An assessment of the English churches’ engagement with Europe since 1939

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An Assessment of the English Churches' Engagement with Europe since 1939

by

David Hinchliffe.

This thesis is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts

in

The University of Durham,

Department of Theology.

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

"An Assessment of the English Churches' Engagement with Europe since 1939."

The aim of my thesis is to offer an assessment of the English Churches' engagement with Europe since 1939. My first two chapters set the context for the Churches' engagement with the European Union by outlining the principal European political developments and issues since 1939.

In chapters 3 and 4, I assess the key Christian contributions since 1939. Chapter 3 focuses on the thinking of Bishop Bell, Archbishop Temple and A.C.F. Beales; as well as the contributions to the debate made by 'Sword of the Spirit', The Tablet newspaper, and the 1967 British Council of Churches' report, Christians and the Common Market. My fourth chapter concentrates on the developments in English ecclesiastical engagement with Europe since 1973. I analyse the official denominational reports published since the late 1980's, together with other church publications, such as those contained within church newspapers, theological journals and essays. I also assess the particular contributions made by Cardinal Hume, David Edwards and Philip Ludlow.

In chapter 5, having highlighted the deficiency of English ecclesiastical engagement with Europe in previous chapters, my 'diamond model' describes ways in which individual Christians, the Churches as institutions, and theology can play a role in responding to the situation. In particular I explore the implications of the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers as it may relate to Europe; as well as the need to re-affirm a theology of Community for Europe. It is my argument that a multi-faceted approach needs to be employed if the Churches are effectively to engage with Europe in the future. This inevitably means that far greater personnel, financial, and theological resources must be given by the Churches, if Europe is to be taken seriously in the future. It remains to be seen whether the English Churches are sufficiently committed...
IN GRATITUDE...

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Grace and Peace to you all.
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the commencement of my training for the presbyteral ministry of the Methodist Church, I was asked whether, as part of my training, I would consider researching for the degree of Master of Arts. I said I would! One of my main private interests has been the relationship between Christian faith and Christian political action. A central political issues of the present age for Britain has been the United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union and the wider Europe. Does the Church have any contribution to make to this debate?

I had expected that my research would enable me to offer a critique of how the English denominations had hitherto engaged with Europe. In fact, at an early stage of my studies, it became manifestly clear that the English Churches have often been silent about Europe, and have only engaged with Europe in an extremely limited way. As I shall show, a persistent and sustainable criticism of the English Churches is the charge that they do not understand how Europe works, and therefore are unable to engage effectively with Europe at any level. As a consequence, my research has been directed into three parts, reflected in the following chapters.

Chapters 1 and 2 are principally concerned with giving an account of how the European Union has come about, how its structures work, and how the United Kingdom has engaged with these structures. Chapter 1 examines the period from 1939-1972; chapter 2 examines the period from 1973, when Britain became a full member of the European Communities (EC) and now the European Union (EU). This is an attempt to respond to the Churches' perceived ignorance about Europe.

In chapters 3 and 4 I have described the varying contributions which English Church leaders and denominational authorities have made to the debate about Europe. Following the same pattern as chapters 1 and 2, chapter
3 gives an account of the period from 1939-1972; and chapter 4, from 1973 until the present day. As I will show, there are parallels between how the British political establishment and the Churches have been interested in Europe. Although the parallel is not absolute, it will be seen that Church interest has been greatest, when Europe has been a significant domestic political issue. It will also be seen, however, that, practically since the end of the Second World War, there has been little theological reflection about Europe coming from the Churches, until the present decade; and even now there is precious little.

It is my belief throughout this thesis that the English Churches need to take Europe - and in particular the European Union - seriously and engage with it practically and theologically. Chapter 5 is, therefore, my own reflection on the ways in which this might more successfully happen in the future.

Throughout my research, I have used a variety of material - where possible, from source. In chapters 1 and 2 I have used government documents from the Public Record Office; biographies, autobiographies and speeches of the chief British protagonists in the political drama; and, for analysis and discussion, a number of histories of post-war European integration, as well as newspaper articles and journals. In chapter 3 I have concentrated on the leading Christian thinkers' contribution to the debate about Europe's future (there being no formal denominational reports to study except the 1967 British Council of Churches' report, 'Christians and the Common Market'). I am indebted to the Westminster Diocesan Archives for the access they gave me to Roman Catholic material, and especially material relating to Sword of the Spirit, of which, regrettably, there is little written. For the bulk of chapter 4, I have been able to study the increasing number of reports flowing from the denominations since 1989, and also the variety of material relating to Europe which some
of the denominations are using to stir up the debate. The substance of chapter 5 has arisen from a number of valuable and illuminating conversations I was able to have with British Christian Euro-MP's, as well as members of the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society. I am very grateful to Stephen Hughes, MEP for Durham, who enabled me to use his office, and gain access to Parliament and MEP's alike during my research visit to Strasbourg and Brussels in 1996.

Because other parts of the UK have different denominational structures, and for the sake of clarity and consistency, as well as for ease of access to source material, I have confined my exploration to England. It was my hope that I could examine the many ingenious ways in which the denominations engaged with Europe. Clearly, that research will remain until the Churches have done far more work! Significantly, as will be seen, much of the ecclesiastical material I have used has been aimed in recent years at the leaders of the denominations. Much more material and work needs to be aimed at 'ordinary' church members - for, as I shall argue, individual Christians have an important role to play. In this thesis, inevitably I will highlight the deficiencies of the Churches. However, much is starting to be done, and the future of Europe is beginning to be addressed by the Churches. Much, nevertheless, has yet to be done. It is my hope this work will contribute to the debate.
Although it may be tempting, when offering an outline of recent developments in European political and economic integration simply to begin where many do, at the end of the Second World War, that would, I believe, be a mistake. As we shall see, important developments which can rightly be seen to be crucial for Europe, and in particular for Western Europe, have their origins at the heart of that war. In the first of our periods, 1939-1958, I shall outline the seeds sown which led to the Europe of the present day. It will be seen that this period contains a startling reversal in Britain's relations with the rest of Europe. At the outset of this period Britain was seen as the hope not just for a free Europe but a free world. By 1958, Britain was increasingly on the margins of international affairs, and both physically and ideologically on the periphery of European developments. So how did this rapid reversal occur?

With Austria and Germany united, Czechoslovakia annexed, Poland smashed, Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium invaded, and the collapse of France appearing to be imminent, it seemed likely that the defeat of Great Britain would be next. A high degree of unity had been achieved on the European continent, but it was a Europe united, not by the popular will of its many diverse peoples, but by their subjugation at the hands of Nazi Germany. Yet even in May 1940, when France faced disaster and Britain's crushing seemed inevitable, the beginnings of a free and more united continent may well be viewed.

Upon the outbreak of war, the British and French governments set up the joint Supreme War Council. The British Expeditionary Force was sent to France and placed under France's Commander, Gamelin. Together the French and British governments launched their abortive and wholly disastrous attack upon the German invasion forces in Norway. This
ultimately led to the collapse of Daladier's government, and the commencement of Paul Reynaud's brief premiership of France.

Upon Reynaud's accession to France's premiership on 21st March, 1940, "Almost his first act was to conclude with the British an agreement... to make war and peace in common."(1). On 1st March 1940 Chamberlain agreed in principle to the creation of an Anglo-French Union, but it was not until Churchill had replaced Chamberlain as Prime Minister and the collapse of France seemed inevitable, that the proposal drafted by Sir Roger Vansittart, Jean Monnet and General de Gaulle was formally put to the British Cabinet (2). Meanwhile steps were being taken towards closer Anglo-French partnership. At the meeting of the Supreme War Council of 28th March 1940, it was agreed that the Council should meet far more frequently, and that the possibility of it having a permanent joint secretariat should be explored. In his memorandum to the Cabinet Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, noted the potential post-war implications of the Council: "The Supreme War Council may not impossibly grow into a regular part of the political machinery in the two countries... It would continue to meet under another name after the war, and would deal with all matters of common concern to the two countries and not merely with military questions." (3)

Undoubtedly, though, the peak of Anglo-French partnership or unionism came in France's worst hour. When the proposal for Anglo-French Union was put to Cabinet, France seemed about to collapse. In his history of the Second World War, Churchill observed of that Cabinet meeting that "Grief for our ally in her agony, and desire to do anything in human power to aid her, was the prevailing mood."(4) Thus, in this spirit, the Cabinet accepted the proposal before them for Franco-British union, which included common citizenship, joint organs for defence, as well as common policies for areas such as foreign, financial and economic affairs (5). Its main aim, though, as Churchill acknowledged, was to give "M. Reynaud some new fact of a vivid and stimulating nature with which to carry
a majority of his Cabinet into a move to Africa and a continuance of the war." The proposal was not well received by the crisis-enveloped French Cabinet. It was accused of being a plan to make France a British dominion and to steal her colonies. Weygand told Marshal Pétain that he believed that Britain, like France, was doomed. Pétain tartly declared of the plan that a union with Britain was like "fusion with a corpse"(6) to which Reynaud replied that "I prefer to collaborate with my allies rather than with my enemies." Thus the plan was consigned to history, and with it, Reynaud's government. The next day, De Gaulle fled to Britain. On 22nd of June Marshal Pétain concluded the armistice with Hitler.

Derek Urwin contends that the plan "had not been a serious proposal that might serve as a core for some distant future, but a strategy... that might persuade a wavering French government to continue as a belligerent in the war against Nazi Germany."(7). I accept that this may well be the case. It is, though, significant that so much effort was put into developing closer ties. After all, there was no necessity for Lord Halifax to highlight the Council's post-war potential, which went beyond mere military matters. Although the serious intent of the Government regarding Anglo-French union and co-operation is debatable, it is nevertheless, worthy of note for a number of reasons. Firstly, the necessity of the situation threw France and Britain together. Partnership or union seemed to be a viable response in the face of a common foe for both governments. And secondly, central to it were three men who would not only be critically involved in the prosecution of the war, but who would be central to the type of Europe that would emerge after the war: Winston Churchill, Jean Monnet and Charles de Gaulle.

After the collapse of France Britain was alone in the fight against Nazism until 22nd of June 1941, when Hitler's main thrust in the European war turned eastwards with the invasion of Soviet Russia. By the end of the year the second world war of the twentieth century was an awful reality;
the United States had been attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbour on 7th December 1941, and Hitler amazingly declared war on America. Britain was no longer alone, but it would still be 3½ years before the European war would come to an end.

Historians have noted that the war was not merely a fight against Nazism or Japanese imperialism. It also had the effect of being a catalyst, particularly in Britain, for social change. Hastings has commented that "As Hitler's bombs ploughed into the worst of slum properties they helped create the will to build a new and less unequal society."(8) A.J.P.Taylor observed that "Men talked of reconstruction as they had done during the First World War. This time they were determined not to be cheated, and therefore demanded the formulation of practical schemes while the war was on."(9) The Beveridge Report which led to universal social security, and the Education Act of 1944 were in their own right revolutionary. As we shall observe later, in the immediate post-war years much of this reforming zeal would be channelled into the various programmes for nationalisation, such as the railways, coal, and steel, and the creation of the National Health Service. But it would be a mistake to suggest that the hope for permanent change was simply confined to Britain.

Throughout war-torn Europe there was a search for what was to come in its place. It was obvious that the punitive settlement of the Treaty of Versailles towards Germany after World War One had been a failure. It had not solved the crisis, even if it gave vent to the anger towards Germany. Furthermore, the League of Nations had failed to ensure world peace. It had, after all, been cast aside by Hitler and rendered ineffective by Mussolini (10). In Wistrich's judgement, "The failure of the League of Nations to maintain international peace was largely due to national sovereignty remaining unfettered and from the lack of sanctions to secure compliance with League decisions."(11) If this was so, then the question remained: what type of future for Europe?

Whilst in prison camp in Italy, Altiero
Spinelli penned and smuggled out of prison what became known as the "Ventotene Manifesto" which outlined a vision for a post-war union in Europe based on a federal structure of government. Soon the Manifesto's ideas were adopted by the Italian Resistance, and eventually led to a major conference in July 1944 in Geneva. The document which was endorsed by all the states represented, with the exception of Norway and Denmark, called for a supranational government for Europe, rather than the pre-war international structure of independent nation-states. It was envisaged that the new governmental structure should have a written constitution, in which the emerging legal authority would have the sole right of judgement. Moreover, the new structure would only allow a single European army, with no other armed forces being permitted (12).

Whilst this framework was undoubtedly significant, its aspirations were by no means unique during the war. The Eastern European governments-in-exile of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 made a declaration of solidarity between them. This was followed in January 1942 with the signing of a confederal Treaty between Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Thinking about the shape of post-war Europe was not simply restricted to mainland continental Europeans either. It was, as I shall show in chapter 3, also much in the minds of English church leaders. Equally, attention was given to it by British politicians, not least of whom was Winston Churchill. In response to a memorandum circulated to the Cabinet in October 1942 which outlined a proposal for a world power structure (13), Churchill wrote on 21st October 1942 a note which, he recognised primarily concerned the future of Europe. He hoped for a more united Europe under a Council of Europe. He also hoped for a Europe in which barriers were removed, and travel made easier. Moreover, the European economy as a whole should be studied, and the needs of each of the European states should be taken into consideration (14). Soon after this, in March 1943, in one of his famous
broadcasts, Churchill called for the creation of a Council of Europe in which even the defeated Germany, or some form of it, could take part - a proposal he echoed at the Teheran conference of 1944 (15). As with the later Geneva document of 1944, Churchill called for a legal framework to work through international disputes, with the earnest hope of preventing "renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars."(16) I shall return to Churchill's position on European issues below. It is significant to note here, however, that even in the midst of the war, Churchill was developing a keen interest in how a post-war Europe might develop - a theme which was to occupy a good deal of his thinking, particularly in the years immediately following the war.

In summary, then, we can observe that there was a wide-spread hope which ran throughout war-torn Europe, that what followed the war must of necessity be better than that which preceded it. It seemed to many that the old ways of independent nation-states had had their day. The structures of the past had not led to the perpetuation of peaceful co-existence, nor had they provided the means for settling disputes. With the end of war, "Many people... thought and argued that Europe could start afresh, with a different political and economic order that rejected the tired doctrines of nationalism, political sovereignty and economic autarky upon which the old state system of the continent had been built. In its place they wanted some kind of political union or federation that would effectively put into practice the old symbolic concept of the harmony of European nations."(17) At the close of war, as Urwin further commented, "Standing alone against Hitler and serving as a floating fortress and supply base, Britain was the symbol of Resistance and the future. All that was needed was for Britain to take the lead."(18) So then, how did this aspiration for a 'new' Europe begin to take shape?

The Europe that existed at the end of the Second World War was a Europe still in crisis, even though
Hitler and the Nazis had been conquered. Germany had been crushed, and was now under Allied control. Physically, much of it had been destroyed by the invasion fighting and the relentless Allied bombing. Liberated Europe was also trying to come to terms with its new freedom, where much had been destroyed. Politically, Europe had changed significantly. Eastern Europe was largely occupied by the Soviet Armies - a reality that was to influence European development for the best part of the next 50 years. In western European countries, new forms of government had to be created after 6 years of tyranny. In Britain, the political map had been changed. Churchill's coalition administration had been swept away by an avalanche of support for Labour, headed by Churchill's coalition deputy, Clement Attlee. Economically, Europe was in crisis, because much of its industry and agriculture had been destroyed. Although Britain had not been invaded, it too faced economic crisis because it had used its immense financial wealth for the prosecution of the war. Now America was the dominant nation politically and economically. As Urwin remarks, the leaders of the U.S.A. "had come to accept that it had, even if only for the sake of its own security and prosperity, global responsibilities which could not be evaded."(19) How then, in the light of this new post-war reality, did a more politically united Europe begin to take shape?

Churchill described his policy in a short dictum: "In war: resolution; in defeat: defiance; in victory: magnanimity; in peace: good will." (20) It seems to me that this is a fair summary of Churchill's outlook, and it had particular relevance for Europe's future. Churchill realised that if Europe was to arise and find stability, then it was necessary that Germany should find a new and acceptable role, rather than endure the total humiliation and subjugation that Lord Vansittart had called for in a debate on post-war Allied policy in 1944 (21). Moreover, as he pointed out in his 1946 Zurich speech, France and Germany "must take the lead together" for rebuilding Germany (22). This theme was echoed in the
debate on the King's speech of 1948, when he spoke of his hope that France would stretch out her hand "to her enemy of a thousand years and, in the moment of absolute German prostration, bring them back to the circle of Christendom and the family of Europe." (23) Whilst the Zurich speech certainly inspired those interested in closer European development, the speech also spoke of Churchill's understanding of Britain's relationship with Europe. Essentially, Britain was to be a sponsor of Europe, an interested party, but for all that, outside it. As Ernest Wistrich commented, "To him the British Empire and Commonwealth came first and the relationship with Europe only in some form of close but external association."(24) For Churchill, the Commonwealth was the primary international responsibility. European policy had to be seen in relation to that (25).

As much as Churchill inspired pro-Europeans to further endeavours, practical necessity also forced European governments into closer co-operation. By 1947 the economies of Europe were still unstable, and so was its political and social well-being. As America came to realise its responsibilities in supporting a stable Europe, George Marshall proposed in June 1947 the 'European Recovery Programme' (which came to be known more popularly as the 'Marshall Plan') in which financial aid would be made available to European countries that desired to receive it. However, the condition was that a sum should be allocated to Europe as a whole. The participating governments were to be jointly responsible in administering and distributing the aid. Although the Soviet Union was offered a share in the programme, it and its satellites refused to take part. Nevertheless 16 European countries formed in April 1948 the 'Organisation for European Economic Cooperation' to distribute the European Recovery Programme Fund, and to work on the liberalisation of trade in Europe. As an organisation it had no supranational powers - it worked solely by inter-governmental co-operation. It did, though, have important implications, for "the true value of the
O.E.E.C. lay in the foundations it established for the future, not least in the fostering of new modes of thinking. It outlived by far the three-year period of Marshall Aid..."(26)

Allied to its post-war economic weakness, Europe was also militarily weak, especially in the face of the emerging 'cold war' with the Soviet Union. The military parallel to the Marshall Plan was the Atlantic Pact of April 1949 which led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Together with the Marshall Plan "it helped to create a more positive environment of co-operation and a valuable learning experience."(27)

As well as the practical effect of Marshall Aid for European cooperation, 1948 also witnessed the holding of the first 'Congress of Europe' which met in The Hague. Around 750 delegates representing most of the European nations attended the May Congress. As Churchill remarked in his chairman's address to the Congress, it was "a representative grouping of the most essential elements in the political, industrial, cultural and spiritual life of Europe."(28)

Significantly, though, there was no strong delegation representing the British Labour Government - a glimmer of the 'official' British view of European affairs. As Churchill also said in his speech, in a sentiment that could hardly be less applicable today, "No-one can suppose that Europe can be united in any party or sectional basis... It must be all for all. Europe can only be united by the heart-felt wish and vehement expression of the great majority of all the peoples in all the parties in all the freedom-loving countries, no matter where they may dwell or how they vote." So what were the hopes and effects of the Congress?

At a simple level the Congress showed by its widely representative nature, that European development was held to be important. For the key protagonists of the war, it was also politically important. The attendance of Germany showed a measure of rehabilitation, and a tacit acceptance that Germany did have a role in the world. For humiliated Italy, the
Congress offered an opportunity for greater participation in Europe with the attendant hope of greater domestic political stability. And for France, it held out the possibility of renewing its international prestige once more. By contrast, as we shall begin to see, "it was at this point that British leadership began to disappear from the unity movement."(29)

One of the practical and far reaching effects of the Congress was the renewed impetus it gave to the Europeans who wished for still closer co-operation. This found an important measure of expression in the signing of the Treaty of Westminster on 5th May 1949, which created the "Council of Europe". The Council was to have two principal 'arms'. It was to have a consultative assembly made up of delegates sent by national parliaments. It was also to have a committee of ministers. The Consultative Assembly first met in Strasbourg in August 1949. Its main function was as a forum for cross-European debate, rather than as a legislature. The Committee of Ministers was the body in which power actually resided. However, although the Committee of Ministers held the power granted by the Treaty, it could still only function as an advisory body to the governments represented. After 1952 this committee was down-graded to having permanent representatives, with ministers only attending key meetings. By its nature, the Committee was far more conservative than the Assembly, which felt itself freer to think out wider issues, largely because it didn't have to satisfy an electorate. As Paul Reynaud said bitterly, "'... The Council of Europe consists of two bodies, one of them for Europe, the other against it...'"(30)

Although, as I shall argue in chapter 5, the Council of Europe has made an important contribution to life in post-war Europe, its main significance in these early post-war years was that the Council was the first political body of national governments which was charged with looking at European questions founded by Treaty. Consequently, although it had no supranational powers, it did provide a meeting point for a large number of the nations which compose the continent of
Europe. As Urwin rightly puts it, it was "an important milestone on the road to the closer association of the European Community."(31)

Whilst the Council of Europe was wholly an inter-governmental body it was not long before the issue of supranationalism came to the fore. In a dramatic press conference on 9th May 1950, the French Foreign minister, Robert Schuman proposed that the coal and steel production of both France and Germany should be pooled, and that other interested allies could join. As John Gillingham said: "His message was as dramatic as it was simple: France was willing to sacrifice national sovereignty for the common good, and thus invited her neighbours to join a venture that would end ancient rivalry, prevent war, and lead to a brighter future."(32) Theoretically that may have been the case, but as Stephen George argues, it is questionable as to whether there was any intention of allowing Britain to join (33). After all, the French had forewarned the USA of its proposal, but not Britain. More crucially, on 1st June Schuman gave an ultimatum to all interested governments: the principle of supranationality was non-negotiable, and all countries who wished to apply had to do so by 8pm the following day.

Both factors virtually ensured that Britain would not join. The coal and steel industries had been nationalised, and, with a reduced Labour majority after the February 1950 elections, it would be unlikely to get the necessary votes. As the meeting of the Cabinet of 22nd June 1950 recognised, "It would be impossible for the government to accept such a scheme if it was based on the assumption that coal and steel production would shortly be surplus to requirement and was designed primarily to restrict production in the interests of the producers."(34) What was even more unacceptable was Schuman's ultimatum on the issue of supranationality. There was general agreement in the Cabinet, held 5½ hours before the deadline's expiry, that "No British Government could be expected to accept such a commitment
without having had any opportunity to assess the consequences which it might involve for our key industries, our export trade and our level of employment."(35) Contrasting with Holland, who accepted in principle the concept of supranationality whilst reserving its right not to participate in any structures it felt to be harmful after negotiation, the Cabinet agreed not to join the proposed Coal and Steel Community on Schuman's terms.

In a sense the Schuman plan brings into clear focus some of the dilemmas Britain has had in regard to Europe. As I have noted on page 7 much of the post-war reforming zeal in Britain had gone into nationalization, whereas the issues of a new Europe were far more keenly explored on mainland Europe. This made it very difficult for the government, particularly a Labour one, to participate in structures which might be perceived as a threat to that reformation. Perhaps more significant, though, is Britain's way of exploring new possibilities. It would not sign up even in principle to structures that were not fully considered. In many ways this approach is fully understandable. On the face of it, it seems to be sensible caution. But what it also served to do was to isolate Britain's influence from European development. You cannot influence a vision if you are not prepared to dream dreams. So far, Britain appears not to have been visionary in European affairs but reactionary. Britain's role and influence had all but vanished in 5 years. In 1945 its leadership was there for the taking. It had manifestly failed to do so. Consequently, Britain has not had a significant role in European leadership since. So then, how important was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the development of post-war Europe?

After 9 months of negotiation the Treaty of Paris was signed on 18th April 1951. In order to implement the pooling of coal and steel production and trade, the treaty sought to dismantle tariffs and trade restrictions, thus creating a common market. Furthermore, to turn the theory into
effect, the Treaty of Paris set up a 5-part structure. The 'High Authority' of nine commissioners, headed by Jean Monnet until 1955, could recommend policy and make binding decisions upon ECSC members by majority voting. The High Authority, however, had to share its executive powers with the Council of Ministers who could limit the Authority's supranational powers. A Common Assembly was also created, but its principal powers lay in its right to censure the High Authority and to call them to resign en masse. It was not, however, in any sense a legislative assembly. A Consultative Assembly was also set up to advise the High Authority on issues within the competence of the Community. And finally a Court of Justice was established to adjudicate on issues brought before it. Its judgements were binding. What, then, were the effects of the ECSC?

Perhaps most important of all were the precedents the ECSC set. It was the first organisation, roughly in accordance with the Ventotene Manifesto and Geneva declaration (see p.8), made up of nations who voluntarily ceded national authority to a supranational body whose decisions were binding upon them. Further, those decisions were backed up by the enforcement of an international law court.

In view of its aims, it was only partially successful. By 1958 the production and volume of trade had risen and restrictive trade discrimination had been reduced (36), and yet in contrast Gillingham observed that the ECSC had failed to break up French and German cartels (37). Much of the High Authority's efforts were also directed towards wrangling with national governments. Nevertheless, as Urwin reflects, "No matter how inadequately, it was a working European operation... to which non-members had to pay regard." (38) It also provided a model upon which to work, when a wider community was being explored in subsequent years which ultimately led to the creation of the European Economic Community.

The architect of the Schuman Plan, Jean
Monnet envisaged a 'sectoral approach' to European integration, coal and steel being the first such sectors. In the face of the Korean War Monnet urged France's new Prime Minister, René Pleven, to propose that defence be examined in a 'Schuman-like' scheme. All the European members of NATO were invited to enter into negotiations though, as with the ECSC, Britain declined to enter the process. Subsequent negotiations led to the formation of the European Defence Community (EDC) in May 1952, joined by the six members of the ECSC. The EDC proposed the formation of a European Army. But as Wistrich noted, "the creation of the EDC posed the problem of adequate democratic and political control."(39). In March 1953 a draft treaty for a European Political Union was published. It was not well received, and the treaty for the creation of the EDC also failed to be ratified. By the end of 1954 both the proposed Defence and Political Communities were dead. In 1955, however, Anthony Eden announced that the British Government was happy for the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, which agreed socio-economic, cultural and military co-operation between France, the UK and the Benelux countries to be developed; and for West Germany and Italy to be included. This led to the subsequent formation of the Western European Union (WEU) which has, until the 1990's and the Balkan crisis, been hugely overshadowed by the more powerful military alliance of NATO. The WEU did, however "serve as a conduit, no matter how limited, between Britain and the Six."(40)

(B) BRITAIN IN THE WILDERNESS: 1958-1972

In the next major period of post-war European development, we will begin to see Europe taking still new directions. In this period the Treaties of Rome were enacted by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, thus inaugurating a period of closer European integration. We shall also see Britain seeking to come to terms with this phenomenon, first by its own attempts at economic co-operation through EFTA, and subsequently by its repeated
attempts to join the EEC until being eventually successful in 1973. We shall also see high-lighted once more the pragmatic, rather than ideological approach of British politics as applied to Europe.

Although the process of European integration appeared to have suffered a severe set-back with the failure of the European Defence Community and European Political Union, the process was by no means over. In 1955 the foreign ministers of the Six met in Messina charged with looking for new ideas for broader development, rather than the more limited sectoral approach. An intergovernmental group, under the chairmanship of Paul Henri Spaak, was given the task of exploring the possibilities. This committee met from July 1955 to March 1956, when the Spaak report was published. This formed the basis of intergovernmental negotiations which led to the drafting of treaties which made provision for the creation of 2 new communities: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM). On 25th March 1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed and, after parliamentary ratification by signatory states, the EEC formally came into being in January 1958.

The aims of the EEC, though dominated by economic language, were broad. Economically, the EEC aimed to increase stability and expansion with the concomitant aspiration to improve the living standards of the citizens of member states. Politically, it aimed to promote closer relations between member states and their governments. In order to assist in bringing these about 3 funds were established: The European Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the European Investment Bank. Although it was hoped that the translation of aims into reality should only take a limited time, the Treaty had no expiry date: it was irrevocable.

The structures created by the treaty of Rome were essentially modified forms of those used in the ECSC. The Commission (cf. the 'High Authority', see p.16 above) was charged with administering the Treaty. It could also recommend
legislation to the Council of Ministers. The Commission might well be "the guardian and embodiment of the European ideal" (41), but as Philip Ludlow observed in his 1994 Beckly Lecture, "Under the treaty of Rome, and contrary to the original intentions of those who drafted the treaty of Paris, the Council rather than the Commission is at the heart of the system" (42) because unlike the High Authority, the Commission could not make decisions binding upon member states.

Decision-making power rested with the Council of Ministers, and decisions were made through negotiation on an intergovernmental basis. However, a measure of the supranational concept of the treaty of Paris was kept, because once decisions were taken, they were then binding upon all member states. When decisions did not require unanimity, voting was by qualified majority. Each state had a number of votes allocated roughly in proportion to population size. For a decision to be passed 12 out of the 17 available votes had to be in favour, thus ensuring that the smaller states had an important role to play in the process.

As with the ECSC, consultative committees were permitted to advise and represent the views of interested parties. Equally a parliamentary assembly was set up. As with the Common Assembly, it still had no legislative powers, though it could recommend legislation. Symbolically, the members sat in political and not national groupings. The Court of Justice was further charged with adjudicating in disputes relating to the treaty. A simple majority of the 7 judges was needed to make a binding decision (the 7th judge was appointed by the Council of Ministers). So then, how did the British government respond to the impulse of Messina and the Treaty of Rome?

Although Great Britain had been invited to send a delegation to the Messina negotiations without having to accept any concept in principle (cf. the acceptance of supranationality that was required prior to beginning negotiations for the ECSC) its response was low key, if not
outwardly contemptuous. Britain sent a civil servant as an observer, and he was subsequently withdrawn in November 1955. As Stephen George has commented, the British wrongly believed "that the failure of the EDC indicated that the EEC proposal would also fail."(43) At the same time, throughout 1955 the British government began to talk about developing a European Free Trade Association to which all OEEC countries could join. In December 1955, this was explained in greater detail at the NATO Council meeting. In the light of the Messina negotiations, Monnet noted that the proposals were treated with deep suspicion by the Six (44). However, when serious negotiations began in October 1957, 7 months after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the Six did take part. When De Gaulle acceded to the French presidency France quickly withdrew; the other EEC members followed. The negotiations appeared to be in a state of collapse, but they struggled on between the other interested states, and in January 1960, the Stockholm Convention was signed by Britain, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) formally came into being in May 1960, 2 years after the creation of the EEC.

The Stockholm Convention provided for the elimination of tariffs on industrial goods traded between EFTA nations by 1970, but unlike the EEC, there was to be no common external tariff. Significantly, from Britain's point of view, this meant that trading patterns with the Commonwealth countries would not be affected. Also, unlike the EEC, any member state could withdraw from membership provided that one year's notice was given to the rest, and, the Stockholm Convention created no supranational body to govern members' responsibilities. Thus it relied solely on cooperation rather than enforcement, and was not envisaged as a precursor to closer political integration.

In Roy Jenkins' judgement, the British proposal for EFTA was a "halfway house" and "a foolish attempt to organize a weak periphery against a strong core."(45) The
net effect was to further alienate the British government from the EEC members, and France in particular. Arguably the most telling judgement on EFTA was that just 20 months after signing the Stockholm Convention, the UK and Denmark applied to join the EEC as full partners.

So why, then, did the Macmillan government make such a dramatic shift in European policy? It seems that there were both economic and political dimensions which, together, proved decisive. Although the European Free Trade Association had reduced trade tariffs between member countries, it could not provide an adequate trading base for Britain. Most of its trade was conducted with EEC countries, rather than the smaller EFTA member countries. If the EEC began to put up trade barriers against non-member states, the effects for Britain would have been increasingly severe. At the same time, trading patterns with Commonwealth nations were changing. Whilst the emotional ties remained strong, the economic links were being loosened. Even Canada, which, as Foreign Office papers for the period of negotiations show (46), feared acutely the change in trade that Britain's entry into the EEC might bring, would according to David Holden only suffer a potential loss of around 4% of the total value of its annual exports (47). Another decisive factor which undoubtedly contributed to the change in British attitude was the bald fact the the EEC had worked: it had brought economic stability and prosperity to the Six, and the economic growth of the Six was superior to Britain's. For example, between 1953 and 1958, the growth in real terms of Britain's Gross National Product was only 2.2% compared with Italy's 5.2% and West Germany's 6.9% (48). Economically, co-operation seemed to work.

Politically, one very significant reason for Britain's changing position was the trend away from a Anglo-American 'special relationship'. Observable even in the late 1940's, it found its full expression when President Kennedy met Macmillan in April 1961. The US government hoped that Britain would join the EEC and be a counter-balance to the
political domination of the EEC by France and West Germany (49). As Lord Gladwyn acknowledged in his confidential essay about dealing with De Gaulle, 'The Lion and the Giraffe', "The Americans... desire a 'special relationship'; but they want it to be with Europe, not with us."(50) Denis Healey argues, however, that the change in civil service attitude and the subsequent change in government policy was a symbol of the collapse in the late 1950s, not of the 'special relationship' but "of confidence in their own inability to solve Britain's problems, rather than the intellectual conviction that the Common Market would help us."(51)

After thorough consultation with Commonwealth governments in June and July of 1961, the Cabinet meeting of 27th July 1961 confirmed the decision to apply to join the EEC "in order that negotiations might be opened with the Community with a view to ascertaining whether satisfactory arrangements could be made to meet our requirement, particularly in respect of British agriculture and of the needs of the other Commonwealth countries and the other members of the European Free Trade Association" (52). This position, emphasizing the British desire to accommodate Commonwealth and EFTA interests within the British application, was reflected in Harold Macmillan's negative-sounding speech to the House of Commons on 31st July 1961, prior to the formal application being made on 10th August. Both the discussion in Cabinet and Macmillan's speech illustrates the difficult political arguments the application would cause, and in particular, the need to balance the needs of the Commonwealth with the earnestness of the application. The government had to convince the Commonwealth, British public opinion and the EEC, that it meant business. Macmillan was also cautious because of "his appreciation of the problems that his own party would have in swallowing the new orientation."(53) Although Monnet recognised the political interpretation of the speech (54), it served to create uncertainty with Community governments as to the sincerity of the British application.
On 10th October 1961, formal negotiations with the EEC commenced with Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal, setting out Britain's concerns and hopes. During the subsequent period of negotiations intense public and political lobbying took place. Organisations were formed to promote the various positions, such as the 'Forward Britain Movement' (against application) and the 'Common Market Campaign' (pro-application). Public and political opinion was divided throughout, as it is today. As a secret Conservative party analysis of public opinion polls written on 18th September 1962 showed 45% of Conservatives interviewed were in favour of joining, and 34% against, whereas only 34% of Labour supporters were in favour of membership, with 46% being against (56). Significantly, Iain Macleod, the Tory party chairman and author of the analysis, commented that "By far the main reason for opposition... is a sort of patriotism (or its negative counterpart xenophobia) which extends to both our own sovereignty and to our links with the Commonwealth." Concluding, Macleod remarked that "The picture that emerges is that the country's head is convinced, the country's heart is opposed." Towards the close of 1962 the difficult negotiations seemed to be drawing towards completion. By the end of January 1963, the government's policy seemed to be in shreds.

As Lord Gladwyn's paper, 'The Lion and the Giraffe' (cited above) makes clear, the crucial figure for the success or failure of Britain's application was France's president, Charles De Gaulle. At a press conference on 14th January 1963, De Gaulle was asked about British entry. His reply was a de facto veto upon the British application, citing his belief that Britain had not effectively renounced its Commonwealth or EFTA interests (56). But, as Derek Urwin rightly points out, "his depiction of the British position in his press statement more accurately reflected Britain's starting point in the negotiations rather than the current state of play."(57) So why did De Gaulle peremptorily scupper the negotiations when they were nearing resolution?
It seems that there were two central reasons. Firstly, De Gaulle was deeply hostile to Britain's perceived relationship with America. After all, Kennedy had strongly advised Macmillan to join in order to provide a check on Franco-German power within the EEC (See above). This had been confirmed, for De Gaulle, by Macmillan's agreement to buy Polaris missiles from the USA in December 1962. Britain in the EEC would be little more than America's "Trojan horse". Secondly, Britain's application had also been welcomed by the smaller members of the EEC as a counter-balance to Franco-German domination. For De Gaulle, British membership could undermine the French-led Franco-German alliance.

Despite Macmillan's somewhat absurd threat to De Gaulle that a failure to complete negotiations would lead Britain to turn its back on Europe in favour of other alliances, such as with the USA, the Commonwealth, even the USSR (58), when the British application was vetoed, official British policy toward membership did not change significantly. Instead De Gaulle was blamed for the failure(59). Britain then had to wait. The next British application would be made by a Labour government.

During the first Wilson administration (1964-1966) the issue of re-application did not really emerge. Labour had a tiny parliamentary majority, and sustaining a majority for application in a party divided over Europe was an impossibility. Indeed, psychologically, it would almost certainly have been too soon after De Gaulle's snub for the U.K. to re-apply. However, the issue of re-application did emerge during the 1966 general election, and, with an increased Labour majority, a new application to join the EEC was made in May 1967. As with the previous Conservative administration, Harold Wilson had initially been against membership of the EEC. He supported a new application probably because the political and economic reality of the British position forced the decision. However, again at a press conference, General De Gaulle utilized his national veto, and the British application
for membership of the EC (renamed when the structures of the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM merged in July 1967) was once more rebuffed. The message to Britain was obvious: Britain would never be permitted to join the EC until De Gaulle was no longer president of France. In 1969, Georges Pompidou succeeded De Gaulle to the French presidency, and new opportunities began to open up for the EC and for British membership alike.

Before going on to outline Britain's new application for membership and subsequent accession to the Treaties of Rome, it is worth noting how the Community changed during Britain's decade of frustration.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 1960's marked a period of increasing atrophy for the EEC. This was inextricably linked to the ideological position De Gaulle adopted and pursued during his presidency. He envisaged a 'Europe des Patries' - a Europe of nation states - rather than a federal and supranational Community. He repeatedly proved to be a stumbling block to closer integration. This is clearly seen in the French Fouchet Plan of 1961 which sought decision-making to be by unanimity only. Moreover inter-governmental committees would be charged with over-viewing policy areas such as defence, common foreign policy interests, and commerce, instead of the Commission. The Fouchet Plan also called for a European Assembly (not Parliament) with delegates nominated by national parliaments. The Plan was swiftly rejected, however. As Urwin has noted, "While all the objections to the Fouchet Plan were inter-related, the main factor influencing its rejection was ultimately the fear that it would weaken the Rome treaty and whatever political objectives it implied to the advantage of the national capitals, especially Paris."(60)

De Gaulle's rejection of supranationalism was further evidenced in 1965 with a renewed clash within the Six over the decision-making responsibilities within the Community. By now the European Parliament was calling for more powers, especially over budgetary scrutiny, which had hitherto
been the responsibility of national governments and parliaments. The Commission was calling for increased independent revenue-raising powers, which would in effect cede power from the Council of Ministers. After January 1966 decision making would take place through majority voting rather than the unanimous vote hitherto required in most areas. France also wanted the question of the Common Agricultural Policy to be resolved, though it refused to budge on the other issues. This led to the "Empty Chair Crisis" when the French delegation walked out of the Council of Ministers. This was resolved by the "Luxembourg Compromise", which agreed to the continuation of the right to veto proposals when the national interest was in question, but as "each state would be free to define its own vital national interest, the effect would be that the Community would be subject to unanimous agreement."(61) Wistrich went on to note that the consequence of the Luxembourg Compromise was "in effect an agreement to disagree. The Treaty was left intact, but in practice no major decisions were taken without unanimous agreement."(62)

The formation and finalisation of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) also became a prominent issue during the 1960's, and indeed has remained so, not least for Britain, as I shall explain in chapter 2. In 1960 the Mansholt Plan outlined a triad of principles for the CAP. The settlement should guarantee an adequate living for farmers, stabilize European food markets, and guarantee reasonable food prices for consumers. After years of attempts at price setting, which came adrift in the 1965 crisis, a modified Mansholt Plan was adopted in 1968. The result of the modified Plan was that the CAP would impose a levy on cheaper imported food. Conversely stock-piling would be allowed where there was over-production. Costs were guaranteed by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. The consequence of such a policy has been serious. "The strength of national farm lobbies, once they had been persuaded of the virtues of the system, and perceptions by politicians of
their political strength, would keep the CAP in the tradition of protectionism."(63)

The 1960s also marked a number of important developments for the EEC's international relations. On 22nd January 1963 France and West Germany signed a Treaty of Friendship, thus, closing a dark chapter in Franco-German relations and signalling the rehabilitation of West Germany. Also in 1963 the first Yaoundé Convention was signed by the EEC as a trading block, and 18 African states. The Convention offered reciprocal preferential trading arrangements, though it should be noted that this did not extend to agriculture, which is arguably the most important sector for the 18 to trade in. Certainly this does not diminish the charge of protectionism which later came to be made against the CAP. It was not until the agreement of the Second Yaoundé agreement of 1969 that a lower external tariff for tropical produce was agreed upon. The Yaoundé conventions are significant because here the EEC related to the outside world as a single unit rather than as independent states, though, as Urwin notes, this was not reflected in votes at the United Nations! (64) It also shows in embryonic form, that the EEC does have a responsibility to the outside world, as I shall argue in chapter 5.

The Sixties also saw continued institutional development within the EEC. One important institution that emerged in the mid-1960's was COREPER, the Council [of Ministers'] Committee of Permanent Representatives. It was a group of officials from each member country, granted ambassadorial function and status within Europe, which was charged with continuing on-going negotiations with the Commission when the Council wasn't sitting. It liaised weekly with the Commission, and so was also able to brief ministers. Because of its permanent nature, it could also negotiate and settle minor issues without the necessity for summits being called. It became, in Urwin's words, "a crucial and influential hinge" (65) between the two halves of the Community executive:
the Council and Commission. In July 1967 the organisation of the three European communities (Euratom, EEC and ECSC) were harmonised into the renamed the European Communities (EC).

Radical change was off the European agenda during De Gaulle's presidency as has been shown, but when he left power in 1969, new possibilities began to be considered. This new thinking was perhaps most obvious at The Hague summit of December 1969.

Jean Monnet might well have declared over a decade before that "'The Common Market is outward-looking, not inward-looking. There is nothing magic in the number six'."(66) but it was not until The Hague summit that this was actualized by all the members and the way for enlargement made clear. The result of the summit, though, was to be far more wide reaching than the renewed impetus for enlargement alone. Under the leadership of Etienne Davignon a committee was set up to explore methods of closer political cooperation. The principle of European Monetary Union by 1980 was also agreed, and a committee under the chairmanship of Pierre Werner was created to explore ways of turning the principle into reality. The European Parliament was granted further powers to scrutinize the EC's budget, and the question of financing the CAP was resolved. After the atrophy of a De Gaulle-dominated Community, The Hague Summit "clearly marked the resumption of progress."(67)

As a consequence of this renewed impetus the 1970s began with a flourish of activity. In April 1970 the Treaty of Luxembourg was signed, setting up the new financial arrangements for the EC which had been agreed upon in the post-summit negotiations. The Treaty provided for two forms of income. Firstly, the revenues from the Community's agricultural levy and customs duties were to be handed over to the EC direct. Secondly, because the income from duties could fluctuate, it was agreed that from 1975, up to 1% of member states' VAT income should be handed to the EC. The Treaty also
granted new powers of budgetary supervision to the European Parliament. Reflecting upon the Treaty, Urwin observed that "The importance of all this was that, by enlarging the role of the Commission and Parliament, it increased the supranational possibilities of the EC." (68)

In 1970 Britain also saw the return of the Conservatives to power. This time, however, the Prime Minister was Edward Heath who, in George's opinion, "is the only Prime Minister to date to have been fully committed to the idea of the EC." (69) Under Macmillan Heath had conducted Britain's abortive negotiations. Now as Prime Minister, Heath led his government, along with the governments of Ireland, Denmark and Norway, formally to apply once more to join the European Community.

With the British application to negotiate terms of entry to the EC formally submitted in June 1970, it might have appeared that Britain was now set on sailing confidently and smoothly into the European harbour. In fact, as the early years of the decade began to unfold, the waters to harbour were to be very choppy indeed. In the 1970's Europe moved from being simply a foreign policy issue, to a key domestic political issue as well.

Although negotiations for entry began swiftly, by the spring of 1971, they appeared to have reached an impasse, over such issues as the CAP and British contributions to the EC budget. The question of intent also surfaced again. Britain became unsure as to whether France was about to exercise her veto again; France questioned the genuineness of British goodwill towards the EC, and to whether Britain wanted to turn the EC into a revised EFTA. In May 1971, Heath met President Pompidou, and the good personal relations between them aided the move towards resolution. Particularly, it was agreed that Britain's budgetary contributions should have a phased increase, and any imbalances could be ironed out in the future. As George has said, "To gain entry, and then
sort out any difficulties, was the approach taken by the Heath government." Of this tactic, George concluded that "This seems, even in retrospect, to have been a sensible approach in the conditions of the time." (70) As I shall show in chapter 2 however, it did not resolve the political dilemma that Europe caused for domestic British politics. Nevertheless, on 22nd January 1972, Britain signed the Treaty of Accession, and on 1st January 1973, the United Kingdom formally entered the EC as a full member.

CONCLUSIONS

During the period under review in this chapter, from 1940 until the end of 1972, we have seen a time of unprecedented change in the international relations that existed on the continent of Europe. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, this process of fluidity, of adaptation, and re-appraisal is on-going, both politically and institutionally as 'Europe' develops.

I have attempted to outline in this period the ways in which Europe sought to emerge from the period of unparalleled horror of the Second World War, and how that response has varied and developed. For some states, inspired by Jean Monnet, that response has led to the conclusion that the only way to guarantee prosperity and growth, and an absence of war, has been through international co-operation and, most significantly, the sharing of some national sovereignty. This has been seen in the 'sectoral' organisation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the more comprehensive European Economic Community and latterly, the European Community. As I have also shown, this has not always been a smooth process. Serious questions and crises have arisen, such as the issue of sovereignty, the role of European and national parliaments, the finance and machinery of the European Institutions and so on. In our period the initial impetus was clearly for a supranational structure, but ended in a Europe of nation states.
committed to inter-governmental co-operation. We shall see in
the next chapter, that these issues were in no way finally
resolved. Many of these issues are still fiercely debated
today.

Despite these serious questions, what is
equally clear is that economic growth in the Six nations of the
EEC outstripped other European countries. We have also, most
importantly, seen the rapprochement between France and West
Germany, and the rehabilitation of West Germany into the
international community, which has amply fulfilled Churchill's
dictum quoted on page 10. Moreover, we have seen the
stabilising effect of the EEC in Western Europe replacing the
volatile structures present before the war. However, we have
also seen the ability of the community to be damaged by the
obduracy of member governments and their leaders, as De Gaulle
demonstrated in the repeated use of the veto against British
applications to join the EEC, and in the so-called 'Empty Chair
Crisis'. As we shall see in the next chapter Margaret Thatcher
has continued that inheritance.

This period under review also marked a
period of tremendous soul-searching in Britain. As I have
explained, Britain was at the beginning of this period at the
very heart of Europe, with its leadership there for the taking
after the war. However, we have seen Britain initially turn its
focus away from Europe. At first, it saw its national interests
as being best served through nationalisation rather than
supranationalisation. In its international outlook, its heart
remained firmly wedded to the Commonwealth and to its history;
in military and cultural terms, to the Atlantic relationship so
enamoured by Churchill, Macmillan, and as we shall also see, by
Callaghan and Thatcher.

In fact the effect of such policies have
not helped Britain in the long run. It postponed the
reassessment of its international rôle that Britain had yet to
face. The parlous British economy after the war did not grow
as fast as it might have done had it taken the development of European co-operation seriously, and, in the end, when Macmillan realised where the future of Britain's best interests were, it was too late to influence Europe from the outset. Yet it is, I believe, highly unlikely that any other course of action was possible. The experience of winning the war, of an empire, of nationalisation was too heady a drug to have made alternative policies possible. In fact it perhaps needed the 'quintessential Englishman', Harold Macmillan, to lead Britain towards the threshold of Community membership, and after De Gaulle's snub, for Wilson equally pragmatically to lead Britain along that pathway until the pro-European ideologue, Edward Heath, became Prime Minister at the time when the demise of De Gaulle offered the opportunity to Britain and others to apply to join the Community.

The fact that Britain repeatedly applied to join the EEC purely from pragmatism (with the exception of Heath) and not out of an ideological commitment which was seen in the leaders of post-war mainland European politicians is, perhaps, the most important perspective to remember as we continue our historical view in the next chapter. This pragmatism has largely meant, as the Conservative Party opinion poll I quoted above showed, that the people - and therefore politicians - might be intellectually committed to Europe (though Margaret Thatcher may be an important exception), but not emotionally committed to Europe. It is this most of all, in my opinion, that will make Britain a reluctant and "Awkward Partner" as George described the British, when, from 1st January 1973 Britain became a full member of the EC.

NOTES

(1) A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, p. 470
(2) For the minutes of the Cabinet of 3pm on 16th June 1940, see Public Record Office (PRO) file W.M. [40] 169.
(3) PRO: W.P. [40] 124.
Hitler withdrew from the League of Nations after rejecting France's proposal to the Disarmament Conference in October 1933. The League of Nations failed to prevent Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Italy withdrew in 1937.

The summary is based on that provided by Urwin, pp. 8-9


From an extract of Churchill's broadcast of 21 March 1943 quoted in Wistrich, p.24

Vansittart saw Germany as, "a nation of swollen heads and swollen souls that must be deflated lest they inflict a third war on us. Some are born humble, some achieve humility, others have humility thrust upon them. The Germans belong to the third category, and the thrust will have to be hard." Hansard, House of Lords, 26th September 1944. Vol. 133, 1944.

The extract from Churchill's Zurich speech, quoted in Urwin, p.31


This position was still held by Churchill in 1961/2 when the first British application to join the E.E.C. was being negotiated: See letters and articles contained in PRO: PREM 11, Piece 2785.

John Gillingham's essay, 'Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal' in D. Brinkley and C. Hackett (ed), Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity, p.137f

See Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, p.20
(37) See Gillingham's essay in Brinkley and Hackett, p.156f
(38) Urwin, p.55
(39) Wistrich, p.31
(40) Urwin, p.70
(41) Urwin p.81
(42) Philip Ludlow, The Churches in the European Union, p.9
(43) George, p.27
(44) Jean Monnet, Memoirs, pp.448-449
(45) Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.105
(46) PRO: PREM 11/4016
(48) O.E.C.D. figures quoted in Anthony King, Britain Says Yes: The 1975 Referendum on the Common Market, p.8
(49) See George, p.31
(50) PRO: PREM 11/3789
(52) PRO: C.C. (44) (61). My italics.
(53) George, p.33
(54) Monnet, p.454
(55) PRO: PREM 11/4415
(57) Urwin, p.124
(58) PRO: PREM 11/3561
(59) PRO: C.C. (5)(63)
(60) Urwin, p.106
(61) Wistrich, p.35
(62) Wistrich, p.36
(63) Urwin, p.134
(64) Urwin, p.131
(65) Urwin, p.136.
(66) Monnet, quoting his own "Harrogate speech", p.448
(67) Wistrich, p.36
(68) Urwin, p154
(69) George, p.49
(70) George p.56
In this chapter, which commences with Britain's entry into the European Community, we will see a time of great activity and reform of many of Europe's institutions. We shall also see major changes in the nature of the Community as a result of the Single European Act (SEA), and subsequently, the Treaty of Maastricht which led to the formation of the European Union (EU). Significantly, I shall also show that, despite Britain's membership of the EC, Britain also becomes, as the title of Stephen George's book suggests, an "Awkward Partner". As I shall show, throughout this period the issue of Europe becomes an increasingly divisive factor in domestic British politics which has been destructive to both the Labour and Conservative parties, and which does much to explain Britain's awkwardness. Finally, in this chapter I shall reflect on the political ideologies which have shaped policy towards Europe, before drawing any conclusions that may be made at this stage.

The first question to explore, is the continuing uncertainty that remained over Britain's membership of the EC even after it had joined. As we shall see, it was an issue which was to cause serious division in the Labour Party in the 1970's. Moreover, many of the questions raised in the 1970's can obviously find a parallel in the Conservative Party of the 1990's.

After Labour's electoral defeat in 1970, the party began a rapid swing to the Left. As a consequence of this realignment, the application to join the EC, as well as the desire to cast off restraint whilst in opposition, led to a hitherto latent body of anti-European Community sentiment being exposed to the full light of day. For Labour the danger of a
deep split was very real. Many prominent Labour MPs were very much "pro-European", such as Roy Jenkins, William Rogers, Shirley Williams, and David Owen. Equally, there were many ardent "anti-Europeans" such as Peter Shore, Michael Foot, and increasingly trenchant in his views, Tony Benn. Any sharp move to one wing or the other could imperil the whole party.

The seriousness of the problem was seen clearly in the vote at the end of the six day debate on entry into the EC. On 28th October 1971, the Tories allowed their MPs a free vote; the Labour Party however imposed a three-line whip for MPs to vote against the government and against the terms of entry. Roy Jenkins later commented that "this was one of the decisive votes of the century... I saw it in the context of the first Reform Bill, the repeal of the Corn Laws... the Munich agreement and the May 1940 votes..." (1) When the vote was taken, 198 Labour MPs voted with the whip against the government, but 69 MPs, including Labour's Deputy Leader Roy Jenkins, defied the whip and voted with the government with a further 20 pro-European Labour MPs abstaining. Anthony King asserts that "'Rebellion' is too weak a word for what happened on October 28. This was civil war." (2) In fact many of the rebels, including Jenkins, subsequently obeyed the Labour whip in future votes, thus ensuring the legislation for accession to the EC was only just passed. Nevertheless it was a portent of the trauma to come.

The division that was becoming manifest appeared to be little short of hypocritical: Labour supported membership whilst in government; in opposition it was against membership. James Callaghan, in a speech in Bradford in 1971, suggested the alternative idea of renegotiating the terms of membership. In 1972 this became party policy. It seems that this device prevented the Party from being torn apart, and it "managed to make sense of Labour's strange stance of approving entry into Europe in principle but objecting in practice to the Conservatives' terms..." (3) It also enabled Wilson to project
himself as a champion of the British national interest, more so than even Heath. But perhaps more importantly, Wilson could demonstrate to his Euro-skeptical Labour parliamentarians that he was not advocating a policy of 'entry at any cost'.

The Labour National Executive Committee, now dominated by Benn and the Left, then promoted the idea of a referendum to consult the people on the results of renegotiations. Although initially resisted, especially by pro-Europeans such as Jenkins, the Shadow Cabinet agreed to adopt this policy in March 1972. The anti-Europeans strongly supported this constitutional novelty in the belief that they had popular support on their side. Conversely, pro-Europeans opposed a referendum on the grounds that referenda could enable extreme popular views to rule the day. Equally, it was likely that if a referendum was called in 1972, the pro-Europeans would lose the vote. When the policy of holding a referendum was adopted, Jenkins, Thomson and Lever resigned from the Shadow Cabinet. They were not going to give way to the Left without a fight.

When the Labour minority government was elected in February 1974, the Party was in an invidious position. The pro-European Right were unyielding; but so too were the anti-European Left, who now dominated the Party. Even on the eve of the conclusion of negotiations a special Labour Party Conference in April 1975 recorded a vote of 2:1 in support of the NEC's stance against Europe and the government's policy. Consequently, Labour "presented the public with the unprecedented spectacle of a government taking one stance, and the political party under whose auspices it had been elected taking another."(4) It was not, however, to be unique, as the machinations of the Conservative Party of the 1990's shows.

Renegotiations did nevertheless begin in March 1974. The other eight members were sympathetic, realising that Britain had grounds for renegotiation, and because otherwise there was a real possibility of a defeat in the
The referendum which would lead to Britain's speedy departure from the Community. Revised terms of entry were agreed at the Dublin Summit of March 1975, which included a revising mechanism for budgetary contributions, provision for access for Commonwealth countries to EC markets, and improved provision for overseas aid. The result was that Wilson and Callaghan could declare that they had fought a difficult battle, won improved terms and yet in the end recommend, as the Cabinet came to do, that Britain should accept the revised terms and thus stay in the Community. As Pimlott noted, the new question was "how to maximize the chances of a 'Yes' vote, without doing irreparable damage to the Government and the Party in the process."(5)

The Cabinet accepted the re-negotiated terms by a majority vote of 16:7 in favour at a meeting spread over the 16th and 17th of March 1975. This in itself was important because the Cabinet had been composed by Wilson to balance the views on Europe: a 50/50 split. The ground at last was beginning to move towards staying in the Community. King asserts, "The renegotiations were the result of the factional in-fighting within the Labour Party, but in the end they may have actually been a necessary condition of Britain's remaining a member of the EEC."(6) Roy Jenkins' conclusion was however, more caustic: "That renegotiation was a largely cosmetic enterprise, producing the maximum ill-will in Europe with the minimum of result..."(7)

With the referendum previously agreed by Cabinet in January 1975 in anticipation of the conclusion of the negotiations, one further procedural novelty was agreed upon. During the referendum campaign Cabinet collective responsibility was to be suspended on the European issue. Once the referendum was over, collective responsibility was to be resumed on European questions as in others. When campaigning began, prominent Cabinet members joined organisations both for and against membership: Roy Jenkins was elected president of the cross-party group "Britain in Europe"; Tony Benn and Peter
Shore were prominent in the "National Referendum Campaign". During the campaign, there was a large measure of cross-party alliances to put forward their respective cases. For some, including Roy Jenkins, it provided a release from the routine adversarial party political system. In the end, the result of the referendum was decisive.

Of the high turn out of 64.5% of the electorate, 67.2% voted in favour of continued membership of the EEC; only 32.8% voted against (8). As King has observed, 66 of the 68 counties voted in favour of membership. "The pro-Europeans' victory was nationwide, not merely geographically but also socially."(9) King concluded that "The most important single consequence of Britain's "Yes" vote... was to place Britain's membership in the Common Market beyond any doubt. The fact that the vote was a democratic one, together with the size of the pro-European majority, gave Britain's membership in the EEC a legitimacy that nothing else could possibly have done."(10) For all that this seemed decisive at the time, it was not to be the case. In fact, it only led to an armistice in the continuing ideological battle that still cuts across the British political spectrum. As Jenkins noted with ill-disguised contempt, "Within two years Tony Benn was campaigning for a reversal of the verdict of the oracle of direct democracy, about which he had spoken so sacerdotally before it had given him the wrong answer..."(11)

One of the most persistently recurring, and increasingly acrimonious issues with which the Community and Union has faced from the 1970's to the present day has been the search for closer financial integration. As I have already noted in chapter 1, a founding principle at the setting up of the EEC was the increasing of prosperity of member states and their citizens. By the end of the 1960's it seemed desirable to head towards economic and monetary union (EMU). This principle was first asserted at The Hague Summit of 1969, and then planned for in the Werner Report of 1970. Envisaging a gradual
process towards a fixed exchange rate and, if desirable, a single currency, this led to the creation of 'The Snake' - a system of currency management. However, the creation of EMU soon seemed to be fatally damaged by external world pressures, particularly the 1972 Arab-Israeli war, which OPEC used to double its oil prices, creating economic chaos. As I shall explain, however, this was an issue which has continued to be explored since then. Moreover, as I shall further show, the quest for closer economic and monetary union has raised fundamental questions about the future direction of the EU.

A major effect of the 1972-3 oil crisis was its strangulation of industrial nations dependent on Arab oil. This had the consequence of plunging counties such as the UK into deep recession, further exacerbating rising inflation and increasing unemployment which were already becoming particularly acute in the UK. Britain's domestic situation was further complicated by industrial strife. This cocktail of high unemployment, inflation and industrial unrest found their ultimate manifestation towards the close of the decade in the 'Winter of Discontent' of 1978/9 which ultimately led to a radical Conservative government being elected in the early summer of 1979.

The difficulties of these events did not, in the end, destroy the quest for economic and monetary union. In January 1977, Euro-enthusiast Roy Jenkins, became President of the European Commission. By his own admission, his first months in office were not a success. Moreover the dynamism of the Community seemed to have evaporated, with no Franco-German leadership forthcoming either. Influenced "by the advice of Jean Monnet... to advance along the line of least resistance provided that it led in the right general direction"(12) Jenkins' panacea was the revivification of Economic and Monetary Union, relaunched in Florence on 27th October, 1977.

Initially, most member states were not enthusiastic. It was not until the Copenhagen Summit of 1978,
when Helmut Schmidt made proposals along Jenkins' lines, that momentum began to grow. This led to the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS). Denis Healey was, by this time, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. Never a Euro-enthusiast, he was initially agnostic towards EMS, but in the end became resolutely opposed. He concluded that "Like other international organisations, the European Monetary System suffers from a crucial defect. It can impose agreed disciplines only on its weaker members; the strong are able to reject them."(13) Britain would have been a weaker member.

There were to be two main elements in the EMS. The first was the creation of the ECU, the European Currency Unit. This was formed from a 'basket of currencies' with its value fixed as a percentage of each country's share of the Community's GNP, and its share of internal trade. The second element was the creation of the ERM, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, membership of which was optional. This sought to reduce currency fluctuation by fixing each currency's exchange rate in relation to the ECU. Each member currency then had a pre-defined margin within which it could fluctuate. If it exceeded its limits, central banks were required to act for the currency. Together with these two main elements, the European Investment Bank was also formed, which could offer subsidized loans to the poorer member states for investment.

As Healey's views (noted above) suggest, the British Government's response was likely to be less than enthusiastic. Callaghan had been considering proposals for a sterling/dollar initiative with the IMF when Jenkins and Schmidt made their proposals for EMU, thus showing a "typical difference in gaze between the British and German leaders."(14) In the end, however, the Callaghan government did agree to act as if it were a member of the ERM, whilst remaining technically outside it. Why act in this way? Stephen George suggests that Callaghan's actions "indicate that political considerations, both domestic and international, were uppermost...; by not
joining formally the Government quietened the protests from within the Labour Party and demonstrated its continued determination not to be drawn into an institution which was regarded with suspicion by the United States; by adapting its policy voluntarily, and also declaring its intention to join eventually it kept on the right side of the Germans." (15)

At the same time, the Conservative Party's position appeared equally ambivalent. Whilst it declared membership of the ERM to be a goal, it only committed itself to looking for ways to join (16). When the Conservatives came to power in 1979, (in practice) there was no change in this policy. Only by 1985 did the Foreign Office and Treasury believe that "the time was right" and that the volatility of oil prices which it believed would have rendered membership of the ERM impossible had "paled into insignificance" (17). When a meeting of senior ministers and officials with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took place on 13th November 1985, significantly, Thatcher in effect vetoed the plan, despite her ministers and officials supporting it. For Lord Howe, this "was the first time that any of us had contemplated her exercising a veto of this kind - and against the very principle of government policy that we had all been proclaiming for years." (18)

Comparing Callaghan and Thatcher's overall approach to the question of membership of ERM, Jenkins concluded that when Thatcher came to power "at least we remained bipartisanly faithful to our national habit of never joining any European enterprise until it was too late to influence its shape. Then, when wholly predictably, we are eventually forced to apply for membership, we complain bitterly that the shape suits others better than it suits us." (19) In fact it was not to be until October 1990 that Margaret Thatcher agreed to join; however, membership was only to be temporary, for, in September 1992, Britain suffered its ignominious exit.

Despite the vacillation of British policy
towards EMS, the process did not stand still in the rest of the Community. In 1985 the quest for EMS took on added impetus, with Economic and Monetary included as a vaguely defined policy objective in the Single European Act. Moreover, in 1989, the Delors report was published which led to the Madrid European Council of June 1989 calling for a further intergovernmental conference (20) to discuss economic and monetary union. This led to the Maastricht Treaty.

The Delors report proposed a three-staged process to full economic and monetary union. The first stage called for the removal of exchange controls. The Madrid Council set this starting date for 1st July 1990. 8 of the 12 member states were to join stage 1 then, with the other 4 working towards joining. Stage 1 expected that all participant currencies would also accept EMU as the ultimate goal in principle. It also outlined measures to assist economic convergence. For Britain, this process has caused significant difficulties. Margaret Thatcher stridently asserted that she was "of course, opposed root and branch to the whole approach of the Delors Report. But I was not in a position to prevent some kind of action being taken upon it."(21)

The second stage, which was to begin on 1st January 1994, set up the European Monetary Institute in Frankfurt, and by this time all central banks, except Britain's and Denmark's, who had gained 'opted outs', were to be independent of government control.

The third stage was the permanent fixing of exchange rates and the substitution of national currencies with the single currency. Stage 3 would set up the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which the European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks would form. It was anticipated that a decision would be taken at European Council level, in consultation with the European Parliament, to fix the starting date, and if no date was fixed by the end of 1997, 1st January 1999 was to be the automatic initiation of Stage 3. However,
the Maastricht negotiations gave the British government an 'opt-out' from Stage 3: it would join only if Parliament agreed. Those countries who cannot reach the criteria for Stage 3 are thereby excluded from the common currency and its institutions, though they may subsequently admitted upon review by the European Council, in consultation with the ECB, European Parliament and the Commission. It now seems increasingly unlikely that most member states will be able to reach the budget deficit and debt criteria set down at Maastricht which will lead to full participation in EMU (22). At the time of writing, it is still unclear as to whether the criteria will be weakened, the time frame extended, or even whether EMU will be abandoned. So then, what issues does this long and complex process to EMU raise?

One significant issue which EMU raises is the perennial question of national sovereignty. The creation of EMU, as I have already pointed out, will lead to the irreversible transfer of some national sovereignty over finance to an independent European Central Bank, including the authority to issue bank notes. For Margaret Thatcher, acceptance of Stage 3 of EMU "would be a fundamental and crucial loss of sovereignty and would mark a decisive step towards Britain's submergence in a European superstate."(23)

One may argue, however, that national sovereignty in financial matters is today rather more illusory than real as financial markets and planning are now seldom solely determined by the economics of the single nation-state. It is also possible to argue that the formation of a single currency and an independent central bank will lead to the Europeanisation of finance, instead of the Germanisation of European finance caused by the tremendous economic strength of Germany, thus "commit(ing) the country [Germany] irrevocably to a western alliance."(24)

How accountable will the new system be? When national finances are controlled from the national
government, that government must, to a lesser or greater extent budget according to the wishes of its people. If the ECB is to be entirely independent, its sole responsibility and raison d'être is financial. The danger is that it will then lead to the creation of a financial fortress-Europe, and that it will also have no social responsibility to the developing world in particular. At the moment economic sovereignty is democratically accountable. However limited and flawed that may be, I believe that there needs to be a similar safeguard for a European central bank too.

The creation of a new large financial bloc raises a further philosophical question: that of enlarging the EU. As Bainbridge and Teasdale have pointed out: "EMU, if attained, would constitute a deepening well beyond anything that applicant states from central and Eastern Europe could hope to take part in for at least a generation."(25) The obvious danger is that the creation of an economic fortress-union closed in effect, to those on its borders who wish to join, could, far from stabilising the post-Communist countries' political systems, potentially destabilise them.

Economic and monetary union which, made from a small number of EU member states, will pose problems for those outside EMU. As the plan suggests, those states which are not members of EMU will be excluded from the ESCB. As Britain's experience has shown, to be on the edge of an issue or system makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to influence the future development of that system until you are a member, and by then, your opportunity may have already gone. The potential, then, is for a more divided "two speed" Europe.

The whole question of EMU, its process and goals, raise many of the central issues we have seen throughout the post-war political developments in Western Europe: sovereignty, accountability, the restraining and liberation of Germany, the question of enlargement, the social responsibility of the Union. In many ways, though, it is very different from...
anything that has preceded it, not least the EMS. It is different in scale. The interlocking of the finances of its member states will be far greater than any other Community venture to date, and therefore so will the difficulty of any single nation extricating itself in the future be. It is also different in terms of its effects for Europe: the potential for a two-speed or multi-speed Europe is greater; as is a European Union that will probably be far more difficult for central and eastern European states to join. If EMU takes place, its effects will be profound, and must be watched carefully to ensure it is responsible, democratically accountable and open.

Another core area of the EU's life, which raises important issues for the future direction of the Union, is the European Parliament. Although the Treaty of Rome made provision for a democratic parliament, its powers have been limited, indeed it was not until 1979 after years of delay that the first directly elected European Parliament was to sit.

Despite these direct elections, it is clear that the policy of many national governments has been to prevent further powers from being granted to the Parliament. Even with direct elections in 1979 Wistrich rightly concluded, "The powers of the elected Parliament remained unchanged from that of its nominated predecessor... It was clear that the battle for more powers lay ahead."(26). Direct elections did not at this point enhance the powers of the European Parliament. Nevertheless, in 1979, an international electorate of over 190 million people had the opportunity to vote for direct European Parliamentary elections. Throughout the Community 62.5% of the electorate voted. Only 32.3% voted in the UK. This was only to rise to an all-time high in the UK European Parliamentary elections of 1994 to 36.4%! (27)

Although Wistrich suggests that nothing significantly changed between the nominated parliament and its
directly elected successor, such a view, in the opinion of Teasdale and Bainbridge is disingenuous, for in spite of its limited powers, the European Parliament "showed a real determination... to use its powers to the full and to increase them..."(28) Although the Parliament's powers were limited, they were subsequently increased by the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht. So then, what are the powers of the European Parliament, and how does it operate?

Technically, the European Parliament sits in perpetual session. This is to ensure that, when the Parliament is not sitting in plenary session in Strasbourg (its official seat), it can carry on its business. In practice it is usual for the Parliament to meet in Strasbourg for the minimum time allowed by the agreement of the Edinburgh Summit of 1992, 12 times a year (though, this has frequently been unilaterally reduced by the Parliament). The Parliament follows a monthly cycle: a 1 week plenary session in Strasbourg, 2 weeks of committee work usually in Brussels, and a week free of committee work. Usually in the 3 weeks away from Strasbourg, mini sessions of the parliament may be held in Brussels.

Today, the Parliament is made up of 626 MEP's elected under their own country's electoral system. Members sit in a semicircle, and are grouped by party rather than by nationality, thus, for example, British Labour MEP's belong to the European Socialist Group (PES). Much of the Parliament's work is conducted by the 20 standing committees of the Parliament. These committees then produce reports which are subsequently debated in plenary session and voted on as appropriate. The Treaty of Maastricht also accorded the Parliament the right to initiate committees of inquiry if deemed necessary. At the monthly plenary session, questions can be made to the Commission and Council of Ministers, in addition to the time allotted for topical debates.

In my judgement, the tone of the European Parliament is significantly different from that found in
Westminster. Debates are noticeable for their general lack of party-political histrionics. This can be explained procedurally and culturally.

Procedurally, the reports are agreed by the cross-party committees which prepare them. Consequently, the report is substantially an agreed document, with usually only minor amendments being made. Also, representatives of the political groups respond to the report, and further speaking time is allocated on a party-proportional basis. In practice speakers often have no more that 1 or 2 minutes in which to speak, thus requiring brevity and clarity of points rather than debating hyperbole.

Culturally, the emphasis of the European Parliament is consensus-seeking, as compared with the adversarial nature of British party politics. As Helen Wallace has noted, this reflects the fact that "In many member states cross-party positions are constructed, often through formal coalitions and structured dialogue with social partners... In these cases it is perhaps accurate to describe what emerges as a 'national' approach orientated towards shared 'national interests.'"(29) Furthermore, it can be argued that if the European Parliament is to be taken seriously, then a large measure of unanimity is required. It seems to me to be an open question as to whether such a high degree of consensus-seeking would continue in the event of the Parliament obtaining full legislative powers. A further point worthy of note is that it is often difficult to tell which country a member is from when she or he is speaking. There is a more broadly 'European' tone to the debates rather than debates reflecting any national division. So then, what are the actual powers of the European Parliament?

Until the advent of the Single European Act (SEA), it was, technically, still the 'European Parliamentary Assembly'. Consequently, because it does not have full legislative powers, it has had to acquire them gradually, as
The most significant development in the powers of the European Parliament has been over the Community budget. In 1975 the Parliament was granted the final say in how non-compulsory expenditure was allocated, within agreed limits (although the Council remained the final authority for allocating compulsory spending). The Parliament also has the power to reject any proposed budget by an absolute majority. This it exercised in 1979 and 1984. Since those turbulent days, a conciliation committee was formed, so that the budget could be discussed in a committee representing both the Parliament and Council. This has been crucial in avoiding further budgetary crises. Today, the European Parliament and the Council together form the 'Joint Budgetary Authority' of the EU.

In 1983 the Stuttgart Declaration granted the European Parliament the right to scrutinise the Commission and Council by submitting written and oral questions to them. At the plenary sessions, each day has a question time, for MEPs to act in this way.

The Parliament's legislative powers have historically been limited. Nevertheless, during this period under review, the Parliament's powers have increased. Until the SEA, the Parliament was restricted to giving its 'opinions' on legislation. However, the Council and the Commission could ignore the recommendations of the Parliament if they so chose. The SEA granted the parliament the right to two readings of draft legislation, firstly to scrutinise the initial legislation, then to amend or agree the common position arrived at after the first reading. Alternatively, at the second reading, the Parliament could reject the legislation in its entirety. The SEA was also significant in granting the Parliament the right to give its assent to Association Agreements, and Accession Treaties. As one commentator remarked, "The overall effect of these changes was to make the
parliament something of an upper house, entitled to scrutinize, question, delay and sometimes amend."(30)

The Treaty of Maastricht has further enhanced the Parliament's powers. Of these new powers, as Teasdale and Bainbridge have observed, "the most important is the co-decision procedure"(31). Modelled on the processes of the Joint Budgetary Authority, a conciliation committee can be formed by the Council and Parliament to negotiate directly. However, if agreement cannot be reached, the Parliament has the right of veto. The Maastricht Treaty also granted the Parliament the power to veto the appointment of the President of the European Commission - a power it attempted to use when Jacques Santer was nominated president. Moreover, the Parliament has the right to be consulted over other appointments to the Commission. The Parliament may also appoint Parliamentary Ombudsmen too.

To summarise then. The European Parliament has been given significantly enhanced powers since 1973, especially in relation to the Union's budget and the scrutiny of legislation. It now also has a say in Commission appointments, as well as an increased right to question both the Council and Commission. Nevertheless, it is still not a full legislative assembly. Its powers are still restricted by those granted by Treaty, i.e. by member governments. Such a truncated form of Parliament raises interesting questions.

One of the principle criticisms of the European Union is its 'democratic deficit'. In other words, the assertion is that the institutions of the EU are not transparently democratic either in their operation or their accountability. For the commentator, John Cole, "Not just the European Commission but, more importantly, the Council of Ministers ought to be democratically controlled. Otherwise a Europe which was garnering more power each year would be ruled not by democracy but by diplomacy..."(32) Unlike the British
situation, where the executive is formed from the legislature's ruling party, the European Commission and Council of Ministers are not formed from the European Parliament. The Commission is appointed, and the Council of Ministers is composed of national ministers with particular portfolios from member governments. Crucially, the European Parliament's powers of scrutiny are limited. As I have shown, questions may be asked and legislation may be explored, but in practice, the Council of Ministers are accountable only to their national parliaments.

Wistrich foresees a further weakening of this limited democratic oversight: "Once majority voting applies, especially behind closed doors, no individual minister can be held personally accountable. And the collective decisions of the Council cannot be subjugated to scrutiny by the individual twelve national parliaments - to whom the Council is not constitutionally responsible."(33) Thus, although the increased use of qualified majority voting in Council decision making may lubricate the decision taking, national parliaments cannot scrutinise in the same way as before. Although the Treaty of Maastricht attempted to address this democratic deficit by extending the powers of co-decision for the European parliament, as Bainbridge and Teasdale also point out, the Treaty "established important new areas of Union activity - the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs - with only very modest provision for parliamentary involvement, national or European."

Who then controls the executive? At the moment neither national nor European Parliaments have the power to fully control the activities of the executive - yet the European Parliament is the only directly elected institution for the Union. Although some powers of scrutiny have been transferred from national parliaments to the European Parliament, there is still a serious deficit in the democratic accountability of the European institutions. While ever that is the case, John Cole's charge that the Union is directed as much
by diplomacy as democracy will be sustainable.

The other side to the question of the 'democratic deficit', is how we hold our elected representatives accountable. One of the constant problems which constituents and MEP's alike experience is that of access, for a fundamental mode of accountability is accessibility. The very size of the Union and its structures, as well as the size of members' electorates militate, against easy access. For example, the monthly parliamentary cycle of Brussels committees, and Strasbourg plenary sessions restrict members' availability to their constituents. Moreover, the very fact that most British euro-constituencies are composed of seven or eight Westminster parliamentary constituencies compound the difficulty. Despite this, as has been pointed out, "whatever solution is found, it is clear that a Parliament that is already administratively cumbersome cannot go on growing indefinitely."(35) Thus, if the Union grows, the parliament cannot expand much further; the likelihood is that constituencies would be enlarged as each national allocation diminishes.

Another important issue relating to the Parliamentary accountability, and indeed of the EU at large, is the so-called "information deficit"(36). Although 'Europe' is seldom out of the news, it is equally clear that knowledge about how Europe and its Parliament works, how one gains access to the organs of the Union, even, perhaps who one's own MEP is, is generally lacking. Thus, when alarmist and biased views are portrayed in the news media, opinion may be accepted as fact. A lack of knowledge and information is fundamentally undemocratic, indeed anti-democratic, as information and knowledge, as the old dictum suggests, is power. If citizens do not have accurate information and access to the organs of the European Union, and especially that of its parliament, then the alienation and cynicism of the electorate is hardly surprising - even if it is profoundly disturbing. Thus, we can see a
'double democratic deficit': a weak democratic oversight of the organs of the EU by its parliament, but also weak links and poor information between and about Europe, its Parliament and members. As I shall explain in chapter 5, when considering the individual and the Churches' engagement with Europe, the Churches have an important contribution to make in this respect.

Another general criticism which is frequently levelled at the European Parliament is its excessive costs. There are two areas in which this charge is made. The first area is the parliament's location. In 1992 the Edinburgh European Council decreed that the European Parliament must sit in Strasbourg for at least 12 plenary sessions per annum. However, the vast majority of the Parliament's work is conducted in Brussels. Thus, there are the costs of maintaining buildings in both cities, and there are the great costs of transporting members, officials, assistants and documentation between Brussels and Strasbourg for 1 week per month. As a recent leader article in the European Voice illustrates, "MEPs are often portrayed by the media as holders of first-class seats on a luxury Euro gravy train. It may be unfair, but it is an image which has lodged in the minds of many ordinary members of the public."(37) In a recent debate about the costs of its buildings members of the European Parliament recognised the ridicule aimed at them, and the resulting unpopularity of the Parliament and Europe (38). The Parliament's prerogatives in this respect are limited by the Edinburgh Summit's decision. However, for 2 consecutive years, the Parliament has unilaterally reduced the number of Strasbourg sessions, which has led France to take the Parliament to court. It seems to me that this split country/split site nature of the Parliament is grossly inefficient. More importantly, it illustrates how restricted the Parliament is, not even being able to decide where it shall meet. Thus the inefficiencies (which can conveniently be blamed on the Parliament) will continue. As the
European Voice leader commented, "it is only when the Union is seen to be tackling such apparent examples of waste and inefficiency on its own doorstep that it will be able to convince Europe's tax-payers that their money is well spent."

(39)

Another major expenditure which the EU, and especially the Parliament incurs is that of language translation. At present, all documents, debates and committees are required to be translated into each of the official languages of the Union. Consequently, the costs are immense. Moreover, if the Union expands eastwards, the costs of translation seem set to rise even further. Generally speaking, it would be possible for the parliamentary committees to operate using a reduced service of, say, 5 languages including English, French and German. It seems to me that whilst it may be practical indeed necessary to trim the budget, as I shall argue in a chapter 5, it is nevertheless imperative that plenary sessions of parliament should retain the full simultaneous translation service, and that all EU documents are available in all the official languages of the EU. Otherwise it makes the decision making procedures of the EU even more remote from its citizens and less accountable. As before, knowledge and information is fundamental to power and accountability.

So then, I have raised a number of issues surrounding the Parliament, such as costs, and democratic accountability. In both areas I have illustrated some of the deficiencies of the present structures. I believe that present structures are problematic, yet to alter the Parliament would raise not only procedural questions, but in fact the central philosophical question facing the EU today: which way is the EU going? Will it remain broadly similar to today's construction? Will it 'return' to a more Gaullist Europe des patries? Will it develop into a more classical federal structure? Or will it advance as it has already done, after the fashion of Monnet - sector by sector, in a gradual development? The Parliament
merely reflects these questions that face the governments and citizens of the EU. Their conclusions, though, will also affect those countries who seek to enter the EU in the future. It is important to remember, however, that such developments have been made largely possible because of the fundamental reviews of the European Community institutions which have taken place since 1973, which I shall now examine.

Since the creation of the EEC in 1957 there have only been four fundamental reviews of the foundation treaties: the first inter-governmental conference (IGC) led to the signing of the Treaty of Luxembourg, more popularly known as the 'Single European Act' (SEA) which came into force in July 1987; the second and third working concurrently on economic and monetary union, and European Political Union, led to the Treaty on European Union, known as the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in November 1993; and the fourth, leading to the revising Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. It will, in fact, be impossible to understand the development of the EU without exploring these conferences which, in Community Law, are the only ways in which the Community and Union may be changed.

The first IGC was called as a result of several pressures. One significant pressure arose from Lord Cockfield's white paper on the Single Market, which was endorsed by the Milan European Council in June 1985. It was clear that if the Single Market was to be created, decision-making procedures needed improving. Pressure from the European Parliament for increased powers, together with the prospect of Spain and Portugal joining the EC, showed clearly that institutional reform was urgently required if the EC was to avoid complete atrophy in the future. By January 1986 a draft treaty was ready, and after much delay, came into being in July 1987.

The Act brought about a number of important changes for the EC. For the first time the European Council
became a formal part of the Community's institutions, though its definition remained vague. Procedurally, the Treaty extended the areas in which qualified majority voting (QMV) could be used, particularly in areas relating to the formation of the Single Market. Generally, only new policies required unanimity; policy implementation could be voted on by QMV. The Act agreed co-operation and assent procedures (see above). SEA also enhanced the powers of the European Court of Justice, and created the Court of First Instance, which was empowered to deal with cases in a limited scope, in order to speed up European legal processes. The Single European Act set 31st December 1992 as the final date for the creation of the Single Market. The treaty also included articles on cohesion, research and technology and environmental policy. Significantly, the Treaty formalised modes of European Political Co-operation (EPC), which called for a joint European Foreign Policy, and closer collaboration on defence and security issues.

Although the British government was opposed to it, the Treaty restated that the goal of the European Community was a European Union, and that the quest for economic and monetary union was a stated aim. "In essence", says Urwin, "the Single European Act was an attempt to turn the EC towards the original goal of a common market set out in the Treaty of Rome."(40) So then, how important was the Single European Act?

Initially, as Bainbridge and Teasdale observed, "The SEA fell far short of the European Parliament's hopes and was regarded as being only of technical interest as an exercise in tidying up the Treaties.(41) It heralded, for some, the reorientation of the Community in the British Government's free-market direction (42). Lord Howe commented that "This was indeed our [The Conservative Party's] chief campaigning cry - 'Thatcherism on a European scale'."(43) The Cabinet and Prime Minister approved of the compromise that the SEA was believed to be. It was, at that time seen as a limited Act, bringing a modest victory for British diplomacy and
compromise which had substantially won for the Tory government what it wanted. In fact, with the benefit of hind-sight and experience, I believe that Wistrich's view was to be the more perceptive, that "The Single European Act marked a major step forward in the process of European integration."(44)

It was to have far reaching consequences because it reasserted and extended the role of qualified majority voting, which seemed to undermine the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 (see p.26), and the rhetoric of the Treaty rekindled the aspiration for a full European Union. In a little over a year after the commencement of the SEA Margaret Thatcher gave her 'Bruges Speech' in which she "appeared to repudiate the commitment in the Single European Act to the European Union, presenting instead the neo-Gaullist idea of a Europe of independent states..."(45) thus, giving vent and focus to the divisions in the Conservative Party over Europe which have become a fissure in the 1990's.

It does seem, nevertheless, that at first the SEA was seen as a technical exercise, and that most did not see the "potential for revolution" - including Margaret Thatcher. In fact, though, it was to be revolutionary (if such a revolution could take place virtually un-noticed). It was equally clear that when the second IGC began, any proposals would be rigorously thought through, and argued over.

In many ways the Single European Act was enacted at a high-water mark in European Community affairs. Europe was enjoying an economic boom and Britain appeared to be co-operating in the EC after the settlement of the budgetary dispute. The Single European Act appeared to be a focus for both of these elements. Conversely, the Maastricht Treaty was painfully enacted at a low-water mark for EC affairs. Communism had collapsed in the central and eastern European states. The optimism it had generated was quickly replaced with a resurgence in nationalism and neo-Nazism, which seemed to
undermine a liberal Europe. Economically, Europe was now in recession. The 'feel good factor' of the mid-eighties had gone. The TEU began its tortuous passage through the EC's legislative processes in these difficult circumstances, augmented, not least, by the scope and complexity of the Treaty.

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) resulted from two parallel inter-governmental conferences: one on economic and monetary union guided by finance ministers, and the second on European Political Union, largely guided by EC foreign ministers. The economics IGC set out the three stages for EMU which I have outlined on pages 43 and 44. The British Government obtained an opt-out: it could chose whether to sign up to Stage 3 or not; Denmark was permitted by the Edinburgh Summit of December 1992 to have a permanent opt-out of Stage 3.

The 'political' IGC led to far reaching changes for the EC, as it made explicit once more the determination of the EC to work towards ever closer union. The Competence of the Community was extended into new areas, such as culture, education and vocational training; consumer protection, industrial policy and environmental policy; as well as trans-European networks, and aid policies. However, at the insistence of the British Government the Social Chapter of the Draft Treaty, so much the Conservatives' bête noire, was believed to be "quite simply a socialist charter - devised by socialists in the Commission and favoured predominantly by socialist states."(46) Instead, the other 11 EC members agreed a Protocol on Social Policy. As I have already outlined, the Treaty enhanced the powers of the European Parliament, and extended the scope of decisions that could be taken by qualified majority voting. Major additions to the nature of the EU were the so-called "pillars" that were created. The TEU envisaged a European Union made up of three 'pillars', the first, the institutions of the European Community, the supranational element. The second two pillars were to be inter-governmental structures, creating justice and home affairs,
and Common Foreign and Security Policy 'pillars'. Although in one sense the two new pillars widened the scope of the European Union, giving credence to the charge made by some of the creation of a European 'super-state', in fact the role of the Commission and European Parliament is very restricted. The Council of Ministers and European Council remain in the ascendant in these areas.

If it can be said that there are any two concepts which help to define the treaty and antagonise its opponents, these are the concepts of federalism and subsidiarity. In negotiation, the British government insisted that all references to a federal Europe were to be omitted from the Treaty. Any overt reference to federalism would have been clearly politically explosive in Britain. Instead, the principle of subsidiarity was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. Officially, "This principle purports that the Community should deal only with those matters it is better equipped to deal with than the Member States and the regional and local authorities."(47) Noting the irony, however, Wistrich reflected that "The principle of subsidiarity has reinforced its federal nature by defining the distribution of powers between the European and national levels of government."(49) As I shall argue in chapter 5, however, the principle of subsidiarity has far wider implications than that.

Although the Treaty may well be fundamentally less radical than the Single European Act, the results of the Maastricht Treaty were far more politically explosive.

A considerable weakness of the Treaty (though this has been considered its greatest strength) is that the Maastricht Treaty is susceptible to vastly differing interpretations which subsequently leave it wide open to be so caricatured as to be virtually two different Treaties! For example, the Treaty was portrayed by the Major Government as preserving the role and ancient histories of the nation states.
At the same time the then president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, was portraying the Maastricht Treaty as relaunching the Community. He repeatedly stressed the federal nature of the Treaty. In a sense both are correct, hence the ambiguity: the Treaty stresses the principle of subsidiarity (Major); it also created a more comprehensively federal structure (Delors).

The attendant problem is the question of federalism and its meaning. To Conservative "Euro-sceptics" a federal Europe is anathema. It is synonymous with the end of the nation-state and national and cultural identity. Yet to others who live in a federal structure, such as in the USA and Germany, a federation is the constitutional means of ensuring a delineation of authority and identity - the very principle espoused by the principle of subsidiarity. It seems to me that a weakness of the Treaty is that in fact, it does not have a thorough-going definition of its federal goals. Although it might have been expedient - perhaps even essential - to omit any references to federalism in order for the Treaty of Maastricht to be ratified, unless there is a genuine debate that is not grounded in vituperative polemics it may be difficult for Europe to move forward in any direction.

The element which should surely be applauded in the Treaty is the avowal of the principle of subsidiarity, rooted as it is in Catholic social teaching (see chapters 4 and 5), for, as Baroness Williams has contended, "It is a principle that sits well with the emphases on empowering citizens, building public and private partnerships, and working with non-governmental and community-based organisations that characterise so much contemporary political discourse."(49) It has implications not just for the EC, but national governments as well.

Another important feature of the Treaty of Maastricht is its essentially temporary nature. It gave a mandate for an inter-governmental conference to begin in 1996 to make a thorough-going review of the EC Treaties, and where
the EU is to go into the new millennium. However, it seems that the Amsterdam Treaty has been a revising, rather than a revolutionary treaty, which has failed to give much new visionary impetus.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Maastricht Treaty from the public's point of view is its language and format. As Teasdale and Bainbridge have noted, "However well-intentioned, a treaty covering so many heterogeneous issues, some very sensitive, negotiated largely in secret, and for the most part unintelligible to the general public, could hardly be expected to win friends."(50). Surely, that is a crucial problem (as I have alluded to in relation to the European Parliament). If the general public cannot have an effective rational debate about the future of Europe, it is again undemocratic. As Churchill realised nearly 50 years ago, Europe would be built by people's hearts (51). Largely speaking, it has failed to do so.

However one chooses to judge the Maastricht Treaty, what is clear is that it aroused strong emotion. The ratification process was fraught with difficulty. The Danish referendum voted 50.7% against ratification. Only after securing a permanent opt-out from Stage 3 of EMU at the Edinburgh Summit could Denmark ratify the Treaty after a new referendum received a vote of 56.8% in favour. The referendum in France called by President Mitterand gained only a very narrow majority in favour of ratification, 51.05% voting 'yes'. In Germany, the treaty was referred to the German Constitutional Court for judgement. But it was in Britain that the ratification process was stormiest. The passage of the Bill through Parliament was turbulent because the Labour Party had determined to cause as much difficulty as possible in view of the Social Charter "opt-out". The small group of Euro-sceptics in the Conservative Party used the opportunity to exercise their disproportionate might to inconvenience the Bill's passage. It was not until a motion had been linked to a vote of
confidence in the government, after what "was possibly the most serious parliamentary defeat suffered by the Conservative Party this century"(52), that the Bill could pass into law.

Although the Maastricht process was concluded by the enacting of the legislation the legacy of division it exposed in the Conservative Party has not gone away. It is remarkable (though now not unusual) that Norman Lamont, less than a year after his resignation as Chancellor of the Exchequer, openly defied Government Policy when speaking to the Selsdon Group fringe meeting at the Party Conference in 1994, and considered the possibility of the UK leaving the EU. At the very least, he declared that "The lesson of Maastricht is that the Tories will not go on down the road to a federal Europe."(53). For Euro-sceptics the Maastricht Treaty was a "Treaty too far." (54)

Although Norman Lamont may reflect that "We seemed to have joined a club very different from that we had in mind in the early 1970's. The forces for political integration have proved stronger that was foreseen"(55), in fact we should see the Treaty on European Union as part of the process of European integration so espoused by Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann. Indeed, it may be one of the ironies of history that John Major insisted that the preamble of the Treaty should reaffirm the Treaty of Rome's quest for "ever closer union". Such a Union was always envisaged as being both economic and political. Moreover, it seems to me that the current debate recalls the discussion of the 1960s described in chapter 1: as Britain explored whether EFTA or EEC was the way it wanted to travel. What the Maastricht Treaty has served to show once more, is that the issues surrounding the Union are still very much live ones. The EU is still politically and ideologically in flux. Undoubtedly this is reflected in the controversy which Europe has illustrated in the British political parties in particular. It is, therefore, necessary to explore more fully,
the place of ideology in Britain's politics to the issue of Europe.

As I have already illustrated, the British political approach to Europe since the Second World War was essentially pragmatic. Pragmatically, Harold Macmillan sought British entry into the EEC; Wilson followed suit. The 1970's and 1980's however, in the main, witnessed a departure from this position. It has, it seems, reappeared in the 1990's in John Major's pragmatic (if pressured) approach to Europe. If Edward Heath was, as has been suggested on p.29, the only British Prime Minister to be intellectually committed to the EC (56) Margaret Thatcher, his successor, was in many ways his antithesis. For her politics was the politics of conviction, not least in her approach to Europe.

At first, as we have seen, Thatcher appeared to be broadly neutral to Europe at first, keeping out of the limelight in the 1975 referendum debate. At times she even appeared to be moderately 'pro-European', indicating her willingness to join the ERM 'when the time was ripe'. As her memoirs reveal, "I sought at the start to strengthen our 'European credentials'. We Conservatives were welcomed in Strasbourg because we were seen as more pro-European than Labour..." However, concerning joining the ERM, she added, "I already had doubts about the wisdom of this course..."(57) Although she appeared to be more "pro-European than Labour" at first, by the end of her premiership, as Heath was synonymous with Euro-enthusiasm, so Thatcher became synonymous with anti-Europeanism. This was seen, in the popular mind, as Thatcher herself records, as "a narrow, nostalgic nationalist who could not bear to see the feudal trappings of Britain's ancien régime crumble to dust like Miss Haversham's wedding cake, when the sunlight of Europe's rational modernity was turned upon them." (58) How did such a marked change come about, and Britain
further become known for political awkwardness?

One important characteristic of Thatcher's approach to politics was confrontationalism. For her, consensus and compromise were repugnant. The 'Butskellist' approach to post-war consensus politics in Britain had, in her mind "shaped and distorted British society" (59). When the British Budgetary Question was faced, Thatcher was typically pugnacious, in stark contrast to Geoffrey Howe, her then chancellor, who "came to be seen as the soft-cop in contrast to the hard-cop persona that enfolded Margaret Thatcher's championship of our case."(60) Such a persona, whilst successful in some circumstances, not least in securing a more equitable financial settlement for Britain, could also be counter-productive. For example, despite there being widespread support for a renegotiation of Britain's budgetary contributions, Thatcher's style was so abrasive that she "thus performed the considerable feat of unnecessarily irritating two big countries, three small ones and the Commission within her opening hour of performance at a European Council."(61) Finally, she felt forced to threaten to withhold British payments to the EC. Only after years of wrangling was a solution to the British budgetary question eventually agreed at the Fontainbleau Summit of June 1984.

Again, in 1987, a new basis for EC funding, reforming the CAP and increasing research funding was proposed, but the European Council of June 1987 ended in confusion because Thatcher vetoed the proposal, even though the draft communiqué "in the opinion of many observers went much further to meet her demands than it did to meet anybody else's."(62) Compromise was, for Margaret Thatcher, anathema. In Europe, where the method of political operating (and especially European policy), was arrived at by consensus, it increased Britain's perceived awkwardness. In that important sense, Mrs Thatcher was not 'communautaire'.

Allied to her abrasive character, Margaret Thatcher was also convinced in the rightness of her own views.
As John Cole observed, by the time Thatcher left office, "She now believed that she knew better than almost anyone what was right and what was wrong."(63) It is a conviction which is reflected in her memoirs. She was "convinced not just that I was right about the way forward for Europe, but confident that if the Government and Party I led kept their nerve we would be vindicated by intellectual developments and international events."(64) Such self-belief precluded any achievement of consensus. Her first volume of memoirs, The Downing Street Years, certainly leaves little room for an alternative view. Such a certitude ultimately led to the resignation of Nigel Lawson and Geoffrey Howe from her Cabinet, which precipitated her own downfall in November 1990.

When exploring her attitude towards Europe, it is also necessary to examine Margaret Thatcher's belief in Britain. One of her heroes was Winston Churchill "for whom my admiration... now knew no bounds." (65) In some ways there is a legitimate parallel to be made between the two. One was their shared pugnacity of character. Another was their grand view of Britain's role and place in the world. Recalling her youth, Thatcher wrote, "I have to admit that I had the patriotic conviction that, given great leadership of the sort I heard from Winston Churchill... there was almost nothing that the British people could not do."(66) This attitude was reflected in her belief that "Britain was the most stable and developed democracy in Europe..." and therefore, "we had perhaps the most to lose from these [sc. federal] developments."(67). This created an arrogant view of the British system, and, conversely, a condescension towards other states: "If you have no real confidence in the political system or political leaders of your own county you are bound to be more tolerant of foreigners of manifest intelligence, ability and integrity like M. Delors telling you how to run your affairs. Or to put it more bluntly, if I were an Italian, I might prefer rule from Brussels too. But the mood in Britain was different. I sensed
it..."(68) Consequently, any European influence would be resisted.

Significantly, though, Thatcher differed from her hero. Whereas Churchill was a passionate believer in 'Britishness' and the British political system, he also supported and encouraged the development of post-war European integration. Although he was tied emotionally and intellectually to the Commonwealth and the United States rather than to Europe, he displayed an intellectual flexibility towards Europe that escaped Margaret Thatcher, thus giving credence to her own caricature of her nationalism (see p. 63).

Both Churchill and Thatcher, did, however, share the view that the central political alliance must be with the USA. Thatcher believed that "If America remains the dominant partner in a united West, then the West can continue to be the dominant power in the world as a whole." Significantly, "Britain's role in such a structure would, I believe, be a disproportionately influential one."(69) She thus concluded her notorious Bruges Speech of 1988 by saying, "Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward and not inward, and which preserves the Atlantic Community - that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic - which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength."(70)

Equally crucial for understanding Thatcher's actions on Europe, is her attitude towards Europe itself. In many ways they reflect the attitudes of the 1960s. Structurally, Thatcher is a Gaullist. For her Europe should develop not as a 'federalist super-state' but as a "Europe des patries", where the nation-state is paramount, and European integration is no more than co-operation. Moreover, its essential aim should not be to foster political or cultural integration, but simply be a modified version of the European Free Trade Area. In this light it is possible to understand her support of the Single European Act of 1986, and her opposition
to the Maastricht Treaty. This Atlanticist, anti-federalist, free-trade approach to the future of Europe was set out in what may well be her abiding ideological statement and contribution to the debate on the future of Europe, the Bruges Speech of 1988.

The Bruges speech caused consternation and confusion for British policy towards Europe. Howe believed that at that point "The party was effectively being split by the defection of its own leader." (71) In my belief, however, such a judgement is unfair. The Prime Minister 'defected' in the sense of turning against her own government's policy, but in another way, she simply gave oxygen to those who were 'Euro-sceptic' in the Conservative Party. In that respect, she was not so much defecting, as reflecting the views of a wing of her party. One person's defection is another's strong leadership! The full effect of such a position, was seen during the 1992-1997 Major administration which eventually lost its parliamentary majority.

In short, Margaret Thatcher's ideological goal was not a united Europe, but a free-market, pro-American, anti-socialist Britain, inspired by her belief in the superiority of Britain, and bolstered by an astonishing self-confidence that became arrogant towards the end of her premiership. What seems to me to be most significant, is that Thatcher's ideology clashed fundamentally with Europe when it moved beyond a merely economic, free trade area. She did not have the intellectual or personal flexibility to work to modify it. Her approach was to stop the change, and to oppose any hint of compromise. It is no coincidence that as Europe pursued closer political and social co-operation as well as economic co-operation, she became more and more opposed to Europe. It was this increasing intellectual and emotional antipathy towards Europe which led to Howe's resignation, and her subsequent loss of office. She was, eventually, impaled by her ideology towards Europe, amongst other issues.
Thatcher's legacy concerning Europe, has therefore been one which has made public the serious divisions within her own party concerning Europe. It has also been one which has challenged the direction, the pre-suppositions of Europe. In that sense it has been creative. The very longevity of her premiership, though, meant that any 'free thinking' on a developing issue was going to be dangerous politically both to her and her party. The enduring legacy of Thatcher's ideological and confrontational approach to Europe has been that Britain is seen to be the awkward, if not tempestuous partner in Europe. Helen Wallace has concluded that "in 1985 a number of other Europeans were prepared to work hard to keep the British on side and on the inside. That willingness and commitment can no longer be assumed..."(72) Would Mrs Thatcher's Bruges Speech have caused so much consternation, if she had been more temperate towards Europe? Who knows? The turbulence experienced by the Major administration, himself a pragmatist in the Macmillan and Wilson mould, has hardly put Britain "at the heart of Europe" however much that may have been his hope. The enduring legacy of the Thatcher ideology may well be marginalisation for years to come. It remains to be seen whether the positive rhetoric of the Blair government will fundamentally improve Britain's relations with the rest of the EU.

To conclude, then, in this chapter concerned with British membership of the EC, we have seen Britain persistently perceived as being awkward. British European Policy has been dominated by the internal politics of the individual parties, which have not favoured an easy relationship with the rest of the EC. We have also seen many developments within the EC, which have reflected differences in aims for Europe between Britain and other EC members, notably in the pressure for the achievement of economic and monetary union. We have seen an expansion in areas of EC competence, as the process of work towards a European Union progressed.
We have also examined a Community which is far from perfect. The questions surrounding the European Parliament and EMU, as we have seen beg important philosophical questions about the future of the EU, which need to be resolved. Both areas have been problematic for British politicians. In a real sense, Britain is still a marginal member of the EU, after 23 years of membership. Before exploring the British Church's relationship to Europe, it would be profitable to review briefly, the main developments I have noted, since 1940.

At the beginning of 1940 as I have shown in Chapter 1, Britain was very much the hope for the free world. At first it seemed that Britain was going to be a place of radical vision for a post-war Europe. At the highest echelons of Government a federal union had been spoken of but, as we have seen, this was seen as a ploy to keep an ally fighting. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, it seemed inconceivable that the United Kingdom could ever be remote from Europe again. At the same time, the politicians who would be at the helm of Western European post-war reconstruction were beginning to dream of a new Europe, free and more united. Unlike the League of Nations, a united Europe needed strong backing: it needed legal enforcement, and by implication required the ceding of national sovereignty to a supranational body. But above all, the post-war Western European politicians seemed to have a vision for a new Europe, that went beyond the creation of new political structures. The vision had four main tenets: permanent peace, reconciliation, reconstruction, and the increase in material prosperity for all its citizens. In short, Europe was coming to realise that its future was better served by working together. Only a deeper level of co-operation seemed to serve these aims. And in the light of the League of Nations' failure, this seemed to suggest the need for a supranational structure.
In my opinion, the post-war process of integration and co-operation in Western Europe has been astonishingly successful in achieving its four aims. With the tragic exception of Yugoslavia and mindful of the post-war stalemate caused by the 'Cold War', Europe has enjoyed 50 years of peace in the West. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that Germany and France would have achieved so deep a reconciliation had it not been for the vision of men such as Schumann, Monnet, and Adenauer which was symbolised in the 1963 Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. Undoubtedly such stability has been the bedrock to material prosperity which the citizens of member states have enjoyed. It is not surprising that in the post-Cold War world central and eastern European states are seeking membership of the European Union as a means of perpetuating the years of peace, reconciliation and prosperity. Yet the British attitude has been persistently problematic. Why is this?

History has played a major part in defining our national consciousness, and we are still, 50 years after World War II, in the process of coming to terms with our limited world role. We have still not consciously become "European", rather we are still "British, and members of the Common Market" to many. Moreover, as I have shown, the reasons for Britain applying to join the EEC were radically different from those of the original Six. Our reason for membership was, and is, pragmatic and economic. We wanted to join because we wanted the greater material prosperity that the EEC seemed to offer. In this way, we have only had one of the four reasons for co-operation and integration. We have joined, to put it crudely, for the money, but without the vision of Monnet, Adenauer, Schuman, Spinelli, Spaak, even Churchill. As Geoffrey Howe remarked in his resignation speech - in effect summing up the British pragmatic approach to Europe - "I am not a Euro-idealist or federalist. My concern is less with grand schemes than with immediate realities, as they affect our well-being and prospects as a nation." (73) Until we move beyond pragmatism
alone and catch a vision for EU membership, we will, I believe always be on the physical, intellectual and emotional edge of Europe. As Wallace has perceptively commented, "For Britain to be at the heart of Europe would require Europe to be in the hearts of the British." (74). As it is, Norman Lamont may be correct in suggesting that the direction for future integration in Europe "is not two speeds at all. It is two completely different directions" i.e. the British view, and the European view. (75)

Another key reason, it seems to me, why Britain has been marginalised has been because domestic politics played a restraining, indeed damaging, role in British European politics. Even at the outset, with the foundation of the ECSC, as I have noted, the Cabinet realised that politically it was impossible to join the ECSC when the coal and steel industries had just been nationalised, because of the belief that this would threaten the demise of those industries. When Britain joined the Community, the internal strife taking place in the Labour Party ensured that the Wilson governments, and to some extent the Callaghan administration, were limited in their ability to work in and with Europe. This trend, of course, has been mirrored by the machinations of the Conservative Party.

Although, from the outset, Margaret Thatcher was not as I have shown a 'Euro-enthusiast', her earlier role was constructive, and her tenacity in the face of the budgetary question has won plaudits. But as her administration continued, despite having a Cabinet in which strong 'pro-Europeans' had prominent portfolios, such as Geoffrey Howe at the Foreign Office and Nigel Lawson at the Treasury, her position became far more dogmatic and abrasive. Her rejection of the membership of the exchange rate mechanism, her increasing obsession with nationalism and sovereignty and so on, brought her into increasing conflict with European partners, and with members of her own Cabinet. Such an
abrasive style and strident anti-Europeanism ultimately led to Geoffrey Howe's resignation in November 1990, and precipitated a challenge to her leadership.

It seemed, however, that when John Major became Prime Minister, such anti-European rhetoric had been put aside. John Major called for Britain to be "at the heart of Europe", and his policy seemed aimed at healing the wounds inflicted by Margaret Thatcher. All that, however, seems to have been only temporary. After winning the 1992 election with only a tiny parliamentary majority, once more the internal struggles of the Conservative Party came to dominate our relations with Europe. Through the "defection of its own leader" as Howe described Thatcher, a strand of anti-Europeans has been able to inflict serious wounds upon Major's European policy, most spectacularly in the temporary defeat of the Maastricht Bill in the House of Commons. This withering effect led to Major's increasingly hostile stance towards Europe. As we have seen, in September 1993, Major wrote a staunch defence of Britain's position in Europe, and of his desire to see Europe enlarged (76). In just over two years, the rhetoric had become noticeably more "Euro-sceptical". In his article in the Daily Telegraph on 18th December 1995, although stating that "My agenda [at the Madrid Summit] was simple: to help to shape a Europe that succeeds and in which Britain can succeed", it was necessary for Britain, "to continue to raise the difficult questions". Far from offering a vision, or suggestions, Major was reduced to asking questions, as if Britain was still on the outside waiting to join. Moreover, his rhetoric was antagonistic towards the EU. In a stern warning from EU Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, wrote of the danger of pandering to Euro-sceptics and not being more positive about Europe (77). It may well be the case, that unless there can be a bi-partisan approach to European questions - and this seems highly unlikely to be achieved because Britain's membership in Europe has pragmatic rather than ideological origins - such
internal party squabbling will continue to seriously damage the health of Britain's position in Europe.

It is easy, however, to say that Britain's relationship has been wholly negative, and destructive. This, as we have also seen, has not been the case. Although tenaciously arguing for budgetary changes, Thatcher and Howe helped to press for a more just and permanent budgetary settlement. The British EC commissioner, Lord Cockfield, was instrumental in setting out the plan for economic integration leading to the Single European Act of 1986, and for the greater liberalisation of trade, which had, since EFTA days, been a keen British interest. Britain has been relatively effective in implementing EU policy and law once it had been made, more so, some would suggest than other members. And, perhaps most significantly, Britain at times remembered the benefit of using the language of the community in order to get its own way. For example, Stephen George cites the example of the concept of Subsidiarity within the Treaty of Maastricht, as a method of safe-guarding British interests as the government sees it, whilst using the language of co-operation (78).

We may nevertheless conclude that Britain is, in the title of Stephen George's book, justifiably called, "An Awkward Partner". This has been the case since 1973, but it surely reflects the entire post-war period. Despite policy objectives being achieved, and positive approaches in Europe being made, right to the present time, the abiding impression is of a reluctant Europeanism. Membership of the EU, still needs to be consolidated in British politics, and in the British mind, if that is to change permanently. This is crucial in view of the many institutional changes we have seen since 1973, such as the development of EMU, the Single European Act, and the Treaty on European Union.

So then, how have the churches in Britain
related to Europe? I shall examine this question in my next chapter.

NOTES

(1) Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.329
(2) Anthony King, Britain Says Yes: The 1975 Referendum Campaign on the Common Market, p.42
(3) King, p.43
(4) Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.636
(5) Pimlott, p.654
(6) King, p.84
(7) Jenkins, p.492
(8) King, p.130
(9) King, p.132
(10) King, p.137
(11) Jenkins, p.418
(12) Jenkins, p.463
(13) D.Healey, The Time of My Life, p.440
(14) Jenkins, p.477
(15) S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, p.130
(16) The 1979 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, quoted in G. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p.111
(17) Howe, p.112
(18) Howe, p.450
(19) Jenkins, p.484
(20) An inter-governmental conference (IGC) is the constitutional committee of representatives of member states which alone can amend the foundational treaties of the Community (eg the Treaties of Rome) after reaching unanimous agreement.
(21) M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p.750
(22) European Commission forecast on member states attaining the criteria for Stage 3 of EMU, reproduced in The Economist, 9th December 1995.
(23) Thatcher, The Path to Power, p.486
(24) The Economist, 30th September 1995
(26) E. Wistrich, The United States of Europe, p.40
(27) Bainbridge and Teasdale, p.187
(28) Bainbridge and Teasdale, p.200.
(31) Bainbridge and Teasdale, p.217
(32) John Cole, As it Seemed to Me, p.168
(33) Wistrich, p.112
I am grateful to Stephen Hughes, MEP for Durham, and chairman of the European Parliament's Employment and Social Affairs Committee, for this helpful phrase and insight.

European Voice, 18th July 1996.

For a summary of the debate, see Strasbourg Notebook, (PE 199. 195), 21.5.1996.

CHAPTER 3: ENGLISH CHURCH ENGAGEMENT
WITH EUROPE: 1939-1972

By the Middle Ages Europe and Christianity had become virtually synonymous. Although Europe is now a multi-cultural and multi-faith continent, the Church has continued to be interested in the "world", even in a post-Christendom Europe. For Britain, and in particular English Christianity, there is a long history of an inter-connection between Christianity and State politics. The Church of England was forged in the crucible of controversy between the English King and the Pope, becoming a Church which is both Catholic and Reformed. The Roman Catholic Church in England has had a turbulent history of persecution, intolerance and eventually grudging acceptance. The Free Churches have often been involved in radical politics, not least in the formation of the Labour Party. In fact, in European terms, the denominational structure is unique: there is no parallel in mainland Europe between the tri-partite Church composition of Established Church (of England), Roman Catholic and Free Church outside of the British Isles(1). As chapters 1 and 2 showed a distinctive British political outlook (especially towards Europe), now I shall also show that Britain has its own peculiar Church identity, experiences and insights. In the next two chapters, I shall therefore ask whether the English Churches still have insights to bring to bear in the modern post-Christian Europe, let alone offer a vision for the future of Europe.

As in chapter 1 I shall take the commencement of the Second World War as my starting point. I shall show that the activity of the British Churches in relation to European political integration has generally fitted into three phases: the war and early post-war years; the 1960's; and the late 1980's onwards. Although the correlation is not precise, I shall show that, in the main, these three more intense periods of thought and activity relate to the
greatest secular British interest in Europe: World War II; British applications to join the EEC in the 1960's; and (in chapter 4) the increasingly tense political debate in Britain from the middle to late 1980's.

In this chapter, covering the years from the beginning of World War II to the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Community in 1973, I shall evaluate the contribution of the Churches which has largely come through printed material produced by some of the leading Christian thinkers of the period. As we shall see, in this period (1939-1972) the Church was very interested in the future of Europe. At times its thinking was far more advanced and "pro-European" than its contemporary political counter-part, especially during the 1960's. By contrast, however, in chapter 4, as the material published by the main English denominations shows, the English Churches have only engaged with Europe at the more limited level of description, rather than by entering into a deeper theological and political discourse. In chapter 5 I will explore ways in which the Church might engage and contribute with Europe in the future. Firstly, though, we must return to the period of 1939-1972, and in particular, to the Church's war-time engagement with the whole European question.

As I have shown in Chapter 1, from the outset of the Second World War there was a keen interest in the type of world and European order that would emerge from the war. This was true no less of the key thinkers in the Church of its day. This spirit of exploration and thinking is characterised well by George Bell, Bishop of Chichester (1929-1958); William Temple, Archbishop of York (1929-1942) and subsequently Archbishop of Canterbury (1942-1944); lay Roman Catholic thinker and educationalist A.C.F. Beales, as well as the "Sword of the Spirit" movement inspired by Cardinal Archbishop Arthur Hinsley (Archbishop of Westminster, 1935-1943). So then, what did these distinguished churchmen offer in their thinking and action for post-war European reconstruction?
Although Bishop Bell was no utopian and believed that "Systems have to be worked not by angels but by men. And men are moved by passions, prejudices, ambitions and vices"(2), he was an idealist, who refused simply to accept the jingoism of war. Indeed, in his first war-time letter to The Times Bell asserted that "there should be an honest recognition that the Church can express solidarity, not by saying ditto to the State, nor by stimulating patriotism, but by really being the Church." He further added that, "The Church is a universal society, while it seeks to fulfil its mission in different nations. It binds its members in a unity which includes the members of the nation with which we are at war."(3) In many ways that quotation is indicative of his persistent and consistent message to the country, so well enunciated in his 'Penguin Special', Christianity and World Order of 1940.

In Christianity and World Order Bell gives a brief and clear analysis of what he viewed as the causes of the Second World War, as well as his understanding of the nature of the Church, together with his beliefs about the nature of the war, peace aims, and the basis of reconstruction. It is, essentially, a manifesto of Bell's war-time ministry.

Central to that ministry was Bell's repeated assertion (indeed sometimes it was a reminder) that "Germany and Nazism are not the same thing."(4) This distinction was important for him not simply for judging the method of prosecuting the war, but also for post-war reconstruction.

One reason for this position was Bell's extensive personal and formal ecumenical links, both at home (as we shall see with his involvement with Sword of the Spirit), and especially in continental Europe. For him, the Church as Una Sancta transcended national barriers - a point to which I shall return in chapter 5. Throughout the war Bell attempted to keep the plight of European Christians in the public's mind, after all, the bombs that were dropping on
Germany were dropping on churches he had known and people who were his friends. As soon as was safe and practical, towards the end of the war he attempted to rebuild links with continental churches. In fact, the ecumenical dimension to Bell's character and activity should not be underestimated. The result of such persistent solidarity with Christians is well described by Bishop Walker: "By 1946 this naturally shy and gentle man was listened to in Europe as a leading Christian voice."(5)

In many ways the intellectual position Bishop Bell adopted and held to which embodied his views for peace and reconstruction were the Five Peace Points, given by Pope Pius XII in an allocution on Christmas Eve, 1939. For Bell, the Peace Points were, to his mind, "the most fruitful contribution to reconstruction."(6) Although the Peace Points were openly supported by the Anglican, Roman Catholic and Free Church leaders in a letter to The Times on 21st December 1940, it was Bell who kept returning to them. Quoting them fully in Christianity and World Order (7), he was also a strong advocate for them at the Sword of the Spirit meetings held at the Stoll Theatre in 1941, indeed, Thomas Moloney asserts that "By common consent the speech by the Anglican Bishop George Bell on the Pope's Five Peace Points was regarded as the finest of those delivered."(8) The Points asserted that all nations had the right to life and independence; any peace settlement must work towards disarmament; some form of juridical authority needed to be created to act as arbiter to settle international disputes; just attention must be given to the claims of nations, populations and racial minorities; and, ultimately all settlements must be governed by the principles of love and justice.

As a fundamental basis of reconstruction Bell was convinced that any occupation of the Axis countries after the end of the War must only be temporary. In a fierce ideological clash in the House of Lords, Lord Vansittart wanted
the government to make it clear that "we are entering Germany not as friends but as conquerors, bent on reducing this German nation to sufficient humility and military impotence..." Bell's agenda was different. He stressed that "it ought to be regarded as a first step... in the rebuilding of Europe." Moreover, it presented an opportunity to the Allies to "encourage whatever democratic forces can make good"... and to stress "that it is their firm intention... to let the rule of freedom, in government as well as in speech, begin as soon as they can."(9)

What is also vital to remember, when considering his views on peace and reconstruction, is that for Bell, Christianity and Christian principles offered the only sure basis for reconstruction, because it alone had the power to change people's hearts (10). Throughout the war, despite the criticism he endured for his principled stance, he remained loyal to his beliefs, so much so that Adrian Hastings asserted that "Bell was one of the first Anglicans in high position to reclaim the role of prophecy and to recognise the need for a dualist distancing of church from state."(11) Indeed, in my judgement, Jaako Rusama has correctly concluded that "The word 'integrity' well describes his [Bell's] basic outlook."(12)

Bishop Bell's more famous war-time contemporary was Archbishop William Temple. As with Bell, Temple was concerned about both the prosecution of the war and especially, what should come in the place of war.

In many ways Temple is significant for the fact that he largely reflected contemporary thinking, in a way in which Bell never quite did. Bell was, to quote Hastings again, "Much more of a prophet than Temple but less of a statesman..."(13) As I have already shown, there was a significant body of opinion that looked towards a post-war federal union between some states in Europe. This was a position Temple endorsed. Reported in The Times, he spoke on ultimate peace aims. Temple looked to a possible peace
settlement arrived at through a Congress of Nations in which a post-Nazi Germany could play a full part - an idea not dissimilar from Churchill's March 1943 broadcast (see p.8f). Importantly, he added that "Many of us hope that the Congress will pave the way for a Federal Union of Europe in which we can see the only hope of a permanent peace settlement."(14) Such a post-war federal structure was needed in order to limit national sovereignty, stressing that "It is not a mere repetition of a League of Nations programme, for that expressly left national sovereignty untouched."(15) He went further when he not only posited the possibility of a future union of 2 or 3 states, but also suggested that national sovereignty should disappear in that instance and that to want to retain the right to secede from the union should be a bar on entering the union (16). With remarkable prescience, in July 1942, Temple speculated on the possibility of an "international syndicate" working the industrial resources of the Ruhr "together with some neighbouring countries beyond the frontiers of the Reich"(17). Such a suggestion was not dissimilar from what actually happened with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (see pp.14-17).

To summarise Temple's position on a federal Europe, it is worth quoting Alan Suggate at length: "guided by realism elevated to a principle, Temple thinks that, short of the leavening influence of an effective universal Church, the way forward best lies in the organised co-operation of groups of people sufficiently close in tradition and interest for this to be voluntarily accepted, yet sufficiently disparate to introduce some effective checks and balances... Temple was searching for something practicable, intermediate between complete national autonomy and a general federation."(18) It can remain only a question of speculation as to how he would have reacted to the post-war push for closer European integration, but it is quite clear that in the early years of the war, Temple's European federalist ideals were similar in
style and rationale to his secular counter-parts. He was rooted, however, not simply in the political world; he sought to make the world less un-godly, by searching for possible structures in which un-godliness (such as war and aggression) could be practically outlawed.

If Temple was concerned with post-war structures, he was even more concerned with the principles which could prepare the way for, and underpin, them. In a joint letter to *The Times* in support of the Pope's Peace Points (summarized on p.79), the four Church leaders, Cosmo Lang, Cardinal Hinsley, Walter Armstrong of the Free Church Federal Council, and William Temple, believed that "The present evils in the world are due to the failure of nations and peoples to carry out the laws of God. No permanent peace is possible in Europe unless the principles of the Christian religion are made the foundation of national policy and of all social life."(19) For Temple, such principles were worked out in two substantial ways. The first were what might be described as 'practical principles' which could assist the immediate prosecution of the war; and the second, 'theoretical principles' which could contribute to the emerging debate about the nature of post-war reconstruction and society. So then, what were his 'practical principles'?

Initially, Temple was keen to assert a duality of thinking and attitude towards the war. The war must be for something, and conducted in the right way. For example, in the early days of the War Temple was keen to stress that "we wish to conduct the war as crusaders for justice and freedom." (20)

Temple was also notable for his open and tolerant attitude towards Germany. Although he was quite clear about Nazi Germany's guilt, and that there could be no accommodation with the Nazis, he was also swift to suggest at the same time that "the terms which we make with an honourable German government shall be arrived at in such a way as to show
that we have sought no kind of advantage for ourselves and no humiliation for the German people."(21)

Whilst Temple called for the use of right principles both for the actions of the Allies and their attitudes towards their enemies, it is, I believe, certainly questionable as to whether he did in fact manage to keep the distinction between the quest for justice, right action, and right attitude. Unlike Bell, as the war progressed - and in common with the public attitude - Temple's own attitude towards Germany hardened and his less critical acceptance of Allied war policy became more apparent.

However, whilst 'practical principles' were important for Temple's war-time thinking, it is his 'theoretical ethics' for which he is perhaps best remembered - the classic statement of which was Christianity and Social Order.

In 1941 Temple accepted the invitation to be chairman and convenor of a conference called by the Industrial Christian Fellowship. In his letter to the delegates he set out the aims of the conference. These were: "'to consider from the Anglican point of view what are the fundamental facts which are directly relevant to the ordering of the new society that is quite evidently emerging, and how Christian thought can be shaped to play a leading part in the reconstruction after the war'."(22) Because of the brevity of the Malvern Conference and the 'heavy-weight' nature of the delegates, Iremonger remarked that "whatever else it was or achieved, it certainly was not a conference."(23) Nevertheless, it gave rise to Christianity and Social Order, which has subsequently been described as "Temple's personal sequel to the Malvern Conference."(24)

Although Christianity and Social Order is composed of only seven brief chapters and an appendix, Bell described it "as one of the most persuasive and lucid statements of the Christian's attitude to the social system,
as Temple viewed it."(25) So then, what principles does Temple enunciate in *Christianity and Social Order*?

The first third of *Christianity and Social Order* is comprised of a defence of the right of the Church to speak to the political situation. "The Church must announce Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with them. It must then pass on to Christian citizens, acting in their civic capacity, the task of reshaping the existing order in closer conformity to the principles."(26) Although I shall explore this position in greater detail when considering "The political practitioner as priest" in my next chapter, it is worth setting out here in brief what Temple meant. Temple believed that the task, indeed duty, of the Church was to state the principles of the Gospel for individuals and communities to live by. However, he also believed that the Church could not state practical policies—only politicians as 'experts' could do that. Temple defended this position by pointing out that "this repudiation of direct political action does not exhaust its political responsibility. It must explicitly call upon its members to exercise their citizenship in a Christian spirit."(27) Indeed, mindful of the charge that the Church is talking but not doing, he affirmed his belief that "By talking we gradually form public opinion, and public opinion, if it is strong enough gets things done."(28) With this justification of the Church's right to speak, Temple then went on to outline two divisions: primary and derivative principles.

For him the two primary principles concern God and the nature of human beings. He believed that God had no need for the world, however "creation is a kind of overflow of divine love"(29) Human beings are created for fellowship with God, but live in a state of corruption, yet "The image of God—the image of holiness and love—is still there, though defaced."(30) This is important to note, for rather than espousing a utopian cause, Temple affirmed that a human "must
be treated as what he actually is, but always with a view to what in God's purposes he is destined to become."(31)

In addition to these two primary principles, Temple also described three derivative principles: freedom, social fellowship, and service. For him, all people are created free. Even if some abused the privilege, nevertheless, freedom ought to be preserved and sought after, indeed he believed that "Freedom is the goal of politics. To establish and secure true freedom is the primary object of all right political action. For it is in and through his freedom that a man makes fully real his personality - the quality of one made in the image of God."(32) Interestingly, though, freedom was only possible if order was present, for Temple believed that without order there could be no freedom (33), indeed the law was created to protect that order, and thus freedom (34). In practice the war was prosecuted for the sake of freedom. Ironically, perhaps, Temple was prepared to concede that individual liberty could be given up for the greater good, when planning reconstruction (35).

The second of Temple's derivative principles was that of fellowship, because God created people "in order that they might be a fellowship of love answering the love which has made them."(36) Furthermore, "for the completeness of personality, there is needed the relationship to both God and neighbours. The richer his personal relationships, the more fully personal he will be."(37) Thus, fellowship and community were the counterpoint to individuality, and yet it was precisely in that fellowship that the individual personality could reach its greatest maturity.

Temple's third 'derivative principle' was that of service. He argued that "the combination of Freedom and Fellowship as principles of social life issues in the obligation of Service."(38) This could be found in voluntary work, or in the attitude to paid work, and indeed, in service to the nation. So then, what was significance of Archbishop
Temple's contribution towards the prosecution of the war and post-war reconstruction?

Undoubtedly Temple's war years did contribute towards thinking about post-war reconstruction for he was, like Bell, prepared even in the early days of the Second World War to reflect on what might happen after it. As I have shown, this can be seen in Temple's interest in federal structures, and indeed, in the conduct of the war itself.

The most striking feature of Temple's thinking, though, is his reflection of contemporary main-stream thought. Again, this may be seen in the early days of the war in toy ing with federal structures, but perhaps more keenly in Christianity and Social Order because here, in his "tract for the times, designed to give Christians the tools and inspiration for the task of post-war reconstruction" (39), he highlighted the principles and issues which so animated British thinking in the second half of the war, such as employment, work and social welfare, and the education system. The contemporary parallels were the Beveridge Report, the Education Act 1944 (in which Temple was very active) and later social security reforms. As with British political thinking perhaps we do see a shift away from concentration on post-war Europe to post-war Britain. However, as I shall show in Chapter 5, the principles that Temple outlined in Christianity and Social Order, in my judgement, still offer an important contribution to our thinking today about the principles that may inform and guide Europe.

As I have also shown, Temple was also concerned with the 'practice' of the war. Here, though, is the most disturbing aspect of his war-time ministry. Temple was happy to state his principles, but one must ask whether he lived up to them. He remained silent on obliteration bombing, and as Suggate has noted, "retributive justice can easily lapse into vengeance", and indeed, retribution is not enough, reformation was also needed for Germany to be rehabilitated.
Perhaps this is evidence of an inability to relate the theory to the awful reality. Comparing Bell with Temple, Rusama noted that Temple "did not take a really significant part in the German Church conflict. On international policy Temple did not have the knowledge Bell had." Consequently, without Bell's personal knowledge, he might have found it easier to be convinced of the official Allied position. Temple was certainly not the prophet Bell was. Thus, his weakness was not so much in the principle but in translating it into practical action — a danger which, as I shall explain in chapter 5, the Churches must avoid today in its relations with Europe.

In spite of Temple's weaknesses, it would, nevertheless be a great mistake to write off his contribution towards British Christian thinking about post-war Britain and post-war Europe. For all his faults Temple was struggling to live out the Christian gospel in the midst of a devastating war which was, as he realised, a fight to keep the possibility of a world based on Christian principles alive.

It was not simply the Church of England which was concerned with the prosecution of the war or what followed it. One of the most striking ecclesiastical features of the early years of the Second World War was the creation of Sword of the Spirit. Inspired by Cardinal Arthur Hinsley's radio broadcast of 10th December 1939, a group of leading Roman Catholic laity urged the Cardinal to follow up his words with the creation of the Sword of the Spirit. Launched on 1st August 1940, in his inaugural address to the Sword of the Spirit Hinsley asserted that, "We are met together to start a movement for a more united and intense effort for a true, just and lasting peace. Our aim is Catholic. We mean by prayer, self-sacrifice and work to do our part in promoting the reconstruction of Europe. We are convinced that a better world can be built only on the foundations of faith, hope and charity." Barbara Ward, honorary secretary of the Sword,
further added in a letter to priests that "The purpose of the organisation is, briefly, to try to bring home to our fellow-Catholics and to as many non-Catholics as we can reach, the important Christian issues at stake in the present war, and also to insist that no post-war settlement or reconstruction, whether social or international can hope to last unless it be founded upon a truly Christian spirit."(43) Wherein lay its significance?

Sword of the Spirit was significant in the early war years for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Hinsley himself pointed out in a letter to fellow bishops, "'After the collapse of France, it seemed urgently necessary to show that we in this country were loyal, in spite of the entry of Italy into the war and in spite of the other 'Catholic' peoples actually or possibly hostile to Britain. I had reason to fear propaganda against British Catholics if steps were not taken to forestall it'."(44) Hitherto, the Roman Catholic Church had been considered suspicious in many British minds. Here, Hinsley was asserting that British Roman Catholics were as loyal as any other British citizen to the British 'cause'.

Secondly, the Sword had as a key aim, post-war reconstruction in Europe. As Bell and Temple illustrated, the Church was not merely concerned with the war, but what came after it in Europe. In a sense, this is particularly true of the Roman Catholic Church, being as it was and is more truly pan-European than the other English denominations. Indeed Cardinal Hinsley hoped that the Sword of the Spirit would explode "outwards from an embattled Britain to refertilise the continent in a spiritual revival."(45) However, as Michael Walsh has noted, "although its members were united in a desire to oppose totalitarianism in any form and to reconstruct Europe along Christian principles, they were far from agreed as to how, in practice, the second of these two aims was to be achieved."(46) In that respect, the Sword was by no means unique!
Equally significant was the Sword's ability (at first) to act as a major catalyst for ecumenical cooperation in the U.K. As Hastings has observed, "in the face of the national emergency the ecumenical fraternity had widened yet further to include the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster." (47) This was most strikingly seen in the Sword of the Spirit sponsored meetings at the Stoll Theatre on 10th/11th May 1941, which were perhaps more truly ecumenical than any experience before: Hinsley in the chair on the 10th, with Bishop Bell the keynote speaker (see p.79); Archibishop Lang in the chair on the Sunday, with the acting moderator of the Free Church Federal Council and Dorothy Sayers amongst others, being key-note speakers. As Hastings has commented, "To have an ecumenical platform of this strength sponsored by an English Catholic organization was something which truly needed to be seen to be believed." (48)

Unfortunately, because of opposition within the Roman Catholic hierarchy to such an ecumenical movement, it soon became necessary for the non-Catholics to leave Sword of the Spirit and create the parallel 'Religion and Life' movement. "The joint Christian meetings were a feature of the war years and, broadly speaking, did not survive the war..." (49) The experience nevertheless showed new ecumenical possibilities for co-operation on issues of common concern. As Thomas Moloney has concluded, "The 'Sword of the Spirit' was born in 1940, and in a sense it finished there, for it was a phenomenon which could flourish only in the extraordinary and unrepeatable atmosphere of that year. As the major interdenominational nucleating force of its generation the 'Sword of the Spirit' must be measured not by its later struggles... but by the very fact that it came to birth. Therein lay Arthur Hinsley's justification, and therein lay the movement's glory." (50) In that sense, as ecumenical catalyst and as an organisation formed to look beyond the war and into the future, the Sword of the Spirit was important for its
One of the Sword of the Spirit's key activists was the educationalist A.C.F. Beales. In 1941 he published *The Catholic Church and International Order* in the Penguin Special series. As with Bell and Temple's books in the series, *The Catholic Church and International Order* reflected from an English Roman Catholic perspective on how international society arrived at its problems in the early 1940s, and how the future might be better shaped.

The tone of his book is clearly set out in his first chapter, for there Beales recognises the prevailing federalist wind of the early 1940's intellectuals. However, he is swift to disagree with their emphasis in finding an appropriate political machine for the prevention of war, arguing that "the religious world has seen a good machine (the League) ruined for a lack of moral spirit among its leaders with which it alone could function truly." Moreover, "without a foundation of elementary principles clearly stated, and accepted by all parties concerned, no machinery or international constitution will be worth the time and labour spent in drafting it."(51) Thus he stakes the claim of his book that "The Catholic theory of international order is not concerned merely with the international convenience and smooth relations and the avoidance of war; but with something fundamental... the 'wholeness' and corporate nature of life itself", which "rests on the solidarity of mankind."(52) So then, how does A.C.F Beales see the international order, and what does he hope for the reconstruction of a post-war Europe?

In the first part of *The Catholic Church and International Order*, Beales describes what he sees as the descent into the problems of the early 1940's. In his view, Christendom had "disintegrated into a set of Sovereign States"(53) which asserted that the State could be ruled without reference to religion; that Man was autonomous, independent of supernatural control or reference, and where
justice was a matter of social agreement; and that this was expressed in the doctrine of economic man, where humans are rationalistic and nationalistic (54). For him, evidence could be found in Fascism, Marxian Communism, Nazism and Neo-Democracy. Consequently, "When modern man abandoned the theology, he abandoned the only criterion that gave his principles any ultimate validity. He has been, ever since, at the mercy of a succession of usurper-Absolutes created by himself."(55) Moreover, whilst the Pope could speak through encyclicals and so on to these particular situations, offering moral guidance to individuals and nations alike, in the end the papacy had to act through the power (and limitations) of diplomacy. Having thus stated the problem, Beales then turned his attention towards exploring Catholic teaching, based on the traditional Thomist view of natural law.

After analysing the ideas of peace and war Beales goes on to examine the nature of society. A key component for any understanding of society was an understanding of society's basic unit - the individual, and in particular, the nature of the 'natural man'. In classical Catholic teaching human nature is common to all. This is reflected in universal human rights: the right to life, freedom, family and property. Nevertheless, Beales points out that individuals do not possess all abilities; individual reason and will is limited. Thus "only a society of persons can make up for this inadequacy of the individual person." Conversely, "extreme individualism is a sin against humanity, for it tends to disintegrate society... In short, the human person is fully human but can realise his humanity only in communion with others."(56) Stated more positively, "Each person is vital to the life of the whole - for each person has a function, a vocation, in relation to the whole community"(57) which can only be realised through the grace of God and the aid of the sacraments (58).

As a consequence of this mutuality of worth
and need comes a mutuality of responsibility. On the one hand the individual has duties to God and one's neighbours in society at large; on the other hand the civil authority has a duty to protect the rights of individuals. Moreover the rights of the State are limited by the rights of persons, family, Church and neighbouring states. In order for this to be achieved, laws must be impartial, and must not be contrary to Natural Law. In a comment reminiscent of Temple (see p.84), Beales concludes that, whilst the Church has no competence in itself to determine which form of government is superior, nevertheless, "any government, if it violates the rights of man and God and the family and society... becomes automatically in need of correction by its people."(59) Again, as I have remarked above, it is questionable as to whether he realised the gravity and responsibility inherent in this claim.

From this smaller unit of a single nation or community, Beales magnifies the teaching, exploring the implications for international society. For international order to be possible, it is important in his judgement for countries to remember both the essential unity of human nature, and at the same time acknowledge the great diversity found within human communities. This fundamental premiss has important consequences for the organisation of international society.

Firstly, it enabled him to distinguish the 'Nation' from the 'State'. According to Beales nationality can be defined as a culturally distinctive community allied to a desire to preserve a common form of government (60), whereas a 'state' may contain more than one 'nation' within its borders (as Switzerland does), or it may provide a home to a national minority. Where the latter is the case, it is incumbent upon the 'state' to preserve the natural rights of minorities within its borders. Beales warns how fragile this relationship may be, for "A nation is a natural form of society; but a State can be something very artificial, held together by nothing stronger than the bonds of temporary interest... and ready to split up
into the national groups that compose it, the moment the bond ceases to hold."(61) As I shall show in chapter 5, it is a warning that the present-day European Union needs to remember as it discusses its future direction.

Secondly, Beales points out that neither nationality or state-sovereignty are absolute, because all people are equal before God. Consequently the notion of racial superiority is an illusion. Because state sovereignty is not absolute, international society must be based on the principles of natural law. Thus, "What has to be found is a body of common obligations, derived from this sociability, that can be agreed on in advance by the co-operating societies of the world, and enforced, from a sure knowledge that the alternative to them is anarchy."(62) Such obligations, which by their very nature must be binding on all members of such an international society, are sincerity, justice (based on the natural rights of humans), and charity. These demand loyalty to the community, for such moral obligations are "derived from natural law, and not from mere convenience"(63). Beales then describes his "Ten Point Framework of International Order" (included in the footnotes to this chapter [64]), which, as can be seen from my first two chapters, have in a large way been incorporated into the development of the EEC and EU.

Having thus described his understanding of Catholic social teaching, Beales sets out the implications of his analysis for the future. His exploration brings him to four conclusions for action. The first is that any future system of international order must not simply repeat the failures of the past, indeed to do that, "will be merely to wreck a second machine and to disillusion still another generation."(65)

Secondly, Beales believes that any future international organisation, however formed, must have a moral structure underpinning it. Thus, Aquinas' assumption that "a sound moral basis as indispensable to the steady working of any form of government, is vital."(66) For a Christian continent,
the only alternative to a secular ethic is the Christian principle, based on Catholic teaching on natural law.

Beales' third conclusion is that, international structures must not simply have underlying principles, but that membership of the 'Club', as he describes it, must be over a high threshold: "The higher the subscription, in terms of moral principles accepted, the better."(67) Although, as he acknowledges, in the short term this may lead to slower growth in the new international order, it should also be deeper. Conversely, "If what is wanted is faithful adherence to standards in international society, the International Community is better without the contamination of the unworthy."(68) Thus, if a nation transgresses the code, the International Community is fully justified in expelling the code-breaker. Nevertheless, in time a transgressor may reapply to join, and such high standards would also attract those who were not members to join. It is interesting to note here that only in passing does Beales see economic factors, such as a customs union or currency stabilisation, as playing a part in this process of integration and stabilisation.

The fourth conclusion is the corollary of the previous two which also restates the sub-theme of Beales' book, that the papacy as the focus of Church has no view per se on the structures of International Society, only the aims and principles underlying that society. Moreover, in the face of moral questions, whilst the Pope can make suggestions on contemporary issues, he must be careful not to make situations worse, citing potential civil war in Germany had the Pope condemned the Nazi regime. Thus, whilst the Church may inform moral principles, and may or may not speak out on international affairs, it is not there to determine the best form of government. So then, what is the contribution of The Catholic Church and International Order to contemporary thinking about the future of Europe?

The Catholic Church and International Order

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is an important book for a number of reasons. Firstly, in adopting a classical Thomist view of society, and reminiscent of Temple's thinking, Beales points out that creating a new society after the war was not simply about having good structures. As he pointed out, the League of Nations seemed like a good structure, yet in fact it was fatally weak. Stressing that for any post-war structure to bring lasting peace, he highlighted the need of a bed-rock of principles to guide it. It is important for Europeans today to ask whether, for a harmonious Europe to exist, a common bed-rock of principles subscribed to by the vast majority of its citizens needs to be found. As Beales reminds us, Europe needs to be founded on more than treaties or economics.

Beales is also significant for his analysis of the nature of nationality and society. He points out that national identity is more than holding a particular state's passport. He further stresses that there needs to be a dynamic relationship between the individual and society, for both are necessary and neither is sovereign. As I shall explore in greater depth in chapter 5, it behoves the citizens and governments of the European Union, to remember the essential wholeness and solidarity of humankind, and its attendant mutuality of responsibility, which characterised Beales' understanding of Thomist Law.

As with the EU of today, Beales was exercised by the threshold at which members could join the new structures. Concluding that a high threshold needed to be adopted for membership, he raises questions about the nature and speed of future EU enlargement. There is surely a case for saying that the higher threshold of membership, the greater the stability within the EU. However, the contemporary situation is very much different to the early 1940's. Today, much of Eastern Europe looks to the EU for stability and economic development and prosperity - precisely the vision which, as I have shown in chapter 1 - led to the creation of the EEC. Therefore the
question needs to be asked, what type of enlargement does Europe need, and what type of enlargement can be sustained? Beales reminds us that a quick form of enlargement is not the only way forward, and indeed such a process does have its dangers too.

The Catholic Church and International Order is also noteworthy for asserting that it is the duty of the state to enshrine and protect the rights of individuals in all legislation. Beales however also points out that fundamental natural rights are balanced by the duties of the individual to the state, and one's fellow citizens. However, a serious question which can be asked of Beales is whether he truly understood the implications of this balance. For example, he was prepared to argue for the primacy of the human conscience, even if that led a person into error (69). Beales also argues that, in the face of war, it is the duty of the citizen to take up arms at the government's request unless they are absolutely sure of the justice of their case, because the statesmen know more of the facts than the individual.

A related weakness is found in Beales' uncritical view of the papacy. As Hastings has rightly said, The Catholic Church and International Order presents "a heavily ultramontane view of the papacy", and, "whilst Beales was very much a Sword of the Spirit man, he was also perhaps too recent a convert not to take Roman claims rather over-seriously."(70) This is evident when Beales' repeatedly supports Pope Pius XII limited pronouncements concerning fascist and Nazi aggression (71). He further supported the Pope's refusal to call German catholics to lay down their arms, because the consequences of that might be greater than the evil that was being perpetrated. With the help of hindsight, this seems incredible. The serious criticism is that whilst he proclaimed the virtues of the doctrine of Natural Law, propounding the balance between the rights of the individual and the call of the state, Beales did not seem to have the ability to relate that to the grave
situation of the war. At times he was blatantly inconsistent.

In spite of its weaknesses The Catholic Church and International Order, is a very valuable book, not least because here is a Roman Catholic thinking seriously about the future from a Catholic perspective, and raising important practical and theological questions that are still relevant today. If Sword of the Spirit was a sign that the Catholic Church had taken its full place in British Society, then The Catholic Church and International Order is a lively symbol of that new reality in British life.

As I have shown, then, the first few years of the Second World War were an extremely fertile period for Christian theological reflection, both on the problems that had led to the war, and possible ways in which Europe - not just Britain - could develop after the war was won and over. In the thinking of Bell, Temple, Beales and the Sword of the Spirit movement, many of the issues that face the European Union today were raised and explored: federal union and national sovereignty, justice and freedom, mutuality of worth and responsibility, ecumenism at a personal and institutional level, practical and theoretical Christian principles to underpin post-war structures, the threshold at which countries may join the structures, the place of the prophetic within the Church balanced by the belief that the Church has no authority to dictate the type of government structures. In many ways the agenda is set there. So how did the Churches follow this after the war years?

Undoubtedly as World War II progressed towards its conclusion, the emphasis of the English Churches changed as did that of the British Government. As I have shown in chapter 1, British intellectual vigour went very much into the reform of the domestic education and welfare systems - both of which Temple had keenly supported. Institutionally,
ecumenical relations had been formalised, with the creation of the British Council of Churches in 1942. As I shall now show, once the problems caused by the war had been responded to, the Church's keen interest in the future reconstruction of Europe appears to have diminished. The end of the war, did, however, bring much need in its wake.

One organisation which sprang up in the wake of the war was the inter-Church Agency for the Intellectual Relief in Germany which was committed to providing books and magazines in order to help in "the elimination of prejudices, misunderstandings and ignorance". This would, they hoped, contribute to the reintegration of Germany into post-war European society.

In addition to this, "Save Europe Now" was formed of which Bishop Bell was a sponsor. Ultimately the campaign led to the formation of Christian Action. At the "Save Europe Now" meeting in the Conway Hall in October 1945, resolutions were passed noting that, "In view of the crucial importance of the Ruhr coal mines for the economy of the whole of Western Europe" the means of international co-operation and the increase of production should be fostered from which "the allotment of a proportion from the output of German household needs" should be made. Moreover, resolution 6 called for governments "To press forward with the establishment of a Supreme Economic Council for the co-ordination of the assistance to be given to and by the different countries concerned, and for the longer-term reconstruction of all needy and devastated areas." Thus, as with secular European politics (see chapter 1), the impulse for economic co-operation came from the pressing need for economic survival, reconstruction and stability.

It is further interesting to note that the reconstruction of Europe began to slip from Sword of the Spirit's agenda, despite the fact that its core aim at its inception was the reconstruction of Europe based on Christian
principles (74). Following on from the death of Cardinal Hinsley in 1943, Hastings has wittily noted that "the Sword would shrink till it became little more than a penknife."(75) Indeed, in the late 1940s, Sword of the Spirit had to battle not to be closed down. However, Hastings goes on to note that although the Sword "had struggled on none too effectively through the forties and fifties... as the fifties turned into the sixties, it too came back to life."(76) Indeed, the 1960's marked a period of renewed Church interest in the future direction of Europe. It should, of course be remembered that the 1960's also mark the British government's abortive attempts to join the EEC.

In 1967 a British Council of Churches report noted "the almost complete silence of the British Churches during the past twenty years concerning European unity..."(77) The most significant contribution during the "silent period" was, undoubtedly the English Roman Catholic Church's emerging pro-European stance at the beginning of the 1960's.

One of the church instruments which supported the development of the EEC was the Roman Catholic newspaper, The Tablet. Although somewhat uncritical of the EEC - which perhaps reflects the EEC's halcyon days in the early 1960's - it was, nevertheless clear on what it saw as its benefits and its implications. Economically, The Tablet recognised that industry was in the process of globalisation. Although it set back Socialist hopes of state-owned industry, it believed that "This is the price to be paid for the very real advantages of making Western Europe richer."(78) It also recognised that British industry was already looking to the markets of the EEC, commenting that "while the government is still looking for ways in, private firms are going in."(79) Politically, The Tablet also supported the Treaty of Rome's aim of eventual political union between the
member states. It believed that "The men whom made the Rome treaties saw very clearly not only that a customs union can produce political union... but that political unity is the only guarantee that a customs union will endure."(80) In that same article the writer further believed that political union would be the only antidote to national self-interest undermining European progress.

The Tablet's main interest, however, was in exploring Britain's position in relation to membership of the EEC. One political reality that Britain needed to learn was Britain's post-imperial role in the world. In particular, The Tablet criticised the belief that the UK could provide a link between America, Europe and the British Commonwealth: "On the contrary... only if Britain is part of the second unity will she be at the centre of the political and economic developments of the Atlantic Community."(81) Thus, The Tablet believed that Britain as an integral part of the EEC would be the best way of preserving Britain's stature in the new post-imperial world.

Equally noteworthy was The Tablet's persistent criticism of the British Government's position at the beginning of the 1960's. It criticised the false perceptions of the EEC, as it saw it, pointing out that "The united Europe which is being wanted for today is not the succession of Philip II, Louis XIV, or Napoleon, carries no sort of threat to Britain... It is therefore the kind of unification we should support and not thwart from any ignoble feeling that it will displace London, and that Paris or Brussels will become the counterpart of Washington and Moscow."(82) Part of Britain's myopic view of the EEC was, in The Tablet's view, because Britain was determined "not to get closely associated with anything we could not be sure of controlling, a determination for long nourished by the thought that it was very improbable that West European Governments would ever agree on anything, least of all the French and the German."(83)
Whilst criticizing Britain's national 'psyche', The Tablet also asserted that it was pleased that the British Government had not been present at the Messina negotiations which led to the treaties of Rome, lest it had wrecked the treaties which had been made on "what are proving very sound lines." Going further, the same article believed that "there should be some further growth [i.e. within the EEC] before our relationship is negotiated."(84)

When Britain did apply to join the EEC, although The Tablet judged that any failure in the negotiations would have a serious effect, it saw a far graver problem arising if Britain subsequently joined the EEC on "false pretences", establishing "ourselves while there still has to be a unanimity in the political decisions, and then set out to thwart every step towards the final political goal."(85) Moreover, the article warns that Britain must take seriously the claims of the 'political clauses' of the Treaty of Rome. Under no circumstances must Britain enter and then destroy the EEC from within, because there was the danger that, once in, "we should be immediately under an immense temptation to resume our old ways... to hold up every step that could really lead to a united Europe. Now that the vision has begun to take clear shape, we should not be forgiven if we brought it to nought."

In short, Britain should only enter the EEC if it was deeply committed to it and to European unity. If that was not the case, it was far better for Europe that Britain should remain outside the Community.

In fact The Tablet could hardly have had a stronger message! Within those six or seven articles in the early 1960's, The Tablet clearly and concisely addressed the British view of its place in the world, the direction and implications of the EEC, and also the need (as it saw it) for Britain to be either deeply committed to membership or to desist from joining. It will be obvious that the issues which The Tablet raised in the 1960's have in many ways, as I have
shown in chapter 2, not yet been fully worked out. It would be easy to transpose the articles from the early 1960's to the late 1990's. Much of the substance of the articles remains pertinent.

What is most significant, though, is that The Tablet's view on Europe was ahead of its time. When Britain was largely opposed to membership of the EEC - remember Gaitskell's "Thousand years of history speech" had still to be made - here was a highly respected British Church newspaper advocating the cause of the European Economic Community, and the change in attitude which Britain needed to be an effective part of it. It was very much ahead of its time. However, it was not entirely alone in exploring the question of Europe.

At the beginning of the 1960's the Sword of the Spirit began examining the theme of Britain and the Common Market. The executive committee of Sword of the Spirit met on 9th February 1961 and agreed to the setting up of a committee of European experts. In 1961 the Sword also arranged a series of lectures on the whole issue. Unfortunately, there are now no extant detailed records of the programme in the archive material of the Sword of the Spirit, however, the Sword's historian, Michael Walsh, noted that the programme "was one of the most successful it ever undertook."(86) It was not, however, to be sustained in the long-term as the emphasis of the Sword was shifting towards issues relating to the developing world. This was confirmed by the decision of April 1965 to transform the Sword of the Spirit into the Catholic Institute for International Relations. There its main focus was the developing world, and Europe only in so much as its policies impacts upon the developing world.

So then, two important contributions from the British Roman Catholic Church towards thinking about the future direction of Europe: The Tablet looking at general political implications of British membership; and Sword of the Spirit (and subsequently the Catholic Institute for
International Relations) raising the issues surrounding Europe's wider responsibility to the developing world. Both were much in advance of the other main British denominations.

In 1967, however, an important report was presented to the British Council of Churches, Christians and the Common Market. Described as "pioneering" by David Edwards (87), it aimed to remind Christian people that the European question was also a moral question.

Christians and the Common Market commences by suggesting five reasons why Christians should be interested in Europe: the Church was part of society; Europe had a rich Christian heritage; Christianity had, conversely, been responsible for much division in Europe; the EEC affected British citizens whether Britain was in the EEC or not; and, indeed, many areas of the Church's mission found resonance in the EEC, such as reconciliation, the best use of resources, and the campaign for third world development. Interestingly, the report is also aware that the bringing down of secular barriers in Europe might also have a similar effect for the Church as well. Having thus stated why it believes Christians should be interested in Europe, the report then turns to examine the kind of European Community the Churches should be working towards.

At the centre of the report's world view is the belief in the essential unity of humankind. Christians, consequently are called to shape developments which may help the furtherance of this belief. Christians, it argues, should be looking to the EEC to take its responsibilities towards the third world seriously. Christians should also be looking to further reconciliation within Europe, and encouraging the codification and enforcement of human rights as contained within the European Convention on Human Rights. The Community must always be an open one, and it should be strongly democratic. Essentially, "What is sought is a flexible system which can enable the member states to deal on a Community basis with problems that can no longer adequately be planned for
nationally. Within these present spheres, it should be recognised... that the exercise of sovereignty is henceforth a sovereignty between the European institutions in Brussels and the national institutions of Member States."(88) If, therefore, the Community experience was a good one, it could provide a 'community model' for the countries emerging from colonial rule to learn from. The report then goes on to identify three core aims of Europe as it sees it: the prevention of war; the expansion of technology and industry; and Europe's wider role in the world. Then Christians and the Common Market identifies three parallel Christian concepts to consider in relation to the aims: reconciliation, stewardship and service. How then can the Community contribute in these ways?

In order to prevent war, the quest for reconciliation needs to be present within the EEC. This process of reconciliation, in the Report's judgement, is focused in the Community institutions: the Commission, Parliament and Courts. Reconciliation between individuals may also be fostered as the freer movement of EC nationals became possible. Equally, though, the EEC could also function as a reconciler between member and non-member European states.

Christians and the Common Market also stresses the importance of good stewardship, recognising that "the Christian concept of stewardship poses questions about the social responsibility of the vast European companies the EEC favours, about the conditions of production, about the nature and distribution of the wealth produced, and above all how it is used to alleviate world poverty."(89) However, although the report recognises the advantages of large-scale industry, not least the Common Agricultural Programme, the report also notes that many areas were not covered by the original treaties, such as transport, energy, and even most areas of social policy. Further, the report also believes that the regional policy was underfunded. If good stewardship of resources was to be a reality, these areas needed addressing.
Allied to the concept of stewardship in the report's eyes was that of service. Although it acknowledges the importance of aid to developing countries given by EEC states, it asserts its belief that "trade is where the self-respect of developing countries demands that special emphasis be placed." (90) The report believed that a collective European policy on both aid and trade was needed, for it regretted that "a 'Europe united in order to serve' remains an idea far ahead of the reality." (91) The report then asks what contribution Britain could make to the EEC.

The most striking assertion of the whole report (considering the time in which it was written), was the belief that "Britain's potential contribution to the European Community is not that we are essentially different but that we have a relevant similarity. Put bluntly, Britain represents 55 million more Europeans." (92) Although Christians and the Common Market is keen that talk of British leadership of the EEC should cease, it does believe that Britain could make a positive contribution to the Community, such as bringing its world-wide links, its financial system based in the City, its democratic credentials, and its more liberal attitude to trading with developing countries. Negatively, it was aware that Britain would bring a reputation of hostility to supranationalism. It also had a slower economic growth rate than the EEC, and it had a 'superiority complex'. If the UK was to enter the EEC then it would bring that mixed baggage with it. That would have implications for Europe as a whole.

The report hoped that British membership would make a positive contribution to reconciliation in Europe, both facing up to latent British anti-German feeling, and also providing a power balance to the Franco-German alliance, which may, in turn help the smaller member-states' own process of reconciliation within Europe. British research and development, especially in science-based industries, could help to further a common stewardship of resources. Equally, British liberal trade
policy could liberalize Europe's own, whereas Europe's greater liberality of aid might encourage the UK government to greater generosity. Equally, it was hoped that British membership of the EEC would help to revitalise British industry and the economy in general. Whatever happened, the report was convinced that "The most important result of British membership would be its effects on the nature of the European Economic Community."(93) What, though, did this mean?

In acknowledging the possibility of British membership of the EEC, the report recognised that Britain's relationship with the EEC was always likely to be somewhat ambiguous and awkward, suggesting that "it is unlikely ever to be 'European' other than as a power with world-wide interests, a commitment to countries of the Commonwealth... and a close bond with North America."(94) Certainly there has been little in the intervening 30 years to disabuse us of the substance of that comment.

Finally, the report concludes with the belief that Britain was, ultimately, on the road to membership. There was no viable alternative in the long term for, although it is "invaluable for dialogue across the North-South divide, the Commonwealth does not offer an alternative economic and political partner." Equally it recognised that close cooperation with the United States was not viable either, describing the Atlantic Free Trade area as "a phrase for the 51st State option without voting rights. Only in Europe is there the combination of political, economic, cultural, and historic relationships that makes equal British membership of a Community conceivable."(95)

Whatever might happen regarding Britain's membership of the EEC - and in 1967 the outcome was by no means certain - Christians and the Common Market reminded the Churches that "It is more important that European power should not become an end in itself. It is a new 'method' of conducting affairs between states, not as a re-assertion of European
Power, that the European Community is of most value to the world." (96)

At its meeting on 25th and 26th October 1967, the British Council of Churches adopted the following resolution:

"The Council considers that British membership of a Community which (based as it is on a common understanding of human rights and liberties) counts among its aims the reconciliation of European enmities, the responsible stewardship of European resources, and the enrichment of Europe's contribution to the rest of mankind, is to be welcomed as an opportunity for Christians to work for the achievement of these ends". (97)

So then, was David Edwards justified in describing the report as "pioneering"? He was correct in his judgement, because, irrespective of what it actually said, it was the first time that an ecumenical report had been produced evaluating Britain's relationship with Europe. Hitherto individual thinkers and various denominational movements had made their contributions. This, however, was different, for Christians and the Common Market was an interdenominational committee wrestling together with a key political question of the age. Although the Roman Catholic Church was not a member of the British Council of Churches - and that is inevitably a weakness of the report - as will have been seen, many of the issues wrestled with in the report are those which were seen in the series of article in The Tablet in the early 1960's. It is the ecumenical nature of the report which is truly pioneering.

Christians and the Common Market is also important for its content too. Far from presenting a falsely utopian vision, the report is realistic in its political analysis, even if that reality might be unpalatable for some to accept. For example, it recognised that Britain was a European country, irrespective of membership of the EEC. It also acknowledged that even if Britain entered the European Community it would be an awkward member. Both of these views were based on an honest assessment of Britain's position in the
world by the middle 1960's. Ultimately Britain's future was within Europe; the Commonwealth and the United States could not make up for that fact.

The report was also useful for reminding the Churches of what may only have been implicit: that membership of a community would require both give and take. Britain, in its judgement, had a positive contribution to make to Europe if it chose to. Similarly, it also had much to learn from other European countries. Therefore, any notions of 'British leadership' should be displaced. If Britain was to become a member of the EEC, then it must be on the basis of equality and not of superiority.

One of the key features of the report is its repeated reminders that the EEC must not be an end in itself. Europe as a powerful trading block composed of many old colonial powers had a major responsibility towards the developing nations, and that was not simply in granting aid, but in opening up trade to the developing countries. It is indeed interesting to note that the language the report uses throughout is very redolent of William Temple, using key concepts such as reconciliation, stewardship and service to define in theological terms the function the Churches believed that the Community must live out.

Despite its significance the passage of time has also shown up some of the report's weaknesses. It was somewhat naive in its praise of the Common Agricultural Programme. It was also incorrect in its assessment of the democratic impulse it believed British membership would bring to the EEC for, as I have shown in chapter 2, the British Government has repeatedly balked at any increase in powers for the Community or Union. It must be remembered, however, that the report was written at the apogee of the Community. The events of history that were to scar the Community in the 1970's had not happened. The EEC looked like an unmitigated success.

In short then, the report was a pioneer. It
was realistic when examining an issue that raises strong emotions. In that way it was not only ecumenically pioneering but intellectually a pioneer too: it was very much ahead of its time, and ahead of public thinking. Despite the ecclesiastical traumas of the 1960's, the Church was still, in some way, keen to think about the outside world critically and theologically.

To conclude then, in this chapter concerned with British Christian thinking on Europe from 1939-1972, we have seen in the early 1940's a keen interest in how post-war Europe should be reconstructed. This was followed by nearly 15 years of silence, before renewed Christian thinking in the 1960's.

As I have shown, although their backgrounds were different, the thinking of Bell, Temple, Beales and Sword of the Spirit do have a good deal of common ground: the belief that whilst it is not the Church's function to describe the type of post-war government machinery, the Church as Church has the right to speak out in matters of national and international importance. Equally, there was the common belief that any structures that arose from the ashes of war must be grounded on Christian principles for them to last.

Theologically, each war-time writer in varying degrees accepted the basic belief in the fundamental unity of humankind that was particularly influenced by the doctrine of natural law. This belief was also explored in the 1967 British Council of Churches' report. As a consequence of this thinking, there was an awareness that it was essential for Germany to be rehabilitated into international society as soon as practicable.

Ecclesiastically, it should be further remembered that, during the early war years in particular, both the writers I have examined, and Sword of the Spirit, were particularly noted for their strong ecumenical spirit. This
undoubtedly coloured their thinking profoundly. Ironically, however, it should be noted that none of the writings, not even the Sword of the Spirit, represented the Church as institutions. The books and movements I have explored are not official church reports, but the work of committed individuals and groups. Even at the end of our period only the 1967 British Council of Churches' report, Christians and the Common Market, addressed Europe as an issue in a major way for the English Churches (99).

I have also shown in this chapter that the times at which thinking on Europe was both active and inactive were very similar to secular British politics as well, as seen in chapter 1. There was a great deal of activity at the beginning of the war as Christians wrestled with an uncertain future. As the war progressed, as in secular politics, interest turned to rebuilding British society, and, in as much as Europe was considered, it was considered in relation to the alleviation of the suffering of the post-war years. Only in the 1960's, when Britain was applying to join the EEC did the Churches begin to take European institutionalism as embodied by the EEC seriously. When the Churches did, however, begin to take the EEC seriously, then, as I have shown, they asked penetrating questions about the EEC, about Britain's relationship to it, and the issues they raised.

As I have shown from the articles in The Tablet and Christians and the Common Market, there was a good deal of common Christian recognition of the issues that the EEC raised, such as sovereignty, community, and responsibility to the developing world. Equally these publications were far more prepared to accept 'Europeanism' than secular British society at the time, and also, it has to be said, more realistic and honest about Britain's place in the world. Was this because the Church as a world-wide phenomena and organisation could see beyond national territorial boundaries? To some extent I think it was. The Second Vatican Council had opened up the Roman
Catholic Church and reminded the world that it was a world Church. The demise of the colonial powers also reminded the European countries of their responsibilities to their former colonies, and perhaps both streams deeply affected the Church in the 1960's.

In my next chapter, however, as we shall see, the whole question of Europe seemed to go into the background of the English Churches' thinking during much of the 1970's and 1980's. It is only towards the end of the 1980's, when Europe became an explosive issue in British politics once more, after the signing of the Single European Act, Mrs Thatcher's provocative 'Bruges speech', and the collapse of the Communist bloc in the east that the Churches in Britain begin to examine Europe again. However, as we shall also see, unlike in this chapter's period of 1939-1972, in the main it is the Churches as denominational institutions, rather than individual Christian thinkers, that are beginning to explore Europe as a political and theological issue again.

NOTES

(1) It is worth remembering, as a recent URC report notes, that the description of "'Free Church' tends on the continent to convey something nearer to a sect, community church or gospel hall than [a] mainstream historic denomination..." Quotation from United Reformed Church - A European Church, p.4.
(2) G.K.A. Bell, Christianity and World Order, p.25.
(3) The Times, 13th September 1939.
(4) Bell, p.92.
(5) P. Walker, Rediscovering the Middle Way, p.11.
(6) Bell, p.97.
(7) Bell, pp. 98-100
(10) Bell, p.102.
(14) The Times, 3rd October 1939.
(15) The Times, 14th November 1939.
(16) The Times, 6th February 1940.
(17) The Times, 8th July 1942.
(19) The Times, 21st December 1940.
(20) The Times, 21st September 1939.
(21) The Times, 3rd October 1939.
(23) Iremonger, p.430.
(24) Suggate, p.68.
(25) Bell's 'Memoir' in A.E. Baker (ed), William Temple and his Message, p.34.
(26) William Temple, Christianity and Social Order, p.58.
(27) The Times, 28th September 1942.
(28) W. Temple, Christianity and Social Order, p.114.
(29) Temple's opening speech to the Malvern Conference, quoted in The Times, 8th January 1941.
(30) Temple, Christianity and Social Order, p.62.
(31) Temple, p.65.
(32) Temple p.67.
(33) See Temple, p. 83
(34) Temple, p.68.
(35) The Times, 27th May 1940.
(36) Temple, Christianity and Social Order, p.37
(37) Temple, p.71.
(38) Temple, p.73.
(39) Suggate, p.126.
(40) Suggate, pp. 193-194.
(41) Rusama, p.82.
(42) Quoted in Michael Walsh, From Sword to Ploughshares - Sword of the Spirit to Catholic Institute for International Relations: 1940-1980, p.6.
(43) Westminster Diocesan Archives: Sword of the Spirit Papers, Letter to priests, 20th August 1940:
(45) Moloney p.195.
(46) Walsh, p.13
(48) Hastings, p.394.
(49) The Sword, 140, September 1950, Volume 1.11, p.37.
(50) Moloney, p.204.
(51) A.C.F. Beales, The Catholic Church and International Order, p.18.
(52) Beales, p.20.
(53) Beales, p.35.
Beales' Ten Point Framework of International Order' (pages 172-173) are:

"(1) The moral force of right should replace the material force of arms.
(2) The life and liberties of each nation must be respected.
(3) Obligatory arbitration of all international disputes that are covered by International Law.
(4) Obligatory settlement, by process of conciliation of all international disputes that are not so covered.
(5) International sanctions to compel recourse to arbitration or conciliation.
(6) The reduction of national armaments to the minimum level compatible with international order.
(7) The greatest possible degree of freedom of trade.
(8) Scrupulous regard for the rights of religious and national minorities.
(9) Freedom of the seas for all except international outlaws.
(10) A recognised procedure whereby treaties and contracts may be revised when their continued validity can no longer be morally defended."

Beales, p.177
Beales, p.179
Beales, p.180
Beales, p.181
Beales, pp.187-188
Hastings, p.282
Hastings, p.92. For a critical assessment of Pius XII's war-time pontificate, see Hastings, pp.367-370
Westminster Diocesan Archives, Griffin Papers: GRI/27a
Westminster Diocesan Archives, Griffin Papers: "Save Europe Now", GRI/27b
Walsh, p.6
Hastings, p.396
Hastings, p.572
The Tablet, 19th November 1960.
The Tablet, 11th March 1961.
The Tablet, 27th May 1961.
ibid.
(86) Walsh, p.19
(87) David L. Edwards, Christians in a New Europe, p.24
(90) BCC Report (1967), p.66
(91) BCC Report (1967), p.72
(92) BCC Report (1967), p.77
(94) ibid.
(96) BCC Report (1967), p.102
(97) The resolution is quoted on BCC Report (1967), p.5
(98) cf. The Church of Scotland's General Assembly resolutions of 1951 and 1953.
Adrian Hastings, when considering the English Churches' contribution to theology and society in the 1970's and early 1980's confidently concludes that "there was probably more mature Christian outspokenness in the field of social affairs in these years than in any era since that of Temple and Bell."(1) Whilst that may be the case for the Churches' response to domestic social and political issues, it is certainly not the case when it comes to the Church's thinking about Europe. As I illustrated in chapter 3, the 1967 British Council of Churches' report, Christians and the Common Market, noted the almost total silence of the Church concerning Europe in the 1950's and 1960's (see p.99). It is a criticism which could be applied to the British Churches for most of the 1970's and 1980's with ample justification for, as I shall show, although there was some interest in the 1975 referendum on British membership of the European Community, it was not until the late 1980's and early 1990's that the major English denominations began to take Europe seriously as an important issue again. Why should this be so?

It seems to me that there were three key events towards the end of the 1980's which must be remembered in order to understand the renewed interest in Europe. Firstly, Margaret Thatcher delivered her 'Bruges speech' in 1988 which ignited the domestic political debate about Europe. Although, as I have shown in chapter 2, British membership of the EC had always been controversial the 'Bruges speech' made it politically explosive. Could the Churches seriously remain silent about Europe?

The second impulse was the swingeing political changes taking place in central and Eastern Europe: the end of the 'Cold War' and the democratization of post-Soviet dominated countries. Although former Lutheran Bishop
Károly Tóth correctly writes that "the way to its [ie. the Soviet bloc's] demolition was Gorbachev's policy of perestroika which gave up its claim to hegemony in Central-Eastern Europe"(2), it is also certainly true that "Individual Christians and churches played a notable part in the peaceful revolution of 1989-91."(3) After all, who could forget the silent candle-lit vigils of Leipzig's Christians? In Central and Eastern Europe, it seemed that the Church was a dynamic force for peaceful change. How could the British Churches ignore their sisters and brothers in half of the European continent?

The third impulse was that created by the calling of the first European Ecumenical Assembly in Basel in May 1989 which was jointly sponsored by the Orthodox, Protestant and Anglican founded Conference of European Churches and the Roman Catholic Council of European Bishops' Conference. Although the conference did not produce an ecumenical blue-print for Europe's future, it affirmed the European Churches' quest for justice, peace and the integrity of creation. No less significant was the fact of its meeting. Here, after all, was a conference which served to highlight the common European Christian identity once more.

I am sure that these three major events of 1988-1989 served to re-awaken British ecclesiastical interest in Europe. However, as I shall also show, in the main, the Churches have been playing 'catch-up': trying to describe what Europe as a political reality is. Only more recently have the English Churches begun to engage theologically in reflecting upon the key issues that surround the European Union. What have the English Churches contributed to thinking about Europe, since the UK joined the European Community in 1973?

As I have shown in chapter 3, one of the main supporters of the ideal of the European Community was the Roman Catholic newspaper, The Tablet. In the 1960's it had encouraged British membership of the EEC on the condition that
it adhered to the Community's ideals. It was, moreover, prepared to criticise the British government's vacillation over membership. In the mid-1970's, with British membership of the EEC now secured, if anything The Tablet became even more strident in its comments. This is seen no more clearly than at the time of the 1975 referendum campaign.

Whilst remaining acutely critical of the referendum, and castigating Harold Wilson's "demagogic opportunism" (4) for calling it (although as I have shown in chapter 2, with the benefit of hind-sight it seems that Wilson's referendum campaign may well have been the only way of keeping Britain in the EC), The Tablet did, nevertheless address many of the campaign issues.

One of the issues that it returned to several times during the referendum campaign was the question of national sovereignty. It has, of course, been argued that membership of the EC had reduced Britain's national and parliamentary sovereignty. However, a major article in February 1975, "The myth of national sovereignty"(5) rejects that thesis, believing instead that it had been a free act of sovereign will to enter the EC, and that Britain still used its sovereign powers in the decision-making processes of the EC. Moreover, Britain could exercise its sovereign will and leave the EC if it so chose. The Tablet then went on to reject the argument that membership of the EC had reduced Parliament's right to scrutinise European legislation, blaming instead Party managers who didn't make enough time at Westminster available to scrutinise European legislation. In a subsequent article, Vincent O'Donovan pointed out that the sovereignty of the European Community is limited to the areas granted to it by the Community Treaties, and where powers have been granted to the EC, they are still subject to the rule of law as embodied in the European Court of Justice (6).

In a very thoughtful article, produced in The Tablet on 31st May 1975 on the eve of the referendum,
Barbara Ward (who had been instrumental in the creation of Sword of the Spirit in 1940) wrote of the moral necessity of the European Community, and of Britain's place in it. Describing Europe as being a post-sovereign community, she believed that "Only in Europe can the values of the nation - variety, culture, tradition, loyalty - be transcended in 'a wider community' which is not blasphemously sovereign in the old sense but post-sovereign in being open, sharing and supportive, a symbol not of hate but of love... And if it is indeed the vocation of what was once called Christendom to carry forward this reconciliation to a wholly new kind of sharing and living in community, how can the Christians of Europe bear to be left out?"

For Ward, there were other moral imperatives which necessitated Britain's remaining in the European Community. Firstly, there was the need to care for the physical environment, and that needed to be Europe-wide. Environmental damage was not just limited to a single state. Secondly, she believed that Europe offered a greater hope of achieving justice for the developing countries of the world. "This is why" she argues, "every Commonwealth country urges us to remain in Europe".

As I noted in chapter 2, the similarity between the referendum debate of 1975 and the British political debate about Europe today is striking. It seems to me that these few articles in The Tablet not only address a central question raised today, namely national sovereignty, but they also point us towards a renewed understanding of what to be in community means. Although I shall explore the concept of community in greater detail in my next chapter, it is worth remembering again that the articles stated categorically that being Christian has wider implications than just being British. Perhaps it is the Church as Church, which can see beyond what Ward called the "collective egoism" of the nation state. Here, once more, British Christians were wrestling with a key
political issue of the day. But as we shall see, for the following 14 years, the Churches largely returned to their slumber over Europe. Only in the late 1980's did they awaken again.

In the wake of the dramatic ecclesiastical and political events that occurred in Europe in the late 1980's (see above) David Edwards published *Christians in a New Europe*. Although it neither offers a systematic history of European political developments, nor a systematic account of the Church's contribution to Europe, Edwards nevertheless attempts to grapple with both secular and Church history in a positive, yet critical way, believing that "new objectives for society need clarification and agreement."(7)

Despite its flaws, Edwards argues that Christians should welcome the European Community as a community of peace and freedom, which has its power dispersed, is in practice a Community of Communities, and also reflects the world in which it lives. Thus the Community is sufficiently large in a world that demands efficiency, yet which equally sets common standards both for goods and services, and which works towards the cohesion of all the people of the EC through assisting less developed parts of the Community. He also believes that the Community should be applauded for the work it has done in fostering aid and trade agreements with former colonies through the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions. Moreover, despite its obvious defects, Edwards gives a qualified endorsement of the Common Agricultural Policy.

Having thus welcomed the European Community, Edwards then goes on to set this within the wider context of European history. Noting that whilst the 'New Europe' is no longer a monolithic Christian continent as perhaps it once was, he believed that Christians had still profoundly influenced Europe's developments - a line which he believes has continued with the development of the European
Communities under the inspiration of such eminent Christian politicians as Schummann, de Gasperi, and Adenauer.

In spite of the positive Christian contributions to Europe's development, Edwards also outlined the movements that have challenged Christianity and Europe as a whole, such as the rise of scepticism, consumerism and Communism, and also the Church's own guilt for often supporting European colonialism. As a consequence, he felt that Europe's guilt had left it too acquiescent today in the face of social injustice; too patriotic in the face of war; arrogantly dogmatic in the face of scepticism; frightened of Communism; and too often indulgent in the face of consumerism (8). Consequently, Edwards argues in the second half of his book that in order for Europe to develop in the future it must address its colonial past.

Edwards argues for a sober judgement of the costs and benefits of colonialism. Despite the terrible things done in the name of European countries and, indeed, in the name of Christianity, he believes that with colonialism, economic expansion (for Europe) had taken place, which had ultimately brought benefits to the whole world. Thus he asks, "Could such a world afford a poor Europe?"(9). Edwards further notes that the values which had led to the emancipation of colonial nations were 'European' in origin. Today, Edwards also notes, Europe provides a home, through immigration, for many from the two-thirds world. "For today's Europeans that means repentance, but not a complete condemnation of all that Europe has done."(10) Can it be said that present day economic and immigrations policies are sufficient recompense for colonial rule? Is that repentance or conscience salving?

Edwards then sets out key issues which he believes will face the European Community in the future. He also observes that the powers of the EC need to be more efficient and more democratically controlled. He also wonders whether the work of the Council of Europe could effectively be
subsumed into the work of the European Community, in order to make a 'Second Tier' Europe in which non-EU countries might benefit from the fruits of economic prosperity even before they were able to become full members. Socially, Edwards believes that the Market must not be allowed to dominate Europe entirely, and that the question must be faced of how to safeguard freedom and diversity in Europe. The European Community, he argues, needs to make social cohesion a reality and not leave it merely as a hope. Further, the EC needs to emphasise its role as a Community of communities "deliberately encouraging the diversity that still makes sense economically."(11) Thus it needs to develop into being a Civil Society for the people and not just the Markets, and to this end Edwards supports town-twinning within Europe as an aid to achieving this aspiration. Europe, though, also has a wider responsibility: to the environment; to the poorer regions of the EC; to Eastern Europe, and to the Two-Thirds World. Edwards, however, does not stop by simply asking questions about the future of the European Community. He goes on to examine what the future of the Churches may be in the 'New Europe', and what they have to offer.

Rejecting any outdated 'colonial attitudes' of European Christians Edwards believes that "European Christianity could become more attractive if its humbler attitudes could become more mature and stable; if its own spiritual life could be so enriched that it is perceived chiefly as a religion, not as an ideology of imperial Europe."(12) Indeed, in his judgement, "The best route to this spiritual wealth is the road which European Christians can take together, the road which is called ecumenical."(13) In theological terms, this is best encapsulated in the word *koinonia* - deep and genuine communion between the Churches. Acknowledging that many of Europe's religious problems arising from the reformation have scarred Christianity throughout the world, Edwards also notes that the ecumenical movement sprang
to life from initiatives in Europe - not least from the crucible of war - so much so that "without achieving, or really wanting, uniformity under a single authority, the EC and the Church have this in common: both seek the growing wealth and union that have come through exchange."(14) Such a deep unity of koinonia ought, believes Edwards, to be an inspiration for the world. But if that is to be more than a lofty hope the Churches must take action. "As Christianity enters its third millenium in Europe... Christians are needed to help the new Europe come to birth. But they cannot give the necessary help unless they are prepared to 'come over' in spirit, to move courageously from some of their present or recent positions."(15) This means, therefore, that the Churches must not only come to terms with the 'New Europe', but more radically still, "as a new Europe is born, European Christianity must be reborn."(16) So what contribution to Christian thinking about Europe does Christians in a New Europe make?

Although at times Edwards' historical surveys are disjointed - separate historical reflections depending on the subject can be found in chapters 3, 5 and 6(!) - Christians in a New Europe is useful for setting the developments of the European Community and of the Churches in a wider historical context. Equally, he is honest in showing that Europe's (and the Church's) achievements were not universally praiseworthy.

One of the major emphases of the book is the responsibility that the EC has to the Two-Thirds World, both in terms of aid and trade, and in this way is very reminiscent of the articles of the 1960's and 1970's in The Tablet. But Edwards' book is also interesting for suggesting that a wealthy Europe also benefits the rest of the world. Indeed he asks, "Could such a world afford a poor Europe?"(17) Thus, by implication, Edwards seems to be pointing towards the need for examining the possibility of a theology of wealth as
well as a 'bias to the poor'. The question remains, as to whether he fully understood the need for Europe to change in order for the two-thirds world to fully develop.

Written when Euro-scepticism was being revived in Britain, it seems to me, however, that the greatest significance of Christians in a New Europe rests in Edwards' challenge of the Church's attitudes and actions towards Europe. Although he rejects any claim to any expertise to offer a vision for Europe, he nevertheless calls upon the Church to wake up to the new political realities in Europe; offering a positive contribution to Europe's future development whilst, at the same time, rejecting any colonial 'right' to dominate European thinking. In fact, Edwards' closing remarks seem to offer a cogent summary of his book: "as a new Europe is born, European Christianity must be reborn." Perhaps indeed, even without him admitting it, that is a vision to offer to the Churches in Europe.

In 1993 the Methodist Church produced a report for discussion called, **Under One Roof: The UK and Europe in the 21st Century**. Inspired in the first instance by the 1989 Assembly of the BCC, it nevertheless signalled the beginning of a flow of documents on Europe from the principal English denominations, and not least from the Methodist Church itself.

In its 24 pages, **Under One Roof** briefly traces the development of, and outlines the structures of, the European Community and the Maastricht Treaty. It then outlines, as it sees it, the European model of political economy in which "there is a powerful commitment to the value of the free market on the one hand and to social belonging on the other."(18) **Under One Roof** then suggests ways in which the market, business and government can work this out in practice. It then briefly analyses Britain's position, before going on to ask how close any European Union should be, and the implications that quest raises for both economic union and
political accountability. The report next suggests priorities for the Community, and raises questions surrounding migration, refugee and asylum legislation within the EC, as well as the Community's responsibilities toward the Two-Thirds World and the environment.

In spite of it being a brief document, Under One Roof is important. The Methodist Church was the first British denomination to publish a 'popular' booklet on Europe. Although it is clearly aimed at a wide market, and therefore fairly basic, it seeks to set the scene concerning European politics. It is thus a discussion starter. Moreover it is not written from a particularly 'Methodist' viewpoint, but with an ecumenical readership in mind. It therefore avoids some of the more critical problems of subsequent denominational reports and publications, as I shall now illustrate.

At the request of the United Reformed Church's 1993 General Assembly its Church and Society group was requested to produce briefing material on contemporary Europe-wide issues. The United Reformed Church: A European Church is the response to the General Assembly's resolution.

The booklet begins with the assertion that "The United Reformed Church is a European Church" (page 3). It then goes on to justify this assertion by outlining its historic links with European denominations which have their origins in the Reformation, and how to the present day links have continued to be forged, not least of which was the Leuenberg Agreement of 1973. The document then lists the denominations in Europe with which the URC nationally and provincially has links, and then followed by listing and describing the European ecumenical agencies and programmes which the URC participates in, directly or indirectly, such as the Conference of European Churches (CEC), and the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society (EECCS).

Turning towards the political structures of Europe, The United Reformed Church: A European Church then
gives a basic description of the 'three pillars' of the Maastricht Treaty, and the instruments and official bodies of the European Community to which the church organisations relate.

The report then raises the main moral and political questions it believes that Europe and the Churches need to address. These are the questions of poverty and social exclusion, racism and xenophobia, the environment, the nature of Europe, Europe and the developing world. Indeed it asks, whose common home is Europe? The 'political section' of the report concludes by affirming that "Europe, conceived of as our common home, must find ways of delivering peace and justice for all its peoples, and bringing healing to the brokenness of the world (environmentally, economically and politically)", adding that "In reality there is no separating our concern for Britain from those of Europe or the world. The rights and legitimate expectations of people to live in peace and justice, to support themselves and their families and to be part of communities of love and concern is intimately linked across the planet."

The remainder of the report outlines possible modes of involvement with churches in Europe such as local church twinning, formal ecumenical links, as well as personal links through Christians from Europe worshipping in local churches. The document then concludes with the guidelines for church linking and the resolutions of the 1993 URC General Assembly concerning Europe.

The United Reformed Church: A European Church is a far more thorough document than Under One Roof. It is more precise in outlining the existing links between the United Reformed Church and 'continental' European Churches, and it gives a more comprehensive description of the European bodies (both ecclesiastical and political) with which it is linked. The document raises the contemporary questions more thoroughly than does Under One Roof. Clearly, though, the report has weaknesses. Because it is a briefing document, it
The report displays the authors' frustration with the Church of England in relation to links with continental denominations. As a result of the Meissen agreement, the document notes, "Many Anglican dioceses and parishes are linking up with churches and church districts in Germany. When inter-church visits take place it would be good to seek participation and courteously to draw attention to the fact that we are in full communion with the German churches."(20). Thus it highlights the anomaly that both denominations are in communion with the same Churches in continental Europe, but are not in communion with each other in England. Creatively, the report also suggests that if a local United Reformed congregation was planning ecumenical links with Meissen churches, they should consider contacting the local parish highlighting the long-standing links between the URC and the EKD (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland), and perhaps suggesting ecumenical links in the future.

Ironically, The United Reformed Church: A European Church seems to suggest that local churches should direct their attentions to forging links with local churches in Europe, whereas the bulk of the report examines Europe's political institutions as well as the main political and social issues faced by Europe today. Despite these weakness, the report is a useful document.

It successfully raises key ecumenical and political issues. It is useful for outlining the ecumenical and political institutions in Europe. The United Reformed Church: A European Church is also important for stressing local and personal ways of building up a new Europe, especially through church and regional twinning arrangements, which I shall explore in greater detail in my next chapter when considering
the effect of personal engagement with Europe. Crucially, the report also points out, as I have observed, that many of the issues facing Britain also face the rest of Europe. In that way it helps to remind the reader that Britain is an integral part of Europe.

Close on the heels of the United Reformed Church's report came the Church of England's report to the General Synod, Europe. Of the reports produced by 1994 Europe is the most comprehensive and "serious". Rather than attempting to provide a simple sketch to the Church of England and Europe, it is, as I shall show, a document seeking to inform and question Europe at quite a deep level.

Prepared in response to the General Synod debate about Europe in July 1990, Europe states its aim as being to question whether the Church of England can be a "European" church, and indeed "should the Church of England seek to play its own rôle in Europe, or should it work with (and if necessary pay for) others to witness to Christian values?" Within the context of a Europe damaged by the troubles in Northern Ireland and the civil war in Yugoslavia, Europe asks a more fundamental question still: can a religious voice be credible at all in such an age as this? (21)

The report illustrates how the changes in Europe have affected the Church as a whole, bringing both increased liberty for travel and exchanges, but equally a deepening enmity between some Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox communities that has come with increased religious liberty. Equally, the financial constraints of the 1990s also feature for churches in both east and west. Positively, the Conference of European Churches has been able to play an important role, and the Church of England within it.

Noting the public's disillusionment with politicians and institutions since the heady days of optimism in the late 1980's, Europe, questions whether political institutions can be the panacea for Europe at all. However,
Europe describes ways in which Christians may contribute to Europe's future, not least in bringing faith and discipleship, and offering a renewed moral vision, a theology of community, and a scope that is wider than simply regarding Europe as an economic entity. Then, Europe notes, "The issue is not whether a moral vision is needed, but how the churches can provide it when there are so many obstacles to overcome" (22) such as denominational fragmentation, the weakness of the Churches in Europe, and not least the question of religious pluralism in a multi-cultural continent. However, the report hopes that the ecumenical experience of Britain and Ireland may provide a model for future action in Europe. At the very least, the report believes that the Church should seek to influence political culture, for the "Churches have a mandate to say strong things about the ethical values which should guide policy formation."

In the report's view, the European Union needs to address the questions of how the social and economic aims of the EU can be environmentally sustained; how minorities are treated within Europe; how extremism (political, national and religious) can be managed; and how the disparities within Europe and between the rich and the Two-Thirds world may be addressed in a global way.

After showing how the Church of England relates to Europe through its Diocese in Europe, the various mission agencies and its denominational links, as well as the ecumenical bodies which the Church of England is part of, or which it has contact with. The paper then concludes by setting out its aims for the future, and detailing policy recommendations for the Church of England to address. Of primary importance, in the report's judgement, "is to work with other churches in seeking to ensure the most effective presentation of the Christian Gospel in contemporary Europe... This involves... joining actively from a Christian standpoint in the debate about the future of Europe"(23) To this end the
report believes it is important that the Church of England works to strengthen links with the Diocese in Europe, that it should encourage closer co-operation with bilateral and ecumenical partners as well as better co-ordination of the wider Anglican work in Europe, including developing a chaplaincy and representative post in Brussels along the lines of the Strasbourg chaplaincy. Key to all of these aims is the strengthening of ties to hold the various aspects together in common.

Throughout the report there are a number of recurring themes and problems which are raised. Although Europe repeatedly stresses the importance of its links with continental European Churches as well as the various ecumenical bodies, it is particularly noticeable that the report does not consider the related question of whether the English denominations could work ecumenically together in order to present a common Christian voice. Perhaps this shows a measure of justification for the criticisms gently laid at the Anglican Churches door by The United Reformed Church: A European Church.

Mirroring the financial concerns that troubled the Church of England in the early 1990's, another recurring theme which runs through the report is the cost of Anglican and ecumenical witness and work in Europe. For example, it is worrying that Annex 1 of the report warns that the work of the CEC may have to be curtailed and staff laid off, because of the costs of subsidising the Eastern European members of CEC. Clearly costs are a genuine concern, which may of course spur the Churches to greater ecumenical co-operation, but it is also a reminder that if the Churches are to offer an effective witness to Europe (whether ecumenically or not), it will need sufficient funding.

Significantly, although the report began by asking how the Church of England could be engaged with Europe, the Paper does not offer a closely defined blue-print. Although, as I have shown, the report outlines in some detail
the ways in which the Church of England has relations with European denominations, ecumenical organisations and direct contact with the institutions, in the end it only offers a set of broad aims and principles to guide the Church of England in the changing political reality that makes up the continent of Europe, and articulate ways in which it might proceed in the immediate future. In this way it is arguably both cautious and pragmatic. It thus recognises that resources are finite, that Europe is fast changing, and that, whilst there are ways in which the Church can immediately respond, the future is not precisely mapped.

There are, it seems, two important weaknesses to the report. Firstly, although it does, as I have illustrated, raise some of the moral questions that surround the EU, it does not enter into in-depth theological discourse about the possible courses of action. Secondly, although it explores the ways in which the Anglican Church engages with Europe, it does not give significant attention to the political structures which operate within Europe. Had the report reviewed the European political institutions as well as its ecclesiastical links with Europe, it may well have come nearer to answering its central question: how to be more effectively engaged with Europe. In fact it was to be nearly two more years before the next denominational report was to be produced which attempted to enter into that debate; this time it would be the Methodist Church's discussion document, Methodists Looking at Europe, produced for its 1996 Conference.

Divided into three sections (of vastly unequal length), Methodists Looking at Europe sets out a section on the churches and the future of Europe; the Churches in Europe; and Methodism in Europe.

Section 1, which forms the bulk of the Paper, begins by outlining the issues that it believes will be of major interest at the 1996/7 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). Methodists Looking at Europe, goes on to set out in a
"more reflective and theological manner" (Paragraph 9) questions about what belonging to Europe means, by offering a sober analysis of the place of national boundaries, religious beliefs and values (and their boundaries), and the problems that language makes for the process of deeper European unity and identity.

The Paper then proceeds to ask "Is there a divergence of belief and value in the existing union that compounds the problem? Or is there an underlying, common, deposit of faith and value that makes us European?" (24) It seeks to answer the question by exploring the relationship between faith, aspiration and action; the different relationships between Church and State experienced in Europe; and the place of the Church in Civil Society. It concludes that "out of the hard experience of contemporary society, a form of Christian belonging is being formed - one which has a distinct commitment to the truths revealed in Christ, but which wants to proclaim that truth as in essence celebrating a common humanity," (25) Moreover, it asserts that the aspiration for a common humanity "is present so widely in the pronouncements of the mainstream churches in Europe as to be virtually beyond argument." (26)

Section 1 then explores further avenues of the Church's thinking, calling for the Church to have a more comprehensive understanding of diakonia. It also stresses the Church's ability, by virtue of its world-wide links, to remind Europe of its place in the world. The Discussion paper then proposes a policy for British Methodism, with practical recommendations. It concludes with two appendices exploring Christian statistics and Christian values for Britain and Europe.

Section 2 of the Paper offers a brief summary of the major inter-church agreements of recent years: the Leuenberg Agreement; the Meissen Agreement; and the Porvoo Agreement. It challenges churches to be more European-minded,
instead of the more nationally-focused past.

Section 3 complements this, by briefly outlining Methodism’s history in Europe, together with the developments of closer co-operation between the European Methodist Churches since the Second World War. It concludes by outlining the contribution that the European Methodist Churches have made to British Methodist thinking about Europe. What, then, are the weaknesses and strengths of Methodists Looking at Europe?

There are, it seems to me, a number of weaknesses in the document, the first of which is the title. As can be seen from the documents reviewed above, a criticism which may be laid at the Church’s door is that too often the Church has failed to engage with Europe beyond the level of description. The very title, Methodists Looking at Europe, suggests that Methodism is looking at Europe as into a goldfish bowl. This is doubly unfortunate, because the Paper does seek to engage theologically with European issues. A title that suggested this would not only have been more helpful, but more appropriate. Perhaps such a remote title is an attempt to interest a Euro-sceptic audience!

Another weakness of the report is that it is evidently written by different groups (as the initial paragraph points out). This seems to be indicative of a certain amount of confusion that ‘Europe’ raises for the Churches. For example, the Methodist Church’s Division of Social Responsibility has been responsible for political and social developments, and the Methodist Church Overseas Division has been responsible for relating to Methodist Conferences in mainland Europe. However, as the initial paragraph notes, "The coming months will see a greater harmonization between these, and other, elements of our European concern." This is surely to be welcomed as a necessary procedure for fostering a more coordinated approach to Europe.

The report also has, unfortunately, a
tendency to make sweeping generalisations. For example, when considering European Politics and the Inter-Governmental Conference, Paragraph 6 states that "European voters have already equated the single currency with deepening unemployment, and the proposal has become an electoral quagmire." Although it would certainly be a fair comment about Euro-sceptical politicians, it would have been helpful for a footnote on the evidence for this conclusion about the European population as a whole (opinion polls, etc.) to justify this claim. Moreover, as in Britain's case, economic and monetary union (as I have shown on pp. 43-46) raises far wider issues than unemployment alone.

Paragraph 7 falls into a similar trap by suggesting that because Britain has, in the Paper's judgement, failed to break into the Franco-German hegemony in Europe, "This failure, rather than the current official attitudes to Europe, might be seen as the main force that has shaped the British response to Europe over the quarter century since its entry." As I have shown in chapters 1 and 2 Britain's awkwardness towards Europe is more complex than the suggestion that British obduracy is a fit of pique. In fact, as I have explained, when British leadership in Europe was there for the taking - even, perhaps, until the withdrawal from the Messina negotiations in the mid-1950's - Britain's objectives were different to those of the integrationists. The Paper would, in my view, have been better served by raising issues in more temperate language, rather than with such sweeping generalisations which it fails to test out in a substantial way.

A further weakness of Methodists Looking at Europe is Section 2, concerned with the Churches in Europe. Although noting the recent developments in inter-church cooperation and dialogue, it is particularly weak at explanation and analysis. Moreover, it largely fails to explore any implications that any such agreements might have for
engaging with European issues, or even what implications such agreements might have for the Methodist Church. Although Section 3 (Methodism in Europe) is also brief, it is nevertheless more successful at raising the issues and implications, both for British and European Methodism as a whole, by having denominational links which stretch across Europe (27). Despite such weaknesses, *Methodists Looking at Europe*, is a valuable document for a number of reasons.

Firstly, it is useful in outlining the key issues which are under review at the current Inter-governmental Conference. The Paper is also helpful in taking forward Christian thinking by offering theological reflection on such concepts as the boundaries and beliefs within Europe. As I shall argue in chapter 5, it is particularly necessary that the Churches do engage with issues and concepts in a theological way, rather than just allowing issues to be owned by politicians, and *Methodists Looking at Europe* makes a helpful contribution in this way.

The discussion document also contributes by exploring the concept of Civil Society, and asking where the Church can contribute (if at all) to it. It seems to me that, in the light of Edwards' challenge in *Christians in a New Europe* (see above), this exploration is particularly pertinent as the Churches try to reinterpret their place and rôle in an increasingly secular and multi-cultural society, whilst maintaining the Church's right to speak as well as affirming the right of others to do likewise.

*Methodists Looking at Europe* is particularly good at setting out ways in which mission and service can be developed, and in particular, how ecumenism can impact both the Churches as a body and as it witnesses in contemporary society. As I shall show in chapter 5 it is, I believe, vitally important that the Church seeks to work and think in comprehensive ways and avoid selectivity in its approach to Europe. This Paper hints at the broader canvas upon
which to work and reflect. Importantly, though, it also seeks to remind the Church that Europe must be seen in the context of the wider world, and not in a vacuum.

Methods Looking at Europe is also important for showing the ways in which the Methodist Church sees itself as working in the future, in that it offers 4 principles of policy and practical arrangements to facilitate their implementation. It is worthwhile quoting the principles in full, which seek:

"a- To develop our understanding of the political, social and economic dimensions of the European Union, and to communicate this effectively to British Methodists;
b- To build effective working relations with major European Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church, and to play an appropriate part in ecumenical European bodies;
c- To foster relationships with Methodist churches throughout Europe;
d- To work with ecumenical partners in responding to crises in Europe, such as that in Bosnia at present."

It is worth noting their practical, ecumenical, and wide-ranging scope, which is often missing from Church thinking when it considers how to engage with Europe, as I shall explain in my next chapter.

On the whole I believe that Methods Looking at Europe is a very important document, which commends itself well to discussion and, significantly, theological reflection upon questions about Europe, and how the Church relates to European issues.

As I have explained in chapter 2 (see p.59), one of the central philosophical concepts introduced at the behest of the British Government in the Maastricht Treaty was that of subsidiarity. Although it is now known for its political significance, its origins lay in classical Catholic social teaching. Politically, subsidiarity "supports a dispersal of authority as close to the grass roots as good government allows, and it prefers local over central decision-making."(29)
Allied to the concept of subsidiarity is that of solidarity. The recent report, *The Common Good*, believes that "Solidarity expresses the moral truth that 'no man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main'(John Donne)."(30) It is these two principles of Catholic social teaching which run through *The Common Good*, published by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales in the run up to the 1997 British General Election for thought and reflection. When it briefly addresses the issue of Europe it reminds the reader that Catholic teaching has an international and global dimension. Further, *The Common Good* (reminiscent of Edwards' beliefs) asserts that "Although all European states are pluralist societies, the churches still have a crucial role in safe-guarding and promoting the moral and spiritual values which gave Europe its soul."(31) Consequently, the twin principles should guide Catholic thinking about Europe. Hence, *The Common Good* believes that "local loyalties and commitments are important and should be fostered, but they should not be in opposition to these wider expressions of solidarity. It is possible to be both British and European."(32)

Although Europe is not the main focus of *The Common Good*, it is important in the sense that it sets out the broad spectrum of Catholic social teaching. Moreover, the Bishops' report correctly recognised that Europe would be a major issue in the British General Election, and consequently it seeks to show the reader how that social teaching may be applied to thinking about Europe (amongst other issues).

As I have shown, then, the major Christian denominations (Anglican, Roman Catholic, Methodist and United Reformed) have, in the last 3 years been reflecting on the implications for both Church and Society of the changes in Europe during the last 20 years. Although the reports which I have just outlined may be seen as the 'official' pronouncements, many of the Churches have also been addressing
European issues in other ways as well. It is to these that I shall now turn.

Particularly notable has been the variety of publications that the Methodist Church has produced in recent years. A 'popular' style of publication is Eurobulletin, published bimonthly originally on the initiative of the Methodist Church's Division of Social Responsibility. Eurobulletin covers a broad spectrum of issues that have a European dimension to them. This ranges from book reviews to analysis of events and trends in European politics, religion and culture. As broad as its scope of subjects is its variety of contributors. In recent issues, articles and pieces have been contributed by Christian MEP's, EECCS, Methodists, other European denominations and so on. By its very nature - it is a bulletin rather than a journal - it cannot produce in-depth analysis of all that is happening in Europe. Nevertheless, Eurobulletin is a useful publication for highlighting issues which would normally be ignored by the secular press. Moreover, it serves to remind its readers, that Europe is far richer and more diverse than just whether the Maastricht criteria for EMU will be reached!

Also at the more 'popular' end of the market is The Methodist Recorder. Although producing only occasional series' of articles concerning Europe, it does attempt from time to time to highlight European issues. For example, in the run up to the 1994 European elections a series of articles by John Kennedy, the then Social and Economic policy secretary of the Methodist Division of Social Responsibility were published. They provided sketches about modern political Europe, examining the issues such as enlargement, the European Parliament, and, interestingly, an article examining Europe from a Scottish perspective, which contrasted with the 'English' perception of Europe. Kennedy asserted that "this is a European country, in a way that
England is not." (33) The series also included an article by German Methodist Minster, Dr. Siegfried Lödewigs, examining Germany's position on Europe. The series concluded on 23rd June 1994 with a review of the British election campaign, noting its negative tone, but also setting out issues that would be on Europe and its Parliament's agenda for the future. Since then, The Methodist Recorder has produced occasional articles which look primarily at European Methodism, but also at European political issues.

In addition to The Methodist Recorder's 1994 European election series, the 1994 Methodist Conference devoted its annual Beckly Social Service Lecture to the theme of The Churches in The European Union. Given by Philip Ludlow, director of the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies, the lecture again highlighted the Methodist Church's interest in Europe both as a theological and political issue. In the lecture Ludlow set out in detail the characteristics of the EU as a historical process and governmental system, as well as focussing on where EU institutions are (and are not) relevant to political and social problems. Ludlow then concluded the lecture by outlining ways in which the Churches in Britain could and should engage with the European Union.

The major emphasis of the lecture, as Ludlow concedes, is a description of how the European Union works, "on the grounds that an understanding of how it works is a precondition of any attempt by the churches or individual Christians to work with or through it." (34) It is a point he repeatedly makes throughout his lecture (35), and far from complimenting the perspicacity of the British Churches' interest in Europe, Ludlow criticises them for not understanding how Europe works, and therefore, how the Churches may contribute to Europe's future development.

In explaining how the 'system' works, Ludlow illustrated his lecture by using a selection of social issues as case studies on the opportunities and limitations of
the EU. In the case of unemployment for example, Europe can only operate as a partner with member states who have the bulk of the work to do in seeking out methods to alleviate unemployment; however, in the case of asylum and refugee policy (which is largely determined through inter-governmental co-operation rather than through the institutions of the EU) there would be advantages in closer European co-operation. Thus he argues that the European Union is neither necessarily a panacea for all European improvement, nor also the antithesis of national self-interest.

Ludlow is also keen to point out that it is the Churches' right and duty to speak, for European issues "should... engage us as individuals, as priestly prophets or prophetic priests, and, by no means least, as denominations." Thus it is vital for the Churches to understand how Europe works, indeed, "Whether we are individual Christians or churches, we ignore the European level of government at our peril."(Page 24)

One way in which the Churches have attempted to respond has been through such organisations as the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society. However, Ludlow notes with regret that "They are... lonely outposts lacking for the most part precisely that ingredient which makes the Union so strong, namely organic, living links with national communities who acknowledge their responsibility - and their need - to operate effectively at a European level. Unless and until national churches take the European dimension seriously, the ecumenical Euro-experts will be condemned to be a half-effective sub-culture..."(36) Equally problematic, in his view, is the national orientation of many European denominations, which, when "lacking a natural European dimension, national communions can suffer from inadequate information and perspective." As a consequence, the Churches need to work closely together, for "I cannot imagine that there is a specific 'Anglican' as opposed to a 'Methodist' position on
most if not all the more important issues actually or
prospectively under consideration at European level."(37).

In my judgement, the Beckly Social Services Lecture is one of the most important contributions to the Churches-and-Europe debate, because it was given by an English Christian who is engaged daily with the institutions of Europe. Therefore his criticisms (implicit and explicit) of the British Churches need to be taken all the more seriously. The Churches in the European Union functions as a serious indictment for past failures and for letting Europe be marginal to the Church's thinking in the present, yet it also serves as a challenge to renewed exploration and energy, for as Ludlow notes in his final remarks, "Individual Christians and Christian communities have... a heavy responsibility to make their witness in word and in action within a European as well as a national framework."(38)

Continuing interest in Europe, can also be found in the Methodist theological journal, Epworth Review, which is currently publishing a major series of essays exploring some of the many issues surrounding Europe. Commencing in May 1995 with a "Data-Sheet on Europe", outlining the population, economy and institutions of Europe, as well as sign-posting issues facing the future of the EU; the series has to date explored a broad range of issues. This has included an essay exploring the issues surrounding the current inter-governmental conference (September 1995), as well as asking whether Britain can ever really care for Europe (January). Thus have made the series rich in different perspectives.

Inevitably, such a variety of writers make it difficult adequately to summarize their essays. There are, however, features of the series which are worthy of note. Firstly, the series is being published at all! It is tangible evidence of interest in the present and future of Europe. By producing a series, it enables a more rounded and detailed theological debate on European issues to take place. By virtue
of the national and denominational diversity of the authors, it is also allowing non-British, European Christians to address Europe as an issue, and confront us here in Britain with an alternative perspective to those we might normally hear.

Theologically and politically, the series so far has been broadly pro-European. However, although it may be pro-European, it is neither sycophantic or uncritical. Thus the articles repeatedly praise the peace and economic benefits of the EU, whilst also challenging Europe's weaknesses. The articles also seek to address some of the issues that will face Europe in the future, such as the future enlargement of the EU to the East. Therefore Hermann Barth's avowedly pro-European essay is also the essay which asserts that high unemployment, growing poverty and racial discrimination "points to an unsolved task of the realisation of a true community." (39)

The collection of essays in the Epworth Review also serve to challenge the readers and the Church to think further about its own responsibility to think and act. For example, John Nurser, the director of CAFE (Christianity and the Future of Europe), notes in a way reminiscent of Ludlow's Beckly Lecture, that, "So far as I can tell, there is almost no wide-spread or high-profile commitment for the Churches to taking the Europe project seriously." (40) Curiously, the series of essays have not explored any vision for the future of Europe beyond the issues that face Europe in the short and medium term. Unlike such writers as Bell, Temple and Beales, who were not only able to address their contemporary Europe but able to contribute to thinking about the long-term future of Europe after the war, the Epworth Review has not as yet made the jump into the distant future. I hope that in due course it will do just that.

As I have shown, therefore, the Methodist Church has begun to address the question of Europe at many different levels, from the official level of reports to the
Methodist Conference; the theological level of the Epworth Review; as well as the more popular level through such publications as Eurobulletin and The Methodist Recorder. At the risk of exhibiting a Methodist bias, it is, I believe, particularly important that the Churches address Europe in a comprehensive way at various levels, and the Methodist Church has begun to do that. However, other denominations have also been actively engaged in exploring the question of Europe, not least of which has been the English Roman Catholic Church.

As I have already suggested, both in this and my previous chapter, The Tablet has been consistently interested in the future of Europe, and how the United Kingdom contributes to it. This has continued in the 1990's.

The Tablet has continued to offer only critical support for the EU, highlighting the short-comings of the EU, such as the 'democratic deficit', which it saw as being created on the one hand by "the brilliant work of European bureaucrats in Brussels", and on the other hand by the "secretive decision-making of the Council of Ministers, which is not properly accountable to the European Parliament..."(41)

In its judgement, the links between national parliaments and Europe's needed to be strengthened.

In 1995 a short series of articles examining issues facing contemporary issues was published by The Tablet. At the heart of these articles was the recurring question of national sovereignty. In the first essay Damian Howard argued that, for Britain, the question "comes down... to our never having faced the concrete question involved in political union. Reading the words of Euro-sceptics one gets the impression that national sovereignty is an end in itself, not something to be used in order to guarantee the well-being of the nation's citizens."(42) Howard further argues that far from fearing the future transfer of powers to Brussels, Euro-sceptics have "missed the point. The power is already there, but it is being exercised clumsily and without proper
democratic control." Thus Howard argues that Britain must seriously debate the questions of sovereignty and federalism, rather than allowing the issues "to be obscured by tabloid prejudice and political manipulation." Damian Howard's article was then followed by two essays given by Owen Hickey, formerly of The Times and The Tablet, and Edward Mortimer, the foreign affairs editor of The Financial Times.

Hickey began by stressing the crucial importance of the European debate by stating that, "... the issue is the nature of the British state." Hickey then proceeds to outline what he sees as the risks of the EMU, not least for its undermining of national (i.e. British) sovereignty. Hickey argues, in fact, for a 'traditional' British view of a semi-detached approach to Europe: "For many generations, educated Britons have made themselves familiar with European culture and believed themselves to be part of it. Yet he [i.e. the British] felt no necessity to cement the relationship by marriage of convenience."

Edward Mortimer's essay outlines a more positive view of closer European integration, believing that far from undermining British sovereignty, it could positively enhance it, for at the moment Britain has an "'elective dictatorship'". Consequently, in his opinion, "The only checks on Parliament's otherwise absolute power are the threat of insurrection, the fear of losing the next general election, and the United Kingdom's membership of two supranational bodies which have their own law: the Council of Europe and the European Community." Thus Mortimer believes that Europe needs to become "more genuinely federal and more fully democratic." This would require the further development of the EU, by granting greater law-making powers to the European parliament, the granting of statutory powers to local and regional assemblies by European law, and the enshrinement of the powers of national parliaments in EU Law so that they could challenge the Union if it exceeded its constitutional powers. Responding
to Mortimer's article, Hickey rightly noted that "Mortimer's embrace for European federalism, discerning as it is, comes down to a... transmanche rescue plan for Britain."(43) It is, in other words, as much an essay outlining the deficiencies of Britain's constitution, as a paean of praise for the EU.

Whilst The Tablet continues to promote discussion on Britain and Europe, and is largely in favour of the European project, that support is qualified. Its approach is fascinating for its 'secular' approach to Europe. It wrestles with Europe as a political entity (and rightly so), but also seems to suggest by omission, that Europe has gone beyond the theological debate which characterized The Tablet's articles in the 1960's and 1970's. Returning Europe to the theological arena, however, is Cardinal Hume's book, Remaking Europe: The Gospel in a Divided Continent, which I shall now examine.

Although Remaking Europe was published in 1994, it is in fact a collection of addresses made by Cardinal Hume between 1982-1993, and as such, was intended to apply to the many changes that occurred in Europe during the decade prior to its publication.

The starting point for Remaking Europe is the realisation that Europe has been since the collapse of Communism in a state of social and political flux. If Europe is to find a way forward and to remain a pluralist but stable society, common values need to underpin our society. It is, in Hume's judgement, the Church's task to show that in an age of social and political malaise God alone can meet people's deepest desires. It is therefore, the Christian's task to live in a Christian way. To help fulfil this calling, Hume explains that "the Church has, especially in this century, fashioned a social doctrine which has been called one of the Church's best kept secrets"(44). The purpose of Remaking Europe, therefore, may be viewed as an attempt to relate Catholic social thinking to the contemporary Europe. For Hume, the main principles of
Catholic social thinking can be summed up in four words: dignity, development, solidarity and subsidiarity (45).

The Church, asserts Hume, is committed to the dignity of each individual person, and to their rights as a human being, because of the fundamental belief that all people are created in the image of God. That essential humanity must be reflected practically in politics and international affairs. At the macro-level, this is seen in a commitment to world development and in the quest for justice; at the individual level, it is seen in the development of the human spirit and in each person's potential.

In Catholic social thinking - whose language has been widely employed by the European Union - two further concepts explain the implications of human dignity. Firstly, there is the principle of solidarity which recognises that because of each individual's dignity, one must stand alongside all human beings as equals and partners. The second principle is subsidiarity. Hume defines the principle of subsidiarity as "a recognition that people, because of who and what they are, should be empowered to take decisions for their own lives with due regard for the interests of the wider community. It is clearly opposed to excessive bureaucracy, to paternalism, to the imposition of policies and strategies by the strong on the weak. It emphasises the need to develop human potential as God-given and as the greatest resource possessed by the planet."(46) As a consequence, in his view, "We all need to reflect on our human solidarity within Europe and outside. We need to see the unbreakable connection between love of God and love of our neighbour."(47) So then, how does Hume suggest these principles may be employed in order to remake Europe?

At the heart of Hume's book is the classical Thomist view that "the defining features of human nature do not change, and they generate certain universal and permanent requirements of human well-being and fulfilment which moral values seek to express."(48) The problem, as he sees it,
is that Europe has lost confidence in these moral norms which he believes are essential for human well-being. Universal solidarity, however, has its moral content: it acknowledges the worth of each individual, and therefore is at odds which such phenomena as racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. "In fact", argues Hume, "the acceptance of God's unconditional love for each person leads us to see that human solidarity has to be universal."(49) So what content to moral action does this belief give?

On the one hand, it has implications for Europe. The liberalization of trade with countries outside the EU is imperative. Emergency aid is not sufficient. Similarly, in the face of so great an increase in the number of refugees and other immigrants into Europe, it is important that Europe does not simply react to the problem by putting up barriers, but by addressing the root causes of the problem.

On the other hand, the moral content of the belief in human solidarity has implications for the Church. "We have to advocate an inclusive and open solidarity formed on love and respect for the stranger, and oppose an exclusive and closed solidarity founded on indifference or even fear of the stranger."(50) But if that moral voice is to have force, the Church must also address its own brokenness, and recognise that a divided Church is a stumbling block to its own integrity. Furthermore, the Church must rediscover its own beliefs, and begin to engage in mission and service. Therefore the Church must recall that its heart is God and not human wisdom; it must rediscover its understanding of the alienating effect of sin, which results in brokenness and division, and, instead of idly sitting back and waiting for the Kingdom, "we have to pray for it ceaselessly and work for it tirelessly and recognize its every manifestation in the affairs of humanity."(51) In short, Christians are called to the re-evangelization of Europe and to the renewal of the Church. Thus, through each Christian engaging in the struggle against injustice, in the reverence
for the despised of our society, and in the good stewardship of the world's resources, "The Christian can provide contemporary Europe with a radical alternative to the pursuit of power; it involves trust in the presence and power of God and unswerving commitment to the gospel of love."(52)

Hume concludes with the bold assertion that "The future will not be secured by political tinkering or social engineering and improved technology. What is needed is response to the centuries-old call of Christ to true conversion of heart and mind. There will be no better world without better people. And no better people without growth in genuine love. And there can be no growth in genuine love without faith in God and a true and lasting love of him."(53) So then, what is the importance of Cardinal Hume's book?

Remaking Europe: The Gospel in a Divided Continent is interesting because it lucidly restates Catholic social teaching in relation to contemporary Church and Society in Europe. It has a particularly strong emphasis upon the dignity of the individual person as made in the image of God, whilst at the same time reminding the reader of the corporate responsibility of humanity.

In many ways Remaking Europe stands within the traditional Thomist understanding of a common humanity and a natural moral law that underpins the world order. The book therefore also stands within the tradition espoused in the 1940's by Bell, Temple and Beales (see chapter 3). As with Bell's concept of the Church as Una Sancta, Hume stresses the importance of the Church as the potential model and vehicle for the renewal of society. As with Temple, Hume stresses the importance of human dignity and worth, whilst holding the tension between personal freedom and an ordered society together. Again, like Temple, Hume attempts to find appropriate moral principles to guide Europe into the future. As with Beales, Hume casts his work within the main stream of Catholic social thinking (though without the overt ultramontanism which
characterised Beales' book). Similarly though, as with the 1940's publications, the question for us today remains as to how credible a hope it is, in a multi-cultural and multi-faith Europe, for there to ever be a common corpus of values to underpin European society. Perhaps Hume is too swift to suggest that Europe has merely lost confidence in traditional Christian moral values (Hume, p.26), and too slow to wrestle with the genuine question of reconciling different values into a common corpus for a stable Europe.

Hume's book is also significant in that once again it throws out a double challenge: to Europe as a whole and to the Churches. Remaking Europe is forthright in stressing the responsibility of Europe and European Christians to stand alongside the disadvantaged, to act for justice, to work towards a raising of standards for the developing world, and for the need for Europe to remember that it is part of a global community. Hume is also candid in recognising that the Church's message to Europe is severely diminished by the divisions within the Churches in Europe. Both need to be addressed to give an authentic voice to the gospel.

Perhaps most significant of all, is the fact that it is a distinctly Christian vision of how Europe may be rebuilt. As with Bell in 1940, Hume sees that ultimately, Europe can only be rebuilt through a Christian renewal throughout Europe. Just to address the political issues alone would be "tinkering" as he puts it (Hume, p.103). Perhaps the book's weakness at this point may be the lingering question of whether Hume is, in effect, hoping for a return to the "romantic dream"(54) of a new Christendom-Europe.

In my judgement, Remaking Europe: The Gospel in a Divided Continent is a particularly helpful book, precisely because it does try to relate Catholic social thinking to contemporary Europe. Its effect must surely be for the reader to wrestle with the apparent dialectic between seeking the renewal of a Christian Europe and Church, with the
reality that Europe is more multi-cultural than it has ever been. What Hume achieves is to set out his framework, based on the dignity of each person and the corporate nature of humanity, so that Europe might be remade, and that the Gospel might have a word to say in a divided Continent.

During the 1990's, then, we have seen a number official reports from the main English denominations. We have also seen an emerging range of materials from some denominations aimed at raising issues and awareness about Europe, most particularly from the Methodist and Roman Catholic Churches. What is perhaps just as noteworthy, is the relatively small amount of material produced by the Church of England. Although Strasbourg Briefing is produced by the Anglican Chaplaincy there, relating both to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, and occasional articles are produced in both the Church Times and Crucible (the Board of Social Responsibility's journal), there is relatively little specifically Anglican printed input to the debate. However, it is equally noteworthy that the Church of England is making a significant contribution to pan-European work, through such individual people as John Arnold, the Dean of Durham and Chairman of the Conference of European Churches, and David Edwards (whose 1990 book I have explored above). It is to be hoped that as the Church of England opens up to other European Churches as a result of the Meissen and Porvoo agreements, as well as through its support of such ecumenical groups as EECCS, it will also find a greater voice to bring its own insights and experience to bear on the future of Europe.

To conclude then. In these last two chapters, as with chapters 1 and 2, we have seen a variable response from the English churches towards Europe. As with secular politicians, so in the war years the Church leaders were in the forefront of thinking about what shape post-war Britain and Europe might take. A case can be made for saying
that the Church leaders in England, such as Archbishop Temple and Bishop Bell, and indeed A.C.F. Beales together with Sword of the Spirit were ahead of their secular counterparts in considering the future. With the close of the war, the retreat from thinking about Europe, whilst mirroring their political counterparts was more dramatic. With the exception of the 1967 British Council of Churches' report, there was no English Protestant voice raised at all concerning Europe for nearly 30 years. Only the Roman Catholic Church has kept an interest in Europe alive.

In this chapter concerned with British Church engagement with Europe since the United Kingdom joined the European Communities in 1973, we have seen a varying picture of how the Churches have engaged with Europe. Initially there was some interest (mainly Roman Catholic) at the time of the 1975 Referendum campaign, but until the late 1980's silence reigned once more. However, from the late 1980's until the present day, as I have shown in chapter 2, Europe became a vital domestic and foreign policy issue for the government. As a consequence of the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern, inspired in many countries by the Churches, Europe became impossible for the English Churches to ignore.

It is not surprising, then, that it was at the end of the 1980's that the Churches began to look seriously at Europe, as the recent flurry of denominational reports indicates. But this renewed interest is noteworthy for its descriptive work, rather than deep theological engagement with Europe. The Churches were, in effect, attempting to catch up with where Europe already was. They were not, it seems, in a position to ask where Europe might go in the future.

In the last 3 or 4 years we have, however, begun to see signs that British Churches are beginning to engage in political and theological reflection and analysis over the question of Europe, especially in the Roman Catholic and Methodist Churches. What is surely to be regretted is that
it has taken nearly 20 years since Britain entered the EC for the Churches to wake up to Europe again. If Hastings was correct in suggesting that British Christians have been more outspoken in the 1970s and 1980s on social issues since the era of Temple and Bell, Europe was conspicuous by its absence from the Churches voice. So can the English Churches effectively engage with Europe? It is to this crucial question that I shall now turn to in my next chapter.

NOTES

(2) Károly Tóth's article, 'Central-Eastern Europe six years after the changes' in Epworth Review, Volume 23, No. 3, September 1996.
(4) The Tablet, 8th February 1975.
(7) David L. Edwards, Christians in a New Europe, p.9
(8) Edwards, p.119f
(9) Edwards, p.28
(10) Edwards, p.127
(11) Edwards, p.181
(12) Edwards, p.199
(13) Edwards, p.200
(14) Edwards, p.203
(15) Edwards, p.246
(16) Edwards, p.247
(17) Edwards, p.28
(19) The United Reformed Church: A European Church, p.21
(20) The United Reformed Church, p.5.
(22) Europe, p.16.
(23) Europe, p.41.
(25) Methodists Looking at Europe, paragraph 32.
(26) Methodists Looking at Europe, paragraph 33.
(27) For a more complete description of the Methodist Church in Europe, see Peter Stephens, Methodism in Europe (3rd Edition).
(28) Methodists Looking at Europe, para. 43
(30) The Common Good, para. 23.
(31) The Common Good, Para. 99
(35) see also Ludlow, pages 3 and 24.
(36) Ludlow, p.25
(37) Ludlow, p.26
(38) Ludlow, p.27
(39) Hermann Barth's article, 'A View from Germany' in Epworth Review, Volume 24, Number 2 (April 1997), p.74
(40) John Nurser's article, 'Can British Christians Learn to Care About Europe?' in Epworth Review, Volume 23, Number 1 (January 1996), p.71
(41) The Tablet, 22nd May 1993.
(42) The Tablet, 17th June 1995.
(44) Basil Hume, Remaking Europe: The Gospel in a Divided Continent, p.14
(45) Hume, p.17
(46) Hume, p.19
(47) Hume, p.21
(48) Hume, p.28f
(49) Hume, p.30
(50) Hume, p.50
(51) Hume, p.74
(52) Hume, p.96
(53) Hume, p.103
(54) Ludlow, p.27
"I am certain that the Christian faith has a word of incalculable value for these times... I am certain that it is the truth about human life, personal, social, international.\(^{(1)}\) So began Bishop Bell's Forward to his 1940 paperback, Christianity and World Order. Bell, of course, wrote his book at a time of deep crisis for both Britain and Europe. Clearly Europe does not face such a crisis today, even if one accepts the proposition supported by many of the authors and reports reviewed in chapter 4, that Europe is in the midst of moral, social and political malaise. In this chapter I shall ask whether Bell's confident belief is justifiable. Do the English Churches have a word of incalculable value for Europe today? Furthermore, if one believes that the Church does have a word to speak, what is its message, and how may it raise its voice and engage effectively in such a complex, pluralist society, which makes up Europe today?

In this chapter, I shall be arguing that the Church can have a word for our times; indeed, if it does not, then the Church cannot really claim to have a universal gospel, nor claim to speak to the oikoumene - the whole inhabited earth. However, I shall also suggest in this chapter, that if the English Churches are effectively to engage in and be engaged by Europe, that engagement must be thorough, comprehensive and competent in what it says and does. In short, I shall offer in this chapter a 'Diamond model' for the British Churches' engagement with Europe.

A diamond has a remarkable set of properties. It is multi-faceted; extremely durable; and has a tremendous cutting edge. The model of the diamond I shall be describing suggests that the Church's approach should similarly be multi-faceted if its voice is to be durable and have a cutting edge, to speak effectively to our times. What, then,
are the implications of the 'diamond model' for the Church?

Firstly, the model suggests that the Church needs a multi-faceted, comprehensive approach to Europe. In his analysis of the Church's response to poverty in Britain in the early 1980's John Atherton charged the Church with failing effectively to respond to the many levels in which poverty had to be combatted. Citing the three levels of response as being the individual response, the area response and the structures-of-society response, Atherton believed that the Church largely responds in the first two areas. However, he argues that "if adequate responses to poverty are about individualist and area policies, and yet about more than that, then what does the 'more than that' require of us?" (2) He argues that the Church "must engage the very ordering of society." (3) As I have made clear in chapter 4, Ludlow has rightly criticised the Churches' lack of knowledge and understanding about how the European Union works (4). Does the Church have a word to say about the structures of Europe, which affect our lives as profoundly as the Westminster parliament? It is my contention in this chapter that the Churches must understand how the political structures work, and then adopt a comprehensive approach to its work when engaging with Europe.

As the Church of England's report, Europe, suggests, the churches must ask themselves how that voice may effectively be spoken. Europe implied that the Church of England preferred the most cost-effective approach to engagement. It seems to me, however, that if the Church is to have a multi-faceted approach to Europe, it must recognise that its voice must also speak on different levels too. This voice may come from the institutional Churches - as institutions speaking to institutions. It may also come from Christian theologians and social scientists, wrestling with what it means to be European. It may also be that the Church speaks most eloquently through individual Christians acting in their civic capacity - a concept which I shall explore in detail below -
whether as officials, politicians, jurists or citizens. I shall
argue below that the Church must act and speak at each of these
levels.

One criticism which can be justly levelled at the Church's door has been its tendency to be selective in its approach to European political issues. The Church is often guilty of only responding to issues with an overtly moral or religious dimension. For example, the Churches have often (rightly) challenged instances of racism and xenophobia, and have championed the cause of justice and human rights. However, very few pronouncements have been made on economic and monetary union. In fact if the churches have such a narrow scope, they reduce themselves to the role of a pressure group on the issues which interest them most. In fact, if the Church believes in the oikoumene, then it must spurn such a limited approach. Instead I shall be arguing that Christians need to be involved where power lies, and that means active engagement in politics. Moreover, if Christians remove themselves from the political process, the likely corollary seems to be that political thinking could become more remote and amoral. The Church needs to reject the limited pressure-group/selective model, in favour of the comprehensive, multi-faceted approach to Europe, which I shall advocate in this chapter.

The second characteristic of a diamond is its durability and strength, which gives the diamond its remarkable cutting edge. This too has implications for the Church. In order for the Church's voice to be durable, as Atherton suggests, it needs to acquire both competence and expertise, and recognise that which already exists in the Churches' life. If the Church is to be heard, a minimal requirement is a competent understanding of how Europe works! It must, moreover, be methodical and sustained in its exploration and analysis of contemporary Europe.

Equally, if the Church is to have a cutting edge, as Edwards pointed out (see chapter 4, p.121) it also
needs humility, rather than abrasiveness. Thus, whilst the Church's analysis of Europe must be competent, and resolute in relating its faith to the possibilities for the future, it must still avoid any arrogance which can undermine contributions from other faith communities or academic interests. This is in part because the Church can no longer claim to have a pre-eminent place in Europe's thinking. Respect for our contribution has to be earned not expected. It is also, in part, because the Church now exists in a multi-faith Europe. Christians cannot expect Christian values to be uniformly adhered to. The Church must therefore avoid the abrasiveness and arrogance which often points to a blunt edge instead of a cutting edge. Moreover, in a pluralist society, the Church must be open to testing and criticism by others outside in order for the worth of its words to be accepted.

What, then, are the practical applications of this model of a multi-faceted, tough and endurable diamond with its cutting edge for the Church's engagement and contribution to Europe? How may they speak a word of "incalculable value" for today?

In the following pages I shall use three "facets" through which I believe the Churches can and should be engaging with Europe. The first facet is that of personal engagement with Europe; the second is that of institutional engagement with Europe; and the third is at the level of theoretical engagement. By engaging in each of these levels, I believe that the Church's competence may be demonstrated, and thus give the Church's voice a cutting edge for our times.

**FACET 1: PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT.**

One of the deficiencies of many of the church reports described in chapter 4, is that they are clearly aimed at the leadership of their respective denominations. This is not to devalue their worth, but it perhaps does reflect a
problem which the Churches - as well as secular politicians - have: namely engaging the 'average' person in the street or in the pew. As Ernest Wistrich has bleakly observed, "People have become increasingly alienated from their governments. Democratic accountability of national governments to their citizens through elected representatives has become tenuous... Representative democracy, meant to give ordinary citizens a say in their lives, is becoming discredited through growing cynicism about politicians. A sense of community has been replaced by a general feeling of 'them and us' as the gap between government and governed has alarmingly widened."(5) If this is the case for national parliaments, how much more it is for the European Parliament! It may also be the case that such a gap also exists between the Church leaders and the 'average' church member. A recent statement on Christian political responsibility, appealed "to all members of the church to play a part in political controversy. None should feel in advance that their views cannot influence debate, or that their convictions are unworthy of a hearing."(6) How, though, may individuals, or small groups (the 'personal facet') engage with the Europe of today in the face of so much cynicism, disillusionment and disinterest in politics?

(i) Scrutiny and Accountability

One important element of the personal facet of Christian engagement with the European Union is that of scrutinizing carefully what goes on in the EU, and holding accountable those who make and enforce its decisions. In many ways circumstances tend to militate against members of the public doing this!

As I explained in chapter 2 (see pp.50-53) one of central criticisms of the European Union is its 'democratic deficit'. This criticism believes that the institutions and policy-making processes of the EU are not transparently democratic in either operation or accountability.
Together with the complexity of the EU structures; the problems of access; as well as the often distorted media portrayal of the EU so that it is often difficult to discern the truth from the interpretation, the net result being that people often switch off from European issues. As Wistrich pointed out, this in turn leads to deeper cynicism and alienation from the institutions and from the democratic process itself.

At a basic level, it is important for all citizens to become familiar with how Europe works. Just as the Churches cannot engage effectively with Europe unless they know how Europe 'works', so it is equally important for individuals to understand how Europe works, not least because the European Union affects our daily lives as much as Westminster or County Hall.

It is also important to listen and watch carefully and critically for what is going on in Europe. Thus, as the 1995 Methodist Statement on Political Responsibility observes, "we affirm their strengths and expose their weaknesses, seeking clearer pictures of the various vested interests which we find at work."(7) Christians, then, may contribute to civil society by using their critical faculties, indeed, if Christians do not use their critical faculties when considering Europe, there is the genuine danger that Europe will not be effectively democratically accountable, to the detriment both of Europe and the citizen - though of course political apathy may not ipso facto lead to authoritarian rule, as the political ethicist, J.P. Wogaman has argued (8). In that way, by holding the EU to account, and thus by standing for Christian values, the message of the gospel may be proclaimed, not just for one's own benefit, but for the benefit of those who are on the margins of society, and who have little or no say in society's structures.

One of the weaknesses of the British approach to Europe is that discussion is so often couched in polemical terms. In Wogaman's view, "A democratic society is
well served by a citizenry not fanatically attached to single issues or causes but capable of rounded judgements and a careful weighing of ambiguous alternatives."(9) A particular contribution that Wogaman is calling for is for Christian-political dialogue rejecting the polemical approach, and seeking more rounded judgements. It would be particularly useful if local groups of Christians (as opposed to the Synod, Assembly or Conference level of the Church) began to explore European issues, and attempted to set them in the light of faith, by setting aside the polemics so commonly attached to Europe. Individual Christians, then, can engage with Europe, through familiarity and understanding, critical exploration of Europe, and a desire to defend human, civil and democratic rights.

(ii) Personal involvement in European politics and European institutions.

Another key element of the personal facet of Christian engagement with Europe, may, however, be more pro-active, and can mean that more Christians ought to become actively engaged in political activity (including party politics), not least in Europe.

When Christians become involved in the European political process, whether as politicians or as officials, in some sense, by virtue of their Christian faith, they carry with them the standard of the Church. Archbishop Temple contended that "The Church must announce Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with them. It must then pass on to Christians, acting in their civic capacity, the task of reshaping the existing order in closer conformity to those principles."(10) I have already evaluated Temple's principles in chapter 3, but what is significant here, though, is the differentiation of roles: The Church may announce principles; individual Christians acting in their civic
capacity must put them into practice. Acting in their "civic capacity" for Temple means that Christian men and women should act in a Christian way in their daily lives, especially when they have power to formulate or execute public policy. Although Temple, like his contemporary, A.C.F. Beales (see chapter 3, p. 84), does not claim that any form of government is 'Christian' per se, Temple strongly believed that individual Christians had a great contribution to make in reforming society under the guidance of Christian principles. In that sense, Christian political practitioners were the proverbial leaven in the lump. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to Temple's beliefs being realised is the general contempt for European politicians and bureaucrats. It seems to me, however, that in the face of so much public cynicism, it is of paramount importance that Christians become actively engaged in the European political process, either as politicians or as officials (below I shall group them together as 'political practitioners because, in some sense, they are mutually dependent for their roles and responsibilities). How then may these European political practitioners be rehabilitated, and how may more Christians be encouraged to get personally involved in reshaping Europe according to Christian values whilst acting in their "civic capacity"?

One of the much used images of the Christian Church has been based on 1 Peter 2.5, 9-10, which states that all Christian people are "a chosen people, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people belonging to God." It seems to me that there are a number of ideas attributed to the "priest", which can find a parallel in the political practitioners.

One important element in the traditional image of the priesthood is the sense of vocation. A common (and unsolicited) comment from the Christian Euro-MP's I spoke to during my research visit to the European Parliament was the profound sense that God had similarly called them to serve as
politicians. For many, that was at great personal cost to themselves and their families, not least because of the 3 or 4-way split of the month between Strasbourg, Brussels, constituency and home. Although there is no rite of ordination for them (unless victory at the ballot box is equivalent to the congregation's cry, "They are worthy![11]"), the Church should, I believe, not only recognise their genuine vocation to serve, but should actively affirm them in their ministry. According to a recent report, "The commitment of individual Christians to work for social and political change should also be recognised as a fully legitimate form of discipleship."(12) To this end, the Churches could and should be actively considering the possibility of setting up pastorally-focused chaplaincies to the European institutions, for presently, there are no chaplains to the institutions (13). If Christian officials and politicians were perceived as being legitimately called by God as the clergy usually are by the Church, it would, I believe, assist in the rehabilitation of the worth of political practitioners in Europe today.

Another traditional understanding of the priestly role has been the priest as representative and mediator. As such the priest represents Christ to the Church and the Church to Christ, and through prayer becomes a mediator between the two. As Frances Young comments, "the Church inherits through Christ not just the promises to Israel, but the responsibilities, to be a priestly people, representing God to the world, a go-between, a 'pontifex' or bridge builder."(14) If the Christian political practitioner has similar characteristics then the task and the responsibilities take on new significance. By virtue of their Christian faith, when acting in their "civic capacity" the Christian political practitioner will also be acting in a "priestly" way, representing God and the Church in the official arena through their values, attitudes and conduct; and also representing the civil structures to God and to the Church. The political
practitioner, thus functions not only as a mediator but also, to use Young's phrase, as a "bridge builder".

A key element in the Methodist understanding of the priesthood of all believers is that the presbyterate shares in priesthood with the whole Church of Christ. The Methodist Church's 1960 statement on ordination held that "ministers... are called and ordained to this sole occupation... but they hold no priesthood differing in kind from that which is common to the Lord's people..."(15) It is important for Christians to remember that Christian officials and politicians at work in Europe are not only there on behalf of the electorate; they are also at work as part of the community of faith. Moreover, as Christian practitioners in Europe are joined in the priesthood of all believers, so it must be equally true, that all Christians must, in some way, share the priesthood of the political practitioner. To quote Frances Young again, "The whole community of believers is built into a spiritual temple, and the whole community has a priestly office, like old Israel, to be a light to the nations." Not all Christians may be called to politics, or to the European Civil Service, but all Christians are called to reflect Christian values in all that they do as they act in their own "civic capacity". Consequently, it seems to me, that Christians have a responsibility to take European politics seriously, and those who are engaged in working with Europe day by day. Christian practitioners in Europe should not be the excuse of the Church to ignore Europe, nor the butt of jokes either. At the very least, Christians need to grasp something of the political responsibility which individuals have as "a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's own people, that you may declare the wonderful deeds of him who called you out of darkness into his marvellous light".

Unfortunately, for many, the world of practical politics is perceived as objectionable because of the ambiguity and compromise needed to keep the political wheels
moving. This, in some sense, appears to contradict the call for the employment of Christian principles. However, as Temple also pointed out, "The political problem is concerned with men as they are, not with men as they ought to be. Part of the task is so to order life as to lead them nearer to what they ought to be..."(16) Wogaman goes further by arguing that even in the midst of ambiguity and compromise the Christian practitioner can make a positive contribution to the debate and execution of policy, because Christian faith "leads one to respect the humanity of one's political adversaries..."(17) When European issues are often dominated by polemics in Britain, it is important to remember that there are Christians in each political party, as well as in the European Commission, and that respect for adversaries is an important contribution which Christian practitioners can make in the current climate.

Wogaman also believes that Christian practitioners have a perspective on history which should profoundly affect their judgements. "Because the hope of Christians is set beyond history, they are not prone to absolutize particular goals. And they are more prepared to enter into the give-and-take of political process with its necessary compromise. On the other hand, because the hope of Christians is also within history they are able to work vigorously for attainable historical goals - and even to entertain hopes long abandoned by the disillusioned and cynical."(18) When European politics can easily stagnate through the intricacies of the political currents and processes, such a long view may indeed encourage those who are involved in the processes. Thus, it seems to me, that a mixture of Temple's Christian idealism and Wogaman's political realism needs to take place, which can inform each other, and thus lead the political reality forward. It may well be that the approach of some continental European states towards consensus-seeking politics (see chapter 2, p.48) may be more akin to this approach.

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(iii) Personal encounters with other Europeans.

In addition to the political connotations of personal involvement with Europe, there are also increasing opportunities for people to engage with Europe through work, education and even the local church, both as Britons go to other parts of Europe, and as citizens of other EU and non-EU states come to the United Kingdom. Such informal personal contacts are likely to grow.

A method of personal contact with other Europeans strongly advocated by the 1994 report, *The United Reformed Church: A European Church* is church twinning. In setting down its guidelines for such arrangements, the report stresses the need for local support for the initiative, and that a commitment to the project in prayer and in sensitivity for the partner church(es) is essential. The report also points out that with the increasing practice of towns twinning within Europe, that local help and possibly even some funding, might be available if a twin was sought in a partner town. Why though should the churches consider twinning arrangements at all?

At one level, it has implications for the churches involved. "Entering into a twinning relationship is meant to help a church in Britain and a church abroad to see how each expresses its own understanding of the Gospel through its life and programmes. It should involve an experience of local life and culture as well as of national church traditions and structures." At another level, it can have implications for Europe as well.

Two of the main goals of the founders of post-war Europe, both from secular society and from the Churches (as I have shown in chapters 1 and 3) was the building up of peace and reconciliation after the devastation of war. Church twinning arrangements offer the opportunity for Christians to grow in understanding of what it means to live in another part of Europe. For many, it could be the first time that a church member has had personal contact with people from
other countries, other than through the remote experiences of package holidays where genuine encounter with the local culture and its people is strictly managed. In addition, it may, for some, offer an opportunity to work through prejudices and hurts built up over a lifetime. Perhaps when the modern political structures of Europe appear to be monolithic and remote, and political language (and sporting, as the coverage of the Euro 96 football championship showed) is often couched in nationalistic terms, it is even more essential that the barriers of prejudice are challenged by personal contact and human relations. In fact, it may well be that it is through such personal contacts that the goals of the founders of post-war Europe may best have their dreams realised. As the URC report comments, "it is from such small-scale informal friendships that greater links often develop, with significant results for European co-operation and understanding."(20)

Wherever possible, churches would do well to give time to considering church twinning arrangements.

(iv) Prayer.

An equally important element in personal engagement with Europe is through prayer for Europe as a continent, and for those who are involved in shaping Europe's life through national parliaments, the Council of Europe, and through the instruments of the European Union. In many denominational service books, prayers are included for the state and all members of parliament. There are, however, no equivalent prayers included for the European Union. Moreover, prayer cycles often refer to ecumenical links with other European churches but not the political structures. If it is right to pray for the state and those involved in government, it must also be right to pray for the governmental structures of the European Union; indeed all Christians can and should participate in the process of prayer, without being experts on European issues.
There are, then, many ways in which individuals or groups of Christians can become more personally engaged with Europe. It is not my intention to advocate that each person must do it all, but it is my hope that in the local churches each element will be taken seriously, and that individual Christians be enabled to feel that they have a part to play in the up-building of Europe.

If the Churches are effectively to engage with Europe, the personal facet of our diamond is vitally important. Equally so, the facet of the institutional Churches' engagement with Europe must also be taken seriously, and it is this second facet, I shall now explore.

FACET 2: INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT WITH EUROPE

(i) With whom?

The primary question which the Churches must ask of themselves when seeking to engage effectively with Europe is, with whom should we engage? At present there are two main European bodies with which the Church could engage: The European Union and the Council of Europe (NB. This is not the European Council, which is the EU heads of governments' summit).

As I have explained in chapter 1, both institutions have their origins in the debate about the future of Europe which took place in the early years after the Second World War. Both institutions can similarly trace their origins to the epoch-making Congress of Europe of 1948 (see pp. 12-14). At first, as Bainbridge and Teasdale have noted, "the Council of Europe was... the main forum for debate over the future of Europe..."(21) With the inauguration of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, however, the Council of Europe became overshadowed by its increasingly prominent partner. Both institutions have differing roles, however.

If the European Union can be caricatured as
the dominant political power in Europe, the Council of Europe may well be similarly caricatured as the dominant moral and ethical forum in Europe. Unlike the EU's 15 members, the Council of Europe has 34 member states. Since the Council's inception in 1949, it has been committed to "the spreading of democratic security through a common allegiance to human rights, political pluralism and respect for the rule of law." (22) Each member-state must be democratic and committed to these goals.

Perhaps the most famous contribution to post-war Europe has been the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its 1965 supplement, the European Social Charter. The importance of this contribution is widely acknowledged, indeed, in his recent book, Race for the Millenium, David Haslam notes that whilst the EU is "more structured, and of course economically powerful, ... the latter [i.e. the Council of Europe] is also important, especially where matters of human rights are concerned." (23) The Council of Europe is, however, also concerned today with culture, environmental protection, medical ethics, the fight against crime, and also supporting the countries of central and eastern Europe in the process of democratization. Despite the Council's important contribution, its fundamental weakness is that its conventions do not automatically have the force of law in member countries. It is entirely at the discretion of member states as to whether they are ratified in national law. However, in recent years, significant areas of agreement and overlap between the Council of Europe and the European Union have emerged. For example, although there is virtually no mention of human rights in the Treaty of Rome, "Article F2 of the Maastricht Treaty requires the European Union to respect the rights set out in the Convention and in the constitution of member states 'as general principles of Community law'." (24) Teasdale and Bainbridge further note that the European Commission and Parliament are in
favour of the Union itself becoming party to the Convention, with the effect that the Convention would become EU law. Further to the issue of human rights, the EU is also now engaged in promoting environmental protection; the Maastricht Treaty also grants the EU increasing powers in the fight against organised crime. Thus, the argument follows: if political power (and therefore the power to change things via legislation) resides in Brussels and not with the Council of Europe, then the Churches should in fact really be concentrating on engaging the instruments of the European Union if they want to influence Europe for the better, rather than with a body that has no power to enforce its decisions, however worthy they may be.

It is my contention in this chapter that the Churches' engagement with Europe should be multi-faceted and comprehensive. I do not believe, therefore, that it need be a case of the churches only engaging with either the European Union or the Council of Europe. In fact, there are, I believe, compelling reasons for the churches in England to actively engage with both the EU and the Council of Europe, as I shall now explain.

Firstly, the Council of Europe is more truly pan-European than the European Union is, or is likely to be in the foreseeable future. Therefore any influence that the churches may bring to bear in Europe can arguably be far more widespread than simply by working with the EU. Indeed, as Diana Pinto noted, in an implied criticism of the EU, "with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Council of Europe was finally free to attain its 'natural' pan-European scope. It is thus not an overstatement to say that the revolutions of 1989 did not throw the Council of Europe into an existential crisis but instead brought it back to full life."(25) Certainly the Council became more genuinely pan-European than it had ever been. Equally, because the Amsterdam Treaty failed adequately to address the question of internal reform, the process of enlargement has
been made significantly more difficult because "applicants [face] the unsettling prospect of either negotiating entry terms without knowing what influence they will wield as members in the EU's two key institutions, or risking a delay in completing the talks until the Union has agreed its own internal institutional reforms."(26) Because the Church in Europe transcends national barriers, they can hold the claims of the EU and non-EU states together, as they remind the EU that Europe is made up of many more nations than the 15 states of the EU.

Secondly, it is clear that, despite the Council of Europe's relative obscurity when compared with the European Union, it has, nevertheless, been an important force in Europe for moral and ethical reflection, and the challenge to European states to enshrine its ethical conventions in their own national laws. However, its limited authority clearly means that such moral and ethical reflection must also take place within the political structures of the EU as well. By engaging with both institutions the churches can act as a bridge, bringing moral and ethical reflection and challenge to the EU, and also bringing political realism into the work of the Council of Europe.

Thirdly, whilst it is certainly true that the European Union wields great political power whereas the Council of Europe can only operate as a moral/ethical pressure group through intergovernmental co-operation, it is not true to say that the Churches should only be engaged with the Council of Europe simply because on the surface its raison d'être seems more akin to the churches' agenda. That would simply re-enforce the dualist tendency that wants to keep the churches talking about morality, whilst leaving the structures of political society well alone. As one Christian MEP impressed upon me, he believed that Europe was where power would increasingly reside; indeed he felt he could achieve far more for his constituency as an MEP than he could even as a government back-bencher at
Thus, by engaging with both structures, the Churches can claim that both ethics and structures are within the churches purview as it works within society. How then, should the English churches effectively engage with Europe?

(ii) Understanding, Scrutiny and Reflection.

One of the vitally important steps for the Churches as institutions to take, is the seemingly obvious one, of becoming familiar with how the European institutions work. Ludlow and Nurser's admonishment for the Church's lack of understanding (described in chapter 4) should be take seriously. However, as the recent spate of denominational reports exploring the structures of Europe has shown, the English Churches are becoming more interested in the question of Europe, however belatedly that might be. As such, it provides the beginning of the process of engagement. What seems to be needed just as much, however, is to engage the congregations of the Church with the issue of Europe, so that they can share in the Church's reflection. Under One Roof is a start in this direction.

Secondly, as with individuals, the Churches need to give careful attention to what is happening in the European institutions and in European society as a whole. To some extent Eurobulletin outlines what is happening; Methodists Looking at Europe takes the process further by exploring not only some of the issues affecting the EU, but also the values of its peoples. The Tablet continues to analyse the politics of Europe. Crucial to this, though, will be a critical examination of the media which, as I have commented, often appears to have an a priori bias against anything European, irrespective of the relative merits of the topic. However, if the Church is to effectively understand the implications of what is happening in and to Europe, it needs to give priority to listening.

Equally, the Churches must begin to listen to the voice of faith and teaching. Temple's argument that the
Churches may legitimately be involved in the political process was based on his belief that Christians have a contribution to make which comes from the corpus of Christian teaching. If the Churches are to engage critically with Europe, they must be actively involved in theological reflection upon European society. What has been notably deficient in the Churches' reports is theological reflection. The Churches must listen to faith and the call of God in addition to the voices of the marginalised, the nations and Christian communities in order to have a deep understanding of what is happening in Europe both politically and to the people within and outside Europe's borders.

(iii) Listening.

As I explained in chapter 3 (see p.78f), one of Bishop Bell's great inspirations during World War Two was his belief in the Church as *Una Sancta* - the Christian fellowship which transcended all national barriers. It is no less important for the churches in England to remember that it is part of *Una Sancta* too, for a vital part of the English Churches' contribution is that of listening to Christians in other parts of Europe and the wider world. This is essential because some policies may seem to be beneficial to British or European citizens, but may be actively harmful to other people. If the English churches are to guard against national parochialism, and thus to speak with the global view in mind, they must listen to what is being said by Christians around the world. Two obvious examples of areas of concern which illustrate the point are the disputes over the reduction of fishing in order to conserve stocks; and trade from developing nations with the EU. What might benefit British fishermen might deplete fishing stocks; EU protectionism could easily hamper the economic growth of developing nations. To explore where justice is to be found, will mean careful listening. Only as a result of careful listening can the English churches hope to
speak with the authority of the *Una Sancta*.

Another important group of people to listen to are those in European society who are effectively disfranchised from the political process, and on the margins of society, such as migrant workers and racial minorities. If the Church is effectively to hold to account the structures and process of European society, it must listen to those who are affected by those structures, and indeed to the widest possible cross-section of society.

(iv) Speaking out.

The Church's engagement with Europe must go beyond listening, it must also be prepared to speak out when necessary, for, in Bishop Bell's memorable phrase, "It is not the Church's function to say ditto to the State." (28)

In his essay, *Hints and Guesses: Changes in Europe as a Challenge to Congregations*, Alastair Hulbert (Executive Secretary of EECCS), explains that "In Brussels and Strasbourg the churches are developing a 'theology of insistence' vis-à-vis the European institutions. It constitutes an ongoing missionary programme: advocacy on issues of justice and ethics and critical dialogue about the economics and cultural paradigm." (29) It is worth considering the implications of Hulbert's programme.

The first point to note is that Hulbert is calling for a "theology of insistence" rather than a "theology of resistance". It is a theology which agrees with Temple and Bell's view that the Church has a right and duty to speak out on social and political issues. Moreover, it is a challenge to the churches not to treat Europe with passivity; the churches should state their case positively, rather than merely resisting what is happening in Europe.

The second element in Hulbert's programme is the advocacy of justice and ethics. If the Church is to have any credibility with the marginalised in European society; and
if the Church is to listen to what people are saying beyond the EU's borders, then the Church must, as a world-wide institution, serve as a voice for the voiceless in the advocacy of a just global society. However, as the persistent controversy over the merits of liberation theology has shown, it is by no means clear that this is possible yet. Furthermore, the Church should be calling for the highest ethical standards in Europe's life. This, however, does not simply mean high standards of probity from officials. It means that Europe must act ethically in all things. As such, the Church must act as a guardian for such high standards, and speak out where such standards are violated.

The third element in Hulbert's programme of action is a critical dialogue about the economic and cultural paradigm. According to a recent statement of political responsibility, "The Church... needs to become an arena for moral reflection on the way the corporate state operates - affirming and criticising what goes on. And it needs to recover its confidence in being able to affect the way society is run by large institutions and faceless bureaucracies."(30) This seems to me to be what Hulbert is principally calling for. This means that the churches cannot give an ecclesiastical monologue. They must be prepared to listen and to exchange ideas with the European institutions. Equally importantly, in Hulbert's view, "Inspired by the prophetic vision of the Bible, Christians must join forces with others outside the church to open up new fields of social discourse as Western civilization advances deeper and deeper into a cul-de-sac."(31) Thus, others may join the dialogue, not least of whom may be other faith communities in Europe. Through genuine dialogue what is good about the economic and cultural paradigm may be affirmed; what is objectionable has the chance to be reformed.

The fourth factor in Hulbert's statement is his assertion that the whole process is an integral part of the Church's missionary programme. This too is important for the
Churches to remember, for it reasserts the claim that the Churches have a legitimate mission to the structures of society as well as to individuals. It affirms that the Church should, as part of its total mission, bring the challenge of its teaching and principles to bear when considering the present and future direction of Europe in just as serious a way as if it were considering mission and service in a local housing estate. So vital is the Church's mission to Europe, that Keith Jenkins observes in his provocative comment, "If the European Union is to evolve into a self-centred, self-protective free trade area seeking to isolate itself from other parts of Europe and other continents, let the churches remain silent. If, however, they recognise their responsibility to contribute to the debate about goals and methods... they must recognise that now is the time to make their analyses, stimulate debate in church and society and make their voices heard."(32) It is, like Bishop Bell before him, Keith Jenkins' view that the Church must have a word for the times.

Together insistence, advocacy, critical dialogue, when seen as part of the Church's mission form the framework for a potentially fruitful engagement with the structures of European society. "In the wake of the collapse of Communism and the consequent uncertainty, there seems to be a greater openness to discussing issues of mutual concern among politicians and civil servants at the European level."(33) Moreover, Jacques Delors called for the discovery of a soul for Europe. As Jenkins noted (see above), the door appears to be open for the Churches to take part in the dialogue. One question remains, however, how may the Church's work with the institutions?

(v) The practicalities.

One possibility would be for each denomination to set up an office in Brussels in order to represent their church's interests and concerns. The Quaker
Council for European Affairs and the office of the EKD are examples of this. However, with the multiplicity of denominations in England, let alone the United Kingdom, this option seems problematical. It would be an inefficient use of the Churches' financial and human resources. Ironically, it would also serve to diminish the Church's voice rather than enhance it. For example, it is far more likely that the European Commission would listen to a united voice representing 4-5 million people, rather than voices individually representing (in the case of Methodism) around 500,000 people.

Another alternative would be to use the existing European ecumenical bodies as a means of entering into dialogue with the European institutions. How committed are the churches to such bodies, though? One problem, in Hermann Barth's view, is that whilst the main focus of the Church's mission is rightly in the local community (cf Atherton, pp.68-82), "it is also obvious that the Churches in their work cannot stick to the structures of the past when political and economic structures change."(34) In other words, Europe must no longer be peripheral to Christian thinking as it is at present, but central to it.

The Church of England's report, Europe, asks whether the English Churches are prepared to pay the price for engaging with Europe. All the evidence has hitherto suggested that they are not, for, although the western European churches have hitherto paid the 'fees' of the eastern European churches taking a full part in the CEC, the report also notes that the Churches' Council for Britain and Ireland have failed to allocate funding for EECCS, unlike its predecessor, the British Council of Churches. Only the Church of England and the Church of Scotland from the UK have substantially contributed to the funding of EECCS (35). At the barest minimum, the churches need to adequately fund the European ecumenical organisations that already exist. In the case of EECCS, which usually has Councils of Churches rather than individual
denominations affiliated to it, the CCBI needs to address the issue carefully.

If, however, the churches are effectively and efficiently to engage with Europe on an ecumenical basis, then a number of implications follow. The English churches need not only to co-operate ecumenically in the local community, they need to be deeply committed to working together when exploring the issue of Europe too. Otherwise, as is so often the case, the vision and the work load will continue to rest on a few dedicated people. Secondly, the Churches need to work towards finding common ground on European issues wherever possible, for, as Philip Ludlow has remarked, "I cannot imagine that there is a specific 'Anglican' as opposed to a 'Methodist' position on most if not all the more important issues actively or prospectively under consideration at a European level."(36) If that is to be the case, then the churches need also to be prepared to allocate personnel, academic, theological and financial resources to the project. Thirdly, if this is in place, then it would be worth the English Churches either setting up an office in Brussels, or affiliating themselves with EECCS in a formal way (or both), so that the fruits of the Church's commitment can be worked out in dialogue with the Commission. Barth is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that even with the present ecumenical structures in Europe, "In terms of the capacity to act, the Churches lag far behind political and economic institutions". Perhaps it is only when these questions are answered that the Churches will be ready to engage effectively with Europe.

The Churches, then, must engage with Europe, not only through the facet of personal engagement, they must also engage at an institutional level as well. But as I shall now argue, alongside the personal and institutional facets of the diamond, must also be the theological facet - the principles that underpin the Churches' engagement.
FACET 3: THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT

As I explained in chapter 1, there were four main aims of the founding architects of post-war Europe: the securing of a just and lasting peace in Europe; reconciliation between former enemies - crucial to this was a Franco-German rapprochement; the reconstruction of a devastated continent; and the rebuilding of material prosperity for Europe's people. As I have argued in my first two chapters, I believe that these goals have, in the main, been achieved by the EC/EU. Ironically, with the passing of the years, and because of the achievement of Europe's post-war aspirations - it is, for example, inconceivable to my generation that Britain should ever go to war with Germany - Europe is now in a time of deep uncertainty about its present values and goals for the future. I would go so far as to suggest that Europe now needs a new vision to guide it into the next century.

During the past 50 years the name of the European enterprise has undergone a number of changes. The European Union was initially the European Coal and Steel Community; this developed into the European Economic Community (the Common Market); this then metamorphosed into the European Communities (EC); and latterly, into the European Union. To some extent, it reflects a shift in emphasis from solely economic integration into a more fully integrated Europe ('Union'). What is perhaps to be regretted, in these days of the EU's unpopularity with the public, is that the idea of community has been dropped from Europe's institutional 'title', and from common parlance. Instead, Keith Jenkins' nightmare vision of Europe's evolution into a "self-centred, self-protective free trade area", where governments operate solely on the basis of national self-interest, let alone European self-interest, seems to be just as likely as an open Union. Consequently, it is my belief, that one of the greatest contributions that the Church can make to the future
development of Europe for the next century, is to rehabilitate a deep-rooted theology of community. Indeed, it is, I believe, the principle of community, worked out in practice, which is, I believe, the best hope for Europe's development.

One of the most profound New Testament images of the Church is Saint Paul's description of the Church in 1 Corinthians 12 as the "Body of Christ". Written to a community faced with jealousies and divisions over what were the greater spiritual gifts, the image has become paradigmatic of what it is to be the Church, and also, what the implications are for life in community. It is not my intention to argue that Europe is or must be synonymous with the Church as a new Christendom. However, many of the problems implicit in 1 Corinthians 12 and many of the implications of community living which Paul draws from the Corinthian church's problems can, in my judgement, find parallels in the present community of Europe as well. Thus, I shall argue, that four of the ideas in Paul's image of the Body in 1 Corinthians 12, can profitably teach a secular society practical lessons about living in a diverse community.

(i) Individuality.

The first principle which Paul's image suggests is the principle of God-given individuality. For Paul, one of the abiding truths of the Corinthian community was that God had given many different spiritual gifts to individuals. For any community, the basic unit is the individual. William Temple argued, moreover, that "The primary principle of Christian Ethics and Christian Politics must be respect for every person simply as a person... The person is primary, not the society..."(37) As Cardinal Hume points out, because "The theme of human dignity is fundamental to the Church's teaching..."(38) the Church is therefore committed to the defence of human dignity and human rights. It is equally the
duty of the Church to speak out where the rights of the individual or social groups are infringed and the dignity of each person is undermined.

This belief challenges Britain to ask again, what it sees Europe's purpose to be. As I have argued in my first two chapters, part of the problem of Britain's perceived awkwardness in relation to Europe has been because it has tended to see Europe as a free-trade area, and has resisted fiercely any idea of a social Europe. "There is no such thing as society" as one former Prime Minister famously put it. However, if the European Union is more than a complex trading area, and thus has a social function too, then Britain must alter its attitudes. It must recognise that European society is made up of individual human beings made in the image of God, first and foremost. Thus, success of the EU should not simply be judged by trading balance sheets, but also how the EU flourishes as a society, and thus how it enables its citizens to flourish as part of that society.

(ii) Diversity.

The corollary of the principle of respecting God-given individuality is the principle of affirming God-given diversity. In Paul's image of the body such diversity of spiritual gifts had been given to individuals "for the common good" (39) and not just for the self-edification of the individual. It seems to me that in this way, Paul's image of the body affirms both human individuality and diversity as being gifts from God.

If, as Temple suggests, a single nation-state is a community of communities (40), then the EU (which is a group of nation-states) needs to remember that, as Beales pointed out with the pertinent example of Switzerland, many differing communities and nation-states make up modern Europe. It must therefore actively avoid excluding individuals and communities from the life of Europe, especially religious,
ethnic and cultural groups which are on Europe's fringes, such as post-colonial immigrants, refugees and Travellers.

Such God-given diversity can, however, be extremely threatening to people. It should not be forgotten that the present-day Europe arose after its virtual destruction caused by a regime committed to the elimination of all racial and cultural diversity. There are however, I believe, a number of important implications that Paul's celebration of diversity poses for the modern-day Europe.

Europe must guard against the tendency towards uniformity. Of course common standards on safety, service, quality of goods and so on should be welcomed in a community, but they must not be allowed to be a precursor for a European mono-culture. Rather, the European Union needs to recognise that it is a "Community of Communities" (states) which are themselves "Communities of Communities", and support and sustain such diversity in national, historical and cultural life. This is especially important if the rights and traditions of ethnic and religious minorities are to be safeguarded in the face of "The juggernaut of Western culture..."(41) which can easily swallow up opposition and cultural diversity.

Reflecting on the problem of language in Europe, Methodists Looking at Europe believes that "The limits of Europe's unity are closely connected to its multi-lingual nature. It seems improbable that it could ever become a polity able to meet a crisis with a common voice."(42) Thus it is of concern that, because of the huge costs incurred by the EU through providing translation services that there is the possibility of language facilities being restricted. As A.C.F. Beales noted in The Catholic Church and International Order, it is incumbent upon all states (and therefore the European Union) to preserve and defend the rights of all minorities within them. Preserving access to information through the preservation and affirmation of language can play an important role. Indeed, it is not only important for cultural richness, but for
democratic accountability that official material must be available for all of the EU's official national languages, and that translations are not excluded for the more minority national languages such as Danish or Swedish.

The principle or truth of human diversity must also be a challenge to the Churches (as indeed the multiplicity of spiritual gifts were to the Corinthian Church). As Suzanne Gee notes, "As intolerance and religious discrimination are often found within religious groups, such communities can and should inform and educate people about religious communities other than their own." Furthermore, Gee also believes that "Churches should take advantage of their transnational links and, through contacts with partner churches, identify themselves with the task of reconciliation between majorities and minorities. They should help to promote peaceful co-existence and mutual recognition...(43)

(iii) Mutuality.

The next principle which Paul's image of the body stresses is the principle of mutual worth: "If all were a single organ, where would the body be?"(1 Corinthians 12.19) As Professor Barrett put it, "The members of a human body are various and inter-related; they are diverse, but form a unity."(44) In essence, this means that, because all individuals are created in the image of God, and because God has willed human diversity, no individual person is more important than another; no ethnic group or culture is more worthwhile than another; no state is superior to another, nor does it have absolute sovereignty. As Beales put it, "only a society of persons can make up for this inadequacy of the individual person."(45) Equally, each component part, necessary for the building up of the whole, has great worth, for "each person has a function, a vocation, in relation to the whole community."(46)

For William Temple, the corporate nature of
human society was summed up in the word, 'fellowship'. "For the completeness of personality, there is needed the relationship to both God and neighbours. The richer his personal relations, the more fully personal he will be."(47) For him, fellowship and community were the antithesis of exclusive individuality, and yet it was precisely in fellowship that the individual personality could flourish and mature.

Temple's understanding of fellowship means that, on the one hand, in Europe today, we should warn that no individual, group, culture or nation has the right to dominate another, precisely because each component part is valuable. Equally, we must also affirm that each individual component of European society serves to build up the whole and enrich us all. Therein lies Europe's potential richness, because it is made up of individual parts. Paradoxically, then, it is by being ourselves in community, that we find expressed our true worth. However, for many, this means radically altering their view of Europe, for if Europe is to develop into a genuine community which affirms the mutuality of worth of all its partners, then our use of language needs to change. Commonly, European negotiations are cast as being conducted between 'them and us'. Thus, if something happens 'we' don't like, it is because 'Europe has forced us to do this'. Instead, we need to move to the language of co-operation and honesty, so that we might hear instead that 'As part of the Community of Europe, we have agreed to do this, because being part of a community involves give-and-take, because we are committed to each other.' As I have shown in my first two chapters, Britain has been far more central to Europe when it is happy to negotiate openly and honestly as an equal partner, instead of adopting a childish insistence of always getting its own way even in the minutiae of detail.

The belief in the mutuality of worth also has, I believe, constitutional implications as well. One of the most significant catholic social doctrines, as I observed in
chapter 4, is the principle of subsidiarity. Enshrined in the 1931 papal encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, and "elaborated in response to fear of a growing centralization of state authority. It was intended to defend intermediary bodies - families, enterprises, associations - constituted on the basis of civil society." (48) It was, thus intended, to affirm the worth of each order of society, and to defend their freedom and rights. Cardinal Hume defines the principle of subsidiarity thus, "It is a recognition that people, because of who and what they are, should be empowered to take decisions for their own lives with due regard for the interests of the wider community." He adds, "It is clearly opposed to excessive bureaucracy, to paternalism, to the imposition of policies and strategies by the strong on the weak. It emphasizes the need to develop human potential as God-given and as the greatest resource possessed by this planet." (49) As I have explained in chapters 2 and 4, the principle of subsidiarity has been 'adopted' by the European Union. In effect the principle is applied to determine which 'level' of government should be responsible for which aspect of community life. Hitherto, it has been primarily used to define the relationship between the powers of state and EU. Clearly, however, if the principle of the mutuality of worth is to be taken seriously; if each person is to be as free - indeed Temple claimed that freedom was the real goal of politics (50) - then decisions affecting peoples' lives need to be taken as near to each person as possible. To quote Voyé once more, the principle of subsidiarity "affirms the rights and duties of people, and similarly of each level of the social order to define their ends, and to be helped by the higher level in seeking these ends without interference... negatively, the principle of subsidiarity denies any higher level group the right to deprive any lower group, and more fundamentally still, the person of their responsibility of initiative." (51)

If the European Union is to take the
principle of subsidiarity, then in fact, it has far wider implications than just the distribution of powers between national governments and the EU. It implies that if lower levels can deal with issues - regional, local and community governments, for example, then they are the levels at which decisions should be taken, so that people can have as much direct access to decision making as possible. Clearly in Britain, however, the trend of the last 20 years has been the movement of power upwards - from local to central government and from Westminster also to Brussels. Undoubtedly there is a rôle for these tiers of government. There seems to be, in my judgement, merit in Edward Mortimer's belief (52) in the need to move (dare one say it?) to a more genuinely federal Europe. This is not to be misinterpreted as an argument for centralising power with the EU. A genuine federal structure, such as those of the United States or Germany, actually defines authority and power at particular levels. Moreover, it has a constitutional court for appellants to approach if the appropriate authority is abused. If we are serious in affirming the mutuality of worth of people, groups, states, then the organs of power need to be as close to them as possible - as does defence against excessive bureaucracy. A federal structure applying the concept of subsidiarity and affirming the mutuality of worth within European society, which responds to the needs of people and defends their freedoms, needs to be seriously examined by the Churches and by civil society as a whole, with polemics set aside.

(iv) Responsibility.

As the principle of subsidiarity implies, the attendant principle to a mutuality of worth is a mutuality of responsibility, for, as Temple argued, "the combination of freedom and Fellowship as principles of social life issues in the obligation of service."(53) To return to the Pauline image, "... that the members may have the same care for one another.
If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honoured, all rejoice together." (1 Corinthians 12.25b-26)

For St. Paul, the bestowal of spiritual gifts was for the building up of the community. It was the duty of the gifted person to share the gift with the church. For Temple, it was the responsibility of free citizens also to serve, whether that be in voluntary work or work for the state. Thus, the implication is, that if some failed to serve, the whole community suffered.

Relating to this belief in the mutuality of responsibility of service is the Catholic social doctrine of solidarity, which The Common Good defines as "the willingness to see others as another 'self', and so to regard injustice committed against another as no less a serious injustice against oneself." (paragraph 23) So what are the implications of a doctrine of solidarity as mutual responsibility?

Firstly, it affirms that by virtue of our common God-created humanity, we have solidarity with all people, irrespective of their race, colour, creed, nationality or language, and moreover, irrespective of whether people are citizens of the European Union or not. This privilege brings with it responsibility. We have a responsibility to all the people of the world, and especially those in the developing two-thirds world. One such way is to ensure that all countries have the ability to trade honestly and openly with the EU. That means that in the interest of global justice, the EU's protectionist and self-interested trading patterns need to phased out. As Europeans we cannot stand in our fortress and yet claim to stand in solidarity with those who wait outside, without doing something to lift the portcullis.

As well as 'national' solidarity as that might be described, Europeans have a duty of responsibility to those who come from third countries, so that they do not remain marginalised. The book of Exodus states the duty of concern clearly: "You shall not wrong a stranger or oppress him, for
you were strangers in the land of Egypt. You shall not afflict any widow or orphan. If you do afflict them, and they cry out to me, I will surely hear their cry." (54) There are parallels today.

There are many 'strangers' in Europe today — refugees who came to the EU seeking a haven from persecution, yet for whom 'freedom' has meant the journey from the airport to the prison cell without the 'distraction' of a court. Europe needs a common, just and humane refugee policy, if we are to claim we take our solidarity with those who are seeking sanctuary with us seriously. There are also many migrant workers in Europe today, who, as the many vicious arson attacks in Germany in 1991 showed, can easily become the scape-goat for society's ills. There is a duty of hospitality and protection to all whom we invite here. Yet the underlying problem remains: in a just global society the inevitability of economic refugees or migrant workers may well be reduced and eradicated, but until that is the case, we must work for justice in the world, and within Europe.

Equally there are parallels with the "widows and orphans" — those who are citizens, and yet who are made to feel that they do not belong. For there are many in our society who feel disenfranchised: racial and religious minorities, the poor, the long-term unemployed. They are within society; they are citizens of the EU, and yet are variously ignored, criticized, and ostracised. Christians, however, have the duty to stand alongside those of our own society, who feel they have no place. And if Europe's policies do not address those who are marginalised, then their policies need to be challenged vigorously. Indeed, we need to take Paul's comment seriously, when one part of the body suffers, the whole of the body suffers. It is no less true of global or European society, than of the Corinthian church.

Solidarity, though, also has another, and altogether more positive dimension because "if one member is
honoured, all rejoice together" (1 Cor. 12.26b) For the Church, the sharing of gifts enriched the whole. As European Christians, by virtue of our common humanity, we also stand in solidarity with all people in Europe irrespective of their religious beliefs, because we share a common European home. We live in a society which is indeed multi-cultural and multi-faith. It is important for Christians to acknowledge our own responsibility to work for renewal in Europe, by humbly restating principles, through which the Churches can engage with Europe at institutional and at the personal level. But equally, we have a duty to work with all people who are sincere about exploring the future of Europe. Perhaps in that way, as we acknowledge our solidarity with all people, we will have the opportunity through dialogue - and also through being open to criticism and challenge - to state our Christian beliefs and to listen to the values of others, and thus to discover what it is to be a common humanity, and to build up a common European home.

St. Paul's image does, then, have much to commend it as a model of principles for the Church to explore, and from which the Church can examine what is happening in European society. Do we acknowledge and celebrate our individuality? Does Europe rejoice in its diversity? Do our policies affirm the mutuality of our worth, without demeaning the contributions of the marginalised and oppressed? Do we also acknowledge our responsibilities as an international community both to the world outside it and the world within? The real challenge of St. Paul, though, was more profound than that. It was to challenge the Corinthian church to reorientate itself towards the outworking of love and service, that was the greatest challenge of all.

Do the English churches, then, have anything from their own experience and example to offer to the future of Europe?

As I highlighted at the beginning of
chapter 3, one of the distinctive features of English ecclesiastical life has been its 3-part composition of Anglican, Roman Catholic and Free Churches. It is a structure not found anywhere outside of the British Isles. Over the centuries since the Reformation the relations between the three have changed; from the quest for uniformity and persecution for non-conformity, to grudging acceptance, to tolerance, and, in many instances today, of deeply committed co-operation and partnership. In some places the co-operation has had dramatic effects, as as been seen in Liverpool (55). In other places, it has been less dramatic, but no less important, as churches have come together in partnerships, sharing agreements and so on.

Another remarkable feature of the war years, shown in chapter 3, was the growing ecumenical movement, characterised by the spirit of the Stoll Theatre meetings and formalised by the creation of the British Council of Churches in 1942. In recent years ecumenical commitment has been re-affirmed, most strikingly in the Swanwick Declaration of September 1987 (56). Since then, the British Council of Churches has been replaced by the Churches' Council of Britain and Ireland, and by national bodies, such as Churches Together in England. Such developments have much to offer to Europe.

The most striking feature has been the way in which the Churches have moved from intolerance to acceptance and co-operation. In some ways, this mirrors what has been happening in Europe during the last 50 years. What is equally true, however, is that the Church is not yet one, and such brokenness is, in Cardinal Hume's view, a scandal (57). However, what has been remarkable has been the renewal of the quest for unity amidst diversity. As the Swanwick Declaration put it, "In the unity we seek we recognise that there will not be uniformity but legitimate diversity."(58) Although there is no common understanding as to what form unity may take (again perhaps mirroring the EU), it is nevertheless a clear commitment to recognition of the richness and importance of
diversity, whilst recognising that the underlying unity of faith is more important than the divisions. It is, I believe, an important concept for the EU to grasp: a European unity and polity which respects diversity of national, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds, and yet which can celebrate all that we have in common. It equally recognises that diversity cannot be compressed into uniformity. As the EU works out what that means in practice, so the Churches must also share in that journey as they learn what it means to be united in diversity.

Secondly, "The Church understands itself to be the place where the Spirit sustains a profound unity in the midst of all the diversity as a sign and instrument of reconciliation in the world. Mission and unity belong together."(59) In other words, the quest for unity is not for its own sake, however important that may be in itself. It is unity for service. As post-war European structures achieved their aims in the West, perhaps now the quest for European unity needs to recognise its own call to service afresh: service towards Central and Eastern Europe; service towards the two-thirds world. As the Churches are interpreting the call to be one as a call to serve, the EU needs to adopt a similar understanding, if it is to avoid a narrowness which may be injurious to the rest of the world.

In no way can the English Churches' experience be said to be perfect. Manifestly the Church is not united, and often hesitant in its service. It is, though, equally true to say that attitudes have profoundly changed for the better since the beginning of World War II. It is my hope that the ecumenical pilgrimage will continue, and in so doing, by celebrating its rich diversity and call to serve. This can be a journey which Europe and the Churches can share together, as they wrestle with many of same issues: unity, diversity and responsibility.
CONCLUSIONS

From the outset of the Second World War, as I illustrated in chapter 1, a critical question emerged for many people, both in the Church and outside it: what kind of Europe should emerge after the war was over? It became clear that if war was to be avoided, four aims needed to be realised: the maintenance of peace; reconciliation; reconstruction; and material prosperity. Many concluded that the pre-war structures and old inter-governmental alliances had failed these aims; the pooling of national sovereignty became, for many, the means to achieve these aims. Such desires appeared to reach their apotheosis with the formation of the European Economic Community in 1958. It seemed to realise the vision of the wartime political and ecclesiastical leaders. That other member states wanted to join, and continue to want to join for their own security and economic well-being is testimony to its success.

As I have shown in chapters 1 and 2, the developments since the war have been organic, rather than expressly planned. Powers and responsibilities have moved between national governments and the European institutions since 1958. Clearly what we have in Europe is not perfect. There are serious questions over the democratic accountability of the EU; its relations with countries outside its borders; its ability even to relate to its own citizens. Its aims may have been fulfilled, but Europe is also in a time of malaise. It stands, in fact, at a crossroads, wondering which way to turn. Whichever way it turns, as Churchill realised 50 years ago, it must carry the hearts of people with it.

As I explained in chapter 3, English Church leaders were equally concerned about the future of Europe as the war progressed. Churchmen like Archbishop Temple, Bishop Bell and A.C.F. Beales wrestled with the question of how Europe might develop. Each in their own way pointed to the limits of
structures. Structures have their role - though each was careful not to advocate a particular governmental structure - but what was more important was that Christian principles underpinned the structure. Regrettably, just as British politicians turned their thinking away from Europe after the war, so did the Churches'. Although, in the 1960's there was a time when the English Church's thinking was much in advance of its secular counterparts, from then until the late 1980's the English Churches generally remained silent about Europe.

It apparently needed the seismic shock of the collapse of Communism on the continent, and the eruptions in the British Conservative Party to reawaken the Churches from their European slumber. Many of their reports since then have been limited in their scope: some describing the changes in Europe; others highlight issues of concern. Very few have moved into any deeper theological reflection and engagement with modern day Europe, which is highly regrettable, considering that the UK has been part of the EC for 24 years. Equally regrettable has been the Churches' lack of support for organisations such as EECCS, who are attempting to wrestle with European issues daily. It is to be hoped that now that EECCS is to become an agency of the Conference of European Churches, that a new prominence will be given to such work. Do the English Churches have a word, then, of value to offer to Europe, in the light of such past weakness?

It seems to me, in the light of chapters 3 and 4 that if the Churches are to speak a word of value today, then the Churches' attitudes and practice needs to change significantly. Thus, I advocate a diamond as a model of the Church's potential engagement with Europe, for the diamond is multi-faceted, extremely durable, and has a cutting edge second to none. Sadly, the Church's message today towards Europe is blunt, because its engagement has been neither comprehensive or durable. Thus, I believe that it is imperative that the Churches must begin to engage in a comprehensive way not
hitherto seen.

The Churches must engage, and be engaged by Europe at various levels. It is vital that individual Christians feel that they have an active part to play in Europe's life, whether it be through holding the EU to account; working in the institutions; personal relationships or prayer. It is equally important that the Churches as institutions catch up, learning how Europe works, engaging in scrutinizing what is happening. Equally, it must learn with whom to engage! It must comprehensively engage with the political realities, and not just with selective 'moral' issues.

Underpinning these issues, however, is the level of Christian principles which, as Temple and others realised, must underpin any political structure. It is my belief that, in these times of malaise and uncertainty, and in an age so often characterised by individualism, that the Church rediscovering the principle and richness of Community as a way of underpinning the EU. St. Paul's image of the Body of Christ illuminates many of the elements of Community life: an affirmation of the unique nature and worth of each human being; a celebration of God-given diversity; but equally importantly, a realisation of the responsibility of each person for the good of the whole. In that way the concepts of subsidiarity and solidarity both point towards our responsibility to others, including those on the fringes or outside of Europe. Clearly though, the Churches cannot teach Europe how to behave, without addressing its own failure to be the body of Christ. Its disunity is a severe hindrance to the effectiveness of the message. Thus, if the Church is to advocate that Europe must change, the Church must, itself, be prepared to change, and address some of the same questions it faces.

Temple and Beales could easily be accused of not being able to relate principle to reality. Am I simply advocating a utopian ideal, then? I hope not! To quote the cliché, the Church must not be all heavenly minded and no
earthly good. It is absolutely vital that the Church address the political and social realities as they are - and not just be a moral or issue-based pressure group. The Churches cannot hope to effectively engage with Europe, let alone change it, if they are not grounded in the way things are, and the way people are. Equally though, I also believe that it is important that Christians carry a sufficient amount of idealism with them that can enable themselves and the Church to see beyond the immediate, and to see how things could be. Is that not, in fact, what such war-time leaders (and post-war European architects) like Adenauer, Schumann and de Gasperi, did? Indeed the Churches must give a vision for the future, leaving no question of just of 'tinkering with the edges'. I want to advocate pro-active Christian engagement with Europe which is truly comprehensive in its scope; which is inspired by Christian faith and underpinned by Christian principles; but which deals with reality in Europe. Unless the Churches manage hold to these ideals in tension, and allow them to be exposed to one another for illumination and development, the Church's message will continue to lack durability or a cutting edge. Thus, in David Edwards' phrase, "as a new Europe is born, European Christianity must be reborn"(60) - and, we might add, English Christianity too.

NOTES

(1) 'Foreword' in G.K.A. Bell, Christianity and World Order, p.vii.
(2) John Atherton, The Scandal of Poverty, p.71
(3) Atherton, p.72
(5) Ernest Wistrich, The United States of Europe, p.98
(7) Methodist Statement on Political Responsibility, para. 39a
(8) J.P. Wogaman, Christian Perspectives in Politics, p.170
(9) Wogaman, p.175
(10) Temple, Christianity and Social Order, p.58
(11) Methodist Ordination Service, p.G7
(12) Methodist Statement on Political Responsibility, para. 45c & 45d.

(13) Note: Although there is an Anglican chaplaincy in Strasbourg, the priest is chaplain to the Anglican community in the city of Strasbourg. He also serves as the Archbishop of Canterbury's Representative to the Council of Europe. He does not serve, however, as a chaplain to either institutions.


(15) 'Ordination in the Methodist Church (1960)', printed in Statements of the Methodist Church on Faith and Order 1933-1983, p.126

(16) Temple, p.60

(17) Wogaman, p.176

(18) Wogaman, p.175

(19) The United Reformed Church: A European Church, p.25

(20) The United Reformed Church: A European Church, p.22

(21) Bainbridge and Teasdale, The Penguin Companion to European Union, p.89

(22) D.Pinto, From Assistance to Democracy to Democratic Security, p.5

(23) David Haslam, Race for the Millenium, p.185

(24) Bainbridge and Teasdale, p.278

(25) Pinto, p.5

(26) European Voice, 18th June 1997.

(27) I am grateful to Graham Watson, MEP, for this insight.

(28) Bell, Christianity and World Order, p.87

(29) Alistair Hulbert writing in Hear What the Spirit Says to the Churches, Gerhard Linn (ed.), p.14

(30) Methodist Statement on Political Responsibility, para. 44

(31) Hulbert, p.13


(33) Hulbert, p.14


(35) Europe, pp.45-47

(36) Ludlow, p.26

(37) Temple, p.66

(38) Basil Hume, Remaking Europe: The Gospel in a Divided Continent, p.17

(39) 1 Corinthians 12.7

(40) Temple, p.71

(41) Hulbert, p.13

(42) Methodists Looking at Europe, p.5

(43) Suzanne Gee, Human Rights and Religious Minorities in Europe, p.83

(44) C.K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, p.292

(45) A.C.F. Beales, The Catholic Church and International Order, p.137

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(47) Temple, p.71
(49) Hume, p.19
(50) Temple, p.67
(51) Voyé, p.113
(52) The Tablet, 24th June 1995.
(53) Temple, p.73
(54) Exodus 22. 21-23
(55) For an account of ecumenical co-operation in Liverpool, see Sheppard and Worlock, Better Together.
(56) The Text of the Swanwick Declaration is printed in Called to be One, p.1f
(57) Hume, p.80
(58) Called to be One, 1.3
(59) Called to be One, 1.6
(60) David L. Edwards, Christians in a New Europe, p.247


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