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Tees, Sheila E

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PSYCHOTHERAPY AS SOCIAL CRITIQUE

Sheila E Tees

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Thesis submitted for the degree of M. Phil.

University of Durham
Department of Psychology

1996

- 6 OCT 1997
Abstract

Several commentators on psychotherapy have suggested that certain features of contemporary society are creating additional psychological problems for people. They argue that traditional individualistic approaches to psychotherapy cannot account theoretically for the social dysfunctions which could be responsible for psychological problems. The focus of such dysfunctions are de-ethicalised human relations either due to social institutional constraints (forms of macro-conduct) or the uncoupling of micro-conduct (person to person activities) from macro-conduct. I examine recent approaches to psychotherapy to find out whether they consider contemporary features of social existence in their accounts.

My aim is to provide an account of psychotherapy which considers personal and social existence co-relative to each other. Only by theoretically establishing such a relation can there be an adequate analysis of persons interacting with each other or their social practices. I propose three modalities, personhood, micro-conduct and macro-conduct for my account of psychotherapy. Each of these can influence the other.

My approach to psychotherapy as social critique is organised around the principle of social and moral values which includes both persons as evaluators and the values pertaining to social practices in the social environment. I contend that such evaluators are moral agents with both species-related and individual attributes of intentions and powers and also what I term, knowledge-ability. I suggest that the process of evaluation is a skilled process involving feedback between persons and their practices as a result of which persons can regulate and modify their social practices. This skilled process establishes also the regulatory methodological features of psychotherapy practice which can give rise to psychotherapeutic betterment.

I have achieved an account of social psychotherapy that is relational and developmental and in this respect allows for psychotherapeutic betterment. The account which I offer is not a normative account but is one which is available for empirical enquiry.
Acknowledgements

For Aurelie, J.K., and Akihiro Nakamura.

For Eleanor, Helen, and Archie Hind, author of The Dear Green Place.

For Jim Good, the supervisor of this thesis, for his incomparable scholarship, teaching and guidance, which was much appreciated.

For especially Julie Hunter and Tom Sterling, along with Mike Sands and his staff of Durham Associates for the presentation and production of this thesis.

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Chapter 1
Introduction and Background.

I have spent approximately 20 years in the profession of psychotherapy. Further, the institution in which I worked after training was interested in staff and professional development. As a result, over the years I went to a good many courses and workshops on approaches to psychotherapy. At that time, some new approaches to psychotherapy were beginning to splinter from the main traditional ones. For example, one of these new approaches was Assagioli's Psychosynthesis (1971) which fused aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis with a modified version of existentialism. For Freud the psychological constructs of destructive and irrational instincts or drives, which conflicted with the superego and rational ego were held in check by an integrated homeostatic system. This form of integration was superseded in psychosynthesis by the construct of an energy force whose function was the opposite. The drives, in this case, were liberalising and energising and culminated in what was termed a spiritual harmonic integration. May (1972) in his existential approach to psychotherapy proffered certain goals of self-actualising processes which lead to heightened levels of awareness. These higher levels were considered to be important in their own right. Such accounts had part of their origins in Maslow's (1954, 1968) concept of a hierarchical pyramid of needs. The base levels of these needs were physiological and early and later social nurturing needs. However these lower levels of needs were not considered to be as important in the later humanistic accounts of psychotherapy. This meant that the acculturation processes and social contexts of
persons in psychotherapy were not represented in their accounts of psychotherapy. All of these accounts were illustrative of what was named the human potential movement which is still thriving and diversifying without necessarily being grouped nowadays around that particular title. (Shaffer, 1978) The first point I want to make is that there seemed to be so many differing approaches to psychotherapy available. But few, if any, had much theoretical grounding or offered their approaches for scientific scrutiny and validation. Those who made claims to scientific rigour, like Assagioli with regard to psychosynthesis, did not empirically pursue the claims that they had made for their approach. The second point has to do with more orthodox approaches to psychotherapy.

I taught for 8 years on a Postgraduate Guidance and Counselling course, mainly for teachers. The approaches to psychotherapy which the course offered were traditional accounts of psychotherapy such as the two main variants of behaviourism and traditional humanistic versions of psychotherapy. The course included counselling psychology theory, educational theory, sociology and practical workshops. It had a practical focus and the graduate teachers had to consider and decide on their own approach to counselling to be applied within "educational and guidance" contexts. Also within the course was a unit on guidance issues dealing with what was then termed "problem children". This was backed up by field visits to institutions in which adolescents with social and psychological predicaments either resided or were educated or both. One specific institution had legal restraining orders to prevent certain of its clientele leaving the institution at will. That meant that a good part of its clientele were what was considered by the institution as a psychologically disturbed group of the population. The personnel involved in supervising the adolescents had to alternate between the role of custodians and surrogate parents.

The psychotherapeutic treatments on offer included both humanistic and behavioural approaches to psychotherapy. There are two dimensions to behaviouristic approaches. Firstly, there are the psychological principles on which accounts of psychotherapy are grounded. These have to do with general principles of learning and
the behaviourist's belief that irrational or maladjusted behaviour is learned and maintained and that different and appropriate learning approaches to the events in people's lives would overcome their psychological problems. Then, secondly, there are the regulated behavioural technologies used in psychotherapy. Operant conditioning is the approach most commonly used in institutional settings. The focus is not simply on learned behaviour but has to do with the conditioning involved in the learning and maintenance of behaviour. Behaviour is under the control of the environment and what happens is contingent on environmental factors. If these environmental factors remain unaltered the environment will continue to have consequences for the person and reinforce the behaviour and in the case of persons who arrive at therapy the environment is considered to have been a negative reinforcer. Operant behaviour is behaviour that "operates" on the environment to produce change in it. (Skinner 1953) The humanistic approaches were based on the work of Rogers (1973), supplemented by Perls. (1969) Their notion of human nature implied that persons were rational, altruistic and purposeful. For Rogers, persons' experiences originate from the external world. They are organised around and evolve into a form of self-structure consisting of positive or negative psychological self-concepts, depending on their experiences over time being either good or not. Rogers' account of psychotherapy was an enhancement of positive self-concepts and involves the belief that such enhancements promoted rational, altruistic and purposeful conduct. The accounts of psychotherapy that were available for the psychotherapeutic treatment of the psychologically disturbed adolescents were the same ones that were being offered to teachers in their mainstream guidance role. But where the teachers chose one or the other as a background for their guidance programmes, the residential personnel approached their task within the frameworks of two incompatible views of human nature and two incommensurate explanations of human conduct.

Other problems in relation to a theoretical grounding for an account of psychotherapy were equally demanding of clarification. The early influences and social constraints on those adolescents in residential care or on pupils requiring
counselling and guidance were made theoretically irrelevant. Welfare officers, social workers and school officers who made out assessments and reports of the person's home background and their conduct in residential care did this in relation to their social studies training and their professional social-work remit. But in order for them to make a contribution to and assessment of the psychotherapeutic features of their clientele's difficulties, they had to opt out of a social work framework into a psychological framework. This meant theoretically, if not practically, ignoring the social assessments and reports that would have been relevant and useful in the explanation of the psychological difficulties and the promotion of the psychological welfare of the person.

Overall, it has occasioned an incommensurate split, between personal being and social being. When case conferences were called beyond the confines of the residential institution, where the issue was the psychological state of the person in therapy the anomalies widened. The rationale of these case conferences was their multi-perspectiveness. The multi-faceted nature of the problems of the person-in-care with legal and a host of other social parameters and contexts denied the privileging of an approach involving a psychology of the individual. None of the traditional accounts of psychotherapy or those which resulted from attempts at integrating the notion of mind/self and behaviour, such as cognitive-behaviourism (or forms of existentialism coupled to psychoanalysis) was adequate either on their own merits or their integrated versions. (Smail, 1978)

For me, a different way of thinking about approaches to psychotherapy came about via the male/female structuring of the student population in the polytechnic in which I worked. It helped me to gain insight into, and also gave me a means of approaching the central problem inherent in accounts of psychotherapy. In polytechnics at that time, a gender split occurred between males (especially overseas males) doing engineering courses, and British women doing social science courses. More and more frequently the women on these courses specialised in the counselling option of their course and many specialised further in aspects of the discourse of
psychotherapy in postgraduate studies and in professional work. So my third point under consideration occurred through the realisation that the women who had first-hand knowledge of counselling approaches, in the main, seldom conceptualised themselves and their psychological problems in terms of individualistic accounts of psychotherapy. Rather, when they discussed areas of their existence in relation to their psychological states, their discussions were always politically and morally contextualised. What came significantly out of the therapeutic discussions was the matter of the moral abuse experienced by them in the past and its sustaining features in the present.

However, as the acute features of their anxiety states diminished, the moral context of the psychological dilemmas of the persons in therapy became more pronounced. They themselves made it a central issue of their psychological difficulties. More especially, as matters were psychologically improving, the majority of these women returned to a political milieu that had previously directed their beliefs and interests. There was a definite move away from their own personal dilemmas into a way of life that incorporated moral indignation and the taking of moral stances over civic and other public issues. Focusing on moral issues, the evaluation and ongoing selection of the most worthwhile or appropriate moral exemplar for the occasion and situation, and the taking of moral stands were central factors in my contribution to their psychotherapeutic betterment.

Parallel to this was the matter of those overseas students doing engineering courses who also came to therapeutic sessions. Few were acquainted with Rogerian or any other Western counselling approach. In contrast to a vast majority of lay people now seeking psychotherapeutic help, they were similar to the women doing counselling options in so far as they, also, did not contextualise their problem in individualistic psychological terms. Rather, their psychological problems were located within a mix of family pressures; pressure from their educational and technical government departments; from constraining norms and politics of their own culture; and from the racial ascendancy of competing cultures in their home countries.
Their problems also involved the norms of U.K. culture and the effect of open or closeted racial attacks on them in the U.K.

The complex social origins of these persons' psychological traumas were not covered by the theoretical substance of the contemporary discourse of psychotherapy. Rather, various individualistic accounts of psychotherapy were, in fact, theoretically designed to exclude the origins of their psychological problems which were the result of government and economic policies as well as of certain forms of religious practices.

Finally there was another group of students who came to psychotherapy who made me look again at approaches to psychotherapy. These were mature male students from a catchment area of the North-East. They had been made redundant from work due to the break-up of the mining and shipyard industries. As there was no alternative work, some entered education. But in their particular cases what was happening when they entered higher education was that their new educational social structures, had become uncoupled or separated from the micro structures of family and mates. The last vestiges of the idea of a "neighbourhood environment" (that combined micro- and macro-practices), where men worked and socialised and which gave them their point of reference as men to other men and to women was being eroded. Again these students on entering college did not have the prevalent lay persons' acquaintance with contemporary individualistic accounts of psychotherapy. They, themselves, understood their psychotherapeutic problems either in terms of their being victims of economic and social forces or as a result of flaws in their character both seemingly beyond their control. It would have trivialised their psychological difficulties to consider them as involving only their own individual feelings or their own irrational thoughts, which is pretty much now how standard approaches to psychotherapy would have viewed such matters.

However, there was a paradox in relation to the mature woman from the same catchment area. Prior to coming to college, certain of these women were involved firstly in the miner's strike and then in collective units organised to prevent the
closure of the mines. They had joined or formed themselves into collective groups for the administration of strike funds and other resources. But these collective groups in time drew upon the repertoires of other forms of women's groups, one of whose central features involved self-help. This in turn meant that what happened in these women's groups had more to do with the discourse of individualistic accounts of psychotherapy such as Rainwater's (1989) *Self-Therapy: A Guide to Becoming Your Own Therapist*. This resulted in the solidarity of the collective forces and the embracing of the political powers to which they had recently subscribed being made residual to their newly found goals in education. There was an abandonment of interest in what was happening jointly to themselves and their families in relation to the macro-social and economic practices of their existence. What followed from these newly formed women's groups was that the women were defining themselves reflexively in terms of their "selves" and reconstituting Rainwater's dictum to be your own therapist. They followed this through to the letter by taking up careers in counselling or psychotherapy. But there the only resources available to them and their future clients were again individualistic accounts of therapy; so that the whole social milieux - home, education and career - were "self circulating" and reinforcing each other in terms of a "private individual self". Overall it would have been impossible to ignore the role that the social context played in any of these examples of persons in therapy. Rather, it highlighted the relevance of and necessity for an account of psychotherapy having a universal framework which recognised and included both persons and their ongoing social contexts and the relation of one to the another. Moreover, unlike individualistic accounts of psychotherapy, which this social account is meant to counter, there is no such phenomenon as private morality or individual politics.
2 A Relational and Developmental Social Account of Psychotherapy

My account of psychotherapy is organised around the social and moral contexts of the person in therapy. However, instead of one duality covering persons and their social contexts, I propose two dualities: one covering the relation of person or agent to their micro-activities with colleagues and intimates; and one to do with persons or agents in relation to their institutional macro-practices of work or non-work, education, family and its domestic organisation. The common factor to each is the notion of personhood or agency. I also examine the relationship between micro- and macro-practices and the constraints of the latter upon the former as well as the lifting out or disembedding of micro-conduct from institutional macro-practices. I illustrate contemporary social constraints and social transitions in the case-studies of persons who come to therapy. The two dualities neither privilege persons nor their social contexts, but are utilised interdependently in the unit of analysis. I argue that it is through such an ongoing intrinsic relation that personal and social development can occur including the means for psychotherapeutic progress or betterment.

The background resources to develop such a relational account have come initially from Gibson's central statement that,

the words *animal* and *environment* make an inseparable pair. Each term implies the other. No animal could exist without an environment surrounding it. Equally ... an environment implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded.

(Gibson, 1986:8)\(^4\)

I have extended this statement into an appropriate framework for a social account of psychotherapy through the use of the work of Reed (1989) and Heft (1989), who have both emphasised the concept of intentionality. A central feature of the notion of intentionality is that it allows not for the notion of choice, but the choosing of alternatives. The notion of alteration is a key concept in the promotion of psychotherapeutic betterment and arises from the intentional selection of more appropriate practices by the person in therapy. Heft and Reed both argue that intention is situated in respect of two facts: one to do with the social environment; and the other to do with personhood. Again one co-implies the other. In my account
the person purposefully and continuously selects moral exemplars from the social environment as he or she interacts with it, thereby eliminating other less worthwhile exemplars. I also suggest that moral exemplars act as guides for moral conduct. Each person, in turn, intentionally specifies the behavioural contexts for the other in a dynamic progression. It is a case of two independent beings dialectically related through their activity and each providing the constraints of that activity for the other. The metaphor of the dance which Still and Good (1992) have offered is apt: one person's conduct dialectically regulating his own and the other's. The unit of analysis is both relational and developmental and it cannot be broken down to an individual person's behaviour or discrete episodes relating to interactions between persons.

However, I have extended Still and Good's dialectical approach to one which is more politicised by using Giddens' concept of the dialectic of control. Persons in therapy are more often than not embedded within asymmetrical power relations. Persons in therapy have to find the means to act otherwise and to make a difference to their social activities and practices. Giddens comments,

The two-way character of the distributive aspect of power (power as control); how the less powerful manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established power relations. (Giddens, 1984: 374)

The notion of asymmetrical power relations and the means of overcoming them is brought more into the sphere of psychotherapy by Smail who suggests that,

The extent to which a person can influence present circumstances will depend on the availability to him/her of material powers and resources, including embodied personal assets. (Smail, 1993: 230)

But for an account of psychotherapy as social critique the notion of values and the critical evaluation of values must be central. I have drawn upon three social theorists to achieve the way I want the notion of values and evaluation to be considered. These are Gibson (1966, 1986), Manicas (1990) and Brown (1990). The pivotal key is Gibson's concept of affordances and the affinities the term affordances has with those of the notion of values. In discussing the concept of affordances, Gibson states,
I have coined this word as a substitute for *values*, a term which carries an old burden of philosophical meaning. I mean simply what things furnish, for good or ill. (Gibson, 1966:285)

Affordances are neither subjective nor objective. Rather they are equally a fact of the environment and a fact of the person or organism. They cut across the dichotomy of subject and object, since one co-implies the other. Affordances are properties of a value-rich environment taken with reference to humans and animals who live in it. Affordances are not objects or properties of objects, as such, but what objects can offer or afford in terms of values or use-values, information and opportunities. Gibson's concept of affordances, though, has to do with his theory of direct perception and the concept of affordances meshes the notion of perception with the notion of invariances. 5

Gibson's establishment of a psychological theory which considers both man and his environment with the one co-implying the other, however, gives me a way of considering an account of psychotherapy as social critique centred on social values.

I propose that the notion of values must be considered as also having both subjective features and objective features, the one co-implying the other. Values pertain to social practices (the social environment) but they also have to be evaluated and put up for debate, and this requires an evaluator. I obtain the latter from Manicas' social theorising. Manicas, following on from Gibson, comments that humans have "discriminative and comparative capacities, the *basis* of judging, predicating or subsuming". (Manicas, 1990:35)

Such discriminating and differentiating or evaluating propensities are features of persons' cognitive processes. But what must also be considered is what is being evaluated. (I suggest that values have not to do with intuitive processes, per se, but they co-imply what is being evaluated. Nor are they to be considered as values which can be appealed to as universal standards across time and place). The key point is that values pertain to social practices (that others have access to) but they require the notion of cognitive evaluators. In addition although values pertain to social practices,
they are not encapsulated by them. Values are use-values and they offer up opportunities best suited for a moral existence. One starts this evaluation by selecting the most worthwhile and competent moral exemplar from the social practices on offer and this can be put up for debate with others.

But Brown (1990) has also suggested that judging or evaluating is a skill that requires training, previous experience, and an appeal to others with regard to both the judging process (coaches/therapists) and what is being judged (referees/social scientists). Such skill is a practice involving the person and their activity, and the value picked out in the affordances of such activities. I term this skill ethical knowhow. This knowhow is tantamount to picking out the correct notes of a musical phraseology while composing. It is also a corrigible process and perhaps would need further refining and critical reviewing by the composer and other musicians. There could always, hopefully, be a better or more appropriate exemplar brought about through the aptness and modification of the previous selection. Skills, moreover, are essentially regulatory and constraining propensities involving a feedback process between the person and the practice involved. The feedback process involves the evaluator who is evaluating along with what is being evaluated and a recognition that one influences the other in a goal-directed progression. The idea of values is part of a relational configuration of persons skilfully discriminating among the values pertaining to social practices to obtain the most apt moral exemplar and subjecting it to evaluation.

Through the notion of values, I have outlined a particular relational and developmental account of psychotherapy which provides the regulated and progressive procedures for psychotherapeutic betterment.

Indeed, all of the terms I have used converge into the configuration of a relational and developmental account of persons in therapy. In order to establish this configuration, I have drawn upon certain social theorists, social philosophers, and practitioners and commentators on psychotherapy. My primary resources have been Bauman (1990, 1991), H. Brown (1990), Deleuze and Guattari (1990), Heft (1989),
Giddens (1984, 1991), Gibson (1966, 1986), Good and Still (1992), Harré (1983, 1990), Jensen (1990), Reed (1989), and Smail (1987, 1993). My secondary resources (which are equally important in supplying what was lacking in my account) have been Archer (1986), Baier (1985), Crook, (1991), Hampshire (1979), Ingleby, (1981), McIntyre (1992), and Nagel (1979). None of these social theorists and commentators on social theory has provided me with an overall theory but they have allowed me to develop an integrative account of psychotherapy that is social, moral and political and one which is essentially both relational and developmental.

3 The Autobiographical Agent

There has been a traditional view in philosophy, psychology and psychotherapy that there must be an idea of a universal unifying centre of being who is the author or subject of his or her beliefs and practices. This being has a core centre which unites his or her experiences throughout life in what is termed transcendental apperception. (Husserl, 1973) This involves universal mental acts that constitute consciousness. Harré (1983) has recognised that there has to be a place for a core being that has awareness, unifies experiences and controls action but argues that this must firstly presuppose a social being. Human existence is on two planes, a primary social plane, and a secondary plane to do with the particularity of the person. One requires the former to establish the particularity of the person.

For an account of psychotherapy as social critique, I suggest the idea of an active cognitive being who is the author of his or her existence in so far as he or she is intentionally directing action, is able to continuously recollect a chronicle of events that have occurred to him or her, and can carry out moral projects. In other words, an active being in social history capable of interacting with others in certain ways and enacting certain modes of social conduct. This has resonances with Harré’s concept of autobiography in which existence is not just a chronicled narrative of events. For the notion of autobiography also implies having a growing grasp of capabilities and potentials. Jensen has extended Harré’s concept of autobiography to
what he has termed a moral self-in-activities whose particularity is obtained in the take up of his or her social activities and the realisation of a better way of life through certain of them. (Jensen, 1990:261)

Conceptualising the notion of autobiography in terms of an active moral being, acting within social contexts provides the setting for an account of psychotherapy as social critique. However, I believe the notion of autobiography requires one further dimension which will emphasise the self in history with a present, past and future. My argument for this starts with the notion of "identity as A" but also implying "other than A" (or "different from A"). This would imply the law of contradiction entailed within the proposition "if A, then not A". But the idea of "identity" and "difference" implies not just an "identity" but an "identity" as ongoingly other or different from what went before. Difference implies "other than" but also to "defer". For example, the child will develop into the man or woman and will be other than a child and has discontinuous moments within an underlying formative continuity. It is the inclusion of the second moment within the first that gives an accurate understanding of the first."Every moment of becoming is simultaneously co-extensive with a successive moment of becoming". (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990) He or she has autobiographical continuity which allows for something beyond itself and other than it is and which could, perhaps, be "better" than it is. For example there are the discontinuous "moments" within the continuity involving different physical and social transitional activities: entering into early education and not being at home all day which feeds into other transitional aspects of existence; the physical and social transition associated with puberty; and then marriage or living with a partner. In addition, this ongoing continuity is not confined to individual selves but refers to one's social existence in relation to others e.g. peers discussing their sexuality at puberty with others. Some aspects of this discontinuity are part of the evolving social maturation that occurs with physical maturation but one cannot allow social existence to just happen. For significant areas of life have to develop through being intentionally transformed. A theory of psychotherapy needs the appropriate
form of selfhood-autobiography - personhood and one also needs the notion of "difference" as "other than." For it is the latter concept that allows for possibility and change. (May, 1993)

However, modern social philosophers and commentators on psychotherapy such as Rorty (1989) and Deleuze and Guattari (1990) counter the notion of identity as a universal self or person being the author of his or her existence. They offer, instead, what has been called the contingent subject. Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the contingent self occurs through the juncture of two happenings, with the happenings themselves being arbitrary. There is no predictability that the same two happenings will occur again. There is a latent determinism involved in such theories, for persons are determined by chance without recourse to their knowledge or competences. I argue that these proposals are detrimental to the grounding of an approach to psychotherapy. This is due to the fact that persons in therapy, in the first instance, are psychologically confused and are already upset about the arbitrariness of the happenings to them and the lack of control they have in warding them off. Offering conditions and possibilities of no stable future and one in which persons have no control over their existence will not enhance their psychological betterment.

I offer in my account of psychotherapy on the one hand the means to prevent persons being considered only as ahistoric beings, expressed in the central notion of the unifying of experience by selves or where persons are considered in terms of stable identities. Such a perspective does not allow for the notion of possibilities or change necessary for psychotherapeutic betterment. On the other hand my account prevents persons being considered as nothing but the self as process or flux as in Maslow's (1968) notion of self-actualisation processes; the reflexive processes of Rainwater's (1989) notion of self; and the notion of desire as flux considered by Deleuze and Guattari. (1990).

My account of psychotherapy can be considered a continuist theory because of certain of its proposals. The idea of the Harrean self is embedded in the theoretical tradition of the notion of core selves organising their experiences, having a point of
view, and monitoring their actions. But my account also incorporates notions of the
discontinuist theorists in which selves are viewed as the products of history. What
integrates both notions of the "self" is the trajectory of the self in terms of my idea of
autobiography with its past, present and future continuities in time, which can
underwrite its social and historical discontinuities. e.g. displaced political refugees with
their psychological vulnerabilities, who in certain respects are the products of history.

4 Chapters
In chapter 2 I counter certain classical accounts of psychotherapy, namely mainstream
behaviouristic, cognitive and humanistic ones. Behaviourism has been extensively
refuted on grounds of a lack of a concept of "self" and is the antithesis of what is
required for an account of moral psychotherapy which has to promote selves as agents
involved in moral projects through their interaction with others. I indicate also that
self theories themselves have problems of an opposite nature to behaviourism i.e.
where there is nothing but subjective experiences of the self resulting in the person's
own individual point of view. I also indicate the direction such self theories are
moving towards, e.g. Rainwater's (1989) *Self-Therapy*. In her approach, the "self"
develops as it goes along with no reference to anything beyond itself. Or put a
different way these "selves" are not morally accountable to anybody but
"themselves". One of the reasons that the theories of the self as "flux" have been
allowed to flourish and gain the upper hand as Smail (1987) has indicated, has been
due to lack of consistent and sustainable social science findings with regard to
accounts of psychotherapy. Moreover such theories of "self" circulate within the
person in therapy's own world. In many ways, persons come to think of their personal
existence only in terms of such self theories. (Giddens terms the intersection between
social theories and social practices, the double hermeneutics.)

When one has introduced the topic of morality into accounts of psychotherapy
one is considering an account that is already necessarily social. I compare my account
of psychotherapy with two moral accounts and two political accounts (with moral
implications) that fall under the rubric of social critical theory. These accounts either fail to integrate personal being with social being or they collapse personal being into social being (defined in terms of sociolinguistic practices). Also certain of these accounts are normative accounts which are underwritten by prescriptive rules. According to Münch (1988) and Trigg (1985) such accounts do not allow for the idea of change.

I introduce the notion of social critique into my account of psychotherapy. Underwritten in the concept of critique is the idea of examining certain social facts and offering something different, (as well as the means and ways of alteration to something different). The definition of the notion of social critique is considered as (a) social values, (b) transformation occurring between persons and their social practices, (c) practical knowledge as ethical knowhow required in the alteration of social practices and (d) emancipations which have to do with social exchanges that occur between persons or between persons and their practices that could be developed into more morally enhancing ones. All of these terms are incorporated into a configuration of persons altering their environment as they interact with it. My account of psychotherapy as social critique, incorporating such configurations, is thus a relational and developmental account.

Chapter 3 moves the argument away from traditional individualistic accounts of psychotherapy. The title of the chapter is transformative agency. I consider the attributes of personhood or agency in terms of capabilities, intentionality and knowledge or information (or what I have termed knowledge-ability). These attributes are related to each other. Knowledge-ability is a competence or skill requiring capabilities or powers to manoeuvre oneself around the social world and intentions are defined as social acts that require knowledge and competencies in their enactment. Each attribute also co-implies both personal and social existence.

I suggest that as well as the attributes of agency, there must be a notion of personhood with public accountability of one's moral actions and a notion of a self directing one's actions and having a particular point of view. Harré suggests that the
notions of personal being and social being are on two planes. Social being as personhood is determined by public criteria of sociolinguistic practices and the notion of personal being, the self, is realised through sociolinguistic practices. The emphasis is also on autobiographical histories of persons with capabilities and potentials with which to alter their social practices: the confluence of one person's autobiographical history being part of another's, e.g. that of siblings or lovers.

Chapter 4 deals with the micro-activities of the person in therapy. The micro-activities form the first of the dualities dealing with personal and social existence. The micro-activities involve co-present activities which have to do with colleagues, intimates, and others—such as therapists and persons in therapy involved together in goal-oriented activities. The importance of these activities is that they encompass both the social activities of the interview contexts and also the social activities of that person's existence, external to the interview situation. I have termed this section of the chapter, the "Two Worlds" of the Person in Therapy. Simply just offering a theoretical relationship between psyche and society, as proponents of critical theory have tended to do in order to theoretically structure an account of psychotherapy, will not be causally effective in producing psychotherapeutic betterment.

The next section of chapter 4 provides the necessary linkage between the "two worlds" of the person in therapy. This section is entitled, "Transformation Points". Transformation points mark the switches between the micro-environment of the interview situation and the external world of the person in therapy. They are the "linked breaks" or regulated interventions in the therapy interview process. They occur in the dialogical exchange between the person in therapy and the therapist where the change or alteration or transformation might be expected to happen by the person intentionally altering their social practices (if not now then in the future). Transformation points are the formative processes in the dynamic and dialectical procedures of the interactivities of the interview. They, like skills, structure the process in a cumulative manner and at the same time act as the conditions for psychotherapeutic betterment. They interconnect the "two worlds" of the person in
therapy through their "contents"- namely social values along with a critical review of them.

Social values, for my account of psychotherapy, are moral values with political implications. Moral values are conceptualised as moral exemplars. Exemplars are defined by me as an "example of", or better still a "sample" of worthwhile and appropriate social values. The idea of "sample" involves both what is being evaluated and a notion of a skilled evaluator or sampler. Hence my idea of moral exemplars links together my notion of values co-implying an evaluator and underwrites the notion of skills as regulatory and constraining features of the processes and outcomes of psychotherapy.

What is sampled and is a product of the sampling is always a narrowing range of appropriate worthwhile conduct. Persons in therapy ongoingly interact with other persons, be it with therapist or friends. Each of them is one term in an active relationship and together their activities form a goal-directed process. Persons can use specific moral exemplars in their conduct with the other person. Such conduct specifies and directs the conduct of the other in a continuous series of behavioural loops. The taking of moral stands and the enacting of moral conduct, I believe, are the means by which persons in therapy might overcome their psychological vulnerabilities and which might enable them to act differently or to do otherwise than they would have done. The final section of chapter 4 offers two case-studies to illustrate the therapy procedures involved in a moral account of psychotherapy and it indicates the contents and timing of the transformation points. I also discuss within the contexts of the case-studies contemporary social processes which tend to de-ethicalise social relationships.

Bauman (1990,1991) and Giddens (1990) describe the problems of contemporary relations where micro-conduct has become spread across time-space. The distancing of time from space produces the disembedding features of social existence where persons are locationally distant from each other. This often leads to the substitution of impersonalised acquaintanceship for institutionalised friendship.
The effect of the disembedding features of modernity is increasingly recognisable in the autobiographical histories and social practices of persons in therapy.

The second of the dualities is concerned with individuals and their institutional or macro-practices such as education, the economy, work and non-work and the organisation of family practices. Chapter 5 deals with persons and such macro-practices but it also deals with the relations between macro-practices and micro-activities. Macro-practices are those long term enduring institutional practices spread across space and time. As Bauman (1991), Nagel (1978) and Smail (1993) suggest they have a greater tendency towards impersonality, diffusion of knowledge and lack of moral accountability. Radical and critical theorists have focused on the implicated constraints and effects of the macro-practices on the micro-practices of colleagues, family peers and intimates. This is represented in Smail's notion of the fields of powers and is illustrated in his case-studies. The fields of powers involves a relationship between macro-social practices, micro-conduct and the person, and the influences of each upon the other, especially the influences of political and economic powers. (Smail,1993:36,65) However, Giddens (1990) has pointed out that as well as the boundedness or integrating influences of macro-practices upon micro-practices there is a tendency now for such micro-activities to be "lifted out" from macro-practices. Habermas (1975) makes reference also to such dysfunctional processes in modern technological societies. There is an uncoupling (or de-democratising) of civic participation from the state and political systems which has resulted in depoliticised activities. This is manifested in the decreasing influences of trade unions and the increasing influences of the role of consumption and leisure. For Habermas the de-democratising processes have greatly lead to the relativising of morality

This chapter deals with the notion of agents and their social practices and how in such accounts of psychotherapy persons must be able to alter their social practices. Certain social theorists such as Baudrillard (1983) maintain that such theories involving the notion of agents and such social structures are no longer tenable for the polarities have collapsed and neither of the terms is tenable by itself. In countering
such a notion I argue that it is precisely such social structures which have to be examined. Eliding them from social theories denies them any form of investigation. The paradigm of the relation between agency and social structures has originated, in the main, from Giddens' (1979) social theorising. However Giddens himself has conflated both terms with each other or there is caesura between them in the processes of analysis. I examine Giddens two terms for social institutional practices, namely social structures and social systems. In the first case I offer social values as a substitute for his concept of rules and make the notion of moral values the resources persons can draw upon in relation to their social practices. In the second case I refer to the notion of social systems as unanticipated consequences of action in which moral resources become diffused within institutional practices, since one is less likely to be in control of such action. Bauman (1991) suggests that we need a new ethics, an ethics of distance and distant consequences, an ethics commensurate with the uncannily extended spatial and temporal range of the effects of technological action.

5 Conclusion

I have examined traditional individualistic theories of psychotherapy but none of the theories have enabled me to link them to theories which would allow social existence to be incorporated into a theory of psychotherapy. I have also examined theories of social psychotherapy and theories of moral psychotherapy but none of the versions which I have examined have given me the attributes which I require for a theory of psychotherapy as social critique. I require my account of psychotherapy to be conceptualised within a configuration of agents with the attributes of intentionality, knowledge and capabilities, interacting with their social activities and practices. For an account of psychotherapy as critique, persons in therapy have to be dealing with and evaluating social values pertaining to their activities with others and their social practices. Some of these values will be immediately available others are more obfuscated.
Notes

1. Freud's (1973) psychoanalytic theory is based on a dynamic system of the structure of the mind represented by the id, ego and superego. The dynamic system involves intrapsychic conflicts and tension between the interplay of the structures of the mind. The id is a psychic energy force seeking self-gratification. One of the functions of the ego is cognitive control of the id's demands. Freud maintained that the id was the enemy of civilisation and the internalisation of social constraints by the superego is "a most precious cultural asset in the psychological field."

2. From a humanistic perspective, Maslow (1954, 1968) suggests that persons have different levels of needs. He proposes a five-tiered level of needs. The basic needs include physiological needs such as food, sleep and sex. The next level of needs include job security, affection and sociality. Level five involves self-actualisation processes which have an ethical dimensions as well as what Maslow considers as the ability to distinguish the real and authentic from the false and inauthentic.

3. Hosford (1969) considers four factors necessary for a behavioural programme using the techniques of operant reinforcement. 1. There has to be sustained motivation on the part of the client, 2. The programme must be designed in such a means-end format that it does achieve the elicitation of the desired behaviour, 3. The reinforcer, contingent on the desired behaviour must be administered soon after the elicitation of the behaviour. 4. The application of a regulated schedule of reinforcers such as a fixed ratio schedule (the ratio between the response and reinforcer) is required. A fixed ratio schedule is an intermittent reinforcer; for example every nth time is reinforced. There are direct and indirect reinforcers. Token reinforcers are indirect reinforcers and are more commonly used in institutional settings. Token reinforcers are rewards such as a day away from the institution contingent upon the desired behaviours being enacted prior to the day away.

4. No animal could survive and live without a terrestrial environment that surrounds it. Gibson (1986) maintains that persons do not perceive objects in the terrestrial environment but the medium, substance and the surfaces (with their layouts) that surround objects. One of the important terrestrial mediums is light.- the important feature of light for perceiving is ambient light. -that is light that surrounds any point in the environment.

5. In the theory of direct perception ambient light is available to the observer and has structure. Such light makes directly available information about reflected surfaces. For Gibson, the ambient optic array is structured along with other mediums. The structure of an ambient array can be described in terms of a complex set of visual solid angles, corresponding to objects, with a common apex at the point of observation. The optic array changes in some respect and not in others as the point of observation moves or alters. Invariances are related to the concept of affordances and can be established by the concept of ambient light and the ambient optic array. The invariants in the terrestrial environment are the persistent features of the lay-outs of surfaces and the reflectant of these surfaces. To pick up an invariant is to perceive the persistence of a surface layout. The layout tends to persist because most of the
objects are sufficiently solid or rigid, as for example the layout of a chair. Different layouts have different properties. Gibson then asks the question how does one get from the notion of surfaces to the notion of affordances?. What one perceives are not their properties but what the property affords or offers.

6. To "defer" is connected to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of difference, which in turn comes from the Derridian notion of difféance. The latter carries the idea of difference and also to defer. Deferral is never wholly present but resides in past-futures and futures which have still to be. To defer is always an encounter with the new and yet to be known. As such it allows for possibilities and change.

7. "Every 'object' presupposes the continuity of a flow; every flow, the fragmentation of the object. Doubtless each organ-machine interprets the entire world from the perspective of its own flux, from the point of view of the energy that flows from it." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990:6)

8. The double hermeneutic involves the intersections of two frames of meaning; (a) the metalanguages invented by the social scientists and (b) the meanings constituted by lay persons. There is constant "slippage" of one to the other.

9. Smail (1993) suggests that there are two forms of powers, one which is proximal and the other which is distal. Proximal powers are those powers which are of immediate influence upon the individual and are "proximal" to them and are associated with depressive syndromes, phobias and other anxieties of a psychophysical type. Persons suffering from such psychological conditions are considered by Smail as having a lack of psychological powers. The origins of this lack are the distal powers. These powers are both mediated and diffuse and arise within the interconnected institutionalised hierarchies of domination.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 Psychotherapy.

1 Introduction

Chapter 2 is divided into five sections. After a brief overview I provide a critique of the main orthodox accounts of psychotherapy such as behaviour and cognitive therapy and those accounts of psychotherapy developed by self theorists. I argue, also, that where there have been attempts at integrating these theories the means of integrating them are not adequate and hence have resulted in dualistic accounts of either mind and behaviour. I contend though, that the outstanding problem is that they are individualistic accounts about individual beings whether of a statistical or empirical nature (or neither). All theoretically exclude the social contexts of persons in therapy.

It is impossible, though, in real life to ignore the social practices of persons in therapy, for at all times and places people are socially situated and the unit of analysis has to take this into consideration. Unless the social contexts of the person in therapy are considered then the account can only be a partial account and has little or no reference to the person's lives and their problems. I argue further that it is the tension between persons and their social contexts that initiates psychological problems in the first place. So both must be acknowledged in order that the tension can be determined and where possible removed. Social practices, as stated above, are altered by persons employing what was termed the dialectic of control and acting back upon certain of their social institutional constraints. The resolution of the theoretical problem of accounts of psychotherapy comes about by acknowledging the
configuration of both social contexts and persons as a relational unit which allows also for the means of alteration, or rather of psychotherapeutic betterment. In the third section, I examine those theories of psychotherapy which are fundamentally social accounts. Morality presupposes a social account but there are few moral accounts of psychotherapy available. These are in the main normative rule-regulated accounts and are exemplified in Heaton's (1976, 1979) Newman's (1991) and Guignon's (1993) approaches to psychotherapy. I have also examined those social accounts which are more politicised moral accounts and fall under the rubric of critical theory. In this context, there is a mention also of Buss's principles of personal being and social being for an account of psychotherapy and I have countered these principles on the grounds of (a) lack of a concept of agency, (b) the unbridgeable schism between the two forms of being which in part has resulted from the non-conceptualisation of agency, and (c) his reliance on a form of empiricism for social sciences which has kinship with the laws of the regularities of nature and is value-free. The latter is problematic for his version of critical theory in which a central concept of critique has to be social values and their role in evaluating the theories of psychotherapy which he is proscribing and the form of society he is indicting. (Buss, 1979) I examine Deleuze and Guattari's (1990) reformulation of the concept of the Freudian id. Instead of the id as a wishful impulse incorporated within a tripartite mental structure of individual being, they offer the notion of desire as a social force (physical as well as social) that connects with other social forces. Their notion of desire is that it escapes categorisation and can call into question established orders of society. I suggest in order to have a social theory directed by a critical propensity one requires in addition the notions of knowledge, competencies and intentionality.

I argue though that their postulate of social desire is an extension of Freudian theory rather than a severance from it. They reintroduce the problems of the Freudian id which "knows no judgement of values, no good and evil and no morality." ² In contemporary thinking there are those such as Deleuze and Guattari, and also Kovel (1981, 1993) who demand that the notion of desire has to be the primary postulate of
social theory and there are those who advance that powers of control are the primary postulate. Smail (1993) as a commentator on theories of psychotherapy, and a practising therapist, rather, has offered an interconnecting format of a field of powers and power as the connecting propensity. The field of powers is transmitted and retained through interconnected hierarchies of various discourses and practices. The field consists of macro-practices, micro-activities and personal powers, which one either absorbs or transmits. Macro-practices are institutionally structured and have powerful influences on both the micro-environments and the lay person's individual experiences and ways of life and psychological well-being or non-well-being.

The fourth section entitled social critique examines the concept of critique and its function and its methodology in an account of psychotherapy. I have used 4 terms to define the concept of critique; value, practice, transformation, and emancipation. Each of these terms has a double role involving the discourses of both (a) psychotherapy and (b) social critique and they become linked together as psychotherapy as social critique. I connect them through such concepts as transformation points. These represent the continuous points-in-time or specific aspects of the regulated developing procedures of therapy where the therapist intervenes in the therapeutic procedures. But the interventions have also to do with the person in therapy's problematic psychological existence and its social contexts and the critical resources and means to alter it.

What has happened further in the process of writing up this account of psychotherapy is that I have realised that critical social theorists, apart from Smail (1993), have lacked the concepts to deal with the psychotherapeutic practices that achieve psychotherapeutic betterment. Conversely theorists of psychotherapy have theoretically excluded the disabling social contexts and their sustaining psychological features which have their origins and continuity in such social constraints. Both ideas are required in any paradigm of psychotherapy and are brought together in the concept of psychotherapy as social critique.
Traditional Individual Accounts of Psychotherapy

In this section I look briefly at behaviourism, cognitive theories and self approaches to psychotherapy to indicate why traditional theories of psychotherapy are not theoretically adequate to furnish a social account of psychotherapy. My argument is that they offer only one term of an individual-social duality. Moreover, their version of individual being does not have the necessary attributes to allow for a moral agency able to overcome certain social and psychological difficulties.

Behaviourism and behaviour therapy gained ground in the argument against what is called mentalism, where therapeutic problems could only be considered in terms of some intrapsychic disturbance. (Nelson-Jones, 1982) Traditional behaviourists believed that, on the one hand, the mind of the person in therapy was inaccessible to the observer and that any account of the mind was unscientific and depended on the individual's own belief system which was considered far from being incorrigible. It could be subject to delusions. On the other hand theories of psychotherapy based on behaviouristic principles could be available for scientific investigation. Behaviourism is considered in terms of the observable physical extended body in space rather than what might be termed a non-substance such as "mind". Overt signs of anxiety like palpitations or facial tics and symptoms of anxiety like sweating and shaking can be monitored and as such are available for scientific procedures of assessment, measurement and prediction.

Behavioural psychotherapy stems from two main types of theories of behaviourism; classical conditioning and operant conditioning. The main tenet of both types of psychotherapy is that behaviour is regarded as being acquired and maintained through habit. It is believed that behaviours i.e. non-maladaptive behaviours could be learned and maintained which would be psychologically beneficial to persons in therapy. The idea behind classical conditioning is that a neutral object gets paired with an anxiety arousing stimulus and the neutral object then initiates and continues to arouse the anxiety. Behaviour therapy consists of pairing a non-anxiety provoking response to the psychologically problematic stimulus. That would involve a relaxation
exercise (e.g. calling up a mantra) being paired with a stimulus of a particular fear such as a picture of snakes. Wolpe (1958) conceptualised this as the reciprocal inhibition of neurotic anxiety in which learned and conditioned behavioural habits, e.g. conditioned fear of snakes are weakened or extinguished. Wolpe was the main originator of behaviour therapy based on classical principles of learning and he defined his behaviouristic approach to therapy as one involving the use of experimental principles of learning for the purpose of changing maladaptive behaviour. (Wolpe, 1958) From a different conceptualisation of learning theory, Skinner maintained that behaviour is learned and shaped by its consequences. Under certain prior or antecedent conditions, if one behaves in a certain way, such behaviour is likely to have certain consequences. Previous responses cannot be predicted or controlled but there is a probability that the response can be modified or altered in the future. Operant conditioning is behaviour that operates on the environment to produce a consequential response and also is contingent upon the consequences produced by the environment. (Skinner, 1953)

However, behaviourists themselves recognised the limitations of their assumptions. Persons had no personal activating role in producing their own psychological betterment - or they could be rather than just a response in the experiment, be a part of experimental 'effects' and in this sense could be biasing the experiment. (Secord, 1990)

Orthodox behavioural principles involved in accounts of psychotherapy began to be recognised as limited if contextualised within a simple stimulus and response framework. (Nelson-Jones 1982) There had to be a mediating principle of personhood with conscious awareness of what persons are about, if only at least to allow for a concept of suitably aware subjects to carry out human behavioural programmes.

Firstly, Meichenbaum (1977) has attempted to rectify these problems with regard to classical conditioning. He has developed a two-stage version of the psychotherapeutic procedures of systematic desensitisation, which involves cognitions or self-awareness as well as behaviour. He believes that changes in certain
specific behaviours are brought about by changes in certain cognitions. Persons should become aware of the self-defeating cognitions and self-instructions they are giving themselves with regard to their therapeutic difficulty. He offers a programme of desensitisation and deconditioning. Positive results of changes in behaviour depend on reviewing one's self-instructions.

Meichenbaum (1977) while recognising the need for cognitive awareness at a theoretical level, though, has not allowed for a duality of mind and behaviour because of his discrete two step approach to psychotherapeutic betterment. Also the notion of mind telling the body what to do in a one to one correspondence has been questioned from various points of view Harré (1983). Bandura (1977) has indicated that the learning process is more complex than Skinner's operant conditioning approach allows for. Learning is less reactive and largely occurs through the expectations people create for themselves. People do not learn all of their behaviour from the consequences of their reinforced responses. Bandura thus has distinguished Skinner's approach to conditioned learning from that of his own. Rather, Bandura maintains that persons do not only respond to their environment. They have what he has termed self-efficacy by means of which they believe they will successfully execute the required behaviour. In this sense, persons in therapy rather than the external contingencies are controlling their behaviour. Also the person in therapy is more likely to adopt a certain behaviour if it is internally positively valued. But Bandura can be criticised from two perspectives. Meier, McCarthy, and Schmeck (1984) found there was no true relationship between self-efficacy and behavioural performance. Also Bandura has relied on modelling, role-playing or observational performance techniques more so than imaginable processes. By relying on observational principles of behaviour he is still fundamentally behaviouristic. Neither Meichenbaum nor Bandura have achieved an integrated account that links cognitions to behaviour and thus they perpetuate the Cartesian schism of inner mind and extended external body as behaviour.
Overall, with regard to behavioural principles and methods, Breger and McGaugh, (1965) have pointed out flaws in the design of behavioural experiments. Even although there has been improvements of experimental design the evidence is still weighted against the empirical adequacy of behavioural programmes. Smail also points out that there are only a few very simplified behavioural programmes which can be operationally defined and manipulated to achieve the empirical results determined by a constant relationship between the hypothesis and data findings. (Smail 1978, 1987, 1993) Such experimental findings, though, bear little or no relationship to the autobiographical history and the social contexts of persons in therapy's psychological difficulties. Moreover, Ingleby and Smail have indicated that there are more fundamental problems with the behaviouristic approach. Behaviourists are not starting from a neutral or objective standpoint in any case for they are - "presupposing something about the relation of conduct to its surroundings which it should be the task of research to question, not to assume." (Ingleby, 1981: 41) It is in the relationship or configuration between behaviour or rather conduct and its contexts in which the psychological problems reside and not in individual behaviour itself. This is where psychotherapy as social critique must direct its attention.

Behaviour therapy has its opposite counterpart in cognitive therapy. Accounts of psychotherapy involving cognitions can be discussed in terms of Beck's (1976) account of cognitive restructuring. In this approach, persons are trained in therapy treatments to monitor their thought processes and to come up with alternative beliefs about themselves which are more realistic and more appropriate to the situations involved. The idea, again, is that persons need to alter irrational self-statements they hold about themselves. However there are arguments and evidence against this as Lewinsohn (1980) has indicated. They maintain that people who have depressive syndromes have a realistic view of themselves in relation to the world, compared to non- depressive persons who had a more idealistic view of themselves. Fonagy and Higgitt (1984) have also pointed out that certain of the concepts that are used in cognitive therapy are no more precise or revealing than concepts used in Freudian
psychodynamic accounts of the mind. Both sets of concepts involve internal constructions of the mind and carry with them all the problems of mentalism. Also, as with the behavioural concept of maladjusted behaviour, the maladjusted nature of self-statements begs political questions such as Illich, (1985) Ingleby (1981), and Smail have asked. i.e. where does the norm of adjustment lie in terms of adjusting to what and who are the proposers of the normalising categories. I have found from my practical experience in psychotherapy that persons in therapy do make realistic statements about themselves and in relation to their social contexts. However this contrasts with how they perceive others' perceptions of themselves. They perceived themselves via others, less realistically and almost always reductively.

Moreover there are other sources of critique of cognitive approaches to psychotherapy as well. Harré (1983) in fact has argued against purely cognitive principles constituting the psychology of personal being. He has argued that cognitive theorists do not allow for a being with a core self, with a social history, a point of view, and can control and monitor conduct.

The self is conceptualised differently, though, in accounts of psychotherapy. The privileging of the self in approaches to psychotherapy has come from two main sources, that of the American psychologist, Rogers (1973) and the other being that of the English psychologist, Winnicott (1958, 1965) Though they make reference to a social environment of parents, friends etc., it is a from-the-social to-the-individual phenomenon where the social phenomenon is cognitively internalised. But the upshot is that in reality it is an individual account and the social environment is made residual in the enquiry. The self becomes both subjective and objective being and there are no social beings, external to these selves. Rogers' objective being is offered through what he calls self-concepts i.e. a stable set of unifying perceptions about oneself. Subjective being is defined through experiencing processes of symbolisation which may or not be conceptualised into awareness (subception). The awareness processes involve not just cognitive informational awareness of the mind, per se, but take in bodily awareness as well. Awareness is neither defined as mental or physical
but is psychological and is named by him, the organismic self. The objective self or self-concept occurs through interaction with others. Through those interactions with others persons gain objective perceptions of themselves (perception is equivalent to general awareness).

The self-concept is an ongoing grouping of concepts central to the person in therapy, some of which are evaluated negatively and some positively. When experiences are accurately symbolised and integrated into the self-concept, there is a congruence between the objective self and what is called the organismic evaluating self. The latter gives rise to good feelings about the self. Integration, however may not always occur. In Rogers' theory of psychotherapy there may be incongruence between the subjective experiencing self and the objective self-concepts which one has of oneself. When this occurs, experiences are not accurately symbolised and they are consequently distorted or denied. Anxiety arises as a state of tension as a result of the incongruence between the self-concept and the organismic evaluating self. i.e. bad feelings about the self.

The practice of therapy has not only to reduce this tension-like state but has to increase the congruence between the perceiving self and his or her self-concepts with a view to what Rogers and others, such as Maslow (1954, 1968) have termed ongoing self-enhancement or self-actualisation.

Rogers did attempt to provide a more scientific account of psychotherapy with regard to greater understanding of psychological betterment. He introduced a self-report evaluation programme by means of what he calls the "Q" test, (before therapy treatment, the person in therapy is given cards with certain terms that may be appropriate to an individual's self-concepts. The person picks out those that have self-reference .e.g. - I am a bully - and ranks them in order of their being characteristic of him or her. Then he or she is given another set of cards with regard to an ideal self. The two "Q" sorts are correlated to find the degree of incongruence between bad self-concepts and ideal self-concepts). The test is given at regular intervals including post-
treatment of therapy to determine whether there is further alteration or change between the two forms of self-concepts.\textsuperscript{4}

However there are problems with regard to Rogers' phenomenological approach to psychotherapy and its relation to his experimental methods. Reality, phenomenologically, is understood only through the individual's perspective or through what is called his or her own internal frame of reference - what Rogers has regarded as the person's phenomenal field. But divisions begin to occur in the assumptions made in his theorising that do not tally with his experimental findings. The research dealing with discrete episodes of self-reports, mathematically correlated is not compatible with concepts such as self-actualisation. Self-actualisation as a process of flux is non-measurable and is considered by some theorists as outside of the domain of explanations or of statistical relationships. (Mackay 1975) Another problem is the emphasis Rogers has placed on the interactive nature of therapy and the role of the therapist as an intervening variable in therapy betterment. But this aspect of his work, also, founders, for some of the concepts such as empathy are grounded in philosophical problems of intersubjectivity in which inner being has no means of relating to outer being. This renders the units of analysis for interactive procedures in psychotherapy inoperable. There is no overall fit in his social theorising with regard to his proposed concepts and methods for psychotherapy.

Overall if behavioural accounts of psychotherapy have reduced individuals to their modes of measurement, self theorists have tended (through the use of such terms as self-actualisation) to make of therapy some impossible nirvana to be arrived at through sensory awareness processes. Residing in these approaches is a latent optimism that comes from two directions. The first comes from the idealist nature of such concepts as self-actualisation where possibilities are limitless. The second comes about by theoretically removing the person in therapy from their social contexts and the constraints of society are necessarily removed at one and the same time.
Winnicott's concept of self can be viewed as a more social version of the notion of self than Rogers'. Winnicott has maintained that "analysis" for accounts of psychotherapy must not be considered in individual terms, but in terms of a relationship. For Winnicott, what must be examined again and again in therapy is the early bonding of mother and child which can result in the offspring determining themselves as bad or good selves. Winnicott's overall theoretical assumption about the self is that there is an ideal non-analysable primitive self which is too precious to cope with the mundane world of growing up. A false self splinters away from the ideal self in order to cope with the external world and to protect the ideal self. The proper development of the false self allows for a mature independent being. Any collusive protection or psychological neglect of the child by the mother in bonding prevents proper psychological development and results in the "bad self" becoming prominent. Winnicott has stressed the gradual psychological development in the ongoing facilitative bonding.

Winnicott did attempt to give more scope in his psychotherapeutic framework to the bonding of human relationships in early life but the assumptions both of relationship or development of bonding are not the crux of his theorising. For, in effect it is an individualistic account of psychotherapy. He has produced one formulation of what has been termed the bipartite divided self, (extracted by him, from the tripartite version of a Freudian dynamic structure of the mind). The false self is some protective psychological mechanism.

Moreover, the nature of Freudian psychotherapy is essentially authoritarian from the superego's protective role in the dynamic mental structures of the mind right through to the role of the psychoanalyst. The "self" theorists rightly offer instead a more democratic approach to therapy. For example, Rogers' concept of empathy as one of the six necessary and sufficient conditions for psychotherapeutic change has some democratic nuances. The democracy involved in the new and different bonding between persons and their psychotherapist out of which comes psychotherapeutic betterment such as positive self-regard is an important factor. This
is especially important where previous interpersonal activities have been skewed or
distorted and the appropriate bonding mechanism is then reconstituted in the
relationship between therapist and person in therapy.

But both Rogers and Winnicott's form of democratic symmetry in human
relations has produced an idealised form of human relations. In effect, I think they
reintroduce what they are trying to eliminate. For the way their theories of self are
constituted, the protective mechanisms of self, sever the self from the constraints of
their social contexts. There is no theoretical allowance made for the therapist to spell
out or examine these constraints and the effect of these constraints upon the person in
therapy and others.

For me their proposals for a democratic symmetrical relationship of bonding
in effect becomes largely depoliticised. But this is also reflected in the society in
which the persons in therapy resides. Theories of self which have filtered into the lay­
person's world merely reinforce this. They do not have the theoretical means to
counter it.

What one has to do is to recognise that the world is problematic for most of its
members and that human relations are asymmetrical as Bhaskar, (1986) Brittan
(1977) ,and Douglas (1977) have put forward. The goal of therapy is to alter these and
not to offer a benign world to the person in therapy that bears no relationship to the
world and context in which the person in therapy resides. For this we need concepts
like agency and the dialectic of control in which persons become skilled at acting
back upon their social environments as they interact with them; not simply a
psychotherapeutic approach concerning vulnerable or benign beings.

At the time in the late 50's and 60's when Rogers and Winnicott were
introducing their theories of self, it was the time when social institutions were in the
processes of consolidating or expanding in a more liberalising manner. There were
what Berger and Kellner (1982) have named cultural, political and religious
movements of ordered re-enchantment. This would mean that persons would or could
appropriate stable selves from such social environments. Also in the social sciences
reinterpretations of social and psychological facts were ongoingly occurring but they were still contained within the notion of a unifying principle such as Rogers "organismic self"—or from a Habermasean perspective the human sciences must still appeal to universal standards of agreement or consensus. These involve the universal claims of validity; truth; correctness and sincerity achieved through universal non-distorted communications.

But there is an emphasis now that both social theories about the self and societies are grounded in process of historical discontinuities. The notion of selves can now be considered as solely historically produced rather than the self being considered as a universal self. 6

Giddens (1991) maintains that contemporary perspectives of the notion of the self must take into account the self as a reflexive project for which the individual alone is responsible. He suggests that,

The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choices as filtered through abstract systems. (Giddens, 1991:5)

It is a reflexive project for which the individual alone is responsible. Giddens maintains further that reflexivity belongs to the reflexive history of modernity rather than the reflexive monitoring of action.

What this means is that there is no notion of a core self with its social correlates, embedded within or connected to its social institutions and contexts. If there is no relationship, there is no one alerting anyone to aspects of the break up of aspects of the relationship. If there is no duality of agents and their social structures and only selves and these selves differ from Rogerian stable selves, then there is no possibility for a social account of psychotherapy. This is the conclusions that follows from Giddens' proposals and which he does not pursue. Such proposals, however, have become part of contemporary thinking in accounts of psychotherapy. Rainwater (1989) suggests that psychotherapy can only be successful if it is grounded in continuous projects of self-observation. The individual queries what is happening to
him or her both bodily and psychologically in a series of reflexively asked questions. "Holding a dialogue" with time underwrites the process of self-realisation. At each moment the individual is asked to conduct a self-interrogation in terms of what is happening to him or her. Each moment of life is a new moment for self-questioning. However, Brittan (1977) expounds that this privatised self is contributing to the greater irrelevance now of public issues for the mass of the population. Brittan terms this the "idealist mess" that so much social thought finds itself in. It results in the belief that the suffering of the individual is not located in a given historical situation but is dependent on existential choices which may or may not be available at a given moment in time. It is epitomised in Rainwater's proposal-what do I want for myself? This latter phrase in addition can easily be converted into consumer choices where the issues that surround it are far removed from the origins of existential alternatives through political action.

3 Social Therapies

Having indicated that persons and their social contexts have to be considered in relational and developmental terms for an account of psychotherapy, I now examine four social accounts of psychotherapy. To a certain extent they have in one way or another all contributed to the development of my own account. The four accounts are Heaton's (1976, 1979) Newman's (1991), Deleuze in conjunction with Guattari's (1990) and Smail's (1987, 1993). Fundamentally my account has more affinities with the critical social theory of Smail which is expressed in terms of power/knowledge relations. These power/knowledge relations are manifested as systems of domination within institutions, practices and discourses. They are sustained as disciplinary powers rather than as systems of objective truth in which the former continue to define the latter. Such disciplinary powers permeate the discourse of psychotherapy in terms of behavioural technologies and explanations; psychoanalytic interpretive methods as well as the privileging of the self as a master principle.
All of these social theorists have argued against individualistic accounts of psychotherapy with each theorist emphasising what they believe to be a particular problem in the theories of psychotherapy. Together their critiques cover and counter all the major orthodoxies of psychotherapy, namely behaviourism/cognitive-behaviourism; self and cognitive theories and Freudian psychoanalysis. The range of their social accounts of psychotherapy takes in moral accounts of psychotherapy through to more politicised accounts of psychotherapy. Heaton (1976, 1979) has countered psychoanalytic and "self" theories of psychotherapy. Those, for him are the theories of psychotherapy, which deal with self-knowledge. Heaton comments, 

They all assume that we get knowledge of our desires, pleasures, emotions, thoughts and feelings by observing ourselves. They believe that there is an internal psychical reality which is on the whole inaccessible to most of us, but that can be observed by part of the ego with training. (Heaton, 1979: 184)

For Heaton problems in theories of psychotherapy have arisen because such scientific knowledge has got confused with ethical knowledge. Ethical knowledge cannot be considered in terms of universal laws of the mind or again in terms of behaviour, as an object of science. For Heaton knowledge of objects of science are defined in terms of univocal meanings and/or through units of measurement. Whereas, what Heaton has termed the science of human affairs has to do with the practical knowledge of public beings and any principles derived from such knowledge occur out of common happenings in the practices of living. Rather human existence is contextualised by the rules and meanings of the society people live in. Once, however, one has brought in Heaton's concepts for conventions or rules and rituals of living, then I believe his account is problematic in ethical terms and ultimately loses its ethical force.

Heaton has used both of the terms, morality and ethics for his account of moral psychotherapy. Ethics are considered as the rules that constitute the society we live in, and morality involves the regulative rules that one reproduces in the practices of living. The constitutive rules of society are enacted in the processes of reproducing...
moral conduct. Like Harré (1979) and Giddens (1984), he considers that the notion of actions or conduct is analogous to that of language. This is termed more generally as the linguistic analogy. Heaton has stipulated that "constitutive rules are basic to our actions and actions include speech". Ethical conduct has constitutive rules akin to grammatical forms of language and moral conduct has regulative rules akin to those that occur in speech-acts. For Heaton ethical rules are equivalent to rules of syntax and semantics of language which are presupposed and drawn upon in the context of sociolinguistic practices. These rules, however, whether they are action-based or language-based are organising principles which express how social existence can be ordered rather than changed. The patterning or ordering of human activities which is constituted purely by rules, whether one makes them, follows them or transforms them - for they in turn must be followed - can never provide the mechanism for change, or rather alteration and development which is required for psychotherapeutic betterment. Keat suggests that such interpretive social theory in effect views its objects rather as if they had already attained what should really be considered as unrealised historic projects. (Keat, 1981)

It seems to me, moreover, that the examples cited by Heaton (1979) Searle (1983) and Melden (1967) to illustrate constitutive and regulative rules are to do with social codes of behaviour in respect of formalised games or rules of the road and other such similar sociolinguistic practices. None of these can represent the idea of moral abuses or psychological distress central to an account of psychotherapy.

However, Heaton has also linked his account of psychotherapy to what he has termed the practical sciences. The latter take into consideration the manner of satisfactory living where the rules cannot be presupposed in advance. Such acts of living, though, are much more open-ended than speech-acts could allow for, if the latter are ever to have sense-meanings. Although there is a contradiction in the theorising of Heaton (1979) with the greater emphasis of his social theory on an ethical science determined by rules, his particular delineation of the practical sciences establishes what is necessary for an ethical approach to psychotherapy.
Newman (1991) offers a method of psychotherapy that entails morality but his account of psychotherapy is politically contextualised rather than founded on moral theory or moral philosophy. His discussion involves the political framework of contemporary urbanised society and its macro-practices with its concomitant constraints on human existence; namely life-chances in terms of health, work and leisure possibilities. For Newman, disabling social environments have a direct influence on young persons, both psychologically and educationally. One has to create the appropriate liberalising or enabling social conditions in the social environment. These provide the only means by which people will develop psychologically. People, themselves, in these social environments have to actively participate in the creation of the appropriate learning milieux in order to learn and develop educationally and psychologically. Otherwise, people "die emotionally, intellectually and morally." Moreover Ziner, following Newman, comments that,

By expanding the traditional theoretical base of psychology to emphasize the relevance and, hence, explanatory power of social organization on human behaviour, outcomes of clinical practice can only improve. (Ziner, 1993:42)

Newman's account of social psychotherapy is centred in Vygotsky's developmental approach to social psychology (Vygotsky, 1979). The basis of this approach is that humans exist on two planes. The primary plane is interpersonal and one develops as a person, intrapsychically through a form of internalising interpersonal processes. Vygotsky's conceptualisation of development includes learning and together the planes form a dialectical unity. True development occurs only when there is a separation from learning with others interpersonally (external) to learning to learn by oneself (internal). This occurs as a continual process or passage of the one through to the other. Language activity brings about behavioural development and operates as a bridge between early and later development. Cole and Scribner comment that,
Vygotsky believed that the internalization of culturally produced sign systems brings about behavioral transformations and forms the bridge between early and later forms of individual development. (Cole and Scribner, 1979:7)

Newman bases his theory for psychotherapy on these Vygotskian proposals and he terms his theory, Learning- Leading- Development (L.L.D.). People can only learn if the conditions in the social environment facilitate learning, and learning groups have to facilitate these conditions. Human development only comes out of the enabling conditions for learning and learning has to have appropriate contexts. Learning cannot involve the categorisation of the learner as neurotic or maladjusted for he or she cannot develop psychologically if defined and "socially constrained" by these categories. Newman seems, though, to have two "vocabularies", one which uses the idioms of critical social theory demanding the notion of revolutionary agents and their role in altering institutional constraints or socially demeaning macro-practices. This is undertheorised. The other "vocabulary" has a Vygotskian backgrounding of which Newman comments, "His (Vygotsky) is therefore both a normative and a descriptive statement - his psychology and his morality."

(Newman 1993:7) Thus, Newman, in his own words, excludes critical social theory from his account of psychotherapy. But I believe in any case that political critique has no basis in a Vygotskian model of social psychology where the emphasis is geared to the linguistic and non-manipulatory processes of sociolinguistic practices. Newman's social theorising is extremely insightful in the way he has theoretically linked the notion of learning and development to more democratic and politically enabling environments but the linkage is not sustained for theoretically he focuses on an educational model for an account of psychotherapy and disengages from the political model.

Both Newman and Heaton's accounts of what they term moral or ethical psychotherapy are important in that they argue against behavioural and other traditional theories of psychotherapy. There are, though, problems in their accounts with regard to a lack of the conceptualisation of personhood, micro-conduct and macro-conduct and the relation of the one to the other. In Heaton's case, the notion of
personhood is only presupposed in speech-acts. The latter is not sufficient for a notion of persons who have to act upon the world and "be able to do otherwise" in the world. In Newman's social theory, personhood is underconceptualised. In this case it does require a Vygotskian notion of personhood which Harré (1983) makes central to his theoretical account of social psychology. But, it needs also the political backgrounding of the Giddensian concept of agency which is also lacking in Harré's particular approach. An account of psychotherapy needs to be contextualised within the terms of personhood, as a knowledgeable being who is aware of the moral abuses occurring to both himself and others in society and has the knowledge and capabilities to deal with them and alter them.

Deleuze and Guattari (1990) do offer an emancipatory principle which is lacking in Heaton's (1976, 1979) account of psychotherapy and is not properly developed in Newman's (1991) account of moral psychotherapy. Schizoanalysis, in contrast, to psychoanalysis, belongs to the tradition of critical social theory. The primary postulate of the paradigm of psychotherapy is considered by Deleuze and Guattari as "desire". The concept of desire reflects not idealised wishes but, rather, an emancipatory active force which has to deal with and prevent individual psychological repression and social oppression. There is no compartmentalisation of the mind into such dynamic sub-structures of ego, id, and superego. There is only a single primary id-like force or creative energy unfettered by constraints of the ego and the superego. Instinctual energy in its state of becoming or flux is not used up in fixations or fantasies by repressing the id. Desire is primarily a productive and subversive force and in its nomadic form refuses settlement and authority. It resists categorisation and representation. Its role is to investigate and decode or break up codes of representation and classification and signification. These codes have defined the way that people are theorised and categorised in society and in discourses with specific reference to the discourse of psychotherapy. Deleuze and Guattari have pointed out that desire is socially constituted and one desiring proponent fuses with another.
The two theoretical constructs which they offer are desiring machines and desire production. Desiring machines can be conceptualised either as codes or as physical or as psychological or as social machines. They are not machines, as per, a piece of machinery, but are composites of general types. The mother who feeds her baby has not got a unified social identity obtained through being a mother. For after feeding her baby she could be a worker in a factory. There is no integrated role of being a woman or having a unified concept of self or identity. She is both being and becoming some other being, progressively through time. A desiring machine is defined as a system of interruptions or breaks. Every machine at the same time is related to an energy flow that it cuts into. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990:36) The notion of being is itself not a productive propensity but requires the energy flow or flux to ensure continuity. This, then, is desiring production in which desire is "the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows and bodies, and that function as units of production." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990:26) In this process every moment of becoming is simultaneously co-extensive with the successive moment of becoming. It is the inclusion of the second moment, as discussed above, within the first that gives an understanding of the first. The idea of simultaneity does not involve a universalising principle which synthesises the two moments into a synchronic whole with its own internal self-justifications. Rather, it is the synthesising of two happenings as an ongoing and a productive process that entails ruptures and connections in relation to other happenings and their assessments. Assessment, also has to do with a unifying and developing or becoming process through which systems can change. What comes out of their theorising and is important for an account of psychotherapy as social critique is their notion of assessment or evaluation.

May, following, Deleuze and Guattari, suggests that,

Without any transcendental clues as to how to elude the oppressions of a given system, one can only try things out and then assess the effects of one's own attempts - its effects can be assessed and other action taken on the basis of that (epistemological and ethical) assessment... it is always a possibility for action and change.... that action
involves no transcendental promises - it must always be an experimentation. (May, 1993: 10, 11).

Likewise, no account of psychotherapy can offer in advance a blueprint for psychotherapeutic recovery or be comprehensive enough to accommodate everyone's autobiographical history and supply all of the conditions which will directly relate to and lead to psychotherapeutic recovery. What May can offer in these proposals for an account of psychotherapy is that recovery comes out of the trial and error processes of assessment. The recovery can only occur if the persons in therapy continuously modifies his social environment as he interacts with it and assesses it.

There are, though, deficiencies in Deleuze's and Guattari's (1990) paradigm of psychotherapy. These deficiencies have firstly to do with a lack of a proper notion of self or agency having the attributes of intentionality, knowledge-ability and personal and social powers. Only with a notion of agency having these attributes, can one direct, modify and assess ones' action. This cannot occur with their notion of a decentred self which is the outcome of two arbitrary historic processes. For them the notion of a self has continuity in a unifying process only when he or she becomes other than he or she is. Secondly, they do not allow for, in an account of psychotherapy, the idea of micro-conduct to do with the day to day happenings of persons in immediate contact with others. The reason for this, in the main, has to do with what they consider as the Freudian problem of micro-conduct - in this case conduct to do with the Oedipal family as agents of both psychic and social repression. For Deleuze and Guattari childhood and adolescent development, sociality and society are mediated through the oedipal family in a Freudian account of psychotherapy. But, at one and the same time, by countering a specific account of micro-conduct and offering no other account in its place, they have eliminated an important element of psychotherapy, namely the activities between spouses, friends, and lovers as well as the day to day dealings with colleagues and one's peers. Moreover unless one has a concept of micro-conduct in its own right one cannot
enquire into the de-ethicalisation of social relations and in turn, convey how the altering of institutional practices (macro-practices) effects modes of micro-conduct.

Smail (1993), in contrast, to Deleuze and Guattari has made the concept of "powers" the primary concept for a critique of social theories and society and has indicated that no one can escape the latter's abusive influences. The idea of "powers" is considered theoretically as a field of powers which is expressed as a relational term involving personhood with special reference to the body, micro-conduct and macro-conduct. The latter has greater force and greatly influences the other two. Within the fields of powers are distal powers and proximal powers. Power is wielded in terms of distal powers by the state and other social hierarchies. It hence originates at a distance from the individual. Proximal powers have reference to powers (or lack of them) that "surround" individuals which powers one either absorbs or transmits - either in material bodies or in the accumulation or lack of material goods or sociolinguistic practices. Persons in therapy suffer through what he believes to be a lack of their own powers; be it in terms of lack of self-esteem; or behaviours involving bodily stress. Present day accounts of psychotherapy through the proliferation of individualistic accounts must be considered as offering widespread support to the belief that psychotherapeutic difficulties and cures lie within the proximal powers (or their absence) of the person in therapy. Smail has put forward that, "we are thus restricted to making guesses, speculating and surmising about happenings in our proximal worlds which have distal causes". Smail believes that psychologists have ignored the macro-environments where economical and social powers of control reside and which are mostly out of persons in therapy's ken or reach. He maintains that what should be primarily held up for examination, and forms the true study of a person's psychological difficulties, are the power relations embedded in social institutional practices; academic milieux; and human relations. Society in history rather than the individual person's case-history should be investigated or put under surveillance and explained. Psychological disorders originate in the economical and social practices and structures of capitalism. During the 1980's there has been a qualitative difference
in the type of problems presented to clinical psychology that corresponds to the route capitalism has taken. As a profession, psychotherapy should be seeking the origins of the persons in therapy's anxieties that arises from the form which capitalism has become rather than seeking it in individual psychological distress. Smail maintains that,

The explanation of our conduct is thus not to be sought in a psychological analysis of individuals, but in a socio-economic, historical analysis of relations between people, and of the ways these have shaped the world we have to live in. (Smail, 1987:70)

Venn states that the birth of the individual subject,

produces the identity between the 'normal' subject of individualism and that of rationality and locates that identity inside the subject ....assumptions about mental processes highlight their connection with the notions of the individual which are more clearly found in administration and in economic calculations; (Venn, 1984:133)

Therefore, Smail argues,

So unused are we to looking for the causes of our distress in the operation of distal powers that one needs to place particular stress on the necessity as well as on the empirical justification for doing so- (Smail, 1993:38)

4 Social Critique.

Traditionally, the role of social critique has been to put forward the limits of certain social theories and the values upholding them, as well as the examination of the institutions of society and the economic and social values in relation to those institutions. Theories were deemed to be limited when they did not consider persons in terms of some relational interaction with their institutional constraints and the means of overcoming the constraints. There is a belief by those advocating critical social theories that there has to be some relation as to how society is organised, its organisational influences on individuals and the need for theories and forms of explanation to specify what the relationship is between persons and their social institutions and the values inscribed in that relationship.
In the main, however, such theories have emphasised a relationship between constructs such as the unconscious or the conceptualisation of a rational being or the concept of desire and the constraining economic and social features of society. But none of the theorists such as Bhaskar (1987, 1979), Marcuse (1972), and others such as Habermas (1972) could link constructs of the mind with notions of institutionalised society. The idea of the mind as a mental predicate could not theoretically be extended to incorporate notions of society with its long term enduring institutional practices. One of the reason for this is that they are on different time and "space" scales from each other. The means to integrate the psyche with the macro-practices of society has thus not been possible. Those radical commentators on approaches to psychotherapy such as Buss (1979) who have considered an account of psychotherapy in these terms have omitted from their accounts the everyday activities with peers and intimates which are directly influenced by economic and other social constraints. Moreover such interaction with peers, family and intimates is central to the autobiographical social history of the person in therapy and must initiate the therapy case-review.

There are two factors surrounding Habermas' critical social theory. He deals with the personal as a rational reflective being in relation to micro-activities in his meta-theorising in *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1972). It is in this text that he introduces his paradigm of psychotherapy. He deals with the micro- and macro-practices of rational beings in completely separate works such as *The Theory of Communicative Action* Vols. 1 and 11, (1984) and *Legitimation Crisis* (1975). The first text differs from the second and third text due to the fact that they are on different levels of knowledge enquiry. The first is epistemological and has to do with Habermas' broadening of knowledge claims into three different forms, namely empirical-analytic sciences, the historical-hermeneutical sciences and a knowledge-claim in respect of self-reflection. These knowledge claims are constituted by three forms of interests and refer to three standards of explanations. The second and third texts concern a social and political theory with regard to the uncoupling of the micro
activities of the symbolic life world of the family from the macro-practices of state administration and economic practices in the dynamics of welfare capitalism. The uncoupling prevents matters of public interest being debated or the people participating in civic affairs and issues.

But what is apparent is that Habermas has not been able to offer in his paradigm of psychotherapy a relational account involving a notion of an active personhood acting within his or her micro-activities and acting upon his or her macro-practices. None of these modalities can be elided from an account of psychotherapy because they are all central to social existence. Moreover the influencing of the one upon the other both creates the psychological problems and also offers psychotherapeutic solutions depending on whether those influences have positive or negative value. Drawing on Habermas' paradigm of psychotherapy, to some extent and in some respects creates problems for the discourse of psychotherapy. Ingleby (1981) has countered traditional schools of psychotherapy and has offered Habermas's paradigm of psychotherapy in their place with special emphasis on the historical-hermeneutical social sciences which supply a framework for communication and action. The assumptions of the Habermasean social philosophy which Ingleby draws upon are not the political assumptions about society but the epistemological foundations of ideal speech communication and universal consensus which Habermas believes should underwrite critical theory. This is somewhat paradoxical for Ingleby (1981) is at pains to stress the primary nature of the economic and institutional backgrounds of the psychological difficulties of the person in therapy. As far as the person in therapy is situated within what is perhaps a chaotic and risk-laden life-style the offering of presupposed foundational certainties is not the way to approach psychological disaffections. How does the person if offered ideal conditions of existence deal with them in a contingent changing world in which these claims may have no reference?. One must find the critical means, rather, as Crook has stated between attempts to ground one's social theory in foundational guarantees on the one
hand and nihilistic attempts to deny the possibilities of guarantees, and in particular moral guarantees, leaving every situation to arbitrary chance.

I have used four terms, namely values; practice; transformation and emancipation to delineate the properties of social critique. These terms underwrite a developmental and relational account of psychotherapy. In addition they establish and uphold my account of psychotherapy as social critique.

(a) Values

I start my argument for an account of psychotherapy as social critique by stating that social values are neither subjective nor objective but that both of these features co-imply each other. (Gibson, 1966) I conceptualise values as a two-way process involving values and their assessments or evaluations. In order to assess or evaluate values one does not simply presuppose an evaluator but stresses the notion of a knowledgeable being as an evaluator who evaluates. The latter refers to the therapist and person in therapy and obviously other people resources. I obtain the notion of an evaluator through the statement of Manicas (1990), whereby persons have discriminating and comparative capacities which are the basis of judging and evaluating, or subsuming. The values pertain to the social practices and activities of the person in therapy's social environment. The process of evaluation and evaluators is, as stated, a relational process. The notion of values and evaluation do not define each other or collapse into each other since one is personal (the evaluator) and the other is social (values pertaining to social practices) but they logically entail each other. The questioning and checking upon values and their assessment by the evaluator forms a unit of a goal-like task or practice. Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari consider the notion of the assessment of values to be essential aspect of any social theory or social practice. Deleuze and Guattari (1990) conceptualise the notion of assessment of values through the term experimentation and Foucault (1980) through the term problematisation. The former term, experimentation is not founded on rules or guiding principles: nor is there a privileged point of view. Assessments are an enquiry into what conditions ethical or non-ethical activities and the effects they
produce. The values of modernity must be subject to critical review. This diachronic process of assessments allows for possibilities and change. Scott, following Foucault, states,

Rather than arguing for a position regarding what people ought to do, who they ought to be or how the world should be changed, he engages in a process of 'constantly checking' the regulations, procedures and constellations of power that make up our inheritances for identity and commitment. (Scott, 1991:33,34)

This forms part of the substance of Foucault's notion of problematics (problematisation). Cook following Foucault, stipulates that,

problematisation involves "analysing not behaviours, nor ideas not societies, nor their 'ideologies' but the problematics by means of which being can and must be thought and the practices by means of which they are formed." (Cook, 1987:217)

I extend the notion of an evaluator evaluating values to include not just an evaluator, who is a person who discriminates and differentiates between social values, but that ultimately certain values have to be selected from one's social practices. The idea of intentional selection (in the processes of evaluation) means that one selects from one's social practices a certain value rather than others and one has foreclosed on less morally desirable options. The selection process is a constraining and modifying process and eliminates other less worthy values. This process of selection is an essential aspect of psychotherapeutic procedures and regulates and structures the processes incurred in psychotherapeutic betterment.

I continue the important idea of the selection of social values through my conceptualisation of social values as moral exemplars. The main point of using the term moral exemplars is to focus on the idea that exemplar is "an example of" or "sample of". The term "sample" or rather "sampling" has associations with evaluation and judging and requires a knowledgeable and discriminating being with regard to his or her subject matter. Moral exemplars are the "contents" of what have to be sampled and judged and this requires a person with knowhow in the adjudicating process.

Finally, moral exemplars are worthwhile examples of social values which may require debate and critical review before being enacted in moral conduct. For any moral
account of human existence there has to be the notions of both moral exemplars and moral conduct. One cannot have an armchair philosopher debating morals extricated from human situations nor can one dogmatically "man" the political barriers without moral debate.

(b) Practice.

The term practice has several definitions. One general approach to the term practice is to consider the human sciences as practical activity which must always be prior to theoretical activity as Shotter (1975) has pointed out. For, Shotter the latter always emerges out of the former in the human sciences. This has to be a central idea of accounts of psychotherapy in which investigations or explanations must take account of the autobiographical social history of the person in therapy rather than subsuming psychological difficulties under an abstract theoretical model. For my account of psychotherapy practice or praxis refers to the configuration of persons interacting in their social environments. Bhaskar has put forward that practice is neither personal nor social but involves the relation between the two. 9 The important focus for my proposals is that practice is essentially to do with skills which have a personal and social dimension. The skills or knowhow relevant to an account of psychotherapy is ethical knowhow in the ongoing evaluation of moral exemplars or conduct. Brown (1990) has indicated that judgement or evaluation is a skill that requires practice, training and future assessments and cannot be an appeal to universal standards across time. Brown, however, does not relate persons to their social practices, necessary for any practice or skills related process as Healy indicates (1990). Brown offers a two-stage process of evaluation. The first assessment concerns the individual and a quite separate second assessment concerns the social community. However, one requires both persons and the practice in the monitoring, modification and open-ended advancement of the practice. The essential nature of skills activity operating between persons and their practice is achieved through regulatory and constraining mechanisms and processes. Psychotherapeutic betterment occurs in the operation of ethical knowhow whereby the person becomes skilled (with others' helpful advice,
comments and assessments) in selecting the moral exemplar that is most apt for the contexts and situations in which he or she can enact moral conduct.

(c) Transformations.

The third term, transformation, is related to the notion of critique, values and practice. The way in which it is related to these three notions is through the central idea of alteration. The therapist must be a skilled practitioner in order to make a contribution in the alteration or "transformation" of the social existence of the person in therapy. Equally so, the person in therapy's own response to their social existence is to acquire the knowhow to alter their social practices. The notion of transformation gives critical impetus to the idea of values and to critique. Critique is involved in the assessment of social values pertaining to moral abuses and the offering of alternative values by which to alter social practices. The idea of transformation involves the configuration of person in therapy with attributes of intentionality, knowledge-ability and powers or capabilities. These attributes of agency are necessary for the investigation and alteration of social practices. The key point also is that the notion of the concept of transformation as Bhaskar (1987) has stated is always situated in and stretches across space and time. It is an essential part of the ongoing structuring or patterning of human existence. Persons transform their social practices as they interact with them. Each of the two terms of the configuration, persons and their social environment specifies the other and contributes to the development of the other. The focal point, though, for the notion of transformation is that the specification can always offer something different in the second term which is already provided for by the first term. The first term regulates, directs, and modifies the second term. Linking the notion of transformation to the notion of constraints in the systematic procedures of therapeutic practices prevents it being associated with transforming or magicking away persons' moral and social dilemmas - nor does the term transformation give entry into political or social utopias, divorced from the realities of human travails. The key point for the notion of transformation is that it has to be considered as the intersection between the practices and procedures of
psychotherapy and the critical interventions in social practices of the persons in therapy. I put forward that both "psychotherapy" and "social critique" come together in the notion of "transformation points". These occur as significant interventions in the procedures of psychotherapy which the therapist believes will make a contribution to the altering of social practices by the person in therapy.

(d) Emancipation(s).

I have hesitated to use the idea of emancipation(s) because part of its references concern political and economic oppressions and uprisings against them. Using the term in accounts of psychotherapy could devalue its political impact. The other aspect of its references has to do with the conceptualisation of universal freedoms. However the term, itself, has become demoted and unfashionable in critical social theory because some of its assumptions have to do with the idea of universal freedoms, universally determined (Laclau, 1992) - those who are committed to claims to knowledge being contingent and random will repudiate the possibility of emancipated universal utopias being universally determined. One has to be careful, also, that the usage of a term does not demote its essential meaning and the force that the meaning may have. This has occurred with associated emancipatory concepts such as "enabling" and "empowerment" which are more to do now with individuals or aggregates of individuals, as groups, competing against each other for scarce resources. Previously these terms presupposed a collective will and collective sociality. The term emancipation, however, by those who still recognise its value as a concept has remained political rather than personal. On those grounds it is worthwhile still to make use of it. For my account of social psychotherapy I draw upon Israel (1979), Still and Good (1992), and also Giddens' (1984) perspectives of the term dialectics to achieve what I mean by emancipation.

Israel (1979) has established that the notion of the dialectic is primarily a relational and progressive term and occurs through two independent terms which are intrinsically related. The idea of the dialectic is that it unites subject and object but it specifies something beyond itself within that unification. Following Still and Good
I have used the concept of dialectics in connection with relational activities between persons, where one person provides the progressive social contexts for the other as what happens in co-counselling. In the case of a moral account of psychotherapy the person in therapy has to courageously introduce a moral dimension within the social contexts of their social encounters. Within an emancipatory perspective the person in psychotherapy has to re-ethicalise - de-ethicalised - social encounters. They do so by specifying the moral context of an activity or encounter for both themselves and the other person. In general, one can offer an emancipatory context for the other person only if one can separate out when to be the "caretaker" and when to be the mate, the colleague, the lover or the co-counsellor. The nature of such dialectic activities between persons must be as democratic as possible involving equality between female and male; female to female; male to male; adult to child and teacher to taught. There are, however, times when the notion of moral ascendancy must take precedence over the notion of equality. A similar position must be achieved within more politicised encounters in which persons are the recipients of the imbalance of economic, material and authoritative power, resources and facilities. They either have no access to them or have been divested of them. For notions regarding democracy can never remain within the processes of interactions but must always be grounded in political facts which then implicate such interactions. Giddens (1984) in his conceptualisation of the dialectic of control suggests that persons have a "transformative capacity" to intervene in their social practices and alter their social affairs (powers are logically entailed within persons and because of these powers persons have the capacity to act differently and do otherwise). Smail (1993), Bhaskar, (1987) Deleuze and Guattari (1990) conceptualise such a transformative capacity in their own terms. Smail considers this form of powers as transitive powers which are transformed by the person into some form of action. Smail and Bhaskar point out though that the imbalances of powers and the social and political asymmetries of human relations constrain and prevent much of such transitive powers. In this respect, for Smail powers are intransitive and reactive and more often than not remain as a
lack of proximal powers, and become associated with psychophysical suffering of some kind.

There is one final point to do with the notion of emancipation and human betterment which includes psychotherapeutic betterment. Should betterment in a moral account of psychotherapy be organised around some value-ideal or should betterment be considered as different from or other than what went before? Again the latter provides the approach to psychotherapy as social critique. One can bring in Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "difference" or "other than" along with their use of the term to "defer", but place it in a different context. This would imply that social affairs could become different in terms of possibilities and change which emerge out of a critical assessment of what went before and the gradual elimination of certain adversities - without any proposals encompassing ideal utopias. Dandeker puts forward that judgements of fact and judgements of value are logically and historically related. He comments,

To explain the social world is to set limits on answers to the question of how it might be changed. What society is and how it might be changed are not different orders of question. (Dandeker, 1983: 197)

5 Conclusion

Most of the ways traditional theories of psychotherapy have developed over time were in response to the limitations in the prevailing accounts which were currently then available. However, over time, each has lost its innovative and critical raison d'être and has been less subjected to empirical scrutiny. (Smail, 1984) The inherent problem of privileging of inner or outer existence as mind or behaviour resulting in monisms still persists as is illustrated in Rainwater's (1989) notion of the rituals of self-observation. Such accounts of psychotherapy which have made attempts at a theoretical integration of mind and behaviour such as Meichenbaum (1977) and Bandura (1977) two-step approach involving mental predicates and then behaviour still maintain their dualistic problems. Where attempts have been made to integrate
personal and social existence for a theory of psychotherapy they too have been unsuccessful.

In general with regard to individualistic accounts of psychotherapy they can never be considered as moral accounts for morality presupposes a social order grounded in social values. Moreover the nature of their scientific-analytic methods remains almost wholly value-free. (Smail 1987) Nowhere do those theorists who endorse individualistic accounts of psychotherapy examine the social values which constitute their theories or the values that they have imposed on certain groups of society especially those groups under investigation through their scientific enquiries as Sampson (1981, 1985), and Secord (1990) have indicated. Another problem is in relation to critical theorists such as Buss. (1979) Although his account of psychotherapy consists of a critique of society and the social values inscribed in constraining social practices, the scientific account which he endorses belongs to the tradition of value-free scientific explanations and the methods to achieve them.

Normative accounts in social psychology are assumed more often than not to be grounded in a moral order. (Harré, Shotter, 1990) I query, though, if a moral order should be considered within what is a normative discourse which has its basis in conventions of language, symbols and signs or rule-related ritualised conventions. There is no means in Heaton's (1979) moral account of psychotherapy for the critical decoding of the conventions or putting meaning up to be examined and assessed. Rather, its the reverse for general agreements as to meaning and its interpretations are presupposed in an already prescribed social order. Also I believe where language is considered as primary in sociolinguistic practices there is not sufficient distinction between language as the medium through which social transactions mainly take place and linguistic practices as the principle by which almost all of social existence is organised. Bhaskar (1987), Smail (1993), Deleuze and Guattari, (1990) believe that an enquiry into systems of domination and apparatuses of knowledge must be the principle by which social theory is determined. Instead for them, modes of linguistic
communications are to be put up for investigation rather than the means by which both social theories and social activities can be determined.

My proposals for an account of psychotherapy cannot be accommodated by individualistic principles of psychotherapy; nor normative principles of social psychology; nor critical social theory involving value-ideals; nor yet again in nihilistic accounts of subversive practices where values as to whether they are good or bad ones cannot be assessed; nor in relativistic accounts where all values have equal weighting and no appeal to adjudication processes is considered as necessary.

I have indicated problems with both traditional and contemporary social and individualistic accounts of psychotherapy. I have offered in their place a moral and political account of psychotherapy which has affinities with Smail's political critique of social theories and social practices, conveyed through the principle of political powers. I have offered the notion of moral and political values as the organising and ordering principle for my account of psychotherapy. Basically I structure my account around the configuration of persons with the attributes of knowledgeability, intentionality and social and personal powers interacting relationally with others in terms of activities or with their longer term institutional practices. Values are what are investigated within those activities and practices and these require and co-imply an evaluator along with other evaluators. Secord maintains that,

an applied scientists must be more than a scientist, he or she must have considerable knowledge and experience relevant to the application and must draw upon biographical, historical and social contextual knowledge if the application is to be effective... They need to obtain probing accounts of how the affected individuals see the projected social change, they need to understand how these accounts support the behaviour that is to be changed, and they must grasp how existing social structures relate to the target behaviour... This is true because of the nature of our world, and not because of the immaturity or wrongheadedness of social science.

(Secord, 1986:213,219)

Notes

1. There is according to Casell (1993) a primordial conflict between the individual subject and the social object. This means that one cannot resolve a
social theory by appealing to an idea of order for the latter poses a problem for any social theory involving the individual and his or her social existence.

2. For Freud, (1973), the oedipal stage is part of the phallic pre-adolescent stage of psychic development. The oedipal stage has to do with the mother being the object of desire for the son (object-cathexis). To obtain discharge of the id (psychic desire), he has to assume his fathers' role (the Freudian concept of identification) and become a surrogate husband. In order to do this he needs to destroy his father. This wish then becomes reciprocated by the father in a desire to castrate the son. Displacement of desire occurs in restraints being proffered by other persons or finding alternative ploys and sublimating desire. Freud maintained that the id was the enemy of civilisation and the internalisation of social constraints by the superego is "a most precious cultural asset in the psychological field". Deleuze and Guattari (1990) oppose this family Oedipal triad. By submitting desire to the oedipal triangulation it becomes repressed and restrained by social mechanisms of control. Desire loses its subversive psychic energy. This means that the hegemony of hierarchical institutional practices remains intact.

3. The organismic self also involves an organismic evaluating process in which there is a continuous evaluation of experiences as good or bad experiences. The organismic self then perceives itself as either "good me" or "bad me". (Rogers, 1973)

4. The "Q sort" is a form of self-sort-technique introduced by Stephenson (1953). It has been modified by Rogers and Dymond (1954) as a self-rating procedure for persons in therapy. The purpose of the experiment is to find out if changes in self-concepts of the persons in therapy were attributable to psychotherapy and its outcomes or whether they were attributable to initial relief in obtaining psychotherapy. The experimental tests are designed to include self-concepts to do with the preliminary interview, interviews during psychotherapy, and a post-therapy interview. The self-concepts involve an ideal self, a putative ordinary self; and how one perceives oneself in terms of others' perception of oneself. Correlations express the relation between tests.

5. The notion of empathy is underwritten by a way of looking at social relationships. Rogers considers the concept of empathy as one of the six necessary and sufficient conditions of psychotherapeutic personality change (psychotherapeutic betterment). Empathy for Rogers occurs when a person experiencing the events "as if" by analogy they were his or her own. The notion of empathy though carries with it philosophical problems as Merleau-Ponty has recognised. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) How can self-knowledge of private experiences be extended to others as intersubjective knowledge. One must begin the philosophical argument not from private experiences but with common intersubjective suffering. The usefulness of the term, empathy, rather, has been its practical influence on lay and professional people's interaction with each other and the contribution it has made to the democratisation of social and work practices.

6. There are two issues relating to "self" theories, the first issue involves the idea of the self as a stable unifying centre controlling all thought and action - metaphorically the centre of the universe. This has been the paramount notion
regarding the self from the Renaissance onwards until this present century. The notion of self can be said now to have been de-centred and can now be considered as a ruptured product of history. (Rorty 1989) The first issue leads into the second issue as to whether theories are continuous throughout history or whether theories such as the decentred self are representative of a discontinuist view of social theorising.

7. Schizoanalysis is a paradigm of psychotherapy constructed by Deleuze and Guattari (1990) to counter the paradigm of psychoanalysis. Social theories and the capitalist culture have categorised or coded forms of social existence, including mental health. In so doing they have imposed a repressive and suppressive social order through such categorisation. Persons such as schizophrenics resist the repressive nature of such categorisations and do not conform to the imposition of social order and social confinements. They do not recreate the representations nor are they determined by them. As a consequence they have more psychic and creative energy to deal with the world as it is- rather than conflict and contradictions being restricted and suppressed within the domains of social orders.

8. The knowledge claims are constituted by three forms of interest; technical practical and emancipatory and they are related to three forms of validity claims of which interpretations (established intersubjective meanings) increasingly become central to Habermas' proposals for social philosophy. He emphasises more so within the interpretive framework, communicative interaction which he considers as the irreducible category of social existence. For him there must be, moreover, an appeal to ideal speech situations which are divorced from the politicised distortion of everyday communicative interactions. There is, though, a body of critique (Ottmann 1983) which argues that Habermas' three claims to knowledge are all distinct claims. His attempt to make the third knowledge claim, self reflection/emancipatory knowledge related as critique to the other two knowledge claims has failed because self-reflection is entailed within self-knowledge.

9. "A' practice' cannot be identified either with a 'structure' or with the 'agency' which reproduces or transforms it; it is rather, as it were, the structure at work in praxis .... Practices are the conveyors of history, but their individuation and articulation raise complex questions." (Bhaskar, 1987:129)
Chapter 3
In this chapter I offer a relational account of psychotherapy in which persons can act in a skilled ongoing manner with regard to their social activities or practices. For this to occur the notion of agency is required. The notion of agency is best considered as having three attributes, namely powers, intentions and knowledge-ability. Each of these attributes is related to each other and all are related in terms of a configuration of persons and their social activities or practices. These attributes co-imply the social environments in which agents interact. Agents and their attributes cannot be specified without reference to their social environments. The attributes of agency allow both for argumentation and assessments and guides to action. The notion of agency entails neither a purely individual primitive unanalysable core self nor a purely public personhood (or social identity) but involves both a notion of self and public personhood.

I have made use of Harré's (1983) concepts of personhood and selfhood to establish both social and personal being. The main Harrean idea is that personal being is related to and realised through the notion of social being. Social being is defined by public sociolinguistic practices and individual selves are realised through self-talk or the indexation of the use of the pronouns "me" and "I". For Harré, persons have personal and social autobiographies as well as having selves (theoretical selves) and
cognitive awareness. I extend his notion of autobiography by introducing the idea of persons as historical beings situated "in time" with developing autobiographies. These ongoing autobiographies are co-temporaneous with the autobiographies of others in conjoint activities. These autobiographies are historically situated and are the products of certain social practices and of the manner in which the individual deals with and particularises such practices. I then incorporate Jensen's (1990) social theorising into my account of psychotherapy for two reasons. The first is that Jensen, following Harré, considers human beings as autobiographical selves. The notion of autobiographical selves is conceptualised by Harré as selves with a growing grasp of capabilities and potentials, by which persons can act upon the world. This is Jensen's "self-in-activities". The key point (and the second reason for my use of Jensen within an account of psychotherapy as social critique) is that autobiography is not conceptualised as narrative but as action in which moral conduct has a central role.

The Notion of Powers as an Attribute of Agency.

I have divided the term powers into two, (a) powers as abilities and (b) powers of control. The first use of the notion of powers is to set it against what has been termed the mechanical model of man. (Harré and Secord, 1972) The second use is to set it against the psychoanalytical postulate of desire as powers. Deleuze and Guattari's (1990) reformulation of the Freudian id as desire or force equate it with the notion of social and political powers. There are two relevant features of contemporary thought with regard to the notion of powers. One feature is that powers are conceptualised as desire as in the social theorising of Deleuze and Guattari and is also, exemplified in Kovel's (1981) Age of Desire and Kovel (1993). The other feature is the conceptualisation of powers exemplified in Foucault's (1980) Powers/Knowledge. Smail, (1993) has proposed for the discourse of psychotherapy the second feature of this conceptualisation of powers i.e. powers of control (transitive powers) in terms of being able to act otherwise or being able to act differently. It involves being able to influence asymmetrical situations or superordinate groups of people. This form of
power is established as a field of powers conceived as a relation between the person in therapy and their micro-and macro-conduct, with their social constraints and social resources.

The first notion of powers (a) - as abilities - within psychological science comes from Harré and his co-authors (Harré and Secord, 1972, and Harré and Madden, 1975). Harré argues against a psychological model of wo(man) in which persons are nothing but operationalised respondents to stimuli and in which behaviours are acquired by an S-R (stimulus-response) process. Harré counters a mechanical model of man on three grounds. The first is the assumption of causal models in psychology that the same external stimuli always obtain the same responses. The second assumption of causal models has to do with Humean efficient causation in which there is only a contingent relationship between two events and one is dependent upon the other occurring. The third has to do with a psychological research model of causality in which methods are operationalised in terms of objective numerical values. Any other values such as moral values cannot be verified according to the principles of scientific claims to truth. Harré, in opposition to these three assumptions maintains that in a proper account of a psychology of persons one must start from the assumption that persons have powers as capacities or competencies to achieve tasks and to make things happen.

Harré and Secord (1972) offer a paradigm of psychological science in which persons, in certain respects, are architects of their own and others' social existence and are not passive responders to causal events. Powers are part of what is required in order to make things happen and are the generative means by which things happen. Part of what a thing is and part of what it does in terms of powers are not separate. For having a particular power or liability is being in such a state that one is likely to behave in a certain way. The ascription of powers is ascribed in formulaic terms. As \( C_1, C_2, C_3 \); then \( B \), in virtue of \( N \). \( C \) represents a set of conditions forming an open injunction, \( B \) represents the ensuing behaviour and \( N \) represents the nature of the state of the individual, in virtue of being capable of doing \( B \), should any of the conditions
of C obtain. An example of this is the physical and material properties of dynamite as (N) which will allow it to explode (B) i.e. dynamite has the power to explode given a set of certain conditions (C). (Harré and Secord, 1972:18)

Harré suggests that this ascription of powers can be brought into a psychological model of persons with the rider that humans have species-specific powers involving cognitive, manipulatory and social skills. The hand grasp and the powers of speech are particularly human phenomena. He makes use of Hampshire's (1959) and Strawson's (1959) theorising to arrive at his own notion of personal powers. Harré gives a summary of what he terms the anthropomorphic model of man and what the notion of powers consists of. (Harré, 1972) This model argues for psychophysical beings located in space. A human being can initiate change and act upon things; he or she is capable of being aware of things other than himself or herself and knowing what they are. He or she has the power of speech and interacts through speech. Humans must be able to monitor their conduct and give public accounts of it. Language users must have a place in the same system of reference as that to which language refers. This has to do with not only the reflexive pronouns of "I and me" but also with terms such as "over here" and "over there" in relation to the person. A human being has also an existence in time and is located within his or her position-practices. Persons occupy positions as social identities and engage in practices that are located historically in time-space. Harré sums up his idea of powers by suggesting that,

The point of application of power is in the primary structure, where the person is located, while the point of origin of the power is at the culturally idiosyncratic source or apex of the secondary structure. (Harré, 1983:144)

However, if one follows through this quotation with regard to speech-acts incorporated within conversations (which is central to Harrés account of psychology) then problems arise. The powers of speech as psychophysical acts or utterances of speech differ in kind from speech-acts involving communications such as
conversations, or logical assertive propositions. (Both, also, would imply someone having cognitive resources rather than simply powers, per se).

Overall, though, Harré follows the notion of powers through by reference to Gibson. (1966) Gibson's psychological theory considers persons as having manipulatory and cognitive propensities by which they can relationally engage the world. But also, Harré in opposition to this emphasises the essential principle of human existence as one which is organised around the intersubjective norms of human conduct—especially those involving conversations.

If Harré (Harré and Madden, 1975) had reconsidered his discussion of powers as a field of potentials and established a different conceptualisation of powers within the discourse of social psychology, then I believe that he would have averted two problems. The first problem is where there is a severance of the notion of social and personal being i.e. between the individual with powers and his or her social encounters. Heft (1989) and Reed (1989), following Gibson, have countered in their theorising this form of severance and made the central features of their own theorising the co-implication of personal being with social being. The second is a corollary of this with regard to the ambivalence that is raised as to whether Harré's account of human behaviour is fundamentally embedded in a social and moral order explained by consensual meanings and expressive communications. Or whether explanations of human behaviour have to rely on structural properties of things with their generative mechanisms as when persons are to be construed as thinglike with psychophysical powers of speech. (Shotter 1990) A means to avert the problem is to conceptualise powers within a form of field theory. A "field" is not thing-like but it is relational and has no substance or essence, only powers (or in the language of physics, it has potentials). But such a notion of powers requires to be converted to social powers which influence persons either as liabilities or enablements. This relational notion of powers however would still lack the political and moral basis of Smail's concept of fields of power, necessary for an account of psychotherapy as social critique.
The second notion of powers (b) is powers of control, or rather, powers required to make a difference to one's social affairs. Giddens (1979) in fact, starts off from Harre's concept of powers as capacities for action but uses the term in a relational politicised form rather than a psychological one. Giddens introduces a relational concept of powers in his major proposal for the duality of agents and their structures (rules and resources of social practices). I suggest that persons in therapy require social and personal powers in order to make a difference to those social practices which are preventing their psychological wellbeing. For Giddens powers are logically prior to the concept of agency but persons use such powers in relation to others. He maintains that "powers" is a relational concept but only operates through the use of a transformative capacity generated against structures of domination. Giddens suggests that,

Power relations therefore are always two-way .... Power, in this relational sense, concerns the capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others. The use of power in interaction thus can be understood in terms of the facilities that participants bring to and mobilise as elements of the production of that interaction, thereby influencing its course. (Giddens,1979:93)

This is an essential notion for an account of psychotherapy as social critique and it allows for persons to act back upon disabling moral practices and their concomitant moral abuses. Persons, as agents, can take moral stances and use moral exemplars as guides for the form of action required to act back.

Giddens (1984) compares his notion of powers to the central concept of Foucauldian powers. It was Foucault's (1980) intention not to adopt the notion of a universal stable self controlling all thoughts and actions. Giddens to a certain extent concurred with this proposal. He decentred what was a universal self, as ego but recentred it in his idea of agency - which has to do with beings having the powers to intervene in social affairs. He criticised Foucault for the total decentring of the self in which there is no agental self as a controller in the dialectic of control.
For the notion of powers which I wish to consider, I require both these concepts of powers. Agents having logically entailed powers which can be used to intervene in human affairs and Foucault's more diagnostic analysis and critique of the role of powers, as domination in human affairs. The régimes of powers involve a network of hierarchical practices which proclaim what has to be "truth and falsehood, normal and deviant behaviour as well as admissible and non-admissible bodies of knowledge."

Smail (1993) as a practising clinical psychologist and commentator on the discourses of psychotherapy conceptualises his account of psychotherapy through the idea of powers. The latter is the principle by which knowledge régimes, discourses and institutional practices are organised. His concept of powers is expressed in a relational form as the field of powers involving persons, their macro-practices and micro-practices. The origins of persons psychological problems although manifested in proximal bodily symptoms emerge from the distal powers of politics and economics and the manner in which society is hierarchically structured. Each person operates within a power span or horizon and those with least access to consumer or economic resources will have less access to any of the establishments that uphold regimes of power. Any insurmountable frustrations directly associated with lack of bodily, economic or material power are designated mad or bad and these terms themselves demand only individualistic explanations.

To sum up one could not survive without cognitive and manipulatory powers but as well as that one requires the powers of intervention upon one's social affairs through the processes of confrontation and debating social issues - as well as the taking up moral stands and enacting moral conduct.

I suggest further that humans not only have species-specific powers or general competencies but they are always also particularised as individual competencies. (Harre, 1972) My proposals for an account of psychotherapy as social critique is that competencies are both social and individual. They are skills to be used by a person in order that he or she can intervene in his or her social affairs. Skills or competencies require not just the notion of capabilities and resources but they also require the
notion of knowledge or more specifically practical knowledge. I call knowledge which is skill-based, knowledge-ability and where it refers to morals or ethics, ethical knowhow.

3 The Notion of Knowledge-ability as an Attribute of Agency
(a) Practical Knowledge

The idea of knowledge both with regard to its claims to truth and claims to universality has posed major problems. These problems evolve around epistemological issues of how do we know what we know. Such issues have entered accounts of psychology and psychotherapy as the self-knowledge of introspection. The self as an object of knowledge under the rubric of "self" observation, as discussed above, is still operative in Rainwater's (1989) approach to psychotherapy. Those committed to experimental research methods in psychology have traditionally repudiated self-knowledge on the grounds of its idiosyncrasies, particularity and unreliability. There is no means of reliable access to self-knowledge and hence no guarantees as to its validity. Behaviourists have traditionally argued for the psychological objects of knowledge to be inscribed in the laws of nature.

This section on knowledge-ability attempts to overcome these problems by considering the idea of knowledge manifesting both objective and subjective features, the one co-implicating the other.

Inbuilt into the notion of knowledge-ability is the view that knowledge is primarily practical. Shotter (1975) maintains that for the discourse of social psychology, practical knowledge which has to do with the ordinary explanations that persons give in their accounts of behaviour should take precedence over theoretical abstract knowledge. Not only is the notion of knowledge-ability not contemplative knowledge, referring to propositional truths gained from inferences expressed in words or symbols, but it also differs from other forms of practical knowledge. For example, Habermas (1972) in his approach to critical theory suggests that one form of
his three claims to knowledge is practical knowledge. Such knowledge is constituted by interests. Interests are the mediators between the sociocultural practices of human existence and knowledge pertaining to them. The latter is considered as interpretive knowledge. This form of knowledge is founded on intersubjective understanding of meanings which can be communicatively shared. Rational consensus, as to what constitutes repressive free communications for Habermas could lead to a repressive free, or freer, society. This is achieved by an ideal speech situation of discourse which can be appealed to and for which there will be general agreement binding on all subjects. The validity claims or standards for practical knowledge are comprehensibility, truth, rightness and sincerity.

The practical knowledge which I envisage for an account of psychotherapy, however, has to do with knowledge that one acquires by trial and error. The criteria for such knowledge claims are standards of success or failure rather than claims to truth or falsity or the validity claims inhering in linguistic communication. I propose, rather, that we all approach life by trial and error and for this one needs standards which are part of ongoing assessments. But one cannot approach life just by trial and error. It would be both risky and time consuming. I suggest that to orientate around the social world such practical knowledge will require social skills and such skills obviously short circuit the trial and error process.

James Russell suggests that knowledge has both subjective and objective features. Russell states that,

knowledge of an object must be held by a subject, and to give conditions for a system's (man or machine) possessing objectivity we are at the same time giving conditions for subjectivity. (Russell,1984:128,129)

The relation of knower to known is especially important for an account of psychotherapy where information given by the therapist has to be assessed and acted upon by the person in therapy. What has to be considered for a social account of psychotherapy is the notion of an active cognitive being or rather agent exploring his or her social environments with others as he or she interact with them and for this he
or she requires knowhow. This knowhow is a skills-orientated notion involving both subjective and objective features of a knower as well as objects of knowledge. Such a notion of knowhow co-implies both a practitioner and his or her social practices which form a unity through the ongoing goal-related progress of certain activities. There is a two-way feedback procedure between the person and his or her task in the context and progress of the activity and there also have to be assessments of such activity which contribute to and alter the feedback process. The person evaluates and discriminates between alternatives in respect of social values. This is skill or knowhow as a regulatory and constraining process in which the person selects alternatives from his or her social practices and progressively replaces these with other alternatives.

I obtain such a relation of knower to known in part, through Giddens' (1984) concept of knowledgeability and in part through Harre’s (1983) notion of knowledge resources. Also for the idea of ethical knowhow I draw on the Gibsonian notion of values having both subjective and objective features. Firstly, Giddens defines the term knowledgeability as,

Everything which actors know (believe) about the circumstances of their action and that of others, drawn up in the production and reproduction of that action, including tacit as well as discursively available knowledge. (Giddens, 1984:375)

There are two issues with regard to his formulation of the term knowledgeability. Firstly, the emphasis within his social theory has to do with what he refers to as practical consciousness or tacit knowledge. The latter refers to an awareness of what one is doing in routine tasks of every day life. This is tacit awareness which involves consciousness but not reflective awareness. I require, though, to emphasise discursive knowledge which is used in public debate and public evaluations.

Secondly, Giddens in his social theorising creates an analytic caesure between what the actors know and the object of knowledge inscribed in social practices. Although Giddens acknowledges that the subjective and objective features of
knowledge are both present existentially he has not been able to specify their relationship analytically. In order to focus on discursive knowledge required in debate and argumentation which is necessary for any grounding of morality I have used Giddens’ term knowledgeability but hyphenated it to knowledge-ability.

Harré similarly to Giddens, considers knowledge not just as cognitive awareness but as practical knowledge considered as a guide to action. Practical knowledge is required in the explanation of actions through its monitoring and accounting processes. Harré, therefore, suggests that, we may find ourselves required to accept a generic account of knowledge, wider than but including that which emerges when knowledge is studied only relative to Cartesian limits. (Harré, 1983:47)

Harré in his social theorising also separates what he terms performance knowledge from competence knowledge, required for action. Competence knowledge is collectively stored and thus involves more than one person. Different people bring different knowledge resources to a project. For example, in case-study conferences involving therapists, lawyers and medical personnel, all draw on different knowledge resources but these are collectively stored (case-histories and reviews) and collectively deployed in decision making.

But an important point for psychotherapy as social critique is that Harré is less concerned compared to Giddens (1984) and Luckmann (1982) with the social stratification of knowledge or the hierarchical organisation of knowledge in which there is differential access to knowledge resources by different groups of people. Further, Cook commenting on Foucault's social theorising states that,

Foucault 's expressed interest is in the system of domination specific to the modern age, as well as in the forms of knowledge and ethical behaviour which combine in that system to render modernity problematic and susceptible to criticism. (Cook,1991:142)

Smail (1993) maintains in his commentary on the discourse of psychotherapy that the correlates of power and knowledge invested in the discourse have been instrumental in the production of human suffering as well as attempting its cure.
Thirdly, I have obtained the notion of values having both subjective and objective features from Gibson's theory of affordances. (1966,1986) I have conceptualised the subjective features of values as persons who evaluate values through Manicas' (1990) proposals. Persons, as discussed above, have cognitive, discriminating and comparative propensities which are the basis of judging and evaluating. I have considered the objective features of the notion of values as the values pertaining to social practices and what such values "afford" or offer up in terms of their use-value. (The term, afford, as used by Bhaskar, 1987, and Shotter, 1983, has entered the domain of social psychology and social philosophy in less rigorously defined terms than in Gibson's original formulation of the term, affordances).

However there are two additional problems with the use of the Gibsonian theory of psychology for my account of psychotherapy. Gibson implies that affordances as values furnish one for good or evil. But again such terms themselves require challenging, debating and evaluating for often the not so good is expressed as good. Also, I require to consider in my account of psychotherapy stocks of knowledge and prior knowledge of one's subject area. Knowledge resources held by communities are also historically changing and acculturisation processes require continuous probing and enquiry as to what effects they have upon individuals especially during times of rapid transition such as is occurring at the moment.

(b) Mediated and Non-Mediated Forms of Knowledge-ability

By means of Crook's (1991) radical perspective on contemporary social theorising I offer a dual relation between a mediated and non-mediated form of knowledge-ability, focused on values and the evaluation of values. Crook offers a two-step approach to a moral order for society. The first step is an enquiry into the social values prevalent at present in society and the second concerns what are the best means and methods to evaluate them. Crook wants to steer a middle course between what he considers to be cultural nihilism on the one hand in which there are no moral standards and hence no means of objective assessments, and on the other hand an a
priori universal moral order which offers only prescriptive standards as to how life should be lived for all peoples across all times and places.

I consider the problem of mediated and non-mediated knowledge in terms of critical social theory by examining Bhaskar's (1987) paradigm of psychotherapy in terms of what he describes as direct/indirect forms of knowledge. I then consider the problem of the non-mediated form of knowledge in terms of Baudrillard's approach to social theory. I finally return to the social theorising of Crook to obtain my mediated and non-mediated forms of knowledge concerning values and their evaluation and the role of ethical knowhow.

Bhaskar (1987), in line with Habermas (1972), offers a paradigm of psychotherapy which is based on Freudian and Marxist principles. The combination of such principles allows for a combined social and psychological emancipatory order of existence. Bhaskar, especially, maintains that initially knowledge concerning psychotherapeutic problems of the person in therapy is not immediately available to the person in therapy but has to be deciphered. For this, one requires a mediator in terms of an applied scientist who can appeal to causal laws to find out what structures underlie the observable phenomena or symptoms of psychological distress. Bhaskar puts forward the view that persons in therapy have illusory or distorted beliefs about themselves which manifest themselves as observable anxiety symptoms of behaviour such as fits of shaking. Bhaskar proposes that the psychotherapeutic problem is not solved by dealing directly with the anxiety symptoms, or simply describing them, but by identifying the responsible causes of the anxiety. The psychotherapeutic situation evolves round a person in therapy Y who wants to, but is unable to perform an act or a system S of a class of acts. Scientific realism puts forward the proposition that there is a mechanism M blocking or compelling Y to behave in a certain way. General explanatory theory T investigates the structure of the blocking mechanism in the domain in question under the control of empirical data and research. Causal explanations in order to be adequate explanations enquire into the regular relations
between observed and unobserved happenings and the mechanism or structures which link them.

The application of $T$ depends on the agent as well as the therapist. Thus, Bhaskar also recognises that during psychotherapy the social events of the life-history of the person in therapy alter independently of the therapy process: for the person in therapy is subject to contingent events during therapy. For example spouses often persuade their partners to go to therapy and during therapy the spouse informs the partner that they (the spouse) want a divorce. Knowledge therefore has a dimension of being socially produced and is the outcome of social practices. Equally important is the fact that Bhaskar also acknowledges the non-cognitive oppressive social conditions with regard to the psychological problem of the person in therapy and such conditions are not to be exempted from processes of transformation.

The primary relationship which Bhaskar advocates, however, is not between the person and their social existence (which includes the alteration of social practices through persons acting upon them). The primary relationship is between the structures of the mind or society and their generative mechanisms i.e. their tendencies or powers to behave in a certain way. For Bhaskar this transfactual activity comprises the real basis of causal laws and the events which they "normally-conjuncturally generate".

In terms of the paradigm of psychotherapy it is the transformation of unwanted sources of determination to wanted and needed sources of determination of the individual which allows for psychotherapeutic betterment. The relationship is founded on what Bhaskar terms scientific realism or his emancipatory version of it - critical realism. Critical realism is still entailed within the realism in which ultimate objects of scientific enquiry exist and act for the most part independent of the enquiry. Critical realism has kinship with the physical laws of nature. This is what he terms the intransitive dimension of knowledge which is explanatory but not predictive.

But Bhaskar also realises that although scientists do not create the laws of nature, science itself is an historical process and produces knowledge. The latter is
what Bhaskar terms transitive knowledge which he stipulates complements intransitive knowledge. Both together constitute critical realism which provides for a reality that is "structured, differentiating and changing". He maintains that,

- science must be seen as a social process, irreducible to an individual acquisition, whose aim is the production of the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production of phenomena in nature. (Bhaskar, 1989:18)

For various reasons Bhaskar, however is not able to extend theoretically such unwanted determinations of the person in therapy into emancipatory social acts. One of these stems from the fact that his social theory is encapsulated within and has as its basis a model of the mind. His paradigm of psychotherapy takes into consideration the mind as wants and beliefs and having powers to act but these in themselves do not achieve action or allow for persons’ existence to be socially contextualised. As Harré stipulates, actions can exist, paradigmatically only in the reciprocal intentions and understanding of more than one person. (Harré,1990:148) Moreover Bhaskar stipulates that social existence is primarily pre-given and pre-exists persons and their activities. (Bhaskar,1987) At that level of society there is no possible relationship between mental predicates of the mind and institutional practices for they are on different space-time dimensions. Kellner (1988) in Post Modernism as a Social Theory also considers that such depth psychologies are not theoretically viable in historic terms. He maintains that,

Modernity was the era of Marx and Freud, the era in which politics, culture and social life were interpreted as epiphenoma of the economy, or everything was interpreted in terms of desire or the unconsciousness. These 'hermeneutics of suspicion' employed depth models to demystify reality, to show the underlying realities behind appearances, the factors that constituted the facts. (Kellner,1988:246)

Kellner suggests that such theories have been overtaken by what Baudrillard (1983) proposes is happening historically to depth theories of psychology. Baudrillard maintains that the two related forms of a depth knowledge can no longer be scientifically substantiated. He stipulates that one form of these knowledge-claims has "imploded" into the other. There is no longer the polarity between such knowledge-claims. There is only a one dimensional form of knowledge which is a different form
of apparent knowledge and whose origins lie in imitative processes. Imitative knowledge is considered scientifically as simulated knowledge. Simulated knowledge, in the main, is part of informational systems such as computers. Knowledge is no longer produced by persons in social life in which they are involved in crafting or creating objects or testing out ideas among peers or behaving badly or otherwise. Computer systems simulate social life by first making it abstract and numerical and then computer programming it to simulate general patterns of human behaviour. In such proposals there is no social theorising occurring about the nature of personal and social being. Such theorising is fundamental to any social theory. Social theorists, further cannot offer the theoretical means of intervention to allow persons to make "things different" in their lives. Nor can such a theory allow for the practical intervention of social theory into social existence as Bhaskar (1987,1989) advocates. Rather, the computer programme writes its next and next again programmes without human intervention. The numerical information is represented by a binary system having two variables whose values are either affirmative or negative and each cancels the other out. There are no longer claims to truth or falsity in which direct experience could be considered as false or illusory or distorted and where theories could be considered as making claims to truth based on the symmetry between predictability and explanation. There are no longer good and bad social values as these cancel each other out and there can be no proper adjudication between them. The problem for social existence, according to Baudrillard, is that this simulated form of knowledge has "imploded" into social forms of life. Meaning and moral values have collapsed. Forms of violence are apparent everywhere on the signs of things and there are no longer critical features of knowledge to counter such violence. The most psychologically vulnerable groups of people or individuals will suffer these ill-effects as they are in any case removed from any of what could be either life enhancing features of society or the hypereality of simulacrated or make-belief manifestations of reality. Although Baudrillard points to nihilistic features of society, he does not offer any critical propensity for examining such features of
society nor offers any theoretical or social alternatives. There must surely be an examination of social values whose signs of violence are everywhere. These signs must be available for general acknowledgement and exploration as to their merits and demerits. Violence itself could be an indicator of what is problematic in society rather than an evil effect of society and its practices.

I consider my notion of mediated knowledge to be in the tradition of critical social theory. Foucault (1980), Crook (1991), Deleuze and Guattari (1990) repudiate critical theories which involve a unitary principle such as a reflective self or an idea of the unconscious that organises all experience, or forms of causality or predictable laws of nature which determine social realities.

Foucault maintains that epistemes of knowledge are not independent of the historic conditions and regimes of power which constitute them. This is equally true of economic and administrative institutional concerns as it is of academic discourse. Foucault makes specific reference to the discourse of psychotherapy and suggests,

The problem is not changing people's consciousnesses—or what's in their heads—but the political, economic, institutional régime of the production of truth ....It's ...a matter ...of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. (Foucault, 1980:133)

In addition Crook's (1991) discussion of critical social theory allows me to establish a relation between what I have termed mediated knowledge and non-mediated knowledge with regard to social values. Crook suggests that there has to be a way forward between what is considered as an impossible a priori form of knowledge with universal standards and processes of evaluations to which all forms of knowledge must make reference to and appeal to: and knowledge which is considered as nihilistic in which there are no judgmental procedures involved in ethical discourses. He maintains, in contrast, to Habermas' (1972) appeal to an emancipatory status for knowledge that there is no special status itself to be accorded to emancipatory knowledge. What has to be considered are the ways knowledge and values are appropriated and put to work. For this to be achieved, he proposes a dual
relationship for an enquiry into social values. The first part of the dual relationship is a first-order mundane enquiry into social values. The mundane enquiry is an empirical enquiry into the social interests of members of society and such an enquiry has to engage with the first-order value problems faced by social actors and communities. Enquiry can challenge and provoke, as well as support the social values it relates to.

What I suggest is that this form of mundane knowledge is to be considered as a non-mediated available form of knowledge pertaining to social values which, as Crook suggests, is a mundane enquiry which can engage directly and pragmatically with the first order value problems. However, rather than utilising Baudrillard's (1983) idea of signs, or Baier's (1985) notion of facts incorporating values I want to suggest that values are conveyed in information that pertains to social practices. Social practices for a mundane enquiry yield knowledge or information. Such knowledge is in an available form for persons to deal with. Persons have to explore and familiarise themselves with such available information in society.

The second part of the dual relation is an orthogonal enquiry into the second order of value problems, namely the "value of values". In its radical form, it is not dealing with the interests or social values of groups or their members. Rather the focus of the second order of enquiry is, according to Crook, the investigation into how judgements are made and why certain judgements are agreed to or not. Such judgements result in certain theories being taken up into social sciences and other theories being excluded. For example, moral theory was included in the early stages of the discourse of psychology and has been excluded until very recently when it seems to have found a minor place within accounts of psychotherapy and a possible place within social psychology. When one is evaluating modernity or the history of the social sciences one has to recognise that knowledge is interested and not impartial as Habermas (1972), Foucault (1980), and Smail (1993), indicate.

Each society has its régime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; (Foucault, 1980:131)

The dual relationship that Crook considers is one of values (a first order enquiry) and the processes of evaluation (a second order enquiry). I maintain that knowledge or information regarding values is firstly non-mediated and initiates the first order enquiry and then is further examined to discover any hidden obfuscations. One thus has an non-mediated form of knowledge regarding values (a first order enquiry) but such non-mediated knowledge always demands further investigation. A second order of enquiry must be adopted to find out who or what is upholding social values and who is making the judgements about these values. One must initiate the enquiry by considering the non-mediated forms of values in social practices - what is to hand or what is available in the mundane practices of people and then enquire into the mediated form. The latter must emerge out of the former. This is my dual relation of values. I also propose that evaluators (connoisseurs) and their evaluations of values (starting with the non-mediated form of values) co-imply each other. The selection of values from social practices (the first order enquiry) simply pre-empts the evaluating process (the second order of enquiry).

(c) "Knowledge-ability"

I have used the term knowledge-ability as knowledge or information differently from the Gibsonian notion of information. The concept of information which Gibson (1966) has made central to his concept of affordances is stimulus information. It is information that is already structured in the activity of perception. But the structuring process which I require for an account of psychotherapy has to do with the knowledge that persons draw upon in the processes of social activities and social practices and the reformulation of knowledge as the outcome of those practices. As Gibson states knowledge is not perception but is an extension of perception. (Gibson 1986: 258) Such knowledge would include stocks of knowledge, and knowledge involving past experiences and "memory traces" for a set of skilled activities. I have similarly not drawn upon Reed, (1991) and Rogoff (1990) and Lave's (1988) concept of cognitions
requiring social contexts because they also exclude from the notion of cognition such knowledge resources which are discursive and used for argumentation. As Reed has indicated, Rogoff and Lave consider cognitions in terms of problem solving or task-related processes of development. Their research proposals involve cognitive task-related problems or cognitive processes of development in the contexts of social settings. Although they do make reference to the variety of contexts which facilitate cognitive skills and learning they are concerned with thinking as a cultural product.

Further, I have not used the term knowledge itself, for it is entailed within specific epistemological issues that would not have allowed me the scope to advance an account of the practices of psychotherapy (which entail presuppositions and assumptions about human nature and human action). Moreover, Giddens' concept of knowledgeability as tacit knowledge is in the tradition of social and psychological theorising which includes Langer (1992), Polanyi (1967) and Searle (1983). These theorists emphasise the concept of tacit knowledge in three ways: either as the ability to make tacit inferences; as routinised knowledge with conscious awareness but without reflective awareness; and as scripted action. I argue against the privileging of tacit knowledge since focusing on it prevents the emphasis on discursive knowledge necessary for debate and assessment, and the adjudication between values. What I have argued for is some theoretical means to make sense of what are readily available social values (as well as their obfuscations) and the skilled means of their evaluation.

(d) Knowledge-ability as Social Skills

The concept of skill in psychology was originally considered as conditioned and maintained habits. Habits differ from skills in that habits allow for no variation of the skill. (eds. Taylor and Wright, 1970) The notion of skill has since come to be considered as involving both the subjective organism and the objective social environment. Taylor and Wright suggest that a skill,

must be initiated and directed by both environmental signals and those which are generated as a result of the operators' own activity: internal and external feedback .... The signals have the character of a field or pattern which, although it may be highly
differentiated ...still retains its identity or 'wholeness'. (eds. Taylor and Wright, 1970:325)

Skills can be defined as abilities that require practice and training (skills would be downgraded if not practised). Skills also involves goal achievement and this achievement has reference to persons and their social environment. Psychology, mostly, deal with sensori-motor skills that have application in the laboratory or with task-related skills.

The social character of skills is necessary in a social account of psychotherapy and must involve both the content and direction of altered social conduct. Social skills models, in general, have been considered in terms of social communication in face-to-face interaction. Argyle has offered different versions of social skills models which include biological bases for skills created activities, reinforcement theory (Argyle, 1975), rules-related approach to social skills (Argyle, 1983, 1984), and a social powers model. (Argyle, 1975) He has now introduced these features into an ethogenic model of social psychology. (Argyle 1990) His main plea is for a cognitive approach in social psychology to be complemented by a model of social interaction. Harré (1990) suggests that by introducing the notion of artificial intelligence into his cognitive approach, Argyle has thereby severed personal being from social being. Harré maintains further that Argyle has considered a conversation model to be one which requires empirical investigation rather than making it the principle by which social explanations can be established.

Overall Argyle has given his ethogenic model too broad a basis which leads to incompatible psychological principle in his social theory as, for example when a concept such as stimulus reinforcement is linked with the notion of intentionality and rule-governed conduct. But there are other equally more problematic issues at the heart of his model for social psychology. In the main the function of his social skills model is that of the control of other people in social interactions. (Argyle, 1975, 1983) The patterns of interlocking behaviour in Argyle's proposals mean power or domination over others in social encounters. In many ways people do need to invest
in social skills to psychologically operate in social contexts. But to offer models which are predominantly the antithesis of moral conduct suggests a fundamentally flawed account of human conduct. Argyle has also underpinned nearly all his theorising with what I consider are forms of managed or virtual identities and actual identities - in other words a "back and front region" - one for public manifestations of behaviour and one for private manifestations. However, these two forms of identities, according to Baudrillard (1983), have collapsed into each other giving rise to a single counterfeit order of social identity which disallows moral values.

I prefer instead Roche's (1973) approach to social skills. This is more appropriate to the configuration of persons actively dealing with the nature of their adverse social environments. Roche suggests that,

A skill-employing entity necessarily must be social, and equally it necessarily must be intentional also.... Thus intentionality is associated with the thesis that a person's intentions consciously conform with, or break with...expectations and pictures which he believes others have of how he and people like him, or people 'in his position' ought to act". (Roche, 1973:298,301)

Roche's notion of skill is useful for my account of psychotherapy since it allows persons to break with expected patterns of conduct if these are psychologically damaging and this implies also intentionally intervening in collective social practices. For this to occur, one requires as well as knowledge about social affairs, knowhow as to how and when to take moral stances and how and when to intervene in de-ethicalised relations.

Brown (following Putman, 1978 and Polanyi, 1967), maintains that not all claims to knowledge can be established by formal theories and that claims to knowledge are also embodied in skills. Brown (1990) suggests that judgement or evaluation is also a skill which requires prior experience and training. Brown wants to steer a course for rationalism between what he considers as foundationalism (which is ahistoric and which founds the fixed and unambiguous rules and standards of science) and a particular form of relativism in which every one's knowledge-claim has equal merit.
Brown admits, (as does Roche, 1973) that claims to knowledge can be rule-bound but they cannot always be appealed to in foundational guarantees. Brown also maintains that judgements without rules are far from being fallible or arbitrary. Rather, judgement is a skill that involves the ability to evaluate a situation, assess the evidence, and come to a reasonable decision in which rules of adjudication may not be available. Moreover it is a learned ability. It requires ongoing training and experience in assessing evidence and attention to the details at hand. This is precisely as discussed above what Heaton (1979) as a practising therapist and commentator on psychotherapy has suggested in his account of moral therapy. Persons in therapy are not to be explained in terms of faulty minds or faulty behaviour. What they, in fact, lack are practical judgements and skills as to when and how to assess their social situations. For the idea of skilled connoisseurship in connection with ethical knowhow, I suggest that, values and evaluations co-imply each other. Like Brown, I also suggest that processes of evaluation are skills related. The skill of judging allows a person to modify the practice or skill on the basis of his or her judgements. I reinforce this idea with the concept of moral exemplars as an "example" of morality. Examples or "samples" of morality like any other sampling process requires not just an evaluator but a skilled connoisseur, only in this case having ethical knowhow about social affairs.

4 The Notion of Intentionality as an Attribute of Agency

The idea of intentionality like that of knowledge has been a central topic in philosophy. Intentionality is also a central concept in my account of psychotherapy. It stands opposed to explanations of the mind involving causes such as are involved in the psychoanalytic notions of repressed motives or the structural mechanisms of society. (Bhaskar, 1987) Moreover it stands opposed to an account of psychotherapy considered in terms of passive responses to stimuli. The concept of intentionality in my account of psychotherapy is linked into and reinforces the central notion of configuration of persons actively altering their social contexts. The notion of
intentionality is a key attribute for the alteration of social practices. (Bruner 1982, Reed 1989) Traditional philosophical issues concerning the notion of intentionality have been formulated around the question as to whether intentionality is a species of a causal happening which is then redescribed in action reports or statements. Or alternatively, whether intentionality has to do with agency involving the mental components of wants and desires or reasons for acting.

The notion of intention as desires or wants brings with it various conceptual problems. According to Brand (1984) if one considers intentions as desires, the endpoint can only be considered as satisfaction, whereas the endpoint of intentions is fulfilment of action. The key point for an account of psychotherapy is that the latter requires the person's own effort and purpose rather than passive happenings to a person. Harré, in turn queries the term fulfilment and considers it to be philosophically problematic since not all intentions are fulfilled as actions. For there are many more intentions than are ever fulfilled, as every one is aware of. Harré (1983) also queries Davidson's concept of intentionality. Davidson (1968) considers the notion of intentionality as a two-step process: a pro-attitude or a want and a belief that the action will be carried out. This pro-attitude initiates the action, and redescription of that want occurs in the action itself. Harré maintains that Davidson shifts the locus of the power to act from that of psychological necessity to a natural necessity in which human agency is reduced to hidden lawfulness. (Harré, 1983: 182)5

Searle's (1983) views on the notion of intentionality would seemingly have more resonances for an account of psychotherapy as social critique involving the notion of powers, knowledge and intention. He maintains that the activities pertaining to mind require a background of capacities and skills or knowhow which give rise to efficacious causality allowing the person to purposefully carry out his or her intentional acts. The criticism of Searle's notion of intentionality is that the mental aspect of intention i.e. a prior intention is "identical" to what is occurring in the observable reportable action i.e. the intention in action. However gifts that are given to spouses or partners may not have had the prior intention that the recipient assessed
in the action itself. The unfolding plots of gothic horror stories also point up the schism between prior intentions and observed actions. O'Hear maintains, in addition, that there is an over fixation with the "stuff of the mind". For him what should be of interest is what people can do, how they react and how generally they themselves go about their world. (O'Hear, 1985:221)

Harré (1983) and Giddens (1984) consider the notion of intentionality as being linked to the idea of an ability or capacity to do things. They view it as a "doing" concept or a competence /skill requiring knowledge resources. It is not just contained within the idea of a mental state or having freedom of will to act. To fulfil the requirements of a social account of psychotherapy, the attributes of agency such as intentionality must be both social and relational as well as involving the idea of knowledge and action, or in the case of moral practices, conduct.

Brentano (1973) is considered to have proffered the idea that intentionality takes an object. It also points beyond that object. In other words, intentionality specifies something beyond itself and more importantly other than itself and this is a correlate in which two terms, subject and object, are involved. An advancement of this form of correlate is that the second term also has a specifying function. Heft (1989) suggests, following Gibson (1966), that (wo)man and his or her environment can only be considered in relational terms. He maintains that the relation occurs through the notion of intentional goal-like acts. These are situated with regard to both the functional characteristics of the environment confronting the individual in terms of what it specifies and in relation to the purposeful information seeking behaviour of the individual. The social environment is not specifiable independent of the individual. Intention therefore is not solely to do with the self-direction of goal-like acts of the autonomous individual (such as those acts brought into teleological explanations by Charles Taylor, 1967) .

Heft (1989) following Gibson (1966) suggests that the stream of behaviour arising from the interaction with the environment is redirected and shunted by the intentional acts of the individual. Reed (1989) like Heft indicates that the notion of
intentionality involves both objects and subjects and both require a social setting. Intentions are, again, not discrete mental events. For as Reed suggests "intentions are spread across mind and body, information and ecological and social settings."

The key point for an account of psychotherapy as social critique is that intentionality as a notion has to do with alteration of social practices by an agential personhood. Reed provides this requirement in his social theorising by commenting that,

the theory proposed here is that, within any real world task context, the emergence of intentions is the growth of the ability to select specific affordances for the observer to become aware of and to use. This selection process operates on all kind of affordances in all kinds of situations, from the simplest to the most complex. (Reed, 1989:45)

For Reed the perceived meaning of intentions is the growth of the ability to select specific affordances for the person to become aware of and to use. There are two factors relating to Reed's conceptualisation of intentionality necessary for my account of psychotherapy. One is that I use the notion of affordances as social values or moral examples or "samples" which the person in therapy selects from his or her social practices and in the process of "sampling" further refines the selection. The gist of the proposal is that persons intentionally select social values from what their social practices afford but also evaluate and continuously assess them. Secondly, the notion of intentional acts, especially, has regulatory and constraining features due to the processes of discrimination. Intentional acts are being differentiated, and alternatives are being systematically eliminated. The discrimination occurs in conjunction with what values the social practices specify and what is intentionally selected. The discrimination and selection processes of values pertaining to social practices are two constraining and refining procedures which co-imply each other. This is a two way process involving the person's selection and what is being refined in the selection process but it is also a process involving continuity as there is a continuous stream of transactions occurring between the social practices of the social environment and the
individual which are being systematically modified and altered. The notion of a two-way intentional process allows for social practices to be altered as people interact with each other.

Intentionality is a key notion in an account of psychotherapy as social critique whose remit is to allow for the values which pertain to social practices to be other than they are and which requires the attributes of knowledge-ability and powers as capabilities. Intentionality is also linked to the other concepts in the configuration of persons and their social practices and it is linked into deliberate and deliberated actions rather than routine actions that persons are not reflectively aware of in their monitoring processes. As Reed (1989) and Bruner (1982) suggest the notion of intentionality requires conscious effort. This is in line also with Harre's comments.

Value accrues to human beings just in so far as they are seen to be intentional actors because by that alone they can lay claim to personhood, to a place in a moral order. This is not because they are then seen to be responsible for good actions, but because of the respect due to beings who are capable of planning and acting. (Harre, 1983:272)

The quotation from Harré may seem somewhat cryptic and it tends to overemphasise the notion of a competent being but it also underlines the idea that living life morally demands a knowhow about how the world operates and intentionally redirecting and achieving ways to act differently within it.

Overseas students who came to study in The U.K. often suffered from a reactive syndrome of depression. The reasons that induced such depression were a mix of a lack of financial funding, substandard accommodation and intermittent racial abuse. They also were part of an academic elite when younger, and later on they had to compete for scarce academic places. Governments also could take away scholarships on political grounds as well as academic ones. The parents of overseas students often had to put up a financial bond for their offspring to study abroad and if the students failed academically the bond remained with the government and sometimes the parents' home was taken away as part of the bond. In addition, their home culture was often altering economically and politically.
All of this induced high levels of anxiety and depression as well as broken sleep patterns and lack of energy and psychological withdrawal from their academic communities and their own national communities. To explain psychological symptoms of distress in terms of repressed motives based on an individualistic account of psychotherapy could not provide these students with the means to deal with their psychological problems. A more psychologically beneficial approach was to explore the knowledge or information and values they themselves selected from both host and home social environments. It was an enquiry into which values they selected from which culture and which had a use-value in terms of moral conduct with, where relevant, its political implications. They had to be encouraged to select certain social values pertaining to their immediate social environment which fitted in with what they believed to be a different manner of living. After that there was a need to find out what conduct could be intentionally fulfilled, or not, due to their depressive states. Such an approach involved a continuous process of narrowing down the alternatives for them while offering them the advantage of possibilities afforded by their social environment. When they intentionally altered their environment as they interacted with it, the goal attainment which emerged out of the interaction gave them more control over their situation. This occurred as a feedback process between the person and his social environment in the context of action. The affordances or use-values in the social environment gradually allowed for a growing sense of what to look for and what to make use of in their social environment which would be conducive to psychotherapeutic betterment. Such a "growing sense" implies knowhow or knowledge-ability and as Roche (1973) maintains "the attribute of intentionality is entwined in a non-solipsistic attribute of sociality in the concept of a skill-user."

5 Moral Agency

My proposal for the notion of moral agency starts with the Vygotskian idea that human existence is on two planes, one social and one personal. The latter refers to the
higher-order mental functions. The child's cultural development appears twice. Firstly, it occurs on the social level and then secondly, on a personal cognitive level. Transformation occurs from external social existence considered as collective speech reports to inner existence involving personal speech reports (child talking to her or himself and using indexical pronouns) through a process of internalisation (Vygotsky, 1979:52). Harre gives a rendering of a Vygotskian two plane model as a duality between personhood and selfhood. He considers the primary structure of human existence being that of conversations having rule-related grammatical structures. For the intentionality of actions and talk are interpreted within the framework of the meanings of social interactions. Persons as social individuals are locations in the primary structure and so are identifiable by public criteria. The main point for Harre is that there are no inner versus outer manifestations of human existence. The primary structure is formed around a concept of personhood. This is the basis for my use of the term "person in therapy". However, the public criterion which I require for psychotherapy as social critique, needs to have much more political force than that envisaged by semantics and grammatical syntaxes. They involve civic and political collectivities with their debating procedures rather than speech-acts.

The Vygotskian and Harrean concept of the person does not exclude the notion of the self or individual. The properties of the primary structure of a social world once appropriated by an individual as a secondary structure is modified to a greater or lesser degree by an intrinsic personal process. The Harrean notion of self consists of the unified organisation of experiences (perceptions, feelings and beliefs) and the indexical nature of language (the child learning to refer to him or herself as "I" and being a "you" for other people). The notion of the self is not just a unifying centre to prevent the flow of experiences occurring in a state of non-permanent flux. It also involves an acquired identity transmitted from social practices, conscious awareness which involves the monitoring of one's thoughts, and agency which involves capabilities, decisions, and actions. These three aspects of the self give rise to a
unified centre of being in which people experience themselves within a unified process of consciousness, point of view and action. I offer a less well defined notion of the self than Harré has offered, since I am not so much involved with the structures of conscious awareness as with those aspects of being that have certain attributes that are species-specific which one must have if one is to beneficially alter human situations. I require a notion of a core self enduring over time that will intentionally direct activities and be morally accountable for them. I make the idea of agency entail all three dimensions of the Harrean self, albeit with different emphases. Rather than agency being one of the three dimensions of the self, agency has three attributes of its own: intentionality, knowledge-ability and capability. I also want to make the notion of social and personal beings have social and personal histories - in other words autobiographies - rather than an acquired identity. Nearly all case-records of the profession of psychotherapy are formulated out of autobiographical case-histories and not acquired identities. I achieve my notion of autobiography by allowing the person to have a social identity but conceptualising it as "identity and difference" as discussed above. This involves historic continuities and discontinuities in which every moment of becoming is simultaneously co-extensive with successive moments of becoming and discontinuities in the second or third moment arise out of prior and future continuities. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990) This idea is best illustrated at transitional points in lived existence. For example, the boy becomes other than he is in terms of manhood i.e. he has an identity in time through an autobiographical history. These autobiographical histories have confluences with other persons occurring in the contexts of social activities. This is illustrated in the Barmitzvah celebration of boys reaching puberty. The boy does not acquire a fixed social identity but an identity through time. He joins the Barmitzvah celebration with peers, for example cousins, who are at present having their own celebrations along with those who will have their celebration soon and those who have had their celebration in the recent past (as his own celebration will soon be).
However there are other aspects of Harré's own conceptualisation of autobiography that are important for the formulation of my account of psychotherapy. The first important point with regard to the Harrean autobiography is his emphasis on the notion of capabilities and potentials, a view which is reinforced by Jensen. (1990) The second important point is that autobiography is not considered as narrative but as social activities. Barthes (1985) stipulates that linguistics furnish the structural analysis of narrative. Rather, I require concepts which can be incorporated into moral conduct and Jensen's notion of autobiography as the "self in activities" underwrites moral conduct for me. A moral decision is made as to which communities one has solidarity with and which not, and what one is prepared or not prepared to fight for (or take moral stands about). It is through such involvements that moral agency can have viability.

I believe that Jensen (along with Hampshire, 1979, and Guignon, 1993) integrates a moral theory with a theory of psychotherapy but in the process of doing so splits personal existence from social existence. In addition social existence is a constant. Both these features disallow the theoretical means for persons to modify and alter their social practices. For example Jensen suggests that,

the self is... the function of activities as conducted in interpersonal relations, and a function of our realization of particular ideas and values. (Jensen, 1990:261)

What occurs within these three social theories is that persons are obtaining their ideals from social practices such as expected rule-borne norms and rituals which do not alter. It is always a from-the environment (social ritual or moral prescription) - to the person i.e. It is always a from-to situation. The person never seems, in turn, to modify or alter the social practices of his or her social environment. Those persons, who have had emotionally distorted parenting and who have written about it in their autobiographies or memoirs could not have survived psychologically if they had not in some ways modified and altered their social contexts as teenagers. Making social practices a constant in terms of ritual behaviour or other social practices reveals another problem. That is the mediating terms between social existence and personal
existence all belong to this 'from-to' phenomenon; namely internalisation, appropriation and realisation. For Laing (1982), et al., these mediating concepts have no connecting principles.

What is required is not just a notion of social being and personal being linked through some mediating propensity but the acknowledgement that personal being co-implies social being. I have offered the idea of co-implication via the notions of intentionality, knowledge-ability and personal and social powers, as well as through the notions of values, involving the sampling and selection of social values along with their evaluation. If there are no appropriate or potential social values pertaining to one's social practices available, then the emphasis must be (a) on the transformation of one's social practices or (b) a search elsewhere for other possibilities, a to-from-situation. For both (a) and (b) he or she requires the attributes of intentionality, powers and knowledge-ability. For an account of psychotherapy one must be able to select what the social environment offers as worthwhile exemplars (a from-to-situation) as well as modifying or transforming that social environment (a to-from-situation). Heft (1989), following Shotter (1983), suggests that,

These environmental modifications, in turn, transform the surround, which may influence the individual, and so on in a reciprocal manner.... As a result the individual may take an active role in fashioning his environment in important ways. These ongoing reciprocal exchanges form an essential part of the individual's psychosocial history and, consequently, serve as the foundation from which subsequent development proceeds. (Heft, 1989:9)

6 Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter involves ways to overcome problems inherent in certain individualistic approaches in psychology, e.g. the mind-behaviour problem in traditional concepts of intentionality. If persons are to use intentional strategies to overcome their social constraints, such traditional concepts have to be considered in relational terms that involve both social and personal being. I have tried to avoid for my account of psychotherapy as social critique, problems of knowledge-claims which have to do with mechanisms that are not directly available for investigation such as is
represented in repressed consciousness or the causal mechanisms that structure economic interests and their effects in society. I have avoided aligning my account with depth explanations but have, also, avoided aligning my account with a Baudrillardian form of simulated knowledge. I have offered a different approach through the notion of mediated and non-mediated knowledge-ability. These two forms of knowledge or ethical knowhow have reference to persons as evaluators, evaluating their social practices as they interact with them. I have indicated that the evaluation process is a skilled process in which there is ongoing feedback. It is a regulating systematic process. I have used the notion of values (pertaining to social practices) and evaluation (person evaluating) akin to the Gibsonian concept of affordances as a two way process. Where he has proposed invariances underlying affordances I have emphasised a regulatory process evolving from the skills involved in evaluating.

I have used Harré's concept of powers to underwrite the notion of competencies which are required in skill-related activities. However I have made his concept of powers into a more political phenomenon by using the Giddensian concept of the dialectic of control. I have found Harré(1990) and Jensen's(1990) proposals for the notion of self, personhood and moral agency very useful for my account. There is a tendency, though, in their proposals, for social being and personal being to lack a connecting propensity, or personal being to be immersed within conversational practices. (Harré 1983) However in comparison to Deleuze and Guattari(1990) as well as Foucault (1980), Jensen and Harré do offer a form of moral selfhood that can direct moral activities, whereas the other three only allow for a contingent self formed out of two arbitrary happenings or contingently historic occurrences.

I have given a relational account of psychotherapy involving the configuration of moral agents with the attributes of intentionality, powers and knowledge-ability all of which are necessary for persons to transform their social practices as they interact with them. I have also attempted to relate the three attributes of powers, knowledge-ability and intentionality by indicating that each of the three requires to be
complemented by the other. These attributes are not instrumental competencies and 
skills but skills involving ethical knowhow. The skill is involved, also, in the dialectic 
of control in which persons in therapy have the moral agency to act back upon the 
world and in some small way transform it through the taking of moral stances and the 
enactment of moral conduct.

Notes

1. In line with the clustering of the attributes which I offer, Harré suggests that a 
general psychology of social action requires knowledge as a necessary 
component of competencies and capabilities. (Harré, 1983:54) Further Russell 
(1984) comments that any notion of intentionality is underwritten by cognitive 
processes otherwise there can be no intentional acts. Furthermore Giddens 
(1984) considers intentions as capabilities and also that capabilities require 
knowledge in their performances.

2. There are two areas of Harré and Secord's (1972) paradigm of a psychology 
centred on their notion of powers which need to be extended. One is a 
recognition of Lewin’s (1938, 1951) concept of "powers field" as a social 
phenomenon in which the source of a power field can be a person and involve 
the individual's social life-space. The other is Harré and Madden's (1975) 
notion of the field of potentials. Lewin’s psychological theory is underwritten 
by tension reducing psychological needs of negative and positive valences 
which have affinities with magnetic forces of repulsion and attraction, Harré 
and Madden's concept of the fields of potentials offers a more contemporary 
expression of the terms forces and powers. The term force no longer means an 
actual exertion, but a potential or power. "The fundamental entity is a single 
unified field in perpetual process of change as its structures modulate from 
one distribution of a certain value to another". The field of potential is a 
relational term. Moreover Harré and Madden consider the field as a source of 
action which has to have "something" of the character of an agent. (Harré and 
Madden, 1975:176). The line of thought to develop a new paradigm for 
psychotherapy is (a) Lewin's emphasis on both psychological and social 
features of power fields but (b) conceptualised within Harré's fields of 
potentials.

3. See Archer on the Giddensian problem of the relationship between micro- and 
macro-practices. (Archer 1986:75)

4. Giddens (1984) proposes that the level and nature of "penetration" that actors 
have of the conditions of system reproduction depends on four factors. The 
means of access actors have to knowledge in virtue of their social location; the 
modes of articulation of knowledge; circumstances relating to the validity of 
belief-claims taken as "knowledge", and factors to do with the means of 
dissemination of available knowledge.

5. Natural necessity differs from logical necessity. Natural necessity for Harré 
and Madden (1975), and Bhaskar (1979) involves the concept of generative 
mechanisms and powerful particulars and their effects. It is an empirical
relation based on the laws of nature and not a logical relation between what needs to be explained, its mode of explanation and the explanation itself.

6. The behaviour of persons is established by laws in terms of which an event occurring is held to be dependent on that event being required for some end. (Taylor, 1967)

7. An important feature of my account of psychotherapy is the term "person in therapy". It has been chosen in contradistinction to the term patient or client and is derived in certain respects from the Harrean notion of personhood. The term patient has associations with the non-agency of passive beings within a medical model of psychotherapy. The term client has associations - even moreso today with the business or professional world as a client who is offered a private consultancy, out of which the owner of the business makes money. In contrast the most important facet of the term "person in therapy" is the notion of civic and public personhood with civic and public accountability. Persons in therapy develop the skills of social existence by participating in and assessing public conduct.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 Micro-Conduct in An Account of Psychotherapy

1. Introduction

This chapter offers a different theoretical approach to an account of psychotherapy. It is centred on a relational and developmental approach to social interactions. It is based on the belief that the psychological problem of the person in psychotherapy arises out of previous and sustained or present problematic social interactions. The theoretical substance of psychotherapy, therefore, needs to be grounded in the means to counteract existing problematic social relationships and to offer a different focus on human conduct.

The profession of psychotherapy itself is underwritten by large amounts of government or personal finance in the training of psychotherapists in the development of (as well as demanding professional standards for) interpersonal skills. These interpersonal or interactionist skills are considered necessary for the psychological development of the person in therapy. If good interpersonal relationships between therapist and the person in therapy are considered important theoretical grounds for human development (or specifically for psychotherapeutic betterment) it seems odd to theoretically exclude the modes of ongoing interaction between the person in therapy and his or her colleagues and friends etc.

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Most persons who come to psychotherapy have been involved in the kind of social relationships that have gone badly wrong for them in psychological terms (with the effects being physical and/or emotional). But psychological problems and their remedy are not simply to do with the reduction of the psychological effects of anxiety or depression (expressed in bodily symptoms or the manifestation and acknowledgement of some inner fear). People's anxiety and depression seem very often, nowadays, to be a function of social relationships at any one time. A paradox is occurring in which the social transactions of persons are psychologically unsatisfactory but when they do withdraw from certain social interactions they have high levels of anxiety, brought about by feelings of abandonment and isolation. This is not just to do with only the break up of intimate relations but with other forms of relationships. I found also, rather than states of anxiety or depression being the presenting problem that the latter was increasingly to do with present interactivities with others - some with intimates and some not.

According to Bauman (1990), Giddens (1990), MacIntyre (1992) and Smail (1993) social relationships have psychologically and morally deteriorated due to certain social conditions pertaining in contemporary society. Giddens (1990) and Bauman (1990) point out that the re-embedding nature of friendships with the institutionalisation of loyalty and trust no longer holds. The opposite idea of a friend now is being instituted. For Giddens this involves the notion of 'acquaintance' or even 'someone I don't know'. Persons in therapy who withdrew from inadequate relations of friendships, would then have good reasons to believe that they were being psychologically abandoned. Bauman can offer another dimension to this in his suggestion that the "stranger" often now masquerades as a friend. He terms this the "alien neighbour" who has a set of techniques for de-ethicalising social interactions.

Far 'from moralizing' human life, modern society has failed abominably to replace the moral impulse which the process of modernization defused and marginalised. (Bauman, 1990;35)
What I propose for an account of psychotherapy is that the moral dimension of social interactions should be its central focus. Psychotherapeutic problems, past and present, can always be defined within a moral principle be they child abuse or other forms of abuse. Moral abuse can never be excluded from the diagnosis of psychotherapeutic problems. What one requires in social transactions is for a person, including the person in therapy to courageously take moral stands if moral abuses are occurring within social interactions. The goal of the therapist is to offer the person in therapy the means to do this and the means by which they can alter their social contexts through the processes of their interaction. This involves ethical knowhow about contemporary social practices and also a recognition that one is oneself inscribed within those practices. The title "psychotherapy as social critique" is a recognition of the two social environments of the "two worlds" of the person in therapy. This refers to both the therapy environment and his or her own social environments. I indicate in section two that these worlds obviously bear some relation to each other as well as having differences. The conceptualisation of most accounts of psychotherapy however concentrates on the one, the therapy environment while excluding the other. I argue that contemporary social predicaments must be described and explained as well as how they are particularised within psychological predicaments.

In the third section I consider the linkage between the "two worlds" of the person in therapy through the concept of "transformation points" and its functions in the development of psychotherapeutic betterment. Transformation points are basically the therapeutically useful interjections or interruptions that any therapist makes in the dialogical exchange between herself or himself and the person in therapy. In my account of psychotherapy the "contents" of these points have to do with social values. The transformation points structure and regulate and direct the therapeutic processes. For an account of psychotherapy as critique they are not solely interjections but represent the "switches" that occur in therapeutic interaction between the therapy environment and the person's own social environment. Transformation points
represent the intersection between the procedures of psychotherapy and the procedures involved in transforming or altering one's social existence. The fourth section of this chapter is entitled, moral exemplars. These are defined as the range of appropriate worthwhile and socially "competent samples" of moral conduct. Moral exemplars involve the evaluation of values debated by both the therapist and the person in psychotherapy and involve the skills of ethical knowhow as regulatory functions which order one's own and others' existence. In the fifth section, entitled moral conduct, I examine two interactional models of social psychology whose remit is to consider that social psychology is theoretically a moral enterprise. But I suggest that the terms that are used and the modes of human development which are proposed do not theoretically allow for persons to develop through their moral interactions. In the fifth section I argue for a relational and developmental account of micro-conduct that is grounded in moral values. Psychotherapeutic development comes out of particular forms of moral interactivities.

Section 7 of this chapter offers two case-studies. They are illustrations of the main ideas incorporated into an account of psychotherapy as social critique.

2 The "Two Worlds" of the Person in Therapy

The theory and practice of psychotherapy is unique in that the person who is "in therapy" belongs to two worlds, namely the micro-world of the therapy environment with its practices and procedures for psychotherapeutic betterment and the micro-and macro-world of their social and work environments. The development of skills for living occurs in the therapy interview room through the therapeutic processes, but these skills are relevant for the world external to the interview room. In all other activities as for example learning to type, the skills of typing, as Heft (1989) indicates, implicate the structural characteristics of the objects utilised in the performance of the action and the structural characteristics of the body that engages with these social objects. It is a cyclic process that has reference to the operator of the task and what is accomplished in the task. Both operator and task co-imply each other.
as for example in the goal directed act of typing and finishing off a letter. But the skills on how to live that the therapist imparts in the therapeutic procedures to the person in therapy are not demonstrative in the same way. The skills of living are applicable and effected in the social environment external to the world of therapy in which the therapist is almost never involved. Accounts of psychotherapy can never just be a model of psychotherapy concerned with the procedures of therapy but must involve the two worlds of the person in therapy.

In nearly all accounts of psychotherapy there is a theoretical separation with regard to the therapy environment and the social environment in which the psychological problem originated, and in which it must be countered and rectified. It is as if there are two parallel worlds. This applies in any cathartic account of psychotherapy. The technical inducement and measurement of cathartic processes becomes the raison d'être of psychotherapy procedures. The universal problematic social environments of partners, family and colleagues and especially lack or loss of them which occasioned these feelings and emotions are made theoretically residual to psychological explanations and psychotherapeutic procedures. Contrary to this, are those adherents and commentators on radical traditions in psychotherapy, such as Buss. (1979) Buss offers an approach to psychotherapy that deals with the concepts of psyche and society where society and its constraints are recognised as the determinants and influences upon the psyche and the cause of psychotherapeutic difficulties. He has not considered the therapy world and the role of psychotherapist within that world with their professional experience and knowledge. I would suggest also by not considering the micro-conduct of the therapist he ignores the fact that the therapist themselves could be knowledge resources of such social institutional constraints. Further such radical models of psychotherapy ignore the skills and experience of the therapist in promoting and developing the psychotherapeutic abilities of persons in therapy so that the latter can and do make a difference to their everyday institutional or interpersonal constraints. One must consider the micro-environment of the therapy world and the micro-world of the persons in therapy.
external to the therapy world. The concept of the critique of social environments in an approach to psychotherapy cannot be taken without reference to psychotherapeutic concepts, practices and goals.

The two terms, psychotherapy and society are necessary for an account of psychotherapy (society in this chapter refers to micro-conduct between friends, kith or kin, or other relationships). These two environments do not necessarily collapse into each other but have meaning and value only if they underwrite each other. What is required, essentially are concepts that can intersect the two worlds of the person in therapy. Such concepts have to be representative of both a psychotherapeutic approach and a recognition of the place of social critique in the discourse of psychotherapy.

3 Transformational Activity

The term transformation points is touched on by Giddens in his social theorising regarding society and its institutional social practices. Giddens converts the mathematical term, transformation points into social structural relations. An example of the latter has to do with private property as a cluster of rights of ownership. Such structural relations become translated into factors of control such as managerial control or industrial authority. Transformation points mark the "point" where social practices intersect with such authorities and the use of powers of control at these points. (Giddens, 1984) However there are obvious differences between Giddens' conversion of the term transformation points and the way I require to use these points to bridge the two worlds of the person in therapy.

Transformation points have several functions. Transformation points have to do with both therapeutic procedures as well as providing the intersection between these procedures and the reformulated social practices or those social practices in the process of reformulation by the person in therapy. I have used the notion of transformation points to indicate that these are the points of therapeutic activity where therapeutic betterment is most likely to occur.
They are equivalent to the interventions or interruptions that the therapist makes with regard to the narrated contents of the social autobiography of the person in therapy. The therapist "cuts into" or "breaks into" the flow of the autobiographical information offered by the person in therapy. The therapist controls the flux-like situation and judges what should be the interventions or transformation points and when the interventions should occur in the process of achieving psychological betterment of the person in therapy. The interventions or transformation points involve the nature of the "contents" and timing of the intervention. They also include either encouragement by the therapist or psychologically distancing oneself from the person in therapy in order that he or she at certain points can take more control of the therapeutic activity. They involve the skill of probing and they also incorporate the notion of repetition in order to reinforce certain issues. They also involve giving advice and negotiations regarding the use of appropriate moral exemplars.

The therapist makes use of transformation points at the points most likely for psychotherapeutically betterment to occur. If the interventions are psychotherapeutically ineffective at a particular point, they are there, though, as "markers" for future possibilities in the continuity of psychological betterment.

The regulation of these transformation points although part of the therapist's professional skills and judgement is formed out of the ongoing activities between the therapist and the person in therapy. The therapist intercedes in the flow of the autobiographical narrative history of the person in therapy at the transformational points and imparts or offers what he or she would consider a range of appropriate social values. The person in therapy debates and evaluates the appropriateness of these values for his or her own social contexts. The therapist directs, redirects and structures the therapeutic interviews by means of such transformation points towards more personally enhancing moral practices for the person in therapy to enact. The contents and contexts of the transformation points themselves, altering and becoming different as a result of the dialectic social interchange and in turn such exchanges are altering the contents and contexts of the dialectic exchange. Transformation points
directing and being products of such exchanges are part of the regulatory structuring process of psychotherapy through which the systematised development of psychotherapeutic betterment can occur.

Transformation points in an account of psychotherapy as social critique fits into the overall configuration of persons and their social environments, with special reference to the notion of alteration of the latter. Transformation and its specifics in transformation points are one of the essential aspects for the idea of the configuration of persons and their social context. Transformation of one's social practices at the transformation points cannot occur without the relational attributes of agency, namely intentionality, knowledge-ability and social and personal powers. This has reference to both the therapist and the person in therapy. These attributes too are necessary to systematically control, direct and regulate the procedure of psychotherapy and are the enabling propensities of any transformation. Transformation points are the link between the two worlds of the person in psychotherapy and occur at the points where one world intersects with another. But in an account of psychotherapy as critique the implications are that the contents of these transformation points as social values have both a diagnostic and transformative propensity and hence take on the role of social critique. They are open themselves for critique, and enquiry into their efficacy in the production of psychotherapeutic betterment.

Transformation points also differentiate and regionalise one account of psychotherapy from another through the contents and the ongoing methodological procedures and constraints of particular psychotherapies. My account of psychotherapy sets it apart from Rainwater's (1989) notion of self-actualisation processes which are considered as reflexive processes of flux - or a development of self in which the person reflexively (intrinsically self-referential) constructs his or her life history as an ongoing series of "moments". Theoretically both the social dialectic exchanges occurring between therapist and person in therapy and therapeutic interventions which direct that exchange are missing from her accounts of psychotherapy. The notion of transformation points incorporated into the dialectical
exchange sets it apart, also from Wolpe's (1958) systematic desensitisation programmes in which there is a discrete arithmetic ranking of a listing of a hierarchy of fears. It also sets it apart from Heron's discrete six categories of intervention taught in the training of trainee therapists. These approaches also do not allow theoretically for the transformation of social contexts to be a continuous process and product in which future transformations emerge out of the previous ones with the transformation points characterising and regulating the psychotherapeutic process— with the rider that these transformation points occurring within social contexts theoretically require the notion of agency as well as that of the dialectic interchange.

Other differences in psychotherapeutic approaches can be established in the timing of interventions. In general therapists who use cathartic approaches in psychotherapy make the interventions early on in the procedures to both reduce psychological tension and prevent psychological blockage of emotion.

The contents also of the transformation points along with the timing differentiates psychotherapy as social critique from other accounts of moral therapy. For example in an account of psychotherapy as critique early discussions would be about the social values in one's proximate social contexts and later ones would refer to icons or archetypes of social values that condition the micro-conduct of everyday life.

4 Moral Exemplars

Moral exemplars are part of the broader concept of social values which are considered as value-laded rather than value-free. Crook (1991) endorses Smith's (1988) approach to social values. She, too, does not wish to be identified with either a moral order of universal values with universal standards that are valid across all time and cultures or a form of nihilism where there as been a "collapse of values". Moreover she believes that everyone's decision about social values cannot have equal merit and there must be a means of evaluation between values which results in some values being more morally enhancing than others. She, like others such as Baier, rejects the fact-value
dichotomy on the grounds that, when values are not prescriptive there does not require to be a logical separation between facts and values.6

Like Baier (1985) she believes that there has, in fact, to be a continuity of values across discourses and the fact-value separation obscures the problematisation of values within and across discourses.

From a different perspective, MacIntyre (1992) believes that values and their collective evaluations and standards have been eliminated from both moral theory and moral life in preference for values which have to do with individual choices or preferences.

The notion of moral values which I propose also runs counter to those accounts in social psychology as for example Shotter's(1990), and in psychotherapy as for example Newman 's(1991).They both firstly oppose value-free accounts of psychology and psychotherapy such as behaviourism with its adherence to laws of nature. But they secondly place moral values, within a rule-regulated normative conventional social discourse where the standards have to do with agreements regarding meanings rather than values.

Baier asks,

- do we need normative theories, theories to tell us what to do, in addition to theories that present to us the world in which we are trying to do it. Theories tell us what the world is like, and we need to know that if we are to act successfully in it, either to maintain something in it or to change it. (Baier, 1985:232,233)

She believes along with Crook and Smail that moral values involve an empirical enquiry and empirical justification to determine their use in social affairs. She is also of the opinion as well that moral theory instead of influencing the assumptions that certain discourses hold has become entailed mimetically within such discourses.

There is the meditation, the examination of conscience, the confession .And now there is cost-benefit analysis, moral philosophy imitating the accountant and the merchant, and game- theoretical approaches.... if ,we are to imitate, to be aware of why we choose the model we do. (Baier, 1985:241)
However, I have had to find a place for social values within an account of psychotherapy which allows for the psychotherapeutic development and betterment of the person in therapy. Social values, too, must form part of a relational and developmental configuration of persons and their social contexts. This can be achieved by considering social values as moral exemplars and defining moral exemplars in a particular way as "examples of" or "samples of". The best way to focus on this suggestion is to consider exemplars involved in the processes of "sampling". The idea of sampling involves both a sampler and the samples to be evaluated and the one co-implies the other. The sampler in any craft exhibition involves a connoisseurship or skilled person in the judgement of the samples. He or she are more often than not involving his or her judgements with other connoisseurs. His or her main task is that of selection and evaluation which involves discrimination and differentiation as a refining process. As indicated in chapter 3, skills provide a regulatory function that involves progressive feedback in refining and directing the procedures in the goal orientated task. This process is underwritten also by Reed's (1989) notion of intentional selection of social affordances, thereby eliminating other social affordances. The intentional selection is a two way regulating process between practitioner and the practice that one becomes skilful at. The information offered in social values acts as a constraining and regulating propensity as it eliminates other values. The person as a skilled evaluator as time goes on more rapidly picks up such information specified in social affordances. It is a goal directed task which involves both the sampler and what is being sampled. Intentionally selecting $t$ from $x, y, z$ means that $t$ differs from $x, y, z$ and the selection of $t$ eliminates other alternatives and alters the course of the activity. The "sample" is not an instantiation of a law or representative of an ideal type that has no concrete representation in the mundane world but it is an exemplar which is the outcome of an intentional and constraining process of selection and assessment. But the point, though, of overlaying the notion of sampling upon the previously discussed notion of evaluation is that the concept of moral exemplars distinguishes my account from other modes of evaluation in
accounts of psychotherapy and also from other notions of how moral exemplars are conceptualised such as Arendt (1961) or MacIntyre's (1992) notions of moral exemplars.

Moral exemplars are closely related to Hampshire's (1979) conceptualisation of moral values which are part of the mundane world of everyday social practices. Moral values are not invoked or intuited as some universal law across time and place. Nor is there one overriding moral exemplar such as equality or justice or cruelty or comradeship but all are equally underdetermined. Nor are they reductive like the greatest good for the greatest number in which certain significant concerns of groups of people have to be sacrificed or marginalised.

Hampshire (1979) has offered two forms of moral values. Those which will have resonances for almost all peoples and in which there is general agreement or in his terms agreement by association. He has named this primary morality and for Hampshire this has to do with the universal protection of children, kinship bonding and ritual observances to do with the newly dead. Secondary morality has to do with moral values offered in certain social practices that are pluralistic, conflictual and require to be debated and elucidated prior to being enacted. But, I prefer to combine Hampshire's concept of pluralism in which conflict is involved, along with Wahl's (1920) notion of pluralism. Pluralism is not a multiplicity of perspectives but through "the elucidation of conflict, difference and change can be established." 7

However, primary morality is itself undergoing alteration also. Kinship roles have altered and I would say often fall under the rubric now of secondary morality. Males live today in a household of children, none of which are their own and for which they have no legal parental responsibility. Their role has often to transcend custom related parent-child relations. Similarly youngsters live in the same household with other youngsters with which they have no sibling kinship ties. The blood sisters and brothers of these youngsters often live apart elsewhere. Kinship bonding and cross sex bonding has no longer the universal provenance it once had. So that persons in therapy are presented today with different moral quandaries and conflicts involving
different forms of social relationships. The moral exemplars of moral practices have to be explored, evaluated and sought after in the situated contingencies of the mundane world. There are few prescribed conventions for heterosexual or heterosexual/homosexual threesome households or how to be a modern step-parent perhaps living apart from one's own children and apart often from one's step children as well. Giddens (1991) makes reference to such social dilemmas incurred by divorced people. The divorcee has to have a new sense of self - and reflexively "make up" such identities as he goes along - the self has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual - we are no longer what we are but what we make ourselves. I maintain instead that persons have to be extracting relevant moral exemplars from contemporary contingent social practices. What we need is relevant information for the task in hand with regard to what to select and the appropriate contexts for social practices and not to invent our "selves" which if there is a trajectory of self uniting past to present one cannot in any case do so.

5 Moral Conduct

Smail (1987) has put forward that the common feature of all psychotherapeutic profiles of persons in therapy is represented in terms of how one treats one's fellow beings. Psychotherapeutic problems are constitutive of how one conducts oneself in relation to another or how others have conducted themselves in relation to oneself. What therefore requires examination and explanation is what we do to one another in terms of moral conduct. The explanation and the resolutions of psychotherapeutic problems has in the greater part to do with treating each other differently and thus "better" in a moral sense. Psychotherapeutic explanations are not to be found in maladjusted thoughts or maladjusted behaviour. For when one brings in concepts concerning what one does to one another and its moral implications, then one is not dealing with theories seeking psychotherapeutic explanations in terms of individual beings but explanations inscribed in theories of interaction between persons.
There are problems concerning the role of ethics, though, with regard to a model of interaction in the social theories upon which I have drawn. Authors such as Bhaskar (1987) who emphasise the constraining features of institutional practices do not allow for the influence of one person upon another at the micro-level of interaction. (They acknowledge the role of micro-conduct in social theorising, e.g. Bhaskar recognises, in his own theory, Giddens' concept of position-practices which is a form of social identity with historic and cultural implications which "position" one in society. Bhaskar, though, in his paradigm of psychotherapy does not indicate how the effects of one person influencing another, can result in the way the mode of interaction is directed and altered).

Giddens (1984) has a more elaborated version of what can be termed the micro-conduct of co-present (face to face) activities. He separates the notion of human relations from human interaction. The latter refers to social encounters which people engage in and through which institutional systems become articulated. Interaction depends on the "positioning" of individuals in time-space contexts of activities. However according to Kilminster (1991) there are certain problems regarding Giddens' conceptualisation of social encounters. There is no interdependence between persons and hence no developmental bonding between persons in Giddens' notion of social encounters. Kilminster maintains that the lack of the concept of the bonding involved in human activities occasions simply aggregates of persons. This means that humans are separate entities, arithmetically "summed" up.

Harré makes an important statement that draws together essential features for a moral account of social psychotherapy. He suggests that among the many changes that go along with taking persons and their actions as the focal point of social psychology is the shift away from abstract studies such as dissonance or bystander effects. Both have to be substituted for a methodology which focuses on the concrete situated activities of persons. This involves the admission that people are moral beings and that issues of moral responsibility are essential with regard to how they
behave. All sanctions too, are embedded in moral orders, along with systems of duties and obligations with associated value criteria. These link in with the conceptions of the propriety and virtue of oneself and one's associates as persons.

This statement seemingly would cover all the points to be considered in the idea of micro-conduct implying a moral order. It should also allow for how an individual handles moral endeavours and the interpretive and critical or evaluative accounts that can be given with regard to them. It also moves psychology into what Harré has termed the expressive order of social psychology which has to do with interaction rather than a psychophysical order of action with its concomitant philosophical problems of either inner being with mental predicates or outer being with extended observable behaviour.

However, there are problems which I believe pertain to both Harré (1990) and Shotter's (1983) social theorising that detracts from their theories being grounded in a moral order. Harré endorses Shotter's notion of intentional beings having freewill. They conceptualise the latter not as freewill, because of the philosophical problems that surround the concept, but as autonomy in which persons have freedom of choice and action and individual rights. They also emphasise obligations and sanctions that persons are "duty bound" to perform. Harré emphasises the ritualistic sanctions pertaining to social practices and these combined rituals amount to what he terms a person's moral career. However, if one considers his concept of moral careers, the sanctions element of disgrace greatly overrides the autonomy of the individual. The notion of autonomy thus either is elided from his moral order or becomes encapsulated in the individual and there is really not any moral progressive career at all. It then results in an optimistic perspective of choices being considered as individual rights or a non-optimistic notion of persons having to obey society's demands with no interrelated means for the individual to overcome these sanctions.

There is a schism, also, with Shotter's proposals for a social theory of interaction. Shotter (1983) correctly more so than Harré puts forward a relationship and developmental model of human interaction in which to ground a social
psychology discourse. But I do not believe that his psychological model constitutes a moral order of interacting beings. He has rightly argued against individualistic accounts of human behaviour and has proposed that the unit of analysis has to consider two terms of a personal relation and the intentional effect of one person's action effecting another. One person through their intentional interactivity provides or specifies the developing formative contexts for the other. However by introducing Bohm (1980) and Prigogine's (1980) notion of development he has undercut his notion of dialectical and dynamic exchange where one person does provide the social contexts for the other. For they are no longer two independent personal terms that come together in ongoing intentional activity. The schism occurs when he emphasises the binding element or ordering propensity in human relations as something that is self-produced and the formative cause of its own production - "an ordered and structured activity based on inner movement". The intentional being is not then developing through the context of others but is in some self-formative process of his or her own.

Finally both Shotter and Harré for a moral account of social psychology ground their notion of a social psychology in both rights and obligations. But together these two notions combine to act as checks and balances for each other, incorporating a balance of personal duties and personal rights in a well ordered society.

A model of psychotherapy must acknowledge the asymmetries in human existence between persons as well as the symmetries. Bhaskar (1987) and Brittan (1977) suggest that the world is problematic for most of its members. One has to consider that human encounters consist of what Bauman (1990) terms both ethical encounters (meetings) and more often now than in the past de-ethicalised encounters (mis-meetings). For those in therapy the latter must be translated into to the former as much as possible and this cannot be considered outside a mode of developing interactions which Bauman's terms, however, do not provide.
A Relational and Developmental Approach to Micro-conduct for Psychotherapy

Reed (1989) and Heft (1989), following Gibson (1986), do recognise the influence of one person's behaviour upon another. The classical phrase is one person affords the behaviour of another. There are negative anarchic connotations though within the conceptualisation of such a phrase - the implications are that violence could beget or afford violence. Still and Good (1992) offer an approach in which the complexities of human conduct can be better addressed.

The idea of a dialectic social exchange involves two terms of a personal relation or ongoing activity. Examples of this are the dialectic relation between mother and child, coach and trainee or the therapeutic activity between the therapist and person in therapy. There are always two terms in the personal relationship. Each term in the personal relation co-implies the other person or his or her activity. The dialectic social exchange also recognises that each person has a different relationship to the other within the activity and sometimes one person may have to take the moral ascendancy in the activity. The activity involving the two persons is a relational unit of analysis. Persons and their activity imply and specify the activity for the other. Each person is not just participating in the activity but setting, altering and disrupting the context of the activity for the other through a systematised spiral of behavioural loops including both parties within the social contexts of the activity. The asymmetries and symmetries of human activities can be incorporated into the notion of such a dynamic and dialectic exchange. The therapist offers shifting social contexts for the other, sometimes a nurturing context, other times assuming a more impartial and open-ended mode of conduct - other times confronting the person with regard to how they relate to others. Also the idea of the dialectic of control means that the person can be influential in altering the moral asymmetry of social conduct. They can intentionally specify certain social values in their own conduct which they believe is appropriate for the conduct of both, and, if and when, necessary debate such values. What separates the notion of the dialectic exchange from such ideas of behaviour.
affording behaviour is the notion that persons have intentionality, knowledge-ability
and competencies to control their conduct with others and make morality intrinsic to
that conduct. Also the notion of dialectics can be considered not only as a relational
term but it is significantly bound up with progress and change. (Israel 1979)

This notion of progress and change though is not conceptualised as some
totality or unified whole but involves a temporal progressive dialectic unit of persons
together directing their moral activities towards more morally enhancing conduct. The
nature of progression is a regulated continuity which allows for and specifies the
discontinuities of one form of moral interactivity and the uptake of another through
the ongoing assessment of social values. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1990)

7 Case-Studies 1 and 2.

With many post-adolescents, if you queried them about social values, they would
surprisingly deny having any values. This would include college students doing
options with a political dimension within the option. (All people, except those where
the medical prognosis of health considered as a non-conscious state, uphold certain
social values). The problem is that in many cases the people often have not been able
to articulate social values because they have not found collective groups which would
confirm them as shared social affordances. I believe also that when people often deny
having values it means that values in their immediate social environment have never
been questioned or appraised.

Rather than viewing this negatively a more positive approach is needed which
is achieved by probing and appraising social values as explanatory accounts of human
conduct. However "probing" persons in therapy initially with regard to social values
is not always insightful for them or they might believe that not being able to articulate
their value-system involves a personal lack pertaining to themselves alone.
Extraneous sources in these cases are quite helpful. Often, ironically, persons in
therapy bring books or discuss films or pop songs which are in fact value-saturated
and have some collective import for values.
I offer two case-studies to illustrate my proposals for a new account of psychotherapy. The two case studies illustrate ways of acquiring social values and the means to evaluate values. The first case study emphasises social values incorporated within modes of social conduct to do with the micro-conduct of intimates, family and colleagues and the second case study has to do with a micro-conduct study in which macro-conduct or institutional practices are implicated.

Case-Study 1
The first case-study concerns the psychological difficulties of a male student, Colin, who lived in student lodgings with a mixed sex group. He had been brought up by a timid mother and an emotionally cold father. The father had been away at sea and left the looking after of his five children to his wife. When he returned home on leave he did not like the laissez-faire environment which his home afforded him and he continued to command the home as if he were on board the ship. The children objected to these periodic bouts of puritanical and officious fatherhood and he let it be known that he was far happier on board ship. Things came to a head when he was made redundant. His wife saw the only way out of her husband reconstituting the role of master of the ship to master of the hearth was to start divorce proceedings against him, on the grounds of incompatibility. The adolescent children had never been afforded an emotionally strong role model from either parent. They alternated between bouts of lethargy, and bouts of cruelty to each other and their parents. There tended to be no family networking and although they remained in the one family home they tended when not being aggressive to each other, to ignore each other. When the student went home he psychologically terrorised the family to such an extent that he was asked not to come back. It seemed to me, though, that he was the one who was psychologically holding the family together. Often the person who has implicitly been given that role by his family members is explicitly denied the means to do anything about it by them. The person succumbs psychologically to a double bind situation. The student began to suffer panic attacks and was starting to
psychologically disintegrate and along with other anxiety symptoms to feel as if parts of his body were missing. A common occurrence of this is where people believe and feel, for example, that their stomach is no longer there or is being eaten away.

The outstanding characteristic of this student was his frank and direct approach to life. His mother frequently mistook his directness as an aggressive threat to her. But he was gradually losing that frank directness and becoming uncertain about even his psychological existence. This uncertainty began to occur, also, with regard to himself in relation to peer group activities.

The first point of intervention or "transformation point" for this student was to reinforce his direct and frank approach to life. However to temper such an approach with a more complex value-system than the one to which he was committed, for he tended to evaluate social matters as either yays or nays. The underlying personal qualities, though, of frankness and directness was that which was necessary to take up moral positions and moral stances for the purpose of transforming his social practices.

The first extraneous "material" which I used was an essay that the student had just completed. The essay was apt because its subject matter was Joseph Conrad's "Lord Jim". "Lord Jim" had jumped a lascar ship after it had collided with another ship when he was sharing the responsibility and command of it. He had expected, if he had remained on duty, to be drowned along with the over-the-number limit of passengers on board. But the ship was saved. He lied in an officially signed document about the conditions of the accident before obtaining the news that it had been saved. The parallel was that student's own father had metaphorically jumped ship by not taking responsibility for his children's upbringing. Also there are underlying currents that come through Conrad's literary work of males not able to deal psychologically with the female world. Conrad had difficulties himself in portraying or characterising women. His "heroes", as a result, are not explicitly or implicitly sexually involved with women or do not develop emotionally through encounters with women. Conrad's hero, "Lord Jim" to a large extent represented the social and psychological predicaments of the student's father. However my use of the text is not only for the
person in therapy to obtain a moral perspective in respect of his father's conduct but to bring in the relationship of fathers and sons and in particular his own relationship to his father. Also to separate the father's fear of commitment to women from the person in therapy's withdrawal from social activities which included non-involvement with women.

Further, one of the purposes Conrad had for his novel was to express the ambivalence in the character and actions of the protagonists and to question if Lord Jim were a coward or not during and after the boat incident. The point of this for the student was that the student should consider "problematising" the moral values in relation to Lord Jim and then map these values onto his own family network and their problems. Certain moral theorists would demand that the ambivalence be understood as simply a conflict of values or ranking of choices. I wanted the moral values and evaluation of values to come out of the exploratory processes of probing his family's social contexts and for the student to review his previous assumptions about his family. The major problem was that the moral and social standards for his father and mother's conduct had been laid down by a previous generation and when the divorce occurred they had to formulate their social and moral standards as they proceeded through the divorce machinations. The student on his part had to a certain extent been wrongly critical of seeming timidity expressed by his parents at this stage, when in fact his parents had no social guidelines as to how to conduct their own and their children's lives in the divorce proceedings. It was lack of how to go about life rather than timidity at this stage that was splitting the family further apart. The student had to judge what were the moral exemplars best suited for a family going through their family crises and share some of the social affordances that were being offered by each to each other but which were being ignored by one to another. What I wanted in psychotherapeutic terms was for the student to build up a body of knowledge or knowledge resources about his family affairs and to develop the skill of ethical knowhow which as Brown (1990) suggests involves skills in evaluation. This knowhow involved placing his parent's psychological predicaments in wider terms of
contemporary social predicaments but developing the skills of knowhow and judgements that would be applicable across multiple social predicaments that he would come across in both present and future social circumstances.

Giddens stipulates that,

"Modernity is essentially a post-traditional order. The transformation of time and space, coupled with the disembedding mechanisms, propel social life away from the hold of pre-established precepts or practices. This is the context of the thoroughgoing reflexivity which is the third major influence on the dynamism of modern institutions." (Giddens, 1991:20)

Giddens maintains no one can escape from or opt out of the problems of modernity. He believes that the notion of self-identities is no longer a given but self-identities are reflexively constituted as one engages in social practices. For Giddens this has also specific reference in the act of divorcing. Giddens suggests, that a divorced person needs moral courage to try new relationships and find new interests. Many people in such circumstances lose confidence in their own judgements and capabilities, and may come to feel that planning for the future is valueless... Children of divorced couples...often suffer profoundly from the dissolution of the family household. (Giddens, 1991:11)

Much of this form of suffering is common knowledge but the important point is that Giddens (1991) and Smail (1993) are identifying and offering for analyses the psychologically risky features of contemporary existence that condition personal trials and personal crises. Without such analyses it would be difficult to identify the problematic social contexts of the person in therapy and its relation to his particular psychological predicament. Giddens also reverses the debate and asks what do these personal crises tell us about modernity.

The second extraneous piece of "material" that I used for this student, was a practical critique of one of T.S. Eliot's poems.\(^\text{10}\)

The key point that the critic picks up is of a younger man wanting to end a love affair with an older woman. He goes to see the woman about ending the relationship but is
brought into a collusive scenario with her. There is one relevant quotation where the woman using flattery and intimacy, comments,

"I have saved this afternoon for you"

The critic expands on this,

'How does one meet this request when one has not asked to have it saved'

The young lover in his stream of consciousness, asks

"How can I make cowardly amends for what she has said to me?"

The critic then states,

'This must be the classic reformulation of that complex mental state in which one feels irrationally guilty for the other's breach, not one's own, or guilty for one's inability to respond to a demand that should never have been made.' (Schneider 1975:19)

There must have been some undisclosed needs originally between the two lovers which means that the relational activities were by no means disinterested love. So this allowed her to make psychological demands on him. Somehow in these relationships, you have to spell out your present and future intentional acts with the other person who is made aware also of these intentional acts and there has to be some form of negotiation as to how to conduct joint activities in moral terms. This has to include what the other person may demand or need in terms of the relation. In this case needs are opened out and are demanded as more honest needs. You do not have to treat this, either, as a dialogue of "rights" that you are in fact demanding for yourself but you have to express what your moral projects are in terms of the relationship and what are the moral exemplars that are to be selected in shared affordances.

This is tied further into what one is wanting to convey and achieve in therapy procedures. For the most important point of the scenario is that the lover is made powerless both in terms of action and the articulation of the truth and cannot take the moral stands that he wishes to do because of the collusive statements offered. So that
I use this passage over and over again to break the impasse in the taking of moral stances that persons in therapy find themselves in with regard to their social interaction with others. Also it not only acts as a stop to the collusiveness occurring in the shared affordances but it makes the other person realise that you are not affording them the means to be collusive and that the collusive strategies have no import. It is not one sided moral highmindedness of one person controlling activities on behalf of the other. For the taking of moral stands and the articulation of them redirects the intimate physical and interpersonal activities elsewhere. There is a dialectical and ongoing social exchange between the persons where one person specifies and intentionally offers moral values for the other and by doing so sets the moral contexts of conduct for both himself and the "other". The other person in turn perhaps selects the moral exemplar offered and redirects or shunts forward the mode of activities. As Still and Good (1992) state it is a double dynamic flow. When necessary morals exemplars as characteristics of the flow have to be evaluated and, at other times, the moral values themselves allow for the contexts of the encounters to go forward without recourse to evaluation.

What also happens is that the person in therapy in his or her own social encounters sensitively brings in his own transformation points with regard to the timing and content of the appropriate moral exemplars he or she wishes to use. It can be conceptualised in general as ethical knowhow which involves a critical awareness of the world and oneself within it. Also the use of the appropriate moral values specify, regulate, direct and redirect the social exchange. It has less systemised constraints than the therapy social exchange but it still involves skilled regulation of the procedures.

I was beginning to find also that persons in therapy were panicking both when they were with people and if they were left alone. On both counts they were feeling socially isolated and this is also what was happening to this male student. The third piece of extraneous material used to explain the student's predicament was Bauman's notion of dé-ethicalised relations. Bauman (1990) puts forward the concepts of
mismeetings and meetings which elucidates this student's predicament. Previously in more cohesive societies human relations were clear-cut. One was either neighbour or about to be neighbour and he conceptualises this relationship as meetings; the converse of this is the interaction with the alien/foe which he conceptualises as mismeetings. But he finds that the mismeetings of aliens or foe are masquerading as the meetings now, with the result that meetings between people are becoming de-ethicalised. The key point also is that society in its fracturing of its moral resources through its disembedding processes has made many persons psychologically vulnerable. Bauman states that,

The art of mismeetings relegates the Other to the background; just a blot on the backcloth against which the action is set... His is an irrelevant presence; a non-being being, an incongruity resonant with his own. By the technique of mis-meeting the stranger is allocated to the sphere of disattention. (Bauman, 1990:25)

Although Bauman is a sociologist he has expressed what is happening to many persons psychologically today. This student, Colin, suffered from what is called loss of self or non-being being. It has come about through the mismeetings both past and present in the person's interactivities in which the person becomes "morally" powerless or what Bauman calls the moral void of personal existence or what Smail believes persons suffers from as a loss of moral viability. It cannot be explained, as Smail stipulates, either in terms of mind or body dysfunctions or as an existential non-being or personal alienation but only through the influences of economic and social institutional features of contemporary existence and their implications in the de-ethicalising of micro-conduct.

This moral void is a common occurrence with many post-adolescents who do feel that their values are insubstantial. The psychological directness of this male student was being deflected and ignored or as Bauman states, allocated to the sphere of disattention (Giddens term for it is civic disattention or better still civic indifference). This student in a morally powerless state suddenly ceased to be a
democratic member of his peer group and suddenly became a case-study or object of psychological investigation and explanation to his mates. Bauman suggests,

Aliens appear inside the confines of the life world and refuse to go away....they are...both neighbours and aliens.... people are... morally distant but physically close....it is rather ,an indiscriminate amorphic totality in which individuality dissolves.... units are replaceable and disposable. (Bauman,1990:24,26)

In such situations person's power to give moral command is denied. It is at this point in human interactivities that people turn to the safe haven of welfare agencies. But Bauman is critical of these welfare agencies. He states of the welfare personnel that

"It is my courtesy and good judgement which makes me tolerate their presence. In doing so, I give tribute to my generosity, not their rights. (Bauman,1990:26)

The implications behind Bauman's remarks in certain ways mirrors the collusive substance of the statements of the female lover. It seems to me that the profession of psychotherapy institutes a peculiar asymmetrical protective role for its clientele 'I have saved this afternoon for you' can be translated into 'I have saved this therapy hour for you.' A form of pseudo-intimacy is then set up by the therapist on behalf of both the therapist and the person in therapy. The relationship is not bounded by any regard for democratic principles of solidarity or political equality. Nor is the therapeutic relationship upheld by more politically democratic principles that Bauman (1990), Deleuze and Guattari (1990) MacIntyre(1992) and Smail (1993) argue for, in a reflexive and critical psychotherapeutic discourse. It is not that one is denying the necessary comforting role of the therapist or that the skills involved in psychotherapy procedures should be trivialised as of no consequence, but the debate regarding human suffering cannot be conducted within a psychological discourse to do with mental predicates or behaviour or solely the empathic role of the therapist which often now consist only of emotional support and the only request asked by the therapeutic clientele.

Case Study 2
Bess, a female student had had a particularly traumatic childhood. Her mother had left her father for another man and she had returned to the West Indies. For most of her adolescence her father had been unemployed. He spent his nights and most of his days on a settee in a run down council house. He suffered for years with depressive and anxiety syndromes which seemed to be a pre-condition and result of his marital breakdown. Much of his existence resulted in exhibiting indifference, sometimes intentionally and sometimes unintentionally to the world at large and to his family in particular. The children in such cases have to be psychiatric nurse and emotional comforters rolled into one. Often with the emotional supports, which they afford to their parents, not being reciprocated.

Bess could not psychologically manage her domestic and emotional duties and attend school as well. The school welfare officer came up against an unwillingness of any of family members to respond to the demands of her attendance at school. In the end as a result of a case-work decision she was suddenly sent away to a children's home. What remained of her agential power to combat the world made her rebel and she rebelled so often by running away that she was eventually allowed to return home. She reached puberty at an early age. Although she had achieved what she had wanted by leaving the children's home, she tended not to spend much time in her own home and spent the time with older friends of both sexes. Part of her reasoning for this was that her father when she returned from the children's home blamed her for the now regulated and frequent house visits by welfare personnel to his home. She drifted into an early marriage, partly because her boy-friend threatened to commit suicide if she did not. She found his dependence on her and his paradoxical need to flirt with other women too much to deal with, and she drifted out of the marriage with not much interest in it or anything in the future. She came to see me along with a student welfare officer who had asked her to live with him. He had tried to help the father since her family and his family shared the same social and economic affordances. But because Joe had worked and had redundancy money, Joe felt that he could select out of his environmental resources what he valued and leave behind what he did not. Joe
said that the father was part of a social underclass and his problems were social not psychological, and Joe said that he had been willing to help him in any way he could. When, however, the extra welfare money that he had found for Bess' father was used up the father treated him to the same indifference that he offered to his daughter.

Joe felt that he could only cope with Bess' unconcern about himself and he stopped seeing the father and suggested that she deal with him herself. At that point she told Joe that she had had incestual sex with her father. He asked Bess to talk to her father about the incestual events. The father said on one occasion that he was sorry and on the next occasion that he had no recollection of saying that. She stopped trying to make sense of what the correct information was that the father was really affording her. Joe felt the father's lack of responsibility and lack of guilt with regard to his sexual dealings with his own daughter, too much to take and said that he would damage the father for life and at the same time say goodbye to her. Bess came then to the counselling service to find a way for Joe and herself to become emotionally closer partners. She felt that she could as easily drift out of this relationship as she had done with her father and her ex-husband, even although there did not seem any reason to do so with Joe.

The first transformation point or probing intervention within the therapy procedures was to find out what values the children's home had afforded her and what her primary home had afforded her and why she had wanted to return to her primary home and what was there for her to return home to. What were the different constraints afforded by each and what were the differences in each with regard to family "politics". In her primary home the "motif" was abandonment and in the children's home "rescue" and could she start to detect anything different in these motifs.

She felt that her house-aunt had afforded her kindness but that the kindness was built into a formalised discipline which was in contradiction to any significant regard for her. Almost as if decency was dictated by house-rules. There was always a benign, or not so benign discipline over-riding the acts of kindnesses. Also the
kindness was not so much an altruistic value towards others, as tied into wider less positive social values. The resources the home offered were educational and social training for adolescents in a family environment. But Bess detected in the information given that they somehow managed to condemn most of adolescents' home environment while at the same time transposing what they saw as social inadequacies of their background onto them as individuals. The reason for the adolescents being there was, that originally they were, in the main, from problem families but very shortly, they were being defined individually as "problem persons". Instead of the values of the home involving surrogate parenting, the values of the home were being enacted within a custodial framework. When she had wanted to find an ally in her father with regard to the shared affordances of what the children's home offered in terms of custodian values and the freedom he afforded her, she was stunned into an inarticulateness by his indifference as to whether she came back or not.

The first transformation points were not implemented for the purpose of catharsis or release of emotion about her childhood suffering. As far as I am concerned compassion not backed up by the relevant information and its assessment to find out the way such disciplinary powers operate is a form of sentimental collusion. What was required was a seeking of the relevant information and then a correct endorsement of the information which she herself had detected and to explore further that information with her. So the second major transformation point was to ask Bess to what extent the father believed himself to be a decent father. He said that he had not been particularly keen to go out to work but had given up going out to work to look after her two older brothers and herself. He felt cheated that his wife whom he felt that he had rescued from being sexually used by men had turned her back on him and walked off. He said that he had been overwhelmed by the domestic chores and the squabbling between herself and her brothers. Smail suggests that,

They therefore tend to attribute 'the cause' of how they feel to the proximal experience of events or the actions of people close to them which are in fact determined by distal influences well out of their sight. (Smail, 1993:66)
Bess picked up the information that nurturing his family had been important to
the father, but the father had been incapable of raising the family by himself. The
social contexts of his environment afforded no opportunities for him to be
resourceful, both psychologically and materially and lack of these resources reduced
his ability to be morally altruistic and look after his children's basic interests. The
point of his answer for me, was to convey to her that his relation to her, in her early
life had been lack of ability in dealing with family matters rather than lack of love.
Before I investigated further I wanted her to realise that she had had some form of
early father-daughter relations in which he had wanted to be a moral resource for her
even although it was only being articulated and confirmed in the present. However the
notion of indifference had to be explored further. Because the independence that he
allowed his daughter was tied into an indifference that belied any form of democratic
freedoms. The indifference which he meted out to her was not really endorsing her
liberty to come and go as she please but was masking an unarticulated dependency on
his daughter. For when she came back from the children's home, the original
dependency upon her returned. This time not as any practical dependency but only as
an emotional dependency. However his needs could not be demanded in the same
manner as previously since Bess went much her own way and ignored him. Masked
behind his indifference to the world was something akin to a feeling of being
abandoned. He knew his wife had actively done this to him and not his daughter. So
the second time round his sense of abandonment took a different form. He became a
sort of voyeur to her presences and absences from home. He mostly believed that he
still was not committed in any way to his family's interests and activities and so the
voyeurism was rationalised somehow by him as non-involvement with his family and
for him the voyeurism did not exist. However as well as partaking of these voyeuristic
practices, which in reality did exist, there were times when the indifference to life
became so overwhelming that he felt his body physically disintegrating which is a
symptom of extreme psychological distress and panic attack. He did not know what
was happening to him. It was at those times that the incestual sexual acts occurred. It
was not so much a sexual assault on her or a sexual need for her but it was to prevent himself from physically disintegrating and he needed another person there to prevent what he felt was physical disembodiment. Smail puts forward that,

Environmental influence becomes embodied (i.e., becomes a collection of biological assets and liabilities). (Smail, 1993:230)

From Bess' perspective the indifference he had meted out to her in her early years had prevented her from believing that he appreciated her or that she could be a surrogate sexual partner in lieu of her mother. She just believed that the sexual fondlings and sexual acts were what happened to problem families when they went further into social degradation. She was neither particularly sexually stimulated nor disgusted and she gradually began to treat the incidents with indifference but continued to remain away from home as much as possible to avoid any recurrence of such incidents. In a few years time she left home and only occasionally returned and on those occasions the sexual intimacy was not acknowledged or enacted. This can be elaborated further by Smail's comments that social powers are socially distributed and differentiated. They are to do with, material and authoritative resources at the social apex which are not allowed to be shared by those at the bottom of the apex.

There were two things she had to do as far as I was concerned: one was to find out how she wanted to take a moral stand with regard to her father's conduct to her and two to decide how she wanted present and future transactions with her father to be conducted and what sort of adult-daughter relationship did she want to have with her father. These represented the core moral exemplars and she had to put them into use by taking moral initiatives in the ongoing moral transactions. She had to find out what her father's intentional conduct to her was. I detected from the information that she gave me that her father was highly selective in what information he did give her. She had to detect when her father, firstly, preferred to remain silent because he had come now to view his daughter in a voyeuristic sexual role rather than a daughter and secondly when he had actually psychologically disintegrated to the point of
needing her physically to ensure that he was still the "stuff of this world" with the incest episodes following after those bouts. He had to separate out the fears being produced by unarticulated feelings of abandonment and those that forced his daughter to have sex with him in order that she could perform the role of "rescuer". From my point of view, it was incorrect wholly to see her as shamed victim and he as guilty perpetrator or for her to clamour only for rights for victims or joining groups in order to express aggregated feelings. To me they were democratic street-wise people who felt more exploited socially and politically than covering up shame or guilt. Bogue (1989) in his commentary on Deleuze and Guattari suggests that "there are those who have to shoulder the blame of the real and be responsible for all that reactive life metes out." Such reactive circumstances, according to Smail, (1993) become more private and individual as people become more detached from the possibility of acquiring associative power. Such power is likely to become available for them only through a therapy or legal framework.

8 Conclusion

I have offered firstly a social and moral account of psychotherapy which can stand opposite to traditional individual accounts of psychotherapy. In addition I have proposed a different social and moral account compared to other accounts, such as Heaton and Newman's. The main proposals for my account is that it is a relational and developmental approach and it is concerned with moral conduct. Central to my account is the belief that person's moral conduct can be enhanced within the domain of psychotherapy and that, in the main, this should lead to psychotherapeutic betterment. Conduct like action is open-ended but the notion of conduct is entrenched in the idea of sociality to do with the relations between person or their activities. My social and moral account concerns the shifting contexts of conduct between persons and the therapist's role in offering the ways and means to beneficially alter conduct and its social contexts.
Secondly I have pointed out that the person in therapy inhabits two worlds which are not mutually exclusive. For a psychotherapy entitled social critique, critical attention must be paid to the problematic social contexts of the person in therapy and the resulting personal trials and crises must be addressed in the processes of psychotherapy. The connecting principle between them is termed by me, transformation points. This term has a significant part to play in my account and links procedures in psychotherapy with the social contexts of the person in therapy. The term transformation provides a duality between personal and social existence. Personal existence is defined by me as transformative agency and includes the attributes, knowledge-ability: intentionality and personal and social powers which notions allow persons to alter their social activities and practices.

Thirdly I have established that morality needs to be a practical affair if it is directly involved in altering social activities. (Baier, 1985) My notion of morality is thus set against morality involving either intuitive processes or prescriptions or typifications of morality. The essential idea for morality is that it has to be considered as moral exemplars taken as samples of morality which need assessing and evaluating in the processes of, or prior to their enactments. For this one requires an evaluator becoming skilled in the processes of evaluation. I have endorsed both Baier (1985), Crook (1991), and Smail's (1993) empirical enquiry with regard to social values and their assessments.

The central ideas in this chapter have been introduced into my case-studies and conversely my case-studies illustrate my ideas involved in my approach to psychotherapy and its procedures.

Notes


2. Giddens (1991) proposes three features of modernity which effect social relationships. i.e. the separation of time and space - for example fathers often work away from their home and their country and lack the intimacy of family.
life. He can have immediate access to his family by information only as, for example by phoning or faxing his family. ii. the disembedding process in which social interaction becomes separated from or lifted out of institutional practices. iii. the reflexivity of social practices in which there is chronic revision of new information which has to be assimilated.

4. Heron's (1975) Six Category Intervention Analysis.
5. Confrontational approaches require more in-depth monitoring as to the timing of the interventions, otherwise the person in therapy may feel psychologically pressurised and evaluate psychotherapy processes negatively. But the timing of the transformation points in respect of confrontation processes nevertheless separates out different approaches to psychotherapy. Ellis (1962) with his more cognitive approach has a more flattened curve. Assertive approaches to therapy have a sharper curve.
6. Normally it is considered that the explanations associated with facts causally explaining why someone behaved as they did are logically distinct from those facts which prescribe how to behave.
7. See Wahl (1920) on the notion of pluralism.
8. Harré and Shotter oppose Husserl (1973) who did not achieve a notion of intersubjectivity since his mainstream philosophy disbarred such a notion. His primary notion of a transcendental ego was to provide the conditions of thought within the thinker and this necessitated bracketing out the social world. They also opposed simply a presupposed form of an intersubjective world. They believe that sociolinguistic practices (language is essentially intersubjective) organise social existence e.g. language is structured grammatically and social existence is explained through its collective use and its accounts.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 Macro-Conduct in an Account of Psychotherapy

1 Introduction

When dealing with the social practices of persons in therapy in terms of macro-conduct, one is dealing with deeply layered, hierarchically organised institutional practices such as work, school and family. Long term institutional practices or macro-practices are extended in greater time and space. Thus the binding of time is different with regard to macro-conduct in comparison to micro-co-imply-present activities. The former is termed by Giddens as the long durée involving the continuity of reproduced and sedimented institutionalised practices to distinguish it from the short durée of more fleeting face-to-face encounters. To have an adequate account of psychotherapy, though both micro- and macro-conduct have to be acknowledged. Also the way they can or cannot be related is an important issue for the account of psychotherapy which I offer. Firstly, Giddens notes that,

Thus one could investigate how the actors' motives and processes of reasoning have been influenced or shaped by factors in their upbringing or prior experiences and how those factors have in turn been influenced by general institutional features of the wider society. (Giddens, 1984:310)

Secondly, Secord argues for the notion of social structures to be included in the discourse of psychotherapy and from a similar perspective suggests that,
Any attempt to apply social psychology to a social problem is apt to fail if it does not take the social setting or social context into account. Social structures play an important role in maintaining or changing behaviour. The interconnectedness of social life means that various behaviours are facilitated or discouraged by social structural factors that must be taken into account. If they are not dealt with in the process of attempting to bring about social change, the effort is largely wasted. Examples are legion. Consider the case of individual psychotherapy. Hundreds of thousands of people are seeking psychotherapists who limit their contacts to the troubled individual despite the fact that most social behaviours, including undesirable ones, are supported by the significant other people with whom the patient interacts. These properties of the world demand that application be interdisciplinary—no one discipline can aspire to explaining social behaviour in real-world settings. (Secord, 1986:214, 218)

Giddens (1979, 1984, 1991) more than any other social theorist has been the background impetus for my social account of psychotherapy. His notion of the duality of structure and agency (and how the one implicates and influences the other) has been an important factor in the conceptualisation of my main ideas for a social account of psychotherapy. There is a recognition of both constraints and enablements running through his social theorising which is essential for any account of psychotherapy. For example, agents are coerced by social constraints but they are intentional beings with powers to act back upon dominating long-term institutional practices. The important point for an account of psychotherapy is that Giddens emphasises that institutions are hierarchically organised and that knowledge is stratified within them. Long-term institutional constraints such as educational constraints are reconstituted in persons' social activities. Poor education, no-work-situation, split up families all have escalating effects on day to day micro-activities. Such activities are often reduced to within the four walls of the refuge of home, as was illustrated above in the case-study of Bess with reference to her father. I had originally thus intended to embed my social account of psychotherapy within Giddens' conceptualisation of the duality of structure with its emphasis on both social constraints and powers of control; however because of certain inherent problems within his social theory, I have had to rely on other sources.
In section 1, I consider the notion of social structures for an account of psychotherapy. These are defined by Giddens as rules and resources but I substitute values for rules. In section 2, I consider the notion of social systems defined by Giddens as the unintentional consequences of action. But, I define social systems as the unanticipated consequences rather than the unintentional consequences of action. In section 3, I relate social structures to social systems through the notion of agency. I introduce, in section 4, the notion of thisness or heccity. The latter refers to the particularity of the person in relation to institutional practices. One has to recognise that persons have species-specific attributes but they also have differing competencies and skills and differing autobiographies. I have drawn on the notion of heccity or thisness from Deleuze and Guattari (1990) to express my idea of the particularity of the person. They subscribe to the view that the particularity of a person or what they call their thisness is not a synthesising unity of an "I" or a "me" but is a function of productive processes that interact with each other. However, I have altered the meaning of heccity or thisness to fit in with my account of psychotherapy and its notion of self and agency along with the autobiographical case-history. Their notion of particularity allows for no fixed identity or fixed point. It is metastable and can eventuate in any number of forms and has only a differential relation to other particularities or singularities. For example neither the mother or young child have fixed social identities. They have rather only a differential relation to each other. While they are mother and baby at play they are also a member of a nursery or worker in a factory. For Deleuze and Guattari they are "known" only in their differences to each other. What I consider as the notion of thisness or heccity is an emphasis on and extension of the Harrean selfhood rather than the Harrean personhood. (Harré 1983) I spell heccity as haeccity to underscore my meaning for thisness and to distinguish it from the term heccity. In section 5, I have emphasised economic and social institutional constraints which effect the psychological health of persons in therapy. (Goldberg and Huxley, 1992) I have also pointed to the uncoupling of macro-practices from the micro-practices of social interaction in contemporary times. The
ongoing shifting contexts in which this occurs leads to greater psychological problems for persons in psychotherapy. I have illustrated these factors with collective case-studies.

2 Social Structures in an Account of Psychotherapy

There are two main points, initially, with regard to the notion of social structures. The first, is that in the past as Ritzer (1983) indicates, social structures were often linked with social systems as in, for example, structural functionalism. The second point is that Giddens has separated the notion of social systems from social structures and has linked social structures with the notion of knowledgeable and intentional agents. But in his reformulation of both terms, social structures, are enacted through social systems.

Giddens has formulated his idea of social structures from the social theories of Parsons (1978), Durkheim (1982), and from the European influences of structuralism (Kilminster, 1991): and also from the philosophical theories of Wittgenstein (1972). The main difference, though, in comparison to all of these influences is that Giddens has provided for the notion of personhood, or rather agency. I believe, however, that there are problems with Giddens' concept of the duality of agents and social structures due to an incompatibility between the social theories upon which he draws.

Giddens has offered four features pertaining to social structures. The applicable ones for the discourse of psychotherapy are structures and structural properties. Structural properties are defined as rules and resources in social life. I have elaborated upon the notion of resources in discussing the idea of powers. Resources are mediators between persons' agential powers of control and the practices they intend to control. The main features of resources are twofold. One has to do with allocative resources or material resources including technological resources, and the other has to do with the authoritative resources which people have themselves in the dialectic of control or have access to with regard to others. Rules are generalisable procedures for the enactment of social life. Such procedures refer to a generalised
capacity to respond to and influence a number of indeterminate social circumstances. In order for this to occur rules are not static but are carried in time and are transformative. Rules are implicated and generated in action and are, in the main, the means of its production. Structures such as rules have no existence of their own, they are virtual. Structures simply exhibit social properties. Structures give shape to and come into being only when constituted in social activities. They provide the medium and outcome of those social practices in an ongoing manner. Structures presuppose the agent who draws upon rules in his or her enactment of social conduct. Social structures are both constituted recursively by human agency and are the medium and outcome of that constitution. Giddens maintains that,

The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise. (Giddens, 1984:25)

However there are several problems within his social theory and in particular his conceptualising of the duality of structure. Agents and social structures on the one hand existentially presuppose each other but they are bracketed or separated for the purpose of analytic investigation. But the recursive nature of the duality of structure poses further problems. The point at issue is that Giddens does not offer a proper mediating principle between his notion of agents and structures and as Cassell (1993) suggests agents are not rules. The two phenomena of agents and social structures are recursively the medium for each other and hence a degree of circularity occurs. Bryant and Jarry (1991) query; moreover, how is it possible to investigate a structure of rules and resources when structures do not produce a set of unmediated effects?. The result is that the two phenomena of the duality of structure collapse into each other.

Another issue that has to be considered is the notion of constraint within Giddens's social theory. It seems to me that two ideas of Giddens (1984) are conflated into one even though he gives different definitions for each. The first is the notion of
coercive social constraints and the second is the notion of the regulative constraints of rules of procedures. The notion of coercive constraints is derived from Durkheim's (1982) social theorising. But these latter constraints become depoliticised and incorporated into the structural constraints of regulative procedures and they underscore routine rule-regulated activities. These constraints involve a structuring principle to do with the binding of time and the internal coherence of the flow of action and they stem from ideas in structuralism (Culler, 1984). The rule-regulated routinisation of action gives what Dallmayr (1982) considers "an air of domestication" to Giddens' social theorising. In the main also it is the depoliticised version of constraints in the Giddensian duality of structure which is drawn upon by social theorists such as Heft (1989) and Shotter (1983). Generally the process of depoliticising his concepts for social theory prevents Giddens having a place within critical social theory. (McLennan, 1984)

3 Social Systems in an Account of Psychotherapy

Social structures are virtual and have no existence of their own. They are implicated in social practices or social systems. As far as Giddens is concerned social systems are fundamental to the social science enterprise. McLennan (1984) in this case believes that Giddens conceptualisation of social systems is the most useful aspect of his social theory and Giddens rendering of the concept of social systems is equally useful for founding an account of psychotherapy as social critique. Social systems are regulated institutional practices, which are deeply embedded in space and time. Giddens (1979) has indicated that social activities reproduce widespread patterning or degrees of systemness that are being constantly mediated. The consequences of persons' action in institutional practices are extended well beyond their immediate control. Systems have thus an affinity with structural constraints which prevents persons having control over their existence and as such must have reference to persons in psychotherapy. Giddens, though, has opposed traditional conceptualisations of social systems as unintentional consequences of action and has
introduced the concept of intentionality. When both are integrated into an account of social systems and have some form of interplay then they have resonances for an account of psychotherapy. For the person in therapy, through intentional action, has more control over the effects and consequences of his or her action.

Traditional examples of unintentional conduct are when persons fall in love and get married. The unintended consequences of their action of getting married is that overall housing needs may be altered when couples change from the parental home to their own home. This has the unintentional effect of altering housing statistics, such as are expressed annually in the government publication, Social Trends. The couple's intention was to get their own house, in order to rear a family and not the unintentional consequences of altering the demographic and social features of society. As a consequence of their action, however, these features do become altered. Another example is illustrated when a happening is mediated in terms of the next happening (Giddens calls this the accordion effect). The intentional act of switching on the light reveals the unintentional happening of a burglar being present in the sitting room. The intentional act of switching on the light was to light up the room but the by-product of the action revealed the burglar.

The notion of the unintentional consequences of action, however, has to be more seriously considered for psychotherapy as critique. In the examples cited the missing element is the intentional agent who can, under his or her own auspices, directly effect his own and other's conduct. The key statement comes from Giddens who suggests,

To understand what it is to do something unintentionally, we have first of all to be clear how 'intentional' should be understood. This concept I define as characterising an act which the perpetrator knows and believes will have a particular quality of outcome and where knowledge is used by the author of the act to achieve the quality or outcome. (Giddens, 1984:10)

However, rather than using the term unintentional conduct, which is embedded in mediateness, I prefer to use the term unanticipated consequences of action. The lack of control of the consequences of one's actions is to a certain degree a
central problem concerning persons in psychotherapy. As Gouldner (1957) indicates, certain problems of which the layman complains can be analysed as the unanticipated consequences of his or her own actions, policies and commitments. A theory of unanticipated consequences of action systematically directs the attention of layman, therapist, and social scientist to the problem-generating forces most directly accessible to the person in therapy's control. However the meshing of the intentional agent with the unanticipated and unforeseen consequences of action are the terms which must underwrite an account of psychotherapy and be offered in its research enquiries:

The male partner who has taken his partner for granted often rewoos his partner when she starts to be indifferent to his presence. He starts to shower gifts, first on his spouse and then on his daughter, if the marital break up becomes more of a probability. He has somehow to be aware of the unforeseen effects of his conduct. He believes that he is not in control of the reciprocity of his family relationships and offers expensive gifts to prevent it breaking down. But in the offering of such gifts collusion can occur or expensive presents from him are often destroyed or given away. The offerings often bring in their wake, cruelty or indifference by the recipient of the gift and they never have the value that was originally intended. The person, learns too late about the gift-factor in human relationships and the consequences of his action. The therapist has to focus on the unforeseen consequences of his supposedly altruistic gesture.

The concept of unanticipated consequences of action as Gouldner (1957) has put forward, is also an important factor with regard to persons who repeatedly conduct their social affairs to their own psychological detriment. Persons, as more knowledgeable agents can anticipate more so what cumulative effects and outcomes their actions will have in their social contexts. The next important step is to consider the terms unforeseen action in wider contemporary affairs of moral and political practices. As Bauman (1991) suggests in the past the effective range of action was "small" and so were the good and evil values about which action" had to care". In his
words these values lay close to the act, either in the praxis or in its immediate reach. Each action though in contemporary times is for Bauman both mediated and mediating. If there is a causal link between one's behaviour and its consequences it is considered now as a fault of reason rather than an ethical failure. The loss of ethics in the mediateness of action means that persons are seldom confronted with their choices of action and its consequences. In these cases action is morally neutralising and belongs to no one in particular. Further as Atkinson comments,

in the cases which Laing examined, he recognised how children often came to be defined as 'mad'. There is an escalation of interrelated and changing definitions, values and actions. This whole sequence of unintended consequences of events may end up with the development of situations very far from those with which we started. (Atkinson1971:231)

The notions of intentionality and the unanticipated consequences of action and the co-implication of the one with the other is important. It can be incorporated into actions which are either less or more mediated. The terms also indicate the problematic nature of contemporary affairs due to the mediateness of action or the escalating effects of action. Although there are social theorists who believe that the meaning of the term unintended consequences of action is so all encompassing that it has become meaningless (Hindess,1988), there are others such as Boudon (1982) who find a central place for it. Boudon maintains that those who advocate the notion of intentionality within their theorising without implicating the boundedness of action or the unforeseen effects of action offer a too optimistic and simplistic approach to human affairs. He conceptualises adverse unforeseen effects of action as perverse effects. He is arguing against either the notion of effects of action being conceptualised under mechanical determined causation or action being considered in terms of freedom to act which could sometimes be construed as whims or unbounded choices. He is suggesting that the notion of the effects of action must be taken into consideration and emphasis placed on the mediated results of one's action as well as what conditioned it. I propose that to enact moral conduct one must intentionally direct and influence one's action as much as possible to prevent the adverse effects of
action. It underwrites the meshing of intentional action with the desired outcome of action. This is more likely to occur if there is a knowledgeable agent reflexively involved in reproducing or modifying his or her action in the light of informational feedback.

4 Agents and Their Institutional Practices.

There are further problems when the Giddensian notion of social structures is integrated with that of social systems. Giddensian social structures are virtual as they have no existences of their own and they are instantiated only when enacted in social practices or social systems. The structural property enters simultaneously into the constitution of a single action and "exists" in the generating moment of this action.

This is tantamount to stating that all universal practices are implicated in an individual's brief action. Archer (1986) in her critique of Giddens points out a problem stemming from what she terms the "crunching up" of institutional practices within a person's individual actions. In Giddens' social theory structures and action do not operate on different time scales. Giddens is, therefore, unable to provide in his central notion of the duality of structure any theoretical grasp of social practices being structured over time and this is an essential proposal for any account of psychotherapy. For Archer structures logically pre-date actions and what she terms structural elaboration post-dates those actions. Structural elaboration is the consequence of actions, but it also conditions a new set of influences upon actions and interactions. This is a cyclic process and should be equivalent to the recursive processes involved in Giddens' notion of the duality of structure but with the inclusion of the dimension of the structuring of time.

FIGURE 1.

T1 structure

T2 T3 action

T 4 structural elaboration.
All three lines are continuous, the analytical element consists only in breaking up the flows into intervals determined by the problem under investigation. (Archer, 1986:72)

Archer is emphasising a different set of social structures from that required for an account of psychotherapy. The social structures which she is considering are taxation systems, population variables and wage differentials. Also I suggest the converse occurs with regard to Archer’s morphogenic approach. She separates the notion of persons from their social structures and she focuses on social structures rather than on both agents and their social structures. Archer thus polarises the two constituents of the duality of structure in her own social theorising. However I suggest a different approach to the duality of structure could be O’Gorman’s (1986) reformulation of the duality of structure as the hylemorphism of agents and social structures in which both phenomena are co-relative to each other.

FIGURE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T3</th>
<th>social values including moral sanctions (sexual mores) that pre-date persons in therapy and their practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T4 persons in therapy and their social values pertaining to social practices that have been emptied of their &quot;contents&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T5 social values pertaining to practices that post-date the person’s action as the outcome and consequences of that action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following Archer (1986), Figure 2 can be expanded into a generalised therapy case-study. I found certain women students, whose mothers or grandmothers were illegitimate often suffered from a depressive syndrome. One of the main characteristics of the behaviour of these granddaughters and their mothers was to isolate themselves socially from everyone except their immediate families. Any
problematic social or psychological factors pertaining to the granddaughters, such as
relations with partners or would be partners, especially males, tended to activate the
depressive syndrome. Then social isolation became more problematic and the
psychological factors involved became more complex. There were two aspects to the
problem. The first was how these granddaughters perceived other persons' perception
of them, especially males. Such perceptions made them psychologically vulnerable to
the nuances of any relationship. The second aspect of the problem was the
reproduction of their grandmothers' pattern of isolation in which the stigma attached
to the conduct, the contents of which - as Manicas would term it - had been emptied
out. (Manicas, 1987) The therapist had to indicate to the persons in therapy the way
the stigma of illegitimacy was being unnecessary reproduced over generations. There
was a discrepancy between their own conduct and what conditioned it. At the same
time the granddaughters had to challenge contemporary demeaning social values or
other problems would simply be recycled through the generations. These
granddaughters had to be aware of the unanticipated consequences of their actions,
and by not reproducing the adverse effects of isolation, they would as Archer (1986)
has indicated be influencing a different set of conditions. The psychotherapeutic
problem could not always be resolved by suggesting in Giddensian terms that rule-
borne social constraints are implicated in the action when the sanctions were no
longer being upheld. The carrying over of the same pattern of conduct of one
generation to another when the contents of the conduct have been emptied out is
much more common in psychotherapeutic difficulties than this one example of
illegitimacy suggests.

However I believe that rather than rules as structures pre-dating persons (as Archer
accords in FIGURE 1) the notion of values should replace that of rules. I do not
believe that the notion of rules - whether they be transformative or not- can indicate
or solve the problematic nature of society. Whereas values pertaining to social
practices embody the problems of society and their examination must initiate the
means to alter the problems occurring in society (There may be social rules involved
but social values would pre-empt and determine the rules). There is one final problem with Giddens' social theory in relation to social structures and social systems. Rules are drawn upon in the production of action, so they must pre-date that action (social structures) but the consequences of action must post-date that action (social systems). There is a difficulty within Giddens' social theory concerning social structures being implicated in social systems. Pre-dated rules in action (social structures) cannot theoretically be extended to encompass the unintended consequences of action (social systems). The problem is that Giddens is operating within two different theoretical paradigms. His notion of social structures is derived to a certain extent from structuralism, (Giddens, 1979) and his notion of the unintended consequences of action is based on a modified version of functionalism (Giddens, 1979). Moreover the notion of agency refers to one perspective namely - the duality of structure but not to the other - social systems. When rules, however, as social structures are implicated in social systems or social practices then the notion of agency becomes subsumed under the rules produced in action. The notion of agency is made residual in one perspective of his social theory to do with social structures and only implicit in the other perspective dealing with social systems (as intentions rather than agents with intentions).

I propose a different format for an account of psychotherapy as social critique. In this format there are:

(a) values which pre-date action (social mores past and present)
(b) agents who draw upon such values in their actions
(c) values which post-date the action which have consequences for others as well as these agents.

The agent as an evaluator (with prior stocks of knowledge) regarding values must evaluate values (b) and incorporate such assessed values within their present and future social practices. In a hylemorphic approach the evaluator co-imply the evaluation of social practices.
So far I have concentrated upon general attributes of agency such as knowledgeability, intention and general powers or capacities. These are general competencies. Bhaskar (1987), Harre and Secord (1972) have pointed out, though, that as well as general competencies and capabilities and powers, there are particularities regarding competencies. Persons have certain individual competencies of their own. Persons, also, have a range of altering particularities that give them their singularity or haecceity e.g. one's childhood being differs in some respects from one's adult being and adult being differs from one's being in old-age. Their thisness is thus not a cluster of personality traits for thisness or haecceity is incorporated within their social history. Their thisness is altered to some extent through that autobiographical history and contributes to the alteration of that particular history. However I have indicated that the person is not so much just "in history" but that the social autobiography involves persons in ongoing relation to their institutional practices.

Apart from a few behaviouristic therapy programmes, persons in therapy interviews spend much time talking about themselves and also like everyone else they perpetually "defend" themselves through their thisness. Establishing thisness or a person's particularity is important and fundamental to the psychotherapeutic discourse. Smail (1984) has stated that persons hide behind their particularity (or the more idiosyncratic features of their particularity) and are fearful of revealing such particularities even in the safe havens of therapy interviews. Part of the therapy procedures has to be confirmation of this thisness; sometimes with some of its defences more or less intact. Thisness or haecceity, though, should direct rather than limit one's approach to one's social practices and should help moreso to confront some of the constraints in social practices. In the case-studies discussed in Chapter 4, the psychotherapeutic problems of Colin and Bess can be understood by their thisness or haecceity in relation to their social practices.

Mackay (1975) stipulates that among the behavioural therapists there are those who believe that the individual should be the object of study in his or her own right.
Frank (1983) comments that the history of the individual case is of crucial importance for the work of the psychotherapist and in psychoanalysis the unique history of the patient is of the greatest importance. "Meyroff (1962) also maintains that psychoanalysis only works so far as the reconstruction of the history of the individual is considered. The dilemma for Allport (1940), Frank (1983), and Meyeroff (1962) is whether to privilege explanations based on the ideographic particularity of the individual or to privilege explanations based on the general laws of behaviour in which the individual's behaviour is an instantiation of such a law. Bhaskar (1987) indicates, also, that the agent plays a special role in the verification of his or account of conduct. But knowledge is never epistemically self-certifying. I suggest rather that the problem should be diverted and considered in the terms of person's thisness or haecceity in hylemorphic relation to social existence.

I propose that the notion of thisness or haecceity has five significant qualities, which distinguish it from ideas of personality traits that are constant over a variety of circumstances. These qualities include as follows:

(a) both the Harrean form of personhood and selfhood. In the case of thisness or haecceity the emphasis is on the individual self who controls his or her action and has points of view including a "world view" arising out of his or her belief system, stocks of knowledge and the memory "traces" of his or her autobiographical history. Guattari (1972) considers such a notion as the very fabric of a person's most intimate existence made up of events of contemporary history, at least those that have marked him or her in various ways.

(b) persons having not only generalised species-specific attributes such as knowledge-ability and generalised competencies (which include intentions) but have individualised renderings of these attributes. (Bhaskar 1987 and Harré 1983)

(c) personal autobiographies such as that of the "Barmitzvah boy" and the ritual practices of the Barmitzvah celebration.
(d) selfhood established by the Harrean notion of self with the indexicals of the pronouns "I" and "me" and the self's embodiment in the indexicals "over here" or "over there".

These four qualities of the individual have already been discussed in my account of psychotherapy but they are drawn together by the notion of thisness or haecceity. Along with a fifth quality they form the constituents of the person's thisness or haecceity.

(e) The fifth quality involves the personalisation of language. I establish this idea via Rorty's (1989) social philosophy but I do not base it on his notion of selfhood. Rorty suggests that selves are not universal beings defined by their universal essences. Selves are created when persons begin to individualise language, or in his terminology, selves come into being by being redescribed in language. The individualising of language occurs mainly through the personalisation of metaphors. The latter for Rorty offers ways of diversification and change in human existence. Such a notion is important in the procedures of psychotherapy and can be illustrated in terms of four examples. The first is furnished by persons who use metaphors as a defence mechanism. A common example of this is students who turn the terminology of psychoanalysis back on itself when such students consider their psychological problems in terms of classical Freudian metaphors such as male aggressive instincts. The second example concerns the lay stereotypical metaphor which is interpreted by Rorty as a platitude. The third example is where the metaphor is again stereotypical but is used by the person to crystallise their psychological problem (very often underlining common human predicaments). The final example is illustrative of Rorty's "original" or innovative metaphor. In this latter case the person is using language to probe, sum up and describe his or her psychological difficulty. This individualised use of language is more often than not complemented by a greater degree of bodily relaxation: a differential colour change in the face, especially above and below the lips and a greater lightness of tone in the voice.

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In more general terms Rorty can point to a different focus in which to consider the idea of language. A focus which suggests, that we are not simply in language or that we cannot escape language, or that we can be defined as language users; nor yet that language as conversations is organised as the principle by which explanations of social existences can be elucidated. What Rorty's conceptualisation of language suggests that as well as having indexical features such as "I" and "me" that there is also an indexical use of language which makes it mine and contributes to the notion of my thisness. I have found persons in psychotherapy, who simply subscribe to stereotypical contemporary icons such as a "psychotherapy of feeling", deny the process of exploration of their own and any one else's social adversities. Such processes of exploration are the essence of psychotherapeutic practices and betterment The difference between Rorty's proposals and mine though is that persons' particularity including their use of language arises out of their sociolinguistical practices and contexts. (Harré, 1983) This compares with Rorty's separation of social being and individual being in which social being is purely an aggregated form of individual being.

Having indicated a different approach to the concept of self, the notion of thisness must also co-imply the notion of social practices.

In the 1980's, second and third generation Asian immigrant women came into higher education and chose colleges offering their preferred academic subject area. They did this rather than living in the parental home and going to local colleges which may not have provided for that particular subject of study. Their Asianness was being further filtered through Western education and other Western institutions such as U.K. halls of residence but their social identity was still Asian. Because of that filtering process, however, there was more of a diversity as to how they related to their Asian institutions and part of that filtering process for some involved leaving home and having a career compared to the previous immigrant generations. When the students talked about their personal difficulties they were often talking about themselves and their own agential power, or lack of it, in relation to Asian institutional
social practices. The point I want to make is that they had their own singular or haecctic relation to their Asian institutional practices in which their haeccticity was important to them. To one person who embraced traditional Indian values, I suggested that she seemed to be the incarnation of Mother India and she said that was her nickname (this is how the therapist can open up the discussion regarding metaphors). This person could not hide behind traditional agrarian community values of a past era in India. Nor did she herself want to. But she wanted to retain the Hindu religious and social practices and the values inherent in them that counteracted forms of Western individualism. She wanted to be part of an extended family in which she and other women could take up careers and raise their own family within it but contribute time and money to the family network. Another person wanted to be more politically motivated and wanted to be part of the U.K. political culture. It was important for her to obtain a career in broadcasting or journalism through which she, rightly or wrongly believed, allowed for a political voice. Another wanted to radicalise her Asianness in terms of altering practices in Indian culture. Another person wanted to come out as a gay person and another wanted to be a gay Asian which incorporated and emphasised their Indian culture. I am not referring just to groups or aggregates of individuals.

Each person in therapy had a particularity in terms of their Asianness and that their thisness was linked to the social practices as they were interacting with them. Others had to deal, each in different ways, with the cultural sanctions imposed on them by their parents or sanctions, in respect of their behaviour, placed upon their parents by the elders of the community.

Having indicated a different approach to the notion of self, the notion of thisness must also co-imply the notion of social practices. Some persons have greater difficulties than others with regard to either the values which are institutionalised in their culture or to the changing contexts of their cultural values. There were some who suffered more than others from the dislocation process of the latter. Such dislocation effects is the essence of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the schizophrenic which is characterised by them as the nomadic subject. The nomadic subject has no
fixed identity, no fixed location and no fixed function. He has become
deterritorialised and refuses to be categorised by or succumb to social codes or
conventions. The nomadic subject is representative of Hanif Kureishi's particular
characterisation of his hero in the "Buddha of Suburbia" (B.B.C.2 film). The hero is
representative of the deterritorialisation of the nomadic subject or the dislocating
cultural effects pertaining to immigrants in a new and different culture.

Hanif's play the "Buddha of Suburbia" captures the qualities of the thisness of
a young immigrant third generation Indian in relation to his shifting institutional
contexts. He was literally searching through Asian institutions, some more
westernised than others, to find some form of enlightened collective affordances that
enabled him and others to be able to recognise and articulate what was happening to
Asians in the dislocation processes of their society. There were parallels in his search
to the "lines of flight" of Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenic in which "he was not
seeking liberty or escape, simply a means of movement, a way of transforming the
situation." What the "contemporary Buddha of Suburubia " found were Asian music
cliques or art or other social cliques; some were seemingly radical and some not, but
all were cut off from the information or knowledge that could lead to, or go some way
towards their collective political and moral enlightenment and solidarity. They were
cut off, in addition, from the contribution each could make to that enlightenment. The
cliques seemed to be overtly self-conscious and self-reflective social aggregates or if
not that, bounded by a form of social simulacra or pretence rather than any true
questioning of values pertaining to contingent social practices and to what was
happening all around them. The "Buddha " was not left simply feeling personally
alienated within the existence of a single being but his haecctiy was incorporated into
one line of flight after another searching for contact with what Guattari (1972) terms
the groupe-subjet (the group-subject) as distinct from the group-assujetti (the
subjected group). The latter group has exclusive membership, is hierarchically
organised, operates within received codes and conventions (reterritorialisation) and is
determined by other groups. The former groupe-sujet calls "into question its goals,
and attempts to articulate new significations and form new modes of interaction. "allowing for new possibilities to be dealt with. (Bogue 1989:86) Such groups are more likely to force obfuscated powers into the open (which are hidden in instrumental procedures of decision-making and policy making) and allow for greater political and civic participation.

Finally, Hanif in an interview given in Desert Island Discs (B.B.C. Radio 4 programme, May 1996) stated that at some time recently he had visited Pakistan for the first time. Like the nomadic subject he had become socially deterritorialised. His Pakistani Indian relatives paradoxically stipulated that he, Hanif was a Paki but alternatively that they themselves were Pakistanis. Hanif concluded the interview by indicating that although he had a British mother he was not a Western British person or a westernised British person - nor as he now realised was he a Pakistani - but that his cultural identity was incorporated in what would be equivalent to my notion of thiness or haecity. I believe, though, that what gives people their ethical security is this notion of thiness or haecity in relation to their social practices and activities with others. I consider it to be an important feature of an account of psychotherapy, especially the therapist role of recognising, confirming and encouraging the significant aspects of the person in therapy's thiness while discouraging its redundant or destructive aspects.

6 Micro- and Macro- Conduct

An account of psychotherapy, especially in terms of social critique has to recognise both micro- and macro-conduct and also the manner in which they are related or not related. For there are institutional constraints of macro-conduct that are directly implicated in persons in therapy's micro-conduct. An example of the macro-institutional practices of economics and poverty directly and indirectly affected the father's relation and conduct to his daughter as discussed in the case-study above. But also one has to recognise that micro-conduct can be uncoupled from macro-conduct as Habermas (1975) and Giddens (1991) have drawn attention to. This uncoupling,
for both Giddens and Habermas is a contemporary phenomenon. Habermas has sought to identify the problem of the uncoupling of macro-conduct from micro-conduct and to offer the means to prevent its occurrence, if possible. Giddens has not offered solutions but gives an explanation of its happenings and consequences.

Collins (1981), Archer (1986), and Giddens (1984) enter the debate over the relationship between micro- and macro-conduct and put forward various arguments with regard to the relation between them as well as questioning and offering various interpretation of each other's terms and methods of analyses. The debate is centred on whether aggregates of persons at the micro-level are to be the models for analysis or whether analysis, as Archer (1986), indicates, has to be conducted at the level of macro-practices. If neither of these have to be privileged there follows the question of scope as to where one places the level of analysis in the continuum of the processes of face-to-face interaction through to large-scale institutional practices. Harré (1979) considers that it is impossible analytically to achieve a unified mode of analysis that incorporates both micro and macro-practices. He has preferred to integrate overlapping commonalities from both social psychology and micro-sociology into micro-conduct and to explain institutional organisations by hypothetico-deductive methods. (Harré, 1979) Social phenomena do not always have observable features and are difficult to measure- for example rules or patterns of society that exhibit large scale regularities. Hypothetico-deductive methods are based on the idea of a theory consisting of a set of statements which involve logical rules that would allow for universal generalisations on the nature of society. Others like Shotter (1983) have maintained that these disciplines such as sociology and psychology have their own region or boundaries that have to be examined in terms of their own adequacy, constraints and modes of analysis.

The debate surrounding micro- and macro-conduct and their interrelation has been conducted mainly in terms of social integration (micro-conduct) and system integration (macro-conduct). The former is defined in terms of the reciprocity of co-present action or communication, by most social theorists. System integration has to
do with long term enduring institutional practices either in terms of organisations such as the state or in global terms of international companies. Archer (1986) suggests that there are problems with regard to Giddens' approach to the relation of macro - to micro-conduct. Archer comments on Giddens social theorising,

"Thus the crunching up of...transformation and recursiveness (equally salient and eternally operative ) and of moment and totality (no sequence only simultaneity), is now joined in his 'dimensional approach' by a compacting of the micro- and the macro-, which are not teased out in scale and time. (Archer1986:76.77)"

Archer comments further,

"Once again the duality notion has produced two unreconciled images :the one presents the 'principles' as governing the 'modalities' (the macro-dominating the micro-), the other portrays the 'modalities' as cyclically transforming the 'principles '(the micro-directing the macro-). The attempt to interrelate them fails on logical grounds, the attempt to identify the principal components also fails on practical grounds. (Archer,1986:79)"

Habermas (1975) has provided a fuller explanation of this uncoupling process. But also a greater degree of uncoupling has occurred since his original discussion of it. He has brought together 4 terms to cover system integration and social integration, namely the family; official economy (family economy), state, and public opinion. One axis runs between private family economy and private life world and the other runs between the state as public system (state organisation/administration), and public-opinion making. They interconnect through the two axes but the themes that are important for an account of psychotherapy as critique is the politicising and splintering of family, or life world of public opinion from the political machinery. There is a general uncoupling of the state from family life except at the level of the consumer or at the level of the recipient of welfare (now itself being uncoupled).

In the early 1980's, the mining and shipyard industries were in decline and by the late 1980s there appeared a new group of student - the economically redundant male student. These students indicated that they were seriously involved in their courses. Most produced competent essays and those who took a social science course involving counselling options and other social science subjects could debate various
academic issues in relation to counselling theories and other social theories. However in quite a few cases they could not sustain the demands of the course on personal grounds and they opted out of the academic system. Many of them had early educational and social constraints which had placed them in secondary modern schools. Thereafter there were family pressures to go into mining or the shipyards. There seemed to be family network pressure, especially on "sensitive boys" to go into the shipyards or the mines and the common theme was "it will make a man of you". Many of them had detested the sexual and physical apprenticeship rituals. They had joined heavy industries in order to get a steady wage and a job for life but most of them disliked the working atmosphere. For the camaraderie which provided the cohesion of the work force could also turn against its members, with various degrees of cruelty if they did not uphold the integrated norms of the socialising processes at work. The retraining courses which were being offered to them were in job areas in which there was already an over-capacity and they would have been in competition with fully apprenticed and experienced workers. They had a cynical attitude to the notion of suitable government retraining schemes. Neither had they been over-willing to re-enter education as mature students. But there were no other economic or welfare prospects. In addition they had a cynical attitude to the fact that they often had to academically comment on Lemert's (1967) notion of the "underdog" while as they believed it, they were also one of them in real life. It is an ironic example of the participant-observer role demanded by much of modern social science.

However what was happening to them was that they firstly, as noted above, had to endure the constraining influences of their early environment i.e. academically bright children who did not have the "educational nous" to bypass the secondary modern school system. They were pressurised to go into heavy industry and there were no alternative careers available. But secondly, in re-entering education, the life-world at home was being split or uncoupled from the higher-educational institutional practices. This had not occurred when they attended their secondary-modern school. In the latter case, relatives, friends and work-mates had been to the same school and
were part of an integrated symbolic life-world. When they proceeded to use the
educational resources, the second time round, to obtain different opportunities, this
macro-world was splintered off from their micro-world. They suffered on both
counts: one was the macro- and micro-world of early constraining influences without
any career or educationally stimulating opportunities and the other was the
disembedding features of the micro-world uncoupled from the macro-world in both
its educational and work aspects. On the first count as Fuhrman (1986) indicates
modern societies do not always function or maintain themselves in the present but on
the second count they do. In the case of these mature students societies are operating
on two different temporal zones. He further comments that modern societies do not
exhibit the coherence that some social theorists puts forward - rather such societies
are non-synchronous as they are 'multi-layered' in time and space. Often according to
Fuhrman spatial differences such as class-divisions are mediated, complemented and
contradicted by such temporal zones. (Fuhrman, 1986:78)

Finally it could be said that Habermas (1975) was guilty of gender blindness
or gender insensitivity. He had either placed women in the private domestic symbolic
role or ignored their part in the family economy and public opinion making process.
There are though greater escalating processes in the dissolutional aspects of society
compared to what he has put forward. During and after the miner's strike, women had
begun to be involved in the organisation of family welfare groups and from there, join
womens' groups and from there, came into higher education. One of their reasons for
coming into the psychotherapeutic milieu was that they wanted to work in counselling
at the end of the course. But they had started to understand counselling in terms of a
reflexive notion of the self. They embraced, as discussed, above a form of self-
therapy grounded in self-observations and (what they would believe) as a
reconstruction of a new self out of contemporary notions of womanhood "we are not
what we are but what we make ourselves " What was happening also was that these
miners' wives were contributing to the splintering of the micro- from the macro-
worlds as they implemented their day to day actions. They no longer were interested
in the demise of the mines and its mining culture. Also, by endorsing the principles of individualistic counselling they were severing themselves from references to both macro and micro-environments.

What had happened, in fact, was that some of the women were leaving their long term partners and going to live with other men, and some of the women with other women. Others wanted independent lives. Husbands came back home in the evening to find that both wives and furniture had gone and gone for good, even when the wives were pressed to come back. Secretively, the women had taken off and entered a self-contained and morally neutral existence. They were also using their bodies, and the withdrawal of them within the sphere of distal power. In broader terms they were acting out society's forces without having knowledge of what really was happening to them. In the process of doing so they were contributing to the dissolution of their social structures and practices. What was happening though compared to the men, was that the women were beginning to realise new competencies and possibilities in education and other life-chances, whereas the options of the men's social existence were being narrowed down. The men were victims of their economic social constraints; plus their previous masculine North-East role was being eroded by the new power-role of the women. Manicas (1987) suggests that one cannot simply describe the world or achieve consensual meanings one must first ask whether its members have an adequate understanding of their world. In some ways the men had an understanding of or knowledge-ability of their previous economic situation, its values and its boundeness but such knowledge is now decontextualised and redundant for them. Along with this they no longer had an understanding of their masculine identity which was previously defined in terms of their then social relations to women in addition to other men. Such knowledge was being decontextualised as well. Fuhrman (1986) in Morality, Self and Society: The Loss and Recapture of the Moral Self in his explanation of modern societies states that they exhibit spatial and temporal unevenness and dysjunctures so that their social
structures do not hang together very well. The moral cracks and crevices of such structures are exactly what the actor has to negotiate. (Fuhrman, 1986)

7 Conclusion

It is doubtful whether there can be a compelling argument made for an individualistic account of psychotherapy. What needs to be considered is what type of social and moral account with its political implications is truly adequate. The account has to consider the processes of contemporary society and the personal trials they give rise to. Conversely psychotherapeutic provision must be made for such personal trials and the contexts that gave rise to them.

In order to have an adequate account of psychotherapy, provision must be made for the modalities of micro-conduct, macro-conduct and agency and the influences and dysfunctions occurring among them. Psychotherapy theory and practice must be considered as a practical intervention in society and it has thus a role as a critique of society and a critical force in altering society. Nagel (1979) considers that ethics must be focussed within hierarchical organisations and institutional practices due to their impersonal qualities and the mediateness of the consequences of persons' actions in large scale organisations.

In this chapter I have continued outlining my proposals concerning values for the centring of an account of psychotherapy. I have backgrounded my account by considering Giddens' (1979) notion of personal and social existence in his conceptualisation of the duality of structure. I have had to extend my version beyond his proposals for persons in relation to their institutional practices. I have managed to reformulate the notion of the duality of structure through O'Gorman's (1986) notion of hylemorphism in which persons and their practices are co-related. I have allowed for different time-scales for agents and their social practices by bringing in the terms pre-dated institutionalised values (supplied in stocks of knowledge and memory traces) and post-dated values pertaining to persons' actions (practices) and their
consequences. I argue for a social theory that is organised around the principle of social and moral values rather than the Giddensian one of rules.

Although the notion of agency has species-specific attributes they by themselves will not occasion psychotherapeutic betterment. The therapist has to appeal to the person in therapy's own intentions, knowledge and capabilities. The monitoring of these involves the practical skills of the therapist. But over and above this the therapist has to confirm the person's particularity within his or her life contexts but suggesting that some contexts be altered while some be retained. The altering of the contexts conditions a different mode of conduct for the person in therapy.

I have continued the theme of ongoing autobiographies. It is only very simplistic forms of behavioural stimulus and response programmes that do not seriously consider the encompassing autobiographical data given by the person in therapy. If one does not consider the notion of personal and social autobiographies within a psychotherapeutic theory, how do psychotherapists commit themselves to the belief that the future of persons in therapy (i.e. in terms of their psychological betterment) will be different from their pasts? I have used the notion of autobiography in different terms from other social theorists who consider autobiography as narrative or story telling in which language is primary. (Barthes, 1985) Autobiography as I understand it requires to have a trajectory of self as past, present and future but conceptualised in terms of a developing being in relation to their social practices (a developing being which presupposes persons having a growing grasp of capabilities and potentials and knowledge in order to alter such practices as they developmentally interact with them).

There is one final point which is important for the way I have conceptualised the notion of autobiography and countered the notion of autobiography as narrative or as a chronicle of episodes or narrative conceived as a story telling function which would have analogies with fiction. Barthes (1967,1985) and Selman (1989) indicate that there is an increasing movement towards social theories being expressed in terms
of the discourse of literature. This is occurring through the privileging of structuralism or semiotics as social theory. Barthes suggests that,

The world of the literary work is a total one, in which all knowledge, social, psychological or historical, has a place, with the result that for us literature has that great cosmogonic unity which the ancient Greeks enjoyed but which are denied today by the fragmented state of our sciences. (Barthes, 1967:410)

Barthes continues

That is to say that structuralism, itself developed from a linguistic model, finds in literature, which is the work of language, an object that has much more than an affinity with it; the two are homogeneous. ....We can understand then why structuralism should... be... a linguistics of discourse, whose object is the 'language' of literary forms... (Barthes 1967,412:413.)

For me the individual's personal trials and their embodiment in physical suffering of high levels of anxiety such as panic attacks, loss of moral viability and heightened adverse social factors such as unemployment cannot be incorporated into literary forms, which are essentially fictional works which have no encompassing reference to any living person.

The reason I have had to draw on fictional representations like the "Buddha of Suburbia" is because of the dearth of examples of moral conduct or moral collectivities in any of the approaches to psychotherapy. As Rorty notes,

Fiction ...gives us the details about kinds of suffering being endured by people to whom we had previously not attended. That is why the novel, the movie, and the T.V. program have, gradually but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principal vehicles of moral change and progress. (Rorty,1989: xvi)

Persons' psychological problems in reality cannot be grounded though within fictional discourses. Psychotherapeutic modes of reality dealing with the shifting contingencies and contexts of persons social existence at particular spans in their life cannot be reduced to pre-structured fictional forms. What is required is a theory of psychotherapy that allows for the person in therapy to be considered within his or her social and moral contexts, and explanations of his or her psychological disaffections to arise out of the relation of such persons and their social environments. But the last words must be with Baier (1985) and Smail (1987). Baier stipulates that,
Moral agents also need theories, or rather the reliable facts good theories produce - facts about the way people react, about the costs and consequences of particular ways of life, on those who adopt them and on their fellow persons. We need psychological theories and social theories, and, if we are intent on political change, theories about political power and its working, and about economics..... moral reflection is empirically informed, that is to say informed by psychological political and historic knowledge, and it is also practical, a reflective version of real motives in real-world situations. (Baier,1985:233,238)

Smail maintains from the perspective of the person in therapy,

In order to change things for the better - in order, that is, to be able to act morally - the individual must have the moral space in which to do so. This is not something which people can create for themselves as private individuals, but something which is socially created and maintained through the proper use of concerted (political ) power. (Smail ,1987:161)

Notes

1. Ritzer (1983) indicates that term structural-functionalism can be used as one term or two terms. Giddens (1979) firstly separates the terms but thereafter attempts to make them interdependent at certain points in his theory e.g. the structure of any organisation is determined by the function (the systemness) it has in society.

2. The other references to structures by Giddens (1979,1984)are one, the structural principles which are implicated in societal totalities. These are standardised practices which have the greatest time-space extension such as the enduring governmental practices of nation- states. The second reference has to do with structural properties involved in the processes of structuration. The latter are considered as the systemness of social relations across space and time, in virtue of the duality of structure.

3. Structures: rules structure actions; structures are virtual, they have no existence of their own. They exhibit properties and are organised as properties of social systems.

4. One of the implications of "the structural" in structuralism is its synchronic characterisation in which language is made present or instantiated in speech. The backgrounding to this idea is that in the processes of instantiation of the spoken word a universal grammatical order of language (syntax and semantics) is brought into being with its presence manifested in speech. The analogy of action with language brings in problems, however. Action is a much more open indeterminate process and cannot be defined within the more closed system of grammatical utterances.
Chapter 6
Chapter 6 Conclusion

1. Introduction

My account of psychotherapy is a moral account (with political implications), involving persons and their micro- and macro- practices. None of these three modalities can be excluded from an adequate account of psychotherapy. Persons are social beings interacting with others and are embedded in enduring institutional practices. The focus of my account is the political and moral features of contemporary practices and the means available in relation to the practices of social psychotherapy for their analysis. These social features have influenced and/or socially constrained those persons who come to psychotherapy. As Giddens argues no one can opt out of the problems of modernity with its disembedding features. Bauman (1990) Habermas (1986) and Giddens (1991) indicate that the problems of modernity make people seek out psychotherapy. Smail (1993) has reversed the traditional notion of the case-study in psychotherapy and entitled one of his chapters "A Case-Study: the 1980s". What needs problematising is the sort of world we live in with its business, professional, political and moral practices which, in the main, form the origins of persons' psychological disaffections. One cannot, thus, have an account of psychotherapy devoid of a critique of society in which there is no intent to question society and its practices. Moreover in the processes of assessments of the values pertaining to social practices some alternatives must be found and attempts made to make social matters
other than they are. The person in therapy has a central role to play in this. Habermas comments,

I cannot imagine any seriously critical social theory without an internal link to something like an emancipatory interest. That is such a big name! But what I mean is an attitude which is formed in the experience of suffering from something man made, which can be abolished and should be abolished. This is not just a contingent value-postulate: that people want to get rid of certain sufferings. No, it is something so profoundly ingrained in the structure of human societies ___ the calling into question, and deep seated wish to throw off, relations which repress you without necessity ___so intimately built into the reproduction of human life that I don't think it can be regarded as just a subjective attitude which may or may not guide this or that piece of scientific research.(Habermas,1986:198)

2 Accounts of Psychotherapy
In order to establish an account of psychotherapy, I firstly had to find out if traditional modes of psychotherapy were adequate for grounding my account of psychotherapy. I have contested the adequacy of individualistic mainstream accounts on a number of grounds: their views of human nature, their concepts, procedures and claims of validation. None has been empirically substantiated over time (Smail 1978, 1993).

The two most important cognitive and behavioural psychotherapies have operated out of the Cartesian schism of inner mind and extended physical body (observed behaviour). As a result these are two rival and incompatible accounts. Where there have been attempts to integrate accounts of psychotherapy to include both cognition's and behaviour they have often been conceptualised as a two-step process rather than an integrated theoretical approach (as exemplified in Meichenbaum's ,1977, and Bandura's ,1977, two-step mind and behaviour approaches to psychotherapy). A similar problem resides in attribution theory where the inferred causes of behaviour have been attributed to either situations (an external cause) as suggested by Nisbett (1975) or attributed to persons (an internal cause) as suggested by Kelley, (1973).

There have been doubts as to whether persons and their situations can be effectively integrated within an attributional approach Burke (1962).Howarth (1989) in a review of theories of, and approaches to psychotherapy demands greater scientific
substantiation based on research findings. He indicates that there is now a greater consensus within theories of psychotherapy and such consensus should be the focus of research. But I argue that what he is assessing are not integrated theories. For the main two theories have irreconcilable views on human nature, irreconcilable perspectives of psychotherapy and incompatible grounds for theorising.¹

There are other worrying problems with regard to approaches to psychotherapy. One of the problems is the removal of any social implications from the notion of self-theories. In Rogers' (1973) theory of psychotherapy, the notion of the self-concept was obtained from socialising processes involving what he termed significant others. In Winnicott's (1965) case he underlined his approach to psychotherapy with the necessity of the early bonding of mother and baby. There is reference to a social dimension in psychotherapy in both cases although it tends to be offset by the conceptualisation of the organismic self (Rogers, 1973) or the true and false self. (Winnicott, 1958)

However, there seems to be a greater dissociation of the notion of self from forms of sociality. This is inherent in Rainwater's (1989) proposals for self-therapy where the self is intrinsically self-referential. Giddens endorses her notion of the reflexive self. Such a notion requires what Giddens has termed the continual reorganisation of the self due to the collapse of the enduring traditional institutional practices which gave persons their continuity of social identity. Giddens' statements point up the way in which an emphasis on individualism is being retained or reintroduced in accounts of psychotherapy (exactly the opposite of what is happening in psychology where ideas regarding cognition are being socially contextualised as Reed, 1991, indicates). This desocialising of the self in psychotherapy also indicates something much more questionable occurring within Giddens' own writings. His initial commitment was to a theory which recognised the social domain at the level of institutional organisations and their structures of domination. (Giddens 1979, 1984) However modernity which is marked out by a greater number of social transitions is less emphasised by him at the level of society and he refers moreso to the problems of...
the self-in-modernity. For he stipulates that "such transitions are drawn into and
surmounted by means of the reflexively mobilised trajectory of self-actualisation."
The reflexive project of the self involves a process whereby self-identity is constituted
by the reflexive ordering of self. (Giddens, 1991) It is as if one polarity of Giddens'
central concept in his social theory has been made residual. In the process of the
analysis of society he has tended to reconstitute society's dysfunctions within his own
theorising rather than identifying limits to and critiques of these dysfunctions. O'Neill
(1986) critically refers to the excision of society from social theory as sociological
nemesis and Lash and Urry (1986) refer to it as "the dissolution of the social."

There is an equally worrying problem in the social theorising of Handy
(1987), Holland (1977) and Newman (1991). They endorse one "vocabulary" which is
realised in critical social theory in terms of the institutional constraints of macro-
practices but they refer to a totally different "vocabulary", that of micro-conduct in
which to ground and establish their social theories. Each of these authors is writing
from a different perspective but each of them wishes to establish an adequate account
of psychotherapy which takes cognisance of the institutional conditions and
constraints influencing persons in therapy. However, all contain their social theorising
within an interactionist approach. Missing from their accounts is the notion of agency
within social contexts and the nature of such contexts and the means of eradicating
their socially demeaning effects through the auspices of capable and knowledgeable
beings. Paradoxically, these radical critical theorists request that theorising in
psychology and specifically clinical psychology should consider the interplay
between social structures and individual subjectivity while at the same time
dispensing with it within their own theoretical interactionist approach. This is
exemplified in Handy's statement.

Radical critics of psychology, are in essence, condemning the discipline's
propensity for focusing on the psychological aspects of social reality without
grappling with the problem of how objective and ideological features of society
influence the psyche. One of the most common themes they raise is the discipline's
failure to deal with the political and historical contexts of human behaviour. (Handy, 1987: 161)

What is required and provided for in psychotherapy as social critique are the three modalities of persons, their micro and macro-practices. Firstly it is necessary to include both macro- and micro-practices. For persons inhabit the world in joint activities with their siblings and intimates and these activities are conditioned by the cultures, institutional practices and economies - in other words by the social environment which surrounds them. Secondly the relation between the micro- and macro-practices must also be considered both in terms of the influences of traditional macro-practices upon micro-conduct and also the contemporary uncoupling of macro-practices from micro-practices. I have illustrated in one of the general case-studies that persons in traditional cultures can suffer the effects of both the social and economic constraints of a low-wage or unemployed industrial background along with the uncoupling of the locale of work (macro-conduct) from the locale of leisure (micro-conduct). The effects tend to deny males both their male identity and economic identity along with their overlapping features. (Fryer and Ullah, 1987)

I have organised my account of psychotherapy around two dualities. One duality has expressed the relation between persons and their social existence, in terms of micro-conduct. The other duality has expressed the relation between persons in therapy and their social existence in relation to their macro-practices. The person in therapy with his or her agental features is the common factor between the two dualities. There has to be an active being intentionally responding to and interacting with the social practices of the social environment and what it offers. This involves a developing feedback process between the two which is constraining but directive and which allows the person to actively modify his or her social environment. 2

I have provided for the necessary agential features of the person in therapy within the species - specific attributes of powers, intentionality and knowledge-ability with a recognition that such attributes can also be particularised. The important point is that each of the attributes are defined by a relational approach to personal and social

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existence in which the one co-implies the other. Also each of the attributes forms an overlapping cluster with the other attributes so that they complement each other. The notion of intentionality is the key to the alteration of social practices by the person in therapy. This notion of intentionality also requires social and personal powers which allow both for the capacities to act and for the powers of control to make things different. (Giddens, 1984, Harré 1983) The third notion, that of knowledge-ability is also a key concept in my account of psychotherapy. According to Harré (1978) social knowledge is drawn upon by persons to formulate intentions in order to perform appropriate acts. Social knowledge or rather knowledge-ability involves stocks of knowledge as personal and collective memory traces upon which persons draw for their discursive and action orientated activities. The central notion of psychotherapy as critique has to do with practical knowledge founded on skill or practice. With regard to knowledge as practice I have argued, like Giddens, that knowledge in certain aspects is "available" and I suggest also that the social environment "yields" knowledge. (Giddens, 1984:91,375) For example, the "outdoor monumental" sculptor obtains knowledge from the social environment from which he will compose his sculpture which will fit into a particular social and physical landscape. He does not create or invent such knowledge. The architect, similarly has to carry out much the same task with regard to public buildings. The social environment thus yields knowledge which has to be considered within the conceptual, symbolic and structural forms of the sculpture or building. Such practical knowledge is a two-way process involving the practitioner practising his or her skill in relation to the information offered by the social environment.

In the case of psychotherapy as critique such knowledge involves ethical knowhow which links together the motifs for an account of psychotherapy as critique. There is not just a relation between personal and social existence but a relation which specifies both as a skill-based propensity. I have provided for this skilled phenomenon in terms of the notion of an evaluator and values, which pertain to social practices by drawing on Gibson (1966) and Manicas (1990). The
evaluator/practitioner discriminates and intentionally selects from the values pertaining to relevant social practices. This discriminative process is not just a comparative process but is one which allows for the selection of alternatives from "in situ" social practices. I achieve the moral account of psychotherapy through the notion of ethical knowhow but in addition I supply the concept of moral exemplars. The notion of moral exemplars sets my account against other moral accounts of psychotherapy and the way they have been conceptualised. But the term exemplars also integrates psychotherapy as critique by means of the way I have conceptualised it. I have defined the notion of exemplars as samples which like any particular sample has to go through a process of assessment. The assessment proposed for a psychotherapy as critique is that which is advocated by Deleuze and Guattari (1990) and by Foucault (1980) as "experimentation" and problematisation" as a continuous enquiry into values whose effects can be assessed and other action taken on the basis of that assessment. The form of assessment is not an adjudication process which is an end in itself, but is one which diachronically leads to change or offers other possibilities, albeit with successes and failures on the way. (May,1993)

Such assessment processes, moreover, include an enquiry into what upholds values rather than values being regarded as solely given, presupposed or intuited. Such an enquiry is theoretically central to my account and is the basis for the procedures of psychotherapy. Further, with regard to the notion of values or exemplars I have proposed a dual account of values for the discourse of psychotherapy based on Crook's (1991) notion of a dual relation for values . In my account, I have proposed that values pertaining to social practices are available as information. But they have to be queried as to what upholds and what obfuscates them and in terms of who makes the judgement and on behalf of whom. The important point is that the mediated form of information or knowledge comes out of the non-mediated form. For example, the values associated with assertive psychotherapy are underwritten by certain economic values immanent in society. One would examine and assess the values pertaining to the psychotherapy and its practices
and relate them to and assess them within the broader features of, economic and political individualism. Bogue comments, "An evaluation of values must start with the differential origin of values, with a determination of the way of life that creates those values." (Bogue, 1989: 17)

My proposals for psychotherapy have set my account against individualistic accounts of psychotherapy as well as against, other moral and social accounts. In addition such proposals have set my account against the critical social theories of Bhaskar (1989), Baudrillard (1983), Habermas (1972), Deleuze and Guattari (1990) - they have either used a paradigm of psychotherapy modelled on Freud and Marx or in the case of Deleuze, Guattari and Baudrillard obtain their model for social theory through counterpointing a Freudian/ Marxist account.

I have introduced the notion of a relational and developmental account with persons either being in contact with others through certain activities or persons being in contact with their more enduring institutionalised practices as macro-conduct. With regard to micro-conduct, I have drawn on Still and Good's (1992) notion of persons setting the social context for others in a dynamic and dialectic process of development. The unit of analysis is focussed on goal-directed activities and the contribution each person makes to the activities (each person specifying the further contexts for the other and producing the continuity of development). In like manner the therapist discusses with the person in therapy the social contexts to be set for future activities with intimates and colleagues. A key to the nature of psychotherapy as social critique, however, is that the person in therapy is involved in two sets of activities with other persons. One set of activities has to do with the psychotherapist and the other has to do with their own social activities outside of the psychotherapeutic situation. I have named this the "two worlds" of the person in therapy. Radical accounts of psychotherapy have tended to ignore the mediating role of the therapist; and traditional accounts have ignored the values immanent in society which affect the person in therapy. I have related these two worlds through the interventions that the therapist makes via the details given in the autobiographical
history of the person in therapy and dealt with in the discursive processes of psychotherapy. I have termed these interventions "transformation points" and they mark the intersection between the psychotherapeutic discourse and the discourse of critical social theory which involves a critical review of society's practices and values.

3 The Recentring of the "Social"

I have found the conceptualisation of the relation of persons and their institutional practices problematic for various reasons. Giddens has been generally commended (Heft, 1989, Shotter, 1983) for the central tenet of his social theory, namely the concept of the duality of structure incorporating a relation between persons and their institutionalised practices. The practices refer in the main to rules instantiated and expressed in social practices (social systems). But there are several theoretical problems with Giddens' notion of the duality of social structure as indicated by Archer (1986) and Kilminster (1991). In order to bypass such problems I have substituted the notion of values for that of rules. I have then allowed values in institutional practices to both pre-date and post-date persons and their practices. The agent has access to pre-dating values within present stocks of knowledge as value resources akin to Harre's (1983) knowledge resources. Values also post-date the person since acts of persons, with their concomitant values, have consequences which effect their own and others' institutional practices. The common factor in the pre-dating and post-dating features of social existence is agency. The notion of agency is not simply a trajectory of self with a past, present and future in time for agents have changing social histories; in part occurring through agents acting upon the social environment and thereby altering that particular relation between their social contexts and themselves as agents.

I have argued against Baudrillard's social theorising (1983) which indicates that the bipolarities of concepts such as agency and social structures are no longer tenable. His argument relates to what has been termed the "end of the social" and the querying of the necessity and rationale for social theory itself. There are two
important issues with regard to what is regarded as "the end of the social". Firstly, society - its institutional practices and its politics - can no longer be investigated or questioned or evaluated. Moreover if social theories do not exist there can be no critical "seeing through" of society based on empirical enquiry and research. Further there can be no new theories making positive scientific advancement on the old.

Secondly there can be no introduction of a social theory involving social practices into the discourse of psychotherapy. Accounts of psychotherapy will then be encapsulated within theories of the mind or self and the latter two are for some social theorists debatable issues also. It means further that the tradition of enquiry and research into social factors and their relation to the dysfunctioning (in terms of anxiety and depression) of the person in therapy cannot be upheld or further developed if one is working outside of social theories and social research.

Belle (1982), Brown and Harris (1978), Goldberg and Huxley (1980, 1992) have all examined specific social circumstances related to specific types of psychological disorder. In the latter's 1980 study, and their review of other studies considering the relation of social factors to psychological difficulties, Goldberg and Huxley found that there was a predictable outcome at six months, for persons who were psychologically ill and who were attending psychiatric clinics and who had adverse material and social circumstances. Jarman (1983, 1984) has constructed a numerical score consisting of eight categories of underprivileged groupings of the population which bears a positive correlation (+.87) with psychiatric admissions to hospital. The categories are positive indicators of the relation of social deprivation to psychological illness. Five of these categories are: one parent families; unskilled workers; unemployed people; overcrowded homes; and ethnic minorities. These are not independent variables, as effecting causes of mental illness but they are more generally what Huxley and Goldberg term as "proxy" variables. More research studies are required with regard to persons in therapy and the influences of adverse social circumstances and institutional constraints upon their psychological health. Many other variables need to be taken into account and Goldberg and Huxley indicate that a multivariate model is required.
in order for hypotheses to be tested regarding the way social and environmental variables might relate to psychological ones. A multi-dimensional model will give information about the common factors of such psychological illnesses. Additional variables required are population variables (information of how psychological illness is distributed across the population); dimensions and levels of morbidity; diagnostic categories; vulnerability and predisposition factors; and types of external stressors. Goldberg and Huxley indicate that there is a possibility that there are specific links between types of social disorders and psychological illnesses. The problem as they state seems to be a very real one demanding the attention of social science. These suppositions should have a theoretical rationale linking persons in therapy with their social institutional practices and circumstances. Such studies indicate that accounts of psychotherapy have to consider the social implications of persons' psychological difficulties. It is a matter of concern if the discourse of psychotherapy is solely considered in individualistic terms without recourse to the social circumstances of, and the social constraints placed upon the person in therapy.

Other problems of social theories emerge in connection with another issue. Baudrillard (1983), Deleuze and Guattari (1990) and Rorty (1989) argue that there can be no universal referent such as the unconscious or the self. There are only contingent selves. Their philosophies and theories are representative of what is termed discontinuist theories which involves a break or discontinuity from the theories of the past. (Khun, 1970) In fact, I have opposed such a discontinuist role for theories of psychotherapy. I have proposed a continuist role for social theory but with certain reservations. I achieve what I want for my account of psychotherapy by centring it on Harré's (1983) reformulation of traditional notions of selves which can organise experiences and have their own point of view (albeit drawn from sociolinguistic practices). What I advocate is the idea of humans having both personal and social characteristics, with autobiographical personal and social histories and who alter their social practices as they interact with them, thereby altering their social histories. Paradoxically I make use of the theories from the discontinuists such as Deleuze and
Guattari. I supply the notion of persons having characteristics and they supply the notion of these characteristics having continuity over time but a continuity which in certain respects can alter over time. The extension of traditional theories into more contemporary contexts prevents the disclaiming of what is still important in social theories but allows for more innovative approaches to emerge.

4 Approaches to Psychotherapy

The case-studies illustrate the principles and practices of psychotherapy as social critique, and the parameters of psychological difficulties. The psychological difficulties are not resolved by appealing to notions such as mental predicates but by looking at contemporary social factors and how to countermand them. The focus is on what could be termed the de-ethicalisation of human relations either in the form of the Giddensian "pure" relation or Bauman's notion of "mismeetings". Giddens' notion of the pure relation is a central feature of contemporary psychological difficulties emerging from contemporary modes of the ways persons relate to each other. The pure relationship operates only so far as persons are fully autonomous beings within the relationship. That is why self-knowledge and self-reliance, according to Giddens, are so important. For it makes one's dependency on the other person less necessary - or the need for the other person or partner to give one, one's identity since external referents (or criteria) are unobtainable within or outside of the relationship. The pure relation exists and lasts only in so far as persons can obtain rewards or psychic returns for themselves. Bauman's notion of mismeetings is in part an extension of the pure relation in which there are only morally neutral and "disinterested" intercourses between persons. Such notions of social encounters form part of the larger sphere of moral abuses that contextualise the psychological difficulties which persons bring to psychotherapy. Most personnel in the psychotherapeutic profession would agree that persons in psychotherapy have been victims of forms of moral abuse (some with political and economic implications and some involving de-ethicalised relations and sometimes the two together). However few psychotherapists and commentators on
psychotherapy would consider that alleviating and countering moral abuses would be the most obvious response to, and direct means out of psychological difficulties.

It is inconceivable, though, that psychotherapy as social critique could be universally prescribed to cover all psychotherapeutic problems and their solutions. No single theory of psychotherapy can be the panacea for all psychological problems. Certain behavioural programmes including relaxation exercises in systematic desensitisation programmes have a part to play with persons with anxiety syndromes. (Wolpe, 1958) There are also those persons in therapy who, either through their own desires or by virtue of their problems require a more structured behavioural approach to therapy procedures such as might be involved in alcohol dependency counselling. I would offer the rider, however, that an enquiry into ways of living - and their related long term and short term goals - has to be part of the features of such psychotherapy. For these will have conditioned the problem in the first place. There always has to be some relationship between what conditioned the psychotherapeutic problem, the modes of access to it and the psychotherapeutic recovery within the person's own social contexts. Psychotherapy as social critique will, moreover, have little relevance for short term counselling support such as envisaged for types of crisis counselling. Although psychotherapeutic approaches involving assertive training encourage persons to take stands in relation to issues concerning other's behaviour, such "assertive" psychotherapy is contained within Western traditions of self where might is logically entailed within right. Such a view is central to persons acquiring assertiveness in their behaviour as envisaged in Alberti and Emmons Your Perfect Right (1974) and Stand Up, Speak Out, Talk Back! (1975). In every walk of life the ideas stemming from assertiveness has had a reductive effect. MacIntyre (1992) rightly comments that the division between non-manipulative and manipulative social relations have been obliterated. MacIntyre's comments underwrite most of Argyle's (1975) notion of social encounters with specific references to communicative controls.
I would hesitate in certain circumstances to impose a moral psychotherapy on persons who thought that morality had no part to play in their lives. Examples of the latter might be no-hope teenagers or persons who had committed certain crimes against persons. I would consider, however, where and how morality could perhaps be part of these person's lives without necessarily wanting them to accept a set of rights and duties within a benign moral order or within terms of that order which seeks simply to suppress violence. There are other aspects of social existence where a moral psychotherapy should not be automatically offered without qualification. There are those who use moral conduct as a form of compliance with others and who in fact hide behind an apolitical moral order where moral issues are not debated or moral stands taken up (including the manner in which other persons behave towards them). There are other persons who are already on the moral high ground but who have been victims of again skewed relations along with generally demeaning ways of life. They lack the impetus to engage themselves with the world and in their own words and terms do not lead fully satisfying lives. Such a view is representative often of left-wing students with high political and social ideals, who can sometimes retreat behind their own form of idealism. However there are those already on the moral high ground for whom social reality is not obfuscated. They however cannot advance any way to enhance their lives socially or economically and no further probing into their past will be enlightening either for themselves or their therapist. Psychotherapy, especially moral therapy in such cases seldom reveals the ways and means of psychotherapeutic betterment.

5 Some Limitations to My Account of Psychotherapy and Some Further Possibilities to Extend It.

I obviously have not solved any of the traditional philosophical problems with regard to the concepts of intentionality or knowledge. In both cases, though, the problems can be slanted differently in ways which are more conducive to my central tenets of personal and social existence. The concept of intentionality has both subjective and
objective features. The subjective features have to be active and exploratory with respect to altering the objective features of social existence. In the case of epistemological factors concerning the subjective and objective features of knowledge the key lies in the conceptualisation of knowledge as practical knowledge which persons both draw on and use for further exploration. This is what I have termed as the knowledge-ability of the connoisseur. It is a skill that requires constant feedback between its objective and subjective features. In terms of my account of social psychotherapy I have termed it ethical knowhow.

A more general approach to ideas pertaining to the notion of objective knowledge needs to be directed towards the Giddensian notion of "available" knowledge (Giddens, 1984) and the Gibsonian notion of the environment "yielding knowledge". These terms need further addressing, defining and elaboration. It is through the probing of these concepts and reformulating them within a social context that a more appropriate social theory for psychotherapy can be achieved. Gibson (1986) himself indicates that knowledge is an extension of perception and this is a crucial factor in developing my account of psychotherapy. I believe that the lines of development and means to achieve a more general account of knowledge must begin from Gibson's (1986) central postulate that (wo)man and his or her social environment co-imply each other. For me the notion of the active nature of cognitive beings exploring their social environment as they interact with it is one of the most democratic principles in psychology. By extension persons are critically engaging with the world by means of an active co-relation to it, in which they are critically aware of the world and their place (or identity-positioning) within that world. As stated above persons have discriminatory and evaluating propensities by which they can judge social and political affairs.

Gibson's postulate in addition must override Harre's (1983) and Jensen's (1990) social theorising in which social existence and personal existence are disconnected terms because of a lack of a connecting principle between the two. The use of terms such as realisation and appropriation are not connecting principles. It is
only if one starts with the Gibsonian notion of personal existence co-implying social existence that one can avoid such Kantian splits. This Gibsonian notion also avoids the converse of personal existence being subsumed under the linguistic features of social existence. Further lines of development could consider different aspects of Harré's (1972, 1990) social theorising in which he endorses Gibson's social theory of perception. The important dimensions of perception are those that specify the environment and persons relation to the environment. Harré indicates that this approach must be taken into account in experimental work in which person's capacities to behave in certain ways may be centred or abrogated by the laboratory situation. However this endorsement of Gibson's theorising runs counter to his proposals for social psychology in which people are viewed as moral beings and embedded in normative orders. Harré thus adopts both a Shotterian hermeneutic and a Gibsonian realist perspective. There is a possibility that these two perspectives could be reconciled. In its classical form scientific realism must consider reality as being independent of human thought, beliefs or social knowledge or the product of social practices. Harré himself does not subscribe to such a classical mode of realism. Following a perspective of Gibson's own theorising he maintains that science is a set of techniques (both cognitive and practical) about what is invariant in the world but not independent of it. However this does not solve the problem that arises from his request that social psychology has to be centred also in a normative discourse. There are two ways out of the dilemma. One is to consider morality in the empirical terms that Baier (1985) does. The other is to offer a different relational form for the discourse of psychotherapy. Baier comments,

The... moral philosophy Hume practised was a mental geography of our powers of reflection, and our reflective practices.... His sort of moral reflection is empirically informed, that is to say, informed by psychological, political, and historical knowledge.... The psychological theory is... empirically testable, and so is the political theory.... we should be looking for new and better ways both of designing our own role, and of conducting our reflection on and examination of the moral practices of our time.... the important aspects of the latter are its nonrationalism ,and its version of the relation between moral philosophy and the actual practices in which appeals to
moral judgements are made and in which morality makes a difference to what is done, thought, and felt. (Baier,1985:236,238)

What is valuable in Harré's proposals is the idea of active beings having manipulatory and cognitive powers and propensities in relation to their social environments. But I propose, however, that the relational model be considered as a form of field theory. A field is a relational notion and forms a system of co-existing factors which are not mutually exclusive but which are interdependent and influence each other. In social psychology, field theory was extensively employed in the theorising of Lewin (1938). More recently Harré and Madden (1975) have drawn upon the notion of field theory in relation to their concept of powers. In the psychotherapeutic literature Rogers (1973) has made passing reference to the term (in relation to Combs and Snygg, 1959). There is also Smail's more political contexts of fields of powers which include embodied personhood and macro- and micro-conduct and the social, political and psychological influences of the one upon the other. (Smail, 1993, Figure 3:74)

Harré, in fact, offers a conceptualisation of a relational field of powers in his use of the idea of fields of potentials. There are thus ways to consider field theory apart from Lewin's notion of force fields with positive and negative valences seeking a tension reducing equilibrium. Harré (Harré and Madden, 1975:175,179) recognises powers or forces in a relational form but equally important for my account is that he maintains that "we must ascribe to the field a certain power of acting"...."once its potentials have been invoked" ...."In short the field has to have something of the character of an agent" which in my terms also requires knowledge and intentionality if it is to be considered for human contexts. On the one hand such a field of powers with their enablements and liabilities can be set against Deleuze and Guattari's (1990) notion of powers and forces. They establish that such powers or forces are relational but metastable with no fixed identity or function. They are differentially related to each other and only obtain their value from each other. They are, though, subjectless and agentless. On the other hand a relational format can gets over the problem of
powers as non-changing thing-like entities. For such powers in a field of powers must be in relation to something else and can induce change within its sphere of influence. In human terms this must refer to persons, micro-practices and macro-practices. It could finally link in with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of powers or forces representing either a dominating or dominated perspective of powers and Smail's concept of the field of powers in which powers are either assimilated (absorbed) or transmitted depending on the dominating or the lack of dominating influences of powers.

6 Conclusion

My account is neither wholly an action based account but one which allows for deliberation and debate through the notion of the assessment of social values as moral exemplars. Neither can my account be considered as intellectual argumentation for it is theorised around social practices (actions or rather conduct) and the enquiry into certain of such practices. Although my account cannot be considered as one with determinate law-like invariances, I have made the notion of regularities and the patterning of such regularities an essential vehicle for psychotherapeutic betterment and a necessity for any social theory. I have use the notion of developing skills as the regulatory methodological processes of psychotherapy. Skills co-imply knowledgeable persons and their practices and skills allow for practices to be modified by a feed-back process. The "contents" of the skills are evaluations of social values and the skill in this case is ethical knowhow in terms of judging values and then drawing upon them in one's conduct. In my moral account of psychotherapy I have avoided embedding social values in a normative discourse prescribing what persons ought to do or who they ought to be. I have also avoided the idealism of utopias about how the world should be. However I have countered a normative discourse for another reason. Namely that we are embodied in a material world as well as a social world and I have reinforced my account with the views of both Baier (1985) and Smail (1993) who advocate that moral and social theories be empirically
tested. The indices that Goldberg offers discussed above are representative of material deprivation as well as of social deprivation. By not using a normative prescriptive account I bridge the logical gap between facts and values and social and natural orders.

The notion of autobiography is extremely important and must always be theorised in any account of psychotherapy. Those who do elide the notion of autobiography from their approaches to psychotherapy are not offering adequate accounts of persons and their psychological difficulties. For without the notion of autobiographies altering historically there can be no concept of psychotherapeutic betterment. A key point concerns the way I have conceptualised the notion of autobiography. It holds together my notion of persons with identities which alter as a result of social and historical factors (this is the concept of identity and difference in which persons are the same beings but are beings with evolving social histories which in certain senses alter their perspectives of the world). My notion of autobiography as the social self-in-activities rather than a narrative self is also very important. It distances my account from one in which there narrative-self constructs or invents his or her identity in the processes of the evolving narrative. It also distances my accounts from those social theories which consider narrative in terms of fictional orders. (Barthes 1985) What is required to be established as Smail (1993) indicates is the empirical justification for the social practices we enact or inflict upon others.

This means reconsidering the nature and notions of (wo)man and the nature and notions of society that enables better social practices. The way I have conceptualised agency or personhood having knowledge, intentions and powers as active beings in relation to their social practices - altering them as they interact with them - sets my account against other accounts. This particular emphasis on a knowledgeable and active agent sets my account against other accounts of social theory which can be given the general term of a critique against irrationality. Such a critique of irrationality enters into theories in anthropology, in social psychology and in psychotherapy and tends to in varying degrees to "pathologise" the person. Smail

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Illich (1985) Ingleby (1981) and Deleuze and Guattari (1990) speak out against the conceptualisation of this in accounts of psychotherapy. The major proponent of the pathologising of the person is the psychoanalytic discourse in which the explanations of person's irrationality is dependent on the claims (unfounded) of rationality manifested in the scientific rigour of psycho- "analysis". The critique of the irrational also enters social psychology in that only bizarre, unfamiliar and puzzling actions (which paradoxically come under the heading of "ordinary explanations") require explanations. (Antaki 1981, Harré 1972 and Shotter 1983) In both cases there is a polarisation between rational and irrational explanations that is sometimes unnecessarily paralleled by the proposal of the rational scientist versus the less than rational layman. Smail (1987), Rorty (1989), and Bauman (1990) from opposite perspectives ask for an increasing sensitivity towards what they consider as unfamiliar sorts of people (strangers) with unfamiliar practices and for people in collectivities to underwrite this sensitivity.

I have distanced myself from tacit accounts of psychology. One has to look at accounts of psychotherapy not in terms of the polarities of tacit versus discursive or rational versus irrational forms of knowledge but in terms of what Foucault (1984) indicates as what is knowable and what is sayable and what is the converse of this as what is unknowable and unsayable and involves the suppression of social orders and social institutions and discourses and various forms of sociolinguistic supressions. "In every historical formation of knowledge configurations of forces dictate the conditions of visibility and enunciability of all possible objects of knowledge." (Baugh,1993:63) Another problem is the extent to which psychological problems contextualised as individual pathologies have entered the lay world and one has a therapeutic society with its expanding influences on the way society is conceived. This critique comes from various perspectives Bauman (1990) MacIntyre (1992), Smail (1984), and Illich (1985). Each alerts one to different perspectives of this process. It is only Giddens(1989) who in his analysis of modernity considers the increasing role of psychotherapy as an inevitable consequence of the disembedding
processes of society. He among the others is not condemning the double slippage of questionable psychotherapeutic theories into the lay world and their revamping again within social theories. The problem also is that the psychotherapeutic theories which he endorses have increasing notions of the intrinsically self-referential self, self cocooned from the mishaps occurring in society.

What I have in mind is that persons do not have self-referential selves obtained through self-observation. (Rainwater, 1989) Nor can persons be considered as emotive selves with only choices and preferences and no objective means of moral evaluations. Neither can the notion of personhood involve only self-actualising processes with their occasional peak sensory experiences. What is required is the notion of the ethical security of the person through establishing his or her thisness or haeccty in relation to ethical practices. This always requires deliberation and effort.

In many ways my account could thus be considered as promulgating the Western individual with the virtues of effort and skill in action complemented by a rational belief system. Rather it is a timely warning that if we take away the place of knowledgeable and ethical security from people who should be drawing upon it in their daily lives then the truly irrational forces will take over.

"If you do not comprehend the necessity to criticise society, then indeed you must be mad". (A. Hind, 1989, Author of The Dear Green Place).

Notes
2. Giddens (1979, 1984) rightly argues for a feedback cycle which can occur only through some monitoring process of intentional and knowledgeable beings. He thus makes a distinction between his notion of a feedback loop and those social theorists who have opted for some form of momentum or drive which delivers a feedback loop between effect and cause.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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