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NEUROSIS ACCORDING TO KAREN HORNEY AND THE
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ST. MAXIMUS THE
CONFESSOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

BY

GEORGE VARVATSOULIAS

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PH.D. THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This doctoral thesis deals with the topic of Pastoral Psychology. It is a comparative study of the Psychoanalyst Karen Horney and the Father of the Church, Saint Maximus the Confessor. The central part of the thesis is a comparison of Karen Horney's psychological theory of neurosis and Saint Maximus the Confessor's anthropological understanding of the nature of human fallenness.

This is preceded by a comparative study of the understanding of the potentialities of healthy human nature, or human nature as God intended it, and followed by a comparison of the therapeutic methods proposed by Karen Horney on one hand and Saint Maximus on the other. The whole study is prefaced by a historical introduction that seeks to place the American Psychoanalyst and the Father of the Church in their respective historical and intellectual context.

This study closes with conclusions and an epilogue that deals with the current position of Karen Horney's psychoanalysis, and the way in which Saint Maximus the Confessor's teaching on Creation, Man and World contributes to the teaching of the Church today.

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Dr. Andrew Louth supervised me as a genuine British scholar who is very well aware of what to correct, advise, and suggest in a doctoral thesis. From the co-operation I had with him, I must mention that he was always pointing out not only what work needed to be done, but also what exactly I had to think in order to provide my dissertation with the aspects, the thoughts and the discussion being useful for the completion of my thesis. Speaking sincerely, I truly acknowledge to him the gift of διδάσκειν ἐν εὐθύτητι, ποιεῖν ἐν σοφίᾳ, καὶ ὁμιλεῖν ἐν σωφροσύνῃ (teaching in honesty, acting in wisdom, and speaking in moderation). I thank him for every academic supervision, advice and suggestion he tirelessly provided me.

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*ΑΠΟΛΥΤΙΚΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΑΓΙΟΥ ΜΑΞΙΜΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΟΜΟΛΟΓΗΤΟΥ
ΕΟΡΤΗΣ ΕΝ ΤΗ 13Η ΤΟΥ ΜΗΝΟΣ ΑΥΓΟΥΣΤΟΥ.*

ΟΡΘΟΔΟΣΙΑΣ ΟΔΗΓΕ, ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑΣ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΕ ΚΑΙ
ΣΕΜΝΟΤΗΤΟΣ, ΤΗΣ ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΣ Ο ΦΩΣΤΗΡ, ΤΩΝ
ΜΟΝΑΖΟΝΤΩΝ ΘΕΟΠΝΕΥΣΤΟΝ ΕΓΚΑΛΛΩΠΙΣΜΑ, Ω ΜΑΞΙΜΕ
ΣΟΦΕ, Ο ΦΩΤΙΣΑΣ ΠΑΝΤΑΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΣΟΙΣ ΔΟΓΜΑΣΙ, Ω ΛΥΡΑ ΤΟΥ
ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ, ΠΑΤΕΡ ΟΣΙΕ, ΠΡΕΣΒΕΥΕ ΧΡΙΣΤΩΙ ΤΩΙ ΘΕΩΙ
ΣΩΘΗΝΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΨΥΧΑΣ ΗΜΩΝ.

*ΑΠΟΛΥΤΙΚΙΟΝ OF THE SAINT MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR'S FEAST ON
AUGUST THE 13TH.*

GUIDE OF ORTHODOXY, TEACHER OF PIETY AND REVERENCE,
BEACON OF THE CHURCH, DIVINELY-INSPIRED ORNAMENT OF THE
MONKS, O WISE MAXIMUS, YOU ENLIGHTEN ALL WITH YOUR
DOCTRINES, O HARP OF THE SPIRIT, INTERCEDE WITH CHRIST GOD
THAT OUR SOULS MAY BE SAVED.

ΚΟΝΤΑΚΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΟΡΤΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΑΓΙΟΥ.

ΕΡΑΣΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΤΡΙΑΔΟΣ, Ω ΜΕΓΙΣΤΕ ΜΑΞΙΜΕ, Ο ΚΗΡΥΞΑΣ
ΣΑΦΩΣ ΤΗΝ ΘΕΙΑΝ ΠΙΣΤΙΝ ΕΞΥΜΝΩΝ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΝ ΕΝ ΔΥΟΙ
ΦΥΣΕΣΙΝ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΑ, ΘΕΛΗΣΕΙ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙΣ, ΗΜΕΙΣ ΟΙ
ΠΙΣΤΟΙ ΤΙΜΩΜΕΝ ΣΕ ΕΝ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ, ΦΘΕΓΓΟΜΕΝΟΙ, ΧΑΙΡΕ Ω ΚΗΡΥΞ
ΤΗΣ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ.

ΚΟΝΤΑΚΙΟΝ OF THE SAINT'S FEAST.

LOVER OF THE TRINITY, O GREAT MAXIMUS, WHO PROCLAIMED
CLEARLY THE DIVINE FAITH BY PRAISING CHRIST WHO EXISTS IN TWO
NATURES, WILLS AND ACTIVITIES, WE THE FAITHFUL HONOUR YOU IN
SONGS, AS WE CRY OUT, HAIL, O HERALD OF THE FAITH.

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PROLOGUE

In the Orthodox Theology departments of Greece, some years ago, there began an important scientific comparison between psychoanalysis and the neptic tradition. The idea for this comparison derives from the attempt to detect common traits between these two traditions, so as to lead them into harmonious co-existence. The background used in this comparison is on the one hand the various psychoanalytic theories and how these seem to be applied in contemporary society, whilst on the other the various neptic teachings and the anthropological elements they display.

The comparison between psychoanalysis and the neptic tradition demonstrates positive and negative elements. The more we compare these two, the more we discover two characteristics. On the one hand, we find many common traits, whilst on the other we find many differences. The common traits refer to the way both reveal themselves in theoretical and practical levels, i.e the way in which they investigate the human psyche in accordance with its close relationship to the body, and how this relationship affects one's own existence in a practical way.

At this point, I think it is useful to explain the meaning of the term "neptic". The adjective "neptic" finds its origin in the Greek verb "νήφω" (to be sober) which in the ascetical tradition is linked with ideas such as watchfulness (φυλακή), attentiveness (προσοχή), and spiritual alertness (ἐπαγρύπνησις). The connotation of the word "sober" includes the readiness (ἐγρήγορσις) of the intellect (νοῦς) not to accept any thought (λογισμός) of temptation.

According to the Greek patristic tradition, this watchfulness is the restraint (ἐγκράτεια) or guard (φύλαξ) of the intelligence (λογιστικόν) within the heart (καρδία), so that no thought enters therein, which would create the preconditions for the committing (διάπραξις) of sin (ἁμαρτία). Watchfulness in other words is the guard of the heart.

The outcome of the "marriage" between psychoanalysis and the neptic tradition led to a new branch of Patristics which developed in Greece in the late 1960's. In Greek this is called "Ποιμαντική Ψυχολογία". This can be translated "Pastoral Psychology", a term

familiar in English since the 1930's, though in English it has a rather different connotation and is hardly conceived of as a branch of Patristics.

The person who officially created this term in Greek, and who to this very day ceaselessly works on it, is the Professor emeritus - now - of the Kapodistrian University of Athens Dr. Ioannis Kornarakis. The first monograph written by Professor Ioannis Kornarakis was "Pastoral psychology in the psychology of Carl Jung" and it was published in 1958¹. His second monograph was published some years later and carried the title "Pastoral psychology in the epistles of the Saint Isidor Pilousiotis"². He then published the treatise "Elements of neptic psychology"³.

Through his writings Professor Kornarakis continues to exercise even today an important influence on pastoral psychology, such that we may characterise him as a "lay-pastoral theologian". As a result of these works, one may say that Pastoral Psychology has been established not only as an official discipline in the orthodox theology departments⁴, but in everyday orthodox practice and behaviour as well.

In Greece, pastoral psychology is considered to be effective, not only because it helps in the clarification of the elements connecting the aspects of psychoanalysis and neptic tradition to each other, but also because it has been practised, and continues to be practised, in the life of the Greek Orthodox Church as well.

Pastoral psychology, in Greece, therefore, exists as a part of the study of patristics. The

¹ The Greek title of the monograph is "Η ποιμαντική ψυχολογία στην ψυχολογία του Γιούνγκ".

² Η ποιμαντική ψυχολογία στις épιστολές του άγιου Ίσιδώρου του Πηλουσιώτου, Afoi Kyriakidis, Thessaloniki 1961.

³ Στοιχεία νηπτικής ψυχολογίας, Ipiresia Dimosievmaton, Thessaloniki 1963.

⁴ The official appearance of Pastoral Psychology as a branch and discipline in the orthodox theological departments of Greece began when Professor Kornarakis was appointed tutor and lecturer of this branch of patristics in 1968 in the theological department of the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki. In turn this branch was officially founded in the theology department of Athens, when Dr. Kornarakis was elected Professor in 1978.

objectives of pastoral psychology are to study the writings of the neptic fathers of the church, and to compare them with modern psychological-psychoanalytical theories; secondly, to provide instruction in the psychoanalytical approach of the fathers for members of the clergy, who wish to be trained in pastoral counselling, so as to be able to help their congregations, and those who seek assistance because of various psychospiritual sufferings. Today pastoral counselling is practised in many parishes throughout Greece⁵ and there is general agreement that it helps the orthodox christians.

Through pastoral psychology one understands that religious faith provides emotional security, a sense of personal identity, and of belonging within the wider perspective of human existence. In Greece other scholars who are occupied with pastoral psychology, apart from Professor Kornarakis, are the Archimandrite Dr. Philotheos Pharos, and Professor Alexandros Stavropoulos of the theology department of Athens. The next generation of pastoral psychologists is already emerging in such clergy as the very Reverends Vasilios Thermos and Adamantios Avgoustidis.

The parallel between psychoanalysis and the neptic tradition is not only a matter of modern concern, but it also something that already has a history, in that, in the early fathers, we find deep anthropological interest in the human psyche, which bears comparison with modern psychological investigations. This is why this thesis involves a comparison between one of the figures of the modern psychoanalytic movement, and a great and early father of the Greek neptic tradition.

There seem to me to be three important reasons for comparing psychoanalysis and neptic tradition:

a) Common Framework

The common framework involves a common interest in human psychology. Modern psychology has progressed by using the empirical method common to all modern sciences.

⁵ Considerable spiritual guidance involving the findings of pastoral psychology takes place in the parish of the *Assumption of the Virgin Mary* in Acharnai-Athens, where the *Archimandrite Markellos Kampanis* provides to his congregation this pastoropsychological practice.

In other words, psychoanalysis investigates a person's relationship to himself, and to his close and wider social environment, his relationship to others, finally it investigates the convictions he adopts in life, the way he develops his abilities in it, and the points in which he is influenced positively or negatively by it.

Psychoanalysis approaches these matters, not dogmatically, but tentatively, with a view to a healthy personal and social life, free from conditions which do not promote one's personality either on personal or on social level.

The same is, more or less, valid from the viewpoint of the neptic tradition as well. The neptic tradition can also be presented as a science, or better, as a scientific endeavour with considerable existential implications. The neptic tradition sees the teaching of the fathers of the church as providing theological and anthropological principles for an effective investigation of the human condition.

What concerns the neptic tradition is not catalogues of notions and interpretations about man, but effective investigatory approaches to man's weaknesses with a view to their resolution. The neptic tradition scrutinises man through the conditions of his life, which are related either to himself or to others or to God. These conditions are not considered as autonomous procedures or as procedures separate from the everyday reality of life, but they are investigated within life, which is subject to positive and negative influences.

Simultaneously, the neptic tradition attempts to detach man from experiences which do not integrate him, but keep him imprisoned in spiritually destructive experiences full of psychological cul-de-sacs. This effort of the neptic tradition is pursued through present therapeutic procedures, that seek psychosomatic vigilance and social balance.

b) The Neptic tradition helps one to understand psychoanalysis

The neptic tradition helps us to understand psychoanalysis as an important investigation of the nature of the psychosomatic man. Through the neptic tradition a researcher may discover in the findings of psychoanalysis deep existential implications. The stages in the development of psychoanalysis manifest considerable significance. They suggest the framework in which psychoanalysis appears as a science, and they clarify the points of interest in the approach of psychoanalysis to man.

The neptic tradition helps us to understand psychoanalysis as an humane science displaying theoretical and practical intervention in the life of the contemporary man. (Later on we shall discover that there is a considerable debate within psychoanalysis as to whether it is to be understood as a science or as a branch of the humanities).

The entire concern of this science is to suggest useful solutions to psychosomatic deficiencies. To be more exact, when one pursues the neptic tradition, one clearly perceives the various psychoanalytical suggestions about man. In other words, one understands:

- a) the reality and existence of the unconscious experiences in the soul.
- b) the need for a constructive and effective self-analysis of them.
- c) the process of repression and the struggle towards the awareness of all the unconscious habits.

The methods and tactics of psychoanalysis become more receptive from the researcher of the neptic tradition, who by extension becomes able to understand the abilities and skilfulness of psychoanalysis from a critical viewpoint. Also, a researcher understands how psychoanalysis contributes to the proper investigation of modern man. The neptic tradition possesses the ability to distinguish in psychoanalysis, both the constructive function and suggestions needing further scrutiny and interpretation as, for instance, are the specific characteristics composing a man's personality, his thinking, the emotions and their problems.

Through the neptic tradition it becomes more understandable that psychoanalysis recognises in man a personal system of convictions and values through which it attempts to approach and estimate one's tendencies and activities properly. Simultaneously psychoanalysis is considered as a scientific system of psychological rules which studies the functional character of the psychic phenomena and the determinism governing these phenomena.

In conclusion, the work of psychoanalysis can be understood from the point of view of the neptic tradition as an investigative one. The soul is the investigatory field of psychoanalysis. Its scrutiny is investigated methodologically, as also happens in the case of any other science. The investigative by-products of psychoanalysis are estimated and evaluated

on the basis of psychoanalytical principles which build up the determinism governing psychic phenomena. The investigation of man by psychoanalysis is directed to all parts of his existence, and provides proper considerations about his existential nature and compositions.

The neptic tradition is, in my opinion therefore, the factor through which we may understand psychoanalysis in a proper and secure way. If we examine the neptic tradition in the writings of the desert fathers, i.e in the *Gerontikon* (γεροντικόν), or as it is also called, *Apophthegmata Patrum* (Αποφθέγματα Πατέρων), we notice meaningful psychological investigations of the human psyche, and spiritual guidance either in the form of questions and answers, or in the form of simple stories or examples.

These writings provide us with a kind of *psychic radioscopy* through which one may understand the composition of the psychosomatic man. Neptic Fathers who provide that kind of teaching and investigation would include Saint Paphnutius, Abba Sisoës, Abba Poemen, Evagrius of Pontus, Macarius the Egyptian, Saint Nilus, Saint Diadochus, Saints Barsanuphius and John, Saint Maximus the Confessor, and many others. In general it is the spirituality existing in the neptic tradition which helps us to understand the work and scope of psychoanalysis.

c) Psychoanalysis provides a vocabulary with which the modern man can approach the neptic tradition

The subject matter of psychoanalysis is human behaviour in all its manifestations. The task of a psychoanalyst is to study, to discuss, to understand, and to explain this behaviour.

There have been many advances in the last century and a variety of techniques for investigating the soul were cultivated very quickly. Psychoanalysis also was not afraid to draw conclusions concerning the psychological weaknesses of the modern man. Today the scope and applications of psychoanalysis continue to be broad. Psychoanalysts are to be found not only in academic institutions, but also in many other sections of the modern society, where they attempt to apply their psychoanalytical knowledge properly and

effectively. More generally psychoanalysis has expanded the intellectual vocabulary of modern man.

In the last one hundred years, therefore, psychoanalysis has developed and continues to develop significantly, attempting to provide the best solutions for the sufferer. In the course of this history, psychoanalysis has developed a vocabulary to refer to the problems of psychosomatic man. Modern man finds himself, more or less, in a position to understand better his psychosomatic weaknesses by utilising this psychoanalytic vocabulary.

The neptic tradition itself uses ancient psychology which poses many problems in the modern world. It borrows this psychology not only from philosophical sources, but also from other religious teachings as well, and uses it with considerable anthropological acuity and theological profundity. What the Neptic tradition expresses through this psychology is teaching of real spiritual maturity with centuries-old validity and potential, which, could indisputably help modern man to overcome his inner and personal deficiencies. For this reason, any attempt to translate into the vocabulary of modern psychology aspects of the Neptic tradition is likely to prove illuminating.

The Thesis will be a comparative study of the psychoanalyst Karen Horney, who worked on the problem of human neurosis, and the anthropology of the Greek neptic father of the church, Saint Maximus the Confessor. The idea of comparing Karen Horney with Saint Maximus the Confessor arises for two reasons.

a) Karen Horney's sympathy with religion

Her entire psychoanalytical labour seems to me to be very significant. She worked on modern man's psychospiritual problems, and tried to provide solutions she thought it would be helpful against the deficiencies that haunt him. This effort of hers proceeded on paths not only bearing a close relationship to other psychoanalytical theories, but she also developed a theory open to religious considerations and ideas. She never criticised religion, but she discovered in it new developments and influences for her theory of neurosis.

Karen Horney was the person who found in religion ways of understanding others peoples' problems better. When we say she was "sympathetic to religion", we also mean

that she studied the New Testament in a way suitable to her existential searches for an effective interpretation of neurosis. As we discover in her writings, she was always very keen to work at and to be influenced by religion, because, as she herself indicates, she obtained considerable help from it in explaining many neurotic phenomena.

It is by the way important to notice how Karen Horney works on neurotic notions through the assistance she acquires from religion, because we discover in her a psychoanalyst who provides decisive ontological considerations concerning the problem of the human neurosis. Karen Horney was a psychoanalyst who, although she did not exhort her clients to discover themselves through religious approaches, nevertheless utilised many aspects of the everyday practice of religion, incorporating them in an appropriate psychoanalytical way.

b) because Saint Maximus the Confessor provides a framework both theoretical and orthodox

In studying Saint Maximus the Confessor, one fixes one's attention not only on the speculative and doctrinal realms of his anthropology. The cardinal attitudes of his life and thought were both his faith in the Orthodox tradition inspired by the Holy Spirit and his belief in the mystery of the God-man.

We stress that the whole system of the Maximian anthropology is an ascetical and mystical one. His first notion is that God is the Creator of every thing visible and invisible and that He rules over all with an ineffable love. The anthropology of Saint Maximus operates through his understanding of human nature and man's actual conditions. Thus, he provides considerations concerning the soteriological perspectives of man's salvation and deification. For the holy father, man becomes God by grace, because God is He who first became man; for Saint Maximus, the mystery of Christ attracts him and this is the reason the Maximian anthropology can be considered as a synthetical one because it displays the main objective of this father: to demonstrate God and Man in a synthetic form, where everyone becomes responsible for his actions, and thus they are "incarnated" in one another.

The above consideration of the Saint Maximus' anthropological system shows the theoretical framework expressed in his entire teaching. The holy father is someone who explained theoretically many aspects of the inner and outer man, and in a variety of anthropological dimensions. He saw in God the Personal reality who, through His divine providence and grace, provides man with the ability to confront temptations, and not to commit sin.

He also approached God as the Being whose objective is to put man onto the right soteriological path towards salvation. Saint Maximus also made a considerable scrutiny of the world of λογισμοί and how these affect one negatively. He explained such λογισμοί systematically and one can easily understand when his teaching becomes strict against them, and when he provides the solutions needed immediately. Saint Maximus is one of the neptic fathers of our church who never ever leaves one in suspense; he always interprets in the most comprehensible manner all these phenomena that further the destructive outcomes of the fallen man, and he does not hesitate to be direct in the therapeutic notions he considers most appropriate.

Saint Maximus is the father whose theoretical considerations built up a completely firm anthropology, because he provided the principles that seem to be useful for one's own proper orientation, suitable functional principles with deep theological implications.

INTRODUCTION

A) KAREN HORNEY AND HER WORK ON THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN NEUROSIS

1A) BIOGRAPHY OF KAREN HORNEY

Karen Horney was born in Hamburg in 1885¹ into an upper-middle-class Protestant family. Her father was a devout Bible reader and her mother a free-thinker. In her early years Karen Horney went through a period of religious enthusiasm and interest in theological matters. The family, in which she was born, was socially and financially very secure. Her father (Berndt Henrik Wackels Danielsen) was a Norwegian sea captain, who later became Commodore of the North German Lloyd shipping company. Her mother (Clothilde Marie van Ronzelen) was Dutch.

Horney spent much time with her father on far away sea voyages. She met many people and was very proud of her father's abilities. Although she was a young girl, these voyages encouraged her to take significant decisions about the future of her later life. She decided to be occupied with people because she wanted to talk with them and hear their thoughts, experiences and interests.

At the beginning of the twentieth century she went to Berlin for medical, psychiatric, and psychoanalytic studies. She was an excellent student and her ability and personality won the respect of her professors as well as that of her (mostly male) colleagues.

In 1909 at the age of twenty-four she married Oscar Horney, a Berlin lawyer and with him she had three daughters. Because of different interests and her increasing involvement in the psychoanalytic movement which followed her earning of a Doctorate in Psychoanalysis (Berlin 1915)², she divorced him in 1937.

Horney spent a large part of her life in Berlin (1909-1932). From 1914 to 1918 she studied Psychiatry and from 1918 to 1932 taught at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute.

¹ Kelman, *The biography of Karen Horney*, New York 1966, p. 9f.

² The subject of her Ph.D thesis was: *Ein Kasuistischer Beitrag zur Frage der traumatischen Psychosen*. Berlin 1915.

She participated in many international congresses, among them the historic discussion of lay analysis³ from 1924 to 1926, chaired by Sigmund Freud.

Horney was a pupil of Sigmund Freud. She was psychoanalyzed first by Karl Abraham, whom Freud regarded as one of his ablest pupils, and then by Hans Sachs, whose attitude towards Freud was a reverential one.

Karen Horney's origins and early experiences prepared her for wider perspectives. She was greatly interested in interpersonal relationships, and how they affect contemporary persons. This interest led her at last to become a physician-psychoanalyst. Horney's primary emphasis in psychoanalysis was to connect therapy with traditional therapeutical aspects drawn from theology and philosophy, and for this reason she was highly regarded as a broad-minded teacher and analyst of wide experience.⁴ Her talents for teaching and training found expression in her natural ability for clinical research.

In 1932 Dr. Horney went to the United States and for two years she was associate director of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Chicago. In 1933 she went to New York and was a member of the teaching staff of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute until 1941, when she became one of the founders of the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis and the American Institute for Psychoanalysis.

In New York she became more interested in the therapy of mental sufferers. She began to be specifically occupied with neurosis and devoted all her effort to exploring this phenomenon. She gave expression in this in her books, through which she tried to give, in simple language, to the wider public therapeutic methods for dealing with the phenomenon of neurosis. Challenging significant assumptions of both aspects of the psychological establishment - German neurophysiology and American behaviourism - and their

³ This congress discussed the issue of whether non-doctors could be allowed to practice analysis. *Freud* maintained that analytic work need not be the exclusive preserve of doctors. With this *Sandor Rado* disagreed who believed that psychoanalysis should be practised only by the medical profession. *Karen Horney* could see both sides but she refused to take an exclusive position on either side.

⁴ Oberndorf, *Obituary, Karen Horney*, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, part II 1953.

surrounding culture, Karen Horney greatly extended the boundaries of Freud's theories about male/female neuroses. Through her work on neurosis, she sought to bring the benefits of her curative procedure to all those who wish to learn, to understand and to fight against, their neurotic tendencies. She died of cancer of the bile ducts in the liver in 1952, that had spread to her lungs.⁵

Anyone wishing to approach Karen Horney's theory of neurosis needs to tackle the particular scientific topics on which she built her psychoanalysis and the influence upon it of *Melanie Klein's* understanding of neurosis. In turn, one should consider the whole development of her theory, in order to grasp her central idea about neurosis, which enabled her to cure human beings of this ailment.

Horney's central idea is a mixture of philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis. She used these three fields of study, as she attempted to understand each neurotic case through the whole experience of people's lives and interactions, together with their changing environments. Studying her theory we see a woman of wisdom and experience at work, searching for better ways to alleviate human suffering.

Parallel to this, Horney was influenced by Melanie Klein on issues of feminine psychology. Initially, she accepted Klein's rejection of the primary character of girls' penis envy. In this argument she considered - as Klein did - that penis envy it is not a primary formation but a defence mechanism.⁶ Further, Horney agreed with Klein that girls were probably aware of their vaginas at an earlier stage than that maintained by Freud.⁷ Horney supported Klein's whole psychoanalytical theory about feminine psychology except her conviction that the girls must be analysed at a very young age, indeed, if possible, at the age of four or five⁸. Horney was together with *Josine Müller* the only one, to support Melanie Klein in the psychoanalytic conference in Berlin in 1922, maintaining that Klein's

⁵ Rubins, *Karen Horney, gentle rebel of Psychoanalysis*, London 1978, p. 337.

⁶ King-Steiner, *The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-45*, London 1991, p. 344.

⁷ Quinn, *A Mind of her own (The life of Karen Horney)*, New York 1987, p. 235.

⁸ Quinn, p. 183.

writings about feminine sexuality are very important, making known that she felt very distressed because psychoanalysis did not comprehend Klein's theory, while complaining simultaneously that insufficient attention has been paid to Klein's work.⁹

Horney was also influenced by Melanie Klein in her understanding of the concepts of *hatred*, *greed* and *envy*. Hatred considered by Horney thereafter as the neurotic experience which is directed against bad internalised objects, ultimately focuses on the individual's own impulses, which are felt to have been and to be destructive and dangerous, so that, finally, hatred becomes a self-compulsion within a person's life. Greed and envy also were considered by Horney in the same way as Klein, i.e. as deep aggressive processes with insatiable and hostile contents.¹⁰

Another aspect of Klein's influence on Horney was her flexibility in interpreting philosophical matters and also her freedom in seeking direct solutions for the problems of daily reality. By saying, *flexibility in interpreting philosophical matters*, I mean that Horney, under Klein's influence, encountered man and society in an *unprejudiced way*. Concerning Klein's *freedom in discovering direct solutions for problems of daily reality*, I mean that Horney felt free, as Klein did herself, not to identify herself with cultural or social institutions, when she investigated them as *vehicles* of neurotic expressions.

Horney's efforts constitute a constructive approach to psychoanalysis. Her ideas continue to be relevant in our time, to the extent that her theory is even now still criticised constructively. Many of Horney's ideas have been incorporated into psychoanalytic thinking: her emphasis, for instance, on first addressing the here and now instead of diving right into the patient's past. The recent attention to the narcissistic personality in the writings of *Heinz Kohut* and other "self psychologists" was anticipated by Karen Horney thirty-five years ago in her books *Our inner Conflicts* and *Neurosis and Human Growth*. Even *Dr. Samuel*

⁹ Quinn, p. 235.

¹⁰ Klein-Heimann-Money-Kyrle, *New Directions in Psychoanalysis. (The significance of Infant Conflict in the Pattern of Adult Behaviour)*, London 1955, p. 324.

Atkin, who opposed Karen Horney's theories in 1941, conceded that Horney was ahead of her time in recognising psychoanalysis as a humanity rather than a rigid science.¹¹

Her perspectives derive from her psychodynamic, phenomenological and critical background.¹² She was working on the problems of human neurosis, even when she was a student. Her analytical theories developed through careful observations and direct experience gained in hospitals and clinics year after year. Her clinical psychoanalysis was very famous¹³ in spite of technical difficulties relating to the methods she used. She emphasized the need for clinical observation, clinical circumstances and clinical means, which the neurotic person needed in order to be more secure. She never lost the spirit of searching, testing, revising, changing, dropping and adding new hypotheses. Her work was really a wholehearted self-offering search for the right solutions to the problems of every neurotic person that came her way.

¹¹ Quinn, *A Mind of her own*....pp. 14-15. From Susan Quinn's interview with Dr. Samuel Atkin, May 16, 1983.

¹² Kelman., *The biography of Karen Horney*, New York 1966, p. 19.

¹³ About this see her work: *The technique of Psychoanalytic Therapy*, Berlin 1917.

2.1) CRITICISM OF FREUD

The relationship between Horney and Freud was at first rather creative, but subsequently because of their differences in psychoanalytic matters, came to a halt and was finally discontinued.¹⁴ The disagreements between these two concerned female psychology and sexuality.

Her criticism of Freud started in 1922 when Horney and Freud met together at the International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Berlin. Freud was the chairman of this conference and his purpose was to lead every psychoanalytic discussion towards his own interpretation. Horney was very well aware of Freud's disposition and she opened her speech by suggesting a revised version of penis envy. For Horney penis envy was to be placed within a context of normal female development; it does not create femininity but rather expresses it. Penis envy does not constitute a deep and wholly womanly love attachment to the father. Horney's speech was entirely gentle and in the most correct manner possible. She explained penis envy as a masculine narcissism which was too self-evident to need explanation and that this view of Freud's was not only opposed to feminine sexuality, but also to biological science itself.

In 1926 Freud published his provocative paper about the consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. Horney read this paper and became more explicit in her criticism of him. She said with increasing urgency that Freud had drawn attention to a certain one-sidedness in his analytical researches. Horney also rejected Freud's speculation about castration and the oedipus complex. Another matter on which she criticised Freud was feminine masochism, where he said that women feel an inferiority complex towards man's penis they do not have, and thus they develop sexual masochistic tendencies because they envy man's penis, and they try to possess it. Horney maintained that such masochism is woman's natural experience, it is a gift of nature in which woman is obviously superior to man. In general terms, Horney did feel very upset by Freud's

¹⁴ For her relation with Freud, see: Alexander and Selesnick, *The history of Psychiatry*, New York 1966, pp. 186-187.

psychoanalytical interpretations and she expressed her opposition to him by saying: "The dogma of the inferiority of women had its origins in an unconscious male tendency".¹⁵

In addition, it can be maintained that Horney was the first, and perhaps the best, critic of Freud's ideas about women. Her early essays on female psychology have an astonishing immediacy. In such brilliantly argued papers as *The flight from womanhood*¹⁶ Horney was saying in the 1920's what feminist critics of Freud rediscovered fifty years later.

Horney officially broke her scientific link with Freud in around 1933 when she was asked by *Franz Alexander* to be a co-founder of the *Institute of Psychoanalysis* and thus went to live in New York. This Institute was renamed after her death the *Karen Horney Psychoanalytic Institute* and one can find it at 329 East 62th Street. Further, in 1952, a few months before her death, the *Karen Horney Clinic* was founded as well.

However, even in New York, her writings frequently criticised Freud, and she tried to provide proper corrections of Freudian terms and notions, in accordance with her effort to explore psychoanalytically the experiences of a neurotic's life.

In contradiction of Freud's theory of neurosis, all neurotic phenomena, according to her, are the result of an insufficiency of the ego's normal function of control, which leads either to symptom - formation, i.e to an unconscious psychic procedure, where a repressed drive is indirectly released and appeared through a symptom, or to characterological change i.e when a symptom appears, it functions as a reconciliation between conscious and unconscious drives, and changes one's psychic character by converting every inhibited drive to an operation of the ego, or both. A neurotic conflict can best be explained structurally as a conflict between the forces of the "ego" on one side, and the "id" on the other. The forces of the "ego" refer to the control apparatus of the psychic

¹⁵ Gay, *FREUD-A life for our time*, New York 1988, pp. 519-521.

¹⁶ This paper is to be found as the second chapter in Horney's *Feminine Psychology*. In this chapter, Horney examines the masculinity complex in women as viewed by men and by women, pp. 54-71. More about the controversy between Horney and Freud, one may find in the work of Marcia Westkott, *The feminist Legacy of Karen Horney*, New Haven 1986.

structure, which function consciously and are influenced by logic, whilst the forces of "id" are under the domination of the unconscious factors and operate in accordance with the pleasure principle. These "id" forces are explained as the instinctive reservoir of man and they have their basis in anatomy and physiology.

The decisive neurotic conflicts occur in the first years of childhood. The ultimate aim of psychoanalytic therapy is to resolve the infantile neurosis, which is the nucleus of the neurosis of adulthood and, thereby, to do away with neurotic conflicts.¹⁷

Horney believed that psychoanalysis can free a human being who is tied hand and foot; but it cannot give him new arms or legs. In other words, psychoanalysis shows us that what we regard as constitutional merely represents a blockage of growth, a blockage which must be cleared.¹⁸ Karen Horney had defined her holistic concept of blockage in contrast to Freud's mechanistic notion of resistance. Her concept with blockage entailed a deep understanding of the psychoneurological experiences which prevent a person from being freed¹⁹. Horney uproots this blockage through the perspective of growth-oriented, life-affirming, and freedom-seeking alternatives. These alternatives destroy blockage and restore man, providing also possibilities to protect him from every social or environmental interaction. On the contrary Freud's notion of resistance means that such blockage is never uprooted by man, even if it seems that it is so. The reason for this is that the analysand is hidden behind his analyst, and, furthermore, because he resists providing every possible help to his analyst against this blockage. This failure to treat blockage is firmly connected with the analysand's resistance to the healing procedures of psychoanalysis. From another viewpoint, Freud's *resistance* defines the conscious or unconscious opposition towards disclosure and treatment of unconscious experiences. Resistance is mainly connected,

¹⁷ Greenson, *The classic psychoanalytic Approach* in the American Handbook of Psychiatry, New York 1959.

¹⁸ Horney, *The technique of Psychoanalytic Therapy*, Berlin 1917, p. 28.

¹⁹ Kelman and Vollmerhausen, *On Horney's Psychoanalytic Techniques, Developments and Perspectives* in Psychoanalytic Techniques, New York 1967.

according to him, with subjective defence mechanisms²⁰ as the positive transference²¹, the self-awareness reactions, and the self-criticism. These are turned against urges containing inferiority complexes, hypochondriacal fears, repressed desires and inhibitions in interpersonal relationships which threaten the *ego*.

Horney's chief success was in helping to free psychoanalysis from all instinctive, i.e. from all selfish explanations and approaches of other psychoanalysts, and monolithic meanings as well, connected either with partial or excessive or erroneous interpretations of several analysts, who not only investigated the tasks of psychoanalysis and tried to explore therapy methods without taking into account the special needs of a person, but they also applied non-universally accepted estimations, which they endowed with improper scientific argumentations. The theory Horney offered was an alternative one and had two branches: an interpersonal and a cultural one. People develop living in relation to other people living within a cultural ambience.²²

Horney describes neurosis as an "actual situation"²³, which involves man in vicious circles of disturbances and tyrannizes over him through:

- a) "creating conflicts which the neurotic person attempts to solve".
- b) "creating psychospiritual weaknesses in which the neurotic person experiences considerable intrapsychic voids".²⁴

²⁰ The subjective defence mechanisms reveal the effort of a person to be freed from neurotic procedures affecting its entire psychosomatic being. These defence mechanisms are characterised as personal ones - in accordance to one's specific needs - and vary many times from the equivalent general ones.

²¹ *Positive transference* is interpreted as a repetition of an attachment to others, which in reality is proved as a desire for seeking assurance and protection against anxiety.

²² Horney, *Final Lectures*, New York 1991, p. 10.

²³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, New York 1937; see also: *New ways in Psychoanalysis*, New York 1939; comp. Kelman's and Vollmerhausen's work., *On Horney's Psychoanalytic Techniques, Developments and Perspectives*.

²⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, New York 1937.

Horney had a wide knowledge of literature. She had read authors who displayed in their works psychoanalytic approaches. Karen Horney employed their approaches and it can be maintained that she was influenced by them in the development of her theory.

An example of her use of literature can be found in her general psychoanalytical idea of *neurotic shoulds* and how these affect the *real self* of a person. For Horney an individual may impose tasks upon himself which are detrimental to his whole being. A classic example of this kind is found according to her, in Dostoevski's *Crime and Punishment*²⁵. Horney analysed Raskolnikov's behaviour in order to find out why dissatisfaction with other persons may develop *neurotic shoulds* and harm one's *real self*.

For her, Dostoevski shows us, in unmistakable terms, that Raskolnikov's tendencies were full of resentment against his poverty, and so that nothing was more imperative for him than to kill. Dostoevski shows that Raskolnikov had oppressed himself into doing it, i.e. he had convinced himself with the idea that if he kills this lady he will become free from the obsessions that haunted him. What he actually felt against her represents for Horney the appearance of the neurotic shoulds in his life, which operate as vital needs towards the task of self satisfaction.

He thought therefore that if he killed her he *should* be able to feel inner freedom from the obsessions against his poverty. Nevertheless, Horney states that, at the time he was thinking and preparing the plan of killing, so to satisfy his neurotic shoulds, he did not take into account, at least just for a moment, that this action of his would harm his real self irreparably, which - his real self - from time to time attempted to provide understanding about himself, so as not to do it. On the contrary, alas, he did not pay any attention to his real self; he followed the tension of his neurotic shoulds, and he fulfilled his objective.

For Horney, in this state Raskolnikov experienced his inner void, and felt that he would remedy it, if he acted out the way he was thinking, and thus decided on the killing. When he committed the murder, he did not feel what he was expecting he would, but he experienced once more this inner void instead. This inner void remained, due to his

²⁵ Horney, *Neurosis and human growth*, W. W. Norton, New York 1950, pp. 119-120.

neurotic shoulds, which not only harmed his real self, but soon afterwards, led Raskolnikov to give himself up to the police.

Horney concludes that the murderer was too hapless to resist the thought of killing; he rejected the advice of his real self, and he gave into his neurotic shoulds which already had taken action.

Horney, in her development of human psychoanalysis, makes the fundamental difference between pathologic and normal phenomena. Pathologic phenomena show more distinctly as through a magnifying glass the processes going on in all human beings. Normal phenomena show the inner forces which a human being possesses. These forces help every neurotic personality to avoid dangerous situations and to create a security valve within him.²⁶

Karen Horney can be classified with several other psychoanalysts who have spoken about neurosis in a more specific and elaborate way. She is perhaps the only scientist who dedicated all her writings to neurosis. Indeed, she could be considered as one who extended the boundaries of research into neurosis, beyond what can be reached, even today. Karen Horney describes her theory as "optimistic", in contrast with Freud's "pessimistic" one. Horney accepts the above definition in the sense of "world and life affirmation", i.e. man may be detached from his neuroses if he learns how to draw power from the sources of his inner capabilities and those positive environmental factors surrounding him, even while he experiences all the tragic elements of neuroses within himself.²⁷ On the contrary the notion "world and life negation" characterises Freud's psychoanalysis, because in a deep sense it provokes pessimism, i.e. depressive feelings in which man recognises that there is no effective solution to his conflicts and neuroses. This pessimism occurs in many of the experiences of a person without any effort to cancel them. From Horney's perspective, Freud remains a slave of false interpretations which, by extension, mislead anyone trying to draw optimism from his theories.

²⁶ Kelman, *The biography of Karen Horney*, New York 1966, p. 28.

²⁷ *Neurosis and human growth. A struggle to Self-realisation*, London 1951, p. 378.

Horney's chief preoccupation was to explain feminine neurotic behaviour in relation to neurosis and narcissism. At the same time she also examined male neurotic psychological behaviour and tried to bring to the surface the problems which arise from the relations between two sexes. In her work, Horney examined the psychology of females. She attempted to uncover this psychology by examining the behaviour of females in their lives. Dr. Horney's evolving ideas on feminine psychology were presented through her differences with Freud. After confronting Freud's male-oriented psychology with her own so-called female psychology, she described the "feminine type" of woman, saying that, this type is shaped as much by cultural factors as by certain instinctual demands. Horney further asserted that the "patriarchal ideal of womanhood" is culturally determined, not an immutable given.²⁸

²⁸ Kelson., *The biography of Karen Horney*, New York 1966.

3.2) CHRISTIANITY AND KAREN HORNEY

Significant evidence for our reference to Karen Horney's relation with christianity includes:

- a) Her diary.²⁹
- b) The relationship she developed
in New York with Paul Tillich.³⁰

In her autobiography, Horney displays her faith in God as an attempt at approaching Him empirically. She was searching for God because she wanted to raise herself spiritually, and because she tried to be integrated existentially.

Horney's first approach to Christianity began when she was nine years old. The family environment in which she lived offered her false religious experiences, i.e compulsory church-going, feigned morality, tyrannical behaviour, which were too far away from the spirit of Gospels. Moreover, an example which was always a bad experience for her is that her father, although he was an active member of the church community in Hamburg, nevertheless, was authoritarian towards Karen during her childhood. Such authority revealed lack of love and affection. Because of this, her behaviour against her father started being troubled and completely alienated. She felt hatred against him and discovered her inability to love him any more. Parallel to this, she also started not accepting God the Father: she associated Him with her father's behaviour and the result was to consider her contempt for her own father as two parts of the same inability.³¹ Karen was deeply hurt by her father's behaviour, because she initially took him as an example, but finally she discovered he was not. This eventually was the main reason she started to think profoundly about God's existence and God's divine presence.

²⁹ *The adolescent diaries of Karen Horney*, New York 1980.

³⁰ All we know about the relationship between Horney and Tillich we know from Tillich's wife *Hannah*. *Hannah Tillich* was interviewed about it from *Susan Quinn*, the author of *A Mind of her Own (The life of Karen Horney)*.

³¹ *Quinn, A Mind of her Own*, p. 28.

The first steps towards discovering God, had been given by her religion teacher *Herr Schulze* who enthusiastically referred to Christ's love towards His creatures, and how man may experience it. Karen was positively inspired by him and she developed a very firm and constructive relationship between herself and Christ's teaching of love.

With the passing of years, Horney considered herself within God's plan for man's salvation. She always investigated her actions critically and attempted to place them at God's salvational purpose. Many times she felt very humble and asked in her prayer to be a firm disciple of Christ's teachings, not to exploit others, to love everybody - especially her father - and not to be in any kind of controversy with anyone. When she "caught" herself being hostile, she felt very heavily burdened by hypocrisy and confessed that her faith, conviction and belief towards God was really listless. She continually prayed not to behave hypocritically; she prayed to feel the doctrine of love and self-offering; to long for the faith, that makes oneself and others happy; to be sincere and to act accordingly. Often her prayers, as she confesses in her autobiography, were followed by a deep and frequent crying and guided her into constructive experiences, the results of which were eventually revealed within her theory.

God for Horney is an eternal existence. His essence is necessity and eternity. His power consists of the omnipotence of love. He always understands man's weakness. God's unity is found in the doctrine of Trinity. His divinity can be recognised by its characteristics: He has intellect, He has an externalised Word, and He sends His Spirit to the world.

The idea of Church was important for her. The Church for her was the edifice of Christ which has to be always understood as a glorious ideal. The Church itself provides the proper guidance of salvation. It guides souls into God, and teaches elements of morality which always exhibit great ethical values. Church converts man's bad habits into useful and christian ones and renders christians disciples of Christ psychosomatically, christians in action, and not christians in word and sentiments only.

From all the aforementioned, we can accept, in conclusion, that Horney's position in faith is not a negative one, but, on the contrary, positive. This faith towards God and His church was very helpful not only for her early age, but also for her mature years. She,

accordingly, was influenced so much constructively by it, that she was utilising all those works until her later years in life and for the development of her theory, seeking the right therapeutic solutions for man's neurosis and its phenomena³².

Although we do not have precise sources referring to Paul Tillich's relationship with Karen Horney, we can maintain that Tillich's influence on Horney's thought and work was important and vice versa. Each influenced the other in certain ways. Karen Horney was particularly interested in Tillich's ideas concerning the function and interpretation of christian virtues and values. One of Tillich's writings which Horney read and studied in her declining months, was the *Courage to be*.³³ Karen Horney was therefore influenced by Tillich, but also she influenced him in his theology and anthropology.

Her relationship with Tillich started in 1934 and lasted until her death in 1952. Horney was introduced to Tillich either through Tillich's wife Hannah³⁴, or through *Erich Fromm* who also was at Karen Horney's side as a friend³⁵ and introduced her to non-analyst

³² The above is drawn from *The adolescent diaries of Karen Horney*, New York 1980.

³³ New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952.

³⁴ Unfortunately there is no source indicating how Hannah met Karen. What we can suppose is that perhaps they met through Fromm.

³⁵ a) Karen Horney's relationship with Erich Fromm led to suspicions that she was getting all her ideas from him. Those who maintained this pointed out the many references Horney made to Fromm's works, published or unpublished, when she wrote her first two books *The neurotic personality of our time*, 1937, and *New ways in psychoanalysis*, 1939. Nevertheless, this was not true: the relationship was anything but one-sided. Horney's relationship with Fromm was nothing but of that a colleague. It was a "marriage" of minds. A proof of this is found in Erich Fromm's *Escape from freedom* (New York 1941, Farrar and Rinehart). He refers repeatedly to Horney's work, and his idea of *individual powerlessness* in modern culture, is closely related to Horney's idea that *basic anxiety* stems from a sense of powerlessness. Horney however stresses individual childhood experiences, while Fromm stresses historical and cultural determinants.

b) Karen Horney had known Erich Fromm and his wife Frieda Fromm-Reichmann in Berlin, where all three had studied psychoanalysis. Fromm had been analysed by *Hans Sachs* and had practised analysis in

friends among the newly arrived German Intelligentsia in New York. Horney met the Tillich family³⁶ in New York among other Germans living there..

As Hannah testifies, they often got together at Horney's apartment for dinner. Apart from theological discussions they had, sometimes indeed lasting overnight, Hannah notices that they also talked about films and other subjects. Sometimes they also argued when they discussed philosophical or theological issues, whilst sometimes Horney disagreed with some of Tillich's ideas on psychological matters.

Here it can be said - as Hannah Tillich herself says -, that although Paul liked having exogamic love affairs, the relationship between Horney and Paul never became a sexual liaison, but on the contrary was only an intellectual one. Horney liked hearing Tillich's theological ideas, whilst Tillich was frequently impressed by Horney's analyses of the inner man. According to Hannah, Paul was deeply interested in the matters he discussed with Karen, and especially concerning depth psychology. If Paul had had a love affair with Horney, Hannah maintains that she would have been the first person to know it. Hannah never felt resentful towards Horney and always considered her as a good friend.

The subjects on which Tillich influenced Horney are as follows:

a) Love. He stressed that the principle of love is expressed as the unconditional validity of the moral imperative, and provides the ultimate norm of all ethical content.³⁷

Berlin, beginning in 1930. In 1933 he went to Chicago and his friendship with Horney, who was fifteen years older than he was, intensified. Over the next decade it is impossible to sort out Fromm's influence on Horney from her influence on him in the writings they each produced. The relationship between Horney and Fromm started in about 1926 and ended in mystery in about 1938.

³⁶ It is not quite sure that Fromm had a friendship with the Tillichs. We do not have information about it.

But we can be sure about two things:

a) that Fromm was living in Chicago and not in New York, and

b) that Hannah never ever mentioned anything about him in her autobiography *From time to time*, Stein and Day, New York

1973.

b) Insight. For him insight constitutes the unification of feelings, proving it is a feeling itself.³⁸

c) Correlation between Theology and Psychoanalysis from a therapeutic viewpoint. Psychoanalysis helps humans to be liberated from particular compulsions, whilst Theology provides the right solutions to every destructive experience.³⁹

d) Conscience. For Tillich, conscience's character is a moral one. It commands us what to do and what not to do. It is manifest when man is estranged by himself and the environment he lives in. Simultaneously, many prohibitions and commandments are revealed, producing a very uneasy conscience and calling man by remorse to reinstate his actions constructively.⁴⁰

Although Paul Tillich had long known about depth psychology, it is nevertheless certain that Karen Horney's influence on Tillich was a different one. She introduced Tillich to a better understanding of the terms of depth psychology, provided him with psychological notions having a direct connection with one's inner investigation towards psychospiritual betterment.

The subjects in which Horney influenced Tillich are as follows:

a) Awareness. For Tillich the principle of awareness is related to contemporary depth psychology, it is old as religion itself, and many times it is clearly expressed within New Testament.⁴¹

b) Freedom. Spiritual freedom dissolves for him every impediment, providing effectiveness and wholesome psychosomatic growth.⁴²

³⁷ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 3, The University of Chicago 1964, p. 51, and Schröder, *The nature of theological argument: A study of Paul Tillich*, Scholars Press, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 1975, p. 146.

³⁸ Schröder, *The nature of theological argument*, p. 142.

³⁹ Thatcher, *The ontology of Paul Tillich*, Oxford University Press 1978, p. 174.

⁴⁰ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, p. 51.

⁴¹ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, p. 246.

c) Real self. Tillich asserts that the more one is reunited with one's true being under the impact of the Holy Spirit, the more one is free.⁴³

Paul Tillich's theology followed another course when he went to the States⁴⁴. He tried to adapt there thoughts and understandings exhibiting more sufficiency and adequacy in theology. He tried to avoid the philosophical and theological paths he had followed in Europe and he considered New York as providing spiritual opportunities to him. This is perhaps one of the main reasons he accompanied Karen Horney and he started from now on to encounter theological matters, not of course from the viewpoint of Karen Horney, but more broad-mindedly, i.e he discussed interpretations provided by Horney on topics concerning theological issues and how these can be successfully adapted to modern humanistic notions.

Paul Tillich delivered the funeral speech for Karen Horney. His speech can be summarised in the following extract:

"Few people whom one encountered were so strong in the affirmation of their being, so full of the joy of living, so able to rest in themselves and to create without cessation beyond themselves. She was what the words of Jesus say, *a light on a high stand which gave light to all in the house*.⁴⁵ It was this light radiating from her being which we have experienced whenever we encountered her. It was this light which gave light to her friends, who knew that hours with Karen would count as good and often unforgettable hours in their lives. She wrote books, but she loved human beings. She helped them to throw light into the dark places of their souls. Her being, her power to be, was the well-founded balance of an abundance of striving and creative possibility"⁴⁶.

⁴² Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 246-247.

⁴³ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, p. 247.

⁴⁴ He became a member of the *Union Theological Seminary* in New York. This seminary was a centre of Liberal Protestant theology.

⁴⁵ comp. Matthew, 5. 15.

⁴⁶ Quinn, *A Mind of her Own*, pp. 418-419.

4) CONCEPT OF NEUROSIS

As we have seen the notion of *neurosis* is central to Karen Horney's understanding of psychology. Her theory about neurosis can be said to stem from her effort to clarify psychoanalytically the human problems which arise in everyday life.

She discerns abnormalities in personal relationships as a basic factor in the creation of neuroses.⁴⁷ The alienation of a neurotic person from others and from his own self, constitutes a sign of disturbed human relationships.⁴⁸

The core of neurosis is found in the unceasing opposition between humans.⁴⁹ Neurosis can neither be resolved, nor cured, if the experience of a normal human relationship does not exist.⁵⁰ A good reason for the persistence of the neurotic phenomenon is to be found in the underlying interdependence of the neurotic person upon others.⁵¹ Such an interdependence is often expressed as animosity, anxiety, and general inclinations towards pride, ambition, egocentricism, envy, vengefulness, jealousy etc., which constitute the aforementioned "core of neurosis"⁵².

The structure of the character evolving thereby bears witness to the contradictory nature of an ensuing security and satisfaction, which, for the neurotic person, are effective tendencies. In this way, the neurotic person makes clear without realising it, that these searches are in fact established choices, which rest on deceit.⁵³

The neurotic structure of character is more or less inflexible; it is also precarious and vulnerable, due to its many weak points: pretences, self-deceptions and illusions.⁵⁴ This

⁴⁷ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 9, comp. also p. 167.

⁴⁸ *Our inner conflicts. A constructive theory of neurosis*, New York 1945, p. 74.

⁴⁹ *Neurosis and human growth: A struggle to Self-realisation*, p. 366.

⁵⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 306, comp. p. 367. See also, *Our inner conflicts*, p. 47.

⁵¹ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 278.

⁵² *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 278.

⁵³ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 173.

⁵⁴ *Selfanalysis*, New York 1942, p. 65.

structure is corroborated in what we call the "essence of neurosis", the central points of which are characterised as "neurotic tendencies".⁵⁵ Each time Horney speaks about neuroses, she implies neuroses of the character i.e. conditions under which, the main disorder rests on a distortion of character, even if the external manifestations happen to be identical with those of a symptomatic neurosis.⁵⁶ Neurosis is the result of a devious and chronic procedure, usually starting in childhood, which influences the personality in part or "in toto".⁵⁷

"Neurotic attitudes" are specific behavioural patterns of neurotics which are seen as outward signs of their neurotic conditions. These could be classified as follows:

- a) Attitudes referring to giving and receiving love.
- b) Attitudes referring to self-evaluation.
- c) Attitudes referring to assertion of personal identity.
- d) Attitudes relating to aggression.
- e) Attitudes related to sexuality.⁵⁸

Horney was not solely interested in the exterior image of neurosis. Her care turned chiefly towards the upsets of character of a neurotic. Character distortion is the outcome of every neurosis, with symptoms which, from a clinical point of view, may be forerunners of new neurotic disturbances⁵⁹. Neuroses, according to her, are the price which humanity pays, for its cultural evolution.⁶⁰ It is therefore imperative, for practical reasons, for a disorder to be classed as neurosis only when the behaviour of a patient deviates from the

⁵⁵ *Selfanalysis*, New York 1942, p. 65.

⁵⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, New York, p. 30. The term "symptomatic neurosis" denotes a neurotic phenomenon, which happens once and which is repeated either rarely or not at all.

⁵⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 31.

⁵⁸ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 35.

⁵⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 31.

⁶⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 283.

general rules of a specific civilisation.⁶¹

Paradoxically, it is anything but easy to establish the components of a neurosis. Certainly, it is difficult to trace signs which are common to all neuroses. For example, symptoms, such as phobias, depressions or bodily disorders, cannot be considered as criteria, because it is possible that they may never surface. Equal difficulties are encountered when trying to distinguish a neurosis from the image it projects in the disorders of relating to others. These include sexual disorders.⁶²

Karen Horney distinguishes two specific signs, which are observed in all neuroses, even when the structure of personality is not entirely known:

- a) a certain rigidity (or lack of ability) in reaction (or beneficial defensive suppleness). And,
- b) a difference between the ability to act and the result of an action.

She also regards the lack of suitable formative factors during the occurrence of various events, as rigidity of reactions.⁶³ Rigidity is a sign of neurosis, only when it deviates from the norms of cultural behaviour. The difference between the capabilities and the real output of a human being can be attributed to external conditions. Neurosis exists when, despite his ability and favourable external conditions for development, a person remains unproductive. So the neurotic has the impression that the way ahead is blocked by his own self. On the other hand, it is possible for someone to have a neurosis which follows as a reaction to external co-ordinates⁶⁴, without affecting or warping the rest of his behaviour.⁶⁵

The existence of contradictory tensions the content of which is unknown to the neurotic

⁶¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 29.

⁶² *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 21-22.

⁶³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 22.

⁶⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 23.

⁶⁵ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 30.

concerned, and for which he tries to find instant, compromising solutions, is also an essential characteristic of neurosis. One of the main characteristics of neurosis is the displacement of the energies expended by a neurotic person⁶⁶ in his effort to develop the fantasized abilities of his ideal self, instead of developing those of his real self.

The energies of ideal and real self⁶⁷ exist within the neurosis, but they vary in degree; They start with a widespread inertia or certain sporadic acts of negligence, and up with the of indifference.⁶⁸ Neurosis is a obsessive-compulsive experience, developing with implacable logic, tending to cover gradually more and more aspects of personality.⁶⁹ According to Horney, neuroses are more easily comprehended, if they are to be considered as variations of natural behaviour.⁷⁰

She, therefore, takes into consideration that:

- a) In most neuroses, there exist basic disorders, which constitute fundamental reasons for dissatisfaction of a person with the way he functions mentally, i.e these disorders constitute valid reasons for discontent with the functioning of the mind.⁷¹
- b) Neurosis is a psychic disorder, caused by fears and defensive measures which must be taken to counteract these fears.⁷² And,

⁶⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 28.

⁶⁷ *Neurosis and human growth...*p. 166. Ideal self - Real self constitute the internal conflicting juxtaposition of the true-self against the pseudo-self, which is dependent upon the superficial appearance of events, and which frustrates each human endeavour aiming at the survival of the largely latent inner creativity.

⁶⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 165-166.

⁶⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 333.

⁷⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 19.

⁷¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 139.

⁷² *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 28-29.

c) There are persons who, though suffering from a serious neurosis, appear to be well adjusted to their present way of life.⁷³

The critical condition, thus established - because of the above three factors - simply reveals the existence of a long standing neurosis. If the above neurosis exists, then it is of a serious nature and, the overt and covert inhibitions caused by it are unfathomable. The inhibitions are based upon his inability to feel, think or do certain things.⁷⁴

The creation of a vicious circle constitutes one of the most noticeable procedures in any neurosis, being also the main reason for their manifestation, even if the external conditions do not change.⁷⁵

Control of a person's vitality exists in every neurosis because, ultimately, neuroses are the results of conflicts which goad the resistance of the personality.⁷⁶ These conflicts may possibly bring about contradicting tendencies, which are predefined by the person's life.⁷⁷ When any personality is disturbed, it brings about psychological disorders⁷⁸, which betray the existence of an idiosyncratic neurosis, irrespective of the quality or quantity of the symptoms displayed.⁷⁹ Neurosis usually destroys peace of mind⁸⁰ and cannot be simply cured by the obliteration of a symptom.

One of the usual methods employed in identifying a neurotic person, or in calling a person neurotic by definition⁸¹, relies on ascertaining whether a person's life style conforms with

⁷³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 21.

⁷⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 31, 59, and 53.

⁷⁵ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 138.

⁷⁶ *Final lectures*, p. 96, comp. *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 24.

⁷⁷ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 168.

⁷⁸ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 12.

⁷⁹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 11.

⁸⁰ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 90.

⁸¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 31.

any of the accepted contemporary ways of living.⁸²

According to Horney, neurosis is seen as the demonic character of man, who hunts down power as an aim. She enlists such a person among the sufferers and she regards him as a being that is possessed by a demon.⁸³

Naturally, all persons afflicted with neurosis wish to be rid of their neuroses or neurotic tendencies, and they try to use methods and ways to this end. The negative way is for one to aspire to a state of being unfettered by resorting to pseudo-solutions aimed at sorting out the life of the neurotic, so that he may not be ideal but they can achieve psychological equilibrium, and in cases of serious complications, they might constitute the best possible answer, even if the results are not always fully attainable.⁸⁴

The positive way relates to the salvaging of spontaneity of sentiments, i.e. to the expression of volition, aiming at controlling activities. The most realistic definition at therapy is expressed by spontaneous affection.⁸⁵ These aims are valid, because they constitute a logical extension within the pathogenetic factor of a neurosis.⁸⁶

⁸² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 14.

⁸³ *Final lectures*, p. 83.

⁸⁴ *Selfanalysis*, p. 272.

⁸⁵ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 242.

⁸⁶ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 242.

R) ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR AND HIS WORK ON THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY

Saint Maximus was born during the reign of Emperor Tiberius I Constantine around the year A.D. 580 and lived through the reigns of Maurice, Phocas, Heraclius, Constantine III and died finally in 662, in the reign of Constans II. Peter was the monothelete Patriarch of Constantinople at that time. Two famous bishops of Rome were his contemporaries: Pope St. Gregory the Great (590-604) and Pope St. Martin the First (649-655)⁸⁷.

His life took him to the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire at that period. According to the Greek Life he was at Constantinople from 610-614 as the first secretary of Emperor Heraclius⁸⁸; then again we find him in North Africa from 630-645; later at Rome where he had a role in the Lateran Council of 649. Later still in exile at Bizya, and at last at Lazica in the south-east corner of the Black Sea, where at the end of his life he was exiled because of his support for the doctrine of the two natural wills of Christ.

Again according to the Greek Life, St. Maximus had received a "complete" education on all the sciences of his epoch. He was educated in grammar, classical literature, rhetoric and philosophy.⁸⁹ Beyond these he was competent in arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, logic, and also ethics, dogmatics and metaphysics.⁹⁰ This education was extremely useful to him, because it enabled him to enter at the service of Heraclius the Emperor, as we have already mentioned.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, Kansas 1988, p. 18. Comp. Stemberger, *2000 Jahre Christentum*, (illustrierte Kirchengeschichte), Erlangen 1989, p. 256 ff.

⁸⁸ See about Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, p. 19.

⁸⁹ Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*, Lund, Sweden 1965, reprinted by Open Court Publishing Company in 1995, Peru Illinois, U.S.A, p. 1. Although St. Maximus studied the writings of *Evagrius* and *Nemesius*, nevertheless it is not clear how much direct knowledge he had about Plato, Iamblichus, Proclus, the Neoplatonists and Aristotle. On this, see Sherwood, (trans.) *The ascetic Life; The four centuries of Charity*, New York 1955, p. 6.

⁹⁰ Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 1.

⁹¹ Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, p. 19.

All these studies and, of course, his orthodox-christian experience, led him to become a monk. During his monastic career he was very faithful. He exhibited the same exceptional zeal and facility as he had done in the period of his early studies and, as a result, he was able to make significant progress in the spiritual life.⁹² As a person he was exceptionally humble. He did not want to see his name with bright letters, or to be famous and acceptable to everyone. That was the reason that he had only two disciples, Anastasius Apocrisarios and Anastasius the Monk⁹³ who were with him for the rest of his life.

The whole life of St. Maximus was full of struggles and dangers. He was particularly active against the heresy of Monothelism, which was quite explosive for the Church of the seventh century. This heresy had adherents not only among the people, but also among the Emperors and Patriarchs of the Byzantine Empire as well. Saint Maximus first fought Monothelism with words and writings and as a result he was arrested several times. He was put on trial with his disciples and finally exiled. At the first trial in 652, his opponents tried to press against him and his disciples political charges, but they failed completely. Subsequently, they were exiled in Bizya in Thrace. A year later (653) the heretics attempted to persuade Maximus and his disciples to accept their views about Monothelism, but their attempt ended in complete failure. Instead, Maximus and his companions were sent to a second exile in Perberis for six more years. Finally, the Emperor Constans lost his patience and in the year 662 he recalled Maximus and his disciples for a final trial and punishment in Constantinople. This time the accusation was

⁹² Maximus first became a monk in a monastery of Chrysoupolis. According to the Syriac Life he had earlier been a monk at Palaia Lavra in Palestine. Chrysoupolis was at Bosporus, north-east of Chalkedon and near the Black Sea.

⁹³ According to Farrell (see above), Anastasius the monk was the biographer of St. Maximus, p. 19. Nevertheless, Anastasius' Life does not survive as such.

assured and was not based on political reasons. They were abused, debased and spat at. Their prosecutors, or, better, slanderers, tried to persuade them to deny their beliefs, using illicit means and “sweet words”. Saint Maximus was certain that, this trial would be his last and that, he was seeing his beloved City of Constantinople for the last time. The verdict of that “immoral” trial was against them. They were anathematized and then turned over to the civil officer who was responsible for their execution. The executioners mutilated their tongues -to prevent them from speaking the truth - and their right hands - to prevent them from writing. They were paraded around the city, exposed to the scorn of the populace, and finally were shipped off to their last exile in Lazica on the south-east shore of Black Sea.⁹⁴ It was there that, because of his many tortures and pains, St. Maximus departed from this life, a little later on 13 August in the same year. His cause, however, was to be victorious within a few years time, at the Council of Constantinople in 680-681, although he was not himself personally vindicated in that Council.⁹⁵ According to *F. Winkelmann* and *W. Elert*, St. Maximus is to be characterized as “the greatest theological luminary of the seventh century”⁹⁶ and as “the one and only productive Thinker of seventh century”⁹⁷. *G. Bausenhart* says that, the name of St. Maximus proves his great and divine work in theological studies.⁹⁸ He was, undoubtedly, next to his

⁹⁴ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos. The vision of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, New York 1985, p. 20. Comp. *ibid.*, Sherwood, *Ascetic Life...*p. 27.

⁹⁵ Thunberg, *Man and Cosmos*, p. 20.

⁹⁶ Winkelmann, *Kirche und Gesellschaft in Byzanz vom Ende des 6. bis zum Beginn des 8. Jahrhunderts*, 1977, p. 488.

⁹⁷ Elert, *Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie. Eine Untersuchung über Theodor von Pharan und Zeit als Einführung in die alte Dogmengeschichte*, Berlin 1957, p. 258f.

⁹⁸ *In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde. Studien zum Beitrag Maximus' des Bekenner zur altkirchlichen Christologie*, Mainz 1992, p. 9.

mentor, Sophronios, the most important person who helped the seventh century to reject the heresy of Monothelism.⁹⁹

Monothelism was an attempt to accommodate Monophysitism. It was treated by St. Maximus as its equivalent. Saint Maximus knew that this problem could undermine the whole orthodox christology of the earlier fathers¹⁰⁰, and also the whole faith of Orthodoxy. Monothelism denied that all nature was specified *ad extra* by means of energies. On the contrary Maximus affirmed in his doctrine of the two energies or wills of Christ that, without a natural energy, no nature, whether divine or human, possesses real existence. Consequently, Christ must have necessarily possessed two natural energies, which manifested the full reality of his two natures.¹⁰¹ Maximus attempted to “attack” this “evil doctrine” at its roots after 638, but he found the entire church establishment turning against himself, as his master Sophronius had found before (in 633).

The Theology of St. Maximus can be understood as a “beautiful song” about the Unity of all the rational and irrational creatures and things of the universe. The unity of all is brought about by the creative and redemptive love of God. For St. Maximus this is the meaning of unity: the love of God for all creatures. The centre or key for this process to unity is to be found in the person and life of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is for Maximus the foundation on which man stands, the cause of every “good”, and the incarnate Word of God, who came into the world for the deification of man. The incarnation of the Son of God is for Maximus the Light of all divine mysteries, by which alone we may come to

⁹⁹ Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, Wiesbaden 1965, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Maximus stands within the Neo-Chalcedonian or Cyrillic Chalcedonian tradition of Christology, Farrell. *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, p. 23.

¹⁰¹ Meyendorff, *A study of St. Gregorius Palamas*, Leighton 1974, p. 211f.

know God the Father and our salvation.¹⁰² The Confessor's thoughts do not derive from some humanly-positing principles of Philosophy, but from the vision which the theology of the Church provides in everyone's experience.¹⁰³

Saint Maximus' views on human psychology as they appear in his treatises concerning man are based on the notion of man as a microcosm and mediator.¹⁰⁴ For St. Maximus, the man operates as microcosm because the holy father understands him in the relation between unity and multiplicity and he provides christological interpretations in relation to the created cosmos and man. Man is also the mediator for him, because he considers him as being the link between paradise and the inhabited world (οἰκουμένη), between visible and invisible creation, between perceptible and conceptual images, and between God and His creation.

According to him sin (ἁμαρτία) is the main problem of every human being. The experience of sin finds its causes in man's orientation to live away from God's grace. This orientation obscures for him the eternal presence of God and provokes the creation of passions. Maximus identifies the fundamental passion which is responsible for keeping a human being apart from God, with self-love (φιλαυτία). Self-love affects man's existence, because it attempts to turn man into sinful dispositions. It is a sort of "amputation" from the almighty Creator and appears in human nature itself.¹⁰⁵ Man concentrates upon himself in the egoistic self-love and becomes isolated from the creative

¹⁰² Sherwood, *The Ascetic life*, p. 4f.

¹⁰³ *The Ascetic life*, p. 4f.

¹⁰⁴ Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, pp. 16-19.

¹⁰⁵ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 56. The presence of the self-love within man's life inhibits the progress towards spiritual life. The progress towards spiritual life, is examined by St. Maximus in the same manner as in St. Gregory of Nyssa. Both examine it in accordance with the Alexandrian Tradition, where the sons of Israel, after their Exodus and their wandering in the desert, finally entered in Promised

tendencies of his being. This selfishness brings to him animosity against his fellow human "brother" and neighbour. The direct result of this animosity is a person's alienation from others.¹⁰⁶ This alienation causes many disorders to interpersonal relationships. Maximus maintains that everyone who is under the oppression of self-love becomes a slave to every passion.

Self-love is disobedience to the will of God.¹⁰⁷ It is related to the selfish behaviour of a person and it is considered by Maximus as the mother of all vices; it destabilises every healthy innerpsychic activity.¹⁰⁸ The priority of self-love undermines the unity of man.¹⁰⁹

Self-love generates a multitude of passions.¹¹⁰ It invites all the passions to exercise their disintegrating role, according to the differentiation of man's nature and the world.¹¹¹ According to Maximus, a selfish person, possessed by his self-love, soon becomes a fragmented personality. The expressions of a person with such a negative attitude are always influenced by his attempt to behave self-amorously and to hurt others.

Land and reached this spiritual progress. Also as God sent Moses to them from the desert for their liberation from every illogical and oppressive passion, they were led on the right path of virtue.

For St. Maximus, man must be concerned for the avoidance of his sinful and selfish tendencies and to combat against every evil and unnatural behaviour. If the effort of the man is wholesome, it opens to him the way towards perfection. And when man starts his effort towards perfection, he is guided through the expulsion of his sins and passions towards catharsis. See Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 22.

¹⁰⁶ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 57.

¹⁰⁷ *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 94.

¹⁰⁸ *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 95.

¹⁰⁹ *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 95.

¹¹⁰ *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 95.

¹¹¹ *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 97.

The notion of self-love is therefore of vital importance in St. Maximus' anthropology. It is manifested as an attachment to things of the world and sense. In this tendency there exist no clear or true desire towards God. The slavery to self-love turns man to search for pleasure which gives birth to painful experiences. Self-love is the perversion of desires towards worldly things, and it pertains in the appetitive part of the soul.

The antidote against self-love is found for St. Maximus in love (ἀγάπη). Love invites all the virtues (ἀρεταί), leading them to exercise their transforming power over the different faculties of man, conquering the vices and utilising them in a good cause.¹¹²

For the holy father, love is first the preference of God to all creatures. This is the absolute requirement and goes directly contrary to the primordial sin of self-love. Love for him is the state in which one accepts one's neighbour with all his imperfections, and thus one is opposed in a special way to anger. The virtue of love goes always together with dispassion, and both lead to the knowledge of the mystical life. In other words, love unites man with God and deifies him. For St. Maximus, the virtue of love elaborates the notion that all are loved equally, and are extended to God's divine contemplation (θεῖα θεωρία).

¹¹² *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 97.

CHAPTER 1. THE HUMAN PERSONALITY IN ITS INTEGRITY

In this chapter we will examine, on the one hand, Karen Horney's considerations about man, when he is or tends to be in integrity, and on the other, Saint Maximus the Confessor's aspects who will present us his anthropology on man as he is expected to be.

In Karen Horney's part we will see her tendency to give us exact and clear interpretations about the psychosomatic composition of the man when this functions properly. This chapter will not only be an introductory study of what Karen Horney considers as proper stages towards a wholesome development of oneself, but it will also be a thorough investigation on the aspects she considers as healthy ones. In this chapter our attempt will be to detect each psychoanalytical notion she investigates, in accordance with her psychoanalytical framework.

The second part of this chapter will discuss Saint Maximus' anthropological investigations. This part will be concerned with fundamental aspects of the Maximian theology, which are very important for the psychosomatic balance of the man. We will examine the stages of the spiritual life which lead to self-restoration, and communion with God. The stages of the spiritual life disclose a doctrine concerning the structure of the man as a human being. This structure confirms each part of the spiritual life as a surely-placed component of the human entity. This chapter will also provide us with an understanding of how man can experience in his own existence the union between body and soul integrated in the human hypostasis, and how St. Maximus' anthropology fits in with his christian metaphysical perspectives.

This first chapter will close with a comparative study in which we will compare one by one the psychoanalytical notions of Karen Horney, and the anthropological notions of Saint Maximus the Confessor.

1) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF KAREN HORNEY

Integrity is for Karen Horney, on the one hand, a wholesome inner dynamism, whilst on the other, it is the intended objective of the neurotic person. She studies these aspects in depth, leading to conclusions which are also not so widely accepted in other psychoanalytical theories. Her psychological considerations on them can also be called, more or less, theological notions as well. The major task for Horney was to present all these topics as the foundations, or better, as the inner qualities leading into a healthy "involvement" with life.

We begin our discussion of integrity, as does Karen Horney, with the notion of "love", and end with the notion of "real self". In my opinion, Karen Horney sees love as the psychoanalytical factor which is meant to operate constructively, and to "impose" its positive activities on one's psychosomatic entity. Love is for Horney the experience which constitutes a healthy basis for integrity and all psychological behaviour.

Her notion of real self is the objective or the entirely wholesome reality in which the neurotic self of a person is converted into a well-balanced character. It also constitutes the aim which inspires a neurotic person to seek wholeness. The real self will be also investigated as the inner world of man which consists of non-inner contradictions and of wholesome dimensions, where the proper alternatives reveal the tasks for a true psychological development. The real self will be treated as the final psychoanalytical aspect of integrity, which discloses personal and social remedies.

Love and real self, therefore, will be examined as the poles which control the psychosomatic balance of a person, and provide the characteristics needed for a thorough investigation of the features developing and confirming human integrity. It is in relation to these poles that Horney places other aspects of human integrity, which will prove to be either contained in them, or dependent on them: such as freedom, conscience, inner independence, and truth. These not only express love and real self, but as we will see, sometimes they interpret them as well.

The basic thought of Horney to be examined in this chapter will be her attempt to make a neurotic person aware that beside all his conflicting oppositions, he may be sustained by

wholesome psychic characteristics, fighting effectively every neurotic symptom and phenomenon.

Love

It was difficult for Horney to define love. According to her, love is a person's ability of to give himself spontaneously either to people or to a cause or idea, instead of retaining everything for himself in a egocentric way¹.

Love gives human life a very creative content² and it leads towards a constructive humility about one's talents. This humility, as well as hope, is necessary in any discussion of the possibilities of psychoanalytic self-examination.³ Besides, these two constitute the first steps towards resolving conflicts. Love is necessary to every person, like oxygen⁴ to every living organism. Love calms anxiety and normalises every precarious activity.⁵ It does not constitute an illusion, provided that the person who adopts it willfully and unequivocally succumbs to its precepts.⁶

The more a person shakes off neurotic introversion, the more he is left free to love and to show a sincere interest in others.⁷ A neurotic person obtains greater calmness by closer contact with others and a search for love.⁸ If he experiences love, he stops being isolated; he throws away every threat arising from the animosity of others and does not feel insecurity in himself.⁹

Simultaneously, he fights for normal and frank relations; he respects every individuality

¹ *Feminine psychology*, New York 1967, p. 249.

² *Selfanalysis*, New York 1942, p. 36.

³ *Selfanalysis*, p. 11.

⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, New York 1950, p. 228.

⁵ *The neurotic personality of our time*, New York 1937, p. 153.

⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 287.

⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 15-16.

⁸ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 286.

⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 286-287.

or idiorhythmy¹⁰ of others and does not exploit them.¹¹ He feels sympathy and cultivates love because he accepts it as the indisputable present of God towards every psychosomatic reconstruction and every healthy interpersonal relationship.

¹⁰ By saying that he respects every *idiorhythmy*, we mean that he behaves respectfully to others having different mentality and necessities. He accept others as they are with their difficulties or eccentricities, considering them as an integral part of the process of living. Simultaneously he regards them as a means for developing a spirit of mutuality and believing that he himself through others can be led into a clearer and deeper experiencing of his own feelings, wishes and beliefs.

¹¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 364. and 162.

R) INNER STRENGTH AND FREEDOM

Inner freedom is spiritual health, when all psychological abilities are exercised for use to their optimum output.¹² Horney stresses that an existing neurotic structure should be overturned so that inner strength and freedom can be regained.¹³ The more a person confronts his conflicts, fathoming their solutions, the more he gains in inner integrity.¹⁴ Inner freedom is obtained by the gradual unravelling of various neurotic symptoms which also supplies fresh motivation for development.¹⁵

The spring of happiness is located in one's inner ability.¹⁶ One will feel able to taste real joy, only with patience and stability of character.¹⁷ An individual may retain and improve his personality as he abandons his selfishness and utilises methods which contribute to, or assist in the overcoming of his doubts without being based on the principle of individual competition¹⁸ These methods refer to correct interrelations and free association.¹⁹

The feeling of a certain inner coercion towards improvement constitutes an important method of attaining inner strength and freedom and its intensity depends on the degree and range of obstacles to express control of the ideal image. Its experience is painful, it is not compared with any outside neurotic influence and it allows the person to create the basis for development and retention of his freedom. This potential is realised in the feeling of

¹² *New ways in psychoanalysis*, New York 1939, p. 182. Comp. to this: Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, 1915. He says that *the full capacity is available for use*.

¹³ *Selfanalysis*, New York 1942, p. 243.

¹⁴ *Our inner conflicts*, New York 1945, p. 27

¹⁵ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, New York 1946, p. 184, comp. p. 257.

¹⁶ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 289.

¹⁷ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 36.

¹⁸ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 284.

¹⁹ *Final lectures*, New York 1991, p. 42. Free association reflects, according to Horney, upon the genuine human emotions and assists towards the full sincerity of thoughts and experiences. Comp. Dörsch, *Psychologisches Wörterbuch*, p. 55.

relief one senses when one is rid of neurosis, as well as the inner strengthening of a powerful real self, pure activities and inner freedom.

The greatest obstacles to building up a complete self²⁰ are always found within a neurotic person.²¹ A major one is the refusal to accept responsibilities. A neurotic person ignores and detests this. He does not consider whether his actions are right or wrong and he denies responsibility which is an indispensable precondition to inner freedom.²²

Another obstacle is the lack of appreciation of the repercussions of his actions. He operates totally overtly and as he wishes, without consideration for any side effects. The conscious realisation of the repercussions of these careless actions by a neurotic person, is according to Horney, a powerful curing factor in psychoanalysis, because it convinces the neurotic person that, by changing mentality he might gain his freedom.²³

The existence, therefore, of powerful positive motives constitutes a counterbalance for the negative repressive experience of a neurotic person. His desire for inner strength and freedom, happiness or progress, blocks the descent towards neurotic difficulties and leads towards the ascent to restitution.²⁴

The more a person alienates himself from himself, the more his freedom becomes meaningless. Withdrawal from active life, isolation of conflicts and loss of interest for upgrading its personality, forces a neurotic person not to experience his deeper emotions.²⁵

Man is barred from the experience of freedom, if he does not delve within himself to discover his contradictions, and if he considers others' tolerance to his weaknesses as

²⁰ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 123

²¹ *Selfanalysis*, p. 226.

²² *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 174-175.

²³ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 177.

²⁴ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 234.

²⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 285.

their own shortcomings.²⁶

²⁶ *Final lectures*, p. 95.

c) CONSCIENCE

Conscience, according to Horney, is a person's constructive non-indulgence of his own self.²⁷ It contributes towards the realisation that attitudes and behaviour are neurotic and turns against the compulsiveness of the ego, the influences of unconscious feelings and all the other processes of neurotic phenomena, such as fears, unawareness and destructive tendencies. Without conscience, behavioural attitudes remain in the unconscious, even if their solutions are almost achieved.²⁸

For the identification of the behaviour of various neurotic conditions, one must follow a process, aiming at:

- a) bringing to consciousness all the overt or covert expressions of specific attitudes or conflicts.
- b) identifying their psychomotive nature.
- c) appreciating his subjective worth as well as his deleterious repercussions.
- d) studying to be fully related via conscience to the whole personality.²⁹

c1) Moral Conscience

The existential character of conscience, according to Horney, is entirely moral. It aids the development of a neurotic's personality, it makes him sincere and accountable for his actions and endows him with the ability of self-scrutiny and self-criticism. Thus, his neurosis is dispersed, an equilibrium in relationships with others is achieved and a person is at peace with his environment.³⁰

c2) Guilt feelings - Remorse

Horney's understanding of Guilt varies. Initially she entertained three theories:

²⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 132.

²⁸ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 20.

²⁹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 230.

³⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 131.

- a) The “negative curative reaction”, according which a neurotic person prefers to remain in his neurosis because of unconscious feelings of guilt.
- b) The theory of “superego”³¹, as an inner manifestation, punishing the “ego”³².
- c) The theory of the “moral masochism”³³ which interprets self-inflicted pain as a result of a desire to be punished³⁴.

Another of her perceptions is that guilt consists of violations of moral imperatives and prohibitions which pertain within a given culture. The feeling of guilt is the expression of a painful realisation that, such a violation has indeed taken place. This erroneous belief refers to the violation of certain rules, which the individual considers worth while.³⁵ A neurotic’s attitude towards other people is also dependent on this belief and is defined not so much by conscious desires or values, as by unconscious and pressing factors.³⁶ Feelings of guilt have a great role to play in neurosis. Certain of these manifest themselves openly and intensively; others appear to be somewhat withdrawn, although their existence is discerned from the neurotic person’s behaviour, attitudes and way of thinking and

³¹ The *Superego* is an unconscious part of the psychic apparatus. It results from the resolution of the Guilt feelings. As a consequence, it incorporates the remorse against actions hurting the conscience, either by warning the individual or by protecting him from current or oncoming dangers. *Feminine psychology*, New York 1967, p. 180.

³² The *Ego* is the control apparatus of the psychic structure. It organises and synthesises the conscious functions. *Feminine psychology*, p. 180.

³³ By the term *moral masochism*, Horney means an indulging and victimised feeling, where a neurotic person accepts every activity on the basis of his inner premises to be self-punished. See *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 54 and 214.

³⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 258.

³⁵ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 237.

³⁶ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 185.

reacting.³⁷

From a different point of view, a neurotic person observes that these feelings of guilt arise very easily and he ought to see them as a virtue, because they prove to him his great sensibility towards moral commands.³⁸ Identifying, therefore, their liberating action, he accepts his shortcomings and takes responsibility for his actions. This method, however, demands an awakened and upgraded level of inner reaction on the part of a neurotic person.³⁹

Genuine feelings of guilt offer great relief indeed, because they expel neurotic symptoms.⁴⁰ They constitute conscious experiences and relate to attitudes revealing a desire for perfection.⁴¹ Thus, a neurotic person is forced to criticise himself, to demean himself and to try to rid himself of these, developing self-punitive tendencies.⁴²

The self-criticism of a neurotic person, when he feels guilty, does not refer to his true sentiments. He accuses and scrutinises his own self, so that he becomes defensive when confronted by criticism or attack.⁴³ If we observe carefully these feelings of guilt we shall see that many of these which resemble guilt are in fact either expressions of anxiety or defenses against it.⁴⁴ With the development of neurotic tendencies, such as safety tricks, this anxiety is impeded in its drive towards the core and the background of conscience.⁴⁵ So, these feelings of guilt do not always refer to healthy self-criticism. Neurotic self-accusations are not morally based and they have an adverse influence, since they prohibit

³⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 230.

³⁸ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 220.

³⁹ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 220.

⁴⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 232.

⁴¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 232.

⁴² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 232.

⁴³ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 52.

⁴⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 234-236.

⁴⁵ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 75.

a neurotic person from doing anything about his problems to resolve them.

In other cases, these feelings of guilt cause fear to a neurotic person, lest it is discovered and criticised by others⁴⁶. The difference existing between these feelings and those classed as unconscious is indeed minimal. The former are awaiting the chance to externalise themselves, while the latter are expressed in depressive tendencies and self-admonitions.⁴⁷

The disorganisation of the structure of personality constitutes a source of danger, because it reveals the negative tendencies existing within a neurotic person. Automatic control is the sincere effort for restructuring. By this automatic control, these feelings of guilt do not only define the activity of urges or of sentiments but also act as "alarm bells" warning of the impending danger as soon as undesirable sentiments appear.⁴⁸

For these sentiments of guilt not to be considered as compulsive, they must be countenanced as healthy curative factors. The realisation coming from the feelings of guilt does not simply imply a general gain of self-awareness, but also means a partial neutralisation of every destructive weakness.⁴⁹ The "closet" neurotic persons who hide behind each and every unfounded and arbitrary obsession certainly about what is correct, are "deaf" to any self-accusation and do not realise any of their mistakes even if they are full of intense accusations.⁵⁰ In the event of accepting the verdict of the feelings of guilt, so that they simply embed a falsely cured picture, they overturn each constructive action which could help them and become immersed even deeper in their self-deception, considering that they are the only persons who really know exactly what to do and how; they start also putting blame on others⁵¹.

⁴⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 131.

⁴⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 231.

⁴⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 181.

⁴⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 15.

⁵⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 255.

⁵¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 246.

The operation which is undertaken by these feelings of guilt offers a successful method of restoring a precise and completed picture of the personality, aiming at bringing to the surface the unconscious elements of the life of a neurotic person.⁵² The inner dictations which they herald, if not satisfied, lead to violent emotional reactions which cover the whole gamut of anxiety, desperation and the tendencies towards self-destruction.⁵³ Self-scrutiny is defeated if a neurotic person persists in remaining his attitudes and rejecting all change.⁵⁴ The most direct result deriving from adhesion to feelings of guilt is the going along with guilt towards a correct cure of the personality.⁵⁵

Uncertainties and remorse are also derived from conscience and become primarily important. When experiencing guilt, the conscience is in a state of agitation. It calls upon a neurotic person to confront seriously his own errors and his improper behaviour without giving precise dimensions to the events which constitute these errors. It advises him to delve inside and to search for his misdemeanours and to try to overcome these in some healthy way. To achieve this he must not seek solutions in neurotic interactions.⁵⁶ The most potent sector, perhaps with the most powerful experiences of guilt, is sexuality.⁵⁷

c3) Healthy Conscience

A healthy conscience derives from the integral function of feelings of guilt, and from the neurotic's compliance with their biddings. It represents the reaction of the true self to a healthy development. Horney believes that a healthy conscience expresses one of the

⁵² *Selfanalysis*, p. 36.

⁵³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 74

⁵⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 74.

⁵⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 15.

⁵⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 131.

⁵⁷ *Feminine psychology*, p. 237. Horney compares here the saying of Friedrich Schiller: *Es sind nicht alle frei, die ihre Ketten spotten* (Not all are free, who mock their chains) because she wants to show that, even if sexuality is characterised as a normal situation, it contains serious remorse feelings.

main guarantees of the obliteration of neurotic complications.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 131.

Δ) TRUTH

The central precondition for pinpointing the truth for the essential smoothing of inner life lies in the neurotic's attempt to accept his own fault/weaknesses and to consider the bitter effort of purging himself, as an unquestionably inseparable part in the path of his life.⁵⁹ The means by which this is attained is a healthy desire for solitude.

The wish to be alone, in order to investigate his inner conflicts, cannot in any way be considered neurotic. When frequent contact with others causes insufferable, inner stress to the individual and solitude becomes the basic means of avoiding this contact, then the individual's desire for isolation indicates a distancing from neurosis aiming at the objective of freeing all his creative faculties, energies, and structure for a more sufficient relationship with the environment in which he lives. This solitude must not be considered as a lack of contact with others, or disposition for alienation from them, but it relates to a desire to be away from people for an autonomous inner life, which can remedy his relationship to himself and other persons.⁶⁰

The discovery of truth is not simply an upsetting agent but it is simultaneously a redeeming factor. This redeeming force is interwoven with every truth, and it overpowers the results of neurotic disturbances. As soon as this occurs a feeling of relief ensues. Apart from this and especially when the effect of neurotic disturbance prevails, this discovery of truth continues to be the harbinger of the resolution of the individual's problems. Even if the person cannot see the truth clearly, he can, nevertheless, sense it, thus gaining power so that he may walk with greater assurance.⁶¹

When the neurotic really arrives at the discovery of truth for his own self, it is possible to fight against all attempts at escape and all resistance - which operates through inhibitions, -

⁵⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 364.

⁶⁰ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 73.

⁶¹ *Selfanalysis*, p. 32.

with all the constructive power of truth.⁶²

The leading impulse of the neurotic towards the discovery of truth is a yearning for unity and virtue: it does not constitute a mystical desire, but is prompted by the practical necessity of having to function in life.⁶³ Man has the tendency to believe in something and this something is Truth.⁶⁴

⁶² *Selfanalysis*, p. 254. The meaning of *resistance* according to Horney, is the sum total of the neurotic's interests and desires to fight against every neurotic disturbance, p. 108. The reconstructive value of truth forms the opposing dynamic pole against the forces which cause these disturbances, p. 245.

Resistance is a very important notion in Karen Horney's psychoanalytical theory and it will be discussed later on in the third chapter of the thesis where she considers it as a valuable therapeutic factor in avoiding neuroses.

⁶³ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 56.

⁶⁴ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 52.

e) TRUE INDEPENDENCE

To achieve true inner independence, a neurotic person needs to make himself capable of supremacy on the ladder of his own values and to apply this to his own life.⁶⁵ This means that a person understands which options he must discard and which methods he must adopt so that he achieves inner health.

True independence derives from the overcoming of the negative factors which overshadow the life of the individual; he learns to expect nothing from others, not to apportion blame to them and to consider them as personalities with special needs, albeit defective.⁶⁶

Regarding others, he learns to respect their individuality and their rights. By exercising healthy individuality, he sets down the basis of an exceptionally genuine mutuality towards them.⁶⁷

A neurotic person needs to realise that independence is not about doing what he wishes and that he cannot be demanding or eccentric. Cynicism in life and non-compliance to customs and rules do not make him independent. On the contrary they box him in still more. By studying society and customs, man chooses what is right without resorting to neurosis as a solution. Independence emanating from the acceptance of others and shouldering of responsibilities lead a neurotic person towards inner calmness.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 241.

⁶⁶ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 202.

⁶⁷ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 241.

⁶⁸ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 202.

F) THE REAL SELF

The real self is a leading term in Horney's psychoanalysis. It stands in contrast to the ideal self, a product of delusions, that we will examine later. For Horney the real self sums up all the genuine possibilities open to an individual. The discovery of the real self is the key to her notion of therapy.

In every work of hers, she points out that the real self is what the man needs to confront his neuroses. It is an inner capacity which functions for the sake of one's integrity and operates against all intrapsychic trends and phenomena which restrain man in his attempt to balance his existence and put it on the right course towards non-neurotic experience.

Horney interprets the aspect of the real self very carefully, because she wishes to present it not only as the counter-action of someone who wants to be free from his imbalances, but also as the particular means which reinforce man and increase his effort not to be enslaved in illusions and delusions.

Real self constitutes therefore, according to Horney, the source of emotional strengths, of virtues and of constructive activism. It is orientated towards the completion of its comparative ability⁶⁹ and expresses the genuine strength which contributes to human development and improvement. It purges neurotic disabilities and assists in the reconstitution of true personal identity.⁷⁰

Real self offers inner life its pulse. It excites spontaneous sentiments, be they joy, impassive passion, lust, love or anger, fear, desperation. It defines the behaviour of favourable outcome what he desires by acting and confronting against inner weaknesses.⁷¹

Karen Horney regards the real self as an inexhaustibly significant element in human integrity. She regards it as the healthy core of existence which is able and wants to develop upwards.⁷²

⁶⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 173-174.

⁷⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 158.

⁷¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 157.

⁷² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 155.

Real self's certain ability is the human Mind. The Mind's only possession is thinking, is reason. Its goal is the truth. For the truth is eternal, and the greater our striving, the greater our happiness. The Mind's main power is the Intellect. Through his intellect man decides what is positive and what negative. If the intellect is hampered by passion, suffering remains. Thus, the desire to please, voluptuousness, greed, sensuality, expresses surrender to the force of external things. There is suffering, too, if the mind strives for something transient, changeable, or if its noble striving attaches to perishable things.⁷³ In summarising these it is worth noting that the pattern emerging here between Intellect and Passion is actually very close to St. Maximus' equivalent psychological patterns.

If man wishes to avoid all the above catastrophic actions, he must search always for positive activities which make him strong, so that under favourable conditions he may attain the full potential behaviour of his real self.⁷⁴

These favourable conditions relate to the psychosomatic involvement of a neurotic person. Real self may contain all these factors, but can achieve nothing by itself. If a person does not co-operate each and every action of the real self, he remains "deaf and mute". Only parallel action brings about the desired solutions. Real self guides a neurotic person to discover the correct "path" and follow it thereafter.

⁷³ *The adolescent diaries of Karen Horney*, New York 1980, p. 93.

⁷⁴ *The adolescent diaries of Karen Horney*, p. 112.

2) THE THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

Saint Maximus' anthropology operates with an understanding inherited from the past. His close links with earlier anthropological considerations and notions, are manifest in his reproducing and repeating teachings of Evagrius of Pontus, Nemesius of Emesa and Macarius the Egyptian, for example. The connection of the holy father with these previous neptic fathers concern anthropological understandings of the human psyche, the characteristics of a wholesome spiritual life, the means towards an integrated psychospiritual balance, the sinful deeds and stages of the human fallenness, and also, the therapeutic approaches towards an entire self-restoration.

Behind these theological influences we can see influences from Plato's and Aristotle's philosophical and psychological ideas. For example, there is the distinction between the spiritual and the bodily part of the human existence, and its further refinement in the notion of the tripartite part of the human psyche, which basically derives from Plato's philosophical and existential understanding of the spiritual part of the human existence.

In St. Maximus' anthropology, however, the psychosomatic unity of the man is more apparent than the creation of divisions within it. St. Maximus' emphasis on the unity of the soul transcends many of the problems raised by thinking of faculties in the soul, even though he appears to use the language of "faculty" psychology.

The structure of the three psychological aspects of the self will be revealed to us by the holy father as the concrete psychological factors, which struggle against one's sinful tendencies and trends. In turn, we will watch Saint Maximus unfolding before us the psychospiritual qualities which are necessary for the healthy functioning of the self. This functioning is for St. Maximus a deep activation of many virtues which enable one to entrench oneself against the destructive functioning of all vices.

Λ) THE INTELLECT (Ο ΝΟΥΣ)

The intellect represents for St. Maximus a holy place and a temple of God.⁷⁵ It is the vestment of the Holy Trinity (Αγία Τριάς). It is built mysteriously through God's peace (ειρήνη). It becomes in spirit the abode (κατοικητήριον) of His wholeness and it is discerned by its purity and its usefulness.⁷⁶

Soul's composition, according to St. Maximus, is:

- a) Its intellectual part (τό νοερόν). The intellectual part operates by self-determining volition (διά αὐτεξουσίου βουλήσεως). It is divided into an intuitive (θεωρητικόν) and an executive (πρακτικόν) part. The intuitive part is called intellect (νοῦς) and the executive, reason (λόγος).
The intellect expresses the mind, it guides it and thus it is called wisdom (σοφία). Purpose of the intellect is to preserve intact all motions (κινήσεις) towards God.
The spiritual part is the leader (ἡγεμών) of the mind. It supervises the traits of the soul and arranges them in their correct sequence without leanings towards temptation.
- b) Its life force part. This potent character of the mind, preserves it unaffected by sin⁷⁷.

⁷⁵ ...τόπος ἅγιος καί ναός Θεοῦ ὁ νοῦς ὑπάρχει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου... *Char.* II, 31; comp. *Mystagogia* chapt. IV, 91, 672 B-C.

⁷⁶ Ὁ νοῦς ναός μυστικῶς ὑπό τῆς εἰρήνης οἰκοδομούμενος, Θεοῦ κατοικητήριον γίνεται ἐν πνεύματι. *Cap. theol. et oecon.* I, 53. Ἐπιτηδειότατος πρὸς κατοικητήριον Θεοῦ μόνος ὁ καθαρὸς ὑπάρχει νοῦς. PG 90, 369D, Q.Th. 31.

⁷⁷ Ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ νοεράς γάρ καί ζωτικῆς δυνάμεως καθολικῶς συνίσταται· καί τῆς μὲν νοεράς ἐξουσιαστικῆς κατὰ βούλησιν κινουμένης, τῆς δὲ ζωτικῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀπροαιρέτως, ὡς ἔχει μενούσης. ... τῆς νοεράς εἶναι τό τε θεωρητικόν καί τό πρακτικόν (μέρος)· καί τό μὲν θεωρητικόν καλεῖσθαι νοῦν· τό δὲ πρακτικόν, λόγον· καί τῆς μὲν νοεράς δυνάμεως κινητικόν

The intellect is distinguished by its simplicity (ἀπλότης) and by its indivisibility.⁷⁸ It constitutes the logical part of the soul which, in itself is capable of comprehending all which have been previously understood and all which need to be comprehended.⁷⁹ The mind comprehends creation by countenancing it; it intrudes within creation and it investigates the reasons for the existence of the principles of creation (οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὄντων). The intellect is called the “head of the soul”⁸⁰ and it is depicted as the field where the natural world may sincerely approach the transcendent God.⁸¹

The reason the intellectual part of intellect is related to its active part is due to the intellect’s capacity for overseeing. Within this it behaves as prudence (φρόνησις), because prudence manages the life force of the intellect with good sense (σωφροσύνη), attaching the actions of the life force to the mind without the deleterious effects of sin.

Intellect observes and oversees, through soul everything because intellect is the essential manifestation of the soul.⁸² Intellect rejoices when it comprehends the natural creation and it begins examining the reasons for being as well as the contents of each the parts of creation.

εἶναι τὸν νοῦν· τῆς δὲ ζωτικῆς προνοητικὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸν λόγον· καὶ τὸν μὲν εἶναι τε καὶ καλεῖσθαι σοφίαν· φημί δὲ τὸν νοῦν, ὅταν παντάπασιν ἀτρέπτους ἑαυτοῦ διαφυλάττῃ τὰς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν κινήσεις· τὸν δὲ λόγον ὡσαύτως φρόνησιν καὶ εἶναι καὶ καλεῖσθαι, ὅταν σωφρόνως τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόνοιαν διοικουμένην ζωτικὴν δύναμιν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις συνάψας τῷ νῷ δεῖξειεν ἀδιάφορον. *Mystagogy*...p. 132, ver. 5-18; Chapter V, 672 D; comp. *ibid.*, Balthasar., *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners*, p. 335.

⁷⁸ Ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦς καὶ ἀμερῆς ἐστί. *Cap. theol. et oecon.* VII, 67.

⁷⁹ Νοῦς ἐστὶ ψυχῆς τὸ καθαρότατον καὶ λογικόν, εἰς θεωρίαν τῶν ὄντων καὶ προκατελημμένων. PG 91, 361A, “About the Soul”.

⁸⁰ Ὁ νοῦς κεφαλὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀνομάζεται. ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΒΙΤΣ, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, ver. 17.

⁸¹ PG 91, 1116D, Ambigua 141; Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners*, p. 287.

⁸² Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners*, p. 287.

When the intellect is engaged in the contemplation of things visible, it searches out either the natural principles of these things or the spiritual principles which they reflect, or else it seeks their original cause⁸³. When the intellect turns its attention to the visible world, it perceives things through the medium of the senses in a way that accords with nature. And the intellect is not evil, nor is its natural capacity to form conceptual images of things, nor are the things themselves, nor are the senses, for all are the work of God.⁸⁴

The visible and the tangible are the intermediary stages through which man can comprehend the Divine. Of course these, by themselves can achieve nothing, because they need the efforts of the human intellect which is detached from any sinful correlation without:

a) being enslaved by the perceptible (τά αισθητά)

b) being led astray by the intuition of the conceptual
(τά νοητά).

The means of motion of the mind is truth.⁸⁵ The mind was created for truth. Truth is heralded by it. The mind reaches rest, quenching its thirst, only when it is in full possession of the truth. Truth, by its infinite meaning, fills the mind. It nourishes fully the person who wishes to know the infinite glory of God.⁸⁶

The mind coordinates all the intellectual power of the soul. Although it exists within the

⁸³ Ἐν τῇ τῶν ὁρατῶν θεωρίᾳ γενόμενος ὁ νοῦς, ἢ τοὺς φυσικοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους ἐρευνᾷ ἢ τοὺς δι' αὐτῶν σημαιομένους ἢ αὐτὴν τὴν αἰτίαν ζητεῖ. *Char.* I, 98.

⁸⁴ Ὁ νοῦς ἐπιβάλλων τοῖς ὁρατοῖς κατὰ φύσιν νοεῖ τὰ πράγματα διὰ μέσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως· καὶ οὔτε ὁ νοῦς κακόν, οὔτε τό κατὰ φύσιν νοεῖν, οὔτε δέ τὰ πράγματα, οὔτε ἡ αἰσθησις. *Char.* II, 15.

⁸⁵ Περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁ νοῦς ὄρον τῆς κινήσεως δέχεται, περιγραφομένης αὐτῷ τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ τῆς ἐξεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας. *Mystagogy*...p. 140, ver. 94-96.

⁸⁶ comp. *Mystagogy*...p. 136, vers. 46-51.

perceptual⁸⁷ and conceptual sphere, ultimately it can operate outside it. This impetus of the mind ultimately draws the body along with it. It directs it, it reforms it and it renews it. In intellect, the *three powers of the soul* (τό τριμερές τῆς ψυχῆς) are realised in full unison and in turn they are wholly integrated with the body. A man who has not been integrated within the world does not exist within the correct conditions of real man.⁸⁸

The sincere movement (νεύσις) of the intellect towards God compels the body to seek only those things necessary for being, and nothing more.⁸⁹ The intellect joined to God for long periods through prayer (προσευχή) and love, becomes wise, good, powerful, compassionate, merciful, long-suffering; in short, it includes within itself all the divine qualities.⁹⁰ The strong and constructive prayer prepares the intellect for pure deeds in favour of the soul. The dynamic and constructive spirit pervading the intellect rids man from passions.⁹¹ Under the salvational actions of the intellect, Creation becomes an instrument of virtue and spiritual knowledge. Thus everything is scrutinised by the intellect as supplementary elements for the achievement of union with God.

⁸⁷ Ἡ ἀλήθεια καί τό ἀγαθόν δηλοῦσι τόν Θεόν· τήν μέν ἀλήθειαν, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τό θεῖον σημαίνεσθαι δοκῇ· ἀπλοῦν γάρ ἡ ἀλήθεια (ὡς ὁ νοῦς) καί μόνον, καί ἕν, καί ταῦτόν καί ἀμερές (ὡς ὁ νοῦς), καί ἀτρεπτον, καί ἀσταθές πρᾶγμα καί ἀλάθητον καί παντελῶς ἀδιάστατον· τό δέ ἀγαθόν ὅταν ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας. *Mystagogy...*, p. 136, verses 46-51.

⁸⁸ *Mystagogy...*, p. 134, vers. 26-31.

⁸⁹ Ὁ νοῦς ἐάν νεύσῃ πρὸς Θεόν, ἔχει δούλον τό σῶμα καί πλέον οὐδέν αὐτῷ παρέχει τῶν πρὸς τό ζῆν ἀναγκαίων. *Char.* III, 47.

⁹⁰ Νοῦς Θεῷ συναπτόμενος καί αὐτῷ ἐγχερονίζων διά προσευχῆς καί ἀγάπης, σοφός γίνεται καί ἀγαθός καί δυνατός καί φιλόφρων καί ἐλεήμων καί μακρόθυμος καί ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, πάντα σχεδόν τά θεῖα ιδιώματα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιφέρει. *Char.* II, 52.

⁹¹ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner's*, p. 412.

Β) Λόγος OR THE UNIQUENESS OF THE PERSONAL

The notions of *logos*, *logistikon* can be traced back to Plato if not further. Reason has a number of meanings in Plato. It is used in a very general way to describe the activity of the intellect. It is also used for that which inheres in things in the world as their meaning; but he also uses *logos* to describe the intellectual activity of the human person and the meaning it arrives at. Reason also is defined by Plato as *the shepherd of the soul*, who leads the two lower parts of the soul to the acquisition of every good.⁹²

Saint Maximus the Confessor employs this term from the platonic tradition and adapts it in accordance to the patristic tradition of the church. The adjective “rational” (λογικός), contains the analytical observance of all things created, where contact with God is observed as His Gift.⁹³ According to St. Maximus, man is intelligent by nature. His reasoning is expressed by desires, thoughts, volitions, searches, ideas, choices, strivings and uses.⁹⁴ The contents of the existential vertical section of man are the soul and the body. These two parts constitute the essence of the natural principle (λόγος φύσεως), which is seen as the existence of soul and of body, that is to say: of logical psychosomatic existence.⁹⁵

God has placed within man, simultaneously with man’s creation, *three powers relating to the soul: reason/logos, thymos, and desire/epithymia (αἱ τρεῖς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς*

⁹² Plato, *Republic*, IV, 434d-441c.

⁹³ Thunberg, *Man and Cosmos*, p. 75.

⁹⁴ Λογικόν οὖν φύσει ζῶον ὑπάρχων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὀρεκτικός ἐστί, καί λογιστικός, καί βουλευτικός, καί ζητητικός, καί σκεπτικός, καί προαιρετικός, καί ὀρμητικός, καί χρηστικός. PG 91, 24A, *Opuscula theologica et polemica*.

⁹⁵ Λόγος δέ φύσεως ἀνθρωπίνης ἐστί τό ψυχήν καί σῶμα καί ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς εἶναι τήν φύσιν καί σώματος. PG 91, 1341D, *Ambigua* 31; comp. Bausenhart, *In allem uns gleich außer Sünde, Studien zum Beitrag Maximus’ des Bekenner zur altkirchlichen Christologie*, names here the *essence of natural principle* as *Inhalt der Natur (content of the nature)*, because he wants to show that the existence of the natural principle is truly found as a content within the whole Creation, p. 145.

εἰσίν: λόγος, θυμός καί ἐπιθυμία). The presence of the intellect makes the soul λογικὴν (rational) and leads all intrapsychic abilities of man to perfection. In accordance with this, we can stress the idea we noticed before when we referred to the intellect, that λόγος is related to νοῦς because logos constitutes the executive part of the soul which expresses the intuitive one, i.e the intellect. Their relationship is confirmed from the bond existing between the two that they externalise the motions of soul through actions.

Θυμός and ἐπιθυμία belong to the irrational part of the soul. In St. Maximus' psychology we discover that more or less both aspects are connected with the bodily part. Logos, thymos and epithymia constitute, as I previously said, the tripartite side in man. This side represents one's psychosomatic realm which acts, reacts and advances the "ever-moving" development at one's psychospiritual reality, whether it is a positive or a negative one. This tripartite structure, if operating in accordance to its proper purpose, i.e in accordance to the will of God, meets Him and uplifts the human personality. We seek, then, God through logos, we desire the discovery of every coveted gift, deriving from Him, through epithymia, whilst through thymos we strive for the safeguarding of this asset in Holy Spirit.

Reason is not only general, it is also specific for Maximus. Although its actions are common to all people, nevertheless it always varies in its manifestation in each person, corresponding to the fact that man does not act as "something" but as a "someone that is as a unique person". This distinction is made clearly in *Opuscula 1*,⁹⁶ in one of the passages where Maximus lays down certain lexical rules, and provides definitions of theological and philosophical terms. On the side, therefore, of nature he identifies the κατ' εἰκόνα whilst on the other side of the personal he finds the καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. This means, on the one hand, that the κατ' εἰκόνα is given by God to all human beings and it is equivalent to the notion of λόγος. On the other hand, the καθ' ὁμοίωσιν is the objective

⁹⁶ Πρόσωπον, ἦτοι ὑπόστασις· φύσις, ἦτοι οὐσία. Οὐσία γάρ, τό κατ' εἰκόνα, ὁ λόγος· τό καθ' ὁμοίωσιν δέ, ὁ βίος, ὑπόστασις ἐστίν, ἐξ' ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἡ ἀρετή συμπληρῶται. PG 91, 37B-C, *Opuscula theologica et polemica 1*.

all human beings ought be turning to. Both κατ' εικόνα and λόγος express the common elements existing in every human being, whilst καθ' ὁμοίωσιν and ὑπόστασις express the uniqueness of the personal, which is expressed through βίος, i.e through the specific course in life which is particular personal, unrepeatable, and “certifies” each one of the human beings as indisputable individualities. If the rational part of the human nature does not coincide with the individual way of the personal existence, then they cannot exist either “within Him (ἐν Αὐτῷ)” or “within us (ἐν ἡμῖν)”. In other words, they operate neither as part of the divine dispensation towards salvation, nor as outstanding values, leading into psychosomatic restoration.

The rational part of the soul⁹⁷ is the cohesive, renewing and the correctly co-existential ability which aspires to the correction of the (inter)personal relationships, to the entrenchment of virtues and to the rejection of evils which divorce personalities from their unity.⁹⁸ When reason is cultivated by virtue, it creates the spiritual knowledge of the physical creation; spiritual knowledge generates spiritual ecstasy which distances the intellect from the biddings of the senses and brings every intrapsychic activity into equilibrium.

The hypostasis of a person characterises the quality of its natural profile. This profile possesses an entire spiritual character which is considered from Saint Maximus the same as essence. The Image of God is the essence which is recognised in man as the logos itself. Logos is the common feature within all humans which is never spoilt. The Likeness of God implies a person's course within life which aims at spiritual perfection, and it is nothing else but one's deification. The Likeness of God indicates the consummation of the creative

⁹⁷ Ὅθεν ἐν μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῶν προσώπων κατὰ τὴν πράξιν γνωρίζεται· ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, τὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀπαράλλακτον ἐνεργείας. ...ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἅπαντες τὸν τε λόγον ἔχομεν καὶ τὴν τούτου κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείαν. PG 91, 137A; comp. Bausenhart, *In allem uns gleich außer Sünde*, pp. 145 and 173; comp. Francois-Marie Léthel, *Théologie de l' agonie du Christ. La Liberté humain du Fils de Dieu et son importance sotériologique mises en lumière par Saint Maxime Confesseur*, *Théologie historique*, no. 27, Paris 1979, p. 67; comp. Farrell, *Free Choice*, p. 170.

⁹⁸ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 95.

presence of God within each human life. The only rule for the achievement of this spiritual consummation is that one must operate through the Image of God one possesses, and to proceed himself as a spiritually virtuous entity towards his objective to resemble God totally. In experiencing the course towards God, one expresses genuinely the character of the Likeness towards God, which is latent in the entire character of life, from which a person acquires the data for its personal existence.

The holy father utilises the term “βίος”, meaning not the perishable one but the spiritual one instead, which is received as an imperishable characteristic of the Holy Spirit. Βίος is the Likeness of God which is closely connected or fully adapted to πρόσωπον namely to the notion of individuality itself. In other words, καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν and πρόσωπον define the personal individuality of a person who runs a particular and - in relation to others - unsimilar βίος, because he is an unrepeatabe πρόσωπον aiming towards his personal unification with God via the καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν.

On the other hand, the aspect of λόγος for Maximus lies through a different approach. Λόγος for him contains the same features as κατ’ εἰκόνα. It is a common trait for every human being and it is connected with φύσις, which characterises oneself as a natural logos where life is experienced through.

In this way, one acquires the foundations for the proper manifestation of one’s existence within this perishable life. Reason and life are fulfilled in virtue, so that one’s course as an Image of God is orientated to the Likeness of Him and possesses stability and “immobility” to every vice that threatens to disorientate it. Logos and life are polar realities. They are never meant to function separately, but always in unison.⁹⁹ A similar pair of polar realities is existence and nature.¹⁰⁰

The uniqueness of the personal forms the texture of individuality. In this texture, reason

⁹⁹ Οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ὑπόστασις νοῆσαι ἄνευ φύσεως· οὐ δὲ πάλιν σχῆμα ἢ χρῶμα ἄνευ σώματος· ἢ δὲ φύσις, οὐ πάντως καὶ ὑπόστασις. PG 91, 264A, *Opuscula theologica et polemica*.

¹⁰⁰ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 223.

is always the leader of each action and choice. Θυμός and Ἐπιθυμία depend on Reason. They subjugate themselves to this uniqueness and they work for the betterment of the human being. The texture of individuality forms the self of a person to a multi-dimensional εἶναι, where the character of personality is a completely different aspect if compared to any other individuality. This different individuality accordingly builds its analogous texture.

When we say “texture” we mean all particularities existing in one’s personality. The texture of one’s individuality operates in two ways:

- a) either as a forming character which deepens each action and deed to a new psychological attitude.
- b) or as a factor maintaining a person’s motivation towards new alternatives and decisions.

To explore the means this individual texture uses, is extremely hard. It is very difficult to say that in exploring an individuality we discover his personal potential or deficiencies in life. Life itself influences these up and down experiences, and every time and moment the actions and reactions are unsimilar. There is not, therefore, any reason to assume that any individual behaves or will behave in a way similar to another individual.

The exploration of individuality primarily accepts the idea that man neither contradicts nor destroys himself, but on the contrary he gains in spiritual knowledge and behaves in a way dictated from his λόγος, so to reinforce himself against the irrational influences of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία.

He controls, therefore, temptation, he strives against passions and he sins the less.¹⁰¹ When the reasonable prevails, it guides correctly the intellect of the soul and it pursues the spiritual promotion of man by suitable means.¹⁰² Nature is the basis upon which reason

¹⁰¹ Ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶ ὁ μὴ ἑαυτῷ πολεμῶν, ὁ θυμόν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καθυποτάξας τῷ λόγῳ. PG 4, 400A, Scholia in liber de Divinis Nominibus.

¹⁰² Κρατεῖται ὁ λόγος θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ ὑφειμένα· ἐν τῇ τούτων γὰρ ἐποχῇ ἡ λογικὴ φαίνεται ἐξουσία καὶ δύναμις, ὥστε μὴ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι χρησιμον κεχρηῆσθαι αὐτοῖς. PG 4, 549D, Scholia in Epistolae Sancti Dionysii.

guides the human existence. Nature, in turn, functions through natural *logoi* (φυσικοί λόγοι), holding θυμός as one of its tools, subtracting the illogical and safeguarding indivisibility from corruption. Nature is thus a tool, a substance, a place, and a functioning system.¹⁰³ Common human nature is regulated existentially, through the system of Nature. This relationship constitutes human morality¹⁰⁴ which, according to St. Maximus, is connected with *Logos-Christ*.¹⁰⁵ The total integration which this relationship expresses in man is related to the Divine precedence of the “word”.¹⁰⁶

Our reason proceeds from the intellect . Λόγος constitutes the messenger of intellect’s concealed movements¹⁰⁷ and it links the senses to the intellect.¹⁰⁸ The rational part leads to God through the reading of prayers and spiritual intuition.¹⁰⁹ By virtue of its creation, the rational is perfect. It does not lean towards any change or negative influence.¹¹⁰ It aims at making man whole and assisting him in meeting God. To reward this aim, rational employs certain abilities. These are φρόνησις and διάκρισις, whose use gives birth to two virtues: moral wisdom (φρόνησις in its deeper sense) and justice (δικαιοσύνη). Moral wisdom is a habit of knowledge that unfailingly puts together knowledge of beings,

¹⁰³ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenner*, p. 142.

¹⁰⁴ Thunberg *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 93.

¹⁰⁵ *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 110.

¹⁰⁶ *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 124.

¹⁰⁷ Ὁ παρ’ ἡμῖν λόγος ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ κατὰ φύσιν προέρχεται, ἄγγελος δὲ τῶν κρυπτομένων τοῦ νοῦ κινήματων ἐστίν. *Cap. theol. et oecon.* II, 92.

¹⁰⁸ ...τὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν κατὰ λόγον εὐγενισθεῖσαν τάς ἐν τῷ παντὶ διαφόρους δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας φαντασιουμένην τοὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ὡς ἐφικτόν τῇ ψυχῇ διαγγέλλειν λόγους διδάξαντες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου, ὡσπερ ναῦν, τὴν ψυχὴν σοφῶς οἰακίσαντες, τὴν ὑγρὰν ταύτην καὶ ἄστατον καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως φερομένην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπικλύζουσιν τοῦ βίου κέλευθον ἀβρόχοις διώδευσαν ἰχνεσιν. PG 91, 1116D, Ambigua 140; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenner*, p. 287.

¹⁰⁹ *Char.* IV, 13, 44.

¹¹⁰ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenner*, p. 173.

while justice is a habit that presents equality and guards the equal status of all the spiritual powers before God.¹¹¹ This condition assists man in the stabilisation of his faith to God.

In his "Mystagogy", St. Maximus sees the gnostic (γνωστική) and practical (πρακτική) as complementary in every step of the spiritual life; so there is brought to equilibrium, in an intuitive intellect and intelligence, wisdom and prudence, spiritual knowledge and action and ultimately full spiritual knowledge and faith.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Τό λογικόν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν διαιρεῖται εἰς φρόνησιν καί διάκρισιν, ἤγουν ἰδικοσύνην, ἣν φάμεν ἕξιν εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου διανεμητικὴν, ὡς γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὲν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀρεταί δύο γενικαί, φρόνησιν (ἕξις ἐπιστημονικὴ ἀπταιστώσ τὴν τῶν ὄντων συλλεγομένη γνῶσιν) καί δικαιοσύνην (ἕξις διανεμητικὴ τοῦ ἴσου καί τῆς τῶν ὄλων ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων περὶ Θεόν ἰσονομίας φυλακτικὴ). ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΒΙΤΣ, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, verses 13-16, 17-18 and 20-22.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, *Mystagogy*...p. 5; PG 91, 672; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 165.

C) THE INCENSIVE POWER (Θυμικόν)

This term is also found in Plato and it is named θυμοειδής. In English it may be translated as “incensive”. The “incensive” for Plato is the power that sometimes fights against desire, which implies that they are distinct principles. It indicates the part of the soul which attempts to keep the balance in man and purges the desires if they are turning against a person’s psychic peacefulness.¹¹³

Saint Maximus borrows this term from platonic sources and interprets it as a power leading to God. The power of the incensive power excites the desire for union with the Divine. Without it, man does not live in peace which in its purest form is the undisturbed and perfect domination over satisfaction. The incensive power turns desire towards one aim only, which is the movement towards a spiritual *eros* (ἔρωσ) of God.¹¹⁴

In this connection Saint Maximus ascribes to the incensive power the “endurance” for the sake of divine peacefulness through which desire is being focused in an intense longing for God. By “endurance” he means (in my opinion) that the divine peacefulness is analogous to the peacefulness existing in the incensive power, when it attempts to balance and unify the inner reality of the soul with the Divine. On the other hand, valour (ἀνδρεία) is the potent virtue of the incensive towards this aim, where each and every cowardice and audacity (θράσος) is overturned, whilst the seeds (τά σπέρματα) of truth are preserved.¹¹⁵

Θυμός, if properly directed, can be expressed through the divine love (ἀγάπη). This means that *thymos* is perfected through love which can be experienced as a spiritual one

¹¹³ Plato, *Republic*, IV. 441e-442b.

¹¹⁴ Ἐκ τῆς θυμικῆς τὴν θεϊαν εἰρήνην ἀντέχεται, ἐπιστύφωσ πρὸς τὸν θεῖον ἔρωτα τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὴν κίνησιν. PG 90, 449B, Q.Th. 49.

¹¹⁵ (Ἀρετῆ) ἐκ δὲ τοῦ θυμικοῦ ἀνδρίαν - (ἦτις) ἔξις ἀναιρετικὴ δειλίας καὶ θράσους, φυλακτικὴ δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν (ἔστι). ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΒΙΤΣ, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, verses 16 and 18-19.

opposed to hatred.¹¹⁶ In having one his thymos transformed such as aforementioned, one behaves towards his fellow humans in a complete love.¹¹⁷ When love prevails over the θυμικόν, it operates as a “bridle”¹¹⁸, or restraint, because it preserves the incensive from every irrational tendency. For the holy father the love is a strong factor because preserves the θυμικόν from “flirting” with sinfulness and thus protects it from every disposition against fellow human beings.

Thymos, therefore, is the disposition of a person to connect itself with God. It expresses the tendency towards unification with the Divine. This tendency is often experienced by a person as an attempt for personal contact with God. It also presupposes that the person must approach God through a sincere behaviour. When a person realises that his contact with God needs such behaviour, then his thymos is converted into longing for God, which is completely transformed into Divine love.¹¹⁹ Its incensive power rejects hatred and cleanses to love all behaviour inimical to other human beings.¹²⁰ When the soul’s incensive power is constantly stimulated, it is cured by kindness (χρηστότης), compassion (φιλανθρωπία) love, and of course, mercy (ἔλεος).¹²¹ In particular, mercy and mercifulness (ἐλεημοσύνη) are “the ladies in waiting” of the incensive power, because they always adapt it to fellow human beings who they countenance as individual and dear personalities. Under this prism of mercifulness the incensive power aids in the constructive co-operation with brother Man, and is healed at the same time by the actual

¹¹⁶ ...τῷ δέ θυμικῷ, ἀγάπην πνευματικὴν, τὴν τῷ μίσει ἀντικειμένην... Char IV, 44.

¹¹⁷ Ἡ εἰς τὸν πλησίον (ἀγάπη) ἀνθίσταται τῷ θυμῷ (...). Char. IV, 75.

¹¹⁸ Τὸ θυμικόν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀγάπη χαλίνωσον (...). Char. IV, 80.

¹¹⁹ Ὁ θυμός ὀλοσχερῶς εἰς τὴν θεῖαν μετετρέπη ἀγάπην. Char. II, 48.

¹²⁰ ...ἢ τε ἢ πρὸς τὸν πλησίον ἀνόθευτος ἀγάπη...κατὰ λόγον μὲν καὶ φύσιν κινούμενον, πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν κατορθοῦν (whilst, on the contrary) παρά λόγον δέ καὶ φύσιν (κινούμενον) πᾶσαν κακίαν ἐργάζεσθαι. Char. IV, 15.

¹²¹ Ὁ θυμός ἰᾶται διὰ χρηστότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ ἐλέους. Char. II, 70.

experience of rapport and of almsgiving.¹²²

¹²² Ἡ μὲν ἐλεημοσύνη, τὸ θυμικόν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύει. *Char.* I, 79.

Δ) APPETITIVE ASPECT OF THE SOUL (Ἐπιθυμητικόν)

The last part of the soul for Plato is the desiring one: in Greek ἐπιθυμητικόν. Plato by saying “desiring” part of the soul, means the aspect which loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and flutters, and having compassion, or expressing habits, containing various indulgences and pleasures. This part also forces one against one’s reason. For Plato the desiring power many times engenders particular negative conditions and psychic diseases, which can overturn the healthy apparatus of the soul.¹²³

Saint Maximus takes all this over. He examines it as the good precondition of the spiritual life, when it is not ill. For him, desire (ἐπιθυμία) is a power that does good to rational beings (ὄντα), the purpose of which is to lift up through itself (ἀποτείνεσθαι) to that which is truly good.¹²⁴ Its aim is to enable man to regulate himself through Divine love.¹²⁵ The appetitive power of the soul looks always towards the desire of God and towards the increase of an intense longing towards Him¹²⁶, so to be perfected from desire to wordly things to ἔρωσ for God. Every motivation (κίνησις) of the soul towards good is rightly ordered, provided its desiring power is subordinate to self-control (ἐγκράτεια).¹²⁷ Moderation (σωφροσύνη) is assigned the desiring power in the effort and exercise towards self-control.¹²⁸ Moderation is typified by its ability to abstract from within the soul irrational (ἄλογος) desires and through this ability to construct within man

¹²³ Plato, *Republic*, IV, 434d-441c.

¹²⁴ Ἡ ἐπιθυμία δύναμις ἀγαθοποιός λογικοῖς μὲν πρὸς τὸ δι’ αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ἀποτείνεσθαι ἀγαθόν. PG 4, 301C, Scholia in liber de Divinis Nominibus.

¹²⁵ Ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμητικῆς ἡ θεία συνέστηκεν ἀγάπη. PG 90, 449 B, Q. Th. 49.

¹²⁶ Ἡ ἐπιθυμία εἰς τὸ θεῖον ὑπερηύξησεν ἔρωτα. *Char.* II, 48.

¹²⁷ Εὐλόγως κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν αὐτῆς, τῇ ἐγκρατεῖα πεποίηται. *Char.* IV, 15.

¹²⁸ Τῷ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, σωφροσύνην καὶ ἐγκράτειαν (συνιστάμενον). *Char.* IV, 44.

the virtue of real (ὄντως) love.¹²⁹

Virtue and dispassion result from the correct application of desire, which helps man to prefer all goods deriving from it and not from any temptation. It makes flesh (σάρκα) the abode (κατοικητήριον) of the Divine; it uses luminosity (λαμπρότης) as its glory (δόξα); it employs virtues as means of *evangelising* (εὐαγγελισμός) salvation without placing upon them the onus of enjoyment (ἀπόλαυσις) of earthly goods. It also smoothens and cleanses delight (ἡδονή), turning it towards the comprehension (ἀντίληψις) of the Divine and of the angelic spirituality. By undergoing these experiences, man avoids not only the worldly (κοσμικός) desires, which scorn the one dispassionate cause and nature, that alone is truly desirable, in favour of what is inferior, giving preference to the flesh rather than to the spirit, and taking pleasure more in visible things than in the magnificence and glory of intelligible realities.¹³⁰ But also each worldly belief (φρόνημα); working towards the uplifting (ἄνω φερόμενον) of his own being above the “muddy waters” (θολοῦντα ὕδατα) of sin, forsaking all worldly desires and setting himself above all worldly distress.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ σωφροσύνην (ἔξις ἀφαιρετικὴ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ὄντως ἀγάπης γεννητικὴ). ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΒΙΤΣ, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, verses 16 and 19-20.

¹³⁰ Ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς μίας καὶ μόνης ἀρετῆς τε καὶ ἀπαθοῦς αἰτίας καὶ φύσεως ποιουμένη τά μετ' αὐτὴν ἐρασμιώτερα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν σάρκα προτιμωτέραν τιθεμένη τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ τῆς τῶν νοουμένων, δόξης τε καὶ λαμπρότητος, ἐπιτερπεστέραν ἐργαζομένη τὴν τῶν φαινομένων ἀπόλαυσιν· τῷ κατ' αἴσθησιν λείω τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀπείργουσα τὸν νοῦν τῆς θείας συγγενούς τῆς νοητῆς ἀντιλήψεως. *Ibid.*, *Com. on the Our Father*, p. 192.

¹³¹ Ὁ φεύγων πάσας τὰς κοσμικὰς ἐπιθυμίας, πάσης ὕλης κοσμικῆς ἑαυτὸν ἀνώτερον καθίστησιν. *Char.* I, 22; comp. II, *Titus*, 12.

ε) REMEMBRANCE OF GOD (Μνήμη Θεοῦ)

According to St. Maximus, remembrance of God refers to the ability of the soul to revive in the mind of man the continual awareness “in depth” of the Divine. Once this takes place, the remembrance of God is entrenched within human existence and advances it towards the experiencing of spiritual knowledge (γνώσις) of God.¹³² Spiritual knowledge is gained only through practice of the virtues and struggle against the passions. If this effort is constructive, it turns accordingly into spiritual elation (εὐφροσύνη).¹³³

A special factor in the existence of divine remembrance is the contact of the faithful with the remembrance of the Saints’ lives. This factor operates as a conductor, because, on the one hand, it assists in the deadening of passions, whilst on the other, it aids man towards the life of the virtues.¹³⁴

From these two references of St. Maximus, one concludes that, the saint starts first from the result and then analyses the means of achieving it. Why should this be so? In my opinion, this occurs because of the saint’s spiritual maturity. For him the result is achieved through the proper choice and assessment of the means and data, leading to its realisation. The course towards the discovery of this result, assists in the restoration of an individual’s spirituality as well, the need of which compels him to seek constructive methods of approaching the result. These methods find their repercussions within the faithful’s personal effort, which opens to him a path towards inner motivation. He who has made

¹³² Δεῖ νοεῖν, ὡς τῆς μνήμης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀνανευομένης ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ τοῦ μνημονικοῦ... (εἰ δέ τοῦτο) συμβαίνει,... ἡ μνήμη Θεοῦ εἰκότως λέγοιτ’ ἂν ἡ γνώσις τοῦ Θεοῦ. PG 4, 145 B, Scholia in librum de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia.


¹³³ ...δικαίῳ λαμβάνοντι... τῶν δέ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πόνων τὴν λήθην διὰ τὴν διαδεχομένην τοὺς πόνους τῶν ἀρετῶν εὐφροσύνην τῆς πνευματικῆς. Ps. 59, I 865B, *Char.* II, 34, comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, pp. 253-254.

¹³⁴ Τὴν μνήμην-therefore-ἔχων τις τῆς τῶν ἁγίων ἀναστροφῆς, τὴν μὲν τῶν παθῶν ἀποτίθεται νέκρωσιν· τὴν δέ τῶν ἀρετῶν ζωὴν ἀποδέχεται. PG 90, 389A, Q.th. 37, 6.

this attempt not only achieves methods resulting in a mature spirituality, but he also revives his relationship with God.

Every result, therefore, presupposes for Saint Maximus intense effort and continuous struggle. Both effort and struggle lead to recollection of God, and motivate man's spirituality towards remembrance of God. When man retains in the incensive power of his soul (θυμικόν) this recollection, he communicates with God and comes closer to Him. This approach retains the links between man and God; it upgrades man spiritually and aids him in his comprehension of God's Energies. This comprehension helps towards the entrenchment of this remembrance.¹³⁵ Each time the remembrance of God carries within the sense of His presence, it leads to spiritual knowledge. This happens only when man complies with God's commands.¹³⁶

The dimension given by St. Maximus to the approach of the remembrance of God, is represented by a form. Schematically, therefore, the following applies:



If man rejects the memory of God, conscience taunts him and checks him, recoiling and attacking him because when he does not act upon the remembrance of God he overlooks his own faults while not forgiving those of others.¹³⁷

Saint Maximus prays that man does not undergo such experiences. His main interest is in the finding of the right path towards the memory of God for which he tells us that

¹³⁵ Ἡ γὰρ ἐνθύμησις κινεῖ μνήμην... PG 90, 589A, 1297D, Q.Th. 56, 13.

¹³⁶ ...ἐν τῇ πράξει τῶν ἐντολῶν... Thal. 48, I 440A, comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 253.

¹³⁷ Καὶ τῇ μάστιγι τῆς τῶν προημαρτημένων μνήμης κατὰ τὴν συνείδησιν ἀφανῶς πληττομένη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συστολῇ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πταισματα ὄραν οὐκ ἀνεχομένης. PG 91, 600C, Epistle 20.

“whoever has been granted remembrance and spiritual knowledge of God, fully enjoys the pleasures that come from it, and he despises all other pleasures produced by the soul’s desiring power (ἐπιθυμητικόν)”¹³⁸.

If the Christian does not wish to be enmeshed by the appetitive aspect of the soul let him desire the “living intellect” (ζών νοῦς). The “living intellect” leads a person’s appetitive aspect towards restoration and transforms it desiring only God. The relationship developing between the living intellect and the appetitive aspect operates as a strong factor towards salvation. This relationship directs man to desire God and to want to integrate with Him. He who wishes to see the Lord without practising virtues does not find Him because he has searched for Him without personal effort. He who fully enjoys remembrance and spiritual knowledge of God is directed towards discovering the inner essences of God’s creations. Every intellect capable of contemplation is finally led to the remembrance of God. St. Maximus utilises the parable of the farmer who preserves the seeds without tares. By adhering to the remembrance of God, man safeguards carefully and attentively the seeds of the Divine Word (Θεῖος Λόγος), and he preserves them into his life, retaining God’s re-membrance within him.¹³⁹

“Therefore let us, beseech the Lord that the saving memory of him be preserved within us, lest the practice of good works corrupts the soul which has been raised upon high and dared, like Ozias, to (pass) beyond nature”.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ ...ὁ γνώσεως Θεοῦ καταξιωθεῖς καί τῆς ἐκ ταύτης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύσας γνησίως, οὗτος καταφρονεῖ τῶν τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τικτομένων πασῶν ἡδονῶν. *Char.* III, 63.

¹³⁹ Πᾶς νοῦς ἰσχύν πρὸς θεωρίαν ἔχων, καὶ ἀληθῆς ἐστὶ γεωργός, καθαρὰ ζιζανίων διὰ τῆς οἰκείας σπουδῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τὰ θεῖα τῶν ἀγαθῶν διαφυλάττων σπέρματα, μέχρις οὗ συντηροῦσαν αὐτόν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ μνήμην. *Q.Th.* 48, 232-236..

¹⁴⁰ Διό πάντοτε δεηθῶμεν τοῦ Κυρίου τὴν σωτήριον αὐτοῦ μνήμην φυλαχθῆναι ἡμῖν, ἵνα μὴ διαφθεῖρη τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ κατορθούμενον, πρὸς ὕψος ἀρθεῖσαν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, ὡς ὁ Ὀζίας, κατατολήσασαν. *Q.Th.* 48, 239-243.

F) THE GOOD CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSCIENCE WHICH ACCUSES
(Άγαθή και ἐλέγχουσα Συνείδησις)

The view of Saint Maximus on “good conscience”, is closely related with the activity and character of faith (πίστις). For Man to comprehend the essence of faith and its connection with good conscience, the Saint states: “Love and true disposition, namely faith and good conscience; exist hiddenly as a work of the heart’s movement, which has no need at all of external matter for generation”¹⁴¹, whilst he explains later, that: “ Faith is true knowledge, the principles of which are beyond rational demonstration; for faith makes real for us things beyond intellect and reason”¹⁴².

The connection between conscience and faith reveals the common characteristic of their relationship with the truth. Although Saint Maximus does not say anything about the truth in this context, we can assume it, because both faith and conscience are based on the true expression of their contents. Both utilise as their foundation the truth and inform one clearly, either about the existence of God or about the inner situation of one’s self, without lying. Without truth it is impossible for faith to operate, or better, without truth they cannot be expressed or defined as “faith” and “conscience”. The lack of truth disorients faith and conscience and disbalances the relationship either with God or himself. The task of faith and good conscience is to operate as concepts beyond matter.

The connection between these two references is found in the noun “ὑπόστασις” (existence), which in the Saints’ expression about faith is considered as containing characteristics more than what the intellect and reason can understand, but in his expression about good conscience is latent. This indicates that, on the one hand, he


¹⁴¹ Ἀγάπη καί γνησία διάθεσις ἤγουν πίστις καί ἀγαθή συνείδησις ἔργον τοῦ κατὰ προδήλωσ τήν καρδίαν ἀφανῶς ὑπάρχει κινήματος, τῆς ἐκτός ὕλης πρὸς γένεσιν παντελῶς οὐ δεόμενον. PG 90, 652A, Q.Th. 62, 7.

¹⁴² Πίστις γάρ ἐστι, γνῶσις ἀληθινή, ἀναποδείκτους ἔχουσα τὰς ἀρχὰς ὡς τῶν ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ λόγον ὑπάρχουσα πραγμάτων ὑπόστασιν. PG 90, 1085D, *Capita Theolog. et Oecon.* I, 9; comp. Heb. 11, 1 and Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenner*, Einsiedeln 1988, p. 339.

employs “ὑπόστασις” (existence) as a noun, while on the other he refers to it through the verb “ὑπάρχειν” (to exist), pinpointing that faith and conscience are sustained as movements of the heart (καρδία).

A good conscience represents God’s love towards Man, where its pinnacle is the non-consideration of the transgression of the divine commandments, as a sin¹⁴³, and the reason that this is saved, is because good conscience represents the ever vigilant factor which ensures that, everything happens in harmony, during the expression of this love.

Recipients of this good conscience, according to St. Maximus, are two elements:

- a) 
- b) love towards other human beings, neighbours, and every creation which is adopted within the whole “prism” of salvation.

These two elements¹⁴⁵ (provided they are sincere, true and balanced) are recycled and constantly returning to the Axiom that a good conscience is not accused by any commandment that has been transgressed.¹⁴⁶

What is then this conscience? St. Maximus, wishing to attribute to it a divine origin and character, he stresses that, it is the voice of Christ which leads to the awareness of sins.¹⁴⁷ If man heeds this voice of God, he bears (ἐπιφέρηται) conscience within him as inherent

¹⁴³ Ἡ ἀγαθή συνείδησις ἐπιφέρεται τύπον θείας ἀγάπης, ἐν ἣ τὸ παράπαν θείων ἐντολῶν οὐκ ἔστι παράβασις. PG 90, 520B, Q.Th. 54, 21.

¹⁴⁴ ...ὡς μηδεμίαν ἔχουσα παράβασιν ἐντολῆς. PG 90, 532C, Q.Th. Scholia 21.

¹⁴⁵ Ἡ ἀγαθή συνείδησις τὴν εἰς τὸν πλησίον διὰ τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν ἐντολῶν ἀγάπην συνίστησιν. PG 90, 661C, Q. Th. Scholia 7.

¹⁴⁶ ...ἡ ἀγαθή συνείδησις παραβαθείσαν ἐντολὴν οὐκ ἔχει κατήγορον. PG 90, 661C, Q. Th. Scholia 7.

¹⁴⁷ Φωνὴ τοῦ βοῶντος ἔστι Λόγου ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκάστω πλημμεληθεῖσι. PG 90, 424C, Q.Th. 47.

advocacy¹⁴⁸ and escapes from terrible remorse. A direct result, therefore, is that conscience builds up a kind of living, approved by God.

Conscience creates the Godpleasing life which is achieved by practising Christ's commandments¹⁴⁹. Accordingly, man projects an image which, according to St. Maximus, is "the spiritual resurrection of a new person"¹⁵⁰, because he is based upon "unsullied and genuinely real intimate communion (παρρησία) of conscience"¹⁵¹.

St. Maximus' interpretation of the term "conscience" is significant. A christian who complies with the bidding of conscience not only must do things not pleasant to himself, but must also be convinced that, for the correction of his being, it is not enough to obey conscience, but to confront his own self.

Here, the christian's strife is polarised against sinful tendencies and expectations which, on the one hand, disorientate him, while, on the other hand, they harbour compulsive trends, reactions and repressions, not only about himself, but also about fellow human beings. The steps against these sinful tendencies and expectations, according to St. Maximus, are as follows:

- a) "He persuades his conscience to embrace what is most evil as if he has done something that is good by nature, such as one has stretched out the activity of the soul like a hand and taken in a blameworthy way from the tree of life, since he thinks that what is most evil is immortal by nature"¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ ...ἐπιφέρηται ἐαυτῷ σύμφυτον συνηγορίαν PG 90, 664B, Q.Th. Scholia 13.

¹⁴⁹ ...τόν θεάρεστον βίον, τῇ τηρήσει τῶν ἐντολῶν. PG 91, 577A, Epistle 16.

¹⁵⁰ ...ἡ τοῦ καινοῦ ἀναστάσεως ἀνθρώπου... PG 91, 628A, Epistle 32.

¹⁵¹ ...ἀκηλίδωτον καί ἀληθινὴν παρρησίαν τῆς συνειδήσεως. PG 91, 628, Epistle 32.

¹⁵² Ὁ πείσας τὸ συνειδὸς ὡς φύσει καλὸν πραττόμενον ἔχειν τὸ κάκιστον, οὗτος χειρός δίκην ἐκτείνας τὸ πρακτικόν, ἔλαβε ψεκτῶς τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς, ἀθάνατον ἠγησάμενος φύσει τὸ κάκιστον. Q.Th. 44, S. 6.

- b) "Do not defile your conscience, which is always advising you for the best, for it bestows on you divine and angelic opinion and rids you of the hidden infections of the soul and gives you the intimate communion with God at the moment of death."¹⁵³
- c) "Examine your conscience with accuracy, in case it is your fault that your brother is still hostile; and do not distort it when it discerns your secret thoughts and it blames you at the moment of death and when it becomes an obstacle during the time of prayer"¹⁵⁴

In the event, therefore, that man disobeys the commands of his conscience, chastisement commences. This chastisement is the natural outcome of disobedience, which has been emplaced by God to investigate man's deliberate choice, when he commits an error, considering it not only as a virtue but also as something innate to him¹⁵⁵.

Conscience utilises the following means of checking:

- a) Sorrow¹⁵⁶. This relates to sins which are

¹⁵³ Μή ἀτιμάσης τὴν συνείδησιν, ἀριστα σοι αἰεὶ συμβουλευούσαν. Γνώμην γὰρ θεῖαν καὶ ἀγγελικὴν σοι ὑποτίθεται καὶ τῶν κρυπτῶν τῆς καρδίας μολυσμάτων ἐλευθεροῖ καὶ παρρησίαν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν ἐν τῇ ἐξόδῳ σοι χαρίζεται. *Char.* III, 80.

¹⁵⁴ Ἐρεύνησον τὴν συνείδησιν μετὰ πάσης ἀκριβείας μήποτε τῇ σῇ αἰτία ὁ ἀδελφός οὐ διηλλάγη· καὶ μὴ παραλογίζου αὐτήν, τὰ κρυπτά σου γινώσκουσαν καὶ κατηγορούσαν σου ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς ἐξόδου καὶ ἐν καιρῷ δὲ προσευχῆς πρόσκομμά σοι γενομένην. *Char.* IV, 33.

¹⁵⁵ Τὴν κατὰ τὸ συνειδὸς τοῦ κακοῦ διαβολὴν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φυσικῶς ἐνθήμενος ὁ Θεός, διέκρινεν αὐτόν τῆς ζωῆς κακόν τῇ προαιρέσει γινόμενον· ἵνα μὴ, τὸ κακόν πράττων, δύναται πείσαι τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν, ὅτι φύσει καλὸν ὑπάρχει τὸ κάκιστον. PG 90, 417B-C, Q.Th. Scholia 5.

¹⁵⁶ Τὴν λύπην, ὅλον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ βάθος περιλαμβάνουσαν, τῇ μάστιγι τῆς συνειδήσεως αἰκιζόμενον τῆς κατ' αἰσθησιν ἡδονῆς. Q.Th. 58, 5-14, and Q. Th. 58, 111-131.

written in the “book” (βίβλος) of conscience. Each time man reads this book sincerely he feels overwhelming sorrow and tries for the best.¹⁵⁷

b) The “whip” (μάστιγα) of conscience against each impropriety which afflict man.¹⁵⁸

c) The “accusations” (ὕπωπιασμοί) of conscience, i.e. its stings against every sin.¹⁵⁹

Saint Maximus, therefore, urges us to be alert so that we are not defeated by the deceptions of matter and of earthly sensual pleasures, so that our conscience does not check us.¹⁶⁰ Thus, not only we do avoid its stings, but also the intensity of influence of evil spirits. By this method, man attains the truthful character of purity, having been purged from every sinful concept.

The reading of conscience offers man a fancy free comprehension of sins and impedes the impelling of the soul towards practicing them.¹⁶¹ The result is, therefore, the innate thoughts towards “good”, which simultaneously check also the unjustifiable hatred against fellow human beings.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ Τὴν λύπην ἢ κατὰ συνείδησιν τῶν πλημμεληθέντων ὑμῶν βίβλος, φιλοπόνως ἀναγιγνωσκόμενη τιθηνεῖται. PG 91, 416A, Epistle 4.

¹⁵⁸ Τὴν μάστιγα τῆς συνειδήσεως ἔχων ἐπὶ τοῖς πλημμεληθεῖσιν αὐτόν καταϊκίζουσαν. PG 90, 704B, Q.Th. 64, 19.

¹⁵⁹ Ὑπωπιασμούς δέ τούς ἐκ τῆς συνειδήσεως, μεθ' ὑπομνήσεώς τινος παρακλητικούς αἰκισμούς, οἷς προτεινομένους ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡρέμα πως εἴωθεν κάμπτεσθαι τό αὐστηρόν τοῦ λογισμοῦ καί πρὸς τὰ καλά διὰ τὴν χρονικωτέραν ἐξιν ἀνύπεικτον, οὐ φέροντος ἔνδομυχούσαν, καί οἷον αἰκίζουσαν τε συνεχῶς καί διοχλοῦσαν τὴν βάσανον ἕως λυμῆνται τὰ τὴν ψυχὴν λυμαινόμενα πάθη, δι' ἐγκρατείας καί τῆς πρὸς τὰ μέλη τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκουσίου νεκρώσεως. PG 90, 1396D-1397A, Questionen ad Theopemphum.

¹⁶⁰ Ἐκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν τῶν ἡττημένων τῇ ἀπάτῃ τῶν ὕλικῶν, καί ταῖς ἡδοναῖς χαιρόντων τοῦ σώματος, δέχεται καί τὴν συνείδησιν αὐτόν πλήττοντα. PG 90, 728B, Q.Th. 64, 52.

This check of conscience constitutes the virtue in the manifestation of feelings of remorse for man's own good. It offers the solace desired by the soul and unshackles man from each sinful content. It confronts sin as the breach in the relationship both man and God and looks forward to the reinstatement of this relationship by the realisation and rejection of all the negative, disorienting constructs.

Saint Maximus says that "he only has a conscience coloured by earlier circumstances. For he cannot remember what he is doing, it is as if he were doing them".¹⁶³ "Let us not fall back into pleasures; let us not grow slack in our thoughts; let us not defile the conscience".¹⁶⁴ A conscience which stings is the basis and prerequisite of moral life.¹⁶⁵ It leads towards the imperative for love and can be likened to a mirror which contains the shape of all good deeds.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹ ...τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτῇ κακῶς πεπραγμένοις ἐστιγμένης συνειδήσεως καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα τοῦτον γενησομένης τῶν πονηρῶν πνευμάτων φοβερᾶς ἐρεύνης τὴν ἐννοιαν. PG 91, 424A, Epistle 5. Τὴν ἀψευδῆ δέξασθαι κατὰ συνείδησιν καθαρθεῖσαν τῶν πλησόντων αὐτὴν νοημάτων τῆς ἀναπαύσεως. PG 91, 1173D, Ambigua 166 ... (γινώσκων) ἕκαστος τὰς ἐ-αυτοῦ (ἀμαρτίας), τὴν βίβλον ἀπλανῶς ἀναγινώσκων τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συνειδήσεως. PG 91, 381A, Epistle 1, 212; 416D, Epistle 4. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀπὸ ἀμαρτιῶν ἀνακόπτεται διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν τύπτουσαν. *Char.* II, 81.

¹⁶² Τὸν ἐμφυτον κατὰ συνείδησιν λογισμόν, τὸν ἀδικον μῖσος ἐλέγχοντα. PG 90, 769D Q.Th. 65, 61.

¹⁶³ Μόνην δέ τὴν συνείδησιν ἔχει κεχρωσμένην ταῖς προτέραις προλήψεσιν. Οὐ δύναται γάρ ἄπερ ἐπραξε, μὴ λογίζεσθαι ὡς μὴ πράξας. PG 90, 852C, Quaest. et Dubia 78.

¹⁶⁴ Μὴ ὑπτιωθῶμεν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς· μὴ χαννωθῶμεν τοῖς λογισμοῖς· μὴ ῥυπώσωμεν τὴν συνείδησιν. . PG 90, 956C, Liber asceticus 45.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*, Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 150.

¹⁶⁶ Τὸ μὲν ἔσοπτρόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν ὄρω φάναι, συνείδησις τὴν τῶν κατὰ πράξιν ἀνελλιπῶς πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἔχουσα μορφήν. *Thal.* 46, I 420 B; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, pp. 150-151.

However, if man mars his conscience without striving to improve, he loads it with ensuing stains of errors and, sooner or later, he accepts willingly spiritual death.

St. Maximus ends his report on good conscience and remorse with a prayer which constitutes an epitome of the intention behind his analysis:

“Deliver us oh Lord from the adversities of the world, according to Your goodness, so that, having crossed the ocean of life with a pure conscience, and standing by This Your awesome throne blameless and whole, we may be made worthy of eternal life”.¹⁶⁷

St. Maximus alongside the Resurrection of Christ, which for Man means the liberation from passion, perceives a second resurrection: the spotless and true intimate communion in accordance with conscience.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Σώσον ἡμᾶς Κύριε, ἐκ τῶν δυσχερειῶν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, κατὰ τὴν χρηστότητά Σου, ἵνα ἐν καθαρῷ συνειδήσει τὸ πέλαγος τοῦ βίου διαπεράσαντες, ἀμεμπτοι καὶ ἀκέραιοι τῷ φοβερῷ βήματί Σου παραστάντες, ἀξιοθῶμεν τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς. *Liber asceticus*, 39, PG 90, 948C.

¹⁶⁸ ...τὴν κατὰ συνείδησιν ἀκηλίδωτον καὶ ἀληθὴν παρρησίαν. *Ep.* 32, II 628A; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 151.

Γ) ΔΙΣΠΑSSION (Απάθεια)

Dispassion, according to St. Maximus, is linked with other experiences of deliverance. Its essence is not one-dimensional but it attaches to other spiritual conditions and virtues. St. Maximus is occupied with them and he recommends everything good which can contribute to the clarification of this virtue.

Firstly, therefore, it is the fruit (καρπός) of repentance (μετάνοια), heralding the alleviation of every sin.¹⁶⁹ We are not surprised by this opinion, because the Saint sees dispassion as the precondition for attaining inner freedom whose power is related with each human spiritual integration.¹⁷⁰ Remembrance of God constitutes the path towards this integration, a result of which is also dispassion.¹⁷¹

Secondly, dispassion is encountered as the specifically peaceful condition of the soul (ψυχή) in which the soul is not easily moved to evil.¹⁷² For the soul to sin, it needs the co-operation of the senses. Nevertheless, Word-Christ comes via dispassion and blesses these senses with the salutation of peace, i.e with inner peace and calmness against all passions. This experience characterises dispassion¹⁷³, through which perfect love is born¹⁷⁴ and vice versa.¹⁷⁵ Dispassion and love are almost equivalent in the eyes of God as well as human beings. The value of dispassion converts in the writings of St. Maximus' into incomparable qualitative activity, through love¹⁷⁶.

¹⁶⁹ Καρπός μετανοίας ἐστίν, ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς· ἀπάθεια δὲ ἐξάλειψις ἀμαρτίας. PG 90, 956A, Liber asceticus 44.

¹⁷⁰ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenners*, p. 278.

¹⁷¹ Ἀπάθεια συνίσταται ἐκ μνήμης Θεοῦ. PG 90, 1416D, Other chapters 73.

¹⁷² Ἀπάθεια ἐστίν εἰρηνικὴ κατάστασις ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν δυσκίνητος γίνεται ψυχή πρὸς κακίαν. *Char.* I, 36; comp. Bausenhardt, *In uns allem außer Sünde*, p. 159.

¹⁷³ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 164.

¹⁷⁴ ...ἐξ (ἀπαθείας) τίκεται ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη. *Char.* IV, 91.

¹⁷⁵ Ἀγάπη μὲν, τίκει ἀπάθεια. *Char.* I, 2.

¹⁷⁶ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, pp. 99-100. This means, therefore, that the aspect of equilibrium inherent in the concept of *dispassion (apatheia)* has been transformed by St. Maximus into a demand for

When dispassion relates to the above virtues it leads towards spiritual knowledge (Γνώσις) of God. This spiritual knowledge is founded upon a certain asceticism which tends to resemble dispassion towards every malice and also upon the natural countenance of ideas or principles explaining the reasons of creation.¹⁷⁷ By tasting dispassion in this way, Man is trained in meekness (πραότης) and wisdom (σοφία) which although emanating from other sources always end on the epicentre of love¹⁷⁸

St. Maximus does not fragment his analysis of dispassion. Instead, he relates it to life itself. He considers it as a part of life; this is why he considers it so closely related to it. Everything referring to the life of Man is totally inseparable thus it can participate wholly in dispassion,¹⁷⁹ whose beginnings for supremacy in Man's life is the absence of temptation.¹⁸⁰

St. Maximus uses the name of the day of the week "Sabbath" as his preferred method for cataloguing the conditions of the spiritual life. The conditions of the spiritual life for the holy father are: Sabbath (Σάββατον) as the day of ἡ ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς λογικῆς (the dispassion of the rational soul) which practices the struggle against passions¹⁸¹; Sabbaths are the days where ἡ ἐλευθερία ψυχῆς λογικῆς (the freedom of the rational soul) is offered against nature and senses¹⁸²; Sabbaths of Sabbaths¹⁸³ are ἡ ἡρεμία πνευματικῆς ψυχῆς

equality and non-discrimination in the activity of love. About this see please the meaning of the *Evagrian and Maximian understanding of dispassion* in Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, pp. 319-327.

¹⁷⁷ Ὁδός ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν ἐστὶν ἀπάθεια. *Char.* IV, 57; Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 68.

¹⁷⁸ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximos' des Bekenners*, p. 330.

¹⁷⁹ Τό μὲν γάρ αὐτῆς (τῆς ζωῆς) ἀμέριστον ὁ καὶ ἀπαθές. PG 4, 565A-B-C, Schol. in Ep. S. Dion.

¹⁸⁰ ...μερικῆς τυχόν ἀπαθείας (ὅτε λείπουσιν οἱ πειρασμοί). *Char.* IV, 53.

¹⁸¹ Σάββατον ἐστὶν, ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς λογικῆς. *Cap. theol. et oeconom. I*, 37; comp. Leviticus XXIII, 3.

¹⁸² Σάββατα ἐστὶν, ἐλευθερία ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς αἰσθησιν, διὰ τῆς ἐν πνεύματι φυσικῆς θεωρίας, ἀποθεμένης ἐνέργειαν. *Cap. theol. et oecon. I*, 38; comp. I, 15.

¹⁸³ *Cap. theol. et oecon. I*, 39; comp. *ibid.*, 32, 38. Other references on *Sabbaths* in *Leviticus*, related to the above passages are in XXIV, 8, XXV, 2, 4, 6, and in XXVI, 34-35.

λογικῆς (the spiritual peacefulness of the rational soul) where the intellect endows through the ecstasis of the intense longing of God, the steadiness against sin¹⁸⁴. The significance of this passage taken from *Leviticus* is that the holy father through this reference shows us the development of dispassion into further stages by employing illustrations from the allegorized text.

Therefore, the day (ἡμέρα) of Saturday indicates for Saint Maximus the spiritual process of the rest and abstinence from the passions (ἀργία τε καὶ ἀποχή ἀπό παθῶν), where every dark and vicious deed is expelled.

The soul acquires dispassion as follows:

- a) by spiritual purging where each sinful stain is utterly casting off.¹⁸⁵
- b) by practicing of all virtues.¹⁸⁶

God's recompense and reward to man, when man is restrained with self-control (ἐγκράτεια), is dispassion again. This in turn engenders discrimination (διάκρισις)¹⁸⁷, where the Faithful (Ὁ Πιστός) learns to identify each condition containing passion (πάθος) as expellable, because it could, at any time, not only develop a pathological habit (ἔξις) but also to be repressed within his inner world. Passion if repressed has the ability to reign internally and to reappear during sleep in the form of dreams. If the Faithful does not accept such sinful habits, or perceives them only externally, he starts to obtain total dis-

¹⁸⁴ Σάββατα Σαββάτων ἐστίν, ἡρεμία πνευματικῆ ψυχῆς λογικῆς· καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν πάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θειοτέρων λόγων τὸν νοῦν συστελάσης· καὶ μόνῳ τῷ Θεῷ κατ' ἐρωτικὴν ἔκστασιν ὀλικῶς ἐνδησάσης, καὶ παντελῶς ἀκίνητον αὐτὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τῆς μυστικῆς θεολογίας ποιησάσης. *Cap. theol. et oecon.* I, 39.

¹⁸⁵ ...κατὰ τὴν πρακτικὴν παντελῶς ἀποβαλλομένης τῆς ἀμαρτίας τὰ στίγματα. *Cap. theol. et oecon.* I, 37.

¹⁸⁶ ...διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν καταλαμβάνει τῆς ἀπαθείας κατάστασιν. *Chap. theolog. et oeconom.* I, 53.

¹⁸⁷ Μισθός τῆς ἐγκρατείας, ἡ ἀπάθεια. Ἡ ἀπάθεια τίκτει τὴν διάκρισιν. *Char.* II, 25; comp. Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 206.

passion¹⁸⁸, and he is not led astray towards images (φαντασίας) during the sleep¹⁸⁹.

St. Maximus believes that the intellectual (νοερόν) part of the soul or otherwise the intellect (Ὁ Νοῦς), is in essence totally dispassionate but not because passions do not affect it but because it perceives them as sources of external dangers.¹⁹⁰ The dispassion of the intellectual part constitutes condition of its existence, because God is the Creator of this. However, as soon as the intellect is entangled in man's unnatural behaviour and life, it begins acquiring passions because it is tempted by external causes and thus the purity of its dispassion is transformed into a sinful and disorientated situation. "When the intellect that has not yet attained dispassion flies up towards heavenly knowledge, it is held back by the passions and pulled down to the earth".¹⁹¹

At any rate the fact remains that God in conjunction with the volition (βούλησις) of man, is He who endows man with dispassion because He is, of course the Supreme Dispassionate One and He forbids passions to take root within human intellect.

The reason for this behaviour is because God does not inflict His opinion upon Man, but He leaves him free to decide, if he wishes to follow paths towards dispassion. Man also acquires dispassion if he remains dispassionate in the face of what happens to him, forgiving those who offend him, as does God Himself, Who dispassionately forgives His creatures. Parallel to this, he also must not allow the memory of things that afflict him, to be stamped on his intellect, lest he inwardly sunders human nature, by separating himself

¹⁸⁸ Σημείον ἄκρας ἀπαθείας, τό ψιλὰ τά νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων αἰεὶ ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, καὶ ἐγρηγορότος τοῦ σώματος, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους. *Char.* I, 83.

¹⁸⁹ ... (μὴ ὄντες παραπλανώμενοι ὑπὸ) ταῖς ἐν ὕπνοις φαντασίαις. *Char.* I, 89, 93; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 416.

¹⁹⁰ Ἀπαθὲς τῆς ψυχῆς τό νοερόν, οὐχ ὡς πάντῃ ἀμέτοχον πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξωθεν τοῦ πάσχειν ἔχον τὰς ἀφορμάς. PG 4, 565B-C, Scholia in Epistolae S. Dionysii.

¹⁹¹ Ὁ νοῦς, μήπω ἀπάθειαν κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γνώσιν τῶν οὐρανίων πετόμενος, ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν καθελκόμενος, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν κατασπάται. *Char.* I, 85.

from some other man, although he is a man himself.¹⁹² Dispassion, therefore, belongs to God and only to Him. Man approaches this dispassion¹⁹³ if he strives to preserve “free

¹⁹² Ὡσπερ Ὁ Θεός ἀπαθής ἀφήσιν, οὕτω καί αὐτός ἀπαθὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι διαμένων, ἀφήσει τοῖς πλημμελήσασι μὴ συγχωρῶν μνήμη τινι τῶν φθασάντων λυπηρῶν τυποῦσθαι τὸν νοῦν, ἵνα μὴ τέμνων τῇ γνώμῃ τὴν φύσιν ἐλέγχηται, πρὸς τινα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διεστηκῶς, ἀνθρωπος ὢν. *Comment. on our Father*, verses 21-24.

¹⁹³ Farrell, *Free choice...* p. 135. *St. Maximus* states that God is both *good* and *dispassionate* at the same time, and also that the *dispassion* of man should be an imitation of God's. But the imitation of God is connected with our disposition of will in the same way that our virtue has to be related to the disposition of our *gnome*. It is thus the natural energy of man that should be liberated and used in imitation of God, even if it has to co-operate with divine grace and manifest itself in communication with Christ, God and man. Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 100. Comp. PG 91, 364 A-B, Epistle 1, where *St. Maximus* writes the following: Οὐδεὶς οὕτω τῶν φωτός, ὡς οἶμαι καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον ἐστερημένων ἡλιακῆς ἀκτίνος ἀπολαῦσαι ποθεῖ, ὡς ἡμεῖς οἱ ταπεινοὶ πάντες, οἱ τῆς σῆς πλουσίως ἐμφορηθέντες καλοκαγαθίας, ποθοῦμεν πάλιν σε θεάσασθαι παρόντα, καὶ ἀπολαῦσαί σου τῆς καλλονῆς· τοῖς θεοῖς μὲν τοι τῶν συντρόφων ἀρετῶν κεχαρακτηρισμένων τρόποις, οἷς καὶ πρότερον ἐνδημοῦντα μεγαλοφυῶς ἐμπρέποντά σε γινώσκομεν· δι' ὧν μᾶλλον σαφῶς ἐδιδάχθημεν, γνώμης, ἀλλ' οὐ τάξεως εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν· καὶ διαθέσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀξίας εἶναι τὸ θεομίμητον. Οἷς γὰρ εἰς τὸ βάθος τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ὑμᾶς εὐλογημένοις, γησίως ἐνεργίζωθι τῆς πρὸς Θεὸν ἀγάπης ἢ δύναμις, τούτοις τὸ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἀναμφιβόλως προσγένονεν· ὡσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τοῖς ἐπτοημένοις τῇ ἀγάπῃ τῶν ὑλικῶν, τὸ εἰς πλῆθος παθῶν εὐπέμπωτον τε καὶ εὐσκέδαστον. Καὶ μάλα γε εἰκότως. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐνός ὄντος καὶ μόνου, καὶ ἀπαθούς, καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐξ' αἰδίου κατ' οὐσίαν διάφορον συνθεωρούμενον ἢ συνεπιθεωρούμενον ἔχοντος· οὐ γὰρ ἐφικνεῖται αὐτοῦ τι τῶν ἐξ' αὐτοῦ· κατὰ τὴν ἐφῆσιν γνωμικῶς ἀντεχόμενος, εἷς καὶ αὐτός ἐστι καὶ μόνος καὶ ἀπαθής, τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀσχέτῳ νεύσει γενόμενος, εἷς τε καὶ μόνος, καὶ ἀτρεπτος. Εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἐστι καὶ μόνον αὐτῷ τὸ ποθούμενον, τοῦτο δὲ κυρίως ἀτρεπτόν ἐστιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀκίνητον.

volition" (γνώμη) dispassionate and unrebelling in relation to nature.¹⁹⁴ Otherwise man is hampered by passionate expressions. A common point between the passionate and the dispassionate character is dispossession (στέρησις). This relates to a splitting of existence in the case of the passionate man whilst in the other case it constitutes the basis of union with God¹⁹⁵.

He who knows that he is struggling in matters of faith, he cannot maintain that he does not have harmful thoughts; on the other hand, he who has practical knowledge of perfect dispassion in his life rejects every passionate and dark idea.¹⁹⁶ Those faithful, living in dispassion, aspire to the correct Knowledge of God, proving that they have progressed through to the spiritual knowledge and discarded the images of all sensual and material things.¹⁹⁷ No one is classified as attaining dispassion, whether real or apparent, if when some trial occurs that he cannot overlook a friend's fault.¹⁹⁸

St. Maximus' interest is to teach us that achieving dispassion is within man's ability and not a deficiency. Through dispassion Man is overhauled and becomes the agent of each elevated spiritual advancement and completion. Dispassion is identified by its Liberty (Ἐλευθερία) at offering good things only, liberating us from the bondage of sin and cleansing thoughts and feelings from every pitfall or hurdle.

¹⁹⁴ ...ἀπαθῆ τὴν γνώμην πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐτήρησεν καὶ ἀστασίαστον· PG 90, 877D, Comment. to Our Father; comp. Bausenhardt, *In uns allem außer Sünde*, p. 155.

¹⁹⁵ Τοῦ ἀπαθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐμπαθοῦς τὴν διάθεσιν, ἡ στέρησις ἐλέγχει. *Char.* II, 82.

¹⁹⁶ Διὰ τῆς τελείας ἐν πίστει τῶν πιστευσάντων πληροφορίαν πᾶς ἐτι καθ' ὅτι οὖν σκάζων κατὰ τὴν πίστιν, λογισμόν αὐτῶν ἀπελαύνεται· τῶν δέ πρακτικῶν τὴν τελείαν ἀπάθειαν, δι' ἧς πᾶς ἐμπαθῆς καὶ ἀφώτιστος λογισμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπογίνεται. For this footnote see the Greek critical text of *St. Maximus' Mystagogia* by Archim. Ignatios Sakalis, Athens 1973, pp. 234-236, verses 59-64.

¹⁹⁷ Τῶν δέ γνωστικῶν τὴν συνεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ἐπεγνωσμένων· δι' ἧς πᾶσαι τῶν ὑλικῶν αἰ εἰκόναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκδιώκονται. *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Οὐπω ἔχει τὴν ἀπάθειαν, ὁ διὰ σύμβασιν πειρασμοῦ, τὸ ἐλάττωμα τοῦ φίλου παραβλέπειν μὴ δυνάμενος. *Char.* IV, 92.

Christians acquiring dispassion do not worry about the acquisition, or otherwise, of material goods. Therefore, if they are people with possessions, they possess them dispassionately, and so when deprived of them they are not dismayed, but are like those who accepted the seizure of their goods with joy.¹⁹⁹

The Saint's understanding of dispassion, acquires a dual substance, on occasions, if Man imagines he enjoys perfect dispassion when the object arousing his passion is not present. Nevertheless, dispassion in reality means that if man remains unmoved by both, the object and the subsequent thought of it, he may be sure that he has entered the realm of dispassion.²⁰⁰

The full advice of St. Maximus in defining dispassion, finds its identity in his proposal regarding perfect habits (τέλειαι ἕξεις) and the preoccupation with Creation from a dispassionate point of view. He says therefore: "It is good before one has attained the perfect habit, not to attempt natural contemplation, lest seeking the spiritual principles of visible things, we will be found to collect passions"²⁰¹.

¹⁹⁹ Τῶν κτωμένων οἱ μὲν ἀπαθῶς κτώνται· διό καὶ στερούμενοι αὐτῶν, οὐ λυποῦνται, ὡς οἱ τὴν ἀρπαγὴν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς μετὰ χαρᾶς προσδεξάμενοι. *Char.* II, 89, comp. Heb. 10;34.

²⁰⁰ Μὴ νόμιζε τελείαν ἔχων ἀπάθειαν, τοῦ πράγματος μὴ παρόντος· ὅταν δὲ φανῆ καὶ μένης ἀκίνητος πρὸς τε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα μνήμην αὐτοῦ, τότε γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, τῶν ὄρων αὐτῆς ἐπιβεβηκέναι, πλὴν μηδέ οὕτω καταφρονήσης. *Char.* IV, 54.

²⁰¹ Καλόν ἐστι πρὸ τῆς τελείας ἕξεως μὴ ἄπτεσθαι ἡμᾶς τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας· ἵνα μὴ λόγους ἐπιζητοῦντες πνευματικούς ἐκ τῶν ὀρωμένων κτισμάτων, λάθωμεν πάθη συλλέγοντες. Q. Th. 49, 308-314. *Dispassion*, therefore, has a very serious negative aspect. It is the *absence of evil passions*; in its positive aspect it is connected also with a good and active use of man's faculties in virtue of his divine aim and in the service of *love*. St. Maximus says that the *habitus* of dispassion is a state in which the *face* of the *psychic disposition* of man is elevated in glorification of God, a *face* formed by a multitude and variety of virtues. Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 101. Comp. PG 90, 512 A, Q.Th. 54, 6: Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ἠδύνατο τὸν Θεὸν εὐλογεῖν, μὴ ἄρας πρὸς ὕψος θεωρίας καὶ γνώσεως κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν



Η) VIRTUE (Ἡ Ἀρετή)

The real birth of virtue comes out of the voluntary alienation of the soul from anything relating to the flesh (σάρξ) and to matter (ὕλη). This effort of man to gain virtue indicates a predisposition for knowing the truth and the undertaking of a struggle towards success.

God is blessed when virtue is exercised. No one can achieve such a degree of spiritual uplifting if he does not first sanctify his body through virtue. When the faithful tastes a true drive towards virtue he is depicted in a picture of psychosomatic existence, because he considers everything as it is in relation to their creation, dispassionately. “Desist therefore” St. Maximus says; “from any association with the flesh and matter, make your logical soul the abode of a clear intellect (Καθαρός Νοῦς)”, purge your senses, consider virtue as your priceless mother²⁰² and “once you have distanced the soul from the flesh and completely detached the intellect from the senses through the spirit, you have rendered virtue the priceless mother and discovered the unending fountain of divine knowledge.”²⁰³ and the gift of this knowledge of the Divine is the dispassionate countenance of God’s creations. “He who is not altered by the influence of the perceptible, pursues the genuine practice of virtues”²⁰⁴. “If, therefore, the flesh is in good conditions and getting plump with passions, the soul is tortured and darkened, while the habit of virtues and the

τῆς ἀπαθείας ἤγουν τῆς ἀπήμονος εἰρηνικῆς καταστάσεως· τό κατά ψυχὴν τῆς διαθέσεως πρόσωπον· τό ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων ἀρετῶν χαρακτήρων δίκην συγκείμενον.

²⁰² According to another option, *Völker* discerns flesh as this *priceless mother*, referring to its association with the soul. According to him this association converts to virtue and it lengthens the glory of the soul; see *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 221; comp. ...τό κατ’ ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς...κλέος. *Thal. prol.*, I, 244-245A.

²⁰³ Τῆς σαρκὸς κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν λογικῶς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποχωρήσας, καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὀλικῶς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκπάσας τὸν νοῦν, τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν κατέστησας μητέρα πολῦτιμον, τὴν δέ, θείας πηγῆν ἀένναον ἀνέδειξας γνώσεως. PG 90, 244, *Thal. prol.*, I.

²⁰⁴ Ὁ τῆ κινήσει τῶν αἰσθητῶν μὴ συναλλοιούμενος, ἀκίβδηλον τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέρχεται πράξιν. PG 90, 360B-C, Q.Th. Scholia 5.

illumination of knowledge retreat²⁰⁵, leading it away from the true spiritual knowledge, for “the virtues exist for the sake of knowledge of creatures”.²⁰⁶

If someone wonders why St. Maximus relates Virtue to Sense, at this point, he needs to consider firstly, that sense - according to the Saint - is the source of sensual pleasure (ήδονή); it is illogical and it constitutes the nucleus of sin.²⁰⁷ Secondly, because the analysis of sensual pleasure is of double value: on one hand it relates to moral corruption of the natural urges and everything natural²⁰⁸ and on the other it is imperative for

²⁰⁵ Εἰ τοίνυν σαρκός εὐεκτούσης καί παινομένης τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ ψυχὴ βασανίζεται καὶ σκοτίζεται τῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐξέως καὶ τοῦ φωτισμοῦ τῆς γνώσεως ὑποχωρούντων. PG 91, 1300D, Ambigua 30.

²⁰⁶ Αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ διὰ τὴν γνώσιν τῶν γεγονότων. *Char.* III, 45.

²⁰⁷ An interesting chapter is paragraph 18 of *Th.* 49, which symbolises the growing of κακία. The number 5 clarifies the senses, it is connected κατὰ τάς μονάδας with the number 6, and thus indicates the ἐπιτηδειότης of the sins about κακία. With the growing of the numbers, it develops as well the δύναμις the ἕξις and finally the ἐνέργεια. (...) Ὁ γὰρ ἑξαδικὸς ἀριθμὸς, εἴτε ἐκ μονάδων ἔχει τὴν σύνθεσιν, εἴτε ἐκ δεκάδων, εἴτε ἐξ ἑκατοντάδων, εἴτε ἐξ ἑτέρου τινὸς ἀριθμοῦ, τὴν ποιητικὴν ἕξιν δηλοῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς κακίας, κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ πολυπλασιασμοῦ τῆς συνθέσεως, τὴν ἀπαρτίζουσαν τήνδε ἢ τήνδε τὴν ἕξιν διάθεσιν, τοῖς μετ’ ἐπιστήμης τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐπιβάλλουσι παριστῶν ὧτινι ἑξαδικῶ ἀριθμῶ συναφθεῖς ἢ προστεθεῖς, ἢ συντεθεῖς ὁ πέντε ἀριθμὸς, παραδηλοῖ τάς αἰσθήσεις, ἡγουν τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν δύναμιν, ἢ ἕξιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν, παρακειμένην, ἢ ἐπικειμένην, ἢ συγκειμένην ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν. (...). *Thal.* 49, I 456D; ...τῶν παθῶν τὰ αἰτία, φημί δὴ τάς αἰσθήσεις μετὰ τῆς πρὸς αὐτάς τῶν αἰσθητῶν συγγενούς οἰκειότητος. *Epistle* 12 II 505 D; comp. *Amb.* 10, 22b. ...καὶ αἰσθήσεις τρέφονται τῇ πηγῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀνασχόμενος. *Amb.* II, 91, 1149 A; comp. *Völker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 111.

²⁰⁸ ...πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν πρώτην κίνησιν διὰ μέσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔσχε παρά φύσιν ἐνεργουμένην τὴν ἡδονήν. *Thal.* 61, I 628B; comp. *Völker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 111; comp. ...ὁ μὲν (scil. ἡδονικὸς πειρασμὸς) τῆς ἀμαρτίας (ἐστὶ)

sustaining life where it is possible for virtue to thrive through the movement of the natural passions within us; one of the natural passions thriving within man is the passion of divine pleasure²⁰⁹. Essentially, virtue contains the highest positive value when it assists the cohabitation of the soul with the Word-Christ.²¹⁰ And thirdly, sensual pleasure is the root of every almost sin, it appears as the seed of vice and it certainly does not lead to God, but away from Him and His Love.²¹¹

Virtue and vice (κακία) correspond to the disposition of the soul.²¹² Vice is defined by St. Maximus as the erroneous and wrong use of the conceptual images of things, which leads us to misuse the things themselves.²¹³ This danger leads Man towards adherence to bodily desires, a precondition of which is the eyeing of persons and conditions through the prism of the flesh. So Man endows this prism with exclusive power and becomes unable to evaluate it beyond its surface.²¹⁴ The antidote is found in the ability of the intellect to advance in spiritual knowledge and a characteristic sign of this is the discrimination between virtue and vice.²¹⁵ Man becomes wise and sensible through this discrimination, he fathoms the reasons behind the actions of virtue and the causes of errors so that he may correct them.

γεννήτωρ. Comment. to Our Father I 908 C. ...πᾶσα σχεδόν ἁμαρτία διὰ ἡδονὴν γίνεται. *Char.* II, 41.

²⁰⁹ ...τῆς θείας ἡδονῆς... *Char.* II, 41.

²¹⁰ ...ἡδονὴν γὰρ μίαν ἐπίσταται τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸν λόγον συμβίωσιν. Q.Th. 55, I 541 A.

²¹¹ ...πᾶσα σχεδόν ἁμαρτία διὰ ἡδονὴν γίνεται. *Char.* II, 41; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, pp. 111-112.

²¹² Ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν θεωρεῖται. *Char.* IV, 46.

²¹³ Κακία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐσφαλμένη κρίσις τῶν νοημάτων, ἣ ἐπακολουθεῖ ἢ παράχρησις τῶν πραγμάτων. *Char.* II, 17.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Mystagogia*...pp. 96-97.

²¹⁵ Πρακτικὴν μὲν ὁ νοῦς κατορθῶν, εἰς φρόνησιν προκόπτει· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐστίν, εἰς διάκρισιν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας φέρει τὸν ἀγωνιζόμενον. *Char.* II, 26.

Each soul, therefore, must shy away from bodily sensual pleasures²¹⁶; and the gift of virtue and of the correct adoration of God the Creator, will be its reward.²¹⁷ Virtue is the reflection of the Divine Attributes.²¹⁸ Its aim is to “resist material nature and to battle against it”.²¹⁹ Thus, virtue influences the tripartite aspect of the soul and leads it towards good. In theological terms, “Good” (Τό Ἄγαθόν) constitutes the integration of the Divine Attributes, Acts and Energies, where the incensive power and the appetitive aspect of soul are led towards blessings always under the supervision of the intelligent (λογιστικόν) part of the soul. A constant vigil is, nevertheless, required, because sin must never be permitted to become the controlling agent in any of the virtuous thoughts, employed by the soul, when it attempts to correct the body. Otherwise, there is no point of return back to healthy behaviours and habits. That is why vigilance is needed, giving the opportunity to every soul for inner restoration. The predominance of the intelligence over the passions is one of the chief means employed by the soul against the senses and it proves how in rational existence, virtue is the foundation of faith.²²⁰ The above mentioned three natural forces (intelligence, incensive power, appetitive aspect of the soul) are in close relationship and connection, and they are of equal value. St. Maximus speaking about these, implies that they must always be unified, so that they can work towards the conquest of virtue.²²¹

²¹⁶ Δεῖ πάσαν ψυχήν, ἡδονῶν σαρκικῶν στερεῦσαν διὰ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῶν ἀρετῶν σπέρματα. PG 91, 1124D, Ambigua 144.

²¹⁷ Οὐδέ τῷ Θεῷ τις λατρεύειν δύναται μή τήν ψυχήν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐκκαθαίρων. PG 90, 257B, Q.Th. Scripturae sacrae 13.

²¹⁸ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 147.

²¹⁹ Τῇ φύσει γάρ ἡ ἀρετή μάχεσθαι πέφυκε. PG 91, 1140A, Ambigua 151.

²²⁰ Ὁ λόγος κρατῶν τῶν παθῶν, ἀρετῆς ὄργανον ποιεῖται τὰς αἰσθήσεις. *Chap. theolog. et oeconom.* II, 58. Comp. Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 125.

²²¹ *ibid.*, Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, pp. 220-221.

“All the virtues co-operate with the intellect, produce this intense longing for God, pure prayer (προσευχή) above all”²²². Virtues isolate the intellect from passions.²²³ He who practises virtue endures and resists temptations and experiences that in this effort of his, The Word-Christ is omnipresent, Who rids him of every blemish (σπίλος) and stain (κηλίς).

When virtue underperforms, then vice begins to grow. The reason for this malfunction is latent in the fact that Man’s mind has abandoned for a short or a long while the path to virtue²²⁴, while being occupied with material passions.²²⁵ Freedom (ἐλευθερία) of the soul is related always with the effort towards virtue, with the suppression against passions and with the achievement of every “good”.²²⁶

Virtues are the human shapings of the perfection of the Divine Word.²²⁷ Saint Maximus knows this adding that man must avoid the damaging tempests of passion by *practising* virtue.²²⁸ The true adherence of the faithful to the purposes of virtue is accompanied by considerable pain in achieving it, but also by a potent spiritual happiness. This pain refers

²²² Πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ συνεργοῦσι τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὸν θεῖον ἔρωτα· πλεόν δέ πάντων ἡ καθαρὰ προσευχή. *Char.* I, 11.

²²³ Αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ, τῶν παθῶν τὸν νοῦν χωρίζουσιν. *Char.* III, 44.

²²⁴ Ὁ μὲν ἀκατάσειστος ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἐγκαρτερῶν νοῦς δεινοῖς, ἐνεργουμένην ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ἔχει τὴν πρώτην τοῦ Λόγου παρουσίαν, πάσης αὐτὸν κηλίδος καθαίρουσαν. *Chap. theolog. et oeconom.* I, 98.

²²⁵ Ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ στάσις κακίας ἐστὶ ἀρχή, τοῦ νοῦ περί τι ὧν ἐκατέρωθεν τῇ ὁδῷ παρακειμένων ἐμπαθῶς ἀσχοληθέντος. PG 90, 304D, Q.Th. 17; Ματσούκας, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατὰ τὸν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, Athens 1980, p. 331.

²²⁶ Τοῦ πονεῖν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς, ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἐλευθερία, τὸ δούλον εἶναι παθῶν ἐπιλεγόμενος. PG 91, 1068C, Ambigua 118.

²²⁷ *ibid.*, *Mystagogia*....pp. 23-24.

²²⁸ Τὴν ἀπωθουμένην λέγω τὸν καύσωνα τῶν παθῶν διὰ πράξεως ἐξιν τῆς ἀρετῆς. PG 91, 441C, Epistle 8.

to corrupted senses which cause the reaction of the flesh.²²⁹ An unavoidable condition for the achievement of virtue is for man to appreciate his spiritual illness, to strive towards its cure and to fix his gaze on realising a union with God.²³⁰

Saint Maximus continues the analysis of virtues and he categorises them in relation to a certain separation which the soul and spirit of man undergo. This separation refers to a natural evaluation of various virtues. That is to say that the virtues of the spirit differ from those of the soul. Nevertheless, their denominator is common. For the soul this denominator translates as simple possibilities, while for the spirit these are possibilities of grace (χάρις)²³¹. Soul and spirit are linked in mutuality by reason. Virtue changes life for the better. It rejects malice. It transforms man, making his life a *Church* (Ἐκκλησία) within which the High Priest (Ἀρχιερεύς) Christ enters and sanctifies it equating Virtue with each of our spiritual acts. It also changes the sinful mentality of the man, offering him the salvation.²³² The devil, seeing the effort of the faithful to possess virtue and knowledge, stirs up a terrible struggle and undertakes a war whose aim is to devise means against human existence which exploit the weaknesses of our innate powers. By attacking

²²⁹ Πάση γάρ ἀρετῇ ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος παρέπεται· πόνος μὲν σαρκός, ἐστερημένης τῆς προσηνοῦς καὶ λειοτέρας αἰσθήσεως. PG 90, 597C, Q.Th. 58, 20.

²³⁰ Ἀρετῆς ὄρος ἐστίν, ἡ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀσθενείας κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν πρὸς τὴν θεῖαν δύναμιν ἔνωσις. PG 90, 589B, Q.Th. Scholia 16.

²³¹ The distinction between ψυχή and πνεῦμα in *stoic thought* is not a theological distinction. It is a distinction between soul and intellect in different spiritual levels. What distinguishes Saint Maximus' distinction in ψυχή and πνεῦμα is that they are activated through virtues and purified through the grace of God.

²³² Μεταβαλοῖ τὸν βίον ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον, τῆς κακίας τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπαιρούμενον ὁ τοιοῦτος κυρίως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἀρχιερεῖ νοείσθω τε καὶ λεγέσθω συνεισιέναι εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν, Ἐκκλησίαν τροπικῶς νοουμένην. *ibid.*, *Mystagogia*...p. 178.

and counter-attacking, the christian learns to distinguish virtue from vice.²³³ For virtue when habitual kills the passions and when it is neglected, they come to life again.²³⁴

There are two types of person according to St. Maximus: He who fights for virtue and he who struggles for material possession and he gains possession or he fails. Tribulation is the meeting point for both. In the former, because passions fight back, denying him inner betterment, and in the latter because frequently he fails and cannot fully experience the false delights which matter would offer him.²³⁵ Despite the tribulation and the difficulties which the struggle for virtue promises, St. Maximus points typically that:

- a) the intellect becomes increasingly discerning through habits deriving from the practice of virtue.
- b) the tyranny of passions is curtailed and
- c) the intelligence becomes spiritually potent and struggles against the passions to achieve the spiritual knowledge of God.²³⁶

²³³ Πολεμούμενοι καί ἀντιπολεμούντες, εἰς διάκρισιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καί τῆς κακίας ἐλθωμεν. *Char.* II, 67.

²³⁴ Ἀρετὴ χρονίζουσα, νεκροὶ τὰ πάθη, ἀμελουμένης δέ, πάλιν ἐγείρει αὐτά. *Char.* IV, 54.

²³⁵ Θλίψιν γάρ ἔχουσιν ἀμφοτέρω, καί ὁ πράττων τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τὸν αὐτῆ συνημμένον πόνον, καί ὁ τὸν κόσμον ἀγαπῶν διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀποτυχίαν. *Cap. theolog. et oeconom.* II, 95.

²³⁶ Ὁ ἐν τῇ ἔξει τῆς γνώσεως λογικῶς τὴν ἀρετὴν μετερχόμενος τῆς τῶν παθῶν τυραννίδος σφάζει τὸν διορατικὸν νοῦν...οἰονεὶ ἰσχὺν καλοῦντος τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἐν τῇ ἔξει τῆς γνώσεως πόρευσιν δέ τὴν κατὰ τῶν παθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς δεούσης παρασκευῆς πρόθυμον κίνησιν. Epifanovich, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, verse 68.

Ι) ΗΜΙΛΙΤΥ (Ταπεινώσις)

Saint Maximus calls humility “mother of all virtues” or “the primary foundation of virtue”²³⁷ His reference on humility is that it constitutes:

- a) a firm foundation for anything that God builds within the soul.²³⁸
- b) the active pedestal for the widening of salvational opportunities.²³⁹

Humility is particularly useful and necessary for moral advancement. It is pictured as the protector and giver of each virtue and it becomes the supreme sanctuary and haven of everything good.²⁴⁰ These definitions of humility are due to the following facts:

- a) it does not corrupt the positive efforts of the soul.²⁴¹
- b) it introduces the virtues to the *cool breeze* (δρόσος) of goodness (ἀγαθότης) in the human spirit.²⁴²
- c) it preserves “goods” (τά ἀγαθά), it consolidates them (πῆζει ταύτας) into good experiences and it maintains them.²⁴³

²³⁷ ...μητέρα πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν..., ...πρώτην βάσιν τῶν ἀρετῶν...*ep.* 37, II 632B; *ep.* 2, II 396A; *gnost.* I 15, I 1089A; *Thal.* 97, II 69C.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*,...θεμέλιον τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ θεῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἀρραγές. *Comp. ibid., Völker...*p. 402.

²³⁹ Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 402.

²⁴⁰ *Thal.* 48, I 437A-441D.

²⁴¹ ...μή διαφθείρη τῆς ψυχῆς τό κατορθούμενον...; *Amb.* 10, 31, 4, II 1161C.

²⁴² ...διά τήν συνημμένην ταῖς ὄντως ἀρεταῖς δρόσον τῆς πτωχείας (ἀγαθότητος) τοῦ πνεύματος. *ep.* 12, II 505C; *ep.* 37, II 632B.

²⁴³ ...τήν φυλακτικήν μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν; *Amb.* 10, 51, III205A; ...εἰς πῆξιν τῶν καλῶν καί συντήρησιν. *Thal.* P7, II 69C; *comp.* the same work of Völker...p. 403.

When Man progresses in virtue, he must not be haughty (ὕψηλόφρων) but humble (ταπεινόφρων).²⁴⁴ St. Maximus adds that, humbleness is the first and greatest of God's gifts (δῶρα) to man, where the true *Philosophy in Christ* (ἐν Χριστῷ Φιλοσοφία) is vindicated.²⁴⁵ Humble is the Christian who recognises God as the Supreme (Ὁ Ὑπερέχων) Master of everything and as the Creator (Ὁ Δημιουργός) of every good. He is also humble, when he sympathises with others and he forgives their misdemeanours towards him.²⁴⁶ The faithful remains truly in humility because he understands through his intellect, that the essence of sinfulness and its tendencies could turn him into an incomplete personality.²⁴⁷ Thus, the Christian refers his problems to God, simultaneously redressing his relationships with other human beings.

Humility frees the intellect from conceit (τύφος), from conceited actions and assists towards escape from vainglory (κενοδοξία).²⁴⁸ When the faithful experiences humility lovingly, he upgrades it to a quality of life.²⁴⁹ He abolishes any possible conceit (ἐπαρσις) of the soul and he *tames* (δαμάζει) each daemonic power and action.

According to St. Maximus, the co-traveller of humility is ascetic hardship (κακοπάθεια) and it is through this that Man could be freed from sin, because he can curtail (περι-

²⁴⁴ Προκόπτοντες εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν μὴ ὑψηλοφρονῶμεν. ἀλλὰ μάθωμεν ταπεινοφρονεῖν. *Char.* II, 67.

²⁴⁵ ...Θεοῦ δῶρον μέγιστον καὶ πρῶτον, τῆς ἀληθοῦς φιλοσοφίας καρπὸν οὖσαν δρεψόμεθα. PG 91, 505C-D, Epistle 12.

²⁴⁶ Ταπεινωσις γὰρ ἐστίν, ἡ ἐκάστου πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν κατὰ παράθεσιν ἐκ παραλλήλου τῆς ὑπερεχούσης καὶ ποιητικῆς αἰτίας ἐπίγνωσις· καθ' ἣν ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν ἀνθρώπων γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν συνδιάθεσις, καὶ ἡ τῶν πλημμελημάτων δίδοσθαι τοῖς ὀφείλουσιν ἄφεσις. PG 91, 512A, Epistle 13.

²⁴⁷ Ταπεινοφροσύνη ἐστίν ἐπίγνωσις νοός τῆς ἰδίας ἀσθενείας τε καὶ πενίας, ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσιώσει τὸ ἐλλειπές καὶ πτωχὸν θεωροῦντος. *Ibid.*, ЕПИФАНОВИЧЬ, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, ver. 19.

²⁴⁸ Ἡ ταπεινωσις τύφου καὶ κενοδοξίας τὸν νοῦν ἐλευθεροῖ. *Char.* I, 80.

²⁴⁹ *Char.* I, 80; see also: I 977C; II 43; I 1000A.

κόπτει) bodily passions²⁵⁰ and he opens the road to humility to *cut out* all of the passions of the soul.²⁵¹ “Do not”, therefore, “reject the benefits of the ascetic hardship”, says the Holy Father, “but through it you may be humbled and eject your pride”.²⁵²

Before each virtue come mercy (ἔλεος) and truth (ἀλήθεια). Without humility, therefore, truth is blind. Humility is their product (of mercy and truth) and through those, discrimination (διάκρισις) is attained. The virtue of discrimination stands above any comprehension of the purpose and control of events and actions. The basis of all good is humility. It is true and sincere when it derives from sorrow (λύπη), i.e. Man’s realisation of his sinfulness.²⁵³

Therefore, its contribution is essential and vital. If the nucleus of virtue, which humility describes, is not debased, then humility itself remains clear; if, however, this nucleus is debased, then the soul is assailed and becomes sullied.²⁵⁴ Man’s steadfastness during its employment applies the commandment of love in his life and reaches the height of humility.²⁵⁵

A result of humility is gentleness (πραότης).²⁵⁶ The gentle man receives through gentleness the ability not to be influenced by the three powers of the soul (intelligence,

²⁵⁰ ἵνα...ταπεινωθεῖς, τὴν ὑπερηφάνειαν ἐμέσῃ; *gnost.* I 15, I 1088D: δι’ ἧς (scil. τῆς ταπεινοφροσύνης) πᾶσα μὲν διαβολικὴ δαμάζεται δύναμις; *ep.* 5, II 421C; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 406.

²⁵¹ Ταπεινωσις καὶ κακοπάθεια, πάσης ἀμαρτίας ἐλευθεροῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἡ μὲν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ δὲ τὰ τοῦ σώματος περικόπτουσα πάθη. *Char.* I, 76.

²⁵² Τοῦ κακοπαθεῖν μὴ ἀπαναίνου...*Char.* II, 43.

²⁵³ Ταύτης τῆς ἐπαινουμένης λύπης, γέννημα τυγχάνει τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐξαιρετὸν ἀγαθὸν ἢ ταπεινοφροσύνη. PG 91, 417A, Epistle 4.

²⁵⁴ Ταπεινωθείσης τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς ὑποχωρήσεως τῆς ζωτικῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀκάθαρτος γίνεται. PG 90, 852B, Quæstiones et dubia 78.

²⁵⁵ Τῇ ἐντολῇ τῆς ἀγάπης παρατείνων, εἰς τὸ ὕψος τῆς ταπεινοφροσύνης προκόπτεις. *Char.* III, 14.

²⁵⁶ Ταύτης τῆς ταπεινοφροσύνης προβολὴ καθέστηκε ἡ πραότης. PG 91, 417 B, Epistle 4.

incensive power, appetitive aspect of the soul), *if* and *when* these act unnaturally.²⁵⁷ Humility composes the totally constant part of the list of virtues enumerated by St. Maximus.²⁵⁸ The connection between humility and gentleness has to do, on the one hand, with the purposeful heightening of humility²⁵⁹ and, on the other hand, with their close relationship.²⁶⁰

The Christian sees within humility, one lofty spiritual value: repentance (μετάνοια), which leads to the forgiveness (συγχώρησις) of sins; therefore, to dispassion; the existence of which, preempts the obliteration (ἐξάλειψις) of each sin.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Ὁ ταπεινούμενος πραῦνεται τὴν τῶν παρά φύσιν τοῦ θυμικοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας κυημάτων ἀνενέργητον ἐξὶν λαβῶν. *Cap. theolog. et oeconom.* I, 16.

²⁵⁸ Saint Maximus categorises virtues in two parts: virtues of the soul and virtues of the body. The virtues of the soul are: Ἀρεταὶ ψυχῆς εἰσιν αὐταὶ ἀγάπη, ταπεινώσις, πραῦτης, μακροθυμία, ἀνεξικακία, ἀμνησικακία, ἀοργησία, τό ἄθυμον, τό ἄφθονον, τό ἄκριτον, τό ἀκενόδοξον, ἐλεημοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀφιλαργυρία, συμπάθεια, ἄτυφον, ἀνυπερήφανον, κατανυκτικόν. The virtues of the body are: Ἀρεταὶ δέ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν αὐταὶ νηστεία, χαυμενία, ἀγρυπνία, ἐγκράτεια, ἀκτημοσύνη, τό ἀπερίσπαστον. *Quaest.* I, I 785C; *ep.* 12, II 508C; *ep.* 45, II 649A.

²⁵⁹ ...ὕψος τῆς ταπεινοφροσύνης... *Asc.* 45, I 956C; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 408.

²⁶⁰ *Char.* III 14, I 1020D; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 408.

²⁶¹ Καρπὸς μετανοίας ἐστὶ ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς. *Asc.* 44, I 956A; *gnost.* I 37, I 1097C; comp. Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 410.

κ) GENTLENESS (Πραότης)

According to St. Maximus, gentleness is the human activity which continually relates to the battle against anger and desire. It becomes, therefore beloved to God and useful to man, when it leads towards the extinguishing of the motivations of sin.²⁶² The aims of the activities of meekness are:

- a) to keep the soul's incensive power in a calm state²⁶³ and
- b) to immobilise tendencies of anger and desire against their leading to these unnatural (παρά φύσιν) conditions.²⁶⁴

The gentle person occupies, for St. Maximus, middle position between honour (εὐφημία) and obloquy (δυσφημία), that is to say man is the stabilising agent of each praise or excessive praise and each bad or excessive slander. Man remains dispassionate to these situations, neither puffed up by the first nor cast down by the second.²⁶⁵

The power and strength of gentleness is termed commonly as "dispassion". Both these, i.e dispassion and gentleness, build up love and they are distinguished by the wisdom which imbues their actions. Gentleness comes from courage (ἀνδρεία) and prudence (σωφροσύνη). Gentleness is nothing more but the entire motionlessness of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία in respect of what is unnatural. This motionlessness has been called by so-

²⁶² Τὴν πραότητα μὲν, ἵνα τὰς ἐμπαθεῖς τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας κατασβέσας κινήσεις, Θεῷ γένηται καὶ ἀνθρώποις εὐάρεστος. PG 91, 509D, Epistle 13.

²⁶³ Ἡ πραότης ἀτάραχον τὸν θυμὸν διαφυλάττει. *Char.* I, 80.

²⁶⁴ Ἡ πραότης γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερον οὔσα καθέστηκεν, ἢ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας παντελῆς πρὸς τὰ παρά φύσιν ἀκινήσια. PG 91, 509D, Epistle 13.

²⁶⁵ Μέσος εὐφημίας καὶ δυσφημίας ὑπάρχων ὁ πρῶος, ἀπαθὴς διαμένει, μήτε ταῖς εὐφημίαις φυσιοῦμενος, μήτε ταῖς δυσφημίαις στυγνοῦμενος. *Commentary on the Our Father*, verses 5-12; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 312.

me people dispassion, and for this reason it is the goal of all activities.²⁶⁶

Every virtue assists in the development of gentleness calling upon the faithful to strive while heeding Christ's teaching, and to be absorbed in His love.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ ...ἐκ δέ τῆς ἀνδρείας καί τῆς σωφροσύνης τὴν πραότητα, μηδὲν ἄλλο τυγχάνουσαν ἢ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας παντελῆ πρὸς τὰ παρά φύσιν ἀκινήσιαν, ἣν τινες ἐκάλεσαν ἀπάθειαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος ὑπάρχουσαν. PG 91, 1249A-B, Ambigua 7, 199a; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 343.

²⁶⁷ Ὁ πραῦς τηρεῖ τὰς ἐντολάς. *Cap. theolog. et oeconom.* I, 16.

3) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FIRST CHAPTER

The general overlap in both Karen Horney and Saint Maximus, is found in their attempt to present the stages of the integrity in man, as a systematical recording of what one must experience and how to operate through this integrity. Commencing then, from this point of view, we will discover in the following comparisons, the "whereabouts" of their convergence and divergence.

Love

Love for Karen Horney, constitutes the essential and specific solution to the problem of neuroses. It directs the individual towards a loving relationship with his fellow beings, causing the necessary breach which will achieve the re-emplacement of the interpersonal relationships upon a healthy basis. It dissolves inner conflicts, it directs the inner world to spiritual calmness and teaches it truly to care for others. Love is not an illusion and it does not exist so that it may fulfill a missing condition. Correct human interrelationships develop through Love; the individual's personality changes and it operates according to the loving disposition of the soul. Love resists egocentrism and all its by-products, i.e. pride, desire, narcissism. Love's opposition to the egotistic behaviour of man places him within a correct socio-behavioural frame. Also it rids man of existentialist problems and it rejects any hypocrisy.

Saint Maximus' references on love, although primarily indicating its chief function and presence within man's life, as Horney does, nevertheless also contain the idea, and this is the crucial point, that this virtue constitutes the mystery of the God's presence in man. In love, Saint Maximus encloses the whole of christian life, which operates as the edifice of self-restoration. In other words, love is a psychosomatic potential which converts the deficiencies in man, and replaces them with virtues. This does not mean that love is some kind of quality in man, but the factor needed for the spiritual "revolution" of man against tendencies diminishing his existence. One might say that the notion of love in Maximus is not only the supreme virtue, but is a further condition and stage without which neither knowledge nor other term of the christian life would be possible.

For Saint Maximus, love is the fullness of the spiritual contemplation. This means that man through love “sees” God and experiences His presence spiritually. In deepening this idea of contemplation in love, we stress the point that this virtue brings man in true relationship to other human beings.

In conclusion, we must notice the fact that this virtue in Maximus is not considered only as a characteristic for the “expulsion” of malfunctioning deeds, as it does in Horney’s theory, but more than this is an experience of life in Christ, in which one completes himself not only in the stage of avoiding sins, but in the stage of protecting himself from each evil behaviour.

Conscience

For Horney, conscience is the imperative protection against each and any neurosis. She does not confuse conscience’s essence with awareness but she interprets it as the beneficial development impulse of man. Conscience has moral value, according to her, and its product is self-knowledge. Its moral essence directs the individual towards psychosomatic health, aiding the discovery of the real self. If the individual displays mental and malfunctioning, then conscience checks and goads him. Man, therefore, benefits from its constructive control and he shoulders responsibilities for the correction of his life avoiding neurotic snares.

Conscience, for St. Maximus, constitutes the means for the safeguarding of the psychosomatic integrity against all temptations and passions. It directs man towards the necessary means for salvation. It protects him from his own weaknesses, offering him equally to him ready made solutions for avoiding errors. It leads him to a life of self-awareness. It does not compel him to any of its biddings, leaving him free to do as he wishes, even if he stains his conscience by this freedom. It is important for man, according to St. Maximus, not to cheat his conscience. The remorse which emanates from a controlling conscience leads man towards therapy of the inner man.

The definition of religious conscience is impossible without taking into consideration the nature of the revelation of God. Specifically, the exact character of man’s psychic situation, when he sins, is given by St. Maximus. When he is referring to the results

following the transgression of moral conscience, he means that it is nothing more than “guilt” itself. The term “guilt” clarifies the pain of soul during the committing of sin. Conscience provokes guilt and tries in this way to correct the man for restoring and balancing moral life.

However, although there is an overlap both Karen Horney’s and St. Maximus’ approaches to conscience, there is nevertheless an obvious divergence between them. This divergence lies in the idea of morality both accept that conscience expresses.

The aspect of conscience in Horney consists of moral capabilities. These capabilities are pervaded by cultural factors and alter their neurotic characteristics. However, although these capabilities express moral potential, nevertheless this morality does not change the neurotic person’s weaknesses. The way morality behaves in Karen Horney’s aspect of conscience does not indicate to a neurotic person what he needs to do in order to escape his neurosis, but it provides him with general solutions against his neurotic behaviour.

On the contrary, St. Maximus’ morality in conscience has to do with the inner ability operating for the entire restoration of the self. This ability is for the holy father the source of a man’s wholesomeness. When man experiences the morality in conscience in this life, he is led to a true purification and to a healthy inner psychospiritual realm. Morality in conscience, according to Saint Maximus, traces all inner weaknesses and transforms them into potential features. Accordingly, it assists man to in resisting each tempting disposition which may affect him irretrievably.

Intellect

Intellect for Horney is a purely rational faculty. She accepts it as a psychological experience in man which lies under rationality and objectivity. It does not not emerge as an important characteristic of the soul. The Intellect for her is mainly an ability on man’s part to understand better the steps he must proceed upon, in order to oppose his neurotic tendencies. The considerations and clarifications of intellect end up without any further explanation of the term. Horney considers the intellect only as something which makes oneself aware of one’s problem only in a rational way. Beyond this, the intellect, according to her, does nothing else and thus remains as an intrapsychic behaviour without

considerable meanings and implications in one's life, or as an inner status which acts only on the surface of the inner life, without being in the state to help against one's neuroses effectively.

For St. Maximus, intellect is the central defining characteristic of the human being. It is an intuitive faculty which operates as a link between man and God, man and fellow humans. For the holy father, the intellect represents the contemplative part in man which functions through the divine realities existing within him. For St. Maximus, intellect is the characteristic which educates soul, in order for the soul to educate the body properly. Intellect for the holy father is directly illuminated by God through non-innate knowledge. This leads to the conclusion that the holy father accepts the immortality and incorruptibility of the intellect, once we know that its composition lies untouchable because it constitutes part of the incorporeal soul.

What we observe in the pattern of intellect, is that, on the one hand, Karen Horney's considerations relate only to the intellect's material presence in the life of a neurotic person, therefore is a kind of faculty for man clearly perceiving the obstacles and disturbances, caused from neurosis, whilst on the other, St. Maximus in his psychology refers to it as an aspect closely connected to the existence of soul, i.e. closely linked to a mature psychological capability which perfects man through its existential categories. It is very difficult to discover any overlap in the notion of intellect, once it is presented as a rational faculty and as a central expressive definition of the soul. The problem with this difference is that Karen Horney remains only in the logicity and objectivity of the intellect, whilst St. Maximus steps forward and presents this faculty as a feature of the psychosomatic man which rules him and provides considerable assistance against the disruptive behaviour of the sinful self. In other words, the intellect in Maximus is central in changing each trend from evil to good, whilst in Horney the intellect is only a psychological quality which changes the man's general psychological behaviour.

Real Self-Dispassion

Another convergence can be found in the aspect of real self for Karen Horney, and in the aspect of dispassion for St. Maximus. In both we can see that, these aspects are opposed

on the one hand to the ideal self, whilst, on the other, to the attachment to sin. In considering the stages of real self and dispassion, we observe that both ideas fight against situations which in a deep sense harm a person's integrity. The real self for Horney is the stage where man can find peace of mind and inner calmness, whilst dispassion for Saint Maximus is the virtue expelling all vices and leading to deification.

The convergence found in these two aspects covers in my opinion a lot of ground in the comparison of the stages of integrity. That is the notions real self and dispassion overlap at many places, such as in the ideas of inner restoration, psychosomatic balance and spiritual perfection. Both notions are concerned with *detachment*, and with whatever it is that opposes someone to himself, to fellow humans, and to God. Both real self and dispassion find fulfilment in the non-activity of either neuroses and passions.

In this convergence the only thing, in my opinion, in Saint Maximus which I do not find in Horney, is the idea of the holy father, that dispassion leads one's soul to purification, where one learns how to discern good from evil, and how to love others. In Horney I do not find something like that. She considers real self as an inner - i.e spiritual - disposition, - i.e intellectual characteristic - which although it distances man from neuroses, nevertheless cannot lead one's soul towards catharsis. In Maximus we have the positive outcome of dispassion, i.e the pure soul and the virtues of discretion and love, which keep man in the state of psychosomatic balance, whilst we do not have the same in the Horney's aspect of real self. What I think we have is a more or less "superficial victory" over neuroses. I do not consider that the outcome of integrating man in fullness comes through the aspect of real self, and the reason for this is the lack of connection between the actions of real self and the behaviour of the soul. In other words, there is a lack which can lead to new neurotic disorders, because the core of neuroses was never properly treated, so that its root causes were not really expelled from the inner man. Consequently, the neuroses remain latent as compulsive conditions in the soul.

What we observe from the first chapter and especially from its last part, the comparative study, is that we have on the one hand Karen Horney “struggling” to making the neurotic persons aware of what they need to do against neurosis in general, whilst on the other, Saint Maximus unfolding his aspects of integrity as conditions for a pure psychosomatic life. The considerable divergence between the two is found in the different objective of their aspects of integrity.

Thus, Karen Horney is only interested in *healing* from neurosis, and she considers this healing as the only really vital result of therapy, without thinking that this objective of hers is not enough for the person’s inner and outer balance, whilst Saint Maximus reflects on his aspects of integrity through the prism of the man’s *deification*, i.e. *unification* with God. This is the objective of the holy father because he is very well aware that every human being only finds utter psychosomatic fulfilment in God, away from every malfunctioning behaviour, whether we call it “neurotic” or “sinful”.

CHAPTER 2: THE HUMAN PERSONALITY IN ITS FALLEN STATE

The second chapter of my thesis concentrates on Karen Horney's many interpretations of neurotic phenomena, and the theological perspective of the human fallenness according to the anthropology of Saint Maximus the Confessor.

In this part of my work, I will examine the neurotic and sinful character of the man's morbid behaviour. There will also be juxtaposed important contributions to the understanding of neurosis and sin, and how these two co-operate in harming one's psychospiritual balance.

On the one hand, therefore, we will scrutinize in the first part of the chapter Horney's understanding of a person's tendency towards:

- a) strivings for recognition from others, as ego-centric solutions, i.e as the perspective in which one is preoccupied with oneself, and thus one behaves with insensitiveness towards others.
- b) strivings for mastery and imposition on others, as general solutions, i.e as neurotic conditions which result from the mistaken sense that one can solve them through one's own superiority.
- c) strivings for an ideal image, as neurotic resignation, i.e as behaviour where the neurotic person either believes that he possesses the perfect self, or that he is able to create the perfect society. In a deeper interpretation, neurotic resignation consists of tendencies which display psychoneurotic withdrawals from inner conflicts.

On the other hand, in the second part of this chapter, we will expound Maximus' anthropological investigation of φιλαυτία with all those characteristics that either express it or ensue from it. In other words, we shall examine the man's selfishness as follows:

- a) that man lives under egotistic conditions, which mar his existence and therefore deflect from it the aim of reaching God.
- b) that man is a slave in his self-projection, and therefore he always strives for indulgent experiences.
- c) that man considers himself as a supreme personality in comparison to others, and therefore he exploits them.
- d) that man refuses to abandon his self-centred tendencies, he does not approach God, and thus he remains alienated from Him.

In the final part of this chapter we will be occupied with a comparison of the previous two parts. We will pinpoint the links existing between Karen Horney and Saint Maximus, and discuss them under the perspective of bringing closer the two different approaches to man's fallenness. This comparative study will be an attempt towards a constructive presentation of the two disciplines represented by Karen Horney and Saint Maximus the Confessor.

1) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF NEUROTIC PHENOMENA ACCORDING TO KAREN HORNEY

The chapter that follows will reveal to us the characteristics Karen Horney considers as neurotic phenomena which show that a personality is in the state of experiencing the destructive traits affecting an individual which operate through the compulsive trends of neurosis.

In the first part of this chapter, therefore, we will approach:

- a) the causes creating those neurotic phenomena,
- b) the influence they impose on the human existence,
- c) the disturbances set up between man and himself,
and between man and his fellow humans.

Karen Horney interpreted seventeen standard neurotic phenomena which are abnormally strong and lead into an idealised version of the self, where the existential potential of the real self is not only abandoned, but it is also ostracised from the man's entity. Horney posited two chief neurotic phenomena, which, in her opinion, include all other neurotic experiences. These phenomena are neurotic pride and the ideal self.

Neurotic pride is, for her, the phenomenon containing all one's compulsive tendencies and behaviour, which mislead the neurotic person into a failure to love, lack of freedom, lack of truth, and inability to contact with others. Pride for Horney is approached as the result of faulty self-love or self-evaluation, and as a precondition for tendencies towards self-condemnation and feelings of inferiority. Neurotic pride was investigated by Horney as the phenomenon necessitating avoidance of situations where the true performance of the abilities of the self can not be evaluated.

Ideal self was presented by Horney as an inaccurate self-picture which engages oneself in a self-defeating "search for glory". The aspect of ideal self, fills one with delusions of superficial expectations. Horney stressed the fact that the neurotics of this category believe that they constitute individuals with more needs than others. She also stressed the point that the ideal self is nothing but an unrealistic attitude which basically is unattainable, and

causes not only destructive experiences, but also aims at imprisoning a person within vicious circles of neurotic behaviour and pseudo-depictions of self-improvement.

All other neurotic phenomena investigated by Horney move between the aspect of neurotic pride and the aspect of the ideal self. Horney considers, therefore, all these neurotic manifestations as orientations which tend to become fixed perspectives, obliging an individual to be, e.g., overly compliant to achieve acceptance; overly aggressive and demanding; or to avoid others, being self-sufficient and apart from society. These neurotic expressions will be presented by Horney as disastrous tendencies which are rooted in one's existence, and thus one believes that one possesses them as virtues, which assist one against others. If so, then an individual turns itself into a maladjusted personality, full of complaints against everybody apart from itself, and who practises vindictiveness, disturbed interrelationships, self-aggrandizement, and various other forms of behaviour.

NEUROTIC PRIDE

Neurotic pride is one of the strongest phenomena in neurosis and Karen Horney has made it her special study. Her main work on it is *Neurosis and human growth: The struggle to self-realisation* which constitutes her most famous psycho-analytical text. Here one can easily observe the integrated analysis of her theory, which reaches the conclusion that human personality as a whole is affected by neurotic pride.

Karen Horney examines neurotic pride as a phenomenon that presupposes qualities which are not possessed by the individual concerned although he imagines them as his own.¹ This means that neurotic pride has no substance, but is entirely sustained by different factors, which are based either on idealised self-perception or on pride itself.²

Nothing is left untouched by neurotic pride.³ It is an undesirable factor, that frequently leads to misconceptions of self-perfection.⁴ The ramifications of neurotic pride are such that they end up making certain psychological conditions very uncertain.⁵ When pride takes hold of one's imagination, certain unreasonable demands are repressed, only reappear on certain occasions, causing irreparable psychological damage.⁶

Besides, pride is not only attached to the imagination, it pervades all other mental and psychological faculties: intellect, logic, as well as will power. The endless capabilities with which the neurotic person endows his own self are inner qualities of his own spirit, affecting him negatively. Because of these he becomes self-admiring and arrogant. The conceptual picture he creates of himself is, therefore, a product of his imagination. To maintain this world of fantasy, the affected person guides his efforts, so that, he may devise means of presenting facts differently from what they really are. The greatest part of

¹ p. 90.

² pp. 88-89.

³ p. 93.

⁴ p. 14.

⁵ p. 340.

⁶ p. 91.

these facts is unconscious because of many negative defense mechanisms, relating to pretence, rationalisation⁷, inhibitions, narcissistic trends, needs for approval and power, repressed feelings, hysterical convulsions, ambition for personal recognition and externalisation.⁸

The neurotic person cannot face reality directly and overtly, but covertly. He comprehends only his own thoughts about the world. This is precisely the reason why pride is interwoven with the intellect or rather, with supremacy of spirit. It is not limited, however, to those having spiritual aspirations, but characterizes every kind of neurosis.⁹

Clearly our psychoanalytic writer maintains in her theory that imagination is employed in the creation of conceptual images in all the interactions, which the complicated system of pride employs, so that it can pinpoint the negative interests of man, by transforming needs into virtues, and possibilities into reality.¹⁰ Under this aspect, Horney indicates that the imagination helps neurotic pride to create a particular idealised image, so as to "relieve" all the arrogant necessities of a neurotic person. Furthermore, imagination itself many times becomes a comprehensive neurotic solution, i.e a solution not only for a particular conflict

⁷ Rationalisation is a kind of self-deception by logic. The common conception that rationalisation is used to justify the person to himself or to adapt his actions and motives to accepted ideologies is partly correct; see *Our inner Conflicts*, p. 135. From a different point of view, it is an enforced inner urge by the unconscious to present to the conscious certain rationalised situations which justify the erroneous behaviour of the neurotic; see Dörsch, *Psychologisches Wörterbuch*, Kempten 1992, p. 549.

⁸ Externalisation is the individual's tendency to feel everything happening within as if it were happening without, and, as a rule, to consider external factors as responsible for an individual's difficulties. An unavoidable result of extroversion is the nagging feeling of being void and empty. *Our inner Conflicts*, pp. 115 and 117. Seen from another point of view, this extroversion is the manifestation of experiences and of tensions of the neurotic's inner world. Therefore he expresses his individuality either sincerely or covertly. See Fröhlich, *Wörterbuch zur Psychologie*, Nördlingen 1993, p. 162.

⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 91-92.

¹⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 184.

but one that implicitly promises to satisfy all the inner neurotic needs felt by an individual at a given time. One of these neurotic needs is neurotic pride itself through which the imagination cultivates the trend of the idealised image which is transformed sooner or later to an idealised self. Under the assistance of imagination, neurotic pride considers every need as a virtue and every possibility as a capability which must be realised, irrespective of the fact that many times all these "virtues" and "realities" are actual neurotic disturbances.

In a similar way, logic may become the tool of pride during the process of rationalisation. Then everything can be misconceived as logical, sensible, rational, as indeed it appears to be from the neurotic's viewpoint.¹¹

Pride is also expressed by abilities and gifts which the neurotic person feels he has the right to claim. When the neurotic continues to claim his "assumed" rights conclusively, he becomes enmeshed in a maze, as he satisfies privileges with the available "gifts". He believes he has the right to receive without offering and to feel arrogant¹² while others must accept him with all his neurotic achievements or successes and satisfy his demands.¹³

Horney also underlines the existing relationship between the importance assigned by someone to a certain typical characteristic of his and the neurotic pride existing within which -according to her- constitutes a basic rule of every neurosis.¹⁴

From another point of view, pride contributes to strict adherence to psychologically compelling moral codes. Individuals, orienting their thoughts towards methods of distinguishing "good" from "bad", are self-idolised and believe in self-deceptions.¹⁵ A neurotic's pride, which corresponds to his "moral" imperatives, could appear substantial upon first inspection. In reality, however, it is as unfounded as all other forms of pride sin-

¹¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 184.

¹² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 92.

¹³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 92.

¹⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 94-95.

¹⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 93.

ce it is inescapably connected with various false conventions.¹⁶

Pride makes the individual touchy and this is dependent upon the degree of pride pervading him. This kind of pride is easily offended as much from external as from internal factors.¹⁷ This touchiness in human relationships derives from self-contempt and is equal to the touchiness born of neurotic pride. The result is, however, that it is usually difficult to ascertain whether this touchiness is due to something which wounded his pride or due to the self-contempt he usually displays.¹⁸ In some cases, the neurotic person may become aware of his situation and may believe for once that he is neither wonderful nor worthy of scorn, but merely a suffering individual. He may think that this self-contempt is an artificial result of pride¹⁹, which oscillates between two alternative solutions:

- a) either from pride to self-contempt, or
- b) from the wounded pride to the abyss
of self-contempt.²⁰

Unfortunately, both pride and self-contempt generate fears and inhibitions.²¹

It is Horney's firm conviction that the governing principle within vengefulness is indeed a wounded pride.²² The individual who is arrogant of his vengefulness lives intensively each sentiment of avenging wrath.²³ His wrathful reactions are connected to his wounded pride.²⁴

¹⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 92.

¹⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 95.

¹⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 136.

¹⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 359.

²⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 102.

²¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 140.

²² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 181.

²³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 162.

²⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 102.

In addition, the system of pride increases fear in people.²⁵ The condition of fear not only generates false impressions, but becomes intolerable to the sufferer, because it strikes at his pride which enables him to dominate in any eventuality.²⁶

Pride is the logical conclusion, the pinnacle and the establishment of interactions which started with the search for glory.²⁷ Thus, the tendency for vengeance is intensified so that the need for triumph becomes greater.²⁸ Apart from triumph, nothing else may replace the imaginary splendour enveloping pride.

This is precisely what the neurotic person does: he replaces pride with triumph, which endows neurotic vengeance with incredible intensity.

The neurotic person develops a strong and totally irrational ideal of power²⁹, related to pride.³⁰ Confronted with these developments he behaves sadistically and his sense of power and pride cultivates and reinforces within him the unconscious feeling of weakness.³¹ If he were to abandon his sadistic way of life he would feel, suddenly, that he would be about to lose something valuable. Then he becomes conscious of conceit as he realises that he is able to treat others as he wishes. In time he comes to realise that, the feeling of power and pride he obtained from his sadistic behaviour, was a very meagre substitute.³²

The neurotic's pride is related to his need of supremacy over everybody and everything. His determination to overcome all others in any possible way reinforces within him the

²⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 296.

²⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 337.

²⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 109.

²⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 104.

²⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 103.

³⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 166-167.

³¹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 207.

³² *Our inner conflicts*, p. 208.

impression of overlordship.³³ The feeling of superiority is expressed by excessive dignity.³⁴ He, therefore, considers himself sufficient, he believes he needs nobody and nothing.³⁵

Pride governs sentiments.³⁶ The more the person is imbued with it, the more his sentiments are determined by pride as a guide. As Horney explains metaphorically, it is as if he has shut the real-self hermetically within a room, listening only to the voice of pride.³⁷ The neurotic may feel satisfied, dissatisfied, disappointed, glad, in love with or hateful towards people, and all these feelings are reactions of pride.³⁸ Pride distances him from his own self.³⁹

Neurotic pride is an enemy of love.⁴⁰ The person's fear that he might be led astray by love, is dependent upon his unconscious confirmation that he must abandon neurotic pride for the sake of love.⁴¹

Thus, a basic inconsistency is perpetrated in human relationships. The individual feels distanced from others, insecure, scared, full of animosity, whilst his own affirmations betray that he vitally needs others.⁴²

Although human relationships are gravely important, they cannot nevertheless uproot a deeply rooted system of pride out of a person who keeps his real self away from any psychological communication. At this turning point it is proven, once more, that pride is a foe in the development of an individual's character.⁴³

³³ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 134 and 104.

³⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 271.

³⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 162.

³⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 162.

³⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 163.

³⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 163.

³⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 160.

⁴⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 246.

⁴¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 246.

⁴² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 298.

⁴³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 308.

The arrogant person may sometimes boast of self-confidence. Deep down, however, his system of pride depletes his self-assurance. This depletion or weakening begins with an alienation from one's self and progresses through self-scorn to dereliction of self-esteem together with all the inbred conflicts which split the personality.⁴⁴ Such a person does not understand that pride denies him the possibility of avoiding difficulties, bypasses his interests and provides the illusion of saving his self-esteem.⁴⁵

Pride reinforces basic anxiety. In turn this anxiety is capable of denying the individual any participation in real life. It depresses him and as a result leads him to a basic or central conflict⁴⁶, where the pride system clashes with the real self,⁴⁷ i.e. the conflicting tendencies of the real self are repelled by the tactics of the pride system.⁴⁸

Neurotic pride in all its aspects proves to be a fake.⁴⁹ It is only when the pride system is seriously undermined that a neurotic's conviction of being himself the personification of goodness and holiness begins to waver. He sees how calculating and greedy for personal gain he can be and understands his own outrage each time he is called upon to offer.⁵⁰

Horney, attempting to answer the question: how to uproot the pride system together with all its components and related elements, maintains that a neurotic person must:

- a) realise and identify all negative expressions of pride,
- b) accept that pride expresses a powerful eroding passion and,
- c) appreciate the deleterious influence of this passion.

⁴⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 296.

⁴⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 313.

⁴⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 297. "Basic anxiety" is the condition according to which one feels helpless, isolated and enigmatic. See: *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 69.

⁴⁷ *Selfanalysis*, p. 261.

⁴⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 356.

⁴⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 94.

⁵⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 163 and 353-354.

If all the above are achieved, then the sufferer may begin to cultivate true self-respect and a genuine self-offering to others.⁵¹

⁵¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 341, 345 and 356.

B) COWARDICE - SELF-LOVE

Lack of sincerity leads to the generation of cowardice. In recognising this negative factor, Horney concluded that the neurotic endows himself with imaginary abilities he has not really got, overlooks his own faults and is absorbed in the discovery of other peoples' faults, based upon his own "superiority".⁵² The way of acting offers him characteristics which reduce and impair moral integrity, such as the concealment of truth and egocentrism. The individual leads a split life, being incapable of even a little sincerity⁵³. His actions are not spontaneous but are dictated by cowardice and self-love.⁵⁴

The neurotic expresses his needs excessively, he covers his imperfections carefully, he retreats when he thinks that his interests might be adversely affected and finally he becomes distanced from others.⁵⁵ This distancing is due to his "dead end" option to avoid difficulties and to postpone the correction of his actions. He usually compels others to accept him as their superior but in the event that this cannot be achieved he feigns illness. Shirking of responsibility feeds his cowardice which then appears as a particularly potent deficiency.⁵⁶

A specific expression of self-love, according to Horney, is without a doubt, the phenomenon of opposition to others. It appears as a dangerous moral problem, it leads to neurotic demands and it forces others to serve the personal needs of the neurotic⁵⁷ who becomes particularly self-centred when he places his self-interests above anything else.⁵⁸ He follows non-existent models, contraptions of his own imagination. The psychological impulses governing him create delusions of supremacy, making him insensitive to truth,

⁵² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 95.

⁵³ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 162.

⁵⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 95.

⁵⁵ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 71.

⁵⁶ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 264.

⁵⁷ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 163; comp. *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 48.

⁵⁸ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 85.

whether it concerns him or others or facts and events.⁵⁹

The result of this illusory supremacy is, according to Horney, love of leadership. It is based on the neurotic's inability to develop relations in which each person has equal rights. His main concern is to hold leadership in any way. This stance enhances his self-love so that he does not feel lost, dependent and unaided.⁶⁰

Another attitude of the neurotic is to remain unyielding, to disagree with any opinion or to reject any advice - however correct - so that he may not appear weak.⁶¹ He passes on responsibility to anyone and anything else but himself. On the other side he attempts to be amenable, pleasant and conciliatory. He believes he must conceal his touchiness and he tries to hide it, by pretending "comprehension". Nevertheless, he remains touchy, he experiences pain while not admitting to it, he criticises his own self for the meanness and egoism it displays, developing tendencies of self-condemnation. Through this self-love the neurotic also appears as omniscient and thus, Horney remarks, he reduces his ability for learning.⁶²

These manifestations of the cowardly and selfish man, as Horney presents him, turn his character towards masochism. He turns hesitant, doubting and he desists from offering himself, willingly and wholeheartedly to anything or in any way.⁶³

The solution exists in the desire of the neurotic to leave behind his egocentric isolation and to develop close links with others.⁶⁴ In this way he is unfettered from the isolation of cowardice and self-love; he becomes aware of broader issues which are enmeshed in his life or in his world, thus countenancing others as true personalities.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 30; comp. p. 64.

⁶⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 175.

⁶¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 170.

⁶² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 241; comp. pp. 168-169 and p. 139.

⁶³ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 270.

⁶⁴ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 240.

⁶⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 365.

Every step away from cowardice and self-love, leads him closer to inner freedom and closer to others; renders him more hopeful so that he becomes happy; and thereby adds to his active interest in life, including also his interest in his own development.⁶⁶ Horney means that when a person rejects cowardice and self-love, he commences working for his inner equilibrium which now can be reached on the level it is needed. Being therefore someone away from every egocentric or coward feeling, he approaches other people aiming to develop the relationship that has been broken before. When this relationship becomes a fact, the person then is no longer “stuck” in neurotic demands against them, but he accepts their presence as a means towards his self-restoration, which, despite all obstacles, proceeds into realisation.

⁶⁶*Selfanalysis*, p. 272.

C) ANGER - WRATH - FEAR

Karen Horney considered neurosis as the chief disorientation of personality. In her opinion, all the phenomena expressing it are related to signs of vindictiveness.⁶⁷ The outcome of these signs appear in violent eruptions of anger. These eruptions crystalize into crises of manic vindictiveness which are so evident as to terrify the neurotic himself, lest he commit an irreparable act when he is beside himself.⁶⁸

Anger in itself may be conscious or it may appear within consciousness as a conceptual urge towards violence, without being entirely attached to a specific tendency. It may however also be entirely unconscious.⁶⁹

The neurotic may not manage to reject all the damaging effects of anger simply through self-awareness. This control is not conscious, it is a soul-impelling expression. He believes he is befriending himself, checking the eruptions of anger but essentially he is sunk more deeply in the forgetfulness of his imbalance.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, he understands the vicious circle he is in. He reacts against himself and unfortunately he projects his angry feelings towards others. He considers them responsible for his fall, and behaves truly objectionably to and defensively towards them.

On other occasions he realises he is angry with others. On occasions his anger turns against the excessive - as he believes - tolerance displayed by others.⁷¹ These instances make the neurotic taste the feelings of anger as reactions to fear. Most of these derive

⁶⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 198. As expressions of vindictiveness, she means egocentrism, arrogance and hostility.

⁶⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 198..

⁶⁹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 146. a) In this particular case, referring to the consciousness, she

implies the ability of man to comprehend realistically his actions. And

b) under the term "conceptual impulse" she observes the parallel action of his fixations with his urges and impulses.

⁷⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 182.

⁷¹ *Final Lectures*, p. 95.

from the touching of tender spots which go back to stored past experiences.⁷² The so-called secondary reactions of anger and fear belong to these experiences. Their interpretation is based on various repressed conditions which contain intermingled experiences of anger and fear, proportionate to those mentioned already.⁷³

The individual's tendency to experience sentiments of anger and fear begets a general levelling of sentiments. Then, not only anger and fear, but all emotions, fade and lose their true meaning.⁷⁴ In my opinion, Horney implies that both the sentiments of anger and fear are truly reactions of rage. Although, rage may not always indicate the neurotic pride as its background, there are nevertheless signs in this direction. The whole issue of rage, if not satisfied may in its turn get repressed. In this case it may lead to various symptomatic forms of behaviour, such as psychotic episodes, depressions, drinking, psychosomatic disorders. In this way, rage leads into the emotion of anger and fear which become two of the factors conducive to a general flattening out of emotion. If so, then accordingly both of them and other feelings tend to become full and less sharp.

A sharp reaction of anger, normally leads to wrath, which could take any of the following three directions:

- a) To be repressed for whatever reason and to be expressed by psychosomatic symptoms like exhaustion, migraines, stomach cramps etc.
- b) To be expressed as an angry reaction which can be overt or at least conscious.
- c) To sink the individual into despair and pity for himself.⁷⁵

⁷² *Our inner conflicts*, p. 121.

⁷³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 102.

⁷⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 103.

⁷⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 56-57.

The individual's anger, according to Horney, turns against himself and is manifested mainly in three ways:

- a) When hostile expressions cannot be checked, then the neurotic finds an easy release in outbreaks of wrath against others.
- b) This externalisation takes the shape of an incessant, conscious or unconscious fear or uneasiness that his mistakes, which are unbearable to him, will also anger others.
- c) This externalisation is manifest in organic disturbances, when the individual's wrath against himself generates organic tensions of great severity such as intestinal disorders, headaches, exhaustion etc.⁷⁶

Depression bouts follow when wrath is repressed. These spread out and the individual is lost in a dead-end self-pity. The situation thus formed leads to destructive urges which are expressed by thoughts of suicide or tendencies to self-destruction.⁷⁷

Horney believes that feelings of wrath pass quickly, remaining vague and frequently forgotten. Although these may be parochial and insignificant, they may, nevertheless, sometimes be very dangerous.⁷⁸

If wrath is repressed, hostile impulses escape from all inner or outer obstacles. If these obstacles are strengthened by external sources, they continually exhaust wrath.⁷⁹ By the process of repression, hostility does not materialise but it is not abandoned.⁸⁰ Wrath

⁷⁶ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 121-122.

⁷⁷ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 88.

⁷⁸ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 45-46.

⁷⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 67.

⁸⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 66-67.

directed towards those we admire, like or need is inherent in the entirety of our emotions.⁸¹

Like most of our neurotic feelings, wrath has its roots in childhood. The child is forced to consider himself bad and to despise himself as soon as he expresses wrath towards his parents or transgresses rules laid down by them.⁸² His behaviour emanates from his fear towards them and this is why he behaves repressively against them. The child does not know how to overcome fear by a conscious control over his hostility. He tries to overcome hostility by quashing it.⁸³

Horney maintains that in the core of psychological disturbances there exist unconscious tendencies which are developed by the individual and which are aiming towards dealing with life by ignoring fears.⁸⁴ The neurotic does not have only the common fears but due to the adversities of life he also has fears which differ from common fears in quantity and quality.⁸⁵ He is motivated by specific fears such as those observed in people who hoard money because of fear of poverty.⁸⁶

Simultaneously the neurotic is afraid that his true "face" will be revealed. He wishes to appear to himself and to others different from what he really is. He assumes on talents he thinks he has, he tries to convince others and forgets what really bothers him.⁸⁷

Also, his fear of altering anything in himself leads him to react and remain as he is. Deep down, however, he would like to change out of fear that he may deteriorate.⁸⁸

The entire blame for this discrepancy falls, according to Horney, upon the insincerity of

⁸¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 67.

⁸² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 87.

⁸³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 66.

⁸⁴ *Selfanalysis*, p. 38.

⁸⁵ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 25.

⁸⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 38.

⁸⁷ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 148.

⁸⁸ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 127.

the personality. The neurotic's true fear is essentially that this insincerity will be exposed.⁸⁹ This generates within him impulsive urges which represent ways of managing to remain in opposition to others.⁹⁰

Another considerable cause for fear is the demand for unconditional loving. The neurotics seek protection against their terrible fear of living and they eagerly seek love to conceal their egotistic weaknesses. They remain hermetically sealed, they harbour delusions of security and they oppress themselves.⁹¹

Our conclusion about anger, wrath and fear is based on Horney's attempt to show the links which pervade them as well as the signs which express them. It helps us to understand their inner interconnection which becomes an inescapable negative factor in their solution.

According to Horney, if the neurotic ceases to blame others for his responsibilities, shouldering them himself instead, then and only then can he be free from his self-deceptions.

⁸⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p.235.

⁹⁰ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 12-13.

⁹¹ *Feminine psychology*, pp. 251-252.

NEUROTIC AMBITION

Ambition is a significant expression of the neurotic phenomenon. The tendencies channelling this behaviour are repressed and constitute the individual's entire inclination towards domination.⁹² The inherent tendency to self aggrandisement is related to ambition and in most cases it betrays a latent tendency towards it.⁹³

Individuals may of course be aware that they are ambitious. They do not, however, suspect that this ambition is a voracious passion which defines their lives and which contains the destructive element of the search for vengeful triumph over others.⁹⁴ Ambition may be countenanced as megalomania and vengefulness, resulting in its existence within an inner void.⁹⁵ The condition, to which all these tendencies converge, is called "movement against people". The salient components of this movement are desire for power, effort towards charming and a soul-impelling inner pressure; the result of these components adds up to neurotic ambition.⁹⁶

A neurotic is imbued by ambition not only to perform more and better, but also to be more successful than others, as well as being unique and indispensable. The neurotic's ambition is underlined by a constantly contrived and dangerous animosity.⁹⁷ Ambition is a strongly disturbing phenomenon which more often than not is loaded with anxiety that turns it into repression.⁹⁸ As repression, therefore, it is expressed by greed in many fields, such as the acquisition of clothes and money as well as the continual seeking for recognition by others.⁹⁹ If all these become fixations in the mind of the neurotic, then he

⁹² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 354.

⁹³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 354.

⁹⁴ *Selfanalysis*, p. 102.

⁹⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 315.

⁹⁶ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 14.

⁹⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 192.

⁹⁸ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 109.

⁹⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 125.

begins developing tendencies of grandeur which remain entirely within the realm of fantasy, absorbing endless amounts of time and energy and guiding his life which would then stand without expectations and essentially without content.¹⁰⁰

According to Horney, the result of the pathology of neurotic ambition is inner depression, because the neurotic has followed the spectrum of glory, step by step, having also tried to achieve success which, in real terms was proven to be unachievable.¹⁰¹

The search for glory represents an activity that leads to a neurotic's decision to mould himself into something which does correspond to reality. He feels what he thinks he needs to feel, he desires what he ought to love.¹⁰² From that moment on, this person undertakes every action with glory as his motivation, and thus reduces his interest in the action itself.¹⁰³ The easy road he selects leads, sooner or later, to unavoidable self-contempt and self-torment. In following the self-deception of endless glory, a person loses indeed his real self.¹⁰⁴

The result of self-contempt is neurotic ambition.¹⁰⁵ Karen Horney was interested in the "in depth" analysis of the term and she used to conclude that it was pertinent when the result was connected with its source. Self-contempt is not related to the discarding of the self, but rather with its salvation from impending dangers. The means employed in this case by the neurotic are found within the term of masochistic self-dependence and it is impossible to analyse all the implications of neurotic ambition or of masochistic dependency, if one has not worked out these problems in oneself.¹⁰⁶ According to this term, the neurotic's ambition for survival and growth is subject to the active influence of

¹⁰⁰ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 265.

¹⁰¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 26.

¹⁰² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 159.

¹⁰³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 159.

¹⁰⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 39.

¹⁰⁵ *The neurotic, personality of our time*, p. 230.

¹⁰⁶ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 167.

psychospiritual masochism. This in turn uses self-contempt as its messenger. Through this messenger the neurotic manages to behave in a self-tormenting manner and to prevail through ambition.

The egocentric elements contained in neurotic ambition end up affecting the entire personality and their various results are proportional to the damage suffered by the individual. These results are expressed by inhibitions in love (being the connecting link in human relations), inhibitions in work (being those related to the postponement in taking decisions capable of resolving working disputes etc.), envy towards competitive methods, with tendencies towards feelings of inferiority and with fears regarding assumed successes or failures.¹⁰⁷

Horney suggests two solutions to a neurotic person to overcome the void generated by ambition:

a) To abandon things and situations, which annoy him psychologically and which circumscribe himself as a sick person. This is achieved by alerting every constructive element of the character. In other words he must understand that ambition and success are essentially unfounded and detrimental concepts. The individual must also demand less than what he can offer and he must not consider himself as the only capable and indispensable person. He must also judge assets and talents on the basis of healthy rapport with others, so that his specific mental maturity may come to fruition. And,

b) to retain his inner integrity, free and unfettered from any sentimental complication, influence and pressure, so that he might overthrow the bonds of ambition and rivalry. Thus, Horney concludes, he may preserve his inner life without blemish and blame.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p 109.

¹⁰⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 281; comp. Horney maintains that only analytic work can enable a neurotic person to learn the "old truth" that he must lose himself (his neurotic self) in order to find himself (his real self).

e) NEUROTIC COMPETITIVENESS AND NEUROTIC JEALOUSY

Neurotic competitiveness and neurotic jealousy, and especially their corroding effect in the life of a human being in general, specifically occupied Karen Horney's thoughts. Horney not only tried to pinpoint the negative influence of these neurotic phenomena, but also attempted to interpret them.

She approached their problematic constituents by focusing on the form they assume in the context of modern society and on the way they affect contemporary human beings. She did not discern in these phenomena any feasible tactics, condoning the behaviour of a neurotic person. She specifically underlined the errors taking place when individuals experience these phenomena, even if their motives are healthy.

Neurotic competitiveness is everyone's problem in today's world and it is not strange that it should always be encountered at the epicentre of neurotic conflicts.¹⁰⁹ The spirit of neurotic competitiveness prevailing in society not only assists in the exacerbation of neurosis but also feeds independently what is called the "need for prevalence"¹¹⁰. This tendency leads to cultural conflicts. The main conflict is found firstly between neurotic competitiveness and success and secondly between brotherly love and humility.¹¹¹

This neurotic competitiveness which rules a neurotic's life is displayed by strife in human relationships especially in professional circles. It creeps into social relations through or selfish friendships. It enters surreptitiously into the family through tactless behaviour, carrying with it the seeds of destructive opposition, defamation, suspicion and devious behaviour. The conclusion is that the neurotic acquires the ability to manipulate others, taking advantage of them in any possible way.¹¹²

When neurotic competitiveness prevails in society, it affects adversely the relationship between the sexes, especially if their lifestyles are not strictly separate. These effects refer

¹⁰⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 188.

¹¹⁰ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 101.

¹¹¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 288

¹¹² *New ways in psychoanalysis*, pp. 173-174.

to destructive drives¹¹³ which relate to the neurotic passion for power and recognition.¹¹⁴

Comparing a neurotic to others is another inherent factor of neurotic competitiveness. The neurotic compares himself to others, even if this is not necessary. The neurotic is not as much bothered about the "substance" of his actions as about the degree of success and the recognition and contentment he may gain from these actions.¹¹⁵ Persistence in these actions makes friction with others more acute, leads to animosity, exacerbates the tendency for domination and polarises the attempt to defeat others. In this way "personal victory" is connected with the belief that "to dictate is to win and to prevail".¹¹⁶

Apart from neurotic rivalry there is also neurotic jealousy, which, although it derives from neurotic competitiveness, has its roots in the lack of "warmth" during childhood.¹¹⁷ Jealousy begins as childish jealousy towards brothers, sisters or either of the parents. It increases gradually within family relationships and, although it creates considerable problems during the child's development, it does not stand as the main cause of the neurotic's jealousy in later years. Both types of jealousy, however, the initial childish and the later one, originate from the same source.¹¹⁸

A significant reason for the existence of neurotic jealousy lies in the neurotic need for love. This phenomenon can be observed in many amorous relationships and many friendships. Jealousy, as defined here, is not a reaction based upon sensible factors but a reaction that is greedy and impels people to demand that they be loved exclusively.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 197

¹¹⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 197.

¹¹⁵ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 189.

¹¹⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 192-193.

¹¹⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 83.

¹¹⁸ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp 82 and 130.

¹¹⁹ *Feminine psychology*, New York 1967, p. 246.

So in this instance jealousy is manifested by greed for love and a demand for limitless love.

Horney believed that jealousy may be encountered in any human relationship.¹²⁰ Its interpretation is usually underwritten by a continual fear of losing companionship or the love of a person. This means that a person feels jealous when subconsciously tendencies or feelings are hidden in him that lead to insecurity in himself. Thus, he always feels lack of self-confidence, and this results or is transformed into lack of constructive initiative in life, and into fearful sentiments of latent phobias such as we mentioned previously. These phobias express a neurotic's attitude to be continually dependent on others.

However it bears no relationship to the real danger it harbours.¹²¹ Horney perceived as "real danger" the ever increasing state of hatred and envy which is latent in jealousy and which feeds it and helps it to thrive. These parameters lead towards an unbridled inhumanity. They are totally unrelated to unfounded and unsubstantiated fixations and to hypochondriacs. Neither are they based upon childish searchings, as they are quite a lot harsher and stronger.

These tendencies of a neurotic to demean others is emotionally related to the attitude of malicious envy. Most human beings feel occasionally jealous when confronted with advantages that may or may not exist in other persons. A neurotic feels envious of these advantages, even if he himself does not aspire towards them. So, in order not to be exposed, he covers his behaviour, by pretending that he is either disinterested or that his aspirations are towards other subjects or issues.¹²²

By stating these facts, Horney confirms her conviction that the spirit of rivalry and the characteristic phenomenon of envy end up with leaving the neurotic "empty handed" precisely because he wants everything.¹²³ So, if a neurotic is to overcome these obstacles, it is necessary that he behaves with integrity in his social interactions. This means that he

¹²⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 129.

¹²¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 129.

¹²² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 182.

¹²³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 183

needs to place himself outside the vortex of neurotic rivalry and jealousy and to strive not to adhere to these in any way. Thus he would not be easily ensnared by these nor by the seemingly true love others bestow upon him, nor by the futility involved in the exercise of ambition.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 170

F) ARROGANCE

Neurotic phenomena construct pseudo-images for individuals. Man is removed from reality through them and, sooner or later, he becomes arrogant. Horney uses the term arrogance as synonymous with "conceit". In her opinion, this term is related to a neurotic person's tendency to appropriate attributes which he does not possess. He becomes touchy and greedy towards every external confirmation and recognition.¹²⁵

The arrogant neurotic type of person, persistently wishes to acquire success, power and triumph. His activities are egotistic and ambitious. He experiences an inner emptiness and feels contempt towards others. He steadfastly believes that he is the only one who can be occupied with everything and, of course, be completely correct.¹²⁶ Arrogance does not allow him to praise others. This behaviour of his means that he is less able to be creative and does not realise that he is embroiled in the ideas of others.¹²⁷

Arrogance is a powerful characteristic of poor personality. Its influence is exerted unconsciously. Horney observes that a neurotic person is not aware of his mistaken claims. His arrogant behaviour sometimes is expressed covertly and some other times overtly. A neurotic person does not recognize this behaviour and uses instead excessive modesty and self-justifying behaviour.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 96-97.

¹²⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 260 and 316.

¹²⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 316.

¹²⁸ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 167-168. Horney compares at this point a verse of Apostle Paul: (I Cor. 13:9) According to this verse every human being knows everything in part and not "in toto" because one's knowledge is piecemeal. On the contrary, an arrogant person prefers:

- a) to accuse himself without mercy, and
- b) to detest whatever he thinks or hears, because he believes that he could possibly be controlled by this, or be rendered defective.

The oppression which is exerted on a neurotic person by arrogance is consciously experienced in a double way. The individual makes his claims by arrogant methods and considers himself as possessor of the ideal-image as a result of his ideal-self.¹²⁹

Arrogance has a compulsive effect on man. Its influences are full of "musts" and have to do with a dynamic search for self-glorification and "self-idolization".¹³⁰ A neurotic person tries to acquire greatness and fame. He thinks that he feels secure and perfect, but in fact he stands at a distance from the truth which is latent within him. He pursues a way in life, which keeps him far from his personal freedom.¹³¹

Horney examines this changeable tactic of an arrogant person and wonders: Whether a neurotic person can be considered responsible for his arrogance, given that he lacks the ability to speak or search for moral behaviour in his life?¹³²

¹²⁹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 126.

¹³⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 73.

¹³¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 86.

¹³² *Our inner conflicts*, p. 177.

G) SELF-HATRED - HATRED

The great variety of neurotic phenomena was forcing Karen Horney to highlight their specific characteristics. This was helping her to reach their expressive details without fear of misinterpretation. She was reaching, therefore, lucid clarifications and conclusions of partial as well as general importance.

It was a rule in her interpretations, that each neurotic person is constantly at war with himself.¹³³ This also happens in the case of self-hatred which causes an overt personality breach.¹³⁴ Its negative influence starts with the creation of the ideal self.¹³⁵ It is directed against true self¹³⁶ and heralds the beginning of an internal war within the person.¹³⁷

A neurotic person turns against himself and it is not long before he starts turning against others. Thus, self-hatred develops into an interpersonal phenomenon where a neurotic person converts his repulsion for himself, extends it as hatred against others and reissues it as fear of his own hatred.¹³⁸

Horney clarifies that chief among interpersonal relationships is the one found between the search for limitless perfection or power and self-hatred.¹³⁹ The neurotic desire for power derives from hatred and from a feeling of inferiority and the danger of feeling or being regarded as insignificant.¹⁴⁰ In this way, a neurotic person demands limitless power

¹³³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 112.

¹³⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 112.

¹³⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 112.

¹³⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 112.

¹³⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 112.

¹³⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 373.

¹³⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 375.

¹⁴⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 166.

and control, irrespective of the fact that, more often than not he becomes psychologically depressed.¹⁴¹

The self-hatred is manifested in two ways:

- a) By the active externalisation, where self-hatred is directed outwardly and the person goes against himself, his fate, various customs and his fellow humans.¹⁴² And,
- b) By the passive externalisation, where hatred is turned against himself. The person, nevertheless, feels this as something which derives from the environment around him.¹⁴³

Both these cases of self-hatred express ways linking them to various insecurities of a neurotic person and the experiences he undergoes, and make him an easy prey to hatred,¹⁴⁴ filling him with expansive tendencies. These tendencies include the grandiose designs of his imagination. They refer to great occupations which he could have realised within these, so he overrates his abilities.

The basis for Horney's conviction that these expressions of self-hatred are identical with the expressions of hatred in the interpersonal relations, is latent in the experiences of the child in the family.¹⁴⁵ The potent love which the child seeks unsuccessfully forces it to react hatefully towards brothers, sisters or parents. The result of this contradiction is the

¹⁴¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 376.

¹⁴² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 116.

¹⁴³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 116.

¹⁴⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 223.

¹⁴⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 373.

child's disdainful and spiteful behaviour towards everyone.¹⁴⁶

Horney maintains that powerful love or potent hatred can lead a person, either to a very close contact with people or into conflict with them.¹⁴⁷ This is discerned in the relationship self-hatred - hatred and it is not always correct to exclude hatred from the unconscious part of the personality. This unconscious repelling of hatred encourages the creation of self-destructive tendencies and entraps the development of the personality into a very strong mesh.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p.88.

¹⁴⁷ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 82-83.

¹⁴⁸ *Selfanalysis*, p. 33.

H) RANCOUR

Karen Horney considered as rancour the active causing of damage to others, which results in alienation from them and their rejection of oneself. The rancorous neurotic person moves between three poles: the first relates to ulterior motives, according to which he considers that others plot against him, the second relates to this unfounded belief that others treat him or have treated him unfairly, whilst the third is related to an attitude followed by the neurotic person, betraying that he “understands” that something is going on against him, whether this something occurs in his imagination or not. He, therefore, believes that this rancour protects him from existing or impending dangers. Deep down, nevertheless, these are characteristics composed by himself. He clashes with himself, blames himself and he expresses his anger for himself as a condition generated by others.¹⁴⁹ This result in his feeling badly done by and in his seeing of others as unjust.¹⁵⁰

This complicated experience alienates him, making him vindictive as well as cowardly towards others, because this externalisation of his only replaces his internal conflicts with external ones.¹⁵¹ Instead of improving by rejecting his faults, he compounds them, without any chance at improvement. This externalisation of the unconscious, keeps a neurotic person not only at an unsafe distance from his own self but also diametrically opposed to any healthy rapport with others. The tactics of a rancorous neurotic person are to build, via his prior choices, the image of himself. He may appear amenable or even gullible but at the same time he will pile up secret resentment against this “coercion”.¹⁵² He complies with this image, conceding to its egoistic aspirations and he hides behind it.

¹⁴⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 129.

¹⁵⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 129.

¹⁵¹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 130.

¹⁵² *Our inner conflicts*, p. 125.

role of eminence, thinking that he is quite worth it and that he is the only one suitable for each opportunity that arises.

Should another person with greater gifts or talents appear on the scene, then a neurotic person perceives him not as a fellow human being but as an opponent and he tries to harm him. His first action being to distance himself from such person, and the next is to bear grudges against him. The expression of his rancour in this case appears as envy towards the other person and as a conscious attempt to demean him and to appear better than him in the presence of others. This proves that inwardly he lives dichotomously. This unbalanced experience which he undergoes is reflected outwardly and reveals to him his limitations that are derived from error.¹⁵³

It is quite a common phenomenon for a neurotic person to find himself in such position. Horney stresses that there are times when neurotics cannot bear this rancour and this is expressed by bouts of crises of consciousness, purging and sobering up. Some others, however, are not bothered by such feelings or the objections of the real self, erupting instead into terrible fits of vengeful anger. If a person exists in complete ignorance of these conditions of rancour, he is continually being misled and is deflected towards deterioration.¹⁵⁴ He feels always isolated and exhausted.¹⁵⁵

Nevertheless, there is also a positive contradiction to this neurotic phenomenon in so far as a neurotic person comprehends his delusions, his feelings of insecurity - which are latent within his rancour - and tries to recover by living in resignation.¹⁵⁶ His wish, then, appears

¹⁵³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 355.

¹⁵⁴ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 209.

¹⁵⁵ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 209.

¹⁵⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 263. By the term "resignation" Horney meant the limitation of each wish or desire. In her view it is the attitude in which a person is imbued with feelings of futility, thus believing that there's nothing worthwhile in material life. By "resignation" - she continues - man tries to

to be a tendency towards discerning in others their real needs and quests just as he discerns them in himself. He, therefore, respects them, follows them, learns from them and he repairs his relationships. What this entails - concludes Horney - is the liberation from rancour, by abstaining from its essence and its enslaving temptations.¹⁵⁷

improve relations with himself and others. He strives to win, only what is beneficial and he is strengthened into tolerating everything.

¹⁵⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 263.

1) PASSIONS

Passions exist as expectations of vital necessities, even if, sometimes, these expectations are not represented by neurotic behaviours. Passions can force the creation of neurotic conditions. We cannot isolate passions, without understanding them. A neurotic person comprehends his passions, if he considers them as the contents of the whole neurotic structure.¹⁵⁸ Horney maintains that passions have a double expression depending on whether they are in repressive experience or exercise a possessive role in the life of a neurotic person.¹⁵⁹

Passions can appear in every neurotic tendency. Sometimes they are pursuits of situations prepared by the neurotic person or anticipated by him, and, sometimes they are experiences due to situations which derive from neurotic behaviour.¹⁶⁰

Passions determine a neurotic person's life and they constitute disastrous vindictive expressions against others. If an individual co-operates with these, he considers that he is protected from weakness and feelings of inferiority. Unfortunately, he does not perceive that, he behaves deceptively, because hidden within him is the need for recognition.¹⁶¹

If we accept the conscious or unconscious perception about passions, we must say that we meet sadistic expressions which provide him with a feeling of strength and pride which reinforce his unconscious feeling of omnipotence. The sadistic pursuits are very powerful because they prove that sadism is a derivative of hopelessness.¹⁶²

The experiences of a neurotic person's passionate life are obligatory. He feels that he is

¹⁵⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p.258.

¹⁵⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 258.

¹⁶⁰ *Selfanalysis*, p. 50.

¹⁶¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 173.

¹⁶² *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 206 and 207.

caught within a game, where everyone knows the rules, whilst he tries with difficulty to understand what is going on.¹⁶³

Horney observes that, passions have a very negative presence within the life of a neurotic person. They keep him incarcerated and he is obliged to learn not how to be freed from them, but how to live with the *Sisyphying* meaning of freedom.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 206.

¹⁶⁴ The well-known, ancient Greek myths of *Tantalus* and *Sisyphus* refer to an inhuman transgression of the Divine Law by these two, who accordingly were punished by the Gods. Tantalus was placed in a lake of wine, with delicacies dangling above his head but he could neither drink the wine nor savour the delicacies. Sisyphus was condemned to erect a temple at the top of a hill for his salvation. However, each time he managed to hoist the stones to the top, they tumbled down the other side of the hill. Thus he is eternally trying to rebuild the structure for his deliverance. See about this on Ἰωάννη Κακριδῆ, *Ἑλληνική Μυθολογία*, (Greek Mythology), 2nd volume, Athens 1986, p. 221. These myths, therefore, are used by the writer in a psychological connection with the neurotic phenomena which a person experiences.

When a person follows such phenomena, he is compelled to live under neurotic behaviour. Such a behaviour imposes upon him and sooner or later the person is affected irretrievably. Under this influence of the neurotic phenomena, the person expresses impassive movements which always mislead him without providing him with spiritual freedom, whether he tries, like another *Sisyphus*, to expel or calm them..

There is also a possibility, stresses Horney, of overcoming neuroses or passions by trying to experience new social factors or alternatives. This attempt will possibly lead him into making the beginnings of a prophylaxis of the neuroses, again a task of *Sisyphus*. See on this: Otto Fenichel, *The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis*, London and Henley 1946, p. 589.

J) FANTASY

Fantasy has a very significant role to play in neurosis.¹⁶⁵ It can be like a demoniacal obsession, almost like a monster swallowing up the individual who has created it.¹⁶⁶ There are neurotics whose concepts revolve around fantasy and who appear to others in "mask" or "in disguise".¹⁶⁷ As the individual is led more and more astray by fantasy, he feels less and less the need for a sincere effort of improvement.¹⁶⁸

Karen Horney maintained that fantasy works towards the formation of the ideal image.¹⁶⁹ The procedure followed by the ideal image, consists of the effort to conform the neurotic into supposedly painless fantasies. Initially, this does not cause problems, but in developing it deludes man, making him believe that he may undertake charming roles. The ideal image with the co-operation of fantasy, forces man to seek a self not endowed with his real abilities but with characteristics whose qualities he does not possess.¹⁷⁰

Through fantasy the neurotic becomes idle, he does not care for sincere contributions to everyday life and he withdraws within himself. He is filled with a tendency to fantasize and not to act effectively upon his imperfections.¹⁷¹ Thus he places himself in the service of his neurotic needs striving for neurotic recognition.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 32.

¹⁶⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 76.

¹⁶⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 184.

¹⁶⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 109.

¹⁷⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 325.

¹⁷¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 122.

¹⁷² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 272.

Horney notes that, the neurotic's fixation with his fantasies fills him with expansionist tendencies. These are mainly expressed in grandiose designs for actions which he thinks he achieves when deep down, these relate with his false talents.¹⁷³ The neurotic believes that he is rid of future "wounds", he rests upon the development of neurosis and all his behavioural processes are done unconsciously.¹⁷⁴

The individual who confines reality to the intentions and designs of his fantasy loses himself as a functional entity. He understands neither the limitations of his own true abilities, nor his real talents.¹⁷⁵

Horney believed that fantasy in itself is supremely valued by the neurotic, irrespective of how it is being used. It allows him to look disdainfully at all those seeking the truth, describing them as ditherers and as inferior.¹⁷⁶ The notions of grandeur generated in his mind remain entirely in the realm of fantasy and they absorb endless amounts of time and energy and he experiences the "weakness" of self-inflation which may occur without masochistic trends, or at least without their being significant in the personality.¹⁷⁷

The neurotic person represses his sincere sentiments and he creates inner antinomies. He does not permit sincerity to act for the good of his being and he becomes enemy of his true self. This deception leads him to even greater fantasy extensions.¹⁷⁸

The final result for the neurotic is found in the disturbance of despair. He is forced to realise his inner *void*, he confronts his erroneous choices and understands that he is far away from his assumption that he is a *unique and perfect being*.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 272.

¹⁷⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 106-107.

¹⁷⁵ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 237.

¹⁷⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 91.

¹⁷⁷ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 265.

¹⁷⁸ *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 66-67.

Then fantasy is fully illuminated and it is seen that to lose dangerous self-deceptions about oneself is what really matters. Horney states characteristically that this kind of behaviour belongs to those neurotics who experience their inner dissent, undertake solutions to their own errors, and rid themselves of the shackles of their own fantasy.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 185.

¹⁸⁰ *Selfanalysis*, p. 132.

K) PASSION FOR POSSESSION

According to Karen Horney, the civilizing structures of society create considerable problems for modern man. She arrived at this opinion because of her analysis of neurotic phenomena. Competitiveness and the tendency for projection is, according to her, all that is worst in human society. These two derive from the passion for possession, which leaves man a victim of his passions. Horney bases her conviction upon the uneasy anxiety for the acquisition of possessions.¹⁸¹

The illogical craving for wealth is widespread in society. It is not necessarily oriented towards money or material goods, but it could take the shape of a demand for "ownership" of other people.¹⁸² In a person's passion for ownership, animosity is often seen as a tendency to harm others.¹⁸³

According to Horney, the specific fear, against which ownership is called to protect the neurotic, is the fear of poverty, of privation and of dependence on others.¹⁸⁴ Where wealth is amassed for the purpose of independence, there is usually found the greatest anxiety. The neurotic thinks that everybody behaves suspiciously towards him, that they covet his wealth or the "result" of this, "his independence" and that they try to detach it from him. He cultivates therefore all the time the need to have wealth, and thus becomes a miserly personality believing that he must always focus on this aim because its objective is to protect him against any possible "evil", whether interpersonal or social,¹⁸⁵ without perceiving that the more wealth he acquires, the more anxious he becomes.

¹⁸¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 173

¹⁸² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 173.

¹⁸³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 174.

¹⁸⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 173.

¹⁸⁵ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 173.

The need to possess contains catastrophic trends. The neurotic does not understand this and unfortunately his interests turn even more towards hoarding. So he believes he gains out of ownership even though its results are negative for him.

In line with what we have observed, Karen Horney maintains that the psychological essence of this condition is an illness and she outlines the symptoms existing in its nucleus. She offers solutions relevant to her psychoanalytical background and she classifies them as follows:

- a) for the neurotic to adapt his needs on the basis of his abilities and talents.
- b) for the neurotic to avoid tendencies of hoarding because, if not always, then at least very often they contain unconscious rudiments of the desire for possession.
- c) for the neurotic to moderate the expression of ownership, i.e. wealth as something parochial and not lasting forever.

Horney believed that if the neurotic follows the psychoanalytic dictums of modern science, he is freed from any notion of possession and of egotistic dissent and that being freed from these he can also fight other neurotic phenomena.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 193.

L) IMPOSITION

The notion of imposition as a neurotic condition derives for Horney either from grandiose fantasies or from sadistic trends or from narcissistic tendencies.

The grandiose fantasies depend on self-aggrandised attitudes which promote intense self-accusations, self-doubts, and self-contempt. The neurotic person, experiencing such compulsive phenomena, he refuses to accept them as weaknesses of his inner psychic apparatus, he considers himself a "victim" of all these tendencies, does not recognise his personal responsibility for them, and accuses others of them. As a consequence, he begins to exhibit feelings of rage against them, he transfers these situations to others, and behaves against them imposingly.

The sadistic trends convince him that everybody is at bottom malevolent and crooked, that all friendly gestures are hypocritical, and the only wisdom he can muster against them is to regard everyone with distrust. Slowly then, but steadfastly, he behaves with arrogance towards them, often rude and offensive, even if sometimes he covers himself up with a thin veneer of civil politeness. By feeling therefore he is always right, he humiliates others and exploits them. This behaviour of his leads, sooner or later, into imposition which appears as a stern phenomenon, full of vindictiveness. This vindictiveness makes his imposition against others more secure, and stabilises it as a crucial motivating force.

The narcissistic tendencies are usually connected with self-inflation and self-idealisation. Both these basically derive from his alienation from others and exhibit complex convulsions. The narcissistic tendencies impose on a neurotic person and make wider the chasm between his inner conflicts and his real self. As a result of these narcissistic attitudes, there comes immediately the tendency to impose on others, because he does not accept that there are people who are better than him. He considers them either inferior or as persons not exhibiting any constructive aptitude whatsoever. The feeling of imposition deriving from his narcissism contains all the aggression he experiences against them, and it appears as a need to arrange or to re-arrange his inner world.

The imposition appears as a lack of self-awareness. The neurotic person never understands that he exhibits such behaviour against others, because he does not examine himself

to find the roots of this phenomenon. Karen Horney refers to imposition when she analyses *the neurotic need for affection* and *the need of moving towards people*. She therefore characterizes as imposition a concrete constituent part, which makes the phenomenon of egocentrism into a leading neurotic expression. Aggression and mastery complexes are demonstrations of imposition and they operate through the illusion of the supremacy.

Through aggression the neurotic person experiences vindication and hostility against others. He considers himself as an individual possessing extraordinary attributes, which all the others want to take them away from him, aiming at rendering themselves more capable than him. Through the mastery complex, imposition finds unconscious foundations. Although these foundations are based on a naive belief in greatness, nevertheless they are potentially destructive. The mastery complex leads to imposition because the neurotic person demands devotion and admiration from others for himself.

Consequently the neurotic person aims at imposition. This phenomenon is helped by the exercise of power and self-exhibition.¹⁸⁷ Imposition is based on unconscious conditions. These conditions are latent in repressive activities of inferiority-feelings and hate¹⁸⁸. Several times imposition is connected with pride and extends irrational ideals and rival disposition.¹⁸⁹

The neurotic person expresses the behaviour of infliction as a passion. He accepts hypothetical protection by it, and believes that, he escapes from the experience of weakness and inferiority.¹⁹⁰ The corrosive pretence of imposition exerts a deceiving influence on him, because it is connected with an anxious search for recognition.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 163.

¹⁸⁸ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 163.

¹⁸⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 167.

¹⁹⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 171.

¹⁹¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 171.

In my opinion, a neurotic's tactic of imposition is related to his unrelenting resistance to the advice of others, or to his disagreeable stance towards correct opinions. In that way he finds himself a slave of imposition. He discards whatever is capable of bringing him back to a healthy psychosomatic life¹⁹². He is generally determined by neurotic feelings which express animosity and phobias or demeaning self-confidence and alienation.¹⁹³

¹⁹² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 170.

¹⁹³ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 172.

M) EMPTY AND SHALLOW LIVING

Empty and shallow living occurs when the neurotic abandons every effort towards self-improvement.¹⁹⁴ This inertia¹⁹⁵ forces him into an impasse and into inertness. To cover these weaknesses the neurotic resorts to enjoyment and revelry.¹⁹⁶ The enjoyment of such persons are exceedingly superficial: sexual encounters, wining and dining, gossip, gambling, endless political banter. Because of such behaviour they become vain and conceited. The greater part of their life is spent on the altar of the trivial and not of the essential.¹⁹⁷

Horney discerns three differing aspects of empty and shallow life:

a) In the first, emphasis is given to revelry, enjoyment and generally “vivre-bien”. The motivating power here is not enjoyment in itself, but the need to quash the tormenting feeling of futility.

b) In the second, emphasis is given to social status and recognition or opportunistic success. The impeding control of any contesting effort is complete and it constitutes a basic characteristic of this aspect.

c) The third relates to the individual’s ability to exist as a mechanical creation. In this case, loss of authentic ideas and feelings leads to the levelling

¹⁹⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 281.

¹⁹⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 283. The greater the inertia is, the more all feelings are affected by it and the neurotic is led to emotional mortification, which is converted in relation to the lessening of inertia. Inertia is more acutely felt when initiative is needed in particular actions. The neurotic cannot contribute positively and he falls into spiritual “unstimulation”. *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 281-282.

¹⁹⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 285-286.

¹⁹⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 286.

of the personality.¹⁹⁸

The neurotic of empty and shallow living loses his self-respect, his inner autonomy and he is impelled to elevate himself in the eyes of others. If he fails to do so, he follows their moral codes and their conventions. He feels, thinks and acts as others expect him to or as others consider fit for their environment.¹⁹⁹

The neurotic's feelings are imprisoned and they cannot be easily liberated. Individuals existing emptily and shallowly are usually distanced from any sincerity. If they were to regain control of their senses, they would experience recollections of moral repentance and they become nostalgic for religious experiences which they might have had in the past. Unfortunately, after a short while all this disappears.²⁰⁰ Neurotics existing thus, accept their neurosis as an inescapable condition and they bend to its deficiencies.

Horney based her observations on her personal experiences with her own patients, the curing of whom - in some cases - lasted for over twenty years of continuous analytical work and contact.

¹⁹⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 286, 287-288.

¹⁹⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 287.

²⁰⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 289.

N) INSATIABILITY - ORAL ATTITUDE

Insatiability in all its disguises is explained by Horney as an oral attitude. This classification of hers relates to her observation that insatiability is frequently expressed by a craving for food and feeding habits. It is followed by dreams of military conflicts and it displays to the neurotic the need to resort to food, where he is entrapped into any impasse.²⁰¹

Even though these signs prove that we are not dealing with essential oral needs;²⁰² nevertheless, it is generally known that food is usually the most accessible means for satisfying greed. This is why it is one of the main behavioural attitudes of the neurotic.²⁰³ During sleep (i.e. in dreams), food is the most specific and primeval symbol for expressing insatiable desires.²⁰⁴ In the event that the neurotic is awake, then he feels internally empty, being affected by the negative influence of these neurotic phenomena and manifestations. He believes then, that this emptiness comes from his empty stomach and he resorts to compulsive feeding.²⁰⁵

Oral desires are, according to Horney, sexual in character. The insatiable trait hiding behind is expressed in the relationship between the two sexes and it takes especially the form

²⁰¹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 124. Oral attitude is, firstly, described in the analytical literature by Karl Abraham: "Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido" in "Neue Arbeiten zur ärztlichen Psychoanalyse", second issue, 1934. Also about the oral attitude, extremely characteristic is the film of Marco Ferreri, *Le Grand Bouffe*, Paris 1973.

²⁰² *The neurotic personality of our time*, pp. 124-125.

²⁰³ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 125.

²⁰⁴ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 125.

²⁰⁵ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 117. The insatiability of the neurotic may appear in greediness as a general character trait; as cupidity shown in eating, buying, window-shopping and impatience. *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 124.

of sexual activity.

This is also witnessed in dreams, resulting in the influencing of the neurotic.²⁰⁶ The combination of oral attitude and sexuality is very important for Horney. The deriving countercurative product is channelled into tendencies of possession, appropriation, financial worry, acquisition, exploitation and recognition.

Excessive food is, therefore, revealed as the forerunner of pursuit and its intimate manifestation is fear. Fear is sustained by the neurotic's deficiencies which in turn are caused by his own neurosis. The fact that the oral attitude is related to food is proven by the compulsory feeding and sleeping, when man is scared, and it disappears, when the human personality is safeguarded with true love, cultivation of its talents and constructive effort.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 125.

²⁰⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 125.

SEXUALITY

Sexuality, according to Karen Horney, belongs to the function of neurotic needs.²⁰⁸ The relationships it expresses are not defined by true and sincere needs or sentiments, but by compulsive tendencies of a neurotic disposition.²⁰⁹

Sexual relationships are used by the neurotic as a means of subjugating and demeaning others or even as means of self-subjugation and humiliation.²¹⁰ The role of sex, for such persons, varies considerably. Sometimes it is the only bridge connecting him with others. He creates ephemeral relationships which he breaks sooner or later because he is scared they may become serious. What urges him towards new sexual encounters is his curiosity about other women. As he himself admits, he reacts to women in the same way as he would react towards a landscape or a new circle of acquaintances; just as soon as he gets to know them, he loses interest and turns towards other pastures.²¹¹

For Horney, the neurotic utilises a sexual activity because he believes he will thus find a "let out" to his inner psychological tensions.²¹²

Sexual excitement and desires in neuroses are normally divorced from love.²¹³ When the subjective element is pushed aside, in sexual relationships, the unconscious interest in love is transposed to a conscious interest in sex-appeal.²¹⁴ The specific difficulties between love and sex are part of the entire neurotic disturbance.²¹⁵

²⁰⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 302.

²⁰⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 302.

²¹⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 197.

²¹¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 264-265.

²¹² *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 147.

²¹³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 300.

²¹⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 301-302.

²¹⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 303.

Despite all the destructive passions this situation displays, which harm his personality and disorientate it, the neurotic has the ability to transform sexual weaknesses by seeking the reasons behind them.²¹⁶ I would think that Horney means here that a neurotic person is persuaded to recognise in his sexual weaknesses moral difficulties which are closely bound up with psychological disturbances. These disturbances affect the neurotic's sexual activity and harm his personality, creating problems, which, sooner or later, tend to be psychospiritual weaknesses.

The way for the correct conversion of sexual weaknesses is for a person not to push them towards a condition which may cause passionate desires.²¹⁷ Sexuality is usually hidden in unconscious wishes, which have never been realised before. These wishes, remaining unfulfilled, and thus producing a great danger for a person's homeostatic balance, are either directly connected with sexual aims which became inhibited, or sexual tensions reduced as a result of the unfulfilled wishes, or excessive sexual overestimations linked with illusions which, more or less, are turned into strong emotions affecting one's psychic life.

Although, many times it is very difficult to discover all unconscious wishes having connection with sexual desires or wishes, nevertheless it is easy to understand that all of them are linked with the ideal self, which, more or less, is responsible for all sexual weaknesses containing passionate manifestations.

²¹⁶ *Feminine Psychology*, p. 73.

²¹⁷ *Feminine Psychology*, p. 86.

p) COMPARTMENTALISATION

Compartmentalisation is the neurotic phenomenon in which a person perceives himself as a fragmented personality. Compartmentalisation is caused from disturbances having already been "settled" in one's psychic structure. Under compartmentalisation one experiences conflicts containing inner-splitting tendencies. These tendencies appear as contradictory and disconnected with each other. Compartmentalisation is the psychic fragmentation where a neurotic person cannot realise himself as a whole organism in which every part is related to the whole and interacts with every other part. Compartmentalisation describes a neurotic person only if he is alienated and divided inwardly, so as to lack such a feeling of wholeness.

The individual experiences negative manifestations of neurotic phenomena under powerful pressure. He cannot handle such manifestations and becomes the victim of their influences. To escape this slavery, he compartmentalizes his behaviour. Through this, he comes into a new dangerous phase of his neurotic life. His neurotic experience seems to be of help to him, but it leads him into new adventures.²¹⁸

An individual's conflicts with others contribute very much to the stabilization of compartmentalization. They utilize compartmentalisation as a defense tactic against difficulties, but ultimately split up the personality.²¹⁹ Neurotic persons who adopt compartmentalizing refuse to acknowledge their conflicts and pretend they are free of every kind of neurosis.²²⁰ The experience of compartmentalizing results in contradictions which have to do with weakness in actions and an anxiety about achievement. These contradictions lead the neurotic person to experience lack of unity and a tendency to split apart,²²¹ because he links his needs with a fantastic garb which represents his attempt to solve conflicts caused by lack of activation and the tendency to seek to achieve everything

²¹⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 179.

²¹⁹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 134.

²²⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 335.

²²¹ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 133-134.

Compartmentalisation or psychic splitting means that the individual concerned has not perceived himself as a unified reality.²²² The reason for this, according to Horney, is the falsification of one's freedom and self-esteem. Unfortunately the neurotic person underestimates the seriousness of such falsification and detests every form of responsibility.²²³

Horney accepts that the problem of neurosis cannot be solved by expedient choices or by latent behaviour. Compartmentalisation offers these two "opportunities" to an individual, but leads him, through them, to new cul-de-sacs, besides those mentioned above. The solution to this problem can be found only in a sincere inner synaesthesia, i.e. in a sincere self-awareness which will awaken the person and renders him conscientious, thereby avoiding such precarious perspectives.²²⁴

²²² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 179. Horney borrows here the term "compartmentalisation" from the work *Discovering Ourselves* by Edward A. Strecker and Kenneth Appel, New York 1943.

²²³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 355.

²²⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 355.

q) NEUROTIC NEED FOR LOVE

By the term “neurotic need for love”, Horney does not mean the circumstantial neurosis of the character but the enhanced need to be loved of someone already neurotic, as well as his sensitiveness to the deprivation of this need.²²⁵ While for the healthy individual it is important to be loved, respected and appreciated by those he respects, the neurotic need for love is compulsive and indiscriminate.²²⁶

Love, for the neurotic, constitutes the way by which he satisfies all neurotic needs. The neurotic person considers this love as the only goal worth striving for, worth living for.²²⁷ The aspect of this need represents the attitude of one who behaves oppressively to others. He uses this love as a demand which must be always satisfied. He strives for it, because the reason for rejecting responsibilities derives from the need to offer himself constructively.

He selects love from others as a means of attachment, and not as a means of undertaking the laboriously difficult task and process of being changed from within.²²⁸ The loving behaviour he asks for from others does not contain the disposition to be benefited from it, but on the contrary is accepted as an expression which will ultimately serve his neurotic wishes. He attaches to himself the loving disposition others demonstrate, and he becomes a more egotistic personality, without adapting it into his inner reality, which incontrovertibly exists, but covering it with the disposition he has to exploit others' virtues.

Frequently, the neurotic expresses this need insatiably. The desire for love is not a simple condition but it consists of a strong demand, without terms and doubts, to be loved

²²⁵ *Feminine Psychology*, p. 245.

²²⁶ *Feminine psychology*, p. 246.

²²⁷ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 59.

²²⁸ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 61-62.

without any special effort from himself. His aim is to be secure against external onslaughts, so that he can exercise his animosity towards others.²²⁹

Three groups are related to the neurotic need for love:

a) In the first group belong those who are doubtlessly in great need of love, irrespective of the way and the means by which this is obtained.

b) Those of the second group seek love but if they should fail to find it in a particular individual, then they isolate and withdraw themselves seeking solace in material things concerning innate pursuits either of wealth, entreaty, or chasing opportunities for enjoyment, and they are led to over-eating, purchasing, reading etc.

c) The third group of neurotics maintains a stance which displays a profound mistrust in love. They accept love as an inability, and they observe it as the lure of a mirage.²³⁰ These individuals preclude love from their life. They reject or demean its importance. They scorn and avoid love, considering it a condition of weakness.²³¹

In many cases of neurotic need for love, the interpretation appears to be related to certain strong narcissistic behavioural characteristics.²³² The neurotic suffers considerably in searching for this love and is filled with anxiety. Therefore, he is not aware of his inability to love, because of his anxiety.²³² He continues searching for love narcissistically²³³, believing this to be the way to the appeasement of anxiety.²³⁴

²²⁹ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 131ff.

²³⁰ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 115.

²³¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 304.

²³² *Feminine Psychology*, p. 254.

²³² *Feminine psychology*, p. 255.

²³³ *Feminine psychology*, p. 249.

Horney observes that persons under the influence of neurotic need for love tend to have one sexual encounter after another.²³⁵ The unsatisfied tendency towards sexuality derives from the incorrect linking of feelings of tenderness with sexual activity.²³⁶ The neurotic's negative path to the discovery of truth compels him to select his submission to the delusion of erotic gratification as his means of escape. In many cases, the sexual translation of the need for love depends on favourable external conditions.²³⁷

At any rate, the fact remains that the problem of the neurotic need for love is latent in the individual's effort to depend on others. He links this dependence to the need for love and he strives for its completion. He centralises his attention on a love of his own origin, egotistic and threatening; without attempting to approach others, from whom he only makes demands.²³⁸

²³⁴*The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 149. Unfortunately, without recognising anxiety as the dynamic force behind the neurotic need for love, we cannot understand the precise conditions under which the need is enhanced or diminished.

²³⁵ *Feminine Psychology*, p. 256.

²³⁶ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 148.

²³⁷ *The neurotic personality of our time*, p. 151.

²³⁸ *Feminine Psychology*, p. 252-253.

IDEAL SELF

The preoccupation of Karen Horney with neurotic phenomena led her to the conclusion that a neurotic person is easily attached to neurotic models, because he aspires to experience feelings of superiority.²³⁹

The sublimated self, which a neurotic person aspires to, inhibits him from discerning defects of his personality.²⁴⁰ This sublimated self leads the neurotic person to cultivate the concept of an ideal self. He gives to it great subjective value and uses it as an inner bond for counterbalancing his splitting self.²⁴¹

The ideal self is a "fixed idea" which is created by the neurotic person. This fixed idea is an unconscious phenomenon. It is an imaginary creation, interwoven with factors which are determined compulsively. It is also caused by inner necessities and exercises a dynamic influence on a neurotic person.²⁴²

The ideal self mainly expresses the idolization of neurotic necessities. The individual is rotated by a compulsive accommodation around himself, because he wants to be always neurotically perfect. He tries to form his character into a self-sufficient and independent personality.²⁴³

Unfortunately, however, he does not perceive the strong negative results of his ideal self and becomes even more rigid, every time he rejects a behaviour or conflict.²⁴⁴

The ideal self of a neurotic person does not only constitute a mistaken faith and value;

²³⁹ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 220.

²⁴⁰ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, p. 223.

²⁴¹ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 108.

²⁴² *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 97, 98, 108.

²⁴³ *Our inner conflicts*, p. 121; comp. *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 277.

²⁴⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 277.

but also an embezzlement of every good content and activity of a human being. An unpleasant effect of this is that it inhibits a correct development of personality. A neurotic person is interested in serving his ideal self. He is led to compulsive tendencies of glory, success and triumph, which are expressed as inner tyranny. He believes that he conforms himself ideally, but in fact he is a follower of every kind of neurotic claim and pride.²⁴⁵

The ideal self is a decisive inhibition to every involution or evolution of a human being. It goes hand in hand with conceit, because a neurotic person does not tolerate himself in reality.²⁴⁶ According to Horney, the result of this is entry into disorders of the neurotic procedure; thus, for the sake of the ideal self, he adopts a pseudo-self, he does not use correctly the talents and privileges of his real self and sooner or later is created a rival between the forces of pseudo-self and the forces of real self. This adversity can be turned into an open battle only at a point when the real self has become active enough for one to risk it.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 368.

²⁴⁶ *Our inner conflicts*, pp. 98, 112.

²⁴⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 175.

2) THE THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SELF-LOVE (Φιλαυτία).

ACCORDING TO SAINT MAXIMUS, AND ITS PRODUCTS.

Saint Maximus' anthropology stresses the aspect that a person's alienation from God, results in the characteristics of fallenness. Fallenness represents for the holy father the loss of the divine image in man, and his false adaptation of the traits of the likeness of brutes. Fallenness creates for the Saint the disastrous outcomes of all the passions, which cause one's disintegration. For the holy father, the passions reveal what is incomplete in man, and what engenders imperfect behaviour and experiences.

All the characteristics of fallenness are approached from St. Maximus as destructive and disordered deviations from the soteriological plan of God for man's salvation. The holy father examined in detail all passionate experiences, and he stressed the factors, favouring their creation. The major preconditions "feeding" the existence of passions to be, for Saint Maximus, the aspects of pleasure and pain. Pleasure for the holy father is presented as drawing one towards satisfaction, while pain is the characteristic holding one back from dissatisfaction. The human existence in the state of fallenness presents considerable psychospiritual deficiencies and malfunctions, and proves that many functional disturbances occur in the self.

The discussion of passions in the second part of this chapter follows St. Maximus' presentation of the passion of self-love. Self-love for him is as the creator of all the impersonal character of the psychosomatic man, which produces attitudes of alienation from God, and from fellow human beings. Self-love for the holy father is considered not only as a passion bearing within itself much sinful content, but also as the ability to render incapable of choices concerning one's own salvation.

We present Maximus' understanding of the fallen human condition from the perspective of self-love, because this, for the holy father, lies at the heart of human disorientation. For him there is no other cause of spiritual weakness or corruption than *philautia* itself. We could maintain that for the holy father this passion represents the magnetic pole of all counterbalancing behaviour of the human soul. He is persistent in analysing this passion, because from this passion there "radiate" all the other aspects of fallen human existence.

His teaching is full of quotations characterising this passion. Self-love affects one's soul and gnaws it as a "canker". Self-love contains all evil behaviour turning against a man's psychospiritual capabilities, and connects its activities with passions engendered by it. According to Saint Maximus, this passion finds its starting-points in the disobedience of the first created couple Adam and Eve. It is considered as the main reason for the human mortality, and it always operates as the chief characteristic of the unnatural conditions of man, and tends to destroy, until the very end, every healthy and wholesome psychospiritual and psychosomatic immune system in the self.

Self-love is not a trait of the human nature displaying elements of pathology only. It is the passion which first exhibits a morbid dependency upon oneself with destructive and fatal outcomes, second it can derive from its by-products as well, and third it is characterised by its "voracity" to demolish oneself from within, as by some kind of "electric shock", and so cause irreparable loss.

Initially, then, Saint Maximus considers that "self-love is an impassioned (ἐμπαθής), mindless love for one's body (σῶμα). Its opposite is love and self-control (ἐγκράτεια). A man who has self-love has all passions".²⁴⁸ The consummation of all passions is the ma-

²⁴⁸ Φιλαυτία ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἐμπαθής καὶ ἄλογος φιλία, ἣ ἀντίκειται ἀγάπῃ καὶ ἐγκράτεια. Ὁ ἔχων τὴν φιλαυτίαν, δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει πάντα τὰ πάθη. *Char.* III, 8.

nifestation of pride. “Whoever cuts self-love off cuts off at the same time all the passions that come from it”²⁴⁹.

The passion of self-love does not constitute for Saint Maximus a simple pathogenic process. It is investigated from the holy father as the top-level demonstration of a person’s irregularity. Self-love displays a chief passion which is sustained within, by virtue of all the other procedures of sinfulness which scourge the human entity. Self-love stresses a person’s disposition to remain attached to alternatives aiming first against the interest of himself and second against others. In my estimate, the spiritual instability from the exercise of self-love is opposed to the notion of freedom. Despite the fact that the holy father does not concretely refer to this, I think that he indicates it, when he reckons self-love as the opposite pole of self-control. He implies therefore that as soon as we know that self-control instigates the resistance against passions and consequently self-restraint against pathological situations, it means accordingly that self-control is characterised by the freedom not to be involved in passions, but to build up one’s resistance against sin and the passions. Because whenever self-control is exercised, no self-love is activated, and a person feels free from the slavery of his fallen nature.

Pleasure (ἡδονή), Saint Maximus indicates, is proved as one of the main expressions of self-love. This increases gradually, causing in man irreparable inner upheaval. “The more one is stimulated by sensible enjoyment of the material things, the more one feels the self-love that is born of this. Then, the more one anxiously fosters the longing of self-love, the

²⁴⁹ Ἀρχὴ μὲν πάντων τῶν παθῶν, ἡ φιλαυτία· τέλος δὲ ἡ ὑπερηφανία. Φιλαυτία δὲ ἐστὶν, ἡ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἄλογος φιλία. Ὁ ταύτην ἐκκόψας, συνέκοψε πάντα τὰ πάθη τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς.
Char. III, 57.

more one devises many ways of bringing the pleasure about, which is both self-love and its offspring and its end”.²⁵⁰

Pleasure is also closely related to passion and to the idea of the “unnatural” (παρά φύσιν).²⁵¹ Self-love is eros towards the self seen as (τό ἐρώμενον) and egotism.²⁵²

Saint Maximus does not hesitate to reveal all the time the dreadful influence of this passion and he continually repeats that “self-love, as has often been said, is the cause of all impassioned thoughts (ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμοί). For from them are produced the three generic thoughts (οἱ τρεῖς γενικώτατοι λογισμοί) of desire: that of gluttony (γαστριμαργία); that of avarice (φιλαργυρία); and that of vainglory (κενοδοξία)”²⁵³.

Considerable importance for the examination of self-love, according to Saint Maximus, can be found in his interpretation of how self-love creates its genealogy. The genealogy of

²⁵⁰ Ὅσον δέ ταύτης (τῆς τῶν γνωσθέντων ὑλικῶν αἰσθητικῆς ἀπολαύσεως) ἐνεφορεῖτο, τοσοῦτον τῆς ἐκ ταύτης γεννωμένης φιλαυτίας ἐξῆπτε τόν ἐρωτα· ὅσον δέ πεφροντισμένως περιποιεῖτο τῆς φιλαυτίας τόν ἐρωτα, τοσοῦτον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡς τῆς φιλαυτίας οὔσης καί γεννήματος καί τέλους, πολλούς ἐπενόει τρόπους συστάσεως. *Thal., prol., I, 253D; comp. Völker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens, p. 114.*

²⁵¹ Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens, p. 111.*

²⁵² Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner, p. 181.* Comp. also about Self-love the work of Irene Hausherr, *Philautie. De la tendresse pour soi à la charité selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Rome 1952.* St. Maximus uses two different forms for the aspects of self-love: the pleasing of oneself (*autareskeia*) is the weaker form applicable to the incensive power of the soul and to egotistic conduct in relation to one's neighbour, while self-love (*philautia*) proper is applicable to the appetitive aspect of the soul and to man's relation to God. See for this, Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos, p. 96.*

²⁵³ Ἡ φιλαυτία ὡς πολλάκις εἶρηται πάντων τῶν ἐμπαθῶν λογισμῶν αἰτία καθίσταται. Ἐκ γάρ ταύτης γεννῶνται οἱ τρεῖς γενικώτατοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας λογισμοί· ὁ τῆς γαστριμαργίας, καί ὁ τῆς φιλαργυρίας καί τῆς κενοδοξίας. *Char. III, 56.*

self-love , for St. Maximus, commences from Paradise where man, used by the devil, expressed an unfaithful and inexcusable behaviour in opposition to God. For the holy father, that happened because of the passion of self love, which man experienced and used it against his Creator. In my opinion this is the point where the genealogy of self-love begins. Through self-love, St. Maximus continues, man destroyed every holy, moral and valuable quality given to him by God. The result of man's unfaithfulness to God came, for St. Maximus, when the devil convinced him to turn his behaviour against his nature, i.e against the elements of the God's presence in his life, and thus he continued, from then on, to foster his existence not with the God's presence, but with self-love. After this point come the ideas Saint Maximus considers interlinked to the genealogy of self-love.

“There are three greatest, primordial evils, through which all other evils are engendered; I mean the ignorance, the self-love, and the tyranny. These depend on and bond with one another”. St. Maximus, therefore, examines self-love in connection with another two aspects: the aspect of “ignorance” and the aspect of “tyranny”. He considers self-love as the centre of these aspects and thus places it in the middle of their relationship, indicating that self-love constitutes the negative counterbalancing factor for the man's inner disorientation. Through these three aspects, we observe the holy father putting his anthropology in some kind of modern psychological framework which elaborates more the aspect of self-love and expresses it through a broader theoretical structure. In this broader theoretical structure, Saint Maximus investigates self-love as a pure psychological condition which holds links to aspects manifesting strong psychospiritual attachment to procedures complicating the struggle of man against selfish experiences²⁵⁴ .

²⁵⁴ This paragraph comes from *Letter II, PG 91, 396D-397A*. I have paraphrased this quotation except for the parts in quotation marks. The whole text is as follows: Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κατ' ἀρχάς τόν ἄνθρωπον ὁ ἀπατήσας διάβολος, δόλω κακούργως μεμηχανημένω διά φιλαυτίας, καθ' ἡδονῆς προσβολήν

Self-love impels man to extremes, because it purports to satisfy his sensual tendencies.²⁵⁵ “It is certain that self-love compartmentalises human nature in many segments”.²⁵⁶ These compartmentalisations impede the unification of the personality, enslaving it with egocentric and conceited (οιητικαί) expression.

“Self-love derives from ignorance of God”.²⁵⁷ Ignorance means a necessary lack of virtue, therefore, erosion of life and, naturally, self-love and not love for God.²⁵⁸ Saint Maximus links ignorance of God with idolisation of the creation and in a difficult but important passage in the *Questions to Thalassius* shows how such idolatry of the created order is bound up with self-love which in turn leads to entanglement in pleasure and pain.²⁵⁹

ἀπατήσας, Θεοῦ καὶ ἀλλήλων ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὴν γνώμην διέστησε, τό τε εὐθές διατρέψας, καὶ τὴν φύσιν κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον μερίσας, κατέτεμεν εἰς πολλὰς δόξας καὶ φαντασίας, καὶ τὴν ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ κακῶ μεθοδόν τε καὶ εὑρεσιν, τῷ χρόνῳ νόμον κατέστησε, ταῖς ἡμῶν πρὸς τοῦτο δυνάμεσι συγχρησάμενος, καὶ πονηρόν πρὸς διαμονὴν τοῦ κακοῦ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνθέμενος ἔρεισμα, τό κατὰ τὴν γνώμην ἀσύμβατον· ἀφ’ οὗ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπαξ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως τραπήναι παρέπεισε, καὶ πρὸς τό κεκωλυμένον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτετραμμένου κινήσαι τὴν ὄρεξιν, καὶ τρία τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀρχαῖα κακά, καὶ πάσης ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακίας γεννητικὰ ἐαυτῷ ὑποστήσασθαι· ἀγνοίαν, φημί, καὶ φιλαυτίαν, καὶ τυραννίδα, ἀλλήλων ἐξηρημέναις, καὶ ἀλλήλων συνισταμέναις.

²⁵⁵ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 57.

²⁵⁶ Ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φιλαυτία ...εἰς πολλὰς μοίρας τὴν μίαν φύσιν εἰς πολλὰς δόξας καὶ φαντασίας κατέτεμεν. PG 90, 1196A, *Diversa capita* I, 46.

²⁵⁷ Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ ἀγνοίας ἡ φιλαυτία. PG 91, 397A; *Scholia* II 221.

²⁵⁸ Νικολάου Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατὰ τὸν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, Athens 1980, pp. 257-258.

²⁵⁹ Ἡ περὶ Θεόν ἀγνοία, τὴν κτίσιν ἐθεοποίησεν· ἥς ὑπάρχει λατρεία σαφής, ἡ κατὰ τό σῶμα τοῦ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φιλαυτία· περὶ ἣν ἐστὶν ὡσπερ τις μικτὴ γνώσις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς

It is significant that the holy father considers ignorance of God as leading to idolisation of nature. An oncoming process of this idolatry towards creation is the “settlement” of self-love in the world. Through the behaviour of self-love one simultaneously experiences two other obstacles, on the one hand pleasure, whilst on the other pain. Pleasure and pain are for the holy father a powerful dipolar manifestation of stagnation and disbalancing. Through pleasure one attempts to cohabit with his passions without rejecting them, whilst through pain he experiences the fear that appears when these passions are not served or not exercised by him, and thus through it he endeavours to keep the cohabitation with his passions intact, a situation which will be continued endlessly.

An explanation given by Saint Maximus in the question raised above as to why one deifies creation, is the following: “For one cannot worship the creation, without showing caring for his body; just as one cannot worship God, without purging the soul through virtues. Thus, man performs corrupting worship in accordance with his body and in himself he becomes selfish, having both activated pleasure and pain endlessly. He eats

πειρα καί τῆς ὀδύνης· δι’ ἧς ἡ πᾶσα τῶν κακῶν ἐπεισήχθη τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰλὺς, διαφορῶς τε καί ποικίλως, καί οὐκ ἂν τις ἐφίκοιτο λόγος, πολυμόρφως συνισταμένη, καθόσον ἕκαστος τῶν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μετεληφῶτων φύσεως, κατὰ τό ποσόν τε καί ποιόν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ζῶσαν ἔχει καί πράττουσαν τὴν περὶ τό φαινόμενον αὐτοῦ μέρος· λέγω δέ τό σῶμα, φιλίαν, ἀναγκάζουσαν αὐτόν δουλοπρεπῶς, διά τε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς ἡδονῆς, καί τόν φόβον τῆς ὀδύνης· πολλάς ιδέας ἐπινοῆσαι παθῶν, καθῶς, ἅ τε καιροί συμπίπτουσι καί τά πράγματα, καί ὁ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδέχεται τρόπος· ἐφ’ ᾧ τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν ἐλεῖν δυναθῆναι διαπαντός πρός συμβίωσιν· τῆς ὀδύνης δέ παντελῶς ἀνέπαφον διαμεῖναι, τό ἀμήχανον ἐπιτηδεύειν διδάσκουσιν, καί εἰς πέρας κατὰ σκοπόν ἔλθειν μὴ δυνάμενον. PG 90, 260A, Q.

Th. 14.

eternally from the tree of disobedience, i.e the tree of good and evil in accordance to the same (tree) which has mixed knowledge according to the senses through experience”.²⁶⁰

From our analysis of Saint Maximus so far, we may assume he means that creation itself acquires evil behaviour when its *logoi* are involved by men in procedures with natural capabilities which please the senses. The evil behaviour of creation derives from the man who “tasted” the wood of the knowledge of good and evil. Since then, creation and, by extension, nature reaps the fruits of man’s disobedience.

Saint Maximus describes also self-love not only in terms of daemonic influences, but also in terms of its psychological context. Self - love is man’s self- suffering. It is the moral problem of his own existence.²⁶¹ It is connected with imposition. It places man’s interests above anything else and it is not concerned whether this behaviour expresses selfishness and a struggle to self-realisation. Then man thinks only for himself and he harms others, so long as his selfish imperatives are satisfied. It transforms man to a beast, warping and diluting his healthy characteristics by employing as its means instability and denigration.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Οὐ γάρ δύναται τις λατρεύειν τῇ κτίσει, μή τό σῶμα περιποιούμενος· ὡσπερ οὐδέ τῷ Θεῷ τις λατρεύειν, μή τήν ψυχὴν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐκκαθαίρων. Καθ’ ὃ σῶμα τήν φθοροποιὸν ἐπιτελῶν λατρείαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καί καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ γενόμενος φίλαυτος, ἡδονὴν εἶχεν ἀπαύστως, καί ὀδύνην ἐνεργουμένην ἐσθίων ἀεί τοῦ ξύλου τῆς παρακοῆς, το καλοῦ τε καί κακοῦ κατά ταυτόν μεμιγμένην κατά τήν αἴσθησιν διά τῆς πείρας ἔχον τήν γνώσιν. Q. Th. Prologue, Scripta Sacrae P.G. 90, 257 C.

²⁶¹ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 56.

²⁶² Πάντων γάρ ἀνθρώπων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ τε σώματος καί τῶν ἐκτός τροπή καί ἀλλοίωσις· φέρουσα τε καί φερομένη καί μόνον τοῦτο κεκτημένη σταθερόν τε καί βάσιμον, τό ἄστατον καί φερόμενον. PG 91, 1105B, Ambigua 135b.

Self-love is a man's instability immersed in material possessions. If one befriends himself in this passion without rejecting it, then he creates a plethora of passions.²⁶³ Preoccupation with it explains each fall (πτώσις) of the soul towards the material, the earthly and not divine.²⁶⁴

“From the selfish, i.e the gluttonous λογισμός, follows invariably the λογισμός of fornication (πορνεία) and of avarice and of grief (λύπη), and of anger (ὀργή), and of listlessness (ἀκηδία), and of vainglory, and of pride”²⁶⁵.

“Overeating and gluttony cause licentiousness. Avarice and vainglory cause one to hate one's neighbour. Self-love, the mother of vices, is the cause of all these things”²⁶⁶. By

²⁶³ Εἰ μὲν δι' ἡδονῆς τῆς φιλαυτίας φροντίζομεν, γεννώμεν τὴν γαστριμαργίαν, τὴν ὑπερηφανείαν, τὴν κενοδοξίαν, τὴν φυσιώσιν, τὴν φιλαργυρίαν, τὴν πλεονεξίαν, τὴν τυραννίδα, τὸν γαῦρον, τὴν ἀλαζονείαν, τὴν ἀπόνοιαν, τὴν μανίαν, τὴν οἶσιν, τὸν τύφον, τὴν καταφρόνησιν, τὴν ὕβριν, τὸ βέβηλον, τὸ εὐτράπελον, τὴν ἀσωτείαν, τὴν ἀκολασίαν, τὴν περπερείαν, τὸν μετεωρισμόν, τὴν βλακειάν, τὸν αἰκισμόν, τὸν ἐκμυκτηρισμόν, τὴν πολυλογίαν, τὴν ἀκαιρολογίαν, τὴν αἰσχρολογίαν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιοῦτου γένους ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον δι' ὀδύνης ὁ τῆς φιλαυτίας αἰκίζεται τρόπος, γεννώμεν τὸν θυμόν, τὸν φθόνον, τὸ μῖσος, τὴν ἔχθραν, τὴν μνησικακίαν, τὴν λοιδορίαν, τὴν καταλαλίαν, τὴν συκοφαντίαν, τὴν λύπην, τὴν ἀνελπιστίαν, τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν, τὴν τῆς προνοίας διαβολήν, τὴν ἀκηδίαν, τὴν ὀλιγωρίαν, τὴν ἀθυμίαν, τὴν δυσθυμίαν, τὴν ὀλιγοψυχίαν, τὸ ἀκαιρον πένθος, τὸν κλαυθμόν, τὴν κατήφειαν, τὸν ὀλοφυρισμόν, τὸν ζῆλον, τὴν ζηλοτυπίαν, τὴν παραζήλωσιν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῆς τῶν καθ' ἡδονὴν ἀφορμῶν ἐστερημένης ἐστίν διαθέσεως· (ὡς καὶ) τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, τὴν εἰρωνείαν, τὸν δόλον, τὴν προσποίησιν, τὴν κολακείαν (καὶ) τὴν ἀνθρωπαρέσκειαν. PG90, 256C-D, Q.Th. 13.

²⁶⁴ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 408.

²⁶⁵ Ὁ φίλαυτος, ἤγουν γαστριμαργος λογισμός, ᾧ παρέπεται πάντως ὁ τῆς πορνείας λογισμός, καὶ ὁ τῆς φιλαργυρίας, καὶ ὁ τῆς λύπης, καὶ ὁ τῆς ὀργῆς, καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀκηδίας, καὶ ὁ τῆς κενοδοξίας, καὶ ὁ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας. PG 90, 464D, Q. Th. 20.

displaying all these faults, man manifests, at least, greed (ἀπληστία). He considers himself protected by practising all activities, which these faults suggest to him and he abandons every effort of self-betterment. On other occasions his self-love is expressed by overeating (πολυφαγία) and by his excessive gluttonous tendencies (ήδυφαγία) and he proves that self-love is the mother and the cause of both. Man may recognise this, but essentially he fails to accept it. Self-love leads what Karen Horney called the “ideal self”. Thus he does not pause in breaking up his rapport with his fellow man, since his own concern is his own projection to...himself.

Self-love turns to hatred towards fellow men, which also turns to debauchery. This triptych displays according to Saint Maximus the close connection of self-love with vices representing ways of demonstration of its traits. The holy father in the analysis he provides of self-love attempts to clarify, as far as possible, more phenomena having links with it. When one feels hatred to one’s fellow human, one naturally behaves as avaricious and vainglorious towards them, with the result of coming consequently to debauchery, which renders him slave in material pursuits of every form and manifestation.

The above passions testify indisputably to their close coherence with self-love. All of them co-operate with each other in serving self-love, they harbour and perpetuate its material purposes and corrupt the human entity which totters, by “being in the pay” of them, from one passion to another, from “out of the frying-pan into the fire”.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ Πολυφαγία καί ήδυφαγία, ἀκολασίας εἰσὶν αἰτία· φιλαργυρία δέ καί κενοδοξία, μίσους πρὸς τὸν πλησίον. Ἡ δέ τούτων μήτηρ φιλαυτία τῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἐστὶν αἰτία. *Char.* III, 7.

²⁶⁷ For the English “out of the frying-pan into the fire”, we use in Greece the motto “between Scylla (Σκύλλα) and Charybdis (Χάρυβδη)” (ἀπό τῆ Σκύλλα στή Χάρυβδη) meaning the slavery of oneself in points of no return.

“Stop therefore” advises St. Maximus “pleasing yourself and you will not hate your brother; stop loving yourself and you will love God”.²⁶⁸ Insolence is a common characteristic of selfishness and self-love. “For the obliteration of self-love and the obviating of all its ensuing passions, man must divest himself of the desire of lust and of the fear of pain”²⁶⁹.

When one expels all the characteristics of self-love, one converts each notion of selfishness from negative to positive, one abandons the bidding of his narcissistic pursuits and turns “bad” selfishness into “good”. He adores God as is proper, he revamps the “bad” self-love into “good” self-love towards God, while seeking his internal reconstitution. Thus, Saint Maximus says, “we set ourselves upwardly to the spiritual knowledge of the Creator, we exchange the malicious self-love with the good and intellectual one, and we always seek through God the restoration of our soul”²⁷⁰.

And he concludes: “It is fearful and heinous thing for us, because of our love for things corruptible, deliberately to kill the life that was given to us by God as the gift of the Holy Spirit. Those who have trained themselves to prefer truth of self-love, will certainly know this fear”²⁷¹.

²⁶⁸ Μή ἔσο αὐτάρεσκος, καί οὐκ ἔση μισάδελφος· καί μή ἔσο φίλαυτος καί ἔση φιλόθεος. *Char.* IV, 37.

²⁶⁹ Τῆς μέν ἡδονῆς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καί τῆς ὀδύνης δέ τὸν φόβον ἀποβαλλόμενοι, τῆς κακῆς ἐλευθερούμεθα φιλαυτίας. PG 90, 260C-D, Q. Th. 14.

²⁷⁰ Πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν ἀναβιβασθέντες τοῦ Κτίσαντος, καί πονηρᾶς ἀγαθὴν ἀντιλαμβάνοντες νοεράν φιλαυτίας, ἐκ Θεοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰεὶ ζητοῦντες σύστασιν. PG 90, 260C-D, Q. Th. 14.; PG 91, 397B, Epistle 2.

²⁷¹ Φοβερὸν ὄντως καί πάσης κατακρίσεως ὑπερέκεινα, τό τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν παρά Θεοῦ κατὰ δωρεάν τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος, ἐκουσίως νεκρῶσαι ζωὴν· καί ἴσασι πάντως τοῦτον τὸν φόβον, οἱ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς φιλαυτίας προτιμᾶν μελετήσαντες. *Cap. theolog. et oecon.* I, 39.

Λ) ΠΡΙΔΕ (Υπερηφανεία)

“Conceit is a truly accursed passion. It is a combination of two vices, pride and vainglory. Pride denies the cause of virtue and nature... A proud man does nothing that accords with God’s will”²⁷². The basic support of conceit (τύφος) is, according to St. Maximus, pride and vainglory. Assisted by them, it rejects any reasoning in support of any virtue and any start of any natural activity. God never co-operates in its disorientation, because it not only harms man’s relation with Him but it also destroys human interrelations.

The proud man combines the following characteristics:

- a) “contempt (καταφρόνησις) and blasphemy (βλασφημία) towards God’s providence (πρόνοια)”²⁷³
- b) “estrangement (άλλοτριώσις) of nature where everything is used to excess thus destroying its propriety”²⁷⁴
- c) “rejection of the fact that God is Creator of both, virtue and nature, being vainglorious and dividing nature so to treat some things as worthless. By willing rejection towards God, one also ignores the e-

²⁷² Q. Th. 64, P.G. 90, 716AB.

²⁷³ ...τήν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καταφρόνησιν, καθ’ ἣν πέφυκεν βλασφημῶς διαβάλλειν τὴν πρόνοιαν. Q.Th. 64, PG 90, 716B.

²⁷⁴ Πρὸς τὴν φύσιν κεκτημένος τὴν ἀλλοτριώσιν, καθ’ ἣν πάντα τὰ τῆς φύσεως παρὰ τὴν φύσιν μεταχειρίζεται, τῷ κατὰ παράρησιν τρόπῳ, τὴν τῆς φύσεως παραφθειρῶν εὐπρέπειαν. Ibid.

qual honour existing according to the nature".²⁷⁵

The importance of pride, as it given by St. Maximus, implies man's attempt not to honour the Divine and to ignore the weakness of man's nature.²⁷⁶ In this way he proves conclusively that "he is divested of both human or divine knowledge".²⁷⁷ Can this behaviour of man against God be ever justified? ask St. Maximus. If yes, then it ought to be endowed with certain absolving factors which dilute the intensity of this behaviour. If not, then man is totally without excuse and for self-correction he must seek the reasons within his own self. In both the above cases, one could maintain that St. Maximus shows man where the folly of his own reasoning lies, whilst he tries to provide the right solutions against his sinfulness. That is to say: "The passion of pride consists of two ignorances. Both ignorances, when coming into unity, constitute one confused prudence. Because proud is the man who will ignore divine help and human weakness"²⁷⁸ In the first one he excuses him, referring to the birth of pride out of two ignorances that coalesce and compose man's behaviour in one obscure belief: Man, experiencing this situation, ignores God's possible help towards salvation from his passions. In the second one he remains unconscious of his own ailment. "He", therefore, "remains inexcusable because of the

²⁷⁵ Ὑπερηφανίας ἰδίων, τό ἀρνεῖσθαι τόν Θεόν ἀρετῆς εἶναι γενέτην καί φύσεως· κενοδοξίας δέ, τό μερίζειν τήν φύσιν πρός ὕφειν...Θεοῦ ἄρνησιν ἐκούσιον ἔχουσα καί τῆς κατά φύσιν ἰσοτιμίας ἄγνοιαν. Q. Th., 38; PG 90, 1349 D, *Capita Theolog. et oeconom.* V, 6.

²⁷⁶ Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 293.

²⁷⁷ Ὑπερηφάνεια ἐστὶ θείας καί ἀνθρωπίνης γνώσεως στέρησις. PG 90, 585C, Q. Th. 56, S.4.

²⁷⁸ Τό τῆς ὑπερηφανίας πάθος, ἐκ δύο συνέστηκεν ἀγνοιῶν· δύο δέ συνελθούσαι πρός ἔνωσιν ἄγνοιαί, μίαν φρόνησιν συγκεχυμένην ἀποτελοῦσιν· ὁ μόνος γάρ ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶν ὑπερήφανος, ὁ καί τήν θεῖαν βοήθειαν καί τήν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀγνοήσας ἀσθένειαν... PG. 90, 585C, Q. Th. 56, S.

antipaedagogic habit of presumptuousness (οἷσις), which brings about the illness of pride and the tendency to stand against God”²⁷⁹.

“When you see arrogant men not able to endure praise being given to others better than themselves, and contriving to suppress the truth by denying it with countless insinuations and baseless slanders, you must understand that the Lord is again crucified by these men and buried and guarded with soldiers and seals”.²⁸⁰ When man behaves proudly he reflects in himself those who from arrogance and hostility and hatred led Christ on the cross. This means that Christ is always crucified in a spiritual way, if one does not exhibit the humility which Christ demonstrated, and thus he been nailed on the cross. Lack of humility betrays the existence of every passion corrupting this virtue. For Saint Maximus the conceited man is himself the one who crucifies the Lord without accepting the redemption that accrues from the cross. The notion of the Lord’s burial, I think, implies for Saint Maximus the “concealment” of one’s responsibilities for what he did against God, or if we would like in a better interpretation, against himself, because he is not to be purged of oncoming guilt feelings.

A second means of expressing it is by not recognising his own faults but dressing them up as his assets and virtues. A third is by avoiding judging in equal honour his behaviour and tactics, knowing that by doing so he will reveal his lies and he will let others

²⁷⁹ Η...οἷσις ἀπαιδαγώγητος μένουσα, τό τῆς ὑπερηφανίας γεννᾶν πέφυκε νόσημα, τό τήν ἀντικειμένην τῷ Θεῷ φέρον διάθεσιν. PG 90, 500B, Q. Th. 5; 1265A, Cap. theolog. et oeconom. III, 13...τῇ νόσῳ τῆς φυσιοῦσης οἰήσεως. PG 90, 708C, Q. Th. 64.

²⁸⁰ Ὅταν ἴδῃς τινάς ὑπερηφάνους μή φέροντας ἐπαινέσθαι τοὺς κρείττονας, ἀκήρυκτόν τε μηχανωμένους ποιεῖν τήν λαλουμένην ἀλήθειαν, μυρίους αὐτήν ἀπείργοντας πειρασμοῖς καί ἀθεμίτοις διαβολαῖς, νόει μοι πάλιν ὑπό τούτων σταυροῦσθαι τόν Κύριον καί θάπτεσθαι. Cap. theol. et oecon. I, 65.

understand his personal predicament. He, therefore, tries to embrace his fellow sufferers becoming chief, because of his faults.

“He who feels proud for his virtue or his knowledge without showing virtue as a talent donated by God, which also is cultivated through industriousness, he expands the realisation of his own weakness, and thus he does not avoid the bad behaviour of pride”.

²⁸¹. A fourth, therefore, is by boasting about virtues i.e knowledge of God, while ignoring the fact that virtue is a gift from God and its measure is the correction and cure of the personal ailment called pride.

The abilities and qualities which man carelessly attributes to himself, whether or not true, are classed as powerful products of pride. Man creates a picture of himself which is only his. He considers he is the unique personification of virtues and graces (χαρίσματα), he is willfully blind towards his own deficiencies and he explains everything as by-products of his own abilities. The pride which is latent in all these, makes him a slave of the above; it teaches him how to impose upon others and how to idealise his own deficiencies and it entraps and debars him from any redeeming attempt. Man’s life is propped up by self-delusory and false experiences which achieve anything but good and they strengthen within man this passion called pride; thus forcing him to translate it and to experience it as the supreme virtue of his life.

The only escape from this tunnel of psychospiritual darkness, is “for someone to become a person of understanding and moderation (μετριότης), and not to be a slave to the passion of conceit, continually searching among created things for what is hidden from his knowledge. When someone finds that there are vast numbers of different things that

²⁸¹ Ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ τὴν γνῶσιν ἐπαιρόμενος καὶ μὴ τῷ μέτρῳ τῆς ἐν χάριτι ἀρετῆς, ἦτοι προκοπῆς, συνεπεκτείνων τῆς οἰκείας ἀσθενείας τὴν ἐπὶ γνωμοσύνην, τὸ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας κακὸν οὐ διέφυγεν. Q. Th. 56, S. 7.

escape his notice, one will wonder at his ignorance and abase his presumption. And when one has come to know oneself, one will understand many great and wonderful things; for to think that one knows prevents one from advancing in knowledge".²⁸²

When, therefore, one examines oneself in this way, one will be and remain a conscientious personality, checking his deficiencies, working not on what cultivates them, but on what cleanses them from stains and blemishes. By behaving like this, one is transformed into a strengthened personality.

²⁸² Εἰ θέλεις γενέσθαι ἐπιγνώμων καὶ μέτριος καὶ τῷ πάθει τῆς οἰήσεως μὴ δουλεύειν, αἰεὶ ζήτηε ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τι ἐστὶ κρυπτόμενον τὴν σὴν γνῶσιν καὶ εὕρισκων πάμπολλα καὶ διάφορα πράγματα λανθάνοντά σε, θαυμάσεις τε ἐπὶ τῇ σῇ ἀγνωσίᾳ καὶ συστελλεῖς τὸ φρόνημα· καί, σεαυτὸν ἐπιγνοὺς, συνήσεις πολλά καὶ μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστά πράγματα· ἐπεὶ τὸ νομίζειν εἰδέναί, οὐκ ἔῃ προκόπτειν εἰς τὸ εἰδέναί. *Char.* III, 81.

Ρ) WRATH (Ὀργή) - ANGER (Θυμός) - HATRED (Μίσος)

Wrath represents everything which stands opposite to calmness. It is the cause of many disturbances in the psychosomatic world of man and brings with it, as undesirable by-products, anger and hatred. St. Maximus accurately describes it as the passion of the incensive aspect of the soul. Wrath springs from *hybris* (ὕβρις) and the diminution which an individual experiences by someone else. Saint Maximus says, therefore: “when you are insulted by a person or humiliated, guard against angry thoughts”.²⁸³

The wrathful person (ὁ ὀργιζόμενος) schemes against the person towards whom he directs his wrath, in any way which contradicts good.²⁸⁴ St. Maximus perceives grief as the unavoidable by-product of wrath. Both these are based on vainglory (κενοδοξία), on dishonour (ἀτιμία) and on preoccupation with matter.²⁸⁵ In St. Maximus we encounter a psychological mechanism between these two. Grief, according to him, is more easily perceivable rather than wrath.²⁸⁶ Certainly, “there are things that distress us and this does mean that they are always the same as those that make us angry; the things that distress us being far more numerous than those which make us angry. For example, the fact that something has been broken, or lost, or that a certain person has died, may only distress us. But other things may both distress us and make us angry, if we lack the spirit of divine

²⁸³ Ὄταν ὑβρισθῆς παρά τινος ἢ ἐν τινι ἐξουδενωθῆς, τότε πρόσεχε ἀπό τῶν λογισμῶν τῆς ὀργῆς... *Char.* I, 29.

²⁸⁴ Καί γάρ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, ἥτοι θυμούμενος, κακόν τι ποιούντος τοῦ πρὸς ὃν θυμοῦται, πρὸς τό ἐναντίον τοῦτον μεταγαγεῖν βουλόμενος, τουτέστι τό ἀγαθόν, τῇ τοιαύτῃ κινήσει χρήται. PG 4, 273B, Scholia in liber de Divinis Nominibus.

²⁸⁵ Ἐπί δέ τῆς ὀργῆς καί τῆς λύπης, καταφρόνει δόξας καί ἀτιμίας καί τῶν ὑλικῶν πραγμάτων. *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 288.

philosophy".²⁸⁷ Grief for St. Maximus is a feature of behaviour stronger than wrath. He stresses that the conditions provoking us to "grief" outweigh those equivalent ones of wrath. He, additionally, finds the cause of their difference in the reasons inducing them. Grief is an experience connected with persons and objects having immediate relationship with the man who grieves. It affects man as a process of personal character, and it is linked with one's immaturity in not accepting the natural "flow" of any situation or their results, if he is to blame, whilst wrath constitutes the concrete dimension of rivalry, and the disposition of irresponsibility. The holy father characterises the conditions of wrath as an unphilosophical attitude against life. We could also add that wrath consists of an external experience having internal mirrorings. Wrath wounds one's self-awareness by not confronting things from their proper and serious side, and compels man to be obsessed with perceptions betraying lack of precious interesting and constructive alternatives.

The Saint also provides to us a parallel translation of wrath under the term: "ire" (μῆνις). "Ire is not occasional wrath but persistent anger".²⁸⁸

The holy father thus considers ire as a continuous emotion. This continuity is concrete and determined for specific work. Ire is manifested through persistent wrath which not only ceases easily, but it is perpetuated dangerously by operating dismantlingly to all psychic functions of oneself. This kind of wrath is difficult to get expelled because its action overturns every opposite reaction of a man to it.

²⁸⁷ Οὐ δι' ὅσα λυπούμεθα, διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὀργιζόμεθα· πλεονάζει γὰρ τὰ τὴν λύπην ἐμποιοῦντα, παρά τὰ τὴν ὀργὴν οἷον, ἐκλάσθη τόδε, ἀπώλετο τόδε, ἀπέθανεν ὁ δεῖνα. Διὰ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα λυπούμεθα μόνον διὰ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ καὶ λυπούμεθα καὶ ὀργιζόμεθα, ἀφιλοσόφως διακείμενοι. *Char.* III, 96.

²⁸⁸ Μῆνις οὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα ὀργή, ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐπίμονος. PG 4, 428 B, Scholia in lib. de Mystica Theologia.

Naturally, very few people would readily admit that the wrath they feel within themselves is in fact a constituent result provoked from their alienation from God. This is due to the alienated pattern which generates each sentiment of wrath. The incitement to this kind of behaviour betrays a contradiction of anything which man blames himself for and of anything which fills him with wrath for his own actions. By self-critical examination and by admitting to the nature of things, and the problem of his alienation, man sees wrath as it is and he does not misinterpret it. Wrath is combated through the patience a person exercises and experiences.

St. Maximus maintains that anger starts from the “boiling (ζέσις) of blood around the heart” and that it aims to quench man’s grief against anyone who has harmed him. Anger can be divided into three parts:

- a) wrath which some call “bile” (χολή) or
“rage” (χόλος).
- b) ire.
- c) rancour (κότος).

Wrath is the alternative manifestation of the activated anger. Bile is the defensive tactic against grief. Rage is the behaviour of the being against him who caused the grief. Ire is the repressed anger, whilst rancour is the seeking of a suitable opportunity for the repayment of an evil deed.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁹ Τόν δέ θυμόν πάλιν εἶναι λέγουσιν ζέσιν τοῦ περικαρδίου αἵματος δι’ ὄρεξιν ἀντλυπήσεως. Διαιροῦσιν δέ τούτον εἰς τρία, εἰς ὄργην, ἣν τινές ἐκάλεσαν χολήν καί χόλον, καί εἰς μῆνιν, καί εἰς κότον. Καί τήν μέν ὄργην εἶναι φασί θυμόν πρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἀρχήν καί κίνησιν ἔχοντα, ἢ θυμόν ἐνεργούμενον· τήν δέ χολήν τήν δι’ ἄλλου ἄμυναν τοῦ λυπήσαντος· τόν δέ χόλον, τήν δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ λυπηθέντος ἐπεξέλευσιν εἰς τόν λυπήσαντα· τήν δέ μῆνιν θυμόν εἰς παλαιώσιν (εἴρηται δέ παρά τό μένειν καί τῇ μνήμῃ παρακατέχεσθαι)· τόν δέ κότον θυμόν ἐπιτηροῦντα καιρόν εἰς τιμωρίαν· εἴρηται δέ παρά τό κείσθαι καί οὔτος. Amb.

On this quotation we observe the holy father to refer to the data forming and composing anger through natural terms. The holy father's anthropology at this point is manifested with flexibility, because it approaches the psychological aspect of the subject "anger" within biological syntheses of the body. The terms he utilises constitute for him the particular traces where anger finds its juxtaposition at the body.

An action of anger is the accute animosity (ὄξυχολία) which offers unacceptable and unethical means when man employs it. By following the influence of anger, man demeans himself by obeying its biddings, thus becoming prey (βορά) to demons bellowing (ύλακτοῦντες or βρυχόμενοι) for his destruction.²⁹⁰ He, who is subjected to anger, behaves thus because in essence he is affected by aggression towards others. Naturally, this fear does not refer to any self-protection but it is considered as the cause of spiritual death in a person, because deep down he imitates it by conversion of the anger and the aggression he really had to feel against his real enemy, i.e the demons who never ever stop disturbing him. In my opinion this anger could also indicate that it becomes an experience of disorientation within a person's life. Its influence distresses the soul because it distorts (παρατρέπει) one's being, turning feelings of anger against passions, to anger against other people.

"Forbearance (μακροθυμία), freedom from rancour (ἀμνησικακία) gentleness, all arrest anger and prevent it from growing, while love, acts of charity, kindness and compas-

10, PG 91, 1197B-C. *Saint John Damascene* uses the same quotation as well in his work *Expositio Fidei*, Chapter 30. Both, Maximus and John Damascene took this quotation from *Nemesius*.

²⁹⁰ Ὁ κατά παρατροπήν θυμός, ἀναιρετικός ἐστι τοῖς μιμουμένοις αὐτόν ἀνθρώποις· τροφή δέ τοῖς ύλακτοῦσι καθ' ἡμῶν δαίμοσιν. PG 90, 856A, Quaest. et Dubia 68.

sion make it diminish”.²⁹¹

Hatred, finally, together with the thoughts (λογισμοί) of sensual desire, prove that the soul is tainted (ἀκάθαρτος) because it is contained by them.²⁹² Its characteristic constituents are *hypocrisy* (ὑπόκρισις), the pretence of friendship, animosity (ἔχθρα) and envy (φθόνος), which are always hidden under a false cloak of assumed love.²⁹³

The person against whom hatred is directed is our “brother”. Hatred appears as a temptation on the part of him who hates and it promises dire consequences against the instigator. If therefore a person wishes not to find himself in this controversy with his “brother”, then he must behave as St. Maximus says.

a) “Do not let yourself be overcome by this hatred, but conquer it with love. You will succeed in this, by praying to God sincerely for your brother and by accepting his apology”.²⁹⁴

b) “Do not judge as base and wicked a brother whom yesterday you regarded as spiritual and virtuous; but with long-suffering love dwell on the goodness you perceived yesterday and expel today’s hatred from your

²⁹¹ Ἐπί τοῦ θυμοῦ μακροθυμία καί ἀμνησικακία καί πραότης ἰστώσι καί οὐκ ἑώσιν αὐτόν αὔξειν ἀγάπη δέ καί ἐλεημοσύνη καί χρηστότης καί φιλανθρωπία εἰς μείωσιν ἄγουσιν. *Char.* II, 47.

²⁹² Ἀκάθαρτος ἐστὶ ψυχὴ, λογισμῶν καί ἐπιθυμίας καί μίσους πεπληρωμένη. *Char.* I, 14.

²⁹³ Ὑπόκρισις ἐστὶν, φιλίας προσποιήσις· ἢ μίσος σχήματι φιλίας κεκαλυμμένον· ἢ ἔχθρα, δι’ εὐνοίας ἐνεργουμένη· ἢ φθόνος, ἀγάπης χαρακτῆρα μιμούμενος. *Q. Th.* 56, S. 6.

²⁹⁴ Μὴ νικῶ ὑπὸ τοῦ μίσους, ἀλλὰ νίκα ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ τὸ μῖσος· νικήσεις δέ τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ προσευχόμενος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γνησίως πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, τὴν ἀπολογίαὶν αὐτοῦ δεχόμενος. *Char.* IV, 22.

soul".²⁹⁵

- c) "Do not say: "I do not hate my brother", when you simply efface the thought of him from your mind. Listen to Moses, who said "Do not hate your brother in your mind"²⁹⁶ But reprove him and you will not incur sin through him".²⁹⁷
- d) "Do not think that those who bring you reports which fill you with resentment and make you hate your brother are affectionately disposed towards you, even if they seem to speak the truth. On the contrary, turn away from them as if they were poisonous snakes, so that you may both prevent them from uttering slanders and deliver your own soul from wickedness".²⁹⁸

"A rational soul can not foster hatred towards humans, and to be at peace with God,

²⁹⁵ Μή τόν χθές πνευματικόν ἀδελφόν καί ἐνάρετον, διά τό ἐν σοι σήμερον ἐξ' ἐπηρείας τοῦ πονηροῦ ἐγγινόμενον μῖσος, κρῖνε φαῦλον καί πονηρόν· ἀλλά, διά τῆς μακροθυμούσης ἀγάπης τά χθεσινά καλά λογιζόμενος, τό σήμερον μῖσος τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπόβαλε. *Char.* IV, 26; comp. *I Cor.* 13, 4.

²⁹⁶ *Lev.* 19: 17. LXX.

²⁹⁷ Μή εἶπης, οὐ μισῶ τόν ἀδελφόν, τήν μνήμην αὐτοῦ ἀποστρεφόμενος· ἀλλά ἄκουσον Μωϋσέως λέγοντος, μή μισήσης τόν ἀδελφόν σου, τῇ διανοίᾳ σου· ἐλεγμῶ ἐλέγξης τόν ἀδελφόν σου καί οὐ λήψῃ δι' αὐτόν ἁμαρτίαν. *Char.* IV, 29.

²⁹⁸ Μή ὡς εὐνοοῦντας λογιζοῦ, τοὺς λόγους σοι φέροντας, λύπην εἰ σοί καί μῖσος πρός τόν ἀδελφόν ἐργαζομένους κἄν ἀληθεύειν δοκῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὡς θανατοῦντας ὄφεις τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀποστρέφου· ἵνα κἀκεῖνους τοῦ κακολογεῖν ἀνακόψῃς καί τήν σεαυτοῦ ψυχὴν πονηρίας ἀπαλλάξῃς. *Char.* IV, 31.

Who is the giver of the commandments? If that person does not want to be in peace, you protect yourself from hatred by praying for him properly and not abusing him to anybody”²⁹⁹. That is to say that Saint Maximus advises a person to display a rational behaviour to others, so as not to be in animosity towards God and His teaching.

I think that the holy father in this passage attempts to put one in a good frame of mind with his fellow humans. He stresses that the faithful must be always ready to develop proper relationships with others, without feeling hatred against them. To confront in oneself an assumed hatred which probably comes to the surface in one’s behaviour is to pray for them. Thus, there is no possibility of being defeated by this hatred, and also one will be in the position of accepting others as individuals with their own special needs.

The solution against hatred is found, according to St. Maximus, in forbearance (μακροθυμία) and indeed it has two ways of action:

a) “The long-suffering man is one who waits patiently for his trial to end and receives thus the boast of perseverance (καρτερία).³⁰⁰

b) “The long-suffering man abounds in understanding³⁰¹. He endures everything to the end, and while awaiting that end, patiently bears his distress. The end, as Apostle Paul says, is everlasting life” (Ζωή Αιώνιος).³⁰²

²⁹⁹ Οὐ δύναται ψυχὴ λογικὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον μῖσος τρέφουσα, πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἰρηνεύσαι, τὸν τῶν ἐντολῶν δοτῆρα. Εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνος εἰρηνεύσαι οὐ θέλει, ἀλλὰ σὺ γε σεαυτὸν ἀπὸ μίσους φύλαξον, προσευχόμενος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γνησίως καὶ μὴ κακολογεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸς τινά. *Char. IV*, 35.

³⁰⁰ Ἐκδεχόμενος (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) ὡς μακρόθυμος, τὸ τέλος τοῦ πειρασμοῦ καὶ λαμβάνων οὕτω τὸ καύχημα τῆς καρτερίας. *Char. IV*, 23.

³⁰¹ Ἄνῆρ μακρόθυμος πολὺς ἐν φρονήσει. 14, *Prov.* 29.

St. Maximus considers that, by experiencing the temptation of hatred, one must try to be benefited by it, knowing that, if one bears it without complaining, one can be led to eternal life, where man becomes free from the distress caused by sin. In my opinion, the holy father implies that temptations “sharpen” one’s spiritual demeanour and guide it towards spiritual maturity. Temptations are for Maximus the specific means through which one may become aware of psychosomatic imperfections and thus struggle towards remedying them.

According therefore to the holy father, man must learn to live with the temptation of hatred, without complaining. By accepting this temptation and every temptation:

- a) one does not blame God as the One Who sends temptations.
- b) one learns to consider them as a necessity leading into inner purgation.
- c) one takes the opportunity to be humiliated before God, and to seek for His help.

The great benefit deriving from the state of temptations is to be exercised in patience, and, of course, in humility. By displaying patience, he learns how to confront his fallen self. He does not obey in his worldly wishes, and he welcomes temptations as the motive to think more considerably about his tendency towards sin, and the fact that his existence is many times subjected to conditions dangerously established within himself, which compel him to be involved quite often in its “cogwheels”.

Acquiring therefore awareness of temptations, he considers them as a part of his spiritu-

³⁰²...ὅτι πάντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀναφέρει, καὶ κείνο περιμένων, ἀνέχεται τῶν λυπηρῶν· τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος κατὰ τὸν Ἀπόστολον (Παῦλον). *Char.* IV, 24; comp. *Rom.* 6: 22.

al immaturity. He perceives that whatever is related to them, it will sooner or later entirely vanish, because some day one will depart from life, and thus he will win his controversy with sin, because he displays tolerance against it, not of course by accepting it, but confronting it as a necessary evil, with which he "cohabits", i.e he lives with it, without embracing whatever he is being dictated; he feels consequently no distress at its presence, but he interprets it on the base of eschatological perspectives, whilst finally he considers them, if we prefer it that way, as the forerunner of eternal life, where finally everything referring to them will be entirely and irreversibly abolished.

γ) IMAGINATION (Φαντασία)

“Imagination is the representation (ἀνατύπωσις) of images to the intellect”³⁰³ It refers to the passion connected with everything relating to perceptual images. Imagination misleads the senses by making them behave in opposition to their natural character, and it forces man to experience its deleterious influence. It is divided in three parts:

- a) “Into the way of making images of what makes the sensible impression.
- b) that which makes representation out of the impression that remains from them, the images having faded.
- c) the third form (of imagination) is that in which any pleasure (ἡδονή) in what seems to the imagination to be good consists, or in the case of something that seems to be bad, the sorrow it provokes”³⁰⁴

Saint Maximus distinguishes three kinds of imagination. The first and the second of them are simply concerned with imagination as we what we might call an image-producing faculty in the mind; the third kind is more important for the holy father and is concerned

³⁰³ ...φαντασία (ἐστὶ) τό ἐν διανοίᾳ ἀνατυπωτικόν. PG 4, 205A, Scholia in liber de Divinis Nominibus.

³⁰⁴ Ἡ φαντασία πάθος καὶ τύπωσις ἀναγγελτικῆ αἰσθητοῦ τινος. (...) Διαιρεῖται γάρ ἡ φανταστικὴ (δύναμις) εἰς τρεῖς μοίρας· πρώτην μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀντιλήψεων εἰκονιστικὴν πρὸς τὰ ποιοῦντα αἰσθητὴν τὴν ἀντίληψιν· δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἐκ τῶν μενόντων ἐγκαταλλειμάτων ἀπὸ τούτων ἀνατυπωτικὴν, μὴ ἔχουσαν ἐρηρσιμένας ἐπὶ τι τὰς εἰκόνας, ἣν καὶ ἰδίως φανταστικὴν καλοῦσι· τρίτην ἐν ἣ ἅσα ἡδονὴ τοῦ κατὰ φαντασίαν δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ δοκοῦντος κακοῦ, κατὰ λύπην συνίσταται. PG 4, 201A, §V, Scholia in liber de Divinis Nominibus..

with the way in which the imagination acts as we what we might call a crucible for the passions.

The third kind of imagination functions when the soul is moved by its feelings towards what is experienced by the senses. The soul produces impassioned images and continues to desire the evil and attempts to realise it as a true experience; after this desire of evil, tries to satisfy itself with the sensual pleasure relating to it. If the sensual pleasure is not integrated in itself, then oneself experiences grief at not finding satisfaction. Finally, the thought for the realisation of imagination may come to an end if the idea promoted enters on the stage of senses, which undertake to place it in the dimension of the human body, and to bring it as soon as possible into integration.

St. Maximus describes the relationship between desire, pleasure and senses as follows: One therefore must not endure “the voluntary passions of the flesh and be seduced through the various ways of the crooked pleasure”. Everyone then “by dissolving the multi-flexible and complicated pleasure, together with all the sensory organs which entangle the self-control, converts this crooked road into a straight one”³⁰⁵.

The holy father stresses the point of the non-“seduction”, caused from “pleasure” in order for the man to satisfy the passions of the flesh. Saint Maximus’ conviction on this issue indicates on the one hand the short-lived duration of sensual pleasure, and on the other its “innovating” action against the wholesome interests of the soul. By not satisfying the passions of the flesh, one prevents the manifestation and consolidation of the sensual pleasure in his life. Simultaneously, one also liberates the virtue of self-control which, by

³⁰⁵ *Thal.* 47, I 428A and C. Μήτε τοῖς ἐκουσίαις τῆς σαρκὸς πάθει δια τῆς πολυτρόπως σκολιευομένης πλανώμενος ἡδονῆς τὴν πολυέλικτόν τε καὶ πολύπλοκον ἡδονήν, καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίαις πολυτρόπως συμπεπλεγμένην τῇ ἐγκρατεῖα διαλύσας, τὰ σκολιά εἰς θεῖον ἐποίησεν, quoted by Völker, *op. cit.* p. 116.

being hooked to the selections of the “ingenious” pleasure, was being weakened. Besides, through the rejection of pleasure, the senses are also freed which until then had been bound up in the activity of the passions; they therefore begin operating in accordance to the traits of their natural profile. By denying oneself all these opposed experiences, one cleanses the path leading into the encounter with God, and “asphalts” it through the purification in thoughts and actions.

Sometimes, pleasure which represses the entire intellectual nature plays a crucial role in the creation of passion. This sequence reveals the artificial character of imagination which is based on appearances.³⁰⁶ “First”, therefore, “the soul comes to imagine the bad; then it comes to the desire of it; then feels pleasure or grief; and finally it experiences it”³⁰⁷.

Imagination deceives (φανακίζη) the mind and it concocts imaginary representations which remain in the unconscious of the human soul.³⁰⁸ These representations eventually take root in the intellect, thus creating an habit (ἔξις) to passions.³⁰⁹ When the mind is absorbed superficially with the perceptible (τά αισθητά), it becomes the cause of impure (ἀκάθαρτα) passions.³¹⁰ Then the senses exploit the weaknesses of the mind and through imagination they impel man to obey physically their commands. Each imagination relates to present or to past experiences and it is not connected to situations which have

³⁰⁶ ...ὅπερ δηλοῖ τὴν πλασματώδη τῶν δοκούντων φαντασίαν. PG 4, 37D, S. in lib. de Coel. Hier.

³⁰⁷ ...ἐν πρώτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν φαντασίᾳ γίνεται τοῦ κακοῦ· εἶτα ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ· ἔπειτα ἐν ἡδονῇ ἢ λύπῃ· εἶθ' οὕτως ἐν αἰσθήσει. Other chapters 227, 1456 A.

³⁰⁸ ...μόνη δὲ φαντασία τὸν νοῦν φανακίζουσα...σχῆμα τοῖς οὐκ οὔσι διάκενον...PG 90, 728, Q.Th. 48.

³⁰⁹ Ὅτι κατ' εἶδος τῆς προαποκειμένης τῇ διανοίᾳ κακῆς φαντασίας, ἡ τῶν παθῶν ἔξις ἀποτελεῖται... PG 90, 300C-301A, Q.Th.16.

³¹⁰ Ὁ κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις τῶν αισθητῶν ἐναπομένων διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν νοῦς, ἀκαθάρτων γίνεται παθῶν δημιουργός. PG 90, 461A, Q.Th. 44.

not as yet occurred. It also depends upon two characteristic factors: The imaginative (τό φανταστικόν) fact and the imaginable (τό φανταζόμενον). In the core of these two, imagination thrives. With their assistance, the by-products of imagination are created, whose passion is the imaginable.³¹¹ The form of imagination is complex and it depends on the restructuring (πρόσπλασις) of the material things.³¹²

I think that Saint Maximus implies here the close connection existing between pleasure, senses and imagination. In my opinion, that connection is expressed through futile and superficial searches which stimulate more one's sinfulness and make one a slave to passionate and illusory expectations, which not only disorientate, but also may last for a long time. The connection between pleasure, senses and imagination "drags" one to behaviour and attitudes which harm one's inner potentialities.

The person who leads a life full of imaginative behavioural patterns, falls victim of two misconceptions: Either he creates an unsubstantial idea in which he experiences the knowledge of God or he renders the action of the Divine commands a soulless idol (εἶδωλον). The knowledge which is expressed without the passion of imagination, does not have or cause any negative reactions to the human existence, whilst obedience to commands in the absence of the rational, offers knowledge as the inanimate (ἄψυχον)

³¹¹ ...πάσα φαντασία ἢ τῶν παρόντων, ἢ, τῶν παρελθόντων τῶν δέ μήπω γενομένων παντάπασιν ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς. Σχέσις γάρ ἐστι τοῖς ἄκροις δι' ἑαυτῆς μεσιτεύουσα. Ἄκρα δέ φημι, τό τε φανταστικόν, καί τό φανταστόν, ἐξ ὧν διά μέσης τῆς φαντασίας, σχέσεως οὐσης τῶν ἄκρων, τό φάντασμα γίνεται, πέρας ὑπάρχον ἐνεργείας καί πάθους, ἐνεργείας μὲν τοῦ φανταστικοῦ, πάθους δέ τοῦ φανταστοῦ, τῶν διά μέσης τῆς φαντασίας, σχέσεων αὐτῶν ὑπαρχούσης περὶ αὐτό, ἀλλήλοις συναπτομένων ἄκρων. PG 91, 1263A.

³¹² ...σύνθετον αὐτῇ μορφήν ἐπιτιθέντες τῆς ἀναλειφθείσης κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν ὕλης τό εἶδος, προσπλάττοντες. PG 90, 249C,Q.Th. Prol. 7.

idol of any action, whatsoever.³¹³

Imagination operates through temptations (πειρασμικῶς). The worldly idol (χθόνιον εἶδωλον) which it offers to man, is full of megalomaniac tendencies. The fancies which derive from such behaviour, swamp (κατακλύζουσιν) every part of man's existence and they foment (ὑποθάλλουσιν) the creation of worse conditions, such as passions.

Thus, the wish to be liberated from the deceitful imagination of the senses ought to be the first care and aspiration of the sufferer. By this benefit, man changes course, he conforms to the promise of every Divine knowledge and he rids himself of every passion and each material fancy.³¹⁴ An equal purging is experienced also by the mind. When man has a lucid mind he receives the gift of wisdom (σοφία).³¹⁵ The departure of the mind from the perceptual reality signifies change, progress and transformation of the senses, so that they may not work entirely and solely for the perceptible but they may be in full accord with the intellectual functions.³¹⁶ The liberation of the mind from the slavery (δουλεία) of the senses, means the end of its stagnation and its free passage (πόρευσις)

³¹³ Ὁ δ' ὀποτέραν τούτων τῆς ἐτέρας ἔχων διεζευγμένην ἢ τὴν γνῶσιν ἀνυπόστατον ἐποίησεν φαντασίαν ἢ τὴν πράξιν ἄψυχον κατέστησεν εἶδωλον· γνῶσις γάρ ἀπρακτος φαντασίας οὐδὲν διενήνοχεν· ὑφεστῶσαν αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν οὐκ ἔχουσα καὶ πράξις ἀλόγιστος ἀψύχῳ ταυτὸν εἰδῶλῳ καθέστηκε, ψυχούσαν αὐτὴν γνῶσιν οὐκ ἔχουσα. PG 90, 692A, Scholia 22; comp. Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατὰ τὸν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 370.

³¹⁴ ...τῆς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀπατηλῆς φαντασίας ἐλεύθεροι, τὴν πρὸς τὰς θείας ἐπαγγελίας γνωστικῆς ποιούμενοι πορείαν, ἐσμέν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ τῶν παθῶν λέγω, καὶ πάσης ὕλικῆς φαντασίας καθαρευούσῃ καταστάσει. PG 91, 1369B, Ambigua 247b.

³¹⁵ Ὁ τὸν νοῦν πάσης αἰσθητῆς φαντασίας ποιήσας καθαρὸν, δέχεται σοφίαν. PG 90, 617C, Q. Th. 59, S. 3.

³¹⁶ Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατὰ τὸν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 76.

towards God.³¹⁷

For St. Maximus, when man's mental attitude does not contain an enslavement (ὕπο δουλείαν) to sensual fancies, it acquires the *angelic* (ἀγγελικὴν or νοητήν) non-material knowledge. However, this only happens, if the correlation (συζυγία) between vision (θεωρία) and action (πρᾶξις) does not lose its cohesiveness; otherwise knowledge³¹⁸ is ineffective and it does not differ at all from imagination. The action is without a "soul" because it is devoid of the rational and, in other words, it constitutes an idol.³¹⁹

The Holy Father stresses that man, through ascetic efforts can reach to the natural motion of his nature, abandoning to his past, his weakened and misdirected self, which was derived from the fancies (φαντασίαι) of his senses.³²⁰

³¹⁷ Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατά τόν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 77.

³¹⁸ ...τούς καθαρὰν αἰσθητῆς φαντασίας δεξαμένους τὴν ἄῦλον γνῶσιν τῶν νοητῶν. PG 90, 292A, Q.Th. 10.

³¹⁹ Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατά τόν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 201.

³²⁰ Ταύτας (τάς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς) ἔχων ὑγιεῖς καὶ ἀνεξαπατήτους, συνάγει τόν πολύν λαόν, τά ἐξ αὐτῶν εὐσεβῆ δῆλον ὅτι κατά φύσιν κινήματά τε καὶ διανοήματα (εἶναι). Ὑδατα δέ τά ἐξω τῆς πόλεως, τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς, τά ποιοῦντα τόν ποταμόν τόν διορίζοντα διά μέσου τῆς πόλεως, εἰσὶ τά κατά τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν, δι' ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἐκ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν αἰσθητοῦ παραπεμπόμενά τε καὶ εἰσρέοντα τῇ ψυχῇ νοήματα· ἐξ ὧν ὁ διερχόμενος ὡς πόλιν τὴν ψυχὴν, τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιστήμης ποταμοῦ δίκην ἀποτελεῖται λόγος· ὃν ἕως ἔχει διερχόμενον αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴν, οὐκ ἀποβάλλεται τὰς τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰκόνας τε καὶ φαντασίας· δι' ὧν ἐφισταμένη πολεμεῖν αὐτὴν πέφυκεν ἢ πονηρὰ καὶ ὀλέθριος δύναμις (τῶν πονηρῶν πνευμάτων). PG 90, 449D, Q.Th. 49.; comp. *Mystagogy*...pp. 64-65.

Δ) GREED (ΠΛΕΟΝΕΞΙΑ)

Greed is a factor which promotes and generates passions.³²¹ It is observed in human beings in the form of anxiety for the forever increasing acquisition of earthly goods. The greedy person associates with all the noisome characteristics, relating to material abuse. He sets as his aim his egotistic imposition upon creativity. He considers that everything belongs to him; he does not wish to comprehend that by his behaviour he misinterprets the tendency of reciprocal love of the Creator towards his creations. His desires to own everything turns him into a hapless and impersonal subject to the biddings of passions. Therefore, instead of ascending spiritually, he descends into the darkness, inducing abyss of inhumanity.

Greed is the agent which corrupts (διαφθείρει) equanimity (ισονομία).³²² Its tactics or methods destroy men as well as nations. It demolishes each healthy constitution and upsets each notion of healthy or sincere justice. It effects non-parity as the result in interhuman relationships; denies man any correct usage of law and it corrupts parity through strangulation.³²³ This powerful passion is explained adequately by St. Maximus, although it is encountered scarcely in his writings. For the Holy Father, greed is a condition of life. This means that man opts to live under it and makes it a lifelong experience. Its duality as a passion is expressed by two characteristics:

a) By its materialistic morphology, structure
and methodology.

³²¹ ... (πλεονεξίαν) δέ τήν γεννητικὴν τε καὶ αὐξητικὴν τοῦ πάθους ὠνόμασεν ὕλην. *Char.* I, 83 and 84; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 426.

³²² Διὰ τῆς πλεονεξίας, τῆς δικαιοσύνης διαφθείρει τὴν ἰσονομίαν. PG 90, 768A, Q.Th. 65.

³²³ Ἄνισότητα δέ νῦν τὴν κατὰ στέρησιν τῆς ἰσότητος συμβαίνουσαν, τουτέστι τὴν πλεονεξίαν. PG 4, 368C, Scholia in liber de Divinis Nominibus.

b) By its contradictory behaviour towards justice.

Both these antitheses promote the violation of the personality; they squash each of its initiatives and they benumb its healthy reactions. Result? The imbalance between actions and experiences in man's life.

St. Maximus concludes his references on greed by offering the following advice: "To dispense to each according to his worth is to preserve and to save everything".³²⁴

³²⁴ Τό γάρ νέμειν ἐκάστου τά κατ' ἀξίαν, τοῦτο συγκρατεῖ πάντα καί σώζει. PG 4, 368C, Scholia in liber de Divinis Nominibus.

ε) VAINGLORY (Κενοδοξία)

The passion of vainglory charges (καθίστησιν) human nature and virtue with illegitimacy.³²⁵ It deluges them with futile (μάταιαι) considerations in life and it does not permit them a free expression and behaviour. The vain man perceives persons as well as things egotistically and he does not allow himself to countenance the world in accordance with the constructive spirit of God.

There are two manifestations expressing vainglory:

- a) “Love, interest and adherence towards anything related to material wealth”.³²⁶
- b) “Hatred and confrontational attitudes towards one’s neighbour”.³²⁷

These two manifestations are very strongly interrelated, because the vain man aspires towards an ever increasing accumulation of assets, believing that in this way he will be recognised and glorified by others. By being vainglorious, he “loves wealth” and tries with this behaviour to gain the esteem of others.³²⁸ So, the vain man bases his passion on an effort for recognition by others, irrespective of the fact that this effort leads to a total void, since it does not contain a mature savouring of any virtue.

St. Maximus’ term “vainglory” means, etymologically, precisely this: The empty glory or reputation. Vainglory is seen as a human passion by:

- a) worldly demeanour (φρόνημα).

³²⁵ ...ή κενοδοξία, τήν τε φύσιν καί αὐτήν νόθον τήν ἀρετήν καθίστησιν. PG 90, 716B, Q.Th. 64.

³²⁶ ...κενοδοξία (ἐστίν) αἰτία τῆς τῶν χρημάτων ἀγάπης. *Char.* III, 17.

³²⁷ ...κενοδοξία (ἐστίν) αἰτία μίσους πρός τόν πλησίον. *Char.* III, 7.

³²⁸ ...ὁ δέ κενόδοξος ἀγαπᾷ ἀργύριον, ἵνα δι’ αὐτοῦ δοξασθῇ. *Char.* III, 18.

- b) bodily beauty.
- c) wealth and the power by any means.
- d) assumed prudence (φρόνησις).³²⁹

These four proofs of existence of vainglory reveal that the person who depends on its alienating experience, is based on a selfish (φίλαυτος) behaviour. He is affectedly interested in the exercising of virtue. He judges everything not in accordance with the Divine interrelation of things, but in accordance with his own false understandings. He is also becoming accustomed to reaping of insubstantial (άνυποστάτους) benefits (έπαίνους).³³⁰

St. Maximus stresses that when glory is sought for the benefits of others and for the elevation of the spirituality of man, it does not constitute evil.³³¹ Today's society includes many individuals who are vainglorious. "These persons display an unsullied inner world but it is based on vainglory".³³²

It is no small struggle to be freed from vainglory. Such freedom is to be attained by the inner practice of the virtues and by more frequent prayer; and the sign that you have attained it is that you no longer harbour rancour against anybody who abuses or has abu-

³²⁹ ...Τῆς...τοῦ κοσμικοῦ κενοδοξίας...ἴδιον, τό ἐπί κάλλει καί πλούτῳ καί δυναστεία καί φρονήσει κενοδοξεῖν. *Char.* III, 83.

³³⁰ Κενόδοξος ἐστίν, ὁ τῆς οικείας, ἀλλά μή τῆς θείας ἐνεκα δόξης, τήν ἀρετήν ἐπιτηδεύων, καί πόνοις οικείοις τούς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων άνυποστάτους ἐπαίνους ώνούμενος. PG 90, 1289B, Q. Th. 56, S.4.

³³¹ ...οὐδέ ἡ δόξα (κακόν), ἀλλ' ἡ κενοδοξία. *Char.* III, 4.

³³² Πολλούς ἔχει ὁ κόσμος...καθαρούς τῇ καρδίᾳ, ἀλλά διά κενοδοξίαν. *Char.* III, 47.

sed you.³³³

Also, the same is true when man knows that he has been greatly benefited when he has suffered deeply, because of some insult (ὕβρις) or indignity (ἀτιμία); for by means of the indignity vainglory had been driven out of him.³³⁴

St. Maximus concludes by saying that, "If we want to secure the erasure of vainglory and not to suffer recurrence, we must concentrate our interest and attention to the following constants:

- a) Lest, like the vainglorious we utter dead words, deprived of that life in accordance with the commandments.³³⁵
- b) To become worthy of the gift of Divine Knowledge and the ensuing charity, illumination (φωτισμοῦ) and luminosity by exercising love.

He who has been granted divine knowledge and has through love acquired its illumination will never be swept hither and thither by the demon of vainglory. But he who has not yet been granted such knowledge will readily succumb to this demon.³³⁶ The

³³³ Οὐ μικρός ἀγών κενοδοξίας ἀπαλλαγῆναι ἀπαλλάττεται δέ τις διά κρυπτής τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐργασίας καί συχνότερας προσευχῆς· σημεῖον δέ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς, τό μηκέτι μνησικακεῖν τῷ κακολογούντι. *Char.* IV, 43.

³³⁴ Ὅταν ἐφ' ὕβρει ἢ ἀτιμίας πονήσης, γίνωσκε σεαυτόν μεγάλως ὠφεληθέντα, τῆς κενοδοξίας διά τῆς ἀτιμίας οικονομικῶς ἀπό σου ἐκβληθείσης. *Char.* I, 30.

³³⁵ ...ἵνα μή νεκρούς, ὡς κενόδοξοι, περιφέρωμεν λόγους, καί τῆς κατά πράξιν τῶν ἐντολῶν ἔστερημένους ζωῆς. PG 91, 601D, Epistle 20.

³³⁶ Ὁ τῆς θείας καταξιοθείς γνώσεως καί τόν ταύτης φωτισμόν διά τῆς ἀγάπης κτησάμενος, οὐ ριπισθήσεται ποτε, ὑπό τοῦ τῆς κενοδοξίας πνεύματος. Ὁ δέ ταύτης μήπω καταξιοθείς, εὐχερώς ὑπ' αὐτῆς φέρεται. *Char.* I, 46.

abolition of vainglory delivers man from its demeaning shackles and from assumed achievements, whose by-products are, of course, shameful (αἰσχρά) passions and the debauchery (ἀκολασία) which they promise.³³⁷ One of the achievements of vainglory is also the passion of pride.³³⁸

Frequently, vainglory uses virtues but in an unwholesome (ἀσθενές) context. He who cultivates the virtues for the sake of vainglory, also seeks after spiritual knowledge for the same reason.³³⁹ Vainglory's greatest blow against man is not only unacceptable behaviour against others but also malicious calumny against them, where the vain slanders others' qualities, presenting them as deficiencies, so that he may cloak his own drama.³⁴⁰

Great effort is required for the delivery of man from this passion. The first step is to strive to practice all virtues secretly and exercise more frequent prayer, whilst the second step is to accept fellow humans - with all their existing characteristics - and to discard any notions which bring with them a futile occupation with life and a deceitful circumvention of communion and rapport with others.

³³⁷ ...τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς δῆθεν κατορθώμασι κενοδοξίαν...τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολασίαν. PG 90, 708D, Q.Th. 44.

³³⁸ ...ἐκ δὲ τῆς κενοδοξίας (γεννᾶται) τὸ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας (πάθος). *Char.* III, 56.

³³⁹ Ὁ διὰ κενοδοξίαν τὰς ἀρετὰς μετερχόμενος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ κενοδοξίαν μετέρχεται...*Char.* III, 75.

³⁴⁰ Ἐσχάτης δὲ κακίας εὐρεθήσεται βαθμὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον δάκνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου προτερήμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν τὰ ἐκείνου καλά ὡς οὐ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνουσιν. Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατὰ τὸν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 385.

Ε) GLUTTONY (Γαστριμαργία)

When the part of the soul which is not pathologically affected, generates tendencies and adherence to passions, then gluttony appears. This contributes to the creation of methods and ways which sully (ρύποῦσιν) the senses. The abuse of the natural function of each sense, demolishes the energy of all inner tendencies and their essential worth.³⁴¹

The gravity of the passion of gluttony is such that it can overturn each important drive of the bodily life.³⁴² Its inherent danger is that it destroys virtues. By its lack of control it kills the seeds of prudence. By its greed it stands against justice, bringing injustice and imbalance upon the individual. By its selfishness and self-love it dissolves the continuity of natural philanthropy. In other words this passion leaves nothing standing in its wake, destroying everything.³⁴³ The thoughts of unchastity have also its roots and origins in the causes of gluttony³⁴⁴, because in a deeper sense, unchastity (πορνεία) is the mother of gluttony but also its servant.³⁴⁵ Saint Maximus makes us acutely aware of this procedure

³⁴¹ Γεννά γάρ τό θεωρητικόν τῆς ψυχῆς τήν τῶν παθῶν ἐξιν καί τήν ἐνέργειαν, καί ὡς θεῖαν εἰσοικίζεται τήν γαστριμαργίαν, πρός γένεσιν τῶν ρυπαινόντων τῇ παραχρήσει τὰς αἰσθήσεις τρόπων, εἰς ἀναίρεσιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι φυσικῶν λόγων τε καί σπερμάτων. PG 90, 776 B; comp. Q. Th. 65. 136-141; S. 10, 46-50.

³⁴² Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 284.

³⁴³ Πολλάς τό πάθος τῆς γαστριμαργίας, ὡς ἐν μαχαίρᾳ τῷ λείῳ τῆς ἡδονῆς λογισμῶ, ἠτέκνωσεν ἀρετάς. Τῆς μὲν γάρ σωφροσύνης, διά τῆς ἀκρασίας ἀποκτείνει τά σπέρματα· τῆς δικαιοσύνης δέ, διά τῆς πλεονεξίας διαφθείρει τήν ἰσοτιμίαν· τῆς φιλανθρωπίας δέ, διά τῆς φιλαυτίας τήν ἐκ φύσεως, διατέμνει συνέχειαν· καί, συντόμως εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν κατ' ἀρετήν γεννημάτων ἀναιρετικόν ἐστὶ τῆς γαστριμαργίας τό πάθος. PG 90, 768 A; comp. Q. Th. 65, 732-739.

³⁴⁴ Ἐκ δέ τῆς γαστριμαργίας, γεννᾶται ὁ τῆς πορνείας λογισμός. *Char.* III, 46.

³⁴⁵ Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 285.

and stresses the point that the appetitive aspect of the soul is stimulated by impassioned thoughts of women. Such thoughts are caused by intemperance in eating and drinking, and by frequent and senseless talk with the women in question; and they are cut off by hunger, thirst, vigils and withdrawal from human society.³⁴⁶

The end (τέλος) of gluttony is stench (δυσωδία) and corruption (φθορά), whilst the aim of unchastity is infamy (αἰσχύνη) and dishonour.³⁴⁷ The beginning of this vicious circle starts from gluttony and unchastity and it continues through vainglory and pride.³⁴⁸

The advice of St. Maximus to modern man, who is pathologically affected, is:

- a) “Do not concentrate all your efforts on the endowment of the flesh”.
- b) Exercise the ability and capacity of the flesh in accordance with the principles of self-control.
- c) Do not devote all your time to your body but apply to it a measure of asceticism appropriate to its strength, and then “turn all your intellect to what is within”. Bodily asceticism has only a limited use, true devotion is useful in all things.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ Γινώσκειν δέ οὕτως· οἶον, ἐρεθίζουσι τό ἐπιθυμητικόν τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ ἐμπαθεῖς μνήμαι τῶν γυναικῶν· τούτων δέ αἰτία, ἡ τῶν βρωμάτων καί πομάτων ἀκρασία, καί ἡ αὐτῶν τῶν γυναικῶν πυκνή καί ἄλογος συντυχία. Περικόπτει δέ ταύτας πείνα καί δίψα καί ἀγρυπνία καί ἀναχώρησις. *Char.* III, 20.

³⁴⁷ Ἡ δυσωδία καί ἡ φθορά τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς γαστριμαργίας· ἡ δέ αἰσχύνη τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς πορνείας. ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΒΙΤΣ, *Materials, for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, ver. 78.

³⁴⁸ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 59.

This does not mean, of course, that man must not be concerned with and for his sustenance. It simply means that he must exercise prudent control over it. Food and eating (τά βρώματα) is not evil, gluttony is.³⁵⁰ Everything in accordance with nature is pure, because He is the cause of existence.³⁵¹ Gluttony causes considerable spiritual distress and results in sinful behaviour.³⁵²

For man to acquire the desire and passions of the flesh, his senses must also participate. However, everything depends upon the disposition of the mind.³⁵³ Gluttony is an example born out of the doubtful relationship between soul, body and senses. It affects the entire man and by convention (κατά συνθήκην), it can spread throughout his entire being, affecting his entire concept of the material world.³⁵⁴ The difficulty, therefore, lies in the attitude towards flesh, which tortures the nobility (εὐγένεια) of the soul.³⁵⁵

Gluttony is based, naturally, upon sensual pleasure and it is followed by impatience and haste. Sensual pleasure's mischief is that it works against man's will and volition by pretending poverty (ἐνδεια) and want; it exploits the instinct of self preservation, thus

³⁴⁹ Μή ὅλην τήν σχολήν σου περί τήν σάρκα ἔχε, ἀλλά ὀρισον αὐτῇ τήν κατά δύναμιν ἀσκησιν, καί ὅλον τόν νοῦν σου περί τά ἐνδον τρέψον. Ἡ γάρ σωματική γυμνασία, πρὸς ὀλίγον ὠφέλιμος· ἡ δέ εὐσέβεια, πρὸς πάντα ἐστίν ὠφέλιμος. *Char.* IV, 63.

³⁵⁰ Οὐ τά βρώματα κακόν, ἀλλ' ἡ γαστριμαργία. *Char.* III, 4.

³⁵¹ Οὐδέν γάρ τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀκάθαρτον, ὅτι Θεόν ἔχει τῆς ὑπάρξεως αἰτιον. *Thal.* 27, PG 90, 360 A.

³⁵² Ἰγνατίου Σακαλῆ, *Φιλοσοφικά καί θεολογικά ἐρωτήματα σύμφωνα μέ τόν Ἅγιο Μάξιμον τόν Ὁμολογητή*, Athens 1990, p. 121.

³⁵³ Ὁ κατά σάρκα πόθος περί γάρ τήν αἴσθησιν ἔχει τήν σύστασιν, περί γάρ τόν νοῦν ἔχει τήν ὑπαρξιν. PG 91, 440 C, Epistle 7.

³⁵⁴ Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, p. 284.

³⁵⁵ Τό φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός, τό τυραννοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς τήν εὐγένειαν. PG 91, 1149 A, Ambigua 155b.

turning man into a slave to food and drink.³⁵⁶ He who sates the passionate desires of the flesh, is an idol worshiper (ειδωλολάτρης) and worse, an idol maker (ειδωλοποιός).³⁵⁷

Gluttony can be combated by the grace of faith and by obedience (ὕπακοή) to the Divine Commands³⁵⁸. Man can deaden this passion by the material exercise of virtue. In this way all passionate considerations of the flesh are defeated and the daemons are routed. The utter defeat of gluttony leads to the cessation of the action of each of the passions,³⁵⁹ which depend on it and which, otherwise, might thrive under it.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁶ Ἡδονὴν γάρ ποιεῖ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ μὴ βουλομένων ἡμῶν, καὶ ἡ τυχούσα τροφή, προλαβοῦσαν ἔνδειαν παραμυθουμένη· καὶ πόσις ἀποκρουομένη τοῦ δίψους τὴν ὄχλησιν. PG 90, 541 A, Q.Th. 55.

³⁵⁷ Ὁ τὰς ἐμπαθεῖς τῆς σαρκὸς ὀρέξεις πληρῶν, εἰδωλολάτρης καὶ εἰδωλοποιός ἐστι. Cap. theol. et oecon. II, 26.

³⁵⁸ Τὸ τῆς γαστριμαργίας πάθος...ἡ τε χάρις τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἡ ὑπακοή τῶν θείων ἐντολῶν (καταπολεμᾷ)...PG 90, 784 D, Q. Th. 65, S. 44.

³⁵⁹ Ὁ διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν κατὰ τὴν πράξιν νεκρὰν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καταστήσας τὴν γαστριμαργίαν, τοὺς ἐμπαθεῖς ἐπανισταμένους αὐτῷ λογισμοὺς ἀποκτείνει καὶ δαίμονας. ЕПИΦΑΝОВИЧЪ, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, ver. 80.

³⁶⁰ Ὁ γοῦν ἀποκτείνας τὴν γαστριμαργίαν, συναπέκτεινε αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ αὐτὴν παρῳφιστάμενα πάθη. PG 90, 464 D, Scholia 20.

G) LOVE OF POPULARITY (Ἀνθρωπαρέσκεια)

Love of popularity, according to St. Maximus, is the display of someone's superficial virtues to others. It is related to the externalisation of assumed characteristics of specific purity and talented eloquence.³⁶¹

The life of the lover of popularity is full of trivial pursuits. He adopts the behaviour of the flatterer (κόλακος) as far as his moral recognition is concerned and as far as expressing himself against others whom he considers as his superiors. He does everything for appearances' sake. He appropriates other persons' comments and thoughts, and he "aurally" steals whatever enhances the apparent exercise of virtue and whatever is pleasing to the senses. St. Maximus' description of this, depicts an image of man, who is only interested in the dealing of matters³⁶².

The passion of love of popularity as a pathologic process of the soul, can be considered within a realm which usually follows many passions. This realm is the state of hypocrisy, which although is not stated by Saint Maximus as having connection with the love of popularity, it can be nevertheless investigated, in my opinion, as so.

We can, therefore, observe hypocrisy as established by pretences and manifesting conditions, characterised for the hardship of their activities, because they constitute alienated experiences. Such experiences are hatred, animosity, envy, rancour, and the epiphenomenon of attaining virtues altogether.

³⁶¹ ...ἀνθρωπαρέσκειαν οὖν φαμέν, τὴν ὡς ἐπ' ἀρετῆ δι' ἀνθρώπους γινομένην τῶν ἡθῶν τε καὶ λόγων ἐπίδειξιν. Q. Th. 56, S. 5.

³⁶² Ὁ ἀνθρωπάρεσκος, μόνον ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν φαινομένων ἡθῶν καὶ μὴν καὶ λόγους τοῦ κόλακος· ἵνα τοῖς μὲν τὴν ὄρασιν, τῷ δὲ τὴν ἀκοήν σφετερίζηται, τῶν μόνους ἠδομένων ἢ καὶ καταπληττομένων τοῖς φαινομένοις τε καὶ ἀκουομένοις καὶ μόνῃ τῇ αἰσθήσει περιγραφόντων τὴν ἀρετὴν. Q. Th. 56, S. 5.

From the above we also observe that the manifestations of hypocrisy, which can be also considered in themselves as passions, constitute the human existence through disastrous structures.

The link or the relationship of love of popularity with hypocrisy, I believe is found in the common characteristic displayed by the two terms, namely lack of self-awareness. On the other hand, it is found in the irrational demands demonstrating both the lover of popularity and the hypocrite, when they attempt to communicate with others; again both manifestations refer to a mask behaviour.

In the first case, the lover of popularity believes that only his presence can be the cause for a frequent and sufficient account of others, with the “appropriate” loving disposition; whilst the hypocrite seeks for the same account of others, by pretending friendship with them.

In the second case the lover of popularity demands from others, that they accept his personal characteristics, mostly vicious ones, whilst the hypocrite seeks to create illusions about himself, in order that his demands be satisfied without restraint.

In the third case we discern the lover of popularity to endow virtues just for the impression he is moral person or that he has eloquence showing on speaking, or that he is a well-balanced personality; whilst the hypocrite impersonates virtues as characteristics of a decent life, i.e as a process “inspiring” his biological life and making it acceptable to others. In the following we will investigate that the relationship between the love of popularity and hypocrisy, sometimes goes through the same “channels” and “paths”.

Saint Maximus therefore, speaks about hypocrisy by saying that is found within pretence. This pretence appears in the following expressions:

- a) Hatred concealed by friendship.
- b) Animosity operating as good will.

- c) Envy, mimicking the character of love.
- d) Life imbued with fictitious virtues, imparting contrived modesty.
- e) Pretence of justice which is maintained by imaginary concepts.
- f) Deceit which exist - in form - within latent untruths³⁶³.

Love of popularity is in my opinion the result of these expressions, which is expressed as prudence which strives with alacrity (ἐπιτηδειότης) to blunt each healthy disposition (διάθεσις).

³⁶³ Ὑπόκρισις ἐστὶ φιλίας προσποιήσις· ἢ μῖσος, σχήματι φιλίας κεκαλυμμένον· ἢ ἐχθρα, δι' εὐνοίας ἐνεργουμένη· ἢ φθόνος ἀγάπης χαρακτῆρα μιμούμενος· ἢ βίος, ἀρετῆς πλάσματι, ἀλλ' οὐ πράγματι, τὸ κόσμιον ἔχων· ἢ δικαιοσύνης προσποιήσις, τῇ τοῦ εἶναι δοκῆσει συντηρουμένη· ἢ ἀπάτη ἀληθείας ἔχουσα μὀρφωσιν· ἦν οἱ τὸν ὄφιν τῇ τῶν ἡθῶν σκολιότητι μιμούμενος, ἐπιτηδεύουσιν. Q. Th. 56, S. 6.

Η) PASSIONS (Πάθη)

Hitherto I have discussed various individual passions, but it would be useful to conclude this section by looking at the human fallen state more generally. This would be done in this section by discussing passions and in the way by discussing habit. For these two concepts sum up the mechanisms of the human fallen state.

“Passion is a movement of the soul contrary to nature (παρά φύσιν κίνησις) as in the case of mindless love or mindless hatred for someone or for some sensible things. In the case of love, it may be for needless food, or for a woman, or for money, or for transient glory, or for other sensible objects or on their account”.³⁶⁴ For St. Maximus the primary interpretation of passion begins from the holy Apostle Paul. In analysing verse 5 of the fifth chapter of his letter to the Colossians, he says that passion, according to him, is every passionate notion (ιδέα by the meaning of έμπαθεΐς λογισμοΐ).³⁶⁵ These two considerations of the Holy Father relate to nature and to guilt (φύσις και ένοχή) and they are examined separately even though they are intimately related to each other.³⁶⁶ Each passion is born out of some inner moral and spiritual decomposition (σΉψις). By its birth it causes an imbalance and it grows continually at the inner world of man. Passion becomes habit and it appears in life as factor which impedes progress, destroying the three

³⁶⁴ Πάθος έστι, κίνησις ψυχΉς παρά φύσιν ή επί φιλίαν άλογον ή επί μΐσος άκριτον ή τινος ή διά τι τών αισθητών, οΐον επί μέν φιλίαν, ή βρωμάτων άλόγων ή γυναικός ή χρημάτων ή δόξης παρερχομένης ή τινός άλλου τών αισθητών ή διά ταΰτα. *Char.* II, 16, III, 42.

³⁶⁵ Πάθος τόν έμπαθη λογισμόν ώνόμασεν. *Char.* I, 83.

³⁶⁶ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner's*, p. 191.

powers of the soul.³⁶⁷

The pathology of passion is always dependent on perceptible things and it abets man's preoccupation with these. Passion would never exist, if its underlying notions were not preexisting and latent as past memories and experiences, influencing decisively a man's entire behaviour and attitude, or if its meanings did foment unconsciously within the soul.³⁶⁸ "The passions lie, therefore, hidden in the soul and provide the demons with the means of arousing impassioned thoughts in us. Then, fighting the intellect through these thoughts, they force it to give its assent to sin. When it has been overcome, they lead it to sin in the mind; and when this has been done they induce it, captive as it is, to commit the sin in action. Having thus desolated the soul by means of these thoughts, the demons then retreat taking the thoughts with them, and only the spectre or idol of sin (τό εἶδωλον τῆς ἁμαρτίας) remains in the intellect"³⁶⁹. "Most passions are hidden within

³⁶⁷ Πάν πάθος ἀπό σήψεως γεννᾶσθαι πέφυκε· καί ἐπειδὴν γεννηθῆ, οὐ παύεται ἐσθίον τὴν ὑποστήσασαν αὐτό καρδίαν, ἕως ἂν διὰ τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐξεως εἰς φανέρωσιν ἔλθῃ. Καί ἐλθὼν θνήσκει ταῖς τρισὶ δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς. PG 90, 832B, Quaest. et Dubia 59.

³⁶⁸ Παντός πέφυκε πάθους ἄρχειν τό προσφυές αἰσθητόν. Ἄνευ γάρ τινος ὑποκειμένου...πάθος οὐκ ἂν συσταίῃ ποτε. Χωρίς γάρ αἰσθητοῦ πράγματος, πάθος οὐ συνίσταται. PG 90, 472 D, Q. Th.50, 170-174; S. 8.

³⁶⁹ Ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τῇ ψυχῇ παθῶν, λαμβάνουσιν οἱ δαίμονες τὰς ἀφορμάς τοῦ κινεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν τοὺς ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμούς· εἶτα διὰ τούτων πολεμοῦντες τὸν νοῦν, ἐκβιάζονται αὐτόν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἔλθειν τῆς ἁμαρτίας· ἠττηθέντος δέ αὐτοῦ, ἄγουσιν εἰς τὴν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ ταύτης ἀποτελεσθείσης, φέρουσιν αὐτόν λοιπὸν αἰχμάλωτον εἰς τὴν πράξιν· μετὰ δέ ταύτης λοιπὸν οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν ἐρημώσαντες, σὺν αὐτοῖς ὑποχωροῦσιν· μένει δέ μόνον ἐν τῷ νῷ τό εἶδωλον τῆς ἁμαρτίας. *Char.* II, 31; comp. also I, *Jam.*, 15.

the soul and they are brought to light only when the objects that rouse them are present”.³⁷⁰

St. Maximus draws man’s specific attention to these because passions are dangerous and destructive, harming the soul at times unexpected. Man needs to guard his inner self, in order to overcome the effects of passion. He also needs to check any situation capable of stirring up passions.³⁷¹

An important notion in Saint Maximus’ anthropology concerning the passions, is that of *ἐμπαθής λογισμός* (impassioned thought), which is considered as the particular precondition for the creation of passions. The notion of *ἐμπαθής λογισμός* will be interpreted in detail in the third chapter of my thesis, where I will develop it in connection with the notion of the struggle against *λογισμοί*.

A man, therefore, who is imbued in the principles of the flesh (*τά φρονήματα τῆς σαρκός*)³⁷², amasses visible realities: passions. Bodily desire pushes him to attach himself intensely to the material substance of things and of persons, endowing them with exclusive values. This happens when man cannot perceive beyond the surface of things and of persons.³⁷³ Sadly, this results in the mixing of the natural human urges together with passions, which, therefore, become unmanageable in ordinary terms and the reason for the

³⁷⁰ Πολλά πάθη ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν κέκρυπται, τότε δέ ἐλέγχονται, ὅταν τὰ πράγματα ἀναφαίνωνται. *Char.* IV, 52.

³⁷¹ Πολλά πάθη κέκρυπται ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν, ἅπερ λανθάνοντα ἡμᾶς οἱ ὀξύτεροι τῶν πειρασμῶν φανεροῦσι, καί δεῖ πάση φυλακῇ τηρεῖν τήν καρδίαν, μήποτε παραφανέντος ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, πρὸς ὃ, τό πάθος κεκτήμεθα... *ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΒΙΤΣ, Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, ver. 22.

³⁷² Romans 8,6.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, *Mystagogy*...pp. 96-97.

committing of sin.³⁷⁴ After that mixing, one experiences passionate effects which are linked with every weakness of psychosomatic man. These passionate effects also invade every healthy psychospiritual element and mar one's personality.³⁷⁵ Nevertheless, passions are not created by matter, as they represent an imposed evil.³⁷⁶ Man's enslavement to the perceptible, explains better the ailment of sin in the human existence.³⁷⁷ The soul is led towards sin, by linking the senses to the perceptible and to passion. Only through Christ, can the relationship with the perceptible be achieved and sorted out, in an impassive way. Christ utilises whatever part of the human entity has previously sinned and works with it to create virtue³⁷⁸, chasing also away every pathological behaviour.³⁷⁹

By the conversion of passions into virtues, man comes to resemble Christ who, as the true *Logos*, cleanses the substance of every being created but specifically the substance of human beings³⁸⁰. This particular purging is perfect (τελεία), St. Maximus underlines,

³⁷⁴ Ὁ πάθει προστετηκώς καί πράγμασιν, ἐφ' ἃ μὴ δεῖ τὰς ὀρμάς ποιεῖται. PG 90, 604 A, Scholia 23.

³⁷⁵ Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατά τόν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 245.

³⁷⁶ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 191; comp. Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατά τόν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 241.

³⁷⁷ Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, ἄνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατά τόν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 113.

³⁷⁸ ...ποιῶ δέ πάθει ποίαν ἀρετὴν ἀντιθεῖσα νικήσει (ἡ ψυχὴ), τὸν πονηρὸν φυγαδεύσασα δαίμονα, συναφανίσασα παντελῶς αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτὴν (τὴν) τοῦ πάθους κίνησιν· καὶ πῶς μετὰ τὴν τῶν παθῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν, τὰ οἰκεῖα καλῶς διασκοπῆσαι δυνησεται· καὶ διὰ ποίων λόγων ἢ τρόπων τὰς ἀπαθεῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις οἰκειωσαμένη διὰ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λόγου σχέσεις, μορφώσει πρὸς ἀρετάς, ὡς διὰ τῶν παθῶν πρότερον ἐμορφούτο πρὸς ἁμαρτίας· καὶ πῶς τὴν καλλὴν ποιήσεται δὴ δεόντως ἀντιστροφὴν, τοῖς δι' ὧν τό πρὶν ἐπλημμέλει, χρωμένη πρὸς γένεσιν ἀρετῶν καὶ ὑπόστασιν... *Thal. prol.*, I 252 A.

³⁷⁹ Völker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens*, p. 220.

³⁸⁰ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 82.

when man uproots (ἐκριζῶν) his own passions by employing the evil they generate, the pain deriving from this evil and the ensuing, consequent punishment to this end.³⁸¹

³⁸¹ Ματσούκα, *Κόσμος, άνθρωπος, κοινωνία κατά τόν Μάξιμο Ὁμολογητή*, p. 125.

Δ) ΗΛΗΘΙΣ (ἘΞΙΣ)

According to St. Maximus, habit has its source and origin in an evil imagination stored up in the activity of the intellect.³⁸² Its function displays every persistent trait of the soul³⁸³ which is not characterised by perfection³⁸⁴ but which, on the contrary, it proves man's consent (συγκατάθεσις) to sin.³⁸⁵

The means of practical functioning of habit are found in delight, which is pathologically enmeshed in the various activities of the senses.³⁸⁶ Habit is for St. Maximus something that has a positive function as well as a negative one. In its positive use it operates in accordance with his natural and normal (κατά φύσιν) needs and not in accordance with aberrations and with abnormal (παρά φύσιν) practices. Habit acquires pathogenic qualities when its natural functions are upturned.³⁸⁷

The classification of the domination and infliction of habit starts from illogicality (ἄλογία), lack of intellectual control (ἄνοια), and impetuosity (προπέτεια) in intelligent

³⁸² Ὅτι κατ' εἶδος τῆς προαποκειμένης τῇ διανοίᾳ κακῆς φαντασίας, ἡ τῶν παθῶν ἔξις ἀποτελεῖται καί ἐνέργεια. PG 90, 301 A, Q.Th. 16.

³⁸³ Ἐξις μὲν ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἐμμονος (τῆς ψυχῆς). PG 4, 205 A, Schol. in lib. de Divinis Nominibus.

³⁸⁴ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 63.

³⁸⁵ Χαρακτήρ γάρ τῆς ἐξεως ἡ συγκατάθεσις. PG 90, 329 B, Scholia 1.

³⁸⁶ Συμπλακεῖσα τῇ διαφόρῳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων (ἐργασιῶν) ἡδονῇ, ἡ τῆς κακίας ἔξις ἐμπρακτος γίνεσθαι πέφυκε. Q. Th. 49, S. 11.

³⁸⁷ Ἐλλειψις φυσικῆς ἐξεως, πάθος τῆς κατά φύσιν ὑποκειμένης τῇ ἐξει δυνάμεως. Τό δέ πάθος τῆς κατά φύσιν τῇ ἐξει δυνάμεως ἐστὶν ὁ κατά παράρησιν τῆς φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας τρόπος. Q. Th. 58, 15-24.

beings. These are privations of intelligence, intellect and circumspection (περίσκεψις). But privation is posterior to the possession of habits.³⁸⁸ The procedure of this entire classification betrays a circular succession, where habits lead again to the aforementioned primary weaknesses of the soul.

The character of the habit's tendency to sin is variant, according to St. Maximus. Because it is not always for the same reason that sinners commit the same sin. The reasons vary. For example, it is one thing to sin through force of habit and another to sin through being carried away by a sudden impulse (κατά συναρπαγήν). In the latter case the man did not deliberately choose the sin either before committing it or afterwards; on the contrary, he is deeply distressed that the sin has occurred. It is quite different with the man who sins through force of habit (ὁ ἀπό ἐξεως ἀμαρτάνων). Prior to the act itself (ἐν πράξει ἀμαρτία) he was already sinning in thoughts (ἐν λογισμοῖς) and after it he is still in the same state of mind (τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ διαθέσεως).³⁸⁹ Human intellect finds its right way, when its existence (ὑπαρξις), its force (δύναμις) and its habit are specified as actions of a specific and determinate vector.³⁹⁰

Loss of forcefulness and dynamism by the corrupt of sinful habit, is achieved, according to St. Maximus, through the saving teachings of Christ. By delving into Christ's teachings, man purges and exercises the sensory abilities of the soul. He learns to distinguish good

³⁸⁸ Ἀλογία δέ καὶ ἄνοια καὶ προπέτεια ἐπὶ τῶν λογικῶν, στερήσεις εἰσι λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ περισκεψέως. Αἱ δέ στερήσεις, τῶν ἐξεων εἰσι δεύτεραι. *Char.* III, 5.


³⁸⁹ Οὐχ εἷς λόγος τῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀμαρτίαν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀμαρτανόντων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ διάφορος· οἶον, ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ἐξεως ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ κατὰ συναρπαγήν· ὅς οὔτε πρό τῆς ἀμαρτίας εἶχε τὴν ἐνθύμησιν, οὔτε μετὰ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν· ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα ἐπὶ τὸ γεγονότι ὀδυνᾶται. Ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐξεως, ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίον· καὶ πρῶτον γὰρ κατὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἐπαύετο ἀμαρτάνων· καὶ μετὰ τὸ πράξει, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ διαθέσεως. *Char.* III, 83.

³⁹⁰ Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner's*, p. 336.

(καλόν) from bad (κακόν) and turns habit into a healthy nourishment for the senses.³⁹¹

The experience given to man through good habit, betrays the existential possibilities of likening him to God.³⁹² Correct use of healthy or good habits, leads to the three saving habits, i.e. *virtue*, *knowledge*, and *theology* (θεολογία). The first enacts practically ἀνδρεία and prudence, the second promotes justice in accordance with the correct understanding of creation, while the third flows from the total perfection of wisdom.³⁹³

These three habits can be shown, diagrammatically as follows:



According to the above diagram, habit is divided into the stages of the practical (πρακτικοῦ), the gnostic (γνωστικοῦ) and the theological (θεολογικοῦ) part; preserving the so called *True Philosophy in Christ* (Ἀληθῆς κατὰ Χριστόν Φιλοσο-

³⁹¹ Ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐξὶν τὰ αἰσθητήρια τῆς ψυχῆς γεγυμνασμένα ἔχουσιν πρὸς διάκρισιν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ, στερεάν αὐτοῖς δίδωσι τροφήν. Cap. theol. et oecon. I, 90; comp. 5, Heb. 14.

³⁹² Thunberg, *Man and the the Cosmos*, p. 65.

³⁹³ Οἱ τρεῖς ἐξεις τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγω, καὶ τὴν τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τὴν τῆς θεολογίας. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεῖται τῆς κατὰ πράξιν ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης, ἡ δὲ τῆς κατὰ φυσικὴν θεωρίας δικαιοσύνης, ἡ δὲ τῆς κατὰ φρόνησιν ἀκραιφνοῦς τελειότητος. Cap. theol. et oecon. II, 16; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenners*, p. 531.

φία).³⁹⁴ Thus, by this way, man is entirely unified with God in any actions (πράξεις), thoughts (λογισμοί) and relationships (σχέσεις).³⁹⁵

After this achieved behaviour of the soul, man severs any links with the natural connection with material things,³⁹⁶ he is unified with God and he acquires a steady tendency to do good.³⁹⁷

The comprehension of the concept of habit for St. Maximus is the notion of the relationship of the essences of man and of the Divine, and it constitutes the key to the approach of the Saint's salvational and humanistic teaching.³⁹⁸ St. Maximus says that good habit leads to impassivity. This habit reflects the area where the "face" of man's psychic disposition is elevated towards the glory of God; that is to say a "face" created by the diversity and quality of the virtues.³⁹⁹ The diversity and quality in turn, turns man towards a complete connection with the Divine, within the spirit and the letter of true habit. This means that, when every human being utilises "the blessed grace of virtues" it

³⁹⁴ ЕПИФАНОВИЧЪ, *Materials for the study of the life and works of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, ver. 5-15; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 531. This threefold distinction goes back to Origen at least.

³⁹⁵ PG 4, 564 C, Scholia in Epistolae Sancti Dionysii; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, p. 314.

³⁹⁶ ...τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὄντα φυσικῆς σχέσεως... PG 90, 265 D, Scholia.

³⁹⁷ ...λαμβάνει τὴν περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἀμετακίνητον παγιότητα. PG 90, 265 D, Scholia.

³⁹⁸ Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 53; comp. Heinzer-Schönborn, *Symposium on Maximus the Confessor*, One volume, Fribourg 1980, pp. 239-246.

³⁹⁹ Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ἠδύνατο τὸν Θεὸν εὐλογεῖν, μὴ ἄρας πρὸς ὕψος θεωρίας καὶ γνώσεως κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν τῆς ἀπαθείας· ἦγουν τῆς ἀπήμονος εἰρηνικῆς καταστάσεως· τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν τῆς διαθέσεως πρόσωπον· τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων ἀρετῶν χαρακτήρων δικην συγκείμενον. Thal. 54, PG 90, 512 A; comp. Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos*, p. 121.

follows God by exercising its good habit.⁴⁰⁰

⁴⁰⁰ ...ἐν πραγματικῇ ἔξει καί τυπώσει... PG 4, 564 C, Scholia in Ep. Sancti Dionysii; comp. Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenner*, pp. 313-314.

3) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SECOND CHAPTER

In this comparative study, we will attempt to illustrate the overlap between Karen Horney's notions of neurotic phenomena, and Saint Maximus' notions of fallenness. What one can maintain at first sight, is that both topics investigated, reveal a close convergence between them, and their divergence is less apparent. But, before reaching any quick conclusion of what the comparative study will reveal about either their convergence or their divergence, we must conduct a careful comparison.

For this comparative study I have selected a number of terms from our analysis of Horney and Maximus. Some of them correspond very obviously such as self-love and pride. In other cases I have brought into comparison seemingly difficult notions in which however similar mechanisms can be discerned: examples are the comparisons of Horney's fantasy and Maximus' λογισμοί and her discussion of the oral attitude and Maximus' notion of gluttony.

Self-love

Self-love for Karen Horney, reveals the neurotic's tendency to compel others to succumb to situations which serve his worthless aims, and it is the disturbance distinguished by egomania and malice.

According to her, self-love fights against the truth and prevents one from searching for it. Through self-love, the neurotic person becomes more self-estranged. He does not experience healthy emotional feelings, and he lives in uncertainty about himself. Unfortunately self-love is a "behavioural drag" where man does not work and function like other "live" persons, losing, thus, the opportunity to consider his inner capacity as a kind of objective potential, and as a work of art.

Self-love, for her, is the phenomenon causing, on the one hand, “mental poverty” in man, whilst, on the other, it pushes him towards extreme behaviour concerning his relationship to others.

For Saint Maximus, self-love is a more fundamental matter: it is the mother of every passion. Its value appears as bodily and sensual weakness. It is the one’s irrational aim towards pleasing and satisfying one’s material needs.

Self-love alters and grows according to the prevalent conditions of man’s life, trying to subjugate as many aspects of the personality, as possible. Self-love breaks completely any interrelations with other human beings and, of course, also with God. Self-love renders man not as much a servant of sin but a slave of sinfulness. It dilutes the characteristics of good and pure creation which God has instilled in man and forbids him to move towards self-correction. Essentially, self-love displays the influence of all passions in their worst form. What can be drawn, in conclusion, from St. Maximus’ teachings on self-love is that one can not find accurate enough descriptions to express the damage and the painful repercussions of this passion’s occasions to man’s life.

St. Maximus presents self-love as Horney does, but not in general terms. Horney perceives self-love as a general aspect causing inevitable problems, and she does not expand her research on it. She does not penetrate more in this phenomenon in order to render it more accurate and understandable. On the contrary, St. Maximus examines self-love as the apex and cause of every other vice. His understanding of it operates through accuracy and precision. St. Maximus expands the aspect of self-love, in contrast to Horney, and distinguishes in it hatred against the entire creation. In putting this more directly, we argue that the holy father discerns in self-love tendencies manifesting destructive desires against anything living and breathing. The man embroiled in the “gears” of self-love feels that everything surrounding him works against him whether this “everything” refers to others

or to the environment itself. More than this, St. Maximus considers the passion of self-love as a direct opposition to God.

Pride

Neurotic pride for Horney is the disorder that alters the psychospiritual structure of man. It is the phenomenon which deceives and forces man to believe in talents and virtues he does not really possess. For each individual, experiencing and practising pride as way of living, interweaves it with every idealised image hidden in himself. Neurotic pride erodes every good disposition of the soul and brings catastrophic changes to the personality. It makes the individual susceptible to egotism and selfishness, and it drives him away from any correctional trend. Whoever is affected from pride cannot identify the neurotic constants of this phenomenon, and his psychosomatic realm, sooner or later, follows a disbalancing path.

St. Maximus, although he agrees with Horney's understanding of pride, nevertheless takes it in further stages and examines it in relation to God and His creation. For him, a man behaving proudly expresses blasphemy against God's providence. Pride estranges the physical creation and brings impropriety into the creational and salvational plan of God. Equally it abolishes every notion of parity and justice and it proves that man stands far from any Divine or Human Knowledge. Pride, according to the Saint, impels man to selfish actions, investing him with the cloak of falsehood, and presses him to detest any truth, however self-evident. Furthermore, the man possessed by the vice of pride refuses to honour God as universal Being and avoids acknowledging the weaknesses of his nature as causes alienating him from God.

Passions

Passions for Horney express the overall state of inner neurotic instability. This instability could be displayed in many ways. Some of these are:

- a) Man becoming ambitious.
- b) Man becoming excessive as far as his real needs are concerned.
- c) Man being led easily astray by unfounded ideologies.
- d) Man becoming anxious.

Passions sublimate human needs and present them as inflated. In any human choices the existence of passion may be latent, if in these there thrives an exaggerated need. Passion cheats and ostracises human endeavour.

Passions, such as vice and sin, do not represent for St. Maximus a natural condition of the soul but an abnormality of it. Passions are mainly passionate thoughts. They are not simply motions of the soul but sinful thoughts, i.e representations charged with psychic power which derive from the soul, when it ails. Passions mainly thrive upon the soil of sense and of memory.

According to St. Maximus every passion consists of:

- a) Perceptual matters.
- b) The senses.
- c) The natural forces of anger and desire.

For him, passions are all the manifestations of sinfulness, provided that these act in a destabilizing way, against the human person; through situations which are clearly imbued with sin and provoke imperfections. When man's imperfections appear, they create passions and end up being a permanent feature of his life. The pathology and pathogeny of passions are dependent upon the permanency of them within the soul. Passions take roots in the soul, they bother man and cause incalculable damage.

Although the convergence in the aspect of passions between Horney and Maximus is obvious, nevertheless the divergence between them remains clear. There are two points in my opinion which we can discuss in order to reveal this divergence. The first refers to the phenomenon of passions as a *cultural weakness* which, according to Horney's viewpoint, appears as some kind of "social competitiveness" harming others' equal or supreme capabilities. According to St. Maximus' viewpoint the aspect of passions is on the one hand the "divorce" between man and his potentialities, whilst on the other it is the summit of every interhuman imbalance existing in society, and rendering it "bleeding" as a "moribund" being. That is to say that St. Maximus' consideration on passions does not commence from cultural formalities, but from the *man himself* who affects others and the society, in accordance either with his constructiveness or his destructiveness.

Second, by changing what Karen Horney maintains about passions, that they alter and transform the man's *endeavour*, we could maintain that the holy father does not refer to any kind of "endeavour" affected by passions, but he goes deeper than this and admits that the ability altered by passions is the "demeanour" of the man's psychosomatic realm. Through this transformed demeanour, the passions do not work superficially, as in Horney's viewpoint, but they provoke decisive existential harmfulness in one's course towards καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, disorienting one, thus, from the way leading to personal and universal balance.

Fantasy-Λογισμοί

Fantasy, according to Horney, exists as a neurotic phenomenon to shore and support the essence of ideal self. It leads the neurotic person to inertia and escapisms. It limits man's abilities and it oppresses him phantasizing imaginary situations. These situations lead to fantasies which the neurotic person savours as true experiences, which incarcerate him in

notions of grandeur from which he cannot escape because he likes to live with self-deceptions.

In some way the equivalent of fantasy, for St. Maximus, is the λογισμοί which are the restructuring of substantiated notions within the intellect. For man to function by λογισμοί alone, he must have already allowed them to have taken root in his soul. Λογισμοί are unbreakably linked to desire. Desire entraps the senses and forces them in behaving through λογισμοί.

In this aspect, I think that we have a divergence between the notions of fantasy and λογισμοί. Horney refers to fantasy as delusive tendency of the neurotic individual. She does not consider fantasy as a trend existing because of real neurotic characteristics, but as something deriving from the mind without essential value.

On the contrary, St. Maximus considers λογισμοί as an existential procedure found within man and affecting his inner qualities. Λογισμοί are not linked or expressed through imaginary situation, but they are features of the self, created and adopted by man, in order to substantiate in actions his sinful behaviour. When we say that λογισμοί exist, we mean that they constitute the precise incorporating behaviour every time the man sins. Λογισμοί are, for the holy father, not hallucinating perceptions with imaginary implications, but the particular preconditions for actual sin.

Oral attitude-gluttony

One of the main reasons for the generation of neuroses, for Horney, is the phenomenon of oral attitude or greed as she terms it. This relates to the neurotic's tendency to be constantly preoccupied with food, drink, rivalry and merriment, sexual contacts and the purchase and possession of objects or other "items". The reason for the employment of such methods is found in man's inner void. He has lost the meaning of integrity and he is preoccupied with the folly of matter, which leads him to erosion even faster. What is then

on offer is an empty and shallow living, where the neurotic loses the essence and is absorbed in the trivial.

For St. Maximus the phenomenon and expression of oral attitude or greed is entirely identified with gluttony. As we have examined that passion before, it has to do with an intrapsychic trend which influences the whole psychosomatic personality and provokes many compulsive and abnormal behaviours. St. Maximus' "oral attitude or greed" is connected with all dark and evil immoral "aptitudes". To understand it better he gives us an etymological interpretation of the term "gluttony"

St. Maximus says that "gluttony (*gastrimargia*: μαργαίνω τήν γαστέρα) comes out of a worm or an animal - according to Aristotle - which is born of the *sepsis* between earth and water. Since it is born, it never stops to destroy the earth. After the damages it provokes, it pierces the earth and comes upon its surface. When it appears upon, it dies in three days. After these days it is born again because of rain and starts to live and destroy. That is why the ancient Philosophers called everyone who eats a lot as gluttonous. Oneself, however, can respectfully understand it as it is being set, and to comprehend whatever has been said in accordance to the spiritual contemplation"⁴⁰¹.

This quotation provided by St. Maximus, we could explain, as an example of the gluttonous person, expressing what it means for a man to serve his belly without restraint.

⁴⁰¹ Οὐδείς οὔτε γραμματικῶν οὔτε ῥητόρων ἐμνημόνευσεν. Ἀριστοτέλης δέ ἐν τῷ Περί ζῶων μέμνηται ζώου (σκώληκος), μαργού λεγομένου, ὅπερ γεννᾶται ἀπό σήψεως, μεταξύ τῆς γῆς καί τοῦ ὕδατος. Καί ἀφ' οὗ γεννηθῆ, οὐ παύεται γηϊφαγοῦν, ἕως ἐκτρυπῆσαν τήν γῆν, εἰς τήν ἐπιφάνειαν ἔλθῃ· καί ἐλθόν, θνήσκει τρεῖς ἡμέρας· καί μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἔρχεται νέφος βροχῆς, καί βρέχει ἐπάνω αὐτοῦ, καί ἀναζῆ μηκέτι ἀειφάγον ὄν. Καί ἐκ τούτου οἶμαι τοῦς ἀρχαίους φιλοσόφους ὀρμηθέντας, τοῦς πολυφάγους γαστριμάργους ἀποκαλέσαι. Δύναται δέ τις εὐσεβῶς τοῖς οὔσιν ἐπιβάλλειν εἰδῶς, καί κατά πνευματικὴν θεωρίαν ἐκλαβεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα. PG 90 832 A-B, Quaest. et Dubia 59.

The outcome is, that he becomes an immoral personality because his interest is only to satisfy his gluttonous passion and every other bad habit which is a result of it.

However, if we explain it into a wider patristic context, we could say that the holy father employs this quotation from Aristotle, to show us that for the consolidation of the spiritual contemplation, a person must follow a path free from experiences of worldly habits. When a person lives thus, then he does not “hang” himself up to innate tendencies, but he learns how to utilise nature properly and dispassionately.

Both, Karen Horney and Saint Maximus, examine the oral attitude-gluttony as a neurotic-sinful phenomenon promoting and generating many other passions. Both accept that these tendencies include a broader aspect of exploiting others through carnal desires and greedy behaviour. The only divergence I would argue that exists between them is that Horney investigates the oral attitude as an outcome of competitiveness, whilst St. Maximus considers it as an outcome of self-love. In other words, the starting-point of St. Maximus for the aspect of gluttony is wider than Horney’s, who limits the oral attitude to competing tendencies between people.

Compartmentalisation-Κατάτμησις

The notion of compartmentalisation, the interpretation of which Horney outlines, says that it has to do with the fragmentation of human nature into many pieces. Compartmentalisation can develop into a particularly negative contradiction which fractures the psychosomatic foundations of man.

From St. Maximus’ point of view, κατάτμησις is seen in link with “self-love”. It is the *splitting* of the one nature, which subdivides man in multiples. It reduces the power of man’s inner strength and forces him to function as psychosomatically fragmented⁴⁰².

⁴⁰² The idea of the *psychic fragmentation* is much developed in the *Homilies of Macarius the Egyptian*, which Saint Maximus knew very well.

From these two short paragraphs, we observe that in the matter of compartmentalisation only the term is the same. On the one hand, we have Horney who presents compartmentalisation as a neurotic disturbance, dividing the existential realm of man, whilst on the other, we have St. Maximus who presents it in relation to the passion of self-love.

The relationship Saint Maximus accepts between self-love and compartmentalisation is found in two characteristics. First he presents compartmentalisation as the middle point of the development of self-love, i.e as the factor stabilising the self-love in the psyche of man, and second, he presents it as a spiritual divisibility between body and soul, indicating thus, that it operates as a strong precondition for the psychospiritual deadening of man's existence.

As we observe, in Horney's equivalent compartmentalisation, we do not have anything like what we have in St. Maximus psychology. We just see her referring to a general - again - approach of the term, which although sometimes penetrating, nevertheless remains limited, and, as a result, it is not investigated in consummate scrutiny.

After the comparative study of the second chapter, we come to the conclusion that Karen Horney's notion of neurotic phenomena refers to the man's inner spiritual weakness to be freed from the destructive influence that neurosis imposes upon him. She also examined these phenomena as situations which alienate man from his real self, whilst they imprison him in an enormous amount of intrapsychic illnesses and disturbances.

Saint Maximus' notion of fallenness refers not only to man's inner irreplaceable void, but more than this, refers to man's entire alienation from God. This is, in my opinion, the objective of the holy father, i.e to reveal in "bruised colours" the man's estrangement from God. Besides, this is the meaning of "fallenness" as well, e.g. the fall of man into godless experiences.

I think this is a point Karen Horney did not understand, when she occupied herself with the problem of neurosis and its phenomena. She did not understand that these phenomena are not just what appears externally and what other people conclude when observing others' "doubtful" attitudes. The real "neurosis" is what remains inside the man and never appears if man does not search for it in himself carefully. This real "neurosis" is nothing but the man's division from God, which not only brings about "strange tendencies" or behaviour, but, more than this, brings about an existential aversion to the salvational plan of God for the entire creation.

CHAPTER 3: THE HUMAN PERSONALITY

RESTOREA

The notion of therapy, according to Horney, constituted the most important factor in the philosophical and scientific formation of her theory. Horney aimed in therapy to help a patient to establish good relationships with others, to discover himself and to attain the possibility of working towards his self-realisation. A person's capacity was considered by her as an essential part of his self-realisation, because it includes his faculty creative work, and that of assuming responsibility for himself. The first goal towards a proper development of the therapy for him is found for Horney in the patient's relinquishing his illusions about himself and his illusory goals through discovering his real potentialities, and evolving them in a right way.

Horney's theory on therapy converges on the ontology of human choice. Through therapy one fights against an idealised image and refuses to adopt prescribed patterns of behaviour given by culture or society which harm his psychosomatic being. The therapeutic process is for Horney a journey into releasing from dictates of pride and self-love and the recovery of the real self as the locus of choice.

The task of therapy is turned not to strengthen the externalised living of ego, but to overcome the neurotic need to do so. According to Horney, a person can retrieve through therapy his spontaneity, the faculty of his self-evaluation, and his spiritual self. Not control but release, not managing feelings better, but unlocking and recognising them, not diminishing the moral demands, but casting off the perfectionist proud self, and creating in the whole real self the basis for feelings and self-evaluation.

Horney's therapeutic approach is not an intellectual consideration, but an influence which becomes an emotional experience for the self. In other words, the therapeutic methods suggested by Horney are not the cognitive awareness of oneself, but the

experienced understanding of one's particular experiences, and therefore beyond any level of intellectualisation.

The notion of therapy, for her, is directly related to the personality of an individual himself. In her opinion no therapeutic method will work if the following two conditions are not met. First the neurotic person needs to express his problems entirely; and second the psychoanalyst needs to be capable of understanding them in accordance to the patient's needs, and not simply in accordance with the categories of the psychoanalytical theory he embraces.

On the other hand, St. Maximus' anthropological considerations provide categories including curative teachings which proceed from his articulated spiritual experience. Saint Maximus in his curative teachings promotes the teaching of the Church about salvation and examines it in relation to his personal interpretations on man's existence.

St. Maximus investigated Man and Cosmos in relation to his ideas on therapy and salvation. His whole spiritual work and writings testify to us today that one of his chief preoccupations was to reveal in a proper way the path leading to salvation. In scrutinising in general perspective St. Maximus' notions of salvation, we can maintain that his teaching on this, followed three levels: the salvation of man in Christ, the salvation of man as an entire psychosomatic being, and the man's deification as the pinnacle of this salvation.

All these three levels indicate that salvation is achieved when man discovers in it, the therapeutic process it offers. For the man to discover this therapeutic process, he must search for the wholeness God endows, he must become aware of his fallenness, he must recognize the destructive activity of sin, and he must attempt to experience the salvational work of Christ in himself. When man devotes his entire existence to this search, St. Maximus stresses that he becomes able to perceive all therapeutic methods provided by the Church.

For St. Maximus, therefore, the methods of therapy contribute to man's existential purpose of union with God. For man to understand and examine these methods, he must first realise that God created him not only to complete His work of creation, but to become part of God's perfection. The position of St. Maximus with regard to therapy is considered as an attempt to teach to the man the passivity of the body and the soul, and the necessity for him to get rid of it. These two realities are experienced as one, when man tries in his earthly life to confirm himself in accordance with Christ's commandments, in order to experience the life hereafter which is given to man through Christ as an ever-well-being reality.

In other words, St. Maximus' understanding of therapy constitutes a general aspect of his anthropology, which although hidden in many theological-psychological notions, nevertheless exists as a considerable soteriological precondition, which is attained, or achieved, as an existential event with psychospiritual results, if man maintains the practice of it in his life successfully.

Concluding this discussion on both Horney's and St. Maximus' notions, we say that the greatest help the patient can obtain from any curative method, from Horney's viewpoint, is to realize with full consciousness neurosis as part of his behaviour, which overturns his inner potentialities. This realisation is for her the first step forward against all neurotic phenomena, and constitutes a constructive factor because it opens the patient to more roads of accessibility towards the effectiveness of therapy.

On the other hand, St. Maximus refers to therapeutic procedures in order to stress the idea that man needs to be aware of the means that can be employed against his sinful behaviour. The more one succeeds in discovering ways for his personal treatment, the more one approaches the reality of salvation. The curative methods of the holy father's

psychology promote the anthropology of the Church and render it more useful and helpful for the modern man.

2) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MAN'S THERAPY ACCORDING TO KAREN HORNEY

Karen Horney's understanding of therapy is fundamentally holistic. In other words, she examines every neurotic behaviour of man in connection with his entire living structure. Her basic axiom on this approach is that no neurotic phenomenon can be fully understood or identified by an analysis of its constituent parts alone. In this way, she investigates therapy as an attempt pursuing to solve the man's neurotic weaknesses and deficiencies without dividing them in parts, but considering them in relation to the whole inner and outer disbalanced realm of his self.

Thus, the methods she applies on her holistic approach as methods of therapy reveal the next step for a secure and successful achievement of it. According to Horney, the success of the therapy is no simple matter. Powerful factors in its success would be, according to her, appropriate and valuable means, i.e innovative and fully practicable ones. Horney did not divide the success of therapy from its objective effectiveness. According to her, both notions, that of the success of therapy and that of its objective effectiveness, are interlinked and complement one another. That is to say that for the therapy to be successful, as an expected positive effect in a patient's life, there is first needed its placement within a general framework which will be related to the specific procedural behaviour of all neurotic phenomena. Horney recognised that each neurotic phenomenon moves within a concrete procedure, viz. it commences because of a particular cause, it develops concrete symptomatology and ends with concrete disorientations. The entire neurotic procedure is a procedure full of weakness. For this weakness to be overcome constructively, there is needed a frequent and sufficient attempt by the patient, for, if not the ideal outcome, at least a satisfactory one to be attained.

The therapeutic methods suggested by Horney are: resistance to temptations, insight and religion. These are not the goals for therapy, but conditions informing actions and motives towards efficient therapeutic effort.

In the aspects of therapy being discussed in details right afterwards, we will see that the method of resistance to temptations, for Horney, constitutes a considerable means not only

for the avoidance of every neurotic “missile”, but also a factor intervening in the choices of man in order for them not to be developed neurotically. In other words, resistance to temptations operates as a restraint against situations affecting the man’s psychosomatic potentialities. In this curative method, Horney discovers the “cutting down” of all neurotic demands, caused by any internal or external circumstance. Through this therapeutic process, man “awakens” his existential conscience and behaves as a complete personality against all these phenomena which imprison him in established “shoulds”.

For the therapeutic notion of insight, Horney indicates that, this therapeutic method connects not only with the knowledge of conflicts and strivings that are relatively easy to be identified, but also, and more importantly, with those buried deep in the unconscious and thus disallowed, because all cause neurotic experiences which sooner or later become unbearable psychospiritual burdens. Through insight all idealised images of the self can be cured, and thus one’s personality becomes free from conflicting compulsions, and restored in his existential being, i.e in his real self.

The therapeutic aspect of religion constitutes for Horney an ability with deep implications. Although she does not examine or admit it in pure theological interpretations, nevertheless she approaches it as a potential experience for confronting neurosis essentially. The aspect of religion, for her, consists of healthy existential characteristics which can undertake the difficult work of alleviating all neurotic phenomena. Horney considers that through religious experiences of the past, not only man, but society as well, can face and reject neurosis with success. Religion, therefore, for her, is a very useful spiritual asset which if properly accepted from the neurotic person, i.e if the neurotic person believes and follows it sincerely, then his existence will be freed from every neurotic tendency and behaviour haunting his being.

RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATIONS

The notion of the resistance to temptations is regarded in Karen Horney's therapeutic theory as of the utmost importance. She considers this resistance as something which helps neurotic persons to confront their disturbances in a proper way. When she refers to the term "temptations" she does not of course investigate it as something with deep theological interpretation. She just thinks of it and examines it as a neurotic "missile" disturbing one's inner balance. For Horney these "temptations" contain all the up-to-date tendencies which aim at harming a person's spirituality through "arrows" of existential disorientation.

Karen Horney assumes only one way of facing those situations. A person, according to her, must learn the means of resisting them properly. Resistance to temptations is achieved through two specific means. The first is related to the *eagerness* of the person to fight them continually and sufficiently. This eagerness works in one's existence through a personal effort towards inner self-restoration. Through practice, this eagerness becomes persistent and directed towards the obliteration of his neurotic tendencies. The second relates to a person's *suitable preparation*. This preparation implies that a person always tries to be in control of all weaknesses arising from neurotic trends and those already existing, and those that can be expected. In this way man keeps his eyes open and he does not allow himself to be carrying away by oncoming neurotic disturbances.

The task in respect of the neurotic person is to change all the neurotic factors within him which interfere with his best development. This means not only a major modification in action or behaviour such as gaining or regaining the capacity for inner reconstruction, but is also the result of less visible changes within the personality, such as gaining a more realistic attitude toward oneself instead of wavering between self-aggrandizement and self-degradation, gaining a spirit of activity, assertion, and courage instead of inertia and fears, becoming able to plan instead of hanging onto others with excessive expectations and excessive accusations, gaining greater friendliness and understanding of people, instead of harbouring a diffuse defensive hostility. If changes like these take place, external changes in overt activities or symptoms are bound to follow, and to a corresponding degree.

Karen Horney accepted that various neurotic phenomena and manifestations take the form of temptations which turn against the personality. The greatness of man can easily be seen in his resistance to them and his ability to fight them. She uses, therefore, Christ's resistance to the temptations of the devil as an example, according to which the neurotic can understand the importance of liberation from the trials and tribulations of neurosis.¹

Horney offers also an opposite example in the form of Adam and Eve who lost their purity of feeling because of the deception which they followed becoming enmeshed in the rigmarole of various neurotic conditions. Subjugation to the powers of evil is referred to by Horney as a precondition of psychological trials and negative effects. The pathology of the soul affects the individual through neurotic fragmentations and it blocks the understanding of the necessity of accepting responsibility for his actions.²

Usually, the inability to resist temptations leads to strong psychological depression. Under its pressure, man strives to reach the supreme and the infinite, allotting his best endeavours to the realization of the ideal image and searching for talents he does not really possess, thus destroying his own self.³ This depression is a symbol of an inner misfortune in the face of great dangers which threaten the personality. As a result the neurotic expands his energies in the dead ends of desperation and of rejection of any real improvement⁴, which shows that he experiences fully every psychological or spiritual anxiety.⁵

¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 375; comp. Math. 4: 1-10.

² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 375; comp. Gen. II: 8, 16-17, III: 1-6.

³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 377.

⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 376.

⁵ In this point trying to give us more understanding of *psychological or spiritual anxiety*, Karen Horney uses literary texts: "Sometimes this distress (the psychic or spiritual) may be symbolised by external misfortunes, as it is in Stephen Vincent Benet's: *The Devil and Daniel Webster*. Sometimes it is merely indicated, as it is in the biblical story of Christ's temptation. Some times no distress seems to be present but, as in the old *Faustbuch* and Christopher Marlowe's: *Dr. Faustus*, a person is carried away by his craving for the glory of magical power. At any rate we know that only a psychically disturbed person will

If the neurotic does not become aware that the neurotic conditions of his being affect him considerably, then he is unable not only to resist them, but also to sense their existence. Unfortunately, the psychologically disturbed individual displays such deficiencies quite frequently.⁶

develop such a craving. In Hans Christian Andersen's: *Snow Queen* it is the devil who creates the disturbance in the first place by mischievously breaking a mirror and letting its splinters invade human hearts". See *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 375, n. 11. In such literature Horney finds illustrations of the fact that the neurotic person tries to reach in something higher, something beyond his powers and, of course, something very evil. In this effort, he understands many times his own lack but instead of returning repentant he continues with depression as his main reward.

⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 376.

R) INSIGHT

The therapist employs insight as a decisive curative method because he believes that insight truly and effectively confronts the problem of neurosis.

Insight is the ability of the patient to face his problems squarely. The work of insight constitutes the tendency of recognising factors that are hitherto unconscious. Insight is not only an intellectual process for Horney, it is both an intellectual and emotional experience. This ability of the self may be a recognition of an entirely repressed factor, such as the discovery made by a compulsively modest or benevolent person that actually he has a diffuse contempt for people. It may be a recognition that a drive which is at the level of awareness has an hidden intensity and quality that were never dreamed of: a person may know that he is ambitious, for instance, but never have suspected before that his ambition is an all devouring passion determining his life and containing the destructive element of wanting a vindictive triumph over others.

Or insight may be a finding that certain seemingly unconnected factors are closely interrelated. A person may have known that he has certain grandiose expectations as to his significance and his achievements in life, and have been aware also that he has a melancholy outlook and a general foreboding that he will succumb to some pending disaster within a brief span, but never have suspected that either attitude represents a problem or that the two have any connection. In this case his insight might reveal to him that his urge to be admired for his unique value is so rigid that he feels a deep indignation at its non-fulfilment and therefore devalues life itself.

Insight is the procedure through which one struggles for constructive inner therapeutic experiences. According to Horney, insight is the process which assists to the creation of all curative attempts of psychoanalysis, so that they become sufficient. Horney believed that through insight a person's effort becomes adequate because he learns how to examine his inner self towards the task of his self-awareness and self-restoration. As soon as insight operates in one's existence, the neurotic disturbances begin to vanish and to give way to the well-founded feeling of having taken a useful step ahead against all influences created by neurosis. If someone wants to experience the acquisition of insight properly, he must

first understand the point that insight is developed through extremely painful procedures which help one to experience it fully and its therapeutic value, and secondly that he must be always open in what the work of insight orders him to do in the task of a better obliteration of his neurotic compulsions.

Insight reveals to a person his own true feelings by showing him the speciousness of his attitudes. Through insight one expresses willingly anger, irritation, contempt, fear or whatever was hitherto repressed, and replaces them with active and alive feelings, which help him to recover himself healthily. Seen from another perspective, insight confronts the neurotic process as a problem of the self. Against this process, insight undertakes another one; that of abandoning the self who also is the idolised one, for the real and really actual. Insight neutralizes the pseudoself of a neurotic person, using one's potentials. Simultaneously it works through man's constructive forces mobilised by life or by therapy, and thus leads one to discover his real self.

For Horney it is impossible to say in general terms what it means for a patient to obtain an insight into his problems. The only sure way is to experience oneself that insight constitutes a powerful change or abolition of all inner weaknesses, and results in a real emotional attitude. One might say that through insight a person gains his inner balance. Insight offers oneself great psychological values which revise, modify and control the feelings, strivings and behaviour of man's existence.

Also, insight is one's inner tendency to follow attitudes restoring proper psychosomatic homeostasis. Insight helps one to understand fully and clearly everything that happens in oneself. It works as the factor producing antidotes to all neurotic manifestations. For Horney insight is an immediate reaction which challenges the existing equilibrium and operates for the recovery of the psychic machinery. Insight employs all useful forces functioning within oneself, aiming at utilising in a wholesome way every psychic factor attempting to fight against neurosis.

Insight, therefore, constitutes in itself the experience of an existentialist search which alters the behaviour of the personality. It touches the roots and foundations of the problem and brings positive results to the neurotic who possesses or acquires it. The more an

individual resists the influence and effect of the insight, the more he succeeds in impeding its benevolent influence.⁷ The more he shrinks back from gaining a certain insight, the more his free associations will be impeded.⁸ The more rigid the neurotic system, the less can any modification be tolerated. And the more closely an insight touches upon the foundations, the more anxiety will it arouse for the whole personality.⁹

They are several reasons why an insight may produce relief. To begin with the least important consideration: the neurotic sheds his dangerous illusions and deceptions about himself.¹⁰ It is often a gratifying intellectual experience merely to learn the reasons for some neurotic phenomena not hitherto understood; in any situation in life it is likely to be a relief merely to recognise the truth. This reconsidered viewpoint applies not only to elucidation of present peculiarities but also to memories of hitherto forgotten childhood experiences, if such memories help one to understand precisely what factors influenced one's development at the start.¹¹

This good start for someone's restoration and therapy from all neurotic phenomena and expressions is attained and intensified by further insight. Through insight one develops in the therapeutic process, and acquires the possibility to overcome the emotional difficulties involved in one's relationship to others. By exercising insight, one calms the passions. A person experiences this culmination if he struggles to keep himself in a proper balance with his inner capabilities and expectations.

Horney accepts the practice of insight that increases the self-awareness and the liveliness of an individual. With insight he feels free and secure.¹² Insight pushes away all tensions which might have been generated and liberates all true sentiments. It clears every impasse

⁷ *Selfanalysis*, pp. 108-109.

⁸ *Selfanalysis*, p. 111.

⁹ *Selfanalysis*, p. 108.

¹⁰ *Selfanalysis*, pp. 103-104.

¹¹ *Selfanalysis*, pp. 103-104.

¹² *Selfanalysis*, p. 134.

of the personality granting it independence from subconscious propensities, reactions¹³ and liberating from all the "blind alleys".¹⁴ When the individual accepts its beneficial and benevolent incisions, he gains in dynamism and sincerity.

An insight can be very painful but it may also bring about instant relief. When it is painful, it offends the supposed or assumed equilibrium of the mental processes, it brings inner upheaval and it shakes all the hallucinations of the neurotic. When it brings instant relief, it does so by revealing to the neurotic the contents of his previous stances and behaviour, exposing him for what he is, i.e. a neurotic and it underlines the truth about himself. Every insight gained, no matter how small in itself, opens up new problems because of its interrelation with other healthy psychic factors, and thereby carries "dynamite" with which the whole imbalance can be shaken.¹⁵ This shaken imbalance produces relief again because it derives from the need to escape psychologically impelling conditions.¹⁶

Both insight and relief constitute manifestations which essentially assist in awareness of one's inner reality.¹⁷ They defeat the self-destructive abilities of the individual and they lead to an increasing self-awareness and self-understanding where insight does not become a self-justifying aim but a means of liberating of all abilities towards the unhurried progress and evolution of personality. A person can grow by using the right meaning of insight, only if he assumes responsibility for himself.¹⁸

To express oneself with utter frankness is hard, but it is also a blessing. The same can also be said about gaining insight by oneself and about inner change and alteration through therapy. The first aims at a person's intuitive tendency for a more productive activity,

¹³ *Selfanalysis*, p. 104.

¹⁴ *Selfanalysis*, p. 104.

¹⁵ *Selfanalysis*, pp. 108-109.

¹⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 158.

¹⁷ *Selfanalysis*, p. 105.

¹⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 15.

whilst the second refers to the change of factors which interfere with his best development. This change represents goals towards creative work, towards losing phobias or towards tendencies against depression. The reason for this is that a person becomes a more conscientious personality through insight before coming to analytical therapy, and thus he precipitates and accommodates the work of therapy more elaborately and constructively. For Horney the most accurate and important insight about one's inner problems is acquired before a patient comes into the procedure of psychoanalytical treatment.

The blessing deriving from insight offers true inner peace to the individual and it assists him in the realistic conscious understanding of his neurotic tendencies.¹⁹ Insight, then, is not an aim in itself, but a means of liberating the forces of the healthy spontaneous growth.²⁰ On the other hand, the avoiding of insight distances him from any improvement and it weakens him in his path towards resolving his neurotic tendencies and also causes the neurotic person to rise above others in every possible way by many and gigantic means, reinforcing his whole need for glory and neurotic pride. His inflated pride, then, enhances the vindictiveness, thereby makes a still greater need for triumph.²¹

¹⁹ *Selfanalysis*, p. 112.

²⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 15.

²¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 104.

c) RELIGION

Horney's attitude to religion can be divided into two parts. The first part for her relates to religion as a system of beliefs with either an institutionalised or a traditionally defined pattern of ceremony. Under this aspect, religion is regarded by Horney as a cultural universal which emerges invariably as an outcome of the need to understand human conditions, and particularly neuroses. For Horney, most, although not all, religions and specifically the Christian religion include beliefs notably the concept of a supreme being, and the promise of a pathway to an ideal existence and an afterlife.

The second part, which for her is the more useful one for her therapeutic theory, is that religion is presented as an interdisciplinary field which presents many branches, whether of a sociological, or of an anthropological, or of a psychological, or of a philosophical nature. For her, the great benefit to be gained from religion in this sense, is that religion offers universally positive ideas, which may decisively stimulate the human need for an integrated psychosomatic development, and finally, that the various theological and psychological notions deriving from religion provide good suggestions for the resolution of many crucial cultural problems which create numerous neurotic conditions.

Peace of soul, therefore, is translated by the neurotic as the shirking of every effort, responsibility and strife.²² He believes that nothing is impossible for him and that nothing is unachievable.²³ He is, therefore content to aspire towards few circumstantial and superficial personality changes²⁴ which are devoid of content, of substance and of quality.

Fruitful creativity is linked, according to Horney, with the spiritual toil of man and finds its beginnings in religion.²⁵ Pain is one of its chief means of expression because on one hand it makes man responsible for his own problems and on the other it increases the

²² *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 260.

²³ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 35.

²⁴ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 260.

²⁵ *Are you considering psychoanalysis*, pp. 50-51.

gamut of sentiments and feelings, giving meaning to human life and opening the heart to the trials and tribulations of others.²⁶

The faithful man understands that only God can achieve everything and deal with anything.²⁷ The seeking of psychosomatic equilibrium does not include the distancing from any true change but as far as religion is concerned, it directs the individual towards greater aims and targets.²⁸

According to religious faith, what leads to spiritual development and wholesomeness is the rejection of trivial experiences and unimportant traits of living. This rejection is achieved when the neurotic discards expressions: of personal need and will, sexual desire and the craving for possession of material wealth. If all these are done in the name of and for the sake of God, then man can withstand anything for the sake of eternity. He turns from personal cravings and satisfies the spirituality which exists “de facto” within him.²⁹

History proves the validity of the aforesaid, teaching us that a tireless struggle, when augmented by the accumulation of greater knowledge of the world and the environment, leads to deeper religious experience and mental powers capable of inexhaustible moral courage.³⁰ Through this moral courage, one achieves spiritual assets in all elements of the soul, and experiences better ways of living. He awakens his best energies and strives towards psychic integration. Perhaps the time has come, Horney concludes, for Psychiatry to acknowledge the wisdom of Theology from a psychological point of view.³¹ When Horney refers to the “wisdom of theology”, she indicates the truth has been expressed centuries ago about man, which nowadays can be fruitful. The noun “wisdom” for her implies the wise values hidden within religion, whilst the term “theology” expresses for her

²⁶ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 163.

²⁷ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 35.

²⁸ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 259.

²⁹ *Neurosis and human growth*, pp. 259-260.

³⁰ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 377.

³¹ *Neurosis and human growth*, p. 376.

the strong intervention of the divine Being within creation and life. Theology for her may lead into healthy and firm human interrelationships for the aim of a better society. For the “wisdom of theology”, Horney admits, was lost when Adam and Eve disobeyed God, and was rediscovered when Christ taught the Gospels.

This is the way Horney investigates religion in her theory on neurosis. Although her preoccupation with it, is not very highly developed, nevertheless, she does accept it as an important means of therapy, which can clearly help the neurotic person to be cured from his disturbances. In the way Horney examined religion, she placed it within her holistic approach on man, and proved that this therapeutic process operates healthily for the betterment of human existence and society.

3) THE THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MAN'S THERAPY ACCORDING TO SAINT MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR.

In Saint Maximus' anthropology we do not find the notion of therapy neither as definition nor as an applied procedure. Therapy is a psychological notion and does not fit in the holy father's aspects on man. Nevertheless, he does discuss ways towards a healthy psychological life, though he never separates them from the connections he accepts there exist between the actions of God for the salvation of man, and the man's participation in it. That is to say that, the holy father does not isolate his teaching in parts, in order to speak of a precise therapeutic procedure. Such a procedure can be found in every aspect of his anthropology, because he examines it under the prism of the grace of God.

Saint Maximus' theological framework is imbued with his attempt to stress in a more understandable way the means towards an utter psychospiritual and psychosomatic salvation. In my opinion, although the notion of therapy does not exist as such, as we have previously said, nevertheless there exists the notion of salvation which constitutes deeper and broader approaches to the aspect of therapy, in contrast of that of Horney's.

To investigate, therefore, the ways to this Maximian therapeutic process, and with the objective of facilitating the comparisons with Horney following at the end of this chapter, we will present the aspects of St. Maximus' anthropology which in my opinion not only include the psychological therapeutic methods of Horney, but they also outweigh them through notions more intuitive and penetrating. We shall consider, then, Maximus' "therapy" under the aspects of struggle against λογισμοί, the practice of discernment (διάκρισις), and the meaning of sacraments (μυστήρια).

The struggle against λογισμοί, for Maximus, involves a general understanding of what λογισμοί achieve against man and the persistent attempt towards uprooting the

foundations of every psychospiritual imperfection. The holy father examines this struggle with considerable attention. He considers λογισμοί as the apex of temptations which first and principally attempt to pass into the human intellect in order to reside in it and control it. St. Maximus' struggle against λογισμοί is nothing but struggle against the man's tendency to sin.

The second therapeutic or salvational procedure is discernment. Discernment for him is a continuously acquired virtue, rather than a spiritual quality which can be easily attained. It is something demanding the accurate contribution of the man, in order to become a sufficiently efficient constituent part of his existence. The virtue of discernment restores man and makes him discreet on his actions.

The third aspect of the Maximian "therapy" is the aspect of sacraments. The holy father dedicates to this aspect his *Mystagogy*. For him, all sacraments contribute to the man's salvation; but especially the sacrament of Eucharist. The Eucharist, is for him, not only the apex of all sacraments, but also the path through which man contemplates God. Through the Eucharist, St. Maximus believes that God communicates with man in Christ. Man through the Eucharist pursues path to καθ' ὁμοίωσιν by participating in the mystical body of God. Thus, he becomes christlike and experiences salvation as part of his nature. Through the Eucharist, St. Maximus completes his aspects on "therapy" and places them under the whole objective of God towards perfecting creation.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΙ

The struggle against λογισμοί (to be translated “thoughts”, although we cannot express the term in English precisely) constitutes for St. Maximus a matter of fundamental importance in his teaching. The holy father is occupied with logismoι because they affect one’s psychosomatic balance significantly. In his teaching he mainly refers to the symptomatology of the various kinds of logismoι, and he usually provides the solutions against them in a general form. For the Saint all parts of the human soul are affected by logismoι.

“The intellect receives impassioned conceptual images in three ways: through the senses, through the body’s condition and through the memory. It receives them through the senses when the senses themselves receive impressions from things in relation to which we have acquired passion, and when these things stir up impassioned thoughts in the intellect; through the body’s condition when, as a result either of an undisciplined way of life, or of the activity of demons, or of some illness, the balance of elements in the body is disturbed and again the intellect is stirred to impassioned thoughts or to thoughts contrary to providence; through the memory when the memory recalls the conceptual images of things in relation to which we were once made passionate, and so stirs up impassioned thoughts in a similar way”.³²

We observe here St Maximus presenting the stages the impassioned conceptual images pass through in order to reside in the man’s intellect. On the one hand, therefore, these images attack the intellect by exploiting the senses of man and making them construct

³² Διά τῶν τριῶν τούτων λαμβάνει ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐμπαθῆ νοήματα· διά τῆς αἰσθήσεως, διά τῆς κράσεως, διά τῆς μνήμης· καί διά μέν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν προσβάλλοντι αὐτῇ τὰ πράγματα πρὸς ἅπερ τὰ πάθη κεκτήμεθα, κινῆ αὐτόν πρὸς ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμούς. Διά δέ τῆς κράσεως, ὅταν ἐξ ἀκολάστου διαίτης, ἢ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων, ἢ νοσήματός τινος ἀλλοιουμένη ἢ τοῦ σώματος κρᾶσις, κινῆ αὐτόν πάλιν πρὸς ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμούς, ἢ κατὰ τῆς προνοίας. Διά δέ τῆς μνήμης, ὅταν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς ἅπερ πεπόνθαμεν τὰ νοήματα ἢ μνήμη ἀναφέρη, καί κινῆ αὐτόν ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμούς. *Char.*, II, 74.

impassioned thoughts. On the other hand, through temperament the balance of the body is altered in many ways, and thus the impassioned thoughts impose upon it. Finally, through memory, each thought acquired from the man's relationship to logismoi is activated again and re-generates each passionate experience through reconstruction.

For the holy father a strong factor in the creation and cultivation of logismoi within one's soul is the demons. St. Maximus considers the demons as the ringleaders of the tendencies of the passionate logismoi. The demons, therefore, attempt to constrain one to commit sin, either in thought or in deed. "Those who are always trying to lay hold of our soul do so by means of impassioned thoughts, so that they may drive it to sin either in the mind or in action".³³

The holy father gives a central place to the influence exercised by the demons in one's soul, because for him the evil spirits try to invade soul and to settle in it. Their first and stronger method uses the logismoi, which the holy father characterises as the most powerful means employed by the demons when attacking the soul. According to St. Maximus it is very difficult to confront the logismoi by oneself. It is even more difficult and dangerous than the actual experience of sin. "For the war which the demons wage against us by means of thoughts is more severe than the war they wage by means of material things".³⁴

For St. Maximus, logismoi are divided into two categories: simple ones and in the composite ones. "Some thoughts are simple, others are composite. Thoughts which are not impassioned are simple. Passion-charged thoughts are composite, consisting as they do of a conceptual image combined with passion. This being so, when composite thoughts begin to provoke a simple idea in the mind, many simple thoughts may be seen to follow them. For instance, an impassioned thought about gold rises in someone's mind. He has

³³ Οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ἀεὶ ζητοῦντες, διὰ τῶν ἐμπαθῶν λογισμῶν ζητοῦσιν, ἵνα αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν κατὰ διάνοιαν, ἢ τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀμαρτίαν ἐμβάλωσιν. (...) *Char.*, II, 20.

³⁴ (...) Ὁ διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῶν δαιμόνων πόλεμος, τοῦ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων πολέμου ἐστὶ χαλεπώτερος. *Char.*, I, 91.

the urge mentally to steal the gold and commits the sin in his intellect. Then thoughts of the purse, the chest, the room and so on follow hard on the thought of the gold. The thought of the gold was composite - for it was combined with passion - but those of the purse, the chest and so on were simple; for the intellect had no passion in relation to these things. For not all thoughts which follow impassioned thought are themselves impassioned, as our example has shown. From this, then, we may know which conceptual images are impassioned and which are not".³⁵

Maximus devotes considerable attention to the notion of passionate logismoi and in particular stresses the point that, when the simple and composite logismoi operate as sins in mind, they change the order through which they affect man. And he uses the example of gold. He indicates then, that the gold as material thing does not contain anything impassioned. The man who feels impassioned thoughts about gold, he experiences them because he created them in his mind. In other words, he focused his mind to steal the gold in order to satisfy the logismos of stealing. He also used for this stealing whatever relates to the gold, for example, the purse and the safe. And he concludes in saying that the memory of gold is composite, because it includes the passion, whilst the memory of purse

³⁵ Οἱ μὲν τῶν λογισμῶν ἀπλοῖ εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ σύνθετοι. Καὶ ἀπλοῖ μὲν εἰσίν, οἱ ἀπαθεῖς· σύνθετοι δὲ οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς, ὡς εἰς πάθους καὶ νοήματος συγκείμενοι. Τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, πολλοὺς τῶν ἀπλῶν ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἐπομένους τοῖς συνθέτοις, πᾶν ἄρξωνται κινεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἁμαρτάνειν. Οἷον, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ· ἀνέβη ἐπὶ τὴν μνήμην τινός λογισμὸς περὶ χρυσοῦ ἐμπαθῆς· καὶ ὤρμησε τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐπὶ τὸ κλέπτειν, καὶ ἀπετέλεσε κατὰ νοῦν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. Συνείποντο δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ τοῦ χρυσοῦ, καὶ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ βαλλαντίου καὶ τοῦ σκευαρίου καὶ τοῦ κουβουκλείου, καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς. Καὶ ἡ μὲν μνήμη τοῦ χρυσοῦ, ἦν σύνθετος· εἶχε γὰρ τὸ πάθος· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βαλλαντίου καὶ τοῦ σκευαρίου καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς, ἀπλῆ. Οὐ γὰρ εἶχε πρὸς αὐτὰ πάθος ὁ νοῦς. Καὶ ἐπὶ παντός δὲ λογισμοῦ ὁμοίως εἶχε. (...) Οὐ γὰρ πάντες οἱ συνεπόμενοι τῷ ἐμπαθεῖ λογισμῷ λογισμοὶ καὶ ἐμπαθεῖς εἰσίν, ὡς ἀπέδειξεν ὁ λόγος. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν δυνάμεθα γινῶναι ποῖα τὰ ἐμπαθῆ νοήματα, καὶ ποῖα τὰ ἀπλά. *Char.*, II, 84.

and safe are simple, without passion, and that, one can realise the ways his logismoi operate if he observes them clearly, and in the form the example revealed it.

St. Maximus stresses here, that every time one encloses in his mind the memory of each aspect or depiction of impassioned thoughts, then, his logismoi become composite because he compares them to things able to help his tendency to convert them into actual sinful experiences. If we divide, he says, the composite logismoi in the parts structuring them, then the logismoi become simple and, therefore, incapable of affecting, for the reason that these parts are not the objective the mind aims at in order to create passions. The final idea of St. Maximus in this quotation, manifests the outcome of these simple and composite logismoi, which is to provide the man with a deep understanding of “spying” them out, in order to clear up which of them are passionate and which not.

When the logismoi enter soul, they attack the three parts of the soul . “All impassioned thoughts either stimulate the soul’s desiring power, or disturb its incensive power, or darken its intelligence”³⁶. I think that St. Maximus’ teaching on logismoi operates through the tripartite aspect of the soul, which is affected by them through the notions of: the stimulation, the disturbance and the darkening. These three notions operate against each aspect of the tripartite system of the soul. They either urge the appetitive aspect to give in to desires, or make the activity of the incensive power malfunction, or mar the rational part in order not to reason in the way God created it. These notions contain, in my opinion, important elements of the Maximian psychology on logismoi, because they depict the work of the impassioned thoughts in the soul when logismoi ensnare it, in order to constrain by imprisoning the intrapsychic potentialities of man. St. Maximus presents in a very acute way this trap, and he points out very clearly that once these thoughts enter in the soul, it is very easy for them to expand their influence to the body, i.e to the entire psychosomatic realm of man.

³⁶ Πάντες οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμοί, ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρεθίζουσιν, ἢ τὸ θυμικὸν ἐκταράσσουν, ἢ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐπισκοτίζουσι. (...) *Char.*, III, 20.

In order to struggle against the passionate logismoi decisively, first of all one needs to distinguish the different ways in which these logismoi operate when they attempt to affect the soul. Man needs, in other words, to examine the origin of them, to investigate the reasons creating them, and to be always alert when they attack and try to alter the inner capacity of his soul. St. Maximus says, therefore, that one “ must pay close attention to such thoughts, searching out and eliminating their causes”.³⁷

In turn, one must not allow the soul to keep company with logismoi, once they affect it, - “not allowing the soul to dally with impassioned thoughts”³⁸, - and let it get used to their influence. This is another means of controlling and expelling logismoi, i.e by turning one against the passions, and throwing them out of the intellect. Thus, when the passions leave, the logismoi have no reason for remaining within soul because the roots connecting them with passionate causes have been cut off. So, says the holy father, if you “wish to master your thoughts, concentrate on the passions and you will easily drive the thoughts arising from them out of your intellect”.³⁹ Another powerful means against the influence of the passionate logismoi is the awakening of the intellect which not only makes it difficult for the logismoi to enter, but much more, as the holy father says, enables the intellect to expel them, so that they behave like sheep before their shepherd. If they behave thus, then their only work will be to obey and to remain as a part of the flock. However, the intellect can only exercise such pastoral activities, provided it is not softened and prone to sin. If so, it possesses the ability to guide the ship of the soul properly, and to protect it from every pitfall which appears in its course, either because of logismoi, or because other passionate procedures. If this occurs, then as the holy father says, “the sheep represent thoughts pastured by the intellect on the mountains of contem-

³⁷ (...) ἀκριβῶς τοῖς λογισμοῖς προσέχειν, καὶ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας καὶ γνῶναι καὶ ἐκκόπτειν (...) *Char.*, III, 20.

³⁸ (...) τὸ μὴ ἐγχρονίζειν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοὺς ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμοὺς (...) *Char.*, II, 87.

³⁹ Εἰ θέλεις τῶν λογισμῶν περιγίγνεσθαι, ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παθῶν, καὶ εὐχερῶς ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐξελαύνεις. (...) *Char.*, III, 13.

plation”.⁴⁰

Thus, the influence of the demons will be defeated, too, because they will discover a strong intellect which does not admire them, and that is in no mood to open up any relationship with the destruction of sin. When the demons see that the intellect is spiritually strong enough, then they will abandon their effort to conquer it either through logismoi, or through any other passionate impression. “Consequently, when they find the intellect unreceptive, they will be disgraced and put to shame; and when they find the intellect occupied with spiritual contemplation, they will *be turned back and suddenly ashamed*”.⁴¹ The power of the wholesome intellect has decisive importance in the Saint Maximus’ anthropology because it is the first positive step and obstacle not only against logismoi but against every passion as well.

When, therefore, the behaviour of the intellect is such it attains intimate communion with God, because it does not contribute to the maintenance of the destructive logismoi. If the intellect for any reason loses its way, then unfortunately will occur what the holy father points out: “When the intellect associates with evil and sordid thoughts it loses its intimate communion with God”.⁴²

Saint Maximus also advises that for the expulsion of logismoi it is necessary to exercise the body and soul through performances of the liturgical order. In this way, one is protected from destructive logismoi and acquires the rites of moderation, where he experiences the great virtue of love. So, Saint Maximus suggests: “afflict your flesh with hunger and vigils and apply yourself tirelessly to psalmody and prayer; then the sanctifying

⁴⁰ (...) προβάτων γάρ λόγον επέχουσιν οἱ λογισμοί, ἐπί τά ὄρη τῶν θεωρημάτων ὑπό τοῦ νοῦ ποιμαινόμενοι. (...) *Char.*, II, 55.

⁴¹ (...) Ὅταν οὖν εὐρωσι τόν νοῦν μὴ παραδεχόμενον, τότε αἰσχυνθήσονται καί ἐντραπήσονται· ὅταν δέ τῇ πνευματικῇ θεωρίᾳ ἐνασχολούμενον, τότε ἀποστραφήσονται καί καταισχυνθήσονται σφόδρα διά τάχους. *Char.*, II, 20; comp. Ps. 6, 10.

⁴² (...) ὁ νοῦς τῆς πρὸς Θεόν παρρησίας ἐκπίπτει, ὀπνήνικα πονηροῖς ἢ ρυπαροῖς λογισμοῖς συνόμιλος γένηται. *Char.*, I, 50.

gift of self-restraint will descend upon you and bring you love".⁴³ When one exercises oneself thus, one does not taint one's existence with passionate logismoi, which lead one away from God's love and peace.

As a conclusion to our discussion of logismoi, we could refer to the struggle against temptations, as St. Maximus himself speaks of it. One must be always firm in struggling against temptations. The logismoi ensue from temptations, and the sooner man struggles against them, the better he will obtain hope towards God, Who is the only one Being Who can assist man. If one does not show this behaviour, or if one shows oneself to be incompetent, then unfortunately one will become "prey" to temptations and logismoi. Thus "in time of trial do not leave your monastery but stand up courageously against thoughts that surge over you, especially those of irritation and listlessness. For when you have been tested by afflictions in this way, according to divine providence, your hope in God will become firm and secure. But if you leave, you will show yourself to be worthless, unmanly and fickle".⁴⁴

For St. Maximus there are four ways through which the man can confront and cope with the logismoi in order to control and expel them. The first is for the Christian not to defile his soul with them⁴⁵ and not to corrupt his body through filthy deeds. The second, is for the soul to act in accordance with its nature. A precondition for the soul to behave in

⁴³ Αϊκίζε τήν σάρκα σου άσιτία και άγρυπνία, και σχολασον άόκνωσ ψαλμωδία και προσευχή· και ό άγιασμός τής σωφροσύνης επί σέ έπελεύσεται, τήν άγάπην φέρων. *Char.*, I, 45.

⁴⁴ Έν τῷ καιρῷ τῶν πειρασμῶν, μή καταλίπης τό μοναστήριόν σου· αλλά φέρε γενναίως τά κύματα τῶν λογισμῶν, και μάλιστα τῶν τής λύπης και άκηδίας. Ούτω γάρ οικονομικῶς, διά τῶν θλίψεων δοκιμασθείς, έξεις βεβαίαν τήν εις Θεόν έλπίδα. Έάν δέ καταλιμπάνης, άδόκιμος και άνανδρος και άστατος εύρεθήση. *Char.*, I, 52.

⁴⁵ Μή μολύνης τήν σάρκα σου έν αισχροίς πράξεσιν, και μή μιάνης τήν ψυχήν πονηροίς λογισμοίς· και ή ειρήνη του Θεού έπελεύσεται επί σέ, τήν άγάπην φέρουσα. *Char.*, I, 44.

this way is for its incensive power and its appetitive aspect to remain dispassionate⁴⁶. The third is for one to employ against his impassioned thoughts means such as psalmody, prayer, detachment of the mind from sinful missiles, or preoccupation with things not expressing passionate starting points⁴⁷. Finally, the fourth way against the impassioned thoughts is, for St. Maximus, the word of God, which operates as an oil-lamp and, on the one hand, illuminates the natural logismoi of the faithful, whilst on the other, it burns those behaving unnaturally⁴⁸. St. Maximus likens the word of God to the marrow which nourishes the divine logismoi like bones which support the body of the virtues⁴⁹.

When a man tries the first, he cuts off the causes promoting the creation and residence of logismoi within his soul, and thus he stands away from the reasons stabilising logismoi in his existence. By the second, when the soul does not “flirt” with logismoi, it does not experience close encounters with them, and, accordingly, the purified condition of the soul is not affected by them. By the third, one follows alternative spiritual solutions which can replace one’s sinful tendencies with beneficial activities. Therefore, the man is opposed to every logismos and prevents the passions from employing passionate images, capable of exploiting his intellect. Finally on the fourth we see the holy father pinpointing the fact that the teaching of God helps man, not only by driving away his passionate logismoi, but also by illuminating his being in order to get rid of them effectively. To illustrate this, St.

⁴⁶ Ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἀκαθαρσία, τό μὴ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ φύσιν. Ἐκ τούτου γάρ τίκτονται τῷ νῶ οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμοί. Τότε γάρ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργεῖ ὅταν αἱ παθητικαὶ αὐτῆς δυνάμεις· ὁ θυμὸς λέγω καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς νοημάτων προβολῇ, ἀπαθεῖς διαμείνωσι. *Char.*, III, 25.

⁴⁷ Καὶ ἀποκρούεται μὲν τις τοὺς ἐμπαθεῖς λογισμούς· οἶον, ἡ ψαλμωδία, ἡ προσευχῆ, ἡ μετεωρισμῶ, ἡ ἄλλω τινὶ τοπικῶ περισπασμῶ. *Char.*, IV, 48.

⁴⁸ Λύχνος ἐστὶ, κατὰ ταὐτόν ὁμοῦ καὶ φῶς, ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, καὶ ὡς φωτίζων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν λογισμούς τῶν πιστῶν, καὶ ὡς καίων τοὺς παρά φύσιν (...). *Cap. theologiae et oeconomiae* II, 29.

⁴⁹ Μυελός ἐστὶν ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὁ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν ὡσπερ ὅστ᾽ αἱ θείους διατρέφων λογισμούς, τοὺς ὑποτρέφοντας τό σῶμα τῶν ἀρετῶν. *Q.Th.* 56; 90, 588D, § 12.

Maximus employs the metaphor of the spinal cord which causes the logismoi to grow in man as divine by-products, so that the virtues come to dwell in man and are perfected through spiritual maturity.

However, although the holy father makes us aware of the ways of fighting against logismoi, he nevertheless points out the significant idea that man must also be very cautious how he de-activates the passions. If he de-activates passions through separating them from their conceptual images, then, although the impassioned thoughts remain simple, i.e less dangerous⁵⁰, and do not compel the intellect to scorn God⁵¹, nevertheless, it does not mean that man behaves in a christlike way and follows God whatsoever⁵², because, St. Maximus notices, one must always remember that “it is one thing to be delivered from sinful thought and another to be free from passions”⁵³. In addition, St. Maximus states that, on the one hand, there is the fight against the simple thought in order that the logismos does not activate the passions, whilst on the other, there is the fight against an already impassioned logismos, in order that it does not assent to sin. Both these ways prevent the logismoi from dallying in the soul⁵⁴.

As we have investigated, all aspects there disturb man’s psychosomatic balance operate through logismoi and attempt to disorientate his existence. In my opinion, St. Maximus presents these aspects in a particular order. This order indicates the different levels at

⁵⁰ Νόημα ἐστὶ, ἐμπαθές, λογισμός, σύνθετος ἀπὸ πάθους καὶ νοήματος. Χωρίσωμεν τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ τοῦ νοήματος, καὶ ἀπομένει ὁ λογισμὸς ψιλός... *Char.*, III, 43.

⁵¹ ...ὁ ψιλὸς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων λογισμὸς, οὐκ ἀναγκάζει τὸν νοῦν καταφρονεῖν τῶν θείων... *Char.*, III, 67.

⁵² Οὐ πάντως, ὁ τὰ πάθη ἐκκόψας, καὶ ψιλοῦς τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐργασάμενος, ἤδη αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα ἔτρεψεν... *Char.*, III, 68.

⁵³ Ἄλλο ἐστὶ λογισμῶν ἀπαλλαγῆναι, καὶ ἄλλο παθῶν ἐλευθερωθῆναι. *Char.*, III, 77.

⁵⁴ Ἄλλο ἐστὶ μάχεσθαι τῷ ψιλῷ λογισμῷ, ἵνα μὴ κινήσῃ τὸ πάθος· καὶ ἄλλο ἐστὶ, τὸ ἐμπαθεῖ μάχεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ γένηται συγκατάθεσις. Οἱ ἀμφότεροι δὲ τρόποι, οὐκ ἔωσι χρονίσει τοὺς λογισμοὺς. *Char.*, III, 88.

which the logismoi operate with the result that sin becomes a firm and unalterable state. In scrutinising these levels of sin, the holy father wants to manifest in details all possible parts the actual sin goes through, and, to stimulate man against the cause of it, i.e the logismoi. If man, finally, is vigilant and ready to confront the logismoi, then, all passionate “trailers” following them, will be successfully dismissed.

From the whole of this presentation of the struggle against logismoi, we could maintain that St. Maximus always relates them to the destructive activity of the passions which stimulate and advance the logismoi by creating or restructuring “hot spots” in man’s existential conditions. The passions attract the logismoi and reconstruct man’s inner qualities towards disbalance and dangerous upheaval. One way of avoiding such an influence of logismoi is to turn them towards virtuous behaviour, so that they recover healthily and away from disorders caused because of their cohabitation with passions.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Ὁ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν μετενέγκας τοὺς λογισμοὺς, ἀνέπαυσεν αὐτοὺς, μακρὰν ποιήσας τῆς τῶν παθῶν ἀστάτου συγχύσεως. Q.Th. 49; 90, 461D § 16. He, who diverts the logismoi towards virtue, calmed them, by drawing them away from the unstable confusion of the passions.

In a parallel way, compare the quotation: (...)...ἡ παντελής κατὰ διάνοιαν περὶ τῶν κακῶν συγκατάθεσιν ἀποβολή λογισμῶν, ἐν τοῖς μετὰ λόγου τὴν ἀρετὴν μειοῦσι γινομένη...(...). Q. Th., 55; 90, 544C. The entire expulsion of the logismoi, which assent to evil deeds, from the mind, occurs by employing the virtue together with the intelligence.

ε) ΔΙΣΚΡΝΜΕΝΤ (Διάκρισις)

The notion of discernment in Saint Maximus' anthropology is not a frequent topic. The holy father usually speaks about discernment through other virtues that include it, as, for instance, the virtues of love and dispassion. Discernment is presented in the Saint Maximus' writings as the connecting link between important virtues. As a virtue, I would say that it is mainly demonstrated as the state inspiring the levels of the spiritual life towards perfection. Discernment is distinguished for its strong innovative character and as the effective quality of the inner man against temptational procedures. Through discernment oneself obtains the criteria for a proper clarification and explanation of an individual behaviour and experiences touched upon basic spiritual needs of the psychosomatic man.

For Saint Maximus, discernment is an inner ability which provides man with "reins" for a wholesome psychospiritual course. We could say that discernment is a spiritual capacity leading towards intrapsychic knowledge and balance, and also away from the "burdens" that afflict human existence itself and destroy it. The spiritual strengthening of discernment is not of a kind of a "shaking ladder", but embraces all manifestations of the human life. The holy father is very well aware of the spiritual strengthening of discernment and he takes some opportunities for explaining it to man, because he knows that this virtue, as every virtue certainly, sustains the leading of one's personality constructively towards the integration given through the soteriological plan of God.

Discernment for the holy father is the "tool" operating in the existence of a person, by preserving the balance between soul and body, and helping thus towards the proper development of the intrapsychic activity. The right development and manifestation of the intrapsychic activity also assists one in undertaking proper spiritual choices. By undertaking proper spiritual choices, one maintains and develops the talents given by God. When one's talents operate through discernment, then the entire psychosomatic realm of a person acquires the benefits needed towards its spiritual maturity.

The roots of discernment, according to St. Maximus, are found in a deep sense within the notion of self-mastery or self-control. Dispassion is the continuous manifestation of self-control, which, when developing, engenders discernment. "The wages of self-mastery are

dispassion; of faith, knowledge. Now dispassion begets discernment, while knowledge love for God"⁵⁶. In this quotation we observe the holy father connecting the virtue of discernment with dispassion. By discussing this verse a little bit further, we ascertain that discernment constitutes the spiritual means according to which dispassion resides in the soul utterly.

The holy father considers discernment as a child of dispassion, because without dispassion the man cannot distinguish his actions as sinful or healthy. When one experiences dispassion, discernment is the next step in completing his psychosomatic existence. Discernment not only derives from dispassion, but also constitutes all the elements dispassion possesses, and expresses them in relation to the real needs of a person.

In my opinion, St. Maximus points out the "parental relativeness" between dispassion and discernment for the reason to stress the truth that, without discernment the function of dispassion if not accurate, is, at least, limited, because there is always nestling the danger for the dispassion not to manifest its virtual activities properly, in order to fight the notion of sinfulness.

St. Maximus analyses more the strong character of discernment by connecting it with moral wisdom, i.e with utter spiritual demeanour, or in other words with the moral understanding of the spiritual wisdom. Prudence, therefore, displays discernment which is characterised as the ruler of understanding and as the controller of all virtues and vices. "When the intellect practises the virtues correctly, it advances in moral understanding, which leads the contestant to discriminate between virtue and vice."⁵⁷ With this quotation, St. Maximus presents discernment in association with moral activity which on the one hand operates as the way of distinguishing the differences existing between virtue and vices, and on the other as the means resulting to spiritual achievements.

⁵⁶ Μισθός τῆς ἐγκρατείας, ἡ ἀπάθεια· τῆς δὲ πίστεως, ἡ γνώσις· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπάθεια, τίκτει τὴν διάκρισιν· ἡ δὲ γνώσις, τὴν εἰς Θεὸν ἀγάπην. *Char.* II, 25

⁵⁷ Πρακτικὴν μὲν ὁ νοῦς κατορθῶν, εἰς φρόνησιν προκόπτει· θεωρητικὴν δὲ, εἰς γνώσιν. Τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰς διάκρισιν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας φέρει τὸν ἀγωνιζόμενον (...) *Char.*, II, 26.

The holy father also refers to discernment by describing it as a good habit through which one may follow the divine commandments in thought and in deed. When man adjusts his behaviour to God's commandments and follows them in the rational part of his soul, he finally exercises discernment and thus becomes capable of discriminating his useful actions from those useless ones⁵⁸.

When discernment contains the fruits of self-control, St. Maximus implies that one may undertake further efforts towards the catharsis of his inner reality, so that one may proceed safely on the course of the spiritual life. Beyond this, St. Maximus refers to the fact that the relationship between moral wisdom and discernment, ensues from one's intellect which appears to operate in a perfect way, if only it behaves as a healthy manifestation of the soul.

In a parallel way with the above aspect, Saint Maximus integrates more his distinction between virtues and vices recognised and controlled by discernment with the idea that there are specific levels developing these aspects so that this distinction to become more adequate. He, therefore, refers to the outcomes of the counter-attack against vices, if one employs the virtue of discernment. In this respect one becomes spiritually firm, and fully concentrated towards the objective of the virtually spiritual wholeness. If discernment operates thus, then the faithful person proves himself to be no longer an arrogant personality, and demonstrates the behaviour and virtue of humility. Simultaneously with the development of humility, one rejects hatred and every psychic disbalance caused by it. Finally St. Maximus admits that through this properly distinctive function of discernment, one considers oneself within the plan of God towards salvation, and thus becomes more dispassionate, or better, one experiences the disintegration and expulsion of destructive passions, and acquires the virtue of dispassion, which more or less is also engendered by discernment, where every other virtue finds its origin and objective.

“There are five reasons, they say, why God permits us to be warred against by the de-

⁵⁸ (...)...ἡ ἕξις τῆς διακρίσεως· καθ' ἣν σύν λόγῳ τὰς θείας πράττομεν ἐντολάς καί τῶν κρειττόνων διαιρούμεν τὰ χείρονα...(...). Q.Th. 54; 90, 521B.

mons: (1) that in the attacks and counter-attacks we come to distinguish virtue and vice; (2) that possessing virtue in such combat and struggle, we shall hold it firm and steadfast; (3) that with advance in virtue we do not become high-minded but learn to be humble; (4) that having had some experience of vice, we will hate it with a consummate hate; and (5) above all that when we become detached we forget not our own weakness nor the power of Him who has helped us”⁵⁹.

This aspect that, dispassion is engendered by discernment, finds its entire reference in the quotation *Char. IV, 91*⁶⁰ where the Saint expresses concretely that discernment gives birth to dispassion which manifests as its perfect and complete outcome the virtue of love. “The commandments of the Lord teach us to use means reasonably. The reasonable use of means purifies the soul’s condition; a pure condition begets discernment and discernment begets detachment, from which perfect love is begotten”. Discernment leads back to dispassion because oneself works properly on the potential given by the divine commandments towards a reasonable use which disinfects the inner man and guides him away from sinfulness.

⁵⁹ Διά πέντε γάρ αιτίας φασί παραχωρείσθαι ἡμᾶς ὑπό Θεοῦ πολεμείσθαι ὑπό δαιμόνων. Καί πρώτην μὲν εἶναι φασιν, ἵνα πολεμούμενοι καί ἀντιπολεμοῦντες, εἰς διάκρισιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καί τῆς κακίας ἐλθωμεν. Δευτέραν δέ, ἵνα πολέμῳ καί πόνῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν κτώμενοι, βεβαίαν αὐτὴν καί ἀμετάπτωτον ἐξωμεν. Τρίτην δέ, ἵνα προκόπτοντες εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν, μὴ ὑψηλοφρονῶμεν, ἀλλὰ μάθωμεν ταπεινοφρονεῖν. Τετάρτην δέ, ἵνα πειραθέντες τῆς κακίας, τέλειον μῖσος αὐτὴν μισήσωμεν. Πέμπτην δέ ἐπὶ πάσαις, ἵνα ἀπαθεῖς γενόμενοι, μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οικείας ἀσθενείας, μήτε τῆς τοῦ βοηθήσαντος δυνάμεως. *Char.*, II, 67.

⁶⁰ Αἱ μὲν ἐντολαὶ τοῦ Κυρίου, διδάσκουσιν ἡμᾶς τοῖς μέσοις εὐλόγως χρήσασθαι πράγμασι ἢ δὲ εὐλογος τῶν μέσων χρήσις, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς καθαίρει κατάστασιν ἢ δὲ καθαρὰ κατάστασις, τίκτει τὴν διάκρισιν ἢ δὲ διάκρισις, τίκτει τὴν ἀπάθειαν, ἐξ ἧς τίκτεται ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη. *Char.*, IV, 91.

c) THE SACRAMENTS (Τά Μυστήρια)

If one looks at the range of therapy Saint Maximus envisages, it is important to realise that alongside the ascetic practises about which he has so much to say, Maximus presupposes the normal sacramental life of the orthodox Christian. This section is devoted to Maximus' treatment of the sacraments.

For the holy father the sacraments constitute the God's gift to man; they form a part of God's soteriological plan for the salvation of man. The *Mystagogy* of St. Maximus the Confessor, as well as dealing with ecclesiology also develops liturgical and sacramental principles. There, one becomes aware of the fact that the sacraments are regarded as pure salvational presuppositions, of great importance in the life of the faithful. The importance of the sacraments operates within the life of the Body of the Church, and converts all the false tactics of man into useful spiritual remedies.

The "centre of gravity" of the holy father's teaching about the sacraments is occupied by the Eucharist (Εὐχαριστία), where one is united with God to the depths of one's psychosomatic being. In this way, one becomes christlike and follows a course in his life, where one is entirely free from any worldly disposition and behaviour. St. Maximus refers to the Eucharist without neglecting the redemptive value of the other sacraments. What we maintain as beyond dispute is that the holy father emphasises the Eucharist and stresses through this the value of the other sacraments as well, which do not take place as separate celebrations in man, but are always found in close relationship to the Eucharist. The *Mystagogy* refers to the Eucharist:

- a) by connecting it with the symbolic structure of the Church in man.
- b) by analysing several aspects of the Eucharistic celebration.

The sacraments of the church, therefore, are for St. Maximus the concrete soteriological interventions within one's perishable life. The way according to which the holy father investigates them, implies their strong beneficial presence in a man's life. According to him the sacraments demonstrate the spiritual grace of the God the Trinity within creation. We

could say that the sacraments reveal themselves as the oasis of re-creation “to the ship tossed about in a stormy sea” when one experiences the world of sin. One’s life is inspired by the sacraments and their spiritual activity.

St. Maximus commences his *Mystagogy* by making clear that before him *St. Denys the Areopagite* dealt with these aspects in his treatise of the *Ecclesiastic Hierarchy*. St. Maximus takes for granted St. Denys’ considerable work on the *Mystagogy* of the Church. He also considers himself as inferior in value to him, and believes that the Holy Spirit revealed the mysteries of the Divine to this father. He, finally, accepts that one is insolent and mindless if attempts to experience what St. Denys experienced. St. Maximus gives, in the beginning of his work, his personal testimony to what St. Denys offered to the Christians, and the beginning of his analysis of the liturgical order and the sacraments is devoted to his predecessor Denys the Areopagite⁶¹. The holy father begins his teaching on the Eucharist itself with the *Entrance (Εἴσοδος)*.

The entrance indicates for St. Maximus the procedural preparation for the Eucharist. The holy father shows that through the entrance one enters to an utterly new mystical understanding of the God’s dispensation (οἰκονομία) for the salvation of the world. Through the Eucharist one acquires, in a form of perfection, spiritual perception and awareness of the teaching and knowledge of the mystery of the divine dispensation. For St. Maximus the Eucharist introduces mankind in to the mystery of the divine dispensation. “By the entrance into the holy mysteries we see the more perfect and mystical and

⁶¹ Ἄλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τῷ παναγίῳ καὶ ὄντως θεοφάντορι Διονυσίῳ τῷ Ἀρεοπαγίτῃ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησιαστικῆς Ἱεραρχίας πραγματείᾳ, καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἱεράν τῆς ἁγίας συνάξεως τελετὴν ἀξίως τῆς αὐτοῦ μεγαλονοίας τεθεώρηται σύμβολα· (...). Τολμηρόν γάρ καὶ αὐθαδὲς καὶ ἀπονοίας ἐγγύς, ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνου πειρᾶσθαι, τὸν μῆτε χωρεῖν αὐτόν ἢ νοεῖν δυνάμενον καὶ ὡς ἴδια προκομίζειν, τὰ ἐνθέως ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ διὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος φανερωθέντα μυστήρια· (...). Prooemium 91, 660D-661A.

new teaching and knowledge of God's dispensation towards us'⁶².

In continuing his exposition of Eucharist, Saint Maximus stresses the point that this sacrament is connected and coincides with the supersubstantial God. Through this sacrament one succeeds in becoming God by grace, and one enjoys the creative presence of God residing in him. For St. Maximus the Eucharist transforms man and renders him an instrument on which the Holy Spirit plays in this very life. St. Maximus stresses the fact that when the christian participates in Eucharist, he proceeds with awareness into this life by being led through the grace ensuing from faith, and obtains the conviction that if he lives in accordance with the mystical realm of the church, he will also participate in the spiritual gifts of the Holy Spirit which manifest themselves in a creative way, so that one gains in spiritual clarity and intrapsychic maturity. "By holy communion (μετάληψις) of the spotless and life-giving mysteries we are given fellowship and identity with him by participation (μέθεξις) in likeness, by which man is deemed (καταξιούμαι) worthy from man to become God. For we believe that in this present life we already have a share (μεταλαμβάνω) in these gifts (δωρεαί) of the Holy Spirit'⁶³.

For the holy father all perceptual symbols employed by the church for the proper clarification of its sacraments, constitute archetypal symbols of all heavenlike mysteries. When the holy father refers to these perceptual symbols, he refers, in my opinion, to the part which composes the sacraments, i.e to the matter which is needed for the utter

⁶² Διά δέ τῆς εἰσόδου τῶν ἁγίων μυστηρίων, τὴν τελειωτέραν καὶ μυστικωτέραν καὶ καινὴν περὶ τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς οἰκονομίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ διδασκαλίαν καὶ γνῶσιν. Chap. 24, 704 C. For the translation of *Mystagogy* I have used the text *The Church's Mystagogy*, (transl. by George C. Berthold), Paulist Press, Mahwah, New Jersey 1985, p. 207.

⁶³ Διά δέ τῆς ἁγίας μεταλήψεως τῶν ἀχράντων καὶ ζωοποιῶν μυστηρίων, τὴν πρὸς αὐτόν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐνδεχομένην δι' ὁμοιότητος κοινωνίαν τε καὶ ταυτότητα· δι' ἧς γενέσθαι θεός ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καταξιούται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ὡν γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ζωὴν, διὰ τῆς ἐν πίστει χάριτος, πιστεύομεν μετεληφέναι δωρεῶν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος..., Chap. 24, 704 D; *The Church's Mystagogy*, p. 207.

manifestation of the sacraments in the world, so as to deify the participant faithful christian when he experiences the spiritual benefits of the sacraments, i.e “the original mysteries which have been represented for us through sensible symbols here below”.⁶⁴

For Saint Maximus everything relating to the concrete liturgical practice of the church, indicates our “crossing” (διάβασις) from the perceptual things to the conceptual ones. When one enters the reality of the conceptual images, one understands the innovative teaching of the church concerning the mystery of man, i.e one understands man in relation to the liturgical order and spiritual grace of the sacraments, and one experiences simultaneously the harmony, love, and equal behaviour between man and itself, man and God, and man and fellow humans. According to St. Maximus, the awareness man acquires arises from the sacraments of the church.

For St. Maximus it is impossible to demonstrate the liturgical order of the Church, if that does not culminate in Eucharist. The liturgical order is connected with the divine liturgy, and we could maintain that the same order takes place for the other sacraments as well. The ancient order of the church was known to St. Maximus who considered the sacraments of the church as a part of the current liturgical life, so that their therapeutic action is to be understood always as a present one, and not as a past or a futural one.

In the following quotation, therefore, St. Maximus provides us an analytical scrutiny of this liturgical practice, because he is interested in expressing it as occurring within the sacramental reality of the edifice of the church, which deifies and raises one up to an encounter with the conceptual reality of the Eucharistic Theology, so that through a mystical and ineffable way one experiences a psychosomatic unification with God, and the appearance of the God’s providence within his life through a soteriological way.

“The closing of the doors and the entrance into the holy mysteries and the divine kiss and the recitation of the symbol of faith mean in general the passing away of sensible things and the appearance of

⁶⁴ ...τά παραδειχθέντα διά τῶν ἐνταῦθα αἰσθητῶν συμβόλων ἡμῶν ἀρχέτυπα χαριζομένου μυστήρια. Chap. 24, PG 705 A; *The Church’s Mystagogy*, p. 208.

spiritual realities and the new teaching of the divine mystery involving us and the future concord, unanimity, love, and identity of everyone with each other and with God, as well as the thanksgiving for the manner of our salvation. In a particular way it means the progress of the faithful from simple faith to learning in dogmas, initiation, accord, and piety. The closing of the doors indicates the first thing, the entrance into the holy actions the second, the kiss the third, the recitation of the creed the fourth. For those at the active stage it means the transfer from activity to contemplation of those who have closed their senses and who have become outside the flesh and the world by the rejection of activities for their own sake, and the ascent from the mode of the commandments in their proper principle, and the connatural kindship and union of these commandments in their proper principles with the powers of the soul and the habit which is adapted to theological thanksgiving. For those who have knowledge, it involves the passing of natural contemplation to the simple understanding according to which they no longer pursue the divine and ineffable Word by sensation or anything that appears and the union with the soul of its powers and the simplicity which takes in under one form by the intellect the principle of Providence".⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Ἡ δὲ κλείσις τῶν θυρῶν, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἁγίων μυστηρίων εἰσοδος, καὶ ὁ θεῖος ἀσπασμός, καὶ ἡ τοῦ συμβόλου τῆς πίστεως ἐκφώνησις, γενικῶς μὲν δηλοῖ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάροδον, καὶ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν φανέρωσιν, καὶ τὴν καινὴν τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς θεοῦ μυστηρίου διδαχὴν, καὶ τὴν πρὸς πάντας πάντων ἑαυτοῦς τε καί, τὸν Θεόν γενησομένην ὁμοιοῦσας καὶ ὁμογνωμοσύνης καὶ ἀγάπης ταυτότητα καὶ τὴν ἐφ' οἷς ἐσώθημεν τρόποις εὐχαριστιᾶν ἰδικῶς δέ, τῶν μὲν πιστῶν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπλῆς πίστεως εἰς τὴν ἐν δόγμασι διδαχὴν καὶ μύησιν, καὶ ὁμοφωνίαν καὶ εὐσέβειαν προκοπὴν· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον, ἡ τῶν θυρῶν δηλοῖ κλείσις. Τὸ δεύτερον δέ, ἡ τῶν

Another strong and vital characteristic of the spiritual dynamism of the Eucharist is linked with the divine adoption of man which undertaken by God. This adoption is the outcome of His goodness and displays one's intimacy, resemblance, and deification towards God. This course leads one to the archetypal beauty which lies in one's existence, making one adaptable to the virtue, knowledge and intense longing of God. "The partaking of the holy and life-giving mysteries signify the adoption and union, as well as the familiarity and divine likeness and deification which will come about through the goodness of our God in every way on all the worthy, whereby God himself will be "all in all" alike to those who are saved as a pattern of beauty resplendent as a cause in those who are resplendent along with him in grace by virtue and knowledge".⁶⁶

If the faithful wants to experience the vital activities of the Body of the Church, they must neither be removed away, nor to be alienated from the path of the church. If one escapes or is carried away from the flock of Christ, one does not allow the sacraments to become part of one's life, and thus the talents given by the Holy Spirit are not exercised.

ἀγίων εἰσοδος· τό δέ τρίτον, ὁ ἀσπασμός· καί τό τέταρτον, ἡ ἐκφώνησις τοῦ συμβόλου· τῶν δέ πρακτικῶν, τήν ἀπό πράξεως εἰς θεωρίαν μυσάντων τάς αἰσθήσεις καί ἔξω σαρκός καί κόσμου γενομένων διά τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν κατ' αὐτούς ἐνεργειῶν, μετάθεσιν, καί τήν ἀπό τοῦ τρόπου τῶν ἐντολῶν, εἰς τόν λόγον αὐτῶν ἀνάβασιν· καί τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἐντολῶν κατά τοῦς οἰκειοῦς λόγους συγγενῆ πρός τάς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκειότητά τε καί ἔνωσιν, καί τήν πρός θεολογικήν εὐχαριστίαν ἐπιτήδειον ἔξιν· τῶν δέ γνωστικῶν τήν ἀπό τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας εἰς τήν τῶν νοητῶν ἀπλήν κατανόησιν· καθ' ἣν οὐδαμῶς δι' αἰσθήσεως ἢ τινος τῶν φαινομένων ἔτι τόν θεῖον καί ἄρρητον μεταδιώκουσι λόγον· καί τήν πρός τήν ψυχήν τῶν αὐτῆς δυνάμεων ἔνωσιν, καί τήν κατά νοῦν ἐνοειδῶς συλλαμβάνουσαν τόν τῆς προνοίας λόγον ἀπλότητα. Chap. 24, 708 C-D, 709 A; *The Church's Mystagogy*, p. 209-210.

⁶⁶ ...καί ἡ τῶν ἀγίων καί ζωοποιῶν μυστηρίων μετάληψις τήν ἐπί πᾶσι καί ἐπί πάντων τῶν ἀγίων ἐσομένην· διά τήν ἀγαθότητα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν υἰοθεσίαν, ἔνωσιν τε καί οἰκειότητα, καί ὁμοιότητα θεῖαν καί θέωσιν δηλοῖ· δι' ἧς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν ἔσται τοῖς σωζομένοις αὐτός ὁ Θεός, ὁμοίως· ὡς κάλλος ἀρχέτυπον κατ' αἰτίαν ἐμπρέπων τοῖς αὐτῷ δι' ἀρετῆς καί γνώσεως κατά χάριν ὁμοίως συμπρέπουσι. Chap. 24, 709 C; *The Church's Mystagogy*, p. 210.

The Holy Spirit provides His talents for human beings liturgically. The greatest gift given by the Holy Spirit is, according to St. Maximus, the gift of the adoption which through baptism is displayed within the life of the faithful, and leads him into the proper experience of the Christ's commandments.

Through the sacraments, one presents himself before God as worthy - i.e., exercising the talents given by God. Through this godlike behaviour, one averts the passions from the appetitive part of the soul, for they display idolatrous appearances. By avoiding the relationship to the passions of the flesh, and addressing oneself to God Who is the Giver of the sacraments and the talents, one resists all procedures that send one away from his Creator.

“Let us, then, not stray from the holy Church of God which comprehends in the sacred order of the divine symbols which are celebrated, such great mysteries of our salvation. Through them, in making each of us who conducts himself worthily as best he can in Christ, it brings to light the grace of adoption which makes us perfect in Christ. Instead, let us with all our strength and zeal render ourselves worthy of the divine gifts in pleasing God by good works”.⁶⁷

Saint Maximus concludes the chapter on sacraments by stressing the sinful process alienating oneself from the soteriological plan of God and the resolution to it if one becomes sober. “Not being occupied as are the pagans who know not God, with the passion of desire, but as the holy Apostle says, “putting to death our members which are rooted in earth: fornication, impurity, passion, evil desire and covetousness which is

⁶⁷ Μή τοίνυν ἀπολειφθῶμεν τῆς ἁγίας τοῦ Θεοῦ Ἐκκλησίας, τοσαῦτα κατὰ τὴν τῶν τελουμένων θείων συμβόλων ἁγίαν διάταξιν τῆς σωτηρίας ἡμῶν περιεχούσης μυστήρια, δι' ὧν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καλῶς μάλιστα πολιτευόμενον ἀναλόγως ἐαυτῷ κατὰ Χριστὸν δημιουργοῦσα, τό δοθέν διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου βαπτίσματος ἐν Πνεύματι ἁγίῳ χάρισμα τῆς υἰοθεσίας, εἰς φανέρωσιν ἁγίῳ κατὰ Χριστὸν πολιτευόμενον ἀλλὰ πάσῃ δυνάμει τε καὶ σπουδῇ παραστήσωμεν ἐαυτοὺς ἀξίους τῶν θείων χαρισμάτων, δι' ἔργων ἀγαθῶν εὐαρεστοῦντας τῷ Θεῷ... Chap. 24, 712 B; *The Church's Mystagogy*, p. 211.

idolatry, from which comes God's wrath on the sons of disobedience, and all wrath, animosity, foul language, and lying, and to sum up, putting aside the old man which is corrupted by the lusts of illusion with his past deeds and lusts, let us walk in a manner worthy of God who has called us to his kingdom and his glory, having clothed ourselves with heartfelt compassion, with kindness, humility, meekness, and patience, bearing with one another in love and forgiving one another if one has a complaint against the other just as Christ has forgiven us, and over all these let us clothe ourselves with love and peace, the bond of perfection, to which we have been called in one body, in short, the new man who is constantly renewed in full knowledge according to the image of the one who created him".⁶⁸

⁶⁸ ...μή αναστρεφόμενοι κατά τά ἔθνη, τά μή εἰδότα Θεόν, ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας· ἀλλά καθώς φησιν ὁ ἅγιος Ἀπόστολος, Νεκρώσαντες τά μέλη τά ἐπί τῆς γῆς, πορνείαν, ἀκαθαρσίαν, πάθος, ἐπιθυμίαν κακὴν, καί τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ἣτις ἐστὶν εἰδωλολατρεία· δι' ἣ ἔρχεται ἡ ὀργὴ ἐπὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῆς ἀπειθείας· ὀργὴν τε πᾶσαν, καὶ θυμὸν καὶ αἰσχρολογία καὶ ψεῦδος· καί, συντόμως εἰπεῖν, κατά τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης, ἀποθέμενοι σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ἀξίως τοῦ Θεοῦ περιπατήσωμεν, τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ βασιλείαν καὶ δόξαν· ἐνδυσάμενοι σπλάχνα οἰκτιρμοῦ, χρηστότητα, ταπεινοφροσύνην, πραύτητα, μακροθυμίαν· ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων ἐν ἀγάπῃ, καὶ χαριζόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς ἐάν τις πρὸς τινα ἔχη μομφὴν, καθώς καὶ ὁ Κύριος ἐχαρίσατο ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τε τὸν σύνδεσμον τελειότητος, τὴν ἀγάπην καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην, εἰς ἣν καὶ ἐκλήθημεν ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι, καὶ ἵνα συνελών εἶπω, τὸν νέον ἄνθρωπον, τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν. Chap. 24, 712 B; *The Church's Mystagogy*, p. 211.

3) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE THIRD CHAPTER

In the last part of the third chapter, I will try to interpret under comparative scrutiny, the therapeutic aspects given by both Karen Horney and Saint Maximus. I think that the therapeutic aspects investigated by Horney and Maximus constitute their final attempt to restore one's personality haunted by neurosis and sin.

The aspects they investigated and which we analysed before, represent the apexes of their preoccupation with man. The reason I have chosen these three considerations in order to present the therapeutic process both adopted, is that these considerations appear not only as important ones, but also vital as well.

When I say they are important, I mean that one may discover in these aspects, psychoanalytically therapeutic notions which are not so common or relevant with the general theory of psychoanalysis itself. Horney provides these therapeutic considerations as competent therapeutic ideas which if "exploited" in a good sense, can improve the work of psychoanalysis and make it more valid for the nowadays flawed society.

On the other hand, in saying that these aspects are vital as well, I mean that one may understand them as topics consisting of notions specifically directed to one's needs and spiritual expectations. What we can also stress before this comparison takes place is that although Horney's and Maximus' therapeutic aspects do not appear in the same terms and presentation, nevertheless they reveal overlapping approaches.

In my opinion, it is really important to stress the point that the comparative overlap existing between the two therapeutic approaches proves to be a considerable factor in the interpretation of therapy they both provide, and also to understand that the huge time gap between Horney and Maximus may often appear as a gap which helps modern science to discover, even in delay, the wisdom of the writings of the fathers.

The notions of resistance to temptations and the struggle against logismoi, the importance of insight and discernment, and the position of religion and the sacraments, are the aspects which in the comparative study following will reveal to us not only the links existing between Horney's theory on therapy and this equivalent of St. Maximus', but also the need for an immediate procedure against all neurotic and sinful tendencies which keep man away from the objective of his existence, e.g. from the objective to be integrated as personality through developing healthy relationships with his fellow humans.

The struggle against temptations-logismoï

Both, Karen Horney and Saint Maximus begin their preoccupation on therapy from the acceptance that temptations-logismoï affect one's behaviour in turning it to a frail one. Both also admit that temptations-logismoï harm one's psychospiritual potentialities. In considering the terms both employ we can maintain that one completes another.

Temptations according to St. Maximus are contained in the notion of logismoï, which for the holy father are found in wider sense than the notion "temptation", whilst logismoï are investigated by Horney as neurotic manifestations, full of characteristics of temptational tendencies. Another common characteristic between the two, is that they approach temptations-logismoï through particular psychoanalytic-anthropological methods with the purpose of fighting them effectively. They also present the need that one must be aware of the dangers incurred from temptations-logismoï, so one to confront them in a proper way.

In my opinion the differences between Karen Horney's notion "resistance to temptations" and the holy father's "struggle against logismoï" are first, the acceptance from the St. Maximus' viewpoint of the demonic character in logismoï, which operates as the prime mover towards harbouring them, whilst Horney refers to temptations as something containing inner neurotic stimuli against one's soul. The second is that St. Maximus investigates logismoï under the viewpoint that God permits them to operate in the soul and thus one may be truly integrated through his temptations, so to be fully led into psychospiritual wholeness, whilst in Horney we see her occupying with temptations only in the intellectual and emotional realm of a person, without implying that temptations operate because something particular has happened in the entire edifice of the man's existence.

Resistance against temptations is considered by Horney as an attempt by oneself to avoid neurotic conditions and experiences. For her, they are temptational dispositions, which provide man with neurotic preoccupations, preventing him thinking or acting freely. Horney admits and investigates resistance against them, because she tries to put the neurotic person on the way of thinking that if he does not undertake a strong struggle against these inclinations, then he is in danger of being carried away more disorientately, and experiencing weaknesses which create unique psychospiritual disturbances. For Horney resistance

against temptations has strong therapeutic implications aiming at the proper confrontation of neurosis. A particular means which she, more or less, suggests to the neurotic person, is to consider as an example the temptations of Christ for the purpose to confront his own. When Horney refers to the temptations of Christ, she approaches them as a means against the temptations of neurosis. According to her, a classic example about neurotic temptational tendencies, which must be avoided by man, is the couple Adam-Eve, who chose to live away God, and thus became slaves on futile promises and fell to neurotic experiences. I think that resistance against temptations from Horney's viewpoint, finally represents her effort to maintain therapeutic methods on firm aspects.

For St. Maximus resistance against temptations is in fact resistance against logismoi. The equivalent notion of the term "temptation" in Horney finds its presentation in the holy father's writings under the term "logismoi". For the holy father, logismoi constitute an already settled problem on man's course towards salvation. Causes of logismoi are, as we previously said, the demons who attempt through every possible means to "creep" into and harm the man's soul. In contrast to the way in which St. Maximus refers to the demons as the cause of logismoi, Horney examines temptations as the attitude which finds a basis in the neurotic experiences of the past which have settled in one's soul, so as to move the "threads" for the creation of neurotic temptational dispositions.

A powerful means against logismoi, for the holy father, is to exhaust the body, so as to acquire spiritual benefits against the destructive temptations of logismoi. For Horney, a neurotic person must convert every neurotic temptational factor into a non-temptational, so as to develop himself properly. This means that one must fight against his psychospiritual imperfections, aiming at attaining the knowledge of the self.

Insight-Discernment

The next therapeutic method suggested by Karen Horney and St. Maximus, is the insight-discernment. Both stress that through this method one confronts the neurosis-sin face to face. According to Horney, insight helps towards the awareness of unconscious experiences. For Saint Maximus discernment is the specific criterion and potentiality which makes one conscious of his inner imperfections. The fact that one is found under the

influence of destructive neurotic phenomena, which create in him the state of pseudo-self, leads Horney to the thought that insight provides an inner disruption to pseudo-self, by employing the creative abilities of the inner man. Discernment gives oneself the understanding of the destructive fallen nature, indicates St. Maximus, and thus helps man to reject and restore it.

Horney believes that through insight it is proved that one must undertake every effort for one's personal therapeutic procedure. Thus, insight leads a neurotic person's existence into psychospiritual restoration. The same happens through discernment as well, and St. Maximus stresses the point that discernment moves towards restoration of a person's every intrapsychic activity. For the holy father, discernment is the direct outcome of self-control, and operates as a significant factor towards the spiritual catharsis and integration of man. Through self-control, discernment renders one to a spiritually firm personality.

The labour for the acquisition of insight is extremely painful. For Horney, through insight psychoanalysis is developed as an effective scientific effort. Discernment is directly connected with the healthy spiritual demeanour, which is employed as the resolution means against man's sinful behaviour. Discernment, when applied effectively, provides the ability to know, understand and clarify which actions contain virtues and which contain vices. For Horney when insight prevails as a method of psychological behaviour, then all neurotic disturbances are clarified and dismissed. Horney considers insight as a blessing because it leads one's effort into inner peace with himself. For St. Maximus, discernment discriminates and divides virtues from vices; it helps man to know himself, to choose activities displaying considerable spiritual benefits, and to avoid the harmful ones. When discernment is a firm experience in one's psychosomatic reality, then one is led to dispassion, which really is a blessing for the man's existence.

Religion-Sacraments

Another therapeutic means employed by both, Karen Horney and Saint Maximus, are the religion-sacraments. For Horney, religion provides considerable psychological implications and helps towards spiritual development and wholeness. Sacraments for Saint Maximus

provide the sinful man with soteriological perspectives which not only lead him to spiritual evolution, but they also support him in overcoming all sinful deeds operating in his life.

Horney considers that religion may lead one to the state of humility, which in this part of her theory is of a great value, because it helps one against the destructions caused by neurotic phenomena. The way Horney connects religion with humility comes out because of her disposition in searching for moral and spiritual values, which are not available in psychoanalysis. Horney considers humility in religion as the potential which displays all the elements of the human tragedy in neurosis, and makes man aware not only of his incapability in fighting neurosis individually, but also, what he must do, and what not, against it.

For her, religion becomes more helpful in a neurotic person's life, and reveals man's potentialities becoming destructive if one involves himself in the cul-de-sacs of neurosis. The history of the mankind, for Horney, shows a living and untiring striving towards greater spiritual knowledge about oneself and towards deeper religious experience of the world surrounding him.

For St. Maximus the sacraments lead one always more deeply in spiritual knowledge which more or less is proved to be the knowledge of the self. Through the sacraments of the church there is revealed the mystical connection with God, which always advances into more spiritual experiences. I could say that, for Saint Maximus, decisive factor for the acquisition of the sacraments is the virtue of humility as well, which makes man conscious of his fallen nature and his inability to fight against this fallenness alone. So, he implies that, without humility one cannot realise the conditions of one's fallenness, and thus, one cannot experience the assets deriving from sacraments. The sacraments according to the holy father is the step forward towards the unification of oneself with God. They are the holy presuppositions containing spiritual reflections.

Wisdom of Theology-Eucharist

The last convergence between Horney's aspects on therapy and St. Maximus' curative ideas can be found in the notions of the wisdom of theology and the Eucharist.

Horney stresses the notion of the "wisdom of theology", implying that it contains fundamental principles which are found in the position to assist one in the struggle against neurosis. For Saint Maximus, in my opinion, the centre of "wisdom" of sacraments is found in the Eucharist. Although, the holy father has nowhere left us a complete exposition of the Eucharist, not even in the *Mystagogia*, he nevertheless, speaks directly about the salvational and prudential benefits deriving from this sacrament, because the mysteries of the Church are given by God for the purpose of leading one upon the path towards His likeness, where one is called God by grace, because of the divine presence of God, Who lives nothing unfilled by His presence.

For Karen Horney, Theology helps psychoanalysis as well towards its better development. She stresses the point that psychoanalysis must think deeply about the goods given by theology, so as to be developed more humanistically, and without aspects which may display lack of real interest in man's psychological deficiencies. For Saint Maximus, the Eucharist helps the Church to be developed spiritually, or better, the Eucharist represents the divine behaviour of the Church. The reason for this, is because the Eucharist contains the grace of God leading to the obliteration of sin.

CONCLUSIONS

Before drawing the conclusions in my thesis, I would like to say that both Karen Horney and Saint Maximus the Confessor worked on man either psychoanalytically or anthropologically, because they attempted to provide their era with new theoretical dimensions concerning the investigation on man, and because they wished to examine his behaviour in life as a significant trait of his presence either on personal or on social levels.

The conclusions following will refer to three points of approach:

- a) to the principles they build upon.
- b) to the common elements they display.
- c) to the differences they develop in their theoretical and practical preoccupations.

The Karen Horney's psychoanalytical principles are as follows:

- a) neurosis is the price one pays because of the development of society.
- b) the neurotic phenomena are the ultimate outcomes disturbing human relationships.
- c) the neurotic behaviour has its origin not in the frustration of drives, but in "basic anxiety", which is, more or less, a deep feeling of helplessness towards a world conceived as potentially hostile.
- d) life itself is the most effective help for an individual's development.

Through these principles, Horney attempted to understand and clarify essentially all overt or covert disorders. She raised the issue to encourage endeavours towards a constructive self-examination, rather than offering any clear-cut answers. In such an endeavour, Horney stresses to oneself the need for self-realisation, and by this she meant not only the

development of one's special gifts, but the development of one's potentialities in order to become a strong and integrated human being, free from crippling compulsions.

Saint Maximus' anthropological principles are as follows:

a) man must always keep constant spiritual communion with God.

This communion comes through the man's effort to avoid the λογισμοί and to love his fellow humans.

b) his ideas about the created world represent advanced christological reflections on the created order.

c) his ideas on the logoi of creation outline his consideration that God creates things the λόγοι of which pre-exist in Him before creation. The λόγοι of creation are unchangeable and remain complete as God is complete in Himself.

d) that creation is the divine act of condescension.

e) that sin keeps one vigilant because one accepts spiritual sufferings as an opportunity to realize that one's presence in life is not in a perfect state.

The principles of St. Maximus' anthropology envisage man as the sacrament of the cosmos (κόσμος), or better reconstruct in a psychospiritual sense the sacramental capabilities of man, which are found in coherence with the God who established the cosmos as sacrament. These principles can be discovered in oneself through one's experience of God's presence in the sacraments of the Church.

Both, Karen Horney and St. Maximus were under some personal "self-evaluation". In studying Karen Horney we discover her saying: I do have uncertainties in my theory, and also: I do not also mean that my research on neurosis builds up a new psychoanalytical

school¹. On the other hand, St. Maximus never speaks as possessing an authority. He always speaks as a simple monk answering others' questions. He also never "impersonates" the role of the spiritual father. A proof of this is that he did not have - except the two Anastasii we know - disciples or a congregation following him. He always behaved as a simple Christian struggling for the good of the Church without promoting personal interests. He believed that everything belongs to the Church, and that the Church is the Holy Edifice which decides for every matter in Holy Spirit.

Another common element between the theory of Karen Horney and the St. Maximus' anthropology is the "knowledge of oneself", which for Horney is not only valuable but also a feasible goal, whilst for St. Maximus this aspect is a positive movement which always demonstrates one's creative effort against one's fallen nature.

For Horney a significant role is played by the notion of the unconscious and how this can be revealed, so that the presuppositions of neuroses can to be confronted constructively. For Maximus the demonic character of sin might be considered as equivalent to the notion of the unconscious. The demons for St. Maximus are considered as the particular cause of the creation and establishment of the depictions of all sinful activities within the soul, which from then on begin to operate as part of one's unnatural course within life.

The psychology of the unconscious is developed in St. Maximus' anthropology through the term "ἀνεργησία" (inefficaciousness)², a notion that St. Maximus links with the idea of the demonic. The term "inefficaciousness", therefore, represents for Maximus the

¹ *New ways in psychoanalysis*, p. 11.

² Ἐπί τῇ τῶν παθῶν ἀνεργησίᾳ, ἢ ὑπερηφανία ἐπισυμβαίνει, ἢ τῶν αἰτιῶν ἀποκρυπτομένων, ἢ τῶν δαιμόνων δολερῶς ὑποχωρούντων. *Char.* II, 40. We grow when the passions cease to be active in us, and this whether they are inactive because their causes have been eradicated or because the demons have deliberately withdrawn in order to deceive us.

influence of passions when they remain inactive in man, and indicates the baneful attitude of the unconscious. This "latency" of the passions occurs for the holy father because of either their hidden causes or the withdrawal of the demons when aiming to deceive the man. Nevertheless, whatever the reason is for this latency of the passions, the point is that the demons influence man, even though they do not operate actually.

In my opinion, this is the hardest action of the passions. Through that inactivity, which is always temporary, the passions present their utmost bad behaviour. They let the man believing that they behave completely out of their potential, and whenever the man is unable to confront them, they re-appear and cause irredeemable damage in the soul.

Beyond this, we also meet in St. Maximus the notion of "προσβολή" (attack) which indicates the presence of demons - who hide behind these "attacks" - as well. These προσβολαί produce many λογισμοί which, more or less, settled in soul. The thoughts choose as place of their settlement the human soul, and continue to exist and behave like repressive experiences which always attempt to reveal themselves in the conscious part of human existence. When logismoi are settled within soul, then, they engender habits which demonstrate the existence of many destructive unconscious experiences.

For Horney the notion of "habit", finds its juxtaposition in the term "neurotic behaviour". For her, "neurotic behaviour" is the habitual tendency of every neurotic phenomenon which operates through particular psychospiritual pathology caused from every manifestation of neurosis.

The differences between Karen Horney and Saint Maximus the Confessor can be listed as follows. First, the whole psychoanalytical edifice of Karen Horney's theory represents characteristics of secular knowledge attained through scientific education. As we have noticed before, Saint Maximus regards all worldly knowledge as of no value in comparison with divine knowledge. One receives divine knowledge from God, only if one strug-

gles for inner purification. Thus, acquired knowledge in its secular form is not enough for the holy father, or rather, it is invalid because it does not exhibit the benefits of the spiritual and liturgical order.

In Horney this kind of psychoanalytical knowledge represents the spiritual outcome of an assiduous study of man, whilst in St. Maximus, on the one hand, the secular knowledge acquired in studying is either inadequate or limited, whereas on the other, it is acquired through purification of soul and intellect. For the holy father if the intellect is pure, it is sometimes God himself who invades and teaches it; sometimes the angels who suggest good, beautiful things to him; and at other times, natural contemplation.

Another difference between the two, is that on the one hand Horney refers to one's inner dynamism by stressing the point that this dynamism, if wholesome, may help considerably the obliteration of many neurotic phenomena, whilst on the other, despite the fact that this "inner dynamism" is expressed for St. Maximus through virtues, he stresses the point that these are attained not by man himself, but through the grace of God, who operates as the Giver of all inner qualities against sin. In other words, it is the man who attains the possession of virtues, but God Who provides them to man for the sake of his salvation.

Another important difference is seen when Horney refers to the "wisdom of theology". This term, in the way she employs it, is nothing more than an already attained privilege, which one may easily discover, if one studies the New Testament. In other words, she considers the notion of "wisdom of theology" as an already available therapeutic material, which one can "exploit" as a worldly acquisition. On the contrary, in Saint Maximus' teachings, the term "theology" is considered as an experience not attained through academic effort or labour, but through a personal relationship to God, through a close encounter and contact with Him.

In Saint Maximus' anthropology the notion of "theology" is both spiritual experience deriving from the "company" one cultivates with God, and spiritual attitude manifest in constant effort of the faithful after the benefits provided with eschatological perspectives. It is also the outcome of the "vita practica", i.e. of the practical life, the life which is lived by exercising virtues.

As we have particularly examined in previous chapters of the present thesis, Horney's theory on neurosis examines this phenomenon as a process presented as the problem of oneself. It is a process of abandoning the real self for an idealised one; of trying oneself to actualise this pseudo-self instead of his given human potentials. Neurosis is a destructive warfare between the two selves. Horney believes basically that it is very difficult to be detached from one's neuroses, or even to allay this warfare by employing one's best efforts. What she incontrovertibly states is that one must always remain attached to the process of therapy, in order to awaken one's inner constructive forces, and to re-discover them in relation to the existent real self.

Saint Maximus' anthropology is manifest in the ways he builds up his theology against all dreadful sinful phenomena, and in maintaining that the resolution against sin is always found in the proper experience of spiritual life. For him, spiritual life is not a static, but a dynamic process. It is the "ever-moving cessation of sins" and the "standing motion" in one's psychosomatic entity. The spiritual life settles in human soul through virtues. When Maximus speaks about virtues, he does not mean human deeds, which are natural virtues, but those which are fruits of the Holy Spirit, and which are the outcomes of man's communion to God. Virtues lead one towards perfection because they are conditions having no spiritual limits. Through virtues, man is continually perfected and there is no end in his course towards this perfection, because it leads to the life to come. For Saint Maximus there is continuous progress for man because he enters stages of purification and

illumination. This is the way in which the anthropology of the holy father is developed, and through this development he also shows us the causes that make oneself a sinful personality, and the means to be employed against sin and for the needs of therapy.

EPILOGUE

As a preface to this Epilogue, it is good to be able to state that, there is a broad consensus that Karen Horney the psychoanalyst largely achieved her objectives. She did not approach man as some other contemporary colleagues of hers did, or wanted to, but in the way she herself believed would be helpful for resolving one's psychosomatic distresses. Apart from the polemics she experienced, including the so-called "scientific persecutions", she finally examined neurosis as a psychological condition, affecting not only patients, but many apparently healthy people, too. Horney always had man and his problems in her mind, and she was seeking to discover the best possible methods for relieving them.

Her belief was that inherent in man there are evolutionary constructive forces which urge him to realise his given potentialities. By this, she did not mean that man is essentially good - which would presuppose a given knowledge of what is good and bad. It means that man by his very nature and of his own accord strives towards self-realisation.¹

Her life encompassed part of the Victorian Epoch, the golden decade of Weimar Germany, the Nazi tyranny, two world wars, and modern America. It combined European traditionalism and conservatism with American avantgardism and freshness. Just as Freudian psychoanalysis was iconoclastic with respect to classical psychiatry and to social mores in general in the 1920's, so Horney's psychoanalysis was iconoclastic with respect to Freud's "classical" theories in the 1940's. She was a bridge builder between the psychological man of Freud's psychology and the sociocultural man of today. Although she did not foresee it, she foreshadowed the modern emphasis on "Ego Psychology" and "Social Psychiatry". Her ideas did not find any momentous, outright acceptance, but they have largely become part of our present-day psychological knowledge. Many have been taken

¹ Rubins, *Karen Horney, a gentle rebel of psychoanalysis*. See about this on the back flap of the book.

up by psychoanalysts today, discovered, so to speak, without credit being given her. The concept of self-realisation - which has become the basis for several schools of psychology-, the importance of pride, self-love and the pathological self-idealisation in neurosis, the concept of compartmentalisation, the significance of a realistic and broad patient-doctor relationship in therapy and the role of specific non-instinctual interpersonal attitudes are a few instances.² Karen Horney emphasised social learning to the extent that her writings seem more easily comprehended when discussed with social theorists or humanists.³

A significant point to which it is useful for us to refer is that she never considered herself as a healthy person, but on the contrary she always checked her own condition, on the lookout for improprieties harming not only herself but, much more, her patients. The way we approached her theory and work follows, as much as possible, her personal attempt to understand man and his weaknesses. This was, therefore, her central idea of a concern with neurosis: to make the neurotic persons aware of their problems and of their ability to confront them. She also proceeded with a general theory of neurosis and presented it under a new psychoanalytical prism. She invented ways of facing the neurotic phenomena through different approaches than those given by earlier psychoanalysts. She considered the neurotic persons as individuals and she never applied to them any method without testing it first. After her death, she left several disciples who until this very day work on her findings and apply them whenever is considered necessary. Nowadays, therefore, - especially in the United States - psychoanalysis follows Karen Horney's theoretical and practical path. The Psychoanalytical School of New York, which was founded by her, with the assistance of Franz Alexander, approaches the problems of the human person, based upon her own personal specification and ideas. In relation to psychoanalysis, Horney

² Rubins, *Karen Horney, a gentle rebel of psychoanalysis*, pp. 14-15.

³ Kimble-Schlesinger, *Topics in the history of Psychology*, Vol. 2, Hillsdale, New Jersey-U.S.A, p. 338.

achieved what she was struggling for: to become aware not only of one's problems, but also of ways of combatting them effectively as well. Psychoanalysis reached the task towards detaching itself from all "chains" of old teachings that prevented free thinking and utterance.

Karen Horney's theory helped humanistic theories to see the person as an active agent, who, although satisfying his lower level needs, can, nevertheless, control his neuroses, by resisting conformity to social pressures, conventions and standards.⁴

In interpreting the above we observe that Horney, in referring to "humanistic theories", indicates theories with deep philosophical interest in practical value for the investigation of man, and that she accepts a person as an "active agent" in life, because she considers man as the vital factor who can both adopt or reject dynamically influences of psychological disorders.

In turn, Horney accepted the ability of a person to choose between disbalance caused by neuroses, and the peace of mind when one resists them. She also refers to the "lower level needs" in the sense of experiences which do not advance one's personality towards perfection. Many times these "lower level needs" are consequences caused or imposed on oneself either through society or through cultural factors. When imposed they mostly provoke disharmony and inner disturbances.

Horney challenges modern man not to conform unto such influences, which deeply harm him psychosomatically and feed his already existing neurotic weaknesses, but to resist them so to ask for avoidance of all the experiences creating inner disorientating conflicts.

On the other hand, it is good to remind oneself that Saint Maximus the Confessor became widely known in East, theologically and scientifically, especially after the first half of the ninth century. In the West he became known later, in the second half of the ninth century,

⁴ Kimble-Schlesinger, *Topics on the history of Psychology*, p. 183.

largely because of and in connection with the works of Saint Dionysius of Areopagite.⁵ In the East, by contrast, Saint Maximus was read more independently of Saint Dionysius, whose fame stood higher in the West. In the East Saint Maximus' thoughts influenced specific scholars and theologians of the middle and later Byzantine period.⁶

Saint Maximus' writings are of considerable value for the problems of the modern society. They also reveal deep spiritual values when approaching issues concerning the church and the world. In the anthropology of Saint Maximus one sees that God is an active Being Who cares for man and creation, whilst on the other it is revealed that everything within creation does not fulfill its objective, if it does not operate through the grace and integrity deriving from the supranatural revelation of Jesus Christ's incarnation.

Saint Maximus' anthropology has deep theological dimensions, and can be summarized in three aspects: the human personality, its fallenness, and its salvation. In addition, the holy father illuminates his anthropology with the teaching of deification, and he responds positively to the thirst of man towards the Absolute God. Saint Maximus presents man as the creature longing for God as the only spiritual Good that completes salvation. Finally, through his anthropology, he restores the human personality and leads it to communion with God, proving that this communion corresponds to spiritual tendencies of today's world towards universal communion and godlike knowledge.

The anthropology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, although confirming the idea that modern man is haunted by bad experiences, nevertheless states that such experiences can lead to self-awareness and towards psychospiritual fulfillment. This fulfillment functions as a wholesome feature against any sullied and sinful process. The anthropology of the holy father serves the disposition of man for inner perfection. Through his theological

⁵ On this aspect compare the work of Aidan Nichols, *Byzantine Gospel*, Edinburgh 1993, p. 216ff.

⁶ Nichols, *Byzantine Gospel*, p. 218.

articulation Saint Maximus expresses profoundly anthropological notions with large psychological implications. In this thesis I have ascertained that in occupying oneself with the anthropology of Saint Maximus, one discovers that the holy father's teaching contains coherent material for every field of the theological studies, because he investigated many topics concerning philosophical and theological matters for the encountering of the Divine.

The fallenness of the human personality begins for the holy father with the fall of Adam. St. Maximus considers that Adam lost whatever he was enjoying in Paradise by seeking an unnatural (*παρά φύσιν*) enjoyment in the things of sense⁷. Thus, simultaneously, he lost the knowledge of God, the contemplation of Him, and the experience of the God's presence. St. Maximus investigates Adam's fallenness in many parts of his work and what we must stress is that through this fallenness he expresses his anthropological aspects on the fallenness of the human personality.

The aspect of salvation for the holy father operates, or better, is identical with the aspect of deification. In salvation, man completes himself in Christ, and he abandons each deed keeping him away from God. The aspect of salvation for Maximus, commences from the man's earthly life. In this life the man experiences the good habits of salvation, and tastes them as outcomes of the deification. St. Maximus in investigating salvation connects it with every activity of the man, which is able to transform him into a deified person, in order to save his entire existence.

In concluding this epilogue on Saint Maximus' anthropology, I would maintain that it includes both theological and psychological considerations which expand the neptic tradition of the Church in two new dimensions. The first relates to the deepening and widening of the branch of Patristics, whilst the second co-operates with the development of secular scientific findings. The anthropology, therefore, of the holy father embraces the

⁷ Q.Th. 61; 90, 628A.

world and especially man, through the gracious and protective “shield” of the church, and provides solutions of psychological interest, which he develops through with the unfathomable wisdom given to him by the Holy Spirit. Thus, world and man find themselves in the position of profiting easily from all the benefits deriving from the grace of Trinitarian God, and adapting them in present-day reality, not only socially and culturally, but also personally.

On the other hand, Karen Horney’s theory on neurosis manifests the idea that all solutions are, more or less, found within the self. The man discovers these solutions when he tries to bring them onto his psychological surface through the potential characteristics of the self. If man devotes his life and being in understanding himself through these characteristics he feels not only capable in fighting his neuroses, but he also purifies his real self from every bad habit.

The central idea of Horney’s theory expresses her belief that man is free from every neurotic phenomenon when he learns how to “discover the secrets of his inner potential and to demystify his past behaviour”⁸. Through this phrase she indicates that all experiences and feelings that have been disallowed re-appear and he purges them in accordance with his real needs and objectives in life.

I think, finally, that this is the ultimate perspective of Horney’s theory: through recognising the self and accepting him, the man becomes more sure about how to take care of it, and thus, he makes himself not only better, but he also improves each cultural activity for the sake of the society.

⁸ Westkott, *The Feminist Legacy of Karen Horney*, p. 213.

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AL= On the Ascetic Life.

Amb.= Ambigua (Books of Difficulties).

CC= Centuries of Love.

CT= Centuries on Theology and the Incarnate Dispensation of the Son of God.

Ep.= Epistles.

Myst.= Mystagogy.

OA= About the soul.

OC= Other Chapters.

OD= Commentary on the Holy Father.

Opusc.= Opuscula et polemica.

QD= Questions and answers.

QT= Questions to Thalasius.

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