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**TWO DIFFERENT WORLDS: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE
SPIRITUAL AND THE POLITICAL MAN IN THE WRITINGS OF
ST AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO**

A thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of
Politics, University of Durham, by Edward J. Sullivan, in the academic
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11 MAY 1999

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

This work examines the central position of Augustine of Hippo in the evolution of Christian political thought. Born less than fifty years after the Edict of Milan and dying less than fifty years before the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, Augustine's stature in life and in history and the survival of most of his works make him an important thinker in western political philosophy. Augustine's thought allows Christianity to assume political power while retaining its otherworldly orientation and forms a transition from traditional Christian acceptance of power to its use. That Augustine and his contemporaries in the Church would have participated in the administration of the Western Empire, as he did in the last years of the Empire, would have been unthinkable at the time of his birth.

The dissertation ascribes the development of Augustinian political thought to the confluence of his reading of Neo-Platonic and Pauline sources and the growing political and social darkness he finds around him. In particular, the dissertation holds that Augustine found that a believer has obligations in two different worlds, i.e., the political and social world of earthly existence and the spiritual obligations of the world to come. The work describes his thoughtful analysis of the believer's duties in the family, the Church, and the world, based mainly on Pauline injunctions. Finally, it analyzes the application of the use of the civil power in combating the Donatist schism, a position which may have been based on an historical accident, for Augustine previously shunned the use of force. Once the command to use force is given, however, he supports it fully.

For Augustine, it is obedience to duly constituted authority that is required and the internal disposition of love that governs such obedience. Subjection of the will of man to man is necessary to effect a complete subjection to the will of God to attain salvation.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ad Simplicianum: Ad Simplicianum de Diversis Quaestionibus.

App.: Appendix.

ch.: Chapter.

Cf.: Compare.

Enn. In Ps.: Ennaration in Psalms.

Ep.: Epistle.

Serm.: Sermon.

Sir.: Sirach.

Tr. in Epis. Ioh.: Sermons on the First Epistle of John.

Tr. in Ioh.: *Tractatus in Ioannis Evangelium/Epistulam.*

BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT:

Dan.: Daniel.

Gen.: Genesis.

Prv.: Proverbs.

Ps.: Psalms.

BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT:

Col.: Colossians.

Cor.: Corinthians.

Gal.: Galatians.

Lk.: Luke.

Matt.: Matthew.

Pet.: Peter.

Rom.: Romans.

Tim.: Timothy.

Tit.: Titus.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Augustine of Hippo is one of the most interesting and important personages in western history, philosophy, and theology. Coming as he did at almost the end of the Western Roman Empire, he bridged the gap between the classical and medieval worlds. The crucial role he played in the political, philosophical, and social formulation of the Middle Ages—and the present time as well—gains for him both admirers and detractors. In particular, he is responsible for the "Christianisation" of social and political thought from the former Greco-Roman model. No stranger to controversy, Augustine's strong positions on social and political matters, repugnant to modern liberals and conservatives alike, are less disproven than succeeded by a different worldview.

To many, Augustine is a period piece, classified by his time and circumstances. That historicism makes it easier to dismiss his political and social views as primitive in character and as the defiant ranting of a high official in the existing order defending a church-oriented regime under siege. Augustine's life and writings, however, extend over many decades and, although his views (especially on knowledge and grace) evolve, they retain a remarkable core consistency. His later—and some would say darker—political writings are, however, consistent with his long-held views on man and the civil authority, at least from 391, when he took Holy Orders and began his nearly 40-year stay in Hippo.

The purpose of this dissertation is to review those political views against the background of Augustine's other writings concerning a fallen humanity, human community institutions (i.e., domestic and ecclesiastical relationships) and, lastly, the civil authority. Others have done excellent work in setting forth Augustine's political views.¹ It is not the purpose of this



dissertation to retrace those steps. Rather, it will attempt to demonstrate the consistency of those views with the remainder of Augustine's writings. In addition, it will deal with his significant change of position regarding the use of the civil power to enforce religious orthodoxy. The seeming inconsistency of this change is, in fact, a small step from the use of force to prevent violent acts and may be explained by the Edict of Unity of 405, which Augustine did not seek, but which he defended. This defence of the existing order as a part of a Providential plan is characteristic of Augustine's views that the political order punishes evildoers and tests the good, sometimes both at the same time. Moreover, both his political quietism and views of Providence reflect the otherworldly orientation of his thought.

Augustine never wrote a treatise on political theory, and his political observations are undertaken in the context of his theological and philosophical work. However, he was trained as a *rhetor*, a specially trained person who could present cases and could expect a post in the Empire, given his training. He was steeped in the Classics, but abandoned both his rhetoric and his classical background to be a bishop and to teach in Church and through his writings in a way that his audience could understand.² Despite his concentration on matters not involved in social or political theory, his views on man and social relationships, the building blocks of what we glean as his political theory, fall into coherent and consistent patterns.³

It will be suggested that Augustine's views on political and social matters, as with his views on human nature, are based on his reading of Scripture (particularly Pauline writings) and did not change appreciably after 391. A number of those Scriptural passages dealing with domestic and ecclesiastical matters are reviewed in detail to demonstrate that fact and to illustrate the nature of those obligations. His views on political authority are derived from Scripture, particularly with regard to the effects of Original Sin and the social obligations imposed by

Pauline writings. Therefore, Augustine's use of certain Scriptural passages regarding fallen human nature and its consequences and the effect of grace will also be examined to determine whether there is any asserted social or political improvement arising from grace. Our examination will concern three levels of human activity.

First, the development of Augustine's social and political views can be traced to their source, i.e., his conception of human nature. This conception appears to have grown darker and darker as the Western Roman Empire completed its collapse. Additionally, his conflicts with the Pelagians over the last two decades of his life even more strongly emphasised the fallen state of man through Original Sin. Perhaps in reaction to his earlier days as a Platonist, Augustine is convinced that philosophy and human knowledge, while good, are not sufficient for, and perhaps not even relevant to, salvation. He turns increasingly to Scripture as authoritative and tends to ignore classical literature as the source of spiritual joy. And, while he benefited much from Rome, he becomes more indifferent to the role the Empire played in human history. Eden and Calvary are the two focal points in history on which Augustine fixes his gaze, and only the Last Judgement has any future consequence.

These views are generally continuations of trends found throughout Augustinian works, forming a large corpus, presenting difficulty for the scholar.⁴ At bottom, however, there is a remarkable consistency in this work. Augustine's views of man following his conversion begins as a Neo-Platonist, in which classical knowledge is complemented by removal of the effects of Original Sin through baptism, allowing spiritual progress to be made. The comparative optimism of Neo-Platonism is succeeded, but is not entirely replaced, by Pauline theology, which profoundly influences Augustine's political and social views. His more mature position is that Original Sin had so degraded man that only grace can provide the means by which salvation can

be achieved. And that salvation is available only to the elect, chosen by God, a choice not dependent on human efforts.

For Augustine, fallen man cannot save himself. Moreover, his very being is corrupt and tended to self-inclination, unless grace is given and is used to do works that merit salvation. Just as man is corrupt, so are human institutions. Consistent with his Neo-Platonist past, Augustine finds that prayer and contemplation, rather than human activity, are ideal activities. However, the realities of his times call him from these works to an active role in the world. As bishop, he sees and hears of many human failings, crimes, and sins. No doubt he saw his share of anger, jealousy, loveless marriages, and alienation. His watchword is perseverance, with the advice that suffering in this world is a helpful reminder of sin and the human condition and that of the sufferings of Christ, which humanity is called upon to emulate.

Second, human institutions are no better than the men they serve. Just as the human lot is self-inclined, the presence of two or more humans, whether in a family or a monastery, creates tensions and a greater possibility that sin will occur. Among other things, Augustine counsels, consistent with Scriptural injunctions, that wives are subject to their husbands, husbands love their wives, and children are subject to their parents. He is certainly aware of domestic tensions, but views them as part of the consequences of the Fall. The struggle for spiritual balance is incessant, and one generation never improves over the previous generation, regardless of any technical progress achieved in the world.

Indeed, those same tensions are found inside Augustine's own monastic community, which has a rule of obedience.⁵ He saw on a daily basis the clashes of personality and style, which must have been present even in his own religious community. Inside the Church community, those tensions are manifest and exacerbated by differences in wealth, family

relations, and generations of interfamily difficulties. While he leads his congregation, Augustine also knows, from his role as arbiter of many disputes, about the human condition. Given his position in the community, it would be difficult seeing him with an optimistic view of that condition.

Third, just as relationships within a household or a church devolve into considerations of love and duty to counter self-inclination, so also the relationships of citizens within the city devolve. These duties are demanded, and love enjoined, by Scripture, which provides signposts to salvation for those justified in a murky world of self-inclination. He thus concludes that humanity on earth lives simultaneously in two different worlds, i.e., that of the spirit and of the social and political orders. The competing demands of these two orders are the subject of this dissertation, which is divided into several parts, consistent with the arguments presented.

Following this introduction, Augustine's view of the human condition will be examined. While his views of that condition evolved over time, the mature view is that humanity is continually at war with itself. Often, Augustine uses the Pauline formulation of the war between the flesh and the spirit; however, one may safely say that this war also exists within the spirit, so that the self-inclined person must transcend himself or herself to be saved. He concludes that such transcendence can be achieved only through grace. It is from the basic defects of human nature that Augustine's views on the inherent defects of the community institutions and the political authority proceed. It is the depth, rather than the fact, of those deficiencies, that makes Augustine's views on political and social matters so striking.

The profound defects in human nature are not limited to lack of knowledge of the good, so characteristic of his neo-Platonist days, but extended to the will. Even knowledge becomes secondary to the need to have the will inclined toward God. And that need cannot be achieved

without grace. As the battle against the Pelagians raged, Augustine is inclined to emphasise the characteristics of fallen men, which were not curable by teaching. He writes of what he had experienced in himself and others, i.e., lust, envy, jealousy, and the desire for money and power, as characteristic of unmitigated egoism. Indeed, his work waxes most lyrical in cataloguing the sins and deficiencies of human life. He knows temptation, even in his own life as a bishop, and views living thoughtfully as a constant struggle.

Following the discussion of human nature, we turn to the realisation of that nature in human institutions, particularly the household and the Church. To exist in the world, those institutions are required to maintain an internal discipline, which could involve both a rough and possibly unfair human justice. Just as he was beaten and brutalised as a child, so also does Augustine view the human condition and see similar domestic brutality as the norm, counselling love and perseverance in response.

In these sets of personal relationships is found the first and most enduring manifestation of the double demands of an eternal order. That is, one must love and generally obey the command of a parent, master, or religious superior, regardless of the motivation or inherent goodness of that person. Rather, it is the relationship that governs obligations commanded by Scripture. It is not a difficult step to require love and general obedience to a political superior as well.

Augustine views the role of the Church, as he saw his own role as bishop, as one of admonishing and correcting members of his flock. Confessed sinners might be excluded from all Church services for a time, a means of social coercion for conformity.⁶ Excommunication is also available as an additional tool for reform. He also served as a judge to his community, much like

the Old Testament judges, spending many hours dealing with disputes, particularly over inheritance.

Inside his own monastery, Augustine seeks to impose a rule to minimise conflict. In involving himself in the petty problems of daily life, it is easy to advance that Augustine may have reason to be contemptuous of his parishioners or monks. Notwithstanding his desire to contemplate Scripture, he never shirks those duties, viewing them as his obligations.

Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* is his masterpiece⁷ and contains a view of the earthly Church as having both the elect and others, sheep, and goats. He constantly feels the need to minister, to admonish, and to lead this diverse group of imperfect people toward their own destinies. He sees their imperfections and his own obligations toward them, regardless of their own destinies. Decades of such ministrations convince Augustine that there is no evolution of man through knowledge, as he hoped in his younger days. He concludes that the incessant struggle in man requires the civil authority to perform the negative role of repressing vice and providing a world where daily business may occur. However, just as humanity spends generation after generation dealing with the same problem of self-inclination, the lack of progress for individual men is reflected in the lack of social and political progress as well. Man is helpless and hopeless without grace; however, that grace provides no institutional "silver bullet" for the political order as to the social and political improvement of humanity.

Similarly, the conflicts with the Manichees, the Donatists, and the Pelagians greatly influence Augustine's views of man and his social and political communities. As harsh as his views are, the alternatives are even more at odds with Augustine's views of man and his institutions. The Manichees seek a form of *gnosis*, or special knowledge, to assist in the fight between the powers of good and evil. Augustine answers that the concept of God requires that

He is all-powerful, and there can be no such struggle of this sort. Rather, the struggle is internal, and humans are responsible for their destinies. The Donatists opt for a pure Church, where sin (whether from the *traditor*⁸ handing over Scripture to be burned, or the sins of Church members) cannot taint the work of God on earth. Augustine answers that, as humanity cannot avoid sin, the Church is an inclusive institution that reconciles sinners. The Pelagians contend that man can perfect himself through his own free will, but Augustine answers that one cannot save oneself, and the reality of Original Sin can only be relieved by grace. Augustine's social and political views grow out of his understanding of Scripture and the irritants of these controversies.

As to the civil authority, Augustine writes *De Civitate Dei* to refute the pretensions of those remaining pagans that Rome is a special, historical case, answering with a withering, levelling historical analysis. He counters these views by showing that regimes and civilisations come and go without any particular importance in the patterns in history. While he is certainly involved in the workings of the political order from his vantage point in North Africa, he is increasingly sceptical about the value of human political activity.

The reality of civil authority, he concludes, is a negative mechanism for keeping civil peace. Implicit in this judgement, however, is the notion that those who control the regime, as fallible humans, also are infected with the virus of self-inclination and more liable to advance their own interests in manipulating the levers of government. He is more interested in providing an environment in which the Church can do its work of salvation, protected by a civil authority of whatever pedigree. Legitimacy of authority is less important than its existence. He advises his listeners to follow the Pauline injunction to respect and obey civil authority, except when the order is contrary to Scripture.

One particular set of issues is addressed at some length regarding Augustine's use of civil authority for the improvement of humanity. Those issues relate to the use of that authority to repress, by force if necessary, heretics and schismatics, particularly the Donatists, and, to a later and lesser extent, the Pelagians. Augustine's previous indifference to the political order appears to dissolve as he urges the civil power to take necessary steps to reconcile these groups and stamp out error. This work appears, to some extent, a matter of circumstance, for, while Augustine previously does not seek the use of the civil power to do this work, except to prevent physical violence, his views suddenly change.

The occasion for that change is the Edict of Unity against the Donatists, which was issued before Augustine's advice on the matter was received in Rome in 405. Even in supporting that decree, Augustine requires its administration to be undertaken with clemency and an inward disposition of charity, a disposition forgotten by many of his medieval followers and modern critics. This decision to support, and even encourage, political repression of unorthodox activity appears to run counter to Augustine's passive acceptance of the civil authorities and his rejection of a progressive unfolding of history. However, these counterintuitive notions may be reconciled with Augustine's views on the moral duties of ecclesiastical leaders and the workings of Providence.

Augustine finds no means to collective salvation in endorsing the use of civil force in suppressing error. Rather, the regime of the day provides a medium by which the Church does her saving work and a field in which moral choice may be maximised. Augustine emphasises God's sovereign role in human history and events and has an answer for every occasion. When the Church is persecuted, Christians are enjoined to be faithful despite the pressure otherwise. When Christians hold power, they are to maximise chances for themselves and others for

salvation. Augustine believes in illumination of knowledge through grace, grace in individual salvation,⁹ and the unknowable workings of Providence in history. For him, God influences each man's own salvation history, as well as human history itself, all as demonstrated by Scripture. However, the pattern and purpose of these events are made known only at the Last Judgement. Until then, history (save for Eden and Calvary) is meaningless and individual and collective humanity the lump of clay in God's disposing hands.

The result of these views is an account of a highly fractured social and political order, with the ends of regimes as diffuse as the motivations of those who control those regimes. Unless directed toward God, a highly unusual phenomenon, the regime follows the vain and self-defeating directions of those who control its machinery. Augustine's conclusion is that the social and political orders are dynamic, but achieve no more than technical progress. The increasing efficiency in mass murder and repression in recent history appears to be consistent with these views. Because the social and political structure cannot change, Augustine suggests turning inward to achieve a personal good, with grace and prayer.

Thus, Augustine's man lives in two different worlds. On the one hand, he has his spiritual duties. On the other, he is the participant in the political order, as well as human society, and must live in a political and social world of outward conformity and obligation. The Christian man is also the citizen, the spouse, the child, and the monk, all of whom have specific social duties enjoined by Scripture. These duties require an additional inward disposition toward their accomplishment. From the position of the fallen man, these duties are difficult and require humility and perseverance and derive no merit, except from grace. These two worlds, like the societies of Augustine's two cities, continue in the same man and compete for attention and realisation.

¹ See, e.g., John N. Figgis, *The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei* (London, 1921); Henry Paolucci, ed., *The Political Writings of St. Augustine* (Chicago, 1962); Herbert A. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Johannes van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon* (Leiden, 1991); and R. A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

² F. Van der Meer, *Augustine the Bishop* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1961), at 406-409. This author quotes from Sermon 17, 2 (425-430), about Augustine's motivation:

" . . . So, I tell you, I am delivering my soul. I shall be in a position, not of great danger but of certain ruin, if I have kept quiet. But when I have spoken and carried out my office, it will be for you now to take notice of your danger. What, after all, do I want? What do I desire? What am I longing for? Why do I preach? Why do I sit here upon the cathedra? What do I live for? For this one thing alone, that we may one day live with Christ! That is my endeavour, my honour, my fame, this is my joy and my treasured possession! And if you have not heard me attentively, and I have for all that not remained silent, then I have at least saved my own soul, but I do not desire to attain everlasting salvation without you."

See also, Van der Meer, *supra* note 2, at 263; Sermon 340, 1 (c. 415); and Ep. 21 (391).

³ Deane, *supra* note 1, at viii.

⁴ There are more than five million words that have come down to us from Augustine. Some of the better known works, such as *Confessiones* and *De Civitate Dei*, have been translated from the original Latin text fairly often. However, many lesser known works are either not generally accessible, are available only in Latin, or have older or fewer reliable translations.

⁵ See, Tarsicius J. Van Bavel, O.S.A., ed., *The Rule of Saint Augustine* (London, 1984), at 116-118; and George Lawless, O.S.A., *Augustine of Hippo and His Monastic Rule* (Oxford, 1987), at 77, 101, and 117.

⁶ Van der Meer, *supra* note 2, at 384-87.

⁷ Norman Baynes notes that this work was published in parts and was not revised later, adding to the view that Augustine was not a systematic thinker, but reacted to outside stimuli of various controversies in which he participated. Norman Baynes, *The Political Ideas of St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei* (London: Historical Association Pamphlet, 1936), at 3.

⁸ The word "traditor" is the basis of the modern word "traitor."

⁹ As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, grace played a role in calling man to salvation (sometimes to the extent, as with St. Paul, of being irresistible), in causing him to respond to that call and in giving him the ability to do works worthy of salvation.

II. AUGUSTINE'S VIEWS ON MAN AS THE SOCIAL UNIT

A. Looking Inward.

The examination of Augustine's views on the dual obligations of the spirit and the world begins with his views on man and human nature. For purposes of that examination, Augustine's own intellectual history is briefly set out as relevant to the evolution of these views, which change greatly between the time of his conversion when he was under the sway of Neo-Platonism and the time of his anti-Pelagian polemics. This chapter also examines the influence of Scripture, particularly Pauline writings, on these views and suggests that Augustine's views on grace and predestination have roots in the Orphic and intuitive strands of Neo-Platonism. Finally, this chapter will examine selected Scriptural passages to determine if Augustine found any correlation between grace and social and political leadership toward the Kingdom of God. The conclusion finding no such relationship is consistent with Augustine's view that world history, as the unfolding of a Providential plan, is unknown to man. Augustine finds no grand plan for world salvation, just the daily struggles of human beings alone and in relation to God and fellow humans, which are examined in the following chapters.

The circumstances of his own conversion and the strength of the Neo-Platonism he embraces as a young man combine to influence Augustine's view of man as profoundly as does his opposition to various heterodoxies in later life. The restless inquirer of the *Confessiones*, so aware of his fascination for the things of this world, is at the same time the committed philosopher pursuing the good. Turning from the dualistic materialism of Manichaeism to the idealism of Neo-Platonism, Augustine finds a more consistent explanation of the world and hopes to satisfy his longing to unite himself with that good. While he ultimately determines that

Neo-Platonism is not a sufficient response to this longing, this conversion sets Augustine on the course to his Christian home and establishes his frame of reference.¹

From his contact with Ambrose of Milan and the scholar Simplicianus (a strong influence on Ambrose), Augustine comes to know of the Neo-Platonist Victorinus, who had translated some of the works of Plotinus into Latin.² The attraction of Neo-Platonism and of its most influential living exponent (as well as the high regard for Neo-Platonism by his own mentor, Ambrose) strongly affect the young Augustine. The *Enneads* of Plotinus exposes Augustine to ideas that resonate well with him. Plotinus had lived in Alexandria and Rome in the third century and held, like Plato, there was a single, simple, transcendent good, called the "Absolute." While unknowable to less-gifted and inquiring minds, this Absolute is the object of delight and desire to the human soul, which seeks it as a light in the midst of the darkness of existence. When the soul achieves that light, it becomes illuminated, experiencing peace and joy. Such souls can achieve unity with the Absolute through the consistent rejection of lesser things, including those of the material world, and by living a morally just life. The state of unity is achieved whenever all earthly concerns, whether involving pain or pleasure, are ended. According to Plotinus, the soul then takes the "flight from the alone to the alone" and ascends to the Absolute.³

The Neo-Platonism studied by Augustine includes themes he takes to heart for the remainder of his life, including the notion of an ordered universe and a moral order of goods in which the spiritual is higher than the material. But the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus also had its mystical aspect, through which, with spiritual and moral discipline, one could unite with the Absolute through intuition, rather than knowledge.⁴ The pursuit of an unknowable, but profoundly beautiful and good, entity is a theme that Augustine modifies in the light of his

Scriptural exegesis. But Plotinus provides content to Augustine's understanding of what is later to be called by Thomas Aquinas the "Beatific Vision." Similarly, the notion of contemplating the Absolute as the goal of life and the emptying of self through discipline are themes common to Neo-Platonists and the Christians of Augustine's time.⁵ Neo-Platonism stresses the apprehension of the Absolute by intuitive grasp rather than through the intellect,⁶ anticipating Augustine's own later stress on the will over the intellect in the Pelagian controversies.⁷

Augustine's relatively high regard for the Neo-Platonists is found throughout Book VIII of the *De Civitate Dei*, in which his own attraction to this school is demonstrated in the context of a discussion of competing schools of philosophy:

". . . For diverse philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together. Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have not affirmed a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God—enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if indeed, we may draw any comparison between these things. But what the nature of this comparison is, will, if God will help me, be shown in another place, to the best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention that Plato determined the final good to be to live according to virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and imitates God—which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophise is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal. . . . But the true and highest good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God."⁸

The acceptance of Neo-Platonism marks a break with the dualism of the Manichees in favour of the pursuit of an ineffable, transcendent goodness. It is true that Augustine strongly denounces Neo-Platonism in his *Retractationes*. These denunciations must be seen in context, as, at the time of the *Retractationes* in 426-427, Augustine was the advocate of the inability of men to undertake goodness or salvation alone, a very different view from that of Neo-Platonism. His zeal and rhetorical exaggeration frequently mask a more considered position. At the time of

intelligible,⁵⁰ he does not disagree with the pursuit of wisdom, rejection of the world of the body in favour of the spirit, and unity with the Absolute. In fact, the notion of Plotinus that the Absolute is not grasped by intellectual activity is more consistent with his later view that the saints were not necessarily familiar with liberal arts.

C. The Mature Position—A Defect of Will.

Matured by the controversies against the Manichaeans, the Donatists, and, most notably, the Pelagians, Augustine's views on living well demonstrate a marked change of emphasis in his later years. Although, as noted above, he does not specifically reject the Neo-Platonic views to which he adhered during his stay at Cassiciacum, his later work does not contain the optimistic formulae for earthly happiness that marks these earlier works undertaken at leisure and under the spell of philosophy.⁵¹

Perhaps influenced by his conflicts with the Pelagians, Augustine turns from the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the intellect, so evident in his writings in Cassiciacum, to a position that emphasises the will. As his Anti-Pelagian writings show, Augustine believes that will alone is not sufficient for salvation—what is required is an infusion of grace, beyond the ability of man alone to provide. A few examples of Augustine's views of the role of grace follow:

In *De Correptione et Gratia*, III, 2, he states:

"The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord must be apprehended as that by which alone men are delivered from evil, *and without which they do absolutely no good thing, whether in thought or will or affection, or in action*; not only in order that they may know by the manifestation of that grace what should be done, but moreover in order that by its enabling they may do with love what they know. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

In *Retractationes*, I, 9, 4, he states:

". . . The will is, indeed that whereby we sin and that whereby we live justly; this is the point that we treated in those texts. So, *unless the will itself is to be freed by the grace of God from the servitude whereby it has become the slave of sin, and*

unless it be helped so that it may overcome defects, it is impossible for mortal men to live righteously and piously. And if this divine assistance, whereby the will is freed, were granted for its merits, it would not be a 'grace'—a gratuitous gift—for it would not have preceded the willing. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

In Serm. 2 on Psalm 31, at 8, he states:

". . . Another Psalm has said of one such man, and it applies to the class as well as the individual: *He would not understand, that he might do well.* [Psalm 35:4]. It does not say 'He could not understand.' *Therefore to act aright you must have the will to understand, then you will arrive at a clear understanding.* What do I mean by a clear understanding? Nobody must boast of the good works he did before he had faith; nobody must be sluggish in doing good works now that faith is his. It is God who pardons all the ungodly and makes them just through faith." (Emphasis supplied.)

This change in emphasis is significant. In the *Retractationes*, Augustine writes that he was not fully aware of human inability to perform meritorious actions when he wrote *De Libero Arbitrio* in about 395.⁵² It may have been the study of the Pauline Epistles in the decade of the 390s that caused Augustine to consolidate his thought on free will and grace and his battles with the Pelagians in the last two decades of his life that caused his position to harden. Although Augustine had read St. Paul before this period, the Manichaean controversy caused him to concentrate his mind on Pauline texts, as both sides of this controversy used New Testament authority.⁵³ To counter Manichaean determinism, Augustine is required to look at the question of free will and make a case exegetically.⁵⁴ Augustine asserts that Scripture bridged the gulf of the human consciousness repressed by the Fall, with an inexhaustible proliferation of imagery, which he uses extensively.⁵⁵ There is no higher source to Augustine than the written Word of God. Augustine's work following his conversion is filled with Scriptural citation, used in the same way a lawyer may prove a case to a judge, a forensic device used by rhetoricians of his day. By the same token, Augustine also perceived that classical exposition of Scripture (i.e., literal interpretation) was not possible and adopted the allegorical interpretation method of his own mentor, Ambrose of Milan.⁵⁶ This approach allowed Augustine to make much of the words

as analogies or types and provided much grist for his theological arguments. In part, he adopted the theory of illumination of the Donatist Tyconius, so that all that was discovered in Scripture by believers had been foreknown and foreseen by God, who provided for that illumination.⁵⁷

The question arises, however, as to the nature of the damage to spiritual faculties by the Fall. As is well known and shown above, Augustine believes that the ability to choose the good was impaired by Original Sin. Yet a further inquiry should be made as to whether this impairment extends beyond the realm of the spiritual. The fact that his positing such an impairment does not cause Augustine to change his views on many of the tenets of Neo-Platonic philosophy may well lead one to believe that the impairment does not extend to the perfectibility of human society through some plan of living well. Such a position is, however, inconsistent with Augustine's reluctance to find any human institution, including the Roman Empire, to be the vehicle for the work of the Church or the betterment of civil society. The contention that Augustine separates issues relating to salvation from those relating to practical, prudential political judgement is also borne out by the treatment, discussed later in this chapter, of a number of Scriptural texts used by Augustine and relating to civil society.

Augustine, like many other Neo-Platonists and Stoics, argues by a process of excluding inferior goods (bodily health, strength, and beauty, sensual pleasures, and psychic goods, such as knowledge and virtue, fame and power) in favour of higher, spiritual goods.⁵⁸ After this process is complete, there is left only that to which man's efforts should be directed. Augustine considers various philosophical approaches to identifying the ultimate human good from Varro's catalogue to conclude that the highest good is virtue for its own sake.⁵⁹ While he holds that the soul is the higher part of man, Augustine realises that both bodily and spiritual goods are necessary for

human happiness. Given his Christian background, it is not surprising that he holds that eternal life is the supreme good and that seeking such a good in this life is shallow.

Order is an integral concept in Augustine's worldview, particularly due to his adherence to Neo-Platonism. His view of order as the harmony of creation continues through his life, although he does emphasise that angels and men have the ability to frustrate that order by their free will.⁶⁰ The theme of order is a constant one, beginning with his Neo-Platonic writings at Cassiciacum and continuing throughout his lifetime. Even as late as 412, when he writes *De Libero Gratia*, there remain elements of a Neo-Platonic outlook.⁶¹

As his work matures, Augustine finds that a diversion from the divine order in men and angels tends toward negation, rather than the attribution of any particular quality. He speaks as early as 388 in *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et Moribus Manichaeorum* about corruption, which affects things in accordance with their own nature. He explains that corruption causes things to be what they were not and to be brought to non-permanence, inconsistent with being, which implies permanence, and concludes that order produces being, and disorder, which is also called perversion or corruption, produces non-being.⁶²

Contrary to his previously held Manichaean views, Augustine holds that no being is evil in itself, and it is the intention of the use of created things, as well as the failure to place them in their proper order with respect to more important, spiritual things, that concerns him. In his mature work, *De Civitate Dei*, he again cites the Roman philosopher Varro for the proposition that virtue is the right ordering of goods.⁶³

While maintaining a fairly consistent view towards order throughout his life, Augustine also is influenced by the notion of a personal journey of the soul to God, a journey that he reads about in the *Enneads* before becoming a Christian. He is forced by the exigencies of the time to

give up his idea of contemplation, which he longed for at Cassiciacum and later Thagaste. However, the transition from Neo-Platonism is not difficult. Christ is the mediator,⁶⁴ not an impersonal demiurge; the major difference is that salvation through grace is given without a pattern, but rather as a free gift to those whom God chooses.⁶⁵ As mentioned above, however, this is not a large step from that of the gift of faith, nor of Plotinus's view that union with the Absolute is not earned.

The combination of the beauty of the orderly world and the results of sin causes Augustine to combine his philosophical and theological concerns in his writings against the Pelagians. The sin of pride becomes the root of all moral evil, because it places temporal things above the eternal and lower things above the higher. Inordinate self-love, whether it be in the pursuit of honours or bodily pleasures, is such an example of disorder in arranging life.⁶⁶ This sin of pride equates to a "social sin" as the individual retreats into privacy and deprivation of the community and effectively severs the bonds of obligation and love. The conflict is no longer a mere entanglement between flesh and spirit or disorder in arranging goods, but rather a desire for perverse exaltation.⁶⁷

At the same time, Augustine is never far from his youthful idealism in which he hopes to unite himself with God through prayer and contemplation. It is not a great step from the Orphic mysteries, which underlie the writings of both Plato and Plotinus, wherein the soul is chained to many existences until it flees the cares of the world, to the longing for union with God and to be freed of earthly cares.⁶⁸ This flight is mentioned in Books One and Seven of the *Confessiones*⁶⁹ and could well be derived from Augustine's near contemporary, Gregory of Nyssa, who was trained in Greek philosophy and who used Plato's *Theatetus*, in which the flight from the earth to the "fatherland" or God is accomplished through acts of virtue.⁷⁰

There are thus a number of factors that influence Augustine's views on humanity and shape his approach to the political and social milieu in which he works. These include his abiding Neo-Platonism, his greater emphasis on will over intellect, his devotion to Scripture, and, in particular, Pauline theology, and the many intellectual contests in which he engages himself. This dissertation suggests that Augustine, nevertheless, has an underlying belief that a non-intellectual element (i.e., grace) is necessary for salvation, although that element does not necessarily lead to greater wisdom or political or social leadership. Rather, it is personal in nature. The next section will review certain Scriptural passages to examine this hypothesis.

D. Corruption, Grace, and the Commonwealth—Augustine's Treatment of Selected Scriptural Passages.

Augustine is consistent in his theology and generally does not ascribe any better form of political leadership to Christian civil, political, or military leaders than to others. To test this thesis, a number of Scriptural passages that may bear on the matter and that are discussed by Augustine are selected. The corpus of Augustine's work is enormous and nearly all of that work survives. Augustine is given to frequent citation of Scripture, and that citation is particularly associated with the development of a Pauline theology, which he uses extensively during the Pelagian crisis. Augustine lived in troubled times, when social and political catharsis was intense. We thus focus on his views on faith and grace in those fields, in contrast with their use on the individual level in the drama of salvation.

The effort is made to distinguish any passages in which a social or political use could be made of religious instrumentalities, such as faith or grace.⁷¹ Dozens of uses of certain passages from Scripture were reviewed, and the conclusion is that there are few of these passages in which the same were not used in a wholly religious or moral—as opposed to social or political—sense. In those cases where there is any doubt, or in which Scripture is used in a way in which it might

illuminate Augustine's political thought, that passage is discussed. The following are the passages considered:

1. Ps. 50:7. *For behold I was conceived in iniquities; And in sins did my mother conceive me.*

Augustine uses this passage to underscore Original Sin, and it has little application outside the theological area. In Sermon 391, Augustine explains that infants are born in sin and are provided for as part of God's natural order:

"... The Almighty Lord, for his part, both fashions the human creature as mortal according to the rules of the order he has established, and also as the best of fathers by his compassionate grace provides immortality through renewal."⁷²

As discussed further in the examination of Augustine's political writings, it does not appear that either the "Christian leader" is ennobled by his adherence to righteous living or is moved to some special social or political action by that fact. The only exception (discussed in Chapter V below) is the duty of Christian political leaders to use the civil power to assist in the repression of heresy and schism. However, as with the Augustinian view of civil authority in general, this is a negative duty. The leader, like the people led, is enmeshed in Original Sin. Similarly, it does not appear that, in the ways of the world, a prudent non-Christian is a worse leader by that fact. The disability appears to be one of ultimate personal destiny, rather than one relating to the quality of political leadership. But, Augustine's lights do not aim the choice of the individual Christian necessarily at conventional political gains in any event.

2. Rom. 7:5. *For when we were in the flesh, the passions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members, to bring forth fruit unto death.*

This passage is also directed in Augustine's works exclusively at moral and spiritual topics and indicates no broad interpretation to find the Christian better in any way in leadership or social or political qualities than others. The passage is best explained in *De Diversis*

Quaestionibus in 396 with respect to its personal moral dimension.⁷³ Augustine's connection of the fleshly struggle with sex described in Romans is decidedly apolitical and does not add further insight to his social or political thought, save to show the earthly orientation of humanity.

3. Rom. 7:15. *For that which I work, I understand not. For I do not that good which I will; but the evil which I hate, that I do.*

This is the first of several passages in Romans in which Paul expresses the conflict between his fallen self (which Augustine equates to sin, with the covenanted people of the Old Testament in an even worse position, as, like Paul, they know the law, but sin anyway) and the pull toward sanctification by grace. This passage, like the others, presents an opportunity for a claim of the Christian acting better socially and politically than others, but there is no such claim from Augustine.

In Serm. 30, written in 412, Augustine explains to his congregation the internal conflicts between sinful inclinations and the good felt by Paul in this and related passages in Romans.⁷⁴ The sermon includes the related theme (treated below) that the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh. If there be no such struggle, then the flesh is winning. Those involved in that struggle can sympathise with these passages from Romans. Augustine adds that the free mind is still struggling with the remnants of his past (personal) slavery to sin.⁷⁵

While beneficial to those interested in Augustine's views on Pauline theology and sexuality, this passage does not add to further insight on his social or political views.

4. Rom. 7:18-19. *For I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. For to will, is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good, I find not.*

There is one interesting discussion of this passage, along with Gal. 5:17, which does not bear directly on Augustine's social or political thought, but does give some insight into his Pauline theology. This discussion is found in Ep. *6, written either in 416-17 or 420 to Bishop

John of Jerusalem to comment on the proceedings in which a council of bishops in Palestine acquitted Pelagius of heresy. The centre of this discussion is marriage and concupiscence, during which Augustine considers the question of sexual relations in Paradise before the Fall. He argues that Adam and Eve exercised abstinence, except when necessary to procreate and did not have the difficulties of post-Fall concupiscence.⁷⁶ He goes on to quote Paul's words that he cannot complete right actions, although he desires to do so, because he still has illicit sexual desire.⁷⁷

Although the point of the letter is a refutation of the Pelagians, it does provide an insight into Augustine's views of a corrupted humanity. These Pauline passages evincing inner conflict are made to reflect sins of the flesh to the exclusion of other faults. The use of these passages shows the hopelessness of good action in this area without grace to repress illicit desire and limit sexual contact to that done within marriage. There is no suggestion that social requirements extend beyond those of chastity or licit marriage (discussed further in Chapter III below) or that political requirements extend beyond repression of vice (discussed in Chapter IV below). Even those regenerated by baptism still have the conflicts Paul describes. This hopelessness is remedied only by grace, but has nothing to do with the civil governance or political leadership.

5. Rom. 7:25. [*Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?*] *The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord. Therefore, I myself, with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of sin.*

Augustine discusses this passage in two commentaries on Psalms, although not in any social or political context. In *Enn. in Ps. 4*, he quotes from the Psalm and adds:

"Be ye angry, and sin not.' For the thought occurred, Who is worthy to be heard? Or how shall the sinner not cry in vain unto the Lord? Therefore, 'be ye angry,' saith he, 'and sin not.' Which may be taken two ways: either, even if you be angry, do not sin; that is, even if there arise an emotion in the soul, which now by reason of the punishment of sin is not in our power, at least let not reason and the mind, which is after God regenerated within, that with the mind we should serve

the law of God, although with the flesh we as yet serve the law of sin, consent thereunto; or, repent ye, that is, be ye angry with yourselves for your past sins and henceforth cease to sin. . . ."⁷⁸

Although there is no social or political context, this passage does stress Augustine's emphasis on a good inward disposition, aimed at personal repentance and compliance with divine guidance.⁷⁹ Otherwise, the social and political duties are those set forth in Chapters III and IV below, respectively.

6. Gal. 5:17. *For the flesh lusteth against the spirit: and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary one to another: so that you do not the things that you would.*

In addition to the discussion on concupiscence in Paradise discussed under Rom. 7:18-19 above, Augustine directs Serm. 400 (412) to the problem of evil and to those who contend that there are two creators or two creations, in opposition to each other. Augustine had long ago rejected this dualism when he left the Manichees. He does so again in this sermon, as he would later do so against the writings of Julian of Eclanum, who accuses him of returning to Manichaeism. While the spirit and the flesh struggle against one another, they are joined together in a sort of marriage, in the same way that Christ is joined to His Church so that, far from being at war, the soul nourishes and cherishes the flesh.⁸⁰ The struggle with the temptations of the flesh is occasioned by Original Sin, so that the flesh, with its own law, must be overcome so that it obeys the spirit. This is a view that is fairly consistent in Augustine following his extensive review of Pauline writings before he became Bishop of Hippo.

In Serm. 25, written in c. 410, Augustine may be commenting on the difficulties of this mortal life, when he writes about the "baleful days" of life on earth.⁸¹ The sermon continues with an exhortation to act peaceably, do well, and hope for salvation, themes that are consistently

used in Augustine's works. Moreover, this and other works express Augustine's views on the necessity of perseverance to fulfil social and political duties, along with the spiritual.

Similarly, in Serm. 30, written in 412, Augustine writes of inner struggle, using some of his best rhetorical technique:

"And you are a man. If you won't believe me, take a look at yourself. Do you really live in this corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, in such a way that the flesh does not lust against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh? Is this kind of brawling unknown in you? Is there no loss of the flesh in you, resisting the law of your mind? Well, if there is nothing in you resisting something else, consider where you as a whole must be. If your spirit has no disagreement with the flesh lusting against it, consider that perhaps your whole mind may be in agreement with the flesh, consider that the reason why there is no war may perhaps be that there is an unwholesome sort of peace. Perhaps you are in total agreement with the flesh, and so there is no brawling going on. What hope have you got of being able to win eventually, if you haven't yet even started to fight?

"But if you delight in the law of God, according to the inner man, while you see another law in your members fighting against the law of your mind; if you are delighted by this one and tied up by that one, free in the mind but a slave in the flesh; if this is already the case, then you should rather sympathise with the man who says, *It is not what I will that I do*. After all, don't you want that lust which resists your mind to be entirely eliminated in you? You are a man of bad will if you don't want to be without such an opponent.

"For my part, I tell you, anything in me that rebels against my mind, and argues with me in favour of a contrary kind of pleasure, anything in me of that sort I would like to slay completely. And if by chance it happens with the Lord's help that I defeat it, I would still much rather not have anything to argue with. For me, not having an enemy is infinitely preferable to defeating one. It's not the case either, is it, that the fact of the flesh lusting against the spirit has nothing to do with me, or that I have been stuck together from a different and opposite nature? No, that fact is a fact about me, and my not agreeing to it is a fact about me. The free part of me is to some extent resisting the bits left over from slavery in me. I want the whole thing to be healed, because I am the whole thing. I don't want my flesh, as something foreign to me, to be separated from me forever, but to be all healed with me for ever."⁸²

It is apparent that Augustine believes that the human condition involved constant struggle, especially with physical sexual inclinations, a struggle that occupied his mind since his

days as a Neo-Platonist. To give into the flesh would certainly have impacts on individual choice and, therefore, leadership and governance. However, there is no necessary relationship between that struggle and social or political leadership.⁸³

This passage also appears twice in Book XV of *De Civitate Dei*. The first occasion is when he speaks of the fratricide involved in the foundation of Rome.⁸⁴ The analogy with Cain and Abel occurs later at Book XV, 7, which also includes a reference to Rom. 7:17, to compare the envy of Cain to the acceptance of his brother's sacrifice to the internal war in every man, which must be overcome by grace. This struggle appears to be a preoccupation of the mind, according to Augustine. That preoccupation may cause the unrighteous to make choices that may bear on governance and leadership; however, there is no necessary relationship between the two.

In his *Contra Litteras Petilianas*, written in about 400, Augustine answers the charge that he is not a peacemaker (presumably because he wishes the assistance of the civil authorities in repressing the Donatists). Augustine responds that the inward disposition of love assisting in correction is the true path to peace.⁸⁵ This response is political in nature, for it serves to justify Augustine's later position of compulsion towards the Donatists by the use of the civil power, although he requires that there be the motivation of love. The authority of Augustine is used for persecution of dissidents in later times, and it may be the failure to emphasise the required motivation that causes him to be so vilified later.

7. 1 Cor. 13:12. *We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known.*

This passage is frequently used in Augustine's works, nearly always in a purely spiritual sense. The words "face to face" are part of Augustine's eschatology, as they show his view of the Beatific Vision; however, they are not part of his social or political thought.

There are a number of uses of this passage that are relevant to the discussions in this dissertation. It might have been thought that the "reflections in a mirror" or "mere riddles" (often translated as "through a glass darkly") would reflect Augustine's view of a disordered human nature in a social or political context.⁸⁶ A review of Augustine's work does not bear out this contention, however.

The first use is in *Enn. in Ps. 48*, in which Augustine states, in discussing verse 4 of this Psalm:

"I will incline mine ear to the parable, I will show my proposition upon the harp. . . .' And why 'to a parable'? Because 'now we see through a glass darkly,' as saith the Apostle; 'whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord.' For our vision is not yet that face to face, where there are no longer parables, where there no longer are riddles and comparisons. Whatever now we understand we behold through riddles. A riddle is a dark parable that is hard to understand. Howsoever a man may cultivate his heart and apply himself to apprehend mysteries, so long as we see through the corruption of the flesh, we see but in part"⁸⁷

This is as close as Augustine comes to indicating that grace imparts a spiritual vision; however, he does not assert that this vision goes beyond the spiritual.

Another use is exemplified in *De Fide et Symbolo*, in which he uses this passage to state that only a clear mind (i.e., sanctified by grace) can expect to understand the mysteries of the Trinity.⁸⁸ Again, there is a note that the theology of the Trinity is understood only in part. Augustine does not make this claim on the political or social levels.

8. James 1:23-24. *For if a man be a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he shall be compared to a man beholding his own countenance in a glass. For he beheld himself, and went his way, and presently forgot what manner of man he was.*

The only use of assistance is found in *Enn. in Ps. 118*, in which Augustine states:

"So shall I not be confounded while I have respect unto all thy commandments. We ought to look upon the commandments of God whether they are read or when they are recalled to memory as a looking glass as the Apostle

James saith. The just man looks in a mirror and may not be confounded; because he chooses not merely to be a hearer of them but also a doer. On this account, he desireth that his ways may be made direct to keep the statutes of God. How to be made direct, save by the grace of God? Otherwise he will find in the law of God not a source of rejoicing, but of confusion, if he hath chosen to look at commandments which he doeth not."⁸⁹

As is often the case in reviewing these passages referring to confusion or conflict, Augustine chooses to interpret the same in a spiritual, rather than in a temporal, or mixed spiritual and temporal, manner. Of course, as noted above, the choices made by the individual are not always so classified. Nevertheless, it is significant that those choices are discussed in the context of a spiritual background.

From the Scriptural passages selected to relate to the corruption of human nature by Original Sin, the consequent struggle and conflict in humanity, and the power of grace to cause spiritual regeneration, there are some conclusions to be made regarding social and political matters:

1. Fallen man has multiple desires that leave him with a fractured will, as various "goods" compete for his attention and action.
2. The grace that redeems a person does not necessarily render him or her more virtuous as a social or political leader or the special instrument of Divine Providence.
3. When viewed in conjunction with those passages regarding social and political matters set forth respectively in Chapters III and IV below, a pattern of obligation to higher authority, as well as obligations regarding use of that authority, emerges. Augustine explores the complex web of obligation in the social and political world outside. However, his focus remains on the individual and his or her spiritual destiny.
4. The watchword for the spiritual man living in the dual worlds of spirit and flesh is perseverance.⁹⁰ The obligation to carry out social and political obligations, described in Chapters III and IV below, to the extent they do not conflict with spiritual duties, is manifest. However, those duties are secondary to the paramount spiritual duties required for salvation.

5. The balance between the two sets of duties lies in an inward disposition that focuses on the spiritual and determines the manner in which the individual sets forth and carries out those duties.

E. Conclusion.

From the foregoing, the influence of Neo-Platonism and Pauline theology are the two principal influences in Augustine's view of man, which form the basis of his social and political thought. The adoption of a Neo-Platonic outlook as a young man acts as a tonic for the intellectual concerns he has over the nature of the good and the problem of evil, questions inherent in Manichaeism. That adoption also responds to the concerns over certainty inherent in Scepticism. Since his reading of Cicero's *Hortensius* before he left Hippo, Augustine determines to seek the good. Neo-Platonism provides a framework for fulfilling all of these concerns and a recognised philosophical infrastructure for his continued inquiries. The influence of Neo-Platonism is especially apparent in Augustine's first four works following his decision to embrace Christianity. However, that influence is not succeeded by another systematic philosophical outlook, although his Christianised Neo-Platonism is combined with his close reading and adoption of Pauline theology.

There is a consistent theme in Augustine's serial adoption of Neo-Platonism, Christianity, and Pauline theology. This theme consists of a rejection of a progressive intellectual journey toward the Absolute, in favour of a preparation for that journey by jettisoning worldly cares by a purer, ascetic lifestyle and contemplation of eternal, rather than transitory, things. However, this preparation, though necessary, is not sufficient. There is an outside force that is not controlled by man, which is also necessary for unity with the Absolute or salvation. That intuition, which allows bridging the gap to the Absolute in Plotinus, and the faith and grace that characterise Christian thought are similar. Moreover, the use of authority, particularly Scriptural authority, as

a supplement (and later a substitute, where necessary) for reason, is also significant in Augustine's thought. Finally, there is a transition in both the life and thought of Augustine to deal with life on a social, rather than an individual, basis.

His life experience convinces Augustine that perfection is not a characteristic of earthly existence. By his use of reason and his reading of Plotinus, he rejects the Gnostic perfectionism of Manichaeism, of which he had entertained strong doubts in any event. It is Plotinus, as well, who causes him to reject Scepticism, another Platonic derivative, for the comparative clarity and certainty of Neo-Platonism. He rejects the notion of a perfect Church, as embraced by the Donatists, by virtue of his experience and Scripture. He rejects the idea of perfection in man when he rejects Pelagianism on the basis of Scripture, particularly the works of St. Paul. Even his position on predestination is based on Scripture, although it requires lifelong struggle, even with the aid of grace. While corrupted human nature is a hallmark of his later theology, the concept of order derived from Neo-Platonism does not change.

The transition from a young Neo-Platonist to the mature Doctor of Grace is accomplished without rejection of Neo-Platonism, although he does reject some portions of that philosophy, such as the doctrine of reminiscence and the dualism of being. The direction of philosophy in seeking the good and the order of being are neither rejected nor criticised by Augustine. Indeed, both doctrines are implicitly accepted by his later work. As shown above, the criticism of Plato found in the *Retractationes* is muted and balanced by multiple other complementary references spanning the whole period of his writings.

While Neo-Platonism remains a strong influence in Augustine's thought, Scripture, particularly the writings of St. Paul, provides a stronger influence. Similarly, authority aids reason in the apprehension of moral direction. The notion of a corrupted human nature, which

requires grace for salvation, also has strong effects on Augustine's political and social thought. While Augustine is never, in any period of his life, a believer in a progressive social order, his later social and political writings resonate with the subtext that man is "stuck on earth," staggering his way through the world and unable to cope in the moral sphere without grace. There is never to be a "heaven on earth," but rather a cyclical and depressing catalogue of crime, sin, and suffering. Human institutions act to keep the civil peace and to restrain civic vice. Even the Church is not perfect, but provides the only institutional guide to personal salvation. Moreover, the splendid solitude of Neo-Platonism, the flight of the alone to the alone, gives way to the responsibilities of the social order, in which even personal salvation is to be found.

There is thus neither ecclesiastical triumphalism, nor an institutional or individual way to perfection to be found in the world according to Augustine. Lacking a "golden way," individuals do the best they can to realise their salvation by their personal faith and grace and their actions with others. This fragmented and fractured view of man has a great deal to do with Augustine's view of the family, the Church, and other social institutions, and is particularly decisive in his view of civil authority. These themes will be reviewed in more depth in subsequent chapters.

¹ Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (Berkeley, 1969), at 146-157. For an account of Augustine's intellectual peregrinations, particularly those involving Neo-Platonism. see, R. A. Markus, *Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine's Spiritual Career* (Philadelphia: 1981 Augustine Lecture, 1982), especially at 41-42; and Mary T. Clark, R.S.C.J., *Augustine* (London, 1994), at 108-119, especially at 116-118.

² Augustine tells of his discussions of Neo-Platonist works with Simplicianus in the *Confessiones*, VIII, 2:

"... But when I mentioned that I had read some books of the Platonists which had been translated into Latin by Victorinus—a one-time rhetor in the city of Rome, who had, so I had heard, died a Christian, he congratulated me that I had not fallen in with the writings of other philosophers full of fallacies and deceptions, 'according to the elements of this world,' whereas in all the Platonic books God and His Word keep slipping in. Then, to exhort me to the humility of Christ, ... he recalled his memory of Victorinus himself, whom he had known intimately when he was at Rome. ...

"For Victorinus was extremely learned and most expert in all the liberal disciplines. He had read and assessed many of the philosophers' ideas, and was tutor to numerous noble senators. To mark the distinguished quality of his teaching, he was offered and accepted a statue in the Roman forum, an honour which the citizens of this world think supreme. Until he was of advanced years, he was a worshipper of idols and took part in sacrilegious rites. ... The old Victorinus had defended these cults for many years with a voice terrifying to opponents. Yet he was not ashamed to become the servant of your Christ, and an infant born at your font, to bow his head to the yoke of humility and to submit his forehead to the reproach of the Cross."

The effect of Neo-Platonism is shown in the *Confessiones*, VII, 10, 16:

"By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel and was given power to do so because you had become my helper. I entered and with my soul's eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind—not the light of every day, obvious to everyone, nor a larger version of the same kind which would, as it were, have given out a much brighter light and filled everything with its magnitude. It was not that light, but a different thing, utterly different from all other kinds of light. It transcended my mind, not in the way that oil floats on water, nor as heaven is above hearth. It was superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was made by it. The person who knows the truth knows it, and he who knows it knows eternity. Love knows it. Eternal truth and true love and beloved eternity: you are my God. . . ."

quoted in Clark, *supra* note 1, at 112.

³ See, *Enn. in Ps. 104, 3* (cited in O'Connell, *infra*, at 271); and *De Civitate Dei, IX, 17*, which fuses together ("with considerable liberty" according to Bishop J. E. C. Welldon in his translation of this work, published in London in 1921); *Enneads*, I, 6, 8, and I, 2, 3. See also, Robert J. O'Connell, S.J., *Readings in St. Augustine's Imagination* (New York, 1994), 174-176 and 257-258; John F. Callahan, *Augustine and the Greek Philosophers* (Philadelphia: Villanova University Press, 1967), at 52-55; and Brown, *supra* note 1, at 178-79. Callahan, *supra*, at 107, notes that Plotinus asserted that the "inner eye" of the soul must be pure in order to see, citing *Enneads*, I, 6, 9, and VI, 9, 9. O'Connell also notes the close relationship between the story of Odysseus and the Prodigal Son, both of whom are affected by outside forces; and *Enn. I, 6*, at 108, 176-78, 223, and 247-49.

⁴ W. J. Sparrow Simpson, *St. Augustine's Conversion* (London, 1930), at 52-54; and Clark, *supra* note 1, at 110-112.

⁵ In Ep. 118 (410), Augustine makes a testy response to Dioscorus, who had asked him to respond to numerous questions concerning philosophy. After urging him to seek the truly happy life, Augustine sets out three alternative courses, centring around the body (the advocates for which were represented by the Epicureans), the soul (the advocates for which were represented by the Stoics), and God, contending that the last is both the complete end and the supreme good for man. He adds at 16-17:

"But, among those who say that our sole and supreme good consists in the enjoyment of God by whom we and all things were made, the Platonists held first place, because they thought, quite properly, that it was their duty to offer the greatest and almost the only opposition to the Stoics and Epicureans. The Academics held the same views as the Platonists, as the continuance of their followers proves. . . ."

"But the Platonists have not been able to play the part of true reason as fully as the others have been able to play their role of error. For, all of them lacked the model of divine humility, which enlightened us at the most fitting time through our Lord Jesus Christ. Before this peerless Model, all the pride of the most fiercely arrogant mind yields, is broken and expires. Therefore, the Platonists are not able by their authority to lead the mob, blinded by the love of earthly things, to faith in the unseen, when they see them so strongly enticed by Epicurean claims to drain the cup of carnal pleasures to the dregs—something they are naturally drawn to—and even to advocate this so strongly that they place in it the supreme good of man. And when they also see that those who are moved to oppose this kind of pleasure through their esteem of virtue behold it more easily in the minds of men, from which good deeds originate, as far as they can judge of them, if they should attempt to suggest to them some divine being, above all forces of change, apprehended by no bodily sense, understood by mind alone, but transcending the nature of the mind itself, and should state that this being is God, who is offered for the enjoyment of the human soul, purified of all taint and human passions, in whom alone is the term of all our good, they would not understand and would much more easily give the palm either to the Epicureans or to the Stoics in this contest than to themselves. Thus the true and saving doctrine would fall into disrepute though the contempt of untaught peoples—a most dangerous result for the human race. This is the case in the field of ethics."

In a perhaps wistful tribute to the Platonists, Augustine concludes his survey with the following at 33:

"But the Platonists, at the time when the errors of false philosophers were raging around them, had no divine person in whose name they could demand faith, so they chose to hide their true belief as something to be sought out rather than exposed to dishonour; when at length the Name of Christ became well known, to the wonder and consternation of earthly powers, they began to show themselves and to publish and expound Plato's doctrines. That was when the school of Plotinus flourished in Rome, and had as disciples many extremely shrewd and clever men. But some of them were led astray by an attraction for the practices of magic, while others learned that the Lord Jesus Christ is the embodiment of absolute truth and unchangeable wisdom, and they came over to His service. Thus, the whole sum of authority and the light of reason is found in that one saving Name, and in His one Church, set up to restore and reform human nature."

⁶ Simpson, *supra* note 4, at 56. Baynes also finds this de-emphasis on reason as the instrument of salvation, with Augustine rejecting it in favour of Revelation and grace. Thus, as Augustine says in writing on political matters, it does not matter under what regime a dying man lives. Rather, what matters is his relation to God. Will, as opposed to knowledge, is the paramount factor in human life. What one

loves as an individual speaks to his or her salvation, while a city is an association bound together by the object of its love. Baynes, *supra*, at 6 and 16.

⁷ See, especially, Gerald Bonner, *Pelagianism and Augustine*, 23 *Augustinian Studies* 53 (1992).

⁸ Book VIII, 8. Further complementary observations on the Neo-Platonic and Platonic schools are found in chapters 4 through 13 of this Book of *De Civitate Dei*, which was written in approximately 415. Although the *Retractationes*, written in 426-427, is less than fulsome in its praise of Plato and the Neo-Platonists, the views taken by Augustine, as a whole, are sympathetic and complementary to this school of philosophy.

⁹ In *Retractationes*, I, 4, Augustine states, referring to *Contra Academicos*, III, 17, 37, and II 10, 24:

"... Moreover, I was displeased—and not without reason—by the praise with which I extolled Plato and the Platonic or Academic philosophers far more than was fitting for irreligious men; for it is against their gross errors that Christian teaching must be especially defended."

Later, in *Retractationes*, III, 2, he responds to his statements in *De Ordine*:

"When I saw the subject—difficult indeed to understand—could not by disputation be brought to the comprehension of those with whom I was dealing, I preferred to talk about an *Order of Study*, by which advance can be made from corporeal things to the incorporeal.

"In these books, too, I am displeased . . . because I attributed a great deal to the liberal arts with which many saintly men are much in ignorance and with which many who are not saintly are thoroughly conversant, . . . because I stated that philosophers who lack true piety were refulgent with the light of virtue; because I propounded the existence of two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible, not as from the teaching of Plato or the Platonic philosophers, but as my own, as if the Lord Himself wished to indicate this, because He does not say 'My kingdom is not of the world,' but 'My kingdom is not of this world,' although the saying can be found in some utterance of His. [John 18:36]. But, even if another world was indicated by Christ the Lord, it could the more fittingly be understood as that one in which there will be a new heaven and a new earth, when that has been accomplished for which we pray when we say, 'Thy kingdom come.' Yet, if we will but attend to Plato's real meaning rather than to the word—a word which, certainly in ecclesiastical usage, is not employed in that connection—Plato was really not in error just because he affirmed the existence of an intelligible world. The eternal and unchangeable Wisdom itself by which God made the world—that he called the intelligible world. Now, if anyone denies the existence of this eternal Wisdom, then logically—if a plan of creation was not present to God—he must hold that without any plan God made what He made, or that, either when He made it or before He made it, He did not know what He made or would make. However, if a plan was present with God, as indeed it was, then Plato seems to have called that the intelligible world. We would not have employed that term, however, if we had been sufficiently instructed in ecclesiastical writings."

¹⁰ See, Peter I. Kauffman, *The Lesson of Conversion: A Note on the Question of Continuity in Augustine's Understanding of Grace and Free Will*, 11 *Augustinian Studies* 49 (1980), at 61.

¹¹ See, Van der Meer, *supra note*, at 577-579. The author believes that Augustine's earlier knowledge is generally useless to him after he becomes a priest, and he abandons, but does not forget, it.

¹² *Confessiones*, III, 4.

¹³ *Confessiones*, V, 3. See also, *Confessiones*, V, 5-8; and *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*.

¹⁴ In *Tr. 29 in Ioh.*, 6; Ep. CXXX, 3. See also, Basil Studer, O.S.B., *History and Faith in Augustine's De Trinitate*, 28 *Augustinian Studies* 7 (1997). In F. Van der Meer, *supra note* 9, at 575, the author summarises Augustine's view of faith and his early Neo-Platonism:

"... He did not pull a face when he saw hordes of pilgrims; on the contrary he mixed with them and delivered a sermon for the occasion. No indulgent smiles at the stupidity of ordinary people; he had no higher form of piety which he kept to himself. On the contrary, he says repeatedly that simple souls can get along quite satisfactorily with faith, hope and charity—once, even that they can get along without Holy Scripture. The proper study of wisdom, which cannot be gainsaid, has no other foundation; and it gives at its best a foretaste of divine contemplation. The illusions he had had about this in his early days rapidly disappeared; he saw that they were the result of overweening folly, a hangover from the neo-Platonic system of thought, lacking humility. He had realised what heights of knowledge and wisdom the simple believer could achieve; he had only to think of his own mother. One thing became clearer and clearer to him and was exposed ever more clearly in his sermons as time went on: What is left of a man when he cuts himself off from society? What is a Christian without the Church? Nothing in the Church of his day was alien to him."

¹⁵ In *De Ordine*, Augustine states:

"It remains for me to declare how instruction is to be imparted to the studious youths who have resolved to live after the manner described above. Likewise, with regard to the acquiring of knowledge, we are of necessity led in a twofold manner: by authority and by reason. In point of time, authority is first; in the order of reality, reason is prior. What takes precedence in operation is one thing; what is more highly prized as an object of desire is something else. Consequently, although the authority of upright men seems to be the safer guide for the uninstructed multitude, reason is better adapted for the educated. Furthermore, since no one becomes learned except by ceasing to be unlearned, and since no unlearned person knows in what quality he ought to present himself to instructors or by what manner of life he may become docile, it happens that for those who seek to learn great and hidden truths authority alone opens the door. But, after one has entered, then without any hesitation he begins to follow the precepts of the perfect life. . . ."

De Ordine, II, 9, 26. See also, T. A. Lacey, *Nature, Miracle and Sin* (London, 1916), p. 16.

¹⁶ Lacey, *supra* note 12, discusses the sublime nature of Augustine's recollection of his meeting with his mother, Monica, at Ostia in *Confessiones*, 9, 10, and compares it with Plotinus's ascent of the soul, p. 21, n. 2, and accompanying text. See also, Clark, *supra* note 1, at 114-115.

¹⁷ A review was made of two related Scriptural passages (John 6:44 and John 6:66), both of which indicate that no one could be saved without being called by the Father. Augustine takes a strong view that these passages deal with a grace that impels the recipient to God. For example, in *Serm.* 131, 2 (417), delivered on the Feast of St. Cyprian. Augustine uses the words of John 6:53: "Unless you eat my flesh," etc., and states this is a hard saying, which means it is unbelievable to those who will not believe. He uses John 6:44 and 6:65 to note that one is not merely led, but dragged ("traho," which has a strong sense of being pulled) by God. He urges his listeners to love and be dragged and states the violence is sweet and pleasant. See also, *Eps.* 186, XI, 38 (417) (where the verb used is "fuerit"), and 217; IV, 12 (426 or 427); and *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali*, XI, 10; *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis*, XIX, 41; and *Contra Duas Litteras Pelagianorum*, I, 6, III; and I, 38, XX. This notion of being called or forced by God easily leads to the use of these passages for justification of compulsion in religious matters discussed in Chapter V below. See also, *Contra Peliliani*, II, 85, 184; *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, II, VII, 15; and II, III, 3; and *Ep.* 93, 5.

This is an especially good article by Jose Oroz Reta, *The Role of Divine Attraction in Conversion According to St. Augustine*, in Martin and Richard, *From Augustine to Erugena* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1991), pp. 155-167. See also, J. O'Meara, *Neo-Platonism in the Conversion of St. Augustine*, *Dominican Studies* No. 3 (1950), pp. 331-343. *Ad Simplicianum*, I, q. 2, written shortly before the *Confessiones*, Augustine states that, while conversion is an act of will, whether one turns to God is a matter of being called "in a way suited to his condition" and of divine pre-arrangement. Eugene TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (London: Burns & Oates, 1970), at 39.

¹⁸ One of Augustine's most often-used passages is 1 Cor. 4:7 (*What do you have which has not been given unto you?*), a passage often used to discuss unmerited grace. See especially, *Contra Duas Litteras Pelagianorum*, I, 38; XX; II, 15; VII; and IV, 14; VI; *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, 7, III (written in 428 or 429); *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum*, II, 28, and 30; XVIII; *De Spiritu et Littera*, 54, XXXI; 50, XXIV; 57, XXXIII; and 60, XXXIV; and; *Eps.* 157, II, 10 (414); 86, II, 4 and 9 (419); 188, 7, 8, 9; and 14 (416); 194, III, 15; and V, 21 (418); and 218, 3 (426).

¹⁹ Leo C. Ferrari, in *St. Augustine on the Road to Damascus*, 13 *Augustinian Studies* 151 (1982), 151-153 and 161-163, notices the similarities between Augustine's conversion in the garden scene in *Confessiones*, VIII, 12; and Acts 9:1-9, in which Paul is converted on the road to Tarsus. Augustine heard "Tolle, Lege" and read Rom. 13:13-14, but rarely mentioned this scene after 402, although he mentioned it extensively between 396 and 401. The author suggests that Augustine's garden scene is a fiction, and his conversion was much less dramatic and more extended over time. He suggests the conversion is made to look more like that of Paul and as another instance of God's transforming grace. The impelling nature of grace given to St. Paul also appears to be ascribed by Augustine to his own situation. The strong identity with Paul and his writings may arise out of this similar experience and the perception of the dramatic influence of grace heightened thereby. Van der Meer, *supra* note 9, at 140-48, notes that Augustine had a difficult time in dealing with his congregation, who wished to make Pinianus a priest against his will and was less than brave in those circumstances, which recalls his own similar forced taking of Holy Orders. It is possible that Augustine saw these activities as impelled by Providence.

Kauffman, *supra* note 3, states that Augustinian notions of grace did not change through his life and were based on his own conversion experience. The choice of man was in accepting God's assistance, for which grace was also needed.

²⁰ The profound influence of the Neo-Platonists on Augustine is demonstrated in TeSelle, *supra* note 14, at 33-39. See also, W. H. C. Frend, *Augustine and Orosius: On the End of the Ancient World*, 20 *Augustinian Studies* 1 (1989), at 6.

²¹ *De Beata Vita*, 1, 4.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ In *De Beata Vita*, 4, 27-29, lack of wisdom is viewed as the chief cause of unhappiness. Augustine elaborates on this lack of wisdom at 29:

"It is as though, when speaking of a place that has no light, we were to say that it has darkness, intending only to state that it has no light. For the darkness does not, as it were, come or go away; but to be without light is the same as to be dark, as to be without clothing is the same as to be naked. For nakedness does not depart, like something moveable, upon the arrival of clothing. Thus, then, we say that someone has want, as we would say that he has nakedness."

The dialogue forms used by Augustine are dealt with well in Laurie Douglass's, *Voice Recast: Augustine's Use of Conversation in De Ordinae and the Confessiones*, 27 *Augustinian Studies* 39 (1996).

²⁴ *De Beata Vita*, 4, 35.

²⁵ This dualism is also found in the *Soliloquia*, I, 15, 27; *De Vera Religione*, XXXVI, 66; *De Diversis Quaestionibus* No. 23; and *De Libero Arbitrio*, 2, 11, 5. In the *Retractationes*, I, 26, Augustine revises slightly the statement in *De Diversis Quaestionibus* and states that he treated the issue more ably in *De Trinitate*, VI, 2, 3. See also, *De Trinitate*, XII, 15. In *Retractationes*, I, 1, 3, he terms his previous inquiries into Plotinian myth and glorification of aesthetics as a "stupid, tasteless fable"; nevertheless, his love for classical literature is apparent through his works. Van der Meer, *supra* note 11, at 236-237 and 319.

²⁶ *Contra Academicos*, III, 13, 29.

²⁷ *Contra Academicos*, III, 20, 43.

²⁸ In *Contra Academicos*, III, 17, 37, Augustine observes:

"Then, why were such great men willing to contend so incessantly and with such persistence to make it appear unlikely that a knowledge of truth falls to the lot of any man? Listen a little more attentively, not to what I know, but to what I think. I have saved this to the last, so that I might explain—if I can—what seems to me to have been the sole purpose of the Academics. Plato, the wisest and most erudite man of his day, spoke in such a manner that importance attached to whatever he said, and he spoke such things as would not be unimportant no matter how he spoke them. He is said to have received still further knowledge from the Pythagoreans after the death of his master, Socrates, whom he loved with a singular affection. But, Pythagoras himself had been dissatisfied with Greek philosophy, for at the time it was almost nil, or, at any rate, very occult. Convinced by the disputations of Pherecydes, a philosopher from Skyros, he had come to believe in the immortality of the human soul. And then, journeying far and wide, he listened to the discourses of many wise men. To the Socratic charm and precision that he had mastered in ethics, Plato joined the skill in the natural and divine sciences that he had diligently acquired from the men I have mentioned. Then he added dialectic, which he believed to be either wisdom itself or at least an indispensable prerequisite for wisdom, and which would synthesise and determine those components. Hence, he is said to have elaborated a complete philosophical science. But we have no time to treat of this at the present moment. For my present purpose, it is sufficient that Plato held the following theories: that there are two worlds—an intelligible world in which the truth itself resides, and this sensible world which it is manifest that we perceive by sight and touch; that consequently the former is a true world, and the present world is truth-like—made unto the image of the other; that the truth emanates from the intelligible world, and is, as it were, refined and brightened in the soul which knows itself; that with regard to the present world, opinion—but not knowledge—can be engendered in the minds of the unwise; that in this sensible world there are political virtues, namely, powers similar to other true powers that are known by only a few wise men; and that whatever is represented by these political virtues can be called nothing more than truth-like."

In two further portions of this work, Augustine appears to find most of philosophical inquiry since Plato to be a departure from, and return to, his thought. See, *Contra Academicos*, III, 17, 38, *et seq.*; and III 19, 42. In one of these battles, "our own Tullius" (i.e., Cicero) upholds the Platonic tradition, setting the stage for the revival of Neo-Platonism in III, 18, 41:

". . . Shortly afterwards, when all the persistent sophistry was dead, and when the clouds of error had been dispelled, then Plato's continence—which is the cleanest and brightest in philosophy—suddenly appeared, especially in Plotinus. Indeed, this Platonist philosopher has been adjudged so like to Plato that they would seem to have lived together, but there is such a long interval of time between them that Plato is to be regarded as having relived in Plotinus."

Immediately following this praise, Augustine distinguishes the "Cynics" who wish to pursue a libertine way of life by using scepticism and those who seek erudition, doctrine and morality, "by which the interests of the soul are consulted, a system of philosophy" that survived through the centuries. This is because men continue to teach that Plato and Aristotle represent the harmony of philosophy. Augustine distinguishes these philosophers from those of "this world" (with a probable reference to Col. 2:8), which is detested by the Church. Rather, their philosophy is:

"... of the other world, the intelligible world—a world to which even the most acute reasoning would never lead souls blinded by the multiform darkness of error and smeared with so much grime from the bodies. Human reason would never lead such souls to that intelligible world if the most high God had not vouchsafed—through clemency toward the human race—to send the authority of the divine intellect down even to a human body, and caused it to dwell therein, so that souls would be aroused not only by divine 'precepts but also by divine acts, and would be thus enabled to reflect on themselves and to gaze upon their fatherland, without any disputatious wranglings."

Contra Academicos, III, 19, 42.

²⁹ *De Ordine*, I, 1, 3.

³⁰ *De Ordine*, I, 2, 3. Later in I, 2, 4, Augustine notes the chest pains that caused him to give up his work as Master of Rhetoric. This condition is also discussed in *Soliloquia*, I, 1, 1, and I, 14, 26, and in the excerpt cited in the text from *De Beata Vita*, I, 1, 4. Perhaps this intimation of mortality and sorrow over his past life are driving forces in reviewing the direction of his life and its purpose. Augustine admits as much in *Soliloquia*, I, 9, 16. At I, 8, 21, in an emotional passage following a discussion of order and evil, one of Augustine's characters discusses turning away from poetry and other human pursuits to philosophy and religion. See also, Van der Meer, *supra* note 9, at 236-37.

³¹ *De Ordine*, I, 8, 24. He adds at the same place:

"... But, when wisdom begins to admonish these to bear with the physician and to permit themselves to be healed, they return to their rags; languid in the ever increasing warmth of those rags, they prefer to scratch the scab of itchy voluptuousness rather than to bear with and submit to the physician's injunctions—painful indeed for a little while, and burdensome to bodily ills—and be restored to the health of sound men and to the light. Wherefore, content with the name of the most high God, and with their sense faculty, as though it were an alms, they live wretched—but they live. But, that Spouse, supremely good and beautiful, seeks other men—or, to speak with greater precision, other souls, as long as they animate a body—worthy of His abode, souls for whom it is not enough merely to live, but to live a happy life...."

In the next section (I, 8, 25), the young Augustine extols the power of reason upon viewing a cockfight, which demonstrates to the students the power of instinct as a part of the natural order:

"... For what do the eyes of lovers [of truth and beauty] not encompass; where do they not search through to see beauteous reason signalling something thence?—reason which rules and governs all things, the knowing and unknowing things, and which attracts her eager followers in every way and wherever she commands that she be sought. Whence indeed and where can she not give a signal?—as was to be seen in those fowls...—precisely because another Reason from on high rules over all things...."

³² *De Ordine*, I, 9, 27.

³³ "... Wherefore, the divine Scriptures themselves—which you so heartily embrace—command, not that all philosophers, but the philosophers of this world, be avoided and esteemed for naught. But, there is another world utterly remote from these eyes of ours, a world which the intellect of a few sound men beholds. This, Christ Himself indicates clearly enough. He does not say: 'My kingdom is not of the world'; He says: 'My kingdom is not of this world.' Indeed, whosoever thinks that all philosophy is to be avoided wishes nothing else than that we do not love wisdom. Now, if you had no love whatever for wisdom, I would utterly disregard you in my writings; if, however, you had just ordinary love for it, I would not entirely disregard you; and much less if you were to love wisdom as much as I love it. And now, seeing that you love it even more than you love me, and knowing your great love for me, and seeing that you have made such advance in it that you are not frightened by the dread of any chance discomfort or even death itself—a most difficult attainment for even the most learned, and a position which all acknowledge to be the stoutest stronghold of philosophy—in view of all this, shall I not gladly entrust myself to you even as a disciple?"

De Ordine, I, 11, 32.

³⁴ *De Ordine*, II, 3, 10. This position contrasts sharply with his former Manichaean view, in which evil is described as an entity.

³⁵ *De Ordine*, II, 4, 11-12. The unfathomable order of things in God's order is exemplified by the feared hangman, who plays a role in enforcing the order of the city, and prostitutes and others of like ilk who prevent even worse disorders from occurring:

"... To me there already occur countless illustrations which bring me to complete agreement. What more hideous than a hangman? What more cruel and ferocious than his character? Yet he holds a necessary post in the very midst of laws, and he is incorporated into the order of a well-regulated state; himself criminal in character, he is nevertheless, by others' arrangement, the penalty of evildoers. What can be mentioned more sordid, more bereft of decency, or more full of turpitude than prostitutes, procurers, and the other pests of that sort? Remove prostitutes from human affairs, and you will unsettle everything because of lusts; place them in the position of matrons and you

will dishonour these latter by disgrace and ignominy. This class of people is, therefore, by its own mode of life most unchaste in its morals; by the law of order, it is most vile in social condition."

De Ordine, II, 4, 12.

³⁶ *De Ordine*, II, 5, 16, and 9, 26-27. At II, 9, 26, Augustine adds to the discussion already quoted in the text in note 15 above:

"As to those who are content to follow authority alone and who apply themselves constantly to right living and holy desires, while they make no account of the liberal and fine arts, or are incapable of being instructed in them—I know not how I could call them happy as long as they live among men. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that, upon leaving the body, they will be liberated with greater facility or difficulty according as they have lived the more virtuously or otherwise."

While human authority and attachment to the senses are often deceiving, divine authority bids humans to soar upward to the intellect, through the sacred rites of the Church. "Therein the life of good men is most easily purified, not indeed by the circumlocution of disputation, but by the authority of the mysteries." *De Ordine*, II, 9, 27. See also, Marcel D'Arcy, S.J., *A Monument to St. Augustine* (D'Arcy, ed., 1930), at 155-168.

³⁷ ". . . But, whoever is still a slave to his passions, or is keenly desirous of perishable goods, or even though he flee from these and live a virtuous life, yet if he does not know what pure nothing is, what formless matter is, what a lifeless informed being is, what a body is, what species in a body is, what place and time are, what *in a place* and *at a time* signify, what local motion is, what non-local motion is, what stable motion is, what eternity is, what it is to be neither in a place nor nowhere, what it is beyond time and forever, what is to be nowhere and nowhere not to be, what is to be never and never not to be—anyone who does not know these matters, and yet wishes to question and dispute about even his own soul—let alone investigating about the Most High God, who is better known by knowing what He is not—such a one will fall into every possible error.

"But then, whoever has grasped the meaning of simple and intelligible numbers will readily understand these matters. Furthermore, anyone of good talents and leisure—through the privilege of age or any kind of good fortune—if he eagerly devoted to study and if he follow the above-mentioned order of studies insofar as is required, will certainly comprehend such numbers. But since all the liberal arts are learned partly for practical use and partly for the knowledge and contemplation of things, to attain the use of them is very difficult except for some very gifted person who even from boyhood has earnestly and constantly applied himself."

De Ordine, II, 16, 44.

³⁸ *De Ordine*, II, 19, 49.

³⁹ *De Ordine*, II, 19, 50.

⁴⁰ "But that you mentioned Pythagoras—I truly believe it came to your mind through that unseen divine order, whatever it may be. For I had entirely overlooked a very important point, which, if we ought to believe anything from history—and, after all, who would not believe Varro?—I am wont to admire in Pythagoras, and, as you well know, to proclaim by almost daily praise; namely, that he taught the science of government last of all, taught it to disciples already learned, of mature years, already wise and happy. He indeed saw the political tempests to be of such magnitude that he was unwilling to commit anyone to them except a man who, in governing, would—almost like a god—avoid destructive rocks, and who, if all things failed, would himself become, as it were, a rock against the waves. Of the wise man only can it be truly said: '*Calmly he stands, like a motionless rock in the turbulent sea-surge,*' and the other things which have been expressed in splendid verses on this point."

De Ordine, II, 20, 54.

⁴¹ This prayer includes a verse which indicates that only the pure would be saved, a notion Augustine repudiated in *Retractationes*, 4, 2, in which he states that God hears the prayers of sinners. The prayer appears to have Neo-Platonic influences, as it addresses God, *inter alia*, as "Father of Intelligible Light, Father of our watching and enlightenment," whose domain "is the whole world unknown to sense," and asks that he be heard in "that Way of Thine well known to a select few." This Platonic notion of illumination is also found in *Soliloquia*, I, 8, 15, to I, 10, 17, and I, 13, 23, and is a frequent topic in this work. Platonic illumination is used interchangeably with the light from God.

⁴² *Soliloquia*, I, 3, 8. This position is rejected in *De Trinitate*, 15, 12, 21.

⁴³ *Soliloquia*, I, 4, 9.

⁴⁴ *Soliloquia*, I, 6, 12. The discourse goes on to set out the role of faith in the operations of a "healthy" soul:

". . . [T]he soul needs three distinct things: that it have eyes which it can properly use, that it look, and that it see. The mind is like healthy eyes when it is cleansed of every taint of the body, that is, detached and purged of the desires for earthly things—which cleansing it obtains, at first, only by *Faith*. As long as a thing cannot be

demonstrated to it because it is unhealthy and defiled by vices—for it cannot see unless it is healthy—it will have no regard for its own health unless it *believes* that, otherwise, it will not see. . . ."

In the following section of this work, Reason terms virtue "correct and perfect reason," which brings happiness. In *Soliloquia*, I, 7, 14, the need for faith in this life is posited to assure the vision of God is maintained in the event of temptation. See also, Donald E. Daniels, *The Argument of the De Trinitate* (University of Georgia: Ph.D. Thesis, 1976), at 17-20; and Vernon J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest for Wisdom: His Life, Thoughts, and Works* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1995).

⁴⁵ *Retractationes*, I, 2. None of what is dealt with in this dissertation is mentioned in this work with respect to *De Beata Vita*.

⁴⁶ *Contra Academicos*, III, 20, 45. Later, he affirms the position that reason is the best part of man, but amends his statement in *Contra Academicos* in *Retractationes*, I, 2, 2, with these words:

" . . . Of course, this is true, for, insofar as man's nature is concerned, there is in him nothing superior to mind or reason. Nevertheless, whoever wishes to live a happy life ought not to live in accordance with this element. If he lives according to this element, he lives according to man; whereas, in order to be able to reach happiness, life must be regulated according to God. And for the same of attaining happiness, our mind ought not to be content with itself: it ought to be subjected to God. . . ."

⁴⁷ *Retractationes*, I, 2, 2.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 4, 1-4. There are various changes in emphasis and clarifications of meaning that Augustine adds; however, there is no change in direction. At I, 4, 4, Augustine again rejects, as he did in his comments to *De Ordine*, the notion that liberal arts training is necessary for the good life, stating:

" . . . [F]or it is more credible that even those who are untaught, upon being properly questioned, give correct answers from certain branches of learning because the light of eternal reason is, according to their capacity, present in them, by which they can descry these ageless truths: not because they once knew these things and forgot them, as Plato or the Platonic philosophers believed." [He then adds that he wrote about this Platonic doctrine of reminiscence in Book 12 of *De Trinitate*, discussed below.]

⁵⁰ That rejection is not complete, for, in commenting on the doctrine of reminiscence, Augustine states in *De Trinitate*, XII, 15, 24:

" . . . But one must rather believe that the nature of the intellectual mind is so constituted that it perceives in a certain incorporeal light of its own those things which, by the disposition of the Creator, are joined to the things which are intelligible in a natural order, just as the eye of the body sees those things which lie near it in this bodily light for which the eye was created capable and fitted. For, it is not because it already knew these things before it was created in this flesh that the eye of the body distinguishes black from white without a teacher. Furthermore, why is it only of intelligible things that this can be done, namely that anyone who is properly questioned can answer correctly regarding any branch of learning even though he is ignorant of it? Why is it that no one can do this with sensible things except those which he sees while dwelling in this body, or which he believes when others tell him what they know by writing or the spoken word."

⁵¹ Robert J. O'Connell, a long-time scholar in Augustiniana, writes in his *Soundings in St. Augustine's Imagination* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), at 4-9, that Augustine should be read as a *rhetor*, so that his original Latin should be taken as written. Though this reading of the original may require the reader to stretch the mind to do so, the result is much better than reading him in a myriad of translations that attempt to discuss what Augustine "really" meant. See also, Markus, *Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine's Spiritual Career*, *supra* note 1, at 23 and 27, where the author suggests that profound differences in the thinking in Augustine may be masked by his "deceptive" continuity in language.

O'Connell stresses how Augustine uses language over what is actually said, so that his poetic imagery should be emphasised over his "philosophical analysis" and finds him more vibrant with his use of literary image. O'Connell makes a strong case that, unlike rigid Cartesian thought, Augustine's use of imagery does not observe the same principle of contradiction as conceptual thought and that his use of imagery in his writings or sermons is where Augustine expresses himself well. While the continuity of thought may be present, as in the failure to contradict his earlier views on living well, O'Connell suggests the reader study the text for changes in emphasis, which may indicate a wholly different position. The almost complete lack of discussion of Plato or Plotinus in his middle and later years renders it difficult to evaluate the role their thought plays in Augustine's worldview. However, the text suggests that such an evaluation is possible.

⁵² Vernon J. Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics* (Philadelphia: Villanova University, Augustinian Institute, 1979), App. VII, at p. 111, referring to *Retractationes*, I, 9. Bourke adds that another author, K. R. Holte, states that Augustine recognised the problem as early as 390, just a few years after his time at Cassiciacum. It is not necessary to deal with the issue squarely until the Pelagian crisis, however. Bourke suggests that even as early as Augustine's response to Ad Simplicianum, I, q. 2, at 10-11, in 385-396, the issue was apparent to him. He found it necessary to "clarify" his position in the *Retractationes*, at II, 1.

⁵³ See, e.g., *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*. Paula Fredriksen Landes, ed., *Augustine on Romans* (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1982), at ix.

⁵⁴ Landes, *supra* note 53, at ix-x. This author states that the *Expositio 84 Propositionum Epistolae ad Romanos* and the *Epistolae ad Romanos Incohata Expositio* are a product of this period. As will be shown below, these works constitute some of Augustine's most penetrating analysis of the Pauline corpus. Even here, Augustine appears to say that faith alone is sufficient for salvation, which is rejected two years later in *Ad Simplicianum* (396). This may not be as extensive a leap, however, when one considers that Augustine found faith itself a thing that could not be willed.

⁵⁵ Brown, *supra* note 1, at 262-264. *Confessiones*, XIII, xviii, 23; *Enn. in Ps.* 138, 14. Brown adds that the last three books of the *Confessiones* were autobiographical, for they seek to allow him to study the Bible to find its veiled secrets. *Confessiones*, XI, ii, 2. He saw it as the basis of a "Christian Culture," or "doctrina Christiana." See, Henri-Irene Marrou, *S. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris: Boccard, 1948), especially, pp. 357-385. He adds that *De Doctrina Christiana* was original, because that work deals with the ties that bound educated Christians to the culture of their age, but also cut the Gordian knot binding him to his past education in rhetoric and Neo-Platonism. See also, Van der Meer, *supra* note 9, at 338, 342-45, 406-09, and 448, regarding Augustine's views on Scripture and the excellent articles on Augustine's exegesis by Joseph T. Lienhard, *Reading the Bible and Learning to Read: The Influence of Education on St. Augustine's Exegesis*, 27 *Augustinian Studies* 7 (1996); and Frederick Van Fleteren, *Augustine's Principles of Biblical Exegesis, De Doctrina Christiana Aside: Miscellaneous Objections*, 27 *Augustinian Studies* 107 (1996), in which the author concludes at 126:

1. God is the author of, and authority for, Scripture. His meanings may not have been intended by his human agent. Moreover, there may be many meanings in the text: historical, aetiological (i.e., relating to cause), analogical, and allegorical.

2. The historical or literal meaning is the most important one and the exegete must search for it. If the text is not to be understood literally, the exegete must look for an allegorical meaning. God did not author Scripture for no purpose.

3. There are multiple sources of allegory: historical, symbolic and narrative. For Paul and Augustine, allegory and type are essentially similar to the other and to metaphor.

4. The Old Testament prefigures the New and the exegete may uncover doctrines in both places.

In addition, the study of Augustine's writings as literature is an interesting one. See, George Lawless, O.S.A., *Listening to Augustine: Tractate 44 on John 9*, 27 *Augustinian Studies* 59 (1996).

⁵⁶ Van der Meer, *supra* note 9, at 442-44.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics*, *supra* note 52; App. III, *Human Felicity and the Supreme Good*, at 83. See also, Markus, *Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine's Spiritual Career*, *supra* note 1, at 24-26. He notes several references to order in *De Civitate Dei*, particularly at XI, 16; XII, 4 and 6; and XIX, 12-14.

⁵⁹ Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics*, *supra* note 52, at 87-89, citing *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 2. Later, at XIX, 5, of that same work, he states that the philosopher's views that the life of the wise men is social is true, for how could the City of God be begun or developed or attain its proper destiny if the life of the saints were not social. He adds:

"... When we mortals possess such peace as this mortal life can afford, virtue, if we are living rightly, makes a right use of the advantages of this peaceful condition; and when we have it not, virtue makes a good use even of the evils a man suffers. But this is true virtue, when it refers all the advantages it makes good use of, and all that it does in making good use of good and evil things, and itself also, to that end in which we shall enjoy the best and greatest peace possible."

⁶⁰ In Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics*, *supra*, the author traces the notion of order through the three periods of Augustine's literary life and finds a consistent theme, beginning with *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 3-5 (396-397), in which the order of the universe and its good use is to be enjoyed:

"For to enjoy a thing is to rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake. To use, on the other hand, is to employ whatever means are at one's disposal to obtain what one desires, if it is a proper object of desire; for an unlawful use ought rather to be called an abuse. Suppose then, we were wanderers in a strange country, and could not live happily away from our fatherland, and that we felt wretched in our wandering, and wishing to put an end to our misery, determined to return home. We find, however, that we must make use of some mode of conveyance, either by land or water, in order to reach that fatherland where our enjoyment is to commence. But the beauty of

the country through which we pass and the very pleasure of the motion, charm our hearts, and turning these things which we ought to use into objects of enjoyments, we become unwilling to hasten the end of our journey; and becoming engrossed in a factitious delight, our thoughts are diverted from that home whose delights would make us truly happy. Such is a picture of our condition in this life of mortality. We have wandered far from God; and if we wish to return to our Father's home, this world must be used, not enjoyed, that so the invisible things of God may be clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made—that is, that by means of what is material and temporary we may lay hold upon that which is spiritual and eternal."

De Doctrina Christiana, I, 4.

⁶¹ "There is a certain life of man involved in the carnal senses, given up to carnal joys, avoiding carnal hurt, seeking carnal pleasure. The happiness of this life is temporal: to begin with this life is a matter of necessity; to continue in it a matter of choice. Doubtless, the infant issues forth into this life from the womb of the mother; as far as it can, it avoids the hurts, seeks the pleasures of this life; nothing else counts. But, after it reaches the age at which the use of reason awakens, and its will is divinely aided, it can choose another life whose joy is in the mind, whose happiness is interior and eternal. *Truly there is in man a rational soul, but it makes a difference which way he turns the use of reason by his will: whether to the goods of his external and lower nature or to the goods of his interior or higher nature, that is, whether his enjoyment is corporeal and temporal, or divine and eternal. This soul is placed in a middle state, having below it the physical creation and above it the Creator of itself and its body.*

"The rational soul can, then, make good use of temporal and corporeal pleasure, provided it does not give itself up entirely to created things and thereby abandon the Creator, but, rather, finds its happiness in serving the Creator, who has enriched it with the overflowing abundance of His own goodness. *For, just as all things God has created are good, from the rational being itself to the lowest form of physical life, so the rational soul acts rightly toward these things if it preserves due order among them, and by distinguishing, choosing, weighing them, subordinates the lesser to the greater, the corporeal to the spiritual, the lower to the higher, the temporal to the eternal, lest by a neglecting of the higher things and a craving for the lower it brings itself and its body into a worse state,* whereas it should rather bring itself and its body to a better state by putting charity in its due place. And, since all substances are naturally good, a praiseworthy rank among them is honoured, but a culpable disorder is condemned. The soul which makes a bad use of created things does succeed in escaping the rule of the Creator, since, if it makes a bad use of good. He likewise makes a good use of evil: then the soul, by using good things badly, becomes evil, but He, by making an orderly use of evil, remains good. Whoever unjustly gives himself over to sin is justly given over to punishment." (Emphasis supplied.)

Ep. 140, 2. Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics*, *supra*, at 38. Bourke further suggests that Augustine insisted in his earlier writings that joy resulted from successful moral activities.

⁶² *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et Moribus Manichaeorum*, II, 6, 8; in Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics*, *supra*, at 44. Bourke notes that, in *De Trinitate*, completed in 419, Augustine states that each creature possesses its essential unity and formal specifications from God's arrangement of things and that each rational creature is impelled toward its ultimate perfection in union with God by that order.

⁶³ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 3, cited in Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics*, *supra*, at 47.

⁶⁴ Although Augustine turns inward like Plotinus, he finds the good to be in Christ as the Mediator, rather than in the soul itself. Brown, *supra* note 1, at 245.

⁶⁵ Markus, *Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine's Spiritual Career*, *supra* note 1, at 20-23. Markus similarly traces the consistency of Augustine's view of order through his life and adds that, while Augustine never ceased to believe in order in creation, he was convinced by the early 390s that order could not be taken for granted. Nor could that order be detected by educated persons, nor realised in this life by the rational control of mind over body or, politically, through an enlightened ruler; rather man is separated from the order of creation when he refuses to follow God's unknown will. He concludes:

"... In the course of the 390s, Augustine came to abandon his previous confidence in man's intellectual and moral capabilities. Human life now appeared to him in terms of a sharp conflict between sin and salvation, and human history as the stage on which this conflict was played out. Salvation was no longer an ordered progression toward a distinct goal, but a sustained miracle of divine initiative; confidence in human resources, moral and intellectual, is the chief of the obstacles man can place in its way. The idea of an ultimate justice comprehensible in human terms, and the possibility of attaining it through the arrangements of social living, now seemed to Augustine a dangerous illusion."

⁶⁶ Markus, *Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine's Spiritual Career*, *supra* note 1, at 28-30. At 30-31, Markus quotes a passage from *De Genesi ad Litteram*, XI, 15, 20, which, he states, anticipates the "Leitmotiven" of the two cities:

"There are, then, two loves, of which one is holy, the other unclean; one turned towards the neighbour, the other centred on self; one looking to the common good, keeping in view the society of saints in heaven, the other bringing the common good under its own power, arrogantly looking to domination; one subject to God, the

other rivalling Him; one tranquil, the other tempestuous; one peaceful, the other seditious; one preferring truth to false praise, the other eager for praise of any sort; one friendly, the other envious; one wishing for its neighbour what it wishes for itself, the other seeking to subject its neighbour to itself; one looking for its neighbour's advantage in ruling its neighbour, the other looking for its own advantage. These two loves started among the angels, one love in the good angels, the other in the bad; and they have marked the limits of the two cities established among men under the sublime and wonderful providence of God, who administers and orders all that He creates; and one city is the city of the just, and the other city is the city of the wicked."

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, at 31-33.

⁶⁸ See, Callahan, *supra*, at 47-52 and 58-62. Callahan states that Plato's *Phaedrus* raised the soul above the body and made it responsible for its own destiny, advising a flight from earth, where evils hover, to God, and to become like Him, holy, just and wise. Plotinus revised Plato's Orphic work, *On the Beautiful*, in which the beauty of the soul was perfected by emancipation from the passions through a purification process. The result is a flight from the self to the Absolute and a self-realisation, so that our spiritual vision is fixed on the Absolute. See also, *Enneads*, 1, 6, 9.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, at 52-55. In *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1950), by Pierre Courcelle, the suggestion is made that the origin of this flight is Augustine's mentor, Ambrose of Milan, for whom Plotinus was a model.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, at 55-58. Gregory's flight involves an intellectual act of the will, unlike the journey of Plotinus, and, in speaking of the work of Fr. Paul Henry, S.J., *Augustine on Personality* (New York, 1950), adds at 58:

"... One must admit, on the one hand, that there is considerable basis for the statements of Father Henry when he contrasts the proud rationalism of Plotinus who has only to close his eyes to the outside world and awaken a sleeping power within himself, and the almost anguished Christianity of Augustine, who must bend his will under the yoke, and break the resistance of a nature that is wounded and divided against itself before he can win the struggle. Yet, on the other hand, if we look at the larger picture presented by Plotinus, there are indications that he was not unaware of the serious problems involved in moral progress; and this is even truer of Gregory. But the fact is that in presenting their versions of the flight of the soul, whether this is understood as seeing or as willing, they have not touched on the real difficulties as an Augustine would have seen them. This is not an isolated instance in their philosophies, since they do not offer anywhere his kind of approach to the role played by the will in spiritual progress. ..."

⁷¹ There were several other candidate passages which, upon analysis as to their use in Augustine's writings, did not provide any further insights into Augustine's political thought. Those passages included:

Rom. 8:7. *Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be.*

Gal. 2:20. *And I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me. And that I live now in the flesh: I live in the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and delivered himself for me.*

Gal. 4:9. *But now, after that you have known God, or rather are known by God: how turn you again to the weak and needy elements, which you desire to serve again?*

Gal. 6:8. *For what things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap. For he that soweth in his flesh, of the flesh also shall reap corruption. But he that soweth in the spirit, of the spirit shall reap life everlasting.*

2 Cor. 5:7. *For we walk by faith, and not by sight.*

⁷² Serm. 391, 1 (393-396).

⁷³ See, *De Diversis Quaestionibus* No. 66, 5-6. Augustine explains that Paul either contends that pleasure's persuasion to sin is more powerful where something is forbidden or that, even if a man does something in accordance with the requirements of the Law, if he has no grace, he attributes his compliance to himself, rather than God and sins the more through pride. The soul's disposition is toward the flesh when it longs for lower things and for the spirit, when it longs for higher things.

⁷⁴ "For the law is spiritual, but as for me, I am carnal, sold under sin. For I cannot tell what I am about; for it is not what I will that I do. It is as a carnal man that he says 'It is not what I will that I do.' He is not blaming the law, but himself. The law, being spiritual, is not at fault. It is the carnal man who has sold himself that incurs guilt. He does not do what he will. When he will he cannot, because when he could he would not. By willing what is bad he lost the power for what is good. It's as a prisoner he is now speaking and the prisoner says, *It is not what I will that I do. For I do not perform the good that I will, but the bad thing I hate is what I do.*

""Not what I will.' And of course Mr. Know-all contradicts, 'Of course it's what you will.' *'It's not what I will that I do.'* "You do exactly what you will.' *'It's not what I will that I do.'* Believe me, brother, *'it's not what I will that I do.'* 'Come off it; if you wanted to, you would do it; it's because you don't want to do that you don't do good.' *'It's not what I will that I do.'* Believe me, brother, I know what's going on in me. *'It's not what I will that I do.'* You are no arbiter of conscience, you opponent of grace. I know that I do not do what I will, and are you going to keep on saying 'You do what you want to do?' *'No one knows what goes on in a man except the spirit of the man which is within him.'*"

Serm. 30, 3.

⁷⁵ "For my part, I tell you, anything in me that rebels against my mind, and argues with me in favour of a contrary kind of pleasure, anything in me of that sort I would like to slay completely. And if by chance it happens with the Lord's help that I defeat it, I would still much rather not have anything to argue with. For me, not having an enemy is infinitely preferable to defeating one. It's not the case either, is it, that the fact of the flesh lusting against the spirit has nothing to do with me, or that I have been stuck together from a different and opposite nature? No, that fact is a fact about me, and my not agreeing to it is a fact about me. The free part of me is to some extent resisting the bits left over from slavery in me. I want the whole thing to be healed, because I am the whole thing. I don't want my flesh, as something foreign to me, to be separated from me forever, but to be all healed with me forever."

Serm. 30, 3-4.

⁷⁶ "... Let them choose which of these two pleases them. For if the lust of the flesh was submitted to, rather than made to submit, then there was no moral freedom there; if, however, it was forced to submit lest he be found to submit to it, then there was no calm and peaceful bliss. No matter which one of these is chosen, the happy beauty or the beautiful happiness of paradise is abandoned.

"Who does not see this? Who would contradict this most obvious truth except by a most brazen obstinacy? It remains therefore that either this concupiscence of the flesh, which we feel disturbing us with such unruly and inordinate desires against our will even when there is no need, did not exist there, although there was the concupiscence of marriage maintaining the peaceful love of spouses and just as the will commands the hands and feet to move to do appropriate things, so it would have commanded the genital organs to acts of generation that in paradise children might have been sown in a marvellous way without the trials of the lust of the flesh, just as they would have been born in a marvellous way without the pangs of birth; or if that concupiscence of the flesh did exist there, it was not such as now that they who fight against it with chastity either of the married, the widow, or the virgin, believe it to be, viz., most burdensome and hateful. . . ."

Ep. *6, 6. See also, *De Civitate Dei*, XIV, 16-24.

⁷⁷ "... For indeed he was not doing evil by presenting his members for fulfilling evil desires, but he said this of the lustful movements themselves, to which even if he did not consent nor do what they urged, still he was doing what he was unwilling to have just by having them. Finally, he adds 'Now if I do what I do not want. . .,' i.e., although I do not consent to the concupiscence—I do not want to lust but I do it anyway—it is no longer I that do it, but the sin which dwells in me.' The guilt of this sin is brought on by generation, is taken away by regeneration by which there is the forgiveness of all sins. Still some of its power and a certain feeling of deadly contagion remain in the corruptible and mortal body even when the guilt has been taken away, against which the person who has been reborn fights, if he is to make progress. . . ."

Ep. *6, 6.

Augustine concludes that the type of concupiscence that may have existed in Paradise was not the same type as Paul describes, where lust covets what is licit and illicit, so that the flesh never "lusted against the spirit" as Paul describes in Gal. 5:17. *Ibid.*, at 7-8.

⁷⁸ *Enn. in Ps. 4*, 6. See also, Serm. 348A, 1, 8, and 10 (416).

⁷⁹ Similarly, in *Enn. in Ps. 6*, at 7, Augustine states:

"Wherefore he goes on to say, 'I have laboured in my groaning.' And as if this availed but little, he adds, 'I will wash each night my couch' (ver. 6). That is here called a couch where the sick and weak soul rests, that is, in bodily gratification and in every worldly pleasure. Which pleasure, whoso endeavours to withdraw himself from it, washes with tears. For he sees that he already condemns carnal lusts; and yet his weakness is held by the pleasure, and willingly lies down therein, from whence none but the soul that is made whole can rise. As for what he says, 'each night,' he would perhaps have it taken thus: that he who, ready in spirit, perceives some light of truth, and yet, through weakness of the flesh, rests sometime in the pleasure of this world, is compelled to suffer as it were days and nights in an alteration of feeling: as when he says 'With the mind, I serve the law of God,' he feels as it were day; again when he says, 'but with the flesh the law of sin,' he declines into night: until all night passeth away, and that one day comes, of which it is said, 'In the morning I will stand by Thee, and will see.' For then he will stand, but now he lies down when he is on his couch; which he will wash each night, that with so great abundance of tears he may obtain the most assured remedy from the mercy of God. . . ."

⁸⁰ Sermon 400, 4. Augustine cites Ep. 5:29, to the effect that no one hates his own flesh, but rather loves and cherishes it. His point is that flesh and spirit must be placed in the right order. On the comparison between the love of flesh and that of Christ for the Church, he adds:

"Doesn't the comparison frighten you, because *he nourishes and cherishes it*, he says, *just as Christ does the Church*? You think the flesh is a shackle; who ever loves his shackles? *For nobody ever hates his own flesh*. You think the flesh is a prison; who ever loves his prison? *For nobody ever hates his own flesh*. Who doesn't hate his chains? Who doesn't hate his punishment? And yet, *nobody ever hates his own flesh; but he nourishes it and cherishes it, just as Christ does the Church*. So you then, who attribute one maker to the flesh, another to the spirit, are going to attribute one to the Church, another to Christ. If that's your sense, it's nonsense. So everybody loves his own flesh; the apostle says so, and apart from what the apostle says, everybody can prove it by his own experience. However much, after all, you may be a tamer of the flesh, however great the severity you enthusiastically treat it with, I imagine you shut your eye if something or someone is about to hit it."

⁸¹ "Baleful days. But are these days baleful or evil that are brought round again and again by the sun? Evil days are made by evil people, and that means practically everybody. Among the masses of evil people groan the few grains of wheat. Let's come back to the just. The others are evil and they make the days evil. What about the just? Aren't they in evil days too? Even by themselves—apart from what they suffer from the evil people among whom they are groaning—even when they are by themselves, let them take a look at themselves, go down into themselves, consider themselves carefully. They will find evil days within themselves.

"They don't want war, they want peace. And who doesn't? And while everyone wants peace and doesn't want war, the man who lives justly turns his gaze on himself and finds war in himself. Ask me what war? . . . Here's a person asking me what war the just man experiences in himself. Teach him from your law. Let the apostle speak: *The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh*. And where can I dump the flesh if war breaks out, if (which God forbid) an enemy invades us? A man flees, and takes his own war with him wherever he goes. I don't mean he's a bad man. No, it's precisely if he's a good man, if he lives justly, that he finds in himself what the apostle says: *The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh*. In this war, how can there be good days?"

Sermon 25, 4. Though not mentioned, it is possible that the "baleful days" may have included the sack of Rome in August of that year.

⁸² Sermon 30, 4. This theme of an internal "brawl" between the flesh and spirit is also found in Sermon 53A, 12, written sometime between 405-420. Augustine illustrates his view of the proper order of things:

". . . What's more, if you want to be a peacemaker between two quarrelling friends of yours, begin the work of making peace with yourself: you should first pacify yourself inside, where perhaps you are wrangling and brawling with yourself every day. That person had some internal wrangling going on in himself, didn't he, who said, *The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, so that you cannot do whatever you will?* They are the words of the holy apostle. *For I delight in the law of God according to the inner self, but I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, and taking me captive in the law of sin which is in my members*. So if there is a kind of daily battle going on in the inner self, and the good fight is being fought to save the higher powers from being overcome by the lower, to stop lust conquering the mind, covetousness conquering wisdom, then that's the right kind of peace you should be making in yourself, to ensure that the better part of you controls the lower.

"Now the better part of you is the one where the image of God is to be found. This is called the mind, it's called intelligence; that's where faith glows, hope takes courage, charity is kindled. Does your mind want to be capable of conquering your lusts? Let it submit to one greater than itself, and it will conquer one lower than itself, and you will have in yourself a peace that is genuine, stable and supremely well ordered. What is the order of this peace? God controls the mind, the mind controls the flesh; nothing could be better ordered."

See also, Sermon 77A, 2, written sometime between 412 and 416, on the theme of struggle.

⁸³ The theme of struggle is also presented at some length in Sermon 128, written between 412 and 416, but in a way to include human responsibility as part of that struggle:

"What struggle? *But if you bite and devour each other, take care you are not destroyed by each other*. But I say, *Walk by the Spirit*. I'm quoting the apostle's words, which were chanted just now from his letter: *But I say, Walk by the Spirit, and do not go through with the lusts of the flesh*. He didn't say, 'Don't have them,' nor did he even say 'Don't act on them,' but *do not go through with them*. What this means I will, with the Lord's help, say as best I can; you must stand by me, in order to understand, if you are walking by the Spirit."

* * *

"So don't get beaten when you fight. Notice what sort of war, what sort of fight, what sort of quarrel he has presented you with; it's within, inside your own self. *The flesh lusts against the spirit*. If the spirit doesn't also lust against the flesh, then commit adultery. But if the spirit does lust against the flesh, then I observe a struggle, I

don't observe defeat, it's a fight. *The flesh lusts against the spirit*; adultery is attractive. I admit it's attractive. But *the spirit lusts against the flesh*; chastity too is attractive."

Serm. 128, 8. Augustine returns to the theme that there was no such struggle before the Fall, and that it is Original Sin that occasions the struggle. He continues:

"So it's the same here too: *The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh*; and what's the meaning now of *so that you may not do the things that you would*? Here, you remember, is where the danger lies for anyone understanding it wrongly. Now for the task of explaining, somehow or other, *so that you may not do the things that you would*. Pay attention, you holy people, whoever you are, actually engaged in the fight. I'm speaking to the battlers; those who fight this fight will understand. It's the one who doesn't fight that won't understand me. As for the one who does fight, I don't say he understands me, but that he's one jump ahead of me.

"What is it the chaste man would like? That no lust at all should stir in his members against chastity. He wants peace, but he hadn't yet got it. I mean, when we get to the stage where no lusts at all rise up to be opposed, there won't be any more enemy for us to wrestle with; nor is there in that state any expectation of victory, because the triumph is being celebrated over the enemy already conquered. . . .

"But now, while the flesh is lusting against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, death is still in the contest, still striving; we do not do what we would. Why? Because what we would is that there should be no lusts, but we can't manage it. Willy-nilly, we have them; willy-nilly, they titillate, entice, goad, molest, try to surface. They can be held in check, but not yet extinguished, as long as *the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh*. . . .

"So as long as we are living here, brothers and sisters, that's how it is: that's how it is even for us who have grown old in this warfare; sure, we have fewer and lesser enemies, but we still have them, nonetheless. Our enemies too have to the same extent got worn out by age, but even so, tired though they be, they never stop disturbing the quiet of old age with all sorts of impulses. The battle is fiercer for young people; we know all about that, we've been through it too."

Serm. 128, 10-11. *See also, id.*, at 13.

⁸⁴ . . . The quarrel then, between Romulus and Remus shows how the earthly city is divided against itself: that which fell out between Cain and Abel illustrated the hatred that subsists between the two cities, that of God and that of men. The wicked war with the wicked; the good also war with the wicked. But with the good, good men, or at least perfectly good men, cannot war; though, while only going on towards perfection, they war to this extent, that every good man resists others in those points in which he resists himself. And in each individual 'the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.' This spiritual lusting, therefore, can be at war with the carnal lust of another man; or carnal lust may be at war with the spiritual desires of another, in some such way as good and wicked men are at war; or, still more certainly, the carnal lusts of two men, good but not yet perfect, contend together, just as the wicked contend with the wicked, until the health of those who are under the treatment of grace attains final victory."

De Civitate Dei, XV, 5.

The theme of struggle ending with the death of the righteous is also found in Serm. 56, 8, written between 410-412, as he states, in discussing the Lord's Prayer:

". . . so when this war has ceased, and all lust has been changed into love, nothing will remain in the body to resist, nothing needing to be tamed, nothing to be curbed, nothing to be kicked, but everything will contribute harmoniously to justice—then is done *thy will in heaven and on earth*. We are demanding perfection when we make this prayer."

⁸⁵ *Contra Litteras Petilianis*, II, 69, 154. This writing is discussed further in Chapter V below, in note 20 and accompanying text.

⁸⁶ *See*, Frederick Van Fleteren, *Per Speculum in Aenigmate*, 23 *Augustinian Studies* 69 (1992), where the passage is used to deal with human knowledge of God in this life and does not have any direct political or social implications.

⁸⁷ *Enn. in Ps. 48* (first part), 5.

⁸⁸ *De Fide et Symbolo*, IX, 20:

". . . For these things cannot be seen except by the heart made pure; and [even] he who in this life sees them 'in part,' as it has been said, and 'in an enigma' cannot secure it that the person to whom he speaks shall also see them, if he is hampered by impurities of the heart. . . ."

The final two uses are found in *De Trinitate*. In the distinction between wisdom and knowledge, Augustine states:

"For knowledge also has its own good measure, if that in it which puffs up, or is wont to puff up, is conquered by love of eternal things, which does not puff up, but, as we know, edifieth. Certainly without knowledge the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed, by which this miserable life may be so governed, that we may attain to that eternal life which is truly blessed.

"Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal things; and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. For although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the apostle too speaks, where he says, '*Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known;*' when doubtless he meant his words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints"

De Trinitate, XII, 14, 22. Later in this same chapter, the "face-to-face" language is used as the equivalent to the Beatific Vision. Continuing this theme of spiritual epistemology, Augustine states in the same work:

"For we wished to ascend, as it were, by steps, and to seek in the inner man, both in knowledge and in wisdom, a sort of trinity of its own special kind, such as we sought before in the outer man; in order that we may come, with a mind more practised in these lower things, to the contemplation of that Trinity which is God, according to our little measure, if indeed, we can even do this, at least in a riddle and as through a glass. . . ."

Ibid., XIII, 20, 26.

⁸⁹ *Enn. in Ps. 118*, 6.

⁹⁰ Jaroslav Pelikan, in *An Augustinian Dilemma: Augustine's Doctrine of Grace Versus Augustine's Doctrine of the Church*, 18 *Augustinian Studies* 1 (1986), suggests that there is a special grace of perseverance. Through this grace, the elect are able to receive both the means and end of salvation, thereby resolving any conflict between divine sovereignty and the need for piety. He relies on *De Dono Perseverantiae* and *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, both written in 428 or 429 at the end of Augustine's life. See also, Kauffman, *supra*.

III. AUGUSTINE ON SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. Introduction.

As indicated in the preceding chapter, the mature Augustine believes that man is profoundly flawed. As he grows older, he becomes increasingly aware of the use of both social pressure and the coercive power of the political order as a means of repressing vice and encouraging outward compliance to law and social codes. While appreciating the marked difference between outward compliance and inward disposition, he also believes the conditions for salvation for the majority are improved through contact with the Church as the instrument of salvation.

This chapter deals with five sets of social relationships that may or may not be regulated by the political order, but that provide the social ties to bind a society in which the Church may undertake her work. Following the methodology of the previous chapter, Augustine's writings are reviewed to determine his views of these relationships. In addition, passages from the Epistles, bearing on certain of those relationships and discussed by Augustine, are examined. Most of these passages are from Pauline writings and were followed by Augustine to the letter. An exception is the institution of monasticism, which is not discussed as such in the New Testament. In addition, the internal discipline of the Church, a subject also not dealt with extensively in Scripture, is also examined.

The conclusion of this study of those relationships is that Augustine finds, largely through Scripture, a prescription for life that does not change from his earliest writings. For Augustine, the ideal way of life is consecrated virginity, which he recognises is difficult and unattainable by many. This chapter first examines two "natural relationships," i.e., that of husband and wife and parent and child. Marriage is the most common social relationship, and

Augustine requires it to be loving, chaste, and orderly. However, he holds that the husband rules both his wife and his household. He is required to be chaste and mild, while the wife is to be submissive. Both are joined in the obligation of mutual love. Children are required to be both obedient and reverent to their parents. This chapter then turns to slavery, an institution Augustine found derived from the Fall. Augustine requires slaves to be submissive and masters mindful of their own submission to God. Finally, this chapter turns to two ecclesiastical relationships that have less Scriptural direction. Augustine formulates a rule for monastic relationships that requires poverty, chastity, and obedience in that institution that came closest to Augustine's ideal of life on earth. Finally, the members of the Church are enjoined to adhere to the bonds of peace, love, and unity.

Only by assuring that the proper relationships are formed among its households can the regime most effectively fulfil its role of suppressing vice and the Church undertake her mission. Moreover, only through adherence to Scriptural directions in these relationships do individuals maximise their own opportunities for achieving salvation. While earlier Christian writers are concerned with the imminent Second Coming, Augustine writes for the long haul, dealing with daily problems of ordinary life. That life may be short and uncertain; however, the need for the formulation of these precepts is such that they are designed to last for many generations or even centuries.

In each of the relationships examined in this chapter, there are persons with dual roles and responsibilities. In those relationships preceding the triumph of the Church in the Empire, very little changes on the outside. Wives, children, and slaves remain subordinate to husbands, parents, and masters, respectively. The change arising out of Christian thought is in a new inward disposition toward those relationships. The subordinate parties are enjoined to love, as

well as to be humble. The dominant parties are enjoined to mildness and love in their rule, bearing in mind their own submission to a higher power. Augustine applied this hierarchical relationship in formulating his monastic rule. Finally, there is a less-structured relationship with respect to Church discipline, but a stronger and purer injunction for love, peace, and unity. As with many aspects of Augustine's writings, there is a dual set of commands. On the one hand, there is the formal adherence to the roles assigned by life. On the other hand, there is the deeper and more spiritual injunction to carry out that role with Christian love and patience.

This pastoral aspect of Augustine's work cannot be overlooked. While he is certainly the grand theoretician of *De Civitate Dei*, he is also pastor and bishop. His letters and sermons provide insights into his thinking on these particular social matters and a basis to examine his interpretations of Scripture, as it applies to social life. As will be seen below, it is his sermons and letters that provide much of the material for consideration of Augustine's views of social relationships. Augustine is consistent, and that consistency is found in all his writings on these relationships, always faithful to Scripture, particularly the Pauline writings. And while Augustine does not invent monasticism, his writings provide much of the structure that is built upon by the mediaeval orders. Those writings also set forth a basis for internal Church discipline and, ultimately, the intellectual basis for the use of the civil power to maintain that discipline, which is examined in Chapter V below.

B. The Relationship Between Husband and Wife.

Augustine himself understands the emotional and sexual needs of men and women. Indeed, he had a long-lasting relationship with a woman, with whom he had a child, Adeodatus, and even considered marriage while preparing for his baptism.¹ In his *Soliloquia*, Augustine conducts an extended conversation with himself (or "Reason") about his life at that time and,

among other things, considers his desire not to marry because of the adverse impact on his ideal life of studying and contemplating philosophy and Scripture.² At the time of his conversion, he decided to follow the single life to pursue religious and philosophical goals. It appears to him that the ideal life is one that allows such activity, either alone or with a community of like-minded men as he found in Cassiciacum. No doubt, this desire is but one product of his Neo-Platonism.

Augustine admits the role played by his mother, Monica, in his conversion. Her example and exhortation is apparent in the *Confessiones*, in which he discusses his mother's influence in his early life,³ her efforts to change him,⁴ and her death in Ostia, which had greatly impressed Augustine.⁵ Shortly before her death, the two participate in the "Vision at Ostia," which Augustine so movingly describes in the *Confessiones*.⁶ More to the point, however, Augustine also writes approvingly of the peace brought by Monica to her own household when she won over her mother-in-law, who had been set against her by "the whispering of mischievous maids." Augustine registers no disapproval of the subsequent disciplining of the maids through beatings, which were required by his father for the good of the household.⁷

There is no doubt that Augustine shares an attitude toward women and children that characterises the late classical period and is reinforced by Scripture. He believes that women, as children of Eve, are weaker than men and are required, by nature and Scripture, to be submissive to their fathers and husbands.⁸ At the same time, he exhorts mutual love and fidelity in marriage. In Serm. 392, preached in 420, Augustine uses his rhetorical gifts to deal with the pervasive problem of marital infidelity. After urging fidelity and confession of infidelity, he continues:

"Finally, my brothers, men are listening to me, women are listening to me; why are you getting angry with me? If only you would do what is written: *Be angry, and do not sin*. I should be afraid that what happened to the apostle Paul, which you heard, if you were paying attention, when it was read just now, may

happen to me: *So have I become your enemy, by proclaiming the truth to you?* And if that's how it is, let it be so. If I have to be your enemy, I prefer being yours, as better than being the enemy of justice. I even commend you to the custody of your wives. They are my daughters, just as you are also my sons. Let them listen to me; they must be jealous of and for their husbands; they shouldn't cherish for themselves the empty reputation which married ladies are regularly accorded by their shamelessly unchaste husbands, who praise them for so calmly tolerating their husbands' shameless infidelities. I don't want Christian wives to show that sort of patience; they must definitely be jealous of their husbands; not for their bodies' sake, but for their souls."⁹

In Ep. 262, to Ecdicia, Augustine gives a lengthy response to a lady who questions him about her duties as a wife. Ecdicia had announced a vow of chastity to her husband, then persuaded him to do the same. When he found that she had, without his knowledge or consent, given family possessions to some travelling monks, he denounced the vow, left the house, and took up with another woman, demanding custody of their son. Augustine finds the result is a lack of submission and moderation on the part of the wife and discusses his views of the arrangement of a proper household. In doing so, he notes 1 Cor. 7:1-5, in which Paul states that, while it is better not to have touched a woman, "for fear of fornication," every man who cannot resist the flesh should have a wife, and every woman similarly disposed should have a husband.¹⁰ Augustine concludes Ecdicia had erred by refraining from sexual intercourse, even after her husband changed his mind about the matter. She compounded that error by giving away family possessions without her husband's consent.¹¹

Augustine also chides Ecdicia for her unilateral decision to wear the attire of a widow, a sign of devotion, turning to his often-used consideration of the inward heart over the outward appearance of clothes in making his point.¹² For domestic peace, the wife must submit to her husband on the matter of sexual relations, disposition of property, and attire. Her husband's conduct, while regrettable, is the result of her "reckless and ill-considered behaviour," and she is urged to return to him abjectly and not to scorn his conduct.¹³ While certainly reflecting the

male-oriented society of his time, Augustine's comments have a Scriptural basis. This letter presents not a treatise on marriage from one who never married, but Augustine's reckoning of the requirements of Scripture, as opposed to what would be otherwise praiseworthy conduct. Family structure and an inward disposition of love prevail over chastity, almsgiving, and a desire to present oneself in holy humility.

There is no question that Augustine expects that love and fidelity are requirements of every marriage. In Serm. 224, delivered in 414, Augustine deals with the relative lightness with which adultery is apparently seen in North Africa at the time. He suggests that the common excuse that sins of the flesh are not spiritual is comparable to the seduction of Eve in the Garden of Eden, where Eve blamed her sin on the serpent. He continues:

"Therefore, I say to you, my brethren, my sons, to you who have wives, do not admit any other interest; to you who do not have wives and who wish to marry, keep yourselves inviolate for your wives as you desire to find them inviolate. You who have vowed chastity to God, do not look back. Behold, I say this to you; I cry out to you; I exonerate myself, for God has placed me here as a minister, not as an overseer. Nevertheless, wherever I can, wherever I am given the opportunity, wherever I am permitted, wherever I know circumstances, I chide; I rebuke; I anathematise; I excommunicate. . . ." ¹⁴

Augustine admits that his purpose in preaching so harshly is in "both scaring the faithful and building you up."¹⁵ Additionally, he is aware of the abiding character of the temptation toward adultery and the power of recurrent sin, but urges those in that situation to change immediately, calling their intentions to change "tomorrow, tomorrow" (or in Latin, "cras, cras") the meaningless cawing of crows.¹⁶

Similarly, Augustine exercises his rhetoric in Serm. 332, delivered between 410-412, in which he suggests that the gift of the heavenly city is love. However, he asserts that not only murderers, but fornicators, too, will not enter that kingdom and, noting that many beat their

breasts at that thought, urges them to return to marital chastity.¹⁷ Serm. 385 (date uncertain) combines the same elements of exhortation, taunting, and persuasion that often characterise his sermons. After shocking his audience by stating that those who reject the love and friendship of God are adulterers, Augustine describes life as a series of relationships or friendships, especially marriage. In that relationship, neither party wishes harm to the other. If lived well, husband and wife love each other, as well as their children, and both will be able to love their relatives, neighbours, unknown strangers, and enemies, so that perfect charity is found.¹⁸

Augustine never questions Pauline texts on which the Church's view of the marriage relationship is based. As a North African, as well as a Christian, he believes that the husband is responsible for administering the household and ameliorates the potential harshness of this requirement by emphasising the husband's duty to love his wife and children and to run the household according to divine injunctions. But, as a political order must rule, whether or not the ruler seeks justice, a husband must rule, whether he rules in accordance with those injunctions or not.

In Serm. 152, delivered in 419, Augustine describes discord as the struggle for concord,¹⁹ just as he later describes the earthly end of every regime as the establishment of peace, regardless of justice:

"The discord now experienced between spirit and flesh is really a struggle for concord; the reason the spirit struggles is to bring the flesh into peace and concord with itself. Just as if in one home a man and his wife are quarrelling, what the man ought to strive for is to tame his wife; his wife once tamed, to subject her to her husband; his wife once subjected to her husband, to establish peace in the home."²⁰

This theme of struggle is also present in Serm. 154A, delivered in 417, where he contends the flesh must be defeated for its own good, and Augustine adds a domestic analogy:

". . . It's like a house, when a bad wife is fighting a good husband; she wins to her own hurt, she loses for her own good. I mean, if the bad wife wins, the house is all back to front, with the bearded male serving the bad woman. But if the bad wife loses, she starts serving the good husband; and the woman becomes good herself, because she is serving the good husband.

"So it's the same with our flesh too, as it is with the bad wife when she's beaten, because it's beaten for its own good. To summon to our aid the one who can join the two together and give them both the prize, that's why we cry out of this depth to our Lord, as we said in the Psalm. Because if we conquer and do not consent to the evil desires of our flesh, later on the flesh will rise again; and there you won't find any evil desires to contend with."²¹

What Augustine does not discuss in either sermon is the result of a bad husband winning the struggle. From his approach, it appears that the wife must bear this evil as a consequence of Original Sin and leave it for the Last Judgement to sort out the consequences if she is unable to win him over by persuasion in this life. Augustine faithfully interprets the Pauline texts regarding the domination of husbands over wives to his congregation, a point perhaps overemphasised in the modern view of him. But he sees a seamless web in the duty of mutual love and the notion of domestic order in his work.²²

In short, it is not the flesh that was evil to Augustine. That difficulty was overcome when he rejected Manichaeism, even before he embraced the Church. In particular, he denounces the Manichaean view of the flesh as evil, as opposed to the spirit, finding the two to be good and joined together.²³ Similarly, in one of his most-considered theological writings, *De Trinitate*, he rejects the notion that men and women have different destinies.²⁴

An examination of Augustine's use of selected Scriptural passages²⁵ bears out this attitude of compliance with Pauline attitudes towards marriage:

The first passage is 1 Cor. 7:1-4, in which continence is advised, but "for fear of fornication" marriage is permitted, and each party is obliged to "render their debt" to the other.²⁶

Two uses of this passage, i.e., in Serm. 332 and Serm. 392, have been discussed above.²⁷ In the *Confessiones*, Augustine regrets his lustful youth, chiding himself with this passage and regrets his own "touching a woman."²⁸ Elsewhere, in *De Civitate Dei*, he upholds the example of Sarah, wife of Abraham, who thought herself barren and used her power over her husband's body to allow procreation by her husband with her servant Hagar.²⁹ However, he most often uses the passage against adultery. In *De Bono Conjugali*, he advises payment of the "debt" of sexual relations, even if demanded intemperately, because marriage is allowed "by leave" of Scripture to prevent fornication and that one partner may sustain the other in their mutual weakness.³⁰ He also upholds the lawfulness of divorce for fornication, although with some difficulty.³¹

The second passage is from 1 Cor. 7:7-16, dealing with the primacy of chastity, marital duties, and mutual fidelity.³² In *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, Augustine notes the latitude given to married people by St. Paul, who upholds both continence and conjugal chastity in cohabitation, and holds that adherence to these injunctions is an indication of free will.³³ In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, he observes that, while continence in marriage is praiseworthy, other activity is "tolerated" to avoid lapse into worse sins, i.e., fornication and adultery, adding:

". . . To escape this evil, even such embraces of husband and wife as have not procreation for their object, but serve an overbearing concupiscence, are permitted, so far as to be within range of forgiveness, though not prescribed by way of commandment: and the married pair are enjoined not to defraud one the other, lest Satan should tempt them by reason of their incontinence. . . ." ³⁴

In Serm. 51 (418), he reminds his congregation that marriage is meant for the procreation of children, as is said both in Scripture and the marriage contract.³⁵ In *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, he takes on once again the question of divorce for fornication, equating the spouse's paganism with fornication. In doing so, he attempts to reconcile the permission to

divorce for fornication with the words of this Scriptural passage, which appear to allow a Christian spouse to remarry if the pagan spouse has left.³⁶

Finally, Augustine deals with the question of whether the daughter of a widow, who survived her other siblings should marry and give the widow grandchildren, or whether she should become a consecrated virgin. The widow had promised that, if her daughter survived, she would be a consecrated virgin, but now wishes to substitute herself, as a consecrated widow, for her daughter's virginity. Following Paul's words, he advises if she cannot exercise self-control, she should marry. However, if she can be chaste, she should be a consecrated virgin, and he advises meeting the vow.³⁷

The third passage is 1 Cor. 11:3-12, which deals with the head of the household being the man, the use of head coverings, and man being the image of God.³⁸ Augustine uses this passage for a number of purposes, one of which is to condemn the Manichaean view that flesh is evil, as humanity is the image and likeness of God.³⁹ A further use is to discuss head coverings.⁴⁰ Another confirms the husband as the head of the wife, as well as the household.⁴¹ A third use is to confirm women's subordination to man.⁴²

The next passage comes from Ep. 5:21-33,⁴³ which deals with the relationship of husbands and wives, likening it to that between Christ and the Church. Augustine uses this passage repeatedly in *De Continentia* to take issue with the Manichaeans over the goodness of the flesh, so long as it is subordinated to the spirit. He stresses the order of creation, in which the relation of husbands and wives, of spirit and flesh, and of Christ and his Church are all similar.⁴⁴ The headship of the husband is also used in a passage from *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* discussed above.⁴⁵ He also uses it as a call for conjugal love and "marital chastity" (i.e., fidelity).⁴⁶ He also uses it to remind his congregation of their membership in the Church, where

Christ is the head and calls them to goodness.⁴⁷ Finally, in *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine uses this passage to deal with the ideal situation of the Garden of Eden, to call marriage and sexual relations "natural" and conjugal love to flow from these relationships.⁴⁸

The next passage is Col. 3:18-19, an injunction for marital love.⁴⁹ This passage is discussed, as relevant to this dissertation, in only two places, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* and *De Bono Conjugali*. The first deals with the Old Testament concession that men could have multiple wives and rule over them.⁵⁰ The second deals with the order between continence, marriage, and fornication⁵¹ and is consistent with the previous discussions.

The final passage is 1 Pet. 3:1-7, which also deals with domestic roles, interior dispositions, and personal adornments.⁵² This passage is used in that portion of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* quoted above to demonstrate subjection and love of a wife to a husband, in the way that Sarah was subject to Abraham.⁵³ It is also used in another part of a similar treatise for these same propositions, along with a discussion of personal adornment.⁵⁴ Augustine uses the passage in Serm. 332 in 410 to remind his congregation of the roles of the spouses and the need for love and fidelity.⁵⁵ In Serm. 161, he again enjoins fidelity, but adds the need for an interior disposition of goodness over personal adornment.⁵⁶

Augustine was faithful to Scripture. However, he does not make distinctions between the sexes, aside from their respective earthly roles. Women are as eligible as men to be the recipients of grace and equally are the "image of God," which is an expression that is not oriented to the body, but the soul of every human being. As a consequence of Original Sin, Augustine views the respective roles of the sexes established by the New Testament. After the trials of the earthly existence, there is no distinction between male and female in Paradise. By

the same token, it is Scripture that enforces the sex roles in the meantime, and it is Scripture that Augustine follows closely in his writings on marriage.

C. The Relationship Between Parents and Children.

Augustine's thoughts regarding the relative positions of parents and children are also based on New Testament writings. They are also shaped by the relationship with his own mother, Monica, who kept after him to change his ways. While she is described in the *Soliloquia* and the *Confessiones* as a wise and pious person, her persistent prayers and repeated entreaties to her son must also have won his admiration. As noted above, Augustine cites favourably the example of Monica regarding the role of wives. It is obvious from his writings that he also idealises her as a parent.

At the same time, Augustine retains his theological consistency. He believes that sin is transmitted with human generation⁵⁷ and that children, being of the same substance as parents, have the same attributes from Original Sin, just as the persons of the Trinity have the same substance.⁵⁸ Given fallen human nature, Augustine holds that mankind requires two things for this life, i.e., well-being and friendship, with the latter guarding against loneliness. He adds that friendship begins with a married partner and children and from there moves on to strangers.⁵⁹ Consistent with civil law at the time, he holds the purpose of marriage (as well as the purpose of sex) is to have children and to raise a family.⁶⁰

Augustine is also well aware of the natural feelings of solicitousness of parents toward their offspring, particularly in the matter of saving of funds for their futures. Indeed, he is required to deal with that tendency when it clashes with inheritance matters and, especially, with the duty to give alms.⁶¹ He exhorts almsgiving by noting that savings for children should be done for the children and not for prideful purposes, but for God most of all, so that a perfect

order may be maintained.⁶² He is certainly aware of the usual human desire and expectation that parents will precede their children in death and the pain that occurs when this does not happen.⁶³ In short, he knows of, and probably shares, the concerns felt by parents watching their children grow. Yet as with the tensions between almsgiving and providing for present and future needs for children, Augustine is aware that raising children could interfere with spiritual focus. He advises that bishops have neither wives nor children for these reasons.⁶⁴ While he is aware that parents tend to be indulgent with their children,⁶⁵ he also foresees tensions between the two as part of that process of training and education.⁶⁶

Central to Augustine's view of the relationships between parent and child is the notion of honour and obedience due the parents. He notes at one point that there are things that God has not commanded, but a father has, which must be done because of the requirement that parents be obeyed.⁶⁷ He also urges parents to be well disposed to their children.⁶⁸

The requirement for raising children well is also a frequent theme for Augustine. Infants are contaminated with Original Sin, but must be saved, in part, by their parents' efforts.⁶⁹ While urging honour and obedience to parents, Augustine also finds limits to that love, particularly when it interferes with the ministry or the law of God. Using the words from the New Testament, *Whoever loves father and mother above me is not worthy of me*,⁷⁰ he holds that the issue is the order, rather than the requirement of love for parents.⁷¹ In dealing with this conflict, he states:

" . . . How can you not think lightly of your mother, if you wish to live in the mother of Christ? How can you not think lightly of your father, if you wish to have as your father the Father of Christ?"⁷²

Nor is Augustine unfamiliar with the difficulties of domestic relations. He makes a careful distinction between anger and hate in administering discipline, as shown above in the

excerpt from Serm. 13.⁷³ The necessity for a pure inward disposition is important for him in administering discipline and relationships to keep the balance. This view is an important one that finds its way into his concept of judging, as well as administering the regime of the day.

Three passages from Scripture are used to illustrate Augustine's views on parents and children.⁷⁴ As with the relationships between husband and wife, Augustine does not vary much from the Pauline texts; however, there are some interesting applications of those texts.

The first text is 2 Cor. 12:14, which requires their parents to save for their children, and not the reverse.⁷⁵ As with the discussion on inheritance above, Augustine deals with the avoidance of almsgiving (and of contact with others) by urging charity to all.⁷⁶ On another occasion, in a dispute with Jerome of Jerusalem over Scriptural interpretation, he prays that if his view were incorrect he would profit by being shown his error. He adds that as if he were a child he need not save for his parents, but the older man, Jerome, is like a parent to him, and he is the recipient of Jerome's beneficence.

A second passage is found in Gal. 4:1, which notes that even a child who is an heir is like a servant, despite his potential wealth.⁷⁷ In Serm. 265C, delivered on Ascension Day in 415, he contrasts concern over possession of material goods in times of war with that of the concerns of children, who do not have those possessions.⁷⁸ What we possess, he adds, is with the heart "intelligence, sense, character, reason, thought, and judgement" and urges that these things be thought dear, rather than material possessions.

The final passage is from Ep. 6:1-4 and deals with mutual relations of parents and children.⁷⁹ He uses this passage often to underscore a child's obligation under the Fourth Commandment.⁸⁰ But he also uses it to compare piety toward parents with that toward God, which is a superior obligation.⁸¹

Augustine's treatment of the duties of parents and children is not surprising. He remains close to Pauline texts and is not obliged by circumstance to depart from them in any special case.

D. The Master-Slave Relationship.

Slavery had continued to be a means of dealing with labour in the later Roman Empire, as it had at the time of St. Paul, from whom Augustine had taken most of his direction on this subject. Paul had expected that the Paraousia would arrive shortly and that Christians should prepare themselves by turning upon eternal things and being passive to the things of the world. The imminent nature of the Paraousia is less compelling in Augustine, although he continues the Pauline (and Neo-Platonist) approach of consideration of eternal things and the temporary, transitory nature of the present world. While he regards slavery as an evil, Augustine believes that this evil is a consequence of the Fall and endorses the relatively quiescent view of Pauline writings.

In the *Confessiones*, Augustine notes the sad state of man enslaved, but suggests that slavery by sin is a worse proposition.⁸² Similarly, in *De Civitate Dei*, he attributes the misery of slavery to the sin of Adam and believes that this institution will always be with humanity.⁸³ Augustine supported manumission of slaves; however, while some entered the monastic life, many were left without the means of support.⁸⁴

In his commentary to the Sermon on the Mount, Augustine discusses the charity that causes a man who sues for a coat to be given the cloak as well.⁸⁵ While articles of property are not a concern, he does not say the same of slaves as property.⁸⁶ This passage does not oppose slavery, but does require consideration of the humanity of the slave and consideration of his or her soul.⁸⁷ This equality of worth of the slave to the master before God is an important social distinction of Christianity emphasised by Paul and Augustine.

In Serm. 33, Augustine associates slavery with fear and the Old Testament, as distinguished from the law of love and the freedom of the New Testament.⁸⁸ Here, he contrasts the two sons of Abraham, one born of his wife, Sarah, and the other of his bondswoman, Hagar, as an indication not of the inherent evil of slavery, but the superiority of New Testament spiritual freedom over the law of the Old Testament.⁸⁹

In Serm. 211, written before 410, Augustine considers another difficult point, i.e., how to deal with asking forgiveness of slaves. He handles the matter deftly, stressing his usual emphasis on interior intention over appearance.⁹⁰ If the slave responds to the Pauline injunctions, he or she will love and fear the master, even the froward one, and receive the appropriate reward. The sermon is addressed to the one in power, the master, requiring that he or she also consider the human obligations that accompany power. Augustine does not forget the meekness of Christ himself, who became as a slave, in expecting others to have that same attitude.⁹¹ Just as in correcting one's son, the father does not hate him, so also the master chastising a slave must also preserve the same interior intention of love.⁹²

Of the six passages used to review Augustine's attitude on this relationship, four either have no social or pastoral use, or the use is not relevant to this relationship.⁹³ Except for the use of Ep. 6:5-9, the selected passages regarding slavery have only two entries. It may be that slavery is so engrained in late classical culture that there was no need to question the institution.

Regarding Ep. 6:5-9,⁹⁴ urging slaves to obey their masters with love and reminding masters that they, too, have a master in heaven, Augustine uses this balance on several occasions, but tends more toward exhortation of slaves to obedience. In *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, he recalls the 70-year Babylonian captivity of Israel and likens that captivity to the life of a man on earth until the promise of release is met. The Israelites are permitted to build houses and gardens

and to raise their families pending their release. This order of things is reinforced by this passage:

". . . Again, Christian servants and good believers are also commanded to serve their temporal masters in equanimity and faithfulness; whom they will hereafter judge, if even on to the end they find them wicked, or with whom they will hereafter reign in equality, if they too shall have been converted to the true God. Still all are enjoined to be subject to the powers that are of man and of earth, even until, at the end of the predetermined time which the seventy years signify, the Church shall be delivered from the confusion of this world, like as Jerusalem was to be set free from the captivity in Babylonia. . . ."

In Serm. 44,⁹⁵ Augustine urges heads of household who aspire to be bishops to take care that their own households are in order. In this way, they will assure that each member, even slaves, keep faithful to the Church. He adds that slaves and masters have the same price set for them, adding:

". . . Do not neglect then the least of those belonging to you, look after the salvation of all your household with all vigilance. This if ye do, ye put out to use; ye will not have to fear so horrible a condemnation."⁹⁶

Indeed, Augustine compares the duty of man to God to that of servant and master, under their mutual equality before God.⁹⁷

The final passage is from Tit. 2:9-10, exhorting servants to be obedient and not to defraud so that they may adorn the doctrine of the Lord.⁹⁸ In Ep. *24, written sometime after 422, Augustine uses this passage to note that an "Apostolic discipline" binds slaves to be obedient in dealing with a question about the child of a free man "leased" for 25 years *vis-à-vis* the owner of the land.⁹⁹ This passage also arises in Serm. 44, discussed above.

Again, it appears that Augustine, while certainly not advocating slavery, tolerates that institution because of compliance with Scripture. However, he does remind masters of their obligations and of the equality of all before God.

E. The Monastic Life.

Another human relationship that is rife with tension and need for order is monasticism, the ideal way of life according to Augustine.¹⁰⁰ From the time of his conversion, he seeks to live with other like-minded men in the study of philosophy and Scripture at Cassiciacum and, later, Thagaste in Northern Africa. Upon his ordination, he continues, as priest and later bishop, to live in community with other men dedicated to chastity and poverty. He administers this community and, in 397, develops a rule for community life, which has its separate versions for men and women, which do not differ appreciably. By that time, Augustine has had the experience of administering the lay community in Thagaste from about 388 and forms his lay community at Hippo in 391. When he becomes a bishop, he forms a community for clerics in 395-396.¹⁰¹

Both versions of Augustine's rule have eight parts, which are similar. The orientation of the rule can be seen in its repeated emphasis of several themes. The main theme, however, relates to life in community of those who live and work in the way of the Lord. The work portion of community life cannot be overemphasised, as Augustine believes that most monks are required to earn their living, while they live in prayer and sacrifice. His work, *De Opera Monachorum*, inveighs against monks who live from the gifts of others or seek to make a living by selling relics, a practice Augustine finds distasteful.¹⁰²

Rule 1, The Basic Ideal: Mutual Love Expressed in the Community of Goods and in Humility, relates to internal harmony and mutual love by which all things are held in common, as in the Jerusalem community, as opposed, for example, to an anchorite existence.¹⁰³ The rules relating to prohibitions on personal possessions,¹⁰⁴ the provision of only that which was needed by each member and the break with class and social attitudes, which otherwise would have

applied, appear to indicate that such attitudes were a concern to Augustine.¹⁰⁵ This ideal of brotherhood is found in Augustine's sermon on Ps. 132, which notes the praise in the Psalm of the brethren who live together in unity.¹⁰⁶

Rule 2, Community Prayer, deals with the need for such prayer, for individual prayer, and for keeping the text of the prayer in mind while praying. The emphasis in the rule is on community prayer, interspersed with work.¹⁰⁷ Yet, it is clear to Augustine that even those who take the more perfect route of monastic life still require grace for salvation, just as grace is necessary to accept monastic life truly.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, Rule 3, Community and Care of the Body, keeping the body healthy and its appetites in check through fasting,¹⁰⁹ is another theme. While the sick must be accommodated, so also must those who are, because of their former life, weaker.¹¹⁰ Each must be cared for—the sick in their physical weakness and those weaker because of their former life—for that reason alone. It is obvious that the community is responsive to the needs of its individual members and does not harbour equality for equality's sake.

Rule 4, Mutual Responsibility in Good and Evil, deals with intra-community relations. Among other things, the rule requires that no one dress in a way to attract attention (particularly sexual attention¹¹¹), that no one leave the community without permission, and that he travel with others until the destination is reached. The rule also requires that men not look at or think inordinately about women and aid their brothers to do likewise.¹¹² The rule also deals with admonitions and the correction of others.¹¹³

Rule 5, Service of One Another, deals with allocation and use of clothing, which comes from a common storeroom and not other sources, such as family,¹¹⁴ is given to those who need it and is washed in consultation with a superior. This is done to assure there is no "exaggerated

desire for clean clothes" to sully one's character. The rule also deals with allocation of work, complaints of sickness, availability of books, care of the sick, and bathing. Included in these prescriptions are requirements that one who claims illness is to be believed, that visits to the public baths are to be accompanied by brothers of the superior's choice, and that such visits should not be done for the enjoyment of the bather.¹¹⁵ As with the other rules, these rules emphasise the unity of the community, while recognising the need for diversity of its members.

Rule 6, Love and Conflict, builds from the principles of mutual love in God and respect for other members of the community. Augustine understands there is conflict among members and seeks to provide a means of resolving those conflicts with the least damage to the spiritual welfare of the participants. He advocates immediate confrontation and resolution of conflicts, mutual forgiveness, and a certain allowance for younger, more impetuous members of the community.¹¹⁶

Rule 7, Love in Authority and Obedience, requires obedience to a superior as a father, with respect given to his office, dealing with corrections and reprimands, and love for those particularly responsible for the community. The superior, a *primus inter pares*, is enjoined not to lord authority over his or her charges, but to act as a good example and to serve the community.¹¹⁷ Similarly, the authority of a bishop in control of clergy in a monastery is also to be recognised.¹¹⁸

Finally, Rule 8, Concluding Exhortations, encourages brothers to remember the purpose of their living together, which is spiritual in nature,¹¹⁹ and enjoins that the book be read once a week as a reminder. It is clear that Augustine believes that the monastic life is to be preferred, even to the life of a cleric, and is often conflicted over the call for his participation in the world.¹²⁰

F. The Integrity and Internal Discipline of the Church.

Much has been written about Augustine's views on the nature of the Church, that unity of the blessed in heaven, the hopeful, and the blessed on earth who await the end of the toils of life to see God face to face. He did not equate the institutional church, or its members, with those to be saved. One recalls his observations that frequently those who thronged the churches could, the very next day, be seen in the theatres.¹²¹ In the social entity of the Church, the virtues of humility, discipline, and hope are only available to those chosen by grace to use them for good.

In *Tr. 11 in Ioh.*, Augustine chides Donatists who claim merit from their persecution by the civil authorities, suggesting that their few bodily afflictions do not compare with the rending of the unity of the fabric of the Church. In doing so, Augustine raises a favourite simile, i.e., a comparison between Sarah, the wife of Abraham, and Hagar, her servant, who fled from her after a beating, to illustrate the inward disposition necessary to respond to divine command.¹²²

Much of Augustine's writings on ecclesiastical harmony is in response to the Donatist controversy and is initially supportive of gentle persuasion.¹²³ The Church is the engine of spiritual rebirth through baptism¹²⁴ and requires a modicum of peace in which to do her work. Similarly, the Church is also the social institution in which charity and brotherly love are to be played out in context.¹²⁵ As Augustine's view of Christianity becomes more social, he becomes more interested in the work of the Church, as opposed to the days of repose in Cassiciacum and his monastery in Thagaste. These views are also honed by the Donatist controversy, which gives him the focus and the time to consider the nature of the Church.

Augustine has a special verbal vehemence for those who rupture Church unity, but he also views the institutional church as strengthened through controversies over schisms and heresies, and that pride, which is the source of those controversies, would not prevail against the

Church.¹²⁶ It is because of the interference with unity that Augustine becomes exercised, particularly over the claims of the Donatists that there were unlawful Catholic bishops, i.e., the *trahitor* who gave over the sacred books to be burned or those consecrated by them. He argues that, if they were bad, one should follow the good of what they said, not what they did, but that there is no excuse for severing the unity of the Church.¹²⁷

Serm. 399, written in about 400, discusses the internal discipline of the Church at some length and well represents Augustine's thoughts on this subject. The purpose of the Church, according to Augustine, is to assist the individual Christian in learning through the use of discipline.¹²⁸ He then catalogues particular ills attending the Christian wayfarer, who can learn from the Church how to conduct his or her life, chiefly through application of Scripture. Thus, the balanced way to love God, oneself, and one's neighbour, how to deal with money, avoiding envy and pride, and living and dying well are all part of "the house of discipline," the Church. Recalling his discussion of his own difficult experience with learning as a youth in the *Confessiones*, Augustine concludes that discipline is necessary for secular living.¹²⁹ An anxious parent seeks the best for the child by forcing it to learn, with all its pains, for the sake of a better life. Similarly, the Church seeks to better its members through discipline to avoid the perils of self-inclination and the temptations of this world.

Because the Church has an important function to fulfil, disunity is to be avoided. Disunity is a sin against charity, which overcomes all merits that might arise from any other source.¹³⁰ Augustine is particularly incensed over the Circumcelliones, those roving bands of Donatists who brought physical terror to rural North Africa during this controversy.¹³¹ Similarly, he suggests that those separated from the Church do not possess the Holy Spirit, which brings unity, and instead become partisans of one cause or another.¹³² At another point, Augustine says

that, by tolerating Judas, His betrayer, Christ gave the example of peace, so that it is the destroyer of unity who separates himself or herself from the unity of the Church.¹³³ Augustine is well aware of the difficulties of entrusting a divine mission into the human hands that comprise the Church. He is aware that the promise that a church be presented "without spot or wrinkle" follows the end of world,¹³⁴ but does not expect the Church in this world to meet that standard.

In the meantime, the Church has its mission to fulfil, however difficult and awkward. The mission, he believes, is aided by the Spirit, but requires the cooperation of Church members to assist with the fulfilment of that mission by overcoming their doubts and differences. In this context, disunity is comparable to treason and would ultimately be so judged.

G. Conclusion.

This chapter has traced Augustine's treatment of five sets of social relationships to examine his views on outward social conformity and the inward disposition of humility and love in those functions of ruling and being ruled. This examination is done as a prelude for the discussion in the chapter that follows, regarding Augustine's view of the political order. In each of our studies on domestic relationships (i.e., husband and wife, parent and child, and master and slave), Augustine remains bound by Scripture, by his view of internal disposition, and by his other-worldliness orientation. He does not change his views on any of these relationships in any material way in his writings. With respect to the monastic life and church discipline (two subjects not directly covered in the New Testament), Augustine works out rules of life for those who seek to live in community in chastity, awaiting the resurrection. Moreover, he forges a rule of brotherly love and peace in the Church that is not broken without sin and deals with schismatics and heretics systematically. His treatment of each of these subjects is influential on the medieval Church. In short, there is a supportive reiteration of Scripture to the effect that the

individual should undertake the duties of his or her position, bear in patience, and look for rewards (and punishments) in other than this world.

This approach is carried over to the political sphere. Just as life relationships are a moral field for human action, rather than valuable in themselves, so also the political order is meaningless in history, except to form a field for moral action. The fidelity of a husband to a wife, the obedience of a child to his or her parents or of a slave to his or her master, have relatively clear lines. At times, those relationships may not be loving, but rather dominating and sinful. In those cases, the subordinate member is required to suffer wrong, but must realise that such suffering is a part of life. Redress comes later. Similarly, Augustine finds the monk or nun and the Church member also have fairly clear directions and that they, too, must occasionally suffer wrong. They, too, must await redress in the Last Judgement. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, regimes, too, are human institutions that often inflict wrong to be borne patiently. Just as there is no perfect human family, or monastery, or Church, the political order is a vehicle by which humanity undertakes the daily struggles of life. In itself, the regime is meaningless, except as a field for choice and election. It is, along with the social institutions discussed in this chapter, the medium in which humanity is saved or damned.

¹ *Confessiones*, VI, 15, 25. His mother, Monica, had been attempting to arrange a marriage for him at the time. *Ibid.*, VI, 13, 23. There is no room in this dissertation to treat Augustine's complex views on women. Two good studies are F. Ellen Weaver and Jean Laporte, *Augustine and Women: Relationships and Teachings*, 12 Augustinian Studies 115 (1981); and Kim Power, *Veiled Desire: Augustine's Writings on Women* (London, 1995).

² This portion of the dialogue focuses upon Augustine's self-examination of his attachment to worldly goods following his decision to convert. After questioning him on riches and honours, Reason asks about marriage:

Reason: What about a wife? Would you not be delighted by a fair, modest, obedient wife, one who is educated or whom you could easily teach, one who would bring along just enough dowry so that she would be no burden to your leisure . . . —would you not be delighted by such a one, especially if you had reason to hope that you would suffer no inconvenience on her account?

Augustine: No matter how much you choose to portray and endow her with all good qualities, I have decided that there is nothing I should avoid so much as marriage. I know nothing which brings the manly mind down from the heights more than a woman's caresses and that joining of bodies without which one cannot have a wife. Thus, if it is part of a wise man's duty (and this is something which I have not yet discovered for certain) to devote himself to children, the man who takes a wife for this sole reason can seem to me worthy of admiration, but not of imitation. It is, indeed, more hazardous to attempt this than it is fortunate to be able to do it. On this account, for the sake of

the freedom of my soul, I have enjoined myself—with due justice and good reason. I think—not to covet, not to seek, not to marry a wife.

Soliloquia, I, 10, 17. See also, *Soliloquia*, I, 11, 18; and I, 14, 25.

³ In *Confessiones*, I, 11, 17-18, Augustine notes that, as a boy, all in his household, except his father, were Christians:

"... He, however, did not overrule the influence my mother's piety exercised over me, by making any attempt to stop me believing in Christ, in whom he did not at that time believe himself. My mother did all she could to see that you, my God, should be more truly my father than he was, and in this endeavour you helped her to win the argument against a husband to whom she, though a better person, was ordinarily subject, for in taking this course she was in fact subjecting herself to you, who so commanded her."

⁴ In *Confessiones*, III, 11, 19 to 12, 21, Augustine speaks of a dream of Monica, in which she stood on a giant ruler, mourning the apparent ruin of her son, but a young man, Christ perhaps, tells her that where she stood, Augustine also stood. She saw her son standing close by on the same ruler. When he attempts to dissuade her, she remarked again that where she stood, he would also stand, and added:

"... I confess to you, Lord, that, as my memory serves me—and I have often spoken of this episode—I was more deeply disturbed by this answer that came from you through my sharp-eyed mother than by the dream itself. She was not worried by the false interpretation that had come to me so pat, but saw immediately what needed to be seen, as I had not done until she spoke. ..."

⁵ *Confessiones*, IX, 8, 17. See also, Book IX, 11, 27-28. From Book IX, 8, 17 to IX, 9, 22, Augustine gives a short biography of his mother, with some moral instruction included. He mentions that his mother was nurtured by a servant who had helped raise her own father and who denied her a drink of water outside meal hours, instructing her that this would help her not be tempted to tittle wine when she was older. However, she did learn to tittle wine when bringing it from a storeroom, but when given a stern verbal rebuke by her maid and took it to heart. She was also gentle with her husband, despite his infidelity, not only avoiding any domestic violence, but also being influential in changing him.

⁶ *Confessiones*, IX, 10-23-36. See also, Book IX, 12, 29-37, in which Augustine describes his grief over the death of his mother, pays her tribute, and reaffirms his adherence to the path to which she led him.

⁷ *Confessiones*, IX, 9.

⁸ In *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, 66, 5, Augustine describes the Miracle of the Loaves and Fishes, focusing on the number present at that event and the reason why women and children were not counted, attributing it to Old Testament attitudes toward them and their difficulty in complying with Jewish Law. He adds:

"... These two kinds [of difficulty], i.e., weakness and error, are indicated by the words *women* and *children*, for the female sex is weak in acting, while childhood is given to playing. And what is as similar to the play of children as the worshipping of idols, inasmuch as even the Apostle has compared this kind of superstition to play when he says: 'And do not worship idols as some of them did.' As it is written 'The people sat to eat and to drink, and they got up to play.' Therefore, there was a similarity to women in those who, amid the hardships of waiting until they had achieved the things promised of God, had not manfully persevered and thus had tempted God, and to children in those who sat to eat and to drink and got up to play. However, not only are the Old Testament people to be compared to women and children, but also the New Testament people who do not endure to the attaining of perfect manhood due to either lack of strength or fickleness of mind."

⁹ Serm. 392, 4. With a keen eye to his time, he added:

"I don't have to tell husbands to be jealous of their wives in this matter. I know what they do, yes I know very well. Which of you would ever put up with an adulterous wife? And you bid women put up with adulterous husbands? There's justice for you! Why, I ask you, why?

"'Because I, of course, am a man.'

"You're a man, are you? Let's prove that you're a man, in the matter of courage and strength. So you are a man, eh? Conquer lust. How are you a man, when your wife is the stronger, the braver of the two? You, man, are the head of the woman, it's true. But only where the household is rightly ordered, is the man the head of the woman. If he's the head, he should lead; the wife should follow. If you are the head, take the lead; let her follow her head. But notice where you're going; don't go where you don't want her to follow. Don't go where you're afraid of having her hard on your heels, of your both tumbling together into the pit of adultery, of your teaching her to do what you do. You're sick at heart if you both fall into the pit of adultery together. Be equally sick at heart if you fall in alone. You're jealous, you don't want her to tumble into it; be afraid, don't tumble in yourself.

"You, though, chaste and virtuous women, do not for your part imitate your unchaste husbands. Far, far be such a thing from you! Either let them live with you, or let them perish alone. It is not to her unchaste husband that a

woman owes her chastity, but it's to God that she owes it, to Christ that she owes it. Let her bear in mind the price that was paid for her; let her reflect on her marriage contract.

"Finally, they can think what they like, those people who are perhaps feeling indignant at my bringing up such matters; because I know that those of you who are wise will love me for it; because it is not for nothing that it is written, *Rebuke a wise man, and he will love you; rebuke a fool, and he will continue to hate you* (Prv. 9:8). He didn't say 'will begin,' but 'will continue' because he already hated you. So I know that the wise love me in this connection. Those who know that I know their sins should refrain from communion, in order not to be turned back from the altar rails. As for those whose sins I don't know, I summon them before God's judgement. They too should do penance, and from now on abstain from the filthiness of their fornications."

For a portrayal of North African sexual morality at the time and citation to other Augustinian works on marriage, see, Van der Meer, *supra*, at 180-190.

¹⁰ Ep. 262 (date uncertain). Because the husband had agreed to the arrangement initially, the wife was absolved of her obligation to give herself to him, at least to the point where he changed his mind. In Sermon 192, 2, delivered sometime after 412, Augustine repeats the theme that, while abstinence is best, marriage is licit to avoid fornication and urges that the conscience remain "virgin in faith." Similarly, in Sermon 210, 9 (391-396), he recommends, but does not require, abstinence from sex during lent. See also, Sermon 354A, 5 (397).

¹¹ "But there is a point which, I am sorry to say, you did not observe, because you should have given way to him all the more humbly and submissively in your domestic relationship since he had so devotedly yielded to you in so important a matter, even to the extent of imitating you. For he did not cease to be your husband because you were both refraining from carnal intercourse; on the contrary, you continued to be husband and wife in a holier manner because you were carrying out a holier resolution, with mutual accord. Therefore, you had no right to dispose of your clothing or of gold or silver or any money, or of any of your earthly property without his consent, lest you scandalise a man who joined you in vowing higher things to God, and had continently abstained from what he could demand of your body in virtue of his lawful power.

"Finally, it came about that, when scorned, he broke the bond of continence which he had taken upon himself when he was loved, and in his anger at you he did not spare himself. For, as the bearer of your letter described it to me, when he found out that you had given away everything or almost everything you possessed to two unknown wandering monks, as if you were distributing alms to the poor, he cursed them and you with them, and alleging that they were not servants of God but men, who creep unto other people's houses, leading you captive and plundering you, he indignantly threw off the holy obligation he had assumed with you. For he was weak and, therefore, as you seemed the stronger in your common purpose, he should have been supported by your love, not exasperated by your boldness. For, even if he was perhaps slower in being moved to almsgiving on a more liberal scale, he could have learned that also from you, and if he had not been affronted by your unexpected extravagance but had been won over by the dutifulness he expected from you, you could have done together even this which you rashly did of yourself, and much more prudently, in more orderly and honourable fashion, with union of hearts. . . ."

Ep. 262, at 4-5. To clarify and to add considerations of responsibility for the children, he stated later in the same letter at 7-8:

"However, when I say this, I do not mean that if our good works prove a stumbling-block to anyone we should think of leaving them off. The case of strangers is different from the case of persons bound to us by any tie; the case of believers is not the same as that of unbelievers; the case of parents toward children differs from that of children toward parents; and, finally, the case of husband and wife (which is the one especially considered in the present circumstances) differs from the others, and the married woman has no right to say: 'I do what I please with my own property,' since she does not belong to herself, but to her head, that is, her husband. . . ."

"And what wonder that a father did not wish the son of both of you to be stripped of his means of support in this life, not knowing what state of life he would follow when he began to be a little older, whether it would be the profession of a monk or the ministry of the Church or the obligation of the married state? For, although the children of holy parents should be encouraged and trained for better things, 'every one hath his proper gift from God, one after this manner, another that,' unless, perhaps, a father is to be blamed for showing foresight and caution in such matters, although the blessed Apostle says: 'If any man have not care of his own and especially of those in his house, he denieth the faith and is worse than an infidel.' But when he spoke of almsgiving himself he said: 'Not that others should be eased and you burdened.' Therefore you should have taken counsel together about everything; together you should have regulated what treasure is to be laid up in heaven and what is to be left as a means of support for yourselves, your dependants and your son, so that other men be not eased and you burdened. In making and carrying out these arrangements, if any better plan happened to occur to you, you should have suggested it respectfully to your husband and bowed obediently to his authority as that of your head. . . ."

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.* Augustine also advises Ecdicia that her son is more subject to his father than herself, and her husband could not be denied custody.

¹⁴ Sermon 224, 3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Serm. 332, 4. Augustine continues by outlining his view of a good marriage relationship:

"Be satisfied with your wives, because you want your wives to be satisfied with you. You don't want anything to be done by her apart from you; don't you do anything apart from her. You're the master, she's the servant. God made you both. *Sarah was obedient to Abraham, calling him lord* (1 Pet. 3:6). It's true; the bishop has put his signature to these matrimonial tablets; your wives are your servants, you are the lords and masters of your wives. But when it comes to that business in which the sexes are distinguished, and each sex is mated with the other, *the wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does*. Yes, you were delighted at that, you felt grand, you clapped yourself on the back.

"The apostle put it well, the *chosen vessel* (Acts 9:15) put the matter excellently: *The wife does not have authority over her body, but the husband does*. Because *I* am the lord and master.'

"You've all applauded. Listen to what comes next, listen to what you don't like, to what I beg you to like.

"What's that?"

"Listen: *Likewise also the husband, that lord and master; likewise also the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does* (1 Cor. 7:4).

"Be happy to listen to that. It's vice, not authority, that is being taken away from you. It's your adulteries that are being forbidden, not women that are being raised up to equality. You're the man; show it. 'Man' comes from 'manliness,' *vir* in Latin from *virtus*, or *virtus* from *vir*. So have you any manliness, any virtue? Conquer lust. *The head of the woman, it says, is the man*. If you're the head, lead, and let her follow; but see where you are leading her. You're the head; lead her where she should follow; and don't go where you wouldn't like her to follow. In order not to tumble over a precipice, take care you walk along a straight path."

¹⁸ Serm. 385, 6 and 8 (date uncertain).

¹⁹ Serm. 152, 4 (419).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Serm. 154A, 4 (417).

²² In speaking of the need for chastity as a requirement for the heavenly reward in *Enn. in Ps. 56*, 15, Augustine states:

"... Observe, that a reward thou shalt obtain . . . I will tell you, brethren: in these human alliances consider a chaste heart, of what sort it is towards God: certainly human alliances consider a chaste heart, of what sort it is towards God: certainly human alliances are of such sort, that a man doth not love his wife, that loveth her because of her portion: a woman her husband doth not chastely love, that for these reasons loveth him, because something he hath given, or because much he hath given. Both a rich man is a husband, and one that hath become a poor man is a husband. How many men proscribed, by chaste wives have been the more beloved. Proved have been many chaste marriages by the misfortunes of husbands: that the wives might not be supposed to love any other object more than their husbands, not only have they not forsaken, but the more have they obeyed. If therefore a husband of flesh freely is loved, if chastely he is loved; and a wife of flesh freely is loved, if chastely she is loved; in what manner must God be loved, the true and truth-speaking Husband of the soul, making fruitful unto the offspring of everlasting life and not suffering us to be barren? . . ."

²³ *De Continentia*, 24.

²⁴ In *De Trinitate*, Book XII, ch. 7, Augustine states:

"... Who is there, then, who will hold women to be alien from this fellowship, whereas they are fellow-heirs of grace with us: and whereas in another place the same apostle says, 'For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many as have been baptised into Christ have put on Christ: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus?' Pray, have faithful women then lost their bodily sex? But because they are there renewed after the image of God, where there is no sex; man is there made after the image of God, where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit of his mind. Why, then, is the man on that account not bound to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God, while the woman is

bound to do so, because she is the glory of the man; as though the woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, which spirit is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created him? But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was possible rightly to represent under her bodily covering that part of the reason which is diverted to the government of temporal things: so that the image of God may remain on that side of the mind of man on which it cleaves to the beholding or the consulting of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not for men only, but also women have."

Head coverings are also considered in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, II, 26, 40, citing 1 Cor. 11:7-12.

²⁵ Only one passage has no significant use for purposes of this dissertation. That passage is Tit. 2:4-6:

That they [the aged women] may teach the young women to be wise, to love their husbands, to love their children, to be discreet, chaste, sober, having care of the house, gentle, obedient to their husbands, that the word of God be not blasphemed.

²⁶ *Now concerning the things whereof you wrote to me: It is good for a man not to touch a woman. But for fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband. Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and the wife also in like manner to the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband. And in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife.*

²⁷ See text accompanying notes 17 and 9, respectively, and Serm. 354A, 4 and 5 (397).

²⁸ *Confessiones*, II, 2, 3. He states that he "ought to have listened with greater heed to the voice from those clouds of yours" and that he "should have become a eunuch for the sake of the kingdom of heaven."

²⁹ *De Civitate Dei*, XVI, 25. Augustine distinguishes this act, done for the sake of progeny, from sex out of "guilty excess," adding:

"... And when the pregnant bond woman despised her barren mistress, and Sarah, with womanly jealousy, rather laid the blame of this on her husband, even then Abraham showed that he was not a slavish lover, but a free begetter of children, and that in using Hagar he had guarded the chastity of Sarah, his wife, and had gratified her will and not his own—had received her without seeking, had gone in to her without being attached, had impregnated without loving her—for he says, 'Behold, thy maid is in thy hands: do to her as it pleaseth thee:' a man able to use women as a man should—his wife temperately, his handmaid compliantly, neither intemperately!"

See also, Serm. 51, 28 (418).

³⁰ *De Bono Conjugali*, 4 and 6. In the latter passage, Augustine states:

"... Therefore married persons owe one another not only the faith of their sexual intercourse itself, for the begetting of children, which is the first fellowship of the human kind in this mortal state; but also, in a way, a mutual service of sustaining one another's weakness, in order to shun unlawful intercourse: so that, although perpetual continence be pleasing to one of them, he may not, save with consent of the other. . . . That that also, which, not for the begetting of children, but for weakness and incontinence, either he seeks of marriage, or she of her husband, they deny not the one or the other; lest by this they fall into damnable seductions, through temptation of Satan, by reason of incontinence either of both, or by whichever of them. For intercourse of marriage for the sake of begetting hath not fault; but for the satisfying of lust, but yet with husband or wife, by reason of the faith of the bed, it hath venial fault; but adultery or fornication hath deadly fault, and, through this, continence from all intercourse is indeed better even than the intercourse of marriage itself, which takes place for the sake of begetting. But because that continence is of larger desert, but to pay the due of marriage is no crime, but to demand it beyond the necessity of begetting is a venial fault, but to commit fornication or adultery is a crime to be punished: charity of the married ought to beware, lest, whilst it seek for itself occasion of larger honour, it do that for its partner which cause condemnation. . . ."

³¹ Compare, *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, XVI, 43 (394), with his later thoughts in *Retractationes*, I, xix, 6, in which he urges review of other treatises (his own or others), given his own uneasiness over his handling of this question. He adds that all sin is not fornication, so that divorce may not happen if one or the other party commits a sin, but admits the question is a difficult one. The questions of fidelity and adultery are also discussed in Serm. 332, 4, and Serm. 392, 4, above.

³² *For I would that all men were even as myself: but every one hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that. But I say to the unmarried, and to the widows: It is good for them that they so continue, even as I. But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry. For it is better to marry than to be burnt. But to them that are married, not I but the Lord commandeth, that the wife depart not from her husband. And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife. For to the rest I speak, not the Lord. If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And if any woman hath a husband that believeth not, and he consent to dwell with her, let her not put away her husband. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife; and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband: otherwise your children should be unclean; but now they are holy. But if the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For*

a brother or a sister is not under servitude in such cases. But God hath called us in peace. For how knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? Or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?

³³ *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, 8. After noting both the counsel for continence and the injunctions to married people, he continues:

"... Now, do the many precepts which are written in the law of God, forbidding all fornication and adultery, indicate anything else than free will? Surely such precepts would not be given unless a man had a will of his own, wherewith to obey the divine commandments. And yet it is God's gift which is indispensable for that observance of the precepts of chastity. . . ."

He adds, of course, that it is grace that enables man to keep these commandments.

³⁴ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, I, 16, 14. Augustine emphasises here, and elsewhere, that such activity is licit, although not recommended. He concludes:

"... For the nuptial embrace, which subserves the demands of concupiscence, is so effected as not to impede the child-bearing, which is the end and aim of marriage."

See also, *De Bono Conjugali*, VII, 10; and *Serm.* 354A, 7, 8, and 12 (397).

³⁵ "But anyone who desires his wife's body for more than is prescribed by this limit (the purpose of procreating children) is going against the very contract with which he married her. The contract is recited, it's read out in the presence of all the witnesses, and what's read out is: 'for the sake of procreating children'; and it's called the matrimonial contract. Unless this were what wives are given away and taken for, who with any sense of shame would give away his daughter to another's lust? But to save parents from being ashamed when they give away their daughters, the contract is read out, to make them fathers-in-law, not whoremongers. So what's read out in the contract? 'For the sake of procreating children.' The father's brow clears, his face is saved when he hears the words of the contract. Let's consider the face of the man who is taking a wife. The husband too should be ashamed to take her on any other terms, if her father is ashamed to give her away on any other terms.

"But if they can't manage it (I mentioned this a minute ago), let them demand the debt, but don't let them go beyond their debtors. Both the woman and the man may relieve their weakness with each other. Don't let him go to another woman, don't let her go to another man (that's where adultery gets its name from, as much as to say *ad alterum*, to another). Even if they go beyond the limits of the matrimonial bargain, don't let them go beyond the limits of the matrimonial bed. Is it really not a sin, to demand the debt from your marriage partner more than is required for the procreation of children? It is indeed a sin, though a venial one. . . ."

Serm. 51, 22. The notion of accommodating weakness is also found in *Serm.* 354A, 5 (397).

³⁶ *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, No. 83. This question is also treated in *De Sermonibus Domini in Monte*, I, 17, 43-50, with another attempt to reconcile various commandments regarding marriage, with the same distinction between what is commanded and what is advised. However, he rejects at I, 17, 49, the notion that a modern-day Abraham might be given permission by his wife to have intercourse with another, stating:

"... [B]ut such an opinion is not to be entertained, lest it should seem that a woman also, with her husband's permission, could do such a thing, which the instinctive feeling of every one prevents."

However, Augustine does note in I, 17, 50, the story of a woman in Antioch who sought to save her husband from death for nonpayment of a debt by consenting to sexual relations with a rich man, with the consent of her husband. Augustine draws no moral from the tale, but does admit that instinctive sense does not revolt against this action, given its circumstances.

³⁷ *Ep.* *3. Augustine's advice, after discussing the superiority of continence and the licitness of marriage, concludes:

"But to you I say: Deal with her as you seem to love her, which is good because of the Kingdom of Heaven. One must be very careful lest perchance she, seeking widowhood, but not for the reason for which it ought to be sought, not be able to withstand the ardour of her age, above all because of human failings which are always unpredictable. Nor is it in her power that her daughter marry or bear children and, indeed, it is to be feared lest when something untoward happen (though I hope it will not), she think of herself as cheated, and, as it were, having lost the reward of her dedication and she fail because of this worldly reasoning. It is our God who said: 'Not all can accept this precept, but only to those to whom it is given; let her keep her heart steady and raise it on high in order that she love the heavenly promises and scorn earthly experiences. Concerning her daughter, she should intend and seek nothing other than what she vowed be fulfilled—which may he 'in whose hands both we and our words are' grant to her."

³⁸ *But I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God. Every man praying or prophesying with his head covered, disgraceth his head. But every woman praying or prophesying with her head not covered, disgraceth her head: for it is all one as if she were shaven. For if a woman be not covered, let her be shorn. But if it be a shame to a woman to be shorn or made bald, let her cover her head. The man indeed ought not to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. For the man*

was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man. Therefore ought the woman to have a power over her head, because of the angels. But yet neither is the man without the woman, nor the woman without the man, in the Lord. For as the woman is of the man, so also is the man by the woman: but all things of God.

³⁹ *De Continentia*, 24. He emphasises, as did Paul, the need to place the flesh in the control of the spirit. This point is examined in *De Trinitate*, XII, 7, 9-12, in which Augustine concludes that it is the rational mind that is that image, rather than the body. By doing so, he avoids the issue of whether it is men or women that have this image. He emphasised in Book XII, 7, 12, that women were "fellow-heirs" of grace, that there will be neither male nor female in paradise, because man is made in the image of God, where there is no sex, i.e., in the spirit of His mind. He continues by treating the Scriptural passage on men leaving their heads uncovered because they are the image of God, while women must cover their heads and are the glory of men, as if not renewed in the spirit:

"... But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was possible rightly to represent under her bodily covering that part of reason which is diverted to the government of temporal things: so that the image of God may remain on that side of the mind of man on which it cleaves to the beholding or the consulting of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not men only, but also women have."

Later, in ch. 13, 21, he states however this passage is received, it is clear that one should live according to God and fix the mind on things eternal, again understanding the passage in a spiritual, rather than a way in which women are understood to be of a lower station. That same spiritual notion is also advanced in Book XV, 8, 14, in which the transformation to something greater of human nature by grace is the point of the passage. In Ep. 245, to his friend Possidius, Augustine finds some room in the decision on wearing of jewellery, but uses this passage to require women to cover their heads, except only for their husbands, for whom they may "deck themselves out," and that only by indulgence, rather than command.

⁴⁰ See, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, II, 26, 40, mentioned at note 24 and accompanying text. The discussion is used to say that it is error, and not the flesh, that causes such disorder. Order is restored when the husband rules the wife and is ruled by God. Later, in that same work at 28, 42, Augustine also denies that either the flesh or women are evil, as both are from God.

⁴¹ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, I, 10, 9. However, Augustine also notes the order of such rule, so that Christ rules the man. *Tr. 15 in Ioh.*, 19(4) and 28. Similarly, in *De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber*, 3, 6, Augustine states that while man is a head or principal, the woman is not head of anything in the ranking of creation of man. And, in 16, 61, of the same work, Augustine states this image is not to be taken as equal and co-eternal with God.

⁴² In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, 11, 15, Augustine states:

"... For there was still need to bring it about not only that the soul rule over the body, because the body has the position of a servant, but also that virile reason hold subject to itself its animal part, by the help of which it governs the body. The woman was made as an illustration of this, for the order of things makes her subject to man. Thus, we can also come to see in one human what we can see more clearly in two humans, that is, in the male and the female. The interior mind, like virile reason, should hold subject the soul's appetite by means of which we control the members of the body, and by just law it should place a limit upon its helper, just as man ought to rule woman and ought not to allow her to rule him. When this happens, the home is perverted and unhappy."

This same notion of domestic order following the natural order is found in 12, 16, and 17 of this same work. The order is understood in a moral sense with the use of this passage in *Enn. in Ps.* 3, 10; *Enn. in Ps.* 45, 18; and *Serm.* 341, 20 (417). It is understood as Christ leading the Church in *Enn. in Ps.* 65, 7.

⁴³ *Being subject one to another, in the fear of Christ. Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord: Because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church. He is the saviour of his body. Therefore as the church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and delivered himself up for it That he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life: That he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy, and without blemish. So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife, loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the church because we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the church. Nevertheless let every one of you in particular love his wife as himself: and let the wife fear her husband.*

⁴⁴ *De Continentia*, 19, 22, 23 and 25. He recalls particularly the injunction to husbands to love their wives like their own bodies, reminding the readers that no one hates his own flesh. He specifically rejects the view that flesh is evil and in an inherent conflict with the spirit, a position also taken in *Serm.* 242A, 3 (411); and *Serm.* 400, 4 (412). In *De Continentia*, 23, he sets out the order of creation as he perceives it:

"The Apostle has made known to us certain three unions, Christ and the Church, husband and wife, spirit and flesh. Of these the former consult for the good of the latter, the latter wait upon the former. All the things are good, when, in them, certain set over by way of pre-eminence, certain made subject in a becoming manner, observe the beauty of order. Husband and wife receive command and pattern how they ought to be one with another. The command is, 'Let wives be subject unto their own husbands, as unto the Lord; because the husband is the head of the wife'; and, 'Husbands, love your wives.' But there is given a pattern, unto wives from the Church, unto husbands from Christ: 'As the Church,' saith he, 'is subject unto Christ, so also wives unto their own husbands in all

things.' In like manner also, having given command to husbands to love their own wives, he added a pattern, 'As Christ loved the Church.' But husbands he exhorted to it from a lower matter also, that is, from their own body: not only from a higher, that is, from their Lord. For he not only saith, 'Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church,' which is from an higher: but he said also, 'Husbands ought to love their own wives, as their own bodies,' which is from a lower: because both higher and lower are all good. And yet the woman received not pattern from the body, or flesh, to be so subject to the husband as the flesh to the spirit; but either the Apostle would have understood by consequence, what he omitted to state: or haply because the flesh lusteth against the spirit in the mortal and sick estate of this life, therefore he would not set the woman a pattern of subjection from it. But the men he would for this reason, because, although the spirit lusts against the flesh, even in this it consults for the good for the flesh; not like as the flesh lusting against the spirit, by such opposition consulteth neither for the good of the spirit, nor for its own. Yet the good spirit would not consult for its good, whether by nourishing and cherishing its nature by forethought, or by resisting its faults by continence, were it not each substance showeth God to be the creator of each, even by the seemliness of this order. . . ."

The relationship between husband and wife (in this illustration, Adam and Eve) and Christ and His Church is also made in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, II, 4, 12, as a dependent one, to counteract the Pelagian contention of human adequacy.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, at I, 10, 9, mentioned in note 41 and accompanying text. See also, Sermon 341, 20, and 21 (417).

⁴⁶ Sermon 132, 2 (c. 420); and Sermon 9, 3 (410).

⁴⁷ Sermon 161, 1 (date uncertain).

⁴⁸ *De Civitate Dei*, XIV, 22.

⁴⁹ *Wives, be subject to your husbands, as it behoveth in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter towards them.*

⁵⁰ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, I, 10, 9. Augustine explained it in this way:

"... In the advance, however, of the human race, it came to pass that to certain good men were united a plurality of good wives.—many to each: and from this it would seem that moderation sought rather unity on one side for dignity, while nature permitted plurality on the other side for fecundity. For on natural principles it is more feasible for one to have dominion over many, than for many to have dominion over one. Nor can it be doubted, that it is more consonant with the order of nature that men should bear rule over women, than women over men. It is with this principle in view that the apostle says, 'The head of the woman is the man: and, Wives, submit yourselves unto your husbands. . . .'"

⁵¹ *De Bono Conjugali*, 14.

⁵² *Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands; that, if any obey not the word, they also may without the word be won by the conversation of the wives: While they behold your chaste conversation coupled with fear. Whose adorning let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel; But let it be the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not corruptible, even the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which is in the sight of God of great price. For after this manner in the old time the holy women also, who trusted in God, adorned themselves, being in subjection unto their own husbands: Even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord: whose daughters ye are, as long as ye do well, and are not afraid with any amazement. Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with them according to knowledge, giving honour unto the wife, as unto the weaker vessel, and as being heirs together of the grace of life: that your prayers be not hindered.*

⁵³ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, I, 10, 9, mentioned in note 41 and accompanying text.

⁵⁴ *De Bono Conjugali*, 14.

⁵⁵ See, note 17 and accompanying text.

⁵⁶ Sermon 161, 11 (date uncertain).

⁵⁷ *Enchiridion*, 46.

⁵⁸ In *Contra Maximinum Arianorum Episcopo*, II, 14, 6 (428), he states:

"Learn, children, what scripture says, to pay due honour to your parents. But you too, parents, when you are offended, remember precisely that you are parents. A mother prayed against her children, she was heard; because God is indeed just, because she had indeed been wronged. One of them had both hurled abuse at her and

laid hands on her; and the rest put up patiently with the wrong done to their mother, and didn't respond to their brother with even a single word on her behalf. It is because God is just that he heard her prayer, that he paid attention to her sense of injury. But what about that unfortunate woman? Was she not punished all the more, for being heard so quickly? . . ."

⁵⁹ Serm. 299D, 1 (413).

⁶⁰ Serm. 278, 9 (414).

⁶¹ For example, in Serm. 9, 20 (410), he admonishes:

"Don't be sparing of transitory treasures, of vain wealth. Don't increase your money under the guise of family piety. 'I'm saving it for my children'; a marvellous excuse! He's saving it for his children. Let's see, shall we? Your father saves it for you, you save it for your children, your children for their children, and so on through all generations, and not one of them is going to carry out the commandments of God. Why don't you rather pay it all over to him who has made you out of nothing? The one who made you is the one who feeds you with the things he made; he is the one who also feeds your children. You don't after all, do better by entrusting your sons to your patrimony for support, than to your creator.

"And anyhow, people are just lying. Avarice is evil. They want to cover up and whitewash themselves with a name for family piety, so that they may appear to be saving up for their children what in fact they are saving up for avarice. Just to show you that that is what very often happens: they say about somebody, 'Why doesn't he give alms? Because he is saving for his children.' It so happens he loses one of them. If he was saving for his children, let him send that one's share after him. Why should he keep it in his money-bags and drop him from his mind? Give him what is due to him, pay him what you were saving for him. 'But he's dead,' says he. In fact he has gone on ahead to God; his share is now owed to the poor. It's owed to the one he has gone to stay with. It's owed to Christ, since he has gone to stay with him. . . ."

⁶² In Serm. 299E, 5 (397), Augustine asks rhetorically if the savings were for the purpose of having the money or done for the children, but then discusses the faith that must accompany daily action. He uses the example of Abraham ready to sacrifice his only son, Isaac, at God's command and added:

"There you are, that's how you must possess your wealth, and possess whatever you have the power to: not to nourish various sorts of greed, but to carry out various works of kindness and piety, and so wait for the last day without anxiety; genuinely rich, inwardly rich; outwardly as best you can, inwardly as you have been commanded. . . ."

See also, Serm. 399, 8 (400). The fact that this situation is raised in three different sermons indicates it was a common social situation.

⁶³ Serm. 301, 1 (417).

⁶⁴ In Serm. 340A, preached at the funeral of a bishop in 411, he stated, referring to Paul:

"He also said among other things, *the husband of one wife*; but how much better if of none! Progress has to be made, he said, to the extent of not more than one; but it would be much better if he didn't even have one wife. *Having children who are compliant*; that is, if he has any, that he should have compliant ones; not that he should make an effort to have children if he hasn't got any. You see, he was recommending discipline over the children, for the good management of the household: *Since how will a man, who does not know how to control his own household, have the necessary concern for the Church of God?* These are the apostle's words.

"And how will a bishop be without children, if he is a good bishop? In any event, your bishop in the name of Christ, assisted by the grace of Christ, has decided not to have children according to the flesh, in order to have children according to the spirit. So it is your business to comply properly with his wishes, properly to obey him, to serve him with appropriate service; and then he will have children who are compliant. . . ."

⁶⁵ Serm. 302, 1, preached in 410, refers to the habit of parents giving nuts to their children, much in the same way parents give sweets to their children today.

⁶⁶ In Serm. 13, 9 (418), he states:

"You don't fail, after all, to train your own son. And you begin by seeing what a combination of shame and leniency can do to train him, so that he will be ashamed of offending his father, instead of fearing him as a harsh judge. You take pride in such a son. But if he turns out to be of the kind that despises such treatment, you apply the rod, you inflict punishment, you cause him pain, but all the time you seek his welfare. Many are corrected by love, many by fear, but what they arrive at through fear and trembling is love. *Be instructed, you who judge the earth.* Love—and then judge. There is no question of advocating harmlessness at the expense of discipline. . . . Whoever does not apply discipline is cruel. I am absolutely convinced of this. I'm convinced of it, and I will show

you how it can be kind to beat and cruel to spare. Let me give you an example. A case of its being kind to beat. I stick to the instance of father and son. The father loves even while he is beating. And the boy does not want to be beaten. The father ignores what he wants and considers what is good for him. Why? Because he is a father, because he is getting an inheritance ready, because he is bringing up an heir. That is how a father shows kindness by beating, by beating his son shows him mercy. 'Now give us a man who is cruel by sparing.' I won't change the cast; I present the same pair to my audience. But this time the boy is ignorant and undisciplined, and if he goes on living in a way that leads to his ruin, and if the father pretends not to notice, if the father spares him, if the father is afraid of offending his wastrel son with the harshness of discipline—isn't he then cruel by sparing him? So then, *Be instructed, you who judge the earth*, and by judging well do not hope for your reward from earth, but from him who made heaven and earth."

⁶⁷ *Enn. in Ps. 72, 2*. He states:

"... Now the Lord had not commanded this, but their own father. But they so received it as though it were a commandment from the Lord, their God: for even though the Lord had not commanded that they should drink no wine and should dwell in tents; yet the Lord had commanded that sons should obey their father. In this case alone a son ought not to obey his father, if his father should have commanded anything contrary to the Lord his God. For indeed the father ought not to be angry, when God is preferred before him. But when a father doth command that which is not contrary to God; he must be heard as God is: because to obey one's father God hath enjoined...."

Obedience to parents is a frequent theme for Augustine. Sermon 8, 7 (410); Sermon 9, 3, 4, and 14 (420); *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, II, 2; *Contra Maximinum Arianorum Episcopo*, II, 10, 3.

⁶⁸ Sermon 323, 1 (c. 426). Augustine includes a quotation from Sir. 3:9, *A father's blessing strengthens the house of his children; a mother's curse uproots its foundations*.

⁶⁹ In Sermon 115, 4 (419-420), for example, he observed:

"... Where had these babies got lost? As far as they are personally concerned, I see them as innocent; I look more deeply for the guilt. Where? I listen to the apostle: *Through one man*, he says, *sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and thus it passed into all men in that all have sinned*.

"So let the babies come, then, let them come; let the Lord be heard, when he says. *Allow the children to come to me*. Let the children come, the poorly to the doctor; let the lost come to their redeemer, let them come; don't let anybody forbid them. They have not yet committed anything in the branch, but they have already perished in the root. Let the Lord bless the little ones together with the great; let the doctor touch both the little ones and the great.

"I entrust the cause of the little ones to the grown-ups. Speak for those who can't, pray for those who can only cry. If it's not for nothing you are their elders, be also their protectors; look after the interests of those who cannot yet conduct their own case. Being lost was the common lot of us all; let it also be our common lot to be found. We all got lost together; let us all be found together in Christ. What we deserve is very different, but the grace we are offered is the same for us all. Infants have no evil in them but what they have contracted from the source; they have no evil but what they have contracted from their origin. Their elders, who have added many other sins to what they contracted, must not keep them back from salvation. Older in age means older too in wickedness. But the grace of God wipes out what you have contracted; it wipes out too what you have added. *For where sin abounded, grace abounded all the more*."

Augustine conceded that the love of children was natural to all animals and that all, regardless of faith, possessed that love. He saw this type of love not particularly praiseworthy; rather, it was a super-natural love to which a Christian was called. Sermon 349, 2 (412). In Sermon 385, 2 (date uncertain), he stated:

"Lawful love starts from marriage; but that is still a fleshly form of it. You can see that it is shared with the animals; and those sparrows, which are chirping away there, have marriages and build nests, and together sit on the eggs, together feed the fledglings. It is, to be sure, a lawful kind of love between human beings, but as you see, it's fleshly. The second grade is love of your children, but this too is still fleshly. It is not, after all, particularly praiseworthy for people to love their children, but it is abominable when they don't. I mean, am I going to praise as something remarkable in a human being what I can see in a tigress? Snakes love their children, lions and wolves love their children. So don't imagine that it is anything very remarkable that you love your children; with this kind of love you are still on a par with snakes; if you don't love your children, you are letting snakes beat you. I am now speaking about respectable kinds of love: you see, I have excluded those shameful kinds."

Augustine urges that the range of love be expanded from these family relationships to strangers and enemies as the real test for the law of love.

⁷⁰ Matt. 10:37-38.

⁷¹ Sermon 344, 2 (428).

⁷² He adds:

"Parents, please, mustn't be angry. We show them very considerable respect if the only one we put before them is God. Or if they don't even want us to prefer God to them, what do they want for themselves, what is the case they are making? Well, let's listen to them. I imagine they won't dare to tell us 'Put us before God.' They don't say that. . . . So what do they say? 'God told you'—What did God tell me? *Honour your father and your mother.* I agree. God did tell me this. Don't you be angry with me, when the only one I put before you is the one who told me this. I love, I most certainly do love, I love you too. But the one who told me to love you is better than you. Only please don't turn me against him, and please join me in loving him who taught me to love you—but not more than him."

Serm. 65A, 7 (397-398). This same point is made in Serm. 72A, 4 (417-418). See also, *De Fide et Symbolo*, 4, 9.

⁷³ In Serm. 387, 2 (c. 420), he discusses this distinction:

". . . Do you want to know what the difference is? We often find parents who hate their children. A father can be angry with a son whom he loves; it is possible to say, 'He is angry and loves'; it is impossible to say, 'He hates and loves. . . .'"

⁷⁴ A fourth passage considered, but not used, as there were no significant references to it in Augustine's writings, is Col. 3:20-21:

*Children, obey your parents in all things: for this is well pleasing to the Lord.
Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged.*

⁷⁵ . . . *For neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children.*

⁷⁶ "So extend your love, and not only as far as your husbands, wives and children. That degree of love is to be found even among cattle and sparrows. You know how these sparrows and swallows love their mates; they share the task of sitting on the eggs, together they feed their chicks, out of a charming and natural goodness, without a thought for any reward. I mean the sparrow husband doesn't say, 'I will feed my children, so that when I grow old they may feed me.' No such thoughts as that; he loves them freely, feeds them freely for nothing; he shows the affection of a parent, he doesn't expect any reward. You too, I know, I'm sure, love your children in the same way. *For children ought not to save up for their parents, but parents for their children.* It's on these grounds many of you justify your avarice, because it's for your children that you are amassing fortunes, for them you are hoarding.

"But extend your love, let this love grow, because loving children, husbands and wives is not yet that wedding garment. Have faith in God, trust him. First love God. Extend yourselves toward God, and grab whom you can for God. An enemy, perhaps; have him snatched for God. A son, a wife, a slave; have them snatched off to God. A stranger perhaps; have him snatched off for God. Grab, grab your enemy; by being grabbed he will cease to be an enemy."

Serm. 90, 10 (411-420).

Now I say, as long as the heir is a child, he differeth nothing from a servant, though he be lord of all: . . .

⁷⁸ Serm. 265C (415).

⁷⁹ *Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is just.*

Honour thy father and thy mother, in which is the first commandment with a promise:

That it may be well with thee, and thou mayest be long lived upon earth.

And you, fathers, provoke not your children to anger; but bring them up in the discipline and correction of the Lord.

⁸⁰ Serm. 9, 7. (410). In this sermon, Augustine discusses the Ten Commandments and notes that this is the first of the Commandments on the second tablet, which deals with love of neighbour. He asks rhetorically whether, if one does not love parents, there is anyone that person will spare. See also, Serm. 33, 4 (405-411).

⁸¹ See, Serm. 100 (395 or 417), in which Lk. 9:57-62, which, among other things, deals with Christ's call to one who excused himself, saying he had to bury his father. Augustine acknowledges this duty is important, but is subordinated to the call of God for a higher purpose. See also, Serm. 159A, 6 (397).

⁸² *Confessiones*, VII, 6, 8-9; and XIII, 18-22.

⁸³ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 15.

⁸⁴ Van der Meer, *supra* note 9, at 135-137, noting the position of slaves in Augustine's works, including *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 16 and 21; see also, *Enn. in Ps. 124*, 7.

⁸⁵ John 18:23.

⁸⁶ ". . . But whether it is to be understood of slaves also is a great question. For a Christian ought not to possess a slave in the same way as a horse or money: although it may happen that a horse is valued at a greater price than a slave, and some article of gold or silver at

much more. But with respect to that slave, if he is being educated and ruled by thee as his master, in a way more upright, and more honourable, and more conducing to the fear of God, than can be done by him who desires to take him away, I do not know whether any one would dare to say that he ought to be despised like a garment. For a man ought to love a fellow-man as himself, inasmuch as he is commanded by the Lord of all . . . even to love his enemies."

De Sermone Domini in Monte, I, 59.

⁸⁷ *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, II, 26, 40, citing 1 Cor. 11:7-12. In *Contra Mendacium*, 22, Augustine does not answer directly whether it is better to allow one's slave to take a beating in place of an innocent guest, stating that:

" . . . [I]t would take long to argue, whether even a master may justly use his right of power over his slave, so as to cause an unoffending slave to be smitten, that his unoffending friend may not be beaten in his house by violent bad men. . . ."

However, the implication from the statement and its context is that the answer is in the negative.

⁸⁸ Sermon 33, 1 (405-411).

⁸⁹ Augustine continues in the same place:

"True, that slavish fear embodied in the old man can indeed have the harp of ten strings, because that law of the ten commandments was also given to the Jews according to the flesh, but it cannot sing to its accompaniment the new song. [The sermon discussed the new song played on a harp of ten strings from Ps. 144:9.] It is under the law and cannot fulfill the law. It carries the instrument but doesn't manage to play it; it is burdened, not embellished, with the harp. But any under grace, not under law, they are the ones who fulfil the law, because for them it is not a weight to shoulder but an honour to wear; it is not a rack for their fears, but a frame for their love. Fired by the spirit of love, they are already singing the new song on the harp of ten strings."

⁹⁰ "There are persons of humble status in terms of this world's classes, who start putting on airs if you ask their pardon. This is what I mean: sometimes a master sins against his slave—because even though one's a master, the other a slave, still they are both the slaves of a third party, because both have been bought by the blood of Christ. Still, it seems hard that I should give this command, this injunction, that if a master happens to wrong his slave, by unjustly picking on him, unjustly beating him, he should say, 'Forgive me, please grant me pardon.' Not that he ought not to do it, but in case the other should start getting proud. So what then? In the presence of God he must be sorry, in God's eyes he must punish his heart, and if he can't say to his slave, because it isn't fitting, 'Please grant me pardon,' he must speak to him in a friendly way. A friendly approach is a way of asking pardon."

Sermon 211, 4 (before 410).

⁹¹ See, e.g., Sermon 2, 4 (417).

⁹² Sermon 400, 5 (412). See also, Sermon 159B, 4 (404).

⁹³ These passages include:

1 Cor. 7:21-25. *Wast thou called, being a bondsman? Care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. For he that is called in the Lord, being a bondsman, is the freeman of the Lord. Likewise he that is called, being free, is the bondsman of Christ.*

You are bought with a price; be not made the bondslaves of men.

Brethren, let every man, wherein he was called, therein abide with God.

Now concerning virgins, I have not commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel, as having obtained mercy of the Lord to the faithful.

Col. 3:22-4:1. *Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not serving to the eye, as pleasing men, but in simplicity of heart, fearing God.*

Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart, as to the Lord, and not to men:

Knowing that you shall receive of the Lord the reward of inheritance. Serve ye the Lord Christ.

For he that doth wrong, shall receive for that which he hath done wrongfully: and there is no respect of persons with God.

Masters, do to your servants that which is just and equal knowing that you also have a master in heaven.

1 Tim. 6:1-2. *Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honour; lest the name of the Lord and his doctrine be blasphemed.*

But they that have believing masters, let them not despise them, because they are brethren; but serve them rather, because they are faithful and beloved, who are partakers of the benefit. These things teach and exhort.

1 Pet. 2:18-20. *Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. For this is thankworthy, if for conscience towards God, a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully. For what glory is it, if committing sin, and being buffeted for it, you endure? But if doing well you suffer patiently: this is thankworthy before God.*

⁹⁴ *Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ:*

Not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but, as the servants of Christ doing the will of God from the heart, with a good will serving, as to the Lord, and not to men:

Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man shall do, the same shall be received from the Lord, whether he be bond or free.

And you, masters, do the same things to them, forbearing threatenings, knowing that the Lord both of them and you is in heaven; and there is no respect of persons with him.

⁹⁵ Sermon 94.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* This same sense of responsibility of the great as with the lesser is found in *Enn. in Ps. 62*, 4.

⁹⁷ In *Enn. in Ps. 125*, 7, Augustine states:

" . . . The primary and every day relation of authority between man and man is that between master and slave. Almost all houses have a power of this sort. There are masters, there are also slaves; these are different names, but men and men are equal names. And what saith the Apostle, teaching that slaves are subject to their masters? 'Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh:' for there is a Master according to the Spirit. He is the true and everlasting Master; but those temporal masters are for a time only. . . . It hath been thy lot to become a Christian, and to have a man for thy master: thou wast not made a Christian, that thou mightest disdain to be a servant. For when by Christ's command thou servest a man, thou servest not the man, but Him who commanded thee. He saith this also: 'Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh.' Behold, he hath not made man free from being servants, but good servants from bad servants. How much do the rich owe to Christ, who orders their house for them! So that if thou hast had an unbelieving servant, suppose Christ convert him, and say not to him, Leave thy master, thou hast now known Him who is thy true Master: he perhaps is ungodly and unjust, thou art now faithful and righteous: it is unworthy that a righteous and faithful man should serve an unjust and unbelieving master. He spoke not thus unto him, but rather, Serve him: and to confirm the servant, added, Serve as I served: I before thee served the unjust. . . ."

See also, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, 3, II.

⁹⁸ *Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters, in all things pleasing, not gainsaying:*

Not defrauding, but in all things showing good fidelity, that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things:

⁹⁹ Ep. *24, 1 (after 422). See also, Ep. 108, 18 (409), which speaks to such a discipline when speaking against the freeing of slaves by the Circumcelliones.

¹⁰⁰ In *Confessiones*, VIII, 14, Augustine notes that one influence upon his conversion decision was his reading of the monk Anthony of Egypt. There are certainly similarities between Platonic asceticism and the Scripture-oriented monasticism of Anthony, both of which would have appealed to Augustine. In *Tr. 97 in Ioh.*, 4(2), Augustine suggests that the first hospices and monasteries were established in the time of the Apostles. For additional background on Augustine's views and experiences with the monastic life, see, Van der Meer, *supra* note 9, at 206-217.

¹⁰¹ Van Bavel, *supra*, p. 4. The editor adds at pp. 6-8, that the rule appears to be a summary of oral conferences between Augustine and his monks and that the conciseness of the same presupposed familiarity with his work and with Scripture, which is cited often (no less than 35 times). The rule is based on the ideal of the Jerusalem community of Acts 4:31-35. Finally, the rule balances the interiority of monastic life with its community obligations. Augustine himself describes the life of his community in Sermon 355 and Sermon 356 (426). The circumstances of his own coming to Hippo as a monk are set out in Sermon 355, 2. See also, Gerald Bonner, *Augustine as a Monastic Legislator* as Appendix B to *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies* (Norwich, 1986), on the authenticity of the rule; and Lawless, *supra*.

¹⁰² For example, at 19, he states:

"As therefore the Apostle, nay rather the Spirit of God possessing and filling and actuating his heart, ceased not to exhort the faithful who had such substance, that nothing should be lacking to the necessities of the servants of God, who wished to hold a more lofty degree of sanctity in the Church, in cutting off all ties of secular hope, and dedicating a mind at liberty to their godly service of warfare: likewise ought themselves also to obey his precepts, in sympathising with the weak and unshackled by love of private wealth, to labour with their hands for the common good, and submit to their superiors without a murmur; that there may be made up for them out of the oblations of good believers that which, while they labour and do some work whereby they may get their living, yet

still by reason of bodily infirmities of some, and by reason of ecclesiastical occupations or erudition of the doctrine which bringeth salvation, they shall account to be lacking."

Augustine believed it is morally dangerous to be idle. *Ibid.*, at 25 and 26.

¹⁰³ For example, Rule 1, 3, states:

"Among you there can be no question of personal property. Rather, take care that you share everything in common. Your superior should see to it that each person is provided with food and clothing. He does not have to give exactly the same to everyone, for you are not all equally strong, but each person should be given what he personally needs. . . ."

¹⁰⁴ The difficulty in having personal possessions is seen in Sermon 355, 3, 4 and 6, in which a priest came into a monastic community, claiming he had nothing except a legacy for his daughter who was in a convent, but not of age to take her final vows. When approaching death, he made a will and claimed the legacy was his, and that he wished to give it to the Church. Augustine regrets the falsehood, but especially the wrangling between the daughter and a dispossessed son, also in the religious life, which the will occasions. (The children eventually settled the case and the money came to the Church in any event.) In part 6 of that same sermon, he changes his policy on not giving continued clerical status to those with possessions, but adds that they would face a sterner judge later. *See also*, Sermon 356, 14. In Sermon 356, 2-3, Augustine raises this case again and states that the rest of his community is not in the same position, except for two who have not come of age and own property in common with others outside the community. *See also*, Ep. 83 (405).

¹⁰⁵ Rule 1, 3-7. The Van Bavel commentary notes the passage from Sermon 356, in which Augustine requests that the relevant passages regarding the Jerusalem community be read out to refresh the recollection of the brothers so that they may be of one mind and one heart in their dedication to God. *See also*, Sermon on Ps. 4, 10; and *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, 5, 9. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at 42-43.

¹⁰⁶ Specifically, he states:

"For these same words of the Psalter, this sweet sound, that honeyed melody, as well as the mind as of the hymn, did even beget the Monasteries. By this sound were stirred up the brethren who longed to dwell together. This verse was their trumpet. It sounded through the whole earth, and they who had been divided, were gathered together. The summons of God, the summons of the Holy Spirit, the summons of the Prophets, were not heard in Judah, yet were heard through the whole world. . . . Whence those five hundred, who saw the Lord after his resurrection, whom, the Apostle Paul commemorates? Whence those one hundred and twenty, who were together in one place after the resurrection of the Lord, and His ascension into heaven, on whom when gathered into one place the Holy Spirit descended on the day of Pentecost, sent down from heaven, sent, even as He was promised? All were from thence, and they first dwelt together in unity; who sold all they had and laid the price of their goods at the Apostles' feet, as is read in the Acts of the Apostles. The distribution is made to each one as he had need, and no one called anything his own, but they had all things common. And what is 'together in unity'? They had, he says, one mind and one heart God-wards. So they were the first who heard, Behold how good and how pleasant it is, that brethren dwell together. They were the first to hear, but heard it not alone. . . ."

Enn. in Ps. 132, 2. In sections 3 to 5 of this same sermon, Augustine derives the name of monks (from the Greek word "monos" or one, to demonstrate the unity of purpose) and distinguishes these monks from Circumcelliones and other false monks. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at 43-44. Van Bavel notes at 60 that one of Augustine's favourite scriptural citations, and which reflected his view of community life, was John 4:20 ("Whoever does not love his brother whom he sees, cannot love God whom he does not see.") and adds the following from Augustine's *Tr. 7 in Epis. Ioh.*, 11: "Sisters and brothers, if you want to live in love, then first be aware that love is no trifling matter; it is not something cheap and easy for which nothing has to be done. One lives in love not just being good-humoured. Actually, this is putting it too mildly. To be more precise, the lazy, the indifferent and the nonchalant are not living in love. Do not think that you love your servant just because you refrain from striking him, or that you love your child if you do not bother to teach him discipline, or that you love your neighbours if you never speak to them. That is not love, but weakness. . . ."

¹⁰⁷ Van Bavel notes that Augustine would have preferred a life of prayer, contemplation, and manual work to the work of a bishop, deciding cases of people he does not know. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at 61-62; Van der Meer, *supra*, at 14-15, and 237.

¹⁰⁸ *De Gestis Pelagii*, 55 (XXX).

¹⁰⁹ Van Bavel describes Augustine's principle as one of denying something that is lawful, with a view toward strengthening oneself in the process and notes that he did believe living in community was already simple austerity and that training in self-control was the object. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at 66. He also notes Augustine's view that there is no value in fasting unless the poor are given what is saved. *See also*, Sermon 209, 2.

¹¹⁰ Rule 3, *Community and Care of the Body*.

¹¹¹ Van Bavel indicates that one of Augustine's themes was modesty in dress as a protection for the religious brother or sister. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at pp. 73-74; *De Sancta Virginitate*, 34, 34; Sermon 356, 14.

¹¹² Van Bavel says that this concern arises from Matt. 5:27-28, in which Christ said that wilfully looking at a woman lustfully is adultery. Again, he wishes to protect his religion from these evils that gave rise to those rules. He adds that Augustine saw it as a community duty to assist members in retaining their chastity and that, in the Council of Hippo in 393, the bishops called on consecrated virgin women to live in community to strengthen themselves against temptation. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at pp. 74-77. He states the

rule against the receipt of letters or a gift from a person of the opposite sex in secret was because such materials were associated with private intimacy. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at 85.

¹¹³ Rule 4, 1-11. The enhanced character of admonition comes from Matt. 18:15-17. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at p. 78. Van Bavel also cites a number of Augustine's works to the effect that there is a duty to correct (Serm. 82, 4 and 7) and that the reticence of the corrected person and his superior must be overcome (Serm. 83, 7, and 8). In any event, his experience illustrates that the allocation of punishment is a difficult business (Ep. 95, 3). Ultimately, he holds that love for a person must provide the means for correction of that person's faults (Ep. 153, 1, and 3; and *Tr. 7 in Epis. Ioh.* 11). *Ibid.*, 81-85.

¹¹⁴ Augustine touches upon that theme at length with regard to his own case in Serm. 356, 13, in which he states he would sell a cloak given to him and suitable for a bishop. The reasons appear to be implicit in both Serm. 355 and Serm. 356, *viz.*, his own integrity (i.e., the shame of receipt of unsuitable clothes) and the damage to reputation. It is this damage to which he spoke in *Contra Litteras Petilian.*, III, XL, 48, in which he notes that the monastic life he leads is of a kind now known throughout the world.

¹¹⁵ Rule 5, 5-7.

¹¹⁶ Van Bavel raises a common theme in Augustine's works, i.e., the distinction between anger and hatred. Anger can surge, but must be resolved before it turns to hatred, which is akin to loss of love, and thus, death. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at pp. 94-98. *See also, Enn. in Ps.* 54, 7; and Serm. 49, 7, 7; Serm. 56, 9, 13; and Serm. 211, 3, 3.

¹¹⁷ Van Bavel correctly emphasises that it is love that motivates both the leaders and the remainder of the community, and urges following leaders by God's command. Van Bavel, *supra* note 101, at 105-107.

¹¹⁸ Ep. 64, 3 (401).

¹¹⁹ In particular, Augustine focuses upon the ability to live freely in the monastic community—free of the cares of life and family relationships, freedom to use the grace divinely given for meritorious work, and freedom to live in love for the length of one's earthly life. *See, Van Bavel, supra* note 101, at pp. 116-118.

¹²⁰ In Ep. 48, 2, and 3 (398), to his fellow priest Eudoxius, Augustine notes this conflict and advises that a call to serve the Church in the world must not be accepted too eagerly or declined out of indolence. In Ep. 64 (401), to his fellow priest Quintianus, he advises against allowing less successful monks from becoming clerics, finding the poor qualities of one may carry over to the other. He also notes the difficulties of those leaving the monastery being under any practical jurisdiction upon leaving the diocese.

¹²¹ *De Civitate Dei*, I, 35. The depth of Augustine's feelings against the theatres reflects his own attraction to them in his youth, as well as the Platonic and Neo-Platonic dislike of them. Bishop J. E. C. Welldon in the introduction to his edition of *De Civitate Dei* (London, 1924), at xlii and at Appendix C, demonstrates the strength of Augustine's dislike for theatre, given his partiality to it as a youth. The Bishop emphasises the theatre as an index of public morality and states that Augustine found that level to be low indeed in late classical times, in addition to supporting the multiple gods of Rome. It is in the churches that Augustine sees the development of the two cities, joined together in this world, but separated at the Last Judgement. The weakness of men that necessitates social coherence in the Church is illustrated in Peter's cocksure affirmation of support for Christ, followed by his three denials. Serm. 295, 3 (410). *See also, Van der Meer, supra* note 9, at 574.

¹²² *Tr. 11 in Ioh.*, 13. This text is discussed further in Chapter V below in the text accompanying note 34. The use of Sarah and Hagar here is more interesting because this story is often used as a prefiguring of predestination.

¹²³ *See, e.g., De Baptismo Contra Donatistas*, I, 7-9, 8-10, and 11. In the latter passage, Augustine asks who would not act for a friend with a grievous wound to allow a surgeon to operate and makes the comparison with the Church, wounded by schism, to seek the medicine of unity. In Book III of this same work at 15-20 to 17-22, he emphasised the fault and sin of those that sundered the bonds of that unity and lack the requisite charity for salvation.

¹²⁴ *Tr. 12 in Ioh.*, 2 and 7.

¹²⁵ Serm. 65A, 7 (397-398).

¹²⁶ Serm. 346B, 3 (410). In Serm. 361, 19 (411), Augustine urges his hearers to prepare for the Last Judgement and likens the Church both to a chaste wife receiving her husband and the Ark, seeing its inhabitants through the deluge. Indeed, Augustine finds heresies to be of value to the Church, forcing it to defend its dogma and, thus, investigate it more closely. *De Civitate Dei*, XVI, 2. This certainly appears to be true of Augustine himself.

¹²⁷ Serm. 340A, 11 (411). This sermon shows Augustine at his rhetorical best, arguing for universal unity against African chauvinism, using reason against unreasoning, and, more importantly, is more consistent with Scripture over the nature and mission of the Church. One of his themes is that the personal faults of the clergy are not grounds for sundering Church unity. This theme is also found in Serm. 137, 7 (400-405). To the clergy, Augustine notes that the flock they are leading were Christ's and not their own. Serm. 229O, 3 (422).

¹²⁸ At the beginning of the sermon, Augustine, in quoting Sir. 51:28, 23 (*Accept discipline in this house of discipline*), suggests the etymology of "discipline" from "disco," I learn. And, as is consistent throughout Augustine's works, it is the purpose of the discipline that mattered. As he asked rhetorically about the Donatists, after noting that they had consecrated virgins, the reason for consecration, whether for Christ or Donatus, mattered greatly. *Tr. 13 in Ioh.*, 13 and 15.

¹²⁹ "Why did you go to school, and get beaten, and run away when taken there by your parents, and get looked for and found, and dragged back again, and laid out on the floor when you were brought back? Why were you beaten? Why did you endure such ghastly evils in your boyhood? To make you learn. Learn what? Your letters. Why? So that you could earn money, or obtain honours, maintain a high social rank."

¹³⁰ *De Patientia*, 23.

¹³¹ *Contra Litteras Petilianas*, II, 89, 194. Sermon 359, 9 (411).

¹³² Sermon 71, 28, 30, and 36 (417-420). In the last passage, Augustine suggests that disunity in the Church is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit for which there is no forgiveness. Cf. Matt. 12:31. Sermon 162A, 9-12 (404), is an appeal to the Donatists in which Augustine uses exegesis, reason, and rhetoric to persuade the Donatists to return, noting the consequences for continued separation. For, as he states in another sermon on unity with the Donatists, after pointing out that the Donatists did not prevail in their suit before the Emperor: "[T]his is not a matter of litigating, but of loving." Sermon 359, 5 (411).

¹³³ Sermon 313E (410). Augustine adds that Christ shows that separations are not to be made, but unity cherished and peace preserved. In Sermon 268, 2 (405), Augustine gives an organic character to the Church, finding that its one spirit in Christ, which allows it to work in concert and that one member feels the pain of another who is injured. However, he notes that, if a member is cut off from the body, the spirit does not follow, and the member cut off loses its life.

¹³⁴ Augustine himself states:

"... Because it is not so much when the Church is involved in so many evils, or amidst such offences, and in so great a mixture of very evil men, and amidst the heavy reproaches of the ungodly, that we ought to say that it is glorious, because kings serve it,—a fact which only produces a more perilous and a sorer temptation: but then shall it rather be glorious, when that even shall come to pass of which the apostle also speaks in the words, 'When Christ, who is your life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with Him in glory....'"

IV. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. Introduction.

The previous chapters have demonstrated a consistent set of views held by Augustine regarding fallen man and certain social relationships. Notwithstanding his earlier relative optimism regarding human ability to achieve unity with God, Augustine becomes convinced that this is an impossible task without unmerited grace.¹ He finds fallen man to be vicious and self-inclined² and his only real choice is over which sin he will commit.³ Augustine believes there is no inherent merit in human actions.⁴ Even if called, baptized, and given grace, a man still must overcome the world, and himself, in a toilsome and bitter life in which temptation and travail are constant companions.⁵ Scriptural injunctions over family and social relationships are necessary to assist humanity in its journey through life. However, as noted above, Augustine finds no necessary relationship between grace and success in the social and political realms.⁶

Notwithstanding these travails, those who are called follow the law by dint of grace and delight in doing so.⁷ They are able to put aside their own disordered inclinations and focus upon the spiritual, put aside the temporal for the eternal, and overcome themselves to be united with God.⁸ This election has no perceptible effect⁸ upon the fortune of these elect in the world, who are still subject to the same benefits and burdens as those alongside whom they live.⁹ The world and its history go on, as ordered by Providence, outside the ken of humanity and, except as directed by and to Providence, devoid of significance.¹⁰ The history of the worldly city is one of never-ending conflict among human egos as they struggle for power and glory among their peers.¹¹ As most of the objects sought in these conflicts are temporal in nature, they turn out to be unsatisfying, even in the acquisition.¹² Thus new objects must be sought, resulting in new conflicts.¹³

This account of Pauline conflict is merged in Augustine with another body of thought that also profoundly motivates him, i.e., Neo-Platonism.¹⁴ As noted in Chapter II above, while Augustine rails at most of the non-Christian philosophers,¹⁵ his comments on the Neo-Platonists are relatively mild, probably reflecting his own complete adherence to that school of thought at the time of his conversion.¹⁶ He finds this school closest to the Christians and finds much in common with it.¹⁷ Neo-Platonism is never completely rejected in Augustine's works, so much as succeeded by his Scripture-centered worldview.

There are many common points between Augustine and his fellow Neo-Platonists. One such common point is the notion of order in the universe, a constant theme in Augustine's works.¹⁸ One of the greatest faults of sin is that it disturbs the order of creation, particularly in the choice of a lesser good over a greater good.¹⁹ Only a rightly ordained love is good. Moreover, like the Neo-Platonists, Augustine sees evil as disorder, and not as an entity. Rather, it is the privation of good, much in the same way that darkness does not exist, but is rather a privation of light.²⁰

Augustine also shares the Neo-Platonic view that the spiritual is superior to the physical,²¹ although he does not despise the physical as evil.²² He finds the spiritual order is higher and that order includes man in his proper place, i.e., below God and the angels, but above the beasts, the plants, and the remainder of the world over which He has dominion.²³ He shares the Neo-Platonist view that the highest aim of man is intellectual²⁴ and can only be achieved by purifying oneself from the outside world.²⁵ Similarly, he finds the world as transitory, in contrast with the eternal world that may be known beyond the world of the senses.²⁶

Finally, Augustine ultimately reconciles, as did Plato, the relationship of the individual soul to society. While for both the Neo-Platonists and Augustine, the highest intellectual order is

apprehended individually, Plato and other Greek political thinkers require that this be done in the context of the *polis*.²⁷ Augustine reads Scripture to require that salvation be sought generally in the medium of society, rather than as an anchorite.²⁸ Therefore, while he lives subordinating the physical to the spiritual with his community, even as bishop, he reluctantly spends most of his time living in the world, attempting to lend it a spiritual dimension.²⁹ This transformation from the communities of Cassiciacum and Thagaste to the Cathedral at Hippo Regius is an outgrowth of his reading of Paul that his ministry is in the outside world. From those labours, there is no rest.

Unlike the Neo-Platonists, however, Augustine ultimately accepts that there can be no level to which man can raise himself in this world that will achieve true peace, order, and justice.³⁰ As will be noted below, Augustine holds that true peace and justice may be achieved only in the Kingdom of God.³¹ Earthly justice is not *true* justice, for it reflects the interests of those in power.³² More importantly, earthly peace is not true peace, but the repression of vice³³ and maintenance of peace among nations by force.³⁴ Similarly, the Platonic and Neo-Platonic notion of self-sufficiency cannot abide with the requirement for grace to remedy a fatally flawed mankind.³⁵ He found neither dialogue nor self-purification able to improve the human community.

As has been noted, over the Neo-Platonic structure that marks Augustine's early intellectual life is found the strong influence of Pauline theology. Augustine reads St. Paul from the time of his conversion, and his views on grace and predestination coalesce by 396.³⁶ Nevertheless, it is the Pelagian controversy that brings his immense rhetorical and Scriptural skills on these matters to the fore. Augustine accepts without reservation or change Pauline

views on household relationships and builds upon Scripture to set forth his monastic rule and his views on discipline within the Church. These become a part of his notion of human order.

Aside from these relationships, it is predestination and grace that are the frequent topics of the pen of the mature Augustine.³⁷ The inability of individuals to achieve salvation unaided is consistent with his views on the inability of men together to achieve true peace, order, and justice. Similarly, the murky nature of men's thoughts and intentions renders it more difficult for justice to be pursued successfully.³⁸ As a Christian, Augustine cannot ignore Pauline writings and gives them literal meaning in his controversies with the Pelagians. He can do no other. However, the perceptive Augustine also ascribes the troubled and conflicted humanity in Pauline writings to the political and social institutions in the world around him. This ascription is consistent with both experience and the Pauline corpus.

Augustine finds himself bound by Scripture. Indeed, he does not wish it otherwise.³⁹ It is Scripture that set forth the terms of various social relationships and, as shown below, the relationship of ruler and ruled. While not above manipulating the use of Scripture to make a point,⁴⁰ Augustine views Scripture as a consistent whole, the depths of which are to be mined for truth. For that reason, he undertakes commentaries on even the more obscure books of the Old Testament and finds many new meanings and applications of the Psalms.

For Augustine, Scripture points the way out of the circular life of recurring conflicts in which humanity finds itself.⁴¹ However, only when grace prompts man to take that way out is salvation possible. Otherwise, humanity is left with wars, litigation, and other forms of strife arising out of pride, lust, and desire for domination of others. All of these are ultimately pointless and unsatisfying and lead to further unhappiness. Only the irruption of the Incarnation into history gives any hope of breaking out of the circle of conflict until death. Augustine's

political views flow from his views on human nature, set forth in Chapter II above, and Scriptural injunctions in the social sphere, set forth in Chapter III above. As with his application of Scripture to those social relationships, Augustine counsels love, obedience, and humility in dealing with civil authorities, while retaining his perspective on the nature of the dual sets of obligations in life. The duty to those in authority requires humility and obedience, even in the face of injustice. Political authority has its own uses, such as punishing the wicked and testing the good. It further provides "a kind of peace" in which the Church may do her saving work.

This chapter, and the one following, will deal with the social and political results of fallen man, as Augustine saw them. This chapter extends Augustine's social views of a fallen humanity to the political sphere. The following chapter will deal with the use of civil force to enforce orthodoxy as a duty of Christian leaders.

B. A New Perspective of Political Obligation.

When Augustine was born in 354, Christianity existed for slightly over 300 years. For much of that time, the sect had been persecuted or was in official disfavor. Beginning with Christ and almost all the Apostles, nearly all the great names of Christianity had gone to their deaths as martyrs or had affirmed their desire to do so if necessary. Christianity had been officially tolerated in the Roman Empire for fewer than 50 years. The perspective of the early Christians to that empire ranged from the indifferent to the hostile and carried over to Christian thought of Augustine's time. The words of Jesus and St. Paul shaped these perceptions.

When Christ tells his disciples to "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's,"⁴² the dualism of living in two worlds is established. When Christ says His Kingdom is not of this world,⁴³ that dualism is reinforced to separate the worldly kingdoms from the Kingdom of God. When Jesus tells His followers to "resist not evil" and to

"turn the other cheek," He calls for a different attitude from that which had existed in the Jewish and non-Jewish worlds to that time. These and other sayings,⁴⁴ in addition to the conduct of Jesus from the time of His arrest to the Crucifixion, provide ethical guidance for Christians. To these Scriptural passages are added the words of St. Peter,⁴⁵ and especially the words of St. Paul from Rom. 13:1-7, to obey the commands of earthly rulers and pay taxes.⁴⁶ The personal nature of the obligation (i.e., to the "powers that be") in lieu of an obligation to a disembodied entity, such as "the state," is not merely a verbal characterization. For, just as Scripture speaks in personal terms, rather than to the entity known as "the state," Augustine views the obligation as one among persons. Persons make the moral choice in deciding political and social matters and are personally responsible for their consequences. The result of these Scriptural readings in the early Church is often an attitude of indifference in which Christians viewed the world as transitory and evil and in which passive acceptance of the established order was the norm.⁴⁷ Augustine changes those views so that the political machinery can proceed, but moral responsibility is fixed at the levels of the leader and those who must follow.

Augustine deals not only with the recent toleration of Christianity, but its installation in the halls of power in the late Western Roman Empire. From the time of the Edict of Toleration in 312 to the death of Augustine in 430, much more had happened than the mere passage of time.⁴⁸ The Church, that had been persecuted, now had much power. But with that power comes some measure of responsibility for the affairs of the late Western Empire and some ability to influence the regime of the day in those matters of interest to the Church. Previous Christian writers did not address, much less imagine, the role of the Church in such circumstances. As the most prolific of late classical Christian writers, Augustine's work inevitably treats these new and difficult issues.

Starting from the themes of earlier Christian writers, Augustine points out that Christians must be good citizens in all regards, save those in which the primacy of their God and his Word are at issue.⁴⁹ Thus, obeying all laws that do not offend divine law and paying taxes are enjoined upon Christians. That direction is not difficult, as it follows the words of Christ and St. Paul. The next issue that arises is more difficult, as it deals with the participation of individual Christians in the machinery of government, particularly in the formulation and application of policy and in military affairs.

Before launching into this more personal question, let us review the views of Augustine on the nature of civil authority. From *De Civitate Dei*, there are these disquieting words:

"Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possessions of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, 'What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet are styled emperor.'"⁵⁰

Augustine addresses this issue of a regime depending on force, rather than justice, at different portions of this same work;⁵¹ there is, nevertheless, some controversy as to whether he requires justice to be part of the framework of a political entity. A fair reading of his work as a whole indicates that no such element is required in a political entity. There are no such qualifications in the sayings of Jesus, or in the prescriptions of St. Paul. The discussion of the extension of Ninus' kingdom as a robbery almost immediately following the above passage does not turn on the legitimacy of his rule.⁵² And, as Herbert Deane has pointed out, the grammar and

context of this and similar discussions clearly point the way to having the existence or legitimacy of a kingdom or other political entity not depending on justice.⁵³ The result is that Augustine's rhetoric is consistent with the political passiveness of earlier Christian writing.

Also consistent with a skeptical element of previous Christian writing is Augustine's view that kingdoms of the world, including Rome, are drawn to the love of the earthly city.⁵⁴ Augustine does not deviate from the traditional Christian view that the rulers are to be obeyed, but that the entity to which duty is owed is transitory and it ends most often in conflict with the duties owed to God. Authority is neutral as a moral guide;⁵⁵ it is the place on the moral scale to which that authority is used which is important and requires the exercise of judgement.

A similar theme is that of the earthly peace needed for the optimal conduct of earthly affairs. Whether it is the constant and bloody strife between Rome and the various forces that were slowly, but inevitably, bringing down the Empire, or the civil wars that were raging around him, Augustine is convinced that some kind of peace is desired by all creatures. He notes that men prefer any kind of peace to death⁵⁶ and that some kind of accommodation is necessary so that business, and living itself, may occur.⁵⁷ While Augustine despairs of true peace on earth, he does find the drive to peace natural and part of a divine scheme of order and demonstrates the similarity of well-ordered domestic rule to that of well-ordered political authority:

"... And because, so long as he is in this mortal body, he is a stranger to God, he walks by faith, not by sight; and he therefore refers all peace, bodily or spiritual or both, to that peace which mortal man has with the immortal God, so that he exhibits the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. But as this divine Master inculcates two precepts—the love of God and the love of our neighbour—and as in these precepts a man finds three things he has to love, God, himself, and his neighbour—and that he who loves God loves himself thereby, *it follows that he must endeavour to get his neighbour to love God, since he is ordered to love his neighbour as himself. He ought to make this endeavor in behalf of his wife, his children, his household, all within his reach, even as he would wish his neighbor to do the same for him if he needed it;* and consequently he will be at

peace, or in well-ordered concord, with all men, as far as in him lies. And this is the order of this concord, that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and in the second, do good to every one he can reach. Primarily, therefore, his own household are his care, for the law of nature and of society gives him readier access to them and greater opportunity of serving them. . . . For they who care for the rest rule—the husband the wife, the parents the children, the masters the servants; and they who are cared for obey—the women their husbands, the children their parents, the servants their masters. But in the family of the just man who lives by faith and is yet a pilgrim journeying on to the celestial city, *even those who rule serve those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to the others*—not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy."⁵⁸ (Emphasis supplied.)

The kind of peace that is advanced is dependent on the love that underlies it. If it is the carnal love of the earthly city, that love will not be satisfied and will seek other earthly goods and true peace will not reign. If it is the love of God and, from that love, the love of neighbour, that *caritas* will be an approximation of that heavenly peace of God.

That peace, which is based on Christ, will help the earthly city, as it will bring peace to the household, which is the building block of the earthly city.⁵⁹ This instruction is also consistent with New Testament direction of the reverence and obedience due to higher powers. Finally, that peace is also useful to the Church, as it allows her to pursue her work in the world of saving souls.⁶⁰

C. Inward Disposition.

The transition between the apathy and hostility to the Western Roman Empire and the active participation in the work of the administration by Christians is based on the notion of inward disposition. Consistent with the application of this concept in the social field, this notion works from the law-abiding nature of Christian citizenship in all matters not involving danger to their faith, while preserving the dualism of the two kingdoms. Before Augustine, it was clear in Christian thought citizens are generally required to obey laws and other commands of the sovereign and pay taxes. It was not clear, however, that Christians could or should accept high

positions in the Empire. Moreover, the work of a soldier may involve enforcement of claims of dubious merit and the possibility of using deadly force. It is obvious that there were Christian emperors and other officials, yet the basis for their participation is not at all clear. What is clear is that Augustine never criticized the emperors or other high Roman officials, even when his friend Marcellinus had been judicially murdered.⁶¹ Instead, Augustine counsels an outward disposition of obedience, save for matters of faith, and an inward disposition of love and otherworldly orientation. It is in this area that Augustine made his singular contribution to Christian political theory.

If all were to follow the injunction not to resist evil, but to turn the other cheek, the peace of the world could not be maintained; Christians could not participate in military or civil affairs. However, it is legitimate for the peace of the world to be kept, and Christians are enjoined to keep that peace. The notion of inward disposition is not only practical, but also consistent with Christian teaching regarding the obligation to keep our inner-selves within the injunctions of Christ. Consider this excerpt on war:

" . . . What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, nor any religious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars, when they find themselves in such a position as regards the conduct of human affairs, that right conduct requires them to act, or to make others act, in this way. Otherwise, John, when the soldiers who came to be baptized asked, What shall we do? would have replied, Throw away your arms; give up the service; never strike, or wound, or disable any one. But knowing that such actions in battle were not murderous, but authorized by law, and that the soldiers did not thus avenge themselves, but defend the public safety, he replied, 'Do violence to no man, accuse no man falsely, and be content with your wages. . . .'⁶²

Further, the punishment of evildoers by the authorities and just wars to punish the unjust do not contravene Christian thoughts, given the function of civil authorities to do so. This has the practical effect of securing peace and preventing further wrong.⁶³

Similarly, the use of inward disposition allows the citizens of the two cities to work side by side, separated, as Augustine would have it, only by the loves that the citizens of each city possess.⁶⁴ For Augustine, the soul moves toward Christ as the object of its desire and its weight is its love.⁶⁵ The Christian could work for one who was evil, but could put off the blame through an interior disposition that does not intend the evil done.

The result of this exercise is a freedom of movement for the Christian, which allows participation in official work and in the military. It must be said, however, that the farther one moves in such circles and has more freedom of choice among alternatives, the more responsible that person is for the actions taken. Lowly functionaries could appropriate property for taxes, if so ordered. Soldiers could arrest and torture people, without blame. "Following orders" is a defense. Yet deciding what property is to be taken for taxation, or determining one or another group as subversive to the regime and thus liable to fearsome consequences could bring the burden of eternal condemnation. However, these are matters for the Last Judgement, and the individual moral judgements of individuals are their own responsibility.

In part, this view is derived from Augustine's reading of Scripture, which is oriented toward order and the existing regime, and his views of Providence, which is unknown to men.

He states of the grant of power to rulers of Rome:

" . . . [W]e do not attribute the power of giving kingdoms and empires to any save to the true God, who gives happiness in the kingdom of heaven to the pious alone, but gives kingly power on earth both to the pious and the impious, as it may please Him, whose good pleasure is always just. . . . He who gave power to Marius gave it also to Caius Caesar; He who gave it to Augustus gave it also to Nero; He also who gave it to the most benignant emperors, the Vespasians, father

and son, gave it also to the cruel Domitian; and, finally, to avoid the necessity of going over them all, He who gave it to the Christian Constantine gave it also to the apostate Julian, whose gifted mind was deceived by a sacrilegious and detestable curiosity, stimulated by the love of power. . . ."66

D. Conclusion: Living With the Existing Order.

The counsel given by Augustine to the subjects of the Empire is, broadly stated, to endure the travails of the social and political orders and not to rebel against them.⁶⁷ This position is entirely consistent with Augustine's reading of Scripture and reflects the otherworldliness of Christianity. The endurance of the existing order may require a great deal, however.

In the first place, property, which is both a punishment and a remedy for Original Sin, is perpetuated, along with the inequalities in wealth and social standing that accompanies this institution.⁶⁸ Property is held, not in accordance with some natural law or right, but only as a result of positive law imposed by the sovereign. Indeed, all property is held under the iron whim of the ruler.⁶⁹ Thus, the property holder has an interest in the affairs of the regime and the existing order, if only to protect his or her holdings. The danger of this attachment becoming hazardous to spiritual health is apparent.

Secondly, slavery, like property, is not a natural institution, but the result of Original Sin as a lust for domination.⁷⁰ Like property, too, slavery is part of the established order to which Christians are enjoined to endure out of discipline and a regard for Scriptural injunctions.⁷¹ Property, slavery and civil authority are, for Augustine, all parts of the disorder inherited after Eden. Unlike the husband and wife or parent and child relationships, they are not natural, but the subject of Scriptural discipline nonetheless.

Finally, law is also an instrument of the existing order and a penal result of Original Sin. All institutions have some form of law, even robbers, in making agreements to share the spoils.⁷² Positive law, and its administration, has the potential for bias and arbitrariness. Law may result

in the loss of life or property, but is not without its uses, as it instills a fear that maintains the existing order.⁷³ Nevertheless, application of law is imperfect, either through corruption, perversity, or even human error.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the law is an instrument to be used to defend or expand one's property interests through litigation, another instance of the strife that marks this life.⁷⁵ To reduce this strife and the lawsuits condemned by Pauline writings, the Church in Augustine's day often attempts to resolve disputes, a time-consuming and laborious job that Augustine preferred to avoid.⁷⁶

Augustine never squarely faced the difficult question of a change in "the powers that be," as one power claims sovereignty, usurps, or succeeds another. North Africa had its share of usurpation and rebellion during Augustine's lifetime, and he was certainly aware of the civil war, palace intrigues, and murder of rulers accompanying change of authority in Rome. When the new power establishes itself, it is now the "power that be" and is entitled to obedience, save in matters of faith, regardless of its pedigree. The concurrent, and more important, spiritual obligation, however, remained unchanged.

Augustine, although influenced greatly by Neo-Platonism, is a faithful son of the Church, who does not part ways with his predecessors over matters of doctrine. His significance in political thought lies in the position in history in which he finds himself. He abandons the search for the "good life" as an object of the *polis* and takes a much more limited view of the possibilities of politics.⁷⁷ Ever the apologist for orthodoxy, he is also called upon to decide or advise upon questions that are of first impression in the Western Church, particularly those relating to participation of the faithful in the machinery of government and the role of civil authorities in dealing with heterodoxy. The second appears to follow from the first, as

permission to participate also includes a duty to use the machinery of a regime in a way in which the mission of the Church is advanced.

In all other respects, Augustine follows the political and social precepts of the New Testament, as he understands them. Civil authority exists to punish evildoers and, if it should itself be the medium of evil, that situation would serve to punish the evil and test the good. The political regime, like life, is to be borne with the prospect of another life in mind. In the following chapter, we shall examine the participation of the civil authority in the defense and advancement of orthodoxy and the position of the individual in such a regime.

¹ As the "Doctor of Grace" and scourge of the Pelagians, Augustine goes to great lengths to illustrate his point of the impossibility of auto-salvation. In *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 1, he holds that the human race is divided into two groups. The vast number are carnal and evil. However:

" . . . By grace—for so far as regards himself he has sprung from the same mass, all of which is condemned in its origin; but God, like a potter (for this comparison is introduced by the Apostle judiciously, and not without thought), of the same lump made one vessel to honour, another to dishonour. . . ."

In his introduction to *De Civitate Dei*, Bishop J. E. C. Welldon finds Augustine to make the same point about the two cities, one that would be honoured, the other dishonoured. Welldon, *supra*, at xxiii, with reference to XII, 28. See also, *ibid.*, XV, 21; XVI, 2; XX, 1; and XXI, 16. In Deane, *supra*, at 25-26, the author collects a number of works, especially from Augustine's anti-Pelagian period, to make this same point.

² See, e.g., *De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 22. In *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 4, Augustine discusses the struggles that characterize the earthly existence:

"But the earthly city, which shall not be everlasting (for it will no longer be a city when it has been committed to the extreme penalty), has its good in this world, and rejoices in it with such joy as such things can afford. But as this is not a good which can discharge its devotees of all distresses, this city is often divided against itself by litigations, wars, quarrels, and such victories as are either life-destroying or short-lived. For each part of it that arms against another part of it seeks to triumph over the nations though itself in bondage to vice. If, when it has conquered, it is inflated with pride, its victory is life-destroying; but if it turns its thoughts upon the common casualties of our mortal condition, and is rather anxious concerning the disasters that may befall it than elated with the successes already achieved, this victory, though of a higher kind, is still only short-lived; for it cannot abidingly rule over those whom it has victoriously subjugated. But the things which this city desires cannot justly be said to be evil, for it is itself, in its own kind, better than all other human good. For it desires earthly peace for the sake of enjoying earthly goods, and it makes war in order to attain to this peace; since, if it has conquered, and there remains no one to resist it, it enjoys a peace which it had not while there were opposing parties who contested for the enjoyment of those things which were too small to satisfy both. This peace is purchased by toilsome wars; it is obtained by what they style a glorious victory. Now, when victory remains with the party which had the juster cause, who hesitates to congratulate the victor, and style it a desirable peace? These things, then, are good things, and without doubt the gifts of God. But if they neglect the better things of the heavenly city, which are secured by eternal victory and peace never-ending, and so inordinately covet these present good things that they believe them to be the only desirable things, or love them better than those things which are believed to be better—if this be so, then it is necessary that misery follow and ever increase."

³ Deane, *supra* note 1, at 19, and 24-28, citing Figgis, *supra*, 41 and 46.

⁴ See, e.g., *De Civitate Dei*, V, 26, in which Augustine states eternal happiness is given only to the "sincerely pious."

⁵ In Sermon 105, 11, quoted in Paolucci, *supra*, Augustine states:

"... Ye are Christians, Brethren, we are all Christians. Christ did not come down into the flesh that we might live softly; let us endure rather than love the things present; manifest is the harm of adversity, deceitful is the soft blandishment of prosperity. Fear the sea, even when it is calm.

"On no account let us hear in vain. *Let us lift up our hearts.* Why place we our hearts in the earth, when we see that the earth is being turned upside down? . . ."

See also, *Enn. in Ps.* 40, 5, cited in Deane, *supra* note 1, at 42; *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 7; XX, 7; and XXI, 15.

⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, I, 16, and 28; *Tr. 115 in Ioh.*, 2, as noted in Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at xix. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 25.

⁷ *De Correptione et Gratia*, XII, 33; *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 3; and XXII, 30; *De Spiritu et Littera*, XVI, 28; *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis*, IV, 9; *Enchiridion*, IX, 30; *Tr. 14 in Ioh.*, 6; *Enn. in Ps.* 267, 13. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 25-27.

⁸ *De Civitate Dei*, I, 29, 30, and 33; III, 14; XIX, 1, 3, and 10; and XXI, 15, 16, and 25; Serm. 150, 4 and 5. The whole of *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIX, with its discussion of Varro's 286 separate ways of seeking the good life, is an argument for the Christian view of endurance and otherworldliness. In Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at 308-310, the author cites *Enn. in Ps.* 124, 7-8, showing that Augustine takes the relationship between master and slave as his paradigm of authority and cites the passages expected. Slaves are submissive to their temporal master for the sake of their eternal master. Neither masters nor slaves are inherently good or evil.

⁹ *De Civitate Dei*, I, 8 and 9; Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at xix; and 292-298, citing *Tr. 115 in Ioh.*, 1-5, to the effect that Christ, in stating that His kingdom is not of this world, effectively telling the rulers of the world that He would not interfere with their rule.

¹⁰ *De Civitate Dei*, I, 28 and 33; IV, 33; V, 5, 11; VII, 30; X, 14; XII, 13, 14, 20, and 21; XIV, 27; and XVIII, 2; *Enn. in Ps.* 110, 2; *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, XXII, 78; and Ep. 199, 11 and 39. Markus states that, for Augustine, history: the Roman Empire (and indeed all political entities) are devoid of significance and otherwise homogenous outside of Scripture. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra*, at 133. See also, the discussion by Paolucci in note 5, at pp. 89 and 171-172. The notion of the provision of a kind of order as the function of the regime, an order that only vaguely approximates the order of the universe maintained by God, is an important one for Augustine. Clark, *supra*, at 100.

¹¹ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 4; *Confessiones*, IX, 4, 10. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 33 and 48.

¹² *Contra Mendacium*, VII, 10; Serm. 80, 7; *De Civitate Dei*, XIV, 15; *Tr. 40 in Ioh.*, 10; and Eps. 100, 4; 101, 10; and 151, 10. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 41-45 and 85.

¹³ *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 4; XIX, 5; *De Vera Religione*, XXI, 41; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 45.

¹⁴ As a young Neo-Platonist, Augustine shares the view he held throughout his life that the health of the soul is most important. Deane, *supra* note 1, at 84. His Neo-Platonism heavily influences his search for the good in life, set forth extensively in *De Civitate Dei*, XIX. Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at 118-119.

¹⁵ *De Civitate Dei*, II, 7; XXII, 22. In the latter passage near the conclusion of *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine states:

"... The world's sages affirm that philosophy contributes something to this—that philosophy which, according to Cicero, the gods have bestowed in its purity only on a few men. They have never given, he states, nor can ever give, a greater gift to men. So that even those against whom we are disputing have been compelled to acknowledge, in some fashion, that the grace of God is necessary for the acquisition, not, indeed, of any philosophy, but of the true philosophy. And if the true philosophy—this sole support against the miseries of this life—has been given by Heaven only to a few, it sufficiently appears from this that the human race has been condemned to pay this penalty of wretchedness. And as, according to their acknowledgment, no greater gift has been bestowed by God, so it must be believed that it could be given only by that God whom they themselves recognize as greater than all the gods they worship."

¹⁶ While comparatively mild, Augustine attacks Platonists, for endorsing rites, including plays, for the Greek gods in *De Civitate Dei*, XVIII, 13, and XIV, 5, for their views that the flesh is a burden to be shed. His most intense criticism is found in *De Civitate Dei*, VIII, 10, in which he discusses Paul's attack on the Greek philosophers, probably the members of the New Academy and followers of Plato, in Rom. 1:19-23. After accusing them of philosophizing according to this world and missing what is obvious, he admits these philosophers know of some of the good in creation, but do not worship God out of vanity and foolishness. They are to be preferred, however:

"... This, therefore, is the cause why we prefer these to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers have worn out their minds and powers in seeking the causes of things, and endeavoring to discover the right mode of learning and of living, these, by knowing God, have found where resides the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk. All philosophers, then, who have had these thoughts concerning God, whether Platonists or others, agree with us. But we have thought it better to plead our cause with the Platonists, because their writings are better known. For the

Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest place among the languages of the Gentiles, are loud in their praises of these writings; and the Latins, taken with their excellence, or their renown, have studied them more heartily than other writings, and, by translating them into our tongue, have given them greater celebrity and notoriety."

¹⁷ See, note 16, *infra*. Augustine faults the Neo-Platonists for being so adverse to the physical world as to reject the Incarnation and the Last Judgement. *De Civitate Dei*, X, 29 and XIV, 16. The Incarnation is a special impediment for the Neo-Platonists. Deane, *supra* note 1, at 22-23. He also disagrees with Plato over the perfectibility of society. *Ibid.*, at 11.

¹⁸ Augustine explains the peace and order of the universe as follows in *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 13:

"The peace of the body then consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of the appetites, and that of the rational soul is the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life and health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place. And hence, though the miserable, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy peace, but are severed from that tranquillity of order in which there is no disturbance, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly miserable, they are by their very misery connected with order. They are not, indeed, conjoined with the blessed, but they are disjoined from them by the law of order. . . ."

Indeed, Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at ix, cites Serm. 125, 5, as additional authority to state that, because human affairs appear to be in disorder, that there is no governance of those affairs. Augustine's entire Neo-Platonic past is based on order, which is a lynchpin of his thought, even if that order is not apparent.

¹⁹ *De Civitate Dei*, XII, 8. See also, *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 5; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 117.

²⁰ *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 9 and 10; Deane, *supra* note 1, at 15. In the same way, wars, civil disturbances, and revolutions disturb the political order. Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at 84; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 241. Similarly, earthly peace is but a blurred image of God's order. *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 17.

²¹ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 3-10. This thorough examination of bodily and spiritual goods, following Varro's classifications, appears to be the work of a lifelong reflection on these matters.

²² *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 1; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 66. Augustine does note, following St. Paul, that sexual desire was one of the consequences of the Fall, as humanity struggled to keep its bodies in check. *De Civitate Dei*, CIII, 13; XIV, 16; XIX, 24; Deane, *supra* note 1, at 42. Augustine disagrees with the anti-physical aspects of the philosophy of Porphyry over whether the body is to be escaped from, and the Platonists, who have particular trouble with the Incarnation. In contrast, he recalls his mentor Simplicianus, a former Platonist who deals with these difficulties among his former colleagues. *De Civitate Dei*, X, 29 and 32. See also, *De Civitate Dei*, XIII, 16. He similarly denounces the error of Origen, who holds that men were punished by imprisoning their souls within a body. *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 23.

²³ *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, XXII, 74-79.

²⁴ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 14. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 85, note 48, on Augustine's doctrine of illumination.

²⁵ Augustine's nascent doctrine of purgatory is found in *De Civitate Dei*, XX, 25.

²⁶ The enormity of the effects of Original Sin is explained in this choice of the transitory over the eternal from *De Civitate Dei*, XXI, 12:

"But eternal punishment seems hard and unjust to human perceptions, because in the weakness of our mortal condition there is wanting that highest and purest wisdom by which it can be perceived how great a wickedness was committed in that first transgression. The more enjoyment man found in God, the greater was his wickedness in abandoning Him; and he who destroyed in himself a good which might have been eternal, became worthy of eternal evil. Hence the whole mass of the human race is condemned; for he who at first gave entrance to sin has been punished with all his posterity who were in him as in a root, so that no one is exempt from this just and due punishment, unless delivered by mercy and undeserved grace; and the human race is so apportioned that in some is displayed the efficacy of merciful grace, in the rest the efficacy of just retribution.

See also, *De Civitate Dei*, V, 27; X, 24; XIV, 15; and XIX, 4 and 14; *Contra Mendacium*, VII, 10, and X, 6. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 42 and 44.

²⁷ See, e.g., *The Republic, The Statesman, and The Laws*. George J. Lavere, in *The Problem of the Common Good in St. Augustine's Civitas Terrena*, 14 Augustinian Studies 1 (1983), contrasts the Greek model, carried over by Cicero, with that of Augustine's. He ascribes the comment in *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 21, on kingdoms lacking justice as being great robberies as an effort to deconstruct pagan pretensions on the glory of Rome. He also notes the dual obligations of the two cities (as opposed to the traditional Roman view in which civic and religious obligation are joined) and Augustine's suggestions that the earthly peace be used for advancement of the heavenly city. The earthly city is merely secular, rather than evil (as suggested by Tertullian), or a direct instrument of God (as suggested by Eusebius). Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 10, at 133-153; Brown, *supra*, at 266; and Clark, *supra* note 10, also agree with this analysis, citing *De Civitate Dei*, XVII. Markus notes the fundamental distinction between the notion of human betterment in the *polis* and that of a Jewish or Christian "people of God" for whom order is not found by citizens but by divine intervention. Indeed, Rome did not seek such political participation. *Id.* at 73-75.

²⁸ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 5. While he finds political life to be a penal consequence of the Fall, Augustine holds that society and the family are natural. *De Bono Conjugali*, I, 1; Deane, *supra* note 1, at 78.

²⁹ See, Van Bavel, *supra*, at 61-62.

³⁰ The discussion of the nature of kingdoms without justice (a state which is not possible in the real world) as great robberies in *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 3 and 6, illustrates this theme. See also, *Serm.* 72, 10 (397).

³¹ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 17, 21-24, and 26. While Augustine accepts Plato's views on the perfection of society in justice, he despaired of finding that justice on earth. Deane, *supra* note 1, at 11, and 98-102. For Augustine, it is not the violence of the judicial or military systems that is evil; rather, it is the inward disposition of anger and greed. *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, XX, 74-79.

³² In addition to the extensive examination of justice in earthly kingdoms found in those portions of *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, set forth in note 31, *supra*, see the careful parsing of that discussion in Deane, *supra* note 1, at 118-125, and 151.

³³ *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, XXII, 74 and 78; Ep. 188, II, 14; and Ep. 189, 6. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 117 and 242.

³⁴ *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 15; *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, XXII, 74, 78. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 223.

³⁵ See, notes 31 and 32, *supra*; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 134, and 139-140.

³⁶ Deane, *supra* note 1, at 19, citing *Confessiones*, VII, 21, 27; and *Expositio 84 Propositionum Epistolae ad Romanos*, 55. See also, Brown, *supra* note 27, at 151-157.

³⁷ See, e.g., *De Natura et Gratia; De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis; De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali; Contra Julianum; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio; De Correctione et Gratia; De Praedestinatione Sanctorum; and De Dono Perseverantiae*.

³⁸ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 5; *Tr. 90 in Ioh.*, 2. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 63.

³⁹ As Deane, *supra* note 1, at 12, notes, most of Augustine's writings are commentaries on the Scriptures.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, at 219. Deane relates the enthusiasm with which Augustine used the "compelle intrare" analogy from Scripture against the Donatists.

⁴¹ For the unredeemed, history is a circular enterprise of sin, lust, and attempted domination. For Augustine, the cycle of human history is interrupted by the Incarnation; and he describes humanity in the two cities by way of Scripture, seeing Eden and Calvary as the two most important events of history. Clark, *supra* note 10, at 95.

⁴² Matt. 22:21.

⁴³ John 18:36.

⁴⁴ Also important, at least for Augustine, is the reply of Christ to the Centurion regarding the strength of his faith at Matt. 8: 9-10.

⁴⁵ See, 1 Pet. 2:13-14.

⁴⁶ Deane states that Rom. 13:1 is one of Augustine's favorite passages and cites his discussion of that passage in *Contra Litteras Petilianis*, II, 20, 45; and *Serm.* 358, 6. Interestingly, however, this passage is not used in *De Civitate Dei*.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Francis Dvornick, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy* (Washington, D.C., 1966), ch. 9, particularly the references to Tertullian, *Apologetica* (ch. 30), and the *Libera ad Scapulum*, 1-2; and Hippolytus of Rome, *De Antichristo*, 29, 34, 36; and *In Daniele*, IV, 9.

⁴⁸ An excellent recollection of the political and intellectual supplanting of classical culture by Christianity is found in Charles Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford, 1940), at 375-516.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Serm. 62, 8, 13 and 15, found in Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at 310-314, in which Augustine discusses Rom. 13:1-5, and establishes a hierarchy of power to fear. This excerpt comes from part 13:

"Consider these several grades of human powers. If the magistrate enjoin any thing, must not be done? Yet if his order be in opposition to the Proconsul, though dost not surely despise the power, but choosest to obey a greater power. Nor in this case ought the less to be angry, if the greater be preferred. Again, if the Proconsul himself enjoin any thing, and the Emperor another thing, is there any doubt, that disregarding the former, we ought to obey the latter? So then if the Emperor enjoin one thing, and God another, what judge ye? Pay me tribute, submit thyself to my allegiance. Right, but not in an idol's temple. In an idol's temple He forbids it. Who forbids it? A greater Power. Pardon me then: thou threatenest a prison, He threatenest hell. . . ."

See also, Serm. 359B, 14 (404).

⁵⁰ *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 4.

⁵¹ See, *De Civitate Dei*, II, 21; IV, 6; and XIX 21-24.

⁵² *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 6. See also, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 128.

⁵³ Deane, *supra* note 1, at 120-124. Deane gives four reasons for his conclusion: (1) Augustine's use of the conditional descriptive "probabilior" to show that justice is not probably necessary; (2) when Augustine speaks to his new definition (i.e., of a kingdom without justice) as "this definition of ours"; (3) his view that the love of the people determines their political association; and (4) this latter definition (i.e., the regime without justice) is repeated throughout Augustine's writings. See, *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 8; Ep. 138, II, 10; Ep. 155; III, 9; *De Libero Arbitrio*, I, VII, 16, 52; *De Ordine*, II, 18, 48. See also, *De Civitate Dei*, XVII, 14; and *De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber*, IX, 9.

⁵⁴ *De Civitate Dei*, XIII, 2. It must be emphasized that the function of the civil authority for Augustine was not a positive one in making men better, but, consistent with Rom. 13:1, *et seq.*, the negative one of restraining evil. See, the extensive discussion by Deane on this issue. Deane, *supra* note 1, at 31, especially note 81; and Joseph Torcia, 'Pondus meum amor meus' *The Weight Metaphor in St. Augustine's Early Philosophy*, 21 *Augustinian Studies* 163 (1990), which ascribes the source of this analogy to *Enneads*, I, 6, and IV, 3.

⁵⁵ *Contra Litteras Petiliani*, II, 92, 104.

⁵⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, XVIII, 2.

⁵⁷ *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 4, and XIX, 12. The first passage tells of the continuing struggles for dominance in the earthly city and the short-lived nature of its peace. In the latter passage, Augustine states:

"Whoever gives even moderate attention to human affairs and to our common nature, will recognize there is no man who does not wish to be joyful, neither is there any one who does not wish to have peace. For even they who make war desire nothing but victory—desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with glory. For what else is victory than the conquest of those who resist us? And when this is done there is peace. It is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by war. For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making peace. For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed to a peace that suits them better. . . ."

⁵⁸ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 14. The notion of pilgrimage through the world by one who is not of this world is a principal theme in Augustine's writings. See, M. A. Claussen, *Peregrinatio and Peregrini in Augustine's City of God*, 46 *Traditio* (1991), at 33-75. As noted by Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 10, at 75, Augustine's view of life as pilgrimage had its political effects:

". . . The development of his thought was steadily away from this classical starting point, towards a biblical notion of a transcendent kingdom where alone men would find their true home, and of human societies which could never aspire to provide the means for human fulfillment, societies in which the citizen of the heavenly kingdom could never be more than a *peregrinus*. But although Augustine came to repudiate the 'creative' conception of politics characteristic of the classical tradition, this was only the first major development of his own political reflection. In the end he was not content with this rejection. In the final phase of his thought there is an obstinate sense of a need to give more weight to the political order than it could bear in the perspective of a stark, biblical repudiation of 'creative' politics. A way had to be found for reconciling the Christian's sense of having no abiding city here with some real political participation in and commitment to a city which was far from an abiding one. This reconciliation appears in the writings of Augustine's last years."

Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 10, at 75. Markus goes on to describe Augustine's disillusionment in his attempt to find the possibility of order in the political process on earth. Scripture convinces him that such order is not to be found in this world and that God's ways and justice are inscrutable while men are on earth, a notion advanced by his later views on grace and predestination. He then accepts that the political order is unnatural in origin and negative in its function. Moreover, the function of a ruler is not, as seen in the Theodosian settlement, to be God's agent. Rather, obedience is given purely out of discipline and regard for Scriptural injunctions. *Id.* at 75-87.

⁵⁹ In *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 16, Augustine appears to model political life on that of the family:

"... And if any member of the family interrupts the domestic peace by disobedience, he is corrected either by word or blow, or some kind of just and legitimate punishment, such as society permits, that he may himself be the better for it, and be readjusted to the family harmony from which he had dislocated himself. . . . Since, then, the house ought to be the beginning or element of the city, and every beginning bears reference to some end of its own kind, and every element to the integrity of the whole of which it is an element, it follows plainly enough that domestic peace has a relation to civic peace—in other words, that the well-ordered concord of domestic obedience and domestic rule has a relation to the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and civic rule. And, therefore it follows, further, that the father of the family ought to frame his domestic rule in accordance with the law of the city, so that the household may be in harmony with the civic order."

See also, *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 13, as set forth in note 18, *supra*.

⁶⁰ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 17 and 26. See also, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, XXI, 37; Deane, *supra* note 1, at 104; and Van der Meer, *supra*, at 399, referring to the use of 1 Tim. 1-2 in Ep. 149, 17.

⁶¹ Van der Meer, *supra* note 60, at 163.

⁶² *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, XXII, 74, citing Lk. 3:14. The context for this discussion is the justification for war, particularly in the Old Testament. Augustine justifies participation of Christians in just wars and in wars ordered by God, as in the Old Testament. He uses the "Render unto Caesar," the admiration expressed by Christ over the faith of the Centurion in Matt. 8:9-10, and Rom. 13:1, passages from Scripture, to justify his position. He then deals with the "resist not evil" and "turn the other cheek" passages from Matt. 5:39 and declares:

"... [T]he answer is, that what is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition. The sacred seat of virtue is the heart, and such were the hearts of our fathers, the righteous men of old. But order required such a regulation of events, and such a distinction of times, as to show first of all that even earthly blessings (for so temporal kingdoms and victory over enemies are considered to be, and these are the things which the community of the ungodly all over the world are continually begging from idols and devils) are entirely under the control and at the disposal of the one true God. Thus, under the Old Testament, the secret of the kingdom of heaven which was to be disclosed in due time, was veiled, and so far obscured, in the disguise of earthly promises. But when the fullness of time came for the revelation of the New Testament, which was hidden under the types of the old, clear testimony was to be borne to the truth, that there is another life for which this life ought to be disregarded, another kingdom for which the opposition of all earthly kingdoms should be patiently borne. Thus the same martyrs, which means witnesses, was given to those who, by the will of God, bore this testimony, by their Confessiones, their sufferings, and their deaths. . . ."

See also, Eps. 47, 5; and 189, 6; on the issue of inward disposition. A father or ruler may be required to punish as part of his governing functions, and is blameless if he does it with love. Ep. 104, II, 7; Deane, *supra* note 1, at 153.

At another point, Augustine contrasts Christ sending disciples without script, or purse, or shoes, while at another time, he had them buy swords. Augustine attributes the difference to the needs of different times requiring different arrangements. Similarly, the required inward disposition made it possible for the Church to meet the needs of different times. See also, Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at pp. 14-17.

⁶³ Eps. 47, 5; and 189, 6; *De Sermonibus Domini in Monte*, I, XIX, 59. See also, Ep. 138, II, 14; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 159, 164, and 225.

⁶⁴ In *Enn. in Ps. 6, 9*, Augustine, as quoted by Deane, *supra* note 1, at 32, states:

"... [E]ven if they use the same tables and houses and cities, with no strife arising between them, and in frequent converse together with seeming concord: notwithstanding, by the contrariety of their aims, they [the wicked] are enemies to those who turn unto God. For seeing that the one love and desire this world, the others wish to be freed from this world, who sees not that the first are enemies to the last? For if they can, they draw the others into punishment with them. . . ."

See also, *Tr. 5 in Epis. Ioh.*, 7; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 37.

The discussion of a people as being defined by its love, contained in *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 24, is typical of the divisions made by Augustine in humanity. A people is "an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love." The people of the *civitas terrena* love the things of the earth and maintain a regime that may get them those things they want. The people of the *civitas Dei* want eternal life and work obediently with their earth-bound brethren while awaiting their reward. The difference is that those looking heavenward do not have earthly things as their love.

⁶⁵ Deane, *supra* note 1, at 40, citing *Confessiones*, XIII, 9, 10; Ep. 55, 10, 18; *Enn. in Ps. 85*, 6; *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 28; Serm. 96, 1; and *Tr. 7 in Ioh.*, 1.

⁶⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, V, 21. Baynes underscores this view, finding that, even if the regime cannot claim justice, even if founded by murderers and vitiated from the beginning by the Fall, the regime is part of the system of Divine Providence. He attributes this view to the Old Testament view of authority as coming from God, a theme repeated in the Old Testament. Baynes, *supra*, at 8.

⁶⁷ In *De Civitate Dei*, II, 19, Augustine states:

"... But because this man listens, and that man scoffs, and most are enamoured of the blandishments of vice rather than the wholesome severity of virtue, the people of Christ, whatever be their condition,—whether they be kings, princes, judges, soldiers, or provincials, rich or poor, bond or free, male or female—are enjoined to endure this earthly republic, wicked and dissolute as it is, that so they may by this endurance win for themselves an eminent place in that most holy and august assembly of angels and republic of heaven, in which the will of God is the law."

See also, *De Civitate Dei*, XXI, 25; Ep. 114; Serm. 55, 9-13; *De Vera Religione*, XXXI, 58; *Enn. in Ps. 65*, 14; *Confessiones*, III, 8, 15; and Deane, *supra* note 1, at 124 and 146.

⁶⁸ Property does not exist before the Fall according to Augustine, but is rather part of the temporal order, so that established interests would maintain that order. Deane, *supra* note 1, at 5, 11, and 104.

⁶⁹ *Tr. 6 in Ioh.*, 25-26; Ep. 93, XII, 50. Deane indicates that Augustine used the positive law analysis to the advantage of the Church in the dispute with the Donatists. Deane, *supra* note 1, at 104-105. He adds that actual or threatened deprivation of property is a key element of governance. *Ibid.*, at 139 and 235.

⁷⁰ In *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 15, Augustine states:

"... [F]or it is with justice, we believe, that the condition of slavery is the result of sin. And this is why we do not find the word 'slave' in any part of Scripture until righteous Noah branded the sin of his son with this name. It is a name, therefore, introduced by sin and not by nature. . . . The prime cause, then, of slavery is sin, which brings man under the domination of his fellow—that which does not happen save by the judgement of God, with whom there is no unrighteousness, and who knows how to award fit punishments to every variety of offence. But our Master in heaven says, 'Every one who doeth sin is the servant of sin.' And thus there are many wicked masters who have religious men as their slaves, and who are yet themselves in bondage: 'for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.' And beyond question it is a happier thing to be the slave of a man than of a lust; for even this very lust of ruling, to mention no others, lays waste men's hearts with the most ruthless domination. . . ."

See also, *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 16; and *Enn. in Ps. 124*, 7-8. In this latter piece, excerpted in Paolucci, *supra* note 5, at 308-310, the master-slave relationship is taken as a paradigm for the relationship between men and God.

⁷¹ See, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 5, 11, and 104.

⁷² *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 4. This is consistent with Augustine's views of the republic as having a community of interests and a common acknowledgment of law found in *De Civitate Dei*, II, 21.

⁷³ Ep. 185, 19-36; Ep. 100, 1-2.

⁷⁴ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 5-6. Nevertheless, as Markus notes, duty and human solidarity call upon men to undertake the duty of deciding. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 10, at 99-100.

⁷⁵ See, Deane, *supra* note 1, at 62.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, at 174.

⁷⁷ Markus summarizes Augustine's political insight as follows:

"In the last resort man's destiny is not within his control. Not even in society can men work out their salvation. And this being so, as the functions, institutions and the quality of a society cannot be assessed in terms of

the ultimates of human destiny, then the relevant language of politics must move in a more limited sphere, the sphere of the needs which social life exists to satisfy. Augustine's repudiation of the classical 'politics of perfection' prepared the ground for a political theory which he never in fact elaborated beyond the bare indications that its realm is that in which the two 'cities' overlap. But he saw the direction and indicated it clearly. The realities of the *saeculum* must be spoken of in historical or political, not in theological, terms."

Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 14, at 103-104.

V. POLITICAL INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

A. Introduction.

Even a cursory knowledge of Augustine's life and work will reveal that he had to deal with three major religious challenges. In his earlier years, he had been a Manichaean and had broken with that sect with his adoption of Neo-Platonism, which eventually leads to his adoption of Christianity. For much of his time in Hippo, he struggles against the Donatists, who believed that they had the Church of the pure. In the last 20 years of his life, he opposes the Pelagians and articulates his doctrines on grace and predestination. Each of these opponents provides a foil for Augustine's thought and an object of his attention.

Of these three opponents, only the Donatists present a political, as well as a theological, difficulty. The Donatists were purely a North African phenomenon and were centred in the Roman province of Numidia. They also had a social aspect in that they tended to be rural, frequently of the lower classes, and spoke the local languages, Punic and Berber. To some extent, their break with the Catholics was social and political in nature.¹

A major doctrinal consequence of the Donatist split is the emphasis of that sect over the purity of the minister conferring the sacrament of baptism. If the minister is "impure" (e.g., consecrated by a *traditor* or not otherwise in communion with the Donatists), the person must be rebaptised. Augustine counters this controversy, as he does the many other heresies, schisms, and controversies, through debate and the written word.

By the time Augustine is consecrated Bishop of Hippo in 395, Donatism is a very real threat to the Church in Africa. In addition, as the Church of the poor, the lowly, and the persecuted, the Donatists come to see themselves as the Church of the pure and the legitimate successor to Cyprianic Christianity in North Africa. That image is not quite true, however, as

roving bands of adherents (called "Circumcelliones") would roam the countryside attacking Catholics and, if necessary, seeking martyrdom. The combination of religious and national sentiments is explosive.² Moreover, the Donatists support, or are supported by, opponents to the political authorities in Rome. Neither the Manichees nor the Pelagians ever posed such a political threat.

Augustine meets this threat with the tools that he honed in the controversies with the Manichees.³ He discusses theology and debates the Manichees' clergy⁴ and writes numerous treatises on the theology underlying their dispute with the Catholic Church.⁵ Yet this is not a dispute that is resolved by learned discourse. The level of violence; ethnic, social, and class conflict; and African nationalism are all factors that make reasoned discussion difficult. Nevertheless, Augustine pressed on with peaceful attempts to restore the unity of the Church,⁶ a unity about which he felt strongly.⁷

While the division between the Catholics and the Donatists began before Augustine's birth, the controversy was especially pronounced by the time he became a bishop, and it was his chief concern until the Pelagian controversy began after the sack of Rome in 410. The Donatists had unsuccessfully appealed as far as the Emperor Constantine, almost a century earlier, and had, at times, been under legal disabilities.⁸ Notwithstanding the loss of their case, the Donatists held on and successfully prevailed on the civil authorities to provide the sect with assistance in a dispute with a splinter group of their sect, the Maximinians.⁹ Additionally, the sect had received assistance from the apostate Emperor, Julian.¹⁰ Augustine himself had advocated persuasion, but not the use of criminal penalties, except for actual violence, but states he changed his mind when convinced that sterner steps were needed to move Donatists caught by custom and lethargy.¹¹

The details of the change in policy are of great importance and appear to play a significant role in Augustine's views on this important matter. For he is overtaken by events in 404-405 when, after he prevails in the Council of Carthage in 404, the mild recommendations he made were sent to the emperor.¹² However, the Bishop of Bagai had previously made an appeal to the emperor, after being attacked and left for dead by Donatists, who beat him with boards broken from his own altar.¹³ Augustine explains what happened as a result of the Bishop's appeal:

"But God in His great mercy, knowing how necessary was the terror inspired by these laws, and a kind of medicinal inconvenience for the cold and wicked hearts of many men . . . brought it about that our envoys could not obtain what they had undertaken to ask. . . . For a law had already been published, that the heresy of the Donatists, being of so savage a description that mercy towards it really involved greater cruelty than its very madness wrought, should for the future be prevented not only from being violent, but from existing with impunity at all; but yet not capital punishment was imposed upon it, that even in dealing with those who were unworthy, Christian gentleness might be observed, but a pecuniary fine was ordained and sentence of exile was pronounced against their bishops or ministers."¹⁴

At this point, the rhetoric changes. Instead of counselling persuasion, Augustine becomes the apologist for intervention, justifying the forced suppression of the Donatists as a Christian political imperative. There is no doubt he supports the Edict of Unity in his writings in 408 and thereafter. The many Scriptural citations, the somewhat stretched analogies, and the practical reasons for supporting this program are dealt with in this chapter. Nevertheless, one cannot help thinking that this effort might have been unnecessary and intellectual history quite different had the Council's recommendation reached Rome before the case of the Bishop of Bagai were decided.

It is at this point that Augustine's views on man, his social views on love and unity in the Church, and his views on the obligation of rulers coalesce and are applied to the Donatist schism.

It is here that the two different worlds of outward obligation and inward disposition meld and can be examined. While it may appear to some that there is a risk of hypocrisy in Augustine's change of views in the use of the civil authority in promoting orthodoxy, there is no basis in his writings to indicate he is anything less than sincere with both positions. This chapter concludes that Augustine was aware of the dangers of outward conformity without internal change; however, he concluded that outward social conformity brought the possibility of reform. In this situation, the two different worlds compliment each other and make manifest the characteristics of each.

B. The Rationale for Intervention.

Once Augustine determined that the civil authorities would assist in the suppression of the Donatists, that the Imperial authorities in Ravenna had acted, and that his colleagues supported these actions, he becomes an apologist for this position. Previously, he preferred persuasion as the means of conversion, although he also favours the suppression of Donatist violence.¹⁵ However, that violence, particularly that of the Circumcelliones, gave ample ground for suppression. In a letter of 412 to his friend Marcellinus, charged with enforcing the Edict of Unity, Augustine argues against the use of the death penalty in the enforcement of orthodoxy. However, he concurs with the view that some punishment is justified to those who had confessed to the death of a Catholic and the beating and maiming of others:

". . . For although we might silently pass over the execution of criminals who may be regarded as brought up for trial not upon an accusation of ours, but by an indictment presented by those to whose vigilance the preservation of the public peace is entrusted, we do not wish to have the sufferings of the servants of God avenged by the infliction of precisely similar injuries in the way of retaliation. Not, of course, that we object to the removal from those wicked men of the liberty to perpetrate further crimes; but our desire is rather that justice be satisfied without the taking of their lives or the maiming of their bodies in any part, and that, by such coercive measures as may be in accordance with the laws, they be turned from their insane frenzy to the quietness of men in their sound judgement

or compelled to give up mischievous violence and betake themselves to some useful labour. This is indeed called a penal sentence; but who does not see that when a restraint is put upon the boldness of savage violence, and the remedies fitted to produce repentance, are not withdrawn, this discipline should be called a benefit rather than vindictive punishment?"¹⁶

A second moving factor is Augustine's desire for Christian unity, a significant theme in his work and about which he feels strongly. He finds that the Donatists err grievously in shattering the bonds of peace in the Church and that this is a great evil. In a letter to the Donatist Vincentius, Augustine demonstrates the depth of his convictions on unity:

". . . [W]ho, under the Christian name, have been led astray by perverse men, in the measures used to prevent them who are Christ's sheep from wandering, and to bring them back to the flock, when by punishments, such as exile and fines, they are admonished to consider what they suffer and wherefore, and are taught to prefer the Scriptures which they read to human legends and calumnies. For which of us, yea, which of you does not speak well of the laws issued by the emperors against heathen sacrifices? In these, assuredly, a penalty much more severe has been appointed, for the punishment of that impiety is death. But in repressing and restraining you, the thing aimed at has been rather that you should be admonished to depart from evil, than that you should be punished for a crime. . . . The impiety of these men [the Donatists] is perhaps even a greater sin than idolatry. Since, however, they cannot be easily convicted of this (for it is a sin which lies concealed in the mind), you are all alike restrained with a comparatively gentle severity, as being not so far alienated from us. And this I may say, both concerning all heretics without distinction, who, while retaining the Christian sacraments, are dissenters from the truth and unity of Christ, and concerning all Donatists without exception."¹⁷

Third, Augustine argues that there are barriers to the use of reason and argument with many of the Donatists, due to their social context. Many, he feels, are afraid of offending their neighbours or those in the Donatist party, or are otherwise bound by "inveterate custom."¹⁸ Fear and the "scourge of tribulation" may chastise treachery and evil that are lodged in the will and remain there through inertia.¹⁹ Much in line with his view of man, he sees the campaign against Donatism as a continuation of the war between the flesh and spirit.²⁰ Just as a man overcomes

sin by denying the flesh, so also would the spirit triumph through scourging pride and loving instruction.

Fourth and finally, Augustine is convinced that judicious use of civil authority is good therapy to reconcile Donatists with the Church. The Church is not the enemy of heretics or schismatics, but has a mission to bring them to salvation, even if they cannot see the way at the time.²¹ He argues that not all who are indulgent are good, or all those who smite evil; rather, trauma is an opportunity to reconsider one's life and may well be the occasion of charity, particularly as he believes that outside the Church there is no salvation.²² Indeed, Augustine views it as part of his role as bishop to effect that peace and intercede for sinners to mitigate the harshness of their punishment.²³

Given the imperial action already taken, Augustine uses a host of Scriptural citations and analogies to justify that decision. For Augustine, Scripture remains the primary authority and point of appeal in his middle and later years. However, Scripture says little directly about heresy or schism. Therefore, the argument is over the use of Scripture and analogy, an area in which authority may be manipulated to prove a point.

The Use of Scripture to Justify Intervention. Augustine is not so much inconsistent in this matter as difficult to follow. He urges an inward disposition of humility. In responding to Macedonius regarding his condoning sin by seeking to forgive the sinner, Augustine reminds his correspondent of the phrase from Matt. 6:12 of "Forgive us our debts" in the Lord's Prayer. He says that one is forgiven as one forgives others in advising him to hold a disposition of forgiveness.²⁴ However, he is not above stretching Scripture to fit a situation, using Ps. 101:5, "Whoso privily slandereth his neighbour, him will I persecute [or 'cut off']," to mean that those

who divide the Church with lies and calumnies will themselves be persecuted and cut off from the Church.²⁵

Augustine uses Scriptural texts on correction to justify the forcible inclusion of the Donatists into the Church. For example, in the letter commonly called *De Correctione Donatistarum* (Ep. 185) of 417, he makes use of various parts of the Book of Proverbs on correction. There are Prv. 23:14 ("Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and shall deliver his soul from hell."); Prv. 29:19 ("He will not be corrected by words."); and Prv. 13:24 ("He that spareth the rod hateth his son."). Taken together, Augustine weaves a tapestry showing the charitable nature of correction with a good heart, but a harsh rod, along with a good heart, when words are insufficient.

Augustine is also able to respond to those Donatists who used the words of the Sermon on the Mount, "Blessed are they who suffer persecution for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven" (Matt. 5:10). His multiple use of this passage in his responses to Donatist criticism stresses the need to look at the righteousness of the Donatist cause, which Augustine clearly finds lacking.²⁶

The use of civil power is a new element of Church discipline, but Augustine's creative mind is equal to the task, particularly with Ps. 71:11 ("And all the kings of the earth shall adore him; all nations shall serve him."). In Ep. 87, 8, to Emeritus, Augustine states:

". . . [Y]ou will say that the Roman emperors are incited against you by us. Nay, rather blame yourselves for this, seeing that, as was long ago foretold in the promise concerning Christ, 'Yea, all kings shall fall down before him,' they are now members of the Church; and you have dared to wound the Church by schism, and still presume to insist upon rebaptising her members. Our brethren indeed demand help from the powers which are ordained, not to persecute you, but to protect themselves against the lawless acts of violence perpetrated by individuals of your party, which you yourselves, who refrain from such things, bewail and deplore"27

In Ep. 93, 9, Augustine cites Ps. 2:10, 11, 1, 2 ("*Be instructed, ye judges of the earth, serve the Lord with fear.*", etc.), making the analogy of the three children saved from the furnace of King Nebuchadnezzar, adding:

". . . In the age of the apostles and martyrs, that was fulfilled which was prefigured with the aforesaid king compelled pious and just men to bow down to his image, and cast into the flames all who refused. Now, however, is fulfilled that which was prefigured soon after in the same king, when, being converted to the worship of the true God, he made a decree throughout his empire, that whosoever should speak against the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, should suffer the same penalty which their crime deserved. The earlier time of that king represented the former age of emperors who did not believe in Christ, at whose hands the Christians suffered because of the wicked; but the later time of that king represented the age of the successors to the imperial throne, now believing in Christ, at whose hands the wicked suffer because of the Christians."

The changing times in which Old Testament use of royal power being supplanted by the use of the same power to promote religion after the Incarnation is especially reflected in *De Correctione Donatistarum*:

". . . How then are kings to serve the Lord with fear, except by preventing and chastising with religious severity all those acts which are done in opposition to the commandments of the Lord? For a man serves God in one way in that he is man, in another way in that he is also king. In that he is man, he serves Him by living faithfully; but in that he is also king he serves Him by enforcing with suitable rigor such laws as ordain what is righteous, and punish what is the reverse. . . ."28

By far the most discussed Scriptural justification for use of civil power to suppress heresy and schism is that of "*compelle intrare*" (compel them to come in), a part of a parable in Matt. 22:3, 9, and Lk. 14:18, 23, in which various guests to a royal wedding feast make excuses as to why they cannot come. The king has his servants bring in the lame, the halt and the blind as guests, but the hall is not yet full.

"All such came on time, when those who had earlier been invited were rejected by their own excuses. They came on time; they came in from the squares and alleys of the city. And the servant who had been sent answered, *Lord, what you commanded has been done, and there is still room. Go out, he said, into the high roads and hedges, and whomever you find, compel them to come in.*

Whomever you find, don't wait for them to agree; compel them to come in. I have prepared a great dinner, a great house; I won't tolerate any empty places there.

"From the squares and alleys came the Gentiles; let the heretics and schismatics come from the highroads and hedges. *Compel them to come in.* Here they can find peace, because those who put up hedges are seeking divisions. Let them be dragged from the hedges, wrenched from the thorns. They are stuck fast in the hedges, and they don't want to be compelled. 'Let us come in of our own free will,' they say. That wasn't the order the Lord gave: *Compel them,* he said, *to come in.* Let necessity be experienced outwardly, and hence free willingness be born inwardly."²⁹

Finally, Augustine used obedience of the civil power as commanded in Rom. 13:1-4, as a basis for intervention, noting that the civil powers may use this passage as a basis for persecution, adding:

". . . The whole question therefore is, whether schism be not an evil work, or whether you have not caused schism, so that your resistance of the powers that be is in a good cause and not in an evil work, whereby you would bring judgement on yourselves. Wherefore with infinite wisdom the Lord not merely said, '*Blessed are they who are persecuted,*' but added, '*for righteousness' sake.*' . . . How great is the perversity of those who cling to their own unrighteousness, and yet find fault with the severity of the civil powers?"³⁰

The clear implication of the use of these passages is that Scripture sanctions the forcible return of the Donatists to the Church. Additional justification for compulsion can be found in an examination of certain types and analogies from Scripture used by Augustine.

Types. There are several Scriptural types used by Augustine to illustrate his views on correction of heretics and schismatics. Old Testament figures include Isaac and Ishmael, who represent spiritual and carnal figures, respectively, and the persecution of Isaac by Ishmael represents persecution of the just by the unjust.³¹ Another figure is that of David, who suffers persecution at the hands of Saul,³² and who weeps when his rebel son Absalom is killed in battle in violation of his orders.³³ A final set of figures is that of Sarah and Hagar from Gen. 16, who bear children for Abraham and serve as an excellent foil for Augustine's point:

". . . Hear and see in the very facts of Old Testament history all the signs and indications of things to come. Sarah is found to have afflicted her maid Hagar: Sarah is free. After her maid began to be proud, Sarah complained to Abraham, and said, 'Cast out the bond woman'; she has lifted her neck against me. His wife complains of Abraham, as if it were his doing. But Abraham, who was not bound to the maid by lust, but by the duty of begetting children, inasmuch as Sarah had given her to him to have offspring by her, says to her: 'Behold, she is thy handmaid, do with her as thou wilt.' And Sarah grievously afflicted her, and she fled from her face. See, the free woman afflicted the bondwoman, and the apostle does not call that a persecution; the slave plays with his master, and he calls it persecution; this afflicting is not called persecution; that playing is. How does it appear to you, brethren? Do you not understand what is signified? Thus, then, when God wills to stir up powers against heretics, against schismatics, against those that scatter the Church, that blow on Christ as if they abhorred Him, that blaspheme baptism, let them not wonder; because God stirs them up, that Hagar may be beaten by Sarah. Let Hagar know herself, and yield her neck: for when, after being humiliated, she departed from her mistress, an angel met her, and said to her, 'What is the matter with thee, Hagar, Sarah's handmaid?' When she complained of her mistress, what did she hear from the angel? 'Return to thy mistress.' It is for this that she is afflicted, that she may return; and would that she may return, for her offspring, just like the sons of Jacob, will obtain the inheritance with their brethren."³⁴

Additional Old Testament figures include Daniel, whose accusers were thrown into the same lions' den from which he was saved,³⁵ and Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, the three children saved by God from the furnace, which resulted in King Darius forbidding the name of the Israelite God being profaned.³⁶

In the New Testament, a frequently used figure is that of Paul himself, because he used his civil status as a Roman citizen. He did so to secure an escort when he feared he was to be killed by his fellow Jews in Acts 23:17-32,³⁷ to make a successful claim that he could not be scourged (Acts 22:25),³⁸ and to make a direct appeal to Caesar in Acts 25:11.³⁹ Paul is also used as a figure to show that God can, and does, directly compel actions He desires.⁴⁰ Another New Testament figure is Peter, who was weak so that Jesus told him he could not follow Him now, but could come later, and so represents weak men who should not be abandoned.⁴¹ A final New

Testament figure is the woman taken in adultery in John 8:3-7, who Jesus does not condemn for her crime, but is instead moved by pity to help her, an approach he urges on judges.⁴²

Analogies. Augustine makes use of them freely. One analogy he uses is that of the physician, seeking to aid a patient ill with a dangerous fever and running headlong through destruction.⁴³ Another is the good shepherd who keeps watch on the sheep. In *De Correctione Donatistarum*, Augustine uses the analogy well:

" . . . Is it not a part of the care of the shepherd, when any sheep have left the flock, even though not violently forced away, but led astray by tender words and coaxing blandishments, to bring them back to the fold of his master when he has found them, by the fear or even the pain of the whip, if they show symptoms of resistance; especially since, if they multiply with growing abundance among the fugitive slaves and robbers, he has the more right in that the mark of the master is recognised on them, which is not outraged in those whom we receive but do not rebaptise? . . ." ⁴⁴

An unsurprising analogy is that of the judge. Augustine expects that God will judge all men and calls that theme to mind to his Donatist colleagues.⁴⁵ But he also expects that judges will bring terror to those who stray to cause them to return.⁴⁶ For example, in 411 he writes his friend Marcellinus in an effort to reduce the punishment to Donatists who had killed and maimed Catholics:

"Fulfil, Christian judge, the duty of an affectionate father; let your indignation against their crimes be tempered by considerations of humanity; be not provoked by the atrocity of their sinful deeds to gratify the passion of revenge, but rather be moved by the wounds which these deeds have inflicted on their own souls to exercise a desire to heal them. Do not lose now that fatherly care which you maintained when prosecuting the examination, in doing which you extracted the confession of such horrid crimes, not by stretching them on the rack, not by furrowing their flesh with iron claws, not by scorching them with flames, but by beating them with rods,—a mode of correction used by schoolmasters, and by parents themselves in chastising children, and often also by bishops in the sentences awarded by them. Do not, therefore, now punish with extreme severity the crimes which you searched out with lenity. The necessity for harshness is greater in the investigation than in the infliction of punishment; for even the gentlest men use diligence and stringency in searching out a hidden crime, that they may find to whom they may show mercy. Wherefore it is generally

necessary to use more rigour in making inquisition, so that when the crime has been brought to light, there may be scope for displaying clemency. . . ."47

Serm. 13, written in 418, deals extensively with the role of judges as an analogy for instruction of the humility and charity to be shown in the work of suppressing the Donatists. Judges must remember that they are sinners judging sinners and, though exempt by their offices from the injunction against casting the first stone, they must attack the sin, rather than the sinner.⁴⁸ More than any of the other citations from Scripture, or the use of types and analogies, the discussion on judging contains at once the thoughtful use of Scripture as well as an understanding of the human psyche.

The final analogy is the use of charity as a form of inward disposition in the application of discipline. In comparison with the violence of the Circumcelliones, the Catholics allow the Donatists to depart if they cannot be reconciled.⁴⁹ In Serm. 138, 2, Augustine comes to the heart of the inward disposition of charity necessary to administer correction by distinguishing the suffering of the Donatists in their pride, and the disposition called for by the Gospel:

*If I speak, he says, with the tongues of men and of angels, but do not have charity, I have become like booming brass or clanging cymbals. If I know all mysteries, and have all prophecy and all faith such that I can move mountains, but do not have charity, I am nothing. So it's a great thing, on the last point, this faith that moves mountains; indeed, they are all great things. But if I have these without charity, he says, I, not they, am nothing. But he still hasn't touched those who falsely boast of being martyrs in their sufferings. Listen to him touching them—or rather running them through. If I distribute all my goods, he says, to the poor, and hand over my body to burn—here they are now; but notice what follows—but do not have charity, it does me no good at all. There you are, it's come to the point of suffering and dying, it's come even to the point of shedding one's blood, even to the point of one's body being burnt; and yet it does not good, because there's no charity there. Add charity, all these things are worthwhile; subtract charity, the rest are worth nothing at all."*⁵⁰

In the end, charity comes down to an evaluation of whether action is more likely to further the salvation of a greater number than would otherwise be lost. Consider this Augustinian calculus:

". . . [W]hat is in this case the function of Christian charity, especially when we consider that those who utter threats of their own violent and voluntary deaths are very few in number in comparison with the nations that are to be delivered? What then is the function of brotherly love? Does it, because it fears the short-lived fires of the furnace for a few, therefore abandon all to the eternal fires of hell? and does it leave so many, who are either already desirous, or hereafter are not strong enough to pass to life eternal, to perish everlastingly, while taking precautions that some few should not perish by their own hand, who are only living to be a hindrance in the way of salvation of others, whom they will not permit to live in accordance with the doctrines of Christ. . . ."51

Anger and aggression may thus coexist with love and provide a means for bringing men and women to the correct path of truth.⁵² Humility and love are required elements, and the possibility of feigning them in himself does not appear to occur to Augustine. He seems to be as sure of his own motives as he is of the conversions he sought by love and peace. It would be for others to twist those instruments for other uses.

C. The Inward Disposition.

Augustine is sometimes charged with being the intellectual ancestor of the Inquisition and totalitarian methods of interrogation and re-education. A certain reading of his works lends some credence to this allegation; however, as with many aspects of intellectual history, the answer is not black and white.⁵³ Augustine is aware that his ecclesiastical position is very different from that of those with civil power and that his position calls him to request clemency for those deserving of punishment.⁵⁴ He also indicates that, if not reconciled, Donatists are free to leave ecclesiastical care.⁵⁵ Yet, there is support in his sermons, correspondence, and other writings for more proactive civil efforts for reconciliation.

Augustine's penetrating mind does not accept that obedience to the law or suffering itself is righteousness or gives righteousness. All depends on the intent and purpose of the law or the suffering:

". . . [S]o let all be called to salvation, recalled from the path of destruction,—those who may, by the sermons of Catholic preachers; those who may, by the edicts of Catholic princes; some through those who obey the warnings of God, some through those who obey the emperor's commands. For, moreover, when emperors enact bad laws on the side of falsehood as against the truth, those who hold a right faith are approved, and, if they persevere, are crowned; but when the emperors enact good laws on behalf of the truth against falsehood, then those who rage against them are put in fear, and those who understand are reformed. Whosoever, therefore, refuses to obey the laws of the emperors which are enacted against the truth of God, wins for himself a great reward; but whosoever refuses to obey the laws of the emperors which are enacted in behalf of truth, wins for himself great condemnation. . . ."56

Nor is Augustine troubled by the turnabout in which Christians use power to force others to certain conduct, after being persecuted themselves for nearly three centuries. For him, the power of the Church is of "divine appointment in its due season" through Christian kings, who may use the instruments of compulsion to compel others to come into the Lord's banquet.⁵⁷ Similarly, the injunction to "turn the other cheek," is a matter of inward disposition, rather than actual practice; otherwise, there would be no stability at all.⁵⁸

Motive, intent, and purpose are all-important to Augustine. All must be directed with love for the fallen-away person as a neighbour so as to create the means by which he or she may be reconciled. Men, he said are not good through dread of punishment, but by love of righteousness; nevertheless, human recklessness should be confined by fear of the law to protect the innocent and cure the evildoers.⁵⁹

Augustine finds that hate of persons is both unChristian and unproductive⁶⁰ and counsels against the cycle of returning evil for evil.⁶¹ Except for matters of faith, the Christian is called to be satisfied with his or her place and to obey earthly powers.⁶² Scripture is the guiding light for correction, which must proceed from an inward disposition.⁶³ This disposition may not be manifest to the object of the correction for whom, with Augustine's Olympian objectivity, persuasion is not the only method, nor words the sole medium.⁶⁴ The correction administered is

to be done for the good of the patient,⁶⁵—in these cases, the Donatist—and must be activated by love. As to Donatists being "forced to do good" against their will, Augustine responds in this way:

". . . You say that God has given us free will, and that therefore no man should be compelled even to good. Why, then, are those whom I have above referred to [i.e., bishops] compelled to that which is good? Take heed, therefore, to something which you do not wish to consider. The aim towards which a good will compassionately devotes its efforts is to secure that a bad will be rightly directed. For who does not know that a man is not condemned on any other ground than because his bad will deserved it, and that no man is saved who has not a good will? Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that those who are loved should be cruelly left to yield themselves with impunity to their bad will; but in so far as power is given, they ought to be both prevented from evil and compelled to good."⁶⁶

As to feigned "conversions" under pressure, Augustine appears to believe that, while they should be avoided, correction is to be judged by results in the eventual reconciliation of the Church over time.⁶⁷

Augustine also writes with insight of the work of judges in enforcing the anti-Donatist laws and of his work as an intercessor, particularly in doubtful cases where the possibility or actuality of change is remote. As noted above, judges are one of the analogies he uses in dealing with correction, and his advice to judges begins with the requirements for humility and self-examination, so that the sin, rather than the sinner, may be attacked. It is the possibility of reform that makes the task of judging remedial and the death penalty ill considered.⁶⁸

Thus, it is the purpose of the correction and the inward disposition of the persecutors that is important. For the persecutors act by love to bind those in a frenzy and stir up the lethargic to action; sweet instruction is supplemented by "salutary fear."⁶⁹ That fear could lead to the breakdown of pride, which, he believes, held many Donatists fast, to the destruction of their

souls. He wishes that they would come to the banquet of unity.⁷⁰ It is this spirit that distinguishes the work of correction from the normal responsibilities of judging:

"It may also be inquired, if the wicked also persecute the wicked, just as ungodly princes and judges, while they were the persecutors of the godly, certainly also punished murderers and adulterers, and all classes of evil-doers whom they ascertained to be acting contrary to the public laws, how are we to understand the words of the Lord, *'If ye were of the world, the world would love its own'*? For those whom it punisheth cannot be loved by the world, which, we see, generally punisheth the classes of crimes mentioned above, save only that the world is both in those who punish such crimes, and those who love them. Therefore that world, which is to be understood as existing in the wicked and ungodly, both hateth its own in respect of that section of men in whose case it inflicts injury on the criminal, and loveth its own in respect of that other section in whose case it shows favour to its own partners in criminality. . . ."⁷¹

D. Intention and Results.

Augustine is interested in providing a clear way to salvation for as many of his North African contemporaries as possible and thus endorses the new penalties and disabilities placed on the Donatist community in 405. He suggests use of all such penalties and disabilities as a means of conferring and converting,⁷² preferring this approach to force. He disclaims any responsibility for the suicides of Donatists,⁷³ believing that allowing the schism to continue is not an option. However, he is less sanguine over the salvation of the Circumcelliones or others that had committed crimes against the laws of the Empire:

". . . Moreover, if their course of crime brings some of them to death, they make out that these deaths are justly the occasion of odium against us, and of glory to them. They take no blame to themselves for the harm which they do to us and they lay upon us the blame of the harm which they bring upon themselves. They live as robbers, they die as Circumcelliones, they are honoured as martyrs! Nay, I do injustice to robbers in this comparison, for we have never heard of robbers destroying the eyesight of those whom they have plundered: they indeed take away those whom they kill from the light, but they do not take away the light from those whom they leave in life."⁷⁴

For similar reasons, Augustine rejects the notion that the Donatists who did suffer as a result of these edicts are in any way martyrs. Again, the purpose of the sufferings is all-

important. Whether the sufferings arose out of violent activity⁷⁵ or the practices⁷⁶ of the Donatists, they are not entitled to the title of martyr. This is not on account of the sufferings, which were real, but the inconsistency of the purpose of the sufferings with Christian goals of unity and reconciliation.

Moreover, the work of reconciliation, though forced, appears to have borne fruit. Augustine's writings contain testimony of former Donatists who rejoiced to be Catholics, such as this one from 408:

" . . . [T]he repression and correction of whom, by the powers which are ordained of God, appears to me to be labour not in vain. For we already rejoice in the correction of many who hold and defend the Catholic unity with such sincerity, and are so glad to have been delivered from their former error, that we admire them with great thankfulness and pleasure. Yet these same persons, under some indescribable bondage of custom, would in no way have thought of being changed to a better condition, had they not, under the shock of this alarm, directed their minds earnestly to the study of the truth; fearing lest, if without profit, and in vain, they suffered hard things at the hands of men, for the sake not of righteousness, but of their own obstinacy and presumption, they should afterwards receive nothing else at the hand of God than the punishment due to wicked men who despised the admonition which He so gently gave and His paternal correction. . . ." ⁷⁷

Augustine gives the administration of correction careful thought. He is uniformly adamant on the subject of capital punishment, as it makes the process of reformation of an evil will impossible.⁷⁸ There is another practical reason for clemency, however, which relates to the authorities:

" . . . For even granting that we ought never to deviate from a fixed purpose of overcoming evil with good, let your own wisdom take this also into consideration, that no person beyond those who belong to the Church is at pains to bring before you cases pertaining to her interests. If, therefore, your opinion be, that death must be the punishment of men convicted of these crimes, you will deter us from endeavouring to bring anything of this kind before your tribunal; and this being discovered, they will proceed with more unrestrained boldness to accomplish speedily our destruction, when upon us is imposed and enjoined the necessity of choosing rather to suffer death at their hands, than to bring them to death by accusing them at your bar. . . ." ⁷⁹

For Augustine, the Church opposes the death penalty to save souls and to show her own clemency as an example in the world. There appears to be no insincerity in Augustine's approach of leniency to those convicted of capital and other crimes,⁸⁰ and it is consistent with his approach to reconciliation and penance in other areas.

The obvious question arises that, given Augustine's views on grace and predestination, what is the justification for the strenuous efforts towards reconciliation? The answer probably lies in Augustine's own life of preaching, exhortation, and dispute. Like Paul before him, Augustine feels morally obliged to undertake efforts at reconciliation. No doubt he makes these efforts, with their hoped-for effects,⁸¹ all as part of an unfolding plan of Providence for this time and place (and political instrument), which would be revealed to him after the Last Judgement.

E. Conclusion: The Inward Augustine.

There is much to be said for the proposition that Augustine's change of position on the use of the civil power to suppress heresy and schism is the result of his being overtaken by events, namely, the Edict of Unity of 405 resulting from the complaint of the Bishop of Bagai. Once the political decision is made, Augustine becomes its primary apologist, supporting and defending that decision with his impressive mind and Scriptural exegesis. None of the writings supporting the use of force was written before 405, except for those dealing with the response to the violence of the Circumcelliones. His lengthy examination of the minds of the separated brethren and of those seeking to force their return reflects the extensive consideration he must have given to this matter.

But a sudden and complete change of mind is not new to Augustine. Indeed, change is the pattern of his entire life. He changed from Manichaeism to Scepticism to Christianity, from orientation towards the classical system to Scripture, from a contemplative life to one standing

on the battlements of controversy, from confidence in reason to the necessity of grace. It may well be argued that none of his previous positions ever left him completely. His Manichaeism is always manifest in the strong line drawn between good and evil and the difficulty of doing good. His Scepticism is manifest in his painstaking examination of even obscure points and constant resort to faith when gaps occur. His citation of classical literature in *De Civitate Dei* and obvious admiration for Plato and Neo-Platonism are manifest throughout his work. Augustine weighs in on the theological controversies of the day and takes an active role as Bishop of Hippo; however, he lives in community with other monks and seeks solitude for prayer and reflection. Finally, he uses reason as a tool for argument.

The perfection he seeks in Neo-Platonism eludes Augustine and is replaced by the reality and imperfection of human affairs. Perfection would only come to the elect, following the Last Judgement. Moreover, he finds no certain way in which men may be assured of sharing that perfection by activities in this life—unless certainty is defined in a negative way. The writings of St. Paul convince Augustine that an inscrutable God governs the universe and that His commands must be followed, with the reasons and explanation of events made known later. Much in his writings concerns the theme of dealing with adversity, taking it as a punishment or a test,—again, with the reasons for Divine Justice given later. Indeed, it is Scriptural command that replaces reason as the basis for moral guidance. The imperfection he sees in man is reflected in the controversies in which he participates. In response to the Manichaeans, he holds for human responsibility. In response to the Donatists, he holds for a Church full of imperfect humanity. In response to the Pelagians, he holds for human inability to achieve salvation unaided.

On the other hand, that perfection survives in Scripture, which, if properly understood, provides all the answers to human problems. The Donatists must, therefore, be made to understand the truth contained in Scripture and the consequent error of their ways.⁸² Humanity is uncertain in its apprehension of the truth,⁸³ and the ways of God are unknown to man.⁸⁴ The word of God is the key to eternal life. If it were not understood, nevertheless, it must be believed. If God deigns to provide understanding through the grace of illumination, so much the better. Regardless, men must follow the commands of Scripture, be content in the uncertainties of this life, act well, and pray for salvation in the next. Augustine does not speak in abstract terms of the "state" or the "Empire" in this or any other practical political context; rather, he directs his efforts to individuals, reminding them of the duties of their offices with regard to those of the Church. His view is that the execution of these duties—and not some conceptual entity—is the essence of political obligation.⁸⁵

In the Donatist controversy, the reality of the imperial commands overcomes Augustine's concerns over the effectiveness and morality of coercion. Whereas, he has formerly been content with argument and persuasion (perhaps with some civil help in repressing Donatist violence), he turns *volte-face* and requests assistance in their religious repression.⁸⁶ Augustine continues to see it as his ecclesiastical duty to intercede for those to be punished for heresy or schism, including those who injured others.⁸⁷ However, he also argues that kings have a duty to assist the Church in suppressing schism and heresy.⁸⁸

There is a good deal of reality in Augustine's views on use of the civil power to enforce orthodoxy. At one point, he chides the Donatists for lack of Apostolic precedent in seeking recovery of ecclesiastical property.⁸⁹ At another time, he responds to an argument that the Apostles would not have requested the assistance of earthly kings in suppressing heresy by

remarking that his critics do not consider the different character of that age and that everything comes in its own season. At one time, "why do the heathen rage and the people imagine a vain thing" was appropriate, but now "Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed ye judges of the earth" is more appropriate.⁹⁰ He also responds to the Donatists' claim that they do not force anyone to join their sect by stating that they are too weak to do so.⁹¹ To the Donatist question "What have we to do with the kings of this world?" Augustine not only responds with Scripture, but also with a view of Christ working in history to bring salvation through kings, while giving the wayward the opportunity to reform and the Church the opportunity to evangelise. While he appears to reject a Eusebian-type argument in *De Civitate Dei*, his position is implicit in his support of the anti-Donatist, and later, anti-Pelagian, decrees. While this is no Hegelian view of history as the progressive unfolding of Providence, Augustine would allow the Church to take advantage of whatever civil power is available in fulfilling her mission of saving souls.

Augustine's decision to support the use of civil force against heterodoxy was, and is, controversial. However, that decision is born of charity and concern over the destinies of those in the Donatist camp. He argues, debates, chides, exhorts, and begs for unity. He does not believe that men will be saved by force, but opts to give them that opportunity as an alternative to damnation. In the end, the decision was a personal one for Augustine:

"... Buried deep under the faith by which he lived, was it not in the last resort his sound commonsense, his natural modesty, his sense of proportion, his respect for existing institutions, his fear of any kind of fanaticism—was it not, in a word, all things in him that went to make up the type of the Christian humanist (a type we can never afford to lose), that caused him to be filled with horror by the action of those would-be great ones who thought that because they were themselves scandalised by little men, they were entitled in their turn to scandalise those same little men by leaving the Church?"⁹²

The two different worlds of outward adherence to civil authority in this matter of religious conformity and inward disposition of conscience meet in the application of the Edict of Unity to

the Donatist schism. The result is not the ordered one that Augustine might have expected in his earlier career. However, it is the result of his work with a disordered humanity and the best rationale he is able to make to justify increasing the salvation of the flock he shepherds.

¹ An excellent historical and theological explanation of the origins of this controversy is found in W. H. C. Frend, *The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 1-24. At 322-323, the author discusses the changes made from the Cyprianic Church of North Africa a century before, which distressed many of those more removed from Roman power and culture. These changes included the deletion of the reference of Church members as the elect, loss of puritanism, the tacit alliance made with the Roman authorities, and changes in honouring martyrs, including placement of non-African martyrs on the Church calendar. Most importantly, Frend and others believed that the Donatists perceived that more than the sacred books had been surrendered, i.e., the sense of social justice of the North African Church had been compromised. The Donatists were also involved in African politics, using civil force to suppress dissidents within the sect, accepting support even from the Emperor Julian the Apostate. They also used the Roman appeals system to have their cases heard and supported the revolt of Firmus, Heraclian, and, most significantly, Gildo, Count of Africa, against the Western Roman Empire in 398-399. See also, Van der Meer, *supra*, at 79-101 and 126-127 (who, at 90 calls the sect "the strangest mixture of African and Numidian particularism, early Christian idealism, and personal resentment"); and Frend, *The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa, supra*, at 10, noting that Augustine wrote *Contra Parmiani* to justify suppression of heresy.

² Frend, *The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa, supra* note 1, at 335, states that in rural areas, Berber was used as the language of the Mass. He adds at 234-243 that, in his view, Augustine greatly misjudges the Donatists. He never visits their centres, nor speaks Punic or Libyan. Although he speaks Berber, Augustine is of a different class than most of the Donatist adherents who are peasants. He is certainly more aligned with Rome and believes he is dealing with a mental aberration hardened through custom. Augustine chooses to enter into a propaganda war with the Donatists and uses their watchwords "peace" and "unity" against them, attempting to provoke them into debate. He works on unity assiduously and finds the way to battle the Donatists is to sever the clergy-congregation contact and to use force. The result, however, according to Frend was the weakening of the Church in Africa so that it fell to the Arianism of the Vandals and, ultimately, to Islam in the seventh century.

³ In *Contra Epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundimenti*, ch. 2, Augustine states, somewhat sympathetically, that those who rage against the Manichaeans should also know with what labour truth is found and how difficult it is to overcome the flesh. In chs. 3 and 4, he notes that he overcame his own Manichaeanism through reason.

⁴ See e.g., Ep. 44 (399), describing the discussion he had with the Ep. Donatist Bishop Fortunius. This discussion is described in detail in Brown, *supra*, at 331-334.

⁵ See e.g., *De Baptismo contra Donatistas, Contra Litteras Petiliani, and De Correctione Donatistarum* (Ep. 185, written in 417).

⁶ In Ep. 23 (392), to Maximinus, a Donatist bishop who ultimately rejoined the Church, Augustine complains of the rebaptism of one of his deacons and proposes a joint statement on the relations between the two camps. Augustine states he would not take advantage of the presence of the military to press the point, but would await the departure of the troops. At 7, he stresses that it is no part of his plan "that men should be forced into communion against their will, but that truth should be manifest to those seeking it in quietness." On the other hand, he also calls for a stop to the terror of the Circumcelliones.

⁷ In Ep. 34, 1 (396), Augustine repeats that he does not intend to force anyone into communion with the Catholics against his or her will, but hopes that truth may be revealed to those in error. In Ep. 35, 4 (396), he notes that he rejected the proposed use of force of a Catholic farmer who wished to retrieve his daughter for the Church after she became a Donatist nun. At the same time, he observed that Donatists subjected Augustine and his colleagues to insults by Donatists while travelling near Hippo. Despite this rancour, Augustine expended great literary and theological energy in his efforts to propagate unity with the Donatists. See, C. P. E. Springer, *The Prosopopoeia of Church as Mother in St. Augustine's Psalmum Contra Partem Donati*, 18 Augustinian Studies 52 (1987). Further, his discussion with Bishop Fortunius, described in Ep. 44 (398), appears to have been civil. At 11, he notes:

"... I affirmed that they had not preserved this peace and forbearance, when they had caused a schism, within which, moreover, the more moderate among them now tolerated more serious evils, lest that which was already a fragment should be broken again, although they did not, in order to preserve unity, consent to exercise forbearance in smaller things. I also said that in the ancient economy the peace of unity and forbearance had not been so fully declared and commended as it is now by the example of the Lord and the charity of the New Testament; and yet prophets and holy men were wont to protest against the sins of the people, without endeavouring to separate themselves from the unity of the Jewish people, and from communion in partaking along with them of the sacraments then appointed."

See also *Tr. 10 in Ioh.*, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 12-21.

⁸ In Ep. 185, 4-6 (417), Augustine gives a good retrospective summary of the Catholic position. In Ep. 88, 5 and 7 (406), Augustine adds the more recent history of the dispute in a letter to the Donatist prelate Janarius, in which an existing law against the Donatists is supplemented as a result of further violence against Catholics. At 7, he states:

" . . . After this, when the notorious atrocities of your clergy and Circumcelliones continued, a case was brought to trial; and Crispinus being condemned as a heretic, although he was through the forbearance of the Catholics exempted from the fine which the imperial edict imposed on heretics of ten pounds of gold, nevertheless thought himself warranted in appealing to the emperors. [He continues that the appeal was unsuccessful.] And yet, even after that answer was given, he was permitted to escape the infliction of that fine, through the intercession of our bishops with the Emperor on his behalf. From that Council, however, our bishops sent deputies to the court, who obtained a decree that not all your bishops and clergy should be held liable to this fine of ten pounds of gold, but only those in whose districts the Catholic Church suffered violence at the hands of your party. But by the time that the deputation came to Rome, the wounds of the Catholic bishop of Bagai, who had just then been dreadfully injured, had moved the Emperor to send such edicts as were actually sent. When these edicts came to Africa, seeing especially that strong pressure had begun to be brought upon you, not to any evil thing, but for your good, what should you have done but invited our bishops to meet you, as they had invited yours to meet them, that by a conference the truth might be brought to light?"

⁹ Ep. 185, 17 (417); *Contra Litteras Petiliani*, II, 92, 203.

¹⁰ Ep. 93, 11; *Contra Litteras Petiliani*, II, 92, 203.

¹¹ Ep. 93, 17 (408). See also, *Retractationes*, II, 5, 32; and Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, at 94-95. However, in Ep. 185, 25 (417), Augustine states that the previous law against heretics, under which a fine of ten pounds of gold could be imposed, is insufficient in the view of his more experienced episcopal colleagues. They recommended sterner measures, which the Emperor adopted.

¹² Ep. 185, 4, 6; and 25-27 (417).

¹³ *Ibid.*, at 26-27.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, at 26. See also, Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, at 88-89; and Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine, supra.* at 136-138. Markus notes that the recommendations from the Council of Carthage of 404, while not supportive of compulsion, did recommend stronger measures against the Donatists, as the Catholic policy of engaging the Donatists in dialogue had been rebuffed by the latter in 403. The Edict of Unity was promulgated in February and March of 405.

¹⁵ Augustine consistently complains about Donatist violence as a legitimate object of civil enforcement. Ep. 111, 1 (413); *De Correctione Donatistarum*, VII, 30.

¹⁶ Ep. 133, 1. See also, Eps. 51, 3 (399-400); 87, 8 (405); 88, 7 (406); 93, 2 (408); 155, 17; and 185, 15, 25, and 28 (417).

¹⁷ Eps. 62, 18, and 93, 10 (408). Unity is a major theme of this letter and is addressed elsewhere in sections 1, 2, 16, and 17. See also, *Contra Litteras Petiliani*, I, 18-20; II, 58, 132, and 69, 154; and Eps. 44, V, 10-11 (398); 141, 5 (412); 173, 4, 6, and 10 (416); and 185, 1, 15, 25, and 28 (417).

¹⁸ Ep. 185, 29 (417). In the latter letter, Augustine states that the anger or "madness" of the Donatists, and consequent fear of physical retaliation, keeps many from returning to the Church. Custom is a frequent reason given by Augustine to justify intervention. In Ep. 93 (408), custom is discussed in several places, including 1, 2, 3, 17, and 18. In 2 and 3, Augustine finds the habit of custom a very difficult problem:

" . . . (2) [W]hy should not such persons be shaken up in a beneficial way by a law bringing upon them inconvenience in worldly things, in order that they might rise from their lethargic sleep, and awake to the salvation which is to be found in the unity of the Church? . . .

" . . . (3) For if they were only made afraid, and not instructed, this might appear to be a kind of inexcusable tyranny. Again, if they were instructed only, and not made afraid, they would be with more difficulty persuaded to embrace the way of salvation, having become hardened through the inveteracy of custom When, however, wholesome instruction is added to means of inspiring salutary fear, so that not only the light of truth may dispel the darkness of error, but the force of fear may at the same time break the bonds of evil custom, we are made glad, as I have said, by the salvation of many, who with us bless God, and render thanks to Him, because by the fulfilment of His covenant, in which He promised that the kings of the earth should serve Christ, He has thus cured the diseased and restored health to the weak."

See also, Eps. 89, 6, and 7 (406); and 185, 29 (417); and Serm. 17, 2 (425-430).

¹⁹ *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 84, 184. See also, Ep. 83, 3 (408). In her comments to Serm. 112 (411), Sister Wilfrid Parsons, S.N.D., compares the use of the civil power and the use of fines to the efforts made to end racial discrimination in the United States. Exile of the Donatist clergy is used in an effort to break the hold of the sect. It is also fairly certain that other extra-legal efforts were also made, although they are not found in written records. For example, in Ep. 173 (416), Augustine writes to Donatus, a Donatist cleric who attempted to commit suicide while being taken forcibly for instruction. In Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, the author notes that Augustine could justify such force, as he did in Serm. 19, 6 (419), when he states, "Everywhere God seeks to fill our hearts with terror so that He need condemn no man." See also, Ep. 28, 8 (398). Similarly, in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, II, III, 9, Augustine stresses the use of fear as an instrument of love and reconciliation:

"... Entertaining such impious views as these, of what use is it that you fearlessly face what is enacted for you [referring to the Edicts of the Emperor Honorius] in order to induce salutary fear and to treat you as a human being, and not as that poor animal of yours which is surrounded with the coloured feathers to be driven into the hunting toils? Need was that you should hold the truth, and, on account of your zeal for it, have no fear; but, as things are, you evade fear in such wise that, if you feared, you would rather run away from the net of the malignant one than run into it. The reason why your catholic mother alarms you is, because she fears for both you and others from you; and if by the help of her sons who possess any authority in the State she acts with a view to make you afraid, she does so, not from cruelty, but from love. You, however, are a very brave man; and you deem it the coward's part to be afraid of men. Well then, fear God, and do not try with such obstinacy to subvert the ancient foundations of the catholic faith. Although I could ever wish that that spirited temper of yours would entertain some little fear of human authority, at least in the present case, I could wish, I say, that it would rather tremble through cowardice than perish through audacity."

Markus also notes that, as he grows older and more familiar with Pauline notions of grace and predestination, Augustine considers choice compatible with constraint and fear, noting that God chastises in both the New and Old Testaments to remedy evil. Compulsion and discipline break the bonds of habit and strengthen faith and understanding through the use of divine authority and reason. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 14, at 142-44.

²⁰ In *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 69, 154, Augustine notes that the spirit lusts against the flesh and the spirit against the flesh, citing Gal. 5:17 and Ep. 5:2, that no man hates his own flesh, adding:

"... But if no man ever yet hated his own flesh, and yet a man lusteth against his own flesh, here you have unity sought by war, that the body, being subject to correction, may be brought under submission. But what the spirit does against the flesh, waging war with it, not in hatred but in love, this those who are spiritual do against those who are carnal, that they may do towards them what they do towards themselves, because they love their neighbours as neighbours indeed. But the war which the spiritual wage is that correction which is in love: their sword is the word of God. . . . See then that we act not without the sword, but with the word. . . ."

²¹ Ep. 89, 6 (406). See also, *Tr. 10 in Ioh.*, 2, 5, 6, and 12-21. Markus, in *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 14, at 140-141, points out that coercion is a fact of life in late classical Roman North Africa, and Augustine had no choice in determining whether coercion would occur in a repressive regime with which he was connected. He could, however, influence its direction.

²² Ep. 93, 4 (408); Ep. 153, 3 (414). The latter is a response to Macedonius, Vicar of Africa, and written in 414. In it, Augustine strongly stresses the constant need for forgiveness. After all, it is Augustine who advises, in effect, that one love well, and then do what he or she wishes. (1 Ep. John, vii, 8). See also, Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, at 128, regarding the unavailability of salvation outside the Church, which was a great motive for Augustine to seek reconciliation. See also, Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies*, *supra*, at 26.

In Ep. 93 (408), Augustine continues the analogy of therapy thus:

"... He who binds the man who is in a frenzy, and he who stirs up the man who is in a lethargy, are alike vexatious to both, and are in both cases alike prompted by love for the patient. Who can love us more than God does? And yet He not only gives us sweet instruction, but also quickens us by salutary fear, and this unceasingly. . . ."

In part 3 of that same letter, Augustine deals indirectly with those Donatists who are inclined to commit suicide than be instructed in the Church, urging that the treatment of heretics and schismatics not be given up, even if the malady of some is incurable. Similarly in Ep. 185, 33 (417), he uses the analogy of viewing a house about to fall down with two persons in it not desiring rescue. The Church is under a duty to rescue both, but if one dies in the rescue, that person commits suicide.

²³ See generally, Ep. 153 (414), the lengthy, but thoughtful, response to Macedonius's query as to whether intercession is efficacious. He makes this point again to Macedonius in Ep. 155, 8 (419). In *Enn. in Ps. 65*, 4, Augustine urges his congregation not to revile those outside, but to pray that they might return to the unity of the Church. In Ep. 173 (416), he explains to the priest Donatus the nature of his episcopal role:

"But you think that this should not have happened to you because you believe that no one should be forced to do good. See what the Apostle said: 'If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work,' yet how many are forced against their will to undertake the episcopacy; they are dragged in, they are imprisoned, they are kept under guard; they suffer all this unwillingly until there arises in them a will to undertake this good work. With much greater reason should you be dragged away from the baneful error in which you are your own enemies, and led to the knowledge and embrace of truth, not only that you may receive honour in safety but that you may not come to an evil end. . . ."

See also, Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, at 261-262. The author adds that his correspondence shows Augustine could make life difficult for officials by appealing to their consciences.

²⁴ Ep. 153, 13 (414).

²⁵ Ep. 93, 8 (408). In *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 80, 176, he responds to the charges that the Donatists are being persecuted, stating:

" . . . Seek therefore the reason or the measure of the persecution, and do not display your gross ignorance by finding fault in general terms with those who persecute the unrighteous. . . ."

²⁶ See, Ep. 93, 1, and 8 (408); Ep. 185, 9, and 12 (417); *Tr. 88 in Ioh.*, 15:20-21, 3; and *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 85, 186.

²⁷ Ep. 87, 8 (405). See also, Ep. 93, 3, and 18 (408); and 173, 10 (416). In *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 92, 203, Augustine responds to the Donatist rhetoric of "What have we to do with the kings of this world?" He notes the assistance that sect received from former Roman Emperors and the role of Old Testament kings, such as Darius and Nebuchadnezzar, in the unfolding of the plan of salvation. On the other hand, reflecting his political realism, Augustine is aware of the temptations of having the civil authorities serve the Church, which he terms "a more perilous and a sorer temptation" in *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis*, XV, 35.

²⁸ Ep. 185, 19 (417). See also, Sermon, 13, 4, 6, and 9 (418). In the last-cited part of the sermon, Augustine discusses the role of judging as an inward disposition:

" . . . Many are corrected by love, many by fear, but what they arrive at through fear and trembling is love. *Be instructed, you who judge the earth.* Love—and then judge. There is no question of advocating harmlessness at the expense of discipline. . . ."

²⁹ Sermon, 112, 8 (411). In Ep. 173, 10 (416), he discusses the point of the humility involved in the compulsion:

" . . . He showed this quite clearly in the parable of the wedding feast, in which, after the invited guests had been notified and had refused to come, the servant was told: '*Go out into the streets and lanes of the city and bring in hither the poor and the feeble and the blind and the lame.*' And the servant said to his lord: 'It is done as thou has commanded and yet there is room.' And the lord said to the servant: '*Go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in that my house may be filled.*' Notice how of the first to come it says: '*Bring them in*'—it does not say 'compel'—thus indicating the beginnings of the Church while it was still growing to the point where it might have the strength to compel. Accordingly, since it was fitting that when the Church had been strengthened with His strength and greatness, men should be compelled to come in to the feast, the words were afterward added: 'It is done as thou has commanded and yet there is room,' and he said: "*Go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in.*" Therefore, if you had been walking peacefully outside this banquet of the unity of the holy Church, we should have found you as if in the highways, but now, because of the many evil cruelties which you have perpetrated against our people, we find you, as it were, in the hedges, as if you were full of sharp thorns, and we compel you to come in. He who is compelled is forced to go where he does not wish to go, but when he has entered he shares willingly in the banquet. Therefore, you must restrain that wicked and rebellious mind of yours so that, in the true Church of Christ, you may find the life-giving banquet."

See also, Eps. 93, 5, and 208, 7 (date uncertain). In *De Correctione Donatistarum*, at 24 (417), Augustine compares the highways and hedges to heresies and schisms.

³⁰ Ep. 87, 7 (405). See also, Ep. 97, 3 (408); and *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*, I, 10, 16, and I, 12, 19, all cited by Frend, *The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa*, *supra* note 1, at 325.

³¹ Ep. 93, 5 (408) (referring to Gal. 4: 29).

³² Ep. 185, 19 (417).

³³ *Ibid.*, at 32. Absalom represents the rebel heretics to which the Church wishes to be reconciled.

³⁴ *Tr. 11 in Ioh.*, 2:23-25; and 3:1-5, 13. See also, Eps. 93, 6 (408); and 185, 9 and 12 (417).

³⁵ See, Dan. 6:24; Eps. 88, 5 (406); and 185, 4 (417).

³⁶ See also, *Tr. 11 in Ioh.*, 2:23-25; and 3:1-5, 13; and Ep. 93, 9 (408); discussed at p. V-6 of the text, *infra*, and *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 92, 203.

³⁷ Eps. 87, 8 (405); and 185, 28 (417).

³⁸ Ep. 185, 28 (417); *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 58, 132.

³⁹ Ep. 185, 28 (417).

⁴⁰ In Ep. 173, 3 (416), to Donatus, Augustine responds to the notion that Donatus has free will and should thus not be compelled:

"... If the evil will is always to be left to its own freedom, why was Paul not allowed the use of his altogether perverted will to persecute the Church? Why was he thrown prostrate in order to be blinded, and blinded in order to be transformed, and transformed in order to become an apostle, and made an apostle in order to endure for the truth the same sufferings he had inflicted while in error? ..."

See also, Ep. 185, 21 (417).

⁴¹ Ep. 93, 3 (408).

⁴² See, Ep. 153, 9 (414), in which Augustine states Jesus moves us from revenge to pardon. Although the judge must enforce the law, the implication is that this must be done with love. In *Serm. 13*, 4-5 (418), Augustine does not question the law against adultery, but inquires as to who will execute the same.

⁴³ Ep. 93, 2 (408). In *De Correctione Donatistarum*, at 4 (417), he likens their treatment to that of the physician and the loving father viewing his undisciplined son:

"... [T]he former because of his restraint, the latter because of the chastisement which he inflicts: yet both are action in love. But if they were to neglect their charge, and allow them to perish, this mistaken kindness would more truly be accounted cruelty. For if the horse and mule, which have no understanding, resist with all the force of bites and kicks the efforts of the men who treat their wounds in order to cure them: and yet the men, though they are often exposed to danger from their teeth and heels, and sometimes meet with actual hurt, nevertheless do not desert them till they restore them to health through the pain and annoyance which the healing process gives.—How much more should man refuse to desert his fellow-man, or brother to desert his brother, lest he should perish everlastingly, being himself now able to comprehend the vastness of the boon accorded to himself in his reformation, at the very time that he complained of suffering persecution?"

See also, *Serm. 360C*, 5 (406), in which the drive to unity is compared to forcible feeding of the sick.

⁴⁴ Ep. 185, 23 (417). See also, Eps. 93, 19 (408); and 173, 23 (416); and *Serm. 138*, 2 (411-412).

⁴⁵ Eps. 89, 7 (406); and 153, 10 (414).

⁴⁶ Ep. 100, 1 and 2 (409).

⁴⁷ Ep. 133, 2. See also, Eps. 134, 3 (412); 153, *passim* (414); and 185, 19 (417); *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 58, 132. The charity expected of a judge, even while enforcing the law is illustrated by this excerpt from *Tr. 88 in Ioh.*, 15:20-21, 4, discussed at p. V-12 of the text, *infra*.

⁴⁸ *Serm. 13*, 1-4 and 6-9 (418). Augustine asks the judge to sit in judgement upon himself and repent of his or her sins, before judging one's neighbour. At part 8 of the sermon, there is a plea not to impose the death penalty, so that reform can be possible. Nevertheless, he still insists that discipline is a necessary part of the craft of judging.

⁴⁹ Ep. 88, 9 (406). See also, Eps. 44, V, 10-11 (398); 89, 6 (406); and 153, 19 (414).

⁵⁰ *Serm. 138*, 2 (411-412). See also, Ep. 173, 4 to 6 (416).

⁵¹ Ep. 185, 14 (417). In Ep. 144, 3, Augustine professes to rejoice at the town of Circa recovering from its obduracy. If there were feigned conversions, God would judge those persons. In any event, the opportunity to convert is present.

⁵² Indeed, Augustine notes that Christ used the rod and was aggressive when he cleansed the temple. *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 81, 178.

⁵³ Markus suggests Augustine's views on religious conversion are not inconsistent with his views on the need to embrace Christ with the will. Indeed, he suggests that, in his later years, Augustine's views on grace and predestination reinforce his endorsement of the use of compulsion. He points out that Augustine had previously endorsed measures against the remaining pagans (although these did not include forcible conversion, which he rejected in such cases), that he disliked feigned conversions and, most importantly, because it succeeded, it was an excellent pastoral strategy directed towards unity with fellow Christians. That strategy involved a graduated series of corrections, beginning with verbal admonitions and continuing through threats and their realisation in actions. And while individuation was preferable, the burdens of his office and the masses of Donatists justified a more general approach. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 14, at 134-142.

See also, Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, at 95-97, and especially note 83 therein. This author concludes at 96:

"Yet Augustine did not live in the eighteenth century. He did not smile when the truth was at stake. Also, he did not believe that mankind could be educated without punishments, and so he came to take a more positive view of force in the service of morality. The forcible reunion proved to be a success when it was completed. To everybody's surprise it turned out that there were thousands of Donatists who were Donatists merely from habit and who felt it as a relief when they no longer had to maintain the rigid and unyielding attitudes of their sect. . . . And so Augustine began to meditate on the *compelle intrare* of the Gospel. How could one deal with this ossified attitude except by seizing hold of the people? We must not worry, he had preached in the past, if we are inconvenient. Ice must not be melted, it must be broken, and boys often cry when they have to go to school. People will say, 'The Apostles forced nobody.' That was true: they were fishermen. They threw their nets out upon the high seas and were content with what they caught. But after he sent the fishermen God sent the hunters, as the prophet Jeremiah prophesied, and 'these hunters are ourselves, our duty being to beat up souls from the undergrowth of those great heretical mountains named Arius and Photinus and Donatus.'" [Footnotes omitted.]

⁵⁴ Ep. 134, 3 (412).

⁵⁵ Ep. 87, 9 (405).

⁵⁶ Ep. 185, 8 (417). See also, *Ibid.*, at 10; Ep. 89, 7 (406); and *Tr. 11 in Ioh.*, 2:23-25 and 3:1-5, at 13. In Ep. 93, 8 (408), Augustine distinguishes persecutions by cause:

". . . In some cases, therefore, both he that suffers persecution is in the wrong, and he that inflicts it is in the right. But the truth is, that always both the bad have persecuted the good, and the good have persecuted the bad: the former doing harm by their unrighteousness, the latter seeking to do good by the administration of discipline: the former with cruelty, the latter with moderation; the former impelled by lust, the latter under the constraint of love. For he whose aim is to kill is not careful how he wounds, but his whose aim is to cure is cautious with his lancet; for the one seeks to destroy what is sound, the other that which is decaying. The wicked put prophets to death; prophets also put the wicked to death. The Jews scourged Christ: Christ also scourged the Jews. The apostles were given up by men to the civil powers; the apostles themselves gave men up to the power of Satan. In all these cases, what is important to attend to but this: who were on the side of truth, and who on the side of iniquity; who acted from a desire to injure and who from a desire to correct what was amiss."

⁵⁷ Ep. 185, 24 (417). See also, *Tr. 11 in Ioh.*, 2:23-25, and 3:1-5, 14, in which Augustine observes:

"But they wonder that Christian powers are roused against detestable scatterers of the Church. Should they not be moved, then? How otherwise should they give an account of their rule to God? Observe, beloved, what I say, that it concerns Christian kings of this world to wish their mother the Church, of which they have been spiritually born, to have peace in their times. [He then deals with Dan. 3, over the placing of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego in the furnace, their survival and the decree of King Nebuchadnezzar that there should be no blasphemy against their God.] See how an alien king acts with raging indignation that the God of Israel might not be blasphemed, because He was able to deliver the three children from the fire: and yet they would not have Christian kings to act with severity when Christ is contemptuously rejected, by whom not three children, but the whole world, with these very kings, is delivered from the fire of hell! . . . [H]ow should not these kings be moved, who observe, not three children delivered from the flame, but their very selves delivered from hell, when they see Christ, by whom they have been delivered, contemptuously spurned in Christians, when they hear it said to a Christian, 'Say that thou are not a Christian'? Men are willing to do such deeds, but they do not wish to suffer, at all events, such punishments."

This idea of a different "season" prompting a different response to the world in the use of compulsion allows Augustine to adjust his responses to religious and, ultimately, social and political, problems through his creative use of Scripture to fit the needs of the day. For it allows him to cut the cords that bind him to tradition, as well as to the Roman political tradition.

⁵⁸ Christopher Kirwin, *Augustine* (London, 1989), at 218, citing Ep. 138, 13.

⁵⁹ In Ep. 153, 19 (414), he states:

" . . . But, if perversity and impiety are so great that neither punishment nor pardon can avail to correct them, it is still true that, whether severity or leniency is shown, the obligation of charity is fulfilled by the good through their intention and upright conscience which God beholds."

Similarly, in *Contra Litteras Petiliani*, II, 95, 217, he adds:

"We neither drag you to us against your will, nor do we kill our foes; but whatever we do in our dealings with you, though we may do it contrary to your inclination, yet we do it from our love to you, that you may voluntarily correct yourselves, and live an amended life. For no one lives against his will; and yet a boy, in order to learn this lesson of his own free will, is beaten contrary to his inclination, and that often by the very man that is most dear to him. And this, indeed, is what the kings would desire to say to you if they were to strike you, for to this end their power has been ordained of God. But you cry out even when they are not striking you."

⁶⁰ In Ep. 153, 3 (414), Augustine states:

" . . . [W]e pity the man, while detesting the deed or crime, and the more the vice displeases us, the less do we want the culprit to die unrepentant. It is easy and simple to hate evil men because they are evil, but uncommon and dutiful to love them because they are men; thus, in one and the same person you disapprove the guilt and approve the nature, and you thereby hate the guilt with a more just reason because by it the nature which you love is defiled. Therefore, he who makes war on the crime in order to free the man is not involved in a share of the wrongdoing, but, rather, of human feeling. Moreover, there is no other place but this life for correcting morals; whatever anyone has sought out for himself in this life, the same will he have after it. Consequently, we are forced by our love for humankind to intercede for the guilty lest they end this life by punishment, only to find that punishment does not end with this life."

⁶¹ Eps. 93, 2 and 5 (408); and 185, 12 (417).

⁶² *Expositio 84 Propositionum Epistolae ad Romanos*, 72.

⁶³ In Ep. 53, 1, Augustine quotes Gal. 1:8. to the effect that if an angel were to command something inconsistent with Scripture, he is anathema. At 6, he urges that historical documents in the Donatist controversy be less relied upon than Scripture.

⁶⁴ Ep. 185, 21-22 (417). See also, Eps. 93, 3 (408); and 100, 2 (409).

⁶⁵ Ep. 89, 6 (406).

⁶⁶ Ep. 173, 2 (416). See also, Ep. 93, 5 (408).

⁶⁷ Eps. 93, 17 (408); and 144, 3 (412). Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, at 125-129, states that it was Augustine, more than any other source, including the Edict of Unity, who conquers the Donatists. He believes the schism caused people of faith to come forward and defend that faith and heal the broken fabric of the Body of Christ. In *De Correctione Donatistarum*, 30 (417), Augustine notes the probable presence of a large number of persons who have not left Donatism, but states:

" . . . But those who feigned conformity, becoming by degrees accustomed to our communion, and hearing the preaching of the truth, especially after the conference and disputation which took place between us and their bishops at Carthage, were to a great extent brought to a right belief. . . ."

⁶⁸ In Serm. 13, 8 (418), Augustine argues:

" . . . Do not have a person put to death, and you will have someone who can be reformed. As a man having this kind of love for men in your heart, be a judge of the earth. Love terrifying them if you like, but still go on loving. If you must be high and mighty, be high and mighty against the sin, not against the person. Be savage with what you dislike in yourself, not with one who has been made in the same way as you. You come from the same workshop, from the hands of the same craftsman; the same clay provided your raw material. Why destroy, by not loving, the one on whom you sit in judgement? Because what you are destroying is justice, by not loving the one on whom you sit in judgement. 'But penalties must be applied.' I don't deny it, I don't forbid it; only let it be done in a spirit of love, a spirit of caring, a spirit of reforming."

It must be stressed once more that Augustine does not find discipline inapplicable, but advises it be used with love and for reformation. *Ibid.*, at 9. See also, Ep. 133, 2 (412); and 153, 3 to 5, and 16 (414). Augustine also is aware that his intercession might, or might not, result in reformation, and particularly when there is doubt about the case. However, he finds giving the benefit of the doubt to be part of his vocation. Consider this passage from Ep. 153 (414) on restitution:

"... All or almost all of us men love to call or consider our suspicions knowledge, since we are influenced by the credible evidence of circumstances; yet some credible things are false, just as some incredible ones are true. . . . It is possible that you might know something I do not know and that I might think I ought to intercede for someone in a case where I could be deceived, but you could not, because I believed that a man did not possess what you knew that he did possess. Thus it could be that we might not have the same idea of a man's guilt, but neither of us would approve a failure to make restitution. As men we have different ideas about a man, but in the concept of justice we are one. . . . To sum up, then, neither to you, nor to men such as we rejoice to find you—if any others can be found—nor to those who 'with great eagerness pursue interests foreign to them, utterly unprofitable and even extremely dangerous and deadly,' nor to my own heart would I dare to say, as I would not think or decide that intercession should be made for anyone to enable him to possess unpunished what he has wrongfully taken, but I hold rather that he should restore what he has taken, when his offence has been pardoned, always supposing that he has either what he took or some other means of making restitution."

However, the point of the use of force was to cause the schismatics to reconsider their actions and to reform. Ep. 93, 16 (408); and *Contra Gaudentium*, 2, 12, 13.

⁶⁹ Ep. 93, 3, 4, and 6 (408). The emphasis remains on the inward disposition of charity. Serm. 138, 2 (411-412). In *De Correctione Donatistarum*, 8 (417), Augustine terms this work as recalling those who are on the path of destruction through the sermons of Catholic preachers or the edicts of Catholic princes. It matters little whether their fear is engendered by the warnings of God or the Emperor's commands. In part 12 of this same treatise, Augustine discusses the judicious use of the civil power:

"... [S]he persecutes her enemies and arrests them, until they become weary in their vain opinions, so that they should make advance in the truth; but they; returning evil for good, because we take measures for their good, to secure their eternal salvation, endeavour even to strip us of our temporal safety, being so in love with murder, that they commit it on their own persons, when they cannot find victims in any others. For in proportion as the Christian charity of the Church endeavours to deliver them from that destruction, so that none of them should die, so their madness endeavours either to slay us, that they may feed the lust of their own cruelty, or even to kill themselves, that they may not seem to have lost the power of putting men to death."

⁷⁰ "Let us be done, then, with vain and bad excuses; let us come to the dinner at which we can inwardly take our fill. Let us not be prevented by arrogance or pride; let no unlawful curiosity either lift us high with excitement or cast us down in terror, and in either case turn us away from God; let no sensual voluptuousness divert us from heartfelt willingness. Let us come, let us take our fill."

Serm. 112, 8 (411).

⁷¹ *Tr. 88 in Ioh.*, 15:20-21, 4.

⁷² See, Ep. 23, 7 (392), discussed in note 6, *supra*.

⁷³ Eps. 173, 1 and 5 (416); and 185, 14 (417).

⁷⁴ Ep. 88, 8 (406). On the other hand, he argued that forgiveness of greater sins was all the more meritorious. In Ep. 153, 13 (414), he states:

"For this reason, those whom the Lord Himself calls good because they receive a share of divine grace He also calls evil because they have the defects of human weakness, until the whole of which we are composed is healed of all evil tendency and crosses over into that life where there will be no more sin forever. . . ."

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Augustine's letter to Marcellinus in 412, Ep. 139, 2, in which he asks that the death penalty not be used because it would cheapen the work of the earlier Christian martyrs.

⁷⁶ In Serm. 138, 2 (411-412), Augustine compares the Donatists to the Good Shepherd:

"Because you see, even among the heretics, who have endured a certain amount of harassment because of their iniquities and errors, there are those who boast of being martyrs, in order to steal all the more easily under this cloak of respectability; because in fact they are wolves. But if you really want to know in what class to count them, listen to that good shepherd the apostle Paul, saying that not all who had over their bodies to the flames in martyrdom are to be considered as having shed their blood for the sheep, but rather against the sheep."

See also, Eps. 88, 8 and 9 (406); and 88, 9 (406); and *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 84, 184.

⁷⁷ Ep. 93, 1 (408). See also, *Ibid.*, at 16 and 18; and Ep. 185, 4 and 13 (417).

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Eps. 100, 1 and 2 (409); 133, 1-3 (412); 153, 17 and 19 (414); and Serm. 13, 8 (418). In Ep. 139, 2 (412), to his friend Marcellinus, he put the case for clemency this way:

"As to the punishment of these men, I beseech you to make it something less severe than the sentence of death, although they have, by their own confession, been guilty of such grievous crimes. I ask this out of a regard both for our own consciences and for the testimony thereby given to Catholic clemency. For this is the special advantage secured to us by their confession, that the Catholic Church has found an opportunity of maintaining and exhibiting forbearance towards her most violent enemies; since in such a case where such cruelty was practised, all men to proceed from great leniency. . . ." [He adds his leniency will be even more conspicuous, given the circumstances.]

⁷⁹ Ep. 100, 2 (409).

⁸⁰ The theme of leniency appears, along with the recognition of the need for discipline, throughout Augustine's writings on correction of the Donatists. See, Eps. 101, 1 and 2 (409); 133, 2 and 3 (412); 134, 2-4 (412); 139, 2 (412); and 153, *passim* (414). Augustine praises the use of the rod, in place of instruments of torture, in a letter to Marcellinus in 412. Ep. 133, 2. The rod is used as a symbol of correction, rather than punishment. Eps. 173, 3 (416); 185, 21 (417); Sermon. 13, 9 (418); *Contra Litteras Petilianus*, II, 93, 225.

⁸¹ Frend, *The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa*, *supra* note 1, at 242-43, saw Augustine's efforts as short term for, while he had like-minded people in key bishoprics, the independent Cyprian tradition in Africa fell to the might of Rome. Yet the Church in Africa was weakened, first with the Vandal invasion of 426-431 and then with the Islamic surge of the eighth century.

⁸² *De Correctione Donatistarum*, 2 (417).

⁸³ In *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 6, Augustine speaks to the dark side of political life, indicating that the Christian will not shirk his or her duty to administer and judge, notwithstanding his or her own sinfulness and uncertainty. Kirvin, *supra* note 59, at 219. See also, Ep. 153, 22 (414).

⁸⁴ Ep. 89, 7 (406); *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, I, XIV, 28; and III, VI, 16.

⁸⁵ The author is indebted to Markus for this notion of individual (or "atomistic") responsibility of political officers in lieu of that of a depersonalised entity, such as the state, and notes that the much-reviled "mirror of princes" theory has some basis in Augustinian thought. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, *supra* note 14, at 148-153. He concludes at 151 that the blend of the two cities in time is the ultimate reality of history and politics:

" . . . This invisibility of the presence of eschatological categories of historical realities is the foundation of Augustine's theory of the *saeculum*. In order to insist on the ultimate eschatological ambivalence of all empirical human groupings and institutions Augustine had to by-pass their collective, institutional character, and to break them down (though with the rider that this could never in fact be carried out with assignable named individuals) into terms of individuals with their personal loyalties to different, and very mixed, ultimate values. This is why his habit of reducing political institutions into their component personal atoms is linked with some of his most fundamental concerns, at a fundamental level."

⁸⁶ Ep. 86, (405). Indeed, in a letter to Sixtus (who became a pope after Augustine's death) in 418, Augustine expresses concern over the spread of Pelagianism and the use of the same tools as those used against the Donatists:

" . . . [T]here remains upon you the yet greater duty of seeing not only that those be punished with wholesome severity who dare to prate more openly their declaration of that error, most dangerously hostile to the Christian name, but also that with pastoral vigilance, on behalf of the weaker and simpler sheep of the Lord, most strenuous precautions be used against those who more covertly, indeed, and timidly, but perseveringly, and in whispers, as it were, teach this error, 'creeping into houses,' as the apostle says, and doing with practised impiety all those other things which are mentioned immediately afterwards in that passage [i.e., 2 Tim. 3:6]. Nor ought those to be overlooked who under the restraint of fear hide their sentiments under the most profound silence, yet have not ceased to cherish the same perverse opinions as before. For some of their party might be known to you before that pestilence was denounced by the most explicit condemnation of the apostolic see, whom you perceive to have now become suddenly silent; nor can it be ascertained whether they have been really cured of it, otherwise than through their not only forbearing from the utterance of these false dogmas, but also defending the truths which are opposed to their former errors with the same zeal as they used to show on the other side. These are, however, to be more gently dealt with; for what need is there for causing further terror to those whom their silence itself proves to be sufficiently terrified already? At the same time, though they should not be frightened, they should be taught; and in my opinion they may more easily, while their fear of severity assists the teacher of the truth, be so taught that by the Lord's help, after they have learned to understand and love His grace, they may speak out as antagonists of the error which meanwhile they dare not confess."

Ep. 191, 2. The Eastern and Western emperors apparently followed this advice. Ep. 201, 1 (416).

⁸⁷ Ep. 153 (414).

⁸⁸ Ep. 185, 19 (417), and Ep. 87, 8, *supra* note 27, and accompanying text. *See also, Ibid.*, at 24; *Tr. 11 in Ioh.*, 2:23-25 and 3:1-5, 14; Ep. 155, 10. In *Contra Litteras Petiliani*, II, 92, 203, he adds that kings nowadays "must surely go on to consider what decrees they ought to make in their kingdoms, that the same God who has granted remission of sins, and given freedom to the whole earth, should not be treated with scorn in their realm." *See also, Ibid.*, at II, 210; *Contra Cresconium*, III, 56; and *De Civitate Dei*, V, 24, all noted by Kirwin, *supra* note 59, at 217.

⁸⁹ Ep. 93, 13 (408).

⁹⁰ Ep. 185, 14 (417).

⁹¹ *Contra Litteras Petiliani*, II, 84, 184.

⁹² Van der Meer, *supra* note 1, at 127.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the foregoing chapters, we have traced Augustine's views on human nature, social relationships and political obligation. In addition, we discussed Augustine's intellectual development and his changed positions on the use of civil force to enforce religious orthodoxy. These discussions were undertaken from a standpoint of observing Augustine's political views from the perspective of the spiritual man living in two different worlds simultaneously. While Augustine is not the first Christian writer to deal with the problem of dual obligations, he profoundly influenced western political thought by dealing with the consequences of Christianity holding social and political power.

In writing about holding power, Augustine bridges the gap between those previous Christian writers who were convinced the end of the world was near and that the authorities would always be the enemies of their religion. He read Tertullian, Lactantius, and Cyprian and, like them, honours the martyrs. But he lived at a very different time, as he was born more than 40 years after Christianity was officially tolerated in the Roman Empire and died a century and a quarter after the last persecutions. While he was still a young man, Christianity was made the official religion of the Roman Empire, and he witnessed mass conversions to the new religion. The emperors were deferential to Christianity and, indeed, required the assistance of the Church in the administration of that Empire.

At the same time, Rome was in decline, and the Western Roman Empire would end less than 50 years following Augustine's death. In less than 25 years before that death, barbarians had crossed the Rhine and were besieging Hippo while Augustine was on his deathbed. The level of involvement in the world that had been achieved by Christian clergy and laypersons had not been anticipated by any of the earlier Christian writers. However, in North Africa, there had

been such involvement undertaken from the time of Constantine, who unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the Donatist controversy. Augustine's historical and intellectual significance lies in his thoughtful discussion of the respective roles of Church and civil authority based upon his experience.

The transition from persecuted sect to official religion of the Empire required theoretical adjustments of the relationship of Church and the civil authorities. These adjustments are required to be consistent with the worldview of Christianity, as well as to deal with the realities of governance. Given the decline of the Western Roman Empire and its need for assistance in governing, these adjustments made from the previous worldview are radical ones indeed. The Church requires the peace given it by the civil power as well as it can to do her work. To some extent, the Church collaborates with the civil power, if only through the injunction to obey the powers that be.

Augustine meets those needs by stressing the requirements for love and obedience to authority, two central Christian themes for life in the secular world. However, he adds to this his own mark by considering the political implications of the Fall, along with the practical needs of daily governance. Unlike Eusebius, he does not attempt to write hagiographies of leaders. His political philosophy is derived, as we have shown, from his view of human nature. There is no manifest plan for history; rather, kingdoms and empires rise and fall according to the mysterious will of God. However, governance becomes part and parcel of Christian life. Augustine urges high officials not to leave their posts for contemplation. Rather, he urges them to exercise their offices *as Christians*. His emphasis on inward disposition allows Christians to be administrators, soldiers, and tax collectors. Moreover, he sees the civil authority as an instrument to prevent the spread of error and to excise error where it exists.

Much of the discussion of Augustine's political theory has been at the "macro" level—for example, his statement that kingdoms are nothing but great robberies without true justice. This view has its place in Augustinian thought, as a response to pagan charges over the decline of the Western Roman Empire following its adoption of Christianity. However, Augustine's work is normally at the pastoral level, and a much better view of his political philosophy is garnered in the way this dissertation has approached the matter, i.e., from the "bottom up." Thus, to begin with his concept of human nature, moving from thence to the social relationships that occupy the thoughts and energies of most ordinary people, and then moving to the nature of political obligation, is more consistent with the approach Augustine actually took than one that moves from theory to practice.

Augustine's concept of human nature governs his political theory. That concept changes over the course of his writings, particularly from those Neo-Platonist writings at Cassiciacum to his anti-Pelagian writings of the last 15 years of his life. There is no political philosophy in those early writings, though it is quite possible that the young Augustine would not be inimical to a Platonist view of the *polis* being helpful in leading a good life. It is experience, the review of Pauline works, and the insights of his own pastoral life that move Augustine away from a Neo-Platonic view.

Instead, it is Paul who becomes Augustine's social and political mentor. We show that Scripture, particularly the Pauline writings, is paramount in Augustine's own writings on matters of domestic and ecclesiastical affairs. We show that Augustine's views in these areas are unchanged. The straightforward injunctions regarding husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and slaves, are honoured and elaborated upon by Augustine. Further, he constructs theories of monastic living based on the apostolic community in Jerusalem that held things in

common and loved one another. He constructs a theory of ecclesiastical discipline that is also based on love and unity and is similarly derived from Scripture.

These Scripture-based social injunctions are the basis for similar political injunctions, again mostly derived from Pauline writings. These injunctions, however, cannot be divorced from their basis in St. Paul and his own views on human nature, which are, in turn, largely derived from St. Paul. Human energies are directed largely toward social ends before the political. It is not surprising, therefore, that Augustine's energies are far more often expended to matters of pastoral and ecclesiastical affairs than to political matters. It is far more relevant that he write about appropriate dress, or proposed marriages, or the latest heresy, than to deal with the fate of the Roman Empire.

It is a small step, indeed, from writing about the loss of egoism in submitting oneself to domestic authority to writing about submitting oneself to civil authority. Given the views of Paul and Augustine on corrupted human nature and the need for grace, it is a small step as well to require an inward disposition of love and obedience to authority, however constituted. Both the social relationships discussed, as well as political authority, are divinely established. Both form a defence against evil from the outside and, if corrupt themselves, provide a test for the righteous. The common point for both is that these social and political relationships are transitory results of the Fall, and a test for the righteous.

This common point appears to have its roots in Pauline notions of stability and indifference to the world. That stability enjoins the domestic relations discussed by Paul and endorsed by Augustine, as well as the elaboration upon those relationships by Augustine in the monastery and the Church. That stability also involves submission to political authority, within its limits, regardless of its pedigree. The indifference notion is related to that of stability. It does

not matter under which—husband, parent, or master—one must submit for purposes of salvation. Similarly, it does not matter under what regime a dying man must live.

These Pauline themes are all reflected in Augustine's work. Where he elaborates upon Paul is in dealing with the reins of power. He notes on several occasions that Paul uses authority for advancing his cause, i.e., in avoiding scourging and appealing to Rome as a citizen. Augustine takes a leaf from Paul in the use of authority, particularly in the use of the civil power to suppress heresy and schism. He does so, it appears, out of a motivation to maximise the chances of reform and salvation of those otherwise drawn to error. As bishop, Augustine is aware of his responsibilities to those lost sheep so as to correct their error. However, as we have shown, his support of the application of the law against heretics and schismatics to the Donatists followed the issuance of the Edict of Unity against that sect. That support is thus consistent with his support of the established order and his own understanding of the love and duty toward them. That duty included provision of the opportunity for salvation. It is God's grace that decides whether the schismatics take advantage of that opportunity. In this sense, Augustine himself lives in two different worlds—the secular world, in which schismatics are persecuted and forced into outward adherence; and the spiritual world, in which he attempts to secure salvation for his fellow man.

To Augustine, the duality of these two worlds has no alternative. Grace is the only divine irruption in a world in which man is drawn to his own ambitions, whether those ambitions be directed to carnal or intellectual ends. Without grace, man only has the power to choose the sins that result in his own damnation. While man must live and act in the world, his salvation depends upon receipt of that grace, and his efforts in this life must be turned toward that receipt.

The secular world would not, and indeed could not, improve. From one generation to the next, there is the circle of difficult relationships at the domestic level involving infidelity, brutality, neglect, and the like. At the political level, there is the incessant struggle to achieve and maintain power with its own catalogue of sins. Augustine's life is devoted to convincing others that there is no other alternative and no improvement in life, whether that be the denial of responsibility of the Manichaeans, the prideful purity of the Donatists, or the perfectionism of the Pelagians.

Augustine presents his hearers and readers with a stark view of the world, one inimical to the classic age as to our own. He strips that world of its pretensions to satisfaction, to intellect, to glory, and to progress. Only when there is no other alternative can the only choices apparent to him be considered. Those choices are either the dead ends of carnal or intellectual pleasure (including the vanities of classical culture) or eternal life. However, the choice of eternal life requires compliance with Scripture in this life. And, for social and political purposes, that compliance means conformity with those Scriptural passages relating to domestic and ecclesiastical matters discussed above and those passages relating to political conformity as well.

One must appreciate the change between the Greco-Roman model of religious and political obligation, which were joined together, and that of Augustine, which sets forth different sets of obligations. The change here for Augustine parallels that of his abandonment of classical literature in favour of Scripture as the source of his authority and the object of his attention. However, Augustine retained the notion of order from classical literature and substitutes sin and pride for fate. The effects of Original Sin perverted that order. In its human form, order could only hope to repress evil and allow the Church to do its work. Additionally, the use of faith, grace, and intuition in place of knowledge is, as we have shown, not inconsistent with several

classical strands of thought. Finally, the very personal nature of the journey through life is consistent with certain strands of Neo-Platonist thought. The strongest break from Neo-Platonism is from that of personal enlightenment to the need for social and mutual support, another result of Pauline theology. Without the Incarnation, there is no point in history or in politics. After the Incarnation, things fell into place in a plan known only to Providence, in which the day-to-day drama of salvation is played out.

Augustine illustrates the two different worlds of obligation throughout his writings. Indeed, almost everything he writes is directed toward the theme of order of choices or relationships. Authority in the world must be followed, unless it is contrary to Scripture. It is licit to engage in sexual relations, but only with a spouse. One may beat a slave, but must have love in the heart in doing so. One may not be rebaptised if one has lawfully received the sacrament previously. Earlier Christian writers had touched upon many of these themes. None, however, had done so as systematically as Augustine. None had done so in the changed political world of Christian Rome as had Augustine.

The bleak nature of the world only serves to contrast for Augustine the glorious nature of the world to come. It is better that there is "no silver bullet" or "man on a white horse" to relieve the pain of the existing world, which is so full of pride, sin, and ambition. Perseverance is required to make the journey through life, fulfilling obligations to the temporal and spiritual orders. The journey to one's destiny is a solitary one, as there is no organisation—even the Church—that can provide certainty. Neither the community nor the Church is able to better humanity as institutions. It is grace that does this work, operating within the chosen individual, operating on that person's inward disposition. And it is the inward disposition toward those dual obligations that characterises Augustine's thought.

