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**Reading Plato's *Hippias Minor*:**

**Introduction of a methodology for reading Plato's dialogues**

**and**

**Analysis of the *Hippias Minor***

**A thesis**

**submitted to University of Durham**

**for**

**the degree of Master of Letters**

**in Classics**

**By Akitsugu Taki**

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**Durham**

**1995**



**- 8 JAN 1996**

Akitsugu Taki

**Abstract of *Reading Plato's Hippias Minor: Introduction of a methodology for reading Plato's dialogues and Analysis of the Hippias Minor* (a thesis for M.Litt., 1995)**

This work presents a reading of the whole and parts of Plato's *Hippias Minor*, independently of his other dialogues, on the premise that we cannot legitimately reduce Plato's characters' speech in a dialogue to his indirect speech. Hence the crux is analysis of Plato's interlocutors' interplay, but not his thought or Socrates' doctrine. The *Hippias Minor* properly provokes in readers intertwined paradoxical questions centred on two conversational conclusions: 'All and only false men are true' and 'All and only those are good who do injustice as they wish to'. In reply to Socrates' fishing question in Homeric context, Hippias, shackled by his boast of polymathy, allows the possibility of deceit as achievement, despite his persistence in the usual dispositional sense of honesty. This unanalysed idea of Hippias' and Socrates' rhetoric invites Hippias' public downfall. He is forced to accept the first conclusion by his commitment to the commissive sense of 'speaking falsely' and the reciprocity of ability with actuality. Led into a respondent's role again by Socrates' long *ex post facto* speeches, Hippias resists Socrates' push towards the moral implication of the first conclusion: the preferability of those who do injustice as they wish to. Socrates rhetorically pushes Hippias to the preferability by a circumventive arrangement of analogical topics and, further, by a trilemma argument on the assumption that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge. Each time Hippias affirms the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions, but he rootedly rejects the preferability. Socrates does not necessarily commit himself to the craft-analogy and justice as a knowledge, but, finally, questioning the existence of those doing justice as they wish to, scuttles the trilemma argument. Socrates' implication by this question is irreconcilable with his preceding presuppositions, but he suggests Hippias' inconsistency in his commitment to justice in an achievement sense.

**The material contained in this thesis has not  
been submitted for any previous degree in  
any academic institution.**



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## Note on References and Abbreviations

I use the following abbreviations for ancient authors and works on the basis of those listed in Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon*.

5 Plato, *Alcibiades I* = *Alc. I*

id., *Apologia* = *Ap.*

id., *Charmides* = *Chrm.*

id., *Cratylus* = *Cra.*

id., *Crito* = *Cri.*

10 id., *Epistulae* = *Epi.*

id., *Euthydemus* = *Euthd.*

id., *Euthyphro* = *Euthphr.*

id., *Gorgias* = *Grg.*

id., *Hippias Major* = *Hp.Ma.*

15 id., *Hippias Minor* = *Hp.Mi.*

id., *Ion* = *Ion*

id., *Laches* = *La.*

id., *Leges* = *Lg.*

id., *Lysis* = *Ly.*

20 id., *Meno* = *Mn.*

id., *Menexenus* = *Mx.*

id., *Phaedo* = *Phd.*

id., *Phaedrus* = *Phdr.*

id., *Politicus* = *Plt.*

id., *Protagoras* = *Prt.*

id., *Respublica* = *Rp.*

id., *Sophista* = *Sph.*

5 id., *Symposion* = *Smp.*

id., *Theaetetus* = *Tht.*

Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* = *EN*

id., *Ethica Eudemia* = *EE*

id., *Physica* = *Ph.*

10 id., *Historia Animalium* = *HA*

id., *Problemata* = *Pr.*

id., *de Partibus Animalium* = *PA*

id., *Metaphysica* = *Metaph.*

id., *Topica* = *Top.*

15 Aristophanes = *Ar.*

Homer, *Iliad* = *Il.*

id., *Odyssey* = *Od.*

Xenophon = *Xen.*

Thucydides = *Th.*

20 Demosthenes = *Dem.*

Aeschylus = *Aeschy.*

Euripides = *Eur.*

Sophocles = *Soph.*

By *LSJ*, I refer to Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edition revised by Jones and McKenzie.

I refer to Plato's works by the pages and sections of the edition of Stephanus, Henri Etienne, Paris, 1578. The following numbers are the lines of Burnet's edition (*Platonis Opera*, 5 vols., Oxford, 1903-1907). I refer to Aristotle's works by using the pagination of Bekker's edition (Immanuel Bekker, *Aristotelis Opera*, 5 vols, Berlin, 1830-1871). Other ancient works are referred to according to the Oxford Classical Texts.

Modern books and essays are normally referred to by their author's name and the date of publication of the first edition, if no other specific edition is significant, to indicate the chronological order of the related studies. Full publication data of cited works that I have used are given in the bibliography.

I refer to Professor Stokes' oral and marginal comments only by his name in some endnotes. In our tutorials about my earlier versions of this work, he very often said that he was making not assertions but questions about my work. Even in his marginalia on his copy of my earlier drafts, he often did not forget to indicate by punctuation that he was asking about my passage or his own reading. Hence, exactly speaking, in that case, I should refer not to his *suggestion* but to his *question*; for he did not commit himself to my opinion. So by his name only I refer to his proposition embodied in his question and I do thus in order to indicate that my idea concerned did not come right without his speech or marginalia on my work.

## Introduction: the Objective of this Work

This work aims at presenting a reading of Plato's *Hippias Minor* as a whole, by putting into practice a justifiable method of reading Plato's dialogues. I will consider a methodological approach in the first chapter, and apply its results to the *Hippias Minor* in the second chapter. I wish my readers to trace each step of a general hypothesis and its application.

I will, in a general introduction, make the outline of my work clear, reserving my particular supporting arguments for their pertinent sections in the main part.

The range of this work does not go beyond reading a text. I do not refer to Plato's biography or the synopsis of Plato's corpus. This restriction is entailed by my answer to the question how we can legitimately approach Plato's dialogues.

'Reading' is used equivocally in ordinary language and the matter theoretically has not been fully analysed. I attempt to evaluate different recursive and reasoned readings of my own and others' and choose one according to the relevancy to the whole and parts of a text.

To present a reasoned reading of a given text, we have to ask what statements we can legitimately make about it. My answer concerning reading Plato is that I do not pursue reduction of Plato's 'implicitly fictional' dialogues to his indirect speech as organised assertions but take them as fictions.

My general premise is that interlocutors exchange a given expression in a real conversation but not necessarily the same value of the expression in the same conceptual scheme. The premise is theoretically open to question; it requires



investigation of a propositional act to be established. However, I leave it open in this work.

Following this premise, I maintain that in a written work in dialogue form, readers are *prima facie* given an interactive exchange between interlocutors. Therefore, in a dialogue of Plato, readers are *prima facie* given an interactive exchange between interlocutors but not Plato's speech directed to us. What Plato's readers can do first is to analyse the given interactive exchange.

Taking the author's point of view, we may legitimately ask what literary conventions Plato availed himself of. But I only provisionally regard Plato's work as an inexplicit fiction until we have acquired some established notion of Socratic writings by the historical investigation of Socratic writings as a literary convention. Rather my attempt is to ask what readers can do with a given form of a text.

My contention entails, first, that readers are given an interactive exchange, irrespective of the author's indirect intention, although a given text by Plato is not a literal script of a real conversation but a script of what Plato conceived. Plato governs and permeates the whole conversation and every expression exchanged between his interlocutors. Nevertheless, the expressions in a dialogue as Plato represents them appear to readers *prima facie* to be exchanged under the interlocutors' interplay.

Further, my premise implies that we cannot decide whether Plato, who probably also circulated the whole to his contemporary readers, supported or resisted any belief his interlocutors hold or represented any interlocutor's speech

---- not without considering other dialogues.

In sum, we cannot approach Plato's indirect speech, if any, through his portrayal of conversations until we have a notion of Socratic writings. The reason is that we cannot decide how and in which particular passage of a dialogue Plato transformed his own speech in his real context into his interlocutors' speech in his 'fictional' context.

A positive result is that instead of rounding off a 'wiry'<sup>1</sup> conversation, we analyse the functions of ambiguities and fallacies in a given conversation. Whether or not Plato instills any such deficiencies into what he conceives as proceeding in a conversation, any exchange *prima facie* appears to readers to be liable to personal divergence in communication. Although the same public circulating expression is exchanged, personal divergence as well as impersonal isomorphising force in encoding and decoding systems is a necessary accompaniment in communication. My task is to describe such interplay in a dramatic conversation; Plato's interlocutors' intentional deficiencies and conscious negligence are, though, to be distinguished or identified so far as possible.

Generally speaking, my method follows the interpretive assumptions, suggested by Stokes<sup>2</sup> and reformulated by me, as follows: (1) reading Plato's dialogues in the first place independently but not interdependently; (2) reading a whole of a particular dialogue, but not a part, whether the part may be categorised as 'philosophical' or 'literary'; (3) exploring the contextual relationship between the parts and the whole. Accordingly, my position is irreconcilable with the working hypotheses, suggested by Kraut<sup>3</sup>, and Irwin<sup>4</sup> and reformulated

by me, as follows: (1) Socrates' remarks in Plato's dialogues are the full or open expression of Plato's philosophy (or the historical Socrates'); (2) Plato uses dialogue form as a device to give his (or the historical Socrates') real opinion; (3) we have historical evidence on Plato's intention in his philosophy (or the historical Socrates'), especially, Aristotle's evidence<sup>5</sup>; (4) therefore, by interpreting Plato's main interlocutor's intention in his speech according to Aristotle's evidence on Plato's intention, we can deduce from a particular passage in Plato's dialogues what Plato (or the historical Socrates) believes and why.

Plato's Socrates' speeches before and after his question about a proposition are so treacherous in respect of his commitment to the proposition embodied in his question that Plato's text has given some ground for the attempt to reduce Plato's dialogues to Plato's direct speeches through Socrates' direct or indirect assertions.

Lastly, I refer to my reason for choosing the *Hippias Minor*. First, I think it worth trying to apply the method to the *Hippias Minor*, to which it has not yet been applied<sup>6</sup>. Secondly, while the Socrates's in the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Gorgias* clearly are taken by their interlocutors to argue for some positive beliefs, the Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* seems murky. Therefore, it is still significant to present a reading of the whole and parts of the *Hippias Minor* independently of the Socrates's in other dialogues.

## I. On the Method of Reading Plato's Dialogues

How can we approach Plato? When we read the dialogues, we talk much about Plato. However, how can we legitimately make statements about Plato? What did Plato intend to say? If we assume that Plato was expressing his own philosophising in writing dialogues, how should we understand his dialogues? How can we answer these questions? First, let me roughly portray a methodological situation and, then, argue about a specific problem of reducing Plato's dialogues to his arguments.

How far can we reconstruct Plato's historical life, setting aside his writings? Plato would have done other things besides writing dialogues, such as ordinary conversations<sup>7</sup> with his friends or lectures, if he gave more than one<sup>8</sup>. However, we can get little on the whole<sup>9</sup>.

Then, what can we know about Plato from his writings? The dialogues give us few autobiographical events. *The Seventh Letter* tells us some but its authenticity is controversial. Unfavourably, if we admitted the view in the letter that he wrote nothing serious in his writings<sup>10</sup>, all we obtain from his dialogues are nothing but rich and 'laboured' jokes, although they are better than nothing.

Then, how else can we approach Plato in his dialogues? How can we know what Plato intended to say indirectly in writing dialogues by using a literary convention? If we had been familiar with his ordinary discourses, we could have presumed, when we read his dialogue and found his voice in his character's lines, that it is just in this passage that Plato instilled his ordinary speech. Even so, he



gave no authorised key to transform his dialogues to his speech. Then, how can we know what Plato was thinking just when he was writing this or that passage in his dialogue?<sup>11</sup> Plato might have been thinking his characterisation of his *dramatis personae* and the whole process of the dramatic conversation, but how can we know what Plato was thinking indirectly from what his character is saying?

The situation is like this. A composer composes a piece of music and for its premiere, he asks a conductor to interpret it through his written score, which will be copied and continue to circulate. He gives the conductor many instructions on how to represent the score. The conductor learns how to supply what the composer did not fully express in notation. Then, is the conductor privileged to interpret the score according to the composer's intention? Is even the composer privileged to represent its final form?

In such a situation, we face interpretative problems such as a relation between an author's work and his or her intention in writing it or that between the background and the foreground of a work. However, I believe that we still have to consider the methodological questions of reading Plato's dialogues. We have already unreflectively introduced interpretive assumptions, including philological ones, in reading a text.

For example, when we turn over any leaf of Platonic studies, while we are shown scholarly references to a particular passage of Plato's dialogues, we are sometimes embarrassed that we do not easily understand on what interpretive assumptions a particular statement about Plato or Socrates is made in respect of the quoted passage. We are not told the method of reading or the established

consensus of stating something about Plato. Nevertheless, my trivialism claims that if we quote a particular passage of Plato's dialogues out of context to support our statement about Socrates and Plato, we need to make traceable how we deduce the statement concerned from the passage. The above-mentioned expository style motivates us to ask methodological questions for fear of illegitimately getting into tacit interpretive habits.

As to preceding methods of reading Plato's dialogues, there have been rivalling and sometimes irreconcilable assumptions. Although not every writer makes explicit his assumptions in reading Plato's dialogues, when Plato or Socrates are mentioned in respect of their belief, doctrine, philosophy, or ethics, there seems, according to careful interpreters' remarks<sup>12</sup>, no established consensus, but only working hypotheses to be evaluated by the criterion of their fruitfulness.

Then, can we methodologically assume that any working hypothesis on reading Plato's dialogues can be evaluated only by evaluating its results? Can we not put its legitimacy into question, considering Plato's dialogues?

When modern interpreters deal with a dialogue, some tend to reduce it to something other than itself, such as his predetermined philosophical system, his philosophical development, his anti-dogmatic investigation, his philosophical discontinuity or unity, his autobiography, his biography of Socrates, his genius, his psychology, the socio-economical conditions in his life, and so on; some maintain that we can deduce nothing about Plato's thoughts from his dialogues. According to Tigerstedt and Bowen<sup>13</sup>, modern studies on Plato alternate between

such reductionism and skepticism.

As Bowen argues<sup>14</sup>, the claim of deducing anything but the portrayed conversations is methodologically illegitimate in that Plato has no position in dialogue form. Truly we can formulate the question 'What did Plato believe?' meaningfully, and probably Plato believed something when he wrote his dialogues. But how can we deduce Plato's belief from his dialogues? From his main character's beliefs?

Kraut denies that it is an a priori truth that a dialogue is not a treatise<sup>15</sup>. He urges that Plato used a dialogue form to express his own views, in contrast to Greek tragedians and comedians whose objective was to express what satisfied their audience<sup>16</sup>. Orators also might not necessarily have proposed their moral beliefs in their existing writings, but they must sometimes have appealed to the audience's moral beliefs<sup>17</sup>. However, how can we legitimately assume that Plato's Socratic writings were politically and culturally independent of ancient readership and censorship, psychological or not?

Kraut claims the truth of the hypothesis that Plato uses his main character to support his reasoned views and that he does not intentionally instill ambiguities and fallacies<sup>18</sup>. However, it is unclear to what extent this can explain Plato's representation of an interplay between Socrates and his adversary.

Irwin admits the following premises: (1) Plato took no role in the dialogues; (2) it is possible that Plato did not support the content<sup>19</sup>. However, he also denies that writing a dialogue is not writing a treatise<sup>20</sup> and defends on the historical data the view that Plato did not invoke any established literary convention but

used a dialogue form for 'presenting his own philosophical views'<sup>21</sup>. He maintains that Aristotle gives reliable evidence on Plato's intended expression of his own views in the dialogues<sup>22</sup>.

However, Aristotle gave no substantial analysis of Plato's dialogues. It is still doubtful whether there is any reliable instruction for transforming Plato's dialogues into treatise.

As to the reduction of Plato's act in writing the dialogues to Plato's direct speech, apart from the cultural significance of the constellation of ancient philosophical writings and Socratic writings, we can easily imagine, if we take the point of view of an addresser in communication, that Plato could have fictionalised his own beliefs into a variety of literary forms. However, when we are given a dialogue form of text, how can we readers deduce from the dialogues the views of a person absent from the scene or of an author who governs an exchange between interlocutors characterised by himself?

Reductionists tend to assume (a) that Plato used his main character, Socrates, as his mouthpiece and (b) that his Socrates performs assertions directly or indirectly<sup>23</sup>. However, his Socrates unfavourably often disavows knowledge and performs question directly or indirectly<sup>24</sup> in a controversial context of an elenchus<sup>25</sup>. Nevertheless, reductionists such as Santas<sup>26</sup>, Kraut, Irwin, Vlastos<sup>27</sup>, and Penner<sup>28</sup>, apart from differences in detail, deduce Socrates' positive beliefs from Socrates' questions, whether or not justified by Socrates' commitment to the propositions embodied in his questions, and Plato's beliefs from Socrates<sup>29</sup>.

On Socrates' disavowal of knowledge of the issue in the conversation, they

take it at face value and yet, for the reason that an unexamined belief is, according to Socrates' standard, not knowledge<sup>30</sup>, they interpret that his disavowal is not incompatible with his positive beliefs.

According to this interpretation, Socrates does not know the issue concerned; then, he asks a question because he wants to know his interlocutor's answer to his question about the issue, and he secures *his interlocutor's agreement to his belief as a proposition embodied in his question*.

Asking about a proposition is compatible with believing it<sup>31</sup> but also with *not* believing it. How can we know Socrates' belief from Socrates' question?

Some working hypotheses are: Aristotle's evidence on Socrates' and Plato's philosophy (Irwin<sup>32</sup>); Socrates' asking context in which he knows the answer to the question (Santas<sup>33</sup>); Socrates' justification in his denial of his interlocutor's initial belief as well as the inconsistency of a set of beliefs which his interlocutor holds (Vlastos<sup>34</sup>); Socrates' hints to solve conflicting beliefs (Penner<sup>35</sup>). As to this issue, Kraut does not deduce Socrates' belief; rather, he assumes that Socrates holds positive beliefs<sup>36</sup>.

Stokes cuts his way into interpretive reductionism by noting that there is no punctuation to signal assertion or question in Plato's original text and that the grammatical form of a given sentence should be critically decided<sup>37</sup>. He indicates that *either* Plato's Socrates' introducing a grammatically interrogative signal *or* Socrates' disavowal of knowledge and questioning stance is a proof that Socrates asks a question<sup>38</sup>. He admits that Socrates may or may not believe the proposition embodied in his question<sup>39</sup>, which is one reductionist premise, but urges that,

insofar as asking is not asserting, Socrates does not commit himself to the proposition<sup>40</sup>. Put another way, in asking, Socrates neither supports nor objects to the proposition embodied<sup>41</sup> or, possibly, he might not endorse even the presuppositions of his question.

5 Stokes' main point is that for interpreters, it is indeterminable from the situations inside the conversation, in which questions Socrates instills his opinion<sup>42</sup>. Moreover, instead of seeking how to dig out Socrates' or Plato's belief, he indicates that Socrates sometimes reformulates what he understands his interlocutor believes, in referring to his interlocutor's speech act, by what Stokes  
10 calls a diagnostic tagged question such as 'Do you say that ...?'<sup>43</sup>. Further, he suggests that Socrates does this not only in his question but also in his *assertive sentences*<sup>44</sup>. According to Stokes on Socrates' intention in introducing of interrogative or assertive forms, Socrates explicitly or implicitly reformulates his interlocutor's beliefs or seeks to establish them. Therefore, although Stokes  
15 admits that Plato's Socrates sometimes performs assertions, he maintains that the main point of a dialogue is not that Socrates expounds his opinion but that Socrates' interlocutor is compelled by his own previous admissions and character to accept the proposition embodied in Socrates' question<sup>45</sup>.

20 Against Stokes' general proposal<sup>46</sup>, Kidd, regarding it as etiolation of Socrates' questions, gives priority to Plato's governance of his fictionally portrayed exchange rather than to what is going on between dramatic interlocutors<sup>47</sup>. His intention is to make Plato's philosophising deducible, but his argument for promoting only Socrates' initiative is not valid because interpreters

cannot assume that Plato originates only Socrates' speeches<sup>48</sup>. However, his proposal implies that we should remove from the dramatic exchange the interlocutors' different understanding of the same exchanged expression, although dramatically and communicatively an exchange goes on under interaction. His position prevents this interpretively hazardous point by giving priority to Plato's governance. Apart from his commitment to this implication, his view suggests that we can see Plato carrying on an argument unhazardously.

Further, if Stokes means by 'a Socratic conclusion'<sup>49</sup> or 'Socratic tenets'<sup>50</sup> what readers recognise Plato's Socrates professes in a dialogue independently of his other dialogues, Taylor has the right to argue that Plato's Socrates attempts not only to show that his interlocutor is compelled by his admissions to commit self-contradiction but also to argue for his *beliefs*<sup>51</sup>.

Certainly, while one cannot commit oneself to the proposition in one's question, one can believe it; further, Plato's Socrates' interlocutors sometimes not ought to but can take Socrates to profess his belief in advance of his questioning or to have believed the proposition in his preceding question. However, even if Plato's Socrates always fishes out his interlocutor's initial assertion and, then, without making explicit his non-commitment, asks whether his interlocutor agrees to his beliefs, his inferential rules, and his conclusion inferred from them and contradictory to his interlocutor's initial assertion, could readers say that Socrates argues for his beliefs? If Socrates' interlocutor always consciously understands the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions *as Socrates expected him to understand them according to the same system of beliefs as*

*Socrates holds* and if he always agrees to the propositions, *he can take Socrates* not only to make public his self-contradiction but also to have argued for Socrates' belief by his answers. However, it is still open to question whether Socrates' interlocutor always understands the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions as Socrates expected him to understand them, and always agrees to the propositions<sup>52</sup>, even in a didactic context in which Socrates' interlocutor is ready to correct his previous wrong answer<sup>53</sup>. Thus it is still open to question for the interlocutor whether Socrates *argues* for his beliefs<sup>54</sup>. Contrariwise, whether or not Socrates always instills his opinion into his question inexplicitly to ask whether his interlocutor agrees to it, insofar as his interlocutor agrees not because Socrates believes it but because he believes it, his interlocutor is taken by Socrates and the audience to profess his opinion each time he responds.

Certainly, Plato offers some motivation to deduce Plato's Socrates' and Plato's beliefs. Plato's Socrates does not always make explicit, before and after asking about a proposition, his non-committal stance. He sometimes makes explicit what he believes before and after his question. Whether or not Socrates believes what he says he believes, his interlocutor often *can take him to* have introduced his belief into his question.

Plato's Socrates sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to profess that he is concerned with not his opinion but his interlocutor's opinion in asking a question<sup>55</sup>; sometimes with the proposition neutral to personal opinions<sup>56</sup>; sometimes with both him and his interlocutor<sup>57</sup>.

Plato's Socrates sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to profess his



opinion by some explicit indication<sup>58</sup>. On the other hand, Plato represents an exchange in which one's interrogative sentence is not taken by another as a question<sup>59</sup>. In questioning, Plato's Socrates sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to ask a question and not to assert his opinion, with some explicit indication<sup>60</sup>, for example, by assuming someone's question to his interlocutor<sup>61</sup>; sometimes, to assert his opinion indirectly<sup>62</sup>, even when his interlocutor admits that he performs a question<sup>63</sup>, and sometimes not<sup>64</sup>; sometimes, to ask explicitly whether his interlocutor agrees to his opinion<sup>65</sup>.

Specifically, (1) when Plato's Socrates uses the first person plural pronoun in his question, he sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to commit himself to the proposition<sup>66</sup>, although his interlocutor may be required to form his own judgement on the proposition embodied in Socrates' question. Then, (2) when Plato's Socrates deals with consequences of his questions and his interlocutor's answers, Socrates sometimes may be taken by his interlocutor to take upon himself the responsibility for the consequences<sup>67</sup> and sometimes not<sup>68</sup>. Further, (3) when Plato's characters use the verb ὁμολογεῖν and its related verbs συνδοκεῖν, συμφάναι, συγχωρεῖν<sup>69</sup>, συνομολογεῖν, in the context of a direct or indirect report of an answer to a question or a response to a statement, (3)-(i) they can be generally taken to mean 'admit a proposition while one's interlocutor does not commit himself to it'<sup>70</sup> or 'agree to one's interlocutor's opinion'<sup>71</sup> or ambiguously either<sup>72</sup>; (3)-(ii)-(a) Plato's Socrates sometimes can be taken by the supposed audience of his indirect report to mean by these verbs 'admit a proposition embodied in a question while a questioner does not commit

himself to it<sup>73</sup> and (3)-(ii)-(b) sometimes can be taken by the supposed audience of his indirect report or by his interlocutor to have instilled his opinion into his previous questions<sup>74</sup>, even into his previous diagnostically tagged question<sup>75</sup> or into his alternative question<sup>76</sup>; (3)-(ii)-(c) Socrates sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to be asking whether his interlocutor agrees to his opinion<sup>77</sup>, although Socrates sometimes requires his interlocutor not to say anything against his interlocutor's belief<sup>78</sup> and (3)-(ii)-(d) sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to be ready to agree to the proposition in his question by using the first person plural form of a verb<sup>79</sup> and (3)-(ii)-(e) sometimes Socrates' interlocutor can be taken by him or the audience to admit the proposition in Socrates' question whether Socrates believes it or not<sup>80</sup>.

It is, therefore, risky to generalise about Plato's Socrates' speeches in conversation although it is tempting to seek communicability with Plato by hypothesising that Plato instilled his reasoned beliefs into his Socrates' speeches and that his Socrates instills his and Plato's reasoned beliefs into his questions.

It is hardly determinable how Plato instilled his opinion into the dialogue; neither is it necessarily a sound approach to dialogues to deduce one interlocutor's statement from his interrogation and then, to deduce an author's statement from his. We have not yet any established notion of the literary convention Plato availed himself of<sup>81</sup>; Plato gave readers no explicit marks of his intention of writing fiction. Accordingly, readers must *prima facie* interpret a given message by Plato in accordance with a structure in which a hearer or reader decodes the message, i.e., by regarding it as a kind of quotation of which a hearer or reader

suspends judgement in respect of fictionality, as if it were overheard.

If readers are given a dialogue form of writing as a kind of quotation, all the expressions in a script appear to them to be exchanged by the interlocutors concerned. Readers can read the exchanged expressions, but are not present as the public audience<sup>82</sup>.

All the expressions in a fictionalised script originate from the author. They do not appear to readers to be addressed to them, but to be exchanged between his characterised interlocutors, although the author can use a narrative form in which the expressions appear as if addressed to readers by a fictional character<sup>83</sup>.

We must clearly distinguish a fictionalised script from a script of a real conversation with regard to the role of a scriptwriter<sup>84</sup>, but what readers can do with both kinds of scripts first is to analyse the expression exchanged between the interlocutors concerned, based on a script as an abstract from a live spoken language. A fictionalising scriptwriter is not present at a real conversation and it is interpretively irrelevant to reconstruct the unnoted elements of a conceived conversation. However, the dialogue form looks like a script of an exchange. When readers deal with a fictional script, they do not re-present the original situation of a conversation, but dramatise or recreate what they interpret the author to conceive.

Accordingly, my general premise of interpreting dialogues whose fictionality is open to question is that given expressions in a written dialogue appear to readers to be exchanged under conversational interactions like those in a real conversation. Specifically, if a conversation is possible, persons get into a

relationship between interlocutors; a speaker issues an expression to a hearer; the hearer receives the same expression. However, both do not always understand the same connotations of the expression, because the value of the same token is different according to personally divergent conceptual systems.

Speakers presuppose the possibility of a propositional act by reference and predication in advance of their utterance as a condition of the possibility of their utterance. They presuppose the possibility of individualising the possible referents by a system of generic classification and the possibility of characterising them by a system of descriptive differentiation. These systems are impersonal in advance of their utterance and work in utterance under both personally diversifying and impersonally isomorphising forces, but the whole of the elements and their relationships of a system are personally divergent in utterance; for even by expository exchanges, interlocutors have to elicit *indefinite* mutual agreements on the elements and their relationships of a system each possesses. What is *prima facie* given to readers is just a script of a conversation between interlocutors with personally divergent backgrounds<sup>35</sup>.

Readers cannot legitimately assume that Plato dramatised his central line of argument into a dialogue. Readers cannot assume an argument proceeding prior to characterised interlocutors' interactive exchange. Therefore, readers may assume only that it appears to each interlocutor that an interlocutor's statements or answers to questions lead to a conclusion. From each interlocutor's perspective, it does not necessarily follow that linguistic tokens such as words and sentences are used with the same connotations. Even the logical connectives

such as 'and', 'not', and 'if..., then ...' can be subject to the conversational interaction in a dialogue. If A may take B in a concluding stage to persuade A to B's belief by producing the consequence of A's admissions of propositions and inferential rules, A may take B to have perceived that persuasiveness.

5 Therefore, on the problem about Socrates' intentional fallacy or Plato's consciousness of it<sup>86</sup> interpreters should not add tacit premises to justify some neutral argument in a dialogue, i.e., explain away logical deficiencies, but interpret what each interlocutor understands to be exchanged<sup>87</sup>.

10 In addition, as to general inconsistencies of the main characters' views, readers need not explain them away. For readers should not read the view of the Socrates in one dialogue into an exchange between the Socrates in another dialogue and his interlocutor. Even if the Socrates in one dialogue is taken by one interlocutor to *commit himself to* any proposition or any presupposition in his question, it does not follow that the Socrates in another dialogue assumes that proposition or presupposition in talking with another interlocutor.

15 Certainly, if we justify the claim that expressions in a dialogue are exchanged under personally divergent connotations as well as impersonal isomorphising force, we have to investigate fully the conditions of a speaker's reference and predication. Hence, it is still open to question how our personal divergence turns out to be at issue when we exchange expressions with others. However, in  
20 respect of a method of reading Plato's dialogues, although every expression functions under the control of what Plato conceives is going on in a conversation, it is worth trying the method of reading a dialogue based on interlocutors'

interaction. Within these limits, we legitimately deal with a dialogue as interactive exchange, and my interpretive task is to recreate what Plato conceived as occurring in a conversation, by supplying how the interlocutors issue particular utterances and by analysing interlocutors' personal divergences in a given expression.

Let me describe a typical problem. According to my assumptions on verbal activity, when one interlocutor addresses another, one's expression is uttered in an action realised under the control of a convention and also exchanged with the other. My task is to describe fully these interrelated aspects in each speech in a dramatic conversation. However, as the text fundamentally lacks full information about an interlocutor's implicit intention, we have to reason out the contextual consistency, and still more, different kinds of indeterminable elements in the interlocutors' interaction. We have to deal with such a scene as an open context or frankly admit the ambiguity of the text.

Specifically, we have to note three types of discourses in analysing dramatic conversation. First, we deal with a sentence as an open unit whose function is to be determined by the context of parts and the whole. In this stage, we can interpret that one interlocutor says this and that, but how can we answer questions about interlocutors' intentions or about the responsibility the interlocutor takes in making a speech or what the other interlocutor understands of it? Certainly, the interlocutor intends to do something in saying this or that under a certain rule which controls a mutual relationship formed on the basis of mutual recognition of personality, and we can conjecture the rule determining the

interlocutor's intention in saying something, but can we decide that the interlocutor understands so? This is the problem even within a method of reading independently of other dialogues or reports.

For example, if we read some interrogative form of sentence in Socrates' speech, do we have the right to state that Socrates is questioning? It is not self-evident that because Socrates is grammatically using an interrogative form of sentence, he *has an intention* to ask a question. He might intend to do something in accordance with the way that his speech type ordinarily functions in his company, or he might take advantage of the function to do something else.

Then, how should we describe the interaction in each speech? The key to the problem on one interlocutor's intention and responsibility for a rule which the interlocutor's action follows is the relationship with the other interlocutor. If we find the other's response to the first interlocutor, we have a right to read that the first interlocutor's speech functions as a certain speech act as the other judges from his knowledge of the language, and also that the first interlocutor appears to the other to take responsibility for the speech. Therefore, we can describe the interaction from the interlocutors' mutual standpoints. We need at this stage to determine the function of an interlocutor's speech by analysing the value of the other interlocutor's response to the speech. Provisionally, we can say of a speech that when the interlocutor makes it, the other's response tells us that the interlocutor appears to the other to be performing a certain speech act and to take the responsibility for the act. Inasmuch as the interlocutor does not object to the other's understanding, we can determine further that the interlocutor intended to

perform the speech act indicated by the other's response.

However, the second stage of analysis involves the same problem. Can we decide that the other interlocutor's response to the first speech functions as intended? If A says something to B, A's intention and intended speech act is not determinable separately from the context. If it depends on B's intention in the responding speech act, we have to determine B's intention, but we are similarly required to determine A's intention in the next speech to determine B's. However, the dramatic conversation ends somewhere. Therefore, A's intention is open and theoretically we cannot start our plan. In a conversation, B might not always respond to A, or say what B understands by A's speech. Anyway, if one interlocutor's intention is determinable by the other's understanding of it, we are given no ultimate evidence. Then, is my plan impracticable? Certainly, we have to admit that we cannot finally answer how B understands A's intention or A's understanding of B's intention, but it is not the case that we have no starting point for analysis. Although many points are indeterminable by the context, we are given a script of the interlocutors' speech as the starting point. Exactly speaking, we cannot determine what the interlocutors intend to do in their speeches or what rules they understand mutually. Therefore, we should attempt to find the form of the speeches which best accords with the agents' intention, rules, and understanding of themselves and the others. Hence, according to our interpretive understanding of the speeches in context, we have not only to consider the mutual interaction at the second stage but also, finally, to say, of the interlocutors, not what they are doing or what they understand but what one may



be taken by another to do and understand.

For example, when we judge that Socrates is using an interrogative sentence, it does not immediately follow that Socrates understands that he is asking a question or that he intends to be asking a question. Neither does it immediately follow that Socrates appears to his interlocutor to be asking a question or to understand that he is asking a question, even if we judge that Socrates' interlocutor is grammatically responding to a question. Therefore, given Socrates' speech in a grammatically interrogative form and his interlocutor's one in responsive form, what we have the right to say is not the description of their intentional action, namely, that Socrates is asking a question and his interlocutor is answering it. We have to say on our knowledge of the language that Socrates may be taken by his interlocutor *both* to be asking a question *and* to take responsibility for his speech act; and, further, Socrates may take his interlocutor to be answering what he regards as Socrates' question and to understand that he is responsible for his answer. When we simply say that Socrates is asking a question by using a certain grammatical token, we must note that we are describing our interpretively condensed construction of what the interlocutors are mutually taken to understand as their actions in using that token.

My fundamental objective is reading a Platonic dialogue as a dramatic dialogue by dramatic interlocutors and not reading a dialogue as, or reducing it to, Plato's speeches to us, whether they are his philosophy or his biography of Socrates. I do not propose that we should avoid all assumptions in reading dialogical writing. I believe, like most readers and scholars, that if we introduce no

assumptions into our reading, whether they are systematic transforming methods or ordinary reading habits, we cannot read a writing. What I intend to show as my reading output of Plato's dialogues is not an innovation in Platonic studies but, maybe, just a practice of a method reflectively generated from some habit already effective in readership of literature.

What is reading a written script of a dramatic conversation under the aspect of the interlocutors' interactive activities? A simple and far-reaching question is what we have a right to say about the text more than to copy the original. What can we say about unwritten things in a text? Where is the border between things written and unwritten? The answer depends on our reading assumptions but we must admit that there are no absolute reading rules to inhibit readers from deducing an arbitrary output. The task of tenacious readers of a text is to put forward their reading assumptions and make traceable how a particular part is read on those assumptions. This would be the first step for the stage in which we publicly evaluate the relevancy of different readings to a text.

## II. Analysis of Plato's *Hippias Minor*

### 1. Introductory Note on my Analysis

My approach to the text, as shown in the preceding chapter, is not to regard Plato's text as a treatise as Hoerber did<sup>88</sup> or to hearken to Plato's voice as Grote assumed he could<sup>89</sup>. I do not try to extract a dialectic structure neutral to interlocutors' interplay from their prima facie exchange, as Goldschmidt does<sup>90</sup>. Neither do I read into the text any assumptions on Plato's intention, whether 'philosophical' or biographical, or any of Plato's development and, then, deduce the output from the text. Therefore, I do not assume, as Sprague<sup>91</sup> and Pohlenz<sup>92</sup> do, that Plato intentionally instills fallacies into the dialogue. Nor do I assume, as Ovink does<sup>93</sup>, that Plato is attending to analysis of the freedom of will on the basis of his critical and idealistic philosophy<sup>94</sup>. Nor do I read into the dialogue, with Müller<sup>95</sup> and Sciacca<sup>96</sup>, Socrates' belief in metaphysical knowledge of goodness in itself which leads to a just action. Likewise, I do not attempt to introduce what Socrates believes into the exchange independently of what goes on in the dialogue, pace Penner<sup>97</sup> and Guthrie<sup>98</sup>, who objects to Wilamowitz seeing only Socrates' mockery in the *Hippias Minor*<sup>99</sup>. Thus, I do not seek for any philosophical result, as do Zeller<sup>100</sup>, Ritter<sup>101</sup>, Apelt<sup>102</sup> and Fouillée<sup>103</sup>, who objects to Stallbaum's preference of seeing Plato's mockery to seeing his philosophy in the dialogue<sup>104</sup>, even if the interlocutors' exchange is woven, as Wilamowitz sees<sup>105</sup>, only by Socrates' sophistry and mockery; neither do I defend Socrates' sophistry by Plato's implicit philosophy as Stallbaum does<sup>106</sup> or by

Plato's concept of knowledge as a thing passing the test of cross-examination, whether sophistical or not, as Grote does<sup>107</sup>. Furthermore, my approach differs from that of Jantzen, who preconceives the conversation in the *Hippias Minor* as a discussion on ability or disposition in general or as a Platonic discourse necessarily developing some concept along with its opposite<sup>108</sup>. Neither do I accept Weiss<sup>109</sup> and Zembaty's<sup>110</sup> reading assumption that validity of the argument can be separated from other aspects of the conversation, because I do not believe that I can deduce a neutral argument separately, as even Weiss needs subsequently 'the argument in context' to endorse the intactness of the argument<sup>111</sup>. As the problem of Weiss' introduction of 'the argument in context' suggests<sup>112</sup>, we should find some criterion by which I hope that we can distinguish the assumptions which we make relevantly to the dramatic conversation from our conjecture of Plato's tacit conceptions on the dramatic setting. Blundell assumes that Plato explores aspects of moral and intellectual character by characterising the dramatic characters, Hippias, Socrates, and Eudicus, and by forming the argument<sup>113</sup>. This raises the question how we can know Plato's intention. Further, when she refers to 'Plato's scrutiny of Homer's character and his own use of characterisation'<sup>114</sup>, she tacitly assumes that she can reconstruct the 'broader dramatic and cultural context'<sup>115</sup> in which Plato sets the conversation. Although one appreciates that she spotlights aspects other than the argument in the *Hippias Minor*, and although I agree that Hippias' commitments are explained by his character as represented in the dialogue, how can we project not arbitrarily into the dialogue a broader cultural and dramatic context? It is

risky to set in the same level of discourse what is deduced from the interlocutors' viewpoint and what is deduced as Plato's characterisation<sup>116</sup>. If we deduce from Plato's other dialogues his interest in education and read into the dialogue the contrast between Socrates' educational work and the sophists', as Ritter<sup>117</sup>, Pohlenz<sup>118</sup>, Friedländer<sup>119</sup>, and Jantzen<sup>120</sup> also do, then, we could say, with Blundell<sup>121</sup>, that the introductory dialogue raises the question of education and literary character, however, neither Socrates nor Hippias puts forward a universal theme of education or literary character at 363a1-365d5. Therefore, what questions appear to arise from the dialogue depends on what she regards as Plato's view.

Against my negative contrast to the preceding approaches, students of Plato's dialogues would want to ask what Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* means concerning the Socratic doctrines, 'Virtue is a knowledge' and 'No one does wrong as one wishes to (ἐκών)'. Whether or not these doctrines mean that all and only those are good in themselves who know goodness in itself as one and the only end in itself but not as an end in a specific spatio-temporal situation or as a means to an end established for a skill or science, does Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* believe the doctrines in some sense and argue for them indirectly? Apart from such questions of Socratic ethics, if any, the exchange between Socrates and Hippias gives interpreters difficulty in explaining parts and the whole consistently, to say nothing of the two paradoxical conversational conclusions: 'All and only false men are true' (369b3-7) and 'All and only those who do injustice as they wish to, if there are such, are good' (376b4-6). I will try

to tackle this difficulty only on the basis of the exchange in *the Hippias Minor*.

This is my positive proposal.

The interlocutors' interplay provokes intertwined paradoxical questions in readers. As the crucial part of Homer's lines which Hippias quoted suggests (365a4-b1), honesty is, commonsensically, a disposition to say what one believes or, as Socrates' interpretation of Achilles' behaviour in the *Iliad* indicates (370a2-d6), achieve what one tells others that one will do; deceitfulness is a disposition to say what one believes false or to say that one will do what one does not intend to do. Then, why does Hippias, suggesting this commonsensical idea (364e7-365b6), admit to the discussion a false man who tells a lie about the subject of an expertise (367a6-b1)? According to the commonsensical idea of honesty and deceitfulness, expertise is irrelevant to these dispositions, but why does Socrates come to talk about expertise (366c5-6; 367d6, 367e8-368a1; cf. 368b2, 368d2-3, 373c9, 374a2)? When Socrates asks about a false man about other subjects besides arithmetic (367a6-7), does Hippias accept that all or some false men are occupied about any other subject besides arithmetic or that for any subject, there is a false man who deceives about it (367a8)? Why does Hippias accept the existence of a deceitful man occupied about the subject of an expertise (367b1)? Moreover, when Socrates asks whether all and only false men are true (367c7-d2, 368e2-369a2, 369b3-7), why does Hippias not reject the conclusion as a whole by maintaining that doing justice is not doing injustice (367d3, 367e6-7, 368a7, 369a3, 369b8-c2) rather than only deny that both Homer's Achilles and Odysseus are both false and true

(369c2-5; cf. 369a9-b1, 369b4-7)? Further, when Socrates, saying retrospectively that Homer's heroes are difficult to distinguish in respect of truth and falsity and the rest of goodness (369e1-3), suggests that falsity is included in the rest of goodness, why does Hippias not object that deceitfulness is not goodness (370e5)? Furthermore, when Hippias clings to the preferability of those who do injustice as they do not wish to (ἄκοντες) to those who do injustice as they wish to (ἐκόντες) in respect of their wish to do justice (371e9-372a5), why does Socrates attempt to induce Hippias to commit himself to the preferability of the latter to the former without specifying the criterion of the preferability (373c7-8, 375d1-2; cf. 371e4-5, 371e7-8)? And yet, while Hippias accepts the preferability of those who err as they wish to, probably in respect of the ambivalence of the ability, i.e., the ability to do well and badly, suggested only at 374a7-b3, in the field of expertises (373d7, 373e5, 374a3, 374a6, 374b3-4, 374b8, 374c2, 374c4, 374e5, 375a1, 375a2-3, 375a6, 375a7, 375b1, 375b2, 375b4, 375b6, 375c3) and not in the field of crimes such as assault or fraud, why does Socrates repeatedly show that Hippias should properly believe the preferability of *those who do injustice as they wish to* (372e3-6, 375d5, 375d7)? If Socrates believes that, if the criterion is the wish to do justice, that preferability concerning injustice is false, why does Socrates need to restart questioning for Hippias to reach the conclusion of the preferability concerning injustice and yet do thus by asking whether justice is a knowledge and/or ability rather than by referring to the case of crimes as Hippias' firm ground (375d8-e1)? Why does Hippias, then, not object that neither knowledge nor ability is relevant to justice

(375e1), although his admission of falsity as a knowledge and ability (365d6-366a1) led him to his apparent self-contradiction (366a2-369b7)? In the final stage, confronting Socrates' formulations interpretable according to a dispositional sense of justice (376a6-7; 376b2-4), why does Hippias affirm the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions (376a7, 376b4)? While Socrates talked about Homer's Achilles' lordly scorn of speaking truly (369d5-6) and enumerated lying coordinately with injustice (372d4-7), why does he question, by using a conditional clause (εἰπερ, 376b5-6), at the end of the conversation, the existence of a man who does injustice as he wishes to? Does this question of Socrates' (cf. 376c2) indicate the same wavering as he mentioned (372d7-e3)? Does this question imply that he did not believe the presupposition of his previous questions about a false man (365d5-369b7) and about non-psychic or psychic things which err (373c6-375c6)? Is there any interpretation which can explain all these questions inter-relatedly and consistently? The task of my analysis is to try to answer all these questions.

## 2. Setting

As Eudicus' opening address to Socrates indicates, the conversation starts after some exchange among Hippias, Eudicus, and some audience remaining behind. Socrates is present at the unofficial after-session. We are given no exact evidence on what precedes Eudicus' opening address. We can only construct the opening situation by conjecture from Eudicus' indications. Hippias finished a while ago his presentation which Eudicus might have sponsored and organised. Some of the audience, including Socrates, remain behind afterwards. Pace



Ritter<sup>122</sup>, Wilamowitz<sup>123</sup> and Tarrant<sup>124</sup>, the number of people present, as Grote<sup>125</sup> and Jantzen<sup>126</sup> indicate, is more than three as Hippias' speech at 369c7 suggests. Whether or not Eudicus is presiding over the after-session, some of the people present praised some point of it.

### 3. Personal Relationship

I assume (see p. 16) that every speech in dramatic conversation is made under a certain significant or non-significant personal relationship. However, not every written token of an interlocutor's speech explicitly shows such relationship. Although every language has some signals of a personal relationship, interlocutors do not always refer to it. In ordinary speeches, we often already preconceive personal relationship, and so, we do not reconfirm it each time we make an utterance. We may regard personal relationship as background on specific utterances. Then, should interpreters analyse the personal relationship of dramatic characters and read the result in every stage of their conversation? Certainly, we can collect implicit and explicit elements concerning personal relationship from the whole work and make some judgement on mutual relationship among interlocutors. But suspending indications of personal relationship is a dramaturgy. Hence interpreters should not say that every speech at every stage is a function of this construed mutual relationship. Provisionally, any token in a speech at some stage may give us a different aspect to interpret another preceding or subsequent stage. In other words, if we read any construed assumption on the mutual relationship into a certain stage, we may explain better what an interlocutor means or give a different value to a speech from

when we leave open the relationship.

Within these limits, the personal relationship among Eudicus, Hippias, and Socrates can be conjectured only in their later remarks. Eudicus may be so acquainted with both Hippias and Socrates that he can influence them (363c4-6; 364b9; 373a6-7; 373c1-3). Hippias may be so acquainted with Eudicus that he respects Eudicus' request (373c4, 363c7). Socrates has known Eudicus' father, Apemantus, so well that he can give his view on Homer's poetry exactly (363b1-4), but it is not determinable whether Socrates is acquainted with Eudicus<sup>127</sup>. Socrates may have frequented the circles in which his contemporaries successful in the world (σ ο φ ό ς) appeared (369d2-e2; 372a6-d3). So he heard Hippias speaking of his crafts and abilities at the money-changers' tables, and that so carefully that he can repeat the detail (368b5-e1). Although he gives no evidence whether or not he has crossed swords with Hippias<sup>128</sup>, he is now present at Hippias' display again.

#### 4. Skirmish (363a1-365d5)

##### General analysis of 363a1-365d5

The text permits speculation about the interlocutors' conversational tactics<sup>129</sup>.

5 It is doubtful whether Hippias takes Socrates to be *earnestly* concerned with Homer's characterisation and whether Hippias is *straightforwardly* expounding Homer's characterisation in order to make Socrates understand the subject-matter distinctively<sup>130</sup>. Interpreters tackle what preconception Hippias holds in introducing the predicate 'polytropos' (364c6-7) and what preconception  
10 Socrates holds in asking whether Achilles is not created by Homer to be polytropos (364e5-6) and further what Hippias means by the predicate 'false' when introducing it to explain 'polytropos'. If the interlocutors require each other to keep consistency with their preceding speeches in a question-and-answer bout about a false man in general (365d6 ff.), one interlocutor could claim that the  
15 other has held some specific answer to the above interpretive questions consistently. However, it is not necessary that as most interpreters assume<sup>131</sup>, Hippias holds a specific belief about a polytropos man and a false man. He might introduce these predicates to take and retrieve the initiative from Socrates, because they are open to exposition of their descriptive conditions. Hippias takes  
20 Socrates to ask a conducive question about Homer's Achilles (364e5-6), but Socrates can ask for Hippias' usage of 'polytropos' to establish Hippias' opinion because it has no established meaning. Crucially, although Hippias later, if he suspected Socrates' strategy here, could take him superficially to have tried to

understand Hippias' opinion by asking a question<sup>132</sup>, Hippias is shackled by his public boast of polymathy<sup>133</sup> to escaping Socrates' questions by all means. Further, Hippias' downfall arises not, as some interpreters explained<sup>134</sup>, from Socrates' ambiguity between potentiality and actuality or between ability and disposition, in describing a false man, but, as Blundell suggests<sup>135</sup>, Hippias' unanalysed, indistinct opinions about falsity in opposition to sincerity.

Readers can suspect that both interlocutors attempt to enact their hidden tactics in the conversation about literary characterisation of heroes, but it is hard to prove beyond their speeches that both players play their different games using the same cards at the same place. What we can say at most is that their later remarks give some sign of their hidden intentions in the opening.

#### **Eudicus mediates the conversation between Socrates and Hippias (363a1-c6)**

Eudicus draws Socrates' attention. He may be pressed<sup>136</sup> to address Socrates in order to leave Socrates in silence no longer<sup>137</sup>, and/or may be surprised<sup>138</sup> at the contrast of Hippias' great speech to Socrates' silence<sup>139</sup>. Whether or not Socrates has been thoughtful<sup>140</sup>, Eudicus, presupposing that Socrates is performing a purposeful inaction in issuing no utterance about Hippias' presentation, reminds Socrates of his continued inaction. Implying a reproach, he encourages Socrates to lift the inaction and, specifically, to involve himself in the interchange among Eudicus, Hippias, and the other remaining audience (363a1-3). Eudicus suggests that Socrates has not uttered so much as Hippias (363a1). In referring to the quantity of Hippias' lecture, Eudicus does not expect Hippias to take him to suggest that Hippias' lecture was verbose; however, not

only Eudicus may be ironical<sup>141</sup>, considering his distance from Hippias' side later (373a9-b3, 373c1-3) but also Socrates would take his expression as ambivalent.

Since, as Eudicus' expression 'praise together' indicates (363a2), at least one of those present has praised at least part of Hippias' speech, his expression (363a2) not only indirectly requires Socrates to keep in line, but also works to Hippias as an indirect praise.

Whether or not Eudicus himself praised Hippias' presentation, he is not, apart from the evidence at *Hp.Ma.* 286b7, a blind follower of Hippias. Translation of  $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$  (363a2) as 'join us in praising'<sup>142</sup> suggests that Eudicus is a follower of Hippias. However, pace some critics<sup>143</sup>, Eudicus does not blindly protect Hippias from what Hippias claims as Socrates' bad conduct in the conversation (373c1-3). As Wilamowitz<sup>144</sup> and Hildebrandt<sup>145</sup> interpret, neither would he be a Socratic, pace Jantzen<sup>146</sup>. It would not be cogent that Hippias is left alone among Socrates and his disciples; for others have praised some of Hippias' display (363a2) and Hippias supposes that this audience can judge his and Socrates' contest for interpreting Homer (369c7-8), although Socrates may possibly claim, by using the first person plural pronoun (364b3, 364c1; cf. 364b9), that this audience are on his side.

On the other hand, it is hardly determinable whether Eudicus, using a particle  $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$  (363a3) modifying the verb  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ , means by this verb what he regards as Socrates' usual activity. As some critics point out<sup>147</sup>, Eudicus' expression suggests Socrates' questioning. However, it does not necessarily follow that, as Pohlenz<sup>148</sup> and Blundell<sup>149</sup> indicate, Eudicus means by  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$  what Socrates

usually performs in making interlocutors see their self-contradiction. But, as most translators and critics indicate, Eudicus refers to Socrates' refutation<sup>150</sup>. If Eudicus refers to something more than Socrates' statement, pace Zeller<sup>151</sup> and Guthrie<sup>152</sup>, what does he mean by ἐλέγχειν? In my opinion, whether or not Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* is a man who usually requires interlocutors to answer his questions briefly, ἐλέγχειν is not a simple speech act in which a speaker's intention is fulfilled by the speaker's utterance irrespective of the hearer's responses. We should recognise this point in translating ἐλέγχεις as 'criticise' or 'refute'. Refutation would be relative to some subjective or objective axiological system of beliefs. We should consider how we can both *refute* and ask others. Certainly, Eudicus may imagine that Socrates can refute some point of Hippias' speech by (a) just asserting that it is wrong, possibly by explicitly appealing to some self-evident truth, *or* (b) proving on what Socrates regards as true propositions and rules of valid inference, that it is wrong *or* (c) making Hippias admit that it is wrong, (c)-(i) by eliciting Hippias' agreement to what Socrates regards as Hippias' assumptions and logical rules and/or (c)-(ii) by putting an arrangement of loaded questions to Hippias. It is hardly determinable whether Eudicus suggests that Socrates can go by (c) beyond Socrates' subjective criticism in (a) or (b). It is not necessary that Eudicus takes Socrates to be able to refute Hippias by (c) nor to imagine that Socrates is able to do it.

Then, in what sense does Eudicus regard ἐλέγχειν as an unordinary act in this context by 'even'? His modification functions to Socrates as indicating intensively that Socrates should not only refer to Hippias' negatively evaluated

point but also ask a question to test or disprove it. But, a question to test or disprove what Socrates evaluates negatively is different from a question to understand something in Hippias' presentation. Therefore, asking about some negatively evaluated point is an act not reinforced by the preceding speakers and different from a simple critical statement. Therefore, Eudicus' modification also affects Hippias as an expression of Eudicus' courtesy in that it suggests that a question to disprove or test something wrong in Hippias' display is less expected<sup>153</sup>.

Then, Eudicus justifies Socrates in *even* asking a question by the fact that the audience have the right definitely to claim (μάλιστα ἂν ἀντιποιησάμεθα) to participate in *philosophical* activity, in the sense of general cultural<sup>154</sup> and not reprehensible<sup>155</sup> activity, as his distance from both Hippias and Socrates indicates (363a3-5). Specifically, Eudicus' reasoning would be: (1) those remaining have a right to claim to participate in any cultural activity; (2) Socrates is one of those remaining; (3) therefore, Socrates has a right to claim to participate in a cultural activity; (4) asking a question to disprove or test something in Hippias' presentation is participating in a cultural activity; (5) therefore, Socrates has a right to claim to ask a question to disprove or test something in Hippias' presentation.

Although Eudicus addresses Socrates directly, simultaneously he reminds others, in referring emphatically to those remaining, including Hippias, in the first person (363a4, a5), that they claim the ability to participate in *philosophical* discourse.

Socrates follows Eudicus' message<sup>156</sup> (363a6), but does not specify his assentient intention. He does not confirm or question the right to what Eudicus regards as a 'philosophical' discourse, which Eudicus endorses in support of Socrates' involvement in the conversation (363a3-5). Neither does he make clear that he does not choose to praise any topics of Hippias' presentation nor that he chooses to ask a question to test or disprove some wrong point. Although Socrates eventually praises none of Hippias' presentation in his contiguous speech, he does not here make clear, by repeating the verb ἐλέγχειν, his intention of following Eudicus' alternative suggestion, i.e., asking a question to test or disprove something in Hippias' presentation. He specifies no wrong point. In Hippias' presence, he does not describe his intention under the conditions which Eudicus specified (363a1-5). Even in the following conversation with Hippias in Eudicus' presence, when he refers to Eudicus' opening suggestion, he does not show that he understood that Eudicus suggested him performing an elenchus to disprove some wrong point; he rephrases Eudicus' suggestion as that of asking a question (364b9) or his inducement to converse with Hippias (373a6-8), although Socrates' use of διαλέγεσθαι suggests that he may take Eudicus to suggest that he should hold a specific style of conversation with Hippias (cf. 364e9) in contrast to an exchange with long speeches (373a1)<sup>157</sup>. However, now he only ceases to retain the inaction of issuing no utterance, he does not refer to his preceding inaction as negligence or thoughtfulness<sup>158</sup>.

Socrates indicates that he has something to say at least (363a6). In professing that there is something he would like to ask Hippias on what he said about



Homer (363a6-7), he expresses in Hippias' presence his willingness to ask Hippias a question, although even indirectly he has not performed a question yet because he has not specified his interrogative formulation. He only limits the subject-matter to Hippias' remarks about Homer. Hence, in his opening speech, Socrates expresses assent to Eudicus' preceding message, but does not give a response directly relevant to it. Although Eudicus probably accepts Socrates' intention to ask a question within the limits of what he regards as a *philosophical* discourse, Socrates, suspending his question, shows that he is asking about a topic relevant to the unofficial after-session.

Next (363b1-5), Socrates associates the subject-matter of his forthcoming question with Eudicus father's, Apemantus', view. Socrates supposes<sup>159</sup> that his topic does not directly arise from Hippias' speech<sup>160</sup>. For when Socrates (363c1-3) says that many other things of all kinds have been lectured to us about poets, especially Homer, Socrates excludes Hippias' lecture from the subject-matter of his question. However, we must, at the same time, admit the difficulty in reconciling Socrates' exclusion of Hippias' lecture with his introductory indication that what he would like to ask about is Hippias' remarks about Homer (363a6-b1).

Apemantus' theses as Socrates formulates them (363b2-b5) are:

- (1) Homer's *Iliad* is finer (καλλίον) than his *Odyssey* (366b2-3);
- (2) the *Iliad* is finer than the *Odyssey* to that degree to which Achilles is better or braver (ἀμείνω) than Odysseus (363b3-4);
- (3) the reason is that Homer created the *Iliad* with Achilles as its

subject<sup>161</sup> and the *Odyssey* with Odysseus as its subject (363b4-5)<sup>162</sup>.

As Socrates recounts, Apemantus' view has an inferentially clear construction. Truly, it is arguable whether we can legitimately accept statements about imaginary characters in respect of their verifiability. However, if we make the argument explicitly non-fallacious, we have to read (2) as the thesis that the degree to which the *Iliad* is finer than the *Odyssey* depends on the degree of the superiority of one main character to the other in respect of goodness or bravery. Although, considering the grammatical subordinate relation, (1) cannot be inferred from (2) and (3) without the thesis that Achilles is better than Odysseus, (1) and (2) logically entail that thesis<sup>163</sup>.

Thus Eudicus could take Socrates (363b5-c1) to ask about a tacit entailment from Apemantus' theses or the premise necessary for concluding that the *Iliad* is finer than the *Odyssey*. Therefore he could take Socrates to cite Apemantus' view as a topic related to Hippias' lecture in order to accept what he regards as Eudicus' introduction to the conversation. At the same time, Socrates does not commit himself to Apemantus' theses.

While Socrates shows that his question is concerned with Apemantus' view, he indirectly asks Hippias a question by referring to Hippias' willingness (363b5-c1). Socrates is not explicitly allowed by Hippias to ask, but by indicating that his question is relevant to the after-session, he indirectly claims the right conditioned by Hippias' willingness. For the purpose of the claim, while mentioning Apemantus' view, he contrasts<sup>164</sup> the subject-matter of his question to those of Hippias' display (363c1-3):

Socrates formulates a diagnostically tagged question<sup>165</sup> (363b7-c1). Hence, pace some critics<sup>166</sup>, Socrates shows he is asking not which hero is better but which *Hippias says* is better; Socrates does not show willingness to learn from Hippias Homer's character's moral value. We can suspect that Socrates is not serious in seeking information but asks a question as a run-up, as Ovink interprets<sup>167</sup>, and that his question is a snare to his cross-examination of Hippias' own thought, as Guthrie interprets<sup>168</sup>. But we have difficulty in proving Socrates' tactics here beyond what Hippias can take Socrates to be responsible for in formulating his question. Socrates' interrogative formulation (363b7-c1) indicates his concern with Hippias' personal opinion on Homer's poetry rather than Homer's poetry itself. He does not explicitly indicate that he wants to know some true proposition about Homer, despite mentioning Apemantus' view of Homer.

As the diagnostic tags indicate obviously, when the speaker introduces them, the speaker passes to the hearer the responsibility for the propositional act. Therefore, a speaker introducing an interrogative formulation with a diagnostic tag cannot be formally committed to the propositional act in the formulation, while the hearer takes responsibility for the propositional act insofar as the hearer admits the speaker's right of asking the question.

Accordingly, when Socrates indirectly asks what *Hippias thinks* about Homer's Achilles and Odysseus (363b6-7), he is not committed to the propositional act in referring to Homer's Achilles and Odysseus and predicating something of them, while Hippias takes responsibility for that propositional act,

if he admits Socrates' right of question. The same conditions apply to the propositional act in the proposition of Socrates' indirect question which of the heroes *Hippias says* is the better or the braver (363b7-c1). The relevant answers to Socrates' interrogative formulation with diagnostic tags naturally implicitly contain performative verbs in the first person. Therefore, we can judge formally that, while Socrates introduces the propositional parts, he cannot give his opinion in his interrogative formulation. Truly, it is puzzling to assume that Socrates is not concerned with the truth-values of the propositions he introduces. However, what Socrates has the right to do by using interrogative formulations with diagnostic tags is not professing his own opinion or showing his interlocutor's agreement but, at most, seeking Hippias' personal opinions.

If Socrates leaves out explicit second person performative verbs from his questions, his interlocutor has the right to require Socrates to admit the possibility of the propositional acts presupposed in his questions and even the admissibility of the vocabulary in the question<sup>169</sup>. However, even in a question without a diagnostic tag, generally speaking, Socrates might not expect a right answer of the hearer<sup>170</sup>.

Eudicus' ἀλλὰ (363c4) indicates that Socrates' conditional clause in his indirect question is superfluous. Eudicus tells Socrates in Hippias' presence that evidently Hippias will not refuse to answer if Socrates asks *a question*. We can take that Eudicus means 'any question' or 'some question'<sup>171</sup> by 'a question'. The reading 'any question' does not necessarily determine whether Eudicus is a follower of Hippias or not; Eudicus' attitude still can be ironical or appreciative.

He is indirectly requesting Hippias to answer Socrates because in Hippias' presence, he refers to Hippias' future speech act, i.e., his grudging refusal to answer Socrates and publicly rejects it. He thus inhibits Hippias from refusing to answer Socrates' question, by reminding Hippias and the audience that he would seem to the audience to be grudging Socrates his answer.

Eudicus gives Hippias a choice in introducing an alternative interrogative formulation<sup>172</sup> (363c5-6). However, considering his second alternative of Hippias' right of any choice, his expression does not appear to Hippias to offer choice, if Hippias is proud of the so-called ability to answer any question, i.e., polymathy, as his following speech suggests (363c7-d4) and, thus, assumes that the audience know his reputation for polymathy. Rather, he appears to Hippias to press him to answer Socrates<sup>173</sup>. Hence his apparent offer of any choice would be condescending to Hippias.

#### **Hippias' boast of polymathy and Socrates' ironical extolment (363c7-364b3)**

Responding after a tacit assent<sup>174</sup> (363c7), Hippias takes Eudicus' preceding remarks as his indirect request for Hippias' answer to Socrates' question. Hippias, like Socrates, superficially makes no response relevant to Eudicus' alternative interrogative form, but actually accepts his indirect request in the introductory response. Hippias understands Eudicus' request and Socrates' intention to ask, and, so, accepts their request.

Hippias justifies himself also by his own reasoning: addressing Eudicus in Socrates' presence, he introduces his substantial response, in saying, "I would do awful things<sup>175</sup> if ....(363c7)" Those present could easily anticipate that Hippias

would not refuse to answer Socrates from his putting the case of his refusal in his conditional clause. Hence Hippias suspends their anticipation<sup>176</sup> with his description of his practical principle.

As Socrates' reference to Hippias' display on money-changers' tables suggests (368b3-368e1), Hippias may suppose that people gathering for his presentation have some ideas of Hippias' so-called successful life based on many crafts, abilities, and knowledge as polymathy. While Hippias accepts Eudicus' request and keeps the audience in suspense, he is drawing their attention to his feat at the Olympics and showing his practical principle in order to demonstrate his rhetoric<sup>177</sup> and to boast of his feat (363c7-d4).

Responding to Hippias' speech to Eudicus, Socrates expresses suspicion of the practicability of Hippias' principle that he never fails to answer any question from anyone on any display by him, ironically by eulogising Hippias (364a 1-6). When Socrates refers to Hippias' state at the festival (364a 1-3), he understands that if Hippias offers to make any speech he had prepared and answer any question on it, then, Hippias assumes that he is able to do what he offers. Socrates describes Hippias' state as hopeful about his soul in respect of cleverness (364a2-3). He does not affirm Hippias' preceding remark, but, putting Hippias' presupposition in the conditional clause (364a 1-3), eulogises his blessedness on this condition. His words suggest to Hippias that his eulogy is superficial, because they smack of exaggeration. Therefore, he is suggesting that he may suspect the practicability of Hippias' principle<sup>178</sup>; especially as it would be discourteous overtly to doubt Hippias' boast<sup>179</sup>.

Further, Socrates is suggesting so in comparison with an athlete at the festival (364a3-6). He does not directly question the practicability of Hippias' principle concerning his verbal and intellectual activity; however, in expressing his hypothetical astonishment at the physical Olympic athlete with the same perfect fearlessness and confidence, he indicates that as he doubts the possibility of such an athlete, so he does the possibility of a verbal athlete like Hippias.

Hippias is confident in answering any question on his speech. Therefore, when Hippias responds in reserved tone to Socrates' exaggerated, and somewhat emotive, sarcasm (364a7), the audience can take Hippias to risk showing a ridiculous attitude in accepting Socrates' exaggerated eulogy. He puts forward the evidence, following Socrates' analogy to a physical athlete; that he has never encountered any competitor mightier since he first competed at the Olympics (364a7-9). This literally justifies his fearlessness and confidence. Against Socrates' sarcasm, he ostentatiously affirms that he is the mightiest competitor in a verbal exchange *on any subject, too* (εἰς οὐδὲν)!<sup>180</sup>

Whether Hippias hearkens to this critical sound or naively takes Socrates' eulogy at face value depends on our interpretation of Hippias' tactics. To allot conversational tactics only to Socrates and, as Stallbaum<sup>181</sup> and Blundell<sup>182</sup> do, confine Hippias to a subordinate role with tactical naïveté might be to oversimplify Hippias' role. We have to give Hippias some right of retort here.

Against Hippias' retort reducing Socrates' sarcasm to a genuine eulogy, Socrates sets aside their tit-for-tat with expressions of extreme admiration. He sarcastically extols Hippias as famed for cleverness (364b1-3). In this exchange,

whether or not Hippias can answer Socrates' question turns out to be the public test of his professed cleverness as polymathy<sup>183</sup>.

If we may glance at the overall significance of Hippias' boast of polymathy, on one hand, Hippias' confidence in answering any question on his display (363c7-d4) constitutes his practical judgement on accepting the request for his answer to Socrates' question, and he shows his audience that he lives up to his practical principle. On the other hand, his confidence (363c7-d4; 364a7-9) not merely causes the conversation to proceed by answering Socrates' questions but also shackles himself to answering any question, even when Socrates' ordering of questions appears to him unfair. He might ask back about Socrates' question at the expense of his professed polymathy. From Socrates' point of view, Hippias turns out not to give any appropriate answer in the conclusion of each topic (369b3-7; 376b8-c6), although Hippias keeps confident of answering any question on his display<sup>184</sup> (365d5; 369a6; 369c2-8; 370e5; 371a1; 371b2; 371d8-e3; 373b4-5; 373c4-5; 375d6; 376b7). In other words, the practicability of his principle begins to be tested by Socrates' questions. From the audience's viewpoint, whether or not Hippias fails in answering depends on the standard of appropriateness of question and answer, although Hippias would have to be able to examine the appropriateness of the question in his answer. Socrates does not request Hippias simply to give an answer to his question, but an answer he can understand. Socrates obtains from Hippias the right to repeat a question and understand the answer (364c8-d7). From Socrates' viewpoint, Hippias cannot answer properly until Socrates understands. Socrates' demand seems reasonable



to the normal audience, but, importantly, if neither Hippias nor Socrates defines the conditions on which Socrates understands his answer, Hippias cannot finish answering. At the end of the conversation, Socrates indicates that Hippias fails in answering Socrates' question, and that it turns out to be awful (376c4-6). Socrates' remark suggests that, whether or not Socrates' questioning is unfair, Hippias' practical principle is not practicable<sup>185</sup>.

### *Coups d'essai* (364b3-c7)

Socrates ends their retorts about Hippias' practical principle and returns to his performance of direct questioning (364b3-5). Addressing Hippias directly, he reformulates his question as follows: "What *do you say* to us about Achilles and Odysseus? Which *do you say* is the better and in what respect?" Following his first indirect formulation (363b5-c3), Socrates shows that he is not asking about Achilles or Odysseus but what Hippias says about them; he asks with a diagnostic tag, 'you say'.

Without immediately allowing Hippias to answer his question, Socrates expresses his motivation to ask (364b5-9) and, then, again differently, "..., tell and explain (διδάσκειν)<sup>186</sup> to us clearly; what *were you saying* about those two men? How *were you distinguishing* them? (364b9-c2)" Pace Blundell<sup>187</sup>, διδάσκειν is not always used with educational connotation (see *LSJ*). Rather Socrates uses educationally connotable words μανθάνειν and διδάσκειν ironically to dissimilate a learner of something from so-called clever men, as Pohlenz suggests<sup>188</sup> (cf. 364e5, 369d4, 372c2, c6, c7, c8). Socrates admits that

he could not understand things which Hippias was saying in his lecture. Hence Hippias and the audience can take Socrates superficially to be motivated to ask about a point he did not understand.

Socrates' third and final interrogative formulation (364c1-2) makes him responsible for the condition that he wants to know clearly what Hippias said about Homer's Achilles and Odysseus, and how Hippias distinguished them. Socrates clearly presupposes that Hippias said something about the heroes and that Hippias distinguished them in some respect.

If Socrates, as Sprague suggests<sup>189</sup>, were taking any steps possible to lead Hippias, as Socrates will suggest in the ex post facto context (370e2-3), to a conclusion *like* that at 369b3-7, i.e., (ID) the identity of a consistent virtue with its consistent opposite, then, Socrates would be taking the first step of his strategy not after Hippias' answer at 364c3-7, as she thinks<sup>190</sup>, but before it. Even in his opening speech (363a6-c3), he would be able to induce Hippias to differentiate Homer's Achilles from his Odysseus in respect of some goodness in reference to Apemantus' view. Specifically, Socrates would be taking a crucial step here after Hippias' unsolicited boast of his polymathy in asking how Hippias *was* differentiating the two heroes (364c2), because he would be inducing Hippias to confirm that he *differentiated* the two heroes, whether or not Hippias' display had explicitly mentioned this point. Consequently, whichever route Socrates would expect Hippias to take to (ID), if he had reason to assume that Hippias accepts (1) that one hero has a goodness while the other has its opposite; (2), as she suggests<sup>191</sup>, that both goodness and its opposite are

logically polarised to incompatible characteristics; (3) that this opposite, an apparent vice, is a knowledge; (4) that the opposite is performed intentionally and consistently; (5) that the first goodness is the same knowledge; (6) that this goodness is also performed intentionally and consistently, then, Socrates could expect Hippias to be faced with (ID), such as a proposition that courage is cowardice<sup>192</sup>. Socrates, certainly, has reason to expect that (a) however Hippias characterised Homer's Odysseus, he would attribute Homer's Odysseus' characteristic to his shrewdness (φρὸνησις), because of his knowledge about Homer (363c2-3) [(3)]; (b) he would also admit, because of his Homeric knowledge, that Homer's Odysseus' shrewd character is actualised in his intentional performance [(4)]; (c) as Blundell points out<sup>193</sup>, Hippias would admit that any goodness is knowledge, because he professes to know anything (363c7-d4; 364a7-9) and teach it too (364d3-6) [(5)]. However, how could Socrates expect that Hippias admit the logical polarisation of a personal characteristic [(2)] and its consistency [(4), (6)]? Hippias might admit this polarisation to avoid public self-contradiction because of his boast of polymathy (363c7-d4), if he admitted the differentiation of Homer's heroes' characteristics as a logically consistent distinction. Further, he might admit Homeric heroes' consistent performance, because of what he showed as his living up to the principle (363c7-d4), if he projected his principle of consistency into Homer's heroes'. Therefore, if Hippias admits the superiority of Homer's Achilles to Odysseus, who is shrewd, Socrates could expect, to a certain extent, (d) that Hippias would accept that Homer's Achilles has a knowledge in respect of his goodness and, consequently, (e) that

Hippias would reach (ID). However, if Hippias admitted, against Apemantus (363b1-5), the superiority of Homer's Odysseus to Achilles, could Socrates expect Hippias' commitment to the conclusion? Socrates might succeed in committing Hippias to the moral ambivalence of Homer's Odysseus' shrewdness in contrast to Homer's Achilles' naivete as moral ignorance; Hippias might potentially accept that even moral badness is a knowledge, if he were ready to admit logical polarisation of a personal characteristic and its consistency; however, Socrates could not necessarily expect Hippias to accept that Homer's Achilles has a knowledge in respect of his character, whether it is good or bad. Therefore, Sprague has reason to start her argument at 364c3-7, but, in my opinion, still confuses what a dramatic interlocutor can anticipate with what readers conceive the author can command, even if one cannot refute another without intention.

If Hippias said nothing to distinguish the heroes, he has to question Socrates' presupposition (364c3) that he distinguished them. However, if he admits Socrates' presupposition, he must describe the heroes' characteristics distinctively in order to answer Socrates' question on his display.

Hippias is required to consider Homer's passages and form his judgement in order to answer. With ἀλλὰ (364c3), Hippias accepts Socrates' request for his answer to Socrates' third interrogative formulation at 364b9-c2. Pace Blundell<sup>194</sup>, Socrates' demand of clearness does not imply that Hippias' speech was in itself, or seemed to Socrates, unclear. But Socrates leaves the *possibility* that he means that it was unclear<sup>195</sup>. Accordingly, in accepting Socrates' demand of clearness,

Hippias, admitting Socrates' possible implication, proclaims that he is going to make a statement *even more clearly than before*. Superficially accepting Socrates' demand, Hippias is making a subtle retort against Socrates' possible implication<sup>196</sup> (364c4-5). Then, Hippias expresses his intention to propound thoroughly (διελθεῖν) what he says about other heroes as well as Achilles and Odysseus. He makes publicly clear his intention of answering Socrates' question, satisfying his request.

His answer is: "*I say that Homer created Achilles the best or bravest<sup>197</sup> man among those who arrived in Troy, Nestor the wisest<sup>198</sup>, and Odysseus the most polytropos. (364c4-7)*"

Apparently, Socrates can judge Hippias' answer consistent with his preceding remark in that he refers to another hero, Nestor, and in that he allots different characteristics to those three heroes, distinctively by the superlative adjectives. If he requires Hippias to distinguish the heroes clearly, he can ask for further exposition on what descriptive conditions Hippias claims that Homer used the evaluative words. If Hippias takes him to want to learn from Hippias how Homer distinguished the heroes clearly, Hippias can expect him to ask for this exposition. Specifically, if he takes Hippias to mean 'the best' by ἀριστος, he can ask about the descriptive conditions of goodness. On the other hand, if he takes Hippias to mean 'the bravest' by this superlative, he can ask whether bravery is goodness.

Further, Socrates cannot determine whether Hippias means by 'polytropos' 'the wildest', 'the most wandering', 'the most resourceful' or anything else. What

Hippias means by it depends on his tactics in conversation with Socrates. Hippias might understand, and use, this word to mean 'wily' or 'cunning'. Socrates and the audience may later turn out to take him to have used it thus here if he keeps consistency with his exposition of this predicate by the predicate 'false' (364e7-365b6), but his present speech gives Socrates no clue<sup>199</sup>.

Alternatively, Hippias might mean 'resourceful' by this word here in reference to his subsequent admission that a false man is able to do something (365d7-8; cf. 365a1)<sup>200</sup>. Ex post facto, interpreters are inclined to require Hippias to keep consistency with his subsequent remark. Hence, we may interpret that Hippias has to be ready to mean by this word 'deceitful'. But it does not necessarily follow that he is ready to do so. Neither does it follow that Socrates can take him to mean 'deceitful' by 'polytropos'. He might understand that the word has no established meaning and use it, for example, to induce Socrates to demand further explanation. The word exchanged may be a currency in common, but the interlocutors may hold different connotations and even change connotations according to their conversational tactics. This is practicable especially when the word exchanged has no established meaning. Pace Blundell<sup>201</sup>, it is so arguable whether 'polytropos' had an established meaning that Antisthenes raised the question whether it was laudative or reprehensive and attempted some interpretation of it<sup>202</sup>. Therefore, neither is it decisive whether Socrates understands, as Mulhern and Weiss interpret<sup>203</sup>, that πολύτροπος means 'resourceful', although if Hippias later requires Socrates to be consistent, Socrates might be ready to admit that he understood what the word meant. In

any case, Hippias' answer is still open to question in the context.

**Socrates' 'flinch' for a rollback and Hippias' 'allowance' according to his 'professional ethic' (364c8-d6)**

Hippias' explicit performative, 'I say', (364c4) squares ridiculously with Socrates' demand in his interrogative formulations. Socrates responds exaggeratedly as if he interrupted Hippias, who seemed about to develop supporting points by Homer's particular passages (364c8)<sup>204</sup>. Socrates does not discuss Hippias' answer (364c4-7), but discusses the way of their ongoing conversation (364c8-d2).

Socrates exclaims with surprise (364c8), but, as his verbatim reference to Hippias' answer just after Hippias' concession indicates (364d7), not because he did not catch the words. Socrates makes an apparently exaggeratedly self-humiliating entreaty, whether as a signal of missing his words or not, to make Hippias change his way of answering. He also leaves unspecified the substantial conditions of answering properly and does not clarify what in Hippias' preceding answer contravenes his demand. Calogero takes Socrates' entreaty as a means to induce Hippias to answer the question<sup>205</sup>, but Socrates does not show his hidden intention on the surface of his speech.

*Either* Hippias might think he has finished answering Socrates' question as he professes in his practical principle (363c7-d4) *or* he might be ready to propound further Homer's characterisation if Socrates requests further explanation. Nevertheless, Socrates suggests publicly that he claims a right to ask further when he does not understand things Hippias says. Hippias must inescapably give Socrates the right to ask again because of his boast of

polymathy (363c7-d4; 364a7-9). However, once he gives Socrates the right, Hippias cannot predict when Socrates' questioning will end, for it is not clear on what conditions Socrates *understands things which Hippias says* (364c9).

In reply to Socrates' entreaty (364c8-d2), Hippias does not refer to or confirm what he understands that Socrates intends to do by using humble expressions (364d3). Nevertheless, reinterpreting that Socrates entreats him to *make allowances for asking a question again* and to *answer gently*, he inexplicitly expresses his acceptance (364d3-6) in the type similar to his former acceptance of answering Socrates (363c7-d4), as follows: "it would be ugly and/or shameful (*αἰσχρόν*), if ..." Again suspending his acceptance, he draws Socrates' and the audience's attention to his professional principle. Specifically, he professes, whatever Socrates takes him to teach, his professional principle that he teaches others in respect of the very thing that Socrates mentioned and deserves the fee.

Readers can see, as Blundell does<sup>206</sup>, that Hippias indirectly shows off his moral principle in teaching and his living up to the principle (cf. 363c7-d4; 364a7-9) and that his principle is eventually indirectly tested by his responses as its embodiment; however, Socrates does not directly question its validity.

As Socrates leaves unclear his substantial conditions in entreating Hippias to change his way of answering (364c8-d2), so does Hippias not specify how he makes allowances for Socrates or how he answers gently and generously. Even in respect of the length of an answer, Hippias' second answer (364e6-365b6) is evidently longer than his first (364c3-8).

**Socrates fishes out Hippias' opinion about 'polytropos' (364d7-e6)**



Both leave vague the descriptive conditions of the evaluative 'generous' and 'gentle', but Socrates expresses satisfaction with Hippias' attitude; for he could appeal to some public check on Hippias' commitment to a 'generous and gentle' answer although Hippias leaves room for evasion.

Returning to the substance of Hippias' answer on Homer's characterisation (364c4-7) and referring his preceding entreaty to Hippias' answer (γὰρ τοι), Socrates does not discuss Hippias' answer as a whole, nor refers to the truth-value of Hippias' statements about Homer's characterisation of the three heroes. He says he thought that he understood that (1) Homer created Achilles the best or bravest and (2) Homer created Nestor the wisest (364d7-e1). But he says he does not understand at all (3) that Homer created Odysseus the most polytropos (364e1-4). To understand (3), he asks whether Achilles is not created polytropos by Homer (364e4-6).

Socrates does not question the soundness of the presuppositions of the statement type that Homer created a hero  $x$  [as]  $F$ , where ' $x$ ' is a hero and ' $F$ ' a predicate. Once Socrates sought Hippias' opinion about Homer's characterisation (364b9-c2; 364b3-5; 363b5-c1), Hippias can plausibly take Socrates to admit the possibility of making such a statement type because Socrates would plausibly expect him to make such a statement in relation to Apemantus' view. Socrates can question the justifiability of making such a statement type, but Hippias would take such an ordering of questions to be inverted because Socrates would query a presupposition of his previous question which Hippias takes him to have admitted. Socrates can question how we can refer to a poet's

intention in characterisation; for, as Blundell points out<sup>207</sup>, Homer gives no direct evidence on his characterisation and Homer is not committed to his characters' propositional acts about characterisation<sup>208</sup>. Socrates can question, especially, how Hippias can deduce Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Nestor by comparing other heroes and ranking them<sup>209</sup>, but he does not. Socrates can assume that Hippias made a statement about Homer's characterisation by applying his descriptive conditions of the predicate 'good' or 'brave' and the predicate 'clever' to Homer's portrayals of his heroes, but he does not confirm it.

Further, when Socrates says in contrast to the cases of Homer's Achilles and Nestor that he does not understand what Hippias meant by his statement on Homer's Odysseus (364e1-4), Hippias can legitimately take Socrates to have admitted the possibility of statements about Homer's characterisation and to have traced Homer's portrayal of Odysseus because Socrates says that he thought he understood Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Nestor. Therefore, Hippias and the audience can take for granted that Socrates admits the possibility of statements about Homer's characterisation.

However, Socrates is not ready to require Hippias to check his statements with Homer's specific passages. Hence, it is not plausible that Socrates is querying the justifiability of statements about Homer's characterisation. Considering Socrates' readiness to let Homer go (365c8-d1), he may give priority to establishing Hippias' opinion about 'polytropos', taking advantage of the role of a learner of Hippias' exposition about Homer's characterisation. Accordingly, when he sets aside Hippias' statements about Homer's Achilles and

Nestor, he might only appeal to circulating literary discourse on Homer's characterisation and regard Hippias' answer as understandable within these limits<sup>210</sup>. However, the predicate 'polytropos' has no established meaning. Hence, he might seek to prevent Hippias from using it ambiguously.

It is dubious whether he admits Hippias' statement about Achilles and Nestor and whether he admits that Hippias applies the predicates 'good' or 'brave' and 'clever' rightly. However, superficially, Hippias can leave him to say not that he *understood* Hippias' statements but that he *thought that he understood* them, because Hippias can take him to use these predicates meaningfully but not to understand what are Hippias' descriptive conditions of them. For Socrates introduces derivative forms of the predicates, 'the best' (363b3-4, 363c1, 364b4) and 'the wisest' (364a2, b2), which Hippias subsequently introduces; as his usage of the evaluative words including the predicates in question shows (363b2, b3, b3-4, c1, 364a1, a2, b1, b4, d1, d7), Socrates recognises an evaluative function and a descriptive one of the evaluative words. Accordingly, he has reason for not asserting that *he understood* what Hippias was saying, and it does not follow that he admits that Hippias' statements are true or not.

Socrates says he does not understand that Homer created Odysseus the most polytropos and asks whether Achilles is not created polytropos by Homer (364e1-6); however, it does not follow that Socrates has some preconception of the predicate 'polytropos'. Socrates takes a syntactically positive form of the adjective from Homer's text and introduces it into his question about Achilles in order to understand Hippias' descriptive conditions for it. Hippias can take

him to conceive Homer's portrayal of Odysseus even with this predicate just as he thought that he understood Hippias' statements about Homer's Achilles and Nestor, but Socrates does not necessarily hold some established idea of its meaning. He may ask for Hippias' usage in asking the possibility of applying the predicate to an object which Socrates is familiar with. Hippias may take Socrates' negative, possibly grammatically loaded form of interrogation to imply that Socrates has some preconception of the predicate, but Socrates may only be seeking information after his disavowal of understanding<sup>211</sup> in saying, '[To talk of] Achilles, isn't he created polytropos by Homer?'<sup>212</sup>

Pace Sprague<sup>213</sup>, there is still little reason for taking Socrates to have anticipated already the conclusion that all and only false men are true, apart from the identity of a goodness with its opposite, and to attempt to lead Hippias to the conclusion, whether didactically<sup>214</sup> or for a true aporia<sup>215</sup>; specifically, there is no reason for taking Socrates to pretend 'not to have understood what Hippias meant by calling Odysseus wily' and ask 'whether Homer did not make Achilles wily as well'. It is tempting but, as argued before (see p. 47 ff.) invalid to read all ensuing actions of Socrates into his intention here. The dramatic Socrates cannot predict what Hippias will do next.

### **Hippias characterises Homer's Achilles as simple and true and his Odysseus as polytropos and false (364e7-365b6)**

Hippias does not propound how he deduces his answer on Homer's characterisation from Homer's poetry. Socrates does not confirm Hippias' descriptive conditions of the predicates, 'good (or brave)' of Achilles and 'clever'

of Nestor. Socrates leaves the issue unresolved. On one hand, Hippias can prima facie take Socrates to admit Hippias' steps in deducing Homer's characterisation when he says he *thought that he understood* what Hippias said. On the other hand, if Hippias assumes that Socrates has some preconception of 'polytropos', he can take Socrates to be suggesting, in saying that he does not understand Hippias on Odysseus, that he cannot follow what he conceives as Hippias' descriptive conditions of 'polytropos'. Socrates may seek Hippias' descriptive conditions of it, by confirming its predicability of 'Achilles' with whom he is well acquainted; nevertheless, Hippias can take Socrates to ask him to confirm Socrates' preconception about 'polytropos'. Specifically, Socrates may appear to understand Hippias' descriptive conditions and object to<sup>216</sup> Hippias' ranking Homer's Odysseus first.

Introducing the categorically negative response, '[Not in the] least'<sup>217</sup> (364e7), Hippias denies that Homer created Achilles polytropos. Socrates' question at 364e5-6 possibly works to Hippias as stupid rather than trivial in that the proposition that Homer's Achilles is not polytropos would seem self-evident to Hippias<sup>218</sup>. If Hippias takes Socrates to ask whether Homer's Achilles is not the most wandering, he would have to deny the predication categorically, considering Homer's poetry<sup>219</sup>; if he takes Socrates to ask whether Homer's Achilles is not wily, his response would be the same<sup>220</sup>. Apart from Socrates' possible tactics, this works as a fishing but clarifying question<sup>221</sup>.

Concerning Hippias' claim of Homer's distinction, this answer indicates that in saying that Homer created Odysseus the most polytropos of the Greek heroes

at Troy, he did not imply that Homer's Achilles partakes of polytropia. On his usage of the superlatives in his answer, he does not make clear whether Homer created Achilles as partaking of cleverness, Nestor as partaking of goodness (or braveness) and polytropia, and Odysseus as partaking of goodness (or braveness) and cleverness. Nevertheless, in the subsequent conversation in the non-Homeric context (365d5-369b7), Hippias' answer suggests his readiness to predicate 'clever' of Odysseus (cf. 365e9-366a1), and although inaccurately and hesitantly, of Achilles, (cf. 367c7-d3) and to predicate 'good' in the meaning of 'good at something' of Odysseus (cf. 366d3-5). Therefore, if Hippias cannot explain the polysemy of his characterisation terms or the experiential gradability of personal characteristics, Hippias would turn out not to distinguish Homer's heroes so clearly as he claims at 364c3-4.

Responding to Socrates' question on Homer's Achilles, Hippias develops new points on Homer's Odysseus and Achilles (364e7-365d6). Socrates may take Hippias apparently to base Homer's distinction on a particular passage. Hippias introduces four predicates to explain Homer's characterisation realised in particular passages. Hence, Socrates can check the explanatory predicates, 'false' and 'true' with Hippias' exposition on particular passages.

On the whole, Socrates can provisionally take Hippias to give enough explanation for Socrates to conceive how Hippias deduces his exposition about Homer's characterisation.

(I) As to 'simple' and 'true'<sup>222</sup>, which Hippias introduces concerning Homer's Achilles in opposition to 'polytropos', Socrates would easily accept that these

predicates are predicable of persons, and are circulated in ordinary language, even if he could not easily conjecture on what descriptive conditions Hippias predicates them of Homer's Achilles. While 'simple' of a person implies sincerity, or frankness<sup>223</sup>, 'true' is commonly used of a statement in the truth-value sense that Socrates introduces just before (364e3) or of things, meaning 'genuine'. However, it is not uncommon to predicate 'true' of a person on the descriptive conditions that the person is performing, or tends to perform, a propositionally right speech act including a statement or simply, in the meaning of 'truthful' or 'honest', as Plato's examples<sup>224</sup> and others in *LSJ* show. Therefore, we could suppose that the predicate 'simple', coordinated with the predicate 'true', of a person, gives Socrates more idea of Achilles' character than the rare opposite predicate 'polytropos'. Further, Hippias might echo in the co-ordinate arrangements of 'true and simple' and 'polytropos and false' the idea that the truth is simple and its counterpart that falsity is double, many, various or indefinite<sup>225</sup>. Although the collocation 'a true man' often requires further explanation to avoid ambiguity, speakers can reflectively use 'true' distinctively in the meaning of 'honest', 'frank' or 'open'. Hence, we could admit that Hippias supposes that he gives more specific characteristics to Homer's Achilles, and more associations of Homer's Achilles' character.

(II) As to the controversial predicate 'false' in Hippias' argument, even the predicate of a person in this context would not be so strange to Socrates as we suppose separately from the context<sup>226</sup>. For Hippias, first, categorically denies the description of Achilles by 'polytropos' and affirms the description by 'true'

and 'simple', although leaving the responsibility for the predication ambiguous. As 'false' is in circulation used of a belief or a statement or of a thing in opposition to 'true', Socrates would easily associate some opposition with the relation between these two predicates. Further, Hippias illustrates the descriptive conditions of the predicates with Homer's passage. Although Hippias does not make clear the relation between 'simple' and 'true' and between 'polytropos' and 'false', in arranging a couple of predicates coordinately, it would not be difficult to associate those four predicates of persons with some circulating ideas of personal character such as sincerity.

(III) As to Hippias' quotation of Homer (365a1-b2), when Hippias gives the reason for his belief that Homer does not in the least create Achilles polytropos, but very simple and true (364e8-b6), Hippias supposes that the crucial evidence<sup>227</sup> on Homer's characterisation of the two heroes lies in the book entitled '*Prayers*', *Iliad*, IX. Hippias' reasoning is as follows:

P1. Homer narrated in *Iliad*, IX, that Achilles and Odysseus converse, and, then, Achilles makes the speech 'S' to Odysseus ('S' is a symbol of Achilles speech (365a1-365b2)) (364e8-365b2; 365b5-6);

C1. therefore, Homer makes clear in 'S' each hero's character: Achilles is both true and simple; Odysseus is both polytropos and false (365b3-5)<sup>228</sup>.

As to 'S', Hippias quotes not a part but the *whole* of Achilles' speech to Odysseus as evidence for Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Odysseus in contrast



to Socrates, who refers to a later part of the conversation (370a4-5, 371d2-3). Insofar as Socrates takes Hippias to find his final justification of his introduction of the explanatory predicates, 'true' and 'false', and 'simple' and 'polytropos' in 'S', pace Calogero<sup>229</sup>, Hippias can require Socrates to take up the whole construction and the detail of Hippias' quoted passage and not to associate his explanatory predicates with a part.

Achilles calls Odysseus by his epithet and paternal lineage, and in advance of his following substantial message, professes what he has to do in giving his message. Then, he supports his obligation by his practical principle of sincerity. Finally, he returns to his present address and professes his specific performance.

Logically, Achilles transfers a specific practical rule to a general supporting moral principle, and then, to a particular instance. Apparently, except for naming Odysseus, Achilles is concerned only with his practice. Therefore, Achilles does not seem to refer to Odysseus' character. However, Hippias interprets that Achilles recounts his practice in allusion to Odysseus.

One should not attach too much weight to Achilles' address; however, Odysseus' epithet 'resourceful' would function as an expression of his typical characteristic. This morally neutral characteristic related to his ability and tact, is to be explained by 'polytropos' and 'false' according to Hippias' deduction of Homer's characterisation. Nevertheless, Hippias gives no clear implication between this particular description and the explanatory terms. On the other hand, considering the following conversation, it is noteworthy that Socrates, while responding to Hippias' answer to his question about a false man, talks about

ability and, then, about specific sciences and arts. Therefore, although we could not require this epithet to bear out the whole conversation, we note that Hippias smuggles confusing elements into his explanation without distinguishing them so that Hippias' explanation anticipates his answers to Socrates' subsequent questions<sup>230</sup>.

At 365a2-3, Socrates can find Achilles' rejection of studied speeches in requiring his intentions to correspond to his words<sup>231</sup>. Hence Hippias introduces the explanatory predicates, 'false' and 'true', based on commissive acts<sup>232</sup>: the speaker's commitment to future actions. Hippias here supposes that Achilles refers to a man who commits himself normally to future actions in his utterance in contrast to one who immorally pretends to commit himself.

At 365a4-b1, to support the preceding specific rule, Achilles expresses his abhorrence of those who say different things from what they intend. Therefore Hippias allows the possibility that he primarily refers to the opposition of sincerity to deceit or lying in respect of an agent's expressed intention, whether or not the agent fulfils his or her intention.

At 365b2, Hippias allows the possibility that he supposes that Achilles finds the typical characteristic of a false man in insincerity of a commissive speech<sup>233</sup>. However, Achilles emphatically professes his intention to fulfil his commitment. Accordingly, Hippias' reference to this passage allows Socrates' possible overinterpretation on Achilles' assertion. Telling what one intends to do or what one believes true is not necessarily particularly praiseworthy. Achilles probably contrasts that normal conduct to a morally significant contravention of it.

Socrates, however, can doubt whether Hippias refers to an unusual kind of sincerity as achievement of one's commitments in contrast to deceit or lying as achievement. If he does, he can doubt further whether Hippias supposes that deceit or sincerity as fulfilment requires an agent to be able to realise his or her expressed intention.

In consequence of (I), (II) and (III), although Hippias may misinterpret Achilles' implication in the original context<sup>234</sup> and also makes a dubious inference in concluding one's sincerity from one's professed hatred of insincerity<sup>235</sup>, Hippias allows the possibility that he interprets that Homer made Achilles profess his hatred of insincerity, especially in a commissive speech, while making a snide remark about Odysseus. Further, Socrates can find Hippias' indistinctness between deceit as attempt only and deceit as achievement as well and *between* sincerity as both expressed intention and attempt to fulfil one's commitment *and* sincerity as achievement of one's commitment.

#### **Hippias' commitment: 'polytropos' means 'false' in Homer's poetry (365b7-365c2)**

Hippias does not specify his descriptive conditions of 'true' and 'false', or how he deduces Homer's characterisation from the passage quoted. Neither does Socrates fully specify how he has come to think he understands Hippias' exposition.

Even if Socrates does not judge that what he regards as Hippias' deduction of Homer's characterisation is sound, if Socrates is ready to justify his saying that

he has probably understood Hippias' exposition (365b7), Hippias can assume that Socrates does not object to what he conceives as Hippias' interpretive steps to Homer's characterisation.

Therefore, when Socrates says he has probably understood what Hippias says, Hippias can suppose that Socrates can specify what he conceives as Hippias' interpretive steps to this explanation. Specifically, when Socrates introduces a negative form of question about Achilles (364e5-6), if Hippias takes this as conducive, he can take Socrates to conjecture on what descriptive conditions Hippias applies 'false' and 'polytropos' and how Hippias thinks his descriptive conditions match Homer's descriptions of Odysseus.

Accordingly, when Socrates indirectly asks a question<sup>236</sup>, by referring to both a particular point of his understanding of Hippias' exposition and Hippias' present speech act, in saying, 'You mean 'false' by 'a polytropos man as it seems' (365b8), Hippias can take Socrates tacitly to trace Hippias' interpretive steps. Truly, Socrates need not justify himself in asking a question and embodying a proposition in it, because he is asking indirectly, but how can Socrates have come to conjecture the relationship between the predicates 'polytropos' and 'false' despite Hippias' failure to give any clear suggestion about a false man in general? The problem is why the direct translation makes sense and seems trivial to most translators and readers.

Socrates might read into Hippias' coordinate arrangements of the predicates, 'both true and simple' and 'both polytropos and false' (364b4-5) the idea that the truth is simple while the falsity is indefinite<sup>237</sup>. However, when Hippias

propounds Homer's characterisation (364c3-7; 364e7-b6), and Socrates says that he probably understands (365b7), Hippias can take Socrates to conceive that Hippias is concerned with the relationship between the predicates of Homer's heroes and a bundle of descriptions of the heroes as the elementary predicates. In other words, he can take Socrates to conceive how Hippias can apply a predicate in question to a given referent with a bundle of descriptions; he can take Socrates to consider how Hippias can assume a general implication between a predicate and its elementary predicates for characteristics of the referent. Certainly, Hippias bases his consideration of the standard by which to apply a predicate on Homer's imaginary referent and his descriptions, but he can take Socrates to conceive that *Hippias* is substantially concerned with the relationship between the descriptive conditions of a predicate and the given descriptions of a referent. Therefore, when Hippias introduces the predicates, 'true' and 'false' (365b4-5), Socrates has enough reason to leave out Homer's responsibility for the relationship between the predicates 'polytropos' (explicandum) and 'false' (explicans<sup>238</sup>).

Although Socrates says that probably he understands what Hippias says, he does not appear to Hippias to stop questioning (365b6-7). Socrates is not ready to admit that Hippias has, as he offered, properly answered Socrates' question on his display. It is ambiguous to Hippias whether Socrates means that he could not fully understand Hippias or he has with difficulty come to understand Hippias. While Socrates turns out to be reserving his right to ask about a false man in general (365d6 ff.) after Hippias commits himself to Homer's view of the

contradiction of predicating 'false' with predicating 'true', of a man, Socrates does not take a step necessary to analyse the descriptive conditions of 'false'. Socrates does not ask what Hippias' formulation implies about Homer's descriptive conditions or check it with Hippias' exposition of Homer.

Specifically, it is unclear whether Socrates thinks that he has understood *that Achilles is not polytropos*, as he seemed to want to learn from Hippias (364e4-5), or *that Odysseus is the most polytropos*, as he was not able to understand (365e1-4). If Socrates had difficulty in understanding these points, he could legitimately ask again about them. However, instead of asking, Socrates says, 'You mean 'false' by 'the polytropos man', at least as it seems (365b8).' Socrates' conjecture in his indirect question about Hippias' expository speech act of the relation between the predicates, 'false' and 'polytropos', would not be irrelevant; for Hippias certainly left unclear the implication between the coordinately arranged predicates (365b5).

Hippias understands that Socrates formulates a general proposition. Hence, he is going to justify affirming the general proposition by extrapolating Homer's characterising Odysseus as a false man in accordance with his way of propounding Homer's characterisation (365c1-2).

Accordingly, when Hippias definitely affirms the general proposition embodied in Socrates' indirect question, he is tacitly justifying himself by appealing to his way of expounding Homer's characterisation. When Hippias in the next speech explicitly justifies his definite affirmation by saying that Homer created Odysseus false in many passages in both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (365c1-2),

this extrapolation is a necessary entailment from the assumptions in Hippias' way of expounding Homer's characterisation. For, as his interpretation of Homer's characterisation requires, Hippias has to apply 'false' consistently as an explanatory term to the major descriptions of Homer's Odysseus. Nevertheless, a man boasting of answering any question on interpreting Homer's poetry may strategically introduce non-univocal terms such as 'polytropos' or 'false' consecutively to adapt the descriptive conditions to particular passages adroitly and furtively<sup>239</sup>.

Hippias must be ready to refer his general statement on characterisation to his interpretation of particular passages. Insofar as Hippias attempts to distinguish Homer's Achilles from his Odysseus in some specified respect consistently and exhaustively in order to avoid being caught committing inconsistency, Hippias must extrapolate the distinction.

Hippias would be ready to propound particular passages convincingly enough to prove the distinction, as shown by his confidence in proving Homer's general and consistent distinction at 369c2-5. Socrates can check the point he indirectly asked about with Hippias' specific interpretation of Homer's passages by learning it through Hippias' interpretive speech. Accordingly, if Hippias has expected that Socrates is concerned with learning Homer's characterisation from him, he may expect to demonstrate publicly his ability to answer any question on his display by retrieving the initiative to get through Socrates' questions.

**Hippias' commitment to Homer's opinion that no false men are true  
(365c3-7)**

Socrates does not explicitly mention Hippias' explicit speech act (365c3-4), but only Homer's belief as Homer's propositional attitude. Clearly, not Hippias but Socrates introduces from Hippias' preceding speeches the embodied proposition that no false men are true. However, Socrates connects the proposition with Hippias' preceding speeches by an inferential particle ( $\tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ ; 365c3), and refers by the phrase 'as it seems' to the assertiveness of what he conceives Hippias would infer. Therefore, Socrates' speech functions as an indirect question to Hippias<sup>240</sup>.

Without enquiring further about the view that Homer created a polytropos man false, Socrates here mentions Homer's belief that no false men are true, by inference from Hippias' preceding speeches. Hippias can suspect that Socrates attempts to establish his opinions when Socrates introduces the formulation concerning Hippias' inference on Homer's view. As Socrates connects this with Hippias' preceding speech ( $\tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ ), Socrates would be concerned with the question whether Homer created Odysseus false, or whether Homer created Achilles true. If Socrates is concerned with either, he has to check this with Homer's passages before suggesting dismissing Homer's responsibility for what Hippias regards as Homer's intention in the quoted lines (365c8). Therefore, if Socrates is concerned with the justification of Hippias' way of expounding Homer's characterisation according to the soundness of Hippias' interpretation of Homer's particular passages, it would be pointless to suggest dismissing Homer's responsibility for what Hippias' formulation formally implies as Homer's view.



Socrates says, 'In Homer's opinion, one is a true man and *another* [or *the other*] is a false man but *the same man* is not [both true and false] (365c3-4).' Socrates' expression admits of ambiguity from our point of view, because he uses the correlative pronouns, 'one' and 'another' or 'one' and 'the other'. Hippias can understand Socrates' expression as a particular proposition or as a general one, compared with Socrates' other clearer expressions in the conversation<sup>241</sup>. If Socrates intends a particular proposition, he means that one of the two, i.e., Odysseus and Achilles, is a true man and the other is a false man while neither is both true and false. He may mean that Achilles is a true man and Odysseus is a false man, while neither is both true and false. But, if Socrates intends a general proposition, he means that no false men are true.

The former proposition under Homer's responsibility would be trivial to Hippias because it would be what he meant by his preceding speeches; he did not, though, state that Homer created Odysseus not true.

But, to what extent did Hippias explicitly commit himself to Homer's belief on the general relation among the predicates, 'true', 'simple', 'false' and 'polytropos'? Hippias certainly is ready to affirm that Homer created a polytropos man false. Thence Socrates has the right to conjecture the proposition, as a counterpart, that Homer created a simple man true, but Socrates could not infer from these two premises that Homer held the view that no false men are true. What Socrates has the right to claim about Hippias' statement under Homer's propositional attitude, 'Homer created ...', is at most the proposition with the particular subject, 'Odysseus' or 'Achilles' under this propositional attitude, if

Socrates still concedes the implication of the propositions under Homer's propositional attitude. Within these limits, Socrates can use his expression with the correlative pronouns to put forward a particular proposition. Accordingly, if Hippias takes Socrates to trade on his following affirmation, by misinterpreting that he affirms a general proposition, he would take Socrates to abuse his ambiguous expression.

Then, how could Socrates justifiably conjecture a general proposition under Homer's propositional attitude from Hippias' speeches? It would be reasoning from Hippias' previous commitments and common sense about the opposite predicates, 'true' and 'false', as follows<sup>242</sup>.

(1) Hippias asserted that Homer created Achilles not polytropos (364e7).

(2) Hippias affirmed that Homer created a polytropos man explanatorily identical with a false man (365b8).

(3) Therefore, insofar as Hippias does not question the validity of inference between the propositions under Homer's propositional attitude (365b3-6), Socrates has the right to infer that Homer created Achilles not false.

(4) Further, Hippias affirmed that Homer created Odysseus false in many passages (365c2).

(5) Therefore, if Socrates has the right to interpret that Hippias is ready to accept by extrapolation that Homer created Odysseus false in any passage, Socrates would have enough right to

assume, as a counterpart, that Hippias may accept that Homer created Achilles true in any passage.

At this stage, neither Socrates nor Hippias has any right to conclude that no false men are true. If Socrates does not avail himself of Hippias' assumptions, he must consider what Hippias must assume on the general relation between predicating 'false' and predicating 'true' of a person in order to conclude that Achilles is true and not false while Odysseus is false and not true. Hippias cannot accept the logical possibilities (1) that all true men are false or (2) that all false men are true. Therefore, what is left to Hippias is (3) that no true men are false or (4) that some true men are false. Logically speaking, Socrates can ask whether Hippias concludes from both Achilles' consistent truth and Odysseus' consistent falsity in Homer's poetry that Homer believed that there is someone who is both true and false.

Nevertheless, probably Socrates conjectures that Homer believed that no false men are true, for the following reasons: (a) we can assume that both Hippias and Socrates could easily associate the couple of predicates of a person in question with the homonymous incompatible predicates of propositions, or of things in respect of genuineness; (b) we can assume that both could easily find the general opposition on sincerity in Achilles' speech to Odysseus, whether or not it is used in an unusual achievement sense; (c) we can assume that both could suppose that an imaginary character functions as a kind of bundle of universal characteristics, if the referential function of the imaginary character is removed. Accordingly, we could explain why Socrates introduces what he regards as a

conclusion from Hippias' preceding speeches and indirectly asks a question. Since Socrates is indeterminate about what he conjectures, Hippias need not require Socrates to justify himself in affirming anything<sup>243</sup>.

At the same time, when Socrates formulates Homer's proposition about incompatibility of human proclivities, Hippias, considering the opposite predicates commonsensically, has a right to accept the proposition; however, reflecting about an inoffensive lie in daily life<sup>244</sup> or a lie morally necessary in an agent's situation<sup>245</sup>, if he does not believe that telling a lie is such a moral principle as he showed off (363c7-d4; 364d3-6), Hippias can suspect that Socrates may introduce logical polarisation as sophistry<sup>246</sup>.

In reply to Socrates' indirect question about Hippias' implicit inference on Homer's view (365c3-4), Hippias' rhetorical question emphasises his tacit affirmation (365c5). He accepts the general proposition probably because he read into Homer's passage Achilles' opposition to Odysseus in respect of sincerity in commissive speech acts<sup>247</sup> and read his usage of the opposites, 'true' and 'false', into Homer's characterisation. Apparently, Socrates is merely asking an appendant question about Hippias' agreement to Homer's view (365c6). Instead of asking about Socrates' purpose in arranging his preceding questions, Hippias categorically affirms his agreement to Homer's view by appealing to the paradoxicality of its denial (365c7).

However, in the whole context, Socrates' question at 365c6 works to elicit, in advance of their exchange on false men in general (365d6 ff.), Hippias' personal opinion of false men which Socrates eventually rejects (367c7-d2, 368e1-369a2,

369a4-5, 369b3-7). However, pace Zembaty<sup>248</sup>, Blundell<sup>249</sup>, and Vlastos<sup>250</sup>, readers need not require Socrates to establish the refutandum and keep consistency in referring to it.

As to the predicates in question, 'polytropos', 'false', 'true', 'simple' and their superlatives which appear at 364e1-2, 364e5, 364e7, 365b4-5, 365b5, 365b7-8, 365c3-4, we can legitimately ask what each interlocutor means by them and what one conceives the other means. If Socrates later, considering Hippias' remark at 369c2-5, requires Hippias to be consistent here, he could take Hippias to have meant 'sincere' or 'honest' by 'true' and 'deceitful' by 'false'. Further, if Hippias, considering Socrates' remark at 369e2-370a2, requires Socrates to be responsible for his speech, he could take Socrates to have understood here that Hippias avails himself of Homer's passage to mean 'deceitful' by 'false'. Most translations and paraphrases suggest this<sup>251</sup>.

Certainly, it has been disputed whether the predicates belong to the concept of ability or that of typical behaviour; the concept of potentiality or actuality. As Mulhern initially pointed out<sup>252</sup>, we have reason to interpret that Hippias introduces, based on the quoted passage of Homer, the concept of a false man who actually makes an insincere commitment at 365b5 and that Socrates conceives at 365b7-8 that Hippias does this. Even if, as some interpreted<sup>253</sup>, Socrates intentionally takes advantage of Hippias' use of the predicates to defend the paradox that all and only liars are truthful, and to lead Hippias to self-contradiction, Socrates must recognise that Hippias implies actuality and typical behaviour by the predicate, 'false'.

However, neither Socrates nor Hippias, while using the controversial polysemous predicates as Kraus shows<sup>254</sup>, offers expository speeches about their meanings. Hippias does not explain 'false' or 'true' further. Socrates does not request further explanation. Therefore, certainly, Hippias means and Socrates understands something specific by 'true' and 'false', but Hippias does not expound it or show how he deduces these predicates from Homer. Therefore, I think that they use πολύτροπος as a predicate without established meaning and ἀληθής, ψευδής, ἀπλοῦς as those predicable of a person and a thing. We should translate those predicates consistently and interrelatedly, as Schleiermacher did in German<sup>255</sup>, 'vielgewandt', 'einfach' 'wahr (wahrhaft)' and 'falsch' or in English<sup>256</sup>, 'complex', 'simple', 'true', and 'false'<sup>257</sup>. Hence, I follow Vlastos' translation of ψευδής<sup>258</sup>, but not his assumption that it is exchanged in a specific meaning constantly between the interlocutors.

In my opinion, the interpretive point is not to ask what specific preconception about 'polytropos' and 'false' interpreters must take the interlocutors to have held because of subsequent speeches, but rather, to ask what unanalysed ideas about falsity Hippias provides Socrates for further questioning. My answer is that Hippias' downfall arises from his indistinctness between achievement and intention in deceit and sincerity<sup>259</sup>.

### Hippias lets Homer go (365c8-d5)

Subsequently, Socrates makes a reasoned proposal and order to Hippias, to obtain the right to ask about Hippias' own opinion (365c8-d4).

First, Socrates suggests that they should dismiss Homer's responsibility for what Hippias claims as Homer's view (365c3-7). Socrates' reason is that it is actually impossible (καὶ ἀδύνατον) to ask again what Homer intended in creating *those lines which Hippias quoted*<sup>260</sup> (365a1-b2). Next, Socrates orders Hippias to answer his question with Homer on behalf of Homer and himself. Socrates' reason is that Hippias obviously takes responsibility for Homer's view and shares with Homer the very things *Hippias says* Homer says (365c3-7).

Hippias would have no reason to reject Socrates' propounded reason for his order at 365d2-3 because of Hippias' preceding affirmations. For, certainly, Hippias might be able to avoid all-out agreement with Homer, but Socrates confines Hippias' agreement to what *Hippias says* Homer says.

But, if Hippias accepts, for the reason Socrates gives (365c8-d1), Socrates' proposal to dismiss Homer, Hippias also has to accept the presupposition of that reason that it is impossible that Hippias asks Homer about his intention. Then he has no right to say what Homer intends to say. Therefore, he has no right to accept Socrates' propounded reason for the order.

Then, when Socrates makes the proposal and the order, does Socrates allow the possibility that he commits himself to what he regards as the reason for these two speech acts? If so, Hippias can take Socrates not to be self-contradictory, but to indicate that while Hippias has no right to deduce Homer's view, Hippias holds the same view. Nevertheless, if so, Hippias can take Socrates to be intentionally making an unacceptable request in public.

When we make a proposal, we can elicit the hearer's attitude toward it, but

may be required to commit ourselves to the proposition. Nevertheless, we are not necessarily explicitly professing commitment. Therefore, Socrates may leave Hippias to understand what he says in his proposal and give an answer.

Grote<sup>261</sup>, Shorey<sup>262</sup>, and Friedländer<sup>263</sup> interpret that Socrates talks about the general impossibility of learning Homer's intention in his poetry<sup>264</sup>, but Socrates refers to the particular passage Hippias quoted (365d1). Hence, Socrates need not refer to the general impossibility<sup>265</sup>. As Guthrie<sup>266</sup> and Friedländer<sup>267</sup> indicate, Socrates' proposal and order here work to lift the opaqueness of the proposition under Homer's propositional attitude and lead Socrates to ask about Hippias' opinion. Whether or not Socrates commits himself to the general impossibility of learning Homer's intention, Socrates' speech here might be, as Guthrie<sup>268</sup> and Waterfield<sup>269</sup> point out, a dialectical stratagem, but Hippias would have the right to argue that Socrates claimed, and presupposed in his questions, Homer's intention.

Hippias commits self-contradiction if he affirms propositions embodied in the reasons in Socrates' proposal and order (365d5). Although Socrates does not enquire about Hippias' attitude toward his proposal and order separately, Hippias does not show what he understands of Socrates' speech or point out its contradictory presuppositions.

When Hippias next (365d5) repeats by implication his principle of answering any question, he is still confident of answering Socrates' questions as he promised (363c7-d4). While his request for a brief question suggests that he is alert to Socrates' eristic motion, he cannot anticipate what Socrates is going to



ask about.

In the *Hippias Minor*, Hippias is not so well-trained in answer-and-question bouts as he claims<sup>270</sup>, but it is improbable that he has no tactics<sup>271</sup>. Then, does he botch owing to Socrates' tactics? Does Socrates manoeuvre? Is Socrates' expression so ambiguous? Relatively so. For Socrates' expression may be so ambiguous that if Hippias does not request clarification, and yet affirms or denies what he regards as the proposition embodied in Socrates' question, then, Socrates may formulate another question on Hippias' response by interpreting that Hippias responds to what Socrates thought as a proposition embodied in his question. At the same time, Socrates' expression may be so clear to *Hippias* that Hippias can interpret the proposition embodied without requesting clarification of what Socrates regards as the proposition embodied.

The author of the drama may create how Hippias' answers lead to a paradoxical conclusion because of his lack of clarification. However, even if Socrates' concluding question appears to press Hippias to admit self-contradiction, Socrates is not necessarily committed to the ambiguity of his expression in which Hippias involved himself by answering Socrates' questions. Therefore, even if Socrates' concluding step discloses Hippias' self-contradiction, we need not conclude that, as Sprague maintains<sup>272</sup>, Socrates intentionally commits ambiguity. Therefore, pace Grote<sup>273</sup> and Gomperz<sup>274</sup>, Hippias is not forced by Socrates to answer Socrates' questions but answers at his will. If Hippias is forced by anything within the drama to answer, it is *his boasts*<sup>275</sup>. Insofar as we confine our analysis to the dramatic characters' intention in interactive

conversation, what forces Socrates' interlocutor to admit the proposition embodied in Socrates' question? Socrates' trick or sophistry as his interlocutor sometimes claims? How does Socrates trick his interlocutor in order to elicit agreements which he wants? Although Socrates might be taken by his interlocutor to be insincere in that he does not commit himself to the proposition embodied in his question or surreptitiously supports some opposite view, and although Socrates' interlocutor turns out to be aware of what appears to him to be Socrates' sophistry, we must say that Socrates asks a question and, at a quite high rate of success, elicits an answer which turns out to contribute much to formulation of his concluding question which presses his interlocutor to self-contradiction. As the reverse of the coin, what his interlocutor interprets as a proposition embodied in Socrates' question presses him to give his own answer at each stage.

Therefore, our task is to explain how Socrates is successful in eliciting answers leading his interlocutor to self-contradiction. We must consider how Socrates uses his interlocutors' preceding assumptions in belief and logic and how he formulates a proposition representing his interlocutors' potential view and how he gets a sense of direction in ordering his questions.

## 5. Barrage (365d6-369b7)

### General analysis of 365d6-366a1

Socrates takes the initiative in asking about Hippias' predication of false men by introducing predicates of them into the propositions embodied in his questions<sup>276</sup>.

Hippias allowed the possibility that he had preconceived the concept of falsity in advance of explaining Homer's characterisation of Odysseus by 'false' (365b5). However, not only is Hippias reminded of Homer's Odysseus by Socrates' reintroduction of 'polytropos' (365e2), but also he may compare false men to Homer's Odysseus whenever he answers Socrates' question on Homer's behalf (see 365d3-4). For Socrates asks about Hippias' predication of false men after Hippias introduced 'false' to explain Homer's characterisation of Odysseus (365b5, 365c1-2). Accordingly, if Hippias seeks consistency, he has to judge whether he validly applies to Homer's Odysseus the predicates given by Socrates. Specifically, Hippias accepts that 'able to do something' and 'clever' (σοφός) are predicated of false men; for he cannot accept that Odysseus is unable to do something (365b6-e2) or that Odysseus is not clever in deceiving (365e2-366a1).

As to the interpretively controversial points, first, neither interlocutor analyses the concept of falsity for the sake of analysis, but Socrates attempts to establish Hippias' opinion about false men without any preconception of 'polytropos', while as Zembaty and Blundell point out<sup>277</sup>, Hippias is shackled by his boast of polymathy (363c7-d4; 364a7-9) to surviving a barrage of questions from Socrates.

Next, as to Hippias' opinion about deceit, Socrates introduces predicates of false men, but does not necessarily invent them. In explaining Homer's Odysseus' polytropa by quoting Homer's Achilles' speech to Odysseus (364e7-365b6), as the ambiguity of the normal usage of 'deceit' suggests, Hippias did not distinguish attempted deceit from achieved deceit, but what Hippias proposed as Achilles' sincerity (365a2-3, 365b1) permitted overinterpretation of it as achievement of his commitments. Therefore, Hippias' explanation was not unambiguous. Hence, Socrates allowed the possibility that he believes that sincerity categorically matches ability to do something (365d6-7). Hence, *pace* Hoerber<sup>278</sup>, Socrates does not directly add to confusion by 'confused logic' or 'confused terminology'.

Moreover, as to Hippias' opinion about ability, Socrates does not commit himself to the analysis of ability; neither does Hippias differentiate his usage from the normal. It is crucial for Hippias to show Socrates in what meaning he distinctly uses the predicate, 'able', but he leaves it moot. This point has provided the controversy over the equivocation between actuality and ability.

Apart from the dramatic interlocutors' commitment to the equivocation, this problem has been mostly resolved by recourse to the ordinary usage of 'ability' which is indifferent to actuality<sup>279</sup> since Aristotle's suggestion<sup>280</sup>. Certainly, talking about potentiality of an action, talking about its actuality, and talking about their relation should not be confused. However, the interlocutors' exchange is not so transparent. What Hippias understands about ability is confusing according to his commitment to the propositions embodied in Socrates'

questions. But ordinary usage of 'ability' is not necessarily distinct. If it is a kind of possibility, it lies conceptually between impossibility and necessity. The borders of modal concepts are philosophically murky. Hence, to solve the general problem of the usage of 'ability', I believe, we must reconsider how and what we can legitimately and distinctly talk about by introducing a group of expressions related to 'able to', such as 'capable of', 'can', 'habit', 'typical performance', 'regular performance', 'state', 'disposition', 'choice', 'wish' and so on. Therefore, the problem is still open<sup>381</sup>. However, neither Hippias nor Socrates provides such reconsideration in the *Hippias Minor*, although it might give a hint towards such reconsideration as it would have done to Aristotle<sup>382</sup>. In the exchange, Socrates does not invite Hippias to undertake such reconsideration from Hippias' equivocal commitments but starts questioning from Hippias' commitments.

If we introduce the concept of potentiality as probability of the case that one does on some occasion what one is not doing or what one is doing, I will show that we can interpret that Hippias is ready to accept that ability is not potentiality as inexperience or insufficient experience but as infallible cause of actual performance.

Then, Hippias' categorisation of falsity as ability in his answer to Socrates' first question (365d7-8) enables Socrates to invent other predicates in subsequent questions as possible components of Hippias' unanalysed opinion about falsity.

Further, Hippias' additional remarks in his first answer (365d7-8; cf. 365e8,

365e10) pave the way for Socrates' questioning about false men in sciences and crafts (365e7, 365e9, 366a4, 366b1-2, 366b3, 366c5 ff.).

In this stage, Socrates does not palm off a wrong inference from a proposition about potentiality to that about actuality. It is questionable whether Socrates knowingly introduces that wrong inference into his question (365e3; 365e7), in assuming (a) that ability is potentiality indifferent to actuality, whether as experience or as inexperience, (b) that falsity is such potentiality, and (c) that they talk about false men's deceit in respect only of potentiality. Whether or not Hippias distinguishes ability from potentiality indifferent to actuality and whether or not he distinguishes ability from actuality, Hippias clearly commits himself to the proposition that falsity is actuality, i.e., that false men actually deceive (365e4-5, 365e8-9).

Weiss attempts to make the argument logically innocuous<sup>283</sup>. She proposes that both interlocutors use every dispositional word in the non-standard meaning, i.e., in the meaning of potentiality indifferent to actuality<sup>284</sup>. However, although her interpretation, as she understands, trivialises the paradoxical conclusion at 369b3-7, her presupposition about ability is controversial (see Zembaty<sup>285</sup>). Weiss presupposes (a) that 'typical and regular employment of ability' as Mulhern understands it<sup>286</sup>, does not follow from ability<sup>287</sup> and (b) that a single performance does not constitute ability<sup>288</sup>. Hence, she can leave innocuous the effect of both interlocutors' references to false men's actual performance at 365b1, 365b2, 365e3, 365e7, 365e8-9, 366b3. However, if she admits that it is sound that an expert is able to speak truthfully and lie, then,

according to (b), she must admit that an expert practised both speaking truthfully and lying more than once. Then, would she suppose that once an expert has acquired the ambivalent ability without ambivalent disposition he does not typically employ the ability<sup>289</sup>?

**Hippias' commitment: false men are able to do many, especially, deceive others (365d6-8)**

Socrates' tagged question introduces alternative formulations, namely, either 'false men are such as those unable to do something just like sick people' or 'false men are such as those able to do something' (365d6-7)<sup>290</sup>.

The Greek word for 'able'<sup>291</sup> can be used variously in respect of a substitute for the dummy part, 'to do something', like the English, 'able'. In taking a sick man as an example of one unable to do something, Socrates is not committed to how they should analyse the meaning of 'able to do something'. He would only suggest a circulating usage of 'unable'. Pace Sprague<sup>292</sup>, Socrates need not introduce terms 'ambiguous by nature' in order to make Hippias transpose the contradiction of truth to falsity to the equivalence of truth and falsity. Hippias' unanalysed opinion evolves self-contradiction through *his* ambiguity expressed in understanding what Socrates introduces into his question. Whether Socrates clarifies Hippias' ambiguity or not, Socrates may introduce the proposition possibly involved in Hippias' opinion. Ability is difficult to analyse; as Sprague says<sup>293</sup>, it involves ambiguity. Ability may be used morally neutrally; Socrates may use this characteristic. However, Socrates' introduction of 'able' is justified by Hippias' preceding unanalysed opinion about falsity (365a1-b2).

Hence, what kind of propositions are embodied here depends on Hippias' interpretation. Socrates does not attempt to clarify further what propositions he means by these formulations; neither does Hippias attempt to clarify what propositions Socrates intends to introduce. Accordingly, it is dubious whether Socrates or Hippias analyses the concept of ability for the sake of analysis.

Hence it is not necessarily fruitful to read into their conversation an analysis of the concept of ability and test its soundness. On the basis of modal concepts<sup>294</sup>, Jantzen classifies the model of ability into two classes as follows, according to the co-ordinate relation between the possibility that an agent does appropriately to an end and the possibility that an agent does inappropriately to the end<sup>295</sup>: (1) an ordinary elementary motion like running in which the two possibilities are co-ordinate<sup>296</sup>; (2) a skill or science in which the possibility of an improper action apparently derives from the possibility of a proper action but does not<sup>297</sup>. Jantzen maintains that Socrates' fallacy cannot be excluded if, as Weiss interprets, all *tropos*-words are unusually used as *dunamis*-words in the conversation<sup>298</sup>. Socrates' fallacy, as Jantzen sees it, is that of the double-meaning of ability<sup>299</sup> and, specifically, that of applying the model (1) to the model (2)<sup>300</sup>, and that of applying the model (2) to the case of morality<sup>301</sup>. He rejects the ambivalence of ability in an area of a skill or science<sup>302</sup>. Jantzen's analysis brings out the problematic of the concept of ability, but I do not see in which speech<sup>303</sup>, Socrates argues about or commits himself to or asserts the ambiguous usage of ability in reference to modal concepts (see also p. 129 ff.).

Hippias later might take Socrates here (365d6-7) to have elucidated Hippias'



opinion about Homer's characterisation but he could not decide which alternative Socrates indirectly proposes that he should take. When Socrates said that he probably had understood what Hippias said (365b7), Hippias might have taken Socrates to *have understood that Hippias regarded* falsity as deceitfulness found in Homer's Odysseus, but Hippias could not *understand that Socrates regarded* falsity as deceitfulness or *that Socrates implies* ability by deceitfulness.

Socrates' question commits him to neither alternative<sup>304</sup>. On one hand, if Hippias has allowed the possibility that he meant only attempted deceit by falsity in his explanation about Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Odysseus (364e7-365b6), Socrates possibly takes Hippias to believe that false men are unable to do something normal like sick men. On the other hand, if Hippias has allowed the possibility that he meant by falsity achieved deceit in contrast to Homer's Achilles' emphasis on his realisation of commitments (365a3; 365b2), Socrates possibly takes Hippias to hold that false men are able to do something because they always achieve their plots. However, Hippias did not make clear the distinction between sincerity and insincerity in deceit in respect of attempt and achievement. Socrates can come to believe that Hippias categorises deceit as ability or as inability, but could not decide exactly how Hippias categorises falsity. Hence, pace Kahn<sup>305</sup>, Socrates does not invent the unusual meaning of falsity; pace Sprague<sup>306</sup>, it is not Socrates but Hippias who masks his ambiguity about falsity.

Hippias not only admits predication of false men by 'able to do something'

(365d7) but additionally remarks in respect of the actions as objects of the ability that false men are extremely able to do many things and, especially, to deceive people (365d8)<sup>307</sup>.

In whatever sense Hippias understands 'ability', if he intends to keep consistency in answering, on Homer's behalf, Socrates' questions about Hippias' predications of false men, he would have to take Homer's Odysseus as an exemplar of false men in spite of letting Homer go. Hippias would have to judge whether a given predicate of false men is predicated of Homer's Odysseus, and hence, given Socrates' formulations, whether Odysseus is in a sense unable to do something.

Hippias drops some reservation (*οἶον*; 365d6) in Socrates' categorisation of false men as those able to do something and emphasizes the degree of the ability and the number of actions as objects of the ability (365d8). Hence, Hippias allows the possibility that he assumes that (a) there are many things in which false men are capable<sup>308</sup>, (b) the many things are sciences and/or skills, (c) deceiving others is representative among the many things false men are able to do, (d) the many things are subordinated to deceit, or (e), on the basis of conjecture from (c), deceit is achievement of one's plots and not attempt only. Hippias' additional remark raises a question whether the many things Hippias refers to as what false men are able to do are co-ordinate with deceit; whether they are ordinary subjects like arithmetic or skills like plaiting; for what purpose false men are able to do many things. Although Hippias can object that those who are able to achieve something are not necessarily those who actually do it

on some occasion, Socrates possibly takes Hippias to assume that those who are able to achieve deceit<sup>309</sup> are those who actually deceive.

Although Hippias is pressed to distinguish ability from inability and not actuality from possibility or potentiality<sup>310</sup>, if we define a man who does something *potentially* as a man who *actually does* on some other occasion what he is not doing or what he is doing, we can interpret that Hippias can mean by ability (i) potentiality as inexperience which does not cause present actual performance<sup>311</sup>, (ii) potentiality as insufficient experience which only accidentally causes present actual performance<sup>312</sup> or (iii) potentiality as experience which infallibly causes present actual performance<sup>313</sup>. If Hippias significantly refers to plurality of what false men are able to do, Socrates can take Hippias to mean by the ability potentiality which possibly causes present actual performance ((ii) or (iii)). Hippias will not make clear whether he assumes that falsity is present actual performance or that false men's actuality is deduced from their ability, but he will come close to ability as potentiality as experience (iii), inasmuch as he emphasises the degree of false men's ability. Pace Kraus<sup>314</sup> and Fouillée<sup>315</sup>, Hippias does not immediately leave false men's disposition out of consideration. Mulhern<sup>316</sup> interprets that (a) on account of his explanation of πολύτροπος by ψευδής (365b4-5), Hippias supposes that falsity is not only ability but 'typical and regular employment of the ability' and (b) therefore, Hippias accepts that falsity is ability. However, Hippias may take ability as something more than power which accidentally causes present actual performance, as Weiss suggests<sup>317</sup>. Pace Blundell<sup>318</sup> and Waterfield<sup>319</sup>, Weiss'

interpretation of ability in contrast with actuality implies that ability as skill is not mere capability but some acquired and trained experience closely connected to the disposition concerned.

Hippias may not analyse how one can achieve a deceit or realise his intention. It is questionable whether the ability to deceive others is generally possible, because we cannot specify the elementary actions involved. Generally, when one deceives another, one may take advantage of a deceived person's belief of something in some area and, if successful in deceit, may need knowledge of the area. However, Hippias may not analyse falsity. On one hand, Hippias may mean by 'ability to deceive others' potentiality as experience which infallibly causes present actual performance. On the other hand, Hippias may only deduce Odysseus' ability from Homer's portrayal of Odysseus' actual deceit. He may deduce Odysseus' ability from his successful deceits and other characters' reference to his wiles rather than from analysis of the possibility of deceiving others.

Hippias' first answer to Socrates' first question involves the crucial issue in the whole subsequent conversation<sup>320</sup>. Hippias is responsible for presupposing the possibility of the ability to do wrong intentionally in referring to the ability to *deceive* people (cf. 365e8-9). However, finally, Socrates questions the existence of a man who does wrong as he wishes to (376b5-6).

Sincerity is normally concerned with expressed intention and not necessarily with achievement of commitments. Hence, if we categorise sincerity as ability or inability, we normally commit a category mis-match<sup>321</sup>. On the other hand,

deceit as insincerity can normally ambiguously mean attempt or achievement, as Kraus' analysis here suggests<sup>322</sup>, although it cannot be specified how one can attempt or achieve deceit.

If Hippias admits that one is able to deceive another, he probably admits that one is able to succeed in deceiving another. For normally, if we say that one is able to deceive another, what we admit is not that one is able to attempt or intend to deceive another but that one is able actually to deceive another<sup>323</sup>. Hence, if Hippias, tacitly assuming that deceit is specifiable, keeps consistency, he would have to avoid admitting that deceit involves failure by ignorance or error. He would come close to admitting that that kind of deceit as achievement shares the same knowledge with truth, that is, with sincerity as achievement of one's commitment. But, if Hippias means by ability to deceive *not* potentiality (ii) *but* potentiality (iii) as experience which infallibly causes present performance, he must admit consistently that falsity is actuality. Hippias' downfall is involved in his categorisation of falsity as ability, as Sprague<sup>324</sup> and Hoerber<sup>325</sup> indicate; however, pace Sprague<sup>326</sup> and Weiss<sup>327</sup>, it is open to question whether Hippias admits only ability for evil purposes but not that for good ones, distinguishing this from that.

#### **Hippias' commitment: false men are shrewd (365e1-6)**

Socrates performs an indirect question by referring to the statement asserted under Hippias' responsibility as probable (365e1-2) and seeks confirmation (365e2); Socrates himself leaves unclear whether he approves the propositions in his indirect question.

Linking the content in the present question with Hippias' answer (μὲν δὴ; 365e1), Socrates introduces the proposition that false men are also polytropos (365e1-2). He asks not whether if a false man is able to do something, then he is polytropos, but whether a false man is able to do something *and* polytropos.

Socrates does not attend here to Hippias' limitation of the objects of false men's ability. Hippias referred to plurality of actions which false men's ability covers, whether or not they are relevantly subordinated to deceit, but Socrates (except as argued below) drops this point. As Jantzen criticises<sup>328</sup>, if as Weiss' interpretation implies<sup>329</sup>, Socrates asks whether false men [whom both interlocutors suppose able to deceive] are able and polytropos, i.e., able to deceive, Socrates' formulation may seem redundant to Hippias.

Whether or not 'ability' differs in exact meaning according to the action concerned, Socrates can justify asking for Hippias' confirmation about the proposition about false men's ability because Hippias dropped Socrates' reservation (οἶον) in categorising false men as able to do something and committed himself to the category-match between falsity and ability.

However, Socrates apparently redundantly adds 'polytropos', co-ordinately with 'able', and makes ambiguous the focus of his question. Hippias can judge Socrates' introduction of 'polytropos' redundant, if Hippias intended *not* to imply 'polytropos' by 'false' only, as the grammatical form suggests (365b8-c1), *but* to explain 'polytropos' by 'false' bi-conditionally in introducing 'false' in expounding 'polytropos' to Socrates<sup>330</sup> (364e1-365b6). Since Socrates professed that he did not understand what Hippias meant by 'polytropos', Hippias introduced

'false' to make Socrates understand, and, then, Socrates confirmed this point (364e1-365b6). Therefore, Socrates' re-introduction of 'polytropos' into the exposition of 'false' may seem redundant to Hippias.

However, if Hippias judges that when Socrates did not ask for clarification of 'false' (365b7-c4), he understood that Hippias meant 'deceitful' or 'insincere' by 'polytropos', Socrates does not necessarily seem to Hippias to commit redundancy and shift the focus of the question by introducing 'polytropos'. Rather, Socrates leaves open the possibility that he confirms Hippias' additional remarks in his preceding answer (365d7): '*exceedingly* able to do *many* things and, especially, to *deceive people*'. Hence, Hippias' ψευδής at 365b4-5 is, as Mulhern interprets<sup>331</sup>, not 'merely pleonastic' but exegetical; nevertheless, Socrates' reintroduction here is still, if not entirely certified, legitimate<sup>332</sup>.

Socrates would have understood what Hippias meant by 'polytropos', through Hippias' explanation by 'false', in contrast to 'true'. It would not necessarily follow that Socrates preconceives a meaning of 'polytropos'<sup>333</sup>. However, since Hippias suggests that falsity is categorised not only as ability but also as deceit as achievement, he allows the possibility that if he associates a false man with Odysseus, he would affirm that both polytropia in Homer's Odysseus and deceit as achievement are caused by unscrupulousness (πανουργία) and some shrewdness (φρόνησις) rather than by folly and foolishness (365e2-4). As Sprague indicates<sup>334</sup>, Socrates' reference to 'polytropos' suggests his rhetoric hidden in his apparent redundancy.

The whole contiguous context indicates not that Socrates is investigating

mutual difference about the concept of polytropia or that he is attempting to cheat Hippias by trading on the redundancy of the expression and the shift of the focus of the question. Rather, by using 'polytropos', as he thinks Hippias does, Socrates is trying to establish what Hippias implies by categorising falsity as ability and inexplicitly as deceit as achievement.

We learn from this conclusion that the conversation does not proceed monolinearly toward analysis of the general concept of polytropia. Neither interlocutor makes clear his plan or method of analysis. Apparently, polytropia is analysed into falsity and then into ability, based on the interlocutors' public agreement, but further relevant analysis by the question what actions are the object of the ability is not raised. Neither Hippias nor Socrates is necessarily taking things in order.

Hippias affirms unreservedly that he predicates 'able' and 'polytropos' of false men (365e2). He cannot deny the predication by 'able' of false men because he just accepted it. Neither can he deny the predication by 'polytropos' of false men because he explained 'polytropos' by 'false' (364e7-365b6) and confirmed this (365c1-2). Pace Sprague<sup>335</sup>, insofar as Hippias supplies what he takes Socrates to omit as obviously implied in the conversation, Hippias does not necessarily take Socrates to commit the fallacy of *de dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*<sup>336</sup>. As the conversation proceeds (366c5 ff.), Hippias would suspect that Socrates' sophistic move led in a different direction.

Hippias can ask about Socrates' intention in asking the question and about his intention in arranging the two predicates co-ordinately at 365e1-2. However,



even if he may suspect Socrates' cheat, he might still be confident of keeping consistency in categorising falsity as ability. We cannot assume that Plato cannot represent that one interlocutor asks back about another's question<sup>337</sup>. So Hippias might feel constrained not to ask back because he boasted of answering any question from anyone on his lecture (363c7-d4) or on any subject (364a7-9) and in any way (364d3-6).

Socrates is asking whether Hippias predicates of false men 'polytropos and deceitful because of foolishness and folly' or 'polytropos and deceitful because of πανουργία and a kind of φρόνησις (365e2-4). Socrates arranges 'polytropos' and 'deceitful' co-ordinately, whether he substitutes 'deceitful' for 'able to deceive' in Hippias' speech (365d8) or deduces the former from the latter.

By πανουργία Socrates introduces ideas about how one can succeed in deceiving. Whether Socrates focuses on morally neutral intelligence in wrongdoing or on morally bad wish in wrongdoing without scruple, Hippias can take πανουργία as a morally negatively evaluated element. Hence, pace Hoerber<sup>338</sup>, Socrates does not add to confusion at least for Hippias<sup>339</sup>.

Does Socrates introduce any confusion here by φρόνησις? Aristotle at *EN* 1144a26-28 seems to convey how people used this term and its derivatives but this passage is controversial<sup>340</sup>. However, Aristotle's analysis of the *Hippias Minor* suggests that its confusion lies in the equation of 'a false man' to φρόνιμος, i.e., a morally neutral intelligent<sup>341</sup>. Socrates may understand that this term can connote morally positive evaluation, as Smith<sup>342</sup> and Zembaty<sup>343</sup>

indicate, when he qualifies it. However, pace Sprague<sup>344</sup> and Hoerber<sup>345</sup>, Hippias interprets that it means a morally neutral or negative element, insofar as he affirms the proposition in his question<sup>346</sup>. As Jantzen suggests<sup>347</sup>, we should distinguish what interpreters see as interpretatively confusing from what Hippias takes Socrates sophistically to introduce as confusion, although, pace Jantzen<sup>348</sup>, Hippias recognises moral wrongdoing here. *By questions, Socrates seeks to establish what Hippias commits himself to by Hippias' words in Hippias' usage in Hippias' propositional act*<sup>349</sup>.

Socrates was not embodying in his question the conditional proposition that if false men are able to do something or many things, then they are polytropoi; neither is he embodying the conditional proposition that if false men are polytropoi, they are deceitful; neither a syllogism: if false men are able to deceive others, they are polytropoi; if they are polytropoi, they are deceitful; therefore, if false men are able to deceive others, they are deceitful.

Socrates' linkage between this question (365e2-4) and the preceding (365e1-2) suggests his concern with Hippias' predication and not his own.

The predications about the cause of being polytropos and deceitful arise indirectly from Hippias' speeches because (1) Hippias did not clearly distinguish achieved deceit from attempted deceit (364e7-365b6), (2) Hippias allowed the possibility that he referred to achieved deceit in predicating 'able to deceive others' of false men (365d8), and (3) Hippias added that false men are able to do many things including deceiving others (365d8).

Certainly, a deceitful man is not necessarily a man who is deceiving someone

now, but rather a man who deceives someone on some occasion, regularly or habitually. Normally, a deceitful man is one inclined to attempt to deceive others, whether he succeeds or not. Further, it is indeterminable whether Socrates means so or not<sup>350</sup>. However, if Hippias supposed that the ability to deceive others is some potentiality which does not cause a present actual performance or is indifferent to actuality, and if he understood that deceitfulness here means such ability, he would deduce such ability from false men's actual performances.

If Socrates intentionally introduced a wrong inferential transition from potentiality to actuality, Hippias could accuse Socrates of palming off. However, Hippias did not clearly categorise ability to deceive others as potentiality indifferent to actuality or as potentiality implying actuality. Moreover, Hippias is ready to accept that false men are not those who deceive potentially only but those who deceive actually (365e7; 365e8-9; 366b3), whether accidentally or infallibly. Therefore, Hippias supposes that a deceitful man actually deceives. *Hippias* is responsible for what he understands as inferences and conclusions embodied in Socrates' questions.

Socrates' alternatives of the cause of polytropia and deceit are 'foolishness and folly' and 'unscrupulousness and a kind of shrewdness' (365e2-4). Whether or not Socrates believes that some foolishness and folly can cause deceit, Hippias can read into Socrates' alternatives the opposition of deceit by shrewdness to deceit by ignorance or stupidity. If Hippias takes the second alternative, he leaves open the possibility that he believes that as he suggested (365d8), a false

man has knowledge of the area in which he is shrewd in deceiving others<sup>351</sup>.

Hippias takes Socrates' second alternative and emphasises false men's unscrupulousness (365e4-5). In dropping Socrates' qualification of shrewdness at 365e4, he may interpret that Socrates' question introduced at 365e2-4 the proposition that false men are *polytropos* and deceitful because they have knavery and shrewdness in achieving deceit. He may take causes of deceit as morally bad. However, if he cannot distinguish moral badness of false men from morally neutral intelligence, his response allows the interpretation that he accepts that morally neutral intelligence is proper to false men (368e5-369a1).

Hippias leaves unclear whether he substitutes 'deceitful' for 'able to deceive' or deduces the former from the latter. If Hippias believed that a false man is only potentially a deceiver, he would not admit the meaningfulness of the proposition in Socrates' question. Accordingly, his answer (365e4-5) suggests that (a) he believes that a false man is actually a deceiver and (b)-(i) he infers ability in false men from actuality in false men if he supposes that ability is potentiality which does not cause present performance or (b)-(ii) he infers actuality from a kind of ability as experience which infallibly causes present performance. Hence, pace Zembaty<sup>352</sup>, not Socrates but Hippias takes the crucial step although Hippias later could take Socrates to have inserted somewhere a sophistical, perhaps illegitimate, question.

In forming a proposition in his indirect question<sup>353</sup> (365e5-6), Socrates avails himself of a form of inference from a propositional type that *x* is *F* because *x* has *G*-ness to a propositional type that *x* is *G*. If the former propositional type is

affirmed, the truth of the part that x has G-ness is also affirmed. Therefore, the conclusion that x is G is validly concluded. If Hippias thinks it valid, he has to accept the form of inference.

Hippias emphasised unscrupulousness with morally negative connotation rather than shrewdness perhaps morally neutral (365e4-5). However, Socrates does not here introduce the proposition that false men are unscrupulous and shrewd. Socrates clearly chooses the predicate, 'shrewd', which can denote morally neutral intelligence. If Hippias supposes that Socrates instigates him to commit himself to meaning by this predicate something morally neutral, he can reproach Socrates for instigating him to reduce a morally significant idea to a morally neutral one. Socrates is not committed to Hippias' predication because he is asking about Hippias' predication. Therefore, *either* Hippias does not distinguish unscrupulousness from shrewdness, assuming that both are intelligence and morally negative disposition *or* he does not distinguish achieved deceit from morally neutral intelligence. The latter case presages Hippias' self-contradiction.

As Sprague<sup>354</sup> and Waterfield<sup>355</sup> suggest, Socrates consistently does not refer to any terms with explicitly morally negative evaluation after Hippias' reference to ἐξαπατᾶν (366a1), whether Hippias uses κακοῦργουσίην (365e8-9) morally or non-morally. However, if there is reduction of morality to moral neutrality, it is Hippias who commits himself to it<sup>356</sup>.

Hippias categorically affirms *his* predication by 'shrewd', additionally remarking, 'false men are too shrewd' (365e6). Hippias does not accuse Socrates

of choosing 'shrewd', and omitting 'unscrupulous', probably (a) because he supposes (1) that shrewdness is the cause of an achieved deceit and (2) that shrewdness is in that case directed to morally bad ends and (b) because he would not deny Homer's Odysseus the characteristic.

In his categorical affirmation (365e6), he probably believes that he is consistent in assuming that false men are those who arrange the means appropriate to achieving deceit as a specifiable act.

According to Hippias' commitments about the cause of deceit, Socrates can judge that Hippias contrasts those who achieve deceit to those who deceive by ignorance or stupidity. Hence, he can take Hippias to believe that he keeps consistency in answering from a successful deceivers' point of view, but if Hippias confuses the standard for evaluating intelligence in achieved deceit with the standard for evaluating wish to deceive, he would lose consistency.

Further, Hippias allows the possibility that he believes that (i) there may be someone who achieves deceit because of foolishness and ignorance; (ii), therefore, some deceivers may be foolish and ignorant; (iii) false men are not foolish or ignorant. Moreover, if Socrates contrasts Hippias' possible opinion about true men to his opinion about false men by introducing 'guilelessness' as a counterpart of 'unscrupulousness', then, whether or not Hippias admits the category-match of the proposition that true men *are honest* because of foolishness and ignorance or because of guilelessness and some shrewdness, Socrates possibly takes Hippias to believe that (iv) true men *achieve honesty in realising their commitment* because of (a) ignorance and foolishness or (b) guilelessness

and some shrewdness; (v) there may be someone who realises his commitment because of (a) ignorance and foolishness; (vi) therefore, some honest men are ignorant and foolish; (vii) true men are not ignorant or foolish; (viii) true men achieve their commitment because of (b) guilelessness and some shrewdness; (ix) therefore, true men are guileless and shrewd in some sense<sup>357</sup>. Socrates could be aware of the probability of Hippias' identification of truth with falsity in shrewdness if he, disregarding Hippias' possible emphasis on true men's guilelessness as at 365e4-6, envisaged Hippias' possible shift to shrewdness from guilelessness as a disposition, as at 365e6 ff..

**Is Hippias committed to the proposition that false men are clever at deceit or at deceit about any subject concerned (365e6-366a1)?**

Socrates, linking his question with his previous question at 365e5-6, introduces an alternative form of question about an implication of Hippias' predication of 'shrewd' to false men (365e6-7). Socrates introduces an inferential form that if  $x$  is shrewd,  $x$  knows *what  $x$  is doing*. This inferential form is not self-evidently valid on account of the meaning of 'shrewd'.

Socrates' alternatives about an implication of the predication to false men of 'shrewd' are 'not knowing what they are doing' and 'knowing what they are doing' (365e7). 'What they are doing' is not necessarily univocal. It is theoretically difficult to specify what agents know about what they are doing<sup>358</sup>. However, here, Socrates attributes what he refers to by 'what false men are doing' to Hippias' preceding speech (365d8), if Hippias' subsequent speeches (365e8; 365e10) make more sense. *If* what Socrates refers to here by 'what false men are

doing' is the same as what Hippias refers to as the cause of false men's misbehaviour in the next speech (365e8), what Socrates rephrases in plural form (365e8), and what Hippias refers to by the plural neuter pronoun as to what false men are clever at (365e10), as argued below, *then* Hippias can refer these referents only to the objects which false men are able to do (365d8). Hence, although Socrates does not specify what false men are doing, Hippias can take Socrates to refer back to what Hippias suggested as the sciences or crafts in which false men are false.

Hippias takes Socrates' second alternative (365e8-9). Consequently, he commits himself to the inferential form that if *x* is shrewd, *x* knows what *x* is doing. Hippias does not mention what false men know, but as he emphasises the degree of false men's ability (365d8; cf. 365e5), so he emphasises that of their knowledge. Hippias adds that false men actually do badly, whether morally or not, because they know what they deceive others about. Hence, Hippias presupposes that false men not only potentially but actually do badly.

Socrates introduces an alternative form to ask about the implication of Hippias' predication, 'knowing what they are doing', of false men without specifying the objects of knowledge (365e9-10). Socrates introduces two predicates concerning knowledge, σοφός and ἀμαθής, which can mean respectively 'wise' and 'foolish' with moral connotations<sup>359</sup>, 'clever'<sup>360</sup> and 'stupid' as to worldly tactfulness or ability to learn<sup>361</sup>, or 'skilled' or 'knowledgeable' and 'ignorant' as to a specific knowledge.

Socrates introduces (365e9-10) an inferential form that if *x* knows *y*, *x* is





*sophos*, and implicitly, a transitivity: if x is false, x knows y; if x knows y, x is *sophos*; therefore, if x is false, x is *sophos*. He does not, however, commit himself to this inferential form; nor the inference as follows: x is shrewd; if x is shrewd, x knows y; if x knows y, x is *sophos*; therefore, x is *sophos*. It is Hippias who admits their validity and concludes that false men are *sophos*. Socrates later can use his acceptance in introducing his concluding proposition about Hippias' commitments into his question.

Hippias affirms the implication that if false men know what they are doing then they are *sophos* and the proposition that they are *sophos* (365e10-366a1). If Hippias associates '*sophos*' with morally good connotation, he could not affirm this. But, if Hippias considers what Socrates means by '*sophos*' here in contrast to Socrates' previous superficially laudative reference to Hippias' '*sophia*' (364a2, 364b2) and in contrast to Hippias' own predication of Homer's Nestor by '*sophos*' (364c6), he has to make distinct their differences to keep consistency. Pace Schleiermacher<sup>361</sup> and Hoerber<sup>362</sup>, '*sophos*' is not necessarily connected to morality.

Although Hippias' qualification for the limitation of the characteristic suggests both specific areas of knowledge and deceit, as did his qualification for false men's ability (365d8), Hippias would mean in reference to false men's shrewdness that false men are clever at deceiving in the areas in which they are false; for, pace Burnet, I delete the comma at 365e10<sup>363</sup>.

On one hand, (1) σοφός can be used like δεινός, ικανός and δυνατός with an infinitive defining the meaning of the adjective or with περὶ

or a limitative accusative (see *LSJ*); (2) according to Brandwood's *Word Index*, Plato's examples of σοφός with infinitive are rare but confirmed at *Prt.* 310e6-7 and *Euthd.* 271d3; (3) the word order of the adjective, σοφός, followed by the limitative accusative modifying the following infinitive is admissible<sup>365</sup>; (4) the word order in which modifiers of an infinitive are arranged between the adjective, σοφός, and the infinitive is supported by *Euthd.* 271d3; (5) Plato admits this order with ικανός<sup>366</sup> and δυνατός<sup>367</sup> also; (6) Plato co-ordinately arranges σοφός with δεινός in the sense of 'clever'<sup>368</sup>; (7) Plato uses δεινός with an infinitive as its modifier<sup>369</sup>; (8) as to the word order of an adjective modified by an infinitive, Plato admits orders as follows: (a) infinitive before adjective<sup>370</sup>; (b) infinitive and its modifier before adjective<sup>371</sup>; (c) adjective between infinitive and its modifier<sup>372</sup>; (9) Plato admits the order in which another element of a sentence is inserted between an adjective and an infinitive which modifies the adjective<sup>373</sup>; (10) as Jantzen says<sup>374</sup>, if Hippias commits himself, on one hand, to the proposition that false men are able in respect of things in which they are false (366a3-4) and, on the other hand, to the proposition that false men are able to speak falsely or deceive (366b2), Hippias' response separate from the exchange here involves some gap between capability of a skill or science and capability of deceit, although Socrates does not, as Jantzen infers<sup>375</sup>, deviate the meaning of ability from the area of deceit to that of a skill or science.

On the other hand, (11) Plato uses σοφός with limitative accusative<sup>376</sup> as well as περί<sup>377</sup> more often than with infinitive; (12) the collocation with

infinitive here is related to the controversial examples at 366b5 and at 366b6; Schleiermacher<sup>377</sup>, Croiset<sup>378</sup>, and Jantzen<sup>379</sup> take the infinitive at 366b5 as modifying σοφοί against Muraji<sup>380</sup>, Totsuka<sup>381</sup>, Vlastos<sup>382</sup>, and Blundell<sup>383</sup>; some are not unambiguous in this respect<sup>384</sup>; (13) the infinitive at 366b5 can grammatically modify σοφοί but it is implausible that the same infinitive at 366b6 modifies ἀμαθής; the adjective opposite to σοφός, in Socrates' next proposition (366b6-7) which is probably the contraposition of the previous proposition (366b4-5); only Schleiermacher<sup>385</sup>, Schneidewin<sup>386</sup>, and Jantzen<sup>387</sup> take the infinitive to modify both adjectives; (14) although Stallbaum<sup>388</sup> and Weiss<sup>389</sup> point out Hippias' reference to the areas in which false men are false, most critics interpret the limitative phrase by the neuter plural pronoun and the intensive one at 365e10 as appositive to the next infinitive, 'deceive' (366a1)<sup>390</sup>; (15) Lyons' lexical analysis suggests that (a) ἐπίστανται ὅτι ποιοῦσιν at 365e7 would be ἐπίστανται ἐξαπατᾶν rather than ἐπίστανται X-εἶν with 'X' as a given technical action like ἀριθμεῖν or οἰκοδομεῖν<sup>391</sup>, (b) ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ ἐπίστανται at 365e9 would be ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ ἐξαπατητικά rather than ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ N-κά with τὰ N-κά as a technical matter like τὰ αὐλητικά<sup>392</sup>, (c) therefore, αὐτά γε ταῦτα at 365e10 would be τὰ ἐξαπατητικά in apposition to ἐξαπατᾶν at 366a1<sup>393</sup>, and (d) therefore, the area mentioned in the relative accusative at 366a3, 366b1-2, and 366b3 would be τὰ ἐξαπατητικά rather than any technical subject related to ἐξαπατᾶν.

On balance, although σοφός with infinitive here is not entirely certified by

the usage of this adjective (366b5) and its opposite, ἀμαθής (366b6), without supplying another infinitive modifying the opposite, I believe that the limitative accusative (365e10) modifies the infinitive (366a1) and that this infinitive modifies the adjective, σοφοὶ (365e10), (a) because this reading makes Hippias' reference to the areas concerning falsity consistent and (b) because this gives Socrates more reason for starting asking about false men in the area of sciences and crafts (366c5 ff). Hence, Hippias' answer paves the way at least for Socrates' questioning about a false man in a specific area of knowledge.

Certainly, as Lyons' work suggests, Hippias might envisage the area related to deceit (ταῖς ἐξαπατητικαῖς) and as *Ion*, 537c1-e8 suggests, he might envisage the detail of one subject (ἐξαπατητική); however, the question arises what Hippias believed false men are able to do besides or in relation to deceit at 365d8, and what he believes are sub-skills for a skill of deceit.

A moral area is co-ordinately arranged with different established technical areas in Socratic craft-analogy<sup>394</sup>. Socrates' locution in the *Hippias Minor*<sup>395</sup> suggests a usual transition from morally neutral skills or sciences to morality. However, Hippias' polymathy with all skills and sciences in one person (368a8-e1) and his controversial admission at 367a8 leaves open the possibility that, referring to a particular skill at each step in his induction, Socrates takes Hippias to commit himself to the propositions about skills subordinated to deceit as a superintendent skill and about a false man with this superintendent skill who is occupied about each subject concerned.

Socrates proposed and Hippias accepted that they should let Homer go

(365c8-d5), but if Hippias gets through Socrates' questions without committing self-contradiction, he has to examine the validity of a predication of false men according to the validity of its predication of Homer's Odysseus, insofar as he is committed to the proposition that Homer's Odysseus is false. He seems to Socrates to introduce the predicate, 'false', according to his own descriptive conditions, but if Hippias, asked about his predication of false men, intends to keep consistency on the assumption that 'false' is not polysemous, he ought to consider the validity of the predication of Homer's Odysseus, and, in respect of the predicate, '*sophos*', of Homer's Nestor as well. In reference to Homer's Odysseus, his rejection of predicating 'unable to do something like a sick man', 'polytropos and deceitful because of foolishness and folly' 'not knowing what they are doing' and 'stupid' would be justified. At the same time, he must avoid confusing the standpoint for evaluating intelligence of achieved deceit as wrongdoing with the standpoint for evaluating wish to achieve deceit as wrongdoing in order to keep consistency.

Further, although Hippias suggests that false men are experienced in achieving deceit, he has not yet explained what potentiality he means by ability (see p. 88). If he means by ability potentiality which does not cause present performance, he must avoid committing himself to reducing falsity to ability; for he has committed himself to the proposition that falsity implies actual performance (366e4-5; 365e8-9). But he leaves the possibility of his readiness to accept that ability is potentiality as experience which infallibly causes actual performance. If he reduces falsity as actual performance to ability as such potentiality, he

would risk approximating falsity as that ability to truth.

#### **General analysis of 366a2-c4**

Hippias admits Socrates' review of his predicates of false men. He has not made distinct whether intelligence in false men's deceit is morally neutral or what potentiality false men's ability to deceive is. But he accepts (a) that a true man and a false man are different and most opposite in respect of actuality, (b), in answering Socrates' questions about Hippias' implications, that a false man is able to *falsify* (see below) whenever he wishes to and (c) that 'a man who *does* that which he wishes to do whenever he wishes to' is 'a man able to do something'. Hippias leaves open the possibility that he admits that falsity is potentiality and that he presupposes that falsity implies actuality. Hippias' ambiguity about ability paves the way for Socrates' questions about ability in the usual sense which is indifferent to a temporally specific actualisation of the ability and independent of the acquisitional process of the ability.

#### **Hippias' commitment: false men are able to falsify about what they falsify about, whenever they wish to (366a2-b7)**

Socrates omits Hippias' explicit predication by 'polytropos' and 'deceitful' and inexplicit predication by 'unscrupulous' in his review of Hippias' previous predications (366a2-4). Further, he paraphrases 'knowing what one is doing' into 'knowledgeable' and generalises Hippias' limitation of falsity by unspecific areas (365d8, 365e7, 365e10), deceit (365d8, 366a1) or doing badly (365e8-9) into those areas in which false men are false. When Socrates lists the predicates, he

might intend to note what Hippias predicated of false men, but if Socrates' notes omit any of his predications at 365d6-366a1, and if Hippias wants to keep consistency, he must correct Socrates' review or supply what he finds missing; however, he only affirms (366a4), probably because of his confidence of his consistency or his boast of polymathy.

Hippias did not commit himself to the superlative degree in the opposition of a true man to a false man before (365c3-7). Whether Socrates remembers this or not, Socrates asks whether a true and a false man are different and *most*<sup>397</sup> opposite (366a5-6).

Socrates might set this question here to ask Hippias to confirm the proposition finally to be refuted. As argued before (p. 47, 57, 99), readers have reason for assuming that Socrates anticipates his concluding question (367c7-d2; 369a8-b1; 369b3-7), because readers are privileged, unlike dramatic interlocutors, to read Socrates' concluding question. If Socrates assumed that Hippias is going to accept propositions and inferential rules embodied in his preceding questions, he could anticipate that Hippias will have to accept the proposition embodied in his concluding question. However, Hippias is not forced by Socrates to accept them as Socrates anticipated.

Socrates is asking a question, not conducively (366a5-6). Socrates gives Hippias the right to deny the proposition. Hippias can suspect Socrates' intention but Socrates has reason to set the similar form of question again because he sets the question after confirming that Hippias held that false men actually deceive and that they are clever in achieving deceit in a given area.

Without asking about Socrates' intention, Hippias affirms that a true and a false man are different and most opposite (366a6). If he keeps consistency with his previous commitment to the same proposition as he understood, he has to reaffirm it, inasmuch as he does not reconsider what is the criterion of the degree of opposition or what his commitment entails.

Socrates does not commit himself to the law of the excluded middle, but can assume that Hippias accepts it (cf. 365c3-7; 365d6-8; 365e6-8; 365e9-366a1).

Then, Socrates starts a series of questions different from his previous two questions without proclaiming his purpose (366a6-8). Although Socrates does not explain how he deduces the proposition from Hippias' previous affirmation, he also refers to what Hippias implies in his previous predication of false men.

Using the same form of indirect question of Hippias' commissive speech act as that at 365e1 (cf. 365b8, 365c3), Socrates indirectly asks<sup>398</sup> whether Hippias implies that he categorises false men as members of the classes of able and clever men (τῶν δυνατῶν τινες καὶ σοφῶν). He chooses Hippias' first and last predicates in his review (366a2-4). He gives no reason for his choice. Neither does he refer to Hippias' implications among his predications, specifically, that between ability and cleverness. But if Socrates finally establishes Hippias' belief that ability and cleverness are similar in respect of experience which endorses actual achievement, he will be able to take Hippias to believe not only that false men actually deceive sometimes but that they have potentiality which infallibly causes actual performance.

Hippias affirms categorisation of false men as able and clever men, because



he predicated these predicates with the limitation of their predicability in respect of false men's action and because he assumes that cleverness or ability does not form different categories according to the limitation by an agent's action (366a8). Socrates does not specify the limitation of ability and cleverness, but the expression, 'some of able and clever men', is sufficient for Hippias' acceptance, insofar as it does not imply identification without limitation.

While referring to specific areas in which false men are false by using the phrase, 'in respect of just those things', correspondingly to previous limitative expressions (366a4, 365e10, 365e9, 365e7, 365d8), Socrates would be reformulating that Hippias affirms that false men are able and clever, and asking about Hippias' implication, by introducing an alternative form of question (366a8-b3): whether Hippias implies that, in respect of subjects which they *falsify* (see below) about, false men are able or unable to falsify whenever they wish to.

As to the punctuations at 366a8-b3, Croiset puts a comma before the first limitative phrase, εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα (366b1-2)<sup>399</sup>, in contrast to (1) the punctuation with a comma after it<sup>400</sup>, (2) that with a comma after the first limitative phrase and another before the phrase ἄπερ ψεύδεσθαί (366b3)<sup>401</sup> and (3) that with a comma after the first limitative phrase and another before the second one εἰς ταῦτα ἄπερ ψεύδεσθαί<sup>402</sup>. I follow Croiset because (a) Socrates asks Hippias about his previous affirmation, which does not refer to the area in which false men are false, (b) if Socrates refers to the area, he would intend to refer to it in both alternatives in the consequent clause, (c) Socrates'

reference to the areas in which false men falsify can be justified by Hippias' reference (366a4, 365e10, 365e9-10, 365e8, 365e7, 365d8) and (d) this reading explains why Socrates starts asking about false men in a specific area (365c5 ff.).

Socrates introduces the derivative verb, 'falsify' ( $\psi\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\delta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ) of 'false' ( $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta\varsigma$ ). The translation, 'falsify' is my recoinage which can mean 'deceive'<sup>403</sup> ('attempt to make another believe what one believes false or what one does not intend to do' or 'achieve either of those things'), 'tell a lie'<sup>404</sup> ('tell what one believes false or what one does not intend to do'), or 'speak falsely'<sup>405</sup> ('tell what one believes false and is false', 'tell what one believes true and is false' or 'tell what is false, whether one believes it false or not'), from an observer's or an agent's point of view', or as an intentional or unintentional act. Hence, Hippias must interpret what proposition Socrates introduces into his question and respond to it, or ask for clarification.

If Hippias accepts either alternative (366b2-3), he allows, on account of the implication of the limitative expression, the possibility that he still presupposes that a false man actually and not only potentially falsifies. Therefore, if he later takes Socrates to palm off equivalence of actuality to potentiality in introducing a proposition about ability into his question, he could have recourse to this limitative expression of Socrates' inasmuch as he distinguishes ability to falsify in respect of actuality and potentiality. Hence, pace Vlastos<sup>406</sup>, the text does not show that throughout the dialogue, Socrates means by  $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta\varsigma$  'able to speak falsehoods if one so chooses'<sup>407</sup>.

Socrates may anticipate Hippias' choice of the first alternative in his question.

If we simplify the proposition embodied, setting apart the implication of the ability to fill the gap between wish and realisation<sup>408</sup>, and further, if Socrates assumes that ability and cleverness are closely related and that 'falsify' adds nothing new as a verb derived from the adjective 'false', the proposition type is that if x states that false men are able, x implies that, in respect of those things about which they falsify, either they are able, or they are unable, to falsify whenever they wish to. The focus of the question seems the choice between 'able' and 'unable', but if Socrates assumes that Hippias can deduce ability from ability and cleverness, what Socrates focuses on is, rather, whether or not Hippias admits that false men are able to falsify in an area in which they falsify *whenever they wish to*. If so, Socrates might be ready to introduce infallibly false men in an area in contrast to infallibly true men in that area; hence, ability implying infallible *falsifying* in an area in contrast to ability implying infallible 'verifying'<sup>409</sup> in that area.

Hippias takes the first alternative without reservation (366b3-4). Hence Socrates can take him still to presuppose that false men actually falsify. Hippias could have objected that some false men sometimes, while wishing to falsify, fail in falsifying, because of ignorance. However, once he admitted that false men are deceitful because of shrewdness (365e4-5) as knowledgeable (365e8-9) and cleverness (365e10-366a1), he would come close to self-contradiction unless he took the first alternative. Hence, pace Grote<sup>410</sup> and Kahn<sup>411</sup>, it is not Plato or Socrates but Hippias who commits himself to the view that false men are those who are able to speak falsely.

Socrates' speech comes in a series of tagged questions (366a8; 366b1; 366b2). Hence, Hippias probably takes Socrates to refer to Hippias' speech act also in his concluding speech in this series. Therefore, pace Burnet, Socrates' speech functions as a question at least for Hippias (366b4-5). Hence, pace Weiss<sup>412</sup> and Vlastos<sup>413</sup>, Socrates does not commit himself to the proposition.

In asking in conclusion whether false men are both able to falsify and clever at falsifying, Socrates indicates that he is introducing something deducible from Hippias' preceding affirmations and asks whether Hippias draws such a conclusion (366b4-5).

At 366b5, F in Burnet's critical apparatus, puts a definite article, *οι* before *σοφοί τε καὶ δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι* in contrast to the omission of the article in W and T. This reading suggests that, according to the normal usage of Greek definite articles<sup>414</sup>, whether or not the usage for indicating a bi-conditional relation was fully established (cf. 367c3-4; 367d7-9; 368a4-5; 376b4-6)<sup>415</sup>, Socrates leaves open the possibility that he introduces the proposition that the class of false men is co-extensive with that of men who are both able to falsify and clever at falsifying<sup>416</sup>.

However, first, the co-extension of these two classes does not, as Socrates professes, follow from Hippias' previous commitments. Clearly, unlike the context at 365b7-c2, both are concerned not with Hippias' explanation but his inference. So the convertible proposition here would not necessarily be contextually explanatory. Further, Hippias previously accepted (1) that false men are able and clever (366a6-8) and (2) that if false men are able and clever,

they are able to falsify about what they falsify about, whenever they wish to (366a8-b3), but it does not formally follow, at least because of inconsistency of Socrates' locution here, that the man both clever at falsifying and able to falsify is the false man. Socrates omits the predicate 'clever' in the consequent of (2). F suggests Socrates' formally unsound argument (FUA): an invalid inference with inconsistent locution.

Secondly, Socrates certainly may seem to Hippias to ask about the differentia of the genus of false men here (366a6-b4). Hippias may think Socrates is trying to ask him to admit that 'those able and clever' is a genus and 'clever at falsifying and able to falsify' is the differentia, but this interpretation does not explain why Socrates introduces the clause 'whenever they wish to' at 366b2-3 and omits it at 366b4-5.

According to the usual sense of 'able', 'a man able to do something' does not necessarily mean 'a man able to do it whenever he wishes to'. Hence, Socrates' omission of the clause concerned at 366b4-5 indicates inconsistent locution. It is, however, undeniable, considering the sense of 'clever at doing something', that Socrates might believe that a man clever at falsifying is able to falsify whenever he wishes to. Socrates might inexplicitly indicate that 'falsifying whenever they wish to' is an element of a definiens of 'false men'. However, Socrates does not show Hippias what is the differentia.

Alternatively, as the translation not taking the infinitive at 366b5 as modifying 'clever' or the infinitive at 366b6 as modifying 'ignorant or foolish' suggests<sup>16</sup>, Socrates at 365e1 might have set aside the analysis of Hippias' opinion about

false men's ability for this part (366a6-c4), while working at analysis of Hippias' opinion about false men's polytropia and deceitfulness (365e2-3) into his commitment to false men's cleverness (365e10-366a1), and now he might get down to analysis of Hippias' opinion about false men's ability on the assumption that Hippias takes false men's cleverness as established. However, this interpretation does not explain why Socrates refers to false men's cleverness in the antecedent at 365b1.

Therefore, whatever Hippias understands by ability in respect of its reciprocity with actual performance, formally, if Socrates introduces a bi-conditional proposition, and if Socrates introduces an object of the ability and cleverness concerned as the differentia, Hippias would take Socrates to introduce (FUA) into his speech as to the definition of 'false men' in contrast with his previous attempt to avoid ambiguity of class inclusion by the verb, 'be', and a definite article (366a6-8); Socrates' sophistry and Hippias' tactics behind the scenes, though, could not be entirely denied in that Socrates has left Hippias to disregard Socrates' qualifications (365d6-8; 365e2-5) while Hippias has allowed Socrates to omit part of what Hippias accepted (365e5-6; 366a2-4).

Furthermore, if Socrates asserted this concluding speech with Burnet's punctuation<sup>418</sup>, Hippias could judge that Socrates apparently commits himself self-defeatingly to (FUA) while attempting to find the differentia of the genus of clever and able men. However, even if Socrates asks a question, Hippias can still take Socrates to introduce (FUA) into his question. Anyway, if Socrates palms off (FUA), Hippias can accuse Socrates of sophistry. Accordingly,

formally, when Hippias does not object to Socrates' intention in his speech (366b5), he may unwarily admit (FUA) without understanding or he may leave Socrates' sophistic move without regarding his disregard as crucial.

Further, as to Hippias' understanding of ability, (i) *if* Socrates understands that Hippias assumes, according to the normal idea of ability, that ability does not imply actuality, and (ii) *if*, in spite of introducing into his previous question (366a8-b3) the proposition presupposing, as Hippias consistently supposed (364e7-365b6, 365e4-5, 365e8-9), the actuality of falsity, Socrates intends to ask Hippias whether, by committing himself to that bi-conditional: all and only false men are both clever at falsifying and able to falsify, Hippias reduces actuality in false men to potentiality in them, *then*, Hippias can accuse Socrates of palming off a wrong reduction *inasmuch as Hippias can point out Socrates' intentional ambiguity*. However, Hippias accepts without reservation what he regards as the proposition embodied in Socrates' question (366b5). If the premises, (i) and (ii), are right, *either* Hippias gives an unwary admission without noticing Socrates' intentional ambiguity *or* he does not accept what Socrates understands that he introduced. Then, what does Hippias accept? If Hippias accepted that false men are able to falsify in the sense indifferent to actual performance, he would be too loose in answering Socrates' questions, even if Hippias made commitment in a question-and-answer bout.

However, Hippias, suggesting that ability to achieve a deceit implies actual deceit (365d8), does not explicitly commit himself to the proposition that ability is potentiality which does not imply present actual performance or that ability

does not imply actuality. Hence, although it is debatable whether Hippias understands that Socrates introduced a bi-conditional, if Hippias unusually but not very distinctly supposes that ability implies actuality, apart from (FUA), he would have no reason to reject the bi-conditional. Then, does Socrates clearly sophistically commit Hippias to (R) the reduction of actuality to ability in the usual sense? Certainly Socrates may introduce the bi-conditional. However, it does not follow that Socrates intends sophistry. Socrates may seek to establish Hippias' opinion about false men, reserving his question about Hippias' usage of 'able', although Hippias later still could take Socrates to have arranged his questions sophistically.

Therefore, we might not necessarily delete the definite article at 366b5, if Hippias understands the ability unusually but not very distinctly and if Socrates has not committed Hippias to the distinct idea of ability. Further, it would be debatable, as suggested by Socrates' omission of definite articles in the contraposition (366b6-7), whether Socrates introduces a bi-conditional and whether Hippias understands Socrates does so<sup>419</sup>. However, F's reading gives Hippias more reason for easily taking Socrates to introduce into his question both (FUA) and (R). This reading implies that *either* Hippias admits both unwarily but later will be unable to withdraw *or* Hippias knows that he leaves, according to normal Greek usage of a definite article, the possibility that he commits himself to the bi-conditional, and yet intentionally disregards what he regards as Socrates' sophistries, (FUA) and (R), because he boasted of his ability to answer any question. If Hippias unwarily commits himself to (R) somewhere in



the conversation, against his certainty of the opposition of falsity to truth in respect of actuality (366a5-6; 369c2-5), F's reading gives a cogent but too blatant mark, and, ironically, botches interpreters' attempt to purify Socrates of sophistry. Therefore, insofar as the ambiguity in the usage of definite articles for logical equivalence is not endorsed, I reject F's reading.

Hippias affirms the proposition in Socrates' question without reservation (366b5). It is unclear whether or not, as Socrates suggested, Hippias deduces it from his previous commitments (366a6-8; 366a8-b2). Hippias might affirm it by regarding falsifying as deceit and by following his previous answers (365d8; 365e10-366a1), in order to avoid risking self-contradiction.

The proposition which Socrates introduces into his question<sup>420</sup> at 366b6-7 and Hippias affirms is the contraposition of the proposition Hippias accepted. Socrates could anticipate Hippias' affirmation, given the inferential rule about contraposition.

However, if the connective, 'and', does not function epexegetically, the logical contraposition is not that a man unable to falsify *and* stupid in falsifying is not false but that a man unable to falsify *or* a man stupid in falsifying is not false  $((P \rightarrow (Q \cdot R)) \equiv ((\sim Q \vee \sim R) \rightarrow \sim P))$ . Hence, since Hippias does not make distinct his commitments about the relation between ability to falsify and cleverness at falsifying, Hippias leaves open the possibility that accepting paraphrase by contraposition, he presupposes that as normal usage suggests, there is some implication between cleverness at falsifying and ability to falsify.

**Hippias' commitment: false men falsify whenever they wish to (366b7-c4)**

The proposition embodied in Socrates' question is the explanation of a man able to do something<sup>421</sup>.

Socrates may expound what proposition he introduces but need not commit himself to the proposition (366b7-c4); however, unless he clarifies his non-commitment, he allows the possibility that he expounds his opinion about ability.

But when he does not propose clever men's freedom from failure<sup>422</sup> but excludes an exceptional case that a man able to do something whenever he wishes to do it is prevented from realising his ability through illness etc. (366c1), he leaves the possibility that he refers to the ordinary meaning of 'able', in which illness etc. do not repeal our right to regard that man still as able to do it. Hence, Hippias cannot take Socrates to refer to identifying ability with actuality, whether or not ability, as Hippias understands it, involves actuality. Further, when taking Hippias as an example of a man able to do something, he says, 'I talk about such a thing as the case that you *are able to* write my name whenever you wish to (366c2-3).' But he refers to the proposition that ability to do something is to do it whenever an agent wishes to. Hence, he focuses on whether or not a man able to do something does it *whenever he wishes to*. Socrates' rhetoric by excluding the exception would canalise Hippias to the plausibility of being asked *both* whether a man knowledgeable at some area *is able to* speak truly, i.e., telling consistently and infallibly what he believes true and is true, *even if he fails through unusual circumstances* (366c5-e1) *and* whether he is able to *falsify* (366e1-367a5)<sup>423</sup>. However, if Hippias understands that ability

implies actuality, he must be alert to Socrates' introduction of the transition from actuality to potentiality according to the broader sense of ability.

Socrates asks whether Hippias commits himself to the proposition that the man able to do something is the man who *actually* does it whenever he wishes to. Certainly, it is still arguable whether Socrates' qualification (366b7-c1) excludes the case that ability is actuality. Therefore, although Socrates' locution does not necessarily focus on clarifying Hippias' distinction of ability from potentiality, *Hippias* is responsible for reducing falsity as actuality to falsity as potentiality, if Hippias supposes that a man able to do something whenever he wishes to does not necessarily actually do it.

Hippias affirms Socrates' proposed description of a man able to do something (366c4). Hence, Socrates can apply Hippias' general description of a man able to do something to that of a false man. Specifically, Socrates can assume that according to the ordinary usage of 'able', which does not necessarily imply the reciprocity with actuality, Hippias will accept that a false man falsifies whenever he wishes to.

What implications Hippias realises he is committed to in his affirmation at 366c4 is not decisively explicable, although we have the right to interpret that Hippias supposes in a sense of ability that a false man is able to deceive others and clever at deceiving others. However, it is still not clear on what conditions Hippias accepted that a false man deceives others; neither is it clear, considering Hippias' tacit reference to Homer's Odysseus as an exemplary false man, whether Hippias supposes that only telling a lie is a necessary condition for deceit.

When Hippias affirmed that no false men are true (366a6), he could not have realised what implications he turned out to commit himself to after affirming the propositions embodied in Socrates' subsequent questions (366a6-c4). Hippias here might not realise how his preceding affirmation at 366a6 is related to his following affirmations (1) that a false man is a man both able to falsify and clever at falsifying (366b4-c7) and (2) that the man who *does* what he wishes to do whenever he wishes to is the man able to do something (366a7-c4). However, as he supposed that a false man actually falsifies, to keep consistency, he must consider whether or not all false men *falsify* whenever they wish to actually falsify.

Hippias would, on one hand, affirm the following contradictions about actuality: those between sincerity as expressed intention and insincerity as contravention of it, between deceit as achievement of one's plot and truth as realisation of one's commitment, between telling a lie generally and telling the truth generally, between telling a lie on a particular occasion and telling the truth on that occasion, and between introducing a false proposition into his speech on a particular occasion and introducing the negation of the proposition into the same speech type on the same particular occasion. That would be mainly, perhaps wholly, why he accepted that no false men are true (366a6). On the other hand, he would accept the truism that one who can judge whether or not a given proposition is false can judge whether or not it is true<sup>424</sup>. From this truism, he might realise that each couple of the above contradictions are similar in respect of presupposed knowledge of the matter concerned.

If Socrates appears to the audience to foist on Hippias the proposition about the opposition in the above senses, the audience could accuse Socrates of sophistry although Hippias betrays the vanity of his boast of polymathy.

Indeed, according to our ordinary usage, Hippias has reason for affirming the opposition of falsity to truth in the meaning of the above contradictions. However, it is not evidently paradoxical, considering that truism, that a man who falsifies whenever he wishes to is opposite to a man who '*verifies*' whenever he wishes to.

Accordingly, whether or not Socrates believes the propositions in his questions, the consistency of Hippias' admissions as a test of his practical principle depends on his understanding of ability; if Hippias would accept that if a man falsifies whenever he wishes to, he has not only learned how to falsify but also acquired the disposition to falsify, then, Hippias would risk committing self-contradiction in accepting that all and only those able to falsify are able to '*verify*'<sup>425</sup>. If learning how to falsify is complementary to learning how to verify according to corresponding senses of '*falsify*' and '*verify*', and if learning how to falsify does not require acquisition of the disposition to falsify, Hippias would not take that risk. However, if learning how to falsify in a sense is acquisition of the disposition to falsify and if verifying and falsifying are incompatible, Hippias could not avoid self-contradiction.

The problem is the interpretation of the ability to do something, i.e., doing it whenever an agent wishes to. If Hippias interprets the ability as potentiality indifferent to actual performance; he would commit an error in meaning by 'a

false man' an actually deceitful man and a potentially deceitful man<sup>426</sup>. But, if Hippias interprets that ability as potentiality implying actual performance, he would commit an error in accepting that a potentially deceitful man is the same as a potentially truthful man.

If Socrates committed himself to the inferential rule in his questions such as the transition from actuality to potentiality indifferent to actuality and rejected the inference from potentiality indifferent to actuality to actuality, Hippias could accuse Socrates of inducing him (a) to commit the wrong transition from actuality to potentiality and (b) to accept that the equivalence of truth to falsity in respect of potentiality indifferent to actuality is that equivalence in respect of actuality, especially if Socrates knew that Hippias had accepted the opposition in respect of actuality. However, *pace* Vlastos<sup>427</sup>, we need not care about Socrates' sophistry because Socrates is not saddled, by any commitment to the proposition embodied in his question, with Hippias' conclusion deduced from his previous commitments<sup>428</sup>.

### General analysis of 366c5-369b7

After asking about Hippias' expertise in arithmetic (366c5-367d3), Socrates asks Hippias to confirm that his commitment to propositions about his expertise (367d6-368a7) is generalised to propositions about an expert in general (368a8-369a2). Socrates concludingly asks whether Hippias commits himself, contradictorily to his earlier commitment (365c7; 366a6), to the conclusion that all and only true men are false. From Hippias' commitment to this (369a3), Socrates shows that Hippias' commitments entail, contradicting his earlier commitment (365b4-5), that both Odysseus and Achilles are both true and false (369a4-b7).

Socrates' questions suggest that for Hippias to reach this conclusion, Socrates asks him to appeal to (1) the truism that the criteria in judging truth or falsehood of a proposition are the same (366e5-6) and (2) to a supposed scheme of proof by means of the inferential rules which Hippias committed himself to earlier (365d6-366c4). Specifically, by recourse to (2)-(i) the inference by contraposition (366b4-6; cf. 367b3-5) and (2)-(ii) the rule of transitivity (365e5-366a1), Socrates might be taken by Hippias later to ask whether he accepts a proof *in which* the conclusion that all and only false men are true follows by the rule of transitivity from the following premises, implying the reciprocity of ability with actuality: (P1) all and only experts are true (cf. 367c6); (P2) all and only experts are false, and *in which* each premise follows by contraposition from the further premises: (P3) all experts are false (366e3-e6) or true (366c5-d1), which is a proposition of the transition from expertise as ability to truth or falsity

as actuality; (P4) all non-experts are neither false (366e6-367a2; 367a2-a5) nor true.

However, Socrates does not propound clearly how Hippias has to deduce the conclusion from his commitments. Rather, Hippias reluctantly accepts the conclusion (367d3; 367e6-7; 368a7; 369a3), except for Socrates' concluding formulation (369a8-b1 and 369b3-7), without objecting. Hippias used 'true' and 'false', at least in a dispositional sense (365a4-b1). Hence, Hippias is committed to the reciprocity of ability with actuality (cf. 367c6).

Hippias may be confident of keeping consistency with his admissions (366c6-7, 366d1, 366d5-6), but Hippias' boast of polymathy shackles him to answering, even when: (a) he may not be sure of the right answer (367d3) or of the valid inference leading to the right answer (367b5-6, 367c7, 368a3); (b) he may suspect Socrates' concealment of his intention in his question (366c6-7, 366d1, 366d3, 367b7, 367d5, 368a1) or Socrates' ordering of questions (366c6-7, 366d3, 369b2). He would realise that if he objects to Socrates' question or even withdraws his previous admission (cf. 369b2), he would risk publicly betraying the emptiness of his polymathy.

Hippias would not care whether Socrates refers to (1) a professional who has acquired a disposition to obey a professional ethic, (2) an expert in a subject, whether professional or not, or (3) a clever man who has abandoned professional ethics and acquired the ability to do improperly as well as properly<sup>429</sup> (366c5-6, 367d9, e2, 367e8-368a1, 368b2, 368c1, 368d3; cf. 373c9, 374a2, a6). Socrates' reference to Hippias' experience is sophistic formally in the conversational



interplay.

However, when Socrates refers to Hippias' utterance of true propositions about his experience in order to refer further to his utterance of false propositions in commissive context, Socrates' move is crucial for Hippias if Hippias commits himself to the systematic shifting of the meaning of both 'speak truly' and 'speak falsely'<sup>430</sup>. Although Socrates has linguistic means, say explicit performative verbs, to distinguish 'uttering true or false propositions in commissive context' from 'uttering true or false propositions, irrespective of a commissive context', Socrates leaves Hippias to understand whether or not these verbs involve a commissive context. Most critics and translators suggest that the interlocutors use the verbs in commissive context<sup>431</sup>. Kraus<sup>432</sup> and Wilamowitz<sup>433</sup> indicate the systematic ambiguity of the verbs; Grote<sup>434</sup>, Croiset<sup>435</sup>, Fowler<sup>436</sup>, and Santas<sup>437</sup> suggest it. Ovink clarifies this problem<sup>438</sup>. Vlastos argues about this problem and rejects the interlocutors' shift of the meaning of the verbs<sup>439</sup>.

Most critics have instilled into their interpretation the formalised proof:

- P1. all and only experts in an area are able to *speak truly* in the area;
- P2. all and only experts in the area are able to *speak falsely* in the area;
- C1. all and only men who are able to *speak truly* in the area are able to *speak falsely* in the area.

And yet they often regard premises P1 and P2 as true and, therefore, the argument as valid and sound, although they are divided as to the meaning of the relevant verbs<sup>440</sup> and although some reject the soundness of the argument in which the verbs are used as 'uttering true or false propositions in commissive

context'<sup>441</sup>. However, critics have not discussed fully where and how Socrates introduces the verbs into his questions or in what sense of these verbs Hippias commits himself to the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions.

Certainly, if we interpret that the verbs mean 'formulate true or false propositions', the argument is fairly, although not entirely, sound because ability to formulate true or false propositions effectively defines knowledge, but it is not necessarily trivial, as some suppose, that all and only experts are able to utter true or false propositions if they disregard or can disregard commissive context<sup>442</sup>; nor is it trivial that all and only experts are able to utter true or false propositions in commissive context. The interpretive problem still lies between Hippias' usual response about an expert's uttering true propositions (366c5-e1) and Socrates' introduction of an expert's uttering false propositions (366e1-367a5). If Socrates does not envisage a trivial conclusion, readers may plausibly assume some gap between the meanings of the complementary verbs, '*verify*' and falsify in 366c5-e1 and 366e1-367a5.

In the drama, Socrates is concerned only with Hippias' commitments. Socrates does not necessarily investigate whether or not the propositions Hippias is committed to are experientially and commonsensically supported; rather, what Hippias should properly believe according to his earlier commitments.

I. Socrates does not, as Jantzen suggests<sup>443</sup>, investigate the conditions for expertise or speaking falsely. To produce a wrong product of calculation, we must follow an arithmetical rule and take another additional arithmetical procedure. In arithmetic, if we show others that we contravene the arithmetical rules, we

have to follow the rule first and not vice-versa. Also, an expert in arithmetic, by definition, knows the one criterion of appropriate and inappropriate procedures in following arithmetical rules. Hence, an expert in arithmetic is able to judge which arithmetical procedure or product is right and wrong according to arithmetical rules. Therefore, if the expert is given any example of arithmetical procedure or product, he is able to judge whether it is right or wrong. Further, the expert is able to formulate a wrong example of an arithmetical procedure or product by following arithmetical rules and then deviating.

However, from our point of view, apart from the interlocutors' opinions, the expert is, as Vlastos suggests<sup>444</sup>, not necessarily trained to tell a lie in uttering a false proposition in commissive speech, even if the expert is in the utterance situation in which the audience takes him not to be committed to the wrong arithmetical procedure in question, as when a teacher tests a student by deliberately showing a wrong procedure or when the speaker knows that the hearer understands that the speaker is not committed to the proposition introduced in the commissive speech<sup>445</sup>. Pace Kraus<sup>446</sup>, an expert in arithmetic is not necessarily able to speak truly or falsely in commissive context. Practice in introducing a false proposition is not proper to the process of learning arithmetic. Therefore, introducing a false proposition into one's commissive speech type is not proper to an expert.

However, an expert in arithmetic does not lose his ability to follow arithmetical rules, even if he speaks falsely in arithmetic in commissive context. Intentional deviation from the rules is sufficient for expertise. A reliable expert

in arithmetic is expected to speak truly in arithmetic in commissive context. The expertise is acquired by habituation to following the rules. However, an expert does not necessarily speak falsely or truly in his area in commissive context. Therefore it is indifferent to expertise in arithmetic whether the expert wishes to speak truly or falsely in arithmetic in a commissive speech type, and still more whether the expert wishes to deceive others or to be honest in arithmetic, although expertise in arithmetic would be an important factor in deceiving others in arithmetic.

II. Socrates does not investigate the conditions of deceit. However, since Hippias suggests his unanalysed opinion about deceit in an achievement sense (365d8, 365e10-366a1), one notes that uttering false propositions is not sufficient or, exactly speaking, necessary for achievement of a deceit without a hearer's noticing, although uttering a false proposition is necessary for achieving a lie without a hearer's noticing. The conditions of deceiving others concern not only a deceiver's act but also a deceived person's beliefs and proclivity to believe something. Uttering a false proposition consistently and infallibly whenever one wishes to can be telling a lie consistently and infallibly but cannot be necessarily succeeding in deceiving the hearer without the hearer's noticing.

Further, if we can conceive a successful and consistent honest man who achieves his commitments, unusually but correspondingly to such a deceiver, we can say, likewise, that uttering true propositions is not sufficient or necessary for being thus honest.

III. As some critics assume, if we take, as Hippias would do, 'falsify' in a

moral or non-moral sense, we might find a sound argument in the conversation about a false man in an area of sciences and crafts (366c5-369b7). However, even if we take 'falsify' as 'formulate a false proposition', we could not keep entirely intact the whole argument in the *Hippias Minor*.

Probably a man able to formulate a true proposition is also able to formulate derivative false propositions. Only in this sense, as Jantzen says<sup>447</sup>, can we say that an expert is able both to formulate a true proposition and to formulate a false one. As argued on pp. 128-129, an expert is not necessarily able both to tell the truth and to lie. Neither is an expert able both to do appropriately and to do inappropriately to the expertise, if, as Jantzen<sup>448</sup> and Sprague<sup>449</sup> say, the expert preserves his acquired disposition to do appropriately to the expertise. Nor, crucially for Hippias, is a man able both to do appropriately and inappropriately a criminally described action. An expert in a specific criminal act is not necessarily able to work improperly.

In the proposition embodied in his question, Socrates refers to the point that formulating a false proposition parasitically derives from formulating a true proposition (366e6; cf. 370d5-6)<sup>450</sup>. Socrates does not emphasize or develop this point, even in his reference to the conclusion of the present conversation (371e7-8; 372e3-6) or in the following (373c6-375d7). Pace Jantzen<sup>451</sup>, the interlocutors, at least at 365c5-369b7, do not talk about a false man who does something falsely or wrongly but one who speaks falsely or truly a given proposition in a skill or science; Socrates at 373c6 ff., though, refers to the case of doing something well and badly, probably in reference to the conversation at 366c5-

369b7 (cf. 372e3-6, 371e7-8, 373c7, 374a7-b1, 375e9-376a1). But whether or not the derivativeness in formulating a false proposition applies to uttering a false proposition in commissive context, i.e., lying or deceit, and further, to the case of doing wrong in general is crucial, *not from the interlocutors' point of view but from ours*, for the justifiability of Hippias' commitment about a false man (366c5-367d3) and for the interpretation of Socrates' wavering (372d7-e3).

If the derivativeness of formulating a false proposition applies to wrongdoing in general<sup>452</sup>, intentional wrongdoing in general derives from formulating doing right and therefore, intentional wrongdoing presupposes knowledge of doing right. This derivativeness holds in speaking falsely. One who attempts to lie or deceive believes what is true or what he intends to do, but this does not hold generally. He, *prima facie*, does not necessarily know what is right. Moreover, apart from the two plausible assumptions (1) that there *exists* only one absolute norm that no one should contravene and (2) that there is some relation between an established criminal law in a society and that absolute norm, knowledge of a norm a man intends to contravene, if it is described as knowledge of a norm he acknowledges, is impossible; hence one contravening a norm he does not acknowledge might formulate an action of obeying the norm when he intends to contravene it. However, one described as a wrongdoer, i.e., contravener of a norm from the point of view of one who acknowledges the norm, can intend to *obey another norm* from an agent's point of view, although this norm is incompatible with that norm. Even a psychological conflict between incompatible norms might not occur to him. Therefore, the derivativeness of formulating

a false proposition from formulating a true proposition cannot, as Socrates' remarks (372e1-6; cf. 371e7-8) suggest to some, be applied to intentional wrongdoers, and, especially, intentional and consistent criminals, except for the case of those aware that they are contravening a norm others acknowledge.

If an agent imagines which means is appropriate to an end and yet does something inappropriate to the end, the agent has in view both the end and the means appropriate to it. In some area like calculation, we can only describe one-way derivative relation. What we can intentionally do is either calculating appropriately to arithmetical rules or avoiding calculating appropriately to the rules and taking another arithmetical additional procedure. We have no means to perform the wrong calculation directly.

This suggests that, according to the model in which we regard an action as rule-following analogously to keeping or contravening a specific rule, on one hand, we can keep a rule or intentionally avoid keeping it, and on the other hand, we can contravene a rule or avoid contravening it. For example, we can preserve others' lives intentionally or avoid preserving others' lives intentionally, while we understand a specified means to preserve others' lives; we can take others' lives intentionally or avoid taking others' lives while we understand a means to take others' lives. We have to distinguish two types of actions according to what an agent regards as a norm of the action.

According to a model, we can accept that an intentional wrongdoer is better than an unintentional wrongdoer in the sense that an agent who avoids an action (A), called 'an intentional wrongdoer', is better at following a rule ('a<sub>1</sub>', 'a<sub>2</sub>', 'a<sub>3</sub>')

called 'doing right', than a person who fails in the action 'A', called 'an unintentional wrongdoer'. The person who fails in the action ('A') unintentionally does the same thing ('a<sub>1</sub>', 'a<sub>2</sub>', 'a<sub>3</sub>', 'a<sub>4</sub>') as an agent intentionally does ('~A'). Also, we can accept that 'an intentional wrongdoer' is worse than 'an unintentional wrongdoer' in respect of intention to do right ('A'). But we cannot confuse the person who fails in doing an action ('A') in unintentionally doing a certain thing with the person who intentionally does the same thing ('~A'). We use the same name of an action for what happens to an intentional agent and what happens to an unintentional agent. Therefore, even if formulating a false proposition derives from formulating the true proposition, it does not follow that doing wrong in a specified action derives from doing right. Therefore, we cannot justify what Socrates induces Hippias to accept (369b8-376c6).

IV. Neither Socrates nor Hippias questions Socrates' right to ask about a science or skill if he is not an expert in it. Why does Socrates conjecture what an expert in arithmetic can do if he is not an expert (366c5-367a5)? As also in the case of geometry (367d6) and astronomy (367e8-368a1), Socrates asks whether Hippias is an expert in the area in question, but does not explain why he has to ask (366c5-6). Socrates does not profess whether or not he is an expert in some specific area, but he must have some ideas of what is true of a specific expertise not in respect of its content or rules but in respect of some formal things common to expertise in general and knowable to laymen. If Hippias is not an expert in some specific area Socrates refers to, could Socrates not expect Hippias to answer the same questions not about Hippias but about an expert in



some specific area in general? Even if both of them knew little about arithmetical rules, could Socrates not ask Hippias whether Hippias, if he became an arithmetician, would be able to speak truly of a given arithmetical proposition? Socrates' right would be supported by the conditions on which a layman can both suppose a formal truth about a specific expertise and discourse about it. Even if both were laymen, they would plausibly talk about formal truth about a skill or science. Laymen, for example, can refer to what is available for them, such as a product of a skill or science; however, they could not specify the process of the production. Accordingly, if laymen obtain a formal idea about production of a skill or science, it would come from an ordinary idea of a means and its end. Further, laymen hold the idea of truth and falsehood in advance of expertise. Therefore, whether or not Hippias is an expert in a specific area is indifferent to Hippias' commitment to a possible argument leading to the conclusion that all and only false men about calculations are true about them.

**Hippias' commitment: an expert in arithmetic '*verifies*' whenever he wishes to (366c5-e1)**

Socrates' new series of questions (366c5-367a5) does not refer generally to a false man, a man able to falsify, a man who falsifies whenever he wishes to, or a man clever at falsifying, in relation to the preceding conversation about a false man in general; he refers to *Hippias* (366c5). Socrates' first question is personal. Hippias could not understand Socrates' intention. Apparently Socrates appears to Hippias to confirm by a conducive question Hippias' experience in arithmetic (366c5-7). Socrates asks thus probably because of his personal

knowledge of Hippias (368b2-5) or Hippias' commitment to polymathy<sup>453</sup>. Whether or not Socrates intentionally commits Hippias to the existence of a man experienced in arithmetic by a personal question, Hippias' commitment is not logically necessary for<sup>454</sup> but still crucial to eliciting his commitment to the proposition that in any area, all and only experts speak truly whenever they wish to. By taking 'Hippias' as subject of a proposition about someone experienced in an area, Socrates can pin the responsibility for commitment to the proposition on Hippias. Looking ahead to the conclusion (367c7-d2), Socrates refers to Hippias as a representative expert in an area both (a) to commit Hippias to the propositions in his questions and (b) to ask about an expert in an area in general (367d6-9; 367e8-368a2).

Socrates refers to Hippias not as a professional but as someone experienced. However, Hippias showed that he has professionally cultivated principle implicitly in contrast to a lower end changeable in a situation (364d3-6; 364a7-9, 363c7-d4)<sup>455</sup>. Hence, Hippias would distinguish (1) a man who has acquired a disposition to obey a professional ethic from (2) an expert in an area, but Socrates may refer to expertise of (3) a clever man, occupied about a subject, who is able to use his skill properly and improperly (see p. 125-126).

Hippias emphasizes his superlative experience in arithmetic boastfully and unsolicitedly as before (cf. 365d8)<sup>456</sup> (366c6-7). Then, Socrates does not ask whether *an arithmetician*, asked what is the product of multiplying 700 by 3, gives the right answer quickest and best of all if he wishes to. But Hippias possibly takes Socrates to ask a proposition generalised from the proposition in

his personal question, by taking Hippias as a representative expert in arithmetic and multiplication of 700 by 3 as a representative arithmetical performance (366c7-9) in a less probable conditional sentence<sup>457</sup>. Socrates puts this second personal question not only to elicit Hippias' commitment to the proposition that an expert in arithmetic utters true propositions whenever he wishes to. As Hippias implicitly accepted a logic of a representative instance (366c2-3; 366c4), he would allow Socrates commonsensically to generalise from an exemplary instance<sup>458</sup>.

No one who knows that Hippias is an arithmetician would ask arithmetical questions to test him. Readers can explain partly why Socrates uses the less probable conditional sentence (366c7-d1). Certainly, he is in a position to elicit a more assertive commitment to the proposition about an expert in arithmetic in general. Then, why does Socrates dare to distance Hippias from his possible assertion of a general proposition by a personal question? Socrates may anticipate (cf. 366e1-367a5) that he will have difficulty in eliciting a commitment to a proposition that Hippias *falsifies* if he wishes to and that *not* in the sense that Hippias utters a false proposition, irrespective of a commissive context, *but* in the sense that Hippias tells a lie or deceives. If so, this could explain why Socrates encourages (366e1-3) Hippias to answer questions about speaking falsely (366e3-367a5).

*If* Hippias supposed that Socrates is trying to commit him to the proposition that an expert in arithmetic tells a lie or deceives about arithmetic, (a) by recourse to the ambiguity between 'falsify' and 'speak falsely' which appears first

at 366e5, and (b) by taking advantage of the case that uttering what one believes true in commissive context is not significant for reliability in expertise in the sense that honesty in a usual dispositional sense is irrelevant to arithmetic, *then*, Hippias could suspect that by the expression, 'one would speak truly if one should wish to' (366c8-d1), Socrates will distort Hippias' commitment about arithmetic into his commitment about his honesty in arithmetic not in a usual dispositional sense but in an unusual achievement one. However, Hippias, attending to the contrast of 'uttering a true proposition, irrespective of a commissive context' to 'uttering a false one in that context', does not recognise the ambiguity between 'speak falsely' and 'falsify'. Neither does Hippias attend to the difference between honesty in dispositional and achievement senses; for Hippias would not, and only Socrates could, canalise that difference into the exchange unusually<sup>458</sup> and irrelevantly to expertise, in reference to Hippias' commitment to the idea of deceit in an achievement sense. Socrates is now asking Hippias about his arithmetic, not about deceit or about honesty.

'Speaking truly' can be used neutrally to an agent's intention and is less morally loaded than 'telling the truth'. However, if Hippias cannot show that he distinguishes the case (a) that someone is taken by another to utter a true proposition, whether he believes it or not, from the case (b) that someone is taken by another to introduce a true proposition into his speech in commissive context, Socrates later might take Hippias to have committed himself to meaning by 'speak truly' 'intentionally introducing a true proposition into commissive speech', as 'telling the truth' or 'being honest'.

To reply to Socrates' assumptive question (366d1), Hippias must assume that he is in a situation where he as an expert in arithmetic answers a questioner, whether pupil, teacher, or layman. Insofar as he admitted that he is most experienced in arithmetic, Hippias may assume that he is in a teaching context; he may also assume that he shows his ability in arithmetic in answering the question rightly. In this regard, Socrates' example of multiplication of 700 by 3 is not so simple, like multiplication of 7 by 3, and not so difficult, like multiplication of 739 by 321, that Hippias can question whether Socrates seriously asks about his ability to calculate or suspect that Socrates asks about a true man indirectly in contrast to a false man in arithmetic. Hence, Socrates' example can provoke Hippias' assumptive demonstration of his ability in arithmetic.

Hippias could not recognise what question Socrates is going to ask consequent on his commitment to his ability to answer correctly a questioner about arithmetic, but Hippias would have to accept the proposition about his ability because of the personal function of the question. For this question psychologically presses Hippias to multiply 700 by 3 quickly and perfectly, assuming that Socrates knows the right answer; for, after his boasting, if he does not confirm the right product, he might publicly ridicule himself. He would be tempted, by the personal function of this question, to disregard the supposed context of his speech to the supposed commissive questioner. Although hardly embarrassed by that calculation, he would be tempted to attend to the audience. Thus Hippias would not attend so much to the supposed commissive relation to the supposed

questioner as his own propositional act, i.e., what is the right product of the calculation<sup>460</sup>.

Hippias might miss the possibility of moral connotation of Socrates' expression 'speaking truly'; he might not care about separating introducing a true proposition into his speech from the context of a commissive speech. For he would not have suspected that Socrates' questioning about his experience in arithmetic is concerned with his questioning Hippias' suggested view: the incompatibility of being false with being true in respect of achievement in the area concerned (365e10-366a1; 366a5-6).

As Hippias boasted that he is most experienced in arithmetic (366c6-7), Socrates uses successive superlatives in formulating the proposition (366d2). Socrates substantially elicits from Hippias his commitment to the proposition that a man is able and clever in arithmetic if and only if he *verifies* about any arithmetical proposition if he wishes to (366d2-3); for Hippias admitted that 'knowing' implies 'clever' (365e9-366a1), that 'able' implies 'clever' (366b4-7), and that he is most experienced in arithmetic (366c6). However, it is open to question whether Socrates admits that 'experienced' implies 'knowing'<sup>461</sup>.

Socrates asks whether Hippias predicates of himself further 'best at arithmetic'. In asking whether Hippias is only cleverest and ablest or also best at things in which he is ablest and cleverest, namely, arithmetic (366d3-5), Socrates leaves unclear whether predication by 'good at arithmetic' is deduced from predication by 'clever and able in arithmetic'. Neither does he ask whether Hippias is good at arithmetic, if he is able and clever in arithmetic.

Socrates does not make clear whether Hippias is morally good in respect of being honest about arithmetic if he is clever at *verifying* and able to *verify* in the sense of being honest about arithmetic, whether in a usual dispositional sense or in an unusual achievement sense in relation to Hippias' idea of deceit in an achievement sense. Neither does Socrates ask whether if Hippias is an expert in arithmetic, he is able and clever in arithmetic; nor does he analyse an arithmetician further, apart from answering a representative arithmetical question rightly.

If Socrates takes Hippias to admit that the predicate 'experienced in arithmetic' is equivalent to the predicate, 'good at arithmetic', it is dubious whether Socrates investigates the conditions of an expert in arithmetic. Rather, Socrates allows the possibility that he is trying to elicit from Hippias his commitment to the predication of 'good at arithmetic' to elicit Hippias' further commitments by his following questions, whether or not Hippias recognises that 'good' is used equivocally in the meaning of knowing how to follow a norm or following a norm, and whether or not Socrates intends to lead Hippias to admit that he committed himself to predicating of a false man in arithmetic the predicate, 'the best', which Hippias used to differentiate Homer's Achilles from Homer's Odysseus and Nestor.

Socrates also allows the possibility that he introduces 'good' as a word of approval in respect of cleverness and ability in arithmetic and somewhat irrelevantly, pace Sprague<sup>462</sup> and Fouillée<sup>463</sup>, if Hippias takes Socrates to relate arithmetic to some moral goodness irrespective of the syntax. However, Hippias could not recognise what Socrates intends to do in arranging questions. He

would not mind the predication 'good', if he understands by it 'good at arithmetic'. But inasmuch as he committed himself to the proposition that he is most experienced in arithmetic (366c6), he would have to accept definitely that he is best, as well as cleverest and ablest, in arithmetic (366d5-6).

Socrates elicited from Hippias by his first two questions Hippias' commitment to the proposition that if Hippias is experienced in arithmetic, he would introduce a true proposition in commissive speech about a particular arithmetical question if he should wish to (366c5-6; 366c7-d1). Socrates is asking conducively, based on Hippias' commitment to his being himself 'good at arithmetic in general' (366d5-6), whether Hippias would speak truly about arithmetic in general most ably (366d6-e1). Apart from using successively the superlative form 'most ably' (366d6), Socrates leaves unclear whether he intends to elicit some new point from Hippias' commitment to the predication of 'good at arithmetic' to himself.

Socrates refers not to the context of performing a commissive speech in this question (366d6-e1) but to Hippias' speaking truly about arithmetic in general. Hence, Socrates may focus on ability to utter a true proposition without referring to a commissive context, if we assume that Socrates anticipates Hippias' commitments to the propositions in his following questions about Hippias' ability to speak falsely about arithmetic.

To sum up, Socrates refers to an arithmetician's goodness in respect of his cleverness and ability. However, Hippias takes Socrates to ask *not* whether an arithmetician is able to be true in arithmetic in the sense that he is able to



achieve his commitments about arithmetic, if any, *but* whether an expert in arithmetic is able to utter a true proposition in arithmetic in the sense that what he tells about arithmetic is true, irrespective of a commissive context. If Socrates asked about an honest man in arithmetic, Hippias' experience in arithmetic (366c5) would be irrelevant. However, Hippias probably does not attend to the point that an arithmetician take the commissive context for granted.

Hippias may suspect Socrates' rhetoric in formulating and ordering his questions, but he is in no position to foresee Socrates' development of his following questions. Hippias accepts that if he is good at arithmetic, he would most ably speak truly about arithmetic *not* in the sense that he would introduce a true proposition into his commissive speech as an honest man about arithmetic in contrast to a deceitful man about arithmetic *but* in the sense that he is able to utter a true proposition, taking the commissive context for granted. He would accept the proposition on account of his acceptance of the proposition in Socrates' second question (366b7-d1) in this series, but if he must keep consistency in his commitments, he must distinguish the ability to utter a true proposition irrespective of a commissive context from the ability to tell the truth in introducing a true proposition into commissive speech.

**Hippias' commitment: an expert in arithmetic falsifies whenever he wishes to (366c1-367a5).**

Most experts take for granted speaking of arithmetic in a commissive context (see p. 128ff.). Therefore, to be honest or deceitful about arithmetic sounds strange. However, telling a lie or the truth about arithmetic approximates uttering a false

or true proposition about arithmetic. Hence, Hippias may alternate between the two interpretations of 'speak falsely' (366e1-367d3).

Socrates tells Hippias he is going to change the subject-matter of his questions to speaking falsely, and requests Hippias to answer nobly and magnificently just as he answered on speaking truly (366e1-3).

Socrates does not make clear whether he elicited from Hippias his personal commitment to the proposition embodied in his question or obtained Hippias' agreement to what Socrates can deduce from the proposition embodied in his question; neither whether he is concerned with Hippias' commitment to Hippias' personal characteristics nor whether he interprets only that Hippias personally is honest in introducing a true proposition in commissive speech about arithmetic, regardless of other experts nor whether Hippias is able to introduce a true proposition about arithmetic, regardless of a commissive context; nor whether he elicited from Hippias his commitment to the proposition that an arithmetician in general is honest in introducing a true proposition into commissive speech or is able to introduce a true proposition, regardless of a commissive context.

While Socrates perhaps leaves unclear how he interprets the answers elicited from Hippias, he shows that he is going to ask questions about speaking falsely about arithmetic in general, whether in commissive speech or not (366e1-2). He leaves unclear in what relation to the questions about speaking truly he is going to ask about speaking falsely, but shows his satisfaction with the answers elicited from Hippias in suggesting that Hippias answered his questions nobly and magnificently. Hippias would take Socrates to have talked about speaking

truly in arithmetic in contrast to speaking falsely in arithmetic. He need not have noticed Socrates' reversion to the topic about the relation between being true and being false.

Socrates asks, 'If someone should ask you what is the product of multiplying 700 by 3, would you falsify most and always consistently speak falsely about the product, wishing to falsify and never to give a right answer (366e3-6), *or* [if someone should ask the same question,] would a foolish [or ignorant] man in arithmetic be abler to falsify than you are when you wish to (366e6-367a2); *otherwise*, on one hand, would a foolish [or ignorant] man, if it so happened, often speak truly against his wish, while wishing to speak falsely, because he does not know about arithmetic, and on the other hand, you, clever [at arithmetic] as you are, would falsify always consistently if you should wish to falsify (367a2-5)?'

As regards the alternatives here, Socrates does not clarify their relation. If Socrates means that the second (366e6-367a2) is exclusive to the first (366e3-e6), Socrates would have to ask in the second, formally, whether there is someone who would falsify more and speak falsely more consistently and infallibly, wishing to falsify and never to answer rightly, than Hippias. When Socrates introduced the superlative adverb in the question about speaking truly (366c7-d1), he did not refer to a non-expert or a foolish man in arithmetic. But, in the second alternative (366e6-367a2), Socrates introduces the comparative form for the comparison between a foolish or ignorant man and an expert. Neither does Socrates there refer to consistency and infallibility in speaking

falsely. Socrates' introduction of the verb, 'be able to', can be associated with the first alternative, according to Hippias' commitment to the proposition that the man able to do something is the man who does it whenever he wishes to (366b7-c3). Therefore, the second alternative is associated with 'falsifying much' in the first. Hence, Hippias must supply the lacking counterpart to make the first and second alternatives exclusive in respect of the incompatibility of an expert with a foolish or ignorant man and in respect of consistency and infallibility in speaking falsely. As the second alternative lacks detail, Hippias must still judge the meaning of 'falsify'.

As to the relation between the second alternative (366e6-367a2) and the third (367a2-5), Socrates linguistically marks their alternativeness; he introduces both 'Hippias' as 'an expert or a clever man' and 'a foolish or ignorant man' in both alternatives. But they are apparently not exclusive. The second part of the third alternative (367a4-5) suggests the exclusiveness in that that part formally refers to the same content of the first alternative. Hippias takes Socrates to refer to both a foolish man and a clever man, or both an expert and a non-expert and describe what each of them does in respect of the same thing, speaking falsely or falsifying, but Socrates keeps consistency neither in expressing ability at 366b2-3, 366b5, 366b7-c3 nor in using 'speaking falsely' and 'falsifying'. Therefore, what proposition Socrates introduces into his question depends on Hippias' demand of clarification or Hippias' interpretation.

As to Socrates' arrangement of the verb, 'falsify', Hippias would have taken Socrates to substitute this for 'deceive', which Hippias had introduced at 365d8

and 366a1 (366b2, b3, b5, b6). But as Socrates predicated the verbal phrase 'speak truly' of Hippias (366d1), so he predicates 'falsify' of Hippias in the corresponding question (366e5) and yet coordinately with the verbal phrase, 'speak falsely' (366e5); as he collocated the adverb, 'most' with a verbal phrase, 'speak truly' (366d1), so he does with the verb, 'falsify' (366e4). Further, Socrates uses this verb, 'falsify', of Hippias (367a5) as a counterpart of the verbal phrase, 'speak truly', used of an ignorant or foolish man (367a3) and, in this third alternative (367a2-5), 'falsify' (367a4) is used as a rephrase of the verbal phrase, 'speak falsely' (367a2-3), because both are introduced in the corresponding clauses about an agent's wish (367a2-3; 367a4). Further, the predicative part at 367a4-5 in the third alternative is meant as a paraphrase of the second verbal phrase of the first alternative, 'always consistently speak falsely' (366e5). Hence, Socrates would appear to Hippias to make no distinction between the use of 'falsify' and that of 'speak falsely'. Hippias has the right to ask Socrates to clarify his meaning to ask. However, in this context (366c5 ff.), Socrates allows the possibility that he uses the verb, 'falsify' and the verbal phrase, 'speak falsely' in the meaning corresponding to that of the verbal phrase, 'speak truly' (366d1) in Socrates' question about Hippias' expertise in arithmetic.

As to Socrates' expression of ability, he allows the possibility that the participle, 'wishing' (366e5-6, 367a2) corresponds to the conditional clause at 366c8 and 367a4.

On the content of Socrates' question in contrast with his locutions, Socrates does not introduce the same type of proposition about speaking falsely by

formally substituting 'speak falsely' for 'speak truly'. Socrates regarded Hippias as an expert in arithmetic (366c5-6) in his questions about speaking truly about multiplication of 700 by 3. He did not refer to a non-expert or a foolish man in arithmetic who would think he knows arithmetic. However, in asking about speaking falsely, apart from choosing different words and conforming to the form of the previous question about speaking truly, Socrates refers to three cases about speaking falsely of the multiplication of 700 by 3 as follows:

(1) An expert in arithmetic or a clever man occupied about it *speaks falsely* consistently and infallibly if he wishes to (366e3-6; 367a4).

(2) An ignorant or foolish man in arithmetic often *speaks truly* against his wish if he chances to (367a2-5).

(3) An ignorant or foolish man in arithmetic *speaks falsely*, if he wishes to, worse than an expert in arithmetic or a clever man occupied about it does if he wishes to (366e6-367a2).

Case (1) means *either* (1)-(a) that an expert in arithmetic or a clever man introduces into commissive speech what he believes false if he wishes to *or* (1)-(b) that the proposition which an expert in arithmetic or a clever man introduces into commissive speech if he wishes to as what he believes false is false. The former (1)-(a) means that an expert in arithmetic or a clever man intentionally speaks falsely if he wishes to; the latter (1)-(b) means further that the proposition which an expert in arithmetic or a clever man intentionally introduces into his speech as false is false, too. Apart from the commissive context, Socrates allows the possibility that he means the latter (1)-(b), because Hippias takes

Socrates to contrast an expert to a non-expert or a clever man to a foolish man in respect of the truth-value of the proposition that they utter as what they believe false.

Further, as to the context of commissive speech in answering a questioner, the first case (1)-(b) means *either* (1)-(b)-(i) that a clever man occupied about arithmetic tells a lie by uttering a false proposition if he wishes to *or* (1)-(b)-(ii) that an expert in arithmetic utters a false proposition if he wishes to, irrespective of commissive context. Simply speaking, (1)-(b) means *either* (1)-(b)-(i)' that a clever man occupied about arithmetic is deceitful in arithmetic if he wishes to be *or* (1)-(b)-(ii)' that an expert in arithmetic introduces a false proposition into his speech if he wishes to, irrespective of a commissive context. Further, this clause in (1)-(b)-(ii)' does *not* imply that Hippias interprets that an expert disregards commissive context. If Hippias interprets so, he would admit that an expert is dishonest just because of *disregarding* commissive context. Hence, that clause implies that Hippias, from the viewpoint of an observer of an expert, disregards whether or not the expert is set in commissive context. In other words, if Hippias takes case (1)-(b)-(ii), he means that if we disregard the commissive context of speech, we can take one who utters a false proposition if he wishes to to be an expert.

Hippias can also interpret the second case (2) and the third one (3), *mutatis mutandis*, in the same way according to the double standard of interpretation of the commissive context, apart from the detail of Socrates' formulation.

Therefore, if Hippias simplifies Socrates' formulations, he could envisage two

schemes in Socrates' questions about speaking falsely. One scheme (A) following case (1)-(b)-(i) is that a clever man occupied about arithmetic is deceitful by uttering a false proposition about arithmetic in commissive context if he wishes to be, while a foolish man in arithmetic [who would think that he knows arithmetic but does not] may fail in being deceitful by uttering a false proposition about arithmetic in commissive context, if he wishes to. The other scheme (B) following case (1)-(b)-(ii) is that if we disregard a commissive context, an expert in arithmetic utters a false proposition if he wishes to, while a non-expert in arithmetic may fail against his wish in uttering a false proposition.

Socrates does not make plain which scheme his question refers to. Hence, if Hippias does not seek clarification about Socrates' whole scheme and if Hippias affirms the propositions embodied in his question, he leaves open the possibility that he commits himself to either scheme.

This means (1) that if Hippias took Socrates to mean 'utter a true proposition in commissive context' by 'speak truly' [scheme (A)], he naturally takes Socrates to mean 'utter a false proposition in commissive context' by both the verbal phrase, 'speak falsely', and the verb, 'falsify' and (2) that if Hippias took Socrates to mean 'utter a true proposition, irrespective of commissive context' by 'speak truly', he *naturally* takes Socrates to mean 'utter a false proposition irrespective of commissive context' by both 'speak falsely' and 'falsify' [scheme (B)].

Most experts, especially, arithmeticians, take for granted that they make statements about arithmetic. Hence, it is irrelevant for them to ask whether an arithmetician is honest about arithmetic, at least in a dispositional sense.



However, disregarding one's commissive context differs from taking it unquestioningly as established. Further, disregarding one's commissive context differs from leaving another's commissive context out of consideration. However, this time, Hippias does not distinguish between the following cases: (1) Hippias disregards his own commissive context and (2) Hippias reflectively leaves his supposed commissive context out of consideration.

Hence, Hippias may take for granted the commissive context in arithmeticians' speech, but when he is asked about his speaking truly at 366c7-d1, Socrates' question works personally for Hippias to follow scheme (B). Further, as only one answer of the arithmetic question is right, it would be irrelevant for Hippias to ask whether an expert uttering a true proposition is set in commissive context. Hence, as Smith suggests<sup>464</sup>, it is *natural* for Hippias to follow the line of thought in (B), unless he suspects Socrates' sophistry. Hence, he would have to make clear what he is committed to in his answer to Socrates' question, if he persists in consistency of commitment.

Scheme (B) is experientially nearly intact because it avoids the problem of an expert's acquisition of a disposition to speak falsely. Further, if Hippias follows (B), he is, truly, consistent in interpreting the meaning of the controversial verbs, 'speak truly', 'speak falsely' and 'falsify'. Nevertheless, Socrates would not try to commit Hippias to (B). If Socrates reduces Hippias' opinion about false men to (B), insofar as Hippias commonsensically believes that knowledge is ability to make a true statement about a right or wrong answer of a given question, Socrates would too trivially reduce Hippias' idea of deceit to knowledge. This

could not explain Hippias' intense affirmation of a false man in arithmetic in the next speech (367a8); still less would even Hippias miss such a sophistry. However, even if interpreters can admit that Socrates has tried to commit Hippias to accept scheme (A), why could Hippias understand (1) that Socrates, having asked about Hippias' speaking truly in (B), asks about Hippias' speaking falsely in (A) and (2) that Hippias may be taken to commit himself to all his affirmations in (A)? One reason is that he committed himself to the proposition that false men are clever at deceiving in respect of what they deceive about (365e10-366a1). In other words, although it is dubious that honesty in an achievement sense is conceivable in contrast to deceit in an achievement sense, Hippias commits himself to (A) because he believes, without analysing the possibility of honesty in an achievement sense, that he is consistent in believing that deceit in an achievement sense needs expertise in many areas. Another reason is that when Hippias is asked the same assumptive question about the same multiplication (366e3-4), he disregards the commissive context probably because he habitually disregards it in displaying his self-professed ability to answer any question. Certainly, answering any question from anyone does not imply disregarding one's responsibility for one's statement; however, public display of polymathy involves the inclination to disregard it. No one can answer every question rightly. Hence, asked about the same multiplication in the supposed context, unlike the former situation (366c6-d1), Hippias is relieved of worry about his ability being publicly tested. He probably replaces his ability to make any number of true statements consistently and infallibly about what is a

wrong answer of the multiplication concerned by his ability to make false statements about the right answer consistently and infallibly. For these reasons, Hippias would take (A) at least here (366e3-367a5), not necessarily through Socrates' sophistic questions.

Consequently, although Hippias may believe that Socrates instilled his opinion into his question (367a5), Hippias allows the possibility of his commitments to the proposition that a clever man is able to deceive and tell a lie consistently and infallibly *by means of* giving a wrong answer in uttering a false proposition, if he wishes to, while a foolish man is not. Further, as regards uttering an objectively true proposition (366c5-e1), retroactively Hippias allows, *mutatis mutandis*, the possibility that he committed himself to the proposition that a clever man occupied about arithmetic *is honest and tells the truth* consistently and infallibly *by means of* uttering an objectively true proposition, if he wishes to, while a foolish man is not. Therefore, insofar as neither party makes clear what proposition they refer to, Hippias allows the possibility that he believes (i) the above propositions and, accordingly, (ii) the proposition that a clever man occupied about arithmetic *is able* both to be honest and tell the truth by means of uttering an objectively true proposition, if he wishes to, and to deceive and tell a lie, by means of uttering an objectively false proposition, if he wishes to, because he does so consistently and infallibly if he wishes (cf. 366b7-c1).

**Hippias' commitment: false men falsify about subjects concerned (367a6-b1)**

Socrates did not refer to a false man in general at 366c5-367a5, but does so at 367a6 probably correspondingly to 'a foolish man' (366e6-367a1; 367a2) and 'a clever man' (367a4). He asks whether there is no such thing as a false man in calculating (367a6-7). He allows the possibility that he has referred to a false man in arithmetic as an example of a false man in various areas as Hippias suggested (365e10-366a1; cf. 365d8).

Socrates has introduced questions personal to Hippias, but after Hippias' affirmation to his question about falsifying and speaking falsely, he links Hippias' commitment to his preceding questions with one about a false man. When Socrates started his questions about Hippias by introducing 'Hippias' as a subject, Socrates did not make clear his intention to ask about a true man in arithmetic by taking Hippias as a representative expert in arithmetic or that he intended to ask about a false man in transition to the subject of speaking falsely. Hippias might have enough reason for recognising that Socrates had been continuously asking about a true man and a false man, because Socrates introduced the words he had used in the previous questions about a false man (εἰ βούλοιο (366c8; cf. 366e5-6, 367a2, 367a4), δυνατώτατός τε εἰ καὶ σοφώτατος (366d2; cf. 366d3-4, 366d4-5), δυνατώτατα (366d5), τὰ ψευδῆ (366e1-2), ψεύδοιο (366e5, cf. 366e6, 367a1, 367a4, 367a5), ἀμαθῆς (367a1, 367a2), σοφός (367a4)). However, Socrates has just made clear that he has taken Hippias as a representative expert in arithmetic and has just suggested that he avails himself of Hippias' affirmations given to questions about Hippias' personal expertise as Hippias' commitment to a general

proposition about a false man and a true man in arithmetic. Insofar as Hippias admitted publicly that he is most experienced in arithmetic and committed himself to the propositions about his expertise in respect of their general implications, Socrates could justify conjecturing a general proposition about a false man from Hippias' answers.

Hippias, accepting the proposition in Socrates' question (367a8), might understand, following scheme (B), that there is a false man who utters a false proposition, irrespective of a commissive context, in each subject or, following (A), that as Friedländer<sup>465</sup>, Fowler<sup>466</sup>, and Waterfield<sup>467</sup> suggest about 367a6-7, a false man achieves deceit about subjects concerned.

Socrates proposes that they should assume the thesis that someone is a false person about both number and calculation (367a8-b1). Pace Penner<sup>468</sup>, Socrates is, as Robinson suggests<sup>469</sup>, not saddled with Hippias' implications, but by appearing so, encourages Hippias to reach the conclusion, because Socrates never agreed to Hippias' opinion before. Socrates focuses again on what Hippias had presupposed, i.e., the existence of a false man, in an achievement sense, about number and calculation. Socrates shows that he will start another series of questions about a false man in arithmetic.

On one hand, Hippias at 367b1 has no reason to reject the existence of false men occupied in the field of arithmetic, because of his preceding affirmation (365d7-8, 365e8-9, 365e10-366a1, 366a4, 366b3-4; cf. 365a3, 365b2); on the other, Socrates allows the possibility that he refers to a false man only in arithmetic, not to a clever man who achieves deceit about subjects concerned.

When Socrates refers to Hippias' previous commitments next (367b1-5), he may refer to a liar in an achievement sense; Hippias may replace scheme (A) by (B) at 367b6-c7. Some critics<sup>470</sup> see Socrates' usual craft-analogy, specifically, the transition from speaking falsely in a skill or science to telling a lie in the domain of morality. Socrates' following references to an area<sup>471</sup> may support his appeal to this transition. However, *Hippias'* commitments to the transition leaves the interpretability that Hippias only indistinctly sees the transition from telling a technically specific lie to telling a technically non-specific lie.

**Hippias' commitment: an expert in arithmetic is able to speak truly and falsely (367b1-c4)**

Socrates asks with tagged reference to Hippias' commitment (366b4-7), whether, assuming the existence of a false person about number and calculation, if a man is false about number and calculation, he is able to falsify (367b1-5). Socrates introduces into his question the proposition that all men false in arithmetic are able to falsify in arithmetic, because no men unable to falsify become false.

The formulations he introduces into his questions (367b2-5; 367b6-7, 367c1-2), in the context different from questions about false men (365d6-366c4) and which Hippias commits himself to are:

- (1) a false man about number and calculation is able to falsify if he is false (367b2-6);
- (2) Hippias is the ablest to falsify about calculations (367b6-7);
- (3) Hippias is the ablest to speak truly about calculations (367c1-2).

At 367c2, Hippias does not dismiss his affirmation given to the formulation, 'Hippias is the ablest to *speak truly* about calculations'; though he does not clarify whether he means by 'speak truly' 'tell the truth, to be honest in an unusual achievement sense' or 'utter an objectively true proposition, irrespective of a commissive context'. He admitted that he is most experienced in arithmetic (366c6) and, accordingly, accepted that he utters a true arithmetical proposition if he wishes to, but not in an unusual achievement sense of honesty (366c5-d3). Hence, Hippias may be alert to how Socrates intends to use Hippias' previous commitments, but Hippias does not realise that his three answers to Socrates' questions about a false man in arithmetic imply that honesty and deceitfulness are the same in a dispositional sense.

If Hippias assumes (1), he can review (2) and (3). If he interpreted the verbs in question consistently in accordance with scheme (A) of Socrates' question about falsity (366e3-367a5), the propositions which Hippias is committed to would be:

A(1) a false man about calculations is able to deceive or tell a lie about calculations;

A(2) Hippias is the ablest to deceive or tell a lie about calculations;

A(3) Hippias is the ablest to be honest or tell the truth about calculations.

What Hippias has the right to deduce from the premises is, for example, the combination of A(2) and A(3). But if Socrates interprets that Hippias' acceptance implies that all and only those able to tell a lie and deceive about calculations are able to tell the truth and be honest about calculations, he leaps

some steps.

However, if Hippias admits that A(1) is inferred from the proposition that a false man is able to falsify if he wishes to, and if he admits, correspondingly, that a true man about calculations is able to be honest or tell the truth about calculations, he would obtain, by the reciprocity of ability with actuality in truth and falsity, the proposition that he is both true and false about calculations. He may recognise that he is pressed by his commitments to face the conclusion whose acceptance would make public his inability to answer any question from anyone in that he cannot keep consistency in the whole of his answers.

Hippias might be confident of consistency even if pressed to accept the proposition that he is both true and false in arithmetic, because he is not committed to the proposition that all and only false men are true in arithmetic. If he sees that it is inescapable to accept that the same man is true and false in arithmetic in the sense that all and only false men are true in arithmetic, he might not give affirmation to Socrates' question.

If Hippias reviews his commitments by interpreting the verbs in question in accordance with scheme (B) of Socrates' question about falsity (366e3-367a5), and in the way similar to the above case, he could formulate that the same man is able both to utter an objectively true proposition, and to utter an objectively false proposition, irrespective of a commissive context, but need not interpret that irrespective of a commissive context, in arithmetic, all and only those able to utter an objectively true proposition are able to utter an objectively false proposition. Therefore Hippias need not conclude by substituting 'true' and 'false'



for the above predicates that in arithmetic, all and only false men are true.

If Hippias tacitly admitted the reciprocity of ability with actuality, he could perform a valid inference, but, according to (A), if he must have acquired the disposition of honesty and deceitfulness, he has to understand by the conclusion that he is both honest and deceitful in a dispositional sense. He could not accept this conclusion. Therefore, this argument is not sound for him. But if he reconstructs the argument in accordance with (B), Hippias still must accept the premise about reciprocity to draw the conclusion. Unless he understood that falsity is not actuality but ability, he would not reach the conclusion. Nevertheless, if he systematically misunderstood by 'speak truly or falsely' 'formulate a true or false proposition', he could suppose that he soundly draws a conclusion, holding the premise about reciprocity. Therefore, if he believes that he justifies his commitments, he might replace the argument according to (A) by that according to (B) by systematically mistaking 'speaking truly or falsely' for 'formulate a true or false proposition'.

Socrates' speech (367c2-4) works at least as an indirect question for Hippias<sup>471</sup>, because Socrates refers to implications of Hippias' commitments: 'Therefore, the same man is the ablest to speak falsely and truly about calculations' and 'And this man is a man good at them, namely, an expert in arithmetic.' Socrates can combine the propositions which Hippias just confirmed, by using a pronoun, 'the same man' in the meaning in which the same man, Hippias, is the ablest to speak truly and falsely about calculations.

Certainly, Hippias admitted his expertise in arithmetic (366c5-7; 366d3-6).

Hence Socrates justifiably adds that Hippias is good at calculations. However, unless Socrates needs to generalise Hippias' commitments, Socrates would not need to substitute 'the same man' for 'Hippias' or refer to Hippias simply as good at calculations, instead of as the best at them as before (366d5).

Then, in what sense can Socrates show as entailed by Hippias' commitments that the same man is able to speak truly and falsely about calculations while adding that the man is expert in arithmetic?

If Socrates simply assumes that Hippias is good, i.e., expert at arithmetic, he cannot properly infer that all and only those able to speak truly about calculations are able to speak falsely about calculations, from the following propositions about Hippias: (1) Hippias is good at calculations; (2) Hippias is able to speak truly about calculations; (3) Hippias is able to speak falsely about calculations. But Socrates has the right to combine the three propositions to conclude that there is at least one man, Hippias, good at calculations, and able both to speak falsely and to speak truly about calculations.

Nevertheless, the conclusion suffices to make public that Hippias does not keep consistency in answering, because the proposition that there is at least one man who is both true and false about calculations contradicts the proposition that no man true about calculations is false about calculations. If the audience understand this, then they could see that Hippias does not keep consistency because he commits self-contradiction about the opposition of a true man to a false man at least in one area.

If Socrates intends the ambiguous formulation about 'the same man' and

justifies deducing from Hippias' commitments, as 367c3-4 suggests, that all and only those able to speak falsely about calculations, i.e, experts in arithmetic, are able to speak truly about calculations, Socrates must take Hippias as a representative expert. Further, if Socrates interprets the controversial points according to scheme (A), and if when a predicate applies to Hippias about calculations, it applies to any clever man good at calculations, i.e., any clever expert in calculations, then he could conclude that all clever men occupied about calculations are able both to deceive or tell a lie and to be honest or tell the truth about calculations.

However, even if Socrates takes Hippias as a representative clever man who achieves deceit about calculations, he ought not to conclude that all and only men who are able to deceive and lie about calculations are able to be honest or tell the truth about calculations. Without assuming that Hippias believes the reciprocity of ability with actuality, he could not justify Hippias' possible belief that all clever men occupied about calculations are both true and false about calculations; still less, his possible belief that all and only false men occupied about calculations are true about them.

Whether Hippias, considering the superlative (367c3), interprets 'the same' as 'Hippias himself' or 'an expert in arithmetic', and whether Hippias reinterprets that Socrates has asked about a clever man who achieves deceit about arithmetic in accordance with (A) or about an expert in arithmetic, Hippias cannot avoid giving affirmation to Socrates' formulation including his additional remark, without demolishing the conversation. However, he affirms relevantly to

Socrates' speech (367c4); hence, he might recognise retrospectively that his emerging inconsistency stems from this acceptance and also to Socrates' hiding his intention in questioning, but not that he is committed to accepting that all and only false men occupied about calculations are true about calculations.

**Hippias accepts the conclusion: all and only false men are true in arithmetic (367c4-d3)**

Socrates continuously asks about what Hippias' previous commitments entail to lead Hippias to the concluding proposition that all and only false men occupied about calculations are true about calculations (367c7-d2).

Socrates says, 'Then, Hippias, who becomes false other than a man good [at calculations]? I ask this because the same man is also able [both to speak truly and to speak falsely or to speak truly]; because this man is also true.' The whole speech works as a question, the latter part as Socrates' summary of Hippias' admissions<sup>473</sup>.

Socrates supposes out of Hippias' anticipated affirmation that Hippias must accept that all and only false men occupied about calculations are true men about calculations. How does Socrates justify deducing Hippias' conclusion from the formulations he introduces into his question?

C1. No one becomes false about calculation other than one good [at calculations].

[367c4-6]

P1. The same man is also able [both to speak truly and to speak falsely or to speak truly or to speak falsely about calculations].

[367c6]

P2. or C2. This man is also true [about calculations].

[367c6]

C2. or C3. the same man is both false and true about calculations.

[367c7-8]

If Socrates means 'a man good at calculations' by 'the same man' and rephrases C1 as that all those false about calculations are good at calculations<sup>474</sup>, the possible arguments are as follows according to different grammatical supplementations.

## I.

P1. All men good at calculations are able both to speak truly and to speak falsely about calculations.  
 [367c6: the proposition about ability; cf. 367c2-4, 367b6-7, 367b1-6, 366e3-367a5, 366d6-e1, 366c7-d1, 366b7-c1]

C1. All men false about calculations are good at calculations.  
 [367c4-6: the proposition about the transition from actuality to ability; cf. 367a8-b1, 367a6-8, 366d3-6, 366a6-8]

P2. All men good at calculations are true about calculations.  
 [367c6: *the proposition about the transition from ability to actuality*; cf. 366c5-d1, 366d6-e1]

C2. All and only men false about calculations are true about calculations.  
 [367c7-8: the proposition about actuality]

## II.

P1. All men good at calculations are able to speak truly about calculations.  
 [367c6: the proposition about ability; cf. 367c1-2, 366d6-e1, 366c7-d1, 366b7-c1]

C1. All men false about calculations are good at calculations.  
 [see I, C1]

P2. All men good at calculations are true about calculations.  
 [see I, P2]

C2. All and only men false about calculations are true about calculations.  
 [see I, C2]

## III.

P1. All men good at calculations are able to speak falsely about calculations.  
 [367c6: the proposition about ability; cf. 367c2-4, 367b6-7, 366b7-c1, 366e3-6]

C1. All men false about calculations are good at calculations.  
 [see I, C1]

P2. All men good at calculations are true about calculations.  
 [see I, P2]

C2. All and only men false about calculations are true about calculations.  
 [see I, C2]

On the soundness of these arguments, it is questionable how Socrates justifies explaining C1 by P1 in any of them without implicitly assuming some other proposition. Even if Socrates inexplicitly assumes that Hippias appeals to the reciprocity of ability with actuality, Socrates has no right to deduce the mediating proposition that all and only those good at calculations are false. In other words, Hippias might assume that all those able to falsify are false and that all those able to *verify* are true, but Socrates cannot justify the proposition that all and only false men about calculations are good at calculations. Further, in any argument, Socrates has the right to posit that the same man, i.e., a man good at calculation, is true and false about calculations, meaning that all those good at calculations are both true and false about calculations, but not to infer that all and only those false about calculations are true about calculations. Furthermore, if Socrates means by the first summarising remark (P1), 'the same man is also able', the proposition that all and only those good at calculations are able both to speak truly and to speak falsely about calculations, Socrates has the right to propose explaining C1 by this proposition. However, he has no right to infer that all and only those false about calculations are true about calculations.

Then, how does Socrates justify inferring Hippias' conclusion, in spite of the propositions in his questions being ineffectual to enforce Hippias' deduction of the conclusion? In general, the following form of inference, reading 'E' as 'expert', 'F' as 'false' and 'T' as 'true', is invalid.

P1. For any x, if x is E, x is F.

P2. For any x, if x is E, x is T.

C1. For any  $x$ ,  $x$  is  $F$  if and only if  $x$  is  $T$ .

If the premises are both bi-conditional, as Weiss indicates<sup>475</sup>, the conclusion follows according to the rule of transitivity. However, Socrates has not dealt directly with such bi-conditional premises. Therefore, if we need reason for assuming that Socrates justifies supposing that Hippias reaches the conclusion through Hippias' commitments, we have to find another valid inference or plausible premises inexplicitly suggested. Considering specific exchange between the interlocutors, one promising candidate for a sound argument which we may legitimately conceive that Socrates would appeal to lies in the exclusiveness between expert and non-expert or between a clever man and a foolish man, and between ability as infallibility and inability as fallibility. The possible specific arguments which Socrates would conceive are as follows, according to the interpretation (A) of the controversial words.



**Scheme of a justifiable argument  
which Socrates would conceive**

P1. All clever men occupied about calculations are honest or tell the truth about calculations whenever they wish to.

[366c7-d1, 366d2-3; cf. 365e10-366a1, 367a2-5, 367a6-8]

P2. All foolish men occupied about calculations are not always honest and do not always tell the truth about calculations if they wish to, but sometimes tell a lie or deceive against their wish.

[No textual evidence; analogy to P5; cf. 367a2-3]

C1. All and only clever men occupied about calculations are honest or tell the truth whenever they wish to.

[No textual evidence; combination of P1 and the contraposition of P2; inference by combination (366a2-4, 365d6-366a1, 366b6-7, 366b4-5); inference by contraposition (366b6-7, 366b4-5)]

P3. All and only those able to tell the truth about calculations if they wish to are those who tell the truth whenever they wish to.

[366d6-e1, 366c7-d1, 366b7-c1, 366a8-b4, 367c1-2; cf. 366e3-367a2]

C2. All and only clever men occupied about calculations are able to tell the truth whenever they wish to.

[C1, P3 and transitivity (365e5-8, 365e8-366a1)]

P4. All clever men occupied about calculations tell a lie or deceive whenever they wish to.

[366e3-6]

P5. All foolish men occupied about calculations do not always tell a lie or deceive about calculations if they wish to, but sometimes are honest or tell the truth about calculations against their wish.

[367a2-3]

C3. All and only clever men occupied about calculations tell a lie or deceive about calculations whenever they wish to.

[No textual evidence; combination of P4 and the contraposition of P5]

P6. All and only those who are able to tell a lie or deceive about calculations if they wish to, tell a lie or deceive about calculations whenever they wish to.

[366e3-6, 366e6-367a2, 366b7-c1, 366a8-b4]

C4. All and only clever men occupied about calculations are able to tell a lie or deceive about calculations whenever they wish to.

[C3, P6 and transitivity; 367b6-7, 367b1-5]

C5. All and only those who are able to tell a lie about calculations are able to tell the truth about calculations.

[C2, C4, transitivity]

P7. All true men occupied about calculations tell the truth about calculations [whenever they wish to].

[No textual evidence; analogy to P8; transition from achievement to infallibility]

C6. All true men occupied about calculations are able to tell the truth [whenever they wish to].

[P3, P7, and transitivity; analogy to C7; no textual evidence]

P8. All false men occupied about calculations tell a lie or deceive about calculations [whenever they wish to].

[367a6-8, 367a8-b1, 366e3-6, 367a4-5; transition from achievement to infallibility]

C7. All false men occupied about calculations are able to tell a lie or deceive about calculations [whenever they wish to].

[P6, P8, and transitivity; 367b1-6]

P9. All men who are able to tell the truth about calculations [whenever they wish to] are true men occupied about calculations.

[367c6; *transition from ability to actuality*]

P10. All men who are able to tell a lie or deceive about calculations  
[whenever they wish to] are false men occupied about calculations.

[*Transition from ability to actuality*; no textual evidence; analogy to P9;  
cf. 365d7-8]

C8. All and only true men occupied about calculations are able to tell  
the truth about calculations [whenever they wish to].

[C6, P9; no textual evidence]

C9. All and only false men occupied about calculations are able to tell  
a lie or deceive about calculations [whenever they wish to].

[C7, P10; no textual evidence]

C10. All and only false men occupied about calculations are true men  
occupied about calculations.

[C5, C8, C9, and transitivity; 367c7-8]

If Socrates anticipates that Hippias will have to see the conclusion because of previous commitments, and if Socrates justifies the necessity in Hippias' seeing the conclusion, Socrates must trail some argument like those shown in this table. It is certain that the interlocutors do not mention the reciprocity of ability with actuality, especially, the acquisition of disposition of deceit or honesty in the process of learning to be false or true (P9 and P10), or consistency in respect of truth (P1).

If Socrates leads Hippias to see the conclusion which Hippias must draw according to his commitments and the inferential rules Hippias committed himself to, Socrates must ask at the last step to the conclusion whether Hippias accepts the inferential transition from ability to falsity and truth. Socrates refers to this point in summarising Hippias' previous admissions (367c6). He says, '[I ask this because] this man [i.e., a man good at calculations] is also true?' Moreover, Socrates leaves the possibility that he is asking the question in accordance with scheme (B).

The above candidate for Socrates' possible justification in leading Hippias to see the conclusion has some defects in reference to the text; it is dubious whether Socrates is ready to justify the entailment of Hippias' commitments not by Hippias' giving affirmations to the formulations in his questions but by Socrates' formulating the scheme of inference. However this candidate would be qualified. Some critics see Socrates' palming off upon Hippias the wrong transition from ability to disposition<sup>476</sup>; however, Socrates would have recourse to some sound argument if he has the right to lead Hippias by Hippias' reasons

to see the conclusion and publicise Hippias' self-contradiction.

Hippias answers with reservation for the first time in the conversation about a false man (367c7). Hippias gives affirmation to Socrates' formulation, whatever propositions or argument he interprets that Socrates introduced. Hippias would affirm that only a good man, meaning an expert in calculations, is false about calculations (367c4-6), because he would accept that a false man about calculations is a man able to speak falsely about calculations whenever he wishes to. Further, Hippias would accept, in Socrates' summary of his commitments, 'an expert in calculations is able to speak falsely (367c6),' because an expert in calculations is able to utter a false proposition infallibly and consistently, while a non-expert is not. However, Hippias could not accept that an expert in arithmetic is true about arithmetic (367c6) if he does not accept that if a man is able to speak truly he is true. If asked whether a man able to speak falsely and falsify is false, he would consider, before accepting the proposition, the acquisition of disposition of deceit in the process of learning arithmetic or learning to falsify about arithmetic. However, since a learner of arithmetic acquires the disposition to formulate a proposition in accordance with arithmetical rules by exchanging commissive speeches with a teacher, Hippias would accept the reciprocity of ability with actuality easily in a professional arithmetician; less easily in an expert in arithmetic; least in a clever man who has abandoned the disposition and practised falsifying about arithmetic. In spite of his crucial commitment, it is dubious that Hippias is sure of his commitment to some inference leading to the conclusion that all and only false men are true

about calculations (cf. 369b3-7); he is, though, ready to give affirmations to Socrates' respective formulations and sees the concluding formulation that the same man is true and false about calculations.

Hippias would have recognised (a) that anyone is exclusively an expert or a non-expert in arithmetic and (b) that all and only experts utter a false proposition when they wish to. In analogy to uttering a false proposition, Hippias possibly recognised that the similar propositions are true of the case about uttering a true proposition, *mutatis mutandis* (P1-7 and C1-7 at the preceding table (see p. 166). However, it is arguable whether he recognises that it follows from these propositions that all and only false men in an achievement sense, occupied about calculations are true men in an achievement sense, occupied about calculations (C10). If he does not recognise the necessity of the conclusion by reciprocity of ability with actuality (P9-10, C9-10), and if he still finds some reason to affirm the conclusion, he might appeal to the truism that all and only experts in arithmetic are able to judge whether a given arithmetic proposition is true or false, according to one and the same criterion.

From our point of view, Socrates has to recognise and appeal to the truism that a man who knows a criterion of the truth-value of a proposition is able to judge whether it is true or not, i.e., whether it is false or not, if he anticipates that Hippias' affirmation to his formulations leads to the apparently paradoxical conclusion that a true man and a false man are the same in arithmetic. However, if Hippias finds some necessity to give affirmation to the concluding formulation, Hippias has to recognise that truism. Therefore, dramaturgically speaking, if the

author, Plato, governs the interplay between interlocutors, and wants to have the audience understand the plausibility that the interlocutors reach the paradoxical conclusion, he has to use the truism inexplicitly, whether he is committed to it or not. However, it is arguable whether the proposition (a), crucial in Hippias' commitments, that all and only men able to utter a false proposition are able to utter a true proposition follows from the proposition (b) that all and only men able to judge whether or not a given proposition is true are men able to judge whether or not the proposition is false.

Consequently on Hippias' reserved affirmation at 367c7, Socrates asks about the conclusion from Hippias' previous commitments (367c7-d2)<sup>477</sup>.

Socrates leaves unclear whether he means by the formulation, 'the same man is both false and true about calculations,' the proposition that all and only false men about calculations are true about calculations. Socrates does not use the formulations, 'a false man about calculations is the same as a true man about calculations,' or the formulation, 'a man good at calculations is both true and false about calculations.' However, when he uses the pronoun, 'the same', with subject and modifier omitted, and refers to the opposite relation between a true man and a false man, in his explanatory remark (367d1), he refers to the formulation that a true man about calculations is the same as a false man about calculations.

Socrates appears to Hippias to refer to what Socrates believes objectively true in using the phrase, 'see that ...'<sup>478</sup> and 'not ... as you thought', but Socrates could only oppose what Hippias should properly believe to what Hippias believes.



Socrates leaves unclear whether he commits himself to what he believes Hippias has to infer from his previous commitments according to the inferential rules Hippias followed.

Socrates' reference to Hippias' opinion about a false man in the preceding stage (366a5-6) does not necessarily indicate that Socrates intentionally distorted Hippias' opinion about a false man. For Hippias has not fully analysed its consistency, although Socrates did not take the initiative of distinguishing ability from achievement, ability from disposition, or a clever man occupied about calculations from an expert in calculations. At that stage, Hippias appeared to Socrates to mean by a false man a successful cheat exemplified in Homer's Odysseus in opposition to a consistently honest man like Achilles (364e7-365b6), but Socrates would not necessarily have been sure whether Hippias used 'a false man' in an achievement sense or in an attempt sense. Therefore, Socrates consistently seeks Hippias' opinion about false men. Admittedly, Hippias later could take Socrates to have arranged his questions sophistically and to have referred to his previous commitments in different senses in subsequent questions. However, Hippias loses consistency in making commitments about a false man, even if he believes that he keeps consistency in understanding a false man.

Hippias gives a reserved affirmation limited to the area of arithmetic (367d3). Although he suggested that false men are occupied with falsifying about many subjects (365d8; 365e10-366a1), he might suspect that he wrongly somewhere mistook a person whom he would observe uttering a false proposition about arithmetic consistently for a clever man who is occupied with lying or deceiving

about arithmetic. However, he could perhaps not find where and why he committed himself to the identity of falsity with truth in arithmetic in respect of actuality.

Hippias does not refer to the formulation, 'the same man is both false and true about calculations'. Hence, he might accept the proposition that an expert in arithmetic is able both to speak truly and to speak falsely in arithmetic, even in the sense that the expert is able both to be honest and to deceive. Certainly, Hippias would accept that a false man in arithmetic is no cleverer at arithmetic than a true man in arithmetic in the sense that both consistent and infallible deceit and honesty are due to knowledge of arithmetic, and, therefore, that a true man and a false man are the same in arithmetic in respect of knowledge. However, he would not accept that a deceiver in a dispositional sense is better than or the same as an honest man in that sense in respect of the evaluation of sincerity. Hippias would not miss the distinction between 'good in respect of sincerity' and 'good at calculations' while answering Socrates' questions. If he were asked about the distinction by an exact formulation, he would be committed to the proposition that an honest man in a dispositional sense is better than a deceiver in that sense in respect of wish to be honest and would suspect the proposition that if anyone deceives in arithmetic, the deceiver in arithmetic is the same as an honest man in arithmetic, in respect of sincerity, because he would commonsensically take a deceiver in a dispositional sense if he compares the deceiver with an honest man. The problem lies in his potential idea of an honest man who is occupied with calculations and achieving his

commitments about calculations.

**Hippias concedes 'consideration' of a false man in another subject (367d4-5).**

Whether Socrates supposes that the reason for Hippias' reservation in his affirmation is Hippias' suspicion of Socrates' questions about arithmetic or, literally, Hippias' limitation of his affirmation to the field of arithmetic, Socrates appears to Hippias to take him at his word. Socrates proposes to Hippias to continue consideration with him.

Since Hippias had allowed the possibility that he inexplicitly referred to areas in which false men falsify (365d8, 365e10-366a1; cf. 366a4, 366b1-2, 366b3), Socrates had reason to refer to the field of arithmetic subsequently (366c5-367d2). Now (367d4), Socrates might suppose that Hippias understands that his commitments about arithmetic are so exemplary as to be generalised to any other area or he might suppose that Hippias might believe that false men are differently occupied about other subjects. Further, Socrates might believe that Hippias can generalise his conclusion, if he applies his previous commitments to any area of sciences and crafts, into the general proposition that all and only false men are true about any subject; if so, Socrates might intend to make Hippias see further that his belief involved in his idea of falsity in an achievement sense implies that all and only consistent and infallible deceivers occupied about any subject concerned are consistent and infallible honest men in respect of achievement of their purpose as well as knowledge. Hence, although Socrates suggests that they have been considering something, Socrates might heuristically consider not so much some inter-agreed belief as how Hippias' beliefs are

evolving.

Hippias shows that Socrates' proposal depends on Socrates' wish, not his (367d5). Hippias neither refuses to continue their consideration nor shows willingness to continue.

**Hippias applies his previous commitments to the case of geometry (367d6-367e7)**

Following the preceding series of questions about arithmetic (366c5 ff.), Socrates attempts to confirm Hippias' experience in geometry, still ambiguously in acquired disposition as at 366c5-6, before asking whether Hippias applies his commitments about arithmetic to geometry.

Hippias seems to realise why Socrates asked the question about his expertise and in what context. Hippias would realise that he must commit himself to accepting formulations similar to those which Socrates introduced about arithmetic as his expertise, *mutatis mutandis*, if he wishes to keep consistency of commitment. Yet he cannot find any reason for denying his expertise in geometry as in the case of arithmetic (see p. 134).

On Hippias' commitment to his expertise in geometry, Socrates can anticipate, at the beginning of his speech (367d7), Hippias' acceptance of propositions analogous to those elicited about arithmetic. Hence, in his conducive question (367d7), Socrates suggests that Hippias must see the same conclusion as about arithmetic (366c7-d2). However, Socrates does not specify what scheme of inference Hippias followed about arithmetic.

Hippias can compare Socrates' question about geometry at 367d7-9 to those

about arithmetic at 367c2-4, but if he recalls his commitments, Hippias, first, must recall his acceptance that Hippias, a representative expert in arithmetic, utters a true proposition on a given arithmetical question, if he wishes to, (366c5-d1) and a false proposition on a given arithmetical question if he wishes (366e3-367a5) and, then, has to transform his acceptance into the propositions about ability respectively (365d6-7; 367c1-2), probably because of his previous commitment to the meaning of ability (366b7-c4).

This suggests that Socrates allows the possibility that he held the following, though unspecified, assumptions in the conversation about Hippias' expertise in arithmetic (366c5-367d2): (a) that Hippias followed the inferential rule of combining Hippias' commitments (367b5-c4); (b) that Hippias took himself as a representative expert in arithmetic (367a6-8); (c) that Hippias followed the rule of substitution of 'Hippias' for 'an expert in arithmetic'(367c2-4). It is arguable whether Hippias recognised the inferential rules which Socrates can take Hippias to have inexplicitly followed in accepting what Hippias regarded as the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions. However, when Socrates proceeds to introduce the propositions in the frame similar to the preceding conversation about arithmetic, Hippias can suspect that Socrates takes him to have committed himself to accepting on arithmetic both formulations and inferential rules similar to what he commits himself to about geometry.

Socrates did not use the formulation substituting 'calculations' for 'geometrical figures' and 'arithmetician' for 'geometrician', apart from a similar formulation at 367c2-4. As to Socrates' usage of 'the same', it is controversial as before

whether Socrates here intends to lead to the proposition that all and only false men about some specific area are true about the area or the proposition that an expert in some specific area is both true and false about the area. Further, Socrates uses the combination of 'falsify' with 'speak truly' for the first time (367d8). Hence, as to the usage of the three verbs, 'falsify', 'speak falsely', and 'speak truly', Socrates does not keep consistency or make any distinction between 'falsify' and 'speak falsely' (366e5; 366e6, 367a2-a3; 367a4-5; 367b6-7; 367c2-3). Neither does Socrates make clear what he meant by the verbs, except for his suggestion in reintroducing the words, 'true' and 'false', which Socrates can take Hippias to understand in the sense which he had introduced (365b4-5). Hippias would have to decide whether he means by 'falsify' 'utter a false proposition in commissive context' or 'utter a false proposition, irrespective of commissive context', if he denies or accepts what he regards as a proposition embodied in Socrates' question.

Hippias accepts the proposition in Socrates' question (367d9), whatever he understands Socrates to mean by the verbs. Therefore, Hippias leaves the possibility that he follows his commitment about an expert's ability to speak truly and speak falsely (366c5-d1; 366e3-367a5; 367b6-c4), including the rules of inference involved in accepting the contiguous formulations, and follows the systematic substitution of geometric for arithmetical matter. Hence he must face the conclusion that the same man is both true and false about geometrical figures, in whichever sense he understands it (cf. 369b3-7).

At 367d9-e1, Socrates attempts to confirm that Hippias means 'a man good

at geometry' by 'an expert in geometry', in analogy to substitution of 'a man good at arithmetic' for 'an expert in arithmetic' (367c4). The proposition Socrates introduces can be that a man good at geometry is an expert in it and not the converse. However, Socrates can suppose that Hippias would admit that the predicates, 'an expert in some area', 'clever at some area', 'able in some area' and 'good at some area' are interchangeable (365e9-366a1; 366a8-b7; 366d1-6; 367c3-4) and that a predicate by the name of an expert in an area is used indistinguishably from those predicates (367c3-4; 367d7-9).

In his question at 367e1-3, Socrates refers ambiguously to a professional who obeys his ethic or to a man who works at geometry, but adds nothing substantial to Hippias' previous commitment (367d7-9). Rather, if Hippias understands that Socrates uses 'good' and 'clever' in the subject *not* redundantly in the sense that he is good and clever at geometry *but* substantially in the sense that he is good and clever in respect of sincerity or consistent and infallible sincerity, Hippias must ask for exposition about the predicates, 'good' and 'clever', to prevent Socrates from trading on Hippias' commitment.

Further, Socrates asks whether only the man good *at geometry* is false about geometrical figures (367e3-4) and summarises Hippias' admissions (367e4-6). Socrates asks a concluding question about a false man in geometry, but does not refer to the conclusion similar to that about arithmetic (367c7-d2). As Socrates' question suggests, Socrates would be following the form of his remark about arithmetic at 367c4-6.

Socrates' first summary of Hippias' preceding admissions at 367c6 corre-

sponds to his first summary here, but the second one at 367c6 does not. Socrates is referring here, on geometry, to what he believes to have resulted from Hippias' commitments about arithmetic, in saying that the man good at geometry, i.e., the expert in geometry *was*<sup>478</sup> able to speak falsely and that the man bad at geometry, i.e., the non-expert in geometry *was* unable to falsify. Socrates did not refer to the propositions in any speech. Nevertheless, Socrates supposes (1), as Sprague indicates<sup>479</sup>, that the propositions follow from Hippias' commitments about arithmetic and (2) that giving affirmation to the formulation in his present summary suffices to lead to the conclusion similar to that about arithmetic by virtue of what Socrates supposes to be Hippias' affirmation of the propositions in his preceding questions, even if he does not specify the conclusion. Therefore, Socrates did not make clear how Hippias had to reach the conclusion about arithmetic from his commitments, but retrospectively he suggests here that the necessity lies in the bi-conditional proposition that all and only experts in geometry are able to falsify or *verify* about it.

Socrates introduced into the last part of his speech (367e5-6) the proposition Hippias affirmed before (366b6-7; 367b3-5). Although Socrates introduced the proposition that a false man is able to speak falsely, paraphrasing by the form of contraposition is not trivial for the interlocutors. However, if Socrates supposes that the affirmation of these propositions suffices for Hippias to reach the similar conclusion, he believes Hippias to accept a premise about the reciprocity of ability with actuality; specifically, the proposition that ability to falsify is falsity, whether or not Hippias confirms this point in his affirmation



(367e6-7).

Hippias admits that the case Socrates referred to stands without any subjective reservation. Consequently, although Socrates did not make clear how the conclusion about arithmetic had to follow from Hippias' commitments, Hippias allows the possibility that he accepts the transition from ability to falsity as well as truth and that he accepts retroactively how the conclusion follows from his commitments in geometry as in arithmetic.

**Hippias reluctantly applies his previous commitments to astronomy, looking ahead to the conclusion (367c8-368a7).**

Socrates shows that he knows Hippias' expertise in astronomy (367e8). Whether or not Socrates appeals to Hippias' greater expertise in astronomy than the former subjects to elicit the conclusion from Hippias' commitment, he proposes that they should examine an astronomer in general.

Asking personal questions about Hippias' expertise, still ambiguously in acquired disposition (367e8-368a1), Socrates allows the possibility that he has thought that if Hippias accepts the propositions about Hippias' expertise, Hippias commits himself to the proposition about the relevant expert. Whether Socrates believes (a) that what he is examining is an inter-agreed sound belief uncovered by an exchange by questions and answers or (b) that what he is examining is what Hippias should properly believe, Socrates allows the possibility that they have been examining the truth in Hippias' admission. However, Hippias would not necessarily take at face value Socrates' procedure  
 ; l by taking the initiative in asking questions.

Following Hippias' agreement to his expertise in astronomy (368a1), Socrates asks whether the 'same' thing is true of astronomy also (368a2). Neither Socrates nor Hippias has specified what is the same truth common to the areas mentioned or what is the same process leading to the conclusion in the areas. On geometry, Socrates referred to a process he had not referred to in the conversation about arithmetic but did not specify the conclusion similar to that about arithmetic. Accordingly, it is dubious whether both have the same idea of what is the same in these areas, but Socrates suggests that he supposes that the same conclusion that a true man and a false man are the same in a specific area follows from the same process.

While Hippias shows reluctance to accept the same conclusion as in arithmetic (368a3), Socrates resumes in his question and additional summary what he regards as the same propositions and inferential rules as those in the conversations on arithmetic and geometry, asking<sup>481</sup> whether only the good astronomer, i.e., the man able to falsify, will be false (368a3-5) and explaining, 'I ask this because the man unable [to do that] is at least not false; he is foolish (368a5-6).'

Socrates' whole speech summarising Hippias' commitments resembles speeches at 367c4-6 and 367e3-5. As the proposition in Socrates' summary (368a5-6) suggests, Socrates supposes Hippias can infer the proposition in his question at 368a3-5 from the bi-conditional that all and only experts in astronomy are able to *verify* or falsify if they wish to; specifically, from the proposition that a non-expert in astronomy is not able to falsify (368a5-6) and

the proposition that a man unable to falsify is not false (368a5). Socrates does not repeat the same form of the proposition as before.

Hippias reluctantly affirms (368a6). As Socrates did not use the same proposition or locution, it is dubious whether Hippias recognises the similarity in the propositions in Socrates' questions. However, if he realises that he must accept the propositions about astronomy by analogy, he must accept the transition from ability to falsify infallibly to actual performance of falsity.

Socrates asks<sup>482</sup>, 'Therefore, will the same man be both true and false in astronomy also(368a6-7)?' Socrates did not refer to the proposition that a man expert in astronomy is able to speak truly about astronomy or specify the proposition that a man expert in astronomy is able both to speak truly and to speak falsely about astronomy, but he seems to suppose that the formulation that only a man good at astronomy, i.e., able to speak falsely about astronomy is false is crucial for Hippias to draw the similar conclusion. It sounds paradoxical that only a man good at astronomy is false, but if Hippias understands by 'speak falsely' 'utter a false proposition, irrespective of commissive speech', it would be plausible insofar as it approximates the proposition that a false man about astronomy is able to formulate a false proposition. However, unless Hippias understands 'false' in an achievement sense, he would not dissolve the oddness in the collocation, 'false in astronomy' in parallel with 'true in astronomy'. In other words, it would make more sense that a false man in an achievement sense, i.e., a man who achieves deceit about astronomy, is expert in astronomy. Inasmuch as Socrates leaves unclear the process or the inferential rules of the argument to

the conclusion, it is not necessarily clear whether the interlocutors recognised the crux in the whole. However, if Socrates envisages the necessity of Hippias' conclusion, he would assume that Hippias accepts the transition from ability to falsify to actual falsifying in drawing the conclusion about actuality.

Hippias affirms the similar conclusion reluctantly<sup>483</sup> according to some necessity of a certain specifiable argument leading to the conclusion (368a7).

Hippias would have been confident of keeping consistency in committing himself to the proposition (a) that the same person is not both truthful and deceitful in a dispositional sense and to the truism (b) that because the criterion of the truth-value of a proposition is one and the same, the same person is both able to judge whether a given proposition is true or not and to judge whether it is false or not. Therefore, Hippias might assume without inconsistency that a consistently and infallibly truthful man about a specific area, if any, is expert in that area and that a consistently and infallibly deceitful man in the area, if any, is also expert in the area. However, Hippias does not have the right to infer by combination of the two propositions that all experts in a specific area are consistently and infallibly both truthful and deceitful, because normal experts learned a disposition of proper use of the skill concerned and because only some experts, having acquired the ability with the disposition of proper use, abandon the disposition.

Commonsensically, it is not necessarily true that all the experts in some area are consistently and infallibly truthful in it; neither is it true that all the experts in some area are consistently and infallibly deceitful in it. If Hippias follows our

common sense, Hippias would not affirm the formulation that an expert in a specific area is both true and false in the meaning of the proposition that all experts in the area are consistently and infallibly both truthful and deceitful, whether in an achievement or in a dispositional sense.

However, if he assumed that an expert in an area has acquired the disposition to deceive in the process of acquiring the ability to deceive, he would have mistaken that ability for potentiality indifferent to disposition. If his affirmation is to be justified, he must admit that there is an expert who, having abandoned the disposition to do properly in the expertise, has acquired the disposition to do properly or improperly for a purpose different from that appointed to the expertise. Indeed, if Hippias has any reason in the conclusion at all, he has to admit that all and only clever men who have practised both a proper and an improper use of a skill or science achieve honesty or deceit about a subject concerned whenever they wish to.

### **Socrates' clincher and Hippias' welshing (368a8-369b7)**

Hippias has showed reluctance in affirming the propositions in Socrates questions about astronomy (368a3; 368a6; 368a7), except for that about his greater expertise (368a1). Socrates did not keep consistency in locution while showing the similarity in the steps to the conclusion in the areas mentioned. However, Socrates pushes Hippias to apply the consideration about areas mentioned to all the areas of expertise in his self-proclaimed polymathy.

Socrates leaves inexplicit whether he is committed to the result of Hippias' consideration, but if there is some reason for pushing Hippias to apply the

preceding consideration to all expertises, he would have recognised some necessity in Hippias' reaching the conclusion from his commitments, specifically, an argument which Hippias has to follow by Hippias' reasons. Although he encouraged Hippias to regard the latter two conversations as abridged versions of the first conversation, he crucially repeatedly introduced the similar type of question with summary of Hippias' admissions, embodying the propositional type that only a man good at X is false about X (367c4-6; 367e3-4; 368a3-5). Considering a justifiable argument which leads Hippias to the similar conclusion in a specific area, the proposition concerning the reciprocity of ability with actuality, especially, the proposition concerning the transition from ability to falsify or *verify* to falsity or truth, is crucial for Hippias, from our point of view. However, Socrates referred to this transition only once, at 367c6, and that passingly. Why did Socrates suggest to Hippias that Hippias' affirmation of this propositional type (cf. 367c6) but not the one about the transition is so crucial for Hippias to reach the conclusion?

Socrates might have been trading both on an apparent similarity by similar locution and on Hippias' boast of ability to answer any question, once he obtained Hippias' commitment to the transition from ability to actuality passingly. Hence, he might have been distracting Hippias from the crux of Hippias' commitments.

However, if Socrates has some reason in the interplay, we must consider what Socrates might have sophistically distanced Hippias from or what propositions Socrates assumes that Hippias tacitly accepts other than that type. We could

offer some answer by considering why Socrates used a rhetorical question such as 'Is anyone but an expert false about some specific area?'

Socrates, certainly, appears to Hippias to induce him to evaluate falsity in some respect against an established morally negative sense of falsity which Hippias acknowledges (364e7-365b6). Socrates might shift the meaning of 'an expert in an area' from 'a man clever at a specific subject' to 'a clever man occupied about the subject'. He might systematically shift the meaning of the verbs concerned from a non-commissive to a commissive sense. But Socrates would assume that an expert's expertise is a mediating term between truth and falsity and that if 'speak falsely' means 'tell a lie' or 'deceive' in a usual dispositional sense, it is less plausible that an expert is able to speak falsely if he wishes to. Therefore, Socrates introduces a type of question which challenges this implicit implausibility (367c4-6; 367e3-4; 368a3-5).

Socrates might assume that if Hippias is convinced of the general truth in all expertises, he must repeat the consideration about his own expertises or generalise his previous commitments in any other expertise irrespective of his own expertises; anyway, Socrates reminds Hippias that Hippias is in a position to consider whether the same conclusion holds true in any other expertise (368a8-b1). On this reminder, Socrates repeats Hippias' boast of his expertises, probably to encourage Hippias to carry out his consideration, and to publicise Hippias' cleverness<sup>484</sup>.

In enumerating Hippias' expertises (368b5-e1), Socrates asks him to consider (368a9-b1) (1) whether an expert is able to speak falsely on a given question

consistently and infallibly if he wishes to, (2) whether a non-expert is unable to do that, (3) whether an expert is able to speak truly on a given question consistently and infallibly if he wishes to, and (4) whether a non-expert is unable to speak truly. Socrates assumes, in whatever meaning he takes and thinks that Hippias takes 'expert' and the verbs, 'falsify', 'speak truly', and 'speak falsely', that if Hippias gives affirmation to the four propositions, Hippias must see the conclusion that all and only false men are true in any area.

Socrates asks Hippias to appeal to what both have agreed in considering Hippias' and others' expertises, but Socrates does not specify what proposition types Hippias should examine in each expertise and under what inferential rules (368e3-4). Accordingly, Socrates would assume that Hippias understands how he deduced the similar conclusion from his commitments. Apart from the points in the process leading to the similar conclusion, and unlike his introductory remark in the same speech (368b1), Socrates points out that he is asking Hippias to judge on his previous agreements whether or not all and only false men are true in any area.

Socrates does not introduce the proposition that falsity and truth are the same characteristic but the proposition that in any area, if any man has either, he necessarily has the other (368e4-5). If Hippias assumes that it is possible that being true and being false are both attributed to the same man at the same time as characteristics concerning speaking truly and falsely on the same subject, he must assume that they are not actual characteristics but potential.

Socrates, suggesting that it does not matter whether Hippias regards a false



man as clever or unscrupulous or of any other characteristic according to Hippias' previous commitment, concludingly asks whether or not Hippias finds, according to their previous result, any science or craft in which it does not hold that all and only false men are true. While indicating that there is no area in which it does not obtain, whether Hippias takes Socrates to regard it as truth or as a necessary deduction from Hippias' commitments, Socrates asks Hippias to find some area<sup>485</sup>.

Although Socrates did not show that he agreed to the propositions in his previous questions, he asks Hippias to appeal to what has been agreed by Hippias and Socrates<sup>486</sup>. Socrates apparently is ready to share the responsibility for Hippias' previous commitments leading to Hippias' miscarriage; Socrates gives the impression that he believed the proposition he introduced into his question which Hippias affirmed; however, Socrates did not commit himself to any affirmations of Hippias'.

Hippias provisionally surrenders to the generality (369a3). But, Socrates denies its provisionality as Hippias indicates that Hippias cannot find any counterexample (369a4-5). Socrates observes that Hippias will find none. Also Socrates appears to Hippias to recall<sup>487</sup> what comes out<sup>488</sup> from their conversation<sup>489</sup>. To what degree Socrates assumes that Hippias' affirmations to the propositions in his questions are acceptable beyond the limits of Hippias' previous commitments is controversial, but at least, Socrates reminds Hippias that Hippias must accept the conclusion (a) if he accepts the propositions and the inferential rules in Socrates' questions about arithmetic and (b) if he accepts

that the same form of steps to the conclusion holds valid in other areas.

Socrates did not necessarily formalise the steps to the conclusion. Hence, in the conversation, Hippias is responsible for the formal necessity of the argument in Hippias' affirmations only or the content of the form as well.

Hippias indicates that he cannot find in the preceding conversation what Socrates means by 'what comes out for both Hippias and Socrates from their exchanges' (369a6). When Hippias gave affirmation to the formulation in Socrates' question, he might have thought that Socrates was setting a series of loaded questions in a certain order without telling Hippias his intentions. Therefore, he might think there is no entailment for which he should take responsibility.

However, as Hippias recognised that he is liable to be publicly taken by the audience to commit self-contradiction at least partially, he might be passing the responsibility to Socrates. Socrates appears to him responsible for his apparent self-contradiction, if not his affirmations, in public, but he cannot make public Socrates' specific cheat in the conversation; that would betray the emptiness of his boasted ability to answer any question.

While snidely remarking on Hippias' forgetfulness in reference to his mnemonic, Socrates reminds Hippias of what Socrates regards as the consequence of their exchange (369a7-b1). Socrates, first, asks Hippias to confirm that Hippias said that Achilles is true while Odysseus is false and polytropos (365b3-6). But he does not say in what sense he believes Hippias used these words. At least, Hippias used them in a dispositional sense at 364e7-b6 (cf. 365e3,

365e7, 365e8-9, 366b3). Hence, he leaves open the possibility that he is trying to show that the formulations which Hippias committed himself to include a contradiction *formally*.

Following Hippias' confirmation (369b2), Socrates, first, invites Hippias to recognise<sup>490</sup> that it has been shown that all and only false men are true (369b3-4). Referring to the conclusion in the preceding conversation, Socrates presupposes that Hippias' affirmations have entailed that all and only false men are true in any area. Socrates appears to Hippias to refer to the objective truth of the conclusion by some valid proof, but he might mean by 'what has been shown'<sup>491</sup> 'that which Hippias should properly accept from his affirmations'. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that Socrates believes the propositions affirmed.

Taking the general proposition as a premise, Socrates asks Hippias whether it has been concluded that if Odysseus was false, he becomes true and that if Achilles was true, he becomes false too and that they are not different or opposite but similar (369b4-7). Socrates has indicated that he meant by the previous concluding formulations with 'the same' at 367c7-8, 368a6-7, 368e4-5 the general proposition that all and only false men are true.

Formally, whatever Hippias means by 'true' and 'false', (1) *if* Hippias introduces into his statement the formulation (FP1), 'Odysseus is false,' and the formulation (FP2), 'Achilles is true,' and (2) *if* Hippias gives affirmation, on one hand, to the formulation in Socrates' question (FP3), 'for any man, if he is true, he is not false,' and on the other hand, to the formulation (FP4), 'the same man is both true and false,' meaning the formulation (FP5), 'a man is true if and only

if he is false,' and (3) *if* he accepts the rule of instantiation and applies it to FP3 and FP5, *then*, Socrates has the right to conjecture that Hippias may work out from FP1 and FP3 both (FC1), 'Odysseus is false and not false' and (FC2), 'Achilles is true and not true.' Formally, if Hippias affirms the formulations FP3 and FP5, Socrates rightly invites Hippias to confirm his formal self-contradiction. However, if Hippias realised that Socrates asks Hippias to mean the words, 'true' and 'false', differently between (FP3) and (FP4), he could accuse Socrates of palming off the shift of meaning. Nevertheless, if Hippias did not realise his commitment to the shift, he might be supposing the premise which admits the shift, i.e., the reciprocity of ability with actuality.

As to Socrates' initiative in proceeding with their conversation by questions, could Hippias take Socrates to have taken wrong procedures? First, Hippias may take Socrates to be wrong in applying Hippias' affirmation to the formulation about a specific expertise to the formulation without any limitations of a specific expertise. Hippias might accuse Socrates of analogising the truth in the area of expertise to morality. However, although neither interlocutor had expository exchanges about 'true', 'false', 'falsify', 'speak truly' and 'speak falsely' effectively in spite of Hippias' apparent affirmations of Socrates' formulations, it was Hippias who suggested that false men are clever at deceiving about subjects concerned (365e10-366a1) and who allows the possibility that 'speak falsely' is used commissively in an area of a skill or science.

Although Socrates began asking Hippias about his expertise in order to elicit Hippias' commitment about the expertise in question, Socrates did not make

explicit that he was asking about expertise in order to ask about the relation between truth and falsity. In his questions about expertise, Socrates neither referred to 'deceit' which Hippias explicitly had used before nor distinctively used 'speak falsely', 'speak truly' and 'falsify'. Hippias later certainly could take Socrates sophistically to have started questioning about Hippias' uttering a true proposition indistinguishably from his telling the truth. However, it was Hippias who had unanalysed opinion about falsity, whether in an achievement or in a dispositional sense, complementarily to that about truth.

Further, in his concluding remark (369a8-b1; 369b3-7), Socrates certainly does not refer to the area of expertise as the domain of discourse in formulating the conclusion. What Socrates has the right to introduce as Hippias' conclusion is that all and only false men are true not in a dispositional but in an achievement sense. It is Hippias who is required to understand his conclusion according to an achievement sense of the predicates. To interpret the conclusion thus, Hippias must admit that there is an expert who has become ambivalently able to do properly or improperly by abandoning the disposition to do properly.

Actually, Hippias might still be confident of keeping consistency because Socrates introduces a paradoxical conclusion and because Hippias believes that he gave each affirmation to what he believed true. Certainly, if Socrates formulates in his question, instead of using 'true' and 'false', the conclusion that a deceitful man and a truthful man are the same, he would give the audience some impression of his cheat in taking the initiative in asking questions and pushing Hippias to the conclusion.

However, when Hippias finds some exemplariness in both heroes in respect of sincerity in a commissive context, his quoted passage allowed the interpretation of 'true' and 'false' in an achievement sense. In other words, Hippias first assumed normally but inconsistently that Homer's Odysseus achieved deceit while Achilles is dispositionally honest. Hence, when Socrates asked whether false men are like those able to do something (365d6-7), Hippias is not wrong in working out a kind of ability from his belief in successful deceitfulness and specifiability of the means of already achieved deceit. Hippias might deduce the proposition about potentiality from the proposition about actuality.

If Hippias understands ability in a normal sense, and, so, admits (a) that ability does not imply actuality and (b) that the inference from actuality to ability is valid, then, according to Homer's passage which suggests that both falsity and truth are actuality, Hippias would not have been wrong in affirming that false men are able to do something (365d7-8) or in inexplicitly admitting that false men actually falsify (365e3, e7, e8-9, 366b3). However, if he commits himself to the proposition that ability to do something is doing it whenever one wishes to (366b7-c4), and if he commits himself to the transition from this ability to actuality (367c6), he wrongly modifies either the meaning of falsity and truth or that of ability. If he reduced falsity and truth to ability in a normal sense, he would be inconsistent in deducing actuality from that ability (365e3, e7, e8-9, 366b3), even if he rescued the transition from ability to *verify* to truth (367c6); if he modified ability in a normal sense to the ability with reciprocity to actuality, he would rescue the above issues but would have to solve the identity

of truth with falsity; specifically, Hippias would have to require 'ability' to mean 'ability to do properly or improperly in an expertise with reciprocity'. In this case, apart from the interlocutors' mutual justification, Hippias would logically have to see the ability with consistent reciprocity to actuality in both Homer's Achilles and his Odysseus and have to require truth to mean ambivalent ability in contrast to experts' usual unambivalent truth.

## 6. Roll-in and Roll-back (369b8-373c5)

### General analysis of 369b8-373c5

Neither party makes clear whether he intends to end their conversation (369b3-c8). Socrates might, but Hippias' response (369b8-c8) invites Socrates' and thus re-involves Hippias (373c6 ff.).

Socrates' question at 369b3-7 clinches their conversation concerning Hippias' opinion about Homer's characterisation (363a1-365d5), and specifically about false men (365d6 ff.) because, as Weiss indicates<sup>492</sup>, Socrates refers, first, to the general conclusion about false men and, then, to the inference from it to Homer's Achilles and Odysseus. This conclusion implies that Hippias' initial opinion (364c3-7, 364e7-365b6) is insolvent. However, Hippias does not end their conversation by accepting or rejecting the conclusion or by objecting to Socrates' previous particular speech (369b8). He objects to Socrates' conversational method, despite his professional boast (364d3-6), and proposes the contest for interpreting Homer (369b8-c8). He is still confident of proving that Homer's Achilles is truthful and Odysseus deceitful (369c2-5). So, allowed to respond, Socrates makes a long meta-elenctic speech (369d1-370e4), counter-arguing for his method (369d1-e2) and, relatedly, a retrospective speech defending his practice (369e2-370e4). He interlaces this with his proof of Homer's Achilles' falsifying which is obviously open to Hippias' counter-interpretation (cf. 369c2-5). He leaves moot Hippias' acceptance of the general conclusion (369b3-4) that all and only false men are true. Hippias predictably counter-argues for Achilles' unwished



deceit (370e5-9). Socrates reargues for Achilles' wish to deceive Odysseus by referring to lines Hippias forgot in the *Iliad* (370e10 ff.). Socrates drags Hippias around to a consequence of Hippias' previous affirmations (365d6-369b7), the preferability of those who falsify as they wish to to those who falsify as they do not wish to (371e7-8). Taking the thesis as an explicitly moral proposition, Hippias asks rhetorically whether it is not against a commonsensical penal presupposition (371e9-372a5). Leaving the thesis uninterpreted, Socrates shifts to his apparently suspended meta-elenctic speech (372a6-c8) and professes that his wavering over that moral thesis, caused by ignorance, is swung to it by Hippias' previous affirmations. To resolve this wavering, Socrates demands Hippias' response to questions (372e6-373a5). Hippias concedes this by force of his boast of polymathy, evading his dilemma between allowing for Socrates' unwished misbehaviour and admitting Socrates' conversational superiority (373b4-9; 371e9-372a5; 364d3-6), and following Eudicus' demand (373c1-3). Hippias fails in retrieving the initiative by displaying on Homer and reverts to a respondent's role.

**Hippias' objection: Homer's Achilles is innocent; his Odysseus is a liar (369b8-c8)**

If Hippias recognised which previous admission entails the unintended conclusion, would he readily withdraw the wrong admission<sup>493</sup>? Some critics interpret that Hippias does not know where Socrates' fallacy or his own wrong admission lay<sup>494</sup>. Certainly, Hippias has not exactly located his unwary admission, but would not question his or Socrates' previous particular speech

because he thinks the audience believe Socrates has arrived sophistically at a paradoxical conclusion. Hippias would understand that he appears to fail in surviving Socrates' questions in committing self-contradiction; however, to retrieve the initiative, he would not publicly analyse a specific 'blunder' but appeal to Socrates' sophisticated impression on the audience. Since Socrates did not clarify actuality of falsity and truth (369b3-7)<sup>495</sup>, pace Weiss<sup>496</sup>, Hippias would be objecting to only a part of the conclusion indirectly (369c2-5). The conclusion certainly appears paradoxical, but pace Blundell<sup>497</sup>, Hippias would not be ready to disentangle his confusion through Socrates' pedagogic elenchus.

Hippias does not answer Socrates but criticises Socrates' plot in intertwining his speeches (369b8); specifically, Socrates' distinguishing whatever point makes difficulty, and touching on it in detail while ignoring the subject-matter of the whole conversation<sup>498</sup> (369b9-c2). He suggests that by sticking to whatever point he finds hardest to manage, Socrates has not discussed the main question on the superiority of Homer's Achilles to Odysseus, as he believes they should (369c1-5).

Hippias proposes that they should each make a speech on the superiority of one hero, and that, within these limits, if Socrates wishes, he should in turn compare the argument, and that the audience should judge their speeches (369c2-8).

However, Hippias does not compare his present statement with his preceding affirmations, or clarify on what criterion he *judged* Homer's Achilles superior. As Schleiermacher says<sup>499</sup>, Hippias requested short questions (365d5); consciously

or not, he avoids disclosing his dialectical inability. Setting apart his preceding affirmations about ability and still supporting Achilles' superiority, he indirectly rejects at least part of Socrates' conclusion in the sense of actuality.

**Socrates's provocative 'defensive' speech involving a reminder: Homer's Achilles demotes speaking truly from his principle (369d1-370e4)**

Socrates' defensive speech, pace Vlastos<sup>500</sup>, does not so clearly defend his conclusion at 369b3-7, especially as one drawn from the definition at 366b4-5, nor offer, as Weiss argues<sup>501</sup>, a topical transition from ability to actuality.

Socrates evades Hippias' proposal (a) by implying that Hippias proposed a contest in 'cleverness' and (b) by conceding Hippias' superiority in 'cleverness' without clarifying his criterion of cleverness (369d1-2).

In defence, Socrates explains that he habitually questions only a speaker he judges clever to 'learn' something (369d1-7). He indicates that if he persists concerning what a speaker said and asks a question to profit from learning something, then he thinks the speaker clever (369d7-e2). If Hippias thought Socrates' description applied to this conversation, Socrates would appear to him to suggest that as he asked him persistently, Socrates thought him clever, Socrates, though, did not explain what he learned from a speaker.

Socrates does not specify how he has applied his habitual way with a man he thinks clever to his conversation with Hippias. But he obviously asked about Hippias' opinions and referred to his cleverness (364a2, 364b2). Hence, Hippias may naively take Socrates to explain his habit with a clever man by his preceding behaviour; Socrates might psychologically contrast his listed habitual

procedures to his preceding behaviour through his disbelief in Hippias' cleverness (369e2)<sup>502</sup>. He suggests this (1) by saying what he *believed* against Hippias on Homer's characterisation when Hippias quoted Achilles' speech at 364e7-365b6 (369e2-370a2) and (2) by additionally making his case against Hippias' view by interpreting Homer (370a2-370d6).

While Socrates proposed to drop Homer (365c8-d1) before asking about a false man in general (365d6-369b7), and declined a contest (369d1-2), he smuggles Homer's interpretation into his retrospective remark.

Socrates says he thought that Hippias showed by quoting Achilles' speech (364e7-365b6) that Achilles regarded Odysseus as a deceiver in an achievement sense (ἄλαζόνα). He indicates he thought that Hippias' interpretation that Achilles is true and simple while Odysseus is false and polytropos (364e7-365b6) was inconsistent with Homer's portrayals<sup>503</sup>. Hippias might take Socrates to have thought that Hippias meant by 'false' normally 'deceitful' in a dispositional sense or 'a man expert at achieving deceit in subjects concerned', although, as Grote suggests<sup>504</sup>, Socrates does not make explicit the moral connotation of 'falsify' here. Further, Socrates might have previously recognised his subsequent part-proof<sup>505</sup> of Achilles' falsity by a single but not infallible falsifying<sup>506</sup> when Hippias quoted Homer (365a1-b2). Anyway, Socrates does here argue against Hippias' interpretation of Homer.

Readers should not read arbitrarily into the preceding conversation what Socrates tells Hippias that he thought. Readers may consider Socrates' retrospective suggestion, but it is risky to read one's *ex post facto* remark into

preceding deeds. When Socrates remarks what he tacitly *supposed* earlier, he may be motivated for some reason in the present, for example, for counter-arguing against Hippias' firm belief in the way that Hippias suggested they should follow. One speaking retrospectively necessarily stands at his present perspective. Therefore, Socrates here attends to the result of the preceding conversation at 363a1-369c8.

At 369e2-370d6 Socrates does not make clear, but Hippias can reasonably assume, his continuing commitment to his interpretation of Achilles' behaviour.

*If* Socrates here assumes that Hippias accepts (1) that Homer's Achilles is typically honest in an achievement sense, (2) accepts that Odysseus typically deceives in an achievement sense, (3) means 'able to *verify*' by 'true' and 'able to falsify' by 'false', and (4) according to his commitments, has to accept that both Odysseus and Achilles in Homer are able both to falsify and to verify in the sense that they actualise their ability whenever they wish to, *then*, Socrates is counter-arguing against Hippias' (1) and (2).

Socrates indicates retrospectively that he thought that if Hippias interprets Odysseus as *polytropos* in the sense that he typically achieves deceit, Hippias must justify Homer's portrayal that Odysseus does not attempt to deceive relevantly to Achilles' snide remark and that Achilles deceives once (369e2-370a3).

Further, in terms of a proposition of potentiality, Socrates allows the possibility that he presupposed that Hippias thought that Achilles is actually, not only potentially, honest and that Odysseus is actually, not only potentially, deceitful. Hence, whether or not, while asking a question, Socrates palmed off

the inference from a proposition of potentiality to one of actuality on Hippias, if Hippias recognised, according to a normal sense of ability, that Socrates' impropriety was trading on that inference, he could nail Socrates' past and present impropriety by seizing on Socrates' remark immediately. However, Hippias did not and does not criticise Socrates. Hippias might have attended to both non-reciprocal and reciprocal uses of ability when they talked about false men's ability, but he might not have been able to distinguish the reciprocity in a clever man occupied about subjects concerned from that in a reliable expert in formulating a true proposition of a subject.

Socrates interprets Achilles' wish, by considering Achilles' inaction incongruous to his commitment (cf. *Il.* 11. 598-600, 607-614). On textual evidence, he concludes that while declaring that he will leave, Achilles obviously made no preparations but *belittles speaking truly in lordly fashion* (370d2-6). Whether Socrates evaluates Achilles' wish as moral<sup>507</sup> or ironically non-moral<sup>508</sup>, he allows the possibility (a) that he interprets that Achilles tells a lie in his declaration of leaving and (b) that he *thought* that Achilles, but not Odysseus, tells a lie in the passage concerned.

As Socrates interprets, Homer's Achilles commits self-contradiction in his commissive speeches to Odysseus and others, about sailing off the following day (*Il.* 9.356-363, 417-418, 614-615, 646-651); Achilles does not sail off but overlooks the battle (*Il.* 11. 598-600, 607-614); hence, Achilles here demotes speaking truly from his professed principle (*Il.* 9.312-313). Homer represents characters doing something, but does not necessarily ascribe the described

action to their wish. Hence, Socrates can interpret what Homer's characters wish under Homer's description, but Socrates' interpretation as well as Hippias' is only one possibility. Achilles may or may not falsify as he wished. It does not follow that Achilles tells a lie consistently whenever he wishes to. Homer indicates that Achilles lies at least once. However, neither Achilles' audience nor even Achilles may believe that he tells the truth about leaving. Neither Diomedes (*Il.* 9. 697-698) nor Odysseus (*ibid.* 673-683) need, as Socrates apparently does, believe that Achilles commits himself to the proposition that he will leave<sup>509</sup>.

Possibly Hippias takes Socrates to exercise his memory of Homer to extemporise or to have ready a rival interpretation of this passage. However, if Hippias, as a professional contender for Homeric interpretation, considers Socrates' display of his ability to formulate the proof by scanning Homer's *Iliad* and if Hippias supposes some sound criterion of interpreting Homer's characters' wish in their behaviour, then, he may suppose that Socrates is ready now to prove Achilles' insincerity, irrespective of preceding conversation. Contrariwise, if Hippias rejects any sound criterion, except a popular one, Hippias could suspect Socrates (1) of showing off his ability to expound Homer in any way from various passages to mock Hippias and (2) of being constantly ready to invent a counter-argument against Hippias' type of interpretation.

Anyway, Hippias could suspect that Socrates was able to argue that Homer's Achilles deceives at least once, while Odysseus does not deceive relevantly. Further, if Hippias considers Socrates' introduction of the word, ἀλαζών

(369e4), and admits that it can imply some expertise, Hippias could eventually recall Socrates' sophisticated arrangement of questions; specifically, he could take Socrates to have thought, when Hippias explained that Odysseus is false (364e7-365b6), that Odysseus' falsity implies his expertise<sup>510</sup>. Hence, Hippias could suspect that Socrates might have believed, tacitly interpreting Hippias' quoted passage, that Hippias' descriptive condition of the predicate 'false', when Hippias introduced it (365a4-b6), was, as he suggested subsequently (365b7-8, 365e10-366a1), cleverness at achieving deceit about subjects concerned. If Hippias suspected so, he could conclude that, while believing so, Socrates might have (i) given priority to establishing the general contradiction of falsity to truth on this condition (365c3-7), and, then, (ii) dismissing Homer's responsibility (365c8-d4), restarted asking about Hippias' descriptive conditions of 'false' (365d6 ff.).

Earlier Socrates superficially suggested, using diagnostically tagged questions (363b7 and elsewhere), that he mostly concerned himself with Hippias' opinion of Homer's characterisation. Further, he did not mention the soundness of Hippias' opinion, only saying he thought he understood what Hippias said (364d7-e1, 365b7-8). Even in the conversation about false men, although Hippias naturally said what he believed true (366b7, 367a5), Socrates mostly seemed concerned with Hippias' opinion, pinning on Hippias the responsibility for the proposition embodied in his tagged questions<sup>511</sup>, or making 'Hippias' a subject of such propositions<sup>512</sup>. Socrates in his concluding speeches would have appeared to Hippias to concern himself with the truth-value of Hippias' propositions<sup>513</sup>, but



not what Hippias should consistently believe from his previous commitments. Accordingly, despite Socrates' apparent concern with Hippias' beliefs<sup>514</sup>, Hippias might take Socrates to have believed what Hippias affirmed. Hence, if Hippias took Socrates to have assumed he could elicit true opinions from Hippias, whom Socrates thinks 'clever', he could question how Socrates can justify his beliefs, by eliciting Hippias' affirmations or denials of propositions embodied in questions.

If Hippias relied on Socrates' retrospective remark and exerted his mnemonic art, he could suspect that (a) Socrates, not mentioning the soundness of Hippias' opinions on Homer, concerned himself with it tacitly, (b) specifically, when indirectly asking, 'You mean 'a false man' by 'a polytropos man', at least as it seems (365b7)?' Socrates suspected that Hippias' exposition conflicted with Socrates' own textual interpretation of Achilles' behaviour, and (c) supposing that Odysseus obviously does not lie relevantly, Socrates was not opposed to Hippias' extrapolation that Homer created Odysseus as false in many passages in *the Iliad* (365c1-2). However, in exerting his mnemonics so well, Hippias would remember that Socrates did not refer to or justify Socrates' opinion about Homer's Achilles and Odysseus. Therefore, Socrates' retrospective remark would be unreliable, even for Hippias; it might even intensify Hippias' suspicion of Socrates' weaving of speeches; Socrates might invent his previous opinion since Hippias resuggested Homer's Odysseus' achievement of deceit at 369c5.

Hippias here can take Socrates to tell him truly or falsely his earlier thoughts; Socrates here links his proof of Achilles' falsity with what he had thought in his

initial question (370d6-e4), saying, 'So then, Hippias, *even* from the beginning, I asked you because I *didn't know* which of those two men is created by the poet to be the better ...' [Italics mine.]

Since Socrates refers to the temporal order of his views on Achilles' falsity, Hippias could suspect Socrates of asking Hippias' opinion about Achilles' superiority without making explicit his belief that one hero's superiority can hardly be justified in respect of 'falsity and truth and the rest of goodness'.

Socrates does not tell what particular proposition he meant to introduce into his question or which he believed true. Socrates tells Hippias, on the initial question which hero is the better in what respect (364b3-5; cf. 363b6-c1, 364c1-2), that he was not committed to any proposition as he did not know the answer; rather, he suggests that he had reason to think he could not give any right answer on any comparative criterion such as 'falsity and truth and the rest of goodness (370d7-e4)'.

Socrates speaks after (a) he required Hippias to see the conclusion implying Hippias' self-contradiction (369a8-b7) and (b) Hippias, rejecting at least the consequence about Homer's characterisation (369c2-5), showed readiness still to counter-argue for Achilles's superiority in honesty (369c2-5). In this *ex post facto* context, Socrates declares his interpretation against Hippias that Achilles falsifies at least once. Hence Socrates suggests (370e1-2, e3-4) that one hero's superiority is hardly discernible. Neither party specifies his criterion of falsity ( $\psi \epsilon \upsilon \delta \omicron \varsigma$ ); nor does Socrates make clear whether falsity is included by the rest of goodness (370e2-3)<sup>515</sup>.

To keep consistency, Hippias must exclude from goodness disposition to speak falsely and cleverness at achieving deceit and could not reduce heroes to specialists.

Socrates makes his second retrospective remark (370d6-e4) just after arguing that Achilles *falsifies* at least (370a3-d6). If he argues against Hippias' evaluation of Achilles' wish (369c2-5), he must have Hippias realise that Socrates means 'tell a lie' and/or 'deceive' by 'falsify'. If Hippias connects Socrates' remark to his preceding argument on Achilles' character, Hippias could suspect, in proportion as he supposes that Socrates' previous argument is not conditioned by the present retrospective context, that Socrates is committing himself to his general views.

Hippias could then suspect that Socrates in his initial question was not merely undecided but also sceptical about justifying one hero's superiority; therefore, he could suspect not that that question was incompatible with what he says he supposed, but that while not ready to support one hero's superiority, he asked Hippias' opinion, without explaining his intention to learn the truth from him. If Hippias disbelieves Socrates' first retrospective remark (369e2-370d6), he probably disbelieves Socrates' second. However, Hippias could not deny that Socrates' remarks, if decontextualised, shake Hippias' firm ground again.

**Hippias' objection: Homer's Achilles does not wish to tell a lie while his Odysseus does (370c5-9)**

Socrates does not make explicit his continuing commitment to earlier considerations. Hippias can suspect Socrates' extemporisation of these beliefs.

Nevertheless, Hippias argues on the assumption that Socrates (a) is committed to what he said he had believed (370e5) and (b) is indifferent to one hero's superiority in respect of wish to deceive because both heroes sometimes deceive (370e5).

Hippias intends to maintain Achilles' superiority in respect of wish to deceive, by proving that Achilles has no such wish, being forced to remain against his wish (370e5-8) while Odysseus deceives in consequence of wish to deceive without the victim noticing (ἐκὼν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιβουλή<sup>ς</sup> 370e8-9). Therefore, Hippias admits Socrates has some right to interpret that Achilles made an unfulfilled commissive speech but Hippias thinks Achilles does not deceive deliberately (370e5-8). But he thinks Odysseus deceives in consequence of his wish.

Agents' wish is ordinarily significantly mentioned in explanation, justification or penalisation of an action; so, introduction of words related to wish is often associated with morally negative connotation; unlike Socrates Hippias would commit himself to that connotation.

**Socrates' responsive objection: Homer's Achilles wishes to deceive (370e10-371e3)**

Socrates reproaches Hippias for deceiving him, wishing to deceive him misinterpreting that Homer's Achilles does not deceive because he wishes. Hence, Socrates argues for Achilles being no better than Odysseus in respect of wish to deceive because deceiving is Achilles' wished deed (370e10-11).

Whether or not he recognises the possibility of Socrates' interpretation,

Hippias denies his intention of foisting off misinterpretation and suggests, by asking what Socrates means and in reference to what (371a1), that he intends to argue from Homer's text about Achilles' wish to deceive.

Socrates argues against Hippias as to the sound interpretation of Homer, whether or not deceit is ascribed to Achilles' wish (371a2). Hence, apparently, Socrates is not concerned only with Hippias' opinion but with the difference between their opinions; he suggests that this difference is resolved on the interpretation of Homer's passage which Hippias is clever at (363c7-d4; cf. 369d1-2). On the proposition that Achilles falsifies as a deceit, both probably agree to a condition for falsifying that Achilles *both* makes a commissive speech saying he will leave *and* does nothing conforming to it; however, they differ in respect of the actual object of Achilles' wish, although Homer portrays Achilles' inaction but not necessarily his wish in his inaction (cf. *Il.* 598-600, 607-614)<sup>517</sup>. Achilles might intentionally commit inaction but not wish to. Whether or not Socrates is ready to argue about Hippias' opinion seriously, Socrates would admit that if Achilles falsifies in deceit and Odysseus does not falsify relevantly, then Hippias is wrong according to his comparative criterion.

Anyhow Socrates shows that Achilles' actions suffice to ascribe wish to deceive to him. By morally negative words such as 'cheat', 'a treacherous man', and 'imposition (ἄλαζονεΐα)' in opposition to Hippias' opinion (371a3), Socrates does not distinctively categorise Achilles as a man who does injustice but as a deceitful man, particularly in falsifying about subjects concerned in successful deceits.

Socrates indicates, by showing that Achilles easily deceives Odysseus without Odysseus' noticing, that in general Achilles deceives in consequence of his wish without the victim noticing (371a4-b1). He takes advantage of (1) Achilles' *not* telling Odysseus the reason for doing nothing conforming to his commitment and (2) Odysseus' *saying nothing* to Achilles to indicate that he noticed Achilles deceiving (371a7-b1).

Socrates deduces (1) that Achilles is deceitful in an achievement sense and (2) that Achilles designedly deceives Odysseus from both (3) that Achilles *dares* to tell Odysseus two contradictory things, *without telling Odysseus his contradiction* and (4) that Odysseus *says nothing* to Achilles to indicate that he noticed. Yet one doubts that Socrates or Hippias can justify Homer's characters' wish in their inactions, since if Homer does not describe their wishes. Hence one doubts that Socrates can justify his assertion that Odysseus did not notice Achilles deceiving just because Homer does not describe Odysseus' behaviour implying his noticing.

Both Odysseus' recognition of Achilles' self-contradiction and Achilles' superiority in cleverness at achieving deceit are indifferent to proving Achilles' wish to deceive Odysseus but not his achieving deceit. But Socrates inserts cleverness at achieving deceit as the condition of deceitfulness. Accordingly, if Hippias believes that Socrates has some reason in inserting cleverness, Socrates allows, whether or not he believes in the specifiability of conditions of achieving deceit, the possibility that he proves Achilles deceitful in an achievement sense as Hippias suggested. Hence Socrates proposes Achilles' achievement of deceit

and his superiority to Odysseus in this respect in addition to Achilles' wish to deceive.

Interrogatively Hippias suggests that Socrates' interpretation is inadmissible (371b2)<sup>518</sup>. Whether or not Socrates generally infers from the premise that A deceives B without B's noticing that A is clever at achieving deceit, Socrates, allowing the possibility that he is scorning Hippias' cleverness at interpreting Homer in introducing a conducive question, appeals to Achilles' speech to Ajax in Odysseus' presence about remaining at dawn after his speech about leaving (371b3-5).

Hippias asks Socrates to cite Homer's passage which Hippias has not noticed (371b6).

On Achilles' speech to Ajax (*Il.* 9.650-655) (370b8-c5)<sup>519</sup>, Socrates asks whether it implies that Achilles (a) wishes both to disregard sincerity and contradict himself in his commissive speech, (b) regards Odysseus as old, and (c) assumes that he will outdo Odysseus in both plotting and deceiving (371c6-d7).

Socrates does not conclude explicitly that Achilles is the better at achieving deceit or that Achilles is the worse in respect of wish to deceive.

However, Hippias does not refer to Socrates' description of Homer's portrayal but criticises Socrates' argument from it. Socrates makes explicit Hippias' approved view that it is not in consequence of his wish against Odysseus without his noticing that Achilles falsifies (371a2-3) and asks Hippias to confirm that both Achilles' scorn of deceitful men (ἀλαζόνας) and his self-contradiction undermine Hippias' opinion. Socrates not only argues that falsifying

is Achilles' wished action but indicates that Achilles falsifies successfully.

**Hippias' objection: Homer's Achilles says different things from his good will (371d8-e3)**

Hippias admits Homer allows the interpretation that Achilles tells Ajax what contradicts what he tells Odysseus; however, he denies Socrates' interpretation that Achilles contradicts himself designedly ( $\epsilon\tilde{\xi} \epsilon\pi\iota\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\varsigma$ ) but interprets that it is because Achilles is convinced by his goodwill.

Although Hippias neither refers to nor argues from a particular passage, he interprets, 'it is always by design that Odysseus *speaks truly* and *falsifies* (371e2-3)'.

Since Hippias told Socrates that Homer characterises Odysseus as false in many passages (365c1-2), it is controversial whether Hippias interprets by using 'speak truly' that Odysseus sometimes *tells the truth*. Hippias probably gives  $\epsilon\tilde{\xi} \epsilon\pi\iota\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\varsigma$  morally negative connotation (372a3). Hence it is further arguable whether Hippias justifiably asserts that it is always *by evil design* that Odysseus *tells the truth*.

However, Hippias' present point is that deceit is not Achilles' wished action but Odysseus'. Hence he is consistent in arguing that Achilles is better than Odysseus in respect of wish to be honest.

Consistently he intentionally or unintentionally avoids associating morally negative connotation with Achilles' behaviour in contrast to Odysseus'; his phrase 'say different things (371e1)' on Achilles' behaviour is less morally loaded than 'falsify' which could earlier mean 'deceive' or 'tell a lie' for Socrates. As



some suggest<sup>520</sup>, Hippias allows the possibility that Odysseus speaks truly or falsely as he wished to but not that Odysseus tells truth for its own sake. Hippias would avoid ascribing to Odysseus wish to tell the truth for its own sake, because, otherwise, Hippias is committed to the proposition that Achilles is not necessarily better than Odysseus in respect of wish to be honest for the sake of honesty. Therefore, he would mean by 'speak truly' 'utter a true proposition' or 'say that one will do what one will do' and not 'tell the truth'. Therefore, by 'falsify' he would mean 'utter a false proposition' or 'say that one will do what one will not do' and not 'deceive' or 'tell a lie'. Hence, if Hippias keeps consistent, he would use ἐξ ἐπιβουλής with morally negative connotation like 'plot'; otherwise, though not consistent in locution, he might assert that Odysseus utters a true proposition and deceives *by plot*<sup>521</sup>.

**Socrates' question: 'Is Homer's Odysseus better than his Achilles because of Hippias' previous admission?' (371e4-8)**

Socrates at least indirectly asks about what Hippias' previous commitment entails (371e4-5)<sup>522</sup>.

Changing direction, he appears to Hippias to try to trip him on his words on Odysseus<sup>523</sup>, if Hippias does not remember suggesting that a deceitful man is clever at achieving deceit.

Admittedly, if Hippias followed Socrates' patchwork interpretation, he could interpret that Odysseus is better in some part of Homer than Achilles in respect of both wish to deceive and actual deceit. Further, if he admitted what Socrates interprets as Achilles' supposition in his behaviour (371a3-6; 371d5-7), he could

interpret that Achilles is better at achieving deceit than Odysseus.

If Socrates conjectured that in an achievement sense of deceit, Hippias compares Achilles with Odysseus in respect of cleverness at deceit involved in wish to deceive, he could conjecture that Hippias' previous commitment (370e5-9; 371e2-3) entails Odysseus' superiority.

However, Hippias plausibly would have compared consistently only by the criterion of wish to deceive, not cleverness at achieving deceit, although, not always specifying the criterion, he allows the possibility that he means 'achieve deceit' by 'falsify'.

Socrates proved that Achilles falsifies, to prove that Achilles is not better than Odysseus in respect of sincerity (370a2-d6), but did not make clear here or at 370d5-6 whether the criterion is disposition or, unusually, achievement. However, in formulating the difference between his opinion and Hippias' (371a2-3), although he might have dared to show that he suspected that Hippias deceived him by maintaining that falsifying is not Achilles' wished action (370e10-11), he pointed out that Hippias' crucial point is that it is not in consequence of wish formed without the victim noticing that Achilles falsifies. Hence Socrates allowed the possibility that he recognised that Hippias (1) judged Achilles superior in wish to deceive and (2) had not been concerned with the judgement of Odysseus' superiority by cleverness at achieving deceit (370e5-371e3).

Therefore, insofar as Hippias does not remember invoking deceit as achievement, Socrates appears to Hippias abruptly and irrelevantly to change the

criterion from wish to deceive to cleverness at achieving deceit. Hippias consistently denies the proposition by interpreting the criterion of the comparison as an agent's wish to deceive, believing that Homer's Achilles is honest dispositionally (371e6).

Hippias would accept that Achilles falsifies but not designedly; he would accept that Odysseus falsifies and *always* designedly. Therefore, still confronting the issue whether Achilles designedly falsifies, Socrates appeals to what he deems Hippias' previous commitment (366c5-368b1; 368e2-369a2): he who falsifies always consistently, if he wishes to is more experienced in a subject about which he falsifies or cleverer at falsifying in it than he who does so not consistently, if he wishes to (371e7-8).

Socrates, giving the appearance of getting an unexpected denial from Hippias, asks, without diverting the conversation, 'Didn't it turn out just now<sup>524</sup> that those who falsify ἐκόντες are better than those who falsify ἄκοντες? (371e7-8)'

If we inspect the whole conversation as readers, this speech links the preceding with the subsequent conversation. Socrates might be only conducting Hippias to giving affirmation to the formulation in his question, but Socrates allows the possibility that he believes what Hippias regards as the proposition embodied; for Socrates conducively asks, without referring to any responsibility, whether the proposition did not turn out<sup>525</sup>.

Leaving aside Socrates' possible manoeuvre, Hippias' preceding comparison presupposes that (1) Achilles falsifies on particular occasions in the *Iliad* (370e5-6, 371d8-e2); (2) Achilles falsifies not in consequence of wish formed

against someone else without his noticing (370e5-8; 371d8-e2); (3) Odysseus falsifies always in consequence of such wish (370e8-9, 371e3); (4) Odysseus speaks truly always in consequence of such wish (371e3). Hippias admits that each hero falsifies sometimes; therefore, Socrates has no prospect of obtaining affirmation that Odysseus is better than Achilles in respect of falsifying. Then, as to wish to falsify, Socrates and Hippias are divided; therefore, Socrates has no prospect of obtaining Hippias' affirmation that Odysseus is better than Achilles in respect of wish to falsify. What Socrates can use among Hippias' commitments is (2) and (3). Since Hippias allows the possibility that he would accept that Achilles *always* does not falsify in consequence of wish formed against someone else without his noticing, he would possibly affirm that Odysseus is better than Achilles in respect of infallibly falsifying in consequence of such a wish in an achievement sense of falsifying.

Although Socrates appeals to the proposition from the preceding conversation, nothing in the interlocutors' speeches tallies with the present formulation about actuality. Socrates here must have Hippias see that the proposition Hippias denies without specifying the criterion contradicts what resulted before. Hence, whatever Socrates usually means by ἐκῶν and ἄκῶν, he has to introduce the words in Hippias' usage and Hippias would understand the words according to his criterion since they have not made expository exchanges about them.

Although Socrates first introduced ἄκῶν, he introduced it but not ἐκῶν, not in the present context about Achilles' falsifying but in the conversation about false men (367a3). Socrates only tacitly suggested that the function of the

participle, 'wishing', (367a2), is conditional (cf. 366c8, 367a4). Although ἐκῶν and βουλόμενος (366e5-6, 367a2, 367a2, 367a4) are often interchangeable, if Socrates means 'wishing to do the action concerned' by ἐκῶν, he cannot justify Hippias' inferential transition from 'ability to do something' to 'doing it, wishing to do it'. For the proposition that one falsifies, wishing to do so, meaning a proposition about actuality, does not follow from the proposition about ability that one falsifies if one wishes to; that actuality proposition would not follow without the premise of reciprocity of ability with actuality or without distinguishing wish to do within one's ability from wish to do beyond one's ability.

Socrates introduced ἄκων as an adverb modifying 'speak truly' in contrast to 'speak falsely' subordinated to 'wish to'. Socrates' usage of ἄκων at 367a3 is traced in the proposition type that if an agent wishes to do X, he does not always consistently do X but does Y (cf. 366b7-c1; 366e3-367a6). Socrates uses ἄκων to distinguish different things the grammatically same token 'Y' stands for: what an agent ascribes to his wish and what he does not. Since Socrates referred already to an agent's not knowing about what he wishes to do (367a3) as the cause of failure, he would have meant by ἄκων, 'as the agent does not wish to', or 'against the agent's wish', if he means a proposition about actuality by 'one does Y ἄκων'. Hence, although Socrates did not use ἐκῶν in the formulation about a false man who speaks falsely always consistently whenever he wishes to, he would not necessarily need to use ἐκῶν insofar as he uses the equivalent verb. Hence, in this context, if Socrates were to use ἐκῶν, it would mean 'as an agent wishes to'<sup>526</sup>.

But *Hippias* introduces ἐκῶν and ἄκῶν (370e7-8) into the conversation in relation to ἐξ ἐπιβουλής (370e6, 370e9, 371e3, 372a1; cf. 371a2). Therefore, if Socrates is asking Hippias to confirm the proposition in his question, according to Hippias' understanding of the words, he must recognise that Hippias understands what Socrates means by the words.

Concerned with Socrates' interpretation on Achilles' unfulfilled commitment, Hippias indicated that lying is not Achilles' wished action. He would then mean by ἐκῶν 'as one wishes to' or 'not as one is forced to' and by ἄκῶν 'as one does not wish to'.

Therefore, as to what Socrates' question indicates resulted (371e7), Hippias too would understand that those who falsify *as they wish to*, or *wishingly*, are better than those who falsify *as they do not wish to*, or *unwishingly* (I use these shorthands below for convenience)<sup>527</sup>. If so, Socrates does not directly quote or paraphrase but asks Hippias to infer the proposition from his preceding commitment (cf. 375d5; 375e3, 376c1), insofar as they had not argued this point already in the present conversation (369b8 ff.).

Socrates might suppose that he himself referred to those who falsify *unwishingly* about calculations (367a3-5), just as about geometry he asked Hippias to confirm what he supposed resulted (367e4-5). However, he did not refer to those who actually falsify *wishingly* or *unwishingly*; hence, he has no right to refer directly to them. Neither did Socrates refer to comparison between them (cf. 366e3-6; 367a2-5). Socrates only indirectly suggested the comparison of those who falsify whenever they wish to with those who do not always falsify

when they wish to.

If Socrates considers, following Hippias' commitments, that Hippias would be ready to accept that (1) an expert is better at the expertise than a non-expert, (2) all and only experts *wishingly* falsify or *verify* always consistently whenever they wish to, meaning a proposition about ability, *then*, Socrates may fairly conjecture that Hippias will accept that those who *wishingly* falsify always consistently if they wish to are better at *verifying* than those who *unwishingly* falsify.

However, Socrates cannot refer directly to Hippias' commitment to the proposition that those who actually falsify *wishingly* are better at verifying or falsifying about subjects concerned than those who actually falsify *unwishingly*. Certainly, Socrates can take Hippias to have admitted (367c6) inexplicitly the reciprocity of actuality with ability, but it is dubious that Hippias would commit himself to that reciprocity. Hence if Socrates has reason to introduce what Hippias' previous commitment entails, he still has to appeal to Hippias' commitment to the inference from ability to actuality.

However, the proposition in Socrates' question here is probably conjectured on Hippias' previous admissions<sup>528</sup>, if, pace Kraus<sup>529</sup>, Hippias reinterprets his previous admissions on falsifying about a skill or science in a moral context<sup>530</sup>. For those who falsify *wishingly* are *mostly* experts or men clever at falsifying because sometimes non-experts can falsify *wishingly* accidentally; those who falsify *unwishingly* are non-experts or men foolish in falsifying; therefore, mostly the former are better at the subject in which they falsify than the latter. Experts

or men clever at falsifying cannot by definition falsify *unwishingly*. Therefore, those who consistently falsify *wishingly* are better at the subject in which they falsify or at falsifying about the subject concerned than those who falsify *unwishingly*.

Socrates asks Hippias to confirm the proposition not as accepted but as what his preceding commitment entails<sup>531</sup> and, also, that Hippias admitted the proposition as *fait accompli*. Specifically, by appealing to the general proposition, Socrates asks Hippias to affirm that Odysseus is better at things in which he falsifies or at falsifying about the subject concerned than Achilles. Insofar as Hippias' preceding admissions imply that consistently falsifying *wishingly* belongs only to an expert and falsifying *unwishingly* belongs only to a non-expert, Hippias must accept the proposition according to his commitments, if Socrates specifies the comparative criterion.

**Hippias' objection: 'How could those who do injustice *wishingly* be better than those who do injustice *unwishingly*?' (371e9-372a5)**

If Hippias distinguishes attempted from achieved deceit and if he assumes that wish to do something, whether within or beyond one's ability, implies no actuality, he possibly takes Socrates to divert their argument in respect of the comparative criterion (371e4-5). Specifically, he would take Socrates to switch the criterion from wish to ability. Hippias could by clarifying the criterion accuse Socrates of his improper shift, but he does not (371e6). Socrates justifies his shift from what Hippias' previous commitments imply (371e7-8), but Hippias



leaves inexplicit the difference between attempted and achieved deceit.

Hippias does not confirm whether his previous commitments entail the proposition in Socrates' question, whether or not he believes he affirmed the propositions about morality; but he denies what he regards as the proposition Socrates introduced. Specifically, Hippias possibly takes Socrates to have intended to introduce into his question the proposition that those who falsify *wishingly* are better than those who falsify *unwishingly* in respect not of wish to falsify but of ability to falsify, whether as expertise in a subject or as cleverness at falsifying and *verifying* about a subject concerned. Yet Hippias, intentionally or not, indicates that Socrates introduced the self-contradictory formulation presupposing that those falsifying *wishingly* wish to *verify*.

Unlike Hippias, Socrates has not made explicit that falsifying or speaking falsely is doing injustice or wrong; although Hippias would plausibly have associated Socrates' expressions with wrongdoing. However, Hippias indicates that Socrates introduced a proposition about doing injustice. Tacitly denying the proposition, he suggests by conducive question that his denial is justified by the presupposition of penal assessment<sup>532</sup>. By regarding agents' wish as the criterion, Hippias supports the commonsensical moral opinion that those who do injustice *wishingly* and who formed a wish without the victim noticing and do a bad thing *wishingly* cannot be better than those who do so *unwishingly*.

Without questioning the existence of people who do bad things *wishingly*, he indicates that according to the criterion of wish to obey a norm, a man acknowledging the norm judges that those who contravene it *wishingly* are worse

than those who contravene it *unwishingly*.

If Hippias recognises that Socrates omits the criterion in questions at 371e4-5 and 371e7-8, he would take Socrates to use the omission to elicit Hippias' commitment to the proposition Hippias rejects. However, if Hippias imagined somehow that what he had suggested as achievement of deceit presupposes the possibility of comparison according to an agent's cleverness at deceit, he could not object to Socrates' introduction of that comparison into his questions, especially, if wish to deceive is wish to achieve deceit within one's ability as Hippias suggested (366b7-c4). Hippias leaves open his attitude towards this comparison, allowing the possibility that he prefers an agent's wish to ability in evaluating a wrongdoer.

**Does Socrates learn from Hippias how to heal his wavering over the preferability of those who go wrong *wishingly*? (372a6-372e6)**

Socrates neither answers Hippias' question nor immediately argues against the preferability of those who do injustice *unwishingly*; he neither requests clarification about the preferential criterion nor concludes whether or not Homer's Achilles wishes to falsify; nor does he ask whether Hippias believes that lying is bad as a means to another unmoral end as he suggests concerning Odysseus (371e2-3) or that lying is bad in itself as concerning Achilles (365a4-b1)<sup>533</sup>. Leaving these questions moot, Socrates resumes a meta-elenctic speech, abandoning the heroes (372a6-b1).

Socrates here would appear to Hippias to try to reinvolve him in another sophistry by reminding him of both their conversational context of Socrates'

learning from clever men and Socrates' ignorance causing their opposition (372a6-d3). He defends his persistent questionings of 'clever' men, by denigrating his other qualities about knowledge (372b2-4). He suggests that he differs from Hippias on the preceding issue, but justifies his question by his general way of resolving the difference from 'clever' men which indicates his foolishness, whether or not he eventually learns something from Hippias. He still does not specify how and in what they differ over the preferability of those doing injustice *wishingly*. He emphasises only their difference. Socrates' difference from any opinion of 'clever' men's is as empty as Hippias' polymathy.

Hippias can suspect that Socrates frames his general attitude in front of the audience, as if he had been learning what he wants to learn from Hippias as a teacher by asking questions. Previously he left unclear his opposition to Hippias' affirmation of the proposition in his question, although he did not always confirm what Hippias affirmed. Only after Socrates pointed out that what Hippias' commitments entailed was self-contradiction (368e1-369b7) and Hippias criticised Socrates' conversational way (369b8-c8), did Socrates tell Hippias that *during their previous conversation he had* held views different from Hippias': specifically, not the view that Homer's Achilles does not falsify (369e2-370d6) or that Achilles is better than Odysseus in respect of some goodness (370d6-e4). When Hippias came close to the conclusion or offered a part of a general conclusion, Socrates vaguely indicated readiness to share responsibility for Hippias' previous commitments which he expected would lead to Hippias' miscarriage (367d4, 367e6, 367e8, 368e3-4, 369a5); when he

thought Hippias' self-contradiction was made public (369b3-7), he abandoned his passingly shared responsibility by retrospectively showing that he had differed from Hippias (369e2-370e4). If Hippias exerted his mnemonic, Socrates' statement would be unreliable.

Again, on the preferability of those who falsify *wishingly* to those falsifying *unwishingly*, Socrates has not confirmed in what sense Hippias understood the issue, but makes clear, suspending his reason for their difference (cf. 372e3-6), his concern with their different opinions (372c8-d2); he ascribes their difference ambivalently to what he is, to speak no better or no worse of himself<sup>534</sup> (372d2-3).

Socrates explicitly proposes his belief (372c8-d4; 372e2). Hippias can *prima facie* take Socrates to oppose what Hippias says at 371e9-372a5 by formulating (F): the preferability of those who damage people<sup>535</sup>, do injustice, falsify<sup>536</sup>, deceive<sup>537</sup>, or go wrong (ἀμαρτάνοντες), *wishingly* (372d4-7). He introduces 'go wrong' (ἀμαρτάνω; cf. ἐξαμαρτάνω (372e2)), which can mean moral wrongdoing or error or non-moral error<sup>538</sup>, to use it as a representative item (372e2; 373c8). However, apart from his intention of reducing moral injustice to non-moral mistakes by analogy to error<sup>539</sup>, Socrates does not refer to the criterion of (F).

On one hand, Hippias would believe it self-contradictory that those who do injustice *wishingly* wish to do justice. Hence, he would reject (F) in respect of wish to do justice. Further, Hippias would believe that Socrates has recognised this self-contradiction because Socrates apparently argued for Achilles' wish to

deceive (371a2-d7; cf. 370a2-d6). Hence, Socrates would not appear to Hippias to oppose him over (F) (372d7-8). If Hippias has plausibly conjectured on Socrates' preceding remarks (371a4-b1; 371d4-7; 371e4-5; 371e7-8), that Socrates here takes cleverness at doing injustice as the criterion of (F), it would not matter that Socrates does not ask whether wish to do justice is a criterion prior to cleverness at doing injustice.

On the other hand, if Socrates believed that if he specified the criterion by adding  $\tau\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\ \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\omega}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\iota$  at 372d7 (cf. 366d3-6), Hippias would admit the proposition based on Hippias' previous admissions at 365d6-369b7, he would not need to leave the criterion unspecified. As Hippias still clings to Achilles' superiority to Odysseus in respect of not wishing to tell a lie (371e9-372a5), Socrates would see Hippias' firm ground irrespective of Hippias' blunders in the conversation about a false man (365d5-369b7). Hence, Socrates, at least, reflectively, appears to Hippias to avoid clarifying his opinion for some hidden purpose.

Further, Hippias can take Socrates *prima facie* to profess that he wavers over (F) through ignorance (372d7-e1). When Socrates diagnoses his wavering as a periodical fit (372e1-2), Hippias might find that Socrates reads (F) as the preferability in respect not of wish to do a good thing but of cleverness at doing a bad thing. However, when Socrates ascribes his present provisional commitment to (F) to the preceding conversation, he would appear to Hippias to be engineering another sophistry if he remembers that Socrates did not commit himself to any of Hippias' affirmations. Hippias might remember believing that

Socrates instilled his opinion into some questions (cf. 367a5), but he could not believe that Socrates believed all that Hippias affirmed. Hence Socrates' emphasis on their difference and his abrupt commitment to Hippias' preceding affirmations would be unreliable for Hippias. That commitment might be a stratagem; for Hippias has not answered (cf. 371e7-8) whether or not he accepts (F) in respect of cleverness at doing a bad thing. However, if Hippias soon associates Socrates' wavering both with his request of healing it by Hippias' answering his question (372e6-373a2) and his inhibition of Hippias' long speech (373a2-5), Hippias could see Socrates' plot in his long speech here.

If Hippias relied on Socrates' remark (372a6-c8), he could suppose that Socrates believes him clever, suggesting that Socrates means by cleverness expertise or polymathy exemplified in Hippias (372a6-c1). Hippias could believe that Socrates is generally opposed to a so-called 'clever' man's view although he claims that he wants to learn the truth from such a man by questioning. Hence, Hippias could assume that Socrates generally wavers about (F), even in the preceding conversation (363a1-369b7), while, because of that conversation's result, he now opposes Hippias' opinion on (F), and therefore, Hippias could suspect that before conversing with Hippias, Socrates is acquainted already with (F). Therefore Hippias could suspect that Socrates had (F) in view. However, Socrates' apparent profession purposely set in an *ex post facto* context appears to Hippias to work to induce him into Socratic conversational way.

Socrates here might, as some say<sup>540</sup>, mean to say what he is saying. If Socrates indeed holds his usual doctrine, 'No one does wrong *wishingly*', he

might face the problem concerning (F), whether a good man able to do badly will do so. Penner sees Socrates' irony here, abandoning ambivalent ability in morality while maintaining general resemblance between morality and crafts<sup>541</sup>, in contrast to Kraut, Vlastos, and Blundell, who see Socrates' honest profession of aporia. However, pace Kraut<sup>542</sup>, Socrates did not argue for his opinion or commit himself to craft-analogy; he asks Hippias to appeal to it. Whether or not Socrates believes Hippias' preceding affirmations unsound<sup>543</sup>, he would appear to Hippias to request him, as Kahn suggests<sup>544</sup>, ironically to *heal his periodical fit* by answering Socrates' question.

### **Hippias resumes the role of respondent (372e6-373c5)**

Socrates requests Hippias to cure his soul (372e6-373a2), not by a long speech but by answering questions (373a2-4). Socrates endorses that answering will not damage Hippias (373a5), but leaves the possibility that he is reallocating Hippias a respondent's role.

Eudicus not only indicates that he supports their continuation of argument but also indirectly demands Hippias' answering on the basis of his previous commitment (363c7-d4). This Eudicus conducively asks Hippias to confirm.

Shackled by his boast, Hippias, nevertheless, appeals to Eudicus against their request on the ground that Socrates always raises disturbance<sup>545</sup>. Although he may fairly suspect Socrates of improper questioning, he does not specify what Socrates did where.

Socrates argues against Hippias' appeal that he makes trouble not *wishingly*, but *unwishingly* (373b6-7). If he behaved ill *wishingly*, he would be clever and

shrewd according to Hippias' argument (373b7). Leaving unspecified a criterion of the preferability of those who do injustice *wishingly* (371e9-372a5), Hippias suggested that those who do wrong *wishingly* are bad in respect of wish to do wrong. If Socrates recognised Hippias' suggestion, what Socrates refers to as Hippias' argument here is not Hippias' suggestion there but what Socrates has believed to be the entailment from Hippias' previous commitment (365d6-369b7), i.e., the entailment that a man contravening a norm *wishingly* knows how to obey the rule as an expert. Whether or not Hippias admits to what Socrates calls Hippias' argument, Socrates indicates here that if Hippias follows the entailment from his commitments (365d6-369b7) and if Hippias regards raising disturbances as Socrates' wished action, he must admit that Socrates is clever and shrewd at things in which he raises disturbances. Whether or not Socrates accepts the conclusion, this suggests that Hippias would have to admit that Socrates might equal or surpass him at doing right in conversation. If Hippias refuses the admission, he must reject his previous admissions. To do that, he must specify what Socrates was doing when Hippias affirmed a particular proposition Socrates introduced.

But, if Hippias admits that Socrates behaved ill *unwishingly*, Hippias would have to make allowances for Socrates' unwished ill behaviour as Socrates concludes (373b7-9), because Hippias took wish to do wrong as the criterion of the preferability of those who do wrong *unwishingly* (371e9-372a5).

Socrates argues that he behaves ill *unwishingly*, but also suggests that Hippias must admit that Socrates is good at conversation or make allowances



for Socrates' unwished ill behaviour. But if Hippias accepts what Socrates calls Hippias' argument and what he said about penalisation, Hippias has to admit both (1) that those who do wrong *wishingly* are better at doing right than those who do wrong *unwishingly*, in respect of knowledge of doing right and (2) that from the viewpoint of a rule-follower, those who do wrong *wishingly* are not better than those who do wrong *unwishingly*, in respect of their wish to do wrong. Therefore, since Socrates behaves ill either *wishingly* or *unwishingly* and not both, Hippias must either admit that Socrates is clever at conversation or make allowances for him.

Eudicus requests Hippias to answer partly for the sake of Hippias' earlier statement (373c1-3). Whether or not Hippias admits what Socrates calls his argument, Hippias follows Eudicus' request for Eudicus' sake. This escapes the dilemma at 373b6-9. However, Hippias, requesting Socrates to ask what question he wishes, has little specific idea how Socrates misbehaves in his questions.

## 7. Pull-about and Scuttle (373c6-376c6)

### General analysis of 373c6-375d7

Socrates restrained Hippias from a long speech (373a2-3) but by his own long speech (372a6-373a8) returns Hippias to a respondent's role. He restarts questioning about the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers<sup>546</sup>.

Socrates repeats the subject-matter in different interrogative types in the middle part of the exchange (373c9-375d4)<sup>547</sup>. Further, he supports the sequence by repeating a linking phrase between cases, 'What then? (τί δὲ)<sup>548</sup>'. If Hippias gradually takes Socrates to anticipate his answer leading to the same conclusion in each case, he could take Socrates to invoke a kind of induction by not coordinate but analogical cases towards the conclusion which he must deny to remain consistent with his previous commitment (371e9-372a5).

Hippias rejects at 375d1-2 the anticipated conclusion. Socrates does not make clear whether he uses ἐξαμαρτάνειν and κακουργεῖν with moral connotation, but Hippias takes him to ask about the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-doers (cf. 365e8-9) and repeats the preferability of *unwishingly* to *wishingly* unjust men as at 371e9-372a5.

### Socrates' objective in his self-proclaimed examination (373c6-9)

Socrates declares his desire to examine the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers as his provisional opinion based on Hippias' previous commitments about false men. However, in the restarted bout, Socrates asks Hippias' opinions by tagged questions (374c2-3) or by pinning the responsibility

for the proposition introduced on Hippias<sup>549</sup>. Socrates does not propose his own opinion, despite taking the initiative in forming propositions. Pace Blundell<sup>550</sup>, the exchange here is still Socrates' question about Hippias' opinion, not Socrates' argument; Hippias can, though, literally take Socrates to argue for his own belief in spite of his ironical confession at 372c8-e3.

If Socrates ascribes to Hippias' affirmations about false men the provisional validity of the preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers (371e7-8; 372e3-6), Socrates allows the possibility that he finds some applicability of Hippias' preceding affirmations to the following cases of wrong-goers. However, if he understands Hippias' affirmations as concerned with ability in a usual sense but not actuality, Socrates, as argued before (see p. 219 ff.) cannot deduce but can conjecture some conclusion about actuality.

However, if Socrates believes that Hippias' affirmations apply not only to falsifying in uttering a false proposition in a science or craft but also to going wrong in that domain, Socrates must already have considered (a) that all and only experts are able both to follow a rule and to contravene it in a science or craft, (b) that no experts contravene it *unwishingly*, (c) that only experts consistently contravene it *wishingly*.

According to the propositions in Socrates' questions about calculation (366e3-367a5), falsifying in a science and craft consists of three steps: (i) following a rule, (ii) contravening it by deviating from following it, and then, (iii) showing the resulting proposition to others; Socrates did not mention how an expert takes steps (i) and (ii), but only (iii), uttering a false proposition or demonstrating

some mis-handling. Socrates can infer that only experts consistently falsify *wishingly*, but it is questionable (1) whether actually going wrong *wishingly* is performable and profitable in some science or craft and (2) whether, as shown before (see pp. 129-133), the derivativeness about calculation can be generalised to going wrong.

Even if, as Socrates suggested at 372e3-6, Hippias' affirmations about false men give any solution, Socrates eventually does not ask Hippias to confirm the crucial premise in accordance with his question about an expert in calculations (366e3-367a5; esp. 366e4-6; 367a4-5); specifically, neither (a) whether a man bad at running runs slowly not consistently, if he wishes to, i.e., *is unable to run slowly* nor (b) whether a man bad at running, if he wishes to run slowly, *often* runs quickly, if it so happened, against his wish, because he does not know how to run.

#### **Preferability of a *wishingly* slow runner or racer (373c9-d7)**

Socrates asks three main questions about δρομεύς, a runner or a racer: (A) 'Do you admit the descriptions 'a good δρομεύς' and 'a bad δρομεύς'?'<sup>551</sup> (373c9-d1); (B) 'In running or racing, a man who runs quickly is a good runner or racer and a man who runs slowly is a bad runner or racer?' (373d4-5); (C) 'Which is a better runner or racer, a man who runs slowly *wishingly* or a man who runs slowly *unwishingly*?' (373d5-7)

As to the exemplariness of this first case, to support the conclusion of the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers in any given area, Socrates first has to arrange the conditions on which he has the right to introduce into his

concluding question a proposition similar to that general conclusion and qualified by a particular area. Since Hippias must change the criterion of evaluation from an agent's wish to an agent's ability if he accepts the conclusion in each case, Socrates must beforehand arrange to ask Hippias to confirm any particular description of the criterion by which Hippias evaluates an action in running or racing (373d1-5). Further, to elicit from Hippias affirmation of any particular description of a rule or norm, Socrates must obtain beforehand Hippias' acceptance of the possibility of evaluation in the area concerned (373c9-d1). But Socrates does not ask beforehand about the justifiability of evaluation but only the evaluation (373c9).

Concerning Socrates' tactics in examining each example, if he intends to elicit Hippias' affirmation of a concluding formulation similar to that at 373c7-8, Hippias possibly thinks it fair if Socrates makes clear the steps to the conclusion in the opening case of a runner or racer. But if Socrates later, as at 367e4-5, tries to commit Hippias to what Socrates believes resulted, and if Hippias, then, admits the proposition concerned and supposes that the examination of each example has the same structure as the first, Socrates will be able to use Hippias' commitments here reciprocally with later ones. Within these limits, Socrates has the right to use different language with an organ or a soul as subject of an action, to invert the order of or to omit questions corresponding to those in the first example.

Hippias can take Socrates first (373c6-8) to summarise the theme mentioned at 371e7-372a5 and 372d4-372e6, and to rephrase the problem as that concerning

'going wrong'. Socrates professes that his following way is most relevant to the whole problem (ὁρθότατ' 373c8). But why does he need examples like running or racing?

Truly Socrates and Hippias referred to people who, so to speak, violate a criminal law (371e9-372a5; 372d4-7), in addition to people who tell a lie in a craft or science. Hippias took up 'doing injustice' and 'doing or performing bad things' in listing crimes (371e9-372a5); Socrates took up similar immoral descriptions. However, when Socrates added '*go wrong*' (372d4-7), and, further, in reformulating, used only '*go wrong*', whether as a subsuming or representing term or not, he allowed the possibility that he suggested error in immoral actions.

Then, if Hippias takes justice dispositionally, and not in an achievement sense, he can suspect that Socrates evades his objection at 371e9-372a5.

To justify his way of reexamining the issue Hippias denied (371e9-372a5), Socrates admittedly must refer to the same field by the same words as Hippias used. To make Hippias admit he is wrong, Socrates ought either (1) to investigate the validity of his opponent's beliefs by using the same words in the same meaning as his opponent or (2) to argue from what his opponent regards as a more comprehensive standpoint than his. Moreover, the opponent must accept the argument from the more comprehensive standpoint. However, Hippias may not realise that Socrates' propositions about going wrong in the area of expertise would include his belief as to doing injustice, if he, judging expertise irrelevant to dispositional justice and injustice, does not imagine that his idea of falsity as achievement implies that he should understand justice and

injustice in an achievement sense. However, if Socrates tries to test Hippias' belief according to his unanalysed opinion of falsity as achievement, he could have some reason to talk about going wrong in a subject concerned in relation to injustice in an achievement sense; although he does not refer to Hippias' skill or science explicitly recounted (368b2-e1; 366c5-368a7).

If Socrates directly tries to resolve the issue comprehensively, Hippias could easily find the similarity to the case of injustice in a domain where an action of following or not following a rule is evident, such as playing a game. However, considering Socrates' introduction of 'go wrong', if Hippias does not potentially, as in the case of a false man (365e10-366a1; 365d7-8), take an unjust man to achieve injustice about subjects concerned, he would take Socrates naturally to distance his attention from the domain with an evident rule-following action and to trade on a domain where there is not a norm but a degree which makes an agent's physically quantitative ability distinctive.

Lexically, in which meaning the word  $\delta\rhoομεύς$  here is used, a racer or a runner' depends on the context and is open to question<sup>552</sup>. Few critics or translators discuss whether Socrates means or Hippias understands by  $\delta\rhoομεύς$  'a runner' or 'a racer' or whether they leave it ambiguous<sup>553</sup>. Only Jantzen analyses this section on the assumption that Socrates means by it an ordinary action which, unlike skills and justice, admits ambivalent ability, but he misses Hippias' understanding of this word<sup>554</sup>.

In contrast with  $\delta\rhoομικός$ <sup>555</sup>, Socrates still refers to a runner or racer ambiguously in acquired disposition (see pp. 125-126). If Socrates referred to

a professional racer, Hippias might doubt whether a professional racer who has acquired a disposition to obey a norm disregards it. Further, to circumvent Hippias' objection, Socrates might intentionally leave the ambiguity, (1) because the domain of a developmentally acquired habit would seem to Hippias to be less normative, (2) because, if Socrates meant explicitly by  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  a racer, Socrates could so easily remind Hippias both of the established norm in the domain such as running as quickly as possible and outrunning other competitors and of the ability such as speed in running that Hippias would come closer to the comparison in respect of wish to obey a norm, and (3) because Socrates tries to commit Hippias to what Hippias understands by the formulation with  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ , in order to lead him to the concluding formulation about the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers.

If one in a race runs more slowly *from his wish* than other competitors and actually achieves his end of running relatively slowly to lose, when any other competitor wishes to run faster than the others but may actually run relatively slowly and lose, then he is still able to run faster than others. Although one acknowledging the rules of racing would describe him as contravening them, he is good at racing. Only someone good at racing runs more slowly *wishingly* than other competitors because it is a premise that any other racer wishes to run faster than he. Socrates would be ready to apply his question to the case of racing if he used the case after that of wrestling. Socrates leaves Hippias to take a runner as a racer in order to commit Hippias to the conclusion. Hippias might see with Ovink<sup>556</sup> that Socrates is trying to replace absolute goodness by relative



goodness such as speed in running. But Hippias would easily find an analogy to his firm belief, if Socrates clearly referred to the case of racing first. Therefore Socrates must use the ambiguity of  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  to circumvent Hippias' objection.

Hippias unreservedly admits the description of 'a good runner or racer' and, then, 'a bad runner or racer' (373d1), because of the usual complementary relation of bad to good. Certainly, it is not self-evident what is the criterion of goodness in an ordinary elementary motion such as bending one's index. It is difficult to find who is a good walker, because we need not specify a rule or norm by which we evaluate our ordinary elementary motion. Socrates' choice of running brings controversy whether or not he chooses a case representative of our ordinary elementary motions. Socrates might take advantage of the difference between running and walking or standing for the reason that the relative degree in speed is admissible as a criterion for the evaluation of running. Admittedly, in the domain of ordinary elementary motions, there is no distinct norm. Experientially, we recognise such elementary motion as an action in a theoretical analysis or medical rehabilitation of malfunctional limbs. However, the analogy to a rule-following action would not be far wrong, considering our learning process of such an action and some relative anatomical and physiological isomorphism in our ordinary motion; the crux in describing a hierarchy of an action including elementary motions is that doing justice or injustice is not at the apex of an agent's spatio-temporally describable action but his evaluation of the action.

Because speed is admissible as criterion, Socrates might choose running as

an ordinary action to circumvent an exemplary case of a rule-following action. However, it would be easier for Hippias to take  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\zeta$  as a racer, if he commits himself to some criterion of evaluation. Whichever criterion Hippias takes, insofar as he admits the use of the predicate, 'good' and the predicate,  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\zeta$ , he could not avoid admitting their collocation, and complementarily that of 'bad' with  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\zeta$ .

Whether or not Hippias recognises what his commitments imply for Socrates' examination, he must affirm the reference to a bad runner, since he admits commonsensically, as he did (367e4-5, 367e6-7) the complementarity between goodness and badness (373d1) and his boast of polymathy still works<sup>557</sup> (cf. 373c4-5).

Socrates asks Hippias whether he relates his criterion for evaluation of a runner or racer to some mode of running (373d1-2).

In this stage, the present participle Socrates introduces can be interpreted generally or particularly. 'A man running well' can be 'a man who runs well generally' or 'one who is running well on a particular occasion'. Since a good runner mentioned in the first stage (373c9) is not running on a particular occasion, Hippias would take Socrates, pace Jantzen<sup>558</sup>, to refer by the participle of the verb 'run' in this stage (373d1-3) to generality or ability.

While affirming unreservedly (373d2), Hippias might not, as he did not before (366c5-e1), recognise why Socrates refers to a runner in examining preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers. However, if he has no reason to object to relating the criterion of evaluation to some characteristic of a runner or racer's

action, Hippias could find no reason to give denial because the proposition with two positive evaluative predicates appears tautological.

In asking, 'Then, does a man who runs slowly run badly, and a man who runs quickly run well?', Socrates does not ask Hippias to agree to Socrates' criterion of evaluating running or racing; but, generally, Socrates asks whether Hippias affirms speed as Hippias' descriptive condition of evaluating running or racing (373d3).

Generally speaking, speed in running is a relative graded characteristic of running and not necessarily a self-evident discrete standard for evaluating an action of running, if we do not compare a runner with another. Truly, compared with actions approximate to running, such as walking or standing, we can easily take speed as the standard to distinguish running from other linearly moving actions as well as grade people discretely, *if they run a race*. However, Hippias might fairly take either graceful postures or sure-footedness in running or ability to choose speed as a standard. Hence he has to answer on his view.

Hippias unreservedly affirms speed as the criterion of evaluating running or racing (373d3). As to the relativity of speed, if Hippias compares runners in respect of quickness or slowness, he must mean by the speed of a runner not the speed which the runner feels only but that which is measured objectively too, as truth in speaking truly and falsehood in speaking falsely. Therefore, whether or not Hippias recognises what he implies, he must admit that a runner who runs slowly only *wishingly* is able to run quickly, because he runs more slowly than on some other occasion.

Hippias would be motivated to affirm that criterion in running or racing, if he thinks ability is honourable, as Socrates heard Hippias boast of publicly (368b3-e1). However, if Hippias took speed as a norm in running or racing, he would, as Ovink suggests<sup>559</sup>, risk admitting relatively gradable goodness.

Socrates paraphrases his preceding question using an abstract particular term (373d4-5). Socrates does not explain his intention. Hippias, however, if he remembers, could later take Socrates to (a) have prepared for introducing the phrase  $\kappa\alpha\kappa\grave{\alpha}\ \epsilon\rho\gamma\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  which Hippias had used (372a1, 372a3, 372a4-5) and replacing the phrase 'run slowly' by 'perform a bad thing at running' (373e3-4), and (b) have come near to the concluding formulation about doing a bad thing in running, which is both analogisable to the following cases and approximate to the formulation about doing wrong and, further, about doing injustice, although the distance from one to the other formulation proves too blatant.

Saying, 'Yes, but what else would you expect?', Hippias may be alert for impropriety while accepting Socrates' paraphrase (373d5)<sup>560</sup>. Hippias may recognise that having accepted both the criterion of evaluating running and Socrates' paraphrase, he cannot avoid accepting the preferability of a man who performs a bad thing at running *wishingly* in respect of the ability both to run quickly and slowly. However, he probably does not imagine that Socrates is referring to a man who goes wrong about running or racing as analogous with a man who achieves injustice about subjects concerned (cf. 372e2-3). Hippias could imagine a man achieving deceit about subjects concerned (365e10-366a1; 365d7-8) but could not easily imagine a man achieving injustice about subjects

concerned; he should from his commitments (cf. 371e9-372a5; 373b7; 365e10-366a1) but does not recognise that injustice is an achievement about subjects concerned like falsity.

In asking about the preferability of a *wishingly* slow runner, Socrates asks about that of a *wishing* wrong-goer in running or racing (373d5-6)..Since Hippias affirms the reference to a good runner or racer and the criterion of evaluating running or racing, Socrates can logically ask a question about the comparison between a man who *wishingly* contravenes a rule in running or racing and a man who does so *unwishingly* in respect of ability to follow the rule. If Hippias supposes that contravening a rule is relevant to a race but not to an ordinary run, he would take Socrates to refer to a racer.

If Socrates assumes, in accordance with Hippias' commitments about a false man in arithmetic, that all and only experts in running, i.e., those who are able to run quickly, run objectively slowly whenever they wish to, that only slow runners run slowly *unwishingly*, and that only quick runners consistently run objectively slowly *wishingly*, Socrates could analogously infer that a man who runs slowly *wishingly* is better than a man who runs slowly *unwishingly*, in respect not of wish to run quickly or the actual slow run but of the ability to run quickly<sup>561</sup>. Further, if he supposes that Hippias can draw the same conclusion, he can suppose that if Hippias is ready to assent to the question with the criterion of comparison unspecified, Hippias would affirm the proposition that a man who runs slowly *wishingly* is better at running quickly than a man who runs slowly *unwishingly*. He can suppose further that Hippias would affirm that

a man who does something bad in running *wishingly* is better at doing something bad in running than a man who does so *unwishingly*.

Since Hippias accepts the preferability of a *wishingly* slow runner or racer, unqualifiedly and without specifying the criterion of preferability (373d7), he allows the possibility that he affirms (A) that a man who runs or races slowly *wishingly* is an expert in running or racing or (B) that a man who *wishingly* does a bad thing in running or racing is clever at doing a bad thing in running or racing. Jantzen sees here the confusion of the coordinately ambivalent ability in an ordinary elementary motion with the only apparently coordinately ambivalent but actually non-ambivalent ability in skills or sciences<sup>562</sup>. But neither Hippias nor Socrates makes explicit or commits himself to the confusion (see pp. 125-126; 129-133). Certainly, we have no standard for penalising our ordinary elementary motions, and, as Pohlenz points out<sup>563</sup>, slowness in running is morally indifferent; however, demolishing a race is possibly a moral problem and slowness possibly an aesthetic one. Therefore, Hippias does not yet see any analogy to a morally unjust action, but allows the possibility that he believes the preferability of a *wishingly* slow runner or racer in the sense of the preferability of a *wishingly* bad man in running or racing.

#### **Preferability of a *wishingly* bad and shameful and/or ugly runner or racer (373d8-374a1)**

Hippias might not understand the main point of Socrates' examination about a runner or racer (373c9-374a1), apart from the formal sequence of questions, because of the ambiguity of  $\delta\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ , but Socrates uses Hippias' affirmations

in the section about  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  (373c9-374a1).

As regards the similarity to the following cases, Hippias would later see that *racers* are similar to wrestlers (374a1-6) as Socrates will introduce the proposition subsuming these two cases under using the body (374a7-b3). In contrast to Socrates' later examples, if Hippias translates into normal language the animistic language in which Socrates assumes bodily organs as subjects of actions, Socrates leaves Hippias to suppose that the structure of examination about  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  corresponds to that about taking a beautiful posture such as dancing (374b5-9), that about singing in tune (374c2-4), that about steering a ship (374e4-5), that about riding a horse (375a1-3), that about shooting an arrow (375a7-b2), that about healing patients (375b4-7) and even that about walking properly (374c6-d2), or that about viewing properly (374d2-6).

Specifically, if the similar questions are omitted in some cases, Socrates implicitly leaves Hippias to supply the conditions on which Hippias has the right to affirm or deny the concluding proposition in each case. Yet the comparison between *wishing* and *unwishing* doers of a bad thing in each case is formulated differently. Sometimes Socrates leaves out the condition, 'when agents do a bad thing' (373e4-5, 375b7-c3) and sometimes expresses the question not in comparative form (374d8-e2). However, in general, Hippias must refer to the exemplariness of the first case if he affirms each conclusion. Socrates does not specify the criterion in each case except at 374a8-b1, 375b5, 375b7-9, but Hippias must supply the ability both to do a positive thing and to do a negative thing in a particular area, whether or not he or Socrates confuses this ability in

a particular expertise with the ability to achieve wrongdoing about any subject concerned.

By asking, conducively, the trivial 'Isn't to run to do something?' (373d8), Socrates is preparing to replace the phrase, 'run slowly' by the phrase 'perform a bad and shameful and/or ugly ( $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$ ) thing at a running' next (373e1-2). While giving an assertive affirmation, Hippias could not recognise Socrates' intention in arranging the question here. However, according to his previous commitment (365d6-7, 366b8, 365e7, 372a3) and the general usage of 'do', he can hardly deny a rather tautological question (373d8).

In asking conducively, 'Then, if it is to do something, isn't it performing something, too?' Socrates asks another triviality to get Hippias to admit paraphrasing 'do' by 'perform' (373d8-e1). Hippias admits the tautological paraphrase, as his usage indicates (372a1, 372a5; cf. 372a3).

Pace Ovink<sup>564</sup>, Hoerber<sup>565</sup>, and Jantzen<sup>566</sup>, neither Socrates nor Hippias commits himself to some real hierarchy of existents between 'do' and 'perform', and, correspondingly, between skill and morality, in reference to *Chrm.* 162a, 163e. As Jantzen indicates<sup>567</sup>, if we read this periphrastic usage as a kind of expression about the original ordinary expression and the secondary expression as showing or explaining the action's structure, we must consider the quality of the substantialised particulars which stand for an action. Truly, certain verbs such as 'have' or 'do' occur with two different types of particulars as logical subjects. For example, the sentence type, 'x is F' can be ordinarily paraphrased as 'x has F-ness' or 'x runs' as 'x does a run'. But if we regard this paraphrase as



some significant procedure, we would have no right to stop taking the same procedure for the first paraphrased sentences. Consequently, we obtain another sentence type, 'x has having-ness of F-ness' or 'x does a doing of a run'. This would continue *ad infinitum*. Therefore, although the relationship between a subject of an action and its ability is a key to consideration of Socrates' introduction of animistic language, it would commit us to an unnecessary burden that, as Jantzen interprets<sup>568</sup>, Socrates commits a fallacy in introducing the verb, 'produce a work' into the area of bodily abilities. Rather, I think Socrates introduces the words which Hippias uses in his opposition to 'Socrates' view' of the preferability of *wishing liars* (371e9-372a4), to make Hippias think about the issue in his own words. Socrates introduces periphrases such as 'do a bad deed at running' or 'perform a bad and ugly act at running' in order to approximate the language about running or other actions to the evaluative language in which the descriptive conditions of evaluation are concealed such as 'doing a bad thing' or 'performing injustice'. Indeed, Socrates introduces 'doing' or 'performing a bad thing in some actions' to make Hippias finally judge about performing a bad thing in general.

In asking, 'So, does the man who runs badly perform at running a bad and αἰσχρόν (ugly and/or shameful) thing?', Socrates introduces a possibly moral evaluation of running (373e1-2). Hippias possibly takes Socrates to deviate, as Calogero suggests<sup>569</sup>, the topic to morality gradually.

If Hippias sees no difference between negatively evaluated predicates, 'run badly' and 'perform a bad and ugly and/or shameful thing', Hippias would take

the question as trivial. However, by adding  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$ , Socrates leaves open the possibility that he is trying to elicit Hippias' commitment to the proposition that a slow run is an ugly and/or shameful thing.

Socrates, combining two predicates, introduces into his question (373e1-2) two propositions one of which Hippias would find trivial. Therefore, if Hippias distinguishes 'bad' from 'ugly and/or shameful' significantly, he can suspect Socrates of taking advantage of Hippias' admission of the other non-trivial proposition, as earlier (365e1-2; 365e2-4; 365e5-6).

Socrates leaves open the possibility that he means by 'perform an  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$  thing' (1) 'perform a thing which causes an agent to feel shame', (2) 'perform a thing which causes an observer to feel ashamed of it, whether the agent feels ashamed or not', or (3) 'ugly' of an agent's outward appearance<sup>570</sup>.

Socrates has no reason to decide which Hippias takes him to mean by  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$  or what implications between 'ugly and/or shameful' and 'injustice' Hippias assumes. Consequently, what Socrates can do at best is to suggest the possibility of an analogy between slowness and injustice<sup>571</sup>.

As to the effect of introducing  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$  (373e1, e5, 374a3, a5), it refers to outward characteristics for an observer rather than an agent's feeling. An unscrupulous contravener of a norm does not feel ashamed. Socrates cannot necessarily assume that Hippias is ready to infer from an agent's choice of shameful and/or ugly things to his choice of injustice. Hippias, however, may (1) easily take an outward ugliness and/or the spectator's shame as the criterion of evaluating using the body, (2) as about falsifying (366c5-367a1), miss the

agent's wish to contravene the norm because the agent does not necessarily feel shameful, (3) evaluate *wishing* wrong-goers in respect of ability, as Socrates' question suggests, (4) replace ability to judge right from wrong by ability to demonstrate diversified wrong performances and (5) be restrained from assuming that an agent evaluates his wished action as shameful and/or ugly or unjust.

Affirming assertively (373e2), Hippias allows the possibility that he ordinarily affirms the proposition embodied in Socrates' question by using a part of its predicate in Socrates' question; however, Hippias may disclose his inclination to take only the predicate, 'perform a bad thing', relevant to the context. But if he is not explicit which of the combined propositions he affirms, Hippias allows the possibility that he affirms both.

If Hippias is to justify affirming the proposition with the predicate  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$  by distinguishing 'bad' from  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$  significantly, then, regarding  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  as a runner, he may take Socrates to refer to an ugly appearance of a slow runner<sup>572</sup> or to an agent's feeling of shame, given respect for physical strength in a male dominant society. If Hippias interprets  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  as a racer, he could easily associate a racer who runs slowly in a race and loses, not only with ugly appearance in being outrun but also with the racers' and some spectator's shame.

At 373e3 Socrates repeats the question at 373d3. He does not conducively ask but can anticipate Hippias' repeated affirmation. Therefore, his question rhetorically works to distract Hippias from Socrates' introduction of  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu$  as in the case of the clause 'if one wishes to' (366a8-c4), apart from the trivial

inference of transitivity (373e1-2; 373e3)<sup>573</sup>.

Socrates' question at 373e4-5 indicates that Hippias' preceding affirmations imply that a runner or racer good at running *wishingly* performs a bad and shameful and/or ugly thing in running slowly; a runner or racer bad at running *unwishingly* performs that bad and ugly and/or shameful thing (cf. 367e4-5).

Socrates can assume because of Hippias' previous affirmations (373e2, 373e3; 373e5) that Hippias would replace 'run slowly' by 'performs a bad and shameful and/or ugly thing'.

If Socrates assumes that Hippias interprets  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\zeta$  as 'runner' rather than 'racer', he cannot assume that Hippias will accept (1) that a runner who is able to run quickly, and, so, able to run slowly, does not wish to run slowly or (2) that he does not run slowly *wishingly*; likewise, he cannot assume Hippias' acceptance that a runner who always runs objectively slowly runs slowly *unwishingly*; Hippias, though, could be constrained from accepting that doing a bad thing is a quick runner's wished action, after accepting that a slow run is bad<sup>574</sup>.

If Socrates assumes that Hippias interprets  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\zeta$  as 'racer', he can assume more easily Hippias' acceptance that all and only experts good at racing are able to run quickly; that all experts in racing do not run slowly *unwishingly*; that only experts in racing consistently run slowly *wishingly*.

If Socrates justifies Hippias' conclusion in his question on the basis of Hippias' affirmation, then, as he turns out to introduce the detailed formulation in his first generalised question (374a7-b3), Socrates has to interpret that the

proposition means that if a man is good at racing, then if he is performing a bad and shameful and/or ugly thing in running slowly, he is doing it *wishingly*, because he is able to do both: running quickly and slowly; while if a man is bad at racing, then if he is performing a bad and shameful and/or ugly thing in running slowly, he is doing it *unwishingly*, because he is not able to run quickly.

Hippias reluctantly accepts the proposition he thinks embodied here. To justify this, he would have to re-interpret the present formulation as that which he gives affirmation to (373d5-6) or supply the above-mentioned missing conditions.

Socrates concludingly asks about the preferability of a man who performs bad things *wishingly* at running (373e6-374a1). He conjectures that Hippias' affirmation to the just preceding proposition implies that preferability, but neither, without supplying the missing conditions, has the right to infer that preferability from Hippias' preceding affirmation, apart from appealing to Hippias' affirmation of the preferability of a *wishingly* slow runner or racer (373d5-6).

But by using the expression, 'perform bad things', which Hippias used (372a4-5; cf.372a1) in listing criminal descriptions, Socrates has come close to Hippias' firm ground in that *wishing* wrong-goers in running are closely analogous to *wishing* wrong-doers about subjects concerned.

Hippias affirmed reservedly (374a1), as he answered Socrates' concluding question about arithmetic (367d3). In limiting the validity of his affirmations to the area of running, he suggests that he is unconvinced of their application to doing injustice, in spite of giving affirmations to the formulation with words

resembling those he used about doing injustice (371e9-372a5). As Jantzen suggests<sup>575</sup>, Hippias would limit the validity to running not as an ordinary motion but as a skill. He thinks that the validity holds in the case of skills but not of justice. As Sprague and Ovink<sup>576</sup> see, ordinary experts who have acquired and preserved the disposition to try to win a race as well as the ability to race cannot lose *wishingly*, but as Ovink admits<sup>577</sup>, *wishingly* losing a race can be morally good or bad and, whether or not penalised, is bad according to a norm to be obeyed by racers.

#### **Preferability of a *wishingly* bad and shameful and/or ugly wrestler (374a1-6)**

Inside the section about using the body (374a1-374b4), Socrates arranges the question about running as an exemplary case, followed by the question about wrestling<sup>578</sup>, and subsumes both cases under 'using the body'. The choice of running is not necessary, and the criterion of comparison there is not more understandable than in the case of wrestling, because of the ambiguity of *δομεύς*. Rather, Hippias could clearly understand what aspects of these actions Socrates focuses on just in his intermediate concluding question (374a6-b3), after Hippias committed himself to the conclusion in the particular cases. On one hand, Socrates still refers to *πάλαιστῆς* ambiguously in contrast with *πάλαιστικός*. On the other hand, if Socrates believes that Hippias takes him to try to induce him to reach the conclusion about injustice, Socrates presumably understands that the first section about simple strong bodily actions is necessary to lead Hippias to the comprehensive conclusion of the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-doers in any given area. Therefore, Socrates would be

suggesting that Hippias should properly admit not only that *wishing* wrong-*goers* in a particular area are experts but also that wrong-*doers* who achieve wrong are expert in doing wrong in any area concerned.

Socrates does not introduce a gradable property such as speed in running into the case of wrestling. On wrestling, Socrates does not mention the mode of an action but two aspects of the same event in the wrestling match, falling and throwing. The main point here is not the mode of action but an evaluative standard. Therefore, the second stage of Socrates' examination about wrestling is to commit Hippias to a prescribed norm in a certain area. Here Socrates can ask about the comparison between two types of wrong-*goers*; Hippias more reluctantly continues to agree (373e5, 374a1, 374a3, 374a6, 374b3-4). As Jantzen indicates<sup>579</sup>, the gradable mode of an ordinary elementary motion would canalise Hippias more easily to the concept of the ambivalent ability, but it is not clear whether Hippias commits himself to applying gradability to mode of an action in other cases.

Asking immediately about the preferability of a *wishingly* falling wrestler (374a1-2), Socrates leaves Hippias to supply the condition of reference to a good or bad wrestler and the criterion of evaluating a wrestler. By leaving Hippias to appeal to running or racing as exemplary, Socrates introduces the similar concluding proposition (cf. 373d5-6), but he is ready to arrange the question about the criterion of evaluating wrestlers after this question (374a3-4, 374a5-6).

If Socrates supposes, according to the rule for a wrestler, that Hippias will admit that a wrestler ought to try (1) to outdo his opponent in power by throwing

and (2) to win the bout with the opponent falling, Socrates can anticipate his affirmation following Hippias' corresponding affirmations (373e6-7, 373e4-5, 373d5-6; cf. 373c7-8) and can suppose Hippias ready to compare the wrestler who falls not in respect of following the rule of wrestling but of the ability to follow the rule by overpowering his opponent.

The meaning of 'fall' Socrates introduces here is marginal in the classification of motions into intentional actions or unintentional motions; for, when Socrates applies the verb to a man falling *wishingly*, he can mean that the man causes his body to fall in intentionally reducing his power in a wrestle, with or without one's opponent noticing; when applying it to a man who falls *unwishingly*, Socrates can mean that the man attempts to overpower his opponent but unintentionally falls by the opponent's throw.

Hippias reluctantly admits, or possibly indirectly questions, the preferability of a *wishingly* falling wrestler (374a3). This requires him not only to apply his preceding corresponding affirmations (373d5-7; 373e6-374a1) to the present proposition but to confirm that falling is doing a bad thing in wrestling. If he recalls the established rule, he could not reasonably reject falling as complementary to throwing as the criterion of doing badly in wrestling.

Whether Hippias could infer the proposition in Socrates' question depends on Hippias' admissions of these propositions: (1) if a wrestler causes his body to fall on purpose by using less power than his opponent who acknowledges the rule of wrestling in attempting to overpower, then, although he loses the wrestle, he is still good at wrestling because he is able to outdo his opponent in power;



(2) if a man acknowledging the rule of wrestling attempts to outdo his opponent by exerting his power but is thrown, he is bad at wrestling because he has not the power to outdo his opponent; (3) therefore, only non-experts fall *unwishingly*; only experts consistently fall *wishingly*.

Hippias would have less difficulty in inferring the proposition than in the case of running; therefore, his reserved answer suggests that he recognises the conversation's direction rather than the proposition's truth-value.

Socrates leaves Hippias' reservation. Introducing the predicates, 'worse' and 'more shameful and/or uglier' (374a3-4), Socrates asks Hippias which he chooses as the criterion of evaluating a wrestle negatively, falling or throwing. Understanding that he introduced into the preceding question the proposition similar to Hippias' previous affirmation, he can anticipate Hippias' choice of falling.

Hippias chooses falling unreservedly, in contrast to his preceding answer, because of his commitment (374a1-3) and the normal view about wrestling. Further, by analogy with the racer, he would rationally affirm, as he might have inexplicitly supposed that losing a race or running slowly is doing a bad and ugly and/or shameful thing.

Consequently on Hippias' affirmation (373e1-3) Socrates might have intended to ask Hippias to reconfirm that in wrestling also, falling is not only doing a bad thing but also a shameful and/or ugly thing. However, whether or not Socrates believes this view, even if Hippias affirms it now, Socrates cannot assume that Hippias' affirmation of the proposition concerning an agent's choice of a

shameful or ugly thing in an area commits Hippias to the proposition concerning an agent's choice of injustice, unless Socrates believes that Hippias believes (a) that all and only shameful and/or ugly things are unjust, (b) that all and only inabilities are unjust. However, because Hippias committed himself to the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers in wrestling, Hippias allows the possibility (1) that an agent who wishes to do bad and shameful and/or ugly things in an area possibly wishes to do injustice and (2) that because throwing or falling in wrestling is not an end in itself for a man who goes wrong *wishingly* in a wrestle, he is clever at achieving wrong correspondingly to Hippias' unanalysed idea of achieving deceit.

Asking<sup>580</sup> concludingly about the preferability of those who perform bad and shameful and/or ugly things *wishingly* in wrestling, Socrates indicates that he asked the first question about wrestling to introduce this concluding formulation and ask Hippias to confirm that the same stands here. Hippias can take Socrates not to have thought it trivial to ask whether falling is worse and more shameful and/or uglier.

When affirming reluctantly again (374a6), Hippias has no reason to reject that preferability if he prefers an agent's ability rather than wish as a criterion of evaluating a 'wrestler'; however, Hippias would be reluctant to agree because he would see that Socrates induces him to confirm some general proposition about doing a shameful and/or ugly thing based on his affirmations about running and wrestling.

**Preferability of a *wishingly* shameful and/or ugly athlete (374a7-b4)**

Socrates asks next about the generalisation: (1) a man good at using the body is able to do (374a7-8): (1)-(a) both strong things and weak things (374a8-b1) and (1)-(b) both shameful and/or ugly and honourable and/or beautiful things (374b1); (2) therefore, whenever a man performs bad things in respect of the body, the man better in body performs *wishingly*, and the man worse *unwishingly* (374b1-3).

As to the evaluative predicate  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{\alpha}$ , Socrates first introduced it coordinately with 'bad', but as subsumed by 'bad' (373e1-2), and continued to arrange it coordinately with 'bad' (373e4-5; cf. 374a3; 374a5). Hippias allowed the possibility that he accepts that 'bad' subsumes it (373e4-5). However, Hippias has not committed himself to a proposition with  $\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}$  (374b1), 'honourable and/or beautiful', and Socrates has not introduced  $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{\alpha}$ , 'shameful and/or ugly', separately from 'bad'. Certainly, Hippias can assume, analogously to 'bad', that 'good' subsumes  $\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ . Hence, Hippias can assume that 'bad' implies 'shameful and/or ugly'; and 'good', 'honourable and/or beautiful'. However, when Socrates introduces the combination of these predicates (374b1) without referring to 'good' or 'bad', Hippias can suspect that Socrates has been inducing him to give affirmation to the proposition with these predicates.

Socrates has not yet introduced the proposition underlying Hippias' inference of the preferability of a man who *wishingly* does a specific bad thing in an area, but he apparently conjectures in detail how Hippias possibly infers that type of conclusion, whether or not Socrates believes the proposition. However, if

Socrates has assumed, as he told Hippias, that he can justify the conclusion provisionally by Hippias' affirmations about a false man, then, although he still does not specify the comparative criterion (374a7, 374b2, b3), he allows the possibility that he believed that an expert in using the body is able to do something either strongly or weakly.

However, it is not necessarily plausible that Socrates can justify this last conclusion by Hippias' affirmations about a false man. Truth-values are not gradable like physical strength; rather, like 'honourable and/or beautiful' and 'shameful and/or ugly', they are normally discrete. If Hippias chooses a degree of speed in running as the criterion of evaluating a runner by applying 'good' and 'bad', Hippias can regard the evaluation of a runner as a matter of degree on that basis. If Hippias bases the application of 'shameful and/or ugly' and 'honourable and/or beautiful' or evaluation by the relative criterion such as speed in running, he has no reason to reject the use of the predicates in comparative form (374a3-4); however, Hippias would commit a fallacy in analogising something normative or rule-following to something relative and gradable<sup>581</sup>. As Guthrie says<sup>582</sup>, this analogy would hold within the limits of relatively gradable things but not between two discretely incompatible things. For example, concerning running, Hippias can grade a variety of particulars by speed. If Hippias maintains the relatively gradable degree in affirming the proposition about actions, he presupposes that agents are capable of doing an action but are differentiated by some relative criterion found in that action.

Answering reluctantly and with qualification by an area, Hippias affirms the

proposition but would not necessarily admit the case about injustice (374b3-4). Since Hippias affirms the proposition generalising the preceding cases about wrestling and running, Socrates can retroactively take Hippias to have admitted the corresponding conclusion for the reason Socrates proposed in his question.

Whether or not Socrates intended to introduce animistic language with organ or soul as subject of an action, Hippias commits himself to the instrumentality of the body as an unanalysed idea in ordinary language, though, *pace* Jantzen<sup>583</sup>, not beyond it. Hence Hippias' commitments to the separation between the subject as user and the body as used pave the way for Socrates' introduction of that language.

Hippias here does not necessarily, as Smith interprets<sup>584</sup>, admit only 'strong and weak' but not 'beautiful and/or honourable and ugly and/or shameful'; as Calogero indicates<sup>585</sup>, Hippias could not reject the latter predicates after previous admissions (373e2, 373e5, 374a6); rather, without clearly understanding Socrates' intention, he would dimly look ahead to the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men.

### **Preferability of a *wishingly* uglily dancing body (374b5-c2)**

Socrates has not yet used language making the whole body, organs or souls into subjects or instruments of actions. Whether we commit ourselves or not to the implication of such animistic language, we can observe such language in ancient Greek and modern tongues.

However, in the context of ascription to an agent, such language, if it has the same qualification as the language with a human being as subject, would be

pointless in our experience. For example, the spatio-temporal limit of ascribable responsibility is not the same as the limit of our body. Considering the almost complete lack of examples of ἐκών and ἄκών with non-human subjects<sup>586</sup> and of examples of organs as subjects of actions, Socrates' phrases of ἐκών and ἄκών with non-human subjects sound odd even if the interlocutors implicitly paraphrase the sentence with a human being as subject.

Therefore, Socrates' justification for introducing animistic language depends on his purpose. We must consider his strategy and the necessity of the order of topics and questions. For, if we omit consideration of animistic language or assume that Socrates thinks that such language can be paraphrased in ordinary language, it would not be necessary for him to arrange his questions and topics in the present order, for the topics and questions in animistic language could be arranged coordinately with others in normal language. Accordingly, when Socrates apparently distances Hippias from normal language and a normative idea associated with a shameful action as an agent's wished object, his rhetoric suggests that he intends to drive Hippias round to the conclusion by distracting Hippias' attention from normal language<sup>587</sup>.

While using 'shameful and/or ugly', Socrates asks whether Hippias *thinks*, in the case of bodily grace, that if the body takes the *ugly* and bad postures in dancing *wishingly*, it is better, and if so *unwishingly*, it is worse (374b5-7). Socrates asks Hippias' opinion without asserting his own. Introducing the proposition analogous to but linguistically different from the latter part of the proposition in his preceding question (374b1-3), without detailing the criterion

of evaluation of dancing postures, Socrates asks whether the same conclusion holds in the case of the body dancing.

Allowed to make clear his opinion, Hippias affirms unreservedly the proposition in Socrates' question in contrast with his preceding reluctance (374b8). Hence, *Hippias* supplies the conditions for that proposition and draws the conclusion.

Socrates asks<sup>588</sup> whether gracelessness ( $\alpha\sigma\chi\eta\mu\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ ) as a body wishes it is derivable from the body's goodness and gracelessness as a body does not wish it is derivable from the body's badness (374b8-c1). This introduces an explanatory proposition on Hippias' affirmation.

A dancer taking an ugly posture may be one whose outward appearance does not please spectators or one who contravenes a norm of dancing. A bad thing a good dancer does *wishingly* may be either unaesthetic or illicit. Hippias and Socrates, therefore, may or may not put the same interpretation on the propositions Socrates embodies in his questions and Hippias accepts. Hippias could give reserved affirmations to either version<sup>589</sup>.

### **Preferability of a *wishingly* mis-tuning voice (374c2-5)**

Socrates asks about Hippias' presupposition on having acquired good things (374c5-6) before the question on limping feet (374c6-d2). This arrangement is explicable, to some degree, if Socrates introduces the proposition with the feet separate from the human subject to elicit below Hippias' affirmation about a soul governing the body.

Why does Socrates arrange the cases about dancing and singing before the

question on having acquired good things and the case of limping feet? The case of a mis-posturing dancing body does not subsume the case of a mis-tuning singing voice or that of limping feet. These three cases are coordinate. Classified, they would fall under the category of going wrong of things we possess (374d6-7), but not under that of mis-perceiving (374d2-374e2). Further, the class including the mis-perceiving senses would be, as Socrates' reference to possession at 374e1-2 suggests, what we possess<sup>590</sup>.

For one thing, miscarrying bodily action in examples such as running and wrestling implies the measure of physical strength. However, the case of posturing deals with making one's body outwardly beautiful.

For another, the characteristic of going wrong differs between these two sections. Simple physical strength normally enables agents to achieve the performance demanding less power, although they may miscarry against their will. Miscarriage in singing or dancing is not based on physical strength (374a8-9) but rather on deviation from trained outward uniformity. But in such a case performers often use animistic language in swearing at their own failure and, literally or not, they often superficially ascribe their failure to the body out of control. Therefore, Socrates has some right to differentiate the two sections in reference to the difference of the use of the body and of the kind of deviation from appropriateness concerned.

Socrates seeks Hippias' opinion of the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-*goers* in the case of a tuning voice (374c2-3). He can anticipate Hippias' affirmation to the proposition following Hippias' commitments to corresponding



conclusions in corresponding questions (373d5-7; 373e6-374a1; 374a1-3; 374a5-6) and Hippias' admission of animistic language.

Choosing unreservedly a voice which mistunes *wishingly*, Hippias would find no reason in preceding affirmations to reject the proposition in this alternative (374c4).

To justify affirmation to the proposition with the equivocal term, 'mis-tune', Hippias must understand the singer's wish to mis-tune. He must understand that a man who conceives what is the right tune for a song and sings a particular wrong melody by deliberately deviating is better at singing in tune than a man who simply fails in singing in tune. However, Hippias might disregard the singer's wish to contravene a norm by attending only to the outward ugliness of the sound.

Socrates asks (374c4) about the inverted comparison with 'inferior', as he asked at 373e6-374a1. Hippias cannot avoid affirmation because of his preceding affirmations at 374c2-4 (374c5). Hence, Hippias allows the possibility that he admits that a *wishingly* wrong-goer in mistuning is clever at going wrong in singing.

### **Having acquired good things (374c5-6)**

Hippias' commitment to preference for having acquired good things shackles him to evaluating non-human subjects according not to wish to follow a rule but to knowledge or ability to follow it.

Asking, 'Then, which would you accept, having acquired good things or bad things<sup>591</sup>?' Socrates makes clear that it is Hippias' choice, and introduces in his first alternative a tautological proposition<sup>592</sup> implying that Hippias approves pos-

session of things he approves. Hence Socrates evidently anticipates that he can refer to things acquirable analogically.

In contrast with Socrates' strategy in introducing a proposition with 'Hippias' as subject of doing a bad thing (cf. e.g. 366c5-367a5), Socrates' animistic language would distract Hippias' attention from a specific ordinary-language proposition.

Hippias has no reason to reject the first alternative insofar as he admits evaluative propositions and leaves open the criterion of good things (374c6). He clearly cannot anticipate Socrates' later using the formulation 'have acquired' in odd animistic language.

#### Having acquired *wishingly* limping feet (374c6-d2)

The verb,  $\chi\omega\lambda\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\omega$ , means 'limp'; it often refers to innate irretrievably disabling deformity or acquired irretrievable mal-function, e.g., by mutilation<sup>591</sup>. Therefore, we can cause our feet to limp by injuring ourselves, but it is medically often practicable for one who *wishingly* became lame to retrieve the ability to walk properly. Socrates could refer not to one pretending to go lame but to one who comes to limp by injuring himself and recovers. Socrates might not envisage a case where one who limps *wishingly* does not actualise his ability on account of something irrelevant to the time-span for recovery (cf. 366c1-3)<sup>592</sup>. Hippias would, as Aristotle remarks<sup>593</sup>, take 'limp *wishingly*' as 'mimic limping' like 'fall *wishingly*' in a wrestle. He would believe that, unless one who limps *wishingly* pretends to limp, he is not able to walk whenever he wishes to.

What Socrates intends to ask at 374c6-7 is inferred as follows.

P1. If Hippias affirms that he would accept having acquired anything, he affirms that it is good.

[374c5-6]

P2. (a) Hippias affirms that he would accept having acquired feet which limp *wishingly* or (b) he affirms that he would accept having acquired feet which limp *unwishingly*.

[Presupposition of question at 374c6-7]

C1. (A) Hippias affirms that feet which limp *wishingly* are good or (B) he affirms that feet which limp *unwishingly* are good.

[(A): instantiation of P1 and P2 (a), modus ponens; (B): instantiation of P1 and P2 (b), modus ponens]

Therefore, while introducing animistic language, Socrates formally asks Hippias' opinion about a proposition similar to those in his preceding concluding questions (373d5-6; 373e6-7; 374a5-6; 374c2-3; cf., 373c7-8; 374a1-2). Accordingly, Hippias allows the possibility that he, supposing that limping is ugly, accepts (1) that personified feet, acknowledging the beauty of walking properly, which contravene beautiful postures, are good at walking properly because they are able both to walk and limp or (2) that a man who limps *wishingly* is better than one who limps *unwishingly*, in respect not of wish to walk properly but of ability to walk and limp.

Hippias unreservedly accepts having acquired feet which limp *wishingly* (374d1). Having accepted similar propositions and admissions of animistic language, he affirms the preferability of *wishingly* limping feet in respect of

capability of walking properly and, in ordinary language, the preferability of a *wishingly* limping man. He might imagine in odd language the preferability of *wishingly* limping personified feet out of their proper subject's control or in ordinary language the preferability of those *wishingly* mimicking limping. Disregarding the morals of mimicking lameness, Hippias could reasonably accept the preferability of a *wishingly* limping man because mimicking limping implies ability to walk. However, he allows the possibility that one who *wishingly* walks improperly is clever at going wrong in walking because he abandoned a developmentally acquired habit of walking properly<sup>596</sup>.

Asking whether limp of the feet is not inferiority and gracelessness (374d1), Socrates refers to Hippias' presupposition in his preceding affirmation in questions in the reverse order to those concerning wrestling at 374a3-4. Referring by 'gracelessness' (374d2; cf. 374b8) to visually negative evaluation associated with organs' malfunction, Socrates may still see some analogy of choosing gracelessness to contravening a norm in Hippias' admission at 374d2, but Hippias would not see a normative association in this word; he accepts limp as gracelessness because of his and the popular association.

Socrates could legitimately ask further about propositions concerning another organ in odd language. Apart from the formal similarity to the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men, Socrates' questions work to distance Hippias from the conclusion about injustice and so to distract Hippias' attention from an analogy of wish to walk improperly with wish to do injustice towards evaluation of bodily ugliness.

### Having acquired *wishingly* dimly viewing eyes (374d2-6)

Socrates conducively asks whether dim sight is not the condition for a conclusion about the eyes like that about feet (374d2-3). Hippias unreservedly affirms so (374d3). In respect of dim sight, Hippias cannot affirm that he would accept having acquired such eyes.

Socrates asks about the preferability of having acquired and *living with* the eyes with which one views dimly and experiences illusion *wishingly* (374d3-5). It is questionable from our viewpoint how one can mimic viewing dimly or how one can retrieve an optical function which one caused to halt. However, Socrates can anticipate Hippias' affirmation because Hippias (1) accepted dimness as badness of the eyes and (2) affirmed the similar proposition about feet. Although Socrates did not refer to a human subject, if Hippias affirms the proposition with a human subject, he retroactively allows the possibility that he accepts the proposition with a human subject about the feet too and that he will accept such propositions again.

Further, Socrates did not first refer to experiencing illusion as inferiority of the eyes (374d2-3), but he adds experiencing illusion (374d5). If Hippias affirms, he allows retroactively the possibility that he accepts that experiencing illusion is inferiority (cf. 373e1-2 and 374b1). Therefore, Socrates can look ahead to (a)<sup>597</sup> the analogy of living with organs (374d4) to keeping in partnership with tools (374e3), (b) the analogy of illusion of the eyes with that of other senses and with errors of subjects and (c) the analogy of a possible wish to experience illusion with wish to do injustice in respect of error.

Choosing unreservedly the eyes with which a man views improperly *wishingly*, Hippias committed himself to the preferability of a *wishingly* improper viewer (374d5-6). Therefore, Hippias allows the possibilities that (1) he takes ability to view properly as the criterion, (2) retroactively, he admits the preferability of a *wishingly* limping man in respect of ability to walk properly, and (3) he admits that a man who *wishingly* goes wrong in viewing badly is clever at going wrong about viewing. Socrates would now have come to look ahead more clearly to analogies (a) and (b) above in reference to Hippias' affirmed propositions using ἀσχημοσύνη (374b8; 374d2) and ἀπάδουσαν (374c3). 5

#### **Having acquired organs which do bad things *wishingly* (374d6-e2)**

Socrates arranges the case of having acquired one's own organs before that of keeping in partnership with an instrument. Does Hippias find any necessary relationship between these cases? Is there any reason why Socrates necessarily set the question about sense organs before that about instruments?

Concerning the relationship between the question about instruments (374e3-375a1) and that about an animal's soul (375a1-7), Hippias later might find some positive reason for Socrates' ordering of questions, in that each treats a human being's possession of independent objects and controlling them as instruments. Therefore, considering Socrates' further transition from the question about having acquired an animal's soul to that about having acquired a person's soul (375a7-c3), Hippias later could find Socrates' plot in the order of the three subjects. However, what could Hippias later understand that Socrates intends

by arranging the question about sense organs before that about instruments in general?

Is the preferability of *wishingly* erring sense organs sufficient or necessary for that of *wishingly* erring instruments? First, 'the sense organs which do a bad thing *wishingly*' is animistic language but 'those having acquired or keeping partnership with instruments and wrongly manipulating the instruments *wishingly*' is normal language. Secondly, having acquired sense organs is not keeping partnership with instruments. Certainly, ordinary ideas of sense organs involve instrumentality. But the preferability of sense organs is not sufficient for the preferability of instruments.

Then, is the former necessary for the latter? Organs are analogous to instruments. Some miscarriage of organs would be necessary for wrongly manipulating instruments. However, if we apply having acquired the instruments to the case of having acquired organs, we enlarge the usage of 'having acquired' in that we cannot separate our sense organs from ourselves. Even if we *conceptually* separate off our sense organs, it is dubious whether the organ itself is a subject of an action. Moreover, it is questionable whether we can manipulate our sense organs since perception does not stand without something external given. As Smith suggests<sup>598</sup>, Socrates would appear to Hippias later to have tried to shackle him to the conclusion by his preceding admissions of analogous propositions, especially, by re-approximating to a sentence with a soul (which governs the body) as subject.

Neither is Socrates' question on sense organs coordinate with his question on

instruments; nor are these questions subsumed by his question on having acquired an animal's soul; for the meaning of 'having acquired' in the case of instruments is closer to that in the case of having acquired an animal's soul because of the contiguity of the matter referred to. The possibility is, rather, that the case of having acquired sense organs is subsumed by the case of having acquired a human being's soul.

If the question of sense organs is not coordinate with the question of instruments, the analogy would stand between two kinds of having acquired good things: having acquired any sense organ which goes wrong *wishingly* and having acquired any instrument with which a worker does a bad thing *wishingly*, if Hippias understands a sense organ as a kind of instrument as in circulating animistic language. Socrates does not regard normal instruments as agents of actions; rather, in this regard, the analogy would stand between the cases of having acquired a sense organ and having acquired an animal's or a human being's soul.

As to the arrangement of the examples, after Hippias commits himself to accepting having acquired good things, Socrates takes up, as the preferable object to have acquired, i.e., to live with, *wishingly* limping feet, *wishingly* improperly viewing eyes and *wishingly* mis-perceiving sense organs. These are coordinate, but the degree of receptiveness of perception is problematic. We can imagine the dimness of senses but we have difficulty in finding what we counts as an error of the perception concerned. The cases Socrates enumerates are not necessarily acceptable. If Hippias commits himself to the possibility of causing



oneself to mis-step, mis-look, mis-hearken, mis-smell, or mis-taste, he would pass gradually from the observer's standpoint for evaluating the outward appearance of an agent to an agent's standpoint for evaluating the capability of a controlled object.

Socrates asks about Hippias' supposition about his own organs in his preceding affirmations at 374c5-d6 without specifying the criterion of preferability (374d6-7); however, he refers to the proposition presupposed in Hippias' preceding affirmations. Hence he can take Hippias to take a subject's ability but not wish as the criterion; further, he may anticipate Hippias' affirmation.

Hippias affirms but with similar qualification, avoiding any generalisation, on the area in which the proposition holds (374d7), as at 367d3 and 374a1. Unable to answer, 'No,' following his preceding acceptance, he might foresee Socrates' sophisticated way, his unreasonable generalisation, or some analogy he dislikes.

Socrates introduces a general proposition into his question<sup>599</sup> at 374d8-e2. He explains the reasons for the preferability of organs which do bad things (374d3) *wishingly* but does not specify the criterion of goodness (cf. 374b8-c1; 374a7-b3), whether a subject's wish or ability. He can anticipate Hippias' affirmation because he generalises Hippias' preceding affirmation. Hippias' affirmation at 374e2 by an explicit performative enables Socrates to assume, although it is open to question how an agent controls his sense, that *Hippias* admits generalising his preceding affirmations.

**Partnership with tools by which a man *wishingly* does a bad thing in**

**respect of their appointed purpose (374e3-375a1)**

Socrates refers to general preference for having partnership with tools (374e3-4) and having acquired an animal's soul (375a1-2) instead of referring to Hippias' preference for having acquired something (cf. 374d5-6)<sup>600</sup>. How does Socrates arrange his questions for Hippias to commit himself to the proposition that in any given area, *it is better to have acquired* an animal's soul which goes wrong and with which we perform wrongly *wishingly* (375a1-7), paraphrased into the propositional type: 'in any given area, it is better to have acquired the soul of x which goes wrong and with which we *wishingly* perform wrongly, i.e., a good soul of x'?

What he wants Hippias to accept prior to the case of an animal's soul seems to be the proposition that for every instrument, in any given area, it is better to keep partnership with an instrument with which we *wishingly* do wrongly the thing appropriate to the instrument or manipulate the thing subordinated by the instrument, paraphrased into the propositional type: 'in any given area, it is better to have acquired x with which we do *wishingly* wrongly the thing appropriate to x or manipulate the thing subordinated by x, i.e., a good x'. Hence, on the relationship between the generalised conclusions which Socrates asks Hippias to confirm in those two stages, Hippias would find, despite the different logical structure, an analogy of steering a ship with <sup>a</sup>riding a horse in respect of controlling something. Therefore, Hippias possibly takes Socrates to suppose that what stands concerning instruments in general also stands concerning the animal's soul as an instrument. If Hippias admits the analogy of tools to an

animal's soul in instrumentality, Hippias could accept Socrates' transition.

After the general concluding question (374e3-4), Socrates enumerates examples. He will reenumerate those of shooting an arrow and playing the flute in the section on having acquired a human being's soul. This reenumeration indicates that Socrates does not implement a simple induction by enumerating co-ordinate samples irrespective of his animistic language. Rather, in analogical transition between topics, he would be seeking progressive stages to the final conclusion probably by dissolving gradually the difference between a subject and its instrument, once posited in animistic language<sup>601</sup>.

Socrates asks (374e3-5) a question similar to his question about having acquired an organ. Assuming Hippias believes it is good to keep in partnership with a good thing, Socrates asks about the preferability of the partnership with an instrument with which a man *wishingly* does a bad thing in respect of what it is for. Hippias probably takes as the criterion the tools' capability of having a user able to manipulate them rightly. Hence, when Socrates takes a rudder as example (374e4-5), Hippias chooses one in respect not of the user's ability but of the rudder's own capability (374e5). Hence Hippias allows the possibility (1) that he generalises his affirmation from this exemplary case, (2) that he evaluates a user of an instrument in respect of a use appropriate to some purpose which the instrument is for, and (3) he assumes, on the basis of past commitments, that a man who uses an instrument badly *wishingly* conceives the appropriate way and deviates from it.

Without describing a user's specific abuse of an instrument, Socrates asks

Hippias to reconfirm the generalised proposition about partnership with an instrument (374e5-6). Affirming unreservedly (375a1), Hippias endorses the above possibility.

But, saying, 'You are right' (375a1), Hippias ascribes responsibility for the proposition to Socrates. Since Socrates introduced a conducive interrogation, Hippias has some right to assume colloquially that Socrates indirectly asserted in interrogative form (cf. 364b1; 364d7; 376b7). It is risky to generalise Hippias' supposition, but it is too trivial to arrest attention that whenever Hippias answers Socrates' question, he always refers to what he regards as the proposition which Socrates introduces into his question, whether he rejects or accepts the proposition or neither (cf. 374a3). Whether or not Socrates believes the proposition he introduces, Socrates does not give in his questions any distinctive mark by which he lets Hippias know what proposition Socrates believes. However, Hippias might perhaps assume that Socrates induces him to agree to what Socrates believes, not only after Socrates apparently professed (372c8-e6) that he believed the preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers but also if Hippias looks ahead to Socrates' push to the general conclusion.

**Having acquired a soul of an animal with which a man *wishingly* does a bad thing in respect of its appointed purpose (375a1-375a7)**

How does Socrates arrange his questions for Hippias to reach the intended conclusion that in any given area of sciences or arts, it is better to have acquired a soul which does a bad thing *wishingly*, i.e., *a good soul* (375a7-9)? The preceding case of having acquired some animal's soul has a grammar close to

the next case of having acquired a person's soul. However, compared with the latter, the former concerning controlling animals does not include the whole area of sciences or arts. Moreover, these two neighbouring stages refer to 'having acquired a soul' in different senses. It means controlling a soul something separate in the former; it means ambiguously, in the latter, hiring or becoming a man occupied about a skill or science. Thus the transition between the stages is not logically necessary but is a kind of analogy. Therefore, Hippias could not find how Socrates arranges the two cases except for shared introduction of a soul, but Hippias later possibly takes Socrates to have tried to elicit his commitment to the proposition in the former to push him to the proposition in the latter.

Socrates asks a question analogous to those about having acquired an organ at 374c6-7; 374d8-e2; especially 374d3-5 and that about keeping partnership with an instrument at 374e3-4 (375a1-2). He asks about the preferability of having acquired the soul of a horse with which a man will ride badly *wishingly*. Hippias affirms that it is better to have acquired such a soul of a horse (375a2-3).

In introducing a soul of a horse, Socrates does not specify the criterion of a bad thing in riding a horse or explain his view of the relation between the soul and that which has it; neither will he ask further about the conditions for a particular relation. Unlike the case of an organ or an instrument, Socrates formulates his question by introducing the division of the controlled thing into two subjects, a horse and its soul.

Socrates may now (375a3) anticipate Hippias' commitment to the preferability

of a soul of a horse with which a man will ride badly *wishingly* in respect of the soul's capability of what Hippias regards as having the man riding well. Hence, he might utter this speech like a statement, but in what Socrates regards as examination, he has shown Hippias that he is asking about Hippias' opinion. Therefore, at least, pace Burnet, Socrates asks Hippias to confirm that his preceding commitment implies the proposition<sup>602</sup>, and Hippias affirms (375a3).

Socrates asks Hippias to confirm that the similar type of conclusion holds true by using a similar interrogative form in animistic language (375a3-5)<sup>603</sup>; another point would be whether Hippias admits the relation between what he regards as a man's doing a bad thing and the work of the soul. As Jantzen shows<sup>604</sup>, only a good soul of a horse enables a rider to do badly *wishingly*.

To justify his intense affirmation (375a6), Hippias has to interpret that the formulation in Socrates' question means that if a man has acquired a good soul, then, if he does the soul's work badly, he does it *wishingly* and if a bad soul, if he does it badly, he does so *unwishingly*. Hippias allows the possibility that he believes (1) that in an area of having acquired a soul of an animal, he would accept a good soul of an animal and (2) that if a man has acquired a good soul of an animal, he does the work of the soul of an animal well and (3) that if a man has acquired a good soul of an animal, if he does the work of the soul of an animal badly, he does so *wishingly*. Therefore, irrespective of the descriptive condition of the predicate, 'bad', Socrates has some prospect of Hippias' affirmation about a man's soul.

Socrates asks whether Hippias generalises the preceding affirmation to the

case of a soul of an animal in general (375a6-7). Hippias accepts (375a7). Hence, Socrates can generalise Hippias' implication at 375a6.

**Having acquired a human being's soul as one's instrument which, occupied with a skill or science, goes wrong *wishingly* (375a7-375c3)**

In 375a7 ff., Socrates directly uses the proposition type that in a certain area it is better to have acquired the soul which *wishingly* does a bad thing in the area. Further he deals with the case of having acquired the slave's soul which performs in any given area.

As Jantzen suggests<sup>605</sup>, unlike the preceding meaning of 'having acquired', there is no technically inner relationship between the owner and the owned soul occupied with a skill or science like that between a rider and a horse. Ovink<sup>606</sup> and Hunziker<sup>607</sup> interpret Socrates' 'having acquired' as 'hiring', but the meaning depends on Hippias' interpretation. Socrates' point here is an idea of a soul as an instrument<sup>608</sup>.

Socrates arranges the example of having acquired slaves' souls (375c3-6) in contrast with having acquired a soul occupied in each art or science, which invites Hippias' reserved answer at 375c3. Socrates shows in the case of a soul in general in sciences or arts that in any given area, it is good to have acquired a good soul in the area and that in any given area, a good soul is one which goes wrong in the area *wishingly*. But Socrates intends to show in the case of slaves' souls that in any given area, if we have acquired a slave's soul as our instrument, *we would accept having acquired* the soul which goes wrong *wishingly*. Socrates intends thus to corroborate the next stage's conclusion by appealing to

the case of having acquired our own soul.

Socrates asks about the preferability of having acquired a bowman's soul which misses the mark *wishingly* (375a7-b1). He may also be asking, specifically, whether it is better to miss *wishingly* than to miss *unwishingly*. Hippias must answer consistently with preceding admissions which soul is better at archery, one which does a bad thing *wishingly* or one which does it *unwishingly*.

In introducing the action of missing, Socrates can assume that if Hippias affirms the case of a bowman's soul, Hippias is ready to analogise the model of missing as going wrong ( $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ ) to another case.

Therefore, if Hippias does not query the analogy by indicating its limits in his preceding affirmations in respect of the relation between a man and what he has acquired, he leaves open the possibility that he believes that a man who goes wrong *wishingly* is good at things he goes wrong about. Socrates might believe that Hippias has understood by a man who goes wrong *wishingly* in an area not an expert in the area but a man who does a bad thing *wishingly* because of his cleverness at doing a bad thing about subjects concerned, if he believes that Hippias commits himself to an agent's wish to go wrong in each area in the preceding analogies (373c6-375a7).

In affirming unreservedly (375b1), Hippias keeps consistency probably by accepting the preferability of a man who misses the mark *wishingly* as about runners and wrestlers.

However, he does not query the limits of the analogy presupposed by these



affirmations. Hence, Hippias allows the possibility that he believes what the analogy and the model of missing the mark imply.

In the second question in a series as at 375a3 (375b2), Socrates asks about the preferability, in archery, of a soul missing the mark *wishingly*.

Socrates has left Hippias to imagine what is badness in an area of having acquired an organ or a soul of an animal or keeping in partnership with an instrument and what is the criterion of evaluating something which does that bad thing *wishingly*; however, Socrates specifies that criterion in the case of a bowman's soul, apart from his question about using the body in general (374a7-b3; especially, 374a7-b1; 374a5-6).

Hippias keeps consistency in his unreserved affirmation (375b2), understanding that a bowman who misses the mark *wishingly* is better at archery than one who does so *unwishingly*. However, when he affirms Socrates' formulation, he allows the possibility that he analogises his criterion of comparison of a bowman who misses the mark to his tacit criteria elsewhere. Further, whether or not Hippias would affirm that a bowman's wish to miss is analogous to an agent's wish to go wrong in contravening a norm, he affirms the proposition approximate *in locution* to the conclusion that a soul which goes wrong ( $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ ) *wishingly* is better than one which does so *unwishingly*.

Socrates at 375b3-4 introduces the formulation which Hippias can interpret as the proposition (a) that a soul of a bowman which misses the mark *unwishingly* is worse than one which does it *wishingly* in respect of archery or as the proposition (b) that a soul which goes wrong *unwishingly* is worse in its

wish to obey a norm than one which goes wrong *wishingly*<sup>609</sup>. Socrates would appear to Hippias to be palming off what Hippias regards as a wrong view (b) on him.

Hippias makes clear that he commits himself to proposition (a) but not to (b) (375b4) and suggests that he inhibits Socrates from generalising his affirmation. However, since Hippias affirms (a), Socrates can assume, specifying explicitly the criterion of the comparison, that Hippias is ready to affirm that a soul which *wishingly* does a bad thing in doing something specific in an area is better in respect of knowledge and/or ability in the area than a soul which does it *unwishingly*. If Socrates supposes that Hippias assumes that a wrongdoer is not only about archery but about any other subject, as he suggested about a false man, Hippias offers the possibility that he admits that a *wishingly* bad man occupied about a subject is better in respect of cleverness at doing a bad thing about the area than an *unwishing* bad man.

Without referring to a soul of a man reliable in medicine, Socrates asks Hippias to confirm on his preceding affirmations that a soul which does *wishingly* what Hippias supposes as a bad thing concerning medicine is good in respect of ability and/or knowledge in medicine. Socrates does not introduce the word, 'go wrong' here but introduces the phrase, 'perform bad things', which Hippias introduced in listing criminal descriptions (372a1). This phrase as well as 'go wrong' echoed as 'do wrong' to Hippias as it did in Socrates' preceding questions (373e6-374a1; 374e1; 374e4). Socrates does not disclose what he intended by the formulation in his preceding question, but while making

unmistakable the criterion of the comparison which Socrates believes Hippias has presupposed in his preceding affirmations, he asks about what Hippias' affirmation implies in medicine (375b4-5).

Hippias unreservedly affirms that in medicine, a soul which does a bad thing to bodies *wishingly* has more knowledge and/or ability in healing bodies than a soul which does so *unwishingly*, whether or not he refers to the soul which disregards a norm in healing patients (375b6). Socrates can now introduce into his question the phrase, 'perform bad things', associable with 'do injustice'.

Without referring to the soul as a physician's soul, Socrates invertedly asks<sup>610</sup> whether Hippias substitutes the word, 'better' for the phrase, 'skilled in medicine' (375b6-7). In introducing the word, 'skill', of medicine, Socrates can expect Hippias' generalisation of the case of archery and medicine to the case of skills and knowledges in general because it is a permissible induction and because Hippias allowed generalisation (374a7-b4, 374d6-7, 374d8-e2, 374e3-375a1, 375a6-8).

Hippias confirms the implication of his preceding affirmation (375b7). Hence he leaves the possibility that he assumes (1) that his criterion of comparison about a soul which does a bad thing *wishingly* in the area of a skill is an ability and/or knowledge in the skill which does not imply acquisition of a disposition to obey the norm prescribed in the profession *or* (2) that his criterion is cleverness at going wrong about a skill concerned because the soul abandoned the disposition to obey the norm and practised doing improperly.

Socrates at 375b7-c3 asks a concluding question like the preceding ones

(373e4-5; 374a7-b4; 374b5-7), about having acquired a soul occupied with a skill or science. He leaves open the possibility that he is asking in normal language, *without referring to a professional*, whether or not an expert in a subject goes wrong *wishingly* while a non-expert in it goes wrong *unwishingly*. Therefore, in his conducive question, Socrates may fairly expect that Hippias applies his affirmation given to those preceding similar questions to the present case, insofar as he assumes that Hippias has referred not to the preferability of an expert professional soul to a non-expert non-professional soul but the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers occupied about a subject concerned. While specifying both the domain of discourse as skills and knowledges and the criterion of comparison as ability and/or knowledge in a specific area, Socrates introduces not only the predicates, 'perform bad things' which echoes as 'do wrong' to Hippias and 'performs ugly and/or shameful things', but also the predicate, 'go wrong' (ἐξάμαρτάνει) meaning either 'do wrong' or 'err'. Hippias allows the possibility that he admits Socrates' introduction of the predicates, 'perform bad things' and 'perform shameful and/or ugly things'; for Hippias, although resistingly, committed himself to substituting 'perform bad and shameful and/or ugly things' for 'do something badly' in the case of a runner (373e1-2) and admitted Socrates' introduction of 'perform bad things' in that of medicine (375b4-6; cf. 374d7, 374e1).

However, Socrates has not introduced 'go wrong' (ἐξάμαρτάνει), explicitly anywhere since he introduced it into his reformulation of his view opposed to Hippias' (372e2) and the synonymous verb at the beginning of his

examination (373c8). Socrates is motivated to introduce this word in order to induce Hippias to reach the conclusion that those who go wrong *wishingly* are better than those who go wrong *unwishingly*.

However, it is a subtle question whether Socrates has enough reason for expecting Hippias to admit ἐξ αμαρτάνειν. On one hand, since ἐξ αμαρτάνειν and ἀμαρτάνειν are almost indistinguishable in general, Socrates might have supposed Hippias ready to affirm that doing a bad thing in any other preceding case as well as an exemplary case of dancing or tuning is a kind of going wrong, as he indicated at 373c8 and, so, that doing a bad thing is going wrong in any area. However, Socrates has not asked Hippias to generalise what Hippias regarded as doing a bad thing to going wrong since the examination began. On the other hand, Hippias affirmed Socrates' introduction of ἀμαρτάνειν in the meaning of a bowman's missing the mark, in the present speeches about a skill and a knowledge. Socrates may conjecture that Hippias would admit ἐξ αμαρτάνειν in the sense analogisable to a bowman's missing. However, Hippias suggested that his affirmation about a bowman should not be generalised (375b4).

If Hippias has some reason for his unassertive affirmation (375c3)<sup>611</sup> anyhow, he must supply the condition, 'if the soul performs bad and shameful and/or ugly things and goes wrong'. He cannot object to the missing condition because he gave affirmation to the same proposition type before (373e4-5; 374b5-8).

If Hippias assumes that Socrates has been talking about the case (a) that what an agent does in a specific area is consistently wrong, whether or not the agent

believes it to be wrong, but not the case (b) that a wrongdoer occupied about a subject concerned *wishingly* goes wrong in that area and if he understands that Socrates, introducing ἐξάμαρτάνειν refers to what Socrates formulated as the object of Socrates' present examination (373c6-8; 372e2-3), he could object to Socrates' deviating from consistency in locution bit by bit. However, because of his previous affirmation of the same proposition type, he may be not only admitting the introduction of ἐξάμαρτάνειν and ἄμαρτάνειν but also affirming the proposition approximate to the object of Socrates' examination as follows: in any area of knowledge and skill, a soul which goes wrong *wishingly* is better at things which it goes wrong about than one which does so *unwishingly*.

**Having acquired slaves' souls as one's instrument which both go wrong and do wrong *wishingly* (375c3-6)**

Socrates appears to Hippias to be trying to induce him to affirm the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-doers by changing the subject-matter from the soul of a man occupied about a science or skill through the slave's soul occupied about it to our own soul.

Socrates indirectly asks Hippias to withdraw his unassertiveness in his affirmation at 375c3. He refers to a case which he supposes that Hippias' preceding affirmation indicates holds true certainly, but weakens the assertiveness of his supposition. Hence, Socrates' speech works as an indirect question<sup>612</sup>.

On Hippias' presupposition that it is good to have acquired a soul expert in a skill or science (375a7-c3), Socrates asks him to confirm the conclusion in the area of having acquired a slave's soul in the meaning of using a slave as an

instrument<sup>613</sup>, in spite of Hippias' weakening assertiveness in his conclusion about having acquired *a wishingly wrong-going soul in any area of a craft or science*. Socrates, using the first person plural, refers to the proposition that we would accept having acquired the slaves' souls who *wishingly* go wrong and do a bad thing (κακουργούσας) in a science or skill because they are more skilled.

Hippias unreservedly affirms the preceding conclusion in the case of having acquired slaves' souls (375c6), but when he admits Socrates' introduction of 'morally or non-morally go wrong' and 'do a morally or non-morally bad thing' (κακουργεῖν; cf. 365e8-9, 373b5)<sup>614</sup>, Socrates can come close to what he has intended to introduce into his question.

**Having acquired one's own soul which both does a bad thing and goes wrong wishingly (375c6-d2)**

Socrates omits the phrase indicating the area in which the proposition stands both in the opening formulation (373c7-8) and the final formulation at the end of the series of examples (375d1-2), as in the opening and conclusion of the examination about a false man (365c3-4, 369b3-4; see also 366a5-6, but 367c7-d2).

This might be strong evidence that Socrates commits the fallacy of *de dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*<sup>615</sup> or that he wrongly applies the case which stands in sciences and crafts to morality. However, Socrates might use the question with implicit qualification of the area. Hence, Socrates' apparent fallacy depends on Hippias' interpretation of Socrates' question. The fallacy of the

wrong transition from crafts to morality, or the wrong substitution of goodness as an end in itself for goodness as a means depends on Hippias; for Socrates (1) does not make clear whether 'go wrong' or 'do a bad thing' is used in a moral or criminal sense, (2) may refer to doing a bad thing in the preceding cases in relation to an achievement sense of injustice, whether criminal or not, (3) in reference to false men's or Homer's Achilles' falsifying, refers to no distinction between 'bad as a means' and 'bad as an end' or 'good as a means or an end in a situation' and 'good as an end in itself' and (4) allows the possibility that 'goodness' (370e3, 374c1) functionally belongs to a group of 'falsity' (370e2), 'truth' (370e3), and 'badness' (374c1).

In asking conducively about the preferability of possessing our own soul as good as possible (375c6-7), Socrates appeals to the same commonsense as is presupposed in Hippias' affirmation that he would accept having acquired good things (374c5-6). He does not specify the descriptive condition of the evaluative word, 'good', here, as he did in the case of a soul in the area of a skill and a knowledge (375b2, 375b4-5, 375b7-c3). Socrates does not necessarily commit himself to the proposition that we would accept having acquired slaves' souls which are good at a skill or science; however, since Hippias committed himself to this proposition (375c6), Socrates might appeal either to a fortiori argument that if we would prefer to possess technically good slaves' souls, we would even more prefer to possess good souls of our own or to Hippias' commitment to approval of having acquired our own organs which do bad things *wishingly* (374d5-6)<sup>616</sup>.



Hippias unreservedly affirms (375d1), but might not understand whether Socrates applies 'good' by the criterion of a soul's knowledge of following a norm or by that of a soul's wish to follow it. Whichever way Hippias interprets, what he regards as the proposition in Socrates' question would be obvious to him insofar as he affirms the common sense, as at 374c5-6, that we would accept having acquired a good thing. Apart from Socrates' criterion of 'good', Hippias is forced by his commitment to (a) instrumental interpretation of what he possesses, (b) ambivalence of ability<sup>617</sup>, and (c) respect for abilities.

In asking about the preferability of a *wishingly* bad and wrong-going soul in the case of our own soul (375d1-2), Socrates does not make clear whether he refers to a criminally bad thing or specify the preferential criterion. If Hippias later knows what Socrates reargues for (375d7ff), he might take Socrates to have asked here, as at 371e4-5 and 371e7-8 (see pp. 214-216, 221-223), about the preferability of a man who both morally does wrong and morally goes wrong *wishingly* in respect of expertise in things about which he does so. Further, if Hippias later relied on Socrates' remark at 375d5, he might take Socrates to have taken here his inductive step prior to asking again about the preferability of *wishingly* to *unwishingly* unjust men; he could take Socrates to have, as before, regarded as the criterion not wish to obey justice but cleverness at achieving justice and injustice about the subjects concerned.

Hippias denies the proposition he thinks Socrates introduced into his question or looked as if he was going to introduce next; he explains that the proposition's implications would be absurd (375d3-4)<sup>618</sup>. Hippias understands that Socrates

introduced or was about to introduce and was inducing him to affirm the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-*doers* in the case of our souls. Then, Hippias would anticipate again that if he affirms, Socrates would understand him to imply the preferability of *wishingly* to *unwishingly* unjust men in respect of wish to do right. Therefore, Hippias would deny what he regards as Socrates' proposition. However, Hippias repeatedly does not specify whether he accepts the preferability of a *wishingly* unjust man in respect of expertise in a subject in which he does injustice or cleverness at achieving injustice about subjects concerned or whether he prefers an agent's wish to an agent's ability as the criterion of preferability on injustice. Hippias still leaves his attitude open, but to keep consistency, he must distinguish (1) a clever man who, occupied about subjects concerned, does wrong by disregarding a norm concerned from (2) an expert who consistently goes wrong irrespective of his moral intention.

Socrates expounds *neither* what proposition he would have introduced if Hippias had accepted the proposition introduced into his preceding question at 375d1-2 *nor* in what respect he introduced the preferability of *wishingly* bad and wrong-*going* souls (375d5). Socrates does not confirm Hippias' reason for denying the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men. How can Socrates reasonably suggest that Hippias should properly accept the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men according to his previous commitment?

As it may seem to Hippias, Socrates might have been inducing Hippias only to affirm publicly, despite his consistent denials, but not to see reasonably, the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men in respect of their wish to do justice, if

Socrates admits that this preferability is self-contradictory.

However, since Hippias referred to a man who achieves the wrong he wishes to do (371e9-372a5), he allowed the possibilities (a) that criminally described actions can be the object of an agent's wish and so, (b) that one can be clever at achieving justice or injustice. Consequently, Socrates may fairly take Hippias to be ready to admit that *wishingly* unjust men are preferable in respect of that cleverness. Therefore, Socrates could have been trying to induce Hippias to take that cleverness as the criterion of the preferability.

Indeed, Socrates has left Hippias to understand what proposition Socrates means by his formulations about the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers in each area (373c6-375c6); especially, as to the criterion, Socrates has not resolved the priority of an agent's expertise to an agent's wish to do properly. Further, Hippias has allowed the possibility that he prefers the criterion of an agent's expertise or cleverness, only in the case of non-criminally described actions; Socrates clearly refers to an agent's ability and expertise as the criterion at 374a8, 375b2, 375b7-8, and 375c6.

However, although Hippias has affirmed preferabilities without specific criterion, Socrates suggested (373b7; 372e3-6; 371e7-8), and Hippias perhaps still does not believe, that Hippias should properly take cleverness at achieving injustice as the criterion of the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men. Thus Socrates can perform a reasonable induction, but Hippias could again take Socrates sophistically to be trying to supply Hippias' criterion.

Hippias denies Socrates' suggestion that Hippias should properly accept the

preferability of *wishingly* unjust men following his previous commitment (375d6). Hippias might believe that whatever different formulations Socrates introduced into questions, he himself is consistent in denying the preferability of *wishingly* to *unwishingly* unjust men in respect of wish to do justice and in accepting the preferability of *wishing* to *unwishing* wrong-goers in respect of expertise in areas where they consistently go wrong, whether or not they wish to *go wrong*.

Despite Hippias' repeated denial (375d3-4; 375d6), Socrates still shows that he has expected Hippias to accept the conclusion from his previous commitments<sup>619</sup>. If Socrates believes that Hippias and he would not take the preferability of a *wishingly* unjust man in respect of wish to do justice because it is self-contradictory, then how could Socrates believe, without having referred to any criminally described actions at 373c6-375c6, that Hippias should take that preferability in respect of expertise in justice or cleverness at doing both justice and injustice? Socrates, certainly, has referred to a *wishingly* bad and wrong-going man occupied about a skill or science or developmentally acquired habit but not to a *wishing* criminal. Then, how could Socrates believe that Hippias should analogise the cases of wrong-goers about non-criminally described cases to the case of wrong-doers closely connected to criminals for Hippias (371e9-372a5)? Socrates might, as some interpret<sup>620</sup>, assume his usual analogy of crafts to morality, whether it is his elenctic stratagem or his belief. Certainly, we have some reason to interpret that Socrates would believe the analogy because he may appeal to it in his concluding questions about a false man (368e1-369b7); although Hippias at 371e7-8 might take Socrates to have referred to moral cases

consistently.

However, Socrates does not explicitly mention the distinction between morality and sciences or crafts. Admittedly, he refers under others' responsibility to goodness in general (370e3) or Homeric heroes' goodness (363b3-4, 364b4-5, 364d7), but he does not propose the distinction of moral from technical goodness. Socrates commits himself only to the goodness of speech (364b1, 364d7) and the goodness of his conversational habit (372b2, 372c3, cf. 373a1, 373a5). Rather, Socrates, demanding the examination of all skills and sciences<sup>619</sup> (368a8-b1; 375b8-c1), appears to Hippias not to care about the conceptual division (368e5-369a1). Hence, Socrates does not necessarily presuppose it; neither does he propose, on this presupposition, that what holds in all crafts and sciences holds in morality.

Further, Socrates does not explicitly commit himself to the craft-analogy. He takes the initiative of introducing the topics about a science or skill, but introduces them in examining Hippias' opinion (366c5-369b7; 373c6-375c5). Hippias' preceding commitments pave the way for Socrates' introduction (365e10-366a1; 372e3-6) and Hippias admits them.

If Socrates implicitly introduced his usual doctrine, that would render problematic the consistency of Socratic ethics in relation to the interpretation of Socrates' final remark on 'No one does wrong voluntarily' (376b5-6)<sup>620</sup>. Specifically, if Socrates believed that some or all of the propositions holding about all or some crafts also hold concerning morality and if he believed that a craftsman's ambivalent ability to do properly or improperly in his craft holds in

morality, Socrates would face the conclusion that a just man has the ability to do justice or injustice. If the meaning of 'ability' does not imply 'having acquired the disposition to do properly', the argument is intact, but raises the question in what sense both a craftsman and a morally good man *is able to* do improperly in each area. Further, if Socrates supposed the existence of *wishing* wrong-goers in crafts, he would face the existence of *wishingly* unjust men. Therefore, if he accepted the preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers in the case of crafts, he would confront the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men in respect of justice as a knowledge. Accordingly, he would confront its presupposition that a *wishingly* unjust man is 'just', i.e., expert in justice and an *unwishingly* unjust man is 'unjust', i.e., non-expert in justice. If Socrates rejected this consequence of the craft-analogy, he would have to reject the whole analogy or exclude the ambivalent ability from the shared characteristics, as Penner does<sup>623</sup>.

In my opinion, it is not Socrates but Hippias who is forced by his commitments to accept both the division of the two areas and their analogy; Socrates, so far as this conversation goes, may or may not believe them. Hippias does not make explicit what morality is, but Hippias commits himself to his and Homer's Achilles' practical principle. Socrates does not commit himself to the proposition that justice is a knowledge, but he has a right to assume, on Hippias' boast of polymathy (see p. 296), that Hippias believes it. Further, Hippias suggests that falsity is an achievement about subjects concerned (365d7-8; 365e10-366a1) and lists falsifying coordinately with doing injustice (371e9-372a5). Therefore, neither Socrates nor Hippias commits himself to the craft-analogy, but Socrates

may fairly ask Hippias to appeal to it as the potential implication of Hippias' commitments; Hippias, though, appears to Socrates to reject the analogy indirectly (369b3-7; 371e9-372a5; 375d3-4; 375d6).

If Socrates does not ask Hippias to appeal to the analogy of craft to justice, Socrates might ask Hippias to appeal to a logical implication between the preceding cases in a craft or science and a case in justice. Socrates has referred to no judicially penalised crime at 373c6-375c5, but might suppose that Hippias has committed himself to the proposition about an agent's wish to do injustice in going wrong about each subject. He might have listed 'doing injustice' coordinately with 'going wrong' (372d3-7) in proportion as Hippias arranged 'doing bad things' coordinately with 'doing injustice' (371e9-372a5); hence, after referring to the cases which he categorises as wrong-going (372e2-3; 373c7-8), he might have referred to the cases co-ordinate with judicially penalised crimes including lying. Certainly, Socrates has not explicitly referred to cleverness at doing wrong about subjects concerned but often to expertise, i.e., knowledge of how to do properly in craft or science (374a8, 375b2, 375b6; 375b7-8; 375c6)<sup>624</sup>; further, it is doubtful whether Hippias believes he has affirmed the proposition about an agent who wishes to do morally or criminally wrong about a craft or science (373c6-375d5). The problem is that Hippias believes that he commits himself to the proposition that an agent wishes to go wrong in a skill or science but does not believe he commits himself to the proposition that the agent wishes to do injustice. Interpreters have to decide whether all experts are skilled in doing improperly. If interpreters admitted so, they would suppose

Hippias rightly to admit the ambivalence of ability in a skill or craft and to suggest in his repeated denial that the ambivalence does not hold in justice. However, in my opinion, as Sprague<sup>625</sup>, Ovink<sup>626</sup>, and Jantzen<sup>627</sup> suggest, an expert is not necessarily able to do improperly (see pp. 129-133), and an expert must abandon the disposition to do properly and practice doing improperly to be able to do both properly and improperly consistently and successfully. Hence, I think (1) that Hippias believes that he is so clever that he can easily acquire the ambivalent ability and (2) that Hippias would demote an agent's wish to go wrong in each area (373c6-375d5). Hippias need not accept against Socrates' possible overinterpretation (a) that Hippias has committed himself to the proposition that each *wishing* wrong-goer in a craft or science does a legally penalised action and (b) that each *wishing* wrong-goer in a craft or science disregards justice. He might even object that a *wishing* wrong-goer occupied about a skill or science disobeys the norm concerned for a higher approvable norm<sup>628</sup>. However, whether or not Socrates objects that not all legally unpenalised actions are morally insignificant, if he asks Hippias to appeal to some direct reason for acceptance despite his repeated denial, Socrates might see, besides the craft-analogy, Hippias' preceding admissions of both an agent's wish to go wrong in a skill and science and a clever man's achievement of a specific improper action. Further, Socrates might see that Hippias, admitting the existence of a *wishingly* unjust man, should admit the presupposition that in the situation of conflicting norms a *wishingly* unjust man is clever at obeying and disobeying them.



### General analysis of 375d7-376b7

The first discrepancy between Socrates and Hippias in understanding the result of the examination leads Socrates to restart questioning about justice but not injustice (375d7-376b8). Socrates finds the discrepancy in understanding the relation of justice to cases concerning skills and sciences; therefore, Socrates must try to clarify the relation if he thinks Hippias should accept the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men in respect of expertise in justice. This time, while asking Hippias to appeal to previous affirmations (373c6-375d7; 365d6-369b7), Socrates would appear to Hippias to try to induce him to bring every horn of a trilemma to the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men in respect not of wish to do justice but of cleverness at achieving justice. However, when Socrates (376b4-6) conclusively refers to Hippias' conclusion from his preceding affirmations, he indicates his wavering over the criterion of preferability, 'good', because Socrates not only introduces a confusing locution for 'do unjust things ( $\alpha\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\ \pi\omicron\iota\omega\nu$ )' but also reduces to a hypothetical condition (376b4-6) the existence of referents of the term 'a man who goes wrong and does both shameful and unjust things *wishingly*'.

Hippias consistently denies what he regards as Socrates' proposition. Without confirming what proposition Hippias understood Socrates introduced into his statement, Socrates scuttles the argument by agreeing to Hippias' denial. Hippias is unconvinced of the conclusion, as ever, in spite of giving affirmations to the preceding formulations in Socrates' questions. Socrates indicates that the validity of the conclusion is limited to the validity of Hippias' affirmations and that

Hippias fails in answering Socrates' questions in failing to resolve the issue over which Socrates 'wavers'.

**Hippias commits himself to the assumption of a trilemma: justice is a δύναμις (ability or property) and/or knowledge (375d7-e1)**

In ordering Hippias to answer questions again, Socrates attempts to have Hippias confirm that he should accept the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men in respect of expertise in justice according to his previous commitment. Socrates asks Hippias conducively, 'Is justice some δύναμις or knowledge or both; or isn't it necessary that justice is at least some one of them (375d7-e1)?'

δύναμις is polysemous<sup>629</sup>. It can mean 'ability' or 'property of a soul'<sup>630</sup>. Socrates has not explicitly referred to ability since 374a8, and before that at 368a5. In 373c6-375c6, as his explanation at 374a8 indicates, Socrates would have supposed that Hippias affirmed the preferability of a *wishing* wrong-goer in each section in respect of an ambivalent ability, but Hippias does not necessarily at 365d7-8 associate falsity as ability to do something with justice. Neither is it clear, pace Fouillée<sup>631</sup>, whether or not Socrates introduces his usual opinion that virtue is knowledge of goodness in itself. Hence, the direction and meaning of the argument depend on Hippias' interpretation.

It also depends on Hippias whether justice is necessarily δύναμις or knowledge or both (375d9-e1), but if Hippias affirms it and takes one alternative, Socrates may fairly refer to the applicability of the case true of ability and/or knowledge to the case of justice. Socrates might be trying to commit Hippias finally to what Hippias denied firmly (371e9-372a5; 375d3-4, 375d6), i.e., the

preferability of *wishingly* unjust men, and yet not in respect of wish to do justice but in respect of cleverness at achieving justice and injustice. If Socrates has supposed that Hippias accepted the preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers in any science or craft in respect of an ambivalent ability, and if he believes Hippias to accept that justice, like falsity, is achievement in a science or craft, he could ask Hippias to substitute 'do injustice' for 'go wrong' both in an achievement sense.

It is not logically necessary that justice is δύναμις and/or knowledge. If Socrates does not appeal to logical necessity, Socrates must appeal for the propositional necessity to what he regards as Hippias' previous commitments. Socrates need not found the necessity on his understanding of justice as knowledge and/or ability. Anyway, neither interlocutor has referred to justice before. Hippias has not necessarily given his own reason for believing the necessity. Hippias has (1) boasted of polymathy<sup>50</sup>, and suggested that (2) falsity is an achievement (364e7-365b6), (3) falsity is an ability (365d7-8) and cleverness (365e10-366a1) and (4) falsity is coordinate with or included by injustice (371e9-372a5). Hippias probably assumed that injustice is coordinate with doing a bad thing and going wrong but not with mis-calculating or mis-steering. Accordingly, if Hippias affirms that justice is δύναμις and/or knowledge, he must face questions different from those where Socrates tried to induce him to see the preferability of wishing wrong-goers. However, Socrates left unclear whether he believed that Hippias committed himself not to the proposition that a specific action in an expertise such as running or steering is doing injustice but to the proposition that contravening a rule by improper action

in an area like running slowly is doing injustice.

Socrates' usage of abstract particular terms (375d8-e1) is not based on further analysis of the right to use these terms (cf. 373d4-5, 374b8-c1), but the crucial point is that if Hippias affirms the proposition with abstract particulars, he allows the possibility (a) that he accepts that justice is a particular member of a group of knowledges and/or abilities, i.e., that justice is knowledge of how to do something and/or ability to do something and, further, formally, (b) that he accepts that the related words are co-ordinate with the words used in a particular knowledge and/or ability<sup>633</sup>. He possibly accepts, for example, that as 'justice' is coordinate with 'arithmetic', the predicate, 'doing justice' is co-ordinate with 'calculate'; likewise, 'just' of a person with 'expert in arithmetic'; 'do injustice' with 'mis-calculate'; 'unjust' with 'non-expert in arithmetic'; on the other hand, formally, the predicate, 'do a bad thing' or 'go wrong' subordinates 'do injustice'<sup>634</sup>. However, Socrates does not in the final stage mention the qualification on a subject about which a man achieves justice or injustice.

Hippias affirms unreservedly (375e1), but it is not clear here how Hippias justifies affirming that the proposition is necessary. Because of the polysemy of  $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ , Hippias might, as Guthrie suggests<sup>635</sup>, not refer the necessity back to his previous commitments. Hippias' acceptance suggests his confusion about the ordering of concepts such as the coordination of goodness as means with goodness as an end in itself<sup>636</sup>; however, his confusion is due to his unanalysed idea of justice as an achievement, as his idea of falsity and truth suggests (364e7-365b6). His beliefs imply that one is able to achieve justice and injustice

as specifiable actions.

**Hippias' commitment: if justice is a knowledge and/or ability, justice admits the ambivalent ability to do honourable and/or beautiful or shameful and/or ugly things (375e1-376a1)**

In Socrates' first question on his trilemma (375e1-3)<sup>637</sup>, if Hippias transforms (a) the proposition in which Socrates refers to a soul as earlier into (b) the proposition with a person as a subject as Hippias tacitly transformed it just now (375d3-4), he can interpret that Socrates introduces the proposition (1) that if all just men are able, all abler men are juster and, in support, the proposition (2) that all abler men are better.

As to (1), it would be invalid if justice is actuality because the antecedent implies the transition from actuality to ability while the consequent implies the transition from ability to actuality. Hence, unless Hippias assumes the reciprocity of ability with actuality, he commits fallacy; Hippias, though, committed himself to the assumption (cf. 367c6). Moreover, (1) is apparently invalid because it seems to commit a *fallacia consequentis* as Pohlenz points out<sup>638</sup>, if it can read formally:

$$'(\forall x(\text{Just}(x) \rightarrow \text{Able}(x))) \rightarrow (\forall x(\text{Abler}(x) \rightarrow \text{Juster}(x)))'$$

Insofar as Hippias does not assume that the degree of ability is in proportion to the degree of justice<sup>639</sup>, Hippias cannot justify this. However, neither Socrates nor Hippias has suggested that assumption. Accordingly, if Socrates assumes that Hippias should accept the proposition, Socrates would ascribe the validity of the inference to his next proposition.

Then, if Socrates assumes that Hippias can understand that Socrates means by 'that kind of soul' a man who is abler, does Socrates have the right to conjecture that it appeared to them<sup>640</sup> (3) that all those abler are better, and, further, to conjecture proposition (1)?

As to Socrates' reference to that transformable proposition (3), whether or not he assumes that Hippias understands that Socrates' criterion of comparison in reference to 'better' is an agent's knowledge of what he is able to do, he has not introduced the formulation, 'all those abler *to do something* are better *at doing it*'; however, in both the conversation about a false man (365c6-369b7) and the conversation about the preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers (373c6-375c6), Hippias accepted that in a science or craft, all those able to do something are good at things about which they do it in the sense that they are clever or expert in them (cf. 366d3-6). Insofar as Hippias admits Socrates' use of comparatives, pace Pohlenz<sup>641</sup>, Socrates can refer to the proposition that all those more able to do something are better at things about which they do it.

In Socrates' speech, (1)-(C) that all abler men are juster, does not follow from (1)-(A) that all just men are able, but if Socrates adds a premise that all men abler to do something are better at things about which they do it, he may fairly conjecture the proposition that all abler men are juster, because he may fairly assume that 'doing justice' is formally a name of action as a substitute for 'do something' subordinated to 'able to' and that the related predicate, 'just', is a substitute for 'good at doing justice'. In other words, what Socrates conjectures in his speech is as follows:

P1. All just men are able to *do justice*.

P2. All and only just men are good at doing justice.

[reciprocity of ability with actuality]

P3. For any action, all men able to do it are good at doing it.

C1. All men able to do justice are good at doing justice.

[Instantiation of P3 by substituting 'do justice']

C2. All men able to do justice are just.

[P2, C1, Substitution of 'just' for 'good at doing justice']

C3. All men abler to do justice are juster.

[C2, Transformation by a comparative form]

If we assume that Socrates transforms the proposition with abstract particular terms into the proposition with specific subjects and predicates, the formulation in his question would be redundant in respect of the identity of ability with the criterion of applying the predicate, 'good'. However, apart from the possible redundancy, if Socrates assumes that he can justify the above inference, his point in the first horn of the hypothetical trilemma lies in the assumption that words concerning injustice work like words concerning a domain of a science or a craft, insofar as Hippias understands that justice is not only disposition but also achievement.

Hippias admits his previous commitments (375e3). Socrates can trace Hippias' inference in his preceding affirmations, although Socrates does not specify in which part Hippias admitted that an abler soul is better. To that extent, despite his affirmation, it is questionable how Hippias understands what

his commitment to the proposition that justice is  $\deltaύναμις$  and/or knowledge entails.

Socrates asks about the consequence of the second horn that justice is a knowledge (375e4-5). In conducively asking, 'Isn't the cleverer soul juster and the more foolish soul more unjust?', Socrates avails himself of transformation from 'knowing' to 'clever', and introduces the proposition about a foolish soul although he did not introduce into the first horn the proposition about a soul unable to do something.

If Socrates supposes Hippias ready to transform the proposition about a soul into that about a man in this case too, the proposition he introduces into his question implies (1) that if all just men know something, then all cleverer men are juster, and (2) that if all just men know something, then all men more foolish are more unjust. If Socrates further assumes Hippias is ready to admit, as before (365e9-366a1; 366d2-3; 366e3-367a5) that 'know something' is replaceable by 'be clever at something', while the predicate, 'not know something' is replaceable by 'be foolish in something', what Socrates conjectures as the consequence from the second assumption in analogy to the preceding inference is as follows:

P1. All just men know how to do justice.

P2. All men knowing how to do justice are clever at doing justice.

P3. All and only just men are good at doing justice.

P4. For any action, all men clever at doing it are good at doing it.

C1. All men clever at doing justice are good at doing justice.

[Instantiation of P4 by substituting 'do justice']



C2. All men clever at doing justice are just.

[P2, C1, Substitution of 'just' for 'good at doing justice']

C3. All men cleverer at doing justice are juster.

[C2, Transformation by a comparative form]

Then, how does Socrates conjecture the proposition that all men more foolish in doing justice are more unjust? If it is not by committing the fallacy of denying both logical predicates of C2 that Socrates conjectures the proposition with a positive form that all men foolish in doing justice are unjust, he might take the contrapositives of P1 and P2, as he did (366b6-7; 367b3-5; 367e5-6; 368a5) and apply to them the rule of transitivity as he suggested (366a8-b5; cf. 369a8-b7), as follows:

P5. All who are not clever at doing justice do not know how to do justice.

[Contraposition to P2]

P6. All who do not know how to do justice are not just.

[Contraposition to P1]

C4. All who are not clever at doing justice are not just.

[P5, P6, the rule of transitivity]

If Socrates substitutes opposite predicates for the negatives, he may reasonably conjecture the following conclusion:

C5. All men foolish in doing justice are unjust.

Socrates might conjecture this either from the second assumption that justice is knowledge or by appealing to the exclusiveness of a clever man against a foolish man in respect of ability (367a2-5), the identity of a man clever at things

with a man good at them (cf. 366d4-5, 367c3-4), and the identity of a man foolish in things with a man bad at them (cf. 367e4-5; 368a5-6), as Hippias affirmed in the conversation about a false man, because Hippias had admitted Socrates' indistinguishable usage of 'expert', 'clever', 'able to', and 'good at'. According to this interpretation, what Socrates conjectures as the inference is as follows:

\*P5. If all men clever at anything are good at it, then all men foolish in it are bad at it.

\*C4. If all men clever at doing justice are good at justice, then all men foolish in doing it are bad at doing it.

[P5, Instantiation of P5]

\*C5. All men foolish in doing justice are bad at doing it.

[C1, C4, and modus ponens]

\*C6. All men foolish in doing justice are unjust.

[Substitution of 'unjust' for 'bad at doing justice']

Accordingly, as to the missing formulation of the question on the first assumption, i.e., 'All men unable to do justice are more unjust', if Socrates can conjecture the conclusion that all men more foolish in doing justice are more unjust, and if Hippias affirms it, Hippias allows the possibility that he admits that all men more unable to do justice are more unjust.

Whether or not Hippias bases his unreserved affirmation on preceding affirmations, if he admits the indistinguishable usage of 'ability' from 'knowledge', as before, Hippias has to affirm (375e6).

Socrates induces Hippias to accept the consequent from the assumption on the basis of Hippias' affirmations to the question on the first and second assumptions (375e6-8), although Socrates did not refer to a more unable soul. Socrates introduces an abstract particular term and a verb, 'have', for the preceding syntax with subject and predicate. Further, he is inconsistent in using a comparative form. However, he may conjecture Hippias' agreement to the necessity of the proposition in the sense that Hippias has already affirmed the consequences from the first and second assumptions.

Accordingly, if Socrates assumes that Hippias is ready to transform the proposition about a soul to one about a man, as before (375d3-4), Hippias allows the possibility that he affirms that all men both abler to do justice and cleverer at doing justice are juster while all men both more unable to do justice and more foolish in doing it are more unjust.

While saying unassertively, 'It appears so (375e8),' Hippias has no superficial reason to weaken his affirmation, insofar as he has already affirmed the consequences from the first two assumptions, but Hippias may begin to suspect that Socrates is trying to snare him into self-contradiction by using the hypothetical trilemma when Socrates has led to the similar conclusion with not necessarily consistent locutions about comparative forms.

Assuming that Hippias is ready to admit the transformation by using a positive form of comparative words, Socrates is asking Hippias to confirm that Hippias' preceding affirmations imply that all able to do something and clever at doing it are good at doing it and able both to do honourable and/or beautiful

things and shameful and/or ugly things, in every occupation (375e9-376a1). Socrates does not refer to honourable and/or beautiful things and shameful and/or ugly things in the conversation about false men or to ability to do both things in the conversation about the preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers, except at 374a7-b3<sup>642</sup>. However, Socrates linked the proposition (A) that in any area, an expert is able both to falsify and to *verify* while a non-expert is unable to do either (cf. 366c5-367a6)<sup>643</sup>, with the proposition (B) that those who falsify *wishingly* are better at things about which they falsify than those falsifying *unwishingly* (371e7-8), for the reason (C) that consistently falsifying *wishingly* is a characteristic proper to an expert while falsifying *unwishingly* to a non-expert. Therefore, whether or not Socrates assumes that Hippias justifies him in linking his affirmation of the propositions about false men with his affirmations to the propositions about *wishing* wrong-goers, Socrates can ask Hippias to confirm what his affirmations imply.

Hippias affirms that his preceding affirmations imply the proposition in Socrates' question (376a1), although Hippias consistently denied the application of his affirmations to the case of justice. Pace Kraus<sup>644</sup>, Hippias must have recourse to his idea of injustice as achievement, whether or not it is contradictory to a Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge of goodness in itself. Jantzen sees Socrates' distortion of justice because Socrates usually believes that justice has no specific product<sup>645</sup>, but Hippias commits himself to the proposition embodied in Socrates' question.

**Neither Socrates nor Hippias concedes the conclusion from Hippias'**

**commitments: the man who goes wrong about justice *wishingly* is the good man (376a2-376b8)**

Socrates introduces the type of interrogation<sup>646</sup> he used in the conversation about a man who goes wrong *wishingly* (374a7-b3; 374b5-7; cf. 373e4-5; 375b7-c3). He asks Hippias herewith (1) to confirm that if a man is able to do something and/or clever at doing it, then, if he is performing shameful and/or ugly things, he is doing so *wishingly* and (2) to confirm that the case about justice is the same because justice is ability and/or expertise<sup>647</sup>.

With reluctant acceptance (376a4), Hippias has not completely anticipated what Socrates is going to propose in his question if Hippias gives affirmation, but he might recognise that if he assumes that justice is ability and/or knowledge, he is going to face the question whether those who are able to do justice and/or clever at doing it do *wishingly* injustice as an action of performing a shameful and/or ugly thing in the domain of that ability and/or knowledge, whenever they do injustice. If Hippias understands justice in an achievement sense, he must accept the ambivalence of justice; if in a dispositional sense, he must reject it, for injustice would not be an agent's wished object.

Socrates asks<sup>648</sup> Hippias successively to confirm that in the domain of justice as an ability and/or knowledge, 'do injustice' is a substitute for the general predicate, 'do bad things in a domain of ability and/or expertise', and 'not doing injustice' for 'do good things in a domain of ability and/or expertise', although he introduces 'beautiful and/or honourable' for 'good' at 376a5<sup>649</sup> (376a4-5).

While Hippias affirms unreservedly (376a5), Socrates leaves open the

possibility that he introduces a tautological judgement about evaluative predicates. Hippias might not recognise that his affirmation is a crucial step to the conclusion in a series of questions based on a hypothetical trilemma. However, he cannot avoid giving affirmation, if he follows the trilemma assumption and his preceding affirmations; for he could not deny that to do injustice is to do bad things (cf. 371e9-372a5).

Socrates is not necessarily consistent or distinct in using terms and predicates in his propositions, especially in using 'good' and 'bad'. Neither does he transform the propositions about a soul into those about a man. He might use the proposition with a soul as subject to make it difficult for Hippias to anticipate his concluding formulation in his question. Socrates introduces an inference by instantiation, on the basis of (a) Hippias' preceding affirmation at 376a4 in reference to 376a2-3, (b) Hippias' reconfirmation of the proposition that justice is an ability and/or an expertise at 376a4 in reference to 376a3-4, and (c) Hippias' preceding affirmation about the rule of instantiation as to the predicate (376a4-5). Socrates asks (1) whether in the domain of justice as an ability and/or expertise, if a soul is able to do justice and good at doing justice, then just when he does injustice ( $\delta\tau\alpha\nu\pi\epsilon\rho$ ), he does so *wishingly*, and (2) whether if a man is unable to do justice and bad at doing justice, then, if he does injustice, he does so *unwishingly* (376a6-7). Whether or not Socrates tries to suggest by  $\pi\epsilon\rho$  (376a6)<sup>650</sup> that justice is a disposition, if Hippias understands that his assumption that justice is a knowledge and/or ability implies (a) that 'a just man' means 'a man able both to achieve justice and to achieve injustice' and (b) that 'justice'

is a name of a knowledge about a means but not an end in itself, he has to disregard the dispositional sense of justice.

With reluctant acceptance (376a7), Hippias would see some defect of his beliefs about justice. Hippias might regard injustice as an achievement but not justice. If Hippias supposes that justice is some specifically describable action-type as an object of knowledge, he must admit the ambivalent ability in the field of 'justice', and by his admission about ability (366b7-c4), he must admit that a 'just' man does injustice whenever he wishes to because 'injustice' can be an agent's wished action. Further, if he admits the existence of an expert who is able to do improperly in a skill or science, he must admit the existence of a man who is clever at doing justice or injustice for another higher purpose.

In his question (376b1-2), Socrates does not necessarily appear to Hippias to focus on the transformation rule of the proposition about a soul into the proposition about a man; rather, in reference to justice he leaves here open the possibility that he refers to a proposition not about goodness as expertise but about goodness as moral disposition.

Affirming unreservedly (376b2), since Hippias may reasonably take the transformation rule as established in ordinary language (375d1-4)<sup>648</sup>, he would understand that Socrates asks about a trivial proposition about a soul which wishes to obey or contravene a norm. He allows the possibility that he switches from the area of 'justice' as expertise to the area of dispositional justice.

Socrates introduces into the question (376b2-4)<sup>649</sup> a proposition similar to his preceding ones (374b5-7; 374b8-c1), but leaves open the possibility that he is

asking *not* (1) whether consistently doing injustice *wishingly* is the nature of a man good at justice as a knowledge and/or an ability while doing injustice *unwishingly* is the nature of a man bad at justice as a knowledge and/or an ability, if indeed, the man good at justice has a soul which is good at justice as a knowledge and/or an ability *but* (2) whether consistently doing injustice *wishingly* is the nature of a man who wishes to obey justice while doing injustice *unwishingly* is the nature of a man who wishes to disobey justice, if indeed the man has a soul which wishes to obey justice.

In saying, 'But, surely, he does have a good soul (376b4),' Hippias, pressed to give affirmation to the formulation in the sense of (1), but recognising the proposition in the sense of (2), is inclined to deny the formulation; therefore, showing tacitly that he admits what Socrates presses him to admit, he emphasises that a man who wishes to obey justice has a soul which wishes to obey it.

Expecting Hippias' agreement, Socrates concludingly states, 'Therefore, the man who goes wrong and does shameful and/or ugly and unjust things *wishingly*, Hippias, if indeed there is such, would be none other than the good man.'

Socrates formulates not (a) that the man who does injustice *wishingly* is none other than the man good at doing justice or (b) that in the domain of justice as an ability and/or a knowledge, if a man goes wrong in doing injustice *wishingly*, he is good at doing justice, but (c) that the man who goes wrong and does shameful and/or ugly and unjust things *wishingly* is the good man (376b4-6).



Socrates arranges the predicates, 'go wrong' and 'do unjust things', coordinately, and the predicates, 'do shameful and/or ugly things' and 'do unjust things', coordinately. He does not use the predicate, 'do injustice', which he may fairly assume that Hippias affirmed as the predicate for doing wrong in the domain of justice as an ability and/or a knowledge. He allows the possibility that he has meant that these couples of predicates are coordinate and that he has confusingly distinguished the domain of knowledge and/or ability from the domain of justice in spite of the hypothesis that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge.

Apart from Socrates' confusing choice of words, if he formulates his questions on the basis of Hippias' affirmation of the hypothesis that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge and if he assumes that Hippias regards 'good' as 'good at something' in his affirmations, he has the right to draw the following conclusion following Hippias' preceding affirmations.

P1. Justice [in an achievement sense] is an ability and/or a knowledge of a soul.

[375d8-e1; cf. 375e1-2; 375a7-c3; 375c6-d4]

P2. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, all souls able to do something and/or clever at doing it are good at doing it[; all souls unable to do it and/or foolish in doing it are bad at doing it].

[375e9-10 and 376a1; 375e3-4; 366d3-6, 367c3-7; 367e1-7; 368a3-6]

C1. In the domain of justice, all souls able to do justice and/or clever at doing justice are good at doing justice, i.e., just ; all souls unable to do justice and/or foolish in doing it are bad at doing justice, i.e., unjust.

[P1, P2, Instantiation. 375e1-8]

P3. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, all souls able to do something and/or clever at doing it are able to do honourable and/or beautiful [good] and shameful and/or ugly [bad] things.

[375e10-376a1; 374a7-b4; cf. 366c7-e1 and 366e3-367a5; 367c2-4; 367e1-7; 368a6-7]

C2. In the domain of justice, all souls able to do justice and/or clever at doing justice are able both to do good things and to do bad things in that domain.

[P1, P3, Instantiation. No explicit textual evidence; cf. 376a3-4]

P4. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, if a soul is able to do something and/or clever at doing it, then, if a soul performs shameful and/or ugly things [or does a bad thing and goes wrong], it performs them *wishingly* [; if a soul is unable to do it and/or foolish in doing it, then if a soul performs shameful and/or ugly things, it performs them *unwishingly*].

[376a2-4; 375e4-6; 375e6-8; 376a7; cf. 374a7-b4; 374b5-8; 375b7-c3]

P5. In the domain of justice, to do injustice is to do bad [or do shameful and/or ugly things or go wrong] and not to do injustice [or to do justice] is to do good [or do honourable and/or beautiful things].

[376a4-5]

C3. In the domain of justice, if a soul is able to do justice and/or clever at doing justice, then if it does injustice, it does it *wishingly*; if a soul is

bad [at doing justice: unable to do justice and/or foolish in doing justice], then if it does injustice, it does so *unwishingly*.

[P1, P4, P5, Instantiation. 376a6-7]

P6. If a soul has a characteristic, if a man has the soul, he has the characteristic.

[375a7-c3; cf. 376b1-2; 375c6-d7]

C4. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, if a soul is good at doing something, then if a man has the soul, he is good at doing it; if a soul is bad at doing it, then if a man has the soul, he is bad at doing it.

[P6, instantiation. 376b1-2]

C5. In the domain of justice, if a man is able to do justice and/or clever at doing justice, then if he does injustice, he does injustice *wishingly*; if a man is unable to do justice and/or foolish in doing justice, then if he does injustice, he does injustice *unwishingly*.

[C3, P6, Application of P6 as a transformation to C3. No explicit textual evidence.]

C6. In the domain of justice, if a man does injustice *wishingly*, he is good at doing justice; if a man does injustice *unwishingly*, he is bad at doing justice.

[C5, C1, modus ponens. 376b2-4]<sup>653</sup>

C7. In the domain of justice, if a man *wishingly* goes wrong and does shameful and/or ugly things *in doing injustice*, he is good at doing justice [; if a man *unwishingly* goes wrong and does shameful and/or

ugly things *in doing injustice*, he is bad at doing justice].

[376b4-6; paraphrase of C6]

The last step to C6 would not be clear to Hippias, especially if he understands that the criterion of applying the predicate, 'good', was not expertise in justice according to the hypothesis but obeying justice or wish to obey justice. However, Socrates' possible scheme would be justified by Hippias' preceding affirmations of his formulations in which expertise, ability, wisdom, and goodness as expertise or skill are interchangeable.

However, Hippias rejects what he regards as the proposition in Socrates' statement (376b7). Socrates also scuttles the argument as if he had asked as Hippias understands (376b8).

In contrast with previous denials (371e6, 371e9-372a5, 375d3-4, 375d6; cf. 373b7), Hippias here again confronts the following irreconcilable presuppositions of Socrates' ambivalently interpretable statement:

(A) the man who *wishingly* goes wrong in doing injustice is the just man, i.e., the man who is able to do justice and/or knows it;

(B) the man who *wishingly* goes wrong in doing injustice is the just man, i.e., the man who wishes to do justice.

Hippias, presupposing the existence of *wishing* unjust men, denied (B) before (371e9-372a5, 375d3-4, 375d6); but it is not clear whether he denied (A) (cf. 373b7). Hence Socrates' questions (375d7 ff.) are not irrelevant for Hippias; for if Hippias had believed it false that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge, he would have rejected the preferability of a *wishingly* unjust man for that reason.

Therefore Hippias at the beginning of a trilemma argument would not have looked ahead to (A) as an implication from his commitment to the trilemma. However, he would probably have come to view (A); he did not foresee (A) at once at 376a1, but dimly at 376a7 and clearly at 376b4. If Hippias had kept consistency with the trilemma assumption by suspending his preconceptions about justice in a dispositional sense, he could have legitimately concluded that a man who goes wrong about justice *wishingly* is good at justice, whether he regards this man as a normal expert or a clever man. Even if justice as a disposition seems to him, as Jantzen points out<sup>654</sup>, to have no specific product like other expertises, if he could appeal to his potential belief that justice like falsity is an achievement of some describable end, he would not have to reject the conclusion. However, Socrates does not conclusively state that the man who *wishingly* goes wrong in doing injustice is good *at justice*.

Hence a possible explanation for Hippias' denial is this: Socrates' locution does not work as any warning against (A) except for his introduction of ἄδικα ποιεῖν at 376b5 (see below). Hippias finds reason to accept (A) because he accepted the trilemma assumption and the ambivalence of ability and/or knowledge. However, **either** (i)-(a) he suspects that Socrates has tried to palm off (B) again **and/or** (i)-(b) he feels reluctance to accept (A) publicly because his acceptance gives the impression of immorality and/or because his acceptance contradicts his objection at 371e9-372a5 **or** (ii) he has just recognised the monstrosity of (A), to whatever extent he may notice Socrates' questioning of the existence of *wishingly* unjust men (376b5-6).

Then, when Socrates adds in his statement (376b4-6), 'if there is such (εἴπερ τις οὗτος ἐστίν)', does Socrates by implication affirm or deny the proposition that there is a man who goes wrong and does ugly and/or shameful and unjust things *wishingly* or does he merely hypothesise it? How can interpreters determine Socrates' suggestion in this clause, although formally it does not affect Hippias' commitments?

Plato might have, as Wilamowitz says<sup>655</sup>, instilled Socrates' doctrine, 'No one does wrong voluntarily (ἀμαρτάνει ἐκων)' and suggested to ancient Socratic readers that Socrates here denies the proposition in the clause. Whether or not ancient non-Socratic readers, as Wilamowitz says, saw Socrates' immoral view in the main sentence without recognising his doctrine in the condition, one may ask, as Jantzen rightly suggests<sup>656</sup>, whether we are justified in interpreting with some critics<sup>657</sup> that Socrates appeals to his usual belief without actually referring to it.

Then, can we assume, with Shorey<sup>658</sup> and Hoerber<sup>659</sup>, that the conditional clause with εἴπερ suggests Socrates' rejection of the proposition in the clause? Plato's usage of this word περ may sometimes suggest the speaker's rejection of the proposition in the clause. However, Shorey and Hoerber's argument by reference to *Euthphr.* 8e6 and *Grg.* 480e5-6 begs the question. We have to know Socrates' usual belief beforehand to decide whether or not he instills it. The mark εἴπερ does not necessarily suggest the speaker's rejection of the proposition in the clause<sup>660</sup>. Socrates may only be making explicit Hippias' presupposition, whether or not Hippias is encouraged to question it.

Socrates can use 'εἰπερ P, Q' when he does not believe 'P' and also when he does. If περ modifies the conjunction, one can literally or ironically emphasise the propositional relation, e.g., like '... if and *only if* ...'<sup>661</sup> or '*even if* ...'<sup>662</sup> If περ modifies 'P' but propositionally adds nothing to 'P' like 'really', one can suggest 'not P' when his opponent believes 'Q'<sup>663</sup>, and 'Q' when they have agreed on 'P'<sup>664</sup>. Then, at 376b4-6, Hippias does not believe the preferability of *wishingly* unjust men in respect of their wish [Q]; he admitted their existence and he thinks Socrates has admitted it [P]. Hence, Socrates might literally or ironically emphasise their existence causing their goodness; otherwise, he might appear to Hippias to suggest their non-existence or their preferability.

Then, how can we support Socrates' rejection inside the present conversation? Socrates uses περ three times hereabouts (376a6; 376b3; 376b5). It is doubtful that as Jantzen interprets<sup>665</sup>, Socrates rejects the instrumental understanding of our soul at 376b3. At 376a6, Hippias would have dimly viewed (A) by *the proposition* in the clause of ὅταν περ but pace Blundell, the word does not grammatically work as a warning. As the trilemma argument goes on (375d8 ff.), Socrates faithfully, although in locution inconsistently, traces, except for ἄδικοι ποιοῦν at 376b5, what Hippias' assumption that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge entails. Socrates has used propositions with a human being's soul as subject without confusion; he introduced 'ugly and/or shameful' and 'beautiful and/or honourable' (375e10-11) at least in accordance with the locution Hippias had admitted (373e1-2, 371e4-5, 374a3-4, 374a5-6, 374b1, 374b5-7, 375b7-c3). However, Socrates would probably have come to look

ahead to (A) in his concluding formulation. If he believed what Hippias has affirmed and also Hippias' assumption in the trilemma argument, Socrates would have no reason to avoid drawing the conclusion presupposing (A) or to weaken it by questioning the precedingly presupposed existence of *wishingly* unjust men. If Socrates at 376b8, assuming that Hippias rejected (B) at 376b7, agreed to Hippias' denial of the conclusion presupposing (B), he would not need to question the existence of *wishingly* unjust men.

Socrates might have been trying to palm off (B) without questioning the validity of (A). Socrates' self-proclaimed wavering would appear to Hippias to be rhetoric to give the impression of their shared downfall. If Socrates publicly rejected (A) without questioning the existence of *wishingly* unjust men, he might clearly see that his escape is, by modus tollens, rejecting *either* that justice is a knowledge and/or ability *or* that the ambivalence does not hold in justice *or* both. However, his device by questioning the existence might suggest that he sees some different defect in (A), as some critics focusing on motivation in Socratic ethics suggest<sup>666</sup>.

If Socrates identified the defect as substitution of knowledge of practical means for knowledge of an end in itself, this would explain Socrates' rejection of the existence of one who, knowing an end in itself, sets himself a different end for another higher end. Then, Socrates does not explain how (A) is unsound, but interpreters can explain Socrates' final denial by introducing the hierarchy of means and end and can rescue, by abandoning the ambivalence in justice, the Socratic unmentioned doctrine that no one does wrong voluntarily, i.e., that



virtue is a knowledge of goodness in itself.

However, if this assumption interpreters introduce needs further theoretical justification, the question arises whether it holds in our experience. Neither interlocutor explains an agent's motivation in general, but it is open to question, (i) whether there exists something good in itself or an end in itself, (ii) whether everyone believes both things; (iii) whether everyone presupposes these conceptual hierarchies in his discourse about action; (iv) whether every agent always ratiocinates in advance his end and means, whether or not by evaluating all possible consequences of each electable means; (v) whether if anyone assumes these conceptual hierarchies and ratiocinates his end and means in advance of his action, he necessarily chooses the action resulting from his ratiocination. In a scheme, an agent's contradiction to his preceding ratiocination is due to a kind of ignorance. Hence, it is possible to interpret the value of Socrates' wavering in relation to Socratic ethics constructed from other passages in Plato's dialogues. However, Socrates does not mention the view that wrongdoing is harmful for an agent and that a *wishingly* unjust man is ignorant of the damage of wrongdoing to himself. Hence, his wavering is open to speculation. However, Hippias has no good reason to take Socrates at his word because of Socrates' behaviour which he deems sophistical.

Since Hippias admitted the existence of the subject at 371e9-372a5, he does not reject the conclusion for the reason that no one does injustice *wishingly*, but for the reason that a just man does not wish to do injustice. Therefore, Hippias also does not keep consistency with his commitment to the assumption that

justice is an ability and/or knowledge. However, he is still inconsistent in committing himself to the propositions that there is a practical principle (363c7-d4; 364d3-6; cf. 365a4-b1), that the principle is an object of knowledge (364a7-9), and that those who disobey it *wishingly* know it (371e9-372a5).

Socrates has not questioned the existence of those who do injustice *wishingly* in his questions about a false man (365d6-369b7) or his statements about Homer's Achilles (369b8-372a5); rather, Socrates took responsibility for positively admitting their existence in opposition to Hippias' view (372d3-e6). Hippias would have taken Socrates to have presupposed the existence of a *wishingly* unjust man. Hence, if Socrates has found in the end, some reason to question the existence of those who do injustice *wishingly*, he also questions his and Hippias' preceding presupposition.

Then, if Socrates here admits the non-existence of those who do injustice *wishingly*, he would have to regard his and Hippias' speeches presupposing the existence of such people as meaningless. However, Socrates would have referred to some experience in talking about Homer's Achilles' demotion of speaking truly from his principle (370d5-6), his wished deceit (371a2-b1; 371c6-d7), and those who do bad things *wishingly* (372d3-e6; 373c6-375c6). Hence, whether or not he abruptly instills his usual opinion in the conditional clause at 376b5-6, he would not reject the meaningfulness of the preceding speeches (365d6-375c6). He would rather suggest (a) that if doing a bad thing is specifically described like lying or a crime, even if it is cruel or maliciously designed, there exists a man who is clever at doing this bad thing for another good or bad purpose

without the disposition to avoid it and (b) that if an agent believes some specifiable action to be unjust in itself, it cannot be his wished action.

**Socrates' final remark on his wavering over the conclusion (376b8-c6)**

Socrates suggests that he has reached the conclusion on the basis of Hippias' affirmations and of his own choice of words (376b8-c1). But Socrates limits the validity of the conclusion to Hippias' preceding affirmations to his questions on the basis of the hypothesis that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge<sup>667</sup>. If Socrates refutes Hippias by professing their shared wavering, his target is Hippias' confused beliefs. Hippias refers to his own or Achilles' practical principle, but admitting the penal presupposition, he has to admit that under conflicting norms, the evaluation of a man as a *wishingly* unjust man alternates with the evaluation of the same man as a *wishingly* just man according to which norm an evaluator acknowledges. If Hippias applies his commitment to an achievement sense of falsity to injustice and further to justice, he must admit that a man who achieves injustice is clever at doing justice and injustice about subjects concerned. However, he himself would publicly reject that a man who achieves justice has acquired the disposition to do injustice as he rejects that all and only false men are true. Hippias' commitment to injustice as achievement results from the disposition embodied in his polymathy. His personal emphasis on learning and teaching makes him think of moral qualities, in a kind of 'successful' relativism, as cleverness at achieving for one's purpose what alternates between justice and injustice.

### III. Conclusion

1. I have attempted to establish reflectively a method of reading Plato's dialogues, and applied it to the analysis of the *Hippias Minor*. My method is not an a priori construct in advance of a literary form of dialogue in general but a working hypothesis to be refined and/or remoulded by reciprocation with practice of reading Plato's dialogues. I must critically review the effect of the preceding analysis.

According to the arrangement of my work, one may rightly ask whether I have practised my method effectively; specifically, first of all, whether I have analysed the interplay of the interlocutors against the background of their personally divergent understandings of exchanged speeches.

I have attempted to reconsider Socrates' intention in his speeches on the basis of Burnet's punctuations<sup>668</sup>. In question-and-answer bouts (365d6-369b7; 373c6-376c6), Socrates sets his speeches in series of questions but often, without any grammatically explicit interrogative marks, makes a confirmatory or interrogative speech with ἄρα<sup>669</sup> or ἄρα, ὡς εἰκέν<sup>670</sup>. Hippias might understand Socrates to confirm Socrates' opinion, but Socrates would be referring to what he conceives as Hippias' opinion or inference in the context of seeking Hippias' opinion. Socrates' speech works as an indirect question, even if Hippias takes it as also expressing Socrates' present belief. Hence, Hippias allows the possibility that he appears to state his present opinion to Socrates in his response.

This means that insofar as Socrates does not expound his question, what

Socrates' direct or indirect question means is mainly explained not by what Socrates means by it but by what Hippias understands by it. Therefore, in a question-and-answer bout, apart from analysing Socrates' ordering of questions, my analysis has focused on what Hippias understands by Socrates' questions and what implication Hippias leaves in his response. This analysis is designed to explain how Socrates can approach Hippias' beliefs in his next question and why Hippias admits or denies what he understands as the proposition embodied in Socrates' question. The analysis did not delve into what Socrates means by the proposition in his question, because Socrates leaves Hippias to understand precisely what proposition he introduces.

Socrates makes a meta-elenctic speech (369d1-e2; 372a6-d3) and a retrospective speech on their preceding question-and-answer bout (369e2-370a1; 370d6-e4), but in an ex post facto context and not just before and after asking the question concerned. Hence, I did not read these subsequent speeches and Hippias' response to them into the preceding conversations.

These speeches of Socrates' are statements in contrast with his questions. Hippias might understand Socrates to state his belief, but the ex post facto context makes his speech appear ironical.

But despite apparently offering opinions at 372c8-e3, Socrates is not necessarily arguing for his opinion as well as refuting Hippias, although Socrates' mode of expression separate from Hippias' point of view might indicate his arguing for his opinion. The conversation at 372d3-376c6 is formally an example of Socrates' arguing for his opinion. However, Socrates still uses

diagnostically tagged questions and bases his initial belief on the preceding conversation, i.e., substantially Hippias' affirmations leading to self-contradiction.

I have attempted to avoid speculating about the interlocutors' background beyond the conversational proceeding and their speeches. I have attempted to explain Hippias' responses here and there by his initial unsolicited boast of polymathy, but not solved to what extent I should read into my analysis ancient Homeric studies and Hippias' reputation for Plato's ancient readers. The interlocutors' personal divergence is open to further analysis. The interplay with personal divergency is complex in contrast with soliloquy. No propositional act can be separated from the interlocutors' interplay, but it is still worth analysing this complex construction.

2. According to my reading method and practice, I contradict myself if I refer to the historical Socrates' or Plato's ultimate intention in this conversation<sup>671</sup>. Admittedly, question-and-answer dialogue provokes readers into examining the proposition which one dramatic interlocutor introduces into his speech to another, because questions can often notify some audience that the propositions embodied in the questions are open to general consideration<sup>672</sup>. However, I have not explored how to dig out what Plato was philosophising when writing a particular passage<sup>673</sup>.

Now let me dare to go halfway to consider what follows from the assumption that Plato argues for Socratic doctrines in a series of dialogues. It is controversial to enumerate and interpret Socratic doctrines<sup>674</sup>, but provisionally, let us suppose that Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* believes (A) the craft-analogy: some or all

characteristics common to some or all crafts and sciences are common to knowledge of goodness in itself and (B) 'No one does wrong voluntarily': no one who knows goodness in itself chooses to do wrong. I suggested the problem arising from introducing Socrates' usual doctrines (see pp. 290-291). Socrates asks Hippias to appeal to the craft-analogy at 368a8-b3, 368e1-369b7; 375b7-d2; he suggests doctrine (B), as most critics mark, at 376b5-6. He questions the view that there is someone who goes wrong *wishingly* (ἐκῶν) (376b5-6). Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* does not argue against it in reference to (a) a science of measuring pleasure and pain, (b) the popular view of conversion between justice and honourableness and/or beauty and between injustice and shamefulness and/or ugliness, (c) the view of the damage of wrongdoing to an agent, (d) the contrast of an agent's choice with all the consequences considered to an agent's choice in an unenlightened state, or (e) the view of 'good for oneself' as a universal object of an agent's wish. Hence, it is open to question, except for the ambivalence of ability, how a student of Socratic ethics should deal with Socrates in the *Hippias Minor*.

According to a typical interpretation, Socrates develops the argument from the area of a craft or science to morality, from the area of knowledge of goodness as a means to the area of knowledge of goodness as an end in itself. Apart from the soundness of these interpretative concepts projected into the text, in the conversation about false men (365d6-369b7), Socrates examines a man who tells a lie about a science or craft, and then, draws the conclusion that all and only deceitful men are truthful (369b3-7). Following this conclusion (371e7-8;

372d3-e7; 373c6-8), Socrates considers those who go wrong about a craft or science, and then concludes that those who do injustice *wishingly* are morally good men who are able to do justice whenever they wish to. Most critics see that Socrates draws an unacceptable conclusion by recourse to the craft-analogy. Specifically, a typical objection is that an expert in a skill or science is able to do improperly and so performs for another purpose while an expert in knowledge of goodness in itself is able to do improperly but never so performs for another purpose. The ambivalent ability which holds in the case of knowledge of means or practical judgement of an end in a situation, does not hold in the case of knowledge of goodness in itself<sup>675</sup>. However, whether or not Socrates rejects the craft-analogy in the broadest sense is open to question<sup>676</sup>. Since it is self-contradictory that one who knows goodness in itself as an end in itself, chooses an end different from the end in itself, the typical argument in the *Hippias Minor* indirectly still leaves a problem on an agent's choice of an end in a practical situation<sup>677</sup>. As suggested before (see p. 318), a theoretically justifiable starting-point on considering motivation is not self-evident, although we have already talked about it ordinarily. However, if Socrates, holding his usual doctrines, is to reconcile, besides his suggestion on Hippias' standpoint, his acceptance of the existence of *wishingly* unjust men in the context about criminal law (372d4-7) with his suggested rejection of their existence at 376b5-6, he has to have different explanations about *wishingly* unjust men. My proposal is based on *Leges IX* (857b9 ff.)<sup>678</sup>. On one hand, if wrongdoing is no longer relative to a subjective norm, an authority of an absolute norm, governing penalisation,



ascribes wrongdoing to an agent's wish; on the other hand, the agent is involuntary in the sense of being ignorant that wrongdoing is against his interest; in other words, in the sense of being ignorant that his actual object is against his interest.

3. There is no unilinear argument in the conversational interplay. From the interlocutors' viewpoint, Socrates tries to induce Hippias to produce some view consequent on his commitments, whether or not Hippias recognises Socrates' rhetorical stratagem at the time of a question. Socrates does not necessarily show by what procedure Hippias should work out the consequence from his particular commitments, common sense and some inferential rules which Hippias previously admitted. Hippias does not examine how he should work out the consequence, as Socrates suggests (367c4-367d3; 367e1-7; 368a3-6; 369a4-b7; 371e4-372a5; 375c6-d7). Neither Socrates nor Hippias might be ready to or able to justify how Hippias should work it out. If there is a sound procedure to work it out from Hippias' point of view, that is left to discover.

4. According to my method in practice, what interplay is going on? Hippias cannot object to Socrates' questions about Hippias' opinion about Homer's characterisation (364b3-c2) because Hippias boasted that he can answer any question about any subject (363c7-d4; 364a7-9; cf. 364d3-6). Whether or not Hippias clearly distinguishes achievement from disposition (365a1-b2), Hippias cannot object to Socrates' questions about a man who achieves deceit about subjects concerned (366e3-369b7), because Hippias suggested the idea (365d7-8; 365e10-366a1). Although Socrates let Homer go (365c8-365d5) and refuses

Hippias' offer to compete in interpreting Homer (369d1-2), Hippias cannot object to Socrates' reintroduction of interpreting Achilles' wish in Homer (370a2-d6) because Hippias offers to display his cleverness at interpreting Homer (369c2-8; 370e5). Hippias thinks Socrates is trying to induce him rhetorically to accept the preferability of *wishingly* to *unwishingly* unjust men when Socrates does not specify the criterion (371e7-8; 375d1-2; 376b4-6); but Hippias cannot object to Socrates' question because he boasted that he could answer any question (373c4-5; 365d5) and because he confuses cleverness at achieving injustice about a subject concerned with cleverness at the expertise in which unjust men do injustice. At the end of the dialogue, if Hippias clearly distinguished his commitment to legal evaluation of an agent's wish to do injustice from his commitment to cleverness at achieving injustice about subjects concerned, and if he exerted his mnemonic art for Socrates' artful interlacing of his questions, Hippias could take Socrates to have committed Hippias sophistically to (1) the proposition about a true man in relation to a false man by asking about Hippias' expertise; (2) the transition from ability to actuality by asking, only passingly, whether a man good at arithmetic is true; (3) confusion between *wishing* wrong-*goers* as experts in a subject and *wishing* wrong-*doers* occupied about any subject concerned. When Socrates questions the existence of a man who achieves injustice *wishingly* (376b5-6), he leaves open the possibility that he questions not only the existence of *wishing* wrong-*goers* in specific subjects but also his own previous proposition that Achilles demotes telling the truth and successfully deceives Odysseus, and Hippias' affirmation that an expert falsifies

if he wishes to. Therefore, while Socrates ascribes the provisional and reserved validity of the preferability of *wishing* wrong-goers to Hippias' previous affirmation (376b8-c1), he allows the possibility that he questions the meaningfulness of Hippias' idea of achievement of falsity and injustice about subjects concerned.

5. Is there any interpretation which explains inter-relatedly and consistently all the intertwined and paradoxical questions that Plato's *Hippias Minor* provokes in readers which I enumerated at the outset of the analysis (see pp. 27-29)? Since Hippias' response involves the inconsistency of his unanalysed beliefs, it would be irrelevant to give Hippias uniformity in his beliefs. However, my proposal in this work is this. Although Hippias would show publicly that he does not believe that doing injustice is doing justice, he allows the possibility that justice alternates with injustice in the situation of conflicting norms. When Hippias allows the possibility that he admits the possibility of achieving deceit about subjects concerned (367a8, cf. 365a3, 365b2, 369c5, 372e3) and the ability to do so (365d7-8, 365e10-366a1), and when Hippias allows the possibility that he admits the existence of *a wishing* wrongdoer (366e5-6, 371e9-372a5), Socrates can develop his questioning about Hippias' unanalysed opinion about falsity and injustice as achievement. But if Hippias has any reason for not objecting that reliable and consistent justice alternates with reliable and consistent injustice, it is probably because Hippias is ready to admit the idea that what people approve as virtue and what people reprove as vice, if interpreted as achievement of any describable end, are indistinguishable in respect of knowledge and ability.

## Endnotes (Introduction & Chapter I)

1. Vlastos, 1956: p. xxxi.
2. Stokes, 1986: pp. 1-35, esp. p. 2. As to the interpretive method to read dialogues not as a form in which Plato instilled his opinions, but as they are: a drama between interlocutors, see also Friedländer, 1969: pp. 154-170, esp. p. 161; Strauss, 1964: pp. 50-60; Weingartner, 1973: pp. 1-7; Sandbach, 1985: pp. 478-497; Kato, 1988: pp. 3-26; Rowe, 1992: pp. 53-68; Kosman, 1992: pp. 82-85.
3. Kraut, 1992: p. 5; p. 25 ff. When he suggests that the main character in the dialogues represents Plato (p. 26), clearly he keeps in view Plato's middle narrative dialogues. However, the prevalent hypothesis that the Socrates of the early elenctic dialogues represents the historical Socrates while the Socrates of the middle narrative dialogues represents Plato is not incontestable; see Stokes, 1992 (b); Frede, 1992: esp. pp. 213-214.
4. Irwin, 1992: p. 73 ff.; id., 1988; for his view on Aristotle's evidence, see *ibid.*: p. 195; id., 1977: p. 291.
5. On Aristotle's evidence, see note 4; Vlastos, 1991: pp. 45-103, esp. pp. 91-98; Stokes, 1992 (a): n. 1 at pp. 77-78; Kahn, 1992: pp. 233-240; Vander Waerdt, 1993: n. 7 at pp. 3-4.
6. Now Blundell (1992) scrutinises parts and the whole of the *Hippias Minor*, although I do not use many of her reading premises introduced from outside the dialogue and she does not analyse the detail of the exchange at 366c5-368a7. For difference between Blundell and me, see Ch. II.
7. For Plato's unwritten opinions, see *Ph.* 209b11-17.
8. Cherniss, 1945: pp. 1-30.
9. See Riginos, 1976.
10. *Epi. VII*, 341b7-d2; cf. *Phdr.* 275c5-277a5. It is controversial how to interpret these passages.

11. Cf. Vlastos, 1991: p. 50; Taylor, 2nd ed. 1991: pp. xiv-xvi.
12. Crombie, 1962: pp. 14-30; Stokes, 1986: p. 27; Kraut, 1992: p. 29; id., 1988: p. 177; Irwin, 1988: p. 199; id., 1992: p. 77; Vlastos, 1991: p. 53; Day, 1994: pp. 16-17.
13. See Tigerstedt, 1977; Bowen, 1988. Bowen (p. 63 ff.), criticising the modern problematic of the alternative choice between reductionism and skepticism, which he thinks involves Tigerstedt too, claims that philological analysis of the dialogues is independent of the reader's philosophical activity concerned with questions given in the dialogues. However, the border between a reader's philological analysis of a dialogue and philosophical involvement in it would be murky if applying linguistic rules to a specific utterance in a dramatic dialogue is not necessarily precedent to but rather interdependent on understanding the utterance.
14. Bowen, 1988: p. 63 ff.
15. Kraut, 1988: p. 177. Kraut draws on Berkeley's dialogue (*Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 1713) for his denial. But Plato's dialogues are different from Berkeley's in respect of the existence of the argument which the main character supports (see Crombie, 1962: p. 15).
16. Kraut, 1992: p. 25.
17. See Dover, 1974: pp. 5-6.
18. Kraut, 1992: pp. 25-30.
19. Irwin, 1992: p. 77.
20. *ibid.*: p. 73.
21. *ibid.*: pp. 73-77.
22. *ibid.*: pp. 77-78; Irwin, 1988: p. 199; id., 1977: p. 291.
23. By speech act theory we can reconsider what interlocutors perform by using a linguistic token to invoke a convention closely related to it, whether a highly socialised convention like promise or rather a privately working one. See Austin, 1962 and Searle, 1969. Further, grammatical categories such as interrogative or

declarative sentences do not necessarily correspond to what a speaker intends to do unless s/he makes explicit what s/he intends to do by some linguistic tokens such as 'I ask if ...', 'I assert that ...', or 'I order you to do ...'. See Wittgenstein, 1958: Part 1, Section 21; Austin, 1962: pp. 67-82; Searle, 1969: pp. 24-25; id., 1975.

24. For the convention of asking a question, see Searle, 1969: p. 66; Santas, 1979: pp. 59-96, esp., pp. 66-72; Kiefer, 1983; Kidd, 1992: p. 84. On a negative form of interrogative sentence, a speaker can use it to assert *indirectly* (see note 23) and can use it to ask a conducive question. It is controversial whether a speaker can use it as a purely information-seeking question. Kiefer admits the possibility (*ibid.*: pp. 98-99) but Davison denies it because that negative form cannot be transformed into the explicit form, 'I ask if ... not ...' (1975: pp. 143-185). However, an indirect speech of a negative interrogative form can be found in English and in Plato's works. See the following example, 'Asked if Labour was not moving into precisely that territory as it dropped socialism, she agreed that Labour was leaving its traditional grounds as the Tories returned to the traditional values' (Neil, the *Sunday Times*, No. 8,825, 10 October 1993: p. 1). See also *Grg.* 463c3. Therefore, a speaker can use a conducive form only to ask for information, although s/he may be taken by his interlocutor to assert indirectly. Cf. Stokes, 1986: p. 359.

25. Vlastos, 1983 (a).

26. Santas, 1979.

27. Vlastos, 1956; id., 1971 (adapted from the article published in 1957); id., 1972; id., 1983 (a) and (b) (See also Kraut, 1983); id., 1985. It is wrong to deal with Vlastos' views in the above essays as unchanged. He professed (1983 (a): n. 8 at p. 28) that he misinterpreted Socrates' elenchus in his introduction of Plato's *Protagoras* (Vlastos, 1956). Although Vlastos consistently emphasises Socrates' method prior to any conviction even in his earlier two essays, he does not clearly emphasise Socrates' commitment to his beliefs in that introduction (1956, p. xxx) unlike his later essays.

28. Penner, 1992: p. 131.

29. On analyses of the propositions which they interpret that Socrates believes while asking questions, see, for example, the following analyses on the *Laches*: Irwin, 1977: pp. 48-49; Santas, 1969: p. 195 ff.; Vlastos, 1973: pp. 266-269; id. 1994: pp. 109-126.
30. See Vlastos, 1971: p. 10; for his revised view, Vlastos, 1985: n. 2 at p. 5; p. 20; Santas, 1979: pp. 66-72, esp. p. 69; p. 72; Irwin, 1977: p. 39-40; p. 62; Kraut, 1988: p. 179.
31. See notes 27 and 30; see also Irwin, 1977: p. 38; Penner, 1992: p. 131.
32. Irwin, 1977: p. 291, note 33.2.(2). For Aristotle's view on elenchus, cf. Bolton, 1993: esp. pp. 133-135.
33. Santas, 1979: p. 69.
34. Vlastos, 1983 (a): esp. p. 52-55; id., 1991: pp. 45-106, esp. pp. 50-53; n. 55 at p. 95; id., 1994: pp. 13-17, 18-29, 33-37.
35. Penner, 1992: pp. 131-132.
36. Kraut points out that not every premise needs justifying in a proof (1983: p. 62). He questions Vlastos' demand of Socrates' methodological justification in proving a conclusion as well as its premises (*ibid.*: n. 42). He maintains that Vlastos' claim that Socrates' moral beliefs are consistent at any time is not supported by textual evidence such as Socrates' perplexity in the *Hippias Minor*, which Vlastos later takes at face value (1991: pp. 278-280), and that Socrates does not infer his moral belief from Vlastos' Socrates' premises on methodological justification (*ibid.*: p. 68; see also Vlastos, 1983 (a): p. 52, 55).
37. Stokes, 1986: p. 7; note 19 at p. 456. Cf. Smyth, 1956: pp. 596-606; Denniston, 1954: pp. 430-441; Turner, 1987: pp. 9-10.
38. Stokes, 1986: pp. 3-7.
39. *ibid.*: p. 4, 13.
40. *ibid.*: p. 4, 5, 7, 9, 21.
41. See also Frede, who formally argues for this point (1992: pp. 205-212; pp. 215-217).

42. *ibid.*: p. 23.
43. *ibid.*: p. 7 ff.
44. *ibid.*: p. 4, pp. 28-33.
45. *ibid.*: pp. 28-30; cf. Frede, 1992: p. 216.
46. *ibid.*: p. 30.
47. Kidd, 1992: pp. 82-85. His main point of the directive force of Socrates' questions by Plato is based on a misleading premise expressed in the phrases, 'spring from', 'derive from', and 'originate' (p. 84).
48. Kidd, 1992: pp. 83-84.
49. Stokes, 1986: p.28.
50. *ibid.*: p. 30.
51. Taylor, 2nd ed. 1991: pp. xiv-xv.
52. For this situation in the conversation, cf. *Euthd.* 295a10-295c11.
53. Cf. *Mn.* 82b9-85b7; Frede, 1992: pp. 208-209.
54. See Klosko, 1983: pp. 367-373. Apart from the limitation imposed on interpreters' introduction of Socrates' tacit premises (*ibid.*: p. 372), if Socrates' interlocutor interprets that what he understands as the propositions and inferences embodied in Socrates' questions form an unsound argument, then, *he not ought to but can take Socrates to commit a fallacy, if he ascribes the argument to Socrates.* However, pace Klosko, it is not necessary that Socrates' interlocutor '*should* [my italics] judge Socrates guilty of arguing fallaciously' (p. 370, 372). As Klosko suggests (p. 372), Socrates' interlocutor can take Socrates to induce him to commit himself to a fallacious argument *sophistically*, but, insofar as he commits himself to the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions, he *must* clarify Socrates' intention or his own intention or distinguish a fallacious argument from a valid one *if* he judges Socrates guilty of the fallacy and keeps consistency. Penner also confuses the relation between readers and Plato's characters with that between Plato's characters (1992: pp. 131-132).
55. *Chrm.* 163e4-7, 165d4-e2.



56. *Chrm.* 161c5-7, 162e2-5; *Grg.* 453a8-b3, 453b5-c4; *Prt.* 333c5-9.
57. *Prt.* 331c4-d1
58. *Ap.* 19e1-2, 28b3-d5, 28d6-10; *Cri.* 49a6-7, 54d5-6; *Euthd.* 291c4-5; *Grg.* 450c10-d2, 450e4-9, 451a7-c9, 451d1-3, 452e9, 454d4-6, 462b8-9, 462d8-9, 463b3-4, 463c3-5, 463d1-2, 463d4-5, 463e5-6, 464a7-b1, 464b2-3, 467b2, 467b5, 467b7, 467b9, 467d4, 472d6, 472e4, 486e5-487a1, 495e1, 507c8, 510a7-8, 510e6, 523a1-3; *Prt.* 352d3-7, 352e5-6, 353a2-6, 353b1-5, 353e4, 353e5, 354a1-2, 354a7, 354b5, 354c2, 354e3-356c2, 357a3-4; *Rp.* I. 339b4, 345d5-6.
59. *Grg.* 466a9-b2, 466b9-c6.
60. *Euthphr.* 5c8, 5d7, 6e3-4; *Ap.* 27a9; *La.* 190e7-9, 191c8-d1; *Grg.* 449b8, 453b5-c5, 461e1-462a5, 462b1-2, 489d2, 494d4-5, 501d7-9, 505b4-5, 505d2-3; *Hp.Ma.* 287b5, 302e3; *Prt.* 318c8-d4, 329b5-7, 329c6-d2, 331a4, 333d3-4, 334d4-5, 357a3-4, 360e6-8; *Mn.* 72a8-b7, 72c1-4, 72c6-d1, 79e5-6.
61. *Prt.* 311a8-312a2, 330e2-331b1.
62. *Mn.* 89a4-5, 96c2; *Euthphr.* 12d4; *Rp.* I. 335b1, 335d11-13; *Grg.* 453a6-7; *Chrm.* 160d4, 161a10, 161b3-4; *Hp.Ma.* 285b3-4, 297b7-8, 298a9-b1; *Prt.* 313c3-4, 332b3.
63. *Grg.* 467c3-4.
64. *Prt.* 333b8-c2, 350c7-9, 353c1-8, 353c8-e1.
65. *Cri.* 49c10-e3; *La.* 192a1-6, 198a7-9; *Grg.* 468c7-8, 469c1-4; *Prt.* 312d7-e2, 330b6-c2, 330c2-7, 330c7-d1, 330d1-3, 330d3-4, 330d5-e2, 331a6-b8, 340b2; *Ly.* 214c6-d3, 214d3-7; *Euthd.* 289d8-290a5; *Ion* 533c9-535a2; *Hp.Ma.* 302c7-d2, 302e3-5; *Rp.* I. 333b11-c1, 341e2-8; cf. *Chrm.* 165d4-e3; *Hp.Ma.* 300e2-6; *Rp.* I. 345d1-e3; *La.* 192a8-b3; *Grg.* 452a1-d4, 467d3-6; *Prt.* 318b1-d9, 319a10 ff.
66. *Mn.* 89e1-3, 90d5, 96c3-5; *Euthphr.* 12d3; *Cri.* 50a6-c2, 51c3-4; *Ap.* 20a8; *Rp.* I. 334e3-4, 335e7, 346c9-11; *La.* 193d6-7, 193d9, 199a3, 199e6-7; *Ly.* 216a4-5; 217c2; *Euthd.* 279b4-8, 281a1, 288d7, 289b4-6, 289b7-c4, 292d4-6;

*Ion* 535d1-5, 537e3; *Grg.* 480d6-7, 499a1-2, 502c2, 502d5-8; *Chrm.* 168a6-8, 168b5-6; *Hp.Ma.* 288c1-3, 288c6-7, 288e1-2, 293e11, 300a3-4; 303a2-3; *Prt.* 311d4-e4, 311e5-6, 312c8-d3, 312d3-5, 330d1-3, 330d3-4, 332e6, 333a1-b3, 353a2-6, 353c1-8, 353c8-e1, 353e5-354a1, 354a2-7, 354a7-b5, 354b5-c2, 354c2-5, 354c5-d3, 354d4-e2, 357a3-4. Cf. Vlastos, 1994: n. 68 at p. 27.

67.*Cri.* 48b11; *Rp.* I. 350c10-11; *Grg.* 461b7-c1, 463a1-2, 479b4-5, 479c4-5, 479d7-e6; 480a2-3, 496e5, 498e10-11, 515d9-10; *Ly.* 213b8; *Euthd.* 281e2-3, 291d6

68.*Rp.* I. 334a10, 339e5-7; *Chrm.* 164c7-8; *Prt.* 351a5; *Mn.* 79b4; *Grg.* 463a1-2.

69. This verb does not necessarily indicate that the speaker believes the proposition concerned to be true. See Robinson, R. 2nd ed. 1953: p. 97.

70.*Rp.* I. 339e2, 340a5, 340b1-2, 340c9, 348e7; *La.* 195e3, 197a3, 197c3; *Euthd.* 277c3, 283d2, 284c2, 284c3-4, 284d4-5, 286a7, 286b3, 286c9, 294d1-2, 294d6, 295a5, 296c4-5, 296c8, 298d8, 299d5, 299d6, 301d3-4, 302b1, 302d7, 302e1, 302e7; *Ion* 540e5; *Grg.* 499b4-5, 506a2, 508c3; *Chrm.* 162e7-9, 163a10, 163a12, 165b7, 165c1-2; *Hp.Ma.* 290c8, 291b4; *Prt.* 350d2, 350e4, 350e5, 350e6.

71.*La.* 196b1, 198b5; *Grg.* 461b5, 461b8, 467a5, 472b4, 472b7, 476a1, 482b5, 482c5, 486d5, 486e5, 487e1, 487e5, 488a7, 488a8, 489a5, 497a2; *Chrm.* 160e6; *Hp.Ma.* 288e1; *Prt.* 356e4, 357c2, 357c6, 357d7, 359c2, 359d7.

72.*Ap.* 27c10; *Euthd.* 287d4; *Grg.* 467b3, 467b5, 476d2, 476d4; *Prt.* 331a6-7.

73.*Euthd.* 276a7, 277c3, 277a3, 277a4, 277a6, 277b7, 277c1, 277c4, 277c6, 283d2, 284c2, 284c3-4, 284d4-5, 286a7, 286b3, 286c9, 294b10, 294d1-2, 294d6, 295a5, 296c4-5, 296c8, 298d8, 299d5, 299d6, 301d3-4, 302b1, 302d7, 302e1, 302e7

74.*Mn.* 87e3-4, 89c5-6, 96c3-5, 96e7-97a1, 97a3-4, 97a6-7, 98e4-6, 98e7-8, 98e10; *Rp.* I. 342c10, 342d2, 342d3, 342d8, 342e1, 342e5, 346c2-3, 346c12, 350c7-8, 350c9; *Euthd.* 279a4, 279b2, 279b3, 280a5, 280b1, 280b3, 280b4, 280b5, 281a1, 281a6, 281b4, 281c8, 281d1-2, 281e5, 282c3-4, 288d7, 292b1-2,

292c2-3; *Grg.* 461a5, 468b8-c1 (cf. 467c3-4, 467d4-5, 467d6-e1), 476d5, 477c9-d1, 479b4-5, 479c4, 480b3, 500d6-7, 503c7, 506c7, 509e4, 509e5, 515c2, 515c3, 516d5; *Chrm.* 172d7, 172e1; *La.* 198b2, 199b3; *Ly.* 213b8, 218c3, 221c5; *Prt.* 330d4-5, 332b3, 332b6, 332c3, 332c3, 332c9, 332d1-2 (cf. 330e3-331a5, 331b1-8), 332d2-3, 332d6, 332e1, 332e5-6, 332e7 (cf. 332a4-6), 353e4, 353e5, 354a1-2; 354a2-7, 354b5, 354c5, 358b6, 358c3, 358c5-6, 358d4, 359c2, 359e6, 359e7, 360b3, 360b6, 360c5, 360c6, 360a3, 360a6, 360a8; *Euthphr.* 15c8-10; *Cri.* 49a7; *Euthd.* 288e4-289a1 (cf. 281d2-e1).

75.*Rp.* I. 350c7-8, 350c9 (cf. 349d13 ff., 349e10, 350a6, 350b14); *Grg.* 476e3-4; *La.* 193d4-5.

76.*Prt.* 333b3-4; *Euthd.* 276a4. Cf. Kidd, 1992, p. 84.

77.*Cri.* 49a7; *La.* 198b9-10; *Ly.* 216b2; *Grg.* 468d1, 470b1, 496c3-4, 504a4, 516c8-10.

78.*Grg.* 516c8-9; *Cri.* 49c11-d1.

79.*Hp.Ma.* 289b6, 289c1, 290d3-4, 291b5, 294c8-d3, 299c2.

80.*Prt.* 333c2, 350c8; cf. 332b7, 332c1, 332c7, 332c8, 351b4, 351b5-6, 360c7, 360d1, 360d2-3.

81. Vander Waerdt, 1993: pp.2-4.

82. Cf. Kosman, 1992: esp. pp. 82-85.

83. For example, the outset of *Rp.*

84. Cf. Kidd, 1992: p. 84.

85. For expository exchanges, see *Mn.* 72d1-3, 73d9-e6, 75d7-e6; *Euthphr.* 12a3-12d11; *La.* 190e7-9, 191a1-3; *Grg.* 450c10-d2, 450e1-2, 450e4-9, 452a1-d4, 452e9-453a7, 462b6, 462c10-d2; *Rp.* I. 331e5-332a2, 339a5-6; *Hp.Ma.* 284e10-285a2; *Prt.* 330e3-331a4, 341a2-341b7. For exchanges indicating personal divergence, see *Euthd.* 295c4-9; *Grg.* 450e1-2, 450e4-9, 454c6, 462b4-5, 466b6-8, 466d6-e5, 467b3-5, 469c3-4, 491e2-4, 500d4-5, 500e3-4, 510a11-b1; *Prt.* 332a1, 334e2-3, 350c6-7.

86. See Robinson, 1942; Sprague, 1962; Crombie, 1962: pp. 23-26; Klosko, 1983.

87. On the importance of interlocutors' point of view in considering the problem of Socrates' fallacy, see Klosko, 1983: sections II, III, pp. 367-373.

## Endnotes (Chapter II. 1-4)

88. Hoerber, 1962.
89. Grote, 1865: p. 61.
90. Goldschmidt, 1947: pp. 103-112.
91. Sprague, 1962.
92. Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 61-66.
93. Ovink, 1931: pp. 125-126.
94. *ibid.*: pp. 189-201.
95. Müller, 1979: pp. 62-64; p. 67.
96. Sciacca, 1953.
97. Penner, 1973: pp. 139-141; p. 151.
98. Guthrie, 1975: pp. 197-198.
99. Wilamowitz, 1920: pp. 103-104.
100. Zeller, 1839: pp. 154-155.
101. Ritter, 1910: p. 308; *id.*, 1931: p. 39.
102. Apelt, 1912: pp. 204-205.
103. Fouillée, 1872: p. 50.
104. Stallbaum, 1832: p. 234.
105. *ibid.*
106. *ibid.*
107. Grote, 1865: pp. 64-66.
108. Jantzen, 1989: pp. viii-xi.
109. Weiss, 1981: p. 242; p. 251; n. 2 at pp. 255-256.
110. Zembaty, 1991: pp. 51-52.
111. For the concept of the argument in the *Hippias Minor*, cf. Sprague, 1962: p. 79; *Metaph.* 1025a6-13.

112. Weiss, 1981: p. 245 ff.
113. Blundell, 1992: p. 135.
114. *ibid.*
115. *ibid.*
116. *ibid.*: p. 136.
117. Ritter, 1910: pp. 306-307.
118. Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 68-69.
119. Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: pp. 131-132.
120. Jantzen, 1989: p. x: pp. 29-38.
121. Blundell, 1992: pp. 134-135; cf. pp. 165-172.
122. Ritter, 1910: p. 297.
123. Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 101.
124. Tarrant, 1928: p. xxx.
125. Grote, 1865: n. 2 at p. 55.
126. Jantzen, 1989: p. 29.
127. For example, Lysimachus is acquainted with Socrates' father, Sophroniskos, but has not recognised Socrates (*La.* 180e1-181a3). Stokes suggested this point. Hence, pace Blundell (1992: p. 137), Socrates' acquaintance is not decisive whether Eudicus is Socrates' friend.
128. There is no decisive evidence on Hippias' acquaintance with Socrates. Pace Bekker (1816: p. 212), Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 307), Hirschig (1856: p. 276), and Fowler (1926: p. 449), I interpret the connectives, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, at 369c2 in Hippias' speech (369b8-c8), not as causal but as limitative like 'and yet'. Hence I take Hippias to mean by ἀεὶ the previous time in the conversation and, pace Croiset (1920: p. 35 verso) and Waterfield (1987: p. 284), not his acquaintance with Socrates. This was Stokes' suggestion. For the limitative usage of ἐπεὶ, see also 363c1; 369a2.
129. Cf. *Top.* 156a8-157a6; Kraus, who regards the dialogue as a peirastic dialectic (1913: pp. 55-56).
130. See, e.g., Stallbaum, 1832: p. 244; Sprague, 1962: pp. 66-67.
131. See, e.g., Calogero, 1948: p. 7.

132. For a similar expository exchange, cf. *Rp.* 331e5-332a2.
133. For the significance of the role of the silent audience, cf. Woodruff, 1982: pp. 124-125; Phillips, 1989: p. 369; Blundell, 1992: p. 138. For Hippias' boast, see Phillips, 1989: p. 369.
134. See, e.g., Hoerber: 1962, p. 125.
135. Blundell, 1992: p. 134.
136. See Ovink, 1931: p. 136).
137. See Jantzen, 1989: pp. 29-30.
138. See Stallbaum, 1832: p. 229; Croiset, 1920: p. 26 verso; Waterfield 1987: p. 275; Blundell, 1992: p. 137.
139. For δὲ δῆ, see Denniston, 1954: p. 257-259, esp. p. 259; Ast, 1835: vol. 1, p. 424. δῆ indicates that Socrates continues to be silent (Stallbaum, 1832: p. 239). See also *Grg.* 452b4.
140. Compare Socrates after Protagoras' great speech in *Prt.* 328d3-7. See also Stallbaum, 1832: p. 239). Jantzen speculates that Socrates is indifferent to Hippias' display based on Socrates' criticism against sophists' displays in general (1989: p. 29; p. 30 ff.).
141. See Calogero, 1948: p. 3.
142. See Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 297; Jowett, 1871: p. 607; Fowler, 1926: p. 429; Croiset, 1920: p. 26 verso; Waterfield, 1987: p. 275.
143. Ovink, 1931: p. 136; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 126; Muraji, 1974: p. 328; Totsuka, 1975: p. 218.
144. Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 101.
145. Hildebrandt, 1933: p. 48.
146. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 29-30.
147. Smith, 1895: pp. xl-xli; Fowler, 1926: p. 426; Shorey, 1934: p. 87; Blundell, 1992: p. 137; cf. p. 141.
148. Pohlenz, 1913: p. 36; pp. 59-60.
149. Blundell, 1992: p. 137.
150. For the interpretation of ἐλέγχεις as refutation, see Bekker, 1816: p. 199; Hirschig, 1856: vol. I, p. 272; Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 297; Stallbaum,

1832: p. 229; Jowett, 1871: p. 607; Fowler, 1926: p. 429; Ritter, 1910: p. 297; Croiset, 1920: p. 26 verso; Ovink, 1931: p. 136; Mulhern, 1968: p. 283; Waterfield, 1987: p. 283; Jantzen, 1989: p. 29; Phillips, 1989: p. 366; Muraji, 1974: p. 71; Totsuka, 1975: p. 76.

151. Zeller, 1839: p. 150.

152. Guthrie, 1975: p. 192.

153. Stokes suggested that Eudicus uses the modification 'even' in courtesy to Hippias. Among translators, Schleiermacher (1818, p. 297) and Waterfield (1987, p. 275) recognise this particle.

154. See Calogero, 1948: p. 4, contra Smith, 1895: p. 81; Jantzen, 1989: p. 30; Blundell, 1992: p. 141.

155. Cf. Dover, 1974: pp. 11-13.

156. For assentient καὶ μήν, see Denniston, 1954: p. 355; *LSJ*.

157. For διαλέγεσθαι with a special association, see *Euthd.* 295e2, 301e4; *Chrm.* 154e7, 155a5-6; *Prt.* 335b6, 336b2-3, 336b5, 336b9, 336c3, 336c4, 348c5, 348d6.

158. For the view that Socrates is interested neither in praise nor in criticism but in asking a question, see Mulhern, 1968: p. 283; Guthrie, 1975: p. 192; Jantzen, 1989: p. 29; Blundell, 1992: p. 135.

159. For καὶ γάρ at 363b1, cf. Denniston, 1954: p. 108. Socrates' usage, separated from his other speeches, would leave unclear whether καὶ means 'even' or 'also', or whether it modifies 'Apemantus' or the whole sentence. Bekker (1816: p. 199), Hirschig (1856: p. 272), Fowler (1926: p. 429), Totsuka (1975: p. 76), and Waterfield (1987: p. 275) take καὶ as dependent on the whole sentence. Schleiermacher leaves the ambiguity of the original particles (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 297); Jowett does not translate the particles verbatim but suggests that they modify the whole sentence (1871: p. 607).

160. I learned this from Stokes' criticism of my earlier version. For the view that Socrates finds in Hippias' display the same view that he used to hear from Apemantus and Socrates' question directly arises from Hippias' display, see Gauss, 1954: p. 193; Calogero, 1948: p. vii; p. 4. Guthrie denies this view (1975: n. 3 at pp. 191-192). For the view that Hippias referred to Achilles' and Odysseus' characters and/or their comparison, see Grote, 1865: p. 56; Fouillée, 1872: p. 51; Croiset, 1920: p. 25; Schneidewin, 1931: p. 32; Blundell, 1992: p. 140. Apelt (1912: p. 203), Wilamowitz (1920: pp. 101-102) and Jantzen (1989: p. 38; n. 30 at p. 39) interpret that Socrates' question does not directly arise from Hippias' display. On balance, Hippias would have referred not to the same view as Apemantus' but at least to Achilles' character and Odysseus' character in



Homer's poetry according to Socrates' and Hippias' remarks at 364c1-4. See also note 159.

161. For  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  as indication of the subject of a poem, see Kühner: II. 1. p. 471; Smith, 1895: p. 82. See also Schleiermacher, 1818: p. 297; Jowett, 1871: p. 607; Croiset, 1920: p. 26 verso; Fowler, 1926: p. 429; Calogerò, 1948: p. 4; Totsuka, 1975: p. 76; Waterfield, 1987: p. 276.

162. Wilamowitz takes it that Apemantus' view is childish and that Socrates uses it to elicit Hippias' view (1920: p. 102). For the meaning of the theme from a historical point of view, see Blundell, 1992: p. 140; note 41.

163. I learned this point from Stokes' suggestion.

164. Pace Muraji (1974: p. 71) and Totsuka (1975: p. 76), the conjunction is limitative.

165. Stokes, 1986: pp. 7-8.

166. Ritter, 1910: p. 297; Apelt, 1912: p. 203; Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 102; Weiss, 1981: p. 245.

167. Ovink, 1931: p. 146

168. Guthrie, 1975: n. 2 at p. 192; Robinson, 2nd edition, 1953: p. 8.

169. Stokes suggested the point of the admissibility of the vocabulary in the question.

170. For example, we might not expect a right answer of our hearer, when we say, 'Which party will win the next election?'

171. See Waterfield, 1987: p. 276.

172. As to Burnet's punctuation (Burnet, 1903), the introductory combination of particles,  $\tilde{\eta}\ \gamma\grave{\alpha}\rho$ , does not constitute an independent sentence, 'Isn't it so?' Bekker (1816: p. 200), Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 298) and Croiset (1920: p. 26 verso) follow Burnet, but translate the combination of particles like 'Isn't it so?'. But it introduces the contiguous sentence. This punctuation implies that the particle  $\tilde{\eta}$  works as an interrogative signal and the other particle  $\gamma\grave{\alpha}\rho$  as an emphasis on something in the interrogative form or an explanation. See Smith, 1895: p. 83 and Fowler, 1926: p. 431. If we put a full-stop after Eudicus' calling to Hippias, the next sentence is an improbable asyndeton (see Denniston, 1952: pp. 99-123). Therefore, Burnet's punctuation is right.

173. See Waterfield's translation (1987: p. 276).

174. For  $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \gamma\grave{\alpha}\rho$ , see Denniston, 1954: pp. 73-77, 86-89, 108-111.

175. Smith judges the voice of the verb active but its meaning middle (1895: p. 83). See also Fowler, 1926: p. 431; Waterfield, 1987: p. 276.
176. See Smith, 1895: p. 84.
177. For Hippias' pompous rhetoric, see Waterfield, 1987: note 2 at p. 276.
178. For Socrates' sarcasm on Hippias' principle, see Stallbaum, 1832: p. 229; Schleiermacher, 1818: p. 295; Hildebrandt, 1933: p. 48; Friedländer, 1930: p. 125; Blundell, 1992: p. 138.
179. I learned from Stokes Socrates' reason as his urbanity. See also Stokes, 1986: pp. 89-90. Cf. Pohlenz, 1913: p. 56; p. 67; Vlastos, 1991: p. 28.
180. Cf. Calogero, 1948: p. 6; Blundell, 1992: p. 149.
181. Stallbaum, 1832: p. 229.
182. Blundell, 1992: p. 139.
183. This is a typical opening scene in conversations between the Socrates's and their interlocutors as in the *Meno* and the *Euthyphro*.
184. For similar expressions of polymathy, see *Grg.* 447d6-448a3, 458d8-e1, 462a8-9.
185. See Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 104; Stallbaum, 1832: pp. 232-233.
186. For the non-educational connotation of the verb, cf. Jowett, 1871: p. 608; Croiset, 1920: p. 27 verso; Fowler, 1926: p. 433; Waterfield, 1987: p. 608, in contrast to Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 299; Jantzen, 1989: p. 4.
187. Blundell, 1992: p. 137; p. 141.
188. Pohlenz, 1913: p. 59.
189. Sprague, 1962: p. 66.
190. *ibid.*
191. Sprague, 1962: pp. 73-74.
192. Cf. Vlastos, 1991: p. 277.
193. Blundell, 1992: p. 160.
194. Blundell, 1992: p. 137; p. 141.
195. Contrast Blundell, who interprets that *Socrates* implies that Hippias' lecture was unclear.

196. Stokes suggested this point. Pace Jantzen (1989: pp. 40-41) and Sprague (1962: p. 66), Hippias' answer is not irrelevant to Socrates' demand.
197. For the translation 'the bravest', see Jowett, 1871: pp. 607-608; Croiset, 1920: p. 27 verso; Fowler, 1926: p. 433; Taylor, 1926: p. 35; Calogero, 1948: p. 7; Sprague, 1962: p. 66; Mulhern, 1868: p. 283; Weiss, 1981: p. 245; Zembaty, 1989: p. 52; Blundell, 1992: p. 143. Friedländer (3 Aufl. 1964: p. 126) translates 'Beste (Tapferste)'. Calogero (*ibid.*) and Blundell (*ibid.*) further interpret that 'the bravest' means 'the best' as a moral virtue in Homeric world. On the general meaning, see also Ovink (1931: pp. 147-150). Pace Blundell (1992: p. 140), the epithet of Achilles is not necessarily directly taken by Hippias from Homer.
198. On Homer's usage of 'wise', see Blundell, 1992: pp. 141-142.
199. Zeller (1839: p. 150), Kraus (1913: p. 9), Wilamowitz (1920: p. 102), Guthrie (1975: p. 192) and Weiss (1981: p. 245) assume that Hippias means 'wily' or 'cunning' by 'polytropos' in his present speech. Cf. Muraji, 1974: p. 73; Totsuka, 1976: p. 79.
200. See Ritter, 1910: p. 298; Ovink, 1931: p. 136; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 126; Mulhern, 1968: pp. 283-284; Blundell, 1992: note 54 at p. 143.
201. Blundell, 1992: p. 144; p. 145.
202. See Dindorf, [1962]: pp. 9-10; Mullach[ius], 1867: pp. 277-278; Giannantoni, 1990: vol. II, pp. 209-211.
203. Mulhern, 1968: p. 283; Weiss, 1981: p. 245.
204. Cf. 365c1-2, 373a2-5, 369c2-5, 371b2.
205. Calogero, 1948: p. 8.
206. Blundell, 1992: pp. 134-135; pp. 171-172.
207. Blundell, 1992: p. 145.
208. Cf. Ovink's commentary (1931: p. 146), purporting that Homer did not regard the heroes as ethical persons or compare them or make any statements from which an answer to Socrates' question follows logically. Ovink points out that Socrates' question requires a judgement not of a universal type but of a particular person: from a dialectic point of view, the Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* is not concerned with an investigation on a universal concept, specifically, 'a wrongdoer', but two particular heroes (1931: p. 147). For the heroes, Achilles and Odysseus, as paradigmatic types, see Blundell 1992: p. 140; n. 38.
209. As to the adjectives in the superlative form which Hippias introduces under Homer's responsibility, the heroes in question are not consistently described by

the characters in the poetry with the adjectives in question. Achilles is characterised by himself or others with the adjective in superlative form 'the best (or the bravest)' in *Il.* 1. 244, in the comparative in *Il.* 2. 239; 7. 114; cf. 22. 333, and in the positive in *Il.* 1. 131. However, the superlative is not only usually used as a substantive for a leader in the war, but also no form of this adjective functions to give Achilles a distinctive characteristic consistently as used in *Il.* 1. 131, 3. 179, 4. 181 in the positive; 4. 405, 7. 114, 16. 709, 22. 333 in the comparative; 1. 244, 7. 50, 1. 91, 2. 768, 23. 802, 891 in the superlative. There is no passage in which the adjective 'clever' and related forms are used of Nestor. Only Odysseus is characterised with the adjective in the positive form 'polytropos' in *Od.* 1.1; 10. 330, but there is no passage of comparison with other heroes in this respect. Therefore, even if readers assumed that Homer represented some character's characterisation of the heroes in question, readers could not decide which character represents Homer's own characterisation (cf. Blundell, 1992: p. 145).

210. For an excerpt of Homer's specific descriptions of each hero, see Ovink, 1931: pp. 149-154; Blundell, 1992: pp. 141-142. For Hippias' type of discourse on Homer's poetry, see Pfeiffer on Antisthenes' exposition of Homer (Pfeiffer, 1968: pp. 36-37). See also Jantzen, 1989: p. 41.

211. For Socrates' provocativeness, see Schneidewin, 1931: p. 11. For the similar context, see *Rp.* I, 331e5-332a2.

212. As to the conduciveness of the question, the translation type, 'Isn't Achilles polytropos, too?' is taken by Bekker (1816: p. 202), Schneidewin (1931: p. 11), Ovink (1931: p. 136), Calogero (1948: p. vii), Sprague (1962: p. 67). For the view that Socrates' question is taken to be conducive because Socrates presupposes that *πολύτροπος* is 'resourceful', see Mulhern, 1968: p. 283. He interprets that 'He [Socrates] objects especially to Hippias' use of *πολυτροπώτατον*' in asking this question. Weiss assumes (1981: p. 245) that Socrates presupposes that 'polytropos' means 'a neutral ability'. Phillips assumes that Socrates presupposes that 'polytropos' means 'wily' (1989: p. 366).

213. Sprague, 1962: pp. 66-67.

214. See Blundell, 1992: p. 148.

215. Cf. Frede, 1992: pp. 210-212.

216. Cf. Mulhern, 1968: p. 283.

217. See 371e6. For Plato's colloquial use of this categorically negative answer, see also *Grg.* 469b11, 472d9, 474c9, 496a6; *Smp.* 202d9; *Rp.* V. 449b7; *Phdr.* 276c6.

218. See Blundell, 1992: p. 144.

219. For example, according to *Od.* 9-12, not Achilles but Odysseus is the most wandering.

220. For example, according to *Od.* 3. 240 ff.; 9. 19; 13 ff., not Achilles but Odysseus is the wiliest.

221. For this type of Socratic question, see *Rp.* I 338c4-d2; *Gorg.* 490c1-7; *La.* 194e4.

222. On the reading of 364e7,  $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$  in the manuscript F is omitted in T and W according to Burnet's critical apparatus (Burnet, 1903; see also his *Praefatio*). Bekker (1816: p. 202), Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1817: p. 299), Stallbaum (1832: pp. 242-243), Hirschig (1856: p. 272), Jowett (1871: p. 608), and Fowler (1926: p. 432) follow the omission in T and W; Burnet (1903), Croiset (1920: p. 28 recto), Shorey (1934: p. 87), Calogero (1948: pp. 9-10), Weiss (1981: p. 245; p. 246), Waterfield (1987: p. 278), and Jantzen's revision of Schleiermacher's translation (1989: p. 5) take the reading of F. Stallbaum takes it that  $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$  is an addition glossing the preceding word  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ , and interprets that Hippias develops the explanation of 'simple' by introducing Homer's passage. He interprets that Hippias is focusing exactly on the explanation of the word, 'simple', which he introduces while Socrates, referring to Hippias' explanation, replies, 'Now probably I have understood what you mean: ...' (1832: pp. 242-243). Calogero argues against Stallbaum that Socrates' references to his understanding are closely connected and that Socrates' answer is concerned not with Hippias' explanation of the word, 'simple' but with the whole answer of Hippias'. Calogero interprets that Hippias is not explaining 'simplest' but the meaning which he attributes to 'polytropos'; specifically, Hippias is explaining that a false man, namely, a man who tells a lie in not saying what he thinks is contrary to a simple man who says what he thinks and what he thinks to be right (1948: p. 9).

According to Burnet, although Dodds doubts Burnet's report of F (1959: pp. 42-43; see also pp. 34-56), we cannot say that there is a significant tendency that if any reading exists in F but not in T or W, it is an interpolation; further, the collocation of the word  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma$  and the word  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\eta}\varsigma$  is not quite unplatonic (see note 223); however, if we dare to remark on the textual problem based on the interpretation of the conversation, in the *Hippias Minor*, the readings of 364e7 and 366b5 in F which Burnet follows make clearer the proposition in the speeches exchanged by the interlocutors, but leave less room for the interlocutors' conversational tactics, if any. Therefore, if we may believe T and W, *ceteris paribus*, instead of F, we have more reason to interpret that, while Hippias seems to be explaining the words which he introduces, he is not necessarily making the meanings of the predicates definite.

223. See *LSJ*. Plato uses 'simple' of a person in *Lg.* V. 738e7, *Rp.* II. 361b6, 382e8, *Cra.* 406a2. The collocation with 'true' is not unusual in his usage. See also *Cra.* 405c2. For the connotations of 'simple' in opposition to 'polytropos' as a predicate without any established connotation except for predicability of

'Odysseus', Hippias associates it with ἀψευδής (369c4) and δολερός (369c5), and Socrates shows that he understands that Hippias opposes it to 'ἀλαζών' (369e4). For examples of 'simple' in contrast to δόλος, see Ar., *Plutus*, 1157-1158 and Eur., *Iphigeneia Aulidensis*, 927. διπλοῦς and ποικίλος as opposite predicates to ἀπλοῦς are fairly associable with 'polytropos'. ἀπλοῦς is predicated of Achilles in Eur., *Iphigeneia*, a926 and ποικίλος of Odysseus in Eur., *Iphigeneia Aulidensis*, 526.

224.*Rp.* II, 382e8; *Phd.* 89d6.

225.Cf. *Cra.* 405c2; Aesch., fr. 176; Eur., *Phoenissae* 469; Xen., *Anabasis* 2.6.22; *EE*, 1233b38-39; (spurious) *De virtutibus et vitiis* 1250b41-42. For the association of 'simple' with 'right', see Dem., 18, 10; 19, 203; 20, 93; 20, 123; 45, 45.

226.The predicate, 'false' is predicable of persons as indicate the examples of *LSJ: II.* 4.235 ('liars'); Soph., *Philoctetes* 992 ('a liar'); Soph., *Antigone* 657 ('a liar'); Eur., *Orestes* 1608 ('an involuntary falsehood-utterer'; Th., 4.27 ('an involuntary falsehood-utterer'); *Tht.* 148b8 ('an involuntary falsehood-utterer'); *Chrm.* 158d3 ('an involuntary falsehood-utterer'). It is arguable whether there are any examples of the predicate used in the meaning of 'a liar' in the fourth century B.C.. There are many examples predicated of a proposition embodied in a speech act, but few predicated of a person. The example in Xen. *Cyropaideia* 5.2.4 means 'an involuntary falsehood-utterer'.

227.καί, 364e8.

228.In Hippias' actual explanation, the conclusion precedes the premise P.2. as γὰρ (365b5) indicates.

229.Calogero, 1948, p. 10.

230.Cf. Mulhern, 1986: pp. 284-286.

231.For Achilles' stress on the realisation of an intended act, see Labarbe, 1949: pp. 50-65. Cf. Blundell, 1992: n. 60 at p. 144.

232. By the commissive acts I refer to promise and statement and their related speech acts. Cf. Austin, 1962: ch. xii.

233.For Achilles' abhorrence of insincerity, see Calogero, 1948: p. vii.

234.Although Odysseus might commit wiles in missing Agamemnon's last remark (*Il.* 9. 160-161) when he tells Achilles about Agamemnon's offer (*ibid.* 264-298; see Sowerby, 1985: p.32), Achilles makes this speech, if as a snide remark, probably not against Odysseus but against Agamemnon (cf. *ibid.*, 197-198; 344-345; 375-376; see Hainsworth, 1993: p. 102).

235. Cf. *Od.* 9. 19. If Hippias justifies himself in regarding Achilles as sincere by this inference, he can justify himself in regarding Odysseus as wily because Odysseus professes to be wily.

236. For Socrates' intention of questioning in this speech, see Jowett, 1871: p. 609; Croiset, 1920: p. 29 verso; Jantzen, 1989: p. 42; Weiss, 1981: p. 245. Totsuka (1975: p. 80) and Muraji (1974: p. 74) translate Socrates' illocutionary force (see Austin, 1962: ch. viii) by a Japanese modal particle, 'ne', which can function confirmatorily or interrogatively, in contrast to the explicitly interrogatively functional particle, 'ka'.

237. See note 225.

238. Cf. Ritter, 1910: p. 298; Mulhern, 1968: pp. 284-285; Weiss, 1981: p. 245.

239. Cf. 370e5-9, 371d8-e3.

240. Pace Zembaty (1989: p. 54), I agree with Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 300), Jowett (1871: p. 609), Fouillée (1872: p. 52), Ritter (1910: p. 298), Jantzen (1989: p. 6).

241. 366a5-6, 367c7-d2, 368a6-7, 368e4-369a1, 369b3-4. For the usage with a definite article in the general meaning, *Mn.* 78b6, *Ly.* 212b4, *Ion.* 537d3-4, 537e2-3, *Prt.* 329d7, 330e6, 331a2-3, 331d4-5, 331d8.

242. See Kahn, 1992: n. 24 at p. 249.

243. Pace Weiss (1981: p. 245), Socrates is not necessarily enquiring about polytropia in general, but as she indicates (*ibid.*), Socrates asks about Hippias' opinion and, pace Blundell (1992: p. 145), Socrates does not necessarily establish his refutandum with clear preconception about falsity and truth in Hippias' usage.

244. Gauss, 1954: pp. 196-197.

245. Ritter, 1910: p. 308; Pohlenz, 1913: n. 3 at p. 71; cf. Xen. *Memorabilia* 4.2.17; *Rp.* 382c6-d3, 459c2-d3.

246. See Sprague, 1962: p. 74.

247. See Grote, 1865: p. 56; Ovink, 1931: p. 136; Calogero, 1948: p. 13; Mulhern, 1968, p. 285; Zembaty, 1989: p. 54; n. 8 at p. 67.

248. Zembaty, 1989: n. 8 at p. 67.

249. Blundell, 1992: n. 65 at p. 145.

250. Vlastos, 1991: p. 276.

251. Bekker, 1816: p. 203; Stallbaum, 1832: p. 230; Zeller, 1839: p. 150; Hirschig, 1856: p. 273; Grote, 1865: p. 56; Fouillée, 1872: p. 51; Hunziker, 1873: p. 28; Ræder, 1905: p. 94; Ritter, 1910: p. 298; Apelt, 1912: p. 203; Kraus, 1913: pp. 9-11; Croiset, 1920: p. 28; Taylor, 1926: p. 85; Schneidewin, 1931: p. 9; Ovink, 1931: p. 136; Hildebrandt, 1933: p. 48; Leisegang, 1941: col. 2379; Calogero, 1948: p. 10; Dupréel, 1948: p. 196; Gauss, 1954: p. 193; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 126; Guthrie, 1975: p. 192; Waterfield, 1987: p. 278; Jantzen, 1989: pp. 42-43; Kahn, 1992: n. 24 at p. 249.

252. Mulhern, 1968.

253. Taylor, 1926: p. 35; Sprague, 1962: p. 67; Waterfield, 1987: pp. 276-277; Kahn, 1992: n. 2 at p. 249.

254. Kraus, 1913: pp. 8-10.

255. Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818.

256. Modified from Jowett's (1871), Fowler's (1926), and Waterfield's translations (1987).

257. For the similar attempt in Japanese, see Totsuka, 1976: pp. 79-80.

258. Vlastos, 1991: p. 276-277.

259. For virtue in an achievement sense, cf. Gulley, 1968: p. 85; Penner, 1973: n. 5 at p. 137.

260. For Socrates' reference to Hippias' quoted lines, see Waterfield, 1987: p. 278; Blundell, 1992: p. 145.

261. Grote, 1865: p. 56.

262. Shorey, 1933: pp. 86-87.

263. Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 125.

264. Cf. *Phdr.* 275d4-e5; *Prt.* 347e1-348a9.

265. Cf. *Ap.* 21b3.

266. Guthrie, 1975: p. 192.

267. Friedländer, 2 Aufl. 1964: p. 126.

268. *ibid.*: n. 2 at p. 192.

269. Waterfield, 1987: n. 3 at p. 278.

270. Grote, 1865: p. 63; Gomperz, 1912: p. 295; cf. Woodruff, 1982: p. 124.



271. See, e.g., 365e10-366a1; cf. Pohlenz, 1913: p. 61.

272. Sprague, 1962: p. 66.

273. Grote, 1865: p. 64.

274. Gomperz, 1912: p. 291.

275. See Zembaty, 1989: p. 64; cf. Vlastos, 1994: p. 21; Blundell, 1992: pp. 147-149. Pace Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 295), Hippias' speech on his Olympic display (363c7-d4) has a significant role in the conversation.

## Endnotes (Ch. II, 5)

276. For Socrates' intention of examination of Hippias here, see Pohlenz, 1913: p. 59; Kraus, 1913: pp. 54-57; Calogero, 1948: p. 13; Zembaty, 1989: p. 55; Blundell, 1992: p. 147.
277. Zembaty, 1989: p. 64; Blundell, 1992: pp. 148-149.
278. Hoerber, 1962: p. 125.
279. See, e.g., Apelt, 1912: pp. 225-226.
280. See *Metaph.* 1025a1-13; cf. *EN* 1129a6-17, 1127b14-15.
281. See Zembaty, 1989: pp. 57-58; pp. 64-65; n. 19 at p. 69.
282. *loc. cit.*
283. Weiss, 1981.
284. *ibid.*: pp. 244-245.
285. Zembaty, 1989: p. 58.
286. Mulhern, 1968: pp. 284-286.
287. Weiss, 1981: pp. 243-244.
288. *ibid.*: n. 51 at p. 260.
289. For other criticisms on Weiss, see also Vlastos, 1991: n. 134 at p. 277; Waterfield, 1987: pp. 276-277.
290. For Socrates' question about Hippias' opinion here, see Calogero, 1948: p. 13.
291. Cf. Jantzen, 1989: n. 10 at pp. 50-51.
292. Sprague, 1962: p. 67.
293. Sprague, 1962: p. 67.
294. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 52-55.
295. Jantzen, 1989: p. 64.
296. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 79-83.
297. Jantzen, 1989: p. 59.

- 298.Jantzen, 1989: n. 26 at p. 62.
- 299.Jantzen, 1989: pp. 55-56.
- 300.Jantzen, 1989: p. 59.
- 301.Jantzen, 1989: p. 63.
- 302.Jantzen, 1989: p. 63-64.
- 303.Jantzen, 1989: pp. 50-56.
- 304.Pace Fouillée (1872: p. 35), Socrates does not put forward his opinion in a series of questions; neither does Socrates intend to define ability as the potentiality which determines particular actuality. Pace Vlastos (1992: n. 129 at p. 276), Socrates focuses on what *not* Socrates *but* Hippias means by ψευδής.
- 305.Kahn, 1992: p. 249.
- 306.Sprague, 1962: p. 67.
- 307.Calogero (1948: p. 13) and Bekker (1816: p. 201) take the accusative as limitative.
- 308.For this point, cf. Weiss, 1981: p. 253.
- 309.For deceit in an achievement sense, cf. Gould, 1955: p. 42.
- 310.See Kraus, 1913: pp. 12-13.
- 311.For example, when we say, 'I *am able to* speak an unknown language [if I learn it],' I understand this kind of potentiality.
- 312.For example, when we say, 'I *am able to* run 100 m. in 13 seconds [if every condition is favourable, although my record is 14 seconds],' I understand this kind of potentiality.
- 313.For example, when we say, 'I *am able to* spell my name [if I wish to],' I understand this kind of potentiality.
- 314.Kraus, 1913: p. 10.
- 315.Fouillée, 1872: p. 35.
- 316.Mulhern, 1968: p. 285.
- 317.Weiss, 1981: n. 51 at p. 260.
- 318.Blundell, 1992: n. 70 at p. 146.

319. Waterfield, 1987: p. 277.
320. See Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 128.
321. For the category mis-match between sincerity and ability, see Smith, 1895: p. 90.
322. Kraus (1913: pp. 8-11) analyses the ambiguity involved in falsity into (a) inclination to deceive, (b) ability to deceive, and (c) ability to speak falsely, correspondingly to that involved in truth.
323. For the element of achievement in this expression, see Gulley, 1968: p. 85; Blundell, 1992: p. 146.
324. Sprague, 1962: p. 67.
325. Hoerber, 1962: pp. 126-127; cf. *Metaph.* 1025a1-13; *EN* 1127b14-15.
326. Sprague, 1962: p. 67.
327. Weiss, 1981: pp. 245-246.
328. Jantzen, 1989: n. 19 at p. 57.
329. Weiss, 1981: pp. 245-246; n. 18 at p. 257.
330. Mulhern (1968: p. 284), Weiss (1981: p. 245), Zembaty (1989: p. 53) and Blundell (1992: pp. 144-145) interpret thus.
331. Mulhern, 1986: pp. 284-285.
332. Cf. *ibid.*: p. 285.
333. Pace Weiss (1981: p. 245), although Socrates introduces 'polytropos' into his speech, he does not necessarily 'takes great pains to ascertain that Hippias does indeed literally identify *polutropos* and *pseudēs*.' In association with the predicate, 'polytropos', Socrates does not necessarily preconceive anything but Homer's epithet for Odysseus (*Od.* 1.1) or Homer's Odysseus' self-proclaimed characteristic (*Od.* 10.330).
334. Sprague, 1962: p. 68.
335. Sprague, 1962: p. 67.
336. Cf. Waterfield, 1987: p. 270; Jantzen, 1989: n. 19 at p. 57.
337. See *Euthd.* 295b4-c3, *Grg.* 466b11-e2.
338. Hoerber, 1962: p. 125.

339.Cf. *Mx.* 246e7-247a2, *Tht.* 177a8, *Rp.* III 409c6; *Dem. Olynthiac I.* 3; *EN* 1144a26-28, *EE* 1221a13, 36-37. See also Des Places, 1964; Woodhouse; Burnyeat, 1990: p. 34.

340. See Ross, 1992 [first published in 1925]: p. 156; Gauthier, 1959: II.2. p. 551; Rackham, 1934: pp. 366-367; Greenwood, 1909: pp. 120-121; p. 205; Burnet, 1900: p. 284; Stewart, 1892: vol. 2, p. 102; Rassow, 1874: pp. 124-125.

341. *Metaph.* 1025a6-9

342. Smith, 1895: p. 90.

343. Zembaty, 1989: p. 63.

344. Sprague, 1962: p. 68.

345. Hoerber, 1962: p. 125.

346. For the context in which Socrates' interlocutor takes this term as morally neutral or negative, see *Rp.* 348d2-3, 349d3-4, d6; *La.* 192d10-12; *Grg.* 489e8, 491b1, 491b2; *Prt.* 352c7. For the meaning of φρόνησις here, cf. Stokes, 1986: pp. 80-82; Vlastos, 1994: pp. 109-116; Fouillée, 1872: pp. 31-32; Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 70-71; Ovink, 1931: p. 137; pp. 166-167; Goldschmidt, 1947: p. 109; Calogero, 1948: pp. 13-14; Gould, 1955: n. 2 at p. 42; Guthrie, 1975: p. 192; Jantzen, 1989: p. 7; p. 56; Zembaty, 1989: p. 63; Blundell, 1992: p. 146, 152.

346.

347. Jantzen, 1989: n. 19 at p. 57.

348. *ibid.*

349. Cf. Müller, 1979: p. 68; p. 74, *contra* Ritter, 1910: p. 298; Ræder, 1905: p. 94; Pohlenz, 1913: p. 60; Tarrant, 1928: p. xviii; Shorey, 1933: p. 88; Hoerber, 1962: p. 125; Mulhern, 1968: p. 285; Weiss, 1981: p. 245; Blundell, 1992: p. 146. As Vlastos argues (1991: p. 277), Socrates does not obtain Hippias' admission 'by dishonest means', but turns out to seem to Hippias to weave a plot into his speeches (369b8).

350. Jowett (1871: p. 609), Smith (1895: p. xli), Sprague (1962: p. 68), Guthrie (1975: p. 192), Jantzen (1989: p. 56) and Blundell (1992: p. 147) take ἀπατεῶνες explicitly in a sense of actuality. Even Weiss does so (1981: p. 246; cf. p. 245).

351. Cf. *La.* 192e.

352. Zembaty, 1989: p. 54.

353. For Socrates' question here, cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Jowett, 1871: p. 610.
354. Sprague, 1962: p. 68; p. 79.
355. Waterfield, 1987: n. 2 at p. 279.
356. Cf. Leisegang, 1941: col. 2379.
357. Apart from the difficulty in identifying Antisthenes' view in Porphyrius' scholium on *the Odyssey*, 1.1 (Mullach[ius], 1867: p. 277; Dindorf, [1962]: pp. 9-11; Giannantoni, 1990: pp. 209-211), Hippias faces the similar task of distinguishing the heroes by interpreting the predicate, 'polytropos', except for Hippias' introduction of the predicates, 'true' and 'false' (cf. Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 57-59).
358. See, e.g., Anscombe, 2nd ed. 1963: pp. 11-15.
359. See Dover, 1974: pp. 119-122.
360. Cf. Blundell, 1992: p. 142; n. 53 at pp. 142-143.
361. Cf. *Euthd.* 276a3-c7.
362. Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 456.
363. Hoerber, 1962: p. 125.
364. Stokes suggested the possibility of this reading apart from its implications.
365. See Kühner: II. 2. pp. 9-12; cf. *Euthd.* 273e2-3.
366. *Chrm.* 169a7, *Prt.* 329b2, *Rp.* 405c1-2.
367. *Hp.Mi.* 365d7, *Euthd.* 273c8, *Grg.* 457a5-6.
368. *Prt.* 341a9, *Cra.* 398d6, *Tht.* 154d8.
369. *Cra.* 369e4-397a1; *Sph.* 232c9-10; *Plt.* 259a6-7; *Rp.* 333e6.
370. *Cra.* 398d7, *Rp.* 488d2.
371. *Prt.* 259a6.
372. *Cra.* 369e4-397a1, *Rp.* 333e6, 334a7, 426c5, *Sph.* 232e9.
373. *Prt.* 312d9, 312e1, 312e3, *Rp.* 426c5.
374. Jantzen, 1989: p. 57.
375. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 57-58.

- 376.*Ap.* 22d7, *La.* 194d1-2, *Ly.* 206a1, *Prt.* 312d1, *Mn.* 93e3, *Th.* 154e3-4.
- 377.*Ap.* 19c6; *Rp.* 405b9-c1.
- 378.Schleiermacher, 1818: p. 302.
- 379.Croiset, 1920: p. 30 verso.
- 380.Jantzen, 1989: p. 58.
- 381.Muraji, 1974: p. 77.
- 382.Totsuka, 1975: p. 83.
- 383.Vlastos, 1991: p. 276.
- 384.Blundell, 1992: p. 147.
- 385.Bekker, 1816: p. 205; Hirschig, 1856: p. 274; Jowett, 1871: p. 610; Fowler, 1926: p. 439; Waterfield, 1987: p. 279; n. 1 at p. 279.
- 386.Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 302.
- 387.Schneidewin, 1931: p. 9.
- 388.Jantzen, 1989: p. 58.
- 389.Stallbaum, 1832: p. 231, p. 246.
- 390.Weiss, 1981: p. 243.
- 391.See Bekker, 1816: p. 204; Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 301; Stallbaum, 1832: p. 246; Hirschig, 1856: p. 274; Smith, 1895: pp. 90-91; Croiset, 1920: p. 30 verso; Fowler, 1926: p. 437; Ovink, 1931: p. 137; Calogero, 1948: p. 14; Muraji, 1974: p. 276; Guthrie, 1975: p. 192; Totsuka, 1975: p. 82; Waterfield, 1987: p. 279; Zembaty, 1989: p. 55; Blundell, 1992: p. 146.
- 392.Lyons, 1963: pp. 161-166.
- 393.Lyons, 1963: p. 161; pp. 170-173.
- 394.See *ibid.*: pp. 173-174.
- 395.See, e.g., *Prt.* 311a8-312e6.
- 396.367d7, 368a6-7, 367a9, 367c4, 367c5, 367c8, 367d8, 368a8-b1, 368e5. Contrast 369b3-4.
- 397.Socrates might not attend to the degree of opposition, assuming that the grammatical form has no indication but contradiction. For this usage, see

*Euthphr.* 7a8.

398. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 302; Croiset, 1920: p. 30; Jowett, 1871: p. 610; Jantzen, 1989: p. 7; cf. Totsuka, 1975: p. 88, who uses a Japanese confirmatory or interrogative particle, 'ne'.

399. Croiset, 1920: p. 30 recto.

400. Burnet, 1903; Bekker, 1816: p. 205; Hermann, 1851: p. 404; Fowler, 1926: p. 438; Calogero, 1948: pp. 14-15; Muraji, 1974: p. 77; Totsuka, 1975: p. 83.

401. Stallbaum, 1832: p. 246; Hirschig, 1856: p. 274.

402. Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 302; Jowett, 1871: p. 610; Waterfield, 1987: p. 279.

403. e.g., *Ap.* 22d3, *Grg.* 499c4.

404. e.g., *Ap.* 20e3, 21b6, *Euthd.* 283e8, *Grg.* 449b7.

405. e.g., *Rp.* 338b6, *Grg.* 467c2, *Prt.* 353d3.

406. Vlastos, 1991: pp. 276-277.

407. See also 365e3, 365e7; cf. 365e8-9.

408. The relation among one's wish, one's realisation of it and one's ability to realise it is unspecific in a description of a non-temporal state of an agent. Especially, if we assume that choice, will or wish is a necessary accompaniment to its related action although they are not an action by themselves, we have to say that if x does an action P, x necessarily wishes to do P. However, if x wishes to do P, x does not necessarily do P. Accordingly, if we say that x does P if x wishes to do P, we refer to the proposition about ability. Hence, the point of the expression here is that Socrates introduces the idea of the ability endorsed by experience, i.e., such ability as doing something *whenever* one wishes to. Such relation between wish and deed, whether or not we introspectively recognise that we wish to do what we are doing, can be understood, primarily, in reference to the description type of (a) the gap between an agent's wish and realisation in the agent's past action or (b) the gap between an agent's wish and ability in the agent's expected action. For the type (a), we say 'x wished to do y, but was not able to do y,' in contrast to saying simply, 'x did not do y' (cf. Th. 2.19.1, 2.33.2-3, 3.103.1; 4.12.2; 4.33.1-2; 4.33.2-34.1; 4.78.4-5; 4.129.4; 5.33.2; 5.55.2; 6.38.4; 6.64.1; 7.79.2-3; 8.31.3;). For the type (b), we say, 'x wished to, if x could, do y, and did (or did not do) y' in contrast to saying, 'x wished to do y and did y' (cf. Th. 2.8.4; 2.67.1; 2.77.2; 4.9.4; 4.70.2; 4.83.2; 5.4.5; 5.33.1; 5.36.2; 6.1.1; 6.11.6; 6.57.3; 6.88.6; 6.90.2; 6.91.1; 7.12.1-2; 7.46.1, 7.56.2; 7.72.3; 8.6.1; 8.52.1; 8.100.3; 8.100.5; 8.104.4).



409. The verb, 'verify', is my recoinage which can mean 'being honest' ('telling what one intends to do or what one believes true' or 'attempt to achieve one's commitment' or, unusually, 'achieve one's commitment'), 'speak truly' ('tell what one believes true and is true', 'tell what one believes false but is true', or 'what one tells is true, whether one believes it to be true or not'), or 'tell the truth' ('tell what one believes true or what one intends to do').

410. Grote, 1865: p. 67.

411. Kahn, 1992: n. 24 at p. 249; cf. *Metaph.* 1025a8.

412. Weiss, 1981: p. 244. Hippias might take Socrates to stipulate the meaning of falsity but Socrates does not necessarily does it. do /

413. Vlastos, 1991: p. 277.

414. For the generic use, *Prt.* 331c1-2; 350c6-351b2; *Hp.Ma.* 296e5-6 in contrast to 296e1-2.

415. Taylor (2nd ed. 1991: pp. 158-159) doubts the establishment of logical equivalence in relation to the controversy over the interpretation of a definite article at *Prt.* 350b7. In Plato's text, a definite article is not necessarily put before what we can take as a definiens or a definiendum (for the omission of a definite article before a definiens, see *Chrm.* 159b8; *La.* 192d10, 196d1-2; for that before a definiendum, see *Chrm.* 159b2-3, 161b6; *La.* 190e3, 191e10, 192a1, 192b2; *Mn.* 71e1-2, 71d5; *Euthphr.* 6e10-7a1; for that before both, see *La.* 190c5-6; *Mn.* 76d4-5, 76a7, 77b4-5, 78c4-5; *Hp.Ma.* 287e4). However, it does not necessarily follow that the formulation in which a definite article is put before both substantive terms is not a definition.

416. Hunziker, 1873: p. 28; Pohlenz, 1913: p. 61; both base on *Metaph.* 1025a6 their interpretation of taking Socrates' speech as a definition. Mulhern (1986: p. 286), Weiss (1981: p. 244), Vlastos (1991: p. 276), and Blundell (1992: p. 149) also take this proposition as a definition.

417. See p. 103-104.

418. Mulhern (1968: p. 286), Weiss (1981: p. 244), Waterfield (1987: p. 279), Vlastos (1991: p. 276) and Blundell (1992: p. 147) take this interpretation.

419. Cf. *Prt.* 350b7; Adam, 1893: p. 175; Stokes, 1986: pp. 337-338.

420. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113.

421. Stallbaum, 1832: p. 230; p. 247; Grote, 1865: p. 57; Ritter, 1910: p. 298; Kraus, 1913: p. 8; Croiset, 1920: p. 30 verso; Calogero, 1948: p. 15; Sprague, 1962: p. 68; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 128; Muraji, 1974: p. 77; Totsuka, 1975: p. 77, translate 'A man who *is able to* do what he wishes to do whenever

he wishes to is able', but the insertion of 'able to' in the relative pronoun clause is grammatically implausible, and unnecessary. Socrates introduces the exposition of potentiality into his question although the following example including 'able' (366c2) indicates Socrates' inconsistent locution (cf. Schneidewin, 1931: p. 9.). For the exposition of ability, see Ovink, 1931: p. 137; Leisegang, 1941: col. 2379; Gulley, 1968: pp. 89-90; Guthrie, 1975: p. 192; Blundell, 1992: p. 148.

422. See Stallbaum, 1832: p. 230; p. 247; Smith, 1895: p. 91; Müller, 1979: pp. 68-69; Santas, 1979: p. 149; Jantzen, 1989: p. 58.

423. For this rhetoric, see Schneidewin, 1931: p. 9; Calogero, 1948: p. 15; Gulley, 1968: p. 85; Croiset, 1920: p. 30 verso.

424. Cf. Aquinas, *In XII Lib. Metaph.* 1137; Kraus, 1913: p. 14.

425. Cf. Vlastos, 1991: n. 134 at p. 277.

426. Cf. Robinson, D. B., 1971: p. 213; Mulhern, 1968: p. 286; Blundell, 1992: p. 147.

427. Vlastos, 1991: p. 276.

428. For Socrates' non-commitment in the conversation, cf. Zembaty, 1989: pp. 63-64; Blundell, 1992: p. 147.

429. For the possibility of this ambivalence, cf. Penner, p. 139: pp. 146-147; Irwin, 1977: p. 77, contra Jantzen, 1989: pp. 62-64.

430. See Kraus, 1913, pp. 8-11 (see note 322). Plato uses the couple of the predicates,  $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$  or  $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  and  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\eta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ , irrespective of a commissive context (*Prt.* 358a3-4, *Rp.* 338b4-6) or ambiguously either in a commissive context or irrespective of it (*Euthd.* 284a4-6, 284c5-6). Further, he uses  $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  in a commissive context (*Ap.* 20e3, 21b6, *Grg.* 449b7) or irrespective of it (*Rp.* 338b6, *Euthd.* 287a1, *Prt.* 353a3, *Grg.* 467c2);  $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$  irrespective of a commissive context (*Euthd.* 286c6, 286d1); and  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\eta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$  in a commissive context (*Euthd.* 284d2, 294c2, *Ap.* 17b5) or irrespective of it (*Hp.Ma.* 302e3).

431. See, e.g., Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: pp. 302-304; Stallbaum, 1832: p. 230; Calogero, 1948: p. 17; Waterfield, 1987: p. 280; cf. *Metaph.* 1025a6-9.

432. Kraus, 1913: pp. 8-10.

433. Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 102.

434. Grote, 1865: p. 57.

435. Croiset, 1920: p. 31 verso.
436. Fowler, 1926: p. 439; p. 441.
437. Santas, 1979: p. 148.
438. Ovink, 1931: pp. 166-167.
439. Vlastos, 1991: pp. 276-277.
440. For the soundness of the argument about ability to tell the truth or a lie, see Stallbaum, 1832: pp. 230-231; Zeller, 1839: p. 150; p. 153; Smith, 1895: p. 91; p. 93; p. 96; Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 60-61; p. 66; Croiset, 1920: p. 23; Taylor, 1926: p. 36; Guthrie, 1975: p. 193; Waterfield, 1987: p. 277; Weiss, 1981: p. 244; Zembaty, 1989: p. 54; cf. *Metaph.* 1025a6-9.
441. Fouillée, 1872: p. 54; p. 60; Kraus, 1913: p. 15; Ovink, 1931: pp. 161-163; p. 165; Sprague, 1962: pp. 75-76; Totsuka, 1975: p. 222; Santas, 1979: pp. 148-149; Vlastos, 1991: pp. 276-277; Blundell, 1992: p. 146. Cf. Jantzen, 1989: p. 58; pp. 62-64, who denies the soundness of both arguments.
442. See Santas (*ibid.*) and Vlastos (*ibid.*).
443. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 50-64.
444. Vlastos, 1991: n. 134 at p. 277.
445. For the difference between lying and speaking falsely without intention of lying, see Vlastos, 1991: n. 30 at p. 276.
446. Kraus, 1913: p. 14.
447. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 55-56; p. 59.
448. Jantzen, 1989: n. 19 at p. 57; n. 26 at p. 62.
449. Sprague, 1962: pp. 75-76.
450. Jantzen overestimates its implication (1989: p. 48).
451. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 50-51; p. 59; p. 61; p. 62.
452. Ræder admits the applicability of ability to tell a lie to ability to do injustice (1905: p. 94). Cf. Jantzen, 1989: p. 108.
453. I learned this reason from Stokes.
454. See pp. 132-133.

455.Cf. Blundell, 1992: pp. 158-159.

456.Cf. Weiss, 1981: p. 246.

457.For Socrates' use of a conditional sentence in his question for a representative case, cf. *Mn.* 74b4, 74b3-e3, 75a5-6; *Euthphr.* 7b6-c1, 7c3-5, 7c7-8, 7c10-d5, 7d8-9, 7e1-4; *Cri.* 50a6-c2; *Ap.* 28b3-5; *Rp.* 332c5-8, 341e2-8; *La.* 192a8-b3, 198a7-9, *Io.* 540e1-3; *Grg.* 450e6-9, 451a7, 451a7-c9, 454d4-6, 469d1-e6; *Chrm.* 165d4-6, *HpMa.* 287c1-3ff., 289c9-d5; *Prt.* 311b-312a, 330c-331b, 353a2-6, 353c-356e.

458.See Blundell, 1992: pp. 148-149.

459.Cf. Kraus, 1913: p. 10.

460.Cf. Blundell, who ascribes Hippias disregarding moral context ultimately to his inverted moral idea of giving priority to a means (ability) but not an end (disposition) (1992: pp. 148-149).

461 *Metaph.* 981a1-3.

462.See Sprague, 1962: p. 68.

463. Fouillée sees the dialectic ascension from actuality as exterior goodness to goodness in itself as superior goodness through potentiality and knowledge as interior goodness (1872: pp. 33-34).

464.Smith, 1895: p. 93.

465.Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 126.

466.Fowler, 1926: p. 441.

467.Waterfield, 1987: p. 280.

468.Penner, 1973: p. 141.

469.Robinson, 2nd ed. 1953: pp. 93-97.

470.Grote, 1865: pp. 57-58; Taylor, 1926: pp. 36-37; Shorey, 1933: p. 88; Müller, 1979: p. 69; Santas, 1979: pp. 148-150.

471.367c8, 367c4, 367c5, 367d8; 367d7, 368a6-7, 368e4; cf. 368e5.

472.Burnet's punctuation is a full stop in contrast to Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 304), Jowett (1871: p. 612) and Jantzen (1989: p. 9).

473.Cf. Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 304; Jantzen, 1989: p. 9.

474. Cf. Jantzen, 1989: p. 47.

475. Weiss, 1981: p. 247.

476. See Zeller, 1838: p. 153; Smith, 1895: p. 96; Hunziker, 1873: p. 28; Ritter, 1910: p. 298; p. 304; Gomperz, 1912: pp. 291-292; p. 295; Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 60-61; p. 66; Schneidewin, 1931: p. 10; Ovink, 1931: p. 137-138; Leisegang, 1941: col. 2380; Dupréel, 1948: pp. 196-197; Hoerber, 1962: p. 126; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 126; Mulhern, 1968: p. 286; Waterfield, 1987: p. 277; Jantzen, 1989: p. 58; pp. 62-64.

477. Pace Burnet, Socrates asks here because he refers to Hippias' reason. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113.

478. For the same expression, see *Euthphr.* 11a3-4; *Grg.* 461a-5, 489e6; *Chrm.* 172a7-8.

479. For this imperfect, cf. Smith, 1895: p. 96; Goodwin, 1878: p. 8; Kühner: II.1. pp. 145-146.

480. Sprague, 1962: p. 69.

481. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113.

482. Pace Burnet, I follow Jowett (1871: p. 613). Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113.

483. For Socrates' opponent's reluctance in accepting a conclusion, see *Chrm.* 159d12, 170c11, 171b6; *Cri.* 49c1; *Euthphr.* 8a6, 10d8, 15c10; *Grg.* 453e5, 460c2, 460c6, 460e2, 475c5-6, 475c7, 475d4, 475e6, 476e3, 477a3, 477e2, 477e6, 478b2, 478e2, 478e5, 479a4, 479d2, 479d7, 479e9; *Hp.Ma.* 289c5, 297d2, 297d9, 303a1; *Io.* 532b2; *La.* 193c12, 193d8, 199c2, 199e5, 199e10, 199e12; *Ly.* 210c8, 212c8-9, 212d5, 213a5, 213a6, 216e7, 216b6, 219b2, 219b4, 222a6, 222d5; *Mn.* 73c3, 83e7; *Prt.* 313c3, 332e5, 333d6; *Rp.* 333d5, 334a6, 346c8, 346d9.

484. Cf. Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 66-67; Blundell, 1992: pp. 149-150.

485. ἐπεὶ at 369a2 works, pace Smith (1895: p. 101) and Calogero (1948: p. 24), as a contrast of Hippias' consequence to the possibility of Hippias' way-out.

486. For the passive form of ὁμολογεῖν with the first person plural dative pronoun, see *Cri.* 49a7; *Euthd.* 282c3-4; *Grg.* 470b6-7, 475d1-2, 477c9-d1; *Ly.* 218c7, 221c5; *Prt.* 332d1-2; for the passive form without any indication of responsibility, see *Grg.* 461a5, 461d2, 461d3, 462e6-463a4, 476d5, 476e3-4, 477c7-8, 479b4-5, 480b3, 496c6; *Prt.* 332e6, 358a5, 358b2, 358e5, 360a6, 360a8; *Rp.* 339d5-9, 339e2, 342d6, 342d7, 342e1; *La.* 193d4-5, 199b3; *Euthd.* 280b4.

487. For μέμνησαι as an indication of conclusion, see *Prt.* 332e5, 359c1; *Grg.* 460c7.

488. For Socrates' non-commitment to the proposition in his use of συμβαίνει [ἐκ τοῦ λόγου], cf. *Grg.* 459b5-6, 461b7-c1, 498e10-11, 499b1; *Chrm.* 164c7-8; *Prt.* 351a5; *Mn.* 79b4; *Rp.* 339a2, 339e5-7, *Ly.* 213b8; *Euthd.* 281e2-3, 291c3, 291d6. See also *Grg.* 463a1-2, 477c7-8, 479c4-5, 479c7, 480e4, 496e5.

489. For ἐκ τοῦ λόγου or ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, see *Mn.* 79b4, 87e3-4; *Rp.* 340b3-5; *Grg.* 460c4, 479b4-5, 479c5, 480a2-3, 515d9-10; *Chrm.* 164c8-9, 160b8; *Ly.* 213a4; *Cri.* 48b11; *Hp.Ma.* 297c5; *Prt.* 358e4, 360e4-5.

490. For a similar situation, see *Grg.* 479c5, 496e3.

491. For a similar use, see *Rp.* 334a10; cf. *Rp.* 343a1-2, 350c10-11.

## Endnotes (Ch. II-6)

492. Weiss, 1981: pp. 247-248.

493. For Plato's interlocutors' withdrawal, cf. *Chrm.* 164c7-d3.

494. See Pohlenz, 1913: p. 61; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 127; Blundell, 1992: p. 148; pp. 150-152.

495. Cf. Blundell, 1992: n. 100 at p. 153.

496. Weiss, 1981: p. 248.

497. Blundell, 1992: p. 148.

498. For a similar expression of a subject-matter, see *Euthd.* 283e9; *Grg.* 453b2, 472d1, 491a2-3, 505c4; *Hp.Ma.* 293d4; *Prt.* 334d1.

499. Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 417.

500. Vlastos, 1991: p. 277.

501. Weiss, 1981: p. 248.

502. ἐπεὶ at 369e2 is taken as explicative by Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 308), Waterfield (1987: p. 284) and Jantzen (1989: p. 13) and ambiguously as co-ordinate by Bekker (1816: p. 213), Hirschig (1856: p. 277), Jowett (1871: p. 615), Croiset (1920: p. 35 verso), Fowler (1926: p. 451), Muraji (1974: p. 85), Totsuka (1975: p. 93).

503. On the reading of 369e2-370a2, it is tempting to supply the subject of ἄτοπόν μοι δοκεῖ by 'what Hippias said before' and to interpret the second ὅτι at 369e5 as causal, but, as Stokes points out, this parsing admits that δοκεῖ has no subject. Hence, pace Bekker (1816: p. 213), Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 308), Stallbaum (1832: p. 231; pp. 257-258), Hirschig (1856: p. 277), Jowett (1871: p. 615), Smith (1895: pp. 105-106), Calogero (1948: p. 20), Muraji (1974: p. 85), Waterfield (1987: p. 284), I take ὅτι at 369e5 as the subject of δοκεῖ, following Croiset (1920: p. 35), Fowler (1926: p. 451) and Totsuka (1975: p. 93).

504. Grote, 1865: p. 58.

505. The particle, γοῦν suggests a part-proof for Achilles' falsifying. See Denniston, 1954: pp. 451-454.

506. Cf. Weiss, 1981: n. 25 at p. 258.

507. See Blundell, 1992: n. 107 at p. 155.

508. Jantzen, 1989: p. 66.

509. Cf. Jantzen, 1989: n. 1 at pp. 65-66; Hainsworth, 1993: pp. 147-148. For Socrates' patch-work interpretation, Labarbe, 1949: pp. 407-408; Robinson, D. B., 1971: p. 213; Blundell, 1992: p. 154.

510. For this implication, cf. MacDowell, 1990: p. 289, although he argues that 'the early sense of a specialist claiming superiority' is forgotten in Plato and that the word in Plato is synonymous for 'a liar' (p. 291).

511. 365d6, 365e1, 366a2, 366b2, 367a3, 367b3, 367b4, 367d4, 367e6, 367e8, 368e3-4, 369a5; cf. Hippias' answers at 366a4, a6.

512. 366c5-367a5, 367b6-c4, 367d6-e7, 367e8-a7, 368a8-369a2.

513. 367c7-d2, 368a8-b1, 369a4-5, 369b3-7; 367a5.

514. In Plato's drama, when Socrates' interlocutors affirm a proposition embodied in the questions by Socrates, they regard the proposition as true, as a colloquial affirmative answer 'you say truth (you are right)' indicates (375a1; *Laches*, 192d9, 193b4; *passim*).

515. Cf. Blundell, 1992: p. 162.

516. ἔξ ἐπιβουλή and ἐπιβουλεύειν are associated with secrecy and someone else's loss. See the examples in Brandwood's *Word Index*. I take ἔξ ἐπιβουλή as 'in consequence of wish formed against someone else without his noticing'. I take ἐκὼν as 'as one wishes to'; see p. 217ff.

517. From the proposition that Homer portrays, 'x overlooks the battle,' it does not follow that Homer portrays that x wishes to overlook the battle, although Homer gives a description by which readers take x to overlook the battle intentionally.

518. For a scornful use of this interrogative, see *LSJ*; Smith, 1895: p. 109; cf. *Mn.* 80d6.

519. Schleiermacher regards the passage 370e10-371e3 as irrelevant and unplatonic redundancy (1818: p. 457), but Socrates' reference to Achilles' speech to Ajax is the essential element of a proof for Achilles' self-contradictory speeches which Hippias has not recognised.

520. Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 103; Schneidewin, 1931: p. 12; Dupréel, 1948: p. 197.

521. Cf. Ritter, 1910: p. 301; Ovink, 1931: p. 139; Guthrie: 1975, p. 193; Waterfield, 1987: p. 286.



522.Cf. Jowett, 1871: p. 617. See pp. 65, 69, 113.

523.For Socrates' sophistry here, Stallbaum, 1832: p. 231; Calogero, 1948: p. ix; p. 36; Blundell, 1992: p. 156.

524.This expression does not necessarily mean a direct reference to some previous speech. See 366b6-7.

525.Socrates uses the verbal phrase, 'it turned out that ...', without referring to the responsibility for the proposition in his question (367b6; 375d5; 375d7; 375e3; 376b8-c1; cf. 369b3).

526.Certainly, we have to consider the rendering of the verb, βούλομαι (366b2-3; 366b8-c1; 366c8; 366e5-6; 367a2; 367a4; cf. 363b6; 363d2; 363d3; 365d5; 367d5; 368e5; 369c2; 373c5; 374d4; 375c7; cf. ἐθέλω, 364c3; 373a2; 373a4; 373a7; cf. ἐπιθυμέω, 373c6). We do not necessarily have enough right to decide that 'wish to' is the only translation for the verb. In the context of describing an agent's action, we can substitute for 'wish to' the verbs, 'choose to', 'want to' or any verb for what a speaker ascribes to the agent, subordinates to the agent's actual performance and often conceives to happen in advance of or during the performance, whether or not what usual speakers conceive in using these verbs is misleading, from a theoretical point of view. This group of verbs are, in the context of describing our action, different from the group of verbs such as 'begin to', the group of verbs such as 'attempt to', the group of the verbs such as 'know that', 'be conscious that' or 'be aware that', the group of the verbs such as 'calculate', 'deliberate', 'ratiocinate' or 'justify whether in advance of performance or not, and whether by utterance or not' and the group of verbs such as 'decide to'. Further, the adverb belongs to the group which includes 'voluntarily', 'intentionally', 'willingly', 'deliberately', 'knowingly', 'designedly' and 'consciously'. Hence, if my mapping about the related verbs is plausible, the rendering would admit some verbs relevant to the context.

527.For the meaning of the controversial words, ἐκῶν and ἄκων, see Saunders, 1973: p. 353-355; cf. Wozzley, 1972; Saunders, 1968; I borrow these shorthands from Stokes (1986: p. 418).

528.See Santas, 1979: p. 150.

529.Kraus, 1913: p. 18.

530.Cf. Blundell, 1992: p. 156.

531.Cf. Calogero, 1948: p. ix; p. 36.

532.For the popular and judicial presupposition that there exist people who commit a crime ἐκῶν, see Dover, 1974: pp. 144-160, esp. p. 145; *Lg.* 859c6 ff.

533. Cf. Gauss, 1954: pp. 196-197.

534. Socrates uses ambivalently the comparative form of μέγα λέγειν, 'speak boastful'. Cf. Smith, 1895: p. 114; Fowler, 1926: p. 459.

535. Socrates may rephrase 'those who do bad things *wishingly*' (372a1, 372a4-5). I learned this possibility from Stokes.

536. If he opposes Hippias, he has to mean by 'falsify' 'tell a lie' or 'deceive' as Hippias used in his context (371e9-372a5), whether or not Hippias has used it as a non-moral term in the conversation about an expert in a skill or science (366c5-369a3).

537. Socrates adds 'those who deceive (ἐξαπατῶντες)' (372d6) but may associate it with 'those who form wish against someone else without his noticing (ἐπιβουλεύσαντες)' (372a1) and 'falsify (ψεύσῃται)' (372a3).

538. See *LSJ*; Dover, 1974: pp. 152-153; Saunders, 1978: p. 24. This category covers a non-moral mistake in a science or craft and a moral mistake like an unintentional violation or careless offense. See Calogero, 1948: p. ix. For Plato's usage of the verbs, ἀμαρτάνω and ἐξαμαρτάνω, the examples in a moral meaning are: *Ap.* 30d7; *Cri.* 53a7; *Hp.Ma.* 284c1, 296b6, 296c5; *Euthphr.* 6a9; the examples in a sense of mistake are: *Rp.* 334c6, 336e3-4, 340d1-e1; *Euthd.* 287a2-3, 281e1; *Hp.Ma.* 290b7; *Prt.* 357d4-7; for the convertibility of these verbs, see *Rp.* 340c6-7, 340d1, d2; *Euthd.* 287a2-3, 281c1.

539. See Leisegang, 1941: col. 2381; cf. Ritter, 1910: pp. 307-308.

540. Grote, 1865: p. 64; Smith, 1895: p. 115; Kraut, 1984: pp. 311-316; Vlastos, 1991: p. 277-280; Blundell, 1992: n. 112 and 114 at p. 157.

541. Penner, 1973: pp. 139-147; id., 1992: p. 132; n. 40 at p. 158

542. Kraut, 1984: p. 312-313.

543. See Jantzen, 1989: p. 70; p. 73.

544. Kahn, 1992: p. 253; cf. Apelt, 1912: p. 204; Sprague, 1962: p. 71.

545. Cf. *Rp.* 338d2-3, 341a7-8, 341b1.

## Endnotes (Ch. II-7; Conclusion)

546. 'wishing' and 'unwishing' are shorthands indicating respectively 'wishingly' and 'unwishingly' in the rephrasable adjective clause modifying the substantive concerned.

547. 373d5-6, 373e4-5, 374a2, 374a6-374b3, 374b5-b7, 374c2-3, 374c4, 374c6-7, 374d3-5, 374d6-7, 374d8-374e2, 374e3-4, 375a1-2, 375a7-b1, 375b4-7, 375b7-c3, 375c3-6.

548. 374a1, 374a7, 374b5, 374d2, 374e3, 375a1, 375b4, 375b7, 375c6; cf. 374c2, 375a7.

549. 373c9; 374b7; 374c2-3; 374c5; 374c6; 374d3-5; 374d6-7; 375c3-6; 375c6-d1; 375d5; 375d7.

550. Blundell, 1992: p. 157.

551. For this type of question, see *Mn.* 75e1, 76a1, 88a6-b1; *Euthphr.* 10a5-8; *Euthd.* 276a2-3; *Grg.* 450b3-5, 454c7-8, 464a1, 495c4-5; *Prt.* 330d2, 332a4, 333d8, 351b3-4; cf. *Prt.* 332c3, c5, c7; cf. Calogero, 1948: p. 43.

552. According to Stokes' suggestion, as *LSJ* shows in the first description of the item of  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  and as Woodhouse indicates in the item of 'runner', the ancient Greek language has only the word  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  as the normal agent noun of the verb 'run'. On the other hand, the examples of the word,  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  in *LSJ* indicate that the word tends to be used in relation to a race.

553. Probably in relation to  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \delta\rho\acute{\omicron}\mu\omega$  at 373d4, Jowett (1871: pp. 618-619), Fowler (1926: p. 463), Taylor (1926: p. 36), Ritter (1931: p. 37), Sprague (1962: p. 75), Muraji (1974: p. 92), Totsuka (1975: pp. 101-102), Guthrie (1975: p. 59), Müller (1979: p. 75), Waterfield (1987: p. 289), Jantzen (1989: p. 19) take  $\delta\rho\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  as 'a racer'. Bekker (1816: p. 220), Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 314), Stallbaum (1832: p. 232), Hirschig (1856: p. 280), Grote (1865: p. 59), Gomperz (1905: p. 292), Pohlenz (1913: p. 62), Croiset (1920: p. 40 verso), Leisegang (1941: col. 2381), Calogero (1948: p. x; p. 43), leave its translation ambivalent.

554. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 79-80.

555. cf. *Tht.* 148c2, *Rp.* X 613c2; cf. Lyons, 1963: p. 164; p. 174.

556. Ovink, 1931: pp. 177-178.

557. See 373d2, 373d5, 373d8, 373e3, 374a3, 374a4, 374a6, 374b3-4, 374d7.

558. Jantzen, 1989: p. 79.

559.Ovink, 1931: pp. 177-178.

560.Kühner regards this type as categorical affirmation (II.2 p. 541; cf. *Rp.* 349d12, *Hp.Ma.* 287d2), but with Smith (1895: p. 118), Calogero (1948: p. 44), and Jantzen (1989: p. 79), I see Hippias' slight objection.

561.For the similar commonsensical presupposition, cf. *Prt.* 335e2-336a5.

562.Jantzen, 1989: pp. 80-81.

563.Pohlenz, 1913: p. 63, quoting *Chrm.* 160d.

564.Ovink, 1931: pp. 73-73.

565.Hoerber, 1962: pp. 127-128.

566.Jantzen, 1989: pp. 83 ff.

567.Jantzen, *ibid.*

568.Jantzen, 1989: pp. 84-85.

569.Calogero, 1948: p. 45.

570.Cf. *LSJ*; Dover, 1974: pp. 69-73.

571.I follow Stokes' suggestion.

572.Cf. *Chrm.* 159c13-d3.

573. P1. If a man runs badly, he performs a bad and shameful or shameful thing at running.

[373e1-2]

P2. If a man runs slowly, he runs badly.

[373e3]

C1. If a man runs slowly, he performs a bad and shameful or ugly thing at running.

[P1, P2, the rule of transitivity]

574.I learned this point from Stokes.

575.Jantzen, 1989: p. 83.

576.Ovink, 1931: pp. 179-180.

577.Ovink, *ibid.*

578.Cf. *Hp.Ma.* 295c9.

579. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 79-80.
580. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113.
581. Cf. Ovink, 1931: pp. 177-178.
582. Guthrie, 1975: p. 195. Weiss misunderstands Guthrie's point (1981: p. 251).
583. Jantzen, 1989: pp. 88-89.
584. Smith, 1895: p. 115.
585. Calogero, 1948: pp. 46-47.
586. See Ar. *Pacem*, 612 (the reading of Blaydes); *Equites*, 1267; Pindar, *Nemean Odes*, VI, 57.
587. Ovink sees (1931: pp. 182-189) the unclarity and sophistry of animistic language, including the phrase, 'having acquired' at 374c5, but it depends on Hippias whether or not he sees ambiguity or unclarity in Socrates' locution.
588. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Jowett, 1871: p. 620.
589. This paragraph is based on Stokes' suggested critical summary of my early version.
590. Stokes' marginal commentary.
591. Cf. *Alc. I.* 115c9 ff.
592. For the triviality of this type of question, cf. *Euthd.* 278e3-5, 279a1-4.
593. *PA* 616b10; *HA* 629b30; *Pr.* 895a20, 880b5; Ar. *Acharnenses*, 411, 427, 429; *Paces* 147; *Aves* 1293.
594. Cf. Smith, 1895: p. 119; Guthrie, 1975: p. 196; in contrast to *Metaph.* 1025a10-13 (see Kirvan, 1971: p. 180; Sprague, 1962: p. 79; Calogero, 1948: p. 47; Ovink, 1931: p. 182).
595. *Metaph.* 1025a10-13.
596. Aristotle's criticism of a wrong example in the inductive argument, as Fouillée (1872: pp. 60-61) and Kraus (1913: pp. 44-45) suggest, is pointless for Hippias' commitments because Hippias would accept that mimicking limping is good as a means. Cf. Aquinas, *In XII Lib. Metaph.*, 1138.
597. See Ovink, 1931: pp. 183-184.
598. Smith, 1895: p. 121.

599.Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Bekker, 1816: p. 223; Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 316; Jowett, 1871: p. 621; Jantzen, 1989: p. 21; p. 90.

600.Stokes' marginal note.

601.Cf. Smith, 1895, p. 121.

602.Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 317; Jowett, 1871: p. 621; Jantzen, 1989: p. 22.

603.As to the reading of the part about doing a bad thing as one does not wish to, if Socrates leaves out words corresponding to the part about doing a bad thing as one wishes to, insofar as the meaning is clear, the latter part can be read as Calogero proposes (1948: p. 50), in contrast to Schleiermacher's favourable reading τῆ δὲ πονηρᾶ ἀκουσίως (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 459), which is supported by 376a6-7, τῆ δὲ [κακίονι ψυχῆ] τῆς πονηρᾶς [ἵππου τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα ταύτης [= τῆς ἵππου] τὰ πονηρᾶ] ἀκουσίως [ἄν ποιοῖ], instead of reading, as Smith proposes (1895: p. 120) τῆ δὲ [κακίονι ψυχῆ τὰ] τῆς πονηρᾶς [ψυχῆς ἔργα τὰ πονηρᾶ] ἀκουσίως [ἄν ποιοῖ]. As Smith interprets and as Jantzen points out (1989: pp. 94-95), the work of the superior soul cannot be bad; so, Smith takes τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα ταύτης (the work of the superior soul)' at 375a4 as in apposition not to τὰ πονηρᾶ at 375a4-5 but to the whole sentence, τῆ ἀμείνονι ψυχῆ ἵππου τὰ πονηρᾶ ἀκουσίως ἄν ποιοῖ at 375a3-5; it is more plausible to interpret with Calogero, by taking ταύτης at 375a4 as 'of the horse', that with a superior soul one does the general work of the soul of the horse badly *wishingly*.

604.Jantzen, 1989: p. 95.

605.Jantzen, 1989: p. 96.

606.Ovink, 1931: p. 175.

607.Hunziker, 1873: p. 28.

608.Cf. Gomperz, 1905: p. 292; p. 294.

609.For Socrates' analogical use of ἀμαρτάνειν here, see Taylor, 1926: p. 85; Calogero, 1948: p. 51.

610.Cf. pp. 69, 70-71, 115.

611.For Socrates' interlocutor's expression for uncertainty of Socrates' generalisation, see *Chrm.* 159d3, 161a7; *Euthd.* 281e1, 289b6-7, 298a9; *Grg.* 450b3, 476b2, 502b1; *Ly.* 220d7; *Mn.* 73b5, 78b6, 96d1, 96c9.

612.As to the punctuation of the sentence in question, the problem is whether the introductory combination of particles, ἀλλὰ μήν πού ...γε functions as

introducing interrogations or as introducing assertions.

In *Hippias Minor*, this combination of particles appear three times at 375c3, 375d5, and 376b4. Apparently, as the third example is Hippias' answer to Socrates' question, the combination introduces an assertion or it is neutral to the mode of sentence. Modern editors and critics are divided about the punctuation of the first example, but unanimous in regrading the punctuations of the latter two examples as assertions. Bekker's translation (1816: p. 225), Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: p. 318), Hirschig's translation (1856: p. 281), Jowett (1871: p. 622), and Jantzen (1989: p. 23; p. 97) take the first example as an interrogation, but Bekker's text (*ibid.*), Stallbaum (1832: p. 271), Hirschig's text (*ibid.*), Burnet, Fowler (1926: pp. 470-471), Croiset (1920: p. 43), Calogero (1948: p. 51) and Waterfield do not (1987: p. 291).

Then, does the combination of the particles ἀλλὰ μήν π ο υ ... γ ε necessarily introduce interrogative sentences? The list of ἀλλὰ μήν in Brandwood's index (1976: p. 39) enumerates 195 examples. The result of a survey of these examples shows that there are two cases with the completely same arrangement of the particles ἀλλὰ μήν π ο υ ... γ ε in Burnet's edition: *Gorg.* 477e3 and *Hip.Maj.* 284e5. As to the first case, Dodds (1959: p. 114) and Irwin (1979: p. 50) as well as Burnet put a full stop, but it is in a questioning context. As to the second case, although the sentence seems a part of the following question, Woodruff (1982: p. 5) and Waterfield (1987: p. 236) take this line as an assertion.

The combination, ἀλλὰ μήν ... γ ε, roughly functions to exclude some part of the preceding speech and argue for something which a speaker believes as certain. In this regard, it works to introduce an assertive speech, but the particle, π ο υ weakens the speaker's assertiveness for the proposition. Therefore, it can introduce the speaker's indirect question, if the proposition refers to the hearer's present intention.

613. Burnet's reading τὰ ὕτα at 375c6 can be τὰ ὕτα, if we interpret that Socrates focuses not on the change of the subjects in which a human's soul works but on the change of the subject-matter from having acquired one's own soul to having acquired slaves' souls in the sense of using them.

614. Cf. Weiss, 1981: n. 49 at p. 260.

615. Cf. Sprague, 1962: pp. 74-75; Waterfield, 1987: p. 288.

616. Stokes suggests this possibility.

617. For (a) and (b), see Jantzen, 1989: p. 98.

618. Cf. Weiss, 1981: p. 250, p. 252.

619. Cf. Jantzen, 1989: n. 22 at p. 101.

620. Grote, 1865: pp. 60-62; Gomperz, 1905: p. 292; p. 295; Ritter, 1910: p. 305; Apelt, 1912: p. 203; Taylor, 1926: p. 37; R. Robinson, 2nd ed. 1953: pp.

43-44; Müller, 1979: pp. 61-62; Weiss, 1981: n. 48 at pp. 259-260; Waterfield, 1987: p. 287; Jantzen, 1989: p. 85; Blundell, 1992: p. 159.

621.Cf. Weiss, 1981: n. 37 at p. 259.

622.See Taylor, 1926: p. 37.

623.Penner, 1973.

624.Cf. Xen. *Memorabilia*, 4.2.20.

625.Sprague, 1962: pp. 75-76.

626.Ovink, 1931: pp. 178-179.

627.Jantzen, 1989: n. 19 at p. 57; n. 26 at p. 62.

628.Cf. Ovink, 1931: pp. 179-180.

629.See Jantzen, 1989: n. 10 at p. 50. Kraus sees ability to choose an end and ability to choose a means to a chosen end, the latter of which leads to an unsound argument (1913: pp. 22-29).

630.See Müller, 1979: p. 64.

631.Fouillée, 1872: p. 48.

632.Cf. Blundell, 1992: p. 160.

633.See Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 131; Weiss, 1981: p. 251; p. 254; Penner, 1992: n. 37 at p. 157.

634.Pace Sprague (1962: p. 72), 'do a bad thing' is a predicate in a higher order than the predicate, 'do injustice', according to Hippias affirmation of the trilemma assumption.

635.Guthrie, 1975: p. 195.

636.See Kraus, 1913: p. 32; Sprague, 1962: p. 72; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 131; Weiss, 1981: p. 251; p. 254; Penner, 1992: n. 37 at p. 157; Blundell, 1992: p. 160.

637.For  $\gamma \acute{\alpha} \rho \pi \omicron \upsilon$ , see Denniston, 1954: p. 494. See also pp. 69, 70-71, 115.

638.Pohlenz, 1913: p. 64.

639.Socrates' proposition is taken as a proportional proposition by Schleiermacher (2 Aufl. 1818: pp. 318-319), Grote (1865: p. 60), Jowett (1871: p. 622), Gomperz (1905: p. 293), Kraus (1913: p. 31), Croiset (1920: p. 44 verso), Fowler (1926: p. 473), Ovink (1931: p. 142), Sprague (1962: p. 72), Friedländer



(3 Aufl. 1964: p. 131), Guthrie (1975: p. 194), Weiss (1981: p. 250), Waterfield (1987: p. 292), Jantzen (1989: p. 23; p. 102), Zembaty (1989: p. 61). Contrast Taylor (1926: p. 36).

640. For the expression, ἡμῖν ἐφάνα, cf. 376c1; *Euthphr.* 15c1-2; *Rp.* 335c5; *La.* 193d2; *Ly.* 222a5; *Grg.* 475d3-4, 478e1, 479d1-2; *Prt.* 333b5, 357a6.

641. Pohlenz, 1913: p. 64.

642. See Jantzen, 1989: p. 103.

643. For Socrates' implicit reference to (A), see Kraus, 1913: p. 32.

644. Kraus, 1913: p. 32.

645. Jantzen, 1989: p. 103. Contrast Penner, 1973: pp. 145-146.

646. Pace Burnet and Kraus (1913: pp. 32-33), Socrates asks. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Jowett, 1871: p. 623.

647. Pace Guthrie (1975: p. 195), the genitive at 376a3 indicating the logical relation of abstract particulars does not necessarily involve the fallacy of converting the inconvertible proposition that justice is a knowledge and/or ability.

648. Pace Burnet, Socrates continuously asks. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Schleiermacher, 1818: p. 319; Jowett, 1871: p. 623; Jantzen, 1989: p. 24.

649. For the transition from 'good' to 'beautiful and/or honourable', cf. 373e1-2; 373e4-5; 374b1.

650. See Gomperz, 1905: p. 293. Contrast 374b1 and 376a2.

651. Contrast Jantzen, 1989: p. 112.

652. Pace Burnet, Socrates asks. Cf. pp. 65, 69, 113; Jowett, 1871: p. 623.

653. Kraus (1913: p. 34) deduces C7 from the latter part of C6 by *conversio simplex*.

654. Jantzen, 1989: p. 103.

655. Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 103.

656. Jantzen, 1989: p. 111; n. 29 at p. 111.

657. Stallbaum, 1832: p. 232; Zeller, 1839: p. 153; Apelt, 1912: p. 203; Pohlenz, 1913: p. 65; Hildebrandt, 1933: p. 49; Taylor, 1926: p. 37; Gauss, 1954: p. 196; Gould, 1955: p. 43; Sprague, 1962: p. 76; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 131; Robinson, D.B., 1971: p. 214; Blundell, 1992: p. 161.

658. Shorey, 1933: p. 471.
659. Hoerber, 1962: n. 2 at p. 128; cf. Blundell, 1992: n. 133 at p. 161.
660. See Denniston, 1954: 481-490; *LSJ*; Kühner: II.2 pp. 170-171.
661. Burnet, 1924, on *Euthphr.* 4b10; Denniston, 1954: p. 488 and n. 1; cf. *Prt.* 324e1.
662. Kühner: II.2, p. 170, quoting *Euthphr.* 4b10.
663. *Ap.* 27d4; *Euthphr.* 8d9; *Mn.* 73d1; cf. *Prt.* 352c4.
664. See *Grg.* 474c9; *La.* 194d4; cf. *Chrm.* 161e11.
665. Jantzen, 1989: p. 108; p. 112.
666. Croiset, 1920: pp. 23-24; Guthrie, 1975: pp. 198-199; Irwin, 1977: pp. 116-118; cf. p. 77; Kraus, 1984; Vlastos, 1991: p. 278; cf. pp. 148-156; Penner, 1992: n. 40 at p. 158; Blundell, 1992: pp. 161-162.
667. Socrates' qualification by provisionality is missed by Müller, 1979: p. 61; Weiss, 1981: p. 252; Blundell, 1992: p. 163.
668. 365b7-8, 365c4, 365e6, 366a8, 367c4, 367c6, 367e6, 368a5, 368a6, 368a7, 371e5, 374c1, 374e2, 375a3, 375b7, 375c6, 376a4, 376a5, 376b4. Burnet's punctuations there agree with those of modern editors: Bekker (1816); Stallbaum (1832); Hermann (1851); Hirschig (1856); Croiset (1920); Fowler (1926).
669. For the responsibility for inference, cf. e.g., *Ap.* 26d2; *Chrm.* 159d4, 160b7, 167a1; *Cri.* 49b8; *Euthphr.* 8a10, 8d4, 10c9, 10d12; *La.* 190c4.
670. Cf. *Ap.* 25a9; *Chrm.* 161a6; *Euthphr.* 8a4, 8a12, 12d6, 13d7, *La.* 199c5, *Prt.* 358d1; *Phd.* 106e6; *Rp.* 479b11; *Tht.* 188d10; *Lg.* 962b4.
671. For historical survey of the study of the *Hippias Minor*, see Grote, 1865: pp. 55-56; Fouillée, 1872: pp. 1-10; Kraus, 1913: pp. 1-7; pp. 46-62; Schneidewin, 1931: pp. 18-24; pp. 34-35; Guthrie, 1975: p. 196; Jantzen, 1989: pp. xi-xvii.
672. For the provocative function to the readers of Socrates' speeches, see Smith, 1895: p. 95; Pohlenz, 1913: p. 68; Kraus, 1913: p. 31; Croiset, 1920: p. 21; Sprague, 1962: p. 78; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 127; Totsuka, 1975: p. 224; Penner, 1992: p. 132; Blundell, 1992: pp. 132-133; p. 148.
673. The deducibility of Plato's belief is assumed by Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: pp. 291-292; Stallbaum, 1932: p. 233; Zeller, 1839: p. 155; Fouillée, 1872: p. 50; Gomperz, 1905: p. 294; Ritter, 1910: p. 305; Apelt, 1912: p. 204; Kraus, 1913: p. 59; Croiset, 1920: pp. 21-22; Ross, 1924: p. 348; Taylor, 1926:

p. 37; Shorey, 1933: p. 86-87; Hildebrndt, 1933: p. 49; Sprague, 1962: p. 77; Friedländer, 3 Aufl. 1964: p. 127; Totsuka, 1975: p. 223; Waterfield, 1987: pp. 267-271; Jantzen, 1989: p. 108; Vlastos, 1991: p. 279.

674.Cf. Zeller, 2 Aufl. 1859: pp. 93-115; Guthrie, 1969: pp. 130-142.

675.Schleiermacher, 1818: pp. 291-294; Stallbaum, 1832: pp. 234-235; Zeller, 1839: pp. 151-153; id., 1859: p. 101 ff.; Grote, 1865: pp. 67-69; Fouillée, 1872: pp. 38-44; p. 60; p. 70; Hunziker, 1873: p. 28; Smith, 1895: p. xliii-xliv; Gomperz, 1905: pp. 294-296; Ritter, 1910: p. 305; pp. 307-308; id., 1931: p. 39; Kraus, 1913: pp. 50-52; Pohlenz, 1913: pp. 61-63; Croiset, 1920: pp. 22-23; Wilamowitz, 1920: p. 103; Taylor, 1926: pp. 37-38; Shorey, 1933: pp. 86-87; Goldschmidt, 1947: pp. 109-110; p. 112; Calogero, 1948: pp. xi-xii, pp. 54-55; Gould, 1955: pp. 43-44; Sprague, 1962: p. 76; Hoerber, 1962: p. 129; Gulley, 1968: p. 16; pp. 85-87; Totsuka, 1975: pp. 222-223; Penner, 1973: p. 139; Santas, 1979: pp. 147-155; Waterfield, 1987: pp. 269-270; Blundell, 1992: p. 161. Contrast Ovink, 1931: p. 126; pp. 174-177; Guthrie, 1975: p. 196; Kraut, 1984: pp. 311-313; Jantzen, 1989: p. 118.

676.For Socrates' retention of the craft-analogy except for the ambivalent ability, see Jowett, 1871: p. 603; Taylor, 1926: p. 37; Robinson, 1971; Penner, 1973: p. 139; Irwin, 1977: p. 299; Kraut, 1984: p. 313; Waterfield, 1987: p. 269; Blundell, 1992: pp. 160-161.

677.Schleiermacher, 2 Aufl. 1818: p. 459; Hunziker, 1873: p. 28; Gomperz, 1905: p. 294; Goldschmidt, 1947: pp. 109-110; p. 112.

678.Cf. Saunders, 1968: pp. 433-434; id., 1973; id., 1975: pp. 367-369; id., 1987: p. 24.

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