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POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS IN IRAQ, 1908-1920

by

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A Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Durham

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This study is to analyze the principal patterns of proto-nationalism as they emerged in the anti-colonial movement in the first two decades of twentieth century. The earliest party political activities were based on notions of Arab separatism from the Ottoman Empire and on anti-Western attitudes on the part of some religious Shi‘i. On the eve of the award of the mandate for Iraq to Britain, two major political parties were actively opposed to the British occupation, and this opposition found expression in the country-wide uprising in 1920.

At this stage Iraqi nationalism, in the sense of both qawmiya and wataniya, was only at a very early stage of development. The popularity and breadth of the uprising was largely due to its being based on a combination of existing social networks, and the way in which it acted as a focus for proto-national and anti-colonial sentiments. Haras al-Istiqnal succeeded in mobilizing 'traditional society' and managed at least in part to overcome tribal, religious, sectarian and urban/rural differences, especially with a support it attracted from Shi‘i ‘ulama and sadaq. al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi, on the other hand, originally
established as an 'Arabist' society by former Ottoman officers, also tried to mobilize tribal society, mainly in northern Iraq, after becoming separated from its Syrian-based founders. This caused antagonisms between the organization's headquarters in Damascus and tribal and other local political forces in Iraq.

Both parties attempted to mobilize sentiments which can be described loosely as 'Iraqist'. Although the idea of Iraqi wataniya was still vague in 1920, this early expression of Iraqism as a proto-nationalist force has functioned as a source for reproduction and the imagining of Iraqi national identity.
Introduction: political parties and social networks in Iraq, 1908-1920

The term 'nationalism' is the translation of two different terms in Arabic. The first is \textit{wataniya}, territorial patriotism based on the \textit{watan}, or fatherland; the second is \textit{qawmiya}, common cultural and ethnic identity based on Arab descent and the Arabic language. The strength of \textit{wataniya} differs greatly between Arab countries; thus the anti-colonial movement in late 19th century Egypt began as a form of \textit{wataniya}. On the other hand, as \textit{wataniya} basically derives from the existence of the sense of belonging to a particular territory, there was no clear idea of \textit{watan} in 19th century Syria, Jordan, or Iraq, except perhaps a vague territorial notion of Sham, Syria. The notion of \textit{wataniya} has tended to have become submerged under the flood tide of Arab nationalism, which gives priority to the Arab \textit{umma} or \textit{qawmiya}. It is only relatively recently that \textit{wataniya} has been emphasized in a number of Arab states as an official expression of patriotic feeling towards the national territory.

Because of these two manifestations of nationalism in the Arab world, there have been different interpretations.

tions of Arab political activities at the end of the Ottoman period and in the anti-colonial movements during the early period of British and French control over the Arab world. Most Arab historians have considered these movements to be part of the process of the development of Arab nationalism, and recognized them as marking the beginning of Arab nationalism or the development of Arab national consciousness. Antonius pointed out in 1938 that "the Arab national movement was born [in the middle of the 19th century] ... alive and growing, and was borne slowly towards its destiny on the wings of a renascent literature". Zeine noted that "this political nationalism [= the desire of the Arabs to be separated from the Turks] which marks the second stage in the development of Arab nationalism was primarily a product of political and social conditions prevailing during the last years of Turkish rule in Arab lands". al-Husri, one of the leading Arab nationalist writers, emphasizes that "the growth of Arab nationalist (qawmi) thought ....began in those Arab countries which remained under direct Ottoman rule in the middle of the 19th century", and "the Syrian Arab Kingdom was created in a strong and enthusiastic atmosphere of


These writers, as Khalidi has recently pointed out, "overemphasized the connections between the literary nahda linked to the earliest stirrings of protonationalist feeling in the late nineteenth century and the effervescence of the period from 1908 to 1914".

These and other historians and polemicists have tended to over-emphasize the Arab nationalist character of political events in Iraq during that period. The activities of political parties are explained in the context of the renaissance of Arab culture and supposedly of Arab nationalism. Some even describe the 1920 uprising in Iraq in terms of Arab nationalism (qawmiya). The 1920 uprising was the first large scale popular uprising in the area which had just become Iraq, but it was basically an anti-colonial movement aimed at securing the complete independence of Iraq from British control. Antonius stresses the

1. Al-Husri, Abu Khaldun Sati', Muhadarat fi Nushu' al-Fikra al-Qawmiya (Lectures on the evolution of Nationalist thought), Bayrut, Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiya, 1985 (First ed. 1951) p.120, p.158


role of "ex-officers of the Arab Revolt" in the uprising, and emphasized their relations with their fellow nationalists in Syria. Nazmi, though acknowledging the role of Haras and the Shi'i ulama in the uprising, also considers it as an Arab nationalist (qawmi) movement.

However, the characteristics of the 1920 uprising are in fact such that it can be more accurately described as an Iraqi nationalist (watani) movement. This conclusion has been reached particularly in accounts written by individuals who were themselves active in this uprising, including Muhammad al-Basir and 'Ali Bazirgan, who were both prominent in the political association Haras al-Istiqlal. al-Basir describes each tribal uprising in Middle Euphrates area as a "al-haraka al-wataniya" ([Iraqi] nationalist movement) in a book written just three years after the uprising. Although he recognized the existence of both "national (watani) and religious spirit" in the uprising in Shamiya, he emphasized the success of the nationalists (=wataniyun) in forcing the

3. al-Basir, Muhammad Mahdi, Tarikh al-Qadiya al-'Iraqiya (The history of Iraqi problem), London, LAAM, 1990, p.120.
British army to retreat from the Middle Euphrates area. These writers of course also describe themselves as active nationalist (watani) participants in this uprising, and it is reasonable to suppose that they would define any such movement as a nationalist movement. Nevertheless, their notion of wataniya itself was very vague and they made no clear distinction between the idea of a national movement and notions of anti-colonialism and the struggle for independence. as well as having only a vague concept of the Iraqi watan. More recently, al-Wardi has evinced a similar point of view, emphasizing the patriotic (watani) aspect of the uprising. He mentions that the people of Iraq called out "long live the watan" (=yahya al-watan) for the first time during the uprising, and says that the uprising itself was the foundation of Iraqi patriotism (liwa' al-watani). Clearly, this point of view is an implicit criticism of the analysis of the Arab nationalists.

If we accept the validity of this criticism of the Arab nationalist analysis, the religious perspective is worth taking into account, as exemplified by the role of the Shi'i ulama in the uprising. al-Rahimi has analyzed


2. al-Wardi, 'Ali, *Lamhat Iltima'iya min Ta'rīkh al-'Iraq al-Hadith* (Social aspects of modern Iraqi history), Vol.5, Baghdad, Matba'a al-Sha'b, 1974, p.15
Islamic movements in Iraq in the early decades of the 20th century, emphasizing that "the role of the 'ulama .... [was] crucial in the Najaf uprising in 1918 and in the 1920 uprising", defining these uprisings as "al-haraka al-Islamiya". Katib, using the phrase "thawra al-Islamiya", has a similar opinion. Moreover, Katib regards al-'Ahd and Faysal as negative aspects of the uprising, criticizing their attempt to appease Britain. al-Nafisi does not consider the uprising to have been the manifestation of an Islamic movement, but he emphasizes the role of the Shi'is, both 'ulama and tribes. Neither Katib nor Nafisi consider the uprising to have been al-haraka al-wataniya.

These different attitudes towards the 1920 uprising are mirrored in the very mixed responses of those who participated in or were closely connected with the participants in the uprising, as is clear from the works of Bazirgan and al-Hasir. al-Hasani quotes a number of interesting responses from witnesses of the uprising to his


3. al-Nafisi, 'Abd Allah Fahd, Dawr al-Shi'a fi'l-Tatawur al-'Iraq al-Siyasi al-Hadith (The role of the Shi'a in the modern political development of Iraq), Bayrut, Dar al-Nahar lil-Nashr, 1973

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He asked a number of 'ulama, tribal chiefs, sada' and prominent personalities what they thought had constituted the principal elements of the uprising, and whether they thought that there had been any financial support from Baghdad or outside Iraq, and so on. In reply, Naji al-Suwaydi, a member of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, mentioned that "feelings of qawmiya, religion, and wataniya .... were sharpened by the 'ulama and the tribal chiefs...". 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Shallash, a supporter of Haras, said that [the uprising happened] at the height of qawmiya among Iraqi tribes", while another supporter, 'Alwan al-Hajj al-Sa'dun, mentioned that "our uprising was for the sake of religion, watan, and the principle of Arabism." On the other hand, men of religion like 'Abd al-Karim al-Jaza'iiri emphasized that "[the purpose of the uprising] was to form an Arab/Islamic government" and "[the 'ulama's] function in the uprising was that of enjoiners of religious obedience, that is to the Imam and the shari'a". At the same time, other 'ulama recognized that "[the intention of the uprising was] the formation of an Arab watani government" (Jawad Sahib al-Jawahir), or "the Syrian Arab monarchy of Faysal and the Kemalist movement were the causes of the rise of the spirit of wataniya among the Iraqi people"(al-Shahrastani). Many of them mention the term watan in their responses but their

definition is vague and ambiguous.

In the course of abstracting particular aspects of this imprecise perception of watan from the various interpretations of the uprising, we can sense the operation of a mechanism of the "reinvention of the past". As Anderson and other scholars have shown, nationalism consist in part of imagining the community, and the legacy of the past is rediscovered in the process of the invention of an essentially imaginary nationalism. Works on the 1920 uprising have not escaped this tendency, and the ways in which scholars analyze the topic reflect their own image of national identity. It is clear that the Arab nationalist analysis reflects the rise of Arab nationalism as a major ideology on the political scene, or equally as a form of officially prescribed nationalism. In contrast, the religious perception expressed by al-Nafisi in 1973 and al-Rahimi in 1985 reflects the political situation of that period, under the oppressive Ba'th regime and the rise of the Islamic movement after the 1970's. In addition, it is significant that there has been a recent trend to reprint works emphasizing the primacy of watani or patriotic nationalism, such as those by al-Basir, Bazirgan, and al-Wardi. The work of al-Basir was reprinted in 1990, those

of al-Wardi in 1993, and that of al-Bazirgan in 1991, the first two being published in London. Under the strict restriction of press freedom in Ba'thist Iraq, it is interesting to see that more and more books are reprinted outside Iraq emphasizing the role of wataniyun, 'ulama, tribes, and cooperation between Sunni and Shi'i, in contrast with the official Arab nationalist interpretation.

These interpretations of the 1920 uprising show how an ambiguous, undefined "proto-nationalism" has been turned into a particular form of nationalism. The variety of perceptions of the 1920 uprising and the vagueness of the notion of watan as expressed by witnesses to or participants in the uprising derive from a number of elements in the uprising which combined in a form of popular proto-nationalism. The term "proto-nationalism" is defined by Hobsbawm as "certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed" which "state and national movements could mobilize". In his view the major elements of popular proto-nationalism are language, ethnicity, religion, and "the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity". Of course, "proto-nationalism alone is clearly not enough to form

nationalities". As I shall show in the following chapters, the expansion and chain-reaction of these proto-national feelings in the beginning of the period of British control did not lead directly to the emergence of Iraqi nationalism.

Nevertheless networks within this pre-existing proto-nationalism were used effectively used to mobilise people into various anti-colonial movements. "Networks" here means the complex of possible concurrences and chain-reactions of actions on the part of an individual or group based on a sense of real or imagined common identity. As Iraq lacks "the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity" --- apart from the fact that it was created from the three former Ottoman wilayats of Baghdad, Basra (without Kuwayt), and Mosul --- this mobilization depended on other components of proto-nationalism like ethnicity, language, and religion. More specifically, the major networks which were put to use in the anti-colonial movements were based on tribal, patriarchal and religious affiliation. These networks had long existed under the loose control of the Ottoman Empire, and we can call them "traditional" networks. On the other hand, as a consequence of the processes of modernisation in the late 19th and early 20th century Ottoman Empire, a number of new social networks had come into being. most

notably modern academic networks, military networks, and intellectual movements based on language and ethnicity. We can call these "modern" networks. I should say that I do not intend to suggest a frame of reference opposing "modern" to "traditional" but I shall try to clarify the process in which the two types of network were mobilized in the service of the popular movements. Here it is important to see how these networks were mobilized in the uprising, using tribal or patriarchal ties as the basis of imagined national identity, religious eminence as a symbol of integration, and a shared language as an indicator of a common cultural heritage.

Another important point to be discussed in the content of "mobilization by networks", is the "multiple structure of social identity". This notion was introduced by Itagaki, who emphasizes that "there are many answers to the question of self-identification, "who am I?"". According to him, social identity does not remain fixed, and the selection of identity much depends on political and social circumstances, "as if a man were to choose visiting cards on which his titles were printed differently to give to the different people he meets". As social networks are based on aspects of common identity within

1. Itagaki, Yuzo, Rekishi no Genzai to Chiliki-gaku (the Modernity of Historiography and Area Studies), Tokyo, Iwanami-Shoten, 1993, pp.219-222.
the community, they can be flexible and variable according to how the individual member of the community imagines, or is forced to imagine, his or her identity. It is true that Iraq has a diverse and heterogeneous population of Muslim and Christians, Sunni and Shi‘i sects, Arab and Kurdish ethnic groups, and some autonomous tribal confederations. Social networks and self-identification are often confined to these categories, but at the same time there are other forces at work to break down the heterogeneity. The Ulama’s religious network can surmount tribal and ethnic diversity, and consciousness of uruba (being Arab), or the legacy of all Arabs being descendants of ‘Adnan and Qahtan, can break down the difference between various tribal groups and between the Sunni and Shi‘i sects. Diversity does not mean that the various groups are either self-contained or monolithic, and ethnic, religious, and tribal differences are themselves not fixed but very fluid. I will discuss this flexibility of social networks in Chapter 2.

The range and scope of the networks and common social identity changes under different social and political circumstances, depending especially on the circumstances of state-society relations. When the state cannot offer the people a proper opportunity to participate in policy-making and economic distribution, it can often be the case that the people rely on their social networks either to obtain a share in the political and economic
monopoly of the state, or to oppose it. The period that I would like to discuss here is a good example of a time when the role of the state was undergoing very profound change (the decline and ultimate fall of the Ottoman Empire), and its future status was quite unclear (the form of the new Iraqi state was not decided until the Cairo conference of 1921). Under such circumstances, social networks play a crucial role in the political field.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether there are any possible social bases for the production and reproduction of wataniya. In order to do this, I will take the case of the uprising of 1920, and I would like to reconsider the uprising as a "proto-nationalist", in the various senses already mentioned. The following issues will be examined:

(1) What were the characteristics of political activity in Iraq on the eve of the First World War and afterwards? Did any unified ideology or "nationalism" cover all these activities?

(2) How did the nationalists in early 20th century in Iraq try to mobilize social networks?

(3) As social identity and networks are flexible, what kind of transformation of social networks or social identity actually took place?

In order to do this, I will analyze the main characteristics of Iraqi political activities during the period between the Young Turk Revolution and the uprising of 1920, on the basis of a consideration of the social back-
ground of the various political actors. The political actors naturally reflect the social networks from which they themselves originate, while political parties are more complex representations of these networks. Political activities in Iraq began with small scale networks representing their own interests as they had during the Ottoman period, and developed into broader networks as a consequence of the great transformation of society and of the threat posed by direct British control.

In Chapter 1, I will summarize the history of the political activities of Iraqi intellectuals during the period 1908-1920. Then in Chapter 2, I will analyze the basic characteristics of those social networks used in the mobilization of the population, and their role in the formation and conduct of political parties. In Chapter 3, focussing on three types of Iraqi intellectual or political associations active in the period, I will discuss the ways in which they tried to mobilize social networks and to combine them with each other.
1. Early political parties in Iraq: reactions to the 1908 Revolution

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 had a considerable impact on the political situation in Iraq. Many branches of the CUP were established in the Iraqi provinces, notably in Baghdad, Najaf, Mosul and Hilla. As many historians have noted, differences between Turks and Arabs emerged clearly for the first time under the new regime of the CUP. Western nationalism also had an important influence, as well as the opposition movements against the increasing centralization of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish officials were preferred to Arab officials for government posts after the revolution, and religious circles in particular felt the disadvantages of the new system of government.

The Young Turk Revolution was not the first occasion that what may be described as "traditional" Iraqi society had undergone a substantial transformation. In addition to

1. There are many discussions of the origins of Arab nationalism in this period. See articles in Khalidi, et.al., op.cit.
the major legal reforms of the Tanzimat era, Midhat Pasha had initiated a major reform of the educational system during his governorship of Baghdad (1869-71). The first modern secular schools were established in 1869 with the first rushdiye [secondary] military school in Baghdad followed by an i'dadi military [high] school in 1879. In 1881, a civil i'dadi school was established. In the latter half of the 19th century, the number of modern schools increased. At the end of the Ottoman era there were 71 primary schools, about 10 civilian secondary schools, a military secondary school, a high school for officers, and a high school for civilians in Baghdad. The purpose of the reforms was to train Arab officers for recruitment into the new Ottoman Army. These changes had a profound impact on traditional Islamic society; in particular the 'ulama lost much of their prestige as they had always


2. The sixth Corps of the Ottoman Army was placed in Iraq in 1848, and many Iraqis were recruited to this corps. See Republic of Iraq, Ta'rikh al-Quwat al-`Iraqiya al-Musallaha (History of the Iraqi Armed Forces), vol.1, Baghdad, Dar al-`Arabiyah, 1986, p.143.

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played a leading role in the religious educational system.

The first reaction against the 1908 Revolution came from these traditional 'ulama. The naqib al-ashraf of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani, formed Jam'iya al-Mushawwara, which opposed the policy of the CUP. He had enjoyed popularity as naqib, and on the basis of this eminence had became a member of the Ottoman parliament. But the rise of the CUP threatened his position. Other members of the Ja'miya were 'Isa al-Jamil and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Haydari, both of whom were sada' and prominent Baghdadi notables. Their main aim was to maintain the integrity of the Islamic community and Islamic law, both of which they considered threatened by the new Ottoman constitution.

Apart from such reactions from traditional circles, there was also a significant response to the policy of the CUP from modern intellectuals. Young educated Arabs formed the nucleus of the political parties opposing the CUP, and several Iraqis joined these parties. It is significant

1. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani (locally pronounced "al-Gaylani") was a descendant of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani who was the founder of the Qadiri sufi order (tariqa), the first tariqa in the Muslim world in 11th century. See Isuramu Jiten (in Japanese, [Encyclopedia of Islam]), Tokyo, Heibonsha, 1982.

2. For the social position of the Naqib in the Arab world in the last days of Ottoman Empire, see Khoury, Philip, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.14.
that such parties were established in Istanbul first. In 1908 *al-Jam'iya al-Ikha' al-'Arabi al-'Uthmaniya* was formed in Istanbul, and among its Iraqi members were Shakir al-'Alusi, Najl al-Suwaydi, and Hamdi al-Pachachi. Initially, the Arab parties established in Istanbul claimed to support the maintenance and unification of the Empire. Subsequently their programmes put forward demands for Arab autonomy and ultimately independence. *al-Jam'iya al-Qahtaniya* emerged in 1909, also insisting on the integration of the Empire, but at the same time demanding the administrative autonomy of the Arab provinces.

On the other hand, *al-Hizb al-Hurr al-Mu'tadil*, one of the anti-CUP parties based in Istanbul, established its branches in Basra, Baghdad and Mosul in 1911. Among them the Basra branch led by Sayyid Talib al-Naqib was the most active and rather independent from its center in

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Istanbul, and it had an important influence in developing the anti-CUP movements in Iraq. Talib also led the Basra branch of Hizb al-Hurriya w'al-I'tilaf, the successor organization to al-Hizb al-Mu'tadil in Basra. Meanwhile he became more and more inclined to Arab separatism, having good relations with Hizb al-La-Markaziya al-Idariya al-Uthmaniya in Cairo, and eventually he organized his own political party, al-Jam'iya al-Islahiya fi'1-Basra, in 1913. It was the first Iraqi political party to insist on the separation of the Arab lands from the Ottoman Empire.

Not only political activities but the Iraqi cultural renaissance began mainly in Basra. In 1910 Jam'iya al-


Also see the lists of the parties in Tables, which were derived from the above sources, although I omit the names of the members who are mentioned only once and cannot be traced in the other sources.
'Ilmiya al-Adabiyah f'il-Basra was formed, whose objective was to appreciate and emphasize the importance of the language, culture, and history of the Arabs. These political parties in Basra demanded the official usage of the Arabic language. Thus Basra, in this period, was the centre of "Arabism" in Iraq.

Notions of the Arab revival and Arab separatism spread to Baghdad from Basra by 1912. Hamdi al-Pachachi, an ex-member of al-Jam'iya al-'Uthmaniya, formed Nadi al-Watan al-'Ilmi and Talib al-Naqib supported it. In Mosul, in comparison with the other two cities, "Arabism" had little echo as the grip of the CUP was tight. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that Da'ud al-Dabbuni, an ex-member of al-Qahtaniya, from Mosul played a leading part in Istanbul in organizing the pro-Ibn Sa'ud party of al-'Alam al-Akhdar and an anti-Turkish terrorist party called al-Yad al-Sawda'.

1. Atiya, al-Basir, and Shabar mention this name or al-Nadi al-Watani, but al-Juburi mentions the party called Nadi al-'Ilmi. Al-Juburi mentions only a few members like Hamdi al-Pachachi in Nadi al-'Ilmi, though Atiya names 'Abd al-Majid al-Kanna, who supported the activities of Haras and formed Jam'iya al-Difa', and Shabar names Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi and Mubdir al-Fir'un, the tribal chief of Fatla, as the members of Nadi al-Watani al-'Ilmi. Also al-Juburi insists that the founding year of the party was 1912, though the other two 1913. But it might be the same organization as the characteristics of both parties are very similar and both are described as the publisher of the newspaper of al-Nahda. See al-Basir, op.cit. p.29.; Shabar, ibid, pp.20-21; Atiya, ibid., pp.59-60.
2. The second stage of party political activity: from anti-Ottoman movement to anti-British movement

(a) Shi'i Political Activities

Until 1914, the focus of the activities of all political parties was directed mainly against the new Ottoman regime. After the First World War broke out in 1914, these activities had two aspects: one towards the Ottoman regime, and another towards Britain and other European colonial powers.

Among the 'ulama, the threat posed by the European powers had been seriously felt since the late 19th century. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh had already sounded the alarm and insisted on the protection of the Islamic community. In Iraq, the Shi'i 'ulama in particular were quick to respond against the threat from the "kafirs". The call to jihad had been sounded against the Russian invasion of Iran in 1910, and against the Italian attack on Libya in 1911. The first organized political activity of the Iraqi Shi'i 'ulama was a call for jihad against Britain in 1914, when the war started on the Basra front. Muhammad al-Habubi, a friend of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, was the most active 'alim and himself

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took part in the battle of Shu'ayba.

Notwithstanding this atmosphere among the Shi'i 'ulama, most intellectuals who were committed to the opposition movement against the Ottoman regime were pro-British, as they expected Britain would support demands for Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire. The jihad movement did not expand or last for long because of the ambiguous attitude of the tribes. As British forces increased their military superiority, more and more tribes and influential local urban families came to favour British protection.

In 1918, when it became unambiguously clear that the British would take over Iraq, the situation changed. As I shall mention in the next chapter in more detail, the tribes came to sense the threat of direct British control.

The introduction of the new tax system and the appointment


2. Atiyya notices that the chiefs of mahalla in Najaf were cooperative with Britain and they celebrated when the Baghdad fell into the British control in 1917. *op.cit.*, p.227.

Also in Karbala', 'Ali Kanuma, the ruler of the city, asked for the help of Britain to assure him "the independent and hereditary authority to the holy area from Samarra' to Najaf". See al-Wardi, *op.cit.*, pp.192-196.
of British Political Officers to each area forced tribal society to recognize the growing potential threat to their autonomy. In 1918, Jam'iya al-Nahda al-Islamiya was established, an anti-British organization composed of 'ulama and leading families in Najaf. The Najaf uprising against Britain in 1918 was mainly backed by this organization, and Najm al-Baqqal, the leader of the riots, was a member of the militant section of al-Nahda.

al-Nahda was the first political party in which Shi'i 'ulama took a leading role; it was followed by similar organisations in Karbala' and Kazimiya. In Karbala', Muhammad Rida, the son of marja'-i taqlid Muhammad al-Shirazi, formed Jam'iya al-Islamiya fi Karbala'. In Kazimiya, Abu'l-Qasim al-Kashani organized Jam'iya al-Islamiya fi al-Kazimiya. In Najaf, after al-Nahda collapsed

1. As for the reasons for tribal and local resistance to Britain, we can mention the abhorrence of non-Muslim rulers and Western style of control which the local people had never experienced, the transformation of local industry because of the introduction of the market economy, the promotion of transportation which oppressed the local traditional traders, and so on. I do not discuss about such reasons here. See the works of Issawi, Charles, The economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966, and Sluglett, Peter, Britain in Iraq, London, Ithaca Press, 1976.

2. Information on the parties in Karbala' and Kazimiya comes from Shabar, op.cit., pp.75-76. On the other hand, Juburi mentions Jam'iya al-Wataniya al-Islamiya in Karbala', which seems to be the same organization as Shabar mentions as most of the members are same. According to Juburi, Muhammad al-Shirazi himself joined the party. Juburi, op.cit..
because of British repression, al-Hizb al-Najafi al-Sirri was established by 'ulama and tribal chiefs in 1919. The main characteristic of these Islamic parties was that all their members were Shi'i, and that their activities were confined to southern Iraq, especially Najaf.

(b) Jam'iya al-'Ahd

1918 was the great turning point for Iraq. After a four year campaign, the three wilayats of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul fell decisively under British control and Britain began to rule the territory of Iraq directly. Furthermore, the establishment of the Arab Kingdom in Syria in the same year had a great impact on the national movement in the Arab world. The Arab Kingdom was an important symbol for the Arab movement but it had two aspects which were incompatible. The first was that Faysal, the son of Sharif Husayn of Makka, had relied on Britain to establish his rule over Syria, a compromise arrangement typical of the attitudes of Arab intellectuals at that time. The other was that Faysal depended on Arab military officers, especially those who had joined the Makka revolt. These officers formed Faysal's most important power base, but they were not entirely pro-British, as many of them were from Iraq, which Britain was now attempting to "control".

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Abu al-Qasim al-Kashani later supported Mossadeq and was active in the anti-Shah movements in Iran.
rather than "liberate".

Jam'iya al-'Ahd, established in Istanbul in 1913 and subsequently in Damascus, was an organisation composed largely of Arab military officers with a few civilian intellectuals. Its political slogans were similar to those of al-Qahtan, advocating the introduction of the "Austro-Hungarian" system into the Ottoman Empire. Many of members of al-'Ahd joined the Arab revolt in support of the Sharif. al-'Ahd made its pro-British stance clear from the beginning of its activities, and one of its members, Sharif al-Faruqi, was the principal intermediary between Sharif Husayn and Britain.

In al-'Ahd, Arab officers played a leading role and the percentage of officers from Iraq was particularly high. Atiyya notes that a military career was almost the only means of upward social mobility for young lower class Iraqi Sunnis. A pattern typical of the Iraqi members of

1. The early slogans of al-'Ahd insisted on the maintenance of the position of the Khalifa in the Ottoman dynasty, and refusal of the dismemberment of Ottoman territory by foreign powers. Here the 'Austro-Hungarian Empire' system means the system "where the Arabs have rooms in the house of Uthman". Juburi, op.cit., pp.11-13.; al-Basir, op.cit., p.25.

al-'Ahd can be seen in the career of Maulud Mukhlis. He went to the military rushdiye school in Baghdad, and expected to proceed to the military academy in Istanbul. But he failed to get accepted and this made him very hostile towards the Ottoman government. After returning to Iraq, he took part in the battle of Shu'ayba as an Ottoman officer, but soon afterwards deserted from the Ottoman Army and asked the British to support the creation of an independent Arab force. 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi's career developed on similar lines to that of Mukhlis.

When Faysal's Kingdom came into being in Syria in 1918, al-'Ahd became divided into the Syrian Branch and the Iraqi Branch. Both were based in Damascus and their basic policy was to ask Britain for technical assistance. But it was natural that it was difficult to maintain a united policy towards Britain because of the different

1. This information on the career of Mukhlis is from al-Wardi, vol.4, op.cit.; Zumayzam, op.cit.; Faydi, Sulayman, Mudakkirat Sulayman Faydi fi Ghamra al-Nidal (Memoire of Sulayman Faydi in the flood of struggle), Beirut, Dar al-Qalam, 1952.

When Mukhlis and Jawdat approached British forces in Iraq, they asked Britain for support to establish their own Arab forces. Britain refused their demand and insisted that the Arab officers should be included within the British forces with high salaries and ranks. Here we can see a sign of disharmony between Arab officers and Britain. See al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.4, pp.172-174.

2. Atiyya points out that the Syrian members were hostile to the Iraqi officers, who were the majority of the Sharifian officers, considering that they had joined the Arab revolt for higher ranks and salaries, not for political motives. op.cit., pp.104-107.
circumstances pertaining in both regions. As Syria was threatened with French occupation, it was in some sense reasonable for Faysal and the Syrian al-'Ahd to seek British support. On the other hand, Iraq was actually occupied by Britain and a clash with Britain would be inevitable if independence was to be achieved. This difference in the political situation brought some discord between Faysal's regime and some members of al-'Ahd al-Iraqi, most notably Yasin al-Hashimi. al-Hashimi remained a senior officer in the Ottoman Army until the end of the First World War, and did not join the Sharifians. Since he felt no particular loyalty to Faysal or Britain, Britain threw him into prison as he was critical of British policy. Ja'afar al-'Askari, one of the Sharifian officers, criticised al-Hashimi in 1931 saying that he had remained in the 8th Ottoman Corps which was the "enemy of the Arab brothers".

Yasin al-Hashimi and other members of al-'Ahd al-Iraqi strengthened their anti-British tendency and started to attempt to liberate their homeland. First Ramadan al-Shallash, the commander of the Syrian Army in Raqqa,


moved his troops and tribesmen to Dayr al-Zur in July 1919. Dayr al-Zur was under the control of British forces at the time and al-Shallash's purpose was to annex it to the territory of the Syrian Arab Kingdom. He also tried to proceed to Albu Kamal, clashing with British forces. al-Shallash was replaced by Maulud Mukhlis, who took the same stance as his predecessor. In March 1920, leading members of al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi called the first Iraqi National Conference in Damascus. They adopted the following declaration:

(1) We demand the complete independence of Iraq, which is composed of the Wilayas of Diyar Bakr, Mosul, Baghdad, Basra and Dayr al-Zur....

(2) Its government should be a constitutional monarchy whose king is either Amir `Abd Allah or Amir Zayd.

(3)...(omitted)
(4) All necessary economic and technical support should come from the U.S. as long as it does not violate our political independence.

(5) We reject any immigrants of non-Arab races, particularly Indians and Jews.

(6) We demand the complete independence of Syria...

The important changes of policy in this declaration were the anti-British statements in (4) and (5). In the early days al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi had expected support from Britain but now they asked for American aid.

2. In (5), "migrants from India" means Indian soldiers or officers who were British subjects.
In this anti-British atmosphere, Jamil al-Midfai moved his corps towards Mosul and incited the bedouin tribes to rise against Britain. Groups of tribesmen occupied Tall 'Afar with some help from al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in June 1920, but the occupation lasted for only a short period. Soon after the uprising of Tall 'Afar, the Syrian Kingdom was overthrown by French forces and also the activities of both al-'Ahds came to an end.

(c) Jam'lya Haras al-Istiqlal

The political activities of al-'Ahd formed the principal anti-British movement outside Iraq. Another major political player, which developed inside Iraq, was Jam'lya Haras al-Istiqlal. It was formed in 1919, when A.T. Wilson, Acting British Civil Commissioner in Iraq, asked the Iraqi people three questions about their future: whether Iraq should include Mosul, which kind of polity the Iraqi people needed, and who should become the leader of the country.

1. It is well known that Wilson wanted to declare Iraq a full protectorate under Britain, despite the intentions of India and Foreign Office. He had expected that the answer to these questions would be a demand for British rule over Iraq, and this was indeed the reactions from many regions in Iraq, except Baghdad, Najaf, and Karbala'. Atiyya and al-Wardi point out that the people had no experience of being asked about the future of their own polity as they had been unaware of the idea of self-determination, and this brought satisfactory answers to Wilson. See Busch,
**Haras al-Istiqal** took this opportunity to present their demands to Britain. They demanded the complete independence of Iraq and the installation of one of the sons of Sharif Husayn as king. Leading members of Haras were Muhammad al-Sadr, Yusuf al-Suwaydi, 'Ali Bazirgan, Ja'far Abu'l-Timman, and Ahmad al-Shaykh Da'ud. These leading members of Haras came from a variety of backgrounds; al-Sadr was a Shi'i notable 'alim, al-Suwaydi was a Sunni notable 'alim, Bazirgan had been a Sunni effendi under the Ottomans, and Abu'l-Timman was a lawyer from a Shi'i merchant family. All were from Baghdad, but no uniform characteristics united them.

Wilson, however, rejected their demands and at first did not even want to talk to them. But as Haras increased its agitation, organising demonstrations and popular gatherings in mosques, the government could not help taking these activities more seriously. On 23 May 1920, 'Isa 'Abd al-Qadlr, the poet, recited a nationalist poem

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1. al-Suwaydi was from an influential Sunni family second only to the family of al-Naqib in Baghdad. Nazmi, *op.cit.*, p.335. He was a sayyid but his family was not mentioned in the Ottoman list of sada' in 1894 as he was a descendant of 'Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet. Batatu, Hanna, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1978, p.154.
in a ta'ziya gathering (see Chapter 3). His subsequent arrest was followed by a fierce clash between the British police and people demanding his release. Haras organizing the delegation which negotiated his release. 15 representatives were elected as delegates, including the above-mentioned members of Haras and Sa`id al-Naqshbandi, Abu'l-Qasim al-Kashani, and so on. It was not a delegation only for the release of those arrested but also to discuss the future of Iraq with the government.

Wilson agreed to see them on 26 May. The delegation requested as follows:

(1) Immediate independence.

(2) The establishment of a national congress which would decide the future polity of Iraq.

(3) Freedom of the press.

(4) Removal of restrictions on communication inside and outside Iraq.

At the meeting Wilson invited pro-British Iraqis like 'Abd al-Majid al-Shawi and Jews, who did not dare to oppose the demands of Haras, contrary to Wilson's expectations. In


June the representatives met again with Wilson and Bonham-Carter, but no agreement was reached. In July, Wilson decided to form an electoral committee as a preliminary to the election of a general assembly. He invited the former Iraqi deputies to the Ottoman parliament, but it was clear that its purpose was only to buy time to avert the nationalist attack. Talib al-Naqib, Sulayman Faydi and other former members of the Ottoman parliament accepted this offer, but Abu'l-Timman, al-Suwaydi and al-Sadr of Haras rejected it.

As it had obtained no results from the negotiations with Wilson, Haras increased its agitation and the mobilisation of the people. At the same time there were increasingly frequent tribal uprisings in the Middle Euphrates area. Many of the tribal leaders who rose in the uprising were members or supporters of Haras. The government decided to arrest members of Haras in the middle of August, fearing the expansion of the uprising. Ahmad al-Shaykh Da'ud was caught and exiled to Hinjam Island, and 'Abd al-Majid al-Kanna who helped several of them to flee was executed. Others including Abu'l-Timman, al-Suwaydi, and al-Sadr escaped arrest. They fled from Baghdad to Karbala' and Najaf, where they supported the tribal uprising. Although these individuals continued to be active, Haras as a political organization collapsed as a result.

of British repression.
Chapter 2. Basic networks of Iraqi society: traditional networks and modern networks

Chapter 1 gave a short history of Iraqi political parties. In general the activities of these parties began on a small scale when they were in Istanbul, and then expanded over much of the territory of Iraq in the days of Haras. In brief, the early political activities of Iraqi intellectuals were confined to the small circles of their academic and military careers, old patron-client relationships, or religious networks. The broadening of the political activities of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and Haras was achieved as they expanded and combined these various networks. As I will mention in the next chapter in greater detail, al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, which was basically composed of a small circle of ex-Ottoman officers, tried to extend its network of popular mobilization by cooperating with tribal groups and local political groups in Mosul. Haras, based in Baghdad, succeeded in combining religious and tribal networks with the rising anti-British movement among intellectuals there.

Before analyzing these parties' activities, I would like to make a short overview of the various social networks in Iraq. In very broad terms, the late 19th century and early 20th century was a period of major transformation from "traditional" to "modern" society. By "tradi-
tional society" I mean the society which existed under the Ottoman Empire until the modern nation-state system was introduced under the influence of Europe. Here I will survey the situation of "traditional" Iraqi society, which I will define in terms of tribal and religious networks, and "modern" society, especially the academic and military networks based on the new educational system.

1. Characteristics of "traditional" society: tribal networks

(a) A general overview of "tribal society"

Throughout the Arab world family ties are strong and form the basis of society. In terms of the standard terminology, the word is a'ila in Arabic, and several groups of a'ila form a fakhd. An 'ashira is "composed of several fakhds or families [buyut], which live collectively in a common way". Then comes the qabila, the largest of the units, which is "a body uniting several 'asha'ir [pl. of 'ashira]." 'ashira is usually translated as clan, and qabila as tribe. However, the size of an 'ashira or qabila is variable and the difference between the two is often not quite clear. The integration of the components is not

1. The definitions are from al-'Azzawi, 'Abbas, 'Asha'ir al-'Iraq (Iraqi tribes), vol.1, Baghdad, Sharika al-Tijara wa'l-Tiba' a al-Mahduda, 1937, p.54.
2. Ibid.
entirely dependent on kinship, as Eickelman notes. Here I will use the word "tribal society" or "tribal group" for both 'ashira and qabila without making any distinction between them. However, as the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the internal structure of individual tribal groups but to analyze the relations between tribal society and other societies and the state, "tribal society" can be roughly defined as a society bound by tribal kinship or loyalty, whatever its size. The bond which unites members of a tribal group is called 'asabiya (=solidarity), according to Ibn Khaldun. As 'asabiya means "nerve", tribal society can be seen as an aggregate of nerves based on a real or fictitious common ancestor. Quoting Fu'ad Khuri and Richard Tapper, Philip Khoury suggests that tribal society can be viewed "as a collective substance..., a typical mode of behavior and a value system, or ... state of mind".

The important point here is that tribal members can select their "common ancestor" according to the social and political situation. They choose a "common ancestor" who seems to be the most relevant person for them as their tribal founder. The Sabah family in Kuwayt, originally

from the 'Utub tribal confederation, achieved their own autonomous status as the political leaders of that confed-eration in the middle of the 18th century, and since then their identity as members of al-Sabah seems to have been stronger than as a member of 'Utub. Nevertheless, solidarity among the 'Utub can be seen in confronting external threats, shaping the alliance between al-Sabah and al-Khalifa of Bahrayn against Arab tribes in Persia. The extent of tribal integration and alliance depends largely on objective factors and political orientation and can often be quite fluid, fabricating a history of tribal cohesion in many different political situations. Hence political solidarity can sometimes expand to level of imara, a confederation of qabila, and can equally easily break down into fragments of 'ashira or fakhd. Some tribal groups like the Shammar (in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula), the Muntafiq (in southern Iraq), or the Ka'b (around Muhammara) constituted large scale political entities, and achieved an autonomous political status as imara within the existing states (the Ottoman Empire, Iran) in the 18th and 19th centuries. However, integration on the level of the imara suffered from the various reforms of the state, and the Muntafiq imara was an good example; it had begun to disintegrate after the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, which effectively transformed the status of their paramount

shaykh from that of a political and military leader to that of a mere landowner.

Tribal cohesion on the basis of a "common ancestor" is often strengthened by the Bedouin tribal ethos. Certain features have long remained constant among the Bedouin; as Ibn Khaldun says, Bedouin people are "undomesticated beasts in the eyes of townsman"... but "more courageous and virtuous than them", and "are ready to help themselves by themselves without depending upon others.... It is only these who have the ties of 'asabiya that can live in the desert". Even until the middle of the 20th century, the strength of tribal cohesion based on 'asabiya was maintained to a very considerable extent, and tribal leaders held certain powers based on the loyalty of their tribesmen. Bedouin tribal society has the capacity to form an autonomous, cohesive social entity with its own ethos, as we can see in the autonomy of the Shammar and the Muntafiq. In addition, the military strength of tribal groups contributed greatly to their ability to maintain their autonomy. Thus the Muntafiq kept its autonomous status with its military power which could challenge that of the Ottoman Empire until the 1870's.

The strength and persistence of this kind of tribal cohesion long continued to be a feature of urban and settled rural society, as well as of nomadic groups, in the Arab world in general and in Iraq in particular. Those who have settled can easily lose their autonomy and 'asabiya, as Ibn Khaldun notes, but the tribal ethos is still effective as a form of social cement. Tribal manners and customs are often imported to the cities, as can be seen in the example of migrants to Baghdad who kept their tha'r customs until recently.

Thus the tribal society can be described as a social entity on the basis of a changeable "common ancestor", united by 'asabiya and loyalty to its tribal leader, strengthened by tribal ethos and military power, which has the potential to develop into a politically autonomous unit, the imara. This society can be easily mobilized by other political actors, especially by the state, when its "history" or ethos is remolded into another political

ideology, that of national integration. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud introduced the new ideology of the ikhwan based on Wahhabi principles into tribal society. After a clash between himself and the ikhwan in 1929, 'Abd al-'Aziz tried to use and reorganize the Bedouin tribal forces as an army. A similar policy was adopted by Amir 'Abd Allah of Transjordan. Equally in the Gulf countries, Davis states, some ruling families like al-Sabah have tried to use tribalism as "an important component of the official conceptualization of state formation". He continues: "oil wealth has allowed certain tribal values, such as those of hospitality and paterfamilias, to be transferred from the tribal context to that of the nation-state as a whole".

At the same time, however, tribal society can often function as a manifestation of opposition towards the state, since its cohesive power makes tribal groups likely challengers to the political centre. Loyalty is not to the central government or the state but to tribal chiefs if the 'asabiya of their society remains strong. Given that a modern state should ideally be based on civil society, tribal loyalty must be overcome. If tribal ties are


stronger, the soldiers in a modern army, many of whom have been recruited from tribal backgrounds, may well join tribal uprisings against the state. This might be more serious in situations where the tribal society has its own military forces independent of the central power. The quantity of arms in the hands of tribal groups was greater than those possessed by the government at the beginning of British rule in Iraq, with the result that the introduction of conscription largely undermined tribal political autonomy. We can see an example of this in the tribes' fierce resistance to the introduction of conscription in 1935-36. Thus the tribal society has a dual relationship with the state, as it can both easily be swayed into participating in the state structure, and into becoming a potential threat to the integrity of the state.

1. British reports underline contemporary fears of tribal solidarity undermining national integration as follows: "Many of the officers are believed to be in sympathy with the government's opponents [-tribal rebels], and the majority of the rank and file, being Shi'a... some few officers actually refused to proceed to the front, and the men of the punitive column... were reduced to tears by the appeals of the women not to shed the blood of their brother Arabs and coreligionist." F0371/18945, 21, March, 1935.

2. The government had 15,000 guns, while more than 100,000 rifles were in private hands in 1933. See Simon, Reeva S., Iraq Between the Two World Wars: the Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p.117.

(b) The political attitudes of tribal society in Iraq, 1908-1920

The earliest political activity based on tribal 'asabiya in the period under examination was the revolt in Najaf in 1915. As has already been shown, it had often been the case that tribal groups attained autonomous status in the Ottoman Empire. But the autonomy of Najaf was remarkable because of its agitation against both the Ottoman government and Britain at the same time. The anti-Ottoman movement in Najaf was encouraged by Iraqi officers who fled from the Shu'ayba battlefield to Najaf and was intensified as the Ottoman government tightened its control over the local society of Najaf. There was growing resistance to the interference of central government; the people of Najaf attacked official buildings and occupied them, and then set up an independent municipal organization. Karbala' also experienced an anti-Ottoman insurrection in the same year.

The autonomous body in Najaf strengthened its relations with Britain at various times in order to confront the Ottoman forces. But Britain also came to threaten the autonomy of Najaf after the defeat of the Ottomans and the occupation of Baghdad. British political officers were sent to Najaf and Shamiya in 1917. The vital objective for the local power centre in Najaf was the maintenance of its autonomous body in Najaf, op.cit., vol.4, p.188.
autonomy, and its relations with Britain were only secondary. British officials were also suspicious of the loyalty of these local forces. ʿAtiyya Abu Qulal, the head of ʿAmara mahalla in Najaf, asked for British help in the insurrection of 1915, but he also kept on trading with the Ottoman forces which retreated to Ramadi after the fall of Baghdad.

As a result of the ambiguous relations between the local powers in Najaf and the British, the pro-British ʿAnaza tribe migrated to the vicinity of Najaf in October 1917. Abu Qulal requested them to pay tax, but they refused. In addition the increase in the population brought about a serious inflation of the price of grain. Britain offered no mediation in the conflict between Abu Qulal and the ʿAnaza, and frustration in Najaf was directed against Britain. Faced with attacks from Abu Qulal, Britain sent a political officer to assert tougher control. This brought about another anti-British movement on the part of Jamʿiyya al-Nahda al-Islamiya, whose military section was led by Najm al-Baqqal. al-Baqqal organized groups of youths from Huwaysh and ʿAmara mahallas in 1918, and in the clashes Marshall, the Political Officer, was killed. A fierce battle ensued between British forces and the rioters, who entrenched themselves in the city and were only finally

1.Ibid., vol.5, Part.2, pp.206-209.
obliged to surrender because of shortages of water and food.

The autonomy of Najaf in 1915 and the Najaf uprising in 1918 were provoked by local leaders. As they were settled and long time residents of the city, we cannot define them as tribal authorities, although we can point to a certain tribal ethos in their behaviour. al-Wardi makes the following distinction: "there were two kinds of society in Najaf. One of them was *mulla'iya*, that is, a group of *ulama*, and the other was *mushahada* a society based on tribal customs and ethos". *Mushahada*, he continues, "derives from the tribal ethos of *'asabiya* and chivalry, and the tribal custom of *tha'ar* and raiding". According to his view, those who led the upheavals in 1918 were *mushahada*. However the real tribal chiefs like the chiefs of *'Awabid, Humaydat*, and *'Ali 'asha'ir* also joined in the uprising in 1918.

In this context it is clear that the organization of society in Najaf closely resembled that of tribal society. Najaf was divided into four *mahallat*, *'Amara*, Huwaysh, __________________________

1. *Ibid*, vol.4, pp.407-410, vol.5. Part.2, pp.210, 232-236. He also points out that "the people in Najaf apart from the ulama are civilians with rifles".

2. The tribal groups which joined the uprising were all from Bani Malik tribal congregation, which ranged over a wide area of southern Iraq. see al-Sa'adi, Hamud, *Dirasat 'an 'Ashā'ir al-'Iraq* (Studies on Iraqi tribes), Baghdad, Maktaba al-Nahda, 1988, pp.56-67

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Buraq and Mushraq. From the tribal point of view, Mushraq was dominated by Zuqurt and the others by Shumurt. Each mahalla, a kind of para-tribal society, was led by influential leaders and repeated its alliances and conflicts vis a vis the other mahallat. Abu Qulal, for example, was the leader of 'Amara mahalla. A similar structure can be seen in the society of Karbala*, which was mainly dominated by the Kamuna family with the rival clans of 'Awad and Ma'ala.

The mahalla as a para-tribal society showed its dual nature especially when it was forced into confrontation with neighbouring tribal groups. The mahalla was usually a target for the assault of the tribal groups; thus the city of Diwaniya had been threatened by the Khaza'il gabila, and Karbala' by the Bani Hasan gabila. As a para-tribal society, however, the mahalla often made alliance with tribal groups especially in the face of a powerful enemy like the Ottoman forces or British control. One of the

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1. As for the para-tribal character of the mahalla, Batatu points out that "the social organization of the quarter in this city [=Najaf] was still largely based on the tribe". See Batatu, op.cit., p.19. Miura also emphasizes the role of the mahalla in Damascus as a para-tribal social unit in the last part of the Mamluk period. See Miura, Tooru, "Gaiku to Minshu Hanran [Mahalla and Popular Uprising]", Shibata, Michio et.al. ed., Shakaiteki Ketsugo [Patterns of Sociability], Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1989.

It is also interesting that al-Sa'di classifies the family of Kazim Subbi, the head of Buraq mahalla, as Albu Subbi, the tribal section of Khalid al-Ahsa' gabila. al-Sa'di, ibid., pp.47, 49-50.
examples of the latter phase was that the city dwellers of Hilla cooperated with the Khafaja *qabila* in attacking the official buildings of the Ottoman government and army when Ottoman forces retreated from the city in 1917. The fact that the same tribe raided the same city soon afterwards was a good example of the other aspect of the *mahalla*. Mahallat were sometimes involved in conflicts between tribes; thus the Fatla *`ashira* of Najaf supported the Hilla dwellers against Khafaja. Tribes were also involved in rivalries of *mahallat*, as in the case of the conflict between the Kamuna and `Awad families in Karbala' when the *`Awad* asked the Bani Hasan for help.

One of the remarkable characteristics of the Najaf uprising in 1918 was that it took place on a level above that of the fragmented *mahalla*. `Amara was the centre of the riot because Abu Qulal, the first leader of the revolt, was the chief of the *mahalla*, but it soon expanded to the youth of Huwaysh *mahalla* which had long been the principal rival of `Amara. Kazim Subbi, who always supported Abu Qulal, was the chief of Buraq *mahalla*, and Sa'id ibn al-Hajj Radi, the chief of Mushraq *mahalla*, also

1. These examples are mentioned by al-Wardi, vol.4, pp.338-342. The names of the tribes were cross-checked in al-`Azzawi, op.cit., al-Sa`di, op.cit., al-Samarra`i, Yunis al-Shaykh Ibrahim, *al-Qaba'il al-Iraqiya* (Iraqi tribes) Baghdad, Maktab al-Sharq, 1989.
supported the riots. Only the chief of Huwaysh, Mahdi ibn Sayyid Salman, was against the revolt, because of his personal rivalry with Abu Qulal. Thus the uprising marked a first step towards united action on the part of these fragmented para-tribal societies, although it is not clear whether the tribal groups surrounding Najaf joined in the riots. The most outstanding case of their involvement in political upheavals in cooperation with the cities can be seen in the uprising of 1920, as will be mentioned in the next chapter.

Reviewing the cases of the tribal and para-tribal societies of the Middle Euphrates, we have emphasized that the tribal ethos can act as a countervailing factor in the creation of social integration. If we compare the range of tribal territory with the territory which was to become that of the Iraqi state in 1921, tribal networks covered only a small area within the territory, the mahalla or tribal dira. There is a pattern of expansion of tribal (or para-tribal) activity in the Najaf uprising and in the 1920 uprising, but these activities were still confined

1. Three sons of Sa\'d Ibn Radi, Karim, Muhsin and Ahmad joined al-Nahda. See Table 5.

2. The British authorities invited the chiefs of the surrounding tribal groups including \'Abd al-Wahid Sikkar and \'Alwan al-Hajj Sa\'dun to observe the British forces destroying the city wall of Najaf after the uprising. This can be recognized as a kind of warning and display of British power to the tribal groups. See al-Wardi, _op.cit._, vol.5. Part.2, p.243.
within limited geographical parameters. Thus the tribal factor in the Middle Euphrates worked as an essentially anti-cohesive force, especially within the framework of the state.

On the other hand, tribal forces in Northern Iraq tended to function on a trans-territorial level, since the fact that the main tribal confederation, the Shammar, used to range over the broad area of the Jazira region and between Iraq, Syria and Jordan, meant that tribal networks functioned beyond the territory of the Iraqi state. This was another characteristic of the tribal networks which al-‘Ahd tried to use in order to expand its influence from Syria to Iraq.

2. Characteristics of "traditional" society: religious networks

(a) A general overview of "religious society"

"Religious society" here means a society based on Islam, where, in theory, there are no "nationals" but only Muslims and dhimmis, and no nation except for the umma Islamiya. Until the end of the Ottoman Empire there was a general absence of ideologies based on ethnicity or language attempting to integrate society in the Middle East. In the latter part of the 19th century Jamal al-Din al-Afghani appealed to the umma Islamiya to confront the crisis caused by the expansion of Europe, and his notion
of the maintenance of society, or nation-building, was based on Islam. It was not until the writings of al-Kawakibi, or more urgently the abolition of the Caliphate after the First World War that versions of the European model of "nationalism" or secularism emerged in a form separate from Islamic ideology. In this sense, the notion of umma Islamiya could to some extent offer an alternative to the Western model of nation-building, and could also revive "the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity".

In considering religious society as a proto-national actor in facing external threats to and crises within the society, the 'ulama are a most significant element, both at the level of local social mobilisation and (among the higher 'ulama) as opinion leaders or ideologues. In Islam, although the 'ulama and religious notables enjoy popular esteem, there is no regular hierarchical organization like that in the Christian church. As Batatu mentions, "the hierarchy of prestige was neither stable nor clearly defined". Religious nobility was not the only source of social influence, and the degree of the 'ulama's influence on society differs in various political situations. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 'ulama had played a greater

1. Hobsbawm, op.cit., p.77. See Introduction to this thesis.

2. Batatu, op.cit., p.158
role in education before the modern educational system was introduced, as ideologues and signifiers of the value-system of Islam for the people as well as for the rulers.

In Shi'i society, there is the hierarchical system of marja'-i taqlid. As marja'-i taqlid means the person who is the source to be immitated, his behaviour should be a model for his community and obedience to his fatwa is an absolute religious duty for his followers. As a form of political philosophy for community-building the fatwa was often used in order to legitimize the rulers' decisions as well as to reject them. It greatly depended on the political attitude of the marja'-i taqlid whether Muslim society could be mobilized at particular historical conjunctures.

In a diverse society where Sunnis and Shi'is coexist, the absolute nature of the position of the marja'-i taqlid sometimes works as an atomising factor. Sectarian membership often causes differences to arise in a sort of chain-reaction, but even in a society whose members all come from the same sect, the political attitude of the Muslim community differs according to the 'alim whom the people consider most influential and reliable, if 'alims differ politically among themselves. Still, when the sense of solidarity within the umma Islamiya is strong among most of the 'ulama, religious networks expand to the level of umma Islamiya and the whole of Muslim society can be
mobilized to "save the umma Islamiya" from an enemy defined as a kafir. It is important to notice that there are some symbolic places and institutions which remind every Muslim of the notion of the umma Islamiya through history. al-Azhar in Cairo has been a spiritual and educational center for almost all Sunni Muslims in the world, and Najaf fulfilled a similar function for the Shi'is. Mecca, Medina and al-Quds are the most sacred places for all Muslims, and Karbala' and other holy places have special religious significance for Shi'is. Religious rituals like hajj and 'ashura (for Shi'is) fortify the ties among the community in reviving their "common memories". This mechanism is sometimes effectively used not only against invasion on the part of non-Muslims but also in the political struggle against a nominally Muslim enemy whom the rulers at the time considered as a kafir, because of attacks on these symbolic places or because of a decline in the religious institutions.

But some contradictions may arise in the relations between the ruler of the state and the "religious establishment" (in the broadest sense) when the notion of the secular territorial nation-state system is introduced into Muslim society. Almost inevitably modern notions of nationalism based on secularism contradict Islamic doctrine, which, at least in any idealized notion of Islamic society, rejects "the territorial nation-state, based on nationality, and the relatively modern European concept of
nationalism... which integrates a national community under a secular law of the land applied uniformly to all the citizens regardless of religious belief". Tibi says that the core principle of the modern nation-state system is a combination of sovereignty, territory, and nation, and that internal sovereignty is based upon "the idea of citizenship, which presupposes transforming... prenational ties into national identity and loyalty". As I mentioned in the discussion of tribal society, "any competing loyalty is looked on as threatening, illegitimate" by the state. In addition the notion of umma Islamiya is essentially supra-territorial, while the state concentrates on integrating society within a defined territory, and thus the idea of a revival of the umma may run counter to processes of nation-building. These contradictions could become crucial for the rulers of the state and an Islamic order might be able to mobilize the people more effective-ly than the state.

(2) The political roles of Islam in Iraq: 1908-1920

What may be described as the crisis of the umma

Islamiya went through two phases in this period. One was the transformation of the Ottoman regime which has already been described, and the other was the perceived threat from the European colonial powers. The former led to the formation of Jam'iya al-Mushawwara in Baghdad, and the latter stimulated the anti-Western movements of the Iraqi 'ulama.

A typical example of these anti-Western movements was the declaration of jihad against British forces just after the outbreak of the First World War. The first declarations of jihad against Britain organized by local 'ulama, apart from the formal proclamations by Ottoman government, were in Baghdad and Najaf at the request of the people of Basra, where fierce fighting was taking place at the end of 1914. The leading 'ulama promoting jihad were Muhammad al-Habubi, 'Abd al-Karim al-Jaza'iri, Jawad al-Jawahiri in Najaf, Hamid al-Killidar in Baghdad, and Mahdi al-Khalisi in Kazimiya. There were also 'ulama who did not support this action, like Hasan al-Sadr and 'Abd al-Husayn al-Asadi, but the majority of 'ulama were positive including the marja'-i taqlid Kazim al-Yazdi. This attitude of the 'ulama induced many of the tribal chiefs of the Middle Euphrates, like Mudbir al-Far'un of al-Fatla, to support the jihad movements. These tribal chiefs, however, became less responsive to the movement when they realized that British forces were superior to the Ottomans. The 'ulama organized a second jihad movement in 1915 calling espe-
cially upon Shi'is, but this time tribal chiefs were slow to respond to the call. Funds for jihad were distributed to the major chiefs in order to finance their military operations, but some tribal groups in Daghghara and 'Afaj did not receive them.

The main aim of the tribal groups at that time was, as mentioned before, the preservation of the autonomy of their tribes rather than the maintenance of the umma Islamiya. The differences of aim between the tribal leaders and the 'ulama were more apparent in the Najaf uprising in 1918. In al-Wardi's definition of Najafi society as a combination of mulla'iya and mushahada, the mulla'iya, were against the uprising, which was led by the mushahada. al-Yazdi tried to play a mediatory role in this insurrection, but "only from a humanitarian point of view". His coolness towards the uprising was evident from his refusal to issue a fatwa to save those who had been arrested after the revolt had been suppressed by Britain, though al-Hajj Radi asked him to issue one. Some 'ulama like 'Abbas al-Khalili, 'Aziz Allah al-Istrabadi and Ibrahim al-Kashi did

1. The second jihad movement was promoted by the notable family of al-Haydari in Baghdad according to al-Wardi. Batatu mentions that there are two families of al-Haydari, both sada but one Sunni and the other Shi'i. Here we can guess that the family which played a leading role was the Shi'i al-Haydari. See al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.4, pp.232-234; Batatu, op.cit., p.224.
2. al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.4, pp.234-235
join the revolt, although al-Wardi observes that they were rather low class and not particularly influential. Moreover "the characteristics of al-Khalili can be rather recognized as that of mushahada, when we see that he was known for his excellent marksmanship".

Nevertheless the ideological influence of some 'ulama upon the revolt is clearly apparent. The uprising was led by the military section of Jam'iya al-Nahda al-Islamiya, and the ideological centre of al-Nahda focussed on two 'ulama: Muhammad Jawad al-Jaza'iri and Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum. Both were arrested after the revolt and sent to Hinjam island, but Jawad al-Jawahir who was one of the leaders of the jihad movement insisted on the innocence of Bahr al-'Ulum. Thus the Najaf uprising had two aspects, one of which was the distance between the goals of "para-tribal society" and senior 'ulama like al-Yazdi, and the other was the combination of the Islamic ideology of the younger and lower 'ulama and the executive ability of the para-tribal groups. In the latter aspect al-Nahda can be recognized as a precursor of the activities of Haras al-Istiqlal. Also some proto-nationalist tendencies are discernible in the slogan of al-Nahda, which insisted on Islamic law, Islamic independence and self-rule: "it is necessary to seek cooperation with other Arab organiza-

1. Ibid., vol. 5. part 2, p. 233.
tions in order to resist colonial rule". Although the activities of al-Nahda were confined to Najaf, it had branches in Karbala', Kazimiya and Samarra', in an effort to expand its activities.

The activities of al-Nahda were followed by those of al-Hizb al-Najafi al-Sirri in Najaf. It was led by 'ulama like 'Abd al-Karim al-Jaza'iri and Jawad Jawahiri, and also by the tribal chiefs 'Abd al-Wahid al-Sukkar and Sha'lan Abu Chun. The structure of the organization was similar to that of al-Nahda, but they differed in two ways. In the first place the power of the chiefs of mahalla as a para-tribal force in the city had been undermined after the uprising in 1918. At this point the tribal chiefs joined Hizb al-Sirri.

Secondly a number of sada' joined it. Sada' are those claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, and there were many sada' in the Middle Euphrates area. Sada' are notables with a certain social influence based on nobility of origin and can be either Sunni or Shi'i. Sada', like 'ulama, are not always assured of special status and wealth because of their origin, but some sada' families enjoyed high social status, like the Naqib families of

1. The text of the principles of al-Nahda is from Shabar, op.cit., pp.36-37.
Baghdad and Basra, and the Sa'dun family who were chiefs of the Muntafiq tribal confederation. The Shi'i sada' of the Middle Euphrates did not come from major families as the Sunni did, but they also enjoyed a wide influence in local society if on a rather lesser scale. The Abu Tabikh family in Shamiya and Rumaytha, the Qazwinis in Hindiya, and the Zuwayns in Jara'a (south of Najaf) were the principal notable families. An important characteristic of the sada' in the Middle Euphrates was that they had strong connections with tribal society. In Baghdad, for example, the Kaylani family were long established urban notables with no special relations with tribal society. On the other hand the sada' of the Middle Euphrates, often played the role of mediator in tribal conflicts, and sometimes acted as tribal chiefs. al-Wardi gives the example of Nur al-Yasiri who was respected almost as a saint in the Ibrahimini 'ashira of Bani Malik. Thus a sayyid could incorporate both "tribalism" and "religiousness", and stood at the conjuncture between tribal society and the Islamic network. Thus Sayyid Hadi Zuwayn and Sayyid 'Alwan al-Yasiri joined Hizb al-Sirri and contributed to the expansion of

1. al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.5, pp.118-119. On the role of the sayyid in the tribal society, Batatu remarks as follows: "there were those to whose leadership a religious significance was attached and who, though commanding tribes, did not, as a rule, stand in any blood relationship to them....The tribal sada' abounded in the Arab Shi'i areas, particularly in the mid-Euphrates..." See Batatu, op.cit., p.79.
its activities. But the sphere of its activities was limited to Shi'is and connections between religious and tribal networks took place only within Shi'i tribal groups on the one hand and Shi'i 'ulama and sada' on the other. It was only after Haras was created that a network was established which could overcome these sectarian differences.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that this network of 'ulama was not confined to the territory of Iraq. As pointed out before, the 'ulama in Najaf reacted not only to the situation in Iraq but also to the crisis in the whole Muslim world. They were especially sensitive to the situation in Persia, as many of them were Persian. 'Ulama like al-Kashani and al-Isfahani called for jihad against "kafirs" in Arabistan in Persia, and the jihad forces which participated in the battle of Shu'ayba attacked

1. Apart from these sada' in Hizb al-Sirri, Sayyid Muhsin Abu Tabikh was famous for his anti-British attitude from 1915 to 1918, and it became clearer in the uprising in 1920. It is interesting that al-Sa'di lists the name of the family of Sayyid Abu Tabikh in his book on 'ashira. See al-Sa'di, op.cit., pp.143-149.

2. The British authorities seem to have taken little account of the influence of the Persian 'ulama in Najaf, because of the difference in their nationality. But the trans-national characteristics of the religious community can be seen in the answer of the Persians who attended ta'ziya meeting as follows: "[the reason why they took such active interest in the future of the Iraq is] that they had lived for many years in Mesopotamia, and felt themselves to be bound up in its destinies". C0730/1, Intelligence Report, 31, Dec. 1920.
Ahwaz, threatening British interests there. Thus the Islamic network had two dimensions; the trans-territorial and expanded network of 'ulama, linking the main Shi'i religious centres of Najaf, Karbala', Kazimiya, Samarra', and Isfahan or Mashad in Persia, and a more closely-knit network of sada' and local lower 'ulama which attracted the loyalty of the tribal forces in the Middle Euphrates area.

3. The rise of "modern" networks: academic and military networks based on the modern educational system

So far I have discussed the characteristics of the main "traditional" networks and their political roles in the period of transformation from Ottoman to British rule. As Wilson described in A Clash of Loyalties, the major social resistance to the introduction of the modern nation-state system came from these traditional societies. But the struggle against the imposition of British control was not a simple opposition of "tradition versus modernity". The Najafi uprising and subsequent political developments in Iraq show that traditional barriers among tribal groups, between tribes and cities, between tribal society and the 'ulama were gradually breaking down. What, then,

were the relations between the modernized sectors of society and traditional society? Before analyzing this, it would be better to specify the characteristics of the modernized sector of Iraqi society. "Modernized" is defined here as applying to those inspired by modern Western ideologies or educated in the modern system.

As noted in Chapter 1, the modern secular educational system was established at the end of the Ottoman period. This educational system was almost the only way for Iraqis to make a career based upon Western culture and ideology apart from those few who had the good fortune to be sent to Istanbul or Paris as students or Ottoman officials. Unlike in Syria and Lebanon, there were few foreign schools or Christian intellectuals in Iraq who could import Western ideologies and ideas directly, and the only door to the West or international society was through the new educational system.

Hence most of the Iraqis who joined political parties in Istanbul were studying there at the time. From al-Jam'iya al-Ikha' al-'Arabi al-'Uthmaniya to al-'Ahd the political parties were made up mostly of those who had gone or been sent to Istanbul to ascend the ladder of the Ottoman educational system (see Table 1). Similar tendency.

1. There were also several Christian or Jewish schools in which secular education was given, but numbers were small. Simon, "The Education...", op.cit., p.152.
cles can be seen in the careers of the members of the parties which established and imported ideas of Arab separatism to Iraq, from Hizb al-Mu'tadil in Basra to Nadi al-Watani in Baghdad (see Table 2). Active political workers, that is, those who joined more than one party, were as follows:

(a) Sulayman Faydi ... graduated from Baghdad military i'dadi school (Hizb al-Mu'tadil, Hizb al-I'tilaf)

(b) Mahmud Adib ... writer (Hizb al-I'tilaf, Nadi al-Watani)

(c) 'Abd al-Haraid al-Shalchi ... graduated from military academy in Istanbul (al-'Ahd, Nadi al-Watani)

(d) Hamdi al-Pachachi ... graduated from University of Istanbul, lecturer at Baghdad law school (al-'Uthmaniya, al-'Ahd, Hizb al-I'tilaf in Baghdad, Nadi al-Watani)

(e) Muzahim al-Pachachi ... graduated from Baghdad law school (al-'Ahd, Nadi al-Watani)

(f) Ibrahim Hilmi al-'Umar ... journalist (al-'Ahd, Nadi al-Watani)

(g) 'Asim al-Chalabi ... teacher (al-'Ahd, Nadi al-Watani)

(h) Subha Najib ... graduated from military academy of Istanbul (al-'Ahd, Nadi al-Watani)

(i) Tahsin al-Askari ... graduated from military academy of Istanbul (al-'Ahd, Nadi al-Watani)

(j) Mustafa al-Wa'iz ... member of Ottoman parliament(Muntada' al-Adabi, Hizb al-I'tilaf in Baghdad)

Of these ten active party members both in Istanbul and Iraq, all except Sulayman Faidi and Mahmud Adib began their political activities in Istanbul. Five of them had their education in Istanbul, and all were educated under the new systems established under the Tanzimat. Thus these
active members of the parties which pressed for Arab separatism before the First World War formed an academic network based on the new Ottoman educational system. In addition, there was a military network as well as an academic one. Military careers coincided with academic careers, as those who proceeded to higher educational institutions included those who wanted to be officers in the Ottoman Army. Many of those who had higher military education joined the parties established in Istanbul, especially al-‘Ahd. But when we consider the parties established in Iraq itself, the percentage of military members declines. The military members mentioned in Table 1 (the list of parties established in Istanbul) account for 17 out of a total of 39, but that number falls to 9 out of 40 in Table 2 (the list of parties established in Iraq before the First World War). In other words, al-‘Ahd was composed of both civilian and military members, but most of the civilian members joined Nadi al-Watani, while all the military members remained in al-‘Ahd and subse-

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1. Faydi mentions that he was a classmate of Nuri al-Sa‘id, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Shalchi and Taha al-Hashimi in the military 'Idadi school in Baghdad. According to the careers of the members of al-‘Ahd, 'Ali Jawdat and Maulud Mukhlis also studied at the same school at the same time. See Faydi, op.cit., p.22; Basri, Meer, A‘lam al-Siyasa fi’l-'Iraq al-Hadith (Political personalities in modern Iraq) London, Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1987, pp.126, 58,172.
quenty became members of *al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi* in Damascus. Thus the Ottoman educational system created two broad political tendencies, one of civilian political activities based in Iraq, and other of military activities based outside Iraq.

These differences between the civilian and military networks affected the activities of *al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi* when it tried to expand its activities inside Iraq. *al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi* established branches in Mosul and Baghdad, but the characteristics of the members of its branches were quite different from that of the organisation in Damascus. As we see in Tables 3 and 4, all the Damascus members of *al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi* were military, but the leading members in the branches in Iraq itself were civilians and local notables. For example, Sa`id al-Naqshbandi, the head of the Baghdad branch, was a religious notable who shared no common academic or military background with the members in Damascus. Other members of the Baghdad branch were associated

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1. The civilian members who left *al-`Ahd* and joined *Nadi al-Watani* were as follows: Ibrahim Hilmi al-`Umari, Hamdi al-Pachachi, Muzahim al-Pachachi, `Asim al-Chalabi, `Abd al-Hamid al-Shalchi, Subha Najib. The only military member who joined both *al-`Ahd* and *Nadi al-Watani* was Tahsin al-`Askari, but he also joined *al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi* in Damascus.

2. In the military network of *al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi*, we can also see the kinship at work. Apart from the al-`Askari brothers Tahsin and Ja`far, Batatu mentions that "Ja`far al-`Askari and Nuri al-Sa`id were married to each other's sisters", and that "the mother of Jamil al-Midfa`i was from a family... which had a matrimonial tie with the family of `Ali Jawdat". See Batatu, op.cit., p.323.
with al-Naqshbandi because they were his relatives. The characteristics of the members of the Baghdad and Mosul branches were similar to those of the parties seen in Table 2, except those activists who have already been mentioned. Parties in Iraq before the First World War were made up of a mixture of civilian Arabists and influential locals, who could be notables, merchants, or landowners. The background of the members of the branches of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was the same as that of these parties in Table 2. This lack of homogeneity between the membership of the central organisation of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and its branches led to severe limitations on any expansion of its activities as I shall point out in the next chapter.

Another notable feature of these civilian and military academic groups is that almost all their members were Sunnis. This was because the modern Ottoman educational system was more accessible to Sunni Muslims and also because Shi'is were reluctant to attend the government schools as religious education in them was based on Sunni Islam. It is true that the earliest political activities were led by Sunni intellectuals, but this was not because the Shi'is were fundamentally less interested in political

1. The networks of the Mosul branch included three members of the al-‘Umari family, Muhammad, 'Abd Allah and Mustafa. The ‘Umari were a notable family from who had provided a chief treasurer at Baghdad in the middle of 18th century and a wali of Mosul in the early Ottoman period. See Batatu, op.cit., pp.211-212; Basri, op.cit., pp.205, 229-231.
activities nor because their level of political consciousness was lower than that of the Sunnis, but because of the exclusive nature of the state educational system and its limited networks.
Chapter 3 The effect of the combination of social networks upon political activities 1908-1920

In the previous chapter I reviewed some of the characteristics and structures of what I have described as "traditional" and "modern" networks, and saw how these influences affected political activities during the period between 1908 and 1920. In this chapter I will see how the combination of these various networks encouraged the expansion of political activities, taking three examples; Sayyid Talib al-Naqib, al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi, and Haras al-Istiqlal.

1. Networks based on personal power bases: the case of Sayyid Talib al-Naqib

Many of the early political parties in Iraq were led by Sayyid Talib al-Naqib, as I pointed out in chapter 1. His activities were based on his own political power base, and his aim was to extend his authority over the rest of the country in the early days of the Iraqi state. I will first outline his political career. He was from a respected Basra notable family, a descendant of Ahmad al-Rifa'i, the founder of the sufi tariqa of that name in the 12th century. His family owned substantial waqf lands, and enjoyed considerable fame in the Basra region. He was

appointed as mutasarrif of the new wilaya of al-Hasa' in 1902, but in the course of his conflict with the wali of Basra Muhsin Pasha he tried to establish his own autonomy in Basra. He maintained good relations with the Shaykhs of Muhammara (Khorramshahr) and Kuwayt, as he acted as a bulwark against Ottoman penetration of the Arabian peninsula and of Persia. Geographical and political circumstances led him to follow the Kuwayti model in the sense of preserving his authority under the protection of Britain.

After the Young Turk Revolution he joined al-Muntada al-Adabi in Istanbul, and after coming back to Basra formed Hizb al-Hurr al-Mu'tadil, al-Hizb al-Hurriya w'al-I'tilaf and al-Jam'iya al-Islahiya f'il-Basra, advocating the separation of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire. He enlarged his political influence not only in Basra but also in Baghdad and Mosul, as he became the effective leader of Nadi al-Watani al-'Ilmi in Baghdad and Jam'iya al-Islahiya f'il-Basra urged intellectuals in

1. Atiyya, op.cit., pp.64-65. For his relation with Britain and Shaykh Khaza'il of Muhammara and Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, see al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.4, pp.106-112.

2. According to al-Basir, Talib protected the members of Nadi al-Watani, who escaped from the Ottoman suppression and went to Basra, as well as financing them. al-Basir, op.cit., p.29.
Mosul to form Nadi al-Adabi. He also had good relations with the other anti-CUP Arab political parties like Hizb al-La-Markaziya al-Idariya al-Uthmaniya in Cairo, and signified his cooperative attitude towards Sharif Husayn in Makka in 1911.

There were two aspects of the expansion of his activities. In the first place his activities were supported by modern-educated urban intellectuals. As I mentioned in chapter 2, the early political parties in Iraq were led mainly by those few urban intellectuals who had been through the new state secular educational system. As a leading figure in the movement for Arab separatism Talib attracted these civilian intellectuals, and his autonomous and influential position and his connections with other parts of the Arab world as well as with Britain was likely to be of considerable advantage in negotiations with the Ottoman or British governments. Thus the spread of Talib's activities greatly depended on the academic network in Iraq, so that he was associated with individuals like Sulayman Faydi in Basra (a supporter of Hizb al-Mu'tadil and al-Hizb al-I'tilaf) and Hamdi Pachachi in Baghdad (a

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1. Only al-Juburi mentions this party. According to him it was established in 1916, and its prominent members were Muhammad Rawf al-Ghallami, Daud al-Chalabi, Yasin al-Hashimi, Mawlud Mukhlis, 'Abd Allah al-Dulaymi, 'Ali Jawdat, et.al.. I have not mentioned it in Tables as I cannot verify its presence from other sources. al-Juburi, op.cit.


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supporter of Nadi al-Watani). The alliances between these urban intellectuals and Talib as a local notable was a pattern typical of political activities in this period; a similar coalition can be seen in the foundation of al-Nadi al-Adabi in Mosul on the advice of Sulayman Faydi.

Another aspect of Talib's activities in the period immediately before the First World War was his attempt to use his influence on the tribal society of southern Iraq in order to mobilize the people. Hizb al-I'tilaf in Basra asked the sada' of Middle Euphrates area for cooperation, since they had considerable influence in tribal society, men like 'Alwan al-Yasiri and Hadi Zuwayn. His party also appealed for the support of the Naqib of Najaf and influential notables of the mahalla like 'Atiyya Abu Qulal.

The same policy was pursued by Jam'iya al-Islahiya, and

1. al-Juburi states that al-Nadi al-Adabi in Mosul was established when Sulayman Faydi visited there. Muhammad Rawf al-Ghallami, a leading member of this organization, was a traditional influential high 'alim, without any connection to the academic network. But linkages between academic networks and the local authorities can be seen in other parties like Hizb al-I'tilaf in Basra. See Table 2.

   al-Juburi says that Faydi was a member of al-Jam'iya al-Islahiya fi'l-Basra, but in other sources Faydi appears only in the above mentioned two parties. Juburi, op.cit.

1. According to Juburi, it asked help from Mubdir al-Fir'un, the chief of al-Fatla 'ashira in Najaf, and Sayyid 'Alwan al-Yasiri. It is noteworthy that these two were active in the subsequent anti-British movements, as well as the above-mentioned sada' and chiefs of mahalla, even after Talib stopped organizing political parties and turned pro-British. Juburi, *op.cit.*. Also al-Basir points out Talib's influence on tribal society in the Middle Euphrates. al-Basir, *op.cit.*, p.29.

2. Despite Talib's good relations with the Shaykh of Kuwait, the Shaykh advised Britain that "full reliance be not placed on Sayyed Talib's professions ...". F0371/2140/77724.

ish attitude, hoping to become ruler of a British con
trolled Iraq.

This opportunistic progression shows that his main
aim was to further his ambition to extend his own authori-
yty, whatever his ideology may have been. Subsequently,
when the British were in control of Iraq, he changed his
"Arabist" policy. Thus he sided with Sharif Husayn of
Makka before British rule, seeing him as a symbol of
Arabism but refused to recognize that the sons of Sharif
Husayn had any right to the throne of Iraq, claiming that
the king should be a "Sharif of Iraq", meaning himself.

These inconsistencies and contradictions showed the
limitation of his political activities and resulted in a
series of short-lived alliances with other political
actors. As Shabar notices that "it is not clear whether
the alliance between Hizb al-Islahiya and Nadi al-Watani
happened naturally or whether it was rather the result of
manoeuvring on Talib's part", and it is likely that the

1. Talib put forward a plan for the formation of the Iraqi
state in July 1920, when he was asked for cooperation by
the members of Haras, saying as follows: "if you want me
to cooperate with, there are four conditions. First, the
head of the state should be an Iraqi Sharif... Second, the
members of the [preparatory] committee [for the parlia-
ment] should be noble persons with good reputation. Third,
agitation for the revolt should be stopped. Fourth, ashraf
in Baghdad and the persons who are not the members of your
party [Haras] should be invited to the [above] committee."

2. Shabar, op.cit., p.22. al-Basir also mentions about the
expectation of the urban Arab nationalists of the power of
Talib. al-Basir, op.cit., p.29.
urban intellectuals only tried to use Talib as a kind of symbol of Arab separatism at that time. Shabar also mentions that Sulayman Faydi, a long time supporter of Talib, "formed a secret political party in Mosul in 1913 much to Talib's discomfort, and it lasted only a short time".

In any case Talib's efforts to organize political parties ended when he went to India at the beginning of the First World War. After coming back to Iraq he pursued his personal ambitions without the help of any organized body. Most of Talib's urban associates stopped their activities during the period of the insurrections, with the exception of those who became members of the various remaining parties: Faydi became the head of the Baghdad branch of al-ʿAhd and Muhammad al-Ghallami developed his own party of Jamʿiya al-ʿAlam into the Mosul branch of al-ʿAhd.

2. Wataniya as Isolated Arabism: the case of al-ʿAhd al-ʿIraqi

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, al-ʿAhd al-

1. Shabar does not mention the name of this party in Mosul. It can be presumed to be al-Nadi al-Adabi, which al-Juburi notes was established by Sulayman Faydi in Mosul in 1916, but I cannot confirm it. Shabar, ibid., p.23.

2. Only Aswad mentions that Faydi became the head of that branch after the death of Saʿid al-Naqshbandi. See Aswad, op.cit., p.14.
"Iraqi was a political group based on a military network closely associated with the pan-Arab movement in Syria. It was isolated from Faysal's regime in the Arab Kingdom of Syria, as its stance towards Britain was inconsistent. At the same time, it was also isolated from the various political power-bases inside Iraq. All the members of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi remained in Damascus, as Britain refused them permission to return to Iraq. In this sense, the activities of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi were limited in two ways; in the first place the Syrian regime did not assist them and even restricted their activities, and secondly there was no effective way of mobilizing support inside Iraq from the outside.

In order to overcome this difficulty, al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi opened branches in Baghdad and Mosul. But as I pointed out in chapter 2, they were not so closely connected with their centre in Damascus. Moreover, to the disappointment of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, its Baghdad branch failed to gain popular support in Baghdad, where popular feeling rallied mainly around Haras. Nazmi says that the Baghdad branch failed to obtain the cooperation of the Shi'ī marja'-ı taqlid Muhammad al-Shirazi because of the old rivalry between al-Shirazi and Sa'id al-Naṣṣabandi, the head of the Baghdad branch, although Haras remained
in good terms with al-Shirazi. According to Nazmi, some young members of the Baghdad branch left and transferred their allegiance to Haras.

al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi could not base its activities inside Iraq through its branches. It tried to make an alliance with Haras but in vain, as will be described in the next section. It turned to the various social networks to extend its influence, first approaching the tribal networks, then local groups in Mosul, and finally Turkey and the pro-Turkish groups in Iraq.

(a) Trial and error: cooperation with tribal society in northern Iraq

An important characteristic of the tribal groups in northern Iraq was that most of them traveled between both

1. Nazmi says that al-Naqshbandi was afraid of the rising influence of al-Shirazi while al-Shirazi was in Samarra’. As for the relation between Haras and al-Naqshbandi, Shabar points out that it was good, to the extent that al-Naqshbandi joined Haras, together with other members of Baghdad branch like ‘Arif Hikmat, and al-Naqshbandi was also present in the Haras meeting with the members of Hizb al-Sirri. Nazmi, op. cit., p.334; Shabar, op. cit., p.58.

2. Nazmi mentions Sami Shawkat, Naji Shawkat, and Hamdi al-Pachachi as joining Haras later. It is not sure, however, as Sami and Naji Shawkat are mentioned as having been in Haras in the other sources but there are no other references that they were in the Baghdad branch. Basri also says that al-Pachachi was a member of Baghdad branch, but he does not mention whether al-Pachachi was in Haras. Nazmi, op. cit., p.334; Basri, op. cit., p.202.
Syria and Iraq. Thus the Shammar tribal confederation, for example, extended from northern Iraq to north-eastern Syria and eastern Jordan. The wide networks of these tribal groups gave useful opportunities for the al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi to export their activities into Iraq through these networks. Ramadan al-Shallash, the commander of Raqqa, was a member of the tribal group of Albu Saray in 1 Dayr al-Zur, one of the sections of the ‘Aqaydat ‘ashira. When he advanced to Dayr al-Zur in 1919, he led 500 tribesmen from Albu Saray. Mawlud Mukhlis, the successor of al-Shallash also expected support from the surrounding tribal groups, through the distribution of financial aid and propaganda to them, although he was not from a tribal background himself. Even though he had no religious background either, he declared jihad against Britain to the tribal groups when he advanced from Dayr al-Zur to Mayadin.

Taking a lead from the attitude of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi the tribal groups themselves began to make overtures to the organization. Fahd al-Battikh, the chief of the Shammar Tuqa escaped from his British captors, and went to Dayr al-Zur and then Damascus to contact Tahsin al-‘Askari, a member of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi. An alliance was subsequently established between al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi and the

1. Atiyya, op.cit., p.301.
Shammar Tuqa, and with the Dulaym (a qabila living in the Upper Euphrates between al-Ramadi and Shamiya) and the Aqaydat in Mosul.

In May 1920, Jamil Midfa'i led the uprising in Tall 'Afar with the assistance of the Shammar confederation headed by its chief 'Ajil al-Yawar, the Aqaydat, the Jabur (which occupied an area extending from Mosul and the Khabur in the north to Diyala and to Diwaniya in the south), and so on. The main forces in this uprising were the tribal groups in Tall 'Afar; they killed Barlow, the British Political Officer, and occupied several official buildings. The rioters then raised the Arab flag, pulling down the British flag from the roof of the saray. Midfa'i attempted to march his forces on Mosul after the success-

1. After the meeting with the members of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, Fahd al-Battikh attacked British forces located between Tikrit and al-Sharkat and Balalij railway station with his tribesmen. The cooperative attitude to al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi by other tribes were mainly the result of the rivalry for the position of tribal chief within their tribes. For example, Najris al-Ka'ud, the chief of Dulaym qabila fought against his pro-British rival, 'Ali al-Sulayman, for the position of head, and he himself was anti-British as his brother had been killed by the British. These tribes also attacked the British caravan between Sharkat and Hammam al-'Alil. al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.5., pp.144-145.

All the information on the tribal groups mentioned above is from al-'Azzawi, op.cit..

2. This information on Jabur qabila is from al-Samarrai, op.cit., vol.1, pp.109-110. He describes the recent situation of Jabur tribe, in contrast with the information of al-'Azzawi, who described the tribal situation in the 1930's.
ful liberation of Tall `Afar but in vain, faced with the superior military forces of Britain.

The "liberation of Tall `Afar" soon ended, not only because of the superiority of British forces but also because of the ambiguity inherent in the cooperation between the tribal forces and al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi. Most members of al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi were not from tribal backgrounds, with the exception of al-Shallash. The alliance with tribal groups was only superficial and temporary. The vulnerability of their coalition can be seen in the episode of the clash between Mawlud Mukhlis and Shallash, as the former found it difficult to prevent the tribal forces from engaging in indiscriminate attack and pillage, while the latter did not care.

In addition, al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi had no coherent policy towards Britain. The local groups in Mosul, including the Mosul branch of al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi were prepared to join the revolt in Tall `Afar to fight against Britain, but Midfa'i withdrew his forces too soon. In fact al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi was closely linked with Faysal's government in Syria, and which did not want to risk any open confrontation with Britain. Faysal himself warned `Ali Jawdat

1 According to al-Wardi, Mukhlis refused the entrance of Shallash and his tribesmen to Dayr al-Zur to avoid disorder, at which Shallash got angry. The tension between them became high and `Ali Jawdat had to mediate between them. al-Wardi, op.cit., vol. 5, pp.138-141.
before the uprising, saying: "I agree with the idea (of resistance to Britain) only on condition that it will be done by Iraqis on their own responsibility, not to create difficulties in my relations with Britain. Do not use arms in it". Both the military support and the financial aid from al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was unexpectedly small, which caused great disappointment among the tribes.

(b) More trial and error: cooperation with local political forces in Mosul

al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi asked local political groups in Mosul to assist in the Tall 'Afar rising. It is remarkable that many members of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi came originally from Mosul. Mawlud Mukhlis, Jamil Midfa'i and 'Ali Jawdat were born in Mosul, while Yasin al-Hashimi was born in Baghdad but his family was originally from Mosul. This common background led them to make special contact with political forces in Mosul, and may well have prompted them to seek the "liberation" of the Mosul area first, apart from any "geographical" considerations.

The Mosul branch of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi played an important mediating role between al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and

1. Ibid., vol.5, p.150.
local political leaders in Mosul. The Mosul branch was formerly established as Jam‘iya al-‘Alam in 1914, led by Muhammad al-Ghallami, a member of al-Qahtaniya in Istanbul. Both the ideology of this party and the military experience of its members was similar to that of al-‘Ahd; Thabit ‘Abd al-Nur and Rawf al-Shahwani had joined the revolt of the Sharif of Makka as did many of the members of al-‘Ahd (see Table 2). When Faysal’s government was established in Syria, al-‘Alam made contact with al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi and turned itself into the Mosul branch of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi in 1919. In comparison to the branch in Baghdad, the Mosul branch had considerable local political experience and was far more active. It extended its activities to Tall ‘Afar and succeeded in attracting the support of influential tribal leaders like ‘Ali Agha ‘Abd al-Karim, chief of Albu Dawla ‘ashira, and Jamil Muhammad Nuri, the chief of Al Khalil Afandi. Members from Kirkuk and Sinjar also joined the branch.

After the uprising in Tall ‘Afar, the revolutionary atmosphere spread to Mosul. ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Dabbuni, an


2. Ibid., pp.54-56.

The family of al-‘Umarl, three of whom were members of the Mosul branch, seems to have played an active role in the attack on Dayr al-Zur. Amin al-‘Umari headed the jihad forces in moving forward to Mayadin, responding to the call for jihad issued by Mukhlis. al-‘Adawi, op.cit., pp.131-133.

* Former head of Jam‘iya al-‘Alam is Thabit Abd al-Nur. See The Encyclopaedia of Mosul, University of Mosul. For his biography and his political role in Iraqi politics, his role is yet to be comprehensively studied. See Encyclopaedia of Mosul.
ex-assistant political officer, attempted to rise against Britain with the help of the chiefs of the Shammar and Jabur. The Mosul branch was also ready to join the action. Nevertheless support from al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi was only nominal, as mentioned above, which depressed the local political movements in Mosul. The Mosul branch wrote to Midfa‘i asking him why the forces of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi had been withdrawn so quickly, making clear the dissatisfaction of all the anti-British groups in Mosul. His answer did not convince them, and relations became cool.

(c) The return to a pro-Turkish policy: relations with Mustafa Kemal

Wilson's description of the anti-British movements in Iraq as "a chaotic insurrection by anarchist tribes incited by Hashimite agents" is of course far too simplistic, as the movements were not simply answers to such calls from outside but rather a natural development inside Iraq, as was the case of the uprising of 1920. The influence of Turkish propaganda was also made much of in many British

1. Ibid., pp.337-342.
reports at that time, but it was not as strong nor as deeply rooted in Iraq as Britain believed.

Nevertheless, there was at least something of a pro-Turkish tendency in northern Iraq. Geographically Mosul is close to Turkey (Anatolia) and sovereignty over this area had not yet been decided between Turkey and Britain. Mosul and Turkey were closely related both economically and socially, and political activities in Mosul were greatly influenced by the situation in Turkey. The CUP branch in Mosul, for example, was more active than those in the other cities in Iraq, and keen on spreading the idea of Turanianism. Even after the Ottoman defeat in 1918 a pro-Turkish organization, al-Jam'iya al-Turkiya f'il-Mawsil was formed, insisting on the reversion of Mosul to Turkey, rejecting British control. In addition there was a pro-Turkish party named Fida' al-Watan in Baghdad in

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1. For example, a British Administration Report describes that it was clear that "the Tall 'Afar expedition, in its early stages, was backed by the Kemalists". Also it emphasizes the threat from the "Bolshevists" who "were carrying on violent anti-British propaganda", and that they "have been steadily increasing during the year in Mosul. Mustafa Kemal's alliance with them is taken for granted...". Even though, the same report points out the "serious friction between the Ahd and ...the Baghdad representative of a pro-Turk society" in the end of 1920. See C0696/3, XC197170, "Administration Report of the Mosul Division for the Year 1920". See also F0371/5081, 197189, "Mesopotamia: Extracts from the Baghdad Police Report, January-June, 1920", which reports some financial and military aid from Turkey to the nationalists in Iraq.


3. Ibid., pp.48-49.
1920, demanding a Turkish mandate if Iraq did not achieve independence.

A certain pro-Turkish tendency can also be seen among some members of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi. Part of their anti-British attitude was expressed in pro-Turkish feelings; Nuri al-Sa‘id, a prominent pro-British member, wrote that "discontent caused by the existence of a military administration in Iraq gave rise to pro-Turkish sympathy". Turkey was the main source of arms supplies for the revolts in Dayr al-Zur and Tall ‘Afar. Moreover these close relations were encouraged by the fact that most of the members of al-‘Ahd were Ottoman officers and came from the same background as Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the new Turkey. Yasin al-Hashimi in particular, who remained in the Ottoman Army longer than many of the others, seems to have retained a good deal of loyalty to Turkey. Thus the shared career of many members of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi gave rise to a degree of fellow feeling between Kemal and al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi, although there was no concrete cooperation or alliance.

2. Ibid., p.304.
3. According to al-Qaysi, Yasin al-Hashimi was acquainted with Mustafa Kamal, as was Midfa‘i, Jawdat, Nuri al-Sa‘id and Ja‘afar al-‘Askari, in Istanbul. al-Qaysi, op.cit., p.30.

al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi was a proto-nationalist movement encouraged by Iraqis outside Iraq, and its attempt to expand its activities inside Iraq ended in disappointment and frustration on the part of local political groups. In comparison, Haras al-Istiqal can be said to have been rather more successful in promoting patriotic movements over a broader area. The main reason for this was that Haras was based in Baghdad and brought together various social movements against Britain. Their activities were deeply rooted in local society, and had a firm ideology which could unite a variety of traditional social forces. The efforts of Haras came to fruition in the uprising of 1920, which forced Britain to confront the unacceptable of colonial rule. Here I will point to five reasons for Haras' success in enlarging the range of their proto-nationalist activities.

(a) Making alliances with other political organizations

The party's guiding principles emphasized the importance of alliances with other organizations demanding the complete independence of Iraq. In particular Haras had good relations with Hizb al-Sirri, as Sa’d Salih, Hadi Zuwayn and Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi, all members of Hizb
al-Sirri, subsequently joined Haras. Haras also had good relations with 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Shallash, who was a member of Hizb al-Sirri and a financial supporter of the uprising in Najaf. The activities of Hizb al-Sirri and other religious forces had been confined to Najaf or other Shi'i areas but the alliance with Haras extended their networks to Baghdad.

Haras also attempted to cooperate with al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi. The slogans of the two parties were quite similar, demanding the complete independence of Iraq as a constitutional monarchy, with a king who should be one of the sons of Sharif Husayn of Makka. In 1919, Jamil Midfa'i and Ibrahim Kamal were sent from Damascus to Baghdad to ask for a coalition with Haras. Nonetheless Haras did not agree with al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi's willingness to accept economic and technological assistance from other coun-

1. According to Zumayzam, Sa'd Salih belonged to Haras. Juburi notes that he was a member of Hizb al-Sirri, then founded Jam'iyya al-Shabiba which was annexed to Haras. Al-Wardi points out the participation of Hadi Zuwayn in Haras in March 1920. Zumayzam, op.cit., p.65; Juburi, op.cit., 46.; al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.5, p.98.

2. al-Shallash played a mediating role between Haras and the local groups in Middle Euphrates together with Zuwayn. See Atiyya, op.cit., pp.313-4.

3. Though it was called the Secret Party of Najaf, it was supported by the following persons in the area outside Najaf: Abu'l-Timman and al-Sadr in Baghdad, Rahim al-Zawalimi in Rumaytha, Shaykh Ahmad al-Mulla al-Khurasani, Mahdi al-Basir in Hilla, Kazim Fawzi in Daghghara, Kazim 'Awadi in 'Afak, 'Ali al-Sharqi in Gharraf. See Juburi, op.cit.
tries, or more generally their pro-British attitude. Thus the coalition failed. However, some members of Haras praised the anti-British activities of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi when al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi intensified their military actions against Britain in the north. Muhammad al-Sadr welcomed the uprising of Tall ‘Afar, and al-Shabibi participated in the meeting of the Iraqi National Congress in Damascus organized by al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi.

(b) The mobilization of religious society

Basically Haras maintained good relations with religious organizations, which were formed mainly by Shi‘is. Moreover the support from the marja’-i taqlid Muhammad al-Shirazi allowed Haras to mobilize more Shi‘is to join their cause. al-Shirazi, who become marja’-i taqlid in 1919 after the death of al-Yazdi, generally favoured political involvement unlike his predecessor. Although he himself had refrained from political activities, Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulam advised him to move from

1. As I mentioned in note 14, Shabar and Nazmi differ in their analysis of relations between Haras and the Baghdad branch of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi. al-Wardi points out that al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi tried to contact Haras by itself as its branch hated Haras, considering it pro-Turkish. al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.5, p.94.

Samarra' to Karbala to counterbalance al-Yazdi while al-Yazdi was marja'. At that point he began to make his political stance clear, protecting sada' arrested by Britain because of their anti-British activities. He opposed the Anglo-Persian treaty, which was to be concluded in 1919, and sent a letter to Tehran. In 1919, he issued a fatwa saying that Muslims should not permit non-Muslims to rule Muslims. This implied a rejection of direct British control of Iraq, although he did not approve of military resistance to Britain, insisting "that action should be peaceful". But after his son Muhammad Rida was arrested by the British police while calling for huge demonstrations at the mosque of 'Abbas in June 1920, he escalated his anti-British attitude and issued a fatwa sanctioning resistance, including military action.

This change in political attitude of the supreme

1. Ibid., p.74.

2. For more details, see al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.5, pp.103-112.

3. Muhammad Rida was widely known for his radical anti-British attitude. He was a founder member of the Islamic organization Jam'iya al-Islamiya fi Karbala'. The British authorities believed that he encouraged his father Muhammad al-Shirazi in anti-British movements, saying as follows: "His father [al-Shirazi], who is over 90 years old, is only a tool in his hand and Mirza Muhammad Ridha has taken every precaution to cause his father to be surrounded by a number of such persons as are in sympathy with his own opinion...". F0371/5078, 197189, "Brief Note on the Activities of the anti-Government Party at Karbala", 3, July, 1920.
Shi'i 'alim had a great influence on Muslim society, and it also favoured activities of Haras. Haras tried to contact al-Shirazi in the beginning of May 1920, and Ja'far Abu'l-Tlimman visited Karbala' and Najaf to see him. During the days of negotiation with the British authorities, Haras sent al-Shabibi to al-Shirazi in order to exchange information. al-Shirazi was keenly interested in the development of the negotiations in Baghdad, and also supported the election of representatives to attend parallel negotiations in Najaf and Karbala'. Thus the close relations between Haras and al-Shirazi resulted in making contacts between the political leadership in Baghdad and that of the Middle Euphrates.

(c) The effort to overcome sectarian and religious differences

Perhaps the most important characteristic of Haras was that it aimed to achieve trans-sectarian and trans-religious solidarity. The seventh clause of the political principles of Haras stated: "first, we should start with the unification of the voices of Iraqis, beyond religious

1. In the letter from al-Shirazi to Abu'l-Tlimman on 1st of June, he said as follows: "Your Islamic movement in Baghdad...has filled us with pleasure. Still more were we pleased to hear from Shaikh Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi of all the arrangements made for enemy. We join our voices with your shouting "we declare complete independence without foreign interference"...". F0371/5076, Abstract of Intelligence, 1920. June 5.
and sectarian differences ... ". This attitude can also be seen from the background of the leading members of Haras itself; Muhammad al-Sadr and Abu'l-Timman were Shi'is and Yusuf al-Suwaydi, 'Ali Bazirkan and Ahmad al-Shaykh Da'ud were Sunnis.

As I mentioned before, most "religious-political" activities were led by the Shi'i ulama and tribes and they did not extend to Sunni society. Haras found a way of fostering cooperation between Sunnis and Shi'is by organizing popular gatherings in the mosques. The first joint attendance of Sunnis and Shi'is was observed at the condolence ceremonies after the death of al-Yazdi in 1919. Haras developed this and organized mixed mawlid and ta'ziya ceremonies. Haras led the mawlid/ta'ziya meetings in mosques twice each week and organized political and patriotic campaigns there. The numbers gathered in these meetings increased very rapidly; at a mawlid on 18 May held in the residence of a Shi'i Muslim about 200 people participated without invitations. Even Sulayman Faydi,

1. Full text of the principles of Haras is mentioned in the work of al-Basir. al-Basir, op.cit., p.78.

2. Sluglett, op.cit. , p.303.

3. According to al-Wardi, there are two views on the origin of this joint mawlid/ta'ziya: one is that Salih al-Hilli had started in Kazimiya on 1st of May, and the other is that Mahdi al-Basir hit upon this idea in a discussion with al-Sadr. al-Wardi, op.cit., vol.5, pp.173-175.

who was basically opposed to the military policy of Haras, described the situation as follows: "Although I hate mawlids very much, I feel myself obliged to go there... ."

These mawlid/ta'ziya gatherings led to a clash between those attending and British police on 23 May, which gave an opportunity for Haras to make contact with British political officers as has been described in chapter 1. This cooperation between Sunnis and Shi'is is symbolised in a contemporary proverb: "relations between 'Umar and 'Ali are reconciled, and there is no difference between them ".

Cooperation was pursued between sects as well as between religious groups. At mawlids, Muslims called upon Christians for solidarity, distributing flowers to them. al-Shirazi sent a letter to Abu'l-Timman saying "you must also preserve the rights of Christians and Jews (and) foreigners...so that your enemy may have no charge against your treatment of minorities".


2. al-Wardi, vol.5. op.cit. , p.194.

3. This letter is dated 1 June. See note 41.
(d) Another educational network: the foundation of Madrasa Ahaliya

Unlike members of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and other Iraqi political parties, whose academic careers were mainly based on modern education, members of Haras did not share a common background. Most of them were educated in the traditional way, and came from various social strata such as 'ulama, former Ottoman officials, merchants etc... The only common feature they shared was that they had generally not enjoyed the educational opportunities provided under the Tanzimat, whether they were Sunni or Shi'i.

As the Shi'is were largely isolated from the modern educational system, voluntary educational movements occurred in some Shi'i areas. A remarkable development can be seen in the activities of Nadi al-Turki al-Ja'afariya al-'Uthmani, established in 1908 to promote education and culture for Shi'is; the centre of this organization was the residence of the Abu'l-Timman family. Its principal members were Ja'far Abu'l-Timman and some of his relatives, 'Ali Bazirgan and Amin al-Charchafchi. Zumayzam notes that the family of Abu'l-Timman had long been keen to establish a school together with Bazirgan and 'Abd al-Karim al-Hubba, and had asked the Ottoman government for

1. The composition of the members comes from Juburi. Amin al-Charchafchi was the leader of Hizb al-Nahda al-'Iraqi which would be established in 1922, one of the first official political parties under the British mandate.
permission, which was granted in 1908, when Bazirgan founded Madrasa Ahaliya, the national school. Madrasa Ahaliya was officially recognized by Britain, but when it became a centre of nationalist and patriotic education, Britain came to be afraid of its influence. Although its aim was to provide modern education for Shi'is, Madrasa Ahliyya invited many Sunni intellectuals to become administrative members or teachers, including Jalal Baban and Ahmad al-Shaykh Da'ud from Haras, and Amin Zaki and Sulayman Faydi from the Baghdad branch of al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi.

The promotion of these educational activities by the leaders of Haras had a great impact on the patriotic consciousness of urban youth and enabled Haras to mobilize young people to their activities. Muhammad Kubba, a member of Madrasa Ahaliya later formed Jam`iya al-Shabibiya al-Ja'fariya, which itself took an initiative in encouraging popular movements to support the activities of Haras.

At the same time we should not forget the role of the maqha, coffee shop, in this form of political mobilization. The maqha was a social centre for ordinary people to


2. al-Wardi, op.cit., p.96.

3. For the activities of Muhammad Kubba, see ibid., p.98 and Shabar, op.cit., p.59.
chat, discuss, and exchange information. Haras distributed its political propaganda to these maqahi (pl. of magha), and the owners of magha and shops responded to anti-British calls from Haras with a strike.

(e) Relations with the tribal society of the Middle Euphrates

As mentioned in the previous chapter, tribal society in Middle Euphrates area had been involved in fierce clashes with Britain, and was greatly frustrated with direct British rule. Tribal society and the Shi'i 'ulama had come closer though the mediating role of the sada' in Hizb al-Sirri. Haras also followed the path pursued by Hizb al-Sirri, and succeeded in gaining the full support of the main tribal groups there. Its close relations with tribal society were a major factor enabling it to promote the fierce uprising in 1920 in the tribal areas. Moreover, cooperation was achieved through the sada' and 'ulama, which combined tribal and religious networks in a more profound solidarity, as distinct from the temporary al-

1. After the clash at the mawlid on 23 of May, many shops were closed in protest against Britain. See Zumayzam, op.cit., p.117.

On 30th of May, many pamphlets were distributed to coffee shops owned by Jews and Christians, saying as follows: "Do not consider ...that the demonstration carried out by the citizens affects any of your rights... We have no other object than to claim from the present government the fulfilment of her pledges to the Iraqiuan [sic.] Nation...". F0371/5075, Abstract of Intelligence, 29. May 1920.
liance of al-ʿAhd al-ʿIraqi and the northern tribes. Haras also gave ideological content to what might otherwise have been a mere tribal uprising.

In the early days of 1920, the major tribal leaders were appointed members of provincial councils which were supposed to support British rule. Yet in Shamiya all the members resigned immediately after their appointment, claiming that they could not advise the government when they had no clear idea about the future of Iraq. The tribal leaders refused this form of British appeasement, and instead looked for ways of opposing Britain. They took a keen interest in the activities of Haras in Baghdad, and Hadi Zuwayn, a notable and sayyid of Shamiya joined Haras in March 1920. He invited the main tribal leaders including Shaʿlan Abuʾl-Chun, ʿAlwan Hajj al-Saʿdun and ʿAbd al-Wahid al-Sikkar to discuss the latest political developments. After that meeting, Zuwayn visited Baghdad to see the members of Haras on 20 April, and requested them to sanction military action in the Middle Euphrates, insisting that the tribal groups and the sadaʾ were ready for the uprising. Abuʾl-Timman told him that the members in Baghdad intended to support this action, and he himself visited Karbalaʾ and Najaf.

2. al-Wardi, op.cit., p.98.
Thus Haras came to be deeply involved in the situation in Middle Euphrates. Apart from Abu'l-Timman's visit, Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi contacted al-Shirazi, and Rahum al-Dulaymi kept in touch with Abu'l-Chun and al-Shirazi. Other members of Haras encouraged political movements in Diyala and Hilla, where Muhammad al-Basir took a leading role. When Haras formed the delegation for the negotiation with the British authorities in Baghdad in May, it was followed by the formation of similar delegations composed of tribal chiefs, 'ulama and sada' in Karbala' and Najaf. In Karbala', the tribal chief 'Umar Hajj al-'Alwan was elected to the delegation, and in Najaf Sayyids 'Alwan and Nur al-Yasiri. With this strong support and encouragement from tribal society, Haras took a tougher line in the negotiations with British officials. Yusuf al-Suwaydi insisted as follows: "we must write to the tribal chiefs and the townspeople asking them to be ready to revolt if our rights are denied us".

The meeting with British officials on 2 June ended without any positive outcome, except that Wilson mentioned that a national government would be established in the future. Popular frustration increased and there were more and more demonstrations and popular gatherings in Baghdad.

and Najaf. In this tense atmosphere, Sha'lan Abu'l-Chun, the chief of the Zuwalim 'ashira and a leading political activist, was arrested after a dispute over the payment of taxes on 25 June. His tribesmen realized that his arrest was in revenge for his anti-British activities, and attacked the prison where he was jailed and started military action against British forces. Soon afterwards, 'Abd al-Wahid al-Sikkar and 'Alwan al-Yasiri attacked Abu Sukhayr. There were similar risings in Samawa, Kifr and Hindiya. In Mishkhab and Karbala' fatwas were issued in support of the rising. This was the beginning of the uprising of 1920, which continued until the end of November of that year.

The rising called for the complete independence of Iraq and for the withdrawal of British forces from the Middle Euphrates, the former demand being a basic principle of Haras. A provisional government was formed by the rebels in Najaf, Karbala' and Diwaniya. The uprising introduced its own tax system; the rebels also formed an executive committee, al-Shirazi heading the council of religious justice, which worked as an administrative

body. Such well-organized activities differed greatly from the uprisings in Najaf or Tall 'Afar.

The insurrection spread not only to Shi'i tribal areas but also to Sunni tribal groups. In August, Dari, the chief of Zu'ba qabila in Dulaym region, led his tribesmen to kill a British political officer, and the tribe rose against Britain between Falluja and Baghdad. Also in Diyala, the communication line between Baghdad and Persia was attacked by the rebels led by such tribal groups as the Karkhiya and the Albu Hayaz'a (descendant of Zu'ba), together with some local sada'. Both were Sunni areas, and reflected the cooperative mood between Sunni and Shi'i Muslims. Dari, for example, said to a British political officer: "In Iraq, there is no Sunni or Shi'i but there are only 'ulama who devote themselves to God. Our 'ulama are our rulers."

Haras was suppressed by the British authorities during the uprising of 1920 as mentioned in chapter 1, but its leading members took refuge in the area where the uprising took place and directed it. These included Abu'l-Timman in Najaf, al-Suwaydi and al-Sadr in Diyala, and

3. Zumayzam, op.cit., p.34.
Bazirgan, Mahmud Ramiz and 'Arif Hikmat in Karbala'. The organization of Haras itself was uprooted, but its political philosophy, the way it succeeded in mobilizing the people, and the style of the chain-reactions among the nationalist movements, Islamic networks and tribal networks kept the uprising alive.

Conclusion: The rising of 1920 as a Mixture of Proto-nationalisms

In the previous chapters I have reviewed three types of political movement aiming at securing Iraqi independence in the early 20th century. The first one, although apparently a manifestation of a limited form of pan-Arabism, was in fact based on Sayyid Talib's personal power and his aim was to establish his imara in southern Iraq. Such an attempt to achieve autonomy had been common since the middle 19th century among the Gulf tribes under British protection like those of Kuwait and Muhammara. Talib had a strong connection with these imarat, and "the shaykhs of Kuwait and Muhammara relied on [him] to protect their interests in Basra against the Turkish authorities, and in turn offered him their financial and moral backing".

In contrast, the other two patterns, the cases of al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi and that of Haras, were in an important sense a combination of existing social networks, channeling proto-national feelings towards the formation of anti-


2. Atlyya, op.cit., pp.64-65. Talib, as a mutassarif of Hasa, was a protector of the estates of Shaykh Khaz'al of Muhammara on the west bank of Shatt al-Arab.
colonial movements. Nevertheless there are major differences between the two especially in their methods of social mobilisation. First, Haras relied greatly on religious networks in the Shi'i community, especially on the marja'-i taqlid and the sada', while al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi did not. Religious personalities played a crucial role in connecting local tribal society with the urban intellectuals in the 1920 uprising, in contrast with the Tall 'Afar uprising in which relations between tribal society and the leaders of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was far from harmonious. Second, Haras was active inside Iraq while al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was far away in Syria. The latter searched for "the liberation of the Arabs" first with Faysal and the British, then sought "the liberation of Iraq" after the split in al-'Ahd in Damascus and the contradiction caused by Faysal's pro-British policy. Although they pursued what may be called pan-Arabism with Faysal in the first stage, they turned (or were obliged to turn) to Iraqism --- or what we may call "negative Iraqism". In contrast, the activities of Haras began inside Iraq from the outset, its members watching the British invasion without any illusion that Britain might be a "protector" or "liberator of Iraq". Rather they shared a sense of crisis among traditional societies faced with the reality of direct foreign control. We may call the Iraqism of Haras "positive Iraqism", compared to the "negative Iraqism" of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi.
Though both Haras and al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi had arrived at a form of Iraqism by 1920, we do not know whether they had a concrete idea of `watan` at that time. As for their territorial image of the Iraqi `watan`, only al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi actually defined Iraq (as "the land extending from Diyar Bakr, Dayr al-Zur, Mosul, then to Baghdad and Basra"). It is interesting that they considered Iraq to extend further north and west than the modern state does today, reflecting their psychological attachment to Syria and Turkey. Haras, however, never mentioned where their `watan` actually was. Moreover, neither party had a clear ideology of `wataniya`, nor defined who are `muwatinun` (=nationals), although they called themselves `wataniyun`. If we take al-Fasi's view that "it is impossible for any human to become a citizen of any `watan` provided he frees himself not of his blood or religious ties, but of his mentality which has been shaped by the various environmental influences of the country in which he was brought up", both parties relied on non-`watani` religious and tribal ties. These elements may have the been manifestations of a kind of proto-nationalism, but it seemed unlikely to develop into fully fledged nationalism in 1920.

Cooperation between Shi`i and Sunni, and between urban and rural society, and attempts to overcome these divisions in the uprising did not last long either. As is

1. Bensaid, op.cit., p.163.
evident from a later period of Iraqi history, temporary cooperation between urban intellectuals (=wataniyun) and the Shi'i 'ulama broke down in 1922, as the latter were dissatisfied with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and Shi'i under-representation in ministerial posts. Most tribal chiefs and influential local sada' were appeased by being given official posts in state institutions, although many of them (particularly in the Middle Euphrates) would strongly opposed the introduction of conscription in 1934. Though the uprising was an anti-colonial movement, which Smith suggests can be one of the "first causes" of territorial nationalism, its participants were not to continue to play an important role in building up the new state after the establishment of the monarchy. Rather, as Hobsbawm maintains, "proto-national identifications ... were obstacles rather than contributions to national consciousness" under "the imperialist policies of "Divide and Rule"". Under a series of oppressive regimes, severe political repression and frustration has brought the very diverse societies of Iraq close to country-wide popular upheaval against a common enemy, as in the 1958 revolution and Sha'ban Intifadah after the Gulf War.

Thus the 1920 uprising was the first country-wide

uprising to confront the Western decision to create the new state of Iraq, and the first occasion on which Iraqis thought in terms of the framework of Iraq rather than simply that of their own religious societies, tribes, or home towns. There was a variety of political reactions to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of British control. The first was an early form of "pan-Arabism", impelled by a religious or sectarian momentum, or tribal cohesion, and then a kind of Iraqism, both "negative" and "positive" in the sense that I have described. In other words, consciousness of "ourselves as Iraqis" appeared as a new form of social identity on the political scene. Nevertheless it did not develop specifically into nationalism (=wataniya), nor can all these political activities be understood as part of a process of developing a single nationalist ideology.

The historical significance of the 1920 uprising is that it has provided a common memory of the uprising as a form of country-wide cooperation which transcended the social differences within the framework of Iraq. It was a manifestation of every element of proto-national emotion in a rather well-orchestrated manner. Without any of these elements, the wide expansion of popular movement could not have been achieved: without the cooperation of the 'ulama, it would be only a short-lived uprising like that of Tall 'Afar; without the urban intellectuals, it would have remained sporadic and confined only to a few rural or sacred areas (like Najaf). I do not underestimate the
influence of Arabism among the urban intellectuals, but their consciousness of \( \text{\textdegree} \text{uruba} \) as proto-nationalism was not the same thing as modern Arab nationalism, or \( \text{qawmiya} \).

This shared memory was especially strong among the \( \text{\ulama} \) who regarded themselves as the major actors in the uprising, but were subsequently excluded from the political scene. This image of collective popular uprising against those who "divide and rule" is attractive even to a contemporary ideologue like Shaykh Shamal, the present leader of the Islamic Bloc in Iraq, who refers it as follows: "[his political aim is] to unite the Islamic forces in Iraq within a framework that includes all groups of the Iraqi people: Arab, Kurdish, and Turkman Muslims --- both Shi'is and Sunnis. That framework is based on the historic roots of the struggle and the unity of the Iraqi people ... which foiled Colonel Wilson's attempt to divide Iraq into three states after the British occupation."

1. al-'Alawi points out the difference between \( \text{al-\textdegree} \text{uruba} \) and \( \text{al-\textdegree} \text{qawmiya al-\textdegree} \text{arabliya} \) in relation to secularism, saying that the latter means some kind of secular political mode, which is not necessarily a key notion for the former. al-'Alawi, Hasan, \textit{al-Shi'a wa'l-Dawla al-Qawmiya fi'l-'Iraq} (Shi'isme and national state in Iraq), France, CEDI, 1989, p.300

2. Shamal's interview with \textit{al-Majallah} magazine when he announced the formation of Islamic Forces Grouping with Islamic Movement in Iraq, Imam's Soldiers Movement, and Islamic Movements in Iraqi Kurdistan, as an opposition coalition against Saddam's regime. The Islamic Bloc is led by al-Alusi, a notable family of Sunni sada', and has close connection with Muslim Brotherhood. FBIS, \textit{Daily Report}, 1991, April 12.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic/Sectarian Origin</th>
<th>Academic Background</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jam'iya al-Ikha al-'Arabiya al-Uthmaniya</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni</td>
<td>Graduated from Istanbul University; Lecturer at Baghdad Law College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakir al-Alusi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamdi al-Pachachi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni</td>
<td>Sayyid; Mutasarrif of al-Hasa; Landed notable; Sufi background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najl al-Suwaydi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni</td>
<td>qaimmaqam of Najaf; graduated Istanbul Law College; Eldest son of Yusuf al-Suwaydi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Muntada al-Adabi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni</td>
<td>Sayyid; Teacher; Poet; Ex-member of CUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talib al-Naqib</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni</td>
<td>Sayyid; Ex-member of Ottoman parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa al-Wa'iz</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni</td>
<td>Student in Paris; Lawyer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
al-Jam'iya al-Qahtaniya 1909 Istanbul

Jamil al-Mldfa'i Arab: Sunni; Graduated from Military Academy; Sharifian officer; Ottoman officer

Yasin al-Hashimi Arab: Sunni; Graduated from Military Academy; Ottoman officer

Daud Effendi Dabuni Arab: Sunni; from Mosul; Doctor

al-`Alam al-Akhdar 1912 Istanbul

Daud Effendi Dabuni Arab: Sunni; from Mosul; Doctor

`Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri Arab: Sunni; Graduated from Military Academy; Military officer

Isma'il Saffar Arab: Sunni; from Mosul; Doctor

`Ali Rida al-Ghazali Arab: Sunni; Graduated from Military Academy

Ahmad `Izzat al-`Azmi ?:?:; Lawyer; Journalist

al-Yad al-Sawda' 1913 Istanbul

Daud Effendi Dabuni Arab: Sunni; from Mosul; Doctor

Jam'iya al-`Ahd 1913 Istanbul

Nuri al-Sa' id Arab: Sunni; Graduated from Military Academy; Sharifian officer; Ottoman officer

Yasin al-Hashimi Arab: Sunni; Graduated from Military Academy; Ottoman officer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Graduation/Profession</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mawlud Mukhlis Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduated from Military Academy; Ottoman officer; Sharifian officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>`Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduate of Military Academy; Ottoman officer; Sharifian officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>`Abd Allah al-Dulaymi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamil al-Midfa'j</td>
<td>Arab/Kurd</td>
<td>from Mosul; Graduate of Military Academy; Ottoman officer; Sharifian officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tahsin `Ali</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsin al-`Askari</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>`Abd al-Hamid al-Shalchi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduate of Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>`Abd al-Ghafur al-Shalchi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Hilmi al-`Umar</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuri Fattah</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Ex-officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamdi al-Pachachi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Graduate of Istanbul University; Lecturer at Baghdad Law College</td>
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<td>`Abd al-Rahman Sharaf</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharif al-Faruqi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Hilmi al-Hajj</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ja'far al-'Askari</td>
<td>Arabized Kurd; Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy</td>
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<td>Taha al-Hashimi</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Abd Allah al-Dumalchi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yusuf al-'Azzawi</td>
<td>??:?;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sa'id al-Tikriti</td>
<td>??:?;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabih Najib</td>
<td>Turk; Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muwaffaq Kamil</td>
<td>??:?;</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Ali Rida al-Ghazali</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy; Military officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majid al-Hasun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muzahim al-Pachachi</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Asim al-Chalabi</td>
<td>??:?; Sayyid; Civilian; Educationalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salim al-Jaza'iri</td>
<td>??:?;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashid al-Khuja</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Military officer</td>
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Table 2: Parties established in Iraq aiming for Arabism and Arab Separatism

**Hizb al-Hurr al-Mu'tadil**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud al-Naqib</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talib al-Naqib</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Basra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulayman Faydi</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Basra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hizb al-Hurriya wa'l-I'tilaf</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Basra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hizb al-Hurr al-Mu'tadil**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Notable Group</th>
<th>Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud al-Naqib</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Son of Naqib al-ashraf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Talib al-Naqib</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Sayyid</td>
<td>Mutasarrif of al-Hasa; Landed notable; Sufi background</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sulayman Faydi</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>from Mosul</td>
<td>Graduate of Baghdad Military High School; Official in Wilaya; Lawyer</td>
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**Al-Hizb al-Hurriya wa'l-I'tilaf**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Notable Group</th>
<th>Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talib al-Naqib</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Sayyid</td>
<td>Mutasarrif of al-Hasa; Landed notable; Sufi background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulayman Faydi</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>from Mosul</td>
<td>Graduate of Baghdad Military High School; Official in Wilaya; Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajj Mahmud Pasha</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Abd Allah Pasha Ayan</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Wahhab Tabataba'i</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Shi'i</td>
<td>Sayyid</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Pasha Sani</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Latif Mandil</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajj Mahmud Ahmad al-Na'ma</td>
<td>Arab</td>
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Hajj Mahmud Ahmad al-Na'ma: ???
Mahmud Adib Arab; Sunni; Writer; military officer
Sa'id Haqqi ?; Military officer
'Abd al-Jalil al-Shalchi Arab; Sunni; Military officer
al-Hizb al-Hurriya wa'l-I'tilaf 1912 Baghdad
Mustafa al-Wa'iz ?(Sunni); Sayyid; Ex-member of Ottoman parliament
Mahmud Nudaym al-Tabaqchali Arab; Sunni; Journalist
Muhammad Kamil al-Tabaqchali Arab; Sunni; Journalist
Shukri Fadil Effendi ?(Sunni); Ex-member of CUP
Hamdi al-Pachachi Arab; Sunni; Graduated from Istanbul University; Lecturer at Baghdad Law College
al-Nadl al-Watan al-'Ilmi 1912 Baghdad
Muzahim al-Pachachi Arab; Sunni; Baghdad Law College
Hamdi al-Pachachi Arab; Sunni; Graduate of Istanbul University; Lecturer at Baghdad Law College
'Asim al-Chalabi ?; Sayyid; Civilian; Educationalist
Ibrahim Najj Arab; Sunni; Student
Thabit al-Suwaydi Arab; Sunni; Graduate of Istanbul University
Bahjat Zaynal Arab; Sunni; Student at Baghdad Law College; family of small merchants
Abd al-Latif al-Falahi Arab: Sunni; Police officer
Yusuf 'Izz al-Din Arab: Sunni; Military officer
Sabih Najib Arab: Sunni; Military officer
'Abd al-Hamid Shalchi Arab: Sunni; Military officer
'Abd al-Majid Kana Arab: Sunni; Military officer
Razuq Ghannam Arab: Christian; Journalist
Tahsin al-'Askari Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy
Sh. Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi Arab: Shi'i; Poet
Sh. Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi Arab: Shi'i; 'Aliim; Teacher
Sh. Mubdir al-Far'un Arab: Shi'i; Tribal chief

al-Jam'iya al-Islahiya fi al-Basra 1913 Basra
Talib al-Naqib Arab: Sunni; Sayyid; Mutasarrif of al-Hasa; Landed notable; Sufi background
'Abd Allah Zuhayr Arab: Sunni; Journalist

Jam'iya al-'Alam 1914 Mosul
Muhammad Rawf al-Ghallami Arab: Sunni; senior 'alim; Writer
Makki al-Sharbtli Arab: Sunni; Lawyer; Writer
* Thabit 'Abd al-Nur Arab: Christian; Joined Arab revolt
Rawf al-Shahwani (Arab: ?); Joined Arab revolt

* Thabit 'Abd al-Nur is founder of the Society of Sufis in Iraq.

* Fuller biography in The Encyclopedia of Mosul, University of Mosul.

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Table 3: Members of al-`Ahd al-`Iraqi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jam<code>iya al-</code>Ahd al-`Iraqiya</th>
<th>1919 Damascus</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuri al-Sa`id</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of military Academy; Sharifian officer; Ottoman officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasin al-Hashimi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy; Ottoman officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawlud Mukhlis</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy; Ottoman officer; Sharifian officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy; Ottoman officer; Sharifian officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Abd Allah al-Dulaymi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamil al-Midfa'i</td>
<td>Arab/Kurd: Sunni; from Mosul; Graduate of Military Academy; Ottoman officer; Sharifian officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsin 'Ali</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsin al-`Askari</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amin al-`Umari</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taha al-Hashimi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawfiq al-Suwaydi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Student in Paris;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lawyer

Naji al-Suwaydi  Arab: Sunni; qa'immaqam of Najaf; Graduate of Istanbul Law College; eldest son of Yusuf al-Suwaydi

'Abd al-Latif al-Fallah  Arab: Sunni; Merchant; ex-official

Ramadan al-Shallash  Arab: Sunni; Military officer; son of tribal chief

Thabit 'Abd al-Nur  Arab: Christian; Joined Arab revolt notible

* See Encyclopedia of Meand for Biography
Table 4: Branches of Iraqi al-`Ahd in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>1919 Baghdad</th>
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<tr>
<td>Baghdad Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sh. Sa'id Naqshbandi</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Landed religious notable; Descendant of sufi tariqa of Naqshbandi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baha' al-Din Sa'id al-Naqshbandi</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Relative of above</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ala' al-Din al-Na'ib</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Relative of above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad 'Izzat al-A'zami</td>
<td>Writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Rida</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuri Fattah</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Ex-military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amin Zaki</td>
<td>Kurd; Sunni; Ex-military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sami Naqshali</td>
<td>?:?: Ex-military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anwar al-Naqshali</td>
<td>?:?: Ex-military officer; brother of above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Sami al-Dabuni</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulayman Fattah</td>
<td>?:?:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasim al-`Alawi</td>
<td>?:?:</td>
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<tr>
<td>`Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri</td>
<td>Arab; Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy; Military officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Mosul Branch

1919 Mosul

Muhammad Rawf al-Ghallami Arab: Sunni; senior 'alim; Writer

Ibrahim 'Attar Arab: Sunni; Landed notable; Friend of Yasin al-Hashimi

Sa'id Hajj Thabit Arab: Sunni; Landed notable; Merchant; Friend of Yasin al-Hashimi

Muhammad Amin al-Musayb al-'Umari Arab: Sunni; Local notable

'Abd Allah al-'Umari Arab: Sunni; Local notable

Mustafa al-'Umari Arab: Sunni; Local notable; Military officer; Graduate of Baghdad Law College

Diya' Yunis al-Tall 'Afari Arab: Sunni

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### Table 5: Political Organizations in Najaf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ja'miya al-Nahda al-Islamiya</td>
<td>1917/18</td>
<td>Najaf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Jawad al-Jaza'iri</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; 'Alim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad 'Ali Bahr al-`Ulum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; 'Alim; Sayyid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazim Subbi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Chief of mahalla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abbas 'Ali al-Ramahi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Razzaq Adwa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Graduate; Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuma 'Adwa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abbas al-Khalili</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; 'Alim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najm al-Din al-Baqqal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karim Sa'd al-Hajj Radi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Son of chief of mahalla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhsin al-Hajj Radi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Son of chief of mahalla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad al-Hajj Radi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Son of chief of mahalla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Muhammad 'Ali al-Dimashqi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab; Shi'i; Mujtahid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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al-Hizb al-Najafi al-Sirri 1918 Najaf

'Abd al-Karlm al-Jaza'iri Arab:Shi'i; 'Alim

Sh. Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi Arab:Shi'i; Poet

Ahmad al-Safi Arab:Shi'i; Poet; Sayyid

Jawad al-Jawahiri Persian:Shi'i; 'Alim

Hajj Muhsin Shallash Arab:Shi'i; Great merchant

Hadi Zuwayn Arab:Shi'i; Sayyid; Tribal chief

'Abd al-Wahid al-Hajj Sukkar Arab:Shi'i; Tribal chief

Kata' al-'Awadi Arab:Shi'i; Sayyid; Tribal chief

Sh. Ghathith al-Hajran Arab:Shi'i; Tribal chief

Sh. Sha'lan Abu Chun Arab:Shi'i; Tribal chief

'Alwan al-Yasiri Arab:Shi'i; Sayyid; Tribal chief
Table 6: Members of Haras al-Istiqlal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jalal Baban</td>
<td>Kurd: (Sunni); Notable; Ex-Ottoman official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud Ramiz</td>
<td>(Arab): ?; Sharifian officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Arif Hikmat</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Ex-officer; Ex-Ottoman official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husayn Shallal</td>
<td>??:?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id Haqqi</td>
<td>??:?; Military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Majid Yusuf</td>
<td>??:?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Latif Hamid</td>
<td>??:?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhi al-Din al-Sahrurdi</td>
<td>?:?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakir Mahmud</td>
<td>?:?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Graduate of Military Academy; Military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahjat Zaynal</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Student at Baghdad Law College; Family of small merchants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ali Bazirgan</td>
<td>Arab/Turk: Sunni; Graduate of Baghdad High School; Ex-Ottoman official; Educationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusuf al-Suwaydi</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; 'Alim; Shari'a judge of Karkh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad al-Shaykh al-Daud</td>
<td>Arab: Sunni; Religious notable; Ex-Ottoman official</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
`Abd al-Majid Kana Arab: Sunni; Baghdad military secondary school; Military officer

Muhammad al-Sadr Arab: Shi'ı; 'Alim; Religious notable

Sh. Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi Arab: Shi'ı; 'Alim; Teacher

Ja'far Abu'l-Tlmman Arab: Shi'ı; Merchant

Naji Shawkat Circassian/Arab: Sunni; Ex-Ottoman official

Sami Shawkat Circassian/Arab: Sunni

Ramzi Bek ??:

Makki Urfali ??:

(1) Names and their background data are derived from the following sources, omitting the names mentioned in only one source and not confirmed in any other sources. Nazmi, op. cit.; al-Wardi, op. cit.; Shabar, op. cit.; Tel'afari, op. cit.; Aswad, op. cit.; al-Juburi, op. cit.; Jamil, op. cit.; 'Umar, op. cit.; Atiyya, op. cit.; Faydi, op. cit.; Basri, op. cit.; al-Basir, op. cit.; al-Suwaydi, op. cit.; Zumayzam, op. cit.; Tarbush, op. cit.; al-Qaysi, op. cit.; Batatu, op. cit.

Ethnic and sectarian origins are estimated in ( ) from their nisba, place of their origin, and so on.

(2) Atiyya mentions him as a writer, and al-Juburi says that he was a Katib (secretary, or writer) when he was a member of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, though he mentions him as a military officer in al-Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-I'tilaf at the same time. See Atiyya, op. cit.; al-Juburi, op. cit.

(3) Atiyya mentions him as a Turkish officer, although al-Juburi describes him as a merchant.
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