Management services as an aid to administrative reform in the Sudan public service

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MANAGEMENT SERVICES AS AN AID TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE SUDAN PUBLIC SERVICE

BY

MOHYELDIN SIDDIG ABDALLA

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A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

JUNE 1995
Abstract

In this research study the experience of the management services function as an aid to administrative reform in the Sudan is examined. Particular attention is paid to the establishment of the departmental management services units (DMSUs), as institutional in-built organs for administrative reform in the public service. The focus of the study is on the problems which confronted the DMSU programme.

Interviews with a number of high-ranking personnel such as the former President Ga'afar Mohamed Nimeiri, the former Ministers of Public Service and Administrative Reform and some Under-Secretaries, all formed an important part of the procedure to trace the development of the management services function in the Sudan. They also provided the opportunity to highlight important issues and problems associated with the subject.

Comparative material on the experience of other countries showed that successful implementation of management services function can not be achieved in neglect of social, cultural and other environmental considerations. The effectiveness and optimum utilisation of the DMSUs must be affected by such considerations.

The general finding of the study is that the DMSU programme has had a rather uneasy development. It did not achieve the objectives which were envisaged. Recommendations for the revival and successful implementation of the DMSU programme are set out in chapter 5.

This study consists of five chapters. Chapter one is divided into two parts. One part is about administrative reform: the concept, definitions and approaches; and the second part briefly covers, the wider structure of administrative reform in the Sudan. Chapter two is about the experience of management services function in the Sudan. Chapter three is about the management services training courses and training of the
management services officers locally and abroad. Chapter four covers analysis of the problems confronted in the management services in Sudan, and chapter five consists of the conclusion and recommendations.
Acknowledgement

I would like to begin this acknowledgement by thanking everyone I contacted in the UK and the Sudan, in connection with this study. I wish to thank warmly all those who have extended a helping hand and those whose efforts made it possible to complete this research.

I am particularly grateful to Professor Tim C. Niblock for his co-operation, willingness, hospitality and unfailing guidance and support in the many meetings I had with him. I am deeply indebted to him for his frankness, flexibility and wide-ranging discussion of the material of this study. He was very patient with my questions and queries and was sufficiently encouraging to induce me to go further. Without his encouragement and assistance, the bits and pieces of this study would not have been pulled together.

Special gratitude and personal thanks are due to my colleagues in the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences and the management services officers who have given freely of their time to facilitate the fact-finding of the study. Thanks also go to my family for their support, sacrifice, patience and encouragement.
Dedication

This research study is dedicated to my late father Siddig, my mother Rowda, my wife Amal, my daughter Hibah, and my sons: Siddig, Walid, Ayman, Ashraf, Mohamed and Ahmed, for their support, love and understanding.
I, the writer of this research study, declare that none of the material offered in this study has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other university.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Management Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMSU</td>
<td>Departmental Management Services Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Management Services Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPSAR</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDOAR</td>
<td>General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>The Civil Service Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Institute of Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAAS</td>
<td>The Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>The Management Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPA</td>
<td>The Royal Institute of Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>The Ministry of Overseas Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TETOC</td>
<td>Technical Education and Training Organisation for Overseas Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Organisation &amp; Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Management Services Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBAR</td>
<td>Central Bureau for Administrative Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Sudan Socialist Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFRAD</td>
<td>African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD</td>
<td>Organisation Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Agency Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JECS</td>
<td>Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPO</td>
<td>Management and Personnel Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSS</td>
<td>Office of Public Service Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAAID</td>
<td>The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QER</td>
<td>The Quarterly Economic Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning Programming Budgeting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TQM</td>
<td>Total Quality Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>Economic Development Institute (the World Bank)</td>
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Introduction

In the late-1960s, the civil service in the Sudan witnessed a noticeable deterioration in conditions and performance. A number of negative indicators were observed: decrease in productivity and efficiency in the administrative public service, the spread of negligence, and slackness in job practices. These problems impeded the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in the government administration.

In the early-1970s, the government of the day (the May Regime) felt the need for sound and effective public administration as a necessary condition to accelerate economic and social development. Following a United Nation mission which came to the Sudan in December 1972 and recommended a comprehensive administrative reform programme, advisory "Management Services Units" were to be made available to public service managers, in order to improve organisational performance and increase public sector productivity. This programme of establishing Departmental Management Services Units (DMSUs) throughout the public service was an important part of the drive towards administrative reform. The idea was to involve all the public organisations directly in administrative reform instead of relying on ad hoc commissions and advisory bodies as was the case before.

This research study covers the background to the DMSU programme, successes achieved, problems confronted, development to-date and recommendations for the future. The analysis of the experience is based on the literature reviewed, the interviews carried out, and the visits (observations) made to a number of the existing departmental management services units. Also, advantage was gained from the experience of the developed countries, mainly the United Kingdom.
1. The Problem

With regard to the origins of the management services idea in Sudan, an O&M unit was established in the Treasury Department (which later became the Ministry of Finance) in 1954. This unit, however, was largely ineffective. Then in 1968, a move was made to give more life to the old O&M unit, which was now transferred to the Civil Service Department, with better staff and better technical assistance. With the creation of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) in 1971, the O&M unit was transferred to the new Ministry and became the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR).

In 1972, a United Nations Mission (which came to the Sudan at the request of the Sudan government) recommended the creation of departmental management services units throughout the public service, government-wide. It was hoped that this national DMSU Programme would lead to the involvement of all public organisations directly in administrative reform processes and would develop a more institutional dimension in the process of administrative improvement and development. The practice of O&M and Management Services in the Sudan Public Service, however, has largely been deemed ineffective and limited in application. Some negative factors impeded the progress and the internal performance efficiency of the departmental management services units. Therefore, the researcher wants to find out:

1. To what extent did the DMSU programme achieve its objectives?
2. What were the successes?
3. What were the problems and weaknesses?
4. What measures could ensure the operational effectiveness of the DMSU programme?
2. Importance of the Study

The importance of this study lies in the need of Sudan's public service for administrative reform. At the beginning of the 1970s inefficiency and ineffectiveness characterised the public service. Society and public management had become more complex. As a result, the Sudan government had to look for measures to make the system of public administration adaptive and responsive to change and to new demands.

Moreover, the literature reviewed showed that there was evidence that management services as an instrument of management improvement helped the developed countries in their search for suitable solutions to their managerial problems [UN Handbook, 1979]. Therefore, one can assume that management services should also be an important instrument of reform in the Sudan.

3. Scope of the Study

The scope of this study is limited to the last attempt at introducing management services which occurred under the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR), during the regime of Ga'afar Nimeiri. Its boundaries are from 1971, when the MPSAR was established, to the late-1980s. The areas to be covered are:

a. The establishment of the Departmental Management Services Units (DMSUs) in the ministries (central government), public corporations and local government.

b. The operational aspects: staffing, accommodation, location of DMSUs and career development of the management services officers.

c. The training of the management services officers locally and abroad.

d. The effectiveness of those DMSUs in meeting their objectives.
4. Feasibility of the Study

In the judgement of the researcher, this study has a strong basis of material on which to ground itself. First, the DMSU programme under the MPSAR lasted for a long time (almost a decade) - much longer than the earlier two attempts of MS. The information needed on the programme and the relevant evidence is available. The first hand (primary) data were still fresh in the files and in the minds of the management services officers and top management. The political leaders who introduced the DMSU programme were still alive, and a number of DMSUs were still in existence.

Second, secondary data and literature on the experience of other countries in management services for comparison purposes, discussion and drawing of conclusions, are accessible.

Third, literature on administrative reform which forms a theoretical frame-work to the study is common. There is a theoretical frame-work which helped the researcher to carry out the study.

5. The Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will be tested:

a. The management services programme, as an aid to administrative reform, failed to achieve its full objectives because it lacked active participation and positive involvement of all ministries and other establishments, government-wide.
b. The continuity and effectiveness of the DMSU programme suffered through inadequate political and top management support.

c. Individual, group and departmental differences hindered the progress and practice of the management services in the Sudan public service.

6. The Methodology

This study is both descriptive and analytical. In carrying it out, the following key questions were kept in mind:

**Scope**
- What precise areas need to be covered?
- What are the boundaries?

**Issues**
- What major issues need to be investigated?
- Are they the heart of the matter?
- What will be relevant evidence?

**Method**
- What techniques will be used to collect data?
- What sources will be used?
- Whom will the researcher need to consult?
- What resources will be needed?
As for the working plan, the researcher proceeded according to the under-mentioned plan:

1. To read the many documents and reports (which were relevant to the subject matter) produced by different bodies.

2. To discuss in depth with the management services officers (MSOs) the present situation of the DMSUs as they saw it.

3. To visit a number of existing DMSUs in the ministries and departments, and to discuss with the top management and senior personnel their opinions on the DMSU programme.

4. To visit RIPA International in London to consult Mr. Noel Floate, the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) consultant who was in charge of the operations at Khartoum when the programme was implemented (1975-1981).

5. Having done these, then the researcher went back to the Sudan in 1994 to discuss the problems identified with the heads of the DMSUs and other senior MSOs and some senior government officials who showed interest in and enthusiasm for the DMSU programme.

6. To discuss the general situation of the DMSU programme with a number of political and administrative leadership, in particular a) the former ministers of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, Dr. Fadlalla Ali Fadlalla and Dr. Ibrahim Abu Ouf), and b) the Under-Secretaries who were associated with the subject matter at the time of carrying out this research (Dr. Kamal Mohamed Zein [the First Under-Secretary of the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform], Sayyed Ismat Mustafa Abdel-Halim [the First Under-Secretary of the Civil Service Department], and Sayyed
Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed Kaboush, [the First Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education]).

Data Sources

There are a variety of different sources from which research data can be drawn: questionnaires, interviews, secondary literature, documents, observations etc. Each of these has its advantages and disadvantages. In this research, the researcher has chosen to place emphasis on the interview as an effective means of generating information, in addition to the visits to observe the reality of what is going on in the departments in which DMSUs were established, and a literature review.

The Interview

The Interview is defined as "a specialised form of communication between people for a specific purpose associated with some agreed subject matter" [Gary Anderson, 1990: 22]. The interview, being a face to face communication, gives an opportunity to explain the objectives of the interview, removes misunderstandings, and creates a common ground and a mutual trust. It encourages psychological flexibility, open-mindedness and a friendly atmosphere, which enables the interviewer and the interviewee (respondent) to give and take in a participative conversation. (The interviewer and the respondent enter into a kind of interactive relationship in which communication becomes a two-way street).

In addition to what is mentioned above, Gary Anderson, in his book The Fundamentals of Educational Research (1990: 222/223), has suggested that the following advantages are found in the interview as a method of data collection:
1. People are more easily engaged in an interview than in completing a questionnaire. Thus, there are fewer problems with people failing to respond.

2. The interviewer can clarify questions and probe the answers of the respondent, providing more complete information than would be available in written form.

3. Interviewing enables the interviewer to pick up non-verbal cues, including facial expressions, tones of voice and, in the case of interviews conducted on the respondent's turf, cues from the surroundings and context.

The interview, however, is not without its own limitations. These limitations include the following:

1. The likelihood of bias. According to Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (1954), the interviewee may withhold or distort the information wanted, because to communicate them is threatening or in some manner destructive to his ego.

2. The context which has the advantage of providing useful non-verbal information, has the disadvantage of sometimes affecting responses due to interruptions and pressure of time [Anderson, 1990].

Despite these limitations, the interview as a method of collecting data was deemed appropriate for this study, due to factors of sample size and due to a perception which is well expressed by Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (1954), "......if the focal data for a research project are the attitudes and perceptions of individuals, the most direct and often the most fruitful approach is to ask the individuals themselves" [Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, 1954: 330].
Observational methods

Observational methods are of primary value in describing and studying behaviour. The visits which were carried out by the researcher were very useful, giving him insight into how the departmental managers and staff viewed the role of the DMSUs. Visits were made to the existing DMSUs, the departments which used to have a DMSU, and others in which management services improvement studies were carried out. These ministries and departments included the following:

b. Ministry of Education.
c. Ministry of Works.
d. National Electricity Corporation.
e. Telecommunication Corporation.
f. Civil Service Department.
g. Post and Telegraph Corporation.
h. Sudan Agricultural Bank.
i. Department of Statistics.
j. Passports, Nationality and Immigration Department.

From observation, a great deal was learnt about the attitudes of the employees towards the management services function and the current situation of the DMSUs.

Literature Survey and Documents

A wide survey of books and articles on administrative reform was carried out. This was useful in framing the theoretical frame-work as an introduction to the subject of study. It helped in understanding the concept, scope, need and problems of the management services function, as the latter is an instrument of administrative reform.
A considerable amount of literature on management services was reviewed, particularly the O&M Bulletin, Management Services in Government, Management in Government and Management Advisor. Experiences of individual countries, developed as well as developing, were also reviewed. Such experiences were of great value in highlighting the gaps and differences in the Sudanese experience, as well as in analysing it and drawing conclusions.

Regarding the Sudanese experience, the relevant files, reports, and documents in the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform, the Civil Service Department, the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences and the other departments that had concern with the subject were reviewed. Also seminar papers on the subject of management services function were consulted.

A model of management services efforts, produced by Professor Neville Harris (Head of External Developments and Assistant Director of the Newcastle Business School, University of Northumbria), was found useful in analysing the experience of the departmental management services units in the Sudan. This model, which is shown in figure (1), identifies most of the areas that can influence a given management services unit. Taking into consideration the differences between the United Kingdom and the Sudan, the researcher used the model as an analytical tool to identify the gaps or the problems that had influenced the successful implementation of the management services functions in the Sudan, as well as developing the future strategy.

The model is made of six concentric circles, the core of which is the management services unit. As we move away from the core (centre) each skin or layer represents a group of influences which are less direct the further away from the centre they are located. These layers in a descending order represent the following:
a. Internal factors
Factors in this category are identified as the core. Their influence is great in the performance of the MS unit. These for example include 1) the type of management style adopted, 2) the internal mechanisms for selection of projects, evaluation of the work done in the unit, use of resources and internal planning and control methods.

b. Perception of management services by management services officers
Factors in this group show how MS staff perceive the role and relationship of the unit. Their perception would greatly contribute to the shaping and the effective functioning of the unit and its relationships.

c. Fundamentals of management services
Within this group, the basic structure of MS is discussed showing diversity of scope of the different types of the MS units. This diversity of scope covers 1) the Single Specialism Unit (Work Study or O&M), 2) the Industrial Engineering Model in which the orientation of the unit will be heavily influenced by the technology of the firm and will provide an extensive service to the manufacturing side of the business. 3) The Multi Specialism Structure in which a number of specialist groups (Operations Research, O&M, Systems Analysis etc) report to a MS manager. 4) The Totaly Integrated Structure, which is a development of the latter, in which case the staff work in teams or problem solving units. 5) The Wider View in which the MS effort is not only in diagnosis and solving of problems but also being concerned with such aspects as Information Technology, Intelligence (Economic and Marketing) and Development of products, processes and people.
Importance of the type of structure stems from the fact that it influences the selection of specialisms within MS. This group also includes factors such as the philosophy of MS and the degree of receptiveness.

d. Perception of management services by management

This group shows that the way how management of the organisation perceive the role and relationships of MS, influences the fundamentals of the MS unit's structure, the specialisms it embraces and the level at which the unit is encouraged to operate within the organisation.

e. The organisation

The nature of organisation and its objectives obviously dictate the type of activities demanded from MS and perhaps affect the specialisms needed and the size of the unit.

f. External factors

In this category, government and the economic climate are shown as traditional influences on organisations generally. Other factors (within this group) which influence the role of the MS units include: Research into Management, the influence of professional bodies, management training and development and marketing of MS. [Harris, 1984].
Figure (1): The Model of Management Services.
The Sample

It is worth noting that most of the data in this study is primary, because the subject of study is relatively new, and almost all its actors are still alive. The sample covered different categories of interviewees, ranging from the former President Ga'afar Mohamed Nimeiri to some individuals who were conducting business with administrative units, which the researcher was focusing on. All of them were closely associated with the DMSU programme, and had a first hand knowledge.

The broad category to be interviewed have already been laid down under the methodology. These included the following:

1. The former President Ga'afar Mohamed Nimeiri, ministers, under-secretaries and top management, whose departments had introduced DMSUs.

2. The expatriate consultant who was assigned to the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, under the United Kingdom Technical Assistance Programme to the Sudan.

3. Professor Neville D. Harris, Head of External Developments-Assistant Director of the Newcastle Business School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle (a senior consultant in the field of management services). He was consulted by the researcher in Newcastle, July 1994.

4. The management services officers (MSOs) and the middle management.

5. The general public who were selected randomly while they were queuing in lines or waiting for services in the departments which had dealings with the public. Such departments included the Passports and Nationality Department, Post and Telegraph corporation, Statistics Department, Housing Department, and the Sudanese Expatriate Department. This
category was interviewed about the problems they face in order to get the services they want. Also their opinions about the changes (improvements) made, and their suggestions if any.

A letter was sent to the Under-Secretaries and top management to fix an appointment at their convenience. It contained a brief summary of the scope and objectives of the study. Assurances were given that their arguments and comments would be kept confidential and would only be used for the purposes of this study and none else. Some interviewees wished not to have their names identified, and this request was acknowledged. An English translation of the letter which was sent to the Under-Secretaries and top management is provided in appendix (1).

The individuals listed below were interviewed for the research. Background information is provided on three political leaders who played an important role in the development of the MS in the Sudan.

1. Sayyed Ga'afar Mohamed Nimeiri. (Former President of the Sudan).
Sudanese head of state and military leader. He graduated from the Sudan Military College in 1952 and took military training courses in Germany and the United States. He became commanding officer in the Military Training Camp at Gebeit in the Red Sea area (eastern Sudan). He was the recognised leader of the revolution in May 1969, and became the chairman of the Council of the Revolution and Minister of Defence in the new government. In October 1969, he became Prime Minister and held that post, along with a variety of ministerial positions till the regime was thrown in 1985. In 1970, the Revolutionary Council named him Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In July 1971, he was briefly dismissed during an abortive coup attempt, but he soon regained his position. In the fall of 1971, he was elected President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Planning in the first government formed after the adoption of the new national constitution. He was also a member of the Sudan Socialist Union.
(SSU) Political Bureau. He was recognised as the leading figure in the creation of the MPSAR, the establishment of the DMSUs and in bringing about the negotiations that led to a settlement of the conflict in the Southern Sudan.

Surviving a second major coup attempt in 1976, Nimeiri was elected again to the Presidency of the Republic by national plebiscite in 1977. Thereafter, he turned increasingly to Islam for political leverage and personal comfort. He began to appear in public in Jellabiya and Imma and was frequently photographed praying in the mosque. His regime undertook a number of moves toward the Islamization of state and society after 1977. Nimeiri eventually declared Islamic Law to be state law when he declared the "September Laws" of 1983 which introduced the Hudud punishments into civil and criminal law.

While on an official visit to the United States, Nimeiri was overthrown on 6th of April 1985 by General Suwar Al-Dahab, who promised to restore the Sudan to civilian rule within a year. Nimeiri never returned to the Sudan and has remained in exile in Egypt [Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard A. Lobban, Jr, and John Obert Voll., 1992: 155/6]. [Sayyed Ga'afar Nimeiri was interviewed by the researcher in Durham in April 1994].


3. Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla. (The former Minister of the MPSAR). He was educated at Khartoum University (1950/54) and New York University where he obtained a master's degree in Public Administration (1960). He has wide professional and work experience in the field of public and development administration. He was
the first Sudanese Director of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) (1963/65) [which later became Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences], and then Director of the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) in Morocco (1965/68) and UN expert with IPA in Libya (1968/70). In 1970 he became Deputy Minister for Local Government [Al-Teraifi, 1979: 143]. In 1971, he became the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR). In 1977, he left the MPSAR for the Ministry of Industry, and in 1979 he became Minister of Transport. In 1980, he was assigned to represent the Sudan Government in the United Nations (Ambassador and Permanent Representative in New York for four years, 1980/84). During the period 1985/90 he became the Resident Representative of the UNDP in Doha (Qatar), and from there he was transferred to be the Resident Representative of the UNDP in Abu Dhabi, (United Arab Emirates, 1990/93). From 1993 to date, he has joined the Sharjah Municipality as a management development adviser in a management development programme. [Interviewed in Durham in July 1994].

4. Dr. Fadlalla Ali Fadlalla, former Minister of the MPSAR. [Interviewed in Khartoum, 1993].

5. Dr. Ibrahim Abu Ouf, former State Minister of Labour and Administrative Reform. [Interviewed in Khartoum, 1993].


7. Sayyed Ismat Mustafa Abdel-Halim, First Under-Secretary of the Civil Service Department. [Interviewed in 1993].
8. Sayyed Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed Kaboush, First Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education. [Interviewed in 1993].

9. Sayyed Ali Musa Omer, former Director of the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR), General Manager of Sudan Airways and later manager of a leading Saudi Arabian Construction Company in Riyadh. [Interviewed in Khartoum, 1992].

10. Dr. El-Nour EL-Khalifa, Director General of the Management Development and Productivity Centre. [Interviewed in 1993].

11. Dr. Ahmed Mohamed El-Hassan Fagiri, Deputy Director General of the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences. [Interviewed in 1993].

12. Dr. El-Muez Malik, former Deputy Director General of the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform. [Interviewed in 1993].


16. Sayyed Hussein Hassan Amar, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Civil Service Department, for Research, Legislation and Training. [Interviewed in 1993].
17. Dr. Awad Ahmed Idris, Deputy Advocate General. [Interviewed in 1994].

18. Dr. Garout Sulaiman, senior lecturer in the SAAS. [Interviewed in 1992 and 1993].


20. Mrs. Wafa'a Mohamed Kamal Farid, lecturer in the SAAS. [Interviewed in 1993 and 1994].


22. Mr. Noel Floate, consultant of the RIPA. He was assigned to the MPSAR, under the United Kingdom Technical Assistance Programme to the Sudan. Now a Principal Consultant in the RIPA International Limited. [Interviewed in London in 28 January 1994].

23. Professor Neville D. Harris, MSC Tech, FI mgt, FMS AMCST. Head of External Developments-Assistant Director Newcastle Business School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle. [Consulted in Newcastle on 13 July 1994].


25. Sayyed Khalid Sir el-Khatim, Director of the General Directorate of Evaluation and O&M in the Civil Service Department. [Interviewed in 1993].
26. Dr. Ahmed Al-Amin Haroun, senior lecturer in the Sudan University of Science and Technology, Department of Engineering (production unit). [Interviewed in 1994].


29. Sayyed Hatim Osman, senior MSO in the Civil Service Department. [Interviewed in 1992 and 1993].

30. Sayyed Awad Rizgalla Ahmed, senior MSO/lecturer in the SAAS. (Migrated to the UAE). [Interviewed in 1993].


33. Sayyed Osman Hassan Kashif, MSO in the Ministry of Education. [Interviewed in 1993].

34. Mrs. Zeinab Osman Ahmed, MSO in the Ministry of Education. [Interviewed in 1994].
35. Sayyed Karsani Mahjoub, administrative inspector in the Presidential Palace. [Interviewed in 1994].

36. Sayyed Mohamed Abdalla Alla'gi, senior administrator in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Budgets and Expenditure. [Interviewed in 1994].

37. Sayyed Mohamed Taha Aba Yazid, senior administrator in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Purchasing. [Interviewed in 1994].

38. Sayyed Mustafa Said, senior administrator in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Investment. [Interviewed in 1994].


41. Sayyed Ahmed El-Tigani El-'Alim, senior administrator in the Post and Telegraph Corporation. [Interviewed in 1993].

42. Sayyed Ahmed Ibrahim Khalil, senior administrator in the Post and Telegraph Corporation. [Interviewed in 1993].

The Constraints

Unlike what would have been the case in a developed country, where the availability of data is not a major problem, the researcher faced many constraints in collecting the
necessary data. The poor documentation system in the Sudan made access to and identification of the needed old files a difficult job. The sudden dissolution of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (1981), and the immediate deployment of the staff to other departments, affected the storage system of the files. Personnel of the Ministry left the premises for their new positions suddenly, leaving some files behind on the assumption that they were no longer useful. When the building was taken over by the Bank of Sudan, the files which were left behind were piled in heaps in the corner of a room. Then, as the need arose for them, they were taken away by interested personnel and were scattered in different locations.

Unfortunately, some of the files needed by the researcher were not classified, were dusty and had some pages eaten by rats - generally in a bad condition. Such valuable documents should have been classified and stored in the National Records Office which is just within a walking distance from the premises. Failure to do so buried important information which was part of the political history of administrative reform attempts.

Finance was another constraint. The interviews and the visits needed mobility and transportation, which were difficult without funds both in the Sudan and in the United Kingdom. Despite this financial constraint, the researcher, (as mentioned before) carried out a field research in the Sudan, in a hot sweating summer (1993). In the United Kingdom, he travelled from Durham to London (Jan. 1994) to consult Mr. Noel Floate of RIPA International. Some Sudanese who had a first hand knowledge of the subject such as Sayyed Ahmed Abdel-Halim, a former Minister at the time, were also interviewed.
A minor constraint was that very few writers had written about the Sudanese experience of MS, despite its value as one of the important administrative reform attempts. Therefore, this study is an attempt to fill the gap, bring together as many of the scattered scraps of documents and reports as possible, and assemble them into a coherent and a unified whole.

**Structure of the Research**

This study is organised in five chapters as follows:

1. Chapter one covers two parts, a) Administrative Reform: the concept, definitions, strategies, approaches and the need for administrative reform. b) The Wider Structure of Administrative Reform in the Sudan. (Other reform programmes besides the MS over the 1971-1985 period).
2. Chapter two, Management Services a Tool for Administrative Reform in the Sudan Public Service. This chapter covers the origin and development of MS, definitions, nature and need for MS. Then the Sudanese experience of MS.
3. Chapter three, Training of Management Services Officers, (locally and abroad). This chapter covers the different types of training courses conducted for the MSOs, number trained in each course, benefits gained and the training wastage.
4. Chapter four, Analysis of the Problems Confronted in the Management Services in the Sudan.
5. Chapter five, Conclusion and Recommendations.
A Note on Spelling of Arabic Names

Arabic names in this research are not written in the proper transliteration way. They are written in the way which is common in the Sudan. This is done in order to make it easier for the readers in the Sudan.

A Note on the Criticisms

The comments on the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (CBAR) are not intended to throw doubt on the sincere and genuine intention of the CBAR in pushing the wheels of administrative reform and development forward. The researcher's intention is to draw attention to possibilities for better thought and practice, in the attempt to develop a more efficient and effective public service.
References.


Chapter One

This chapter is composed of two parts. Part one covers the theoretical background of administrative reform. Its importance stems from the fact that the points which will be dealt with in this introductory part will provide some useful guidelines for analysing the experience of Management Services in the Sudan public service through its different phases. It should, therefore, be appropriate in conceptualising the whole study and helping readers to understand the problems confronting the subject of study.

Part two briefly covers the wider structure of administrative reform in the Sudan over the 1971-1985 period. The aim of this part is to show readers that there were other programmes of reform during this period besides the Management Services programme.

Part 1

Administrative Reform

1. Introduction

Administrative reform has always been a topic of interest to public service reformers, students and practitioners, and has been a major trend world wide [Shui-Yan Tang, James L. Perry and Wai-Fung Lam, 1994]. Countries ranging from the developed to the developing have launched structural reform programmes of one form or another [Caiden, 1991]. In most of these countries calls have been made to "clean up the mess in government administration", and many efforts have been made "to reform the system and its responsiveness to development goals" [Adwan, 1986: 166]. According to Marcus Catlett and Claudio Schuftan (1994), ambitious plans to strengthen institutional capacities, decentralise development activities or improve the attainment of efficient performance at minimum expenditure of resources are announced every year by many governments. Examples of administrative reform efforts given showed
that administrative reform activities are universal in character. As expressed in the words of Roger Wettenhall (1993: 387), they have "certainly crossed the boundaries between the developed and developing world".

Examples of these administrative reform activities are numerous. Due to space limitation and the fear of repetition (as some examples will be discussed later in chapter 2), only a few can be mentioned here:

1.1. In the United Kingdom, Mrs Margaret Thatcher when she came to office (1979), began her reform efforts by substantially reducing the size of the British Civil Service [Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher, 1991].

1.2. In the United States of America, the former President Reagan, after a few years in office, launched his President's "Management Improvement Programme. Reform:88" [B. Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie, 1994].

1.3. In Canada, Brian Mulroney, the former Prime Minister, directed his advisors to review government programmes to make them more simple, more understandable and more accessible to their clientele [Ibid].

1.4. In Australia, Bob Hawke the Prime Minister, decided to reform his civil service along the lines of the Thatcher reforms in Britain [Hood, 1990].

1.5. In the Sudan, the former President Ga'afar Mohamed Nimeiri created the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (1971) to spearhead the administrative reform process and advise the government on major management improvement and manpower policies [MPSAR, 1972].
The Concept

Administrative reform rests on the assumption (or belief) that there is always a better way of doing things (Caiden, 1969), or that the traditional designs and norms of public administration were not able to achieve their objectives [Peter Aucoin, 1990].

This idea of improvement has existed ever since men conceived better ways of organising their social activities. Goodenough (1963) states:

"As long as humanity lasts, men will be reformers......endeavouring to change others in order to maintain or create desired situations for themselves, or to change themselves in order to accommodate to unyielding circumstances or to realise a new dream......When our interests are at stake, be they material or emotional, we become reformers ourselves, rationalising our actions as in enlightened self-interest, as for the good of others, as demanded by moral principle, or as in the interest of a transcendent value such as progress." [Goodenough, 1963: 15].

The concept implies an idea which is commonly associated with public administrators' effectiveness. Effectiveness is doing the right job, doing the job well, and overcoming impediments [James L. Perry, 1989]. Effectiveness is defined by the British Treasury and Civil Service Committee as follows, "an effective programme is one where the intention of the programme is being achieved". [Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher, 1991: 194].

According to Diana Goldsworthy (1993: 140) administrative reform is about, "getting the inside of an organisation right". Therefore, it is seen as improving the administrative performance of individuals, groups and institutions, and advising the organisations how they can achieve their operating goals more effectively, more economically and more quickly.
Administrative reform is a management process. The management element in the process is not only to formulate proposals for change and to make out plans and strategies to carry out the desired reform, but is to be found in the judgement of the concerned groups and individuals about what kinds of reform are to be introduced [Chapman and Greenaway, 1980: 184]. Managers need to promote a climate which is concerned about the needs, aspirations and expectation of their clientele. In other words a conducive reform-oriented climate is necessary.

3. Administrative Reform and Resistance

Administrative reform involves persuasion, pressure and power, and readiness to face the resistance which is likely to result from the shaking up of the status quo. People usually prefer the familiar to the unknown, the tried to the untried. The struggle for reform is not a pleasant and easy process as it is difficult to make people accept something against their will. Caiden quoted from Machiavelli:

"There is nothing more difficult to carry out nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order" [Caiden, 1969: 18].

Marie Christine Kessler (1993), provided a similar perspective saying that, any operation directed towards reforming a country's administrative system is fraught with consequences. It is an area in which there is an inevitable "system effect". Therefore, any change to any component of that system - however slight - is likely to trigger a chain reaction. Attempts to apply reform, according to Adwan (1986), meet with the resistance of those who feel that such changes pose a threat to their interests. Many government administrators feel that change in their administrative status may threaten a significant loss in their ability to affect policy.
4. Administrative Reform: a Continuous Process

Administrative reform is a continuous process, it revolves in an endless cycle. The solutions to problems soon become challenged by new problems, and by the time one need is satisfied, new factors appear to push the need in a different direction. Gross (1964: 249) in Caiden (1969: 57) states:

"The realm of administration is one of flux and becoming......It consists not of separate actions as disparate entities, but of interlocking activities. One activity blends into another. It is hard to find a beginning and still harder to find the end. Every achievement creates difficulties. Every solution creates new problems".

5. When did Study of Administrative Reform Activities Begin?

Although Caiden (1969) contends that the study of administrative reform is "still in its infancy", yet Nicole Belloubet-Frier and Gerard Timsit (1993) argue that research into new administrative paradigms fifty years ago changed administrative functions and structures.

According to John C. Papageorgiou (1994) and Jos C. N. Raadschelders (1994), a meaningful shift towards administrative reform occurred after the Second World War. Administrative scientists felt that they have to prove that public administration is able to analyse administrative structures and processes and indicate how these could be improved in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

According to Peter Blunt and Paul Collins (1994), the subject had its roots in a behavioural approach to management and organisation, particularly in the organisation development (OD) movement, which became popular in the United States of America in the 1950s.
Having listed these arguments, one could point out that one of the earliest attempts at administrative reform which was studied was the rationalisation of the New South Wales Maritime services by the formation of a "Marine Board" comprising government appointees and elected representatives of ship owners, which occurred in 1867 [Geoffrey Robinson, 1992: 104].

6. Administrative Reform: an Open Field

The term "administrative reform", according to Dr. Hassan Abasher El-Tayeb (former Director General of the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences, and former state minister in the Council of Ministers in the later days of the May regime), is so wide that it can encompass the total environment with its various political, administrative, economic, social and cultural subsystems and relationships. His argument is that:

"The limitation of the concept of administrative reform to the more technical processes of administration as some like it to be, is a narrowness in conceptualisation, incompatible with reality. The administrative system whatever its nature, even in military systems which are very particular in abiding by regulations and procedures, is an open system, which is influenced by its environment with all its political, economic, social and cultural subsystems and is also affected by it positively and negatively. Therefore, the concept of administrative reform in its essence should not be confined to the technical administrative process because its outcome will be marginal. It must encompass the total environment with its various political, administrative, economic, social and cultural subsystems and relationships" [El-Tayeb, 1986: 119].

Although this argument may be an exaggeration, recognition of this association with the total environment does contribute to the success and effectiveness of the reform process.
7. Definition

There is no universally accepted or agreed upon definition for administrative reform. Administrative reform can mean very different things to different people [Evert A. Lindquist and Graham White, 1994]. The term administrative reform has been applied, for example, to all improvements in administration, to general administrative overhauls in difficult circumstances, to specific remedies for maladministration and to any suggestions for better government. Adwan lists the key meanings attached to administrative reform as follows:

   a. Raising the actual potential of administration, to cope with the requirements of a desired social and economical development and the accomplishment of announced wishes and the planned goals [Adwan, 1986: 174].

The term administrative reform however, has also been described as an economic process [El-Tayeb (1986) and Elaine McCoy (1992)]. For example, the "application of the discipline of the market to the provision of products and services" [Rolf Gerristen, 1992: 66], or redistribution of resources and alteration of end products [Caiden, 1969]. Also it could be described as a psychological process, for example the alteration of behaviour patterns, beliefs, attitudes, and individual actions [Ibid, 1969].
Due to these differing perceptions, we find different approaches, analysis, different results and definitions. The reasons behind this lack of an agreed definition are described as follows:

1. The term administrative reform is "illusory and controversial" [Adwan, 1986: 172]. It is illusory, because we talk about it but never seem able to define or achieve it to our satisfaction [James L. Perry, 1989].

2. The scope of administrative reform is wide. So it encompasses different meanings and definitions [El-Tayeb, 1986].

3. The criteria that determines the success or failure of reform is not known. There is no universal formula for success in administrative reform [Caiden, 1973].

According to the personal experience of the researcher in the field of Management Services (a tool for administrative reform), some evaluators measure success of reform from a single measure such as the saving in terms of cash benefit. By doing so, they neglect the other elements which are difficult to measure, though they are much needed and of significance in the reform process. Examples of these elements include, improved layout of office facilities, improvement to existing jobs or activities and innovation of new systems and design.

The following examples of definitions reflect the degrees of different meanings and views for the term, "administrative reform".

1. Brian C. Smith (1971), defines administrative reform as "Seeking a remedy to an abuse or a wrong, to create a better system by removing faults and imperfections" [Smith, 1971: 213-226]. In this definition, administrative reform is conditional, that is to say, if there is an abuse or a wrong, a need for reform arises; if not the current situation (existing/present situation - status quo) continues. The second part of the
definition, "to create a better system", gives a sense of a political process, a justification that the end result will produce a better output than it was before.

2. Gerald E. Caiden (1969) defines administrative reform as, "The artificial inducement of administrative transformation, against resistance" [Caiden, 1969: 65]. There are three distinguishing features in this definition:

   a. Administrative reform is artificial, because it is man-made, deliberate, planned (engineered beforehand) and organised. It is not natural, not accidental or automatic.
   
   b. It is induced because it involves persuasion, argument, and the ultimate threat of sanctions.
   
   c. It has moral connotations, it is undertaken in the belief that the end result will always be better than the status quo, and, therefore, it is worth the effort to overcome resistance [Ibid, 1969: 65].

Taking into consideration the above mentioned features, Caiden sees administrative reform as a deliberate change, so distinguishing administrative reform from other social and administrative changes.

3. Rafael V. De Guzman (1968), views administrative reform as a political process. He defines it as, "a deliberate effort to change structures, functions, and methods in the administrative system to attain desired goals" [Guzman, 1968: 395].

4. The International Seminar on major administrative reforms in developing countries, which was organised by the United Nations in New York (1973), sees administrative reform as a change directed to administrative systems. It defines it as:
"Specially designed efforts to induce fundamental changes in public administration systems through system-wide reforms or at least through measures for improvements of one or more of its key elements" [Caiden, 1978: 110].


This definition contains two properties.

a. Goal orientation, (directed and conscious).

b. The comprehensiveness of change, (number of administrative components will be affected by the state of change).

6. John S. T. Quah (1976), defines administrative reform as:

"A deliberate attempt to change both, a) the structure and procedures of the public bureaucracy, and b) the attitudes and behaviour of the public bureaucrats involved, in order to promote organisation effectiveness and attain national development goals" [Quah, 1976: 58].

7. Leemans (1976), defines administrative reforms as:

"Reorganisation of broad scope and of high intensity or both - involving new values and models of behaviour to accommodate new ideas within an organisation context" [Ibid: 111].

This definition draws attention to the fact that administrative reform is primarily concerned with sizeable change both in scope and intensity. It involves both values and behaviour, because the bureaucrats are part of the society and are conditioned by the values and behaviour of their macro society. So it is necessary to prepare the ground before planting the new ideas.

a. "It is the process of making changes in administrative structures or procedures within the public services because they have become out of line with expectations of the social and political environment".
b. "It is the process of making attempts to modernise or change society by using the administrative system as an instrument for social and economic transformation" [Chapman and Greenaway, 1980: 9].

These two definitions suggest that administrative reform stems from a need and a desire, supported by a political power, and they assume that reform in the administrative system will lead to a change and reform in the society, socially and economically.

It may be noted that whereas most of these definitions use the word change as synonymous to reform, Gerald Caiden refuses to use the words "reform" and "change" as synonyms because he sees administrative reform as a deliberate process.

9. Hassan Abasher El-Tayeb (1986), defines administrative reform as follows:

"A deliberate political, administrative, economic, social and cultural effort aimed at bringing about basic positive changes in behaviour, systems, relationships, methods and tools in order to develop the capabilities and capacities of the administrative apparatus in a manner that will ensure for it a high degree of efficiency and effectiveness in the achievement of its goals and objectives" [El-Tayeb, 1986: 119].

It is worth mentioning here that this definition contains a crucial pre-requisite for development, the development of capabilities and capacities.

10. Jeffery Stanyer and B. Smith (1976) also presented a comprehensive definition/example - in the context of local government administration - that encompasses the logical systematic steps of scientific management and analysis of the critical elements in the reform process. They define administrative reform as:
"The introduction of planning programming budgeting systems, research and analysis of the environment within which the authority functions, the adoption of a corporate management approach to the relationship between the authority and the community, and the monitoring and review of programmes against defined objectives" [Stanyer and Smith, 1976: 262].

11. Nassef Abdel-Khalik (1986), defines administrative reform as:

"The major administrative efforts which have to be prepared with the aim of developing and improving the human, organisational and operational aspects of the government apparatus in the hope of raising its efficiency and effectiveness and subsequently its productivity" [Abdel-Khalik, 1986: 263].

12. Jamil E. Jreisat (1988), contends that:

"Administrative reform is conceived of as a deliberate policy and action, to alter organisational structures, processes, and behaviour in order to improve administrative capacity for efficient and effective performance" [Jreisat, 1988: 86].

He argues that his definition has an advantage over other definitions, in so far as it has an operational thrust.

There is no agreement between the management scientists and writers about the meaning and definition of the term administrative reform. It is understood from their writings, however, that the core concern of administrative reform is to advance and renew the administrative ability in developing organisations' systems, practices and skills. However, the definitions provided by Quah (1976) and El-Tayeb (1986) are considered by the researcher to be the most useful ones for the sake of this study. Both definitions contain, improvement of systems and procedures, attitudes and behaviour. In addition to this, El-Tayeb concentrates on reforming the political, social and economic elements of the country, elements which the DMSU programme lacked. It will become clear, in the chapters that follow, that these social, cultural, political,
economic and other environmental factors can not be neglected for a full understanding of the successful implementation of the MS function in the Sudan.

8. The Administrative Reform Strategies

Definition of Strategy

Strategy is defined by Thomas Kempner (1976), as follows, "a proposed action or sequence of actions intended to have a far-reaching effect on the company's ability to achieve its objectives" [Kempner, 1976: 372]. Or according to David A. Statt (1991), as, "The basis of a corporate plan or other broad based and long-term assessment of an organisation's future" [Statt, 1991: 143]. He defines corporate plan as:

"A document that maps out the future work and development of an organisation over a period of years in the light of its resources and the environment in which it operates. The plan is concerned with the long-term objectives of the organisation and the strategy used to achieve them" [Ibid., 28].

Ahmed Sager Ashour (1986), differentiating between four administrative reform strategies, shows that reform strategy can concentrate on one or a small number of elements or it can include all the major elements that affect the performance effectiveness. These four reform strategies are explained in brief hereunder.
1. Partial Reform Strategy

According to Ashour, this reform strategy represents reform developing efforts that concentrate on few elements and choose a specified number of organisations to develop these elements in. This strategy has limitations. It is deficient and narrow in the range of its effectiveness, because, "it generates from a limited vision of the elements and factors that affect the administrative performance and the organisational effectiveness, and from a concern in certain governmental system's organisations" [Ashour, 1986: 57].

He continues by arguing that:

"It could be said, that a great deal of the development and reform efforts that occur from within the governmental organisation itself, have the features and motives of partial reform strategy, since this strategy concentrates on few elements, its effect on improving the performance effectivity indicators in these organisations, is limited accordingly" [Ibid: 58].

This reform strategy could also be called internal or incremental. The most famous example is the practice of Organisation and Method (O&M) in the governmental organisations.

2. Horizontal Reform Strategy

The horizontal reform strategy is like the partial reform strategy in the sense that it also concentrates on a few of the elements that comprise the whole administration. But the difference between the two strategies is in the application. The horizontal reform strategy is applied on all or most government organisations and sectors. In spite of this fact, it is also considered a deficient strategy, because it concentrates on one or few elements that comprise the whole administrative systems. Ashour argues, saying
that, "the concentration on a few of the critical elements puts limitation on the final reform efforts' effectiveness even if those efforts were applied to most governmental organisations" [Ibid: 58].

These limitations occur, because some of the elements remain in the system without being changed or developed. They do not match and work smoothly with the developed elements, resulting in no change or improvement in the performance of the organisation.

3. The Sectoral Reform Strategy

The sectoral reform strategy aims at studying, diagnosing all the critical elements of the organisation's practices and systems in order to develop them. Usually a limited number of organisations are selected. Then emphasis is put on the development requirements, accordingly studies and arrangements are made to develop all the critical elements that influence the final performance, in order to promote the effectiveness of the selected organisations' performance.

According to the concept of sectoral reform strategy, the diagnosis and study of development needs in any organisation, for example, expands to include the functional and organisational structures, systems and procedures, working conditions and environment, styles of leadership, manpower, performance skills and practices, morale and behaviour patterns.

The chances of success of this strategy are larger in comparison with the other strategies, as this strategy is directed towards the final performance of the organisation's target of reform and since reform efforts include all the different systems and critical elements [Ibid].
4. The Comprehensive Reform Strategy

The comprehensive reform strategy takes place when reform efforts are concentrated on developing the entire critical elements in the administrative systems and practices, in all or most of the government sectors or organisations. The comprehensive reform strategy calls for careful attention to the social and political pressures that prevail in the environment of the study, as described by Chapman and Greenaway (1980):

"A comprehensive study of administrative reform cannot be made in isolation from the many social and political pressures within which it is interrelated and which have motivated particular changes" [Chapman and Greenaway, 1980: 10].

The comprehensive reform strategy, in order to be successful, needs the following:

a. A political support.
b. Developing the controlling role of the legislative and other external institutions of the government.
c. Changing and mending of the balance of power between the society’s institutions and authorities.
d. Improvement and change in the education system.
e. Developing the social structure, and the current behaviour and value systems.
   [Ashour, 1986: 63].

The comprehensive reform strategy is considered a revolution, if it is carried out and implemented on a comprehensive range throughout the governmental systems and practices, all at the same time. The possibilities of this strategy's success are greater and stronger when all society goes through a comprehensive social development and change process. Ashour says:
"A comprehensive administrative reform of the government system is not expected to arrive at real success without being a part of a comprehensive strategy to reform the entire society, when efforts of administrative reform interlace with those of a political, economic and social efforts" [Ibid, 1986: 63].

When a government decides to go through a national comprehensive planning, the comprehensive reform strategy is the best and more appropriate one to apply and the role of the administrative reform becomes crucial, as Ashour explains:

"Administrative reform in this case, is considered an even more essential constituent for the success of the economic and social development plans, and cannot be achieved without a comprehensive reform in the government system, while on the other hand, the success of administrative reform is tied to the reform and development of all other political, economic and social fields" [Ibid: 65].

The comprehensive reform strategy is similar to the sectoral reform strategy and the horizontal reform strategy, in two different ways.

1. It is similar to the sectoral reform strategy in the way it concentrates in all the critical elements that affect the performance of the organisation system.

2. It is similar to the horizontal reform strategy in the way that it includes all or most of the government systems in its study.

Figure (2) below shows the four administrative reform strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors and organisations target for reform.</th>
<th>Reform critical elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Few sectors and organisations</td>
<td>Partial reform strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>All or most sectors and organisations</td>
<td>Horizontal reform strategy</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Few elements</th>
<th>Most elements</th>
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<tr>
<td>Partial reform strategy</td>
<td>Sectoral reform strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horizontal reform strategy</td>
<td>Comprehensive reform strategy</td>
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</table>

source: Administrative Reform in the Arab World: Readings
9. Administrative Reform Approaches

Definition of Approach


In this section five of administrative reform approaches will be discussed. These approaches, more or less, are related to the application and performance of the "Management Services Programme" in the Sudan Public Service as an aid to administrative reform.

9.1. The Practical Optimum Approach

The practical optimum approach is the process of continuously innovating (reorganising, rearranging and renewing) and looking to improve the existing performance, without waiting for problems to happen or to occur. It is the desire to cope with the outside world and to keep abreast of technological developments. This approach is a community and clientele oriented one, therefore, it involves a continuous desire for community and clientele satisfaction.

Caiden (1969), says that the practical optimizers head off crises and seek to diminish the possibility of failure. They promote innovation and experimentation to improve on existing performance. In this approach, reforms are warranted whenever the implementation of something new would improve administrative performance. In this sense, it is a self-generating reform approach.
9.2. The Satisficing Optimum Approach

This represents a less demanding approach, involving in Caiden's words, "the skills of keeping out of trouble" [Caiden, 1969: 26]. Administrative reform according to this approach depends upon the feedback from the customers. "It is largely self-adjusting through feedback" [Ibid: 26]. If there are no complaints, the existing performance continues - as far as it is satisfactory - even though it could be improved. So the reform efforts do not take place until the problems and obstacles develop and failure takes place. The concern of this approach is to keep the internal life of the organisation quiet.

Caiden (1969), in contrasting between the practical optimum approach and the satisficing optimum approach, gives the following examples.

a. One administration will keep a piece of machinery running as long as it performs satisfactorily, the other will replace it as soon as something better comes on the market.

b. The practical optimizers concentrate more on satisfying collective purposes by maximising the output available to the community for the minimum expenditure of resources. The satisficing optimizers are more concerned with the internal quest for a quiet life, even at somebody else's expense through loss of output or waste of resources that could be put to better use. [Caiden, 1969: 26-27].

These two examples (a+b) show that the main difference between the practical optimum approach and the satisficing optimum approach is the extent to which they take the internal performance efficiency and satisfaction into account.
9.3. The Attitudinal Approach

This is the process of introducing reform through changes in attitudes. It is recognised by all reformers as a major factor for progress and development. It does not depend on power or coercion. It depends on changing people's behaviour (ideas, attitudes and values). Change in the organisational system without changing the employees' behaviour inside it is regarded as meaningless. Yaser Adwan (1986) states, "the endeavour of administrative reform is to create a conducive administrative climate through gradual planned and integrated change" [Adwan, 1986: 183].

Dimock (1959) in Caiden (1969) writes along similar lines, "......it is also necessary to change their (the employees) thinking and their attitudes to anticipate and to seek out anxieties, to talk difficulties out in a kind of mental therapy" [Caiden, 1969: 154].

Changing an attitude needs an effort, it is not an easy process. It is one of the most difficult and crucial objectives to achieve in the work place. We all believe that change in the behavioural aspects of the bureaucratic organisations is envisaged as a successful approach to increase administrative capacity to develop and reform. The employees gain some attitudes during their childhood and before they join the service. These attitudes become conditioned and fixed in the employees' values and beliefs, so affecting their administrative day to day performance. By the same token, other attitudes are gained during the working life from the first days employees join the service, whether from their superiors, colleagues or the working environment [Ibid]. Therefore, according to this approach once the employees change their attitudes, they may become prepared to accept new behaviour which is expected of them.
9.4. The Bureaucratic Approach

The bureaucratic approach is the attempt to solve administrative problems within the structured organisation frame-work [Adwan, 1986:179]. The creation of the "Departmental Management Services Units (DMSUs) throughout the public service in the Sudan was such an example. The purpose was to upgrade the performance of government bureaucracies with the hope of increasing departments and organisations' internal performance efficiency in order to provide quality services.

This approach is important, as quality services are rarely provided under obsolete systems, practices, top-down management styles, and bureaucratic inertia. Bureaucratic administrators according to El-Tayeb (1978) and Wilks (1993) can not be their own reformers and may alone be incapable of devising solutions to problems. Their argument is that, the reform needed will not take place in the presence of existing methods, systems, procedures, ways of managing the human resources and the narrow interests. Reform is to bring in new techniques, methods, systems and above all to inject new and different blood into the organisation. The appointment of "Agency Chief Executives (ACEs) - in the Next Step initiatives in the UK - was indeed an important innovation. In the upper ranks of many parts of the British Public Sector there has been a movement away from permanent career appointments towards recruitment by open competition [Drewry, 1993]. Such recruitment through open competition ensured that the best qualified personnel with a wide variety of backgrounds were appointed bringing in new blood and vitality to the organisations.
9.5. The Institutional Approach

The institutional approach is to increase the capacity of the administrative systems and to gain legitimacy. It is a mixture of structural and behavioural change. It concentrates on changing the ideas, values, attitudes as well as methods of doing the work [Adwan, 1986].

This institutional approach stems its importance from the fact that, reforming public bureaucracy is a slow and a continuous process. No single commission, however universal the scope of its experience and knowledge, can be expected to prescribe solutions to a country's administrative problems once and for all. Therefore, establishing a machinery inside the government on a permanent basis becomes a necessity [Al-Teraifi, 1979]. This permanent institution is to create a continual base for absorbing change and for increasing the capacity of the system. It has to watch the progress and implementation of the administrative reform programmes and also to point out from time to time which administrative difficulties and deficiencies that require administrative remedies have arisen [Ibid].

The idea of the institutional approach, according to the United Nations Handbook (1979), was pioneered and popularised in the mid-1940s in a number of developed countries. During that period - (the period of reconstruction that followed the Second World War) - the need for efficient management as a means of rationalising the use of resources was very great. Later many developing countries followed this approach when their governments also realised the need for sound administration as a necessary condition to accelerate economic and social development. Examples included the establishment of the (DMSUs) in the Sudan Public Service as built-in institutional mechanisms in order to ensure that reform will be carefully planned and implemented [MPSAR, 1972]. In Ghana, the Mills-Odoi commission recommended the
establishment of the Department of Government Machinery to oversee the implementation of reform measures. In India, the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department was established for a similar purpose. And in Nigeria, the Public Service Review Unit was entrusted with the responsibility for the planning and the implementation of administrative reform programmes [UN, 1979].

10. The Need for Administrative Reform

The need for administrative reform is a common concern shared by governments in all countries [UN, 1979]. The need arises from the malfunctioning of the administrative process. It begins with the intention of removing the obstacles, defects and inefficiencies in order to cure administrative faults and seeking to attain higher performance standards. Maladministration blocks progress and development in all countries, and administrative reform is looked on as a remedy to create a better system by removing faults and imperfection [Smith, 1971].

As far back as the 1940s (post war reconstruction), according to Caiden (1978), the need for the study of administrative reform arose, when the developed countries realised a reconstruction of their societies and a thoroughgoing overhaul of their machinery of government was necessary.

El-Tayeb (1986), argues that:

"The need of or feeling for the importance and necessity of administrative reform usually stems from a realisation of the gap between the present degree of performance of the administrative system and what it should be like according to the ambitions and aspirations in the different aspects of development. Thus administrative reform is looked on as a process or means of closing or bridging the existing gap" [El-Tayeb, 1986: 132].
According to the United Nations Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management in Public Administration (1979), the emerging political, economic, social and technological developments pose a challenge that has led governments to introduce, from time to time, measures that they expect will enable them to make their public services more responsive to the complex problems of nation-building.

Arie Halachmi and Geert Bouckaert (1993) point out that the events that took place within the last decade have transformed the world into a global village. As a result, geography and national borders are losing much of their old meaning. Experiences of many public employees have become obsolete. Past administrative practices and management insights cannot be relied on for dealing with many of the present problems.

"For public administrators a new reality is unfolding as a product of developments in several areas such as office technology, information, telecommunication and international relationships. Due to the emergence of this global village and the interconnectedness of markets, economies and around the clock instant global media reporting, government employees must react instantly, within their jurisdiction" [Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1993: 5].

Bernardo Kliksberg (1994) provides a similar perspective. He says that the internationalisation of the world system and the shift it is currently undergoing will lead in the twenty-first century to a great move towards administrative reform. He gave examples saying that the economic problems in most countries need to be overcome, the social gap be bridged, development of the developing countries in the face of wider technological and competitive gaps be pressed ahead, and the democratic governance be enhanced. This means that countries such as the developing ones are expected to improve their methods of public administration. They are expected to be efficient, open, competitive and support technological progress.
According to Les Metcalfe (1994), the internationalisation of governments sets an agenda for public management reform towards delegation of responsibilities and dispersion of the tasks of government. These include decentralisation, privatisation, contracting out and the creation of agencies to carry out specific tasks.

El-Tayeb (1986), lays out the reasons why administrative reform became an issue in the Arab countries in the following points.

a. The rising ambitions of the people after gaining independence and their aspiration that the national government will live up to its commitment to alleviate their suffering and open the venues of welfare for them.

b. Pressures of the international and regional organisations which give loans or technical assistance to many of the Arab States. These more often demand basic administrative reforms on the claim of increasing the capacity and capability of the administrative system which enables it to effectively use the loans and assistance and meet the commitment that go with them.

c. The revolution of communication and information and its bridging of relationships among states which resulted in increased desire on the part of developing countries in general, and the Arab States in particular, to modernise through technological means and the recruitment of expatriate consultants to introduce modern systems and techniques. [El-Tayeb, 1986: 132-133].

In addition to the above mentioned arguments administrative reform is needed in the following circumstances.
1. When the administration fails to meet what is required from it:

   a. Work not being done at all or done at standards below the planned ones.
   b. Customer complaints about lower quality and standards.
   c. Lack of ability to keep abreast of change and cope with the outside developing
      environment with its total components. "....once an administration falls
      below a certain point (whatever that may be) it is deemed to require
      attention" [Caiden, 1969: 25].

2. When awareness prevails for future commitment, improvement, development and
   continuity, the need arises to energise and mobilise the unused capacities and abilities
   to bring the best out of the employees.

3. When organisations suffer from:

   a. Poor communication internally and with the outside world (environment).
   b. Excessive waste and too much paperwork.
   c. Complicated systems and procedures.
   d. Lack of sufficiently experienced staff.
   e. Mutual distrust between the employees and the citizen.

4. When the status quo is upset by any of the following factors [Caiden, 1969: 134]:

   a. Political, (war, international crisis, changes in regime, constitutional revision).
   b. Economic, (poverty, depression, devaluation, bankruptcy, changes in
      economic systems, redistribution of wealth).
   c. Social, (changes in class systems, redistribution of power, revaluation of
      morals).
   d. Demographic, (population pressure, urbanisation).
e. Cultural, (modernisation, technological advancement, crime).

All the above mentioned arguments, by the different writers, recognise deficiency in public administration as a particular barrier to the development and progress of any country, while a good healthy public administration encourages implementation of new policies, plans, ideas and systems. The discussion in this part of this chapter should make it easier for the reader to understand why the DMSU programme was introduced, the problems it confronted and the drawbacks in strategies and approaches it followed. The same time it should help the researcher to analyse the problems and formulate proposals for the future.

The remaining part of this chapter is to show in brief that the DMSU programme was introduced in conjunction with other administrative reform programmes over the 1971-1985 period.
Part Two

The Wider Structure of Administrative Reform in the Sudan (1971-1985)

1. Introduction

The civil service in the Sudan was established in the first years of this century by the British to serve their colonial interests. Its concern was to maintain law and order, and to collect sufficient revenue to pay the expenses of the government [Abdel-Rahman, 1983]. After independence, the function of the civil service expanded to encompass, in addition to the maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue, the role of economic and social development. This was consistent with the practice in other developing countries.

"In the recently independent country.......it is usual for the government in power to see its main task as being to build the nation and in this task, it expects its senior administrators to assume a substantial part of the responsibility for the formulation and implementation of national plans for economic development and social change" [Hoyle, 1973 in Abdel-Rahman, 1983: 2].

Having said this, it is of note to say that, although the Sudan civil service was seen as one of the most reputable civil service in the territories where Britain held power, yet after independence, and as a result of the policies of the different political regimes, the quality of the services declined. The country faced many challenging problems. These included a lack of administrative capabilities, political instability, economic scarcity, bureaucratic inertia, and narrow interests. All the regimes which adopted "administrative reform" as their slogan faced the same problems. As a result, the public service became deaf to the oft-repeated cries for reform of national administration. Where the problem lay was that there did not exist a programme for this process.
These regimes failed to establish stable ongoing strategies or a framework of administrative reform. Instead they followed ad hoc reform studies in the administrative system whether by domestic or foreign initiatives. Those previous reform attempts did not come out with a strategy that helped to bring out and mobilise energies, build capabilities and develop creativity of the public and the government employees.

Alsoni Banaga (1984) noticed this and argued that the main reason for the failure of those ad hoc reform studies is because they were limited to the study of the working conditions, such as wages and salaries. None of those studies tried to tackle the problem of developing the human element, the capabilities, capacities, institutions, motives or drives.

In 1969, a major change in the approach to administrative reform came with the military coup of 25 May, led by General Ga'afar Al-Nimieri. The new government which was led by Ga'afar Nimieri as head of the Revolutionary Command Council and Babiker Awadalla as Prime Minister, introduced radical reform policies in many fields. Among its early actions were, new policies for the South, including amnesty and regional autonomy, and a broad socialist programme for economic and social development [Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard A. Lobban, Jr. and John Obert Voll, 1992: X1V1].

According to Charless Gurdon (1984), the May regime did more than changing the government of the Sudan. It altered the direction in which the country was stumbling and it embarked on a very ambitious economic and social development policy that was
intended to reverse the results of fourteen years of mismanagement and neglect; the period from 1969 to the late 1970s was described as the decade of hope and optimism.

To begin such a radical administrative reform and to sustain its strength to successful results, a spearhead was required. A spearhead with sufficient capabilities and perseverance to follow through. As a result a "unique ministry" - as expressed in the words of Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, the first Minister of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) - named the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform was created (1971). [Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla was interviewed by the researcher in Durham, July 1994].

2. The Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform

The Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) was assigned the following duties:

   a. Determining objectives and jurisdictions of ministries, departments and public corporations.

   b. Formulating the rules and norms of the public service.

   c. Developing and implementing national training schemes.

   d. Supervising institutions for administrative and managerial training and research.

   e. Steering and servicing government-wide administrative reform [MPSAR, 1972: 4].
The structure of the ministry according to Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, was also very unique [interviewed 1994]. It was a ministry of labour and public service personnel combined, but more than this unique combination it had other roles. For example, it had absorbed the Pension and Post-Service Benefits Administration and the Central Agency for Public Control. It also became the supervising authority for the Institute of Public Administration (later became Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences, "SAAS") as well as for the Centre for Management Development and Productivity, (later became Management Development Centre). Of even greater importance, the Ministry had been mandated the function of planning and co-ordinating training on a national scale. An additional organisational innovation to be attributed to Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, the former Minister, was the establishment of a public service council which was an advisory body to the Minister on programmes of administrative reform. The Council was composed of high-level representatives drawn from the government, public corporations, higher education institutions and the private sector. Figure (3) below shows names of the members of the Public Service Council.

Figure (3) . The Public Service Council

1. Sayyed, Abdel-Rahman Abdalla.
   Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform. Chairman.

2. Sayyed, Amir El-Sawi.
   Head of Public Service and Administrative Reform, and
   Under-Secretary, Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform. Vice-Chairman.

   Formerly Vice-Chancellor, University of Khartoum. Member.

4. Sayyed, Mekkawi Mustafa.
General Manager, Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co. Member.

5. Sayyed, Abdel-Wahab Musa.
   Owner: Advisory Office for Business Management. Member.

6. Mrs Fatma Talib.
   Principal: Girls' Teacher Training Institute. Member.

7. Dr. Ibrahim Hassan.
   Dean, Faculty of Economics and Social Studies, University of Khartoum. Member.

8. Dr. Siddig Ahmed Ismail.
   M.B., B.S., M.R.C.P. Cardiologist, Sha'ab Hospital, Khartoum. Member.

   Workers' Committee-Sudan Socialist Union. Member.

10. Sayyed, Sapana Jambo.
    Regional Director for Finance and planning (Southern Region). Member.

11. Sayyed, Mirghani El-Amin.
    General Manager, Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Member.

12. Sayyed Mohamed Tawfig.
    General Manager, General Insurance Co. Member.


According to Mansour Khalid (1993), the impact of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform in creating a ground-work for administrative reform was markedly observable. It projected considerable influences in the government processes and initiated certain significant administrative changes. These initiatives were the first completed work since independence to recognise the administrative apparatus in order to make it cope with the political changes and to meet the aspirations of the neglected minorities such as women's rights.
3. Broad Administrative Reform Programmes

The plans and programmes for administrative reform in that period aimed at organisational or institutional changes. Emphasis was laid on institution building, structural modifications, promulgation of new laws and regulations or updating of the old ones [Abdin, 1986]. Hereunder are the main broad administrative reform programmes.

3.1. The Management Services Programme

One of the major achievements of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR), was the introduction of the management services programme which will be discussed in chapter 2.

3.2. Revision of Laws and Regulations

The Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, reviewed the old laws and regulations. In 1973, a comprehensive public service law replaced the old one. The new one was called the Public Service Act of 1973. All central, regional and local government units and public corporations (except the universities) were subject to the provisions of that new law [Al-Teraifi, 1979].

The Public Service Act, provided for recruitment by competition and examination, promotion by merit, laid down all conditions of service, including salaries, and dealt with such matters as employee rights, welfare and obligations. It also incorporated the legislative framework of the public service scheme of pension. It provided for job description and evaluation, and spelled out the objectives and functions of the Public
Service Council, the Public Service Appeal Commission and the Public Service Recruitment Board [Ibid: 139].

The Public Service Act was followed by the Minimum Wage Act of 1973, the Public Service Pensions Act of 1975 and the National Training Act of 1976. Under this law a National Training Council has been set with representation of 18 members at the Under-Secretary level. Its functions included; a) the formulation of a national training programme as an integral part of the administrative reform plan, b) follow-up an implementation of training programmes, c) devising necessary measures for consolidating and up-grading the existing training institutions and d) developing special national schemes for the better utilisation of manpower [Ibid].

3.3. Reform Programmes for the Personnel Systems

The United Nations Mission (1972) in its reform proposals, recommended reorganisation and modernisation programmes for the personnel system in the Sudan. It recommended that a comprehensive position classification and pay study should be carried out, at the earliest possible date. "The initiation, at the earliest possible date, of a comprehensive position classification and pay study is an overriding necessity to serve as the basis for a sound restructuring of the personnel systems and administrative practices in the entire public employment sector" [MPSAR, 1972, Section C, Paragraph 80, Page 4].

As a result an International Commission was convened at Khartoum on 7/8 November 1973, to last about six weeks, to study, advise and formulate recommendations on reforming personnel systems and practices in the public service [MPSAR, 1973]. The terms of reference of the commission were to:
1. Investigate the present public service personnel classification in areas of recruitment policies, selection and promotion procedures and recommend measures leading towards general improvements.

2. Advise the government on a new grading system for all posts in the public service and suggest an outline for a new structure of salary scales.

3. Review prevailing personnel budgetary procedures and suggest desirable improvements.

4. Suggest effective means of co-ordination between the Central and Regional Ministries for Public Service and Administrative Reform.

5. As appropriate, make or endorse recommendations on any other reforms which the commission may consider relevant to the general improvement of administrative practices in the Sudan [MPSAR, 1973: 1].

The International Commission recommended that the first task should be to tackle the classification and grading structure. (This was consistent with the recommendation of the United Nations Mission 1972). But up to 1976 the MPSAR had not made the study. In 1976, the former President Nimieri declared that the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme (JECS) should start and be completed in one year [Abdin, 1986]. As a result, the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme was carried out, completed in 1977 and launched in 1978 [El-Teraifi, 1986].

The outcome of the study was not satisfactory. According to Abdin (1986), various groups within the public service were not happy with the grades and salary scales in which they were placed. So there were series of protests which led to hurried and unrealistic adjustments and modifications of the plan that added further to confusion and complications.

According to Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla (interviewed 1994) the JECS faced the following problems:
1. The President Ga'afar Nimieri was often interfering.

2. The first Minister left the Ministry before implementation of the plan. As a result, the JECS was affected by this change of leadership.

3. The Trade Unions and professional groups had put much pressure by claiming for great improvement in the payments.

4. The Ministry of Finance was resisting the project due to lack of funds. It was not disposed to incur additional expenses, and

5. The project did not solve the problem of the expanded public service as the political system was too weak to sack the redundant employees as had been envisaged.

In the judgement of Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, the fifth point was of greatest importance.

According to Al-Teraifi (1986), the study was surrounded by many shortcomings.

a. It lacked trained staff to undergo the study.

b. It lacked adequate up-to-date information. The questionnaires distributed were long and complicated, and as a consequence were often ignored.

c. It failed to realise that the idea of job classification is based on the philosophy that the position is to be classified and not the person currently holding it. [Al-Teraifi, 1986: 76].
3.4. Recruitment and Selection

In the belief that civil servants in any modern State are essential for the planning and implementing of developmental programmes; and the quality of a civil service depends, to a large extent, on the calibre of individuals recruited to it, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, created a Public Service Recruitment Board. The Board was established in 1974 as part of the MPSAR, and had centralised recruitment and selection for all ministries and public corporations, "in an effort to improve efficiency and to reduce favouritism and nepotism" [Al-Teraifi, 1986: 77].

The board was assigned the following:

1. To advise on the framing of the recruitment regulations for the various public services, in accordance with the terms of the Board policy laid down by the government, in consultation with the Public Service Council.

2. To undertake actual recruitment to posts in the administrative and professional class, and;

3. To allocate such selected candidates to the various units [MPSAR, 1973: 21].

Although the Board was thought to have achieved its objectives, some departments had criticised the Board for its lack of adequate knowledge of departmental needs [Al-Teraifi, 1986].

3.5. Decentralisation

Other areas of reform included the establishment of local and regional governments (1971 and 1980, respectively). It was hoped that the local and regional governments
would solve the problems of centralisation and meet the wishes and needs of the various Sudanese communities. Al-Assam (1986) in this connection writes:

"It is virtually impossible to administer a large country like the Sudan without breaking it into smaller units. Coupled with this situation is the problem of poor transportation. In addition to the probes of vast areas and poor communication, the Sudan faces a problem of severe ethnic divisions among its varied population. In such circumstances, a decentralised local government system can play a great role in national unity" [Al-Assam, 1986: 278].

The establishment of the regional governments (1980) was subjected to a lot of criticism, as it was presented in a political propaganda as an aspect of public service reform [Mahmoud, 1984]. There was inadequate allocation of funds and resources. The regionalisation policies were taken without any consideration of the resources to support them. As a result the regionalisation increased expenditure, in time the government was having to reduce expenditure [Niblock, 1986]. Nazih Ayubi (1986) also observed that and writes, "Excessive delegation to agencies with no adequate funds, resources or personnel is quite meaningless as has recently been the case with Sudan's new local government system" [Ayubi, 1986: 105].

According to Donald Curtis (1988), the amount of support from the public treasury was not known and the citizens were reluctant to pay taxes, because they did not lead to visible returns. Promises of services were given without going much further in the way of practical implementation. Moreover, shortage of qualified staff was a problem. According to Marshall, Howell (1974) and El-Bakri (1981) in Idris (1991), more than half of the councillors in the Rural Councils were very inexperienced and possibly ineffectual.
3.6. Socio-Economic Reform Plans

In an attempt to increase the socio-economic development, a five year plan was introduced (1970-1975) in order to:

1. Achieve a degree of balanced growth between the modern sector and the traditional sector and between different regions.
2. Achieve self-sufficiency in major products, and to bridge the gap between consumption and production.
3. Provide for the availability of basic social services.
4. Reduce excessive government expenditure [Mahmoud, 1984].

In 1976, a national committee for planning was created for more popular participation and involvement [Ibid], and a six year plan (1977/78-1982/83) was introduced. The plan's strategy envisaged the optimum use of human and material resources to raise the national income and to achieve accelerating development through:

1. Taking all the necessary measures to remove the constraints and difficulties facing economic development and to raise the level of performance in the public.
2. Giving priority to the agricultural sector, modern and tradition, and to industrialisation of the agricultural products. Also developing of infrastructure and energy.
3. Widening the distribution channels to achieve justice, equity and balance growth between the different regions [Ibid].
3.7. Education

In the field of education, there was an extension in education facilities and the bulk of achievements stemmed from popular participation under self-reliance schemes carried out through voluntary help. [This was the personal experience of the researcher in the new extensions, El-Sahafa, El-Kalaklat and Erkawit]. During this period, the pattern of schooling was changed from four years at each level to six years for primary school, three for general secondary and three for higher secondary school.

Moreover, in 1975, a decision was made to establish two new universities, the Juba and Gezira, and these started functioning in 1978 [Mahmoud, 1984].

4. Conclusion

The above mentioned reform attempts show that Nimieri's regime was interested and more positive towards socio-economic development than the earlier regimes. He made development a political aspect of his regime because unlike the earlier governments he needed to build a new basis for popular support. However, these reform attempts, in the judgement of many observers and writers, were not effective in creating a development-oriented public service because of the following reasons.

1. The political atmosphere was not supportive and the politicisation of the administration worsened the situation. Dr. Ga'afar Mohamed Ali Bakheit felt that the administration of a developing country like the Sudan required political commitment. He states, "all administrative organisations are now obliged to take off the garment of political neutrality and the passiveness of middle positions and must take fully the side of the May Revolution and May leftism" [Fegley, 1986: 123]. (Dr. Bakheit, a Sudanese intellectual and political leader. He was active in political and ideological
affairs after the 1969 Revolution. He was one of the drafters of the Permanent Constitution, editor of the former official newspaper, al-Sahafa, and at various times, Minister of Local Government, and Assistant Secretary-General and Secretary General of the Sudan Socialist Union) [Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard A. Lobban, Jr., and John Obert Voll, 1992: 31].

Nimeiri himself, the former President, declared in one of his addresses that, "the policy of political neutrality of the public service was a reactionary policy and that it was a legacy of the colonial era" [the President's address 1975: 8-9 in Abdin, 1986: 86].

2. As far as economic reform projects are concerned, the level of achievement did not fulfil the expectations. Unfortunately, the "projects rarely fulfilled the production targets which had been set for them, and the output from previously existing agricultural schemes and industries gradually declined" [Niblock, 1986: 36].

The net result of the economic reform projects ranged from varying success to almost total failure. Several factors accounted for such an unsatisfactory situation. These included,

a) bad planning and lack of participation. Professor Niblock writes:

"The projects, then were implemented without full consideration being given to the burden which they would collectively impose on the country's infrastructure (port facilities, roads and railways, electricity supplies and water supplies), manpower resources and foreign exchange" [Ibid: 37].

b) Lack of proper channels of decision-making in the ministries, which led to unstable policies and sweeping change in decisions. This was clear in
the Ministry of Finance, between the policies of the eight ministers who administered the Ministry between 1970 and 1981. [Mahmoud, 1984].

c) Corruption, as well, played a major role. Narrow interests were the drive, rather than economic necessities. [Niblock, 1986, Mansour Khalid, 1985 and Awad Ahmed Idris (Deputy Advocate General, interviewed by the researcher in Khartoum in 24/10/94)].

d) Administrative constraints were also among the factors. These resulted from the sudden shortages of skilled and technical labour who migrated to the Gulf Countries, the absence of effective follow-up, evaluation and progress reports, and the abolition of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform in 1981.


Chapter 2
Management Services a Tool for Administrative Reform

1. Introduction

This chapter sets out to provide information about a professional service which was introduced in the Sudan Public Service as an essential aid to administrative reform. It was and still is a tool available to all managers, to improve the performance of their organisations and increase productivity in terms of the goods or services they provide. This constructive service was given a descriptive name, "Management Services".

To give the reader a clear idea about management services (MS) the chapter begins by defining management services and describing the general operation of management services. We then turn to the experience of management services in the Sudan Public Service, which is the core of the study. The chapter covers the progress made in the programme in the Sudan as well as the problems which still exist.

In describing the general operation of management services, we examine in brief the experience of selected countries. The researcher believes that this brief examination is essential. It helps to explain why management services as an aid to administrative reform has succeeded in some countries and failed in others. Moreover, the experience of other countries provides some insights into the various dimensions of the challenges of using management services for administrative reform, indicating the conditions which lead to success and the prerequisites needed for successful implementation and management.
2. Origin and Development of MS

Management services had its origin in the Organisation and Method (O&M) techniques, and the latter had their origin in the growth of the civil service and demand for increased efficiency, at the beginning of the 20th century [David Nudd, 1984 a]. The O&M function was introduced in the British Civil Service in the 1920s as an aid to internal resource control [David Nudd, 1984 b]. Within the civil service, the O&M function was initiated in the Treasury, as the senior Department of the British Government in the first decade of this century [RIPA, 1976]. Historically, the Treasury has played a key role in civil service management and manpower planning. From 1919 until the 1950s, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury was also head of the civil service. From the Treasury, the O&M units were then spread to local authorities and business enterprises in Britain and finally to the overseas governments of the Commonwealth [Ibid, 1976].

During and after the first world war the number of O&M officers in the civil service rapidly increased, reaching a total of about 60 [Ibid, 1976]. According to Mr R. G. Casey, one of the British Governors in the Middle East in the 1940s, O&M specialists, from the Treasury's O&M branch, were sent to remedy administrative ills elsewhere. He said,

"It was from the pool of O&M talent that the O&M specialist was sent to me in the Middle East. It opened my eyes to the betterment that was possible of achievement in an organisation, at the hands of an individual who had made a study of the flow-sheet of authority in an enterprise, and of the many details that go to make up a smooth-working organisation" [Casey, 1947: 7].

In the 1960s, the O&M function evolved into a Management Services function, in response to more pressures for management efficiency [David Nudd, 1984 b].
Management services is more comprehensive. Its activities extend beyond the limited scope of the traditional O&M work [Noel Floate, interview, 1994].

In 1968, when the Civil Service Department was established to undertake the central management of the civil service [Garrett and Sheldon, 1973], a central MS unit was formed under Management Efficiency, one of the three headings of the Civil Service Department [RIPA, 1976]. According to RIPA (1976), that MS unit had three areas of activities:

1. Providing a full service to smaller departments which were not large enough to support their own O&M divisions.
2. Working with larger departments by carrying out joint assignments with their O&M divisions.
3. Providing advice and practical assistance on a wide range of specialised subjects to all departments.

3. Definitions of Management Services

Management services is a full-time service which gives advice on the structure of an organisation, its management and control and its procedures and methods. The trained management services officers (MSOs) working in a departmental management services unit (DMSU), constitute an extra tool at the disposal of top managers to examine organisation, methods of work, and day to day management practices in order to achieve improvements. They are trained to be objective, analytical and creative. They have no direct authority themselves, except when management requires them to assist with implementing some of the improvements they recommend. They are not investigators but assistants to all levels of staff. They do not investigate or inspect the
individuals involved. They examine and recommend improvements in organisation and in methods of doing work.

According to the Management and Personnel Office (MPO) in the UK Cabinet Office, MS is defined as:

"a generic term covering the internal consultancy service, which most departments have in one form or another, whose objective is to provide managers of the department at all levels with advice, help and support to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the department and to obtain better value for money. It covers a variety of means, including internal value for money studies, it often acts as a focus for internal departmental scrutinies and efficiency studies, and it may be brigaded with or include O&M, staff-inspection, operational research and automatic data processing services" [David Nudd, 1986: 10].

Stephen Taylor (1983) brings out further the character of consultancy performed:
"Management consultants in the dictionary sense of the term are persons from whom managers of organisations seek information, advice and council" [Taylor, 1983: 159].

According to Noel Floate (1976), MS is the process of:

1. Eliminating unnecessary work.
2. Simplifying the remaining work.
3. Increasing effectiveness and efficiency.
4. Improving the quality of public management in its day to day operation.

Neville Harris (1978) defines management services as,

"A management function containing those specialist skills appropriate for an organisation at a specific time, which provide a problem solving advisory service to management at all levels. Such advice is aimed at
assisting the management more effectively to achieve the objectives of the organisation in particular, profitability, cost effectiveness and productivity" [Harris, 1978: 5].

John Argenti (1969) in Harris (1978: 7) defines management services as "a recognised method analysing or solving a recognised type of management problem in a detailed systematic way".

A.H. Lines and C.K.C. Metz (1974) in Harris (1977:13) define management services as "a group of services aimed at advising an organisation's management as to how they can best achieve their company objectives".

The Management Services Division of the British Civil Service, in Harris (1977: 13), defines management services as "Services aimed at assisting management to maintain and improve its own effectiveness and the efficiency of operations by investigating and making recommendations for the solution of special problems and by giving general advice on certain specialised subject".

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4. Nature of Management Services

The phrase "Management Services" is a general term which could include one or more of the techniques available to line management to continually improve its performance [Floate, 1976]. The techniques aim at changing the actual practice of public administration, in a way that would increase its efficiency and effectiveness. The application needs close collaboration with officers concerned and support from political and top management, as is the case with any reform attempt.

Management services work requires that the individuals who undertake it make sure of facts, employ precise observation, where possible carry out experiments and employ realistic and rational thinking. Such work is perhaps the antithesis of making irresponsible assertions about facts or their meanings or indulging in a taste for wishful thinking [Leverhulme, 1947].

Impartiality in judgement, simplification, standardisation and logical reasoning are in the nature of management service. Trained personnel in MS are normally involved in activities which include:

1. Diagnosis of administrative management problems and recommending solutions.
2. Method study in office work as well as directly productive activities in public sector industry, trade and transportation.
3. Work measurement.
4. Improvement of communication and information systems.
5. Improving the work environment as one factor contributing to better motivation, effectiveness and productivity.
6. Developing work policies and suitable organisation structures so that there is a better understanding of objectives, improved flow of information, effective
delegation of authority and increased awareness and participation by all staff with regard to the execution of policies and national targets for development.

7. Contributing directly to improvement in staff training and management development.

8. Analysis of functions common to several public organisations, for example procurement and storage procedures and accounting systems. Advising on national standardised practices where appropriate [RIPA, 1979: 80].

The United Nations *Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management in Public Administration* (1979), also pointed out a similar range of services performed by management services officers:

"....organisational analysis in terms of the design of government machinery, including the structure and responsibilities of government departments, the study of administrative/ clerical methods and procedures, advisement on office mechanisation, including the uses of different types of office equipment (both conventional and sophisticated), work measurement to determine the best form of work distribution and to evaluate performance efficiency, advisement on office layout and space allocation, management of records and information, management of forms and manuals, management of materials and supplies, and modern management systems and techniques, including uses of computer resources in management" [UN Handbook, 1979: 5].

Clearly the potential field of MS is wide. According to Leverhulme (1947), its principles are applicable in the home, the professions, industry, commerce, and all business activities, although its practices and techniques may well vary in each application.
5. The Need for Management Services

In order to point out the advantages of management services, it is worth clarifying the difference between management and management services. Managers at all levels have to perform four interrelated tasks, which constitute the fundamentals of management or the management process: a) planning, b) organising, c) directing and d) controlling [Abdalla, 1983]. They have to carry out this function through the proper use of their staff and other resources allocated to them. Their effectiveness is judged not only by how well they do their own jobs, but by how well their staff do theirs. Theoretically this means they should undertake by themselves all the work necessary for improving the performance of their staff. But practically this is difficult, if not impossible. Noel Floate (1976) states:

"In most organisations, it has been found that line managers are too occupied with their daily demanding tasks. If they are to be vigilant and actually pursue the continuing need to effect improvements, for which they are responsible, they need an additional objective service. This full-time advisory service which exists to make improvements under the control of line managers is called, Management Services" [Floate, 1976: 7].

Management services, as an advisory service, is thus needed for a number of reasons. First, in this modern world, social and technological changes are so rapid that no organisation, however well developed, can afford to remain static. There is always a need for change to keep an organisation up-to-date in its structure, management practice and methods of work, if it is to meet its objectives effectively. Year in and year out, in all sorts of activities, countless jobs are being done unnecessarily, procedures contain valueless and time-wasting features, and every form is capable of being simplified or cut down in size. To review and eliminate unnecessary and unprofitable work only needs a little clear thinking. Management services is usually employed to play this role. An example can illustrate the argument. Mrs Thatcher,
seeking expertise and specialist help, appointed Sir Derek Raynor, joint managing Director of Marks and Spencer, as her advisor on "ways to improve efficiency and eliminate waste in Government". A series of government activities and processes were investigated, analysed and reviewed. The experiment proved successful. Taken as an exemplary case, an annual scrutiny programme was set up, and operated by an "Efficiency Unit" based in the Management and Personnel Office [Wilks, 1993].

Second, continuous pressure is placed upon the public service due to the expansion of the government activities and management services provision can alleviate that pressure. Under-Secretaries and top management in any ministry or department are very busy. They lack the time and to some extent, the expertise (specialist knowledge) to perform all the functions they would wish to perform. They can not possibly watch over all the problems, difficulties and shortcomings of the day-to-day work in their departments. The time they can devote to departmental work is limited. Most of their time is taken up with extra activities such as committees, meetings, official visits and other responsibilities. Their work is, as described by Drewry and Butcher (1988), "a dog's life". Such a situation leads them to turn to a delegated body to shoulder the responsibility of continuous restructuring, examining and innovating.

Third, critical examination of the present situation (status quo) can not be carried out by the individuals who form part of the organisation, as the latter are too close to it. Casey argues that existing personnel, "cannot see the wood for the trees. They cannot avoid having vested interests, personal friendships and personal antagonisms that militate against an objective judgement" [Casey, 1947: 10]. According to David Nudd (1984 b) organisations employ management services consultants because they provide:

1. A view of problems, outside of those directly involved.
2. Additional resources to tackle issues.
3. Specialist help in the form of methodology, analytical or diagnostic tools, consulting skills or change strategies.

Fourth, management services officers are trained to tackle problems from the first principles. A writer whose name was identified by H. S. wrote an article under the name, "Swan Song" in the O&M bulletin (vol. 2 No. 3 August 1947), stressing that management services officers have to treat the principles if they are to effect a really satisfactory solution, and not the symptoms, although it is the latter they are usually presented with when the problem is first described. And this seems to be the main thing about the work of management services.

The literature reviewed showed that the need for management services as an aid to administrative reform is not a new phenomenon. The ideas go back to the year 1887 when Woodrow Wilson pointed out in his article, "The Study of Administration", that the object of administrative study is to discover what the government can properly and successfully do and how it can do these things properly with the utmost possible efficiency and the least possible cost, either in money or energy. He claimed that there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to strengthen and purify its organisation [Caiden, 1969]. This is exactly what management services does. It is all about getting the right job done, efficiently and effectively in the right time, right place, and by the right person, using the up-to-date means and methods.
6. Management Services in the International Perspective

The literature reviewed revealed the growing interest in many countries in the development of management services work. Governments in several developing countries have created O&M units to provide the management improvement services needed to make their public administration systems more responsive to the growing and complex demands of economic and social developments.

In Africa, for example, O&M was introduced in Ghana 1948. An O&M unit was created as a small section of the Department of Statistics and in 1962 it was strengthened and placed in the office of the President. In 1968/69, the unit was further upgraded and was placed in the office of the Prime Minister, and headed by an officer ranked as a senior Permanent Secretary [UN Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management in Public Administration, 1979]. In Tanganyika (now Tanzania), an O&M unit was established in 1953/54 [Ibid, 1979]. In the Sudan, an O&M unit was first established in 1954 in the Treasury [Hamour, 1972], then in 1968 it was revived in the Establishment Department [IPA, 1968], and in 1971 the unit was transferred to the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform [Al-Teraifi 1979].

In Asia and the Far East, O&M units were created in the following countries:

1. In Bengal (Bangladesh) 1946. After the successful work of an O&M officer who came from London on a special assignment, an O&M unit was established to keep continual critical checks on the administrative machine [Casey, 1946].

2. In Nepal. O&M techniques were employed from 1958 and in 1968 the government established a department named "Administrative Management" within the Prime Minister's Office [UN Handbook, 1979].
3. In Turkey, O&M units were created in 1959 to aid the administrative reform programme in the civil service [Younis, Ibrahim and Mclean, 1992].

4. In Indonesia. Management services work was introduced in 1972 [RIPA, 1986].

5. In Pakistan. Management services was introduced in 1984 [RIPA, 1985].

In the Arab world, the subject was introduced in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1969/70. A central department for organisation and administration was set up by Royal Decree (No.19 of 1964) as one of the departments of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, to carry out management services work [Abdel Khalik, 1986]. In Iraq, O&M units were established in 1971. They worked under the supervision and guidance of the National Centre for Consultancy and Management Development [UN Handbook, 1979]. In Qatar, in 1976 a team of experts and consultants in the field of administration recommended the establishment of a central body for organisation and methods [Abdel Khalik, 1986]. In Kuwait, the Supreme Committee for Developing and Updating the Administrative Apparatus, at its first meeting in 1984, established a sub-committee for organisation and methods [Ibid, 1986]. In Jordan in 1990, management services techniques were introduced and employed under the framework of "Administrative Development Units" in collaboration with the United Nations. This was with the support of the United Nations Development Programme [IPA, 1993].

Generally speaking, in the early 1970s more than 70 developing countries created management services units to cure their administrative ills. The figures below indicate the geographic distribution of these countries:

30 countries in Africa.
17 countries in Asia and the Far East.
22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
6 countries in Western Asia.


It is worth mentioning that it has been a continuing concern of the United Nations to strengthen O&M capability in the governments of developing countries. In 1969, the subject was addressed in a United Nations publication entitled, "The Administration of Organisation and Methods Services" (UN publication, Sales No.E.69.11.H.1), and again in 1970 at the International Seminar on Administration of Management Improvement Services held at Copenhagen (UN publication, Sales No.E.71.11.H.9) [UN, 1979]. Also concern regarding effectiveness of the subject was widely expressed at the Third Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance, held in March 1975, and at another meeting of the same experts in October 1977 [Ibid, 1979]. Moreover, between 1974 and 1977, according to the United Nations handbook (1979), an average of 45 United Nations advisers in O&M and related fields were annually on assignment in different countries to help governments improve their public administration systems. However, the role of O&M units in the developing countries had remained peripheral to the significant changes in public administration. This was attributed to a number of reasons. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the subject faced a number of problems due to:

1. The limited number of qualified personnel in the field of administration and organisation.
2. The lack of sufficient awareness on the part of some of those in charge of government bodies, and their lack of comprehension of the significance of organisation for improving the performance of their units.
3. The weakness of the units both organisationally and administratively in government bodies, and lack of co-ordination between these units and
the Central Department for Organisation and Administration [Al-

In the African countries, according to G. Caiden (1991) the reasons which led to the failure of the O&M function were scarcity of resources, civil wars, purges, crippling inflation, uncertain tenure, poverty and nepotism. Generally, the developing countries, according to the United Nations handbook (1979), faced the following problems:

1. Lack of a clear definition of the objectives and role of the agencies that had been created.
2. Professional and technical deficiencies that stemmed largely from the shortage of qualified staff.
3. Ambiguities in the relations of those agencies with planning, budgetary and personnel processes.
4. Absence of concrete political support and problems of top-level confidence.
5. Resistance from other public agencies and the proliferation of institutions concerned with administrative problems rather than with programmatic considerations.

As far as the developed countries are concerned, some of them started to employ O&M techniques in the early part of the 20th Century, as discussed earlier. Since then, considerable progress has been made in the techniques employed. The United Kingdom and the USA were the first to use O&M techniques in public administration, then the rest of the Western countries followed. One example of the growth of interest was the decision at the International Management Congress, held in Stockholm in 1947 to explore the possibilities of setting up something in the nature of an
international clearing house for ideas and experience on organisation and methods in
the public service [Simpson, 1947].

The success of O&M in these developed countries maybe attributed to a number of
factors. Most important was political backing, top management support, appreciation
and awareness of the employees, availability of capabilities and publicity given to the
subject. Many periodicals concerning O&M were issued regularly. For example, in the
UK, we find the O&M Bulletin, then Management Services in Government,
Management in Government and the Management Adviser. In France, we find the
O&M Bulletin issued by the Budget Directorate, Ministry of Economy and Finance,
and in Canada we find Optimum issued by the Bureau of Management Consultancy,
Ministry of Supply and Services.

Lessons that could be drawn from this international experience - for the sake of our
study - are that employment of management services techniques as an aid to
administrative reform requires the following:

1. Strong political support.
2. Top management support.
3. Appreciation of the subject by the government employees.
4. Appropriate training.
5. A reform oriented environment.
7. Comments and Views about the MS Function in the Developed Countries

Views on the MS function in the developed countries can provide a useful comparative perspective for this research. They provide information about how the subject was viewed in these countries, and on the factors which have influenced the success, progress and development of the MS function. Furthermore, it will help in the analysis of the Sudanese experience in the later chapters.

The techniques of management services have often been touted as the universal panacea for organisations' ills in developed countries [Poedtke, 1973]. In Sweden, according to Sallfors (1947), employment of the O&M techniques was fruitful. A commission for organisation and methods was established in 1944 and achieved successful results. As a result, larger departments of O&M branches were established. In Australia, Casey, addressing the Institute of Industrial Management on November 14th, 1946, in Melbourne, said,

"The office as a whole, and particularly the supply side clearly needed reorganisation and putting together. To make a long story short, I got from the Treasury in London the services of a highly placed individual, known by the mysterious description of an O&M expert. He turned out to be a Godsend, and quickly turned the office into quite a reasonably smooth-running affair" [Casey, 1947 b: 6].

In the United States of America, where the subject is known as Scientific Management, Mogensen (1947) notes that striking savings of manpower were achieved in government offices and in the armed forces as a result of applying work simplification techniques, which were sponsored at the time by the United States Bureau of the Budget. Dr Harry A. Hopf of the Hopf Institute of Management, New York State, described the practice of O&M in the United States as, "great fun as well as a worthwhile job" [Hopf, 1947: 10]. Professor Peter Drucker of the University of
New York (in Taylor 1983), described a management consultant as a professional diagnostician in management, a professional therapist and a true scholar [Stephen Taylor, 1983].

In Japan, the management services function has also been highly appreciated. According to Yoshinori Ide (1969), in the year 1968 a three year plan was designed for administrative reform and the techniques of the subject were comprehensively employed.

In the United Kingdom, the subject was and still is widely recognised. The Editor of the O&M Bulletin (1947) stated, "The O&M divisions and branches in particular have maintained close contact with progress and development" [O&M Bulletin, Vol. 2 No. 1, 1947: 5]. Mr Crombie (1947), third Secretary of the Treasury and a former Civil Service Representative commented on the progress and importance of O&M saying,

"The study and practice of O&M has moved forward steadily, there is widespread recognition of the contribution it can make to the orderly arrangement and conduct of business and the opportunities that lie before it in the field of government administration are now greater than ever before"

".........it is satisfying to reflect that the entire range of O&M activities almost invariably provides, immediately or in the long run, directly or indirectly, that fundamental hallmark of efficiency-economy of operation" [Crombie, 1947: 4].

Such comments and views make it easier for the readers to understand how and why management services has been developed. In the UK, for example, the progression which occurred moved from O&M units to MS units to an Efficiency unit and finally to an Office of Public Service Sciences (OPSS) in the Cabinet Office [Floate, interview, 1994].
The Sudanese Experience

1. The early attempts

In the year 1954, an O&M unit was established in the Central Establishment of the Sudan Government Treasury (now the Ministry of Finance). The unit was manned by 12 O&M officers, but it proved ineffective due to poor training and lack of technical and administrative support [W.S.Ryan, 1976, Hamour, 1972, al-Teraifi, 1979 and the UN Handbook, 1979]. According to Sayyed Abdalla Siddig Ghandour, the first director of the unit, in Al-Teraifi (1979), the unit worked without any terms of reference, direction and purpose. There was also confusion as to the proper relationship of the unit to the Director of Establishments and the Under-Secretary of Finance. Each of these officials wanted to have the unit under his jurisdiction. Another shortcoming was that the new unit was not introduced to the heads of departments. Very few people seemed to understand what the unit was about, and many heads of departments considered the unit obstructive and wasteful. The utilisation of the unit by the Ministry of Finance as an inspection tool aroused the doubts and suspicions of department heads. Further, the staff of the unit could not give their whole-hearted attention to their work because they were not sure of their position and the future of their careers. Another source of frustration for the staff of the unit was that no active interest in their work and affairs was forthcoming from within the Ministry of Finance, and very few heads of departments seemed to have given the unit's advice and recommendations sufficient attention and thought.

This unit, according to the UN Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management in Public Administration (1979), was later revived and expanded. In the year 1968, it was revived in the Establishment Department (later named the Civil Service Department). Training of O&M officers was undertaken in the Institute of Public Administration (now the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences), and
some limited progress was made [IPA, 1968]. In the year 1971, when the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) was established, the unit was transferred to it [Al-Teraifi, 1979].

2. Management Services Under the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform

In October 1971, a key ministry was created, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR), to shoulder the burden of administrative reform government-wide. In November 1972, and at the request of the government, a United Nations Mission arrived in Khartoum [MPSAR, 1972: 1]. The Mission was headed by Dr Sharif, an International Advisor to the Public Administration Division of the United Nations Headquarters. The terms of reference for the mission included, among the 5 terms of references,

"Helping the Ministry to develop its organisational capabilities for steering and implementing a major administrative reform programme" [Ibid, 1972: 1].

The mission recommended a three-year crash programme of administrative reform, to be undertaken by the Ministry. One of the objectives of this crash programme was:

"Introducing new procedures for planning administrative improvements and building up the network of supporting management services units in the ministries, public sector corporations and local government organisations" [Ibid, 1972: 6].

The UN Mission's report stated clearly that the question of administrative reform required the active participation and positive involvement of all ministries and other
establishments government-wide. It should be regarded as a shared responsibility involving every ministry, public corporation and central government unit, under the supervision, guidance and support of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, which should act as a central body.

The mission recommended the formation of Departmental Management Services Units (DMSUs) in all ministries, public corporations and local government units. The DMSUs recommended to be established were given terms of references which envisaged that they would:

1. Provide staff support for the task force charged with the formulation of improvement programme.
2. Handle the personnel management work on delegation from the Civil Service Department.
3. Take part in project teams carrying out certain improvements.
4. Formulate and take part in the implementation of training programmes for their organisations [Ibid, 1972: 29].

The management services units, depending on the size of the parent organisation, should be made up of a minimum of three management services officers. These officers should be drawn from "promising staff" of the parent organisation, with university education and a minimum of five years experience with their organisations. They should be given the basic, advanced and specialist training courses and they should be kept updated through annual short refresher training programmes. They should be placed within their organisations as close as possible to the Under Secretary, as a staff unit at his disposal. Nevertheless, they must retain strong and organic links with the MPSAR. Furthermore, they were to be directed to service the implementation
of the development programmes of their ministries. The mission also recommended special incentives to be considered to attract the best talent of the parent organisation in these "seed" units [Ibid, 1972].

The Departmental Management Services Units Programme started functioning in 1974. In the period 1974-76, seventeen DMSUs were established in 12 ministries. Figure (4) below shows the location of the DMSUs and the deployment of the management services officers (MSOs) at the time.

**Figure (4): Location of DMSUs and deployment of MSOs as in 1976.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Department or Corporation</th>
<th>Number of MSOs in post 1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPSAR</td>
<td>GDOAR</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of peoples' local government</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Police Department</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prisons Department</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Information</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Construction and Public Works</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Water Corporation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport and Communication</td>
<td>Telecommunications Dept.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post and Telegraph Dept.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan Railways Corporation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan Airways Corporation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Planning and National Economy</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Youth and Sports</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry</td>
<td>Industrial Production Corporation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Commerce and Supply</td>
<td>State Trading Corporation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Noel Floate, 1976: 16-18].
In those DMSUs, almost all management services officers were selected from graduate staff, mainly administrative officers. In some departments a few professional officers were included, and it proved to be very beneficial. For example, in the Ministry of Construction and Public Works, the DMSU included two engineers. These were very effective in their studies of construction work on-site and associated activities at the headquarters. The Police and Prisons management services officers included uniformed officers, and in the Ministry of Agriculture there was one agricultural officer [MPSAR, 1977].

The head of a DMSU was responsible for managing his own unit just like any other manager of a section. One of his management services officers usually acted as a deputy during his absence. Figure (5), shows the organisational structure of a DMSU.
A look at this organisation chart shows that the system was not split into functional groupings or into personnel who applied a series of related techniques. This was unlike the case in Britain, where the management services unit was divided into distinct areas of activities (such as the Computer or EDP section, the Operational Research section and the O&M section). The Computer section was a common section in all the management services organisation structures in Britain, as was appropriate in a developed country. It was used as a tool for problem-solving, information-processing, planning and management purposes generally. In the Sudan, utilisation of modern data-processing techniques in the public administration was still limited to a few specific areas. No DMSU had in its structure a section for computing services, despite the fact that a "National Information System and Data Processing.
Development Plan was recommended by the UN mission (1972) as a main project in the administrative reform programme [MPSAR, 1972]. Figure (6) below shows a standard management services organisation chart in Britain.

According to the United Nations handbook (1979), a hypothetical organisation chart of a central O&M unit is provided in appendix (2).

Figure (6): A Standard Management Services Organisation Chart in Britain.

Source: [Walley, 1973: 10].
3. Job Descriptions

In 1974, MPSAR embarked on framing job descriptions for heads of DMSUs and management services officers. Each officer, including the head, was to know what his job contained, and the job descriptions were to be approved by the top management, who should know the nature of the work expected of the staff of his DMSU. In figures (7) and (8), the job descriptions for the head of a DMSU and a management services officer are given.

Figure (7): Job description for the head of a DMSU

Name: .........................
Grade: .........................

Job title: Head of Departmental Management Services Unit.
Responsible to: Under Secretary or Director General.
Immediate Subordinates: The DMSU's management services officers.
Limitations of Authority: He has authority over the staff of the DMSU, but he has no authority over the staff of other departments. He has no authority to spend any money for improvements without the approval of the Under Secretary or other appointed senior officer.
Relationship with other managers: Purely advisory.
Membership of committees: He should be a member of any standing committee which is directly relevant to the role of management services as well as other occasional committees which may be appropriate.

Activities:

1. Receiving and programming new assignments.
2. Controlling existing assignments.
3. Arranging and clarifying terms of references and limitations of assignments.
4. Making preliminary surveys and achieving modified terms of reference whenever necessary.

5. Planning, programming, co-ordinating and controlling assignments.

6. Developing the unit and the staff, through in-service training, job rotation and other means.

7. Motivating and managing his staff.

8. Progress reports as required by the MPSAR, and the top management.

9. Budget preparation for the DMSU.

10. Control of expenditure within the unit.

11. Representing the unit whenever it is necessary.

12. Participating in actual assignments as a team leader and/or analyst.

13. Implementation of improvements when authorised to do so.

14. By discussions, seminars or other suitable means, promoting an appreciation of the role and use of management services in the Ministry or Corporation.

Approved by:..........................

Authorised by: (Under-Secretary or Director General).

[MPSAR, Files of GDOAR, 1976].

Figure (8): Job description for a management services officer.

Name:.........................

Grade:....................... 

Job title: Management services officer.

Responsible to: Head of DMSU.

Immediate subordinates: None.

Limitation of authority: He has no formal delegated authority except when acting as a team leader on specific assignments as directed by the head of the DMSU.
Activities:

1. Participating in assignments as directed by the head of the DMSU.
2. Reporting progress on assignments being conducted to the head of the DMSU as necessary.
3. Discussion of problems with other officers of DMSU and/or staff of operational units involved in assignments.
4. Reporting problems or likely areas for additional studies discovered during assignment work or at any other time.
5. Acting as Team Leader on any assignment work as directed by the head of the DMSU.
6. Making representations to other units or elsewhere as directed by the head of DMSU.
7. Implementing improvements when authorised.
8. Explaining the role of management services to managers and staff.

Authorised by: Head of DMSU.

[Ibid, 1976].

4. Focal Point of the Programme

In the year 1971, a directorate was created within the MPSAR, named the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR). This directorate was assigned the responsibility of implementing the MS function in the Sudan Public Service. It was the focal point of the programme for establishing and co-ordinating effective management services units throughout the public service. As the mother of all the DMSUs, it played a predominantly pioneering and leadership role on behalf of
all the established DMSUs. It succeeded in keeping the programme up-to-date and relevant through its Forward Planning and Training section.

Broadly the main role of the GDOAR was concentrated in the following management services functions:

1. Public service-wide participation in various aspects of administrative reform.
2. Management services assignments within the MPSAR and on request in other ministries.
3. Training, establishing, guiding and co-ordinating the newly formed DMSUs in other ministries, public corporations or large departments [Ibid, 1976].

Figure (9), below shows the organisation chart of the GDOAR.
The central DMSU shown in this diagram serviced the whole Ministry of the Public Service and Administrative Reform. It also undertook assignments in other departments where DMSUs had not yet been established. Furthermore, staff of the central DMSU were ready to be detached to other external DMSUs to assist with particular assignments where needed, a case which was quite similar to the function of the central O&M unit in the British Treasury.
The organisation chart also shows that the GDOAR was more involved with administrative reform matters and the building up of specialist capabilities in the field of organisation, work study, forms design and data processing. It was intended to extend the range of these specialisms slowly, as the programme developed, to include data processing and mechanisation, systems analysis, network analysis, project planning and co-ordinating, operations research and management consultancy.

5. Creation of Posts for the DMSUs

The UN mission (1972) recommended special incentives to be considered to attract the best quality of personnel to work in the DMSUs (discussed earlier). When the programme started in 1974, the MPSAR promised the MSOs these special incentives, such as two increments, creation of posts and priority in training. Furthermore, in 1976 Presidential Decree No. 160 dated 11 April, was issued to confirm the incentives in order to encourage and enable the DMSUs to undertake the activities assigned [appendix (3)]. Creation of posts for the DMSUs was a problem from the very beginning of the programme but after several discussions with the Civil Service Department (CSD) posts were created. Even then, it proved difficult to cover all the DMSUs as the number of MSOs started to increase. In December 1978, a meeting was held between GDOAR and the Civil Service Department with the presence of Mr Noel Floate, the RIPA Adviser in management services and Mr H. Curtis, the ODM Consultant who came to the Sudan to evaluate the DMSU programme. The meeting discussed the problems of creation of posts, promotion and careers of the MSOs who were working in the DMSUs. A summary of the agreed action is provided in appendix (4). As a result of the meeting, in February 1979 a circular was issued by the Civil Service Department to all Under Secretaries of departments and directors of public corporations referring to the creation of posts for DMSUs and the need to safeguard the careers of officers who work as management services officers. Appendix (5)
shows the CSD circular referring to creation of posts for management services officers.

6. The Growth in the Number of DMSUs, 1954-1990

By December 1977, the number of management services units in central government, local government and the public corporations was 43, broken down as indicated below:

- Central Government: 19 units.
- Public Corporations: 19 units.
- Local Government: 4 units.
- Southern Region: 1 unit.

Source: [MPSAR, 1977: 15].

In the year 1978 the number of DMSUs reached 48. In 1981 the number had decreased to 24, and in 1990 there were only ten. Figure (10) gives a summary of the number of DMSUs in existence from 1954 to the present.
Figure (10): DMSUs in Existence in the period 1954-1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of DMSUs</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Civil Service Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Central, Local Government &amp; Public Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Central, Local Government &amp; Public Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Central, Local Government &amp; Public Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Central, Local Government &amp; Public Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Central Government and Public Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Central Government and Public Corporations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This figure shows that the period 1977-1981 witnessed a big leap in the development of the DMSU programme. The reasons were:

1. The intensive training of the management services officers.
2. Creation of a special department for management services training in the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS).
3. Presence of the expatriate consultant of the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA).
4. The continuous assistance and participation of the RIPA in training of management services officers, under the United Kingdom's technical assistance programme.
5. The management services appreciation seminars, the general publicity through articles in the newspapers and other news media (marketing and selling the programme), and the effective follow-up system maintained.

Appendix (6) gives a list of organisations with DMSUs as at April 1979.

7. Existing DMSUs in 1990

The list below covers the ministries and corporations which had DMSUs as full-time advisory organs in 1990.

1. Ministry of Education.
7. Seaports Corporation.
8. Sudan Railways Corporation.
9. Civil Service Department.
10 Sudan Agricultural Bank.

[CSD, 1990 and Interviews, 1993].

The existence of the DMSUs in these ministries and corporations and their survival especially in this interim where there was no central co-ordinating and supporting body, was clear evidence of the usefulness of their work and the awareness of top management in these ministries and public corporations of the role of management services as an additional tool at their disposal. Whereas the resistance of top management, lack of appreciation and frustration of management services officers in
the other ministries and public corporations were among the reasons that caused the DMSUs in these organisations to disappear (more details in this respect will be discussed in the analysis chapter).

8. The Experience of Management Services at its Height

The period between the mid-1970s and early-1980s was considered as the golden age of the DMSU programme. Having high political support expressed through a Presidential Decree, the DMSU programme was easily absorbed by the administrators like all other developments which enjoy strong political support. In addition to issuing the presidential decree [appendix (3)], President Nimeiri gave the programme full support when he explained the ultimate aims of the programme in his report to the second conference of the Sudan Socialist Union on 26th, January 1977. He said:

"We have DMSUs to enable the activities of administrative reform to be transformed into the different ministries and departments as an advanced technique of administrative reform, and so as to help ministries and departments in reshaping their organisational structures, regulations, methods and procedures of work to simplify them and to implement the best methods for promoting the efficiency of the system, providing suitable advice when preparing the budgets, examining the obstacles and suggesting administrative solutions for their remedy and endeavouring to upgrade the administrative relations between different organisations" [MPSAR, 1977: 2].

During this period appreciation seminars were extensively held. The Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences and the University of Khartoum were approached to incorporate MS techniques in their management curriculum, as an on-going and permanent feature, and to treat MS as a basic subject on all the courses they run. As a result, it was agreed that the GDOAR would be invited to contribute sessions on management services appreciation, when seminars for top officials in the public service were held [Ibid, 1977].
The programme gained publicity through articles in the daily newspapers and other news media. The inauguration of each new course (Basic Courses) and the final ceremony when certificates were distributed were also publicised. It was a custom that the Minister or Under Secretary of the MPSAR attended and addressed the audience in the inauguration of each new course.

According to Al-Teraifi (1979), leadership was a critical variable in the success of the DMSU programme in those days. Leadership is defined by Esman and Bruhns (1966) in Al-Teraifi as, "the group of persons who are actively engaged in the formulation of the doctrine and the programme of the institution and who direct its operation and relationship with the environment" [Al-Teraifi, 1979: 143]. The leadership of the MPSAR consisted of, a) the Minister, b) the Under Secretary, c) Directors of the various departments within the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, d) the Director of IPA, and e) the Director of the Management Development and Productivity Centre. The first Minister, Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, and the above mentioned group were all professionally competent for the job and were very much committed to the cause of administrative reform and change. They contributed much to the acceptance and implementation of the DMSU programme.

Another factor that helped the DMSUs to flourish in those days was the MPSAR's ability to cultivate and maintain the favourable climate of reform which was prevailing among those groups on whom success might depend or who could facilitate future progress [Ibid, 1979]. The immediate environment of the MPSAR included a) the President, b) the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), c) the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform, d) operating ministries (especially Finance and Planning), e) educational and training institutions, and f) the People's Assembly (legislature). According to Al-Teraifi (1979), the leadership of the MPSAR identified
itself from the start with the slogans and ideals of the SSU. They embraced the administrative reform programmes announced by the SSU. By so doing, the MPSAR gained the personal support of the President and the party leadership. Moreover, the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform was made a member of the Political Bureau of SSU. As a result, he had an easy access to the President Nimeiri. Establishing and maintaining such close links and visible public association with power centres helped the DMSUs in many ways.

9. Evaluation of the DMSU Programme

The DMSU programme was evaluated by many expatriate consultants, commissions and working parties. In January 1976, Mr W. S. Ryan was assigned by the British Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) to assess the following:

1. The benefits obtained by the MSOs who attended the RIPA advanced course held in 1975 in London.

2. The progress made by RIPA in transferring responsibility for basic management analysis courses on to the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) in Khartoum.

3. The attitude of individual ministries in Khartoum in their reception of and support to the Departmental Management Services Units to which they will be assigned [Ryan, 1976].

Mr Ryan commented in his report (1976) that DMSUs were known and appreciated, and the MS function had credibility at all the senior levels he spoke to. He described the climate as being more favourable to DMSUs than at any time in the past. He felt that there was a general feeling at all levels that efficiency must be raised. He described the DMSUs as being very effective and that Ministers and Under Secretaries
were using their DMSUs to carry out organisation studies and investigations on their behalf. He said,

"......the success rate appears to be high. In most of the DMSUs visited, methods assignments relating to mail and registries had been undertaken with the benefits already visible to all. These have led to more complex assignments involving organisational aspects and it is clear that Under Secretaries and Ministers are increasingly looking to DMSUs for support in these areas" [Ryan, 1976: 8].

In January 1978, Mr J. H. R. Davies of TETOC, who was the adviser in public administration to the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), came to the Sudan (on a monitoring visit) in order to evaluate the progress of the DMSU programme and to determine further inputs. In his report (T 1198, dated February 1978), Mr Davies said that the concept and use of management services had taken root [RIPA, 1978].

In December 1978, at the request of the MPSAR, the Ministry of Overseas Development appointed Mr H. H. Curtis to evaluate the DMSU programme. Mr Curtis was a former management services officer from the British Civil Service Department [Floate, interview, 1994]. His comments were very encouraging. He stated that,

"the current evidence is that DMSUs have succeeded beyond expectations in meeting the challenge." And "......there is no doubt about the usefulness of their work" [RIPA, 1979: 14].

Appendix (7) gives the letter which was sent from the Minister of the Public Service and Administrative Reform to the British Embassy in this connection.
The United Nations, in its Publication No. E. 79. 11. H3 (1979), described the DMSU programme as successful and very positive. It said, "one country in which this strategy has been adopted and has had very positive results is the Sudan" [UN Handbook, 1979: 13].

Al-Teraifi (1979), commenting on the achievements of the DMSUs, wrote:

"For the first time in the Sudan, there is a record of the composition and objectives of most government agencies. A base has therefore been made from which it will be possible to advance to a more effective arrangement of the machinery of government" [Al-Teraifi, 1979: 139].

Abdin (1986), provides a similar perspective:

"with its increasing importance and gradual consolidation of its position as the central reform body, the process of administrative reorganisation became gradually institutionalised...... It played an important role in organising, supervising and co-ordinating matters pertinent to the reorganisation process. But its sudden and rather unexpected dissolution in November 1981 left the process of reform in limbo" [Abdin, 1986: 93].

The Director General of the Telecommunications Corporation, commenting on the usefulness of his DMSU, in one of the follow up visits 1978, told the GDOAR representatives that he was able to use his management services officers to implement fundamental changes in the Corporation, for which it would have been necessary to pay $200,000 in fees to expatriate consultants [MPSAR, 1978].

Dr Kamal M Zein, the first Under Secretary of the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform, when interviewed in 1993 by the researcher, said that the management
services officers, apart from their achievements in their DMSUs, took part in many administrative reform projects. Examples included work simplification assignments in Khartoum Teaching Hospital, and in Khartoum International Airport, employment accounting (Hasar al-Gowa al-'Amila, census of government employees), the Technical Committee for Reviewing the Policies of Training, the Technical Committee for Studying the Staggering of Working Hours in Government Units, and the Committee for Studying the Criteria of Performance Evaluation, Incentives and the Privileges in the Public Service.

10. Perception of MS by MSOs

In terms of how the management services officers evaluated their own work, a group interview was carried out in the premises of SAAS in August 1993. The researcher invited a group of more than 20 management services officers, including heads of the existing DMSUs, to assemble in the SAAS. The aim was to find out comments and views of the group about the management services function, its successes, problems and its future outlook. The outcome was that DMSUs in their golden days built up a very good reputation and did very valuable work. They were, according to the interviewees, tightly-knit units, lubricated by close working relationships, founded upon trust and mutual esteem. The management services officers saw things from a similar point of view and discussed problems in a common language. Most importantly, they possessed the capacity for convincing top management and colleagues of their sound techniques.

The group agreed that the early successes helped to build up confidence among the MSOs and the public service. It was well known that the DMSUs could be used in all the ministries and departments as a channel through which information could be
obtained more easily, quickly and accurately. The DMSUs had contacts among themselves bringing together those government departments where DMSUs were established. If any management services officer wanted to know, for example, how the Ministry of Health dealt with a given process, he just had to ring up the DMSU in the Ministry of Health and he would receive the answer, without need to write or suffer inconveniences of delay and follow up difficulties. He obtained the answer quickly and informally because the individuals concerned knew each other. This use of DMSUs, besides their continuous function of management improvement, led to closer contacts between ministries, departments, and corporations on many subjects and to quicker and more effective communication between them.

Also, the group pointed out the usefulness of the monthly periodical meetings of the heads of DMSUs in the context of cementing the relationships and consolidating the programme. Periodical meetings for the heads of DMSUs were held in the premises of the GDOAR. The purpose was to assemble them to enable them to discuss among themselves and with the staff of the central unit of GDOAR their achievements, problems and suggestions in relation to the work of their DMSUs and promotion of the programme as a whole.

According to the group, the management services function at its peak was recognised and accepted in many organisations. Top officials in some departments had delegated to their DMSUs improvement work on a full-time basis. For example, in the Telecommunications Corporation, the Director General used his DMSU to implement fundamental changes in the Corporation. In the Ministry of Construction and Public Works, the unit was used directly by the Under Secretary and the Minister to pursue the developmental programmes of training and management. In the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Under Secretary relied on the management services officers in issues of improvement, and in the Ministry of Education, the Minister and
the Under Secretary used to hold meetings of senior officials and the DMSU team to review the work of the DMSU and authorise implementation and future assignments.

The group emphasised that many assignments were carried out by the DMSUs and a number of improvements were accomplished by management services officers in various departments. In the Ministry of Interior, management services officers made a significant contribution in reviewing the procedures for issuing exit visas, new passports and procedures for performing "Umra" (pilgrimage). A simplified method and new improved forms were recommended, designed and implemented, (appendices 8, 9 and 10). The result was a substantial reduction in the time needed to obtain exit visas and new passports, (this argument was supported by a visit to the Passports, Nationality and Immigration Department, 1993).

Appendix (8) shows the old application form for issuing a passport.

Appendix (9) shows the new (improved) application form for issuing a passport.

Appendix (10) shows the new arrangement for "Umra" performance application.

In the Post and Telegraph Corporation, the MSOs played a leading part in the conversion of the department into a corporation. In addition they brought about a significant improvement in the filing system, office planning and layout and manpower planning. Forms were designed for the newly introduced services, and the old forms were redesigned to suit the expansion and development that took place in the postal service. The private post office boxes were organised in a new layout, giving more room for more private post office boxes, to meet the pressing needs of new customers. This study was taken to be exemplary and applied in the post offices that were scattered in Khartoum State and the Capitals of other States.
Besides the group interview, individual interviews were carried out. The interviewees mentioned other achievements, such as work simplification in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (documentation office), Department of Statistics (issuing of Birth Certificates), motor-car licensing and the issuing of Sudan School Certificates. Notice boards (a new project) were fixed in accessible and visible places, displaying information required and guidance, in front of the departments that dealt with the public [Taha, interview, 1993].
11. Expatriate Advisers

Another valuable additional element which helped the DMSUs to be established, was the presence of expatriate advisers who assisted various aspects of management services and the DMSU programme from 1974. Most important here was Mr Noel Floate, the United Kingdom Consultant of the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA). He worked jointly with the GDOAR from October 1975 to March 1979 [RIPA, 1979]. He was assigned under the United Kingdom Technical Assistant Programme. His main task was promotion and consolidation of the management services programme and creation of DMSUs in the Public Service [SAAS, 1984]. Mr Floate exerted an outstanding effort in the promotion of the DMSU programme and much of the achievements were attributed to him.

12. Development to Date

The sudden dissolution of the MPSAR in November 1981 left the DMSU programme in limbo [Abdin, 1986]. To find out which developments and factors led to the disbandment of the Ministry, different sources were consulted. The researcher interviewed (1993) Sayyed Ismat Mustafa Abdel Halim, First Under Secretary of the Civil Service Department, a senior officer in the MPSAR when it was dissolved, about the reasons behind its disbandment. His answer was that he was told by the political authority at the time, "just cancel it". To the researcher, this argument did not seem convincing. Therefore further sources and points of views were considered.

The literature reviewed revealed a number of factors which might have influenced the decision to dissolve the Ministry. According to Charles G. Gurdon (1991), in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the country was facing drastic financial problems, low
agricultural and industrial production, currency devaluation, famine and political problems, particularly the war in the South. Although in 1976 the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) had announced investment of over $6000 million in 100 agricultural projects in Sudan, actually less than $15 million was spent and only seven projects got off the ground. One reason for this was that in March 1981 (eight months before the dissolution), Arab aid was cut back in order to make some show of disapproval when Sudan resumed full diplomatic relations with Egypt (breaking the Arab diplomatic boycott of Egypt following the Camp David Accords). [Ibid, 1991].

According to Kamal Osman Salih (1991), the level of reserves had dwindled from a meagre $67.4 million in 1979 to a mere $12.2 million by 1981. The country's economy had declined and its ability to finance development and the expanding public sector expenditure was affected.

Another factor that might have caused the disbandment of the Ministry was the failure of administrative reform plans, programmes and projects. According to G. Caiden (1991), the MPSAR failed to follow through properly on public service legislation and long awaited job evaluation and classification. Caiden believed that the capability to see them through was lacking. Moreover, the plans were over ambitious, based on inadequate research and were quite poorly designed. They had made undue demands on the meagre financial, technical and human resources that were available in the country. "The administrative machinery had been just too poor to effect them, particularly in the face of politicisation, nepotism, favouritism, corruption and a serious brain drain in a rapidly deteriorating economy" [Caiden, 1991: 256].

Some arguments refer to the behaviour and personal attitudes of the President Nimeiri as an additional factor. According to the Quarterly Economic Review (QER) of the
Sudan, No. 4, 1981, President Nimeiri used to take decisive and controversial moves and used to initiate a number of structural changes whenever the idea came into his head. For example, in October 1981, he dissolved the National People's Assembly and Southern Regional People's Assembly and called for new elections within 60 days to the former institution and six months to the latter [Ibid, 1981:6]. One month later, in November 1981, according to the Quarterly Economic Review of the Sudan, Annual Supplement 1982, President Nimeiri sacked his entire cabinet, accusing them of failing to make the economic programmes a success. They were seen in his eyes as unable to assist him in the implementation of his domestic policies.

In March 1979 President Nimeiri proposed to the Central Committee of SSU that Northern Sudan should be given regional governments to carry out administrative and security functions [Abdel Rahim el-Rayah Mahmoud, 1984]. As a result, the Regional Government Act of 1980 was issued. The move towards regional government came through several steps. First of all Presidential directions were issued to reduce the size of some ministries and liquidate others, transferring their duties and powers to regional governments [Ibid, 1984]. The MPSAR was therefore very likely to have been among the ministries which were abolished and its authorities transferred to the regions.

According to Sayyed Ahmed Abdel Halim, Nimeiri's former secretary for "Thought and Ideology" in the SSU and a former Minister of Culture and Information (1975), the MPSAR was abolished because its functions were transferred to the regional governments. Sayyed Ahmed Abdel Halim was interviewed by the researcher in London in 28th January 1994.
Sayyed Ga'afar Mohamed Nimeiri, the former President of the Sudan, was interviewed by the researcher in Durham on 18th of April 1994. He argued that his government was the first in the history of the Sudan since independence to establish a key Ministry for Administrative Reform. The MPSAR succeeded in pushing administrative reform programmes forward. It designed job descriptions, specifications and organisation structures for the government departments. The MPSAR was not dissolved but decentralised in order to give the regional governments real delegation, power and control on financial and human resources. In August 1994 the researcher went to the Sudan and visited the Resolution Department in the Presidential Palace to confirm this argument. There he found that Presidential Resolution No. 807, dated 25 November 1981, referred only to the disbandment of the MPSAR with nothing as regard to its functions. (More details in chapter 5, section 1.4 the critical point).

After disbandment of the mother ministry, personnel of the GDOAR were deployed in the Civil Service Department, forming a section named, "the Directorate of Evaluation and Organisation and Methods". The work in that new directorate was not purely management services, since it came under the umbrella of a busy department with heavy responsibilities and many priorities other than the management services function [Faysal M. Ali, interview, 1992]. Since then the management services programme started to lose support, guidance and momentum.

In 1983 an attempt was made to activate and revitalise the DMSUs programme. A seminar was held in the period 13-18 August, 1983, under the title, "Tatwir Wihdat al-Khadamat al-Idariyah Li-Tuwakib Mutatalabat al-Hukm al-Iqlimi" (Improving Departmental Management Services Units to Cope with the Needs of the Regional Government) [CSD, 1983, Circular from the Directorate of Evaluation and O&M]. The seminar was jointly organised by the Civil Service Department, SAAS and some active DMSUs in the Ministry of Works, the Telecommunications Corporation and the
National Corporation for Electricity. Unfortunately the seminar failed to achieve its objectives due to lack of appreciation and support among both public servants and the senior officials [Hatim Osman, interview, 1992]. According to the researcher's colleagues who participated in that seminar, the general attitude towards MS work was one of indifference. Bureaucrats and top management in some departments did not like the DMSUs. They perceived them as interfering in their work, limiting their freedom to manage and threatening their personal interests.

In the year 1987, the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (CBAR) was created to spearhead the administrative reform programmes. Figure (11) below shows the organisation structure of the CBAR.

Figure (11): Organisation Structure of the CBAR.

Despite the fact that the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform was politically supported, it was unlike the former GDOAR.
The General Directorate for Organisation and Administrative Reform had offered dynamic leadership in its follow-up role with respect to the established DMSUs, in addition to its professional role as a "centre of excellence" providing effective management services consultancy both of a general and specialist nature within the MPSAR as a whole and in external departments, especially where there were no DMSUs or where those established were weak. The Central Bureau for Administrative Reform was entrusted with playing the same role but playing such a role required sound central specialist capabilities, a professional staff competent in special management fields of importance to the function of management services. The CBAR suffered a shortage in trained staff. Most of the personnel working with it were on a secondment basis, borrowed from other departments. None of its top posts were occupied by senior staff with management services background, and of course, one who lacks such a background and experience could give nothing to this challenging controversial subject. Hence it is self-evident that the CBAR could not play the role of a mother department to the DMSUs, since all its top posts were staffed by personnel from outside the field.

Moreover, during the period 1987-1993, the CBAR did not take any initiative to follow-up or solve the problems that confronted management services officers in their departments. The DMSU programme was not on its list of priorities, though it was fully dependent on management services officers in carrying out its tasks. Management services officers constituted a majority of its working teams. The two main departments - the General Directorate for Organisation and the General Directorate for Procedures Simplification - did not have their own staff nor means of transportation to follow up their own work. The situation had become even worse because of the departure of the two most senior managers. One, who was the director for organisation, joined the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences, and the other who was the director for procedures simplification, was appointed Director General of the Management Development Centre. The acting heads of these two
directorates complained that the terms of reference were not clear and the relationships between them and the DMSU programme were not known [El-Hassan and Mariam, interview, 1993].

This situation resulted in a great deal of frustration among the management services officers. It created a critical and depressed atmosphere. The CBAR was continually criticised by the management services officers when issues arose as to its leadership role, its record in follow-up, its policies on career development and the extent of its support for them in confronting their problems. Some management services officers kept their distance, others bitterly put it quite simple that CBAR should put its own house in order before it could have an effective influence on external departments.

13. Problems

Despite the efforts of the MPSAR to improve the quality of management in the public service through the creation of DMSUs, the DMSUs as a principal instrument of change and reform were de-emphasised. Numerous problems were encountered, embracing such crucial issues as the support and leadership of DMSUs, organisational location, adequacy of staff and financial resources, the substance and content of work programmes and institutional and environmental linkages. The causes of the problems faced in many DMSUs included resistance to change among public officials, especially those who wished to maintain the status quo, and therefore looked upon management services work as an unnecessary interference, lack of political support, the indifferent attitude of top administrators, and the lack of knowledge and understanding of the concept and purpose of management services.
One major reason for the difficulties was that in almost all the DMSUs which the researcher visited, the units were established and put into operation without the relevant accommodation (offices), furniture, equipment, posts, incentives, transportation facilities and budget being clearly assessed and explained. Nor were the ministries and departments in which DMSUs were created taken into confidence through planned consultations and active involvement. Chapter 4 (discussions and analysis) will cover in detail all the constraints and impediments which hindered effectiveness and continuity of the DMSU programme.

14. Conclusion

In this chapter particular attention has been paid to the development of the MS function in the Sudan. It has been seen that the DMSU programme was successful in the period between the mid-1970s and the early-1980s. This period was considered the golden age of the programme. During this period the programme succeeded in institutionalising the process of administrative reorganisation. Many studies were carried out and improvements made in areas such as systems, procedures and office planning and layout. The programme gained publicity and enjoyed full political and top management support.

However, after the dissolution of the MPSAR in 1981, the programme lost momentum and started to decline. It will become clear in the chapters that follow, that a variety of problems were responsible for the decline of the programme.
References


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44. Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR), An Introduction to the New Management Services Centre (MSC) Within the New Organisation of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA), December 1978.

45. Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS), Report of the Head of the MS Department, "Revival of the MS Department". August 1984.


Chapter 3

Training of Management Services Officers

Introduction

The major purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a brief idea about the training of the management services officers (MSOs) locally and abroad. One of the important factors stressed in the UN Mission report (1972) was the need for accelerated management services training [MPSAR 1972]. In response the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) created a section for "Forward Planning and Training for Management Services", within the GDOAR [discussed in Chapter 2]. That section embarked on a policy of intensive training locally and abroad, in order to adequately develop the skills and capabilities required by the management services officers (MSOs) [GDOAR 1976].

The training of MSOs began in September 1974. It was undertaken by the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) in London as part of the United Kingdom's programme of technical assistance to the Sudan in cooperation with the GDOAR [MPSAR 1977]. Since then the training progressed rapidly and had a great impact in increasing confidence and motivation of the MSOs [SAAS 1981 A]. Between September 1974 and September 1992, 784 officers were trained in a series of basic courses. 175 of them had additionally attended an advanced course at RIPA in London. Nineteen of them had attended a training techniques course at RIPA and 10 of them had attended specialist courses in work study, forms design, supply management and systems analysis. Also 10 heads of departmental management services units (DMSUs) had attended special courses to develop their capabilities as managers of the management services function at RIPA and
Khartoum [SAAS, 1993]. Figure (12) shows number of MSOs trained in the period 1974-1993.

Figure (12): Number of MSOs trained between 1974-1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Number of Participants (MSOs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic management analysts course (Khartoum)</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced management analysts course (RIPA)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training techniques course (RIPA)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists training in UK &amp; USA</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of DMSUs (RIPA &amp; Khartoum)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [SAAS, Management Services Training Files, 1993].

Appendix (12) shows list of organisations for which MSOs had been trained.

1. The Standard Training Courses

The Basic Management Analysts Course which was annually conducted at the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS, Khartoum), and the Advanced Management Analysts Course which was conducted at the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA in London) were the two main training courses. A brief idea about these courses is mentioned hereunder.
a. The Basic Management Analysts Course

This was the fundamental training course for the whole DMSU programme [MPSAR, 1978]. The aim of the basic course was to train selected officers so that they could function, as management services officers, full-time in DMSUs immediately afterwards [Floate, 1976]. The training was designed to develop a systematic, analytical, critical and creative approach to solving problems on behalf of management [Ibid, 1976]. Figure (13) below shows the number of MSOs trained in the first basic course by departments.

Figure (13): Number of MSOs trained (by department) in the first basic management analysts course, Khartoum, Sept-Nov 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Department</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Administration</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Airways</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Railways</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication Department</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Local Government (Headquarters)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [MPSAR, 1977, P 6]
The course was of 12 weeks duration. In the first 2 weeks participants were given an introduction to the principles of management, background to modern management, motivation, group behaviour, leadership and communication. The rest of the weeks were devoted to method study, an appreciation of work measurement, associated basic techniques needed to practise O&M, problems of implementing improvements and practical training projects [SAAS, 1981 b]. The whole training coverage is shown in appendix (13).

From when the training first started and till the late-1979, selection of participants was based upon specific criteria. It was normal that each nominee had to satisfy the criteria specified hereunder to qualify for selection to attend the basic course. The candidate should have:

1. A university degree (exceptionally, candidates with many years of suitable experience in the public service were accepted).
2. At least two years experience in the public service.
3. An aptitude for generating new ideas and participation in the challenging process of change.
4. Commitment on behalf of the candidate and his/her department that he/she will work full-time in a DMSU for 3 to 5 years immediately after training [GDOAR, 1976].

b. The Advanced Management Analysts Course

The advanced courses which were conducted at the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) in London were eight weeks long [Ibid, 1976]. According to the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR)
and the RIPA consultant who was assigned to assist the MPSAR in launching the Management Services (MS) programme, the aim of these courses was to increase the confidence and knowledge of the MSOs who completed the basic course. Selection of participants for the advanced courses was based on the following criteria:

1. Successful completion of the basic course in Khartoum.
2. Demonstrated potential for further training in the UK.
3. Acceptable proficiency in English language.
4. Commitment to work full-time in a DMSU for 3 to 5 years on their return to the Sudan.

Content of the advanced course included coverage of the following:

1. Management services in the civil service.
2. Management services in the public corporations.
3. Management services in the local government.
4. Training of MSOs in the public service.
5. Selected additional techniques in office work measurement.
6. Incentive schemes.
7. Stock control.
8. London Borough's job evaluation scheme.
10. Network analysis.
11. Development project planning and co-ordination.
Like the basic course, participants were given a chance to undergo real projects of two weeks duration. Performing such projects in organisations entirely strange to them was, in the words of Mr. Floate, a "very testing and strengthening experience". Participants on the first advanced course (May-July 1975) performed remarkably well in the United Kingdom. Overall about 80 percent of their recommendations were accepted for implementation by their host organisations, which included local government, a public corporation, a regional authority, a university department and a very large firm in the private sector [Ibid, 1976]. For more information a list of the assignments they undertook is provided in appendix (14). Figure (14) shows the number of MSOs trained in the first advanced course in the UK by departments.
Figure (14). Number of management services officers trained in the first advanced course in the UK (May-July 1975).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance (Budgets)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government (Headquarters)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Telecommunications</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Airways</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Railways</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior (Police)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior (Prisons)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Information and Culture</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Trading Corporation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Corporation for Industrial Production</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [MPSAR, 1977: 9-10].
2. Other Training Courses

\textit{a. Training Techniques}

Selected MSOs who showed an aptitude for teaching and strong motivation to promote the MS work were selected to attend courses in training techniques at the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) in London [MPSAR, 1977]. The aim was to build up a pool of Sudanese MSOs who could train their fellow MSOs locally and make the subject self-sufficient and relevant to the needs of the Sudan [Ibid, 1977].

After the first 3 Sudanese trainers returned back from the first training techniques course held at the RIPA (August-October 1975), Sudanese participation in the basic course started to increase and the RIPA consultancy weeks started to decrease [RIPA, 1978]. After the Sudanisation of training, since 1980 the basic courses were conducted entirely by Sudanese trainers [SAAS, 1993].

\textit{b. Specialists Courses}

Specialist training began in the United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA), in September 1977. The areas of specialism included: work study, systems analysis, supply management, accountancy improvement services, operational research and organisation development [GDOAR, 1980]. Twelve carefully selected MSOs from the GDOAR and some of the strong DMSUs were sent to England and the United States of America to be specialised in the above-mentioned areas [Ibid, 1980]. Assurances were obtained from the selected participants and their departments that specialists would be used full-time after training to practise and develop their respective specialisms for as long as possible
in the interests of the DMSU programme as a whole and their respective departments [Ibid, 1980]. However, despite the assurances obtained, some of the specialists migrated to the Gulf Countries, and others were deployed to other positions [SAAS, 1984]. Figure (15) shows number of management services officers trained by departments and areas of specialisation.

Figure (15) Number of participants trained in the specialists courses by departments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialist Training</th>
<th>Number Trained</th>
<th>Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Study</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GDOAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Study</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Telecommunication Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Study</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Post and Telegraph Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms Design and Office Equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GDOAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GDOAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems Analysis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>GDOAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Research</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sudan Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation Development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GDOAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [GDOAR, 1980].

Other areas of specialisation were requested by the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR) to cover the techniques of job evaluation, personnel administration, project management and financial management [Ibid, 1980]. According to the researcher who was working in the GDOAR between 1976 and 1979, those specialist courses did not take place. It seems that they were requested in the knowledge that the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) would continue to function and the
allotted awards for training MSOs could be taken up. But the MPSAR was dissolved and the request was not followed up.

c. Managing a DMSU Workshops

Two refresher courses, entitled "Managing a DMSU", were conducted for heads of the Departmental Management Services Units (DMSUs). Each workshop was of one week's duration. The first was on 23 October 1978, and the second on 3rd February 1979 [GDOAR, 1980]. Objectives of those workshops were:

1. To reinforce the importance of planning, organising and controlling the MS work in the departments where DMSUs were established.
2. To motivate the heads of DMSUs to proceed more vigorously with the management of their respective DMSUs.
3. To enable each head of DMSU to prepare a specific action plan for the on-going work of his unit by the end of the workshop [Ibid, 1980].

16 MSOs participated in those two workshops from the following departments:

a. (28 Oct.-2 Nov. 1978)
2. Telecommunication Corporation.
3. General Staff Administration.
5. Ministry of Education.
b. (3 Feb.-8 Feb. 1979)
1. Ministry of Co-operation.
2. Southern Region. (Regional MPSAR)
4. Sudan Railways Corporation.
5. Sudan Sea Ports Corporation.
6. Rural Water Corporation.
7. Sugar Distilleries Corporation.

Course programme and pre-course preparation work sheets are shown in appendix (15).

d. Management Services Appreciation Seminars

According to Sayyed Ali Musa Omer, one of the earlier directors of the GDOAR (1976-1979), appreciation seminars were held in a number of organisations to sell and promote the DMSU programme. The seminars were designed in the form of a one day visit explaining the role of DMSUs and requesting action to establish and use MSOs effectively. Although it was intended to conduct more seminars, to cover all the departments in central government, regional government and the provinces, no more were held because of some contingent difficulties that stood against finalising the arrangements [Ali Musa Omer, interview, 1992]. Institutions in which appreciation seminars were held included:
2. Sudan Railways.
3. Department of Labour.
5. Gezira Board.

**The Five Year Training Plan (1976-1981)**

In 1976 the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR), made a five year training plan with the assistance of the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA). It was planned to run four basic management analysts courses, each of 10 weeks' duration, each year. In order to keep the training practice-oriented and effective it was agreed that the number of participants per course should be limited to 20. Also, subject to the availability of funds under the UK Technical Assistance, it was planned to hold two advanced courses for two groups of 20 each year at the Royal Institute of Public Administration in London [Ibid, 1980]. Figures (16) and (17) provide a summary of the five year training plan.
Figure (16): Basic Courses of the Five Year Training Plan (Khartoum)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Number of courses</th>
<th>Total number of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct76-Dec 76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 77-Apr 77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 77-Dec 77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 78-Apr 78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 78-Dec 78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 79-Apr 79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 79-Dec 79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 80-Apr 80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 80-Dec 80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 81-Apr 81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 81-Dec 81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure (17): Advanced Courses of the 5 year Training Plan (RIPA).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Number of Courses</th>
<th>Total Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May76 - July 76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 76 - Oct 76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 77 - July 77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 77 - Oct 77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 78 - July 78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 78 - Oct 78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 79 - July 79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 79 - Oct 79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 80 - July 80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 80 - Oct 80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 81 - July 81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 81 - Oct 81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 82 - July 82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 82 - Oct 82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [GDOAR, 1980]
The five year training plan, according to Mr. Floate, (the RIPA consultant), did not go as was planned. At one stage it was decided to consolidate existing DMSUs rather than increase their number. That decision necessitated a complete revision of the training plan [RIPA, 1979].

In order to give maximum priority to the consolidation of the existing DMSUs, the following distribution of participants among user departments was suggested for general guidance in selecting candidates for the basic courses of the years 1979/1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers ..................</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry Headquarters ...............</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Housing .......</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Department ...........</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Oil Seeds Corporation ....................</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Transport Department ...........</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Insurance Corporation ...........</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgets Administration ..................</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts Administration ..................</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs and Excise Department ............</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stores and Equipment Department ...........</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Transport Corporation ...........</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Province Transport Co ...........</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Province ..........</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala Province ...........</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile Province .....................</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region ...................</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Construction and Public Works .......</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Water Corporation ...............</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Trading Corporation .......................</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Sudan ..................................</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinnning and Weaving Corporation ................</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and Plastics Industries Corporation ....</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Polytechnic ..</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[GDOAR, 1980].
The division of numbers under the headings of junior and senior was intended to draw attention to the need to select at least one officer of higher status as a leader for each DMSU especially in the ones which were staffed with MSOs of junior grades [Ibid, 1980].

The Management Services Centre (MSC)

In order to make the MS function a permanent feature of public management, the MPSAR decided to create a strong institutional base for basic and advanced training in management analysts [MPSAR, 1978]. To meet this objective an institution called a Management Services Centre (MSC) was established in 1981 as a permanent institution within the organisation of the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS). It started as an autonomous division with its own budget, buildings, equipment and staff [Ibid, 1978]. The centre was to provide on-going training as well as specialist consultancy in the field of "Management Services" (MS). Furthermore it was planned to develop additional types of training so as to extend the range of services which could be needed in various departments and to provide practitioners with in-depth capabilities [Ibid, 1978]. Appendix (16) shows the role of the MSC, and appendix (17) shows the proposed organisation chart for the MSC.

As far as the training staff were concerned, about 10 MSOs from the GDOAR, (most of whom were already involved with training) were transferred to form the nucleus of the staff of the MSC [SAAS, 1981 A]. And in an attempt to consolidate the staff of the MSC, the MPSAR requested the UK Technical Assistant Programme provision of the following expatriate experts:
1. A Co-Director for 2 years to assist the Sudanese Director to establish the centre.

2. An O & M expert in total systems for 1 year to develop Sudanese counterparts to review total systems.

3. A work study expert for 1 year to develop trained Sudanese specialists on the job.

4. An operational research expert for 1 year to develop Sudanese specialists on the job [Ibid, 1981 a].

A six year training plan was made for the MSC for the period 1980-1986. It was planned to train a minimum of 502 MSOs to staff 78 DMSUs throughout the public service [MPSAR, 1978]. The plan included 30 basic management analysts courses, 16 advanced courses, about 28 specialist courses and 72 seminars [Ibid, 1978]. A summary of the 6 year training plan is shown in appendix (19).

Submission for the building of the premises of the MSC was included within the Six Year National Development Plan (1978-84) [Ibid, 1978]. A site for the building was registered in December 1976. It was an area of 40 meters x 56 meters, situated in Plot 2 / Block 12 /13 / 14 East, off Shara el-Gamhouria. Detailed architectural plans were produced by the Ministry of Construction and Public Works under reference Po/ 77/ 6/ .[Ibid, 1978]. It was expected that the construction of the building would start in the financial year commencing 1 July 1978, but for one reason or another it was postponed for consideration at some
future date [RIPA, 1979]. As of July 1993, the centre was still not built. The records for the building appear to have disappeared and the allotted plot of land is now being used for another building. In July 1993, the researcher went to Shara el-Gamhouria to trace the site, but did not find an open space. He consulted the Ministry of Finance and the former Ministry of Public Works, but no one was able to clarify the point.

Regarding the planned input of the experts' support, according to Mr Noel Floate (RIPA consultant and Co-Director of the MSC) who was interviewed by the researcher on 28 January 1994 at the RIPA International in London, the Co-Director went to the Sudan and took the job, but the other 4 experts did not. It was not known why they did not go. It appears that the idea was not welcomed by the personnel of SAAS and the authorities concerned did not follow up the case.

The MSC, according to its training staff (of whom the researcher was one), enjoyed strong political support through being in constant touch with the GDOAR and with the Under-Secretary of the MPSAR. In the eyes of the GDOAR, the centre was envisaged as a promising consultancy and training institution. However after the dissolution of the MPSAR (1981) the centre lost its autonomous status, and its political and technical support [Report of the technical committee into the role of DMSUs, 1990]. As a result the training staff lost enthusiasm and interest; five of them migrated to the Gulf countries, one joined the private sector and one went for self-employment [SAAS, 1984]. The remaining two were deployed in SAAS training departments and the basic management analysts course became a mere routine middle management training programme.
5. Training Wastage

Although a great deal of effort had been exerted in training, a high rate of wastage among the trained officers was noticed [GDOAR, 1980]. That wastage was a direct loss in terms of the specific objectives of the DMSU programme. The percentage of wastage among those who have had different levels of training since the beginning of the MS programme in 1974 and up to 1980 is shown in figure (18) below.

Figure (18): MS training wastage (% Loss of Personnel) 1974-1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Training</th>
<th>Percentage of Wastage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic management analysts course</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced management analysts course</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist course</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [GDOAR, 1980].

The interviews revealed a number of reasons for that big percentage of wastage. The reasons included the deployment of trained officers in other key posts and on promotion [Ali Musa Omer, interview, 1992], lack of appreciation of the role of MS by some top officials and by middle management [Kamal Zein, interview, 1993], delays in the creation of posts for MSOs [Hussein Amar, interview 1993] and the financial limitations which restricted the provision of offices and equipment for DMSUs [Mariam Hassan, interview 1993]. According to Abdin (1986), such a situation was mainly responsible for the weakening of several of the DMSUs and their unsatisfactory performance.
6. Conclusion

The training of MSOs passed through two stages: before and after the dissolution of the MPSAR. The training peak was in the period 1974-1980. During that period the MS training responsibility was with the GDOAR within the MPSAR. It was enjoying full political, financial, technical and administrative support. The GDOAR was planning and executing the training on a regular basis. It was achieving the careful selection of the right candidates and the effective marshalling of resources to ensure that regular and appropriate training continued to meet the on-going needs of the MS programme.

Training of the MSOs gained its importance due to the fact that, unlike the other training programmes, the whole approach was participative and practice-oriented. A great deal was learned by the joint practical involvement of line management, participants and training consultants. Brainstorming and project discussion were generally very useful in showing all members of the department the problems which were being faced in an assignment and how they were being overcome. That was an invaluable part of education in the MS training.

Mr W. S. Ryan, a British MS consultant who was assigned by the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) to evaluate the MS programme in the Sudan (1976), attended a presentation of one group in the basic course of 1976 at the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) in Khartoum. He stated that the group presented its case well and defended itself intelligently and with dignity. He states,
"The case, I heard was a study of organisational relationship within the State Trading Corporation, which is complex, has several layers of command, with diverse products handled. A testing assignment for experienced MS staff - extremely difficult for students who in the event were challenged on a few recommendations by the Director-General of the Corporation. They did well. I would be happy to employ all the three - including one lady and I felt that training staff who could use this admittedly good material so well were more than competent" [Ryan, 1976: 12].

Also Mr H. Curtis, who came to the Sudan in 1978 to evaluate the MS programme (discussed in Chapter 2), made the following comment:

"Training has produced technically competent personnel. However, the system is approaching a watershed. The capability to continue successfully is present, but very much depends upon the vitality of the MPSAR. Minimum requirements are dynamic direction supported by experienced technical support coupled with an unambiguous attractive career development plan." [RIPA, 1979: 14-15]

According to the researcher, the advanced courses in London were most useful. They were crucial in building up the confidence of the trainees, and left a marked increase in the participants' motivation and confidence to promote the MS work.

Those who attended the advanced courses in London were exposed to the established practice of MS both in the public service and the private sector. By
means of planned visits, attachments and training projects, their confidence was greatly increased. Talking and listening to experienced people who were practising MS in various organisations was an added advantage. They were able to see at first hand the enormous contribution that MS work can make as an integral part of the management of large organisations. (The researcher had many attachments at different places in the UK during the period 1977-78: the Greater London Council, the Defence Medical Equipment Depot (Andover), Reading Royal County Supplies Department, Southern Gas (Southampton), Western Electricity Board (Bristol), the Civil Service College (Victoria) and the Lewes County Council MS unit).

Mr Ryan, also commenting on the usefulness of the advanced course, stated in his report (1976) that,

"The outstanding difference I detected among MS staff on this visit as compared with my 1969 visit was the greatly increased self-confidence of the present DMSU staff. This they universally and emphatically attribute to the UK course. The turning-point quoted in every case was the practical project and as separate teams carried out assignments in government, local government and private industry, the conviction that MS can and does work cannot be attributed to any one special circumstance such as a strong personality in the local MS unit. The project in every case, demonstrated the credibility of MS in the UK to the students. And as in most cases, their recommendations were accepted, it demonstrated that they too had achieved credibility" [Ryan, 1976: 11].

Based upon the experience of the researcher's colleagues and the information drawn from the visits and interviews conducted with some top managers, MS training and the exchange of experiences had enriched the quality of the public
service in many of the government departments. For example, in the Post and Telegraph Corporation and the Department of Customs and Excise Duty, such exchange of experience was of distinct benefit. The former MSOs succeeded in contributing considerably towards raising the quality of management and services.

After the disbandment of the MPSAR (1981), training of the MSOs was not taken as seriously as it was before. Although the UN mission (1972), and Mr H Curtis (1978), recommended that the future of MS programme depended on maintaining relevant and dynamic training, the government failed to recognise that crucial fact. Other factors which influenced training of the management services officers were that the assignment of the RIP A consultant came to an end, the technical support stopped and the careers of the DMSUs became ambiguous. The basic MS course which was conducted annually in SAAS was no longer connected to the DMSU programme. Criteria for selection of the participants were non-existent. The basic MS courses were presented without the appropriate level of consideration of the organisations' or the individuals' real training needs, as had been given in the days of the GDOAR. However, the basic MS course had a reputation as one of the best training courses conducted in the SAAS [SAAS, 1992, Basic MS training master file]. In 1984 the Head of the MS Department in the SAAS, after discussions of the annual training programme proposals for the academic year 1984/85, wrote,

"We were very pleased for the serious, genuine and constructive discussion that the Basic MS training proposals had ..........It stemmed from our belief in the importance and effectiveness of this kind of training and the role it plays in solving administrative problems and guiding the performance of the public service towards efficiency and effectiveness. For these reasons we are keen on its continuity and widening the range of the beneficiary bodies...........If the purpose of training is to occur positive changes, MS training has the lead amongst all our programmes in meeting this objective" [Head of MS Department, 1984 ].
The researcher noticed, however, that since the training started in 1974, no effort was made to review the content of the Basic Management Analysts Course, in order to make it relevant to the actual needs, especially at a time when the country was facing challenging developmental problems. Appendix (19) shows the current content of the basic course (1993/94). The techniques, exercises and case studies which were designed and laid down by the RIPA consultants in early-1974 and used twenty years ago were, according to many officials, still fairly commonplace. The impact and importance of the techniques were declining. Review of the basic management services course manual (Master File 1992) revealed that few attempts were made to devise new case studies and some exercises, most of which were not more than a mere translation from English into Arabic and a changing of names [SAAS, Basic MS Training Master File 1992].

As far as further training is concerned, advanced, specialist and refresher courses were not available. As a result the knowledge and expertise of the MSOs was affected as no new techniques were taken up. In this connection B. H. Walley (1973) writes, "MSOs should be constantly going through an old technique rejection and a new technique acceptance. The practitioner who is not going through this cycle is intellectually moribund and will soon be obsolete in his job practices". [Walley, 1973: 36].

Besides the funding constraints, there was no agency responsible for the DMSUs and their training. Even continuation of the basic MS course was likely to be threatened due to acute shortage in the training staff. Eighty percent of the training personnel in this field migrated to the Gulf countries [SAAS, 1992]. Only two remained and no replacement took place. Generally, it is a major challenge to convince the government in the Sudan to allocate funds for training. In spite of the often repeated statements that, "man is the most important resource" [Zaki, 1986],

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funds for developing human resources were limited. Prof. Mirghani A. Hamour observed this and wrote,

"In formulating the country's plan and programmes, priority is frequently given to material production and construction work, to the complete neglect of the question of managerial development, a situation which often leads to failure of plans and programmes" [MSAR, 1972].

Lack of appropriate training, in addition to the many problems which will be discussed in the next chapter of analysis, all taken together, impeded the progress and effectiveness of the MS function as an aid to administrative reform in the Sudan public service.
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Chapter 4

Analysis of the Problems Confronted in Management Services

Introduction

The discussion in this chapter is based on the material gained from the 42 interviewees (the list of interviewees is provided in the introduction), the secondary material and the observations of the researcher. (The researcher visited the existing DMSUs and a number of departments in the Sudan in 1993 and 1994). It is worthy of note that bringing secondary material into this chapter is based on several considerations. First, the researcher believes that the secondary material employed is of great benefit in shedding light and explaining the Sudanese case. Secondly, such valuable material will be useful for future readers in the Sudan who may not have a chance or access to the origin and sources of the material brought in.

As was discussed in chapter 2, the early momentum of the DMSUs was impressive. Enormous efforts and resources were directed towards the DMSU programme, yet there was concern from various quarters that the programme was not as successful as it might have been. The programme faced problems and criticism from a majority of senior government officials, and some concerned parties, to the degree that they sought to stop it immediately and relieve the public service from this headache. Such views were shared in varying degrees by a majority of the interviewees.

The data collected from the different sources, particularly the interviews, showed that the DMSU programme met many difficulties. These affected the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of the public service as it was envisaged. This chapter will focus on the main factors which stood in the way of an effective implementation of the management services function in the Sudan public service. These factors are categorised into five broad categories, and within each
category, a number of separate influences which were likely to have affected the performance of the DMSUs are grouped. The researcher believes that this breaking of the problems into small separate elements may be of advantage in the process of developing alternatives for the recommendations. These categories are considered in brief in the sections which follow.

1. Internal Factors

From the data collected, five factors were identified in this category. These are covered below.

1.1 Appropriate Training

Deficient training was considered by a majority of the interviewees as a major problem which affected performance of the DMSUs. After the dissolution of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, effects of inappropriate training became apparent. The technical assistance of the United Kingdom and the EDF stopped, and training of the MSOs was not taken seriously as there was no agency to shoulder this responsibility. The UK advanced, specialist and refresher courses were no longer mounted. The only training course available for the MSOs was the Basic Management Analysts Course which was conducted annually in the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS), as a routine middle management course. The content of this course had not been updated since the training programme was first mounted in 1974 by the British experts. It required replenishment and nourishment from other sources of knowledge and from theory not necessarily contained within the SAAS and the other training institutions. The chances of developing such knowledge and bringing in new techniques were very small due to the
financial constraints and the general attitudes of the Sudan government towards training abroad.

The researcher believes that this weakness in training (based on a lack of necessary expertise and knowledge) was reflected in the quality of the assignments and studies carried out by the MSOs. It lowered their morale, affected their outlook and possibly jeopardised the efforts of administrative reform. According to Dr. Ahmed M. Fagiry, Deputy Director General of the SAAS, who was interviewed in Khartoum in 1993, the changes in methods and procedures did not "pay off" in more or better output, and in some cases changes were proposed without realistic appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the organisations under study. This situation, according to Sayyed Ali Ahmed Ali, a senior MSO and head of the Ministry of Public Works' DMSU, who was interviewed in 1993, gave room for opponents of the programme to criticize it as constituting mere propaganda. The likelihood of achieving feasible management services improvement within the public service, therefore, were small.

Colleagues of the researcher, management services trainers at the SAAS, argued that techniques learned on the basic management services course were not closely related to the operational environment of the service. They were obsolete, inadequate and incapable of coping with the needs of the public service. They demanded techniques which were more appropriate to the culture of the Sudan to suit public needs and aspirations. Techniques such as the F. Taylor's, "Time and Motion Study", were hard to accept in the age of participative management and management by objectives of the 1990s. The outside world, the UK for example, had moved from management by command to management by contract with much more structural delegation [Noel Floate, interview, 1994].

What was needed was the interfacing of management services with other functions. In contrast to the Sudan, where we find techniques of the management services did not
go beyond those of the conventional concept of O&M, management services in Britain, for example, had a considerable interface with other functions. They were linked with all the functions in the department or the company which were involved with the measurement of productivity and of change. Figure (19) below shows the interface of management services with other functions in Britain.

Figure 19. Management services interface with other functions in the UK.

Source: B.H. Walley, (1973), P.7
One lesson drawn from the experience of the developed countries is that MSOs should be "mature and competent". According to Warren Bennis (1969:49), competence of the change agent must encompass a wide range of knowledge including:

1. Conceptual diagnostic knowledge cutting across the entire sector of the behavioural sciences.
2. Knowledge of theories and methods of organisational change.
4. Orientation to the ethical and evaluative functions of the change agent's role.

It is clear from the above mentioned discussion, that the arrangements made in the Sudan did not take account of this range of knowledge.

1.2. Career Development of the Management Services Officers

Career progression, succession and continuity was a major concern to the MSOs. According to Sayyed Hussein Hassan Amar, Deputy Under Secretary for Research, Legislation and Training in the Civil Service Department (interviewed in 1993), the career path of the MSOs was not clear. The closed system of the civil service in the Sudan prevented the free interchange of MSOs with other departments. At the same time there was no general seniority list for the MSOs to safeguard the career of the staff of the DMSUs. (Promotion in the Sudan civil service depended to a large extent on the seniority list. Without such a list the basis for promotion did not exist). Chances for promotion in the DMSUs were small, and those who achieved promotion were compelled to leave the DMSUs to perform duties related to new jobs in which they had been promoted. As a result the DMSUs lost a considerable number of capable personnel.
Foreign advisers tried to reshape the programme so as to make it more effective, but their advice was not followed. Mr. W.S. Ryan (1976), when he came to the Sudan to evaluate the DMSU programme, discussed with the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform the possibility of having all the DMSU officers on a common national seniority list with a good deal of movement between ministries. The discussions were not successful, partly because movement between ministries did not constitute part of the normal Sudanese pattern; government employees tended to spend entire careers in one ministry. Moreover, movement between ministries would cause some conflict of loyalty for outstationed staff. At this point, it might be of advantage for reasons of future outlook, to point out that, unlike the Sudan, mobility and movement of MSOs between the departments in the United Kingdom was widely practised. According to David Nudd (1984), criticisms of the early O&M led the British Civil Service to recruit businessmen, and the government advocated the exchange of practitioners between departments in order to staff the units by officers of high quality.

Another foreign adviser suggested a similar point of view. Mr. H. Curtis in his report on DMSUs (1979), when he came to the Sudan to evaluate the DMSU programme, made constructive comments and recommendations on the career development of the MSOs. ".......Minimum requirements are dynamic direction supported by experienced technical support coupled with an unambiguous, attractive career development plan". In addition to this he attended a meeting which was held in the Civil Service Department on 8th December 1978, in relation to the creation of posts for the DMSUs and the safeguarding of their career. The meeting ended with agreement on action to safeguard the career of the MSOs, but very soon the agreement was broken. This ambiguous and unattractive career development caused the programme to fall short and decline.
1.3. Quality of Management Services Officers

Management Services work is elite work. It needs personnel with force of character and intelligence. (This observation stems from the experience of the researcher in the UK during his training in the UK courses and attachments to the British DMSUs, 1976-78). Management consultants, as described earlier by professor Peter Drucker in Taylor (1983), are professional diagnosticians in management, professional therapists and true scholars. However, in the Sudan personnel who came forward for training in the management services training courses during the years 1979-1992 were of low calibre and junior grades [SAAS, 1992]. It was observed by all the interviewees, both managers and MSOs, that these newly trained MSOs were very inexperienced and possibly ineffectual, and thus were discredited in the eyes of the senior officials and top management. According to G. Caiden (1991:255), MSOs in the Sudan were, "invariably of such a low calibre and so bereft of real power and influence that they were rarely in a position to bring about fundamental changes".

Failure to meet the need to train replacements for MSOs who left their DMSU's service for one reason or another resulted in an acute shortage in suitably trained MSOs. It was a trend in the earlier days of the programme (1974-1978) to always have a mix of experienced and newly-trained MSOs at any point in time. According to a majority of the interviewees and the MS training records of the SAAS (1979-1992) the officers who came forward to attend the management services courses were younger and junior in grades. As a result, a shortage of senior personnel in the DMSUs happened. Therefore these junior and inexperienced MSOs were not in a position to give the programme the impact which was expected of it, as they lacked strong leadership and did not have access to the senior personnel within the departments in the field. This was a significant factor in causing the whole programme to decline.
1.4. Interest and Morale of the Management Services Officers

There was total agreement amongst the senior MSOs who were interviewed (approximately 40 per cent of the interviewees), that the initial optimism and enthusiasm which prevailed during the golden period of the programme, were replaced by frustration, demoralization and disappointment. According to these senior MSOs, the MSOs lost determination and enthusiasm. It was known that it is the nature of management services, as in any reform attempt, to face resistance and receive rebuffs, and that a good MSO is the one who fights his schemes through, when there is intense opposition. However it was not only opposition that MSOs faced, they faced problems which denied them the pre-requisites of the work. These problems included:

a) Offices for accommodation were not provided.
b) Posts were not created.
c) The promised incentives were not fulfilled.
d) The criteria for selection of participants for the MS training courses was no longer regarded. (Mentioned earlier).
e) The UK advanced courses stopped.
g) The MSOs were not treated as potential, creative and productive officers.

The views of senior administrators are of particular importance. Most of the studies and recommendations made by the MSOs, according to Dr. Kamal M. Zein, the First Under Secretary of the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (interviewed in 1993), did not receive appropriate attention by the departments concerned and therefore were not carried out. Failure to secure financial approval, disbelief in the usefulness of the DMSUs work, and the natural resistance to change according to Mrs. Mariam Hassan Abdel-Latif, (acting Director of the Directorate of Procedures Simplification in the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform, interviewed in 1993), were some of the reasons for the frustration of the MSOs.
In addition to these problems, the MSOs experienced personal and ethical discomfort with the view of their role which cast them primarily as architects of staff reduction exercises. This was made clear to the researcher by Abdel-Rahman Mohamed El-Hassan, acting Director of the Directorate of Organisation in the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform. (Interviewed in 1993). Sayyed Abdel-Rahman El-Hassan, was supervising a group of more than 20 MSOs, who were involved in reorganisation projects in the government departments (1990-1991). These factors taken together lowered the morale of the MSOs, affected their performance in the DMSUs, and caused some to leave.

1.5. The Methodology Followed by the MSOs in Tackling MS Assignments

The methodology followed by the MSOs in tackling the assignments was partial and limited in effect, in the judgement of some management scientists such as David Nudd and R. Harrison. According to David Nudd (1984 a), the methodology was not effective because, a) a doctor-patient relationship was assumed, b) the management was remote from the diagnosis, therefore c) there was an unwillingness on the part of the managers to believe the diagnosis or accept the prescription offered.

R. Harrison (1981), refers to such a methodology as the "Dump and Run" model of operating. He criticizes it as ineffective, because solving the problem and leaving implementation to the client is often not enough to bring about the improvement required. But as a matter of fact MSOs did not have a say in the implementation unless they were asked to do so. Therefore they did not follow up their work, and the temporary effects disappeared as soon as the MSOs left the place. Many examples were given by the interviewees (Hassan Khalid, Affaf Bakhiet and Hassan Kashif, "Senior MSOs", interviewed in 1993) where changes were made, but later proved
ineffective through lack of help with implementation and follow up. These cases included improvement studies which were carried out in the Sudanese Expatriate Bureau and the Department of Statistics.

Another associated problem was that the methodology gave too little emphasis to planning and organisation (insufficient time and attention were given to the planning and organisation) in most of the studies. According to Sayyed Khalid Sir El-Khatim, a senior MSO and Director of the Directorate of Job Evaluation and O&M in the Civil Service Department (interviewed in 1993), in most of the assignments undertaken emphasis was concentrated on the output rather than on the input and the process. As a result the outcomes were not satisfactory.

2. Fundamentals of Management Services

Under this category the researcher will analyse effect of the factors which stem from the fundamental nature and role of management services. These are covered below.

2.1. The Nature of Management Services

The nature of management services was believed to be a problem by a great majority of the interviewees. The problem stems from the fact that management services generally operates on an advisory basis, and must therefore be requested by the top management, line management or the client organisation.

The work of the DMSUs in the Sudan was purely advisory. They needed invitations to carry out assignments from the top management in their respective departments. This meant that they did not have the "right of entry" to examine the work of the
department, and therefore they found it difficult to plan or arrange priorities. It is true that in some cases (such as the DMSUs of the Ministry of Education, Public Works, and the Telecommunications Corporation), the DMSUs operated according to a working plan, but the plans had to be approved by the top management, or a high authority in the department. This situation left DMSUs in a dilemma, because the lack of authority limited their work and hindered them from securing work and conducting major administrative reform studies. As a result, the MSOs were continually changing directions and in some cases abandoned assignments which remain uncompleted.

In an interview, Dr. Mazoub El-Khalifa, the State Minister in the Ministry of Labour (1993), argued that the nature of the programme was inadequate as it was not binding. Therefore the results achieved were of a limited duration. Participation and involvement of the leaderships in the public service was marginal. They did not react positively with the DMSU programme due to lack of commitment [Al-Sudan Al-Hadith, Issue No.1338, 13th, September 1993].

Mrs. Mariam Hassan Abdel-Latif (Acting Director of the Directorate of Procedures Simplification in the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform), asked the following question: "Should the DMSUs remain advisory bodies whose recommendations were not binding on the departments concerned, or should the status be changed to make the recommendations forcibly implemented?" This question was also asked by Mohamed Ali Taha (a senior MSO) and his working team in the CBAR.

It has been stated above that the nature of the management services throughout the world is advisory. However the problems which confronted the DMSU programme in the Sudan, were due to lack of appreciation and ignorance of the benefits of the management services function. For this reason, the researcher believes that the DMSUs' status should be changed and the recommendations made binding and then
forcibly implemented. This of course will need the necessary enactments to be issued to make the proposals and recommendations of the DMSUs legally binding.

2.2. The Scope of Management Services

The DMSU programme was affected by the conventional approach of O&M. According to the management services training staff of the SAAS, most of the work was focused on low key activities that had little impact on administrative reform and management improvement. An example of these was the improvement of the clerical work methods and related activities. Abdel-Rahim Al-Rayah Mahmoud (1984), who also noticed this factor, argues that the DMSUs were more concerned with changing the structures than tackling the real problems and substance of the administration. Therefore their efforts ended in numerous reports rather than action.

Due to this orientation, particularly in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the tendency was for the DMSUs to be staffed largely with personnel from clerical and related grades [SAAS, 1992]. This tendency created much criticism of the programme and lowered the image of the DMSUs. According to Sayyed Abdu Ahmed Abdalla, deputy Director General of the Post and Telegraph Corporation (former Head of the DMSU in the Post and Telegraph Department, interviewed in 1993), professional and university graduates who were trained in the golden days of the programme lost interest in the work and left the DMSUs because of the limited scope and the low priority given to the work by top management or higher authority in the departments.
3. Perception of Management Services by Management

The way the management of the departments perceived the role of the management services functions influenced their behaviour and attitudes. Factors highlighted in this category are covered below.

3.1. Resistance to Change

The literature review has shown that efforts of administrative reform throughout the world have suffered problems of resistance. The experience of management services in the Sudan was no exception. DMSUs were agents of change, and it was inevitable that change was seen as unwelcome. Change is always uncertain and often painful. This is true particularly for the interested parties within the departments who benefit from, or are comfortable with, the status quo. The DMSU programme was met with opposition from some senior officials, and hostility from other interest and pressure groups.

The writers who follow, provide further backing for the abovementioned argument - indicating that opposition to change within administrative organisations is a major factor which inhibits change. For example, Machiavelli, quoted in G. Caiden (1969), said,

"There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order" [Caiden, 1969:18].

G. Caiden (1969) himself presents a similar perspective, saying that people normally keep and stick to their status quo until they see something better, or something useful in their favour appears in front of them. They are conditioned to preserve the present situation and resist change.
Harry Hopf (1947), in his article "Polishing Brass in Sinking Ships", described some managers as hard nuts to crack, saying that they would not take the risk on anything. They were like the fire insurance agent who was so cautious that he would not issue a policy on a concrete pier submerged in water.

G. Drewry and Tony Butcher (1991) also present examples of resistance to change. They describe how the invention of the typewriter in the late Nineteenth Century, which heralded the end of the copyists in the British government departments, and the advent of the telephone, which revolutionized communications in Whitehall and elsewhere, were resisted as new-fangled nonsense when they first appeared.

A. H. Mogensen (1946), also showed resistance of people to change in a paper which he presented at the annual conference of the National Office Management Association of America, under the title, "Work Simplification in Offices". In that paper, he showed resistance of people to change saying,

"We have to do away with the old idea of suggestion systems where you put boxes around the place and offer prizes and have contests, and all that kind of stuff. We have had that in our organisations for the last twenty-five years, and ninety-five per cent of the suggestion systems that I know of, installed before the war, failed. It was not a good record. You wonder sometimes why people have that eternal hope that somehow or other a suggestion system ought to work" [Mogensen, 1946: 41]

Lord Leverhulme (1947) has also emphasised that the first factor influencing and limiting the acceptance and use of O&M work has been the reluctance to change. He stated "Many of us enjoy our grooves, for they give us confidence and security, so that we may dislike the idea of leaving them". Giving another explanation for resistance to management services work, he said that O&M work needed time and effort (painstaking research), and that most human beings are naturally lazy. His research
showed furthermore, that the attitude of the employees towards the management services work had been warped and prejudiced in the following way:

1. Realization on the part of the employees that greater financial efficiency often results, albeit temporarily in decreased employment at the work concerned. Employees might be unemployed, transferred, or displaced. In such a case, they would suffer the loss of home life, or if the family had to move as a unit, the loss of social connections and environment.

In interviews with some managers, about the usefulness of the DMSUs, it became apparent that they were opposed to the management services idea in general. For example, a great majority of the managers said that they knew the recommendations and solutions of the MSOs would not work, as they have been doing the job for years and years and they knew how to do it. Moreover, they claimed that what the management services officers claimed as a new system or procedure was the same old thing in a new form. One reason for this mistrust towards the MSOs was the attitude inherited in the managers who had worked during the colonial era. According to Mohamed Fakhry El-Rawy (1986), in the days of colonization it was not accepted by the colonials that the administrative leadership would become involved in politics, or economic or social problems, as its role was confined solely to serving the goals of the colonial power. (Administrative reform was defined earlier as a deliberate political economic and social effort aimed at bringing about basic positive changes in behaviour .....etc). El-Rawy stated,

"That group of administrative leaders were priviledged compared with the rest of the society with many social and material advantages that made them undertake that limited role with satisfaction. That appeared clearly from their behaviour which was characterised by their snobbery and egotism. This had a great effect on their outlook towards management and its role in the society. They gave more importance to centralization and organisation charts, and full concern to legal rules
and procedures while confining their activities to a narrow administrative role in the society" [El-Rawy, 1986: 203].

To these managers the process of continuous organising and reorganising the system of their departments as a method of improving the administrative structure was not an acceptable practice.

In the group interview of the MSOs in 1993, a majority of the interviewees said that they often heard words like, "the work is going fine ...... we have been doing it this way for years and years, since we learned it from the Khawajat (British) .........why do you want to change it?" Such an attitude from some managers, who were still influenced by their former colonial bosses, had a negative effect on their relations with DMSUs.

Other interviewees attributed resistance of the management services function to the experiences of the 1950s and the 1960s. In those days the O&M officers were called "investigation officers", a name which gave a notion of inspection and fear. In the eyes of some commentators, management services work was viewed as a means to limit freedom of top management and introduce close supervision of employees. Till the mid-1980s, for most of the government officials, working in the public service meant a source of income and power. In those days, abuse of public property prevailed and personal interests took priority over anything else. To such managers, the mere suggestion of reform is enough to threaten and offend.

In any administrative reform situation, the status quo may be preferred to any conceivable alternative, as people are naturally defensive of what they possess in terms of skills and status, and suspicious of anything which might appear to challenge them. Therefore conflict can exist between conservatives, who stick to their present situation (status quo), and management analysts (reformers) who want to initiate a new order.
The interviews revealed that there were two forms of resistance to the management services function, "passive resistance, and lack of appreciation". The former was a very striking phenomenon which was observed in many departments especially in front of the RIPA consultant and the leadership of the DMSU programme. On many occasions, when the RIPA consultant was visiting a department, high authorities and top management gave lip-service to the importance and usefulness of the DMSUs as an aid and extra tool to them, and expressed their willingness to help and support their units. Yet, in practical terms their views which were expressed in front of the RIPA consultant were forgotten once the consultant has left. Many examples can be given of this. Some departments, especially the ones that dealt with the public, had long-standing policies, informal systems and procedures of their own. In these departments the recommendations of the MSOs were suppressed and their final reports shelved in cupboards. By doing so, those departments managed to create frustration and problems with their DMSUs.

3.1.1. Lack of appreciation

From the very beginning of the DMSU programme, management developed a defensive attitude. According to the experience of the researcher, it was difficult for management and employees to resist the creation of the DMSUs in their departments when the management services programme was first launched, as the programme was standing on a strong political power base and was supported by a strongly committed leadership. Once the DMSUs were established and put into operation, however, management created conditions and situations which made it difficult for DMSUs to achieve their objectives: offices were not assigned (or only after a struggle), posts were not created, furniture and stationery were made difficult to obtain, and transportation was not made available. Some of the managers who were interviewed were of the view that they were paid to manage their organisations and did not see
why a new department should be established, and new posts created, to do the same job. The theoretical literature makes reference to this kind of problem. Stephen Taylor (1983) has attributed this negative and defensive attitudes to the fact that managers do not have confidence in themselves and fear "exposure" by external intervention. (Taylor was General Manager of the Public Service Division of Hay Management Consultants and a member of the Management Consultants' Association's Public Sector Working Party). By taking this attitude they cut off a possible support which could have helped them in doing their jobs.

Examples of lack of appreciation were many. Indicative of the general attitude were the words of the First Under Secretary of the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform, whose role was supposed to be that of supporting and maintaining the DMSUs. While being interviewed in 1993, the Under Secretary said to the researcher, "you are sucking a dead breast". To the researcher these words coming from a senior figure in the administration were disappointing; they revealed a very negative view of the management services function in the Sudan public service.

According to the interviewees (MSOs), the meetings which were held with the concerned departments in order to generate a kind of general awareness of the importance of the DMSUs and to gain support for the demand for adequate staffing were ineffective. In their judgement most of their time and effort were consumed in unproductive meetings and discussions. Only lip-service and promises were heard, with no action following.

Another example of lack of appreciation is the case of the Management Services Centre (MSC), discussed in chapter 3. The idea of establishing an autonomous centre for management services was clearly not welcome to the SAAS and similar institutions such as the Management Development and Productivity Centre (MDPC). As a result, there was much delay for the setting up of the MSC. The Co-Director of
the MSC, who came from the RIPA (London), was not given any premises for a whole year after his arrival in October 1979. The equipment provided by the European Development Fund (EDF) on behalf of the European Economic Commission (EEC), was left in crates in the garden of the SAAS for a long time. It was only after an ultimatum from the EDF which indicated that it was planning to withdraw the equipment, that the SAAS allowed the equipment to be brought into service. Expertise necessary for the MSC's establishment (one O&M, one work study, and one OR expert) did not go to the Sudan. It seems that this stemmed from the failure of the authorities to follow up the matter. (This information is from a source who wished not to be identified).

Lack of appreciation was so strong that in some cases it outweighed the resolutions of important governmental conferences and presidential addresses. Noel Floate (1979), in one of his reports, stated,

"Early in 1978 the National Conference on Local Government in the Sudan passed a resolution that DMSUs should be established in the provinces. Later in 1978 this was re-iterated in a Presidential address to the nation. As a result the GDOAR wrote to the Bureau of People's Local Government Affairs on 17 December 1978 and again on 5 March 1979, putting forward plans to implement the resolution that the establishment of DMSUs in the provinces as an essential improvement service should go ahead. However, when I left Khartoum on 23rd March 1979, there was no evidence of substantive progress in this matter [RIPA, 1979: 10].

The interviewees confirmed this argument. The resolution was never implemented and the provinces did not enjoy the improvement service promised.

Lack of appreciation was clear in the case of the Ministry of Finance. A considerable number of the Ministry's staff were trained in management services training courses locally and abroad, but its DMSU had little more than a nominal existence. Despite GDOAR's efforts for years to revitalise the DMSU, this was not achieved. Promises
were given and intentions expressed at high levels within the Ministry to utilize the DMSU effectively, but nothing came of these [SAAS, 1981].

In the year 1978 the programme lost a valuable opportunity for publicity by television. According to Awad Rizgalla Ahmed, a senior MSO, interviewed by the researcher, a comprehensive series of 4 programmes on management services was carefully organised covering the most important areas of management services activity, and also looking at future development. Though plans were made for the actual broadcasting of the 4 programmes, the series was never broadcast and the whole idea disappeared. (Awad R. Ahmed was interviewed in Khartoum in 1993).

Even where the attitude of the departments were favourable and supportive to the DMSU programme, progress and development of the programme could be blocked. For example, in the Department of Customs and Excise Duty, more than 10 MSOs were trained for the DMSU, and the top management was eager to keep them in the unit. In spite of this, none of the officers stayed in the DMSU due to the Civil Service Department resisting the creation of the right number and right grades of posts for the DMSU. According to Ali Gariballa, a senior MSO in the Civil Service Department (interviewed in Khartoum in 1993), submissions were made two times for the creation of posts, but were not approved by the Civil Service Department.

3.2. Interdepartmental conflict

Interdepartmental conflict was an important cause of the poor performance of the DMSUs. The creation of agents other than the Civil Service Department (CSD) to carry out the management services function was considered by the former as involving overlapping of responsibilities. According to Abdel-Rahman Mohamed Al-Hassan, acting Director of the Directorate of Organisation at the Central Bureau for
Administrative Reform, this led to a lack of harmony between the administrative reform institutions. The central disharmony was between the CSD and the MPSAR. Giving an example, Al-Hassan observed that the Civil Service Department failed to support the creation of DMSU posts. The CSD believed that the DMSU programme should have come under its jurisdiction, as it was carrying out the same function as that of the DMSUs. (Al-Hassan was interviewed in Khartoum in 1993).

The abovementioned argument was confirmed by Sayyed Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, the first Minister of the Public Service and Administrative Reform (1971-1977). He told the researcher that interdepartmental conflict between the CSD and the MPSAR was clear from the very beginning of the DMSU programme. The Civil Service Department wanted to be promoted to a ministry, as it saw itself as the core element of the public service. It had controlled chapter 1 of the budget, had accommodated the earlier O&M units, and had exercised authority over all government employees. The Department became jealous when it found that the MPSAR had been given authority over recruitment, training and pension schemes of employees - activities which were previously under its own jurisdiction. (Abdel-Rahman Abdalla was interviewed by the researcher in Durham in the 7th of July 1994).

3.3. Adoption of Western Techniques Without Suiting the Sudanese Context

The techniques of management services were described by a majority of the interviewees as inappropriate to the Sudanese context. In their judgment, adoption of the traditional western philosophy of administrative efficiency without sufficient consideration to its suitability and validity in the Sudan, was one of the shortcomings of the DMSU programme. Focus on F. Taylor's "Motion and Time Study", and emphasis on the Scientific School of Management's mechanisms of control and monitoring were examples given. The interviewees, argued that these task oriented
techniques often serve to control office management rather than to improve administrative performance.

The view given by the interviewees finds support in some of the theoretical literature. Ahmed Ashour writes:

Some Arab countries in applying scientific methods have copied foreign formal systems, believing that they are neutral and universal [Ashour, 1986:50].

J. E. Jreisat (1988) provides a similar perspective:

Reliance on Western norms and techniques of management, without adequate attention to influences of social, cultural, religious and political factors constitutes a revival of the devalued Western traditional approach of closed-system analysis, isolating the organisation from its environment. This practice is analogous to a transplantation of an organ without regard to characteristics of the receiving body, risking rejection and continuation of the ailment. [Jreisat, 1988: 93].

The spreading of such perceptions among managers and their subordinates created a negative attitude towards management services work.

3.4. Misinterpretation of the Name "Management Services"

Mr. Noel Floate, the then RIPA Consultant, who was interviewed by the researcher in London in 1994, Osman El-Zubeir Ahmed (1984), Director of the Management Consultancy at the SAAS, and other colleagues of the researcher were of the opinion that there was a misconception about the management services function amongst top management and senior officials. They argued that misinterpretation of the name
"management services" was one of the factors which affected the perception of managers and government employees towards the management services function.

The name "management services" was imported from Britain and used in the Sudan by the British experts without taking into consideration the problems which might face the whole programme due to its local meaning. The Arabic translation of "management services" is Al-Khadamat Al-Idaria, a term which had been well known to top management and senior officials since the colonial days. Al-Khadamat Al-Idaria were and still are offices in the government departments responsible for providing services such as furniture, transportation facilities, security, maintenance and cleaning of the offices. Normally these offices were staffed by very junior personnel, and located at the bottom of the organisation structure of the department.

In spite of the fact that many appreciation seminars were held, and a tremendous effort was exerted by the GDOAR, to explain the role of the DMSUs as advisory organs, yet the concept of Al-Khadamat Al-Idaria was still in the heads of the government officials. Failure to differentiate between the concept and objectives of the two units created many problems and much confusion between the managers and the management services units. This situation resulted in the treatment of the latter with distrust and limited respect.

3.5. Mislocation of the Management Services Function

Ninety percent of the interviewees were of the opinion that the location of the DMSU programme in the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform was one of the shortcomings of the programme. Their reasoned argument was, that the function of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform in the eyes of the government officials was the same as that of the Civil Service Department: the
creation of posts, the preparation of chapter 1 of the budget, and the ordering of organisational structures and the civil service regulations. Top management and senior officials throughout the government, thus, never expected the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform to discuss matters and issues outside its speciality. Such issues outside its speciality, included for example, systems of purchasing in the Ministry of Commerce, materials handling in the Department of Stores and Equipment, health care in the Ministry of Health and the relationships between the different educational levels in schools.

In contrast to the Sudan, where the central responsibility for the MS function was assigned to the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, in most other countries the management services function has been assigned to the highest level of power and authority. The Office of the President or of the Prime Minister, or the Cabinet, has often been the central agency responsible for the overall administrative reform of the government. Nepal, Ghana and Senegal, were among the countries in which that responsibility was exercised from the office of the Chief Executive. [United Nations Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management 1979]. In the United Kingdom, it started in the Treasury (as the biggest department), then moved to the Prime Minister's Office and later to the Cabinet [Noel Floate, interview, 1994].

Generally speaking the effect of a high form of institutional linkage has been positive, in the sense that it gives more strength and recognition to the management services work. Also it helps to open doors in different government departments to the management services programme. In these countries which adopted this pattern, the programme was widely accepted and frequently used by the different branches, sectors and other levels of government. [UN Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management 1979].
Different point of views about where the programme could be located were expressed by the interviewees. For example, Sayyed, Ali Musa Omar, the former Director of the GDOAR, while being interviewed by the researcher in 1992, argued that the DMSU programme should have been placed under the responsibility of a central body such as the Council of Ministers. However, in the light of the economic problems which the government was facing, the researcher believes that locating responsibility for the MS function in the Ministry of Finance would have been better. In the judgment of the researcher, linking the DMSU programme with a controlling agency such as the Ministry of Finance would have meant that the programme could be seen as a meaningful approach to cost reduction and rationalization in the use of resources, as was the case in Britain and France. Moreover, the techniques of management services could have been used to strengthen budget control functions in the government. The estimates from the different governmental departments for the purchase of office equipment and machines could have been sanctioned by the DMSUs. This would have helped to improve the perception of MS in the minds of management as being beneficial and rewarding in terms of financial savings.

3.6. Lack of a Conscious Strategy (Deficient Strategy)

The limitation of the DMSUs' work to office management was considered a drawback to the DMSU programme. Work undertaken in the office management included: procedure simplification, office planning and layout, filing system, forms design and clerical work measurement. Those of course were only part of the problem. The reform of the system needed to be more than that. Colleagues of the researcher who were involved in training the MSOs, noticed this and criticised this strategy as being deficient and lacking comprehensiveness. Their argument was that the studies and assignments which were undertaken by the DMSUs were limited to office management and were common exercise in all DMSUs' work. Concentration on only
the office house-keeping, without including all the other parts which comprise the total elements of reform, did not lead to any noticeable change in the performance of the public service.

Ashour (1986), describing the drawbacks of such a deficient strategy writes,

"Deficient strategies have little effect, since the elements subject to development unite with other elements comprising the total administrative performance. So if they were changed and developed away from the other interacting elements, the rest of the undeveloped elements will reverse the effect of this limited development" [Ashour, 1986:56]

In the light of these arguments, a strategy which embraces the whole organisation as one system seems essential. Only then could the possibilities for wide-spread improvement throughout the public service be achieved.

4. The Organisation: Public Service Departments and their Environment

Factors which had affected performance of the DMSUs under this category are covered below.

4.1. Lack of Participation and involvement

Failure to involve management and employees in the diagnosis and analysis of the problems was a factor which created criticism of the DMSU programme. The term departmental management services unit, itself brings out the departmental
involvement. The units were intended to involve the whole public service. However, the interviews revealed that involvement and participation were lacking.

About 60 per cent of the managers who were interviewed said that the MSOs, instead of working out the causes for the problems jointly with the concerned parties, and accordingly developing agreed solutions, carried out the studies in isolation. The managers therefore felt that they were being instructed rather than helped. The solutions put forward by the MSOs were seen by top management as rules, regulations, and instructions which were imposed upon them.

It seems clear that assignments should not have been carried out in isolation from the concerned parties. MSOs need to bring the concerned parties along with them at every step. This is because participation and involvement create a supportive environment, and build up an effective management team that can help and cooperate. According to Douglas Mcgregor (1967), who was a consultant to a management group at Union Carbide in 1964, building such a team is one of the explicit tasks of the consultant. It helps in developing a collaborative effort and a mutual understanding.

The following extract from a paper written by A. H. Mogensen 1946 at the annual conference of National Office Management Association of America under the title, "Work Simplification in Offices", emphasises the point - showing the importance of both top management involvement and the co-operation of the employees in the successful implementation and performance of the management services work. He writes:

"The main value of a work simplification programme is to get out the steam shovel and go after the savings, the big increases in productivity that can be accomplished by getting everyone in the organisation from the top to cooperate on a programme of questioning every single thing we do and eliminating a great share of it".[Mogensen, 1947: 41].
Ashour also provided a similar perspective. He stated,

"As much as organisations - targets of reform - participate in drafting the reform plans and programmes, the reality of these programmes and plans is achieved" [Ashour, 1986: 65].

In addition to the abovementioned benefits of participation and involvement, it should also be borne in mind that employees are a rich source of development ideas. They have the ability to renew and develop initiatives. In spite of their varied interests, positions and authority, the employees in their working environment can play an important role in interpreting any new system or idea and influencing its implementation and practice. Ashour (1986) has pointed out that:

"Quality circles that started and spread in Japan and then transferred to a number of American and European organisations, are considered an example to strategies that depend on employees effective participation in initiating suggestions for development and reform, which would contribute to upgrading efficiency and increasing productivity" [Ashour, 1986: 65].

Nazih Ayubi, explaining the importance of the total involvement of the concerned parties for the implementation and success of any administrative reform programme, states,

"Implementation requires political support from the leadership, dedication from the lower administrative echelons, co-operation from the clientele or the public, and coordination at all levels. If the mechanisms for ensuring these requirements cannot be incorporated in the planning process, there may very well be a case for considering this particular type of planning an (inappropriate technology)" [N. Ayubi, 1986: 92].

Mogensen (1947), also acknowledging the abilities and benefits of employees' participation states,
"You have to change your whole formula. Teach your people - everybody - from the president on down to the last person in the company, the sweeper, the elevator operator, how to think, how to use the tools of work simplification, then give them the incentive to use those tools and you will find there be so damn many ideas for improvement coming, you will have to furnish an adequate staff to handle them. Then put them into effect. The talent is there and we have to realise that" [Mogensen, 1947: 42].

In the light of these arguments, the failure of the MSOs to gain the support of the employees and to acknowledge their participation and suggestions caused the DMSUs to lose the former's crucial role in turning the latter's work into success, reality and actual practice.

4.2. Instability

The constant change of ministries, ministers, management and top level personnel resulted in a lack of continuity which affected the performance of the DMSUs. In the cases where ministers and managers were changed, the successors needed to be informed and convinced all over again. The departure of the two most senior officers of the GDOAR who were directing the department was a significant case in point. These two managers left the department in one of its most important stages: 1977-1978. One who was in effect the Director for Government Management Services, was appointed General Manager of Sudan Airways, and the other was deployed elsewhere [Abdel-Rahman Abdel-Wahab, 1985].

The continuous reorganisation of the Ministries disturbed the stability and development of some DMSUs and lowered the morale of their personnel. For example, in the year 1979 the following changes were made in the organisation of the central ministries:
1. In the context of decentralization, the Ministry of Interior was dissolved and the administrations of the police and prisons services were transferred to the Council of Ministers. As a result their DMSUs were abolished.

2. The Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs were amalgamated with the Ministry of Education under a new title of Ministry of Education and Guidance thus reducing 3 existing DMSUs to only one for the new Ministry.

3. The Ministry of Co-operation and the Ministry of Commerce and Supply were amalgamated under a new title of Ministry of Co-operation, Commerce and Supply, thus reducing 2 DMSUs to 1 for the new Ministry [CBAR, 1990].

4.3. The Cultural Attitudes of the People Inside the Public Service Departments

One of the drawbacks of the DMSU programme was that it did not consider attitudinal and behavioural obstacles. According to the experience of the researcher (as a MSO and a MS trainer: 1976-1992), almost 80 per cent of the management services studies carried out were based on developing formal functional procedures and organisational structures without paying attention or considering the other elements which comprised the total administrative performance of the organisation. MSOs did not realize that change in attitudes was as important as change in systems and procedures, and that systems change alone might not effect any change in attitudes.

The literature review showed that Alsoni Banaga (1984), and other advocates of reform from various disciplines and backgrounds such as A.H. Mogensen (1947), Carl Poedtke (1973), Gerald Caiden (1978), Hassan Abasher Al-Tayeb (1985) and Nazih Ayubi (1986), saw change not only in terms of institutions and procedure
simplification, but in terms of conduct, behaviour, motivation, and attitude. These
management scientists believe in changing people in order to change administrative
systems, not vice versa.

People who work in organisations have values, needs, motives, and anxieties and they
bring their expectations to their place of work. Failure of the DMSUs to consider these
factors, according to Hassan Abasher Al-Tayeb (who had an inside view of the
situation), was an aspect of the confinement of the management services practices to
the adoption of a bureaucratic model and the application of its narrow mechanical
techniques. In his judgment this was due to the misunderstanding which MSOs held
about the concept of administrative reform: "the incorrect belief that administrative
reform is the implied meaning and synonym of bureaucratic reform" [Al-Tayeb, 1986:
137]. With such an understanding, and being captives of bureaucratic structures and
systems, the MSOs followed the bureaucratic model approach in studying and
analysing the elements which were related to the office management techniques
without any consideration of the other critical elements in the working environment.
This understanding and its consequences narrowed the work of the DMSUs to a small
part of its original grand objectives (discussed in chapter 2).

Management services is an aid to administrative reform, and the latter as stated earlier
is primarily concerned with change, both in scope and intensity. J.S. Quah (1976) in
his definition to administrative reform (chapter 1), said that administrative reform is a
deliberate attempt to change both, a) the structure and procedures of the public
bureaucracy, and b) the attitudes and behaviour of the public bureaucrats, in order to
promote organisational effectiveness and attain national development. Gerald Caiden,
(1969) explaining the wide scope of administrative reform, states,

"Administrative reform is not synonymous with bureaucratic reform. It
is more than the mere building of a bureaucratic state, the consolidation
of public bureaucracy and the agencies working within it, the spreading
of bureaucratic thought in all society, and the imposition of bureaucratic agencies on all citizens. It is concerned with administrative systems, of which the bureaucratic organisations are one part only. It transcends adherence to formalities, to values, attitudes and conduct. It surpasses the administrative experts and bureaucratic elite to encompass the whole administrative system and its interaction with the cultural circle within which it operates. It rises above bureaucracies to take into consideration alternative administrative systems" [Caiden, 1969: 38].

Hassan Abasher Al-Tayeb (1985), writing with a Sudanese experience in mind provides a similar perspective,

"The administrative development by definition is not a mere technical administrative process confined to selected and formal systems of regulations. However if it is confined to this closed and narrow scope, then we will go back to a marginal technical process having limited influence in realizing the capabilities needed for management development. Thus administrative development is a political, social, economic, cultural and administrative process." [Al-Tayeb, 1985: 4].

Management services is an instrument of change. However employment of a set of techniques alone is not enough to bring about the change required. Carl Poedtk (1973), in his article, "Work Measurement Alone is not the Answer to their Problems" explained, the limitations of these techniques saying,

"Work measurement techniques are often touted as the universal panacea for a company's ills. Actually they are only one aspect, and not necessarily the most important aspects to improve worker effectiveness" [Poedtk, 1973].

Hassan Abasher Al-Tayeb (1986), quoting from Ibrahim Ziyani (1985), elaborates further saying,

"The development of the administrative apparatus does not stop at knowing the internal mechanism of this apparatus but requires, in addition to that, a thorough knowledge of the external environment in which it operates. That is acquaintance with customs and traditions and also the socio-cultural characteristics of the population which have had noticeable impact on the administrative apparatus" [Al-Tayeb, 1986: 120].

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Organisation development (OD) advocates, such as Warren G. Bennis (1969) of the State University of New York at Buffalo, believes that the only viable way to change organisations is to change their "culture". That is to change the systems within which people work and live. This is because culture is a way of life, a system of beliefs and values, an accepted form of interaction and reality.

Nazih Ayubi (1986) explaining the impact of culture on efficiency and effectiveness, argues,

"The value dimension is most important. There are some values in our societies that sometimes obstruct the effective offering of service to the citizen..............of these values, it is obsequiousness and 'going along' in Arab society which lead to waste of time and avoidance of the effective confrontation of problems. Other values include concern over appearance and formalities..............and the values of domination and authoritarianism..............and there is also the careless attitude to time" [N.Ayubi, 1986: 94].

In the light of these arguments the following lesson could be drawn. More significant for the DMSUs than the employment of the mere formal office management techniques was the organisational context - the system within which the techniques were used. MSOs should have viewed the whole organisation as a system in need of improvement. They should have considered in their studies beliefs, attitudes, values as well as the structure of the organisation, so that the public service departments could better adapt to the improvement required.

4.4. Problems of Policy and Executive Directions

Lack of a clearly stated policy defining the objectives and goals to be achieved by the DMSU programme was another factor which affected performance of the DMSUs.
The goals and needs to be satisfied were not clearly specified beyond the overall objective of making the public administration system more efficient and effective. The researcher believes that this weakness stemmed from the absence of coordinated and comprehensive administrative planning.

Many examples were given by the management services officers who were interviewed of problems of policy and executive directions. One case was that of the staff of the GDOAR who were transferred to the Civil Service Department after the dissolution of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (1981). Their role as MSOs became very minor and gradually disappeared. According to the staff of the Directorate of Job Evaluation and Organisation and Method, in the Civil Service Department (interviewed in 1992 and in 1993), there were no clear executive directions as to the role of the Directorate as far as management services work was concerned. Very soon the staff of the Directorate were fully engaged in the Civil Service Department's routine work.

Another example can be drawn from the observations made by the researcher during his visits to the DMSUs in 1993. It was observed that the units recognised before as being active, in the Ministries of Public Works, and of Culture and Information, and in the Telecommunications Corporation and the National Electricity Corporation, were not as active as before. In some instances the relationship between the unit and the other sections of the organisation or ministry were not clear. This situation according to the MSOs in these departments stemmed from the absence of a clearly stated policy and executive directions as far as the work of these units was concerned.
4.5. Training Wastage

One of the problems which impeded the effectiveness of the DMSU programme was that not all those officers who were trained as MSOs (particularly in the advanced and specialists courses) were used full-time in their DMSUs. This was of course, contrary to the whole philosophy and practical application of the management services function.

The visits and the interviews made by the researcher to the DMSUs in 1993, revealed that there was a substantial decline in the number of MSOs working within the DMSUs. (The number declined from 6 MSOs to 3 or 2 in the existing DMSUs). Moreover, according to the management services training records of the former GDOAR (1980), 40 per cent of the total of 352 MSOs who were trained by March 1979, were not working in the DMSUs. [For more details see Figure (18) in chapter 3, MS training wastage between 1974 and 1980].

Management services officers, after having expensive and intensive training locally and abroad, were directed to other work. The regulations affecting the training programme were in fact inconsistently applied. MSOs attended the management services training courses under an arrangement whereby, for the following 3 to 5 years, they would not be allowed to attend long courses in other subjects. Some of them, however, were sent off on long study courses abroad for PhDs and master degrees, before they rendered the contractual obligation of 3 to 5 years practical service in the DMSUs. Another notable characteristic was that a considerable number of well-trained and experienced MSOs migrated to the Gulf oil producing countries, mainly to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Many reasons were given by the interviewees for this training wastage. These included the following:
1. There was a lack of appreciation of the role of management services by top management and by middle management.

2. There was an intentional delay in the creation of posts.

3. The financial limitations restricted the provision of offices and equipment.

4. The problem of indecision over whether to have a DMSU or not, with the consequent loss of time, created a training wastage and meant that the MSOs were deployed to other jobs and departments. In spite of the fact that MSOs had been trained to work in the DMSUs in their respective ministries, some ministries failed to establish effective DMSUs. For example the Ministries of Finance (Headquarters), of Defence, of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior [Report of the Technical Committee, 1990]. In those Ministries, where the DMSUs had little more than a nominal existence, efforts were made by the former GDOAR to revitalise them but no evidence of substantive progress was achieved. [Ibid, 1990].

5. The dissolution of some ministries (discussed earlier) created further problems of training wastage. Officers trained as MSOs were not transferred to DMSUs in other departments to work full-time in the new DMSUs. Instead they were simply given a non-management services work. For example, after the dissolution of the Ministry of People's Local Government, it was proposed that the group of MSOs who had been very thoroughly trained for its headquarters could form a "task force", a mobile unit to make visits to provinces without DMSUs to undertake management services training and assignments. This group, however, did not assemble nor did its members go to work in another DMSU [GDOAR, 1980].

In spite of the fact that this training wastage had a disruptive effect on the DMSU programme, and in addition deprived the concerned departments of effective
management services work, the researcher believes that it was in fact of advantage to
the public service generally. Those management services officers who were deployed
to other jobs, were able to work more effectively in their new jobs - through the
training and expertise which they had acquired.

4.6. Budgetary Constraints

Shortage of financial resources was another explanation for the poor performance of
the DMSUs. All the MSO interviewees and a minority of managers agreed that the
financial resources to support the management services programme were too limited.
According to these interviewees only negligible proportions of budgets were approved
for items such as office equipment, demonstration and training facilities.

Owing to this budgetary constraint, incentives such as the two increments which were
proposed by the MPSAR for the MSOs in the beginning of the programme (1974),
were not implemented. In addition, the promised posts for the MSOs were not created,
the advanced and specialist training courses stopped, and career progression and other
expected conditions were not realised. As a result, the MSOs lacked the incentive to
remain long in their DMSUs, and a great majority of them left management services' work.

4.7. Lack of Publicity

The lack of publicity on DMSU activities might explain why government senior
employees and their subordinates did not recognise the special nature of the
management services function. In the earlier days of the programme (1974-1976), the
inauguration and the final ceremony of every MS course were used to be publicised
through the daily newspapers and the radio. (Discussed in chapter 2). The literature review on the experience of the developed countries showed that management services work was strengthened through effective publicity on the activities of the management services units.

British and other examples are in stark contrast to the Sudanese experience, where the DMSU programme lacked any organised effort to popularise the management services work through the publication of professional journals and other periodicals. In Britain, the O and M Bulletin, which later became Management Services in Government was issued about four times a year by the Civil Service Department. In France, the O and M Bulletin was published quarterly by the Budget Directorate, in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and in Canada Optimum, another scientific management periodical, was published quarterly by the Bureau of Management Consultancy in the Ministry of Supply and Services.

These publications contained useful articles on practical O&M applications, results achieved, difficulties experienced, solutions proposed and new developments in the field. As a result, we find that in these countries, according to the editor of Management Services in Government, in David Nudd [1984 b, P.14], "many staff carry out what is recognised as management services work but, for organisational reasons, do not bear the label management services". Therefore due to the awareness gained through publicity, public employees became administrative reform conscious.
5. External Factors

Factors under this category are identified below.

5.1. The Political and Economical Environment

Through values and styles of operation of the government, narrow interests, resistance to change, and corruption of some senior administrators, the political and economical environment affected the DMSU programme. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the political environment in the Sudan was not favourable to the DMSU programme. Internally the government was unstable: there was a continuous changing and reshuffling of ministers and leadership. For example, the National People's Assembly and the Southern Regional People's Assembly were dissolved in October 1981, and the entire Cabinet was sacked in November 1981, in the belief that they were ineffective.

Moreover the country was facing drastic financial problems and Arab aid was being cut back (discussed in chapter 2). There was war in the South, famine in most parts of the country and the currency was devalued. As a result prices went up and the government employees' real income deteriorated. There was a scarcity of resources and a cut back in services supplied to the public by the government systems. Its consequences were that everyone was competing against everyone, procedures became complicated and corruption prevailed. Such problems were beyond the control and capacity of the DMSUs to handle, and caused their performance to deteriorate further.
5.1.1. Political Support

The absence of political support may explain why the DMSU programme started to decline in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The scope and objectives of management services activities are to a large extent dependent upon the degree of commitment on the part of political authorities. According to Warren Bennis (1969),

"Social action depends on power just as physical movement depends on energy. Nothing changes in human affairs until new power is generated or until old power is redistributed" [Warren Bennis, 1969: 79].

According to the United Nations Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management (1979), unless there is political backing as well as a strong political will to undertake a systematic overhaul of the machinery of government and its methods of operations, a meaningful approach to management improvement is difficult to develop.

The DMSU programme was initially introduced by a presidential decree (discussed earlier in chapter 2), and was consolidated by the President Nimeiri's encouragements at different occasions, and by the commitment of the programme's leadership (discussed earlier in chapter 2). The presidential decree had laid down that administrative reform was of the highest importance, and mentioned among other items the value of much greater delegation of authority and paying greater attention to the utilization of resources. According to W.S. Ryan (1976), who came to the Sudan in January 1976 to evaluate the DMSU programme, the presidential decree had alerted ministers and civil servants alike to the need for administrative reform, and a great deal of pressure and propaganda was devoted to that end. The ministers and top management who formed the leadership of the programme released relatively senior people to join the DMSUs, giving the management services function a prestige which it had perhaps lacked in the earlier two attempts of 1954 and 1968. In its peak period
(mid-1970s and early-1980s), the DMSU programme enjoyed full political support, and wide acceptance, and achieved conspicuous success.

After 1981, successful actions by DMSUs were comparatively rare, and this had much to do with insufficient political support for the programme. According to the MSOs who were interviewed in 1993, most suggestions of the DMSUs for improvement were rejected and defeated. This argument was confirmed by Dr. Kamal al-Zein, the First Under Secretary of the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform. (Al-Zein was interviewed in Khartoum in 1993 and in 1994). The MSOs lost their power position, status and access to top management and to the higher authorities who could convince others in the department to implement the necessary changes.

5.1.2. Administrative Leadership

The DMSU programme also suffered owing to the lack of sustained administrative leadership support. In spite of the fact that it was recommended by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform that DMSUs should be placed at the highest level of power and authority in order to have access and good connection to the necessary leadership support, DMSUs were placed low in the hierarchy of the ministries and departments. This practice led to down-grading the image and role of the DMSUs. Moreover the relatively low position of the DMSUs excluded personnel of the DMSUs in many cases from taking part in the process of high level administrative planning and decision-making. And in some cases when major changes happened, such as the implementation of regional government (which necessitated the dissolution of some ministries and amalgamation of others), DMSUs were undermined.
Broadly speaking, management services work need the full support of top management. It has to start at the top and has to be backed by the highest authority. This is because the degree of effective participation by the political leadership in supporting administrative reform defines the success possibilities of the reform efforts and plans. A.H. Mogensen (1947), addressing the annual conference of National Office Management Association of America, (explaining the importance of leadership support) says,

"I want to stress the fact that work simplification is a philosophy. It is something that you must start at the very top of your organisation, and if you office management people cannot go back and get the president of the company interested in work simplification and get him to back the programme, actively back it, I mean, you are not doing a real job of work simplification promotion" [Mogensen, 1947: 40].

Ashour (1986), also providing a similar perspective, writes that the role of the political leadership does not stop at providing a strong thrust towards reform but extends to include the solving of conflicts that arise between the different parties during the process of change. This was exactly the role which the former GDOAR was playing, and which the DMSUs under the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (CBAR) lacked.

In contrast to the Sudan, we find that in the United Kingdom political will and backing lay behind the success of the O&M and later the management services functions. In the 1940s, the Select Committee on National Expenditure in its (1946-47) session published a report on "Organisation and Methods" and on its O&M's effect on the staffing of government departments. The report was described as an O&M bible. The committee showed the usefulness of O&M techniques in the British Civil Service and in redesigning the structure of the government. The committee, impressed by the O&M achievements as well as its potential for the future, underlined the importance of O&M techniques in planning, stressing that O&M should be
brought in at the very early stages when new activities were being planned [Editorial, O&M Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1947].

With such encouragement and support, the O&M function grew large in size and status. It started to carry out important tasks and undertake assignments at higher levels [John Garrett and Robert Sheldon, 1973]. In the days of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, according to Professor Richard Chapman, the United Kingdom, "saw more administrative reform than any previous decade in the twentieth century" [Chapman, 1991: 1]. Mrs. Thacher's governments, making a focal issue of efficiency in central and local government, stressed the need to "reduce waste" and to get "value for money" [Wilks, 1993]. As a result the management services work was further developed into "efficiency units", and the UK witnessed major changes in the structure and processes of public sector organisations and also in administrative culture and style of management [Noel Floate, interview, 1994].

5.1.3. Absence of Guidance and Coordination

After the disappearance of the GDOAR in 1981 (discussed in chapter 2), the DMSUs lost the guidance, co-ordination, feedback, and technical advice which they had been receiving. During the visits which were made by the researcher in 1993 to the DMSUs in Khartoum, the DMSUs were found to be fragmented, uncoordinated and working towards individual goals. Strikingly and disappointingly, there was no supervision or follow up from any of the administrative reform institutions, particularly the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform. This situation had its impact on the training and morale of the MSOs as well as on the performance of the existing DMSUs. Each DMSU, due to the absence of a co-ordinating and controlling body, was planning and carrying out its work in isolation from the other DMSUs, repeating similar ineffective studies which are considered in the judgment of the researcher to be a waste of time,
effort and material. These studies were described by a great majority of the senior MSOs who were interviewed as being, "deficient or narrow in range". They were initiated to serve particular interests of either the employees or the unit itself.

Unlike the days of the former GDOAR, assignments were carried out without consulting a coordinating body, and the proposals were formulated away from the objectives considerations of the DMSU programme. In many cases recommendations were made for superficial considerations or to serve propaganda motives. Examples given by Mohamed Ali Taha and Zeinab Osman Ahmed (MSOs - interviewed in 1994), included the studies which were carried out in the Rural Water Saving Corporation, the Central Electricity and Water Corporation, and the Ministry of Education.

5.2. Corruption

Corruption is one of the reasons that may explain resistance to the DMSU programme. According to Mansour Khalid, who had an inside view of the situation, there was a faction within the May regime whose interests were threatened by the reforms. This group, based at the Presidential Palace, believed, (rightly) that strong reform institutions would monitor financial corruption and the abuse of power.

More seriously, in the end this group was able to convince President Nimeiri of their logic and have him embark on, "an emaciation of the institutions". [For more details, see Mansour Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May, KPI, London 1985, pp. 92-138, also pp. 193-320. Peter Woodward, Sudan 1898-1989, the Unstable State, Lynne Rienner Publishing Inc. Colorado, 1990, pp. 175-176].
This fact was confirmed by Dr. Awad Ahmed Idris (Deputy Advocate General of the Sudan). He told the researcher that Baha al-Din Idris (State Minister for Special Affairs in the President's Office), Adnan Khashoggi (a Saudi Arabian business man) and others had played a big role in frustrating Sudan's development plans and de-institutionalizing the country's organs. The Deputy Advocate General stated that, after the fall of Nimeiri in April 1985, the abovementioned group was taken to court. Some of them (but not Khashoggi) were imprisoned and some preferred to pay back large sums of money to the government purse. Giving an example he said Khider al-Sharif (a Sudanese business man) paid approximately twenty five million US dollars to the government. (Awad Ahmed Idris was interviewed in Khartoum in the 14th October 1994).

5.3. Insufficient Public Support

Insufficient awareness and response on the part of the public presented another obstacle to the DMSU programme. In the absence of an awakened public support as an externally monitoring body, it proved difficult for the DMSUs to make the desired improvement in the performance and practice of the public service. According to the staff of the Directorate of Procedure Simplification in the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (Mrs. Mariam Hassan Abdel-Latif, Mohamed Ali Taha, Bukhari Hassan and Miss Affaf Bakhiet - all interviewed in 1993), the improvements which were made in many departments (such as the Sudanese Expatriate Bureau and the Housing Department), were abandoned to preserve the status quo. The solutions implemented in these departments did not last long. Long queues appeared again, and complaints from the clients about the slowness of the procedures and the interference of middlemen were heard. According to the staff, trying to short-cut procedures via middlemen in some places and situations became a norm, an accepted behaviour in the
eyes of the unawakened public in order to get the services required quickly and properly.

In a visit by the researcher (1993) to the departments which dealt directly with the public, such as the Telecommunications Corporation, the Sudanese Expatriate Bureau, the National Electricity Corporations and the Department of Statistics, a small sample of 18 clients (altogether) who were standing in the queues were informally interviewed. They were asked about the usefulness of the administrative reform programmes and their opinions on the delivery of services after and before the improvements which were made by the management services teams. To cut a long story short, a great majority of this small sample did not show any interest in the DMSUs and the improvements they made.

Based upon these informal interviews, other observations made during the visits, and the working experience of the researcher, public opinion was not sufficiently articulate to provoke general interest in administrative reform programmes. This might be due to the lack of civic sense and ignorance of the citizens, who were poorly educated, deeply influenced by the traditional values and behaviour patterns, and who were therefore less able to understand, appreciate and support such a reform programme.

In the light of this discussion, it seems that the commitment and support of the public is as important as the people doing the job. The responsibility falls to the public to follow up and maintain the implementation of the DMSUs' proposals and recommendations. Therefore the public needs to be enlightened, and taught how to interact with the government employees and to understand the concept and function of administrative reform and development.
5.4. The DMSU Programme was Too Ambitious

Another factor which explains the unsatisfactory performance of the DMSUs was that the DMSU programme was over-ambitious compared to the priorities of the Sudan with regard to the problems of administrative reform. The large number of MSOs who were trained locally and abroad (784 MSOs - see Figure 12 in chapter 3), and the vast expansion of the DMSUs throughout the government organisations (48 DMSUs - see Figure 10 in chapter 2) were too large and difficult for the economy and public service to bear. The Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, being over-enthusiastic and ambitious, introduced the programme without making a thorough assessment of the availability of resources (financial, technical and human). Abdin (1986), writing on administrative reform in the Sudan stated that,

"The launching of a large new institution overnight without appropriate building and staff available will weaken existing institutions by threatening to draw away their best staff and their opportunity for high level work" [Abdin 1986: 90].

The experience of the Sudan is again in contrast to that of other countries. In the United Kingdom, according to Noel Floate of the RIP A International who was interviewed by the researcher in 1994, there was only one "efficiency unit" in the UK, located in the Cabinet Office, staffed only with 6 officers (at the time of the interview). In the United Republic of Tanzania, according to the United Nations Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management (1979), only six management analysts were serving the whole government in 1962, increasing to 10 officers in 1970. The experience of Iraq was no different. Revolutionary Command Council Resolution No. 333, issued in May 1972, directed the establishment of a network of O&M units in the different ministries and state organisations. As a result, 28 O&M units were established, distributed in 17 ministries and 11 public enterprises. These were staffed with only 60 O&M officers [Ibid, 1979].
In the light of this discussion the researcher believes that the introduction of the DMSU programme in the Sudan Public Service could have achieved better results if the attempt had been slow, systematic, and organised with many fewer units. It also needed to be well defined, specific and clear in its objectives, and having clear lines of authority to give a more practical structure.

5.5. Lack of Institutional Support

The lack of adequate and sustained institutional support was also a factor which affected the performance and continuity of the DMSU programme. After the dissolution of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (1981), the DMSU programme lost its legitimacy. The enthusiasm shared by the majority of the MSOs and a minority of top administrators was not enough to support and maintain the DMSUs. The Management Services Centre (MSC), which was supposed to give the programme an institutional strength, did not get off the ground. The consequences were that most of the DMSUs failed to attain stability and continuity.

Later, when the administrative reform responsibility was assigned to the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (CBAR), which was created in 1987, to spearhead the administrative reform programmes, the DMSUs became even more crippled due to the mislocation and inexperienced staff of the new agency in the field of management services. MSOs were arguing that the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform had the advantage of starting with a new outlook on the problems of the DMSUs, depending on and benefiting from the experience of the senior MSOs who were either working in the existing DMSUs or performing non-MS function in the different public service departments. Unfortunately, nothing substantial happened, as the revival of the DMSU programme was not on the new agency’s list of priorities.
5.6. Lack of Integration of MS work into the Socio-Economic Plans

One of the problems which confronted the DMSU programme was the failure to integrate its work with the socio-economic plans. Although the main purpose of launching the DMSU programme was to modernise continuously and to revolutionize the administrative methods and procedures to cope with the national plans and programmes in different fields [Presidential Decree No. 160, dated 11 April 1976, appendix (3)], most of the country's development plans included no meaningful programme on administrative reform or management services. Although it was obvious and taken for granted that sound administration was a prerequisite for the successful implementation of development plans, no concrete actions were taken. This negligence might be due to the failure of top administrators to perceive the real purpose of administrative reform and its instruments as effective tools and machines of any national development plan.

The importance of sound administration as an instrument for social and economic transformation has been emphasised by many writers. Richard Chapman and J.R. Greenaway (1980), in their book, The Dynamics of Administrative Reform stressed that reform in the administrative system leads to social and economic change and reform. Hassan Abasher El-Tayeb (1986), also emphasised that administrative reform is inseparable from the overall socio-economic plans. More than that, it encompasses the total environment with its various political, administrative, economic, social and cultural subsystems and relationships.

"A deliberate political, administrative, economic, social and cultural effort aimed at bringing about basic positive changes in behaviour, systems, relationships, methods and tools in order to develop the capabilities and capacities of the administrative apparatus in a manner that will ensure for a high degree of efficiency and effectiveness in the achievement of its goals and objectives" [El-Tayeb, 1986:119].
The GDOAR and the RIPA consultant exerted tremendous efforts to integrate the management services work into the socio-economic plans. Despite their effort, the DMSU programme was not tackled as part of the socio-economic development plan. It was proposed that MSOs should be involved in the initial programming of any development plan. The Presidential Decree No. 160 stated clearly that DMSUs should be established and utilized in the best way possible in order to achieve objectives of the socio-economic plans. The decree also gave priority in training to the MSOs, and emphasised their participation in the meetings and the actual implementation of the development plans. This lack of symbiotic relationship between the two resulted in poor performance and discontinuity of a number of DMSUs. For example, in a Ministry like the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, where an organic interdependency between administrative reform plans and economic and social development plans should have been most appreciated and integrated to achieve the desired objectives, the DMSU was not used on full-time basis.

Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, it could be said that the problems summarised above are those which could arise in any new organisation. The DMSU programme was still in its infancy (1974 to the mid-1980s), only a decade old. Its shape and potentialities had not been fully developed in order to counteract management problems in the public service which continued to grow. Yet the programme laid good foundation in its golden days, and promised to develop real improvements in the public service. Chapter 5 (Recommendations), will deal briefly with some recommendations and necessary pre-requisites which may help in the revival and improvement of the management services function in the Sudan.
References

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Chapter 5

Conclusion and Recommendations

1. Conclusion

This study has focused on the experience of the Management Services function in the Sudan public service. The aspects given most attention have been the establishment of the departmental management services units (DMSUs), training of the management services officers (MSOs), and the problems confronting the management services programme from 1974 to the late 1980s.

The starting point was in 1974 when the first basic management analysts training programme was conducted in Khartoum by the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA London). The measures adopted to institutionalise the management services' work included the creation of the DMSUs throughout the public service, staffed by management analysis specialists (MSOs) to help the ministries and departments improve their administrative systems and procedures, and to make practical improvements in the day to day work.

With the help of the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA), under the United Kingdom's Technical Assistance Programme to the Sudan, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) embarked on planning, training (locally and abroad) and creating DMSUs throughout the public sector.

1.1. Comparative References

This study has benefited from the availability of comparative material on the experience of other countries, notably that of the United Kingdom. A further
important element is provided by the model of management services activities within an organisation created by Neville Harris (1984). This was found to convey useful and important lessons. The factors included in this model cover the elements needed for the development of an effective management services function in the Sudan. A total transference of any model will never be entirely appropriate, because the model will be practised within a different social setting and cultural environment than that in which it was developed. Having said this, however, it is important to note that examples of successful performance of the management services function in the United Kingdom will always be of interest and provide a basis for guidance in formulating recommendations for the future revival of the DMSU programme in Sudan.

1.2. Achievements and Successes

The DMSU programme in its golden days (mid-1970s to the early-1980s) enjoyed a good reputation, and achieved good results. A number of improvements were brought about by management services officers (MSOs) in various departments such as the Sudanese Expatriate Bureau, the Department of Statistics, the Housing Department, the Passports, Nationality and Immigration Department,...etc. Work simplification studies were carried out in 22 governmental units dealing with the public on a day-to-day basis. The results were positive. [Mariam Hassan in agreement with a majority of the interviewees, 1993].

In addition to this, the moving of MSOs to other positions after having worked in their DMSUs for a period of 3 to 5 years in full-time management services work was found to have worked well. It enriched the public service by bringing in new blood, and at the same time provided a large pool of better-quality middle managers. (This was evident, for example, in the Post and Telegraph Corporation and the Customs and
Excise Duty). These MSOs had been trained in special techniques and had worked in their DMSUs for some time. When they took up their new jobs, they were able to propose improvements and to tackle problems facing their departments. They were able to take a broad view and to test their ideas against the experience of similar work done elsewhere.

Many of the evaluators who evaluated the MS work in the Sudan pointed to impressive achievements. Among those were Mr. Ryan (1969), Mr. Davies (1978), and Mr. Curtis (1979).

Success of the DMSU programme in the golden days was dependent upon the following organisational environmental factors:

a. Full support of the Sudan's political leadership (especially that of the former President Ga'afar Nimeiri and the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform, Abdel-Rahman Abdalla). (Discussed earlier).

b. The high level of administrative support, in other words support of the administrative leadership in the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform, the Institute of Public Administration, the Management Development and Productivity Centre and the National Training Department. (Discussed in chapter 2).

c. The high organisational and technical capability of the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (the mother department), as well as the intensive training MSOs had locally and abroad.

d. Organisational location of the DMSUs in the structures of the departments. The reporting level of the head of the DMSU was usually high in the organisation (to the Under-Secretary or to the Minister).

e. Credibility of the MSOs and good reputation of the DMSU's activities at the time.
f. A foreign policy orientation which was conducive to sustaining the development efforts, providing scope for technical co-operation and training awards.

With such successes and achievements, it was hoped that top management would grasp opportunities to give this new service the highest support. Also it was expected that demand for this new service would grow and that the government units would participate fully in the reform process which the DMSU programme has initiated. However, by the late-1970s the impact of management services had declined sharply in almost all ministries and departments of the government.

1.3. Resistance to the DMSU Programme

The first thing to note from the analysis of the problems discussed in the previous chapters is that the DMSU programme faced resistance from some top management (and from some lower-level employees) and negligence from some ministries such as the Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Finance was opposed to the programme and therefore was blocking finance. [Abdel-Rahman Abdalla, interview in 1994]. There was a remarkable degree of consensus among the interviewees, including the Ministers, that there was a problem of finance. As a result:

a) The training programmes which were a central pillar of the DMSU programme were reduced to the level of only one basic course, conducted once a year in the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS).

b) Management services posts were not created and offices to accommodate the DMSUs in most of the departments were not established.
The problem is that some senior employees were covering the positive aspects and highlighting the shortcomings of the programme. DMSUs in their eyes were believed to be substantially below standard and weak in performance (Kamal Zein and Ali Al-Arabi, interviewed in 1993). Among the points taken against the DMSUs' work was that this was built on a technical set of techniques and was based on viewing the administrative system as a closed system, as if it was an isolated island. Therefore the DMSUs' work produced no more than small improvements in systems, methods and procedures. The management services function was not understood as a purposeful effort within the context of the total environment, which should take into consideration all the critical elements and various variables which influence the process of administrative reform and development.

1.4. The Critical Point

The stated objectives of the DMSU programme were to improve the managerial system of the public service. However, after the dissolution of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR) in 1981, suggestions as to who would support the DMSUs, and who could follow up, co-ordinate and solve the programme's problems were largely missing from the proposals. In addition, an idea of what machinery could be established to sustain the DMSUs was also missing. (See appendix 20: the Presidential Resolution No. 807 dated 25 November 1981). As a result of this vague situation, coupled with the disappearance of the power base, the DMSU programme declined. Today (at the time of writing this research) the programme is at best in a state of suspension.
1.5. Outcome of the Study

The conclusion drawn from this study is that the management services function in the Sudan has had a rather uneasy development. The study contends that the decline of the DMSU programme was closely linked to the vague situation which existed after disbandment of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform in 1981, coupled with the many factors which were discussed in chapter 4. These negative factors made the programme's progress more difficult than it should have been.

The DMSU programme did not make enough impact on the public service management, and did not provide the benefits expected. It brought insufficient change, and failed to secure enough ministerial support. It was not organised and managed well enough to form a coherent and an effective specialist function, in part because it had no effective head of profession.

1.6. Possibility of Improvement

A majority of the interviewees believed in the possibility of future improvement of the management services function in the Sudan. In their judgement, there is still a need for specialist internal consultancy to help improve the performance of the public service, and to upgrade the ability of the government organisations to handle its various economic and social programmes in the most efficient way possible. The researcher also believes that DMSUs have much to offer. They can bring to government departments new ideas and enthusiasm, and can give quality service. Management services officers can be real allies to all levels of management. To achieve this, some corrective action is needed; the revival of the DMSUs should lead to them being better organised and better managed.
The revival and development of the management services function becomes a necessity towards building a capable administrative machinery in an age in which "management is fast becoming the central resource of the developed countries and the basic need of the developing ones" [Peter Drucker, 1969: 54]. In agreement with a majority of the MSOs who were interviewed, the researcher believes that DMSUs of great competence are deeply needed in the Sudan, where there is a growing awareness (amongst the MSOs) of the outstanding role these units could play.
2. Recommendations

In the light of the constraints which have been identified in the last chapter, as well as the difficulties which the existing DMSUs face in carrying out their work, one is left with the question as to what recommendations would ensure successful functioning of the management services in the Sudan. Developing recommendations to cater for all the problems and challenges which have confronted the DMSU programme is extremely difficult. The measures discussed below are intended to ensure that the management services function can succeed and be reflected in improved efficiency in the performance of the public service. The recommendations are based on the literature reviewed, the opinions of the interviewees, observations (visits made by the researcher to the DMSUs in 1993 and 1994), and the experiences of different countries. Attention should be drawn to the fact that the recommended points are organised in descending order, according to their implementation expenses: a) short term and low cost solutions and b) long term solutions.

a) Short Term and Low Cost Solutions

Help from Externally-Based Governmental and Non-Governmental Organisations

In view of the economic constraints which the country is facing, it is recommended that contact be made with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which have offices or agents in Khartoum, in order to secure some funds for the revival and development of the MS function in the Sudan. These NGOs may include:

3. Overseas Development Administration of the United Kingdom (ODA).
4. United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
6. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
7. African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD).
10. Arab Organisation of Administrative Sciences.

**Overseas Professional Help**

In addition to the above help can also be sought from retired professionals who were formerly employed by one of the agencies and from professional institutions, to assist in training and provision of training materials. The latter institutions may include:

1. RIPA International Ltd. (UK).
2. The Institute of Management Services (UK).
3. The Civil Service College (UK).
4. UK University Business Schools.

Use could be made of students studying in the business schools (both undergraduate and postgraduate), especially those whose studies combine Arabic and business studies. They could be hosted in the Sudanese universities and training institutions for 6-9 months attachments. By so doing, the students would improve their Arabic language and the Sudanese benefit from the students' managerial knowledge and skills.
Promotion of MS Knowledge

The development of a new strategy whereby the MS knowledge could be widely spread and understood by the public employees is required. This could be done through the creation of a supportive climate in the following manner:

First. Bringing the higher educational establishments closer to the MS, by approaching the universities, the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS) and the Management Development Centre (MDC) to include MS techniques in their educational and training programmes. Including these techniques in the curriculum of higher education and training institutions is assumed to be a very significant development towards the promotion of the MS knowledge. Also it would offer an opportunity for practising MSOs to enhance their professional knowledge in MS. In addition to this, the scope of MS knowledge would extend to encompass all the concerned quarters in order to make DMSUs meeting points at which all elements and entities interact. This interaction might perhaps lead to a widely spread and understood MS function, and ultimately would change the perception and behaviour of the senior administrators. They would become more technocratic and more rationalistic: technically discussing their objectives and paying full attention to ways of reaching them efficiently and effectively.

Second: Including MS Techniques in the Induction (Orientation) Training Programmes of Administrators

This study has shown how the level of commitment and interest shown by leadership of the DMSU programme positively affected performance of the DMSUs in their golden days (1974 to late-1980s). This means that
the environment within which a management services unit operates should favour administrative reforms.

To develop such an environment it is recommended that new appointees to administrative and managerial positions in the government organisations should gain through their induction training a fair idea about the management services function and its benefits. The programme may include the study of practical problems of administration and the employment of management services techniques. This will later help to create talented public servants with an awareness of administrative reform and will reduce their resistance to and increase their acceptance of change. In addition to this, such an orientation will draw to the attention of the public administrators that development administration demands much more than the traditional concept of the administrative function that they have learnt (POSDCORB), and will form a solid meaningful joint commitment to the programme.
Third: Creation of an MS Association

The founding of a professional society in the field of management services is to be encouraged. This will provide a professional focus for management activities and promote the interchange of contacts between the DMSUs. Moreover, this professional society may lead to greater recognition of the management services function amongst government employees.

Fourth: Publicity

Promotion of knowledge of MS requires some sort of general publicity, because if the DMSUs are to grow and develop and become the spearhead of efficiency, they "need to assert themselves, to raise their credibility through better management and higher practitioner standards and to publicise their achievements". (David Nudd, April 1984:14).

After consultation with the personnel of the existing DMSUs and the Directors of the Radio and the Television, a series of programmes could be produced by the MSOs for use by radio and broadcasting services, the television services and other news media. Possible areas to be covered could be general description of the DMSU programme, the usefulness of the programme and any activities which suggest a good image for the programme.
b). Long Term Solutions

1. Intensified Training of the MSOs

The United Nations mission report (1972), the expatriate consultants who evaluated the DMSU programme afterwards and a majority of the interviewees from the side of the MSOs, have all stressed the importance of training. The expatriate consultants contended that the future of the management services in the Sudan depends on planning effectively and maintaining relevant dynamic training. The success of the DMSUs in the government departments lies in the capability and strength of the MSOs. The more experienced and trained the MSOs are, the more competent and valuable the services rendered become. Therefore it is recommended that positive management services training policies should be developed and maintained in order to enrich the management services staff.
1.1. Revision of the Content of the Basic MS Course

A significant step forward towards the revision of the content of the basic management services course is needed. For the DMSUs to become developmental agencies, the techniques of management services should be related to the public service's needs and demands. Many developments in the fields of management services have taken place, but so far these developments have not been made available in the Sudanese management services training courses. Therefore, revision of the content of the basic management services course becomes essential to reflect current needs and demands and to take account of new thinking.

The content of the basic course should expand to include modern management methods and techniques which could meet the new demands and thinking. Also topics on matters of behavioural science and attitudes are important, in order to create a self-motivated willingness to change for the purpose of securing the public good and delivering the best possible services. Knowledge of behavioural science is especially important, "since it is people who make up an organisation and who manage and operate." [Barker, 1981: 86]. This kind of knowledge addresses the processes between groups and individuals. It enhances understanding of the culture and values of the people who are working in the organisations.

1.2. Advanced and Specialists Courses

There is an essential need to develop in-depth practical ability in specific techniques to meet the differing needs of various departments in the public service. Short advanced and specialist intensive courses need to be developed and run regularly to produce confident practitioners in special management techniques such as Network

1.3. MS Appreciation Seminars

A series of orientation seminars for top management and senior officials is required, in order to explain to them the management services function and to promote its use. This recommendation is important in order to make these policy makers more aware and appreciative of the importance of management services and its special significance to administrative reform. Also this type of orientation is essential to winning the necessary top-level support for wide-spread management services.

1.4. MS Training for Managers

In conjunction (parallel) to the basic management analysis course which is conducted annually in the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS) for management services officers (MSOs), training of the government employees, mainly the middle management, is also necessary. The circle of participation should extend to encompass all the concerned quarters in order to make the DMSU a meeting point at which the elements and entities interact. An appropriate in-service training in the field of management services is clearly a necessary step towards developing a cadre of management services oriented personnel. This means that the MS training courses will not be limited only to the MSOs, but will embrace other staff who are engaged in different types of administrative and management work. This will perhaps include functional specialists such as accountants, financial controllers, personnel officers, procurement and supply officers ... etc. Such training teaches employees how to work.
in a management services way and emphasises the importance for managers to take
the lead in getting things done and to deal with the public and their needs effectively.

Similar ideas were put forward in H. Curtis's report (1979) when he visited the Sudan
to evaluate the DMSU programme. Also they were referred to in the RIPA report of
(1978) as well as in Mr. John Davies' report (1978). In the latter report Mr. Davies
states: "Indeed, the development of effective management services requires the
development of parallel general training programmes for middle level administrative
staff in the departments concerned" [RIPA, 1978:20 and RIPA 1979:102]

Professor Neville Harris (1984) has also highlighted the general importance of this
kind of training, stating:

"The approach likely to be most liked by departmental managers is
probably that of providing a management development programme
enabling managers themselves to be able to tackle many of their own
problems individually and in teams, using the smaller MS units to deal
with the very difficult aspects of data collection and a specialised
resource within the teams. Such a management service unit would
probably be undertaking a considerable amount of development work
with managers" (Harris, 1984:24).

1.5. Institutionalisation of the Training

In order to ensure continuation and successful operation of the MS training courses,
the following lines of action may be recommended:

a. Identifying a central body to be responsible for developing the training
   policies and directing their execution. MS training should be considered
   a continuous need and therefore be institutionalised.
b. Identifying and initiating action to obtain new and additional training aids and equipment which will be required to support the successful execution (implementation) of the MS training programmes.

c. Developing professional staff competence of the MS instructors in the SAAS in special management fields of importance to the needs of the DMSUs.

d. Allocating financial resources appropriate to running the training at the different levels locally. Also, suitable fellowship schemes should be established for advanced and refresher training abroad.
2. Developing a Supportive Organisational Environment

The development of a new spirit towards making the MS function to interface with other functions in the public sector departments is necessary. To achieve this recommendation, the points which follow need to be taken into consideration.

Co-ordination of the DMSUs Work

a. Internally, by bringing together similar disciplines from within the department. For example, co-ordination between the Internal Audit function and the DMSU by creating a multidisciplinary management support group.

b. Externally, by integrating the management services work with national socio-economic plans. This recommendation requires a high degree of organic interdependence between administrative reform plans and economic and social development plans, in order to bridge the existing gap which separates them, and to integrate their efforts to achieve the desired overall objectives.

c. Generally, by developing and defining general public national objectives for all the DMSUs. One objective should be taken at a time, according to a working plan or a list of priorities which should be consistent with the overall development objectives. These national and general objectives can then be a reference for all the different strategies, policies, programmes and activities of the DMSUs in the public organisations.
Improvement of Interdepartmental Relationships

A close professional liaison is essential between the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (CBAR) (which is assumed to undertake the role of a technical administration and promote the DMSU programme), the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (as a training institution), the Civil Service Department (as a sister department), and the Ministry of Finance.

Emphasis should be put on the creation of posts for the DMSUs by the liaison of the CBAR with the user departments and the Civil Service Department in reviewing the structures of DMSUs and requesting the right number and grades of posts which need to be created. A close consultation is also required between the CBAR and the Ministry of Finance in order to release funds for training the MSOs.

Creation of DMSUs in the Newly Established States (Wilayat)

A capable administrative system, which could effectively cope with the expanding State (wilayah) services as well as the new demands resulting from the decentralisation process, is required. In order to establish and maintain management improvement programmes in these State governments, special organisational arrangements and a commitment to resources are required. DMSUs, in the eyes of the researcher, could play this role. However, what is needed in the States is not the traditional or conventional management services concept, but a wider view - a new approach for the creation and development of a new pattern of public service. Such a shift of DMSUs towards the rural areas (the States) with their problems would help the States to achieve high productivity and better welfare.
DMSUs, besides their advisory service, could have a satisfying and a worthwhile job to do in the States. They can support top management in the preparation of policy, and assist in implementation of agreed policy and in explaining the policies to other sections or departments within the State. DMSUs should not be looked at as closed systems and should not simply react to situations, as was the case in the earlier experience. They should be an influencing factor of a positive nature in the development of the States. Developing more objective measures of public service performance should be a major objective for the DMSUs in order to bring about change - change in organisational behaviour and organisational culture. Special attention needs to be given to the social, political and economic factors which have far-reaching effects on the administration of the States.
A Central MS Unit in each State

To begin with, the establishment of a central management services unit is recommended for the capital (headquarters) of each State, to serve the State's departments. This central management services unit should be staffed with highly experienced management specialists, capable of providing support and back up services to the external DMSUs within the States when established in the future. Apart from organisation and methods specialists, personnel of this central unit should represent an integrated capability with a wider coverage of modern management techniques. For example, employment of a technique such as the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) would be useful at present (in view of economic scarcity). This technique may enable the central unit to assist the different departments in displaying their budget proposals and organising expenditure of each programme. The need or priority of each programme and its effectiveness will act as a justification for the expenditure they require. By so doing, managers will be able to assess their work by performance indicators, measured in terms of money or quality of services, and the State's Ministry of Finance could manage and control its limited financial resources according to priorities.

Role of the State's Central MS Unit

The central management services unit should concentrate on productivity and achievements, and should establish a spirit of organisational creativity and innovation. The following points describe areas to which the central MS unit can give attention:

a. Attracting all the available energies and resources and utilising them effectively in a harmonised and an interactive manner in order to attain the State's objectives and aspirations. [El-Tayeb, 1986].
b. Redesigning the pattern of community life in the rural areas by altering the public culture or transforming the way the citizens feel about themselves, about their community, about the purpose of their work, and the purpose of being together. The idea would be to streamline and co-ordinate efforts of the citizens to design and implement integrated administrative reform projects.

c. Convening series of briefing meetings for top managers focusing on planning, implementing and improving procedures for their development programmes. For example, a working plan with proposals for improvement could be prepared by each department, and discussed in these meetings. The meeting would have the proposals evaluated, analysed, co-ordinated and approved by all the managers according to the appropriate procedures.

d. Organising seminars, conferences and workshops on subjects of importance for the improvement of the public service. Emphasis may be placed upon improving the current decentralisation problems such as:

   Better deployment of personnel, wealth and other resources as between the Federal Government and the States.

   Improvement of the capacity of the States to deal with crises, new problems and new conditions.

   Elimination of artificial barriers between citizens.

   Enhancement of social justice, equalisation of rewards, privileges and provision of equal services to the public.

   Reduction of suffering, unemployment and waste.

   Developing standards of performance, improving evaluation processes, and developing systematic and reliable methods to improve professional skills, ethics and commitment.

   Examining the rationality of setting priorities, goals, strategies, programmes and projects.
Location of DMSUs in the Organisational Structure

The organisational location of the DMSUs in the lower echelon in the departments seems to highlight concern for making the significance of management improvement more visible. It is recommended that the DMSUs be linked to the highest authority. For example, they could be under the control and supervision of the Under-Secretaries or their equivalent, and at no lower level than these. Management scientists such as David Nudd (1986) believe that the success of the DMSUs and the ability to influence managers and therefore bring about significant change is dependent upon their position within the hierarchy of the department and their representation in the senior management and strategy committees.

3 The Need to Create a Mother Department for the DMSUs

It is recommended that priority attention should be given to establishing an effective central machinery, otherwise known as a mother department to be responsible for the formulation and direction of government policies on the development and utilization of the DMSUs. A spearhead with sufficient capabilities and perseverance to follow through is required.

At the moment, the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform (CBAR) has been entrusted to spearhead the administrative reform programmes in the entire public service. Generally speaking, revival of the DMSU programme is not on the CBAR's list of priorities. The CBAR could function, however, as a more effective instrument of administrative reform if its responsibilities were to include the formulation of policies on management services revival and provision of technical support and guidance to the DMSUs. Therefore, it becomes urgent and crucial to draw the attention of the CBAR to this point. It is also recommended that the CBAR should be
directly attached to the highest political body in the government. This institutional relationship should enable the CBAR to obligate all the public service departments to abide by the approved plans and policies. This authority should also enable the CBAR to co-ordinate the work of the DMSUs and their relationships with other bodies.

To play the role of a mother department, the CBAR has to fill its leading posts with suitably trained and experienced management services officers. In consultation with the training departments such as the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences, and sister departments such as the Civil Service Department, the CBAR should form a strong executive institution with clear, undiluted objectives towards the revival of the DMSU programme. Close and co-operative work relationships should be cultivated in order to facilitate participation and involvement and to project more influence.

Under such a strong, powerful, knowledgeable and specialised co-ordinating body, the work of the DMSUs will be integrated and comprehensively supported, improved, and directed towards the overall national objectives.

Role of the Mother Department

The Central Bureau for Administrative Reform should shoulder responsibility for:

a. The follow-up of the existing DMSUs and the continuing implementation of the DMSU programme throughout the public service.

b. The provision of a central management services unit to serve its own Bureau and external departments on request.

c. The development of a central specialist unit (a multidisciplinary management improvement task force) to provide deeper professional leadership and consultancy to external DMSUs.
d. The promotion of co-ordination among the DMSUs and their improvement programmes. DMSUs should be linked together and have compatible aims.

e. The promotion of periodic contacts between the DMSUs, by holding a monthly planning and reviewing meeting for the heads of the DMSUs under the chairmanship of the Director of the General Directorate of Procedure Simplification in the CBAR. These meetings should be used as a vehicle for sharpening the work programmes of the different DMSUs, bringing about better integration between them and activating team-building among the management services officers.

f. Integrating efforts of the different departments inside the CBAR, the central management services unit and the DMSUs supporting the national development process.

g. Developing and upgrading its own new breed of management specialists by making maximum use of the opportunities for training in the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences.

h. "Keeping abreast of theoretical and professional developments, translating new concepts into workable procedures for use in improvement endeavours" [Harris, 1985: 15].

4. Political Support

The revival and development of the DMSU programme requires strong political backing. Legislation should be introduced to provide framework documents that clearly state the policy and the role which the DMSUs will play. Therefore it is recommended that a national act or a presidential decree should be promulgated setting up a machinery for consolidating the existing DMSUs, reviving the management services function and formulating the training programmes. This act
should state objectives of the programme as a government-wide policy binding on all central ministries and the States. The DMSU programme should be regarded as a shared responsibility involving every ministry, public corporation and the States' governments. It should be considered as an integral part of the national development plan.

This approach was the foundation of much public administrative reform undertaken by public lawyers in Western Europe [Caiden, 1969], where the reform required was backed by the law - the law having to be obeyed until it was changed.

Having said this, it is important to stress here that this recommendation needs to be supported by co-operation from all the concerned parties if a successful and a sustainable activation is to be accomplished.

The importance of this recommendation stems from the fact that it should enable the DMSUs to justify their existence and achieve their goals and to have continuous co-operation and close co-ordination with the political decision making organs in order to set workable acceptable developmental priorities.

5. Clear Career Development Plan for the MSOs

It is recommended that attention should be paid to career and succession planning for the management services officers, with specific terms and conditions of service. This means that the enrolment and training programmes of the management services officers must be tied to a reward system in terms of promotion, salary increase and other forms of advancement, recognition and incentives.
Recognition of such career development will help and invite talented and professionally qualified officials to join the DMSUs. Also it will ensure that the right mix of skills and experiences is available in the DMSUs leading towards the development of a greater technical expertise.

6. Changing the Name MS

Although the term "Management Services" has been in popular use in the UK, it did not have general acceptance by those who were associated with it in the Sudan. A great majority of the interviewees including the expatriate consultant of the programme (Mr. Floate), recommended that the name management services be changed to an acceptable alternative. Ten interviewees, including Dr. Kamal Mohamed Zein, the First Under-Secretary of the Central Bureau for Administrative Reform, recommended the name "Research and Development" as an alternative. However, the researcher believes that the term "Total Quality Management (TQM) is more appropriate because it is simple and revolutionary. It is revolutionary because it encourages total participation and involves the employees in what had been management decision-making or the management services function. The techniques used in TQM are the same as those of the management services, but the key point is that total quality management has the power of implementation - a revolutionary advantage.

Total quality management is defined as, "the continuous and rapid revision, implementation and evaluation of an organisation's standard operating procedures". [Steven Cohen and William Eimicke, 1994: 451]. According to these two writers, the word "total", covers every aspect of work, from identifying customer needs to aggressively evaluating whether the customer is satisfied. "Quality", means meeting and exceeding customer expectations. "Management", means developing and
maintaining the organisational capacity to constantly improve quality. [Ibid, 1994: 451].

S. Cohen and R. Brand (1993) in S. Cohen and W. Eimicke (1994: 451), give more explanation to the term TQM by saying that:

a. Employees work with suppliers to ensure that the supplies used in the organisation's work processes are fit for use. (Suppliers are those who provide employees with the material or information that employees transform through the work they perform on it. Supplies can be as common place as a pencil, as complex as computer software or as confusing as a boss's instruction).

b. Employees continuously analyse work procedures to improve their function and reduce process variation.

c. Employees closely communicate with customers to identify and understand what they want and how they define quality. (Customers are those individuals who use the things employees have transformed through their work. A customer can be internal to the organisation, such as the boss reading a memo written by his or her staff. A customer can be external to the organisation such as a pension recipient, or a person applying for a driver's permit).

In addition to the advantages of participation of employees in the implementation of the proposals, the management improvement units (DMSUs) under this recommended name (TQM), are expected to place themselves in the position of being constantly open to and striving towards new learning, as they are constantly analysing and modifying existing work procedures.
A proposed Model of MS for the Sudan Public Service

Figure (5 in page 96) shows that MS units in the Sudan were small and can be categorised (according to the services they offered) as single specialism units (Conventional O&M and work study). Revival and development of the MS function to cater for all the critical elements that may influence successful performance of the DMSUs necessitates the development of an improved model.

Based upon the Harris model (figure 1), the researcher has developed a new model to convey the problems confronted in MS and the environment in which the DMSUs have to operate (the present circumstances of the Sudan), this model is shown in figure (20).
Figure (20): The Recommended Model for Understanding the Elements Affecting Management Services in Sudan
Factors Taken into Account in Devising the Recommended Model

Figure (21) below shows the factors which needed to be taken into account in devising the recommended model.

Figure (21): Factors affecting the recommended model

History and What Happened

Recommended Model

Culture

New Developments in Management

Short Term  Long Term

Evaluation

History and what happened

Discussed earlier in chapters 2, 3 and 4.

Culture

The office procedures and practices are strongly influenced by the culture of the individuals working inside the public service departments. The customs and values
employees bring into their working places shape their behaviour and attitudes and affect management values and processes. The recommended model will not be useful if the cultural factors of the Sudanese officials is ignored.

Hereunder are some cultural characteristics of the Sudanese officials:

1. There is a problem in the concentration of the decision-making process. In many cases, managers were reluctant to delegate authority, share information or to involve subordinates in decision-making processes.

2. There is an unquestionable loyalty for the extended family or the group. Nepotism and favouritism are practiced to a large extent, and it is taken for granted that the family, tribe or the political party members should get priority in treatment.

3. There is inadequate concern for punctuality and time constraints. More importance is given to relationships than to time in the government offices.

Recognition of such cultural shortcomings should make possible the development of a forward-looking adaptable and flexible approach. Managers need to be able to adapt, co-operate and change their attitudes to:

1. Balancing organisation and individual needs and interests.

2. Saying no to inappropriate requests.

3. Avoiding conflict of interest.


5. Ensuring employees participation and involvement.

6. Using power appropriately.

[Michael J. Marquardt and Dean W. Engel, 1993: 297].
New Developments in Management Techniques

Capability and strength of the MSOs is an essential factor for the success of this recommended model. A majority of the interviewees recommended that the content of the MS training programmes should expand to include the new developments in management techniques.

Techniques which the researcher believes to be suitable to the present Sudanese circumstances and actual work situation include the following:

1. Islamic Management Systems

A new development which might affect the MS activity in the Sudan is the introduction of the Islamic Shari'a. The Islamic management and its principles are very much becoming a part of the country's laws, business relations and social customs. Therefore, considering the Islamic values in this recommended model and putting them into practice is important, as the Shari'a governs all aspects of social, political and economic attitudes and behaviour.

2. Human Resource Management (HRM): This is described by R. Harrison as: "The overall and coherent long-term planning and monitoring of organisation's human resources so as to gain from them the maximum added value and best position them to achieve the organisation's corporate goals and mission" [Harisson, R, 1993: 36 in the Human Resource Management Foundation Course Workbook, 1994-1995: 8, MBA Programme, Durham University, Business School].
3. **Total Quality Management (TQM):** Continuously meeting agreed customer requirements at the lowest cost, by releasing the potential of all employees.

4. **Systems analysis and Design:** fitting the job to the computer.

5. **Network analysis:** a project-based planning aid.

6. **Operational Research:** the application of mathematics to management problems.

7. **Quality control:** control and advice of production quality within economic limits.

8. **Value analysis:** a procedure for reducing the cost of components without affecting value.
Evaluation of the DMSU programme

A system of an actual (realistic) evaluation programme for the impact of the DMSUs on the public service should be introduced. Many of the evaluators who evaluated the earlier programme pointed to impressive achievements (discussed in chapter 2). However, these achievements were not accompanied by meaningful public management improvement and strengthening of the institutions which were supposed to sustain the reform process. (This means that the evaluations did not cover all the critical elements). It seems that the DMSU programme lacked proper evaluation. Appropriate performance indicators and means of measuring the results were also non-existent.

Some departments, such as the Telecommunications Corporation, evaluated the success of their DMSUs from a single measure like the savings the units achieved in money terms. However, the DMSUs had multiple objectives and provided a variety of much needed services which were difficult to measure, except perhaps in the long term. (For example, savings in time, space or material spent on improvement to existing jobs or activities; innovation of new systems, new structures...etc.)

As far as this recommendation is concerned, it is not easy to propose how the DMSU programme could be evaluated as there is no one right way to evaluate them. Management services officers and top management, together with the CBAR, need to invent an evaluation system which could be appropriate to their needs and based upon proven principles of evaluation. Guidance could be gained from these words, "performance assessment should be forward-looking, supportive and collaborative rather than past-oriented and punitive. It should encourage learning, innovation, creativity and diligence in adjusting individual and unit activities to meet agency objectives." [Dennis A. Rondinelli, 1994: 477].

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Implementation of the Recommended Model

It was mentioned earlier that the recommendations are divided into short-term and long-term solutions. The move from the former to the latter requires a suitable progressive transformation. Moreover, as was argued earlier, the MS function should be binding on all public service departments and the recommendations of the DMSUs be forcibly implemented (chapter 4).

To begin with, an agreement between the DMSUs and the concerned organisations needs to be made, clearly defining what should be achieved and the establishment of measures to monitor the achievements. According to Harris (1991), this agreement, if carried out on a regular basis, can be an educative experience for both MSOs and top management.

After a period of time (say five years), the MS function is expected to be understood and appreciated. Then a move could be made from the directive (authoritative/binding) stage to a participative style. To reach this point, objectives of the DMSUs need to be written up in key result area terms (a checklist), in order to monitor the progress and evaluate the achievement in a regular form. Factors to be taken into consideration (for judgment of the progress) may include the following:

1. Level of Top Management Support

   a. Improvement in MSOs / top and middle management relationships (by observing their feelings and attitudes towards the DMSU programme [Swartz and Lippitt (1975) in Harris (1991)].

   b. Degree of commitment to change.
c. Improvement (increase) in number of recommendations accepted, and implemented and in success rates.

2. Organisation's Receptivity to MS

a. Adequacy of the budget and the resources allocated to the DMSUs.

b. Location of the DMSUs in the structure of the organisations.

c. Development (innovation) of new systems and new structures.

3. Others

a. Improvement in time or material spent on improvement to existing jobs.

b. Improvement in the spirit and morale of the MSOs.

c. Decrease in operating cost.

d. Improvement in customer satisfaction.

Figure (22) below shows the progressive transformation from the authoritative style to the participative style.

Figure (22): Progressive implementation of the recommended Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2000</td>
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- Short Term
  - Low Cost Directive (Authoritative)

- Long Term
  - High Cost Participative
3. Conclusion

The proposals mentioned above aim at the revival, sustainability and effectiveness of the DMSU programme. They will only be effective if co-ordination is maintained at all levels. All individuals involved one way or the other should cooperate and participate. No one should escape this challenge. The political authorities, top management, senior officials, bureaucrats, and the public (citizens) - all have their part to play in placing administrative reform theory and practice in closer relation with each other and in closer touch with the realities of the public service.

The possibilities of success for the management services function in the Sudan would be stronger if the programme is introduced as part of a whole strategy, when the programme becomes part of a simultaneous and comprehensive strategy to reform the entire governmental system and practices (as discussed earlier).

The impact of the DMSUs depends upon the value the top management and the senior government employees place upon the management services function, and the credibility the MSOs can establish in the day-to-day and face to face dealings during the course of assignments and projects.
References


This study is based on primary sources, mainly files of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR), the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences (SAAS) and the Civil Service Department. This bibliography contains items which have been consulted but have not necessarily been explicitly referred to in the text.

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The following is an English translation of the Letter, the researcher has sent to the Under-Secretaries and the top Management in Khartoum. August (1993).

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

Sayyed: ............................................................
Assalamu Alykum wa-Rahmatu Allah wa-Barakatu

I am carrying out a research study at the University of Durham in England in the field of Administrative Reform particularly the experience of the "Management Services Programme " in the Sudan Public Service.

I would much appreciate your opinions on certain issues relating to the DMSU programme. Issues such as the effectiveness of the DMSUs, problems confronted and suggestions for future outlook are to be discussed if you kindly spare me some time and make the necessary arrangements (at your convenience) to have me in your office. Thanks for your co-operation.

Mohyeldin Siddig Abdalla.
Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences, Khartoum.
Appendix (2)

HYPOTHETICAL ORGANIZATION OF A CENTRAL O AND M UNIT

[UN Handbook, 1979: 63]
Appendix (3) Presidential Decree No. 160, dated 11 April 1976

PRESIDENTIAL ORDER No. 160

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

General Secretariat

Presidential Resolutions

11 April 1976

160 — Departmental Management Services Units Programme:—

Further to resolution No. 663 dated 9.1.1974:

After considering the memorandum No. MPSAR/15/Y/7 dated 11.3.1976 submitted by H. E. The Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform, regarding Departmental Management Services Units programme:

Referring to the deliberations of the honourable Council of Ministers in its meeting No. 6 on 11.4.1976:

And in accordance with the government policy aiming at the continuous modernization and the revolutionization of the administrative methods and procedures, to cope with the national plans and programmes in different fields.

H. E. the First Vice-President has approved the following:—

1. Establishing Departmental Management Services Units in all central government units, in the Southern Region, People's local government and public corporations.

2. Securing the necessary facilities for these units to enable them to undertake the activities assigned.

3. The training plan referred to in para: — No. 6, of the memorandum, mentioned above.

4. That training priorities should be given to persons who work in the Management Services Units for 3 to 5 years.

It remains the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform to communicate with the other units with a view to implementing this resolution.
Appendix (3)  Presidential Decree No. 160, dated 11 April 1976

١٦٠ - مشروع وحدات الخدمات الإدارية والصلحية

الحائض للقرار رقم ٦٦٣ بتاريخ ١٩٧٦/١/١

وبعد الإطلاع على مذكرة السيد / وزير الخدمة العامة والإصلاح الإداري رقم
١٥١٠/٥/١٥٥ بتاريخ ١٩٧٦/٢/٢ حتی مشروع وحدات الخدمات الإدارية
والصلحية.

بالرجوع الى مسؤولات مجلس الوزراء الوطن في اجتماعه رقم (٥) بتاريخ
١٩٧٦/٤/١١

وتنشأ على سياسة حكومة الثورة الازمة إلى التحديث المستمر في الأساليب
الإدارية وتثويرها وواكبا الخطط والبرامج القومية في مختلف المجالات.

وافق السيد / النائب الأول لرئيس الجمهورية على الآتي:

أولاً: إنشاء وحدات الخدمات الإدارية والصلحية في جميع أجهزة الحكومة المركزية
والإقليمية والحكم الشعبي المحلي والجهات والمؤسسات العامة.

ثانياً: توفير الإمكانيات اللازمة لتمكين هؤلاء الوحدات من إداء الواجب الناشطة بها.

ثالثاً: خطة التدريب في المستقبل والوارد في الفترة (١) من المذكرة المشار بها في
صدر هذا القرار.

رابعاً: اعطاء الاستقیة في التدريب والبحث في الأشخاص الذين يعملون في
وحدات الخدمات الإدارية لفترات ثلاثة إلى خمس سنوات بمصالحهم.

وعلی وزارة الخدمة العامة والإصلاح الإداری الاتصال بالوزارات
والجهات المعنيه الأخرى لتكتمل الاجراءات.
Appendix (4)

NOTE OF ACTION AGREED BY CSD

IN RELATION TO CREATION OF POSTS FOR DMSUS

MEETING WITH CSD ON 18 DEC 1978

1. Present

Sayed Hyder Kabsoon  Dir. Gen. of CSD
" Farah
Dr. Ahmed Hag Hussein Acting Dir. of GDOAR
Mr. Noel Floate RIPA Adviser in Management Services
Mr. H.H. Curtis ODM Consultant, evaluating the DMSU programme.

2. Discussion

The problems of creation of posts, promotion and careers of officers in DMSUs were discussed as well as the question of competition for senior DMSU posts.

3. Summary of Agreed Action

The Director of Establishments, the Director General of the Civil Service Department and the Director of the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform agreed the following:

a. Sufficient posts will be created in departments where Management Services Units are being established.

b. The Head of each DMSU should be a senior officer, at least equivalent to the General Director of Administration in each department. This means the creation of several GP V and GP VII posts, and occasionally even a GP III post where there is a clear need.

c. These senior posts in DMSUs should be competed for openly. However, the job specification will naturally require training and experience in Management Services. Therefore it is expected that serving Management Services Officers will do well in such competitions. Where, however, another outstanding officer is seen to be the best choice in all fairness and in strict compliance with Civil Service regulations, after the CSD agrees, such an officer can fill the senior DMSU posts on condition he successfully completes the training programmes which GDOAR have established for Management Services Officers.

d. In the case of senior Management Services Officers filling established DMSU posts above their own scales, they will be considered as acting in the senior grades; and as long as they fill the related posts will be paid an allowance to make up the differ-
ence between their own scales and the more senior graded posts they may be occupying temporarily.

e. The policy for DMSUs is that generally officers will fill DMSU posts for 3 to 5 years, thus avoiding stagnation. The DMSU's work will be enriched by fresh officers being trained and brought into the DMSU and equally those moving back into the field from DMSUs will have had thorough training and a very valuable management development experience. This will assist in succession planning by enlarging the pool of middle level officers who have the potential and practical capabilities to fill more senior posts in the future.

f. No officer should be at a disadvantage in his career in relation to the other officers in his cadre or list because he serves in a DMSU.

g. There may be a small number of officers who, because of their aptitude and/or any specialist training in demanding areas such as Operational Research, Systems Analysis, etc, may stay in DMSUs much longer than 5 years.

h. There will be closer co-operation between GDOAR, Establishments and the Bureau for Job Evaluation.

j. With regard to Job Evaluation, any sample evaluation already made of DMSU jobs may be misleading because in general most of the officers now filling such posts are too junior and might not have done justice to their jobs (as they ought to be) when completing questionnaires and attending interviews. The Bureau will pay particular attention to this now or during the second phase of the implementation of job evaluation.

k. The Director of Establishments, with the authority of the Director General of GSD will circulate these important points throughout the Public Service, with copies to the Heads of DMSU, and the GDOAR.

l. The Bureau of Public Corporations will be requested to do the same with the back-up of GSD.

m. The DMSU programme is still in its infancy, in the years to come a dynamic and flexible approach is necessary to build this new service into an effective and permanent service which is an essential need for the Sudan Public Service and authorised to be established in accordance with Presidential decree No. 160 dated April 1976.
Appendix (5)

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF CSD LETTER

REFERRING TO CREATION OF POSTS FOR MSOs

Addressed to: All Under Secretaries
All Directors of Public Corporations

MANAGEMENT SERVICES UNITS

Because of the importance of the work of MSUs and its connection with the improvement of performance and increase of employees' productivity in the Public Service, a meeting was arranged to discuss the matter with the Director of the G.D.O.A.R. at the Ministry Headquarters and it was decided that it is necessary to write to the Under Secretaries and the heads of units indicating certain aspects for more concern from those Under Secretaries and Directors of Government Corporations for the role of the units, their organisation and the career future of those working in them. The objectives were to promote Management Services Units (MSUs) and allow those in charge of it to conduct and promote its responsibilities effectively and positively. The achievement of such aims require the following:

(1) Conducting of studies for the needs of MSUs of certain posts and the fixing of their scales including that of the unit head in the light of the volume of work in the ministries and departments concerned and in accordance with their organisation to allow effective leadership for units working in a pioneering domain and needing enormous effort. This should also be viewed within the framework of a general review of organisational and job structures in the second phase of the present plan of Job Evaluation.

(2) In order not to put those who operate the MSUs at a disadvantage by restricting their progress within the framework of specialised jobs, they would have the right to compete with others to occupy vacant positions within the framework of the job hierarchy of the group to which they originally belonged. The posts for Management Services Officers would consequently be subject to competition with others, having in mind and consideration the nature of the work and what it requires in terms of certain qualifications and certain individual characteristics.

(3) Those working in MSUs should continue in their jobs for a period of three to five years to lead those units and to gain the required scientific and practical experience to enrich the administrative work in their mother units after they are back to their original positions. The period of work for this group may exceed five years in the case of competent officers who have taken special training in the area of operational or analytical research when the needs demand their continuation in their specialised work for a longer period, and it is proved that this is for the general benefit of all.
(4) When the Management Services Officer is conducting the work of a higher (vacant) post than his, he is going to have the salary of the superior job, the difference between the two salaries would be considered an uncounted increment for pension. In case he is conducting the work of a higher job for the absence of its occupant and for reasons allowing for provisions to temporary replacement, he is going to have the increment by the rate allocated to those in his occupational scale.

(5) A Management Services Officer should not be at a disadvantage as far as occupational opportunities are concerned because of his or her belonging to this group and that means he should be treated equally with his colleagues of the same occupational level and hierarchy.

We hope now that we have shown the importance of the role of MSUs and the necessity of guarding the rights and occupational future of those working in them so that those, selected to work in such a pioneering area are aware of their career future.

(Sd) Hyder M. Kabsoun
Director General
Civil Service Department

Feb. 1979
Appendix (6)

LIST OF ORGANISATIONS WITH DMSUs AS AT APRIL 1979

CENTRAL MINISTRIES

1 Ministry of Culture & Information
2 Ministry of Construction & Public Works
3 Housing Department (Ministry of Construction & Public Works)
4 Ministry of Agriculture, Food & Natural Resources
5 Ministry of Education & Guidance
6 Ministry of Co-operation, Commerce & Supply
7 Ministry of Health
8 Labour Department (Ministry of Public Service & Administrative Reform)
9 General Staff Administration (Ministry of Public Service & Administrative Reform)
10 General Directorate of Organisation & Administrative Reform (Ministry of Public Service & Administrative Reform)
11 Civil Service Department (Ministry of Public Service & Administrative Reform)
12 Budgets Administration (Ministry of Finance & National Economy)
13 Accounts Administration (Ministry of Finance & National Economy)
14 Stores & Equipment Department (Ministry of Finance & National Economy)
15 Customs & Excise Duty (Ministry of Finance & National Economy)
16 Department of Taxation (Ministry of Finance & National Economy)
17 Mechanical Transport Department (Ministry of Transport)
18 Ministry of Industry
19 Council of Ministers
20 Khartoum Polytechnic

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

21 Rural Water
22 Sudan Railways
23 Sudan Airways
24 State Trading
25 Industrial Production
26 Central Electricity & Water
27 River Transport
28 Sudan Sea Ports
29 Sugar Trading
30 Sugar Production
31 Post & Telegraph
32 Telecommunications
33 Social Insurance
34 Khartoum Province Transport Company
35 Agricultural Production
36 Bank of Sudan
37 Peoples Co-operative Bank
38 Spinning & Weaving
39 Leather & Plastics
40 Sudan Oil Seeds
41 Tourism & Hotels

PEOPLE'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT

42 Bureau of People's Local Government Affairs
43 Khartoum Province
44 Kassala Province
45 White Nile Province

SOUTHERN REGION

46 Regional Ministry of Public Service & Administrative Reform
Appendix (7)

COPY OF MPSAR'S LETTER TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY

REFERENCE MR. H.H. CURTIS' REPORT OF DECEMBER 1978

MPSAR/50/D/15/19

14th March 1979

His Excellency,
Mr. D.C. Carden, C.M.G.
H.B.M. Ambassador,
Khartoum

Dear Ambassador,

...Mr. H.H. Curtis's Report on DMSUs, December '79...

Thank you for your letter reference TAS 016/2 dated 3rd Feb. 1979 inviting my comments on the recommendations in Mr. Harry Curtis's report on Departmental Management Services Units in the Sudan.

It is reassuring to learn from Mr. Curtis's objective evaluation, using the methods outlined in paras 06 and 07, that the current evidence as stated in paras 08 and 09 is that "DMSUs have succeeded beyond expectations in meeting the challenge" and that "there is no doubt about the usefulness of their work".

The report rightly draws attention to weaknesses of which we are aware, and in the difficult circumstances prevailing exceptional measures are needed to strengthen the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform in its overall executive responsibility for implementing and following-up the national programme of establishing DMSUs nation-wide. The burden it has borne with respect to the essential training of Management Services Officers, in addition to the far-reaching technical and administrative support which it is essential for GEOAR to provide, is now too much for it to shoulder. Hence the institutional responsibility for effective professional training is to be transferred to the new Management Services Centre (MSC) which is being established within the organisation of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA). We are conscious that great care is now needed to ensure that the GEOAR is not weakened further. On the contrary it needs to be strengthened even more, together with the strong institutional support of the new MSC. We agree with the report that the objectives and organisation of the GEOAR need to be reviewed and that it should be properly staffed.

It is recognised that despite the exceptional successes to date, the programme is now at a "watershed" and at this crucial stage the maximum of assistance will be needed.
In the light of the various recommendations made in Mr. Curtis' report we do look forward to continued United Kingdom Technical Assistance over the next few years in order to strengthen the programme of Management Services Units. We are most grateful for the assistance provided to date which has played a major part in making it possible to make a breakthrough with the programme which is affecting the entire Public Service.

I am writing to Your Excellency separately confirming agreed assistance and requesting further assistance in line with the recommendations made in the relevant reports.

Yours sincerely,

Karamalla El Awad
Minister of Public Service & Administrative Reform

Copy to:-

Mr. Rex Baker
The Representative
British Council
Khartoum.
### The Old (previous) Application Form for Issuing a Passport

**Applicant's Details**

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**Additional Information**

- **Name after marriage**
- **Father's name**
- **Mother's name**
- **Name before marriage**
- **Profession or occupation**
- **Place of residence**
- **Height**
- **Weight**
- **Place of origin or birth**
- **Place of marriage or birth**
- **Race/color of hair**
- **Features of applicant**

**Signature of Applicant**

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The application must be signed by the applicant. Any application that is not signed will not be processed.
Appendix (9) The New (Improved) Application Form for Issuing a Passport

جمهورية السودان
وزارة الداخلية
إدارة الجواز السودانى
البيان الكاذب يكون جريمة تحت قانون العقوبات
الشاهد ملزم بدفع نفقات عودة حامل الجواز إذا عجز عن ذلك

1- الاسم « رياعى »
2- المهنة
3- تاريخ الميلاد
4- مكان الميلاد
5- رقم الجواز السابق
6- اسم الشاهد
7- وقائع الطالب
8- رمز الجنسية
9- الموقع
10- تاريخ طلب جواز سوداني
11- مكان

بةً ضeq طبقاً للبنين 6 من اللائحة
# The New Arrangement for Umrah Performance Application

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Note: The table above represents the new arrangement for Umrah performance application with specific dates and references.
Appendix (11) Organisation Structure of the CBAR

وكيل أول الجهاز

المستشفى العام

الزراعة العامة

الزراعة العامة

الزراعة العامة

الزراعة العامة

المياه والصرف الصحي

المياه والصرف الصحي

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DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIC COURSE FOR MANAGEMENT ANALYSTS

DEFINITION

Management Analysis is concerned with identifying and solving management problems. There are a wide range of techniques available to the management analyst, most of which are referred to under the collective title of Management Services (MS).

PARTICIPANTS

The 11 weeks course is for selected Sudanese officials to undergo initial training to become Management Services Officers (MSOs) as part of the Departmental Management Services Units Programme (DMSUs).

PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE

(a) To give participants a detailed knowledge of selected techniques in order that they can undertake MS assignments.
(b) To include sufficient practical participation and involvement to enable participants to practise with confidence these techniques as members of a Management Services Unit.
(c) To provide an appreciation of additional techniques of which the participants need to be aware.
(d) To enable participants to play a leading role in developing the use of these techniques in their own Ministry, Corporation or Department.
(e) To provide practical training projects of three weeks duration in their own or other selected organisations, which challenge and develop participants by requiring them to practise what they have learnt under supervision.

COURSE STRUCTURE

Weeks 1 & 2: Principles and Practice of Management

After the opening address and introduction to the course, the Principles and Practice of Management are covered with particular reference to the role MSOs play in the improvement process. Each management function is examined and the knowledge gained is reinforced by practical involvement in exercises, discussion and case histories.
Week 1: Public Speaking

The ability to communicate effectively when presenting assignment proposals to line management is essential to an MSO if recommendations are to be accepted. Participants are taught the necessary skills for Public Speaking and throughout the course everyone is given at least one opportunity to practise in a friendly environment.

Week 2: Interviewing

The gathering of information is essential to record all the facts. Participants are shown how to conduct a fact finding interview by a formal lecture session, film and demonstration. They are then given the opportunity to practise interviewing.

Week 2: Job Evaluation

Job Evaluation is the process of analysing and assessing the content of jobs in order to place them in an acceptable rank order which can then be used as a basis for a remuneration system. Participants receive an appreciation of Job Evaluation with reference to the Sudanese experience of its application. This follows the treatment of Job Descriptions for more effective control by management.

Week 2: Principles of Management by Objectives (MbO)

During this session a system which seeks to integrate the organisation's need to achieve its objectives with the manager's need to contribute himself is examined. The important discipline of setting objectives is stressed. It is not intended that participants try to install an MbO system as such.

Week 2: Introduction to O&M and Work Study

A day is spent introducing participants to the two main areas of study included in the course. The concept of a systematic approach to administrative and management problems in order to produce improvements is emphasised. Participants are introduced to the systematic approach which forms the basis of many management services techniques. Select the work to be studied. Record all the facts. Examine these critically. Develop the most practical method. Define the new method. Install, and maintain it as standard practice.

Week 2: Report Writing

Although MSOs are to keep line managers informed continually through consultation, the first formal notification of improvements recommended at the end of an assignment is a report. Participants are taught how to produce an action report that is easily understood and leads to a definite course of action being undertaken if accepted.
Week 3: Critical Examination of Work

Participants are shown how a formalised questioning technique can lead to the development of a better method. This is the essential part of the critical approach to achieve improvements. It encourages initiative and creative thinking in the pursuit of the best method.

Weeks 3 & 4: Charting Techniques

Recording information in narrative form does not always facilitate analysis. Techniques are shown that enable participants to examine and demonstrate methods and procedures, the movement and time taken in operations. These cover outline process charts, flow process charts, flow diagrams, string diagrams, travel charts and multiple activity charts.

Week 5: Assignment Planning & Control

A day is spent stressing the need for MSOs to plan and control their assignments when they start practising MS after their training.

Week 5: Work Measurement

After an introduction to this topic, participants are taught how to compile a standard time. This is only an appreciation of Time Study. More course time would be required to obtain proficiency in Rating and Time Study. However, an extremely useful and readily applied work measurement technique, Activity Sampling, is covered. Participants become practitioners after a short period of instruction and a practical training study.

Weeks 6 & 7: Office Systems

The examination and improvement of office systems can greatly improve administrative efficiency. One day is spent on the design of forms and their control. Office Planning and Layout is covered in three days, Filing and Registration Systems in two days.

Week 6: Statistics

The effective presentation and interpretation of statistical data is taught, without entering into the mathematical foundation of statistical formulae.

Week 7: Evaluation of Costs & Savings

One day is devoted to the important subject of costing. Emphasis is given to the costing of proposals and savings, and controls needed to monitor the progress of implementation.
Week 7: Supply Management

The purchase, storage and distribution of materials is an essential part of an organisation's activities. An appreciation of methods of improving such activities is provided.

Weeks 7 & 8: Case Study

Before attempting their practical projects, participants tackle a case study where techniques and methods covered throughout the course can be applied to a problem. It is an essential part of the course as it offers participants an opportunity to clarify any difficulties they may have and to receive guidance from the Course Tutors.

Week 8: Problems Facing Newly Trained MSOs and the Role of GDOAR

This is an opportunity for participants to hear of existing problems and discuss these and any others they may envisage. The role of the General Directorate of Organisation & Administrative Reform (GDOAR) is explained.

Week 8: In-Service Training

Since MSOs often need to identify training needs as well as recommend specific training in the course of their assignment work, the systematic approach to training is covered.

Week 8: Visits to Currently Active DMSUs

In this week arrangements are made for groups of participants to visit a selection of active DMSUs.

Weeks 8, 9, 10 & 11: Practical Training Projects

About 2½ weeks are devoted to practical projects in participants own, or other selected organisations, for teams of about 3/4 persons each. This is a very important part of the training. Clear terms of reference are agreed and given to the project teams who then proceed with their assignments under supervision from the Course Tutors. These projects are intended to be the culmination of training when course members put their Management Services knowledge into practice. It is essential that at the end of the project a clear, logical report is produced based on the facts gathered.

Weeks 11 & 12: Check Reports & Prepare for Report Presentation Conference

It is the responsibility of each team, once the report has been passed for typing, to assist each typist, to prepare appendices where necessary and to check the whole report. The team can also prepare the visual aids and presentation for the Report Conference.
Week 12: Report Presentation Conference

Each team presents its findings from the practical training projects. Members of the host organisations are present and will comment on the findings and recommendations. In addition Course Tutors provide constructive criticism. This is an important learning opportunity for the whole course.

Week 12: Course Evaluation

On the final day participants evaluate the course.

TRAINING METHODS

The treatment of topics in the various sessions is indicated in the detailed course programme. The methods used include lectures, discussions, films, case studies, role play, case histories, exercises, seminars and specific projects in real-life management situations. The emphasis throughout is on practical participation and involvement of course members.

HOMEWORK

Time has been allocated in the programme for practical exercises that can be undertaken with the guidance of Course Tutors. However, it may be felt necessary to extend the number of exercises or complete exercises outside course hours in order that participants understand the related topics. In these cases homework may be required. In order to minimise this it is important that participants utilise all available time to complete the exercises in course hours. Homework must be completed by the time specified.

COURSE HOURS

It is essential for the effective conduct of the course, as planned, that the following course times are kept strictly.
8.30 - 9.30, 10.00 - 11.00, 11.15 - 12.15, 12.30 - 1.30 (may be extended occasionally).

COURSE CERTIFICATES

Certificates are issued to participants who attend regularly and participate satisfactorily in the full range of training activities.

TRAINING STAFF

The training officers responsible for the course are the permanent staff of the MSC who will do most of the instruction. In addition visiting lecturers will also participate.
Appendix (14)

ASSIGNMENTS CONDUCTED BY SUDANESE OFFICERS ON THE FIRST RIPA ADVANCED COURSE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, MAY-JULY 1975

1. A list of the assignments undertaken by Sudanese Management Services Officers during their RIPA Advanced Course in London held from 31 May - 25 July 1975 is provided below. The management of the host organisations indicated that they would implement about 80% of the recommendations made, overall. This is very creditable by any standards and is evidence of the importance attached to their work by these organisations, where the projects were conducted.

a. Norfolk Area Health Authority

Investigation of the inter-relationships between the departments of the Norfolk Area Health Authority, with reference to the siting of these departments within the constraints of existing accommodation with a view to improving their relations.

b. Eastern Gas Corporation, Norfolk Region

Examination of the clerical and administrative procedures involved in the Area Customer Service operations as they affected the Customer Service Sector Clerks in two specified work units.

c. County Secretary's Department, Norfolk County Council

The assignment took place within the internal administrative section of the County Secretary's Department and involved examining the responsibilities, duties and procedures in the Reception, Filing and Mailing Sections. It was necessary to give special attention to:

(1) The central receipt of mail into the County Hall.

(2) The process of distribution to all Departments and the Subsequent sub-sorting required by the County Secretary's Department amongst its own sections.

(3) The procedures involved in the collating and despatch of outgoing mail.

(4) The system of retention, retrieval and distribution of files in the central filing section.

(5) The duties undertaken by the staff in the Reception Office and any impingement that might occur on other areas of activity within the administrative function.

The team was expected to draw attention to the strengths as well as any weakness in the systems and make suggestions for improvements that were possible. (In the existing economic climate, capital expenditure was ruled out unless it could be recouped within the financial year ending 31st March 1976).
d. Norwich City Council, Housing Repairs Section

(1) Examination of the administrative procedures and methods used to identify, collate, classify, organise and control the work carried out in relation to repairs of the Council's property.

(2) Defining the objectives of the Section, considering special features of the present system.

(3) Listing the faults and shortcomings of the system and recommending improved procedures as indicated from critical examination of the information collected.

e. Norwich City Council, City Treasurer's Department

(1) Interviewing the staff of the Markets Division and drawing up full job descriptions for each of the 21 staff posts in agreement with Management and individual post holders.

(2) Resulting from these interviews, the production of an updated organisation chart.

f. University of East Anglia

Review of the Purchasing office procedures to make recommendations which could improve those procedures and working relationships, determining more clearly the responsibilities of the staff. Particular attention was required with regard to:

(1) Maintenance contracts.

(2) Quotations for goods and services required.

(3) The reporting of price changes.

g. Smedly IIP Foods Limited

Investigation of the clerical procedures used to record the receipt of seasonal raw materials at a canning factory (and the subsequent processing of this information at Company Head Office) to determine:

(1) The existing methods used, the information recorded and the purpose of this information.

(2) The effectiveness of the existing procedures.

(3) Improvements that could be made to the existing procedures which would eliminate or reduce highlighted disadvantages.
"MANAGING A DMSU" COURSE, KHARTOUM

Notes for Directing Staff

1. This short course of one week's duration is being arranged as one in a series for up to 12 Heads of existing DMSU's each time. It is in the interest of consolidation in the context of the national DMSU programme. The purpose of the course is clearly stated in the "Joining Instructions" for participants. You are requested to kindly read through the "Joining Instructions", which include the course programme, the dates and specific instructions to participants for pre-course preparation. The nature of the course is very practical. All the instruction, discussion and written work should lead to action on the part of each participant and on the part of GDOAR to follow-up specific items which may help to solve the problems of DMSU's represented on the course. By the end of the course each participant is expected to have completed an action plan for the more effective management of his DMSU in the light of the instruction received, the ample discussions intended and the syndicate work. All directing staff are requested to participate with this total, integrated objective in mind throughout the course.

2. The elements of the course are:

(a) Identification of real improvement needs in each participant's Department;
(b) Gaining recognition for MS work and the co-operation of top management and other staff;
(c) Systematic control of on-going assignments;
(d) Maintaining systematic records and internal office practice in the DMSU;
(e) Proper management of the MSO's in the DMSU - creation of posts, delegation, use of time, day-to-day job practice, job descriptions for MSO's, specialist training needs careers of individual officers;
(f) Forward planning of assignments and other improvement activities;
(g) The scope of work for DMSU's as a general improvement capability at the disposal of top managers;
(h) The role of the General Directorate of Organisation and Administrative Reform (GDOAR) in relation to the whole DMSU programme and its relationship with the specific units represented on the course;
(j) The role of the proposed Management Services Centre (MSC);
(k) The proposed "Association of Management Services Officers" and the exchange of information among existing DMSU's;
(l) Contributing to the whole DMSU programme promoting it as a whole;
(m) Discussion of problems and finding ways to do the best possible within constraints which cannot easily be eliminated;
(n) Each participant's completion of a live "action plan" by the end of the course, which he will use to manage his DMSU more effectively.
JOINING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS

1. Purpose of Course

The purpose of the course is to re-inforce the importance of planning, organising and controlling the Management Services function in departments where DMSU's exist, with particular emphasis on its introduction and consolidation as a new service to departments. It is for Heads of DMSU's and is intended to motivate them to proceed more vigorously with the management of their respective Management Services Units and provide them with instruction and information to bring them up to date. By the end of the course participants will be required to prepare specific action plans for the on-going work of their respective DMSU's.

2. Pre-course Preparation

These joining instructions, including the course programme will be sent to participants at least 2 weeks before the commencement of the course to enable them to complete specific pre-course preparation. Each participant is expected to complete very carefully pages 2 to 15 which are attached according to the simple instructions provided for each section. During the course these documents will be discussed so that they will be able to prepare individual action plans by the end of the course which they may then use to manage their respective units more effectively (see page 17).
Staff of the DMSU

Please find enclosed a separate form which lists the staff trained as Management Services Officers (MSO's) for your department. You are requested to check the information and amend it wherever appropriate so that it is accurate and up to date.

(Separate form enclosed for data on staff)
Please list all the specific assignments and any other improvement activities which have been done in your DMSU since it started, including the very first training project where appropriate. Comment on the degree of implementation and make any other relevant comments against each item. Attach additional sheets if necessary; but be as brief and precise as possible.

**List of Assignments/Other Improvement Activities**

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<th>Remarks</th>
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(Continuation sheets provided)
List of Current Assignments and Other Improvement Work (Attach additional sheets if necessary)

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List below the areas in which you perceive your DMSU can undertake improvement work of a general nature and by specific assignments in your department if you were to be given authority to pursue them.

**List of Assignments/Other Improvement Work**

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Further Training Needs for Your DMSU

Please list below additional training needs you consider exist for the most effective performance of your DMSU. This must be carefully considered. Do not enter requirements if you really are not sure. Wherever possible name those officers who need training in the "Remarks" column.

Training Needs

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<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>No. to be Trained</th>
<th>Remarks (stating why these needs exist)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Basic Management Analysts Course, Khartoum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Management Analysts Course in London or in the Institute of Management Services, Khartoum</td>
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<td>Any other Specialist Training (be specific)</td>
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Constraints

List below the problems facing you and your DMSU which you consider may hinder your work in Management Services and make any suggestions which you think can help to eliminate or minimise the constraints on your work.

Problems

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<td>Introduction to the Course.</td>
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<td>Identification of Real Needs in Departments.</td>
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<td>Managing the Staff of a DMSU.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Submission of Action Plans and Discussion</td>
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ACTION PLAN FOR THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE DMSU IN

Each participant is required to prepare an action plan for the more effective management of his DMSU to be used by him after the course. The plan should indicate specific action he plans to take under the following headings:

(1) Systematic control of current assignments.
(2) Identification of improvement needs in his department.
(3) Forward plans for assignments and other improvement services his DMSU will seek to do for the next six months including the promotion of actual implementation of improvements.
(4) Plans for better internal office management in his DMSU.
(5) The training needs of his DMSU.
(6) The management of the other MSO's in his DMSU.
(7) Steps he will take to promote Management Services appreciation in his department.
(8) His DMSU's planned contribution to the DMSU programme as a whole.
(9) His planned action to assist GDOAR in its follow-up role.
(10) Steps to be taken to overcome outstanding problems.
Appendix (16) Role of the Management Services Centre

Role of the MSC

3.1 The aims of the centre will be:

(a) To train adequate numbers of suitable personnel to staff the DMSUs in the Public Service, by consolidating existing DMSUs and catering for new ones required.

(b) To offer advanced training locally to Management Services officers practising in DMSUs, who have not had any other opportunity of training beyond the basic course.

(c) To develop specialist consultancy and training capability in specific areas of Management Services including: O & M; Work Study; Project Planning and Co-ordination; Network Analysis; Systems Analysis; Data Processing; Organisation Development; Operations Research; Supply Management; Training Development.

(d) To act as the professional focus for the newly emerging Management Services profession in the Sudan by encouraging professional association of practitioners, publishing material about the events and developments in this type of work in the Sudan, cultivating appropriate professional contacts internationally, acting as an examination centre for further professional qualifications in due course.
3.10 Proposed Outline Organisation Chart for the Management Services Centre

Minister of MPSAR

Director General of IPA

Under Secretary of MPSAR

Management Services

GDOAR Centre

Director of MSC

EEC Expert as Co-Director

Arabic Clerk/Typist

English Language Clerk/Typist

(Provided through EEC).

Training Programmes

Specialist Consultancy & Training Development

Basic Courses

Advanced Courses

Refresher Courses

Work Systems Study (O&M) Management at Research

Library

Typing Course

Training

Supply

On

Pool

Course

Secertaries

Training

Operational

Services

Aids

Services

Messenger Services

Canteen Services

3.11 Summary of Posts Proposed for MSC (not including messengers)

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<th>Post Reader</th>
<th>EEC Experts</th>
<th>Senior Lecturer</th>
<th>Lecturer</th>
<th>Asst Lecturer</th>
<th>Librarian</th>
<th>Clerks</th>
<th>Typists</th>
<th>Project Officer</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Meter Reader</th>
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[MPSAR, 1978]
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NOTES:

(a) In addition, about 12 seminars for 20 participants each time will be conducted per year.

(b) The intention is to replace the existing Advanced Courses held in London by equivalent Advanced Courses held at the Institute in Khartoum by 1981.

(c) After the 6 year period, the throughput should be about 200 per year to cater for the replacement of MSOs and the on-going, intensive courses on special techniques. This leaves room for developing more specialist courses which are bound to be needed and occasional Training Techniques Courses to replace the training of trainers in London.
Appendix (19) The Current Content of the Basic MS Course (1993/94)

Programme of the Basic MS Course

Legal Foundation and Administration

Period: 8/22/1993
Number: 41

Objectives:

* Improvement of employees' skills in the legal foundation and administration
  * To increase the employees' skills in the legal foundation and administration
  * To improve the employees' skills in the legal foundation and administration

Main Subjects:

* Introduction to Administration
  * Regulation and Legislation
  * General Administration
  * Administrative Affairs
  * General Administration
  * Administrative Affairs
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  * Administrative Affairs
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Roles of the Employees in the General Administration and the Council of Ministers

Chairman: Sheikh Moustafa Al-Qurayshy
Secretary: Sheikh Hamad Al-Sayyid

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| **الاستيعاب: القائمة الوظيفية** | **الاسم والرقم** |
| **السماح** 10-8-1971 | **الاسم والرقم** |
| **انتهازية الدعاوات** | **الاسم والرقم** |
| **انتهازي** | 10-8-1971 |
| **القائمة الإدارية** | **الاسم والرقم** |
| **انتهازي** | 10-8-1971 |
| **القائمة الإدارية** | **الاسم والرقم** |
| **انتهازي** | 10-8-1971 |
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| **انتهازي** | 10-8-1971 |

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الاسبوع السادس ٣٨/٥/١٩٣٦

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الملاحظ: هذه المعلومات غير محدثة أو غير دقيق. يرجى التحقق من الأرقام المسجلة مواقعًا أخرى.
Appendix (20) Presidential Resolution No. 807, dated 25 November 1981

:::

Presidential Resolution No. 807, dated 25 November 1981:

:::

By the President of the Republic

:::

On the basis of the resolution entrusted to the latter, and in accordance with the following:

:::


:::

As

:::

1 - Ministry of the Interior

2 - Ministry of the Interior and Internal Affairs

3 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Administration

4 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Development

5 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Planning

6 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Personnel

7 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Public Works

8 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Housing

9 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Education

10 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Health

11 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Economy

12 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Industry

13 - Ministry of the Interior and the Interior Communications

:::

President

:::

[Signature]

:::

Date: 1981

:::

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قرار جمهوري رقم (8) لسنة 1965

 بشأن إنشاء الوزارات المركزية

بهم الله الرحمن الرحيم

رئيس الجمهورية

بعد الإبلاغ على المادة 6 من الدستور قرر:

اسم القرار وبالعمل به

1 - يسري هذا القرار "قرار جمهوري بشأن إنشاء الوزارات المركزية" ويعمل به من تاريخ التوقيع عليه.

التفسير:

2 - الغاء القرار الجمهوري رقم (6) الصادر في التاسع من مايو 1972

إنشاء الوزارات المركزية

- تتكون الوزارات المركزية من:
  - وزارة الدفاع
  - وزارة الخارجية
  - وزارة الحكم الشعبي المحلي
  - وزارة المالية والاقتصاد الوطني
  - وزارة التربية
  - وزارة الزراعة والغذية والموارد الأساسية
  - وزارة الثقافة والإعلام
  - وزارة الصحة
  - وزارة النقل والمواصلات
  - وزارة المناخة
  - وزارة الداخلية
  - وزارة التشريع والادخار العامة
  - وزارة الخدمة العامة والإصلاح الإداري
  - ديوان النائب العام
  - وزارة الري والطاقة الكهربائية المائية

19/00

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وزيرة الثقافة والرياضة
الامامة العامة لflammatory سمر بالصدام
وزيرة الشباب والرياضة والرعاية الاجتماعية
لا يختصصاب

يرجى تبرير الامامات المحددة لقلب النافذة في طرحنا هذا القرار.

تكوين الامارات المركزية

ما لم ينص على خلاف ذلك، في هذا القرار تتكون الامارات المركزية
من المصلحة والإدارات والباشرة التابعة لها في تاريخ هذا القرار،
- تنشأ وزارة جديدة للشباب والرياضة ورعاية الاجتماعية وتقترب من
ادارة الشباب وإدارة الرياضة ومصلحة الرعاية الاجتماعية.

المصالح التابعة للامامة العامة لرئيس الجمهورية

- تتبع المصالح الآتية للامامة العامة لرئيس الجمهورية:
  أ) الحكومة المركزية
  ب) دار الوثائق المركزية
  ج) تتيح الامامة على مؤسسة السياحة والتنافس

صدر تمويني يقضي النصب في اليوم الثالث عشر من شهر محرم
سنة ١٤١٣، الموافق اليوم الخامس والعشرين من شهر يوليو،
سنة ١٩٩٣، م.

١٩٨٥، م.

(حةных)
رئيس الجمهورية

الملحق (صفحة ٣)