Durham E-Theses

Divine revelation and the infallible church: Newman, Vatican II and Arcic

Peterburs, Michael Robert

How to cite:


Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
ABSTRACT

Divine Revelation and the Infallible Church: Newman, Vatican II and ARCIC

The intention of this thesis is twofold: firstly, to define precisely the degree to which John Henry Newman anticipated the teaching of Vatican II on the nature and transmission of Revelation and on the Church's theological understanding of herself; and secondly, to assess the significance of this for contemporary ecumenical discussions between Roman Catholics and Anglicans on authority in the Church.

The first section of this thesis, then, is an exploration of Newman's thought on Revelation and ecclesiology. This includes an analysis of some unpublished and hitherto unconsidered material from the Birmingham Oratory Archives, which reveals that Newman had formulated an organic theory of development by 1840; three years before this is generally reckoned to have been the case. This discussion is set within the historical context of Newman's life, and the relevant scholarly material is also surveyed.

The second section compares Newman's views, as set out above, with the teaching of the Second Vatican Council in the appropriate sections of its two Dogmatic Constitutions, Dei Verbum (on Revelation) and Lumen Gentium (on the Church).

The third section begins with a discussion of the principles upon which Roman Catholics conduct ecumenical dialogue. These are found primarily in the Vatican II document Unitatis Redintegratio, but also in the new Ecumenical Directory; scholarly opinion is also reviewed. There then follows an analysis of the two ARCIC documents on 'Authority in the Church', and the major criticisms of them are considered in detail. Many of these are irreconcilable not only with the documents, but also with one another. It is therefore suggested in the conclusion, that a possible way to overcome some of these divisions is through a discussion of theological method. A brief outline of a potentially helpful method, the seeds of which were sown by Newman, is then provided.
DIVINE REVELATION AND THE INFALLIBLE CHURCH:
NEWMAN, VATICAN II AND ARCIC

MICHAEL ROBERT PETERBURG

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.

PHD THESIS
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM
DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY
1994

27 JUN 1994
No material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree in this or any other university.

Durham, March 1994

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotations from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Michael Peterburs
Grantley Cottage
Pennine Close
Darlington
Co. Durham DL3 9YA
DIVINE REVELATION AND THE INFAILIBLE CHURCH:
NEWMAN, VATICAN II AND ARCIC

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Section I: Newman, Divine Revelation and the Infallible Church

Chapter 1 From Bull to Petavius: First Developments 6
   i. The Arians of the Fourth Century 7
   ii. Controversy with the Abbé Jager 12
   iii. Samuel Francis Wood 16
   iv. Letters to Francis Newman 19
   v. University Sermon XV 34
   vi. Diary Appendices and Copybook on Development 40
   vii. Conclusion 47

Chapter 2 A Natural Progression: An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine 49
   i. Essay on Development 49
   ii. Continuing Revelation 61
   iii. Continuity of Its Principles 66
   iv. Unfulfilled Prophecy and the Primacy Texts 68
   v. Historical Method 78
   vi. Eastern Orthodoxy 85
   vii. Conclusion 92

Chapter 3 Shape and Form, Structure and Authority: Newman's Idea of the Church 94
   i. The Idea of a University 94
   ii. The Rambler Controversy 105
   iii. The Preface to the Via Media 123
   iv. Conclusion 144

Chapter 4 A Tyrant-King? Newman and the Pope's Infallibility 148
   i. Neo-Ultramontanism 149
   ii. Vatican I and its Definitions 157
   iii. The Letter to the Duke of Norfolk 166
   iv. Conclusion 177
Chapter 5  Rome, Right or Wrong?  
Infallibility Examined  

i. Infallible? An Enquiry  
ii. Papal Infallibility?  
iii. Conclusion  

Section II:  Newman and the Second Vatican Council  

Chapter 6  Proclaiming the Word: Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation  

i. The Nature of Divine Revelation  
ii. The Transmission of Divine Revelation  
iii. Comparison with Newman  
a) The Personal and the Propositional  
b) The Mutual Relation of Scripture and Tradition  
v. Evaluation  
v. The Possibility of Irreformable Definitions: the Connexion between Revelation and Infallibility  

Chapter 7  Proclaiming the Kingdom: Newman, Vatican II, and the Church  

i. The Mystery of the Church  
ii. The People of God  
iii. The Hierarchical Structure of the Church  
v. The Laity  

Comparison with Newman  
a) The Mystery and Sacrament of the Church  
b) The Hierarchical Structure  
c) The Laity  
v. Evaluation  
v. Conclusion  

Section III:  Newman and the Quest for Christian Unity  

Chapter 8  The Search for Unity: Foundations for the Building of Ecumenical Dialogue  

i. Catholic Principles of Ecumenism  
ii. The Practice of Ecumenism  
iii. Conclusion  

vi
### Chapter 9  Pope or no Pope? ARCIC on Authority  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Authority in the Church I</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Authority in the Church II</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Criticisms of ARCIC on Authority</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Revelation:</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Dogmatic Formulae</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Pneumatology</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Councils and Reception</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Jus Divinum</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Ecclesiology</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Confessional Identity</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Role of the Laity</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) The Authority of the Ordained Ministry</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Ecclesial Status</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Conclusion</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 10  The Creative and the Cognitive, the Beautiful and the True: Method in Theology  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Toward a Postcritical Theology</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. From Precritical to Postcritical</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. The Critique of Criticism</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. The Sources as Clues</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. The Validation of Discoveries</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. From Faith to Understanding</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. Summary</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii. Conclusion</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Abbreviations  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Bibliography  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bibliography</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
INTRODUCTION

John Henry Newman, whose thought had a profound effect upon both the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, is arguably the greatest English theologian of the modern period. In fact, he is hailed by many as a progenitor of the Second Vatican Council and as a forerunner of ecumenism.

While the latter claim is difficult fully to substantiate, it is certainly true that there is much in Newman's thought that is of use to ecumenical dialogue, and the degree to which he anticipated the teaching of Vatican II in several key areas is quite remarkable.

It is not the purpose of this thesis, however, to argue that Newman was the 'hidden presence' at Vatican II, or that his thought had a great impact upon it. Such a connexion would seem almost impossible to prove, since one would need to know not only how influenced the Council Fathers and periti were by Newman, but also what other influences helped to form their opinions. But that there is significant agreement between Newman and the Council on several important issues is incontrovertible.

The intention of this study, therefore, is twofold:
firstly, to define precisely the degree to which Newman anticipated the teaching of Vatican II on the nature and transmission of Revelation and on the Church's theological understanding of herself, with regard to her character, membership and structure; and secondly, to assess the significance of this for contemporary ecumenical discussion between Roman Catholics and Anglicans on authority in the Church.

This limitation of the field of study is deliberate, and this for two reasons. Firstly, Vatican II covered such a broad range of topics, that to compare each of its documents with Newman's thought would be unrealistic and, within the confines of a thesis, almost unmanageable; and secondly, if Newman is to be of value to contemporary theology, this must be in some central rather than peripheral way. Hence the concentration in Section II on the two Dogmatic Constitutions promulgated by the Second Vatican Council, *Dei Verbum* and *Lumen Gentium*, and in Section III on ARCIC's Agreed Statements on 'Authority in the Church', since it is these, along with the criticisms that have been raised against them, that highlight the fundamental areas of agreement and disagreement between Catholics and Anglicans.

Since the details of Newman's life and writings are so
well known, historical narrative has been kept to a minimum. It was necessary, however, to expound his works in some detail: firstly, so that the comments and criticisms of contemporary scholars could be examined; and secondly, to enable a detailed comparison of his theology with the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. Lengthy quotations from Newman's published works have by and large also been avoided, although on occasion the quality of his prose dictated that he should be allowed to speak for himself.

The first section of this thesis, then, is an exploration of Newman's thought on Revelation and ecclesiology. Chapter 1 draws on unpublished and hitherto unconsidered material from the Birmingham Oratory Archives to explain the importance of the development of doctrine in Newman's early thought. Chapter 2 then discusses his theory of Revelation in the Essay on Development, and the ecclesiology to which this gave rise is treated of in chapter 3. His belief in the necessity of an infallible teaching office is considered in chapter 4. All this theological discussion, which also takes into account the relevant scholarly material, is conducted within the historical context of Newman's life and works. Chapter 5 is a discussion of Newman's attitude to infallibility from the perspective of contemporary theological opinion.
The second section compares Newman's thought on Revelation and ecclesiology with the relevant documents of Vatican II; chapter 6 treats of *Dei Verbum*, and chapter 7 of *Lumen Gentium*. Throughout this section the demands of contemporary scholarship are borne in mind.

The third section begins with a discussion, in chapter 8, of the principles upon which Roman Catholics conduct ecumenical dialogue. These are found primarily in the Vatican II document *Unitatis Redintegratio*, but also in the new Ecumenical Directory; scholarly opinion is also surveyed. Chapter 9 then analyses the documents of the Anglican - Roman Catholic International Commission on "Authority in the Church", and the major criticisms of them are considered in detail. Many of these are found to be irreconcilable not only with the documents, but with one another also. In chapter 10, therefore, it is suggested that a possible way to overcome some of these divisions, which exist not only between the Churches, but within them also, is through a discussion of theological method. A brief outline of such a method, the seeds of which were sown by Newman, is then provided. The overall conclusion is that theology can still benefit greatly from the work of John Henry Newman.

During the course of this study I received
considerable assistance from my supervisor, Dr. Sheridan Gilley, without whose generous support and guidance this thesis would never have come to fruition. I am also grateful to those who have given their valuable time in offering advice and recommending suitable literature. Among these are the Rt. Rev. Gordon Wheeler, retired Bishop of Leeds, the Rt. Rev. Mgr. Kevin Nichols, advisor on religious education in the diocese of Hexham and Newcastle, the Rev. Dr. John McHugh, formerly of Ushaw College and the University of Durham, Dr. Colin Crowder of the University of Durham, and Mr. Gerard Tracey, archivist and librarian at the Birmingham Oratory. Quite obviously my work also owes a considerable amount to the scholarship of Newman experts such as Fr. Stephen Dessain and Fr. Ian Ker. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to my sister, Mrs. Brenda Abbott, for her patient and accurate typing of my partially handwritten manuscript.

Michael Peterburs
University of Durham
Feast of the Annunciation, 1994
Although the subject of papal infallibility was to exercise Newman's mind greatly in the 1860's and '70's, it was not in itself, a major theme of the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine of 1845, and it was not his acceptance of it that led to his conversion to Catholicism. Rather it was the 'hypothesis' of development which enabled him to regard the Catholic Church of the nineteenth century as being one with the Church of the Fathers. The generally accepted opinion of the genesis of the Essay of Development is that the 'theory was something almost entirely new, although Newman first adumbrated it in his Arians of the Fourth Century.' It is in the last of the University Sermons on 'The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine' that the theory is first reckoned to have seen the light of day, reaching its culmination in the Essay. In other words, the chronology of his conversion is thought to be Tract XC, development (University Sermon...

*This chapter is a slightly revised version of an article on 'Newman and the Development of Doctrine' which is forthcoming in Recusant History, 1994.
First Developments

XV as a prologue to the Essay) and then Rome. Such an impression, however, is misleading. His first attempt to work out a coherent theory of development appears in two, as yet unpublished and unconsidered, letters to his brother, Francis William, in October and November 1840, and these, along with the last of the University Sermons form the groundwork to the Essay. Furthermore, the controversy with the Abbé Jager, and discussions with Samuel Francis Wood on the development of doctrine, seem to have affected the development of his thought. Notes made in the appendices to his private diaries between 1843 and 1846 show how his mind dwelt on this subject during those years, and a plan for the Essay is to be found in the "Copybook on Development", dated 7 March 1844.

The Arians of the Fourth Century

In The Arians of the Fourth Century, Newman seems to have recognized that, in the doctrines of the Homoousion and the Trinity, some sort of development had taken place. Following Hawkins, he rejected the idea of sola scriptura arguing that:

Surely the Sacred Volume was never intended, and is not adapted, to teach us our creed: however certain it is that we can prove our creed from it, when it has once been taught us.

He does, however, take a distinctly negative approach
First Developments

Tract LXXIII (1835), which was later published under the title 'On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion'.

Thus the systematic doctrine of the Trinity may be considered as the shadow, projected for the contemplation of the intellect, of the Object of scripturally-informed piety: a representation, economical, necessarily imperfect, as being exhibited in a foreign medium, and therefore involving apparent inconsistencies or mysteries; given to the Church by tradition contemporaneously with those apostolic writings, which are addressed more directly to the heart; kept in the background in the infancy of Christianity, when faith and obedience were vigorous, and brought forward at the time when, reason being disproportionately developed, and aiming at sovereignty in the province of religion, its presence became necessary to expel a usurping idol from the house of God.

Having outlined, however, how undesirable formalized religious doctrines are, Newman then goes on to show how necessary they are to restrain the rovings of the intellect, or silence its clamorous demand for a formal statement concerning the Object of our worship. If, for instance, Scripture bids us adore God, and adore His Son, our reason at once asks, whether it does not follow that there are two Gods; and a system of doctrine becomes unavoidable; being framed, let it be observed, not with a view of explaining, but of arranging the inspired notices concerning the Supreme Being, of providing not a consistent, but a connected statement.
Newman did not regard formal statements of doctrine as merely human constructs. They were part of Revealed Truth. This can be seen from his discussion of ecumenical Councils, in which he makes further use of the theory of the Disciplina Arcani:

Lastly, the secret tradition soon ceased to exist even in theory. It was authoritatively divulged, and perpetuated in the form of symbols according as the successive innovations of heretics called for its publication. In the creeds of the early Councils, it may be considered as having come to light, and so ended; so that whatever has not been thus authenticated, whether it was prophetical information, or comment on the past dispensations, is, from the circumstances of the case, lost to the Church. What, however, was then (by God's good providence) seasonably preserved, is of some sense of apostolic authority still; and at least serves the chief office of the early traditions, viz. that of interpreting and harmonizing the statements of scripture.

As such, not only do such theological expressions 'assist acts of religious worship and obedience', they also 'exclude heresy'. It is the task of the Church, 'the pillar and the ground of truth', to preserve these divinely revealed truths. Two of the main themes of the Essay on Development are already present in Newman's thought: firstly, the creative role of heresy; and secondly, that which underpins the whole process of development - Divine Providence.
First Developments

So, in Arians, Newman regarded dogma as the necessary, if unfortunate consequence of an increasing disdain for the apostolic witness, incapable of fully expressing the divine mysteries it represents. It is, however, also part of Revealed Truth, being the formal statement of the secret, unwritten tradition of which the apostles were in possession. That being said, he still felt it to be regrettable that dogma was at all necessary, but it is regarded as excluding heresy from the Church, whose task it is to protect Christian truth. In connexion with this, he thought of the creeds as a test of authority, not of communion:

the test has been used, not as a condition of communion, but of authority. As learning is not necessary for a private Christian, so neither is the full knowledge of the theological system. The clergy, and others in station, must be questioned as to their doctrinal views: but for the mass of the laity, it is enough if they do not set up such counter-statements of their own.16

Some other elements of the Essay of 1845 can also be detected in 1833. This includes the idea of the interdependence of Scripture and Tradition, although the latter was regarded as 'unauthoritative' and static, rather than as a dynamic, organic reality as it was in the Essay. There is not at this stage a formal attempt to outline a theory of the development of doctrine.
First Developments

The question of the relationship between faith and the Church, however, was to occupy his mind considerably during the following years: 'There was a contrariety of claims between the Roman and the Anglican religions, and the history of my conversion is simply the process of working it out to a solution.'

Controversy with the Abbé Jager

In 1834 Newman entered into direct controversy with the Roman claims in a correspondence, which he took over from Benjamin Harrison, with the Abbé Jager. In his discussions with the Abbé, Newman argued that Anglicanism represented a middle way between 'Romanism' on the one side and popular Protestantism on the other. Both, as he saw it, were corruptions of the primitive faith of the undivided Church, which found its fullest expression in Antiquity. His argument with Jager, which centred around St. Vincent's Commonitorium, was that the Church of Rome had committed 'the intolerable offence of having added to the Faith.' This 'offence' was based on the fallacious belief that 'Tradition per se [is]... sufficient authority for the Church considering a doctrine fundamental.' This was not an error into which Anglicans would fall because 'we consider tradition subordinate, not coordinate to Scripture.'
First Developments

For Newman there were two types of Tradition. Firstly, Episcopal Tradition which was the Creed, 'a collection of definite articles committed and received from bishop to bishop and forced upon the attention of each individual Christian'. The development of Episcopal Tradition was limited to Antiquity, by which Newman meant approximately the first 450 years after Christ.

Secondly, Prophetical Tradition, which he understood to be the interpretation of the Revelation, and which consisted in theological rather than doctrinal development. That which was brought to light through Prophetical Tradition was entitled to attention, although different statements were entitled to very different degrees of credit. The seeds of the idea of the development of doctrine can be found in Newman's discussion of Prophetical Tradition.

Through her Prophetical Office, Newman believed that the Church had 'The power to develop its fundamental Creed into Articles of religion, according to times and circumstances; [but] to develop is not to create. Articles of religion are not essentially fundamental articles as articles of faith are.'

Jager agreed that 'to develop is not to create', but he asked Newman for proof that the 'Thirty-nine Articles are the development of the Creed', for example 'that
there are only two sacraments... that the Pope has no jurisdiction over the Catholic Church [and] that Queen Elizabeth has the chief power in all kinds of causes, whether ecclesiastical or civil.'

More irenically:

No doubt, there is a difference between apostolic tradition and prophetic exposition. The prophets or the doctors of the Church are obliged to define, to comment, to develop the mysteries of religion, and to put them within the people's reach. But as Vincent says, they must do it 'while preserving the same doctrine, the same sense, the same judgement.' When you develop a truth, you do not change it, on the contrary, you give it more force, more lustre, greater scope. That is what the Fathers and the Doctors of the Church did. The Church took care to warn those who had the misfortune to stray from the apostolic doctrine as in their explanations, she pointed out their errors, and condemned them when necessary. And so apostolic tradition has remained pure and intact until our own day, and will remain so until the end of time.

This point evidently weighed heavily with Newman because it is embodied in the first note of a genuine development 'preservation of type' in the Essay on Development. In addition, he was not so keen to diminish the authority of Prophetic Tradition in the Lectures on the Prophetical Office (1837) as he was when he first described it to Froude in 1835. Compare these two quite contrasting attitudes. To Froude he wrote that Prophetic Tradition 'does not carry with it any witness of its reception being necessary for Church Communion. Its reception is the
privilege of the Christian when admitted, not of his admission." Yet two years later in the *Prophetical Office* he described it as:

existing primarily in the bosom of the Church itself, and recorded in such measure as Providence has determined in the writings of eminent men. This is obviously of a very different kind from Episcopal Tradition, yet in its origin it is equally Apostolic, and equally claims our zealous maintenance.... This is that body of teaching which is offered to all Christians, partly being a comment, partly an addition upon the articles of the Creed.

A second point which was to have its effect upon Newman's thought later was Jager's accusation that the Church of England was in the same position as the Donatists, who had separated themselves from the Church 'for articles which were not fundamental':

You hurl at me darts which you think are lethal, namely, that the Donatists were considered by the Church as excluded from salvation, although their error was against Scripture. I answer, almost in your own words, that to maintain an opinion against the voice of the whole Church stubbornly and publicly is of itself without any doubt a mortal sin, and such was the flagrant sin of the Donatists, as St. Augustine tells us.

From the *Apologia* it may perhaps be inferred that in 1839 Newman regarded himself as condemned by his own arguments of four years before.
In summary, then, it may be concluded that the controversy with the Abbe Jager left its mark upon Newman. Already present in his own mind were the seeds of a theory of the development of doctrine, and his correspondence with the Abbe pushed him further in that direction. This can be seen from the discussion on the difference between 'develop' and 'create' which is essential to the Essay on Development. Furthermore, 'the conjunction which so startled him in 1839, of Donatists, Anglicans and St. Augustine, had been present to his mind in 1835, without producing the dramatic effect it had later.' It would appear fair to conclude that the controversy had some effect in changing Newman's opinions, but that where the subject of development occurs in his early work, he is usually found to be attacking it. This is true of the Letters on the Prophetical Office as well as of the controversy with Jager.

Samuel Francis Wood

In 1835, Newman was also confronted with the idea of development in doctrine by Samuel Francis Wood, a former Oriel pupil, and now a friend and disciple in the Oxford Movement. Wood's theory, which he discussed with both Newman and Henry Edward Manning, then Rector of Lavington, may be set out as follows:
1. Under the direction of the Holy Spirit, and pursuant to Christ's commands, the Apostles committed to the charge of the Church a formal system of doctrines ordinances disciplines etc. And this orally, their writings imply or presuppose, but do not contain, it.

2. It is therefore only incidentally that the obligation to receive doctrines arises from their being found in Scripture; primarily, it results from them being ascertained Apostolical Tradition.

3. In common with other societies the Church has the inherent power of expanding or modifying her organisation, of bringing her ideas of Truth into more distinct consciousness, or of developing the Truth itself more fully.

4. It follows that the doctrines may be true, tho' not traceable [amended to 'apparent' following criticism from Manning] to the Apostles.

5. And further, that the Church retains the right of authoritatively exhibiting them, subject only to the condition - arising from the withdrawal of her inspired guides and from her infallibility - of their being true.

6. But the only mode of providing this is by showing their accordance with Scripture. So that while the Church has ever been our sole expositrix, we have now two coordinate tests of doctrine Apostolical Tradition and Scripture.33

Newman reacted against this theory employing the same arguments he had used against Jager. These are summarized by Wood in a letter to Manning, dated 29 January 1836, which he wrote following a visit from Newman during which the theory had been discussed.

Well then! Newman holds that from the time the Church ceased to be One, the right of it to propound Articles of Faith, as such,
is suspended, all that remains to them is to impose terms of communion, articles of peace etc. Further, he says that before the Reformation the Church never deduced any doctrine from Scripture, and by inference blames our Reformers for doing so. Moreover, he objects to their doctrine in itself as to Justification by Faith, and complains of their attempt to prove it from the Fathers, as a perversion of their meaning. Generally, his result is, not merely to refer us to antiquity but to shut us up in it, and to deprive, not only individuals but the Church, of all those doctrines of Scripture not fully commented on by the Fathers: and he seems to consider that our Reformed Church has erred as much in one direction as the Council of Trent in another, and the fact of our churches holding different views e.g. on justification, requires the suspension of our judgement, or at least prevents full acceptance of our doctrine concerning it.40

The argument that doctrine is not to be deduced from Scripture shows that Newman still held to the Disciplina Arcani, and that he rejected the idea of doctrinal development. Theological development was, however, permissible in his view, but its rôle was limited to drawing up terms of communion; what he described to Jager as 'Articles of Religion'. This, however, is a development of his view in Arians that the creeds provide only a test of authority not of communion, and, as will be suggested below, his discussions with Wood, as well as the controversy with Jager, left their imprint upon him. In fact, by 1840, he had formulated an organic theory of the development of doctrine.41
In 1840, Newman resumed an as yet unpublished and unconsidered correspondence with his brother, Francis, with whom he had long been out of contact. In his letters, Francis (who had definite Unitarian sympathies) challenged John Henry to state why he could call himself an Apostolical Christian, when it seemed to Francis that Wiseman's claim was just as good, if not better, than John Henry's. John Henry approached this issue from the direction of Revelation and development.

In a letter of 22 October 1840, John Henry argued that:

if the fact of a revelation be granted, it is most extravagant and revolting to our reason to suppose that after all its message is not ascertainable and that the divine interposition reveals nothing.\(^\text{19}\)

He then went on to draw out what he saw to be the difference between a Unitarian and an orthodox Christian:

'I regard the Unitarian controversy as a singularly difficult one'; I grant it on the assumption that the books of the New Testament are the appointed or direct means by which truth is to be ascertained on the subject, or that nothing need be received as true, but what necessarily follows from the text by the mere force of words, or that nothing is important which though apparently taught in one portion, is not taught in all others
Newman's argument is that the Unitarian picks and chooses the parts of Scripture which suit his argument best, but that the Trinitarian takes Scripture as a whole, interpreted by the creeds. Thus, Trinitarian thought is based on Scripture and Tradition, but the Unitarian approach is distorted by the assumption that 'He who is literally and wholly man, cannot be literally and wholly God.'

He then continues with the argument that Scripture must be taken and interpreted as a whole:

'If I had no Scripture but Paul's epistles, I should believe him an Arian; if I had none but the opening of the 4th Gospel, I might think the writer a Sabellian; if I had the first 3 gospels and the Acts alone, I should most unhesitatingly be a follower of Dr. Priestley'. Granting this for argument-sake, the question is what ought I to believe, when I have ALL these informants [?] Now the Catholic creed is pretty much the union of all these antagonistic opinions which separately become heresies; and heresy in each case is not so much a positive doctrine, as the holding of a particular doctrine to the exclusion of other doctrines. The question then resolves itself into this. Is such union of antagonistic doctrines an absurdity? is it more likely that the various writers of the New Testament should agree by holding a mystery, or should differ, by holding each of them only what is on the surface of their respective writings? Is it not a more probable assumption
than not, that in your words 'every writer of the New Testament held the very same?' You think not, I think it is.\textsuperscript{12}

Newman's thought leads to the conclusion that an authoritative interpreter of Scripture is required, something he had already established to his own satisfaction in Arians. Since he believed that one can understand God's Revelation with certainty, it is not surprising that he saw the creeds, authoritatively laid down by the early ecumenical Councils, as the interpreter of the whole of Scripture, and as catechetical material. Revelation in Scripture is not a series of disunited arguments and opinions. It forms a coherent whole and is intended, by God, to be understood by man. The creeds are the key to understanding Scripture, because they are the explicit statement of unwritten Tradition which explains that Revelation given in Scripture. More will be said below about Newman's understanding of Tradition in 1840 as opposed to 1833, in the discussion of his second letter to Francis.

To John Henry, Francis had approached the issue from the wrong direction. Rather than starting at the position outlined in Arians that faith is taught by the creeds, which are in turn proved by Scripture, Francis started from Scripture, ignoring the existence of Tradition. It was,
therefore, not surprising to John Henry that Francis should speak of the authority of the Church as 'the authority of an unseen abstraction.' John Henry responded:

If the Church is nothing more than this, and so far as it is nothing more, I do not maintain its authority. Supposing one said 'Philosophers are now agreed that the earth goes round the sun' or 'the House of Commons has ruled that it has a right to publish libels'; are 'Philosophers' ideal and the 'House of Commons' an abstraction? So far as the Church does not answer to these illustrations, I do not maintain its authority.

So, in this letter, Newman has, in effect, reproduced the arguments of Arians. Man can understand God's Revelation with certainty, but this Revelation is not taught generally to Christians by the Bible. Rather, it is taught authoritatively by the creeds, which can be proved from Scripture. In consequence of this, the Church has authority to perform her rôle as guardian of the Revealed Truth. There is, however, no mention in this letter of the inadequacy of human language in this context. Since this was a belief he retained in his later theology, it would seem that he has avoided this point for the moment so as not to over-complicate the issue and perhaps to avoid giving Francis further ammunition. It is also to be noted that he does not comment on the desirability, or otherwise, of formal doctrine, even by implication. That which is implied is that doctrine is necessary for the
interpretation of Scripture. Whether this is regrettable or not he does not say.

In the second letter, Newman goes on to set out his first formal attempt at establishing a theory of development. He no longer held the view that there was at one time an age of 'pristine' Christianity, but was of the opinion that Christianity, as it is now known, had developed by fits and starts, in a rather haphazard fashion. He was concerned to show that these developments were legitimate, and that he, who held the developed doctrines of Christianity, was right to call himself an Apostolical Christian. Before setting out his theory, however, he turned first to the 'question whether I go by private judgement though I proscribe it.'

Newman wished to demonstrate that there would be no inconsistency in upholding the authority of the Church, and yet, when she did not speak or could not be heard, going by private judgement.

To illustrate his point, Newman gives three examples of how following one's private judgement need not necessarily conflict with giving way to a higher authority. The general point that is made in these examples is that he did not regard it as illegitimate to
First Developments

rely on one's own private judgement in a situation in which one did not receive, or have access to, commands from a legitimate higher authority. That being the case:

there is nothing impossible in Almighty God having granted the Church a power of speaking truth within certain limits, viz. on certain subjects or for a certain time, or under certain conditions; and that external to those limits private judgement should have its range. There may be moral uses in the freedom of judgement in some things as well as its restraint in others. As to the fact, whether Providence has thus appointed, and its antecedent probability, these are distinct and essential points of course; but I am describing a case in which a use of private judgement is not inconsistent with implicit submission to an external decisive.51

Regarding the theory of development, the important point to note is that Newman is repeating the argument that the Church has authority to protect the faith, authoritatively defined by the early ecumenical Councils. On the issues thus decided there is no scope for the use of private judgement, but in those matters where no such decision had been made, private judgement is the correct means by which to proceed. This argument is also to be found in the fifth, sixth and seventh lectures on the Prophetic Office.52

Having said a few words about the use of private judgement, Newman then addresses the issue on which Francis
has accused him of inconsistency:

You observe then that, if a generally received opinion be of authority, this must be because what is generally received in any age is therefore true, or because its general reception is an index of a reception from the first age; whereas I virtually abandon the former ground by giving up a later age when it contradicts an earlier, and the latter by never attempting to prove the opinions of the Christian body higher than century iv, may by granting differences prior to the ivth. You call on me to make good the first link in the chain.\textsuperscript{53}

It is at this point that Newman sets out his theory, which, given that it is yet to be published, will be quoted in full:

The link in the argument, which you think may be weak, may yet be felt by others.

That argument I shall sketch as follows:

1. From the first, running into the obscurity of the Apostolic century, there has been a large body called the Church, claiming the exclusive dispensation of the gospel; and there has been but one such, - large, continuous and commanding.
2. This body in centuries iv and v, is known to have been of a certain temper, cast of principle, system of doctrine, and character of conduct; in a word of a certain religion.
3. On tracing backwards, the evidences of the existence of this religion are fainter, but still they exist in their degree.
4. Evidence of any other system of religion, (ie in temper, principle, doctrine, conduct) calling itself Christianity, is altogether unproducible. Either this is Christianity, or we do

\textsuperscript{53}
not know (historically) what Christianity is. Everything else is the history of mere sects with known authors. The Christian religion, when traced back from the fourth century, vanishes in this form from the pages of history. In proportion as it is known it is this.

5. There is no reason why this should not be Apostolic Christianity; as it does not differ from Scripture, more than the parts of Scripture differ from each other, and does not resemble foreign systems, which came into contact with it between the first and fourth centuries, more than systems resemble each other which are acknowledged by all to be independent and distinct.

6. This temper, cast of principle, doctrine, conduct, are singularly consistent with each other, or one; so that the existence of eg the temper, makes the co-existence of the doctrine at least not impossible.

7. The temper and principles of the Church have been precisely the same from the first to last, from the Apostolic age to this; viz. what her enemies call dogmatic, mystical, credulous, superstitious, bigoted, legal. I consider no persons doubt this great fact.

8. Its doctrines and course of conduct have developed from external and internal causes, where by development I mean the more accurate statement and the varied application of ideas from the action of the reason upon them according to new circumstances.

9. All systems which have life, have a development, yet do not cease to have an identity though they develop. Eg Locke and Luther have done far more than they themselves saw.

10. While there is no antecedent objection to developments, while they harmonize with its temper and principles, are consistent with the ideas from which they profess to spring, and are professed unanimously by its members. In proportion as these (or if so be, other) tests fail, they become doubtful.
11. Since the 4th century does not present greater developments upon the first, than the 7th upon the 4th, and no one (except thesin diaphulatton) would deny that the 7th professes the same religion as the 4th, it is unreasonable on account of its developments to deny that the 4th has the same religion as the first.

12. There are sufficient doctrines developed from a very early date both to remove the difficulty of the notion of a dogmatic system, and actually to furnish portions and indices of the whole system afterwards confessedly existing. Ignatius has unfolded the episcopal and sanctioned the magisterial principle; from Justin downwards we have an uninterrupted testimony to the Homoousion, (as I consider it will be felt that Bull has shown) and to baptismal regeneration; in Irenaeus, not to say in Ignatius, we find the doctrine of the Incarnation fully developed. All bear witness to the doctrine of the Trinity, and [?] to the rule of celibacy.

My analysis might be more exact; but it is the best I can make of the line of proof, which will, I think, and justly, weigh with men practically, whether they submit to the religion thus ascertained or not, and which I think, even opponents grant by not assailing. All they can do is dispute about details.54

So far, then, Newman has addressed the issue of the identity of the nineteenth-century Church with the Church of the early centuries AD, arguing that the Early Church has, quite legitimately, developed into the current Church. As regards Francis's claim that Wiseman's argument is just as good as his, he continued that

no one seems to deny that from the first the mass of Christianity tended straight to what is afterwards known as
First Developments

Catholicism, and was such, as far as it went; no one pretends to produce from the records the history of an early religion professing to be Christian (e.g., Gnostic or Platonic) with greater claims so to be considered, and never to modern opinions than the Catholic; every one grants or rather urges the sameness of Roman, Greek and Anglican here, every one sees, that whatever superstition may have done for them and rationalism for us, we and they are on the whole the same, Archbishop Whately having written on the Popery in our Church, and Mr. Taylor preferring Popery to early Christianity. Here then we have one religion in all ages; I profess it, I sacrifice my private judgement to it whenever it speaks; I use my private judgement only in accidental details, where it does not speak, or to determine what it speaks.57

In other words, Newman is here relying on the branch theory, i.e., that Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Anglicanism are all branches of the true Catholic Church, being in substance identical with the undivided Early Church; the differences between them being merely in changeable details.

Two points, however, illustrate the fluid nature of Newman's thought during this period. Firstly, among those doctrines 'developed from a very early date [which]... remove the difficulty of the notion of a dogmatic system, and actually... furnish portions and indices of the whole system afterwards confessedly existing', he cites the 'uninterrupted testimony to the Homoousion' (point 12),
First Developments

giving Bull as his authority. This view he came to reject in the Essay, in effect arguing that if the ante-Nicene Fathers were to be judged by the standard of Nicaea they would be heretics.⁸

Secondly, in his letter to Francis, John Henry availed himself of the branch theory to justify his claim to be an Apostolic Christian. This was a theory which he rejected not only before his conversion to Catholicism, but which he attacked in a review⁹ of William Palmer's Treatise on the Church of Christ (1838), i.e. before using it to defend his position to Francis.

It is suggested here, therefore, that there was a certain amount of inconsistency in Newman's thought during this period, but that it appears to have given rise to a creative tension, which resulted in the further development of his own opinions. Furthermore, it would seem that he himself was to realize this much later on, and made use of this insight in his description of the relationship among the offices of Prophet, Priest and King, as exercised by the Church.

In addition, there are certain similarities with Wood's theory of development. Newman had always accepted Wood's first two points, but by 1840 he had come to accept
doctrinal, as well as theological, development. To use Wood's terminology, Newman now accepted that the Church has 'the power... of bringing her ideas of Truth into more distinct consciousness' (point 3) and that this implied that not all true doctrines were not necessarily 'apparent to the Apostles' (point 4). Furthermore, Newman now held that Tradition and Scripture were 'two coordinate tests of doctrine' (point 6), but it was not until 1845 that he became finally convinced that it was the Roman Catholic Church alone that was the judge in such matters.

In summary, then, Newman set out here the basic structure of a theory of the development of doctrine. In points 1 to 7 he identified the nineteenth-century Christian Church with that of the early centuries. He argued that they are identical in 'temper and principles', noting as he did in the Essay that although doctrine may change, the principles that underlie it can be consistent. The obvious differences between the Churches of the different ages he attributed to development, point 8 anticipating his description of the development of an idea in the Essay. In fact, the necessity of development is emphasized (point 9) in terms resembling the famous dictum of the Essay that 'to live is to change and to be perfect is to have changed often'. He also recognized that not all developments are true developments. In point 10,
therefore, he outlined the necessity of tests. He acknowledged the same point in the Essay, but in the 1878 edition he called the tests 'notes', thus suggesting their tentative nature. Another theme covered in point 10 is that of antecedent probability. This takes one back to a point made earlier in the letter about the necessity of judging by antecedent probability in matters of religion. This, of course, has links with the idea of Divine Providence discussed in his earlier letter to Francis.

I have for some years been preaching University Sermons, as I have had opportunity, on this one subject, that men judge in religion, and are meant to judge by antecedent probability much more than by external evidences, and that their view of antecedent probability depends upon their particular state of mind. I consider with you that 'the alleged historical proof of miracles is unsatisfactory', separate from the moral character of the doctrine. Accordingly I think a Churchman is (abstractly speaking) a man of a certain ethos — and a Dissenter of another — And in like manner, abstractedly, the Church has a tendency to produce in individuals a Church ethos, and Dissent a Dissenting ethos. At the same time of course I know that in matter of fact considering the accidents of birth, influence, interest, politics etc etc, men of a Church temper are found among Dissenters, and men of a Dissenting temper among Churchmen.

This belief in antecedent probability allowed Newman to read back from later centuries into earlier as he did in point 11. He provided evidence to support this method in point 12. As regards the branch theory, it can be noted
that by the time of his conversion to Catholicism in 1845 he believed it to be untenable. In effect, Francis had made his point, although he would not have agreed with Wiseman either! John Henry's view, however, that private judgement was valid only in circumstances when the Church had not pronounced remained. This obviously links in with his argument that the creeds are the authoritative interpretation of Scripture.

Again, there is no mention of the inadequacy of human language for expressing the divine mysteries - presumably for the same reason suggested above. There is also no mention of dogmatic formulations being necessary, if unfortunate in some of their consequences. Nor, however, is there any mention of their benefits. As such, we cannot be sure whether his attitude to formal dogma, at this stage in the development of his thought, has changed since 1833.

His attitude towards Tradition, however, has undergone some change. Its working still appears limited to the years of the Patristic Church, but what he expounded in the above letter to Francis is an organic theory of development. He no longer thought of Tradition as something static, secretive and present from the beginning in explicit form, only made known by the ecumenical Councils. Rather, Tradition was now regarded as having
life in itself. Newman was therefore approaching the view of Tradition outlined in the *Essay on Development*, having rejected the notion that there was once an age of 'pristine' Christianity. He had jettisoned his belief in the *Disciplina Arcani*.

The issue of development was to occupy Newman still further during the coming years. During the period 1839-45 he was to move, as a result of his study of development and various blows received within the Church of England, from a position of supreme confidence in himself and his Anglican theological opinions, to a position where he questioned them seriously enough to relinquish them, and to seek admittance into the Catholic Church. The events of this period are well known, and so will not be repeated here, except where necessary to illustrate a point.

Newman's doctrinal difficulties, during this period, resulted from his study of the Fathers. The more he read, the more he became convinced that the Church of England was in schism from the Catholic Church, and that Wiseman's comparison, in 1839, of the Church of England with the Donatists was accurate. That he was working on the idea of doctrinal development during this period is evident from the last of the *University Sermons* which he preached in 1843 on 'The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine'.
First Developments

Taken together with the letters to Francis, the ideas contained therein form the groundwork for the Essay on Development.

University Sermon XV

The sermon was preached on the theme of 'But Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart' (Lk. 2:19):

Thus St. Mary is our pattern of Faith, both in the reception and the study of Divine Truth. She does not think it enough to accept, she dwells upon it; not enough to possess, she uses it; not enough to assent, she develops it; not enough to submit the Reason, she reasons upon it; not indeed reasoning first, and believing afterwards.... yet first believing without reasoning, next from love and reverence, reasoning after believing.... [Thus] at the marriage-feast in Cana, her faith anticipated His first miracle, and she said to the servants, "Whatsoever He saith unto you, do it."

The point that is being made here is that, like Mary, the Church must reflect upon that faith which has been entrusted to her. If she does this development occurs, Dogma is therefore seen in a more positive light than it was in 1833 and 1840, if only because Newman now regarded doctrinal development as a sign of life in the Church:

Here, too, is the badge of heresy; its dogmas are unfruitful; it has no theology; so far forth as it is a heresy, it has none.
Deduct its remnant of Catholic theology, and what remains? Polemics, explanations, protests. It turns to Biblical Criticism, or to the Evidences of Religion, for want of a province. Its formulae end in themselves, without development, because they are words; they are barren, because they are dead. If they had life, they would increase and multiply; or, if they do live and bear fruit, it is but as "sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." It develops into dissolution; but it creates nothing, it tends to no system, its resultant dogma is but the denial of all dogmas, any theology, under the Gospel. No wonder it denies what it cannot attain.

But, formal doctrinal statements are necessary only because the human mind cannot reflect upon that idea [they are designed to express] except piecemeal.... And in matter of fact these expressions are never equivalent to it;... thus the Catholic dogmas are, after all, but symbols of a Divine fact, which, far from being compassed by those very propositions, would not be exhausted, nor fathomed, by a thousand.

So, as in 1833, Newman still regarded human language as inadequate to express the divine mysteries, but that being said, he did not see a contradiction between a personal faith in Christ and a dogmatic creed. The latter gives expression and substance to the former, and is therefore necessary for realizing Revelation:

Theological dogmas are propositions expressive of the judgements which the mind forms, or the impressions which it receives, of Revealed Truth. Revelation sets before it certain supernatural
facts and actions, beings and principles; these make a certain impression or image upon it; and this impression spontaneously, or even necessarily, becomes the subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself, which proceeds to investigate it, and to draw it forth in successive and distinct sentences.

This raises the question as to whether Newman regarded propositions as having any rôle in God's communication, to man, of Revealed Truth. It is not clear from the above passage whether 'principles' are something which are to be regarded as pre-linguistic, or whether they are propositions. This ambiguity is, however, resolved in the sermon, during a discussion of the 'idea' of Christianity: that idea being the sum total of God's self Revelation:

Particular propositions, then, which are used to express portions of the great idea vouchsafed to us, can never really be confused with the idea itself, which all such propositions taken together can but reach, and cannot exceed.... That idea is not enlarged, if propositions are added, nor impaired if they are withdrawn: if they are added, this is with a view of conveying that one integral view, not of amplifying it. That view does not depend on such propositions: it does not consist in them; they are but specimens and indications of it. And they may be multiplied without limit. They are necessary, but not needful to it, [my italics], being but portions or aspects of that previous impression which has at length come under the cognizance of Reason and the terminology of science. One thing alone has to be impressed on us by Scripture, the Catholic idea, and in it they are all included. To object, then, to the number of
propositions, upon which an anathema is placed, is altogether to mistake their use; for their multiplication is not intended to enforce many things, but to express one, - to form within us that one impression concerning Almighty God.\textsuperscript{73}

It would, therefore, appear, that for Newman, Revelation is in the first instance purely personal. It is God's self-communication to man, person to person, through the senses,\textsuperscript{74} without means of language. That being said, it is then perfectly legitimate, indeed necessary, to express this Revelation in propositional form.

Vital to the understanding of this process is the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge. This distinction enabled Newman to regard explicit, formal doctrinal statements as being already present in Revelation (which was not given in a credal form), because they were implicit in it. Thus, when a doctrine was defined, it was not an addition to the faith. Rather, it was the making explicit of what was already implicit. This distinction was discussed in an earlier University Sermon on 'Implicit and Explicit Reason'\textsuperscript{75} and was also present (though perhaps not in so highly developed a fashion) in Arians:\textsuperscript{76}

Yet it does not seem too much to affirm, that copious as [doctrine] may be in theological terms, yet hardly one can be pointed out which is not found or strictly implied in the New Testament itself.\textsuperscript{77}
First Developments

In the sermon Newman commented:

Now, it is important to insist on this circumstance, because it suggests the reality and permanence of inward knowledge, as distinct from inward confession. The absence, or partial absence, or incompleteness of dogmatic statements is no proof of the absence of impressions or implicit judgements, in the mind of the Church. Even centuries might pass without the formal expression of a truth, which had been all along the secret life of millions of faithful souls.  

In summary, then, the Church, like Mary, is to reflect on the faith entrusted to her. This faith did not come in the form of credal statements, but was given at a deeper level than that at which it came to be articulated. As time passed, the idea of Christianity developed, and that which was implicit in it was made explicit. Formal statements of doctrine were necessary for this realization to take place, but they are in themselves an inadequate means of expressing the divine mysteries. Obviously this process was to be guided by Divine Providence.

Taken together with the letters to Francis, it can be remarked that, for Newman, the ecumenical Councils of the Early Church played a decisive role in the formation of doctrine, authoritatively defining the creeds. In addition, Tradition was now regarded as a dynamic, organic reality - the process by which that which was implicit in
Revelation was made explicit. He had also softened his position with regard to doctrine. It was now thought of as something more than an unfortunate necessity, but nevertheless he did not regard it as indispensable for personal faith (as he did in the Grammar of Assent), which was his mature view. One can still detect traces of the idea in Arians, that although the believer cannot worship Christ without knowing something of his divinity, it was unfortunate that the Church in the nineteenth century could not retain the 'peculiar privilege' of the Early Church, which rested in the simplest kind of proclamation of faith.

Another important difference between this sermon and the Essay on Development, is that the operation of Tradition in the sermon appears to be limited to the Patristic Church. Notes in Newman's diaries from this period suggest that it was not until 1844-5 that he was fully convinced that the Catholic Church's so-called 'additions' to the faith were in fact true developments. This implies that in 1843 he still had some doubts as to whether legitimate developments could occur after the end of the Patristic Age. As such, he had not quite arrived at the conclusion of the Essay that 'to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.'
First Developments

The effect that this study was having on his state of mind is evident from the various, still unpublished and largely unconsidered, dated entries in the appendices to his private diaries between 1843 and 1846. In these, he asked himself a series of questions as to which of the nineteenth-century Churches was to be considered one with the Early Church.

Diary Appendices and Copybook on Development

On 17th March 1843 Newman wrote:

Supposing the Catholic religion to be true, qu. whether some great judgement is and likely to have come upon the English for our dreadful suppression of it through three centuries by our national acts - If so, are not the misconceptions we form of it and the horror we have of it, only the expected conformably with the state of the case?83

His thought had progressed further along such lines by the following month:

Is not the RC system the nearest by far to the primitive? looking at the saints in all ages as one company [,] is not the Roman Church decidedly on their side, not on the other, ours, as a Church, on the other, and on theirs? - Are we not in loco haereticorum? is there any doubt what the saints whom we admire would think of our Church? is there much doubt that they would recommend us to do?84
First Developments

From these questions, it can be seen that Newman has changed his mind about the branch theory since he wrote to Francis in November 1840. To him, it appeared that it was only the Roman Catholic Church that may be considered one with the Church of the Patristic Age, the Anglican Church being in the position of the Donatists, Monophysites and Semi-Arians. 'The theory of the Via Media was absolutely pulverised.'

Newman still clung on to the Church of England, however, since he needed to satisfy himself that Catholic doctrines, such as the invocation of saints, were true developments and not corruptions of the Gospels. He broached this issue in his diary on 7 October 1843:

If the developed doctrine of the Holy Trinity is universally received, must be true, else the whole Church has fallen into the most awful idolatry, for the same reason may not the doctrine of saint worship which is universal, be considered religious, lest the same conclusion follow?

It is apparent from the way in which this question was framed that Newman was now in the process of trying to persuade himself intellectually of the truth which he had, on one level, already received, viz. that 'The Church of Rome will be found right after all.' This he approached from the direction of development.
As for the Church of England:

It would be curious to trace the Via Media in antiquity... what has been called the extreme view is the right one e.g. Dionysius against Eusebius and the Semi-Arians, Cyril against Theodore - Leo against the Monophysites.8

This statement echoes Newman's feelings of 1839 (as recounted in the Apologia) when, having seen the Monophysite in the mirror, he came to the conclusion that

The Church of the Via Media was in the position of the oriental communion, Rome was where she now is; and the Protestants were the Eutychians.9

In other words, the Church of England was in schism. It was not, in Newman's view, one with the Patristic Church. He did not regard her doctrines as a true development of primitive doctrines. Rather, he saw the Church of England as occupying the same ground in the nineteenth century that had been occupied by schismatical and heretical bodies in the Patristic Age:

The Fathers say "If a body has certain irregularities in its first foundation, certain evils will follow.... heresy, schism etc. Now this is almost prophetic as regards us..."1

By 4 May 1844 Newman had arrived at the point where:

I am more sure that we are in schism than that the Creed of Pope
Pius is not a development from primitive doctrine. 2. I am far more certain that we have taken from the faith, than that Rome has added to it. On the other side, 1. There is more responsibility in changing to a new communion than remaining where you are placed. 2. One ought to have some clear proof to outweigh the misery it would occasion to others. 3. One ought not to go by private judgement but with others.

Here it is quite clear that Newman had now come to the conclusion that it was only the Catholic Church that was one with the Church of the Patristic Age, and that she alone had preserved the faith in its purity and entirety. He was, however, still held back from seeking reception into her fold by persistent doubts. Perhaps the state of his mind at this juncture can be judged from two comments he made in his diary after his conversion to Catholicism. In June 1846 he wrote:

It is a want of faith, which makes men look at the adoration of the Host as idolatry - of course. To worship it is the natural obvious direct act of an actual faith.

Then in July he added:

The doctrine of honour to St Mary and the Saints brings out a class of feelings unknown to Protestants. Hence the difficulty of talking to them about it.... They say it is red or yellow, not knowing the existence of blue.

It could be that he was held back from seeking
admittance into the Catholic Church by difficulties with certain Catholic doctrines brought about by not sharing in, in his own word, the Catholic ethos. By 1841 he was of the opinion that the Anglican Church was in schism, but it nevertheless took another four years for him to seek reception into the Catholic Church. Why the delay? It is perhaps too simplistic to speak first of an emotional and then an intellectual conversion, but both elements certainly played a role in his thoughts. At the risk of constructing too crude an anthropology, it appears fair to say that Newman's conversion was in the first instance experiential: he says he felt as if he had seen a ghost. He then embarked upon a prolonged period of study to establish the intellectual validity of this experience. This he had done by May 1844. It appears, however, that his conversion was delayed by doubts. Given his understanding of ethos, in his letter of November 1840 to Francis, it could well be that in 1846, he was explaining in his diary, that his conversion did not take place in 1844, because a certain 'class of feelings' was still foreign to him. As such, although he was practically convinced of the truth of the Catholic claim by May 1844, there was still a certain difficulty. It would also seem that where he spoke of 'some clear proof', he was almost rejecting the force of antecedent probabilities, which he had championed in his letter to Francis. He was resisting
the intellectual force of these probabilities because of the experiential difficulties, concerning certain Catholic doctrines, suggested above.

In summary, then, Newman's views on the subject of development underwent a certain amount of change following the writing of his letters to Francis in 1840. He still accepted that the external differences between the Early Church and the Church of the nineteenth century were due to organic development, but he had come to the opinion that it was only the Catholic Church, and not others, that was one in 'principle and temper' with the Early Church. His study of the Fathers revealed to him that the Anglican Church was in a state of schism. Before seeking admittance into the Catholic Church, however, he had to establish to his own satisfaction that various Catholic practices were not corruptions of the Gospel, but were true developments. A summary of his conclusions is provided in the unpublished 'Copybook on Development', dated 7 March 1844:

Developments are likely or necessary
1 from the natural growth of any idea
2 from the terms as admitting of development in Scripture and Antiquity
3 from the heretical attempts
   Montanists, Novatianists, Tertullian and Origen
4 from the strange mixture of true and false eruditio [?] and consistence [?] in Tertullian, Origen, Hippolytus, etc
First Developments

5 from the remarkable fact that heretical writing are absorbed and purified by the Church writers - Origen by Basil and Ambrose, Eusebius (Luke) by Ambrose, Tertullian by Cyprian and S Leo etc - heretics or heterodox <E.g. in Praxeam> are raw material

6 from the inconsistencies in words and evident inextremity [?] of the greatest writers on certain subjects e.g. Athan, about our Lord's ignorance.\(^9\)

This development, however, convinced Newman that the Church of England was

**In loco haereticorum**

Put aside doctrine - since it is not clearly found in Scripture. Take what is *plain* in Scripture, the duties, acts, works, fruits of a Christian as given in the N.T. *When* are they fulfilled? Where can they be fulfilled? are they, can they, be fulfilled among us?\(^{100}\)

Newman no longer regarded Tradition as limited to the Patristic Age. Growth was seen to be the only evidence of life, and so his answer to the last question had to be 'no'. He had come to the conclusion that:

St. Augustine's position towards the ancient sects of the Donatists\(^{101}\) [was the same as] the Church of Rome's to us.... [He was] more certain that the E[nglish] Ch[urch] is in schism, than that the Roman doctrines are not developments.... [He believed that there was] enough evidence to convince those who believe in the probability of the R.C. being right [and that] the present R.C system is by far the nearest of any existing system to the Primitive.\(^{102}\)
He had now satisfied himself that certain 'Roman' doctrines were not a bar to his reception into the Catholic Church. Regarding purgatory, for example:

Is not this doctrine, also, the vivid representation of the feelings and ideas which primitive principles involve? does any other system contain and secure those ideas and feelings?\footnote{103}

Conclusion

In conclusion, the following points can be made: development was a subject that had occupied Newman for many years, although before 1840 he was often found to be arguing against it. This means that it is misleading to think only of the chronology of the events that led up to his conversion as Tract \textit{XC}, development and then Rome. This is not to deny the effect of the Tract \textit{XC} Affair, his study of Arianism and the Jerusalem Bishopric, the combined force of which certainly helped to push him from the Church of England. Rather it is suggested, that along with these events, Newman also felt a pull towards the Catholic Church, which was brought about by his contact with theories of the development of doctrine between 1833 and 1840. After all, he wrote to Francis before the 'three blows'. It was intellectual honesty, as well as disillusionment with the Church of England, that led to his conversion. As such, the chronology of his conversion may perhaps be seen as development, Tract \textit{XC}, further
First Developments

development, Rome. Furthermore, it is clear that his own thought on the subject of development underwent considerable change between 1833 and 1845. It would appear that the development in his thought parallels his description of the development of an idea in the *Essay on Development*, and that, as a consequence of this development, he came to see the Catholic Church as being one with the Church of the Patristic Age, thus leading him to seek admittance into her fold. Looking back with Newman, one can see how he was able to conclude:

"I seem to have many things which I did not consciously hold at the time, but which my present opinions show to be a germ, "astonishing I saw this so early.""104
Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom
    Lead Thou me on!
The night is dark, and I am far from home -
    Lead Thou me on!
Keep Thou my feet; I do not ask to see
    The distant scene - one step enough for me.¹

Newman was received into the Catholic Church on 9 October 1845 by the Passionist missionary, Fr. Dominic Barberi, who had been invited to Littlemore by one of Newman's companions there. The Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, the intellectual defence of his conversion, was first published towards the end of that year; a second edition, with minor textual changes, followed in 1846, demand for the work being so great, and a third edition in 1878. This version is markedly different from the previous editions in its arrangement and order of material. Thus, the papacy is given a more central place, but this is to be expected, since the republication came only a few years after the definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican Council and the controversy with Gladstone which it occasioned.

Essay on Development

In the preface to the 1878 edition, Newman stated
that, despite the re-arrangement of material, the argument of the book itself remained unaltered. He did say, however, that he felt that he had made too many concessions of historical fact to Protestantism in the earlier editions, and that this had now been rectified. This does not mean that he was prepared to dispense with history; he was fully aware that his theory of doctrinal development depended upon historical fact. He was merely 'asserting in 1878, that (even if the lowest possible historical concessions are allowed to the Protestants) you cannot account for the historical facts, which every sane and rational man must accept, so long as you cling to the two traditional ways of explaining dogmatic history' — i.e. translation and logical deduction. He was still making the same claim for a theory of organic doctrinal development based on historical fact that he had in 1845.

A second change in the third edition, is that Newman gave greater weight to the place of logic in theology, and therefore in development. This may have been in response to the criticisms of the Jesuit, Giovanni Perrone, the sharpest of the theologians of the Roman School, and his confrere, Carlo Passaglia. But such a view is also in accord with the argument of the Grammar of Assent (1870), in which Newman argued strongly that faith was rational, though not in the sense of strict logical inference, which,
in the Essay, he rejected as an explanation of development. Chadwick comments: 'The 1878 Essay still taught that Christianity was an idea which makes impressions, and that developments are aspects of the original idea slowly elicited: still taught that the Church has been unconscious of truths which she had later defined: still taught (though the fatal phrase of 1845 about additions of doctrine 'external' to it had been removed) that dogma grew by "incorporation" or "assimilation".'

Other changes made to the Essay may well be regarded as 'tinkering'. Hardly a page of the 1845 edition escaped Newman's pen, with which he made minor changes of style and grammar. A few other changes were dictated by the fact that the writer of the 1845 Essay was an Anglican. He removed one or two unfortunate analogies, historical concessions he knew conservative Catholics would not accept, and items of only contemporary interest, irrelevant to all but the expert reader.

Overall, then, there is no essential difference between the 1845/6 and 1878 editions of the Essay. It is the 1845 edition which will be referred to here, however, in order to maintain the chronology of Newman's thought in the events under discussion in these first chapters.
In the Introduction to the *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, Newman sets out his view that the dictum of St. Vincent of Lerins, that revealed truth is *quod semper, quod ubique, quod omnibus*, is inadequate as a guide as to the true faith of the Church. For a start, he questions what 'taught always' means, and points out the obvious difficulties involved in first deciding how to interpret the rule before applying it:

> It does not seem possible, then, to avoid the conclusion that, whatever be the proper key for harmonizing the records and documents of the early and later Church, and true as the dictum of Vincentius must be considered in the abstract, and possible as the application might be in his own age, when he might almost ask the primitive centuries for their testimony, it is hardly available now or effective of any satisfactory result. The solution it offers is as difficult as the original problem.¹⁰

This conclusion resulted from Newman's analysis of what the various Fathers believed about certain doctrines, some of which are viewed to this day by Protestants as corruptions. The first doctrine to be considered was that of the Trinity. When the evidence among the Fathers for this doctrine is viewed in relation to the evidence for certain other doctrines, Newman's verdict is:

> I do not see in what it can be said that there is a *consensus* of primitive divines in its favour, which will not avail also for certain doctrines of the Roman Church which will presently come
This is despite that fact that the doctrine of the Trinity is not to be found clearly expressed in the writings of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, who if they were to be judged by the rule set out in the Vincentian Canon must be considered heretical. The same result occurs if you try to interpret one Father by another.

After discussing the beliefs of the Fathers about the doctrines of original sin, purgatory, the Real Presence and papal supremacy, Newman concludes that a cumulative argument rises from them in favour of the active and the doctrinal authority of Rome, much stronger than any argument which can be drawn from the same era for the doctrine of the Real Presence.

So, according to Newman, it seems that all of the doctrines of the modern Roman Catholic Church can in some way be traced back to the Fathers. In addition, there is more evidence among these Fathers for some doctrines which Protestants reject, than there is for some which they accept (e.g. he finds more evidence for purgatory, than for original sin).

A second suggestion is that Christianity had always
been changing from the beginning and had accommodated itself to the circumstances of times and seasons. In other words, 'pure' Christianity was corrupted by 'external sources, Oriental, Platonic, and Polytheistic.' This hypothesis, however, is quite inadequate 'till we are distinctly informed what the real Christian doctrine or evangelical message is, or if there be any'.

Newman then discusses how to account for that apparent variation and growth of doctrine which embarrasses us when we would consult history for the true idea of Christianity.

A possible solution is the Disciplina Arcani, according to which it is maintained that doctrines which are associated with the later ages of the Church were really in the Church from the first, but were not publicly taught, and that for various reasons. Despite the fact, however, that a Disciplina Arcani did at one time exist, Newman felt that it could not account fully for the inconsistencies in doctrine found in the Early Church, since they continued long after the practice ceased to operate. Such a view also takes no account of the growth of ideas, the basis of his theory of the organic development of doctrine.
Since an idea... cannot be viewed except under particular aspects, the formal statements under which it is conveyed are practically identical with itself. They introduce us to that idea from which they are derived, and, so far as they seem to oppose, they correct each other, and serve to press a fuller and more exact representation of their original upon the mind.

And hence, if the illustration on which we are proceeding be correct, there is no one aspect such, as to go to the depth of the real idea, no one term or proposition which can duly and fully represent it; though of course one representation of it will be more just and appropriate than another, and though when an idea is very complex, it is allowable to consider its distinct aspects as of separate ideas, for the sake of convenience.

This is obviously in accord with the view Newman expressed in the last of the University Sermons, that the idea of Christianity is not, in the first instance, communicated by propositions, but person to person. Propositions do, however, play an essential role in the communication of Revealed Truth, since they are the means by which the idea is given expression and substance. For Newman, there is no contradiction in saying that faith is personal, but must be articulated in propositions.

An idea, then, lives in the mind of the recipient and as it comes into contact with men, communities and other ideas it grows and develops. Thus:

If Christianity is a fact, and can be made subject-matter of
exercises of the reason, and impresses an idea of itself on our minds, that idea will in course of time develop.

This is why in the early years of the Church there was no explicit concept of the Trinity as such, whereas in later years it was defined by an ecumenical council as a dogma. To use the language of the thirteenth University Sermon, 'Implicit and Explicit Reason', the doctrine was, from the first, implicit in the idea of Christianity, but was only gradually developed and made explicit.

This concept, that Christianity is an idea and develops, forms part of Newman's argument that there is an antecedent probability that there can be legitimate developments in Christian doctrine. The other part of the argument is that one cannot keep merely to the word of Scripture. For example, the phrase 'The Word became flesh' must be interpreted if one is to understand what is meant by 'Word', 'became' or 'flesh'. One's understanding of the verse needs to be developed.

In addition, the whole of Scripture is 'written on the principle of development':

The same test of development is suggested in our Lord's words on the Mount, as has already been noticed. "Think not that I am come to destroy the Law and the Prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil." He does not reverse, but perfect, what has gone before.
Newman is therefore able to conclude:

From the necessity, then, of the case, from the history of all sects and parties in religion, and from the analogy and example of Scripture, we may fairly conclude that Christian doctrine admits of formal, legitimate, and true developments, or of developments contemplated by its Divine Author.

The next stage in Newman's argument is that if it is probable that there can be legitimate developments of doctrine, it is therefore probable that an infallible authority is required, in order that the Church can determine which developments are true, and which should be properly called corruptions:

It feels that the very idea of revelation implies a present informant and guide, and that an infallible one; not a mere abstract declaration of truths not known before to man, or a record of history, or the result of an antiquarian research, but a message and a lesson speaking to this man and that.

Newman then gives various 'Instances in Illustration' of the development of doctrine. They are the Homoousion, the canon of Scripture, communion under one kind and papal authority.

As to the doctrine of papal supremacy:

The question is this, whether there was not from the first a
certain element at work, or in existence, which, for some reason or other, did not at once show itself upon the surface of ecclesiastical affairs, and of which events in the fourth century are the development; and whether the evidence of its existence and operation, which does occur in the earlier centuries, be it much or little, is not just as ought to occur upon such an hypothesis.

Newman regarded the promises made to St. Peter as prophecies fulfilled in the fourth and subsequent centuries. The understanding of these prophecies grew as the Church grew into an imperial organisation. The monarchical structure was, according to Newman, to be expected. To substantiate this he points to a number of institutions of monarchical structure, such as the Church of England with the See of Canterbury at its head. So, there are two parts to Newman's theory:

the antecedent probability of a Popedom, and the actual state of the Post-Nicene Church,

the history of which shows the establishment of the monarchical Church structure Newman sees envisaged in the unfulfilled prophecies in Scripture.

Newman saw the role of the pope as unitive. The unity of the Church, not papal supremacy, was the central issue. The pope was to be at the head of this international
communion. This links together with his imperial image of the Church, which he saw as a visible, political entity, itself a development from Scripture. The Church was to be identified not only with the parable of the Mustard Seed, but also with Old Testament prophecies: 'Does not the Christian Church 'closely' and literally correspond to the promises of Isaiah?'

To show the rise of the papacy and the Church in the fourth century, Newman quotes the Protestant historian Isaac Barrow, thus removing a possible charge from Protestants that he is giving a distorted view of events during that period:

The simple question is whether the clear light of the fourth and fifth centuries may be fairly taken to illuminate the dim notices of the preceding.

The answer for Newman is yes. In the same way as he sees it legitimate to interpret the Ante-Nicene Fathers through the Nicene Creed, he sees it as legitimate to trace the understanding of the development of the papacy back to the early centuries through the fourth and subsequent; this is how one can perceive the course of the development of an idea.

After this, Newman then discusses some 'Parallel Instances'. Newman argues that scepticism and doubt can
be useful instruments in scientific investigation, but that in theological investigations, antecedent probabilities 'may have a real weight and cogency'. One should accept the developments of doctrine that are found in the Catholic Church unsuspiciously as true, in the same way as one accepts Newton's theory of gravitation, on the antecedent probability that he is correct:

Thus the whole school of physical philosophers take Newton's theory of gravitation for granted, because it is generally received, and use it without rigidly testing it first, each for himself, by phenomena; and if phenomena are found which it does not satisfactorily solve, this does not trouble them, for they are sure that a way must exist of explaining them, consistently with that theory, though it does not occur to themselves.

So with theological truths: one should accept the development and the word of the Church, even if on the face of it the evidence is against it, and try to understand the development better. The burden of proof lies with those who wish to prove such developments to be corruptions, in the same way as it would with someone wishing to disprove Newton's theory of gravitation.

In summary, then, if there is no evidence which conclusively proves a development to be a corruption, taking into account the importance of antecedent probabilities and hence one's proper attitude towards
developments recognized by the Church, one should 'acquiesce... [in]... the belief that the Church is infallible'. Furthermore, since it would be wrong to think of the Ante-Nicene Fathers as heretical, 'the Nicene Creed [being] a natural key for interpreting the body of Ante-nicene theology ', it follows that, in analysing the doctrines handed down from the Fathers, one must practise what has recently been termed a 'hermeneutics of recognition'. In the 1878 edition, Newman summarized matters as follows:

My argument is then this:- that, from the first age of Christianity, its teaching looked towards those ecclesiastical dogmas, afterwards recognised and defined, with (as time went on) more or less determinate advance in the direction of them; till at length that advance became so pronounced, as to justify their definition and to bring it about, and to place them in the position of rightful interpretations and keys of the records and remains and the records in history of the teaching which has so terminated.... In such a method of proof there is, first, an imperfect, secondly, a growing evidence, thirdly, in consequence a delayed inference and judgement, fourthly reasons producible to account for the delay.

Continuing Revelation?

Perhaps the most important criticism of the Essay on Development is that raised by Owen Chadwick in From Bossuet to Newman. It is his contention that the Essay allowed for continuing and, in an absolute sense, new Revelation. He
Essay on Development

poses the problem thus: 'The question then for those who think Newman's theology is Catholic, is this: these new doctrines, of which the Church had a feeling or inkling but of which she was not conscious - in what meaningful sense may it be asserted that these doctrines are not "new revelation"?

Chadwick's argument is that the distance between mere feeling and articulated doctrine is so great as to make it incredible to suggest that a doctrine given rise to in such a manner, can be considered part of the Deposit of Revelation. This, however, is to misunderstand Newman. By 'feeling' he did not mean mere sentiment, but rather 'intuitive knowledge'. This is quite clear from the letter he wrote in 1868 to an ex-member of the Birmingham Oratory, Fr. John Stanislas Flanagan:

I conceive that the Depositum is in such sense committed to the Church or to the Pope, that... it is capable of being presented to their minds with the fulness and exactness... with which it habitually resided in the minds of the Apostles; - a vision of it, not logical, and therefore consistent with errors of reasoning & of fact in the enunciation, after the manner of an intuition or an instinct. Nor do those enunciations become logical, because theologians afterwards can reduce them to their relations to other doctrines.... To such theologians they appear as deductions from the creed or formularized deposit, but in truth they are original parts of it.
Essay on Development

It might also be suggested at this juncture that Chadwick does not do justice to Newman's emphasis on the unity and indivisibility of an idea.

Newman's thought in the letter is consistent with the first chapter of the Essay, in which he discusses 'metaphysical' developments,\textsuperscript{51} quoting the last of the University Sermons, to explain how ideas held only implicitly hitherto, are developed by the mind. It is important to note that there is no reference to 'feeling' in this passage. Rather, as Fr. Ian Ker has observed, 'Newman is concerned with intuitive knowledge, knowledge which may be viewed variously as more or less cognitive or imaginative or akin to "seeing".'\textsuperscript{52} Newman's use of the words 'thought', 'contemplation', 'impression on the Imagination' and 'vision' make this clear:

The mind which is habituated to the thought of God, of Christ, of the Holy Spirit, naturally turns with a devout curiosity to the contemplation of the object of its adoration, and begins to form statements concerning it, before it knows whither, or how far, it will be carried. One proposition necessarily leads to another, and a second to a third; then some limitation is required; and the combination of these opposites occasions some fresh evolutions from the original idea, which indeed can never be said to be entirely exhausted. This process is its development, and results in a series, or rather body, of dogmatic statements, till what was an impression on the Imagination has become a system or creed in the reason.... As
God is one, so the impression which He gives us of Himself is one... It is the vision of an object.53

In summary, then, it appears that Chadwick has misinterpreted Newman's argument in two respects. Firstly, he seems to have misunderstood Newman's concept of 'feeling', and secondly, he has not given sufficient weight to Newman's emphasis on the unity and indivisibility of an idea. If these two points are borne in mind, along with the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, which Newman discussed in University Sermon XIII, then newly formulated doctrines need not be regarded as an addition to the Deposit of Revelation. This point can be illustrated by reference to the doctrine of the Homoousion, which was not defined until the Ecumenical Council of Nicaea in 325 and, as such, may, on one level, be regarded as new at that time. The doctrine, however, merely makes explicit and clarifies that which is implicit in Scripture, i.e. that 'I and the Father are one'. The Homoousion, therefore, was not an absolutely new doctrine, and as such neither was it an addition to the Deposit of Revelation, nor a product of continuing Revelation. It was, rather a development, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, of the Revelation given once and for all, which closed at the end of the Apostolic Age. Such was Newman's view expressed to Richard Holt Hutton in October 1871:
A Catholic believes that the Church is, so to call it, a standing Apostolic committee - to answer questions, which the Apostles are not here to answer, concerning what they received and preached. As the Church does not know any more than the Apostles knew, there are many questions which the Church cannot answer - but it can put before us clearly, what the Apostles (being in heaven) cannot, what their doctrine is, what is to be believed, and what is not such.\footnote{4}

Although Lash approves of this description of the Church,\footnote{5} and might well concur with this criticism of Chadwick,\footnote{7} he too does not accept Newman's theory of development. This is because he regards Newman's concept of Revelation as inadequate\footnote{7} and prefers to speak of 'revelation as a continuing process'.\footnote{8} This criticism of Newman is shared by Misner,\footnote{9} who also detects an inconsistency in Newman's appeal to both fulfilment of prophecy and continuity with the past.

In response to these arguments one can only repeat the above stated view that it is possible to subscribe to a theory of development, without accepting the idea of continuing Revelation. In fact, it is the very unity and indivisibility of an idea, which both Lash and Misner accept, that makes this possible. Furthermore, the fulfillment of prophecy actually ensures continuity with the past.
Continuity of its Principles

A further argument that Newman advances in the Essay to demonstrate that the whole idea of Christianity was present from the beginning is contained in his description of the second note of a genuine development of an idea, 'Continuity of its Principles'. Here he argues that principles are far more fundamental than doctrines. In the Essay the distinction between principles and doctrines is that the former indicate the presence of a living idea in society, whereas the latter are the formal statements of that society's beliefs. For a development to be a true development, rather than a corruption, there must be continuity of principles - the living idea itself must remain uncorrupted. This does allow for a considerable variety of doctrine, but continuity of principle is not in itself sufficient. A complementary relationship exists between doctrine and principle:

A development to be faithful, must retain both the doctrine and the principle with which it started. Doctrine without its correspondent principle remains barren, if not lifeless, of which the Greek Church seems an instance; or it forms those hollow professions which are familiarly called "shams", as a zeal for an established Church and its creed on merely conservative temporal motives.... On the other hand, principle without its corresponding doctrine may be considered as the state of religious minds in the heathen world.
Or put another way:

"I did not say a creed was everything," answered Reding, "or that a religion could not be false which had a creed; but a religion can't be true which has none." 6

The distinction between principle and doctrine may indeed be valuable, and Hugo Meynell has argued that it can form the valid basis of ecumenical discussion, since 'this method shows us where the real agreements and disagreements are. It shows the agreement between Catholics and Evangelicals over the Trinity and Incarnation as against the authors of The Myth of God Incarnate who can be identified with Arians and Ebionites.' 3 Despite Meynell's confident approach it could, however, be very difficult indeed to establish continuity of principle in practice.

The political principles of Christianity, if it be right to use such words of a divine polity, are laid down for us on the Sermon on the Mount. 4

To prove in fact, which would be necessary, as well as in theory, that a particular Christian Church has adhered to the ethical spirit contained in the Sermon seems a near impossible task. 5
Unfulfilled Prophecy and the Primacy Texts

Given that Newman's belief in unfulfilled prophecy also forms part of his claim that the whole idea of Christianity was present from the beginning, it is now necessary to examine this view. This will be done with regard to his treatment of the 'primacy texts', which in the Essays is brief. The texts in question are:


Simon, Simon, behold, Satan demanded to have you [pl], that he might sift you [pl] like wheat, but I have prayed for you [sing] that your [sing] faith may not fail; and when you [sing] have turned again strengthen your [sing] brethren.

Matthew 16:18

And I tell you, you are Peter, and on this Rock I will build my Church, and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it.

John 21:15-17

When they had finished breakfast, Jesus said to Simon Peter, "Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?" He said to him, "Yes, Lord; you know that I love you." He said to him, "Feed my lambs." A second time he said to him, "Simon, son of John, do you love me?" He said to him, "Yes, Lord; you know that I love you." He said to him, "Tend my sheep." He said to him the third time, "Simon, son of John, do you love me?" Peter was grieved because he said to him the third time, "Do you love
me?" And he said to him, "Lord, you know everything; you know that I love you." Jesus said to him, "Feed my sheep."

The verses from Luke come during the evangelist's account of the Last Supper, immediately after Jesus has told the disciples that whoever wishes to be the greatest, must be the servant of all, and before he foretells Peter's threefold denial of him.

In vv. 31-32 there is a stark contrast between Jesus praying for Simon Peter and Satan wishing to tempt and test the fidelity of the apostles, the 'you' referred to being plural. Even though the apostles will be tried in such a way, Jesus will stand by Peter as his advocate and his prayer will be efficacious. The fact that this comes immediately before Jesus' foretelling of Peter's denial suggests that Peter's faith will be tried and found wanting. In the long run, however, Peter's faith will return. This is due to Jesus' prayer for him and not to Peter himself. Once Peter's faith has returned to him, i.e. when 'he has repented of his denial of Jesus or when he has turned back from his (period of) infidelity', he will strengthen the faith of his brethren in God.

Matthew 16:18 occurs immediately after Peter's confession of faith of Jesus as the Christ on the road to
Caesarea Philippi. Scholars are divided over whether the 'rock' referred to is Peter or his faith, although it is perhaps fair to say that this is a distinction without a difference, since both interpretations can give rise to a 'Petrine ministry'. For example, McNeile, Gundry, Robinson and Beare all argue that it is the faith which Peter has just articulated: that Jesus is the Christ. On the other side of the argument, Schweizer and Albright and Mann argue that Petros is to be identified with petra because only 'on this interpretation does the pun make sense'. In addition, in the following verse, Jesus says that he will give Peter the keys to the Kingdom. This is a clear sign of authority, and lends support to the hypothesis that Peter is the rock. His authority is 'the same authority as that vested in the vizier, the master of the house, the chamberlain, of the royal household in ancient Israel.' In light of this, 'one must dismiss as confessional interpretation any attempt to see this rock as meaning the faith, or the Messianic confession, of Peter. To deny the preeminent position of Peter among the disciples or in the early Christian community is a denial of the evidence. Cf. in this gospel x 2, xiv 28-31, xv 15. The interest in Peter's failures and vacillations does not detract from this preeminence; rather, it emphasises it. Had Peter been a lesser figure his behaviour would have been of far less consequence (cf. Gal ii 1ff). It is,
of course, clear from the text, that the Church is Christ's Church and that the faith required is faith in Him. And continuing from Luke 22:31-32, Peter is the master whose faith will not fail and whose charge it is to confirm his brethren in their faith.

Despite the divided opinions among scholars as to the meaning of Matthew 16:18, there seems to be general agreement that John 21:15-17 shows that Peter was commissioned by Jesus to perform a pastoral role in the Church. There is a certain poignancy in the fact that Jesus asks the same question of Peter three times, since it reminds the reader of Peter's triple denial of Jesus. But, as is suggested by Brown, the real interest lies in the fact of the ancient and modern 'Near Eastern custom of saying something three times before witnesses in order to solemnize it, especially in the instance of contracts that confer rights and of legal dispositions.' This would lend authority to Peter's role as shepherd. As shepherd, Peter is to tend and feed. This corresponds to his function in the Early Church, in which his leadership and missionary preaching were both required. This is also the understanding of shepherding in both the Old Testament and at the Qumran community.

Again, scholars are firmly agreed that Peter's power
is not absolute. The sheep who are entrusted to Peter's care remain Jesus'. Therefore, St. Augustine of Hippo paraphrases this passage as: 'Tend my sheep as mine, not as yours.' Peter is not replacing Jesus, but is merely taking care of his flock for him. Jesus does after all say 'My sheep' (v.16). Service to the flock is also implied in the notion of shepherding, and it is this that is to characterize his authority.

It has been suggested by some that this divine commissioning was to apply to all of the Twelve. Although it seems likely that Jesus also regarded the rest of the Twelve as having pastoral duties, it is unlikely that this particular commissioning applied to them equally. The reason for saying this is that Jesus questioned Peter specifically, 'Do you love me more than these?' (v.15). Some commentators have argued that Jesus was referring to the fishing equipment and therefore to Peter's life as a fisherman, but since it is not mentioned in the immediate context this seems highly improbable.

Taken with the evidence of the other texts discussed above, which are being combined on the principle that in each passage Jesus is speaking specifically to Peter, about his future role, the following is clear. Peter was commissioned by Jesus to play an important role in the
Early Church. He is to lead the community, to evangelize, to tend to the pastoral care of the flock and also to confirm them in their faith. In this, he is to be the servant of all. Of these verses Newman wrote that they are indications of the Divine purpose as regards St. Peter, too weak in themselves to be insisted on separately, but not without a confirmatory power.

By this he meant that in themselves they do not prove the doctrines of papal primacy and papal infallibility, but that taken together they can provide a proof of them. An obvious example of this principle in practice is that Jesus' comment that 'I and the Father are one' does not demonstrate the doctrine of the Homoousion, but it does provide part of the proof for it.

The key to interpreting Scripture, for Newman, is that it has to be viewed in the context of Tradition. That this is the case is without doubt. If it were not, the doctrines of the Homoousion and the Trinity could not be sustained. This is because there is no explicit statement of them in Scripture, only a proof. The same applies to the doctrines of papal primacy and papal infallibility. For Newman, the connexion between Scripture and Tradition in this case, can be seen in the growth of the papacy in the first five centuries of the Church, a vitally important
episode being Pope Leo's decisive role at the Council of Chalcedon.8 There he exercised considerable influence, though not without opposition, and the Fathers proclaimed that 'Peter has spoken through Leo'.8 They also mentioned Matthew 16:18 in their letter to Leo, once they had defined the two natures in Christ according to the formula set out in his Tome, and upon which he insisted. This was done through his legates. Leo not having attended the Council himself, but having remained in Rome.84

Newman was able to make this connexion because he regarded the primacy texts as unfulfilled prophecy, the fulfilment of these prophecies in the life of the Church being regarded as evidence for the whole idea of Christianity being present from the beginning. This connexion becomes more probable when one takes into account the high antecedent probability that Newman establishes for there being an authority in the Church capable of distinguishing true developments from corruptions.85 In addition, the whole notion of the development of doctrine presupposes the fulfilment of prophecy in the life of the Church - as an idea develops, its possibilities are realized and what was prophesied is fulfilled. In the case of Matthew 16, the prophecy 'On this Rock I will build my Church' begins to be fulfilled by the mere fact of being spoken.86
It has been argued, however, that in the light of recent biblical scholarship, since the publication of Johannes Weiss's *Jesus' Proclamation of the Kingdom of God* in 1900, that Newman is making a rather uncritical use of the texts in appealing to prophecy. Scholars suggest that a connexion between the eschatological Kingdom of God in Jesus' preaching and the Church as it developed is not as straightforward as Newman thought. This may well be the case, but *Lumen Gentium* does teach that the Church is the sacrament of the Kingdom, i.e. its partial proleptic presence. This means that there is the possibility, for Catholics at least, of ascribing to the Church what may be said of the Kingdom.

In addition, Newman was employing a very modern approach to history. He argues that although Christianity is represented in prophecy as a kingdom, it came into the world as an idea, not as an institution. It has, therefore, had to adapt itself to the world in the best possible manner. This it has done by developing the structure of the modern Church.

Misner comments: 'If this old-new perspective enables one to account for aspects of Christianity which were otherwise overlooked, the hypothesis of development is strengthened.' This he goes on to clarify saying,
Newman had long held that Matthew 16 constituted Peter as a type, a scriptural image of church authority. The fulfilment that corresponds to that type cannot be known with precision from scripture. It must be judged according to the meaning in which it was accepted by the church, as is the case for all scriptural passages which are neither complete nor self-explanatory.81

This approach helpfully cuts through the confusion Newman has created by speaking about interpreting Scripture in different senses. In Arians and in the Essay Newman argued that the 'mystical' or 'ecclesiastical' sense was to be preferred to the 'literal'. When interpreting kingdom-ecclesiology in Old Testament prophecies in his sermons, however, he stood by Hooker's literal rule. This suggests, the 'mystical' sense notwithstanding, that when interpreting prophecies concerning the Church the 'literal' rule is to be preferred. But in one passage in the Essay Newman argues that 'the papal church is specifically linked up with scripture "interpreted in a mystical sense" and not "confined to the letter"'.82 It may be, then, that Newman is radically inconsistent in his approach to prophecies. What seems far more likely, however, is that he has become inconsistent and vague in his use of terminology.83

In his study of the Early Church Newman found that the
school of Antioch applied the literal sense of interpretation to Scripture resulting in heresy, but that the orthodox school of Alexandria used the mystical rule. By the word 'mystical' Newman meant that the exegete should be open to mystery of Revelation. This aspect is missed in the literal interpretation of Scripture. It would therefore appear, that what Newman was really driving at is the continuing ability of the Church to know her own mind, even when scriptural passages are incomplete or are not self-explanatory.

When interpreting scriptural prophecies, Newman would agree that these prophecies do need to be explained, as they are not complete, and that they must be interpreted in a manner open to the mystery of Scripture. He wishes to hold that the interpretation placed upon these prophecies by Tradition is true, but also maintains that 'the traditional interpretation... is the more literal fulfilment of the prophecies and therefore the more likely'. If this is the correct understanding of Newman's meaning, then it would seem that even though he argues that different verses should be understood in different senses, the underlying reason for this is always the same - where the verse is incomplete or its meaning needs to be further drawn out, this must be done in a manner that is open to the mystery of Revelation. This
accounts for the discrepancy in terminology where he was discussing which rule of interpretation should be applied to prophecies concerning the Kingdom of God.

In summary, then, if Newman's theory of development is correct, prophecies are fulfilled in the life of the Church, and that which is not explicit in biblical texts can be made so. The primacy texts do not explicitly mention a Bishop of Rome, in possession of an infallible teaching office, who would be the successor to St. Peter. Newman's theory does, however, allow for a fulfilment which corresponds to the petrine type, the scriptural image of authority in the Church, the exact nature of which cannot be known with precision from Scripture. Scripture is to be interpreted in a manner which allows for the mystery of Revelation. If this is done, the Church can know her own mind, and as the faithful guardian of the Deposit of Revelation, entrusted by Christ to his Church, can see that it is developed in the correct manner.

**Historical Method**

A related criticism of the *Essay* is that Newman has dispensed with history, wishing to place the historical material, including the New Testament evidence, within a preconceived framework. Furthermore, it is alleged that the historical basis of the *Essay* of 1878 has been weakened.
because he has omitted lengthy extracts from the writings of other historians concerning historical method. 96

The essential argument, however, was retained, and Newman abided by the method he drew out in 1845. 97 It is true that in the preface to the 1878 edition he wrote that previously he had been too generous to Protestant historians, 98 but it seems that he had in mind passages in the 1845 edition, such as the one in which he described papal infallibility as an hypothesis, rather than as a fact. Since the doctrine had been formally defined by the First Vatican Council in 1870 he could no longer maintain the same position in 1878.

In addition, most of the same historical facts are admitted in 1878 as in 1845. What is important, however, is that Newman has recognised the ambiguity of an appeal to historical fact. He realised that historical method cannot be separated from the historian's assumptions and that there is no historical judgement which cannot be logically contradicted. History, of course, has its own validity where details and facts are to be established, but judgement is something that depends on the insight and imagination of the historian. 99 Newman's argument is that historians must fit the facts they discover into a framework that makes sense of them. This is the only way
in which they can be understood. His method, based on
the belief that the earlier 'tended towards' the later, was
to argue that earlier centuries should be viewed through
those subsequent to them. This aspect of his thought can
only be understood by first analysing the conceptual
presuppositions that underlie it.

Lash has shown how Newman 'had come to conceive of
memory as a mode of apprehension. He tended to regard the
"objects" of memory as "present" in much the same way as
objects of consciousness: "What is time that it should make
a real difference between memory and consciousness". This
shows a tendency to conceive of history as the
description of a subject at a point in time, rather than as
concerned with the historical development of a subject.
When this is combined with 'the probable influence of the
Associationist school [on his thought], with its emphasis
that "the coalescence of our past experience into a
pattern... enables the knower to apprehend an object as the
whole it is", one can understand why Newman was able to
describe facts as looking in, tending towards, a particular
direction:

My argument then is this:-- that, from the first age of
Christianity, its teaching looked towards those ecclesiastical
dogmas, afterwards recognised and defined, with (as time went
on) more or less determinate advance in the direction of
This approach can be detected in the fact that the Essay is an 'hypothesis to account for a difficulty.'\textsuperscript{104} It is not intended to be a formal demonstration, or proof, of the claims of the Catholic Church. It is, rather, an attempt to persuade the reader to see the ambiguous evidence in the same way as Newman himself had come to see it. This reflects his methodological approach to theology in general, as has been drawn out by T.J. Norris in his book *Newman and his Theological Method*: 'A pattern has emerged. This pattern is a process of investigation which begins with the data relevant to the problem, and moves to a tentative solution of the problem, which is variously named, as an "antecedent probability", or, more generally, an "hypothesis". This hypothesis is in turn subjected to critical reflection in order to test its soundness and validity, and the result of this "verification" is a certitude of the mind that the hypothesis is the truth. Verification has qualitatively transformed theory into fact.'\textsuperscript{105} This verification procedure may be identified with the 'Illative Sense' described in the *Grammar of Assent*. This can be clearly seen when Newman's method is expressed diagrammatically:\textsuperscript{106}
In Newman's method, it is not a question of demonstration that provides proof, but a growing into certainty. As one comes to see evidence in a certain way, probabilities converge and certitude is arrived at. His intention is not 'to prove beyond all reasonable doubt', but to encourage the convergence of probabilities. It is an attempt to coax readers to see the evidence in the way he sees it and, in this respect, the objectives of the Essay can be seen to be really quite limited.

Wiles has commented that if this is the case, then 'many of the criticisms often raised against the essay would fall to the ground, but only at the cost of
drastically reducing the usefulness and applicability of the book's approach outside its very own specific and personal forms of reference.'

This comment is based upon Lash's remark in Change in Focus, that Newman did not intend to provide criteria for distinguishing between true developments and what are properly called corruptions. While agreeing with Wiles' conclusion, however, Lash does think that much can be learnt from the Essay:

If theologians stopped trying to find in the Essay what is not there, they might fruitfully discover what is there — and that is a great deal. If they abandoned the search for the sort of formal, theoretical, criteriological argument within, in terms of the subject-matter, it would be anachronistic to look for in a book written in 1845 and which, quite apart from this, was wholly alien to Newman's style and temperament, they might yet learn from the Essay a great deal about patterns of reflection and argument in Christian theology. Specifically, they might recover an appreciation of the extent to which, where fides quarens intellectum is concerned, literary patterns of argument and exposition have an indispensable rôle to play, a rôle more often suited to the subject matter of Christian theology than are more formal, or theoretical modes of reflection and explanation.

A similar view is taken by Kelly, whose intention it was 'to investigate the theory of doctrinal development from the vantage point of the image or model of personal
development in preference to the genetic or organic image or the history of ideas and to determine whether or not this presentation would, in Newman's own terms, "instance", or "illuminate" specific concerns of contemporary scholars of foundational or fundamental theology' and thus vindicate the Essay:

Newman did not set out to solve the critical problem in an abstract way, nor did he think of himself as a theologian in the strict sense. But in his Essay he seemed to be offering a way to do theology, and it is a way that is practical, personal, decisive; yet it is always guided by and enriched by a sense of community and of history.

Furthermore, Newman's claim that certain facts should be seen in the light of others, although dangerous and ambiguous at times, is exactly what Christians, who accept the doctrine of the Homoousion and the definition of the Council of Chalcedon, do when interpreting the Christology of the New Testament. They do this not as part of exegetical method however, but as religious fact. In addition, this is not an exclusively doctrinal argument, but the theological application of a general historiographical principle:

Changes in society are, by a providential appointment, commonly preceded and facilitated by the setting in of a certain current in men's thoughts and feelings in that direction towards which a
As Lash points out, 'His application of the argument to the history of doctrine leads to an assessment of heresy that is at once historically more sensitive and theologically more constructive than was common in the Catholic theology of the period: "heresies in every age may be taken as the measure of the existing state of thought in the Church, and of the moment of her theology: they determine in what way the current is setting, and the rate at which it flows."'

**Eastern Orthodoxy**

Assuming, then, that Newman does provide a method for theological investigation, a further criticism that must be considered is one which has been voiced by Professor Chadwick: 'In the mind of the careful reader... queries will rise. First, whatever in the argument is an argument for the western church, is perhaps equally strong as an argument for the eastern church. Newman hardly mentioned the Eastern Orthodox Church in the Essay, except in two casual references to her stagnation and infertility.' The criticism that Newman ignored the Eastern Orthodox was also raised at the time of publication by Gladstone.

The first thing to bear in mind, when answering this
criticism, is the limited scope of the Essay. Newman was trying to remove a popular objection to Roman Catholicism, rather than prove its claim as a logical certainty. It is an hypothesis that rests on historical evidence, and thus the historian's judgement, and probability. In the final analysis, it rests on his belief in Divine Providence, the 'Kindly Light', of which he wrote so eloquently in 1833. The aim of the Essay is, however, even narrower than that. This is because it is not addressed to the world at large, but to Anglo-Catholic readers, whom Newman seeks to coax into seeing certain facts in the way in which he has come to see them, thus establishing a certitude in their minds as to the validity of the Roman Catholic claim. A full treatment of Orthodoxy would, therefore, have been out of place, although, as Chadwick notes, he does refer to it.

Secondly, as Fr. Ker points out, it is unlikely that Newman would actually have seriously considered becoming an Orthodox: 'Writing four years after his reception into the Catholic Church to an Anglican correspondent thinking of also converting, he says bluntly: "I will not go through the question of the Greek Church, because unless your conversion depended on it, I could not bring myself to contemplate the absurdity (as it seems to me) of an Anglican becoming a Greek." He does not, however deny that, given the unCatholic nature of the Church of England,
"a so-called Anglo-Catholic should leave his communion either for Greece or Rome." 117

The clue to Newman's attitude to the idea of an Anglican becoming an Orthodox is to be found in his description of the Orthodox Christian as a 'Greek'. As Fr. George Dragas has shown, in his essay on 'Newman's Greek Orthodox Sense of Catholicity', Newman left the Church of England 'because he understood that, in the light of the apostolic patristic tradition, locally established catholicity [i.e. Anglo-Catholicism]', even though 'based on a rigorous investigation of the patristic dimension of the ancient Catholic Church and its restatement by the great Anglican divines, was becoming a merely confessional, theoretical and restrictive weapon to be used only in dialectical disputes with the Roman Catholics and, therefore stood for a self-indulgent catholicity rather than ecumenical activity', and that this would jeopardize 'its integrity and truthfulness.' 118 In the same way, his use of the term 'Greek', suggests that he felt the Orthodox to be tied to a particular region. 119 In their case, however, this was not as disastrous as in the Church of England, which, in Newman's opinion, was also hopelessly compromised by its toleration of Protestant beliefs and practices, alongside Catholic ones, which would prevent 'the tractarian Anglo-Catholics... eventually affirm[ing]
catholicity ecumenically and overcome the problem of schism and division.' 120

It is Fr. Dragas's view that 'Newman's historical conversion to Roman Catholicism is not "denominational". It was rather a concrete way of affirming the vision of the Church which he found in the Fathers, the vision which demands the union of all people into one communion. In his own historical concrete Newman became convinced that only in the Roman Church could he affirm his patristic vision unreservedly. As he put it himself, he was convinced that "if Athanasius and Ambrose were to return to nineteenth century Oxford they would feel more at home with the Roman Catholics."' 121

So, although it was Newman's study of the Fathers that made him a Catholic,122 it was, in part, his understanding of catholicity as found in the Greek Orthodox Church in the nineteenth century, which foreclosed the possibility of his seeking admission to her fold.

That being said, the Catholic Newman's theology was one formed by the Fathers, despite what the neo-scholastic schoolmen might have wished:

What St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, and St. Basil taught, can
never be put aside. It is as true now as when those great Fathers enunciated it; and if true, it cannot be ignored without some detriment to the fullness and symmetry of the Catholic dogma [of the Trinity].

In fact, both Fr. Dragas and Fr. Dessain agree that 'if East and West are to come together, we must go back to the Fathers we share in common, and our mentality, our theological outlook on them.'

That being so, Fr. Dragas regards Newman's sense of catholicity as decisive:

The Biglietto Speech clearly shows that Newman, like the Fathers, does not look at the Church in institutional, historical terms, but subjects all her institutions—historical peculiarities and genius,—including the cardinal's hat,—to the reality of God's grace.... Is it not contemporary Christian realism to say that Newman, the Anglican, become Roman Catholic because of the Orthodox Fathers, preshadows forthcoming ecclesial events, and that he is a sign of the historical reconciliation of the Ecclesia Anglicana with the Ecclesia Romana at the intervention of the Ecclesia Greca? ... Newman has given warning about the historical urgency of this task and predicted the rise of liberalism (or secularism) which grows where catholic ecumenical activity is not undertaken. These have today become the greatest enemies of catholic truth, because they unnerve it from its communal existential capacity, its positive openness to God and to the whole world... But apart from the warning, Newman has also supplied the prophetic vision of faith in God's intervention and in the manifestation of God's Catholic and incorruptible truth in the modern world and modern
Thirdly, Newman felt that the Orthodox Church did not answer 'to the early Church in all substantial matters'. Although she was one with the Early Church in many respects, for example in her preservation of priestly orders and sacraments, it was Newman's view that she 'has no political life, such as an ecclesiastical body ought to have - and takes no account of the Pope - not so much as their old Saints took of him.' As he argued in the preface to the *Via Media*, the political office of the Church is vital if the Church is to preserve her independence and freedom of action, as is shown by the Orthodox Church, 'which has lost political life, while its doctrine, and its ritual and devotional system, have little that can be excepted against.'

Fourthly, Newman's understanding of the development of doctrine necessitated a living teaching authority in the Church, and as the first of his 'two casual references' in the *Essay* to the Orthodox shows, he did not believe that, following the schism between East and West, such an authority could be found in the Orthodox Churches, who were no longer in communion with the Patriarch of the West, whom they recognize as *primus inter pares*: 'I am not aware that the Greeks present more than a negative opposition'.
The Orthodox have preserved true doctrine in their liturgy and tradition, but the lack of a living authority explains Newman's second reference: 'Doctrine without its correspondent principle remains barren, if not lifeless, of which the Greek Church seems an instance.'

Fifthly, and finally, 'life' was, for Newman, an important note of the Church: 'The Church is emphatically a living body... she alone revives even if she declines' and as far as he was concerned, 'the Greeks show no sign of life, but remain shut up as if in the sepulchre of the past.'

So, when considering Newman's attitude to, and the Essay's relationship to Eastern Orthodoxy, it is necessary to bear in mind, firstly the limited scope of the Essay and secondly, that the references that are made to it in the Essay are more than just casual, in the sense of not thought out, asides. It was not Newman's purpose to highlight, as he saw it, the deficiencies of Eastern Orthodoxy, but his references to it show that he certainly believed that they were there. It is therefore erroneous to suggest that the argument for the Roman Catholic Church in the Essay can be equally well applied to Eastern Orthodoxy.
Conclusion

In conclusion, then, the *Essay on Development* is a treatise on the nature and transmission of divine Revelation, in which Newman set out a developmental model of Revelation, which he believed accounted for the problems which history poses the student of doctrine. He believed that Revelation ceased at the end of the Apostolic Age, but that man's dialogue with God, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, continues; this process he termed development.

Professor Chadwick, and others, however, have argued that Newman's theory is self-contradictory, and that really it amounts to a theory of continuing Revelation. But it has been argued above, that these scholars do not give sufficient weight to Newman's concept of 'feeling' or his emphasis on the unity and indivisibility of an idea. In addition, his understanding of 'unfulfilled prophecy' and 'continuity of principle' serve to bolster his case, as well as rebuff charges that a theory of continuing Revelation is required.

Newman was convinced that such a theory of Revelation brought about a 'high antecedent probability' of an infallible teaching office in the Church, capable of determining true developments from those which are properly called corruptions. This office he ascribed to the papacy,
which he regarded as the fulfilment of the promises made to St. Peter, although his initial concern was for the infallibility of the Church as a whole. But in the final analysis, Newman's theory rests on his firm trust in Divine Providence. He believed that God would not fail His Church, and given this belief, it is easy to see how he could base his hypothesis in antecedent probability.
He who came for ever, came as a Spirit, and, so coming, did for His own that which the visible flesh and blood of the Son of man, from its very nature could not do, viz., He came into the souls of all who believe, and taking possession of them, He, being One, knit them all together into one. Christ, by coming in the flesh, provided an external or apparent unity, such as had been under the Law. He formed His Apostles into a visible society; but when He came again in the Person of His Spirit, He made them all in a real sense one, not in name only. For they were no longer arranged merely in the form of unity, as the limbs of the dead may be, but they were parts and organs of one unseen power; they really depended upon, and were offshoots of that which was One; their separate persons were taken into a mysterious union with things unseen, were grafted upon and assimilated to the spiritual body of Christ, which is One, even by the Holy Ghost, in whom Christ has come again to us. Thus Christ came, not to make us one, but to die for us; the Spirit came to make us one in Him who had died and was alive, that is, to form the Church.¹

After his reception into the Catholic Church, Newman remained in Littlemore, just outside Oxford, until February 1846, from where he moved to Old Oscott. He stayed there with several other converts, who had been with him in Littlemore, until September, when accompanied by Ambrose St. John he set out for Rome, where both were to train for the priesthood. Upon his return to England, he established the English Oratory. The first house was in Birmingham, and a second was soon to be founded in London, although in 1853 it became independent.²

The Idea of a University

In November 1851, Newman was appointed Rector of the
new Catholic University in Dublin, a post which he held until his resignation on 12 November 1858. He thus held office for seven years, although the university did not commence its work until November 1854, and so in practice his tenure of office was just four years. The events of this period are well known, as are the reasons for his departure from office, and so need not be repeated here. What are important, however, are the views which he put forward in a series of lectures delivered in 1852, *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education*. These were later published, along with some *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects* (1859), written whilst he was Rector of the university, as *The Idea of a University*. This volume was first published in 1873.

The preface to the *Idea* begins with the statement that a university exists for teaching 'universal knowledge'. This does not mean that knowledge for its own sake is a good enough reason for a university to exist, its real purpose is to produce intelligent members of society, capable of thinking and reasoning for themselves.

The first Discourse is introductory and it is here that Newman sets out his qualifications for discussing university education, i.e. his time at Oxford, during which he learnt of liberal education.
Newman's Idea of the Church

In Discourse II Newman considers 'Theology a Branch of Knowledge'. In this lecture he argues that if one believes Christianity to be true, then it must be included in the curriculum of a university that claims to teach 'universal knowledge'. If theology is left out, then 'you will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge'.

This argument is based on the belief expressed in Discourse III, 'Bearing of Theology on other Branches of Knowledge', in which Newman states that 'all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject matter is one.' This he goes on to explain:

As they all belong to one and the same circle of objects, they are one and all connected together; as they are but aspects of things, they are severally incomplete in their relation to the things themselves, though complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes; on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other. And further, the bearings of one science on another... belongs... to a sort of science distinct from all of them, which is my own conception of what is meant by Philosophy, in the truest sense of the word, and of a philosophical mind.

Newman is not, however, describing some sort of 'superscience':

In default of a recognized term, I have called the perfection or virtue of the intellect by the name of philosophy, philosophical
knowledge, enlargement of mind, or illumination.\textsuperscript{12}

The relationship of the sciences, one to another, is further described in Discourse IV, 'Bearing of other Branches of Knowledge on Theology':

I observe, then, that if you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for it; that science is forgotten; the other sciences close up, or, in other words, they exceed their proper bounds, and intrude where they have no right.\textsuperscript{13}

The danger then is that one particular branch of knowledge will put itself at the centre of the circle, and make the others subservient to it. For example, political economy may try to influence ethics, although it has no jurisdiction in that field.\textsuperscript{14}

In the fifth Discourse, 'Knowledge its own End', Newman acknowledges that university students will not, in practice, be able to study all of the sciences,\textsuperscript{15} but only a few of them. Narrow specialization in one area, however, is to be avoided, and the student will benefit from living in a community in which the whole circle of sciences is taught. As Ker remarks: 'Clearly Newman would have regarded certain fundamental subjects - including theology - as absolutely indispensable, but it is ludicrous to suppose that he wanted a university to include every
conceivable branch of knowledge known to man. In fact, in
the last of the Discourses he makes the necessary
modification when he states that "all branches of knowledge
are, at least implicitly, the subject-matter of its
teaching." [Idea, p.183]. In other words, a university
must be in principle hospitable and in practice not hostile
to any kind of knowledge'. The result of this will be
the 'philosophical habit' of Discourse III, and it is in
that sense that knowledge is its own end.

Newman was not, however, in favour of an education
which would provide the student with merely a cursory
knowledge of several different sciences. Rather, each
separate science which is to be studied, must be studied in
detail:

This is commonly and excellently done by making him begin with
Grammar; nor can too great accuracy, or minuteness and subtlety
of teaching be used towards him, as his faculties expand, with
this simple purpose. Hence it is that critical scholarship is
so important a discipline for him when he is leaving school for
the University.17

That university education is for the 'enlargement of
mind'18 is made clear in Discourse VI, 'Knowledge viewed in
relation to Learning':

The enlargement consists not merely in the passive reception
into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but
Newman's Idea of the Church

in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are making in upon it.¹⁰

That which is to be aspired to is the true enlargement of mind which is the power of viewing many things at once as a whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and of determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form of Universal Knowledge, of which I have on a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intellect, and constitutes its perfection.²⁰

In the seventh Discourse, 'Knowledge viewed in relation to Professional Skill', Newman argues that the liberal education described above is 'useful' for two reasons. Firstly, because it is its own end, and 'has its use in itself'²¹ and secondly, because it tends to good, or is the instrument of good.'²² He concedes that it is not always the case that 'good' and 'useful' are identical, but he maintains that 'the good is always useful',²³ remembering that without education, professional and scientific studies will not advance.²⁴

Critics, however, have argued that at this point Newman has contradicted himself over the question of whether a practical end must be assigned to a university course. Thus Culler argues: 'The whole burden of the fifth discourse was that... liberal knowledge is its own end, and
now, under the guise of carrying this argument a step further, Newman has actually reversed it. Where before he had rejected utility as a criterion for evaluating knowledge, he now accepts that criterion and merely claims that liberal knowledge is useful too.\textsuperscript{25} To this Vargish adds: 'The confusion is real and the fault is certainly Newman's.'\textsuperscript{26} But this is not Newman's argument. His point is that a practical end does exist, \emph{if} one must be assigned. As he said in the fifth discourse, having first argued that 'knowledge is capable of being its own end', 'further advantages accrue to us and redound to others by its possession, over and above what it is in itself.'\textsuperscript{27} Yet, if 'a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too'.\textsuperscript{23}

Discourse VIII concerns 'Knowledge viewed in relation to Religion'. Here Newman contends that the 'pursuit of knowledge'\textsuperscript{29} is of great benefit to the study of religion, but he warns against forgetting about God, and arriving at a position where 'sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature.'\textsuperscript{30} In other words, 'Newman suspect[s] liberal education for its sceptical, critical temperament'.\textsuperscript{31}

Doubts about liberal knowledge are also voiced in the final Discourse, 'Duties of the Church towards Knowledge'.
Here Newman considers the relationship between the Church and a Catholic university that teaches Catholic theology (which, of course, it must). It is pointed out that, unless the Church exercises some influence, the tendency of liberal knowledge is 'to impress us with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in the place of Revelation.' Thus, it should not be allowed to 'become the rival of the Church... in those theological matters which to the Church are exclusively committed.'

To summarize, then, a university exists to teach 'universal knowledge'. Accordingly, all sciences, including theology, must be taught. The purpose of this is 'enlargement of the mind'. Warning shots, however, are fired across the bows of liberal knowledge, when it is argued that it must not be allowed to replace God. To this end, the Church must have some say in the running of the Catholic University. As far as Newman's ecclesiology is concerned, the most important things to note at this juncture are the 'circle of sciences' and the role of hierarchical authority.

A critic of Newman has argued that in his description of the relationship of the sciences to one another,

he employs two different images to describe the structure of knowledge, that of the circle of the sciences and that of the
Newman's Idea of the Church

hierarchy of the sciences, and that he makes no attempt to reconcile the two. The former, which is of classical origin, implies that theology occupies one segment of a circle which is presided over by the Science of Sciences, but the latter, which is of medieval origin, implies that she is the queen of the sciences and herself has the ruling of all the rest.\textsuperscript{35}

But, as Ker\textsuperscript{36} has shown, this is to misunderstand Newman's argument. Firstly, he never once mentions a 'hierarchy of the sciences'; secondly, he does not suppose that the sciences in the circle are equal with one another. He makes it quite clear, in fact, that some branches of knowledge, e.g. theology, 'impinge upon (not rule over) a great number of other branches of knowledge.'\textsuperscript{37} The image of the circle does not imply equality, but interdependence. It is, therefore, perfectly possible for one science to be the chief of the sciences, not in any hierarchical sense, but as a \textit{primus inter pares}.\textsuperscript{38} As will be seen later, the type of relationship envisaged here among the different sciences is the same as that envisaged among the three offices of Christ, exercised by the Church, as described in the preface to the \textit{Via Media}. There, the Prophetic, Priestly and Regal Offices are seen to exist in creative tension with one another, but it is also contended that theology, the instrument of the Prophetic Office, is the regulating principle.

With regard to the rôle of hierarchical authority, it
must be remembered that in the university Newman was trying to integrate clergy and laity. Such integration was not common, and clergy and educated laity often held radically different ecclesiology. In order to achieve this integration, Newman felt that he needed to 'reconcile three factors - the autonomy required by the intellect to develop according to its proper nature, free from arbitrary and external constraints; the rights and functions of theology within the economy of a university; and the extent to which the Church has the right to exercise a pastoral authority within the university.' In this he was trying to achieve an equilibrium between competing claims. This, of course, reflects his view expressed in the image of the circle of sciences, that all are necessary and interdependent, but not necessarily equal.

The implications of this for Newman's ecclesiology are clear. The Church is not to be governed autocratically by the pope and the bishops. They are the prime governors of the Church, but their authority does not extend to all spheres. Coulson has summarized the matter well: 'Ecclesiastical authority can rightfully require an obedience to what is essential for the ordering of the Church as a polity or institution, but it cannot supersede conscience.'
Thus, Newman can argue that the Catholic Church has some jurisdiction over a Catholic university, since that university is itself limited and defined by its concept of what constitutes knowledge and truth. There is to be, however, sufficient academic freedom to allow serious research to be conducted, without constant and unwarranted interference from the hierarchy. This relationship parallels the relationship described in the Discourses between liberal knowledge and the Church. Liberal knowledge can be of great benefit to theology, helping it to make significant advances. This, of course, benefits the Church considerably. Left to its own devices, however, liberal knowledge is quite capable of dispensing with God, and substituting secular philosophy. Such study must therefore be kept in check by the Church. Similarly, academic and intellectual freedom in the liberal arts will benefit the intellectual standing of the university, which will, in turn, benefit the study of theology in the university, which then benefits the Church. The Church, however, must exercise such pastoral authority as is necessary to ensure that this is the case, and that the liberal arts do not take over and extend themselves into areas in which the Church is the arbiter. So, the broad boundaries of the university are to be set by the Church authorities, but these must not be too narrowly defined, and should allow ample academic and intellectual freedom.
Newman's Idea of the Church

If the limits are too narrow, scholarship in general will decline, and the rights and functions of theology within the university will be severely impaired. The end result of this is that the Church as a whole will then suffer. This principle gives rise to Newman's views about the place of an educated laity in the Church.

Following his resignation as Rector of the Catholic University, Newman began working on a philosophical treatise in defence of Christianity. He labelled the notes Opus Magnum, but his work on this was delayed, firstly by a request from the bishops that he should become involved in a new translation of the Bible, and secondly, by his involvement in what has become known as 'The Rambler Controversy'.

The Rambler Controversy

The Rambler had been established in January 1848, by John Moore Capes. Capes was a convert, who had been received into the Catholic Church on 27 July 1845, by the future Cardinal Wiseman, who was at that time President of Oscott College. Since he was married, Capes was unable to seek ordination, but he managed to find a post as professor of mathematics at Prior Park College, near Bath. It was while he was there, in 1846, that he decided to found a periodical in which he and other converts 'should write
Newman's Idea of the Church

for the present condition of the English mind, entering into all subjects of literary, philosophic and moral interest, treating them as a person who believes Catholicism to be the only true religion'. Bishop Ullathorne approved greatly of this idea, and the project went ahead, once Newman had been consulted and various difficulties had been ironed out. During the period 1848-54 the weekly periodical sold reasonably well, developing into a monthly magazine in September 1848. The Rambler was smiled upon by the ecclesiastical authorities for the greater part of this period, and was actually favoured by Wiseman. From 1854, however, when Richard Simpson, a graduate of Oriel and convert to Catholicism, became heavily involved in the production of the magazine, the bishops began to frown upon it, as it became associated with Liberal Catholicism.44

In fact, the now well-known controversy over the inspection of Catholic schools led to a meeting on 12 February 1859 in London at which Wiseman, Errington, Grant and Ullathorne decided that the editorship of the Rambler needed to be taken out of Simpson's hands. It was agreed that Ullathorne was to persuade Newman to take over the Rambler. This Newman did, after protracted negotiations between Simpson and the hierarchy, in which he was the middle-man.
Newman's Idea of the Church

Newman had been caught in a difficult situation. He was reluctant to take on the editorship of the Rambler, but believed that the ideals that lay behind it were worthy and proper, and deserved to be continued. In his advertisement for the first edition of the Rambler under his editorship, therefore, he did not mention the change of editor, nor did he change the name of the periodical, as his fellow Oxford convert and editor of the Dublin Review, W.G. Ward had suggested, or merge it with the Atlantis as Simpson requested. Instead he re-asserted, in more moderate form, the liberal ideals which underlay the work of Simpson and Acton, although he intended to change what had in so many ways displeased him.

Despite his intention, Newman immediately angered the bishops in his first number of the Rambler (May 1859). This he did by referring to the education question raised by Scott Naysmith Stokes, the Catholic school inspector, earlier in the year. The passage in which Newman caused offence was contained in his editorial note:

Acknowledging, then, most fully the prerogatives of the episcopate, we do unfeignedly believe, both from the reasonableness of the matter, and especially from the providence, gentleness, and considerateness which belongs to them personally, that their Lordships really desire to know the opinion of the laity on subjects in which the laity are especially concerned. If even in the preparation of a dogmatic definition the faithful are consulted, as lately as the instance
of the Immaculate Conception, it is at least as natural to anticipate such an act of kind feeling and sympathy in great practical questions, out of the condescension which belongs to those who are *forma facti gregis ex animo*.... Surely it was no disrespect towards them to desire that they should have the laity rallying round them on the great question of education with the imposing zeal which has lately been exemplified in Ireland, in the great meeting which was held in Cork.... Let them pardon, then, the incidental hastiness of manner or want of ceremony of the rude Jack-tars of their vessel, as far as it occurred, in consideration of the zeal and energy with which they haul-to the ropes and man the yards.47

The obvious purpose of the editorial was to placate the bishops, although some may feel that it was also intended as a swipe at them. In any event it unleashed their wrath, and Newman was drawn into conflict with John Gillow, professor of dogmatic theology at Ushaw College (the leading seminary in England),48 over the use of the word 'consult'. Gillow understood Newman to mean by 'consult', to ask someone's opinion, and he was adamant that Pius IX and the bishops had not consulted the laity in that sense during the preliminary work to the promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Newman countered that his use of the word 'consult' was to be understood passively, i.e. in the way in which one might consult a barometer and even quoted, in his defence, the Jesuit Perrone, whose work on the Immaculate Conception had been an important element in the promulgation of the
Newman's Idea of the Church

dogma. Although this pacified Gillow temporarily, he was
to return to the attack following the July number of the
Rambler.

It may be felt, however, that Newman's response to
Gillow was rather disingenuous, and that Gillow is to be
forgiven for being puzzled by Newman's use of the word
'consult'. Such a view is perhaps borne out by Newman's
piece in the next number of the Rambler, which seems to be
in favour of an active role for the laity, and by his
account of his meeting with Ullathorne on 22 May, a meeting
at which the two disagreed as to the role of the laity.
Newman argued that an educated laity had a very important
role to play in the life of the Church, but his bishop
would not allow the weight of his argument. Of the meeting
Newman wrote:

he saw one side, I another - He said something like, 'Who are
the Laity?' I answered that the Church would look foolish
without them - not those words.

It was at this meeting that Ullathorne advised Newman
to resign as editor of the Rambler after the July edition,
which he did.

Sharkey argues that confusion arose because Newman
used the word 'consult' in two different ways. He
summarizes the matter thus: 'With regard to the education issue, he had wanted the bishops to enter into dialogue with knowledgeable laity about the provision of elementary schools. In matters of doctrine, though, the laity are to be questioned / consulted about what they believe.'

It would appear, however, that this is a slight refinement of Newman's view. Certainly he used the word consult in two different senses, but only once he had been challenged by Gillow. In the May editorial, Newman believed 'that their Lordships really desire to know the opinion of the laity on subjects in which the laity are especially concerned' given that 'even in the preparation of a dogmatic definition the faithful are consulted'. Newman's point is that since the laity is to be consulted about doctrine, its opinions should be consulted on less important matters also. He makes no distinction in the editorial between two different methods of consulting.

Furthermore, Sharkey concedes this to be the case when he offers 'questioned' as an alternative to 'consulted', since this necessarily involves more in the way of lay activity than Gillow's view, which expected lay opinion to be consulted in a purely passive way. He demanded a fides implicita, which is what is required if the laity is to be consulted in a purely passive sense. Newman would not,
Newman's Idea of the Church

however, have allowed that a dogmatic definition may be disputed, and as his relations with Simpson and Acton show, he felt that the public questioning of authority put the questioner in a false position.52

But Newman's conception of the role of the laity is not purely passive, and as such it does not suggest a purely passive method of consulting the sensus fidelium. As will be shown, Newman acknowledged the legitimacy of the divide between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens, but he seems to have envisaged an organic partnership between the two, not a division between a purely passive laity (if only in matters of doctrine) and an active clergy. Such a divide is not the logical outcome of his policies in administering the Catholic University, nor is it the result of his views on the Present Position of Catholics in England:

I want a laity, not arrogant, not rash in speech, not disputatious, but men who know their religion, who enter into it, who know just where they stand, who know what they hold, and what they do not, who know their creed so well that they can give an account of it, who know so much of history that they can defend it. I want an intelligent, well-instructed laity... You ought to be able to bring out what you feel and what you mean, as well as to feel and mean it.53 [my italics]

In his editorial to the May number and his discussions with Ullathorne following it, one can see Newman's view of
the role of the laity in the infallibility of the Church. This was also in evidence during his time in Dublin, during which he felt it absolutely vital that there be an educated, intelligent laity, who would be 'a substantive power in the University.' This view was fully expounded in the July issue in the essay entitled, 'On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine'. As Lease has commented:

Here in all its pregnant fulness, is Newman's thought on the participation of the laity as guaranteed by the role played in the teaching function of the Church by the whole Church in its character as witnessing to its faith. It does not deny the active character assigned to the ecclesia docens; on the contrary it brings out in great clarity the cooperation essential for the full development of each in its respective role. It is the whole Church Newman is talking about, not one split into separate camps. The teaching office 'ascertains' the fact of the whole Church's witness; on the basis of this witness, in which it itself is a co-witness; it determines the validity of the witness and its extent.

'On Consulting the Faithful' is split into three sections. In the first section Newman defends the use of the word 'consult', re-stating the line of argument in his earlier correspondence with Gillow, that by 'consult' he meant 'ascertain as a matter of fact' what the views of the laity were, rather than ask the laity for a judgement. One might add that such consultation may be interpreted as being akin to looking in a mirror to see one's own reflection, and surely not what Newman was arguing for in
his May editorial.

In the second section,\textsuperscript{57} Newman argues that the laity have the right to be 'consulted', because the consensus of the faithful is an indicum or instrumentum of the judgement of the Church, which is infallible.\textsuperscript{58} The term that Newman used for this was phronema. It was a sort of instinct or, perhaps better, a power of judgement 'deep in the bosom of the mystical body of Christ; as a direction of the Holy Ghost; as an answer to prayer; and as a jealousy of error, which it at once feels as a scandal.'\textsuperscript{59}

In the third section\textsuperscript{60} of the essay, in order to prove the fidelity of the laity, Newman turns to the history of the Early Church, and to the Arian controversy.

I shall set down some authorities for the two points successively, which I have to enforce, viz. that the Nicene dogma was maintained during the greater part of the fourth century,
1. not by the unswerving firmness of the Holy See, Councils, or Bishops, but
2. by the consensus fidelium
I. On the other hand, then, I say, that there was a temporary suspense of the functions of the Ecclesia docens. The body of Bishops failed in their confession of the faith. They spoke variously, one against another; there was nothing, after Nicaea, of firm, unvarying, consistent testimony, for nearly sixty years. There were untrustworthy Councils, unfaithful Bishops; there was weakness, fear of consequences, misguidance, delusion,
hallucination, endless, hopeless, extending itself into nearly every corner of the Catholic Church. The comparatively few who remained faithful were discredited and driven into exile; the rest were either deceivers or were deceived.

II. Now we come secondly to the proofs of the fidelity of the laity, and the effectiveness of that fidelity, during that domination of the imperial heresy to which the foregoing passages have related.\textsuperscript{61}

In the essay the first passage is followed by ten pages of evidence showing the apostasy of the bishops, and the second is followed by sixteen pages showing the fidelity of the laity. Newman conceded that, happily, the state of affairs, which he described as existing in the fourth century, did not exist in the nineteenth, but he was convinced that the \textit{ecclesia docens} is more happy when she has such enthusiastic partisans about her as are here represented, than when she cuts off the faithful from the study of her divine doctrines and the sympathy of her divine contemplations, and requires from them a \textit{fides implicita} in her word, which in the educated classes will terminate in indifference, and in the poorer in superstition.\textsuperscript{62}

As Gilley comments: 'The concluding sentence was a brutal hit as the actual state of the Church in Latin countries for combining aristocratic indifference with popular superstition.'\textsuperscript{63}
For Newman, then, lay people have an important role to play in Church life, and are not mere reflections of the bishops' opinions. He wanted an educated laity, whose opinion would be taken into account in matters of doctrine. If the faith of the laity did not bear witness to a particular doctrine, then that doctrine could not be infallibly defined as dogma. Equally, in those mixed questions, such as education, in which lay people were highly involved, the bishops should take their views into account, and not reserve these topics to themselves. For if the Church is to function properly, there must be an 'organic unity' between the two. Should there be a 'temporary suspense', however, in the function of either party, the Church will still survive through the function of the other. So, although Newman allowed the validity of the divide between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens, the above does not suggest the purely passive role for the laity he described to Gillow. Rather, he seems to favour some sort of organic partnership, possibly one of creative tension.

This essay, which one might almost think was designed to anger the bishops, was an attempt to blunt the clerical tendencies of the hierarchy, which argued that lay people were there merely as mirrors of the bishops' opinions, and needless to say there was an immediate
reaction against it. On 28 August 1859 Gillow wrote to Newman denying that there could be a suspense in the functions of the *ecclesia docens*, and asserting that a *fides implicita* is what the Church rightly demands. Newman responded to this that 'suspense' did not mean failure:

> I think it has a meaning far lighter even than 'suspension'. The 'body of bishops' was the 'actual mass at the time spoken of' - no more.

With regard to the *fides implicita*, Newman repeated his warning of inculcating an attitude which would result in the indifference and superstition he had mentioned in the essay.

Wiseman, Ullathorne and Manning also found the essay unfortunate. Then in October Bishop Brown decided to refer the matter to Rome. He said that he had been in contact with Wiseman, Ullathorne, Manning and Gillow, who said he had written to Newman, but not found his reply to be satisfactory. (Gillow had written a further letter to which Newman thought it pointless to respond, since Gillow had not grasped his method of argument, which, it might be added, appears to have been, at times, somewhat imprecise.) In his letter to Rome, Brown translated the offending terms into Latin to give 'greater theological accuracy'. "Body
Newman's Idea of the Church

of bishops' was translated as 'corpus Episcoporum' and 'general councils' as 'Concilia Oecumenica'. In their Latin sense Newman's treatment of these terms could indeed have been regarded as heretical.

Given that the English hierarchy shared the clerical views and autocratic tendencies of the Roman authorities, and taking into account the manner in which the issue was reported to Propaganda, it is not surprising that Newman came under suspicion of heresy. This cloud remained over him until 1867, when he sent Fr. Ambrose St. John and Fr. Henry Bittleston to Rome to discuss the various misunderstandings which had arisen, despite Newman's willingness to submit to questions from Propaganda, and Wiseman's promise of help. The length of the dispute can be attributed to Wiseman's negligence, no doubt made worse by the onset of diabetes, and his preoccupation with the quarrel with Errington. In addition, Manning did nothing to help Newman although he knew he was in trouble with Propaganda. It is unlikely that Manning deliberately withheld Newman's offer of explanation, but he certainly found it convenient not to rush immediately to Newman's aid.

In summary, then, the 'Rambler Affair' illustrates very clearly Newman's view of the rôle of the laity in the
Newman's Idea of the Church

Church. He wanted an educated, intelligent, theologically aware laity, whose opinions would be taken into account by the bishops. The hierarchy is to exercise an authority that will keep the Church together as an institution, but within her fold, there must be room for legitimate private judgement and freedom of correctly understood conscience. Without such freedom, and proper interaction between the *ecclesia docens* and the *ecclesia discens*, the Church cannot hope to fulfil her missions as effectively as she could, were there to be effective cooperation between clergy and laity.\(^7\) This is not just the case in matters of doctrine, in which the *sensus fidelium* is a true guide as to the faith of the Church, but in all areas, especially those in which lay people may have particular expertise, such as education. An obvious corollary of this stance, is that the comment of Monsignor George Talbot, a Papal Chamberlain and fierce opponent of Newman's, should be rejected:

> What is the province of the laity? To hunt, to shoot, to entertain. These matters they understand, but to meddle with ecclesiastical matters they have no right at all.\(^7\)

No wonder he regarded Newman as 'the most dangerous man in England'.\(^7\)

The clash that occurred over the Rambler demonstrates the chasm that existed, over the nature of the Church,
between the bishops on one hand, and the educated laity on the other; especially the converts from Anglicanism, who expected that the bishops would be only too keen to make the most of their talents. The bishops' conception of the Church was narrowly clerical. They ruled over a family which was to be protected from the outside world, and were not interested in how meaningful decisions could be made if there was no consultation with the laity, but with how they could resist encroachments onto 'their territory'. In March 1859 this was made absolutely clear in a letter from Bishop Ullathorne to Richard Simpson, in which he stated that the bishops regarded it as, 'absolutely unnecessary that the Catholic community should be informed of the grounds of our proceedings.' Simpson's response came in an unpublished letter for Montalembert's *Le Correspondant*, in April 1859, and from which a preferred model of the Church can be easily inferred:

the English Hierarchy has been victorious; not over its enemies but over its friends; no new converts have been made, no enthusiasm excited, no burst of charity or zeal called forth by their artillery and their blows. They have triumphed over their own army, and have excited not the enthusiasm of Christian conquest, but the passions of civil war....

this jealousy of the laity is a natural result of the strictness of the administrative organization which is now considered to constitute the strength of the clergy.... The compactness of the clerical union makes it a caste, it has a separate professional education and separate habits of mind.... The laity are to be kept in ignorance of all religious questions except those in the
Newman's Idea of the Church
catechism, in order to misuse their obedience to a body of
directors professionally educated to manage their religion for
them. Religion is turned into administration, the clergy into
theological police, and the body of thinking laymen into a mass
of suspects, supposed to be brooding on nothing but revolution,
and only kept together by motives of fear, and by the external
pressure of a clerical organization.74

In other words, Simpson is calling for a Church in
which the clergy and laity co-operate together, rather than
a society in which the hierarchy plays the rôle of Orwell's
'Big Brother'. The bishops are certainly the prime
governors of the Church, but the laity must be consulted,
and must be given sufficient trust and freedom to work for
the good of the Church. This is the case both in matters
of doctrine and in those areas in which laymen may have
specialised knowledge and ability. This is a desire with
which Newman, of course, sympathised, although he was not
so outspoken in his public comments. In fact, he was
deeply disillusioned with the attitude of the bishops, as
is shown from his account of his meeting with Bishop
Ullathorne, which led to his resigning the editorship of
the Rambler. His fears about the then current situation in
the Church were expressed in a letter to Henry Wilberforce:

I fear deeply that our Bishops do not understand England and the
English. Either the Catholic laity will kick, or, what I rather
fear, they will more and more fall below Protestants in
intellectual training and have no influence on the public
mind.75
Newman's Idea of the Church

Here we see a reflection of Newman's thought about the Catholic University; without proper intellectual freedom the Church as a whole will suffer. If the laity are to be treated as 'boys' and theological simpletons, rather than as responsible adult partners, then theology, and the life of the Church as a whole, will be severely distorted. This is with what Newman dealt in 'On Consulting the Faithful'. Furthermore, given that it is the whole Church which is infallible, her teaching capacity would be severely undermined if a vital part of her were to be ignored. The implications for ecclesiology are clear. The laity should be encouraged, and should be allowed, to take part in the life of the Church to the full, since the *ecclesia docens* operates at its best at such times. The relevance of this to Newman's ecclesiology in the preface to the *Vía Media* is that without the laity, theology would be impaired, and if that is the case it would not be able to perform its function properly as the regulating principle of the Church. This is what Newman saw happening in the Catholic Church of the nineteenth century, and both he and Simpson were concerned that it would result in Catholic opinion being of low intellectual quality and being held in contempt by Protestants. Newman's thought at this juncture is assessed well by Coulson: 'If the Church has a duty to consult the faithful, then it has a duty to manifest itself fully as a *conspiratio* of priests and
laity, as distinct from the existing practice of acquiescing in a laity which was either superstitious or indifferent, and capable of merely notional assent in matters of faith.  

But the Church in Newman's thought was more than just a political grouping; it was also mystical. As such, he did not merely set the individual conscience against tyranny in the Church, since he recognized that the former is only infallible when in accord with the sensus fidelium. It is the community that is important: securus judicat orbis terrarum. The whole Church is a living witness to the truth, and therefore, a living, dynamic reality, communicating God's presence on earth. Given this mystical conception of the Church, which is wide enough to embrace both the clergy and the laity, giving both the independence needed to ensure the spiritual and intellectual dynamism necessary to preach the Gospel and win converts, it is clear that a non-political regulator is necessary. This is theology. Once again the image of the circle is relevant. The segments are the clergy, the laity and theology. All three are interdependent, but their overall relationship is to be governed by theology, the primus inter pares. This view of the interdependent, creative relationship among authority, the rights of the individual and the rights of scholarship was to find
expression in the preface to the *Via Media of the Anglican Church*.

**The Preface to the Via Media**

The two volume *Via Media of the Anglican Church* was published in 1877. The first volume is the third edition of the *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church viewed relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism*, but now with additional notes in which the Catholic Newman took it upon himself to refute his former Anglican self. In addition, there is a preface in which he sought to answer the charge, that, as an Anglican, he had levelled at the Roman Church, of her being corrupt, because of differences between popular piety and official Catholic teaching (e.g. with regard to the honours paid to the Blessed Virgin Mary). He felt that he had already dealt with the charge of innovation in the *Essay on Development*. The second volume contains various of his Anglican writings on the Church, for example, Tracts LXXI and XC, as well as his Retraction of Anti-Catholic Statements. Primarily, though, the *Via Media*, particularly the preface, is a work of apologetics directed at 'those, not a few, who would become Catholics if their conscience would let them.'

As a work of apologetics, it is remarkable of the
period in that it frankly admits to conflicts and abuses in the Church, and in this it has relevance for our own time.\textsuperscript{23} It is a vindication of Newman's honesty that he dealt with these abuses so openly, and an indication that his aim in the preface was to understand the Church as he encountered her in practice; rather than to elaborate a mere theory.\textsuperscript{24} Newman's starting point for his theology of the Church, although he did not formulate his ideas in quite the same terms as contemporary theologians, is that of the Church as sacrament;\textsuperscript{25} a notion he learnt, as an Anglican, from his fellow Oxford conspirator,\textsuperscript{26} John Keble:

\begin{quote}
When our Lord went up on high, he left His representative behind Him. This was Holy Church, his mystical Body and Bride, a Divine Institution, and the shrine and organ of the Paraclete, who speaks through her till the end comes.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

In other words, it is the Church where Christ makes His presence felt, and where He is active today. Given this Christological perspective, Newman is then able to apply the three offices of Christ, Prophet, Priest and King, to the Church herself:\textsuperscript{28}

These offices, which specially belong to Him as Mediator, are commonly considered to be three; He is Prophet, Priest and King; and after His pattern, and in human measure, Holy Church has a triple office too; not the prophetical alone and in isolation.... but three offices, which are indivisible, though diverse, viz. teaching, rule, and sacred ministry.\textsuperscript{29}
Newman's Idea of the Church

He then goes on to connect these three offices (rather tenuously perhaps) with the four notes of the Church laid down in the Nicene Creed, and specifies by whom he sees each office exercised:

Christianity, then, is at once a philosophy, a political power, and a religious rite: as a religion, it is Holy; as a philosophy it is Apostolic; as a political power, it is imperial, that is One and Catholic. As a religion, its special centre of action is pastor and flock; as a philosophy, the Schools; as a rule, the Papacy and its Curia.

Newman's allocation of these offices has its ambiguities. Firstly, the teaching office he gives to the schools, rather than to the pope and the bishops. As the argument of the preface continues he acknowledges that the bishops do have a teaching function, given their responsibility to preserve unity, but as Dulles has pointed out, this function 'can hardly be called directly doctrinal.' Secondly, the priestly function is not reserved exclusively to the ordained. In his argument Newman concentrates almost exclusively on popular religion and the beliefs of simple people, and thirdly, when discussing the Regal Office, he reserves this almost exclusively to the pope, making very little mention of bishops, or of their relationship to him. In addition, he states that the pope inherits all three offices himself. This is certainly true. He exercises the Regal Office in
his rule, the Prophetic Office in teaching, and the Priestly Office in devotion and in celebrating the sacraments. But to mention this without the corresponding emphasis, that Newman had as an Anglican, on all members of the Church individually inheriting the three offices of Christ to some degree places too great an emphasis on the pope. When discussing the papacy, Newman also only speaks of it in relation to the Regal Office, forgetting that the pope inherits all three offices, not just the one.

Newman then goes on to set out the guiding principles of each of the offices he has described. For theology, truth is the guiding principle, for worship, devotion and for government, expediency. There are, however, dangers involved:

Further, in a man as he is, reasoning tends to rationalism; devotion to superstition and enthusiasm; and power to ambition and tyranny.

But abuses in one office, can be held in check by the correct operation of the other two. A modern analogy to the working of these offices may be the American political system, which is said to operate as a system of 'checks and balances'. Alternatively, it may be likened to the classical political economy, guided by Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'. Both of these analogies imply an element
of competition and creative tension among the offices. Certainly, the gift of infallibility in formal teaching is an aid in preventing disastrous abuses, but it does not amount to impeccability, which is what would be needed to prevent any abuses happening at all.  

In the early part of his discussion, Newman argues that the regulating principle of the system he is describing is theology:

Theology is the fundamental and regulating principle of the whole Church system. It is commensurate with Revelation, and Revelation is the initial and essential idea of Christianity. It is the subject-matter, the formal cause, the expression, of the Prophetical Office, and, as being such, has created both the Regal Office and the Sacerdotal.

As such, the Prophetic Office has a certain jurisdiction over the Regal and Priestly Offices, which Newman considers more liable to excesses, and of these he gives some examples.

Despite this clear statement of the centrality of theology, some scholars have called into question the traditional understanding of this passage. Nicholas Lash has argued that the 'greatness of the preface consists in Newman's refusal to allocate to any one of the three offices a position of privilege or centrality in respect of
Newman's Idea of the Church

Against this it has been maintained by Richard Bergeron, John Coulson and, more recently by H.D. Weidner, that 'the centrality of theology as a "regulating principle" is not only Newman's own position, and does not upset the balance of the offices, but that it maintains that balance.' It is argued that theology can be the regulating principle without being the dominant principle, since it can regulate by co-ordination, thus maintaining a position of centrality.

In the University Sermons and the Grammar of Assent Newman was concerned with the practical and the concrete, and he appears to give theology a secondary role to faith. Faith is a real apprehension, whereas theology is notional. As Weidner notes, however, Newman also realized in the Grammar that propositions have two functions:

The notion and the reality assented-to are represented by the one and the same proposition, but serve as distinct interpretations of it. When the proposition is apprehended for the purposes of proof, analysis, comparison, and the like intellectual exercises, it is used as the expression of a notion; when for the purpose of devotion, it is the image of a reality. Theology, properly and directly deals with notional apprehension; religion with the imaginative.

So, viewed from one direction, the proposition can represent the concrete, but viewed from another, the notional. Weidner comments: 'Theology regulates by
Newman's Idea of the Church

providing the shape of the field within which authority and devotion view the propositions in their own way.... The "practical, the experiential, the concrete" would tend to shapelessness and over-extension if the field were not defined and co-ordinated with other fields. Likewise, devotion and authority could tend to excess as well as not extending themselves properly to the whole truth unless theology and its propositions were there for co-ordinating purposes.105

When the above passage from the Grammar is considered, along with the image of the circle, which Newman developed in his lectures on university education, it would appear that he did intend theology to be the co-ordinating, regulating principle of the Church. The relationship among the three offices is one of interdependency, with theology (the instrument of the Prophetic Office) assuming the position of primus inter pares as the regulating principle, maintaining both the balance, and the creativity of the tension among them. Again, theology can only perform this function if the whole Church acts together. If it were not to perform this function, then the offices would encroach into areas where they have no jurisdiction, destroying the balance of the system. This balance could, of course, also be destroyed by the removal of one of the offices from the system completely. This is a reflection of what would
happen if the balance of the circle of sciences were to be upset. This could be done by the removal of one of the sciences, the greatest damage being caused by the removal of theology, the science that gives the ultimate form to the circle and the boundaries of the others. Theology, then, is the regulating, co-ordinating principle that gives overall shape, form and stability to the Church.

It must be questioned, however, whether Newman claims too much for the schools themselves. Dulles has argued that Newman's stress on the schools results from his desire to answer the criticisms he made in the Prophetical Office. But it must be remembered, that in the past, the various schools engaged in bitter rivalries with one another, and attempted to have their theories given dogmatic status in preference to the others. That being said, Newman is surely right in arguing that the (quest for the) truth must always be borne in mind, and that practical expediency or emotion must not be allowed to ride rough-shod over it.

Although theology is the regulating principle, the Prophetical Office is not exempt from correction by the other two. This Newman goes on to illustrate:

Yet theology cannot always have its own way; it is too hard, too intellectual, too exact, to be always equitable, or to be always compassionate; and it sometimes has a conflict or overthrow, or has to consent to a truce or compromise, in consequence of the
tional.

The rest of the preface is then used to off-set the importance attached to theology at the beginning.

In the section on the Priestly Office Newman contrasts theology and popular devotion. He admits to the fact that differences between the two do occur, but he says that this is inevitable. Here he echoes the Letter to Pusey, in which, addressing the same issue, he argued that in matters of devotion, private judgement has a legitimate role. Certainly, the Church is precise in her doctrinal statements, but in matters of devotion, a certain freedom must be accorded to the individual, and unless his devotions clearly imply heretical doctrine, they will be tolerated. In matters of devotion, the Church

neither prescribes measure, nor forbids choice, nor, except so far as they imply doctrine, is she infallible in her adoption or use of them.

It should also be noted, however, that

Worship, indeed, being the act of our devotional nature, strives hard to emancipate itself from theological restraints. Theology did not create it, but found it in our hearts and used it.

Thus, Newman saw the religious instinct as antecedent...
to positive Revelation, and part of the human condition. This instinct is to be respected and is clearly expressed in Catholic devotion to the saints and angels. Polytheism is a corruption of this instinct. What is intended is that man should give glory to God in all of His creation, especially in the holiest part of it. Idolatry is not a reason to limit this instinct.\[133\]

That being said, Newman frankly admits that in some cases devotion and correct theology do seem to be implacably opposed. To substantiate his argument, he cites the case of the woman with the haemorrhage, who touched Jesus' garment in the hope that she would be cured. She was, and Jesus merely said that her faith had cured her. He did not chastise her for what may well have been a superstitious or even idolatrous act.\[114\] Similarly, a poor Neapolitan crone, who chatters to the crucifix, refers that crucifix in her deep mental consciousness to an original who once hung upon a cross in flesh and blood; but if, nevertheless she is puzzleheaded enough to assign virtue to it in itself, she does no more than the woman in the Gospel, who preferred to rely for a cure on a bit of cloth, which was our Lord's, to directly and honestly addressing him.\[115\]

So, the individual must have a certain liberty in his own devotions, and it must also be remembered by those who exercise the Prophetical Office, that if such devotions,
technically incorrect as they may be, were to be trampled upon, so might be the faith that underlies them. In this connexion, Newman reminds his readers of the exhortations in the Gospels not to throw out the wheat along with the tares, and of St. Paul's admonitions to the more sophisticated Christians not to scandalize the weak (cf. I Cor. 10 and Rom. 14).

Newman also deals with the fact that non-theologians often fear novelty and innovation. This is in contrast to theologians, many of whom are prepared to adopt new theories readily, feeling that they provide new and exciting possibilities. As an example he gives the popular rejection of St. Jerome's re-translation of his own version of the Psalms. In such cases it is argued that the Church authorities must, like St. Paul, side with the weak, so as to avoid scandal and weakening of faith. On such grounds Newman explains the Church's treatment of Galileo.

Again on the theme of toleration and compromise, Newman touches on the problem of missionary accommodation. Here he argues that the Church must adapt itself in order to win converts and cites St. Paul who

became to the Jews a Jew, that he might gain the Jews, and to them that were without the law, as if he were without the law,
Newman's Idea of the Church

and became all things to all men that he might save all.\textsuperscript{118}

This ties in with Newman's argument, based on 'the great principle of Economy, as advocated'\textsuperscript{119} by many of the Greek Fathers, that it is at times better to leave certain points of faith undefined for the moment, out of charity towards the weaker in faith; a principle he applied to the proposed definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican Council.\textsuperscript{120}

It may therefore appear that Newman is sanctioning deliberate falsehood in matters of religion. This, however, is not so. He is merely pointing out, as he did in the Grammar, that debate in matters of religion closely parallels debate in other aspects of life. So:

Veracity, like other virtues, lies in a mean. Truth indeed, but not necessarily the whole truth, is the rule of Society. Every class and profession has its secrets; the family lawyer, the medical adviser, the politician, as well as the priest. The physician often dares not tell the whole truth to his patient about his case, knowing that to do so would destroy his chance of recovery. Statesmen in Parliament, I suppose, fight each other with second-best arguments, the real reasons for the policy which they are respectively advocating being, as each is conscious to each, not these but reasons of state, secrets whether of Her Majesty's Privy Council or of diplomacy. As to the polite world, which, to be sure, is in itself not much of an authority, I think an authoress of the last century illustrates in a tale how it would not hold together, if every one told the whole truth to every one, as to what he thought of him. From
Newman's Idea of the Church

the time the Creator clothed Adam, concealment is in some sense
the necessity of our fall.\textsuperscript{121}

Newsome has pointed out that, despite the obvious
Platonism of the \textit{Essay}, Newman's thought as a Catholic was
still highly influenced by Aristotelianism. Here in the
preface he is employing the 'Aristotelian mean' in a
description of truth, even though he had rejected the \textit{Via
Media}, that most Aristotelian of concepts.\textsuperscript{122}

Newman's treatment of the Priestly Office is
impressive. It deals frankly with the charges he brought,
as an Anglican, in the \textit{Lectures on the Prophetical Office},
and which are still levelled against Catholicism today.
The desire to answer such charges exclusively, however, has
led to the preface lacking a full treatment of the Priestly
Office. For example, greater mention of the holiness of
the Church, the ministry, the sacraments and the liturgy is
required.\textsuperscript{123}

In his discussion of the Priestly Office Newman
concentrates almost entirely on private devotions, in large
part excluding the sacraments and the liturgy. This must
be considered a weakness, since it is precisely in those
areas that the Priestly Office of Christ is exercised to
its greatest degree in the Church. Yet in the \textit{Letter to
Pusey},\textsuperscript{124} Newman criticises Pusey for not paying enough
attention to the official liturgy of the Church, and for merely bringing to light abuses in popular devotion. As Dulles remarks: 'If Newman had dwelt more on this aspect of worship, he could have established a more positive relationship between devotion and theology. He would have had occasion to discuss the principle *lex orandi, lex credendi*, showing how the sense of the faithful, shaped by participation in liturgical worship, is equipped to detect and repel heresy, as occurred in the Arian crisis.'

It is, however, perhaps not so remarkable that Newman did not do this. After all, when he did it before in 'On Consulting the Faithful', it resulted in a formal accusation of heresy being preferred against him. In addition, his *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, published only two years before the *Via Media*, had aroused disquiet in episcopal and curial circles. Given that this followed on from his opposition to the definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican Council, which became public knowledge with the publication of his letter to Bishop Ullathorne, and his now well-known public deference to authority, whatever his private reservations, it is perhaps not surprising that he should wish to refrain from anything likely to cause controversy. It is true, that had he written as Dulles would have liked, he would have provided a far better treatment of the Priestly Office. It
Newman's Idea of the Church

is also likely, however, that he would have once again embroiled himself in bitter and fierce controversy with his own ecclesiastical superiors (many of whom shared the opinion of Monsignor Talbot), and he may well have felt discretion to have been the better part of valour.

Having dealt with the Priestly Office, Newman then goes on to discuss 'the regal office of the Church and her duties to it.' As previously mentioned he saw the Regal Office as the domain of 'the Papacy and its Curia'. This is a vital part of his ecclesiology in the preface:

If the Church is to be regal, a witness for Heaven, unchangeable amid secular changes, if in every age she is to hold her own, and proclaim as well as profess the truth, if she is to thrive without or against the civil power, if she is to be resourceful and self-recuperative under all fortunes, she must be more than Holy and Apostolic; she must be Catholic. Hence it is that, first, she has ever from her beginning onwards had a hierarchy and a head, with a strict unity of polity, the claim of an exclusive divine authority and blessing, the trusteeship of the gospel gifts, and the exercise over her members of an absolute and almost despotic rule.

Newman makes no mention of the ecclesia docens in the preface, and has no notion of collegiality, nor, in this section, of any other factors that might limit the pope's rule.
Newman's Idea of the Church

The instrument of the Regal Office is expediency, the meaning of which in Newman's thought is explained well by Dulles: 'By this he does not mean the self-interest of individual rulers but what rather is dictated by the finality of the Church, which is divinely commissioned to extend its domination and to consolidate itself. Whatever is truly necessary for the survival and mission of the Church, Newman contends, cannot be contrary to God's will. Conversely, whatever is harmful to the unity, sanctity, and expansion of the Church must also be theologically wrong.\textsuperscript{130}

Newman starts by speaking of the missionary activities of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus who adopted certain pagan festivals, but invested them with a Christian meaning:

Having observed that many of the common people were attached to the religion of their fathers from a love of the ancient sports connected with paganism, he determined to provide the new converts with a substitute for those. He instituted a general festival in honour of the Martyrs, and permitted the rude multitudes to celebrate it with banquets similar to those which accompanied the pagan funerals (parentalia) and other heathen festivals.\textsuperscript{131}

Since St. Gregory was a bishop, as well as a missionary, this is an example of the Regal Office acting, in conjunction with the Priestly Office, in opposition to the Theological. The self-regulating system of checks and
balances does not always operate in such a manner, however, and so Newman goes on

to give instances in which the imperial and political expedience of religion stands out prominent, and both its theological and devotional duties are in the background.133

As an example of the Regal Office prevailing over the Theological on the grounds of expediency, Newman cites Pope Stephen's recognition of heretical baptism as valid,133 despite the theological arguments to the contrary. He also argues that Pope Leo IX was forced, out of expediency,134 to reverse his decree which ruled simoniacal ordinations to be invalid. These are instances of the Schools giving way to ecclesiatical expedience, and of the interests of peace and unity being a surer way of arriving at a doctrinal conclusion than methods more directly theological.135

Elsewhere in the preface, however, Newman attempts to demonstrate that the argument from expediency can be supported directly by theology. Thus, he argues that the infallibility of the pope must extend to the canonization of saints, on the grounds that if he did not, the Church would be compromised in its prayer and worship if, as according to St. Thomas Aquinas, 'one who was really a sinner, were venerated as a saint.'136 This, however, is a
Newman's Idea of the Church

strange example. Firstly, he seems to be extending the scope of papal infallibility beyond that which his minimizing interpretation allowed. Secondly, in a private note of 1866, he inclined to the view that the pope is not infallible in each canonization, but merely in recommending the cult of saints. In a letter of 1868, however, he makes the statement, 'to him who thinks it infallible it is such', perhaps implying that it is a matter of theological opinion, and not an article of faith.

The use of this example, like others in this section, rests on the statement that no act could be theologically an error, which was absolutely and undeniably necessary for the unity, sanctity, and peace of the Church; for falsehood never could be necessary for these blessings, and truth alone can be.

In principle, Newman is right. It must surely be accepted that there cannot be conflict between the spiritual goals of the Church and her fidelity to the Gospel. He is also to be commended for his admission that the Church is not impeccable, thus realizing that any implementation of the principle of expediency by the Regal Office is fraught with difficulties. But it does appear that he has given a poor example in trying to show that expediency can be supported by theology and it might have been better perhaps, merely to have observed that the pope...
Newman's Idea of the Church

...is infallible in recommending the cult of saints.\textsuperscript{140}

It may be that the exaggerated view of papal authority in the preface is the result of trying to placate the more Ultramontane of his contemporaries, as John Coulson has argued,\textsuperscript{141} and given the trouble in which he found himself in the past this would seem plausible. But it must be remembered that Newman was trying to understand the Church as he found her, and that in the nineteenth century, particularly following the definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican Council, the papacy was seen as being at the apex of a strictly hierarchical institution. This view of the Church is reflected in certain passages in the 1878 edition of the Essay on Development in which Newman discusses the 'Papal Supremacy',\textsuperscript{142} and also in a private letter to Pusey of 23 March 1867, in which he argued that the pope's jurisdiction was universal, on the grounds that

the Church is a Church Militant, and, as the commander of an army is despotic, so must the visible hand of the Church be; and therefore in its idea the Pope's jurisdiction can hardly be limited.\textsuperscript{143}

When writing to Pusey, it might be imagined that Newman would express Catholic claims for the papacy in the manner least likely to give offence to an Anglican theologian. Yet this does not seem to be the case, and the
Neuman's Idea of the Church

authoritarian element of his ecclesiology, which held the imperial structure of the Church to be the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies, is strongly to the fore.

Once again, the likely reason for this, is that Neuman was trying to understand the Church as he encountered her. This letter to Pusey was written in the run up to Vatican I, which it seemed likely would define the pope's infallibility. Neuman was in the situation of having to defend this doctrine, although it was not at that stage on the council's official agenda.

Furthermore, although Neuman makes no specific mention of collegiality, he does suggest that the Regal Office is to be held in check by 'the operation of the other two.' In other words, he does envisage some sort of structural or institutional restraint upon the government of the Church. This reflects a sermon of 1842, 'The Church an Imperial Power', in which he argued that imperial power in the Church could not have been invested in only Peter or the Apostles:

We must conclude that the power was invested in others also from the size of the empire, for a few persons, though inspired, cannot be supposed to have been equal to the care of all the Church. As Moses found his charge too great for him, and was permitted to have associates in his office, so doubtless would it be with the Apostles.144
The problem in the preface seems to be that in his discussion of the Regal Office, Newman has not taken into account the results of his earlier work on the laity and on the relationship between the *ecclesia docens* and the *ecclesia discens*. If, as argued above, theology can only act as the regulating principle if the laity are consulted, this lends a certain authority to their views, and as such the laity, along with the bishops, also share in the exercise of the Regal Office. This is in contrast to Newman's description of the Regal Office, which takes almost no account of the bishops, and makes no specific mention of the relationship between the *ecclesia docens* and the *ecclesia discens*.  

After much discussion, then, of the relationship of the Regal Office to the Prophetical, Newman ends with an example of conflict between the Regal Office and the Devotional:

that I may not end without an instance of the political in contrast with the Sacerdotal, I will refer to the Labarum of Constantine. The sacred symbol of unresisted suffering, of self-sacrificing love, of life-giving grace, of celestial peace, became in the hands of the first Christian Emperor, with the sanction of his Church, his banner in fierce battle and the pledge of victory for his sword.
Newman's Idea of the Church

Conclusion

In summary, then, Newman has provided an impressive and original account of the three offices of Christ, as they are exercised in the Church. Each is considered in some detail, and the relationship, which is one of creative tension among the three is discussed. He does not try to cover up abuses and failings in the Church, but admits to them frankly; in order to explain why they occur. The centrality of the Prophetical Office is demonstrated, although the key word regarding the relationship of the three offices to one another is interdependence, and the threefold nature of the Church, which he learnt from the Fathers, has been further developed in Catholic theology. This is despite: firstly, the fact that the argument does not attract the modern mind which considers the ruthless pursuit of truth for its own sake the highest of virtues, and has hardly questioned whether the human appetite for truth, in such matters as nuclear research or genetic engineering, needs the restraint of either authority or popular opinion; and secondly, the fact that the idea that tension and conflict in the Church could be beneficial, was not a popular one in the pre-conciliar Catholic Church, in which the view of Ullathorne prevailed: 'The Church was peace. They had a deep faith, they did not like to hear that anyone doubted.'
It must be borne in mind, however, that the preface is distinctly limited in places. Newman's incomplete treatment of the Priestly Office may well be explained by his desire to avoid controversy, as well as his desire to understand the Church as he encountered her, but his discussion of the Regal Office requires fuller comment.

With regard to the Regal Office, Newman appears to separate it from the other two. He discusses it as if it is 'the Papacy and its Curia' alone that exercise it, and when speaking of the papacy, gives the impression that it is only the Regal Office that it exercises, forgetting that at the beginning of the preface he noted that the pope has inherited all three offices. This gives the appearance that he is in favour of a type of papal absolutism. Furthermore, he fails to make the connexion between the rôle of the laity in the Priestly Office and their rôle in the Regal. More importantly, perhaps, he has no developed concept of collegiality, and makes no mention of the *ecclesia docens*. To use the image of the circle, Newman has failed to find the balance of the *ecclesia docens* with the *ecclesia discens* and with theology. He has excluded the laity, not discussed the rôle of the bishops in any detail, and has thereby diminished the ability of theology to act as the regulating principle. But this is hardly a fair reflection of his thought on the matter, and appears
to be the result of his desire to understand the Church exactly as he encountered her in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

There is, therefore, a certain amount of inconsistency in Newman's ecclesiology, but it is suggested here that this should not be looked upon as a major failing. Indeed the concept of collegiality was only just beginning to surface towards the end of the nineteenth century, and Newman did envisage some sort of institutional restraint upon the papacy. Rather, this inconsistency should be seen as an example of the creative tension he described as existing among the three offices of Christ, as exercised by His Church.

In other words, the tension that exists in Newman's ecclesiology, over the relationship of 'the Papacy and its Curia' to the bishops, and to the laity, acts as a spur to the contemporary theologian. It serves as a valuable reminder of the claims that have been made in the past for the successor of St. Peter, and challenges the theologian to find a way of reconciling the legitimate claims of both hierarchical authority and the freedom of an educated laity in the Church. The results of such research can be regarded as the fruits of the tension in Newman's thought, which parallels the creative tension he described as
Newman's Idea of the Church

existing among the three offices of Christ. His understanding of this relationship is a major achievement of the preface.
Trust the Church of God implicitly, even when your natural judgement would take a different course from hers, and would induce you to question her prudence or her correctness. Recollect what a hard task she has; how she is sure to be criticized and spoken against, whatever she does; recollect how much she needs your loyal and tender devotion. Recollect, too, how long is the experience gained in eighteen hundred years, and what a right she has to claim your assent to principles which have so extended and so triumphant a trial. Thank her that she has kept the faith safe for so many generations, and do your part in helping her to transmit it to generations after you.

Following the furore over 'On Consulting the Faithful', Newman withdrew from public life, and it was not until he was challenged by Charles Kingsley, as to whether he valued the truth for its own sake, that he re-entered the public arena. Newman's response to Kingsley came in the form of an apology, the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, published in 1864, in which he argued that truth had always been his motivating principle.

'After the appearance of the Apologia the power which Newman had lost was suddenly restored to him. English people generally were convinced of his integrity, and once more, whatever he said or wrote, he could be sure of a hearing.' Thus, when in 1865, Newman's former Oxford colleague, Edward Bouverie Pusey published The Church of England a Portion of Christ's One Holy Catholic Church, and a Means of Restoring Visible Unity. An Eirenicon, Newman's
Papal Infallibility

response, A Letter Addressed to the Rev. E.B. Pusey, D.D., on Occasion of his Eirenicon, was met with approval from English Catholics, including even his former opponent, Professor John Gillow, and Bishop Brown, by whom he had been delated to Rome in 1859.

In the Letter to Pusey, Newman dealt with the matter of the honours due to the Blessed Virgin Mary, but he left aside the question of infallibility. He had asserted his belief in both the infallibility of the Church and the Immaculate Conception in the Apologia, but having distanced himself from some extreme views which were held by some Catholics at the time, he let the matter rest. In addition, one of Newman's Oratorians, Ignatius Ryder, Manning's nephew, who was to succeed Newman as Superior of the Birmingham Oratory, was holding a public debate with W.G. Ward on the subject, the latter arguing that all doctrinal statements of the pope were infallible.

Neo-Ultramontanism

The middle of the nineteenth century saw a significant growth in Neo-Ultramontanism, as it has been termed since Ward and Butler. This movement is generally reckoned to have begun in France with the publication of the Count Joseph de Maistre's Du Pape in 1819. As Butler tells us, the book is a strong assertion of Bellarmine's
Papal Infallibility

Ultramontanism, and is concerned with the restructuring of French society after the French Revolution. De Maistre believed that a strong Christian State could only be re-established through a union of the papacy and the throne:

He starts from the idea of 'sovereignty', asserting that all sovereignty necessarily implies the acceptance in practice of the ultimate decision of authority, in whatever form of government, as being right, in the sense that it must be acted on, and so far forth is 'infallible' in practice: but in the case of the ultimate religious authority such practical infallibility necessarily becomes real infallibility in the full sense of the word. For him religion, Catholic religion, the Catholic Church, is the only stay of society and of an ordered civil and political system... and so he argues that the Pope must have on the spiritual side, and in a higher degree, the like position of authority, finality, power, jurisdiction, that he conceives the King to have on the side of temporals. The Pope is so necessary for the well-being of society and civil order, that if Christ had not instituted the papacy, it would be necessary to create it. A strong papacy is the great safeguard of Christian society; Christianity has no stability without the papacy. And so de Maistre took hold of and emphasized and developed the... monarchical position of the Pope, his universal jurisdiction and supreme authority over all, and his infallibility when teaching ex cathedra.15

In France, this movement was further developed in conjunction with Liberalism and democracy in temporal affairs by the Abbé de Lammenais, who by so doing,
practically reversed de Maistre's position making the papacy subservient to political ideals. To disseminate his views he started a paper, L'Avenir, and was assisted by the Count de Montalembert and the Abbe Lacordaire, until they recanted under pressure from Pope Gregory XVI. De Lammenais left the Church. Ultramontanism, however, was further popularized by Louis Veuillot, editor of the Univers, who strongly re-asserted Ultramontane principles. In England, Neo-Ultramontane opinion was greatly encouraged by the future Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, Henry Manning and his fellow converts F.W. Faber, the Superior of the Brompton Oratory, and W.G. Ward, the editor of the Dublin Review.

As Newman's former disciple Frederick Faber said:

Ultramontanism is the only really converting thing, because it is the only really generous thing. Rome must not be merely our Court of Appeal from a national episcopate. Rome must really govern, animate and inform things with its own spirit. Bless us and save us! We don't want another dose of Anglicanism with Tridentine doctrine: we want to be sensibly and perceptively Roman. Then we can all go to work cheerfully and manfully, and work our hearts out for souls, and die in our harness.

The Neo-Ultramontane desire for the centralisation of the government of the Church in Rome led also to much eulogising of the pope. This is well illustrated by an
address given by Mgr. Talbot at Ushaw College in 1858. He would tell the pope of the enthusiastic manner in which His Health had been drunk; and that in great St. Cuthbert's College He had many children devoted to Him and that he (Monsignor Talbot) had been present when 500 glasses were raised to drink His Health. (Loud Cheers) He would tell His Holiness that even himself - humble individual as he was - had been received with the greatest kindness and hospitality, and was treated with the greatest honours merely because he came from Him and was there His humble representative. (Tremendous cheering)."19

Pius IX, whose pontificate lasted from 1846 to 1878, was indeed an immensely charming, popular man, who could inspire great affection.20 He had, however, been turned into somewhat of a reactionary by his experience of Garibaldi's desire for the unification of Italy, which led to his imprisonment in the Quirinal and his escape, in disguise, from Rome in 1848, and which necessarily involved the loss of his own temporal power.21

That the mid-nineteenth century surge in Neo-Ultramontanism, which demanded the centralization of power in the Church in Rome, was as much a reaction to political events, as based in theology, is suggested by the events of 1863 and 1864.
Papal Infallibility

In a paper entitled 'The Past and Present of Catholic Theology', Ignaz von Döllinger, the historian and theologian, and the President of the Congress of Catholic Scholars, attacked the neo-scholastic theologians of the Vatican, arguing for the 'scientific' independence of the historian and the theologian, and claiming for them a role equivalent to that of a practical magisterium; he saw the problem of Tradition as purely one of history. In response, the Vatican issued what has become known as The Munich Brief (dated 21 December 1863; published 5 March 1864), which condemned Döllinger's views, to which it could have been predicted Pio Nono would not take kindly. After all, as Newman commented in a private note:

it must be recollected that certain German works have lately been put on the Index, for teaching doctrine inconsistent with the true interpretations of some of our dogmas, and explaining away the nature and character of Revelation.

Furthermore, Newman felt that the Munich Conference 'might be detrimental to faith and obedience', since the 'authority of the Church' had been questioned.

The Brief, however, was not intended merely to curb excesses; it also went some way towards curtailing the legitimate freedom of scholars, asserting that 'useful and certain' conclusions can only be reached if the fallible,
as well as infallible, teachings of the Church are venerated.\textsuperscript{26} To this, Newman’s reaction was fierce:

Does this mean that Newton cannot come to 'useful and certain' conclusions in physical astronomy because he is not a Catholic? does it mean that everyone in his investigations must beware of any conclusion which seems to impinge on revealed truth? which impinges on the letter of Scripture? The application of this principle is the important point.\textsuperscript{27}

To illustrate this, Newman commented that he understood Galileo’s error to be that he 'meddled with theology', rather than 'confined himself to scientific conclusions'. But the Brief, he felt, suggested that 'even men of science must keep theological considerations before them [when] investigating science.'\textsuperscript{28}

Later that same year, Pius IX issued two further attacks on modern scholarship and the modern world, namely the \textit{Syllabus of Errors} and the encyclical \textit{Quanta Cura}, which contained most of the opinions expressed in the \textit{Syllabus}, but in less extreme language.

The \textit{Syllabus} was a list of eighty errors arranged under ten headings. Some of the condemnations contained therein were perfectly reasonable, from a Catholic or Christian viewpoint, such as the condemnation of the
beliefs that God is merely nature; that religious truths are derived from the human reason; that Christianity contradicted reason; that Christ himself was a myth. The pope could hardly be expected to approve or tolerate such principles.

The Syllabus, however, also contained an onslaught on the modern world and modern political beliefs. This is illustrated by the attack on the views that a Catholic might dispute the pope's temporal power; that the pope could not use his temporal power; that Church should be separated from State; that the pope should reconcile himself to progress, liberalism and the modern world.29

A clear link can, therefore, be seen between the desire to centralise both government and theology in the Church, and political events. This link arose as an attempt to stave off the liberal, progressive, modern world, which given the opportunity would deprive the pope of his land and his temporal power, as well as undermine dogma and Revelation.

At the apex of this desire was the clamour for the definition of the pope's infallibility, which culminated in the calling of the First Vatican Council. Thus it is hardly surprising that 'the members of the doctrinal...
commission preparing for the Council were given various sections of the *Syllabus* to serve as the basis of a report.\textsuperscript{30} Herbert Vaughan, the former Oblate of St. Charles and future Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and the then editor of the *Tablet*, understood this connexion well, for when he edited *The Year of Preparation for the Vatican Council*, he reproduced the texts of the *Syllabus of Errors* and the encyclical *Quanta Cura* in the work.

Newman's lack of enthusiasm for the *Munich Brief*, the *Syllabus* and *Quanta Cura*\textsuperscript{31} was viewed with suspicion by his Neo-Ultramontane contemporaries. Thus Manning wrote, on 25 February 1866, in a now famous passage, that Newman has become the centre of those who hold low views about the Holy See, are anti-Roman, cold and silent, to say no more, about the Temporal Power, national, English, critical of Catholic devotions, and always on the lower side. I see no danger of a Cisalpine Club rising again, but I see much danger of an English Catholicism of which Newman is the highest type. It is the old Anglican, patristic, literary, Oxford Tone transplanted into the Church. It takes the line of deprecating exaggerations, foreign devotions, Ultramontanism, anti-national sympathies. In one word, it is worldly Catholicism, and it will have the worldly on its side, and will deceive many.\textsuperscript{32}

That being said, once a Catholic, Newman always shared certain of the Neo-Ultramontane tendencies. Obvious examples are his belief that the Catholic University in
Dublin would succeed because it was the pope's wish, and, towards the end of his active career, the affection he expressed for Pope Leo XIII:

I... have followed with great love and sympathy every act which the Papers have told us of him since his elevation. I only wish he was 10 years younger - that he is not, is his only fault.

**Vatican I and its Definition**

Originally the issue of papal infallibility was not to be debated at the council, but only that of papal primacy. Manning, among others, however, ensured, through various manoeuvres and manipulations, that the infallibility question would be discussed. This was certainly also the pope's wish.

The special deputation which was to receive and discuss proposed amendments to the schemata was supposed to consist of prelates of all shades of opinion. Instead, Manning secured a block-vote for or against a list of twenty-four names chosen by himself, all of whom he knew sympathised with his desire to see the infallibility of the pope defined and promulgated by the council. There was actually one inopportunist on the list, but this could not be prevented by Manning, since Archbishop Simor of Esztergom changed his mind once he arrived in Rome. Of this affair Bishop Ullathorne wrote:
Papal Infallibility

There has been much excitement and diplomacy among the Fathers about the election of the twenty-four for the special deputation on definitions of faith, and we English are not the only ones, though the chief ones, whose united wish, one excepted, has been outwitted by what everybody considers an intrigue.\textsuperscript{37}

The \textit{Vatican}, the supplement to the \textit{Tablet}, reported things rather differently:

Without any shadows of constraint, with no guide but his own judgement and conscience, each Father gave his vote, of which God alone was the witness, in favour of those whom he deemed to bear the immense responsibility delegated to them by the Collective Episcopate. And what was the result? Not a single name identified with, or as we should prefer to say, compromised by Gallican or Liberal principles, was selected. And even this fact, significant as it is, does not suffice to indicate the almost unanimous spirit which animates the Council.\textsuperscript{38}

Newman received several invitations to take part in the council. Towards the end of 1867, Bishop Dupanloup of Orléans asked Newman to attend the council as his theologian and renewed his request with urgency in November 1869. Pius IX also enquired, through Cardinal Caterni and Bishop Ullathorne, whether Newman would wish to be nominated as a consultor of the council, sitting on one of the preparatory commissions. In addition, the English Bishops Clifford and Brown\textsuperscript{39} put Newman's name forward as Consultor and theologian respectively.\textsuperscript{40} Newman, however,
declined all these invitations, and elected to remain in England. His reasoning can be seen in a memorandum he drew up on 14 October 1868, when he arrived at the conclusion that, 'There are some things that I can do - others I can't. I should, by accepting this invitation, lose my independence and gain nothing.'

Despite the fact that Newman was not taking part in the council as such, he was deeply involved in the controversy concerning the pope's infallibility. On 28 January 1870 he wrote to Ullathorne in Rome, strongly denouncing the scheming of those who were in favour of the definition of the pope's infallibility, describing them, in the now well-known phrase, as 'an aggressive insolent faction.'

Somehow the contents of this letter became public, and various quotations from it were published in the national press. After some confusion, Newman decided that the best thing would be to publish the letter in full, which he did. It gave him the opportunity to criticize publicly the Neo-Ultramontane views he opposed, while, on the face of things, merely saving himself from misquotation and backbiting.

This letter shows that even before the council, Newman
felt a definition of the pope's infallibility would be inopportune, despite the fact that he himself held that view as a private opinion. His opposition to the romanizing, autocratic views held by many bishops, and by the Holy See, which discounted the opinion of the laity, is also evident, as is his concern for those whose faith might be shaken by such a definition.

It is one of those strange ironies that several Neo-Ultramontanes invoked Newman's *Essay on Development* to bolster their case for a definition. 'It has been my fate to have my book attacked by various persons, praised by none - till at last it is used against me.'

At the council Archbishop Henry Manning was the 'Chief Whip' of the infallibilists. He organised a petition which demanded that the issue of papal infallibility be debated, and through the machinations mentioned above, ensured that the issue came to the fore, and despite various suggested compromises (e.g. that it should be declared that there was no right of appeal from a pope to a General Council, that it should be declared that the pope was infallible when he was acting on the advice of the whole Church, or that it should be held that it were the decisions of the pope that were infallible, not the pope himself), held firm for the pope's infallibility. In
fact, an extra clause was added, three days after the trial vote was taken on 13 July 1870, which maintained that papal decisions were 'irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.'

Archbishop Darboy, however, attempted to secure a last minute compromise. He and other bishops of the inopportunist minority would vote with the majority, provided that the new clause was dropped and another inserted, which stated that the Church and the bishops were not excluded from papal pronouncements. But this was rejected by the pope, with strong support from Manning and others.

The vote on the proposed dogma of papal infallibility took place during the last public session of the council on 18 July. More than eighty of the bishops, however, including Clifford, had already left Rome, after the pope had rejected Darboy's compromise. It appears that Pio Nono had no doubts about his own infallibility.

The definition of papal infallibility is contained in the fourth chapter of the document Pasteur Aeternus, which is the First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ:

Therefore faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the
beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Saviour of the Catholic Religion, and the salvation of Christian peoples, the Sacred Council approving. We teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in the discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals: and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church. But if anyone which may God avert presume to contradict this Our definition; let him be anathema.\(^5\)

Newman was pleased that the definition limited papal infallibility to 'faith and morals', and that it did not apply to politics, history and science also, which is undoubtedly what Manning *et al* wanted. But although he himself did not doubt the pope's infallibility,\(^5\) he did not accept it as dogma at once. It all depended on whether the dissentient bishops acted as a body and claimed that it was not a free council, or took further part in it, thereby giving tacit assent to its validity.\(^5\) At the beginning of August Newman wrote that he felt that it would still be legitimate to say: 'I have not yet enough information to accept the definition - I must suspend my judgement.'\(^5\)
For Newman, the validity of a definition as a dogma depended on the witness of the whole Church, as well as the initial, active role of the *ecclesia docens*. Here one can see consistency with the line of argument he had followed eleven years earlier in the 'Rambler Affair', as well as his reliance on St. Augustine’s dictum, *securus judicat orbis terrarum*, the importance of which to his thought can be seen in a note he made in 1866:

*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*

When we say that the Church infallibly protects herself, this means when regarded as a whole, and when she does so on principle. It need not be so as regards particular, undeliberate, and local acts. If, as now, she lays down by the mouth of her chief Pastor with the assent of a great number of Bishops, that the temporal power is at present necessary for the spiritual, we may well believe that she is stating a fact in providence <providential fact>, which it would be wrong to doubt. But this would not necessarily apply to such acts as of Paul III or Pius IV towards England; nor again to the conduct of Vigilius, Honorius, John XXII etc.

So, for Newman, in matters of infallibility the whole Church must act together. The pope and the *ecclesia docens* have the initial, active role in the definition of a dogma, but the views of the laity must also be ascertained. If this is not done, and a definition is not generally accepted by a large number of bishops, or the laity does
Papal Infallibility

not accept a definition (as in the Arian controversy), then the definition cannot be regarded as dogma. Newman argued that the definition of the Immaculate Conception was infallible, because the pope had consulted all the bishops, who had in turn ascertained the views of their flocks, i.e. the teaching office of the Church had consulted the witness of the whole Church, in which itself it is a co-witness.

As Dulles comments: 'Occasionally Newman borrowed from certain Continental theologians the distinction between the "active" infallibility of the hierarchical magisterium and the "passive" infallibility of the faithful. These terms, however, do not do justice to Newman's real thought on the matter. The laity, in deciding what they are bound to accept or reject, are in some sort active. Their instinct of faith is in its way, an authentic expression of the infallibility of the Church as a whole. In certain cases in which the pope or the bishops failed to teach, or taught wrongly, the sense of the faithful could serve as a corrective.'

This, of course, touches on the problem of 'reception'. It was Newman's view that 'the general acceptance, judgement of Christendom is the ultimate guarantee of revealed truth' i.e. it ratified it as authentic. It was not the subsequent reception that made
it so: 'Nor have I spoken of a subsequent reception by the Church as entering into the necessary conditions of a de fide decision.'

The doubts which Newman had about the requirement to accept the definition of the pope's infallibility as dogma faded, however, once it became clear that the dissentient bishops were prepared to accept it. He was pleased that ex cathedra had not been defined, which meant that, 'Really therefore nothing has been passed of consequence.'

Everything had been left so vague that he could not understand how Döllinger and others could set themselves against it, especially since it was quite clear that it was impossible for the pope or others to add to the Deposit of Faith, and that as a private person he may be a heretic. The state of affairs was summarised in a letter to Mrs. William Froude on 5 March 1871:

I have no hesitation in saying that, to all appearances, Pius ix wished to say a great deal more, (that is, that the Council should say a great deal more) than it did, but a greater Power hindered it. A pope is not inspired; he has no inherent gift of divine knowledge, but when he speaks ex Cathedra, he may say little or much, but he is simply protected from saying what is untrue. I know you will find flatterers and partizani such as those whom St. Francis de Sales calls 'the Pope's lackies' [sic] who say much more than this, but they may enjoy their own
Papal Infallibility

opinion, they cannot bind the faith of Catholics.\textsuperscript{45}

Newman also hoped that the Neo-Ultramontane emphasis on the pope, as opposed to the whole Church, would be curtailed by a new pope, who would hopefully 'trim the boat',\textsuperscript{66} in the same way as he had seen, in his study of the history of the Church, 'Popes continually completing the acts of their predecessors.'\textsuperscript{67} That being said, he felt great sympathy for Döllinger, whom he considered 'very cruelly'\textsuperscript{68} treated, and thought that people should be given time to accept the definition, even though the 'dogma seems to me as mildly framed, as it could be - or nearly so.'\textsuperscript{69}

\textit{Letter to the Duke of Norfolk}

Despite the fact that Newman's view of papal infallibility can be found in his many letters and theological papers, he made no public utterance on the subject, other than when he wrote to the \textit{Times}, insisting that infallibility did not mean impeccability;\textsuperscript{70} after the newspaper had denounced the concept of papal infallibility, citing papal approval of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572. It was not until January 1875 that Newman made his views public in \textit{A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation}.\textsuperscript{71}
In 1874 Gladstone wrote condemning the decree of papal infallibility by the Vatican Council, stating that Rome had substituted

for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and a change in faith; when she had refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused; when no one can become her convert, without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another; and when she has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient history.\(^7\)

'The "policy of violence and change in faith" was the view of the Council promulgated by Dollinger; the "modern thought" was the whole body of liberal opinion anathematized in the *Syllabus*; the "ancient history" was the proof that past popes had erred.'\(^3\) This was obviously an attack on Neo-Ultramontanism,\(^4\) but the notion of surrendering one's 'moral and mental freedom' on becoming a Catholic was particularly offensive (especially to some of Gladstone's Liberal colleagues such as Lord Emly), as well as inaccurate. Newman realised that this statement required an answer, and he saw in this the opportunity not only to prove Gladstone wrong, but also to attack the Neo-Ultramontanes, whose activities had pushed Gladstone into writing the offending article:

Gladstone's excuse is, I suppose, the extravagance of Archbishop
Manning in his 'Caesarism', and he will do us a service, if he gives us an opportunity of speaking. We can speak against Gladstone, while it would not be decent to speak against Manning.  

Newman tried to answer the article, but he found it hard going.  

Newman felt he could answer, but it was not until 23 November that his thoughts fell into place and the writing began to take proper shape and form. He felt that Gladstone had to be answered well, since 'a failure would be terrible'. This was a difficult task given Gladstone's 'rambling and slovenly' method of argument.

Despite the difficulties, Newman's Letter to the Duke of Norfolk was published in January 1875. Far from being a letter, it was a pamphlet containing one hundred and thirty-one pages of close print. In this, he rejected Gladstone's claim that it was impossible to be a good Catholic and a good countryman at the same time. This Gladstone attributed to a Catholic having no mental or moral freedom, but being at the beck and call of the pope's whims in political matters, as well as theological. He
regarded the failure of his Irish University Bill (which led to his eventual downfall) as due to the Catholic Church's pressure on Catholics in Ireland to oppose it. But, as Bastable remarks: 'It is not implausible to conclude that personal disappointment, deepened by his commitment to the Anglican thesis of religious nationalism, had led Gladstone to overstate his case. His vehemence sprang from a British sense of history and political common sense, without any pretension to theology which might have moderated his emotive conclusion.'

Newman believed Gladstone to be mistaken, and argued that the Irish Catholics had merely been exercising their democratic right to act as political pressure group in opposition to mixed education. In addition, he argued that Gladstone was wrong in thinking that the Syllabus of Errors, Quanta Cura or the Vatican decrees made the pope's political decisions binding on Catholics. Newman had an easy case to fight and won handsomely, with a magnanimity appreciated by the loser.

F. Kerr, however, has argued that Newman failed to answer Gladstone on his main point, viz. that 'the Vatican Council emboldened bishops to confront the State on behalf of the Church.' In fact, it is Kerr's view that Newman did nothing to withstand 'what would later be called
"creeping infallibility". This failure, he attributes to Newman's 'ultramontane conception of the eternal structure of the Church'.

But this criticism would seem to be unfair. Firstly, as will be shown, the Neo-Ul tramontanes were as much Newman's target in the Letter as was Gladstone. Secondly, in order to avoid criticism from Catholics, which would lessen the impact of the Letter, he had to be seen to be giving his full support to the Bishop of Rome. Thirdly, although Newman had no conception of collegiality, he did think that he did envisage institutional / structural limitation of the powers of the papacy. And fourthly, Gladstone's direct charge was that Catholics, as a result of the Vatican decrees, have no moral or mental freedom. This Newman ably contradicts.

The main thrust of the Letter, then, was an attack on the Neo-Ul tramontanes and the wish to make clear, 'that principle of minimizing so necessary, as I think, for a wise and cautious theology.' This, and Newman's desire to set out his own view of the Vatican decrees, is illustrated in the opening pages of the Letter, in which he wrote:

Catholics may in good measure thank themselves, and no one else,
Papal Infallibility

for having alienated from them so religious a mind. There are those among us, as it must be confessed, who for years past have conducted themselves as if no responsibility attached to wild words and over-bearing deeds; who have stated truths in the most paradoxical form, and stretched principles till they were close upon snapping; and who at length, having done their best to set the house on fire, leave to others the task of putting out the flame. The English people are sufficiently sensitive to the claims of the Pope, without having them, as if in defiance, flourished in their faces.88

It was the fault of the Neo-Ultramontanes that Gladstone had misunderstood Catholicism, and Newman was not slow in pointing this out! Conscience was the arbiter in the sphere of morality and politics, and although 'there are extreme cases in which Conscience may come into collision with the word of a Pope, and is to be followed in spite of that word',89 it was Newman's view that conscience could not come into direct conflict with either the Church's or the pope's infallibility. This is because conscience 'is not a judgement upon any speculative truth, any abstract doctrine, but bears immediately on conduct, or something to be done or not done', whereas infallibility 'is engaged on general propositions and in the condemnation of particular and given errors.'90

That being said, Finnis contends that Newman's 'argument here forgets that the actual conscience, being a
rational judgement about a particular option, is an application of rational... norms and principles of judgement - at the highest level, the principles understood and affirmed in the habitual conscience.'\textsuperscript{91} It is therefore possible, Finnis argues, for conscience to conflict with infallibility. This, however, would appear to be a somewhat strange argument, since it is precisely the distinction between 'actual' and 'habitual' conscience that, in practice, prevents a clash between conscience and infallibility.\textsuperscript{92}

A secondary argument is that when a 'Pope legislates or gives particular orders',\textsuperscript{93} conflict is possible, but contrary to Gladstone's opinion:

A Pope is not infallible in his laws, nor in his commands, nor in his administration, nor in his public policy. Let it be observed that the Vatican Council has left him just as it found him here.... What have excommunications and interdict to do with infallibility? Was St. Peter infallible on that occasion at Antioch when St. Paul withstood him? was St. Victor infallible when he separated from his communion the Asiatic Churches? or Liberius when in like manner he excommunicated Athanasius? And, to come to later times, was Gregory XIII., when he had a medal struck in honour of the Bartholomew massacre?... or Sextus V. when he blessed the Armada?... No Catholic ever pretends that these Popes were infallible in these acts. Since then infallibility alone could block the exercise of conscience, and the Pope is not infallible in that subject-matter in which
conscience is of supreme authority, no dead-lock, such as implied in the objection which I am answering, can take place between conscience and the Pope. 94

True conscience is the 'voice of God', not a 'creation of man', 95 but although its dictates are to be followed, one must be sure that one has attempted seriously to discover God's will:

Unless a man is able to say to himself, as in the Presence of God, that he must not and dare not, act upon the Papal injunction, he is bound to obey it, and would commit a great sin in disobeying it. 96

For this reason, Newman can say:

did the Pope speak against Conscience in the true sense of the word, he would commit a suicidal act. He would be cutting the ground from under his feet. His very mission is to proclaim the moral law, and to protect and strengthen that 'Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world'. 97

Newman's argument in the Letter that the pope was not infallible in political issues was not altogether popular with the Neo-Ultramontanes, who would like to have seen the Syllabus and Quanta Cura declared infallible at the Vatican Council. These men were again sharply castigated in the Letter, in which Newman wrote:

Now, the Rock of St. Peter on its summit enjoys a pure and
Papal Infallibility

serene atmosphere, but there is a great deal of Roman *malaria* at the foot of it. While the Holy Father was in great earnestness and clarity addressing the Catholic world by his Cardinal Minister, there were circles of light-minded men in his city who were laying bets with each other whether the Syllabus would 'make a row in Europe' or not... it was very easy to kindle a flame in the mass of English and other visitors at Rome which with a very little nursing was soon strong enough to take care of itself.\(^9\)

The passage may well just be a reference to the gamblers of Rome, but it is decidedly ambiguous and the reference to 'Roman *malaria*' was almost certainly aimed at the Neo-Ultramontanes.

Newman then went on to set out his own minimalist interpretation of the Vatican decree on the infallibility of the pope.\(^9\) Again, this view would have been despised by the Neo-Ultramontanes, who would like to have seen the pope infallible in all matters, and whom they regarded as being the very embodiment of Tradition.\(^1\)\(^0\) In this area of the work, Newman relied heavily on Bishop Joseph Fessler's *True and False Infallibility* (translated for him from the German by Fr. Ambrose St. John). Fessler was a Neo-Ultramontane, who had been Secretary General to the council, but his work actually set out a minimalist view of papal infallibility, and so Newman was able to use Fessler to give weight to his own views. He summarised the issue,
Papal Infallibility

stating that the pope only:

speaks *ex cathedra*, or infallibly, when he speaks, first, as the Universal Teacher; secondly, in the name and with the authority of the Apostles; thirdly, on a point of faith or morals; fourthly, with the purpose of binding every member of the Church to accept and believe his decision.

These conditions of course contract the range of his infallibility most materially. Hence [the eighteenth-century Dominican theologian Charles-Rene] Billuart speaking of the Pope, says, 'Neither in conversation, nor in discussion, nor in interpreting Scripture or the Fathers, nor in consulting, nor in giving his reasons for the point which he has defined, nor in answering letters, nor in private deliberations, supposing he is setting forth his own opinion, is the pope infallible,' t.ii.,p.110. And for this simple reason, because, on these various occasions of speaking his mind, he is not in the chair of the universal doctor.\textsuperscript{101}

In addition, the pope's infallibility, like that of a council, does not extend to physical sciences, the introductions or prefaces of infallible decisions, or teaching on faith or morals given in papal encyclicals.

Accordingly, all that a Council, and all that a Pope, is infallible in, is the direct answer to the special question which he happens to be considering; his prerogative does not extend beyond a power, when in his *Cathedra*, of giving that very answer truly.\textsuperscript{102}

Furthermore, for the definition to be infallible, the
Papal Infallibility

matter must be necessary for salvation. In such deliberations the pope is divinely assisted, not inspired, and he can only define, as a dogma, that which is already the faith of the Church. As in 'On Consulting the Faithful' the laity has a rôle to play, as witness to the faith.

A further limit on the infallibility of the pope is that his definitions have themselves to be interpreted. The body which is qualified to give the required expert interpretation is the Schola Theologorum. It is the collective judgement of the body of theologians which Newman wished to be applied to the definition. This interpretation was not in itself infallible, and neither were the theologians. In the jargon of our day we would say that Newman was keenly aware of the hermeneutical problem and the rôle of the theologians as a kind of "second magisterium."

Catholics in England received Newman's Letter to the Duke of Norfolk with delight. For Newman, the moment was particularly sweet, with compliments and praise from Archbishop Errington, Bishops Ullathorne, Clifford and Vaughan and Cardinal Cullen. It was a great triumph, and praise from the Catholic hierarchy was not something to which Newman was particularly accustomed. Propaganda, however, felt that certain objectionable passages were
Papal Infallibility

contained in the Letter, and wished that either Manning or Ullathorne would remonstrate privately with Newman. They refused, Manning reminding Rome that Newman was a good Catholic, that the Letter was a major triumph for Catholicism in England, and that Newman had successfully extinguished the controversy surrounding the Vatican Council (and indirectly the Syllabus). Thus, Newman's Letter to the Duke of Norfolk went without even private censure, and after all the disappointments of his life as a Catholic, John Henry Newman was triumphant.

Conclusion

In conclusion, then, Newman's view of papal infallibility is clear. That infallibility of which the pope is possessed, is the same as that which resides in the whole Church. The initial, active role is played by the pope (and the bishops), who may define a dogma, but this may only be done once the faith of the laity has been ascertained. The teaching office is a co-witness, in the witness of the whole Church to the faith, which must be reflected in the definition, and which cannot represent an addition to the Deposit of Faith. The teaching office is the judge of the extent and validity of this witness. In this, the pope is divinely assisted, not directly inspired, and infallibility applies only to ex cathedra statements. The pope only speaks ex cathedra, when he speaks as the
Universal Teacher, with the purpose of binding every member of the Church, in the name and with the authority of the Apostles, and on a point of faith or morals. In addition, once a dogma has been promulgated, it must be interpreted by the Schola Theologorum, whose interpretation is not infallible. Only the dogma itself is infallible; nothing which pertains to it can itself be considered infallible. Furthermore, for Newman, there can be no clash between infallibility and conscience. This is because they have different spheres of operation, and since correctly understood conscience is the voice of God, and is therefore to be followed, Catholics cannot be considered to be the moral and mental slaves of the pope.
CHAPTER 5

ROME, RIGHT OR WRONG? INFALLIBILITY EXAMINED

For myself, I did not call it inopportune, for times and seasons are known to God alone, and persecution may be as opportune, though not so pleasant as peace; nor, in accepting as a dogma what I had ever held as a truth, could I be doing violence to any theological view or conclusion of my own; nor has the acceptance of it any logical or practical effect whatever, as I consider, in weakening my allegiance to Queen Victoria.¹

It was generally accepted in 1875 that Newman had won the argument with Gladstone, and in later years Newman's interpretation of the decree of infallibility was to become a significant one in Catholic thought.² But the fact that his arguments sufficed for moderately minded Catholics in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and for some time thereafter, does not mean that they are immune from criticism, or that they should be regarded as the perennial statement of the powers of the pope. This is especially the case in the post-Vatican II Catholic Church, with its emphasis on collegiality, subsidiarity and ecumenical dialogue, and in which confusion still exists as to the roles of the papacy and the curia, as over and against the place of the laity and the academic freedom of Catholic theologians.

One of the fiercest debates raging at the time of the First Vatican Council was not only whether it was opportune or not to define the pope's infallibility, but whether the
Catholic Church could legitimately define an infallible teaching office at all. Within the Church this concern was highlighted by Ignaz von Döllinger (in his book *The Pope and the Council*, written under the pen-name of Janus), who was excommunicated in 1871 for refusing to accept the definition, and was later associated with the Old Catholic Movement. Outside the Catholic Church, non-Catholic concern was voiced by many national political leaders such as Bismarck and Gladstone, as well as by religious leaders. Another issue, raised at the council itself, was whether the pope is infallible or just the decisions he pronounces 'irreformable'. Neither of these debates is dead today, and it is therefore worth considering whether Newman accepts the concept of infallibility in the Church, or more specifically papal infallibility, too readily.

*Infallible? An Enquiry*

Probably the most famous Catholic critic, of modern times, of the concept of infallibility is Professor Hans Küng. It is his conviction that truth is preserved in the Church in spite of possible error, and his contention that the case for the dogma of infallibility based on Scripture and tradition is plainly as meagre as it is brittle.

Küng begins his critical questioning by noting that
Vatican I did not claim that either the pope or the council had been granted a new Revelation. As such, since the council described the definition of papal infallibility as a divinely revealed dogma, it must be possible to find witness to that dogma in the Deposit of Revelation. Arguments from Scripture and Tradition used by the council to validate its definition must therefore be examined. This Kung does.

It is remarked that in the whole chapter of Pastor Aeternus devoted to infallibility there is only one quotation from Scripture (Luke 22:32) and one indirect reference to Matthew 16:18. While he believes that this gives backing to some sort of Petrine ministry, Kung questions 'the historical legal succession of a papal teaching office with a claim to infallibility.'

To prove that such an office is a legitimate development from Scripture, Kung argues that the following would have to be proved:

1. That Luke 22:32 (as well as Matt. 16:18 and John 21:15) refer to a teaching office. But infallibility is not mentioned. A man whose faith does not 'cease' (that is the literal translation) is not necessarily immune from error in detail; and an individual who is by no means infallible (for example, Peter) can in fact strengthen his brothers in faith.
2. That in these passages it is not just Peter who is
addressed, but his successors also. But successors are not mentioned.

3. That the Bishop of Rome is such a successor. In relation to the infallible teaching office, this creates [great difficulties].

Küng cannot find a proof for the above either in his own thought or in the 'Roman textbooks', which he regards as woefully inadequate. Nor, in his view, does Vatican I provide sufficient evidence for supposing that Luke 22:32 is concerned not only with stability in faith, but with infallible propositions.

For Küng, the definition of papal infallibility by Vatican I cannot be sustained by reference to Tradition either. This is because, he argues, the 'primacy texts' were not used during the first eight centuries, in either the East or the West, to lay claim to an infallible teaching office, which was the possession of the Roman Pontiff, despite the various claims of primacy made on his behalf. Hence:

This explains why the Vatican I definition of infallibility is supported by such meagre references to tradition.

Tradition is invoked in the document *Pastor Aeternus*, by the use of the following phrase at the beginning of the chapter on papal infallibility, to assert the Roman
Pontiff's primacy of teaching:

This the Holy See has always held, the perpetual usage of the Church confirms and the ecumenical councils have declared.\textsuperscript{21}

This phrase must be investigated to find out whether history substantiates it and to see whether or not such a tradition is in line with the Scriptures. Küng is surely right in pointing out that such a tradition must be examined critically to see if it is a development in line with, contrary to, or outside of the Gospel:\textsuperscript{22}

Its existence in practice, and often its juridical validity, in no way legitimises it from the gospel point of view.\textsuperscript{23}

An historical survey is then undertaken.\textsuperscript{24} In this the excommunication of Pope Vigilius\textsuperscript{25} in 553 at Constantinople is recorded and it is maintained that the Roman claim to orthodoxy was not interpreted as infallibility. The ninth century forgery of the Decretals of the Pseudo-Isidore is mentioned, and it is shown how they were used by St. Thomas Aquinas (without realising that they were not genuine), in his \textit{Contra errores Graecorum}, to inflate vastly the position of the Bishop of Rome, according to him all manner of powers.\textsuperscript{26} St. Thomas then carried this work over into his \textit{Summa Theologiae},\textsuperscript{27} in which he made the connexion between the primacy texts and
the exalted position of the Roman Pontiff in his *Contra errores Graecorum*. Küng then argues that it was not until the thirteenth century, following the work of Aquinas and the positions assumed by popes such as Boniface VIII in *Unam Sanctam*, that the Roman See, and hence the Roman Pontiff, was regarded as possessing dogmatic teaching authority. This, he says, is despite the fact that the Roman Church was much admired for the stand it took on doctrinal issues, as against the Gnostics, Marcionites and Montanists, or later during the time of St. Ambrose and St. Augustine, and thereafter. Küng also maintains that although ecumenical councils made no doctrinal decisions without or against the pope, they did this on their own authority, not his, since they were neither summoned nor led by him. Küng's summary of the matter is that Papal exaggeration of the teaching authority in theory and practice can quote proved forgeries and decretals based on them in its favour, as well as theological arguments based on those decretals, but it cannot rely on Scripture or on the earliest ecumenical tradition of the Church of the first millennium.

Küng then gives his attention to the conciliar texts mentioned in the fourth chapter of *Pastor Aeternus*. The first council referred to is the Fourth Council of Constantinople (869-70). He points out that there was no mention of infallibility at this council, and that the
Infallibility Examined

Bishop of Rome was not mentioned, just his See. Furthermore, he notes that it was formally annulled some years later and did not carry any weight in the West until the second half of the eleventh century, at the time of the Gregorian Reform, when the final breach with the East took place. The two other councils referred to are the Council of Lyon (1274) and the Council of Florence (1439). Both of these, according to Kung, were Roman councils designed to impose Roman primacy on the Greeks, and again he highlights the fact that there was no mention of infallibility at either of these councils. In his book *The Council and Reunion*, however, Kung accepts the Council of Lyon as ecumenical, thus allowing its decrees considerable authority.

This particular section of Kung's argument, however, appears to be misconceived, since the very Neo-Ultramontanes would have granted that no previous council had defined infallibility. This is why, for them, it was necessary to define it at Vatican I. The purpose of citing previous councils would have been to show on what basis the decree of infallibility rested, e.g. the defined primacy of the Roman Pontiff, which Kung himself accepts.

In the light of his work, Kung then asks why, in spite of all the obvious problems which he sees with a definition
of papal infallibility, did the Fathers of Vatican I go ahead? The answer he gives is because they did not need to be convinced that the pope is infallible. They believed that in any case. This view is surely correct, as can be seen from the texts of the discussions at the council, which show that most of the minority were not concerned with whether the pope is infallible, but with whether it was opportune or not to define his infallibility as a dogma. This, of course, also holds true of Newman. If Küng is right, then Newman's understanding of papal infallibility is under serious threat, and it would be no wonder that the Fathers at Vatican I used such generalizations as 'this the Holy See has always held' and 'this the perpetual usage of the Church confirms'.

Newman's view of the 'primacy texts' as unfulfilled prophecy has already been discussed. In response to Küng, it can be stated that he did not regard them as being sufficient to prove papal infallibility to so high a degree as to warrant its formal definition as a dogma. As Francis Sullivan points out, he did not draw that meaning from them in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, but merely describes papal infallibility 'as the fruit of a growing insight into their meaning'.

What has the long history of the contest for and against the
Infallibility Examined

Pope's Infallibility been, but a growing insight through the centuries into the meaning of those three texts, to which I have referred, ending at length by the Church's definitive recognition of the doctrine thus gradually manifested to her?42

This view of the texts is further illustrated by the fact that he was prepared to suspend his judgement on whether one had to accept the definition of Vatican I or not until the dissentient bishops had made their views known.43 On 27 July 1870 he wrote to Ambrose St. John:

But there are other means by which I can be brought under the obligation of receiving a doctrine as dogma, that is, as part of the faith necessary to salvation.

For instance, if I am clear that it is in Scripture, as that Baptism is the initiatory rite of Christian Discipleship - or again that it is in primitive and uninterrupted tradition, as the Divinity of our Lord. Or when a high probability, drawn from Scripture or tradition, is partially or probably confirmed by the Church. Thus a particular Catholic might be so nearly sure that the promises to Peter in Scripture proved that the Infallibility of Peter is a necessary dogma, as only to be kept from holding it as such, by the absence of any judgement on the part of the Church - so that the present unanimity between Pope and 500 Bishops, even though not sufficient to constitute a formal synodal act, would at once put him in the position, and lay him under the obligation of receiving the dogma, as a dogma, i.e. with its anathema.44

As Newman states later in the letter, he personally accepted the doctrine since he could find nothing to
Infallibility Examined

contradict it, and because it had been defined by a legitimate superior. The letter to Ambrose St. John shows quite clearly that he found the arguments from Scripture convincing but not overwhelming. This, however, is not a problem unique to the doctrine of papal infallibility, but concerns, among others, the doctrines of the Trinity and the Homoousion, and Newman had already dealt with this issue to his own satisfaction in the Essay on Development. Kung, however, provides no rigorous exegesis of the primacy texts, but merely rejects neo-scholastic text-book theology. This is surely a serious weakness in his argument.

Regarding the authority and role of history in such matters, Newman wrote in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk:

For myself, I would simply confess that no doctrine of the Church can be rigorously proved by historical evidence; but at the same time that no doctrine can be simply disproved by it. Historical evidence reaches a certain way, more or less, towards a proof of the Catholic doctrines; sometimes it goes only so far as to point in their direction; sometimes there is only an absence for a conclusion contrary to them; nay, sometimes there is an apparent leaning of the evidence to a contrary conclusion, - in all cases there is a margin left for the exercise of faith in the word of the Church.

This, then, is what Newman is doing, exercising his
faith in the word of the Church whose convert he became in 1845.

Newman also provides a more detailed historical survey of the early centuries, than does Küng, and if one accepts the hypothesis of development, it is quite possible to detect the beginnings of the modern papacy in the first few centuries. Briefly, in the first three centuries, one might mention the following: the development of the threefold ministry in the later books of the New Testament; Clement of Rome's letter to Corinth in AD 96; St. Ignatius of Antioch's address to 'the Church, which has in dignity the first seat, of the city of the Romans'; St. Polycarp of Smyrna who had recourse to the Bishop of Rome on the question of Easter; St. Irenaeus who spoke of Rome as 'the greatest Church, the most ancient, the most conspicuous, and founded and established by Peter and Paul', who appealed to its tradition in preference to that of other Churches, and declared that 'to this Church, every Church, that is, the faithful from every side must resort [or] must agree with it'; and St. Cyprian who described Rome as 'the See of Peter and the principal Church, whence the unity of the priesthood took its rise.... whose faith has been commended by the Apostles, to whom faithlessness can have no access'. In the fourth and fifth centuries the rôle of the Bishop of Rome became more obvious. So, for example,
St. Julius (AD 342) wrote to the Eusebian party remonstrating with them for 'proceeding on their own authority as they pleased [and then] desiring to obtain concurrence in their decisions, though we never condemned [Athanasius]. Not so have the constitutions of Paul, not so have the traditions of the Fathers directed; this is another form of procedure, a novel practice.... For what we have received from the blessed Apostle Peter, that I signify to you; and I should not have written this, as deeming that these things are manifest unto all men, had these proceedings not disturbed us.' As Newman comments: 'St. Athanasius, by preserving this protest, has given it his sanction', and its importance was also noted by Socrates, who wrote that 'Churches ought not to make Canons beside the will of the Bishop of Rome.' Of Pope Damasus, St. Jerome declared, 'I speak with the successor of the fisherman and the disciple of the Cross. I, following no one as my chief but Christ, am associated in communion with thy blessedness, that is, with the See of Peter. I know that on that rock the Church is built.' In the fifth century, the most obvious example of the Bishop of Rome exercising a doctrinal teaching authority is Pope Leo's intervention at Chalcedon in AD 451.5

It is true, that in recent years, this view of the origins of the ordained ministry within the Church, and the
role of the Bishop of Rome, have been questioned, e.g. by E. Schillebeeckx in *The Church with a Human Face: A New And Expanded Theology Of Ministry*.

Such approaches, however, drive a significant wedge between the Gospel message and its corporate bearer, the Church. It seems little credible to suggest, in the light of the principle of oversight in the synagogue and at Qumran, that the first preachers of the Gospel, which is itself the announcement of both the fulfilment of the Law and the advent of the Messiah, would not have put some, at least semi-formal, structures in place to ensure the survival, and easy and authoritative proclamation of the message. In other words, the Gospel message implies the form of the Gospel community, and those accounts which seek to divorce the two, seem not to do justice to the apostles' conception of the importance of their task.

It might at this point be objected that this is an uncritical use of the historical sources, which places them into a neat, preconceived scheme. In response, it would seem reasonable to say that history involves a judgement as how best to view the evidence. The evidence of the New Testament and the early centuries of the Church, to use Newman's phrase, points in a certain direction. One might accept the hypothesis of development as the only way to account for the apparent growth and variation in doctrine.
found in the Church, without subscribing to a theory of continuing Revelation. If so, it is a legitimate use of the imagination to attempt to schematize the evidence in such a manner as to see whether traces of developments, which came to fruition in later centuries, can be found earlier.

A further argument advanced by Künig in his criticism of the proponents of the concept of infallibility is that it is not proven that faith is dependent on infallible propositions, that is statements, propositions, definitions, formulations and forms of words that are not only de facto not erroneous, but in principle cannot be erroneous.54

It is, of course, clear that the faith of the Church is dependent upon propositions of faith (whether expressions of faith in Christ or polemical, self-defensive demarcations from heretics).55 Künig, however, argues that it is not necessarily the case that these statements of faith, binding as they are, are infallible.56 His view is that although dogma does develop, Christianity does not rely on the deliberate development of dogma, and that that which has been defined is the minimum, not the maximum, that must be believed.57 As such, he would agree with Newman that dogmatic definitions are not 'luxuries of
In Künng's opinion, Christianity depends on

the common view of all Christian Churches at all times that
faith grows and develops by the sound proclamation of the
Gospel, and correct administration of the sacraments, prayer,
love, suffering, the individual's acquisition of knowledge.

The question does arise, however, whether Christianity
itself does not require some dogmas to be recognised, not
only as binding, but also as infallible. Künng's response
is that this cannot merely be assumed, but must be
demonstrated, and it is his contention that this has not
been done. To substantiate this he cites the arguments
discussed earlier, i.e. that lack of scriptural support for
this in Pastor Aeternus and the inability of neo-scholastic
textbook theology to
demonstrate from Scripture or the oldest ecumenical tradition
either the necessity or the reality or merely the possibility of
propositions that are a priori infallible. It merely asserts
that the promises that according to Scripture were given to the
Church necessarily assume the existence of infallible
propositions, but fails to exclude the alternative possibility,
namely that the promises given to the Church hold good in the
absence of such infallible propositions.
Infallibility Examined

Newman, however, did not just assume the existence of infallibility. His argument was that, given the fact of doctrinal development, there was a high antecedent probability of it.

The discussion will now be divided into two. Küng's rejection of infallibility per se will be examined first, and then his attack on infallible propositions.

Firstly, then, it is Küng's view that the best step forward is to dispose of the term 'infallibility', and to replace it with a term which much more nearly reflects what he sees as the true development from Scripture and the oldest ecumenical tradition. The promise made by God to His Church is explained by him thus:

however dangerously the Church may deviate in detail, though like Israel it may ever succumb to doubt and hesitation and sometimes err and go astray, he will 'be with you for ever, that Spirit of truth' (Jn. 14:16-7). The Church will not succumb to the power of lies. Because of God's promise, we know that she is undeceivable: infallibility, undeceivability, is bestowed on her by God's promise. In spite of all errors and misunderstanding, it is kept in the truth by God.

For 'infallibility' Küng suggests 'the term "perpetuity" in the truth or 'indefectibility', a concept to which the Anglican Newman also subscribed. This
Infallibility Examined

theory, however, is just as supernaturalistic as the notion of infallibility, since underlying both theories is the idea of Divine Providence.

Furthermore, as Rahner and Vorgrimler have pointed out:

The historical limitations attaching to a dogma do not mean that the Church's infallibility should be interpreted in such a manner as if God guaranteed merely an eschatological remaining in the truth on the part of the Church while dogmas proclaimed by the Church's teaching authority or statement in Scripture could always be wrong. Remaining in the truth is also realized in the propositions; the final fundamental decision by man that by the grace of God places him in the truth is always and inevitably expressed in true statements. The Church as a tangible entity would not remain in the truth if the objective expression of this remaining in the truth, and therefore its own statements of belief as the concrete form of this remaining in the truth, were wrong. Because of the unity and the still continuing history of human thought and awareness every human statement is of course exposed to misunderstanding, capable of interpretation, in need of development, and so on. But the truth of statements or propositions is not a purely supplementary delineation of the original truth and reality. Instead the realization of the truth of statements or propositions itself realizes that more basic and original truth which ultimately is God's revelation of himself in grace to man.\textsuperscript{57}

In addition, Küng seems to be forgetting that the
Catholic Church, like all Christian Churches, claims to teach the truth. In doing this, there is, arguably, an inherent claim to infallibility. Without it the Christian Churches would be teaching a collection of probabilities which they understood to be true. Furthermore, infallibility is not a personal property of the pope, which attaches to his every statement; a fact acknowledged by Vatican I. One cannot but agree with Künig when he says that it is God who is infallible, not man, but Vatican I teaches that although it is legitimate to speak of 'papal infallibility', it is only in a very specialized sense that the gift of infallibility can be regarded as personal.

Secondly, it is Künig's view that it is impossible to have infallible propositions because of the difficulty of attaining 'definitive clarity in those propositions'. But Künig's fire is misdirected. Vatican I was not concerned with infallible propositions, but with 'irreformable definitions'. Insofar as the former expression is philosophical and theological, and the latter is juridical, Künig's questioning of the former leaves the latter untouched. Certainly he deserves some credit for his attack on a widespread misconception of Vatican I, but unfortunately, his imprecision means that he missed the opportunity of advancing the critical understanding of infallibility. An irreformable definition is one which, by
Infallibility Examined

definition, cannot be an error, but the understanding of this definition, unlike that of an infallible proposition, as Küng seems to use the term, can be deepened and widened, i.e. developed. Such an understanding of definitive doctrinal pronouncements would seem to allow for some deviation in detail, which Küng thinks inevitable, especially when one takes into account the four-fold conditioning of dogma outlined in Mysterium ecclesiae (the response of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to Küng's criticisms, although he is not mentioned by name).

The four factors in this historical and cultural conditioning of doctrinal statements are: the limited context of human knowledge in which they are framed; the specific concerns which motivated the definitions; the changeable conceptions of a given epoch; and the expressive power of language used at a given time. Such an understanding is an accord with Newman's belief that any ex cathedra statement must be interpreted by the schola theologorum.

Moreover, Küng seems to be confused over the exact teaching of Vatican I. It did not assign infallibility to particular propositions or statements, but, albeit in a specialized sense, to the pope, whom Pastor Aeternus
describes as being 'possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wished his Church to be provided'.

As Newman wrote in the *Grammar of Assent*:

A certitude is directed to this or that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a disposition of mind relatively to a definite case which is before me. Infallibility, on the contrary, is just that which certitude is not; it is a faculty or gift, and relates, not to some one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a given subject-matter.

Thus, for Newman, infallibility is a faculty, and it is through the exercise of this faculty that 'certitude', or in Künig's expression 'definitive clarity', can be attained in individual propositions.

A further factor that seems to influenced Künig's views is that he stands in the Swiss-German tradition of antipathy towards Rome, following the Reformers, the Old Catholics and other scholars such as Harnack (1851-1930), Werner (1887-1964) and Bultmann (1884-1976). In his treatment of the dialogue between the Old Catholics and Rome, Künig appears to take the view that the Old Catholics are right. Like him, they accept the doctrine of papal primacy, but reject the notion of infallibility, and like
Döllinger, Kün's views regarding the papacy seem to have been shaped by its treatment of him. In the forward to his book Kün writes:

No imprimatur will be sought for this book; not because it is not intended to be Catholic, but because - as we hope - it is Catholic without it. In recent years the imprimatur has become increasingly meaningless. It did not prevent my book The Church becoming involved in Roman inquisitionary proceedings which have not yet closed.... We know from experience that in many cases the imprimatur in practice means precensorship of one theological school by another, and its abolition has long been a matter of urgency.... But in the contemporary world the free expression of opinion is a basic human right that cannot be denied even to a Catholic theologian in the ecclesial community when he is striving after the truth of the Church's proclamation.\(^7\)

Perhaps this is a case of 'Döllinger redivivus', and it is tempting to think that had Newman's views gained more acceptance earlier it would have been unnecessary.

In summary, then, Kün has forced Catholic theologians to take the issues of infallibility and papal primacy seriously.\(^7\) The necessity of drawing out its foundation in Scripture and Tradition is underlined, and through his attack on infallible propositions, he has highlighted the use of the word 'irreformable' by both Vatican Councils to describe definitive doctrinal statements. While the
polemical nature of his argument leads him to take extreme positions, he has nevertheless forced Catholic theology to produce a convincing and rational defence of infallibility, and it is suggested here, that Newman's work on this issue is a significant aid in this task.80

Papal Infallibility?

It has been argued above that Vatican I did not speak of infallible propositions, but irreformable definitions, and defined that the Church's infallibility is capable of exercise by the pope. That the pope is in some sense infallible, has, however, been challenged, and so it is now necessary to examine whether Newman was right in considering the pope to be infallible, as well as the decisions he pronounces irreformable. The view that the pope is not infallible is taken by Garrett Sweeney, in his essay 'The forgotten council'.81 From the notes it would appear that the essay is also intended to be a partial answer to Professor Küng's views on the matter.

Sweeney points out that Pastor Aeternus does not mention 'papal infallibility', or state that the pope is infallible. The title is in fact, 'On the infallible teaching office of the Roman Pontiff', not 'On the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff', which would have been the title if it had not been strongly opposed by the
Infallibility Examined

Council Fathers. The title was changed so as not to give the impression that infallibility is a quality which is personally possessed by popes as private persons.

An analysis of the definition is then undertaken:

The first part is explanatory, leading up to and giving reasons for (ideoque) the second, which is so formulated as to be a condemnation (in its own terms) of the fourth Gallican Article of 1682: 'therefore the definitions of the said Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not by reason of the agreement of the Church.'

Such definitions are irreformable, according to Pastor Aeternus, because 'the Roman Pontiff is in possession of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wished his Church to be provided'. Furthermore, the document states that it can be known that it is the infallibility of the Church that is operating in the pope at such times 'by reason of the divine assistance promised to him in the person of Peter.' Hence Sweeney's conclusion:

Such were the terms and the structure of the definition. When the Fathers said that papal definitions were irreformable they meant precisely that and nothing more - the definitions were irreformable, not the Pope infallible; when they said that this irreformability was due to the infallibility Christ gave to the Church they meant what they said - not that it was due to something described as 'papal infallibility'.

201
According to Sweeney, therefore, the serious question that needs to be answered, is not what makes the pope infallible, but why it is that papal definitions are irreformable. The reason for this he identifies as the promises made by Jesus to St. Peter:

If we want to know why papal definitions are irreformable, it is because our Lord said so: when it fell to him to 'confirm' his brethren, Peter's faith would not fail.86

So, for Sweeney, the pope is not infallible. His decisions are irreformable, but this is due to the infallibility of the Church. In fact, he regards the Church as full of infallibility, because every authentic expression of faith must be infallible, since it derives ultimately from the Holy Spirit. The question is how to distinguish authentic expressions of faith from false. The answer is that the Holy See has the final say,87 and this leads to Sweeney's final remarks about infallibility:

Every genuine act of faith is infallible, proceeding from the Holy Spirit. If in accordance with the Johannine injunction, the faithful have to 'test the spirits to see whether they are of God', they will find true faith in the unanimity of the whole Church. Failing this, they must look for unanimity in the episcopate. If this in turn should fail them, let them turn to the Holy See, for Christ has promised that on such occasions the faith of the successor of St. Peter would be a faith formed by the Holy Spirit.88
Infallibility Examined

Thus the criticism that can be made of Newman's understanding of papal infallibility, from Sweeney's viewpoint, is that Newman has not taken sufficient notice of the debates of Vatican I or the text of Pastor Aeternus. If he had done so, he would have seen that the council did not define papal infallibility, but that papal definitions are of themselves irreformable, and that this irreformability is due to the infallibility which Christ willed to His Church, not to so-called 'papal infallibility'.

As an interpretation of the documents of Vatican I, however, Newman's understanding is surely better than Sweeney's, and this for two reasons: firstly, Sweeney uses the term 'infallibility' with such frequency as to make it almost meaningless. It seems to make the technical use of the word as meaningful as the proverbial Scottish professor makes 'divinity', when saying that he would not deny the divinity of any man; and secondly, his refusal to link the phrase 'the Roman Pontiff is in possession of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed the Church to be provided' to the concept of papal infallibility would appear to be erroneous. His argument is a non sequitur. In fact, Bishop Gasser, in his exposition on 11 July 1870, as spokesman of the Deputation De Fide, in which he explained the proposed definition to
the assembled prelates, does make that self-same connexion:

In what sense is the Pope's infallibility personal? It is personal in that it belongs to the Roman Pontiff, not to the Roman Church, or the Roman See. The infallibility is personal in so far as it belongs to each legitimate occupant of the Roman See. But it is not personal as belonging to the Pope as a private person or private doctor. So we do not speak of personal infallibility although we attribute it to the person of the Roman Pontiff, not as an individual person, the Head of the Church in his relation to the universal Church. Nor is the Pope infallible simply as Pope, but as subject to the divine assistance guiding him. For as Pope he is always the supreme judge in faith and morals, and the father and teacher of all Christians; but he enjoys the divine assistance, whereby he cannot err, only when really and actually (reipsa and actu) exercising the office of supreme judge in controversies of faith, and teacher of the universal Church. Therefore the sentence, 'The Roman Pontiff is infallible', is not to be blamed as false, because Christ promised it to the person of Peter and the person of his successor; but only as incomplete, as the Pope is only infallible when by his solemn judgement he defines matters of faith or morals for the universal Church.

In other words, the pope himself is infallible 'in special conditions' and using a 'special power' (i.e. when speaking *ex cathedra*), but is not infallible as a private person.

This interpretation of papal infallibility, which was almost unanimously accepted and voted for by the Council
Fathers, and so on Sweeney's definition must be regarded as irreformable, is closer to Newman's understanding than to Sweeney's.

As an interpretation, therefore, of the definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican Council, and as a criticism of Newman's understanding of the issue, Sweeney's arguments appear to be incomplete. He is correct in understanding the Church's infallibility to give rise to irreformable definitions, but his refusal to acknowledge infallibility, in some very limited sense, as personal is erroneous. Thus, it would seem that he is right in what he affirms, but mistaken in what he denies. Nor do his views deal with the criticisms raised by Küng, since Sweeney hardly mentions Church Tradition, and cites only one verse from Scripture in his argument. Furthermore, when he cites that verse, he makes no attempt to explain by what hermeneutical principle he can link it to the Bishop of Rome, or to the concept of infallibility.

Conclusion

In conclusion, then, it would appear that Newman does not accept the concept of infallibility in the Church, or papal infallibility, too readily. In his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, he sets forth a theory of Revelation, in which he argues that Scripture must be
interpreted in the context of Tradition, so that the history of doctrinal developments may be correctly understood. Viewing the promises made by Christ to St. Peter as 'unfulfilled prophecies', and bearing in mind the unity and indivisibility of an idea, he is able to demonstrate their fulfilment in the fourth and subsequent centuries AD. He also shows how in Tradition St. Peter became identified with the Bishop of Rome. A strong case is made for the necessity of an infallible teaching office, and the rôle of the pope as a means by which this infallibility is exercised. Newman has thus provided a principle by which the 'primacy texts' can be linked to the Bishop of Rome, and established the necessity of an infallible teaching office. As far as his acceptance of papal infallibility is concerned, Newman is correct to understand the conciliar texts of Vatican I to relate to the Bishop of Rome personally, rather than his ex cathedra pronouncements, which are correctly called irreformable.

To summarize this section. In the first chapter, it was noted that Newman had a formal theory of development worked out about three years before scholars have previously thought; the rôle of this in his conversion to Catholicism is discussed, and it is argued that his reception into the Catholic Church was as much the result of intellectual honesty, as it was of disillusion with the
Infallibility Examined

Church of England. Then, in chapter 2, the Essay on Development, the intellectual defence of his conversion is examined. Various criticisms of the Essay are considered, but it is concluded that Newman's work stands up to scrutiny. The developmental concept of Revelation outlined in the Essay, necessitated for Newman a particular understanding of the Church and her teaching office; his understanding of this is analysed in chapters 3 and 4. Recent criticisms of the dogma of infallibility are then considered in chapter 5.

Throughout, several themes have been stressed: the need for a developmental concept of Revelation, based on the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, in order to understand the history of doctrine; that such a view of Revelation, which places great emphasis on Divine Providence, necessitates an infallible teaching authority; that the Church is the corporate interpreter of Scripture and bearer of Tradition; the importance of an organic partnership between clergy and laity if the Church, and her teaching office in particular, is not to be severely impaired; and that tension between interdependent groups or disciplines may be beneficial.

The next stage in the argument will be to compare Newman's views, as set out above, with the relevant
documents of the Second Vatican Council. The purpose of this is twofold: firstly, to define precisely the degree to which Newman can be said to have anticipated the teaching of that council; and secondly, to further the argument for Newman's continued significance for theology, particularly Catholic theology, in the late twentieth century.
Now after a hundred years, we have had another Council, marked like the first by the emergence of two broadly contrasting wings of opinion and aim. But this time, it is those who can be considered the heirs of the Neo-Ultramontanes who have constituted the minority, and have been forced back on their defences.... The tide has been turned, and a first, immensely important, step has been taken towards the vindication of all the main theological, religious and cultural positions of the former Fellow of Oriel.  

The Second Vatican Council promulgated the 'Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation', after three years of hard debate and redrafting, on 18 November 1965. The issue of Revelation had occasioned much conflict among the Fathers at the council. On the one hand there were those who viewed truth merely in a static way, who denied the personalist element of Revelation, and were committed to defending it against those who, on the other hand, were in favour of the ideas of change and development. The former attitude was typified by the title of a draft document on Revelation: 'On preserving the deposit of faith in its purity'. Those who held the latter view 'were convinced that the Catholic Church needed a credible account of how God's Word acts in history, from the first formulation in human language through the gradual process of understanding, under changing historical conditions and as the Holy Spirit gives new insights.' In the end such a
text was approved by a large majority of the Council Fathers. It shall be referred to here by its Latin title, *Dei Verbum* ('the Word of God'), not only because that is the usual custom with Vatican documents, but because this far more incisive title sets the tone for the constitution as a whole. In Latin, it is the Word of God that stands first, the object of the Church's *listening* and then proclamation: 'Hearing the Word of God with reverence, and proclaiming it with faith...' This shows that the first duty of the Church is to listen to the Word of God and then to proclaim it, thus immediately setting aside any notion that the Church has 'control' over Revelation.

The prologue also makes the connexion between the Second Vatican Council and the Council of Trent and Vatican I: 'Following, then in the steps of the Council of Trent and Vatican I, this Synod wishes to set forth the true doctrine on divine Revelation and its transmission.' The reference to these two councils is not a rejection of any attempt at progress, but nor is it a denial of the achievements of the earlier councils. Rather, it bolsters the view that the history of dogma is a continuum, and that the understanding of it continues to deepen as the Church progresses towards her ultimate goal. Thus one can accept Karl Barth's suggested translation of the Latin formula as 'moving forward from the footsteps of those councils.'
Ratzinger comments: 'This suggests that we might perhaps see the relation of this text to its predecessors as a perfect example of dogmatic development, of the inner relecture of dogma in dogmatic history.'

The Nature of Divine Revelation

Chapter one of the constitution (articles 2-6) is concerned with the nature of 'Divine Revelation Itself'. In this text the Fathers rejected the so-called 'two sources' theory of Revelation, which was dominant in Catholic theology between Trent and the nineteenth century. It was held that Revelation is the actual Revelation of God Himself to man, not just the revealing of propositions or of truths about Himself.

It pleased God, in his goodness and wisdom, to reveal himself and to make known the mystery of his will (cf. Eph. 1:9). His will was that men should have access to the Father, through Christ, the Word made flesh, in the Holy Spirit, and thus become sharers in the divine nature (cf. Eph. 2:18; 2 Pet. 1:4). By this revelation, then, the invisible God (cf. Col. 1:15; 1 Tim 1:17), from the fulness of his love, addresses men as friends (cf. Ex. 33:11; Jn. 15:14-15), and moves among them (cf. Bar. 3:38), in order to invite and receive them into his own company. This economy of Revelation is realized by deeds and words, which are intrinsically bound up with each other. (DV 2)

In contrast with Vatican I the first reference is to God Himself. This places the emphasis on a theoretical and
personal starting-point. It is from the Person of God himself that Revelation proceeds and Him to whom it returns. Thus Revelation is directed towards the 'personal centre of man, it touches him in the depth of his being, not only in his individual faculties, in his will and understanding.'

A more important difference is that a sacramental view of Revelation has replaced a purely propositional understanding of it. Mystery is now regarded as all important. 'The idea of mystery in the Epistle to the Ephesians, with all its associations, should echo here: this idea includes the universality of salvation. the unity of mankind in the one Christ, the cosmic dimension of what is Christian, the relation of revelation to history, and finally its Christological centre.' This is because ultimately the mystery of God is the Person of Christ Himself. From this it can be seen that Revelation is to be considered basically a dialogue between the Person of God and the person of man. This is indicated by the Latin words *alloquitur* and *conversatur*, and the way in which a response is demanded from man.

This conception of Revelation also implies a certain understanding of man, who is seen as a 'creature of dialogue.' In listening to the Word of God he enters
into the presence of God and fellowship with that which he receives, thus entering into fellowship with God Himself, who cannot be divorced from His Word.

Another important element in the text is the Trinitarian aspect of Revelation - from God (the Father), through the Son, in the Spirit, admitting man into fellowship with God. So, although the text can certainly be described as Christocentric, it does not present a one-sided view. Christ is in the centre as the mediator, but the pneumatological and theocentric aspects of Revelation and its transmission are not ignored.16

Finally, as regards the relationship between 'deeds and words', the council was not entering into a discussion of salvation history or Word theology, but was merely concerned to express Revelation in its totality.17 It is not just a collection of supernatural truths which reduce faith merely to an acceptance of them. Rather it is a dialogue between God and man, which cannot take place without supernatural truths, but which consists in deeds and words, which are inextricably bound together, and which touches man in his totality. In this, Vatican II can be seen to be moving forward 'from the footsteps' of Trent and Vatican I, the difference between them being that Vatican II, whilst accepting the teaching of the previous councils,
has developed their understanding of the form in which Revelation is passed on, recognizing that Revelation is passed on in deeds as well as words.

Article 3 treats very briefly of Revelation and salvation history before Christ. The council did not accept the idea of salvation history unreservedly, but merely asserted that Revelation is historical in character, not only a set of timeless supernatural truths, but 'the historical operation of God in time. It sets man in the context of this history as the place of his salvation.'

God, who creates and conserves all things by his Word (cf. Jn. 1:3), provides man with constant evidence of himself in created realities (cf. Rom. 1:19-20). And furthermore, wishing to open up the way to heavenly salvation, he manifested himself to our first parents from the very beginning. After the fall he buoyed them up with the hope of salvation, by promising redemption (cf. Gen. 3:15); and he has never ceased to take care of the human race. For he wishes to give eternal life to all those who seek salvation by patience in well-doing (cf. Rom. 2:6-7). (DV 3)

This passage addresses the issue of 'creation and revelation' or 'creation and salvation'. Firstly, there is an affirmation of the Christological nature of creation, and the self-testimony of God in it is placed in that context, thus emphasizing the unity of divine action. In addition, it is asserted that creation was oriented towards
salvation from the beginning. The Revelation to the patriarchs, however, is seen as something new. This is indicated by the Latin word \textit{insuper} (translated here as 'furthermore'). Thus, as Ratzinger comments: 'the idea of the duality of the orders is combined with that of the unity of the Logos-determined divine action and a dialectic connexion between the two levels of statement.'  

The second concern of the text is to achieve a dialectical relationship between the particularism of salvation history and the universality of the divine saving will. The text sees history after the Fall as 'fallen history', but nevertheless it is also under God's care. This, however, begs the question of whether the council is too over-optimistic on this point. Salvation comes about as the justification of the sinner; that grace given through Christ's saving work on the Cross, thus retaining the character of judgement. It must be remembered that 'the one Word of God appears in the double guise of Law and Gospel.' The issue of sin, law and the anger of God (cf. Rom. 1:17-3:20) does not seem to be given sufficient weight, and, although it may just have been assumed, Ratzinger thinks that this is a serious flaw in this section of the constitution.

The third element in article 3 is a brief Christian
theology of the Old Testament. This would have been the place to speak of Christian Revelation as both Law and Gospel, but again this theme is missing. There is, however, a Christological account of the Old Testament, which shows how it was a preparation for the Incarnation, and it is also argued that the whole period of time before Christ was a preparation for the Gospel (implied by the Latin atque... praeparavit). This demonstrates the unity of the whole of pre-Christian history, whilst emphasizing the special nature of God's mission for Israel.

Article 4 is a discussion of Christ as the last Word of God. This issue lies at the very centre of chapter one, and the fact that this article comes in the middle of this chapter reflects the Christological orientation of the text:

After God had spoken many times and in various ways through the prophets, "in the last days he has spoken to us by a Son" (Heb. 1:1-2). For he sent his Son, the eternal Word who enlightens all men to tell them about the inner life of God. Hence, Jesus Christ, sent as "a man among men", "speaks the words of God" (Jn. 3:34), and accomplishes the saving work which the Father gave him to do (cf. Jn. 5:36; 17:4). As a result, he himself - to see whom is to see the Father (cf. Jn. 14:9) - completed and perfected Revelation and confirmed it with divine guarantees. (DV 4)
The Word of God was made known through the prophets in the past and is now continued in the Word of God Incarnate. But there is not only an element of continuity here. As the quotation from Hebrews 1 emphasises, there is also an element of novelty, because there is something truly new: the Word of God, in Jesus Christ, was made present on earth in its totality and became man. Christ does not communicate only words of, or about God (as the prophets did), but God Himself. In Christ, therefore, God has, so to speak, spoken Himself. In Christ, union between God and man has been brought about, and in Him also, unity in the dialogue of God with man has been achieved. From this it follows that the purpose of this dialogue is not just information, but unity and transformation, which are the goals for which Christians must strive, and this implies that although Christ is the end, He is also the beginning. 'At the same time we can see how for the Christ event, precisely as an end, is also a beginning that necessarily continues, remaining through the whole of history as a presence and a promise of what is to come.' Christ is therefore God's constant address to man. There is nothing new to say, because God has communicated Himself in his totality, but the Word of God is being constantly expressed.

The final paragraph of article 4 emphasizes the
definitive nature of the Revelation that has taken place in Christ:

The Christian economy, therefore, since it is the new and definitive covenant, will never pass away; and no new public revelation is to be expected before the glorious manifestation of our Lord, Jesus Christ (cf. 1 Tim. 6:4 and Tit. 2:13).

Thus the Christian claim to finality based on Christ is made clearer in this section, but the eschatological element is also brought out. This shows the connexion between the once and for all Christ event and Christianity's relation to the future. But, as Ratzinger comments, the element of hope and promise could have been drawn out further, since it provides a good basis for Christianity to make its claim to finality in a world so concerned with progress and change, and which thinks of man, only just in existence, as being incapable of making statements about 'being: 'The starting point is given here with the Christological anchoring of the idea: faith proclaims Christ as the one who has come and as the one who is to come and thus bears within itself both the infinite openness of man and the finality of the divine answer that does not put an end to man's development, but makes him conscious of his true, infinite nature.'
Article 5 then deals with the character of faith, stressing that man must entrust himself freely and totally to God.

"The obedience of faith" (Rom. 16:26; cf. Rom. 1:5; 2 Cor. 10:5-6) must be given to God as he reveals himself. By faith man freely commits his entire self to God, making "the full submission of his intellect and will to God who reveals", and willingly assenting to the Revelation given by him. Before this faith can be exercised, man must have the grace of God to move and assist him; he must have the interior help of the Holy Spirit, who moves the heart and converts it to God, who opens the eyes of the mind and "makes it easy for all to accept and believe the truth." The same Holy Spirit constantly perfects faith by his gifts, so the Revelation may be more and more profoundly understood. (DV 5)

This section is basically a contraction of the relevant passages of text from Vatican I. There are, however, several changes in emphasis, which are due to the fact that the above analysis of faith is placed in the context of a further developed understanding of Revelation.

Firstly, faith appears as more inwardly orientated, and the council has not followed Vatican I in trying to make the certainty of faith measurable, i.e. through exterior signs such as miracles and prophecies. There is no actual contradiction of Vatican I, however, since it is not denied that these exterior signs do attest Revelation:
it is that their role has been given less prominence. Secondly, Vatican II regarded the intellectual element of faith as being part of a wider whole, rather than its sum total, the impression given by Vatican I, which defined faith as 'believing as true what has been revealed by God.' And thirdly, the final sentence of the article sees the Holy Spirit constantly perfecting faith through His gifts, which leads to a continuously more profound understanding of Revelation.

In this section, one can see the intention to provide a foundation for the concept of Tradition developed in chapter two, in which 'tradition takes place essentially as the growing insight, mediated by the Holy Spirit, into revelation that has been given once and for all; it is the perfectio of faith which the Spirit brings about in the Church.' The idea of 'perfection of faith' is what lies at the heart of the difference between Catholic and Protestant theologians over Tradition. For Protestants, faith cannot be conceived of in terms of degrees, since for them one either accepts God or one does not. It should be added, however, that the dialectic between donum and opus is fully sustained in the text, because it is God, through the Holy Spirit, who is doing the acting, but this penetrates man steadily and increasingly.
Finally, in its description of faith, the council has used the idea of obedience primarily, and the idea of trust secondarily. The purpose of this was to show that faith is not a wild self-abandonment which lacks direction. Faith includes a commitment to the Word of God and a readiness for the concrete encounter with God, through His Church.35

Article 6 is an abridged version of the first two sections of the chapter 'De revelatione' from Vatican I. There is again, however, a change in emphasis with the nature of Revelation as dialogue brought to the fore, over and against an understanding of Revelation as the presentation of divine commands. This is shown in the Latin by the replacement of *revelare* by *manifestare ac communicare*.36

By divine Revelation God wished to manifest and communicate both himself and the eternal decrees of his will concerning the salvation of mankind. He wished, in other words, "to share with us divine benefits which entirely surpass the powers of the human mind to understand."

The sacred Synod professes that "God, the first principle and the last of all things, can be known with certainty from the created world, by the natural light of human reason" (cf. Rom. 1:20). It teaches that it is to his Revelation that we must attribute the fact "that those things, which in themselves are not beyond the grasp of human reason, can, in the present condition of the human race, be known by all men with ease, with firm certainty, and without the contamination of error. (DV 6)
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

Starting from the Christological centre of Revelation, Vatican II argues that human reason is an indispensable element of the whole. At Vatican I, the Fathers had started with the natural knowledge of God and then progressed to 'supernatural Revelation'. Vatican II has reversed this order to demonstrate that man's approach to God does not comprise two more or less independent parts. They are inextricably one: 'Vatican II had no reason to suppress [the] basic idea developed with such care by Vatican I; on the contrary, in dealing with the onslaught of atheism it will have increasing importance.'

The Transmission of Divine Revelation

Chapter two (articles 7-10) of the constitution treats of 'The Transmission of Divine Revelation', with article 7 deliberately based on the corresponding Tridentine text.

God graciously arranged that the things he had once revealed for the salvation of all peoples should remain in their entirety, throughout all ages, and be transmitted to all generations. Therefore, Christ the Lord, in whom the entire Revelation of the most high God is summed up (cf. 2 Cor. 1:20; 3:16-4,6) commanded the apostles to preach the Gospel, which had been promised beforehand by the prophets, and which he fulfilled in his own person and promulgated with his own lips. In preaching the Gospel they were to communicate the gifts of God to all men. This Gospel was to be the source of all saving truth and moral discipline. This was faithfully done: it was done by the apostles who handed on, by the spoken word of their preaching,
by the example they gave, by the institutions they established, what they themselves had received—whether from the lips of Christ, from his way of life and his works, or whether they had learned it at the prompting of the Holy Spirit; it was done by those apostles and other men associated with the apostles, who under the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit, committed the message of salvation to writing.

In order that the full and living Gospel might always be preserved in the Church the apostles left bishops as their successors. They gave them "their own position of teaching authority". This sacred Tradition, then, and the sacred Scripture of both Testaments, are like a mirror, in which the Church, during its pilgrim journey here on earth, contemplates God, from whom she receives everything, until such time as she is brought to see him face to face as he really is (cf. Jn. 3:2). (DV 7)

There are, however, changes in emphasis once more, which result from Vatican II's understanding of Revelation as something not purely propositional. To begin with, the legalistic conception of Christian Revelation which had resulted from the idea of nova lex is played down by speaking of Jesus, as not only promulgating, but also fulfilling the Gospel. Added to this, the history of salvation in the Old and New Testaments is united, thus emphasizing the historical and sacramental aspects of Revelation over and against the legal and juridical. Thus the Word of Christ is seen not just as a summons, but primarily as the fulness 'from which the saving activity comes and from which alone the nature of the Christian
summons is to be understood.40 This line is pursued further when the teaching of the Apostles is explained in terms of donum and communicare, thus bringing to special prominence the concepts of grace and dialogue, rather than the law, in the self-communication of God in Revelation. Given this as a starting point, it follows that the passing on of Tradition cannot be understood in exactly the same way as it was by the Fathers of the Council of Trent.41

The Second Vatican Council has presented a comprehensive view of Revelation, which is concerned with the totality of man. As such, this understanding is not based solely on the words that Christ preached, but on his entire Person— all that He said, implied, gestured or did. Hence, that which has been explicitly formulated in words is transcended to include the whole reality of Christian existence. Correspondingly, the guidance of the Holy Spirit is not to be understood as dictation to the writers of the New Testament, but as 'suggestio'. This has obvious connexions with the concept of the 'perfection of faith', discussed above, and from this one can see that the transmission of Tradition cannot merely be the handing on of words.42

Furthermore, following Irenaeus, the principles of Tradition and succession are regarded as indissolubly one.
In his *Adversus Haereses*, Irenaeus argued that heretics had no recourse to Tradition to support their arguments, since that Tradition to which they pledged adherence did not derive from the apostles, who 'like a rich man depositing his money in a bank, delivered into [the Church's] hands in the fullest measure the whole truth: so that every man, whosoever will, can draw from her the water of life.' In other words, Irenaeus is asserting that faith is present in the historical continuity of the believers and can only be found in it, not outside it. This issue is not discussed in full, but only touched upon.

The last sentence of article 7 is the only place in chapter two where Tradition, or its abuse, is actually criticized, and even then only gently. Here the council teaches that all knowledge of God, during the time before Christ's second coming and the eschaton, is seen as in a mirror and is thus a fragmentary reflection. One must, therefore, expect distortions and changes of emphasis. This theme will be returned to below.

Before moving on to the next section, however, it is necessary to take note of what Ratzinger regards as possibly the most important terminological difference between Trent and Vatican II. The Fathers of Trent spoke of traditions, whilst the Fathers of Vatican II spoke of
Tradition, only once mentioning traditions, in a quotation from 2 Thess. 2:15. This highlights the difference between the two approaches. Trent was concerned with the practice of everyday Church life, and its talk of tradition was related to its reform. Vatican II began with an abstract notion of Tradition, concerned with the justification of statements in the catechism. These two approaches are not, of course, mutually incompatible.

**Article 8 is an attempt to explain what was meant by Tradition, the first paragraph describes its total nature:**

Thus, the apostolic preaching, which is expressed in a special way in the inspired books, was to be preserved in a continuous line of succession until the end of time. Hence the apostles, in handing on what they themselves had received, warn the faithful to maintain the traditions which they had learned either by word of mouth or by letter (cf. 2 Th. 2:15); and they warn them to fight hard for the faith that had been handed on to them once and for all (cf. Jude 3). What was handed on by the apostles comprises everything that serves to make the people of God live their lives in holiness and increase their faith. In this way the Church, in her doctrine, life and worship, perpetuates and transmits to every generation all that she herself is, all that she believes. (*DV* 8)

Tradition is regarded primarily as 'the many-layered yet one presence of the mystery of Christ throughout all the ages; it means the totality of the presence of Christ
in this world. This is handed on through teaching, life and worship. Following on from article 7, Tradition has its place not only in formal doctrinal statements, but also in the unstated, and perhaps unstatable, elements of Christian life. This is the basis of the understanding of Tradition as being the constant making present of everything that the Church is and all that she believes. Tradition is the being and the faith of the Church, 'it is Revelation in its transmission.'

That there is a problem with such an expression of Tradition was pointed out by Cardinal Meyer, who in a speech to the Council on 30 September 1964 reminded the Fathers that there can be practices within the Church which are not true developments of doctrine, and that these must not be supported by appeals to Tradition. That this was not made explicit in the text must be regretted, not only for the sake of giving a more balanced account of Tradition, but also because such a treatment of Tradition would have been far more fruitful ecumenically. A good opportunity for furthering such dialogue was missed.

The next section then deals with the dynamic nature of Tradition, which was to be attacked from two quite different angles during the debates.
The Tradition that comes from the apostles makes progress in the Church, with the help of the Holy Spirit. There is a growth in insight into the realities and words that are being passed on. This comes about in various ways. It comes through the contemplation and study of believers who ponder these things in their heart (cf. Lk. 2:19 and 51). It comes from the intimate sense of spiritual realities which they experience. And it comes from the preaching of those who have received, along with their right of succession in the episcopate, the sure charism of truth. Thus, as the centuries go by, the Church is always advancing towards the plenitude of divine truth, until eventually the words of God are fulfilled in her. (DV 8)

So, the council taught that Tradition stems from the apostles and makes progress in the Church through the assistance of the Holy Spirit. By this is meant that there is a growing insight into what has been handed on during the ages (cf. the 'perfection of faith' in article 5), which is linked to the contemplation and study of believers, inner understanding that comes from spiritual experience, and the proclamation of the teaching office. Through this growth the Church is ever moving towards the divine Word in the eschaton.50

This process of understanding, however, is not limited solely to the hierarchy. It is, in fact, based in the whole life of the praying and believing Church, in her dialogue with the Person of God, and it is through this, that that which was given once and for all can be made

228
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

relevant to the changing ages. 'In this process of understanding, which is the concrete way in which tradition proceeds in the Church, the work of the teaching office is one component (and, because of its nature, a critical one, not a productive one), but it is not the whole.'\textsuperscript{51}

This understanding of Tradition was attacked from two quite different positions; by Cardinal Ruffini from a neo-scholastic viewpoint, and by Cardinal Léger from an ecumenical viewpoint. Despite the dissimilar nature of the two positions, the objections of the cardinals were remarkably similar. Ruffini argued that Revelation closed with the death of the last apostle, and emphasized the unchanging nature of Revelation, quoting Vincent of Lérins, who had been cited by both Trent and Vatican I. The Theological Commission did formulate the text slightly more carefully (it did not make any major alterations, because it held that the text referred to a growth in the understanding of that Revelation which is unchanging and was given once and for all), but refused to include the quotation from St. Vincent. This was not because the council rejected the teaching of Trent and Vatican I, but because the static \textit{semper} no longer seemed the correct approach. This appears to be correct: that which is being understood cannot be separated from the process of understanding, yet there is certainly a difference between

229
the two. This dialectical relationship is expressed well in the Latin text by the juxtaposition of the two clauses *Traditio proficit* and *crescit perceptio*.52

After the council, Cardinal Léger's objection (and indirectly Ruffini's also) was taken up by Protestant theologians, such as Oscar Cullmann.53 The problem he raised, however, was not the issue of development, but that of the relationship of Scripture to the Church. This will be discussed below in relation to articles 9 and 10. For now it is enough to say that this argument also suffers from the same defect as the static *semper*.

The last section of the article presents the concrete working out of the preceding definition of Tradition and tries to establish the special place of the Church Fathers in this:

The sayings of the Holy Fathers are a witness to the life giving presence of the Tradition, showing how its riches are poured out in the practice and the life of the Church, in her belief and her prayer. By means of the same Tradition the full canon of the sacred books is known to the Church and the holy scriptures themselves are more thoroughly understood and constantly actualized in the Church. Thus God, who spoke in the past, continues to converse with the spouse of his beloved Son. And the Holy Spirit, through whom the living voice of the Gospel rings out in the Church - and through her in the world - leads believers to the full truth, and makes the Word of Christ dwell
in them in all its richness (cf. Col. 3:16). (DV 8)

Given the council's understanding of Revelation and its transmission, it therefore follows that the Fathers testify to the living presence of Tradition, and that their writings are a concrete expression of the mystery of Christ in the life of the Church. Their writings are a specific source of Tradition, in that they are an expression of 'the act of understanding, which assimilates what has been passed down and holds it for the present.'

The principal concrete effect, or 'monument', of Tradition is also described: 'through it the canon of Scripture is made known and made active, in a constant dialogue of God with men - not in the sense of a pietistic or individualistic conception - but as the converse of the Son with his bride, the Church.' The individual is, of course, not excluded and he is touched by this dialogue in a new and personal way, but this is set in the context of the dialogue between God and His Church, which emphasizes the vital role of the Church in the process of understanding Scripture. The pneumatological character of Tradition is also brought to the fore: the Christ-event is not limited to a given historical period, but is constantly present through the work of the Holy Spirit.
Despite the criticism of Protestant theologians mentioned above, it is true to say that on Vatican II's understanding of Tradition,

Scripture can still be called the supreme norm of faith, the \textit{norma non normata}, in the sense that to appeal to Tradition to interpret Scripture aright is not to appeal away from Scripture to something other than Scripture.... since Tradition is not thought of as exhaustively expressed in Scripture, we can also expect to find it alive and well in the various concrete traditions that manifest the life of the Church.... To judge the Bible on the basis of Tradition as expressed in traditions is not, \textit{pace} Protestant fears, to submit the Bible to an alien authority, rather to identify and declare what is the Bible's own deepest reality.\textsuperscript{58}

Article 9 goes to the heart of this controversy in its discussion of the mutual relation of Scripture and Tradition:

Sacred Tradition and sacred Scripture, then, are bound closely together, and communicate one with the other. For both of them, flowing out from the same divine well-spring, come together in some fashion to form one thing, and move towards the same goal. Sacred Scripture is the speech of God as it is put down in writing under the breath of the Holy Spirit. And Tradition transmits in its entirety the Word of God which has been entrusted to the apostles by Christ the Lord and the Holy Spirit. It transmits it to the successors of the apostles so that, enlightened by the Spirit of truth, they may faithfully preserve, expound and spread it abroad by their preaching. Thus it comes about that the Church does not draw her certainty about
all revealed truths from the holy Scriptures alone. Hence, both Scripture and Tradition must be accepted and honoured with equal feelings of devotion and reverence. \textit{(DV 9)}

In the discussion concerning this issue, objection was made to the so-called 'two sources' theory of Revelation, because it was felt that it implied that Revelation was to be obtained from two independent vessels, thus suggesting that it is something which is divided up arbitrarily into two. Such a view would, of course, conflict with Vatican II's concept of Revelation as a dynamic, organic reality, with Scripture and Tradition seen as interdependent. But it should be noted that Trent, when referring to the 'Gospel' (the Word of Christ and the basis of all historical forms of traditions) used the word 'source' only in the singular.\textsuperscript{59} This suggests that the teaching of Trent about Revelation can be understood to lend support to the interdependence of Scripture and Tradition. Furthermore, Yves Congar,\textsuperscript{60} among others, has shown that Trent in fact rejected a formula that would have suggested that Revelation is to be obtained from two separate sources (partim... partim was replaced with et... et), and the work of Hubert Jedin\textsuperscript{61} makes clear that Trent viewed Tradition as inextricably linked to Scripture.

Ratzinger notes that Protestant theology has accepted
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

the preeminence of Revelation over the concrete forms in which it is presented, but strong objections have been raised concerning the interpenetration of Scripture and Tradition. This is because the Protestant idea of sola scriptura is concerned with Scripture's judging function in relation to the Church, rather than the material origin of particular statements of faith. Thus, paradoxically, an attempt by the council to take into account views put forward by the Protestant Churches has resulted in strong Protestant opposition. That the council has moved further away from the idea of sola scriptura is highlighted for Protestant theologians by the concept of the interpenetration of Scripture and Tradition, and in article 10, their interaction with the teaching office. How, they ask, can Scripture then function properly as the judge of the Church?

As regards these objections, it would seem that the lack of any mention of the need to criticize possible distortions of Tradition, 'and the place of Scripture as an element within the Church that is also critical of tradition' is unsatisfactory. The position of Cullmann and others does not, however, seem to offer any real alternative, as has been pointed out by Ratzinger: 'To contrast Scripture with the Church is not only impossible from the start because the writings gathered together in
the Bible are, and can only be, a "Bible", "Scripture", only within the Church, but it would also involve the absurdity of making faith the function of historical research and expose it to scientific criteria, the certainty of which cannot go beyond a very moderate form of probability and is on quite another level from that of faith.'

This can only be done if our fundamental hermeneutical position is disregarded. To speak of being able to reduce mistakes in Biblical exegesis to a minimum by the development of ever more exact methods seems simply naive. Of this notion Käsemann comments: 'It seems to me safer to walk through a minefield blindfold. Is it possible to forget for a second that we are daily concerned with a flood of doubtful, even abstruse ideas in the fields of exegesis, history and theology, and that our scholarship has gradually degenerated into a world-wide guerilla warfare...? Can we free ourselves from the massa perditiones? Can we pursue our craft in any other way than in the knowledge that those who will carry us out have long been standing outside the door?'

The problem is that kerygma can exist only as Church kerygma. Scripture on its own does not have just one clear meaning. It can only have meaning within the framework of kerygma. Scripture, therefore, cannot be set up in opposition to the Church as Cullmann et al would wish. Cullmann tells us that we must put faith in exegetes being led by the Holy Spirit,
agreement among these exegetes does not appear to be very likely, and should there not also be trust placed in the Holy Spirit leading the Church? This does not mean that there is no place for vigilance; rather it shows that there can be no solution to the problem without the possibility of risk and trust in God.

As regards the objections of Protestant theologians, it is important to note that the text defines Scripture in terms of what is (i.e. the Word of God), whereas Tradition is described in terms of its function: it transmits, preserves, expounds, and makes more widely known the Word of God. Tradition is to serve as part of that Revelation, which was given once and for all. Its task is conservative, not innovative. But it may nevertheless be fairly termed the unwritten Word of God, since it supplies that which is necessary, but is not contained explicitly in Scripture (e.g. the word homoousios).

The next section of the text involves the material completeness of Scripture, an issue which occasioned much debate among the Fathers, despite the fact that the ecumenical difficulties lie elsewhere, and that the resulting text can hardly be disputed. There is no 'proof' in Scripture for every Catholic doctrine, and many Protestants would agree that certainty about God's
Revelation derives not only from Scripture, but also from preaching and the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. Here, the function of Tradition lies in the making certain of faith.\textsuperscript{69}

Ecumenical problems, however, are caused by the last sentence of article 9, which repeats a formula issued by the Council of Trent. But it must be remembered that it is not a complete statement of the relationship between Scripture and Tradition. Rather, it is a statement of the inviolability of dogma. Certainly, Protestant theologians did raise objections, but in essence their difficulties are no different from those already discussed above.\textsuperscript{70}

Article 10 then deals with the relationship of the Church to Scripture and Tradition, which have been entrusted to her.

Sacred Tradition and sacred Scripture make up a single deposit of the Word of God, which is entrusted to the Church. By adhering to it the entire holy people, united to its pastors, remains always faithful to the teaching of the apostles, to the brotherhood, to the breaking of bread and the prayers (cf. Acts 2:42 Greek). So, in maintaining, practising and professing the faith that has been handed on there should be a remarkable harmony between the bishops and the faithful. \textit{(DV 10)}

The task of preserving and realizing the Word of God
is the duty of the whole Church, not merely the hierarchy. This, of course, reflects the earlier teaching of the constitution, and is obviously important for a balanced theology of the laity. It also represents a development upon the solo magisterio of Humani Generis. Following on from article 9, it shows that the ecclesial nature of the Word does not concern simply the teaching office alone, but the whole Church, even though the former does have a particular function:

But the task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the Church alone. Its authority in this matter is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. Yet this Magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but is its servant. It teaches only what has been handed on to it. At the divine command and with the help of the Holy Spirit it listens to this devotedly, guards it with dedication and expounds it faithfully. All that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed is drawn from this single deposit of faith. (DV 10)

The teaching office carries out this function for the benefit of the laity and the bishops together. But although the 'sense of the faithful' is alluded to in article 10, in its mention of the role of the laity in preserving the purity of the Word of God, the council did not greatly expand upon this theory. This was probably beneficial, as a refined form of it is still to be
achieved, and there is also the danger that the sense of the faithful, if misunderstood, could sanction practices resulting from a distortion of Tradition. This would give Protestant theologians more grounds for justified complaint, thus placing another obstacle in the path of ecumenical dialogue. With this in mind, it is important to note that the Magisterium is described as the servant of the Word of God, and its functions, like those of Tradition, are conservative. Although there could never have been any serious doubt that this was the case, it is important to point this out (remembering the opening words of the constitution: Dei verbum religiosæ audiens et fidentes proclamans...), given the impression left by Humani Generis, which spoke not of the teaching office being clarified by Scripture, but vice versa. Theology then becomes 'proving' from Scripture what the teaching office has declared. Article 10 serves to reduce the contrast between the 'listening' and 'teaching' Church: the whole Church listens, and in its listening, the whole Church shares in the preservation of true teaching.

The last paragraph is a summary of the interdependency of Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium:

It is clear, therefore, that, in the supremely wise arrangement of God, sacred Tradition, sacred Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church are so connected and associated that one of them
cannot stand without the others. Working together, each in their own way under the action of the Holy Spirit, they all contribute effectively to the salvation of souls. (DV 10)

Regarding the interdependent relationship of Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium enough has been said in the comments on article 9. Suffice it to say that such a relationship is consistent with what has gone before in the constitution, and from the Catholic viewpoint the three entities are indeed inextricably linked. This is not to say that Vatican II's treatment of the issue cannot be validly criticised. Furthermore, this relationship is placed within the pneumatological context and thereby avoids giving the appearance of 'a merely ecclesiastical functionalism'. The understanding of the theology of the Word is also advanced in the last clause, which speaks of the saving power of the Word of God, which the constitution regards as the dialogue of salvation.

Comparison with Newman

In a discussion of the similarities and differences between Newman's (mature) theology of Revelation and that of Vatican II, the first thing to do is to divide Newman's thought into two: firstly regarding the nature of Revelation and, secondly, regarding its transmission.
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

a) The Personal and Propositional

Newman had a highly personalist approach to Revelation, and for him, it is God Himself that is revealed, not just statements about Him:

As God is one, so the impression He gives us of Himself is one; it is not a thing of parts; it is not a system.... It is the vision of an object. When we pray, we pray, not to an assemblage of notions, or to a creed, but to One Individual Being; and when we speak of Him we speak of a Person.... This being the case, all our attempts to delineate our impression of Him go to bring out one idea, not two or three or four; not a philosophy, but an individual idea in its separate aspects.

This coheres with the view expressed once he was a Catholic, that

what Catholics, what Church doctors, as well as Apostles, have ever lived on, is not any number of theological canons or decrees, but... Christ Himself, as He is represented in concrete existence in the Gospels.

Newman was not, however, as a result of this approach, in any way anti-dogmatic. This is despite the fact that in his early theology, as in Arians, he almost regarded dogma as a necessary evil, rather than as good and necessary, which was his developed view. After all,

Why should God speak, unless He meant to say something? Why should He say it, unless He meant us to hear? [Surely] there
must be some essential doctrine proposed by [Revelation] to our faith.... Religion cannot be but dogmatic; it ever has been.\footnote{\textsuperscript{81}}

So, as well as being personal, Revelation for Newman is also 'a substantive message from above.'\footnote{\textsuperscript{82}} That said, he was also well aware of the inadequacy of human language for expressing the divine mysteries:

No revelation can be complete and systematic, from the weakness of the human intellect; so far as it is not such, it is mysterious.... A Revelation is religious doctrine viewed on its illuminated side; a Mystery is the selfsame doctrine viewed on the side unilluminated. Thus Religious Truth is neither light nor dark, but both together; it is like the dim view of the country seen in the twilight, with forms half extracted from the darkness, with broken lines, and isolated masses. Revelation... is not a revealed \textit{system}, but consists of a number of detached and incomplete truths belonging to a vast system unrevealed, of doctrines and injunctions mysteriously connected together.\footnote{\textsuperscript{83}}

The inability of man during his earthly life, to understand God as He really is, also serves to emphasize the eschatological nature of Christianity. For it is only after one's death, or at the final consumation, that one moves \textit{ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem}.\footnote{\textsuperscript{84}}

Despite the inadequacies of human language, Newman was convinced that there is no incongruity between a dogmatic creed and a personal faith:
People urge that salvation consists, not in believing the propositions that there is a God, that there is a Saviour, that Our Lord is God, that there is a Trinity, but in believing in God, in a Saviour, in a Sanctifier; and they object that such propositions are but a formal and human medium destroying all true reception of the Gospel, and making religion a matter of words or of logic, instead of having its seat in the heart. They are right so far as this, that men can and sometimes do rest in the propositions themselves as expressing intellectual notions; they are wrong, when they maintain that men need do so or always do so. The propositions may and must be used, and can easily be used, as the expression of facts, not notions, and they are necessary to the mind in the same way as language is ever necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as individuals, and for our intercourse with others. Again, they are useful in their dogmatic aspect as asserting and making clear for us the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest. Knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections. We feel gratitude and love, we feel indignation and dislike, when we have the informations actually put before us which are to kindle those several emotions. We love our parents, as our parents, when we know them to be our parents; we must know concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope or trust towards Him. Devotion must have its objects; those objects, as being supernatural, when not represented to our senses by material symbols, must be set before the mind in propositions. The formula, which embodies a dogma for the theologian, readily suggests an object for the worshipper.85

Newman also dealt with the issue of doctrine and devotion in the preface to the Via Media, and at first sight it would appear that in the preface he reversed the order of knowledge and then devotion outlined above, when
asserting that devotion sometimes takes precedence over doctrine.

This passage from the Grammar, however, makes clear that Newman believed that knowledge is imparted in two ways: firstly, through propositions which speak to the intellect; and secondly, through 'material symbols', which speak to the senses and the imagination. The first of these ways of knowing may be equated with explicit knowledge, such as is to be had of Revelation which is given in words, and the second may be identified with implicit knowledge, such as is to be obtained from deeds and images. In any event, 'devotion must have its objects'.

Therefore, while it is true that in the preface Newman wrote that the Prophetical Office (i.e. doctrinal propositions) must sometimes give way to the Priestly Office (i.e. devotion), this is not a case of devotion being put before knowledge per se. It is devotion being put before propositional knowledge, since in such instances, personal knowledge, on which this devotion rests, is to be preferred. In other words, knowledge must ever precede devotion, but sometimes implicit knowledge is to be preferred to explicit knowledge, and vice versa.
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

So, although the Neapolitan crone who chatters to the crucifix is an example of the Priestly Office overriding the Prophetical Office, this is not because devotion precedes knowledge. Rather, it is because in this instance implicit knowledge is to be preferred to explicit. It would, therefore, seem fair to conclude that in the preface Newman has not reversed the order of knowledge and devotion as expressed in the Grammar, although his use of various terms may at first sight suggest that to be the case.

That Newman believed Revelation to be communicated in words and deeds, is also illustrated by his description of the growth / development of an idea, which demonstrates that God's self-revelation, in Christ, requires the 'obedience of faith'. Newman's own life and writings show this clearly.

[An idea's] development then is not like a mathematical theorem worked out on paper, in which each successive advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but it is carried on through individuals and bodies of men; it employs their minds as instruments, and depends upon them while it uses them.

So, regarding the nature of Revelation, it can be clearly seen that Newman has, to a large extent, anticipated the teaching of Vatican II, which emphasizes the personalist aspect of Revelation, which is complete in
Christ, and is conveyed in words and deeds to which a response is required, along with the need for dogma. What is implicit in Newman's theology of Revelation, but not drawn out, is the nature of Revelation as dialogue between the Person of God and the person of man. In the 1878 edition of the Essay on Development, however, Newman, did hold the Incarnation to be the central dogma of Christianity, and acknowledged that there could be no new public Revelation. Furthermore, he recognized the possibility of Revelation outside Judaeo-Christianity, seeing it, along with Judaism, as a preparation for Christ:

pagan literature, philosophy, and mythology, properly understood, were but a preparation for the Gospel. The Greek poets and sages were in a certain sense prophets.... There had been a directly divine dispensation granted to the Jews; but there had been in some sense a dispensation carried on in favour of the Gentiles. He who had taken the seed of Jacob for His elect people had not therefore cast the rest of mankind out of his sight.

It was remarked above that Vatican II was perhaps a little too optimistic, and remiss, in its failure to discuss the issue of Law and Gospel. That salvation is the result of the justification of the sinner through Christ's work on the Cross is evident in Newman's thought, and in this respect, Dei Verbum can benefit from his discussion of Christ's Passion:
He had to bear what is well known to us, what is familiar to us, but what to him was woe unutterable. He had to bear that which is so easy a thing for us, so natural, so welcome, that we cannot conceive of it as of a great endurance, but which to Him had the scent and the poison of death - He had... to bear the weight of sin... He had to bear the sin of the whole world.  

b) The Mutual Relation of Scripture and Tradition

As regards the transmission of Revelation, Newman is clear that it is not a legalistic function, but that it is sacramental. This can be seen from the way in which he does not treat Revelation as being something purely propositional, and in the Essay on Development where he speaks of Christ fulfilling the Law, as well as promulgating the Gospel. That this transmission is the function of Tradition, which is the life and being of the Church, is also clear from a previously mentioned letter of 1871, in which he described the Church as 'a standing Apostolic committee...[which] can put clearly before us... what is to be believed, and what is not such.'  

Tradition is also that of which Newman spoke when he discussed the ability of the Church to know her own mind in the exegesis of incomplete or unclear passages of Scripture. In addition, the importance of the living witness of the Church, described by Augustine in his now famous saying, securus judicat orbis terrarum, in Newman's
conversion to Catholicism must be remembered.

Regarding the relationship of Scripture to the Church, the Catholic Newman has once again anticipated the theology of Vatican II. He saw Scripture as the product of Tradition, and as such could only be understood correctly within that context. Unlike Vatican II, however, he did mention explicitly the possibility of corruptions, rather than true developments, although his seven suggested notes of a true development are rather tentative, and he regarded Scripture as an element within the Church that is critical of Tradition.95 His understanding of the relationship between Scripture and Tradition is well expressed in a note added to the eleventh lecture on the Prophetic Office of the Church, in which he considered the difference between Catholics and (High) Anglicans over the issue to be a matter of words:

Catholics and Anglicans, in the controversy as to whether the whole faith is or is not contained in Scripture, attach different meanings to the word "proof". We mean that not every article of faith is so contained there, that it may thence be logically proved, independently of the teaching and authority of the Tradition; but Anglicans mean that every article of faith is so contained there, that it may be proved, provided there be added the illustrations and compensations supplied by the Tradition.96
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

So, for Newman, as well as Vatican II, the function of Tradition is seen in relation to the Word of God. This, of course, also anticipates Vatican II's statement about the material completeness of Scripture, which brings out the nature of the interdependent relationship between Scripture and Tradition. Thus, Newman would also conclude that it is not possible to set Scripture against the Church as its judge, in the manner Cullmann et al demand, since it is only within the Church that it can be understood. Ker summarizes Newman's thought well:

The idea that "every one may gain the true doctrines of the gospel for himself from the Bible", he called the "ultra-Protestant principle"; whereas according to the Fathers, "the unanimous witness of the whole Church" to the teaching of the apostles was "as much the voice of God" as was Scripture. To insist, Newman argues, on "the Bible as the only standard of appeal in doctrinal inquiries" inevitably leads to the conclusion that "truth is but matter of opinion", since "the Bible is not written as to force its meaning upon the reader", nor does it "carry with it its own interpretation".  

As regards the interdependent relationship between Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium, Newman has once again anticipated the teaching of Vatican II. This is demonstrated by his writings during the 'Rambler Controversy', during which he assigned the Magisterium the active role in the Church's teaching. As regards the
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

laity, he has also laid the foundations for more theological work on the *sensus fidelium*.

The point was made in an earlier chapter that Newman's concept of Revelation rests upon his belief in Divine Providence. This is obviously true when one considers his view that the deeper understanding of divine truth gained by the Church over time is the result of the Holy Spirit leading the Church into all truth. This is another point of agreement with Vatican II which taught that the Holy Spirit perfects the faith of the Church. Taken with Newman's rejection of St. Vincent's static *semper*, one can see that the Catholic Newman's view of the authority of the Fathers had changed to seeing them as part of the process of the understanding of Revelation, rather than as static authorities. This change in his thought reflects Vatican II's understanding of the role of the Fathers.

**Evaluation**

In summary, then, Newman can be credited with anticipating, to a very large extent, the teaching of the Second Vatican Council on the nature and transmission of Divine Revelation.

The main points of agreement between Newman and the council are: the personalist conception of Revelation,
although propositions have their place; that there can be no new public Revelation; that Revelation is complete in Christ; the function of words and deeds in history in the communication of Revelation; the necessity of the 'obedience of faith'; the sacramental character of the transmission of Revelation; the dynamic nature of Tradition; the mutual relation of Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium; and the function of Tradition being in relation to the Word of God. In short, Vatican II has accepted Newman's idea of the organic development of doctrine.

The major differences between Newman and the council are Newman's realization of the need to be wary of possible distortions of Tradition, and the heavier stress he places on Law, as opposed to Gospel, in Christian Revelation.

Newman's thought, therefore, would seem to be of great importance for post-Vatican II Catholic theology on the nature and transmission of Divine Revelation.

**The Possibility of Irreformable Definitions: the Connexion between Revelation and Infallibility**

Given the above discussion, a further issue that arises is the possibility of irreformable pronouncements by the Church in matters of faith and morals. As discussed
Newman was of the opinion that the definition of papal infallibility by Vatican I was, although inopportune, correct, and he was able to defend the definition publicly. Vatican II also accepted the notion of infallibility, although it refined Vatican I's understanding of it, and this will be discussed further in the next chapter. The point in discussion here is the connexion between the nature and transmission of Revelation and the possibility of infallibility.

Newman believed that there was such a thing as infallibility in faith and morals, because he held that the fact of doctrinal development necessitated it. If there are such things as true doctrinal developments then in his view, God must have provided the Church with a means of determining them from corruptions - hence infallibility. Such a view is obviously in accordance with Vatican II's theology of Revelation, which spoke of the Holy Spirit leading the Church into an ever greater understanding of Divine Truth. The nature of Revelation, as discussed by Vatican II also lends itself to such belief. Revelation is the communication of God to man, Person to person. It is because of this communication, which is a dialogue between the totality of God and the totality of man, that man can know about God. The reason why there can be such a thing as infallibility in man's knowledge of God, is because God
Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

has revealed Himself to man in His totality, in the Person of Christ, the Word of God in whom Revelation is complete. As such, man's knowledge of God results from God's personal self-communication of His whole Self to man in the God made man, Jesus.

That Revelation lends itself to infallible pronouncements made by the Church in matters of faith and morals has, of course, been widely challenged. Thus, Paul Avis has argued that a reverent agnosticism must be maintained in such matters, stating that the former view presupposes that revelation is the communication of particular truths in propositional form, and that these propositions are largely immune to the relativities of culture and changes in human understanding.

Avis, therefore, sees a fundamental incongruity in the Catholic position which allows the personal nature of Revelation, while insisting on the need also for irreformable dogma. For him it is necessary that 'to describe reality more fully, language must be correspondingly less precise.'

It is hoped that the opposite to this view has been demonstrated above. The understanding of Revelation promulgated by Vatican II allows that it is, to a great
extent, personal in nature, but that it also has a
propositional aspect. This, of course, was Newman's view. 
In addition, the fact that propositions are historically 
conditioned does not make them half true, and half false. 
This has been drawn out well by Karl Rahner, who pointed 
out that such propositions are an

*adaequatio intellectus et rei*, in so far as they state 
absolutely nothing which is false. Anyone who wants to call 
them 'half false' because they do not state everything about the 
whole truth of the matter in question, would eventually abolish 
the distinction between truth and falsehood. On the other hand, 
anyone who proposes to regard these propositions of faith, 
because they are wholly true, as in themselves *adequate* to the 
matter in question, i.e. as exhaustive statements, would be 
falsely elevating human truth to God's simple and exhaustive 
knowledge of himself and of all that takes its origin from 
him.¹⁰³

Avis's comments, however, are based on a particular 
epistemology, which 'plays of imagination - with its own 
distinctive resources of mythopoeic story-telling, 
symbolisation and concrete image, against intellect in its 
propositional mood.'¹⁰⁴ But it seems that Avis has made a 
false distinction. This is because imagination plays a 
vital role in man's understanding of the event of 
Revelation, and is therefore necessary before a rational 
interpretation of that Revelation can be made.
Criticism aside, Avis's observation that dogmas are historically and culturally conditioned must be acknowledged. That this has been done can be seen from the brief discussion above of the document *Mysterium ecclesiae*, issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1973.\(^\text{105}\) That being said, the faithful... must shun the opinion, first, that dogmatic formulae (or some category of them) cannot signify truth in a determinate way, but can only offer changeable approximations to it, which to a certain extent distort or alter it; secondly, that these formulae signify the truth only in an indeterminate way, this truth being like a goal that is constantly being sought by means of such approximations.\(^\text{106}\)

Newman was also fully aware of the historical nature of dogma, as is shown by the discussion of his view that a definition *ex cathedra* must be interpreted by the *schola theologorum*. This emphasizes the wisdom of both Vatican Councils in choosing to speak of infallibility as a charism of the Church, which gives rise to irreformable definitions, rather than speaking of infallible propositions.
Those of us who took part in Vatican II (the 21st General Council of the Church) became very aware that Newman had not only come into his own but that the whole mind of the Council was imbued with his thought. I do not think it an exaggeration to say that. For it is difficult to imagine how a great deal of the Council's thinking on the Church, Revelation, Conscience and the participation of the laity could have been formulated apart from his initial groundwork.

Originally, it had been intended that the Second Vatican Council would produce only one document on the Church, but once the discussions began it became clear that two were required. The first, Lumen Gentium, 'The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church', was officially promulgated on 21 November 1964, and the second, 'The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World', Gaudium et Spes, followed on 7 December 1965. As its English title suggests, Lumen Gentium is concerned with the Church's theological understanding of herself, and is therefore the one discussed below.

The Mystery of the Church

Chapter 1 (articles 1 - 8) is concerned with 'The Mystery of the Church'. Various objections were raised to this title by some Fathers who felt that it would open the door for the rejection of the doctrine of the visible
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

Church in favour of the invisible Church. Those who opposed the use of the word 'mystery', however, held a very limited concept of it, which restricted it to the secret or abstruse. The use of the biblical term 'mystery' was intended to elucidate the true, complex nature of the Church in all its aspects, both visible and invisible. In fact, this chapter is 'a deliberate effort at a synthesis such as is already implicit in the biblical and patristic notion of mysterium.'

Christ is the light of humanity; and it is, accordingly, the heart-felt desire of this sacred Council, being gathered together in the Holy Spirit, that by proclaiming His Gospel to every creature (cf. Mk. 16:15), it may bring all men to the light of Christ which shines out visibly from the Church. Since the Church, in Christ, is in the nature of a sacrament - a sign and instrument, that is, of communion with God and of unity among all men - she here purposes... to set forth... her own nature and universal mission. (LG 1)

The Church, then, is the light of the nations. Couched more theologically, the Church is the 'universal sacrament of salvation'. (LG 48) Through the sacrament of the Church intimate union with God and the intimate unity of the whole of humanity is achieved. Thus the council has ascribed to the Church 'the value of a sacramental symbolism and instrumentality in the whole of the divine economy of salvation for all mankind and its history.'
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

Articles 2-4 trace the origin and the history of the Church. She was founded by God and has her realization in history. Article 3 develops the Christological basis for the Church and stresses the salvific function of the eucharist. But the stress on Christ is counter-balanced by reference to Pentecost and the work of the Holy Spirit, who bestows upon the Church 'varied hierarchic and charismatic gifts, and in this way directs her... and leads her into perfect union with her Spouse.' (LG 4) The Trinitarian framework for the mystery of the Church is also underscored in a manner which reflects the Trinitarian nature of Revelation in Dei Verbum 2:

Hence the universal Church is seen to be "a people brought into unity from the unity, of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit." (LG 4)

Article 5 deals with the Kingdom of God and the Church. The first point made is that the Kingdom was present in the person, works and preaching of Jesus. Secondly, the Church must continue Jesus' work by proclaiming the Kingdom, and thirdly, this work will only be accomplished once the Kingdom is established in its fulness on earth. In other words, the Church, when acting in Christ brings about the realization of His reign on earth. She is its partial proleptic presence.
Articles 6-7 portray the Church according to many different biblical images, not just the Mystical Body of Christ, which had come to be interpreted in a highly institutional fashion. Many Old Testament images and analogies are now interpreted in terms of Christ, e.g. Shepherd (cf. Is. 40:11; Ex. 34:11f.). (LG 6) Christ is therefore seen as the fulfilment of the Old Testament imagery, as well as the object of that of the New Testament, e.g. as the stone which the builders rejected (cf. Mt. 21:42; Acts 4:11; 1 Pet. 2:7; Ps. 117:22). (LG 6)

Finally the mystery of the Church is expressed, in St. Paul's phrase, as the Body of Christ. (LG 7) This theme is developed in two stages. Firstly, the Church is described as a 'body', i.e. an organic unity. One becomes a member of this body through baptism, in which one participates in Christ's death and resurrection. Once a member of the body, one is nourished through the eucharist. 'In this way all of us are made members of his body (cf. 1 Cor. 12:27), "but severally members one of another" (Rom. 12:4).' (LG 7) That being said, there is a legitimate diversity within the one body, each having different (but equally valuable) roles to play. Should either the unity or diversity be harmed, however, the whole body will be damaged; its individual members must accept
responsibilities, but must not abuse their freedoms.13

Secondly, Christ is described as the head of the body, and it is to Him that the rest of the body is to conform. In this, the body is aided by Christ and the Spirit (who animates the body), who impart graces to it. The relationship between head and body, however, is not impersonal, but rather, 'Christ loves the Church as his bride.' (LG 7) Thus, the Church is not to be regarded as a prolongation of the Incarnation.14

Article 8 then 'takes up the title of the whole chapter, presenting the Church in its reality as mystery, in its sacramental structure.'15 It is emphasized that as well as being a 'visible society', the Church is also a 'spiritual community'. These are 'not to be thought of as two realities. On the contrary, they form one complex reality which comes together from a human and a divine element.' (LG 8)16

Although the full reality of the Church is not completely visible on earth, it should not be assumed, however, that it cannot be identified:

This is the sole Church of Christ which in the creed we profess to be one, holy, catholic and apostolic, which our Saviour after
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

His resurrection, entrusted to Peter's pastoral care (Jn. 21:17). (LG 8)

The text does not, however, simply identify the Church of Christ with the Roman Catholic Church:

This Church, constituted and organized as a society in the present world, subsists in the Catholic Church, which is governed by the successor of Peter and by the bishops in communion with him. (LG 8)

This statement does not obscure the visibility of the Church, but merely acknowledges that 'many elements of sanctification and of truth are found outside its visible confines.' (LG 8) This was a marked shift of emphasis away from Pius XII's encyclicals *Mystici Corporis* (1943)\(^{18}\) and *Humani Generis* (1950),\(^{19}\) which identified the Church of Christ exclusively with the Roman Catholic Church, and it has opened the way for substantial ecumenical dialogue.\(^{20}\)

Thus the Church is called to follow in the footsteps of Jesus 'if she is to communicate the fruits of salvation to men.' (LG 8) Accordingly, she is to reject triumphalism\(^{21}\) and is to serve the poor in the humility that characterized Jesus' ministry. Furthermore, although Christ, the head of the Church, is sinless, the Church herself 'at once holy and in need of purification, follows
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church constantly the path of penance and renewal.' (LG 8)

This sinfulness is due to the Church being realized in sinful men. Although this sin can sometimes damage the luminosity of the Church as the sign of salvation, the preservation of the Church is guaranteed by Christ. That being said, the faithful are constantly being called to repentance and renewal. Christ will also protect His Church from persecution 'so that she may reveal in the world, faithfully, however darkly, the mystery of the Lord until, in the consummation, it shall be manifested in full light.' (LG 8)

The People of God

Chapter 2 (articles 9-17) discusses the concept of the Church as 'The People of God'. This term refers to the Church as a whole, not to the mass of the faithful, over and against the clergy or the hierarchy.

Article 9 deals with the theme of the Church as on a pilgrimage through history, and it is argued that 'God's saving actions in history are directed towards the formation of a community of salvation, which, however, will be granted its fulfilment and absolute perfection only at the end of time.' The first step in this process was the election and guidance of the Israelites, which 'happened as a preparation and figure of that new and perfect covenant
which was to be ratified in Christ, and of the fuller Revelation which was to be given through the Word of God made flesh.' (LG 9)26 The 'People of God' is not a democratic assembly, but a community of worship and salvation gathered before God, with Christ at its head, and for this reason, this image of the Church must always be counter-balanced by that of the Body of Christ.27

Articles 10-12 describe how the People of God participate in the threefold office of Christ, who is Prophet, Priest and King. Of these offices, priesthood is described in the greatest detail.

The baptized, by regeneration and the anointing of the Holy Spirit, are consecrated to be a spiritual house and a holy priesthood, that through all the works of Christian men they may offer spiritual sacrifices and proclaim the perfection of Him who has called them out of darkness into His marvellous light (cf. 1 Pet. 2:4-10). (LG 10)

This priesthood, which is common to all the baptized, differs from the ministerial or hierarchical priesthood not only in degree, but also in essence. By virtue of his sacramental ordination the ministerial priest acts in persona Christi effecting 'the eucharistic sacrifice and offers it to God in the name of all the people' (LG 10), who participate in the offering of this sacrifice as a
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

2. 'They exercise that priesthood, too by the reception of the sacraments, prayer and thanksgiving, the witness of a holy life, abnegation and active charity.' (LG 10)

Article 11 then describes this priestly community in more detail, paying particular attention to the relationship of each individual sacrament to that sacrament which is the Church: 'The sacred nature and organic structure of the priestly community is brought into operation through the sacraments and the exercise of virtues.' (LG 11) It is argued that the Church is built upon the sacraments and that the sacrament of the Church is made explicit in each individual sacrament. Further still, 'every sacrament, received in faith and with proper preparation, demonstrates the will to fellowship with the person and destiny of Christ, His life, death and resurrection; sacraments and the life of moral effort constitute an indissoluble unity.'

Article 12 begins: 'The holy People of God shares also in Christ's prophetic office' (LG 12) through the sensus fidei, and special gifts of grace, bestowed by the Spirit, as He chooses, upon individual members of the People of God. These graces are to be seen in close connexion with the sacraments, through which the Spirit
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

pours out His grace upon the Church, and 'Those who have charge over the Church should judge the genuineness and the proper use of these gifts, through their office, not indeed to extinguish the Spirit, but to test all things and hold fast to what is good (cf. Th. 5:12 and 19-21).' (LG 12) Those entrusted with making the judgement can be said to be sharing in and exercising Christ's regal office.

Article 13 is a discussion of catholicity. 'All the faithful scattered throughout the world are in communion with each other in the Holy Spirit.' (LG 13) As will be elaborated upon further in the discussion of article 23, the universal Church comprises a communion of local Churches, and it is through missionary preaching and administration of the sacraments that the Church can continue the redemptive work of Christ in all places and throughout all ages. Within this unity, a legitimate diversity is also to be preserved. This diversity is due to the exercise of different offices by individual members of the Body of Christ, and / or 'their condition and manner of life.' (LG 13) These differences, however, must not be allowed to hinder the unity of the Church. The article then ends by noting that

All men are called to this catholic unity which prefigures and promotes universal peace. And in different ways to it belong, or are related: the Catholic faithful, others who believe in
Christ, and finally all mankind, called by God's grace to salvation. (LG 13)

This sentence announces the theme of articles 14-16 which deal with the Church, non-Catholic Christians and non-Christians.

Article 14 'turns its attention to the Catholic faithful'. (LG 14) The necessity of incorporation into the pilgrim Church, the Body of Christ, through baptism and faith, for salvation is stressed, as is the acceptance by those who possess the Spirit of Christ of 'all the means of salvation given to the Church together with her entire organization, and who - by the bonds constituted by the profession of faith, the sacraments, ecclesiastical government, and communion - are joined in the visible structure of the Church of Christ, who rules through her Supreme Pontiff and the bishops.' (LG 14) Such membership of the Church does not, however, guarantee salvation if one does not persevere in charity. A person who does not, 'remains indeed in the bosom of the Church, but "in body" not "in heart."' (LG 14) Thus full membership is on two levels - the spiritual and the visible. Indeed, those who do not respond to the graces thus offered them, will be judged all the more severely. Catechumens come very close to this full incorporation into the Church due
to their desire to be part of her. They can therefore be described as 'joined to her' and 'mother Church embraces them as her own.' (LG 14)

Article 15 is a discussion of the relationship of non-Catholic Christians to the Catholic Church. The most important of these links is baptism, but also mentioned are the episcopate, the sacrament of the eucharist and the 'many who hold sacred Scripture in honour as a rule of faith and of life, who have a sincere religious zeal, who lovingly believe in God the Father Almighty and in Christ, the Son of God and the Saviour.' (LG 15) But as the Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio clear, the Roman Catholic church regards itself as more closely formed to some bodies of Christians than others. That being said, all non-Catholic Christians are thought of as joined to the Catholic Church in a real way - i.e. spiritually, although not visibly. Accordingly non-Catholic Churches and ecclesial communities are regarded as a partial sign and their salvific function for their members is recognized. All Christians are then exhorted to pray for unity, so that the sign may shine more brightly.

Article 16 then moves on to 'those who have not yet received the Gospel [but] are related to the People of God in various ways.' (LG 16) Those who are closest to the
Church are the Jews, to whom God's Revelation was first made known. Muslims are also regarded as related to the Church because of their belief in the one God (although, of course, they reject the Trinity) and share the faith of Abraham. That which underlies this relationship, however, is the fact of God's universal salvific will, the unity of the human race and 'the real oneness of Christ with this human race by virtue of the Incarnation... the place of the presence of the saving God in the world.' By this token, grace is not denied to Jews or Muslims. Nor is it denied to those who truly seek God among 'shadows and images... since He gives to men life and breath and all things.' (LG 16) Salvation is also open to those who have not arrived at any explicit knowledge of God, 'and who, not without grace, strive to lead a good life. Whatever good or truth is found amongst them is considered by the Church to be a preparation for the Gospel, and given by Him who enlightens all men that they may at length have life.' (LG 16) This does not, however, apply to those who have exchanged the truth of God for a lie and hence the Church takes care to foster the missions.

Since Christ is 'the source of all salvation for the whole world' (LG 17) the chapter ends with a reminder of the necessity of the Church's missionary work: 'Each disciple of Christ has the obligation of spreading the
faith to the best of his ability.' (LG 17)

The Hierarchical Structure of the Church

The third chapter of Lumen Gentium (articles 18-29) is concerned with the 'Hierarchical Structure of the Church, with Special Reference to the Episcopate'.

Articles 18-21 deal with the New Testament basis for the episcopate. It is stated in article 18 that Christ established a variety of offices in the Church so that good order might be maintained, thus helping the members of the Church attain salvation. The holders of these offices are said to be 'invested with sacred power' (LG 18), and they are to be distinguished from those blessed with the charisms mentioned in article 12.

The biblical foundation for this view is provided in article 19:

The Lord Jesus... called to Himself those whom He willed and appointed twelve to be with Him, whom He might send to preach the kingdom of God (cf. Mk. 3:13-19; Mt. 10:1-42). These apostles (cf. Lk. 6:13) He constituted in the form of a college or permanent assembly, at the head of which He placed Peter, chosen from amongst them (cf. Jn. 21:15-17). (LG 19)

The apostles, having received their mission from
Jesus, which is described as 'sharing in his power' \( (LG\ 19) \), received the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, not just as a confirmation of their office, but as another constitutive element of it. Following this, they carried out their mission to preach the Gospel everywhere, which resulted in 'gather[ing] together the universal Church' \( (LG\ 19) \), of which Christ is the corner-stone.

It is then argued that 'since the Gospel, which they were charged to hand on, is, for the Church, the principle of all its life for all time' \( (LG\ 20) \), the mission of the apostles is to last until the end of the world. Hence the apostles appointed successors, i.e. bishops. To substantiate this point, appeal is made to Scripture (cf. Acts 20:28) and to the practice of the Early Church. As Rahner comments: 'Thus the concrete content of what is laid down in the Scriptures as of divine right, meets us in the form of historical fact, and we have no right to separate the two things.'

Thus according to the testimony of St. Irenaeus, the apostolic tradition is manifested and preserved in the whole by those who were made bishops by the apostles and by their successors down to our own time. \( (LG\ 20) \)

Thus, \textit{Lumen Gentium} teaches that 'the bishops have by divine institution taken the place of the apostles as
pastors of the Church.' (LG 20)

Next, article 21 discusses the nature of the episcopal office in general and the sacramental reality on which all its functions are based. 'In the person of the bishops... the Lord Jesus Christ, supreme high priest, is present in the midst of the faithful... through their signal service... He preaches the word of God to all peoples and administers without cease to the faithful the sacraments of faith.' (LG 21) In order that they might fulfil so exalted a role, the apostles were graced with a special out-pouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. The gift of the Spirit was, and is, transmitted by the laying on of hands in episcopal consecration, in which the fulness of the sacrament of Holy Orders is conferred. By this consecration, the offices of sanctifying, teaching and ruling are also bestowed, and the bishop therefore participates ontologically in Christ's threefold office of Prophet, Priest and King, acting as His representative. The offices of teaching and governing, however, can only be exercised in unity with the episcopal college and its head.

This leads directly to a treatment of one of the main themes of the council: the college of bishops. The relationship between the episcopate and the papacy is
The council taught that there exists, 'in accordance with the Lord's decree' (LG 22) a college of bishops (known also as 'body' or 'order' of bishops) that is the direct successor of the apostolic college. These colleges are united under their heads, i.e. St. Peter and his successors. A number of arguments are put forward to support the idea of such an episcopal college, the most important of which is the existence of ecumenical councils. The doctrine of collegiality is then enunciated:

The college or body of bishops has[,] for all that[,] no authority unless united with the Roman Pontiff, Peter's successor, as its head, whose primatial authority, let it be added, over all, whether pastors or faithful, remains in its integrity. For the Roman Pontiff, by reason of his office as Vicar of Christ, namely, and as pastor of the entire Church, has full, supreme and universal power over the whole Church, a power which he can always exercise unhindered. The order of bishops is the successor to the college of the apostles in their role as teachers and pastors, and in it the apostolic college is perpetuated. Together with their head, the Supreme Pontiff, and never apart from him, they have supreme and full authority over the universal Church; but this power cannot be exercised without the agreement of the Roman Pontiff. (LG 22)

So the college only exists when united to the pope, and one may not distinguish between the college and the
pope, but only between the college with the pope at its head and the pope alone. 'The college of bishops, thus understood, is the possessor of supreme and full authority over the whole Church.'\(^4\) This power, however, is not bestowed on the college by the pope, and the pope's assent to a decision of the college is not something imposed from outside. It is, rather, an intrinsic part of the collegial act itself.\(^4\) Restraint is imposed upon the pope, since he cannot act as a private person in such matters.\(^4\) He must always act as the visible head of the Church, which he is 'only when he is a member of the Church, living in its Spirit and from the institution as a whole. If he has to act as visible head of the Church, then he has to act as head of the college. Hence the collegiate possessor of supreme power in the Church is strictly one but has two modes of action, in keeping with its intrinsic structure through the pope "alone" as its primatial head, and through the college acting strictly as such.\(^5\)

One becomes a member of the college through 'sacramental consecration and by the hierarchical communion with the head and members of the college' (LG 22), and it is argued that all members of the college have the power to loose and bind. The college is also 'the expression of the multifariousness and universality of the People of God; and the unity of the flock of Christ, in so far as it is
assembled under one head.' (LG 22) The bishops have a function with regard to their own local Churches and to the Church as a whole, but in accordance with the doctrine of collegiality, it is taught that an ecumenical council must receive confirmation from the pope, an intrinsic, constitutive element of the council itself.

Article 23 deals with the relationships between a bishop and the whole Church, his own local Church and other local Churches. These relationships are based in collegiality:

The Roman Pontiff, as the successor of Peter, is the perpetual and visible source and foundation of the unity both of the bishops and of the whole company of the faithful. The individual bishops are the visible source and foundation of unity in their own particular Churches, which are constituted after the model of the universal Church; it is in these and formed out of them that the one and unique Catholic Church exists. And for that reason precisely, each bishop represents his own Church, whereas all, together with the Pope, represent the whole Church in a bond of peace, love and unity. (LG 23)

The one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church, therefore, is present in its entirety in each validly constituted local Church under its bishop. It follows, then, that the universal Church is not the sum total of all the local Churches; it is, rather, a communion of them.51
In these local Churches, the individual bishop exercises power only in respect of his own Church, not over other local Churches or the Church as a whole. He is, however, required to do this in a way that is not detrimental to the well-being of the whole Church, since this will, in fact, build up the entire Church. All the bishops, therefore, should join with each other and the pope in missionary work and 'should gladly extend their fraternal assistance, in the fellowship of an all pervading charity, to other Churches, especially to neighbouring ones and to those most in need of help.' (LG 23) The Patriarchal Churches and episcopal conferences are mentioned as ways which contribute 'to the concrete realization of the collegiate spirit.' (LG 23)

Articles 24-27 now take up the functions of each of the individual diocesan bishops in his local Church. Article 25, however, also includes a discussion of the doctrinal authority of the episcopate as a whole, and of the pope.

After underlining the bishop's duty to foster mission work, article 24 stresses that the office of bishop is one of 'service, which is called very expressively in sacred Scripture a diakonia or ministry (cf. Acts 1:17 and 25; 21:19; Rom. 11:13; 1 Tim 1:12)' (LG 24) It is also
added that a bishop cannot be admitted to office should he 'refuse the apostolic communion'. (LG 24)

The first section of article 25 then discusses the teaching office of the individual bishop. The bishop is endowed with the authority of Christ for this function, in which teaching is equated with preaching the Gospel. The faithful are expected to submit their will and intellect to this teaching, although they are not required to give the assent of faith, since a bishop's teaching need not be restricted explicitly to dogma: it covers all issues of theology and Church life. It is stressed that this submission is due in a special way to the teachings of the pope, even when not speaking *ex cathedra*. This teaching may be delivered through various channels, and these dictate the level of assent required. In certain cases, 'obedient silence' may be sufficient.  

The second section deals with the teaching authority of the college of bishops, which in certain circumstances is infallible. This infallibility is exactly the same as that of the pope, and must be exercised in the same manner, subject to the same limitations. Following on from article 22, it is clear that any infallible pronouncement must be a collegial act. The third and fourth sections of article 25 deal with the nature of infallible teaching, and are cited
This infallibility, however, with which the Divine Redeemer wished to endow His Church in defining doctrines pertaining to faith and morals, is co-extensive with the deposit of Revelation, which must be religiously guarded and loyally and courageously expounded. The Roman Pontiff, head of the college of bishops, enjoys this infallibility in virtue of his office, when as supreme pastor and teacher of all the faithful - who confirms his brethren in the faith (cf. LK. 22:32) - he proclaims in an absolute decision a doctrine pertaining to faith or morals. For that reason his definitions are rightly said to be irreformable by their very nature and not by reason of the assent of the Church, in as much as they were made with the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised to him in the person of blessed Peter himself; and as a consequence they are in no way in need of the approval of others, and do not admit of appeal to any other tribunal. For in such a case the Roman Pontiff does not utter a pronouncement as a private person, but rather does he expound and defend the teaching of the Catholic faith as the supreme teacher of the universal Church, in whom the Church's charism of infallibility is present in a singular way. The infallibility promised to the Church is also present in the body of bishops when, together with Peter's successor, they exercise the supreme teaching office. Now, the assent of the Church can never be lacking to such definitions on account of the same Holy Spirit's influence, through which Christ's whole flock is maintained in the unity of the faith and makes progress in it. Furthermore, when the Roman Pontiff, or the body of bishops together with him, define a doctrine, they make the definition in conformity with Revelation itself, to which all are bound to adhere and to which they are obliged to submit; and this Revelation is transmitted integrally either in written form or in oral tradition through the legitimate succession of bishops.
and above all through the watchful concern of the Roman Pontiff himself; and through the light of the Spirit of truth it is scrupulously preserved in the Church and unerringly explained. The Roman Pontiff and the bishops, by reason of their office and the seriousness of the matter, apply themselves with zeal to the work of inquiring by every suitable means into this Revelation and of giving apt expression to its contents; they do not, however, admit any new public Revelation as pertaining to the divine deposit of faith. (LG 25)

This view of infallibility is thoroughly in accord with the teaching of Vatican I and the interpretation given to it above. The understanding of the means by which this infallibility is exercised has, however, been developed by Vatican II, in the light of the doctrine of collegiality. Furthermore, it is also explicitly stated, in accordance with Dei Verbum, that the charism of infallibility is not a means by which the Church can add to the Deposit of Revelation. It is, rather, an assistance in clarifying that Revelation, which was given once and for all, and which is complete in Christ.

Article 26 discusses the sacerdotal office of a bishop. In accordance with article 23 it is stated that: 'In each altar community, under the sacred ministry of the bishop, a manifest symbol is to be seen of that charity and "unity of the mystical body, without which there can be no salvation"' (LG 26) and in the sacramental life of each
local Church the bishop is the priestly superior. Among his duties are the formation of the liturgy and regulation of the discipline of penance. He is also the original minister of confirmation.

Next, the regal office of the bishop is discussed in article 27. Here it is expressly stated that bishops are not 'to be regarded as vicars of the Roman Pontiff; for they exercise the power which they possess in their own right and are called in the truest sense of the term prelates of the people whom they govern.' His power is therefore 'proper, ordinary and immediate.' (LG 27) Thus the bishop has personal responsibility for his own local Church, which he rules in the name of Christ, through the divinely instituted office of bishop.57 The text stresses, however, that his is a ministry of service, and that as well as teaching and commanding, a bishop must also listen to his flock. He should also pay particular regard to missionary and ecumenical work, and charity.

Priests (article 28) and deacons (article 29) also share in the three offices of Christ, but deacons do not share in it to the same degree as priests, who, in turn, do not possess it in the fulness that the bishops do. In other words, one can come to a fuller participation in the threefold office through ordination, especially episcopal
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

ordination.

The Laity

Chapter 4 (articles 30-38) then treats of 'The Laity'. In this chapter, the fundamental equality of the laity with clergy and religious is declared,58 and the laity's place in both the Church and the world is described.

'Everything that has been said of the People of God is addressed equally to laity, religious and clergy' who are all involved in 'the whole salvific mission of the Church to the world.' (LG 30) No theological definition of 'laity' is presented here, but 'the faithful who by Baptism are incorporated into Christ, are placed in the People of God, and in their own way share in the priestly, prophetic and kingly office of Christ.' (LG 31) By 'in their own way' is meant as laymen', i.e. the mission of the laity is secular in character:59

By reason of their special vocation it belongs to the laity to seek the kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and directing them according to God's will. (LG 31)

Next, with reference to Romans 12:4-5, article 32 points out that a great diversity exists in the Church, but that all are one in Christ. Although there are many different roles to be performed in the Church, 'there
remains, nevertheless, a true equality between all with regard to the dignity and to the activity which is common to all the faithful in building up of the Body of Christ.' (LG 32) The pastors should minister to each other and to the faithful, and the People of God should be held together by a fraternal bond, in its ministry of service to each other and to the world.

Article 33 deals with the nature and sources of the layman's apostolic vocation and his apostolic life:

The apostolate of the laity is a sharing in the salvific mission of the Church. Through baptism and confirmation all are appointed to this apostolate by the Lord Himself. Moreover, by the sacraments, and especially by the eucharist, that love of God and man which is the soul of the apostolate is communicated and nourished. The laity, however, are given a special vocation: to make the Church present and fruitful in those places and circumstances where it is only through them that she can become the salt of the earth. Thus, every lay person, through those gifts given to him, is at once the witness and the living instrument of the mission of the Church itself "according to the measure of Christ's bestowal" (Eph. 4:7).' (LG 33)

Thus the sacraments of baptism and confirmation form the foundation for a general Christian apostolate in which the laity shares. Furthermore, through these sacraments, the laity participates in Christ's threefold office of Prophet, Priest and King. Obviously there is a link with
the Church as a whole and the text makes it clear that the laity takes part in the mission of the entire Church. As well as their mission in the world, lay people also have 'the capacity of being appointed by the hierarchy to some ecclesiastical offices with a view to a spiritual end.'

(LG 33)

Article 34 then deals specifically with the way in which the laity shares in Christ's priestly office by offering 'spiritual worship for the glory of the Father and the salvation of man.' (LG 34) This lay people do through all their works, provided they are accomplished in the Spirit: 'And so, worshipping everywhere by their holy actions, the laity consecrate the world itself to God.' (LG 34)

Lay people share in Christ's prophetical office because Christ has established 'them as witnesses and provides them with the appreciation of the faith (sensus fidei) and the grace of the word (cf. Acts 2:17-18; Apoc. 19:10) so that the power of the Gospel may shine out in daily family and social life.' In doing this 'the laity become heralds of the faith in things to be hoped for (cf. Heb. 11:1) if they join unhesitating profession of faith to the life of faith.' (LG 35) Their particular sphere of action is seen as within the sacrament of marriage and
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

family life: 'The Christian family proclaims aloud both the present power of the kingdom of God and the hope of the blessed life.' (LG 35) It is the duty of every layman to work for the building up of the Kingdom of God.

The laity participates in Christ's regal office by recognizing

the inner nature, the value and the ordering of the whole of creation to the praise of God. Even by their secular activity they must aid one another to greater holiness of life, so that the world may be filled with the Spirit of Christ and may the more effectively attain its destiny in justice, in love and in peace. (LG 36)

The laity is to use its particular skills to 'impregnate culture and human works with a moral value' (LG 36), thus preparing a path for the Gospel. In all of their temporal business laymen must be guided by Christian conscience, since no human activity falls outside God's dominion.

Article 37 then treats of the relationship between the laity and the pastors. It would appear, however, that there is some ambiguity in the way in which the council dealt with this issue. On the one hand, it is asserted that although lay people have the right to receive 'the
spiritual goods of the Church' (LG 37) from the pastors, the relationship between the two should not be one purely of dependence upon the pastors. In fact, lay people have the right, and even the obligation, to speak on matters in which they have particular competence (e.g. education), though always through the proper channels. Yet, on the other hand, it is stated that 'the laity should promptly accept in Christian obedience what is decided by the pastors who, as teachers and rulers of the Church, represent Christ.' (LG 37)

The issue at stake is how to give the laity real participatory power. The text, while encouraging the laity to speak and the pastors to listen, at the same time reserves the decision making itself solely to the pastors, with the assumption that all will be peace in the Church. What is required is a clear statement of the organic partnership that should exist between the laity and the pastors, with, at the same time, an acknowledgement that, because of the legitimate divide between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens, there will be some conflict of opinion. Furthermore, as has been argued above, such conflict need not necessarily be detrimental to the Church, but may in fact be creative, resulting in significant advances in her faith, life, worship and teaching. Thirty years after the council there is still
a great deal of unclarity concerning the position of the laity in the Roman Catholic Church.

The chapter then ends with a Christological definition of the secular Christian layman:

Each individual layman must be a witness before the world to the resurrection and the life of the Lord Jesus, and a sign of the living God. All together, and each one to the best of his ability, must nourish the world with spiritual fruits (cf. Gal. 5:22). They must diffuse in the world the spirit which animates those poor, meek and peace-makers whom the Lord in the Gospel proclaimed blessed (cf. Mt. 5:3-9). In a word: "what the soul is in the body, let Christians be in the world." (LG 38)

Comparison with Newman

Newman never wrote a full theological treatise which covered every aspect of ecclesiology, and as such, we should not expect to find in his works a full systematic discussion of the ideas set out above. There is, however, sufficient material in the preface to the Via Media, 'On Consulting the Faithful', his sermons and various unpublished, and hitherto unconsidered papers to warrant a comparison with the teaching of the Second Vatican Council.

a) The Mystery and Sacrament of the Church

As one might expect of a nineteenth-century convert to
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

Catholicism, Newman held a 'high' doctrine of the Church:

Christ formed a body; He secured that body from dissolution by the bond of a Sacrament. He committed the privileges of his spiritual kingdom and the maintenance of His faith as a legacy to this baptized society.... Christianity has not been spread, as other systems, in an isolated manner, or by books; but from a centre, by regularly formed bodies, descendants of the three thousand, who, after St. Peter's preaching on the day of Pentecost, joined themselves to the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship. 63

This aspect of his thought, however, is counter-balanced by the belief that 'no harm can come of the distinction of the Church into the Visible and Invisible, while we view it as, on the whole, but one in different aspects; as Visible, because consisting (for instance) of clergy and laity - as Invisible, because resting for its life and strength upon unseen influences and gifts from Heaven.' 66 The Church is in fact the Holy Spirit's 'especial dwelling place' 67 and the importance of the eucharist in the life of the Church is also asserted:

Christ's blessed Supper is food to us altogether, whatever we are, soul, body, and all. It is the seed of eternal life within us, the food of immortality, to "preserve our body and soul unto everlasting life." The forbidden fruit wrought in Adam unto death; but this is the fruit which makes us live for ever. Bread sustains us in this temporal life; the consecrated bread is the means of eternal strength for soul and body. Who could
live this visible life without earthly food? And in the same
general way the Supper of the Lord is the "means" of our living
for ever. We have no reason for thinking we shall live for ever
unless we eat it, no more than we have reason to think our
temporal life will be sustained without meat and drink. God
can, indeed, sustain us, "not by bread alone"; but this is His
ordinary means, which His will has made such.... We eat the
sacred bread, and our bodies become sacred; they are not ours;
they are Christ's; they are instinct with that flesh which saw
not corruption; they are inhabited by His Spirit; they become
immortal; they die but to appearance, and for a time; they
spring up when their sleep is ended, and reign with Him for
ever.66

In addition, although he did not formulate his ideas
in the same terminology as contemporary theologians, Newman
held the Church to be the sacrament of salvation.67 This
is clear from his hymn 'Firmly I believe and truly', of
which one of the verses runs:

And I hold in veneration,
For the love of Him alone,
Holy Church as His creation,
And her teachings as His own.70

Obviously, Newman was also quite familiar with the New
Testament imagery employed in Lumen Gentium to describe the
Church.71

As already noted, Newman's Christological perspective
on ecclesiology enabled him to apply Christ's threefold ministry to the Church herself.\(^\text{7}\) The examples that he used to describe this have been discussed in detail above. All that need be said here is that, like Vatican II, he saw the whole Church as exercising the offices of Christ, and particular individuals as exercising different functions within it. In *Lumen Gentium*, however, each individual member of the Church is, as a result of his baptism and confirmation, seen as participating in each of the offices individually. In this respect, Vatican II is both more sacramental and hierarchical than Newman. Dulles comments: "Whereas Newman seems to make the distribution of the offices depend largely on the temperament and training of individuals, Vatican II asserts that the threefold office is conferred to lay Christians by baptism and confirmation, and that a deeper incorporation into Christ's threefold mission is given by ordination, especially episcopal ordination."\(^\text{73}\)

That being said, Newman did see the Church as being primarily a communion of the baptized. Fr. Ker summarizes Newman's thought:

Newman's conception of the Church as primarily the communion of those who have received the Spirit in baptism is again the view of the East.... As an Anglican, Newman preached that the Church "is a visible body, invested with, or... existing in invisible
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church privileges", for "the Church would cease to be the Church, did the Holy Spirit leave it", since "its outward rites and forms are motivated and animated by the living power which dwells within it".... For while Christ came "to die for us; the Spirit came to make us one in Him who had died and was alive, that is, to form the Church". The Church, then, is "the one mystical body of Christ... quickened by the Spirit" - and it is "one" by virtue of the Holy Spirit "giving it life".  

Newman was also keen to emphasize the legitimate diversity that exists within the Church and, as his private correspondence shows, was much distressed by the autocratic tendencies of many of the English hierarchy and the Roman administration.  

But Newman was also concerned to see that the unity of the Church was not impaired, and was well aware of her imperfections. These, however, were a sign of life in the Church: 'The Church is emphatically a living body... she alone revives even if she declines; heretical and schismatic bodies cannot keep life.' His view on corruptions in the Church is therefore broadly in line with Vatican II, which taught that the Church is at once holy, yet in need of purification. Where Newman's thought differs from that of Vatican II, however, is in his exclusive identification of the Catholic Church with the Church of Christ. Vatican II is more nuanced on this point.
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

As regards membership of the Church, some unpublished notes of 1848 show that Newman was, at that time, quite uncompromising:

It consists

a) of all *fideles* baptized
b) catechumens (though they are not full members)
c) [-----]
d) (Schismatics do not belong; nor do excommunicants)\(^7\)

Obviously this does not tally completely with the view expounded in the final articles of chapter 2 of *Lumen Gentium*, although both Newman and the council agree on the status of catechumens. It should be remembered, however, that by 1875, Newman, like Pius IX,\(^8\) did allow that salvation was possible outside the Church, even though there is no other communion or so-called Church, but the Catholic, in which are stored the promises, the sacraments, and other means of salvation.... But it does not follow, because there is no Church but one which has the Evangelical gifts and privileges to bestow, that therefore no one can be saved without the intervention of that one Church.... [T]he doctrine of invincible ignorance... has been formally and authoritatively put forward by the present Pope.\(^9\)

In addition, in the *Apologia*, Newman wrote that 'the National Church has hitherto been a serviceable breakwater against doctrinal errors',\(^10\) although he was none too
optimistic about how long that would continue to be the case. Catholics should, therefore, do nothing to undermine the Church of England, despite the fact that by 1864 he had concluded that there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which it finds itself here below, must embrace either one or the other.

Given that Vatican II held that the Orthodox Churches and the Protestant Churches and ecclesial communities have a salvific function as regards their members, it would seem that Dulles is correct to conclude that, the 'doctrine of Vatican II on the "subsistence" of the Church of Christ in the Catholic communion differs in subtle but significant ways from Newman's teaching that the Catholic Church, and it alone, is the one ark of salvation.'

Newman, then, can be said to have anticipated, to a large extent, the teaching of Vatican II on the Church as Mystery and as the People of God. Both Newman and Vatican II regard the Church as a mystery and a sacrament, a communion of the baptized, charged with participating in Christ's threefold office of Prophet, Priest and King. The New Testament imagery used to describe the Church is, of course, common to both, and both recognize the necessity of
a legitimate diversity within the Church, as well as her imperfections and corruptions. Vatican II's treatment of the Catholic Church in relation to the Church of Christ and her members is, however, more nuanced than Newman's, and its discussion of the Church's exercise of the prophetical, sacerdotal and regal offices of Christ more developed. Although Newman did not use the expression 'People of God', the concept itself is clear enough in his thought.

b) The Hierarchical Structure

Like Vatican II, Newman believed the origins of the Church's hierarchical structure to lie in the will of Christ, as recorded in the New Testament. In his early Catholic theology, however, the concepts of collegiality and of the Church as a communion of local Churches are absent. The unpublished notes he made for Robert Coffin, a fellow convert and later Redemptorist Father, demonstrate this clearly:

The Papacy is an Episcopate, or rather the Episcopate - for there is only one Episcopate in the Church.

The power (of jurisdiction) comes from him (the Pope) from the fact of his being bishop of Rome - the Episcopate, Primacy, Monarchy, Papacy, belonged to St. Peter - he died Bp. of Rome & it descends to his successors in that see, as a spiritual privilege belonging to it.
Newman, Vatican II, and the Church

It is accidentally attached to the See of Rome.

Though not de fide that the Pope will always be Bishop of Rome, it is de fide that he is so at present & the present Bp. of Rome is Pope.

It is de fide that St. Peter and his successors are Pope.

The Pope is Vicar of Christ, and successor of St. Peter. Bishops are but improperly successors of the Apostles, more properly Vicars.3-

In some also unpublished notes for lectures 'On the Church and the Pope', Newman held that the relationship between the Pope and the bishops could be summarized as follows:

The doctrine may be summed up in these heads

The Pope is successor of all Apostles and Vicar of Xt.
The Pope is the source of all jurisdiction. [my italics]

His jurisdiction is universal, immediate...
He has episcopal power / jurisdiction over bishops
This prerogative is... divine

Bishops are rather Vicars of the Apostles than successors
They have no jurisdiction over other Bps.
The doctrine seems to be that the gift / power of jurisdiction is given them in ordination, but they cannot exercise it without the Pope.
Bishops have a universal jurisdiction, when brought together in Council [which can only be called by the Pope].87
For Newman the Pope 'is the chief constituent part of a General Council, and in following its decisions he is following what he has both taken part in and confirmed.'

It can be seen, then, that in 1847-8, Newman's view of the hierarchical structure of the Church is far more 'papalistic' than that of Vatican II. This is despite the fact that he believed that 'the Pope does not interfere with the rights of the Bishops', who have jurisdiction in their own dioceses. Firstly, Newman held that all power of jurisdiction in the Church came from the pope, and that the bishops were not successors of the apostles. Although he does not use the term, it seems as though he thought of them as 'Vicars of the Pope'. Secondly, given this starting point, Newman was unable in 1847-8, to describe the universal Church as a communion of local Churches, in each one of which the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church is fully present. Hence he did not, at this point, share Vatican II's concept of communion and, thirdly, he had no concept of collegiality:

The Pope is above a General Council as a Bishop is above his diocesan Synod.

Furthermore, he believed that the bishops only have universal jurisdiction in ecumenical councils because it is
extended to them by the pope. That being said, Newman's ecclesiology did develop some more during the following thirty years, and as has been argued above, he did, in the preface to the *Via Media*, envisage some sort of institutional, or perhaps better, structural, limit on the papacy's exercise of power.

In addition, when he re-published his essay on 'The Catholicity of the Anglican Church' in *Essays Critical and Historical*, he seems to have returned to the view that

> Each diocese is a perfect independent Church, sufficient for itself, and the communion of Christians with one and the unity of them all together, lie... in what they are and what they have in common.... [T]he Church is complete in one bishopric; a number of bishoprics are but reiterations of one, and add nothing to the perfection of the system. As there is one Bishop invisible in heaven, so there is but one bishop on earth; and the multitude of bishops are... one and all shadows and organs of one and the same divine reality.

There are, however, some points of agreement between Newman in 1847-8 and Vatican II. Firstly, that the pope is the chief, constitutive member of an ecumenical council (although it is to be remembered that Newman did not speak of a college of bishops in the same sense as Vatican II did) and secondly, that episcopal consecration and membership of the hierarchy were necessary to perform the
function of a bishop: hence there is agreement on the sacramental nature of the office. Like Vatican II, Newman also believed that a bishop only has authority in his own diocese, except when in ecumenical council.

Given that Newman had no developed concept of collegiality, it is not surprising, therefore, that he did not speak specifically of the infallible magisterium of the college of bishops. He did, however, hold that infallibility rested in the whole Church, not just in the pope, and the idea of collegial infallibility is hinted at in the lecture notes prepared in Rome in 1848:

The Church Infallible

1 in the... body of the faithful
   general belief of the faithful

2 in the Church dispersed, or the Bps

3 in the Church collected, or in Council

4 in the Pope; but not as a mere representative of the Church, but jure divino

As regards the definition of infallibility itself, Vatican II followed Vatican I very closely indeed and supplemented it with various qualifications. Hence all that Newman said about Vatican I applies here, and it is to
be noted that the qualifications enunciated in *Lumen Gentium*, and the provisions of *Mysterium ecclesiae*, are broadly in accord with Newman's view on the matter. The pope only:

speaks *ex cathedra*, or infallibly, when he speaks, first, as the Universal Teacher; secondly, in the name and with the authority of the Apostles; thirdly, on a point of faith or morals; fourthly, with the purpose of binding every member of the Church to accept and believe his decision.\(^5\)

Such a definition must also be in conformity with that Revelation which was given once and for all in Christ. This is to be established through suitable methods of inquiry, and the definition itself must then be interpreted by the *schola theologorum*, whose interpretation is not infallible.

Furthermore, Vatican II taught that 'the assent of the Church can never be lacking to such a definition' (*LG* 25), because the Holy Spirit maintains the faith of the Church. This is fully in accord with Newman's view that the *consensus fidelium* is the ultimate guarantee of revealed truth, without it being part of 'the necessary conditions of a de fide decision.'\(^7\)

Many Newman scholars have argued that this is the
fulfilment of Newman's prediction, after Vatican I, that there would be another council which would 'trim the boat', and set forth a more balanced theology of infallibility. This would appear to be so, although in 1848 he felt that given the fact of infallibility, it was unlikely that an ecumenical council would ever be required again:

Moreover, the expedience of the case shows it, when we get so far as to allow the infallibility of the Church. For the method of Councils is too elaborate for these times; one cannot see how a Council is to meet again. If... new decrees are to issue, it must be in some other ways.... Papal Infallibility is only the same in substance as the way of Councils.

The same feeling was expressed in the twentieth century before it was known that a second Vatican Council was to be summoned.

\textit{c) The Laity}

As far as the laity is concerned, Newman was keen to establish their fundamental equality with religious and clergy. This, and the related issue of the role of the laity, he discussed in the essay 'On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine', in which he argued for the necessity, and the right, of the laity to have a voice in the Church. This is the case in secular issues in which
they have special competence, such as education, administration, finance and communications, but the sphere could be widened to include even theology, since lay people must also be heard in matters of doctrine, due to their sharing in the *sensus fidei*.

This, of course, was a policy that Newman had put into practice in the running of the Catholic University, where it was his intention to appoint laymen to the various chairs, and to have them highly involved in the running of the university in general.\(^{102}\)

In short, Newman wanted an educated, active and theologically aware laity, who would work in organic partnership with the bishops.\(^{103}\) He acknowledged the legitimacy of the divide between the *ecclesia docens* and the *ecclesia discens*, but he did not ascribe to the laity a merely passive role.\(^{104}\) After all, it was, in his opinion, the laity who came to the Church's rescue during the Arian crisis. He also realized that such a relationship would produce conflict, but, as argued above, drawing on his own experiences, he saw the possibility of harnessing this tension, and using it for the benefit of the Church.

Such a view of the relationship between the laity and the clergy is perhaps more realistic, and practical, than
what is envisaged in *Lumen Gentium*, which leaves one unsure as to quite how the laity are either to participate, or to be consulted in any purposeful way.

**Evaluation**

In summary, then, it can be seen that Newman anticipated much of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council on various aspects of the Church. The main points of agreement are as follows: first, on the sacramental nature and mystery of the Church; second, on the threefold mission of the Church; third, on the Church as a communion; fourth, on the need for a legitimate diversity, whilst maintaining unity; fifth, on the use of New Testament imagery to describe the Church; sixth, that the episcopate is of divine institution, and on its sacramental nature; seventh, on the meaning of what it is to teach infallibly; and eighth, on the fundamental equality of the laity with clergy and religious in the Church.

The main points of disagreement are: first, Vatican II is more developed in its description of how the People of God participate individually in the threefold office of the Church; second, Vatican II is more nuanced in its treatment of the relationship of the Catholic Church to the Church of Christ and its membership; third, Newman’s view of the hierarchical structure of the Church is more ‘papalistic’
than that of Vatican II, despite his more moderate statements in the preface, which means that he has no developed concept of collegiality as enunciated in Lumen Gentium; fourth, Newman does not speak specifically of the infallible teaching office of the bishops when acting as a college, although he does hint at it; and fifth, Newman's understanding of the relationship between the laity and the clergy is both clearer and more realistic than that envisaged by Vatican II.

Conclusion

To conclude this section, then, it can be said that Newman has anticipated, to a very high degree, the teaching of the Second Vatican Council on the issues of Revelation and ecclesiology. Given that Vatican II has adopted a theory of organic development as its model for understanding the nature and transmission of Revelation, it is not surprising that there is significant agreement between Newman and the council not only on Revelation, but also on the nature of the teaching authority of the Church, to which such a concept of Revelation gives rise; as well as the nature of the Church herself. That being said, Vatican II has a more balanced view of the respective functions of the bishops and the pope, a more nuanced understanding of the composition of the Church, and of her participation in the threefold office of Christ, than does
Newman. On the other hand, Newman's practical experience of life and work in the Church led him to a more practical and realistic understanding of the relationship between the *ecclesia docens* and the *ecclesia discens* than is found in *Lumen Gentium*.

The next task is to consider the significance of this for the practice of theology in the late twentieth century. In other words, does Newman still have something to teach us? More specifically, can ecumenical dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion benefit from any of Newman's insights? In order to answer these questions, it will first be necessary to set out the principles upon which Catholics conduct ecumenical dialogue, and then, secondly, the Agreed Statements on 'Authority in the Church' produced by the Anglican - Roman Catholic International Commission, and various responses to them, will be analysed.
We often hear it said today that the ecumenical movement of the Churches is at a standstill.... I cannot agree with this judgement. Unity, which comes from God, is given to us at the Cross. We must not want to avoid the Cross, passing to rapid attempts at harmonising differences, excluding the question of truth. But neither must we abandon one another, and go our separate ways, because drawing closer calls for true patient and suffering love of Christ crucified. Let us not be diverted from the laborious way in order to remain where we are, or to choose ways that are apparently shorter and lead astray.

John Paul II

It has been established that with regard to the doctrines of Revelation, ecclesiology and infallibility, Newman anticipated the teaching of the Second Vatican Council in many ways. Although criticisms of his thought must not be overlooked, it has been concluded that much of his work is of value for today. In order to assess his significance for the ecumenical dialogue taking place between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion, it is first necessary to set out some principles of ecumenism on which such dialogue can be based. This will be done with reference to the first two chapters of Vatican II's 'Decree on Ecumenism', Unitatis Redintegratio, officially promulgated by Pope Paul VI on 21 November 1964, as well as other documents. Attention will be directed chiefly towards relations with the Anglican Communion, which 'occupies a special place' among
those communities 'in which Catholic traditions and institutions in part continue to exist.' (UR 13)

The title 'Decree' (as distinct from 'Dogmatic Constitution') expresses the fact that the document largely comprises instructions for Catholics derived from the council's doctrinal teaching. From article 1 it is clear that it rests largely on the Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium. That being the case, both documents must be interpreted in the light of the other, since one explains what the principles of the other entail in practice, when one enters into ecumenical work.  

Catholic Principles of Ecumenism

Article 1 serves as the introduction to the decree. It states that:

The restoration of unity among all Christians is one of the principal concerns of the Second Vatican Council. Christ the Lord founded one Church and one Church only. However, many Christian communions present themselves to men as the true inheritors of Jesus Christ; all indeed profess to be followers of the Lord, but they differ in mind and go their different ways, as if Christ Himself were divided. Certainly, such division openly contradicts the will of Christ, scandalizes the world, and damages that most holy cause, the preaching of the Gospel to every creature. (UR 1)
The council notes that there is a growing movement among Christians, 'fostered by the Holy Spirit' (UR 1), towards unity. The text does not state that it is only the Roman Catholic Church which is the true Church of Christ, but simply affirms what virtually all who 'invoke the Triune God and confess Jesus as Lord and Saviour' (UR 1) already acknowledge, namely that these divisions should not exist. The council looked upon the ecumenical movement with approval and wished 'to set before all Catholics guidelines, helps and methods, by which they too can respond to the grace of this divine call'. (UR 1)

Chapter 1 (articles 2 - 4) then discusses 'Catholic Principles of Ecumenism'. The original title of the chapter was 'Principles of Catholic Ecumenism', but this was changed to avoid the impression that Rome was setting up its own ecumenical movement in competition with Geneva. Article 2 is concerned with setting out the Catholic Church's vision of the unity of the Church. Following that, the relationship of non-Catholic Christians to the Catholic Church is defined (article 3) and the ecumenical movement is described in more detail (article 4).

'The text begins with the sending of the Son, as a sending to unite the human race through grace, and proceeds to the sending of the Holy Spirit, through whom the Lord
Foundations for Dialogue

carries out the unifying of mankind in history, as the image of the fundamental pattern of unity which is that of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.'6 This is underpinned by a doctrine of the Church which may be described as an ecclesiology of *communio*.

This has been explained by G. Thils:

This means an ecclesiology which defines the Church as an organic whole, composed of spiritual bonds (faith, hope and charity), and of visible structural forms (the profession of faith, the sacramental economy, the pastoral ministry), and which culminates in the eucharistic mystery, the source and expression of the unity of the Church, or rather of the one Church. This ecclesiology obviously makes use of the essence of the constitutive elements of the Church - the Holy Spirit, theological activity, its ministerial structure, the papacy - but each of these "elements" is considered in so far as it promotes, conditions, realizes or brings about the "communion" which is the Church.'7

The first paragraph underlines this concept of the Church not presenting it as a society brought about by man, but as a *communio* brought about by God. Particular stress is laid upon 'the wonderful sacrament of the Eucharist by which the unity of the Church is both signified and brought about.' (UR 2)

The second paragraph describes the activity of 'the
Holy Spirit, dwelling in those who believe and pervading and ruling over the entire Church, who brings about that wonderful communion of the faithful and joins them together so intimately in Christ that He is the principle of the Church's unity.' (UR 2) It is important to note that this discussion of the Holy Spirit as the principle of unity precedes that of ministry as a unifying factor, and that the Church is described first as a communion of 'faith, hope and charity' (UR 2) before being described as a society. In short, 'the ministry is the instrument which the Spirit uses, and the Church as a visible society is the servant of the supernatural communion in grace.' This emphasis on the Holy Spirit is undoubtedly important for the renewal within the Catholic Church and for ecumenical dialogue.

The third and fourth paragraphs then describe the hierarchical structure of the Church, but authority is always viewed in relation to its function of creating unity. This obviously has important consequences in practice. The Catholic view of the visible structure of the Church is set forth clearly.

The commissioning of the apostles is dealt with in the third paragraph. The particular commissioning of Peter is mentioned after that of the Twelve altogether, thus setting
Peter's office firmly within the doctrine of collegiality. This section clearly reflects the teaching of Lumen Gentium, and it is emphasized that Peter's office should be exercised in a spirit of Christian love, for the unity of the Church. To avoid the idea that the bearer of the Petrine office is alongside or in place of Christ, it is added that 'Christ Jesus, forever remain[s] the chief corner-stone and shepherd of our souls.' (UR 2)  

The fourth paragraph then speaks of the bishops as successors to the apostles, together with Peter's successor at their head. It is their task to preach the Gospel, administer the sacraments and govern in love, so that the Church may increase. Once again the accent is on the unifying effect of ministry, and it must be underlined that the communio of the Church is ascribed to Christ Himself and the Holy Spirit. Thus in accordance with Lumen Gentium the uniqueness of the Church is emphasized:

The Church, then God's only flock, like a standard lifted on high for the nations to see it, ministers the Gospel of peace to all mankind, as it makes its pilgrim way in hope toward its goal, the fatherland above. (UR 2)

It must be borne in mind, however, that the unity of the Church is a mystery. Whilst its visible structures can be perceived easily enough, there is another level,
accessible only through faith, on which the unity of the Church is an image of the mysterious unity 'in the Trinity of Persons, of one God, the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit.' (UR 2)

As regards the article as a whole, it is important that the Church of Christ is not simply identified with the Catholic Church, although in accord with the teaching of Lumen Gentium, it leaves no doubt that the Church of Christ was taught by the council to be realized in the Catholic Church. This leaves open the question as to the manner in which the Church of Christ may be realized in other Christian communities.

Article 3 then discusses the relationship of non-Catholic Christians to the Catholic Church. The concept of the Church and its unity, as outlined above, made it possible for the council to speak of non-Catholic Christians and their communities in ways 'never previously known from the Church's magisterium.'

First of all, it is noted that from the beginning of Christianity, certain rifts arose in the Church and that St. Paul criticized them severely. It may therefore be taken that the larger divisions which arose in the Church, as the centuries progressed, are also to be regarded as
contrary to the will of God. Three points are of especial importance: firstly, the Church speaks of the separation of communities from the Catholic Church, rather than the division of the one Church of Christ; secondly, this division is described as separation 'from full communion' (UR 3), i.e. an imperfect communion still exists; and thirdly, guilt for these divisions lies on both sides. Furthermore, 'one cannot charge with the sin of separation those who are at present born into these [separated] communities and in them are brought up in the faith of Christ, and the Catholic Church accepts them with respect and affection as brothers.' (UR 3)

This is because

men who believe in Christ and have been properly baptized are put in some, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church. Without doubt, the differences that exist in varying degrees between them and the Catholic Church - whether in doctrine and sometimes in discipline, or concerning the structure of the Church - do indeed create many obstacles, sometimes serious ones, to full ecclesiastical communion. The ecumenical movement is striving to overcome these obstacles. But even in spite of them it remains true that all who have been justified by faith in baptism are incorporated into Christ. (UR 3)
Foundations for Dialogue

The distinction between full and imperfect communion reflects article 12 of *Lumen Gentium*, in which incorporation into the communion of the Church is described as being on two levels - through baptism and acceptance of the visible structures of the Church. That being said, some Protestants deny that infants are 'justified by faith in baptism', and find this particular phrase unhelpful. Nevertheless, it follows from this that the aim of 'ecumenical dialogue' is not to bring about the reconciliation of individuals with one communion or another, but rather a restoration of full communion.¹² This is, of course, linked to the fact that Vatican II taught that the Church of Christ and the Catholic Church are not absolutely identical, although the former subsists in the latter. Hence:

some, even very many, of the most significant elements and endowments which together go to build up and give life to the Church itself, can exist outside the visible boundaries of the Catholic Church: the written Word of God; the life of grace; faith, hope and charity, with the interior gifts of the Holy Spirit, as well as visible elements. All of these which come from Christ and lead back to Him, belong by right to the one Church of Christ. (UR 3)

As such, the salvific value of non-Catholic Christian communities can be recognized, since 'the Spirit of Christ has not refrained from using them as a means of salvation
Foundations for Dialogue

which derive their efficacy from the very fullness of grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church.' (UR 3)

Two points must be commented upon. Firstly, it must be asked whether the non-Catholic Christian communities can be regarded as 'particular Churches', so that they form 'constitutive parts' of the one Catholic Church. The council decided that the Orthodox communities which have maintained the Apostolic Succession and acknowledge all seven sacraments may be called Churches. The separated Western communities, however, it decided to call 'Churches and ecclesial communities', the latter having the character of a Church, but not necessarily acknowledging all the sacraments or maintaining the Apostolic Succession. No attempt was made to distinguish precisely between particular groups in the West, and it was left open as to which, if any of these, such as the Anglican Communion, may be called Churches. The decree's ambiguity on this point may well be attributable to the council's desire to be as generous as possible to the non-Catholic Christians of the West.

Secondly, the Church is regarded as a 'means of salvation'. This does not mean that those who are members of the Church are guaranteed salvation, but that they have the opportunity of it: the Church is a means which assists
in attaining the grace of salvation. This is important for understanding the last paragraph of the article. Here the Catholic Church is evaluated as an institution, and the importance of visible elements in the building up of the Church is emphasized. It is taught that only within the Roman Catholic Communion is the Catholic Church of Christ fully realized on the institutional level. This is why the text speaks of the 'fullness of the means of salvation' (UR 3) existing within the Catholic Church alone. This does not mean that the grace of salvation is not imparted to Christians not in communion with Rome or only to a lesser degree, but that, from the institutional point of view, only the Roman Communion has all the elements of the Church Catholic (notably, of course, a primacy based upon that of Peter).

It is not claimed that the visible structures of the Catholic Church are in every way perfect (indeed, the Council undertook to reform many of them), or that a perfect equivalence exists between the visible institution and either the inner spiritual gifts of salvation, or the Church's state of grace or sanctity. In fact, spiritual renewal was a significant theme of the council. No comparison is made between the Catholic Church and non-Catholic communities with regard to internal gifts of grace. Therefore, with article 14 of Lumen Gentium in
Foundations for Dialogue

mind, it is possible to say that on 'the one hand, the visible sign, outward membership of the Church, can become for an individual person through his own guilt a sacramentum validum, sed informe; and on the other hand, membership of the Church and incorporation into the body of Christ on the inward level, what is signified, can be fully realized even though the sacramental and institutional sign, membership of the Church on the visible level, is incomplete.'

This 'ecclesiology of elements' has been frequently criticized by Protestant theologians, who have argued that ultimately it makes the Church something which man can control and manipulate, since, it is contended, it overlooks the fact that the Church is freely created by God's sovereign Word. In addition, it is suggested that such an ecclesiology makes the Church far too much a conglomeration of different elements. This, it is alleged, ignores the indivisible wholeness of other Churches, by implying that they too could be Churches in the full sense if they were to add to what they already possess on the institutional level.

The heart of this controversy is whether by holding to the institutional elements which it regards as constituting the Church on earth, the Catholic Church is submitting
itself to the Word of God or is trying to control it. This issue was discussed above in relation to the treatment of Tradition in *Dei Verbum*, where it was argued that the Word of God can only be understood within the Church. It is not something over and above it. It cannot be set up in opposition to the Church as its external judge. Whilst it can be agreed that there is a need for vigilance, so that a distortion of Tradition may be remedied, it must not be forgotten that Scripture is, from the Catholic viewpoint, a product of the Tradition of the Church, and can only be understood within that context.\(^{15}\) The history of the Church makes it plain that Scripture does not have just one clear meaning. It must be interpreted. This is not the Church controlling Scripture and its meaning. Rather, it is the Holy Spirit leading the Church into all truth, as Jesus promised. This means that the Church is not to be regarded as a social institution, a man made organization. It is, in fact, both the sign and the instrument of salvation, the membership of which is on two levels — external and internal. In short, the Church is a sacrament, the outward sign of an inward grace.\(^{16}\) As such, not only is the Church an invisible reality, it is also visible. Full membership of the Church, therefore, is achieved on two levels — the visible and the invisible, the institutional and the spiritual.
Foundations for Dialogue

Bearing in mind the objections of Protestant theologians, it should be remembered that the text of the decree does emphasize the Holy Spirit before it mentions the ministerial structure of the Church, which is discussed in relation to its function of unifying the Church. The greater the unity of the Church (both external and internal), the brighter the light to the nations. Hence the Catholic insistence on visible communion with the successor of Peter, the bearer of the Petrine office, who is at the head of the college of the successors of the apostles, whose charge is the unity of Christ's Church.

Article 4 treats of the ecumenical movement in more detail. The first paragraph links articles 3 and 4 together by mentioning the already stated fact that there is an ecumenical movement in existence 'under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.' (UR 4) The object of this movement is to attain that unity which Jesus desires for His Church, and the council exhorted 'all the Catholic faithful to recognize the signs of the times and to take an active and intelligent part in the work of ecumenism.' (UR 4)

The second paragraph then lists those activities which make up the ecumenical movement. At the heart of these is dialogue between the Christian communities. Catholics must be careful to treat 'our separated brethren with truth and
fairness' (UR 4), so that through 'such dialogue everyone gains a truer knowledge and more just appreciation of the teaching and religious life of both communions.' (UR 4)

Since this dialogue should not be directed towards gaining converts to Catholicism, but towards greater understanding, Catholics and other Christians should examine 'their own faithfulness to Christ's will for the Church and, wherever necessary, undertake with vigour the task of renewal and reform.' (UR 4) Common prayer (discussed in detail below) is recommended.

These activities, it is stated in the third paragraph, carried out under the guidance of the bishops, 'promote justice and truth, concord and collaboration, as well as the spirit of brotherly love and unity.' (UR 4)

The results will be that, little by little, as the obstacles to perfect ecclesiastical communion are overcome, all Christians will be gathered, in a common celebration of the Eucharist, into the unity of the one and only Church, which Christ bestowed on His Church from the beginning. This unity, we believe, subsists in the Catholic Church as something she can never lose, and we hope that it will continue to increase until the end of time. (UR 4)

The meaning of the formula 'subsistit in' used both here and in Lumen Gentium 8 has been widely debated. The
general consensus among Catholic theologians may well be regarded as co-extensive with the views of F. Sullivan:

The purpose of this article is to investigate what Vatican II meant by the "subsisting" of the Church of Christ in the Catholic Church, and what ecclesial reality it acknowledged in other Christian communities. The conclusion reached is that "subsists in" means that it is in the Catholic Church alone that the Church of Christ continues to exist with all those properties and structural elements that it cannot lose, while at the same time the Council recognized that outside the Catholic Church, there are not merely "elements of Church", by whose celebration of the Eucharist the Church of God is built up, and there are ecclesial communities that are analogous to particular Churches, inasmuch as the one Church of Christ is somehow present and operative in them for the salvation of their members.  

It should also be made plain, that 'subsistence' is not to be thought of in any philosophical sense, and that the primary meaning of subsisto, as found in a Latin lexicon, is 'to stand still, to stay, to continue, to remain'. Furthermore, Vatican II did not recognize all Christian communities as Churches. Kung is quite wide of the mark in his statement that 'The other Christian communities are recognized as Churches.' In fact, some Protestant theologians have felt that there is enough ambiguity in the text of Unitatis Redintegratio to allow some conservative minded Catholic theologians to deny, on
the basis of the text, the existence of "particular Churches" that lack nothing but visible communion with the successor of Peter, in other words, to deny that they are Churches.20

Given that the fulness of the means of salvation is to be found in the Roman Catholic Church alone, individuals who desire full communion with the Catholic Church should not be turned away. The ecumenical movement should not stand in their way, since the two things are distinct. (UR 4)

The fifth paragraph returns to the theme of renewal within the Catholic Church. It is stated that Catholics must pray for their separated brethren, but 'their primary duty is to make a careful and honest appraisal of whatever needs to be renewed and done in the Catholic household itself, in order that its life may bear witness more clearly and faithfully to the teachings and institutions which have been handed down from Christ through the apostles.' (UR 4) It is clear that renewal does not involve the rejection of the Catholic heritage.

The purpose of such renewal, it is explained in paragraph six, is to increase the sanctity of the Church 'against the day when Christ will present her to Himself in
Foundations for Dialogue

all her glory without spot or wrinkle.' (UR 4)

Paragraph seven then turns to the catholicity of the Church. The intention of this paragraph is to stress that unity does not mean uniformity. 'Unity in essentials' (UR 4) must be preserved, but each member of the Church should, 'according to the office entrusted to him, preserve a proper freedom in the various forms of spiritual life and discipline, in the variety of liturgical rites, and even in the theological elaborations of revealed truth.' (UR 4)

The text does not clarify what the essentials are, and it is therefore difficult to know how much liberty of expression the council intended to allow. The concept of necessary things, however, is not new (cf. Acts 15:28), and perhaps the fact that there were many non-Roman liturgies celebrated during the course of the council, combined with the intention to draw up a code of canon law specifically for the Eastern Catholic Churches, can be considered an indication as regards liturgy and discipline. The proper freedom relating to 'theological elaborations of revealed truth' will be discussed under article 11.

Paragraphs eight and nine then point out that Catholics 'must gladly acknowledge and esteem the truly Christian endowments for our common heritage which are to be found among our separated brethren.' (UR 4)
Foundations for Dialogue

Furthermore, there may be elements in non-Catholic communities 'wrought by the grace of the Holy Spirit' (UR 4) which have been only inadequately manifested, or not at all, in the Catholic Church. Catholics should learn from these so that they may 'bring about a more perfect realization of the very mystery of Christ and the Church.' (UR 4)

Nevertheless, the divisions among Christians prevent the Church from realizing the fullness of catholicity proper to her in those of her sons who, though joined to her by baptism, are yet separated from full communion with her. Furthermore, the Church herself finds it more difficult to express in actual life her full catholicity in all its aspects. (UR 4)

The chapter then ends with praise for the involvement of the Catholic faithful in ecumenism and 'commends this work to the bishops everywhere in the world for their diligent promotion and prudent guidance.' (UR 4)

The Practice of Ecumenism

Chapter 2 (articles 5 - 12) treats of 'The Practice of Ecumenism'. There is, however, no rigid separation in the text between the principles and the practice of ecumenism, and various principles are to be found in this chapter, in the same way as its practice was discussed in article 4.
The first point is that ecumenism is the duty of the whole Church, 'whether it be exercised in daily Christian living or in theological and historical studies.' (UR 5)

The most important part of the ecumenical programme, for Catholics, is renewal within the Catholic Church:

Christ summons the Church, as she goes on her pilgrim way, to that continual reformation of which she always has need, insofar as she is an institution of men here on earth. Consequently, if, in various times and circumstances, there have been deficiencies in moral conduct or in Church discipline, or even in the way that Church teaching has been formulated - to be carefully distinguished from the deposit of faith itself - these should be set right at the opportune moment and in the proper way. (UR 6)

This is in harmony with the teaching of Lumen Gentium that the Church is 'at once holy, yet always in need of reform', and also with Catholic tradition: the term reformatio was not in the slightest bit unfamiliar to the popes, councils and churchmen of the Middle Ages and the Reformation period; indeed, it was used by the Council of Trent.23 It should also be noted that the need for renewal in non-Catholic communities is implicit in the text.

The demand for the renewal in the formulation of doctrine reflects a statement in Pope John XXIII's opening
address at the beginning of the first session of the council: 'The substance of the ancient doctrine of deposit of faith is one thing, and the way in which it is presented is another. And it is the latter that must be taken into great consideration with patience if necessary, everything being measured in the forms and proportions of a magisterium which is predominantly pastoral in character.' Special care must be exercised when this principle is applied to infallible teaching, and the provisions of *Mysterium ecclesiae* must be borne in mind.

The section then concludes with reference to the various fields in which renewal is taking place, e.g. biblical studies, liturgy, the spirituality of married life. These are praised and encouraged 'for the future progress of ecumenism.' (UR 6)

The text then passes from renewal at the ecclesiastical level to renewal on the personal level. Such *metanoia* is important since there 'can be no ecumenism worthy of the name without interior conversion.' (UR 7) The driving force for outward renewal derives from internal spiritual renewal.

This exhortation was directed principally to the clergy. Feiner comments:
Foundations for Dialogue

It is easy to understand why the decree, like other Council documents, addresses its exhortations to humility, love and service, above all to the clergy. For on the one hand, the ministry brings to those who bear it the danger that they may forget the fact that the character of their office is one of service [as stressed in Lumen Gentium], while on the other hand, an example of true service given by the clergy is of particular value because of their standing, and is very influential in forming the countenance of the Church.26

Whilst agreeing with this, however, it must be remembered that the council also taught that the laity too share in Christ's regal office, and so must also live their lives in humility, love and service. Should this be forgotten, and the lives of the clergy held up as examples of excellence, there is a danger that the teaching of chapter 4 of Lumen Gentium on the fundamental equality of all Christians, clergy and laity, will be ignored, as though a function in the external hierarchical order were to imply a superiority in the order of grace.

The text then takes up the theme of the guilt for the divisions within Christianity, and following Pope Paul VI,27 'in humble prayer we beg pardon of God and of our separated brethren, just as we forgive them that offend us.' (UR 7) This links in with the final paragraph of article 7, which summarizes the argument for the need for the inner renewal:
Foundations for Dialogue

The faithful should remember that they promote union among Christians better, when they try to live holier lives according to the Gospel. For the closer their union with the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, the more deeply and easily they will be able to grow in mutual brotherly love. (UR 7)

This renewal and pursuit of holiness, 'along with public and private prayer for the unity of Christians, should be regarded as the soul of the whole ecumenical movement, and merits the name "spiritual ecumenism".' (UR 8) Catholics should model their prayer on Jesus' appeal to His Father 'That they may all be one' (Jn. 17:20). This is a prayer for the unity of the Church, rather than for the return of the separated brethren to the fold: 'non-Catholic Christians are not simply outside the community of the Church, but should grow further into this unity, just as Catholics in their own way must grow further into the unity of the Church.' 2,8

Prayers in common are certainly a very effective means for petitioning for the grace of unity, and are a genuine expression of the ties which still bind Catholics to their separated brethren. (UR 8)

Although common prayer for unity is recommended, and is today a frequent occurrence, the sharing of sacramental liturgies (communicatio in sacris) between denominations is by and large excluded in the teaching of
the Church. The reasons for this (as far as the Anglican Communion is concerned), are to be found in article 129 of the Ecumenical Directory, under the heading of 'Sharing Sacramental Life with Christians of Other Churches and Ecclesial Communities':

A sacrament is an act of Christ and of the Church through the Spirit. Its celebration in a concrete community is the sign of the reality of its unity in faith, worship and community life. As well as being signs, sacraments - most specially the Eucharist - are sources of the unity of the Christian community and of spiritual life, and are means for building them up. Thus Eucharistic communion is inseparably linked to full ecclesial communion and its visible expression.

At the same time, the Catholic Church teaches that by baptism members of other Churches and ecclesial communities are brought into a real, even if imperfect communion, with the Catholic Church and that "baptism, which constitutes the sacramental bond of unity existing among all those who are reborn... is wholly directed toward the acquiring of fullness of life in Christ". The Eucharist is, for the baptized, a spiritual food which enables them to overcome sin and to live the very life of Christ, to be incorporated more profoundly in Him and share more intensely in the whole economy of the Mystery of Christ.

It is in the light of these two basic principles, which must always be taken into account together, that in general the Catholic Church permits access to its Eucharistic communion and to the sacraments of penance and anointing of the sick, only to those who share its oneness in faith, worship and ecclesial life. For the same reasons, it also recognizes that in certain circumstances, by way of exception, and under certain conditions, access to these sacraments may be permitted, or even
Articles 130-6 discuss the conditions under which such sharing may take place. Practically speaking, both intercommunion and occasional eucharistic hospitality are excluded. The regulations concerning sharing in sacramental worship with the Eastern Churches (articles 122-8) are less severe, permitting a limited degree of eucharistic sharing. The reason for the different treatment of East and West is that the Catholic Church recognizes the validity of the priesthood and sacraments of the Eastern Churches, who share the faith of the Catholic Church on such matters. She does not, however, recognize the validity of the priestly orders and sacraments of most Western Christian communities, who hold a variety of beliefs on these issues.

In article 9 the text passes from spirituality to the sphere of the intellect, the intention of the Council being to promote better mutual understanding. This exhortation is addressed in the first place to all Catholics, but as the text continues, it becomes clear that the 'discussion of theological problems' (UR 9) envisaged can only be undertaken by experts. Indeed, that which is advocated here, reflects the experience of Catholic ecumenists who
had been involved in such work for many years:

Catholics who already have a proper grounding need to acquire a more adequate understanding of the respective doctrines of our separated brethren, their history, their spiritual and liturgical life, their religious psychology and cultural background. Most valuable for this purpose are meetings of the two sides - where each can treat with the other on an equal footing, providing that those that take part in them under the guidance of the authorities are truly competent. (UR 9)

There is no requirement on the Catholic side for those taking part in such dialogues to be members of the clergy, thus leaving room for lay theologians to take part in discussions of doctrine. The requirement of authoritative guidance is obviously sensible, whenever those taking part in ecumenical dialogue are acting not as private individuals, but as official representatives of their respective communions.

In keeping with the rest of the decree, it is taught that from 'such dialogue will emerge still more clearly what the situation of the Catholic Church really is. In this way, too, we will better understand the outlook of our separated brethren and more aptly present our own belief.' (UR 9) Chapter V of the Ecumenical Directory discusses the nature of ecumenical dialogue in more detail.
If ecumenism is to take root in the Church, it is necessary that future priests and bishops be trained in ecumenical matters, for 'it is upon the formation that priests receive that so largely depends the necessary instruction and spiritual formation of the faithful and of religious.' (UR 10) As such:

Sacred theology and other branches of knowledge, especially those of a historical nature, must be taught with due regard for the ecumenical point of view, so that they may correspond as exactly as possible with the facts. (UR 10)

That which is required is well summarized by Feiner: 'Catholic theology must discover and set forth the Christian heritage of truth and spirituality which is common to all Christian Churches, and must create an awareness of the doctrinal witness and spiritual endowments which are characteristic of other Christian communities, and which can lead to a deeper understanding of the true catholicity of the Church.' As in Newman's day, many twentieth-century converts from Anglicanism feel that this is being ignored by the Catholic Church in England, which, it is thought, would benefit greatly from the cultural and liturgical riches of the Church of England. In short, what is required is that all Catholic theology have an ecumenical dimension.
Foundations for Dialogue

These requirements are reflected in article 16 of the Decree on Priestly Formation: 'With due regard to the conditions of different countries, students should be introduced to a fuller knowledge of the Churches and ecclesial communities separated from the Holy See, so that they may be able to take part in promoting the restoration of unity between all Christians according to the decisions of the Council.' Chapter III of the Ecumenical Directory goes into even greater detail.

Such formation will be of great assistance in missionary work, which, as the council taught, belongs to the essence of the Church. In fact, the impulse towards unity arose out of the serious problems encountered by missionaries due to the divisions within Christianity.

Article 11 then takes up the question of how Catholic participants in ecumenical dialogue should discuss their own faith:

The means and order in which Catholic belief is expressed should in no way become an obstacle to dialogue with our brethren. It is, of course, essential that the doctrine be clearly presented in its entirety. Nothing is so foreign to the spirit of ecumenism as a false irenicism which harms the purity of Catholic doctrine and obscures its genuine and certain meaning. (UR 11)
Foundations for Dialogue

Whilst avoiding a false irenicism, however, it is necessary to conduct such dialogue in a fraternal spirit, 'speaking the truth in love' (Eph. 4:15), free from polemics. Catholic belief must be explained 'more profoundly and precisely' (UR 11) so that it becomes readily comprehensible to non-Catholic Christians. This is obviously related to the freedom concerning 'theological elaborations of revealed truth' discussed above in article 4, and is more complex than it may at first appear. The document Mysterium ecclesiae provides guidance on this point, and it can perhaps be added that the Second Vatican Council undertook such a re-presentation of Catholic dogma, especially with regard to the Dogmatic Constitutions on the Church and Divine Revelation. This approach can do much to reduce polemics, and increase mutual understanding.

Furthermore:

When comparing doctrines with one another, they should remember that in Catholic doctrine there exists an order or "hierarchy" of truths, since they vary in their relation to the foundation of the Christian faith. (UR 11)

The idea of a 'hierarchy of truths' was suggested in a speech to the council by Bishop Pangrazio of Gorizia on 25 November 1963: 'In order that the unity which already exists among Christians, and that at the same time the differences which still endure, may be rightly
distinguished, it seems important to me to pay careful attention to the hierarchical order of the revealed truths through which the mystery of Christ is expressed, and of the ecclesial elements on which the Church is founded. If all revealed truths are to be believed with the same divine faith and all constitutive elements of the Church maintained with the same loyalty, they nevertheless do not all claim or possess the same status.'³³ This is in accord with the practice of the ancient Church which included only the most important articles of faith in the creed, and does not contradict Mortalium Animos (1928), according to which all revealed truths are to be maintained with the same faith; the formal aspect of doctrine emphasized therein is not the only aspect.

The hierarchy of truths is not to be arbitrarily determined.³⁴ The criterion is the 'relation to the foundation of the Christian faith.' There is some vagueness about this formula, but it can be suggested that among those truths which are of the first order, are the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Trinity and Redemption. (Liberty of theological expression concerning these doctrines must surely be very limited, if not non-existent.) These dogmas are more central than the doctrine of the ministerial structure of the Church and the cult of saints, although all are equally true.³⁵ It can also be
suggested that the Marian dogmas do not belong to the first order, even though infallibly defined, and, when under discussion, should be viewed in their relation to the Incarnation and Christ's saving work. But the decree, it should be emphasized, does not allow for the neglect or rejection of truths of the second or third order. It is essential to stress that it is the method of ecumenical dialogue that is under discussion, and that the council suggests working from the central to the peripheral; and that even non-central dogma is equally essential. The distinctions between Catholic doctrine, dogma, and dogmatic fact must also be kept in mind.  

This principle should be of use in ecumenical discussion as it should bring the most important aspects to the fore, and avoid the dialogue becoming completely bogged down in matters of the second or third rank, although they too must be dealt with. It also opens up the question as to whether certain disagreements are merely due to differences in semantics.

Article 12 treats of cooperation among Christians. This cooperation is seen as the realization of a common witness to the Christian faith in God, one and three, in the Incarnate Son of God, our
Foundations for Dialogue

Redeemer and Lord. (UR 12)

This statement of faith deliberately reflects the Christological and Trinitarian 'basis' of the World Council of Churches. The truths included in it are of the first rank, and that it is therefore clear that the common witness of all Christians relates to those truths which are closest in their relation to the foundation of Christianity.

This witness calls for close cooperation, over and above that generally recognized to be incumbent upon humanity, among Christians in social matters. Two basic New Testament themes are employed: firstly, that of the Church as a community bearing witness to Christ; and secondly, as a community of service in the imitation of Christ.

The particular areas for action are social, charitable and humanitarian work, as well as study of the arts and sciences. Such cooperation 'among Christians vividly expresses that bond which already unites them.' (UR 12) It is perhaps regrettable that no mention was made of biblical translation work carried out in common, as was referred to in Dei Verbum 22.

334
Foundations for Dialogue

Through such cooperation, all believers in Christ are able to learn easily how they can understand each other better and esteem each other more, and how the road to unity of Christians may be made smooth. (UR 12)

Conclusion

In conclusion, Catholics are to take part in ecumenical dialogue in a spirit of trust and peace, and with confidence in the Holy Spirit. It is necessary to state clearly what the Catholic Church teaches and believes, and a false irenicism must be avoided. Catholic beliefs must be expounded, however, in a manner readily comprehensible to non-Catholics, and the 'hierarchy of truths' should be respected. Such dialogue will be aided if it is remembered that ecumenism is not a separate branch of theology, but should pervade all aspects of it. The importance of this in the formation of clergy has been noted.

Non-Catholic communities should not be regarded as irrelevant, but rather the grace of God is to be recognized within them. For this an ecclesiology of communio is especially important. The bonding together of all Christians through the sacrament of baptism is a constitutive element of this ecclesiology. The necessity of common prayer for unity is emphasized, as is the agreement on the central beliefs of Christianity.
Catholics are called upon to renew their faith, theology and structures of the Church. This will lead to a deeper appreciation of Christian truth, and advance the cause of ecumenism. True ecumenism must come from within, starting with metanoia. It is implicit, that non-Catholic Christians and their communities must also be open to such renewal themselves. All Christians must acknowledge the joint guilt of their communions for the divisions within Christianity.

That unity, which is the will of Christ for His Church, is not to be equated with uniformity. There must be agreement on essentials, but there is also to be a certain liberty as regards spiritual life, discipline, liturgical rites and theology, which will enhance the catholicity of the Church. In connexion with this, ecumenism is directed towards the unity of the Church of Christ, not the return of non-Catholics to the Catholic Church.

Finally, the council urged

the faithful to abstain from any frivolous or imprudent zeal, for these cause harm to true progress towards unity.... The unity of the one and only Church of Christ transcends human powers and gifts. It therefore places its hope entirely in the prayer of Christ for the Church, in the love of the Father for
us, and in the power of the Holy Spirit. "And hope does not disappoint, because God's love has been poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" (Rom. 5:5). (UR 24)
Orthodoxy is my doxy; heterodoxy is another man's doxy.¹

A concrete result of the Decree on Ecumenism, *Unitatis Redintegratio*, was the establishment of the Anglican - Roman Catholic International Commission. This was set up by Pope Paul VI and Archbishop Michael Ramsey² to discuss the theological issues which divide the Anglican and Roman Catholic Communions, its ultimate objective being 'full organic unity'³ between the two. The Final Report of the Commission was published in 1982, and contained Agreed Statements⁴ on *Eucharistic Doctrine, Ministry and Ordination* and *Authority in the Church*, along with three sets of *Elucidations*.⁵ The Commission claimed to have achieved 'substantial agreement'⁶ on eucharistic doctrine and ministry and ordination, and a 'high degree of agreement'⁷ on authority.

The method adopted by ARCIC was 'to discover each other's faith as it is today and to appeal to history only for enlightenment, not as a way of perpetuating past controversy.'⁸ This proved to be useful and the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (SCDF) regarded the result 'as exemplary on several counts',⁹ though on
others it was highly critical. In addition, both the General Synod of the Church of England and the Lambeth Conference of 1988 'welcomed' the Final Report by large majorities, though the precise degree of authority conferred by these majorities remains unclear, especially given the very severe criticism raised by Anglican theologians against the documents.

Authority in the Church I

The first Agreed Statement on authority was first published in 1976. In the preface, the Co-Chairmen, Bishop Alan Clarke and Archbishop Henry McAdoo, noted that it 'was precisely in the problem of papal primacy that our historical divisions found their unhappy origin.' Nevertheless, they felt that Anglican and Roman Catholic understanding had been advanced, and that both communions would benefit greatly if they were to be reunited under the Bishop of Rome.

The Statement depends heavily upon the concept of koinonia, the Trinitarian aspect of which is emphasized in the Introduction to the Final Report: 'Union with God in Christ Jesus through the Spirit is the heart of the Christian koinonia.' All 'authority in heaven and on earth' (AI 1) has been given to Christ. 'As Lord of the Church He bestows the Holy Spirit to create a communion of
men with God and with one another. To bring this koinonia to perfection is God's eternal purpose. The Church exists to serve the fulfilment of this purpose when God will be all in all.' (AI 1)

From this standpoint, the Statement then describes 'Christian Authority'. These two paragraphs will be quoted in full, since they expound the doctrine of Revelation which lies at the centre of ARCIC's understanding of authority.

2. Through the gift of the Holy Spirit the apostolic community came to recognize in the words and deeds of Jesus the saving activity of God and their mission to proclaim to all men the good news of salvation. Therefore they preached Jesus through whom God has spoken finally to men. Assisted by the Holy Spirit they transmitted what they had heard and seen of the life and words of Jesus and their interpretation of his redemptive work. Consequently the inspired documents in which this is related came to be accepted by the Church as a normative record of the authentic foundation of the faith. To these the Church has recourse for the inspiration of its life and mission; to these the Church refers its teaching and practice. Through these written words the authority of the Word of God is conveyed. Entrusted with these documents, the Christian community is enabled by the Holy Spirit to live out the Gospel and so to be led into all truth. It is therefore given the capacity to assess its faith and life and to speak to the world in the name of Christ. Shared commitment and belief create a common mind in determining how the Gospel should be interpreted and obeyed. By reference to this common faith each person tests the truth of
his own belief.

3. The Spirit of the risen Lord, who indwells the Christian community, continues to maintain the people of God in obedience to the Father's will. He safeguards their faithfulness to the revelation of Jesus Christ and equips them for their mission in the world. By this action of the Holy Spirit the authority of the Lord is active in the Church. Through incorporation into Christ and obedience to him Christians are made open to one another and assume mutual obligations. Since the Lordship of Christ is universal, the community also bears a responsibility towards all mankind, which demands participation in all that promotes the good of society and responsiveness to every form of human need. The common life in the body of Christ equips the community and each of its members with what they need to fulfil this responsibility: they are enabled so to live that the authority of Christ will be mediated through them. This is Christian authority: when Christians so act and speak, men perceive the authoritative word of Christ. (AI 2-3)

Section II then discusses 'Authority in the Church'. It is argued that the Church is a community which consciously seeks to submit to Jesus Christ. 'Some respond more fully to his call; by the inner quality of their life they win a respect which allows them to speak in Christ's name with authority.' (AI 4) More specifically, 'among these gifts of the Spirit for the edification of the Church is the episcopate of the ordained ministry.' (AI 5) Pastoral authority (cf. Acts 2:42) belongs primarily to the bishop 'who is responsible for preserving and promoting the
integrity of the koinonia in order to further the Church's response to the Lordship of Christ and its commitment to mission. Since the bishop has general oversight of the community, he can require the compliance necessary to maintain faith and charity in its daily life." (AI 5) That being said, those in such positions of authority must bear in mind their mutual responsibility and interdependence. According to the Statement, the episcopate was instituted by Christ: 'This service of the Church, officially entrusted to ordained ministers, is intrinsic to the Church's structure according to the mandate given by Christ and recognized by the community.' (AI 5)

It should be noted, however, that the 'perception of God's will for his Church does not belong only to the ordained ministry but is shared by all its members.... Ordained ministers commissioned to discern these insights and give authoritative expressions to them, are part of the community, sharing its quest for understanding the Gospel in obedience to Christ and receptive to the needs and concerns of all.' (AI 6) For its part, the community must respond to and assess the teachings and insights of the ordained ministers. In other words, there is a divide between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens, but the role of the latter is not purely passive. This helps to keep alive a spirit of constant renewal and reform.
Section III then deals with 'Authority in the Communion of Churches.' This treatment begins from the position that 'koinonia is realized not only in the local Christian communities, but also in the communion of these communities with one another.' (AI 8) From this it follows that since 'each bishop must ensure that the local community [over which he has charge] is distinctively Christian he has to make it aware of the universal communion of which it is part. The bishop expresses this unity of his church with the others: this is symbolized by the participation of several bishops in his ordination.' (AI 8)

This koinonia is strengthened by the Churches discussing matters of local interest in councils, either on a regional or world-wide basis. 'Through such meetings the Church, determined to be obedient to Christ and faithful to its vocation, formulates its rule of faith and orders its life.' (AI 9) Such decisions are 'authoritative when they express the common faith and mind of the Church.' (AI 9) Decisions of regional councils bind only those Churches they represent; ecumenical councils bind the whole Church.

In order to maintain that unity which Christ willed for His Church, it has been the practice from the Early Church onwards (AI 10), that a bishop of a principal see,
when 'he perceives a serious deficiency in the life or mission of one of the local churches [over which he has regional oversight]'... is bound, if necessary, to call the local bishop's attention to it and to offer assistance.' (AI 11) This must be done in a spirit of friendship and collegiality.

It is within the context of this historical development that the see of Rome, whose prominence was associated with the death there of Peter and Paul, eventually became the principal centre in matters concerning the Church universal. The importance of the bishop of Rome among his brother bishops, as explained by analogy with the position of Peter among the apostles, was interpreted as Christ's will for his Church. (AI 12)

It is stressed in the Statement that the function of the Bishop of Rome is to support bishops in their own dioceses, not to usurp their authority, thus promoting 'Christian fellowship in faithfulness to the teaching of the apostles.' (AI 12) In other words, 'communion with him is intended as a safeguard of the catholicity of each local church, and as a sign of the communion of all the churches.' (AI 12)

Next, 'Authority in Matters of Faith' is discussed in Section IV. It is the task of the Church to proclaim the Christian faith so as to lead mankind to accept God's saving work in Christ. 'In order to clarify and transmit
what is believed and to build up and safeguard the Christian life, the Church has found the formulation of creeds, conciliar definitions, and other statements of belief indispensable', even though they are 'instrumental to the truth which they are intended to convey.' (AI 14)

The Church's life and work are shaped by its historical origins, by its subsequent experience, and by its endeavour to make the relevance of the Gospel plain to every generation. Through reflection upon the word, through the proclamation of the Gospel, through baptism, through worship, especially the Eucharist, the people of God are moved to the living remembrance of Jesus Christ and of the experience and witness of the apostolic community. This remembrance supports and guides them in their search for language which will effectively communicate the meaning of the Gospel.

All generations and cultures must be helped to understand that the good news of salvation is also for them. It is not enough for the Church simply to repeat the original apostolic words. It has also prophetically to translate them in order that the hearers in their situation may understand and respond to them. All such restatement must be consonant with the apostolic witness recorded in the Scriptures; for in this witness the preaching and teaching of ministers, and statements of local and universal councils, have to find their ground and consistency. Although these clarifications are conditioned by the circumstances which prompted them, some of their perceptions may be of lasting value. In this process the Church itself may come to see more clearly the implications of the Gospel. This is why the Church has endorsed certain formulas as authentic expressions of its witness, whose significance transcends the setting in which they were first formulated. This is not to claim that these formulas are the only possible, or even the
most exact, way of expressing the faith, or that they can never be improved. Even when a doctrinal definition is regarded by the Christian community as part of its permanent teaching, this does not exclude subsequent restatement. Although the categories of thought and the mode of expression may be superseded, restatement always builds upon and does not contradict the truth intended by the original definition. (AI 15)

Examples of the Church acting in this way are the formation of the canon of Scripture and the definition of the Homoousion at the Council of Nicaea. Such actions imply the 'assurance that the Lord himself is present when his people assemble in his name (Matt. 18:20), and that a council may say, "it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" (Acts 15:28). ' (AI 16)

It is important to establish criteria for the recognition and reception of such definitions. 'A substantial part in the process of reception is played by the subject matter of the definitions and by the response of the faithful. This process is often gradual, as the decisions come to be seen in perspective through the Spirit's continuing guidance of the whole Church.' (AI 16) In addition, weight was attached in the Early Church to the confirmation of a definition of a council by the principal sees, among whom the See of Rome came to occupy a special place. Eventually the canonical validity of a decree was
seen to depend upon its confirmation by the bishop of Rome, who was also 'led to intervene in controversies relating to matters of faith - in most cases in response to appeals made to him, but sometimes on his own initiative'. (AI 17)

In its mission to proclaim and safeguard the Gospel the Church has the obligation and the competence to make declarations in matters of faith. This mission involves the whole people of God, among whom some may rediscover or perceive more clearly than others certain aspects of the saving truth. At times there result conflict and debate. Customs, accepted positions, beliefs, formulations, and practices, as well as innovations and re-interpretations, may be shown to be inadequate, mistaken or even inconsistent with the Gospel. When conflict endangers unity or threatens to distort the Gospel the Church must have effective means for resolving it.

In both our traditions the appeal to Scripture, to the creeds, to the Fathers, and to the definitions of the councils of the early Church is regarded as basic and normative. But the bishops have a special responsibility for promoting truth and discerning error, and the interaction of bishop and people in its exercise is a safeguard of Christian life and fidelity. The teaching of faith and the ordering of life in the Christian community require a daily exercise of this responsibility; but there is no guarantee that those who have an every day responsibility will - any more than other members - invariably be free from errors of judgement, will never tolerate abuses, and will never distort truth. Yet, in Christian hope, we are confident that such failures cannot destroy the Church's ability to proclaim the Gospel and to show forth the Christian life: for we believe that Christ will not desert his Church and that the Holy Spirit will lead it into all truth. That is why the Church, in spite of its failures, can be described as
Section V then deals with 'Conciliar and Primatial Authority'.

In times of crisis or when fundamental matters of faith are in question, the Church can make judgements, consonant with Scripture, which are authoritative. When the Church meets in ecumenical council its decisions on fundamental matters of faith exclude what is erroneous. Through the Holy Spirit the Church commits itself to these judgements, recognizing that, being faithful to Scripture and consistent with Tradition, they are by the same Spirit protected from error. They do not add to the truth, but although not exhaustive, they clarify the Church's understanding of it. In discharging this responsibility bishops share in a special gift of Christ to his Church. Whatever further clarification or interpretation may be propounded by the Church, the truth expressed will always be confessed. This binding authority does not belong to every conciliar decree, but only to those which formulate the central truths of salvation. This authority is ascribed in both our traditions to decisions of the ecumenical councils of the first centuries. (AI 19)

'The bishops are collectively responsible for interpreting and defending the faith.' (AI 20) Primacy implies that one of the bishops may speak on behalf of his fellow bishops, usually after consulting them, but sometimes taking the initiative in speaking for the Church.

Such a primacy must be used to foster koinonia 'by
helping the bishops in their task of apostolic leadership both in their local church and the Church universal.' (AI 21) It must be exercised in collegial association with fellow bishops, respecting the rights of local Churches, e.g. by not seeking uniformity where diversity is legitimate.

Primacy and conciliarity are complimentary. A proper balance, however, must be maintained between the two, so as to avoid one being emphasized at the expense of the other.

The only see which makes any claim to universal primacy and which has exercised and still exercises such episcope is the see of Rome, the city where Peter and Paul died. It seems appropriate that in any future union a universal primacy such as has been decided should be held by that see. (AI 23)

Various 'Problems and Prospects' are then raised in Section VI. The problems centre on the commonly called 'Petrine texts', the language of divine right concerning the successors of St. Peter, infallibility and the claim that the bishop of Rome possesses universal and immediate jurisdiction. These form the subject matter of Authority in the Church II.
Authority in the Church II

The first problem which is discussed is the interpretation of the 'Petrine texts'. To begin with, the Statement acknowledges that in the New Testament Peter is seen as occupying a special place in the Early Church. This is the case whether the Petrine texts contain the exact words of Jesus or not, since 'they witness to an early tradition that Peter already held this place during Jesus' ministry.' (AII 3) For example, one might cite the giving of the name of Cephas, the charge to strengthen his brethren (Lk. 22:31-2), to feed the sheep (Jn. 21:16-7) and his lead at the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15). Pastoral responsibility was not, however, Peter's alone, e.g. the power to 'loose and bind' given to Peter in Matt. 16:19 is also promised to all the disciples in Matt. 18:18. One should also note Paul's leadership and claim 'to share with Peter and others parallel responsibility and apostolic authority (Gal. 2:7-8; 1 Cor. 9:1).' (AII 4)

Peter's position was not due to his own merits, but to his calling by Jesus (cf. Lk. 6:14; Jn. 21:15-7). His rôle, however, should not be divorced from that of the other apostles, whom he has a duty to serve. His is 'a leadership of service'. (AII 5) Nor is he immune from rebuke (cf. Gal. 2:11-4). 'These considerations help clarify the analogy that has been drawn between the rôle of
Peter among the Apostles and that of the bishop of Rome among his fellow bishops.' (AII 5)

'The New Testament contains no explicit record of a transmission of Peter's leadership; nor is the transmission of apostolic authority in general very clear.' (AII 6) Despite differing interpretations of the Petrine texts, however, the Church at Rome, the city in which Peter and Paul taught, and which was consecrated by their blood, came to be recognized as possessing a unique responsibility in relation to the unity of the Church universal, as well as regards fidelity to the apostolic inheritance. The Bishop of Rome came to exercise a function analogous to that exercised by Peter, and he came to be regarded as Peter's successor. The Commission's verdict on this was that

it is possible to think that a primacy of the bishop of Rome is not contrary to the New Testament and is a part of God's purpose regarding the Church's unity and catholicity, while admitting that the New Testament texts offer no sufficient basis for this. (AII 7)

With regard to this, both Anglicans and Roman Catholics agree 'that not everything said of the Apostles as the witnesses to the resurrection and saving work of Christ (Acts 1:21-2) is transmitted to those chosen to continue their mission.' But even 'if Peter's role cannot
be transmitted in its totality this does not exclude the continuation of a ministry of unity guided by the Spirit among those who continue the apostolic mission.' (AII 8)

In summary, then, the Commission held that in a reunited Church the Bishop of Rome should exercise a universal primacy in the service of the unity of the Church. It must be borne in mind, however, that the unity and universality of the Church is not portrayed in the New Testament solely in terms of Peter.

The universal communion of the churches is a company of believers, united by faith in Christ, by the preaching of the word, and by participation in the sacraments assured to them by a pastoral ministry modelled on the role of Peter will be a sign and a safeguard of such unity. (AII 9)

The Statement then discusses the issue of 'Jus Divinum'. The purpose of this section is twofold: firstly, to discover what in Roman Catholic usage 'divine right' actually means; and secondly, to assess the implications of it for the ecclesial status of non-Roman Catholic Communions. (AII 10)

ARCIC notes that Vatican I used the term jure divino to say that the primacy of the bishop of Rome derives from Christ, but that there is no universally accepted
interpretation of this language. Whilst all would agree that it may be taken to mean that the 'primacy expresses God's purpose for his Church' (AII 11), it need not necessarily mean that the universal primacy was directly founded as an institution by Jesus during his earthly life. Nor does it mean that 'the universal primate is a "source of the Church" as if Christ's salvation had to be channelled through him. Rather, he is to be the sign of the visible koinonia God wills for the Church and an instrument through which unity in diversity is realized. It is to a universal primate thus envisaged within the collegiality of the bishops and the koinonia of the whole Church that the qualification jure divino can be applied.' (AII 11)

Furthermore, the Commission held that Vatican II 'allows' (cf. Lumen Gentium 8 and Unitatis Redintegratio 13) that 'a church out of communion with the Roman See may lack nothing from the viewpoint of the Roman Catholic Church except that it does not belong to the full visible manifestation of full Christian communion which is maintained in the Roman Catholic Church.' (AII 12) The example of this is the Orthodox Churches, whose priesthood and sacraments the Roman Catholic Church always recognized (cf. UR 14).
Given the above understanding of *jure divino* and its ecclesial implications, the Commission concluded that the language of divine right need not be an obstacle to the acceptance of a universal primacy exercised by the Bishop of Rome. Nor need Anglicans feel that 'any reconciliation with Rome would require a repudiation of their past history, life and existence — which in effect would be a betrayal of their own integrity.' (AII 14)

The third section of the Statement then deals with 'Jurisdiction'. This is defined as 'the authority or power (*potestas*) necessary for the exercise of an office.' (AII 16) Hence, the specific functions of those who hold different offices within the *episcopate* (e.g. primate or metropolitan) govern the exercise and limits of their jurisdiction. More specifically, a bishop does not have arbitrary power. His power is limited by the tasks he has to fulfil, namely 'teaching the faith through the proclamation and explanation of the word of God, of providing for the administration of the sacraments in his diocese and of maintaining his church in holiness and truth.' (AII 17)

The ascription by the First Vatican Council of universal, ordinary and immediate jurisdiction to the Bishop of Rome, has caused much concern to Anglicans. It
was therefore necessary for the Commission to define these technical terms carefully:

The jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome as universal primate is called ordinary and immediate (i.e. not mediated) because it is inherent in his office; it is called universal simply because it must enable him to serve the unity and harmony of the koinonia as a whole and in each of its parts. (AII 18)

This universal primacy should be exercised in a collegial manner. 'This in no way reduces his own responsibility on occasion to speak and act for the whole Church. Concern for the universal Church is intrinsic to all episcopal office; a diocesan bishop is helped to make this concern a reality by the universal jurisdiction of the universal primate.' (AII 19) It is once again emphasized that a bishop does not derive his authority from the universal primate, and that the primacy is a service to the Church 'which is a communion in faith and charity of local churches.' (AII 19)

In addition, although it is impossible to set precise canonical limits to a universal jurisdiction, moral limits do exist: these 'derive from the nature of the Church and the universal primate's pastoral office.' (AII 20) Since it is the duty of the universal primate to foster catholicity and unity (two issues which must not be
divorced or confused) he can intervene in the affairs of a
diocese and receive appeals against decisions of diocesan
bishops. 'It is because the universal primate, in
collegial association with his fellow bishops, has the task
of safeguarding the faith and unity of the universal Church
that the diocesan bishop is subject to his authority.' (AII 20)

On this issue, then, the Commission concluded that
Anglicans and Roman Catholics share, *in principle*, the same
understanding of jurisdiction, and specifically the
jurisdiction of a universal primate. In practice, however,
it would seem that many Catholics would regard the Anglican
view of the hierarchical structure of the Church as
'Gallican', whilst many Anglicans would regard the Catholic
understanding as 'Ultramontane'. In this connexion, it was
felt, that 'Anglicans are entitled to assurance that
acknowledgement of the universal primacy of the bishop of
Rome would not involve the suppression of theological,
liturgical and other traditions which they value or the
imposition of wholly alien traditions.' (AII 22) The words
of Pope Paul VI were regarded as helpful: 'There will be no
seeking to lessen the legitimate prestige and the worthy
patrimony of piety and usage proper to the Anglican
Church.' 13
The final section of the statement is taken up with a discussion of 'Infallibility'. The first thing to be noted is the recapitulation of the view put forward in Authority I that

When matters of faith are at stake decisions may be made by the Church in universal councils; we are agreed that these are authoritative (cf. Authority I, para.19). We have also recognized the need in a united Church for a universal primate who, presiding over the koinonia, can speak with authority in the name of the Church (cf. Authority I, para. 23). Through both these agencies the Church can make a decisive judgement in matters of faith, and so exclude error. (AII 26)

To this, the Statement adds that nothing can be added to the content of Revelation by such a judgement. In the words of Dei Verbum 4, there can be 'no new public Revelation'. 'These statements would be intended to articulate, elucidate or define matters of faith which the community believes at least implicitly.' (AII 27) Furthermore, such a statement would be historically and culturally conditioned, but that notwithstanding, it would remain of 'lasting significance if... safeguarding the substance of the faith.' (AII 27) It should also be noted that its truth rests ultimately on its fidelity to the Gospel, rather than on the office of the person who proclaimed it; 'it is not true simply because it has been proclaimed.' (AII 27)
It is noted that a 'service of preserving the Church from error has been performed by the bishop of Rome as universal primate both within and outside the synodal process' (AII 29) and Leo's intervention at Chalcedon is given as an example. But it does not follow that bishops are, therefore, restricted to a consultative role.

In order for it to be 'a decisive discernment of the truth' (AII 29), the judgement of the bishop of Rome must satisfy rigorous conditions. These were laid down at the First and Second Vatican Councils and are summarized in the Statement as follows:

He must speak explicitly as the focus within the koinonia; without being under duress from external pressures; having sought to discover the mind of his fellow bishops and of the Church as a whole; and with a clear intention to issue a binding decision upon a matter of faith or morals. (AII 29)

The heart of the problem is then identified:

When it is plain that these conditions have been fulfilled, Roman Catholics conclude that the judgement is preserved from error and the proposition true. If the definition proposed for assent were not manifestly a legitimate interpretation of biblical faith and in line with orthodox tradition, Anglicans would think it a duty to reserve the reception of the definition for study and discussion. (AII 29)
It is for this reason that many Anglicans do not accept the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption, even though they can agree with much that the dogmas are intended to affirm. *(AI 30)* That being the case, the Statement concludes that

Anglicans do not accept the guaranteed possession of such a gift of divine assistance in judgement necessarily attached to the office of the bishop of Rome by virtue of which his formal decisions can be known to be wholly assured before their reception by the faithful. *(AI 31)*

Reception by the faithful, however, is not the means by which 'a definition first acquires authority'. *(AI 25)* It is the ultimate indication that it has been preserved from error. In addition, the Anglican members of the Commission acknowledged that it 'would be incorrect to suggest that in controversies of faith no conciliar or papal definition possesses a right to attentive sympathy and acceptance until it has been examined by every individual Christian and subjected to the scrutiny of his private judgement.' *(AI 31)* But it is clear that the *sensus fidelium* plays an important rôle in the definition of dogma. *(AI 3)*

To this discussion it can be added that to avoid past polemics, which might hamper the dialogue, the term
'infallibility' was not used. (ALI 32) Both Vatican councils used the technical term 'irreformable' to describe a definitive statement of the faith, the meaning of which is well expressed in Authority I 15 & 19, and the existence of such definitions, issued either by the pope in council or alone, is positively affirmed by ARCIC. The controverted issue is that of reception.

So, ARCIC agreed that the Church, whose authority is based on that of Christ, has authority in matters of faith, and can make judgements which exclude error. Juridical structures, it agreed, should be based on the concept of koinonia. If that is done, conciliarity and primacy can be exercised in such a way as to complement one another. Furthermore, there was agreement that a universal primacy was intended by Christ for His Church, and that it should be exercised by the Bishop of Rome, the successor of Peter, the 'servant and focus of visible unity in truth and love.' (ALI 33)

Although these Agreed Statements have been welcomed by many Roman Catholics and Anglicans, as being 'consonant' with the faith of their respective Communions, a significant number of theologians have raised objections.14 The Final Report has also been severely criticized twice by the SCDF, once jointly with the Pontifical Council for the
The more significant objections pertain to the issues of Revelation and ecclesiology.

**Criticisms of ARCIC on Authority**

I Revelation.

a) *Dogmatic Formulae*

Reactions by liberal Anglicans to the Agreed Statements of ARCIC on authority have correctly identified the crux of the issue as the doctrine of Revelation which underlies the documents. The problem, as they see it, is that the Agreed Statements affirm that dogmatic formulae can signify truth in a determinate manner (cf. A1 15 & 19; AII 26).

In an article in *Theology*, Bishop Hugh Montefiore rejected the idea that the appeal to Scripture, the creeds, the Fathers and the definitions of the councils of the Early Church are considered basic and normative in Anglicanism. In fact, he was of the opinion that it was 'rather a lot of luggage to carry around at a time when it was thought prudent to travel light.' He has also argued in an essay, published as part of the Report of the Church of England Doctrine Commission on *Christian Believing: The Nature of the Christian Faith and its Expression in Holy Scripture and Creeds*, that 'all our doctrines are partial
and our dogmas provisional.' Furthermore, Room must surely be kept within the Anglican Communion for those who, in the words of the recent Report of the Church of England Doctrine Commission, "can neither affirm nor deny the creeds, because they look to the present rather than to the past to express their faith, and attach most importance to fresh understanding of that continuing enterprise which has its origin in Jesus" (Christian Believing (London, 1976), p.37).

One of those who fitted that description was Professor Geoffrey Lampe, who in his individual essay in the Report argued that 'theological propositions and systems of belief are not revealed.' As such, the doctrine of the Trinity is not a God-given doctrine, except in the sense in which we may hope and trust that all well-motivated sincere human thinking in every field of inquiry is divinely inspired and guided.

Given such a stance, it is not surprising that in a speech to General Synod he should attack Authority in the Church I, arguing that 'the most that could be claimed for the definitions of Nicaea and Chalcedon, to mention only the most important, would be that they were interpreting the sense of what they found in Scripture; and men's interpretations are never exempt from error. The quest for infallibility, anywhere, is always bound to fail.'

This is also the view put forward by Paul Avis in his
revealingly entitled book, *Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of Doctrine*, which was discussed and criticized above. On the basis of those arguments, it is contended here that the liberal view must be opposed, and that in contrast, it must be explicitly stated that dogmatic formulae can, and do, signify truth in a determinate way. In other words, that Revelation can be expressed validly in propositions. This is because God has revealed Himself to man in His totality in the Person of Christ, the Word of God in whom Revelation is complete. As such, man's knowledge of God results from God's personal self-communication of His whole Self to man in the God made man, Jesus.25

**b) Pneumatology**

In an article on 'Primacy and Authority in the ARCIC Report', Tim Bradshaw26 commented that 'the issue of primacy is not simply an example of ARCIC methodology. Such primacy... is vital to such a methodology.'27 This remark is also based on the concept of Revelation expounded in the Agreed Statements on authority, which emphasizes the role of the Holy Spirit in leading the Church into all truth (cf. AI 2&3).

For Bradshaw, the problem is that the ecclesiastical development described in the ARCIC documents is not
controlled by a fixed norm, whether Bible or tradition or both.

There are criteria which are fixed, surely, and are not themselves evolving providentially... to control their own development [like the Papacy]. The visible signs of celebration of the sacraments and preaching of the word are the two most obvious and expressive of the koinonia of the Church. The quasi-idealism suggested by the ARCIC ecclesiology will either bring about a neutered, ineffectual Roman primacy, or else it will produce an exclusivist, divisive and autocratic mode of primacy, the obverse of a fostering of koinonia.\(^\text{18}\)

This is certainly a harsh criticism, but Bradshaw appears to have missed the explicit assertion of ARCIC that Scripture is normative. In the *Elucidation upon Authority I*, the Commission stated the Revelation is complete in Christ, whose words and deeds 'set forth and interpreted in the New Testament writings, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, are the primary norm for Christian faith and life.' But it was also the view of ARCIC that Scripture does not interpret itself. The essential task of the Church 'in the exercise of its teaching office, is to unfold the full extent and implications of the mystery of Christ, under the guidance of the Spirit of the risen Lord.' (E 2)

Furthermore, the Church cannot add to that Revelation
ARCIC on Authority

which has already been given once and for all and found in Scripture and Tradition. (AI 27) She will, however, have to resort to current language and thought forms in order to express the full significance and implication of that Revelation. In this the celebration of the sacraments and the proclamation of the word provide support and guidance. (AI 15) An example is the adoption of the non-Scriptural term *homoousios* by the Council of Nicaea in 325. The Commission notes that the 'seal upon the truthfulness of the conclusions that result from this search will be the reception by the whole Church.' (E 2) This will be discussed in greater detail below.

So, whilst Bradshaw is correct in pointing out that the papacy is essential to ARCIC's methodology, which is based upon a particular understanding of Revelation, he appears to be mistaken in searching for a fixed norm, if he means something which stands on its own and interprets itself. Scripture is the primary norm, but it must be interpreted (never added to) within the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Support and guidance are provided by sacraments and the preaching of the word.

c) Councils and Reception

The first issue to be dealt with under this heading is the criticism by many Anglicans that the view of ARCIC,
that definitions of ecumenical councils 'exclude what is erroneous' (AI 19), is in direct contradiction to Article XXI of the Articles of Religion, which states that general councils 'sometimes have erred.'

In Elucidation 3, however, ARCIC argues that there is no such contradiction. It is pointed out that the Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia are generally recognized as having erred, and it is emphasized that Article XXI also affirms that general councils do have strength and authority provided that what they define may be proved from Scripture. Since ARCIC stated that to be 'protected from error' (AI 19), definitions must relate to fundamental matters of faith, formulate the central truths of salvation, as well as be faithful to Scripture and consistent with Tradition, its view would appear to be entirely in accord with Article XXI. Thus a loyal Anglican may hold that certain teachings of the Church, which 'do not add to the truth but, although not exhaustive.... clarify the Church's understanding of it' (AI 19) are not erroneous. Such a reconciliation of the Articles of Religion with Roman Catholic doctrine seems similar in style to Newman's arguments in Tract XC.

This, of course, begs the question as to how such definitions are known to be faithful to Scripture and
consistent with Tradition. This was explored in Authority II, in which it was concluded that Anglicans and Roman Catholics base their judgements upon different criteria. Of this issue, the Official Response of the Roman Catholic Church to ARCIC I observes:

For the Catholic Church, the certain knowledge of any defined truth is not guaranteed by the reception of the faithful that such is in conformity with Scripture and Tradition, but by the authoritative definition itself on the part of the authentic teachers.\(^3\)

This view, the Response suggests, is in conflict not only with the Anglican attitude expressed in Authority II 31, but with the joint opinion found in paragraphs 27 and 31 of the same document, in which it is argued that

the assurance of the truthfulness of its teaching rests ultimately upon its fidelity to the Gospel than upon the character or office of the person by whom it is expressed. The Church's teaching is proclaimed because it is true; it is not true simply because it has been proclaimed. (AII 27)

We agree that, without a special charism guarding the judgement of the universal primate, the Church would still possess means of receiving and ascertaining the truth of revelation. (AII 31)

It would appear that the view contained in the Response is based upon the teaching of Pastor Aeternus that 'such definitions are irreformable of themselves, and not
This teaching, however, is understood in a special sense by Catholic theologians, who, following the guidance of *Mysterium ecclesiae*, interpret the definition of *Pastor Aeternus* in its historical context, seeing the phrase quoted above as a rejection, in its own terms, of Gallicanism, which was being re-asserted in some circles at the time. As such, what is ruled out is the opinion that a definition *ex cathedra* only becomes irreformable once it has been subsequently approved by the bishops. *Pastor Aeternus* does not deny that reception by the faithful is the final indication that such a definition fulfils the necessary conditions for it to be preserved from error.

The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council were very much aware of this issue, and taught, in *Lumen Gentium* 25, that the assent of the faithful can never be lacking to an *ex cathedra* definition, because of the influence of the Holy Spirit, who maintains the whole Church in the truth. The Roman Pontiff can only make an *ex cathedra* statement, however, if he is defining the faith of the whole Church, in his role as the 'head of the college of bishops' and 'supreme teacher and pastor of all the faithful'. (*LG* 25)

Furthermore, *Lumen Gentium* 25 taught that an *ex*
cathedra definition must be 'in conformity with Revelation itself', and that the pope and the bishops must 'apply themselves with zeal to the work of inquiring by every suitable means into this Revelation and of giving apt expression to its contents'.

It would therefore appear that if the assent of the faithful, 'who have an anointing that comes from the holy one (cf. 1 Jn. 2:20 and 27)' and inconsequence 'cannot err in matters of belief' (LG 12), were to be lacking to a definition of the Roman Pontiff or a council this would not cause it to be invalid, but it could be an indication that the definition is not in conformity with Revelation and that the necessary conditions for its promulgation, as in the Arian crisis, have not been fulfilled. But, as the Official Response states, an 'authoritative definition... on the part of the authentic teachers' (i.e. when the conditions have been fulfilled, for only then can the adjectives authoritative and authentic be used) is not 'guaranteed by the reception of the faithful... [to be] in conformity with Scripture and Tradition.' Reception is, however, an indication of its truth.

ARCIC's agreed view, therefore, that 'Reception does not create truth nor legitimize the decision; it is the final indication that such a decision has fulfilled the
necessary conditions for it to be a true expression of the faith' (E 3), would seem to be in accord with the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.37

The Anglican objection that they cannot 'accept the guaranteed possession of such a gift of divine assistance in judgement necessarily attached to the office of the bishop of Rome by virtue of which his formal decisions can be wholly assured before their reception by the faithful' (AII 31) does, of course, remain.

As to the controverted Marian dogmas, Catholics will hope that they will eventually be accepted by Anglicans, and it is difficult to see how Anglicans would not be required to subscribe to them, at least in some sense, in any future reunion. (cf. AII 30)38

d) Jus Divinum

A further criticism raised in The Official Response directly contradicts the agreed view of ARCIC in Authority II, about Vatican I's use of the words jus divinum, stating that

From a Catholic viewpoint, it is not possible to accept... that it "need not be taken to imply the universal primacy as a permanent institution was directly founded by Jesus during his life on earth" (n.11). The Catholic Church sees rather in the
primacy of the successors of Peter something positively intended by God and deriving from the will and institution of Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{39}

ARCIC, however, did not deny that the Petrine ministry derives from Christ and that it is part of God's plan for His Church. (AII 11) But, its statement that the 'universal primacy as a permanent institution' was not necessarily 'directly founded by Jesus during his life on earth' (AII 11) can easily lead to confusion, and Catholics might also regard AI 12 & 13 as unhelpful. An exact interpretation of Pastor Aeternus is therefore required, and in this I follow closely the work of Dr. John McHugh.\textsuperscript{40}

Firstly, chapter 1 of Pastor Aeternus affirms that: 'And it was upon Simon Peter alone that Jesus after His resurrection bestowed the jurisdiction of Chief Pastor and Ruler over all His flock.'\textsuperscript{41} It is highly unusual to designate events after Jesus' resurrection as taking place during His earthly life. The conferral of the primacy takes place after Jesus' mortal life was over.

Secondly, it is also stated in chapter 1 that 'the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church of God was immediately promised and given to Blessed Peter the Apostle by Christ the Lord.'\textsuperscript{42}
Thirdly, the dogma is formulated in chapter 2 as follows:

If then, anyone shall say that it is not by the institution of Christ the Lord himself, or by divine right, that Blessed Peter should have a perpetual line of successors in the Primacy over the Universal Church; or that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of Blessed Peter in this Primacy: let him be anathema.  

The New Testament evidence mentioned twice in chapter 1 is not mentioned at all in chapter 2. This must be deliberate. It is therefore clear, that although the primacy is jure divino, Pastor Aeternus did not teach that the disciples were aware of this during Jesus' life time; this does not imply that Jesus was not. McHugh suggests that it was one of the issues on which the Holy Spirit was to lead the Church into all truth (cf. Jn. 14:26; 15:26; 16:12). Hence his view that perhaps the best way of understanding the statement in the Response that the 'Catholic Church sees... in the primacy of the successors of Peter something positively intended by God and deriving from the will and institution of Jesus Christ' is to take it to mean that 'Jesus conferred upon Peter a primacy over the entire Church which was destined to be a permanent institution.'
Such a view would be in accord with the understanding put forward in Authority II (para. 11), as well as ARCIC's willingness to see the operation of the Holy Spirit in the history of the Church (cf. E 8). The method employed by ARCIC in its approach to the Petrine texts was not to rely solely on the historico-critical method, as is clear from Authority II 6-7, in which the interpretation of the Petrine texts by Fathers and doctors of the Early Church is discussed. As such, ARCIC's method coheres with the view of the Response that 'such interpretation cannot be separated from the living Tradition of the Church which receives the message of Scripture.'

Although it is possible, from a Catholic viewpoint, to clarify the confusion over the issue of jus divinum, ARCIC's use of the Petrine texts has been severely criticized by Bradshaw, who argues that 'ARCIC reads into the text what it wants to find.... To produce the Holy Spirit to validate what amounts to a plain reversal of [non-Catholic] interpretation verges on the bizarre and lacks justification.... ARCIC has made a decision that primacy, and the Roman Papacy, does and will foster unity. This decision receives little or no justification.'

The use of the Petrine texts in the justification of the Roman primacy has been discussed above, and the
argument will not be repeated here. What is demonstrated, however, by the quite different criticisms of both Bradshaw and the Response, is the ambiguity of Authority II on this point, and the extreme difficulty in securing agreement in ecumenical dialogue.

II Ecclesiology

a) Confessional Identity

Another criticism that has been raised against the ARCIC process, is that it represents 'a re-confessionalization of Anglicanism.' This charge was levelled by Professor Stephen Sykes, and was based upon his view that during the last one hundred and fifty years there has been a process of profound de-confessionalization within the Church of England, as a result of which 'Anglicanism seems to be in a strange twilight zone between a confessing past and a future of some unspecified kind.' It would appear that his complaint is that ARCIC would lead to the acceptance by Anglicans of the authority of the dogmatic formulae of the Roman Catholic Church, and thus to the loss of a distinct Anglican identity.

Central to Sykes's argument is the view that a Church must be seen to have a confessional identity of its own. There seems no reason, however, why statements of belief should not be shared among Churches. Indeed, as Sykes
himself points out in his book, *The Integrity of Anglicanism:*

It is contradictory to say that there is no specifically Anglican corpus of doctrines and also to say that Anglicans regard the teaching of the undivided Church of the first five centuries as a criterion. For something to be 'specifically Anglican' it is quite sufficient that it be necessary to the characterization of Anglicanism. It need not be sufficient characterization.\(^5\)

Furthermore, as Canon Roger Greenacre\(^5\) pointed out in response to Sykes's article, spiritual, liturgical, cultural and theological elements also make up the identity of a Church. This was something clearly recognized by Cardinal Willebrands in a speech in which he discussed the idea of the *typos* of a Church.\(^5\)

In *The Integrity of Anglicanism,* Sykes was keen to stress that in Anglican ecclesiology authority is thought of as dispersed, rather than as embodied in a single source. Such a view is often invoked by those who wish to define a confessional identity in Anglicanism.\(^5\) ARCIC has, however, suggested that the apparently opposing views of dispersed and embodied authority may not be irreconcilable (cf. AII 33). In fact, if the authority embodied in the universal primate is exercised in such a way as to foster *koinonia* (i.e. as a service to the
Church), then it would seem that there is no reason why it should conflict with the proper regional autonomy of local Churches, whether that be in matters of liturgy, spirituality, doctrine or theology.\\(^4\)

So, Sykes's warning that Anglicanism might be subsumed into Roman Catholicism (something of which ARCIC was very aware), must be heeded, but it seems unlikely that Anglican identity should be seen purely in confessional terms.

b) The Role of the Laity

A further criticism that has been made of ARCIC is that it over-emphasized the role of ordained ministers to the neglect of the laity. Such a view was expressed by Montefiore who felt that the Agreed Statement rejected 'a genuinely lay theology.'\\(^5\) This charge, however, was denied by the Commission, which pointed out in the Elucidations that the ordained ministry had been spoken of at greater length, since it was felt that more difficulties existed in that area. It stressed that baptism gives everybody the right and the ability to perform their role in the Body of Christ. Furthermore, it pointed to the text of Authority I which states that 'the Holy Spirit gives to some individuals and communities special gifts (para. 5), that all members of the Church share in the discovery of God's will (para. 6), that the sensus fidelium is a vital
element in the comprehension of God's truth (para. 18) and that all bear witness to God's compassion to mankind and his concern for justice in the world (Ministry, para. 7)." (E 4)

c) The Authority of the Ordained Ministry

Montefiore also alleged that the Commission's view that a bishop can 'require compliance' (AI 5) was foreign to Anglicanism. Citing the 1968 Lambeth Conference, he argued that the bishop is a servant of the people, 'an enabler, exercising his authority by persuasion and not by requiring compliance.'

This criticism, however, would appear to be a little wide of the mark. To begin with, paragraph 5 of Authority I speaks of those 'whom the Holy Spirit commissions through ordination for service to the whole community.' Also, the Church is said to exist to serve (para. 11), the universal primate's ministry is described as a service (para. 12) and conciliarity and primacy are seen as complementary in the service of unity (para. 23). [My italics.] Indeed, one of the pope's titles is the 'Servant of the Servants of God.'

As regards the claim that a bishop cannot require compliance, it is stated in the Elucidation that both the
Anglican and Roman Catholic Communiors 'have always recognized this need for disciplinary action on exceptional occasions as part of the authority given by Christ to his members, however difficult it may be in practice to take such action.' (E 5) 

This hierarchical authority is based on the fact that the Holy Spirit gives each person the necessary graces / power to perform his rôle in the Body of Christ. Hence, when ordained bishop, the minister receives the grace appropriate to his calling 'and those for whom it is exercised must recognize and accept their God-given authority.' (E 5)

Like Newman, ARCIC acknowledged the legitimacy of the divide between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens, but did not assign a purely passive rôle to the latter.

d) Ecclesial Status

ARCIC has also been criticized by the SCDF and PCPCU for its treatment of the ecclesial status of Christian communities not in visible communion with the see of Rome. Once again, the Official Response directly contradicts ARCIC, stating that
It is the teaching of the Second Vatican Council that a Church outside of communion with the Roman Pontiff lacks more than just the visible manifestation of unity with the Church of Christ which subsists in the Roman Catholic Church.  

Firstly, this is not a direct teaching of Vatican II. It seems to be inferred from Lumen Gentium 8 and Unitatis Redintegratio 13 and 3, the latter article speaking of 'the fullness of the means of salvation' existing within the Roman Catholic Church alone. Vatican II, however, does not teach that a perfect equivalence exists between institutional completeness and the grace of salvation (UR 3), which is what the Response appears to suggest.  

Secondly, the criticism points to an ambiguity in the text of Unitatis Redintegratio. The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council were very careful to distinguish between the separated Churches of the East and the separated Churches and ecclesial communities of the West. The Eastern Orthodox were recognized as Churches, since they were regarded as having preserved the apostolic succession, and as possessing the fulness of both the priesthood and the sacraments (cf. UR 15). The council deliberately avoided calling any of the separated Western communities Churches (UR 19), although that possibility was clearly left open, and the Anglican Communion was described as occupying 'a special place' among the separated Churches.
and ecclesial communities of the West 'in which Catholic traditions and institutions in part [my italics] continue to exist.' (UR 13)

A close examination of the text, however, suggests that it is not possible to allow that any of the separated Christians in the West form a Church. This is because of the many negative qualifications the text makes regarding their orders and sacraments when describing the differences between 'these Churches and ecclesial communities, on the one hand, and the Catholic Church on the other'. (UR 19)

Thus:

we believe that they have not preserved the proper reality of the eucharistic mystery in its fullness, especially because of the absence of the sacrament of Orders. (UR 22)

When the condemnation of Anglican Orders in the Bull Apostolocae Curae (1896) is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that the partial existence of Catholic traditions and institutions, in the only Western communion mentioned by name in the text, is not sufficient if a particular communion is to be regarded as a Church. It can only be an ecclesial community. It is, however, puzzling that the chapter is headed 'Churches and ecclesial communities' if none can claim the title of Church, especially since one would expect the Old Catholics to be
regarded as comprising a Church.

Furthermore, when it is considered that *Unitatis Redintegratio*, in articles 14 - 17, has nothing but praise of the Eastern Orthodox, despite their non-acceptance of the Marian and papal dogmas, and concludes that

in order to restore communion and unity or preserve them, one must "impose no burden beyond what is indispensable" (Acts 15:28) (UR 18),

it would appear fair to conclude that these Churches lack nothing but full visible unity with the successor of Peter.

It therefore appears possible to say that the recognition of a communion which is not in full visible communion with the successor of Peter, as a Church, implies that it is possible that that Church lacks nothing more than just the visible manifestation of unity with the Church of Christ which subsists in the Roman Catholic Church.

The issue at stake for ARCIC (whose programme of discussions appears to be set out in *Unitatis Redintegratio* 22, which refers only to ecclesial communities) is whether the Anglican Communion is a Church. If it is, then it may
lack nothing but visible communion with the see of Rome. If, on the other hand, it is an ecclesial community, it may be that it lacks more (e.g. the apostolic succession and the fulness of the priesthood, as well as of the eucharist). This has still to be officially decided, despite Pope Paul VI's description of her as 'a sister Church' and the placing of his episcopal ring upon Archbishop Ramsey's finger during the latter's visit to Rome.

Conclusion

In summary, the work of ARCIC in Authority I & II is based upon an understanding of Revelation which considers dogmatic formulæ, set down under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, as capable of signifying in a determinate way that Revelation which was given once and for all, in deeds and words, and which is complete in Christ. This, of course, is the teaching of Dei Verbum.

This view gives rise to an understanding of the Church as more than a purely social organization. Indeed, ARCIC regards the episcopate as of divine institution, and argues that it is the task of the whole Church to strive to understand the Gospel: in this the legitimacy of the divide between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens is acknowledged. This also reflects the teaching of Vatican
II. Although the Church is not described as a sacrament, the concept of koinonia (central to both *Lumen Gentium* and *Unitatis Redintegratio*) is the basis for its discussion of ecclesiology. That being the case, episcopacy is seen as service to the Church and the rôle of the universal primate (i.e. the Bishop of Rome) is seen as complementary to that of the bishops. The body of bishops must function in a collegial manner under its head, the Bishop of Rome: his primacy is of divine institution, his jurisdiction ordinary, immediate and universal. ARCIC, however, did not agree that his decisions can be known to be 'irreformable of themselves'. This is despite its view that certain doctrinal formulae do validly and authentically express the truth in a determinate way, and that the Church's decisive judgement in matters of faith, which excludes error, can be made either through a council or the universal primate. Any such definition can be regarded as irreformable, the meaning of which is understood in a way that is in accordance with Catholic doctrine. On all these issues, ARCIC has achieved considerable success, from the Roman Catholic perspective, in making progress towards the reconciliation of the Anglican and Roman Catholic Communions.

Considerable problems, however, remain. As well as the acknowledged differences in the Agreed Statement, over
the nature of the universal primate's teaching office and the Marian dogmas, several of the criticisms raised by theologians highlight the fact that what one theological grouping may regard as self-evident, is quite foreign to another. In short, the views expressed on the one hand by Montefiore and Lampe, and by Bradshaw on the other, are quite irreconcilable, not only one with another, but with the view of ARCIC on the nature and transmission of Revelation.

These are serious problems, and they suggest that ARCIC's work has only touched the surface. That being said, areas of real agreement and divergence have been isolated, and the way ahead is starting to become a little clearer.

But fundamentally the problem appears to be one of method. The following questions therefore need to be addressed: what is Revelation? How is it expressed? And how is it transmitted? More specifically, what is the basis of belief and understanding? What are the implications of theology as an ecclesial discipline? And how are theological discoveries to be validated?

In fact, in a recent letter to the Tablet, the Catholic Co-Chairman of ARCIC II, Bishop Cormac Murphy-
O'Connor, stated that the next study which the Commission is to undertake is on 'Scripture, tradition and teaching authority', a topic he regards as of 'crucial importance.' A preliminary answer to the above questions, however, will now be attempted.
CHAPTER 10
THE CREATIVE AND THE COGNITIVE, THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE TRUE:
METHOD IN THEOLOGY

There never was anything so perilous or so exciting as orthodoxy.¹

The discussions of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission on 'Authority in the Church', when taken together with the criticisms of them that have been raised, have highlighted the urgent need to introduce a semblance of order into contemporary ecumenical theology. These divisions, however, exist not only between theologians and their respective communions, but also within particular communions.

Since Vatican II there has been considerable upheaval not only in traditional Catholic practices and traditions, but also in Catholic theology. One need only think of the correspondence between Rahner and Küng over infallibility,² and the disciplining of various theologians, as well as priests and religious, by the Vatican.³ Cardinal Ratzinger has twice voiced his concern.⁴

A similar pluralism exists within Protestant theology. In Britain, the continuing debate over the Church of
England's decision to ordain women to the priesthood highlights not only differing conceptions of anthropology, but also of Revelation and ecclesiology, such as were already evident in the report of the Doctrine Commission, *Christian Believing.* Anglican theology in general has also been lambasted by the present Bishop of Ely, Stephen Sykes.

These divisions within and among the Christian communions make ecumenical dialogue extremely difficult, for as Dulles has noted, the 'different theological schools have drifted so far apart that what seems false and dangerous to one school seems almost self-evident to another. Theologians lack a common language, common goals, and common norms. Civil argument has ceased to function, and in its absence opposing parties seek to discredit one another by impugning the motives or competence of their adversaries.'

It is Dulles' view that although there must be scope for a legitimate diversity in theology, its ecclesial nature needs to be more widely recognized, if theology is to be able to discipline itself. In pursuit of this objective, he has suggested a theological method which he hopes would maintain the creativity of theology, while at the same time recognizing that theologians must operate
within certain boundaries if their work is to be of benefit to the Church. Before discussing Dulles' suggestion, however, it is necessary to say a word about his career.

Fr. Dulles' career as a theologian extends from before the Second Vatican Council to the present day. He was trained in the rigorous manner of neo-scholastic theology, and was appointed to a chair in 1960. After the council his work developed along more 'progressive', although always orthodox lines, and he has become well known for his use of models in theology. As such, his career has spanned one of the most creative, but also most confusing periods in the history of the Catholic Church. Out of this experience, however, has come a theological method which is rooted not only in Scripture and Tradition, but also in the particular tradition of the Roman Catholic Church. For Dulles, the documents of Vatican II are normative for contemporary Catholic theology, but he also stresses the continuity of the council with that Catholic teaching which preceded it. Consequently, his theology is not only profoundly Catholic, but also creative and innovative, after the manner of John Henry Newman, for as Dulles commented of St. Ignatius of Loyola, St. Theresa of Avila, St. Francis of Assisi and Pope John XXIII, 'the more deeply a prophet or reformer is immersed in the heritage, the more successfully will he or she be able to transform or renew
it with fidelity to its authentic spirit.\textsuperscript{15}

This maxim also holds true of Newman. In fact, a parallel can be drawn between both Newman and Dulles in that their careers spanned considerable periods of time, during which they were subject to various diverse influences, all of which combined to produce an understanding of theology which allows for, in Dulles' words, 'a dynamic equilibrium between continuity and innovation',\textsuperscript{16} made possible by development which maintains, what Newman called, 'Continuity of its Principles'.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, Dulles' thought displays considerable affinities with Newman's,\textsuperscript{18} and these will be highlighted during the following discussion.

\textit{Toward a Postcritical Theology}\textsuperscript{19}

Whilst acknowledging that terms such as 'postcritical', 'postliberal' and 'postmodern' tend to be rather manipulative, and even suggest a degree of chronological snobbery, Dulles shares, to a degree, the convictions of the writers who use such terms, that we are moving into a period unlike the past few centuries, thus necessitating a new approach to theological method. 'The history of theology over the centuries, I submit, can be clarified by the successive attitudes toward criticism; for example, the precritical, the critical and the
postcritical.'

From Precritical to Postcritical

Strictly speaking, there was never a precritical period in theology, but Dulles has in mind the period before the canonical sources were subjected to criticism, i.e. when theology was measured against the Scriptures and the definitions of popes and councils. The critical era was ushered in 'when observation and mathematics were used to overthrow the authority of Aristotle in the realm of science.' At the heart of this movement were Galileo and Francis Bacon, followed by Descartes and Spinoza, and in England Locke and Hume.

Dulles identifies two broad reactions to the 'critical programme': firstly, the paracritical, whose supporters argued that reason has its true role only in the field of science and not in religion where faith is supreme; and secondly, the countercritical, the proponents of which sought to attack criticism with its own weapons, employing exact syllogistic logic and insisting strongly on miracles and prophecies as evidential signs.

The Critique of Criticism

In the second half of the twentieth century, however, Dulles detects the emergence of what he terms the
As far as Dulles is concerned, postcritical 'thinking does not reject criticism but carries it to new lengths, scrutinizing the presuppositions and methods of the critical programme itself.' Five flaws have thus been brought to light. Firstly, 'the critical programme was animated by a bias toward doubt, with the implied assumption that the royal road to truth consists in uprooting all voluntary commitments.' This arbitrary bias in favour of doubt is understandable in the context of religious warfare, but today when a thorough-going scepticism permeates every aspect of life, theology must show that firm religious commitments may be reasonable.

Secondly, 'the critical programme failed to recognize that doubt itself, and consequently criticism, rests on a fiduciary basis.'

Thirdly, 'it is impossible to apply the critical programme consistently. We do not have stringent evidence for even the most obvious facts, such as the existence of the external world or the reliability of the physical and behavioural laws upon which all our ideas of worldly
realities, past, present, and future, inevitably rest. Universal doubt is so repugnant to human nature that it is in fact unrealizable. 31 Usually what has happened is that proponents of the critical programme have used it selectively to attempt to destroy certain beliefs and prop up liberal, humanistic belief-systems. 32

Fourthly, 'the critical programme neglects the social dimension of knowledge. Implicitly it assumes that each individual is in a position to command all the evidence relevant to solving the question at hand. Although critical philosophers have in fact depended upon predecessors and colleagues, they tend to speak as though they were individually self-sufficient.' 33

Fifthly, 'and most fundamentally, the critical programme overlooked the tacit dimension of knowledge. It gave no cognitive value to what Pascal meant by the "reasons of the heart" and what Newman meant by "presumptions", "antecedent dispositions", and the "instincts of an educated conscience". Yet these precritical orientations are essential. Even on the most primitive level of visual perception I have to depend on clues that I cannot specify, still less defend, by formal argument. Uninterpreted visual signals, if they may be said to exist at all, are situated at a level below that of
explicit awareness. Still more palpably, tacit presuppositions are operative in all human knowledge concerning the facts of history, the findings of science, and the data of religious faith.

This attack on the critical programme reflects Newman's position towards Liberalism, as summarized in Note A at the end of the Apologia. The similarities with Dulles are evident, and that Newman's work has influenced him may be inferred from his quotation of Newman.

1. No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be so.
2. No one can believe what he does not understand.
3. No theological doctrine is anything more than an opinion which happens to be held by bodies of men.
4. It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not had brought home to him by actual proof.
5. It is immoral in a man to believe more than he can spontaneously receive as being congenial to his moral and mental nature.
6. No revealed doctrines or precepts may reasonably stand in the way of scientific conclusions.
7. Christianity is necessarily modified by the growth of civilization, and the exigencies of time.
8. There is a system of religion more simply true than Christianity as it has ever been received.
9. There is a right of Private Judgement: that is, there is no existing authority on earth competent to interfere with the liberty of the individual in reasoning and judging for themselves about the Bible and its contents, as they severally
10. There are rights of conscience such, that every one may lawfully advance a claim to profess and teach what is false and wrong in matters, religious, social, and moral, provided that to his private conscience it seems absolutely true and right.

11. There is no thing as a national or state conscience....

18. Virtue is the child of knowledge, and vice of ignorance. 36

Dulles argues, however, that the assault upon the critical programme, which has been underway for at least a generation, does also have a dangerous consequence which needs to be addressed. 37 The critical programme underpinned the achievements of much of the theology of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the countercritical reactions to it. If the critical programme is destroyed, and no intellectually respectable method put in its place, then the validity of theology itself is thrown into doubt. 38 The current sense of drift and confusion cannot be overcome by the countercritical and paracritical theories which, as Dulles notes, 'depict faith as a matter of arbitrary prejudice or blind emotion [and] deprive theology of its cognitive import.' 39 A postcritical theological method must be established and intellectually justified.

The Sources as Clues

Postcritical theology, as Dulles understands it,
begins with a presupposition or prejudice in favour of faith. Its fundamental attitude is a hermeneutics of trust, not of suspicion. Its purpose is constructive, not destructive. This is not to deny that people are entitled to doubt what they have reason to regard as false or unfounded. The doubter can be a serious thinker, candidly exercising the claims made for religion. But theology, as commonly understood, is the kind of enquiring that takes place from within a religious commitment. Drawing on the convictions instilled by faith, the theologian uses them as resources for the proper task of theology, which is the understanding of faith.

For the postcritical theologian the affirmations of faith cannot be rightly probed except from within the horizon of faith. A computer may be able to derive conclusions from creedal statements or dogmas considered as bare propositions. To the believer, however, the formulations of faith are binding and meaningful insofar as they express aspects of a total vision or idea that can never be fully objectified. The contents of faith are known not by detached observation but by indwelling or participation, somewhat as we know our own body with its powers and weaknesses.40

Immediately one can detect traces of Newman. As the Oratorian hymn writer Edward Caswall noted on the flyleaf of his presentation copy of the Grammar of Assent, it was Newman's view 'that you can believe what you cannot understand.... [and] that you can believe what you cannot absolutely prove.' A 'hermeneutics of trust' would surely not be foreign to one who regarded Liberalism and scepticism as leading inexorably to atheism, as in the case of his brother Charles, or for whom a hundred
difficulties did not make a doubt. That being said, Newman was well aware of the difficulties involved in religious belief, reminding his readers in the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk* that it is 'so difficult... to assent inwardly to propositions, verified to us neither by reason nor experience, but depending for their reception on the word of the Church as God's oracle'; and in such cases it may be that a 'German who hesitates may have more of the real spirit of faith than an Italian who swallows.'

In addition, Newman's condemnation of the liberal proposition that theological doctrine is nothing more than opinion finds its echo in Dulles' view that theology can only function within the framework of faith. Furthermore, both would agree that doctrines 'express aspects of a total vision or idea that can never be fully objectified', for as Newman wrote in the *Essay* 'the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation are mere portions of the original impression, and modes of representing it.' Furthermore, Dulles' use of the word 'idea' immediately brings to mind Newman's *Essay on Development*, and has obvious connexions with the former's comment that the 'contents of faith are not known by detached observations'. A process of development, which is the result of an idea's contact with men, minds and communities, not syllogistic reasoning, appears to be what is implied.
Furthermore, Dulles regards theology as an ecclesial discipline. This is because the Revelation of Christ was made known to a community of disciples, which as a group, is animated by the Holy Spirit. Salvation comes to the individual through the community, the Church, which received the promise of Jesus that she would be led into all truth. Newman would doubtless have agreed that a 'theologian who departs from the Church and seeks to work without the support of fellow believers has forfeited a necessary resource for the theological enterprise.'

Thus theology is the attempt to articulate the faith of the Church. This is not done through the application of a scientific method or syllogistic logic, but is learnt within the Christian community through familiarity with life in that community and with the Christian symbols. 'To apprehend the meaning of the symbols, it is not enough to gaze at them in a detached manner as objects and dissect them under a logical microscope. The joint meaning of the symbols cannot be discerned unless one relies confidently on the symbols as clues, and attends to the realities to which they point. From within this stance of faith the theologian seeks to formulate in explicit terms what the Christian symbols have to say to the questions that call for solution.' The theologian must therefore develop 'a kind of connoisseurship derived from personal appropriation.
of the living faith of the Church.'53 As Newman would have put it, the theologian must develop his sensus fidei,54 so that he may correctly apprehend those religious truths which come before him not only in propositional form, but as material symbols.55 Obviously, Newman regarded both the intellect and the imagination as important elements in developing the sense of faith.

Liturgy is, of course, a prime source upon which the theologian can draw. Noting the principle lex orandi lex credendi, Dulles argues that the Church came to be assured of the divinity of Christ partly because divine functions were attributed to Him in prayer and sacramental worship. The same is true of the definition of the Theotokos.56 Newman makes the same point in the Essay, when tracing the evidence among the Ante-Nicene Fathers for the doctrine of the Trinity.57

In the contemporary speculations about God, therefore, Dulles maintains that the requirements of worship should be borne in mind, along with the various philosophical categories. For example, would it still be possible to adore God and call him Father if He were not both personal and yet distinct from the world?58 In a sentence reminiscent of the Via Media, Dulles states: 'Theology should not allow truth to be subordinated to practical
Method in Theology

commends, but it should turn to the praxis of the Church as a locus for the discernment of theological truth. 37

A second source Dulles refers to is the *sensus fidelium*, which as he notes, was described by Newman in 'On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine'. 60 Quite evidently, the theologian must also possess this sense of the faith in order to be able to judge what is consonant with Revelation and what is not. This the theologian acquires through living in the Church and there pursuing his vocation as a theologian in the service of the Church.

'Develop this sense of the faith one apprehends the clues in a subsidiary or tacit manner and concentrates on their joint meaning.' 61 In this instance Dulles has acknowledged his debt to Newman, and so no further elaboration is required.

Dulles notes that the liturgy and the *sensus fidelium* are both particular forms of Tradition, which is itself a source for the theologian. 62 As is clear in the thought of Newman and Blondel, 63 as well as in the teaching of Vatican II, Tradition is dynamic, and preserves the past as a living reality, pointing towards the future. 64 'Consisting predominantly of tacit knowledge, tradition perpetuates itself not primarily by explicit statement but rather by gesture, deed, and example, including ritual actions. The
theologian who wishes to draw on the full riches of tradition seeks to dwell within it so as to assimilate the unspecifiable core that it transmits. To this it might be added that this description of Tradition allows for the inclusion of sacred art and music, as well as the work of the Fathers, which was of particular importance to Newman, among the sources of the theologian.

As well as these unwritten sources, there are, of course, the Holy Scriptures. But as Dulles notes, the Bible is not just a mine of historical and theological information, each element having independent weight, and capable of totally separate treatment. Rather the Bible must be treated 'in its totality as a set of clues that serve to focus the Christian vision of reality from manifold perspectives. Within the Bible the figure of Jesus Christ stands out as God's supreme self-disclosure.' In addition, there are many clear doctrinal statements, as well as the doctrines of the theological schools. 'Recognizing these statements as trustworthy articulations of the Christian idea, the theologian may use them as axioms around which to build a system.' Such systems, however, can never be complete, and the axioms employed can only be correctly understood by believers who have acquired the necessary skills through their participation in the community of faith.
Method in Theology

Such a view of the Bible is, of course, a reflection of Catholic teaching, as found in the documents of Vatican II, and is identical to Newman's.72 Once again there is the typically 'Newmanian' stress on the incompleteness of any theological system, and the necessity of the correct disposition toward the subject-matter, remembering that too sceptical an attitude arises 'from a fault of the heart, not of the intellect.'73

The Validation of Discoveries

Given the exploratory nature of theological research a further subject that must be discussed is the validation of theological discoveries, or in Newman's terms, how a true development is to be distinguished from a corruption.

Dulles begins by noting that theology can never remain static, since it 'must deal with new questions put to the Church by the course of events and by the circumstances of life in the world',74 but even though new 'questions demand new answers... the answers of theology must always grow out of the Church's heritage of faith.'75

Theology begins with wonder and with unanswered questions. These questions, arising in the minds of committed believers, stimulate a confident search for solutions that are foreseen to some extent by the shape of the problems themselves. On the trail of a solution the theologian combs the inventory of
Method in Theology

Scripture and tradition, including the statements of the magisterium and of previous theologians, hoping to find in these sources clues that can be integrated by a feat of imagination so as to provide an answer to the problem at hand.  

Several factors are then identified as being involved in the process of validating theological discoveries. Firstly, there is the theologian's own sense of achievement, the 'eureka syndrome', and his certainty that his theory is agreeable to the tacit demands of faith. Whilst this may satisfy the individual, however, it is not sufficient confirmation. Such confirmation may be provided by two further criteria, the 'cognitive fruitfulness of the theory and the approval of respected judges'.

By the cognitive fruitfulness of a theory, Dulles means 'its capacity not only to answer the precise question that was originally asked but also to illuminate problems not originally envisaged... every genuine discovery opens up a path that leads to a host of further discoveries, each of which confirms, enriches, and in some measure corrects the initial discovery.'

Related to this is the approval or rejection of the theory by people competent and capable of delivering a significant opinion upon it. Obviously the more approval
it receives the more likely is it to be a valid theological advance, and *vice versa*.

Since theology is an ecclesial discipline, the judgement of the bishops, who receive a particular grace to enable them to safeguard the deposit of the faith through episcopal consecration, forms part of the third criterion. Bishops must have a profound sense of orthodoxy and although 'not necessarily competent to assess the theory from the standpoint of its technical correctness... they are commissioned, and presumably qualified to decide whether the theological proposal is helpful or injurious to the corporate faith and witness of the Church.'

The second part of this criterion is the verdict of the scholarly community, 'what some have called a "second magisterium" of scholars.' This is concerned primarily with scholarly competence rather than with the impact on the life of faith. Acknowledged scholars hold key positions in schools and exercise control in a number of ways: firstly, they teach and admit new candidates to their ranks; secondly, they control membership and appointment to office in scholarly societies; and thirdly, they act as referees for scholarly journals and review books. No individual scholar is capable of specialization in every field of theology, but scholars are capable of making
reasonable judgements upon work in fields closely related to their own and thus they can exercise a joint control among themselves. 'By their mutual trust they are normally able to arrive at a mediated consensus regarding the value of new theories.'

On the whole, Dulles regards such dual control over theology as beneficial. Since theology must be done within the Church, its results must be judged by those steeped in its authentic tradition and loyal to it. As he says, 'those who transmit the tradition must not be allowed to dilute it by ideas and values that have not been refined, as it were, in the fire of discipleship.'

Once again, this section of Dulles' argument appears to be shot through with 'Newmanian' ideas. Firstly, Newman would certainly have agreed that the individual theologian cannot himself validate his own research. Take, for example, his criticism of some philosophers who 'consult their own idea of how the mind should work', without due regard to the opinions of others.

Secondly, Dulles' concept of the 'cognitive fruitfulness of a theory' would seem to be the counterpart of Newman's third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh notes of a true development as described in the 1878 edition of
By 'Its Power of Assimilation', Newman meant that a development takes 'into its own substance external materials; and that this absorption or assimilation is completed when the materials appropriated come to belong to it or enter into its unity.' By Developments, however, do not occur by 'a conscious reasoning from premises to conclusion', but an 'idea under one or other of its aspects grows in the mind by remaining there', and its growth can afterwards be traced and be seen to form a 'Logical Sequence'. Such a living idea 'is sure to develope according to its own nature, and the tendencies, which are carried out on the long run, may under favourable circumstances show themselves early as well as late'; and hence there may be an 'Anticipation of Its Future'. Genuine developments, therefore, are 'preceded by definite indications... so those which do but contradict and reverse the course of doctrine which has been developed before them, and out of which they spring, are certainly corrupt'; as such, a true development exercises a 'Conservative Action upon its Past'. Furthermore, since a corruption is 'a sort of accident or affectation' it
cannot last long 'and thus duration is another test of a faithful development', since it exhibits 'Chronic Vigour'.

All these notes, however, and it would seem, Dulles' argument that the sources are the clues, are based upon Newman's first two notes of a true development, namely 'Preservation of its Type', which he explained 'by the analogy of physical growth, which is such that the parts and the proportions of the developed form, however altered, correspond to those which belong to its rudiments', and 'Continuity of its Principles', according to which the 'life of doctrines may be said to consist in the law or principle which they embody'. As such, doctrines may legitimately develop and change, provided the principle which gives them their life remains intact. Hence Dulles' conclusion that the 'solution, when it arrives, is already accredited in part by the anticipations that preceded it'.

This, however, does pose the problem of how developments are to be recognized. In other words, who is the recognized judge in these matters. Newman's view of the ideal, which is essentially the same as Dulles', is expressed in the Apologia thus:
Perhaps a local teacher, or a doctor in some local school, hazards a proposition, and a controversy ensues. It smoulders or burns in one place, no one interposing; Rome simply lets it alone. Then it comes before a Bishop; or some priest, or some professor in some other seat of learning takes it up; and then there is a second stage of it. Then it comes before a University, and it may be condemned by the theological faculty. So the controversy proceeds year after year, and Rome is still silent. An appeal is perhaps made to a seat of authority inferior to Rome; and then at last after a long while it comes before the supreme power. Meanwhile, the question has been ventilated and turned over and over again, and viewed on every side of it, and authority is called upon to pronounce a decision, which has already been arrived at by reason. But even then, perhaps the supreme authority hesitates to do so, and nothing is determined on the point for years: or so generally and vaguely, that the whole controversy has to be gone through again, before it is ultimately determined. It is manifest how a mode of proceeding, such as this, tends not only to the liberty, but to the courage, of the individual theologian or controversialist. Many a man has ideas, which he hopes are true, and useful for his day, but he is not confident about them, and wishes to have them discussed. He is willing, or rather would be thankful, to give them up, if they can be proved to be erroneous or dangerous, and by means of controversy he obtains his end. He is answered, and he yields; or on the contrary he finds that he is considered safe. He would not dare to do this, if he knew an authority, which was supreme and final, was watching every word he said, and made signs of assent or dissent to each sentence, as he uttered it. Then indeed he would be fighting, as the Persian soldiers, under the lash, and the freedom of his intellect might truly be said to be beaten out of him.
In practice, of course, Newman felt the Roman authorities were far too harsh, as his reaction to the Munich Brief demonstrates. In 1863 he wrote to Emily Bowles, in terms that clearly resemble the Apologia:

This age of the Church is peculiar - in former times, primitive and medieval, there was not the extreme centralization which is now in use. If a private theologian said anything free, another answered him. If the controversy grew, then it went to a Bishop, a theological faculty, or to some foreign university. The Holy See was but the court of ultimate appeal. Now, if I, as private priest, put anything into print, Propaganda answers me at once. How can I fight with such a chain on my arm? It is like the Persians driven to fight under the lash.¹⁰⁰

That being said, Newman's description of the ideal practice of the Church authorities in Rome, as regards her intervention in theological disputes, reflects his view of the relationship between the episcopate and a Catholic University.¹⁰¹ In both instances Newman is concerned to allow theologians the necessary freedom to conduct research, but he is also aware that such freedom necessarily involves certain constraints. As he said in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 'Conscience has rights because it has duties.'¹⁰²

Dulles also discusses 'University Theology in Service to the Church',¹⁰³ and arrives at the same conclusion as
Method in Theology

Newman. In fact, apart from John Paul II, Newman is the only scholar quoted at length by Dulles, who applies the latter's conditions for academic research in a university thus:

Adapting these conditions to the subject matter of theology, we may paraphrase Newman's principles approximately as follows: it must not collide with dogma; it must not issue pronouncements on religious matters in competition with the official magisterium of the Church; it must not indulge in brilliant paradoxes but rather propound serious views; it must take care to avoid shocking the popular mind or unsettling the weak.

Again, Newman's influence upon Dulles is clear.

From Faith to Understanding

A related issue is 'whether the methods and findings of theology must be public in the sense of being accessible to persons outside the community of faith.' Critical and countercritical theology were based on the idea that rational, logical argument would convert the unconverted. Paracritical theology rejected that notion and was prepared to exist in an intellectual ghetto. Postcritical theology takes a middle line, intending to speak about reality as actually constituted and to make statements of universal validity. It points to the deficiencies of any system that purports to dispense with faith. Recognizing that every affirmation rests upon some kind of faith,
postcritical theology frankly relies on convictions born of Christian faith. It does not pretend that its arguments can be conclusive to thinkers who do not have the same faith commitment. It nevertheless invites the uncommitted reader to enter into the universe of faith and seeks to foster conversion. Postcritical theology, aware of the tacit dimension, avoids the rationalism of critical and countercritical apologetics. It does not seek to argue people into faith by indisputable evidence. On the other hand, it avoids the fideism that substitutes emotion or blind choice for cognition in the sphere of religion. The postcritical theologian points to the necessity of conversion as a self-modifying act that enables one to look at the world with new eyes. To the extent that faith rests on a specific commitment, it is indemonstrable to the outsider. While the cognitive advantages of believing can be persuasively presented, the truth of the faith cannot be established from within the framework of the unconverted.

For Dulles, awareness of the tacit dimension of faith allows the postcritical theologian 'to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between continuity and innovation.' Thus, Tradition is seen primarily as the bearer of tacit knowledge, and as the Church's understanding of the faith develops, fidelity to Tradition may be consonant with the formulation of new doctrines, such as occurred in the definition of the doctrines of the Homoousion and the Trinity. So, postcritical theology is neither afraid of originality nor suspicious of authority, since proposed new understandings of the faith must be validated.
Dulles notes that, as regards the condemnation or approval of novel theories, mistakes have been made in the past, and that no doubt they will be made in the future. Given that this is the case, there must be room for responsible dissent (in certain areas), but caricatures of the Church authorities as ignorant, self-serving and narrow-minded must be avoided, since they undermine the Church as a community of faith. As Dulles points out, theology 'itself demands a basic confidence in the Church and its official leadership as the transmitter of the heritage of faith.' Certainly, in this situation, a tension exists between the Church authorities and theologians, but as Newman realized, this tension may result in genuine progress in the understanding of the faith.

Arising out of a passionate quest to articulate tacitly held truth that defies adequate formulation, postcritical theology is not a strictly deductive or empirical science. Yet it is deeply concerned with truth; it intends to put the mind in contact with a reality antecedent to itself... The critical programme lost sight of the creative dimensions of theology, and the defensive theology of the countercritical movement shared the same blindness. Some romantic theology of the paracritical variety cultivated beauty and sentiment at the expense of truth. Postcritical theology seeks to reunite the creative with the cognitive, the beautiful with the true. In so doing it can greatly contribute to the vitality of the Church, which depends in no small measure on whether contemporary Christians can hold
forth a vision of reality that is plausible, comprehensive, and appealing.... such a vision can be found in Christ and in full fidelity to the Christian sources.\footnote{114}

In this concluding section of Dulles' argument striking similarities with Newman can once again be seen. As already noted Newman would certainly have agreed with Dulles that faith can only be fully comprehended from within the believing community, and Dulles' remarks are reminiscent of the previous cited entry in the appendix to Newman's private diary in July 1846, when he spoke of 'a certain class of feelings unknown to Protestants.'\footnote{115} After all, it would seem that it was such a lack of understanding which prevented Newman from seeking reception into the Roman Catholic Church earlier.

In addition, such a view is consonant with Newman's method in both the Essay and the Grammar, in which he sought to persuade by coaxing readers to see certain facts in a particular way, and not by syllogistic argument. Furthermore, Dulles' argument that there is a 'dynamic equilibrium between continuity and innovation' reflects the argument of the Essay on Development, crucial to the understanding of which is the distinction of the thirteenth University Sermon between implicit and explicit knowledge. For Dulles, it is the task of theology to articulate this
implicitly or tacitly held knowledge: as Newman might have said, to develop it into propositional form. Both would have agreed with Polanyi's statement that 'Tacit knowing is more fundamental than explicit knowing: 'we can know more than we can tell and we can tell nothing without relying on our awareness of things we may not be able to tell.'11b This, of course, is the argument of the Grammar of Assent, which Nichols has summarized as follows:

The book is indeed a diptych. One way of describing its twofold articulation is to say that in the first part, "Assent and Apprehension", Newman shows how personal, and particularly imaginative, acceptance of the dogmas of the Church is possible, even though the truths concerned are mysteries beyond the capacity of reason to understand completely; in the second part, "Assent and Inference", Newman suggests how we can rationally justify this personal and imaginative adhesion. We can use the materials of experience to come to an unconditional assertion of God's existence (and of the propositions of revealed religion) even when we would not be justified in concluding to these things by strict inference.117

Newman's view of the ideal relationship between the Church authorities and theology has already been discussed, but it can be added at this point that he too realized that mistakes can be made;118 he himself suffered from them, but, as his relations with Acton and Simpson show, he believed that public, vociferous and ultimately self-centred dissent placed the objector in a false position.119
As will be recalled, Newman advocated an organic partnership between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens, which in his view, would improve, among other things, the standard of theology, and thus benefit the Church as a whole.

Summary

This, then, is the place to recall the conclusion to the first section of the thesis, in which the dominant themes of Newman's thought, as analysed in the first five chapters, were outlined. For it is these themes which underpin Dulles' proposed theological method. They are:

- that theologians need a developmental concept of Revelation, based on the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge;
- that such a view of Revelation necessitates an infallible teaching authority;¹²⁰ that the Church is the corporate interpreter of Scripture and bearer of Tradition;
- that the relationship between the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens should be one of organic partnership;
- and that the tension between interdependent groups or disciplines can be beneficial.

It is suggested here that it is these issues, and the related topic of theological method, that now need to be addressed by those involved in ecumenical dialogue, for it is only by discussing such fundamental concerns that the
criticisms of ARCIC can be considered seriously.

It would appear that in the past, those involved in ecumenical dialogue have been too keen to reach consensus statements, and have given insufficient weight to the views of others within their own communions. Theologians must return to the sources; they must respect the ecclesial nature of theology; and they must cast aside the in-built bias toward doubt that has characterized so much theology since the Enlightenment.

This thesis follows that method. It begins with Newman, who first sowed the seeds for such an approach in the *Essay on Development*, the *University Sermons* and the *Grammar of Assent*. In this he anticipated much of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, and it is in the context of that council's teaching, and in light of the ecumenical discussions to which it gave rise, that a postcritical theological method is now propounded. The clues to the answers to the questions that are posed by the divisions between Christians are to be found in the sources that are available to all. But they must be approached in a particular way, and a potentially helpful method is sketched above.

It must not be supposed, however, that this approach
will lead to the swift reconciliation of all Christians: it will not. In fact, it will cause severe disagreement when it reveals the true nature of the divisions between them. That being said, it should also highlight real agreement, and it is only when that has been done that the process of reconciliation can really begin.

As Newman noted in the tenth of the University Sermons:

Half the controversies in the world are verbal ones; and, could they be brought to a plain issue, they would be brought to a prompt termination. Parties engaged in them would then perceive either that in substance they agreed together, or that their difference was one of first principles.... We need not dispute, we need not prove, we need but define. At all events, let us if we can, do this first of all; and then see who are left for us to dispute with, what is left for us to prove.... When men understand what each other mean, they see for the most part, that controversy is either superfluous or hopeless.121

Dulles is surely correct in his comment that Newman's 'frank and realistic appraisal of the obstacles to union can be a salutary corrective for a generation that is tempted to minimize the distinctive claims of every religious body'.122 It also places the emphasis on metanoia as the starting point for ecumenical discussion, since as the divisions between Christians become clearer.
the more prayer and perseverance will be required.

Furthermore, this is very much a Roman Catholic approach. Considerable emphasis is placed not only on Scripture, but on Tradition, the Church and the Magisterium. Many Protestant (and Orthodox) theologians will protest. This, however, will be of benefit to ecumenism if it helps to reveal where the real differences and agreements lie. In addition, as Newman saw so clearly, the tensions which will inevitably result may lead theologians and their respective communions closer to the truth. As the Methodist Stanley Hauerwas has commented:

I want you to be Catholics. I also believe that there is nothing more important for the future unity of the Church than for you to be Catholic.... You have been so anxious to be like us that you have failed in your ecumenical task to help us to see what it means for any of us to be faithful to the Gospel on which our unity depends.123

But before Catholics can be Catholic, they too must agree with each other as to what being a Catholic means, and it is within Catholicism (and internally within other communions) that the issue of method must first be discussed. It can then be brought into the ecumenical arena. A model for this discussion is provided by Dulles, and given the nature of the model he suggests, it is not
Method in Theology

surprising to find that clues to its origins can be found in the history and doctrinal documents of the Church, and particularly in the thought of John Henry Newman, from whose thought such a method can be easily inferred.

Conclusion

Newman's significance for contemporary theology, then, would seem to lie in his understanding of method. Such a conclusion is justified by two considerations. Firstly, the high degree to which he anticipated the teaching of Vatican II provides *prima facie* evidence for his continued significance, suggesting the seminal nature of his thought; and secondly, when this is combined with his influence upon Dulles, which speaks for itself, and Dulles' proposed method, which maintains the equilibrium between continuity and innovation, it is clear that, like Newman, the theologian must work within his own heritage of faith. The process of development which can be traced from Newman to Vatican II and then to Dulles witnesses to this. But it does not suggest that Newman provides all the answers, merely that his thought is of value in trying to arrive at them. Newman helps to provide the starting point, not the finishing line, although the latter is obviously implicit in the former. Furthermore, it is surely the method of Catholic theology to build upon past teaching so as prophetically to re-interpret the immutable Christian
message, as the Holy Spirit leads into all truth in ever
new and changing circumstances.

If this is borne in mind, then theology really will
reunite the creative with the cognitive, and the beautiful
with the true, for as has been remarked of Newman's
writings:

their beauty of form was the product of the struggle to say what
he wished to say for God.... They soar for a purpose, to lift us
to our Maker. The Grammar of Assent was the first of Newman's
works not called forth by special need or circumstance; and even
that work, the summary of a lifetime's thought, was written not
for self but for the Almighty Lover.... For all of us who need
lights to light our path, John Henry Newman is a bearer of
light, to show us where our kindly light is leading. May we at
the last follow him from shadows and images into truth.
### Abbreviations of Newman's Published Works

#### as used in the Notes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apologia</td>
<td>Apologia Pro Vita Sua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arians</td>
<td>The Arians of the Fourth Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AW</td>
<td>Autobiographical Writings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consulting</td>
<td>On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 1845/1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff, I, II</td>
<td>Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered, 2 vols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elucidations</td>
<td>Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essays, I, II</td>
<td>Essays Critical and Historical, 2 vols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS, I, II, III</td>
<td>Historical Sketches, 3 vols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea</td>
<td>The Idea of a University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Loss and Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix</td>
<td>Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS, I-VIII</td>
<td>Parochial and Plain Sermons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prespos</td>
<td>Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

420
TP  The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Biblical Inspiration and Infallibility

TT  Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical

US  University Sermons: Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford

VM. I, II  The Via Media of the Anglican Church, 2 vols.

Full bibliographical details can be found on pp. 501-3.
Notes: First Developments

Notes to Chapter 1 First Developments


4. Edward Hawkins was at that time Vicar of St. Mary's, the University Church. He was later to become Provost of Oriel, and, as is well known, came to disagree sharply with Newman over the role of tutors in the college. Newman was, however, 'deeply influenced by a university sermon which Hawkins had preached on tradition, to the effect that the Bible "was never intended to teach doctrine, but only to prove it, and that, if we would learn doctrine, we must have recourse to the formularies of the Church."' Ker, John Henry Newman, p.22.

5. Arians, p.50.

6. Ibid., pp.36-7.


8. This is discussed by C. Gunton, 'Newman's Dialectic: Dogma and Person in the Seventy-Third Tract for the Times' in Ker & Hill, pp.309-322.


12. See Newman's attack three years later upon the view of Dr. Hampden that 'the Articles of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds are merely human opinions, scholastic, allowing of change, unwarrantable when imposed, and, in fact, the produce of a mistaken philosophy; and that the Apostles' Creed is defensible only when considered as a record of historical facts.' *Elucidations*, pp.5-6; and see also 41; 46-7.


17. *Apologia*, p.106.

18. Benjamin Harrison was a don at Christ Church and a contributor to the *Tracts for the Times*.

19. The Abbé Jean-Nicolas Jager, was a French Catholic priest, whom Harrison had met in Paris, and who wanted to hold a debate about the theology of the Tracts in the *Univer* newspaper. Newman took over the correspondence after Harrison had contributed two letters.


22. *Ibid*.


25. Both in the correspondence with the Abbé, and in the *Lectures on the Prophetic Office*, Newman can be seen searching for the categories of, and distinctions between, different truths, such as are to be found in neo-scholasticism.
Notes: First Developments

27. Ibid., pp.16-17.
28. Ibid., p.17.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p.175.
33. Ibid., p.103.
34. Apologia, p.103-5.
36. Ibid., p.12.

37. Along with Robert Williams, who was also a former pupil of Newman's, Wood worked on an English translation of the Roman Breviary during 1837-8. Plans to publish it, however, came to nothing, when it encountered strong opposition from Fellow Tractarians. Ker, John Henry Newman, pp.166-7.

38. As is well known, Manning became Archdeacon of Chichester in 1841, before becoming a Catholic ten years later. In 1865, he succeeded Nicholas Wiseman as Archbishop of Westminster, in which capacity he exerted considerable influence at the First Vatican Council (1869-70). In 1875, Pius IX raised him to the cardinalate. For an account of Manning's life see E.S. Purcell's two-volume, Life of Cardinal Manning, Archbishop of Westminster, 2 vols. (Macmillan & Co: London 1896). Purcell does, however, present a one-sided and inaccurate view of Manning at times. This, along with other works about Manning are reviewed in D. Newsome's recently published, The Convert Cardinals: John Henry Newman and Henry Edward Manning (J. Murray: London 1993), pp.7-12.


40. Ibid., p.550.

41. Newman's former disciple, Mark Pattison, was also attracted to the concept of development. Cf. D. Nimmo,

42. Letter to Francis, 22.10.1840. (Birmingham Oratory Archives).
I am grateful to Mr. Gerard Tracey, Archivist at the Birmingham Oratory, for bringing to my attention the archival material upon which I draw in this chapter, and which is identified in the notes with the initials B.O.A.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Letter to Francis, 10.11.1840. (B.O.A.)

49. Ibid.

50. The first of Newman's examples is as follows:
'Supposing I were in some inferior command in a battle, and from the smoke and noise could not make out my commanding officer's signals, and could not act for the best, according to my best knowledge of what he was intending and what he was likely to intend, would this be to admit the principle that every one might fight, as he pleased, or by himself.' Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. VM, I, pp.128-85.

53. Letter to Francis, 10.11.1840 (B.O.A.)

54. Ibid.

55. Richard Whately was a former fellow of Oriel, who was from 1825-31 Principal of Alban Hall, a position he relinquished upon his appointment to the Archbishopric of Dublin. When Newman first arrived in the Oriel common room in 1822, Whately was given the task of drawing the young Newman out of his shell. During this period Newman assisted Whately in research for his Elements of Logic, AW, pp.66-7.

57. Letter to Francis, 10.11.1840.


60. Newman's firm belief in the importance of antecedent probability is also illustrated in a letter of 1853: 'Again, I stand by my (Oxford) University Discourses... and am almost a zealot for their substantial truth - and if I have brought out one truth in any thing I have written, I consider it to be the *importance* of antecedent probability in conviction. It is how you convert factory girls as well as philosophers.' *L&D*, XV, p.381.

61. Letter to Francis, 22.10.1840. (B.O.A.)

62. This method is summarized in a letter to W.E. Gladstone on 9 January 1868, in which Newman wrote: 'Next, passing from antecedent probabilities to history...' *L&D*, XXIV, p.7.

63. An account of these can be found in Ker, *John Henry Newman*, p.231-6.

64. Newman's own account of these years is to be found in the *Apologia*, pp.90-213. See also Ker, *John Henry Newman*, pp.158-315; esp. pp.231-6.

65. The comparison was in an article in the *Dublin Review*, VII (August 1839), entitled, 'The Anglican Claim of Apostolic Succession.' In this, Wiseman 'employed Newman's favourite device of paralleling past and present by comparing the Anglican with the Donatist schismatics in Africa in the fourth century.' Gilley, p.183.

66. US, p.313.
Notes: First Developments

67. Ibid., p.318
68. Ibid., pp.331-2.
69. Ibid., p.320.


71. In his 'Introduction' to the *University Sermons*, D.M. MacKinnon notes, 'Newman's own informality and untidiness, interrupted by passages of sharp and rigorous argument... One is aware of this as soon as one tries to identify Newman's views concerning the relations between faith and reason; nothing but the work as a whole is enough to show the reader what those views were.' pp.10-11.

72. US, p.316.
73. Ibid., pp.331 & 336.
74. Ibid., p.333.
75. Ibid., pp.251-77.
77. Arians, p.179.
78. US, p.323.
79. GA, pp.82-3.
80. US, pp.320-1.
83. Dated entry in appendix to personal diary, 17.03.1843. (B.O.A.)
84. Ibid., 07.04.1843.
85. *Apologia*, p.111.
86. Appendix, 07.10.1843. (B.O.A.)
87. Apologia, p.111.

88. Appendix, 25.01.1844. (B.O.A.)

89. Apologia, p.108.

90. Ibid.

91. Appendix, 17.02.1844. (B.O.A.)

92. Ibid., 04.05.1844.

93. Ibid., 06.1846.

94. Ibid., 07.1846.

95. This is defined in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English as: 'Characteristic spirit and beliefs of community, people, system, literary work, or person.' Such a definition would appear to cohere with Newman's use of the term.

96. Apologia, p.111.

97. It might be added to this, that it likely that there were many changes of mind and swings of mood during the period that led up to his reception into the Catholic Church and that trying to describe these (and the reasons for them) accurately must be nearly impossible. Bearing in mind Newman's maxim that 'the whole man moves', I have tried to avoid creating a sharp distinction between emotion and intellect, and the use of the word 'experiential' is intended to express the complex nature of the relationship between the two.

98. Although the 'Copybook on Development' has remained unpublished, Chadwick does make some use of it in From Bossuet to Newman, pp.129, 139 & 232, including some very limited quotation. It is also referred to once by S. Thomas, Newman and Heresy: The Anglican Years (CUP: Cambridge 1991), p.231.

99. Copybook (B.O.A.)

100. Ibid.

101. St. Augustine regarded the Donatists, who had separated themselves from the Catholic Church on a point of discipline (they were doctrinally orthodox, but held strict views about sin and martyrdom) as schismatics. This was because they did not accept the teaching of the universal Church, which is certain, hence Augustine's famous dictum

102. Copybook (B.O.A.)

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 2 Essay on Development


5. Chadwick, op. cit., p.191. This is in contrast to G. Tyrrell's argument that in the Essay, Newman had switched

6. The following note was written by Newman inside the front cover of his own copy of the 1845 edition of the Essay on Development, which is now in the Oratory archives in Birmingham: 'Not only the most incomplete but the most imperfect. When now at the end of 30 years I read this anew I feel there are various statements in it obscure and various that are questionable. The argument seems to be this[:] Christianity is an objective fact, or supposed fact, and a very many sided multiform fertile productive fact - Such extraordinary facts make a deep impression on the minds of those who come across them, which impression may be called the objective idea of them - but from the vastness, richness etc. no individual mind more than partially embraces it, thus it makes a different impression or idea on different minds - the same indeed, but incomplete and therein different - also arranging differently and making different points the most important. It is an answer to objections remaining after proof in favour of Rome.'


10. Ibid., p.24.

11. Ibid., p.11.

12. Ibid., p.12.

13. Ibid., p.16.

Notes: Essay on Development

15. Ibid., p.23.
17. Ibid., p.25.
19. Ibid., p.25.
20. Ibid., p.25.
22. Ibid., pp.30-57.
23. Ibid., p.34.
26. Ibid., p.94.
27. Ibid., pp.97-8.
28. Ibid., p.103.
29. Ibid., p.103.
30. Ibid., p.113.
31. Ibid., p.125. At this stage in the argument (pp.114-30), Newman does not bring the pope into the argument. He is more concerned with 'the necessity of an infallible doctrinal authority of the Church as a whole'. P. Misner, Papacy and Development, Newman and the Primacy of the Pope (E.J. Brill: Leiden 1976), p.75. Indeed, the role of the whole Church in an infallible definition was an important aspect of Newman's thought, as shown by G. Lease, Witness to the Faith (Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh 1971).
32. Development (1845), pp.158-79.
33. Ibid., p.165.
34. Ibid., p.166.
35. Ibid., p.171. This, however, would appear to be a poor example for Newman to use, since the Archbishop of Canterbury does not possess the same juridical authority
in either the Church of England, or the Anglican Communion, as is possessed by the pope in the Catholic Church as a whole.

36. Ibid., p.170.

37. SD, p.224.

38. Essays, II, p.182. 'Can anyone doubt that what Isaiah sang of the glory of Jerusalem was fulfilled in the church triumphant in the fourth and ensuing centuries?' Misner, Papacy and Development, p.53.


40. Ibid., p.179.


42. Ibid., p.181.

43. Ibid., p.149. At first sight, this may also appear a poor example, following Einstein's re-working of Newton's theory. But in actual fact, it is quite a good example to take. Until Einstein, Newton's theory was regarded as immutable. The results of Einstein's research, however, suggested that Newton's theory was only one aspect of a larger scene and therefore needed refinement. This analogy, while not perfect, can perhaps be used to explain how a doctrine of the Church may be further refined.


45. Ibid., p.158.


49. Ibid., pp.153-60.

50. TP, p.159.


Notes: Essay on Development

p.147. This book will henceforth be cited as Bastable.

53. Development (1845), pp.54-5.

54. L&D, XXV, p.418.


56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., pp.98-102.

58. Ibid., p.111.


60. Development (1845), pp.66-73; 318-68.

61. Ibid., p.72.

62. LG, p.119.


64. Development (1845), p.68.


69. R.H. Gundry, Matthew: A Commentary on his Literary and Theological Art (W.B. Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 1983),
Notes: Essay on Development

pp.333-5.


74. Schweizer, op. cit., p.341.

75. Albright & Mann, op. cit., p.196.


77. It may well be, as for example R. Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St. John, vol.3 (Burns & Oates: Tunbridge Wells 1988) has argued, that this passage is the Johannine account of the incident on the road to Caesarea Philippi recorded in Matthew 16, but that does not detract from its significance. Neither is the variation in the use of the verb to love (for the verb 'to love' in the questions and answers of xxi 15-17, the variations are these: v.15 agapas me...philo se; v.16 agapas me...philo se; v.17 phileis me...philo se) deemed significant by scholars (e.g. Brown, Barrett, Bultmann, Schnackenburg, Lagrange, etc). This is because the verbs are used with a general interchangeability in John, and because in Hebrew and Aramaic 'there is one basic verb for expressing the various types of love, so that all the subtlety of the distinction that commentators find in the use of the two verbs in 15-17 scarcely echoes the putative semitic original.' R.E. Brown, The Gospel According to John (xiii-xxi) (G. Chapman: London 1971), p.1103.


79. Ibid., p.1114.

80. Ibid., p.1115.

Notes: Essay on Development


84. Ibid., pp.305-7.

85. It is, of course, the case that not everybody accepts that such an antecedent probability must exist: cf. D. Nicholls, 'Gladstone and the Anglican Critics of Newman' in Bastable, pp. 121-44; esp. 138. The same point is raised by P. Baelz in a review of A. Nichols, The Panther and the Hind: A Theological History of Anglicanism (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1993) in Theology, vol.97, no.775, pp.66-7, in which he asks, 'Is it... a human error to suppose that, since God has given us his 'truth' he must also have given us an infallible historical instrument for interpreting that truth?' p.67.


87. Misner, Papacy and Development, p.89.

88. P. Hinchcliff, op. cit., in his task of analysing the way in which many theologians of the period 1875-1914, have grappled with the newly emerging ways of understanding history and its relationship to faith, praises Newman for 'grasping the idea that the precise form truth takes can change, depending on its context and the implications of its own structure, without being disloyal to its original, embryonic source.' p.48.

89. Misner, Papacy and Development, p.87.

90. Cf. PS, VII, p.231.

91. Misner, Papacy and Development, p.87.

92. Ibid., p.88.

93. So conclude also, Misner, Papacy and Development, pp.87-88 and Lash, Newman on Development, pp.90-3. Cf. D.M. MacKinnon, who in his 'Introduction' to the University Sermons, notes Newman's 'informality and untidiness' (p.10). G. Biemer's comments are pertinent: 'Newman is notoriously untechnical, an original thinker, who is producing and using his own forms and expressions, whose writings were produced as situation demanded and they
followed no systematic purpose, yet the coordination with
the whole can be observed in all his assertions.' *Newman on


95. Ibid., p.88.

96. Chadwick, op. cit., p.149; *Development* (1845), pp.183-
202.


98. Ibid., p.viii.

towards the definition of Papal Infallibility illustrating
the Significance of History in Christian Belief.' J.D.
Holmes in *Newman Studien IX*, p.125.


102. Ibid., pp.105;188. Associationism is usually looked
upon as a distinctively British doctrine, although
Aristotle had proposed three forms of association -
similarity, contrast, and contiguity. 'Association of
ideas' was first used by John Locke in *An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding* (1690). David Hume maintained in *A
Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) that the essential forms of
association were by resemblance, by contiguity in time or
place, and by cause and effect. Following Hume, the chief
British exponents of associationism were David Hartley
(18th century), and James and John Stuart Mill, Alexander
Bain, and Herbert Spencer (19th century). C.f. J.O. Urmson
& J. Ree (eds.), *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western
Philosophy and Philosophers* (Routledge: London 1991),
pp.172-76; 139-44; 208-14; 301-2.


104. *Development* (1845), p.27.


106. Ibid., pp.76-7.


111. Ibid., pp.112-3. In marked contrast, G. O'Collins, 'Newman's Seven Notes: The Case of the Resurrection' in Ker & Hill, pp.337-52, applies Newman's seven notes of a development to the understandings of the Resurrection offered by E. Schillebeeckx and H. Küng, and finds them wanting.


116. According to Gilley, p.231. See also, Nicholls, 'Gladstone and the Anglican critics of Newman' in Bastable, pp.121-44, whose conclusion is that Anglicans rejected Newman's theory for two main reasons: firstly, many claimed that there was no difficulty to be solved; and secondly, if there been change, it was merely that the Church had refined her doctrine in either an explanatory or a defensive manner. The Church of England, they claimed, still taught the faith of the Fathers (p.138). Among the works examined by Nicholls, which allow that change has occurred, are F.D. Maurice's Epistle to the Hebrews (Parker: London 1846), which contained a review of Newman's theory in the preface, and W. Palmer's The Doctrine of Development and Conscience considered in relation to the Evidences of Christianity and of the Catholic System (Rivington: London 1846).

117. I.T. Ker, Newman and the Fullness of Christianity (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1993), p.100. This view is shared by Litvak, who records the view of A.M. Allchin 'tentatively suggested (in a private conversation) that Newman, through his reading of Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, had acquired a distaste for everything Byzantine, and that this antipathy contributed to his avoidance of the Eastern Church', despite the enthusiasm of his friend William Palmer of Magdalen


122. As Newman wrote in his reply to Dr. Pusey's Erenicon, 'The Fathers made me a Catholic, and I am not going to kick down the ladder by which I ascended into the Church'. Diff, II, p.24.


125. Dessain, 'Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition'.

126. Ibid., p86.

127. Dragas, 'Newman's Greek Orthodox Sense of Catholicity', pp.112; 120; 122.

128. L&D, XXV, p.4.


130. L&D, XXV, p.5.


Notes: Newman's Idea of the Church

133. Ibid., p.72. For a survey of Orthodox thought on dogma and its development see Nichols, From Newman to Congar, pp.279-86.


Notes to Chapter 3 Newman's Idea of the Church

1. PS, IV, pp.169-70.

2. For the events of this period see Ker, John Henry Newman, pp.316-75.


5. 'The very title Idea of a University is in itself an indication of Newman's approach, since the term 'idea' in his theology stands not for a mere concept, but for a principle with a life of its own and a power to develop into as yet non-existent forms and institutions: the very germ of a dynamic community, that ability... to embody high ideals in great institutions'. J. Coulson, 'Newman's Idea of an Educated Laity - the Two Versions' in J. Coulson (ed.), Theology and the University: An Ecumenical Investigation (DLT: London 1964), p.53. Coulson's thesis in this and a subsequent article, 'Newman's Idea of an Open University and its consequences today' in Bastable, pp.221-37, is that in later years, Newman changed his mind about the usefulness of a Catholic university as such, preferring an 'open' university in which Catholics would participate while retaining their own identity. This view is contested by I.T. Ker, 'Did Newman Believe in the Idea of a Catholic University?' in the Downside Review, vol.93, 1975, pp.39-42, and also in his critical edition of The Idea of a University, pp.585-6. See also K. Flanagan, 'The Godless and the Burlesque: Newman and the other Irish Universities' in Bastable, pp.239-78 for a comparison of Newman's views on the Catholic University with the other Irish universities, and in the same volume, pp.279-86, P.J. Corish, 'Newman and Maynooth' for a survey of his connexions with the seminary. The possible application today of Newman's Idea of a University is discussed by J.M. Roberts, 'The Idea of a University revisited' in Ker & Hill, pp.193-22, and by R. Jenkins, 'Newman and the Idea of a University' in D. Brown (ed.), Newman: A Man for our
Notes: Newman's Idea of the Church


7. Ibid., p.10.

8. Newman had the double problem in overcoming opposition in being both an Englishman and a convert. Gilley, p.278.


10. Ibid., p.57.

11. Ibid.

12. Idea, p.114. This seems to have been misunderstood by Culler, who speaks of 'a science distinct from and yet in some sense embodying the materials of them all... a discipline... [with] a rather mysterious character'. A.D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Newman's Educational Ideal (Yale University Press: New Haven 1955), p.182.


14. 'Given that wealth is to be sought, this and that is the method of gaining it. This is the extent to which a Political Economist has a right to go; he has no right to determine that wealth is at any rate to be sought, or that it is the way to be virtuous and the price of happiness.' Idea, p.84.

15. In his use of the term 'science', Newman appears to be drawing on Aristotle for whom 'any body of knowledge may be called a science if it can be rationally organized in terms of principles which are either self-evident or are drawn from some higher sense whose own principles are self-evident.' A. Nichols, The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to Its Sources, Principles, and History (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1991), p.300. Such terminology appears to have been quite common in the nineteenth century, cf. H.E. Manning, The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost or Reason and Revelation (Burns & Oates: London 1909), pp.113-5.


17. Idea, p.12. The necessity of knowledge in detail, but...
avoiding narrow specialization, for the formation of a philosophical habit of mind is well described by Ker, op. cit., pp.5-10.

19. Ibid., p.120.
20. Ibid., pp.122-3.
21. Ibid., p.142.
22. Ibid., p.143.
23. Ibid., pp.143-4.
24. Ibid., p.145.
25. Culler, op. cit., p.222.
27. Idea, p.97.
28. Ibid., p.144.
29. Ibid., p.161.
30. Ibid., p.165.
32. Idea, p.185.
33. Ibid., p.184.
34. Cf. Newman's now famous portrait of a gentleman. The point of the portrait is that liberal education can provide much, but not all that is required in a Catholic university. Idea, pp.179-80.
35. Culler, op. cit., p.258.
37. Idea, p.lxi.
38. Idea, p.lxii.

40. Ibid., p.100.

41. This project was abandoned by the bishops 'at the first difficulty.' Dessain, p.111.


44. In 1858, Capes who had suffered from ill health for many years resigned, and Simpson was joined as co-editor by Lord John Acton. 'Acton was unique among his contemporaries... An Englishman by nationality, an aristocrat by inheritance, and a Catholic in religion, he had been made by circumstances of family and education into a thorough cosmopolitan, a competent scholar, and an accepted member of Protestant social and political circles'. Altholz, op. cit., p.45. Bishop Goss of Liverpool was the only English Catholic bishop not to criticize the Rambler in a pastoral letter. P. Doyle, 'Bishop Goss of Liverpool (1856 - 1872) and the Importance of being English' in S. Mews (ed.), *Religion and National Identity. Studies in Church History*, vol.18, (Blackwell: Oxford 1982), p.437.


46. Cf. Ward, I, p.492. Note also a letter that Newman wrote to Acton in December 1858: 'Let it go back to its own literary line. Let it be instructive, clever and amusing. Let it cultivate a general temper of good humour and courtesy. Let it praise as many persons as it can, and gain friends in neutral quarters, and become the organ of others by the interest it has made them take in its proceeding. Then it will be able to plant a good blow at a fitting time with great effect.' Cited by Coulson, Consulting, p.6. For more detail on W.G. Ward see the two volumes by his son, Wilfred Ward: *W.G. Ward and the Oxford Movement* (Macmillan: London 1889) and *W.G. Ward and the Catholic Revival* (Macmillan: London 1893).

48. Gillow was later to approve of both the Apologia and the Letter to Pusey. Ker, John Henry Newman, pp.561;583.

49. Gilley, p.303.

50. L&D, XIX, p.141.

51. Sharkey, op. cit., p.343.


53. Prespos, pp.390-1.

54. AW, p.327.


56. Consulting, pp.54-62.

57. Ibid., pp.62-73.

58. Ibid., p.22.

59. Ibid., p.23. It can be seen as the counter-part of the Illative Sense (or phronesis) of which Newman was to speak in the Grammar of Assent, in his description of that power in the individual to make real assents, going beyond merely notional assents, in matters of faith and conscience. Cf. GA, pp.222-47.

60. Consulting, pp.73-106.

61. Ibid., pp.77;86. As W.P. Frost, 'On Celebrating Newman's Faith in the Laity' in Horizons, vol.6, 1979, has pointed out, the fact that the Catholic faith could withstand the corrosion of heresies was an important factor in his conversion to Catholicism. p.259.


63. Gilley, p.305.

64. In Consulting, Newman summarizes Perrone: 'Conspiratio; the two, the Church teaching and the Church taught, are put together, as one twofold testimony, illustrating each other, and never to be divided.' p.71.

65. Coulson argues that the article was not aimed at the bishops, Consulting, p.36. This view, however, is perhaps
a little generous.


68. Gilley, loc. cit.

69. Ibid., p.307.

70. Newman's preference for that system of authority in the Church can be seen from his decision to become an Oratorian, as well as his attitude to discipline in the university. In both the Oratory and the university authority was to be exercised by personal influence, rather than by autocratic rule. Cf. Coulson, Common Tradition, pp.95-101 and J.P. Marmion, 'Newman and Education' in the Downside Review, vol.97, 1979, pp.10-29.


72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p.111.

74. Ibid., pp.111-2.

75. Ibid., p.113.

76. Ibid., p.114.

77. Ibid., p.121.


79. Newman would, of course, have realized that in practice theology itself can be distorted by political concerns. He himself was labelled a 'Garibaldian' because of his refusal to give enthusiastic support to the pope's temporal power. Yet there is a sense in which he regarded theology as 'non-political', the regulator of the whole Church system. This is very much the way he describes it in the preface: VM, I, pp.xv-xciv. See Coulson, Common Tradition, p.130.


81. VM, I, p.xxxvii, and also, L&D, XXV, pp.4-5: 'My Essay
is to answer the Objection "The Roman Church has added to the faith."

82. **VM**, I, p.xxxvi.


84. It is to be expected, therefore, that Newman's limited objective in the preface will result in the professional theologian detecting various deficiencies in the work, when examining it from an ecclesiological perspective.

85. 'Newman's own deeply sacramental theology was formed to a considerable extent by the writings of the Alexandrian Fathers, where he learned of 'the mystical or sacramental principle', according to which 'Holy Church in her sacraments... will remain, even to the end of the world, after all but a symbol of those heavenly facts which fill eternity.' I.T. Ker, *Newman and the Fullness of Christianity* (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1993), p.96.


88. This theme was also prominent in Newman's Anglican theology, cf. 'The Three Offices of Christ' in *SD*, pp.52-62. See also M.T. Yakaitis, 'The Office of Priest, Prophet, and King in the Thought of John Henry Newman' (Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae PhD thesis, 1990), which I have not as yet been able to consult.


93. 'Not the few and the conspicuous alone, but all her children, high and low, who walk worthy of her and her Divine Lord, will be shadows of Him.... for he is our Prophet... our Priest... our King.' *SD*, p.62.


95. Author of *Wealth of Nations* (1776), and founding father of Political Economy.
Notes: Newman's Idea of the Church

96. VM, I, pp.xlii-xliii.

97. Ibid., p.xlvii.

98. Ibid., p.xlviii.


103. Ibid., p.lxi-lxii.

104. GA, p.108.

105. Weidner, op. cit., p.lxii.


107. J.D. Holmes & B.W. Bickers, A Short History of the Catholic Church (Burns & Oates: London 1992), pp.91-2; 96, describe some of the debate over the Franciscans and the concept of poverty, and an element of the rivalry between the Franciscans and the Dominicans, including the proscription by the former of the reading of Aquinas by their members.

108. Dulles, loc. cit.


110. Diff, II, p.28.

111. VM, I, p.lxxv.

112. Ibid., p.lxix.

113. Ibid., pp.lxxiv-lxv; Dulles, op. cit., p.384.

114. VM, I, pp.lxvi-lxvii.

115. Ibid., p.lxviii. A modern example might be the veneration that was accorded the Turin Shroud. It is now
known that the Shroud was not Jesus' burial shroud, but before this was known, it was venerated by many as such. Although this veneration rested on unfounded belief, it did, however, promote true devotion to Christ. Newman's argument, then, is that although such practices are technically incorrect, if they inspire true devotion to that which they represent (in the case of the shroud, Jesus Christ), they should be tolerated.


120. 'As to myself personally, please God, I do not expect any trial at all; but I cannot help suffering with the various souls which are suffering...' *L&D*, XXV, p.18.


124. Newman's argument is that Catholics are kept from falling into idolatry because of their devotion to Christ in the Blessed Sacrament: 'a Presence within the sacred walls, infinitely more awful, which claims and obtains from us a worship transcendently different from any devotion we may pay to' our Lady. *Diff*, II, p.94.


Notes: Newman's Idea of the Church

131. VM, I, p.lxxviii.
132. Ibid., p.lxxxix.
133. Ibid., pp.lxxxvii-xci.
134. Ibid., pp.lxxxv-lxxxvi.
135. Ibid., p.lxxxvii.
136. Ibid., p.lxxxviii.
137. TP, p.128.
138. Ibid., p.112.
139. VM, I, p.lxxxiii.
144. SD, p.225.

145. 'In... the famous article... about consulting the faithful, it seems to us that Newman presented very shrewdly this communion of the sensus fidelium and of the exercise of the magisterium.' J-M.R. Tillard, Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion (The Liturgical Press: Collegeville, Minnesota 1992), pp.110-11. It is Femiano's view, however, that Newman's view did not become explicit in the document of Vatican II, and he would welcome greater authority invested in the laity: 'the process of the development of doctrine sometimes begins in the people; their concensus activates the infallible teaching authority of the magisterium. In such cases the faithful's infallibility is not merely a passive reflection of the magisterium's teaching but it is an active exercise of the laity's prerogatives.' S.D. Femiano, The Infallibility of the Laity (Herder & Herder: New York 1967), p.136.

146. VM, I, pp.xciii-xciv.

147. Such as Eusebius of Caesarea. The history of the triple office is traced in L. Schick, Das dreifache Amt Christi und der Kirche: Zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der Trilogien, (Frankfurt and Berne, 1982); cited in Dulles,
148. The triple office was given heavier statement in the second chapter of Friedrich von Hügel's Mystical Element of Religion as studied in St. Catherine of Genoa and her Friends, 2 vols. (J.M. Dent: London 1923), I, pp.50-82., esp. note on p.53. A brief survey of how the theme was taken up in Catholic theology is provided by Dulles, op. cit., pp.393-99.

149. Gilley, p.389.

150. Coulson, Common Tradition, p.112.


152. At this point, it can be noted with Fr. Ker that 'the two principal objections that Newman had made as an Anglican against the Roman Catholic Church, far from being removed, became paradoxically the two major arguments in favour of the Church. Instead of doctrinal developments being seen as accretions, they are now viewed as the essential growth of a living body. Similarly, corruptions in the life of the Church are no longer interpreted in a negative but a positive light: for they are now perceived as the inevitable abuses of a Church which possesses the vitality of Christianity in its fullness and in all the complexity of life itself. In short, both original arguments against Roman Catholicism, doctrinal development and practical corruption, become in effect authentic notes of the true Church — that is to say, of the real not the ideal Church.' (Ker, Newman and the Fullness of Christianity, p.122.) For as Fr. Ker notes elsewhere, 'a Church, which is first and last a communion of vastly different persons, albeit baptized in the same Spirit, is hardly likely to exhibit that kind of orderliness and tidiness that is often vainly desiderated in place of the apparently unresolvable ambiguities and tensions that characterize Catholicism.' I.T. Ker, Healing the Wound of Humanity: The Spirituality of John Henry Newman (DLT: London 1993), p.86.

Notes to Chapter 4 Papal Infallibility

1. Idea, p.46.

2. For an account of the events of this period see Ker, John Henry Newman, pp.490-532.

for its own sake, had never been a virtue with the Roman clergy. Father Newman informs us that it need not, and on the whole ought not to be'. Cited in Ker, Ibid., p.533.

4. It was generally reckoned at the time that Newman had 'trounced' Kingsley in the Apologia. Indeed, some felt that Newman had been far too harsh: 'Fenton Hort found the Apologia "sickening to read, from the cruelty and insolence with which he trampled on his assailant". Even Newman's friend, Rogers, said he had the feeling of seeing a man horsewhipped after you thought he had been done with.' O. Chadwick, The Victorian Church, 2 vols. (SCM: London 1987), II, p.415. But, as Gilley notes: 'There is much that could be said on Kingsley's behalf. Newman had implied, as Kingsley said, that monks and nuns were the only Bible Christians. Newman should not have called his sermon on 'Wisdom and Innocence' 'Protestant': it was properly Anglo-Catholic. Kingsley was right, and Newman was wrong, about the marvels in Walburga's life, which unlike those in Neot's had been presented as sober history. Newman misread Sturm's horror of the dirty Germans as a miracle. His dissent from Liguori's moral opinions about the lawfulness of lying did not represent the mind of his own Church; the theologians he cited on the other side did not have Liguori's authority. Nor were the Anglican authorities he quoted as permitting lying in agreement with Liguori on the lawfulness of equivocation by using words in a double sense. Newman's own utterances were sometimes equivocal, and his was an equivocal position in defending the intellectual honesty of his Church, when he doubted it himself.' Gilley, p.333. See also, C. Egner, Apologia Pro Charles Kingsley (Sheed & Ward: London 1969); P. Fitzpatrick, 'Newman and Kingsley' in D. Nicholls and F. Kerr (eds), John Henry Newman: Reason, Rhetoric and Romanticism (Southern Illinois University Press: Carbondale and Edwardsville 1991), pp.88-108; and D. Newsome, The Convert Cardinals, John Henry Newman and Henry Edward Manning (J. Murray: London 1993), p.240. For a different view of the Apologia, see E.E. Kelly, "The Dream of Gerontius": An Appended Finale to the Apologia? in Bastable, pp.305-20.

5. Dessain, p.128.


Notes: Papal Infallibility

9. Newman prepared some notes to aid Ryder in the controversy with Ward. These can be found in TP, pp.145-50. The other papers in this collection are inchoate, as Newman felt they were made unnecessary by the publication of Ryder's letters to Ward. Ryder's views are contained in his publications: Idealism in Theology: A Review of Dr. Ward's Scheme of Dogmatic Authority; A Letter to William George Ward, Esq., D.Ph on his Theory of Infallible Instructions; and Postscriptum to Letter to W.G.Ward, Esq., D.Ph. This debate is discussed by J.D. Holmes, More Roman than Rome: English Catholicism in the Nineteenth Century, (Burns & Oates: London 1978), pp.129-31, to whose survey of the period I am indebted.


12. Ibid., p.58.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., pp.60-72.


18. Cited by Holmes, Ibid.


20. As Virginia A. Millington wrote: 'Pardon me, oh, pardon me for the unprecedented freedom of addressing You, Holy Father. But hearing my Papa daily read from the newspapers of the many sorrows and political sufferings, which afflict Your Holiness and Rome, I could not resist the feeling, which stole over me to proffer my humble sympathies, knowing, Holy Father, that in your benevolence You would recept them, as most heartful and sincere even though they come from a shore, from whence have sprung all the anarchy and distress, which have afflicted our most holy mother Church.' Cited by Holmes, Ibid., p.120.


23. Y. Congar, Tradition and traditions: an historical and a theological essay (Burns & Oates: London 1966), p.214. Dollinger was later to oppose the definition of papal infallibility. He set his views out, under the pen-name Janus, in The Pope and the Council (Rivingtons: London 1870), in which he argued that such a definition would be an historically unjustifiable innovation. Gladstone hailed the book as 'one of the weightiest and most noteworthy documents that has met my eye for many a day.' Cited by V. Conzemius, 'Acton, Dollinger and Gladstone: A Strange Variety of Anti- Infallibilists' in Bastable, p.40.


25. Ibid.

26. 'Catholic thought was bound, not only by dogmatic definitions, but by the opinions of the theological schools and the decisions of the Roman Congregations; and it was wrong, though not heretical, to reject those opinions and decisions.' J. Altholz, The Liberal Catholic Movement in England: The "Rambler" and its Contributors 1848-1864 (Burns & Oates: London 1962), p.222.

27. Ward, p.642.

28. Ibid. For a full treatment of this see I.T. Ker, 'Newman and the Papacy' in the Downside Review, vol.103, 1985, pp.87-98.


34. *L&D*, XXVIII, p.415. For a full treatment of this see I.T. Ker, 'Newman and the Papacy' in the *Downside Review*, vol.103, 1985, pp.87-98.


43. *Ibid*.

44. *L&D*, XXV, p.58.

Notes: Papal Infallibility


47. The text of Pastor Aeternus can be found in Butler, II, pp.276-95; this quotation is from p.295.


49. Ibid., p.155. The result of the voting was 533 'placet', 2 'non placet'. Tom Mozley's inflammatory account of the voting is recorded by Butler, II, p. 163, and in Gilley, pp.368-9.


51. L&D, XXIV, p.29. See also p.146.

52. L&D, XXV, pp.164-5.

53. Ibid., p.172.

54. TP, p.109.


56. TP, p.135.


58. L&D, XXV, p.172.


60. L&D, XXV, p.224.
In addition, Newman felt that Döllinger was inconsistent in his rejection of the Vatican Council on the grounds of intrigue, since he accepted Ephesus as ecumenical, even though it was notorious for intrigue and violence. Cf. Ker, *John Henry Newman*, p.671. A similar charge was levelled at Döllinger by Acton: 'But I can draw no fundamental distinction between the new decrees and the old. If the new ones provide me with a reason to give up allegiance to Rome, what about the earlier Lateran decrees?' Cited by Conzemius, *op. cit.*, p.47. Acton's views can also be gathered from his journal: E. Campion (ed.), *Lord Acton and the First Vatican Council: A Journal* (Catholic Theological Faculty: Sydney 1975).

74. D. Nicholls has argued that Gladstone had detected in the Neo-Ultramontane interpretation of the Vatican decrees a shift away from the acceptance of a pluralist society. 'Gladstone, Newman and the Politics of Pluralism' in Bastable, p.36. Fear of the consequences of Neo-Ultramontanism was expressed by Bishop Goss of Liverpool: 'For his part, the bishop was always convinced to stress that English Catholics were citizens only of England, and that in no sense could the pope claim even the smallest degree of that obedience and respect which a civil ruler could demand from his subjects. As well as resurrecting old accusations of divided loyalty against Catholics, such an argument would only strengthen in Englishmen's minds the
prejudice that Catholicism was something foreign and un-
English'. P. Doyle, 'Bishop Goss of Liverpool (1856-1872)
and the Importance of being English' in S. Mews (ed.),
Religion and National Identity. Studies in Church History,

75. L&D, XXVII, pp.122-3. The 'Caesarism' referred to, is
Manning's Caesarism and Ultramontanism. This is discussed
in E.R. Norman, The English Catholic Church in the

76. L&D, XXVII, p.129.

77. Acton tried to dissuade Gladstone from publishing this
pamphlet. Conzemius, op. cit., p.45.

78. L&D, XXVII, p.159.

79. Ibid., p.146.

80. Ibid., p.159.

81. J.D. Bastable, 'Gladstone's Expostulation and Newman'
in Bastable, p.12.

82. L&D, XXVII, p.192.

83. F. Kerr, 'Did Newman answer Gladstone' in Nicholls &
Kerr (eds.), op. cit., p.141.

84. Ibid., p.150.

85. Ibid.

86. A similar criticism is raised by H. Jenkins, 'The
Irish Dimension of the British Kulturkampf: Vaticanism and
Civil Allegiance' in The Journal of Ecclesiastical History,
vol.30, no.3, 1979, pp.353-77.

87. Letter, p.120.

88. Ibid., p.4.

89. Ibid., p.55.

90. Ibid., p.62.

91. J. Finnis, 'Conscience in the Letter to the Duke of
Norfolk' in Ker & Hill, p.413.

S.A. Grave, Conscience in Newman's Thought (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1989), has argued that Newman's conception of conscience is inadequate, because it differs from conscience in the 'ordinary conception of it'. (p.18.) But this seems rather a curious argument, since why should one prefer the 'ordinary conception' of conscience to Newman's and that found in Catholic thought? In fact Newman acknowledges this difference, and also dismisses the view put forward by philosophers. Cf. Letter, pp.56-8.

94. Ibid., pp.62-3.
95. Ibid., p.56.
96. Ibid., p.64.
97. Ibid., p.60.
98. Ibid., p.94.
99. This interpretation was consistent with 'what, as a Catholic, he had always believed with unshakeable faith about the infallibility of the Catholic Church, and what he had held as a personal opinion, about the nature and limits of the infallibility of the pope.' F. Sullivan, 'Newman on Infallibility' in Ker & Hill, p.446.
102. Ibid., p.117.
103. Ibid., p.121.
104. Dulles, op. cit., p.443.
105. 'Newman's view that the adequate bearer of infallibility is neither the hierarchical magisterium (ecclesia docens) alone, nor the body of the faithful (ecclesia discens) alone, but the Church as a whole, when the official teachers and the faithful concur, is, I believe, consonant with the teaching of Vatican II, which treated infallibility primarily as a charism of the whole people of God, and only secondarily as an endowment of the hierarchy or the pope.' Ibid., p.447.
Notes: Infallibility Examined

Notes to Chapter 5 Infallibility Examined


2. Note not only the enthusiastic reception his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk received in England at the time of publication, but the attention that has been given to his views by leading theologians in the discussions of infallibility during the last twenty years. E.g. J.T. Ford, 'Infallibility: a Review of Recent Studies' in Theological Studies, vol.40, 1979, pp.289-92, and A. Dulles, 'Newman on Infallibility' in Theological Studies, vol.51, 1990, pp.434-49.


5. Upon receiving his complimentary copy of The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance, Bismarck wrote to Gladstone: 'It affords me a deep and hopeful gratification to see the two nations, which in Europe are the champions of liberty of conscience encountering the same foe, stand henceforth shoulder to shoulder in defending the highest interests of the human race.' Cited by D. Nicholls, 'Gladstone, Newman and the Politics of Pluralism' in Bastable, p.27.

6. The concept of infallibility has, of course, often been the subject of fierce polemics. Two noteworthy examples on the Protestant side are R.H. Fuller and R.P.C. Hanson, The Church of Rome: A Dissuasive (SCM: London 1960) and G. Salmon, The Infallibility of the Church, abridged and revised by H.F. Woodhouse (J. Murray: London 1953), which in turn was attacked from the Catholic side by B.C. Butler, The Infallibility of the Church: A Reply to the Abridged "Salmon" (Sheed & Ward: London 1954). The Catholic Church's claim to infallibility was attacked also by Newman in the third and fourth Lectures on the Prophetical Office.


8. Ibid., p.99.

9. Ibid., p.88.

10. Ibid., p.89.
11. Ibid.

12. Refer back to chapter 2 for a full discussion of the 'primacy texts' and Newman's use of them.


15. Ibid., pp.89-90.

16. Ibid., p.90.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p.91.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p.91.


22. Küng, Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., pp.91-98. For a more detailed historical account see B. Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350: A Study on the Concepts of Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages (E.J. Brill: Leiden 1972), whose conclusion is that there 'is no convincing evidence that papal infallibility formed any part of the theological or canonical tradition of the church before the thirteenth century': p.281.


26. Ibid., p.94-7.

27. Ibid., p.96.

28. Ibid., p.95.

29. Ibid., p.96.

30. Ibid., p.92.

31. Ibid., p.93.
32. Ibid., p.98.
33. Ibid., pp.98-9.
34. Ibid., p.99.
38. Ibid., p.100. See also Butler, II, pp.43-70.
40. See chapter 2.
42. Letter, p.110.
43. L&D, XXV, pp.164-5;172.
44. Ibid., p.167.
45. Ibid., p.168.
46. See Chapter 2.
49. See also J.D. Holmes, 'Newman's attitude towards the Definition of Papal Infallibility illustrating the Significance of History in Christian Belief' in Newman Studien IX, pp.119-35.
Notes: Infallibility Examined


55. Accepted also by Küng, Ibid., p.120.
56. Ibid., p.123.
57. Ibid., p.122.
59. Küng, loc. cit.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p.123.
62. Ibid., p.124.
63. Ibid., p.149.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., pp.150;149.
66. VM, I, pp.189-213.
73. A. Flannery, Vatican Council II: More Post Conciliar Documents (Costello Publishing Co: Northport New York 1982), pp.428-40; esp.433-4. Henceforth cited as Flannery, II. J. Ratzinger comments that Mysterium ecclesiae was not directed solely against Künig, but his 'much-read books and their polemical bent were the immediate catalyst that led to the publication of the text.' Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology (Ignatius Press: San Francisco 1989), p.229. A. Nichols notes that it was not only Künig's non-acceptance of papal infallibility, but his refusal 'to accept in an unqualified way the affirmation of the Council of Nicaea that the being of the one who became man as Jesus is divine', that led to the loss of his formal mandate to teach Catholic Theology. The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to Its Sources, Principles, and History (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1991), pp.15-6.

74. Butler, II, p.295. The infallibility of the Church was taken for granted by the Fathers at Vatican I.

75. GA, p.147.


78. Ibid., p.24.

Notes: Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation


82. Ibid., p.167.
84. Sweeney, loc. cit.
85. Ibid., p.168.
86. Ibid., p.171.
87. Ibid., pp.171-2.
88. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 6 Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation


463
of Revelation. A detailed theological analysis of the first two chapters of *Dei Verbum* is to be found in H. Vorgrimler (ed.), *Commentary on the Documents Vatican II*, 5 vols. (Burns & Oates: London 1969), III, pp.155-72, and to this I am heavily indebted. This work will henceforth be cited as Vorgrimler, followed by the volume number.

3. Murray, *op. cit.*, p.75


9. A. Nichols, *The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to Its Sources, Principles, and History* (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1991), p.176. The legacy of Trent is described by Nichols: 'Three approaches were declared, implicitly, to be cul-de-sacs. First, Trent closed off the Protestant position in its Lutheran or Calvinist form. Second, it also excluded the late medieval concept of postapostolic revelation made to the Church. Finally it disposed of the idea of an esoteric, non-public apostolic tradition coming out of the closet from time to time. On the other hand, Trent kept open three other possibilities. It left open the so-called two-source theory, which came to be dominant in the period between the council and the nineteenth century. On this view, there are (alongside Scripture) confessional, liturgical, and ethical traditions in the Church deriving from ancient times and testifying to revelation. Next, Trent can coexist with what may be called the "classical view" of the Middle Ages, namely, that all revelation is virtually contained in Scripture, requiring, however, the Church's interpretation, leaning on apostolic tradition, for its explication. Last, Trent cannot be said to exclude what has become in the modern period perhaps the favoured view of Catholic theologians: the view that sees Tradition (now spelt with a capital T and distinguished from traditions in the plural) as theologically prior to the Bible, and defines that
Tradition is the life and consciousness of the Church, of which Scripture forms an essential part."


11. The Latin text reads: Placuit Deo in sua bonitate et sapentia seipsum revelare et notum facere sacramentum voluntatis suae... Cited Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. In the same way as the Biblical term 'covenant' does not imply equality between God and man, despite the fact that in secular life covenants are contracted between equals, the use of the word 'dialogue', to describe Revelation, is not intended to place man on the same level as God. Rather, it is used by way of analogy to explain God's speaking to man, in his Word, and man's response. In this I follow Ratzinger. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p.172.

17. Ibid. The council did not emphasize 'deeds' at the expense of 'words', as some theologians of the nineteenth and many of the twentieth century have done. J. Baillie comments that there is 'a remarkable breadth of agreement in recent discussions about revelation. It is that what is fundamentally revealed is God Himself, not propositions about God. Equally remarkable, is the recent agreement... that God reveals Himself in action - in the gracious activity by which he invades the field of human experience and human history which is otherwise but a vain show, and drained of meaning.' The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (Columbia University Press: New York 1961), pp.49-50.

18. For example, it did not accept Cullmann's view that the establishment of the canon of Scripture and the self-submission of Scripture to the canon is the climax in the history of salvation. Cf. O. Cullman, The Early Church (SCM: London 1956), pp.87-98; esp.89,90 & 96. In addition, there is nothing in Scripture to suggest such a climax and no evidence to give support to the idea that the Church saw it as such at the time. Furthermore, such a theory is by no means generally shared by other Protestant theologians. The issue of the relationship of Scripture to the Church, raised by Cullmann, is dealt with below in the discussion.


20. Ibid.

21. Given that man's understanding of the range of history has been vastly extended beyond the six thousand years given in Scripture, it was necessary to ensure that the universality of the divine saving should be understood to cover the enlarged range. This, of course, does not affect the relationship between the universal and the particular. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p.174.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p.175.

26. K. Rahner's view is that 'nothing new remains to be said, not as though there were not still much to say, but because everything has been said, everything given in the Son of Love, in whom God and world have become one'. Theological Investigations Volume 1: God, Christ, Mary and Grace (DLT: London 1965), p.49.

27. Ratzinger, loc. cit.

28. Ibid.

29. Fr. Gerald O'Collins has suggested that that Revelation which has been given once and for all, and which is complete in Christ, should be called 'foundational' Revelation, but that that Revelation, when seen as a present reality, should be called 'dependent' Revelation: 'As regards God's self-communication, where the apostles participated in a foundational way, later Christians participate in a dependent way - that is to say, in dependence upon those apostolic witnesses.' Revelation Past and Present' in R. Latourelle (ed.), Vatican II: Assessment and Perspectives, 3 vols. (Paulist Press: New York 1988), I, p.132. (This book will henceforth be cited as Latourelle, followed by the volume number.) This is not the same as continuing Revelation, such as is described by Moran, who rejects the idea of revealed truths, and understands Revelation as the continuous, personal presence of Christ. G. Moran, Theology of


31. Ibid., p.178. Likewise, the Anti-Modernist Oath (1910), according to which 'faith is not a blind impulse of religion welling up from the depth of the subconscious under the impulse of the heart and the inclination of a morally conditioned will, but the genuine assent of the intellect to a truth which is received from outside of hearing. In this assent, given on the authority of the all-truthful God, we hold to be true what has been said, attested to, and revealed by the personal God, our Creator and Lord.' Neuner & Dupuis, p.50.


33. Ibid., p.179.

34. Ibid., pp.178-9.

35. It has been argued that, following the work of Rudolph Bultmann, this can be clearly seen to be in line with Pauline kerygma. Cf. Ibid., p.179.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p.180.


39. Ibid. See also A. Dulles, Models of the Church: A Critical Assessment of the Church in all its Aspects (Gill & Macmillan: Dublin 1989) whose survey of 'Catholic Neo-Scholasticism' (pp.41-5) brings out clearly the legalistic aspect of this.

40. Ratzinger, loc. cit.

41. Ibid., pp.181-2.

42. Ibid., p.182.

43. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, III.4.1; cited in J. Stevenson (ed.), A New Eusebius (SPCK: London 1983), p.120.

44. Ratzinger, 'The Transmission of Divine Revelation',
Notes: Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

45. Ibid., pp.183-4.

46. Ibid., p.184.

47. Nichols, The Shape of Catholic Theology, p.177.


50. Ratzinger, loc. cit.

51. Ibid. The ideal functioning of the teaching office is described by Newman in the Apologia, p.238-9.


55. Nichols, Shape of Catholic Theology, p.177.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p.190.

58. Nichols, loc. cit. 'The Montreal Conference, at the suggestion of the Orthodox theologians, thought seriously of replacing sola scriptura by sola traditione.' Ratzinger, loc. cit. Congar's suggested formula is 'Totum in Scriptura, totum in Traditione', which he sees as Newman's position also (p.413), since it allows for the fact that 'there exist apostolic traditions which are not recorded in the writings of the apostles and we cannot say a priori that among these there are not certain articles of faith. The existence of such traditions, presupposed and
even affirmed by the apostolic writings themselves, has been established over and over again.' Congar, Tradition and traditions, pp.413 & 415.


63. Ibid., p.193.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.


67. Ibid., p.194.

68. Ibid.


70. Ibid., p.196.

71. Ibid. For the passage in question see Neuner & Dupuis, pp.259-60.

72. A good description of the sensus fidei is provided by Fr. Alszeghy, who has suggested the following definition: it is 'precisely the capacity to recognize the intimate experience of adherence to Christ and to judge everything on the basis of that knowledge'. 'The Sensus Fidei and the Development of Dogma' in Latourelle, I, p.147. See also S.D. Femiano, Infallibility of the Laity (Herder & Herder: New York 1967), who discusses both Newman and Vatican II on the sensus fidei.


74. That the interpretation of the sensus fidelium is
Notes: Newman, Vatican II, and Revelation

fraught with difficulties is clear from a comment by Avis: 'Perhaps it wants to be pragmatic, giving people what they want: there is nothing new in this. Roman dogma has tended to respond to popular piety - as, for example, in the promulgation of the Marian dogmas.' P. Avis, Authority, Leadership and Conflict in the Church (Mowbray: London 1992), p.7. Despite the difficulties, the sensus fidelium, or as it has been termed by A. Dulles, 'Revelation as New Awareness', in his Models of Revelation (Gill & Macmillan: Dublin 1983), pp.98-114, it is looked upon as a rich source by many proponents of the various forms of Liberation Theology. Cf. M. Grey, The Wisdom of Fools? Seeking Revelation for Today (SPCK: London 1993), p.28.


76. Ibid., p.198.

77. Ibid.


80. DA, p.388.

81. Ibid., pp.130-1.

82. Letter, p.48.


85. GA, pp.82-3.

86. VM, I, p.lxviii.

87. 'To submit to the Church means this, first that you will receive as de fide whatever she proposes de fide; that you will submit to the decisions of the Schola Theologorum, when unanimous in matters of faith and morals, as being so sure that it is forbidden to contradict them - that you
obey the commands of the Church in act and deed, though as a matter of policy prudence etc. you may think that other commands would be better. You are not called on believe de fide any thing but what has been promulgated as such - You are not called on to excuse an internal belief of any doctrine which Sacred Congregations, Local Synods, or particular Bishops, or the Pope as a -private Doctor, may enunciate. You are not called upon ever to believe or act against moral law, at the command of any superior.' 

L&D, XX, p.545.

89. Development (1878), p.36.
91. Mix, p.336.
93. L&D, XXV, p.418.
96. VM, I, p.288.

100. Indeed, such a conception of Revelation is by no means widely shared. See A. Dulles, Models of Revelation for a wide-ranging survey of thought on the subject. Furthermore, some scholars deny that there is such a thing as Revelation. For example, F.G. Downing, Has Christianity a Revelation? (SCM: London 1964), argues that "I believe in God... and in Jesus Christ... and in the Holy Ghost...", should, as Braithwaite suggests, be taken as a declaration of an intention to live in a particular way; it is well summarized by his coined "agapeistically".' p.185. For
Notes: Newman, Vatican II, and Ecclesiology

Downing, this does not imply any real knowledge about God. p.186.


102. Ibid., p.27.


105. Flannery, II, p.433. The fact that this has been recognized officially was of benefit to the Catholic theologians who took part in ecumenical discussions with Lutherans in the United States, discussing among other things the issue of 'Teaching Authority and Infallibility in the Church'. Cf. P.C. Empie, T.A. Murphy and J.A. Burgess (eds.), *Teaching Authority and Infallibility: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VI* (Augsburg: Minneapolis 1978), pp.44-5.


Notes to Chapter 7 Newman, Vatican II, and Ecclesiology


7. Contemporary Catholic theologians tend to equate the Greek mysterion with the Latin sacramentum. Cf. K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimler (eds.), Concise Theological Dictionary (Burns & Oates: London 1983), pp.452-3; 73; 323. The notion of the Church as Sacrament was interpreted by Cyprian, Augustine, Aquinas and Scheeben, but only emerged in full clarity in the twentieth century. Cf. Dulles, Models of the Church, p.63.

8. Grillmeier, 'Mystery of the Church', p.140. See also Dulles, Models of the Church, pp.66-7.

9. As per the prayer, O Sacrum Convivium: At this sacred banquet in which Christ is received, the memory of His passion is renewed, our lives are filled with grace and a promise of future glory is given to us. See also P. McPartlan, The Eucharist makes the Church: Henri de Labac and John Zizioulas in dialogue (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1993). Nichols notes that Ratzinger was, 'along with Henri de Lubac, one of the first Catholic thinkers to adopt a full-scale, systematic elaborated, "eucharistic ecclesiology".' A. Nichols, The Theology of Joseph Ratzinger (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1988), pp.47-8. See also Y. Congar, The Revelation of God (DLT: London 1968), p.173, on the importance of the eucharist in the life of the Church.

10. Thus there is the possibility of ascribing to the Church what may be said of the Kingdom. Cf. Chapter 2. This view is challenged by H. Küng, The Church (Search Press: Tunbridge Wells 1986), who contends that 'the Church is a sinful Church' (p.320) and 'no more than an all-too-human religious organization.' (p.328).

12. As Galot comments: 'This variety of metaphors is helpful in showing that the Church exists solely in function of Christ: led by the shepherd, vivified by the vinestock, founded on the cornerstone, united to the bridegroom. Christ's rôle is so rich that it can be indicated only through a whole range of descriptions and metaphors.' 'Christ: Revealer, Founder of the Church, and Source of Ecclesial Life' in Latourelle, I, p.392.

13. This, of course, is frequently referred to as 'unity in diversity'. For a discussion of this see A. Nichols, The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to its Sources, Principles, and History (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1991), pp.349-55.

14. Although this was a theory that had had much currency in the past, having been favoured by Perrone and Möhler, the Council Fathers felt that it was easily open to misinterpretation, since the link between Christ and His Church might be seen as a new hypostatic union, or a continuation of the one between the Father and the Son in the Incarnation: 'the Church and the Spirit are only united by a covenant link.' Y. Congar, Tradition and traditions: An historical and theological essay (Burns & Oates: London 1966), p.345. Cf. Manning, who comments that 'The members of the mystical Body who are sanctified, partake not only of the created graces, but of a substantial union with the Holy Ghost.... The union of the Holy Ghost with the mystical Body, though analogous to the hypostatic union, is not hypostatic; for as much as the human personality of the members of Christ still subsists in this substantial union.' H.E. Manning, The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost or Reason and Revelation (Burns & Oates: London 1909), p.xiii.

15. Grillmeier, 'Mystery of the Church', p.146.


17. Cf. the discussion of 'subsists in' in chapter 8.


19. Ibid., p.252.

20. The concept of the Church as communion, and the possibility of imperfect communion has become central to ecumenical dialogue. See, for example, the Agreed Statement of ARCIC II, 'Church as Communion' in One in Christ, vol.27, no.1, 1991, pp.77-97.

21. Cf. the now famous remarks of Bishop Emile De Smedt of
Notes: Newman, Vatican II, and Ecclesiology

Bruges that the Church should reject clericalism, juridicism and triumphalism. Vorgrimler, I, p.109.


23. Cf. Dei Verbum 4, which highlights the eschatological nature of Christianity.

24. As Dulles points out, 'Ratzinger called attention to the concept of the People of God as a type of the Church in the Latin Fathers, especially Tertullian, Cyprian, Optatus, and Augustine. 'A Half Century of Ecclesiology', p.424.


29. Cf. Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, p.48. 'We can say, then, that the seven sacraments are unthinkable and impossible without the one sacrament that is the Church, they are understandable at all only as practical realizations of what the Church is as such and as a whole. The Church is the sacrament in the sacraments; sacraments are the means by which the sacramentality of the Church is realized. Church and sacraments explain each other.'


31. The infallible instinct of faith, which is found to be
in the whole body of the faithful when giving unanimous witness. See also chapter 6.


35. This fact is of great importance to the discussion of Church membership in chapter 8.

36. i.e. an imperfect communion exists between non-Catholic Christians and the Catholic Church.


39. Dulles notes that: 'Vatican II, while looking optimistically on the possibilities of salvation of non-Christians, did not commit itself to any particular explanation.... The assumption seems to be that the Church plays an instrumental role in the salvation of everyone who is saved.' 'A Half Century of Ecclesiology', p.430. He develops this view in greater length in The Reshaping of Catholicism: Current Challenges in the Theology of Church (Harper & Row: San Francisco 1988), pp.138-41.

40. See the discussion in chapter 5 and Nichols, Holy Order, pp.5-34.

41. As Vanhoye comments, however, 'it would be ridiculous to see sacramental grace as an obstacle to the reception of charisms.' 'The Biblical Question of "Charisms" After Vatican II' in Latourelle, I, p.445.

42. K. Rahner, 'The Hierarchical Structure of the Church with Special Reference to the Episcopate' in Vorgrimler, I, p.189.

43. Ibid., p.190. Cf. also, chapters 5 & 6 above, along
with Dei Verbum 7.

44. Cf. Dei Verbum 7.

45. Kung challenges this teaching of the council, arguing that the 'whole Church, not just a few individuals, is the follower of the apostles.' The Church, p.355.

46. In this discussion, for the sake of brevity, no explicit mention will be made of the 'Explanatory Note' (designed to avoid confusion on this point), which was attached to the constitution. It is hoped, however, that these articles have been interpreted according to its provisions.


48. Ibid.

49. Cf. Chapter 5 for a discussion of this issue at Vatican I, esp. by Bishop Gasser, whose speech on behalf of the deputation de fide is recorded in Butler, II, pp.134-48.


51. The term 'communion' is based on the Greek New Testament word koinonia, 'which refers to the sharing or fellowship of human beings with God and one another in Christ through the Spirit, especially as expressed in the reception of Holy Communion.' Yarnold, op. cit., p.1564. As such, theologians must be careful not to interpret communion in merely sociological terms.


54. On the basis of this teaching, G. Sweeney has argued that the views of the minority at Vatican I, 'which may not have received the accolade of dogmatic definition... are nevertheless authentic expressions of faith and [are] necessary to an understanding of those formulae which were finally put to the vote.' 'The forgotten council' in A. Hastings (ed.), Bishops and Writers: Aspects of the Evolution of Modern English Catholicism (Anthony Clarke:

56. Rahner comments: 'The "irreformable" nature of the definition clearly excludes only error in faith. It does not affirm that the dogmatic definition is necessarily opportune in all respects, or that it corresponds fully to the justifiable demands of the mentality of a given age, or that it may not be replaced later by a better definition. The development of dogma does not blot out the past history of the faith of the Church, and yet it is never simply closed. In this sense, it is always "reformable".' 'Hierarchical Structure', p.213. While the limitations of dogmatic definitions which Rahner outlines are broadly in agreement with the provisions of Mysterium ecclesiae, it does, however, seem strange to speak of an 'irreformable' definition as being 'reformable'. It is necessary to emphasize that irreformable definitions do signify truth in a determinate. Rahner is quoted to this effect in chapter 6.

57. At this point the question arises as to how this authority is to be reconciled with the primacy of the pope, who in the 'Decree on the Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church', Christus Dominus, is said to have been 'granted by God supreme, full, immediate and universal power in the care of souls.... He is therefore endowed with the primacy of ordinary power over all the churches.' (CD 2) As Tillard has said, it may appear that there are 'two concurrent powers'. J-M.R. Tillard, The Bishop of Rome (SPCK: London 1983), p.128. This, however, is not the case, as was pointed out by Bishop Gasser, who noted that the proper occasion for the use of the papal prerogative was when there was an issue of faith, disagreement or heresy in a part of the Church with which the local bishops were unable to deal, either individually or by means of a local council. An appeal to the Holy See would then be a matter of the last resort and the power which the pope could then invoke would be a 'special privilege'. Sweeney, op. cit., p.164. Such a view was accepted by the members of ARCIC in 'Authority in the Church II' paragraphs 16-22, The Final Report (CTS & SPCK: London 1982), pp.88-91.

58. Any notion that superiority in the external order corresponds to superiority in the order of grace is thereby rejected.


60. This concept is central to John Paul II's Apostolic Exhortation Christifideles Laici (1988). Neuner & Dupuis,
61. See the discussion in Dulles, *The Resilient Church*, pp.96-110.

62. This would appear to be one of those occasions on which on 'fundamental points, this Council reached a compromise, not on content, but solely on the formal wording. This explains why such divergent positions have been adopted in interpreting the conciliar texts, which, in themselves, for lack of a compromise on content, remained necessarily ambiguous.' A. Anton, 'Postconciliar Ecclesiology: Expectations, Results, and Prospects for the Future' in Latourelle, I, p.424. Cf. A. Dulles' remarks on the presence of conflicting ecclesiology in *Lumen Gentium*. 'A Half Century of Ecclesiology', pp.429-30.

63. Vatican II also produced a separate 'Decree on the Apostolate of Lay People', Apostolicam actuositatem (18 November 1965). This has not been treated of in detail, because the principles which underlie it are contained in *Lumen Gentium*, and such a discussion would, therefore, add very little.

64. In this task, I have been greatly aided by the work of I.T. Ker, *Newman on Being a Christian* (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame 1990), who has summarized Newman's thought on the Church on pp.73-106. Likewise his *Newman and the Fullness of Christianity* (T & T Clark: Edinburgh 1993), pp.126-32, which provides a brief survey of the ways in which Newman anticipated Vatican II. In addition, I am grateful to Mr. Gerard Tracey, Archivist at the Birmingham Oratory, for bringing to my attention the archival material upon which I draw in this chapter.


66. Ibid., III, p.222.

67. Ibid., p.270.


78. Essays, II, pp.53-4.

79. Notes on the Church and the Pope, 1848. (B.O.A.)


81. Ibid., p.122. Cf. also the conclusion to the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine that 'Time is short, eternity is long.' Development (1845) p.453.

82. Apologia, p.298.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., pp.179-80.


87. Notes for lectures on the Church and the Pope, 1848. (B.O.A.)

88. Notes on the Church and the Pope, under the heading De Romanus Pontifica, 1848. (B.O.A.)

89. Notes for lectures on Church and Pope, 1848. (B.O.A.)


91. Notes for lectures on Church and Pope, 1848.

92. Cf. chapter 3.

93. Essays, II, pp.20; 23.
Notes: Foundations for Dialogue

94. L&D, XXVI, p.171.

95. Notes for lectures on Church and Pope, 1848. (B.O.A.)

96. Letter, p.115.


100. Notes for lectures on the Church and Pope, 18 Feb. 1848. (B.O.A.)


102. Cf. chapter 3.

103. See Prespos, pp.390-1, cited in chapter 3.

104. Cf. chapter 3, and also Y. Congar's comment: 'The Church does not exist solely for the clergy, and the laity do not exist as an inactive and inert mass within her.' The Revelation of God, p.161.

Notes to Chapter 8 Foundations for Dialogue


2. In this chapter I am indebted to the detailed theological analysis of the decree undertaken by W. Becker and J. Feiner in Vorgrimler, II, pp.1-164, and upon which I base many of my views. Of assistance also, was L. Jaeger, A Stand on Ecumenism: The Council's Decree (G. Chapman: London 1965). A brief summary of the decree and some observations upon ecumenism, before and after it, are provided by T. Stransky, 'Ecumenism (Unitatis Redintegratio)' in A. Hastings (ed.), Modern Catholicism: Vatican II and After (SPCK: London 1991), pp.113-7. Stransky was a member of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity from its foundation by John XXIII in 1960 until 1970. A further essay of his describes the background to the decree and 'The Foundation of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity' in A. Stacpoole (ed.), Vatican II by those who were there (G. Chapman:
Notes: Foundations for Dialogue

London 1986), pp.62-87. John Moorman, former Anglican bishop of Ripon, and member of ARCIC I for all of its twelve years, who was the chief Anglican observer present at Vatican II provides an "outsider's" account of the debates surrounding the decree, as well as the decree itself in his Vatican Observed: An Anglican Impression of Vatican II (DLT: London 1967), pp.90-103. See also his essay 'Observers and Guests of the Council' in Stacpoole (ed.), op. cit., pp.155-69.

3. In his address to the council on 21 November 1964, Pope Paul VI 'made the explicit point that the doctrine of the Church in Lumen Gentium [promulgated the same day as Unitatis Redintegratio] was to be interpreted in the light of the further explanations given in the Decree on Ecumenism.' F. Sullivan, 'The Significance of the Vatican II Declaration that the Church of Christ "subsists in" the Roman Catholic Church' in Latourelle, II, p.275.

4. This is in contrast to Pius XII's encyclical, Mystici Corporis (1943) in which that self-same connexion is made. It begins: 'If we would define and describe this true Church of Jesus Christ - which is the holy, catholic apostolic, Roman Church - we shall find no expression more noble, more sublime or more divine than the phrase which calls it "the mystical Body of Jesus Christ".' Neuner & Dupuis, p.253. For the antecedents of the Encyclical Mystici Corporis see A. Dulles, Models of the Church: A Critical Assessment of the Church in all Its Aspects (Gill & Macmillan: Dublin 1989), p.230.

5. This was the natural and logical consequence of the theology of Mystici Corporis and the earlier encyclical of Pius XI, Mortalium Animus (1928), which concludes: 'The union of Christians cannot be fostered otherwise than by promoting the return of the dissidents to the one true Church of Christ, which in the past they so unfortunately abandoned; return, we say, to the one true Church of Christ which is plainly visible to all and which by the will of the Founder remains what He Himself destined her to be for the common salvation of men.... let them do so, not with the thought and hope that the Church of the living God, the pillar and the ground of the truth', will sacrifice the integrity of the faith, but, on the contrary, with the intention of submitting to her authority and government.' Neuner & Dupuis, p.282.


7. Cited in Ibid.
9. This is the case despite the title 'Vicar of Christ' which was accorded to the Bishop of Rome, in place of the previously used title 'Vicar of Peter'. This change occurred during the pontificate of Innocent III (1198-1216), and led to an exaggerated view of papal authority being on a par with that of Christ's. For a discussion of this see J-M.R. Tillard, *The Bishop of Rome* (SPCK: London 1983), p.60. In addition, while such a view of the pope as 'Vicar of Christ', implies that Peter has lost his job, the liturgy assures us that he has not. The 'Preface for the Apostles' from the pre-conciliar Daily Missal is translated as follows: 'It is truly meet and just, right and availing unto salvation, humbly to pray Thee, O Lord, the eternal Shepherd, to abandon not Thy flock; but through Thy blessed apostles to keep a continual watch over it; that it may be governed by those same rulers whom Thou didst set over it'.

10. Feiner, op. cit., p.69. In his relatio on the schema, on 18 November 1963, Archbishop Martin of Rouen emphasized the fact that ecumenism was an issue never before dealt with by a council, yet it must be remembered that although the decree was, therefore, a new departure, it was not a revolutionary document. Cf. Jaeger, op. cit., pp.ix; 15-6. Further evidence of the non-revolutionary nature of the decree is to be found in H.E. Manning, *The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost or Reason and Revelation* (Burns & Oates: London 1909).

11. The principle is that there can be but one true Church of Christ.

12. The official relatio on the second version of the schema says: "It would be a quite wrong view of ecumenism if it were to be regarded as a new tactics for achieving conversions more easily. True, the apostolate of reconciling individuals should be recognized as a work of the Holy Spirit and is in no way opposed to the work of ecumenism. But that apostolate differs essentially from the ecumenical movement, which has a different object and is of a different nature. All this is stated in a special section that has been isolated in the amended text." Jaeger, op. cit., p.92.


Notes: Foundations for Dialogue


16. Cf. Lumen Gentium 1; J. Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, (Ignatius Press: San Francisco 1989), p.44; and Dulles, Models of the Church, pp.63; 231 for a discussion of the issue and a list of works on the subject. Also, A. Dulles, A Church to Believe In: Discipleship and the Dynamics of Freedom (Crossroad: New York 1983), ch.3, 'The Church: Witness and Sacrament of Faith', pp.41-52. The, by and large, Catholic understanding of the Church as sacrament stands in marked contrast to the view expressed by P. Avis in his Authority, Leadership and Conflict in the Church (Mowbray: London 1992) that 'Study of the psychological and sociological dynamics of religion suggests that religion is a human production, specifically that the Christian religion is a human response (though a response to a genuinely "other" divine reality) and that the Church as a social institution is (to use Popper's phrase) man-made. Once that is recognized, the stage is set for an "open society" in the church ' (p.85). This approach leads him to misunderstand both the Catholic understanding of the Church and her structures of authority. Montefiore's comment that Avis 'contrasts brilliantly the Anglican and Roman Catholic stances' (Theology, vol.96, no.770, 1993, p.163) in his review of the book suggests that such a misconception is common.


Notes: Foundations for Dialogue


22. As the then Cardinal Wojtyla pointed out in K. Wojtyla, Sources of Renewal: the Implementation of Vatican II (Harper & Row: San Francisco 1980), 'we must not forget to respect the discipline of faith and obedience to the truth already possessed by various communities. Without such recognition we may do a disservice to the true progress of unity, as the Decree points out. The discipline of faith and loyalty to professed truth does not conflict with the Augustinian principle: in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas.' (p.326). Examples of genuine differences that may not be ignored are: the nature of the apostolic succession; priesthood; and the eucharist (cf. Ratzinger and Messori, op. cit., p.161 for Ratzinger's comment).


24. Cited in Ibid., p.97


27. Paul VI's opening address to the second session of the Council on 29 September 1963; cited in Ibid., p.100. Cf. also Paul VI's address to the observer delegates, cited in Jaeger, op. cit., p.105.

28. Feiner, op. cit., p.103

29. Specific guidance on such matters is provided in the recently published Directory for the Application of Principles and Norms on Ecumenism (CTS: London 1993), which was promulgated by John Paul II on 25 March 1993. The purpose of this new Ecumenical Directory is to draw together the various documents on ecumenism that have been issued since Vatican II, and 'to motivate, enlighten and guide...[ecumenical] activity.' (Article 6). It is a document issued by the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, which was created as the successor to the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity by the Apostolic
Notes: Foundations for Dialogue


32. Such a view is now commonly found among Catholic theologians such as Dulles, who wrote that: 'Ecumenism, I contend, is best understood not as a separate branch of theology but rather as a dimension of all good theology.' A. Dulles, The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System (Gill & Macmillan: Dublin 1992), p.x.


35. 'During the voting on Chapter Two of the decree, a modus was brought in on 7 October, 1964, proposing an addition on the hierarchy of revealed truths.... "It should be of the greatest importance for the ecumenical dialogue", the modus says, "that both the truths on which Christians are agreed and the divergent doctrines should be weighed rather than merely enumerated. Though undoubtedly all revealed truths have to be believed with the same divine faith, nevertheless their importance and their 'weight' differ according to their relation to salvation history and the mystery of Christ."' Jaeger, op. cit., p.116. A suitable addition was incorporated in the final version of the text.

36. The following definitions from K. Rahner & H. Vorgrimler, Concise Theological Dictionary (Burns & Oates: London 1983), are helpful in clarifying the matter.

'Catholic Truths. Veritates Catholicae or doctrina catholica: in the strict theological sense all those truths
which the Church teaches authentically but not infallibly — wherein they differ from dogmas and dogmatic facts. Many theological conclusions and much of the teaching of papal encyclicals can be included in this category. The Church requires our internal assent to these truths, but not the absolute irrevocable assent of faith. A person may withhold this assent, which is posited on the basis of the Church's authority, if in view of certain considerations which supersede the state of the question as it has hitherto been expounded, he becomes convinced that an opinion proposed authentically but not infallibly by the Church no longer does the matter justice.' p.61.

'Nature of Dogma. In the present usage of the Church and of theology, clearly and generally taken in this sense only since the 18th century, a dogma is a proposition to be believed with divine and Catholic faith, that is, a proposition which the Church expressly teaches in her ordinary magisterium, or by a papal or conciliar definition, as divinely revealed; the denial of which is, therefore, heresy.... This may be the case even if the dogma is contained in another (dogmatic) truth; for the Church teaches a good deal today as dogma which (while contained in Revelation) was not always expressly taught or thought of as dogma. It is controverted whether a dogma must be formally implicit in another revealed truth in order to be derived from this latter, or whether it can also be logically deduced from a revealed truth with the aid of premises that are not revealed. In any case, we must be clear that the concrete fulfilment of the Christian faith can never be confined to formal dogmas, but must be related to other knowledge, views, and attitudes if it would be truly personal and Catholic.' p.131.

'Dogmatic Facts. These are facts which cannot indeed be deduced from the revealed word of God but which the Church must nevertheless recognize and formulate as such with certainty, because they are necessary for the preservation of the deposit of faith in all its purity (e.g. the legitimacy of a Pope, the ecumenical character of a council, the heretical character of a doctrine). Their theological locus is not so much dogma in the strict sense as the theology of the Church's normal self-fulfilment in practice.' p.133.

Notes to Chapter 9  ARCIC on Authority

2. In a Common Declaration on 24 March 1966 Pope Paul and Archbishop Ramsey announced their intention 'to inaugurate between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion a serious dialogue which, founded on the Gospels and the ancient common traditions, may lead to the unity in truth, for which Christ prayed.' The Final Report (CTS & SPCK: London 1982), p.118.

A Joint Preparatory Commission then met at Gazzada in Italy in January 1967. After further meetings it issued its Report (The Malta Report), which was accepted by both communions as providing the terms of reference for serious dialogue between them. The Anglican - Roman Catholic International Commission was consequently created and met for the first time in Windsor in 1970.

3. The Malta Report, III 17 (Final Report, p.113).

4. These were statements which were agreed by members of the Commission, who had been appointed by their respective Communions to engage in dialogue. They were not agreed by the Church authorities, but offered to them, and to theologians in general, for comment. Cf. A. Clark, 'ARCIC: Method in New Credal Forms' in One in Christ, vol.11, 1975, pp.182-93.

5. The original order of publication of the documents, and the place and year of the meetings which issued them, are as follows:
   1. Eucharistic Doctrine, Windsor 1970
   2. Ministry and Ordination, Canterbury 1973
   3. Authority in the Church, Venice 1976
   4. Eucharistic Doctrine: Elucidation, Salisbury 1979
   5. Ministry and Ordination: Elucidation, Salisbury 1979
   6. Authority in the Church: Elucidation, Salisbury 1979
   7. Authority in the Church II, Windsor 1981*

* Published for the first time in The Final Report

A list of the members of ARCIC and the places and dates of its meetings are on pages 102-7 of The Final Report.


7. Ibid., p.3.

8. Ibid., p.2.

vol.1, 1983, pp.2-11, which I have not been able to consult as yet; cited in A. Nichols, The Theology of Joseph Ratzinger: An Introductory Study (T & T Clark: Edinburgh), p.326.


12. Ibid., p.6.

13. Ibid., p.91.


dialogue: 'warmth and doubts' in One World, vol.173, 1992, p.7. G. Carey, op. cit., was cautious in his comments. In an unpublished paper, 'Marginal Notes on the Response to ARCIC I', originally prepared for the private use of Bishop Clark, J. McHugh notes that the text was issued without protocol, probably having been revised by a secretary with little or no authority to amend the text, and that one 'is left at the end genuinely perplexed concerning the precise degree of authority ascribed by the Holy See to the Response, and therefore to some of the statements which it contains.' p.5. I am grateful to Dr. McHugh for making his 'Notes' available to me.


22. Ibid.


24. Ibid., pp.364-5.


490
Notes: ARCIC on Authority

27. Ibid., p.28.


32. Cf. chapters 4 & 5.


34. Ibid., pp.21-2.


36. Cf. McHugh, op. cit., p.2; and Lumen Gentium 12.


40. McHugh, op. cit.

41. 'Atque uni Simoni Petro contulit Iesus post suam resurrectionem summi pastoris et rectoris iurisdictionem in totum suum oville'. Butler, II, op. cit., pp.280 & 281.

42. 'primatum iurisdictionis in universam Dei Ecclesiam immediate et directe beato Petro Apostolo promissum atque collatum in Christo Domino fuisse'. Ibid., pp. 278 & 279.

43. 'Si quis ergo dixerit, non esse ex ipsius Christi

44. McHugh, *op. cit.* p.3.


47. Cf. chapters 2, 4 & 5.


54. Evans' arguments may be taken to support this view: 'the... Anglican rejection of a "formal", "universal primacy" within its own Communion for the Archbishop of Canterbury has not been a vote against universal primacy as such.' G.R. Evans, 'The Anglican Doctrine of Primacy' in *Anglican Theology Review*, vol.72, 1990, p.378. See also J. de Satgé, *Peter and the Single Church* (SPCK: London 1981), pp.153-6; and Yarnold and Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p.35. This view is fiercely opposed, however, by Bradshaw, *Olive Branch*, pp.116-7.


58. For an example in the Church of England, see the recent case of Anthony Freeman and his book, *God in Us: A Case for Christian Humanism* (SCM: London 1993), which I have not read, but which is reviewed by M. Wiles in
Notes: Method in Theology


60. Cardinal Willebrands, the then President of the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity, has pointed out, it 'would be a mistake to think that the expression [substitit in] aims to concentrate all ecclesiality solely in the Catholic Church and considers the elementa present elsewhere as detached and drifting fragments.' Furthermore, the traditional attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to the Orthodox Churches 'though they too are detached from "communion under the successor of Peter" - shows that instinctively the Catholic Church has refused to see in the Orthodox communities nothing but a collection of elements of the Church. She has seen them as authentic Churches.' J. Willebrands, 'Vatican II's Ecclesiology of Communion' in One in Christ, vol.XXIII, no.3, 1987, p.189. Cf. also F. Sullivan, "Subsistit in": The Significance of Vatican II's Decision to say of the Church of Christ not that it "is" but that it "subsists in" the Roman Catholic Church' in One in Christ, vol.XXII, no.2, 1986, pp.115-23; J. Feiner, 'Catholic Principles of Ecumenism' in Vorgrimler, II, p.79; and L. Jaeger, A Stand on Ecumenism: The Council's Decree (G. Chapman: London 1965), pp.226-8, who lists all the ecclesiastical documents between 1074 and 1964 which describe the Eastern Orthodox as Churches. Also, Stgr. 'On Some Aspects of the Church considered as Communion'.


62. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 10 Method in Theology


8. Ibid., pp.viii-ix.


10. Ibid., pp.41-5.

11. Ibid., pp.45-52.


17. Development (1878), pp.178-85; 323-54. In this chapter references to the Essay on Development will be to the 1878 edition, since the relevant material is here better organized than in the 1845 version.

18. T. Merrigan notes that Newman and Michael Polanyi
'exercised a formative influence on Dulles' thought.' 'Models in the Theology of Avery Dulles' in Bijdragen, tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie, vol.54, 1993, p.141. He also refers to F.J. McAree, 'Revelation, Faith and Mystery: The Theology of Revelation in the writings of Avery Dulles' (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome PhD thesis, 1983), who discusses the influences upon Dulles' thinking. For an indication of Newman's influence upon Dulles one need only consult the indices to his books. Some anecdotal evidence is also provided by Mgr. Kevin Nichols, who related to me a conversation he had with Fr. Dulles, whilst both were teaching at the Catholic University of America, in which Dulles offered the information that Newman's Grammar of Assent had probably been more influential upon him than any other work by any other author.

19. The subheadings in this chapter are taken from chapter 1 of Craft, pp.3-15. Throughout American spellings of words have been silently amended.

20. Dulles, Craft, p.3.

21. Ibid., p.4.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp.4-5. Dulles remarks that the 'neo-scholastic theology of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while rigorously orthodox, was heavily infected by Cartesian rationalism and mathematicism.' p.5.

26. Ibid. G. Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (SPCK: London 1984) is referred to by Dulles in chapter 2, 'Theology and Symbolic Communication', pp.17-39, although he states that his own proposal is markedly different from Lindbeck's.

27. Ibid., p.5.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp.5-6.

30. Ibid., p.6.

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., pp.6-7.

36. Ibid., pp.260-62. Similarly, Cameron notes of the University Sermons that 'Newman is here arguing that what can be rationally demonstrated is insufficient even for the purposes of common living. We have to make assumptions, to trust the general tendencies of our nature, to make anything of the world at all. Scepticism is a mood engendered by the study; it is not and cannot be the attitude of the whole man, man the agent, man the maker, the investigator, the moral being. Scepticism is a malaise peculiar to the sophisticated; but even the sophisticated shed their scepticism when they turn from speculation to practice.' J.M. Cameron, The Night Battle (Burns & Oates: London 1962), p.211.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., pp.7-8.
41. Cited in GA, p.xi.

42. See Newman's description of three Protestants, one of whom becomes a Catholic, another a Unitarian and the third an unbeliever in Ibid., pp.160-1.

43. Letter, p.111.
44. L&D, XXV, p.430.
46. Ibid., pp.36-7.
47. Dulles, Craft, p.8.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. *Ibid.* 'In the genuine and original sense a symbol is not a sign man has arbitrarily chosen and applied from without to a particular thing so as to give the latter historical expression in space and time, but (in very varying degrees, of course) the "phenomenon", other yet connected, in which a thing affirms itself and in which, therefore, it also "utters" itself. In the Trinity the Father is himself when he utters himself in the Son who is distinct from him. The soul exists, that is to say, fulfils its own being, when it embodies and expresses itself in the body which it "informs" and which is different from it. A person succeeds in adopting a certain attitude when he expresses it in a gesture: by "expressing" itself the attitude comes into being, or acquires existential depth. The fact that the symbol originates in what is symbolized does not prevent the latter being subject to certain external norms if it is to find genuine expression in the symbol (for example, the particular ecclesiastical "form" of marriage is prerequisite if the union is to be absolutely binding).' K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimler, *Concise Theological Dictionary* (Burns & Oates: London 1983), p.491.

52. Dulles, *loc. cit.*


55. Cf. GA, p.83 and the comments on this passage in chapter 6.


57. 'And now, as to the positive evidence which those Fathers offer in behalf of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity.... One is the general *ascription of glory* to the Three Persons together, both by fathers and churches, and that on continuous tradition and from the earliest times.' *Development* (1878), p.19. See also Newman's remark that this was the result of the application of the principle *lex orandi lex credendi*. GA, p.91. For Newman's application of this principle in his early sermons see P. Murray (ed.), *John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843. Volume I, Sermons on the Liturgy and Sacraments and on Christ the Mediator* (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1991), pp.57-113.

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Dulles, Craft, p.9.
65. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p.10.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Cf. chapter 6.
74. Dulles, loc. cit.
75. Ibid., p.11.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p.12.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
Notes: Method in Theology

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., p.13.
86. Ibid.


88. Development (1878), pp.185; 189; 195; 199; 203.
89. Ibid., p.185.
90. Ibid., p.189.
91. Ibid., p.190.
92. Ibid., p.195.
93. Ibid., p.199.
94. Ibid., p.203.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., p.171.
97. Ibid., p.178.
98. Dulles, Craft, p.11.
100. L&D, XX, p.448.
101. Cf. chapter 3.
102. Letter, p.58.
103. Dulles, Craft, pp.149-64.
104. Ibid., p.159.
105. Ibid., p.13.
106. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., pp.14-5.
115. Dated entry in appendix to private diaries, July 1846. (B.O.A.)


118. Apologia, p.239.

120. Although this is not made explicit in Craft, Dulles affirms his belief in a 'moderate' infallibility, not dissimilar to Newman's view, in his A Church to Believe In, pp.133-48.

121. US, pp.200-1.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

I PRIMARY SOURCES

THE PUBLISHED WORKS OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN


The Arians of the Fourth Century (Pickering: London 1883).


Discourses to Mixed Congregations (Burns, Oates & Co: London 1871).


Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements (W. Baxter: Oxford 1836).


Historical Sketches, 3 vols. (Longmans, Green & Co: London 1885)
Bibliography


A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation (B.M. Pickering: London 1875).


Parochial and Plain Sermons vol. II (Rivingtons: London 1880).

Parochial and Plain Sermons vols. III & VI (Rivingtons: London 1881).


Select Treatises of St. Athanasius in Controversy with the Arians, 2 vols. (Longmans, Green & Co: London 1890).

Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day (Rivingtons: London 1871).


Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical (Pickering: London 1874).


The Via Media of the Anglican Church, 2 vols. (Longmans, Green & Co: London 1891).

LETTERS, DIARIES, JOURNALS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIRS


UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVAL MATERIAL, BIRMINGHAM ORATORY, ENGLAND

Letter to F.W. Newman, dated 22.10.1840.

Letter to F.W. Newman, dated 10.11.1840.

Dated Entries in Appendices to Private Diaries (13.06.1842 - 12.06.1846), Concerning the Development of Doctrine.

The Copybook on Development (07.03.1844 'In festo. S. Th.').

503
Bibliography


Notes on the Church and Pope, dated 18.02.1848.

ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCUMENTS


THE DOCUMENTS OF ARCIC I & II


II SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS, BOTH ON NEWMAN AND ON THE PROBLEMATIC IN GENERAL


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Dragas G.D., Ecclesiasticus: Orthodox Church Perspectives, Models and Eicons (Darlington Carmel, 1984).


-The Limits of the Papacy: Authority and Autonomy in the Church (DLT: London 1987).

Bibliography


Holmes J.D., More Roman than Rome: English Catholicism in the Nineteenth Century (Burns & Oates: London 1978).


-Voices of Authority (Sheed & Ward: London 1976).


Manning H.E., The True Story of the Vatican Council (Burns & Oates: London 1877).


Bibliography


Bibliography


-The Shape of the Church to Come (SPCK: London 1974).


Bibliography


-(ed.), Vatican II: by those who were there (G. Chapman: London 1986).


Bibliography


ARTICLES, BOTH ON NEWMAN AND ON THE PROBLEMATIC IN GENERAL


-'The Hermesian Dimension to the Newman-Perrone Dialogue' in Ephemerides Theologicae Louvaniensis, vol.61, part 1, 1985, pp.73-99.


Bibliography


Dragas G.D., 'Conscience and Tradition: Newman and Athanasios in the Orthodox Church' in Newman Studien XI, pp.72-84.


Gwynn A., 'An Irish Tribute to the first Rector of the National University of Ireland' in Newman Studien III, pp.99-110.

Bibliography


Holmes J.D., 'Newman's Attitude towards the Definition of Papal Infallibility illustrating the significance of History in Christian Belief' in Newman Studien IX, pp.55-68.


Bibliography


McHugh J., 'Marginal Notes on the Response to ARCIC I.' An unpublished manuscript.


Bibliography


Montefiore H., 'Authority in the Church' in Theology, vol.80, no.675, 1977, pp.163-70.


Bibliography


Stewart R., '"Reception": What do the Churches do with Ecumenical Agreements?' in One in Christ, vol.21, no.3, 1985, pp.194-203.

Sullivan F., ""Subsistit in": The Significance of Vatican II's Decision to say of the Church of Christ not that it "is" but that it "subsists in" the Roman Catholic Church' in One in Christ, vol.22, no.2, 1986, pp.115-23.


-'Did we "receive" Vatican II?' in One in Christ, vol.21, no.4, 1985, pp.276-83.


Ware K., 'The ARCIC Agreed Statement on Authority: An Orthodox Comment' in *One in Christ*, vol.14, no.3, 1978, pp.198-206.


Willebrands J., 'Prospects for Anglican - Roman Catholic Relations' in *One in Christ*, vol.9, no.1, 1973, pp.11-23.


-'Anglican - Roman Catholic Dialogue' in *One in Christ*, vol.15, no.4, 1979, pp.290-304.

Bibliography


