refusal of his superiors to believe his reports or accept his recommendations, and his late marriage to a Tibetan, shortly before his 'removal' in 1922, finally put paid to all hope of promotion. Although his reports remained lucid and balanced to the last, and were certainly no wilder than those he had issued during the period of his first posting between 1913 and 1916 for which he had been commended, a concerted campaign waged against him by Lampson and other members of the Peking Legation during this second period in office, destroyed his career.*85 The reasons for this campaign had more to do with the internal politics of the
Service than with King's behaviour, since he was always very enthusiastic about his role in East Tibet and in the run up to the Lhasa Mission had offered to head the Mission. In doing this he had crossed Bell, with whom he already shared an acrimonious relationship, having outshone him in reports on East Tibet.*86 This hostility from Bell, an established and well respected authority on Tibet, undoubtedly helped to further undermine his reputation, and his attempts to promote the opening of a second frontier post at Atunzu in Yunnan from which to monitor the East Tibetan area more accurately was greeted with open hostility, as were his offers to act as unofficial mediator in the Sino-Tibetan disputes.*87 This adverse reaction to King’s sincere attempt to settle the frontier was in part due to British desires to withdraw from the area, which, by 1919, was viewed as a dangerous trouble spot and as an obstruction to Anglo-Chinese understanding.*88 His appointment after Teichman had left was, in itself, a reflection of the fact that Tachienlu was now once again regarded as a low priority posting, and after King left in 1922 no consular official resided there, although for some years after unofficial reports were received from Paul Sherap and the Chengtu staff who visited it.*89

5. A NEW TIBETAN POLICY

If the confused situation in East Tibet had acted as a barrier to effective communication with China about the re-opening of talks on Tibet, a major factor in preventing negotiations was Britain's inability to form a coherent Tibetan Policy after 1918. This was partly the result of a rapid turnover of personnel during the post war period and of the lack of information about the country after the Dalai Lama's return in 1913.*90 In 1918 Britain had continued a policy of 'sterilisation' in Tibet, based on the concept of isolating her as far as possible from contact with other nations in the hope of protecting her from 'undesirable' influences in accordance with the spirit of the Anglo-Tibetan Bipartite Agreement of 1914.

In May 1920, during the run up to the Washington Conference and in the light of continuing Chinese refusal to resume talks about Tibet, Alston issued a series of policy statements seriously challenging the 'Simla
position' and arguing that, since the pace of events would eventually force Tibet to open her doors to the outside world, Britain's role should now be to ensure that this would be a gradual process that should proceed at a pace comfortable for the Tibetans themselves. In order to monitor and facilitate the process, Alston maintained that the presence of a Permanent British Representative in Lhasa was essential. He was surprisingly less fearful of Japanese penetration into Tibet than many of his colleagues, for though he did fear Japanese influence in China, he believed that Japanese and American approaches to the Tibetans might be better monitored if they came via India rather than through China or Mongolia, and for this reason he advocated the re-opening of the Indian route to Tibet, closed to international traffic since 1913. He also recommended that settlement of the Tibetan question was a matter of some urgency, to be accomplished without China if necessary, since the pressure of international events would now determine the extent to which Tibet was forced into congress with the outside world.

Bell's Mission had also had some effect on Government policy in India, especially as Bell had remained adviser on Tibetan issues, even in retirement, and had continued to advocate what he described as a more 'liberal' policy towards Tibet, based on his own experiences during his stay in Lhasa. Unlike Alston however, he did not favour stationing a Permanent British Representative in the Tibetan capital because he believed that the remote location and the ever present possibility of violence would make the posting unsafe. He believed that the Yatung Agency should be closed and proposals to establish a post at Chamdo also abandoned. In many ways this complete change of heart was an acknowledgement that British power and influence was waning in Asia, but it was also based on a more tolerant and humanitarian approach to weaker nations that was itself a product of the 'new diplomacy' of the post war period. Curzon shared these sentiments to some extent, but unlike Bell, he rejected the concept of 'new diplomacy' and remained far more traditional in his approach to diplomatic affairs, arguing merely that a 'firm line', and an 'open attitude' on Tibet was needed in future dealings with China. The effect of this approach in policy terms however tended to be the same, so that by
1921 there was general consensus within the Foreign Service that the Tibetan 'problem' could be settled without China if necessary. By 1922 British policy towards Tibet had reached a sort of solution based on Britain's need to settle her Asian affairs in the general climate of her declining status in the post-war world. In this new world the 'problems' of Tibet were no longer of vital importance, the main aim of policy for Britain being merely to survive in Asia.
13. Tibetan Soldiers c.1910

29. Soldiers of the New Tibetan Army c.1921
The Younghusband Expedition acted as a catalyst for change in British Tibetan policy. Reluctantly sanctioned by the Foreign Office in the hope of finally settling trade disputes on the frontier, it had soon generated its own momentum following China's refusal to accept the Lhasa Convention which marked the beginning of the problem which Tibet created for Anglo-Chinese relations that came to dominate Tibetan policy between 1904 and 1922.

There was a sad inevitability about the quadrilateral conflict which developed within the British Foreign Service over the Tibetan Question between 1904 and 1922. The problem of Tibet tested the resources of all four branches of the service during this time because each had a different view of the problem. For the Foreign Office, Tibet was but a small part of its wider policy in Asia which aimed at countering Russian interest there and relied on the maintenance of harmonious relations with China in the interests of commercial profit. Within the Foreign Office itself the Far Eastern Department was given a great deal of flexibility during Grey's tenure as Foreign Secretary and his protection also ensured that, in Peking, Jordan was allowed considerable leeway in the implementation of policy in East Tibet as well as great influence in decisions about the Tibetan problem within the service, a fact demonstrated by his rapid fall from grace after Grey's retirement in December 1916.

The problem which Tibet presented for India was quite different. For the Indian government Tibet was purely a frontier matter. Its main aim was to settle the frontier in order to provide a suitable buffer to protect Indian frontiers, firstly from the Russians and, after 1907, when the Anglo-Russian Convention had prevented any overt attempts by Russia to exercise formal control over Tibet, from the Chinese, although attempts were still made after this time to retain the commercial gains secured by the Lhasa Convention. The pull and push of priorities over Tibet at various times, which generated intense conflicts within the various branches of the Service, allowed individuals to exert considerable influence over policy at different times, but the support which Jordan received from Grey between 1906 and 1916 allowed his influence to be disproportionately large.

**CONCLUSION**

The Younghusband Expedition acted as a catalyst for change in British Tibetan policy. Reluctantly sanctioned by the Foreign Office in the hope of finally settling trade disputes on the frontier, it had soon generated its own momentum following China's refusal to accept the Lhasa Convention which marked the beginning of the problem which Tibet created for Anglo-Chinese relations that came to dominate Tibetan policy between 1904 and 1922.

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throughout these years. After this time his influence waned, but he managed to hold on to his post until March 1920, by virtue of his experience and reputation as a China expert.

As Viceroy of India, and later, as Foreign Secretary, Curzon's views inevitably dominated much of the thinking of those keen to promote a forward policy in Tibet. However, his ability to directly influence Tibetan policy after 1905 was minimised by the powerful effect of the non-involvement policy fronted by Morley at the India Office, and later by Hardinge's defensive attitude towards Tibet in his dealings with the India Office and the China Service in the debate over control of frontier policy. Hardinge's dislike of Jordan, and his own presence in the Foreign Office after 1916, may have been a factor in promoting Jordan's premature departure but ultimately, although powerful figures like Hardinge came and went, the conduct of policy was determined by wider events in Asia which only the Foreign Office in London could effectively respond to, and on his return to the Foreign Office in 1919, Curzon felt able to take over the conduct of this policy himself and dispense with Jordan's services.

One of the recurring themes of this thesis has been the conflict between those charged with the implementation of policy on the spot, and the increasing number of experts drafted into the Foreign Office to help deal with the extra workload. The Curzonians who worked at the Trade Marts were the first victims of this struggle, but the China Service also had its victims not the least of whom was Jordan himself who, in challenging the power of ex-Viceroy's like Curzon and Hardinge, made powerful enemies for himself who eventually caused his downfall.

Underpinning many of the disputes were arguments about the promotion of trade which had been lucrative enough to ensure that Trade Agents remained in Tibet long after the evacuation of Chumbi had made their situation politically weak. The cost of protecting them was undertaken by the Government of India, partly as a consequence of pressure from business interests, but also because Tibet was seen as part of an overall plan to develop the commercial potential of the whole Himalayan region, as White's plans for Bhutan and Sikkim reveal, and which was suggested in O'Connor's Report of 1906. After 1911, many of those ventures had to be abandoned,
but interest in the commercial potential of Tibet never really disappeared, and resurfaced in Bell's recommendations for the mining survey of 1921. British misperceptions about the nature of Tibetan society and the roles played by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were a very important source of conflict in this period. Until the Dalai Lama's exile in India between 1910 and 1912, most information about Tibet had come from contact with the Panchen Lama, but after 1912 the Dalai Lama began to gain respect as a powerful ruler in his own right, and the Bell Mission to Lhasa in 1921 marked a watershed in British relations with Tibet since, for the first time since 1904, the Dalai Lama was approached directly as the ruler of Tibet without reference to China. In a sense Bell's Mission brings the wheel full circle because the need to establish closer links with Tibet as a means of ensuring the safety of India's borders had been the main aim behind Curzon's decision to send the Younghusband Expedition in 1904.

The British clearly lost face in Tibet between 1904 and 1922. Their attempts to woo the Dalai Lama were often the subject of international scrutiny, and their inability to compete with either the Japanese or the Russians in acquiring access to the country without force was a serious handicap to their credibility. Apart from a few individuals like Bell and O'Connor, who were able to establish a rapport with Tibetan leaders, there was never a figure who could replace Dorjiev as a trusted friend to the Dalai Lama. Despite its proximity to Tibet, the Indian government could never, like the Chinese, claim traditional alliances with the country, and most treaties they signed with the Tibetans were made under duress, accompanied with promises of support which were not effectively honoured. The mutual antagonism between Christian missionaries and Buddhist monks denied British Consular Officers any possible access which they might otherwise have had to the great monasteries of East Tibet and, since there were many missionaries in the region, and few British Consular officials, this was a serious problem which officials like Teichman and White identified in reports. British attempts to retain prestige on the frontier were also significantly undermined by the traditional ties between the Chinese in East Tibet and the powerful Drepung monastery in Lhasa.
The British problem in Tibet was essentially one of their own making since it was based on a false perception of what constituted control in the country. Although by 1922 a few Tibetan experts appreciated the nature of the vast network of traditional alliances and informal understandings that governed the conduct of policy in Central Asia, there was still great ignorance about the importance of the understandings which was partly the result of misinformation supplied by the Chinese and by the Tibetans themselves, but was often the result of their own failure to perceive the nuances of diplomatic practice other than in western terms.

British interest in Tibet by its very nature helped to create the problems leading to the Chinese invasion of 1959, since without the Lhasa Convention of 1904, the Adhesion Treaty of 1906, the Trade Regulations of 1908, and the Anglo-Tibetan Bipartite Agreement of 1914, Chinese interest in what they had hitherto regarded as a remote and backward region, might not have been so suddenly and disastrously awakened, and the full scale invasion in 1910 of what they had previously regarded as merely a vassal state, might have been avoided. This invasion, which could not be sustained much beyond the Manchu collapse in 1911, only lingered to embarrass the new Republican Government who, in order to save face, had to find a suitable role for Tibet within their new Republic. Part of the problem for them was also the way in which their long standing involvement in East Tibet, as part of their wider plan for the creation of Sikang, became inextricably tied to their belief in the need for formal control in Tibet. Their inability to curb the enthusiasm of the Provincial Governments of Szechuan and Yunnan, and their attempts to avoid losing face by admitting this weakness, had implications, not only for their relations with Tibet, but also for those with Britain and for their own status under international law. Fear of once again being at the mercy of foreign powers, as had been the case after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, dominated Republican thinking on this issue, and was partly responsible for their withdrawal from the Simla Conference in 1913.

The British government must bear some responsibility for exposing Tibet to aggressive Chinese policy between 1904 and 1911, but even after this, their failure to honour promises to support the country under the terms of the
Bipartite Agreement of 1914 and in the face of continuing Chinese aggression, made Tibet once again vulnerable to Chinese invasion. Had the Foreign Office been prepared to honour their obligations to Tibet after 1914, Tibetans might have been more willing to accept a place in the international community than they were. After Bell's departure in 1921 they began to withdraw from involvements, and by 1924 were once again adopting an isolationist stance which, in the absence of international interest in Tibet, the Chinese were eventually able to fully exploit, launching the full scale invasion of the country in 1959.

With hindsight, it is possible to see therefore, that the roots of the policy which placed Anglo-Chinese relations above the interests of Tibetans, and which has allowed the present British government to acquiesce in China's destruction of Tibetan autonomy and culture, may be traced back to the critical debates about frontier policy between the Younghusband Expedition in 1904, and the Washington Conference of 1922.

2. MAPS 2 and 5.


4. Gelugpa or Yellow Hat Sect, see under Glossary of Terms.

5. Amban, see under Glossary of Terms.

6. In Tibet the Buddhist hierarchy is superior to the lay. Monasteries were exempt from taxation and from civil legislation. Monks had been active in political life from the earliest days of Buddhism. Tsongdu, see under Glossary of Terms.


11. W. Rockhill: Appendix biography No. 54

12. Cho-yon, see under Glossary of Terms.


Introduction - Notes 2

17. For example: Alexander Hosie, *Three Years in Western China* (London, 1897) and Major H.R. Davies, *Yunnan the Link Between India and the Yangtze* (Cambridge, 1909).

18. Curzon: Appendix biography No.16.

19. Drepung, Sera, Ganden, see under Glossary of Places.

20. Ugyen Kazi: Appendix biography No.63

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction p.15 and note 14.

2. Macaulay died four years later, a broken man.


4. Accounts of his decisions on frontier issues during his term of office may be found in the Minto Papers, MSS. Nos.12588-12609, 'Summary of the Principal Events and Measures of the Viceroyalty of His Excellency Lord Curzon of Kedleston Viceroy and Governor General of India in the Foreign Department'.


8. MAP 3. Cd.1920, No.13,.Gvt. of India to Secretary of State, 25/6/1895, Reports from Claude White Political Officer in Sikkim on recent developments on the Frontier.

9. A fuller account of the Younghusband Expedition may be found in Peter Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa. (London, 1962).


12. MAP 2. Gartok and Gyantse, see under Glossary of Places.


15. For a first hand account of the signing ceremony see Younghusband, India and Tibet, pp.303-6.

16. For a fuller first hand account of this post Convention period spent in Lhasa see Younghusband, India and Tibet, pp.306-21.


23. Dalai Lama: Appendix biography No. 17

24. Following his return to Britain in November 1905, Curzon helped to mount a very effective campaign in support of a forward policy in Tibet and for years after he continued to receive official reports and documents about the country.

25. For example, Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, pp. 227-9.

26. Cd. 2247, ‘Report by Mr. A. Hosie, His Majesty’s Consul-General at Chengtu, on a Journey to the Eastern Frontier of Tibet, 1904’. Curzonians, see under Glossary of Terms.


31. For example, Cd. 1920, No 124, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27/10/03; No. 129, Gvt. of India to Secretary of State, 5/1/03, Encl. 2, Gvt. of India to Gvt. of Bengal, 22/6/03, Encl. 11, T.A. Yatung to Gvt. of India, 7/7/03; No 15, Extract from O’Connor’s Diary, July 1903.


33. Yu Ta’i: Appendix biography No. 73.

34. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, pp. 34; 74-6; and 146-8.

35. F. O’Connor, *On the Frontier and Beyond*, pp. 27-9 and 34.


35. Cd.1920, No.60, Townley to Lansdowne, 16/12/02; No.65, Townley to Lansdowne, 7/1/03; No. 116, Satow to Lansdowne, 25/9/03; No 117, Satow to Lansdowne, 28/9/03; No. 119, Telegram, Satow to Lansdowne, 1/10/03; No. 142, Satow to Lansdowne, 19/11/03.

Cd.2054, Further Papers Relating to Tibet, No. 46, Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8/4/04.


37. Yu Tai: Appendix biography No.73

Younghusband, India and Tibet, pp.342-3.

38. Cd.2054, No. 8, Secretary to the Gvt. of India to India Office, 2/3/05; No. 9, Secretary to the Gvt. of India to India Office, Encl. 9, Letter from T.A. Gyantse to Gvt. of India, 1/3/05.


Charles Bell, F. O'Connor and F. M. Bailey: Appendix biographies Nos.4, 51 and 3.

40. Cd.5240, No.12, Acting C.G. Chengtu, Campbell to Satow, 30/5/05. For an account of the murder and British comments, Cd. 2054, No.23, C.G. Yunnanfu, Williamson to Lansdowne, 30/6/05, enclosing, 'Reports from Brigadier General in Wei Hsi to this Government', No.24, Goffe to Satow, Chengtu, 10/6/05, enclosing a report from the 'Official Gazette' article on 'How Feng Met His Death.'

41. Cd.52054, No.22, Goffe to Satow, Chengtu, 31/5/05; No. 23, Wilkinson to Lansdowne, Yunnanfu. 30/6/05; No.25, Acting Consul Litton to Satow, Tengyueh, 4/8/05; No. 45, Satow to Lansdowne, 18/11/05.

Tachienlu, see under Glossary of Places.

43. MAP 5. Nyarong, see under Glossary of Places.

Minto Papers, MS. 12640, 'Chinese Claims to the Province of Nyarong' and MS. 12641, Memo for February 1908.

44. Teichman, Travels. This gives a good general survey from the viewpoint of a China Service employee.
There is no reference to Chinese suzerainty in the Lhasa Convention or to any special relationship between China and Tibet. However, in his speech following the signing, Younghusband did mention that the British government recognised Chinese suzerainty (FO 535/5, No. 53, Incl. 2, Younghusband's Speech, 7/9/04). Yu Tai was told not to sign the Convention in the absence of any written confirmation (FO 535/4, 109, Incl. 1, Gvt. to India Office, quoting Wai Wu Fu to Amban, 15/9/04). Although Yu Tai did suggest that an amendment be inserted to include the words 'China, being the suzerain of Tibet' it was not included in the final draft that O'Connor produced. (FO 535/5, No. 20, Incl. 3, 'Suggested Amendments Made By The Amban', 21/8/04). Younghusband subsequently denied that Article 9 made any reference to a special relationship between the Emperor and the Dalai Lama. (FO 535/5, No. 20, Incl. Younghusband to Gvt. of India, 28/8/04).

CD 2370 1905, No. 43, Undersecretary Foreign Office to Undersecretary India Office, 5/11/05.


Morley: Appendix biography No. 47


Dorjiev: Appendix biography No. 19.

For example, Morrison Papers, MSS. 312/259 269/71, 'Notes on the Dalai Lama'.

Introduction pp. 15-16. For example, Cd. 2540 No. 36, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 4/10/05.

Panchen Lama: Appendix biography No. 52.

O'Connor, On the Frontier, pp. 86, 90

Introduction pp. 15-16.

Morrison Papers, MS. 312/259 245 'Notes on the Tashi Lama'.

O'Connor, On The Frontier, p 77.

Minto Papers, MS. 12636, 'Visit of the Tashi lama of Shigatse to India'. India Office Papers L/P&5/10/7250, 'Relations with the Tashi Lama', No. 901, Bell to India, 30/6/09.
White: Appendix biography No. 67

Cd.5240, No. 57 Viceroy to Secretary of State 6/12/05.


56. Tsonga Penlop: Appendix biography No. 61.

57. Minto Papers, MS.12636 p65, 'Visit of the Tashi Lama of Shigatse to India.

58. India Office Papers, L/P&S/17/10/7250, No. 901, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16/1/06.

59. India Office Papers, L/P&S/17/10/7250, No. 906, Secretary of State to Viceroy, Tel 2/5/06. Chapter 4.

60. India Office Papers, L/P&S/17/10/7250, No. 901, Viceroy to India Office, 23/2/06.

61. India Office Papers, L/P&S/17/10/7250, No. 901, Viceroy to India Office, 23/2/06.

62. Minto Papers, MS. 12641, memo, Jan. 1906, 'Report of Newsletter Received From P.M. Nepal, 15/11/06.


66. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

67. This was Younghusband's view. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, pp. 21-46; 52-3 and 132-3.

69. Cd.2054, No.60, Encls.in Letter to Gvt. of India, Foreign Dept., 28/12/05, containing Bell's Report on Chumbi; No.9, Encl.9, Gvt. of India, Foreign Dept., 1/3/05; No 28; India Office to Foreign Office, 15/9/05.
Cd. 5240, No. 113, Minto to Morley, 16/12/06.

70. Phari, see under Glossary of Places.
Jongpen, see under Glossary of Terms.
Cd. 2054, No.26, Morley to Minto, 6/1/05.

71. The Tibetan's believed that the lines could carry messages from evil spirits.

72. Jordan Papers, FO 350/4, Jordan to Campbell, 27/12/06; Jordan to Pelham Warren, 16/1/07; Jordan to Campbell, 24/1/07; Jordan to Campbell, 21/1/07; Jordan to Campbell, Private, 21/3/06.
S.F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs Service, (Belfast, 1950), provides a good background history of the service.


74. Introduction pp.21.

75. MAP 2.
Youghusband, India and Tibet, pp.328-31.

76. Swinson, Beyond the Frontiers, pp.44.

77. Minto Papers, MS 12640, Item 12, and MSS 12641, Item 10.

78. Thomas Richard, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and Fantasy of Empire, (New York, 1993), pp.11-44.

79. Chapter 1 pp.37.

80. For example: India Office Papers, L/P&S/17/10/7250, No.901, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 15/11/06; Foreign Dept. to P.O. Sikkim, 10/10/06; Viceroy to Foreign Office, 28/11/06; Viceroy to Foreign Secretary, 16/9/06; Secretary of State to Viceroy, 18/9/06; Secretary of State to Viceroy, 5/2/06; Viceroy to India Office, 23/2/06.

81. Satow: Appendix biography No.56.

82. Minto Papers, MS. 12640, Satow Report, Satow to Viceroy, 27/9/04.
T'ang Shao yi: Appendix biography No.59.

83. Minto Papers, MS.12594, Morley to Satow, 29/9/04.

84. FO 535/4, No.106, Foreign Office to India Office, 10/10/04.
Van Praag, The Status of Tibet, pp.35-7
85. FO 535/4, No. 119, Incl. Govt. of India to India Office, 29/9/04.
89. Suzerian and sovereign, see under Glossary of Terms.
96. Cd. 5240, No. 43 Foreign Office to India Office, 15/11/05; No. 46, India Office to Foreign Office, 2/11/05; No. 48, Sec. of State to Viceroy, 26/11/05; No. 50, Viceroy to Sec. of State, 30/11/05; No. 52, India Office to Foreign Office, 1/12/05; No. 54, Foreign Office to India Office, 4/12/05.
100. Minto Papers, MS. 12640, Tibetan Indemnity, Trade Reports Chumbi, December 1905.
102. Cd. 2054, No. 54, Foreign Office to India Office, 4/12/05.
103. Cd. 2054, No. 62, India Office to Foreign Office, 24/1/06.

Cd. 2054, No.13, Satow to Lansdowne, 26/4/05; No.35, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 30/9/05.  
Bogdo, see under Glossary of Terms.  
Urga, see under Glossary of Places.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. For a good history of the Foreign Office during this period, see Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1894-1914, (Cambridge, 1969).

2. Grey and Lansdowne: Appendix biographies Nos. 26 and 38.


6. Regularising hours did have the effect of creating a very formal office atmosphere that had previously been absent.

7. Hardinge and Nicolson were both diplomats who had transferred at this higher level.


15. The Legation in Peking was not an Embassy and the British minister not an Ambassador. Despite pressure to upgrade the Legation, permission was not forthcoming, possibly because its primary function was the conduct of trade and commerce.

17. Steiner, *The Foreign Office & Foreign Policy 1898-1912*, pp. 69, 216

18. Grey had delegated much of the European work to Hardinge, his Undersecretary.

Walter Langley: Appendix biography No. 37.

20. Alston, Max Muller, J. D. Gregory: Appendix biographies Nos. 1, 44 and 25.


C. W. Campbell, Max Muller: Appendix biographies Nos. 7 and 44.

25. Doyen, Wai Wu Pu, see under Glossary of Terms.


27. This friendship led to strong criticism of Jordan later on.
Chapter 7 pp 181-183

Chirol describes a visit to the Wai Wu Pu in 1895 with the British Minister Claude MacDonald.

Wellington Koo: Appendix biography No. 66.

30. Satow and Jordan: Appendix biographies Nos. 56 and 32.


33. Tachienlu, see under Glossary of Places.
   The post was to be jointly monitored with the India Service although
   the Consulate was to be held by the China Service. This situation was
   to generate considerable conflict between the incumbants.


35. MAP 4.
   Coates, China Consuls, pp.314-16; 394-7.
   Sir Alexander Hosie, Three Years in Western China, (London, 1897),
   Tengyueh, Yunannfu, Chengtu, and Sadiya, see under Glossary of Places.

36. Coates, China Consuls, pp.306.


38. Coates, China Consuls, pp.396.
   Twyman: Appendix biography No.62.

   Wilkinson, Teichman: Appendix biographies Nos.68 and 60.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

   Godley: Appendix biography No.22.

2. Reports were produced in May and December each year. The May reports cover a year's events in chronological order, and the December reports grouped the same events under subject headings. From 1905 the Viceroy printed Foreign Department reports on his own press at Simla.


4. The India Office, (London, 1926), passim.

5. John Morley: Appendix biography No.47.


8. Godley: Appendix biography No.22.

   Ritchie: Appendix biography No.53.


   MS. 12601,'Record of Lord Kitchener's Administration of the Army in India 1902-1909', pp.217.
   MS.12588, Summary, Home Dept, Part II, December 1904-November 1905, pp.82, (referring to permission given to Officers of the India Service to spend one year in Peking learning Chinese, and 'Frontier Language Examinations' of Officers in the frontier languages of Burma'. 13/8/03;
   MS. 12591, 'Curzon's Speech to the Gvt. of India on Frontier Policy' 30/3/04.
   Gilmour, Curzon, pp.93-4.
13. For example, Cd.1920, No.15, 'Trade With Tibet, Correspondence with Bradford Chamber of Commerce, 6/12/1894; No.24, Bengal to Gvt. of India, 'Trade and Frontier Questions', Sikkim Administration Report, 1897-8,27/8/1898; No. 46, Gvt. of India to India Office, 'Trade in Indian Tea with Tibet', Correspondence with Bradford Chamber of Commerce 26/6/02.


15. 'The Times. 'Indian Unrest' c1910.
Koss, *Morley at the India Office*, pp.91
Hardinge, Curzon, Minto. Appendix biographies Nos.27,16,45.


Gilmour, *Curzon*, pp.205-6


Brodrick and Curzon: Appendix biographies Nos.5 and 16.

22. Gilmour, *Curzon*, pp.265; 275; 291; 301.


Koss, *Morley at the India Office*, pp.113


27. Koss, *Morley at the India Office*, pp.56-7
28. Mary, Countess of Minto always resented the fact that Morley's name always appeared first in correspondence hence the title of her book, *India under Minto and Morley*.

29. For example, The Times newspaper article of 29th September 1897.


32. For example, Chapter 4, pp.101-3; Chapter 5, pp.132-3.


34. For more details about the careers of Hardinge and Crewe, Appendix biographies Nos.27 and 15.


40. Chapter 6, pp. 140-5.


42. Chapter 6, pp.140-5.

43. FO. 535/14, Jordan to Grey, 21/7/11.

44. Chapter 6, pp. 140-5.

45. The Viceroy controlled his own frontier policy.


47. For example, Swinson, *Beyond the Frontier*, pp. 4-5.
Charles Bell: Appendix biography No. 4.

   Dr. Shelton: Appendix biography No. 57.

50. Minto Papers, MS. 12640, 'Opening of Dispensaries at Gyantse and
    Chumbi', Nov. 1905-March 1906, Confidential.
    MS. 12636, 'Revision of Medical arrangements in Chumbi on it's
    Evacuation'.

    Claude White: Appendix biography No. 68.

52. For more details about the pundits Peter Hopkirk's, *Trespassers on

53. Younghusband was educated at Clifton.
    Henry Cowper, *British Education. Public and Private, and the British

54. Ibid. pp. 184 and 188.

    Patrick French, *Younghusband: The Last Great Imperial Adventurer*,
    (London, 1994).

56. Bailey: Appendix biography No. 3

57. For example, Hosie, *Three Years in China*;
    Sherring, *Western Tibet and the British Borderlands*;
    Davis, *Yunnan: The Link Between India and the Yangtze*.

58. Bell was later invited to Lhasa by the Dalai Lama.
    Chapter 9, pp. 228-234.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR


2. Aleksander Petrovich Izvolsky 1856-1919. Russian Minister in St. Petersburg 1906-10. Like the Tsar he opposed the forward policy in Central Asia then being promoted by the Military Party inside Russia.

3. The first of these incidents was the discovery of the presence of a British fleet on cruise in the Baltic. The second was a speech to the Commons by Campbell Bannerman on 23rd July 1906 in which his comments, following the collapse of the Duma, were taken by some to imply criticism of the Tsar.


6. FO 535/9, No. 7, Nicolson to Grey, 26/12/06.


8. FO 535/9, No. 29, Nicolson to Grey, 6/1/07.


10. FO 535/9, No. 84, Nicolson to Grey, 23/3/07.

11. FO 535/9, No. 84, Nicolson to Grey, 23/3/07.

12. Cd. 5240, No. 27, Jordan to Grey, 26/9/07, enclosed draft submitted by Jordan to the Wai Wu Pu; No. 206, Jordan to Grey, 22/8/07.

13. Cd. 5240, No. 207, Jordan to Grey, 28/9/07. This was included in separate notes attached to the Convention.


16. MAP 2. Introduction pp. 16; Chapter 1, pp. 29-30.

17. For a good history of this period and the plans for the creation of Sikang, Adshead, *Province and Politics in Late Imperial China: Viceregal Government in Szechuan 1898-1911*, passim.
18. Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 23/1/08.
19. Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 11/7/07.
20. FO 535/9, No. 29, Nicolson to Grey, 6/1/07.
22. Cd. 5240, No. 209, Jordan to Grey, 14/10/07.
23. Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 11/7/07.
24. FO 535/9, No. 28, Nicolson to Grey, 5/1/07.
25. FO 535/9, No. 28, Nicolson to Grey, 5/1/07.
27. FO 535/9, No. 11, Nicolson to Grey, 5/1/07.
28. FO 535/9, No. 29, Nicolson to Grey, 6/1/07.
30. FO 371/382, India Office to Foreign Office, 5/2/07.
31. FO 535/9, No. 43, Nicolson to Grey, report marked 'Most Confidential' 19/1/07.
33. Hardinge Papers, 1907, No. 11, Hardinge to Nicolson, 19/3/07.
34. FO 535/9, No. 64, Nicolson to Grey, 12/2/07.
36. FO 535/9, No. 28, Nicolson to Grey, 5/1/07.
37. Jordan Papers, 350/10, Jordan to Campbell, 11/7/07, Jordan to Campbell, 23/1/08.


Morley, Recollections, Vol. II, pp.244-5.


41. FO 535/9, No.26, O'Connor to Gvt. of India, 27/4/06.
O'Connor: Appendix biography No.51.

42. In the report O'Connor describes 'The furtherance and development of our commercial relations with Tibet' as the 'second object' of the negotiations for the Convention.

43. FO 535/9, No.26, O'Connor to Gvt. of India, 27/4/06.

44. Jongpens, see under Glossary of Terms.
Phari, see under Glossary of Places.


46. For example, Cd.1920, No.13, Reports from Claude White, Encls. in Gvt. of Bengal to Gvt. of India, 25/6/1894.
White: Appendix biography No.67.

47. Hosie: Appendix biography No.30.
Cd. 2247, Trade Reports, 'Mr. A. Hosie His Majesty's Consul General at Chengtu "On a Journey to the Eastern Frontier of Tibet, 1904". This comprehensive report on the trade in tea and mineral wealth including gold refers to a great highway connecting Chengtu the capital of Szechuan with Lhasa.
Introduction pp.17, Note 17.


49. FO 535/9, No.26, O'Connor to Gvt. of India, 26/4/06.

50. FO 535/9, No.27, Encl.4, Quarterly Report Chumbi Valley, 30/6/06.

51. FO 535/9, No.27, O'Connor to Gvt. of India, 26/4/06.
Hutchinson eventually produced a report in pamphlet form entitled Indian Brick Tea for Tibet, published by the Cess Tea Company Ltd. in 1906. (Calcutta, 1906).

52. FO 535/9, No.27, Encl.4, Quarterly Report by W.L. Campbell, 30/6/06.
53. Tsarong Shape later became one of the Dalai Lama's closest advisors. In 1908, Louis Dane left the talks to become Governor of the Punjab and Eric Wilton replaced him as leading British negotiator. Dane and Wilton: Appendix biographies Nos. 18 and 69.

54. Cd. 5240, No. 118, Minto to Morley, 22/12/06; No. 120, Gvt. of India to India Office, 24/12/06; No 218, Minto to Morley, 5/1/08.


57. Cd. 5240, No. 118, Minto to Morley, 22/12/06.

58. Cd. 5240, No. 124, Grey to Jordan, 28/12/06; No. 127, Morley to Minto, 27/12/06; No. 148, Jordan to Grey, 23/12/07.

59. Cd. 5240, No. 210, Jordan to Grey, 24/12/07.

60. Cd. 5240, No. 218, Minto to Morley, 5/1/08.

61. Cd. 5240, No. 220, Grey to Jordan, 21/1/08.

62. Cd. 5240, No. 235, Encl. in letter to Gvt. of India, 25/2/08; No. 226, Morley to Minto, 10/1/08; No. 226, Minto to Morley, 12/12/08.

63. FO 535/11, India Office to Foreign Office, 21/9/08.

64. CD 5240, No. 257, Extract from O'Connors Dairy week ending 26/9/08; No. 280, Morley to Minto 30/3/09; 294, Encl. in letter to Gvt. of India, P.O. Sikkim to Secretary of Gvt. of India, 30/10/09 and, P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 'Report on Trade Matters', 10/7/09.

65. Cd. 5240, No. 294, Encl. in letter to Gvt. of India; P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 30/10/09; P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India 'Report on Trade Matters', 10/7/09.

Charles Bell, The People of Tibet, (Oxford, 1924), pp. 59-60 and 120.

66. Cd. 5240 No. 92, Gvt. of India to Secretary of State, 31/2/05: Encl. 1, P.O. Sikkim to Secretary to Gvt. of India, 31/12/04.


67. Cd. 2540, 92, No. Gvt. of India to Secretary of State, 17/4/06; Encl. 2, Gvt. of India to P.O. Sikkim, 1/4/05; Encl. 3, P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 5/7/05; Encl. 4, Gvt. of India to P.O. Sikkim, 26/7/05; Encl. 5, Extract from T.A. Gynatse Diary for week ending 3/9/05.
68. Cd.2540, No.92, Encl.7, Gvt.of India to Secretary of State, 7/4/06; Encl.7, P.O.Sikkim to Gvt.of India, 26/3/06.
Minto: Appendix biography No.45.

69. Cd. 5240, No.97, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27/6/06.

70. Cd.5240, No.100, Secretary of State to Gvt.of India, 13/7/06.

71. Chapter 1, pp.34 and 36. Chapter 1, Note 63.
Claude White, *Sikkim and Bhutan*, pp.94-96.
White: Appendix biography No.68.
For a less charitable view of White's character, Patrick French,


73. Cd.5240, No.95, Minto to Morley, 22/6/06; No.96, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 22/6/06.

74. Cd.5240, No.95, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22/6/06.

75. Cd. 5240, No.95, Minto to Morley, 22/6/06.

76. Cd.5240, No.96, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 26/6/06.

77. Cd.5240, No.101, Encls.in letter to Gvt.of India, 26/6/06; Encl. 'Memo of conversation between Louis Dane and Chang Yin-tang'. Minto Papers, MS.12640, 'Interviews Chang and Foreign Secretary', 25/6/06, pp.12-14.

78. Gartok, see under Glossary of Places.
Garpons, see under Glossary of Terms.

79. Chang's assumption that the Chinese Adhesion Treaty had sorted out conditions on the frontier and 'returned' Tibet to China later became the official view of the Wai Wu Pu.

80. Cd.5240, No.96, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 22/6/06; No.101, Encl.1, Memo, conversation between Dane and Chang, 28/6/06.

81. Jordan Papers, FO350/4, Jordan to Campbell, 21/2/07; Jordan to Campbell, 2/5/07; Jordan to Campbell, 19/8/08; Jordan to Campbell, 19/3/08.
Tang Shao-yi: Appendix biography No.59.

82. Cd.5240, No.103, Minto to Morley, 2/10/06.
83. Pon Pon, see under Glossary of Terms.  
Cd.5240, No.105, Encls.in letter to Gvt.of India,18/10/06; Encl.2, 'Campbells report on the arrival of Mr.Chang in Chumbi Valley', 8/10/06; This extensive report is the main source for this section and will henceforth be referred to as, Cd. 5240, No. 105.

84. Cd.5240,No.105, Encl. 1, 'Bell Report, containing Campbell Report and his own comments; No. 131, Encls. in letter to Gvt. of India, 27/12/06; Encl.2, Report in letter dated Pipitang,30/9/06, from Chang Yin-Tang to Gvt.of India.

85. Cd. 5240, No.105.  
Dak Bungalows, see under, Glossary of Terms.

86. Campbell subsequently accused Chang of behaving in the devious way of Chinese diplomats in the Pre-Boxer era when the Chinese were more confident in their dealings with the British.


88. Campbell thought that Chang might have used his presence in Yatung to formally open the mart in his capacity as High Commissioner and in so doing deny that its formal opening by the British before the Lhasa Convention had been signed.

89. This view taken by the Foreign Office and India Office is supported by Lamb, The McMahon Line, Vol.I, pp.129.

90. Note 80.

91. Cd. 5240,No. 131, Encls. in Letter to Gvt.of India,27/12/06; Encl.1, Memo by Bell, 9/10/06.

92. Cd. 5240,No. 105; Encl.1, Bell Report on Campbell Report of Chang's arrival in Chumbi, 27/12/06; No. 131, Encls. in letter to Gvt. of India; Encl. 2, Report on letter dated Pipitang, 30/9/06, Chang Yin-tang to Gvt. of India.

93. Cd. 5240, No. 131, Encls. in letter to Gvt. of India, 27/12/06; Encl. 5, Gvt. of India to P.O. Sikkim, 27/12/06.


96. Cd.5240, No.135, Encls.in Letter P.O.Sikkim to Gvt.of India, 13/12/06; Encl. 3, Officiating T.A. Gyantse to Gvt. of India.

97. Cd.5240, No.135, Encl.4, Bailey to Gvt.of India, 5/12/06; Encl.6, P.O.Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 24/11/06; Annexure 2, Gow to Bailey, 21/11/06; Annexure 3, Bailey to Gow, 22/11/06. Swinson, Beyond the Frontiers, pp.51-2.

98. Cd.5240, No.135, Encl.6, P.O.Sikkim, to Gvt. of India, 24/11/06; Encl.10, Annexure 10, Gow to P.O. Sikkim, 4/12/06.

99. Swinson, Beyond the Frontiers, pp.51.


103. Cd. 5240, O'Connor Reports for March 1907.

104. Jordan Papers, FO 350/4, Jordan to Campbell, 21/2/07.


106. O'Connor: Appendix biography No.51. Cd.5240, 135; Encl. 10, T.A. Gyantse to Gvt. of India, 22/12/06.


109. White's account is given in Sikkim and Bhutan, pp.184-223.

110. Cd. 5240, No.105, Bell to Gvt.of India, 18/10/06.

111. Cd.5240, No.133, Bell to Gvt.of India, 28/11/06; No.135, Encl. 8, 'Notes on conversations between Bell and Chang', 12/11/06.

112. This was a grave oversight since, under the terms of the Lhasa Convention, the Tibetans had to be consulted.

113. Cd. 5240, No.146, Encl.2, Gvt.of India to Bell, 21/11/07.

114. Chapter 5, pp.131-3; Chapter 6, pp.152-4.

115. Bell's reports at this time contain references to rumours that the Tibetans expected an imminent Chinese invasion of Lhasa.

117. India Office Papers, L/P&S/10/7250, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 11/9/06; Secretary of State to Viceroy, 16/9/06; Secretary of State to Viceroy, 28/11/06.

Chapter 1, pp.35-7.

119. PEF 1908/22, India to Bell, 10/10/06; Bell to India, 17/11/06; Quoted in Lamb, *The McMahon Line*, Vol. I, pp.130.

120. Cd.5240, No.60, Encls. in letter to Gvt. of India, 28/12/05; Encl.1, Assistant P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 17/11/05.
Minto Papers, MS.12640, 'The Phari Jongpens Interference in Local Administration, 1906'.
Cd.5240, Encls. in Secretary of State to Gvt. of India, 28/10/08; Encl.1, P.O. Sikkim to Secretary to Gvt. of India, 28/11/08; Annexure 1, P.O. Sikkim to T.A. Gyantse, 16/6/08.

121. Minto Papers, MS.12641, Memo, September, 1905.

122. Cd.5240, No.101, Encl. in letter to Gvt. of India, 28/6/06
Minto Papers, MS. 12640, 'Interview Between Chang and Louis Dane, 25/6/06.

123. FO 535/12, No.25, India Office to Foreign Office, 31/3/09; Encl. 2, T.A. Gartok to Gvt. of India, 23/11/08.

124. For example, FO 535/9, No. 26, O'Connor to Gvt. of India, 27/4/06.

125. For a good general account of the nature of these trade disputes from an Indian perspective, Sherring, *Western Tibet and the British Borderlands*; Rev. A. H. Frank, *A History of Western Tibet*, (London, pub. date unknown), Bell, *The People of Tibet* pp.5-84, 120.

126. Cd.5240, No.131, Encls. in Letter to Gvt. of India, 27/12/06;
Encl.4, P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 21/11/06.
Lien Yu: Appendix biography No. 39.

127. Chapter 1, pp.41.

128. Cd.5240 No.135, Encls. in letter P.O. Sikkim to Secretary to Gvt. of India, 13/12/06; Encl.9 FO. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 8/12/06.

129. Chang Yin-tang: Appendix biography No.10.

130. Garpons, see under Glossary of Terms.
   Introduction pp.20.


133. Formal contact was made in correspondence copied between the Gvt. of India and the Peking Legation.

134. Map.5
   For a good general history of Chao campaigns Adshed,
   *Province and Politics in Late Imperial China*, passim.

135. For some idea of the nature and extent of missionary activity on the frontier Shelton, *Shelton of Tibet*,

136. FO 535/9, No. 165. Fox to Jordan, 23/2/07; Encl. 3, 'Memorandum by Rev. J.H Edgar respecting the proposed colonisation of Eastern Tibet'.
   J.H.Edgar was with the China Inland Mission based in Batang.
   J.H.Edgar: Appendix biography No.20.

137. Cd.5240, No.67, Jordan to Grey, 19/2/07, containing copy of despatch from Goffe Chengtu; No.182, Goffe to Jordan, 23/2/07, containing Goffe's translation of Chao's Proclamation; No 205, Jordan to Grey, containing Chao's Proclamation in full.
   FO 535/9, No.165, Fox to Jordan, 23/2/07.
   Fox and Goffe: Appendix biographies Nos.21 and 23.


139. Lamb, *The McMahon Line*, p.172

140. Cd.5240, No.229, Note re. Siege of Hsiang Cheng, (communicated through C.G.Chengtu), 22/2/08.


142. Minto Papers, MS.12640, 'Nyaring Province in Tibet', Report from F.M.Bailey, February 1907

143. Jordan Papers, 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 28/5/08; Jordan to Campbell, 17/9/08. Morrison Papers, MS. 312/259, No. 261, Tibet. 30/5/05; No. 249, Tibet, 12/6/07.

145. ibid. Dalai Lama: Appendix biography No.17

146. India Office Papers, L/P&S/10, No. 149, Foreign Office to India Office, 30/1/08.

147. Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 29/10/08.

148. Cd.5240, No.249, Jordan to Grey, 21/7/08; No. 222, Jordan to Grey, 29/1/08

149. Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 29/1/08.

150. Cd.5240, No.115, Jordan to Grey, 31/10/06; No. 119, Minto to Morley, 22/12/06.

151. Cd.5240, No.243, Jordan to Grey, 21/7/08.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE


2. Cd. 5240, No. 344, Max Muller to Grey, 14/3/10; Enc. note, Wai Wu Pu to Jordan, 9/3/10

3. For example, FO 535/13, No. 20, India Office to Foreign Office, 24/2/10.


5. Chao Erh-feng: Appendix biography No. 11.

6. Derge, see under, Glossary of Places.


8. MAP 5.
   Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China, pp. 58


    A detailed account of the arrival may be found in the Morrison Papers, MS. 312/1258, No. 121, 'Memo on the Dalai Lama, c. 1908'.

11. The Yellow Temple had been built outside the city gates in order to spare the Great Fifth the indignity of having to descend from his carriage and walk through the gates. Morrison Papers, MS. 321/258, No. 241, 'The Visit of the Dalai Lama'. Introduction p. 14.
    For fuller account of the meeting in 1653 in English, Van Praag The Status at Tibet, pp. 10-13


13. Morrison Papers, MS. 312/258, No. 121, 'Notes on the Dalai Lama, c. 1908'.


    Morrison Papers, MS. 312/258, No. 231, 'Reports on the Dalai Lama, c. 1908' (compiled from newspaper articles Morrison had written for 'The Times' as Times correspondent in Peking).


17. Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Alston, 25/11/08.
    The interview lasted barely eight minutes and nothing beyond the basic formalities were discussed. Jordan's account of this interview can be found in Cd. 5240, No. 262, Encl., Jordan to Grey, 25/10/08.
    Morrison Papers, MS. 321/258, No. 121, 'Notes on the Dalai Lama, c. 1908'.
FO 535/11, No.7, Jordan to Grey, 23/1/09 Encl. 1, 'Memorandum Respecting an Interview Between the Dalai Lama and Maharaj Kuma Sikkim, Held at the Yellow Temple Peking on November 25th 1908; Encl. 2, 'Memorandum Respecting the Visit of Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim to Peking', (both enclosures marked Confidential).
Further details about the Maharaj Kumar's credentials and the reason for his visits are contained in Morrison Papers, 321/258, No. 235, 'Notes on the Dalai Lama, 30/11/08'.
O'Connor. Appendix biography No. 51.

19. Under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention, Russia had agreed not to interfere in frontier matters. When the Dalai Lama sent Dojiev, who had been with him in Peking, to the Tsar's court requesting an escort of twenty-four men to guide him safely home, this request was refused. Adshead argues that the Chinese believed that he had delayed his return to await the Russian decision.
Adshead, Province & Politics in Late Imperial China, p87.

20. Cd. 5240, No. 297, Encls. in Letter to Gvt. of India, 13/1/07, Encl. 2, P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 21/2/09; Annexure 2, Tel. From the Dalai Lama and Council of Tibet to Britain and all the Ministers of Europe, (trans.).
Lien Yu: Appendix biography No. 39.

21. There was already criticism of China's attitude towards Tibet especially after it was discovered that a virulent anti-British campaign had been conducted by the Chinese in the ethnic press. Cd.5240, No. 288, Jordan to Grey, 22/6/09, enclosing note, Jordan to Prince Ch'ing, 17/6/09.

22. Cd. 5240, No. 284, P.O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 24/2/09.

23. Tibetans often used metaphors like 'big worms are eating little worms', as coded messages in their diplomatic dialogues with other countries. The Chinese were quick to point to this as an example of the primitive nature of the Tibetan state. Even Bell thought them childlike. Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, p.81.
Cd. 5240, No. 297, Encls. in Letter to Gvt. of India, 13/1/07.

25. Cd.5240, No. 303, Telegram Grey to Jordan, 11/2/10; 303, Max Muller to Grey, 15/2/10.

26. Cd.5240, No.304, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18/2/10; No.305, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19/2/10; No.306, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19/2/10; No.308, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20/2/10; No. 311, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22/2/10. Younghusband, India and Tibet pp.319-20

27. Cd. 5240, No.308, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20/2/10.

28. Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama , p.82


30. Cd. 5240, No.304, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18/2/10.

31. Cd. 5240, No.306, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19/12/10. Dak Bungalows, see under Glossary of Terms.

32. Cd. 5240, No.297, Encl.s in Letter to Gvt.of India, 13/1/10, Encl.2, P.O.Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 21/12/09; Annexure 1, T.A.Gyantse to P.O. Sikkim, 8/12/09; No. 311, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22/1/10.

33. MacDonald: Appendix biography No.42.

34. Max Muller had replaced Jordan in Peking as Charges d'Affaires, the latter having taken leave after suffering a physical breakdown the result of overwork. Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 6/5/09; Jordan to Campbell, 14/7/09. Max Muller: Appendix biography No.44.

35. Cd. 5240, No.303, Max Muller to Grey, 15/2/10.


37. Cd. 5240, No.319, Grey to Max Muller, 26/2/10.

38. Cd. 5240, No.315, Grey to Max Muller, 23/2/10; No. 318, Max Muller to Grey, 26/2/10.


40. Cd. 5240, No.311, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22/2/10.

41. Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama , p.79

42. Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama* p.98

43. Cd. 5240, No.328, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3/3/10; No. 347, Grey to Max Muller, 8/4/10; No.345, India Office to Foreign Office, 31/3/10.

44. Bell had some knowledge of the Manchu Court and the work of the Peking Legation having been sent there by the Indian government in November 1907 for the purpose of 'gathering information'.

Jordan Papers, FO 350/4, Jordan to Campbell, 3/10/07.

Jordan Papers, FO 350/5, Jordan to Campbell, 28/11/07.


48. The Decree had been issued on 25th February 1910. Cd. 5240, No.322, Trans. Tel. from Wai Wu Pu, 25/2/10; No.323, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27/2/10.

The Chinese view of the Dalai Lama's role may be found in the Morrison Papers, MS. 312/259, No.175, Report, transcript unsigned, addressed to Jordan in Peking c. 1912.

49. Cd. 5240, No.298, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 31/1/10.

50. FO 535/13, No.37, India Office to Foreign Office, 4/3/10.


52. Cd.5240, No.314, Ritchie to Campbell, 22/2/10: No. 316, Secretary of to Viceroy, 23/1/10.

Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, pp.396-7


Lady Minto, *India Under Minto and Morley*, pp.17-18

54. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, pp.396-7

55. FO 535/11, No.101, Encl.1, Note by Major O'Connor regarding Tibet, 13/3/08
56. FO 535/11, No. 101, Encl. 2, Wilton to Gvt. of India, 'Note Regarding India's North East Frontier Relations, 21/9/08'.

57. FO 535/11, No. 33, Encl. 2, H.F. French-Ridley to Consul Hankow, 23/3/09. The Rev. French Ridley was a missionary for the China Inland Mission based in Kansu. He gave regular reports to Fraser at Hankow, providing Jordan with a valuable source of information about this remote part of East Tibet.

58. FO 535/11, No. 11, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 1/2/09.


60. Chapter 4, pp. 90-107.


56. FO 535/11, No. 101, Encl. 2, Wilton to Gvt. of India, 'Note Regarding India's North-East Frontier Relations, 21/9/08'.


64. FO 535/11, No. 101, Encl. 2, Wilton to Gvt. of India, 'Note on India's Relations with the North-East Frontier 21/9/08'. Minto Papers, MS. 12638, Harcourt Butler Report, Nov. 1910.


68. FO 535/11, IO to FO 21/9/08; Encl. 2, 'Note on the North-East Frontier Relations with India' Wilton, Sept. 1908.

70. FO 535/11, 101, Enclosure 2, 'Note on North-East Frontier Relations with India.' Sept. 1908.


73. For further information about Chinese interference in Bhutanese affairs, Van Praag, The Status of Tibet, pp. 161-7. For an account of Bhutanese trading practices Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderlands, pp. 61-9; 278; 304-44.


76. Chapter 4, pp. 108-110.

77. Younghusband, India and Tibet, pp. 402-4; 396-7.

78. FO 535/12, No. 13, India Office to Foreign Office, 17/10/09; No. 25, India Office to Foreign Office, 1/4/09; Encl. 2, Br. T.A. Gartok to Gvt. of India, 23/11/08. Cd. 5240, No. 261, Encls. in Letter to Gvt. of India, 9/11/09; Encl. 2, P. O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 4/11/08; No. 269, Minto to Morley, 10/2/08; No. 285, Encls. in Letter to Gvt. of India, 22/4/09; No. 294, Encl. in Letter to Gvt. of India, 10/7/09.

79. Chapter 4, 83-85.

80. Chapter 4, 92-93. Sherring, Western Tibet and British Borderlands, pp. 150-2, gives some arguments for the retention of a native agent at Gartok. FO 535/11, No. 101, Encl. 1, 'Note regarding Tibet', O'Connor. FO 535/12, No. 25, India Office to Foreign Office, 31/3/09; Encl. 1, Gvnr. of Punjab to Gvt. of India, 9/12/08; Enc. 2, British T.A. Gartok to Gvt. of India, 23/11/08, (refers to the healthy trade through Kulu in Western Tibet). Gartok, see under Glossary of Places.

81. FO 535/13, No. 7, Foreign Office to India Office, 19/5/10.

82. Cd. 5240, No. Encls in Letter to Gvt. of India, 10/7/09.
83. FO 535/12, No.13, Morley to Grey, 17/9/09.
84. Cd. 5240, No.269, Minto to Morley, 10/2/09.
  FO 535/12, No.13, Minto to Morley, 10/2/09.
85. FO 535/13, No.70, Grey to Morley, 19/5/10.
86. FO 535/13, No.146, Grey to Morley, 30/8/10.
  Encl.1, P.O.Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 22/3/09.
88. CD 5240, No.345, India Office to Foreign Office, 31/3/10.
89. FO 535/11, No.114, Grey to Nicolson, 2/8/10.
90. FO 535/12, No.155, Morley to Grey, 8/9/10; Encl.1, Morley to Minto
  1/9/10; Enclosure 2, Minto to Morley, 8/9/10.
91. FO 535/11, No.53, Gvt.of India to India Office, Encl.2, 'Extract from
  the Russki Invalid' 13/11/07. Article headed 'General Kozloff's
  Expedition to Mongolia'; No. 22, Nicolson to Grey, 30/3/08.
92. MAP 1. FO 535/11, India Office to Foreign Office, 18/2/08.
93. FO 535/11, No.40, Foreign Office to India Office, 20/8/09;
  No. 41, India Office to Foreign Office, 1/9/09.
94. FO 535/12, No.21, Jordan to Grey, 20/3/09. Encl. Report of Mr Ridley
  to Consul General Fraser from Nsi-ning (Sining) Kansu, 22/12/08.
95. FO 535/12, No.33, Jordan to Grey, 12/5/09.
96. ibid.
97. FO 535/12, No.38, War Office to Foreign Office, , 6/8/09.
98. FO 535/12, No.159, Grey to O'Brien, 17/9/10.
99. Chapter 8, pp.206-7. A first hand account of these explorations
  can be found in Teichman's, Travels of a Consular Officer in
  North-West China , (Cambridge, 1921).
NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX

1. Hardinge and Crewe: Appendix biographies Nos.27 and 15.

2. MAPS 6 & 7. Tawang and Assam, see under Glossary of Places.

3. Introduction, pp.16-17.

4. FO 535/14, 15, Jordan to Grey, Confidential, 7/1/11; Encl., Wilkinson to Max-Muller, Confidential, 12/12/10.


8. Hardinge Papers, Vol.81, No.5, Hare to Hardinge, 24/11/10; No.146, Lt.Governor Burma, Adamson to Hardinge, 12/2/11.

9. For an excellent account of conditions in Assam and the reasons for the change in policy Choudhury, *The North-East Frontier of India*, pp.58-60, quoting, Bell to India, No.1201, 20/8/10; PSSF, Vol.3, (1910), 1918/1910; Bell Papers, Bell to India, 21/7/09.

10. Ibid, pp.61, quoting, PSSF, Vol.3, (1910), Minto to Morley, 23/10/10


13. Chapter 3, pp.70.

14. FO 535/14, No. 65, Jordan to Grey, 27/7/11.

15. Jordan Papers, FO 350/1, Campbell to Jordan, 14/1/11.


17. Jordan Papers, 350/1, No.24, Campbell to Jordan, 31/3/11.


20. FO 535/14, No.61, India Office to Foreign Office, 26/7/11.


22. FO 535/13, No.170, India Office to Foreign Office, 8/10/10; Encl., Gvt.of India to Morley, 4/10/10.


23. FO 535/13, No.177, Foreign Office to India Office, 24/10/11,

   No.170, India Office to Foreign Office, 8/10/10, Encl., Gvt.of India to Morley, 4/10/10.

24. FO 535/13, No.177, Foreign Office to India Office, 24/10/10; No.179, India Office to Foreign Office, 27/10/10; Encl., Morley to Gvt.of India Telegram, 25/10/10.

25. FO 535/13, No.80, Max-Muller to Grey, 29/10/10, Encl., Max-Muller to Prince Ch'ing, 14/10/10.

26. FO 535/13, No.190, Max-Muller to Grey, 3/11/10; Encl., Wai Wu Pu to Max-Muller, 28/10/10.

27. FO 535/13, No.193, India Office to Foreign Office, 14/12/10;

   Encl., Gvt.of India to Crewe, 6/12/10.

   Kowtow, see under Glossary of Terms.

28. FO 535/13, No. 193, India Office to Foreign Office, 14/12/10;

   Encl. 2, 'Confidential Note on Relations Between Nepal and China Undertaken by Col. Yule of the Indian Government'.

29. FO 535/14, No. 194, Grey to Jordan, 23/12/10.

30. FO 535/14, No. 89, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/10/11;

   Encl., Manners-Smith to Gvt. of India, 25/9/11.

31. FO 535/14, No. 92, Campbell to Hardinge, 1/11/11; No. 100, India Office to Foreign Office, 29/11/11; Encl.1, Crewe to Gvt. of India, 4/11/11; Encl. 2, Gvt. of India to Crewe, 25/11/11; No. 105, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/12/11; Encl., Crewe to Gvt. of India, 5/12/11.

32. FO 535/13, No. 155, Gvt. of India to India Office, 1/9/10.

33. FO 535/14, No. 92, Campbell to Hardinge, 7/11/11; No. 100, India Office to Foreign Office, 29/11/11.
34. FO 535/14, No. 20, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/3/11; Encl. 1, Bell to Gvt. of India, 26/1/11; Encl. 2, Weir to Bell, (very confidential), 15/12/10.
   Weir: Appendix biography No. 64.

35. FO 535/14, No. 10, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/3/11; Encl. 2, Weir to Bell, 26/11/10.
   Chapter 6, p. 149.

36. FO 535/14, No. 10, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/3/11; Encl. 1, Gvt. of India to Bell, 24/12/10.

37. FO 535/13, No. 20, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/3/11; Encl. 4, Mr. Ma to Weir, 8/12/10; Encl. 5, Weir to Ma, 11/12/10.
   Chapter 4, pp. 83-88. Chapter 5, pp. 131-134.


39. FO 535/14, No. 38, India Office to Foreign Office, 10/5/11; Encl. 1, Bell to Gvt. of India, 10/4/11; Encl. 2, Bell to Gvt. of India, Confidential, 27/3/11; Encl. 3, Lease for Site of Br. T.A. Gyantse, Tibet.

   FO 535/14, No. 20, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/3/11; Encl. 1, Bell to Gvt. of India, Confidential, 26/1/11.

41. FO 535/14, No. 52, Crewe to Gvt. of India, 10/7/11; No. 53, India Office to Foreign Office, 6/7/11. Chapter 5, p. 134.

42. FO 535/14, No. 48, India Office to Foreign Office, 20/6/11.

43. FO 535/14, No. 48, India Office to Foreign Office, 20/6/11; Encl. 2, Bell to Gvt. of India, 29/3/11; Encl. 3, Bell to Gvt. of India, 20/3/11.

44. FO 535/14, No. 49, Jordan to Grey, 26/11/11.

45. FO 5353/14, No. 52, India Office to Foreign Office, 4/7/11; Encl., Crewe to Gvt. of India, 10/7/11.

46. Ref: Note 37.

47. FO 535/14, No. 7, India Office to Foreign Office, 3/2/11; No. 12, India Office to Foreign Office, 23/2/11.

The Panchen Lama was besieged by the Chinese and had been ordered to Lhasa where Bell reported that he was behaving like the Dalai Lama. FO 535/14, No. 9. India Office to Foreign Office, 7/2/11; Encl., Gvt. of India to Crewe, 6/2/11; No. 14, India Office to Foreign Office, 4/3/11; Encl., T.A. Yatung to Gvt. of India, 26/1/11; No. 70, Encl. in Letters India Office 5/9/11; Encl., Bell to Gvt. of India, 4/8/11; Encl. 2, T.A. Gyantse to Gvt. of India, 11/8/11.
64. For example, FO 535/13, No.164, India Office to Foreign Office, 28/9/10, Encl.3, Gvt.of India to Morley, 21/9/10, No.92, India Office to Foreign Office, 8/12/10, Encl., Gvt.of India to Crewe, 6/12/10.

65. FO 535/15, No.41, Wilkinson to Jordan, 1/2/12.
   Jordan Papers, 350/1, Campbell to Jordan, 12/10/11.

66. FO 535/15, No.67, Jordan to Grey, 1/2/12. This became known as the 'Szechuan Mission'

67. FO 535/14, No.11, Jordan to Grey, 16/11/11; Encl.1, Wilkinson to Jordan, Confidential, 10/10/11; Encl.2, 'Report on Conditions on the Chinese-Tibetan Border', J. Muir. Muir was a missionary stationed in Batang and a reliable source of information for Jordan. Chapter 8, Note 60.

68. FO 535/14, No.96, India Office to Foreign Office, 22/11/11; No. 109, India Office to Foreign Office, 21/12/11; Encl., Gvt.of India to Crewe, 20/12/11.

69. FO 535/14, No.112, India Office to Foreign Office, 27/12/11; No.101, Gvt.of India to Crewe, 30/11/11.

70. FO 535/14, No.99, India Office to Foreign Office, 29/11/11, Encl., Gvt. of India to Crewe, 28/11/11.

71. Lien Yu: Appendix biography No.39.

72. FO 535/15, No.69, India Office to Foreign Office, 17/5/12; No.168, India Office to Foreign Office, 6/8/12; Encl.2, Gvt.of India to Crewe, 5/8/12, No.170, India Office to Foreign Office, 14/8/12; Encl., Gvt. of India to Crewe, 13/8/12.

73. FO 535/15, No.197, India Office to Foreign Office, 3/9/12.

74. FO 535/14, No.39, Buchanan to Grey, 24/5/11; No.44, Grey to Buchanan, 8/6/11; No.23, India Office to Foreign Office, 21/2/12; Encl., Gvt.of India to Crewe, 21/2/12.

75. An eyewitness account of this procession which took three hours to pass may be found in Berry, Monks, Spies and a Soldier of Fortune pp.115-16.

76. FO 535/14, No.39, Buchanan to Grey, 24/5/11, No.42, India Office to Foreign Office, 31/5/11, No.44, Grey to Buchanan, 8/6/11.

77. FO 535/14, No.40, Foreign Office to India Office, 26/5/11; No.42, India to Foreign Office, 31/5/11; No. 44, Grey to Buchanan, 8/6/11.
78. FO 535/15, No.82, India Office to Foreign Office, 1/6/12; Encl., Gvt. of India to Crewe, 31/5/12; No.85, India Office to Foreign Office, 3/6/12; No.98, India Office to Foreign Office, 1/6/12; Encl., Crewe to Gvt. of India, 10/6/12.

Laden La: Appendix biography No.36.

79. FO 535/15, No.86, India Office to Foreign Office, 6/6/12; Encl.2, Crewe to Gvt.of India; No.98, India Office to Foreign Office, 11/6/12; Encl., Crewe to Gvt.of India, 10/6/12.

80. FO 535/15, No.93, India Office to Foreign Office, 8/6/12; Encl., Crewe to Gvt.of India, 6/6/12; No.107, India Office to Foreign Office, 18/6/12; Encl.1, Gvt. of India to Crewe, 17/6/12; Encl.2, Gvt. of India to Crewe, 17/6/12; No.159, India Office to Foreign Office, 18/7/12, Encl., Gvt.of India to Crewe, 16/7/12.

81. FO 535/15, No.116, Foreign Office to India Office, 20/6/12, No.124, India Office to Foreign Office, 22/6/12; Encl., Crewe to Gvt.of India, 21/6/12, No.104, India Office to Foreign Office, 14/6/12.


83. Chapter 1, p.25.

84. Chapter 4, pp.78-80.

85. FO 535/14, No.106, Buchanan to Grey, 7/12/11, (The Article appeared on 6/12/11)

86. MAP 2.

FO 535/15, No.177, India Office to Foreign Office, confidential, 5/6/12; Encl., Gvt. of India to Crewe, 27/7/12.


87. FO 535/15, No.219, Buchanan to Grey, 18/9/12.


88. FO 535/15, No.226, Note on Tibet by Grey, 24/9/12; No.229, Extract from Note of Conversation between the Marquess of Crewe and M. Sazonov at Crewe Hall, 29/9/12.


FO 535/16, No.88, Buchanan to Grey, 11/2/13; Encl.1, Tibet-Mongolian Treaty, Concluded at Urga, 29/12/12.
90. FO 535/16, No. 88, Bucanan to Grey, 11/12/13, Encl.2, 'Despatch From Actua; State Councillor Koro Slovets', dated Urga, 6th. Jan. 1913; No. 92, Bucanan to Grey, 13/3/13; No. 107, Foreign Office to India Office, 24/2/13; No. 23, Bucanan to Grey, 13/1/13.

91. FO 535/16, No. 429, Alston to Grey, 1/11/13; Encl., Extract from a 'Report by Lt. Binstead on a Journey from Hailar to Urga, and thence to Kiakhta'.


94. For example, FO 535/15, No.57, India Office to Foreign Office, 30/4/12.

95. FO 535/14, No.102, Jordan to Grey, 3/4/12.

96. FO 535/15, No.67, Jordan to Grey, 27/4/12; No.127, Jordan to Grey, 6/6/12.

97. FO 535/15, No.177, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/8/12.

98. FO 535/15, No.241, Jordan to Grey, 21/9/12; No.288, Jordan to Grey, 4/11/12; No. 299, Question Asked in the House of Commons, 5/12/12; No.120, Jordan to Grey, 23/6/12; No. 132, Grey to Jordan, 29/6/12.

99. Yuan Shih Kai: Appendix biography No.72. FO 535/15, No.50, Jordan to Grey, 12/4/12; No.267, Jordan to Grey, 29/10/12.

100. FO 535/15, No.62, India Office to Foreign Office, 8/5/12; No.67, Jordan to Grey 27/4/12; No.75, Grey to Jordan, 22/5/12; No.102, India Office to Foreign Office, 13/6/12; No.118, India Office to Foreign Office, 19/6/12; Encl., Gvt. of India to Crewe, 21/6/12; No. 127, Jordan to Grey, 6/6/12.

101. FO 535/15, No.120, Jordan to Grey, 23/6/12. Chapter 6, p.159, Note 66.

102. FO 535/15, No.182, Jordan to Grey, 2/8/12.


105. Wai Chaio-pu, see under Glossary of Terms.

106. FO 535/15, Jordan to Grey, 16/12/12, Enclosing Memorandum respecting Conversation between Dr. Yen and Sir John Jordan on 14th December, 1912.


NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN


2. Chapter 2, 48-49.
   MacDonnell Commission: Royal Commission to Consider Diplomatic, Foreign Office and Consular Service. The Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service were amalgamated in 1919.

   Hardinge, My Indian Years, pp. 86-7 and 94.

   Gilmour, Curzon, pp. 502-3.


   Hardinge, My Indian Years, pp. 100-1; 107; 116; 131-2.

8. Pope-Hennessey, Lord Crewe: The Likeness of a Liberal, p. 120.
   Chamberlain, Crewe, Hardinge. Appendix biographies Nos. 9; 15; and 27.

   Hardinge, My Indian Years, p. 142.
   Chelmsford: Appendix biography No. 13.

    Busch, Hardinge of Penshurst: A Study in Old Diplomacy, p. 214
    Hardinge, My Indian Years, p. 142.
    Montagu: Appendix biography No. 46.


12. For a good account of Anglo-Japanese relations at this time


19. For example, Jordan Papers, FO 350/15, Jordan to Langley, 14/1/16.


26. Lowe, *Great Britain and Japan, 1911–1915*, pp. 220–266. This gives a good account of this crisis and a list of demands.


CHAPTER EIGHT FOOTNOTES

1. Morrison Papers, MS/312/259, No.229, Tibetan Dossier including Morrison's notes on Conference proceedings, 13/10/13 to 3/7/14. Henceforth referred to as Morrison Papers, Tibetan Dossier.

2. Jordan Papers, FO 350/11, Jordan to Langley, 30/11/13. For examples of the tensions between the Chinese Customs Service, the Indian government, and British Legation in Peking: Chapter 1, p.39; Chapter 4, pp.97-8; Chapter 6, pp.156-7. Doyen, see under Glossary of Terms.

3. Ivan Chen: Appendix biography No.12.

4. For example, Morrison Papers, MS/312/259, No.263, Chen to Morrison 10/11/13; No. 247, Tibetan Telegrams, 8/10/13. Morrison had been Yuan's special advisor to Peking since 1912. Morrison: Appendix biography No.48.

5. For details of Lu's Mission, Chapter 6, p.169.


10. Morrison Papers, Tibetan Dossier, Tibetan Claims, 10/10/13, and Chinese Counterclaims, 30/10/13.

11. FO 535/17, No.6, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/11/14, Encl.1, Memorandum of informal discussions referring to Tibetan Conference containing McMahon's 'Memorandum' which documents his changing ideas throughout the Conference. Henceforth referred to as FO 535/17, No.6, McMahon's Memorandum.


13. Morrison Papers, Tibetan Dossier, Chinese Counterclaims, 30/10/13, FO 535/17, No.6, McMahon Memorandum.


15. FO 535/17, No.6, McMahon's Memorandum, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/1/14.


18. This view is supported by Morrison who was Chen's confidante for the duration of the talks. For example, Morrison Papers, MS/312/1259, No.137, 'Defence of Chen', 12/11/14.


21. This was not a view shared by Jordan and Langley who both became exasperated by the slow cumbersome progress of the Indian administration. For example, Jordan Papers, FO 350/11, Langley to Jordan, 26/3/13; FO 350/12, Jordan to Langley, 4/5/14.


23. Morrison continued to correspond with Chen. Morrison Papers, MS/312/259, Nos.129-134 and 147-201, details their correspondence between 1914 and 1920.


    Jordan Papers, FO 350/12, Jordan to Langley, 28/6/14.
35. This did not please the powerful Lhasa monasteries of Drepung and
    Tengeling or the administrative area of Tashilumpho, which,
    according to Bell, had a yearning to be independent of Lhasa.
    Drepung, see under, Glossary of Places.
36. Tawang, see under Glossary of places.
38. Chapter 8, Note 24.
    The separate agreement was presented in Map form which both
    parties signed, an inspired idea as both parties could immediately
    see which territories were now under their supervision.
40. Van Praag, The Status of Tibet, p. 60.
41. FO 535/17, No. 235, India Office to Foreign Office, 11/9/14;
    FO 535/18, No. 15, India Office to Foreign Office, 10/4/15;
    FO 535/20, No. 6, Alston to Balfour, 19/5/17.
42. FO 535/17, No. 42, India Office to Foreign office, 2/10/15.
43. Cd. 2247, Trade Reports, Report by Mr. Hosie, His Majesty's Consul
    at Chengtu on a Journey to the Eastern Frontier of Tibet in 1905.
    Pt. IV, Tachienlu and the Trade of Tibet, pp. 77-121.
44. FO 535/17, No. 40, Jordan to Grey, 22/9/15
    Coales and King: Appendix biographies Nos. 14 and 35.
45. China Consular Reports, FO 228/2749 and FO 228/2956-7, Reports from
    Tachienlu
46. Meyrick Hewlett gives a first hand account of life in Chegdu during
    this period in Forty Years in China, pp. 92-99.
47. FO. 535/19, India Office to Foreign Office, Encl. 3, Bell to Gvt. of India, 27/1/16.
48. Further details about the new Tibetan army may be found in, Melvyn
    Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of
    the Lamaist State (California, 1989).
49. FO 228/2749, Reports from Tachienlu c.1915-16. Sera and Ganden, see under Glossary of Places.

50. By mid summer 1915 Yuan had briefly regained control of his government and had quashed the civil war raging in Peking.

51. Teichman, Travels, p.59.

52. Jordan Papers, FO 350/12, Jordan to Langley, 1/6/14.

53. In 1917 Szechuan and Yunnan declared themselves independent. For some idea on the nature of the fighting in Chengtu, a city taken by both sides at various times during this period, Sir M. Hewlett, Forty Years in China pp.92-99.

54. Jordan Papers, 350/12, Jordan to Langley, 10/6/16.

55. FO 228/2749, Coale's report from Tachienlu, No. 12, 21/5/16; Coale's report from Tachienlu, No.15, 20/6/16.

56. FO 228/2749, Coale's report from Tachienlu, No.17, 15/7/16; Coale's report from Tachienlu, No. 20,26/9/16.


58. Jordan Papers, FO 350/14, Jordan to Langley, 12/5/16.

59. This idea had dominated his thinking since 1914. For example, Jordan Papers, FO 350/12, Jordan to Langley, 4/5/14.

60. FO 228/2749, No.69, Personal letter to Sir John Jordan by John R. Muir, China Inland Mission, Tibetan Branch, 2/11/17. This letter refers to Jordan's long term interest and concern for Tibet and also includes Muir's recommendation that an Arbitration Board be set up to settle the frontier. Jordan had relied on Muir and J.H.Edgar, also of the China Inland Mission before Tachienlu had opened.


63. Teichman: Appendix biography No.60.

65. Teichman: Appendix biography No. 60.
66. Tachienlu, see under Glossary of Places.
67. FO 228/2749, Teichman's report from Tachienlu, No. 72, 21/11/17.
68. FO 228/2749, King's report from Tachienlu, No. 1, 27/11/15; Coale's report from Tachienlu, No. 11, 10/4/16.
69. FO 228/2749, Coale's report from Tachienlu, No. 20, 26/9/17.
70. FO 228/2749, Coale's report from Tachienlu, No. 25, 1/11/16.
71. FO 228/2749, Coale's report from Tachienlu, No. 68, 1/11/17.
72. FO 228/2749, Teichman's report from Tachienlu, No. 72, 21/11/17.
73. Ibid.
74. Teichman may also have been involved in the compilation of the Memorandum of September 1916.
75. FO 228/2749, Coale's report from Tachienlu, No. 29, 1/12/16.
76. FO 228/2749, Unsigned report on Coale's trip to Batang, No. 32; No. 39 Letter from the Wai Chaio-pu to British Legation in Peking requesting Coale's recall and dated, 3/5/17.
77. FO 228/2956, Teichman's report, No. 10, 12/4/18.
78. Teichman, Travels, p. 57-8.
80. Teichman, Travels, pp. 54-56.
81. Teichman, Travels, pp. 52-54.
82. Teichman, Travels, pp. 52-6.
83. Teichman, Travels, pp. 55-6.
84. King: Appendix biography No. 35.
85. Teichman, Travels, p. 52.
86. Kalon Lama: Appendix biography No. 33.
87. FO 228/2956, Teichman's report, No. 4, 21/1/18.
88. Teichman, Travels, pp. 55-6.
89. Chamdo, see under Glossary of Places.
92. FO 228/2956, Teichman's report, No.11, 18/6/18.
93. Teichman, *Travels*, p.73.
94. Teichman, *Travels*, pp.116-17
95. Ula, see under Glossary of Terms.
   An account of this visit is contained in Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in North West China*, (Cambridge, 1921).
97. Teichman, *Travels*, p.90
98. Teichman, *Travels*, p.84.
102. Ibid.
103. Teichman, *Travels* pp.103
     Chamdo, see under Glossary of Places.
105. Ula, see under Glossary of Terms.
112. Shelton, *Dr. Shelton of Tibet*, pp. 195-96.
   Shelton: Appendix biography No. 57.

113. Shelton, *Dr. Shelton of Tibet*, pp. 198-99

114. FO 228/2956, Teichman to Jordan, No. 58, 20/5/18.


   Chala: Appendix biography No. 8.


122. FO 228/2956, Teichman to Jordan, No. 29, 26/8/18.

123. For some idea of the confusion in Chengtu, Hewlett, *Forty Years in China*, pp. 92-99.

124. FO 228/2956, Teichman to Jordan, No. 16, 20/5/18; No. 37, Teichman to Hewlett, (undated).

125. FO 228/2956, Jordan to Foreign Office, No. 26, 28/8/18; Simla to Peking, No. 28, 21/8/18.

126. FO 228/2956, Teichman to Hewlett, No. 37, undated.


133. Teichman, Travels, p. 169.

134. Full text of Chamdo Agreement with additional article is reproduced in Mehra, The North Eastern Frontier Vol II, pp. 5-9.


137. FO 228/2956, Jordan to Teichman, No. 24, 26/8/18.


139. Tachienlu, see under Glossary of Places. Paul Sherap: Appendix biography No. 58.
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE


2. FO 535/22, No. 1, Jordan to Curzon, Secret, 31/5/19.

3. FO 535/22, No. 2, Jordan to Curzon, 1/7/19; No. 4, India Office to Foreign Office, 21/7/19, Encl. 2, Gvt. of India to Montagu, 27/6/19.

4. FO 535/22, No. 5, Foreign Office To India Office, 30/7/19. Curzon: Appendix biography No. 16.

5. FO 535/22, No. 5, India Office to Foreign Office, 30/7/19; No. 6, India Office to Foreign Office, 31/7/19.

6. FO 535/22, No. 8, Jordan to Curzon, 1/6/19.

7. FO 535/22, No. 9, Jordan to Curzon, 14/8/19.


9. FO 535/22, No. 21, Jordan to Curzon, 23/10/19; No. 24, Jordan to Curzon, 20/11/19; No. 29, Jordan to Curzon, 18/10/19.

10. FO 535/22, No. 24, Jordan to Curzon, 9/9/19; No. 27, Curzon to Jordan, Nov. 1919, No. 31, Alfred Sze to Curzon, 6/12/19.

11. FO 535/22, No. 21, Alfred Sze to Curzon, 6/12/19.

Alfred Sze, (Chih Chao-chi), 1877-1958. Like Wellington Koo, one of a new breed of career diplomats. He held various posts in the Customs Service and was Minister of Communications in the first Republican government in 1912. He was known to Jordan who admired him and his attractive wife. Between 1914-21 and 1929-32 he was Chinese Minister to Britain and from 1932-35 he was Minister to America.

12. FO 535/22, No. 21, Alfred Sze to Curzon, 6/12/19. Alfred Sze, (Chih Chao-chi), 1877-1958. Like Wellington Koo, one of a new breed of career diplomats. He held various posts in the Customs Service and was Minister of Communications in the first Republican government in 1912. He was known to Jordan who admired him and his attractive wife. Between 1914-21 and 1929-32 he was Chinese Minister to Britain and from 1932-35 he was Minister to America.


15. Jordan's departure was much resented in Peking especially after he had seemed to recover some of his old acumen in the last two and a half years of his tenure.


19. FO 535/25, No.8, Foreign Office to India Office, 29/7/21.


22. Ibid.


24. FO 535/26, No. 9, Alston to Curzon, Confidential, 18/9/22; No. 8, Balfour to Crewe, 6/7/22; No.5, India Office to Foreign Office, 10/3/22.

25. S.Berry, Monks, Spies, and a Soldier of Fortune, pp.79; 72-3, 2-3. This book gives a good general account of the activities of all Japanese monks and travellers in Tibet.

26. FO 535/6, No.49, Encl. Report from British Trade Agent, Gyantse, 11/7/05, FO 535/7, Encl.1, Gvt.of India to India Office, 25/5/06. S.Berry, Monks, Spies, and a Soldier of Fortune, pp.79; 72-3; 2-3.


28. FO 535/7 No.130, Grey to MacDonald, 15/6/06.

29. FO 535/9, No.30, Nicholson to Grey, 6/1/07.

30. Jordan Papers, FO 350/1, Jordan to Alston, 20/1/11

31. Ijuin: Appendix biography No.31. Miyazaki Torazo, (1870-1922). A Japanese adventurer who devoted his life to furthering Japanese interests in Asia, and especially China where he specialised in fermenting revolts against established governments. After 1911 he served as advisor to Sun Yat Sen and also served as unofficial go-between for the Republican and Japanese.

32. FO 535/15, No.162, Grey to MacDonald, 24/7/12.
33. FO 535/16, No. 223, Encl. 1, Gould to P. O. Sikkim, Confidential, 9/4/13.

34. FO 535/16 No. 396, India Office to Foreign Office 23/10/13, Encl. 1 Gvt. of India to Crewe, 20/10/13; Encl. 2, Gvt. of India to Crewe, 20/10/13.

35. FO 535/16, No. 396, India Office to Foreign Office 23/10/13; No. 406, Foreign Office to India Office, 30/10/13; No. 411, India Office to Foreign Office, 1/11/13, Encl. Crewe to Gvt. of India, 1/11/13.

FO 535/17, No. 21, Buchanan to Grey, 1/2/14; No. 118, Jordan to Grey, 27/4/14; No. 116, Grey to Crewe, 10/6/14.


37. for more details about the Demands Crisis
Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy 1869-1942, pp. 96-104.
Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan 1911-1915, pp. 220-266.

FO 535/19, No. 4, India Office to Foreign Office, 31/3/16; No. 5, Foreign Office to India Office, 7/4/16; No. 6, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/4/16.

38. Chapter 8, pp. 191-193

39. FO 535/19, No. 5, Foreign Office to India Office, 7/4/16.

40. FO 535/19, No. 6, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/4/16.

41. FO 535/19, No. 6, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/4/16; No. 7, Foreign Office to India Office, 17/4/16.

42. FO 535/20, No. 14, Foreign Office to India Office, 23/11/17.
Montagu: Appendix biography No. 46.

43. FO 535/20, No. 13, India Office to Foreign Office, 19/11/17.

44. FO 535/22, No. 11, Curzon to Jordan, 1/9/19; No. 12, Curzon to Alston, 1/9/19; No. 15, Jordan to Curzon, 28/8/19, No. 17, Curzon to Alston, 20/10/19; No. 18, Jordan to Curzon, 17/10/19; No. 20, Jordan to Curzon, 20/11/19.


46. FO 535/22, No. 15, Jordan to Curzon, 28/8/19; No. 19, Jordan to Curzon, 17/10/19; No. 20, Jordan to Curzon, 20/11/19; No. 27, Curzon to Jordan, 26/11/19.

Lau Kit-ching, Sir John Jordan and the Affairs of China, pp. 3-5 and 31.
47. FO 535/22, No. 10, Memo by Mr. R. H. Clive on the Anti-English Press
Campaign Instigated by the Japanese in Regard to the Tibetan
Negotiations, 28th. August, 1919.

48. FO 535/22, No. 11, Curzon to Jordan, 1/9/19; No. 12, Curzon to Alston,
1/9/19; No. 14, Curzon to Alston, 25/9/19; No. 15, Jordan to
Curzon, 28/8/19.

49. FO 535/22 No. 12, Curzon to Alston 1/9/19; No. 17, Curzon to Alston
20/10/19.

For general discussion about Japanese policy at this time,
Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy 1869–1942 pp. 105–133.

50. FO 535/22, No. 26, Jordan to Curzon, 20/11/19.
Obata Yukichi, (1873–1947). Noted for his aggressive stance over the
Demands Crisis when he had been only a Councillor at the Japanese
Legation in Peking. He became Minister to China in 1918, where his
reputation for taking a hard line with the Chinese continued.
In 1922 he was a member of the joint Sino-Japanese Committee on
Shantung.

51. FO 535/22, No. 17, Curzon to Alston, 20/10/19; No. 26, Jordan to Curzon,
20/11/19.

52. FO 535/22, No. 27, Curzon to Jordan, 26/11/19.

53. FO 535/22, No. 17, Curzon to Alston, 20/10/19.

54. FO 535/23, No. 1, Jordan to Curzon, 27/12/19; No. 2, India Office to
Foreign Office, 5/1/20.

55. FO 535/23, No. 2, India Office to Foreign Office, 5/1/20; Encl. 2,
Gvt. of India to Montagu, 23/12/19.

56. FO 535/23, No. 4, Jordan to Curzon, 27/12/19.

57. FO 535/23, No. 2, Encl. 3, Gvt. of India to Peking, 23/12/19; No. 3,
Curzon to Jordan, 9/1/20. FO 535/23, 54, India Office to Foreign

58. FO 535/23 No. 29, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/5/20, Encl. 1,
Gvt. of India to India Office, 4/5/20, Encl. 2, Gvt. of India to
India Office 5/5/20; No. 33, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/7/20,
Encl. 1, Chief Minister Tibet to P. O. Sikkim, Confidential, 1/5/20,
(14th. day of the Monkey Year); Encl. 3, P. O. Sikkim to Gvt. of
India, 21/5/20, Encl. 4, Dalai Lama to P. O. Sikkim, 7/5/20; No. 51,
India Office to Foreign Office, 18/11/20, Encl. P. O. Sikkim to
Gvt. of India, 24/9/20.
59. FO 535/23, No. 29, Encl. 3, P. O. Sikkim to Gvt. of India, 21/5/20.

Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, pp. 215-17.


63. FO 535/24, No. 12, India Office to Foreign Office, 27/1/21; No. 15, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/2/21; No. 16, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/2/21; No. 24, Alston to Curzon, 5/3/21.

64. FO 535/24, No. 15, India Office to Foreign Office, 12/2/21 Encl. 8, Gvt. of India to Bell, 10/1/21.

65. FO 535/24, No. 15, India Office to Foreign Office, Encl. 4, Bell to Gvt. of India, 21/12/20, Encl. 5, Lonchen Shatra to Bell, 21/12/20. Encl. 6, Bell to Gvt. of India, 3/1/21.


Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, pp. 276-7; 288-9; 292.

68. FO 535/24, No. 59, India Office to Foreign Office, 3/6/21, Encl., Bell to Gvt. of India, Newsletter No. 10. Tibet and Nepal.
FO 535/25 No. 16, India Office to Foreign Office, 18/8/21 Encl. 1, Bell to Gvt. of India, Newsletter No. 15. FO 535/24, No. 21, India Office to Foreign Office, 26/8/21, Encl. 1, Bell to Gvt. of India, Confidential, 8/7/21, (Reporting American attempts to establish a Representative in Lhasa).
King: Appendix biography No. 35.
A. Lamb, Tibet, China and India 1914-1919, pp. 125-7.

69. FO 535/25, No. 50, India Office to Foreign office, 29/10/21.

70. Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, p. 139.


72. FO 535/25, No. 45, India Office to Foreign Office, 21/10/21.
Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, pp. 327-30.


75. The Tibetan School at Gyantse ran for only a year. Tibetan requests to locate the school in Lhasa itself were rejected on advice from Bell whose own experiences there had convinced him that the environment was unstable.


78. FO 535/23, No. 13, Lampson to Curzon Report from C.G. Chengtu, 7/4/20. FO 228/2961, Reports from Tachienlu August 1919. Louis King returned to resume control in Tachienlu in August 1919. Teichman had left for Peking on April 12th 1919 but had apparently expected to return there since he left his possessions. (FO 228/2957, No. 143, Tel. from Chengtu).


80. FO 535/23, No. 33, India Office to Foreign Office, 15/7/20, Encl. 2, Resident Nepal to Gvt. of India, 20/5/20.


84. FO 288/2960, No. 93, Tachienlu Reports, 10/6/20. King: Appendix biography No. 35.

85. FO 535/23, No. 27, Lampson to Curzon, 28/4/20
   Lamb, Tibet, China and India 1914-1950, pp.126-8; p.140, note 248.

87. FO 535/23, No.58, Enclosures in King to Clive, 26/8/20.


89. Chapter 8, p.197.
   Sherap: Appendix biography No.58. Tachienlu, see under Glossary of
   Places.

90. Chapter 7 for details

91. Chapter 8, p.198
   FO 535/23, No.28, Alston to Curzon, 14/5/20; No.32, Alston to Curzon,
   24/4/20; No.36, Alston to Curzon, 21/5/20.

92. FO 535/24, No. 21, India Office to Foreign Office, 26/8/21 Encl.1,
   Bell to Gvt. of India, Confidential, 8/7/21.

93. FO 535/24, No.64, Foreign Office to India Office, 24/6/21.

94. FO 535/24, No.54, India Office to Foreign Office, 27/5/21, Encl.,
   Gvt. of India to India office, 16/5/21.
   Bell: Appendix biography No.4.

95. FO 535/24, No.64, Foreign Office to India Office, 24/6/21.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ABOR.
A tribal group whose name in Assamese meant 'unruly' or 'disobedient' and who are now called Adi (hillmen). Inhabiting the river system of Dihang (Siang) they enjoyed a fierce reputation as plunderers and slavetakkers, launching frequent attacks on the Indian Plains below the Assam foothills. As official contacts with them became more frequent after 1826 this reputation was discovered to be undeserved and the Abor friendlier than previously thought. The British belief that they had been involved in the death of Noel Williamson in March 1911 led to the despatch of a punitive Expedition in October 1911 which resulted in a greater British involvement in Abor affairs.

AMBANS.
Official Representatives of the Manchu Emperor. There was one Amban living in Lhasa and another at Sining in Kansu Province. An attempt to establish a third in Batang in East Tibet during 1905 failed when he was killed by Lamaist monks while trying to flee the city. The Amban's power increased or decreased according to the political situation inside Tibet but, at the height of their influence, all official communication with Peking was via the Amban in Lhasa. By 1900 this power was dangerously reduced and remained so until the Chinese took away the Dalai Lama's right to memorialise the Emperor direct in 1908 and, the Lhasa Amban Yu Ta'i began to reassert some influence and interfered in the internal affairs of Tibet. This power was ended when he was deposed by Republican troops in 1912. In 1913 the post was restored under the new title of Pacificator.

CHO-YON.
Cho, meaning deity. Yon, meaning dispenser of offerings to religious persons. The Cho-Yon was a private and personal agreement entered into freely between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor under which the Dalai Lama agreed to look after the spiritual needs of the Emperor in return for political protection in times of internal disputes or foreign invasion. It was essentially an understanding between equals. Ambans were therefore Representatives of the Manchu Emperor in Tibet. When the Chinese invaded Lhasa in 1910 most Tibetans believed that the Cho-Yon had collapsed. The fall of the Manchu in 1911 confirmed this belief and from then on Tibetans regarded themselves free of all obligations to China. Such arrangements were not unusual in Central Asia and a similar understanding existed between the Dalai Lama and the ruler of the Mongol Buddhists. This had been undertaken between the heads of the two Churches in the sixteenth century and which reinforced the strong spiritual and political bonds between Tibet and Mongolia. (See under Gelugpa).

CURZONIANS.
Those members of the Service committed to the forward policy outlined by George Curzon after 1899 that resulted in the despatch of the Younghusband Expedition in 1903.
**DEPON.**

Tibetan military rank equal to General.

**DOYEN.**

Leader of the Legation Committee in Peking. He represented the Legations as a body in dealings with the Chinese and enjoyed the benefits of a clear working relationship with the Chinese as well as an additional heavy administrative burden. Jordan was Doyen from February 1911 and this kept him out of the Legation for much of the time, often on matters involving the Chinese Customs Service.

**GARPONS. (Tibetan Official)**

Garpons or Viceroys administered the territory around Gartok. Tibetan officials appointed from Lhasa they had their official headquarters at Gartok, but lived there only during the short summer. There were three Garpons at Gartok who held the post for 3 years. Sometimes they sent deputies to carry out their duties while they remained in their comfortable quarters in Lhasa.

**GELUGPA SECT (YELLOW HATS)**

Formed by Tsong Kapa (1357-1419) who then became reincarnated as the First and Second Dalai Lama. Sonam Gyatso (1534-88), the Third Dalai Lama, travelled to Mongolia and established the Cho-Yon with the Mongol Rulers, reinforcing the strong religious and political bonds between the two Buddhist churches of Mongolia and Tibet. In 1656, under the direction of the Lobzang Gyatso, the Fifth Dalai Lama, known as the Great Fifth, the Gelugpa ousted the older Red Hat Sect from all control of the Church in Central Tibet restricting their influence to East Tibet. This left a legacy of bitterness towards succeeding Dalai Lamas which was still there when Thubten Gyatso came to power in 1894.

**JONG.**

Fort.

**JONGPENS. (Tibetan official)**

Subordinate to Garpons. The Jongpens were appointed from Lhasa but administered smaller districts.

**KOV-TOV.**

Touching the ground with the forehead as a sign of total submission. The Dalai Lama would naturally wish to avoid doing this.

**MIRI.**

One of the many tribes inhabiting the hill country around the river Sabanari. In 1911 a mission was despatched to study them and explore their territory, after which time their lands came under the loose political control of the Indian Government.
MISHMI.
A tribe composed of three clans who lived in the basin of the Dibang and Lohit rivers, the Mishmi fought amongst themselves and were hostile towards strangers. They resisted Chinese attempts to befriend them during 1910 and 1911 and, between 1910 and 1911 and between 1911 and 1912, the Indian government despatched a Mission to study them and explore their territory. By 1914 their lands had come under the loose political control of the Indian Government.

PON PON.
Chinese local official, usually in administrative control of a town.

SOVEREIGNTY/SUZERAINITY.
Suzerainty; The right to exercise limited control over governments of semi-independent or autonomous states.
Sovereignty; Absolute control over a state.

Between 1904 and 1922 there was extensive debate and considerable misunderstanding in the West about the status of Tibet vis-à-vis the Chinese Empire. In 1793 the Manchu had assumed suzerain rights over Tibet and, since the Tibetans had no foreign office, they undertook the conduct of Tibetan foreign affairs. The Tibetans had always allowed this arrangement to stand as long as it suited them. The declining power of the Amban led them to review this situation as Tibetans had never recognised the right of the Emperor to conclude treaties on their behalf. They were particularly angered by what they saw as Chinese failure to come to their aid during the Younghusband invasion of 1904 and the term suzerain was not included in the Lhasa Convention. In 1906 the words 'suzerain' and 'sovereign' were excluded from the Adhesion Treaty of 1906 at the express wish of the Wai Wu Pu, despite British anxiety that the Chinese might try to claim 'sovereignty' over Tibet. The issue remained unsolved between Britain, China and Tibet and was a major cause of the breakdown of the Tripartite Talks at Simla in 1914. Tibetans regarded themselves as independent and free of all ties to China after the invasion of 1910 and, under the Anglo-Tibetan Bipartite Agreement signed in Simla in 1914, Britain recognised Tibetan independence.

TAO-TAI
Chinese official.

TRILL.
Commander of the Southern flank of the Tibetan army in East Tibet.

TSUNGLI.
A Chinese soldier with the equivalent rank of General.
TSONDU.
The Tsongdu or Tibetan National Assembly was composed of lay and clerical representatives and took decisions by establishing a consensus view. Since nothing could be decided until all were agreed, debates could continue for days, and even weeks. The Tibetans had no foreign office as such, and part of the problem between Britain and Tibet was that neither side could understand how the other took decisions. This confusion had much to do with the misunderstandings that subsequently arose about the reasons for the indemnity payments as well as about the legality of the Lhasa Convention of 1904.

ULA.
The forced labour and provision of pack animals for officials and important persons travelling in Tibet. Deeply resented in some areas, but absolutely essential in these parts of Tibet where there were long distances between settlements.

URGA HUTUKHTU. (Bogdo)
Hutukhtu are high ranking incarnations. The Urga Hutukhtu was the powerful ruler of the Buddhist Church in Mongolia.

WAI-CHIAO-PU. (See Wai Wu-pu)
The Wai Chiao-pu was formed by the Republican Government with the involvement of the Young China Party and its leader Dr. Yen. It survived into the Kuomintang era with minor organisational changes. Much of its business with British diplomats was then conducted in English. This affected the level of linguistic ability required within the China Service as it was no longer necessary for diplomats to speak and write perfect Chinese in order to conduct diplomatic business with the Chinese.

WAI-WU-PU. (See Wai Chaio-pu)
Until 1861 the Chinese did not possess a foreign office as such, but pressure from the 'Powers' forced them to establish one by Imperial Decree and the Tsungli Yamen became the central organ for the conduct of diplomatic relations. In 1864 the Tsungli Yamen was divided into five bureaus, four concerned with the various groups or 'powers', and the fifth dealing with naval matters. In 1901, after the Boxer Rebellion, the Tsungli Yamen became a full Ministry of the Manchu Imperial Government, known as the Wai-Wu-Pu. This was then divided into bureaus dealing with matters like mining and railway concessions, diplomatic relations being conducted through the Bureau of Harmonious Intercourse. In 1912 it was reorganised along western lines under the Republican Government and became known as the Wai-Chaio-Pu.
GLOSSARY OF PLACES

BATANG.
Formerly a Tibetan State under the protection of the Szechuan Authorities, the Tibetans at Batang spoke a corrupted form of the Lhasa dialect. The city had been brought under direct Chinese control following the suppression of a lama rebellion in 1905 during which an Amban had been killed and the monastery at Batang completely destroyed. Batang was then made headquarters for Chinese troops garrisoned in the southern frontier districts. It was also a centre for missionary activity, with a French Catholic Mission and an American Protestant Mission located in the city.

CHAMDO.
Built on a plateau between two narrow river valleys, Chamdo was little more than a village of mud hovels by the time Teichman arrived there in 1918. The once powerful Chamdo Monastery, (the largest in East Tibet) that had dominated the city, was destroyed by Chinese forces in 1912. An important religious and administrative centre and formerly the capital city of Chamdo Province, it had strong historical and religious links with Lhasa.

CHENGDU.
Famed for its hibiscus flowers, Chengdu was the capital city of Szechuan, one of the richest Provinces in China despite its remoteness. It was described by Sir Alexander Hosie, who visited in 1895, as 'a city of broad paved streets, and shop signs made of gold' (Sir A. Hosie, Three Years in Western China, pp85-87). Teichman, who went there in 1912, described it as the 'finest city in China' but returned in 1916 to find it in ruins. (Teichman, Travels of a Consular Official in North-West China, pp103-4). Sir Meyrick Hewlett lived there between 1916-22 and described the changes in his book, Forty Years in China, pp84-91.

DERGE.
The largest, wealthiest, and most independent of the Tibetan controlled states in East Tibet. In 1895 a power struggle within the ruling family resulted in Chinese intervention and in 1908, Chao Erh Feng's troops entered the state, defeating the rebel army and occupying the capital to the great consternation of the Lhasa Authorities.

DREPUNG, MONASTERY
The largest of the three powerful monasteries closest to Lhasa and, with Ganden and Sera, one of the three pillars of the Tibetan state. In 1912 there were between seven and ten thousand monks living there. Drepung monks had greater sympathy for the Chinese because many of them came from that part of East Tibet bordering China and had no desire to fight Chinese troops who lived so close to their families. Drepung also had interests in Tawang, for Tawang Monastery was their daughter house.
GANDEN MONASTERY
Situated twenty-five miles outside Lhasa and, with Drepung and Sera, one of the three pillars of the Tibetan state. In 1904 there were 5,000 monks living there who were fanatically anti-Chinese. During 1913 Ganden and Sera joined forces to attack Chinese troops in Lhasa.

GARTOK
Situated on an exposed plateau at 15,000 ft. above sea level, the city was an ancient administrative capital for the Garpons who controlled this part of Western Tibet. Apart from the extreme cold in winter, there were problems with the water supply for, in times of drought, the water became poisonous to animals and, if taken with grass, it caused them to moult. There were few houses in Gartok and most people lived in tents during the season that culminated in a huge fair held at the end of August that attracted many traders. By mid-November most people had left the city. From 1904 a British Agent called Thakin Jai Chand administered Indo-Tibetan trade there. A nephew of the ruler of the neighbouring state of Lahaul, he was in a good position to foster links with the peoples of the borderlands and he developed a reasonable relationship with the Gartok Garpons. The British believed that the area's close proximity to Chinese Turkestan would prove very useful in future years. (Younghusband, India and Tibet pp. 258-9)

GYANTSE (TRADE MART)
The third largest town in Tibet and a noted centre for carpets. Only a few miles from Lhasa, Gyantse was a politically sensitive location for a trade mart.

KOKONOR
An area composed of the whole of the upper basin of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers and part of the Mekong headwater country. Sparsely populated and largely uninhabitable desert. The whole area was under the nominal control of an Amban based at Sining on the border of Kansu.

NYARONG
A semi-independent state in East Tibet. In 1860 Tibetans in Nyarong had conquered neighbouring states and had upset the status quo in East Tibet. In response to requests from the rulers of these states the Dalai Lama had sent his army and, from 1865, the Lhasa government effectively controlled Nyarong. The Chinese then annexed the state to the Dalai Lama and Nyarong remained in Tibetan hands until occupied by Chao Erh-feng in 1911.

PIENMA
A village on the watershed between the disputed Chinese and Burmese border, Pienma was occupied by the Chinese because its people refused to pay increased tax on the coffin wood they supplied to Yunnan.
PHARI.
The highest inhabited town in Tibet and not the most popular posting. Waddell described it as the dullest town in the world. It was in fact an important trading centre on the main route to Kalimpong and Curzon had originally wanted the trade mart sited there instead of at Yatung. It had once been located in Sikkim but the failure of the Sikkimese to send a representative to the Tibet-Nepalese Negotiations in 1792 had resulted in the whole of Chumbi valley, including Phari, being transferred to Tibet.

PONG.
A Tibetan district in an area where the Tsangpo river turns south toward the Assam Himalayas to become the Brahmaputra. A tribal region of largely unexplored mountain and jungle, it had been the subject of commercial rivalry between Britain and China for many years. Together with the neighbouring Zayaul, it commanded the shortest route between Lhasa and Yunnan and, for the Chinese, it was a desirable alternative to the longer Szechuan-Lhasa road. In 1910 the Chinese occupied Pome and the people, who were of mixed Chinese and Tibetan blood and had enjoyed virtual independence under Lhasa rule, were in no mood to tolerate Chinese control. In 1911 they attacked and drove out the Chinese occupation force, inflicting a humiliating defeat upon them and effectively halting Chinese forward policy in the area.

RIKA.
Main administrative centre of Zayaul.

RONGBASTA.

SADIYA.
Staffed by the India Service and used to monitor activities on the Assam borders but it sometimes picked up information about Tibet. In 1909 the Indian government set up a language school there to teach Chinese to Indian Officers.

SERAMONASTERY
With Ganden and Drepung, one of the three pillars of the Tibetan state. In 1904 7,000 monks lived there. Sera was a great rival to Drepung and was noted for its 'warrior monks'. The Japanese monk, Kawaguchi, who lived there for a time, noted that the Abbot even allowed duelling before prayer. In 1913 Sera was attacked by Chinese forces during the occupation of Lhasa and, with Ganden, launched a series of fierce attacks on the Lhasa garrison.

SHIGATSE.
The second town in Tibet and situated close to the great palace of Tashilunpho, home of the Panchen Lama.
Sining.
Chief city of Kansu and centre for the prosperous wool trade with Kokonor, it was also situated in a notable wheat and corn growing area. An important administrative centre, it was the seat of the Amban for Kokonor and later, for the Muslim leader, General Ma. There was a missionary post in Sining manned by French-Ridley. The nearby monastery of Kumbum was an important religious centre and the Dalai Lama stayed there during his exile in 1905.

Tachienlu.
Situated nearly 10,000 feet above sea level, and hemmed in by mountains on all sides, Tachienlu was an important commercial centre for the Sino-Tibetan tea trade as well as the seat of the ill-fated Prince of Chala, whose palace was just outside the city walls. After 1912 Tachienlu became a key administrative centre for the Chinese and one of the Chinese Frontier Commissioners had his headquarters there. In 1913 a British Consulate was opened at the request of the Indian government in order to monitor events in East Tibet. This post was officially closed after Louis King's departure in 1922, but Paul Sherap kept the Chengtu Consul informed about developments in the city. In 1924 the Tachienlu archives were stolen by bandits.

Tashilunpho Monastery.
Situated about half a mile from Shigatse and the home of the Panchen Lama. In 1905 it had a population of 4,000 monks. It was an important religious and administrative seat.

Tawang Tract.
Adjacent to the eastern border of Bhutan, Tawang was a strip of territory 80 miles wide extending from the crests of the main Himalayan ranges down to the Brahmaputra valley in Assam. Between 1913 and 1919 it was officially described as part of the western section of the North-East Frontier. In 1919 it became known as the Balipai Frontier Tract, and later as the Kameng Division of the North-East Frontier Agency. An area of wide rivers inhabited by Tibetanised Buddhist tribes, the area contains a monastery of Tawang, daughter to Drepung Monastery which was founded in the 17th century and housing between 500 and 700 monks. A complex and loose system of control bound the inhabitants of this remote area to Lhasa.

Tengyeuh. (Consular Post). Situated in a remote part of Yunnan, Tengyeuh suffered incessant monsoon rain between May and October, making effective monitoring impossible for much of the year. Since half the cost of running the Consulate was met by the Indian Government, its primary function was to monitor trade between China and those parts of Indian held Burma annexed in 1894.

Uurga.
Now Ulan Bator. Capital city of Mongolia and seat of the Bodgo or leader of the Mongolian Church. Uurga was the Dalai Lama's first point of call following his flight in 1904. Situated on the main Lhasa to Uurga trade route crossing the Siberian Plains, it was also an important centre for trade.
YATUNG. (TRADE MART)
Yatung was the most southerly of the three posts in the Chumbi valley and the nearest to the Indian border. It had been the scene of a humiliating British defeat during 1903 when the Chinese built a wall right across the valley entrance, preventing them from trading with the Tibetans or gaining access to Tibet. Yatung had been opened as a trade mart after the successful conclusion of the 1893 Trade Regulations.

YUNNANFU. (CONSULAR POST)
A walled city and the old Provincial capital of Yunnan. Like Tengyeuh the Consulate was set up in 1894 after the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Burma. Although in a good position to monitor Tibetan affairs, its primary function was to investigate French, Chinese, and tribal activity on that upper part of the Burma border annexed by Britain. Hosie, who visited there in 1882, found it a clean city with wide streets.

ZAYAUL. (See Pome)
Like Pome, Zayaul was a tribal area of low altitude and a rich and fertile growing region. In August 1910 Chao Erh-feng established a Chinese settlement there. The Tibetans who opposed his control were defeated and a large Chinese garrison of 300 men established just north of Rima, the administrative capital of Zayaul. The occupation lasted only a short time however, and, by the early summer of 1912, Tibetans had massacred the remaining Chinese who had failed to withdraw.
ALSTON, Sir Beilby, (1868-1929) CHINA SERVICE
Privately educated in Europe, Alston entered the Foreign Office in 1890 and by 1895 was Acting Second Secretary in Copenhagen. Between 1898 and 1910 he held various diplomatic posts before going to Peking to work, firstly as a Councillor (1911-12), and then as Charge d'Affaires at the British Legation in 1913. He returned to the Far Eastern Department and worked there between 1916 and 1919 before becoming British Minister in Tokyo between 1919 and 1920. Between 1920 and 1922 he replaced Jordan as British Minister in Peking. Between 1923 and 1925 he was British Minister to Argentina and Paraguay, before becoming British Ambassador to Brazil.

BALFOUR, Sir Arthur James, (1848-1930) FOREIGN OFFICE
Educated at Eton and Trinity College Cambridge, he became Private Secretary to Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office between 1878 and 1880. Leader of the Conservative Opposition between 1892 and 1895, he then became Prime Minister between 1902 and 1905. He served as Foreign Secretary between 1916 and 1919 and headed the British Mission to the Washington Conference in 1922.

BAILEY, Lt. Col. Frederick, (1882-1965) INDIA SERVICE (Curzonian)
Born in Lahore, India, and educated at Wellington College and Sandhurst, Bailey joined the 17th Bengal Lancers and served in India between 1901 and 1903. In 1903 he joined the Younghusband Expedition and subsequently became Acting British Trade Agent at Gyantse between 1904 and 1905. In 1911 he explored Western China, South-East Asia, and the Mishmi Hills and was awarded the Gill Memorial Medal by the Royal Geographical Society. Between 1916 and 1917 he was Political Officer in Mesopotamia and Persia and, in 1917, he served on the North-West Frontier. Between 1921 and 1931 he was Political Officer in Sikkim and then went on to become British Resident in Kashmir until 1933. From 1935 until 1938 (the year in which he retired), he was British Minister in Nepal. A freemason, whose father knew Younghusband, Bailey had a varied and very successful career as a Political, soldier, explorer, plant collector and spy.
4. BELL, Sir Charles  INDIA SERVICE (Curzonian)
Born in Calcutta and educated at Winchester and New College Oxford, Bell entered the I.C.S. in 1889 and was posted to the Indian Plains. In 1900 he transferred to Darjeeling and, in 1903, joined the Younghusband Expedition. During this period he investigated the possibility of constructing a road linking India with Chumbi Valley but the scheme was later abandoned as too expensive. Between 1904 and 1905 he was Political Officer in Chumbi Valley and between 1906 and 1908, served as Assistant Political Officer in Sikkim. Between 1908 and 1918 he was Political Officer in Sikkim and became Special Advisor to the Dalai Lama while he was living in India between 1910 and 1912. He was Tibetan advisor to the Simla Conference between 1913 and 1914. He retired in 1918 but was then re-employed to lead an Expedition to Lhasa in 1920. He revisited Lhasa during a wider tour of Central Asia and China between 1933 and 1935. After 1912 he replaced Younghusband as Britain's leading expert on Tibet.

5. BRODRICK, St. John, Earl of Midleton, (1856-1942) INDIA OFFICE
Educated at Eton, (where he befriended Curzon), and at Balliol College Oxford. Between 1880 and 1885, he was Conservative MP for West Surrey. After this he served in the War Office, becoming Secretary of State for War between 1897 and 1898. In 1898 he became Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs before serving as Secretary of State for India in the run up to the Younghusband Expedition between 1900 and 1903. In 1907 he was Leader of the Southern Unionists in Ireland.

6. CAMPBELL, Sir Francis Alexander, (1852-1911) FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT
Undersecretary of State for the Far Eastern Department between 1902 and his untimely death from a kidney infection in December 1911.

7. CAMPBELL, C.W. (b. 1861) CHINA SERVICE
Whilst serving as Consul in Tientsin in 1900, he was shot when attempting to parley with the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion and never recovered fully from the subsequent blood poisoning. He spent some time in Korea where, like Jordan, he befriended Yuan Shih Kai before becoming Consul-General in Canton in 1905. He was Consul-General at Chengtu for a brief period in 1905 but requested a transfer on health grounds. Between 1909 and 1912 he served as First Secretary to the British Legation in Peking but retired prematurely following a badly handled investigation led by Max-Muller (No.44) who accused him of hogging the most interesting Legation work for himself.
8. CHALA, PRINCE (or King) TIBETAN RULER
A local Tibetan chieftan or t'ssu, and often referred to as the 'King' of Chala, a state in East Tibet. The kingdom of Chala was subject to indirect control from China and, in 1903, was attacked by troops loyal to the Dalai Lama. His popularity with Tibetans and with western missionaries made him unpopular with the Szechuan government, and in 1911 he was deposed by Chao Erh Feng. He subsequently made peace with the Chinese and agreed to act as intermediary between them and other states in East Tibet. The Prince provided Jordan and King with valuable information about Chinese activities in the region from his palace just outside Tachienlu. The Tibetan population of Tachienlu remained loyal to the Prince, but he was later arrested and imprisoned by the Chinese for a number of crimes and he met his death while trying to escape from Tachienlu in July 1922.

9. CHAMBERLAIN, Austen (1863-1937) INDIA OFFICE
Eldest son of Joseph Chamberlain and Conservative MP for East Worcestershire in 1892, he went on to become Chancellor of the Exchequer in Balfour's government between 1903-1905. After some years in opposition he was happy to accept the post of Secretary of State for India in 1915 but resigned in 1917 over the Mesopotamia Campaign. Between 1919 and 1921 he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lloyd George's government and went on to become Foreign Secretary between 1924 and 1929.

10. CHANG YIN-TANG CHINESE OFFICIAL
Chief promoter of the Chinese forward policy in Tibet after 1905. Chang acted as locum tenens for Tang Shao Yi (no. 59) at the Adhesion Talks held in Calcutta between 1905 and 1906, taking over when Tang became ill. In 1906 he was promoted to become High Commissioner for Tibet, and in 1907, he submitted articles to the Wai Wu pu on the subject of strengthening Chinese rule there. Whilst in Tibet he made it his business to humble and punish all Chinese and Tibetan officials who had helped Youngusband in 1904. Between 1907 and 1908 he represented China at the Trade Regulation negotiations leading to the successful Trade Regulation Treaty of 1908. In 1913 the Chinese put his name forward as Chinese Plenipotentiary to the Simla talks but his unpopularity with the British made his appointment impossible.
11. CHAO ERH FENG

A skilful military Commander responsible for the conduct of the Sikang campaign promoted by the Szechuan government. Between 1907 and 1908 Chang was acting Viceroy of Szechuan, and in 1908, was appointed Imperial Commissioner for Tibet, a post equivalent to that of Amban. In 1909 he ordered the despatch of an invasion force to Lhasa under the leadership of his deputy, Chung Ying, while he concentrated on acquiring more territory in East Tibet. In 1911 he became Viceroy of Szechuan and was murdered by a mob in Chengtu in 1912.

12. CHEN, Ivan

An experienced diplomat with western experience, Chen had been Second Councillor to the Chinese Legation in London between 1911 and 1912 and had earned a reputation for being reasonable which had endeared him to Foreign Office officials. Between 1911 and 1912 he participated in the negotiations leading to the Opium Agreement of 1913, (Jordan No. 32) and in 1912 took the post of Tao-Tai on the Burma-Yunnan border, later becoming Commissioner for Trade and Frontier Affairs in Shanghai. He was welcomed by the British as Chinese Plenipotentiary to the Simla Talks in 1913 but was subsequently criticised by his own government for being too friendly with the British. After he left Simla in 1914 he found it difficult to obtain employment but managed to hang on to the remnants of his career, partly as the result of the support and encouragement he received from Morrison (No. 48).


Educated at Winchester and Magdalen College Oxford, he was called to the bar in 1893. He went on to become Governor of Queensland (1905-9); Governor of New South Wales (1909-13); and Viceroy of India (1916-21) While Viceroy he helped to push through a series of Reforms that led to the Government of India Act of 1919 and which became known as the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms. In 1892 he had been elected a Fellow of Old Souls Oxford. He was re-elected to this post in 1929 and remained there until his death in 1933.
14. COALES, Oliver Robert (b.1880) CHINA SERVICE
Son of a London tutor, Coales entered the Consular Service in 1901. Although not strong he was enthusiastic for rough travel and, in 1910, sacrificed eight months of leave in travelling to Britain via Central Asia. He was Consul General in Tachienlu between 1916 and 1917 and in late 1916, he travelled to the East Tibetan front, accompanied by Dr. Clements of the China Inland Mission in Tachienlu. He disagreed with Bell over Tibetan claims to East Tibet and he thought the main cause of the friction was the result of the religious dispute between the Red Hat Sect and the Gelugpa (Yellow Hat) Sect which, by challenging the Dalai Lama's supremacy over the Buddhist Church in Tibet, had undermined his control in the region.

15. CREVE, Robert Offley Ashburton, Second Baron Houghton and Marquess of Crewe. (b.1858) INDIA OFFICE
Educated at Trinity College Cambridge he became Assistant Secretary to Lord Granville before becoming Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and Chief Secretary in the Colonial Office. Between 1910 and 1915 he was Secretary of State for India after which time he became British Ambassador to Paris. In 1911 he visited India during the preparations for the Delhi Durbar. In 1931 he became Secretary of State for War.

16. CURZON, George Nathaniel, Marquess of Kedleston, (1859-1925) VICE ROY/FOREIGN OFFICE
Educated at Eton and Balliol College Oxford before becoming Conservative MP for Stockport in 1886. Between 1891 and 1892 he was Undersecretary of State for India and between 1895 and 1898 he worked at the Foreign Office as Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He was appointed Viceroy of India in 1899 but resigned in November 1905 over a dispute with Lord Kitchener before he could begin a second term. Between 1919 and 1924 he was Foreign Secretary.
Between 1887 and 1895 he travelled extensively in the Far East, Middle East, and on the North West Frontier and he came to the conclusion that Russian involvement in Central Asia was still a threat to Indian security. Brilliant, but obsessive and demanding, a back injury in youth forced him to wear a corset and left him in constant pain. This combination of factors made him a difficult colleague.
DALAI LAMA, THIRTEENTH, Thubten Gyatso (1876-1933) (TIBETAN RULER)

Born of humble peasant stock in the Tibetan Province of Takpo South East of Lhasa, he was enthroned in 1879 after surviving several attempts to poison him before he reached his majority. In 1904 he fled shortly before the Younghusband Expedition entered Lhasa, visiting Urga and other Buddhist centres in Mongolia. In 1908 he was summoned to Peking and deprived of his power to memorialize the throne direct. He returned to Tibet in 1909 but fled once again, only hours before the Chinese invasion force reached Lhasa in February 1910. Between 1910 and 1912 he lived in exile in India. He returned to Tibet in 1913 declaring independence and signing a friendship treaty with Mongolia. He began a modest programme of modernisation beginning with the Tibetan army which he re-formed and used to attack Chinese troops in East Tibet between 1913 and 1916. Between 1916 and 1919 he withdrew for a period of meditation and, in 1920, welcomed the Bell Expedition to Lhasa, requesting military aid from Britain in the event of future attacks by the Chinese. Between 1923 and 1933 he sought diplomatic ties with America and China and welcomed the Weir Missions to Lhasa in 1924 and 1928. Although remaining friendly with other Powers, he refused to allow Tibet to join the League of Nations. He died in December 1933 in mysterious circumstances and amid rumours that he had been murdered. His feud with the Panchen Lama (No.52) intensified during his period of exile in India between 1910 and 1912.

DANE, Sir Louis, (b.1856) INDIA SERVICE

Dane entered the ICS in 1876 and became Foreign Secretary to the Government of India between 1902 and 1906. In 1905 he led a Mission to Afghanistan for the purpose of concluding a treaty and was Governor of the Punjab between 1908 and his retirement in 1913.

DORJIEV, Aghvan RUSSIAN BUDDHIST

A Buriat from East Siberia and, like the Dalai Lama, a member of the Gelupa (Yellow Hat) Sect. A distinguished scholar he attended Drepung monastery in the 1860's and in 1898, was sent to Russia by the Dalai Lama, then his pupil, in order to study western culture. In the spring of 1900 he travelled to Odessa to meet the Tsar, a trip that attracted the attention of the Indian government who began to suspect him of spying for the Russians. As his ex tutor, and later as his trusted friend, Dorjiev worked for the Dalai Lama until late 1910, retaining contact with him until the Dalai Lama died in 1933. After this he lost influence in Tibet and in 1934 he disappeared and he died in 1938, probably a victim of the Stalinist regime in Russia.
20. EDGAR, J.H. MISSIONARY
A New Zealander, Edgar worked with the China Inland Mission in East Tibet from 1908 until 1922. His command of Tibetan and Chinese, both written and spoken, were good, and his extensive reports on the situation in Tibet were a valuable source of information for Jordan. In 1911 he accompanied Bailey (No 3) on a journey from China to India via East Tibet, acting as guide and interpreter to the party.

21. FOX, H.H. CHINA SERVICE
The son of a clerk in the mercantile trade. In 1895 he was stoned by a mob during the pre-Boxer riots. From 1887 he served at various Treaty ports, usually in makeshift conditions during which time he lost his first wife in a typhoid epidemic. He brought his second wife to the Consulate in Chengtu in 1907 but, when ill health forced her to return, he asked for a transfer to a healthier post. He was particularly irritated by the lavish lifestyle enjoyed by the American and Canadian missionaries who lived in Chengtu, although he agreed to return there between 1914 and 1918. He refused a third term however since his wife still suffered from the lung disease that had forced her return in 1907.

22. GODLEY, Sir Arthur, Lord Kilbracken (1847-1912) INDIA OFFICE
The eldest and only son of John Robert Godley, he was educated at Rugby because his father had apparently left it too late to get him into Harrow. He won an Exhibition to Oxford in 1868 where he studied under Jowett who converted him to Liberalism. After serving as Private Secretary to Gladstone and Granville, and as Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, he entered the India Office in 1880. Between 1883 and 1909 he served as Permanent Undersecretary of State for India. During 1905 he became obsessed with the need to oppose what he described as 'Curzonian influences' in India. His relationship with Morley (No 47), his political chief, was good, although, in later years, it was tinged with resentment at what he felt was Morley's failure to listen to his advice.
23. GOFFE, Sir H.  
**CHINA SERVICE**
The son of a Master Plumber, Goffe joined the China Service at the age of twenty. Intelligent and efficient he nevertheless acquired a reputation for bullying subordinates which made him unpopular in some quarters. He believed that anti-foreign feeling would disappear when China was strong enough to compete with other powers on equal terms, and welcomed the enthusiasm of the Republicans and the discipline displayed by their troops as evidence of a new spirit in China. After joining the Service he served as Consul General in various posts before becoming Acting Consul General in Chengtu between 1905 and 1907. In September 1908 he transferred to Wu-hu, and, in January 1909, transferred to Nanking. Between 1911 and 1912 he was Acting Consul General at Hankow and from October 1912, was Acting Consul General at Yunnanfu. In 1920, and, on Alston's recommendation, he became Acting Consul General at Canton but, to his annoyance, this did not become a permanent posting. He distinguished himself for bravery at Hankow.

24. GOULD, Sir Basil, (1883–1956)  
**INDIA SERVICE**
Educated at Winchester and New College Oxford, he joined the ICS in 1907 and was posted to the Punjab. In 1909 he joined the Politicals and between 1910 and 1912, worked as Undersecretary in the Foreign Department in Simla before becoming Trade Agent at Gyantse in 1912. During 1913 he was Assistant Political Officer in Sikkim and between 1914 and 1917, he served on the North West Frontier. In 1917 he returned to India to become Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. Between 1918 and 1925 he was British Consul in Seistan in Persia and between 1926 and 1929, was a Councillor at the British Legation in Kabul. He served on the North-West Frontier as a Political Agent between 1929 and 1935, and he returned to the North East Frontier to serve as Political Officer in Sikkim until 1947.

25. GREGORY, John Duncan, (b1878)  
**PAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT**
Junior Clerk in the Foreign Office between 1909 and 1913. He became a Senior Clerk after 1913 and, between 1925 and 1928, he was Assistant Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

**FOREIGN OFFICE**
Educated at Winchester and Balliol College Oxford. In July 1884 he was Private Secretary to Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer). He was Liberal MP for Berwick-Upon-Tweed between 1892 and 1916. He was Parliamentary Undersecretary at the Foreign Office between 1892 and 1895 and Foreign Secretary between 1906 and 1916 when increasing blindness forced him to retire.
27. HARDINGE, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, (1859-1944)  
(VICEROY/FOREIGN OFFICE)  
Educated at Harrow and Trinity College Cambridge he joined the German Department at the Foreign Office in 1880. He then served as Attache in Constantinople, (1881-4); as Third Secretary in Berlin, (1884); and as Second Secretary in Washington DC, before being made Ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1904. In 1906 he returned to the Foreign Office as Permanent Undersecretary and, in 1910, became Viceroy of India. While in India in 1913 an attempt was made on his life and this, together with the death of his wife, made him anxious to return home. He agreed to remain in post until 1916, when he returned to his old post as Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office. Nearly forced to resign over his part in the conduct of the Mesopotamia Campaign, he went on to become Ambassador to Paris between 1920 and his retirement in 1922.

28. HARCOURT-BUTLER, Sir Spenser, (1869-1938) INDIA SERVICE  
Educated at Harrow and Balliol College Oxford, he entered the ICS and between 1901, and 1915, served in various departments, rising to become Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. Between 1915 and 1917 he was Lt. Governor of Burma and in 1918, served as Lt. Governor in Agra and Duda. Between 1921 and 1923 he was Governor of the United Provinces and between 1923, and 1927, he was Governor of Bihar. In 1928 he chaired the Indian States Committee.

29. HEWLETT, Sir Meyrick, CHINA SERVICE  
Educated at Harrow he joined the China Service at his second attempt. Between 1898 and 1901 he was a Student Interpreter in Peking, staying on for an extra year in order to become Satow's Private Secretary in the Treaty negotiations that followed the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. He then undertook Consular work at various Treaty ports before becoming Consul General at Chengtu between September 1916 and April 1919, and again between February 1920, and November 1922. Alston (Ho 1) recommended him for promotion to Chinese Secretary at the Peking Legation but, for reasons unknown, this appointment was never confirmed by his successor.

30. HOSIE, Sir Alexander (1859-1931) CHINA SERVICE  
Son of a farmer from Aberdeenshire in Scotland, he became Acting Consul General at Wenchow between 1884 and 1887 before becoming Consul General at Chungking between 1900 and 1902. In 1902 he opened the Consulate at Chengtu, where he lived for some time, taking the opportunity to travel extensively in Western China. Author of two comprehensive reports on trade in East Tibet, Hosie was employed by Jordan from 1904 as a kind of roving reporter. Between 1906 and 1908 he participated in plans for the Opium Treaty which aimed to ban the import of Indian opium to China. (See Jordan, No 32; and Wilton, No 69). Earlier in his career he became involved in a scheme to open the Upper Yangtse to steam ships, a plan that had to be abandoned due to cost.
31. IJUN, Hikokichi, (1864-1924)  
Japanese diplomat and politician. Consul General at Tientsin between 1901 and 1906, he was Japanese Minister to Peking between 1906 and 1913. He then became Japanese Minister to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Between 1916 and 1920 he served as Ambassador to Italy and in 1923, became Japanese Minister in Tokyo. His spoken English was very poor.

32. JORDAN, Sir John Newell, (1852-1925)  
The son of an Irish Presbyterian farming family from Balloo in County Down, and educated at Queens College Belfast, where he received a first class honours in Classics and subsequently an MA, before going on to become a Senior Classics scholar. He joined the China Service in 1876, passing the Chinese Entrance examination with credit. Between 1876 and 1891 he held various posts within the service, becoming Chinese Secretary at the Peking Legation between 1891 and 1896. In 1896 he became British Plenipotentiary in Korea and probably met Yuan Shih Kai in Seoul during this period. On Morrison's (No.48) recommendation, he was appointed British Minister in Peking in 1906. With Alexander Hosie, (No.30), and Tang Shao-yi, (No.59), he successfully negotiated the Opium Treaty of 1913 that banned the importation of Indian opium to China. This Treaty had dire consequences for Indian finance and made him enemies in India. In February 1911 he became Doyen of the Peking Legations and between 1914 and 1918 used his influence to bring China into the war on the allies side. He also mounted his own forward campaign in East Tibet, (see Teichman, No.60). He retired in March 1920 and between 1920 and 1921 he took part in the discussions leading to the Washington Conference, accompanying Balfour as advisor to the talks in 1922. He died in London in 1925, leaving three sons, his only daughter having died suddenly from a viral infection in 1918. His wife Anne, whom he had married in 1885, spent many years with him in China and made an an important contribution to the life of the Peking Legation.

33. KALON LAMA  
Commander in Chief of the newly modernised Tibetan army of East Tibet, the Kalon Lama was universally respected and admired by his people. He was most concerned to effect a Sino-Tibetan settlement, with or without British involvement, and to this end, he was lenient with General P'eng after the Siege of Chamdo in 1918 and was prepared to work with Teichman (No.60) during his peace mission to East Tibet. The Kalon Lama was rumoured to have been murdered in late May or early June 1923.
34. KAWAGUCHI, Ekaï  
JAPANESE TRAVELLER  
A Buddhist monk of humble origins, Kawaguchi spent three years in Tibet between 1889 and 1901. He was possibly working informally as a spy for the Japanese government but he always claimed that the purpose of his mission was religious and finally before reaching Lhasa he studied for many months at Sera Monastery. His published account of his experiences in Tibet was translated into English in 1909. In 1905 he visited the Panchen Lama at Tashilunpho. He returned to Tibet in 1914.

35. KING, Louis Macgarth  
CHINA SERVICE  
Born in China, his mother was the daughter of missionaries and his father worked as a Chinese Customs Official. He entered the China Service at twenty and was the first Vice-Consul at Tachienlu between 1913 and 1915. Between 1915 and 1919 he served on the Western Front before returning to Tachienlu for a second term. He remained in Tachienlu as Vice Consul and then as Honorary Consul from 1919 until 1922, when his marriage to a Tibetan lady called Rin-chen Lhamo forced him to retire from the Service on a meagre pension at the age of thirty-eight. In 1925, while living in Peking in straitened circumstances, he attempted, unsuccessfully, to secure employment in the China Service as advisor to the Panchen Lama. He eventually returned to Britain and collaborated with Rinchen-Lhamo in writing We Tibetans which was published in 1926. He wrote about his own experiences in China in Turmoil.

36. LADEH LA  
INDIA SERVICE  
A British subject and a native of Sikkim, Laden La was a staunch Buddhist who came to work for the British as a spy. A Superintendent in the Darjeeling Police Force, he joined the Younghusband Expedition in 1904 and in 1905 was attached to the Panchen Lama’s entourage during his trip to India. In 1910 he was similarly employed and joined the Dalai Lama’s party in India, becoming a trusted friend to the Tibetans. In 1912 he led a Mission to Tibet and became British Representative at Gyantse. In 1921 he went to Lhasa to join Bell and replacing his Assistant, Achuk Tsering, who had died soon after reaching Lhasa. He remained in Lhasa after Bell left in order to organise a new police force there but left under a cloud in 1924, having been implicated in an attempt to seize military control there. He was apparently forgiven, and returned several times after 1925.
37. **LANGLEY, Walter, (1855-1918)**

FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT

Campbell’s (No.6) Assistant from 1907, he replaced Campbell after December 1911. He promoted Alston as British Minister in Peking in 1920.

38. **LANSDOWNE, Sir Henry Pelty-Fitzmaurice, Fifth Marquess of Lansdowne, (1845-1927)**

VICEROY/FOREIGN OFFICE

Viceroy of India between 1888 and 1894 he then became Secretary of State for War in Salisbury’s cabinet. Between 1900 and 1905 he was Foreign Secretary and, from 1905 until 1915, led the Conservative Opposition in the House of Lords.

39. **LIEN YU**

CHINESE OFFICIAL

Manchu official and Lhasa Amban between 1907 and 1911. He founded a school in Lhasa, acquiring a printing press from India which he used to print translations of Chinese classics into Tibetan in an attempt to influence the culture and habits of the Tibetans. In 1908 he set up a Tibetan Military College where Chinese and Japanese instructors helped to train Tibetan soldiers to become officers. In 1910 he established Trapchi barracks in Lhasa. His proposal to improve agriculture by introducing Chinese settlers into Tibet, and the creation of a Board of Mines to exploit its gold, silver, and mineral resources did not endear him to the Lhasa Authorities. He opened schools in key Tibetan centres like Gyantse which were intended to promote Chinese language studies. His arrogance and his high-handed approach antagonised both Tibetans and British who each complained to the Chinese and Indian governments. He was eventually deposed in 1912 and was summoned back to China. Fearing his reception in Peking however, he failed to obey the summons and remained in hiding in Tibet.

40. **LONGCHEN SHATRA (Pailor Dorje Kalon)**

TIBETAN OFFICIAL

Between 1894 and 1895 he had visited Darjeeling and had learned something of western diplomatic practice. In 1904 he was imprisoned for his pro-British sympathies but was re-instated in 1908. Between 1910 and 1912 he accompanied the Dalai Lama into exile in India and became Tibetan Plenipotentiary to the Simla talks in 1913, collecting a vast amount of evidence to support Tibetan claims. On his return to Tibet in 1914 he was again criticised for being too willing to accept the British terms. He died in 1923.
41. McMAHON, Sir Henry, (b.1862)  INDIA SERVICE
A keen freemason, he joined the Politicals in 1890. Between 1894 and 1896 he was charged with demarcating the boundary between Baluchistan and Afghanistan. He served as a Political Agent in Dir, Swat, and Chitral between 1899 and 1901 and in 1903 became British Commissioner for Seistan in Persia. Between 1905 and 1911 he was Political Agent in Baluchistan. In 1913 he was appointed British Plenipotentiary to the Simla talks and put forward a plan to divide Tibet between Inner and Outer zones. After he left Simla in 1914 he became High Commissioner for Egypt and subsequently Foreign Secretary for the Indian government. In 1919 he became British Commissioner on the Middle Eastern International Commission. McMahon was the last Indian Foreign Secretary to have charge of both the Foreign and Political Departments within the Indian government.

42. MACDONALD, David  INDIA SERVICE
British Trade Agent at Yatung and Gyantse and active on the frontier for twenty years, Macdonald survived the stigma of mixed parentage, (Scottish father and Sikkimese mother), to become British Trade Agent at Gyantse in 1908, and at Yatung in 1912. His marriage to a woman of mixed Scottish and Nepalese blood prevented further promotion but his knowledge of many regional languages and dialects made him a very important British representative on Tibetan affairs until he retired in 1924.

43. MANNERS-SMITH, Lt. Col John, (1864-1920)  INDIA SERVICE
Educated at Trinity College Cambridge and Sandhurst, he served as Military Attache for the Indian government between 1883 and 1885. In 1888 he accompanied a British Expedition to Sikkim. He received the Victoria Cross for his services on the North-West Frontier and, in 1893, became Political Agent at Kabul. Between 1899 and 1918 he served as Political Officer in Kashmir, Baluchistan, Rajputana and Nepal.

44. MAX-MULLER, William Grenfell (1867-1945)  CHINA SERVICE
The son of a German born scholar and not noted for his tact, his career was divided between Peking and the Far Eastern Department. Between 1909 and 1911 he was Councillor and Charges d'Affaires at the Peking Legation and in 1910, conducted an enquiry into Campbell's conduct as First Secretary, (No.7). During his time in Peking he 'forgot' to report on his tour of Consulates with the result that there were no written reports on them between 1909 and 1911. He was passed over for promotion to British Minister in Peking in 1920.
45. MINTO, Sir Gilbert John Murray Kynmond, Fourth Earl of Minto (1845-1914) VICE ROY
Educated at Eton and Trinity College Cambridge, he entered the army, serving in many campaigns between 1867 and 1882. Between 1883 and 1885 he was Military Secretary to the Governor General of Canada succeeding him as Governor General in 1891. Between 1905 and 1910 he was Viceroy of India.

46. MONTAGU, Edwin, (1879-1924) INDIA OFFICE
Educated at Trinity College Cambridge and Liberal MP for Chesterton in Cambridgeshire from 1906 until 1922. Between 1906 and 1910 he was Asquith's Private Secretary and, from 1910 until 1914, was Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for India. Between 1914 and 1916 he was Financial Secretary to the Treasury and in 1916 became Minister of Munitions, resigning soon after his appointment. Between 1917 and 1922 he served as Secretary of State for India but was forced to resign over Turkish policy. He collaborated with Chelmsford, (No. 13) in drawing up the reforms that lead to the Government of India Act of 1919.

47. MORLEY, John, First Viscount of Blackburn. INDIA OFFICE
The son of a Lancashire doctor, Morley was a political thinker and a Gladstonian Liberal. He spent many years in Ireland as Chief Secretary (1886-92) and in 1899, became MP for Blackburn in Lancashire. In 1905 he returned to Ireland as Secretary of State and, between 1906 and 1910, was Secretary of State for India. Between 1910 and 1912 he relieved Grey at the Foreign Office during his frequent periods of illness and returned briefly to the India Office to replace Lord Crewe in 1911. (No.15).

48. MORRISON, George Ernest, (1849-1928) NEWSPAPERMAN
An Australian reporter and traveller whose diaries and papers are a rich source of information about Peking society. He first came to Peking in 1895 and worked as Times Correspondent there until 1912 when he resigned to take up an appointment as an Advisor to Yuan Shih Kai. He used his influence with the Foreign Office to secure Jordan's appointment as British Minister to Peking but, after 1912, friction developed between the two friends as Morrison's loyalties became increasing divided between Britain and China. He gave Ivan Chen considerable support during and after Simla. (Ivan Chen, No.12).
49. NICOLSON, Sir Arthur, First Baron Carnock, (1849-1928) FOREIGN OFFICE
Entered the Foreign Office as Assistant Private Secretary to Lord Granville. He then joined the Diplomatic Service, becoming Third Secretary in Berlin and, in 1876, served as Third Secretary in Peking. Between 1879 and 1906 he held various diplomatic posts in Teheran (1879-1882); Budapest (1888-93); Sofia (1894), and Tangier (1895). In 1906 he became British Minister in St. Petersburg during negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. In 1910 he returned to the Foreign Office to become Permanent Undersecretary, a post he held, reluctantly, until his retirement in 1916. Between 1916, and his death in 1928, he acted as an unofficial liaison officer between the Foreign Office, the Royal Court and the city.

50. NOMI, Yutaka, (later Kan) JAPANESE TRAVELLER
Much influenced by his Oxford Professor Nanjo Bunyu. Nomi was determined to go to Tibet in order to translate Tibetan Scriptures into Sanskrit. Although unsuccessful in his attempt to reach Lhasa in 1899, he travelled extensively in East Tibet and was able to pass on valuable information about the area to the Japanese government. He disappeared somewhere in Tibet during 1904.

51. O'CONNOR, Lt. Col. W. Frederick INDIA SERVICE
O'Connor joined the British Mountain Battery in Darjeeling in 1895 and, between 1895 and 1897, made several journeys into Sikkim. In 1897 he became a Pioneer Correspondent, reporting on events on the frontier. In 1898, while serving as Assistant Inspecting Officer to the Kashmiri Imperial Service Artillery Unit, he began to learn several languages including, Tibetan, Urdu, Nepalese, Punjabi, Persian and Russian. His aptitude for languages attracted the attention of Lord Curzon and in 1901, O'Connor was invited to Simla to discuss Tibetan matters. In 1902 O'Connor stayed with Claude White (No. 68) in Gartok, where the two men apparently discussed Curzon's plans for Tibet and, in January 1903, O'Connor was posted back to Darjeeling in order to assist White in the preparations for the Younghusband Expedition. He acted as Tibetan Interpreter to the Expedition and, in 1904, drew up the Lhasa Convention. In 1905 he was appointed Trade Agent at Gyantse and during that year colluded with White, (probably on Curzon's instructions), to bring the Panchen Lama to India. He accompanied the Panchen Lama to India in 1906 and, after taking leave, he returned to Gyantse to face the conflict with Gcw that would do so much damage to his reputation. He left Gyantse in 1908 to act as Tibetan Advisor to the Trade Regulation Talks and, after they were signed, he found himself unable to get another posting to Tibet. In 1908 he accompanied the Maraj Kumar to Peking at the start of his world tour and probably met the Dalai Lama. Between 1914 and 1918 he served in Consular posts in Persia returning the North-East Frontier in 1918 to become British Resident in Kashmir where he negotiated an Anglo-Nepalese Friendship Treaty in 1923.
52. PANCHEN LAMA, Ninth.  
**TIBETAN RULER**  
As spiritual advisor to the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama was the second most important religious figure in Tibet as well as a powerful ruler in his own right. In 1728 the temporal power of the Panchen Lama was restricted to his own Province of Tsang, with its capital city, Shigatse, and a vast court at Tashilunpho a few miles away. Modest and retiring in nature, and less politically aware than Thubten Gyatso (Thirteenth Dalai Lama, No.17), he had already established good relations with the British and was persuaded to visit India between 1905 and 1906. He stayed on in Tibet after the Chinese invasion of 1910, remaining on reasonable terms with the Chinese after the Dalai Lama fled and, under duress, agreed to go to Lhasa to help stabilise the government there. This created further tension with the Dalai Lama. Attempts to mend the rift when the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1912 were unsuccessful and, eventually, in 1923 the Panchen Lama fled Tibet, living in exile in China until his death in 1937.

53. RITCHIE, Raymond, (1854-1912)  
**INDIA OFFICE**  
Educated at Eton and Cambridge and related to Anthony Trollope, Ritchie was fond of writing and was noted for the excellence of his written reports. Before becoming Permanent Undersecretary at the India Office between 1909 and 1912, he had worked as Private Secretary to Godley (No.22). His premature death in 1912 shocked and saddened his colleagues.

54. ROCKHILL, William Woodville, (1854-1914)  
**AMERICAN DIPLOMAT**  
Educated in Paris, he later briefly joined the Foreign Legion before entering the Diplomatic Service in 1884. He was employed at the American Legation in Peking until 1888 when he resigned his position in order to travel extensively in Central Asia attempting, unsuccessfully, to reach Lhasa. He had studied Tibetan while in France and had developed a passion for Chinese and Tibetan culture. In 1901 he returned to China as American Special Envoy to the post Boxer talks and devised America's Open Door policy towards China. He was American Minister to Peking between 1905 and 1909 and, in 1908, was Special Advisor to the Dalai Lama in Peking, although he was sceptical about Tibet's ability to achieve independence from China. In 1909 he became American Minister to St. Petersburg and, in 1912 was American Minister in Turkey. In 1913, on Morrison's (No.48) recommendation, he applied for, and was accepted, as Special Advisor to Yuan Shih Kai. He took the post on the understanding that he would not have to return to China but changed his mind and died in Honolulu while enroute to Peking.
55. ROSE, Archibald, (b. 1879) CHINA SERVICE

He received a China Medal and Clasp for his services to the British Legation during the Boxer Siege of 1900 and afterwards served in various China Consulates including, Chungking, Ningpo, and Hanchow and was Consul General at Tengyeuh during the Pienma crisis of 1910. He travelled widely in China, Mongolia and Central Asia and was Chinese Advisor to the delegation to the Simla Conference in 1913. In 1915 he became Commercial Attache in Shanghai and went on to become Chinese Secretary at the British Legation in Peking between 1917 and 1921.

56. SATOW, Sir Ernest, (b. 1843) CHINA SERVICE

Born in London, the fourth son of an English mother and Swedish merchant father, Satow's strict Protestant upbringing made him uncomfortable in society. He gained a BA from London University before becoming a Student Interpreter at the British Consulate in Tokyo where his linguistic skills secured his promotion to Japanese Secretary in 1868. His friendship with Ito helped to advance Anglo-Japanese relations and, in 1900, he was asked to become British Minister in Peking. In 1900 he negotiated the terms of the Boxer Settlement with the Chinese and he remained Minister in Peking until 1906. In 1902 he warned of the dangers of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance and, unlike many of his colleagues, he was not surprised by the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. In 1906 he was the only high ranking official in the China Service to have worked as interpreter in China and Japan and his great fluency in both languages was enormously valuable. With Jordan (No.32), he was one of the few people to transfer from the Consular to the Diplomatic Service but, like Jordan, he was not promoted to Ambassador. Between 1906 and 1912 represented Britain as a member of the Court of Arbitration in the Hague and after his retirement, continued to act as unofficial advisor to the Foreign Office on Chinese and Japanese matters. A keen scholar and author of several books on Japanese culture, he never married, but his very open long term relationship with a Japanese woman probably cost him further promotion.

57. SHELTON, Dr. AMERICAN MISSIONARY

A freemason and one of a group of American and British missionaries based in Batang in East Tibet, Shelton and his colleagues travelled extensively in East Tibet. He was well liked by local Tibetans and became a great friend of the Prince of Chala (No.8). In 1917 he tried to organise his own peace initiative but co-operated with Teichman (No.60) in organising the Chamdo Truce. In 1922 he was murdered by bandits after an abortive attempt to reach Lhasa.
58. SHERAP, Paul (Dorjie Zodba)  
CHINA SERVICE
The son of Tibetan and Mongolian parents, Sherap was born in Rongbasta in East Tibet but travelled extensively, living for a while in Darjeeling where he became a Protestant, taking the Christian name Paul. Although he earned his living as a merchant, he also worked part-time for the China Service, passing on information about events in Tachienlu between 1924 until 1928.

59. T'ANG SHAO-YI, (b.1860)  
CHINESE OFFICIAL
Partly educated in America between 1904 and 1906 he was Chinese delegate to the Adhesion Talks. He left India before talks were completed and returned to Peking to become a Minister at the Wai-Wu-Pu. Jordan was convinced that T'ang was the official mainly responsible for the Chinese forward policy from this time. In 1908 he was delegate to the talks leading to the Opium Treaty of 1913, (see Jordan No.32). Between 1908 and 1909 he was Vice President of the Wai-Wu-Pu.

60. TEICHMAN, Eric, (1884-1944)  
CHINA SERVICE
Born in London, the son of a naturalised German fur trader, Teichman joined the China Service in 1907. Between 1911 and 1912 he served as Wilkinson's (No.67) Assistant at Chengtu, distinguishing himself for bravery during the revolutionary disturbances in the city. In 1911 he undertook a long journey to North-West China and was Jordan's Assistant in Peking between 1913 and 1917. In 1917 he was appointed Consul General at Tachienlu. Between March 1918 and February 1919 he went on a peace mission to East Tibet that resulted in the signing of treaties at Chamdo and Rongbasta. He then departed on an unauthorised tour of East Tibet, eventually returning to Tachienlu in February 1919. He returned to Peking to become Chinese Secretary to the Legation until 1924. He was allowed to publish a book about his mission in East Tibet while still in the Service. He retired in 1936 but was called from retirement in 1942 to advise on negotiations relating to the ending of extraterritoriality in China.

61. TSONGA PENLOP, (Sir Ugyen Wanchek)  
BHUTANESE RULER
A figure of great political importance as Bhutan emerged from a period of civil war to become a stable Himalayan state friendly to Britain. Ugyen had acted as an intermediary with the Lhasa Authorities during the Younghusband Expedition and in 1905 was invited to Calcutta to meet the Prince and Princess of Wales. His friendship was particularly valued as previous relations with Bhutan, via the Bhutanese Representative or Vakil in Darjeeling, had been difficult. He was instrumental in the successful signing of the Anglo-Bhutanese Friendship Treat of 1910.
62. TWYMAN, B CHINA SERVICE
A weaver's son from Kent, Twyman became Consul General at Chengtu in 1909. He left after a year, having suffered a nervous breakdown but went on to distinguish himself for bravery in 1915 when he risked his life by facing an angry mob who were storming his Consulate.

63. UGYEN KAZI BHUTANESE OFFICIAL
Bhutanese Representative in Darjeeling, he sometimes spied for the British. In 1901 he agreed to deliver Lord Curzon's letter to the Dalai Lama, who later stated that he had received it but had chosen not to open it. He was attached to the Younghusband Expedition as the Ugyen Wnachek's Secretary. In 1908 he was still spying for Bell in Sikkim.

64. WEIR, Lt. Col. James Leslie Rose, (1883-1950) INDIA SERVICE
Educated at Wellingborough and the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich, he was seconded to the Politicals in 1908 after a short army career in India. In 1908 he was British Resident in Gwalior before becoming British Trade Agent at Gyantsé between 1909 and 1912. Between 1912 and 1914 he served on the North West Frontier and in Mesopotamia and, between 1918 and 1922, served as a Consul in various parts of Persia. In 1926 he became Political Officer in Sikkim and while in post he led two Expeditions to Lhasa in 1928 and again in 1933. Between 1933 and his retirement in 1938, he was British Resident for the Indian States of Baroda and Gujarat.

65. WEI T'SUNG-YAO CHINESE OFFICIAL
Assistant Amban in Lhasa under Lien Yu (No.39), and a man of comparatively liberal views. More trusted by the Tibetans than most Manchu officials, he resigned over the Chinese invasion of Lhasa in 1910. In 1913 he was offered as delegate to the Simla talks and was accepted by the British but declined the post, refusing to travel to India because he felt that the talks would not make progress in London. His support for Yuan Shih Kai's (No.72) Five Nations policy in 1913 lost him support inside Tibet.

66. WELLINGTON KOO (b.1888) CHINESE OFFICIAL
One of the new breed of western educated diplomats, Koo was educated in America and, between 1911 and 1914, was Secretary to Yuan Shih Kai and a member of the Wai Wu pu. In 1915 he was appointed Chinese Minister to America and, between 1919 and 1920, he led the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. In 1921 he was appointed Minister to London and was Chinese Plenipotentiary to the Washington Conference in 1922. He returned to China in 1922 to become Minister for Foreign Affairs and later Minister for Finance. Between 1931 and 1941 he was Minister, and later Ambassador to France and between 1941 and 1946, he was Ambassador to London.
67. WILKINSON, W.H. CHINA SERVICE
The son of a commercial agent in Wolverhampton, he served in a variety of Consular posts in China from 1902 until he became Consul General for Chengtu between 1909 and 1915. A brave man who distinguished himself by staying in post during the disturbances of 1911, he could also be petty and snobbish. In 1911 he prevented his Assistant leaving Chengtu in order to marry the widow of a missionary.

68. WHITE, Claude INDIA SERVICE
Originally an engineer with the Public Works Department, White was seconded to the Politicalss in 1888 in order to assist the Political Officer in Sikkim where it was hoped he could use his engineering skills to organise bridge and road building schemes in the area. In 1889 he became Political Officer in Sikkim and, in 1903, was appointed Commissioner to the Younghusband Expedition. After 1904 the area under his supervision was increased to include Bhutan and parts of Tibet. Between 1905 and 1906 he colluded with O'Connor (No. 51) in bringing the Panchen Lama to India. In 1906 he undertook an exploratory mission to East Bhutan followed by a second visit there in 1907 to represent Britain during the installation of Ugyen Wanchek (Tsonga Penlop, No. 61) as Maharajah of Bhutan. During his years as Political Officer of Sikkim (1889-1908) he built many roads and bridges but, although he tried hard to interest his government in further schemes, he was forced to retire before many of them could be implemented.

69. WILTON, Sir Eric (b. 1870) CHINA SERVICE
He entered the China Service in 1890 and in 1903 was Special Chinese Advisor to the Younghusband Expedition. After his return to China he served as Consul General at Tengyueh in 1906 and, in 1908 was sent to India as Special Chinese Advisor to the Trade Regulation talks. Between 1912 and 1915 he was Chinese Secretary in Peking and was a member of the Special Opium Commission, (see Jordan No. 32). In 1915 he became a Commercial Attaché in Shanghai before being promoted to First Secretary to the Peking Legation in 1917, a position he held until his retirement in 1921.
70. YAJIMA, Yasujiro
JAPANESE TRAVELLER
A veteran of the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, Yajima abandoned a successful military career to join the Nippon Rikkowa (World Travelling Society), a Christian organisation whose aim was to help poor students. He paused in Szechuan on the first leg of his solo journey round the world to help train troops in the Szechuan Provincial army and arrived in Tibet during 1910. In 1911 he visited the Dalai Lama, then in exile in India, and returned to Tibet in 1913 where he was employed as an instructor to the new Tibetan army. Yajima's movements attracted a lot of interest in India and Hardinge, convinced that he must be a Japanese spy, went to a great deal of trouble to investigate his background.

71. YOUIGHUSBAID, Sir Francis
INDIA SERVICE
From a military family in Bamburgh in Northumberland, Younghusband was born at Muree Hill Station on the North West Frontier and was educated at Clifton Public School and at Sandhurst. In 1882 he was sent to join the Kings Dragoon Guards at Meerut and, by 1884, was employed as a reconnaissance scout on the Kohat frontier. About this time he began to develop an interest in Manchuria and, in March 1886, he visited Peking en route for Manchuria, the first of many Central Asian journeys. He met Lord Curzon while on leave in London in 1891 and, when he returned to India, he became First Assistant to the British Resident in Kashmir, going on in August 1892 to become Political Officer in Hunza and then in Chitral where Curzon visited him in October 1894. In March 1895 he resigned from the Politicals to become Times Correspondent in Chitral and, in August 1895, met and married Helena Maghioc. In November 1897 he rejoined the Politicals, returning to India to become Political Officer in Rajputna, and subsequently, British Resident in Indore in Southern India. Both appointments had been secured on Curzon's recommendation and, in May 1903, he was summoned to Simla where Curzon offered to make him leader of an Expedition to Tibet. Between 1903 and 1904 he led the Expedition to Tibet and negotiated and signed the Lhasa Convention of 1904. He returned to Britain to face severe criticism of his conduct in Tibet which he deeply resented. In 1907 he returned to Kashmir as British Resident retiring in January 1910. Between 1914 and 1915 he was employed by the India Office disseminating war news to India and, in 1919 he became President of the Royal Geographical Society. He was Organiser of the World Congress of Faiths until his death in 1942.
72. YUAN SHIH KAI  
**CHINESE RULER**

After failing to enter the Civil Service, Yuan decided upon a military career and obtained his first post in the Maritime Defence Unit in Shantung. In 1882, he played a key role in the military campaign in Korea and became Commissioner of Commerce and Chinese Resident there, gaining a reputation as a shrewd politician. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, he commanded the 'Newly Created Army' which, helped by German officers, employed western principles of military training and organisation. These men stayed loyal to Yuan and probably saved his life during the Hundred Days Crisis of 1898 when he was accused of betraying his Emperor. In December 1899, Yuan was made Governor of Shantung and, under the guise of training and equipping troops to cope with the Boxer rebellion, he built up the most powerful army in China. In 1907, he was forced out of office but returned in October 1911 to take full advantage of the Manchu collapse, offering to act as honest broker between the Manchu Court and the Revolutionaries. When the last Manchu Emperor, Pu-Yi, abdicated in 1912, Sun Yat Sen appointed Yuan Provisional President of the new Chinese Republic and, in March 1912, he became its first President. His attempts to make himself Emperor created a constitutional crisis and, in June 1916, he died suddenly in mysterious circumstances, leaving his country on the brink of civil war. Throughout his period in power, Yuan faced severe financial shortages and civil unrest which made it virtually impossible for him to govern effectively.

73. YU T'AI  
**CHINESE OFFICIAL**

Appointed Amban in Lhasa in 1903, he took months to take up his post but was there to greet Younghusband in 1904, where his sophistication and helpfulness endeared him to the Expedition members. He was arrested in 1907 on the orders of Chang Yin Tang (No.10), and he returned to Peking in chains, accused by Chang of being too co-operative with the British.
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