The political and economic role of trade, unions and associations in the Gaza strip 1967-1993

Al-Astal, Kamal Muhammad Muhammad

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KAMAL MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD AL-ASTAL

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

SEPTEMBER 1995
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To my country, Palestine
To the souls of my mother and father who passed away during doing my thesis
To my sincere and patient wife Samira for her continuous encouragement and kindness, and to my little children Tasnim and Nur for the time which I was supposed to devote to them.
The Transliteration Scheme for Arabic which is used in this Thesis

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KAMAL M.M. AL-ASTAL


Abstract

This thesis attempts to examine the political and economic role of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993. The main theme of analysis is based upon the assumption that these indigenous organizations showed a high degree of politicization.

The thesis discusses the unstable socio-economic-organizational-political-and legal setting in the Gaza Strip under the Israeli occupation which constituted a limit on the overall performance of the Palestinian organizations. Within this volatile setting, three main actors interacted: the trade unions and associations, the Israeli occupation authorities, and the Palestinian political factions.

The study gives a general review of the associations and non-governmental organizations working in the Gaza Strip and it examines the genesis of the Palestinian trade unionism and the trade unions in the Gaza Strip. These organizations constituted a Palestinian institutional-organizational national response and worked parallel to the occupation apparatus.

The thesis goes on to analyse the political role of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip through discussing: the nature of their relationship with the Israeli authorities; their relationship with the Palestinian political movements; their positions towards the uprising (intifada); and their attitudes towards the peace process.

The study argues further that the economic role of the trade unions and association was very limited compared to their political role. The loan programmes and economic activities of two lending organizations working the Gaza Strip are examined. The lending capacity of the credit organizations was less than US$10 million (the GDP of the Gaza Strip was about US$250 million in 1993). Most of their loans went to finance services, consumptive, and non-productive projects.

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Acknowledgements

The completion of this study would not have been possible without the assistance I have received from many dedicated people throughout the various stages of my work.

During the preparation of this thesis I consulted with, interviewed and contacted many people who provided invaluable assistance in my work, in England, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Tunisia, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Jerusalem. To these people I extend my deep thanks and gratitude.

First and foremost, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere and deep gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Tim Niblock, Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at the University of Durham, who throughout the work gave helpful advice and constructive guidance, and devoted great deal of his precious time to reading and commenting upon this work and making many valuable suggestions and whose constant advice and support had placed me on the right path. I also would like to appreciate my supervisor’s encouragement and his human and material assistance.

To those who helped by offering their time in answering my questions, often persistent, and others who at their own request wished to remain anonymous, my sincere gratitude. I would like also to thank my faithful friend Bassam Mutawi for his help in collecting material for this thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my wife, Samira for her patience, endurance and for her unstinting support, and who by her tolerance, devotion and understanding, made my work more pleasant.

I feel that I should mention that the ideas and comments expressed throughout the work are mine and I am solely responsible for them.
Preface

This work is mainly the result of an individual research project and has not been financed by any government, foundation, organization, international or national institution, university, corporation, or any other person or organization.

The researcher was imprisoned three times for about ten years in Israeli prisons (1981-1991), and hoped that the PLO would give him a scholarship or extend financial support to this pioneering study. Correspondence and meetings with the Palestinian Authority's officials, from Chairman Yassir "Arafat to lower ranks did not meet with a positive response or help.

The Islamic University of Gaza and the al-Azhar University of Gaza failed also to provide any help to the researcher, who had worked as a member of their academic staff. Factional Politics has spoiled academic life in the Gaza Strip.

Finally, I would like to thank those who encouraged me and helped me or gave me loans. My supervisor, Professor Tim Niblock, remains one of the most influential persons in my academic career. I reiterate my deep gratitude and appreciation for his great help.
A Declaration

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material included for which a degree has been previously been conferred upon me.

Signature: [Signature]

xvi
A Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without KAMAL AL-ASTAL'S prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
1.0. Introduction

The job of scholars in each successive age is to construct the concepts which will best help towards understanding and acting upon the problems of their world. This study ushers us into the terra incognita of the Gaza Strip. It focuses on the institutional infrastructures of the Gaza Strip. Concentration will be on analysis of the political and economic roles of the trade unions and associations. The study examines the nature of the Palestinian popular organizational response to the Israeli occupation. The unit of the analysis in this study will not be a state; it will address subordinate institutions at the time of the absence of an independent state. Subordinate organizations (i.e. the trade unions and associations) played a salient role on the societal, economic and political planes.

The absence of a Palestinian national authority after 1967 contributed significantly to the expansion of the activities of the professional, voluntary and charitable organizations. Indeed, during the past two and a half decades indigenous organizations have been the major providers of services to the residents in the Gaza Strip.

These organizations were not detached from their socio-economic-political and legal environment. The analysis explores the environment within which the trade unions and associations undertook their functions. The thesis, therefore, examines the political and economic roles of the trade unions and associations in the process of the Palestinian national struggle.

1.1. Purpose and Scope of the Study

The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the main features of the structure and political, economic, and social functions of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip under the Israeli

The study covers mainly the period from 1967, when the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip began, to September 13, 1993, which marked the end of one era and the start of another with the signing of a peace agreement between the PLO and Israel. However, the pre-1967 period was also covered so as to provide background, and some parts of the analysis extended into the year 1994.

Because the study deals with the overall role of Palestinian actors under Israeli occupation, including their functioning (what they did), their structure (how their organs were shaped and how they were related to each other), and their government (internal management), it is necessarily broad in its scope.

1.2. The Importance of the Study

Two main factors, one academic and one historic, have caused non-governmental organizations to become of special interest to students of political science. The first is the rise of academic studies of decision-making and policy-making in state domestic and foreign policies. In these studies it has been shown that non-governmental organizations, pressure and interest groups, have exercised a varying, but often important, influence on the final form of state policies and actions.

The second factor arises from the establishment of the United Nations Organization. National and international non-governmental organizations such as federations of churches, trade unions, and professional, voluntary and charitable organizations were given special recognition within the U.N. as consultative organizations to the Economic and Social Council. The structures, functions, and activities of these organizations have thus become of both academic and practical interest.

Coupled with this growth of the non-governmental organizations is the development of functional theory, which assigned an important role to non-governmental organizations. Functionalism is a doctrine which asserts that the principal task of sociology and anthropology is to examine the contribution which social actors make to the social and cultural life of human collectivities. This usually means showing how
these actors affect and are affected by others with which they coexist over time.¹ In functionalism, society is conceived as a system of interrelated parts in which no part can be understood in isolation from the whole. A change in a part is seen as leading to a certain degree of imbalance, which in turn results in changes in other parts of the system and to some extent to reorganization of the system as a whole.² Trade unions and associations thus satisfy two aspects of the theory - they are presumed to be subordinate organizations within a state or a community, and also, in their actions, they promote cooperation on the basis of the particular functions for which they were created.

Trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip have not been subjected to thorough investigation, partly because of lack of information, and partly because they may have been considered as relatively unimportant. In fact, not only have the trade unions and associations been neglected by the researchers, but the Gaza Strip as a whole has been, to some extent, ignored as well. The Gaza Strip tends to be forgotten when scholars and diplomats discuss the Palestine problem. Mention of a "Palestinian state on the West Bank" or of "confederation between the West Bank and Jordan" often omits reference to the Gaza Strip, or only adds it as an afterthought - "and, of course, the Gaza Strip."³

Any attempt to understand the political dynamics of the Gaza Strip cannot neglect the existence, structure and functions of the trade unions and associations. These organizations were created by that society, and they in turn affected the developmental processes of the Gaza Strip’s community.

1.3. Hypotheses of the Study

This study will explore the following hypotheses:
(a) The socio-economic-political and legal setting of the Gaza Strip produced a labour movement and associations which were significantly different from their counterparts in other independent countries.
(b) A significant feature of the Palestinian trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip was their politicization.
(c) The Israeli military and legal systems affected negatively the activities of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip.
(d) Palestinian factions influenced the political behaviour of trade
unions and associations in the Gaza Strip.

(e) The political role of the trade unions and associations was more salient than their professional one.

1.4. Difficulties and Problems

It must be made clear that there were some significant difficulties and research problems associated with this study.

Source materials from occupied and less-developed areas could not be given the standard evidential weight. The Israeli restrictions on publication and freedom of expression constituted an obstacle. So the researcher had to sieve and to screen the information.

The basic methods of research for this study were the traditional ones of analyzing written material, interviews, field work and observation. The shortcomings of these methods are well known. The official view derived from documents and the subjective nature of interviews and personal observations were very clear.

In addition, a researcher, when in contact with any organization or responsible personality, may be confronted by either indifference, suspicion, an over-willingness to say what might be the expected answer, or a latent and sometimes overt antagonism. No criticism of these attitudes is here implied but they clearly presented a problem to the researcher.

Another problem associated with the research was the lack of information about the Gaza Strip, in general, and about the organizational infrastructure in it in particular. There has been no previous comprehensive study dealing with the issue of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. This means that the researcher was working in a new field.

Moreover, it should be remembered that the Gaza Strip, as with many other less-developed areas, is to a great extent a verbal society, which means that there is no habit of recording events in writing. Taking the Israeli censorship also into consideration, most of the documents produced did not reflect the pure truth.

In the Gaza Strip, there was (at the time of research) no publisher,
periodical or newspaper. The two Universities in Gaza (i.e. the Islamic University and the al-Azhar University) were like big secondary schools. The universities lack documentation units and research centres. In short, they do not play the traditional role of higher educational institutions in building up material about their environment. In the Gaza Strip a good public library does not exist. The official Israeli information sources do not tell the truth.

Interviews with persons who played a role in the development of the Gaza Strip's trade unions and associations might help to supply the missing information. However, the problem here was that the major actors were still alive and often in important social and political positions. Thus on the most controversial and sensitive issues (such as the relationship with the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian political movements) the interviewees might resort to an interpretation which caused the least pain and embarrassment but which was often not completely in accord with reality.

The problem of statistics was very clear. Any country wishing to maintain a satisfactory image, for whatever reason, be it national pride, to attract tourists, or to placate demands of another power, must have statistics to support that image. The Israeli statistics supported its policy in a manner intended to justify occupation. The incentives for arranging the most favourable statistics were, therefore, readily apparent. Under occupation, statistics were used, as they were in other countries, to support political claims and to counter claims. In such conditions, moreover, there was rarely a countervailing authority with sufficient finance, personnel, or expertise to be able to confirm or refute politically-produced, distorted, or adjusted statistics. It was only with extreme caution and mental reservations that these statistics could be used.

Finally, the unstable socio-economic-political and security environments in the Gaza Strip added another difficulty in the way of performing the field work and gathering materials. The unpunctuality of the interviewees was another obstacle encountered in this study.

1.5. Framework and Methodology

This is a pioneering study about the political and economic roles of
popular organizations (i.e. trade unions and associations) in the Gaza Strip. While the state-centered approach could not properly, in this context, be applied, it needed to be complemented by an alternative approach in which non-governmental actors played important roles. The roles and functions of the trade unions and associations, which became centres of power, had become more important under the Israeli occupation.

The study draws attention to the relationship and interaction between these organizations, the Gaza Strip community, various Palestinian political movements, and the Israeli authorities. This is the framework for meaningful explanation of the social, economic and political consequences which flowed from the activities in which the trade unions and associations were engaged. The framework can be conveyed as a rectangle of interactions among four actors within an unstable socio-economic and political setting. Each actor interacts with the other three actors in different ways. The chart below is an attempt to depict interaction among the four actors.

The Israeli military occupation provoked a Palestinian revolutionary-popular-organizational response. Since this response was an attack upon and confrontation to the structures of power centered in the Israeli military institutions, it naturally took the form of professional and politicized popular organizations within the context of the Palestinians' struggle to establish their national entity.

In order to perform this study the researcher designed a model for the analysis of the institutions in the Gaza Strip. An interview checklist also was formulated for conducting the interviews. Criteria, on the basis of which the case studies will be examined, were selected.
1.6. The Model of Analysis of the Trade Unions and Associations in the Gaza Strip

Students of the labour movement have focused their efforts on the following questions about the labour movement: how is one to account for the origin or emergence of labour organizations? What explains the pattern of growth and development of labour organizations? What factors are responsible for the sequence and form in which organizations have emerged in various countries, industries, crafts, and companies? What are the ultimate goals of the labour movement? Why do individual workers join labour organizations? And what is the impact of national cultural and legal experience on worker organizations?

In answering these questions, most of the students of the labour movement, at least until the late fifties, were primarily concerned with the role of organized labour in modern industrial society. Moreover, they seemed to have been in general agreement that modern industrialism was synonymous with capitalism. Upon this premise they built the generalization that the labour movement was a response to the challenge of capitalism. In the words of John R. Commons, "the labour movement is always a reaction and protest against capitalism."

The end result of this approach was a view of the labour union as a collective bargaining agent for its members, the primary, if not the only, function of which was to protect and to advance their economic interests.

The above-mentioned approach reveals a sort of cultural bias, for it is difficult to say that the trade unions in underdeveloped countries emerged as a result of industrialization. In the Gaza Strip, the trade unions emerged in a pre-industrial society and were shaped by the unstable socio-economic-legal and political environment. They played political, economic, professional, and social roles.

For the purpose of analysis of the role of trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip, the researcher has designed a model which includes the following points:

(a) Organization: this will cover the emergence, the structure and hierarchy, and a brief historical development.
(b) Objectives: What the goals and aims are which the organizations are seeking to achieve socially, politically, and economically.

(c) Membership: The analysis will concentrate on the qualifications of membership, kind of members, and the density of membership (especially in the trade unions). In this respect, completeness or density of unionization expresses the proportion of trade unionists in a given constituency in relation to potential membership in the following way:

\[
\text{Density or completeness of unionization} = \frac{\text{Actual membership}}{\text{Potential membership}} \times 100
\]

(d) The roles and functions: The analysis will include activities of these associations at the political and economic levels.

1.7. The interview checklist.

(a) Date: (b) Name of the Interviewee:
(c) Venue: (d) Position:
(e) Date of membership: (f) Date of the birth of the organization:
(g) Do you agree to your name to be mentioned in the research? Yes: No:

1. What are the motives behind your affiliation to the organization?
2. What are the objectives of this organization?
3. What are the salient activities of the organization? (Political, economic, social, and professional)
4. What are the important historical junctures in the developmental process of this organization?
5. Would you clarify the nature of the relationships between your organization and the Israeli authorities?
6. What are the main problems which face your organization?
7. Would you point out the prevalent political trends in your organization?
8. Would you describe the relationships between your organization and the Palestinian political movements (national and Islamic)?
9. How many elections have been held in the organization?
10. Could you define the blocks which stood for elections? What were the results of these elections?
11. What was the stance of this organization towards the intifada?
12. What was the stance of this organization towards the peace process?
13. What is your opinion on the political role of the popular organizations in the Gaza Strip in time of absence of a Palestinian independent state? Does this role lead to the disarticualtion (disengagement) with Israel? In other words: is there a historical (political) role for the organizations in the context of the Palestinian struggle?

1.8. The Organizations which were chosen as Case Studies

The researcher examined a number of trade unions and associations as case studies. These included: the workers trade unions in the Gaza Strip; the Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip and the Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip; and the Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC) and the Economic Development Group (EDG).

1.9. Definitions and Conceptual Approach

In this part of the study, definitions of trade union, association, and political and economic role will be presented.

1.9.1. Definition of a "Trade Union"

Originally, a trade union was defined as an association for the self-protection of employees, particularly in response to the conditions of industrial production existing since the eighteenth century. Dunner defines trade unionism as "a combination of workmen of the same occupation of several related trades for the purpose of united action in securing the most favourable conditions regarding wages, hours, and conditions of labour. Principally through collective bargaining, the trade union seeks to promote and to protect the welfare, interests, and rights of its members." Theodorson defines a trade union as "an association of workers organized around a particular skill, craft, or occupation".

The researcher agrees with Robertson in his definition that "trade unions are organized collectives of working people, usually but not invariably in industrial and commercial rather than agricultural organizations."
Generally speaking, it may be said that trade unions are organizations of employees who have joined together to improve pay and conditions at work. From the sociological point of view, analysis of trade unions can include a variety of foci such as: the contribution that trade unions make to the institutionalization of conflict in society and industry, trade union democracy, the relationship between unions and politics, and unions' membership as an indicator of proletarianization.

In this study the trade unions' concept is used to denote the six existing trade unions in the Gaza Strip. These unions were constituent members of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation (PWTUF) in the Gaza Strip.

1.9.2. Definition of an Association

An association is "a group of people united to pursue a common cause." Mitchell argues that the term describes either a process or an entity. The process is of a number of individuals interacting for a specific end or set of purposes. The entity is an organization of individuals who are held together by a recognized set of rules governing their behaviour to one another for a specific end or set of purposes.

In other words an association is a formal group organized for a specialized and specifically stated purpose. An association establishes rules of organization and procedure, a formalized system of leadership, and certain common interests among its members. Modern society is characterized by a large variety of associations, including business organizations, labour unions, political parties, athletic clubs etc. Usually associations are classified according to function (e.g. occupational, religious, recreational, cultural, etc.). The term "association" in this study denotes the professional and non-professional organizations in the Gaza Strip.

1.9.3. Definition of the Political and Economic Role

A role is defined as "a pattern of behaviour, structured around specific rights and duties and associated with a particular status position within a group or social situation." For example, a person's role in any situation is defined by the set of expectations for his behaviour
held by others and by the person himself. Each individual has many status positions within a society, and therefore he performs a variety of roles. In sociology, role sometimes is defined as the "dynamic aspect of a social position". The social position is usually defined in "terms of norms of behaviour". The economic role is the economic activities of an organization within a given society. The economic role of the organizations in the Gaza Strip can be defined as their activities in enhancing the economic development process in the Gaza Strip.

Role is a relational term. One plays a role vis-a-vis another person's role which is attached to a counter position. Political role is defined as the expected behaviour associated with a socio-economic-politico-legal setting. The political role of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip is their political behaviour under the Israeli occupation associated with the socio-economic-legal and political setting.

1.10. Sources of Data

The sources of the study include the materials which were drawn from published and unpublished materials as follows:

A) Published Materials. Very little research has been done on the Palestinian labour movement and associations. No books have been published dealing with trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. However, there are some written materials concerning the Palestinian trade union movement in mandatory Palestine. Tahbub, Yassin, and Nassar are three writers who wrote about the Palestinian labour movement in Palestine during the British Mandate.

In their studies, they paid relatively little attention to the political activities of the movement and devoted most of their efforts to discussing socio-economic issues. However, Tahbub's, Yassin's and Nassar's studies are very useful and will undoubtedly continue to be an indispensable sources of information about the historical background of the Palestinian labour movement.

B) Newspapers. There is no specialized newspaper in the occupied territories that covers trade unions and associations' activities and matters. Recently, the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation in the
Gaza Strip (PWTUF) has published a number of useful pamphlets about trade unions in the Strip. These publications, however, neglected the political and economic roles of the unions. It must be borne in mind that there was no newspaper published continuously in the Gaza Strip during the period 1967-1993.

C) Government Documents. There are no significant Israeli documents about trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli authorities' documents can, in any case, not be reckoned as a trustworthy source of data.

D) Unions and Associations' Sources. Since their emergence in 1964, trade unions in the Strip have neglected to record their history. However, in recent years, the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation (PWTUF) has published a series of booklets. Their booklets deal with trade unions bylaws, Israeli violations of human rights, and other issues. Also, the PWTUF has been publishing a non-periodical magazine, al-Amil (the Worker). Predictably, no complete collections of unions' publications, annual reports or pamphlets were available.

E) Interviews and Observation. The researcher had the opportunity to observe the leaders of PWTUF at work conducting the daily business of their organizations. Observation is perhaps the most reliable source of data on social behaviour. The researcher, however, devoted little time to making full use of this source. Nevertheless, the experience was invaluable for getting a "feel" of how a labour organization or association functions.

Interviews were utilized intensively and informally and their purpose was to obtain data concerning trade unions and associations' activities and to form a general impression of the political and economic roles of trade unions and associations. In conclusion one could say that the data obtained is, by and large, adequate for the purposes of this study.

1.11. The Plan of Research

This thesis will be divided into six chapters in addition to an introduction and a conclusion:

Chapter One: the emergence of the Gaza Strip in 1948: an overview. This
Chapter will provide a general description of the socio-economic environment within which the trade unions and associations operated.

Chapter Two: laws which regulated the establishment of trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. This chapter examines the legal framework within which the trade unions and associations performed their roles. It discusses Ottoman, British, Egyptian, and Israeli laws which were in force in the Gaza Strip.

Chapter Three: the associations in the Gaza Strip: general review. This chapter presents a review of the associations in the Gaza Strip - their classification, their objectives, and their activities.

Chapter Four: the political role of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip. This chapter presents a historical background to the Palestinian labour movement. It examines the political role of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip by analysing the relationship between them and both Israeli authorities and Palestinian political movements. It discusses the attitudes of the trade unions towards the uprising (intifada) and the peace process.

Chapter Five: the political role of associations in the Gaza Strip: case studies. The case studies deal with two organizations which played a tangible political role in the Gaza Strip. These organizations are the Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip, and the Lawyer's Association for the Gaza strip.

Chapter Six: the economic role of the associations in the Gaza Strip. This chapter discusses the economic role of two lending organizations: the Economic Development Group (EDG), and the Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC).

1.12. Trade Unions and Politics - Literature Review

Until recently political scientists and international relations experts have left labour for most part to their colleagues in labour economics and industrial relations. The labour movements in underdeveloped areas have often frustrated attempts to confine them to either economics or labour relations. Not merely spilling over into politics, trade unionism in these areas is indeed predominantly a political phenomenon.
Traditionally, the phenomenon of a labour movement has been generally associated with Western industrialization. However, since the emergence of new nations in Asia and Africa the labour movement has come to occupy an important place among the social institutions of these nations and played an active political role during the struggle for independence in the colonial era.

This study rejects traditional approaches which regarded the labour movement as a response to the challenge of capitalism and saw it as a collective bargaining agent for its members, the primary function of which was to advance their economic interests. Instead, the study utilizes an approach that views the labour movement as a universal phenomenon emerging as a reaction to industrialization, taking into account the possibility of political unionism and seeks exploration of the political and economic roles of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation. The study clearly shows the high degree of politicization exhibited by trade unions and organizations in the Gaza Strip as a colonized area.

Trade unions in industrial countries concentrate their activities in collective bargaining to serve the interests of their members. However, the trade unions in these countries also play a sort of political role and represent a kind of pressure group.

1.12.1. The Concept of Political Unionism

An analytical framework for the study of the labour movement in developing societies, which utilizes the environmental approach pioneered by the Dunlop-Kerr group, was offered by Bruce H. Millen.

The Millen study was based on the realization that: (1) The cultural bias of American (researchers) concerned with the study and development of labour unions in developing societies is an obstacle to the understanding of these institutions and (2) "Political unionism" is the prevailing type of unionism in such societies and that is the natural order of things rather than an aberration or a mere stage on the road to "mature" or economic unionism. Millen elaborates: "... in the developing countries of Africa and Asia, trade unions have sprung into active political participation."
Millen goes on to define the concept of "political unionism" in terms of certain specific characteristics that the "political union" tends to have:

"1. The amount of time and thought invested in direct political work is a primary index. The political union's leaders are directly engaged in political operations.
2. The goals of its leadership are very broad and may include revamping of the major rules governing the society. The political union through its support of "open-end" objectives has hopes of winning political power.
3. The frequent use of direct mass action in support of non-industrial objectives and propensity for tailoring the performance of economic functions to serve political ends are constant factors.
4. Ideological conformity in the leadership is required. Labour movements are linked to a party or government.
5. There is a marked tendency toward "movementism" i.e., the continual determination to form or participate in a broad-based political force aimed at capturing and maintaining political power.
6. In the early stages of a movement-building process, a political union often closely resembles a political party."

Having arrived at an analytical construct, the author proceeds to explain the predominance of political unionism in developing societies by examining the social, economic, and political factors that have influenced the main direction of unionism in these countries. These factors were found to be as follows: the underdeveloped political system, the low level of economic development, and social systems containing distortions and imbalances.

The value of Millen's approach lies mainly in that it focuses attention on an important and hitherto neglected attribute of labour movements in developing countries: their politicization.

1.12.2. Trade Unions and Political Commitment before Independence in Developing Countries

The labour movements of the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have generally had a common colonial experience and a similar involvement in a national struggle for independence. They emerged from this struggle as important participants in the development of the political system. Thus, they were politicized early in their development. Out of this background emerged the "political unionism" that so
often characterizes the labour organizations of liberated and developing nations. However, the degree of involvement varied from one area to another.

There were three main levels at which the unions could act politically. The first level was their attempts to gain recognition through strikes which were seen by colonial rulers as political, especially when the strikes were directed against the main employment agency - the government. It did not take much for a colonial government to jump to the conclusion that any strike of government employees was subversive.

The second level was political strikes; that many strikes were so categorized, indeed, led politicians and trade unionists themselves to see the strike as a political weapon, and therefore some coordinated planning of strikes which thus became part of the nationalist campaign.

The third level of political activity of trade unions was the alliance between them and political movements during the pre-independence era. Politicians and trade unions leaders in some colonies created a combined trade union-party movement in which the struggle for independence was seen as the first priority.

In his analysis of industrial relations in West Africa, Scott has pointed to two reasons for the involvement of trade unions in politics: the role played by the small industrial communities as "the flashpoints of social and political upheaval", and the fact that the wage structure was dominated by the colonial government so that political activities proved more immediately effective than collective bargaining. This second factor led Sekou Toure, an influential African trade unionist and political leader, to take the view that: "the necessarily political nature of the union struggle is borne out by the fact that the betterment of the workers economic plight can be achieved only by political action."

The slogan "no politics in trade unions" did not exist in developing countries, especially in the pre-independence period. Most of the trade unions in these areas involved themselves in political activities and participated in the national struggle to achieve independence.

In the Gaza Strip the trade unions, like other organizations in the pre-
independence period have been participating in political activities in the context of the national struggle against the Israeli occupation.

1.12.3. Trade Unions and National Movements in the Pre-Independence Era

Prior to independence, the instances where the trade unions allied themselves early with the leading political parties and national movements and continued to do so up to independence are numerous. In Africa, Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya, Tunisia, Algeria, the Ivory Coast, Mali, and Sudan are examples.

In Guinea, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania there was an early inter-relationship between trade union officials and party leaders. In Kenya and Tunisia, trade unions appeared to act for some time as the basis of the nationalist movement and to have acted as substitutes for political organizations when these were forced to go underground.

The founding meeting of the Sudanese Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF), in December 1951, saw the beginning of its involvement in political action. The SWTUF staged strikes (generally known as "freedom strikes"). Taha finds out that, in 1951, the SWTUF amended the Federation's constitution, adding the following political objectives: "first, the immediate defeat of colonialism in Sudan, in all its forms; second, to win for the Sudan the right of self-determination; third, absolute non-cooperation with the colonial regime; and fourth, uniting the Sudanese people in a United Front comprising political and other groups whose political aims approach the Federation's". Following the declaration of December 1951, a United Front for Sudan Liberation was formed. It comprised the SWTUF, the Communists, the Unionist parties, student unions, tenant farmers' organizations and other groups.

In Kenya, Ananaba finds that where Africans were forbidden to engage in politics during the emergency, the trade union movement provided the only platform for them to speak out on political issues. The Kenyan Federation of Labour expressed the yearnings of the African population for freedom. The federation of labour took the role of substitute for the restricted nationalist party as soon as the emergency was declared in 1952. Tom Mboya, the Secretary of the Local Government Workers' Union, stated that "the KFL became the voice of the African people, in the
absence of any other African organization to speak for them.” In 1960, in the Annual Conference of the KFL, Mboya stated that: “the trade union movement must have a right to pronounce on political matters and even to take appropriate action to assist during the struggle for independence.”

Davies argues that Nkrumah supplied an answer to the ban on political activity by trade unions when he coined the slogan "seek ye first the political kingdom and every other thing would be added unto you thereafter."

In some territories, notably Nigeria, Morocco, and the French Cameroon, the unions appeared in the vanguard of the nationalist campaign, and only later moved into an opposition political role.

Beling argues that the Tunisian labour movement was an extremely important force within the Tunisian nationalist front during the struggle for independence. Although trade unionism was declared "apolitical" by the French authorities, this conception had been rejected in Tunisia. Labour in Maghreb countries was always tied to politics and was subordinate to political action during the colonial period.

In Algeria, the Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA) made Algerian independence a major theme of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) fifth congress which was held in Tunisia in 1957. Moreover, the UGTA maintained the closest relationship with the FLN.

In Nigeria, in February 1950, the trade unions began publication of a weekly newspaper, the Labour Champion. The paper's motto was "Towards the creation of a Socialist Republic", and it showed strong interest in politics.

In Asia, an example of a close relationship between political parties and trade unions organizations is shown in the Indonesian experience. Sufrin finds out that, prior to 1960, each of the major political parties had its trade union affiliate, or conversely, each of the major trade unions had a political base.

In the Gaza Strip, the trade unions have close relations with political
movements. Like other areas under occupation, the trade unions in the Strip have allied themselves with Palestinian movements. There is a similarity between these unions and associations and their counterparts in other areas during the pre-independence era.

1.12.4. Trade Unions and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries in the Post-Independence Period

During the post-independence period, organized labour was predestined to play an important role in politics. Recognizing the labour movement's political potential, rulers in underdeveloped countries have sought to use it as a vehicle for gaining legitimacy for their own ends.\(^{23}\)

In post-independence India, Ramaswamy argues that although trade unions were not formally committed to any political party, they were steeped in party politics. The political involvement of trade unions was widely attributed to the partisan links of the leaders of organized labour. It is shown that the splits and mergers in the labour movement since the earliest days of unionism had been occasioned by corresponding splits and mergers between political parties.\(^{24}\) In Indonesia, Tedjasukamana maintains that the trade union movement has been given a political rather than an economic direction (the trade union movement to a great degree is the creature of General Sukarno).\(^{25}\) In Ceylon, Kearney finds that a major political significance of trade unions stems from their capacity to exert pressure by strikes and to precipitate civil order, which may intimidate or discredit the governing politicians and produce major political consequences.\(^{26}\)

In Latin America, Angell shows that trade unions exercise a professional and a political role as well. For example, the Chilean trade union federation (the Federación Obrera de Chile), which was established in 1917, was a highly politicized movement. By 1924, union divisions were a reflection of party or ideological divisions. The phenomenon of non-political unions has not existed in Chile.\(^{27}\) In North America, in Mexico, Clark argues that since the establishment of the organized labour movement in 1910, the trade unions have played a salient political role in shaping the political system and governmental policies.\(^{28}\)

Harbison maintains that although the Egyptian labour movement preceded the Nasser regime, "modern unions in Egypt are not the result of the
development of a free labour movement. On the contrary, they are, by formal design, government-made labour organizations. However, the trade unions in Egypt exercised a political role and affected formulation of governmental policies through their activities within and without the Arab Socialist Union. Later, after showing that the government would like to help unions to get out of politics, Harbison concludes that it has not succeeded.

1.12.5. Trade Unions and Politics in Western Countries

Now let us consider trade unions' influence in politics in some of the industrial and Western countries. Although De Val argues that some countries at first had non-political trade unions, in the long run none of the major unions in these countries has preserved its political neutrality. Wilson, in his discussion of the activities of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), finds that American labour is now firmly established as a pressure group which, even by the standards of the United States, is politically active on an unusually wide variety of issues. He concludes that labour is the example par excellence of pressure group politics. Cochran finds out that trade unions in the United States staged strikes not only to serve the economic interests of their members, but also to influence governmental policies. In Britain, Wetton argues, trade unions are able to exercise their political influence both in their own right and as an important section of the labour movement. Through their individual unions as well as the Trade Union Congress (TUC) the organized workers can and do make their voices heard on a wide variety of political and social questions. Fraser has stated that a major step in the progress of trade unions towards acceptance came with a recognition of their role in the field of politics. This was a twofold process, in part coming from a growing awareness by unionists of their importance as a political pressure group and in part coming from an appreciation by middle-class radicals that the leaders of the working class would be useful allies. In Israel, the Histadrut, the General Organization of Workers in the
Land of Israel, was founded in December 1920. For most of its existence the Histadrut has been acknowledged as an important political organization in the country and a critical component of the "state in the making". Shalev maintains that the state of Israel has been created by the Histadrut. Rolef argues that the Histadrut is the second largest employer after the government and is considered one of the political power centres in Israel.

Trade unions in Poland have played a salient political role. Moses argues that Solidarity was created to change power relationships. This makes Solidarity a system-changing movement. Solidarity represents a distinct advance on trade union thinking in the Western world. It has become a political party. In the Polish elections of June 1989, Solidarity candidates won the vast majority of contested seats, sweeping the Communists from the field. Solidarity has changed the Polish political system and the ideological orientation.

Finally, trade unions in Western and industrial countries play an influential role in the economy. These unions have not been isolated from politics.

1.12.6. Conclusion

One can say that existing political literature provides a sufficient approach in helping to analyse trade unions' political role. Richter argues that unions are, willy-nilly, involved in politics. When they follow their own institutional approaches to the political process they are engaged in "political action", not necessarily or merely in the narrow sense of party politics, but in the deep sense of participation in the larger body politic. Labour unions in developing countries are, by their very nature, considered political more than professional.

In the Gaza Strip, the trade unions and associations played significant political and economic roles. Under the Israeli occupation the organizations undertook a variety of political and economic missions. They, like other trade unions (during the pre-independence period) in the ex-colonies, did not isolate themselves from political matters.

In Western countries, politics is a secondary and not a primary activity of trade unions. The first duty of a union is to protect the vocational
interests of its members by negotiation and consultation; it is only when the methods prove inadequate that the union should enter into politics.

Finally, labour unions constitute a power in the state and their collective bargaining function does not rule out their involvement in politics during the pre-independence and post-independence era. Labour unions in underdeveloped countries have played a salient political role, while trade unions in Western countries have not circumscribed their role to collective bargaining. The degree of involvement of trade unions in politics varies from country to another.
Footnotes and References

Introduction


**Trade Unions and Politics - Literature Review**


University of California, Los Angeles, 1970, p. 11.


14. Tom Mboya, the Secretary of the Local Government Workers' Union, who acted as Director of Information and Treasurer of the Kenyan African Union in the last days before it was banned, was elected General Secretary of the Kenyan Federation of Labour in September 1953. In his words, "The KFL became the voice of the African people, in the absence of any other African organization to speak for them. Davies, Ioan, *African Trade Unions*, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmodsworth, Middlesex, 1966, p. 99.


20. At independence UGTA was in a powerful enough position for the party to accept it as one of the four major political organizations (the others were the FLN itself, the Army, and the Congress of Agricultural Workers). Davies, *Op. Cit.*, p. 187.

22. For example, the Muslim Party was closely related to the Federation of Indonesian Islamic Trade Unions. The Orthodox Muslim Party, a splinter party, was related to the Federation of Indonesian Muslim Trade and Labour Unions. The Nationalist Party was dependent upon the Indonesian Democratic Worker's Federation. The Socialist Party was supported by, and gave support to, the All Indonesian Congress Workers Union. The Independent Radical Party was affiliated to the Central Labour Organization of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Communist Party had a wing the All Indonesian Central Labour Organization. Sufrin, Sidney C., Unions in Emerging Societies: Frustration and Politics, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1964, pp. 43-44. See also: Labour and Indonesia, Department of State, Agency for International Development, Washington, May 1963, p. 49.


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Chapter One
The Emergence of the Gaza Strip in 1948: an Overview

1.0. Introduction

The Gaza Strip was the southernmost section of the coastal plain of mandatory Palestine. It is bordered by Egypt to the South, the Mediterranean to the West and Israel to both the East and the North.¹

In 1948, the Gaza Strip emerged as an artificial entity. In June 1967 it, together with the Sinai, the Golan Heights and the West Bank, fell under Israeli occupation. Since then, a significant amount of attention has been focused on the latter three territories but relatively little has been given to the Gaza Strip. Although the Gaza Strip has been considered the "hottest spot in the Middle East", such that the Israeli government became convinced that it should give up the territory, scholars have generally neglected to carry out research on the area.²

This chapter outlines the administrative and socio-economic environment within which the trade unions and associations operated. The chapter consists of three sections. The first provides a brief history of the emergence of the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian administration, 1948-1967. The second discusses the Israeli military and civil administration, 1967-1993. The third presents a review of the socio-economic infrastructure of the Gaza Strip.
Section One
The Emergence of the Gaza Strip in 1948
and the Egyptian Administration 1948-1967

This section provides a brief review of the history of the Gaza Strip, examines the unique status of the Gaza Strip, and discusses the Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip between 1948 and 1967.

1.1.1. The Emergence of the Gaza Strip 1948

The Strip has no distinct identity. It was historically part of the ancient Philistine state, and its towns continued to be way stations on the coastal route between Egypt and Syria. Gaza's strategic importance was recognized by the British in World War I. Their forces besieged it for two years, leading to the defeat of the Ottoman defenders in the autumn of 1917. The British then moved rapidly north to capture Jerusalem.

Before 1948 the Gaza Strip was part of Gaza Province, an area composed of the districts of Gaza and Bir al-Saba' (Beersheba). Gaza city was the province's capital. According to Liliental the number of villages in Gaza Province at that time was forty-six. Most of these were destroyed by Israel in the 1948-9 war.

War and "outsiders' agreements" led to the existence of the Gaza Strip. There were a number of decisions and agreements which were significant: first, the U.N. partition plan adopted on 29 November 1947, providing for Palestine to be divided into two states: an Arab state and a Jewish state with the Gaza Strip intended to be part of the Arab state; second, the Arab countries' rejection of the U.N. partition plan and the intervention of the Arab armies in Palestine on 15 May 1948; and third, the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement on 24 February 1949 following the 1948 war, which specified that the final status of the Gaza Strip was to be determined within the context of a permanent settlement of the Palestine question.

The Egyptian army moved into the Gaza area at the outset of the 1948 war. In accordance with the armistice agreement which was signed between Israel and Egypt in 1949, the Gaza Strip remained under Egyptian administration.
The Gaza Strip emerged as an entity which was about forty-five kilometers long (28 miles) and eight to twelve kilometers wide (5-8 miles). It encompassed an area that was 367 square kilometers, or one-tenth the size of the West Bank (about 3400 square kilometers). Today, the populated area of the Gaza Strip consists of two cities (Gaza, Khan Yunis), two towns (Rafah, Dair al-Balah), more than ten villages and eight refugee camps.

1.1.2. The Unique Political, Social, and Legal Characteristics of the Gaza Strip

Since 1948, the Gaza Strip has held unique political, social, legal, and administrative characteristics within the territory which was formerly mandatory Palestine.

From 1948 to 1955, the area had no formal name. During that period it was usually called "the region placed under the Egyptian forces' supervision in Palestine". In May 1955, the term "Gaza Strip" appeared for the first time in a constitutional document to describe the Palestinian territories which were placed under Egyptian control. The Egyptian authorities in the Gaza Strip promulgated a constitutional law which was entitled "a Law Concerning the Issue of a Fundamental Law for the Region Placed under the Supervision of the Egyptian Forces in Palestine". The term "Gaza Strip" was used in this law. The Gaza Strip was the only region in the formerly mandatory Palestine which remained for seven years without a constitutionally-determined name.

Politically, the Gaza Strip also had a unique political status. It was the only part of Palestine where no country had (or claimed) legal sovereignty. On March 14th, 1957, Mr Selwyn-Lloyd, then Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, pointed this out when he said in a House of Commons debate: "the facts about the Gaza Strip seem to me to be these. No country has legal sovereignty".

The Gaza Strip was not a part of an independent state; it had never been claimed as an integral part of an Arab state, and Israel did not consider the territory a part of biblical Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel). Although it was administered by Egypt, the Gaza Strip was not subject to "Egyptianization" (unlike the West Bank which was subject to
Demographically, the Gaza Strip was the only part of Palestine where the population tripled within less than one year - 1948-1949. It was a unique part of Palestine which received two-thirds of its population as refugees. The establishment of Israel and the consequences of the 1948 war compelled thousands of Palestinians to leave their homes and land in Palestine to become refugees. The Gaza Strip became the most densely populated area in Palestine (about 3,000 persons/sq. km.). It had no significant economic resources or economic capacity to absorb the population, so, it had to depend on international aid and remittances from migrant labour.

Legally, the Gaza Strip was given a unique status in the Armistice agreements of 1949. The temporary status of the Strip was expressed in the text of the Armistice Agreement which was signed between Egypt and Israel on February 24th, 1949. Article 11 of the Armistice Agreement stated:

"No provision of this agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question." 14

In addition, Article (5[2]) provided that the armistice lines of the Gaza Strip did not have a permanent status. It stated:

"The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims, and positions of either party to the armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question." 15

The latter Article was not found in this wording in the other Armistice Agreements. (Compare Article 5 of the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreements of 20 July 1949 and Article (6[2]) of the Armistice Agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of 3 April 1949). 16

1.1.3. The Egyptian Administration in the Gaza Strip 1948-1956 and 1957-1967

From 1948 to 1967 the Gaza Strip was ruled by an Egyptian military administration except for the four months from 31 October 1956 to 7
March 1957. According to the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement, the Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian administration, but it was neither annexed nor integrated, and it remained so until the war of June 1967. The Egyptian Governor-General controlled the civil as well as the security functions of the Strip. He appointed municipal and village council members, intervened in employment practices in the state schools and health services and closely regulated commerce.  

Between 1948 and 1967, the Egyptian authorities in the Gaza Strip issued two constitutional laws. In May 1955, the first law was promulgated and it was called "a Law Concerning the Issue of a Fundamental Law for the Region Placed under the Supervision of the Egyptian Forces in Palestine" (Law No. 255/11 May 1955). In March 1962, the Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip proclaimed the "Constitutional System of the Gaza Strip". Some light will be shed on the Egyptian administration over the Gaza Strip according to the provisions of the two constitutional laws.

1.1.3.1. The Egyptian Administration According to the Fundamental Law of 1955

The issuing of the Fundamental Law (i.e. constitutional law) meant that the Egyptian authorities intended to change the nature of its administration from military to civilian.

The Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip under the Fundamental Law was defined as consisting of an executive authority, a legislative council and a judicial authority. The character of these bodies was as follows:

The Executive Authority

The Executive Authority consisted of the Governor-General and the Executive Council. The main functions of the Governor-General were to ratify the laws which were enacted by the Legislative Council (Art. 14); to declare and to cancel martial laws (Art. 15); and to ratify court sentences (Art. 16). The functions of the Executive Council were to organize the issuing and implementation of laws (Art. 19); to appoint and depose employees (Art. 20); and to issue legislative laws in time of emergency (Arts. 21, 22). Members of the Executive Council (nine members) were appointed by a decree of
the Egyptian Minister of War. The Legislative Council

The Legislative Council consisted of all members of the Executive Council and the Mayor of Gaza city and three members of the city council, the Mayor of Khan Yunis and two members of its municipal council, one member from each of the village councils of Rafah, Dair al-Balah and Jabalia, four members from the refugee camps to be chosen by the Executive Council, and seven members representing occupations - namely those of medicine, education, law, commerce, and agriculture. The number of the members of the Legislative Council was 30, headed by the Governor-General. The Fundamental Law provided that the Legislative Council was convened and dissolved by an order from the Governor-General (Art. 24), that the members had parliamentary immunity (Art. 25), that resolutions were passed by a majority (Art. 27), and that the Legislative Council had the right to present bills to the Executive Council (Art. 28).

The Judicial Authority

The judicial power consisted of the High Court and other courts (Art. 11). The Law provided that judges were independent (Art. 31) and stated that the jurisdiction of courts was defined by law (Art. 32). Judges were appointed and dismissed by the authorities according to provisions of the Law (Arts. 33 and 34). The president of the High Court was appointed by a decision of the Egyptian Cabinet, while the other judges of the court were appointed by the Minister of War (Art. 35).

The courts in the Gaza Strip, according to the Fundamental Law (1955), were classified into five categories: the high court, the central court, magistrate courts, religious courts (shari'ah courts), and military courts.
1.1.3.2. The Egyptian Administration According to the Constitutional System of the Gaza Strip (9 March 1962)

Seven years after the introduction of the Fundamental Law, the Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip started a process towards forming a Palestinian entity. On 9 March 1962, the Egyptian administration issued a new constitutional system for the Gaza Strip which was called "the Constitutional System of the Gaza Sector".

The reason which pushed the Egyptian authorities to promulgate the Constitutional System of the Gaza Strip was declared in the preamble of the constitution which stated:

"... the requirements of development and the course of events necessitate the availability of a new constitutional system which will meet the aims and hopes of the Palestinian people...".

Competition between Egypt and Jordan, the failure of Egypt's union with Syria, the Syrian support of a number of Palestinian groups, and the formation of a number of Palestinian secret political and military groups pushed Nasser to create a basis for Palestinian organization, with a view to containing any wider Palestinian movement.

According to the provisions of the Constitution, the Egyptian administration in the Strip consisted of an executive authority, a legislative authority, and a judiciary. The nature and powers of these were as follows:

The Executive Council

The Executive Council consisted of the Governor-General, his deputy, and the Directors of various departments (11 members). The Directors were the Director of Legal Affairs, the Director of Interior and Public Security, the Director of Finance and Economy, the Director of Culture and Education, the Director of Health, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Municipal Affairs, the Director of Social Affairs and Refugees, and the Director of Religious Affairs (Art. 24). The Governor-General was appointed by the President of the United Arab Republic (Art. 18). The Governor-
Deputy and the Directors were appointed by the Minister of War.27

The Executive Council was in fact controlled by the Governor-General, who ratified laws and issued them in the name of the Palestinian people, declared and terminated a state of emergency, ratified sentences passed by military courts, and exonerated an accused person (Arts. 20, 22, 23).28

The Legislative Assembly

On the legislative side,29 a Legislative Assembly was set up, composed of the Governor-General (as Chairman), members of the Executive Council, twenty-two members to be chosen by the elected members of the local councils, and ten members to be selected by decree by the Governor-General from among properly qualified Palestinians (Art. 30). Thus there was a total of forty-two members on the legislative council.30

Despite the stacked nature of the Legislative Assembly there were a number of other provisions ensuring that under no circumstances would legislation be passed which had not been approved by the Governor-General. After a law was passed by the assembly it had to be ratified by the Governor-General. If he did not ratify it, the Legislative Assembly could not reconsider it during the current session but only take it up again in the following session, and then it had to receive a 3/4 vote of all the members (Arts. 20, 21).31 However, to make doubly sure, the legislative assembly could only meet when convened by the Governor-General (Art. 38).32 The latter could at any time suspend a session of the Assembly for two months (Art. 37).33 The members of the Legislative Assembly had no right to interfere in affairs coming within the competence of the executive authority or the judicial authority (Art. 45),34 and therefore did not have any control or even supervisory or investigatory powers with respect to the executive.35

The Judicial Authority

With respect to the judicial authority, this consisted of the courts in the Gaza Strip.36 These courts were of six kinds: the supreme court (an appellate court), the central court, magisterial
courts, military courts, religious (shari'ah) courts, and juvenile courts. The president of the supreme court was appointed by the President of the U.A.R. and other judges by the Minister of War (Art. 57). The president of the supreme court was always, in practice, an Egyptian judge.\(^{37}\)

The courts had different functions and competences. For example, the competence of the supreme court included abrogation of administrative orders (Art. 57). Military courts were set up by the Governor-General to examine crimes affecting public security or the security of the armed forces (Art. 59).\(^{38}\)

In October 1956, the Israeli forces occupied the Gaza Strip. The first Israeli occupation lasted for four months (From 31 October 1956 to 7 March 1957). The first Israeli occupation is not significant to our analysis because in that time there were no trade unions in the Gaza Strip. The developments between 1957 and 1967 did not change the basic legal situation and the Gaza Strip remained during these years under Egyptian administration. In June 1967 Israel again occupied the Gaza Strip.
Section Two
The Gaza Strip under the Israeli Military and Civil Administration 1967-1993

In 1967, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip for the second time. At the time of the first occupation, there had been no trade unions and few associations too in the Strip. Thus, the first occupation had no significance for the trade union issue - both because there were none at that time, and because the occupation was too short.

This section discusses Israeli military and civil administration in the Gaza Strip in four subsections. The first deals with Israeli military rule; the second focuses on the Israeli civil administration; the third gives a brief review of the Israeli military orders which affected life in the Gaza Strip; and the fourth gives a brief review of the municipalities, village councils, and local committees in the Gaza Strip.

1.2.1. The Israeli Military Administration in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

In 1967, with the entry of the Israeli army into the Gaza Strip and the issuing of Proclamation 2, the military commander became the legislative authority. He could enact any law, cancel or suspend an existing law, or make legislative changes.¹ According to Sara Roy, Israel did not recognize the status of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory. Consequently, Israel did not regard itself bound by provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), which it had itself ratified. In 1967, the Government of Israel issued military order 144 which annulled the supremacy of the Geneva conventions over orders of the military commander and legally confirmed the legitimacy of military rule in the Gaza Strip and the occupied territories.² Between 1967 and 1993, the area commander issued over 1200 military orders which governed all aspects of life in the Gaza Strip.³ These laws, however, did not apply to the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip which were subjected to a separate set of legislation (i.e. Israeli law).

Sara Roy has shown that the military commander had complete executive and legislative power over matters ranging from the routine to the exceptional. There was no public body inside Israel which had the authority to review or to alter the orders of the military command in

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the Gaza Strip. Even the Supreme Court of Israel had very limited authority over military law in the occupied territories.*

The Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip was originally made up of military personnel exclusively, both regular and reserve. The commanders of each area were made responsible both for preserving security and ensuring the smooth running of the civil affairs of the residents of the area. The district military commanders (the commanders of towns in the Gaza Strip) were subordinate to the military commander of the area (i.e. the Gaza Strip military commander) and they were responsible through him to the regional commander (i.e. the military commander of the Southern Region) who was, in turn, responsible to the Chief of Staff who was himself directly responsible to the Minister of Defence. The Gaza Strip commander was also responsible to the coordinator of the Israeli government’s activities in the occupied areas. Chart no. 1 shows the hierarchy of the Israeli military authority in the Gaza Strip.

**Chart No. 1**
The Israeli Military Government in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister of Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military Commander of the Southern Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator of Activities in the Occupied Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Governor-General of the Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City and Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazzah Khan Yunis Rafah Dair al-Balah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** compiled by the researcher.

From 1967 to 1981 the Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip rested in the hands of the military commander of the Gaza Strip, who had complete executive and legislative power over various matters of the inhabitants’ day-to-day lives. The district military commanders were granted some appointive and administrative powers of government.  

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1.2.2. Israeli Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip 1981

In 1981, the Israeli military administration in the Gaza Strip was modified by the introduction of civil administration. In November 1981, civil administration was established by Military Order 947. Occurring in conjunction with the autonomy talks between Israel, Egypt and the United States, civil administration was created to separate military and civil affairs and to make a division of labour between military and civil officials. The Israeli government intended to alter the situation in the Gaza Strip to pave the way for the application of the Israeli plan of autonomy. 

The Israeli autonomy plan was geared to authorizing Palestinians to administer civilian affairs and keeping all security and foreign affairs under Israeli control. The civil administration was designed to assume responsibility for all non-security functions, such as education, health, and social welfare. This administrative division of labour was institutionalized to ensure that, in the event of autonomy, all powers not given to the civil administration would remain under Israeli control.

The establishment of the civil administration resulted in certain structural and legal changes in the Gaza Strip. The first change produced a clear division between the civilian and military functions of the government. The second modified a number of laws to cope with the establishment of the civil administration and its functions.

With the introduction of civil administration, the district military commanders (the commanders of towns in the Gaza Strip) were made responsible to two parallel systems, one military and the other civilian. In their military capacity they (i.e. the military commanders of towns) were subordinate to the military commander of the area (i.e. Gaza Strip military commander) and they were responsible through him to the regional commander (i.e. the military commander of the Southern Region) who was, in turn, responsible to the Chief of Staff. In their civilian capacity the towns' commanders were responsible to the Gaza Strip governor and through him to the coordinator of activities in the territories, who was himself directly responsible to the Minister of Defence. The chains of command united only in the office of the Minister of Defence. Consequently, all legislative, judicial and executive power
remained with the military commander and not with the head of the civilian administration. Chart no. 2 demonstrates the hierarchy of the Israeli civil administration in the Gaza Strip (1981).
1.2.3. Israeli Military Orders and their Effects on the Residents' Lives in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

The Israeli military orders constituted the legal framework which was used to govern the Gaza Strip and affected all aspects of its residents' lives. Amendments to the existing laws were also issued to guarantee complete control over the functioning of all forms of organizations within the Gaza Strip. The focus of this part of the analysis is on the influences of the Israeli military orders not only on the trade unions and associations but also on the daily life of the population in the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli authorities routinely quoted security concerns for most of the actions they took, but refused to define what security meant to them, or to explain which criteria fulfilled Israeli security requirements in any given case. Military orders were issued prohibiting or restricting the planting of trees (i.e. citrus), specific crops, land reclamation, water utilization, free market trade, exports and imports, licensing of certain forms of industrial activity, trade unions activity, access to private health care, public assembly, cultural expression, free speech and political organization.

The detention of individuals without charge or trial for renewable periods, known as administrative detention, was used extensively by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip after 1967. Thousands of Gaza Strip inhabitants were detained without charge. A number of trade unionists were detained and their detention negatively affected the performance of the unions.

Deportation orders were issued by the area commander. Once served with the order, the deportee was invariably detained in prison until deportation. The deportee had the opportunity to appeal to a Military Objections Committee, which heard the appeal in secret and made non-binding recommendations to the military commander. The deportee could further petition the Israeli High Court against the order. Most of the deportees had little faith in the potential for a fair hearing, and indeed only few orders for deportation were cancelled.

Collective punishment was instituted in the form of curfews, closures, and confining of people through home arrest. The Israeli military
usually issued orders to confine a person to his or her town, village or camp. The order lasted for 3 or 6 months, but it could be, and often was, renewed repeatedly.\textsuperscript{15}

Curfews were imposed upon cities, towns, villages and refugee camps and these could last from one day to several weeks. During a curfew, residents were prohibited from leaving the area and were often confined to their homes. Leaving one’s home under a curfew could result in imprisonment and, in some instances, death. Gaza Strip residents were compelled to observe dusk to dawn curfew from 1967 to 1993.

Closures usually applied to universities, schools and educational institutions, and trade unions and associations.\textsuperscript{16} During the \textit{intifada}, the Israeli authorities closed down a number of schools, the Islamic university in Gaza, press offices, and associations. The authorities also closed headquarters of the trade unions for thirteen years from 1967 to 1980.

Freedom of movement was also often restricted as a punitive measure by confiscation of identity cards and the withholding of permits to travel, usually without reason given and with no time limit specified.\textsuperscript{17}

The Israeli authorities demolished and sealed thousands of houses in the Gaza Strip belonging to families of Palestinians suspected of resistance activity.\textsuperscript{18} The Israeli military commander was authorized to order the demolition or sealing of a house where there was a connection with someone suspected of committing a "security" offence.\textsuperscript{19}

Political life was closely circumscribed under occupation. No municipal elections were held in the Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1993.\textsuperscript{20} Freedom of association was curtailed and the trade unions and associations activities were restricted.\textsuperscript{21} Prominent community leaders and activists in mass organizations and professional associations continued to be deported, administratively detained, or placed under town arrest.\textsuperscript{22}

Courts were negatively affected by the Israeli legal measures. There were two types of courts operating in the Gaza Strip in 1967-1993: local courts (e.g. \textit{Shari'ah} courts) which were run by the residents of the Strip, and the Israeli military courts which were run by the Israeli authorities and meant to deal with security offences (i.e. the violation
of military orders and resistance of the occupation). Most of the local courts (i.e. Palestinian courts) in the Gaza Strip (e.g. juvenile, magistrate, central, and high courts) were in fact not active, especially after the break out of the intifada in 1987. Religious courts (shariah courts) were the only Palestinian-run courts which were active. The shariah courts ruled on personal and family matters.

1.2.4. The Municipalities, Village Councils and Local Committees in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

In order to clarify the organizational structures and the legal setting which governed various forms of organizations in the Gaza Strip, some light will be shed on the municipal framework. Municipalities, village councils, and local committees constituted a part of the socio-economic environment within which trade unions and associations functioned.

In 1967, the Commander of the Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip issued Proclamation 2, dealing with governmental and legal arrangements in the territories, which laid down that the laws in the territories prior to the transfer of government to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) continued to be valid. The Municipalities Law No. 1 of 1934, therefore, continued to be valid before and after 1967. It organized the municipalities' affairs.

In 1993, four cities had municipality status in the Gaza Strip. These cities were Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Dair al-Balah. Ten villages had village councils. There were also six areas which had local committee status.

Under the Israeli control of the Gaza Strip, no municipal elections were held, just as no municipal elections also had been held under the Egyptian administration over the Gaza Strip.

In the period after 1967 the Israeli occupation authorities dismissed two mayors of Gaza. The first was dismissed for his refusal to connect the Gaza Strip to the Israeli electric power grid; the second for his refusal to go along with the Israeli decision to annex the al-Shatti' refugee camp to the Gaza municipality, which he viewed as an Israeli attempt to bypass the Palestinian refugee question.
The municipalities in the Gaza Strip had no choice but to perform the tasks approved by the central authority or suffer the consequences. Mayors in the Gaza Strip were neither elected by the residents nor even selected by the majority of the members of the municipal council. They were appointed by the military governor. The military governor also had the power to appoint the town clerk, through whom he could maintain surveillance over the functions of the council.

Under the Israeli occupation the municipal councils in the Gaza Strip suffered from financial difficulties. Finding money to cover the municipalities' expenses posed a major difficulty for the municipal councils. The Israeli military authorities constantly put obstacles in the way of funds contributed to the municipalities. A significant part of the municipalities' budgets was financed by the population. Financing the municipalities' activities became a burden to the local population.

Moreover, the Israeli military authorities levied taxes on all the equipment and machinery purchased by the municipal councils, even though the machinery was used to provide public services.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Israeli authorities decided to change the status of the refugee camps by appointing local committees to function on a municipal-style basis. The Israeli authorities aimed at transforming the refugee camps' status from temporary to permanent.
The socio-economic features of the Gaza Strip naturally affected the character of the trade unions and associations. It is, therefore, important to shed some light on the socio-economic features of the Gaza Strip. This section will be divided into six subsections covering education, the health services, demographic features, the economy, the professional and non-professional associations, and Jewish settlements.

1.3.1. Education in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

After 1967, education in the Gaza Strip was administered by the military government, UNRWA and some private educational institutions. Schools under government administration were found at elementary, preparatory and secondary levels. UNRWA provided education for the registered refugee community, at the elementary and preparatory levels. UNRWA provided also vocational and technical training and teacher training. Private educational institutions provided pre-school education (e.g. creches, kindergartens), elementary schools, preparatory schools, secondary schools, and higher education (which included two universities and one polytechnic and two institutions for teacher training). The school curriculum in the Gaza Strip was designed by the Egyptian administration.

The educational system was divided into six levels: kindergarten (lasting two to three years); elementary (lasting six years) preparatory (lasting three years); secondary (lasting three years); teacher training college (generally lasting two years); and university (varying periods). In 1993, the Teachers' Training College became a four-year College of Education. At the university level, there were two universities in the Gaza Strip, the Islamic University of Gaza (established in 1978) and al-Azhar University of Gaza (established in 1991). Study at the Islamic University usually continued for five academic years and at al-Azhar University for four years. In addition, the government provided training in two vocational schools devoted to agriculture and commerce. Table no. 3 gives details of the educational institutions in the Gaza Strip under the university level.
Table No. 3

Educational Institutions below University Level in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Governmental Schools</th>
<th>UNRWA Schools</th>
<th>Private Schools</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68/69</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75/76</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81/82</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>307</td>
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<tr>
<td>84/85</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>294</td>
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<tr>
<td>85/86</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>86/87</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88/89</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90/91</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91/92</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92/93</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the researcher from a number of sources

This education system in the Gaza Strip was not without its weaknesses. Political circumstances and factors negatively affected the educational system. The crucial decisions on Palestinian education were left to non-Palestinian authorities. Consequently, the education was not geared to the needs of the Palestinian community. School curricula were imposed. The Israeli authorities kept tight control over Palestinian educational and cultural activities. Education was harassed through censorship, the confiscation of books and periodicals, the imposition of customs duties on educational, scientific and cultural materials, the arrest of students and teaching staff, and the closure of educational institutions.

1.3.2. Health Services in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

Demographic (e.g. high fertility, overcrowdedness), economic (e.g. low income, underdevelopment), and educational (limited educational opportunities, illiteracy) factors all affected the health services offered to residents of the Gaza Strip.

The Gaza Strip suffered from an inadequate health service infrastructure. The health services were marked by poorly equipped and maintained hospitals, extremely limited staff, the constant lack of medicines and medical supplies, lack of community outreach, restricted access to
The health service was provided by governmental hospitals, by UNRWA clinics, and by a number of private clinics and one private hospital. The hospitals under the supervision of the Israeli military authorities were: Dar al-Shifa’ hospital (312 beds) in Gaza city, al-Nasr pediatric hospital (111 beds) in Gaza city, al-Nasr eye hospital in Gaza city which operated as an out-patient clinic, al-Nasr psychiatric hospital (57 beds) in Gaza city, and Nasser hospital (249 beds) in Khan Yunis.

There were nine clinics under the supervision of UNRWA. In every refugee camp there was one clinic, and there was one clinic in Gaza city. Al-Buraij hospital (70 beds) was under the co-supervision of UNRWA and the Israeli authorities. The al-Buraij hospital was closed by a unilateral Israeli decision. There was one private hospital, al-Ahli al-Arabi hospital (60 beds).

The governmental hospitals employed 300 doctors (mostly non-specialists) and 700 nurses. Thus, in the governmental hospitals there was approximately one doctor for every 3,000 persons, and one nurse (usually non-specialist) for every 1,500 persons.

The UNRWA clinics employed 34 doctors, most of whom were non-specialists. There was approximately one doctor for every 1,500 refugees. Six dentists only were employed in the UNRWA clinics (one dentist for 80,000 refugees).

In addition, medical services were provided by private non-profit organizations. Every private organization had its own administrative and medical staff, but each was carefully controlled and regulated by military authorities.

Official sources described the services offered at each of the government hospitals as including internal medicine, general surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, burns, maternity, pediatrics, orthopedics, ophthalmology, hematology, cardiac care, psychiatry, dialysis, urology and intensive care. What was not indicated, however, was the deteriorating services which were offered. The hospitals in the Gaza Strip did not possess the technical infrastructure needed to deliver services effectively. The sanitary conditions in the Gaza Strip hospi-
tals were very bad. Rooms were extremely dirty and in a state of decay as indicated by broken windows, peeling paint, and cracked floors. Hospital beds were very old and rusting, wards were overcrowded, and the patients often lay on torn and blood-stained sheets. The surgical operating rooms were in a bad state and were not sterile. Health insurance fees increased rapidly and most inhabitants could not afford them, thus the majority of the people in the Gaza Strip lacked health insurance. In short, the health services were in a bad condition.

1.3.3. Demographic Characteristics of the Population of the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

In 1993, the population of the Gaza Strip was estimated to be close to one million inhabitants. The annual growth rate of the population was 3.9 percent, among the highest growth rates in the world. The population density of the Gaza Strip was approximately 3,000 persons per sq. km. Gaza city itself had a population density of over 10,000 persons per sq. km., making it one of the most congested places in the world. The average number of persons per household was 6.50. The Palestinian household in the Gaza Strip, therefore, was relatively large.

Young people constituted a high proportion of the population in the Gaza Strip. The population below age 14 accounted for over 48.3 percent of the total population. The percentage of the population aged 16 and over with no education was estimated at about 20 percent. Table no. 4 shows the percentage distribution of the population in the Gaza Strip by sex and age.
Table No. 4

The Percentage Distribution of the Gaza Strip Population, by Age and Sex 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>9.60</td>
<td>20.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>12.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>10.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>9.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>7.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51.99</td>
<td>48.01</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The lack of comprehensive planning at the grassroots and national levels, the harsh military orders and restrictions and the high dependency ratio made the population of the Gaza Strip very poor. *

According to UNRWA statistics, the refugee community comprised a majority of the total population and was estimated at 450,000. 320,000 of these lived in the eight refugee camps, and the remaining 130,000 lived outside the camps. ** Average age on marriage was 23.7 years for males and 19.7 years for females. ***

1.3.4. Economy of the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

The economy of the Gaza Strip was characterized by a population grossly disproportionate to the material resources needed to sustain it. Unemployment was high and this affected negatively the labour force. The industrial sector in the Gaza Strip was underdeveloped and it could not absorb the labour force, and the agrarian sector also could not offer enough jobs for the available workers. This naturally had implications for the trade unions and associations.
In 1948 the Strip emerged as an underdeveloped and dependent economic entity.\(^1\) Between 1948 and 1967, it was linked to the Egyptian economy, and from 1967 on it was characterized by dependency on the Israeli economy.

The Gaza Strip economy suffered from perpetuated economic underdevelopment and de-development as a result of its isolation from the rest of formerly mandatory Palestine, the influx of a large number of refugees, the absence of a national authority, and the Israeli economic restrictions and repressive policies.

During the nineteen years of Egyptian rule (1948-67), the economy of the Gaza Strip had not developed a viable basis or a means of supporting its residents. Workers could find low-paying, seasonal jobs in the orange groves, but at least half of the adults were unemployed and the per capita national product was only $80 in 1966.\(^2\) Citrus was the only growth sector; citrus groves covered 6,000 dunums in 1948, and this had risen to 70,000 dunums in 1966. The produce was exported largely to Eastern Europe.\(^3\)

In 1967, the immediate impact of the Israeli occupation was to exacerbate unemployment: service jobs for the Egyptian army and UN forces vanished, trade with Egypt halted, and Gaza port was closed.

Under the Israeli occupation, the Gaza Strip economy faced inevitable integration into the Israeli economy and Israeli policies increased the Strip’s dependency on Israel. These practices included permitting only certain Gaza Strip products to be sold within Israel, flooding the Strip market with Israeli goods, restructuring agriculture which was the backbone of the economy and encouraging Palestinian labourers to work in Israel.\(^4\) A brief examination of the different economic sectors under the Israeli occupation will be presented.

**Agriculture in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993**

Prior to 1967 agriculture was the main economic activity in the Gaza Strip, accounting for one-third of all employment, 70 percent of GDP and more than 90 percent of all exports.\(^5\)

Under the Israeli occupation agriculture underwent serious difficulties.
Due to Israeli expropriations and restrictions, less land was available, citrus production suffered from restrictions, and land holdings were increasingly fragmented. The marketing system was disorganized and dependent on Israeli permits. The water supply was increasingly inadequate. Israeli policies and the lack of credit resources hindered land reclamation, mechanization and the introduction of modern irrigation techniques.

Compared with the Israeli agricultural sector, the agricultural sector in the Gaza Strip suffered from a number of disadvantages. Israel's policy towards agriculture in the Gaza Strip was geared towards complementing Israel's production and market requirements. Palestinian farmers were prohibited from producing certain crops (such as flowers, and citrus i.e. planting new citrus trees was not allowed) which competed with Israeli products. Wherever Palestinian and Israeli interests competed, Palestinian interests were controlled and suppressed. For example, the sale of Palestinian fruits and vegetables in East Jerusalem was "illegal", but it was not illegal to sell Israeli products in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, agricultural products in the Gaza Strip could not compete with subsidized Israeli agricultural products. As a result, the cultivated areas in the Gaza Strip declined and agricultural labour decreased. Table no. 5 shows the declining percentage of the labour force accounted for by agricultural labour.
The Agricultural Labour Force In the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labourers in Agriculture</th>
<th>Percentage of Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>12,800</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the researcher. An interview with Mr. Muhammad al-Rayyis, Director of the Department of Agriculture, Civil Administration, Gaza, 13/7/1994. Agricultural Workers, Department of Agriculture, Civil Administration, Gaza, 1994, p. 3.

The production of citrus in the Gaza Strip made it nearly a one-crop economy. Accounting for 77 percent of the Strip's exports, the citrus crop experienced a very high output between 1972 and 1976, which was solely attributed to the planting of 40,000 dunums of citrus trees prior to 1967. Beginning in 1977, citrus yields began to decline to an output of 164,000 tons in 1984, from a peak output of 243,700 tons in 1975. The reasons for the decline in output were twofold: Israeli policies directed against the development of citriculture in the Strip on the one hand, and the dwindling of water resources on the other. The Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip issued orders which made it illegal and therefore punishable to plant new trees or replace old, non-productive ones. Moreover, tax policies applied to the citrus industry further impeded its capacity to grow. Taxes fell into four categories: land taxes, income taxes, value added taxes (VAT) and export taxes. In 1984, a new order was issued making it illegal to plant fruit trees (all kinds of fruits and not only citrus) on a commercial scale unless permission to do so was granted. Permits, however, were rarely issued.

Palestinian agriculture in the Gaza Strip suffered from Israeli military restrictions and measures. For example, water restriction was a major problem which hindered the development of agriculture. Military orders were issued against the digging of new wells and limiting the amount of water utilized by the Strip's farmers. Farmers were limited to 800 cubic metres/dunum per year for hard soil and 1,000 cubic metres/dunum per
Military Order 498, which was issued in November 1974, severely restricted both water usage and agriculture in the Strip. It contained the following main restrictions: first, digging wells without prior licence was prohibited; second, planting new citrus trees was forbidden; third, meters should be installed on every well; and fourth, consumption of water should not exceed 800-1,000 cubic metres per dunum annually.

Over-pumping by Israeli settlements became a serious problem with the intrusion of sea water into the aquifer. Over-pumping by Israeli settlements became a serious problem with the intrusion of sea water into the aquifer. In the Gaza Strip, groundwater was the only source of water. The source was located in sandstone aquifers 10-15 metres below the surface and replenished both by direct rainwater infiltration and by underground flows from the east. The Israelis sank more than 40 wells deeper than the wells of the Palestinian farmers, to supply Israeli farmers across the "Green Line" and the settlements in the Strip. Consequently, water used for irrigation became more saline and damaged the quality of the Strip's agriculture. The disruption of the Strip's natural aquifers robbed the inhabitants of a crucial natural asset.

Between 1967 and 1993, livestock production in the Gaza Strip accounted for approximately 26 percent of agricultural output. In 1983, there were about 7,000 cattle, 17,000 sheep, 125,656 goats, and 20,000 laying hens. Within the livestock sector, meat production was the most productive branch contributing 48 percent to the value of livestock in 1983. Milk was the second largest contributor with 27 percent in 1983, followed by egg production which contributed 17 percent. In 1993, there were 37,800 laying hens, 795,000 broiler chickens, 3,656 goats, 8,713 sheep, and 2,000 cows.

Fish contributed the smallest share in the economy of the Gaza Strip (3% in 1983). The main factor accounting for the decline of fishing in the Gaza Strip was the Israeli authorities' restrictions which limited the fishing area to within 12 kilometers of shore. In 1983, the annual catch in the Gaza Strip was between 800 and 1,200 tons and the number of the fishermen in the Strip was 1,000-1,500.

Generally speaking, continued restrictions on the agricultural sector in the Gaza Strip accelerated a process of decline. The Israeli policies
towards the agricultural sector jeopardized the backbone of the Gaza Strip's economy.

Industry in the Gaza Strip

The pre-1967 industrial sector in the Gaza Strip consisted mainly of owner-operated workshops geared towards meeting domestic demand. Industry accounted for only 4.2 percent of the GDP in 1967 and employed between 3,000 to 6,000 persons. After 1967, industry's share of GDP remained low but increased to 9.9 percent.

Before 1967, the development of industry in the Strip was impeded by the absence of natural resources or sources of energy, a limited local market and a shortage of capital. When, in 1967, Israel imposed a common market with the Gaza Strip, the Strip's dependence on Egypt overnight shifted to dependence on Israel. By 1968, 100 percent of the Strip's industrial exports went to Israel and 91 percent of its imports came from Israel. Israel imposed restrictions covering two main areas: marketing and investment. Financing industrial activity in the Gaza Strip was very difficult. Lack of an efficient banking system and other financial institutions meant that the only funds available were from private sources or, to a lesser extent, from local development agencies.

Industrial production remained focused on the processing of primary food products, textiles, clothing, leather, wood and metal products. In 1993, the majority of industrial firms (93%) employed ten workers or less and only 3% of the Strip's industrial establishments employed twenty persons or more. None employed 100 workers or more.

In 1985, the average number of workers per industry was four, with only 5 percent of factories employing more than 10 workers, and only 1 percent employing more than 21 workers.

Roy summed up the Gaza Strip's industrial sector as comprising "fourteen factories of toilet paper, three for cookies, two for notebooks, five for packing ranges (boxes) and two for soft drinks." In addition, there were small workshops and cottage industries engaged in a variety of areas.
Generally speaking, a number of factors led to the slowness of the development of industry in the Gaza Strip. Among these were the absence of a Palestinian national authority which was able to undertake planning and financing of industries; the political instability which did not encourage industrial investment; the Israeli restrictions; problems of marketing; disorganization inside the Strip which impeded industrial planning or research; weakness of the Chamber of Commerce in the Strip; lack of funds; lack of a trained industrial labour force; and Israeli policies which Benvenisti termed a form of "integration and exclusion" (i.e. integration into the dominant economy when it benefited that economy, and exclusion when it did not). The result was that neither the industry nor the economy were able to progress.

Labour in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

Pre-1967, the labour force in the Gaza Strip made up 19 percent of the total population. Since 1967, the labour force proportion has remained between 18 percent and 19 percent. The low percentage made up by the labour force was due to a number of factors: a large proportion of the population was under 15 years of age (about 55 percent); there was a constant emigration of adults; and few women participated.

From 1968, the Israeli authorities permitted workers to be employed inside Israel. By 1980, about 100,000 workers worked across the so-called Green Line, of which at least 30,000 were registered workers and the rest were "irregular" (i.e. not-registered) workers. Alongside the registered workers there was what some Israelis called the "Arab slave market" (irregular workers). It was estimated to be 60,000-70,000. By the end of 1993, the number of workers who were allowed to work inside Israel was reduced to 20,000. Registered workers paid the same social security contributions as Israeli workers, although their wages were low by Israeli standards and the social services available in the Strip were far inferior.

Female participation in the labour force working inside Israel was estimated to be 3.3 percent, although women compromised 10 percent of the domestically employed labour force. Lower levels of female participation in labour were due to the social stigma attached to female employment, particularly in non-agricultural activities. Males who lost employment in Israel tended to seek it within the Strip rather than
emigrate, thereby reducing both the need for female labour and the opportunities available to it. Although the Israeli authorities had raised the minimum age for employment to 14, from 12 previously permitted in the Gaza Strip, some families often sent their children to work to supplement their incomes.

1.3.5. Professional and Non-professional Associations in the Gaza Strip

In the Gaza Strip, the associations and non-governmental organizations constituted active actors parallel to the official Israeli apparatuses. The associations played vital roles at social, economic, and political levels. The associations in the Gaza Strip affected and were influenced by the socio-economic features.

The associations in the Gaza Strip can be classified into a number of kinds: professional associations, non-professional institutions, and charitable organizations.

The professional associations in the Gaza Strip covered a wide range of professions such as medicine, law, engineering, labour, etc. All the professional organizations were registered and performed their activities according to permission from the Israeli authorities.

In addition to the registered organizations, a number of non-registered organizations emerged. The necessity which led to the rise of mass-based initiatives in the Gaza Strip was clearly the result of a number of political, social and economic factors. Most important among them were: first, the intensification in political activity of the Palestinian national movement, with its different factions and parties; second, the existence of a politicized student stratum with a firm and cumulative nucleus; third, the escalation in Israeli oppression and suppression and restriction; and fourth, the increase in daily needs and service demands as a result of regression in the services offered by the occupation authorities.

The professional and non-professional organizations in the Gaza Strip presented various services in different fields and supported various programmes. In the chapters which follow, more details about the associations and organizations will be presented.
1.3.6. The Jewish Settlements in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

The Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip constituted a part of the social and political environment which affected the trade unions and associations' activities. A brief review of the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip will be presented.

Between 1967 and 1971, the Gaza Strip, characterized by a great deal of guerrilla activity, was not suitable for Israeli settlement. Only one Israeli settlement, Ikfar Darom, was built during this period (1970). The significant settlement drive in the Gaza Strip was undertaken after the armed resistance in the Strip had been crushed in 1972. Thereafter, the Israeli authorities steadily appropriated Palestinian lands and sponsored the settlement of immigrants within the Gaza Strip.

Israeli acquisition of Palestinian land was based on the following techniques: first, the military authorities declared land "closed for military or security purposes", and such land could then be turned over to settlers; second, land could be expropriated for the "public benefit", which could be interpreted to cover the establishment of settlements and construction of roads linking settlements; and third, land in the Gaza Strip could be claimed as "abandoned" if the owner left the area before, during or after the 1967 war. Israeli seizure and acquisition of land increased from 1967 to 1993. By 1993, Israel had acquired an estimated 55 percent of the Gaza Strip's land.

Perhaps the most significant feature of these measures was the way in which the state and the public interest were defined as Jewish and not Palestinian. Once declared a state possession, lands automatically became part of the Jewish patrimony. In the Gaza Strip, while twenty-five Israeli settlements inhabited by more than 4,000 persons occupied 30,000 dunums of land, eight refugee camps with a population of more than 300,000 occupied only 5,500 dunums.

The objectives of the Israeli settlement policy in the Gaza Strip were: to create a strong Israeli presence in the Strip which would make it difficult for the Palestinians to form an independent state; if necessary to be able to use the settlements as bargaining cards in negotiations; and to isolate the Palestinian communities from each other. The result of the pursuit of these objectives was a settlement pattern char-
acterized by four blocks of settlements located in the northern, central and southern parts of the Strip.\textsuperscript{11}

The Israeli Northern Settlement Block in the Gaza Strip

The northern block of settlements was built on lands belonging to the villages of Bait Lahya and Bait Hanun. Four settlements comprised the northern block: Eretz, Nitsanit, Elei Sinai and Nevets Sala.\textsuperscript{12} The Eretz settlement began as a military outpost in 1968 and in 1972 was established as an industrial zone.\textsuperscript{13} Nitsanit was initially established as a military post in 1978; it became a \textit{nahal} (military fort) in 1982. It was located just south of Eretz. Elei Sinai was established in 1983 by settlers evacuated from their settlement, Yamit, in the Sinai. It was located west of Eretz. Nevets Sala was effectively an extension of Elei Sinai.\textsuperscript{14}

The Israeli Central Settlement Block in the Gaza Strip

This block was located to the south of Gaza city and was established on land belonging to members of the Abu Middain tribe.\textsuperscript{15} At the heart of it was one large settlement, Nitsarim. Nitsarim was founded in 1972 and was the second settlement built in the Gaza Strip (the first was Ikfar Darom, which was established in 1970 on 450 dunums, near Dair al-Balah).\textsuperscript{16} Nitsarim became a civilian Moshav (cooperative village) in 1980.\textsuperscript{17}

Also in this block were Tal Or, Ambar and Tal Montar, established on lands belonging to some Gaza city families.\textsuperscript{18} Tal Montar was created in 1982 and was located east of Gaza city.\textsuperscript{19} In 1985, Tal Or was established to the south of Gaza city. Ambar was established in 1986 to the south of Gaza city.\textsuperscript{20}

The Southern Block of Jewish Settlement in the Gaza Strip

The settlements of the southern block were situated on state and private lands in Khan Yunis and Rafah. The Israeli authorities confiscated 47 percent of the total land in the Khan Yunis area and 30 percent of the land in the Rafah area.\textsuperscript{21}

On the Khan Yunis land there were fourteen Israeli settlements: Kadish,
Mirav, Katif, Nitzir Hazani, Gani Tal, Gani Or, Ibdwlah, Nevi Deqalim, Atzmona, Ghadid, Katif (D), Yaghol, and Katif Beach Hotel. The settlements constituted Gush Katif (i.e. Katif Settlement Block), which was established in 1973. Gush Katif was the largest block of settlements in the Gaza Strip. It was located north, west and south of Khan Yunis. It contained an air port, hotels, colleges, schools, clinics, synagogues and kindergartens.

In the Rafah town zone there were three Israeli settlements: Murag was built in 1972, Rafiah Yam was established in 1984, and Miztpeh Atzmona was built in 1979. They were located at the southern end of the Gaza Strip near the Egyptian border.

In summary, most of the Israeli settlements in the Strip were located in the south, along the coast near the Strip’s water aquifers. This gave the settlements a large degree of control over Gaza’s water resources. The existence of Israeli settlements in the Strip impinged on all aspects of the residents’ lives. The settlements exacerbated many of the physical, economic, and political problems which already plagued the Gaza Strip.

1.4.0. Conclusion

In 1948, the Gaza Strip was created as an artificial entity as a result of the first Arab-Israeli war and it had unique political, social, and legal characteristics. The Strip was not a part of an independent state; the area had never been claimed as an integral part of an Arab state, and Israel did not consider the territory a part of biblical Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel).

The Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip re-constituted the Strip’s socio-economic-political-legal setting. Jewish settlers were introduced into the Gaza Strip and affected the demographic features; military orders shaped the legal framework; the economy of the Gaza Strip underwent a process of dependency on the Israeli economy; the trade unions and associations were regulated and were prevented from developing smoothly; the administration was dominated by the occupier and the inhabitants’ lives in the Gaza Strip were "processed" to cohere with the Israeli interests.
The unstable socio-economic-political-legal setting in the Gaza Strip constituted the environment within which the Gaza Strip population, the Israeli authorities, the Palestinian political movements, and the trade unions and associations, interacted. Within that unstable environment, the trade unions and associations performed their functions, constituting a Palestinian response to the Israeli occupation.
Footnotes and References


The Unique Status of the Gaza Strip.


The Egyptian Administration in the Gaza Strip.

The Executive Authority in the Gaza Strip according to Article (18) of the Fundamental Law 255/1955 consisted of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Governor-General</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Deputy of the Governor-General (If any)</td>
<td>(If any)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Director of the Legal Affairs</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Director of the Interior Affairs and Public Security</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Director of Finance and Economy</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Director of the Social Affairs and Refugees.</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Director of Culture and Education</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Director of Health</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Director of Public Works</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 Members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Legislative Council in the Gaza Strip according to the Article (23) of the Fundamental Law No.255 11 May 1955 consisted of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Governor-General</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Executive Council members</td>
<td>9 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mayor of Gaza and three members of the municipal council</td>
<td>4 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mayor of Khan Yunis and two members of the city municipal council</td>
<td>3 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>One member from each of village council of Rafah, Dair al-Balah and Jabalia</td>
<td>3 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Four members from the refugees to be chosen by the Executive Council</td>
<td>4 Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Seven members to represent the professions of medicine, education, lawyers, commerce, and agriculture</td>
<td>7 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31 Members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


25. Article (18) provides: "The Governor-General shall be appointed by a decree from the President of the United Arab Republic. In cases of the vacancy of his post or any other impediment, the U.A.R. Minister of War shall delegate some one to act in his place who shall, however, not have the right to ratify or issue laws."


27. Article (15) provides: "The executive powers shall be vested in the Governor-General together with the Executive Council within the limits of this Constitutional System."

28. Article (24) provides: "The Executive Council shall be composed of:

1) The Governor-General (Chairman)
2) Deputy Governor-General (if any)
3) Director of Legal Affairs. (Member)
4) Director of the Interior and Public Security (Member)
5) Director of Finance and Economy (Member)
6) Director of Education and Culture (Member)
7) Director of Health (Member)
8) Director of Public Works (Member)
9) Director of Municipal Affairs (Member)
10) Director of Social Affairs and Refugees (Member)
11) Director of Civil Affairs (Member)


30. Article (30) of the Constitutional System of Gaza Sector provides: "The Legislative Assembly shall be formed in the following manner:

(a) The Governor-General (Chairman)
(b) Members of the Executive Council (c) Twenty-two members to be chosen by the elected members of the local councils of the Arab Palestinian National Union in the Gaza Strip in accordance with rules, conditions and system of election issued by the Governor-General; and (d) Ten members to be selected by a decree from the Governor-General from among properly qualified Palestinians fulfilling all the conditions or candidature for membership of the local committees of the National Union. With the exception of ex-officio members no one shall be permitted to combine membership and a public post."

The Executive Council in the Gaza Strip, according to the Constitu-
tional System of Gaza Sector 1962 (Art. 24), composed of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) The Governor-General</td>
<td>(Chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Deputy Governor-General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Director of Legal Affairs.</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Director of the Interior and Public Security</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Director of Finance and Economy</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Director of Education and Culture</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Director of Health</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Director of Public Works</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Director of Municipal Affairs</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Director of Social Affairs and Refugees</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Director of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>(Member)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 11 Members


31. Articles (20) and (21) provide: "The Governor-General shall ratify and issue laws in the name of the Palestinian people within two months from the date on which they are submitted to him. If he decides not to ratify a draft law passed by the Legislative Assembly, he shall have the right to return it to the Legislative Assembly for reconsideration. If the Governor-General does not return the draft law to the Legislative Assembly within this period (two months) this shall be considered as ratification of the draft law which may thus be issued. The Legislative Council shall not be permitted to reconsider a draft law ratification which has already been refused during the same session" (Art. 20). Article (21) stipulates: "If during another session the Legislative Assembly approves by a majority of three-quarters of its members a draft law which the Governor-General has refused to ratify, the Legislative Assembly shall return it to the Governor-General for promulgation." See: "Republican Decree announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2, Winter-Spring 1963, pp. 156-161.

32. Article (38) provides: "The Legislative Council shall meet only at its official seat or at a place to be specified by the Governor-General if and when necessary. The Legislative Assembly shall meet only when invited to do so by the Chairman. Any meeting contrary to these stipulations shall be considered invalid." See: "Republican Decree announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2, Winter-Spring 1963, pp. 156-161.

33. Article (37) provides: "The Governor-General shall have the right, during the session of the Legislative Assembly, to suspend its sitting, providing the suspension does not exceed two months." See: "Republican Decree announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2, Winter-Spring 1963, pp. 156-161.

34. Article (45) provides: "No member of the Legislative Assembly has


37. Article (69) provides: "Unless contradictory to the provisions of this constitutional system, all Palestinian systems, legislations, regulations, orders, instructions, orders by the Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or any other competent authority since the entrance of the Egyptian Forces into the area is insofar as it does not violate the right of the Legislative Authority to abrogate or amend them within the limits of its power. No responsibility would follow in consequence of the measures, actions, orders or judgements, issued prior to February 25, 1958 in compliance with the laws, statutes, orders, circulars or instructions referred to in the previous section." See: "Republican Decree announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2, Winter-Spring 1963, pp. 156-161. Shamgar, Meir, Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel 1967-1980, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1982, p. 81.


Section Two: The Israeli Military and Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip.


1.2.4. The Municipalities, Village Councils and Local Committees in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Date estd.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ghazzah</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>TM</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Dair al-Balah</td>
<td>TM</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Jabalia</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Al-Nazlah</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Bait Lahya</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Bait Hanun</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Al-Zawaidah</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Al-Nusairat</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Al-Buraij</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Al-Maghazi</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Al-Qararah</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Abasan al-Kabirah</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Khuza'ah</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Bani Suhaila</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Ma'in</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Al-Masurah</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Al-Idhiniyah</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
CM = City Municipality
TM = Town Municipality
VC = Village Council
V = Village without Council
LC = Local Committee

Source: Compiled by the researcher. See also: Nakhleh, Emile A., (ed.), *A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza*, American
2. Ibid., p. 103.


Chapter Three: The Socio-economic Feature of the Gaza Strip

1.3.1. Education in the Gaza Strip


1.3.2. Health Services in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

1. Khali1, Samir Salamah, "Health Institutions in the Palestinian Occupied Territories: between Occupation and the Intifada", *Samid
1.3.3. Demographic Characteristics of the Population of the Gaza Strip 1967-1993


1.3.4. Economy of the Gaza Strip 1967-1993


11. Ibid., p. 45. See also: Al-Astal, cAwwad, "Israeli Economic Policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip", Shu'un Falastiniyyah (Palestine Affairs), No. 179, Beirut, February 1988, pp. 28-35.


13. Water Resources in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, The United


1.3.5. Professional and Non-Professional Associations.


1.3.6. Jewish Settlement in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993


9. Article (49) of the IV Geneva Convention provides that:

"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territories to the territory of the occupying power or to any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motives. Nevertheless, the occupying power may undertake total or partial
evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

The occupying power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are offered in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated. The protecting power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place. The occupying power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. The occupying power shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Hiltermann, Joost R., *Israel's Deportation Policy in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza*, Al-Haq, Ramallah, 1986, p. 98.


16. **Nahal** is acronym for *Nu'ar Halutzi Luhaim* (Fighting Pioneering


26. Ibid., p. 245.

### The Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Eretz</td>
<td>Bait Hanun/Bait Lahya</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Nitsanit</td>
<td>Bait Lahya</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Nevets Sala</td>
<td>Bait Lahya</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Elei Sinai</td>
<td>Bait Lahya</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Tal Or</td>
<td>Ghazzah</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ambar</td>
<td>Ghazzah</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Tal Montar</td>
<td>Ghazzah</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Nitzarim</td>
<td>Ghazzah</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ikfar Darom</td>
<td>Dair al-Balah</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Katif</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Katif (D)</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Katif Beach Hotel</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Atzmona</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Bedolah</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Nevi Deqalim</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Gan Or</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Gani Tal</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Nitzir Hazani</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>Kadish</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Yagol</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Mirav</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Rafiah Yam</td>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
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<td>24.</td>
<td>Murag</td>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>Mitzpeh Atzmuna</td>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>1979</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Two
The Laws Regulating the Establishment and Activities of the Trade Unions and Associations in The Gaza Strip 1909-1993

2.0. Introduction

States occupying territory in belligerent occupation are typically hostile to organizations formed by the occupied population. Such organizations, from the standpoint of the occupant, hold the danger that they will foment opposition. The international law of military occupation requires a belligerent, however, to protect freedom of association, and specifically trade union organizing. A right to organize trade unions, and professional and non-professional associations, is deemed by human rights law to be necessary for the economic and social well-being of the population.

The legal framework within which the state of Israel has sought to control and constrain trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip since occupying it in 1967 is of varied origin. Regulations left behind from the times of Ottoman, British, and Egyptian rule, together with Israeli regulations have all been enforced in this tiny area. Taking into consideration international law and regulations also, it is possible to say that a quintuple legal code has affected directly or indirectly the establishment and activities of trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. During the transitional and post transitional periods of Palestinian self-government, moreover, Palestinian laws are expected to be introduced into the Strip.

In this Chapter a brief review of laws affecting the trade unions and associations will be presented. The focus of the chapter is on the legal setting within which the organizations operated. The chapter will be divided into four sections, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. Section one presents a review of the Ottoman Societies' Law (1909); section two reviews the Cooperative Ordinance (1933) and Part (VII) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) which dealt with the issue of unlawful associations; section three examines Egyptian laws which were issued during the Egyptian administration in the Strip; and section four discusses Israeli military orders issued after the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967.
During the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire witnessed a sustained effort of reform that saw long-preserved and honoured institutions of the classical Ottoman state replaced by new ones, inspired by an increasing knowledge of European thought, society and government.¹

The years from 1909 to 1911 witnessed the period of Ottoman constitutional democracy. In 1909 the Ottoman Societies' Law and the Ottoman Parties' Law were issued.² In this part of the study some light will be shed on the Ottoman Societies' Law, as this still constituted the legal basis for the establishment of associations under Israeli occupation.

2.1.1. An analysis of the Ottoman Societies' Law (1909)

The Ottoman Societies' Law consisted of nineteen articles in two chapters: the first chapter contained sixteen articles and the second chapter three articles.³ It should be noted that the terms "society" and "association" are used interchangeably in the analysis.

According to the definition given in the Ottoman Societies' Law, an association was "a gathering comprising a number of persons combining their knowledge and energy for an indeterminant period, in order to attain some purpose which is not directed to the attainment of profits" (Art. 1). Articles 2 and 6 provided that there was no need for permission to form an association but those who formed an association should inform the Government after the establishment of the association.⁴

The law outlawed some kinds of associations. Article 3 decreed that "it is forbidden to form societies contrary to the laws, public mores, public order and security, or associations which aim to overthrow the present government, or associations which aim to encourage racial discrimination".⁵ The Ottoman Societies' Law also forbade the establishment of some kinds of political organizations. Article 4 provided that "political associations that have been founded on the basis of nationality and race shall be prohibited". The Ottoman Societies' Law outlawed the formation of secret societies. Article 6 stipulated that "it should be strictly prohibited to establish a secret association".⁶
Although the law permitted the formation of an association prior to the government being informed, it obliged each association not to operate before registering with the government. On registration, a certificate of registration should be given to the founders; the certificate would constitute conclusive evidence that the association had been registered in accordance with law. According to Article 3, an association should not be registered if any of its purposes, express or implied, negated the public order, or the security of the area, or if the establishment of the association was liable to serve as a veil for unlawful activities. Nor should an association be registered with a name liable to mislead or to harm the welfare of the public, its sensitivities, the public or the security of the area.  

The founders of a society should immediately inform the Ministry of Interior Affairs. They should enclose information about the society, including its address, its aims, its administration, the names of the persons in its administrative committee and two stamped copies of the society's constitution. Societies also should inform the government of any changes or modifications in membership or in their constitutions.  

Article 7 covered the managerial structure. At every association's centre there should be a management board comprising not less than two members. In every branch there should be a management board connected to the central board. Every board should be obliged to maintain three books as follows: in the first, there should be recorded the names of the members of the board and their titles, the date of their admission to the board, the date of the termination of their membership, their addresses, the year of their birth, their occupation and their identity card numbers; in the second, there should be the resolutions of the board, exchanges of letters and notices; and in the third, there should be a detailed account of all the income and expenses of the association.  

An association had the status of a juristic person. Every association which had received a certificate of registration had the right to appear in court as a plaintiff or defendant through its representative (Art. 8).  

Article 17 gave the right to the government to interfere directly in the societies' activities and to decide whether a society served public
interest or not. The governmental officers had the right to search the headquarters of associations on condition that they were provided by an official permit in writing (Art. 18). Article 19 provided that both the Ministry of Interior Affairs and that of Justice were responsible to implement this law. 11

From the analysis which has been mentioned above, there are clearly some "taboos" in the provisions of the Ottoman Societies' Law: first, it was not permitted to form political associations on a national basis (Art. 4); second, secret societies were banned (Art. 6); third, it was forbidden to form a society without governmental permission (Arts. 2, 6); fourth, it was illegal to hide information related to the financial sources of the society; and fifth, it was not permitted to keep arms in a society's headquarters.
The turning-point in the history of Palestine came during World War I. Both the British and Turkish made overtures to the Arabs to join their ranks in the war which was then raging. In the end, the British succeeded and an agreement was concluded between Sharif Husain of Mecca, as the representative of the Arab peoples, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, on behalf of his government.¹

During the ensuing British Mandate over Palestine, a number of regulations were issued which affected the activities of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. In this part of the study an analysis of the Cooperative Societies Ordinance of 1933, and part of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (Part VII) which relates to unlawful associations, will be presented. The aim of the section is to examine the legal environment surrounding the trade unions and associations.²

2.2.1. The Cooperative Societies Ordinance No. 50 of 1933

Three factors justify including the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 50 of 1933) in this study: first, the Ordinance constituted an integral part of the legal framework in the Gaza Strip within which the trade unions and organizations operated; second, the cooperatives played a significant economic role in the economy of the Gaza Strip; and third, people in the Gaza Strip have dealt with the cooperatives on a similar basis to other associations.

The cooperative movement in Palestine commenced in 1919 when the Anglo-Palestinian Co. and the Palestine Colonization Association were established. Thus, the cooperative movement in Palestine was connected at its beginning with the colonization of Palestine. The first Palestinian Arab cooperative was established in Yaffa (Jaffa) in 1919 but was liquidated in 1927.³ In 1930 a cooperative for citrus producers was established, but in 1931 this was dissolved. The first Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 53) was promulgated in 1920. This Ordinance was integrated in Cooperative Societies Ordinance No. 50 of 1933.⁴
2.2.1.1. An Analysis of the Cooperative Societies Ordinance

On December 27, 1933, the British Mandate authorities in Palestine issued the Cooperative Societies Ordinance. The Ordinance specified that the High Commissioner could appoint a person to be registrar of cooperative societies for Palestine or any portion of it, and could by general or special order confer on any such person all or any of the powers of a registrar under the Ordinance (Art. 2).

As regards the aims of the cooperatives, Article 3 of the Ordinance provided that a cooperative society aimed at "the promotion of thrift, self help and mutual aid among persons with common economic needs so as to bring about better living, better business and better methods of production".

With respect to the association's membership, Article 6 stipulated that the members of a registered society should be individual persons who had completed their eighteenth year; and a cooperative's members should consist of at least seven persons (Art. 6[1]).

For the purpose of registration of a cooperative society, an application should be made to the registrar, and the application should be signed by at least seven persons. The application should be accompanied by two copies of the proposed rules of the society and by the name or names of some person or persons who would negotiate with the registrar about the settlement of the rules (Art. 8). If the registrar was satisfied that a society had complied with the provisions of this Ordinance and the regulations, and that its rules were not contrary to the Ordinance or to the regulations, he might either register the society or refuse registration without assigning any reason for such refusal (Art. 9[1]).

A society which adopted, without substantial amendment, the model rules approved by the registrar for a society of that class, should pay no fee for registration and a notice of its registration should be published without charge in the Gazette (Art. 10[1]). Every other society should, on registration, pay a fee of four pounds and should also pay the same charge for the notice of registration in the Gazette (Art. 10[2]). A certificate of registration signed by the registrar would constitute conclusive evidence that the society was duly registered (Art. 11). Any two or more societies could, with the approval of the registrar, by a
resolution, passed at a special general meeting of each society, held for the purpose, by a three-fourths majority of the members, amalgamate as a single society. The Cooperatives' Ordinance allowed the government to subject cooperatives to its direct control and inspection by several means. First, every registered society had to keep a copy of the Ordinance and of the regulations and of the society's constitution and a list of its members, open to inspection free of charge at the registered address of the society during such hours as the office of the society was open for business. Second, the books of every registered society had to be audited at least once each year. The audit had to include, inter alia, an examination of over-due debts, the verification of the cash balance and securities, and a valuation of the assets and liabilities of the society (Arts. 20, 21).

The Cooperative Societies Ordinance thus constituted the legal basis of the Palestinian cooperative movement in the Gaza Strip.

2.2.2. The Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) and Unlawful Associations

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) were framed by the British Mandate authorities and continued to be implemented by the authorities in the Gaza Strip through to 1993. Although the regulations did not include provisions which dealt directly with trade unions and associations, Part (VII) of the regulations covered the issue of "unlawful associations". It is, therefore, important to shed light on this part of the Defence Regulations. In order to clarify the legal context within which the trade unions and associations operated, a brief review of part (VII) of these regulations will be presented.

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations were issued by the British High Commissioner in Palestine on September 27, 1945. They were based on Palestine (Defence) Order in Council (1937) which stated in Article (6 [1]):

"The High Commissioner may make such regulations as appear to him in his unfettered discretion to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Palestine, the maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot, and for main-
"Unlawful association" was defined in part (VII) of the regulations as:

"any body of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated and by whatsoever name (if any) it might from time to time be known, which by its constitution or propaganda or otherwise advocates, incites or encourages any of the following unlawful acts...."

The "unlawful acts" referred to were: first, the overthrow by force or violence of the constitution of Palestine or the Government of Palestine; second, the bringing into hatred or contempt of, or the exciting of disaffection against, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or the Government of Palestine or the High Commissioner in his official capacity; third, the destruction of or injury to property of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or of the Government of Palestine; fourth, performing acts of terrorism directed against servants of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or against the High Commissioner or against servants of the Government of Palestine; and fifth, "committing or claiming to have been responsible for, or to have been concerned in, any such acts as are mentioned above".

The regulations specified the offences of member(s) of unlawful association) which were punishable by the law. Article 85 stated that the punishments were applicable to: first, any person who was, or acted as, a member of an unlawful association; second, any person who managed, or assisted in the management of, an unlawful association; third, any person who held any office or position in or under an unlawful association; fourth, any person who did any work or performed any service for an unlawful association, unless he proved that he bone fide believed that the work or service was not for the unlawful association; fifth, any person who attended any meeting of an unlawful association, or permitted or suffered any meeting of an unlawful association to be held in any house, building or place belonging to or occupied by him or under his control; sixth, any person who had in his possession, custody or control any book, account, periodical, handbill, poster, newspaper or other document, or any funds, insignia or property, belonging or relating to or issued by or in the interests of an unlawful association; seventh, any person who knowingly handled, collected, received, requested or demanded any donation or subscription for an unlawful association;
eighth, any person who by writing, words, signs, or other acts or representation, directly or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, implication or otherwise, acted on behalf of, or as a representative of, an unlawful association. Those found guilty of an offence were liable tried under the Magistrates' Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance No. 45 of 1939, to imprisonment for three years or to a fine of one hundred pounds or to both such imprisonment and fine; or if tried under the Criminal Procedure (Trial Upon Information) Ordinance, to imprisonment for ten years or to a fine of two hundred pounds or to both such imprisonment and fine. 

The above mentioned analysis of Part (VII) of the regulations is significant within the context of this study because the regulations remained in effect in the Gaza Strip after the Mandate and constituted a part of the legal framework which regulated the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. The authorities which ruled the Gaza Strip resorted to the legal framework to outlaw trade unions and associations. For example, the Egyptian authorities in the Gaza Strip banned the trade unions from 1948 to 1954 and the Israeli authorities banned trade unions in the Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1980.
Section Three
The Egyptian Administration's Laws Relating to Trade Unions and Associations in the Gaza Strip, 1948-1967

The aim of this section is to examine the legal environment which influenced popular organizations during the Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip, and to review the laws which constituted a part of the environment within which the trade unions and associations undertook their functions. The legal framework ensured close governmental involvement in the affairs of trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip.

The Gaza Strip was subject to Egyptian administration from 1948 to 1967, with a break for four months from 31 October, 1956 to 7 March, 1957. During that period the Egyptian authorities enriched the legal system in the Strip by issuing many laws and orders which directly and indirectly regulated the formation of trade unions and associations.

The Egyptian authorities in the Gaza Strip issued constitutional laws, trade union laws, labour laws, club laws, and association laws. The constitutional laws included the Fundamental Law of the Gaza Strip (May 11, 1955) and the Republican Decree Announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector (March 9, 1962). The trade union laws included Order No. 331 of 1954 concerning the granting of permission for forming trade unions in the region placed under the Egyptian forces supervision in Palestine (i.e. the Gaza Strip). The labour laws included Order No. 559 of 1957 which authorized the establishment of a Labour Department in the Governor-General’s Administration (with responsibility for labour affairs), and Egyptian Labour Law No. 91 of 1959, in which section four dealt with issue of the trade unions. As regards clubs, the Clubs’ Law No. 335 of 1954 was issued. On cooperative societies the Egyptian administration issued laws amending the Cooperative Ordinance No. 50 of 1933.

This section is divided into six subsections: the first examines both the Fundamental Law and the Republican Decree Announcing the Constitutional system and how they dealt with the issue of association; the second reviews Order No. 331 (1954), which was the first law in the history of the Gaza Strip which specifically permitted the establishment of trade unions; the third discusses the Clubs’ Law No. 335 (1954) and its amendments; the fourth reviews Order No. 559 (1957), which decreed the establishment of a Labour Department to be responsible for the labour
affairs; the fifth reviews Labour Law No. 91 (1959), which constituted the legal basis of the trade unions' constitutions in the Gaza Strip; and the sixth reviews the Egyptian amendments of the Cooperative Ordinance No. 50 (1933).

2.3.1. The Fundamental Law of the Gaza Strip (1955), the Constitution of the Gaza Strip (1962) and Trade Unions and Associations

The focus of this subsection is the examination of the constitutional rules which were issued during the Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip promulgated two constitutional laws during the period 1948-1967. First, the Fundamental Law (May 11, 1955). Second, the Republican Decree Announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector (March 9, 1962). Although, neither the Fundamental Law nor the Republican Decree dealt directly with the issue of the trade unions and associations, they included articles dealing with the issue of freedom of association. In order to clarify the legal setting within which the trade unions and associations operated, it is important to discuss these articles.

The first section of the Fundamental Law of the Gaza Strip dealt with public rights and obligations. Article 1 provided that the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip were equal before the law, and that they had the right to practise their civil and political rights. Although there was no clear and direct provision concerning freedom of association and trade unionism, it was possible to understand from Article 8 that freedom of association was guaranteed. Article 8 stipulated that "addressing public authorities collectively in the name of a group is only permitted for (juristic) bodies". The article implied that it was possible to address the public authorities by a group of people with a juristic personality (i.e. an association).

The Constitution of the Gaza Strip (1962) included one article which dealt with the issue of freedom of association. Article 14 stipulated that "Palestinians had the right to address the authorities. Public authorities may not be addressed in the name of groups except by organizational authorities." It is clear that the above mentioned article implied the right of the residents in the Gaza Strip to address, individually and collectively, public authorities.
2.3.2. Order No. 331 (1954) Relating to the Granting of Permission for the Establishment of Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip, and its Amendments

In 1954, the first law in the Gaza Strip's history which specifically allowed the establishment of trade unions was decreed by the Egyptian authorities in the Strip. On 24 October 1954, the Egyptian commander of the Gaza Strip, General Muhammad 'Abd Allah Rif'at, issued Order No. 331 of 1954 concerning permission for the formation of trade unions in the region placed under the Egyptian forces supervision in Palestine (i.e. the Gaza Strip).¹

This law was named the "Trade Unions' Law in the Region Placed under the Egyptian Forces Supervision in Palestine" (Art. 1). The law permitted the formation of trade unions in the region placed under the Egyptian forces' supervision in Palestine (Art. 2). The law allowed the authorities to intervene in the affairs of trade unions.

Workers who undertook the same profession had the right to form a trade union to take care of their interests, to defend their rights, and to improve their material and social status. There were some conditions to this: first, the number of workers in one establishment who were eligible to form a union should not be less than twenty-five; second, the number of workers who were not in the same establishment should be no less than fifty; third, it was illegal to form more than one union for workers or employees of the same establishment; fourth, it was not permitted to form more than one union for workers in same profession; fifth, union membership was not open to a worker less than fifteen years old; and sixth, an administrative board member should be at least eighteen years old (Art. 5).²

Administratively, according to the trade unions' law, each trade union had to have an administrative board, consisting of no less than five and no more than twelve members. The administrative board of a union was elected by the general assembly, by secret ballot, according to the rule of one man one vote rule (Art. 8[b]). The Deputy-Governor of the Gaza Strip had to be informed of any change in the membership of a union's administrative board within thirty days (Art. 8[c]).³ This shows that the law ensured the close governmental supervision of the trade unions.

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A union's administrative board had to present the following documents to the Deputy-Governor's office: two copies of the union's bylaw signed by the administrative board's members (Art. 9[1]); two copies of the meeting minutes of the general assembly in which the administrative board was elected (Art. 9[2]); two copies of the list of members of the administrative board: their names, ages, professions, and place of residency (Art. 9[3]); a list of the union's members with their names and titles, ages, place of residency, profession and nationality (the list had to be signed by each member of the union (Art. 9[4])); and a statement signed by the union's administrative board declaring the establishment of the union according to the law (Art. 9[5]).

As to the jurisdiction and activities of a trade union, the Order stipulated that a union had a juristic personality; it had permission to establish saving funds; it had the right to form cooperative societies, sports and cultural clubs; and it had the right to provide social and health services (Art. 17).

Article 18 stated that a union was not allowed to perform any of the following activities: financial, commercial, industrial activities, or acquisition of funds without the approval of the Deputy-Governor; engaging in speculation (financial and commercial); engaging in political and religious matters; receiving donations and bequests without the approval of the Deputy-Governor; establishing or purchasing buildings without the consent of the general assembly; and inciting strikes and sit-downs, encouraging the presentation of collective grievances, and opposing the official authorities in the area. This had its economic and political significance. The law authorized the authorities to restrict the economic and political activities of the trade unions.

The Deputy-Governor of the Gaza Strip had the right to reject ratification of the registration of any union for any of the following reasons: if he deemed that the persons who applied for a union's registration were not eligible; if it seemed to him that the objectives of a union were illegal; or if he considered that the application of registration contradicted with the law (Art. 10).

The Deputy-Governor of the Gaza Strip was entitled to cancel the registration of a union if there was any deception or illegality in the
process of registration; and if a union did not adhere to its declared objectives (Art. 14[a-d]). In any such case, a union had to disband itself within a month after publishing that decision in the official Gazette (Art. 15).

Order No. 331 of 1954 authorized the authorities to supervise the trade unions in a number of different ways. Two of these related to a union's constitutional basis: first, a union was not permitted to perform its activities without depositing the required documents mentioned in Article 9; and second, any modification in a union's constitution had to be deposited in the same way (Art. 10).

Order No. 331 was also concerned with the administrative organization of unions. The overall significance of this is that the Order indicated how closely the government regulated and supervised the running of the unions. The order contained some procedural measures which were intended to organize the activities of the unions and to strengthen the authorities' control of the unions. First, Article 19 provided that a union had to have a registrar who received correspondence, and the Deputy-Governor had to be informed about the address of the registrar. Second, a union had to adhere to its own constitution, which should include the following:

"the name of the union; its seat (headquarters); the address of its registrar; the name of its legal representative; the objectives of the union; the conditions of accepting members (their dismissal and the amount of membership dues); a union's financial resources (its expenditures and its dispositions); the function of the general assembly and the rules that controlled its activities; composition of the administrative board (its jurisdiction, the rules which controlled its activities, the electoral procedures for electing its members, their resignation and their firing); the rules concerning the union's accounts (its budget and the name of the bank in which a union deposited its reserve funds); procedures of the modification of a union's bylaw; and procedures for its dissolution" (Art. 20).

The authorities closely supervised the financial affairs of the unions. A union had to present, to the Deputy-Governor of the Gaza Strip, within three months after the end of the fiscal year, a financial statement signed by a chartered accountant and the minutes of the general assembly meeting during which the statement was ratified (Art. 21). The governmental inspectors had the right, at any time, to enter the head-
quarters of the unions and to examine their records.

The authorities restricted the holding of meetings by a union without obtaining prior permission. A notification should be sent to the Deputy-Governor and to the Director of Interior Affairs and Public Security, seven days before convening a union meeting (Art. 25).

The authorities scrutinized the membership of the unions. In cases where the union's members in an establishment reached three-fifths of the establishment's personnel, the rest of the personnel should be automatically considered members in the union. The Deputy-Governor had to be informed about the (new) members of a union and a list of the members should be presented to him (Art. 23).

It was illegal for a union to dismiss a member without a just hearing in the presence of the administrative board. In cases of dismissal the administrative board should issue a dismissal decision with the support of two-thirds of its members. The sacked member had the right of appeal to the Central Court within thirty days.

Order No. 331 allowed for the formation of a federation of the unions. Trade unions that were formed according to this law had the right to form a federation to take care of their interests and to supervise their affairs (Art. 27). The unions' federation should honour the rules of its constitution, which should specify the manner of representation of each trade union in the administrative board and in the general assembly, and the annual dues payable by each trade union.

On June 4, 1964, the Egyptian authorities in the Gaza Strip started substantive measures to bring the trade unions into existence. The Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip, General Yusuf 'Abd Allah al-'Ajrudi, issued Order No. 6, which in effect authorized the Director of Refugees and Social Affairs to implement the trade union law of 1954. In 1964, trade unions in the Gaza Strip were thus brought into being. Six trade unions were established in 1964 and 1965.

On May 8, 1965, the Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip issued Order No. 14 of 1965, which triggered the establishment of a trade union federation (according to Article 27 of Order No. 331 of 1954). In 1965, the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation (PWTUF) was brought
into existence.

In conclusion, Order No. 331 of 1954 constituted the first law which specifically allowed workers in the Gaza Strip to form their own trade unions. However, the actual formation of unions did not occur until 10 years later, in 1964. The order put the activities of the trade unions under the close control of the authorities.

2.3.3. Order No. 335 Concerning the Clubs' Law of 1954, and its Amendments

The Clubs' Law constituted an integral part of the legal framework in the Gaza Strip within which the organizations performed their activities. Thus, it is important to shed some light on this law.

On November 10, 1954, the Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip, General "Abd Allah Rifat, issued Order No. 335 which allowed the establishment of clubs in the Gaza Strip. The order consisted of 22 Articles which dealt with clubs' matters. The order ensured close governmental involvement in the affairs of clubs.

An application for opening a club had to be presented to the Governor-General of the Gaza Strip, and be signed by the constituent assembly of a club, or by the club's president, secretary, and treasurer. Three copies of the club's constitution, a list of its founding members' names, and the names of its administrative board, had to be enclosed (Art. 3).

The clubs in the Gaza Strip were required to register with the government as the other associations did. It was not permitted to open a club, or to move it from one place to another, without the agreement of the Governor-General of the Gaza Strip, in writing thirty days before opening or moving the club (Art. 2).

The constitution of a club should include the following points:

"its name and its headquarters; the names of its founding members; their surnames; nationality; occupation; and addresses; the goals of the club; the qualifications of membership and membership's fees; procedures of electing the club's administrative board; functions of the administrative board; the jurisdiction of the club's general
assembly; the financial resources of the club; its expenses; procedures of keeping books of account; and procedures of modifying the club’s constitution".

The Governor-General of the Gaza Strip had the right to reject the opening or moving of a club where the place was improper from the hygienic and social point of view; where the constitution of a club contravened law and public order and mores; where some of the founding members of a club were ineligible; or where opening a club was used as a veil to revive another closed one (Art. 7).

A club was prohibited to engage in political matters. A club was not allowed to be involved in inciting people for strike and protest; introducing collective complaints; calling for demonstrations; violating security and public order; or resorting to violence (Art. 16).

A club was not permitted to affiliate to an association located outside the jurisdiction of the Egyptian forces in Palestine without obtaining clear permission from the Governor-General of the Gaza Strip.

Violating the Clubs' Law was punishable by three months of imprisonment, or a fine of no more than fifty Egyptian pounds. The Governor-General of the Gaza Strip had power to close down a club for three months in case of violating the law.

On March 14, 1955, the Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip issued Order No. 349, which amended Article 16 of the Clubs' Law. The amendment added new categories of outlawed political activities. The amendment forbade a club from involving itself in political activities such as organizing sit-downs; taking adversary steps against the official authorities; or participating in riots.

2.3.4. Order No. 559 of 1957 Concerning the Establishment of the Labour Department

Seven years before the establishment of trade unions in the Gaza Strip, the Egyptian authorities in the Strip created a new department to be responsible for labour affairs.

On 16 November 1957, the Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip, General Muhammad Hasan Abd al-Latif, decreed Order No. 559 of 1957. The
order consisted of five articles. Article 1 stipulated that a new branch named the Labour Department was to be established in the Governor-General's Administration, subordinate to the Department of Refugees and Social Affairs. The significance of establishing the Labour Department was to subject the labour affairs to the governmental control and supervision.

According to the order, the functions of the Labour Department were to implement laws, regulations, and orders with respect to the employment of employees and workers; and to implement laws and regulations regarding the organization of relations between them (employees and workers) and businessmen (i.e. employers) (Art. 2).

The Director of the Labour Department and his assistants had the power of police inspectors, and they were entitled to arrest, to inspect, and to investigate during the performance of their functions (Art. 3). In 1957, Husain °Abd al-°Aziz al-Bishri, an Egyptian officer, was appointed as director to the Labour Department (Art. 4).

2.3.5. Egyptian Labour Law No. 91 of 1959

Egyptian Labour Law No. 91 was intended to organize trade unions in Egypt, but it was also applied in the Gaza Strip from 1964 onwards. The law emphasised close governmental involvement in the affairs of trade unions.

The law (with Order No. 331 of 1954) formed the legal basis for the constitution of trade unions in the Gaza Strip. Section four of the law dealt with the issue of trade unions. With respect to the formation of a trade union, the law provided that it was the right of workers of the same craft to form a union to take care of their interests (Art. 160).

A trade union was considered a juristic person. It had the right to establish saving funds, to form cooperatives and athletic and cultural clubs, and to sign social security agreements (Art. 161).

As regards membership, a member of a trade union should not be less than fifteen years of age (Art. 163).

Article 164 of the law mentioned details about the content of a trade
union's constitution. The provisions were similar to those in Articles 20 and 21 of Law No. 331 of 1954. Articles 169 and 170 of the Egyptian Labour Law organized the manner of establishing a federation of trade unions, again in a similar way to that mentioned in Law No. 331 of 1954.

Law No. 91 obliged a union's administrative board which was elected by the general assembly of a trade union to give the respective authorities within fifteen days after its election two copies of the trade union's constitution signed by the members of the administrative board; two copies of the minutes of the general assembly's session in which the administrative board was elected; two copies of the list of the administrative board's members, their ages, crafts, and addresses; a list of names of the trade union's members, their ages, addresses, and professions; and a statement signed by the administrative board's members declaring the formation of the trade union according to the rules of the law. The significance of the obligations was to ensure close governmental intervention in the affairs of trade unions.

The law imposed a number of restrictions and limitations on the activities of trade unions. It was not permitted to invest moneys in financial, commercial, industrial enterprises without the consent of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. Financial and commercial transactions were banned. Intervention in political matters was forbidden, and donations could not be received without the agreement of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (Art. 174). The law had its significance because it restricted the political and economic activities of the trade unions.

The law gave the Egyptian Minister of Labour and Social Affairs the right to ask a court to dissolve a trade union if the latter committed a violation of the rules of the law; incited the overthrow of the regime; incited sectarianism; neglected its duties to serve the public interest; or used force, violence, terror, threat, or illegal measures to achieve its goals. In case of the dissolution of a trade union, its assets went to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

2.3.6. The Egyptian Amendments of the Cooperative Societies Ordinance

The Cooperative Societies Ordinance No. 50 of 1933 was subjected to substantial amendments. The amendments which were introduced involved
exempting the cooperatives from income taxes, and enabling the government to intervene in the cooperatives' affairs and to control their membership and activities. Most of the amendments were intended to ensure close governmental involvement in the affairs of the cooperatives.

First, the Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip, General Yusuf al-Ajrudi, issued Resolution No. 35 of 1965 which exempted the cooperatives' income from tax. This decision was issued on October 12, 1965 and published in the Gazette on November 15, 1965.¹ The resolution had some positive effects in encouraging the cooperative movement in the Gaza Strip. But the other amendments ensured close governmental involvement in the affairs of cooperatives.

Second, on February 17, 1965, the Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip issued Resolution No. 6 of 1965. The resolution determined the procedures for electing members of a cooperative's administrative board as follows: a list of persons who had the electoral right should be prepared; each person who wished to be a candidate had to apply to the secretary of a cooperative; a committee headed by the chairman of the Department of Cooperation, or his deputy (with another two members), should supervise the elections; and elections should be by secret balloting.² The resolution had its positive effects because it permitted electing members of a cooperative's administrative board in a democratic way and it was also intended to encourage the cooperatives' members to participate in electing the administrative boards' members.

Third, Resolution No. 15 of 1966 was issued which allowed the governmental registrar of cooperatives to appoint some members of a cooperative's administrative board. This could be done where the number of the candidates was less than the number required according to the provisions of a cooperative's constitution; where there were no candidates for the administrative board; or when an administrative board was formed by appointment (Art. 1[a,b,c]).³ The negative significance of the resolution was that it authorized the government to intervene in the internal affairs of the cooperatives.

Articles 2 and 3 of the resolution gave the registrar the authority to dismiss a member of a cooperative administrative board if he/she was behaving in contradiction to the cooperative's goals, principles, and...
harming the reputation of the cooperative movement; neglecting the convening of the administrative board because of internal differences; or encouraging personal, familial or ideological clashes among the members of the administrative board.⁴

Fourth, on April 24, 1966, the Governor-General of the Gaza Strip issued Resolution No. 4 of 1966 concerning the amendment of Article 13 of the Cooperative Ordinance No. 50 of 1933. The amendment authorized the registrar to determine the amalgamation of two or more similar cooperatives if it was deemed to serve public interest.⁵ The significance of the resolution was that it gave the authorities the right to superimpose the amalgamation of cooperatives regardless of their members' point of view.
Section Four
Israeli Military Orders Concerning Trade Unions and Associations
in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

The Israeli authorities introduced a legal system which aimed at preventing the establishment of new trade unions and restricting the activities of the existing trade unions and associations. The vague word "security" motivated the Israeli behaviour towards the popular organizations in the Strip. Israel employed all means to control the Palestinian popular associations. The Israeli military authorities issued a number of military orders to "organize" the trade unions' and associations' activities.

The authorities aimed at enhancing their control and supervision over the trade unions and associations. The Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip issued a number of military orders, which produced a repressive legal framework within which trade unions and associations performed their activities.

In this part of the analysis a brief review of these orders will be presented. The section is divided into three subsections: the first examines the Israeli amendments of the Ottoman Societies' Law; the second reviews the Israeli military order number 766 concerning the control of the public bodies; and the third examines the Israeli amendments of the Cooperative Ordinance No. 50 of 1933 and the Clubs' Law No. 335 of 1954.

2.4.1. Military Order 686 Modifying the Ottoman Societies' Law (June 1981)

On June 23, 1981, the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip issued Military Order No. 686 concerning the modification of the content of the Ottoman Societies' Law. The order was declared by the military commander of the Gaza Strip, General Ishaq Segev. The justification which the military commander used in issuing the law was "... in order to maintain security and public order in the area."

The changes to the Ottoman Societies' Law were such that the content of the amended law was significantly different from that of the original Ottoman Societies' Law of 1909. The Israeli amendments covered two
aspects, each related to one aspect of the law. The first section dealt with the indigenous societies and included general rules (the Arts. 1-18), and the second section dealt with the non-indigenous societies. Because this study mainly discusses the indigenous societies, the analysis is focused on the Israeli amendments of the first section of the Ottoman Societies' Law.

The Israeli order determined and restricted the aims of a society. According to the order, the aims of a society could include presenting charitable, religious, cultural, educational, scientific, health, athletic, mutual assistance and social services to the population (Art. 1[A]). The significance of this was that the order predetermined the scope of a society's aims. A society was not allowed to achieve any goal which was not permitted by provisions of the Israeli order.

The Israeli order obliged the founders of a society to register with the authorities. Article 2 was amended. It stated that the founders of a society should apply to the respective authorities for its registration.

"The application should contain the society's name; its aims; its address; the names of its founders (their addresses, their ages, and their identity cards numbers); and a copy of an association's constitution should be enclosed with the application for registration" (Art. 2[C]).

The order authorized the authorities to issue a "standard constitution", which had to be applied by any society which failed to enclose its constitution in the application for registration. The significance of those obligations was that it tightened the authorities' control of the societies.

Article 3 of the Ottoman Societies' Law was changed to contain some restrictions on the registration of societies: the registration of a society was forbidden if its aims implied a contradiction with "security" and "public order", or in case the establishment of a society might be used as a veil to exercise illegal activities. It was illegal to register a society under a misleading name or a name which contradicted with the public feeling of security, or public order, and the security of the area (Art. 3[B]). The change had its substantial significance because it allowed the government, at any time, to outlaw a society and ban its activities.
Article 6 was replaced by a new article under the same number. The new Article aimed clearly at tightening Israeli control on the societies in the Gaza Strip. The article stated that it was absolutely forbidden to establish a secret society, and it was not permitted for a society to exercise its functions without registration (Art. 6[B]). The significance of the article was that a society was no longer allowed to exercise its activities before it had been registered with the authorities.

A new article was added under section (6[A]) which concerned the right of societies to make changes to their constitutions. In such cases, the consent of a majority of the members was needed, and any change in an association's constitution should only enter into force after ratification by the authorities (Art. 6A[A]). The significance of the article was that a society was not allowed to amend its constitution without the agreement of the authorities.

The order gave the Israeli authorities the right for close supervision and intervention in the internal affairs of the associations in the Gaza Strip. Article 7, which was modified, provided that the respective authorities should be informed about the members of a society (their addresses, date of birth, occupations, and identity card numbers). The society account notebooks should be shown to the authorities every year on 30 April (Art. 7[B, C]). The financial assets of a society should be deposited in a bank which was approved by the authorities.

The Military Order 686 granted the Israeli Military Commander of the area full power to dissolve a society after a warning in writing in each of the following cases: where the society operated in contradiction with law; where the society or its aims violated the security of the area or public order, or exercised illegal activities; where a society received donations or financial support without agreement from the respective authorities; where a society bought, built, or gave a service to the public without the consent of the respective authorities; where a society failed to present its books of account and its fiscal report in time according to Article (7[C]); and where a society engaged in political activities (Art. 12).

The order authorized the authorities to decide whether a society served
public interests or not. An association should not be considered to be an association for the advantage of the public until confirmation by the commanding officer of the area. This meant that the authorities could at any time decide that a society was no longer serving public interests and close it down.

The police were given authority to supervise the associations. Police officials might enter the places of their meetings at any time. In this case the police should be obliged to serve an official document containing an order or permission to enter the place. The permission was usually given by the commanding officer of the area.

The Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip issued a number of other amendments to the Ottoman Societies' Law. The authorities aimed at enhancing their control and supervision of the associations. The amendments ensured close governmental involvement in the affairs of associations.

On October 10, 1983, the Commander of the Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip, General Haim Irez, issued Order No. 832, concerning the amendment of the Ottoman Societies' Law. The change dealt with Article 17 and provided that societies were prohibited from presenting services to the public without the agreement of the empowered authorities. The order authorized the government to intervene directly in the functions of the societies.

On February 9, 1984, the Israeli Commander of the Gaza Strip, General Musha Bar Kokhba, issued Order No. 843, containing another amendment of the Ottoman Societies' Law. The order decreed that associations should not hold meetings without informing (in writing) the empowered authorities thirty days before the date of the intended meeting. The letter which informed the authorities about the date of the meeting should contain the place, the day and time of the meeting, and the agenda of the meeting. The order gave the authorities the right to control the associations' meetings.

Clearly, the bulk of articles of the Israeli Orders entitled the Israeli military authorities in the Gaza Strip to strengthen their close supervision of the activities of the associations.
On June 29, 1982, the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip issued military Order No. 766 controlling public bodies such as trade unions, associations and clubs. The Israeli Commander of the Gaza Strip, by issuing this order consisting of 14 Articles, aimed at supervising various kinds of public bodies in the Strip. The significance of the order was that it authorized the authorities not only to extend their involvement in the affairs of trade unions and associations but also in the affairs of any other public body working in the Gaza Strip.

The order defined a public body as "every body corporate which had legal capacity to receive rights, to give obligations, and to enter into a contract". Thus, the order gave another dimension to the legal setting within which the organizations (e.g. trade unions, associations, clubs, companies, funds, banks, etc.) were compelled to perform their activities. The order put limitations on a public body receiving financial support by a public body. It was not permitted for a public body to receive loans, donations, or gifts without prior permission in writing from the authorities (Art. 2[A]). Money which was received by a public body should be put in an account in a bank in the area with approval of the authorities (Art. 3[A]). A public body was required to provide the authority with a thorough report of its financial sources, its expenditures, and its documents (Art. 4). A public body was obliged within sixty days after proclamation of the order to close its account in banks outside the area and open an account in a bank inside the area (i.e. the Gaza Strip), on condition that permission was obtained from the authorities for this purpose (Art. 5[B]). A public body was obliged to put all its financial assets in one account in a bank inside the area (Art. 5[C]), and was obliged to present to the authorities an accurate financial report of the amount of money kept in the bank (Art. 5[D]).

The order included a number of penalties which might be imposed on the public bodies. In case of violating any clause of the order, two years imprisonment or a fine of IS50,000 Shekels, or both penalties, were imposed (Art. 6[a]); a violation of any clause of a public body's bylaw was punishable by two years of imprisonment or a fine of IS50,000 Shekels, or by both penalties (Art. 7); and any public body's official committing a crime (including crimes above mentioned in Article 7) was
punishable by two years imprisonment or a fine of IS$50,000 Shekels, or by both punishments (Art. 8). Private property related to the crime should be confiscated (Art. 9[A]).

On April 30, 1985, the Israeli Commander of the Gaza Strip, General Musha Bar Kokhba, issued Order No. 875, which contained an amendment of Order No. 766. The amendment dealt only with the definition of the term "enemy" which was included in Articles 1 and 2 of Order No. 766. The word enemy was replaced by "an adversary organization" (i.e. the PLO and other Palestinian factions). The order prohibited any kind of communication with an adversary organization. The significance of the order was that it outlawed establishing relations between the organizations in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian political factions.

2.4.3. The Israeli Amendments of the Cooperative Ordinance No. 50 of 1933 and the Clubs' Law No. 335 of 1954

The Israeli military authorities in the Gaza Strip amended both the Cooperative Ordinance No. 50 of 1933 and the Clubs' Law No. 335 of 1954. The Israeli authorities aimed at tightening the legal framework to ensure their close involvement in the affairs of the cooperatives and clubs.

On March 28, 1973, the Israeli military commander of the Gaza Strip issued an order which abolished Resolution No. 35 of 1965, which had exempted the cooperatives' income from tax. The Israeli commander Abraham Orli declared that the new order was in effect from April 1, 1973. The Israeli amendment clearly affected the cooperatives' activities adversely, hindering the development of the cooperative movement in the Gaza Strip.

On June 14, 1981, the commanding officer of the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai, General Ishaq Segev, issued Order No. 687 concerning the modification of the Clubs' Law. According to the order

"it was forbidden to register a club if its goals contradicted public order, to use the club for illegal purposes and exercising illegal activities, to name the club by a misleading name, to violate public order and security, and to receive moneys without agreement of the authorities".
On July 9, 1981, General Segev issued Order No. 704, which related to another change in the Clubs' Law. The amendment obliged the founders of a club to apply for its registration to the respective officer. The Israeli amendment also included authorization of the commanding officer to impose a penalty of three months imprisonment, or a fine of IS20,000 shekels in the case of violating the law.4

On July 14, 1987, the Israeli authorities issued Order No. 921 amending the Clubs' Law. The amendment of Article 3 stated that clubs could not operate without a certificate of registration issued by the respective officer. Article 20 was amended to provide that operating a club without obtaining a certificate of registration from the respective officer and introducing false information in the application of registration form, were punishable by two years imprisonment, or a fine IS10,000 shekels.5

In conclusion, legal obstacles to freedom of association were erected by a number of military orders which were issued by the Israeli occupying power. In addition to legal obstacles in the form of military orders, endless administrative, procedural, and bureaucratic obstacles obstructed the smooth flow of every-day institutional life and hindered the development of the popular organizations in the Strip. The occupation authorities hindered freedom of association and organizations' growth by making full use of both legal and bureaucratic obstacles intended to discourage large-scale popular organizational activities.

2.5.0. Conclusion

The legal setting within which the trade unions and associations operated, in the Gaza Strip, was derived from many sources. There were four main sources of the law: Ottoman, British, Egyptian, and Israeli. The international law constituted a fifth source which also affected the legal framework in the Gaza Strip. However, after 1967, the Israeli military orders constituted the main legal system in effect in the Gaza Strip.
Chapter Two: Footnotes and References.

Section One: The Ottoman Societies' Law 1909


5. The Ottoman Law Relating to Associations of the 29th of Rajab 1327 (1909), Gaza Centre For Rights and Law, Gaza, No Publisher, No date, pp. 1-7.


8. Ibid., p. 150.


11. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Section Two: The British Mandate Laws Related to Organizations in the Gaza Strip


2.2.1. The Cooperative Societies Ordinance No. 50/1933


12. The first Cooperative Societies Ordinance in Palestine was issued by the British Authorities in 1920, and in 1933 the Cooperative Societies Ordinance No. 50 was issued.

2.2.2. The Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945


The Emergency Regulations were also based in the Israeli legal system: the 1948 Law and Administration Ordinance, in Article (9[a]), decreed that:

"should it appear to the Provisional State Council necessary, it may declare that there is a state of emergency in the country and upon the publication of the declaration in the official Gazette the Provisional Government may authorize the Prime Minister or any other minister to make emergency regulations as appear to him to serve the defense of the State, the public's security and the maintenance of vital supplies and services."

*Al-Mawsu'ah al-Falistiniyah* (The Palestinian Encyclopedia), Al-Mujalad al-Thani (Vol. 2), Damishq (Damascus), 1984, pp. 406-408. On May 21, 1948, the Provisional State Council announced a state of emergency in the country (i.e. Israel), and this state of emergency
was in force to the present day (i.e. during the period of the study 1967-1993). See also: Palestine Order in Council, 1922: Statutory Rules and Orders no.1282, London, 1922, Microfiche, Kj-28-169/1 sfr 9., pp. 15-16.


3. Ibid., p. 1075.


Section Three: The Egyptian Administration Laws Related to Freedom of Association and to the Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip 1948-1967


1. Sisalim, Mazin, Imhanna, Ishaq, and Dahduh, Suliman, Majmu'at al-Qawanyin al-Falistiniyah: al-Dustur (The Collection of the Palestinian Laws: the Constitution), Al-Juzu' 27 (Vol. 27), bi-duwun nashir (No Publisher), Ghazzah (Gaza), 1985, p. 49.


3. Al-Waqa'i' al-Falistiniyah (The Official Gazette of the Gaza Strip), Adad Khas (Special Issue), Gaza, February 25, 1958, pp. 1-20

4. Al-Waqa'i' al-Falistiniyah (The Official Gazette of the Gaza Strip), Adad Khas (Special Issue), Gaza, March, 29, 1962, pp. 1-20


2.3.2. Order Number 331/1954 of Trade Unions Law in the Gaza Strip

1. Sisalim, Mazin, Imhanna, Ishaq, and Dahduh, Suliman, Majmu'at al-Qawanyin al-Falistiniyah: al-Dustur (The Collection of the Palestinian Laws: the Constitution), Al-Juzu' 18 (Vol. 18), bi-duwun nashir (No Publisher), Ghazzah (Gaza), 1976, p. 130.

2. Ibid., p. 131.

3. Article (9) of the Order No. 331/1954.
16. *Al-Wa qa'i al-Fal istiniyah* (The Official Gazette of the Gaza Strip), Adad Khas (Special Issue), Ghazzah (Gaza), May 20, 1965, pp. 2-3.

2.3.3. Order No.335 Concerning the Clubs’ Law of 1954

2.3.4. The Order Number 559/1957 Concerning the Establishment of the Labour Department
Palestinian Laws: the Constitution), Al-Juzu' 18 (Vol. 18), bi-dwan
nashir (No Publisher), Ghazzah (Gaza), 1976, p. 165.

2. Ibid., p. 166.
3. Ibid., p.167.

2.3.5. The Egyptian Labour Law No. 91 of 1959

1. Imdugh, Muhammad, Jarvikh al-Harakah al-Magabiyyah li-Ittihad al-Ummal Falastin (The History of the Trade Union Movement of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 1.

2. An interview with Saida al-Astal, the President of the Agricultural Workers Trade Union, the interview was conducted at the researcher’s home, Khan Yunis, 15/7/1994.

3. Article (164) of the Egyptian Labor Law No. 91 of 1959.

4. Qanun al-Amal Raqam 91 (1959) (The Labour Law No. 91 of 1959), No Publisher, No date, Cairo, p. 46.

5. Ibid., p. 48.
6. Ibid., p. 49.
7. Ibid., p. 50.

2.3.6. The Egyptian amendments of the Cooperative Societies Ordinance


5. Ibid., p. 115.

Section Four: The Israeli Military Orders and Societies

1. Sisalim, Mazin, Imhanna, Ishaq, and Dahduh, Suliman, Majmu'at al-Qawabin al-Falastiniyah: al-Dustur (The Collection of the


3. Sisalim, Mazin, Imhanna, Ishaq, and Daghduh, Suliman, Majmu’at al-Qawanin al-Falistiniyiyah: al-Dustur (The Collection of the Palestinian Laws: the Constitution), Al-Juzu’ 7 (Vol. 7), Al-Taba’ah al-Ula (First edition), bi-dwun nashir (No Publisher), Ghazzah (Gaza), 1977, p. 93.

4. The Ottoman Law Relating to Associations of the 29th day of Rajab 1327 (1909). Gaza Centre for Rights and Law, Gaza, No date, p. 3

5. An interview with Lawyer Sā’id Tafish, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza Centre for Rights and Law, Gaza, 23/5/1994.


7. The Ottoman Law Relating to Associations of the 29th day of Rajab 1327 (1909). Gaza Centre for Rights and Law, Gaza, No date, p. 4.


9. Ibid., p. 4491.


11. Ibid., p. 6.

12. Ibid., pp. 6-7.


15. Ibid., p. 6581.

2.4.2. The Israeli Military Order 766: Controlling the Public Bodies 1982


2. Ibid., p. 6311.
3. Ibid., p. 6313.
4. Ibid., p. 6315.
5. Ibid., p. 6316.

6. Jaish al-Difa\textsuperscript{c} al-Isra'ili (The Israeli Defence Forces), Qiyadat Qita\textsuperscript{c} Ghazzah (The Gaza Strip (Israeli) Command), \textit{Manashiir. Awamir, I\textsuperscript{c}lanat} (Leaflets, Orders, and Announcements), Vol. 69, No Publisher, Ghazzah (Gaza), 1985, pp. 7367-7368.

2.4.3. The Israeli Amendments of the Cooperative Ordinance and of the Clubs' Law

1. The Archives of the Department of Cooperation, \textit{The Civil Administration}, Gaza.


3. Jaish al-Difa\textsuperscript{c} al-Isra'ili (The Israeli Defence Forces), Qiyadat Qita\textsuperscript{c} Ghazzah (The Gaza Strip (Israeli) Command), \textit{Manashiir. Awamir, I\textsuperscript{c}lanat} (Leaflets, Orders, and Announcements), Vol. 46, No Publisher, Ghazzah (Gaza), 1981, pp. 4505-4509.

4. Ibid., p. 4547.

5. Jaish al-Difa\textsuperscript{c} al-Isra'ili (The Israeli Defence Forces), Qiyadat Qita\textsuperscript{c} Ghazzah (The Gaza Strip (Israeli) Command), \textit{Manashiir. Awamir, I\textsuperscript{c}lanat} (Leaflets, Orders, and Announcements), Vol. 78, No Publisher, Ghazzah (Gaza), 1987, pp. 8415-8417.
Chapter Three

Associations and Organizations in the Gaza Strip: a General Review

A Classification of the Societies in the Gaza Strip:
their Objectives and Activities

3.0. Introduction

This chapter gives a general review of the associations in the Gaza Strip. It is a factual survey of associations involved in social, economic, professional and non-professional activities. The purpose of the chapter is twofold: first, to provide a comprehensive list of the indigenous associations functioning in the Gaza Strip; and secondly, to provide a general review of these organizations' objectives and activities. For the purpose of the analysis, a number of these organizations have been subjected to examination, as it would be difficult to examine all the associations. However, it should be noted that subjecting an organization's activities to study does not mean that this organization was more important than the others.

The researcher decided to concentrate on associations involved in offering social services to the population, due to the importance of such organizations to population in the Gaza Strip. On the one hand, they have provided valuable services to the population; on the other hand, they have represented one of the only channels available to the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip to organize and assume responsibility. The societies offered a chance for the residents of the Strip to become involved in Palestinian projects, working for the people of the area.

During the period from 1967 to 1993, a number of factors contributed to the emergence of the associations. First, the state of social services (i.e. health, education, etc.) in the Gaza Strip was appalling. Due to the inability or unwillingness of the Israeli authorities to provide the minimum level of social security and sufficient social services, non-governmental organizations in the Gaza Strip emerged to narrow some of the existing gaps and to help solve some of the social problems, which Israeli state policy failed to solve. Second, the harsh economic condition in the Gaza Strip also contributed to the establishment of the associations and organizations in the Strip. Third, the large number of refugees in the Strip (more than 60 per cent of the residents) sig-
nificantly increased the social burden and led to the need for popular organizations to provide social services to help lighten the harsh social and economic burden. The associations in the Gaza Strip represented a Palestinian reply to the occupier’s policies. Thus, they became a means of liberation and struggle against a strategy of deprivation and oppression.

The associations offered a wide scope of social services to the residents of the Gaza Strip and their impact was felt across the society. These services included those given to the needy, such as the deaf, dumb, blind, handicapped and elderly. Services also included those related to training for certain sectors of society, and those which contributed to the development of self-reliance and the performance of projects to secure minimum income. Consequently, the impact of the societies was felt across the entire social, educational, economic, health and welfare continuum of society, stretching from programs for the care of the elderly, invalids and handicapped, to the establishment of schools, health clinics, hospitals, nursing training programs and social and cultural clubs, to economic programs in production and job creation, and to the recording and documentation of human rights violations. On the political level, the associations in the Gaza Strip played a salient role: they provided some institutionalization of society in the absence of a Palestinian national authority. The organizations thus undertook a national mission by participating in the national struggle.

The researcher’s initial intent was to include only those organizations meeting a strict set of criteria. These criteria were that the organization be indigenous and Palestinian; private, non-profit-making and charitable; employing mainly a Palestinian staff; and providing actual service(s) to the community.

An indigenous, Palestinian organization was considered to be one founded by one or more Palestinian resident(s) of the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Board of Directors or other governing body responsible for planning, policy making and major decisions must be composed of permanent Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip. Responsibility for the daily operation of the organization’s service facilities must also lie with such a person or persons and the majority of employees must be Palestinian. Furthermore, the organization should not be affiliated with any other-non-Palestinian organization - in such a way that it must fol-
low directives, or be otherwise unduly influenced by it. The organization must be registered under Ottoman Societies' Law, the Cooperative Ordinance, or the Clubs' Law and their amendments as a private and non-profit organization, and must be engaged in providing services to the residents of the Gaza Strip.

It soon became apparent that these rigid and somewhat arbitrary guidelines did not fit the situation. Many of the organizations providing the bulk of services in a particular field would be excluded for one or more technical reasons, rendering the chapter far less useful. While the aim of the chapter remains to include mainly the private, indigenous organizations, other organizations have been included. Some organizations which received funding of some of their activities from UNRWA, and organizations founded by international agencies and staffed mainly by Palestinians, such as the Near East Council of Churches, the American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), and the Central Blood Bank, which was under the supervision of the Department of Health, were also included.

3.1. Societies Related to Health Services

A number of indigenous health-related organizations were established. In 1993, these organizations and their membership were as follows: the Central Blood Bank Society, which was established in Gaza in 1971, was composed of 250 members; the Red Crescent Society was established in 1972 in Gaza and was composed of 300 members; the Benevolent Society for the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1974, was composed of 350 members; the Maqasid Muslim Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1976, was composed of 22 members; the Arab Medical Association, which was established in Gaza in 1977, was composed of 650 members; the Patients' Friends Benevolent Association, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 175 members; the Physiotherapy Society, which was established in Gaza in 1983, was composed of 35 members; the Gaza Community Mental Health Centre, which was established in Gaza in 1990, was composed of 135 members; the Friends of the Nassir Hospital Society, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1991, was composed of 17 members, the Gharnatagh Medical Centre Society, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 9 members; the Society for Infant and Society's Health Research, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 15 members; the Medical Research and Studies Society, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 17 members; and the Sanabil for
Asthma and Allergy Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 13 members.¹

Examining the above mentioned associations, the researcher noted the following points. First, the size of membership of these organizations was relatively small. It ranged from 9 members for the Gharnatah Medical Centre Society to 650 members for the Arab Medical Association. Second, most of the headquarters of the associations were located in Gaza city; a small number of them had branches in other towns in the Gaza Strip. There were only five organizations with branches outside Gaza city: the Central Blood Bank Society, the Gaza Community Mental Health Centre, the Red Crescent Society, the Society for the Care of the Handicapped in the Gaza Strip, and the Arab Medical Association. Third, a large proportion of the associations were established in the 1990s; their activities were not widely spread across the community in the Gaza Strip. Fourth, most of the associations neglected to establish branches in the refugee camps and the villages, where the need for their services was great.

These organizations aimed at filling gaps in the health services offered by the occupation authorities and UNRWA. For example, the Maqasid Muslim Charitable Society (established in 1976) defined its goals as follows: "establishing modern hospitals; developing the existing ones and establishing pharmaceutical and nursing institutes; and presenting aid to handicapped and needy people".²

In 1971 the Central Blood Bank Society was established as a charitable organization, in cooperation with the Blood Bank in al-Shifa' hospital in Gaza city and under the supervision of the Department of Health. The headquarters of the society was located in Gaza and it had a number of branches in other towns in the Gaza Strip. According to Article 2 of its constitution, the society aimed at "establishing a blood bank in Gaza city; providing blood to hospitals in the Strip; and educating citizens to donate blood" (Art. 2[A, B, C]).³

The Arab Medical Association was established in 1945. At that time its headquarters was in Jerusalem and it had branches in Palestinian towns such as Yaffa (Jaffa), Nablus, and Gaza.⁴ After the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, the association's activities were stopped - to be resumed in 1977.⁵
Article 3 of the Arab Medical Association's constitution determined the goals of the association, which included:

"observing rules of the medical vocation and preserving its ethics (Art. 3[1]); enhancing relations between members of the "medical family" i.e. the doctors and chemists and defending their interests (Art. 3[2]); making efforts in order to raise the scientific standard of the association's members (Art. 3[3]); working in the field of both social service and medical enlightenment (Art. 3[4]); advancing relations with other associations (e.g. charitable and professional organizations) in the Gaza Strip (Art. 3[5]); strengthening the ties with medical associations abroad especially in the Arab countries (Art. 3[6]); and initiating the establishment of unions for various medical vocations (Art. 3[7])." 6

As regards the activities of the associations in the field of health services, these organizations provided a wide range of medical services to the population such as in-patient care, out-patient care, ophthalmic care, dental care, respiratory clinic, physiotherapy, laboratories, X-ray, pharmacies, gynaecological and maternity care, etc. Examples of the associations' activities in the field of health will now be presented.

The Gaza Community Mental Health Programme (GCMHP) is a non-profit organization, which was established in April 1990, to provide comprehensive, community-based mental health services in the Gaza Strip, including training, research, clinic and home based therapy. There were three mental health centres, one each in Jabalia, Gaza city, and Khan Yunis. The GCMHP provided different kinds of services including psychotherapy, play therapy, occupational therapy and treatment for drug addiction. Patients paid minimal fees for the treatment and medications, hardship cases were exempted. 7

The Palestine Women's Union (PWU) in the Gaza Strip also performed health-related activities. In 1992, the PWU planned to organize a course of one year's duration for health education, where about 50 females were enrolled. The graduates were intended to be employed as health instructors in towns, villages and camps where they resided to improve the health standard of the family and community. 8

The Benevolent Society for the Gaza Strip, which was established in 1974 as an independent charity, operated 4 ambulance centres located in Gaza,
Bait Lahya, al-Zawaïdah and Rafah. 15 ambulances served the population of the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Ambulance Centre (7 ambulances) operated as the main centre and served the population of Gaza city and Shatti' refugee camp. The Northern Ambulance Centre (3 ambulances) served the population of the northern part of the Gaza Strip, i.e. the villages of Jabalia, al-Nazlah, Bait Lahya, Bait Hanun, and the Jabalia refugee camp. The Central Area Ambulance Centre (3 ambulances) in al-Zawaïdah village served the population of the central part of the Gaza Strip, i.e. al-Zawaïdah, Dair al-Balah, and the refugee camps of Dair al-Balah, al-Nusairat, and al-Burajj. Rafah Ambulance Centre (2 ambulances) served the population of the southern part of the Gaza Strip - Rafah city and the Rafah refugee camp (i.e. al-Shaburah, Yibnah, Brazil, and Tal al-Sultan suburbs). In 1974, the society established the Artificial Limbs and Physiotherapy Centre for the purpose of fitting and manufacturing prostheses and braces, and administering physiotherapy sessions on the recommendation of the centre's orthopaedic surgeon. The Artificial Limbs Centre also supplied wheelchairs and walkers, with 90% of their costs covered by the Benevolent Society in the majority of cases. Approximately thirty physiotherapy sessions were performed on a daily basis.

In 1986 the Benevolent Society for the Gaza Strip established a Child Development Centre (C.D.C.) in Gaza with the aim of enhancing child survival, health care, and development through prevention, early diagnosis, and early intervention. The Centre was a diagnostic and rehabilitation centre, offering services to children with developmental problems, most of whom fell within the 0-12 age range. Working within the framework of a multi-disciplinary approach to the treatment of a child's disorder, the C.D.C. provided the following services: diagnosis and genetic counselling, psychological assessment and counselling, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, play therapy, orthopedic service, social work services, public health lecturing, and high-risk pregnancy counselling.

The above-mentioned examples give some insight into the aims and activities of the popular organizations in the field of health services. A number of points should be borne in mind. First, most of the organizations in the Gaza Strip which were involved in offering medical services to the population had multiple goals. For example, the Arab Medical Association was established primarily as a professional association for doctors and other members of the medical and veterinary fields. In 1993,
the association served two purposes: first, it remained a professional association foremost; however, and second, the association became involved in providing medical and social services to the community. Second, these associations suffered from the lack of well-trained staff, dearth of financial resources, and the Israeli restrictions which hindered bringing from abroad modern medical equipment. Third, as evidenced by the level of health services provided by the associations in the Gaza Strip, these organizations did have a significant role in enhancing the health services. The organizations, in spite of their limited resources, contributed to the improvement of medical care and the general health of the inhabitants.14

3.2. Societies Associated with Women’s Activities

The formation of the women’s organizations in the Gaza Strip was affected by a number of factors. First, the political developments in the Gaza Strip during the early years of 1960s led to the establishment of the first women’s organization in the Strip (i.e. the Palestine Women’s Union). Second, the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation motivated the emergence of a number of the women’s groups and committees to undertake social and political activities. Third, the Palestinian factions initiated the formation of women’s associations which affiliated to these factions and followed their political orientations.

The origins of the women’s movement in the Gaza Strip lay in the period before Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip, but it was only during the occupation that Palestinian nationalism was articulated and channelled in such a way that women could be mobilized effectively. After nationalist fervor swept the Palestinian community in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Arab governments set up the PLO in 1964. In the same year, the Palestinian Women’s Union was founded in the Gaza Strip, making it one of the few organizations established under the Egyptian administration. In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war, the activities of the Palestinian Women’s Union were suspended, but were resumed in 1968. Branches of the union were established in Gaza (1968), in Khan Yunis (1969), in Rafah (1972), and in Bait Hanun (1981).1

In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of women’s groups and associations were established in the Gaza Strip, making the role of the woman in public
life more tangible. The professed objectives of those organizations were to offer aid to the needy families (especially the prisoners' and martyrs' families) and to encourage voluntary social activities. In 1974, the Society of Women University Graduates was established in Gaza city and was composed of 960 members. In 1979, Women's Work Committees (WWC) were formed in the Gaza Strip. The WWC followed a nationalist line without, however, affiliating themselves with any particular faction. It was clear, though, that most of their founder members were inspired by the political programme of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Muslim Young Women Society was established in Gaza city in 1981 and was composed of 330 members. In 1982, pro-Fatah women founded the Women's Committee for Social Work (WCSW). Pro-communist women founded the Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committees (UPWWC). Activists who identified with the political program of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) established the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC). Most of these committees were outlawed by the Israeli authorities. The Israeli authorities considered them arms of the Palestinian political movements.

In the 1990s, the women's activities were intensified and more women's associations were established in the Gaza Strip. In 1993, these organizations and their members included the Palestinian Women Society in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Jabalia in 1993, was composed of 22 members; the Society for Women's Rehabilitation and Child Care, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1993, was composed of 17 members; the Arab Society for Social Development, Family and Child Care, which was founded in Khan Yunis in 1993, was composed of 17 members; the Society for Organizing and Defending the Palestinian Family, which was brought into existence in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 15 members; the Palestinian Family Defenders' Society, which was established in Rafah in 1993, was composed of 13 members; the Working Women's Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 35 members; and the Charitable Society for Family Care, which was established in Jabalia in 1993, was composed of 11 members.

The constitutions of the women's associations in the Gaza Strip included a variety of objectives such as promoting the woman status in the society; giving an active role to women in public life; initiating training programmes for women; activating the social relations among families; giving aid to poor families by finding employment...
opportunities for women to achieve a better standard of living; supporting equal rights for women and defending the women's right to work and perform social activities; and taking care of the childhood.⁴

The Palestine Women's Union (PWU) in the Gaza Strip, for example, aimed at:

"raising the social, cultural, health and economic standards of women; promoting and patronizing honourable life for needy women and orphans; caring for mothers and children; supporting the working women in their struggle for equality with men in public life; taking care of patients and their families; and co-operating with other organizations with the same objectives".⁵

The Palestine Women's Union performed its activities through its centres in various towns in the Strip. In the child education field, as the pre-school education was not provided in the official educational institutions, the PWU found it was necessary to participate in pre-school education and established five kindergartens in Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Bait Hanun. The kindergartens were equipped with educational media and qualified teachers. In 1993, the capacity of the kindergartens was more than 650 children of 3-5 years of age and about 450 children were enrolled yearly in them. Children of needy families were exempted from fees and provided with uniforms and transportation. In 1978, the Palestine Women's Union inaugurated a nursery, with a capacity of 40 children.⁶

To achieve the objective of raising the cultural standard of women, the PWU in cooperation with the Higher Committee for Combating Illiteracy and for Adult Education started classes for adults. In 1991, 482 students enrolled in 22 centres in the Strip. Courses for teaching English and Hebrew were organized and three libraries were established in the various centres.⁷ The PWU also opened centres for sewing and dress-making. Courses of one year duration were organized, where trainees were given necessary education and training on various styles and fashions. At the end of the course the trainee was given a certificate, which qualified her to work inside and outside the Strip. The sewing workshop in Gaza was founded in 1965. By 1993, 3,000 trainees were graduated. The PWU founded a Cooperative in this workshop.⁸

In 1969 a sewing workshop was opened in Khan Yunis centre. From 1969 to
1993, 1,200 trainees were graduated. In 1972, a third workshop was opened in Rafah, and up to 1993, 410 trainees were graduated. In 1981 a fourth workshop was opened in Bait Hanun where 490 trainees had graduated by 1993. Ladies were encouraged to bring their products to be sold by the PWU.

To preserve Palestinian culture and traditional designs the PWU founded in 1969 an embroidery workshop in each of its four centres. By 1993, about 1,054 women were rehabilitated. Moreover, four crochet and tricot workshops were established in the different centres in Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Bait Hanun. They were equipped with 68 knitting machines. By 1993, 785 trainees had graduated. Their products were either sold or distributed to needy families. In 1991, nine crochet machines were bought and more than 48 women were trained.

In assessing the activities of the Palestine Women's Union it is possible to say that the PWU operated four multi-purpose centres located in Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Bait Hanun. These centres were similar in function, although the centre in Gaza was by far the larger, both in number of people served and number of programmes offered. In 1993, the President of the PWU estimated that 2,000-3,000 families were served by the union's various programmes.

The Society of Women Graduates in the Gaza Strip was founded in 1974 by several professional women of Gaza who felt that women were not participating positively in solving social problems. The aim of the Society was "to involve women within their society, to provide an opportunity for them to think in a forum in which they could discuss and work to solve their common problems."

In its early years, the Society tried to contact all the women graduates in the Gaza Strip to invite them to join the Society. However, the initial attempts to enlist the support of women met with only limited success. This was attributed to several factors, including husbands' refusal, reluctance on the part of women to take an active role, unwillingness to pay the annual fee, and social and class divisions within the Society.

As regards activities, the Society had no real programme. Social activities were held weekly but because of transportation and other
problems, it was difficult for members residing outside Gaza city to attend. A few small activities were undertaken. In 1983, a series of lectures on various subjects were given for women of the refugee camps. A short course in English, taught by a UNIPAL volunteer, was organized. A small sewing class and a Hebrew language class were taught. These were open to all interested women, but members paid only half price. In March, 1984, the Society sponsored an exhibition of local arts and crafts.\(^{14}\)

In 1993, the Society had a membership of 960 women and it was governed by an elected administrative board of nine members. Its members consisted of 960 educated women (of which 342 were university graduates, and 618 graduates of various institute programmes) which represented a large pool of varied talents and skills that could be used in a variety of beneficial projects. This was especially true as it was estimated that less than 10% of members were employed full-time or work in their preferred fields.\(^{15}\)

By 1993, the Society suffered from a lack of well-defined active leadership. The leadership also appeared to lack knowledge of the planning process and precisely what it entailed. Little consideration in general was given to how the Society should be developed as an organization, to what projects could be most beneficial for it to undertake, or to what it was best suited to do.

The Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work (NECCCRW), was established in Gaza in 1951 under the supervision of the Middle East Council of Churches. The NECCCRW was run by Palestinian staff and it was active in various social fields. In the field of women training and education, the NECCRW provided a 22-month intensive course in dress-making aimed at providing training skills in the profession of dress-making for women. Each trainee produced 3-4 articles each month. Some of the produce was sold to the trainees themselves at cost price and the rest was distributed to needy families.\(^{16}\)

Moreover, the NCCCRW offered courses for women in training and instructions on manual and electrical knitting machines. The period of the training course varied from one woman to another depending on the standard and experience of each woman. The NECCCRW also provided an eleven-month-course for women who chose to work as secretaries or
assistants. English language, office practice, typing in Arabic and English languages, simple book keeping lessons and computing were the main subjects taught in the centre. First-aid and other women related subjects were lectured in the centre.  

In addition, the Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work undertook projects to promote employment opportunities. The aim was to provide work for a limited number of families who had lost their bread-winners and did not have a stable source of income. The women received some income through their engagement in performing all kinds of sewing on cloth material which was distributed to needy families. They also prepared all kinds of uniforms for the NECCRW medical staff in addition to the uniforms of trainees at two boy's vocational training centres. A number of women who graduated from the dress-making centre worked under the umbrella of the NECCRW.

Close examination of the women's organizations in the Gaza Strip led the researcher to a number of points. First, most of these organizations were established in the 1990s, although a number of the grass root committees were established in the 1980s. Second, unlike the other women's movements in other parts of the world, the women's movement in the Gaza Strip devoted most of its effort toward the national struggle. Third, the women's committees and associations were affiliated to one or another of the Palestinian political movements. Fourth, the size and activities of the women's organizations in the Gaza Strip did not match with the proportion of women in society (about 52 per cent). Fifth, the burden of the women's organizations in the Gaza Strip became heavier after the outbreak of the intifada in 1987. Women, who had less opportunities to continue their education, became as responsible as men regarding the matter of providing for their families. Many of the men bread-winners lost their jobs and became unemployed workers as a result of the Israeli restrictions. Many other men had been either killed or imprisoned, therefore it was the responsibility of women to take over and handle the matter of earning.

In conclusion, continued efforts needed to be directed at integrating women, as well as other socially marginalized groups, into the development process. Women's societies played a role in training geared towards enabling women to overcome social obstacles, particularly through economic independence. Women's collective projects, which provided social
and economic support structures, were identified as the primary means of promoting the integration of women into social, cultural, and economic development. 

3.3. Societies Related to Child-care

In addressing needs of childhood, a number of Palestinian popular associations were established. These organizations provided education, health, and mother care services. There was a situation where there was a need for services provided by child-care organizations. The political conditions which prevailed the Gaza Strip under the Israeli occupation made that need greater. The establishment of the child-care associations in the Gaza Strip was motivated by the hard conditions under the occupation. As a result of prolonged closures, the problem of children with learning disabilities increased drastically and schools were unable to cope. This problem aggravated the existing problems faced by classroom teachers, such as dealing with physically disabled and emotionally disturbed children, and gifted children. The child-care institutions involved parents in the educational process, and provided informal education opportunities for children. Pre-school education was undergoing a significant process of development that was dynamically related to the overall social and political changes occurring in the Gaza Strip.

In the Gaza Strip, there were about eleven associations involved in dealing with child-care. In 1993, these organizations and their members were: the Al-Amal (Hope) Orphanage Institute in Gaza, which was established in Gaza in 1952 under the Egyptian administration and continued to function after 1967, was composed of 25 members; the Society for the Care of Handicapped Children, which was established in Gaza in 1975, was composed of 350 members, the Childhood Village Society, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 22 members; the Society for Infant and Society Health Research, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 13 members; the Physically-Invalid Child Development Ahli (indigenous) Society, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 19 members; the Society for Disabled Children Right for Life, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 11 members; the Child Affectionates Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 12 members; the Down's Syndrome Children Right to Live Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 9 members; the Dar al-Huda Society for the Child Care in Gaza, which was
established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 23 members; the Sunrise Society for Kindergartens and Social Education, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1993, was composed of 14 members; and the Society for Woman Rehabilitation and Child Care in Khan Yunis, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1993, was composed of 15 members.¹

These societies aimed at providing services to both the healthy and retarded children as well. For example, the Society for the Care of the Handicapped Children in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1975, determined its goals as follows:

"to push society to pay more attention to the problem of mental retardation in order to understand it and to make efforts to change obsolete concepts concerning mental retardation; to establish centres in various areas in the Gaza Strip, to take care of the handicapped, to educate them, and to rehabilitate them, opening classes for the handicapped in schools to enable them to operate on the same footing as non-handicapped people in society; to offer educational and instructive services to handicapped children's mothers in their residences to help the family cope with the handicapped's problems; to offer educational and instructive services to mothers of non-handicapped and who were vulnerable to invalidity as a result of the hard circumstances in the Gaza Strip; to encourage scientific research in the field of impairment, and to conduct educational and training programmes at the university level to qualify people to deal with the problems of handicapped; and to take care of physically and mentally handicapped culturally, socially, and psychologically"."²

The Society for the Care of Handicapped Children is an example of the societies active in the field of child-care. It was active in presenting educational services for the handicapped children. The Society was founded towards the end of the year 1975 when no services for the handicapped Children were available in the Strip. In 1993, the Society employed about 330 persons and it provided services to about 4,000 clients. The Society had branches in Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Jabalia. In 1993, about 400 children received education and services in the Society's branches.³

The Society provided three major services for children. First, the main service facility, which was run by the Society was the Sun Day Care Centre (Markaz al-Shams). Markaz al-Shams was a special education establishment that trained approximately 130 slightly to moderately mentally handicapped children between the ages of 6 and 17. The Centre also had a
waiting-list of about two thousand children. Second, the Society ran the Mothers’ Home-Care/Early-Intervention Programme, which was based on sending home-teachers to 740 mothers of handicapped children every week. The home-teacher taught the mother to become the teacher of her child according to a special curriculum. The Society started in September 1988 a home-based early intervention programme to teach the mothers of non-handicapped children (at risk of developmental delay) to stimulate and educate their children between birth and 4 years of age. This programme served 3,000 non-handicapped children. Third, the Society initiated a Special Education Programme, which was offered by the Fahd al-Lababidi Centre for Special Education in the Beach (shatti’a) Refugee Camp. The Centre was built within an UNRWA primary school and started functioning in November 1986. This unit had four classrooms with facilities which included a gymnasium. It was intended to be the fore-runner of a number of units for teaching the handicapped, to be built within regular schools in the community. Two of the classrooms provided early-intervention programmes for mildly-handicapped children aged 2-5 years, with the objective of sending these children at age 6 to regular schools.

The Society for the Care of Handicapped Children remained one of the most active organizations in the Gaza Strip. This in large part was due to the nature of its leadership. A policy of maintaining contact with a large number of leaders and other prominent officials all over the world was followed. Close relations with professionals in the fields of care and rehabilitation of the handicapped, psychology and other areas related to the Society’s work was maintained.

Some general characteristics of the associations associated with child-care may be noted. First, most of the associations active in this field were of recent origin - most were established in the 1990s. Second, the majority of the child-care associations were located in Gaza city, with few services provided elsewhere. Third, the capacity of these associations was relatively small. In 1993, for example, there were 60 boys and 30 girls resident at the Al-Amal Orphanage Institute, and only 38 children received services by the Down’s Syndrome Children Right to Live Society. Fourth, most of the associations associated with child-care sought to make profit and undertook activities and services covering orphanage, handicapped and invalids, nurseries, and kindergartens. These were costly services and large numbers of families could not afford the
cost to send their children to these associations.

The researcher noted that there were a number of associations which had no active role. Among such were the Child Affectionates Society in Gaza, the Childhood Village Society in Gaza, and the Society for Infant and Society Health Research in Gaza. Some people established associations as a vehicle to obtain social prestige and to establish relations with various Palestinian factions to sell their loyalty to these factions and to obtain financial support for the associations from the faction which stood behind them.

3.4. Educational and Scientific Societies

Two factors contributed to the establishment of Palestinian associations active in the field of education. First, from 1967 on, the Israeli authorities neglected the expansion and development of the educational institutions in the Gaza Strip. A major problem faced by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip was the attempt by hostile forces to destroy the social, economic, and cultural fabric of their society. As a result, the main challenge for Palestinian educators was to find ways through which education could play a significant role in maintaining the society integrated and unified.¹ Second, the Israeli restrictions on and supervision of, the curricula in the governmental schools created a need to express Palestinian national identity in non-governmental education.²

In spite of the continued Israeli repression of educational institutions and cultural and educational activities, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip managed to establish a number of non-governmental educational institutions and associations. They established two universities and four community colleges. Moreover, they greatly expanded pre-school education.³

There were about thirteen registered education-associated associations which were established in the Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1993. These associations and their membership at the time of their establishment included the Quran Memorization Society, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 25 members; the Friends of the Islamic University Society, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 46 members; the Islamic Scientific Society, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 13 members; the Society for Building an Islamic School in al-Qararah, which was established in al-Qararah vil-
lage in 1986, was composed of 17 members; the Society for Establishing a Male Secondary School in Bait Lahya, which was established in Bait Lahya in 1990, was composed of 15 members; the Association of Educational and Creative Thinking, which was established in Bait Lahya in 1991, was composed of 12 members; the Society for Educational Growth, which was established in Gaza in 1991, was composed of 11 members; the Scientific Society, which was established in Gaza in 1991, was composed of 12 members; the Society for Infant and Society Health Research, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 15 members; the Agricultural Research Center Society, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1992, was composed of 17 members; the Medical Research and Studies Society, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 7 members; the Arab Thought Forum Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, as a branch of the Society in Jerusalem, and was composed of 12 members; and the Society for Commercial and Economic Researches and Consultations in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 14 members. In addition, there was also a number of organizations which did not specifically specialize in the field of education and training but offered vocational training and educational and scientific services. These organizations were the Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work; the Friends of the Blind Association, which was founded in Gaza in 1981; and the Union of Industrialists in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1991.

Activities of the educational organizations in the Gaza Strip covered a wide range of services. These included: first, establishing kindergartens and providing school enrichment programmes to make up for the loss in school work due to continued interruption (long closures by the Israeli authorities, strikes, curfews, etc.); second, introducing training and education programmes for women (e.g. training in sewing, embroidery and crochet, short courses, workshops, panel discussions, child care, home economics, first-aid, and home maintenance) with the aim of helping them to perform their role under changing social conditions; third, offering a literacy programme to tackle the problem of illiteracy in the Strip (which rose from 4 per cent in 1967 to 19 per cent in 1993); and fourth, establishing public libraries and organizing trips within and without the Gaza Strip (provided mainly to school children). In the field of vocational training, the Near East Council of Churches...
ran vocational training centres for men and women. In Gaza city, the Men’s Vocational Training Centre aimed mainly at serving teenagers— who generally were school drop-outs. They were taught a trade through training for three years either in carpentry and furniture-making or metal work and welding. Most of the trainees started their training at the age of 14-15 years. Out of 24 graduates (3 in metal work and welding, and 21 in carpentry and furniture) in 1993, eighteen occupied jobs in their field of training inside the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Vocational Training Centre in al-Qararah village was opened in 1984 as a response to the urgent need of having skilled and well-trained electricians. It offered a two-year course in general electricity and the motor-rewinding trade for men who should have completed successfully at least nine years of schooling. A regular NECCCRW follow-up showed that 15 out of 21 who graduated in 1993 worked in their training field.

In 1993, the Union of Industrialists in the Gaza Strip (UIGS) conducted a questionnaire related to the training of released prisoners. The questionnaire aimed to classify the ex-prisoners into three levels to define their training needs. The classification was based on the educational level of the released prisoners. The first level was the beginners’ level, which covered ex-prisoners who possessed no more than the third year certificate of preparatory school. This category needed the following training courses: carpentry, metal workshop, turning, sewing, fashion design, and maintenance and repairing cars technician training courses. The second level was the intermediate level, which covered ex-prisoners who possessed no more than the third year certificate of secondary school. This category needed training courses in cooling and air conditioning, radio and T.V. technician, industrial training courses inside factories to gain experience and industrial machines maintenance and repair courses. The third level was the advanced level, which covered ex-prisoners who possessed university degree. They needed training courses on selling skills, decision making, production planning, pricing and profiting, using the computer in office work, and financial monitoring.

The Friends of the Blind Association was a humanitarian body, which was founded and authorized in 1981 for the interest and well-being of the blind in the Gaza Strip. The association administered a preparatory school for the blind. The activities of the Association aimed at raising the educational, cultural, vocational and economic and social standards
of the blind; developing the preparatory school and starting more classes that might cope with the number of the blind students who successfully passed the primary stage; and following-up the blind students beyond the secondary school to extend whatever services or assistance they required.

Close examination of the above mentioned associations led the researcher to a number of points. First, most of the associations which offered educational services were concentrated in Gaza city and had no branches outside Gaza. Second, a number of the associations no longer existed and were disbanded on grounds of the achievement of their declared aims. For example, the Society for Building an Islamic School in al-Qararah, which was established in 1986, and the Society for Establishing a Male Secondary School in Ba’it Lahya, which was established in 1990, stopped operating after they achieved their aims. Third, the size of membership of the associations was relatively small, ranging between 7 to 46 members. Fourth, the majority of the associations were established in the 1990s and therefore their activities were not very tangible at the time of the research. Fifth, there were some multi-purpose associations, which offered educational services to the residents of the Gaza Strip as well as other services.

3.5. Associations Active in the Field of Senior Citizens and Handicapped

A number of Associations in the Gaza Strip worked in the field of introducing services for senior citizens and disabled persons. In 1993, these associations and their members were: the al-Wafa’ (Fidelity) Invalids Society, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of ten members; the Society for the Handicapped in Gaza, which was established in Gaza in 1975, was composed of 280 members; the Society for the Welfare of Disabled and Aged Persons, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 23 members; the Society of Physically Handicapped People in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 17 members; the Invalids’ Rehabilitation Society, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 33 members; and the Society for Disabled Children Right for Life, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 13 members.

The associations aimed at providing services for the senior citizens and
handicapped. These services included: providing the necessary services for physically handicapped persons and senior citizens, and changing the community's negative attitudes towards them; strengthening the role of disabled persons in the community; lobbying for equal opportunities for disabled persons in terms of education, work and social services; participating in community awareness campaigns to change attitudes towards disabled persons; enforcing laws in defense of the right of disabled persons and promoting legislation toward equal opportunity within the society; proposing projects, programmes and activities with the goal of full participation of physically handicapped persons; defending the rights of senior citizens and handicapped and offering services to them through the establishment of workshops managed by qualified disabled persons; making sure that recreational facilities in the society were available for the disabled and senior citizens; facilitating the employment of disabled persons and co-ordinating and co-operating with other organizations working with disabled and senior citizens to improve their services and activities; and promoting the acceptance of international conventions on disabled persons' rights.2

As regards the activities of the associations in the field of handicapped and senior citizens, the researcher will examine the activities of two associations active in the field of offering services to the handicapped and senior citizens. These associations are the al-Wafa' (Fidelity) Invalids Society and the Society of Physically Handicapped People in the Gaza Strip.

From its establishment in 1980 until 1982, the al-Wafa' (Fidelity) Invalids Society's programme was limited to providing needy old men with food stuffs at their homes. In 1982, the Society rented a house and started its home for aged men. The home accommodated 12 men. The residents lived three to a room and each man was provided with a bed, bedside table and stand-up wardrobe for his individual use. Bed coverings, heaters and (if necessary) clothing were also provided. Three meals a day were served. Medical care was provided by a volunteer doctor and a volunteer nurse; the society maintained a small on-site pharmacy and had a supply of geriatric equipment such as wheelchairs and walkers.3

In its early years the Society had no intention of accepting women until such time when the new building was finished and completely separate facilities could be provided.4
Criteria for admission were that a man be over 60 years old, and partially or totally unable to care for himself. In addition, he should not be seriously ill. The residents did not pay for any services. Most men received a small social welfare pension (approximately US$10/month) which they kept as personal spending money.\textsuperscript{5}

Paid staff members included the Secretary who was responsible for the daily operation of the home and two caretakers (cooks). The Society also employed a part-time social worker who received a small stipend.\textsuperscript{6}

In 1985, al-Wafa' Invalids Society established its own residential and work centre. The initial stage of the building involved the construction of a two-storey building. The ground floor contained the reception and administrative offices, a clinic, doctor's office, a 5-room general infirmary and two isolation rooms. The central area was a large multi-purpose hall for meetings, visitors, etc. The upstairs floor was the residential area accommodating 40 people and containing eight 3-bed rooms, four double rooms and eight singles.\textsuperscript{7}

In 1993, it was apparent that the activities of the al-Wafa' Invalids Society were relatively limited. Its capacity was less than 50 invalid persons.

The Society of Physically Handicapped People came into existence in August 1992 during the first summer camp for physically disabled people, held on the premises of the Young Men Christian Association (YMCA) in Gaza city, under the joint organization of the YMCA and UNRWA. The twenty handicapped persons who participated in the summer camp decided to organize themselves and started to contact other disabled persons throughout the Gaza Strip to solicit their support and their involvement in the Society.\textsuperscript{8}

In April 1993, thirteen qualified physically disabled people formed an administrative board and applied to the Israeli authorities for a license. The Society's membership reached 650 members in 1993. Khalid Abu Za'id, the Society's co-ordinator, in an interview with the researcher maintained, that:

"we hope to include all interested physically disabled persons throughout the Gaza Strip. We also hope to coor-
dinate our activities with physically disabled persons in the occupied West Bank, and to establish a union for disabled persons in all Palestine."\textsuperscript{9}

In 1993, the Society of Physically Disabled People planned to establish an independent living resource centre for the physically disabled, to establish a training centre in computer science, to establish a knitting and sewing factory, and to provide literacy training for persons with disabilities. The Society was active in organizing folklore fairs, popular arts fair, and bazaars, and enlisting members.\textsuperscript{10}

A number of points emerge from the above mentioned information. First, the organizations associated with senior citizens and handicapped, taking into consideration the number of problems faced by senior citizens and handicapped, were relatively small. In a society suffering from military conflict and in which there were large numbers of handicapped and injured people, these organizations tackled the problems of only a very small proportion of the senior citizens and handicapped people. Second, the Palestinian community in the Gaza Strip was slow to pay attention to the problems of the handicapped and senior citizens. One explanation of this phenomenon may be that the religious values, moral code, customs and traditions of the society, obliged people to deal with these problems (especially as regards senior citizens) within the family and prevented people from sending their elders (fathers or grandfathers, mothers or grandmothers) to a nursing home. Third, most of the associations active in the field of senior citizens and handicapped concentrated their activities in Gaza city and neglected other parts of the Strip.

3.6. Societies and Cooperatives Related to Agriculture and Economy

A number of factors contributed to the emergence and establishment of associations which were active in the field of agriculture and economy in the Gaza Strip. First, the importance of the agricultural sector of the economy in the Gaza Strip encouraged some residents to establish organizations which were active in the agricultural field. In 1992, agriculture made up more than 20 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Gaza Strip and more than 20 per cent of the workers in the Strip were engaged in agriculture. Second, the Israeli occupation authorities in the Gaza Strip controlled the governmental Department of Agriculture and put it under its official hegemony. The Department of
Agriculture offered its services in a selective way. Thus, there was a need for the residents of the Gaza Strip to create economic organizations and unofficial agricultural and economic sectors. These organizations attempted to develop the agricultural sector in the Gaza Strip which the Israeli restrictive measures were impeding. Third, the Palestinian agricultural sector faced a range of problems which were beyond the resources of individual farmers to deal with, such as dwindling land and water resources, marketing bottlenecks, lack of training and extension, and problems associated with the lack of vertical and horizontal integration in the sector and across sectors. To overcome these problems the residents in the Gaza Strip established agricultural organizations to help farmers and to coordinate their efforts in the field of agriculture. Fourth, Palestinian agriculture and economy in the Gaza Strip suffered from the total absence of any form of planning (there was no specialized department, council or centralized authority which could provide a framework for sectoral planning). It would normally be expected that the Department of Agriculture (a branch of the Israeli occupation administration) would perform this function. However, it was evident that the Department of Agriculture had been run down to a point where it was unable to provide a basic level of extension and other basic services. It should also be noted that the Department of Agriculture had always operated within an administrative rather than a planning framework.

In 1993, there were more than twenty-five registered cooperatives and associations working in the field of agriculture and economy in the Gaza Strip. These organizations included the Khan Yunis Agricultural Cooperative Society, which was established in 1944 and stopped its activities after 1967 to be resumed in 1984, was composed of 823 members; the Palestine Chamber of Commerce, which was established in Gaza in 1954 and stopped its activities after 1967 to be resumed in 1968, was composed of 3,000 members; Khuzâ‘ah Domicile Cooperative, which was established in Khuzâ‘ah in 1959, was composed of 10 members; the Agricultural Cooperative Society for Bait Hanun Village, which was established in Bait Hanun in 1965, was composed of 150 members; the Domicile Cooperative Society for the Employees in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1966, was composed of 7,431 members; the Wholesale Central Cooperative Society, which was established in Gaza in 1966, was composed of 31 members; the Citrus-Marketing Cooperative Society, which was established in Gaza in 1973, was composed of 141 members; the Animal Husbandry Cooper-
tive Society, which was established in Gaza in 1973, was composed of 140; the Tawfiq (Success) Cooperative Society for Fishermen, which was established in Gaza in 1973, was composed of 339 members; al-Najah (Success) Society for Production and Marketing of Almond, which was established in Rafah in 1973, was composed of 69 members; the Union of Citrus Producers, which was established in Gaza in 1974, was composed of 250 members; Al-Ikhlas (Sincerity) Cooperative for Catching and Marketing Fish, which was brought into existence in Gaza in 1975, was composed of 105 members; Gaza Cooperative for Agricultural Production and Marketing, which was established in Bait Lahya in 1975, was composed of 800 members; the Agricultural Cooperative Society for Strawberry Farmers, which was established in Bait Lahya in 1979, was composed of 440 members; the Agricultural Society for the Production and Marketing of Vegetables, which was established in Gaza in 1979, was composed of 244 members; the Union of Industrialists in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1991, was composed of 700 members; the Women Cooperative Society for Sewing Works, which was established in Gaza in 1991, was composed of 16 members; the Cooperative Industrial Society for Establishing Industrial Estates, which was established in Gaza in 1991, was composed of 19 members; the Agricultural Cooperative Society for the Production and Marketing of Vegetables, which was established in Dair al-Balah in 1979, was composed of 244 members; Al-Qararah Popular Agricultural Cooperative Society, which was established in the al-Qararah village in 1991, was composed of 101 members; the Agricultural Cooperative Society for Khan Yunis Eastern Villages (i.e. Bani Suhaila, Abasan al-Kabirah, Abasan al-Saghirah, and Khuza‘ah), which was established in Abasan al-Saghirah in 1992, was composed of 325 members; Rafah Popular Cooperative Society, which was established in Rafah in 1991, was composed of 725 members; the Family’s Consumption Cooperative, which was founded in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 11 members; the Carpenters’ Cooperative of the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 15 members; Bee-Breeders’ Society in the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 125 members; the Public Workers’ Housing Cooperative, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 20 members; the Cooperative for Employing the Blinds, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 7 members; the Sewing Works’ Cooperative, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 11 members; al-Nusairat Agricultural Society, which was established in al-Nusairat in 1993, was composed of 55 members; Al-Zawaidah Agricultural Society in al-Zawaidah, which was established in al-Zawaidah village in 1993, was composed of
120 members; and the General Union of Palestinian Peasants, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1993, was composed of 4,000 members.\(^4\) In addition, there were a number of other economic-associated and registered but not active organizations in the Gaza Strip.\(^5\)

The objectives of the associations active in the field of agriculture and economy covered a wide range of aims. The agricultural and economy-related associations aimed at promoting the agriculture and economy in the Gaza Strip. Local agricultural cooperatives assumed the function of promoting agriculture through lending money or providing grants etc.. The objective of these cooperatives were to advance methods of agriculture, to help introduce a variety of crops and to encourage techniques that would facilitate the marketing of agricultural produce. For example, Article 2 of the bylaw of al-Qararah Agriculture Cooperative stated that the goals of the society were:

"to undertake all agriculture-related matters such as purchasing insecticides, seeds, fertilizers, saplings, and seedlings, and selling them to the farmers; to provide farmers with required expertise to develop and improve agricultural and animal products and help them in marketing; and to organize and ameliorate the economic and social affairs of its members".\(^6\)

The activities of the cooperatives and associations in the field of agriculture and economy covered a wide range. The associations offered help to farmers to export their agricultural products. They also performed a number of activities such as offering job-creating opportunities; giving loans to farmers and to small investors; introducing guidance and offering agricultural consultancy for farmers; defending the interests of farmers; encouraging production; and packing and marketing of the vegetables and fruits.

To examine the activities of the associations in the field of agriculture and economy some examples will be given. The researcher will examine the Citrus Producers Union for the Gaza Strip, the Palestine Chamber of Commerce for the Gaza Strip, and the Union of Industrialists in the Gaza Strip. These organisations undertook an important economic role in the economy of the Gaza Strip and devoted their efforts to promote the economic affairs of the Strip.

The Citrus Producers Union for the Gaza Strip, was formed in Gaza city
in 1973. Article 2 of its constitution stated the aims of the Unions, which were:

"to improve the economic and social conditions of citrus producers, and defend their interests; to make efforts to develop citrus production in the Gaza Strip; to offer technical, practical, and industrial assistance to members; and to undertake functions which were performed by other similar organizations."

The Citrus Producers Union for the Gaza Strip constantly endeavored to find every possible means for creating jobs for young men who graduated from the faculties of Agriculture and Veterinary. In 1989, an agricultural nursery was set up, which was run by a number of agronomists. In 1990, a project for bee-hives was also implemented. Four hundred bee-hives were distributed to farmers at a low price.

In 1990, the Citrus Producers Union for the Gaza Strip set up a laboratory for testing water, soil and leaves. The laboratory was equipped with scientific apparatus.

In 1992, the Citrus Producers Union wrote a report about the problem of water in the Gaza Strip. In recent years, the underground water level had become lower than the sea level. This resulted in sea water leaking into some wells near the sea. The underground water thus became mixed with sea water and became salty. This was considered dangerous for both public health and agricultural production.

The Citrus Producers Union was unsuccessful in attempting to help farmers in marketing their citrus products. A number of factors caused the Union to be unsuccessful. Those included the Israeli restrictions which hindered the export of the Gaza Strip’s citrus (the Israeli authorities were worried about competition with Israeli citrus products), the Arab economic boycott of Israel which prevented Arab countries from importing citrus from the Gaza Strip (the Arab governments justified their measures by arguing that Israeli products could be exported or smuggled to their countries as Palestinian products), the low prices which were offered to the citrus’ growers, and the Union’s inadequate administrative ability (the administration was mainly composed of citrus growers who lacked the required technical and economic experience). As a result, both the amount of citrus production and the amount of exports went down. Table no. 6 below gives details of
the produce of citrus during the last four years and the countries of import.

**Table No. 6**

Exports of Citrus from the Gaza Strip during the Years 1989-1993
(in Thousand of Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>A. Countries</th>
<th>W. Europe</th>
<th>E. Europe</th>
<th>W. B. Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989/1990</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>06.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990/1991</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>08.3</td>
<td>09.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991/1992</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>03.0</td>
<td>03.6</td>
<td>04.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/1993</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>04.0</td>
<td>05.0</td>
<td>07.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** A. = Arab  W. = West  E. = East  W. B. = West Bank


The Palestine Chamber of Commerce for the Gaza Strip has had a larger presence in Gaza than the Citrus Producers Union. The Palestine Chamber of Commerce for the Gaza Strip was established in 1954.\(^{11}\) In 1955, 12 members were elected with the appointment of 4 members by the Governor-General in accordance with Article 5 of the Chamber of Commerce Law which authorized the Governor-General to nominate 1/4 (one quarter) of the total members. Mahmud Yusuf Nijim was elected the first president for the Palestine Chamber of Commerce. He presided over it until 1977. Rashad al-Shawwa followed him until his death, and was succeeded by Raghib Murtaja who presided until 1991.\(^{12}\) On November 4, 1991, a new administrative board was elected, it was composed of 16 members and Muhammad al-Qidwah was elected as a president of the Palestine Chamber of Commerce for the Gaza Strip. The elected members came from five areas in the Strip and they were: Gaza 8 members, Jabalia and the adjacent villages 2 members, Dair al-Balah and the Central Camps 1 member, Khan Yunis and the adjacent villages 3 members, and Rafah 2 members.\(^{13}\)

Within its jurisdiction the Chamber of Commerce undertook a variety of functions: it represented commercial, industrial, and agricultural interests; it collected information and statistics which were concerned with trade, industry and agriculture, and categorized these items and published them; it provided the authorities with the necessary data and the required information whenever needed; and it also provided the authorities with advice regarding commercial, industrial, and agricultural cases.\(^{14}\)
The Chamber of Commerce was allowed to forward suggestions and ideas to the authorities related to the following issues: commercial, industrial, and agricultural laws; taxes and tariffs; transportation; wages; and economic development. The Chamber of Commerce was also allowed to establish trade fairs, museums, marketplaces, commercial and industrial schools, and to form (out of its members) arbitration committees to solve the disputes arising between any two parties in the fields of trade, industry, and agriculture.\textsuperscript{15}

The Chamber of Commerce held meetings with representatives of various economic sectors in the Gaza Strip to discuss economic issues. For example, the Chamber of Commerce held meetings with merchants to discuss the economic situation and its relationship to the political situation. It also discussed with merchants the obstacles which were created by the Israeli authorities. With regard to importers, the Chamber of Commerce put the latter in contacts with exporters in foreign countries and helped them to obtain competitive prices for the products they wished to import.\textsuperscript{16} The Chamber held a meeting on July 2, 1992 with hotel representatives in an attempt to study the situation of the hotels in the Gaza Strip and to establish a hotel association to defend their interests. When the Israeli "security closure" began on March 29, 1993, the Chamber of Commerce held meetings with businessmen and Palestinian popular organizations in search of a way out of this situation. The Chamber prepared a study regarding the damage sustained by the Gaza Strip as a result of the security closure.\textsuperscript{17}

In the winter of 1991/1992 the Gaza Strip witnessed bad weather conditions, which caused great damages to the cultivated lands. The Chamber of Commerce participated in a campaign to compensate the growers whose plants were damaged.\textsuperscript{18}

The long-term objectives of the Chamber of Commerce were mentioned in an unpublished report, which was prepared by the Chamber. These objectives were:

"to set up various industrial sectors; to open the horizons of direct import and export; to set up a sea port to facilitate import and export activities; to set up an institution for standardization and measurements; to establish a centre of research and bank information; to develop tourism (due to the fact that the Gaza Strip stretches about 45 kilometers along the Mediterranean and has sunny days, and its shore is void of rocks as well as
In 1991, the Union of Industrialists in the Gaza Strip (UIGS) was established in Gaza and in 1993 it represented more than 700 small factories and workshops operating in the Strip. The objectives of the UIGS were mentioned in an unpublished report, which was issued by the Union. These objectives were very ambitious and they were:

"to help those industries achieve their ambitions in terms of growth and development, thus contributing to the economic development of the area as a whole; to provide a voice for the concerns and goals of the industrialists in the Gaza Strip; to encourage and to direct investment in the local industry; to promote inter-sectoral linkages between industry and other economic sectors in the Gaza Strip, especially through processing of agricultural produce; to encourage import-substitute industries (ISI) to promote the Palestinian economy and to reduce dependency; to promote the marketing of local industrial products and to help manufactures reach wider export markets in the Arab world and abroad; to assist in the development of labour-intensive industries that would maximize the use of Gazan workforce, and help reduce the growing unemployment; to establish an effective training strategy based on identifying skill shortages and training needs of local industries; to establish industrial zones so as to improve the industrial infrastructure and to provide industries with needed facilities; and to establish international relations with the industrial countries".

The UIGS recognized the importance of investments in human resources from its very start. It organized courses fulfilling the needs of local industrialists and helping to mobilize local human resources and upgrade their potentials to minimize the bulk of constraints facing the development of the industrial sector in the Strip.

In 1993, the UIGS conducted a comprehensive industrial survey with the aim at studying the needs of industrial establishments in the Strip to the qualified and trained employees.
In conclusion, viewing the associations and cooperatives the researcher concludes that the establishment of Palestinian popular organizations specializing in agriculture and other economic sectors faced severe problems. Most of the problems stemmed from Israeli restrictions. Some of these organizations laid down ambitious objectives, which were usually out of their reach and their potentialities. They also lacked the adequate economic resources which were needed for achieving a comprehensive and accumulative economic development. Although some of the organizations achieved some positive results in the economic field, they failed to put an end to the state of dependency which linked the Gaza Strip's economy to the Israeli economy.  

3.7. Professional Associations

A professional association could be defined as an organization, which is established by members of the same profession or craft, to organize them and to defend their interests. Due to the lack of a professional union law, the professionals sought to organize themselves in accordance with the provisions of the Ottoman Societies' Law. Professionals like lawyers, engineers, doctors, contractors, accountants, traders, etc., organized themselves in societies.

In 1993, there were more than ten professional organizations operating in the Gaza Strip. These organizations and their members were: the Lawyers' Association for the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1976 (with branches in other towns in the Gaza Strip), was composed of 450 members; the Engineers' Society of the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1977, (it had branches in Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Dair al-Balah), was composed of 800 members; the Arab Medical Association, which was established in Gaza in 1977, was composed of 750 members; the Arab Journalists' Association, which was established in Gaza in 1980, (it was a branch of the Jerusalem-based Arab Journalists' Associations in the Occupied Territories) was composed of 75 members; the Society of Certified Accountants, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 220 members; the Society of Arab University Graduates in Commerce, which was established in Gaza in 1982, was composed of 550 members; the Motoring-Schools' Owners Society, which was established in Gaza in 1991, was composed of 55 members; the Bee-Breeders Society, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 70 members; the Agronomists Society, which was founded in Khan Yunis in 1992, was com-
posed of 80 members; the Arab Contractors Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 65 members; the Technical Professions Society, which was brought into existence in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 85 members; and the Social Workers' Association in Gaza Strip, which was brought into being in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 320 members; the Medical Technical Professions Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 82 members.²

A professional organization usually aims at defending the interests of its members and limits itself to offering services to them. For example, the constitution of the Certified Accountants' Association in the Gaza Strip stated in Article 2 that the Associations aimed at:

"making efforts to promote high standards in the accountancy profession and setting up rules and guidelines for its practicing (Art. 2[A]); supporting the accountants by all the available means (Art. 2[B]); holding conferences and organizing seminars concerning to discuss the accountancy issues (Art. 2[C]); encouraging cooperation between the association's members (Art. 2[D]); undertaking activities which were usually performed by other similar associations (Art. 2[E]); defending the interests of the members materially and morally, and offering economic, social, and cultural services to them (Art. 2[F]); establishing good relation and cooperation with the accountants' associations abroad (Art. 2[G]); forming a cooperative composing of the members and establishing a saving fund and a social security fund (Art. 2[H]); establishing a high institute for accountancy with an internationally recognized standard (Art. 2[H]); and establishing a centre for research and documentation (Art. 2[I])".³

In 1995, the researcher observed that these aims were too ambitious and most them had not been attained.

Unlike the ambitious aims of the Certified Accountants' Association, the Association of the Engineers in the Gaza Strip declared modest aims. According to Article 3 of its constitution, the aims of the Association of the Engineers were as follows:

"raising the scientific standard of the engineers to meet requirements of the progress and construction; unifying the efforts of the engineers in the Gaza Strip; offering economic, social, and cultural services to the members; encouraging the conduct of research in the field of engineering; establishing good relation and cooperation with the engineers' organizations in other parts of the world; serving the members and defending their interests; and undertaking functions which were preformed by other
similar organizations".\textsuperscript{4}

The activities of the professional associations in the Gaza Strip covered primarily the interests of their members. For example, in an unpublished report, the Certified Accountants' Association in the Gaza Strip stated that "the Association made efforts to recruit new members, to hold meetings and symposiums, to organize educational and training programmes for accountants, and to participate in festivals and political matters".\textsuperscript{5}

The concentration on serving primarily their members' interests prevented the establishment of strong relations between the professional associations and the community in the Gaza Strip. Professional associations may be conceived as important catalysts for development in the community. However, the professional organizations in the Gaza Strip concentrated mainly on serving the interests of their members and neglected the interests of the residents as a whole. The organizations were plagued by internal strife and they could not acquire credibility. The Israeli restrictions, which prevented most of the associations opening branches outside Gaza city, also minimised their activities at the societal level.\textsuperscript{6}

3.8. Charitable Societies

Charitable societies have long been active in the Gaza Strip, especially since the 1948 war with its dire consequences for the Palestinian people. After 1967, the absence or rarity of social services offered by the Israeli authorities to needy people, pushed the residents in the Strip to establish charitable associations. The first priority of these societies was to maintain the people on their land and help them to resist suppression of their Palestinian national identity.\textsuperscript{1}

A number of charitable societies were active in the Gaza Strip. In 1993, these associations and their members were: the Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work, which was established in Gaza in 1951, was composed of 85 members; the Benevolent Society for the Gaza Strip, which was established in Gaza in 1974, (it was initiated by then Mayor of Gaza Rashad al-Shawwa and was considered as a semi-consulate for Jordan in Gaza) was composed of 300 members; Al-Madhun Family Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1975, was composed
of 150 members; Al-Agha Family Charitable Society, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1975, was composed of 350 members; the Siksin Family Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1976, was composed of 75 members; the Friends of Patient Benevolent Association, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 170 members; Khan Yunis Charitable Society for the Renaissance of the City, which was founded in Khan Yunis in 1980, was composed of 22 members; Al-Fukhari Charitable Society, which was established in Al-Fukhari (a suburb located on the south-east of Khan Yunis) in 1980, was composed of 19 members; the al-Qararah Centre for Social Development, which was established in al-Qararah in 1980, was composed of 23 members; the Blind’s Friends Society, which was founded in Gaza in 1981, was composed of 17 members; the Al-‘Ashshi Family Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1981, was composed of 120 members; the Abu Shabab Family Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1982, was composed of 130 members; the Fight Against Drugs Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1991, was composed of 11 members; Al-‘Aqqad Family Charitable Society, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1992, was composed of 170 members; the Charitable Society for the Welfare of Handicapped, which was established in Gaza in 1992, was composed of 15 members; Al-Fara Family Charitable Society, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1992, was composed of 250 members; the Al-Rahman (Merciful) Charitable Society, which was brought into existence in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 13 members; the Philanthropy and Social Renaissance Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 22 members; the Mbarat al-Rahmah (the goodness of Mercifulness) Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 17 members; and Al-Astal Family Charitable Society, which was established in Khan Yunis in 1993, was composed of 400 members.

Observing the charitable associations which were active in the Gaza Strip, the researcher noted that these associations included indigenous and non-indigenous charities, society-oriented charities, and family-oriented charities. Table no. 7 gives a classification of the charitable associations in the Gaza Strip.
Table No. 7

Classification of the Charitable Societies in the Gaza Strip 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Charitable Societies</th>
<th>Non-Indigenous Charitable Societies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society-oriented Charitable Societies</td>
<td>Family-oriented Charitable Societies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the researcher.

The main goal of most of the charitable societies was to attend to the pressing needs of those who suffered from a handicap, illness, poverty, old age or the effects of war and continued military occupation (e.g. the Palestinian Prisoner Club which was established in 1992 and was composed of 2,500 members and the Palestine Revolution Old Fighters' Association, which was established in 1993 and was composed of 4,000 members). For example, the bylaw of the al-Qararah Centre for Social Development stated that the goals of the Centre were "to raise the cultural and social standards of the village and to improve the condition of the infrastructures in the village". The Centre offered services which included running a kindergarten, operating a family-care unit, sharing in providing potable water and an electric grid, and repairing and reconstructing streets.

Some of the charitable organizations in the Gaza Strip specialised in offering aid to a specific category of the community. For example, the Blind’s Friends Association limited its aims and activities to blind people. The association provided education for blind children at the preparatory level and offered general educational services. To perform its activities, the society depended primarily on donations and aid from philanthropists and other charitable organizations. The constitution of the Blind’s Friends Association determined its goals as follows:

"paying attention to the welfare of the blind in the Gaza Strip; facilitating and raising their standard of living; promoting the cultural, educational, professional, economic, and social standards of blind people; offering special training for blind people in order to be able to
undertake certain jobs; and making efforts to solve problems which face blind people in the governmental and non-governmental establishments.\textsuperscript{6}

During the Israeli occupation, the Gaza Strip witnessed hectic activities to establish family funds and familial charitable societies. A number of extended-family-based charitable societies were brought into being in the Gaza Strip. Several factors led to the emergence of this kind of charity. First, in the Gaza Strip, tribe, clan and extended family (hamulah/\textsuperscript{C}a'\textsuperscript{i}lah) constituted an integral part of the social structure. Second, the gaps in the governmental services which were introduced to the inhabitants of the Strip pushed families to institutionalize themselves to secure the basic needs of their members such as health services, funding, social insurance of widows, poor and needy, orphans, etc. Third, the search for influential social and political roles motivated families to establish their own charities. Dissolution and weakness of the tribal and clannish links, in the modern world, did not prevent the inhabitants in the Gaza Strip clustering around the extended family or the hamulah. Extended families, tribes and clans still constituted a primitive interest or "pressure" grouping. Most of the families in the Gaza Strip sought to have political, social, economic, and cultural roles in the community. The community in various areas in the Gaza Strip was based on tribal, familial balances.\textsuperscript{7}

A majority of the extended families (\textsuperscript{C}a'\textsuperscript{i}lat) in the Gaza Strip organized themselves in a kind of institutionalization at the hamulah level. These grass root organizations usually consisted of a Family Assembly, a Family Council, a Family Fund, and a Family Elder Committee (Steering Committee).\textsuperscript{8}

The extended-family-based associations focused their activities primarily on serving the interests of the family members. The volume of membership of these societies varied and depended on the size of the extended family (tribe, clan, hamulah).

As regards the activities of the charitable societies, they generally provided a wide range of services. These services included: giving aid to prisoners and their families (winter and summer clothes were provided to the prisoners in the Israeli prisons and health services and financial aid were given to their families); offering literacy and educational programmes; offering health services (first-aid sessions, rules
of feeding and bringing up children, rehabilitation of physically and mentally retarded people, health services through the network of dispensaries, hospitals and clinics, administering creches, nursing elderly and handicapped people); rehabilitation of orphans; giving loans and grants to a number of needy students to enable them to follow their studies; taking care of working women and offering motherhood and childhood-care services. For example, the Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work (NECCCRW), through its numerous established projects, paid attention to relieving hardship after the disaster of the refugees becoming refugees. It steadily presumed its involvement in the fields of development, education, and health. The aim of the NECCCRW was always clear: to help the community to help themselves. The activities were "to provide the people with adequate means and opportunities to secure and develop the people's socio-economic and cultural needs; to provide health services and medical care, to aid needy and poor, to educate illiterate people, and to rehabilitate youths".

To sum up, the researcher noted that the charitable societies in the Gaza Strip undertook a humanitarian mission. They offered services to needy people, and their services covered a wide range of activities. The family-based charities limited themselves to offering services to their constituent members.

3.9. Religious-Oriented Societies

The majority of people living in the Gaza Strip are Muslim. There is a small Christian community numbering about three per cent of the population. Religion is an important factor in the social and political lives of the residents of the Gaza Strip. The role of the religious element (especially the Islamic) was increased over the past two decades.

In 1993, the registered religious-motivated associations and their members in the Gaza Strip were as follows: the Young Men's Christian Association, which was brought into existence in Gaza in 1954 and was composed of 400 members; Al-Mujamma' al-Islami Society, which was established in Gaza in 1973, was composed of 300 members; the Islamic Society, which was established in Shatti' (beach) refugee camp in 1976, was composed of 23 members; the al-Maqasid Islamic Charitable Society, which was established in Gaza in 1976, was composed of 25 members; the Society of the Free Muslim Palestinian Youths, which was established in
Gaza in 1978, was composed of 530 members; the Islamic Society, which was established in Jabalia in 1976, was composed of 21 members; the Al-Salah (Righteousness) Islamic Society, which was founded in al-Nusairat in 1979, was composed of 45 members; the Islamic Scientific Society, which was brought into existence in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 13 members; the Quran Memorization Society, which was established in Gaza in 1980, was composed of 35 members; the Young Women Muslim Society, which was established in Gaza in 1981, was composed of 67 members; the Society for Building an Islamic School in al-Qararah, which was founded in al-Qararah in 1986, was composed of 17 members; and Dar (House) al-Huda (Guidance) for the Care of Children Society, which was established in Gaza in 1993, was composed of 22 members.

The researcher noted that the religious-oriented associations reflected a number of characteristics. First, the Christian-oriented associations were established in the 1950s under the Egyptian administration and there was no indigenous Christian association founded during the twenty six years of the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip (from 1967 to 1993). Second, all Islamic-oriented associations in the Gaza Strip were established during the Israeli occupation (in the 1970s and 1980s). In that period, the Israeli authorities encouraged the establishment of Islamic-motivated organizations in an attempt to counterbalance the influence of the PLO’s factions. Third, the establishment of most of the Islamic-oriented associations in the Gaza Strip were substantially triggered by the activities of the al-Mujamma al-Islami.

The declared goals of the Islamic associations in the Gaza Strip were to guide people to adhere to the principles of the Islamic religion. For example, the Al-Mujamma al-Islami Society was one of the active Islamic societies in the Gaza Strip, which aimed to "inculcate religious values in the society and to keep traditional customs and traditions of the Islamic civilization among inhabitants". The constitution of the Al-Salah Islamic Society determined the society’s aims, which were "to construct a mosque in Dair al-Balah refugee camp; to establish a charitable dispensary for child-care; to purchase an ambulance; to establish a public library; and to establish a construction and building company".

A social dimension characterized the aims of the al-Maqasid Muslim Charitable Society. Its constitution determined its goals as follows:
"establishing modern hospitals and developing the existing ones; establishing pharmaceutical and nursing institute; introducing social services; sharing in establishing a university in Gaza; offering aid to handicapped and needy people; and offering services to residents of the Gaza Strip as a whole."

As regards the activities of the Islamic societies, the researcher noted that they usually offered a wide range of religious and social activities. The Islamic societies established Zakat (poor-tax) Committees (charitable institutions) to provide aid to the needy in accordance with the values and laws of Islam, which required Muslims to help the weak and poor. The Zakat committees distributed food stuffs and financial aid to the needy individuals and families, and to the orphans and disabled people.

For example, the al-Salah Islamic Society performed its activities through its sub-committees which included: the Committee for Call and Guidance, the Zakat (poor tax) Committee, the al-Islah (reformation) Committee, the Educational Committee, and the Athletic Committee.

In 1987, the intifada broke out and the Islamic element played an active role in its events. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) emerged from the rank and file of the al-Mujammat al-Islami Society and from members of the other Muslim societies.

In conclusion, Muslim societies became an active factor at the societal and political levels in the Strip. These associations constituted the bed-rock of the Islamic movements, which established themselves as the opposition force to the nationalist movements (i.e. the PLO factions). The Islamic societies and the Islamic elements penetrated and controlled several organizations such as the Islamic University of Gaza, and most of the mosques, clubs, kindergartens, training centres, schools, economic establishments, and political and military organs.

3.10. Conclusion

In sovereign countries, the government usually cooperates with popular organizations in bearing the responsibility of social work and serving society's interest. Government authorities set social policy and establish laws and regulations to ensure the development of social services appropriate to cultural and social needs. Various government agencies
collect statistics, authorize studies, and train personnel to support the activities of non-governmental organizations both morally and materially.¹

In Europe and North America, non-governmental organizations were established as complementary vehicles for the state apparatus for the extension of relief, welfare, or developmental funds to disadvantaged or inaccessible groups, generally in areas outside their national domain.² Non-governmental organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were also mostly established with the blessing and recognition of the state, to respond to conditions of poverty and underprivilege in their own country, or to fill the gap left by the central government, or as a tool for extending the hegemony of the central government to peripheral areas. Sometimes NGOs constituted a counterforce to the predominance of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes (as was the case with many Latin American NGOs).³

Technically speaking, there are no non-governmental organizations in the Strip in the sense that the concept has been utilized in Europe and North America, and in Africa, Asia, and South America, where these organizations emerged within independent states, and hence could be called non-governmental.⁴

The Palestinian experience is different due to the absence of a Palestinian state. Israel, the occupying power, acknowledged no responsibility for the welfare of the Gaza Strip’s inhabitants. Charitable, medical, educational, women’s, religious, professional and research organisations played a dual role in the Gaza Strip. On the one hand, they compensated for the Israeli authorities’ unwillingness to satisfy social needs by offering relief, organising literacy and vocational training classes, setting up health insurance schemes, providing medical care in villages and camps, expanding knowledge of local history and culture through research, and so forth. On the other hand, being the only organisational forms permitted under occupation, they cemented the base of the Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip and contributed to its leadership. The Palestinian popular organizations constituted a Palestinian answer to the requirements of Palestinian society. Their political role in the context of the Palestinian national struggle was crucial. Within this context, they attempted to fill gaps in the social and economic services offered by the Israeli authorities, and by UNRWA
and other international voluntary organizations. They covered most aspects of life and performed an active role at the societal and political levels. They constituted Palestinian popular institutions representing a national challenge to the Israeli occupation and its institutions.⁵

One of the basic obstacles confronting the popular organizations in the Gaza Strip was the restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities concerning the formation, licensing, and activities of these organizations. Despite the Israeli restrictions, the organizations succeeded in building national institutions which provided a wide range of services. They created a nucleus of national infrastructure in the Strip. They functioned parallel to the official apparatuses of the Israeli authorities. One can say that these organizations undertook roles of nuclei organizations of a state.⁶

The goals of the popular organizations in the Gaza Strip may be summed up as follows: organizing professionals and non-professionals, coordinating the efforts of citizens for the good of individuals, groups, and society, caring for members' interests and promoting their standard of living, developing a feeling of responsibility, leadership, and harmony among people, raising organizational, and political consciousness among people, recruiting efforts of the citizenry in the social development of the individual and of society as a whole, caring for the individual in various stages of his/her life and improving the conditions of his environment, helping in construction of infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, and filling the gap in the services offered by the occupation authorities.⁷

The associations in the Gaza Strip offered numerous programmes such as first aid centres, nursing schools, maternity units, provision of equipment for operating rooms and hospitals, programmes for improving employment and educational opportunities, social development, medical care, private schools (from kindergarten through twelfth grade), orphanages that provide rooms, board, education, and other needed facilities (particularly for those children who have lost their father in war or who were separated from their parents by the conflict), senior citizens centres (particularly for disabled, the handicapped, and the poor), nurseries for needy children and children of working mothers, basic health and hygiene programmes (particularly for mothers, infants, and young
children), libraries and cultural programs, specific vocational training courses and seminars (including secretarial work, typing, tailoring), and languages, family planning, handicrafts, small businesses and job-creating projects. The activities of the popular organizations in the Gaza Strip also included economic matters such as trade, industry and agriculture.

Associations in the Gaza Strip suffered from a number of shortcomings and drawbacks. There were a large number of the associations which had no role and were not active. They could be described as dummy associations and represented banners without any content. This kind of association was established as a vehicle to bring financial support from different Palestinian factions and charitable organizations. Their aim was to serve personal, factional, and political purposes without introducing real services to the society.

There was a contradiction between the need for the establishment of organizations as a framework for patterning and encouraging group responsibility and accountability, decision-making and monitoring, on the one hand, and using these organizations as tools to legitimize fund-raising, and to consecrate the position of a focal personality in them or the views of the Palestinian political faction behind them, on the other.

There was a clear gap between the level of organizational concepts and consciousness, on the one hand, and the existing organizational types at the period of the study, on the other. This gap was due to the quick expansion in the formal frameworks of these organizations (i.e. the number of the associations was increasing rapidly), without a parallel and supportive expansion in institutional conceptualization and consciousness. This constituted a drawback which was exacerbated by the absence of a purposeful cumulative economic, social, and political development plan.

The pre-eminence of tribal-familial-factional thought at the institutional level hindered most attempts at coordination among organizations offering similar services. This resulted in wasting limited human and financial resources, fragmentation of work, and in most cases, downgrading the level of services offered, and regression in popular support for them. In the Gaza Strip the family (extended family) is the primary
channel. Family-based recruitment and allocation of benefits reinforce family ties, thereby connecting the individual to the economy and polity. Family and tribe as the basis for obtaining benefits from the socio-political system enhances the societal stability by providing a link between individual and community. Family-based associations have expanded to include friends and acquaintances, as well as private agreements whereby services are provided in exchange for gifts or specific fees. The tribal-familial-factional thought exemplifies the collective action problem. In the collective action problem, behaviour which further's one's individual interests harms the collective interest. The short-run individual interest of each family or tribe head is to back the cause of a family member, even if the case has no merit. The trade unions and associations, family, tribe, community, and political factions and authority in the Gaza Strip are driving out competence by ignoring merit. Solution to the collective action problem is for the community to impose rules and to enforce those rules. But the community appears at present uncommitted to values which favour competence.

While neither Hamulah (extended family) nor tribe is regarded as a civil society institutions in traditional writings on civil society, both must be considered in any discussion of the Gaza Strip that seeks to understand those forces that serve as a buffer between the authorities and society, as well as those forces and organisations that may play a role in furthering the development of civil society and liberalisation process. In the Gaza Strip, having a particular family name, or having a relative in a particular position in business or the bureaucracy can mean improved chances for job, university admission, the forgiveness of a traffic violation, or instant issuance of an official document, etc. Being without such a name one is more likely to spend hours in line to renew a driver's license, have great trouble finding employment, and be more likely to be arrested if stopped by the authorities. Thus the family or clan can play an important role in protecting a member's interests against a sometimes sluggish, sometimes uncooperative bureaucracy. Hamulah and tribe remains two of the strongest institutions in the Gaza Strip society.

The volatile political circumstances in the Gaza Strip did not, normally, allow local Palestinian institutional experience to continue and accumulate smoothly. Nevertheless, these organizations managed to undertake a part in the social, economic, and political spheres.
Most of the associations in the Gaza Strip were devoted to serve the interests of the political and social elites - a limited stratum of the community. Poor people were neglected and villages and refugee camps were abandoned and given insufficient attention. Rich people used the associations as a bridge to obtain influential political status and social prestige.\textsuperscript{14}

Associations' performance were negatively affected by the political and social divisions in the Gaza Strip. The public tended to contribute to and became actively involved in those organizations whose leaders' views were close to their own. Thus, each base of support was drawn from different sectors of society and these followed the existing divisions within society - the traditional leadership and wealthy old Gaza city families versus the refugees; the "sons of the South" (i.e. residents of the southern area of the Strip, south of the Gaza Wadi) versus the "sons of the north" (i.e. the refugees in Jabalia refugee camp and the villagers in Bait Lahya, and Bait Hanun); fundamental Muslims versus the "outers"; Hamas versus the Islamic Jihad; the Islamic University versus the Al-Azhar; the conservatives versus communists or other leftists; and the PLO's supporters versus the others.\textsuperscript{15}

The rights and freedoms of associations and their members were severely curtailed following the uprising, or intifada, which began in December 1987. These difficulties were further compounded by the even more stringent restrictions that were imposed, especially on freedom of movement, as a result of the second Gulf crisis (1990/91) during which a forty-five days curfew were imposed in the Strip. Many of these restrictions were not directed specifically at the associations, but their application in practice resulted in additional constraints being placed on the organizations.\textsuperscript{16}

Another drawback in the associations' performance was that authority for all planning and decisions lay almost completely in the hands of the director, and the Board of Directors remained little more than a paper formality. Centralized and autocratic authority decreased the efficiency of an organization since its entire operation depended on the person of the director. Little could be accomplished when that person was not available as no one else had the necessary authority to act. A very strong leader also tended to inhibit real input into decisions by the
staff. This kind of situation was reinforced by the prevalent cultural values which stressed respect for elders and the traditional values themselves, while discouraging the questioning of the authority.\textsuperscript{17}

The generally individualist and authoritative nature of the current leadership within the associations had one additional drawback, with serious implications for the future. This was the lack of leadership training. There was little effective "middle-level-management", and few young men and women were being brought into the administrative system and trained for the future leadership positions. The lack of the provision for the future did nothing to ensure the continuity of the popular organizations and added to the general uncertainty over the future. Among many of the organizations functioning in the Gaza Strip, many might probably be unable to maintain their current programmes if the current leader were unable to continue his duties.\textsuperscript{18}

Although the leadership of the associations in the Gaza Strip was not optimal, it must be considered within the socio-economic-political context of the situation. When analysed from the point of view of functioning within a comprehensive service infrastructure, overseen and aided to whatever degree possible by a friendly government, as is normal in the West and elsewhere, the drawbacks of the leadership were apparent. However, within the context of the situation of the Gaza strip, the highly individualistic and strong leadership might be a major positive factor. Collective leadership, many in the Gaza Strip argued, did not always allow the freedom of action and spontaneity often required to implement a project. Developing basic services and upgrading the quality of life for the population is never an easy task.\textsuperscript{19}

An additional problem faced by the organizations was the lack of good planning. The leaderships were partly responsible for this situation, although several other contributing factors can be mentioned. The restrictions against surveys and other research made the necessary preliminary information very difficult to obtain. Lack of financial resources was another reason for not being able to do statistical research. Lastly, there was no central complex of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza strip to collect and disseminate information of interest to all.\textsuperscript{20}

In the Gaza Strip, usual problems of development were compounded by the
difficulties of working under an occupation government and in a depressed economy. The Israeli restrictions and lack of trained personnel was a problem that hindered performance of the economic development and other social and economic functions of the associations. Most training in advanced fields must be done abroad as it is not available in the region. However, once people completed their studies and acquired marketable skills, much higher paying job opportunities could be found elsewhere. Furthermore, many people did not choose to return to the Gaza Strip because of the political and economic atmosphere.\textsuperscript{21}

The Gaza Strip remained a traditional area. In some fields, a certain social stigma must still be overcome before an adequate number of people can participate in some functions. This was especially true in nursing and work with the handicapped. Cultural traditions had far reaching effects in other service areas. Vocational training programmes for women must be determined by the general position of women within society.\textsuperscript{22}

Suspicion of spies, informers and collaborators was prevalent in the mentality of the Gaza Strip residents, leading to a general mistrust of motives and actions. The situation could be succinctly described as one in which each person was only concerned about himself and his family; there was little sense of being part of society. This sentiment carried over to the associations whose leaders were not always above such accusations. Therefore, to administer effectively their programmes, these organizations often must first establish their credibility as truly Palestinian institutions working solely for the betterment of the Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{23}

Concentration of the headquarters of the associations in Gaza city constituted another shortcoming which should be reassessed and decentralization of these organizations should be implemented. A system for administrative control and even an "administrative police" apparatus should be established to fight corruption, "\textit{wasta}" (it is not what you know, but who you know), nepotism, favouritism, and discrimination. Intercessory \textit{wasta} involves a protagonist intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage for the client - a job, a government document, a tax reduction, admission to a university. When the seekers for a benefit are many and the opportunities are few, only aspirants with the strongest \textit{wasta} are successful. Succeeding or failing depends on the power of the \textit{wasta} more than on the merits of the seekers. In the Gaza
Strip intercessory *wasta* is rife. This *wasta* angers unsuccessful candidates who have outstanding credentials, and creates dependencies among those who are less capable, yet obtain power and position because of their *wastas*. Competition for positions and resources increases the importance of intercessory *wasta*. *Wasta* favours those connected to well-established families, tribes, factions, and social groups. Political leaders and the Palestinian Authority appear as *wasta*-oriented as the rest of society, and profit most from the *wasta* system. The unconnected are disadvantaged, and must attach themselves to a larger social (and political) grouping. In the desert, smaller clans and tribes attached themselves to larger tribes, and prospered. To prosper, the weak must ally with the strong. The top political and social leaders can join together to reduce or eliminate intercessory *wasta*. So far, this has not occurred.\(^24\)

Coordination should take place between the associations and Palestinian authorities, with participation of Palestinian human rights organizations, concerning the development of laws which regulate establishment and activities of the popular organizations.

Overall, then, much work needs to continue to overcome the problems of the differing opinions of the leaders and the resulting lack of coordination. It remains difficult to envisage Gaza Strip-wide cooperative efforts or the possibility of establishing a forum for joint cooperation. At this point services remained minimal in many areas and far from adequate in others, so that almost any project that was established served a real need. This will not always be true in the future; communication and coordination among the societies must develop to ensure unnecessary duplication of efforts do not become widespread. Even now, increased contact could eliminate many duplicated efforts in planning and estimations for similar projects, as well as allow a greater exchange of ideas and information. Coordination and cooperation and joint projects among the associations of the Gaza Strip remained an area where great improvements could be made.\(^25\)

Trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip represent a sector of the associational life which signifies melange (admixture) of associations, guilds, unions, social clubs, religious organisations, interest groups, and political parties (and factions) which exist in the social space between the individual and the authorities. The trade unions and
associations constitute a hallmark of the civil society. "Civil society refers to an admixture of various forms of associations including unions, clubs, charities, religious associations and other groups that freely interact and communicate with each other in a spirit of civility and tolerance. Such interaction is not only for their own good, but for the sake of the common good as well." The distinguishing characteristic of civil society is the nature of its associational life, civility, and tolerance of diversity and pluralism. In this regard, two unique aspects of the Palestinian situation must be considered because they pose difficulties for studying civil society in relation to the state. First, the Palestinians did not have a national government. Since 1967, the Israeli occupation apparatus has functioned as the de facto authority in the Gaza Strip. Second, prior to the signing of Oslo Agreement in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip accepted an external actor, the PLO, as their "state", clandestinely co-operating with local PLO representatives to sustain a network of institutions through which the PLO and other factions sought to exercise political power in competition with the Israeli military regime. With the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the exchange of PLO and Israeli letters of mutual recognition on September 9, 1993, the PLO has become an internal actor that aspires to replace the authority of the Israeli occupier. The establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in July 1994 and the behaviour of the PLO and the PA towards their constituency in the Gaza Strip (and West Bank) will have an impact on the organs of civil society in these areas.

The politicization of the associations supported the Palestinian national struggle, yet at the same time it damaged the organizations themselves financially and administratively. Political loyalty to one faction or another was often given priority in these associations' policies. Most of the associations became "political shops." A large proportion of the popular organizations tended to follow political guidelines of political organizations. Under Israeli occupation it was difficult to separate associations from politics. Most of them may be called "political shops" committed to the policies and ideologies of one Palestinian faction or another. Political shops, or dakakin siyasiyah, practiced what one might call patronage politics and clientalism. Engagement in patronage politics is a strategy often used by dominant political forces either as a tool to muster support, or to undermine the influence of political competitors. There is no more important or
suitable network of organisations in which to examine patronage politics than the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. In their capacity as representatives of different occupational sectors, the unions and associations are supposed to promote the interests of their members. To do so, they must occupy a space outside the framework of a state apparatus or a dominant political force. The relations of trade unions and associations should be carried out in a way that promotes the interests of the members and not the political agenda of another entity. In this sense, the autonomy of the unions is central to the existence of viable civil society organs.\textsuperscript{28}

The characteristics of society in the Gaza Strip also influence Palestinian associational life. The essence of social organisation is a network of hamulas (extended families) and smaller families, as well as village, neighbourhood and religious solidarities. Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip is mainly rural in character, and even urban centres are closer to the model of a small town than to that of a metropolitan area. Even in Gaza, where close to 85% of the inhabitants reside in Gaza city, the culture is predominantly rural.\textsuperscript{29}

This raises interesting questions germane to the study of civil society in a Palestinian context. Can a society with dominant rural characteristics, essentially organised on the basis of lineages, produce enduring civil society organs that transcend local solidarities? Should Palestinian civil society be studied in the context of statelessness or in the context of a national liberation struggle? And, perhaps the central question, civil society in relation to whom?\textsuperscript{30}

The nature of Palestinian civil society must be considered in terms of the historical context in which Palestinian social organisations have evolved. Since 1967, we find a wide array of associations ranging from religious bodies, clubs, and labour unions, to women’s societies, charitable societies, and family-based associations. These associations emerged outside the framework of the Israeli colonial rule to articulate the interests of their respective social sectors. These organisations constituted a type of civil society that performed social functions whose benefits transcended the boundaries of the family or the local neighbourhood. Women’s societies, for example, opened welfare centres, helped poor families, and taught mothers crafts and skills. By virtue of the national struggle, many of these associations were drawn into the
orbit of the political factions of the Palestinian national movement. The trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip were gradually marginalised and became subordinate organisations to various factions. These organisations had to show their loyalty to one political faction or another.\textsuperscript{31}

The Israeli-PLO agreements has created new challenges for the organs of Palestinian civil society that will test their strength and resilience. The Palestinian Authority (PA) will have to interact with the organs of civil society, perhaps opting to strike a balance between security and democracy. Israel, for its own reasons, favours security, even at the expense of democracy. To achieve a balance the PA will have to apply a delicate admixture of persuasion, co-optation, and intermittent political pressure on Palestinian rejectionists. Such a situation will make the trade unions and association vulnerable. Because the PA is not a sovereign, but is rather a local governor who must manage the spheres of his authority in co-ordination with the distant overlord, in this case the government of Israel.\textsuperscript{32}

In conclusion, the above-mentioned analysis gives a general idea about the Palestinian popular organizations' activities in the Gaza Strip. Examples have been given to show their roles and their part in the developmental process. It is not the aim of this part of the study to cover each of the organizations' goals and activities. Only examples have been above mentioned to show roles of associations in the Gaza Strip at the societal level.

A good beginning has been made to the development of popular organizations and an infrastructure for social, economic, and political activities. It is difficult to articulate a precise prescription for the future, but canceling military regulations and shifting control of legislative power to serve interests of the Palestinian people are among the most important basic steps toward meaningful political, social, organizational, and economic development.\textsuperscript{33}
Appendix No. 1

**Associations in the Gaza Strip 1993**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No. of Registration</th>
<th>Year Estd.</th>
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77. Society for Protection of Public Antiquities
   Gaza 2061 1991

78. Care of Invalid Children Society
   Gaza 1924 1975

79. Palestine Religious Institute (al-Azhar)
   Gaza 1907 1954

80. Society of Physically Handicapped People in Gaza Strip
   Gaza - 1993

**Dair al-Balah, al-Zawaidah and the Middle Camps: (al-Nusairat, al-Buraij, and al-Maghazi)**

1. Agricultural Cooperative Society for the Production and Marketing of Vegetables
   Dair al-Balah 67 1979

2. al-Salah Islamic Society
   Nusairat 1958 1979

3. Nusairat Agricultural Society
   Nusairat 3000 1993

4. Zawaidah Agricultural Society
   al-Zawaidah 3009 1993

5. Multi-Storeys-Buildings Society
   Dair al-Balah 1900 1993

6. Al-Buraij Agricultural Society
   Al-Buraij 3020 1993

**Khan Yunis area (including the Eastern Villages)**

1. Khan Yunis Agricultural Co-Op Society
   Khan Yunis 12 1944

2. Khan Yunis Charitable Association for the Social Welfare of the City
   Khan Yunis 1994 1980

3. Nassir Hospital Friends Society
   Khan Yunis 2058 1991

4. Sunrise For Kindergartens and Social Education Society
   Khan Yunis 3026 1993

5. Arab Society for social Development, Family and Child Care
   Khan Yunis 3028 1993

6. Palestinian Peasants Union Society
   Khan Yunis 3027 1993

7. Farmers and Agricultural Cooperative Society in Gaza
   Khan Yunis 3033 1993

8. Society for the Rehabilitation of Women and Child Care in Khan Yunis
   Khan Yunis - 1993

169
8. Agricultural Research Center Society
   Khan Yunis 3036 1993

9. Society for the Development of Eastern Villages
   Abasan 2081 1992

10. Khuzaa Agricultural Society
    Khuzaa 2082 1993

11. Public Society for Inhabitants of Khan Yunis
    Khan Yunis 1986 1980

12. Agronomists Society
    Khan Yunis 2079 1992

13. Al-Qararah Agricultural Cooperative Society
    Qararah 74 1991

14. Al-Qararah Center for Social Development
    Qararah 1989 1980

15. Society for Building an Islamic School in Qararah
    Qararah 2054 1986

16. al-Fukhari Charitable Society
    al-Fukhari 1996 1980

17. Khuzaa Agricultural Society
    Khuzaa 2082 1992

18. Ma'in Renaissance Society
    Ma'in 2097 1993

19. Eastern Villages' Development Society
    Abasan 2081 1993

21. Educational Enrichment and Creative Thinking Society
    Bani Suhaila 3044 1993

22. The University-Graduates Society in the Eastern Villages
    Bani Suhaila 3035 1993

23. The Eastern Villages Rehabilitation of Handicapped Society
    Bani Suhaila 3022 1993

Rafah

1. Makhlish Community Center
   Rafah 1917 1975

2. Najah Society for Production and Marketing of Almond
   Rafah 62 1973

3. Rafah Agricultural Cooperative Society
   Rafah 76 1992

4. The Palestinian Family Defenders Society
   Rafah 2015 1993

Source: compiled by the researcher. The Archives of the Department of Interior, Civil Administration, Gaza, 1994.
### Registered Cooperatives in the Gaza Strip 1954-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Cooperative</th>
<th>Sort of Coop.</th>
<th>Members' Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Kawkabah Coop. for Spinning and Weaving of Rugs</td>
<td>Indus.</td>
<td>0007</td>
<td>15/1/1955</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Soap Industry Coop. in al-Maghazi</td>
<td>Indus.</td>
<td>0008</td>
<td>10/12/1958</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Needle Works Coop. in Khan Yunis</td>
<td>Indus.</td>
<td>0010</td>
<td>1/2/1959</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Domicile Coop. for Khan Yunis Employees</td>
<td>Consum.</td>
<td>0880</td>
<td>16/5/1959</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Domicile Coop. for the Middle Area</td>
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<td>1212</td>
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<td>0320</td>
<td>8/7/1959</td>
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18. Citrus Prod. Coop. in Gaza
   Agr. 0020  20/8/1959  18
19. Agr. Coop. for Reclamation of Zone 962 in al-Nazlah
   Agr. 0034  7/10/1959  19
20. Khan Yunis Coop. for Domestic Animals' Breeding
   Agr. 0008  22/1/1959  20
21. Import Coop. in Jabalia
   Consum. 00330  14/8/1960  21
   Agr. 0014  30/1/1961  22
23. Soap Industry Coop. in Gaza
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24. Domicile Coop. in Nusairat
   Consum. 1468  15/3/1961  24
25. Imam al-Shafi'i's School Consum. Coop. in Gaza
   Consum. 0553  27/1/1962  25
   Consum. 0638  16/12/1963  26
27. Zaitun Domicile Coop.
   Consum. 1800  16/12/1963  27
28. Rimal Domicile Coop. in Gaza
   Consum. 0010  5/3/1964  28
29. Popular Coop. in Shatti Refugee Camp
   Consum. 1056  5/3/1964  29
31. Domicile Coop. for Jabalia Village
   Consum. 0158  19/3/1964  31
32. Domicile Coop. for al-Daraj Neighbourhood
   Consum. 0900  14/4/1964  32
33. Popular Consumptive Coop. in Rafah
   Consum. 3127  20/4/1964  33
34. National Coop. in Shaja'iyah
   Consum. 2726  20/4/1964  34
35. Consumptive Coop. in Jabalia Refugee Camp
   Consum. 1800  30/4/1964  35
   Consum. 0523  8/11/1964  36

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<th>No.</th>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Al-Nazlah Village Coop.</td>
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<td>0648</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Al-Tufah Neighbourhood Coop.</td>
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<td>0912</td>
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<td>Al-Buraij Domicile Coop.</td>
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<td>1030</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Building by Installments Coop. in Palestine</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Domicile Coop. in Bani Suhaila</td>
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<td>Domicile Coop. in Bait Hanun</td>
<td>Consum.</td>
<td>0580</td>
<td>2/3/1965</td>
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<td>Agr. Coop. in Rafah Palestine</td>
<td>Agr.</td>
<td>0360</td>
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<td>0010</td>
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<td>Domicile Coop. for Returnees (Refugees) in Shatti'</td>
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<td>0746</td>
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<td>Domicile Coop. in Khan Yunis</td>
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<td>2600</td>
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<td>1372</td>
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<td>Coop. for Potable Water Conduction in Dair al-Balah</td>
<td>CPW.</td>
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<td>Agr. Coop. in al-Qararah</td>
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<td>Domicile Coop. in al-Qararah</td>
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<td>Domicile Coop. in Al Sabrah Neigh. Gaza</td>
<td>Consum.</td>
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<td>9/1/1966</td>
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57. Domicile Coop. in Southern Rimal Consum. 140 3/2/1966 57
58. Domicile Coop. for Gaza Port Consum. 0922 16/5/1966 58
60. Central Coop. for Wholesale Trading Consum. 0032"1" 21/11/1966 60
61. Milk Products Coop. in Gaza Indus. 0009 7/4/1968 61
64. Coop. for Solar Baths Production in Gaza Indus. 0008 24/7/1973 64
68. Al-Tawfiq Coop. for Fishermen Prod. 0036 24/7/1973 68
69. Al-Najah Coop. for Almond Producing and Marketing Agr. 0038 2/12/1973 69
70. Al-Ikhlas Coop. for Fish Catching and Marketing Prod. 0105 21/5/1975 70
72. Abu Sagaal Coop. for Fishermen in al-"Arish"2" Prod. 0075 7/6/1977 72
73. Agr. Coop. for Strawberry's Producers Agr. 0076 7/7/1977 73
74. Popular Agr.Coop. in
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Gaza Athletic Club</td>
<td>Gaza-Rimal</td>
<td>1914</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Al-Ahli Athletic Club</td>
<td>Gaza-Shaikh Radwan</td>
<td>1922</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Union Athletic Club in Shaja'iyah</td>
<td>Gaza-Shaja'iyah</td>
<td>1935</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Al-Nasr Al-'Arabi Club</td>
<td>Gaza-al-Nasr</td>
<td>1953</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Al-Tufah Athletic Club</td>
<td>Gaza-Tufah</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Arab Orthodox Club</td>
<td>Gaza-Zaitun</td>
<td>1979</td>
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</table>

Notes:
Consum. = Consumptive  Agr. = Agricultural
Indus. = Industrial    CPW = Conduction of Potable Water
Prod. = Productive     Neigh. = Neighbourhood
Coop. = Cooperative    RC = Refugee Camp
Veg. = Vegetables      Hous. = Housing
"1" = Cooperatives      "2" = Under the Israeli occupation
Northern Sinai and the Gaza Strip was an administrative unit
(before the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1982).

Source: Department of Cooperation's Archives, Civil Administration,
Gaza. Interview with 'Abd al-Rahman Tayah, Officer of Department

Appendix No. 3
The Athletic Clubs in the Gaza Strip in 1993
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Jabalia Athletic Club</td>
<td>Jabalia</td>
<td>1926</td>
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<td>Bait Hanun's Youths Club</td>
<td>Bait Hanun</td>
<td>1942</td>
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<td>Al-Nusairat's Youths Club</td>
<td>Al-Nusairat</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Dair al-Balah's Youths Club</td>
<td>Dair al-Balah</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Khan Yunis Youths Athletic Club</td>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>1934</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Al-Qararah Athletic Club</td>
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<td>2062</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Rafah's Youths Athletic Club</td>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>1918</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Crescent Athletic Club</td>
<td>Gaza-Rimal</td>
<td>3002</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Al-Mashtal (Nursery) Athletic Club</td>
<td>Gaza-Rimal</td>
<td>3007</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>Al-Sahil's (Coast) Youths Athletic Club</td>
<td>Al-Zawaidah</td>
<td>3017</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Athletic Club for Physically Handicapped</td>
<td>Gaza-Rimal</td>
<td>3018</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Al-Buraij Ahli Athletic Club</td>
<td>Al-Buraij</td>
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<td>23.</td>
<td>Bait Hanun Athletic Club</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>Jabalia's Youths Athletic Club</td>
<td>Jabalia</td>
<td>3046</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza. An interview with Abd al-Khaliq Budwan, Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza, 28/4/1994.
Footnotes and References

1. For more details about the cooperative societies in the Gaza strip see:


3.1. Associations Related to Health Services in the Gaza Strip


5. Members of the administrative board of the Arab Medical Association

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according to the result of the 1992 elections were:

Hasan Shurrab Head National bloc
Ziyad Sha'at Vice-President National bloc
Yusuf Awad Allah Secretary National bloc
Nafiz Shallah Treasurer National bloc
Ibrahim al-Habbash Member National bloc
Ismail Abu Madkur Member National bloc
Yahya Habub Member National bloc
Ali Abu Afash Member National bloc
Al-Syyid al-Jadbah Member National bloc
Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi Member Islamic bloc
Muhammad al-Akluk Member Islamic bloc


8. The Palestine Women's Union, Al-Ittihad al-Nisa'i al-Falistini: Taqrir (The Palestine Women’s Union: A Report), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, P. 6.


10. Al-Hai'ah al-Khairiyah li-Musa'adat Abna' Qita' Ghazzah (The Benevolent Society for the Gaza Strip, Artificial Limbs, Polio and Physiotherapy Centre, No Publisher, No date, pp. 1-2.


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3.2. Associations Related to Activities in the Field of Women
1. Al-Ittihad al-Nisa‘i al-Falistini (The Palestine Women’s Union), Gaza, Al-Ittihad al-Nisa‘i al-Falistini (The Palestine Women’s Union), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 1. An interview with Yusrah al-Barbari, the President of the Palestine Women’s Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the Palestine Women’s Union, Gaza, 25/5/1994.


3. An interview with Yusrah al-Barbari, the President of the Palestine Women’s Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the Palestine Women’s Union, Gaza, 25/5/1994.

4. Ibid.

5. Al-Ittihad al-Nisa‘i al-Falistini (The Palestine Women’s Union), Taqrir (A Report), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, pp. 2-3.


7. Al-Ittihad al-Nisa‘i al-Falistini (The Palestine Women’s Union), Taqrir (A Report), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 6.

8. Ibid.


11. An interview with Yusrah al-Barbari, the President of the PWU, the interview was conducted at the PWU’s headquarters, Gaza, 25 May, 1994.


13. An interview with Laila Saba, the President of the Society for Women Graduates in the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the Society, Gaza, 29/5/1994.


15. Ibid., p. 5.

16. An interview with Qunstantin Dabagh, the Executive Secretary of the Middle East Council of Churches (Department of Service to Palestine Refugees-Gaza area), the interview was conducted at his office,

17. Ittihad Kana’is al-Sharq al-Awsat (The Middle East Council of Churches), Ittihad Kana’is al-Sharq al-Awsat: Taqrir (The Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugees Work (NECCCRW: a Report), No Publisher, No date, pp. 3-5.


20. An interview with Adalah Abu Middain, the President of the Down’s Syndrome Children Right to Live Society, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the Society, Gaza, 27/5/1994.

3.3. Societies Related to the Child-care in the Gaza Strip


4. Society for the Care of the Handicapped in the Gaza Strip, Nabdah an al-Jam‘iyah (a Synopsis about the Society), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 1.

5. An interview with Arsalan al-Agha, the Director General of the Society for the Care of the Handicapped Children, Gaza, the interview was conducted at the researcher’s home, Khan Yunis, 9/5/1994. Jam‘iyat Ri‘ayat al-Mu’waqin fi Qita‘ Ghazzah (Society for the Care of the Handicapped Children in the Gaza Strip), The Mothers Home Care/Early Intervention Outreach Programme, Gaza, No Publisher, February 1990, pp. 1-3.

6. An interview with Shukri Shahin, the President of the al-Jam‘iyah
al-`Arabiyyah lil-Tanmiyah al-Ijtima`iyah, lil-Uṣrah wa-Ri`ayyat al-Tifl (the President of the Arab Society for Social Development, Family and Child Care), Khan Yunis, the interview was conducted at his office, Khan Yunis, 19/5/1994.

3.4. Educational and Scientific Societies in the Gaza Strip


4. See appendix no. 1. See also: A Hand-written List of the Associations in the Gaza Strip, Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza, 1993.


7. Ibid.


3.5. Societies active in the field of Senior Citizens and Handicapped

1. A list of the associations and popular organizations in the Gaza Strip, Department of Interior Affairs, *The Civil Administration*, Gaza.
2. The information about the aims of the associations active in the field of senior citizens and handicapped was extracted from a number of the associations' constitutions.


7. *Ibid*.


9. An interview with Khalid Abu Zaid, Co-ordinator of Society of Physically Handicapped People in the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 29/5/1994.


3.6. Societies Related to Agriculture and Economy in the Gaza Strip


4. See Appendix No. 1.

5. See Appendix No. 2.


12. Ibid, pp. 8-10.


17. Al-Ghurfah al-Tijariyah al-Falistiniyah bi-Qita' Ghazzah, (The Chamber of Commerce for the Gaza Strip), The Palestine Chamber of Commerce: Gaza Strip, Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 2.


19. Al-Ghurfah al-Tijariyah al-Falistiniyah: Nubahah Tarykhviyah, Waza'if, wa-Masadir al-Tamwwil (The Palestine Chamber of Commerce: Historical Synopsis, Functions, and Resources of Funds), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, pp. 3-5.

20. Ittihad al-Sina'un fi Qita' Ghazzah (Union of Industrialists of the Gaza Strip), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 1.

21. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

22. Ittihad al-Sina'un fi Qita' Ghazzah (Union of Industrialists of the Gaza Strip) Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 1.

23. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

24. For more details about the economy of the Gaza Strip See also:


3.7. Professional Associations in the Gaza Strip

1. See: Qanun al-Jam'iyat al-Uthmaniyyah (The Ottoman Societies Law) in Sisalim, Mazin, Imhanna, Ishaq, al-Dahduh, Sulyman, Majmu'at al-Qawanin al-Falistiniyyah (Collection of the Palestine Laws), Al-Juzu' al-Sabi', No Publisher, Gaza, 1976, pp. 72-76.

2. See a full list of the associations in the Gaza Strip in the appendices.


4. Jam'iyat al-Muhandisin fi Qita Ghazzah (The Engineers Society in the Gaza Strip), Al-Mizam al-Asasi (The Bylaw), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 1.


6. Observations by the researcher.

3.8. Charitable Societies in the Gaza Strip

1. Palestine: Development for Peace, the proceedings of the eccep-nengoot conference (eccp = The European Coordinating Committee of NGOs on the Question of Palestine, Nengoot = the Network of European NGOs in the Occupied Territories), Brussels, September 28-October 1, 1992, Jerusalem, 1992, p. 88.

2. A Hand-written List of the Associations and the Popular Organizations in the Gaza Strip, the Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza, 1993.

3. Observations by the researcher.


5. Al-Qararah Centre for Social Development, Taqrir (a Report), No Publisher, No date, p. 3.

6. Jam'iyat Asdiqa' al-Kafif (Blind's Friends Association), Taqrir (a Report), No Publisher, No date, pp. 1-2. See also: Al-Mizam al-
Asasi li-Jami'iyat Asdiqa' al-Kafif (The Bylaw of Blind's Association), Gaza, No Publisher, No date. pp. 1-3. An interview with 'Abd al-Khaliq Budwan, Director of the Societies' Affairs, Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza, the interview was conducted at his office, 5/7/1994.

7. Al-Astal, Kamal, Kaif Nunazim 'A'ilatuna? (How to Organize our Family?), a speech delivered in al-Astal family meeting, Khan Yunis, al-Sattar al-Gharbi, the meeting was held in Abu Hammad House, 1/9/1992.

8. Observations by the researcher. An interview with 'Abd al-Khaliq Budwan, the Director of the Societies' Affairs, The Civil Administration, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 26/5/1994.


3.9. Religious-Oriented Societies in the Gaza Strip.


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Chapter Three: Conclusion


2. Ibid.

3. See for more details:


11. Ibid.


13. The researcher noted that most prominent figures in official posts in the Gaza Strip have a family, tribe, and/or hamulah name. For example, Ifraih Abu Middain (of Abu Middain tribe) Minister of Justice in Palestinian Authority; Nabil Sha’ath (of Sha’ath extended-family) Minister of Planning and International Co-operation; Zakria al-Agha (of al-Agha extended-family) Minister of Housing, Un al-Shawwa (of al-Shawwa extended-family) Mayor of Gaza city; Samir al-Azayzah (of al-Azayzah tribe) Mayor of Dair al-Balah; Suliman al-Astal (of al-Astal extended-family) Mayor of Khan Yunis; Abd al-Hadi Idhair (of Abu Idhair extended-family) Mayor of Rafah; Haidar Al-Astal (of al-Astal extended-family) the President of the General Union of the Palestinian Peasants in the Gaza Strip.


15. Observations by the researcher.


17. An interview with Yusra al-Barbari, the President of the Palestine Women’s Union, Gaza, May 25, 1994. An interview with Fayiz Abu Rahmah, the President of the Lawyers’ Association in the Gaza Strip, Gaza, August 23, 1994.


19. Ibid. Observation by the researcher.

20. Observation by the researcher.


23. An interview with Sana’ Abu Za’id, a researcher working with the Down Syndrome Children Right to Live Society, Gaza, May 27, 1944. An interview with ‘cadalah Abu Middain, the President of the Down Syndrome Children Right to Live Society, Gaza, May 27, 1944. Observation by the researcher.


27. Tamari, Salim, "Al-takhalluf wa afaq al-tanmiyyah fi al-diffah al-gharbiyyah wa qita’ ghazzah al-muhatatayn" (Underdevelopment and


31. Muslih, Ibid., p. 262.


4.0. Introduction

This chapter analyses the genesis and the historical development of Palestinian trade unionism, and the political role of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation (PWTUF) in the Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation.

The chapter is made up of four sections in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. Section one covers the emergence of the Palestinian trade union movement in Palestine during the British mandate over Palestine, the disappearance of unions following the 1948 war, and their re-emergence in 1965 with the establishment of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation (PWTUF) in the Gaza Strip. Section two reviews the trade unions which are constituent members of the PWTUF. Section three examines the political role of unions by analyzing the relationship between trade unions and both the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian political movements. Section four explores further this political role by examining the unions' attitudes towards the intifada and towards the peace process.
Section One

Genesis of Palestinian Trade Unionism: the Palestinian Arab Workers Society (1925) and the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation (1965) in the Gaza Strip

This section reviews the genesis of Palestinian trade unionism, and its involvement in politics. It also discusses the establishment of Palestinian trade unions in the Gaza Strip.

4.1.1. Genesis of the Palestinian Labour Movement in Palestine: the Palestinian Arab Workers' Society, 1925

On March 21, 1925, the first Palestinian trade union was formed: the Palestinian Arab Workers Society (PAWS). This constituted the nucleus and genesis of the Palestinian labour movement.

Several factors led to the emergence of the union. First, the British mandate over Palestine effectively provided a channel through which developments in Egypt could affect Palestinian society. The construction of the railway line between Cairo and Haifa, to serve the economic and military interests of the British authorities, created a link between the Egyptian and Palestinian workers who were working together in maintenance of the railway. Egyptian trade unions, such as the Tram Workers' Union, the Railway Workers' Union, and the Trade Union of Employees, directly affected Palestinian workers. Cooperation between Egyptian and Palestinian workers in maintaining the Cairo-Haifa railway created a unionist consciousness among the latter. Significantly, it was on the railways that the idea to establish the first Palestinian trade union was born.

Second, in December 1920 the Histadrut, the General Federation of Hebrew Labour, was established in Haifa. The Histadrut was organized on the Zionist principle of "Hebrew labour" and aimed to create a Jewish working organization excluding Palestinian workers from its ranks. The Zionist challenge and the Jewish character of the Histadrut pushed Palestinian workers to organize themselves.

Third, socio-economic factors contributed to the emergence of the Palestinian trade union movement. Deteriorating economic conditions in
the countryside, especially during World War I, had pushed large numbers of peasants from the countryside to cities and created a steady process of proletarianisation. These peasants were transformed into workers in construction projects. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the British authorities had begun a number of construction programmes involving the erection of railways, roads, bridges and military camps. These programmes needed large numbers of workers. Former peasants composed a significant part of the labour force.⁴

Fourth, the Palestinian working stratum expanded with the development of Arab industrial enterprises. It was during the British Mandate that significant industrialization began, with the development of fruit packing, soap manufacturing, and leather dyeing industries.⁵

Fifth, the political confrontation between Palestinians and Zionism caused Palestinians to be drawn towards organizing themselves, so as to defend their collective interests. Thus the Palestinian trade union movement became closely associated with the Palestinian people in its struggle against the Zionist movement. Even fights for better conditions and higher wages among the more organized Palestinian workers had direct political implications.

In 1920, an unofficial nucleus which was to develop into a trade union was created. Palestinians in Haifa who were working on the railways established their first unofficial organization, which they called the Fraternal Committee of Palestine Railway Workers. The Fraternal Committee operated as a charity in conformity with provisions of the Ottoman Societies’ Law (1909). The Fraternal Committee aimed at raising donations to aid needy workers, to organize the workers, and to establish a workers’ club.⁶

In 1921, Palestinian railway workers applied for membership in the Histadrut but their application was rejected. In reaction to this rejection, efforts to form a union to represent Arab workers were begun by Abd al-Hamid Haimur, a worker in the workshop of Haifa railway station. He succeeded in forming the "Club of Arab Railway Workers" in 1923 as a step on the way to forming a union. Thirty workers were members in the club.⁷
4.1.1.1. Establishment of Palestinian Arab Workers Society (PAWS) 1925

In 1923 'Abd al-Hamid Haimur, and some other members of the Club of Arab Railway Workers, applied to the British mandate authorities for permission to establish a labour society to serve their interests. On March 21, 1925, the authorities gave their official permission for the establishment of a Palestinian Arab Workers Society (PAWS). The society was based in Haifa - in Wadi al-Salib. It will be useful to examine the goals and structure of the society.

The aims of PAWS, according to section one of its constitution, were: first, establishing a central headquarters to connect all branches of the society in Palestine; second, organizing workers with a view to improving their conditions at all levels, especially socially and economically; third, opening branches of the society in the various towns and cities in Palestine; fourth, making efforts and pressing the Mandate authorities to introduce a labour-related legislation which was to include matters related to workers such as wages, leave, allowances and work incidents; fifth, furnishing proper and hygienic housing for workers, and helping workers to educate their sons and to take care of their health; and sixth, defending workers' interests in their relations with capitalists and owners of the workshops (Art. 3).

As regards membership, Article 4 of the PAWS' bylaw stipulated that "the society accepts for its membership each worker except Jewish workers". All members were equal and were obliged to defend their interests collectively. The oath of the affiliated workers was as follows: "I swear by God the Great to be loyal to the society and to observe its law and to sacrifice in serving my brethren Arab workers" (Art. 59). By 1946 the Palestinian Arab Workers Society claimed some 50,000 members. On the social side, the Society encouraged social relations between workers and their families.

4.1.1.2. The Organizational Structure of the Palestinian Arab Workers Society

At the outset the Palestinian Arab Workers Society consisted of three organizational elements: the constituent body, the general assembly, and the administrative board. The constituent body was composed of the mem-
bers who had gained the official permission to establish the society. Its function was to call the general assembly to hold a meeting for election, within six months of the official permission for establishment having been obtained. The general assembly was composed of all members affiliated to the society, regardless of their professions. The administrative board was the executive organ of PAWS.13

The nature of the Palestinian Arab Workers Society was twofold. On the one hand, it functioned as a trade union with branches; on the other it operated as a federation of the trade unions in Palestine. As a trade union with branches, PAWS established its headquarters in Haifa and ran a number of branches in various areas of Palestine such as Acre, al-Bassah, Nablus, Tulkarim, Yaffa (Jaffa), Lud, al-Ramlīh, Bait Nābala, Salamāgh, Khan Yunis, Jerusalem, Ḍamāṣ, Gaza, al-Majdāl (Ashkelon), al-Naqānī, al-Qībāb, Tarṣīḥa, and Safd, etc. As a federation, PAWS operated as a central coordination body for trade unions in Palestine, which functioned as a constituent members of PAWS.14

During the 1920s and the 1930s, the Palestinian Arab Workers Society extended its activities and correspondingly amended its structure.15 It encouraged the workers to organize themselves and to establish other new branches and unions such as the Union of the Palestine Railway Workers, the Union of Bakery Workers, the Union of Drivers, the Union of Quarry Workers, the Cigarette Factory Workers’ Union, and the Union of Municipalities’ Workers.16 In the 1940s, other unions were established by direct support and supervision of PAWS. These unions included the Union of British Military Camps’ Workers, the Union of Postal Workers, the Union of Public Works’ Workers, the Union of Petroleum Refinery Workers, the Union of Sibini Trade Company Workers.17 Meanwhile, PAWS increased its membership. The Secretary-General of the society told the Anglo-American Committee, which visited Palestine in 1946, that the society’s membership stood at fifty thousand. In 1946, the number of the society’s branches in Palestine was estimated at thirty branches.18

In the 1930s and 1940s, the expansion of the society's membership and activities led to the modification of its structure. The new structure consisted of a general convention, a Secretary-General, a central committee, the supreme council of the unions, branches of the unions, councils of unions’ branches (in towns), and the unions’ committees in every industry. The general convention consisted of delegations from the con-
stituent unions and the councils of the union branches in various areas. The general convention elected the central committee, and the latter, in its turn, appointed the secretariat, and elected the Secretary-General of PAWS. Table no. 8 demonstrates the hierarchical structure of the Palestinian Arab Workers Society in the 1940s.

Table No. 8
The Hierarchy of the PAWS (in the 1940s)

| The General Convention          |
| The Secretary-General           |
| The Secretariat                 |
| The Central Committee           |
| The Supreme Council of the Unions |
| The Branches of the Unions      |
| The Councils of the Unions' Branches |
| Syndicalistic Committees in various Industries |

Source: compiled by the researcher.

During the early years of the 1940s, the Palestinian labour movement suffered from divisions. In 1942, two Palestinian communists (Emile Tuma and Bulus Farah) initiated the establishment of the "Union of Arab Workers' Societies and Trade Unions" which was composed of about five thousand members. The Communists criticised PAWS for its moderation, and claimed that this was the main reason for the establishment of the "Union of Arab Workers' Societies and Trade Unions". In 1945, the Union of Arab Workers' Societies and Trade Unions dissolved itself and merged with another workers' body, which was called the "Arab Workers' Conference".¹⁹

The divisions in the Palestinian labour movement had negative consequences not only for the interests of the workers but also for the national interest of the Palestinian people.

4.1.1.3. The Palestinian Arab Workers Society and Politics

The Palestinian Arab Workers Society did not separate itself from the
Palestinian national struggle. From the beginning it constituted a reaction to political developments. Its involvement in political matters was apparent from the resolutions of the conferences held by the society. It should be noted that due to the unstable political setting in Palestine, the PAWS' conferences were not regularly convened.

On January 11, 1930, the PAWS held its first general conference in Haifa. Fifty-eight members attended the conference. The decisions of the conference were clearly political. They called for the independence of Palestine within the framework of Arab unity; rejected the Zionist immigration into Palestine; denounced discriminatory treatment of Arab workers; and asked for the release of political prisoners and administrative detainees and the return of deportees back to their homeland. The second conference of the society was held in Haifa on August 29, 1946, and its third conference was convened (also in Haifa) in 1947. 150 members participated in the conference. The political resolutions of the second conference of the PAWS included, first, the demand that the Palestinian labour movement be a branch of the political movement in Palestine; second, the call for the creation of an Arab army to defend Arab interests in Palestine and to confront Zionist plans; third, the sending of a memorandum to the United Nations Organization to explain the Zionist plot against Palestine and its people; and fourth, the presenting of memoranda to the British mandate authorities protesting against Jewish immigration into Palestine. The third conference of the society, which was attended by 200 representatives, also issued a number of political resolutions. It called for the rejection of the partition plan, and the establishment of an independent Arab Palestinian democratic state. Jews who were living in Palestine before 1918 were to be deemed full citizens of such a state but not Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine after that date. The conference sent a memorandum to the U.N.O. Secretary-General containing these resolutions.

The Palestinian Arab Workers Society organized a number of strikes in the 1930s and 1940s to support workers' economic interests and the national struggle of the Palestinian people as well. On April 20, 1936, the Revolt was declared in Palestine and a long strike (for six months) was started. PAWS urged the workers to participate in the
strike. The concentration of the Palestinian trade unionists on political issues at that time came at the expense of the syndicalistic activities of the PAWS.

In the aftermath of the events of 1948, the scattering of the Palestinian people left both the nationalist movement and the trade union movement in confusion. But gradually the trade union movement was revived as an umbrella for Palestinian workers in some of the countries to which they had been deported. In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization was established as a political vehicle to lead the Palestinian people. In the same year, a number of trade unions were founded in the Gaza Strip. In 1964, the Egyptian authorities, who had initiated the establishment of the PLO, permitted trade unions to exercise their activities in the Gaza Strip. Thus, the re-establishment of trade unions in the Gaza Strip was shaped by political developments.

4.1.2. The Establishment of Palestinian Workers Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip: a Historical Background Through to 1965

Trade union activity in the Gaza Strip has been neglected throughout the twentieth century. Considered an economically backward area, Gaza did not attract the attention of union organizers active in the coastal area during the Mandate period, and after 1948 the Egyptian authorities in the Gaza Strip did not allow trade unions to operate during the period from 1948 to 1964. It was only after the establishment of the PLO in 1964 that the Egyptian authorities permitted trade unions in the Gaza Strip to be brought into existence.

According to Hiltermann, activists made several attempts to establish union branches in the Gaza Strip during the British Mandate, but the area's agrarian economy inhibited the emergence of a large labour movement. However, PAWS did manage to establish branches in Gaza and Khan Yunis, and the Arab Workers Conference reached down to Gaza and established a separate branch. After 1948 it took a full sixteen years before the labour movement could be revived.

From 1948 to 1964, a number of elements delayed the revival of the Palestinian trade union movement: first, in the Gaza Strip a majority of the population (two-thirds) were refugees suffering from unemployment; second, the agricultural character of the economy and the weakness
of the industrial sector hindered the crystallization of an active working class; third, the lack of the workers' consciousness delayed their organizing; fourth, the majority of workplaces in the Gaza Strip were small; and fifth, after 1948, the Egyptian authorities closed the branches of the PAWS in Gaza and Khan Yunis and the office of the Arab Workers' Conference in Gaza. Between 1948 and 1954 the Egyptian authorities considered trade unions activities as communist and illegal. However, after the Nasser Revolution on July 23, 1952, national trends began to be active. Social and labour organizations were legitimized. In 1954, the Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip issued Law No. 331 of 1954, which allowed the establishment of the trade unions. However, ten years passed before the trade unions were brought into existence in the Gaza Strip.

The establishment of the PLO in 1964 facilitated the establishment of Palestinian popular organizations (e.g. trade unions). The trade unions which came into existence at this time became constituent members of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation (PWTUF) which was created in Gaza in 1965.

In 1965, the PWTUF was created in Gaza. It consisted of the following six unions: the Trade Union of Metal Industries' Workers in the Gaza Strip, which was established on November 14, 1964, and was composed at that time of only 25 members; the Trade Union of Business and Public Services in the Gaza Strip, established on October 11, 1964, with 1,469 members; the Trade Union of Agricultural Workers, established on April 18, 1965, with 462 members; the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers in the Gaza Strip, established on October 22, 1964, with 160 members; the Trade Union of Arab Drivers in the Gaza Strip, established on October 22, 1964, with 1,142 members; and the Trade Union of Carpentry and Construction's Workers in the Gaza Strip, established on January 13, 1965, with 272 members.

As to the general conditions of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip at the time of their formation, it should be noted that the number of their members was very small. In 1965, there was a total of only 3,430 members affiliated to the unions, and this number constituted only a small proportion of the workers in the various economic sectors. The largest two unions in membership, moreover, were not in the industrial sector. The first was the Trade Union of Business and Public Services Workers
(1,469 members); and the second was the Trade Union of Arab Drivers (1,142). Adding to these the Trade Union of Agricultural Workers (462), which was also non-industrial, the three largest unions had 3,073 members. The three unions which were directly associated with the industrial sector were marginal and their membership was relatively small. These were the Trade Union of Metal Industries Workers (only 25 members), the Trade Union of Carpentry and Construction Workers (272 members), and the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers (160 members). The whole membership of these three latter unions was only 457 members. This reflected the underdevelopment of the industrial sector of the Gaza Strip economy. The members of the latter three unions in Gaza constituted 32 per cent of the workers in the industrial sector.

It is clear that the emergence of the trade unions in the Strip after 1964 was a direct consequence of political developments. It was not a coincidence that the formation of the trade unions came concurrently with the revival of the political organization of the Palestinian people, the PLO.

4.1.3. The Israeli Occupation Authorities and the Trade Unions 1967-1993

Virtually no union activity took place in the Gaza Strip during the first thirteen years of the Israeli occupation. After 1967, the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip banned the activities of the trade unions and adopted a policy of employing great numbers of Gazan workers inside Israel. The Israeli aim was to make the revival of the trade unions a difficult task.

Although the unions were allowed to reopen in 1980, they were initially prohibited from holding elections or recruiting new members without obtaining prior permission from the Israeli authorities. In effect this meant that the trade unions operated only minimally from 1980 to 1986. During the early years of the 1980s, the trade unions were forbidden to admit into membership anyone who was not already a member in 1967. The result was a small and aging official membership. In 1980 the number of their members was estimated by the ILO to be only 500.

In 1987 trade unions in the Gaza Strip held elections, but the Israeli authorities refused to recognize the results. The area was sealed off for the occasion but members of the unions were able to enter the build-
The unionists refused to back down and continued to challenge the authorities.

In the early years of the 1990s, the trade unions' membership expanded. In 1993, it was estimated at 11,000 members.\textsuperscript{11}

4.1.4. An Analysis of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions' Bylaw 1964

In 1964 the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions' Bylaw was promulgated. It was based on Order 331 of 1954 permitting the establishment of trade unions in the Gaza Strip, and accorded with article 164 of the Egyptian Labour Law 91 of 1959. It is instructive to review the basic rules of the bylaw.\textsuperscript{1}

The first section of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions' Bylaw contained four articles giving details of a union's composition, its headquarters, and its legal status. Article 3 stipulated that the headquarters of the unions should be located in Gaza city, with branches located in each other city in the Strip. There could be trade unions' subcommittees in each establishment (e.g. factories, workplaces). The chairman of a union's administrative board (or his deputy) was considered the representative of the union (Art. 4).\textsuperscript{3} Chart no. 9 shows the hierarchy of the trade unions organisation in the Gaza Strip, 1965-1993.

\textbf{Chart No. 9}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Hierarchy of Trade Union Organisation in the Gaza Strip 1965-1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation (PWTUF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the organizational umbrella of the six trade unions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(six constituent trade unions of the PWTUF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in each city in the Gaza Strip)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in factories and workplaces)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Source}: compiled by the researcher.

As regards the objectives of the unions, Article 5 of the unions' bylaw stated that the trade unions were established in order to achieve objec-
Objectives in the fields of union organization, industrial and professional relations, cultural and social affairs, and international contacts. Details of these objectives are given below:

First: Objectives in the organizational field
In this field, the unions were to aim at: achieving social solidarity among the workers of the same profession; encouraging the affiliation and expanding the membership of that profession in the union; promoting cooperation among the members of the union; and supporting the PWTUF in the Gaza Strip.

Second: Objectives in the field of industrial and professional relations
In the field of industrial and professional relations, the unions were to aim at: defending the rights of their members; improving the conditions of their work; enhancing their members’ industrial and professional standards; ensuring stability of labour relations through making full use of the legal system; and increasing production and national income.

Third: Objectives in the cultural and social fields
In the cultural and social domain, the unions were to aim at: establishing educational institutions for workers and organizing classes to fight against illiteracy; enhancing the workers’ standards in theoretical, practical and professional studies; publicizing leaflets, books and other printed materials about the trade unions; training trade union leaders and educating them to be familiar with trade union organization rules; and enhancing the social standards of members.

Fourth: Objectives in the international arena
In the international arena, the unions were to aim at: representing the trade unions in the international organizations and conferences; and enhancing relations between Palestinian workers in the Strip and workers in other parts of the world.

Organizationally, each of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip consisted of a general assembly and an administrative board. The general assembly of a trade union was composed of all of the union’s members. The functions of the general assembly of a trade union were: electing the mem-
bers of the administrative board of the trade union by secret balloting; voting of confidence (or no confidence) regarding the administrative board or of some members of the administrative board; discussing the annual reports which were presented by the administrative board; discussing the reports and proposals presented by the trade unions' branches; amending the law of the trade union with the consent of two-thirds of the members; ratifying contracts related to work and collective agreements signed by the trade union, and dissolving voluntarily and unilaterally the trade union by the consent of two-thirds of the members. The general assembly passed its resolutions by a majority of the members present, and it also had the right to form subcommittees to discuss various matters (Art. 44).\textsuperscript{10}

The administrative board was the executive authority of the trade union (Art. 46). It consisted of no less than seven members and no more than twenty one members (Art. 45).\textsuperscript{11} The office of the administrative board of a trade union consisted of a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer. The President was the legal representative of the trade union before the official authorities. He presided over the administrative board and the general assembly and signed (with the Secretary) the minutes of the sessions of the general assembly. The Vice-President undertook the functions of the President in the case of the latter's absence. The Secretary performed other administrative functions, such as preparing the agenda for the administrative board's and general assembly's sessions; and controlling correspondence, books and official papers. The Treasurer worked out the annual budget of the trade union, presented the financial report of the administrative board, and was responsible for the fiscal matters of the trade union (Art. 49).\textsuperscript{12}

The jurisdiction of the administrative board of a trade union included supervising the activities of the unions' branches and subcommittees; defending the interests of the union members in the field of industrial and professional relations (e.g. collective bargaining); organizing the members' participation in the subcommittees; preparing the annual report related to the unions' activities; administering the main headquarters of the union; and serving the interests of the members in the areas in which there were no union branches to observe their interests.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, the administrative board had the right to form sub-committees to follow different aspects of workers' affairs.\textsuperscript{14}
4.1.5. An Analysis of the Constitution of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation (PWTUF), 1965

The Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation (PWTUF) was established in Gaza city in 1965. Its constitution was based on Order 331 of 1954 relating to the establishment of trade unions, and was in conformity with the Egyptian Labour Law 91 of 1959. The PWTUF consisted of the six trade unions in the Strip. A brief review of the basic rules of the PWTUF’s constitution will be presented.¹

The first section of the PWTUF’s constitution dealt with the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation’s name, its establishment, its headquarters, and its constituents. Article 1 stated that the PWTUF represented the unions and it consisted of the existing trade unions, with membership open to every trade union to be established in the future.

The founder members of the PWTUF in the Gaza Strip were six trade unions. These trade unions were: the Trade Union of Metal Industries’ Workers, the Trade Union of Business and Public Services, the Trade Union of Agricultural Workers, the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers, the Trade Union of Arab Drivers, and the Trade Union of Carpentry and Construction’s Workers.²

As to the objectives of the PWTUF, Article 4 stated that the PWTUF aimed at: achieving the goals of the constituent unions in the Gaza Strip; defending the rights of the workers in the Strip; sharing in the formulation of legal codes which ensured advanced methods in performing the activities of the trade unions; increasing national production and national income in the Strip; promoting the cultural, professional, social and syndicalistic standards of the members; representing the workers at the local and international levels; and establishing a Social Security Fund to secure a reasonable standard of living for the workers.³
4.1.6. The Organizational Structure of the PWTUF

The PWTUF in the Strip consisted of the following three main organs: the Supreme Council, the Executive Committee, and the Secretariat. An analysis of these organs will now be presented.

4.1.6.1. The Supreme Council of the PWTUF

The Supreme Council of the PWTUF consisted of the six trade unions' administrative boards' elected members. There were forty-two members at the outset and that increased with the expansion of the members of administrative boards' (Art. 6[1]).

The Supreme Council of the PWTUF was considered as the highest organ supervising the trade unions in the Gaza Strip, holding a wide range of powers. Its functions were to supervise the implementation of plans to achieve the unions' goals; to monitor the administrative boards' performance; to design the public policy of the PWTUF; to work out the budget; to discuss reports related to the activities of the PWTUF; to elect the president of the PWTUF and to elect the Executive Committee of the PWTUF; and to amend, if necessary, the constitution of the PWTUF with the consent of two-thirds of its members (Art. 7[1-6]).

The Supreme Council of the PWTUF held its yearly ordinary meeting in September and was also allowed to hold extraordinary meetings to deal with urgent matters (Art. 8[1-2]). The tenure of elected Supreme Council members was two years.

4.1.6.2. The Executive Committee of the PWTUF

The Executive Committee of the PWTUF consisted of thirteen members (in 1993) elected by the Supreme Council. The trade unions should be represented in the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee, as executive organ of the PWTUF, elected the Vice-President, the Secretary, and the Treasurer of the PWTUF; administered the PWTUF's affairs for a two-year period after its election; discussed issues related to workers; implemented the Supreme Council's decisions; and represented the PWTUF and defended its interests.
The Executive Committee passed decisions by absolute majority (51%) (Art. 12[5]). It held weekly ordinary meetings, and it was permitted to hold an extraordinary meeting to deal with urgent issues (Art. 13[1]).

4.1.6.3. Office of the Secretariat of the PWTUF

The Office of the Secretariat of the PWTUF consisted of the President of the PWTUF, the Secretary, and the Treasurer, and it formed a link between the Supreme Council and the Executive Committee (Art. 15).

The functions of the Office of the Secretariat of the PWTUF were to refer decisions of the Supreme Council to the Executive Committee to be implemented and to receive the executive committee's reports and present them to the Supreme Council (Art. 16[1-2]). The Office of the Secretariat held its ordinary meetings every three days (Art. 17).

The President of the PWTUF presided over the meetings of the Supreme Council and the meetings of the Executive Committee; represented the PWTUF in conferences; dealt with the relevant authorities in matters related to workers' affairs; and called for the convening of the Supreme Council in its extraordinary meetings (Art. 19[1-4]).

The Secretary of the PWTUF performed a number of functions such as keeping records of correspondence and managing meetings of the Executive Committee and the Supreme Council.

The Treasurer was responsible for the financial matters of the PWTUF. He kept books and records related to the financial affairs, worked out the budget, and presented financial reports to the respective organs and authorities. The PWTUF had an independent legal status, and the unions were under the umbrella of its juristic personality (Art. 23).
Section Two
The Constituent Members of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation (PWTUF) in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

This section analyses the constituent members of the PWTUF and outlines the structure of the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers as a model of the six unions existing in the Gaza Strip.

The PWTUF consisted of six trade unions. Table no. 10 demonstrates their membership in 1987.

Table No. 10
Trade Unions Members in the Gaza Strip 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Trade Union</th>
<th>Election Date</th>
<th>General Assembly Date</th>
<th>Administrative Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>T.U. of Carpentry and Construction</td>
<td>21/2/1987</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Arab Drivers T.U.</td>
<td>10/6/1987</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers T.U.</td>
<td>30/9/1987</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The membership of the unions increased such that in 1992 they had a total of 9,112 members. In 1993, the President of the PWTUF, Rasim al-Bayari, in an interview with the researcher, estimated membership at about 11,000. Table no. 11 gives details of the membership of each trade union in 1991 and 1992.
### Table No. 11

Members of the Unions in the Gaza Strip 1991-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name of Union</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers T.U.</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>2,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Arab Drivers T.U.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Metal Industries T.U.</td>
<td>1,636</td>
<td>1,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Business and Public Services T.U.</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting Workers T.U.</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>T.U. of Carpentry and Construction</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,153</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,112</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The six trade unions were controlled by the union law which organized the trade unions in the Gaza Strip. Each of them had two organs: a general assembly and an administrative board.

Because all the unions operated in a similar way, one union of them (the Weaving and Knitting Workers Trade Union) will be examined. The other five trade unions followed the same model.

#### 4.2.1. Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers (TUWKW)

The Trade Union of Weaving and knitting Workers (TUWKW) was established in 1964. Its headquarters was located in Gaza city. The analysis of the functions and structure of the TUWKW will be based on the provisions of its bylaw and constitution.

The objectives of the union were: enhancing fraternal ties and friendship between workers; improving the social, cultural, and economic status of the workers; participating in local and international labour conferences; defusing labour conflicts through legal means; giving aid to the sick workers and to their families; and fighting against racism and supporting efforts to establish peace (Art. 2[a-f]).

The bylaw of the TUWKW contained provisions which organized its membership. A member of the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union should be no less than sixteen years old (Art. 3). Muhammad Imdukh, the President of the TUWKW told the researcher that at the end of 1993 the union was com-
posed of 1480 members. A member might be dismissed in the event of first, violating honour, trust or honesty; second, causing injury to the union and its interests; third, deviating from the union’s goals; and fourth, failing to pay membership dues for three consecutive months (Art. 4[a-d]).

Organizationally, the TUWKW consisted of two organs: a general assembly and an administrative board. The general assembly was composed of members who paid their dues regularly, and held its ordinary meeting in March of every year (Art. 5). In its ordinary meetings, the general assembly undertook a number of functions: discussing the annual report presented by the administrative board; approving the budget; electing the administrative board and electing an auditor; and discussing other issues on the agenda (Art. 6[a-e]). The quorum for a general assembly meeting was no less than half of the members (Art. 7).* The general assembly members had the right to call for the holding of an extraordinary meeting to discuss extraordinary issues such as dissolving the assembly, dismissing the administrative board and electing another board (Art. 10[a-c]).

The administrative board of the TUWKW was composed of twelve members who were elected for two years. Its functions were as follows: managing the administrative and technical matters of the union and seeking to accomplish its goals; appointing employees, and punishing and dismissing them; representing the union before local, governmental, and international bodies; preparing an annual report which covered the union’s activities and its financial status; working out the budget; determining the annual and monthly membership dues; inspecting - in coordination with the Department of Labour - and supervising the conditions of workers in their work places; and demanding the improvement of labour conditions (Art. 12[1-8]). The administrative board had the right to form such committees and subcommittees as were deemed necessary to perform its functions (Art. 16).

The union was permitted under its constitution to obtain funds from membership, donations, deposits, and other financial sources which were allowed by law (Art. 17).

If the union was unable to undertake its functions, the administrative board, or one-fourth of the general assembly members, had the right to
call for the holding of a special meeting to consider the dissolution of the union with the consent of two thirds of its members. Article 33 stipulated that the authorities should not dissolve the union unless there was a clear judicial decision in this respect.

As noted earlier the constitution of the TUWKW was a model for the other unions' constitutions - they were controlled in a similar manner. The main difference was simply in the unions' names.
Section Three
The Political Role of the Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip: the Relationship between the Trade Unions and both the Israeli Authorities and the Palestinian Political Movements

Since 1980 the trade unions have played an important political role. The political role has been shaped by four axes: the relationship between the trade unions and the Israeli authorities, the relationship between the trade unions and the Palestinian political movements, the relationship between the trade unions and the intifada, and the relationship between the trade unions and the peace process.

In this section an analysis of the relationship between the trade unions and the Israeli authorities and the relationship between the trade unions and the Palestinian political movements, will be presented.

4.3.1. The Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli Authorities

To examine the nature of the relationship between the trade unions in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli occupation authorities, two different elements should be taken into consideration. These elements constitute the framework within which the trade unions and the Israeli military authorities interacted. The elements are: a legal framework which restricted free organization; and a political attitude (on the part of the Israeli authorities) which inhibited organization. The legal framework and the negative political attitude towards the unions will more be reviewed.

4.3.1.1. The Development of the Relationship Between the Israeli Authorities and the Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip 1967-1993

The development of the tense relationship between the Israeli authorities and the unions in the Gaza Strip, from 1967 to 1993, passed through three main phases. The first phase extended for thirteen years (from 1967 to 1980), during which the Israeli authorities banned the unions' activities. The second phase covered the six years from 1980 to 1986, during which the unions were allowed to resume their activities under restrictive conditions. The third phase started in 1987 and extended for six years to the end of 1993, during which time the unions succeeded in defying the Israeli limitations.¹

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From the early years of the Israeli occupation tense and hostile relations emerged between the unions and the authorities. The Israeli authorities outlawed the unions and banned their activities. In 1980, the Israeli authorities permitted the reopening of the trade unions provided that these unions should observe limitations. These limitations included: first, re-activating of the pre-1967 trade unions' administrative boards without any change, despite the Israeli authorities knowing that a number of the administrative boards' members were deceased, or had immigrated, travelled, or given up trade unionism; second, each trade union was not allowed to admit new members and only the pre-1967 members were allowed to resume their membership in the unions; third, no elections should be held in the unions; fourth, the trade unions in the Gaza Strip were not permitted to defend rights of Gazan workers working inside Israel; and fifth, the trade unions were not allowed to interfere in political affairs.

In a word, the authorities accepted international pressure, especially from the ILO, to allow the trade unions to resume their activities as a kind of formality (the trade unions were allowed to reopen their headquarters, but the Israeli authorities put limitations on their activities).

The above mentioned limitations weakened the unions and put obstacles in their way to recruit members. The Israeli authorities forbade any increase in the PWTUF's membership. When the unions resumed their activities, they had a small number of (aged) members. The inability to offer services to the workers who were working inside Israel pushed the workers away from the unions. In 1986, however, the unions challenged the restrictions of the Israeli authorities and began secretly to increase their membership. From 1986 on, the number of members of the unions was increased. In 1965, the members of the unions were estimated to be 3,430. In 1980, the total number of the unions' members was estimated to be 500. In 1987, the members of the unions had increased to reach 2,656. At the end of 1993, the number of the trade unions members was about 11,000 members.

In the early months of 1987, the unions decided to challenge the Israeli restrictions on elections. On 7 March 1987, the administrative board of the PWTUF decided to hold elections and informed the authorities, but on
1 April 1987, the Israeli Labour Officer sent a letter of threat to the unions rejecting the holding of election. On 2 April the Israeli forces raided the unions' premises and confiscated property and arrested a number of the workers who were in the headquarters. On 3 April, all members of the PWTUF's executive committee were summoned to the Israeli Governor-General who warned them not to hold an election, and the following day the Israeli forces besieged the headquarters of the PWTUF in an attempt to prevent the election. Despite the Israeli measures the PWTUF managed to hold elections in the Red Cross headquarters in Gaza city.⁵

In December 1987 the Palestinian uprising (intifada) broke out and the rights and freedoms of the trade unions and their members were more severely curtailed. The restrictions included long curfews, closures, mass arrest and detention, deportation, etc. These difficulties were further compounded by the even more stringent restrictions that were imposed, especially on freedom of movement, as a result of the second Gulf crisis. Many of the restrictions were not directed specifically at the trade union movement but in practice they resulted in constraints being placed on these organizations.⁶

4.3.1.2. The Israeli Government's Negative Political Attitude towards the Unions

The relationship between the Palestinian trade unions and the Israeli authorities was tense. The functioning of the unions was adversely affected by the Israeli authorities' general negative political attitude, by the repressive legal framework, and by the actual cases of Israeli harassment experienced by the unions. It is clear that summary arrests, administrative detentions, searches of trade union premises, confiscation of property and general harassment of trade unions and their leaders characterized the relationship between the two parties.⁷

The Israeli government's general negative political attitude towards the unions prevailed. The Israeli authorities accused the unions of being fronts for the Palestinian political movements. The authorities remained convinced that the entire trade union movement in the Gaza Strip was a front for "terrorist activities", and that it was controlled, in one way or another, by the Palestine Liberation Organization.⁸ The Israeli authorities considered the trade unions of the Gaza Strip deliberately
structured to reflect the political structures existing in the PLO. Any modification in the PLO structure was immediately followed by a corresponding change in the structures of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation.\textsuperscript{9}

The Israelis accused the unions of performing a political more than a professional role. As a result, the authorities used "security reasons" to hinder the activities of the unions. On a number of occasions, various organizations, including the ILO, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and Al-Haq (the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists) intervened over the arrest and detention of trade unionists or over raids on trade union premises and confiscation of property. The Israeli authorities, however, seldom responded to such interventions. When they did, it was merely to state that such measures were taken for "security reasons" or that the matter was under investigation.\textsuperscript{10}

The repressive Israeli legal framework was implemented through a large number of military orders. Egyptian laws (still valid after 1967) regulating trade union rights in the Gaza Strip remained in place, but they had been the object of constant amendment through the issuing of more than 1,200 Israeli military orders. Many of them affected the organization and functioning of the trade unions as well as the rights of trade union leaders to exercise their functions in full freedom. These orders placed numerous restrictions on civil liberties that were essential for the free exercise of trade union rights.\textsuperscript{11}

The actual cases of Israeli harassment experienced by the trade union constituted obstacles for the unions in performing their activities. During the intifada, a number of trade unionists were arrested and sentenced. The Israeli authorities claimed that they were arrested for acts of violence. The trade unions, the Israelis claimed, were associated with National Popular Committees or "hit squads" of the intifada. There was also much Israeli criticism that the unions responded to all the many "strike" calls that were made by the unified national leadership of the intifada and by the religious movements (Hamas and the Islamic Jihad). Every month no fewer than six days were "strike" days called in support for the intifada.\textsuperscript{12}

Trade unionists were vulnerable and targeted by the Israeli authorities.
Many of the trade unionists interviewed had been arrested and administratively detained, including the President of the PWTUF, Rasim al-Bayari. The latter, in an interview with the researcher, denied that trade unionists had ever been involved in activities of a violent or terrorist nature. Many trade unionists said that their detention, which often lasted months, had been ordered by the military commander without any charges being brought against them or even any interrogation. The Secretary-General of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation told the researcher that his premises had been raided many times in early 1990 and much material had been confiscated.\(^\text{13}\)

The Israeli authorities restricted the freedom of movement and travel of the trade unionists. Trade unionists who received invitations to go abroad, generally to meetings organized by national or international trade unions, had to be in possession of a valid laissez-passer (an Israeli-issued travel document). According to the trade unionists, the issuing of a laissez-passer was a long and expensive administrative formality whose outcome was by no means certain. Trade union leaders were often authorized to go to one meeting and refused permission to a subsequent one, or prevented from going until it was too late. Moreover, if the laissez-passer was obtained, it could be canceled at any time; its renewal was equally uncertain.\(^\text{14}\)

The relationship between the trade unions in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli authorities was thus part of the whole relationship between an occupying force and an occupied people.

4.3.2. The Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Political Movements

The Palestinian political factions made efforts to penetrate, to control, and to direct the trade unions in the Gaza Strip. From 1985 on, the trade unions were actually controlled by various factions of the PLO. This argument can be supported by much evidence.

In 1980, the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation (PWTUF) resumed its activities under the leadership of Abd al-Rahman Darabaih. On 25 October 1984, a Fatah squad tried to assassinate Darabaih in order to remove him so that Fatah could seize control of the PWTUF. It seems that Darabaih was suspected of cooperation with the Israeli authorities.
After the assassination attempt, Abd al-Rahman Darabaih ceased serving as the Chairman of the PWTUF, which then became a focus for activity directed by Palestinian political organizations.\(^1\)

In 1986, PLO-associated activists (some of whom were Palestinians released in the prisoner exchange of May 1985) began making plans to revive the dormant unions - if necessary by defying the authorities' ban on union elections. The intensifying of the unions' activities can in part be attributed to an injection of new ideas and energies and the willingness among activists from different factions to work together. Several of the union organizers had spent long periods in prison. They coordinated their efforts to control the unions' administration and policies. The trade unionists aimed at making the unions loyal to the PLO's leadership and factions.

The trade unions duly became loyal to the PLO and its policies. On 23 July 1986, the trade unions published in the newspapers a resolution supporting the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and opposing Security Council Resolution 242.\(^2\)

The veteran leadership of the PWTUF tended toward a conservative pro-Fatah line. Kamal Abu Assi, the Vice-President of the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers, maintained in an interview (conducted in Summer of 1994) with the researcher that the relations between the PWTUF and the PLO's factions were good and stable. He mentioned that 99% of the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union's members supported the PLO's factions and only 1% were independent (non-aligned) members.\(^3\) Mahdi Abu Armanah, the Secretary of the Trade Union of Metal Industries' Workers, in an interview with the researcher, mentioned that 90% of the union's members were Fatah supporters. He also maintained that four unions of the PWTUF supported the Fatah faction, one union supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and one union supported the People's Party (communist).\(^4\) Activists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine controlled the Trade Union of Business and Public Services. The Communist activists controlled the Carpentry and Construction Workers Union.

The close links between the Palestinian trade unions and the PLO constituted a ground on which the Israeli authorities attacked the unions. The Israeli authorities argued that there was a systematic policy
whereby the PLO's political factions used the term "trade unions" as a cover for political and "terrorist" activity. The authorities gave a list of the main "violations and violent activities" of the unions, directed by Fatah and other PLO's factions: first, receiving money from the Palestinian political factions; second, keeping ongoing communication with the headquarters of the Palestinian organizations; third, transferring intelligence reports to and receiving instructions from the Palestinian organizations; and fourth, distributing political leaflets, the content of which was intended to spark political activities and to glorify the Palestinian political organizations.

In conclusion, the trade unions in the Gaza Strip established good relations with Palestinian political movements. They devoted relatively little time to labour and workers' affairs (i.e. collective bargaining) and were deeply involved in political activities. The trade unions in the Gaza Strip were PLO-affiliated. Indoctrination was carried out in support of the PLO and/or the specific faction with which the union was linked.
Section Four
The Political Role of the Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip: their Positions and Attitudes Towards the Intifada and the Peace Process

In this part of the analysis the trade unions' policies towards the intifada will be outlined. It highlights how these policies were developed and also examines the positions of the unions concerning the peace process. The section is divided into two sub-sections: the first explains how the policies of the trade unions towards the intifada were developed; and the second analyses the unions' positions concerning the peace process which was started in Madrid in October 1991.

4.4.1. The Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip and the Intifada

The trade unions in the Gaza Strip strongly supported the Palestinian uprising (intifada) which broke out on December 9, 1987. The intifada and its multifarious consequences considerably altered the social, political, and economic landscape.\(^1\) The role of the trade unions in supporting the uprising was attested to in the researcher's extended interviews with trade unionists in the Gaza Strip. The unions' support for the intifada took three main forms: issuing broad statements of support for the intifada, giving aid and material support to the families of the activists of the intifada, and direct involvement by workers and unionists in the activities of the intifada.

The trade unionists in the Gaza Strip declared broad statements of support for the intifada. Rasim al-Bayari, the president of the PWTUF, told the researcher that on a number of occasions, during the intifada, the trade unions issued statements of support for the intifada. Al-Bayari mentioned that the statements of support for the intifada were issued in coordination with other popular organizations in the Gaza Strip.\(^2\) The hope that the intifada could lead to independence was a trigger of the unions' support. In an interview with the researcher, Muhammad Qanaitah, the Chairman of the Arab Drivers' Union, maintained that the unions supported the intifada because the intifada met the ambitions of "the Palestinian people to put an end to the Israeli occupation, and to get freedom and independence".\(^3\) All the unionists who were interviewed by the researcher expressed their broad support for the intifada.

The indirect support for the intifada given by the unions took the form
of the provision of aid and material support to the activists of the Intifada and their families. Trade unionists collected and distributed foodstuffs and clothes for the families of the activists. In an interview with the researcher, Rasim al-Bayari, the Chairman of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation (PWTUF), confirmed that during the Intifada the PWTUF provided help to workers and needy families, especially "working class martyrs’ families."

The unions’ direct action to support the Intifada was described by a number of trade unionists. Al-Bayari affirmed that the unions carried out strikes and boycotted work in the Israeli settlements, following the Unified Leadership’s appeals. Al-Bayari himself was arrested during the Intifada many times. In an interview with the researcher, Tariq al-Hindi, the Chairman of the Agricultural Workers Union, maintained that the unions supported and participated in the Intifada in different ways. He mentioned that during the Intifada the unions carried out sit-ins and food strikes in the headquarters of the Red Cross in Gaza protesting against the savage Israeli practices against the Palestinian people. Members of the administrative board of the unions, including al-Hindi, were arrested and the Israeli authorities prevented all the members from travelling abroad.

The trade unions in the Gaza Strip supported the Intifada considering themselves a battalion in the Palestinian national struggle against the Israeli occupation. The interviewees maintained that the Israeli practices against the Palestinian trade unions were stepped up from the beginning of the Intifada. The Israeli authorities placed a number of trade unionists under house arrest and administrative detention. Large numbers of the prisoners arrested during the Intifada were workers. A number of the trade unionists received expulsion orders.

One feature of the Intifada was that it led to the creation of relatively autonomous and organised social units with specific functional responsibilities, foremost among which were serving the population and shielding it from the shattering impact of the Israeli shattering measures. These organisation were made of doctors, lawyers, social workers, educators, and other professionals. They offered financial assistance to the needy, legal and psychiatric care, and moral support to many of those directly affected by the Israeli occupation. Apart from these activities, the trade unions performed underground social work:
helping those injured or wounded by Israeli soldiers, and offering sup­port to the families of the detainees, the deportees, and to those whose houses were demolished by the occupation authorities. Members of these organisations volunteered to offer their professional services free of charge.10

With the emergence of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) in mid-January 1988, special attention was paid to the role of the workers in resistance to the occupation. The intifada had substan­tial effects on the trade unions. The leadership of the intifada called for mass mobilisation of the trade unions.11 For example, in Communiques No. 1, 2, and 3 (of 8, 10, and 18 January 1988) the UNLU call on workers to participate in general strikes. The call on workers to stop in Israeli factories and settlements was repeated regularly during the intifada (from Communique 3 onwards). The trade unions responded posi­tively to the UNLU’s appeals. Workers joined demonstrations as much as anyone else; given their relatively high numbers among the general popu­lation, it is no surprise that of all fatalities in the period 1987-1993, approximately 50 percent were workers.12 For instance, during the first wave of mass arrest in March 1988, detainees included a large num­ber of unions activists and workers. By 1993, most top unions leaders had been placed in administrative detention.13 The trade unions mobilised their resources to respond to the new challenges posed every day. Trade unions in the Gaza Strip merged with nationalist demands.14

The process of politicising and mobilising the Palestinian people intensified during the 1970s and 80s. A conscious decision was made by the PLO in 1974 to begin mobilising the masses in the Occupied Ter­ritories in popular organisations.15 The PLO sought to set up new organisations and to infuse the existing ones with a new ideology. By 1987 a network of or infrastructures of organisations were existed. These organisations were able to provide the basic services lacking the community, and also lead the masses in times of direct confrontation with the occupier. Thus when the spark of the intifada was lit on December 8, 1987, there was a broad mobilised population base. During the intifada, the Israeli occupation forces arrested thousands of Palestinians. They thought that they could end the intifada, but thanks to the mobilisation of the trade unions and popular organisations, everyone was a potential leader, ready to take over.16
The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, and the nationalist political forces behind it, could not have been able to sustain themselves if it was not for the popular support they received and the persistent active role of many grassroots institutions including a host of student, women's, worker's and professional committees and unions. It was these groups that had broadened the arena of the participatory politics among the Palestinian masses.\(^{17}\) The role of the UNLU, and the institutionalised trade unions and organisations connecting grassroots efforts, may be the most enduring aspect of the intifada. Mobilised organisations were pervasive, reaching into almost every home.

The establishment of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising did, however, lead to the marginalisation of the trade unions. Unfazed by Israeli measures designed to break the back of the intifada, the UNLU consolidated its hold over the Palestinian masses, including the trade unions and workers. During the intifada, the UNLU felt strong enough to call for workers to boycott Israeli institutions and to observe general strikes. The researcher noted that the trade unions did not have an independent role in organising mass strikes during the intifada. Each union was loyal (or subordinate) to one Palestinian faction or another. The unions responded to, and observed the appeals of, the Unified National Leadership of the intifada. They were not able to call for general strikes on their own authority.\(^{18}\) The aggravated economic situation during the intifada affected negatively the influence of the trade unions. The trade unions were not able to constitute as a clear leadership of the intifada. For these reasons, political power remained in separate bases, controlled by Palestinian factions.\(^{19}\)

The intifada had a great impact not only on the trade unions but also on the political organisation of the Palestinian community in the Gaza Strip as a whole. More localised forms of organisation, run along either local or political lines, were active. The medical, agricultural, and women's committees belonging to different political organisations and factions greatly expanded their activities during the uprising. The medical committees, for example, were extremely successful in reaching rural areas not previously served with medical care. "Policing" the intifada was taken by the "striking forces". The main function was to ensure the compliance of the population with the appeals made by the Unified Command of the intifada. "Conciliation committees" lijan al-islah administered affairs relating to personal status, such as mar-
riages, disputes, and debts. Popular committees al-lijan al-shabiyyah did their best to fill gaps in various fields. Popular committees ran towns, villages, and refugee camps. The Palestinian intifada became an institutionalised form of interaction between the Palestinian people and the Israeli occupation.\textsuperscript{20}

During the intifada, the trade unions lost an important political opportunity to take the initiative and to lead the masses. The Palestinian factions, and particularly their organisational leaderships, maintained their predominance over the trade unions. The trade unions avoided any attempt to foster an alternative leadership, knowing that any such attempt was doomed to failure. The intifada consolidated the role of the PLO and other Islamic factions. During the intifada the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) established itself as a real contender for resistance power in the Gaza Strip; its strike calls were observed. Gains made by the Islamic Resistance Movement at the expense of the PLO's factions underlined the growth of radicalism in the Gaza Strip. The trade unions' influence was marginalised by the growing power of the various political factions.\textsuperscript{21}

From the extended interviews with trade unionists which were carried out in the Gaza Strip, it was clear that the trade unions in the Gaza Strip considered themselves an integral part of the Palestinian people and its struggle for freedom and independence. The unions, as an important sector of the people, supported and actively participated in the intifada. The Israeli authorities accused the unions of inciting people and performing "terrorist activities" and waged an open war against them. In such a situation, the unions were gravely handicapped in their work; and their capacity to defend and to promote the interests of their members decreased. This, in turn, resulted in a diminishing interest in the trade unions by the membership, a situation that was aggravated by the general fear of intimidation and possible arrest by the Israeli military forces for participation in trade union activity. This helps to explain the small number of workers affiliated to the trade unions: about 11,000 members in 1993. In order to redress this, the unions made strenuous efforts to recruit workers through the setting up of sickness and pension schemes, settling individual grievances with employers and making attempts to negotiate collective agreements.\textsuperscript{22}
The position of the trade unions concerning the peace process initiated by the Madrid Conference in October 1991 passed through two phases. During the first phase, from 1991 to September 1993, the majority of the trade unions supported the peace process. In the second phase, which extended from the end of 1993, the trade unions started to rethink their support.

During the first phase (from October 1991 to September 1993), four trade unions (loyal to the Fatah faction) out of six supported the peace process. They were the Trade Union of Metal Industries Workers, the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers, the Trade Union of Arab Drivers, and the Trade Union of Agricultural Workers. Two trade unions opposed the peace process: the Trade Union of Business and Public Services, which was loyal to the rejectionist political line of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Trade Union of Carpentry and Construction Workers, which was loyal to the Communist People's Party.

Some of the views expressed by leading members of the unions reflected a strong commitment to the PLO leadership and its policies regarding the peace process. In an interview with the researcher, Muhammad Qanaïtah, the Chairman of the Arab Drivers Union, maintained that "the union is absolutely loyal to the PLO's leadership and its policies, and it stands by just, comprehensive, and lasting peace". Saç'id al-Astal, the Vice-President, of the Agricultural Workers Union, told the researcher that the unions had adopted the political policies of the PLO leadership and supported the peace process. Mahdi Abu çArmanah, the Secretary of the Metal Industries Workers Union, similarly maintained that the unions supported the peace process and participated in demonstrations supporting peace. Kamal Abu çAssi, the Vice-President of the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union, asserted that the unions supported the peace process and specifically supported the "Gaza-Jericho First" agreement which was signed in Cairo on 5th May, 1994. He considered the agreement as a starting point for achieving the political rights of the Palestinian people.

Some of the trade unionists supported the peace process on the ground that it constituted a step towards improving their social and economic
standards. In an interview with the researcher, Nabil al-Jafarawi, a member in the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union, asserted that "the trade unions backed peace with full hope that the peace will promote the social, fiscal, and economic standards of the working class."\(^5\)

Opposition to the peace process (especially to the peace agreements) was sounded by a number of the unionists who were loyal to the rejectionist factions. In an interview with the researcher, Bakr al-Jamal, an administrative board member of the Business and Public Services Union, maintained that:

"we support just and comprehensive peace, but we are against the "Gaza-Jericho First" plan. We believe that the plan is aimed at the rearrangement of the occupation in a new way, and that it has introduced serious dangers to our national future. The economic appendix of the peace agreement is a proof that the plan is against the interests of the working class."\(^6\)

In an interview with the researcher, Sadi Nassar, a member of the Business and Public Services Union, backed the rejectionist stand and claimed that his union opposed the peace process because it does not meet the minimum demands of the Palestinian people.\(^7\)

The trends opposing the peace agreements gained ground among the rank and file and even within the leadership of the unions in the Gaza Strip from the end of 1993 onwards. A new phase of opposing the peace agreements then began. There grew up a conviction that the Palestinian leadership had been deceived and had surrendered to Israeli dictation.\(^8\)

In interviews conducted in Gaza in January and February 1995, the researcher noted that most of the unionists supported a just and comprehensive peace which met the Palestinian ambition for freedom and independence, but saw the "Gaza-Jericho First" agreement as dictated to the Palestinian leadership and serving Israeli interests. Unionists in the Gaza Strip had begun to see the peace as being intended to grant peace to Israel, not to the Palestinians.\(^9\)

As expected, the rejectionists' position on the Madrid Conference and the negotiations with Israel was uncompromising. For example, the Islamists insisted that any attempt to come to an agreement with the
Jews was a "treason to Allah", to His Messenger, His religion, and to the believers". In an interview with an Islamist trade unionist, (who preferred to remain anonymous), the researcher was told that "war against the Jews is a duty that falls on the believers, and any treaty with the Jews is null and void and not binding on the believers".\textsuperscript{10}

For those who opposed the peace agreements in Oslo, Cairo, and Washington, it was clear that after more than twenty months of negotiation, the agreements fell below their already dwindling expectations. The agreements seemed to prostitute the inalienability of Palestinian rights.\textsuperscript{11}

In a moment of pique, one opponent made the acid remark that the "general principles" of the Declaration, i.e. the Declaration of Principles, were not "general principles at all, but unprincipled generalities".\textsuperscript{12}

Trade unionists told the researcher of a number of shortcomings of the peace agreements between PLO and the Israeli government. First, the Oslo and Cairo agreements are inadequate for fulfilling Palestinian aspirations and providing for national rights. Second, the Israeli government is backtracking on even these provisions in humiliating ways. Third, human rights violations from the "old days" have been continued in the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian Authority: torture and ill-treatment of detainees (now Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP, etc.), restrictions of movement (more severe than ever before), and extra-judicial killing by IDF undercover units.\textsuperscript{13} Fourth, there are unresolved questions about the legal implications of the Declaration of Principles: has the occupation, even in Gaza and Jericho, ended or merely been redeployed? How has the dual legal system (one for Israelis, one for Palestinians) been perpetuated? Fifth, there is the blatant expansion of settlements, confiscation of land, and massive extension of Jerusalem boundaries.\textsuperscript{14}

Since the Oslo agreement was signed in September 1993,\textsuperscript{15} unemployment in the Gaza Strip has stuck at 50-60 percent of the total work force. Since the Palestinian Authority was installed in July 1994, the cost of living has soared by about 25 percent. "Given the class composition of the Palestinian Authority, and the economic scenarios prepared by Israel and endorsed by the "free trade principles" of the Paris Protocol, Palestinian workers are likely to pay a very high price for the autonomy".\textsuperscript{16}
The peace agreements and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority did not improve the economic conditions of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip. The years of occupation and economic dependency had left Palestinian workers "a nascent migrant worker class of predominantly nationalist orientation". Their work in both Israel and the Gaza Strip was casual, informal, and unskilled, with all the attendant problems this had for effective trade union organising. Palestinian trade unions, moreover, remained divided along factional lines. The trade unions competed with each other for members and turf. The result was a proliferation of factional unions, in inverse ratio to their influence among Palestinian workers.

The Oslo agreement and establishment of the Palestinian Authority did not change or challenge the factional bases of the trade unions. In October 1993, the trade unions federations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank agreed to unify their ranks on the condition that general elections based on proportional representation would be held for a new executive by February 1995. In the meantime, the newly unified Palestinian General Trade Union Federation (PGTUF) would be "internally reorganised" on a district rather than a factional basis. This has not happened. Neither the elections nor the reorganisation "is anywhere on the horizon". "The artificial unity did not improve the unions' work, nor did it reinforce their relations with workers". The union movement regressed because none of the leaders even interested in their unions' constituency.

The establishment of the Palestinian Authority has its political significance for the trade unions. Indicative of this was the problem of amalgamating the PGTUF with its counterpart in Tunis, the PLO's General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPW). For the GUPW's General Secretary Haidar Ibrahim, Oslo necessitated the fusion of the two wings of Palestinian trade unionism. His notion of fusion, however, looks like a takeover. On the GUPW's 19-seat executive, he allocated two places for representatives from the Gaza Strip and West Bank: one for Rasim al-Bayyari, the General Secretary of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation, and the other for West Bank General Secretary Shahir Sa'd. Palestinian unions "inside" flatly refused the deal. The result was an ongoing turf war between the "outside" and the "inside". The struggle for power suggests a future for Palestinian trade unions no less plagued by factionalism than in the past, only now with the unions assuming the augmented role of "state" union for the PA. According to Hassan

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Barghuthi, Director of the Democracy and Workers' Rights Centre (DWRC):

"our fundamental role is to democratise the unions to put them on an independent footing. The current factional leadership will then face a choice: either resign or be held accountable to their membership by fighting on labour issues rather than narrowly factional issues. All of the PLO factions have had the same abusive attitude to trade unions, using them as mere fronts for their political line."

The immediate challenge facing the trade unions in the Gaza Strip and autonomous areas is to stake out an independent position vis-a-vis the Palestinian Authority. The crucial issue here will be labour law which should be consonant with all the international ILO agreements.

The Palestinian Authority followed a policy of marginalisation of the trade unions. There are no representatives of labour among the current (January 1996) 24 ministers of the PA. "Arafat and the PA are banking on the support of Palestine's middle bourgeoisie for both investments in the autonomy and donations to the authority." According to Barghuthi, "the Palestinian workers are likely to pay a very high price for the autonomy. They have the greatest interest in resisting it." This resistance can not be channeled along "classic class struggle forms. Rather, Palestinian workers must become the leading force in a broad democratic coalition made up of Palestinian NGOs, the women’s movement and Palestinian political factions."

In a word, the peace agreements did work against the interests of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip. These agreements created new political and economic challenges for both the unions and working class.

4.5.0. Conclusion

From 1967 to 1980, the Israeli authorities banned the trade unions' activities in the Gaza Strip. From 1980 onwards, there were only six trade unions operating in the Gaza Strip. They were organized under one workers' organization - the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation (PWTUF).

Relations between the unions and the Israeli occupation authorities may be characterised as tense. The Israeli negative political attitude
towards the unions was enhanced by a repressive legal framework. Mutual suspicion between the two parties (i.e. the Israeli authorities and the unions) prevailed. The unions looked at the occupation authorities as the main source of problems which hindered their organization and development. The Israeli authorities considered the unions as fronts for the Palestinian movements.

The unions in the Gaza Strip kept close relations with the Palestinian political movements. Palestinian factions competed to control the policies of the unions. The leadership of four unions followed Fatah’s political line; one union leadership was loyal to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and one to the communist People’s Party. The majority of the official leadership members of the PWTUF were Fatah supporters and adhered to its political line and policies. The researcher noted that the Islamic factions and trends were not influential within the leadership of the unions.

The unions in the Gaza Strip participated in the intifada in different ways. They carried out strikes and sit-downs, and observed the appeals of the Unified National Leadership of the intifada. The trade unions in the Gaza Strip were not isolated from the Palestinian national struggle. They resisted the occupation and suffered from the Israeli measures during the intifada. The unions as an integral part of the Palestinian people supported the intifada and were actively involved in its activities.

Not all the trade unions in the Gaza Strip supported the peace process. The support for the peace process came mainly from the pro-Fatah members who controlled the unions’ leadership. Among the rank and file, opposition to the peace process grew after 1993. The effects of the peace process were seen as going against the workers’ interests. Workers lost their jobs inside Israel and the peace agreements aggravated the already bad economic conditions.

The professional role of the trade unions and their defence of workers’ interests drew them closely into political involvement.
### Appendices

#### Appendix No. 1

Members of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation in the Gaza Strip 1965-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Trade Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahman Darabaih (President)</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Atiyah Hijazi</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Istait</td>
<td>Arab Drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ahmad Abu 'Udah</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Hamdi al-Najji</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>'Adli Saq Allah</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Kamal Abu 'Assi</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Muhammad Dahalan</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Salih 'Abd al-Salam</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Khalaf al-Hadad</td>
<td>Arab Drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Muhammad 'Udwan</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Rajab Abu Samak</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Muhammad Imdukh</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Salim</td>
<td>Carpentry and Const.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Hanzah Abu Saif</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Const. = Construction


#### Appendix No. 2

Members of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation in the Gaza Strip 1980-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Trade Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahman Darabaih (President)</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Atiyah Hijazi</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>'Adli Saq Allah (Vice-President)</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting (President 1983-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Hamdi al-Najji</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Muhammad Sha'ban</td>
<td>Carpentry and Const.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Salim</td>
<td>Carpentry and Const.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad Qanaitah</td>
<td>Arab Drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Fahmi Salah</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Kamal Abu 'Assi</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Sabir al-Ishrafi</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Salih 'Abd al-Salam</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Muhammad Faraj</td>
<td>Arab Drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu 'Udah</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Const. = Construction

Appendix No. 3

Members of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions Federation in the Gaza Strip 1991-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Trade Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Rasim al-Bayari (President)</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Tariq al-Hindi (Secretary)</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Muhammad Imdukh (Treasurer)</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>'Ayish I'baid (Vice-President)</td>
<td>Carpentry and Const.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Marwan al-Kafarnah</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Isma'il Muhrah</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Ahmad</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mahir Dahalan</td>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>'Issam Wishah</td>
<td>Weaving and Knitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>'Abd al-'Aziz Kallub</td>
<td>Agricultural Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu 'Ajinah</td>
<td>Arab Drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-'Afifi</td>
<td>Arab Drivers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Const. = Construction


Appendix No. 4

Members of the Administrative Boards of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip 1964-1967

1. Administrative Board of the TU of Metal Industries (1964-1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahman Darabaih</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Salih 'Abd al-Salam</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Muhammad Saq Allah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Hamdi al-Naji</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Yusuf 'Abd al-Fattah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>'Ata Abu Zur</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Nafi 'Iqwaidir</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Administrative Board of the TU of Agricultural Workers (1964-1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ahmad Abu cUdah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Muhammad cUdwan</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Muhammad Jabir Na' im</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Fahmi Salah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>na.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>na.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>na.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** na. = Not available

**Source:** an interview with Ahmad Abu cUdah, *The Department of the Occupied Homeland*, the interview was conducted at his office, Amman, 18/4/1994.

### 3. Administrative Board of the TU of Public Service (1964-1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>cAtiyah Hijazi</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Walid cAbassi</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hamzah Abu Saif</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sabir al-Ishrafi</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mahmud al-Ashqar</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ragab Abu Samak</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad Dahalan</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Musa al-Jamal</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** an interview with cAtiyah Hijazi, Ex-President of the Trade Unions of Business and Public Service, Gaza, 12/5/1994.

### 4. Administrative Board of the TU of Carpentry and Construction Workers (1964-1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu al-Lail</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Salyim</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Salih al-Adluni</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Sha'ban</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Midhat al-Yazgi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>cAbd Allah al-Agha</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>na.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>na.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** na. = Not available

**Source:** an interview with cAbd Allah al-Agha, Khan Yunis, 10/7/1994.
5. Administrative Board of the TU of Arab Drivers (1964-1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mahmud Abu Istāīt</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fadil Abu Shahla</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Khalaf al-Hāḍad</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Bahjat al-Wahidi</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Husain Abu Karash</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ʿAbd Allah Abu Rizq</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>ʿAbd al-Karim Faraj</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** an interview with ʿAbd al-Rahman Darabāḥ, Gaza, 7/7/1994.

6. Administrative Board of the TU of Weaving and Knitting Workers (1964-1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad Imdukh</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kamal Abu ʿAssi</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>ʿAdlı Saq-Allah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Jawad Gharbiyah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Fawzi Saqr</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fadil al-Turk</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>ʿUmar al-ʿImrani</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** an interview with Muhammad Imdukh, President of the Weaving and Knitting Union, Gaza, 20/6/1994.

Appendix No. 5

Members of the Administrative Boards of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union in the Gaza Strip 1980-1987

1. Administrative Board of the TU of Metal Industries (1980-1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>ʿAbd al-Rahman Darabāḥ</td>
<td>President&quot;1&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Salih ʿAbd al-Salām</td>
<td>Vice-President&quot;2&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Muhammad Saq Allah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Hamdi al-Naji</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Yusuf ʿAbd al-Fattah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fathi Hijji</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Nafiʿ Iqwaidir</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
"1." In 1983 the President was replaced by the Vice-President.
"2." In 1983 he became the President and Vice-President.

**Source:** an interview with ʿAbd al-Rahman Darabāḥ, Gaza, 7/7/1994.
2. Administrative Board of the TU of Agricultural Workers (1980-1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu 'Udah</td>
<td>President&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fahmi Salah</td>
<td>Vice-President&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Suliman Abu 'Udah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Fakhri al-Kafarnah</td>
<td>Member&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ibrahim al-Shanbari</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Musa Hamdan</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Ahmad Hammad</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
"1". He was the President in 1980-1981.
"2". He became the President in 1981.
"3". He became Vice-President in 1981.


3. Administrative Board of the TU of Business and Public Services (1980-1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>'Atiyah M. Hijazi</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sabir al-Ishrafi</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mahmud Hasunah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Khadir al-Imranakh</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ismail Khadir</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Salih Faraj</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ismail Salamah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Husain Abu Nar</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Musa Al-Jamal</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: an interview with 'Atiyah Hijazi, Ex-President of the Trade Unions of Business and Public Services, Gaza, 12/5/1994.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Salim</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Salim Qadadah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Sha'ban</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Midhat al-Yazgi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>'Abd Allah al-Agha</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Yusuf al-Qarshali</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu al-Lail</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Administrative Board of the TU of Arab Drivers (1980-1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muhammad ʿAbd al-Karim Faraj</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Suliman Zuʿrub</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Muhammad Qanaitah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jibril Darabaih</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fayid Abu ʿAdrih</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Mushʿalji</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ʿAbbas Madi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interview with Muhammad Qanaitah, President of the Arab Drivers’ Union, Gaza, 11/6/1994.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muhammad Imdukh</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kamal Abu ʿAssi</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ʿAdli Saq Allah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jawad Gharbiyah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fawzi Sagr</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fawzi Saqad</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Faruq Marzuq</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Muʿmar al-ʿAshshi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ʿIssam al-Ifranji</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix No. 6

Members of the Administrative Boards of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union in the Gaza Strip 1987-1991

1. Administrative Board of the TU of Metal industries (1987-1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Salih Abid al-Salam</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rasim al-Bayari</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Adnan Abu Imdalalah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Faisal Imhanna</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Ish-hadah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Najjar</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Zuhair Hasan Salah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Suliman Saiymah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Rif'at Sa'ad Allah</td>
<td>Member1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Hani al-Masri</td>
<td>Member2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ibrahim al-Batran</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Hasan Zu'rub</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
"1". He became the Secretary on 30/4/1991.
"2". He became Treasurer on 30/4/1991.


2. Administrative Board of the TU of Agricultural Workers (1987-1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fahmi Salah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Yazid Ihwaihi</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Tariq al-Hindi</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Husam Abu Zaid</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ahmad Atiyah Hamad</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Majdi Sa'adat</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahim Isbaitah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Administrative Board of the TU of Public Services (1980-1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Husain Abu Nar</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ilias al-Jildah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Husain al-Jamal</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Talat Lafi</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Bassam Judah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Yahya Icbaid</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mustafa al-Barbar</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Atiyah al-Basyuni</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: an interview with Atiyah Hijazi, Ex-President of the Trade Union of Business and Public Services, Gaza, 12/5/1994.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>'Ayish Icbaid</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Jamil Abu Jaras</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Tawfiq al-Mabhuh</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ziyad cAshur</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>cUmar Abu cWun</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>cIz al-Din Shallah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Emawi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5. Administrative Board of the TU of Arab Drivers (1987-1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad Qanaitah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ghanim al-Izriai</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Fayid Abu cAdrih</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Bashir Faraj</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>cAzmi Abu Mizyid</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>cAli Musa</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu cAjiynah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: An interview with Muhammad Qanaitah, President of the Arab Drivers Union, Gaza, 11/6/1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad Imdukh</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kamal Abu Asi</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Isa Abu Rasas</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Jawad Gharbiyah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Nabil al-Jafarawi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fawzi Saad</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Midhat al-Rabi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix No. 7

Members of the Administrative Boards of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union in the Gaza Strip 1991-1993

1. Administrative Board of the TU of Metal Industries (1991-1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Rasim al-Bayari</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mahir Dahalan</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mahdi Abu Armanah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Muhammad Ramadan</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ibrahim al-Batran</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fathi Abu Iznad</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Khalid Abu Silmiyah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Hamdi Abdin</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Yasin</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ausamah al-Ikrunz</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. Administrative Board of the TU of Agricultural Workers (1991-1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Tariq al-Hindi</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sa'id al-Astal</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Walid al-Qidrah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>&quot;Abd al-Aziz Kallub</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Rafiq Na'im</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Majdi Sa'adah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad Iqwadid</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Hasan Abu Libdah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Suliman al-Qadi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Administrative Board of the TU of Business and Public Services (1991-1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Marwan al-Kafarnah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ahmad Salah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ismail Muhrah</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ilyas al-Jildah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Jamal al-Madun</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Abd al-Aziz al-Bur'i</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Bassam Abu Ghazzah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Imad Abu Za'nnunah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Qasim</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** An interview with Rasim al-Bayari, President of the PWTUF, Gaza, 11/5/1994.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ayish Tbaid</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Abd al-Hadi Zidan</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Jamil Abu Jaras</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Tawfiq al-Mabhuh</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Rafiq Hillis</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Jihad Izwaidi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Amunah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Salamah Ahmad</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** an interview with Ayish Tbaid, President of the Carpentry and Construction’s Workers Union, Gaza, 10/6/1994.

5. Administrative Board of the TU of Arab Drivers (1991-1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muhammad Qanaitah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Ajinyah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Khalil Tanirah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Fayid Abu Adrih</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Iliyan al-Umar</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Nasir al-Ishrafi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Hasan Abu Ilbah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Ausamah Filfil</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ahmad Darwish</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** An interview with Muhammad Qanaitah, President of the Arab Drivers Union, Gaza, 11/6/1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muhammad Imdukh</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kamal Abu Assi</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fawzi Saad</td>
<td>Secretary (resigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zaki Khalil</td>
<td>Treasurer (resigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ata al-Ja’ab</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mahmud Husain</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Munir Abu Daqah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lutfi Abu Hashish</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Issam Wishah</td>
<td>Member (resigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Husam Husuneh</td>
<td>Member (resigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Issam Wishah</td>
<td>Member (resigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mahmud al-Ihjuj</td>
<td>Member (resigned)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix No. 8

Members of the Unions in the Gaza Strip 1991-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agr. W. U.</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A. Drivers U.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Metal Indus.</td>
<td>1,636</td>
<td>1,790</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>P. Services</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Weaving and K.</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Carp. and C.</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,153</td>
<td>9,112</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(a) 1. Agr. W.U. = Agricultural Workers Union
2. A. Drivers U. = Arab Drivers Union
3. Metal Indus. = Metal Industries Workers Union
4. P. Services = Business and Public Services Union
5. Weaving and K. = Weaving and Knitting Union
(b) New Mem. = New members in a union
      incr. = Increment in a union’s members.
      pmu = Proportion of increment in a union’s members.

Footnotes and References.

Introduction.


Section One
Introduction


3. Al-Wadiyah, Salim, Jam'iyyat al-Ummal al-Arabiyyah al-Falistiniyah: 1920-1948 (Palestinian Arab Workers Society: 1920-1948), Al-Ittihad al-Umm al-Falistiniin (Published by the General Union of the Palestinian Workers), No place, No date, p. 12.


5. Ibid., p. 97.

6. See provisions of the Ottoman Societies' Law in chapter two.


the Conditions of the Working Class in Palestine During the Mandate), Shu'un Falistiniyah (Palestine Affairs), Issue No. 5, November, 1971, pp. 45-47.


2. **NAGLO Visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories 1987**, NAGLO (National Association of Local Government Officers), No Publisher, No date, p. 19.


7. **NAGLO Visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories 1987**, NAGLO (National Association of Local Government Officers), No Publisher, No date, p. 19.

8. Imdukh, M. Kamil, *Naqabat C'Ummal al-Khiyatah wa-al-Nasyij: Ba'd Sab'ah wa-c'Ishrin 'Aman Min Ta'sisiha* (The Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting: after Twenty-Seven Years of its Establishment), No Publisher, No date, pp. 10-12.


4.1.3. An analysis of the Palestinian Workers Trade Unions' Bylaw.


242


2. Ibid., pp. 1-2.


5. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. Ibid., p. 6.

8. Ibid., p. 6.


10. Ibid., p. 8.

11. Ibid., p. 9.

12. Ibid., p. 10.

13. Ibid., p. 16.

Section Two
4.2.1. The Weaving and knitting Workers T.U.


**Section Three**

4.3.1. Israel and the Trade Unions.


5. An interview with Muhammad Imdukh, the President of the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting in the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 23/6/1994.


8. Ibid., p. 28.

9. An interview with Muhammad Imdukh, the President of the Trade Union of Weaving and Knitting, Gaza, 2/7/1994.


11. See chapter two for more details about the legal framework which organized the activities of the trade unions in the Gaza Strip.

12. An interview with Rasim al-Bayari, the President of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 20/6/1994.


4.3.2. The Trade Unions and Palestinian Political Movements.

1. An interview with Abd al-Rahman Darabaih, the Ex-President of the PWTUF, the interview was conducted at his home, Gaza, 25/7/1994.

2. An interview with Muhammad Qanaitah, President of the Arab Drivers Union, the interview was conducted at his office in the municipality of Gaza (Department of Electricity), Gaza, 22/6/1994.

3. An interview with Kamal Abu Assi, the Vice-President of the Union of Weaving and Knitting Workers, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 6/6/1994.

4. An interview with Mahdi Abu Armanah, the Secretary of the Metal Industries Workers Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 6/6/1994. The unions which supported Fatah faction were: the Metal Industries Workers Union, the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union, the Arab Drivers Union, the Agricultural Workers Union. The Business and Public Service Union supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Carpentry and Construction Workers Union supported the People’s Party (Communist). See also: Kutlat al-Wahdah al-'Uma'iyah (Workers’ Unity Bloc), No Publisher, No date, p. 24.


6. Ibid., p. 124.

7. Ibid., p. 125.


Section Four

4.4.1. The Trade Unions and the Intifada.


245
2. An interview with Rasim al-Bayari, the President of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 4/6/1994.

3. An interview with Muhammad Qanaïtah, the President of the Arab Drivers Union, the interview was conducted at his office in the headquarters of the Arab Drivers Union, Gaza, 4/6/1994.

4. An interview with Rasim al-Bayari, the President of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 4/6/1994.

5. An interview with Tariq al-Hindi, the President of the Agricultural Workers Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 5/6/1994.

6. An interview with Bakr al-Jamal, the President of the Business and Public Service Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 5/6/1994.

7. A personal observation by the researcher when he was imprisoned in the Israeli prisons during the period from 1981 to 1991.

8. An interview with Ismaïl Muhragh, an administrative board’s member of the Business and Public Services Trade Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 7/9/1994.


11. "Mobilisation denotes the extent to which a population succeeds in gaining collective control over resources, which include such factors of production as land, labour, and capital. A more general definition of resources would include the number of organisation, the size of their membership, the degree of their membership’s commitment, and the amount, scale, and quality of their activities." Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, p. 12.


   During the period 1989-1991, the researcher noted that about 50 percent of the Palestinian detainees, in the Israeli detention camp *Ansar 3* (*Ditzi‘ut*) in the Negev desert, were workers. Lesch, Ann M., "Prelude to the Uprising in the Gaza Strip" in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XX, No. 1, Autumn 1990, pp. 1-22.


14. After 1974, the PLO followed a strategy consisted of three main elements. The first and most important was to mobilise and politicise the Palestinian people behind an organisation representing their interests. The second major part of the strategy was to maintain
the unity of the Palestinians inside the Occupied Territories through very difficult circumstances. An achievable political programme was the third main element of the Palestinian strategy. Hijab, Nadia, "The Strategy of the Powerless", p. 17.


16. Interviews with Rasim al-Bayarri, the Secretary General of the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation in the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, Summer, 1994. and January-February 1995.


4.4.2. The Trade Unions and the Peace Process.

1. An interview with Muhammad Qana'itatb, the President of the Arab Drivers Union, Gaza, 4/6/1994.

2. An interview with Sa'id al-Astal, the Vice-President of the
Agricultural Workers Union, the interview was conducted at the researcher's home, Khan Yunis, 7/5/1994.

3. An interview with Mahdi Abu Armanah, the Secretary of the Metal Industries Workers Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 6/6/1994.

4. An interview with Kamal Abu Assi, the Vice-President of the Weaving and Knitting Union, the interview was conducted at the office of the PWTUF, Gaza, 10/6/1994.

5. An interview with Nabil al-Jafarawi, a member of the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 5/6/1994. An interview with Zaki Abu al-Aish, an administrative board's member of the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 4/6/1994.

6. An interview with Bakr al-Jamal, an administrative board member of the Business and Public Services Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the PWTUF, Gaza, 8/6/1994.

7. An interview with Sa'di Nassar, a member of the Business and Public Services Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the Business and Public Services Union, Gaza, 7/6/1994.

8. A personal impression by the researcher when he visited the Gaza Strip from December 1994 to February 1995. The trade unions which were loyal to Fatah faction, at the time of the fieldwork which was implemented in Summer 1994, were: the Metal Industries Workers Union, the Agricultural Workers Union, the Weaving and Knitting Workers Union, and the Arab Drivers Union. The Business and General Services Union was pro the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Carpentry and Construction Workers Union was loyal to the People Party (Communist).


10. An interview with a trade unionist who preferred to remain anonymous, February, 1995.


15. Fore more details see: Drake, Laura, "Between the Lines: a Textual


17. Ibid, pp. 21-22.  
   See also: Murphy, Emma, Op. Cit. p.35.


See for more details about the peace process:

Chapter Five

5.0. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the analysis of the political role of associations in the Gaza Strip. Two associations (the Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip and the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip) will be examined. The two societies played active roles on the societal and political planes.

Choosing the two societies stemmed from a number of considerations, related to their political relevance. First, the societies showed a high degree of involvement in political matters and undertook a salient role both in society and in politics; second, a number of members of the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations with Israel were chosen from the Red Crescent Society and the Lawyers' Association; third, the head of the Palestinian delegation for peace, Dr. Haidar ʿAbd al-Shafi, was at the same time the head of the Red Crescent Society of the Gaza Strip; fourth, the head of the Lawyers' Association, Ifraīh Abu Middān, was also a member of the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations.

This chapter is divided into two sections, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. Section one examines the Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip, and section two reviews the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip.
The Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip (RCS) was brought into existence in January 1972 as a welfare and relief organization administered and used by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The society's political importance lies in the fact that it was considered as a national organization. After its establishment the Red Crescent Society, in spite of its limited resources, contributed to the improvement of medical care and general health of the residents in the Strip. The society was established according to the Ottoman Societies' Law as a charitable society.

The Society's headquarters were located in Gaza and housed in a spacious wing of an apartment building overlooking the Mediterranean. It had branches in other towns in the Gaza Strip. In addition to administration, the premises contained: a general clinic, a first-aid centre, a dispensary, a laboratory and a small public library.

This section is divided into subsections examining the society: its emergence, its organization, its objectives and activities, its relationship with both the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian political factions, its political and social roles, and its political positions towards the intifada and the peace process will be explored.

5.1.1. The Emergence of the RCS in the Gaza Strip in 1972

In January 1972, the Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip (RCS) was established on the initiative of eleven Gaza intellectuals who - like many other Gaza Strip residents - were haunted by the question: what role could usefully be played in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation, with its demoralizing and harassing impact?. In 1969, a draft constitution was drawn up by the founder members and discussions were started with the Israeli military authorities to obtain a permit. This proved to be a protracted process that lasted about three years. In the course of those discussions the founder members affirmed that the society was to be a secular organization, and that it would not be involved in politics. This meant that it would not promote any particular ideology, support any political faction or engage in political
maneuvering. However, it was in sympathy and solidarity with all moves that promoted the Palestinian national cause. Its non-political character did not compromise the right of its members to be politically active on an independent and personal basis.¹

As regards membership, according to the society's constitution, a member of the society should be no less than eighteen years old (Art. 4) and membership of the RCS consisted of four categories. First, "Founder Members" were those who participated in the establishment of the society (Art. 5[a]). Second, "Active Members" were those who paid dues according to the administrative board's decisions (Art. 5[b]). Third, "Honorary Members" were persons who offer services to the society on an irregular basis. The administrative board gave honorary membership to persons who offered services to the society, as friends, on an irregular basis (Art. 5[c]). Fourth, "Assistant Members" were those who supported the society and offered service to the society as volunteers and did not pay dues to the society (Art. 5[d]).² In 1993, the RCS was composed of about 300 members.

Article 6 provided that membership might be drawn in the following cases: failing to pay membership dues for three consecutive months (Art. 6[a]); committing a breach of honour and honesty (Art. 6[b]); causing harm and injury to the society's reputation (Art. 6[c]); and violating the principles and objectives of the society (Art. 6[d)].³

5.1.2. The Organizational Structure of the RCS

Organizationally, the Red Crescent Society (RCS) for the Gaza Strip consisted of three organs: a general assembly, an administrative board, and an executive bureau. The society formed a number of subcommittees to perform its activities. Table no. 12 shows the organizational structure of the RCS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Assembly</th>
<th>Administrative Committee</th>
<th>Executive Bureau</th>
<th>Sub-Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Services</td>
<td>Information And Public Relations</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Red Crescent Hospital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the researcher.

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Dr. Haidar Abd al-Shafi, head of the RCS told the researcher that the society was organized in such a manner that would allow for democratic practices and collective leadership. A brief review of the three organs and the subcommittees will be presented.¹

5.1.2.1. The General Assembly of the RCS

The general assembly of the Red Crescent Society comprised all the active members of the society. According to the RCS’s constitution, the general assembly was convened once a year (in April) in an ordinary session. In its ordinary session, the general assembly debated the yearly report of the administrative board; elected the administrative board (Art. 8[d]); discussed, approved, and ratified the annual budget (Art. 8[c]); appointed the auditor (Art. 8[e]); and discussed other issues on the agenda (Art. 8[f]).²

The general assembly could also be called for an emergency (extraordinary) session by the executive bureau if there was a need to deal with urgent issues.³ In its extraordinary meeting, the general assembly could decide to dissolve the society (Art. 12[a]), to amend the society’s bylaw (Art. 12[b]), to dismiss the administrative board and to elect another (Art. 12[c]).⁴ The president of the administrative board, or his deputy, presided the meetings of the general assembly (Art. 10).⁵

In the event that the general assembly became unable to undertake its functions, the administrative board, or a quarter of the active members, had the right to call for a meeting to discuss the dissolution of the society (Art. 25).⁶ The decision of dissolving the society should be taken by the support of two-thirds of the members.⁷

5.1.2.2. The Administrative Board of the RCS

The administrative board of the Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip consisted of twenty-one members elected, bi-yearly, by consensus or secret ballot of the general assembly’s members (Art. 13).¹

The administrative board performed a number of functions such as managing the society’s administrative, financial and technical concerns; representing the society before popular, governmental or international
bodies; implementing the resolutions of the general assembly; appointing the employees and punishing them; preparing an annual report about the activities of the society and its financial position; and working out and presenting the budget to the general assembly (Art. 14[a-e]). Moreover, the administrative board had the right to designate sub-committees which were deemed necessary for performing the society’s activities. Every sub-committee should include at least one of the administrative board’s members (Art. 19).

The administrative board should also keep records of the names of the appointed employees; the names of the administrative board’s members and the names of the members of the sub-committees; records of decisions of the general assembly’s decisions, the administrative board’s decisions, and the sub-committees’ activities; the society’s book of accounts; and records of every membership category (Art. 5).

The administrative board met every two weeks, and the meeting was considered illegal unless half of the members attended. In the case that half of the members did not attend a meeting, it could be held after one week and it was considered legal with any number of members attending (Art. 15). If a member failed to attend three consecutive meetings without an accepted excuse, the administrative board had the right to consider that the absentee member had resigned and to elect another member instead (Arts. 16, 17).

5.1.2.3. The Executive Bureau of the RCS

The executive bureau of the Red Crescent Society was composed of seven members, chosen by the administrative board, representing the top administrative officers of the society. The seven members of the executive bureau were as follows: the President and his two deputies, the Secretary and his deputy, and the Treasurer and his deputy (Article 18 of the RCS’s bylaw and Article 16 of the society’s constitution).

According to the RCS’s constitution, the President of the executive bureau had a wide range of jurisdiction. He headed and administered the administrative board, the executive bureau, and the general assembly, (Art. 17[a]); called for a meeting of the administrative board and the executive bureau; represented the society before official bodies; signed the administrative board’s annual report concerning the activities of
the society, and signed the minutes of the general assembly meetings (Art. 17[a 1-7]). The two Vice-Chairmen assisted the President in performing his tasks (Art. 17[b 1-2]).

The Secretary and his deputy undertook the following functions: implementing the decisions of the administrative board; receiving the society’s correspondence; keeping records and documents of the society; and working on the annual report about the society’s activities (Art. 17[c 1-8]).

The Treasurer and his deputy organized the society’s financial matters and safekeeping books of accounts, signed cheques and worked out the budget, and they were responsible about the financial issues of the society (Art. 17[d 1-5]).

The executive bureau initiated issues for consideration by the administrative board, took urgent decisions in the case of emergency, and implemented all the resolutions which were issued by the administrative board (Art. 18). It was also responsible for preparing initial studies about all issues to be considered by the administrative board; and following-up implementation of the administrative board’s resolutions. The executive bureau met at least once a week, and the quorum of a meeting was the attendance of no less than four members (out of seven). Its resolutions were passed by the absolute majority of the members (51%) (Art. 19).

5.1.2.4. The Sub-Committees of the RCS

The Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip executed its activities through voluntary sub-committees, with a minimum of employed personnel. The society carried out its functions and services through four committees for health and social services, information and public relations, finance, and the Red Crescent Hospital. Each committee was presided over by a member of the administrative board (Art. 21).

By virtue of the activities of its sub-committees, the RCS became popular and its membership multiplied very quickly. This unfortunately had two negative effects that bedeviled the society and hampered its progress: first, it aroused the fears of the occupation authorities, which started taking restrictive and strangulating measures; and second, the
society became a testing ground for different ideologies and for com­petition between different Palestinian political factions, which often led to petty quarrels and destructive violence.³

5.1.3. Aims of the RCS

As stipulated in its constitution, the aims covered rendering every possible help for any conceivable human need. This should have meant broad involvement in welfare work for the hardship cases that were bound to emerge in the context of an occupation that had been actively resisted by the population (e.g. hardship resulting from detention, imprisonment, demolition of houses, and loss of life). But welfare work was ruled out by the Israeli military authorities during the preliminary discussions to obtain the permit. So the society had to limit its activities to introducing health services and cultural matters.¹

Article 2 of the RCS’s constitution stated that the society aimed at: performing a variety of human activities (Art. 2[A]); offering aid and help to relieve the needy (Art. 2[B]); and undertaking tasks and activities of other similar societies (Art. 2[C]). In addition, the RCS aimed at improving the health and general well-being of the inhabitants in the Gaza Strip.²

The society’s bylaw stressed the non-political and the non-religious type of its objectives and of its character.³ The society would not interfere in political and religious matters (Art. 3).⁴ However, the society underwent a long politicization process and in fact became deeply involved in politics.

5.1.4. Activities of the RCS

The Red Crescent Society undertook a variety of activities in the field of health services, cultural and social fields. A brief review of these activities will now be presented.

5.1.4.1. The RCS’s Activities in the Field of Health Services

Since its establishment in 1972, the Red Crescent Society has been active in offering health services to residents in the Gaza Strip. The society operated a general clinic, a first-aid centre, a dispensary, a
laboratory, and a public library.

Early in its existence (from 1972 to 1975) the RCS established three first-aid centres and out-patient clinics, which rendered first-aid services free of charge. These first-aid centres provided out-patient medical services where patients were examined for nominal charges and medicines dispensed at cost price. The first-aid centre in Gaza operated round the clock and was equipped with ambulances which provided free transport to hospital if needed. The centres were located in areas close to refugee camps and in places where there were no proper medical services offered by the official (i.e. governmental) health bodies.¹

In 1975, the medical staff compiled a booklet about first-aid for the benefit of the public. Also courses in first-aid were given to candidates who wished to learn. Each course lasted 6 weeks with a total of 18 lectures.²

On March 15, 1974, (fifteenth of March was named by the administrative board as "Red Crescent Day"), a general medical clinic with a dispensary and a laboratory and a first-aid centre were inaugurated in Gaza and the same at al-Qararah (a small village on the northern outskirts of Khan Yunis). The Gaza and al-Qararah clinics operated 3 hours daily, except on Friday's. Both clinics were run by volunteer doctors-members of the society.³

In 1975, the society focused its efforts on preliminary plans for a 200-bed Red Crescent Hospital to be built on a fifty-dunum lot (one dunum = 1,000 sq. meter) in the northeastern section of Gaza. Motivated by the fact that about 2,000 patients per year from the Strip found it necessary to seek medication in Israeli hospitals, the administrative committee resolved to establish a general hospital with a better standard of technical equipment and qualified personnel than had previously been available.

In spite of the fact that building a hospital was not related to any kind of violations to law, the Israeli authorities intervened and ordered the administrative board of the RCS to stop the work in the project. Dr. Haidar Ė Abd al-Shafi, the President of the RCS told the researcher that:
"our progress with this project was well-known to the Israeli military authorities, and after we covered appreciable efforts, getting ready to start building, they insisted on stopping the project and banned any further progress. There was no legal basis for this action and no justifiable reason. It was simply another arbitrary military order".

From 1977 to 1985, the RCS established three dental clinics: the first was established in Gaza and was opened on 3 October 1977, the second was established in Khan Yunis and was opened on 11 March 1979, and the third was established in Abasan al-Kabirah and was opened on 1 January 1985. The Abasan al-Kabirah clinic served the villages that lie on the eastern outskirts of Khan Yunis. It operated 3 hours daily in the afternoon, except on Friday. Examination services and provision of technical appliances were given at very reduced charges.\(^5\) Table no. 13 demonstrates the activities of the dental clinics of the RCS during 1993.

**Table No. 13**

The RCS's Dental Clinics' Services 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>Khan Yunis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clinic (Patient)</td>
<td>Clinic (Patient)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination</td>
<td>2,445</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filling</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>2,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Rays</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gum operation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free service</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetic filling</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teeth construction</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visits</td>
<td>5,586</td>
<td>2,289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the 1970s, there was a chronic shortage of nurses in the Gaza Strip - both in number and quality. Early in its work, the RCS exhibited serious concern for this problem. In the early months of 1973 the Health and Social Services Committee carried out a survey on the problems of nursing in the Gaza Strip with the help of a questionnaire that was distributed to 10,000 persons representing a cross-section of the community. A report was compiled that embodied conclusions and recommendations which were presented to medical organizations in the Strip. The society also
provided scholarships to girls for studying nursing at the Higher Institute for Nursing in Cairo. The society urged girls to study nursing and allotted annual merit awards to the best nurses in different health institutions. The rewards were distributed at a ceremony and were dedicated to the promotion of the nursing profession.  

To solve the problem of the shortage in nurses, the society, in coordination with the Central Committee of the Red Crescent Societies in the West Bank, planned the establishment of a nursing school in Jerusalem. Pursuing the same objective, teams of the society’s female members were organized to help out in hospitals: in the kitchens, wards, out-patient departments etc. This emphasised the worthiness and respectability of the nurses’ work. The initiative met with a positive response and was carried on for two years. Table no. 14 shows the clinics and medical services of the RCS in 1993.

Table No. 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Gaza Clinic</th>
<th>'Abasan Clinic</th>
<th>Khan Yunis Clinic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New patients</td>
<td>11,427</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat patients</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wound dressing</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injection</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor operation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free examination</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical check up</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eye drops</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemas</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid medications</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pills</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Visits</td>
<td>16,199</td>
<td>9,173</td>
<td>4,427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The society organized lectures, panels and seminars in the field of health. The RCS had a mother and child-care programme whereby a regular medical examination for children and pregnant women was offered. Table no. 15 demonstrates these services during 1993.
Table No. 15
Child and Mother-care Services Offered by the RCS in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Gaza Clinic</th>
<th>Abasan Clinic</th>
<th>Khan Yunis Clinic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child visit</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant visit</td>
<td>1,947</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.1.4.2. Activities of the RCS in the Cultural Field

In the field of culture, the society deemed it of prime importance to promote general knowledge and interest in reading among members of the community. So, one of the earliest works was the establishment of a library that has been steadily growing. It was noted that Gaza had no public library yet. "We tried to compensate in a small way for this shortage... as expected, it turned out to be our most successful project," Dr. Haidar "Abd al-Shafi (the head of the RCS) told the researcher. The library contained more than 5,000 books mostly in Arabic (a few hundred in English). A large number of the books were contributed by members of the society and the rest were bought. The average number of daily visitors to the reading room in the library was about 50. The library had a lending section that was busy, with about 3,000 subscribers. ¹

The society engaged in various cultural activities with a purpose to make people aware of the Palestinian cultural achievements past and present, to revive and bring out everything positive in Palestinian tradition, and to combat the demoralizing and depressive influence of the Israeli occupation. The cultural activities of the RCS included presenting lectures for the public on different subjects, staging cultural book exhibitions (mainly on Palestine or by Palestinian authors), organizing fairs for Palestinian costumes and art-works of Palestinian amateur artists, and holding folklore festivals. ²

In 1977, the RCS began to engage in adult education. Most of the students were elderly women. ³ Compulsory education had been enforced and
adequately provided for the inhabitants in the Gaza Strip during the Egyptian Administration. But laxity and lack of proper provision of education had caused problems after 1967. As a result a certain percentage of the younger generation (in addition to some elderly people) were illiterate.

In 1993, the adult courses which were organised by the RCS to fight against illiteracy embraced 24 centres throughout the Gaza Strip. These centres consisted of 43 classes and 43 teachers, and 4 employees (including a supervisor and three deputies). There were 624 students (females and males) attending the classes. The courses were implemented in coordination with the Palestine Women’s Union in Gaza and with charitable organizations in the West Bank, UNICEF, Bir Zait University and the Higher Committee for Fighting Against Illiteracy. Table no. 16 gives information on the centres for adult education in the Gaza Strip which were under the RCS’s administration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Area</th>
<th>No. of Centres</th>
<th>No. of Classes</th>
<th>No. of Teachers</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza city</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabalia RC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bait Hanun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bait Lahya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Buraij RC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nusairat RC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Maghazi RC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dair al-Balah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>635</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: RC = Refugee Camp.


5.1.4.3. Social Activities of the Red Crescent Society

The Red Crescent Society undertook a wide range of social activities. For example, in 1975 the society embarked on a project whereby it recruited work teams from among the ladies of the community who wished to lend a hand in hospital work; the project was called "The Hospital
Friends". There were more than one hundred volunteers in small teams (of three or four) working in different wards of the Shifa' hospital. Aside from the direct benefit of covering a needed service, the project had the following indirect benefits: it encouraged the hospital personnel to do better work; it familiarized the community with the nature of hospital work and to become more appreciative of it; it set an example in the community for the much needed spirit of voluntary and teamwork; and finally, it set an example for young girls that nurses' work was nothing to be ashamed of and helped to dispel all the negative and false ideas that surrounded the image of the nurse.¹

In 1976, the RCS engaged in helping physically disabled persons. It took the initiative of coordinating the efforts of several charitable organizations for this purpose. A joint-committee was formed comprising representatives from the Near East Council of Churches, the Gaza Benevolent Society, the Palestine Women's Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society. The joint-committee facilitated matters for the donating party and the applicants, and ruled out duplication of grants. Artificial aid appliances were provided for the needy.²

In 1977, the RCS shared with other philanthropic societies, in the Gaza Strip, the task of help and rehabilitation for persons disabled as a result of the war and accidents. It was instrumental in coordinating and centralizing all the efforts in this direction, so that everything ran smoothly both for the societies and for the needy persons. Special and successful efforts were made to establish a workshop for artificial limbs in the Strip.³

In 1990, the society celebrated the Child's Year, promoting children's welfare as proclaimed by the U.N. through public lectures all over the Strip, arranging competitions in the cultural field pertaining to children (e.g. writing of stories, songs and art-works) and sharing in public festivals with children.⁴

Occasional social activities (such as giving presents to hospital patients - especially children, circulating books to patients, and providing books to prisoners with the help of the International Red Cross Committee) were performed. The Red Crescent Society organized family visits to Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons. These visits
were coordinated bi-monthly with the International Committee of the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{5}

To finance its services and projects, the Red Crescent Society received funds from many sources (e.g. donations from the citrus industry, other private sources, the Council of Churches, and Arab governments; the sale of RCS stamps; arranging soccer matches; and membership dues).\textsuperscript{6}

5.1.5. The Political Role of the RCS: the Relationship between the RCS and both the Israeli Authorities and the Palestinian Movements

The analysis given here of the relationship between the RCS and the Israeli authorities and Palestinian political factions is based on extended interviews conducted with members, officials, and employees of the RCS.

5.1.5.1. The Relationship between the RCS and the Israeli Authorities

The relations between the RCS and the Israeli authorities were characterized by mutual antagonism. Although there was no special reason for the occupation authorities - when they permitted the establishment of the society - to have any illusion or doubt about the RCS,s humanist orientation or its genuine patriotic identification, still the Israeli authorities started, quite early, to be unsympathetic and attempted to discredit the society.

The fact that the RCS commanded broad public respect, and in a short period became a rallying organization for patriotic citizens, pushed the Israeli authorities to show a negative political attitude towards the society. The authorities resorted to branding the society as a political organization masquerading behind a humanist facade. Dr. Haidar \textsuperscript{6}Abd al-Shafi told the researcher that:

"the Israeli Security Branch branded us (i.e. the society) initially as Fatah, then as PLO and finally as Communists. The emergence of fundamentalist ideology and Muslim fanatics with their enthusiasm and emotionalism provided fertile ground for the authorities to stick to the communist charge.... the communist charge became a kind of incitement against the society".\textsuperscript{1}

On January 7, 1980, the Israeli authorities facilitated the vandalisa-
tion of the RCS's headquarters. Hordes of frenzied Muslim fanatics in a violent demonstration stormed the society's premises in Gaza, burning the library, and destroying and looting the furniture and equipment of the offices and clinics. The tacit approval of the authorities, if not their actual involvement and connivance in what happened was displayed by their non-interference. Dr. Abd al-Shafi maintained that:

"While they (i.e. the Israeli authorities) usually displayed great alertness in combating even peaceful demonstrations of young students within a school yard, here they stood indifferently watching a violent and destructive demonstration marching to its objective. Their failure to track and punish the culprits was an added testimony against the authorities".

Yusra al-Barbari, a member of the RCS's administrative board and the head of the Palestine Women's Union in the Gaza Strip, told the researcher in an interview that As'ad al-Saftawi, a headmaster and prominent figure in the Gaza Strip, in cooperation with Abu Sabri, an Israeli officer in the Civil Administration, planned the attack on the Red Crescent Society on January 7, 1980. At that time al-Saftawi worked with the Fatah faction and with the Islamists as well. Al-Saftawi was assassinated in 1993 in a tragic competition for power within the Fatah faction.

Like other Palestinian organizations under Israeli occupation, the RCS suffered from the hostile Israeli political attitude towards the society. For example, the Israeli authorities put obstacles in the way of the developmental programmes of the society. All cultural activities were banned except for the running of the library. The Israeli officers sometimes walked into the library and confiscated books on the pretext that they incited discontent.

The Israeli authorities put restrictions on the financial channels of the RCS. Although it was agreed by the Israeli military authorities that the RCS could accept and make use of unconditional donations and could raise funds locally and abroad provided that the military would have access to its accounts to verify the channels of expenditure and the society accepted this condition and abided by it, on a number of occasions the authorities refused to permit the society to bring funds from abroad. "They (i.e. the Israeli authorities) issued several orders restricting our freedom in raising and accepting funds from the Arab
5.1.5.2. The Relationship between the RCS and the Palestinian Factions

"Originally, the Red Crescent Society (RCS) in the Gaza Strip was designed to be a national rallying organization representing various Palestinian national forces and factions", Zuhair al-Surani, the Vice-President of the RCS, told the researcher. Al-Surani maintained that various political trends were represented in the society such as Fatah, the Communist Party, independents, and others. "The Society continues to represent different Palestinian political factions aiming at resisting the Israeli occupation", al-Surani stated.

The RCS participated in the political struggle of the Palestinian people to obtain Arab and international recognition of the PLO. On a number of occasions, it presented memoranda to Arab states and international organizations to support the PLO’s efforts to gain recognition. "In fact", al-Surani added, "the society was a body affiliated to the PLO, and the first memorandum was presented to the Arab Summit Conference which was held in Rabat (Morocco) in 1974, supporting the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people".

Various Palestinian political factions competed to control the RCS. The politicization of the RCS and the competition between the various Palestinian political factions to control its administrative board were very clear in the last round of elections, which was held in 1979 (no elections have been held since then). Two political lists (blocs) of candidates competed in the elections: the first group represented the leftist trends headed by Dr. Haidar ´Abd al-Shafi, and the other list comprised Fatah, the Islamists, and the independents. The latter list was head by Asad al-Saftawi (a school headmaster and politically active figure). The second group won four seats in the administrative board of the RCS, and the first group won seventeen seats. The struggle to control the RCS resulted in the formation of an administrative board reflecting different Palestinian factions and trends. The elected administrative board, which embraced 21 members, ran the society’s activities despite the different political positions among the Palestinian factions which reflected themselves directly on the performance of the administrative board.
In 1980, the struggle and competition among the Palestinian political movements to control the society led to a bloody and tragic confrontation. The Israeli authorities encouraged and monitored the development of the conflict between the two blocs. On January 7, 1980, the society's premises was attacked by arsonists, and the Islamists were accused of burning the headquarters of the society which was depicted as "the castle of communists" in the Gaza Strip. As'ad al-Saftawi, was accused of planning the attack on the society, and as a result the general assembly of the RCS decided to dismiss him from the administrative board.5

In 1993, the political weight (influence) of the various Palestinian political factions within the rank and file of the RCS was not so tangible. In an interview with the researcher, Fairuz 'Arafah, a library-assistant in the RCS, told the researcher that the factions weight in the society were not so strong and the majority of the RCS's members were independents (60%). Fairuz maintained that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) faction represented 20 percent, the Fatah faction about 5%, Islamists 5%, and others 10%. Fairuz asserted to the researcher that the RCS offered services for the public regardless of their political affiliations.6

The relationship between the RCS and the Palestinian factions was based on their common interest in offering services to the masses. In an interview with the researcher, 'Abd al-Malik al-Itluli, a librarian of the RCS, told the researcher that there was a sort of coordination between the Palestinian factions and the RCS. The latter dealt with various political factions regardless of their ideologies. Al-Itluli asserted that each of the RCS's employees had his own political affiliation and belief, and that the administrative board was composed of members loyal to various Palestinian political factions and trends.7 Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, the Head of the RCS, told the researcher that the society kept good relations with the Palestinian factions.8

5.1.6. The Political Role of the RCS: the RCS, the intifada and the Peace Process

In this part of the study an examination of the RCS positions towards the intifada and the peace process will be presented.
5.1.6.1. The Red Crescent Society and the intifada

The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, on December 9, 1987, increased the burden on the RCS and other popular organizations in the Gaza Strip. These organizations had to confront a new and unprecedented situation.

During the intifada the RCS undertook a leading role through offering health, social, and other services. The society offered medical aid to Palestinians injured in clashes with the Israeli forces. It also offered its services to detainees and prisoners in Israeli prisons, such as giving summer and winter clothes, presenting sweets to the prisoners on some occasions (e.g. feasts), organizing regular family visits to the prisoners in Israeli prisons, and granting financial support to martyrs' families and needy people.

The indirect involvement of the RCS in the intifada activities was apparent through the transportation and communication services which were offered by the RCS's ambulances. The ambulance service of the Red Crescent Society continued during curfews and general strikes to help in transferring the injured. The ambulance drivers took risks and their lives were in danger while performing their tasks. Medical teams of the RCS were faced by Israeli bullets. A number of them were wounded by the Israeli soldiers and a number of ambulances were damaged.

During the intifada, free of charge medical treatment was offered by the RCS to the wounded. Medication and medicine were given to residents during the curfews and at other times. Moreover, the RCS facilitated medical treatment for the wounded in Israeli and Egyptian hospitals.

The direct involvement of the RCS in political activities during the intifada was apparent and had different aspects. In an interview with the researcher, Zuhair al-Surani, the Vice-President of the RCS, asserted that the society participated in the political meetings which embraced representatives of various political groups. It initiated political strikes, protests, and sit-downs. The society also issued political statements in support for the intifada.

The officers of the RCS considered their social, medical, and financial
services and support for intifada activists (injured, or, detained) as a salient role in supporting the uprising. The human and social activities of the RCS were considered as political back-up and support to the intifada. Nabilah al-Kafarnah, a secretary in the RCS, who was responsible for organizing family visits to Israeli prisons to visit their relatives detained in Israeli prisons, told the researcher that "the RCS offered various services to the needy people during the intifada and there is no doubt that this role supported the political goals of the intifada ....the RCS was involved in the intifada through various aspects of activities".

5.1.6.2. The Red Crescent Society and the Peace Process 1991-1993

At the beginning of the peace process in 1991, the RCS contained many peace supporters. After the signing of the Oslo accord in Washington on 13 September 1993 and of the Cairo peace agreement between the PLO leadership and the Israeli government (on 5 May 1994), the RCS moved to the opposite side. Most of the RCS's officials and employees became opponents of the peace process.

The invitation of the PLO to the Madrid peace conference (in 1991) was met with a positive reply by the Palestinian leadership, which formed a delegation from the occupied territories. The PLO chose the members of the Palestinian delegation for the peace negotiations, and the delegation was headed by Dr. Haidar ğAbd al-Shafi, the President of the Red Crescent Society.

The participation of the president of the RCS in the peace process (from October 1991 to September 1993) as a head of the Palestinian delegation did not mean that his participation represented a collective decision or an official position of the RCS. Dr. ğAbd al-Shafi told the researcher that his participation was a result of his own personal decision, although the RCS supported the peace process and his participation met with welcome and support from the RCS. Dr. ğAbd al-Shafi stated that he had discussed his resignation from the RCS presidency with the administrative board's members but they rejected it.¹

Divisions in political stances among members and employees of the RCS towards the peace process were abundantly clear. Fairuz ćArafah, a library-assistant working with the RCS, told the researcher that
"political discussions among members of the RCS concentrated on whether this peace process will lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the issue of Jerusalem, the refugees, and the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip".²

It was possible to distinguish between two phases in the development of the RCS’s position towards the peace process. The first stage continued for two years (from October 1991 to September 1993). During that period the general attitude was supportive to the peace process. The RCS’s members hoped that a just peace would be achieved, which guaranteed the establishment of a Palestinian independent state. During that period, Dr. Haidar Abd al-Shafi was presiding over the Palestinian delegation for peace negotiations. The secret negotiation between a PLO delegation and an Israeli delegation in Oslo and the agreements which were signed after that undermined the support for the peace process among members of the RCS. Dr. Abd al-Shafi boycotted the peace negotiation and opposed the agreements which were signed between the PLO and the Israeli government. Members of the RCS considered the agreements which were signed in Oslo, Washington, and Cairo as a stab in the back of the Palestinian delegation for peace.³

During the second stage of the peace process (from September 1993 on), there was frank opposition to the peace process and the peace agreements of Oslo and Cairo which were signed by the PLO and the Israeli government on September 13, 1993, and on May 5, 1994, respectively. Yusra al-Barbari, a member of the administrative board of the RCS and the President of the Palestine Women’s Union in the Gaza Strip, told the researcher: "I am personally against the peace process".⁴

There was a wide gap between the high expectations of Palestinians from the peace process and the reality. At the beginning of the peace process it was welcomed and met with tremendous support from members of the RCS. But gradually, this support started to diminish. The peace process produced stillborn agreements and these agreements were seen as being imposed on the Palestinian leadership. Abd al-Aziz Abu al-Qaraya, the administrative assistant of the RCS told the researcher that:

"we support just peace which guarantees our people’s rights in self-determination, and establishing an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Peace should be based on the U.N. resolutions and on the Palestinian National Council’s resolutions. The peace agreements
should be based on the collective responsibility and the support of the majority of the Palestinian people not this peace which was signed by only one faction" (i.e. Fatah).5

5.1.7. Assessment

From the above analysis and the extended interviews with members of the Red Crescent Society, it is clear that the modest services rendered by the RCS were of real value to the community. The society continued to introduce services and to show involvement in political matters. While, from an abstract point of view - at least according to the provisions of the society's constitution - there was no room for political activities, prominent figures in Palestinian politics came from the RCS. Although a number of the officials in the RCS tried to depict their organization as a charity introducing human services to the people, they admitted its politicization.

The relationship between the society and the Israeli authorities was not good, while the relations with the various Palestinian factions were cordial. The Israeli authorities tried to cripple the work of the RCS in the Gaza Strip and they followed a policy of discrediting it. The authorities facilitated the vandalization of the RCS's headquarters in 1980. The Palestinian political factions attempted to control the administration of the RCS and to direct its policies.

The role of the RCS in the intifada was clear through its services to residents of the Gaza Strip. It supported, indirectly, the activists of the intifada by giving financial aid to a number of their families, introduced medical treatment to the wounded, and sending clothes to the prisoners and organizing family visits to them in the Israeli prisons.

Most of the RCS's members opposed the peace process (after September 1993) and the agreements which were signed between the PLO leadership and the Israeli government. The interviewees supported a just and lasting peace which might lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. In their opinion, the agreements between the PLO and Israel could not produce just, real, and permanent peace.
The Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip (LAGS) represented a sector of the educated people on the one hand, and constituted an important part of the professional organizations on the other. It was the first professional organization which was established in the Gaza Strip under the Israeli occupation.

A brief review of the emergence, organization, objectives and activities of the Lawyers' Association will now be presented. The political role of the association will also be explored.

5.2.1. The Emergence of the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip

The Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip (LAGS) was established in 1976. The headquarters of the association was located in Gaza, with branches in other towns of the Strip. The association was established in accordance with the Ottoman Societies' Law, the Lawyers' Regulation No. 32 of 1938, the Council Law of Rights No. 33 of 1938, and other laws which were in force in the Gaza Strip.

Historically, a Lawyers' Association was established during the British mandate. Faraj al-Sarraf, a lawyer from Gaza, told the researcher that Ahmad al-Shuqairi - the first Chairman of the PLO - was the President of the Lawyers' Association during the Mandate.

In the period 1948-1967, there was an unofficial Lawyers' Association with about 14 members. Rushdi al-Shawwa was the President of the Lawyers' Association and Fawzi al-Dirajani was the Vice-President. Although professional unions as such were not officially allowed, lawyers in the Strip formed a local association. The idea of establishing a Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip at this time appeared in the 1950s. In an interview with the researcher, Zuhair al-Rayis, a Gazan lawyer, maintained that in 1956 when he was studying law in Cairo, he applied to participate in a conference held by the Egyptian Lawyers' Union and duly obtained permission. In 1957, the Third Conference of Arab Lawyers was held in Damascus and al-Rayis participated in it and applied to...
represent Palestine in the Conference. Shafiq Irshidat and Zuhair Jarana, members of the standing office of the Arab Lawyers Union, informed al-Rayis that he was chosen as a member in the office and asked him to establish unofficial Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip. In 1958, the Lawyers' Association was formed but it was not very active. The association participated in the Arab lawyers conferences. In the period from 1958 to 1967, there were only fourteen lawyers (members) in the Lawyers' Association in the Strip. At that time, the association had no bylaw or constitution.

In 1967, the Gaza Strip was occupied by the Israeli forces and the association was banned, however efforts were made for the resumption of its activities. In 1969, a bylaw for the intended Lawyers' Association was prepared and, in 1970, an application was presented to the Israeli authorities to permit the establishment of the association. A founding committee headed by lawyer Fawzi al-Dajani was formed and sought to obtain the permit from the Israeli authorities. In 1976, the founding committee received this permit. The Lawyers' Association was the first professional organization in the Gaza Strip allowed to exercise its activities. In 1976, when the recent Lawyers' Association was established, there were about thirty members.

The Lawyers' Association's registration with the Israeli authorities meant that it fell under the direct supervision of the Department of Interior within the Israeli military administration. The association, like other Palestinian organizations in the Strip, was required to submit annual reports to the Israeli authorities, and it was subjected to regular monitoring and intervention from the authorities. Although being registered, in itself, did not necessarily imply that the organization rotated in the orbit of the official authority, it was nonetheless apparent that most of the registered organizations internalized an approach that avoided any violent confrontation with the Israeli authorities.

5.2.2. The Organizational Structure of the Lawyers' Association

Organizationally, the Lawyers' Association consisted of a general assembly, an administrative board and a number of subcommittees. Table no. 17 demonstrates the organizational structure of the association.
### Table No. 17

The Organizational Structure of the Lawyers' Association in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The President</th>
<th>The General Assembly</th>
<th>The Admin. Board</th>
<th>The Sub-Committees</th>
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**Notes:** Com. = Committee       Admin. = Administrative

**Source:** compiled by the researcher.

A brief review of the organs of the association will now be presented.

#### 5.2.2.1. The General Assembly

According to the constitution of the Lawyers' Association, the general assembly consisted of all the lawyers members of the association, active and retired (Art. 6).

The general assembly undertook the following functions: electing members of the administrative board of the association (which consisted of seven members: the President of the association and his deputy, the Secretary, the Treasurer, and three other members) (Art. 7[1]); discussing, approving and ratifying the annual budget (Art. 7[2]); issuing appropriate resolutions related to issues on its agenda (Art. 7[3]); debating administrative and financial matters of the association; passing decisions concerning members' suggestions (Art. 7[4]); and electing an auditor on condition that he should not be a member of the administrative board (Art. 7[5]).

The general assembly of the Lawyers' Association might be exceptionally convened in an extraordinary meeting at any time (to discuss urgent issues) by a decision of the administrative board, or upon a request of one-third of the association's members (Art. 8[1,2]). In this case, the date of the meeting should be declared ten days earlier, and the meeting was considered legal if an absolute majority (51%) of the members attended (Art. 9).

The election of the administrative board, by the general assembly's mem-
bers, was performed by secret voting and by simple majority (51%) of the attendees (members) (Art. 10). Each of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary, and the Treasurer was individually and separately elected, and the three other members of the administrative board were separately elected as well (Art. 10).³

The President of the association presided over the general assembly’s sessions and the Secretary registered names of the members who wished to talk during the session. However, it was allowed for a member to talk spontaneously during a session to draw a member’s attention to comply with the association’s bylaw, ask to put off the session, correct a mistake, reply to a talk concerning the member, or ask for the discussion not to be prolonged.⁴

5.2.2.2. The Administrative Board

The administrative board of the Lawyers’ Association in the Gaza Strip was the executive arm of the association, and consisted of seven members headed by the President of the association (Art. 11). The members of the administrative board were elected by the general assembly for one renewable year (Art. 12). The President should be a lawyer practicing the job for no less than ten years. The Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer should not be elected to their positions unless they had practised their profession as lawyers for at least seven years (Art. 13).¹

The administrative board performed a wide range of functions such as managing the association’s affairs and taking the necessary decisions in this respect, calling for the ordinary and extraordinary meetings of the general assembly, issuing resolutions with regard to membership applications, formulating regulations concerning the association’s employees (e.g. their salary and promotion), supervising the lawyers’ rooms in the courts, establishing and administering the lawyers’ club, working out and implementing the association’s budget, forming sub-committees according to the provisions of the association’s bylaw to undertake various sorts of activities, managing the retired lawyers fund, seeking financial resources for support to the retired lawyers’ fund, and taking expedient decisions which served the association’s interests (Art. 17).²

The administrative board should keep records of the names of the association’s members (which contained information about each member), the
association's resolutions and its contracts, and accounts which contained the revenues, the expenditures, the assets, and the budget of the association (Art. 20[1-3]).

The administrative board of the Lawyers' Association held an ordinary meeting once every two weeks, and it could convene in an extraordinary meeting upon a call from the President of the association, or upon a request of three of its members (Art. 18[1]). The quorum of the administrative board’s meeting was the attendance of the President, or his deputy, and an absolute majority (51%) of the association's members (Art. 18[2]). The decisions of the administrative board were taken by simple majority (51%) (Art. 18[3]).

The President of the Lawyers' Association represented the association before other organizations and implemented its decisions; presided over meetings of the general assembly and the administrative board; and represented the association before courts in litigations to defend its interests (Art. 19[1]). The Vice-President performed the President's functions in case of the former's absence (Art. 19[2]). The Secretary supervised the administrative matters of the association and the Treasurer carried financial responsibility for the association (Art. 19[3]).

5.2.2.3. The Sub-Committees of the Lawyers' Association

The Lawyers' Association performed its cultural, legal, social, financial, and other activities through a number of committees. These committees were formed by the administrative board and each was presided over by a member of the administrative board. The committees included the cultural committee, the legal committee, the publishing committee, the social committee, the committee for in-training lawyers, the committee for the retired-lawyers' fund, and the financial committee.

5.2.3. Objectives of the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip

The Lawyers' Association, like any other professional organization, aimed primarily at serving the interests of its members and raising the standards of the lawyers' performance. The association encouraged cooperation among lawyers in the Gaza Strip and enhanced social relations among them.
Article 3 of the Lawyers' Association's constitution numerated the objectives of the association as follows: defending the interests of the association and raising the standards of the lawyers profession in the Strip and guaranteeing the freedom of a lawyer in undertaking his mission (Art. 3[1]); serving the material and moral interests of the members and offering economic, social, cultural, and health services to them and to their families, (Art. 3[2]); activating and encouraging legal researches and raising the scientific standard of the members (Art. 3[3]); offering job-creating opportunities for the members and extending legal aid to poor and needy people (Art. 3[4]); and fifth, performing tasks and functions which were undertaken by other similar associations (Art. 3[5]).

The Lawyers' Association supported the Palestinian masses in their national struggle against the Israeli occupation and defended the Palestinian prisoners and detainees before the Israeli military courts.

5.2.4. Activities of the Lawyers' Association

The Lawyers' Association, as already indicated, undertook its activities through a number of subcommittees. These committees were formed by the administrative board and each committee was headed by a member of the administrative board.

The Cultural Committee undertook cultural functions such as preparing lectures for lawyers who were undergoing training sessions in cooperation with the in-training-lawyers committee; presenting cultural and legal lectures to the lawyers and the public; establishing a library in the association's headquarters; and giving various information about the cultural activities of the association.

The Legal Committee made studies concerning amendments of laws (that were in effect in the Gaza Strip) and gave its legal opinion concerning these amendments; provided - upon request - legal consultancy to popular, social and charitable organizations in the Strip; prepared legal studies and legal explanations which were required to raise the standard of lawyers' profession; and formulated a "Manner Code" to control the lawyers' behaviour.

The Publishing Committee was responsible for issuing a magazine special-
ized in legal studies; collecting and publishing legal studies; and gathering and publishing courts' resolutions and other legal materials. During a number of visits to the headquarters of the Lawyers' Association, the researcher found that there was no periodical or any significant publication issued by the Lawyers' Association.

The Social Committee undertook a number of functions: examining the applications related to legal aid for needy people and raised its recommendation to the administrative board; encouraging the enhancement of social relations among members of the association; and supervising and organizing - for lawyers - collective excursions and arranged social events. The social committee urged lawyers to participate in general strikes, protests, and demonstrations in solidarity with the national struggle of the Palestinian people.

The Committee for In-Training Lawyers gave its opinions concerning issues related to lawyers who underwent training courses, organized lectures for lawyers undergoing training in cooperation with the cultural committee and other committees, discussed problems facing the in-training lawyers, and presented recommendations on the latter to the administrative board.

The Financial Committee was responsible for developing the financial resources of the association. It also gathered donations and offered its help to the Treasurer in collecting the membership fees.

The Committee for the Retired-Lawyers' Fund undertook the administration and supervision on this fund. The association showed its involvement in politics and its participation in peaceful resistance against the Israeli occupation. It participated in the Palestinian national struggle and in promoting the political identity of the Palestinian people, organising welcome receptions to foreign delegations and explaining the political situation related to the Palestinian cause. It also defended human rights and called for the holding of meetings and conferences that discussed issues of human rights and the Israeli violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people.

5.2.5. The Political Role of the Lawyers' Association: the Relationship
between the Association and both the Israeli Authorities and the Palestinian Political Movements

The Lawyers' Association could not isolate itself from political matters. Politics was dictated on the association. Various Palestinian factions penetrated the rank and file of the association and propagated their ideas and ideologies. The Israeli authorities monitored the activities of the association and intervened indirectly through different means (e.g. legal measures, arrests, detentions, curfews, etc.) in controlling the association.

An examination of the relationship between the Lawyers' Association and the Israeli authorities and the relationship between the association and Palestinian factions will now be presented.

5.2.5.1. The Relationship between the Lawyers' Association and the Israeli Authorities

The relationship between the Lawyers' Association and the Israeli authorities was hostile and full of challenges. It related mainly to sorting out problems facing lawyers undertaking their job, such as those involving the judicial system, the procedures before Israeli military courts, and meetings with prisoners in Israeli prisons. On a few occasions, the association intervened to defend public interests, and protested against the repressive measures of the authorities.¹

The association showed weakness and inability to confront the Israeli policies. Sâ'id Tafish and Sâna' Abu Middain (two lawyers working with the UNRWA) told the researcher that the association was exposed to Israeli policy which aimed to subject the association to the will of the Israeli authorities. Tafish and Abu Middain stated that:

"the association could not confront the Israeli policies because of the weakness of its representatives and their political divisions and their strife.... A number of the association's decisions were hasty and not studied well and were based on wrong calculations. Moreover, the association's reactions to some events were very slow and weak....this was a direct result of the political differences, or lack of political and factional harmony, among its members".²

In an interview with the researcher, Nazim İcwâdah, a lawyer from Gaza,
mentioned two examples of the challenges and confrontations between the Lawyers' Associations and the Israeli authorities. The first challenge was in 1982 when the authorities decided to impose a Value Added Tax (VAT) on the lawyers, who refused the Israeli order. The Israeli authorities exerted pressures on the lawyers, while the national popular organizations (i.e. the associations) staged a strike in solidarity with the lawyers. The tense situation led to an agreement between the authorities and the associations according to which the issue should be raised to the Israeli High Court of Justice. The court, in its turn, supported the authorities' decision. The second challenge was in the early years of the intifada when the Israeli authorities resorted to summary and random arrests, summary trials, and deportations. The Lawyers' Association made efforts, in cooperation with a number of Israeli lawyers who supported the Palestinian cause, to defend the deportees before the Israeli High Court of Justice in Jerusalem. However, the authorities implemented most of the deportation orders.

To confront Israeli practices against lawyers and prisoners (which included insulting the lawyers and putting obstacles in their way to stop them from performing their job), the Lawyers' Association carried out protests (strikes). The protests, which involved abstaining from appearing before the Israeli courts, continued for one year (1988-1989). The lawyers also staged a strike and boycotted appearances before the Israeli common-law courts.

Fayiz Abu Rahmah, the President of the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip told the researcher that in 1981 the association protested to the Israeli authorities when a military court issued a decision to put Abu Rahmah in prison for twenty days, or, instead of imprisonment pay a fine of IL1,000 (Israeli Lira). The military court accused Abu Rahmah of violating the law because he failed to attend one of the court's sessions when he was defending prisoners before the court. Abu Rahmah stated that a memorandum was presented to the Israeli legal adviser who cancelled the decision. In 1982, the association participated in defending lawyers and physicians when the Israeli authorities imposed VAT on their income. Abu Rahmah also maintained that the association played a salient role in defending the Palestinian detainees in the Israeli prisons.

The Israeli authorities hostile political attitude towards the Lawyers'
Association was apparent from attempts of the authorities to weaken the role of the Lawyers' Association. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Farra, a lawyer from Khan Yunis, told the researcher that the Israeli authorities put obstacles to prevent the association from undertaking its mission. Al-Farra told the researcher that the authorities tried to marginalize the association by transferring the competence of the Palestinian Attorney General (''Abd Rabbuh Abu Im'ailiq) to the Israeli Officer of Justice. The association protested against this measure but in vain. Moreover, the association failed to confront the Israeli military order (1982) which imposed VAT. The association also gave in to the Israeli decision to give magnetic cards to the lawyers who wanted to visit prisoners (defendants) detained in prisons located inside Israel, according to Al-Farra.9

From analysis of the extended interviews which were conducted with lawyers (members of the association) in the Gaza Strip, it was apparent to the researcher that the relations between the association and the Israeli authorities were tense. 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Nasir, a lawyer from Gaza, told the researcher that the relationship with the occupation authorities was adversary.10

Relations between the association and the Israeli occupation authorities was, therefore, like the relation between the Palestinian people and Israel: antagonistic.11

5.2.5.2. The Relationship between the Lawyers' Association and Palestinian Political Movements

The trade unionist character of the Lawyers' Association for the Gaza Strip did not negate its political role within the context of the Palestinian national struggle.

The relationship between the Association and the Palestinian factions could be described as interwined. Various Palestinian political movements competed to control the Lawyers' Association. The Fatah faction actually controlled and directed the policies of the association. However, other factions were represented in the association. It was easy to distinguish these various political trends and loyalties among the rank and file of the Lawyers' Association.1
The supporters and opponents of various Palestinian factions attempted to gain ground in the association and to control its administration. The two main political blocs within the association were the Islamicists and the PLO factions. The supporters of the Fatah Movement, the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Arab Liberation Front, the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFPL), etc. all competed to control the association and its policies. A number of lawyers were non-aligned (independents) and they freely expressed their support for one Palestinian faction or another. The competition between these factions was apparent in the association's elections. During the last fifteen years a number of elections were held in a fluctuating political situation, which reflected directly on the structure of the association's administrative board.

In the elections two political blocs competed. Nazim Iwaidah, a lawyer from Gaza, told the researcher that:

"when the intifada broke out two different political trends appeared in the Lawyers' Association: the secular trend which supported the PLO and its factions, and the Islamic trend which backed the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Islamic Jihad. The two trends competed in elections, and the PLO supporters won in the elections because they had financial resources and paid money to the lawyers and bought their votes. The Islamic trend could not pay money to buy the lawyers' votes because this action was considered a violation of morality and it contradicted freedom of voting and conscience as well....The supporters of the PLO's factions, who won in the elections concentrated on the political matters and neglected the professional issues. The Fatah supporters constituted the majority of lawyers in the association".

There were conflicting estimations about the political weight of the various Palestinian factions among the members of the association. Sa'id Tafish, a lawyer from Gaza, told the researcher that:

"representation of the Palestinian political movements in the Lawyers' Association was as follows: 30 per cent supported the Fatah Movement, 15 per cent supported the Islamic movements and Islamic ideology (i.e. Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic trends), 5 per cent supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 5 per cent backed the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), 2 percent stood by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and 43 per cent were independents, who supported the public interest, and causes which were
deemed just from their point of view."* 

A different estimation of the factional support was given to the researcher by Nahid Abu Rahmah, a Gazan lawyer. He suggested that:

"70 percent were Fatah supporters, 15 per cent supported the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 5 per cent backed up the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 3 per cent were loyal to the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and 2 per cent supported the Popular Struggle Front (PSF)."

The Palestinian factions constituted the active element in directing the association’s political behaviour and its policy. The national unity between the factions, who controlled the association was strong and above the political differences. A cooperation and coordination among various Palestinian factions existed regardless of their ideologies.

The strong position and influence of the Fatah faction within the association pushed the association to follow the PLO’s policies and instructions. In the last two elections (in 1992 and 1994) Fatah supporters won and the majority of administrative board’s members were loyal to the Fatah faction. The association was one of the "strong castles" for the Fatah supporters in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the political positions of the association were in harmony with the PLO leadership.

5.2.6. The Political Role of the Lawyers’ Association: the Lawyers’ Association, the Intifada, and the Peace Process

The focus of this part of the analysis is on the examination of the Lawyers’ Association’s attitudes and practices towards the Intifada and the peace process.

5.2.6.1. The Lawyers’ Association of the Gaza Strip and the Intifada

From the early days of the uprising (the Intifada), the Lawyers’ Association’s administrative board held a meeting and decided to initiate a strike (or a protest during which the lawyers boycotted appearances before the Israeli courts) without deciding any clear demands, or a time-limit for the strike. Later, the association was compelled to break its strike and formed a committee to defend, free of charge, the prisoners in Israeli prisons. Lawyers were busy in cases of detainees'
trials related to their activities in the *intifada*. They visited prisoners in the Israeli detention camps, and collected donations such as food stuffs, clothes, and sent them to the prisoners.  

During the *intifada*, the association was involved in political and legal issues. The Lawyers' Association participated in popular and collective activities of the *intifada* such as strikes, protests, and stay-in strikes. On the legal side, the lawyers defended the Palestinian detainees in the Israeli prisons, and made a link between the prisoners in Israeli prisons and their families outside prisons (especially between the detainees in the Israeli Oitsaiçut Detention Camp [Ansar 3] in the desert Negev, and their families).  

The association's direct involvement in the activities of the *intifada* was apparent. In December 1987, the association decided to stage an open-ended strike against the appearance of the lawyers before the Israeli military and common-law courts. The strike continued for one year (from December 1987 to December 1988).  

The Lawyers' Association interacted effectively with the activities of the *intifada*. Nazim Içwaidah, a Gazan lawyer, maintained that the association defended, free of charge, the *intifada* activists' cases before the Israeli military courts. In 1990 it was decided that each lawyer had the right to charge IS$150$ (Israeli Shekels) from the prisoners' families for each case. This sum was spent in covering costs of transportation, translation of charge sheets, visits to prisoners in the Israeli prisons, and other expenses.  

The summary trials compelled the association to skip the legal procedures before the Israeli military courts. The association was compelled to deal with a situation, in which hasty and summary trials of the *intifada*'s activists prevailed. The lawyers, on behalf of the defendants, were compelled to interact and make "deals" with the Israeli military Attorney General. The prisoners were sentenced according to recommendations and instructions from the Israeli intelligence officers (mukhabarat) to the judges of the military courts.  

The Lawyers' Association sought to counter some of the practices of activists of the *intifada*, such as the killing of some innocent persons, torture, blackmailing and collecting money from people and traders,
using forcible ways of imposing strikes, and unjust ways in solving tribal (clannish) and familial (extended family) conflicts. The association participated in meetings held by various groups and organizations to discuss these practices and to find a solution.\(^9\)

The direct involvement of the association in the \textit{intifada} was obvious. A number of the associations' members were detained because of their participation in the \textit{intifada}. The association backed the \textit{intifada} and defended the uprising's activists by forming the Committee for Defence of the Detainees.\(^10\)

The position of the Lawyers' Association towards the \textit{intifada} was, thus, supportive. The association considered the \textit{intifada} as a legitimate form of the Palestinians' struggle to achieve their goals and to attain their legitimate rights.\(^11\)

5.2.6.2. The Lawyers' Association and the Peace Process 1991-1993

When the Middle East Peace Conference was held in Madrid, the members of the administrative board of the association were predominantly pro-Fatah. However, the official position of the association towards the peace process was unclear, and the association did not issue an official statement. Ifrāh Abu Middain, the President of the association supported the peace process and participated in the negotiations for peace. A large number of the members (lawyers) supported the peace process on a personal basis. The support to the peace process continued for about two years (from October 1991 to September 1993). After the signing of the peace accords between PLO and Israel, the support for the peace process gradually began to fade away.\(^1\)

Zuhāir al-Rayis, a lawyer from Gaza, told the researcher that "the association supported the peace process". The former President of the Lawyers' Association, Ifrāh Abu Middain was chosen by the PLO to be a member of the Palestinian delegation for peace negotiations. Al-Rayis confirmed that "there was no lawyer opposed the President's participation in the peace negotiations."\(^2\)

Bashir Abu Hatab, a lawyer from Khan Yunis, told the researcher that:

"from 1991 to 1993 the majority of the administrative board's members of the Lawyers' Association represented the Fatah faction of
the PLO. As a result, the association automatically supported the peace process. Moreover, the association participated in organizing mass demonstrations to welcome the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference on their return. The association held conferences and meetings in support for the peace process.\(^3\)

The Lawyers' Association followed a constant political line which supported the peace process. \(^3\)Abd al-Rahim al-Najjar, a member of the association's administrative board told the researcher that association was supportive to the peace process.\(^4\) The same opinion was expressed by Muhammad al-Attar, a lawyer from Khan Yunis. Al-Attar told the researcher that "the association backed the peace process, which was supported by the official representative of the Palestinian people i.e. the PLO".\(^5\)

Fayiz Abu Rahman, the President of the association, told the researcher that "the Lawyers' Association supported the peace process".\(^6\) Abu Rahman's son Nahid (also a lawyer) expressed the same position, and told the researcher that "the Lawyers' Association supported the peace process, and participated in the peace process".\(^7\)

Faraj al-Sarraf, a founder member of the association, also told the researcher that the association supported the peace process and pointed out that Ifraih Abu Middain, the ex-President of the Lawyers' Association was appointed as a member of the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations. Moreover, a number of lawyers took part in the Taba and Cairo negotiations as members of the Palestinian Legal Committee which participated in the negotiations.\(^8\) "Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Nasir, the ex-Secretary of the Lawyers' Association told the researcher "the recent President of the association (Fayiz Abu Rahman) was a peace believer and supporter".\(^9\)

Not all the members of the Lawyers' Association, however, supported the peace process and the peace agreements between PLO and Israeli government. There was a significant sector of the lawyers, members of the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip, who did not support the process. They argued that the process was dictated on the Palestinian and Arab parties as a result of the strategic imbalance in the Middle East. This sector represented about 20 percent of the association's members. They tended to support the political positions of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), the Islamic Jihad Movement, and independent Islamists. In addition, lawyers who were in the leftist and rejectionist
factions also expressed opposition towards the peace process.\textsuperscript{10}

5.2.7. Assessment

The Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip undertook various roles on the societal, political and economic levels. Consequently, the impact of its activities was felt across the community.

The association demonstrated its involvement in politics, supporting the \textit{intifada} and defending its activists before the Israeli military courts. The association, moreover, participated in strikes, protests, sit-in protests, and demonstrations protesting against Israeli occupation.

The hostile Israeli political attitude towards the association was clear. The lawyers (members of the association) were exposed to Israeli measures and obstacles which were put in their way to perform their jobs.

The Palestinian factions competed to control the structure and policies of the Lawyers' Association. Supporters of the PLO’s factions, Islamists, leftists, and independents sought to influence various activities and policies of the associations.

The majority of the association’s members supported the peace process. But there was a significant sector of members who opposed the peace process and the peace agreements between the PLO and Israel.

5.3.0. Conclusion

From the above mentioned analysis and the extended interviews with members of the Red Crescent Society (RCS) and the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip (LAGS), it became clear that the two organizations showed a high degree of involvement in political matters.

The RCS and the LAGS offered their services to residents of the Gaza Strip. They supported, directly and indirectly, the activists of the \textit{intifada} by giving financial aid to their families, and sent clothes and food stuffs to the prisoners in Israeli prisons.

Most of the RCS's members opposed the peace process and the agreements
which were signed between the PLO leadership and the Israeli government. The majority of the administrative board's members of the Lawyers' Association supported the peace process.

The Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip and the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip underwent a politicization process. Gradually, the two organizations became "political shops" reflecting the ideas and ideologies of various Palestinian factions.
### Appendix No. 1

The Founders of the RCS in the Gaza Strip 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Dr. Haidar Abd al-Shafi</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Abu Sittah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Eng. Mustafa Murtaja</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Dawud al-Sayigh</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mahmud Nijim</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Rashad al-Shawwa</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Wadi al-Tarzi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Dr. Munib Abu Ghazalah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Faraj al-Sarraf</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Dr. Riyad al-Za‘nun</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Appendix No. 2

The Administrative Board Members of the RCS in the Gaza Strip 10/5/1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Is‘af al-Burnu</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Abd al-Hayi al-Husaini</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Dawud al-Sayigh</td>
<td>Vice-Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Jabir al-Nabahin</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mahmud Nijim</td>
<td>Deputy Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Zuhair al-Surani</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ghalib Zimmu</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sayyid Bakir</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Zakria Mikki</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Muhammad Mas‘ud</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Suliman al-Astal</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>‘Umar Sabrah</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Faraj al-Sarraf</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Wadi al-Tarazi</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Laila Iqlaibu</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Abu Daqqah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Mustafa Murtaja</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** An interview with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Abu al-Qaraya, Director-Assistant of the Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip, 3/7/1994.
### Appendix No. 3

The Administrative Board Members of the RCS in the Gaza Strip 10/5/1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Haidar ِّأبَد al-Shafi</td>
<td>President</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>First Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zuhair al-Surani</td>
<td>Second Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Isاف al-Burnu</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>ِّأبَد al-Latif Iبايد</td>
<td>Vice-Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Dawud al-Sayigh</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Yassir Ibsaisu</td>
<td>Deputy Treasurer</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Yusrah al-Barbari</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Laila Iqailbu</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Zakria Mikki</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Yahya al-Hallaq</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Muhammad Masعd</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Khalid al-Qidrah</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Muhammad Zain al-Diin</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>ِّأبَد al-Hamid Taqqash</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>ِّأبَد al-Abadlah</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>ِّأبَد Sabrah</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Yunis al-Jaru</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Najjar</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>ِّأبَد al-Fattah Ihmaج</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Salih Zaqqut</td>
<td>Member</td>
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### Appendix No. 4

The Administrative Board Members of the RCS in the Gaza Strip 1980-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Haidar ِّأبَد al-Shafi</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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<td>First Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zuhair al-Surani</td>
<td>Second Vice-President</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Yassir Ibsaisu</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Dawud Zaqqut</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Dawud al-Sayigh</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Salih Zaqqut</td>
<td>Treasurer (Passed away)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Kamil Shaاث</td>
<td>Vice-Treasurer</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Muhammad Zain al-Diin</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ibrahim al-Yazuri</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Isاف al-Burnu</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Yusra al-Barbari</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Muhammad Masعd</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Yunis al-Jaru</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Najjar</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Khadir Sbanan</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Fuwen Farah</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Khalid Abu Jabir</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Sami Abu Shابان</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Fawzi al-Saqqa</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Abu Daqqah</td>
<td>Member</td>
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</table>

Section Two: the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip: Appendices

Appendix No. 1
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 10/8/1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Faraj al-Sarraf</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Faisal al-Husaini</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Faraj al-Shurafa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Yunis al-Jaru</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
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Source: The Archives of the Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza.

Appendix No. 2
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 18/5/1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Faraj al-Sarraf</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Abu Daqqah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Faraj al-Shurafa</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Riyad Qaradaya</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Abd al-Ra'uf al-Halabi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Umar I'bad</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Archives of the Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza. See also: Jam'iyat Naqabat al-Muhamin fi Qita' Ghazzah (The Lawyers' Association for the Gaza Strip), Al-Dustur wa-al-Nizam al-'Asasi (The Constitution and Bylaw), Gaza, 1979, p. 44.

Appendix No. 3
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 8/4/1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu Sharar</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Abu Daqqah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Faraj al-Shurafa</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sami Ijnainah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Adil Khalifah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Yusuf al-'Absi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Archives of the Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza.
### Appendix No. 4
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 17/4/1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Khalid al-Qidrah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Yunis al-Jaru</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Riyad Qaradaya</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ḥāli al-Naṣṣur</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Salah Abu Zaid</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Diraiwi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** The Archives of the Department of Interior Affairs, *Civil Administration*, Gaza.

### Appendix No. 5
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 3/3/1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ibrahim al-Saqqa</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Abu Daqqah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Nazim Iwaidah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Khalid Jabir</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ḥādil Khalifah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Muhammad Aba Sha'ban</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Fu'ad Ishnawrah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** The Archives of the Department of Interior Affairs, *Civil Administration*, Gaza.

### Appendix No. 6
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 1/3/1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Yunis al-Jaru</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ḥādil Khalifah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Diraiwi</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Ghul</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Muhammad Aba Sha'ban</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Salah Abu Zaid</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** The Archives of the Department of Interior Affairs, *Civil Administration*, Gaza.
### Appendix No. 7
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 27/3/1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ifraih Abu Middan</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ibrahim Abu Daqqah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Khalid al-Qidrah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Salah Abu Za'id</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mahmud Abu Hasirah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Zaki al-kilani</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ali al-Naqq</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Archives of the Department of Interior Affairs, Civil Administration, Gaza.*

### Appendix No. 8
The Administrative Board Members of the Lawyers' Association 1994-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fayiz Abu Rahmah</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Nazim al-waidah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Fayiz Izyarah</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ahmad al-Imghani</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahim al-Najjar</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Lidawi</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Subhiyah Abu Mizyid</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: An Interview with Fayiz Izyarah, the Secretary of the Lawyers' Association, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 1/6/1994.*
Footnotes and References

Section One: The Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip

5.1. Introduction


The founders of the Red Crescent Society of the Gaza Strip are:
1. Haidar ¯Abd al-Shafi – President
2. Ibrahim Abu Sittah – Vice-President
3. Mustafa Murtaja – Secretary
4. Dawud al-Sayigh – Treasurer
5. Mahmud Nijim – Member
6. Rashad al-Shawwa – Member
7. Wadi‘ al-Tarzi – Member
8. Fayiz Abu Rahmah – Member
9. Dr. Munib Abu Ghazalah – Member
10. Faraj al-Sarraf – Member
11. Dr. Riyad al-Za‘nun – Member

5.1.1. The Emergence of the Red Crescent Society of the Strip.


3. Ibid., p. 2.

5.1.2. The Organizational Structure of the RCS

1. An interview with Dr. Haidar ¯Abd al-Shafi, the Head of Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at the RCS’s headquarters, Gaza, 15/6/1994.


4. Ibid., p. 4.

5. Ibid., p. 18.


5.1.2.2. The Administrative Board of the RCS


2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
6. Ibid., p. 6.

5.1.2.3. The Executive Bureau of the RCS


4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

5.1.2.4. The Sub-Committees of the RCS


5.1.3. Aims of the RCS

1. Jamʿiyat al-Hilal al-Ahmar fi Qitaʿ Ghazzah (The Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip), Taqrir (a Report) Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 3.

2. Jamʿiyat al-Hilal al-Ahmar fi Qitaʿ Ghazzah (The Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip), Al-Kitab al-Sanawi (The Year Book), Gaza, No Publisher, 1974, p. 3.

3. Jamʿiyat al-Hilal al-Ahmar fi Qitaʿ Ghazzah (The Red Crescent
Activities of the RCS

1. Jam'iyyat al-Hilal al-Ahmar fi Qita'c Ghazzah (The Red Crescent Society of the Gaza Strip), Taqrir (a Report), Gaza, No Publisher, No date, p. 3. An interview with Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, the Head of the Red Crescent Society, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 25 May 1994.


3. Ibid., p. 1.

4. An interview with Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, the Head of the RCS, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the RCS (at his office), Gaza, 4/6/1994.

5. An interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Abu al-Qaraya, an administrative officer, the interview was implemented at the RCS's headquarters, Gaza, 27/7/1994.


8. Ibid., p. 5. An interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Abu al-Qaraya, an administrative officer at the RCS, the interview was implemented at the RCS's headquarters, Gaza, 25/5/1994.


Activities in the Cultural Field.

1. An interview with Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, the Head of the RCS, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the RCS (at his office), Gaza, 4/6/1994.


3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. Ibid., p. 9.

Social Activities of the RCS


5.1.5.1. The Relation between the Society and the Israeli Authorities.

1. Interview with Dr. Haidar Ābd al-Shafi, Gaza, 25 May 1994.


3. Interview with Yusra al-Barbari, the Red Crescent Administrative Board’s member, and the head of the Palestine Women’s Union, the interview was conducted at the headquarters of the Palestine Women’s Union, Gaza, 25/5/1994.


5. Interview with Dr. Haidar Ābd al-Shafi, Gaza, 25 May 1994. Interview with Ābd al-Āziz Abu al-Qaraya, the administrative-assistant of the President of the Red Crescent Society, Gaza, 4/6/1994. An interview with Kamil Shālah, an administrative board member of the Red Crescent Society, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 4/6/1964.

5.1.5.2. The Relations between the RCS and Palestinian Movements.

1. Interview with Zuhair al-Surani, Vice-President of the Red Crescent Society, the interview was conducted at his office at the headquarters of the Central and High Courts, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

2. Ibid.

3. Interview with Mr. Sami Abu Sha‘ban, the Vice-President of the Central Committee of the Red Crescent Societies in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, the interview was performed at his bookshop, Umar al-Mukhtar St., Gaza, 3/9/1994.


5. Interview with Sami Abu Sha'ban, *Ibid.* As'ad al-Saftawi, a head-teacher, was assassinated in Gaza in 1993.

6. Interview with Fairuz Arafah, a librarian-assistant, the RCS, the interview was conducted at the library at the headquarters of the RCS, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

7. Interview with 'Abd al-Malik al-Itluli, a librarian, the interview was conducted in the library at the the RCS’s headquarters, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

8. Interview with Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, the Head of the RCS, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 20/7/1994.

5.1.6.1. The RCS and the intifada.

1. Interview with Sami Abu Sha'ban, the Vice-President of the Central Committee of the Red Crescent Societies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his bookshop, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

2. Interview with Sana' (She preferred to remain anonymous), a Secretary of the President of the RCS, the interview was conducted at the RCS’s headquarters, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

3. Interview with Fairuz Arafah, a library-assistant of the RCS, the interview was implemented in the RCS’s library, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

4. Interview with Zuhair al-Surani, Vice-President of the RCS, the interview was conducted at his office at the headquarters of the courts, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

5. Interview with 'Abd al-Malik al-Itluli, a Librarian of the RCS, the interview was performed at the RCS's library, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

6. Interview with Nabilah al-Kafarnah, a Secretary in the RCS responsible for organizing family visits to the prisoners in Israel prisons, the interview was performed at her office, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

5.1.6.2. The RCS and the Peace Process.

1. Interview conducted with Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, the President of the RCS, the interview was implemented at the RCS’s headquarters, Gaza, 2/6/1994.


3. Interview with Kamil Sha'ath, an administrative board member of the RCS, and with 'Abd al-'Aziz Abu al-Qaraya, an administrative director of the RCS, the interview was conducted at the RCS headquarters, Gaza, 4/6/1994.

4. Interview with Yusrah al-Barbari, the RCS's administrative board member, the interview was performed at the headquarters of the
Palestine Women's Union, Gaza, 25/5/1994. Interview with Sana' (she preferred to remain anonymous), a secretary working at the RCS's President's office, the interview was conducted at the RCS headquarters, Gaza, 3/9/1994.

5. Interview with *Abd al- Aziz Abu al-Qaraya, an administrative assistant of the RCS, the interview was conducted at the RCS headquarters, Gaza, 4/6/1994. Interview with *Abd al-Malik al-Itluli, a librarian working at the library of the RCS, Op. Cit.

Section Two: the Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip: Footnotes and References.

The Emergence of the Lawyers' Association.


2. The first conference of the Arab lawyers was held in 1944. An interview with Zuhair al-Rayis, a founder member of the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his office, Dar al- Ulum (The House of Sciences) for Publishing and Printing, 3/5/1994.


4. An interview with lawyer, Faraj al-Sarraf, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza-al-Rimal, 1/6/1994.


5.2.2. The Organizational Structure of the Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip.

The General Assembly of the Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip.


The Administrative Board of the Lawyers' Association.


The Sub-committees of the Lawyers' Association.


5.2.3. Objectives of the Lawyers' Association

1. An interview with Abd al-Rahman Abu Nasir, an ex-Secretary of the Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 30/4/1994.


3. An interview with Sharhabil al-Za°im, a lawyer and a legal Consultant working with the UNRWA, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 7/5/1994.

5.2.4. Activities of the Lawyers' Association of the Gaza Strip.


2. Ibid., p. 17.

3. An interview with Sharhabil al-Za°im, a consultant and lawyer, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 23/7/1994.


5. Ibid., p. 17.

6. Ibid., p. 17.

7. Ibid., p. 17.

8. Ibid., p. 17.


5.2.6.1. The Relation between the Lawyers' Association and the Israeli Authorities.

1. An interview with lawyer Sa°id Tafish, the interview was conducted

2. An interview with SaMED Tafish, and Sana’ Abu Middain, two lawyers working with UNRWA, the interview was conducted at their office at the headquarters of the UNRWA, Gaza, 27/8/1994.

3. An interview with lawyer Nazim Icwaidah, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 30/5/1994.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. An interview with Fayiz Abu Rahmah, the President of the Lawyers’ Association, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza-Rimal, 23/8/1994.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. An interview with lawyer cAbd al-Rahman al-Farra, the interview was conducted at his office, the Centre for Defence of Human Rights, Khan Yunis, 1/9/1944.

10. An interview with lawyer cAbd al-Rahman Abu al-Nasir, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 30/4/1994. An interview with lawyer Nahid Abu Rahmah, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 15/7/1994.

11. An interview with lawyer cAbd al-Rahim al-Najar, the interview was conducted at his office, Khan Yunis, 29/5/1994.

5.2.6.2. The Relations between the Association and Palestinian Movements.


2. An interview with lawyer Nazim Icwaidah, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 30/5/1994.

3. Ibid.


5.2.7.1. The Lawyers’ Association and the Intifada.


2. Ibid.

4. Observations by the researcher when he was an administrative detainee in the Israeli military detention camp Qitzi'ut in the desert Negev (1989-1991).

5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


5.2.7.2. The Lawyers' Association and the Peace Process.

1. An interview with Tafish and Abu Middain, Ibid.


3. An interview with Bashir Abu Hatab, a lawyer from Khan Yunis, the interview was conducted at office of Palestinian Lawyers for Human Rights, Khan Yunis, 5/9/1994.


5. An interview with Muhammad al-'Attar, a lawyer from Khan Yunis, the interview was conducted at his office, Khan Yunis, 4/9/1994.


8. An interview with Faraj al-Sarraf, a founder member of the Lawyers' Association in the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 1/6/1994.


10. An interview with Yunis al-Jaru, a member of the administrative board of the Lawyers' Association, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 1/9/1994.

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Chapter Six
The Economic Role of the Associations in the Gaza Strip: a Review and Case Studies

6.0. Introduction

Through twenty six years of military occupation, Israel created in the Gaza Strip an economy dependent on, and subservient to, its own. In the predominantly land-based economy of the Gaza Strip, control of land and water resources was the basis for political and economic control, and vice versa.

The main obstacles which faced economic development in the Gaza Strip were related to structural restrictions generated by a complex network of military orders which covered and controlled all facets of economic activity in the Gaza Strip. Israeli laws were designed to serve the objectives of the occupier in manipulating and transferring the Palestinian economy into a state of dependency.

The Israeli laws and policies have been instrumental in tightening Israel's control over land and water, restricting permits for industrial projects, creating a situation of unequal competition between the Palestinian and Israeli economies, and forcing more than half of the Palestinian workforce to become cheap migrant labour working for the Israeli agricultural, industrial, and services sectors. A meager local market and weak purchasing power, coupled with restrictions on exports and imports, restructured the economy of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli "Cantonization" of the occupied territories, closure and isolation of the Gaza Strip, and frequent curfews had devastating effects on the economy.

Based on this background, Palestinian (and non-Palestinian) organizations emerged in an attempt to fill gaps, and to participate in the economic development. Most of these organizations participated in fund-raising and financial support to economic projects in the Gaza Strip.

This chapter focuses on reviewing the organizations which were active in the field of economic development in the Gaza Strip. The chapter consists of two sections: the first presents a general review of the organ-
izations, which played a role in the economic field in the Gaza Strip, the second examines the economic activities of two lending organizations working in the Gaza Strip - the Arab Development and Technical Corporation (TDC), and the Economic Development Group (EDG). Both were active in loan programmes.
Section One


After 1967, the Palestinian economy in the Gaza Strip was subjected to Israeli control. Nowhere was Israeli's control more pervasive than in the sphere of the Palestinian economy and economic development, precisely because economic independence would fuel political independence. "Security" reasons provided the Israeli authorities with a convenient excuse to reject a whole range of activities, from planting citrus to (themselves) not publishing an official budget for the Gaza Strip.

A number of organizations and associations involved in economic activities attempted to contribute to the economic development of the Gaza Strip. To provide an overview of the organizations, the researcher examined a number of associations and non-governmental organizations active in the economic field. The organizations included agricultural credit and marketing organizations, and organizations involved in non-agricultural activities such as housing, loan programmes, tourism, industry, and other economic activities. Because there was a strong relationship and interdependence between Palestinian organizations and non-indigenous organizations, and because most of the non-indigenous organizations were mainly staffed by Palestinian employees, a number of the latter are also included in the review.

The analysis deals with the organizations separately. Each organization is analyzed through studying the process of its establishment, its administration, its aims and its activities. An assessment of the activities of each organization is also presented.

6.1.1. Al-Zahra' Centre for Studies and Research

In 1990, the al-Zahra' Centre for Studies and Research was established in Gaza as a branch of the head office in Jerusalem. In 1992, the Gaza branch began to operate independently from the head office in Jerusalem.

The administrative board consisted of the Director and a total of 6 staff members in the office; 2 feasibility study officers; 2 research-
ers; and 1 secretary. A 6-member committee was responsible for setting the policies and programmes of the centre.¹

The primary aims of the organization were: informing people in decision-making positions about the situation in various sectors of the Gaza Strip’s economy; providing information about life in the Gaza Strip to society at large; creating a platform for various research institutions to discuss matters of relevance and importance to the residents of the Gaza Strip; and offering unemployed researchers the opportunity to obtain practical knowledge through work given through the centre.²

The primary donors to the al-Zahra’ Centre were UNRWA, the West Bank and Jerusalem offices of the centre, private companies, individuals, enterprises that requested the services of the centre on a commercial basis and the Canada Fund (an official Canadian funding organization).³

The centre carried out a number of programmes. Workshops on economy, development, finance and planning were among its activities. In cooperation with the Save the Children Fund, the centre conducted a survey on Bait Hanun: an economic profile. Various studies were carried out on behalf of public service organizations, such as the Palestinian Workers Trade Union Federation.⁴

The al-Zahra’ Centre for Studies and Research also implemented feasibility studies in the fields of industry, agriculture, handicrafts, printing and publishing in the Gaza Strip. For example, the Centre carried out studies on the curfew through the Gulf War and its effect on the Gaza Strip’s economy; home production; traditional industry; car-maintenance industry; the textile and clothing industry; fishing and hunting; and Israel’s economic policy towards the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.⁵

The centre was active in working with other local and international NGOs. UNRWA had a good working relationship with the al-Zahra’ Centre. It placed a graduate trainee with the centre. The trainee worked on feasibility studies.

The centre, like most Palestinian research organizations in the Occupied Territories, was much better at descriptive than at analytical work. The research papers which were produced by the centre tended to be shallow
and did little more than offer a snapshot of the topic under discussion.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{6.1.2. Agricultural Cooperative Association for Strawberries, Vegetables and Flowers in the Gaza Strip}

The Agricultural Cooperative Association for Strawberries, Vegetables and Flowers in the Gaza Strip (ACASVF) started its activity in 1977. The staff consisted of five members: an administrator, a store-keeper, a loan officer, and a driver. The board of the association was composed of seven members and it held a meeting every second week. The association had 700 members.\textsuperscript{7}

The primary aim of the association was to assist farmers to improve and to export their products.

The association received donations and financial support from other organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA); the Cooperative Development Project (CDP); and the Welfare Association (in Geneva). It earned income through the membership fees which was US$150 per member.\textsuperscript{8}

ACASVF undertook a variety of activities such as offering help to the farmers to export their agricultural products (through the Israeli Agricultural Export Company [AGREXCO], through contacts in Amman, and through contracts with traders in Europe); giving information to the farmers, concerning which crops would be bought by the importers and how to increase cultivation of these crops; offering seedlings to farmers at a price 50\% lower than the commercial prices; and offering a cheap-rate transportation to the farmers' products (by a transport truck and a cold-store truck).\textsuperscript{9}

In 1990, the association launched loan and grant programmes. A revolving loan fund programme of about US$1 million was established, and was to run for a 5-year period. Any of the 700 members of the association was entitled to receive support, in the form of a loan of about US$2,000-3,000. The loans carried 8\% service interest; they had to be paid back within 5 years.\textsuperscript{10}

The ACASVF gave support and advice to newly established cooperatives,
such as those in Bani Suhaila and Rafah. The advice included practical training, participating in meetings, and reporting and presenting lectures about how to run a cooperative.\textsuperscript{11}

6.1.3. Cooperative Development Project (CDP)

The Cooperative Development Project (CDP) office was opened in 1990 in Gaza. The Gaza office consisted of 3 staff members: a consultant, an office Assistant and a Secretary. The Consultant coordinated the CDP's projects, but depended to a high degree on the staff in the Jerusalem office. The Jerusalem office had 18 staff members and had been opened in 1986.\textsuperscript{12} The primary donor to the CDP was USAID, and only agricultural registered cooperatives might be beneficiaries.

The aim of the CDP was to enable Palestinian cooperative organizations to improve their capabilities in order to strengthen the agricultural sector. The programmes of the organization were initially all of a technical, not financial, nature.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1992, a loans programme was planned and implemented. Loans were given to cooperatives that agreed to work according to democratic practices, open membership, proper accounts and audits, and annual elections.\textsuperscript{14}

The CDP extended assistance to a number of cooperatives in the Gaza Strip: the Bait Lahya Strawberry Cooperative; the Cooperative of the Agricultural Society of Animal Husbandry; and the Khan Yunis Agricultural Cooperative. It also issued daily market reports on the agricultural prices, and wholesale markets in the Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1993, the CDP planned to begin a small loans programme for home improvement. Loans were to be for less than US$10,000 and paid back within 20 years.\textsuperscript{16} Up to the end of 1993, the planned programme was not implemented.

The CDP policy was not set by Palestinians but by USAID. CDP only worked with officially registered cooperatives. This policy deprived non-registered cooperatives from benefiting from the CDP's services.
6.1.4. Cooperation for Development (CD)

Cooperation for Development (CD) was one of the non-indigenous NGOs which worked in loan programmes in the Gaza Strip. The main headquarters was in London. The CD Gaza office was opened in 1975 and was composed of 7 members: 1 office coordinator, 4 project development officers (3 for income generating projects, and 1 for export oriented activities), and 1 finance and administrative clerk.\(^{17}\)

The primary aim of the CD was to develop the society through financial support to individual projects. The programmes of the organization included: loans programme to small businesses and agriculture; housing loans; and loans for promotion of agricultural export.\(^{18}\)

From 1975 when it began its activity, up to the early months of 1994, the CD financed 223 projects in the Gaza Strip. These were distributed geographically as follows: Rafah 45, Khan Yunis 28, Central Area 22, Gaza 102, Jabalia 16, and Bait Lahya 10.\(^{19}\) Table no. 18 demonstrates the distribution of the projects by sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table No. 18</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CD-Financed Projects in the Gaza Strip 1975-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Husbandry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horticulture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Interview with Jamal Nawajhah, the CD office Manager, Gaza, the interview was conducted at his office, 17/9/1994.

The loans had a grace period of 6-10 months and should be paid back within a maximum of 4 years with an interest rate of 7-9%.

About half of money for housing in the Gaza Strip, which was given by the EC, was channelled through the Gaza office, which built some 100 apartments and then turned them over to the Palestinian Housing Council, which was responsible for deciding who would buy them.\(^{20}\)
Agricultural export promotion loans were provided by the CD. The primary aim was to offer loans to individual farmers in the agricultural sector to encourage export to the EC. The CD worked with the Economic Development Group (EDG) to support exporters through 2 vegetable packing plants.\textsuperscript{21}

6.1.5. Citrus Producers Union (CPU)

The Citrus Producers Union (CPU) was established in Gaza in 1972. It was composed of 4,500 registered members. The Board of the CPU consisted of a Chairman, a Secretary General, and 4 staff members: 2 agricultural engineers, 1 accountant, and 1 secretary.\textsuperscript{22}

The primary aims of the CPU were to protect citrus groves and the citrus industry in the Gaza Strip, and to improve the agricultural and financial situation for the citrus growers in the Strip (the citrus sector was the backbone of the Gaza Strip economy).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the CPU initiated a number of programmes to support unemployed agronomists. First, it established an agricultural nursery, which was run by a number of agronomists under the supervision of the union. Second, a bee-hive project was established. 150 hives were distributed among 6 agronomists. Third, the union supported the farmers in their efforts to change to packing citrus fruit in paper cartons, from much more expensive wooden crates. Fourth, a laboratory was established for water and soil studies. Fifth, 72 tractors worth US$5,000 each were sold to growers at a non-commercial rate. Sixth, the Union gave legal support and advice concerning legal issues facing the growers.\textsuperscript{23} Seventh, the CPU gave revolving loans to citrus growers, farmers, and agronomists. The loans came to about US$7,000 each for citrus growers and farmers, and about $3,500 each for agronomists (for beehives and greenhouses). The revolving loan interest rate was 1.5%-2% and loans were to be paid back within 8 years, with a grace period of 3 years.\textsuperscript{24}

Although there were 6,500 grove owners in the Gaza Strip and most of them were members of the CPU,\textsuperscript{25} it failed to promote the export of citrus produce. Since 1975 up to 1993 citrus exports were decreasing and the citrus-cultivated land was steadily diminishing. The CPU represented
mainly the big grove owners and neglected the small grove owners.

6.1.6. Agricultural Cooperative Society for Citrus Marketing

The Agricultural Cooperative Society for Citrus Marketing was established in Gaza in 1974. It had a director and chairman of the board and there were 3 staff members: one accountant and two agronomists. The board consisted of nine members. The Gaza Strip's farmers and growers with more than 5 dunums of land were eligible to be members of the cooperative. The primary aim of the society was to improve the financial situation for its members through offering better services, such as fertilizers, insecticides, and marketing assistance and supporting poor farmers. The society's programmes were also intended to support farmers by providing them with picking equipment and by training for pickers during the harvesting season; and to make available improved cultivation techniques, improved fertilizers, etc., in order to improve and facilitate the marketing and export of citrus produce. Only members of the cooperative received its support.

The cooperative ran a modern drip-irrigation project, financed by the UNDP. The project, which cost US$0.5 million, provided irrigation systems free of charge to eligible farmers. The project was developed in two phases: in the first phase (November 1991-June 1992) there were 240 beneficiaries and covered only farmers with less than five dunums; the second phase (July 1992-July 1993), at another US$0.5 million, supported a maximum of 160 beneficiaries covering farmers with 6-10 dunums of land who worked their land themselves.

The cooperative supervised the Gaza Juice Factory which was inaugurated by Chairman Yasir Arafat on July 1, 1994. The factory was financed by the UNDP (US$4.3 million) and the Italian government (US$9 million). In addition, US$4 million was raised locally by selling shares of the juice factory.

The cooperative was the first in Gaza which included small citrus growers and facilitated their access to European markets. There was some competition between the cooperative and the Citrus Producers Union (which represented the large growers).
6.1.7. Gaza Livestock Cooperative

The Gaza Livestock Cooperative was established in September 1990. Its board consisted of seven members, and there were 4 staff members: 1 administrator, 1 part-time accountant, and two veterinarians.\(^{32}\)

The cooperative aimed at developing the livestock sector in the Gaza Strip. Veterinary services to livestock holders were introduced and a daily programme started in 1991, with veterinarians visiting farmers on a regular basis. During 1991 ANERA gave US$27,000 for this programme, for salaries, a mobile clinic, and a vehicle for the clinic. The Save the Children Fund gave US$12,000 for ultra-sound equipment and also for the mobile veterinary clinics.\(^{33}\)

In 1993, plans for a loan programme of US$150,000 to dairy-farmers were made. The minimum loan sum was US$1,500, and the maximum US$3,000 per farmer. The loan was to be paid back with 8% administrative fee and the pay-back period was 2 years, with a 6 month grace period.

The cooperative was assisted in the training of its veterinarians by the Dutch government. One veterinarian was sent to Holland for 6 months of training. Two veterinaries had been to Israel for training in insemination of livestock, financed by ANERA.\(^{34}\)

6.1.8. Shu’un al-Mar’ah Centre (Women’s Affairs)

The Shu’un al-Mar’ah (Women’s Affairs) Centre was started in 1989 in Nablus, and in August 1991 the Gaza branch was established. There was a steering committee for both the West Bank and Gaza centres, consisting of 7 women.\(^{35}\)

The organization aimed at training women in social science research and writing skills, and to build a bridge linking women academics, the women’s movements, and women at the grassroots.\(^{36}\)

In 1992 the Shu’un al-Mar’ah started a research training programme in two main fields: research methodology and writing. Participants were paid a small stipend by the centre for one year. Courses of various sorts, in cooperation with other organizations, were run. Among these
were English language (offered in cooperation with the British Council), management, creative writing (poetry), and short stories writing. The course lasted for four months.\textsuperscript{37}

The Women's Affairs Centre cooperated with several Gaza-based organizations, such as the Gaza Community Mental Health Centre, the Arab Thought Forum, and the al-Zahra' Centre for Studies and Research.

The centre maintained an impressive degree of broad-based political support in a very factionalized environment. However, the capacity of the Centre to grow was limited by the relatively low experience of both the administrator and the women trainees.\textsuperscript{38}

6.1.9. Save the Children Federation

The Save the Children Federation (SCF) is an American NGO working in the Gaza Strip. It was established in 1978. Staff members consisted of an engineering coordinator, a health and education coordinator, three agricultural coordinators, three loan programme coordinators, two assistant coordinators, two assistants, one secretary, and one finance and administration officer.\textsuperscript{39}

The Save the Children Federation aimed at promoting socio-economic development in the Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{40} The programmes of the organization included infrastructure (e.g. water, sanitary projects, water tanks, sewerage, Subsurface Draining Technique [SDT]). The SCF's policy was to cover 50\% of a project's cost (as a grant). The average cost for 50\% of one project (in 1989) was US$350. The health and education programmes amounted in the latest published (1993) budget to US$80,000-100,000. Support to pre-schools for renovations, furniture, and educational materials were given by the SCF. The average cost for 50\% of one project, in 1993, was $2,000. The Save the Children Federation also provided a loan programme for greenhouses, animal husbandry and other agricultural activities. This was started in 1986 to support individuals and groups of farmers. The loans were in the range of US$1,000-7,000. The interest was about 6\% per annum. Sponsorship for Rafah Youth Activity Centre and (Zaitun) private schools in Gaza was provided.\textsuperscript{41}

The SCF began a significant transformation process in 1987. Before that time, they were seen as working very closely with the Israeli author-
ities on the one hand, and with a limited group of Palestinians also close to the Israeli authorities on the other. After the uprising began, the SCF intensified its efforts to shift its target towards local organizations which were loyal to the national movement. This decision was well received in Gaza, and the popular organizations which had boycotted the SCF began to work with the organization.42

6.1.10. Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC)

The Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) were established in 1983. The Gaza office consisted of a director with his two deputies. In the field there were 20 employees plus 15 volunteers with an additional 50 farmer-volunteers. The Board consisted of 7 members.43

The primary aims of PARC were to improve the situation of farmers in the Gaza Strip, to help local agricultural committees to establish their own self-help structures, and to support unemployed agronomists. The programmes of the organization included crop production, animal production, household economy, project development, research and experimental work, market development, professional development, education and training, and emergency relief. In 1990, the PARC started a small-loans programme aimed at the agricultural sector (the loans were for the purchase of cows). Each farmer received a loan of US$2,000 and the repayment was over a 2-year period.44

A number of farmers were given the opportunity to purchase a special net for field cultivation (or a screen for greenhouse cultivation) to help combat white flies (the net/screen helped keep the white fly population off and so this reduced the amount of pesticides used in combating the pest).45

In 1992, PARC started a tree-planting project in the Gaza Strip with the support of French NGOs. The organization planned to plant one million trees (in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). 10,000 seedlings were planted in the Gaza Strip. The trees were of a kind that needs very little water, such as peaches, plums, etc. PARC also invested in greenhouses which were turned over to unemployed agronomists. In return for this, the agronomists worked two days per week as volunteers in the PARC’s agricultural extension services. The PARC also ran a successful commercial seedling nursery in the Zaitun area (in Gaza city).46
The PARC offered training programmes for agronomists and women. It organized a one year practical training programme for agronomists to teach them how to be agricultural extension agents. Training programmes in food production for women's cooperatives also were introduced. Some women obtained training on how to run projects. The women were given hatcheries to run at their houses. The PARC had 7 training centres (in the Gaza Strip 2 and 5 in the West Bank) with about 25 women in each. The training was free of charge.47

Some of the PARC's projects, particularly the agricultural extension services, nurseries and greenhouse projects which were run by agronomists, were successful. Others, such as home production and animal breeding, failed.

6.1.11. Union of the Agricultural Work Committees

The Union of the Agricultural Work Committees in the Occupied Territories started their activities in the Gaza Strip in 1990. The board consisted of seven members: a finance officer, a fieldwork follow-up officer, a public relations officer, a projects officer, a studies officer, and two members working in any other field. The board was elected in 1993 and it met every week. Elections for the board were held every second year and were carried out via the local agricultural committees.48

The primary aims of the organization were to strengthen the tie between Palestinian farmers and their land (so as to make Israeli confiscation of land more difficult), to plant the spirit of cooperation and collectiveness among farmers, to increase crop varieties grown in the Gaza Strip, and to spread out peak harvest seasons by introducing different rotations.49

The Union of Agricultural Work Committees performed a variety of activities. The union paid the costs of greenhouses' construction to 50 farmers. New and different seedlings were used and farmers were trained in how to cultivate these seedlings. In 1991, the beehives project was started in al-Nusairat sponsored by UNDP for one year, then by the Union itself. In 1992, the Union constructed a poultry farm in Jabalia with the financial support of the Save the Children Fund. 85 per cent of the
profit accrued to the labourers and 15 percent to the veterinarian. The labourers were chosen by the local agricultural committee. The selection was based on the criteria that an appointee should be unemployed, not able to enter Israel for work, and with some knowledge in poultry farming. The Union gave help in establishing a nursery in Khan Yunis, budgeted for US$120,000.\textsuperscript{50}

The Union of Agricultural Work Committees extended assistance to other organizations. It provided the Save the Children Fund with information for their contacts with farmers. It also carried out field work on pesticide use for a study, which was conducted by Bir Zait university centre of environmental health and workers safety. During the intifada the Union worked hard to expand its services to small farmers.

The Union was the only organization in the Gaza Strip that undertook land reclamation projects, reclaiming sandy land, especially near Israeli settlements, and rendering it cultivable.

The capacity of the Union to expand its programmes and services was relatively limited by lack of experienced staff, planning capacity, and inadequate funding sources.\textsuperscript{51}

6.1.12. Center for Development Consultancy (CDC)

In 1985, the Center for Development Consultancy (CDC) was established in Gaza as the "implementing office" of the Welfare Association, whose head office was in Geneva. The Association was established in 1983. Its main goal was to provide development assistance for the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories, in the areas of health, education, economic development, culture and the arts. The Welfare Association started giving loans to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in 1985.\textsuperscript{52}

The CDC had a Manager who ran the loans programme and 2 staff members: a field officer who was responsible for programmes with local organizations, and a Secretary.\textsuperscript{53}

The CDC performed a variety of activities. First, it gave grants to local organizations and institutions such as the Red Crescent Society, the Benevolent Society, al-Ahli al-\textsuperscript{5}Arabi Hospital, and the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law.\textsuperscript{54} Second, a small loans programme was established in
1985, although this is no longer functioning. 50 projects received fund­
ing and each project supported 1-4 persons. The minimum sum was
US$10,000, and the maximum was US$40,000. The total sum of US$750,000
was spent. The interest rate was 4% and a service fee of 1% was added.
The grace period was 1-24 months.\textsuperscript{55}

The CDC supported a broad spectrum of organizations in the Gaza Strip
through grants.\textsuperscript{56} In 1991, for example, the CDC gave financial support
(US$30,000) to Rafah Municipality for purchasing books for its library.
The Gaza Centre for Rights and Law was awarded a US$60,000 two-year
grant.\textsuperscript{57}

6.1.13. Khan Yunis Agricultural Cooperative Society

The Khan Yunis Agricultural Cooperative Society was established in 1944,
temporarily disbanded in 1948, re-opened in 1959 under the Egyptian
administration in the Gaza Strip, again closed in 1967, and resumed its
activities in 1983. In 1993, the board consisted of nine members. The
cooperative had ten staff members: an accountant, an equipment super­
visor, a nursery manager, a nursery assistant, a loan officer, 2 tractor
drivers, a bulldozer driver, a truck driver, and a messenger.\textsuperscript{58}

The cooperative offered a number of services. It provided support and
services to farmers through making available tractors, bulldozers and
trucks. The prices the growers paid for those services were 20% less
than the commercial costs. It helped the farmers in marketing of their
produce in the West Bank and Jordan. In 1993, the cooperative started a
revolving loan programme (ANERA gave the cooperative a total US$250,000
for the revolving loan) for the growers. Each loan was for US$4,000. The
service fee was 8%, the grace period was 6 months, and repayment should
take place within 3 years.\textsuperscript{59}

The Cooperative received donations from a number of organizations and it
also benefited from membership fees (US$100 per member). It had about
850 members. There was, however, limited possibility of growth due to
differences among the administrative board’s members and the cooper­
ative’s limited financial assets.\textsuperscript{60}
6.1.14. Arab Development and Credit Company (ADCC)

The Arab Development and Credit Company (ADCC) was a non-profit corporation incorporated and registered in Jerusalem in September 1985. It started its activities in the Gaza Strip in 1993. The administrative board consisted of nine members and it functioned as a steering committee which directed the organization's policy.

The objectives for which the ADCC was established were to conduct all kinds of business activity in the areas under the Israeli control; to give loans and financial assistance; to conduct practical and theoretical research, studies, and publication; and to carry out economic, cultural, and educational programmes.

The ADCC encouraged agricultural projects whose feasibility was deemed good. It also assisted job-generating projects. Special attention was paid to agricultural projects for exporting products.

The ADCC also offered financial support for agriculture-related projects such as land reclamation, nurseries, modern agriculture (greenhouses), irrigation projects (wells and water pipes), bee-hive projects, livestock, and planting fruit trees. The PARC gave also its support for obtaining agricultural equipment.

The ADCC set a number of conditions for lending and giving a loan. First, loans were given to borrowers who were ready to contribute from their own resources (30-50%) of the loan amount. Second, loan was paid in installments timed in light of the executed phases of the project. Third, loan currency was US dollar. However, it was paid to borrowers in Israeli Shekels and was repaid in the same currency. Fourth, the company charged 5% as a service charge. Fifth, the company asked the borrowers to provide two sponsors to secure repayment. Sixth, a loan amount was generally suitable to the cost of project required.

Up to September 1994, the ADCC’s office in Gaza Strip gave loans to 12 applicants to purchase cows for milk, to establish rose greenhouse, to purchase sheep breeding, to purchase beehives, to purchase egg-laying hens, and to plant strawberry. The loans were distributed geographically in the Gaza Strip as follows: the Southern area (Rafah...
and Khan Yunis) 3, the Central area 4, Northern area 4 and Gaza city 1.

6.1.15. Arab Thought Forum (ATF)

The Arab Thought Forum (ATF) was first established in Jerusalem in 1978, and the Gaza branch was opened in 1989. The Gaza branch was composed of 40 members and it had four staff members. Some of the members and the staff were working in the resource centre, the research unit and the training programmes, field research, and administration. The Forum also had a consultative committee consisting of five members.

The Arab Thought Forum (ATF) considered itself an educational organization which aimed at making local society more aware of socio-economic development issues and conducting applied studies on development issues in the Gaza Strip.

The primary donors to the Forum were the Welfare Association (Geneva), the Near East Council of Churches (NECC). ATF received private donations and membership fees.

The ATF carried out researches and played a part in training and technical network consisting of other NGOs. It ran organized workshops and seminars, which were open to members of various development organizations and to researchers. About 10 workshops and seminars per year were conducted.

The Arab Thought Forum played an important role in promoting discussion on development-related issues.

6.1.16. Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC)

The Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC) is a Palestinian non-profit corporation working on economic development in the Occupied Territories. It's head office was established in 1989 in Jerusalem. Two branches were established: in Nablus and Gaza. The Gaza branch was established on May 1, 1991.

The TDC will be dealt with as a case study in next section and it will be subjected to a comprehensive analysis.
6.1.17. The Economic Development Group (EDG)

The Economic Development Group (EDG) is a private, non-profit-making organization, which was established in Jerusalem in 1986. The Gaza office was established in 1987. The EDG was established with the intention of responding to two factors, which existed within the Gaza Strip: the almost complete absence of commercial credit as a result of the forced closure of Arab banks after the 1967 war, and the lack of other schemes for medium and long-term credit.

The EDG will be dealt with as a case study in next section and it will be subjected to a comprehensive analysis.

6.1.18. Assessment

In the light of what has been mentioned above, it is clear that there were a number of organizations playing an economic role in the Gaza Strip. However, these organizations remained isolated. Most of the organizations lacked a mass basis and performed a limited role in the economic sector. The concentration was mostly on service and consumer-oriented projects, staying away from productive projects.

The absence of a comprehensive Palestinian developmental strategy, the shallowness of local organizational experience, the Israeli policies and restrictions, and the pre-eminence of factional-familial thought, had negative impacts on the economic effectiveness of the organizations.
At the time of the 1967 war, there were 3 Egyptian and foreign-owned banks with 4 branches in the Gaza Strip. All Palestinian and Arab banks working in the Gaza Strip were closed by Military Order 7 (8 June 1967) and their assets and liabilities seized or impounded. The Central Bank of Israel's authority was imposed over all banking matters in the Gaza Strip. Effectively, the Gaza Strip was left without a formal banking system, and the only banks licensed to operate were Israeli's. Following the intifada, all Israeli bank branches in the Gaza Strip were closed.

The banking system in the Strip operated under the Banking Ordinance of 1941, which was issued by the British mandatory authorities.

In 1981, the Bank of Palestine was allowed to reopen in Gaza, and it had four branches in the Gaza Strip.

With the absence of an independent Palestinian banking system in the Gaza Strip, during the period 1967-1993, the informal monetary sector assumed increasing importance in day-to-day transactions. Money changers and small lending agencies became increasingly important. Their operations dealt mainly in foreign currency and provided embryonic banking facilities including deposits, transfer of funds, clearance of cheques and granting loans.

In this section of the study two lending organizations will be subject to analysis as case studies: the Arab Development and Technical Corporation (TDC) and the Economic Development Group (EDG).

6.2.1. Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC)

The Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC) is a Palestinian non-profit corporation working on economic development in the Occupied Territories. It's head office was established in 1989 in Jerusalem. Two branches were established: in Nablus and Gaza. The Gaza branch was
established on May 1, 1991.1

The TDC structure consists of a general assembly of 20 members, and a board of nine members. The membership was drawn from all parts of the Occupied Territories. Table no. 19 demonstrates the organizational structure of the TDC.

Table No. 19
The Organizational Structure of the TDC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Assembly</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board of Directors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chairman of Board of Directors</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Manager</td>
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Branches

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<td>Manager</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Nablus</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PDOs</td>
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<td>PDOs</td>
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</tbody>
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Note: PDO = Project Development Officer

Source: The Arab Technical Development Corporation, A Report, No Publisher, No date, p. 4.

6.2.1.1. Aims of the TDC

The Arab Technical Development Corporation’s main aims were to contribute to building an independent local (i.e. Palestinian) economy through the following: constructing economic projects and developing the already existing ones; giving training and enhancing the work force, and developing the qualified specialists in fields of production, marketing and administration; establishing special projects to absorb the technical and professional workmanship, and increasing the technical and consultative experience, particularly in the fields of production, marketing and investment; participating in holding developmental forums and
conferences; and developing financial sources and searching for new ones to finance economic development projects.²

6.2.1.2. The Economic Policies of the TDC

The TDC’s attention in financing projects was paid to the following categories: productive projects and projects aiming at reducing the cost of utilizing production facilities; projects depending on the exploitation of local raw materials; and projects supplying of the local community with vital needs (i.e. food, housing, etc.).³

The TDC supported various economic sectors such as industrial projects (e.g. wood products, textile and clothing, electrical and electronic workshops, printing and publishing, and construction’s material); individual workshops (e.g. laundry, TV production, cooling system); services (e.g. automobile services); and the industry of tourism (e.g. hotels and tourism restaurants).⁴

6.2.1.3. Sources for Financing

The TDC received its finance from a number of sources. Arab governmental and non-governmental sources, the European Economic Community, the Cooperative Development Project (an American NGO), and other international governmental and non-governmental organizations financed the TDC’s activities.⁵

6.2.1.4. Loans, Methods and Instructions

The TDC was active in giving loans for projects in the Gaza Strip, attempting to stimulate internal economic development in the Gaza Strip. The loans were given to the projects which would transfer technology; manufacture products and reduce imports (i.e. import-substitute industry [ISI]); manufacture productive tools and small machinery; create new employment opportunities; and manufacture from the available local raw materials.⁶

Persons or groups of persons were chosen to receive loans (from the TDC) according to the following criteria: first, the project had to be economically feasible; second, the applicant had to have a good credit record; third, the applicant had to offer enough guarantees ensuring re-
payment; fourth, the applicant had to be capable of leading the project to success; and fifth, if more than one application was equal to each other in every respect, then preference was to be given to the first application which arrived. 7

Financially, the ceiling in capital size of a project was US$100,000. At least 50 percent of the total capital should be by personal contribution (from the project’s owner i.e. the investor), such that at most 50 percent of the total capital was by loan to the investor.

The duration of loans offered was 2-7 years, including the grace period which was up to 12 months. The loan was to be paid back in regular or non-regular instalments. The loan recipient paid, in advance, 5 percent to 7 percent as annual service charge. 8

6.2.1.5. TDC’s Mechanism of Carrying out Lending Process

The TDC’s lending mechanism passed a number of stages. The lending process for each loan would start when the applicant applies for a loan and ended when the applicant repays the loan. 9

The first stage was to receive applicants. In this phase the TDC provided the applicant with brief information about the corporation’s lending policies; and completed an inquiry about the applicant and the project. If the information received was applicable to the TDC’s loan policies, a feasibility study for the project was requested, accompanied with an application form to be filled by the applicant. After receiving all the above-mentioned information, other documents were requested such as legal permits, maps, and financial statements. 10

In the second stage the application was to be subjected to a study. The Project Director Officer (PDO) studied all the applications every 3 months in order to choose the most appropriate projects for financing. 11

The third stage included projects’ nomination. According to the branch manager’s recommendation, the General Manager nominated the projects to the Project Committee for approval if the project complied with TDC policies. Upon the project approval, the applicant was informed of the decision, and was requested to prepare a mortgage and insurance. Then an agreement was signed by both parties and technical and legal files were
opened to follow up the execution of the project.\textsuperscript{12}

The final stage was the execution of the project. Two files were usually opened for each approved project. The first file was a technical one consisting of information about the applicant and the project, the loan application, the feasibility study, legal permits, maps, and tenders; the second was a legal file.\textsuperscript{13}

After completing both technical and legal files, the first payment of the loan amount was paid to the project's owner according to the schedule of implementation stages. Finally, repayments were followed-up according to the agreed schedule.\textsuperscript{14} Chart no. 20 shows the procedures of lending and collection
As shown in the above chart, the approval process goes through three major stages:

A) Applications are received and studied by the assigned field officers then thoroughly studied and analysed by the office staff. The selected projects are introduced to the General Manager who proposes them to the Project Evaluation Committee (PEC) to go through the final approval process. B) PEC nominates selected projects to the PDO. C) The PDO makes the final approval for financing.

To facilitate the evaluation and analysis of the projects, a computerized information system is available in each of the organization branches and centralized in the headquarters.

Source: The Arab Technical Development Corporation, A Report, No Publisher, No date.
6.2.1.6. The Economic Activities of the TDC

The Arab Technical and Development Corporation specialized in lending, and holding training sessions. From 1991 to 1993, the TDC received more than three hundred project proposals and applications for loans within the industrial and agricultural fields. It gave loans to "share holding companies", granting an average of US$30,000 per project. 20 per cent of the projects should be "small-scale", and the rest medium and large-scale.15

From 1991 to the end of 1993, the Gaza TDC office approved loans to 19 projects. The amount of loans given was about US$1,200,000. The projects which were financed included industrial, service, and tourism projects: 13 were industrial; 4 in services; and 2 in the field of tourism. The industrial projects included manufacturing of apparel, brick, tricot, food, plastic accessories, diapers, plastic imprinting, stoves, quartz, TVs, and frames for greenhouses, etc. The services projects included cars' maintenance and a cooling store. Two projects in the field of tourism were repair for a hotel (Cliff Hotel in Gaza city) and for furniture for a hotel (Palestine Hotel in Gaza city).16

Geographically, the above-mentioned projects covered three areas: 7 in the South (i.e. Rafah and Khan Yunis), 3 in the Central area (i.e. Dair al-Balah, al-Nusairat, and al-Zawaidah); 7 in Gaza city area; and 2 in the North of the Gaza Strip (i.e. Bait Hanun, Bait Lahya).17

The total amount of loans which were given was US$1,200,000 and the average amount of a loan for each project was US$48,000.18

The TDC also organized - in cooperation and coordination with other organizations - training sessions to its staff in the fields of computing, administration, economic feasibility studies, English language, and the Palestinian economy.19

6.2.1.7. Assessment

Since it started its activities in the Gaza Strip (in 1991) up to the Summer of 1994, the TDC financed 19 projects. However, the economic role of the TDC was limited at the national economic level. There was no comprehensive economic development strategy in the Strip, and the economic
activity of the TDC was still selective. By Summer 1994, the TDC gave loans to only 19 applicants out of more than 300 applicants.

The TDC concentrated on giving loans to industrial and service projects. The agricultural sector, which constituted the backbone of the Gaza Strip's economy was neglected.

The TDC gave loans to the rich stratum of society and neglected poor people. Taking into consideration that the TDC provided 30-50% of the total cost of a project, it is clear that only rich people could initiate a project and cover 50-70% of its overall costs. Rich people became richer while the poor were neglected.

6.2.2. The Economic Development Group (EDG).

The Economic Development Group (EDG) is a private, non-profit-making organization, which was established in Jerusalem in 1986. The Gaza office was established in 1987. The EDG was established with the intention of responding to two factors, which existed within the Gaza Strip: the almost complete absence of commercial credit as a result of the forced closure of Arab banks after the 1967 war, and the lack of other schemes for medium and long-term credit.\(^1\)

EDG's objective was to encourage a self-supporting ideology in the Palestinian community, which aimed at reducing dependence on the Israeli economy; and to produce a strong and efficient economic and social infrastructure.\(^2\) The EDG also aimed to support the development of a strong and sustainable Palestinian national economy through the provision of finance to industrial and/or tourism businesses.\(^3\)

By promoting an independent and self-reliant economy, the EDG, therefore, reflected Palestinian hopes in the establishment of a viable, sustainable and stable Palestinian economy.\(^4\)

6.2.2.1. The Policy and the Organizational Structure of the EDG

The policy of the EDG was set by a board of trustees, which was composed of twelve members. Three of the twelve members were residents of the Gaza Strip.\(^5\)
In the Gaza Strip, the Economic Development Group’s activities were supervised by an executive director who was assisted by two field officers and a secretary. The EDG field officers frequently met with the clients to assess and monitor projects, and to discuss their findings with experts from other organizations.

The EDG provided its board’s members and staff with specialized training programmes within their respective fields, enabling them to enhance and further their skills in order to acquire a better understanding of Palestinian economic development.

The EDG Board had overall responsibility for EDG strategy and direction. This involved setting policies consistent with EDG strategy and direction; setting overall objectives and targets and monitoring performance; ensuring that all lending decisions were sound and within policy; overseeing payment of money from EDG accounts; and ensuring that all dealings were consistent with EDG standards. Table no. 21 demonstrates the administrative evolution of the EDG in the Occupied Territories.

Table No. 21

EDG’s Administrative Evolution (1988-1993)
(In Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Offices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Budget in US$1,000</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Increase by Comparison to 1988.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>102%</td>
<td>182%</td>
<td>191%</td>
<td>227%</td>
<td>550%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the purpose of detailed review of loan applications, a sub-committee of the Board, the Loans Committee, was set up. The Loans Committee consisted of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, two further board members and the EDG’s Director. It was inquorate unless all four Board members were...
The Board might form other sub-committees to deal with matters on an ad hoc basis. However, overall operational management of the EDG was the responsibility of its Director. The Director of the EDG’s operations in the Gaza Strip reported directly to the EDG Director in Jerusalem.

The Accountant and the Accountant-Assistant reported to the Finance Manager. The Administrative Secretary, the Receptionist and the Office Assistant reported to the Office Manager. The organizational structure of the EDG is shown in chart no. 22.

**Chart No. 22**

The Organizational Structure of the EDG 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDG Board</th>
<th>EDG Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans Director (West Bank)</td>
<td>Finance Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director (Gaza)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 District</td>
<td>Accountant and Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 PDOs Projects’ Secretary</td>
<td>Office Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection, Monitoring and Eval. Officer</td>
<td>1 Accountant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** PDO = Project Development Officer. Eval. = Evaluation.

6.2.2.2. The EDG's Target Groups and Sectors

When the EDG commenced its activities in the Gaza Strip in 1987, the allocation of funds was targeted at three important groups: women, unemployed university graduates, and released political prisoners, specifically with respect to the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors.\textsuperscript{15}

While the EDG was committed mainly to supporting small business, it also funded groups with specific needs, such as the physically handicapped and women.

Following an agreement signed in 1992 between the EDG and the Arab Development and Credit Company (ADCC), the EDG concentrated specifically on the industrial sector while the agriculture sector was supported by the ADCC and other financial institutions. The EDG also provided loans for the tourism sector and for agricultural exports from the Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{16}

Chart no. 23 gives details of the total funds which were available for each sector in the year 1993. The total funds covered the EDG's activities in the Occupied Territories (including the Gaza Strip).\textsuperscript{17}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>The Sum (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>3,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-export (Gaza)</td>
<td>850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,550,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Source:} The Economic Development Group, \textit{A Profile of a Palestinian Credit Agency}, No Publisher, 1994, p. 4.

6.2.2.3. The EDG and its Terms of Credit

The Economic Development Group's credit programme was in operation for nearly six years and supported approximately 342 projects in the Occupied Territories (i.e. the West Bank - including Jerusalem - and the Gaza Strip). By the end of 1993, the aggregate volume of credit advanced
by the EDG to these projects amounted to almost US$12 million. The average loan was approximately US$10,000, but the amounts ranged from US$2,000 to US$77,000.\textsuperscript{18}

In all cases, recipients of loans were asked to invest funds of their own, usually making up 20\% to 50\% of the total investment and costs of the project. The EDG also required 2-3 credible guarantors to co-sign the loan agreement with the client. For medium-sized loans (over US$50,000), the EDG asked for other collateral.\textsuperscript{19}

The EDG did not charge commercial interest on its loans, but in order to cover its operational expenses, borrowers were charged an annual service fee approximately 3\% of the loan, deducted at the beginning, of the whole amount of a loan.\textsuperscript{20}

The EDG set a number of loan terms and conditions as follows: first, interest rates, the service charge and the duration of loans were determined as agreed in agreements with the various funders; second, the amount of the loan was set in dollars but a loan was paid to the borrower in Shekels (the Israeli currency);\textsuperscript{21} third, repayment schedules were worked out in the light of anticipated cash-flow. In general, full repayment was expected within a maximum of seven years. This included a grace period of 6 to 12 months.\textsuperscript{22}

6.2.2.4. The EDG’s Financial Sources and Sponsorship

The major source of funding for the EDG was the European Community (EC). Nearly 80\% of the EDG’s capital (approximately US$11 million) came from the EC in the form of grants which were distributed to eligible borrowers strictly on loan basis. In addition, several other countries provided direct assistance through bilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{25}

Another main source of funding was the Welfare Association, a Palestinian institution based in Geneva. The Association began funding the EDG upon its establishment and continued to be one of its funders. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Kuwait also granted funds to EDG for two consecutive years (1988-1990) in order to cover loans for small-scale businesses in the Palestinian occupied territories.\textsuperscript{26}
6.2.2.5. Agreements between EDG and other Credit Organizations 1992

During its early years, the EDG provided agricultural as well as industrial loans. Then, in December 1992, a coordination agreement was signed between the EDG and its sister credit organizations: the Arab Development and Credit Company (ADCC) and the Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC), in which the following split was agreed: the EDG was to focus on medium-sized industrial loans; the TDC was to focus on large industrial loans; and the ADCC was to focus on agricultural loans. It was subsequently agreed with the European Community that the EDG and the TDC would both take responsibility for loans to the tourism sector.27

The purpose of the agreement was to coordinate the efforts of the lending organizations in order to improve their overall level of efficiency, to focus on specific economic sectors, and to establish a united credit Palestinian community. The coordination was only the first step in an effort to realize the final objective of uniting credit organizations into one financial body: a Palestinian development bank.28

6.2.2.6. The EDG and its Loan Mechanism

There were three major areas of loan operation work. These were: reviewing and agreeing a loan; paying a loan; and monitoring a loan. The EDG's objectives, when reviewing and agreeing a loan, were to ensure that the lending risk was properly controlled; loans were targeted on the sectors where there was the greatest potential economic impact; and each application was dealt with in the shortest possible time.29

The loans policies of the EDG, which were agreed by its Board, consisted of a number of lines. First, the EDG did not give grants, it did not give personal loans, it did not give loans for agriculture, and loans might be given to all sectors of the tourism industry. Second, loans to restaurants were only given for kitchens and bathrooms. Third, loans for the brick or knitting sectors were only granted for quality improvements, to residents of refugee camps or for handicapped people. Fourth, no loans above 100,000 ECU granted unless by special agreement with the funder. Fifth, no loans were granted outside the policies defined, unless by special agreement with the funder. Sixth, no loans were given to those borrowing from other agencies and no second loans were given to any existing EDG borrower unless the borrower had a good payment
6.2.2.7. The EDG's Economic Activities in the Gaza Strip

From 1987 to 1993, the EDG gave loans to 73 projects in the Gaza Strip. These projects covered industry, tourism and services, and agro-export fields. The geographical distribution of these projects in the Gaza Strip was as follows: Rafah 3 projects, Khan Yunis 8 projects, Dair al-Balah 1 project, the Middle Camps: al-Nusairat and al-Zawaidah 4 projects; al-Maghazi 1 project; Jabalia 6 projects, Bait Hanun 3, and Gaza 46 projects. Table no. 24 demonstrates projects financed by the EDG.

Table No. 24
The EDG’s Financed Projects in the Gaza Strip from 1987 to the end 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>The original financial source</th>
<th>The sum. US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>EC, CD, CF, WF</td>
<td>1,096,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>194,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Industry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>139,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>WF, EC, CD</td>
<td>151,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,581,272</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Interview with Sami Wafi, a PDO (Project Development Officer) working with EDG, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 22/9/1994.

The EDG gave loans to finance a variety of projects. The projects included plastic and leather industry, purchasing sewing machine, manufacturing soft drinks and citrus juice (e.g. Gaza juice factory), maintaining infrastructure, manufacturing rubber spares for cars, purchasing medical equipment (e.g. CT scan equipment), manufacturing floor tiles, manufacturing textiles, manufacturing tricot and knitting, manufacturing children toys, manufacturing housewares and aluminum, manufacturing bamboo furniture, manufacturing goldsmith and mosaic, manufacturing pottery and glass colouring, establishing bakery, establishing foundry, making computer programming, and establishing agricultural carpentry.

In addition, the EDG financed projects in the field of tourism and services such as electronic maintenance, restaurants, halls, hotels, medical
laboratories, and medical maintenance.

The agricultural projects which had been given loans included green-houses, sheep breeding, beehives, and agricultural export. Table no. 25 below shows the EDG's distribution of funds by sector in the Gaza Strip (1993).

**Table No. 25**

The EDG's Distribution of Funds by Sector in the Gaza Strip 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>The sum (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1,096,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>194,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Industry</td>
<td>139,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>151,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,581,272</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Economic Development Group, A Profile of a Palestinian Credit Agency, No Publisher, 1994, p. 4.*

Finally, the EDG arranged a number of training courses in cooperation with other organizations. The training programmes included: first, a course in sewing machine maintenance held in August, 1993, and attended by 4 persons; second, a course in quality control, held in November 1993 and attended by 15 persons; and third, a course on how to start your own business, held in July 1994 and attended by 23 persons.

6.2.2.8. Assessment of the EDG's Activities in the Gaza Strip

The EDG was active in loan-giving programmes which were vital to the Gaza Strip's economy. It created four administrative jobs in the Gaza office, and it gave loans to seventy-three projects. The activity of the EDG in economic development was tangible and substantial. Since it started its activities in the Strip (in 1987) up to the end of 1993, the EDG gave about US$1,500,000 as loans to various projects.

The EDG activities were influenced by a number of constraints and limitations, such as the Israeli authorities' restrictions, the intifada (general strikes, curfews, closures, etc.), and the limited administrative and economic experience of the organization.

The EDG financed seventy-three projects in the industrial, tourist,
services, and agricultural fields. All the agricultural projects failed. The other projects were considered successful.

In the Gaza Strip, some people still could not distinguish between the concepts of a loan and a grant. The concept of loan, especially during the intifada, was not understood as money which should be repaid. Most people believed that a loan was a sort of grant which supported their "steadfastness" in the Gaza Strip under the Israeli occupation.

6.3.0. Conclusion

The Palestinian community in the Gaza Strip established a number of organizations which were active in the economic field. Agricultural cooperatives, credit organizations, fund-raising associations, and research and study centres participated in the economic activities. However, that no significant economic development occurred during the past 26 years of the Israeli military occupation was not surprising or unintentional; economic and political developments were inseparable and part of the same process.

The lending organizations played an important role in the field of economic development in the Gaza Strip. However, taking the economic situation in the Gaza Strip into consideration, it is clear that the economic cumulative effect of these organizations' activities was limited. The total volume of lending capacity of the lending organizations in the Gaza Strip was less than US$10 million (the gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Gaza Strip in 1992, was (Israeli Shekels) IS751,777 Million [about US$250 million]).

The activities of the lending organizations were affected by a number of constraints and shortcomings.

In the cases of some funding organizations, the Israeli authorities interfered in decisions over approving funding for proposed projects. The concentration was on service and consumer-oriented projects, and neglecting productive projects. In a few cases where productive projects were approved, they should not compete with Israeli products of the same kind which were marketed in the Gaza Strip. Priority was given to projects in the field of infrastructure, such as renewing sewerage, which were, in the first degree, the responsibility of the occupation author-
The lending organizations suffered from a number of defects: first, their participation in the economic development in the Gaza Strip and their lending policies did not comply with a comprehensive national economic development policy (their policies were formulated individually not by a national authority); second, coordination among the organizations was not at the required level (the coordination was more formal than essential); third, most members of the administrative boards of the lending organization were not specialists in business administration (i.e. they were doctors, lawyers, notables and mukhtars, engineers, etc.), and they had not the adequate efficiency to evaluate the priorities and needs of the national economy; fourth, projects which were financed by the organizations made the rich richer, as no project was given a loan unless the investor could cover 30-50% of its total cost. Thus, only rich people could start enterprises. However, the organizations did prepare people to take risks and to deal with the idea of investment and business.

The situation during the intifada reflected itself negatively on the lending organizations’ activities. Curfews, general strikes, closures, and instability hindered their activities.

Some people did not recognize the "meaning" of a loan - they took loans as grants without repayment. Until 1992, most of the projects, especially the agricultural projects, financed by lending organizations failed.

In the field of services, loans were given to a number of projects which aimed at providing medical equipment. This saved the occupation authorities money since the health services fell within their jurisdiction. Moreover, the authorities used these projects for propaganda purposes as evidence that the authorities supported the process of development.

Priority was given to projects supervised by individuals. Most of the projects were one-person-owned. The economic effect of these projects, within the economic context of the Gaza Strip, was limited. In the Gaza Strip, US$12,000-15,000 was needed to generate a single job. Thus, the job-creating projects which were financed by the lending organizations were very few. The lending organizations did not succeed in achieving a
purposeful accumulative economic development.

Most of the lending organizations in the Gaza Strip played the role of "implementing organizations". They did not participate in formulating the strategies and policies of economic development, nor did they give loans to projects as a part of a comprehensive developmental strategy. The granting states themselves defined the sectors which should be given loans and the amount of the loan needed for each project. The absence of a national Palestinian authority was another factor that made formulating a comprehensive economic development strategy impossible.

The lending organizations in the Gaza Strip attempted to introduce financial facilities and a variety of services to investors (mostly individuals). The organizations played an important role in the economic field. However, they did not succeed in achieving purposeful accumulative economic development.

Such a situation was not sustainable in the future. The continuation of these policies would undermine the financial integrity of the credit programmes and have broad negative effects on the financial sector. The role of the lending organizations needed re-assessment and coordination in a comprehensive economic strategy. There was also an urgent need for a strong and effective banking system.
Introduction.


Introduction


Section One: Palestinian NGOs active in the economic development field: an overview

1. An interview with Amin Dabbwur, the Director of the al-Zahra' Centre for Studies and Research, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 26/8/1994.


7. An interview with Riziq Abu Halimah, the head of the Agricultural Cooperative Association for Strawberries, Vegetables and Flowers in the Gaza Strip, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 22/8/1994.


12. An interview with Wun al-Shawwa, the Consultant of the CDP in Gaza, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 7/7/1994.


17. An interview with Jamal al-Nawajhah, the Director of the CD Gaza office, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 17/9/1994.

18. Ibid. Cooperation for Development: Middle East, CD, No Publisher, 1993, pp. 1-3.

19. Interview with Subhi al-Kharrub, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 14/9/1994.

20. Interview with Nibras Ibsaisu, the interview was conducted at her office, Gaza, 15/9/1994.

21. Interview with Samir Minnah, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 14/9/1994.

22. Interview with Hashim cAta al-Shawwa, the Chairman of the Citrus Producers Union, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 20/7/1994.


26. Interview with cAbd al-Latif Abu Middain, the Chairman of the Agricultural Cooperative Society for Citrus Marketing, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 6/7/1994.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Interview with cAbd al-Sami° al-Ifranji, the Chairman of the Gaza Livestock Cooperative, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 20/8/1994.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Interview with I°timad Imhanna, the Director of the Shu’un al-Mar’ah (Women’s Affairs), the interview was conducted at her office, Gaza, 25/8/1994.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.
39. Interview with Rafiq Hamdunah, an officer working with the Save the Children Federation, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 6/9/1994.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Interview with Muhammad Badr al-Din, the Director and Chairman of Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), Gaza branch, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 18/8/1994.

44. Interview with 'Abd al-Karim Ashwur, an Executive Officer of the PARC, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 19/8/1994.

45. Interview with Taysiir Imhaysin, the technical adviser, the PARC office, Gaza, the interview was conducted at his office, 20/8/1994.


47. Ibid.

48. Interview with Muhammad al-Baqari, the Director of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, Gaza branch, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 26/8/1994.

49. Ibid.

50. Interview with Mahmud Aqlain, an officer working with the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 27/8/1994.

51. Ibid.

52. Interview with Rami al-Wahidi, the Executive Officer of the Centre for Development Consultancy (CDC), the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 15/9/1994.

53. Ibid.

54. The Welfare association, A Profile, No Publisher, No date, pp. 1-3.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Interview with Muhammad Salim al-Agha, the Secretary of the Khan Yunis Agricultural Cooperative Society, the interview was conducted at his office, Khan Yunis, 1/8/1994.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.


63. Ibid., p. 2.

64. Interview with Mustafa Abu Shwushah, a Loan Officer of the Arab Development and Credit Company, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 13/9/1994.

65. Interview with Nabil al-Makhalla-lati, the Executive Director of the ADCC, the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 13/9/1993.

66. Ibid.

67. Interview with Muhammad al-Radwan, the Director of the Arab Thought Forum, the interview was conducted at his home, Gaza, 26/6/1994.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

The organizations were 5: the Save the Children Fund (SCF), the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), the Women Committees Group, and the Palestine Health Relief Committee (PHRC).

Section Two: Economic organizations in the Gaza Strip: case studies of two lending organizations.

Introduction


6.2.1. The Arab Technical Development Corporation (TDC)


2. Ibid., p. 2.


4. Ibid., p. 3.


6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. Ibid., p. 5.

8. Ibid., p. 6.

9. An interview with Mirvat Abu Kamal, an Assistant Executive of the TDC, the interview was conducted at the TDC headquarters, Gaza, 12/9/1994.

11. Ibid., p. 4.

12. Ibid., p. 4.


17. An interview with Mirvat Abu Kamal, an Assistant Executive of the TDC, the interview was conducted at the TDC headquarters, Gaza, 12/9/1994.

18. Ibid.

19. The Arab Technical Development Corporation, *A Report*, No Publisher, No date, p. 4. Interview with Samir al-Birawai, Executive Manager, the TDC, Jerusalem office, the interview was conducted at his office, 25/9/1994.

The Economic Development Group (EDG)


2. Ibid., p. 1.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. Interview with Nuhammad Abu Daggah, Acting Director of the Economic Development Group (EDG), the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 12/9/1994.

8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., p. 2.

11. Ibid., p. 3.

12. Ibid., p. 3.

13. Ibid., p. 4.


16. Ibid., p. 5.

17. Ibid., p. 5.

18. Ibid., p. 6.


20. Ibid., p. 3.

21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. 4.

23. Ibid., p. 5.

24. Ibid., p. 7.

25. Ibid., p. 9.

26. Ibid., p. 10.

27. Ibid., p. 14.


31. Ibid., p. 2.

32. Interview with Sami Wafi, PDO (Project Development Officer), the Economic Development Group (EDG), the interview was conducted at his office, Gaza, 22/9/1994.

33. Interview with Sahar al-'Ailah, PDO, the EDG, the interview was conducted at her office, Gaza, 22/9/1994.

Conclusion.

1. Interview with Samyih Jaradat, PDO (Project Development Officer), the Economic and Development Group, Jerusalem office, the interview was conducted at his office, Jerusalem, 25/9/1994.


3. Interview with Suliman Iqtifan, Accountant, the Economic and Development Group (EDG), Jerusalem office, the interview was conducted

4. Interview with Ahmad Sayyid Ahmad, Financial Manager, the Economic and Development Group (EDG), Jerusalem office, the interview was conducted at his office, Jerusalem, 25/9/1994.

5. Ibid.
7.0. General Conclusion

In 1948, the Gaza Strip was created as an artificial entity. It was administered by the Egyptian administration for about nineteen years from 1948 to 1967 (except for four months from November 1956 to March 1957 when it was occupied by Israeli forces). In June 1967, the Israeli forces occupied again the Gaza Strip and military rules were imposed to organize all aspects of its population’s life.

The socio-economic-politico-legal setting in the Strip constituted an environment where three main actors interacted: the Israeli authorities, the Palestinian political movements and the popular organizations (i.e. the trade unions and associations). The interaction among these actors within an unstable socio-economic-politico-legal environment led to the politicization of the trade unions and associations in the Strip. The behaviour of the three parties varied: Israel occupied the area and imposed its military rules and orders to restrict the population’s life; various Palestinian political movements attempted to dictate their party-line interests within the rank and file of the trade unions and associations; and the trade unions and associations engaged in political rather than professional activities. The trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip had to show loyalty to one Palestinian political movement or another.

A set of elements affected the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. The volatile socio-economic-political and legal circumstances and the Israeli restrictions in the Gaza Strip did not, normally, allow local Palestinian organizational experience to continue and to accumulate. However, despite these restrictions, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip succeeded in building national organizations which provided a wide range of services to inhabitants. These services covered most aspects of life, including education, legal aid and health. Interaction between the Gaza Strip population, the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian political movements created a nucleus of organizational national infrastructure (i.e. trade unions, associations, professional and non-professional organizations) in the Strip. The trade unions and associations constituted a Palestinian response to the Israeli occupation’s apparatus. They functioned parallel to the official apparatus of the
Israeli authorities. One could say that these organizations undertook roles of nuclei organizations of a state.

During the span of the study, 1967-1993, the situation remained characterized by the state of military occupation. The tense atmosphere was aggravated by the popular uprising (intifada). The workers, their families, the trade unions, and the population in the Strip were in a more precarious situation than they had known for some time. The consequences of the second Gulf crisis, 1990/1991, had aggravated the already difficult economic situation. The relatively poor efforts that were made to promote development and employment opportunities in the Gaza Strip, together with the requirements of a rapidly growing labour force, had resulted in lower living standards, disturbing social conditions, increasing unemployment and general tension.

In order to discourage trade unionists and hinder their activities, the Israeli authorities - as was their wont - ransacked trade union premises, arrested trade unionists, placed a number of them under house arrest, forbade others to travel abroad, and deported a number of the trade unionists.

In addition, the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip suffered from a number of limitations and shortcomings. The politicization of the trade unions and associations supported the Palestinian national struggle, but it also damaged a number of these organizations financially and administratively and diverted them from undertaking effectively their professional functions. Political loyalty to one faction or another often had priority in most of these associations’ policies.

It was noted that a number of the associations had no significant social and professional activities and were only dummy associations, constituting banners without any substantial and practical content. These kinds of associations were established as a vehicle to bring financial support from different Palestinian and non-Palestinian factions, governments and charitable organizations. The main aim of such organizations was to serve personal, factional, and political purposes without introducing tangible services to the community as a whole.

On the practical level, the pre-eminence of tribal-familial-factional thought at the institutional-organizational level hindered most attempts
at coordination among organizations offering similar services. This resulted in wasting limited human and financial resources, fragmenting work, downgrading the level of services offered, and reducing popular support for these organizations. In addition, there was a contradiction between the need for the establishment of organizations as a framework for patterning and encouraging group responsibility and accountability, decision-making and monitoring, on the one hand, and the need to use these organizations as tools for the Palestinian political faction which stood behind them, on the other.

Political divisions and different loyalties were pervasive. The public tended to contribute to, and to become actively involved in, those organizations whose leaders' views were close to their own. Thus, each base of support was drawn from different sectors of society and these followed the existing divisions within society.

The factional-tribal-familial-political-social divisions negatively reflected on the performance of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip. The trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip were exposed to the Palestinian factions' competition, which had negative effects on their general performance.

An additional problem facing the organizations in the Gaza Strip was the lack of comprehensive planning. The leadership was partly responsible for this situation. Several other contributing factors could, however, be mentioned: first, the restrictions against survey and research made the necessary preliminary information very difficult to obtain; second, the lack of sufficient financial resources made statistical research difficult to undertake; and third, the absence of a central coordinating organization which could collect and disseminate information of interest to all organizations.

There was another drawback in the associations' performance. Authority for all planning and decisions was concentrated almost completely in the hands of the director. The administrative boards' members remained little more than a paper formality. Centralized authority decreased the efficiency of an organization since its entire operation depended on the person of the director. Little could be accomplished when that person was not available as no one else had the necessary authority to act. A very strong leader also tended to inhibit real input into decisions by
the staff. This kind of situation was reinforced by the prevalent cultural values which stressed respect for elders and discouraged the questioning of authority.

The generally individualist and authoritative nature of the leadership within the trade unions and associations had one additional drawback with serious implication for the future. This was the lack of effective "middle-level-management". Few young men and women were brought into the administrative system and trained for future leadership positions. The lack of provision for the future did nothing to ensure the continuity of the popular organizations and added to the general uncertainty over the future. Many of the organizations functioning in the Gaza Strip would be unable to maintain their current programmes or at least would suffer severe setbacks if the current leader were unable to continue his/her duties.

Although the nature of leadership of the trade unions and associations in the Gaza Strip was not optimal, this aspect should be set within the socio-economic-political context of the situation. If the organizations were operating within a comprehensive service infrastructure, overseen and aided to whatever degree possible by a friendly government, as was normal in the West and elsewhere, the drawbacks of the leadership were apparent. However, within the context of the situation of the Gaza Strip, the highly individualistic and strong leadership might in fact be a major contributing factor in much of the work accomplished. Collective leadership, many in the Gaza Strip argued, did not always allow the freedom of action and spontaneity often required to implement a project. It could be contended that accomplishments were often the direct result of the imagination of the leadership and its ability to use all available resources to overcome the obstacles facing it.

On the economic side, the analysis covered two case studies of lending organization activities in the Strip. The establishment of the lending organizations was motivated by the absence of an independent and effective Palestinian banking system. At the time of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, there were 3 banks operating in the Gaza Strip.\(^1\) The Israeli authorities closed all the banks immediately after their conquest of the Gaza Strip, froze their accounts and transferred the cash balances to the Central Bank of Israel. Effectively, the Gaza Strip was left without a formal banking system, and the only banks licensed to operate were

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Israeli. Following the intifada, all Israeli bank branches in the Gaza Strip were closed.

The lending organizations played a significant role in the field of economic development in the Gaza Strip. They gave loans to small projects and encouraged investment. These organizations also prepared people to take risks and to deal with the idea of investment and business. In 1993, the volume of their lending capacity was less than US$10 million. In 1992, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Gaza Strip was 751,777 million Israeli Shekels (IS) (US$250 million).

A number of points should be made about the lending organizations' economic role. In some cases, the Israeli authorities interfered in the decisions for approving funding for proposed projects. The emphasis of the activities of the organizations was on financing service and consumer-oriented projects. They kept away from productive projects. In the few cases where productive projects were approved, they were not to compete with Israeli products of the same kind which were marketed in the Gaza Strip. Priority was given to projects which would improve the physical infrastructure, with special emphasis on maintaining the existing structures rather than on developing them. This infrastructure should have been the responsibility of the occupation authorities.

The lending organizations did not comply with a comprehensive national economic development plan: their policies were formulated by individuals, not by a Palestinian national authority; coordination among the organizations was more formal than essential; and most members of the administrative boards of the lending organizations did not have adequate expertise and efficiency to evaluate the priorities and needs of the national economy.

Projects which were financed by these organizations made the rich richer, because no project was given a loan unless the investor could cover 30-50% of its total cost. Thus, only rich people could start an enterprise and their capital increased more and more. In other words, the organizations served a limited stratum (i.e. the rich) of the population and their activities were not directed to benefit the wider community in the Gaza Strip.

The situation during the intifada reflected negatively on the lending
organizations' activities. Curfews, general strikes, closure and instability hindered their activities. Until 1992, most of the projects, especially the agricultural projects which were financed by the lending organizations, failed. Moreover, some people did not recognize the "meaning" of a loan and they took loans as grants without a perceived obligation of repayment.

In the field of services, loans were given to projects that aimed at providing medical equipment, health and other services. This saved the occupation authorities money since the health services fell within their jurisdiction. Moreover, the authorities used these projects for propaganda purposes as evidence that they supported the process of development.

In the Gaza Strip, US$12,000-15,000 was needed to generate a single job. Thus, the job-creating projects which were financed by the lending organizations were very few.

Most of the lending organizations in the Gaza Strip played the role of "implementing organizations". They did not participate in formulating strategies and policies of economic development, nor did they give loans to projects as part of a comprehensive developmental strategy. In fact, the granting states themselves defined the sectors which should be given loans and the amount of loan needed for each project.

The researcher would like to lay down a number of recommendations. Concentration of the headquarters of the trade unions and associations in Gaza city should be reassessed and decentralization of the organizations should be implemented.

In order to develop the trade unionism and associations in the Gaza Strip, the trade union movement should be given freedom to function. This should be done by explicitly granting rights in law to trade unions. These should include the right to organize, to negotiate work conditions with employers and the authority, and the right to sign binding collective agreements. Further, the trade union movement should be independent of the government and not subject to interference that might affect its freedom. It is difficult to articulate a precise prescription for the future, but cancelling military regulations and shifting control of legislative power to the Palestinians are among most important basic
steps toward meaningful political, social, organizational, and economic development.

Overall, much work is needed to continue to overcome the problems of lack of coordination. Communication and coordination among the popular organizations should be developed to ensure that an unnecessary duplication of efforts does not become widespread. Coordination and cooperation and joint projects among the trade unions and associations of the Gaza Strip remain an area where great improvements could be made.

Finally, the Palestinian organizations and authority must genuinely represent the interests of the Palestinians. Only then can the Palestinian people control their interests, aspirations, and most importantly their future.
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2.2. Newspapers, Newsletters, and Periodicals

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